

**PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE COMMUNAL QUESTION  
IN INDIA**

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE COMMUNAL QUESTION IN INDIA", being submitted by Mr. ASHOK KUMAR BEHURIA, in the fulfilment of nine credits out of total requirement of twenty four credits is his original work and has been carried out under my supervision and guidance. This has not been submitted by any other University according to the best of my knowledge. I recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Putting theory into practice is tough task indeed. This was the feeling I developed while trying to apply various methodological moulds to my research proposal. The area I chose to investigate in this study with its stress on perceiving the perception of a country, escaped such formats. Intuition carried me along uncharted paths and I was about to lose the direction when my supervisor's experience with his guidance saved me. Were it not for his constant persuasion and encouragement, I would have been still searching for a way out of that wilderness. It was he who introduced me to research.

Collection of materials for this study was a difficult proposition for me in the beginning: I had to run from library to library in search of the necessary materials. But the cooperation and cordiality extended to me by the staff of different libraries; Sapru House I.D.S.A. and J.N.U; did not let me feel it difficult at all. I am thankful to all of them.

I owe my effort to all those who encouraged as well as discouraged me in the process of the making of

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Finally I would like to thank Mr. Devender Kumar for the pains he undertook to type out my manuscript which was illegible at times.

Now that I am at the end of it all, there is an inescapable feeling welling up inside me: the study could have been bettered.

Ashok K. Behuria  
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INTRODUCTION

The spurt of communal violence in the recent years in India has invited enough intellectual discourse on the topic. But the Pakistani reactions in the wake of all this (especially the issue of Babri Mosque, the Jammu-Kashmir) have been given less attention to. During the height of the communal disturbance, all through the eighties, there was a feel in the air of Pakistani reactions corrupting the communal environment further. Out of a limited effort to explain such Pakistani behaviour, this study emerged in its present form. The Pakistani behaviour had to be historically placed and analyzed, because Pakistan is yet to slough off the perceptions it had nourished within the fold of the Pakistan Movement (during the pre-independence period) which thrived on an intense communal divide. Pakistan's insistence on Islam with the Pan-Islamic impulses it emits, needed to be studied into. All this required a proper framework with distinct chapterization to cover different aspects of the whole study. The synchronization of the chapters needed special attention so as to maintain the flow, the coherence.

As such, our present study has been divided into four chapters; each with its defined scope within the mainbody of the discussion. Each chapter is being briefly introduced below. The first chapter seeks to define Communalism in the Indian context and trace the roots of communal antagonism in the Indian sub-continent. The chapter has been further sub-divided to study the evolution of both Muslim and Hindu fundamentalism over different time-periods. Such study was needed to reveal the historical foundations of Pakistani perception of communalism in the sub-continent.

The second chapter gives special attention to Islmaic nature of state in Pakistan. Right from its inception, Pakistan has clung fast to the ideology of Islam. The stress on religion has been discussed and explained. The Pan-Islamic feelings that go with such virulent Islmaic assertion has been discussed too.

The third chapter is some sort of a patch-work. It has been made descriptive to serve the reactions (with calculated dose of analysis to cement the reactions to keep the rhythm of the discussion) of Pakistani press as well as leaders and intellectuals to the communal



situations in India, over the years since the sixties. These reactions are taken from Pakistani newspapers, books by Pakistani scholars and speeches and writings of leaders. As such the study has been limited in scope. Access to more literature on the subject would have improved the quality of the study, one always feels.

The fourth chapter seeks to establish some sort of a typology of reactions to make their communal temper more explicit and discerning. The types of reactions are set on a table and studied at different levels; governmental and public. This is done to facilitate the effort at developing a model of Pakistani perception on it. The chapter ends with a review of reactions wherein the Pakistani perception is dispersedly discussed. The discussion draws to a close with some suggestions to remedy the biases affecting the Pakistani perceptions.

C H A P T E R - I

COMMUNALISM : HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND PERSISTENT  
PERCEPTIONS

CHAPTER -I  
 COMMUNALISM : HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND PERSISTENT  
PERCEPTIONS.-----

1.1 Communalism : Towards a Definition

Definition of any sort involves delimitation of scope in the bargain for precise understanding. Before encapsulating a phenomenon as complex as 'Communalism' in a brief theoretical format the problem needs to be addressed in its entirety. When an ideology springs up from a historical experience and explains it thereby, it becomes imperative to have a clear perception of the forces that constitute the core of such experience, before venturing a critique of the said ideology.

While analyzing 'Communalism' as an ideology one realizes how a change of context induces change, in the meaning of the whole concept. Literally the word "Communal" means, 'pertaining to a community'. An adherent of Paris Commune was called 'Communal' too. The word 'Communal' is derived from the word 'common' which means belonging equally to all, to the public, that is, common to all people living in a locality irrespective of their religion social status, caste, or creed. But in India the meaning of the word changed after Morley-Minto Reforms; so much so that the compilers of Oxford Concise dictionary have taken notice of the Indian meaning, and given it recognition. The dictionary describes the word communal thus: (India), of the antagonistic religions and social communities in a district; communal voting, elections,

disturbances etc'. This meaning is just the opposite of what the word 'Communal' really meant earlier. It was parochial in scope and interpretation. All this, no doubt, shows how change of meaning was induced through an experience which was coincidentally sour in the Indian context. The assertion of a community; which quite for a long time was the ruling community and held unswervingly the reigns of power (with deliberate exclusion and systematic suppression of the majority community it ruled over) under the instigative patronage of yet another ruling class, alien and partial; was bound to provoke hatred and active ill will of the majority community, especially when it was assured of the rewards of the democratic number game. When such assertion was termed communal, the term was all but acceptable. The subsequent development of history did little to wipe out such an impression. As such 'Communalism' has come to stay as a negative ideology, condemnable in its expression and parochial in scope.

However, it has been an important factor in Indian social and political life. Different scholars have attempted to describe its nature and to offer explanations for its existence.

#### Impression of Different Scholars :

Bipan Chandra would say that communalism is 'false consciousness'. He would argue that when an objective reality (which has to be perceived through the human mind) becomes too inchoate to

be grasped properly and yet, the human mind seeks to perceive it, false consciousness steps in to fill in the gap. It leads to inexact cognition. One resorts to false consciousness when one tries to grasp reality through inherited social ideas, institution and traditional identities which are the products of an older and different social reality. While discussing communalism Bipan Chandra argues that the colonial rule resulted in political economic and administrative unification of the country. The introduction of democracy, even though in a restricted form, gave rise to new political life, new loyalties, new uniting principles. Secular aspect of democratic behaviour remained misperceived, unlearnt. Plural identities frustrated the search for a common organizing principle. Anti-colonial sentiments could not be exploited for long. The lure of number game excited sectional interest. The prospect of British patronage with the pursuit of 'divide and rule' principle changed the whole political spectrum; what was simply an excitement became an irresistible urge for unity among people along sectoral lines, to grab power. Religion emerged as the strongest point to rally around. 'Of course religion as a social diversity or differentiation existed in real life but making this diversity the basis of political organization, mobilization and action, or as seeing it as the main inner contradiction in social, economic and

political life was certainly an aspect of false-consciousness'<sup>1</sup>. Bipan Chandra concludes that communalism was a by product of colonialism colonial character of economy, incapacity of capitalism to develop society led to economic stagnation which produced conditions favouring internal dissensions and antagonisms within society especially when different groups were making their bids for their just share.

It is a fact that the democratic system prevailing in India lacks the democratic temper to push it forward. the widespread poverty, illiteracy has made people stick so closely to their daily struggle for existence that they hardly bother to cultivate such temperament. As such the society becomes a fertile ground for the narrow sectional interests to grow. The seekers of power leave no stone unturned to convince people of the exploitation of the community by the neighbouring-communities. They attribute communal motivations to social deprivation. 'When what is infact a socio-economic disability or inadequacy is sought to be attributed to communal motivations and discriminations we have the different communities of the country set on a collision course'<sup>2</sup>. Romila Thapar also perceives that communalism is 'the political exploitation of a religious ideology'<sup>3</sup>.

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1. Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (Delhi, 1984), p.23.
  2. P.R. Rajgopal, Communal Violence (Delhi, 1987), p.37.
  3. Romila Thapar, 'Historical Realities', an article in Ramji Lal (ed.), Communal Problems in India; A Symposium (Delhi, 1988), pp.79-87.

Indeed, communities are identified by religion these days. History is exploited to establish how religion led to formation of communities. Communal Ideologues insist on total separation of religious communities. They would deny that social systems cut across religious identities. This is religion exploited politically. Once community is defined on religious grounds, the competitive structure of democracy compels the communities to assert themselves. Especially when a society is plural; multi-communal; where an economy of scarcity prevails, the inter-community rivalry takes violent terms. Prabha Dixit says: "Both in terms of aims and leadership all communal movements based on religion and culture are movements of political and social reaction and not of revolution and reconstruction"<sup>4</sup>. Communalism is a means in the struggle for power, she would say. No body can be as precise as Mr. L. B. Bhopatkar in the definition he offered (for Communalism):

Communalism is a peculiar frame of mind which seeks to aggrandize a community or aids in the aggrandizement of such community at the cost of other communities and to the detriment of national interest<sup>5</sup>.

One may say, communalism is a struggle for power, a parochial obsession with one's own community. But what makes the struggle so close, what makes the obsession so strong? Asghar Ali Engineer would say, 'Stresses of urban life, strains

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4. Prabha Dixit, Communalism : A Struggle for Power (Delhi, 1974) p. 3

5. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 198.

of competitive economic model, rivalry among anti-social groups, political contests, increasing degree of unemployment among the large sections of population, rivalry among intra-communal religious and secular leadership all play their role in exacerbating communal situation.<sup>6</sup>

In our craze for analyzing the economic roots of the problem we lose sight of the psychological factor. In the history of India we find that the shadow of communalism fell even where the economic compulsions excluded such a possibility. In some localities in South-India a symbiotic relationship had emerged on the economic front because the professions urged close cooperation between the two communities. But when members of a community are fed on hatred of another community they have been forced circumstantially to live with, they least bother about the immediate gain-loss calculations. Such communal feeling cuts across class barriers. Ratna Naidu would say that 'Communalism in affluence seems to generate as sharp and painful psychological antipathies as communalism in poverty. Marx's 'class', Weber's 'rationality', Durkheim's 'organic solidarity' each in their own capacity or together have failed to absorb the communal bias or communal loyalty'.<sup>7</sup> One cannot say that underdevelopment is the sole basis on which communalism thrives. Ethnic conflicts are ubiquitous thesedays and not monopoly of underdevelopment alone<sup>8</sup>.

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6. Asghar Ali Engineer, "An Appeal to Muslims; After the Meerut Riots," an article in Ramji Lal (ed), *op.cit.*, p.171.

7. Ratna Naidu, Communal Edge to Plural Societies (Delhi, 1980), p, 11.

8. *Ibid.*, p.24.



Pandav Nayak attempts a theorisation of the mood which breeds communalism: 'Communal manifestation is a logical product of cumulative transformation of individuals into captive subjects held together by a cultivated dogma with an implicit but necessary component of a mystique'<sup>9</sup>. He argues that such movements are results of a 'hegemonic crisis' and communalism as an ideology is an attempt to resolve the crisis one way or the other, either in favour of the dominant majority or dominated minority.

The above discussion is explanatory so far as the social, political, economic, cultural and psychological roots of the problems are concerned. But what has exacerbated communal tension most in Indian context, is demography, The demographic factor creates conditions for conflict, which are sparked off by economic compulsions, threatened loss of political leverage, and fear of losing cultural identity (absurd,irrational fear and hatred). The process of mobilization of the communal minority to avert these threats, generate the counter movements of majorities and the spiralling of communal tensions, Ratna Naidu would suggest. When the communal minority has social, political and cultural ambitions and to fulfill them launches the necessary campaign, his efforts are aborted by discontinuities in its demographic

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9. Pandav Nayak, "Communalism, Relationship between political and Economic : A Materialist Critique", an article in Asghar Ali Engineer and Moin Shakir (ed.), Communalism in India (Delhi 1985), p.29.

spread over territories/nations which nurture communal animosity against each other. The case of the Muslims is apt here.

Attempting a definition in the Indian context; Communalism has emerged as an antithesis to Indian nationalism. It has been a practice of the people of different communities right since the pre-independence times, to lend a religious tinge to the prevailing social economic and political disparities. When concepts of nation, community and religion shade off into one another such religious tinge acquires immense capability of mustering support in its favour by exploiting communal loyalty and communal solidarity of the members. This support is then forged into the electoral power-game and it seeks its share in the power-structure. Communalism is the ideology which blends the patience of the faithful, the anger of the wronged subject the revanche of the revolutionary and the enthusiasm of the citizen together, to form an explosive organizing principle.

For a better understanding of the concept of 'Communalism' one has to have a precise understanding of the Indian history keeping communal interactions as a framework for interpretation. In the following pages an attempt has been made on these lines.

## I

This study is limited in its purpose and does not pretend to go into intricate issues relating to the communal phenomenon. Here the focus is on inter-community relations and reactions, as these are influenced by historical legacies and persisting perceptions of each other.

### 1.2 Roots of Religious Antagonism

It all started in the 8th century A.D. with the Arab conquest of Sind. The Arabs, roused to energy and enthusiasm by the new creed of Islam effected this conquest which Stanely Lane Poole described as 'an episode in the history of India and Islam, a triumph without results'<sup>10</sup>. But the conquest led the door open for later Muslim invaders like Mahmud of Ghazni. Mahmud was neither a missionary for the propagation of religion nor an architect of any empire. His chief aim was to plunder and pillage. The acquisition of wealth of India was indeed his sole object. But his plundering of Somanath Temple; the most celebrated shrine of the Hindus of the age; sowed the seeds of a religious rivalry which has lasted over the years.

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10. Quoted in R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Roychoudhury and K. Dutta, *An Advanced History of India* (London, 1953), p.275.

As Khuswant Singh wrote in an article, a number of Muslim children born during the Partition were named 'Mahmud'. This shows how venerated Mahmud is in the eyes of the Muslims and how dreaded and despised he is in the eyes of the Hindus. Al Biruni's account of India during Mahmud's invasion shows a Muslim's impression on Hindus which has become the reference point of contemporary Pakistani scholars. In his book 'Kitabul Hind' he writes about the consuming arrogance of the Hindus and that:

The Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs.... The Hindus did not desire that a thing which has once been polluted should be purified and thus recovered.... There is very little disputing about theological topics among the Hindus; at the utmost they fight with words, but they will never stake their life or body or their property on religious controversy.

Al Biruni discussed at length the inegalitarian social structure prevailing at the time too. All this shows that even during the early years of interaction the two cultures never sought common grounds on which the two religions would have come together. Stress on divergent value systems with an unconquerable hatred between the advocates of the two religions, set the two communities on collision course. The

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11. Quoted in Muhammad Munnawar, Dimensions of Pakistan Movement (Lahore, 1987) p.108.

subsequent Muslim invasions and the religious fanaticism attached to them further divided the communities apart. The rule of the Ilbari Turks, the founder-rulers of Muslims Rule in India were never tolerant in their approach. They exhibited tremendous jealousy in forcing conversions of Hindus and Hindu places of worship. The concept of secularism never crossed their mind. The Hindus could never reconcile themselves to the fact that a small minority inspired by an infant religion could so effectively suppress them; though they were in majority and their religion was one of the oldest. The Muslim aggression also contributed a lot towards unifying the people of India at least on religious ground. The spirit of this religious unity across geographical barriers laid latent in the psyche of the Indians. This led to the growth of Hindu Identity, in due course of time. As Romila Thapar puts it: 'The term Hindu is an invention of the Arabs and refers to the inhabitants living in the land beyond the Indus'<sup>12</sup>. If one takes a little care as to trace the origin of the word 'Hindu', one discovers that it was the accentual corruption of 'Sindhu', the river which in ancient times was held to be the natural boundary of 'Bharat' or 'Aryavarta'. The word Hindu through further accentual corruption became 'Indus' which gave 'Bharat' its present name 'India'<sup>13</sup>. So Romila Thapar would argue that :

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12. Romila Thapar's article in Ramji Lal (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.79-87.

13. Pandit Shiv Kumar Kaul, Wake up Hindus (Lahore, 1937), p.82.

It is in origin a geographical term and a religious connotation was attached to it... The reason for the appears to be the fact that those who identified with various sects which went into the making of the Hindu, had no common term by which they identified themselves. This was so because the sense of a religious community cutting across caste, religion and language was absent. The nearest perhaps was the concept of 'Varnashrama Dharma' but this excluded the larger number and in any case emphasized the segregation and segmentation of caste society, rather than the all-inclusive sense of a community<sup>14</sup>.

The notion of 'Hindutva' started to crystallize under the auspices of ruthless anti Hindu administration of the Muslim Kings. Every attack on their belief; be it through imposing religious taxes, on through converting their temples; further toughened their resistance. They nurtured the feeling of hatred against the Muslims in the deep recesses of their beings. Ibn Batuta wrote in 14th century :

At each shed (at the road side) there is a well for drinking and an infidel who is in charge of it. If the traveller is an infidel he gives him water in vessels; if he is a Muslim he pours the water into his hands continuing to do so until he signs him to stop.... it is the custom of the infidel in the Malabar islands that the Muslim may enter into their houses or eat from their vessels; if they do so, they break the vessels or gives them to Muslims<sup>15</sup>.

Such was the intensity of hatred against the Muslims. During the 16th century the Sufi-Saints sought to bring the two communities together. But the loss of hearts was so complete that the attempt could not yield much fruit. Akbar's reign was the bright example of a tolerant administration. His approach, though secular, never attained perfection, because

14. Romila Thapar's article in Ramji Lal (ed.), *op.cit*, pp.79-87.

15. Ibn Batuta, Travels in Asia and Africa (London, 1934) p.231.

he sought to propagate a new creed 'Din-Ilahi' which provoked Muslim chauvinism. The end of his reign marked the end of a principle he so fervently championed. The later rulers could never prove their secular credentials. Humiliation of the conquered people through hurting their religious sentiments was in fact one way of a relentless assertion of the Mughal ruling power. This is way, though not enjoined by the Koran, cow-slaughter had become one of the most cherished rights of the Muslim community of India because it hurt the Hindus immensely.

The tensions during this period usually took religious forms precipitating in communal riots. Cow-slaughter was the chief cause for which the riots started. Just as Jijiyā and demolition of temples had become symbols of Muslim supremacy, the protection of the cow had emerged as the symbol of the rising Hindu power.

The advent of British rule changed the whole socio-political climate. The British took power from the Muslims. The British believed that deprivation of power would make the community disaffected seditious and conspiring in the hope of reviving their rule. The Mutiny of 1857 further strengthened their belief. Though the rebellion was not so much of a Muslim design and most of the soldiers who fought during the Mutiny were high caste Hindus, the British took it as plain Muslim incitement and ambition. So after the suppression of the

Sepoy Rebellion the Muslims came under a darker cloud and were themselves corroded and eaten into by their own impotent disaffection,<sup>16</sup>.

The Muslims deliberately kept themselves off from the British system of education and their model of administration they could not adjust themselves with the prospect of being reduced to a subject class from being ruling class. They shun British Education and British Institution of power. But the Hindus seized the opportunity well and established themselves in the power structure. The Muslim realization came late. After the end of the rebellion when the Muslim world was falling apart Sir Syed Ahmed Khan came to its rescue. It was he who set upon himself the task of reconciling the British and the Muslims to each other and the greater task of bringing round his coreligionists to reform themselves and adopt western education. He persuaded the Muslim community to go for western education which he knew would liberalize their outlook and thus release them from their hidebound beliefs and customs, loyalty to the British was his chief principle. Syed Ahmed's persuasions bore immense fruit. By the end of the nineteenth century Indian Muslims perfectly adjusted themselves psychologically to the British rule.

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16. Nirad C. Choudhury, The Continent of Circe (Bombay 1965), p.284.



Sir Syed Ahmed's efforts were timed well too. There was the coincident emergence of Indian nationalism during this period, which had a semblance of revival of Hinduism; there was a Hindu ideological underpinning characterized by the idiom, the nationalists sought to employ. Both the British and the Muslim regarded Indian nationalism as Hindu agitation. The Britishers were perfectly aware of the existing inter-community rivalry. Lord Dufferin wrote in 1888: 'The most patent characteristic of our Indian cosmos is its division into two mighty political communities as distant from each other as poles asunder'<sup>17</sup>. As the nationalist movement gained momentum the British looked to the Muslims as the natural counter-poise to the Hindus and they began' to treat the former with a partiality which almost amounted to pampering'<sup>18</sup>. The Muslims exhibited their loyalty by remaining unambiguously detached from the nationalist movement. Such was the condition when they entered the 20th century.

### 1.3 Muslim Communalism : Pre-Independence Period

In the last quarter of 19th century through vigorous propaganda of men like Syed Ahmed, the upper class Muslims were shaken from their apathy and decided in favour of western

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17. Quoted in Bipan Chandra, *op.cit.*, p.13

18. Nirad C. Choudhury, *op.cit.*, p.285.

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education and partial modernization. But they discovered to their dismay that all middle class callings; whether in trade, professions or government; were in the hands of Hindus. The resultant wide economic disparity between the educated upper classes of the two communities accentuated the already existing feelings of frustrations and resentment among the Muslims.

Dissatisfaction with the system was widely shared by the upper class elites of both the communities. To channelize it they needed an institutional forum. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 to act as a conduit the foundation of Indian National Congress showed the Muslims the way out; to break their political isolation and make effective reappearance on the national political scene.

The Muslims viewed Indian National Congress as predominantly a Hindu organization and tried to assert their separate identity. In order to emphasize their claim the Muslim Elite enunciated the doctrine of incompatibility of interests of the two communities. The very Muslim leaders who at one time saw the future of India in Hindu Muslim cooperation suddenly unearthed the fundamental and unbridgeable differences between the two communities. Some Muslim leaders lamented the loss of honour and prestige of the community in the socio-political hierarchy. Sir Ameer Ali wrote in 1882: 'The destruction of

the Mohammedan aristocracy has proved as injurious to the interest of the community as to those of state'<sup>19</sup>. The champions of the Muslim cause were chiefly in favour of redemption of the fate of the Muslim upper class. Even no less a man than Sir Syed Ahmed was against equal treatment to low class Muslims. In an appeal to the British government he wrote:

Will the members of the noble families in your country like it, that a person of lower class, or lower status, even if he has taken a B.A. or M.A. degree and possesses the necessary ability, should govern them and dispose of their wealth property and honour?<sup>20</sup>

Right from the beginning it was the Muslim Elites who sought to preserve the old order by securing for themselves the vanguard position through modernizing their outlook and overstressing the need for assertion of their community. In order to legitimize their position they needed to carry the confidence of the community on their leadership. But when majority of people were poor and illiterate it did not require much effort to invoke their awe and respect. They appealed to their religious sentiments, and referred to the golden days of the past, duly maligning the Hindu religion. The average masses

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19. K.K. Aziz (ed.), Ameer Ali : His Life and Work (Lahore, 1968), p.48.

20. Quoted in Prabha Dixit, *op.cit.*, p.53.

of the two communities drifted apart leaving the room open for leadership to manipulate. The interests of the leadership banked on this drift, which they would never try to bridge up. During the early decades of the 20th century the drift was so palpable that the Economist of 27th February, 1909 mentioned:

Whatever may be the political atom in India it is certainly not the individual of the Western democratic theory, but the community of some sort<sup>21</sup>.

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
On 1 October 1906 a deputation of prominent Muslims led by Agha Khan met the viceroy Minto at Simla and demanded definite constitutional safeguards to protect the exclusive interests of the Muslim Community. The most important of the safeguards sought was separate Muslim representation in all elected bodies; from Municipal Boards to Imperial legislative council. Minto readily agreed. Lady Minto wrote:

This evening I have received the following letter from an official: 'I must send your Excellency a line to say that a very big thing has happened today. A work of statesmanship which will affect India and Indian history for many a long year. It is nothing less than the pulling back of 62 million people from joining the ranks of seditious opposition<sup>22</sup>.

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21. Cited in Bipan Chandra, *op.cit.*, p.26.

22. Mary Minto, India: Minto and Morley (London, 1934) p.47.



The anonymous British official was very true. This marked the beginning of a history. With this was established the unholy alliance of minority communalism and alien imperialism against Indian nationalism, which endured till the end of British Rule in India and culminated in the Partition.

The British patronage made Muslims more ambitious day by day. Soon after the success of the Agha Khan led deputation the need for the creation of a formal political organization to press in Muslim demand on the model of Indian national Congress was felt. This led to the creation of the Muslim league. The signatories to the Simla deputation became its founder members. Its first president Sir Syed Ali Imam laid down the first principle of the League in following words : 'In our practical politics loyalty to the British Administration is loyalty to India.'<sup>23</sup>

It is necessary to understand the compulsions of the Muslims in forging out such an unholy alliance with the British. The more the nationalist movement gathered momentum the more insecure the Muslims felt about it. The prospect of Hindu

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23. Quoted in Prabha Dixit, *op.cit.*, p.302.

rule after departure of the British was too uncomfortable for them. However distant or impossible that might seem at that moment, the Muslims knew that independence for India was bound to come one day and in that event their future needed safeguards, they felt. Thus there was the need for the separate representation and the founding of an organization. The Indian Muslims hated the British with a hatred which was even more vitriolic than that of the Hindus, because it was they who had been deprived of an empire by the new conquerors. Yet when, they found themselves being wooed by the same conquerors as a counterpoise to Hindu Nationalists, 'They could not resist the inveiglement and struck the bargain, a very Faustian one.'<sup>24</sup> In respect of the Hindus on the other hand, being sure of the British support, the Muslims began to show an arrogance and an enmity which earned them the undying hatred of the Hindus: 'It can be said that in the epoch of the nationalist agitation the Muslims were not only provocative but also openly aggressive. It added a new edge to the old Hindu hatred of the Muslim.'<sup>25</sup>

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24. Nirad C. Choudhury, *op.cit.*, p.302.

25. *Ibid.* p. 303.

After striving the bargain with the British, the Muslims could not relax. The Muslims had enough political realism to perceive that without the British on the scene they would be left to the mercy of majority Hindus. So if they were to survive they needed to rely on their own strength. In their search for security they hit upon the idea of Islamic brotherhood. With the visit of the leader of the Muslim Risorgimento, Syed Jamal-ad-Din-al-Afghani, they started weaving dreams of Pan-Islamic support for their cause.

of the Indian Muslims could not go with their opportunistic flirtation with the British for immediate advantages and soon a conflict between the pragmatic Muslim policies and true Muslim loyalties made its appearance. The signals of danger latent in the Pan-Islamism for British Rule in India was conveyed first from the Czarist Russia. At the end of 1910 Czar Nicholas II and Stolypin spoke to Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, about the danger.<sup>26</sup> The British officials ignored these warnings. But with the Italian attack on Tripoli in 1911, the Indian Muslims gave vent to their spleen. Balkan war

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26. *Ibid.*, p.290.

made matters worse. These two wars exposed the artificial nature of the Anglo-Muslim liaison in India. The Turko-Italian war made the Muslims violently anti-British quite for some time. The motion of the Muslim League is worth noting here:

...retention of communal individuality should be their supreme and vital aim. This alone is the ideal worth striving for Nationalism, faith in some great political doctrines, even lofty aspirations to achieve the federation of the world are lesser loyalties... Turkey is almost as much or as little the Fatherland of Indian Mussalman as for the Turks themselves, for the sympathies of a Mussalman are co-extensive with his religion.'<sup>27</sup>

This violent Pan-Islamic sentiment forced them to strike an opportunistic bargain with Hindu nationalism and the Indian National Congress. Jinnah brought out a coalition of the Muslim League and the Congress at Lucknow at the end of 1916. The strong Pro-Greek policies of Lyod George and the treatment of Turkey by the Allies, made the Pact stronger. The Hindu nationalist movement and Muslim Caliphate Movement went together from 1919 to 1922. But the ultimate victory of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and the rejection of Caliphate by the Turks themselves put an end to the *raison d'etre* of the Hindu Muslim Cooperation. Immediately afterwards, India saw one of the worst Hindu-Muslim

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27. Quoted in Prabha Dixit, *op. cit.*, p.68.



conflicts ever seen; the notorious Kohat riots. Disillusionment with the Pan-Islamic solidarity and the recent communal violence led the Indian Muslims to revert to the old policy of siding with the British. The widespread communal riots in the early twenties drove a wedge into the Congress-League relationship. The communal riots forced Gandhi to admit that he was wanting as a physician prescribing a cure for this malady. The Muslim-League dissociated from the Congress and revived its anti-Hindu stance. In its three successive sessions in 1924, 1925 and 1926, the Congress leadership also did not show any anxiety to revise the Lucknow Pact on the lines laid down by the League. On 20 March 1927 Jinnah came out with 'Delhi Muslim Proposals' as the terms for an *etente cordiale* between the Hindus and the Muslims. The proposals included the need for mixed electorate with representation according to population. This provoked Ambedkar's reaction :

At bottom it is an ingenious contrivance for the protection of the Muslim minorities. For if Hindu majority tyrannizes the Muslim minority in the Hindu provinces the scheme provided a remedy whereby the Mohammedan majority got a field to tyrannize the Hindu minorities in the five Mohammedan provinces. It is a system of protection counterblast against blast; terror against terror and eventually tyranny against tyranny. 28

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28. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.75.

The Congress did not agree to the proposal. It failed. The appointment of Indian Statutory Commission, to review the working of the Government of India Act 1919 and the decision of major political parties to boycott it brought the communal temperature down for some time. Subsequently Nehru Committee was appointed with a view to working out a broad framework for the new Indian Constitution. The major thrust of the Committee was on total abolition of separate electorate, reservation of seats at the centre and the provinces in which Muslims were in a minority strictly in exact proportion to their number, denial of provincial autonomy. Jinnah suggested 3 amendments,

- i) One third Muslim representation at the Centre ;
- ii) In the event of adult franchise not being introduced in Bengal, Punjab, reservation of seats for the Muslims in proportion to their population for 10 years, subject to re-examination after that period;
- iii) The residuary power to be vested in Provinces.

In the all party convention held at Calcutta in December 1928 the Congress refused to consider such amendments. The League objected to Nehru Report. The Convention failed to pass it. This Congress denial to accommodate League's revision of the Report proved too costly for the nation. It alienated

leaders like Jinnah; who was hailed by Sarojini Naidu as the harbinger of Hindu-Muslim amity in India. In 1929 Jinnah came up with his famous fourteen points. The Congress was complacent with a handful of nationalist Muslim leaders and went on ignoring the League. Jinnah's fourteen points were not acceptable to the Congress. Then came the Three Round Table Conferences in which the issue of Dominion Status could not be solved. The issue of Communalism was also not satisfactorily discussed. Rather it was abetted by the declaration of Communal Award of Ramsay MacDonald in 1932. All the major demands of the League were fulfilled; one third representation in Central legislature, separation of Sind from Bombay, Introduction of reforms in NWFP. The British aimed at dividing the Hindu Community by proposing for separate electorates for untouchables in this award scheme. Gandhi's fast and subsequent signing of Poona Pact could avert the danger. But the renewed British zeal at wooing the Muslims out of any possible tie with Congress, further antagonised the Hindus against Muslims. The communal equation was ruptured.

In the mean time Choudhury Rehmat Ali, a Muslim student in London coined the word Pakistan and declared

in a pamphlet 'Now or Never', 'the Muslims of Pakistan, a distinct nation with a homeland of the size of France and a population equal to the French demand the recognition of a separate nation status.'<sup>29</sup> The idea that India formed a single nation, Ali wrote, was a preposterous falsehood. He called for a Muslim nation carved out of the provinces of north-west India where the Muslims were pre-ponderant, the Punjab, Kashmir, Sind, the Frontier and Baluchistan. The name he proposed for the nation, 'Pakistan' meant 'the land of the pure'. He concluded in a fiery, yet inept, metaphor, 'We will not crucify ourselves on the cross of Hindu nationalism.'

When Ali communicated the idea to Jinnah while hosting a dinner at London's Waldorf Hotel in his honour, he received a chilly rebuff. Pakistan, Jinnah told him, was 'an impossible dream'. But adopted by the body that was the focal point of Muslim nationalist aspirations; the Muslim League; Ali's proposal took hold of the imagination of Indian Muslim masses. 'Its progress was nurtured by the chauvinistic attitude of the predominantly Hindu leaders of Congress who remained determined to make no concession to their Muslim foes.'<sup>30</sup>

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29. Rahmat Ali, Now or Never: Are we Going to Live or Perish for Ever? (Cambridge, 1933) p.3.

30. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapiere, Freedom at Midnight (Delhi, 1978), p.29.

The continuation of the policy of refusal to accommodate the Muslim interests; even after they asserted themselves; further strengthened their suspicion. It led to the growth of a hunch in the Muslim psyche which pestered them time and again :in an independent India, They were to be drowned by Hindu majority rule condemned to the existence of a powerless minority in a land they once ruled. The thought of the creation of separate Islamic nation offered an escape from that fate. The idea of the partition of the country, to give themselves the homeland they lacked, lured them beyond their reasoning. The idea seemed fantastic and absurdly ridiculous in the beginning. But it became an obsession with the Muslims in due course of time. The concept of Muslims as a separate nation; first propounded by Muhammad Iqbal; was emphasized with a fervour which bordered on fanaticism.

The League's position took a turn towards the late thirties. In September 1937 the League demanded full Independence for India with a federation of free democratic states in which rights of minorities were to be safeguarded. Let us analyze this change in the policy of the

League in detail. In keeping with the spirit of Government of India act of 1935, the first general election to the legislatures were held in 1937. The Congress and the League campaigned relentlessly for their show of strength. The League proved no match for the Congress in the bargain, though it proved its stakes in the Muslim majority areas. Congress secured majority in seven of the eleven provinces. Here the League offered to cooperate and join the Congress in the formation of the Government. The Congress demanded loyalty to its principles as the basic ground for such consideration. As expected, the League was intransigent. The Congress formed the ministry. The League waited to settle its score. The Congress committed a costly mistake by refusing to accommodate the League. The decision, though not enforced by any Hindu bias, left enough room open for the League to malign Congress on that basis. But to the neutral observer the feeling of obstinacy of the Congress was inescapable. The Congress proved as hidebound in its political beliefs as the League was in its religious faith. A slight relaxation of policy would have ushered in a new inter-community understanding.

The arrogance that accompanied the Congress success was certain to provoke stronger Muslim bias against the Hindus. For some time it made them (Muslims), introspective. Iqbal wrote in May 1937 to Jinnah:

The League has to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far with good reason taken no interest in it. Personally I believe that a political organisation which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslims, cannot attract our masses. 31

From 1937 onwards started the Muslim campaign for a Muslim Federation with active policy of indoctrinating the masses in its favour. The anger expressed by the leaders of the League showed their zeal and their determination. The masses were fed with high hopes. The historical importance of the community was stressed. Anti-Hindu sentiments were built up. The advantages of having a Muslim federation were cooked up and served in a way too alluring to resist the temptation of the masses who were wallowing in poverty and squalor. The hope of virtual monopoly of government services was too alluring ... The ignorant masses were left

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31. Shariuddin Pirzada (ed.), Quaid-i-Azam's Correspondence (Karachi, 1946), pp.158-159.

to interpret the economic implications of Pakistan according to their own imagination. Thus long before Jinnah chose to make his final demand for partition, the Muslim community of India had already been prepared to march towards its Eldorado.' 32

#### 1.4 Assertive Communalism of the League

To have a better feel of the Muslim communal frenzy; that was unleashed in the wake of the League's failure in the elections and subsequent flat denial of the Congress of its solicitation for combined Government; one has to study the idioms of the Muslim leaders used to incite the masses, during this period. Raja of Mahmudabad presiding over the provincial Muslim League Conference held in Delhi on 4th April, 1939 declared :

Let the Karars (the money-lenders) know that a community that once conquered India with 8 soldiers can dictate its terms even today. If any hindrance is placed in our way to the formation of a Muslim Federation, the ears of the Karars would be boxed and they will have to lick the dust. The community still plays a part in the world history and if the noisy, pen drivers, as the Hindus are, dare oppose us they shall be effaced from the earth. 33

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32. Prabha Dixit, *op.cit.*, p.94.

33. Quoted in Inder Prakash, Where we Differ; Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha (Delhi, 1942) p.259.



The Raja of Mahmudabad poured the baby out with tub water; revealing the very nature of economic roots of the communal antagonism. What indeed was caused by the very class character of the society was stretched to imply deliberate communal motive for incidentally the class structure crystallized along communal lines. In Bengal, the Hindus were the Zamindars and money lenders while Muslims were tenants and debtors. In Western Punjab the Muslims were landlords and cultivators while the Hindus and the Sikhs were creditors and buyers of crops. Even in South where the communal equation was less disturbing, the class cleavage ran along communal lines; leaving the field potential enough for the communalists to operate. The Raja's voice, however, was not singular. Fazlul Haq the premier of Bengal said :

If Muhammad Bin Quasim, an 18 year old lad with 8 soldiers could conquer Sind, then surely 9 crores of Muslims can conquer whole of India. 34

In such a statement laid an appeal; haunting and potential; to the Muslims, of the might of their race and their hoary past. Even another League leader F.K. Khan Duranni

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34. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.260.

declared :

Though the Muslims are in minority, they have always enjoyed a prestige for their military prowess and Hindus, in spite of their numbers, have been but sheep before them. 35

The battle-cry of Maulana Akbar Shah of Najibabad was even more indicative of the Muslim mood. The Maulana issued a challenge to Madan Mohan Malaviya to fight under test conditions a fourth battle of Panipat:

If you, Malaviyaji, are making efforts to falsify the result at Panipat, I shall show you an easy and excellent way out. As there are seven crores of Muslims in India and as there are twenty two crores of Hindus, I allow you to come with 2200 Hindus... If you cannot accept the post of generalissimo of the Hindu host, you may give it to any descendants of Dadasiva Rao or Viswas Rao, so that their action may have an opportunity to aveng the defeat of their ancestors in 1761... In conclusion I beg to add that among 700 men that I shall bring, there will be no Pathan or Afghans as you are mortally afraid of them. 36

Jinnah addressing the students of Punjab said:

Our demand is not from the Hindus because Hindus never took whole of India. It was the Muslims who took India and ruled for 700 years. 37

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35. Quoted in Prabha Dixit, *op.cit.*, p.96.

36. *Ibid.*, p.97.

37. Jinnah quoted in Faruqui Ziaal, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay, 1963), p.104.

Even the views of Ulemas who were against Partition were no less communal. Maulana Madani's address to Muslims in 1945 was :

It is the non-Muslims who are the field of action for the 'tabligh' of Islam and form the raw material for this splendid activity. Today by propagating hatred towards Hindus, this field is being closed and this material wasted. 38

This pouring out of venom by the Muslim leaders sprang less out of conviction than out a conscious design to gather mass support in favour of their leadership. They knew well that stressing the richness of their tradition, before the Muslim masses was a powerful rallying point.

With the outbreak of the second World War and subsequent resignation of the Congress Ministry in October-November 1939, the League politicians heaved a sigh of relief. The idiom changed but direction remained the same. The day the Congress Ministers resigned, the Muslim League gave a call to observe it as 'the day of deliverance'. Then came

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38. Ahmed Hussain Madani, An Open Letter to Moslem League (Lahore, 1946), p.44.

the August Offer, the Cripps Mission. Both the offers failed to satisfy the two communities at the same time. Jinnah went on denouncing the proposals on the pretext that 'the democratic system of Parliamentary government on the conception of a homogeneous nation and the method of counting heads'<sup>39</sup> was unworkable in India.

In the meantime in January 1940, Jinnah enunciated his 'Two Nations Theory'. The Muslims of India Jinnah insisted were a nation with a distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, laws and moral codes customs and calendar, history and traditions.<sup>40</sup> Jinnah asserted :

India has never been a true nation. It only looks that way on the map. The cows I want to eat, the Hindu stops me from killing. Every time a Hindu shakes hands with me, he has to wash his hands. The only thing the Muslim has in common with the Hindu is his slavery to the British. 41

Jinnah further stated :

The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. The Hindus and Muslims... belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. 42

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39, Majumdar, Roychoudhury and Dutta, *op.cit.*, p.99.

40. Larry Collins, Dominique Lapiere, *op.cit.*, p.104.

41. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.104.

42. Jamiluddin Ahmed (ed.) *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore, 1960) pp.159-63.

The League earlier demanded a loose federation. But by 1940, League's stand changed. Pakistan was its new obsession. Jinnah's speech revealed it unequivocally :

We are opposed to any scheme,... which has for its basis any conception or idea of a central government - federal or confederal - for it is bound to lead in the long run to the emasculation of the entire Muslim nation, economically, socially, educationally, culturally or politically and to the establishment of the Hindu majority raj in this sub-continent. 43

Jinnah shut his reason out in his uncompromising campaign for Pakistan:

Pakistan came into being on the day the first Hindu embraced Islam. A Hindu individual embracing Islam did not matter much as a physical phenomenon. What mattered in fact was the advent of a new ideology. This was an ideology which ushered in a new behaviour, a new code of ethics, a new culture a new world view. 44

Hardly three months had passed after Jinnah's enunciation of 'Two nation theory', when the League demanded for a separate homeland for Muslims in the Lahore session in March 1940. From that moment onwards,

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43. *Ibid.*, pp.60-62.

44. Quoted in Muhammad Munnawar, *op.cit.*, p.26.

all attempts at reconciliation between the Congress and the League foundered on the issue of Pakistan. The Congress adopted a resolution on 8 August 1942, in favour of starting a mass struggle on the widest possible scale. In the early hours of 9 Aug. 1940, all Congress leaders were arrested and the Congress was declared an illegal body. The time proved opportune enough for the League to launch their campaign without much resistance.

The Simla Conference on 25 June 1945, failed due to Congress-League differences on different issues. In the elections of 1946 the Congress swept the polls in the General seats and the League swept the polls in the Muslim seats. The Cabinet Mission Proposals of February 1946, for a loose confederation of three groups of provinces with the right to secede at convenience, was accepted by the League. But League withdrew its acceptance later when the Viceroy reconstituted his Executive Council without any member of the League represented in it. This was interpreted as a triumph of the Congress which provoked violent reactions among separatist Muslims who fixed upon 16 August 1946 as the day of 'Direct Action'. The

event served to catalyse into violence the rivalry of India's Hindu and Muslim communities. At the dawn of 16 August, 'howling in a quasi-religious fervour Muslim mobs had come bursting from their slums, waving clubs iron bars, shovels.'<sup>45</sup> A number were killed and their houses and shops were looted and burnt. Soon, the Hindus retaliated and for a number of days, hell broke loose on the streets of Calcutta. This caused chain-reaction-riots all over India which changed the course of Indian history. The threat, the Muslims had been uttering for years; their warnings of a cataclysm which would overtake India if they were denied their own state; became a terrifying reality. 'We shall have India divided or we shall have India destroyed'<sup>46</sup> Jinnah vowed.

The 'Operation Seduction' of Mountbatten could never detract Jinnah from the path of Pakistan. 'He was a psychopathic case, hell bent on Pakistan.'<sup>47</sup> Mountbatten sadly concluded. The Plans for Partition were drawn. The Congress saw in this the solution to the communal problem, which otherwise would destroy the

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45. Larry Collins, *Dominique Lapiere*, op.cit., p.26.

46. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.29.

47. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.29.

peace of the country. But the riots that followed the Partition, was the worst ever in the history of mankind. The Congress hopes to avoid a riot situation by agreeing to partition were utterly betrayed.

Formation of Pakistan was made possible by a combination of three factors : the Hindu apathy in the first place and Hindu obstinacy afterwards; the British Opportunism and the Muslim fundamentalism. However, the creation of Pakistan did not solve the problem of communalism. Rather Pakistan became a steady source of trouble between the two communities. We will come to that later on.

#### 1.5 Hindu Communalism : Pre-Independence period

We have discussed how Hinduism is more of a geographical than religious expression. It is more of a culture, a way of life, than a religion. Coming to the religious aspect of it, from the Vedic age, the concept of Varnashram Dharma came up as a characteristic of Hindu society. This was indeed a division of labour which placed Brahmins at the apex of the Varna hierarchy.



Brahmins exploited this apex position to their advantage and gradually 'Brahminism' replaced this Varnashram pattern. The Brahmins laid stress on the ritualistic aspect of Hinduism. The 'varnas' multiplied into castes and subcastes; 1886 for Brahmins alone. Varnashram was at the beginning a prudent and expedient choice. But the Brahmins, made it a an inalienable feature of Hindu society. The caste structure was made rigid and immobile. Man was born into a caste and was to work, live, marry and die within its fold. Idolatry was another feature of Hinduism. The Hindu worshipped God in any form he chose; in animals, ancestors, spirits, sages, natural forces. He found God in shakes, phalli, water, fire, planets and stars. The Hindu temples were loaded with numerous idols. Thus with its stress on an inegalitarian social structure and polytheist idolatry Hinduism was bound to provoke the disrespect of Islam which was egalitarian and monotheistic in nature.

During the period of Brahminic assertion the cow became the symbol of Hindu religion. The veneration of cow dated back to the times of the Aryan settlement. The fortunes of the pastoral Aryan migrants depended largely on their herds, for which they were never killed and the practice in due course of time emerged as a social habit, a taboo, an inhibition. The sadhus of ancient India proclaimed the cow

sacred so as to save them from slaughter in times of famine on which their people's existence depended. Over the passage of years the ban of beef-eating and insistence on cow-protection became one of the strong elements of Hindu religions sentiment. The high priests of culture sought to obliterate the past to explain the present. The texts state for example, the preference of the most eminent of Brahmanas, Yagnavalkya, for the tender undercuts of beef which was seldom referred to; nor publicity was given to the archaeological evidence of a fairly widespread diet of beef among the people thought to belong to the Vedic culture.<sup>48</sup>

The religious reform movements launched in with the advent of the, British tried to shorn Hinduism of the corrupting biases, the superstitious beliefs, which was opposed by the orthodox Hindus. The reformers took a revivalist stance. They sought to liberalize the Hindus without sweeping them off their feet. Such revivalist temper of the reform movement was sure to allay the fears of the Muslims. Thus the feeling of insecurity consequent to the militant nationalism which led the Indian Muslims to demand partition, originated out of unfounded suspicion and irrational scorn against the Hindu Community, because their own community did not take into account the charges being brought in by the reform movements.

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48, Romila Thapar's article in Ramji Lal (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.79-87.

The nationalist movement in its overwhelming zeal for freedom grew oblivious of the Muslim psyche. In its imprudent choice of Hindu idiom and Hindu symbols, it ignored the possibility of Muslim reaction. During the early years of the 20th century, there was a strong Hindu religious element in the extremist thought and propaganda. Bipan Chandra says :

Many of the extremists identified nationalism with revival of Hinduism, talked of Indian culture in terms of ancient Indian culture to the exclusion of medieval Indian culture . . . . . They tried to provide an ideological pinning to Indian nationalism or at least a Hindu Idiom to its day-to-day political agitation.<sup>49</sup>

In 1908 Aurobindo Ghosh wrote :

Nationalism is a religion that has come from God . . . . . If you are going to be a nationalists, if you are going to assent to religion of Nationalism, you must do it in the religious spirit, you must remember you are the instrument of God.<sup>50</sup>

In his famous U.P. speech delivered on 30, May 1909, he said :

I say no longer that nationalism is a creed; a religion, a faith. I say that it is Sanatana Dharma which for us is Nationalism. This Hindu nation was born with Sanatan Dharma; with it, it moves and with it, it grows.<sup>51</sup>

By then, the League was already established. The Hindus of the Muslim majority provinces took this development seriously.

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49. Bipan Chandra, *op.cit.*, p.142.

50. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.142.

51. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.143.

Lala Lal Chand, one of the founder-members of Punjab Hindu Mahasabha wrote in 1907 :

.....the ideal, the predominant factor ought to be communal, rather than geographic interests..  
 .....communal love in fact is the root of the majority of the sentiments which we love and cherish, not excluding even religion... The idea is to love everything owned by a community. It may be religion it may be a tract of country, it may be a phase of the civilization.<sup>52</sup>

In short, conscious Hindu communalism was born out of a sense of concern in the face of Muslim reassertion and subsequent patronage of the British. In 1909 colonel U.N.Mukherjee published a book namely, A Dying Race, in which he wrote :

They (Muslims) are growing in number, growing in strength, growing in health, growing in solidarity, we are crumbling to pieces. They look forward to a united Mohammedan nation we are waiting for our extinction.<sup>53</sup>

Mukherjee's voice was not lone but certainly forlorn. It indicated the deep sense of rivalry existing between the two communities. The victory of one carried with it the feel of defeat for the other even when they were not involved in direct fights.

The nationalist movement in Bengal was marked by its religious fervour. The influence of Bankim Chandra was obvious among the Bengali Youth. Bankim Chandra's novels were a

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52. Lala Lal Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics (Lahore, 1938), p.2.

53 Quoted in Bipan Chandra, *op.cit.*, p.136.

constant source of inspiration for them. His novels were marked for their bias against Muslim rulers. His influence thus was resented among the Muslims.

The Muslims marked this Hindu turn of the movement pretty well. Mohammed Ali wrote in 1912 in *Comrade* under the title 'Communal Patriot':

Whatever may be the inspiration of Hinduism as a religious creed, the educated Hindus made it a rallying symbol for political unity..... The Muslim weighs on their consciousness....as a troublesome irrelevance, and they would thank their stars if some exodus or a geographical cataclysm could give him riddance....The spectacle of a go-ahead Hinduism, dreaming of self govt. and playing with its ancient Gods clad in the vesture of democracy, dazed the conservative Muslim. He felt as if he was being treated as an alien, as a meddlesome freak, who had wantonly interfered with the course of Indian history... With the loss of empire, he felt as if he were to lose his self respect as well. The communal patriots amongst the Hindus treated him as a prisoner in the dock and loudly complained of him as an impossible factor in the scheme of India's future.<sup>54</sup>

Ali captures the Muslim mood well. The Hindus never tried to understand that their strategy of strengthening the movement by stirring up Hindu emotions, could alienate their Muslim friends. Hindu leaders kept on pressing the Hindu identity, hard into the Muslims ears. Respectable leaders like Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Bihari Pal could

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54. Afzal Iqbal (ed.), *Mahammad Ali: Selected writings and speeches*, (Lahore, 1944), p.139.

not get their appeals rid of Hindu idiom. Addressing the Hindu Conference at Bombay on 5, Dec, 1925 Lal Lajpat Rai said:

Organization means power, influence and prestige. Those who neglect to organize must give way to the organized. If the Hindu community does not wish to commit political Harakiri, they must move every nerve to be communally efficient and united.<sup>55</sup>

Tilak introduced the use of 'Ganesh Puja' and the 'Shivaji Festival' to involve the lay masses in politics. While Ganesh Puja had a religious or communal bearing, the Shivaji Festival had an unmistakable anti-Muslim imprint on the Hindu psyche. Bipin Chandra Pal was of the opinion that: 'Behind the new nationalism of India stands the old Vedantism of the Hindus'.<sup>56</sup> When nationalist leaders were so religious in their outlook one can well imagine the feelings of the leaders who claimed themselves to be protectors of the Hindu religion.

Madan Mohan Malavya was one of such leaders. He was apprehensive of the Muslim missions for conversion. He proclaimed :

The question of having a Hindu mission for proselytization has become a very pressing necessity in the situation created in this country by Christian and Muslim missions.<sup>57</sup>

Lala Hardayal argued in favour of Suddhi Movement to convert low castes, intouchables, Bhai Paramanand and Guru Golwalvar

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55. V.G. Joshi (ed.), Lala Lajpat Rai: Writings and Speeches, Vol II (Bombay 1962), p.253.

56. Quoted in Bipin Chandra, *op.cit.*, p.144.

57. Quoted in Prabha Dixit, *op.cit.*, p.158.

also favoured this idea. Voilent patriots like Vir Vinayak Savarkar said :

What is called nationalism, can be defined as in fact the National Communalism of the majority community which has been ruling and still aspires to rule this country.

Defending his stand which was alleged to be communal he wrote :

Indian or any patriotism cannot but be communal in relation to humanity; for nationality is as strong a principle of human division as is a racial or religious or cultural community.<sup>58</sup>

In reaction to the call for direct action day by the league in 1940, Hindu Mahasabha came out with its programme of militarising the Hindus. Some people even started sketching ambitious plans of defusing the league plans. Shiv Kumar Pandit, the president of Bulsar Hindu Mahasabha suggested a redistribution of Hindu population to make vain league's call for partition. The migration and settlement of 60 lakhs from Bihar to Bengal, 71 lakhs of Hindus from U.P. to Punjab and 22 lakhs again from UP to NWFP, would make Hindus the majority community everywhere in India.<sup>59</sup>

All this showed how Hindus never made a secret of their communal mind. They proudly proclaimed to be so. There was a lack of sane reasoning on both fronts. Nehru's reference to the

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58. *Ibid.*, p.176.

59. *Ibid.*, p.181.

Hindu Mahasabha is worth quoting here. He wrote :

The Chief Hindu communal organization is the Hindu Mahasabha the counter-part of Muslim, but relatively less important. It is as aggressively communal as the league, but it tries to cover up its extreme narrowness of outlook by using some kind of vague national terminology, though its outlook is more revivalist than progressive. It is peculiarly unfortunate in some of its leaders who indulge in irresponsible and violent diatribes, as indeed do some of the Muslim League Leaders also. This verbal warfare, indulged in on both sides, is a constant irritant.<sup>60</sup>

Coming from Hindu Mahasabha to the National Congress politics, one is confronted with the fact that there were many politicians in the congress ranks whose secular credentials were suspect. Nehru had to admit in his Autobiography:

'Many a congress man was a communalist under his nationalist cloak'.<sup>61</sup> Bipan Chandra writes :

In the post 1909 period the Hindu tinge was not so strongly etched and a basically secular national movement was being built .... Even so ... a vague Hindu aura continued to pervade much of the congress agitation or at least the idiom of congress political expression.<sup>62</sup>

Gandhi contributed a lot towards the creation of this pervading Hindu aura. Gandhi was too tolerant, genuinely free of any taint of religious prejudice. He desperately wanted to associate the Muslims with every phase of his movement. But he was a Hindu and a deep belief in God was the very essence

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60. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India* (Delhi, 1981), p. 386.

61. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography* (Delhi, 1981), p. 136.

62. Bipan Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 141.



of his being. Inevitably, unintentionally Gandhi's congress party movement began to take on a Hindu tone and colour that aroused Muslim suspicions, This was further strengthened by narrow-minded local congress leaders who persistantly refused to share with their Muslim rivals whatever electoral spoils British rule offered. Golwalkar's warning-that 'minority must live by the grace of the majority and that the people of other religions could "stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation claiming nothings deserving no privileges .....<sup>63</sup> must have made them apprehensive of the Hindu Raj of the future which unless averted was a dangerous prospect, fear of which closed in around them as an inescapable misfortune that ~~was~~ about to land on them. In such an environment with his emphasis on religion and with his rhetoric which could not get rid of its Hindu overtone; Gandhi cut a sorry figure. His unpretentions life, confessions of practising Hindu habits in private life were likely to be misinterpreted. The lay public, unschooled in the principles of rationalism, could never dissociate one's public life from the private. Especially to the Muslims who had turned their backs on Muhammed Ali (who said while addressing the first Round Table Conference "where God commands I am a Muslim first, a Muslim ~~second~~ and a Muslim ~~last~~, and nothing but a Muslim ,.....But where India is concerned

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63. Quoted in M.J. Akbar, India: The Siege within (Hammonds-worth, 1985), p.23.

....I am an Indian first, an Indian second and an Indian last"<sup>64</sup>  
 could never reconcile to this dichotomy, That is why Gandhi's  
 confessions still feature in Pakistani writings to cast aspersions  
 on his secular motive. In an article published on 14th  
 August 1966. Ayub Khan spared no effort at painting Gandhi  
 black and blue by quoting Gandhi's claims that he was a Hindu.  
 Gandhi has admitted in his characteristic way :

I call myself a Sanatani Hindu because firstly  
 I believe in the Vedas Upanishads, and Puranas.  
 and all that goes by the name of Hindu Scriptures  
 and therefore in Avtaars and rebirth. Secondly  
 I believe in Varnashram Dharma ...in its Vedic  
 forms. Thirdly I believe in the protection of  
 the cow as an article of faith, and fourthly I  
 don't disbelieve in idol-worship.<sup>65</sup>

Such an honest admission was mistaken to be a proud  
 proclamation, offensive enough to provoke the orthodoxy of  
 the Muslim. Gandhi provoked such violent reaction in Muslim  
 leaders that even while lamenting his death, as the national  
 leader of Pakistan, Jinnah minced no words in his condolence  
 message 'There can be no controversy in the face of death. He  
 was one of the greatest man produced by the Hindu Community.  
 He was a great Hindu'<sup>66</sup> To the average Muslim, Gandhi could  
 never become more than a Hindu leader Gandhi never ceased to  
 be Hindu and his organization, the Congress which he led un-  
 challenged, never ceased to be a Hindu organization.

64. Quoted in *Ibid*, p.21.

65. Ayub Khan quoted Gandhi in 'The Myth of Indian Secularism'  
 an article in Dawn (Karachi), 14 August 1966.

66. Quoted in Collins & Lapiere, *op.cit.*, p.445.

## 1.6 COMMUNAL SITUATION : THE POST - INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

### Pakistan

Right since partition, Pakistan has been accusing India of being a Hindu state pretending to be secular. But a cursory glance at the political affairs in Pakistan will suffice to prove that in its domestic sphere, it has proved to be thoroughly communal in its approach.

The riots that followed partition were the severest on the Pakistan side of the sub-continent which occasioned major migrations into India. Even after partition, things did not cool-down, the religious - minorities in Pakistan were treated with scorn and contempt. Pakistan's constitution proclaimed itself to be Islamic in nature and content. Even though the separate electorate system was reintroduced, the minorities were relegated to the position of secondary citizens. The minorities in Pakistan were, in a way, kept under constant harassment. They were frowned to silence whenever they tried to raise their voice. The constitution of 1956 guarded against any possible rise of Hindu to the highest seat of power. It prescribed that a Muslim could only be the chief of the state. The constitution urged upon the state to take every possible

step to promote the cause of Islam.

During the sixties there was a tremendous spirit of violence in East Pakistan, over the issue of the theft of the Hair of the prophet. In Khulna East Pakistan serious riots took place which forced another large scale migration from Pakistan into India. In West-Pakistan only 80 per cent of the population were Hindus. They were a subdued class, as such things were less severe there. The Indian Press highlighted the sufferings of the minority in Pakistan. Indian Express (Daily) of 2 March 1964 raised a voice of concern. It sought to arouse World's conscience on this score.

With the establishment of Bangladesh, the communal temperature cooled down there. But in West Pakistan, the religious antagonism fed on the defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war and the subsequent dismemberment..

During the eighties this antagonism showed its face in the form of attack on Hindus and Hindu temples in Pakistan. In February, 1986 there were mass protests against the Babri Mosque issue in Pakistan. The protestors attacked Hindu temples and households. Pakistan public showed similar reaction over the Meerut issue. At Shaheed nagar, on 28 May 1987, a protest

rally was carried out after Id prayers against the genocide of Indian Muslims, at Quila Chowk. The rally turned violent when it reached a temple on the way and burnt the temple. This shows the reaction at the popular level.

At the governmental level, the leaders of Pakistan have refused to follow the secular line. Islam has been for them the sole motivating factor. Their moves on the domestic front are actuated by communal calculations. The case of constitutional de-recognition of Ahmadiyas as Muslims can be cited here. In the face of the popular fury the government, the leaders took absolute care not to hurt majority sentiments. Ahmadiyas were declared to be non-Muslims during Bhutto's time. Ahmadi leaders were asked to step down from high governmental posts.

Over the years the anti-Hindu, anti-Ahmadiya, anti-Buddhist even anti-Christian riots in Pakistan proved that the communal identity of Pakistan was too dear for them to be shaken off. Keeping all this in mind it sounds highly unconvincing on the part of Pakistan to cast aspersions on the secular image of India.

India :

Division of the country on communal basis was agreed

upon on the basis of the hope that with the creation of Pakistan the communal equations would be set aright, and communal peace would prevail in the subcontinent. But the riots that broke out in the wake of Independence disproved all those wishful calculations. The communal violence that broke out was unique, a cataclysm without precedent, unforeseen in magnitude, unordered in pattern, unreasoned in savagery. 'For six terrible weeks like the ravages of a medieval plague, a mania for murder swept across the face of northern India. There was no sanctuary from the scourge, no corner from the contagion of the virus.'<sup>67</sup> All speculation of a happy division followed by a peaceful migration was proved foolish. It was a fact that all the Muslims could not migrate to Pakistan even if they would want to. The Muslim population that stayed behind 'were abandoned to the Hindus. These millions were an awful Korbani, sacrifice to Allah, Akbar!'<sup>68</sup> These Muslims suffered from even a greater league of insecurity complex making the communal situation volatile in India. The way the communal temperature has fluctuated over the years since independence shows the futility of the very logic on which Pakistan came into being. With the partition the communalists got the conducive atmosphere to operate in. Ever since the dawn of independence, they have never looked back.

Ratna Naidu observed that in Kerala and Tamilnadu, where Muslims had settled down as traders and not as conquerors; they

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67. *Ibid.*, p.284.

68. Nirad C. Choudhury, *op.cit.*, p.292.

had learned to develop a non-religious outlook to facilitate their business. But partition has left even the Muslims from these regions 'with an increased consciousness of their religious identity'.<sup>69</sup> The Muslims were more suspicious of the motives of the government which they were convinced was Hindu sort. Syed Shahbuddin presents the case of Indian Muslims in the following words :

Inevitably the Muslim Indian is placed in a situation of insecurity marked by uncertainty, anxiety, depression and frustration. Insecurity has many dimensions : religious, cultural, linguistic, economic and above all physical.<sup>70</sup>

Shahbuddin alleged that all the parties and their leaders were working on the basis of electoral arithmetic and have become not only silent spectators but willing accomplices in the acts of communal disturbances.

The Hindus indeed, after Independence, have all along been too assertive in political, social, economic and cultural fields. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee who led 'Akhil Bharatiya Jan sargh', claimed himself to be communal. 'If being communal means having the courage not to sacrifice our national interest at the altar of the notorious Muslim pandering and Pakistan appeasement policy, we are communal, hundred percent communal and proved to be so'.<sup>71</sup>

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69. Ratna Naidu, *op.cit.*, p.11.

70. Syed Shahbuddin, 'A Muslim Indian Manifesto' in Statesman (Delhi), magazine section, 15 August 1987.

71. Quoted in Prabha Dixit, *op.cit.*, p.201.

Rajni Kothari is of the opinion that after 1969 there was a widespread deterioration of secular politics. Which in a sense owed its origin to the secular democratic polity. Democracy is a number game and our interpretation of secularism is to-lerance of all the beliefs. In such a political system' pnce competition based on issues and ideological considerations are eschewed, the number game essentially becomes an ethnic game'. The secular politics is shown of all its normative contents. Kothari draws our attention to the deliberate stirring up of religious passions by leaders. ' It is quite interesting that immediately after the army action in Punjab, Mrs. Gandhi was in Garhwal and said openly and directly that the Hindu Dharma was under attack. And she made an impassioned appeal to save the Hindu Sanskriti from the attack, that was coming from the Sikhs, the Muslims and the others'.<sup>72</sup> If leaders at the top could be so brazen, one can well imagine the leadership at the grass roots.

The claims to places being historically associated with the biography of avataars has also been politically motivated. Ram Janma Bhoomi is a recent case in sight. Even though there is no historical evidence in favour of the demand, the Hindus have taken it up as an issue involving the prestige of their community and culture. The Muslims have not stayed

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72. Rajni Kothari, State Against Democracy (Delhi, 1988) pp242-246.



behind in their efforts. They are on the move to reviving old, dilapidated mosques. As Asghar Ali Engineer points out, such competitive religiosity has made the communal atmosphere so volatile, vulnerable.

After the sixties, during which there was a marked rise in communal happenings the trend in Indian politics started taking a communal turn. H.V.R. Iyengar revealed it in following terms :

There was not a question which was not first examined from its communal aspect. Even the question of helping the construction of a children's hospital, the primary point that would have occurred to officials was whether majority of the beneficiaries were likely to be Hindus & Muslims.<sup>73</sup>

The sixties could not exhaust all the communal passion the communal equation which improved during the seventies suffered yet another set-back during early eighties. We will come to that in due course of our discussion.

## II

### ✓1.7. Communalism in India : The Pakistan Factor

After the partition of the country there were a large number of Muslims left in India, who has voted for Pakistan

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73. Hindustan Times (Delhi), 10 April 1964.

yet stayed back. There were so many compulsions; economic, political, emotional, to pull them from behind. In such a situation quite a lot of them grew emotional attachment with a country, they did not physically belong to. Pakistan, with its stress on Islam naturally took upon itself the moral and spiritual leadership of the Muslims in India.

Since partition, it has been a covert principle of Pakistan to accuse India of being partial to Hindus and hence, non secular. There has been a deliberate effort, as evidence shows, at stirring up communal passion in India. The rulers of Pakistan very well know that if they fail to prove that India is not secular, it will disprove the very logic of behind the concept of Pakistan. It is interesting to note here that while Pakistan was raising the slogan of secularism in the context of India, it was, within its own boundaries, suppressing religious minorities.

Indian scholars would assure us of the Pakistani shadow on Indian communal politics.<sup>74</sup> The unlocking of Babri Mosque on 1 February 1986, created lot of flutter in Pakistani political circle. The case was raised in Pakistan National Assembly by A.G. Noorani, the interior minister. This was followed by an attack on Hindu temples which was a sequel to

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74. P.R. Rajgopal, *op.cit.*, pp.31-32.

the communal riots in India. Exploiting communal hatred in India has been an integral part of the geo-politics of Pakistan. Pakistan's knows that its stand on communal issues in India creates instability in India. The slogan of 'Islam is in danger' is raised. It serves to wrest considerable political mileage for Pakistan. First, in moments of integration crisis in Pakistan, where regionalism and sectarianism have come to the fore proving the doctrine of religious nationalism unworkable in the long run; stirring up of anti-Indian hatred has become one of the important ground, to hold several identities together, second, with every communal riot India's relationship with Middle East and other Islamic Countries suffers set back and Pakistan tries to take advantage of it. Third it upsets the communal equality in India and disturbs domestic peace.

The Minority Commission in its fourth Annual Report for the period 01-01-81 to 31-03-83 observed :

We cannot overlook the fact that there are foreign as well as internal elements likely to be interested in creating disorder and making out that there is genocide and maltreatment of minorities . . . . . The existence of unscrupulous schemers abroad and in our country who think on their lines rather than on the welfare of minorities in India or of the whole country should surprise nobody.<sup>75</sup>

The visiting Pakistanis who remain untraced in India Act as agent provocateurs, in fomenting communal troubles in

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75. cited in *Ibid, op.cit., p.32.*

India. Apart from entry of the Pakistanis on valid documents, hundreds of them infiltrate through the borders of Jammu & Kahmir, Rajasthan and Punjab. They run missions for Pakistani intelligence agencies 'and many of them have been known to have settled down as Hindus and Indians, but are doing espionage work for Pakistan'.<sup>76</sup> The recent terrorism in the valley owes its origin to Pakistani incitement. The religious sentiments of the people are exploited to create unrest in the valley. 'On every Friday from the pulpits of 20,000 odd mosques and shrines over the valley, Muslim priests raise their hands and pray loudly from Koran 'Fa Ansura Alal Quamil Kafireen'; (give us victory over the non-believers) and millions of faithfuls say 'Amen' in thanderous supplication'.<sup>77</sup> The Indian intelligence has unravelled the Pakistani interference in Punjab too. The terrorists, both the Punjabi and the Kashmiri variety, are trained in Pakistan. From the raid conducted in both the states it was revealed that the terrorists used Pakistani made arms and ammunitions.

Of course one has to understand the Pakistani mind. Pakistan cannot give up Islam or even relegate it to a secondary position. It has nothing else to stand on. Being poor in natural resources, it cannot even cover up a retrogressive historical evolution by maintaining the pretence or illusion of

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76. *Ibid.*, p.48.

77. Ghulam Nabi Khayal, 'Unrest in the Valley', an article in the Illustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 20, October, 1985.

Industrialization, as India is doing. 'Without adherence to a lost cause the country itself will be lost, for there is nothing in it besides Islam which can resist the gravitation of the great mass of India and reabsorption in India'.<sup>78</sup>

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78. Niral C. Choudhury, *op.cit.*, p.296.

C H A P T E R - I I

ISLAMIC NATURE OF STATE IN PAKISTAN

CHAPTER - IIISLAMIC NATURE OF STATE IN PAKISTAN2.1. Nature of State in Islam

It is difficult to attempt a critique of such a controversial topic within such a limited study. However we will limit our attention to the characteristics of a supposedly Islamic state. The opinions of religious scholars in Islam are divided on the constitution as well as functions of a state according to the levels of Islam. As a result of which, over the years the Koranic principles have been interpreted in different ways to give rise to different and differing schools of Islamic thought. Interpretation could have been warranted/through a variety of circumstances; from seeking an apology for a dynastic power-bargain to the basis of a nation. There is no scope in this study to go deep into the divisions of Islam and discuss different stands of interpretations. We will simply focus on those areas where there is consensus among the various divisions.

Islam, more than a religion, is a culture, a code of life. It determines the life of an individual at every step from birth to death. A religion so intimately affecting an

individuals life and seeking complete surrender (Islam, the very religion means; 'an act of surrender) of its adherents was bound to overlap in its sphere of influence, the life of an individual in the civil society as a citizen of the state. Islam does not distinguish between the spiritual and the temporal. Perhaps this confusion has been there since the very inception of the religion when the Prophet; a single individual, was both the spiritual and the temporal head rolled into one. The Caliphs who succeed the Prophet, built upon this confusion but then, Islam could have been used more as an ordering principle than an item of faith. But the confusion endured; even to this present day. A political religion from its very inception; spread more through the force of the sword than convincing persuasion of conscience; it was highly unlikely that it would survive the divorce from politics. Faith and power were inseparably mixed up. Faith determined the affairs of the state. Koran, unmistakably, was the infallible point of reference. State was to be run according to the principles of Islam to help evolve a society where the followers could safely practise their faith. It was believed that an individual alone could not conform entirely to the injunctions of Islam unless and until the practical affairs of his society were in line with God's revealed plan.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Anita M. Weiss, 'The Historical debate in Islam' in Anita M. Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (Lahore, 1987). p.2.



From a religious scripture, a holy book, the Koran was made some sort of a legal document, a battleground of combating interpretations. Different interpretations led to 'different schools of jurisprudence...., recognized as authoritative in different parts of the Muslim world. But they diverged on points of detail rather than essentials'.<sup>2</sup> When they agreed, their verdict was held to be binding irrespective of sectoral and regional variation.

Now we should come to the chief characteristics of an Islamic state based on these points of convergence on the essentials. It was a commonly held belief among obedience to God's laws as laid down in Koran - though the Koran had to be interpreted and even supplemented by 'hadith' (the tradition) about what Mohammed had himself said and done.<sup>3</sup> Gradually the ulama overtook the Caliphs, who were obviously not men with great spiritual qualifications. These ulama elaborated the rules derived from Koran and the hadith into a science of Muslim Law. These laws constituted the Sharia. As per the injunctions of Sharia, the Muslims were to order their lives in a state which was run according to 'Sunna'; the beaten path along which, the Prophet wanted the community to move.

Ibn Khaldun, the great classical Islamic Theorist, elaborated on the relationship between the state and the

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2. Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power; The Politics of Islam (London, 1982), p. 36.

3. *Ibid.*, p.35.

religious society in his well known book 'Al Muqaddana' 'Basing his observations on the roles which the prophet and the Rashidun Caliphate played in depending and spreading the Islamic religion, he suggested three elements which are critical in the creation and institutionalization of an Islamic state;

1. Asabiyah (group feeling), the propensity for cohesion and therefore segmentation.
2. The emergence of a ruling structure which assumes leadership functions.
3. A large community (umma based on religion).<sup>4</sup>

The state in Islamic society is defined in terms of its capacity to maintain justice and to defend the Muslim religion. The believer's obligation to Laws of Sharait is independent of whether the state enforces them or not. The Caliph is given authority in Sharia to enforce law keeping in view the well-being of his citizenry. The ruler has to consult the 'Shuroa' in conducting the affairs of the state.

The Islamic state has also room for the non-Muslims. In the Ottoman Caliphate, the non-Muslims were known as dhimmis (el-e-kita s, the people of the Kitab): the Jews and Christians, who made up the Turkish minority. These minorit

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4. Ibn Khaldun, quoted in Anita M. Weiss, *op.cit*, pp.2-3.

had a protected legal status even though the state claimed to be confessional.

We would not discuss the Islamic law about punishment and revenue as that escapes our scope of discussion. We will now discuss the nature of state in Pakistan which claims Islam to be the chief component of its state-craft.

## 2.2 Islam As Nationality And the Making of Pakistan

For Jinnah, five words were sufficient to describe the vital principle of Pakistan. 'The Muslims are a nation'.<sup>5</sup> In an interview with Beverly Nicholos in 1943, Jinnah confessed that the question of nationality and religion are used interchangeably in this context not 'exclusively' but partly. In a letter to Gandhiji in 1944, Jinnah reiterated his stand... 'when I say the Muslims are a nation, I have in mind all physical and metaphysical standards and values.'<sup>6</sup> It is difficult to establish Jinnah's idea of 'nationality' in a concrete way. But the interpretation that Islam served in the case of Indian Muslim as a mark of identification and differentiation, is nearer to truth. Islam gave their separatist movement an identity and as a different cultural set up, in a negative way, gave them the idea of a nation as differentiated from the

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5. Quoted in Shaheed Javed Burki, Pakistan; A Nation in the Making (Karachi, 1976) p. 44.

6. Quoted in Al Shariif Mujahid (ed.), Ideological Orientations of Pakistan (Karachi, 1976), p.144.

Hindus (as a nation). Bizenzo, a Baluch leader sums up Jinnah's mind very precisely:

The sum and substance of Jinnah's stand was not that the Muslims were a nation but that the Muslims of India had attained all the essential features and characteristics which were sufficient for differentiating them from the Hindus of India on the basis of culture, history, specific social and economic interests and different values and thus they were qualified to live in a separate territory of their own to safeguard their common interests and to that extent they should be treated as a separate nation<sup>7</sup>.

A number of factors go into the making of the concept of nation; i.e. common language, shared history and ethnic ties. However these objective conditions poorly explain national identity. The decisive factor determining the strength of a nation is subjective and psychological; a people form a nation when they think themselves to be one. Muslims in India were indeed strongly conscious of their Muslim identity as something that radically distinguished them from Hindus. Even if they were not grouped together geographically and spoke different languages, the feeling that they were different from the Hindus haunted them and this feeling of separateness served as the necessary binding force. The concept of the 'Ummah' was revitalized and in different dispersed pockets of Muslim habitation, a strong feeling of a separate identity was secretly nurtured. This is the feeling which led the Muslims up in arms against their fellow Hindu brethren in the wake of the call for 'Direct Action' by the Muslim League; which reconciled the Congress

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7. Quoted in Pandav Nayak (ed.), Pakistan: Society and Politics (New Delhi, 1984), p. 4.

leaders to the idea of Partition. For they were to choose between Partition and civil war.

The Partition could not burry communal antagonism. The Muslims got the state they demanded. They had overwhelmingly voted in favour of Pakistan in the elections in 1946.<sup>8</sup> But in the wake of the Partition they were left in a quandary; they could not migrate en bloc. The leaders left for their new state, the masses were left behind. The non-Muslims of Pakistan who had an experience of the 'Direct Action' left Pakistan for India. The riots in the wake of Partition made the sub-continent blind with rage. The leaders of Pakistan were to recount the experience in a flattering voice : 'We crossed a river of blood to achieve independence'.<sup>9</sup>

With the establishment of Pakistan the first task before the leaders was to provide a constitution for the new state outlining its priorities and objectives. Jinnah's oft-quoted address on 11, August 1947 signified the nature of things to come under his leadership. Jinnah had begun to realize that partition would leave a sizable non-Muslim minority in Pakistan. His address was overtly secular in tone and content:

You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the state. .... We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another. ... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state (Loud Applause)... Now I think you should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease

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8. Jinnah had clearly linked the elections to the demand for Pakistan See f.n. 21.

9. Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, (London, 1967) p.101.

to be Muslims not in their religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as the citizens of the state.<sup>10</sup>

As far as the constitution was concerned Jinnah foresaw a democratic constitution with the doctrines of Islam incorporated into it. But he denied theocracy. In his broadcast in U.S.A. in 1948, he said:

Islam and its idealism has taught us democracy, it has taught us equality of men, justice and fairplay to everybody. We are inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligation as framers of future constitution ,....In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by the priests, with a divine mission... we have many non-Muslims..... but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as other citizens and will play<sup>11</sup> their rightful part in the affairs of the state!

### 2.3 Islam And Pakistan's Constitutional Evolution

Implicit in the demand for Pakistan was the demand for an Islamic state. Pakistan owes its birth to the fact that the Islamic feelings of the people wanted to take the expression through a State. Jinnah's charisma as the Quaid-e-Azam could have acted as a safety valve against the fanatic zeal of the Muslims of Pakistan to establish a rigid Islamic state. Jinnah favoured the creation of a democratic state, but the theoretical inconsistencies of the advocates of two nation theory made themselves felt in

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10. Jinnah quoted in Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? (Hammondsworth, 1983), p.42.

11. Jinnah quoted in G.W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (Lahore, 1954), p.64.

the practice of fashioning the new republic. Jinnah's death in 1948 sealed the fate of a possible secular polity in Pakistan. Liaquat Ali proved virulent in his zeal of establishing an Islamic State. In the circle of the power-elite this view held sway. The migrant Muslims were overwhelmingly in support of it. the prevailing mood can be gauged from the opinion of a senior officer in Pakistan army:

I am a pure Rajput, my family has been Muslim for only two or three generations. But I felt that India had to be divided and told.... that I would rather live in a small country as a free man than as a sweeper in a large country... I did not want to see my children serving under the Hindus!<sup>2</sup>

Another senior officer also had similar opinions:

.... I think more than anything else it was a desire to have a homeland of your own where you could model it according to your own ideology, your own genius!<sup>3</sup>

No leadership would dare flout majority support in favour of an Islamic state-craft. We will briefly discuss the Constituent Assembly debates in Pakistan over 'objective resolution'. The objective resolution started with the name of 'Allah':

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful; where as the sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to the almighty and the authority which he has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.<sup>14</sup>

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12. Quoted in Akmal Hussain, 'Pakistan: The Crisis of State' in Asghar Khan (ed.) *Islam, Politics and the State* (Delhi, 1986) p.211.

13. Quoted in *Ibid.*

14. Cited in Al Shariif Mujahid (ed.), *op.cit.*p.l.

Then the resolution proceeded to state that the state would observe the Islamic variety of democracy, freedom, equality and justice. The state will enable the citizens (the Muslim ones) in ordering their lives in individual and collective spheres according to the principles set out in Koran and the Sunnah.

Liaquat Ali Khan presented the resolution and argued in its favour:

We as Pakistanis are not ashamed of the fact that we are overwhelmingly Muslims and we believe that it is by adhering to our faiths and ideals that we can make genuine contribution to the welfare of the world<sup>15</sup>.

In the course of discussion he further said:

State is not to be a neutral observer, but an active participant in the religious affairs. State will spare no effort to promote the cause of Islam<sup>16</sup>.

This sort of open politicization of religion as one of the chief ingredients of statecraft would mean hypocritical in a liberal political environment. The case is quite different with the believers. Leonard Binder puts it this way:

If the most repeated theme of contemporary Muslim thought is rejection of assimilation and the reassertion of an authentic Islamic cultural identity, that identity is most often linked to the belief that Islam requires the unity of religion and politics, indeed that unity of all aspects of life in a single cultural whole<sup>17</sup>.

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15. Liaquat Ali in *Constituent Assembly Debates*, quoted in *Ibid.*, p.2.

16. *Ibid.* p.3.

17. Leonard Binder, 'Islam, Ethnicity and State in Pakistan' in Al Banauzzi and Myron Weiner (ed.), *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics* (Lahore, 1989), p.263.



Most of the Muslim members of constituent assembly whole heartedly endorsed the above theme through their discussion over the 'Objective Resolution'. There was an overwhelming support in favour of the resolution. The voices of dissent of some minority-leaders (HIndus) could not rise above the general clamour of assent.

Since 1947, the country has tried at least half a dozen of different political systems and four formal constitutions. The constitution of 1956 was the first on the list, a West Minister type. Islam was to be the guiding Principle. The constitution was declared Islamic and the state 'The Islamic Republic of Pakistan'.

Then come the constitution of 1962; Ayub Khan's constitution. Ayub was a clear break from the past. He seemed to be a man of secular credentials. His design was to frustrate the orthodox ulema seeking an inlet into the affairs of the state. In a speech in 1959, Ayub declared; 'The miracle of Islam was that it destroyed idolatry, and the tragedy of Muslims has been that they rendered religion into an idol'<sup>18</sup>. Ayub dropped the term Islamic from the Constitution. There was a lot of hue and cry over the issue and the name was restored. But it was the irony of history that when he contested the election for the Presidentship he was to bank on the 'Fatwah' of the Mullah, and his contestant Begum Fatima

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18. Ayub quoted in Edward Mortimer, *op.cit.*, p.211.

Jinnah relied on Maududi who has published so much literature, against the idea of a woman becoming the head of the state. During those days, all conviction, all ethics was thrown to winds. The compulsions of democratic politics rent the monolith (of religion) asunder. Soon after his elections Ayub declared that every law had to be subjected to the interpretation of a group of religious scholars to check if it clashed with the spirit of Islam. Ayub had covered the whole circle. Once in the school of politics he learned how powerful Islam could prove so far as exploiting mass mind is concerned.

In the meanwhile the secessionist Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan in 1970 with the help of Indian troops the Mukti Bahini broke away from Pakistan, and established Bangladesh. It was a failure in the Islamic experiment. Islam proved a poor cement, a poor binding force.

The same period saw the emergence of Butto. Banking on his scheme of 'Islamic Socialism' which appealed to people in Pakistan, He came to power in West Pakistan. The secession of East Pakistan produced widespread disenchantment with Islam. Regionalism sprang up. 'Pakistan of 1971' was a mosaic of many different people. They spoke a number of different languages; Punjabi, Sindi, Bruhui, Pushto, Baluchi, Saraiki, Urdu and belong many different cultures'<sup>19</sup>. The timely assertion of a number of

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19. Shaheed Javed Burki, *op.cit.*, p.71.

religious parties with their virulent call for Islamicization could offset the centrifugal shock registered by the secession of Pakistan's East Wing. Bhutto had to reorient his socialist endeavours along the lines of orthodox Islam, to counter this threat of Islamic resurgence. The constitution that the constituent Assembly drafted under his leadership took absolute care not to hurt the religious sentiments of the people stirred up by the new wave of fundamental politics. His constitution declared that Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan and that the state shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among the Muslim countries based on Islamic unity.

The elections of 1977 returned Bhutto to power with a majority quite unexpected in view of the opposition he encountered. Bhutto's PPP (Peoples party of Pakistan) was poised against PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) a combination of nine political parties of conflicting ideologies (from the right wing Jamiat-i-Islami to the left wing National Awami Party). The success of Bhutto created suspicion among the opposition leaders. Foul play was suspected. 'Operation fair-play' by Zia-ul-Haq ousted Bhutto when conciliatory talks between him and the opposition leaders failed. Zia's coup-de-tat was viewed (like Ayub's and Yahia's) not as the product of personal ambition but as a political imperative. Bhutto was executed in a charge of murder. Zia did not fulfill his promise of

holding fresh elections within ninety days. He went on to excite the religious sentiments of the people and held fast to the reigns of power till his death in 1988. He sought indirect support of masses through different means. One was the referendum of 19, December 1984. Voters were asked to say yes or no to the question whether the people endorsed Zia's moves of Islamicizing the state in Pakistan; for bringing the laws of Pakistan into conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan';<sup>20</sup> for the contribution of this process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. Sixty percent of the 34 million voters said to have cast their ballots; of these an overwhelming 98 percent said yes. This was more the success of Islamic politics than Zia's. The following elections of 1985 was fought on non-party basis Zia, through stirring up an accident which killed him in 1988 Zia's period saw the Islamic bomb and the amended constitution of 1973, which was made more Islamic. Even the fiscal policy, the mode of punishment were changed to suit the needs of Islam.

Rise of Benazir to power after the elections of 1990 has not in the least affected the stress on Islam in the affairs of the state.

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20. *Ibid.*, p.78

#### 2.4 Pakistan's Attitude Towards Indian Muslims

The partition of the sub-continent on the basis of religion was never complete. True, majority of Indian Muslims, fed on the dreams of a homeland away from the Hindu domination and supported by the British patronage; opted for Pakistan in the elections of 1946. Jinnah declared on 1, November 1946:

Pakistan is the issue in the election The Hindus and Muslims are different in everything. We different in religion civilization and culture, in history, in language in architecture, in music in jurisprudence and laws in food and society, in our dress, in everyway we are different.<sup>21</sup>

Once Pakistan was carried out of the Indian Union the Muslims who voted for league and Pakistan could hardly reconcile to the idea of a migration. Many migrated. Many more stayed behind some of them did not have the material support to afford a resettlement . Some of them were secular-minded nationalists. One of the violent champions of the cause of Pakistan, Shuhrawardy seemed to be in a fix. He continued to stay in Calcutta. But Abul-Ala Maududi who was opposed to the idea of Partition left for Pakistan. But on the whole a substantial percentage of the Muslim population still continued to live in India. Many of them still owed loyalty to Pakistan as a nation. The Times of India correspondent reported on 16, April 1986 on Bhopal riots

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21. Quoted in Aloo Dastoor, 'Communalism as viewed by a Political Scientist' in Asghar Ali Engineer and Moin Shaker (ed.), Communalism in India (Delhi, 1985) p.71.

that the rioters shouted slogans like 'Pakistan Zindabad'. 'The shouting of 'Pakistan Zindabad lends credence to the belief that the incident was engineered by certain anti-nationals, who were incited by Pakistan.<sup>22</sup>

In fact, from the beginning of the partition, there was the problem of minority which the partition sought to solve. More than one third of the Muslims remained on the Indian side of the partition lines. If Jannah's statement that 'the Muslims are a nation' was to be taken as the definition of Pakistan, this would mean 40 million Pakistanis were living in India. But this was not to be. In practice as a state Pakistan was defined in terms of territory, not in terms of religion which formed its basis. The Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951 barred further settlement of Indian Muslims in Pakistan and it seemed that Pakistan was reconciled to its territorial identity as a state and religion is not going to appear as an irritant, any more, in its relations with India.

However Pakistan has been expressing its concern about the plight of the Indian Muslims over the years. This concern can be attributed to several factors: neurotic misconception of India as a Hindu State; the feelings aroused by close family and cultural ties among the Muslims on both the sides of the border; the increasing need for an integrating principle

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22. *Times of India (Delhi)*, 16 April 1986.

to stitch different assertive regional and sectarian identities together; last but not the least, the Pan-Islamic sentiments unleashed in recent Islamicization manouevres.

In our discussion of the enduring emphasis on Islam in Pakistan, an explanation was sought to explain Pakistani reactions to changing Communal situations in India. The repeated assertion on Islam over the years reveals the féeble foundations of Pakistan as state. As an ingredient of the state of Pakistan (even after she breaking away of Bangladesh), religion' (often confused with nation as a concept) has taken precedence over territory in the psyche of the people of Pakistan. To state it otherwise, Pakistan is more of a religious state than a territorial one. The stress on religion as an identity-mark has varied in intensity depending on the force of the situational compulsions; but it has come to stay nonetheless.

Pakistan as a movement, of the Muslims of the sub-continent seeking a territorial identity, was never complete, (with an overwhelming Muslim population still left out in India). In such circumstances, the excessive insistence on Islam as a component of the state has infused in the people of Pakistan a Pan-Islamic extra-territorial feeling which showed its teeth, in the face of communal disturbances in India.

Leaders like Z.A. Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq even tried to excite the Pan-Islamic feelings of the people of Pakistan as a counterpoise against threats of disintegration. During Bhutto's rule, some Pakistani leaders had dreamt of Pakistan serving as a nerve centre of the Pan-Islamic Movement. With Zia in the saddle the idea had become an item in the agenda of Pakistan Government's policies. Zia's insistence on the modernization of Muslim 'Ummah' according to the principles of science is a significant pointer in this regard<sup>23</sup>. Such Pan-Islamic concerns can better explain Pakistani reactions which we will study in the subsequent chapters.

#### Reactions of the Leadership :

The leaders of Pakistan always suspect or pretend to suspect Hindu hand behind every riot taking place in India. Liaquat Ali Khan in a press conference in Karachi on 27, February 1990 commenting about the riots in Calcutta accused Patel of inciting the Hindus of Calcutta to indulge in violence: 'On January 1950, the Deputy Prime Minister of India made statements at a Public meeting which could not but incite the Hindus of Bengal to violence. He referred to the days of direct action, and the situation in Calcutta which followed in its wake'.<sup>26</sup> Liaquat described these riot as 'Anti-Pakistan, and anti-Muslim crusade' in which the Hindu leaders used a minor incident to fan the flame of communal

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23. Zia Addressing Islamic Scientific Convention in May 1983 said:  
'Harmonious blend of eternal values of Islam through understanding of reality, provided by scientific knowledge is just the right synthesis for the growth of the Islamic Ummah'.
24. M. Rafiq Afjal (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan (Lahore, 1975) pp.329-331.



passions against the Muslims<sup>25</sup>.

The exodus of Hindus from Pakistan reached its climax in 1956. The migrating people carried with them the germs of communal antagonism; the stories of their torture in Pakistan by the Muslims, sometimes exaggerated beyond measure; which precipitated in communal violence in different places in India, in 1956, 1959, 1962. During January-March 1964 a severe communal holocaust engulfed the eastern part of the sub continent, over the theft of Holy relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Kashmir. In industrial centres of Jamshedpur, Roukela casulatres were to high Pakistan lodged serious protests against these riots.

During 1966-70 the minority problem plagued the relations between India and Pakistan. Ayub Khan reportedly said on 22 September 1968 in Dacca that India was exercising genocide against Muslims and practising 'history's worst apartheid'.<sup>26</sup> Indira Gandhi took strong exception to such statements which led to a slump in the bilateral relations for the moment. The 1970s were less disturbed in terms of communal disturbances. The eighties however was replete with communal riots.

Riot situations in India usually become strong rallying points for unity in Pakistan. Pakistan has always thrust upon itself the task of defending the Muslims in India,

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25. *Ibid.* p.330

26. Ayub quoted in Ghulab Mishra Prakhar, Indo-Pakistan Relations: Tashkent to Shimla (Delhi, 1987), p.210.

who in their hours of peril look to Pakistan for help in the form of strong reaction. The leaders of the Muslims in India always have the feeling of the shadow of Pakistan buttressing them up from behind, irrespective of whether they need it or not. The view of ulema about India Muslims further assures these leaders. The ulema indirectly uphold the concept of 'ummah'. The ulema conference of 1951 had decided that 'the Muslims all over the world were one and the same nation', and they need Pakistani help in the hours of their peril. The ulema stated before the Munir committee that 'Muslims could not be loyal citizens under a non-Muslim government and that in case of war between India and the Islamic state of Pakistan the Indian Muslims should either side with or migrate to Pakistan',<sup>27</sup>. During recent years it is the ulema, which moulded significant section of population in Pakistan. Zia's patronage has made them more assertive even. The recent Pakistani reaction over Babri Mosque and Bhagalpur riots shows, the fundamental temper of the religion has not in the least been blunted by the territorial dismemberment of the continent. The division has been an excuse for expressing concern rather.

## 2.5 Islam And Nature Of Indo-Pak Tension :

The Indo-Pak tension is a prolongation of the Hindu-Muslim feelings that characterized India long before the Partition. There is still a strong feeling behind the statement

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27. Cited in Anwar Hussain Syed, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity (New York, 1982), p.77.

that the two cultures, Hindu and Islam, can never be bridged up. ON either side of the border as such, the feelings of hostility are nourished with a spirit of wishful resignation. Rather strong efforts are afoot in Pakistan to rewrite history. Education in Pakistan, from schools to universities is being fundamentally redefined.<sup>28</sup> The role of religious parties has been instrumental in registering such a redefinition. The text-books are Islamicized with Islam being taught with all its ritualistic, orthodox temper. Moreover in Pakistan, because of the adoption of an exclusivist national ideology, there are no constraints on the free expression of communal hatred. 'Thus, the Hindu is portrayed as monolithically cunning and treacherous, obsessively seeking to settle old scores with his erstwhile masters.'<sup>29</sup> History books mention the break up of Pakistan as a deliberate evil design of the Bengali Hindu. This deliberate revival of communal antagonism after so many years of partition suggests that it is rather a matter of political expediency than religious orthodoxy.

So long as Pakistan goes on claiming its Islamic foundations, such contradictions will be there. Of course Islam is used as a uniting factor in Pakistan as an antithesis of Indian secularism on one hand and as a wholistic framework submerging the sectoral and regional differences on the other. Otherwise system would be rendered unworkable. But

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28. Parvez Amirali Hoodbody and Abdul Hamid Nayar, 'Rewriting the History of Pakistan' in Asghar Khan (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.164.

29. *Ibid.*, p.175.

the overemphasis on Islam makes the religion barren both as a philosophy of life and as ethical code of temporal behaviour. Several Pakistani scholars admit it that the concept of Pakistan and the ideology of the nation. Waheed-uz-Zaman would say that:

The wish to see the Kingdom of God established in a Muslim territory was the new *raison d'etre* of the new nation state.... If we let go the ideology of Islam, we cannot hold together as a nation by any other means .... If the Arabs, the Turks, the Iranians, God forbid, give up Islam, the Arabs yet remain Arabs, the Turks remain Turks, the Iranians remain Iranians, but what do we remain if we give up Islam?<sup>30</sup>

President Zia had the same argument to proffer up:

Pakistan like Israel is an ideological state. Take out Judaism and it will collapse like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state, it will collapse<sup>31</sup>.

Such arguments seek to hide a terrible sense of identity crisis a nation is undergoing. The stress on Islam as a only mode of survival of the nation is born out of an insecurity complex characteristic of a nation which is aware of its fragile foundations, but parades its weakness as a show of strength. So far as the subjective element of a state is concerned Islam fills in the vacuum in case of the state of Pakistan. But in practical affairs of state, Islam has to be applied with caution if it is applied at all.

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30. Quoted in Edward Mortimer, *op.cit.*, p.216.

31. Quoted in Tariq Ali, *op.cit.*, p.133.

Especially the orthodox elements of Islam need considerable overhauling and progressive interpretation. The secular elements need to be stressed upon. The memory of a splendid past, aggressive and radiant, should never overawe its adherents beyond reason. All this required some amount of openness. A reference to the Munir report on anti-Ahmadiya riots is relevant here:

Nothing but a reorientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless, can preserve it as a world idea, and convert the Mussalman into a citizen of the present and future world, from the archaic incongruity that he is today..... Our politicians should understand that if Divine commands cannot make or keep a man Mussalman, their statutes will not.<sup>32</sup>

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32. Quoted in Anwar Hussain Syed, *op.cit.*, pp.78-80.

C H A P T E R - I I I

PAKISTANI REACTIONS TO THE COMMUNAL SITUATION  
IN INDIA

CHAPTER - IIIPAKISTANI REACTIONS TO THE COMMUNAL  
SITUATION IN INDIA3.1 Background :

We have earlier discussed the background against which communalism of both the variety; Hindu and Muslim; evolved. We have also discussed how Islam is one of the inalienable ingredients of the state of Pakistan. The compulsions of maintaining an identity have made Pakistan adhere strongly to the ideal of Islam. But for Islam the state does not have any logic for its existence. These discussions were necessary for our present study of Pakistan's perception of communal situation in India.

In this chapter we will discuss the reactions of the Pakistani media, the leaders and intellectuals over the years since the sixties. We have deliberately kept the earlier phase out of our discussion because the spurt of violence in the wake of partition does not need so much of an explanation as a patient study. The communal antagonism prevailing during that period was so obvious; the communal emotion let loose by the parting of ways of the two dominant communities of the sub-continent seemed so natural. The last two chapters suffice to shed some light on the whole thing.

By the sixties things started precipitating. The communal passions subsided and both the countries seemed to have reconciled to each other's existence. Against such a setting we would start our study and see how the well that had the semblance of a happy reconciliation was indeed the eye of the cyclone. The communal situation suddenly shro during the sixties. Then the two nations were at wars. It makes interesting study to perceive Pakistani concern for the belivers left in India, against such a setting.

### 3.2 The Initial Phase: The Partition and Its Aftermath.

The large-scale migrations in Punjab in the wake of partition, were unprecedented in history. This caused enormous bitterness between the peoples of the two countries and had in inescapable impact on the state relations of the two countries. In order to cope with such problems joint statements were made in 1947 september. In April 1948, an inter-dominion agreement was signed for the purpose. The year 1949 saw another fresh spurt of communal violence in several parts of East Bengal and India which necessitated the Nehru Liaquat Agreement of April 1950. The two prime ministers in the declaration assured their minorities of equal citizenship and full security in respect of life, culture property and personal honour". In the agreement Liaquat agreed that Pakistan would hence-forth claim her nationality on a territorial and and not on an ideological basis as enumerated in the objective resolution adopted by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. The



The minorities in both the countries were urged to accept and acknowledge their allegiance and loyalty to the state of which they were citizens. Pakistan was first to violate the terms of such a settlement. Its constitution of 1956 provided that a Muslim could only be the head of the state. The exodus of Hindus from Pakistan, both West and East, started in 1954 and reached its climax in 1956. The minister of the two countries met thrice, once each year, from 1954 to 1956. The minority problem still remained unsolved. The year 1959 saw one of the most communal riots in Bhopal. The rioters raised slogans like 'Pakistan Zindabad', which created doubt in the minds of Indians about a possible Pakistani involvement in the whole thing. The mutual trust which both the countries tried to cultivate at the leaders' level was marred by the hostilities of the people of the countries which had inevitable repercussion on the relations of the two countries. This was the condition under which both the countries entered the sixties.

### 3.3 SELECT PAKISTANI VIEWS ON COMMUNAL RIOTS IN INDIA AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS

#### a) The Sixties

In 1959, 42 communal riots took place whereas the number dropped to 26 in 1960. The intensity of the riots also dropped; the number of casualties dropped from 41 to 14 in the previous year. The number of injured also dropped from 1344 to 262.<sup>1</sup> The year 1960 as such observed some sort of a full indicative of the impending danger ahead. During September, 1960 the Indo-Pak relations suffered a grave setback, due to the problem arising out of Indus river. The situation deteriorated to the point of near-confrontation. Protracted negotiations and mediation of world Bank resulted in the Indus water treaty of September 1960. However, we should have a look at the Pakistani opinion about India during this period, 1959 riots had evoked tremendous reaction in Pakistan. The subsequent Indus water crisis had sharpened their interest in the conditions of their fellow religionist in India shattering of India's secular image emerged as one of the chief concerns of the Pakistani press.

Ayub Khan who at the beginning of his political career had thought of secularising the constitution of Pakistan was seen busy invoking the principles of Islam, under such circumstances, while criticizing Indian secularism to express sympathy

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1. Mentioned in P.R. Rajgopal, Communal Violence in India (Delhi, 1987), p.67.

for Indian Muslims. He knew that by resorting to the spread of antipathy towards India he could muster a large mass following 1960 saw the beginning of his whole effort in this regard.

Coming to Pakistani reaction about India's handling of the communal situation, we can observe how intense Pakistani concern was. The 30th August 1960 issue of *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) carried the reactions of some leaders of Indian Muslims about the inclusion of Hindu mythology in text books. The newspaper reacted "Such education of Muslim boys and girls in their formative years was likely to subvert their religious beliefs and it was now the concern of the Muslims to save their children from such orientation"<sup>2</sup>. The concern raised by Pakistani press was just representative of the public reaction in Pakistan over the injustice meted out to their co-religionists in India.

Pakistani media always cast slur upon the Hindus while interpreting the riots in India. The 1st October 1960 issue of *Pakistan Times* reported that in Bhopal Hindu boys tried to stir up riots by pelting stones at the Durga image, carried near the south gate of Jamia Mosque.

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2. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 30 August 1960.

The communal situation in India worsened in 1961. The corresponding communal situation in East Pakistan worsened to Riots broke out in Jabalpur in January 1961. Pakistani press was very vigilant about reporting the issue in detail. The Hindu leaders in Pakistan were reported to have appealed to Nehru to ensure safety of Muslims in India. The president of Pakistan Hindu Sudhar Sabha reportedly said that the Hindus in Pakistan were treated on par with Muslims in Pakistan and 'India should learn a lesson from Pakistan'<sup>3</sup>. The newspaper, Pakistan Times of 24 March 1961 reported that the Jabalpur riots were organised. The newspaper in its 24th April issue quoted the Jamiat-ul-ulema-Hind leader Maulana Hifzur Rehman to apprise its readers of the communal situation in India. The Maulana reportedly stated in Bombay that in Jabalpur rioters were joined by a section of the government servants. The newspaper printed in bold letters Maulana's remarks on the discrimination meted out to Indian Muslims : 'The discrimination against Muslims in services and almost their ban in the police and army was equally disturbing'

The same newspaper of 11, June 1961 reported about the holding of a Muslim convention in Delhi. The editorial of the newspaper of 14 June 1961 mentioned that the Congress Working Committee agreed to the proposal to hold the convention after much initial hesitation<sup>4</sup> 'It gave its consent because it thought a little embarrassment was better than the alienation of a large section of the electorate', the editor remarked.

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3. Quoted in *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 21 February 1961.

4. *Times* (London), 15 June 1961, also supported this view.

But he was not satisfied with the utterances of the Muslim leaders, whom he alleged to be too nationalist in their orientation. But he quoted these leaders to prove that Muslims were not treated well in India :

If today Dr. Mahmud (one of the congress leaders) finds it necessary to say what he says (that Muslims were treated as 'subjects, criminals, and traitors and were considered unworthy of any position of trust and responsibility') there is no doubt that he must have reached the limits of his endurance, long ago.<sup>4</sup>

Towards the first week of August Ayub Khan gave the call for Jihad on the issue of Kashmir. Like Pakistan Times quoting the Hindu Sudhar Sabha leader, The Times of India (Delhi) of 5 August 1961 quoted G.M. Ansari, the president of Gaya districts Momin Committee as saying that Ayub's Jihad call was un-Islamic. He reportedly stated that Islam 'is not in danger in India and hence needs no defence. President Ayub is trying to play on the religious feelings of Indian Muslims and dupe them.' The minority leaders' statements were often quoted in the newspapers of both the countries, as if it were they who decided the fate of the communal question, and their statements when they conformed to the national mainstream-opinion were held to be uncontestably true.

In September, October 1961, Aligarh was the venue of the riots which centred around a scuffle between the youths of two different communities over the results of a college election. The riots which broke out at Aligarh spread to different parts of U.P. like wildfire. The students upon returning home gave exaggerated accounts of the whole thing which caused these riot-trail. Pakistan government strongly protested such riots. Ayub Kahn called the killings disgusting and disgraceful and ordered his envoy Aga Hilaly in Delhi to lodge protests with Indian Government on this score.<sup>5</sup> Even a leading social and cultural organization, Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam went to the extent of demanding 'an autonomous homeland for Indian Muslims to live peacefully in that riot-torn country.'<sup>6</sup> It urged Pakistan Govt. to take up the issue in several international fora and ensure a separate homeland for Indian Muslims.

The Pakistan Times of 16, November 1961 carried the news of U.P. Chief-minister's denial to enquire into the causes of the riots. This was reported to prove the apathy of the Indian Government in pursuing such cases.

The year 1962 was relatively peaceful. Still, there were riots in Malda (West Bangal) in March. Santhals attacked Muslims in Malda. The corresponding riots in East Pakistan were severe too. The army was asked to step in to control the situation. The Pakistani press-coverage of the happenings

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5. Pakistan Times (Lahore) 3, October, 1961.

6. Pakistan Times, 14, November 1961.

in India was too limited, and less biting. From mid 1962 the exodus of minorities from both sides started on a large scale. India started sending back Pakistani nationals who entered Assam and Tripura as infiltrators. The riots in East Bengal also caused mass migration of left over Hindu population from East Pakistan. Pakistan Government accused India of fomenting trouble by forcing her own Muslim citizens out of the country. The Pakistani press was very vocal about it too. The announcement of new Islamic constitution in 1962 which held non-Muslims as an unequal social minority caused major migrations of Hindu population into India. The year 1963 involved both the countries in verbal warfare over the issue of these cross migrations. Thus the refugee problem went on nagging Indo-Pak relations.

The Bombay riots of September 1963 drew enough attention of Pakistani press. The riots broke out on the occasion of Ganapati immersion. A magisterial enquiry was ordered by the Maharashtra Govt. The editorial of Dawn (Karachi) of 6, September 1963 said that the whole thing was farcical, because a lower official of the rank of magistrate was appointed to carry on investigation in a case in which many of his superior officers were involved.

The Pakistan Observer (Dacca) of 9, December 1963 quoted 'Times' (London) to criticise Indian action of expulsion of

Muslims in Tripura. The newspaper said that the evicted Muslims were Indian citizens by birth:

They are the victims of the local authorities in that territory whose actions are not fully appreciated in Delhi. They may be acting in response to local forces of communal enmity and greed for land but they are acting with injustice and inhumanity.

The same newspaper in its 14 December 1963 issue said that the eviction was carried out in the harvest season to deprive the Muslims of their labour. The newspaper made a mention of Hindu Sabhaites who accompanied the police to serve eviction notices on the Muslims and printed in bold letters that the women-folk were taken through separate routes to the border and were kidnapped in the midway and taken to unknown destinations.

In his first of the month broadcast to the nation on 1, October 1963 Ayub made a mention of the refugee problem:

Things have begun to happen already on Assam-Tripura border where Muslims who have been there for generations, are on India's voters lists and are Indian citizens, are being driven into Pakistan at the point of the bayonet in a hapless condition, after being deprived of all their belongings. The reasons were simple. For one, Muslims are not tolerable to the Brahminic philosophy and secondly this additional influx of population would add to the burdens of Pakistan, the thing nearest to Indian heart!

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7. Raif Ahmed Jafri (ed.), Ayub; Soldier and Statesman (Lahore, 1965), p.217.



Exchange of views on the issue of Kashmir had its impact on the Indo-Pak relations. Ayub's earlier call for 'Jehad' has been discussed. Towards the close of the year 1963, India effected some changes in the Kashmir's administrative set-up; Kashmir's representatives were to be elected directly, the head of the state was to be called the governor. India's effort was to make Jammu and Kashmir one of the special units of the federal set up. Kashmir was accorded a special status and it was declared that the state's accession to the Indian union is final and irrevocable. The changes were preceded by some unrest in the valley. The issue was discussed in U.N.O.. Pakistan's note to India mentioning the move illegal was regarded as an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of India. The unrest that followed the whole thing was alleged to be conspired by agent provocateurs from Pakistan.

#### 1964 : The year of riots

The whole thing reached the climax on 26, December 1963 with the theft of the Prophet's hair from the Hazaratbal shrine. The theft provoked in its wake tremendous religious frenzy which swallowed the subcontinent for quite some months. Bhutto alleged, the report in Dawn said on 1 Jan 1964, that:

The theft has been permitted by Indian occupation authorities and their puppets as part of India plan to reduce the Moslem majority in Jammu and Kashmir to a minority by bringing home to its Moslem population the feeling that the lives, honour and religion of Moslems are not safe and therefore they must leave the state.<sup>8</sup>

Bhutto's interpretation makes the problem look communal and seeks to prove that the Indian Politics is anti-Muslim in its orientation. As would be subsequently seen, Bhutto's stirring up of anti-Indian sentiment had its roots in his clever design to ensure mass support in his favour. In the meanwhile on 3, Jan 1964 the holy relic was surreptitiously returned and later it was established that it was genuine. Jamma Das Akhtar establishes the fact of Pakistani involvement in the theft in his book.<sup>9</sup> The fact that the two culprits Abdul Rashid Tarali and Ghulam Quadir Butt escaped to Pakistan after being released on bail, establishes Pakistani plans of creating communal disturbances in India.

The Pakistani calculation; if at all it was a Pakistani ploy; did not pay off. The theft set off violent communal rioting in Khulna and Jessore on 3, January 1964 in East Pakistan. About 20,000 demonstrators took out a procession in the town and started murdering and looting Hindus and setting their houses ablaze.' More than 8,000,000 Bengali, Hindus, Buddhists and Christians were forced to leave East Bengal and take refuge in India'.<sup>10</sup>

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8. Dawn (Karachi), 1 January 1964.

9. Jamma Das Akhtar, Pak-Espionage in India (Delhi, 1971), p.165

10. Ibid., p.164.

These refugees brought with them harrowing tales of misfortune which easily provoked riots in West Bengal. Towards the second week of January 1964. The Pakistani press went on accusing Indian Govt of engineering the riots, though actually the riots had started in India through Pakistani provocation. Abdul Waheed Khan the minister of information and Broadcasting in Pakistan urged U.N.O. to investigate anti-Muslim riots in India. Bhutto's reaction was stronger even. He said that the present government (in India) had no right to stay in power and should resign.

Ayub Khan sent messages to Radhakrishnan to take 'firm steps so as to bring the present disturbed situation in West Bengal under control! Ayub wrote that 'as the refugees from West Bengal pour into East Pakistan with their tales of woe, the Muslims of Pakistan are bound to feel disturbed'.<sup>11</sup>

The editorial of the daily Dawn on 14 January 1964 called the victims of anti-Muslim riots in India, martyrs. The editor argued with a passion uncharacteristic of a newspaper man, against everying Indian. The editorial accused Gulzari Lal Nanda, the then minister of Home, of inciting the West Bengal riots. It said that Nanda blew the minor protest incident in Khulna out of all proportion and provoked the Hindu communalist to unleash the rampage.'Mr. Nanda did

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11. Dawn (Karachi) 14 January 1964.

in the heartless way of the militant and soul-less communalist', the editor said. He argued that the aim of the government and the people of Pakistan must necessarily be to contain militant Hinduism. The writer suggested seeking of Chinese help':

Militant Hinduism kills and pillages and in every conceivable way seeks to destroy the followers of Islam. ... Therefore as between militant and murderous Bharati Hinduism and God rejecting but otherwise friendly Chinese Communism the Muslims of Pakistan, in the present state of their environment and increasing insecurity, must necessarily turn to China despite their ideological differences.

The editorial of the Dawn of 18th January 1964 accused India of not being able to stand up to the principles of the Liaquat-Nehru Pact. The central communication minister of Pakistan Sabur said that comments of India's Chief delegate to U.N.O. on Pakistan request for holding of emergency session 'made no secret of that the minorities in India were to be regarded as hostages against their desire to annex occupied Kashmir with the Indian union.'<sup>12</sup>

Ayub Khan could not keep himself aloof from the smearing campaign. ON 8th May 1964 Ayub in an interview with MacClear of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation said that Kashmir problem was a 'manifestation of Hindu enmity towards Muslims, towards Pakistan.'<sup>13</sup> On being asked

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12. Dawn (Karachi) 24 January 1964.

13. Rafiq Ahmed Jafri (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.227.

by MacClear whether a repetition of these communal riots in both the countries could set off an armed conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan, Mr. Ayub Khan replied : 'Well, they have the germs of such a thing in them undoubtedly.'<sup>14</sup>

Throughout this period Indian press tried to establish India's secular credentials by quoting Muslim sources. Patriot of 2, April 1964 quoted President Arif of Iraq to mention that Muslims of India enjoy full religious freedom. Hindustan Times of 28 April 1964 said that the delegation of Muslim leaders from Soviet Union after touring India concluded that there was no religious oppression in India.

With the passing away of Nehru on 27, May the Indo-Pak relation suddenly improved with the leaders offering their heartfelt sympathy for the death of Nehru "which deprived India of one of her most illustrious sons." In his monthly broadcast to the nation on 1st June 1964 Ayub Khan observed that it should be easier for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences because both need peace and security to develop their countries and improve the lot of their teeming millions."<sup>15</sup>

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14. *Ibid* pp.229-231.

15. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-64, p.20239.

Ayub's views were seconded by the new Prime Minister of India Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri :

India and Pakistan are two great countries linked together by history and traditions. It is their natural destiny to be friends with the another... President Ayub Khan's broadcast showed both wisdom and understanding, and it has come just at the appropriate time. However, a great deal of patience will be necessary. 16

In 1964 there were 1070 riots according to the reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs in which 1919 people were killed and 2053 people were injured.<sup>17</sup> It was the high water mark of communal riotings in India. The war which followed this trail of rioting is often attributed to the hostile atmosphere created by the anti-Muslim riots. 'Pakistan's strident anti-Indian propaganda campaign constituted the most consistently explosive element in the political preludes to the war.'<sup>18</sup> The hopes generated by the efforts of Shiekh Abdullah had soon died out after Nehru's death, and the brief Ayub-Shastri meeting in late 1964 did not solve the Kashmir issue. The agreement to arrange mutual discussions between the Home Ministers on refugee problems had come to nothing, since Pakistan avoided them. The year 1964 had seen one of those surprising rapid changes in the atmosphere so characteristic of the conflict. (1965 war)<sup>19</sup>

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16. *Ibid.*

17. From the report of the Ministry of Home Affairs, given in Ratna Naidu, *op.cit.*, p.8.

18. Russel Brines quoted in Lars Blinken Berg, India, Pakistan: The History of Unsoled Conflicts (Copenhagen, 1972) p.239.

19. *Ibid.*

Pakistan's attitude may be explained by the following factors. With little known soft-spoken Shastri at the helm of affairs in India, the feeling among the self-confident military rulers was that it might be easier to persuade him into meaningful discussion, with their having an upper hand in the bargain. The presidential elections in Pakistan in which Ayub contested Miss Fatima Jinnah also necessitated whipping up of anti-Indian sentiments to get popular support. Strong references to Kashmir and anti-Muslim riots in India proved electorally profitable.

Thus the spring conflict around Kutch started more because of deliberate designs of Pakistan. Kutch was the area around which Indian preparedness was very poor. After Ayub's tour to Peking in March 1965, Ayub was confident of Chinese support. The fact that China inflicted humiliating defeat on Indian troops in 1962 was fresh in Pakistan memory. As such Chinese support counted much.

Rann of Kutch was too unimportant an area to be fought for. As early as in 1948, Pakistan raised the issue with India declaring the area to be disputed.

But the issue was pursued by Pakistan with blissful unconcern. Unlike Kashmir, Kutch was never an irritant, leave alone a problem, as far as Indo-Pak relation was concerned. India did not have any army contingent there, which must have been one of the factors that explains Pakistani decision to start aggression there. The fact which must be emphasized is that it was Pakistan which started the war by launching an attack on India on 9 April 1965. There were violent clashes between the forces of both the countries after that. It never led to a real war. There were a lot of hot words exchanged in political circles.<sup>20</sup> A ceasefire was mutually agreed upon, in the end. Britain offered to mediate. Shastri-Ayub talks in London in June 1965 were friendly. Bhutto's surprise statement in London however forebode the nature of things to come: 'Rann of Kutch was not a dispute per se. It forms part of a much larger issue. The heart of Indo-Pakistan dispute lies in Srinagar Valley.'<sup>21</sup>

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20. Indian Education Minister M.C. Chagla said on 16 April, 1965: 'There are people in countries who understood the language of strength and toughness, Pakistan is one of them! Ayub fired back on 26 April 1965 that 'if India failed to understand the language of reason and continues its policy of browbeating her neighbours, it will lead to serious consequences., Quoted in Lans Blikenberg op.cit., p.248.

21. Ibid.



Despite the Rann of Kutch settlement the anti-Indian atmosphere was manifest in Pakistan. In May, Dawn had denoted several front pages to reports of open revolts in Kashmir; Bhutto invoked the teachings of Islam and Algeria's fight for freedom was recalled in propaganda leaflets. There was a substantial increase in cross-fires along the borderline in Kashmir. There were other violations too. U. Thant report of 3, Sept 1965 mentioned that out of 377 violations 218 were committed by Pakistan and 159 by India.<sup>22</sup>

The war that started in September 1965 was well pre-meditated upon by Pakistan. There were quite a lot of Pakistani infiltrations into the valley which caused severe unrest in the valley. Later, all this was taken as a pretext to start the war. During 1971 elections in Pakistan however, the leaders started vying with each other to claim the responsibility for starting 1965 war. Bhutto, reported Dawn, while addressing a public meeting confessed that he was ready to own the charge that he engineered the 1965 war against India. He further stated justifying his stand: 'If Quaid-i-Azam was wrong in starting the first war against India, then I am equally wrong.'<sup>23</sup> A military leader Major General Akbar Khan,

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22. *Ibid.*, p.253.

23. Jamna Das Akhtar, *op.cit.*, p.247.

who was the director of weapons and equipment at Pakistan Army Headquarters in 1947 has in a book entitled 'Raiders in Kashmir', claimed that he had prepared a plan for armed revolts inside Kashmir for strengthening the Kashmiris themselves internally.' <sup>24</sup>

The twenty-two day war between India and Pakistan which started on 1 September 1965 and ended on 23 Sept as a result of UN Security Council's ceasefire resolution of 20 September moved jointly by the two super powers. On 4 September 1965, the Soviet Premier Alexic Kosygin offered to mediate an agreement between the two countries. India and Pakistan agreed to meet under Soviet auspices at Tashkent. The meeting started on 4 Jan. 1966 and continued upto 10 Jan. 1966. The declaration proclaimed non-interference in the internal affairs, promotion of understanding, and friendly relations between the people of the two countries, renunciation of force to settle disputes, encouragement of propaganda that promoted friendly relations between the two counties and withdrawal of armed personnel to positions held by them prior to 5 August 1965. Writing in the December 1980 issue of

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24. *Ibid.*

Defence Journal (Pakistan) Brigadier A.R. Siddiqui (Retd.)

wrote :

Psychologically the 1965 war created a sense of achievement and pride which though not unjustified was out of proportion to the real achievement... With the passage of time the military stalemate or a partial victory, at best, was transformed into total victory. Much was made of Pakistan quality neutralising Indian quantity... An image or myth of military invincibility was thus born... A publicity-shy person by nature and training the professional warrior began to develop a publicity consciousness.

In the December 1965 Pakistani press expressed serious concern over the torture of Muslims in Indian jails. Dawn wrote :

The only fault of Indian Muslims rotting in jails was that they happened in one way or other to be the relatives of Pakistani Muslims. Some others were considered suspects and put in jails.

The paper mentioned that the Hindu prisoners including those undergoing life-imprisonment in murder cases were better looked after.

The year 1966 started with a note of peace, though, within a month or two the two countries reverted to their earlier positions so far as the smearing campaign is concerned. The Pakistani leaders spared no chance to

expose the contradictions in Indian secularism. A new perception of India started emerging; that India which was taken to be a Hindu nation was not actually so because Hindus were not a single nation, and there are several nationalities within its fold. President Ayub said in his address to Pakistan Muslim League Council at Dacca on 19 March 1966 :

So far as the secession threat was concerned it is happening anyhow. The Nagas, Mizos, Sikhs and South Indians are already engaged in such a struggle. 25

The editorials of Morning News (Dacca) and Dawn (Karachi) of 5 March 1966 passionately supported the Mizo demands. <sup>26</sup> The Sikh problem was supported in the budding stage by the Pakistan press. The Pakistani concern, whether genuine or superficial, played its role in sharpening communal differences in India which ultimately led to cleavages.

25. Dawn (Karachi), 20 March 1966.

26. a) Dawn (Karachi) of 5th March 1966 wrote: The Mizo insurrection proceeds directly from New Delhi's policy of sucking into the orbit of Indian culture and polity those people, who owing to their different historical background and cultural personality regard them as non-Indians

b) Morning News (Dacca) of 5th March 1966 wrote that the Mizo rebellion resulted due to and directed against the intolerance the stubborn insensitivity which have characterized the attitude of the dominant community in India.

Keeping the etymology of the word Pakistan in mind Bhutto stated in March 1966 (according to Dawn, 17 March 1966) that 'Pakistan was not to be reshaped or recast but only to be completed.' Inclusion of Kashmir would complete Pakistan's territorial as well as national identity, it implied.

Bhutto said in the National Assembly debates on 15 March 1966, 'India cannot tolerate the existence' of Pakistan. India wanted to destroy Pakistan. In the destruction of Pakistan lay India's most sublime and finest dreams.' <sup>27</sup> In his address to the Muslim League Council cited earlier, Ayub mentioned in April 1966 that :

Indian secularism in any case was a misnomer and at best a wishful thinking. Indian nationalism was based on Hinduism. The same way, the nationalism of Pakistan was based on Islam.

The hate-India campaign by the two leaders, Ayub and Bhutto is understandable in the context of the existing political situation in Pakistan. Ayub's popularity was on the wane after Tashkent Declaration. The Pakistani public opinion was so anti-Indian that no leader could

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27. Cited in Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Delhi, 1970) p.47.

risk his position to establish amity between India and Pakistan. Bhutto's popularity was on the rise as the newspapers gave full coverage to Bhutto's recalcitrance in Tashkent.

The attack on Tashkent declaration formed a major reference point to spread anti-India sentiments. Dawn wrote on 30 April 1966, in an inspired editorial :

One cannot but wonder whence comes the inspiration for these absurd ideas. It is not hard to guess. The inspiration comes from India... If Pakistan agrees, and joint ventures are even discussed, Kashmir and other major disputes will be side-tracked and lose all importance.' 28

In July 1966, Pakistan press reported that India had stepped up eviction of Muslims, Dawn (4 August 1966) reported, resignation of Humayun Kabir's brother Jahangir Kabir from Congress. The ground for resignation was important, in that it alleged that 'Congress had failed to protect the minorities'. Dawn (5 August 1966) reported that fresh quit India notices were served to about 10,000 Indian Muslims.' They were labelled Pakistani infiltrators, while they have been living in India for many years.' The paper reported 3 cases of molestation of

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28. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.44.

Muslim girls on which the police did not take any action. It said that near about 4,000 muslims were sacked from jobs in Calcutta, suspected as Pakistani spies and people having relations in Pakistan met with severe treatment at the hand of the police.

Toward September, October 1966 the communal climate in India worsened because of the issue of banning cow-slaughter. Dawn (16 Oct. 1966) accused Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda that he had by his statement fanned the agitation against cow-slaughter. It quoted Nanda as having said : 'We shall be giving continuous attention to this matter so that any problem... in the way of making the ban country-wide are resolved as soon as possible.' In October a procession demanding ban on cow-slaughter led by the leader of local Janasangh leader attacked Muslim houses in Akola district of Maharashtra. The newspaper said that riots were a favourite past-time with communalist Hindus. The riots were severely condemned in Pakistani press. On November 1966, Dawn wrote that under the cover of cow-agitation Muslims were being slaughtered by fanatic Hindus. It reported that the Pakistani Government ordered its envoy in India to report the details of these Akola riots.

The riots at Udaipur which followed Akola riots were protested by the Pakistan Government. Ayub's interview with John Griggs of Manchester Guardian during this period emphasized two-nation theory when asked if a federal solution weilding India and Pakistan together could be sought recourse to :

Two conflicting ideologies cannot live side by side. We believe in common brotherhood and giving people an equal opportunity; we are not colour or race blind, whereas Hinduism's basic conception is inequality and caste system. 29

It seemed as if Ayub was echoing Jinnah's words. It also indicated that the communal situation in the sub-continent reverted to the pre-partition times. The same uncompromising attitude, the same stress on difference; it seemed as if Pakistan led the Muslims of the sub-continent and India like the Congress Party led the Hindus as alleged by the Muslims.

In March 1967 riots in Hatimpura in Assam were reported in Pakistan Press with characteristic anti-India bias. In May Pakistan Government set up an inquiry commission constituted of judges of Dacca High Court and Pakistan Supreme Court to investigate and examine the causes of exodus and eviction of Muslims from India.

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29. Dawn (Karachi) 19 November 1966.



In May 1967 Pakistan press criticised Zakir Hussain's candidature, which was interpreted as a political stunt to restore the badly cracked facade of Indian secularism.<sup>30</sup> After his election (Zakir Hussain's) Pakistan press launched a vicious campaign to undermine its impact on the common man in Pakistan and to confuse and confound the public of its importance.<sup>31</sup> Mashriq (Lahore) on 11 May 1967 criticised Zakir Hussain :

How could a person play a positive role in the complicated politics of India while his own community does not consider him its representative.

Bhutto said in Jan.1968 while addressing his party's women workers in Lahore :

They make a Muslim, the president of their country and they make a lot of noise about it... They say 'See we have got a secular state, we have given a Muslim the highest position in the country. 32

One can hardly miss the derision associated with the statements.

Z.A. Suleri's article 'India still at it' in 'Pakistan Times' (17 May 1967) about Zakir Hussain's election represented the Pakistani mind well :

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31. Sangat Singh, *op.cit.*, p.50.

32. Z.A. Bhutto, Marching Towards Democracy (ed.) (Rawalpindi, 1971) p.21.

The meaning of the action cannot be lost upon us... For us the salient fact of the Indian scene is not the elevation of Zakir Hussain but the incarnation of Sheikh Abdullah.

Abdul Majid tried to spell out the international repercussions of the election:

A Muslim in the seat of the Mughals may be made to yield a common bond with Muslim countries particularly Arab, to isolate Pakistan. 33

In August came the Ranchi killings. Language was the issue now. 'Dawn' (10 September 1967) reported that most of those killed were Muslims and the non-Muslims killed were done to death on the suspicion that they were Muslims. In Kashmir in the meantime, there started a riot caused by the marriage of a Muslim boy to a Brahmin girl. Pakistan press covered this issue in a cautious way avoiding the fact that the riots were caused by Muslims in Kashmir. The police action to stop riots was condemned rather. 34

In October 1967 the Indian and Pakistani delegates

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33. Abdul Majid. 'Smokescreen for Secularism', Pakistan Times (Lahore) 18 May 1967.

34. Dawn (Karachi), 30 October 1967.

clashed at UN. Indian delegate Prof. Nurul Hassan criticized the Pakistani delegate's reference to Indian Muslims. 'The Pakistani delegate overreached herself to speak on behalf of Indian Muslims. No one except the democratically elected Government of India can represent Indian Muslims.' 35

In February, March 1968 there were serious riots in several Indian cities. Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada urged Indian Government to recognize its responsibilities towards their own citizens. Mr. Pirzada said, '...The Indian Government's endless invectives against Pakistan and their continuous drumming up of alleged Pakistani threat also have made Indian Muslim community an object of suspicion and hatred.' 36

In April there were the Assam riots. The trouble began with Hindus attacking a man carrying a load of beef through the town. 37 This led to serious riots

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35. Statesman (Delhi), 26 October 1967.

36. Dawn (Karachi), 22 March 1968.

37. Times (London), 1 April 1968

in Assam. 'The Times of India' of 4 April 1968 wrote in its editorial that 'the daily barrage of hate propaganda from Pakistan helps to keep communal tensions alive.' The April 1968 riots in Meerut, Kareemganj, Tinsukia, Calcutta and Allahabad helped the Pakistani Press in keeping hate India campaign alive. In July 1968, Ayub Khan appealed to Muslim countries to take notice of the plight of the Muslims in India. 'Dawn' (15 July 1968) printed in bold letters the President's words:

Hindus had come to power after hundreds of years, therefore, they wanted to wreak vengeance on Muslims. They wanted to treat Muslims just as they treated the out-castes of the Hindu society of 4,000 years ago.

In August 1968 the 'Exodus Enquiry Commission' appointed by Pakistani Government gave an unanimous verdict that the conditions of Muslims in India were hopelessly bad. 'Dawn' wrote on 16 August urging Muslim states to unite to protect Muslim minority in India. Towards the end of the month serious riots broke out in Maharashtra. In October 1968 Pakistani Foreign Minister mentioned the case of anti-Muslim riots in India and called for an end to them. In a bid to authenticate its reporting

Dawn of 30 October 1968 quoted New York Times : 'India's 55 million Muslims live in rejection and isolation and a rise in violence heightens their fears.' Of course the rise of rightist parties, especially the R.S.S. generated such feelings in Muslims, and Pakistan perception, even though guided and prompted by different motives, was not altogether misconceived. Golwalkar's address to R.S.S. workers in New Delhi ( the rally of 10,000 strong R.S.S. workers was first of its kind in New Delhi) signalled the rise of Hindu revivalism : 'India is not a private limited company of several share-holders It is the land of the Hindu.' <sup>38</sup> The Cuttack riots of November 1968 provoked serious reactions in Pakistan too. The riots followed the losing of a case by a Muslim leader against playing of music in front of a mosque.

The year 1969 started with Indore riots which followed a gamblers' fight. Towards the end of January Toynbee's references to Prophet Mohammed in 'Statesman' caused riots in Calcutta. Bombay riots followed in February 1969. Pakistan press was very active

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38. Patriot (Delhi) 11 November 1968.

in covering up these riots. 'Dawn' wrote on 17 February 1969 that the majority community in Asia's largest Democracy has often found it possible to give anything an anti-Muslim touch, that comes their way. The Muslim community spread all over the country has been conveniently maligned as unpatriotic, fifth columnists for Pakistan or alien to Indian culture in such deliberate moves.

Just when the nation was preparing for the centenary celebrations of the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of non-violence, violent riots erupted in September 1969 in Gandhi's own state, Gujarat. It all happened in Ahmedabad this way : 1000 Muslims were going in a procession to attend a religious gathering 16 miles away. In the midway they were confronted with some 200 cows herded by some sadhus. There ensued a scuffle. The processionists pursued the sadhus and the cows to a nearby temple. The leaders of minority community apologised immediately. But this could not appease the hurt religious sentiments of the majority community and riots started in full scale. Indian leaders including Jayaprakash Narain suspected Pakistani hand behind murders. The fact that it all happened on the eve of

Gandhi's birth centenary strengthened such suspicion that, it was all designed to disprove India's proclaimed commitment to non-violence. Pakistani press seized the opportunity to explode the myth of Indian secularism. Pakistan Observer (Dacca) of 23 Sep. 1969 wrote in editorial :

We have no illusions about such secular states and their attitude towards the Muslim minority... Since partition there have been so many riots in India. Yet India says it is a secular state and would have the rest of the world believe such a patent lie.

The Pakistan Government lodged strong protests with Indian Government over the riots in Ahmedabad.

In Karachi strong anti-Indian demonstrations were carried out. An effigy of Mrs. Gandhi with the flags of USA and India was burnt. It needs special mention here that USA was not a trusted friend till then. USA arms supply to India was seen with suspicious eyes in Pakistan.

#### b) The Seventies

The year 1970 was the most disturbed of the decade

in terms of riots. In April, riots broke out in Chaibasa when bombs were hurled at a peaceful Ramnavami procession. Riots in Maharashtra closely followed on 7 May 1970. The cause was similar ; Hurling of stones and acid bombs at Shivaji rally on the occasion of Shivaji ayanti in Bhiwandi. Worst disturbances were reported at neighbouring Jalagaon in which 48 people were killed including 16 members of a Muslim marriage party who were burnt alive. Riots took place in Thana and Kalyan. Pakistan Government lodged strong protests. It expressed regret in its report that Indian Government have taken no steps to punish the guilty and ensure the safety of the minority community after the Ahmedabad riots and suggested that: 'This has evidently boldened militant communalists to embark upon renewed persecution of the Muslim community.' A further Pakistani note on 6 June 1970 repeated the request for 'adequate and effective protection.'<sup>39</sup>

Pakistani press in the meanwhile left its usual course of attacking India's secular image. It sought the justification for partition in these riots :

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39. Keesing's Archives, 1969 p.24103



And the riots only prove that Pakistan as a demand pressed by the Muslims of the sub-continent was the only means of self-preservation and survival for them. The continual stream of violence against Muslim citizens further clenches the argument for Pakistan. 40

Pakistani leaders on the eve of the elections were busy gathering mass support in their favour, by stirring up anti-India campaigns. Bhutto's public speeches are a significant pointer in this regard. On 1 March 1970 in a public meeting at Gujarat Bhutto assured his audience that his coming to power would ensure better life for the Muslims in India :

You can ask our enemies, the Indians, whether Bhutto is justified in his claims or not. I give you my word that if people's rule is established in Pakistan, the Indian Government will dare not pursue its policy of annihilation of Muslims in India. 41

In his speech on 8 March 1970 in a public meeting at Mochi Gate, Lahore, Bhutto enumerated the ideology of Pakistan as :

Ideology means service to the Muslims of Pakistan; Well, not only that but also the protection of the Muslims in India, which is possible only when Pakistan is made strong and stable. 42

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40. *Pakistan Observer* (Dacca), 25 June, 1970.

41. Z.A. Bhutto, *Marching towards Democracy* (ed.) *op.cit.*p.21.

42. *Ibid.*, p.37.

All this shows that the public concern about the Muslim in India shaped in a big way, the public opinion in Pakistan, which indirectly influenced politics in Pakistan.



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The atrocities perpetrated on Muslims in India, when it was a fact, evoked responsible reaction in the Indian press, against which Pakistan concern seemed irresponsible, motivated and inciting at times. In November, 1970, Javed Alam, a Muslim lecturer in Salwan college, Delhi was removed on grounds which smacked of communal feelings. The whole thing took place after Javed Alam married a Hindu girl. Janasangh M.Ps supported the move. The whole case was discussed in Indian parliament. Tremendous hue and cry was raised in the Indian press over the issue. The college was threatened with disqualification by the enquiry committee of Delhi University's executive council. Governing body of the college was forced to annul its earlier decision and Javed was reinstated. The Hindustan Times of 12 December 1970 put it as the 'triumph of enlightened public opinion over obscurantism.' Pakistan press reported the case in a small column without carrying details of the furore it

raised in India. The press probably wanted to hide it from Pakistani public that India could be so concerned over the issue.

In the elections in December 1970, Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party emerged victorious in the West Pakistan and Mujibur's Awami League swept the polls in the east wing, capturing 160 out of 162 seats. It seemed the simmering discontent amongst the Bengalis (over the issues of language, economy, politics and security) had borne fruit. In terms of population, contribution to Pakistani economy, Bengalis had an upper hand. But when it came to allocation of funds and overall attention to the woes of the Bengalis, Pakistani Government's treatment was certainly step-motherly. During Indo-Pak confrontation of 1965, the east Pakistan was not paid attention to, so far as its security was concerned. Bhutto's reply was that India could not raise her little finger at east Pakistan because of the threat from China. East Pakistanis naturally felt that if their safety really depended upon the good grace of the Chinese, and fortuitous circumstances of Sino-Indian conflict why should they continue to accept the domination of

the western wing?'<sup>43</sup> In October a terrible cyclone visited East Pakistan. International help reached East Pakistanis earlier than help from West Pakistan. It allayed Bengali suspicion. Mujibur's six-points in 1966 had caught the imagination of the people. The overwhelming success of Awami league in the elections of 1970 renewed their hopes for autonomy. West Pakistan expressed tremendous displeasure over the demand for autonomy in East Pakistan. Pakistani army was utilised to persecute the Awami Leaguers. Yaha Khan's 'Operation Search Light' unleashed terrible violence in East Pakistan. The whole thing continued from March till December. The Mukti Bahini of the Bengalis with the help of Indian forces took over Dacca. 16 December was the day on which 'Bangladesh' came into existence.

In 1971 there was relative communal peace in India. The Muslims fighting Muslims in East Pakistan could have shattered the image of Pakistan as a custodian of the Muslim minority in India. The concepts of 'two nation theory' also no more appealed to the Muslim minority

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43. *Sangat Singh, op.cit., p.21.*

in India. Mazahrul Islam of Rajasahi University Bangladesh said in Madras :

The Muslim League and Muslims in India are still hugging to the illusion that Pakistan is a safe place for Muslims. But we the Muslims of Bangladesh know that this illusion of religion has cast us being the victims of genocide perpetuated by the Muslims of West Bank in the name of religion. 44

In March 1972, on the eve of the Simla-Summit there were riots in Firozabad, Varanasi. India suspected Pakistani hand behind these riots to stifle India's secular image. Simla Accord of June 1972 decided to solve major issues affecting the relationships between the two countries bilaterally. Bhutto, whose election speeches were replete with concern for Muslim minority in India and who rode an uncompromising anti-India wave to power was perhaps cowed down by the turn of circumstance. With the creation of Bangladesh, territory more than religion emerged as one of the major attributes of the state, and this further in experiment of the strength of religion in sustaining a cohesive national consciousness

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44. The Hindu (Madras), 15 September, 1971.

across a geographical distance had in it enough logic; forceful and obvious; to persuade Bhutto in dropping the idea of taking up the issue of Muslims in India with India, on the negotiating table.

During the period of emergency in India, the communal question was lost in the nation-wide stir against authoritarian rule of the Congress. In 1976, in the meanwhile, in its sixth conference the All India Muslim Education society called upon the community to modernise itself as rapidly and uninhibitedly as possible. It demanded the formation of a separate ministry to handle minority affairs. Then came the Janata Government and Syed Imam Bukhari's suggestion of reservation for Muslims in state assemblies and services. Some sympathetic intellectuals favoured the idea of some sort of a limited reservation like 'to relax recruitment qualifications for Muslims<sup>45</sup> on the lower services. The idea was resented in general and the Imam had a taste of press-bite.

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45. Kuldip Nayar, in Times of India (Delhi), 19 May 1977.

From 1978 onwards, the communal temperature rose unexpectedly. In October there were reverse riots in Meerut. In April 1979, Jamshedpur riots took place. In the trail of events that followed these riots it seemed Pakistani reaction was less and less concerned. Girilal Jain larded the Indian muslims : The evidence of Indian Muslims winning freedom from the emotional strangle-hold of Pakistan is so impressive that it is difficult - discerning observer to miss it.<sup>46</sup>

### c) The Eighties

From the eighties the graph of communal riots in India took an upward turn, and Pakistani reaction which hid behind the shame of defeat (in 1971 war) showed its face again. With the fall of Bhutto, a general sense of unrest haunted the public in Pakistan. Zia's military zeal proved no substitute for freedom. The press and the public with their tongue-tied to comment on the domestic affairs of their country, released their pent up anger on India, when they switched over to their favourite topic of communal situations in India.

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46. Girilal Jain in Times of India, 9 May 1977.

In June, riots broke out in Allahabad, in July in Maharashtra and in the 1st week of August in Calcutta. The riots were not so severe. But the riots in Moradabad on 13 August 1980 put everything to shade. In the Moradabad incident men of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) opened fire on about 40,000 Muslims while they were at their Id prayers. It was a clash between the police and the Muslims. It was during the 'Khutba' (the second stage of the namaz) that a pig happened to wander into the Idgah premises despite police patrol outside. This led to a general commotion. There ensued a quarrel between the police and some of the Muslim leaders.<sup>47</sup> The quarrel started getting hotter and the police without warning anybody opened fire on a peaceful crowd without listening to the pleadings of the Imam. The killing started the riots. About 10:00 lock in the night, an outraged mob of Muslims attacked the police station. The mob did not attack any Hindus, any non-Muslims for that matter. The riot was plainly an affair between the police and the Muslims. The police tried to give the whole thing a communal colour. So also did the Pakistani Press.

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47. M.J. Akbar in his book *Riots After Riots*, describes the Muslim reaction to be natural: 'A pig in namaz is just as provocative as slaughtering a cow before a temple. It is not a question of reason or rationale, this is simply how a community feels.'



A lot of hue and cry was raised over the issue in Pakistani press. Mian Tufail Ahmed (defunct Jamaat Islami chief) described the riot as part of a well-planned scheme to liquidate Muslims in India.' The Pakistani Foreign Office expressed concern over Moradabad riots. The Government of Pakistan expressed deep sympathy for the members of the bereaved families. The Indian Ambassador in Pakistan Natwar Singh expressed the Indian reaction: 'The incident has left me diminished as a human being and humiliated as an Indian.'

'Pakistan Times' (Lahore) in its 16 August issue, tried to revive the old logic :

We who live here, enjoying the fruits of freedom and holding our heads high would have met with the same fate... This is a point worth pondering over, by all those who speak lightly of Pakistan and do not attach to it certain due value.'

'Jasarat'(Lahore) of 17 August appealed to Muslim countries to improve economic sanctions against India. A high level meeting at Foreign Office in Pakistan on 19 August 1980 considered to raise the issue at the international level. 22 August was observed in Pakistan

as 'Solidarity day' to express support for Indian Muslims, who were to observe the day as 'Black Day.' The Baluchistan Times of 15 August 1980 carried a big advertisement on its back page demanding, of Indian Government and world community, steps to ensure safety of Muslims in India.

'Nawai Waqt' of 24 August 1980 went further in lampooning Mrs. Gandhi. It displayed a cartoon which showed Mrs. Gandhi telling a newsman : 'Gosh, how could we take beef? The flesh of Muslims we, of course, relish!' Former Pakistan Information Minister Abdul Waheed Khan quoted newspaper to prove that India had sent four Indian students to Spain to study the extermination of Muslims there and the Indian Government has started testing the effectiveness of these methods. <sup>48</sup>

'Jasarat'(Karachi) of 26 August 1980 suspected Soviet hand in organizing anti-Muslim riots in India.

In the same edition the newspaper exploded the

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48. Mashriq (Lahore), 25 August 1980.

secular credentials of some top Indian leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinoba Bhave. It said that J.P. was humiliated in Shahi Quila in Lahore by Muslim policemen and he avenged on the Muslims of Bihar by organizing riots in 1946. It ridiculed Vinoba's 'Bhoodan Movement' as a ploy to weaken Muslim community economically. It mentioned that Vinoba's whole movement was communally motivated for he asked lands from Muslim landlords only and he did not take an inch of land from any Hindu Zamindar. This was utter falsehood but it was believable in Pakistan. Pakistani press, by spreading such unsupported canards contributed to the loss of heart between the peoples of the two countries.

In the meantime, Mrs. Gandhi raised concern over Pakistani Government's public statements concerning the riots in India. This was plain 'interference in domestic affairs', Mrs. Gandhi said and she further stated that she suspected foreign hand behind riots. Pakistani press was quick to react. Jasarat of 29 August 1980 wrote that US, USSR and Israel were behind the plot. Pakistan Times (Lahore) of 2 September 1980 editorially stressed the human aspect of Pakistan's public reaction:

Muslims have peculiarly a strong fellow-feeling all over the world. We feel for struggling Muslims of Palestine and Afghanistan... But the Indian Muslims have a special place in the hearts of the Pakistanis. For after all not so long ago they were the flesh of their flesh and bones of their bones. Therefore if the people were upset it should have been understood.

Shaheed Masud wrote in 'Jasarat' on 15 September 1980 :

The Muslims all over the world have a right to ask the Indian rulers under what compulsion did they grant the Hindus in Morabadad licence for 9,000 guns? The devotees of non-violence who take pride that they even feed the ants, owe an explanation regarding the sport for which they needed these guns? The fools do not even know what to say.

'Muslim' (Lahore) of 24 September 1980, wrote that 'if India claimed the riots to be its internal affairs, on the same analogy, it could perhaps be claimed that Hitler's Jew-baiting in 1930s was a domestic affair of Nazi Germany... holocaust at Soweto was an internal affair of South Africa and... Zionist atrocities was a domestic affair of Israel.'

On 1st October 1980 Zia indirectly raised the issue in U.N. as the Chairman of Islamic Conference. Zia said :

In some countries they (the Muslim minorities) are being systematically reduced to the status of serfs... The very custodians of law and order have become for them instruments of acts of oppression and extermination. This is a challenge to world conscience, and must be met fairly and firmly.

Mrs. Gandhi criticized the address as interference in internal affairs of India. Pakistani press criticized Mrs. Gandhi's comments. Even rejection of adjournment motion on Communal riots in Indian Parliament was severely criticized in Pakistan press.

But strong Indian reactions against such Pakistani opinion could deter Pakistani Government's efforts to reap public support out of it. Whatever anti-Indian sentiments were stirred up was through Press. The press was let loose to fill in the gap created by the withdrawal of the government from the campaign.

In 1981, the responsible section of Pakistani press also indicated the dangers of pushing the relations to the point of confrontation; they admitted that India's political clout was greater than her military prowess. 'Even the idea of a military conflict with India

is not sound... Political solutions are what we need in our disputes with India.', they maintained.

In April 1982, a motion moved by Khurshid Ahmed for discussing riots (in Pune, Solapur, Bihar, Gujarat and Meerut) in India was rejected in Pakistani National Assembly. Khurshid warned the Government of India later that such repetition of genocide of Muslims may compel the Muslims to demand a separate homeland. The Meerut riots were discussed in Pakistan Times on 6 July 1982 and hinted at the fact of involvement of administration at the lower level.

'At the grass-root levels the majority community gets away with violence. Minorities are coerced into accepting dispossession in the wake of sanguinary riots.' In its edition of 21 October 1982 the paper urged international agencies to intervene. In July communal riots broke out in the Indian capital in Kamala Market and Hauz Kazi area. This was reported in Pakistan press as a shame on Indian secularism.

Zia's interview with M.J. Akbar, a Muslim journalist from India, in June 1982, revealed the stance of Pakistani

leadership. Zia defended Pakistani concern on humanitarian grounds. He proceeded to remark :

I wish that Indian Muslims establish their own identity, as Indians and Muslims. It would be a great pride for me to see that Indian Muslims take pride in calling themselves Indians first and Muslims next... There is something common between them and me. And that is Islam itself. So when a Muslim in Pakistan finds a Muslim in India subjected to cruelty because of faith, it hurts. It is only that simple. Now currently we do not even express this. 49

This explains why during rest of Zia's tenure, Pakistani Government reacted less about riots in India.

From 1982, Pakistani Press referred to Nehru-Liaquat pact whenever it raised its concern against India: 'If India has not implemented the pact, the people of Pakistan would refuse to accept Simla treaty.<sup>50</sup> The Assam riots (Neili riots) were strongly condemned in Pakistani press : 'The indigenous population of Assam appears to have unwillingly taken a leaf out of Isreal's recent history of brutality.' The whole thing, the press said,

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49. Sunday, (Calcutta), 13-19 June, 1982.

50. Daily News (Karachi) 15 January 1983.

would make India's relationship with the Muslim countries bitter. 'Mashriq' (Lahore) wrote on 22 February that this happening was a glaring proof of Mrs. Gandhi's political ineptitude' and she should step down. Some people even traced Indo-Israel friendship in this context and quoted Ben Gurion's declaration to justify that the friendship spelt evil for the Muslims. <sup>51</sup> Some people even traced the roots to propagation of Hindu principles :

A rampant obscurantist Hinduism, so blatantly propagated in films produced in India these days has naturally led to violence against those who form an obstruction to the exclusivist utopia envisaged by extremists. <sup>52</sup>

But amid such reactions all around, Pakistan Government chose to dismiss the matter outrightly as an internal matter of India. 'Jasarat' of 4 April 1983 criticized Zia's stand that it was an internal affair of India and said that Zia's silence had greatly disappointed the people of Pakistan.

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51. The declaration ran like this: Relations would have to be established between the state of Israel and the Hindu state for removing from Islam, its virulence', quoted in Muslim (Lahore) 24, February 1983.

52. Pakistan Times (Lahore) 27 September 1983.



The Sikh question started appearing in Pakistani press, from the early eighties.

The Sikhs have been rather late in realising how they have been betrayed, it is clear... That their sacrifices will not go waste.

Throughout 1983 however, the Government of Pakistan raised its voice about Kashmir. Zia was very vocal about the issue. Zia's reaction to Maqbool Butt's hanging in India was very sympathetic : 'Butt was a great freedom fighter.' Lahore High Court Bar Association described the hanging of Butt as 'a judicial murder.' 'Business Recorder' of 16 February 1984 wrote : 'He may survive in Kashmir's soul just as Saint Joan does in the French passion for liberty.'

The May riots of Maharashtra were differently interpreted in the context of the Punjab rising. The May riots were said to be engineered by Indian authorities to serve as a diversionary tactics to Punjab problem. Amidst such voice of indiscriminate criticism there were some voices too. In an editorial page article M.B. Naqvi wrote in 'Dawn' on 30 May 1984 to stop such criticism and 'to create conditions in which our relations with India as well as inter-communal ties should flourish.'

In such an atmosphere the Sikh problem had caught the imagination of Pakistani press as a fertile excuse to criticise India. Z.A. Suleri wrote in 'Pakistan Times' on the recent army action over Golden Temple on 23 June 1984 in a language which was inciting. He wrote that during partition Sikhs could not foresee the danger of being swept over by Hindus. If Sikhs could have known it at that time they could have struck a good deal with the Muslim League. But the short-sighted Sikh leadership let the Quaid's offer slip off its hand. He wrote :

Sikh are a classic example of a lost people. They might protest and agitate but the tentacles of Hindu majority will never relax their grip on them... Brahminism is a jealous creed... It either seeks to absorb non-Hindu cults into Hindudom or to reduce them to serfdom or non-entity. Look at the fate of Buddhism and Jainism. They hardly exist in India except in relics which they have left behind.

In 1984 there were strong pressures on Zia to speak out. Zia admitted it in an interview with 'Time':

When there are atrocities against Muslims in India, we feel very strongly about it. But as a matter of deliberate policy over the past 4 years, I have not spoken a word... I am under heavy pressure from

my own people to speak out, I tell them,  
'it should be upto India to look after its own  
minorities.'" 53

Even this interview made Pakistanis unhappy about the whole thing : '...the Indian Muslims are more sinned against than sinning. Being our first cousins they look for our strong moral support in the hour of agony. 'Jasarat' (Karachi) wrote in its editorial that Zia's efforts at improving Indo-Pak ties were commendable ;

...but friendship cannot be by a single person, it is between two nations. In the hour of the riotings against Indian Muslims, it is wrong to expect the Pakistanis to have a desire for conciliation and understanding.<sup>54</sup>

A significant section of public opinion favoured the idea of avenging the dismemberment of Pakistan by supporting the Sikh cause :

The Hindu has been nor will ever be our friend... We suffered a great blow in east Pakistan. The Sikhs have provided us a golden chance to hit back. Pakistan could put forward the same justification for supporting the Sikhs as India had offered for helping Bengali Muslims.<sup>55</sup>

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53. Zia Quoted in Dawn (Karachi) 3 July 1984.

54. Editorial page article by A.T. Choudury in Dawn (Karachi) 3 July 1984.

55. Editorial page article by Rana Mohammed Tablish, Wafaq (Lahore), 8, August 1984.

From the early eighties, the Sikh problem started affecting Indo-Pak relations, with India suspecting Pakistan involvement in the Sikh uprising. Rajiv Gandhi's new leadership raised hopes in Pakistan as well as fears when Indo-USA relations started taking a better turn in 1985. 'Jang' wrote in 6 January 1985 to 'keep a watch on the thinking of our friends and rivals... and suitably readjust our policies... if there is any change in their thinking that might affect our interest.' From this it becomes obvious that Pakistan public opinion could never take USA-Pakistan relationship for granted.

On 14 March 1985, A.R. Changez wrote in 'Pakistan Times' that :

The Muslims would take pride in calling themselves Indians provided the Hindus leave alone their golden past, remove Ashoka Chakra from their flag, forbid the singing of 'Bande Mataram' and introduce Hindustani as the language of India.

These were serious propositions to make, clearly showing the uncompromising mood going with it. From the statement it seems as if the people in Pakistan by their Pan-Islamic psychological links with the Muslims of India

knew their minds better, and thus making the demand before Indian Government as their leaders.

In June 1985, Pakistani Minister of State, Zain Noorani raised the issue of recent riots in Ahmedabad in Pakistan National Assembly. His voice was very persuasive :

Pakistani Government adhered to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, including India. Yet the Pakistanis could not remain indifferent to the plight of human beings, particularly those with whom they had ties of family bonds and bonds of religion and history.

But the motion was inadmissible in the assembly. 'Jang' of 13 August 1985 mentioned the seizure of Delhi's Jama Masjid by Hindu goondas and warned the Indian Government to ensure steps to 'protect the minorities, for it cannot befool the world for long with its hollow claims of secularism.' Mashriq of 16 August 1985 wrote that : 'the Hindus prove their courage only by their numbers., The writer justified Pakistani right of interference in the communal question in India by quoting Jinnah's speech of 11 April 1946 :

... If they ill-treat their Muslim minority, we shall not remain silent spectators... If during the days of Lord Gladstone, Britain could interfere in Argentinian affair in the name of protecting the minorities why can't we have the same rights?'

'Pakistan Times' of 18 November 1985 served the logic that India is fanning up Tamil problem and is pursuing coercive diplomacy with interventionist strategy. 'While India criticizes Pakistan for inciting Sikhs and Muslims it does precisely the same in case of Tamils.' Pakistan therefore, should not pay attention to Indian allegations and pursue a policy of interference and intervention.

'Jang' of 7 December 1985 covered the issue of Shahbano case and Muslim Personal Law and commented : 'Perhaps the conspiracy was that if the Indian Muslims kept quiet at the first crack in their family law it would be easy to destroy their Islamic identity.'

In February 1986, there was a tremendous reaction in Pakistan about the issue of Ayodhya temple and the riots that followed in its wake in Meerut, Agra, Lucknow,

Srinagar. The 18 February 1986 edition of 'Pakistan Times' urged Pakistani Government to intervene, because 'Indian Muslims are being punished for having supported the Pakistan Movement. It is therefore, the national religious communal and moral duty of Pakistani Muslims to raise their voice in support of the oppressed Indian Muslims.' On 20 February 1986 Zain Noorani's efforts at raising Babri Mosque issue in Pakistan Senate failed.

Zia's efforts to normalise relationship were criticized as too hasty keeping in background the deteriorating situation in Punjab and Muslim unrest over Shahbano case and Babri Mosque.<sup>56</sup> The issue of Babri Mosque was discussed in great details in Pakistan. The Indian court judgement was criticised as 'rankly tantamount to court terrorism and judicial blackmail.'<sup>57</sup>

The attacks on Indian secularism was repetitive but were couched in a language which was capable of arousing violent reactions in India. 'Such happenings demonstrated the dominant Hindu community's primitive barbarism.'<sup>58</sup> It was because of the narrowmindedness

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56. M.H. Ansari in Pakistan Times (Lahore), 21 February 1986.

57. Morning News (Islamabad), 2 March 1986.

58. Muslim (Lahore), 21 July 1986.

and communalism of the majority in India that Punjab has come to such a pass that Sikhs are demanding a free state.' <sup>59</sup> The attack on Indian secularism was a ploy to appeal for national unity in Pakistan, because by that time separatist tendencies had started emerging. Jasarat wrote that :

The divisive forces should learn a lesson from the atrocities being perpetrated on Indian Muslims. They should realise that because of having a free-homeland not only their life; property and honour is safe, but they also breathe the air of freedom.'

Under the pressure of rising public opinion Pakistani Government expressed concern over excesses perpetrated on Muslims within limits of diplomatic behaviour. However, in Pakistani National Assembly the issue was discussed to be an internal affair of India. As Zain Noorani said, 'the heroes of Simla Accord considered Liaquat-Nehru pact as dead. In the changed context, Liaquat-Nehru Pact, under which people argued that the government could still raise its voice was redundant, there was no time limit mentioned for its expiry.' <sup>60</sup>

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59. Jasarat (Karachi), 17 June 1986.

60. Dawn (Karachi) 5 October 1986.



The 6 November 1986 issue of 'Nawai Waqt' ridiculed Indian export of canned beef :

...before partition non-Hindus could not dare to look at mother cow with evil intentions...but now 'Parshuram' himself is exporting beef to fill his purse... Economic pressure are so strong that human beings cannot withstand them.

In its editorial 'Jasarat' wrote in 11 December 1986 that communal division was kept alive in India by propagating anti-Muslim sentiments through deliberate distortion of history in text-book in India. It alleged that the text-books portrayed Muslim rulers as oppressors and Rakshyasas who plundered and pillaged, desecrated temples and built mosques over them.' Referring to Bangalore riots which started in the wake of the publication of some objectionable material on the life of the Prophet Mohammed in 'Deccan Herald' (Bangalore) it wrote:

The Muslim women have not become barren and they can still give birth to hundred-nay-thousands of Illmuddin Shaheed. (Illmuddin killed Rampal who wrote a sacrilegious book against Mohammed.

During April, May 1987, riots took place in Meerut. Badshah Khan was in India during that period, undergoing

treatment in Bombay. Pakistan press criticized Badshah Khan's silence over Meerut riots. But Indian papers carried Badshah Khan's appeal nonetheless. But Pakistani press did not bother to test the validity of its allegations. The press had lost its balance in the heat of the moment. Pakistan Government conveyed its concern over Meerut riots to Indian Government in a restrained way :

Avoidable loss of human lives naturally evoke humanitarian sorrow. The grief as well as the concern is particularly acute when the victims are bound to us by ties of family faith, history and culture. 61

Going by the Indian press coverage, 1988 remained a year of intense soul-searching for Indian intellectuals. Communalism and its roots were discussed in newspapers. The discussions were open and responsible. Solutions were suggested. The year was peaceful compared to the previous year. Such condition shifted Pakistan's attention to Indian politics in the region, its under-estimation of neighbours, the issue of Kashmir was

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61. Cited in Morning News (Islamabad), 4 June 1987.

sparingly referred to. Zia's death in a plane-crash unsettled the whole Pakistani atmosphere. In spite of his excesses Zia's was some sort of an emotional anchor for Pakistanis. The nation in its subsequent preparation for the elections forgot at least for the time being, the communal situation in India.

In 1989 even there were limited references to the cases of riots in India. In 1989 there were serious riots in Kota, Badaun, Bhagalpur, Monghur, Indore and Sasaram. Pakistan, busy putting its own house in order after untimely departure of Zia chose to neglect the issues. The condemnations carried less bite with them. Throughout 1989 Indian Government accused Pakistan of training Sikhs and supplying arms to them. The Indian Government even said that it had documentary evidences of the whole thing. The Government put forward documentary evidence in support of Pakistan's support and involvement with terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir.

Pakistan press at the outset started praising V.P. Singh as 'not the kind of politician who like Rajiv would play both ends of the street at Ayodhya.' <sup>62</sup>

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62. Ghani Eirabi in Dawn (Karachi) 8 January 1990.

It termed B.J.P's move to improve Indo-Pak relations as paradoxical. Still it said :

it was President Nixon's reputation as a staunch anti-communist that enabled him to open up to communist China in 1971 without being dubbed 'soft' on communism and in the same way B.J.P. may succeed. 63

With V.P. Singh's minority government coming to power the problem of Kashmir started assuming serious proportions. There was tremendous unrest in the valley. The militants took control of the valley and spread a reign of terror. Pakistani press was soft. The scattered dissent in Jammu and Kashmir has consolidated into a freedom movement and it has acquired a new force... Sheikh Abdullah who at one time was worshipped in the valley is now denounced as traitor.<sup>64</sup> Ghani Eirabic wrote in 'Dawn' on 8 January 1990 that :

Kashmir problem was to be distinguished from Punjab problem because Kashmir was a Muslim majority state to which India has clung on despite knowing the fact that the international opinion is against it... Kashmir is no longer a simmering dispute between India and Pakistan, it is a rebellion by the indigenous population much in the manner of Palestinian 'Intefeda' in Arab West Bank,

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63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*

In the beginning Pakistan maintained silence over the issue. 'Nawai Waqt' in its editorial on 12 January 1990 wrote the 'Pakistani government's silence hurts lovers of Islam.' In its editorial on 10 January 1990 the same newspaper had argued Pakistani involvement in the issue, would solve the Kashmir issue. :

Pakistan has supported the Afghan Muslims to the hilt without caring for the displeasure of a super power like Soviet Union... India is not a super power, why should it be afraid of India.

Towards the end of January 1990, the Pakistani foreign office made its stand clear that Pakistan is a party to Kashmir dispute and is closely following the developments in Kashmir. It was all done after Indian Government declared that Pakistani Government had organized the unrest in the valley. Pakistani press added to Indian suspicion, in the meanwhile by advising the Government of Pakistan to help the Kashmir militia. Khalid Mahmood wrote in 'Nation' on 18 January 1990 :

It would be real politik if Mrs. Bhutto in line with her father's legacy, decides to keep up a pipeline to the indigenously rooted resistance in the valley played it a low keys and at the same time, sought a dialogue with New Delhi.

In the meanwhile, New Delhi's decision to confer Nehru Award on Yasser Arafat was interpreted as a deliberate attempt to placate Muslim opinion abroad. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, the President of PDP alleged that the P.L.O. leader had shown disloyalty to the whole Muslim Ummah by accepting Nehru Award and supporting India on Kashmir issue.

The communal tension arising out of the V.H.P's move to lay the foundation of Ram Janmabhoomi Temple met with serious reactions from the Pakistan side.

Benazir and several ministers of her cabinet took up the issue with some enthusiasm. The unrest in Sindh and ethnic violence in Karachi could have made their reaction expedient. Pakistan started accusing Indian hand behind Sindh trouble. Benazir, in a move to strengthen her political position in Pakistan was forced to make certain statements which were very provocative in nature. On one occasion she reacted that Pakistan was ready to fight with India for Kashmir for one thousand years.

As such in recent months the two neighbours are caught up in yet another controversy over the issue of Kashmir. The non-interference (or one can interpret it as reasoned silence) of the Super-powers has made the issue a regional one. Left to themselves, the two countries have their calculations to make, whether they can afford yet another confrontation. The Z̄arb-i-Momin operation of the Pakistan, which started in December 1989, makes the Pakistan mind amply clear, that Pakistan is not going to be deterred by the prospects of a war. India, her leaders said, was prepared to take on a war with Pakistan if circumstances compel her. This is the context, now, which even makes our study more important. We will now move on to the next Chapter to analyze the Pakistani perception of the overall communal question in India.

## CHAPTER - IV

### CONCLUSION



CHAPTER IVCONCLUSION : THE TWO FACES OF PAKISTANI REACTION;  
THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT.

Perception of a country as distinguished from the perception of an individual is difficult to establish with scientific precision; because ultimately it is the perception of the individuals commonly held over a period of time which determines the attitude of a country, a nation. In the formation of such attitude so many things operate like; historical cultural background of the people constituting the nation; the socio-political compulsions affecting the decision-making structure of a country; selective nourishment of biases/prejudices by the elite to use the tide of national opinion in its favour; crisis of identity of a people inheriting great traditions and obsessed with them. The awareness of the genesis of Pakistan makes the task of a researcher looking for a perception more difficult even, in this context.

With the formation of Pakistan, the British policy of divide and rule, together with the conspiracies of the minority elite in pursuing a policy of intense inter-communal hatred to form a strong power base,

In case of the later, India, the process of democratization and modernization generated strong impulses in favour of secularism and socialism, though, of course, the continuing role of sections of people not affected in substantial measures by this process, led at times to outbreak of inter-community violence. But inspite of all this the secular trend in India was clear and unmistakable.

But Pakistan did not undergo the process of democratization and modernization to a comparable degree. Hence the obscurantist social forces have been continuously dominant there. India has always felt uncomfortable with such a situation in a neighbouring country. And India has blamed Pakistan as a state embodying a medieval religious principle. Pakistan, rather than analyzing the truth in Indian unhappiness has reacted by ridiculing India as a communal state pretending to be secular. Here in this study the focus is on the Pakistani view of the communal question in India.

#### 4.1 A TYPOLOGY OF REACTIONS

The study of Pakistani reactions yields certain types, into which different perceptions over the years

TYPES OF REACTIONS OVER THE DECADES

TYPES OF REACTION	NINETEEN SIXTIES		NINETEEN SEVENTIES		NINETEEN EIGHTIES	
	Public/Governmental		Public/Govt al		Public/Govt al	
Attack on Indian secularism	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	x
Attack on Indian Leaders' secular credentials	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	x
Hindu character of Indian political set up, emphasized	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	x
Seeking a justification for the creation of Pakistan	x	x	Yes	x	Yes	x
Attack on Indian Administrative and police set-up	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Foreign hand behind communal trouble in India	x	X	x	x	Yes	x
Justifying Pakistani concern for Muslims in India	x	x	x	Yes	Yes	Yes
Discrimination against Muslims in services in India	Yes	x	x	x	x	x

Call for another autonomous homeland	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x
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Appeal to other Muslim states to intervene	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	Yes
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Reaction as Political vengeance against Pakistan's dismemberment in 1971	x	x	Yes	x	Yes	x
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for themselves came to a culmination. The hatred that went with the claims for a separate state was intense beyond measure. It survived the partition of the country into two with differing, mutually exclusive, principles as basis of the state. One claimed to be an Islamic democracy, the other a secular tolerant democratic polity. In the case of Pakistan, the experiment with democracy was a failure. Probably, Islam and democracy do not go well together. Military dictatorship was set up in Pakistan, and it served as a prop to the role of Islam, in the economy and politics of the country. Islam was a powerful rallying point (in such a set up; more a community than a polity in the modern sense) for the people who were believers rather than citizens, in the strict sense of the terms. People preferred dictatorship to democracy. Zia in this respect was a keen student of Muslim behaviour:

Muslims by nature - I know about Pakistani Muslims - demand authoritarian rule. They believe in one God, one Prophet, one book, perhaps they want one ruler also. 1

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1. *Zia in an interview with M.J. Akbar, cited in Sunday, Calcutta, 13-19 June, 1982.*

of the communal question in India can be fitted. The change in type over the last three decades can be put into a table to make our attempt at feeling the Pakistani pulse easier and better. A table of such kind has been made in which the types of reactions are set against decades. The reactions are distinguished as public and governmental. In the former category, we have brought together, the reactions of the press, the intellectuals, the people. In the latter, the reactions of the leaders, the Members of National Assembly and the official statements of Pakistan Government have been emphasized.

Looking at the table one can have a better appraisal of the whole thing. Starting our discussion from the sixties we can observe that the leaders joined the public in launching verbal attack against Indian variety of secularism. They tried their best to expose the secular credentials of Indian leaders. By conforming to the popular reaction prevailing around they hoped to gather popular support for them. However, during seventies there were relatively low-keyed campaigns. Pakistan entered the seventies with a false sense of

complacency derived out of its partially successful campaign against India in 1965. The 1971 war, however, shattered Pakistan's confidence. Thereafter, reactions at the leadership level to the communal situation in India were cautiously hedged around with unprovocative overtures though they continued with the same uncompromising mood at the public level. The reactions took a qualitative leap nonetheless. In the communal troubles in India, Pakistani public as well as governmental opinion, looked for a justification for Pakistan's adherence to Islam. The seventies saw the leaders restrained. Even Bhutto had to change his stand vis-a-vis India. The defeat induced reason in the leaders. But the strong popular reactions fanned up during the late sixties by the leaders were difficult to contain. This explained why popular reaction was still biting.

It was during the eighties that popular reaction reached an unpredictable high. Indira Gandhi's tenure seemed to provoke most of the reactions. Mrs. Gandhi was lampooned in every possible way. The reactions took yet another qualitative leap; they had variety as well as intensity. This popular mood, however, could not influence the least the Pakistan Government's stand,

Zia's years in office were in a sense a departure. Zia's government chose it better not to provoke Indian displeasure by reacting to the deteriorating communal situation in India. Towards the mid-eighties Zia was heavily pressurized to react. Zia's address at the U.N.O. had indirect references to communal happenings in India which met with intense reactions in India, which silenced Zia further. After that his government dismissed the whole problem as an internal affair of India in the face of popular pressure to express its concern. Rather his government tried its best to explain the cause of Pakistani popular concern to avert the wrath of India. The whole effort was persuasive. Zia's hand behind Punjab crisis is often referred to as a Pakistani ploy to stir up unrest in India. But as far as explicit diplomatic posture is concerned Zia had immunised himself against the prevailing popular reaction and maintained a reasoned silence in his official pronouncements on the communal situation in India.

With Zia's untimely death the popular leaders rent the air with hostile cries again, against India. But their election campaign carried less and less reference



to communal situation in India. It was only after the Kashmir unrest in the recent months that the leaders vied with each other in restoring the temper of the sixties in their voice. The nineties as such may necessitate a change in Pakistan Government's position. The recent official pronouncements against India on the issue of Babri Mosque represents such a trend.

#### Explaining the concerns of the leaders

We have found a marked divergence between popular and governmental concern from the seventies till now. Earlier during the sixties, situation was different. Ayub Khan, though a military dictator like Zia, was obsessed with the idea of lending a democratic aura to his rule and this impelled his government to conform to the public reactions over the issue of communal disturbances in India. The rise of Bhutto by exploiting pan-Islamic and anti-India sentiments of the people had its share in involving Ayub in the race. As such the communal question in India was seriously discussed in Pakistan then. The leaders threw all reason to winds to spread hatred against India. Bhutto outclassed Ayub in the act.

But once he was in the seat of power, he changed his style. May be the responsibility of office mad ehim cautious. The 1971 war, creation of Bangladesh and subsequent signing of Simla Accord sealed his lips.

With Zia things were different. Unlike Ayub, with whom he struck a parallel as a military dictator, he was not so much obsessed with the idea of covering his rule under democratic mask. Though the popular reaction against the communal disturbances in India was the strongest during the eighties, Zia's government never tried to reap political capital out of it. with his untimely departure things took a turn towards the past. Paksitan reverted back to democracy and the popular mood found a chance to get represented.

The issue of Kashmir which in recent years, has stirred up strong popular reactions in Pakistan, has duly influenced the governmental pronouncements. Moreover, Pakistan is suffering from an integration-crisis with competitive regionalism and sectarianism raising their heads. Hatred of a common enemy more than love for a common friend is a strong uniting factor, we know.

In view of this anti-Indian pronouncements, especially keeping the communal question in India on the forefront, showed a natural trend of Pakistani behaviour. Pakistan still believes, this could be a better means of integrating its society.

Now we will move on to the last lap of our study which will focus our attention on a general perception of the whole thing across this public-government divide.

#### 4.2 A General Discussion

Whenever communal situation in India worsened Pakistan, whether out of genuine concern for the Muslim brethren (the unintentional victims of partition), or out of a deliberate design to exploit the pan-Islamic emotional links of the Muslims in Pakistan with their co-religionists in India, usually expressed serious concerns. To have a fair judgement of the whole thing, the concern was caused by a combination of these two factors described above. It was difficult to wipe out the bonds of religion, family ties overnight. The Muslims left out in India deserved and got the sympathy from the bordering Islamic state of Pakistan.

Assaults on minority rights in India as such had tremendous impact on the Pakistani Muslims. The reactions were spontaneous. If we analyse the Muslim reactions from the direct action day of 1946 to the present day reactions over say, Babri Masjid, we would find an unmistakable pattern of Muslim behaviour in the sub-continent. There has been a violent reaction at the slightest provocations caused most of the time by real or possible threat to their identity as a cultural group. This also unites them in too strong a bond characteristic of a minority operating in an atmosphere which they perceive to be hostile. In recent years Pakistan made use of Islam as an uniting principle in the face of threats to its integrity. Regional differences are sought to be overcome through appeals to religious sentiments of the people. Islam for the Muslims in the sub-continent was a reaction against revivalist obscurantist Hinduism more than anything else. As such appeals to Islamic sentiments in Pakistan have to be accompanied with denials of the secular basis of the state in India.

Our study of Pakistani reaction confirms the above view. Pakistan has not changed its angle of vision even

after the partition. It has indeed refused to change. The same old line of thinking continues. Victim of a deepseated communal bias, for Pakistan has always viewed India as a Hindu state. Whenever there was any riot situation in India, Pakistan's reaction was guided by this view. Concern was natural but criticism misplaced. Pakistan failed to discern the contradictions in Indian society. The social contradictions that lead to communal riots are the legacy of the Partition along communal lines. Pakistan's image of India as a Hindu nation conditions Pakistan's thinking on the communal situation in India. By refusing to shake off this image of India, Pakistan wants to justify its Islamic existence.

This also provides a justification for its concern for Indian Muslims for Pakistan thinks it owes a historic commitment to the people who as they allege are left to the mercy of a Hindu majority. This has made Pakistan behave as a protector of Muslim minority in India.

The happenings in the sixties showed how a shrinking communal disharmony in India can strain the relations between the two countries. We have seen Ayub

confessing that in such a worsening communal situation lie the germs of an Indo-Pak confrontation. Over the years Pakistani intelligensia has seen the security of Indian Muslims and efforts to improve Indo-Pak friendship as interrelated. Pakistan press has championed this view more volently than others :

Indo-Pak ties and Hindu-Muslim relationships are not two separate things; they are the two sides of a coin. If Hindu-Muslim relations smack of blood, Indo-Pak ties cannot give the fragrance of flower<sup>2</sup>.

The origin of Pakistani distrust of India can be attributed to other reasons too. Pakistan is conscious of the fact that geographically she was never an entity<sup>3</sup> as such it has always apprehended that by rearming herself with western help, India is out to carry on a campaign of annexing Pakistan back into India's fold. Again, Pakistan fears normalisation of relationship with India on the ground that with it the very *raison d'etre* for the partition of India would cease to exist and it would be a matter of time before Pakistan is sucked into India's geopolitical orbit.<sup>4</sup> Pakistan press proclaims loudly the whole effort at reaborbing Pakistan is a Hindu design:

Since the partition, the Hindu Communalists have been entertaining dangerous ambitions of reunion of Pakistan and India. The cow-worshippers take it as a sacrilege, that the mother cow has been cut into two. The caste-ridden Hindu society is a monopoly of Brahmins who have fantasies about creating a Hindu kingdom from Afghanistan to Burma.<sup>5</sup>

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2. Editorial, Jasarat, (Karachi), 28 June, 1984.

3. Arif Hussain quoted in Sangat Singh, *Op.cit* .p.37.

4. *Ibid.*, p.44.

5. A.R. Changez, Pakistan Times (Lahore), 14 March 1985.

The pre-partition apprehensions of a Hindu hegemonism, as such is thus applied in a trans-contextual perspective. If Hindus in India were out to suck Islam into the fold of Hinduism, it is too likely that a Hindu India must be conspiring to overrun an Islamic Pakistan. India's Hindu image is the scale according to which the domestic communal situation in India and the Indo-Pak relations, with the issues arising out of it, are discussed and interpreted.

Modern interpretations of Hinduism and of Hindu India in Pakistan reveal the zeal of Pakistani intellectuals in dismissing the positive aspects of Hindu culture as primitive and chauvinistic. Thus the term 'Hindu' is defined with a wider connotation : the modern orthodox Hindu view that Hinduism was more a 'territorial characteristic' than a religion is accepted and criticized. People belonging to the territory of India save the Muslims are a queer lot, they would say. Al Biruni is often quoted to prove their hypotheses.

Then comes the flourishing diatribe against the supposedly liberality of Hindu religion. Hinduism as a religion accommodates so many systems of belief; from atheism to polytheism. The ritualistic dimension of it is not so binding. One can deny God, be a virulent critic of everything Hindu and still be a Hindu. Hinduism does not dis-own. This is what

explains territorial dimension of the term Hinduism. But for, a Pakistani scholar such 'territorial infatuation' which makes the people so liberal is a negative trait, in Hindu behaviour.

.....their behaviour all along has been primitive rather xenophobic..... This means the love of one's homeland to the extent of hatred for all others, who belong to other lands. Such a behaviour denotes the spiritually semi-barbarian callousness of societies concerned who live at a level not human in fact but animal. Hinduism is pervaded with a consciousness of the environment like aboriginal clans. They have maintained that state of consciousness across the centuries and hence have never accepted the sublime idea of humanity as a vast brotherhood. The prerequisites of the concept of human fraternity lies in outgrowing the geographical and racial bonds.<sup>6</sup>

This shows the Pakistani mood. Pakistan, all the while, is busy discovering loopholes in Indian behaviour; mark of an effort ruminating revenge rather than contemplating friendship. Indian stand on Kashmir is thus seen as thoroughly communal, as a showpiece of Indian secularism.<sup>7</sup> Indian argument that conceding Kashmir to Pakistan would endanger the security of the Muslims in India is mocked away as a blind excuse, as wishful thinking, exposing the vulnerability of India's secular basis. With the advancement of time, the Indian leaders are shown in the media as communal-minded; from Sardar Patel to J.P. Narayan, from Gandhi to Vinoba. This deliberate anti -

campaign which can be attributed to a biased perception of

6. Muhammad Munawar, Dimensions of Pakistan Movement, (Lahore, 1987), pp. 12-13.

7. G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's relations with India, (Meerut, 1971), p.7.



everything Indian, has seriously affected the relationship between the two states.

In Tashkent Declaration it was recognized that only by promoting understanding and friendly relations between the peoples of India and Pakistan a lasting solution to the Indo-Pak problem can be arrived at. This was the ground on which the leaders of the two countries agreed to "discourage any propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries". This is what is needed at this hour of crisis. A firm handling of media in both countries can ensure sympathetic understanding of each other's views. This will go a long way in cultivating amity among the peoples of the two countries. Ultimately it is the people of a country who decide its fate. A people firm and convinced can hold their straying leaders in check.

Keeping the prevailing situation in view, it needs restrained statesmanship on the parts of leaders of both countries to sacrifice the lure of amassing mass support by propagating hatred and they should talk reason to the people. Only by bringing together the two peoples (of India and Pakistan) can one hope to establish lasting friendship between the two countries.

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## APPENDIX - I

Rahmat Ali's PamphletNOW OR NEVERExcerpts

\* \* \* \* \*

India, constituted as it is at the present moment, is not the name of one single country; nor the home of one single nation. It is, in fact, the designation of a State created by the British for the first time in history. It includes peoples who have never previously formed part of the Indian nation at any period of its history, but who have, on the contrary, from the dawn of history till the advent of the British, possessed and retained distinct nationalities of their own.

One of such peoples is our own nation.

In the five Northern Provinces of India, out of a total population of about forty millions, we, the Muslims, constitute about thirty millions. Our religion and culture, our history and tradition, our social code and economic system, our laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are fundamentally different from those of most peoples living in the rest of India. The ideals which move our people to make the highest sacrifices are essentially different from those which inspire the Hindus to do the same. These differences are not confined to broad, basic principles. Far from it, they extend to the minutest details of our lives. We do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different.

\* \* \* \* \*

If we, the Muslims of Pakistan, with our distinct marks of nationality, are deluded into the proposed Indian Federation by friends or foes, we are reduced to a minority of one in ten. This reduction sounds the death-knell of our nation in Pakistan. To help you to realise the full magnitude of this impending catastrophe, let us remind you that we thirty millions constitute about one-tenth of the whole Muslim world. The total area of our five units, comprising Pakistan, is four

times that of Italy, three times that of Germany and twice that of France; and their population seven times that of the Commonwealth of Australia, four times that of the Dominion of Canada, twice that of Spain, the equal to France and Italy considered individually.

\* \* \* \* \*

This demand is basically different from the suggestion put forward by Doctor Sir Muhammad Iqbal in his Presidential address to the All-India Muslim League in 1930. While the proposed the amalgamation of four out of the five above-named provinces into a single state forming a unit of the All-India Federation, we propose that all those five Provinces should have a separate Federation of their own outside India. We are convinced there can be no peace and progress in India if we, the Muslims are duped into a Hindu dominated federation in which we cannot be the masters of our own destiny and captains of our own souls.

\* \* \* \* \*

In any case, we are now face to face with a first-rate crisis, the like of which has not been seen even in the long and eventful history of Islam. It is not the question of a sect or of a community going down; it is the crisis of the whole future of our eighty million Muslims, who till only yesterday, were the custodians of the glory of Islam in India and the defenders of the frontiers of India.

Such is the nature of this crisis. Dangerous as it is, there is no need to despair. We can survive it, and have a still greater future, if only we all answer this appeal like Muslims, oppose the Indian Federation, and support the Pakistan Federation and do that at once.

Let us make no mistake about it. The issue is now or never. Either we live or perish for ever. The future is ours, if we live up to our faith. It does not lie in the lap of the gods: it rests in our own hands. We alone can make or mar it. ....

## APPENDIX - II

Bhutto's Speech at Gujrat on 1, March 1970.Excerpts

\* \* \* \* \*

We are all Muslims. We want to raise the prestige of the Muslims. Pakistan came into being as their homeland. I have firm faith that Islam can never be in danger. Pakistani Muslims are staunch Muslims. Islam will live for ever. Islam was given to us by Allah and His Messenger, and the people of Pakistan have full faith in it. I have served the cause of Islam more than my opponents. You may remember how I upheld the cause of Islam when I was Foreign Minister.

If I did not have the love of Islam at heart I would not have spoken the way I did in the security council. Even now the Indian Government says that anybody may go and talk to them but no Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They know that I shall never agree to anything against the interests of the Muslims of Pakistan. India is opposed to us because we are Muslims. The Indians have always opposed Pakistan because they believe that if there were no Muslims, the subcontinent would not have been divided. The British and the Hindus opposed Pakistan till the end. When Quaid-iAzam Mahomed Ali Jinnah was struggling for Pakistan, the gentlemen who now claim to be the leaders of Pakistan were opposed to him. Now they tell us that the Pakistan ideology is in danger. You may ask them where were they when Quaid-iAzam was fighting for this ideology? When did they favour Quaid-i-Azam? They issued edicts against him and called him an infidel. They opposed the Quaid-i-Azam and Pakistan till the last moment.

\* \* \* \* \*

You can ask our enemies, the Indians, whether Bhutto is justified in his claims or not. I give you my word that if the people's rule is established in Pakistan, the Indian Government will dare not pursue its policy of annihilation of the Muslims in India. You are Muslims and will continue to be Muslims. The People's Party wants to serve the people. We want to bring an end to your troubles, to your miseries and to the tyranny under which you are living. To serve our Muslims brothers, we want to enforce the systems which our Quaid-i-Azam envisioned.

## APPENDIX - III

Bhutto's Election Speech on 3, March 1970.Excepts

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Pakistan's ideology means that Muslims should govern Pakistan to make it a prosperous country. There should be no corruption and injustice. It is not Pakistan's ideology that a few people should have a monopoly over government and wealth at the expense of the people at large who are left to suffer the worst economic difficulties and denied any say in the running of the state. You can't call the ideology of Pakistan. Ideology means service to the Muslims of Pakistan; well, not only that but also the protection of the Muslims in India, which is possible only when Pakistan is made strong and stable.

\* \* \* \* \*

On 27 December, 1963, the Hair of the Holy Prophet was stolen from the Hazrat Bal Shrine in Occupied Kashmir. The people of Kashmir rose against the Indian Government. They were persecuted. Many of them were killed. Then in 1964, India made an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the Charot area of Azad Kashmir. In 1965, she occupied the Kargil area of Azad Kashmir but she had to vacate it on the intervention of the Security Council. In May, 1965, a new wave of oppression against the Kashmiris began in Occupied Kashmir. Seventeen people were killed, 1,926 injured and 419 were arrested. Sixteen newspapers were banned. But disturbances went on increasing against the Indian rulers. On 8 August, 1965, the Kashmiris rose in open rebellion against Indian oppression. India alleged that 7,000 'Mujahideen' had entered Occupied Kashmir from Pakistan. But I ask how could Pakistan's Mujahideen enter Occupied Kashmir in the presence of six divisions of the Indian Army along the cease-fire line? In fact, the Kashmiris themselves had started that movement because they had been persecuted. Scared of the Kashmiri people's struggle, the Indian forces completely burnt two of their villages in the Rajouri area. The U.N. representative in Srinagar, Occupied Kashmir. In spite of that India bombed a Pakistani village, Awan Sharif, on 23 August, as a result of which 25 Pakistani civilians were killed. On 24 August, India occupied Tithwal, and on 25th the Haji Pir Pass. Pakistan retaliated against these attacks on 7 September and occupied Chamb.

\* \* \* \* \*

My friends and brothers, before the war was over, President Ayub Khan had promised to the British and American representatives that he would not send me to represent Pakistan at the Security Council. But the Law Minister, S.M. Zafar, phoned the President from New York that Bhutto was badly needed at the Security Council. I told the President. "I am the Foreign Minister. I am accountable to the people. So I should go and represent Pakistan there. Even China has withdrawn her ultimatum; so why do you stop me now from going there"? After a day-long discussion, I was allowed to go to New York at 7 p.m. And immediately after that, my departure was announced on the radio although it is never done during the war. India wanted to destroy the plane in which I was travelling. But with the blessings of God Almighty, she could not do that .....

My dear brother, you know how I in the Security Council spoke about your struggles, sufferings and sacrifices. You triumphed. Your brave forces beat back the enemy. The people made sacrifices. They will always triumph!

After the war, Ayub Khan went to Washington and met President Johnson who frightened him, threatened him and forced him to his knees. I was pained to see the President of a brave nation being so easily browbeaten.

My dear brothers, we had stood up to the enemy. But Ayub Khan gave in. I was extremely pained. Ayub Khan was a selfish man, he was corrupt, he betrayed the nation at Tashkent. What do you ask me about Tashkent? Ask Ayub Khan. I was the one who opposed the Tashkent Declaration. He signed it.