

**A STUDY OF**  
**GORBACHEV'S APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the award of the Degree of  
**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**BIJAY KUMAR KHANDAYAT RAY**

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICS DIVISION  
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,  
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI—110067  
INDIA  
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जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
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May, 1990

CERTIFICATE

"A STUDY OF  
Certified that the dissertation entitled "GORBACHEV'S  
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS" submitted by  
Mr. Bijay Kumar Khandayat Ray in fulfilment of Nine  
credits out of total requirements of Twenty-four credits  
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of this University, is his original work and may be placed  
before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation  
has not been submitted for the award of any other degree  
of this University or of any other University to the best  
of our knowledge.

*Sumitra Chisti*  
Prof.(Mrs.) Sumitra Chisti  
Chairperson

*Sushil Kumar*  
Prof.(Dr.) Sushil Kumar  
Supervisor

FOR

"BAPA"

'O'

"BOU"

A FEW WORDS

Behind each work of creation , there lies a lot that the creator cannot give expression to, through his creation. Yet he knows, but for them all, this should not have been possible. A wish, a word of advice, an admonition, a small help , a little smile - is all that helps him, his work through. I am happy, I was not deprived of all this. I am grateful to them all who have obliged me thus .

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And last but not least my friends whom I love so much and a mention whose names , I am told , would irk them a lot.

NEW DELHI

*BiJay Ku. Khandayat*  
BIJAY KUMAR KHANDAYAT RAY

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PREFACE

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In this last quarter of twentieth century, when there is a sort of dialectical movement of expediency and morality imparting tremendous impact on the total course of international politics, the acts of political expediency needs to carry forward the aims of peace and prosperity in an international community of divergent national interest and convergent international prospects . When pursuit of national interest at the cost of others interest becomes inconceivable not only in view of international peace and prosperity, but also in view of own survival and security in the changed context of global politics , there arises the need of an approach which combines the factual insight of realism with the ethics and ideals of idealism. At this crucial juncture of human history , the imperative that political wisdom should act successfully in accordance with national interest while political as well as moral wisdom should choose the most possible moral course of action through which both national as well as international interest could be served, unquestionably predominates the whole scenario of international politics.

Quite in the recent years , both the political as well as moral wisdom have had reasonable reflection in Gorbachev's approach to international politics with which this dissertation deals comprehensively.

(ii)

In the first chapter of this dissertation, i.e., "power paradigm, alternatives and Gorbachev's approach", the purpose is directed towards launching a broad and candid assessment of Gorbachev's approach, by making him stand on the platform of international politics, as an alternative theorist of geo-politics in the changed context of international environment. Attempt has been made to place Gorbachev's approach not only as an alternative somewhere beyond the theoretical conviction of power-paradigm, but <sup>to</sup> place it between power paradigm and other alternatives, as it contains the philosophical outlook of all the approaches. The factual insight of realism coupled with the ethics and ideals of idealism, in his approach, has been accorded a distinct mention in this chapter.

In the second chapter, i.e. " Ideology, national interest and pursuit of power and peace in Soviet approach to international politics and Gorbachev's new thinking", the intention is projected at introducing Gorbachev's new thinking towards international politics, by making him stand on the platform of Soviet politics as a Soviet leader, who gives his nation a new direction in not only establishing ideology, but expediting national interest in the pursuit of peace and not power in the changed context of international environment.



(iii)

The third chapter i.e. "Ideology, national interest and pursuit of peace in Gorbachev's approach to international politics" is nothing other than a mere extension of the second chapter that attempts to present a board account of Gorbachev's new thinking both as a Soviet leader and as a global statesman. As a Soviet leader, he has been presented in a manner, where his approach embraces Soviet Union's policy towards the whole world i.e. capitalist, socialist and third world bloc in all its aspects, viz-social, political, economic as well as military in the pursuit of peace and prosperity. As a global statesman, he has been presented in a manner, where his approach invokes his personal as well as Soviet leader's policy towards global peace and prosperity taking all the aspects into account.

*Bijay Kumar Khandayat Ray*

CHAPTER - 1

THE POWER-PARADIGM, ALTERNATIVES  
AND GORBACHEV'S APPROACH

## CHAPTER - 1

### THE POWER-PARADIGM , ALTERNATIVES AND GORBACHEV'S APPROACH

#### 1.1 The Power-Paradigm

1.1.1 The place of power in society - intellectual foundation of the realistic approach in international politics:-

A glance at the history of human civilisation gathers the fact that "the essence of human existence thrives on "lust for power and quest for power"<sup>1</sup>. This lust for power, a product of irrational human impulse; "guides the human instinct to exercise influence and control over others".<sup>2</sup> The famous statement of Hobbes, 17th century English philosopher that men would have all the world, if they could, to fear and obey them"<sup>3</sup> reflects the power seeking aspect of human nature.

Power drives, inherent in human nature get extended to international scene where individuals lust for power has "not only in imagination but also in actuality, the world as its object"<sup>4</sup> and that "would be satisfied, only if the lust man became the object of his domination"<sup>5</sup>. Thus lust for power, becomes the essence of international politics where "nations having conflicting interests"<sup>6</sup>

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1. Morgenthau, H.J., The Escape from Power in "The Decline of Democratic Politics" (Chicago, 1962) P. 312

2. Morgenthau, H.J., "Scientific Man vs Power Politics", (Chicago, 1946) P. 194

3. Struss, L., tr, Elsa M. Sinclair, "The Political Philosophy of Hobbes". (Chicago, 1952 ), p.10.

4. op.cit.; "Scientific Man vs Power Politics". P 198

5. Ibid, p.194.

6. Morgenthau, H.J., "Politics among Nations,

The Search for Power and Peace (New York, 1973)

try to spread their influence to control the activities of each other in pursuance of own interest which derives its logical support from the views of 4th century B.C. Indian diplomat Kautilya and 16th century A.D. Italian philosopher Machiavelli that nations must search and struggle for power to pursue their own interest. Thus, involvement of a nation in international politics results from a type of activity in which it strives to gain power. Subsequently, strife among nations takes precedence over every other consideration and becomes perennial feature of international relations. Permanence and ubiquity of struggle for power prevails in international politics which becomes the underlying principle of power paradigm that gets extolled by a good number of exponents of realist theory like Hans J. Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, George Swarzenberger, Quincy<sup>o</sup> Wright , Martin Wright , George F. Kennan Henry Kissinger and so many others.

To trace the origin of power paradigm to nineteenth century, we have exponents like Trietsehke and Nietzsche who have highlighted power and urge for power . Prior to the first world war, a distinct scholar known as Erich Kaufman depicted the essence of state as (Machtent - Faltung) development , increase and display of power.

#### Power Paradigm in <sup>Post</sup> World War II Period

#### Realist Theory of Hans J. Morgenthau -

Revived after the Second World War , this power paradigm was given a systematic theoretical orientation and transformed into a distinct school of thought by Morgenthau , the chief exponent of realist theory , who upheld that international politics like all politics is the struggle for power which is limitless. Whatever, the ultimate aim of international politics, power is always the immediate objective . "Power , however limited and qualified is the

value which international politics recognises supreme"<sup>7</sup>. It is neither good nor bad in itself and hence socially and morally stands neutral. Morgenthau views world as a static field in which power relations reproduce themselves in the same manner in all times. This proposition emanates from his conviction that since human nature is essentially immutable, the laws derived from human nature are also beyond change. It needs distinct mention that the most precious and pivotal aspect of power paradigm is the "concept of national interest defined in terms of power"<sup>8</sup> Related with this concept thrives the assumption that Statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power. Power paradigm finds its strength in the basic premise that statesmen while describing their aims and objectives in terms of religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal usually strive to achieve and realize them by resorting to use of power which is the capstone among objectives and cornerstone among methods that nations cherish"<sup>9</sup>. Exponents of this model view it axiomatic that states seek to enhance power and assert that "power is the supreme value which states want to pursue"<sup>10</sup>. Thus, power assumes cardinal position both as means

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7. CP. 100, Scientific Man vs Power Politics p. 101

8. CP. 101 Politics among Nations, p. 5

9. Dyke, V.V. , International Politics, (New York, 1957), p.175.

10. Wolfers , A., "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference ", World Politics (Princeton, 4 October 1951), p.40.

and end in the sense that national interest gets served through it and continuing possession of power ensures the enduring preservation of national interest. Behind this belief of dual character lies the assumption that specific interests of states are not constant in substance but go on expanding always. Therefore, in Mergenthau's view, possession of power and its exercise and expansion are always necessary for the safeguard of the specific interest of the present and of the expected interest of the future.

Exponents of power, -paradigm emphasize that defined in terms of power, national interest should be sole guide to foreign policy. A foreign policy, in their view is bound to meet failure if based on any other consideration. Margenthau maintains that dynamic force which determines international relations is to be found in states drive for power. Thus power taken as capacity to control or influence others determines the nature of foreign policies of nations. Margenthau, stresses that political action seeks to keep power to increase it or to demonstrate it. Here, three different politics correspond to these three patterns as conceived by him - policy of status quo , policy of imperialism and policy of prestige. Thus, if a state has the power and influence, it will try to expand in whatever field possible whereas another state which does not possess sufficient power and influence will try to restrict its policy to preservation of its interest of the present . The former type of states will choose an anti-revisionist or status-quo-policy. The policy of status-quo tends towards keeping power rather than changing the distribution of power in its favour whereas the policy of imperialism seeks to acquire more power by reversing the existing power relations. ]

Margenthau examines various attempts made for peace, by dividing them into three categories, viz. peace through limitation, peace through transformation and peace through accommodation. In the first category he examines attempts for peace through disarmament, collective security, judicial settlement, peaceful change and international government. The second category includes schemes of a world state and attempts at creating a world community whereas the third category refers to diplomacy.

Margenthau believes that "men don't fight because they have arms" but "they have arms because they deem it necessary to fight". He, therefore concludes that a mutually satisfactory settlement of political problems is necessary for disarmament. Collective security can also not be made to work unless there is an overwhelming strength against <sup>the</sup> potential aggressor, a single concept of security and the willingness of the participants to subordinate their interests to the common good. Margenthau asserts that nothing in the reality of international relations warrants the assumption about the existence of these conditions<sup>12</sup>. Judicial settlement also cannot solve the problem of war because the disputes that lead to war are mostly political, not legal. Similarly, schemes of peaceful change do not offer any promise of ending war. Peaceful change according to Margenthau is possible within the state.<sup>13</sup> Further, international government

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11. op.cit., Politics Among Nations, p. 408

12. Ibid., p.414.

13. Ibid., p.513.

does not provide answer to the problem of peace, because it can be operative only in the atmosphere of international harmony, which has not been possible historically and also cannot be possible logically in accordance with the nature of national interest.

While discussing peace through transformation Morgenthau firmly upholds that a scheme of world state does not hold promise for the maintenance of peace. Though Morgenthau believes in the desirability of a world state and concedes that permanent peace is not possible without a world state, yet he does not see any possibility of the establishment of a world state under the moral, social and political conditions that obtain in the present day World Order.<sup>14</sup> According to him the establishment of World State is essentially a matter of the evolution of a world community and "the problem of world community is moral and political and not an intellectual and aesthetic one"<sup>15</sup>.

Rejecting all the efforts for peace through limitation and through transformation as inadequate, Morgenthau pins all his hope

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14. Speer II, J.P., "Hans Morgenthau and the World State", World Politics(Princeton)(20 January , 1968), pp. 207-27.

15. op.cit., Politics Among Nations, p.520.



on peace through accommodation that is diplomacy. He is convinced that diplomacy can make peace more secure than it is today"<sup>16</sup>. Diplomacy in his view performs two important functions. While directly <sup>it</sup> mitigates and minimises conflict, indirectly it contributes to the growth of a world community on the basis of which alone a world state is possible.

Morgenthau, maintains that besides by good diplomacy, peace can be preserved by two other devices viz. balance of power and the normative limitation of international law, international morality and world public opinion if only they could be made effective"<sup>17</sup>. The struggle for power leads to the balance of power through which nations try to defend themselves against each other. But even balance of power is an inadequate device to preserve peace because it is an uncertain device. As for international morality, Morgenthau believes that it has not yet reached a stage of development at which it can exert any substantial pressure to preserve peace. Morgenthau does not believe in world public opinion either. For World public opinion presupposes a society and a common morality"<sup>18</sup> and none of them exists today.

Similarly, international law in his view is beset by decentralization in its legislative and judicial function as well as in its enforcement. There is no central authority on the international scene that can create, interpret or impose the law. As such, international law cannot impose effective restraint upon the struggle for power.

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16. Ibid., p.569.

17. Ibid., p.23.

18. Ibid., p.270.

Realist approach of George F. Kennan

George F. Kennan, another leading realist of contemporary international politics comes out with the conviction that the national interest defined in terms of power is a more reliable guide to foreign policy. But at the same time he goes to the extent of differing with Morgenthau on the issue of relationship between national interest ( ) and moral principles .

Kennan believes that we can only know and understand our interests <sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> In this regard he suggests that we should try to conduct our foreign policy and relations in accordance with the requirements of our national interest

on one hand and such moral and ethical principles as are inherent in the spirit of our civilisation on the other"<sup>20</sup>. He, however, warns that our moral and ethical principles are valid only for ourselves, not for others and hence we should not impose them on others".<sup>21</sup> Thus on the question of the relationship between

national interest ( ) on one hand and morality: on the other Kennan projects the idea of "moral relativism".<sup>22</sup>

19. Keenan G.F. American Diplomacy (Chicago, III, 1951), pp. 100-101.

20. Kennan, G. F., The realities of American Foreign Policy, (Princeton, N.J. 1954), pp.213-14.

21. Ibid.

22. Robert C. Good, " National Interest and Moral Theory: The Debate Among Contemporary Political Realists" in Roger Hillsman and Robert C. Good eds. Foreign Policy in the Sixties (Baltimore, Md., 1969), p.284.

Morgenthau, to the sharp contrast, defends the supremacy of national interest defined in terms of power. He is of the view that considerations of national interest must transcend all principles of morality. Thus, it is "relative realism" in case of Kennan and "transcendental realism" in case of Morgenthau when they try to establish relationship between national interest defined in terms of power and moral principles.

### Neo-realist Approach

#### Reinhold Neibuhr

Neo-realist like Neibuhr believes that national self-interest is an inescapable reality but it must not be accepted as the norm. The contribution of realism according to him consists in the awareness of the omni-presence of self interest. Nevertheless he asserts that self-interest unless qualified by higher loyalty to values, would be self-defeating".<sup>23</sup>

#### Quincy Wright

A prominent neo-realist, Quincy Wright, observes that realism like idealism in international politics is full of ambiguity and both can be utilised to distinguish between short run and long run policies of a nation in its behaviour towards other members of international community".<sup>24</sup> According to him, realism in

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23. Neibuhr, R. Christian Realism and Political Problems, (New York, 1953) and Robert Good, National Interest and Moral Theory "The Debates" Among Contemporary Political Realists."
24. ~~Quincy~~ Wright Q., Realism and Idealism in International Politics, (Princeton) World Politics, 15 October, 1954, pp. 126-27
- By Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good in Foreign Policy in 1954*
- Quincy Wright*

international politics, that highlights national interest defined in terms of power would represent short-run national policies that would aim at the fulfilment of immediate necessities and idealism would represent long run policies that would aim at objectives to be realized in distant future.

Raymond Aron

Aron observes that the internal rivalry of nations has continued into the age of inferal machines and nations in their pursuit of power, have not found a way to agree either to a common law or to moderation and compromise<sup>25</sup>. He addresses himself to the fundamental question as to what are the chances of peace in the nuclear age. In his approach to the problems he relates traditions, present consciousness and the will to action and change<sup>26</sup>. Aron shows as how the past conceived in the present helps make comprehensible, the folly or the wisdom of human decisions. Perceptions of the past are a political statement about the present and future. Aron avoids the extremes of determinism and relativism and instead creates a framework in which the future is open but choices are limited by realities and the necessity of including these realities in policy making. A neo-realist in international relations, Aron clearly mentions that national interest deals with collectivities rather than individuals.<sup>27</sup>

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25. Quoted in Robert Colquhoun, Raymond Aron ; The Philosopher in History, Vol 1,

26. Conant, M.B. , Politics and History, New York , 1978), p.IX.

27. Aron, R. , "The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs" in Stanley Hoffmann, ed. Contemporary Theory in International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs), 1960) p 86.

Hedley Bull

Neo-realist like Bull considers World Order to be "those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole"<sup>28</sup>. Such a position acknowledges the fact that a range of ordering options exists to determine how World Order might be achieved, but supports the primacy of the state in relation to individuals and the state system in relation to collectivities. Bull draws a sharp distinction between the role of government as the principal source of domestic order and the more primitive forms of order operative in what he regards as the anarchical setting of international society, anarchy being conceived in the technical sense as the absence of government.

Bull maintains that the achievement of order can be assessed only by reference to the realization of elementary goals of social life identified as common interests of all people: Thus the facts of human vulnerability to violence and proneness to resort to it lead men to the sense of common interests in restricting violence. Rules as incorporated in international law are generally regarded as beneficial for the clarification and preservation of some common interests, but are not effective in relation to fundamental security for the state. For international society which lacks governmental capacities and is composed of members with a weak perception for common interest, order is obtained principally by such mechanisms as "balance of power" and "deterrence", encouraging mutual restraints in a manner compatible with the perceived separate interests of governments.

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28. Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York, 1977), p. 20.

Bull upholds that "within international society as in other societies, order is the consequence not merely of contingent facts such as balance of power but of a common interest. In the elementary goals of social life, rules prescribing behaviour that sustain these goals and institutions that help to make these rules effective"<sup>29</sup>

Bull regards order of this character as valuable in itself and as "the condition of the realization" of other values"<sup>30</sup> including the pursuit of justice". At the same time Bull regards the demands for justice as relating in a profound way to the search for acceptable terms of order. If the parties can agree on just results or if a consensus on an international level can be achieved, then order and justice can be reconciled. It is when, there is disagreement among states as to the character of just results that the more fundamental ordering goals of international society on which agreement can be presumed, suggest the need to accord priority to considerations of order as against the claims of justice.

Finally, Bull considers alternatives to the present reliance on the state system for the achievement of order and justice on global scale. He concludes that the state system is durable despite its defects and vulnerabilities and superior to any alternative conception of World Order that can be plausibly presented at this stage of human experience.

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29. Ibid., p.65

30. Ibid., pp.96-97.

31. Ibid., pp. 253-56 .

The Ascendancy of Power in International Politics

To have a glance at the ascendancy of power in international politics in the historical context , starting with sixteen century , we see that England held a balance of power between France and Holy Roman Empire. In the 17th century, the thirty years war (1618-1648) presents an analysis of balance of power. The treaty of Westphalia (1648), firmly established the state system and clearly determined the general, pattern of international relations . As a consequence, balance of power began to play greater role than before. When the ambitious policy of Louis XIV of France threatened to destroy the balance he was effectively checked by the combined opposition of England and Netherlands. In the 18th century the provisions of the Treaty of Utracht (1714) which closed the war of spanish succession restored the balance of power in Europe. The doctrine was formally incorporated in an "international agreement ad conservendum in Europa equilibrium. In the 19th century the rise of Napoleon once again disturbed the balance of power in Europe. The congress of Vienna sought to establish a new balance of power based on the principles of legitimacy and status quo. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) marks the beginning of its gradual extension of a World Wide scale. The balance of power was further extended beyond European soil when in 1854, France, Britain and Austria formed a coalition against Russia declaring that the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present context , is of essential importance to the balance of power among the states of Europe.

The Crimean War (1854-56) , followed this declaration . The Congress of Berlin (1878) was another attempt to prevent a great power from gaining a dominant position in the Balkan area. It forced Russia to revise the treaty of San Stefano which she had imposed on defeated Turkey in 1877-78. In the twentieth century, the Europe was divided into two camps viz Triple Entente (1907) Powers - England, France and Russia vs. Triple Alliance (1882) Powers -Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy. When the balance of Power in Balkan area was disturbed in 1914 it led to First World War.

#### Interwar Period

In the interwar period, there was formation of alliances and counter alliances in the name of balance of Power which led to the Second World War.

#### After Second World War

In the Post World War-II years, international politics witnessed the rise of two powers and the emergence of these powers led to a sort of cold war characterized by a struggle between them to counter balance each other's power and attain security within a transformed international situation. A differing conceptions of security arose from their different geo-political settings and historical experiences that caused the two powers to clash.

A struggle for balance of power continued among both the blocks in order to ensure security not only for their respective countries but also their respective allies. As a



result, United States formed North-Atlantic Treaty Organization in 19<sup>49</sup> <sup>with its West European allies</sup> in retaliation to which Soviet Union organized Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955, with its East European allies.

Coupled with the conflicting security doctrines was the changed environment of the Post-War World. Though in the interwar period, there had been a constellation of seven major powers, Second World War left only two superpowers thus creating a power vacuum. Consequently, both the superpowers tried to replace the old set of powers in their respective spheres of influence. The differing perception of security led the two power blocs to a state of relationship where each power sought to maximise its power and establish military power in strategic locations which ultimately culminated in Cuban-Missile crisis. By the late sixties changes occurred in the international system as well as in the internal capabilities of each superpower which provided an opportunity for breaking out of this conflictual relationship. The major factor which eased the tension between superpower, was Soviet Union's attainment of parity with the United States in the sphere of nuclear weaponry. Till late sixties United States enjoyed nuclear superiority as a result of which it appeared to be a stronger superpower which in a event of clash of wills would be able to force the weaker super power to back down. With the attainment of strategic parity, the USSR was considered an equal power and the necessary steps were taken in the interest of both during the detente years.

Main considerations which prompted the superpowers to work for the policy of detente were that - both of them wanted to reduce the danger of nuclear war which posed a threat to their very existence, both wanted to stabilize the arms competition on the basis of parity and both were keen to establish normal relations between countries of Western and Eastern Europe to relieve tension.

This phase of relationship between the two power blocs was characterised by several steps towards disarmament coupled with Helsinki peace process for a common European Security. However, by the late seventies international events worked once again to bring about a freeze in the superpower relationship and start a period of new cold war. The genesis of the Second Cold War lay in the type of World Order which the advent of detente sought to formalize. The American approach to detente had been one of offering the Soviet Union, the status of nuclear equal if it agreed to maintain the existing balance of power in the international system. A balance, which incidentally favoured the United States at that point of time. But such a balance could not be preserved however, as internal and regional events in various parts of the Third World led to upheavals which changed the international balance of power. Consequently, it swung in favour of Soviet Union. United States reacted to this unfavourable turn of events in the shape of a determination to stand upto the Soviet challenge by rebuilding its military power and checking Soviet Unions' growing influence in the various parts of the world.

Pursuit of Peace within the Framework of Power -Paradigm

Peace through balance of power

In <sup>international society,</sup> where a large number of nations with varying amount of power exist and in which each nation tries to maximise power, there is a tendency for the entire system to be in a balance in view of maintaining peace. Various nations group in such a way that no single nation or group of nations is strong enough to dominate others because its power is balanced by that of an opposing group. While seeking balance of power, states usually seek preponderance of power and not balanced of power<sup>32</sup> because it gives them greatest assurance of both peace and safety. States are interested in a balance of power that goes in their favour so that it can neutralise other states leaving the home state free to be deciding force and deciding voice<sup>33</sup>. Balance of power is referred as "the maintenance of such a just equilibrium between family of nations as should prevent any of them becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest."<sup>34</sup> Thus it becomes clear that balance of power in the form of preponderance of power

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32. Gelber, L., Peace by Power, New York, 1942), Passim.  
Hassal A., The Balance of Power, 1751-89, (New York, 1914), p.361.

33. Spikeman N.J., America's Strategy in World Politics, New York, 1942, pp. 21-22.

34. Cited in Lenox A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin, World Politics in Transition: (New York, 1956), pp. 107-108.

becomes vital in international politics for states to maintain peace and safety.

Balance of power is identified with a policy based on the assumption that ~~an~~ imbalanced power is dangerous and in a multi-state system, the only policy which can prevent the undesirable behaviour of other states is that of confronting power with countervailing power. Kenneth Thompson and Hans J. Morgenthau give expression to the same usage of balance of power. They view it as an attempt on the part of one nation to counteract the power of another nation by increasing its strength to a point where it is at least equal, if, not superior, to the other nation's strength".<sup>35</sup>

Highlighting the relevancy of the balance of power as a policy of nation Lenox A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin suggest that a country ignoring the balance of power is to remain poorly earned, without allies and with no attempt to balance the power of the aggressor state".<sup>36</sup> Quincy Wright upholds that balance of power helps the protection of vital interest of nations by threatening other states with committing aggression or by enabling the victim to achieve victory in case an aggression occurs.<sup>37</sup>

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35. Thompson K.W. and Morgenthau H.J. ed. Principles and Problems of International Politics, (New York, 1968), p.103 .

36. . . . . op.cit., World Politics in Transition, p.109.

37. Wright Q., A Study of War (Chicago, 1972), Vol II, pp. 743-59.

The notion of balance of power as an ideal distribution of power assumes that peace can be maintained not by putting the power of all nations under the check of all nations but by making overwhelming power available to those who are ready to oppose potential aggressors and punish actual aggressor. Balance of power gets highlighted as universally beneficial principle thriving on the pessimistic view of human nature extolled by Machiavelli, Hobbes and Lord Acton which upholds that all nations should be restrained by counter power and should be guarded against temptation as well as prevented from abusing their power.

Mortan Kaplan asserts that it is in the interest of every nation to prevent other nations from becoming more powerful than itself.<sup>38</sup> — Balance of power produces peace in the sense if power is equally distributed among various nations on their groups, no one side can achieve great pre-ponderance to ensure success in any aggression. Balance of power is said to prevent any aggression and it is often defended on the ground that it has the capacity to achieve peace. Those who believe that balance of power preserves peace advance their case mainly in terms of a historical argument, "InisClaude upholds that "balance of power system has worked successfully in the past as a mechanism for preserving peace".<sup>39</sup>

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38. Kaplan, M.A., "Balance of Power - bi-polarity and other Models in International System." *American Political Science Review*, 51 (Sept. 1957) p. 690
39. Claude I.L., Power and International Relations, (New York, 1963) pp 6-7.

John Herz and Ernest Hass<sup>40</sup> uphold that the 18th century whereas Guglielmo Ferro<sup>41</sup> and Henry Kissinger<sup>42</sup> highlight 19th century as the period of the greatest success of the balance of power.

There lies wide scale difference among scholars regarding pursuit of peace through perfect balance of power. Scholars like A.F.K. Organski observed that periods of balance are periods of warfare and periods of preponderance of power are periods of peace in history. This observation of Organski finds its basis in the logical belief that in a situation of preponderance of power on one side, the weaker party resigns itself to the preponderance. Thus imbalances of power and not balance of power is held as the preserver of peace by him. Highlighting the imbalance of power as device for maintenance of peace John Herz advocates a decisive imbalance and not just marginal, for if the imbalance is marginal, both sides may be tempted to precipitate a showdown"<sup>40</sup>

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40. Herz, J.H., International Politics in the Atomic Age, p.

(New York, 1959) pp. 25-36.

Pursuit of Peace through Collective Security

Collective security seeks to provide for national security and in so doing it proceeds with the assumption that international peace can be possible only when national security is guaranteed. The distinctness of collective security as an approach, lies in its assertion that the security of a nation is no longer the exclusive concern of international society as a whole. Under this system all nations take care collectively, of the security of each of them as if security of all of them, were in danger. If one nation threatens the security of a second nation, all other nations will take measures on behalf of the threatened.

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The emergence of collective security represents an attempt to deal with problems of war and peace by enlarging the scope of balance of power. Collective security thrives on the logic that temporary coalitions formed under the balance of power system, for winning a particular war, could be institutionalised on a permanent basis to deal with any state, which might commit aggression. This permanent coalition

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would represent an overwhelming force and its existence would presumably be sufficient to deter any prospective aggression. The essence of collective security thrives on a set of assumption that wars are likely to occur and they ought to be prevented by the deterrent effect of overwhelming power upon states which would like to avoid the risk of defeat . Thus the theory of collective security accepts the fact of war as a reality and the relevance of power as an effective means for reducing the incidence of war. In course of pursuance of peace, collective security in the views of Inis Claude is a device of the control or the management of power.<sup>41</sup> Collective security is conceived of as an alternative which could be useful because world government is not feasible. In the views of Willard Hoggan, collective security is a method of organizing the widest possible co-operation in efforts to maintain international peace and security.<sup>42</sup> Morgenthau believes that collective security can maintain peace if it can be made to work with overwhelming strength against potential aggressor, a single concept of security and the willingness of the participants to sub-ordinate their interests to the common good.<sup>43</sup>

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41. op.cit. , Power and International Relations, pp. 6-7.

42. Hoggan, W.N., International Conflict and Collective Security (University of Kentucky Press, 1955), p.185.

43. op.cit., Politics among Nations , p.414,



Historical Experience of Pursuit of Peace within the Framework of Power Paradigm

Upto First World War

As it is evident, during the Napoleonic era, the two most powerful nations in the world, i.e. England and France, were on the opposite sides where their power remained equal for a number of years. After the defeat of Napoleon, England, Prussia, Russia and Austria together balanced the Power of France. England emerged after the Napoleonic wars as the greatest single power on the earth. In the second half of the 19th century, the unification of Germany altered the distribution of power in Europe. and Germany attained a position of parity with France. Towards the end of the 19th century, the coalition of France and Russia was balanced approximately by that of Germany, Italy and Austria. In the 19th century, after the Napoleonic wars, it is held that there was complete peace within the framework of power paradigm which prevailed due to balance of power. But in fact peace prevailed due to a vast preponderance of power in the hands of England and France. A local balance of power between France and Germany erupted into the Franco-Prussian War, while the German miscalculation that her power balanced that of her probable enemies led to the out-break of the First World War. It is held that the peace during 1815-1914 existed not as a result of the balance of power but because of the British power.

The purpose of the balance of power during that period was not the preservation of peace but to organize alliances through which could be prevented the growth of power in other alliances. The balance of power during the 1815-1914 period can be described only as a system of the distribution of power in which each state and its alliances sought the preponderance of power.

#### Inter War Period

During this period whatever kind of peace existed was due to a preponderance of power on the side of the allies. When Germany again rose to the position where the power of the axis nations approximated that of the European Allies, the Second World War broke out. After the First World War, the idea of collective security which was adopted as the basis of the league of Nations was, in fact, the idea of converting the everchanging preponderance of power into a permanent preponderance of power of law abiding nations. As the policies of the great powers revealed during the inter war period particularly during the 1930s, the league members viewed the collective security system not as a substitute for balance of power but as a device of making balance (or preponderance) of power a more perfect system and more scientific principle of international politics.

The project for a collective enforcement of peace through collective security was given momentum by President Woodrow Wilson. But by the time he took a clear stand in favour of

collective security, the idea had become an established passion in international life".<sup>44</sup> So much so that the concept of collective security was generally accepted at paris negotiations which led to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the establishment of the League of Nations. The various drafts which formed the basis of the covenant of the League clearly shared that there was an awareness of the need for an international mechanism by which peace could be ensured by the combined use of force"<sup>45</sup>. When collective security was first incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the aggression of the Central power was foremost in the minds of people in West. Later when collective security provisions of the League was invoked, it was directed against Italy, Germany and Japan, for countering aggression and maintenance of peace . Thus, the defeat of axis power in the hand of allied power was made possible.

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44. Bartlett, R.J., The League to Enforce Peace.

45. Miller , D.H., The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928).

Changing International Situation , Technological Development  
and Growing Irrationality of Pursuit of Peace within the  
Power -  
Framework of Paradigm

In the Post 1945 period, the picturesque of whole international politics appeared in a new horizon in the wake of technological development, which is marked by the advent of atomic or nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons that has appeared as "new fact" of international life in the language of Karl Jaspers, has become tremendously relevant to a correct analysis of nature of international politics as it has changed the character of military power of nations. Technology has been an important factor in strengthening the military power of a nation and thus changing the character of war itself as a result of which war has become a phenomenon of total destruction. As a logical corollary this change in character of war has made the choice of the resort to war much more difficult, if not impossible. Military superiority with sophisticated nuclear weapons has become an objective in international politics. The sequence of innovations in the military planning is so rapid that, as Roger Hillsman holds, "efforts at adaption are hardly began before they must be scrapped,"<sup>46</sup> and it has become almost impossible for the experts of military planning to analyse the facts of the present to suit to the political

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46. Hillsman R., "Strategic Doctrines of Nuclear War" in William W. Kaufman, ed., Military Policy and National Security, (Princeton, 1956,) p.42.

purposes of their country".<sup>47</sup>

As such the development of new weapons seeks to have affected the nature of international politics in a normal fashion. As a matter of fact, in the wake of nuclear age, there has appeared utter defenselessness against the new weapons. There may be retaliatory counter strikes after the initial attack but ultimately all would be soon destroyed. As Bertrand Bordie has pointed out, "the essential change introduced by nuclear bomb is not that it will make war more violent" but that "it will concentrate the violence in terms of time"<sup>48</sup>. Further new weapons development is bound to lead, in the long run, to a point where military superiority which seems to be an objective in international politics today, will lose its meaning, because, if total destruction has to come ultimately, military superiority will be of no value as such. The whole concept of victory has now become meaningless because it involves the total destruction of the enemy's territory and possessions as also one's own similar destruction. In other words, nuclear war involves the danger of mutual suicide." Experts like Harold <sup>49</sup>

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47. Finletter, T.K. , Power and Polity: US Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age (New York, 1954), p.256.

48. Bordie, B., The Absolute Weapon , (New York, 1946), p.71.

49. Laswell, H.D. Power and Personality(New York, 1948), p.180.

Laswell and Jacob Viner<sup>50</sup> and several others upheld that the use of nuclear weapons for defence will actually leave nothing to defend. This defencelessness against nuclear weapons has brought about an extremely radical change in the nature of international politics and in that of power since the Post 1945 period. Even the most highly organised and most strongly armed country can now be destroyed. Hence the whole picture is complicated by what John Herz calls the indefiniteness of the nuclear age<sup>51</sup>. As a matter of fact the whole concept of security has now become obsolescent in an environment of such indefiniteness of the nature of a possible future war.

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50. Viner, J., "The Implication of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations in Proceeding of the American Philosophical Society , 90:54(Jan 1946).

51. op.cit., International Politics in Atomic Age~~Age~~  
Age, pp. 25-36.

Irrationality of Pursuit of Peace through Collective Security

To the discredit of collective security as a promoter of peace within the framework of power paradigm certain postulates emerge from the interpretation of the theory and practice of collective security. One such postulate is that collective security war will always be a war in defence of status-quo at a particular time. Thus the principle of collective security is in the words of Walter Lipmann, the custodian of status-quo"<sup>52</sup>. But a commitment to a defence of the status-quo runs counter to the requirements of the dynamics of international politics. In defending the status-quo, collective security aims at avoiding a war of less serious nature in the present at the risk of a war of more serious nature in future, thus frustrating its own objective of peace. While emphasising the need for peace through suppression of aggression by the combined strength, collective security ignores the fact that the status-quo which it seeks to defend may itself be reasonably unjust to those who seek to alter it. In other words, it ignores the problem of peaceful change. Thus its watchword is not peace with justice but peace before justice. Even if it is accepted that the status quo may be just, collective security succeeds theoretically only in enlarging the area of conflict for it demands of all nations to participate

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52. Anwar Hussein Syed, in Walter Lipman's Philosophy of International Politics, (Philadelphia(1963), p. 103.

in the war of collective security. Accordingly, all wars logically must be universal wars and localized wars must cease to exist. Collective security by its very logic must work for the transformation of all local wars into World Wars. Thus under collective security any war anywhere in the world tends to be potentially a world war. Instead of preventing war collective security makes war universal. It does so not only by drawing the small and middle sized nations into great power conflicts and burdening <sup>them</sup> with heavy costs in men and material",<sup>53</sup> but also by asking great masses of people to stand ready to exterminate another great masses of innocent people.

Obviously, then the transformation of local conflicts into World Conflicts does not serve peace which is the objective of collective security. As Morgenthau puts in , if this cannot be one world of peace, it cannot help being one world of war, since peace is supposed to be indivisible it follows that war is indivisible too.<sup>54</sup>

As collective security aims at working against any aggressor anywhere, it commits a nation to be always ready to wage a hypothetical war in the indefinite future

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53. Royal Institute of International Affairs : International Sanctions (London, 1930), p.210.

54. op.cit. Politics Among Nations, p.393.



against an unknown enemy under : unforeseeable circumstances. This general character of collective security system makes the system quite dangerous.

With the advent of nuclear weapons of total destruction, the risks involved in the possible transformation of local war into a World War under collective security have assumed greater dimension. In this regard , collective security has become obsolete with the possibility of nuclear war. It was conceived of in the context of a kind of war which is now old fashioned. In the days of mass armies and conventional weapons , one could think of a successful collective action. It was possible during those days in the sense that any aggressor might be defeated by the prospect of a collective action. nBut military technology has undergone such a radical transformation since 1945 that an effective military enterprise cannot be hurriedly contrived by an adhoc grouping of states. The threat of nuclear war poses new problems which makes collective security largely irrelevant. The victim of an aggression today may be completelybdestroyed before a collective security action is given a start.

Irrationality of Pursuit of Peace through Balance of Power

The relevancy of pursuit of peace within the framework of power paradigm through balance of power has received tremendous challenge in the advent of nuclear age. This has become so because the relevancy has considerably declined in as much as it is extremely difficult now for a nation to observe any strict adherence to an alliance under balance of power system in an exclusive sense. It is becoming more and more apparent that each nation having areas of both amity and enmity with every other nation is creating ground for the emergence of an almost universal system of bilateral alliances. Recognizing the significance of this development, David Singer and Melvin Small have argued that "there is need for a thorough <sup>re-</sup>examination of the theory of balance of power in the nuclear age".<sup>55</sup> In course of this re-examination scholars have differed in their opinion about the relevancy of pursuit of peace within the frame work of power paradigm through balance of power. Scholars like Ernest-Hass argue that there is no alternative course open to nations than that of balance of power that a statesman can preserve his country's interest only by trying to balance the power of his ;

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55. J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance, Aggregation and the Onset of Wars" in J. David Singer ed. Insights and indicators in World Politics: International Year Book of Political Behaviour Research, Vol VI, (New York, 1956.)

rivals".<sup>56</sup> To the sharp contrast scholars like John Burton refuse to accept the validity, of the concept of balance of power in the nuclear age and decry it as fallacious".<sup>57</sup>

Two major arguments follow in favour of the contention that the balance of power has grown irrelevant. The first agreement is that since balance of power requires the presence of three or more roughly equal powers and since the emergence of a bipolar world in the nuclear age goes against this requirement the theory of balance of power is irrelevant. The second argument, a corollary of the first is that the threat of war is of a limited utility in nuclear age because of the nuclear stalemate.<sup>58</sup> It is contended on the basis of these arguments that the system of bipolarity itself is a guarantee of peace and superpowers would not use the weapons of total destruction where those weapons would be an effective deterrent against other countries. However, it is difficult to accept this line of argument that bipolar system has shown any conclusive evidence of being able to maintain international peace without any adherence to the principle of power balancing.

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56. Hass E., The Balance of Power Prescription, Concept  
of Propaganda". World Politics 5 (July 1953) pp 442-77
57. Burton J., International Relations - A General Theory  
(Cambridge, 1965)
58. Waltz, K.N., International Structure, National Force -  
The Balance of World Powers, Journal of International  
Affairs, New York, 21(1967), pp. 215-31.

In <sup>the</sup> advent of nuclear age, the acquisition of unlimited power by the superpowers has affected the traditional balance of power theory in a vital sense. The kind of alliance system required for the maintenance of balance of power which Kenneth Waltz calls "The Old Style of Balance of Power"<sup>59</sup> does not exist at present. The possession of unlimited and effective nuclear weapon by super powers has given them a position of decisive superiority in power vis-a-vis their respective allies. The new style of balance of power system has thus created a situation in which winning allies and constant realignment as a feature of balance of power has lost its validity in nuclear age. Kenneth Waltz believes that this changed nature of alliance system during post 1945 period is a guarantee for peace and stability".<sup>60</sup> According to him, the bipolar system since the end of the Second World War has shown unmistakable signs of maintaining stability in the sense that there has been no direct confrontation between the two superpowers and their parity of power has been a factor, guaranteeing a balance between them. It is further upheld that this maintenance of peace is possible so long as the nuclear balance between the superpowers is ensured. This nuclear balance, in the view of Waltz, is ensured, because both of them are interested in their own survival. He further argues that the inequality of power as a general international phenomenon and parity of power between the superpowers are the pre-requisites of peace in the nuclear age. Kenneth Waltz believes that the emergence

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59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

of a multipolar world with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more and more countries would create a threat to the peace".<sup>61</sup> Distinguished scholars like Karl Deutsch David Singer and John Stossinger have also subscribed to the same view<sup>62</sup>.

Scholars like Richard Rosecrance<sup>63</sup>, refuses to accept the view that bipolar system in a nuclear age guarantees peace because they both <sup>the superpowers</sup> have a vested interest in the avoidance of a direct nuclear conflict. He rejects the idea that bi-polarity has completely eliminated the possibility of unlimited competition among superpowers, ultimately leading to nuclear escalation. In his argument, the present phase of detente presumes that the completion between the two superpowers is not absolute and it is possible for them to pursue their objectives. Simultaneously, within the framework of a common interest of the avoidance of escalation Rosecrance contends that development of detente is desirable in the interest of peace but it will bring considerable corrosion

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61. Ibid.

62. Deutsch, K.W., and Singer J.D., "Multipolar Power system and International Stability", World Politics, Vol 16(1964), pp. 390-406. Stossinger J., The Might of Nations: World Politics in our Times (New

63. York, 1969), 3rd edn. pp. 178-82.

63. Rosecrance, R.N., "Bipolarity, Multi-polarity and the Future." in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), 2nd edition, p 332.

in the idea of bi-polarity, because bipolarity envisages that the two superpowers representing two different poles are in a state of unlimited conflict willing to go to any kind of war including a nuclear war. On the otherhand, Rosecrance believes that although a certain level of rapproachment between the superpowers is necessary in the interest of peace a total rapproachment between them is dangerous because that would lead to some kind of a division of the whole world between them as their respective spheres of domination. Instead there should be a system of what he calls "bi-multipolarity in which a bipolar system and a multi-polar system exist simultaneously. The chief characteristic of this system is that the superpowers are governed by an intense desire to co-operate among themselves in restraining conflict in various parts of the world and yet to compete in trying to prevent each others preponderant influence in those areas. The system of bi-multipolarity operates on the basis of the fact that, there are elements of both conflict and harmony in both the bipolar and the multipolar system. In the bi-polar system, the two superpowers try to co-operate in preventing the escalation of conflict in other areas of the world on the one hand and compete with each other in winning the support of the Third World countries on the other. Similarly, the Third World countries co-operate among themselves in order to prevent an escalation between the two super powers. Thus power balancing takes place in both the cases with the differences that whereas in the former it is the result of the factor of military power, in the latter it is the result of the political manoeuvrability of the uncommitted nations.

Thus, pursuit of peace within the framework of power, which glorifies the slogan "Power for Peace", serves as an uncertain and short term device. In course of pursuing peace through power, over emphasis on power makes the task of peace-making difficult. At a certain phase of history it leaves the whole society in a "no war, no peace" state. Hence dependence on pursuit of peace through power paradigm is not reliable in the interest of peaceful international relations.

1.2

Pursuit of Peace through Alternative Approaches

Idealist Approach

Idealist theory in international politics, based on the general idea of evolutionary progress in society finds its historical origin in the ideas of philosopher Condorcet who envisaged a World Order characterised by the absence of war, inequality and tyranny and constant progress in human welfare, brought about by reason, education and science.<sup>64</sup> The theoretical position of idealism in international relations that emanates from the liberal outlook of the 18th century French philosopher Condorcet, presents the picture of future international society based on the notion of reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. Offering ways out of the problem of survival in a world of archaic power politics, idealists emphasise on the moral principles of a nation. In their view moral nations should try to follow moral principles in their international behaviour, abstain from all forms of traditional power politics and adopt principles of non-partisanship through which evil influence of power politics may be progressively minimized.

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64. Marie Jean Antoine Condorcet, Marquis de, tr, Jane Bara Clough, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (London, 1955).

Idealism conceives of constituting a World Government for abolishing Power Politics .

The intellectual foundation of international idealism can be traced <sup>to</sup> the 19th century Benthamite rationalism which was based upon the idea of supremacy of reason. The real problem being diagonalised as right reasoning sprang up with the argument that a correct understanding of international society could be acquired and international society be improved once the voice of reason is realized. The reverberation of this argument was heard in the exhortation of those who propounded <sup>the</sup> doctrine of harmony of interests . Thus political idealism proceeded with the assumption that the compatibility of interests is possible and achievable through reciprocity and mutuality among nations.



KANTIAN APPROACH

The 18th century German Idealist Kant's vision of an ideal World Order thrives on his philosophical blending towards internationalism contained in the establishment of a federal league of states for the pacific settlement of international disputes with avoidance of Global Warfare. His work on perpetual peace outlines the philosophic rules for an international association as an indispensable presupposition for a lasting peace. The outstanding idealist philosopher goes to the length of suggesting disarmament and abolition of standing armies keeping utter denunciation of global Warfare in the frontline of his philosophical outlook. Kant's idealist visionary of a League of States bound by the canons of morality in the absence of a system of legal sanctions presupposes the very essence of his conviction that perpetual peace is not possible until a League of States is set up as a postulate of pure reason. In his emphatic suggestion, he firmly upholds that treaty of peace must be signed by all states with clear and strong conditions to guarantee its continuance . Kant considers state, as moral entities which  
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t moral obligation to seek peace in relationship  
with one another.<sup>65</sup>

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65. M/c Ains, G.L., World Encyclopadia of Peace ed.,  
Lians Pauling , Vol I, (Pergamon Press,) p. 517.

TOLSTOYIAN APPROACH

A Militant vision of christian non-resistance got reflected in the peace ideas of Leo Tolstoy whose sources of pacifism were two fold, viz., liberal acceptance of the perfectionist teachings of new Testament and his angry rejection of contemporary western societies of which war and the state appeared to him essential aspects. His ideas of non-reistance to evil was designed as a powerful spiritual weapon for undermining the foundations of the modern Moloch erected by the essential militaristic states. The state, in his view must be dismantled entirely and replaced by a voluntarist society before non-violence could be fully effective. Tolstoyian approach believes in total non-resistance other than passive resistance to violence and outrage. According to him "the urge for power is the supreme evil"<sup>66</sup>. Tolstoy sees non-violence as a moral imperative compared with which practical considerations count for nothing.

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66. Porter B.E., World Encyclopadia of Peace ed.,  
Lians Pauling (Pergamon, Press,) Vol II, p. 465.

GANDHIAN APPROACH

A high priest of idealism in international politics Gandhi extended his invaluable doctrine of non-violence, not as a passive submission to evil, but as an active and positive instrument for the peaceful solution of international differences. The crux of his philosophical basis in international relations lies in the fact that in resisting evil and aggression all have to maintain the temper of peace and hold out the hands of friendship to those who, through fear or for other reasons may be opposed to others. Gandhi applied moral values to political action and dwelt on the point that so long as we do not recognise the supremacy of the moral law in our national and international relations, we shall have no enduring peace. So long as we do not adhere to right means, the end will not be right and fresh evil will flow from it. A society based on injustice must necessarily have the seeds of conflict and decay within it so long as it does not get rid of that evil. Gandhi established the fact that human spirit is of more powerful than the mightiest of armaments which he extended to international relations.

Stressing on the need for an international morality, Gandhi insisted on the reciprocity and mutuality of national interest. He upheld that nations should try to find out ways and means to adjust their interest. The compatibility of national interest in his view, is the best guarantee of

survival . Thus he dwelt on the point that interest of one nation can be adjusted with the larger interest of mankind.

Gandhi proposed the concept of civilian based defence which presents the best hope to prevent nuclear catastrophe for it is the only form of defense that neither threatens the attacking party, thus provoking them to attack nor calls for the militarisation of the society. Gandhian approach firmly upholds that non-violence is not only the best way but the only way to rid ourselves of the scourge in all its forms.<sup>67</sup> Gandhi firmly believes that all wars are totally wrong irrespective of the fact that <sup>the</sup> motive of one party is right and the other is wrong".<sup>68</sup> Gandhi further admits that "peace , I want among all mankind, but I donot want peace at any cost and certainly not by placating the aggressor"<sup>69</sup>.

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67. Eswaran E., World Encyclopadia of Peace ed.,  
Lians Pauling (Pergamon Press) Vol I, p. 335.

68. Quoted in Budhadeva Bhatta Charya, Evolution of the  
Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Calcutta, 1969), pp. 443-44,.

69. Bombay Chronicle, Aug.9,1942.

INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

(Approach of Peace Societies, Movements and Organizations)

Approach of Peace Society

Peace society , the oldest of which date back to the end of Napoleonic wars, formed part of a vast movement of reform whose avowed object was "the promotion of permanent and universal peace". The London Peace Society opposed all war in its totality. The American Peace Society worked to eliminate war from the community of civilised nations. A radical wing developed within the peace movement in the United States under the leadership of William Lloyd Garrison who founded the new England non-resistance Society on the basis of a kind of Tolstoyanism before Tolstoy, repudiating all the war. A handful of members of this society even experimented with non-violent techniques of resistance . Moderate Anglo American Peace Society strove to achieve the establishment of machinery for preventing international war.

"The peace schemes of the 19th century, all centred on five fundamentals: arbitration, arbitration treaties and clauses in treaties, an International Authority or Tribunal or Congress , the codification of International Law and (simultaneous and proportional) disarmament<sup>70</sup> . The institutional approach of the 19th century, peace movement had much to its credit both in countering the age long glorification of war and in pressing the material and moral case

70. Beales, A.C.F., The History of Peace(London: 1931), pp. 8-14.

against the continuance of international war in a supposedly civilised community of nations. The movement's proposal for introducing international organisation and a measure of World Government in place of the international anarchy that hitherto had prevailed wars to be commended. They served as a model in many ways for 20th century efforts in this area. In Post War World, most pacifists along with large sections of the Wider Peace Movement were to become acutely aware of the need for social change in effecting the elimination of war, and violence from the World. The exploration of this fresh dimension grew into one of the major tasks facing them.

Quakers or the society of friends widely known to be the pontiff of peace sought to transform the world. After early millenarian or perfectionist hopes had been abandoned, they strove to reform society than to effect a total change. Disregarding the apolitical and quietist trend which gained predominance for a time during the 18th century - Quaker pacifism became an outreaching creed and sought to find expression in international relations. Quite early in the history of Quakers, English quakers like William Penn or John Bellers, propounding schemes for establishing peace between the nations without, at the same time, requiring their statesmen and citizens to become converts to the unconditional pacifism of friends. In 19th century, British Quakers were among the earliest promoters of new peace movement (as well as of a number of other contemporary reform endeavours.)

APPROACH OF PEACE MOVEMENT

X (NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT) APPROACH)

Non-aligned movement ever known to be a prominent peace movement in the history of mankind is the movement of such nations whose policy aims at keeping away from a continuing international situation i.e. cold war or bloc politics thus fighting for the cause of peace. Military alliance being an important feature of cold war, non-alignment insists on keeping away from those alliances. The emergence of new states and adoption of non-alignment by them has added a third dimension to the anti-alliance policy, which holds that competition for enlistment of allies is a cause of tension and ultimately of war. The new aspect of anti-alliance policy holds that in the absence of alliances all nations would be isolated and thus more easily amenable to international law. Non-alignment stresses on the major development in contemporary international relations for which it becomes quite relevant for the cause of peace while keeping away from military alliance. This major development in contemporary international relations is the totally destructive character of modern weapons and the consequent change in the character of war. Non-alignment proceeds with the assumption that the solidarity of states having faith in non-alignment is like a most effective <sup>way</sup> which can help the nations in the present age of nuclear deterrence.

The chief objective of non-alignment has not so much in its recognition of peace as a condition of

progress as in its assertion this condition and progress resulting from it can be meaningful only if and so long as an all out nuclear war does not occur. Jawaharlal Nehru one of the founding father's of non-aligned movement understood the objective of non-alignment and proceeded with the assumption that it is means not merely in the service of national interest but in the service of international peace. By pointing out the hidden potentialities of non-alignment as an instrument of peace, Nehru raised it to a World Force.

While realising the basic truth about non-alignment , its relationship with disarmament and international organisation becomes obvious as it is through them that non-alignment contributes to the cause of peace. Non-alignment supports all activities that aim at the relaxation of international tension and it encourages all institutions which work for peaceful resolution of conflicts . Hence support for disarmament and faith in the United Nations in pursuance of peace are quite important objective of non-alignment.

In an unprecedented situation of war non-aligned nations are left with no choice but to join it on the side which they consider as just . But to avoid a situation of war and especially Third World War , all the plans including those for banning nuclear weapons which helps this prevention , are logically a concern of non-alignment in view of existence of mankind.



Non-alignment is the natural accompaniment of all those countries which support peace and disarmament. In the case of aligned countries, this accompaniment can at least take the form of a proper appreciation of the role which non-aligned countries can play or are capable of playing in peace making. In settlement of disputes, the contribution of non-alignment is its assertion that in peaceful settlement of disputes, nations should not take sides in a particular issue because then only they can be heard by the disputants. Non-alignment tends to narrow the zone of conflict widened by the military-strategic interests of superpowers.<sup>71</sup> Non-alignment of nations isolates the two superpowers and thus isolated, the superpowers, finding that a direct confrontation would inevitably bring about their mutual annihilation would try to find ways and means to avoid such catastrophe.<sup>72</sup>

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71. Sinha R., World Encyclopadia of Peace, ed., Lians Pauling, (Pergamon Press,) Vol II, p.60..

72. Ibid.

THROUGH INTERNATIONAL  
APPROACH TO PEACE ORGANIZATIONS

(UNITED NATIONS' APPROACH)

After the conclusion of the Second World War, United Nations emerged as an organization to establish harmony among nations. The very preamble of UN charter extolls peace to be the highest ideal of mankind where nations of world community take pledge for its attainment.

The Charter reads:

" We the people of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights in the dignity and worth of human person, in the equal rights of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of International Law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom and for these ends, to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institutions of methods, that armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all people, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims"

The purposes of United Nations in terms of attainment of peace are enumerated in article 1, clause (1) and (2) which reads -  
Clause (1): To maintain international peace and security and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of ~~threats~~ to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Clause (2): To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of the Peoples and to take necessary measures to strengthen universal peace.

In pursuit of peace, the Charter of the United Nations also provides for the organisation and its members to act in accordance with the following principles:

Article 2 of the Charter reads: 3  
Cl (3): All members shall settle their international dispute by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

Cl (4): All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Cl (5) All the members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with <sup>152</sup> present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which UN is taking preventive or enforcement action.

Cl (6) The organisation shall ensure that states which United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace.

For the upkeepment of peace as the ultimate end, UN Charter provides for pacific settlement of disputes in article 33 Cl (1) which reads -

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice.

**Thus, alternative approaches have provided reliable set of ways and means for attainment of peace in international relations. Alternative approaches, in a true sense, represent long run policies that would aim at objectives to be realised in the future.**

1-3 GORBACHEV'S APPROACH

In this age of dreadly nuclear weapons and its rapid advancement , when the whole scenario of international politics characterised by struggle for power in the form of nuclear arms race has questioned the survival of whole mankind, the alternative approach of Gorbachev appears as a suitable answer which embraces both a realistic assessment of the international reality and idealistic strategy for peaceful international order.

Keeping the exigency and expediency of the reality in view, from a genuine realistic angle, Gorbachev observes that force or threat of force neither can nor should be the instrument of policy of any nation. He perceives that "if policies are built on erroneous premises, then things would reach an extreme point of confrontation fraught with the most tragic consequence for the whole world, and situation in the world may assume such a character that it will no longer depend upon either the intelligence or the will of political leaders"<sup>73</sup> Gorbachev emphasises on the point that nations must look at the world from a position of realistic politics which explains the situation in the present day world, to be dangerous to allow them, to miss even the slightest chance for improvement and durable peace. In this context,

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73. Gorbachev, <sup>M. S.</sup> Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (Fontana / Collins, London, 1987)

He suggests that all nations, especially strongest of them, have to practise self-restraint and renounce <sup>the</sup> use of force. No one should handle international situation in such a way that would heighten confrontation. Thus, admitting the presence of conflict in international relations, with the factual insight of realist visionary, Gorbachev comes out with proposals for peaceful resolution of those <sup>conflicts</sup> in an idealistic way. Discarding the notion of balance of power, Gorbachev stresses on balance of interest, from view point of security of various nations. His approach outrightly rejects the notion of striving for security at another's cost and with the sacrifice of moral values. Gorbachev insists that, basing international relations on moral and ethical norms that are common to all humankind, and harmonising inter-state relations, has become a vital requirement in the present context. His approach is based on the doctrine that compatibility of interests between nations on the question of security is possible and achievable through reciprocity and mutuality among nations. Since compatibility of interest on the issue of security is the best guarantee of survival, the problem gets automatically solved once this mutuality and reciprocity is attained. In this context, Gorbachev suggests that, "nations must learn to leave in a world that would take into account the security interest of all nations"<sup>74</sup>.

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74. Ibid. P.134

Presenting his alternative security model, Gorbachev emphasises on universal security based on the principle of balance of interest. The very axiom that security is indivisible occupies a pivotal position in his new concept of security. According to this theory, the security of a nation must be coupled with the security for all members of the community, underlying which adversaries must become partners and start looking jointly for a way to achieve universal security. "It is the way of mutually advantageous and reciprocal compromise, on the basis of which the supreme common interest prevents any conflict, where there should be no striving for security at the expense of others".<sup>75</sup>

With a staunch idealist visionary, Gorbachev observes that "the world is entering an era in which existence will be based on the common interests of the whole mankind and the realisation of this fact demands that the accommodation of interest of various nations must be the determining priority in international politics".<sup>76</sup> Gorbachev upholds that, "in the community of states, in international politics, every nation has got its own interest, and policies in every sphere are entitled to find a reasonable reflection in international relations for which there is essential need for balance of interests among nations"<sup>77</sup>. He suggests that "irrespective of diversity of political and social systems nations should respect and accommodate each other's policies and interests made in different times."<sup>78</sup> "Differing policies and interests have got

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75. Ibid., p.142.

76. Gorbachev M.S., Address to 43rd Session of UN General Assembly, : Documents and Resolutions  
(Novosti Press Agency, Moscow) 1988

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their priorities in international relations, but that does not mean that those are doomed to confrontation"<sup>79</sup>. Gorbachev further suggests that, "Statesmen should rise above narrow national interest to save any sort of confrontation between national interest. He firmly upholds that while pursuing own interest, the concept of development at another's expense becomes quite inconceivable."<sup>80</sup> Gorbachev dwells on the point that today's world is complicated, diverse and contradictory and at the same time becoming objectively interdependent and integral. This feature of the human community, in his view cannot be disregarded in foreign policy if it is construed realistically.<sup>81</sup> Otherwise, there will be no normal international relations, otherwise, they will be doomed to a feverish state and ultimately to a catastrophic confrontation".<sup>82</sup>

Gorbachev, with ample realistic visionary, emphasises that the pace of the development of military technology has been quite fast thus leaving peoples, states, and politicians less and less time for recognising the real danger and reducing mankind's possibilities for halting the slide towards nuclear abyss. He warns that there can be no delay; otherwise such sophisticated arms system will

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79. Ibid., p.224.

80. op.cit., Address to 43rd Session of UN General Assembly, Documents and Resolutions pp. 7-14.

81. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press Sept 17, 1986, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 33.

82. Ibid.



appear that it will be altogether impossible to reach agreement on controlling them. He observes that major practical steps capable of checking militarism and changing the development of events for the better are necessary.<sup>83</sup> He warns that the "balance of fear" is causing to be a deterrent factor. In his analysis, not only for the reason that fear in general does not counsel reason and can be an impetus to actions with unpredictable consequences. This fear is a direct participant in the arms race: By increasing distrust and suspicion, it forms a vicious circle of aggravated tension. In his view, it is now clear that the old notions about war as a means of achieving political goals have outlined their time. In the nuclear era, these outmoded dogmas nourish a policy that may bring a universal conflagration. In his analysis of the problem of survival in an era of nuclear power, Gorbachev with a pragmatist visionary observes that "the emergence of nuclear weapons has been a tragic way of stressing the fundamental nature of changes taking place since the midst of the century. In this context, survival of nations cannot be guaranteed by building up even the most powerful security system for that would encourage nuclear arms race ultimately making the whole world a nuclear hostage."

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83. Ibid.

To avert a situation of nuclear arms race that goes in the name of security, Gorbachev presents an alternative where the emphasis lies on the "need for a new historic reality which supports a new model of security on the basis of reasonable sufficiency for defence. According to this model equal security is guaranteed not by highest possible but by lowest possible level of strategic parity, from which nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction will be totally eliminated for genuine security".<sup>84</sup> Again Gorbachev observes that in the present situation "a new dialectic of strength and security follows from the impossibility of a military solution"<sup>85</sup> "as nuclear weapons, the material symbol and bearer of the ultimate military power, have laid bare the absolute limits and human kind is faced with the problem of survival, of self-protection in all its magnitude."<sup>86</sup>

As for a suitable alternative, Gorbachev suggests that the task of security should be left to a political ethics, initiatives and decision making. Constructive and concrete interaction between states and people on the scale of the entire world, should be channelised. "Process of negotiation on nuclear<sup>dis</sup> armament<sup>is</sup>, can be achieved only through intensive and open political dialogue aimed at the essence of problems and not at confrontation."<sup>87</sup>

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84. 27th CPSU Congress Documents and Resolutions, (progress publishers, Moscow) 1986
85. op.cit., Perestroika, p.141.
86. op.cit., Address to the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly. Documents and Resolutions
87. Ibid.

Gorbachev insists on the necessity to step over things that divide nations, keeping interest of whole mankind in view. In his suggestion, any sort of difference should not <sup>b2</sup> transferred to interstate relations and foreign policy should not be sub-ordinate to them, for, interest of survival and prevention of war stands supreme as there would be no loser and no winner in a global nuclear war. In this context, Gorbachev further suggests that in order to prevent any disaster, political leaders should rise above narrow national interest.

Gorbachev emphasises on the role of international organisation and the necessity of international law for the channelisation of sound interstate relations, comprehensive international security and stable World Order. In his view, in the present situation when there are very many changes in the World saturated with the diverse interests of numerous states, and finding a balance of interest is a priority, the role of international organisation occupies a pivotal position. This organisation is the most appropriate forum for seeking a balance of interest between states that is essential for the stability of the world.<sup>88</sup> As he suggests, in this specific historical situation, states should reconsider the attitude towards United Nations, without which World Politics is inconceivable. In his view, the revival of United Nations' role is linked with the improvement in

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88. op.cit., Perestroika, p.140.

the international climate where it embodies the interests of different states. "It is the only organisation which can challenge their efforts - bilateral, multi-lateral, regional and comprehensive in one and the same direction."<sup>89</sup> He stresses that the problem of development being truly universal, what is needed is a united effort, the consideration of the interests of all groups of countries through the mediation of United Nations.

Gorbachev insists that the concept of comprehensive international security should be based on the principles of the UN Charter and on the assumption that international law is binding on all states. While championing demilitarisation of international relations, he stresses on the fact that political and legal methods are to be accorded top priority whereas basic ideals stand for a world community of states with political systems and foreign policies based on law. "With the help of an accord within the framework of UN, on a uniform understanding of the principles and norms of international law, solution to various problems can be sought. "In the nuclear era, the effectiveness of international law must be based on norms reflecting a balance of interest of states, rather than on coercion".<sup>90</sup>

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89. op.cit., Address to 43rd UN General Assembly, . . . .

90. Ibid. Documents and Resolutions

Gorbachev considers it important that the global problems affecting all humanity cannot be resolved by one state or a group of states. This calls for co-operation on World Wide Scale, for close and constructive joint action by the majority of countries which must be based on completely equal rights and a respect for sovereignty of each state. It must be based on conscientious compliance with accepted commitments and with the standards of international law. The imperative conditions for success in resolving the pressing issues of international life, in his view, is to reduce the time of search for political accords and to secure the swiftest possible constructive action.<sup>91</sup> Thus, Gorbachev's approach has given an idealist orientation to realism and realist orientation to idealism by combining both, factual insight of realism and ethics and ideals of idealism.

91. Gorbachev M.S. , "The Contemporary World - Its main tendencies and contradictions." 27th CPSU Congress Documents and Resolution . (Progress Publishers, Moscow) 1986 .

CHAPTER - 2

IDEOLOGY , NATIONAL INTEREST AND PURSUIT  
OF POWER AND PEACE IN SOVIET APPROACH  
TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND GORBACHEV'S  
NEW THINKING

CHAPTER - 2

IDEOLOGY , NATIONAL INTEREST AND PURSUIT OF POWER  
AND PEACE IN SOVIET APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
AND GORBACHEV'S NEW THINKING

Ideological Basis of Soviet Approach to International Politics

Marxist Approach to International Politics

Marx and Engels, for the first time, placed the study of international relations on a scientific basis. They did not see international politics as a battlefield of elemental forces on which a particular mosaic of relations among states and group of states or among countries and peoples take shape. For them, the international relations are not an arena of combat between individuals backed by the might of states, but are primarily a battlefield of class struggle. The entire system of international relations, the dynamics of its developments, were interpreted by them from the stand point of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. All of the more or less significant trends in international politics are organically tied in with the problem and factors of a class and social nature. Thus the principal feature of the methodology applied by Marx and Engels in their research into international relations is the fact that they treated the sphere of international relations not as somekind of self-contained system having purely external connections with the social system and class nature of a state, but as an organic component of a complex social nature developing in accordance with the same laws as social relations in their entirety do.

The content and essence of international politics in the light of the Marxist doctrine, are inseparably linked with the class struggle both on the international scene and within the framework of individual states.

The contribution of Marx and Engels to philosophy , political economy and history provide a comprehensive basis for understanding all principal aspects of international relations that relate to fundamental theoretical problems of international politics. Marxism revealed the decisive role of materialistic dialectics as a method for studying international relations in all its complexity , controversy, multiformity and the causative correlation of the events involved. Again, it unveiled that international relations should be regarded as a specific, but inseparable part of the entire system of the social relations , a part that develops under the influence of same laws by which social relations as a whole develop.

#### WAR AND PEACE

#### Capitalism , Imperialism and War

Marx and Engels laid the theoretical foundation of the proletariat's revolutionary course in international affairs after analysing <sup>the</sup> problems of capitalism, imperialism and aggressive war in international relations. They observed that the fundamental economic interest of the classes lie at the basis of their international policies. 'The very nature of



of capitalist development which seeks to obtain maximum profit compels the capitalism to expand their economic activities and defend their interests in international sphere "1. Industrial production , the principal lever of political power of capitalist, enables them to dictate over other states. Imperialist and neo-colonialist policies based on oppression and exploitation of dependent countries are partial continuation of the capitalist system itself. Under capitalist system, the foreign policy being planned by exploiting classes in the interest of capital , the aspirations of bourgeois lead to expansionism , seizure of foreign land, exploitation and oppression of other people and states and struggle between major capitalist predators, for a redivision of the world, ultimately resulting in aggressive wars. Thus war results from antagonistic socio-economic structure based on exploitation of man by man, inherent in capitalist development . Scientific and technological progress and the rapid growth of productive forces under capitalism help continually to improve, the weapons used by regular armies. As a result every new war started by capitalist, inflict ever greater damage on social progress.

#### Struggle for peace and proletarian task

To eliminate the possibility of war , Marx and Engels determined the proletariat's task in the struggle for peace and against militarism and aggressive actions. They suggested the need for the working people of all countries to join together as the principal means for waging the struggle

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1. Marx, K, and Engels, F., Collected Works, Vol 6, pp. 80,90,91 .

for peace. They observed that a strong and effective means, for struggle for peace and against wars of aggression, would be proletarian internationalism. Marx predicted that the alliance of the working class of all countries would ultimately kill the war."<sup>2</sup> He declared that "the Union of the Working Classes of different countries must ultimately make international wars impossible."<sup>3</sup>

### Socialist Society and Peace

Marx pointed out that the possibility of safeguarding and consolidating peace, greatly depended on the relations between the bourgeois and the proletariat. While emphasising on disappearance of wars in communist society, Marx and Engels upheld that "the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end as the antagonism between classes within the nation, vanishes".<sup>4</sup> Engels observed that a communist society, in which the interest of all its members would coincide, would have no reason for starting an aggressive war. A defensive war would be waged by countries of the New Social System only against aggression. The founding fathers of scientific communism predicted that with the establishment of socialist states, the safeguarding of peace would be a major principle of their international policy.

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2. The Great Council of the First International 1870-71, Minute, p.328.

3. The General Council of the First International 1866-68 minute, p.152.

4. Marx, K., Engels, F., Collected Works, Vol 6, p.503.

LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

While laying down, the foundation of proletariats international task against capitalist and imperialist oppression and exploitation, Marx and Engels upheld that, the working class, that expresses the fundamental interest of all the people, emancipating itself from social oppression and exploitation, can become free only by liberating all the Working people of the World. Internationalism is the prime basis of the proletarian revolutionary struggle to succeed. On the principle of proletarian internationalism, Engels writes that "because the conditions of workers of all countries is the same, because their interests are the same, their enemies are the same, they must fight together having the brotherhood of workers of all nations".<sup>5</sup> Marx and Engels emphasised the need for the working classes of all the countries to adhere to the same revolutionary course on the international platform. They believed that the principal trend in the proletariat's internationalist policy should help complete the transformation of capitalist system and attain the democratization of international relations, for democracy in international sphere is an impudent falsehood under expansionism.

Marx and Engels created important pre-requisites for the proletariat to develop and pursue its own independent policy that would be supported by broad strata of the working people

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5. Marx K., Engels F. Collected Works, Vol 6, p.390.

on which the entire system of international relations would be restructured.<sup>6</sup> They predicted that with the victory of new social system and the supercession of a bourgeois policy by a socialist policy of the proletariat, a new type of international relations would emerge on the basis of new relationship between nations and people where there would be no exploitation of man by man as "its international role will be peace".<sup>7</sup>

The basic aspect of the theoretical framework of Marx and Engels on international relations is the treatment of problems of international relations in general and international policy of the working class in particular. The doctrine of Marx and Engels laid the foundation of international policy of the working class, the prototype of the foreign policy of the new socialist formation. In examining international relations, Marx and Engels focussed their attention on formulating an integral and scientifically substantiated foreign policy programme for the working class which would take full account of the concrete international situation and correctly define the major aims and tasks of the struggle at each phase. Marx and Engels emphasised on the necessity and possibility of formulating and conducting a single policy of the working class on the international scene, the objective basis for which lies in the fact that the class interest of the proletariat in the sphere of world politics are identical and indivisible regardless of the nationality or state it belongs to.

6. Marx, K. & Engels, F., Selected Works, Vol.2, p.18.

7. The Great-Council of the First International (1870-71, Minute) p.328.

Marx and Engels taught the working class to correctly define its role in the struggle and classes of diverse socio-political forces and groups in the sphere of international politics, and to support progressive revolutionary movements, treating them as its ally in the historical confrontation with the bourgeoisie. The international policy of the working class can be successful only when it combines a clear revolutionary orientation with a realistic analysis of the objective conditions and with a sober appraisal of the alignment of class forces both within individual states and on a world wide scale.

Marx and Engels attached paramount importance to the consistency and principled nature of the foreign policy of the working classes warning that deviations from its principles could lead to a departure from class positions. Marx and Engels saw the strength and vitality of the international policy of the working class in the fact that it is fully in line with the fundamental interests of the broad masses.

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### SMOOTHING OVER SOCIALIST CONTRADICTIONS

On their scientific analysis of World Socialism , Marx and Engels observed that the recognition of possibility of contradictions<sup>ly</sup> the development of World Socialist System and interstate socialist relations would be an integral part of it. Such contradictions and differences cannot be antagonistic

and they can be jointly resolved in the interest of each socialist country . Thus they were out and out against idealization and smoothing over contradiction in World Socialist System.

PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH CAPITALIST SYSTEM

In the light of a new system of international relations, Marx and Engels foresaw that the states belonging to the diametrically opposite socialist and capitalist system would co-exist in future despite their sharply divided contradictions in socio-economic sphere. This co-existence is characterised by historical optimism and confidence in the might of the world socialist community and its increasing ability to influence the international politics in the interest of peace and progress.

Lenin's Development of Soviet Approach to International Politics

Lenin, being the founder of the world's first socialist state established the basic principles of socialism's international policy and coined the methods for their implementation. His theoretical framework became the main direction of the policy activities of the communist party and Soviet State. The theoretical propositions and specific recommendations on the cardinal issues, such as the principles of relations between socialist countries and capitalist countries, nature of relationships within socialist countries, socialist policies towards the revolutionary movements of the working class in capitalist countries and towards the national liberation movement of the people's of other countries constitute the firm scientific foundation of Soviet approach to international relations.

Lenin comprehensively enriched the ideas of Marx and Engels on international relations and laid the foundation of the Soviet Socialist Policy by putting them into practice on the basis of scientific analysis of objective reality in the new historical epoch of imperialism and socialist revolution. His theories on imperialism, capitalist transformation, socialist revolution, proletarian class struggle, proletarian internationalism and peaceful co-existence were instrumental in providing a clear understanding to the broad spectrum of international relations and thus a scientific foundations to the Soviet socialist approach to international politics.

WAR AND PEACE

Capitalism, Imperialism and War

In his development of a socialist approach to international relations, Lenin set forth socialism's primary international task, of fighting against aggressive imperialist venture in view of not only defending and consolidating socialism, but also putting an end to imperialist warfare and establishing peace through out world. When formulating the scientific foundations of socialist approach, Lenin based himself on a profound theoretical analysis of his age and took a complete account of its cardinal qualitative feature, above all the nature of imperialism. His work on imperialism was the theoretical basis for the scientific analysis of the major processes of international development in the age of transition from capitalism to socialism. Attributing the cause of global crisis to the nature existing capitalist system and its development to imperialist expansionism, Lenin relates it to the origin of war.

Tracing out the cause of war in international sphere, Lenin put it in theory that "war is <sup>the</sup> product of evolutionary development of world capitalism and of its billions of threads and connections".<sup>8</sup> He proved that the wars which are concomitant with all socio-economic structures based on exploitation and oppression waged in the era of capitalism, inevitably become concomitant with imperialism.

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8. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, Vol. 24, p.67



Objective economic foundation of the aggressive wars would continue to exist till imperialism itself exists. Hence, it will be impossible to slip out of imperialist war and achieve a democratic, non-coercive peace, without overthrowing the power of the capital and institution of capitalism, whose highest form is imperialism.

#### Struggle for peace and proletarian task

Lenin suggested that in this situation socialist and all other progressive forces have to implacably oppose such imperialist wars with all the means, they have at their disposal. He claimed that the wars of oppressed countries against their oppressor would be just and defensive and socialists would wish the oppressed dependent and unequal states victory over the oppressor.<sup>9</sup> He advocated that socialists have to determine their stand on the question of war under imperialism and plan the political course of the party to counter the aggressive policies of imperialism against socialist state, prevent new military ventures by capitalism and exclude war from the life of mankind.

#### Socialist Society and Peace

Lenin observes that war stems from the economic and political interests of the exploiting classes in capitalist society. As there will be no such classes and no such political and economic interests of a particular

9. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 300-301.

class in a socialist society , war is alien to its very nature. Socialist society neither needs to plunder nor seize foreign lands, nor is it interested in exploiting other people, for its viability is essentially dependent on the results of labour unlike the "capitalist society's financial capital which is a decisive force in all international relations."<sup>10</sup>

Lenin's strategy in the struggle for peace and clear programme of action prescribed for socialist state against imperialist war is quite realistic.

LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND PROLETARIAN  
INTERNATIONALISM

Lenin's theory of proletarian internationalism, a strategy for channelising socialist revolutionary process against imperialism, colonialism and aggression on the global arena, becomes an indispensable aspect of Soviet approach to international politics. The very essence of proletarian internationalism demands that "the interests of proletarian struggle in one country should be subordinated to that on world wide scale and a nation which is achieving victory over the bourgeois should be able and willing to make the greatest national sacrifice for the overthrow of international capital, the chief weapon of imperialism"<sup>11</sup>

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10. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, Vol 22, p.259.

11. Lenin , V.I., Collected Works, Vol 31, p.148.

Lenin claimed that "world imperialism must be fought and socialist revolutions in other countries must be helped."<sup>12</sup> As Lenin observed, the collapse of the imperialist colonial system, the emergence of new Sovereign states and their independent foreign policy are inconceivable without the alliance of the international working class and the national liberation movement. To him, "the foreign policy of the socialist country stands for alliance with the revolutionaries of the advanced countries and with all the oppressed nations against imperialists".<sup>13</sup> On this basis, Lenin aptly formulated the internationalist task of the world's first socialist state with the declarations for the "support of proletarian revolutionary movement in advanced countries and democratic revolutionary movement in all other countries with special attention to colonies and dependencies"<sup>14</sup>. Lenin proceeded from the fact that all the national contingent of international working class had objectively a common fundamental interest and aim which demanded that they closely interact, extend support to each other and get united. He further elaborated the relationship between national and international factors in the working class policy and explained the role of

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12. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, Vol 27, pp 64-65.

13. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, Vol 25, p.87.

14. Lenin V.I., Collected Works, Vol 27, pp. 157-58.

proletarian internationalism in creating relations of a new type with the people who freed themselves from the capitalist yoke. Lenin depicted how international and national interest must stand in relation to each other in the working class liberation struggle. "He observed that, the legitimate needs and progressive aspirations of the working masses of each nationality will be met through international unity."<sup>15</sup> There will be the creation of a single world economy by the proletariat of all nations as an integral whole, when the socialist world becomes internationalised".<sup>16</sup>

#### SMOOTHING OVER SOCIALIST CONTRADICTION

Lenin went against any idealisation or smoothing over of contradictions. He upheld that the recognition of possibility and inevitability of contradictions, in the development of the world socialist system and in the interstate socialist relations, is an integral part of a scientific analysis of world socialism. Such contradictions and differences are not antagonistic and they can be jointly resolved in the interest of each socialist country. Lenin pointed out that "all nations will arrive at socialism, but all will do so not exactly in the same way. Each will

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15. Lenin, V.I., The Position and Task of Socialist International, Collected Works, Vol. 21, pp. 38-39.

16. Lenin V.I., Preliminary Draft Thesis on Colonial and National Question, Collected Works, vol 31, p.147.

contribute something of its own to some form of democracy , to some varying degree of socialist transformation".<sup>17</sup>

Lenin outrightly rejected the idea of exporting revolution branding it as un-Marxist and noted that, "communism cannot be imposed on others by force."<sup>18</sup>

#### PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH CAPITALIST SYSTEM

Lenin's doctrine of peaceful co-existence, the main strategic direction of 'Soviet Socialist policy towards the capitalist system, constitutes a vital aspect of Soviet approach to international politics. In his doctrine, Lenin advocated the necessity of peaceful co-existence between the two diametrically opposite socialist and capitalist systems, since he felt that both the systems would have to co-exist for a fairly long period of time which is a historically determined objective. He upheld that peaceful co-existence being the essential pre-requisite for peaceful settlement of all international issues would not only be vital, for the co-existence of both the systems but also serve the interest of whole mankind by eliminating the fear of politics by other means . Again, in view of protecting and promoting the specific interest of socialist system, the principle of peaceful co-existence that aims at safeguarding

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17. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, Vol. 23, pp. 69-70.

18.. Lenin V.I., " Eight Congress of RCP(B) ", Collected Works, Vol. 29, p.175.

and consolidating peace , would ensure the most congenial external conditions for building up socialism and enabling socialist foreign policy to furnish international task.

To materialise the principle of peaceful co-existence Lenin chalked out a strategy on economic platform, dwelling on the Marxist tenet on the decisive role of economic interests in the objective of capitalist class, Lenin set the task of using this factor to develop economic ties with capitalist countries on the basis of peaceful co-existence. He pointed out that there were objective conditions for developing economic relations with capitalist countries and <sup>he</sup> was confirmed that "Socialist Common Wealth can establish economic ties with capitalist countries".<sup>19</sup> In charting out the policy of the party and state for furthering economic co-operation with the west Lenin emphasised on the need to take advantage of the incontestable interest of major capitalist power in establishing economic relations with Soviet Union. The policy of economic co-operation , thus became an effective instrument for implementing the principle of peaceful co-existence, placing it on a material foundation.

Despite all sorts of reconciling characteristics, the principle of peaceful co-existence, to Lenin, did not

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19. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, Vol 42, p.177.

necessarily mean compromise in every aspect. It was not an attempt to change the social nature of the capitalist and socialist countries. Lenin, while propounding this doctrine clearly understood that peaceful co-existence between these two diametrically opposed systems did not imply the abandonment of the class struggle. Leninism does not suggest that peaceful co-existence is somekind of social status quo. Indeed, it cannot reject the legitimacy of the world liberation movement, the struggle against imperialism and colonialism . Peaceful co-existence, keeps away from ideological rapproachment with capitalism since, socialist foreign policy is both a class and international policy.

Ideology, National Interest and Pursuit of Power and Peace  
in Practice

With the Great October revolution of 1917, started a new historical epoch in the international politics as the whole world got divided into two diametrically opposing social systems. The sharp contradiction between capitalism and socialism became the fundamental feature of the age when an acute struggle started between the two opposing systems in all areas of social life- economic, political and ideological, When the capitalist bloc openly supported the counter revolutionary forces and economically boycotted Soviet Union, as a counterblast, in 1919, the latter had to organise the Third Communist International or Comintern\* in order to spread communist revolution in the neighbouring countries. But in the meantime, however the economic condition of the Soviet Union began to deteriorate and to rehabilitate that, Lenin came forward with his "New Economic Policy" whose main objective was co-operation with capitalist bloc.

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\* Communist International or Third International, proclaimed by Lenin at a Moscow meeting, aimed at fighting (by all available means, including armed struggle), for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet Republic. It considers the dictatorship of proletariat, the only possible way to liberate mankind from the horrors of capitalism, and Soviet power, in this regard, is considered as the historically given form of dictatorship of proletariat. The task of the communist international is to liberate the working people of the entire world. It calls on the proletariat of the entire world to



In the struggle for peace and for the creation of favourable international conditions for building socialism and communism, Soviet Union had to determine the basic link in the chain of its policy objectives at the every stage of changed international situation so that it could deal with the complex set of problems facing the country. During the Russian Civil War and the armed foreign intervention, the link that helped defend and save the young Soviet Republic, was the Soviet peace proposal to the bourgeois states. With Lenin's famous Peace Decree that heightened inter-imperialist controversies, which the Soviet government took advantage of to ensure that the peoples revolutionary gains were not lost. In the early 1920's, once the Civil War and the intervention were over, the decisive link in the chain of Soviet Policy objectives was the establishment of normal mutually advantageous economic and trade relations with capitalist countries which helped the country rebuild

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take the same path as adopted by Soviet Union in course of its conquest of the great proletarian revolution. The Communist International recognises that in order to hasten victory, the Working Men's Association, which is fighting to annihilate capitalism and create communism, must have a strongly centralised organisation. The Communist International must be a single communist party of the entire world. The communist parties working in various countries are but its separate sections. The organizational machinery of the Communist International must guarantee the workers of each country the opportunity of getting the utmost help from the organized proletariat of : other

the war devastated economy, establish and develop political diplomatic, cultural and other relations with capitalist countries and create conditions for peaceful co-existence between the two opposing systems. In World War II, the main link in Soviet policy was the struggle to create united world anti-fascist front, to organize a collective rebuff to fascist aggression and to mobilise all people who desired freedom for a struggle that would result in the quickest possible and total defeat and extermination of fascism. Keeping the above objective in view, Soviet Union under Stalin collaborated with capitalist bloc though initially it had joined hand with fascist power to defend its national interest i.e. security. But soon after, the over of World War II, the honeymoon with western bloc was over and marred by mutual hatred and distrust. Stalin looked upon the west especially the US with great suspicion and in his speech of Feb. 1946, referred to the "inevitability of conflict with

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countries at any given moment.

In practice, foreign communists lost control over their own parties to Communist International and their policies so streamlined, followed both Russian revolutionary strategies and dictates of Russia's conventional diplomatic dealings.

the capitalist power". He urged the Soviet people not to be deluded that the end of the war meant that the nation could relax, and emphasised that rather intensified efforts were needed. Soviet Union entered into the game of power politics with US where each of them tried to curtail the influence of the adversary and stop its presumed effort to conquer the world.

Stalinist World view was based upon a series of mutually reinforcing propositions that "Soviet Union was confronted by implacable enemies with whom no real co-operation was possible because they were resolutely dedicated to the destruction of the World; First —

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They were also made to follow the vagaries of Soviet internal politics. After Lenin's death, Stalin's controversy with Trotsky dominated "Comintern" affairs. However, Stalin permitted the "Comintern" to serve only Russian interest.

The "Comintern"'s dissolution announced in May 1943 was probably designed to mollify Stalin's allies while war (Second World War) separated Russia from many European revolutionary and resistance movements.

- Socialist State".<sup>20</sup> The distribution of power between East and West was described not as one of parity of balance but as one characterised by capitalist encirclement. The Soviet Union was considered to be ringed by hostile states bent upon utilising every means at their disposal to undermine and weaken it. The need for vigilance was constantly emphasised based upon the contention that the primary goal of the Soviet regime - ensuring continued survival of socialism in the Soviet Union had not been secured and indeed was very much in jeopardy. This view was expressed by the ideological formulation that the final victory of socialism by which was meant the achievement of sufficient security to rule out any possibility of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union - had not been won and could not be attained as long as the capitalist governments of West Europe and North America continued to exist.

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20. Berin , F.S., The Communist Doctrine of Inevitability of War", American Political Science Review(June 1962), Vol 57, pp. 334-54.

Goodman, E.R., The Soviet Design for World State (New York Columbia University Press, 1960).

Paul M., "Prelude to Detente" International Studies Quarterly, (Dec.1975), Vol 19, pp. 501-28.

Tucker, R.C., The Soviet Political Mind, (New York, W.W. Norton, 1963,) pp. 20-35.

Soviet insecurity was further heightened by a deep sense of fatalism in that, it was explicitly argued that there was relatively little that the Soviet Union could do to alter the international environment in which it existed . It was dogmatically asserted that world wars remained an inescapable feature of international politics under capitalism. During Stalin's period international relations was depicted by Soviet Spokesmen as a Zero-Sum game. In their conception, there were only two players, the socialist camp and the capitalist camp locked in direct conflict. The gains of one side were inevitably loss for the other. The presently oft-pronounced phrase - "the relaxation of international tension" was viewed in Stalin's days as dangerous illusion. Far from advocating the goal of a lessening of international tension, Stalin's main concern was to preserve a high level of tension so that vigilance toward the class enemy would not be relaxed. For Stalin a state of detente was vastly more threatening than a state of acute tension, for tension had the acute advantage of making clear just who was the enemy.

The Second World War placed Soviet Union in a quite advantageous position as a result of which Soviet sphere of influence started extending Soviet Union under Stalin established influence over the countries situated on the border in so far as internal administration and foreign policies were concerned.

What aided the Soviet Union in its quest for a ~~pax-~~ Sovietica in the Post World War Period was the fact that due to the war , it had militarily occupied Eastern Europe. It was an easy step for Soviet Union to create a set of satellite states in the region so as to secure itself. Stalin, having control over the region successfully installed pro-communist governments and saw that communism prevailed in Poland , Hungary, Rumania , Czechoslovakia , Bulgaria, Albania and East Germany. Thus by promoting , Communist governments in Eastern Europe , Soviet Union assumed the leadership of communist bloc . Alongwith building up a . . . Satellite State System in Eastern Europe , Stalin went on to extend his support to communist parties seeking to come to power in West Europe and also in Asia, like outer Mongolia,

Manchuria and North Korea. Thus through out the late forties, it looked as if a communist monolith existed and that the Soviet Union, if it could bring about a series of successful revolution, would establish a Russian dominated global society. It was very clear that Stalin's slogan of communism in one country that was pronounced by him in early 1920s, when he first came to power opposing Trotskyite view of export of revolution, got burried very soon under the mixed pressure of imposition of ideology and pursuit of power, influence and national interest.

With the galloping spread of Soviet influence in Europe, United States took a number of measures aimed at curtailing growing influence of communism in Europe as a result of which Soviet Union under Stalin decided to revive the communist international : : by forging together all the anti-imperialist forces. In September, 1947, it set up the Communist Information Bureau, COMINFORM,\*\* to co-ordinate the work of the communist parties of various countries.

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\*\*\* The original purpose of the "Cominform" appears to have been to help the Soviet Union to tighten the control that it was establishing over the countries of the Eastern Europe - be it in accordance with Stalinist practice in Russia or due to the increasing momentum of the Cold War. It published a journal the main purpose of which was to transmit directives to its members .

This organisation was to take necessary steps <sup>to</sup> popularise communist ideology through propagation. In order to withstand the capitalist threat and promote greater economic co-operation among communist countries Soviet Union initiated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) taking <sup>Č</sup>zechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania in its orbit. In 1949, when NATO military bloc was formed by western powers, Soviet Union <sup>I</sup> tried to counter the western moves by forming the Warsaw pact military alliance with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany where it not only took measures to confront the western power bloc and defend its national interest and that of allies in terms of security, but also emerged as the undisputed leader of the communist bloc.

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Soon after the establishment of the "Cominform", the Soviet Union entered into political conflict with Yugoslavia, Tito having refused to bend the requirements of the Soviet policy. A formal breach occurred with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the "Cominform" in June (1948).

"Cominform" was subsequently dissolved in April 1956 by Khrushchev on the grounds that the organization had exhausted its function.



With the disappearance of Stalin from Soviet as well as World Political Scenario in March 1953, the frozen ice of deep confrontation with capitalist bloc and a dogmatic policy towards socialist bloc started melting gradually which ultimately culminated in Khrushchev's : ~~de~~Stalinisation . In the fateful year of 1956, 20th CPSU<sup>21</sup> under new leadership of Nikita Khrushchev heralded a new epoch in international relations witnessing a historic departure from Stalinist approach. Keeping the very exigency of the time in view it came out with the inference that war was not inevitable and could be prevented thus rejecting Stalin's statement, that advocated inevitability of conflict with capitalist bloc. It was held that though a future conflict could not just be postponed and a peaceful respite prolonged, nevertheless any internal crisis could be settled by peaceful means and not by war. The party proclaimed its conviction in the possibility and necessity of eliminating the threat of war as such and banishing it from the life of mankind upholding that war is by no means an indispensable pre-requisite for social revolution. The party refined the principle of peaceful co-existence with the renovation of Lenin's ideas by Khrushchev in 1959. Peaceful co-existence was a recognition of the Soviet Union's growing confidence in

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21. Summarised from Twentieth CPSU Congress Documents and Resolutions (Progress Publishers, Moscow,) 1956.

its ability to defend itself, an acknowledgement of the dangers to both sides of a nuclear war and a commitment to the idea that communism could defeat capitalism peacefully by producing a superior social and economic system. With this pragmatic assessment of international situation, in the era of potential nuclear warfare, emerged the liberalised Soviet approach to international politics in the form of a policy of peaceful co-existence with capitalist system.

In the 21st and 22nd CPSU Congress<sup>22</sup>, the issue of war and peace occupied a pivotal position where it was declared that prevention of a thermonuclear war and establishment of everlasting peace on earth is a historical mission of communism guided by Marxist-Leninist theory of just war and unjust war, the party programme declared that the party and Soviet people as a whole would oppose all kinds of aggressive wars including wars with capitalist countries, local wars and wars against national liberation movement. But at the same time, the programme stated firmly and unequivocally that Soviet Communists regard it a duty to support the struggle of oppressed people and just wars of liberation against imperialism, the class enemy of Soviet Union, CPSU

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22. Summarised from the Twenty First CPSU Congress and  
Twenty Second CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions  
(Progress Publishers, Moscow.)

declared that the defence of the Socialist homeland and ensuring the security of the socialist world system was its internationalist duty. Soviet optimism was reflected in Khrushchev's declaration that capitalist encirclement no longer existed and that the final victory of socialism had been achieved in the Soviet Union. This repudiation of Stalinist dogma was more than symbolic. It meant that the survival of the Soviet regime was no longer viewed as hanging in the balance. Khrushchev proclaimed that it was fully possible, even while capitalism still existed in the west, to create an international system in which World war would cease to be possible. It was emphasised that in the nuclear age, the Soviet Union and the United States, as the World's only two superpowers had a special joint responsibility to work together to avoid a nuclear holocaust and to regulate conflict anywhere in the world.

The evolution and changes in communist theory and practice in the sphere of international politics go through three major phases: <sup>23</sup> the period of "ideological dreaming"

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23. Duchacek, I.D., Nations and Men, International Politics Today, (New York, 1966), pp. 242-ff.

which lasted upto the October revolution in Russia. The "adjustments" of the communist doctrine to the hard realities of international life in a system of Sovereign nation states and the phase of "further adjustment" to the realities of nuclear age". The first phase was characterised by the belief in an eventual emergence of one world wide communist commonwealth which would be free from capitalistic evils and would function on the basis of proletarian internationalism. Any possibility of peace was ruled out while capitalism existed in any form. Prior to the success of the communist seizure of power in Russia in 1917, the Russian communists under Lenin's leadership were guided in an absolute sense by a programme of revolutionary thoroughness of action for transforming the whole world into communist society. There could be no possibility of the communist world having any diplomacy or foreign policy with the non-communist world still remaining to be made communist. This theory of communism came into conflict with the realities of international life almost soon after the successful conclusion of the Russian revolution. For, it soon became clearer to the Russian leaders that the cause of international communism could not be dearer to them than the practical need of consolidating the internal stability of the Russian state. Hence compromises had to be made and the general ideological visions had to be either modified or abandoned. In the conflict between theory and reality, it was the theory and not reality which was sacrificed.

The result of all this was that the party of revolution had to learn the art of policies and diplomacy and with this, the communist theory moved from its "day dreaming" phase into a phase of "adjustment with reality." This reality was that Russia had no option but to engage itself in the process of power balancing in a world which was actually or potentially hostile. When the communist theory considered capitalism as irremediable evil, the Russian leaders tended to adopt the usual policy of regarding some capitalist countries as lesser evil than others. This policy found a particular strengthening at the hands of Stálin. But the seeds of such a policy were sown during the earlier period itself. According to the pure theory of communalism, the aim was not only Russian Revolution, but a world wide and above all, an all European revolution. It was considered as a duty of Russian communists to promote revolution in Europe. They also knew that the survival of Russia itself depended upon the triumph of communist revolution in some major countries of Europe, because otherwise Russia would always remain vulnerable to an attack from the capitalist governments of Europe. As such, the Russian leaders were faced with the problem of conducting such a foreign policy as could help in the achievement of the traditional national interest of Russia on the one hand and the promotion of the communist ideology on the other. The problem was solved by equating the protection of the Russian national interest with the promotion of the cause of world revolution. So great was

the consideration of power and pragmatism, which had hardly anything to do with ideology as such.

Thus Russian foreign policy was inspired by the same motives as are applicable to all states, whether communists or non-communists namely the preservation and maximisation of national interest. The First World War disproved Lenin's prophecy that inter capitalist wars were inevitable and that they would ultimately lead to a transformation of the world into a communist system. While Russia became communist, the rest of the world remained capitalist after the First World War. Hence it became necessary to readjust the theory of inevitability of war with the new reality of the existence of a non-communist hostile world. This readjustment was made by Stalin on the basis of the well-known thesis of the desirability of a temporary peaceful co-existence until such time as the inevitable war between capitalism and communism could occur under more appropriate conditions in the future. Stalin's argument was that the consolidation of communism within Russia first was the necessary condition of the establishment of international communism. Khrushchev also presented a variation of the same argument when he said that peaceful co-existence would lead to a peaceful burial of capitalism. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders advanced the thesis that the destructiveness of modern weapons must have a sobering effect not only on the capitalists but also on the communists.

The objectives of Soviet policy were formulated by the 23rd Congress of the CPSU.<sup>24</sup> They, broadly consist in ensuring, together with other socialist countries, favourable international conditions for the construction of socialism and communism, in consolidating the unity and cohesion of socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood, in supporting the national liberation movement and engaging in all round co-operation with the young developing states; in consistently standing up for the principle of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems, giving a resolute rebuff to the aggressive forces of imperialism and safeguarding mankind from another world war. These goals proceed both from the existence of a world socialist community and the need for and inevitability of the close interactions of the USSR and other socialist countries in the international arena and from the fact that alongside the socialist system there exists a world capitalist system.

In the year 1971, the 24th CPSU<sup>25</sup> came forth with a concrete programme of struggle for peace and international co-operations. Its objective was a turn in international

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24. Summarised from 23rd CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, (Progress Publishers, Moscow.)

25. Summarised from 24th CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, (Progress Publishers, Moscow,) 1971.

relations, relying on the growing strength<sup>h</sup>, unity and activity of world socialism and on its growing unity with progressive and peace forces alongwith a turn from cold war to peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems, a turn to detente and normal mutual co-operation in various fields of human endeavour. In accordance with the peace programme adopted in the 24th CPSU, the method of peaceful settlement occupied a pivotal position, thus emphasising renunciation of force<sup>h</sup> and threat of force in settling disputes in international relations.

The peace programme was given logical continuation in the 25th CPSU Congress(1976)<sup>26</sup> with the programme for further struggle for peace and international co-operation with due emphasis on the freedom and independence of people from imperialist domination.

As a totality of norms of interstate relations, Lenin's principle of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems were legislatively proclaimed in Article 29 of the 1977 constitution of the USSR which reads:

The USSR's relations with other states are based on observance of sovereign equality, mutual renunciation of the use of threat of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial

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26. Summarised from 25th CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, (Progress Publishers, Moscow,) 1976.



integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for equal rights of the people and their right to determine their own destiny, cooperation among states and fulfilment in good faith of obligations arising from the generally recognised principles and rules of international law and from the international treaties signed by the USSR.

The Soviet policy of detente and co-operation with all countries was made explicitly clear in the resolutions of the 26th CPSU congress<sup>27</sup> in 1981 where the congress proposed several important foreign policy initiatives to preserve and strengthen peace. It advanced broad programmes of measures for strengthening confidence among all states and presented a series of proposals relating to international co-operation. Soviet Union proposed to all countries that to counter balance the aggressive policy of reaction they should work to make the 1980's a decade of renewed success of detente, a decade in which political detente would be supplemented by military detente. It upheld that objective possibility and socio-political forces did exist which could ensure peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems and prevent a world nuclear conflict. The 26th CPSU congress emphasised on the bilateral

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27. Summarised from the 26th CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, (Progress Publishers, Moscow,) 1981.

task between Soviet Union and United States based on strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. As the party programme displayed extensive policy initiatives it expressed Soviet State's readiness to examine several other proposals as well and to co-operate with all democratic forces in the search for acceptable forms and ways of joint action in the fight for peace.

Approach towards Capitalist Bloc in the Post Stalin Years

As a matter of fact, during the days of Khrushchev's leadership, the principle of peaceful co-existence, doctrinally advocated by Lenin and virtually buried by Stalin was renovated and refined with accounts taken of the changes brought about by the Second World War and with the advent of the nuclear age. Efforts were made by Soviet leadership to arrive at understanding on some outstanding issues. But most of the Soviet proposals having failed to receive equal response from the side of counterpart, Soviet initiatives could not succeed to cut much ice. Hence, with the doctrine of peaceful co-existence in the backside, Soviet Union tried to increase its military strength and expand the sphere of influence to contain its adversary. Distrust and suspicion climbed up such a height that it culminated in infamous Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The whole process of peaceful co-existence thriving in a budding stage, was marked by Soviet leadership's intense desire to pursue national interest. However, this aspect of Soviet approach could be averted due to pragmatic visionary of its leadership, which was subsequently hailed as significant contribution of Soviet Union towards promotion of World Peace. Thus, the Soviet doctrine of peaceful co-existence remained at the tip of the ice berg during the days of Khrushchev's leadership.

With the appearance of Brezhnev in the Scenario of Soviet politics, the doctrine of peaceful co-existence, in a true sense, was implanted, grew up and flowered. In the years of detente, Soviet Union tried to reflect the doctrine with a concrete content on the basis of equitable dialogue and co-operation. With consistent efforts towards disarmament and substantial achievement, those years witnessed the upheaval of a new era in the whole history of the two opposing social systems, which influenced the entire global geo-politics. The principle of peaceful co-existence was expedited to such an extent that it culminated in Helsinki-peace-process embracing Soviet Union's all western counterparts. In this conference Soviet Union highly recognised that international atmosphere had begun to change for the better with gradually melting of the ice of past cold war years. Soviet Union's profuse cordiality created the most favourable climate for the renewal of economic, scientific, technological and cultural co-operation apart from political one between the two opposing social systems. Thus, detente became the manifest policy issue of the Soviet approach, thriving on the cherished doctrine of peaceful co-existence, till Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, with which the era of new cold war started.

Approach Towards Socialist Bloc in Post-Stalin-Years

After Stalin's disappearance from Soviet Political Scenario, a process of eliminating deformations and purging the mutual relations of the Socialist countries of unhealthy phenomena commenced. The need to observe strictly the principles of full equality, goodwill, respect for national Sovereignty and consideration for specific national features was acknowledged. The recognition that different roads of socialist development were rightful, was also of great significance.

Unfortunately, the process of rejecting evil initiated after the 20th CPSU Congress ~~was~~ of a contradictory nature. It was influenced by a desire to overcome past inertia, by rigid stereo-types, by a dogmatic incomprehension of change and the new requirements of social development. But the process <sup>was</sup> interrupted by a mixed motivation of the Soviet ideological dogma, national interest and pursuit of influence. The slogan that there can be many roads of socialist development was robbed off its essence when Khrushchev and Brezhnev carried out socialist intervention in Hungary and Poland in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and again in Poland in 1970 and 1980, the most conspicuous and tragical being intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Military force was massively used in Hungary by Soviet Union alone and in Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw pact countries with the leadership of Soviet Union when it felt that its vital interests were being threatened. The interest of Soviet Union was nothing

other than establishing socialism on the line of Soviet policy and hence installing pro-Soviet Leadership. Soviet Union militarily intervened in Czechoslovakia when Soviet leadership thought that the increasing liberalization being carried out by Czech regime in domestic affairs would have a destabilising effect on the rest of the Eastern Europe. In this regard, the famous Brezhnev Doctrine<sup>\*\*\*</sup> stated that the Soviet Union had every right to intervene in the affairs of a socialist country when it became apparent that socialism within the state was endangered. This doctrine introduced the idea of a limited sovereignty for the socialist countries.

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\*\*\* (a) The socialist states are only conditionally sovereign: they may lay claim to the rights of a sovereign state in so far as they do not contravene the interest of the socialist community and the world wide revolutionary movement which take priority over national interest.

(b) The socialist states have only limited powers of self-determination. Breaking free from the "Socialist State Community", is therefore, not possible, as such a step would be detrimental both to themselves and to the interest of other socialist countries and would justify the use of military force.

Approach towards Third World

From the very beginning of the Bolshevik movement in Russia , its leaders have avowed an appreciation of the importance of the East to the World revolutionary cause. In the years following immediately the October revolution, Lenin and his colleagues concentrated their attention in foreign policy on problems relating to the industrially advanced countries of Europe. Yet, they remained sensitive to the role that the "toiling masses of the east" could play in assisting the Russian proletariat to achieve its victory over the world imperialist system. Nevertheless it remained Stalin's successors to make the first substantial and continuing Soviet investments in the countries of Third World .

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- (c). Since the formation of a Socialist Common Wealth, the dictatorship of proletariat has adopted an international character. This implies a global claim to government on the part of the communist parties. The sovereignty of a socialist state has a class character which cannot be violated by acts of intervention of another socialist country. Sovereignty exists by law of the working people to establish a socialist or communist social order under the leadership of a communist party.
- (d) If a communist party, while developing socialism deviates or threatens to deviate from the Soviet model, then the brother countries are obliged , in

The initial thrust of the Soviet entry into the countries of the east came in seeming response to the policies both of Moscow's American rival and the new Soviet ally in Beijing. By the mid 1950s, Soviet leaders were reawakening the Leninist perception of the Third World as the vital "strategy reserve" of imperialism - an arena in which Soviet Union could wage the bipolar struggle with solid prospects of success, but at a lower level of risk than would <sup>be</sup> posed by a direct challenge in the "main arena" of confrontation. The early attention given by Moscow to the Middle-East and South Asia reflected the relative weight these lands carried in Soviet Security Calculation. Having identified their priorities, Soviet leaders soon set about to revise the ideological basis of their new policy.

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(d)contd.,,accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism to intervene by means of military force. Consequently, through ideological divergencies in the "Soviet Common Wealth",-(according to Soviet Foreign Minister , Andrei Gromyko in October 1968,at the UN) the conception of the CPSU can be put into effect with the help of the armed forces of the Warsaw pact should the diverging political line of a country bring the danger of a split in and the inner disintegration of the Socialist Common Wealth and the country in question is not itself able or willing to oppose differences.



Like Lenin, Khrushchev sensed that as long as the burnt of the independence movement was aimed against the "imperialist" west it would serve the security interests of the Communist East. It was Khrushchev's confident expectation that aid from the Socialist bloc would allow the third world countries to break away from the imperialist economic grip and launch their plans for industrialised and truly national economies on the model of Soviet Union's development. A class-conscious proletariat would inevitably emerge in these countries, ready to respond to the political programme of its communist vanguard and - once the "national bourgeois" had revealed the compromising side of its dual nature - to assume political power, even by peaceful means.

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- (e) The principles of peaceful co-existence, equality, respect for territorial integrity and the states' independence in home affairs are, as far as relations between socialist countries are concerned (and in particular with regard to the Soviet Union) only partially effective.
- (f) The defense of World Socialism as a common achievement of the working people of all countries is the common cause of all communists and all progressive people on earth, First and foremost the working people of the socialist countries.
- (g) Any communist party is responsible for its actions, even before all socialist countries and before the Communist World Movement.

The Soviet approach to the third world was developing in truly realistic fashion exemplified by Moscow's willingness to modify the Marxist -Leninist doctrine to fit a variety of circumstances and by its use of a wide range of instruments for establishing its presence and extending its influence. Soviet Unions relations with Third World soon extended beyond ideological appeal and spread into economic, political, cultural and military sphere. The Soviet contacts with Third World countries exemplified the techniques of "informal penetration".<sup>28</sup>

In the year 1969, the well known Asian Security Doctrine<sup>29</sup> was coined by the Soviet leader, Brezhnev, which was based on four major principles, viz. (1) renunciation of the use of force in relations among states,<sup>(2)</sup> respect of Sovereignty and inviolability of frontiers,<sup>(3)</sup> non-interference in internal affairs,<sup>(4)</sup> extensive development of economic and other co-operation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage". One of the new Soviet objectives of the doctrine was to make the continent of Asia as free from intra-continental tensions and disputes as possible, so that those tensions and disputes are not exploited by China or the United States as a pretext for their

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28. Scott , A.M. , The Revolution in State Craft : Informal Penetration( New York, Random House, 1965).
29. Clark, I., "Collective Security in Asia", The Round Table (London), October 1973, no. 25-2, pp. 477-78.

intervention in Asian Affairs. The doctrine of "Asian Security" served the Soviet Union as a convenient instrument which could be used both in its limited conflict with the United States and in its unlimited conflict with China.

As an Asian power itself Soviet Union has long been, deeply involved in that continent. After the rift with China # and China's emergence as an influential power as well as leader of the communist movement in Asian continent, viewing it as the major rival and simultaneously seeing Japan largely as a surrogate for the United States, Soviet Union tried to build stable relationship with India and Viet-nam as partners in their efforts to contain Chinese and American power and to strengthen Soviet Union's own security alongwith influence. Soviet' Union's involvement in the Asian continent though appeared to be peripheral throughout the years, it penetrated into the core towards late 1970s. In the initial years, Soviet Union's tacit support to North Korea against US backed South-Korea in the Korean wars, military support to North-Vietnam against America in the Vietnamese war and indirect influence over Kampuchea through Vietnam did not imply Soviet Union's

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#Conflict was mainly a clash for leadership of the Communist movement, which was given the colour of a doctrinal struggle over the correct interpretation of Marxism-Leninism after the policy of de-Stalinisation was launched by Soviet Union in 1956. Coupled with a number of issues, the direct border conflict aggravated the tension. Later on three major issues viz - Soviet troops concentration in the Mongolian border, Vietnam intervention in Kampuchea and direct Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan heightened the tension.

interventionist policy so much as it happened in case of direct military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Afghanistan being a strategic area on the periphery of the USSR, challenged by a military uprising against pro-Soviet regime, led Soviet Union to act in terms of national interest to defend . Being a Marxist-Leninist regime linked to the Soviet Union by a Solemn Security Treaty, its overthrow not only appeared as a challenge to Soviet interest but also a challenge to Soviet credibility. Soviet Union used military force in Afghanistan to maintain an existing regional balance not to upset it.

Since mid 1950s , Soviet Union has been active in the West-Asian region both diplomatically and militarily as it has sought to pursue its national interest and increase its influence in the region viz-a-viz United States. It sought to promote Arab Unity in an anti-imperialist and anti-Israel bloc . It extended financial assistance to Egypt in the completion of Aswan Dam after United States and other western powers declined to help. In 1956, when combined military attack was launched on Egypt by Britain, France and Israel Soviet Union was at the verge of using military power against these countries. In course of championing the Arab cause against Israel , Soviet Union got involved in a battle of proxy with United States to counterbalance latter's influence and establish its own. It went to the extent of supplying military

assistance to Arab countries in the war of 1967. Soviet Union increased its influence in the region by retracing her position in Iraq, Libya, <sup>and</sup> Syria with supply of military aid. With Iran's joining in the west sponsored Baghdad pact, Soviet Union moved closer to Iraq. In 1958, Soviet Union extended support to Iraqi revolution and neutralised Baghdad pact/CENTO alliance system. In the liberation struggle of PLO against Israel, Soviet Union supported the former by giving military aid. Thus it is clearly evidential that in the course of exercising influence in the West Asian region and trying to curtail that of its adversary, Soviet Union provided military and economic support not being involved in any direct military confrontation.

Closer to Soviet Union, but still separated, from its vital border region, Africa has been a target of intense Soviet attention. Since Nikita Khrushchev's regime, Soviet Union has harboured hopes that a combination of ideological appeal and emulation of the Soviet development model would attract new nations in Africa to Marxist-Leninist camp. Soviet objectives remain relatively modest, especially in comparison with Khrushchev's goal, Moscow hopes by presence to gain a voice in African affairs and in particular to obtain leverage over the liberation movements in South Africa. By enhancing its own influence in the frontline states, the USSR hopes to reduce western influence. Soviet Union has established its influence over Ethiopia and Angola although it has lost control over Ghana, Mali, Guinea and Somali.

So far as Latin American is concerned, Soviet objectives are less oriented towards winning new adherents to the Socialist bloc than towards denying a upperhand to its counterpart in exercising influence in that region. Despite the fact that much attention has been focussed on Central America in recent years, Soviet Union has neither economic nor military interests there, that can be vital to its well being. In Central America, Soviet Union finds its interest to interfere in so far as it does not <sup>have</sup> United States to interfere in the region that is directed towards bringing down Sandinista government in Nicaragua. As a result of this Soviet Union was engaged in a proxy civil war with United States by supporting the communist government with military and economic assistance. In El Salvador Soviet Union has kept the pot stirred with indirect assistance to the Leftist Guerrillas relying on the regime's short-sighted repressiveness to provide main stimulus to the revolutionary cause. Soviet Union takes immense interest in Cuba, its Socialist supporter in the region, through which it gets the vital strategic interest served so far as rivalry with United States is concerned.

Thus, Soviet Union since the Second World War has been playing a significant role on the chess board of international politics as a global power. The pursuit of power and peace has been motivated by its national interest as well as ideology. While ideology prompted it to move in the direction of peace, the dogma of its ideology coupled with national interest prompted to pursue power and thus help emerge as a global power.

In course of time, Soviet Union adopted an approach that carried the imprint of dogmatism and a subjective approach that was unable to attune itself in time to the sweep of the changes that had encompassed the world and that did not always emphasize requisite means of ensuring country's national interest - that this approach frequently bypassed real possibilities, was devoid of dynamism and was accompanied by mistakes and miscalculations.

GORBACHEV'S NEW THINKING :-

The pursuit of power having cast aspersions on the genuine national interest of Soviet Union, and cost it dearly got replaced by the new thinking of Gorbachev which embraced a policy of peace instead of a policy of power, keeping the exigency and expediency of the time. The very need of the country and sweeping changes encompassing the world prompted the Soviet leader to renounce the approach of all stereotypes and dogmas accumulated over the years. Renovating the ideology of a Socialist state that was distorted for misinterpretations and identifying genuine national interest, Gorbachev preferred to choose a path of peace rather than that of power for not only to expedite his country's national interest but the interest of all nations.

CHAPTER - 3

IDEOLOGY, NATIONAL INTEREST AND PURSUIT  
OF PEACE IN GORBACHEV'S APPROACH TO  
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS



IDEOLOGY, NATIONAL INTEREST AND PURSUIT OF PEACE IN

GORBACHEV'S APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The factor of ideology as well as national interest get reasonable reflection in Gorbachev's approach to international politics. Ideology and national interest envisaged in his approach, invoke a policy of peace and prosperity towards the whole world i.e. capitalist, socialist and third world bloc, in all its aspects viz. social, political, economic as well as military. Ideology, being given a renewed dimension, and national interest conceived properly, give a different orientation to Gorbachev's approach that aims at expediting peace and prosperity.

Under Gorbachev's leadership, ideology of a socialist state having taken a moderate form, is more guided by the pressing needs of Soviet Union domestic compulsion as well as existing international situation, and hence accommodates Soviet national interest alongwith the interest of the states of international community.

APPROACH TOWARDS CAPITALIST BLOC

Soviet policy with the guiding principles of Gorbachev's approach, firmly and consistently inherits the leninist doctrine of peaceful co-existence of the states with different social systems. The approach under the new thinking is more than ever, determined by domestic policy, by national interest, with regard to concentration on constructive work to improve the country. Soviet Union needs lasting peace, predictability and a constructive orientation in international relations. Restructuring is an invitation by socialism to peaceful competition with any other social system where Soviet Union vows to prove in action that such competition benefits universal peace and progress. When such competition is to take place and develop in civilised form, there is need for new thinking and need to overcome thoughts, stereo types and dogmas inherited from a past .

The policy of peaceful co-existence as understood by the present Soviet leadership pre-supposes: renunciation of war and the use of threat to use force as a means of settling disputed issues, and the settlement of such issues through negotiations; non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the legitimate interests of each other, the rights of people to independently decide their destinies; strict respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders; co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit; fulfilment in good faith of commitments arising from generally recognised principles

and norms of international law and from international treaties concluded.<sup>1</sup> It pledges to bring about a universal reaffirmation, in international relations, of the principle of peaceful co-existence, as a generally recognised norm of inter state relations to be observed by everyone. The extension of ideological differences between the two systems to the sphere of these relations is held inadmissible.

Soviet Union's strong desire for the development of the process of international detente, regarding it as an essential and natural stage on the road to the establishment of a comprehensive and reliable security system, gets reflected in Gorbachev's new thinking. It stands for the creation and use of international mechanism and institutions which would make it possible to find optimal co-relations of national interests between two opposing systems.<sup>2</sup>

Gorbachev's approach envisages Soviet State's consideration of peaceful co-existence as a political course which intends to go on following unswervingly, ensuring the continuity of its foreign policy strategy. As its international policy, stems from the realities of world, it views the solution to the problem of international security in terms of consistent methodical and preserving effort.

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1. The tasks of CPSU on the International scene in the drive for Peace and Social Progress. XXVII CPSU Congress Documents and Reservations (Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1986), pp. 310-11.

2. *Ibid.* p. 311

The Soviet leader firmly believes that "continuity in foreign policy has nothing in common with a simple repetition of what has been done, especially in tackling the problems that have piled up. What is desired, is firmness in upholding principles and stands, tactical flexibility, readiness for mutually acceptable compromises and an orientation on dialogue and mutual understanding rather than on confrontation. In the present situation objective conditions have taken shape in which confrontation between socialism and capitalism can proceed only and exclusively in forms of peaceful competition and peaceful contest."<sup>3</sup>

A normal and stable relations between Soviet Union and United States of America on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs, respect for each others legitimate interest, recognition and practical implementation of the principle of equality and equal security and the building of the greatest possible mutual trust, is largely upheld by the former under the leadership of Gorbachev. It is emphasised that social systems and ideologies should not lead to strained relations, whereas objective pre-requisites for the development of fruitful and mutually beneficial Soviet-US co-operation should replace all antagonisms. Policies of both powers should be oriented to mutual understanding rather than hostility which is fraught with the threat of

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3. Gorbachev M.S. , Basic aims and directions of party's foreign policy strategy in *ibid*, p.85.

catastrophic consequences for the Soviet and American people as well as for other nations".<sup>4</sup> Gorbachev upholds that there is no alternative to co-existence. The point lies somewhere above the linking for each other and goes beyond politics. Soviet-American relations are to develop along many lines, including political, economic, scientific, cultural and human contacts. To work on the whole set of problems, both must meet each other half-way on the basis of common sense and an objective analysis of events and a willingness to compromise. No one can impose anything on anyone else. It is necessary to abandon the idea that the Soviet Union has more of a stake in improving Soviet-American relations than does the United States. In Gorbachev's view the relations between US and USSR are part of the broader and multi dimensional spectrum of relations between different social systems or between East and West. "It is one of the key tenets of new thinking not to make differences and conflicts a pretext or justification for confrontation especially when the process of renewal, democratisation and openness in the socialist world are creating trends that favour contacts between countries of the East and the West and are making possible a fundamentally new phase in their relations."<sup>5</sup>

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4. Congress Documents and Resolutions, pp. 311-12. XXVII CPSU
5. Current Digest of the Soviet Press  
Vol XL No. 2(Feb.10,1988), p.16.

Soviet leadership believes that all states have the same right to co-operate with one another, in the pursuit of national interest. The historically evolved ties between Western Europe and the US and Soviet Union's relationship with the European Socialist countries are a political reality. This reality must be reckoned with if a realistic policy is to be constructed. A different approach might disturb the existing equilibrium in Europe.

Gorbachev stresses on the point that regional conflicts must not be turned into a policy of confrontation between the two systems especially between USSR and US. Soviet Union is against the disruption and breaking of historic ties between various regions of the world and hence prepared to build relations on a realistic basis, taking national interest into account. It also seeks a balance of interest. Gorbachev makes it clear that Soviet Union is not at all in favour of disregarding the legitimate interest of United States, but does not agree when the world or certain regions thereof are looked on as someone's ancestral patrimony.

Gorbachev stresses that in the context of the relations between the two powers (USA and USSR) security can only be mutual and if international relations is taken as a whole it can be universal. "The highest wisdom is not in caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate unpredictability in politics and concrete actions.

The appearance of new systems of weapons of mass destruction steadily shortens time and narrows down the possibilities for adopting political decisions on questions of war and peace in crisis situations."<sup>6</sup> Gorbachev attaches considerable significance to the state and character of the relations between Soviet Union and USA. In his view , there is the objective need to live in peace with each other, to co-operate on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Again in his view , every one has to look for, find, and use even the smallest opportunity in order to reverse the trend towards an escalation of the threat of war. Peace has to be fought for and this has to be a preserving and purposeful fight.

The orientation of Soviet military doctrine under Gorbachev is unequivocally defensive . It wants to act in such a way as to give nobody grounds for fear about their security. At the same time to an equal extent Soviet Union and its allies want to be rid of the feeling that they are threatened. USSR undertakes the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. After all it lays no claim to more security, but it will not settle for less at any cost.

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6.

, XXVII CPSU Congress and Documents

and Resolutions, op.cit., p. 82-83.

● **The Soviet military doctrine under the new thinking of Gorbachev, strongly indicates a definite paradigmatic shift in the security doctrine - a shift poised on a defensive oriented capability. This defence orientation theme of his military doctrine is centred on the concept**

Gorbachev strongly declares that Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of disbanding of military groupings. Proclaiming that USSR is a member of the Warsaw Treaty, he makes it clear that "this is a defensive treaty and operates strictly within the geographical framework set by the treaty. He expresses Soviet Union's resolute opposition to the US attempt to extend NATO jurisdiction to the whole world.<sup>7</sup>

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7. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.XXXVII, no.30, (Aug. 27, 1986,) pp. 7-8.
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of reasonable sufficiency which was for the first time enunciated by him in 1985. In 1986, at the 27th CPSU he reiterated the concept in terms of restricting military potential within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency. In 1987, Gorbachev offered the goal of a war free Europe in the pursuit of which the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee declared that the military direction of the Warsaw Pact member-states is strictly a defensive one. This declaration came out as a new public commitment made to suit the implementation of Perestroika. In assessing the prospects for the development of East-West relations with a view to the changes taking place in both parts of the European continent, Gorbachev singled out the importance of a further lowering of the level of military confrontation and of respects for the existing borders in Europe.



In Gorbachev's view , realism makes the powers proceed from the assumption that the existing alliances, - NATO and WTO, will be preserved for the foreseeable future . As political alliances , they can make a contribution to strengthening European Security by becoming a bridge based on lofty joint responsibility .

Gorbachev clarifies that "as long as imperialist NATO military bloc exists, Soviet Union considers it necessary to contribute in every way possible to improving

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The evidence of Soviet military doctrine being translated into practice with the effort of Gorbachev, is clearly manifest and strong. In the area of nuclear disarmament this is patently visible. The series of concessions that the Soviet Union made in clearing the decks for the INF agreement stand as concrete proof. In the primary stage, Gorbachev did nothing sort of accepting the "Zero Option" of Reagan, which in itself amounts to a bold stroke of policy change. Secondly, he consented not to insist on the inclusion of the British and French INF capability in the Euro-missile negotiations. It was true that in the beginning these concessions were linked to the over edifice of nuclear disarmament in general and this was his stand at Reykjavik. However, soon he was prepared to delink these two and settle for an INF agreement as a starter. Again, on the issue of verification, it was Gorbachev who went beyond his predecessor's inhibitions and accepted for the first time, comprehensive verification including on-site inspection. Finally, the longstanding Soviet pre-condition of the Americans giving up their SDI, has also been relaxed by the Soviet Union when it signed the INF treaty without insisting on American suspension of SDI. As regards strategic weapons, it was largely, if not solely, due to the recent Soviet initiatives that the super powers consensus on the time bound two stage elimination of strategic weapon could emerge.

the work of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as an instrument of collective security against the aggressive ambition of imperialism and of joint struggle for a lasting peace and broader international co-operation.<sup>8</sup> Gorbachev proclaims that as long as a real threat of imperialist aggression exists, the socialist countries alongwith Soviet Union are compelled to concern themselves with their security. He projects it as the aim served by the Warsaw Treaty, in the framework of which, the troops in arms are in the service of peace, some of them on the territory of a number of allied states. He makes it clear that "the Socialist Countries will not allow any one to regard them as "lebensraum" for others appetites and revanchist longing"<sup>9</sup>. At the same time, he mentions that the troops in other countries are not on permanent anchor, but the anchors must be lifted simultaneously and by everyone.

In view of the objective to provide Soviet people with the possibility of working under conditions of lasting peace and to channelise country's economic and social development, Soviet Union, in Gorbachev's view, needs to terminate material preparation for nuclear war. And at the same time, to open for mankind, a historic period of

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8. op.cit. ,XXVII CPSU Congress Documents and Resolutions, p.304.

9. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.XXXVIII, no. 26, pp.7-8.

progress and prosperity amidst perpetual peace and tranquility and provide an opportunity to concentrate entirely on constructive efforts, a coherent programme for the total abolition of weapons of mass destruction has been put forth under the prospects of new thinking. In Gorbachev's view, the whole idea underscores the open and honest Leninist character of socialist foreign policy strategy. Dwelling on Leninist doctrine<sup>of</sup> peaceful co-existence, socialism rejects war as a means of settling political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes among the states. The philosophy behind this ideal is a world without weapons and violence, a world without weapons and violence, a world in which people choose their own path of development, which is an expression of the humanism of communist ideology, of its moral values.<sup>10</sup>

With an assessment of the real situation, Gorbachev has understood very well that the situation in the world is too dangerous to ignore even the slightest chance of rectifying the state of affairs of moving toward a more stable and lasting peace. The new Soviet leader deemed it necessary to try, by force of argument, by force of example and by force of common sense, to restrain the dangerous course of events.

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10. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, pp. 81-82.

The very complexity of the international situation convinced the Soviet leader that a direct conversation with the US President was direly necessary . Gorbachev observed that the time has come, when under the threat of a universal nuclear danger, all must learn the great art of living together. Having sensed the desire of the peoples of all countries in favour of peace, their desire not only to preserve peace, but also to improve the situation and to achieve real changes for the better in the struggle to end the arms race , the new Soviet leader acknowledged enormous obligations and responsibility that were to be discharged. With this promise in mind, the Soviet leader proceeded to various summit conferences to confer with his American counterpart.

#### The Geneva Summit -(1985)

In the Geneva Summit, Gorbachev presented to the US president, his understanding and appraisal of the situation in the world and insisted him that both Soviet Union and United States must take the current changes in the world into consideration in their respective approaches where "the choice must be between survival and destruction and not a question of the confrontation between the two opposing social systems."<sup>11</sup>

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11. US-USSR Geneva Summit , Documents and Materials ,  
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1985.

Gorbachev dwelt on the point that Soviet Union and United States have something in common that could be a point of departure for improving Soviet American relations; the understanding that "a nuclear war is impermissible that it must not be fought and cannot be won".<sup>12</sup> He resolutely favoured the reaching of agreements that could ensure equal security for both countries. Gorbachev considered it to be "the basis on which consistent strengthening of mutual trust and general improvement in the political atmosphere become possible, a situation in which one could hope for the development of a political dialogue and for the fruitful and humanitarian problems and problems of contacts and reciprocal information."<sup>13</sup>

TH-3231 He told his American counterpart that Soviet Union would neither seek nor strive for military superiority over the US. At the same time, Gorbachev told that Soviet Union would, in no event, allow the US to obtain military superiority over it. He insisted that both sides must get accustomed to strategic parity as the natural condition of Soviet American relations and both sides should make effort to lower the level of this parity and hence carry out real measures to reduce nuclear arms on a mutual basis.

Further, Gorbachev pronounced that neither of the powers should do any thing that might open the door for the arms

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12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

race in the new sphere, specifically in outer space. He stressed in the Summit Conference that if the door into outer space were to be opened for weapons, the scope of military confrontation would grow immeasurably and the arms race would acquire irreversible character. In this context, he warned that the possibility of agreement on any restraint on military rivalry and arms race would grow problematic under such a situation. In the Geneva Summit, Gorbachev made his position clear that he was prepared to carry out a radical reduction in nuclear arms, provided the door was firmly closed for starting an arms race in space. On this condition he expressed his readiness to go through the first stage on the basis of the principle of a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms and then drawing other nuclear powers into the process to move further on the road of radical reduction.

Gorbachev, having discussed key security issues with the US leader and emphasising on the special responsibility of US and USSR for maintaining peace, could get the latter agreed on the point that nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. Recognising that any conflict between US and USSR could have catastrophic consequences, he emphasised the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional.

The Soviet leader put forth the proposal to accelerate the work at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance <sup>the</sup> strategic stability.

The Soviet leader called for early progress in particular areas, where there is a common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions of US and USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim agreement on medium range missiles in Europe. He stressed that during the negotiations of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed, will be agreed upon.

Gorbachev reaffirmed Soviet Union's commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and his country's interest in strengthening, together with other countries, the non-proliferation regime and in further enhancing its effectiveness. The Soviet leader reaffirmed his commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. He joined with his counterpart to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the agency in implementing Safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Gorbachev attached immense importance to mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe and expressed strong willingness to work for the positive results of the Vienna negotiations in this context. Emphasizing on the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, he stated his intention to facilitate, together with other participating states, an early and successful completion of the works of the conference. To this end, along with his American Counterpart, he reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable Confidence and Security

Building Measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

Reykjavik                      Summit (1986)

In the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, the Soviet leader presented a whole package of major proposals with a view to bring about a breakthrough in all directions of the struggle for limiting nuclear weapons and eliminate the threat of nuclear war and hence make it possible to start moving towards a nuclear free world. He pursued a clear cut and firm line to agree in the long run on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with equal security for the United States and Soviet Union at all stages of progress toward that goal. "Three distinct proposals"<sup>14</sup> were put forth by the Soviet leader amongst which the first one concerned the strategic offensive weapons which, in his view, should stipulate a fifty percent reduction of these arms in course of the forth-coming five years, with a view to fully eliminating these deadliest of weapons already by the end of the century.③

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14. USA , USSR Reykjavik Summit , Documents and Materials  
Novostic Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986.

③ Dictated by the need to overcome the negative confrontational tendencies that have been built up in recent years and to clear the way the way to curtailing the nuclear arms race on earth and preventing it in space, an overall lessening of the danger of war and the establishment



In order to make it easier to reach an accord, Gorbachev agreed to a major concession by revoking the previous demand made at Geneva that the strategic equation include American medium range missiles reaching Soviet territory and American forward-based systems. The Soviet leader acted on the belief that the world is waiting for really major steps, substantial reductions than some cosmetic steps intended merely to calm public opinion for a while. The second proposal concerned medium range missiles in which the Soviet leader insisted on the complete elimination of Soviet and American weapons in Europe. In this area, Gorbachev again made a significant compromise by ignoring British and French nuclear forces spearheaded against Soviet Union. He proceeded from the necessity to pave the way to detente in Europe to free the European nations of the fear of a nuclear catastrophe and then to move further - towards elimination of all the nuclear weapons.

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of trust as an integral component of relations among nations, a concrete programme, covering a precisely defined period of time, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world, was put forth by the Soviet leader in Jan, 1986 and also the same was presented to the 3rd Special Disarmament Conference of United Nations.

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In addition , Gorbachev accepted the American proposal to sharply limit the number of medium-range missiles deployed in the Asian part of Soviet Union. The third proposal which Gorbachev put forth as an integral part of his package was the existing ABM Treaty and the nuclear Test Ban Treaty. While presenting , this third proposal Gorbachev's approach was that , since both the powers were entering into a totally new situation that would witness the beginning of substantial reductions in nuclear weapons and their complete elimination in the foreseeable future, it was necessary to protect one from any unexpected developments. Gorbachev considered it immensely necessary to exclude everything that could undermine equality in the process of disarmament to preclude any chance of developing weapons of a new type which would ensure military superiority. He proposed to his American counterpart that a mutual pledge be taken by both US and USSR to refrain from pulling out of the treaty for at least ten years during which time strategic weapons would be abolished.

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Gorbachev proposes that by acting in successive stages, a process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons be carried out and completed within the 15 years by the end of the century.

First Stage:-

In the next 5 to 8 years, the USSR and US would reduce by 50 percent, their nuclear arms capable of reaching other's territory. Such a reduction in Gorbachev's view is possible only if USSR and US mutually renounce the

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He again pointed out that all obligations under the ABM Treaty should be strictly fulfilled within these ten years, that only ABM research and testing in laboratory conditions should be allowed.

At last, the Soviet leader was left with no option but disagreeing with his American counterpart on reaching an accord, when the latter insisted to the bitter end that America should have the right to conduct research and testing on every aspect of SBI both in and outside the laboratory, including the outerspace, for which nothing substantial could be achieved in the Reykjavik Summit.

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development, testing and deployment of space strike arms. In the first stage, a decision would be reached and implemented on the complete elimination of the medium range missiles of the USSR and the US in the European Zone, as a first step on the path to ridding the European continent of nuclear weapon. At the sametime, the US must make a commitment not to deliver its missiles to other countries and Britain and France must make a commitment not to build up their nuclear arms .

Second Stage:

In this stage, which should begin no later than 1990 and last for 5 to 7 years, the other nuclear powers would begin to join in nuclear disarmament . At first, they would make a commitment to freeze all their nuclear arms and

Washington Summit (1987)

Gorbachev signed the historic INF treaty with American President on the "elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles"<sup>15</sup> as he agreed to grant a major concession to United States by delinking INF treaty from SDI programme that had been the stumbling block in the Reykjavik Summit.

The Soviet leader together with his American counterpart reaffirmed the continued commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . He expressed sincere support for international co-operation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under further strengthened IAEA safeguards.

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15. USA - USSR Washington Summit, Documents and Materials

Novostic Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1987.

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also not to have any such arms on the territory of other countries. During this period, the US and USSR would continue reductions that they agreed upon in the first stage and also carry out further measures to eliminate their medium range nuclear arms and freeze their tactical nuclear weapons. After this , as the USSR and US complete the 50 percent reduction in their arms in the second stage, another radical step will be taken - all the nuclear power, will eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons . In the same stage, the Soviet American

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He emphasised that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation should continue. Gorbachev highlighted the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. He stressed on the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe for strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability. He expressed his determination to bring the vienne CSCE follow-up conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

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accord on the prohibition of space strike arms would have to become multilateral with the mandatory participation of the leading industrial powerx

Third Stage:

This will begin no later than 1995 during which the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons will be completed. By the end of 1999, no nuclear weapons will remain on earth. A universal accord will be drawn up to the effect that these weapons will never be brought back to life. It is intended that special procedure will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons.

Moscow Summit (1988)

The Soviet leader alongwith his American counterpart signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the INF Treaty that came into force and for the first time ensured elimination of an entire class of Soviet and US arms and hence gave new standards for arms control. He expressed strong determination to "achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts."<sup>16</sup>

Gorbachev reaffirmed his conviction that universal adherence to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is important in so far as International Peace and Security is concerned. He emphasised on the point that each state not a party to the Treaty would join it, or make an equally binding commitment under, international law to forgo acquisition of nuclear weapons and thus help prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, which would enhance the possibility of progress toward reducing nuclear armaments and reduce the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet leader confirmed his support to IAEA and assured to continue efforts to further strengthen it. He emphasised the importance of strengthening stability and security in

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16. USA - USSR , Moscow Summit, Documents and Materials  
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1988.)

and  
the whole Europe also emphasised that full implementation of the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measure and Disarmament in Europe can significantly increase openness and mutual confidence. He expressed his commitment to further development of the CSCE process and pledged to bring the vienna CSCE meeting to a successful conclusion, through significant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

Malta Summit (1989)

In the Malta Summit of Dec. 89, Gorbachev assured his American Counterpart that the Soviet Union will never start a hot war against the United States. The Soviet leader clearly affirmed his country's willingness to develop relations in such a way that broader opportunities for co-operation are opened up.

Gorbachev raised the question with his counterpart that when there has been progress in all areas and when both the countries are changing over to a defensive doctrine the Soviet Union has a stake in having a corresponding revamping occur in NATO's military doctrine. **In assessing the prospects for the development of East-West relations with a view to the changes taking place in both parts of the European continent , Gorbachev singled out the importance of a further lowering of the level of military confrontation and of respects for the existing borders in Europe.**

The Economic Dimension

Soviet policy under Gorbachev stands for the development of extensive long term and stable contacts between states in the sphere of economy, science and technology on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit. "Foreign economic co-operation is of great political importance, to Gorbachev, for it helps to strengthen peace and relations of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems"<sup>18</sup>

Gorbachev makes it amply clear that if the west has a stake in seeing the USSR join the world economy, there must be complimentary movement on its part too. He extends his invitation to discuss the question of establishing relation with international economic organisations. In his assertion, when Soviet leadership is approaching a fundamental decision on the matter, there is a need for understanding and reciprocal measures from the other side also. He affirms that "Soviet Union cannot accept all the rules for participation in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development all at once when objective conditions are involved. The west must make an effort to adopt itself to a partner like USSR. The main thing, however, is to put an end to the restrictions and prohibition ~~en~~ which the west has been stubbornly insisting."<sup>19</sup>

18. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress Documents and Resolutions  
pp. 312-13

19. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLI , No. 3,  
(February 15, 1989), p.19.



The Common European Home

In the light of new thinking, the idea of an "all European home" is advanced by Gorbachev which means recognition of a certain wholeness, although what is involved here is the states that belong to different social systems and are members of opposing military political blocs. In Soviet leader's view, Europe's historic opportunity and its future lie in peaceful co-operation among the nations of that continent. "It's important to move further, from the initial to a more lasting phase of detente, to mature detente and then to the building of dependable security".<sup>20</sup> Development of peaceful neighbourly relations and co-operation between European states, in Soviet leader's view are indispensable conditions for the stability of positive processes of strengthening security, trust and peaceful co-operation in Europe, which was launched on its initiative and with its active participation, develops and deepens and comes to embrace the whole world.<sup>21</sup>

Gorbachev's concept of "common European Home" suggests a degree of integrity, even if its states belong to different social systems and opposing military-political alliances. Above all, it combines "necessity with opportunity".<sup>22</sup>

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20. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions, p.90.

21. Ibid. , p.312.

22. op.cit., Perestroika , pp. 195-98.

So far as necessity is concerned, Gorbachev outlines quite a number of objective circumstances which come to create the need for a pan-European policy. First of all, densely populated and highly urbanised Europe bristles with weapons both nuclear and conventional. The mightiest of military groups equipped with upto-the-minute hardware, which is constantly updated, confront each other. Thousands of nuclear warheads are concentrated here, while just several dozens would be suffice to turn European soil into a "Gehenna". Secondly, even a conventional war, to say nothing, of a nuclear one, would be disastrous for Europe today. This is not only because conventional weapons are many times more destructive than they were during the Second World War, but also because there are nuclear power plants with quite sophisticated technology. The destruction of those facilities in the course of conventional hostilities would make the continent uninhabitable. Thirdly, Europe is one of the most industrialized regions of the world. The development has reached such a point, where the danger to the environment is close to being critical. This problem has crossed far beyond national borders, and is now shared by all of Europe. Fourthly, integrative processes are developing in both parts of Europe in such a way that it is time to think what will come next. The requirements of economic development in both parts of Europe, prompt the need for a search for some form of mutually advantageous co-operation. There is dire necessity for better use of aggregate potential of Europe for the benefit of its people and in relations with the rest of the world. Fifthly, the two parts of Europe have a lot of their

own problems of an East-West dimension, but they also have a common interest in solving the extremely acute North-South problem. This does not mean that the countries of Eastern Europe share the responsibility for the colonial past of West-European powers. However, the point is that if the destinies of nations in the developing countries are neglected, the very acute problem of how to bridge the gap between the developing and industrialised states is ignored, this may have disastrous consequence for Europe and the rest of the world. West European states like the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, have broad ties with the third world, and could pool their efforts to facilitate its development.

In Gorbachev's opinion, such are the imperatives of a pan-European policy determined by the interests and requirements of Europe as an integrated whole. In proceeding further, Gorbachev proposes that the building of the European Home requires a material foundation - constructive co-operation in many different areas. Expressing Soviet Union's sincere desire, Gorbachev's touches upon new avenues to search for new forms of co-operation such as launching of joint ventures, the implementation of joint projects in third countries. In his view, Western Europe will not get ahead technologically via the militarist star war programme. Nor does the militarisation of space open the way to technological progress. This is sheer demagoguery flavoured with technological imperialism. Many opportunities and areas exist for peaceful scientific and technological co-operation.

Gorbachev upholds that all these would increase the European States mutual interdependence, but this would be to the advantage of everyone and would make for greater responsibility and self-restraint. He further proposes that acting in the spirit of co-operation, a great deal could be done in the vast area of "humanitarianism". In his view, a major landmark on this road would be an international conference on co-operation in the humanitarian field. As he predicts, <sup>in</sup> such a conference the sides could discuss all aspects of problems which are of concern to both East and West, including the intricate issue of human rights and that would give a strong new impetus to the Helsinki process. Gorbachev emphasizes that the most important thing is to preserve and deepen the Helsinki process, to prevent destruction of its principles to enrich it with new ideas and to move toward Helsinki-II, toward a common European Home". Existing political and politico-military institutions, in his view, can and must operate within the framework of the Helsinki process and they must seek mutual understanding and transform themselves in accordance with the challenges of the times, thereby promoting movement toward a new Europe. Gorbachev notes that, it would not hurt the west to tamper its conceit and stop thinking that only Socialist World should change otherwise, there would be no rapprochement. <sup>23</sup>

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23. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLI, No. 47 (December 29, 1989).. p. 27.

Gorbachev upholds that, the profoundity and importance of the changes dictate the need for stepped-up efforts by both East and West to meet each other half the way. This mutual endeavour, <sup>in</sup> his view will enrich each side. This is also not the time to destroy existing international political and economic institutions. He emphasises on the point that they shall be transformed with due regard for internal processes and they should define their place in the new situation and interact. It is of no use to shout about victory in the cold war or about the collapse of one or another social system. Rather, all must analyse everything realistically and work within a framework of balanced interest. Replacing changes of exporting revolution with calls for exporting capitalism, is a dangerous production of old thinking. It is time to face the fact that modern world is not two mutually exclusive civilization, but one civilization - a common one, in which common human values and freedom of choice prevails.<sup>24</sup>

In Gorbachev's view, the idea of European unity must be collectively rethought, in a process of creative collaboration among all nations. The fact that European states belong to different social systems being a reality, recognition of this historical given and respect for the sovereign right of every people to choose a social system, at its own discretion, constitute the most

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24. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLI, No. , 46,  
(Dec. 13, 1989) p.27.

important pre-requisite for a normal European process. The changing of social and political orders in one or another country, is exclusively the affair of the peoples themselves. Hence any interference in internal affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states - either friends and allies or anyone else - are inadmissible. Differences between people can not be eliminated as they are even beneficial provided that the competition between the different types of societies is oriented towards creating better material conditions of life for people.<sup>25</sup>

Gorbachev's dwells on the point that it is time to relegate to the archives, the postulates of the cold war, when Europe was viewed as an arena of confrontation, divided into "spheres of influence" and somebody's "forward defense areas", and as an object of military opposition - a theatre of military operations. But : in today's interdependent world, geo-political notions born of another epoch are just as useless in real politics as the laws of classical mechanics in quantum theory. The realities of today and the prospects of the future are obvious; The USSR and US are a natural part of the European international political structure and their participation in its evolution is not only justified but also historically determined.<sup>26</sup>

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25. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLI , No. 38, (Oct 18, 1989,) p.24.

26. Ibid.

In essence, Gorbachev talks about restructuring the existing international order in Europe in such a way that common European values will come firmly to the forefront and it will become possible to replace the traditional balance of forces with a balance of interests, within the framework of the new thinking the Soviet leadership started out by critically rethinking the ideas about the military opposition in Europe, the dimensions of the external threat and the significance of the force factor in strengthening security. The philosophy of the concept of a Common European Home rules out the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of using force or the threat of force above all military force - alliance against alliance, within alliances or wherever. To replace the doctrine of deterrence it offers a doctrine of restraint.<sup>27</sup>

Gorbachev makes it clear that the existing barriers cannot be overcome in the sense that the west will impose its ways on the East or the East impose its ways on the west and stresses on joint efforts in switching from confrontation and military rivalry onto the tracks of peaceful co-existence. Detente, trust, co-operation, inviolability of existing borders, respect for one another's legitimate interests, in his view, are landmarks on the path that will enable Europe to consolidate peace. While making the question of European co-operation

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27. Ibid.

a first priority, Gorbachev proceeds from the premise that any disruption of the current political and territorial structure of Europe would lead only to chaos and worsening of the situation but while remaining in the present state, Europe can and should make its contribution to forming a new way of political thinking, solving problems of universal human significance and improving the general situation. This contribution, in his view, would be particularly valuable as the result of the combined efforts of states with different systems based on the Europe's vast political experience.

Gorbachev lays down that political thinking must be completely rid of Europe as a theatre of military operation<sup>28</sup>. It is called upon to be an example of the co-habitation of sovereign, different but peace-loving states that are aware of their interdependence and are building their relations on trust. The main road to this, in his view, lies in

freeing Europe from the Atlantic to Urals from the explosives burden of arms.<sup>29</sup> Gorbachev proposes to look for balance at lower levels which is a realistic and urgent task and proclaims Soviet Union's right to count on a positive and concrete response from the west.

<sup>28</sup>. Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>. The Current Digest of the Soviet-Press, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 27

(Aug. 6, 1986) p.5.



On the issue of disarmament in European continent, Gorbachev upholds that abolition of US and Soviet intermediate range missiles in the European Zone are the key areas on which an understanding should be reached. In case of readiness, to seek agreement, Soviet Union quite unhesitatingly expresses its willingness to accept any suggestion on this account. But it will not maintain indifference if Soviet-US dialogue that has started and inspired changes for better, is used to continue the arms race and material preparations for war. It's the firm intention of Soviet Union to justify the hopes of the peoples of the two countries and of the whole world, who are expecting concrete steps, practical actions and tangible agreements on how to curb the arms race.<sup>30</sup>

Gorbachev considers it feasible to substantially reduce the level of armaments in Europe in the course of two or three years with the elimination of all asymmetries and imbalances. He feels it time to begin talks on factual nuclear weapons among all the countries concerned, the ultimate goal being the complete elimination of these weapons. He views the elimination of nuclear weapons, as a stage by stage process. In his view, part of the distance, separating the countries concerned from the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, can

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30. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress Documents and Resolution,  
p. 89.

be covered by all Europeans together, without <sup>them</sup> having to abandon their positions. The USSR can remain true to its nuclear free ideals and the west to the concept of "minimal deterrence". He suggests that if the experts from the nuclear powers conduct a thorough discussion on the question and were to arrive at some common assessments, the problem would become easier at the political level.<sup>31</sup> He makes his stand clear that if NATO countries are disposed to start talks with Soviet Union on tactical nuclear weapons, then the latter could, after consulting allies, embark without delay or further unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

After signing the agreement on medium range missiles and letting aside the discussion of operational tactical missiles, Soviet leader pledges to withdraw from those countries the missiles that were deployed there as a retaliatory measure to the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in West Europe. The implementation of an accord on operational tactical missiles, medium range missiles and strategic nuclear arms in Soviet leader's view would be carried out under strict verification. In his view, an urgent question directly connected with European Security is the concentration in that region, of an enormous potential of armed forces and

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31. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLI, no. 38, (Oct 18, 1989,) p.24.

conventional arms. He stresses that this concentration on the continent of tactical nuclear and non nuclear weapons confronting each other does not correspond to the notion of a state world. The situation must be changed abruptly by taking measures for the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and for the radical reduction of armed forces and conventional arms to rule out the possibility of a sudden attack. As Gorbachev suggests <sup>that</sup> a major step in this direction would be the implementation of the Warsaw treaty countries Budapest programme in which it is proposed to resolve questions of the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in a package with tactical missiles and other tactical nuclear systems. In his opinion, efforts by all European states, the US and Canada are needed for the reduction of armed forces and arms in Europe. It's required to take up a number of top priority measures related to lowering the level of military confrontation and preventing the threat of sudden attack as well as mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous types of offensive arms from zones of direct contiguity of the two military alliances. This would require the exchange of relevant data on the armed forces and arms of the USSR, the US and other states in this region. Soviet leader favours the elimination of all elements of inequality that have arisen, but through reduction by those who are ahead and not through builds up by those who are behind, thus lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe as a step by step process and the observance at every stage of equilibrium at the level of reasonable sufficiency.

Gorbachev puts forth a precious proposal to create a European centre for lessening the danger of war as a place of co-operation between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation. In his view, operating on a permanent basis, such a centre could be transformed into a useful structure, increasing the reliability of European peace. He proposes to carry out the reduction in three stages. Firstly, all imbalances and asymmetries between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation with respect both to a number of troops and basic weaponry, would be identified and eliminated.<sup>ee</sup> This approach could be applied both to the European continent as a whole and to its individual regions. In the second stage, NATO and Warsaw Treaty troops would be reduced on each side from the levels existing after the elimination of imbalances and asymmetries. The reductions would be carried out by disbanding large and small units and simultaneously eliminating their authorised arms. In the third stage, reductions would be continued in such a way that the military formations of both military alliances would finally become exclusively defensive.<sup>32</sup>

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32. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XL, no.28,  
(Aug.10, 1988) p.13.

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<sup>ee</sup> In order to translate, his first proposal into practice, the Soviet leader decided to reduce its armed forces and weaponry unilaterally.

The strength of the Soviet troops, over the next two : : years from 1988, would be reduced by 500,000 men, and substantial cuts will be made in conventional armaments.

In the context of common European Home, unification of Germany becomes a necessary pre-requisite in Gorbachev's approach. Regarding the unification of Germany, his approach derives logical support from his categorical emphasis on the statement that "division of Germany was the result of a specific times in history and the division would disappear when the conditions that brought it into being disappear."<sup>33</sup> But at the same time, Gorbachev has certain reservations regarding the unification of Germany. Firstly, he wants all the belligerent nations of the Second World War to be invited to the process of unification. Secondly, he wants united Germany not to join NATO and remain neutral in view of balance of power not being disturbed.

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33. Visit of Gorbachev to the FRG , (June 12-15, 1989),

Documents and Materials , Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1989 , p.54.

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By arrangement with Warsaw Treaty allies, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw some tank divisions from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary by 1991, and to disband them. In addition, assault-landing formations and units and some others, including assault-crossing support units with their armaments and combat equipment, will be withdrawn from the Soviet forces stationed in these countries. The Soviet forces stationed in these countries would be reduced by 50,000 men and 5000 tanks. The Soviet divisions which still remain on the territory of its allies will be reorganized. Their structure will be changed: a large number of tanks would be withdrawn, and they would become strictly defensive. At the same time, the Soviet Union shall cut troops and armaments in the European part of the USSR. The total reductions of Soviet armed forces in the European regions of the USSR and on the territory of its European allies will amount to 10,000 tanks 8500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft.

Economic Dimensions

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In Gorbachev's assessment, it's time to give thought to how integration process will proceed in both parts of Europe when world economic laws are objective and scientific and technical progress prods to search for some forms of mutually advantageous co-operation. New process in the economy of the countries of the Socialist commonwealth, in his view, would make it possible to set up the pace and enrich the economic co-operation of both halves of Europe and fill it with new content.

Gorbachev considers the formation of a vast economic expanse, in the light of the economic content of the common European Home, with a high level of interconnection between its eastern and western parts, to be a realistic prospect though not an imminent one. The Soviet Union's transition to a more open economy has fundamental importance in this respect, which will increase the inter-dependence of the economies of East and West and consequently will have a favourable effect in the whole complex of general European relations. Similar features in the practical functioning of economic mechanisms, strengthening of ties and economic interest, mutual adaptation - all of these are long term factors in the course of co-operation and a pledge of the stability of the European and international process as a whole.<sup>34</sup>

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34. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLI, no. 38, (Oct. 18, 1989) p. 24.

Thus, Soviet approach to the Western capitalist bloc, under Gorbachev in this historic phase of East-West relationship as well as crucial juncture of world politics, has enormously embraced the doctrine of peaceful co-existence, doctrinally as well as practically, with the principle of de-ideologisation of international politics. The approach, although rooted in Soviet Union's domestic compulsions for expediting socialism in a congenial international atmosphere not only serves the national interest of the former, but also it helps promote the interest of the west by defusing the constellated tension and aggravated situation.

APPROACH TOWARDS SOCIALIST BLOC

Stressing on the need for new relationship among socialist countries, Gorbachev observes that, although the initial phase of World Socialism's rise and development is over, the forms of relations which were established at that time have remained virtually unchanged. In his assessment, negative accretions in these relations were not examined with a sufficient degree of frankness, which means that not every thing obstructing their development and preventing them from entering a new, contemporary stage was identified. Meanwhile, each socialist country, each socialist society has accumulated considerable potential of its own in every field of life. Under this situation, Gorbachev observes that, socialism's prestige and possibilities would be directly harmed, if socialist states cling to the old forms of co-operation and limited themselves.<sup>35</sup>

Gorbachev makes it clear that the role of Soviet Union in the socialist community, in the conditions of restructuring, is determined by the objective positions of the country. Things that are going well or ill in Soviet Union, although affects everyone, yet the level of interaction is the result of more than just the work Soviet Union is doing at home. It is first and foremost, the result of the joint activities and concerted efforts of the fraternal countries.

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35. op.cit., Perestroika, p.164.



Socialist countries, according to Gorbachev, are bound to proceed from the premise that, at this crucial stage of world development, socialism must show in full measure the dynamism of its political and economic system, humane way of life. Accordingly, socialist community relations are to be readapted to the requirements of the time.<sup>36</sup>

Gorbachev proposes that the entire framework of political relations between the socialist countries must be strictly based on absolute independence. In his view, the independence of each party, its sovereign right to decide the issues facing its country and its responsibility to its nation are unquestionable principles. He is firmly convinced that the socialist community will be successful only if every part and state cares for both its own and common interest, if it respects its friends and allies, heeds their interests and pays attention to the experience of others. In Gorbachev's view, collaboration between the ruling communist parties is pivotal to co-operation between the socialist countries. He upholds that the strength of socialist countries resides in unity and from unity they draw confidence that will cope with the issues set-forth by time. Gorbachev emphasises on harmonization of the initiatives of each fraternal country with a common line in international affairs. He firmly believes that no fraternal country can resolve its task on the international scene if it is isolated from the general course. A co-ordinated foreign policy, in his view, can be efficient only provided the contribution of each country to the common

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36. Ibid., p.165.

cause is duly taken into account.<sup>37</sup>

Gorbachev, emphasising on co-operation among socialist countries, upholds that these countries have a task of great magnitude concerning co-operation in the intellectual sphere. In his opinion, "each of the socialist countries is a social laboratory testing the various forms of and methods of the socialist constructive efforts."<sup>38</sup> In this context, he upholds that exchanging experience in socialist construction and summing up such experience is becoming significance. Gorbachev dwells<sup>on</sup> <sup>on</sup> lening' idea that the future of socialism will be created through a series of efforts made by various countries. He strongly believes that a good way to judge the earnestness of a ruling party of fellow socialist country is to look at how it uses its own experience, as well as the experience of its friends and of the world. As for the value of this experience, Gorbachev dwells on one criterion: Social and political practice - the results of social development and economic growth and the strengthening of socialism in practice.

Gorbachev makes it clear that all are working for common goals, but are operating in differing conditions and consequently policies evolved are different. Everything in his view must be seen in the context of the specific situation.

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37. Ibid. pp. 165-66.

38. Ibid., pp. 168.

World Socialism can not develop according to a single pattern or at a single pace that would contradict Marxism and the laws of the dialectics. Concern can arise over a given situation in a friendly country. But when it occurs, the most important thing is to try to understand each other and to consider the circumstances in which a given fraternal party is developing its policies. The principles governing relations among socialist countries and communist parties in his view are defined as "full autonomy and full independence, no interference of any kind, the comradely exchange of views, regular contacts, trust in one another and solidarity."<sup>39</sup>

Gorbachev stresses on the point that the entire system of political relations between the socialist countries can and should be built unswervingly on a foundation of equality and mutual responsibility. Accordingly, one has a right to claim a special position in the socialist world. The independence of each party, its responsibility to its people, the right to resolve the question of country's development in a sovereign way - are indisputable principles. At the same time, success of the socialist commonwealth are impossible without concern on part of each party and country, not only for its own interest, but for the general interests, without a respectful attitude towards friends and allies and the mandatory consideration of their interests.

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39. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XLI, no.38, (Oct 18 , 1989) p.24.

Gorbachev observes that, one of the most important qualitative characteristics of the present stage in the development of co-operation among the socialist countries is the sharply growing importance of exchanges of experience in socialist construction and its generalization. A reliable yardstick of the seriousness of a ruling communist party is not only its attitude towards its own experience but its attitude towards the experience of friends. As far as the value of the experience is concerned, there is one criteria: Socio-economic practice, the results of social and economic development and the actual strengthening of socialism.

Gorbachev, with profound visionary proclaims that destinies of peace and social progress are linked more closely with the dynamic character of the socialist world system's economic and political development which depends on increasingly vigorous interaction and co-operation. In his view, vitality, efficiency and initiatives - all these qualities meet the need of the time and Soviet Union shall strive to have them spread through out the system of relations between fraternal socialist countries. Gorbachev's expresses that Soviet Union attaches growing significance to live and broad communication between citizens of socialist countries, which is a channel of exchanges of views, ideas and the experience of socialist construction. He emphasises <sup>that</sup> considerate and respectful attitude to each others' experience and its judicious utilisation in practice is the cornerstone of potentiality of the socialist world.<sup>40</sup>

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40. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, pp.91-95.

In Gorbachev's view , a creative approach to the new realities on the basis of the immortal theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin is required when international conditions of work for communists are changing and it has entered upon a new phase of development. He observes that communist movements immense diversity and the tasks that it encounters are likewise a reality which, in some cases leads to disagreements and divergences. He makes it clear that Soviet Union is not dramatising the fact that complete unanimity among communist parties can neither exist always nor in everything, as there cannot be an identity of views on all issues without exception. In his assessment, since communist movement came into being when the working class entered the international scene as an independent and powerful political force, the parties that comprise it should pursue common end objectives - peace and socialism. "In Soviet leaders view, diversity of communist movement is not synonymous with disunity, much as unity has nothing in common with uniformity , hierarchy, interference by some parties in the affairs of others or the striving of any party to have a monopoly over what is right."<sup>41</sup> Gorbachev upholds that communist movement can and should be strong by virtue of its class solidarity, of equal co-operation among all fraternal parties in the struggle for common objective, where Soviet Union intends to do everything to foster it.

Gorbachev expresses Soviet communist party's intention to utilise the exchange of experience in socialist construction. He categorically mentions that CPSU looks with

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41. Ibid.

attention and respect on the search for solutions to complex economic and social problems that is taking place in socialist countries. He stresses on the fact that "it is a matter of switching international co-operation between socialist countries to an intensive track, as well, making it deeper and more productive and renovating the machinery of political and economic co-operation."<sup>42</sup>

Gorbachev's approach upholds that Soviet Union is seeking long lasting comradely relations and multi-sided co-operations with other states of the world socialist system, Keeping the view that cohesion of the countries of socialism upholds the common interest and promotes the cause of peace and the triumph of socialist ideals. To strengthen the cohesion of communists of the fraternal countries and to ensure the mutual enrichment of the practice of guiding society, Soviet Union will continue to help broaden inter-party links and promote exchanges of opinions and experience both on a bilateral and multi-lateral basis.<sup>43</sup>

In the sphere of ideology, Soviet policy under Gorbachev outlines Soviet States pledge for pooling the efforts of fraternal parties in studying and practising the experience for building socialism on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory

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42. The Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol XXXVIII , No. 23, (July 09, 1986) pp.6-7.

43. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress Documents and Resolutions, pp. 303-307.

while deepening its creative nature and upholding its revolutionary essence.<sup>44</sup> Invigoration of collective thought, a constant widening of exchanges of cultural and intellectual values and co-operation in science and technology, serve further to strengthen friendship between socialist countries. Under the new leadership, Soviet Union believes that propagation of the truth about socialism, exposure of imperialist policy and propoganda, rebuffing of anti-communism, struggle against dogmatic and revisionist views - these tasks are more easily accomplished when communists act in a single front. The outcome of competition between socialism and capitalism and the future of world civilisation, depend largely on the strength of the community on the success of each country in its constructive endeavours and on the purposefulness and co-ordination of their actions. A constructive comparison of view points and effective solidarity is direly necessary whose accomplishment involves overcoming of contradictions that could harm common interests. Areas of special interest that concerns Soviet leadership are co-ordination of actions in matters of principle, comradely interest in each others success, strict implementation of commitments, profound understanding of both national interests and common international interests.

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44. Ibid.

Soviet Union with Gorbachev's staunch Leninist approach, proceeds from the belief that strong unity and class solidarity among socialist countries are important when formation and development of a new society are taking place in a situation of sharp confrontation between the two world systems, and when imperialism is employing a whole range of differentiated measures like political, economic and ideological, seeking to weaken the position of socialism and disrupt the mutual ties of socialist states. Soviet leadership upholds that the socialist countries, observing equality and displaying mutual respect for their national interests on the principles of socialist internationalism, will strictly follow the teachings of Marxism -Leninism.<sup>45</sup>

Economic                      Dimension

In economic sphere, Soviet policy under Gorbachev stands for deepening of socialist economic integration as the material foundation for drawing the socialist countries closer together.<sup>46</sup> Under the new policy, integration is designed to contribute to an ever increasing extent to progress in the sphere of social production for strengthening of the position of socialism in the world. In the field of economic co-operation among socialist countries, the current Soviet policy pledges to help enhance the role of the council for Mutual Economic Assistance and                      broaden economic, scientific and

45. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress Documents and Resolutions pp. 303-307.

46. Ibid.



technical co-operation on the basis of bilateral and multi-lateral programme.

Soviet economic policy with the new leadership of Gorbachev, undertakes to improve and enrich economic interaction with fraternal socialist countries on the basis of the consistent implementation of the decisions of the CMEA member states' summit economic conference. The new leadership vows to ensure ~~-fuller~~ utilisation of the possibilities afforded by socialist economic integration in accomplishing key national economic tasks and in consolidating the unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community and of its positions in the world, co-ordination within the CMEA framework and on a bilateral basis in the sphere of economic, scientific and technological policies with the fraternal countries for the purpose of jointly finding effective solutions to major problems, occupies a pivotal position in Soviet Union's economic policy under new leadership. The new leadership insists on seeking out new forms and opportunities for developing specialisation and co-operation in production, mutually beneficial trade and other types of co-operation.<sup>47</sup>

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47. op.cit., Perestroika, pp. 166-67.

Expressing hope in accelerating the process of integration, the new Soviet leadership suggests that CMEA should increasingly focus on two major issues.<sup>48</sup> First, of all, it will co-ordinate economic policies, elaborate long term programmes for co-operation in some crucial fields and promote joint research and project. In doing, so, Soviet leadership considers it possible and expedient to co-operate with non-Socialist countries and their organisations like EEC. Secondly, CMEA will focus on the development and co-ordination of normative standards for the integration mechanism as well as on legal and economic conditions for direct co-operation links. Gorbachev wants CMEA to pay greater attention to economic incentives, initiatives and to the socialist spirit of enterprise. He emphasises that any country's lack of desire or interest to participate in any particular programme of CMEA should not serve as a restraint on others. In his suggestion, any one who wants to participate is welcome to do so, if not, one can watch and see how others are doing. Further, every country, in his opinion is free to decide, if it is prepared for such co-operation.

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48. Ibid., pp.167-68.

Regarding the changes that took place in Eastern Europe over these years, Gorbachev, with due reservation observes that these changes have been objectively prepared by the course of historical processes which no one could evade. In his view, these are the problems that have come to a head and they must be solved in new ways. He further stresses that the thrust of these processes are linked with the people's desire to humanise their societies to make them move democratic and to open up to the rest of the world. In his assessment of the whole situation, he observes that a process of convergent movement has taken shape bringing the people's and states of east and west together in a process in which each people retains its distinctiveness and its adherence to its values and its choices.<sup>49</sup>

Seeing that the entire socialist world is in a flux, Gorbachev warns that, without a wind of change it would be unable to adopt to the demands of the time. In his view, for all the distinctive national features and differences, the changes occurring in many countries, are, above all, manifestation of a common aspiration to create a more humane and socially just environment for people to live in and to tap the enormous potential of the socialist system. At the same time, he emphasises that the process of negating dogmas and distortions not entail a nihilistic sweeping aside of that, which socialism has already given peoples, that democracy not be replaced by demagoguery and that one set of ideological

49. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,  
Vol XLI, no. 49 (Jan. 3, 1990) p. 23

stereotypes not be replaced by others that are no less false.<sup>50</sup>

In the context of Gorbachev's approach to socialist bloc , the concept of de-ideologisation of international relations , as the underlying principles of Perestroika, got translated into practice . The doctrine of full sovereignty instead of limited sovereignty , equal relationship instead of special status, socialist pluralism instead of socialist internationalism received full-fledged reflection in Gorbachev's approach towards Eastern Europe.

Over the years, since he appeared in Soviet as well as international politics, Gorbachev has laid emphasis on these aspects for which he could unhesitantly accept the recent changes in East Europe. The ongoing changes in Eastern Europe backed by the pressure of popular movement were warmly welcomed by Gorbachev as a process of democratisation . The popular movements for reform initiated in Eastern Europe was categorised by Gorbachev as those countries' "internal decision" and "their own affairs".<sup>51</sup> Similarly, Gorbachev widely accepted the pro-democratic movements in all parts of Europe. The very introduction of multi-party system, election on

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50. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XLI no. 51, (Jan, 17, 1990) p.21.

51. Ibid

the basis of multi-party democracy , establishment of non-communist regimes and change in leadership (for moderate leadership) were accepted by Gorbachev . Despite the fact that Gorbachev was carrying on restructuring and openness at home, yet he had not imposed them on East European countries till they themselves decided to undergo changes, either due to the impact of Gorbachev's initiatives at home, or domestic compulsions that pressurised those countries in course of time. However, this approach of Gorbachev to the socialist bloc was the practical application of the theoretical principles that constituted the crux of his new thinking.

Approach Towards other Socialist Countries (China)

Gorbachev's approach towards China , the other Asian communist giant started with his emphasis on generally recognised principles of international relations as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. His approach further extends to economic and cultural co-operation , ideological rapprochement with intensive political dialogue and <sup>all</sup> after diffusion of border tension<sup>@@@</sup>.

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@@@ The new Soviet leadership undertook good many measures to reduce the border tension i.e. the military confrontation along the Soviet-Chinese border. Since 1985, Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership, reduced armed forces in the Soviet Far East and unilaterally undertook not to increase

The Soviet leader further affirms his intention to the interaction of two countries in looking for solutions to urgent international problems. Recognising the independence of Soviet Union and China in ~~terms~~ of decision making, Gorbachev highlights each others priorities. Gorbachev clearly mentions that the Soviet Union and China, each have their own approaches to problems and their own opinions of events. This, in his view, should not be considered to be a stumbling bloc to co-operation. The only sensible approach, as he emphasises, is to seek acceptable solution with regard for each others' views and positions. The Soviet leader visualises the possibility of a broad area in which such interaction is both feasible and appropriate. He emphasises its application to the joint contribution to solving present day global problems and to strengthening peace and security on the Asian continent.<sup>52</sup>

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52. USSR-China Beijing Summit , Documents and Materials  
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1989)

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land based and airbased nuclear systems. In accordance with Soviet -American agreement in 1987 in Washington Summit, intermediate and short-range missiles in Eastern Soviet were to be destroyed and Soviet troops deployed there, were to be reduced alongwith ground forces airforce regiments and warships. In May 1989, the Soviet leadership began a new stage in the reduction of forces deployed in Mongolia. It undertook to restructure the forces deployed along the Soviet Chinese border to bring them fully in line with the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency.

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Gorbachev reaffirms Soviet Union's preparedness, at any time at any level, to discuss with China in the most serious way, the questions of additional measures to create an atmosphere of good neighbourliness. He has pointed out that, since the priorities of Soviet Union and that of China are similar, there should be immense justification on each other's part to support and co-operate in carrying out plans where this would, obviously, benefit both sides. Gorbachev has dwelt on the point that better relations among the two communist countries would enable to exchange experience with each other. The Soviet leader has emphasised that great many things in international relations depended on the two biggest socialist countries.<sup>53</sup>

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53. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 30, (Aug. 27, 1986,) pp. 7-8.

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The Soviet leader expressed his preparedness to work for the withdrawal, on terms to be agreed with China, of military units and armaments from the border areas leaving only the minimum personnel required.

Gorbachev has lived upto the expectation of Chinese claim of the three point demand - withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, liquidation of troops, - concentration in Soviet-Chinese border and withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. - that was a major stumbling bloc in Soviet-Chinese relations over the decades.

Approach towards International Communist Movement

Soviet-Union under the leadership of Gorbachev, firmly declares that communist party of Soviet Union is a component part of the international communist movement. The party with the leadership of Gorbachev regards its efforts to perfect socialist society and advance onward to communism, as a major internationalist task, the accomplishment of which serves the interests of the world socialist system, the international working class and mankind as a whole. The new Soviet Policy proceeds from the conviction that the communists in each country analyse and evaluate situations independently, determine their strategic course, policies and means of struggle for the immediate and ultimate goals for communist ideals. The Soviet leader thoroughly studies the problems and experience of foreign communist parties and regards, with understanding, their desire to improve their strategy and tactics to seek broader class alliance on a platform of anti-monopolistic, anti-war activity and to uphold the economic interests and political rights of working people, proceeding from the conviction that the struggle for democracy is a component part of the struggle for socialism. The Soviet leader believes that disagreement over individual issues should not interfere with international co-operation among communist parties and their concerted efforts. In cases of divergences of view on individual problems between fraternal parties, Soviet Union considers it useful to



hold comradely discussion to achieve better understanding of each others view and reach mutually acceptable appraisals. In its relations with the fraternal parties, communist party of Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership, firmly adheres to the principle of proletarian internationalism, which organically combines revolutionary solidarity with the recognition of the full independence and equality of each party. The Soviet leadership pledges to continue the policy of developing ties with socialist and social democratic parties for it considers that co-operation with them can play a significant role in the effort to prevent nuclear war. In Soviet leader's consideration, however great the divergence between various trends of the working class movement might be, they present no obstacle to a fruitful and systematic exchange of views, parallel or joint actions to remove the threat of war, improve the international situation, eliminate the vestiges of colonialism and uphold the interests and rights of the working people. The Soviet leadership attaches great significance to stimulating co-operation among all contingents of the international working class movement and expanding interaction between other democratic organisations in various countries.

Thus, Soviet approach to the Socialist bloc , other socialist countries and international socialist movement under the leadership of Gorbachev's is a concrete reflection of the principle of de-ideologisation and democratisation that envisages full sovereignty instead of limited sovereignty , equal relationship instead of special status and socialist pluralism instead of socialist internationalism.

APPROACH TOWARDS THIRD WORLD BLOC

Soviet policy under the leadership of Gorbachev vows to pursue a policy of expanding contacts with newly free countries and regards with profound sympathy, the aspirations of the peoples who had experienced the humiliating yoke of colonial slavery. Under the new leadership, Soviet Union extends its relations towards these countries on the basis of strict respect for their independence and equality and supports the struggle of those countries against the neo-colonialist policy of imperialism, against the survivals of colonialism and for peace and universal security. Soviet leadership attaches great importance to solidarity and political and economic co-operation with socialist oriented countries, while it vows to extend economic, scientific and technological assistance. Closer relations with the revolutionary democratic parties of newly free countries, co-operation with the countries having a basis of scientific socialism and contacts with all national progressive parties holding anti-imperialistic stance, are highly acceptable to Soviet leadership.

Soviet approach to third world, under Gorbachev, shows the common interest in safeguarding peace, strengthening international security, ending the arms race, sharpening-contradictions between the interests of the peoples and the imperialist policy of imposing diktat and expansion and strengthening of independence with the help of Soviet Union. Solidarity with the countries

seeking to share a common desire to develop independently and run their affairs without foreign interference, is based on the regard for sacred right of newly free countries to decide their own destinies and to choose their own type of social system. Just struggle waged by the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and the oppression of transnational monopolies for the assertion of the sovereign right to be master of one's own resources, for a restructuring of international relations on an equal and democratic basis, for the establishment of a new international economic order, for the deliverance from the burden of debt imposed by the imperialists are the key areas which Soviet leader supports. General struggle for peace and international security is considered to be dependent on solidarity with states and people those who are repulsing the attacks of aggressive forces of imperialism. Support for the struggle of the peoples who are still under the yoke of racism and victims of the system of apartheid, is regarded as another important aspect. Goals and activities of non-aligned movement with respect to its struggle against the forces of aggression and hegemonism and settling of disputes and conflicts arising through negotiation are highly endorsed, by the new Soviet leader, whereas involvement of those states in military and political groupings is outrightly opposed. Enhancement of the role of the non-aligned movement in world politics through

equal participation of newly free countries in international affairs, their contribution to the solution of the most important problems and interaction of those countries with socialist states, is considered to be vastly important for strengthening the independence of people, improving international relations and preserving peace. The essence of this revolves around the idea that alliances of the forces of social progress and national liberation is a guarantee of a better future for mankind.<sup>54</sup>

Soviet policy under Gorbachev upholds that every people deserves to live in a society that is free from social and national oppression, in a society of genuine equality and democracy. It is the sovereign right of an oppressed and exploited people to free itself from exploitation and injustice. Revolutions are a natural result of social development of class struggle in every given country. Export of revolution, the imposition of revolution on anyone from outside, is unacceptable in principle. But, at the same time, the export of counter revolution in any form, is considered as a gross encroachment on the free expression of will by the peoples, on their right independently to choose their way of development.<sup>55</sup>

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54. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress Documents and Revolutions  
pp. 307-9.

55. Ibid., p. 310.

Gorbachev dwells on the points that , in the present context, trend towards strengthening the potential of peace , reason, and goodwill is enduring and irreversible behind which there is desire of people, of all nations, to live in concord and to cooperate . In this context, an immutable factor is Soviet Union's solidarity with the forces of national liberation and social emancipation and its course towards close interaction with socialist oriented countries, with revolutionary democratic parties and with non-aligned movement. Gorbachev offers that Soviet Union is prepared to go on promoting links with non-communist movements and organisations that are out and out against war. From this angle Gorbachev views , Soviet Union's relations with the social democratic movement of third world , He considers it a fact that ideological differences between communists and social democrats are deep rooted and that their achievement and experience are dissimilar and non-equivalent. Yet, in his view, an unbiased look at the stand points and views of each other is unquestionably useful to both the communists and social democrats, useful in the first place, for furthering the struggle for peace and international security. Gorbachev's stresses on the point that, it is important to find ways for closer and more productive co-operation with governments that are genuinely concerned about the destinies of peace on earth, with all peoples in order to build an all-embracing system of international security.<sup>56</sup>

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56. : Ibid., pp. 95-96.

In the context of third world countries, Gorbachev gives paramount importance on every nation's right to choose its own way of development, to dispose of its fate, its territory and its human and natural resources, Considering that international relations cannot be normalised without all these. Ideological and social differences and differences in political systems, in his view, are the result of the choice made by the people. A national choice should not be used in international relations in such a way as to cause trends and events that can trigger conflicts and military confrontations.<sup>57</sup>

In his suggestion, he urges western leaders to set aside the psychology and notions of colonial past. Gorbachev perceives that, as long as west continues to see the third world as the sphere of influence and continues to exert its sway there, tensions will persist and new hotbeds will appear as resistance mounts. Gorbachev clearly pronounces that Soviet Union does not want to pursue goals inimical to western interest, because it realises how important are Asia, Africa and Latin America for US and West European economies. To cut these links, is the last thing that Soviet leadership wants to do and it has no desire to provoke ruptures in historically formed mutual economic interests.

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57. op.cit., Perestroika, pp. 177-79.

Economic Dimension

Soviet leader upholds that all efforts towards construction of a stabler and safer world may prove unproductive if international economic problems are not resolved on a just basis. World economic problems should be solved by the whole world on the basis of internationalisation. In Gorbachev's view, GATT is one of the international mechanisms that can be and should be used to unite the efforts of all countries in the improvement of world economic relations. Hence Soviet Union<sup>58</sup> in his view, has displayed interest in GATT and in the multilateral trade talks that are held in its framework.

Gorbachev suggests that new mechanism for the functioning of the world economy and a new structure of international division of labour is required when world economy is becoming a single entity, outside of which no state can develop normally, regardless of its social system or economic level. The growing gap between the industrialised nations and most of the developing countries that presents an increasingly serious threat on a global scale, makes it necessary to look for a fundamentally new type of industrial progress that would be in accordance with the interests of all peoples and states.<sup>58</sup>

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58. op.cit., Gorbachev's Address to 43rd Session of UN General Assembly, Documents and Materials, pp.5-6, (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow, 1988)



Peace Proposal towards Tangled Knots of Third World

Gorbachev firmly upholds that Asia, Africa and Latin American countries where there are many tangled knots of contradictions and unstable political situations, it is required to search for the relevant solutions. Evidently, it is expedient to begin with coordination and pooling of efforts in the interests of a political settlement of painful problems so as, on that basis to take the edge off the military confrontation and hence stabilise the situation in various parts.<sup>59</sup> Soviet leader is out-and out in favour of vitalising collective quests for ways of defusing conflict situations in all of the planet's turbulent points that is imperatively demanded by the interests of general security.

Asia Pacific

In calling for detente, the complete elimination of nuclear weapon before the end of this century, the creation of a comprehensive system of international security and the development of co-operation, the soviet leadership gives full consideration to the interest of the countries in the Asia-pacific region. It believes that despite differences in the political system, ideologies and world views, the people of Asian and pacific region

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59. op.cit., XXVII CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions, pp. 90-91.

are linked by a community of vital interests. In conditions of growing interdependence of states, it is much more difficult or altogether impossible to solve problems confronting states, single or in an isolated groups. To this end, what is required is to pool the constructive efforts of all states of the region, regardless of their social and political systems. The elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century and the prevention of the militarisation of the space, as proposed by the Soviet leader, would rid all people of the world and hence the Asian and Pacific region of fear, of nuclear threat, — would fundamentally change the situation, facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for the development of mutually advantageous co-operation.<sup>60</sup> The Soviet leader also proposes — through bilateral and multilateral consultations — to work for the resolution of disputed questions, better mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence and thereby to create preconditions for the holding of an all Asian forum to conduct joint searches for constructive solutions.

The vital objective of Gorbachev's policy relates to arms control and disarmament in the region. A major step

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60. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 17, (May 28, 1986) p.6.

in the direction of moving towards ensuring security in Asia Pacific region, would be the elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia and the creation of nuclear free zones. He goes steps forward to extend support to other countries' proposals to set up nuclear weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and on the Korean Peninsula. Again, in Soviet-leader's view, an international conference on the Indian ocean could further the purpose of nuclear disarmament by considering and deciding the question of declaring this area of the world a zone of peace.

Gorbachev identifies the methods and approaches to nuclear disarmament in Asia with that in Europe, where disarmament must be implemented under strict international verification including on site inspections. He invites United States to start talks about nuclear disarmaments in the Asia Pacific region and to solve this problem on a reciprocal basis, strictly observing the security interests of all. In his proposal, he urges Asia Pacific knot to be united where the states situated in the region could embark upon building up a regional security system.

Paying heed to the opinion and concern of Asian countries, the Soviet leader has taken a major step forward by agreeing to a global double zero, with regard to medium and short range missiles. In his proposal,

Gorbachev expresses Soviet Union's readiness not to increase the number of nuclear capable devices in the Asian part of the country, if the US agrees not to deploy in that area additional nuclear weapons that can reach Soviet territory.<sup>61</sup> In this connection, pertinent proposal was advanced by the Soviet leader in Vladivostok in July 1986, that concerned "erecting a barrier against the spread and build up of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific region, reducing Pacific naval activities, cutting down the armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia, expediting confidence building measure and the non-use of force in the region."<sup>62</sup> In spite of the complexity and motley design of the Asian and Pacific tableau and the uneven distribution of bright and dark colours, the essentially anti-nuclear make-up of the general picture, in the Gorbachev's view, is obvious.

Gorbachev strongly favours putting up a barrier to the proliferation and build up of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. He pledges USSR's support of proclaiming the Southern part of the Pacific Ocean, a nuclear-weapon-free-zone and calls on all the nuclear powers to guarantee its status unilaterally or multilaterally. He recognises that the implementation of DPRK's proposal for the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Korean Peninsula would be a serious contribution.

61. op.cit., Perestroika, pp. 183-85.

62. Mikhail Gorbachev Vladivostok Speech, (July, 1986), Soviet Reviews Documents, (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986.)

Gorbachev proposes that talks should begin in reducing nuclear weapon fitted naval activity in the pacific ocean for the limitation of rivalry in the sphere of anti-submarine weapons in particular, An accord to refrain from anti-submarine activity in certain zones of the pacific would help to strengthen stability, which could in his view become a substantial confidence building measure. Gorbachev expresses his favour of resuming talks on turning the Indian ocean into a zone of peace. He expresses Soviet Unions attachment of importance to the radical reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Asia, to the limits of reasonable sufficiency . He displays his concern towards peaceful solutions of the problems, starting with some particular region - the Far East for example. Gorbachev believes that, it has long since been time to shift to a practical footing, the discussion of confidence building measures and non-use of force in the region.<sup>63</sup>

So far as the policy towards Asia -pacific region is concerned, Gorbachev wants to see that, this huge region has everything it needs to improve the situation and due account is taken of the interests of all the states with

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63. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol XXVIII, no. 30, (Aug 27, 1986) pp. 7-8

balance between them. He reaffirms his views against this region being somebody's domain and wants everybody to have genuine equality, co-operation and security. In his sharp assessment Gorbachev compares the situation in Asia with that in Europe which makes him think that the Pacific region, because of mounting militarisation, needs some system of 'safeguard' like those provided by the Helsinki process in Europe. A regional solution should be sought out without delay, beginning with the co-ordination and then the pooling of efforts to produce political settlements to sensitive problems, so as, in parallel and on that basis, to take the edge off military confrontation in various parts of Asia. Gorbachev makes it clear that the speculation that Soviet activities and interests in this region constitutes a threat to the interests of others, is quite absurd.

The approach to this enormous part of the world, where so many different countries are situated, is based on the recognition and understanding of the realities existing in it. The concepts on ways to ensure international security and peaceful co-operation in Asia and the Pacific Ocean rest on the realities and stem from the genuine desire to build up new and just relations in this region together. In Gorbachev's view, the specific features of the world outlook of the people of that region, their historical and political experience and their cultural identity can be helpful in

the region's problems and may well produce ideas which are understandable and acceptable to all.<sup>64</sup>

### Economic Dimensions

As a mark of his wide spread economic programme in Asia Pacific region, stands Gorbachev's declaration of the establishment of highly efficient economic complex in the Far East, with a division of labour that goes beyond national boundaries, a large scale resource base research and production facilities, an optimum economic structure and advanced social infrastructure. In furtherance of economic programme, the proposal for long term economic development plan for the Far-East region through the year 2000 makes another headway. One vital aspect of the economic objective, is the desire to integrate Soviet Union with the economic powerhouse that Asia has become in the 1980's. The new Soviet leader is now keen to use the development of the Far East to expand economic interaction with East Asian countries. In the context of the overall reform of the Soviet foreign economic relations, a special effort under Gorbachev, is being made to devise economic mechanism to expand trade relations, induce foreign investments and technological collaboration and participate in the multilateral economic institution of the Asia Pacific Region. Soviet Union has joined as an

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64. op.cit., Perestroika, pp. 180-83.

observer to the hitherto pro-western grouping pacific economic co-operation conference.

Approach to specific Problems

In his concern as well as approach towards South-East Asia Gorbachev attaches immense importance to the region being turned into a corridor of peace. Turning to other problems of the region he emphasises that a great deal depends upon the normalisation of Chinese-Vietnamese relations. Recognising this to be the sovereign affairs of the governments and leadership of the two countries, Gorbachev points out that others can only express their interest in seeing the border between these socialist countries become a border of peace and good neighbourliness, in seeing a comradely dialogue resumed and unnecessary suspicion and distrust removed.

In his view, there are no insurmountable obstacles to the establishment of mutually acceptable relations between the countries of Indo-China and ASEAN. Given good will and non-interference from outside, they could settle their problems and the security for Asia would benefit at the same time.<sup>65</sup>

As Gorbachev observes, there is possibility not only of removing the dangerous tension on Korean Peninsula but also of beginning to move along the path of solving the national problem of the entire Korean people. He stresses on the point that there are no sensible reasons

65. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XXXVIII, No. 30, Aug 27, 1986, pp. 7-8.



for avoding the rigorous dialogue that the DPRK is proposing . He affirms Soviet Union's unswearving support for the efforts of the DPRK aimed at peaceful and democratic reunificationof Korea. He strongly favours the withdrawal of US troops from the region.<sup>66</sup>

Gorbachev upholds that Kampucheana problem must be settled on the basis of recognition of the existing realities i.e. with the participation of all the forces that are involved in one way or another in that conflict. The parties must work to solve this problem without disregarding the interests of any side, and must move toward one another. In this, a balance of interest is required. If such an approach prevails, in Gorbachev's view, a settlement of the conflict can rapidly be brought closer.<sup>67</sup> On the basis of national-self determination, Kampuchean, in his view, can find the formula of agreement and the future political structure of their country. In his optimistic vision, he stresses on the fact that a qualitatively new situation would emerge and practical

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66. Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to China (May 15-18, 1989) Documents and Materials, (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow 1989), pp. 23-24.

67- The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XL, No 20, (June 15, 1988) p.21.

conditions be created for this old conflict to be finally settled, following the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. As for the Soviet Union, he express his country's readiness to take part in the appropriate national guarantees and to respect any choice of the people of Kampuchea and their country's course of independence, neutrality and non-alignment.<sup>68</sup>

From the ~~restram~~ of the 27th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev declared Soviet Union's preparedness to bring home the Soviet troops, who, in his opinion, were at the request of Afghan government. After making a comprehensive assessment of the situation the Soviet leadership sought to accelerate a political settlement and started giving it still more impetus. Gorbachev, in proceeding with some drastic steps asked-those,-who, in his view, were organising and carrying out the armed intervention against DRA,-to correctly understand, properly assess the steps taken by Soviet Union. He emphasised that their response to it should be to curtail outside interference in the affairs of democratic Afghanistan. He assured that as soon as political settlement is finally worked out, the return of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan could be accelerated accordingly and agreed to the

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68. Visit of Mikhail of Gorbachev to China May 15-18, 1989,

Documents and Materials, Novosti Press Agency  
Publishing House, Moscow, 1989, p. 23.

stage-by-stage time tables for their return. In the initial stage, Gorbachev warned all those who were encouraging and financing the undeclared war against Afghanistan and from whose territory it was being waged, saying that if the intervention against the DRA continued, the Soviet Union would not leave its neighbour in its time of trouble. He declared that : Soviet Union's Internationalist Solidarity with the Afghan people as well as Soviet Union's Security interest ,absolutely exclude it. He declared that Soviet Union supported the Afghan leaderships' line aimed at national reconciliation at the expansion of the base of the April (1978) national democratic revolution upto and including the creation of a government with the participation of political forces that were outside the country, but were prepared to participate sincerely in the nation wide process of the construction of a new Afghanistan.<sup>69</sup> Under the Geneva accord of April 14, 1988 signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the witness of Soviet Union and United States, the former under Gorbachev 's leadership withdrew all its troops within the stipulated time period thus ending a decade long intervention. After the withdrawal, the Soviet leadership believes that the time has come for the world community to take a more vigorous stand

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69. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XXXVIII, No. 30, (Aug, 27, 1986) pp. 7-8.

concerning this conflict which, in his view, threatens to "Singe" neighbouring regions. The Soviet leader makes it clear that, it is well upto the Afghan parties in the conflict to work things out for themselves. The future of Afghanistan in his view must be decided solely by the Afghan people.<sup>70</sup>

### Middle East

The middle-east region being a complicated knot in which the interests of many countries are intertwined, Gorbachev considers it to be important for both East and West that they should untie this knot. From political and moral stand point he disagrees with the view that Middle-East issues are impossible to resolve, Gorbachev<sup>71</sup> suggests that, it is quite preferable to take an active stand and support the efforts of those who are looking for ways to end the Middle East deadlock by way of a just political settlement. Gorbachev admits that under the present circumstance, it is difficult to reconcile the interest of the conflicting sides. Yet it is essential to try to reduce to a common denominator, the interests of the Arabs, of Israel and of its neighbours and other states, Gorbachev makes it clear that Soviet Union does not want the process of working towards a settlement or the very goals of this process, in some way, to infringe upon the interests of the United States and the West. He claims that Soviet Union considers it unrealistic in elbowing the US out of the middle East, but at same time

United States should not commit itself to unrealistic goals

<sup>70</sup>. Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to China (May 15-18, 1989) Documents and materials (Novosti Press Publishing House, Moscow, 1989), p 23

either . Gorbachev suggests that the pivotal thing , here is to take the interests of all sides into consideration. This accounts specifically, for Soviet Union's longstanding initiative in respect to convening an international conference on the Middle East. It is essential that the negotiations get off the ground. They should incorporate existing bilateral and multi\_lateral contacts and a more vigorous search for a just political settlement. If the conference does not prove to be an umbrellla for separate deals and steps, if it is aimed at a genuine Middle East Settlement, with the interests of the Arab countries, including those of the Palestinians and Isreal being taken into due account, Soviet Union is prepared to render all manner of assistance and to take part in allstages of the conference.<sup>71</sup> He affirms Soviet Union's persistent effort for a just and comprehensive settlement that considers everyone, both the Arabs, including Palestiná.. and Isreal and preparedness to co-operate constructively with all the participants in the peace process. In Gorbachev's view, the most important pre-requisite for a settlement is the withdrawal of Isreal's troops from the territories that have been occupied since 1967.

He streeses on the point that the Palestinian people have the right to self determination to the same extent

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71. op.cit., Perestroika , pp. 173-79.

as that right is granted to the people of Israel. The most effective mechanism for achieving a settlement is an international conference under the aegis of the UN. The legal basis for such a conference should be the recognition by all its participants of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including the right to self-determination. The participants in such a conference would be the representations of all the sides involved in the conflict including the Arab people of Palestine in addition to the permanent members of the UN Security Council. As far as the role of the UN Security Council's permanent members is concerned, in Gorbachev's view, it would be primarily to create a constructive atmosphere for the holding of talks at the conference. To this end, they could make proposals and recommendations either collectively or individually.

Soviet leaders supports the struggle of the Lebanese people and their national patriotic forces for their country's liberation from Israeli occupation. In Gorbachev's suggestion, efforts must be made to get Israel to fully and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Southern Lebanon as stipulated by the appropriate UN resolution.

The Soviet leader categorically mentions that the success of the undertaking depends in large part on the major powers mainly the USSR and the US. His approach calls for a combination of strong principles and realism as well as consideration for the view points and interests of everyone involved in the conflict. The focus, in his view, should be on a balance of interests. One of the components of normalisation of the middle East situation, in Gorbachev's view, should be a halt to the arms race there,—especially since it is taking on new dimensions with the acquisition by the warring sides and by those involved in the conflict of means of mass destruction and long range missiles. In Gorbachev's view, reliance not on armed forces but on negotiation and a desire to dictate equal rights, should lie at the heart of the search for a solution to the middle East problem.<sup>72</sup>

In the views of Soviet leader, time has come for the World community to make active purposeful efforts to rapidly eliminate the hot bed of tension in the middle east . International legality and justice should form the basis for establishment of a comprehensive and lasting peace in the region. Gorbachev upholds that, since Middle East conflict is occurring in an extremely important region of the world and its consequences have a negative effect on the World situation as a whole, it cannot be resolved

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72. Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol XL, No. 15  
(May 11, 1988) p.19.

by concluding partial and separate deals. The achievement of a comprehensive and just settlement is possible only through collective efforts.

Gorbachev favours turning the mediterranean the cradle of many civilisations into a zone of stable peace and co-operation. His proposals for extending agreed upon confidence building measures to that region reducing armed forces, the withdrawal, of nuclear weapons, renouncing the deployment of such weapons on the territory of mediterranean non- nuclear countries and the adoption by the nuclear powers, of a pledge, not use such weapons against any mediterranean country that does not permit their deployment on its soil, remain in force. The Soviet leader calls on the Mediterranean states to step up their efforts to turn this region into stable zone of peace that is free of nuclear weapons and foreign bases.<sup>73</sup>

#### Africa

Expressing his concern on the problems in Africa , Gorbachev reveals that Soviet Union does not visualise the continent to be homogenous where all processes evolve to one and the same pattern. Outlining the policy of self-determination he affirms that, like any other country in the world, every African country possesses its own

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73. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XXXVIII  
No. 13, : April, 30, 1986, p.13.



inimitable features and conducts policies all its own. Every African country is lawfully entitled to a free choice of the way of development, which Gorbachev pronounces clearly, expressing utter willingness to extend support to these efforts and policies of African people, for only inviolable political sovereignty and economic independence can provide a sound basis for international relations in today's world. In condemning all attempts of interference in the domestic affairs of African countries, Gorbachev expresses Soviet Union's earnest support for the national liberation struggle of African nations including those in Southern Africa, where one of the last bastions of racism is present.<sup>74</sup> Highlighting the Soviet concern and stance, he raises his strong voice against the inhuman apartheid and immoral oppressive racist regime. Contradicting the western accusation of communist plot and Moscow's influence behind that conflict situation, Gorbachev makes it clear that there is not a trace of Soviet presence or instigation. In expressing further concern, he reaffirms Soviet stand, which unswearingly supports the people of the front line states and other African countries that have embarked on a path of independent progressive development. Siding with their

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74. op.cit., Perestroika, pp. 186-87.

just stances and denouncing South Africa 's hostile actions against them, Gorbachev proclaims that countries in the region must at last have the chance to settle their development issues, their home and foreign affairs independently in peace and stability. Turning his attention towards South-West Africa , Gorbachev upholds the validity of Soviet assistance to Angolan people in their struggle against colonialists, justifying the Cuban interference in Angola, he goes to praise the valour of Cuban internationalists, who, in his consideration, have for many years helped defend the independence and territorial integrity of Angola. He has consistently expressed Soviet Union's readiness to join with all states that are members of United Nations, in contributing to the implementation of the accords on Namibia and assist the final abolition of colonialism and racism on the African continent.<sup>76</sup>

#### Latin America

Extending support to the Latin American countries in their efforts to consolidate their independence in every sphere and cast off all neo-colonialist factors, Gorbachev declares that Soviet Union welcomes the democratic changes in many Latin American countries and appreciates the growing consolidation of the countries of the continent which will help preserve and strengthen their national sovereignty. Gorbachev emphasises

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75. Ibid. , p.176.

76. Gorbachev's Visit to Cuba, Soviet Review Documents  
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow,  
1989..

that Soviet Union does not seek any advantage in Latin America. At the same time, it is not going to exploit anti-US attitudes, nor intend to erode the traditional link between Latin America and the United States. Countering the allegations made by the US right wing forces that the Soviet interest in Latin America lies in engineering a series of socialist revolutions, Gorbachev declares with utmost clarity that such schemes run counter to Soviet Union's theory, principles and entire concept of international policy.<sup>77</sup> While advocating expanded co-operation with Latin American states, Gorbachev makes it clear that Soviet Union does not seek any political or strategic military advantages in the Western Hemisphere. Just as all other continents, Latin America should not be an area of East-West confrontation. In his proposal, for converting Latin America into a zone of peace, Gorbachev reaffirms Soviet Union's stance in enhancing the nuclear free status of Latin America on the basis of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and firmly supports the creation of a zone of peace and co-operation in the Southern Atlantic and of similar zones in central America, the caribbean and the waters of the pacific off South America. If Latin American countries decide to convene an international

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77. op.cit., Perestroika, pp. 187-88.

conference to work out co-ordinated measures, to ensure the observance of the status of such zones inviting the permanent members of the UN Security Council and other powers outside the region, Soviet Union would, unhesitatingly take part in it. Calling on other states to take a similar approach like Soviet Union, in not deploying nuclear weapons of mass destruction, Gorbachev proposes to turn Latin America into a region of durable and stable peace and co-operation. Further, he goes on to express Soviet Union's wish to build trade and economic relations with the countries of Latin America on the principles of justice and reciprocal benefit. For this purpose, he suggests, <sup>that</sup> both traditional and new forms of partnership could be used, including contacts with the existing regional economic organisation.<sup>78</sup>

#### Central America

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership shared the World Communist's alarm over the current explosive situation in Central America and its potential consequences for international peace. The new Soviet leadership strongly deplored the escalation of the aggressive US policy in Central America, demands that a step be put to the criminal preparation directed ~~against~~ the Nicaraguan people and calls on the US to show restraint realism and responsibility.<sup>79</sup>

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78. Gorbachev's Visit to Cuba, Soviet Review Documents, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, ,1989.

79. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XXXVIII, No. 46, pp. 20-21.

The Soviet leadership was fully in accord with the conviction expressed in the declaration of the Contadora countries and their support group that peace was possible in Central America. The new Soviet leadership supported the constructive goals of the Contadora process which aimed at achieving a Latin American solution of the regional crisis and was willing to assist in practical ways in the creation of favourable conditions, for a just political settlement in Central America. The Soviet leadership strongly denies , US accusation of growing Soviet military presence in the region ,which lacks any foundation and declares in the most solemn fashion. It reaffirms its strong solidarity with the just cause of the Nicaraguan people and its willingness to continue giving them assistance and support in their struggle for freedom and independence .<sup>80</sup> Quite recently, after the conclusion of a democratic election in Nicaragua, Gorbachev has widely accepted the new democratic government that has replaced the Soviet supported sandinista government.

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80. Gorbachev's visit to Cuba, Soviet Review Documents,  
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1989)

Gorbachev's approach to the third world bloc both as a Soviet leader as well as a global statesman presupposes peace and prosperity that is necessary for the third world bloc for not only its survival but also development. The Soviet leader in Gorbachev, puts forth renewed pledges of Soviet Union to see the third world bloc free from power politics, whereas the global statesman in him, provides a new direction of peace and prosperity.

Thus, Gorbachev's approach has embraced a policy of peace and prosperity not only to expedite Soviet Union's national interest, - but the interest of all nations. The ideology in his approach coupled with the factor of national interest has ultimately displayed profuse concern for prevalence of peace and prosperity.

TOWARDS A CONCLUSION

Gorbachev's approach to international politics which reflects his own unprecedented account of the revolution embraces a radical alternation of the prevalent International Order. This approach with its multifacet and comprehensiveness imparts profound impact in expediting the transition of the International Order from a bipolar-adversarial-power bloc dominated system towards a more pluralistic and mutually accommodative one. It seeks to shift the focus from the politics of confrontation, bloc solidarity and bloc antagonism to the politics of co-existence, of mutual appraisal and confidence building.

Thus, it seeks to restructure interstate and international relations, predicated on the valid assumption of an integral and interdependent organic world, with prime concern on peaceful co-existence between different social systems, peaceful political negotiations for all disputes on the basis of dialogues, disarmament as a prelude for global socio economic development, a nuclear free and non-violent world based on equal security and global justice as a necessary pre-requisite.

His approach to refashion the whole International Order gets reflected in his comprehensive doctrine of international security encompassing political, military as well as economic one. In its political aspect, his approach envisages a sound international order with emphasis on balance of national interest among nations of the international community having diversified interests. As a corollary of the political aspect of his approach, confidence-building measure ;

based on political dialogues, occupies <sup>the</sup> pivotal position.  
 and democratisation  
 De-ideologisation<sub>^</sub> of international politics has become the  
 crux of Gorbachev's approach that stands as the need of the  
 time. The strategic component of his approach consists in  
 long term political goals of developing a stable peace with a  
 nuclear free and non-violent world based on equal and genuine  
 security, whereas in its economic dimension, his approach  
 envisages an all embracing system of international economic  
 security for protecting every nation against discrimination,  
 exploitation and other attributes of imperialist and neo-  
 colonialist policy.

Thus, his approach constitutes a mature enunciation on which  
 an equitable and just social order can be built on. It envisages  
 a philosophical and political framework for rebuilding relations  
 between states and ushering a new world of comprehensive co-  
 existence. The new thinking has a valid international dimension  
 which emphasises ~~an~~ a contradictory single world, united at  
 the micro-level in a common human civilisation.

The pragmatic visionary of Gorbachev becomes quite  
 relevant not only because Soviet Union needs a renewed approach  
 towards the trifurcated world of advanced capitalism, variable  
 Socialism and the vastly diversified, newly liberated, socially  
 backward, economically underdeveloped and politically unstable  
 residual world, in its time of crisis, but <sup>because</sup> the world itself  
 needs a different approach to peace and prosperity.



Marxist-Leninist ideology translated into the exigency and expediency of the time consists the crux of Gorbachev's approach that takes domestic compulsions of Soviet Union and pressing needs of existing international situation into account. Although the roots of this approach may be traced to earlier periods, it started assuming tangible and vigorous forms only with the appearance of Gorbachev in Soviet as well as international politics. Its fundamental concept and framework has been evolved after a broad and candid analysis of the problems faced by the Soviet Union in particular, and the whole international community in general.

His initiatives within the Soviet Union and Soviet need for a conducive international climate are symbolically related. The very fact that with a peaceful International Order, Soviet Union can sustain the restructuring in its internal dimension, becomes the logic of his new approach. At the same time, to open for mankind a historic period of progress and prosperity amidst perpetual peace and tranquility, his approach provides an opportunity with constructive effort and coherent programme.

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APPENDIX  
EXTRACT FROM  
GORBACHEV'S "PERESTROIKA"

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*How We See the World of Today*

*Where We Are*

We started perestroika in a situation of growing international tension. The *détente* of the 1970s was, in effect, curtailed. Our calls for peace found no response in the ruling quarters of the West. Soviet foreign policy was skidding. The arms race was spiraling anew. The war threat was increasing.

In ascertaining how to achieve a turn for the better, one had to ask the following questions. Why is this happening? What juncture has the world approached in its development? To do this we had to cast a sober and realistic glance at the world panorama, to get rid of the force of habit in our thinking. As we say in Russia, to look at things "with a fresh eye."

What is the world we all live in like, this world of the present generations of humankind? It is diverse, variegated, dynamic and permeated with opposite trends and acute contradictions. It is a world of fundamental social shifts, of an all-embracing scientific and technological revolution, of worsening global problems—problems concerning ecology, natural resources, etc.—and of radical changes in information technology. It is a world in which unheard-of possibilities for development and progress lie side by side with abject poverty, backwardness and medievalism. It is a world in which there are vast "fields of tension."

Everything was a great deal simpler many years ago. There existed several powers which determined their interests and balanced them if they so managed, and warred if they failed. International relations

were built on the balance of the interests of these several powers. This is one domain, that is another, and that one is still another. But have a look at what has happened over the forty postwar years to the present.

The political tableau of the world includes the sizable group of socialist countries which have gone a long way in their progressive development over not so long a history; the vast tract of developed capitalist states with their own interests, with their own history, concerns and problems; and the ocean of Third World countries which emerged in the past thirty to forty years when scores of Asian, African and Latin American countries gained independence.

It seems obvious that every group of states and every country has interests of its own. From the viewpoint of elementary logic, all these interests should find a reasonable reflection in world politics. But this is not so. I have more than once told my interlocutors from the capitalist countries: let us see and take into account the realities—there is the world of capitalism and the world of socialism, and there is also a huge world of developing countries. The latter is the home of millions of people. All countries have their problems. But the developing countries have a hundred times more than other states and this should be taken into consideration. These countries have their own national interests. For decades they were colonies, stubbornly fighting for their liberation. Having gained independence, they want to improve their peoples' life, to use their resources as they like, and to build an independent economy and culture.

Is there a hope for normal and just international relations, proceeding exclusively from the interests of, say, the Soviet Union or the United States, Britain or Japan? No! A balance of interests is needed. For the time being, no such balance exists. For now the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Processes which could shake the entire system of international relations are, however, taking place in the Third World.

No one can close down the world of socialism, the developing world or the world of developed capitalism. But there exists the view that socialism is an accident of history and one long overdue for the ash-heap. Then the Third World would become tame and everything would return full cycle, and prosperity would again be possible at the expense of others. An escape into the past is no reply to the challenges of the future, being merely adventurism based on fear and diffidence.

And we have not only read anew the reality of a multi-colored and multi-dimensional world. We have assessed not only the difference in the interests of individual states. We have seen the main issue—the growing tendency towards interdependence of the states of the world community. Such are the dialectics of present-day development. The world—contradictory, socially and politically diverse, but nonetheless interconnected and largely integral—is forming with great difficulties, as if it is feeling its way through a conflict of opposites.

Another no less obvious reality of our time is the emergence and aggravation of the so-called global issues which have also become vital to the destinies of civilization. I mean nature conservation, the critical condition of the environment, of the air basin and the oceans, and of our planet's traditional resources which have turned out not to be limitless. I mean old and new awful diseases and mankind's common concern: how are we to put an end to starvation and poverty in vast areas of the Earth? I mean the intelligent joint work in exploring outer space and the world ocean and the use of the knowledge obtained to the benefit of humanity.

I could say a lot about the work we do at a national level in our country to help resolve these problems. I touched upon them to a certain extent when I discussed our perestroika. We will do whatever depends on us.

But the Soviet Union alone cannot resolve all these issues. And we are not ashamed to repeat this, calling for international cooperation. We say with full responsibility, casting away the false considerations of "prestige," that all of us in the present-day world are coming to depend more and more on one another and are becoming increasingly necessary to one another. And since such realities exist in the world and since we know that we in this world are, on the whole, now linked by the same destiny, that we live on the same planet, use its resources and see that they are not limitless and need to be saved, and nature and the environment need to be conserved, then such a reality holds for all of us. The necessity of effective, fair, international procedures and mechanisms which would ensure rational utilization of our planet's resources as the property of all mankind becomes ever more pressing.

And here we see our interdependence, the integrity of the world, the imperative need for pooling the efforts of humanity for the sake of its self-preservation, for its benefit today, tomorrow and for all time.



Last but not least, there is one more reality which we must recognize. Having entered the nuclear age when the energy of the atom is used for military purposes, mankind has lost its immortality. In the past, there were wars, frightful wars which took millions upon millions of human lives, turned cities and villages into ruins and ashes and destroyed entire nations and cultures. But the continuation of humankind was not threatened. By contrast, now, if a nuclear war breaks out, every living thing will be wiped off the face of the Earth.

Even what is logically impossible, namely, that mankind can be annihilated many times over, has now become technically possible. The existing nuclear arsenals are so great that for every inhabitant of the Earth there is a charge capable of incinerating a huge area. Today, just one strategic submarine carries a destructive potential equal to several Second World Wars. And there are dozens of such submarines!

The arms race, just like nuclear war, is unwinnable. Continuing such a race on the Earth, and extending it into space, would accelerate the accumulation and modernization of nuclear weapons, the rate of which is already feverish. The world situation can become such that it would no longer depend on politicians but would become captive to chance. All of us face the need to learn to live at peace in this world, to work out a new mode of thinking, for conditions today are quite different from what they were even three or four decades ago.

The time is ripe for abandoning views on foreign policy which are influenced by an imperial standpoint. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is able to force its will on others. It is possible to suppress, compel, bribe, break or blast, but only for a certain period. From the point of view of long-term, big-time politics, no one will be able to subordinate others. That is why only one thing—relations of equality—remains. All of us must realize this. Along with the above-said realities of nuclear weapons, ecology, the scientific and technological revolution, and information systems, this also obliges us to respect one another and everybody.

Such is our world—complex but not hopeless. We hold the view that everything can be resolved but everyone should rethink his role in this world and behave responsibly.