ISLAMIC REVIVALISM : A CASE STUDY OF EGYPT

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation
entitled, "ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: A CASE STUDY OF EGYPT",
being submitted by Anwar Alam in partial fulfilment of
a requirement for the award of the Degree of Master of
Philosophy in this University, is a record of the student's
own work, carried out by him under my supervision and
guidance.

It is hereby certified that this work has not
been presented for the award of any other degree or
diploma.

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CONTENTS

P R E F A C E

The re-emergence of Islam as a Political force throughout the Muslim populated region in the last quarter of twentieth century has attracted a great deal of attention in the media, press, conferences and innumerable publications. But, by and large, the western mass media and literature has consciously presented a distorted picture of Islam and the ongoing Islamic movement. Literature on 'Islamic resurgence' or 'Islamic revivalism' has been dominated by such themes as 'legitimacy crisis', 'identity crisis', 'cultural dualism', socio-economy grievances, military defeats, political suppression, manifestation of conflict between secular and religious forces,failure of Arab socialism and so on. Each of these explanations of Islamic resurgence contains partial truth and so deserves its own place. However, distinct from all these approaches, I have tried to explain the twentieth century Islamic revivalism with special reference to Islamic revivalist movement in Egypt in the context of ongoing historical conflict between the two dominant Islamic models - Jamaleedin Afghani's absolutist/ rejectionist/basic-Pan-Islamic and Muhammad Abduh's

synthesis/assimilationist-nationalist model - arose
in the last quarter of the ninteenth century against
the Western challange to Muslim civilization. Afghanis
model represented complete rejection of western
socio-political, economic and administratige order.
On the contrary,   Abduh's model stood for the
infusion of western scientific and political culture
into the Islamic tradition and values.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters.

The first chapter deals with the theoretical
formulation of Islamic resurgence in which a Third
World perspective of religion has been taken into
account - it points out the fallacies of western
approach of development and religion. This chapter
also discusses the causes, nature and the common
features of Islamic resurgence and its specificities
in a few Muslim mjaority and minority countries.

The Second chapter takes into account a short
historical profile of early Islamic movements in Egypt,
Starting from Jamaleedin Afghani's Pan-Islamism-
till the suppression of Ikhwan under Nasser.

The Third chapter deals with the causes of

reemergence of _Ikhwan_ and other splinter Islamic
groups during Sadat's regime. While discussing its
causes, Sadat's economic policy and its socio-cultural
consequences and the impact of his foreign policy
has been focussed upon. It also examines the basis
and extent of _Ikhwan's_ support to Sadat's regime.
An attempt has also been made to examine the extent
of the impact of Iranian revolution on the _Ikhwan_
and different splinter radical groups. And lastly,
this chapter also discusses the coptic revivalism in
Egypt.

The Fourth chapter deals with the present
position of various moderate and radical Islamic organi-
zation under the regime of Husani Mubarak. It also
discusses Mubarak's policy of containing the Islamic
militant challange. The fifth and final chapter is
the conclusion.

The comparative and histro-analytical method
has been employed in this research work.This dissertation
is based on secondary sources.

I take this opportunity to acknowledge my
great indebtness to Professor K.R. Singh, my supervisor

and guide, **without** whose constant encouragement, constructive comments and valuable guidance, this work would not have been accomplished. I am also grateful to Dr. Z.H.Bari Azmi whose valuable comments, constructive suggestions and cooperation greatly helped me to produce this dissertation.

I am alone, however, responsible for errors and omissions.

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(ANWAR ALAM)

Chapter - I

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

The emergence of Islamic mass movements in
the Seventies, collectively known as 'Islamic revivalism'
or 'Islamic resurgence', now sweeping throughout the whole
muslim populated region (i.e. from Morrocco to Indonesia),
has, indeed, exposed the limitation of the western
modernization theories to explain away the process of
social change and development in the Third World. The
phenomenon of Islamic resurgence has definitely negated
the secular assumptions of treating the authentic Islamic
movement such as Wahabism in Saudi Arabia or the Muslim
Brethern in Egypt and the Fertile Creseent as reactionary
manifestation of a bygone age which to quote Hisham Sharabi..."
came too late to stem the tide of secularism, and its
fate sealed with the triumph of Abdul Nasser Secular
revolution."[1] Similarly, the present phase of Islamic
revivalism has proved the worthlessness of such declaration
-- "Whether from East or west, modernization poses the
same basic challange - the infusion of a rationalist
and positivist spirit - against which Islam is absolutely
defenseless."[2]

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1.   J.H. Thompsonand R.D.Reishauer,ed; Modernisation of
      the Arab World (Princeton, 1966), pp. 26

2.   Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society
      (USA, 1958), p. 45.

Looking through the 'modernization prisms' which
include in commonality the elements of rationalization
of political authority, universalization of political
participation, structural differentiation and cultural
secularization, there is a tendency among most of the
scholars to speak of **religio** - culture based mass movement
of the Third World not only as dogmatic-reactionary but
dubbing the whole socio-politico structure as static,
oppressive, monolothic and finally pre-modern. Thus
Hisham Sharabi takes no pain in saying that "the authentic
modernity is only of western in origin."[2] In fact, the
secular political order and culture in the West, which
has evolved out of the historical process of Reformation,
Renaissance and Industrialization, has reduced the religion
to the level of personal faith or merely moral and ethi-
cal principles. The result is that the majority of
western scholars have not only tended to define the term
"Secularism" in terms of Complete seperation of religion
from politics but have often ignored the dynamism of
tradition, values and ethics in the evolution of society.
Thus, while commenting upon the failure of Revolution
to complete the secularization process in Egypt, Morroe Ber-
ger noted that "the military regime's denial of political

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2. Hisham Sharabi, "The Dialectics of Patriarchy
    in Arab Society" in Samih.K Farsoun, ed., Arab
    Society : Continuity and Change -(London, 1985),
    pp.85-9.

influence to the Ulama is not secularism. Secularism
means separation of church and state and the latter's
supermacy; it does not call for the states's control of
the intimate details of religious teaching or the harnessing
of religion to the purposes of the government of the
day."[4]

However the East and Particularly the Muslim
World has never gone under such kind of structural trans-
formation except a few reformist movements within the
basic structure and tradition of Islam. Therefore, the
principle 'What to render unto Caesar and what to render
unto God' is a concept indigenous to western christian
civilization and cannot be transferred to Islamic
civilization*without completely transforming the spirit
of the entire civilization.

It is notable that a society's tradition do not
constitute a static, monolothic and closed system, but
a diversified and changable conglomeration or as Benjamin

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4.   Monroe Berger, Islam in Egypt Today : Social and
        Political Aspects of Popular Religion
        (London, 1970), p. 128.

*   However Iran is the exception where Shii Islam
        during Abbasid period accepted the principle
        of seperation of church from state. But that
        remained at theoretical level. In fact the
        doctrine of Tawhid (unity of religious & political
        authority) of Ayatollah Khomaini was to give
        an ideological response to that concept.

Schwartz has put it in the case of China - 'a cumulative
range and a reservoir of conflicting responses to human
experience."[5] And, given the European's challenge to
the indigenous institutions and culture, it will be more
apt to remark that "modernity is plural because it results
 from the response of indigenous peoples to the pressure
of Europe and from their efforts to reconstruct their
societies."[6] The present phenomenon of Islamic resurgence
comes closer to this definition of modernity.

However, the'Euro-centric model' (particularly
of post second world war) - failing to appreiate the
dynamic role of tradition and by overstreesing the element
of mechanisation and role of science in the political
process, - has produced a fragmented picture of Third
World developmental process which usually conforms to
the thought - perception of a microscopic 'Westernized'
elite. In this regard Denis Goulet[7] has rightly

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5.   Benjamin Schwartz, 'The Limits of Tradition
        versus Modernity" as categories of Explanation :
        The Case of the Chinese Intellectuals" in
        S.N.Eisenstadt & Graubard, ed., Intellectuals
        and Tradition (New York, 1973), p.76.

6.   I.M. Lapidus, "Islam and Modernity" in S.N.Eisenstadt,
        ed., Patterns of Modernity Vol. II : Beyond
        the West; (London 1987), p. 89.

7.   Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice : A New Concept
        in Theory of Development. (New York 1971).

identified the three fallacies of western thought on
development :-

(i) "Marshall Plan" type of thinking optimisti-
cally advocating changing people's beliefs and attitudes
to be more favourabe to the USA.

(ii) Because of preoccupation with one's own
perspective, failing to grasp Third World nations' own
definition of development.

(iii) The assumptions that underdevelopment
exists exculsively in the non-west and therefore developed
nations have nothing to learn from the non-west.

D.Goulet considered development to be a nor-
mative question, a question for the good life. Different
people will have different definition of development
depending on how they stand on such issues as the relation-
ship between the affluence and the negative impact of
technology on society. Hence a proper analysis of the
Third World Phenomena such as the 'Islamic resurgence'
requires an integrated holistic approach based upon unity
of tradition and modernity.

Apart from the scholastic misunderstanding of
Islam and the historical conflict of christianity with
Islam, another crucial factor which has determined the

western's perception and responses to the ongoing
Islamic movement, particularly in West Asia, is their
geo-strategic, political and economic interest in that
region. They take a very serious view of those radical
ideologies (like Nasserism and Khomainism) and radical
mass movements (like Ikhwan and Palestinians) which
pose the potential threat to their interest in that
region. Thus when Islam with its anti-western tone
emerged in early 70's as a powerful cohesive political
force - capable of challenging the hegomonistic position
of West at international as well as regional level, many
western scholars and mass media responded to the 'Islamic
threat' by prefixing such terminologies as fundamentalism,
neo-fundamentalism, radical Islam, militant Islam,
Political Islam, Return to Islam, Islamic Reassertion,
Islamic Bomb ... and projected Islam as militant and
violent, intolerant, expansionist and hostile, rigidily
conservative, monolothic, archaic, anachronistic and
finally brutal.

Moreover, the Western media has given the
impression as if the current Islamic revivalist movement
is of its first kind in the whole history of Islam.
Such impression runs contrary to the historical fact
that Islam is a living - dynamic force and Islamic move-
ment has been emerging throughout the centuries in order to

cope with the crisis - situations - be it economic,
political, social, cultural or moral.[8] And in conti-
nuation of the tradition of Islam, the theme of current
Islamic resurgence i.e. self - criticism, the quest
for Islamic identity and the formulation of Islamic
response or alternative to the challange of western
modernity has existed throughout the 20th century.[9]

However, it is notable that no indigeneous
word for 'fundamentalism' exists in Arabic and that
Muslims do not define others.[10] In fact the term suffers
from prejudice, rigidity and biasness. At best it should
be treated as a negative category because it restricts
the whole Islamic movements to the orthodox of Islam
and makes Islam as anisolated reactionary - dogmatic
force, a ritualistic dogma, a legitimising instrument,
a mere ideology and finally anathema to socio-politics
and economic development. As Lawerence has rightly

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8.   See, John O Voll, Islam : Continuity and Change
        in the Modern world (Westview Press & Longman
        1982).
        also John Donhue, and John L. EsPosito, ed. ,
        Islam in Transition : Muslim Perspectives
        (New York, 1982).

9.   Ibid.

10.   Bruce B. Lawrence, "Muslim Fundamentalist Move-
        ment:- Reflection Towards A New Approach"
        in Barbara Freyer Stowasser, ed. , The
        Islamic Impulse, (London 1987), p. 18.

commented, "fundamentalism is anti-intellectual to the
extent that it denies the vigilant scrutiny which
characterizes aspects of the tradition that has evolved
over all intervening years; it is anti-modernist to the
extent that it refuses to allow any durable contribution
from either the scientific/ technological or the bureau-
cratic/military achievement of the contemporary era."[11]
To ignore change; as they (fundamentalists)have done,is to become a
victim of the historical process to what Abdullah Laroui
identifies as "historical retardation."[12]

In positive-literal sense, fundamentalism means
orthodoxy in matters of faith and applications of
cannons of religion in a puritan form and spirit. In
this context Prof, A.H.H.Abidi has rightly made a
distinction between an 'Islamic fundamentalist' and a
militant challanger of the status quo under the banner
of Islam.[13] Thus whereas the western mass media (parti-
cularly the U.S.) and the governments have dubbed the
'latter' as fundamentalists, they have maintained a very

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11.   Ibid. pp.31.

12.   Abdallah Laroui, 'The crisis of the Arab Intellectual'
        Cammel D. trans. (Barkely, 1976); p. 116.

13.   A.H.H.Abidi, "Islamic Fundamentalism in
        West Asia", Mainstream (New Delhi) March 19,1988.
        p.25.

cordial relations with the "real" fundamentalist regimes,
(like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco...), if going by the
spirit of above definitions.   they speak the funda-
mentalist language in relation to Gush Emudim,[14], Agudat
Israel and other militant rightist jews groups in Israel.

The partial and hypocratic attitude of the West
only leads to conclusion that they are ready to bear
the burden of subservient Islam of Subservient regimes
but definitely not of the militant, progressive and
reformist Islam which in essence reflects the Third
World desire to liberate themselves from the yoke of
western neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism.

Looking from the evolutionary perspective, the
present phenomena of Islamic resurgence seems to be a
continuation of historical chain of reform, renewal
or revival within the Islam. The earlier Islamic revivalist
movements like Wahabism[15] in the Arabian peninsula,
Naqsbandi order in the Indian subcontinent, Jihad of
Uthman Dan Fodo in central West Africa,Tijamiya order in
North and West Africa and Sanusiya order in Libya   -
arose   against the corrupt practices of sufism and the

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14.   An Ultra-rightist party emerged in 1970's
           which aspires for the pioneering spirit of the
           early Yishuv and define Israeli society in more
           Jewish-nationalist terms.

15.   It is said that the Wahhabi movement marked the
           date of revival of Islam as an activist and
           revolutionary force. See, Edward Mortimer,
           Faith and Power. The Politics of Islam (London,
           1982,) p.64.

declining prestige and authority of the ruling Muslim
dynasties. The modernizing west was not the primary or
most visible challange that aroused the reformist
spirit of these movements.[16]   Whereas in the second
half of the nineteenth century, the Islamic movements
(like Afghani's Pan-Islamism, Abduh's Islamic modernism,
Rashid Rida's Salaffiya movement, Mahadism in Sudan,
Banna's Ikhwan and the present Islamic revivalism),
though share the eighteenth century spirit of socio-moral
reconstruction of society and uphold the principle of
'ijitihad' to make Islam more compatible with the changing
needs of modern society; arose   primarily against the
western penetration in the Muslim life.

It has been said that "the fundamental spiritual
crisis of Islam in the twentieth century stems from an
awareness that something is awry between the religion   which
God has appointed and historical development of the world
which He controls."[17]This spiritual crisis of twentieth
century Muslim world has it roots in the interaction
of Islam with the christian West in the preceding centuries.
The military might and penetrating economic power   of
the west soon exposed the vulnerability of Muslim sk

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16.   Voll, n.8, p.38.

17.   W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton,1957),
        p. 41.

state.[18]   Even the Western based reforms (particularly
in the field of military, law, education and economy)
as epitomized by Mohammad Ali in Egypt and Tanjimat
in the Ottoman Empire could not prevent the ascendency
of western power and hence, when by the end of nineteenth
century the west (Britain and France) completed and
consolidated the political hegemony over the large part
of the Muslim world,[19] Islam was increasingly seen as
lo sing its seperate identity and vitality. The search
for 'Islamic identity' in the midst of Western dominated
world has always dominated the thought-construction of
the leaders of revivalist movements - be they Jamaleedin
Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Sir Sayeed Ahmad Khan, Maulana-
Ala-Maududi, Sayeed Qutub, Ayotallah Khomeini, Ali Shariati,
Mohammad Iqbal, Rashid Rida, Hasan-al-Banna etc. All
these leaders have influenced substantially   the
present phase of Islamic revivalism.

A careful analysis of the thought of these
revivalist leaders reveal that by and large they come
closer   either to Afghani's Pan-Islamic (alternative/
rejectionist) model or to Abduh's Islamic synthesis/

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18.   For instance, the Napoelonic conquest of Egypt
        in 1799.

19.   The Eastern Crisis of 1875-88 and the Berlin
        Treaty (1878) showed that the fate of the
        Ottoman Empire was no longer in their own hand.
        The French occupation of Tunis (1881); and of
        Egypt by England (1882), the formal British
        occupation of India (1858) etc.

assimilationist model - which arose   n the last quarter
of nineteenth. century against the Western cultural
and political pressure. Both the models share the common
perception with regard to the reinterpretation of
Islamic doctrine to meet the new challanges and problems
created by the modern science and technology. But
whereas Afghani sought the remedy of moral degeneration
and political decline of Islamic community in the
political unity of divided (secterian division) Islamic
community under the single banner of Islam and rejected
completely the western political values, ideas,
politico-administrative setup and rationalism; declaring
the Holy Quran and the intrepretation of Four Rightly
Guided Caliph as the only authentic sources of all
sorts of political ideas and rationalism, Abduh, though
upholding the authenticity of tne Quran and the
teachings of Four Salaf, sought for the infusion of
western scientific and political culture in the Islamic
tradition and values in order to overcome the stagnation
of Muslim society. His synthesis of the Islamic
model places great emphasis on western oriented modification
in the Islamic educational system and through it sought
change in the social and cultural framework. Thus
Maududi's construction of 'Theo-Democratic state,- an
Islamic alternative to Western political system and

his systematic, reasoned and argued presentation of the virtues of Islamic way of life,[20] Sayyid Qutub's extension of Maududi's notion of 'Jahiliyya' to all the existing regimes in the world - Muslim and non-muslim alike - and his powerful rhetoric,reasoned, and logical argument in favour of abolition of 'Jahiliyya system,[21] and Khomaini's powerful critique of imperialism, colonialism, monarchy and his concern for muslim unity[22] reflects the tone and spirit of rejectionist model of Jamaleedin Afghani. Whereas Sayeed Ahmad Khan's adoption of western science and education, Iqbal's concept of 'self'[23] and Ali Shariati's construction of 'Islamology',- the sociology of Islam, and his emphasis on the scientific teachings of Islamic philosophy[24] reflects the spirit of assimilationist model of Muhammad Abduh.

It is within these two models of Islamic reformism that the present revivalism should be viewed as a

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20. Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State" in John L.Esoposito, ed, Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford 1983), pp.99-131.

21. Yvonne Y.Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival" in Esposito, n.20,pp.67-94.

22. Michael M.J.Fischer,"Imam Khomaini : Four Levels of understanding", in Esposito,n.20,pp.151-171.

23. John L. Esposito,"Muhamad Iqbal and the Islamic State" in Espdsito, n.20,pp.175-189.

24. Abdulaziz Sachedina,"Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution", in Esposito,n.20,pp.191-212.

manifestation of ongoing struggle between the forces of
Islamic synthesizers and Islamic reaffirmer (rejectionist)
instead of viewing it as manifestation of struggle
between the secular forces and religious forces. Because
secularism in the western sense of seperation of church
from state has never had a substantial hold on the people's
psyche of Muslim society except a microscopic section
of liberal and leftist intellectuals. At this juncture
it is worth while to point out that even the political
behaviour of the Wafadist;aliberal-secular-nationalist
party, were not guided by the secular consideration
as shown by their speeches, debates and discussions
in Egyptian parliament over the issue of Sharia and
the abolition of Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk.[25] Moreover,
it is notable that the same scholars who previously
hailed the advent of western liberal values and parlia-
mentary democracy in the Egypt in 1920's not only became
critical of those values but produced a voluminous
literature on 'Islam' in the wake of rise of <u>Ikhwan</u>
in 30's and 40's - a period wrongly described by
Safran as "The Reactionary Phase".[26] Thus one writer
has rightly remarked that "the cultural revival movement

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25.   Nadav Safran, <u>Egypt, In Search of Political
         Community - An Analysis of the Intellectual and
         Political Evolution of Egypt, 1904-1952,</u>
         (London, 1961), p. 108-21.

26.   Ibid. pp.209-228.

in the second half of the ninteenth century known as
'nahada' and the various nationalist parties that
became active after the First World War were not anti-reli-
gious, but they were looking toward a much more seculari-
zed type of society and culture than salafiyya."[27] The
progressive movement of 50s and 60s - collectively
called Arab socialism (witnessed in the radical state
of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq and Syria) aimed
to produce synthesis between the Islamic tradition
and western modernism and thus came closer to the
Abduh's Islamic assimilationist model or Islamic modernism.
Islam was not the central principle but rather it emerged
as 'a' component in the state's ideology.[28] Acknowledge-
ment of indebtedness to the west for government
structure and institutions as well as science and tech-
nology was distinguished from acceptance of western
values.

Indeed one may discern a cyclical pattern of ebb-
and-flow between the liberal-synthesizing forces and
Islamic reaffirmer (rejectionist). Thus the powerful
ninteenth century impact of European imperailism and

27. Niko Kielstra., "Law and Reality in Modern Islam"
in Earnest Gellener, ed , Islamic Dilemma :
Reformers, Nationalists and Industralization
The Southern Shore of the Mediterrane an (New York,
1985), p.14.

28. John L. Esposito, "Islam and Muslim Politics"in
Esposito, n.20, p.6.

westernization produced an Islamic reaction ranging
from Al-Afghani's Pan-Islamism to Muhammad Abduh's
Islamic modernism. The liberal -constitutional period
in Egypt was followed by yet another Islamic revivalist
reaction in the inter-war years in the hands of Hasan-
al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood. The July 1952 revolution
brought in another synthesising phase which after the
1967 war slowly evolved towards another phase of Islamic
rejectionism.

Perhaps the difference between Islamic synthesizers
and Islamic reaffirmer is that "both believe that Islam
and modernism are compatible but for former, religion
is only a meance to realize modernism and for the latter,
the religion is an end in itself and a basic and
permanent dimension of Muslim character.

International Encyclopaedia of the social
sciences has defined the term "revivalism" in these
words - "In revivalism the aim of the movement
is to return to a former era of happiness, to restore
a golden age, to revive a previous condition of social
virtue."[29] such generalized conception of revivalism
hardly explains away the dynamism and complexities of

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29. International Encyclopaedia of the social
science, vol.II (The MacmIllan Company & The
Free Press, 1968), P.77.

contemporary phase of Islamic revivalism. However, a
glance at the historical profile of Islamic movements
reveal the fact that the dominant theme of all
movements has always been the redefinition of Islam in
the modern context and not the restoration   of seventh
century Islamic tradition. In fact the glorious past of
Islamic civilizations only becomes a source of inspiration
in their fight against the exploitation and corruption
in every form. It is future oriented rather than past
oriented. Thus Ghannouchi, the leader of MTI (Mouvement
de la Tendance Islamique) in Tunisia remarked-
"the Islam of MTI is not the Islam of Golden age
but the Islam of this century which will set the framework
for the battle against exploitation and underdevelopment.
Islam in so far as it is a global revolution fights
against despotism, exploitation and dependency in all
its forms... the fight for Islam is the fight for liberty,
equality, dignity and progress.[30]   The Islamic
factor does not imply an abandonment of the process of
transformation or an attempt to revert to premodern
society in an uncritical manner, they mean an attempt to
build a post-modern society by utilizing traditions that

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30.   Marion Bourby, "The Islamic Challange : Tunisia
        Since Independence", The Third World Quarterly
        (London), vol.10, no.1-2, 1988, p.604.

are deeply rooted within society.[31]   In short, those
who denigrate revivalist and religate them to the
Dark Ages, the Middle ages or the Seventh century
are at best completely missing the dynamics of the
relevance of religion for modern life, or at worst,
purposefully ignoring the new developments in the content
and meaning of various Islamic doctrine.

At best the term "revival" denotes   "an
increased consciousness of and reaffirmation of belief
in the values and ethics of Islam in all aspects of
life, and a more assertative and active expression of
that consciousness and reaffirmation in most parts of
the Muslim life."[32]

The manifestation of the increased religious
consciousness in the present phase of revivalism ranges
from personal to international sphere. The personal
aspect of Islamic revival is reflected in increased
emphasis upon religious observance (mosque
attendance, Ramdan fast, Vieling, outlawing alcohol, gambling
prostitution, pronography etc.), religious programming

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31.   Voll, n.8, p.277.

32.   Patrick Bannerman, Islam in Perspective : A-
       Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law.
       (London, 1982), p.159.

in media and the proliferation of religious literature.
At political level, various Islamic opposition parties
and groups have emerged during the last two decades -
demanding for the application of Sharia. The two most
explicit manifestationsof the current Islamic revivalism
arethe Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) and the
assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar-al-Sadat
(1981) by the Islamic group,- Al-Jihad. A host of Islamic
bankings and organisations like OIC [33] (1969) have
emerged at international level.

As the present Islamic movement comes closerto Afghani's
Pan-Islamic rejectionist model,they aim at Islamisation of mass-
culture. Islamization is defined as a self-conscious
deliberate effort to provide an Islamic alternative to
westernization, whether the latter is seen as Euro-
American or Russian centred. [34] They focus their
efforts on providing an Islamically grounded modernisation.
They aim to identify and elaborate the Islamic view of

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33. One should not undermine the political motivations
of Saudi Arabia - i.e. containing the Nasserite
and leftist forces, dominating the Muslim world
and Arab World in particular in creating
these international organizations. On Proliferation
of Islamic Organizations, See, Stowasser, n.10,
p. 242.

34. Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Islamic Awakening in
Egypt", Arab Studies Quarterly, (Belmont, USA)
Vol. 9, n.3, 1987, p.238.

all aspects of life. In the long term, their goals
are to recreate a modern, vibrant, holistic Islamic
civilization governed by the divine vision for human
life as revealed in the Quran, reality in which
there is no seperation or bifurcation between religion
and state, the religious and the secular,religious know-
ledge and science.[35]

The current Islamic movement is not monolithic
either in manifestation or leadership. It is as
diverse as the Islamic historical experience, in fact,
it is polycentric, for it has no single leadership.
Its common features are political activism in the name
of Islam by governments and oppostion alike, the
growing use of Islamic symbolism and legitimacy at
the level of political action and the assumptions by
Islamic groups of a more assertive posture in most
Islamic countries as contender for public loyality.
Indeed, the' politicization of Islam' has occupied
a central place in the discussion over the phenomenon of
Islamic resurgence. For example, Bassam Tibi stated
that "the Islamic resurgence is merely the repolitization
of Islam and the use of Islamic symbols in the political

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35.   Ibid.

realm.[36] For Dessouki, Islamic resurgence refers to the
increasing prominence and politicization of Islamic
ideology and symbols in Muslim societies and in the
public life of Muslim individuals.[37] These scholars
conceive the Islamic resurgence primarily in terms
of"legitimacy crisis.'

The current Islamic movements also suggest
the sharp division between official Islam restored
to and used by rulers in order to justify the status
quo on the one hand and popular Islam on the other that
is more widespread among the broader spectrum of masses
and used by dissidents to express their opposition.
In most of the Muslim countries, the state has diminished
and in some cases destroyed altogether the financial
and administrative autonomy of religious institutions
and has made them merely a legitimising - instrument
of state policy. Thus Al Azhar - a symbol of official
Islam in Egypt, justified Nasser's socialist measures
and Sadat's seperate peace Treaty with Israel as

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36. Bassam Tibi, "The Renewal Role of Islam in
the political and social Development of the
Middle East," The Middle East Journal
(Washington D.C.), vol. 37, no.1, 1983, p.3.

37. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Islamic Resurgence:
Sources, Dynamics And Implications in
Dessouki, .ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab
World (USA,1982) p.4.

compatible with the Holy Quran and The Tradition.
This subordination to government policies explains
the critical and hostile posture taken by dissident
Islamic groups towards official Islam.[38]

Another notable aspect of the current Islamic
resurgence is that although conditioned by their national-
historical settings, the thrust of Islamic movement is
Pan-Islamic. It is ideological and then by
definition international.[39] It is also non-sectarian[40]
in nature and strives to bring all sects, all the
schools of Muslim thought to common ground. It is
moving neither on the pattern of the "ecumenical move-
ment"in the christian world, nor of that of religious
trade union.[41]

The contemporary Islamic movement differs with
early movement in terms of prevailing social, political
and cultural context, but it comes closer to both
Salafiyya movement of Abduh and Rashid Rida for their
emphasis to rethink and restate Islamic doctrine in order
to cope with the problems generated by the western

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38. Dessouki, "Official Islam And Political Legiti-
    mization in the Arab Countries", in Stowasser,
    n.10,p.185.

39. Khursheed Ahmed, "The Nature of Islamic Resurgence"
    in Esposito,n.20,p.223.

40. However, the western media and conservative Arab
    States has tried to give a sectarian colour to the
    present Islamic Movement by labelling Iranian
    Revolution as Shiite revolution.

41. Ahmad, n.29,Ibid.

technology within the basic structure of Islamic
thought and Muslim Brotherhood for their stress
on Islam as a form of cultural identity and ideology
of high idealism. Like Ikhwan, the present Islamic
movement has greatly appealed to the new intelligensia
of socially mobile but economically and professionally
insecure students, intellectuals, technicians, middling
bureaucrats and professionals. Nazih Ayubi showed that
of 1,950 members of the main assembly of the Egyptians
Muslim Brotherhood in 1953, only 22 were not of educated
urban middle class.[42] Saad Eddin Ibrahim has noted
that the profile of present Egyptian Islamic militants,
over 70% were from modest not poor background and
were first generation city dwellers.[43]

Among the theories the' Euro-centered 'moderni-
zation theory' has been widely used to explain the
current phase of Islamic resurgence. In brief this
theory lays great emphasis on 'rural .

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42.   Nazih Nasif Al-Ayubi, "The Political Revival of
        Islam: The Case of Egypt." International Journal
        of Middle East Studies (London,New York) vol.1 2,
        Dec.1980,p.492.

43.   Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt Militant
        Islamic Group : Methodological Notes and Preliminary
        Fidding",International Journal of Middle East Studies,
        vol.12, n.4,December 1980,pp.438-9.

migration'[44] and views the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence
as a petty bourgeous phenomenon - symptomatic of 'pro-
ductive urban middle class.' Thus Eric Davis has
remarked in the context of Egypt, that "beyond the urban
middle class, it is difficult to see Islamic radia-
alism extending to the industrial working class and
peasantry which has traditionally ignored its appeal."[45]
It treats religion merely as a psychological device
or 'spiritual niche' towards which an individual
helplessly turns failing to cope with the stress and
strains of multiple crisis, viz. political suppression,
economic oppression and cultural regression (losing
of collective Islamic identity due to breakdown of
traditional values) — generated by the uneven process
of modernization - undergoing most of the Third
World countries. Though no one can ignore the socio-
economic factor in the emergence of Islamic revivalism;
but, by reducing it to merely a socio-economy anomie
or urban middle class phenomena, the modernization
theory has not only ignored the mass character of

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44. Between 1960 and 1975 the rate of increase
in the urban population exceeded the growth of
the industrial labour force in Egypt by 2%,
Iran by 3%, Iraq by 8%, Jordan by 18%, Kuwait
by 14%, Lebanon by 3%, Morocco by 10% Saudi
Arabia by 11%, Syria by 3% and South Yemen by
13%. See James P. Piscatori, Islam in a world
of Nation States. (Cambridge,1986),p.27.

45. Eric Davis, "Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt",
Said Amir Arjomand, ed; From Nationalism to
Revolutionary Islam, (London,1984),p.153.

revolutionary Islamic movement (as evident by revo-
lution in Iran and Ikhwan in Egypt) but also has
failed to recognize the in-built potential for self-
purification and regeneration which Islam keeps in
its capacity as historically, evolved rich cultural
system and not merely as a religion in western sense. For
there is no reason to suppose that the Wahabis in the
eighteenth century or Osman Dan Fodio early in the
ninteenth century, were impelled to their enthusiam by
an anticipatory reaction to the emerging world of
Adam Smith and Karl Marx.[46] In fact more than a
practice of rituals, Islam is the total way of life.
It is intimately associated with the political order,
with public education, social ethics and the family.
Thus Rosenthal defines Islam as both a system of
beliefs, practices, personal faith, piety, devotion and
a religious, social and political law for the community
of believer.[47] Watt sees Islam as indivisible
whole consisting of political, economic, social, moral
and ritual segments.[48] Indeed, it is not a formal
ideology but rather a kind of collective

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46. Gellener, n.27, p.4.

47. Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, - Islam in the Modern
National State (Cambridge : 1965), p.11.

48. Montgomery W. Watt, What Is Islam; (London
1979), p.3.

mentalite;[49] not doctrine but conduct.[50]

Many others have associated the origin of the current phase of Islamic revivalism with the sense of dissillusionment, inferiority complex and the ideological vaccum - created by the Arab defeat in 1967. Foud Ajami observed that "the ideological vacuum left behind as a result of the demise of Pan-Arabism is being filled by religious belief on one level and by loyality to the state on another."[51] A few others have linked the revivalism to the new sense of pride, power and identity gained in 1973 Arab-Israel-war and the seven fat years of oil boom which was widely used particularly by Saudi Arabia, Libya and Gulf Sheikhdoms to foster Islamic revivalism in other Muslim countries.[52] But Mitchell has rightly questioned the linking of those events with the Islamic revivalism - Does oil wealth account for the emergence of Sayyid Qutub? Does the notion of 1973 benchmark

49.   Shimon Shamir, "Historical Tradition and modernity in the Belief System of the Egyptian Mainstream" in Eisenstadt, n.6, p.122.

50.   Piscatori, n.44, p.10.
51.   Foud Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism" in Tawfice Farah, ed ;Pan-Arabism and Arab-Nationalism: The Continuing Debate (Boulder,1987);p.105.

52.   Daniel Pipes, In The Path of God : Islam and Political Power (New York,1981),pp.281-321.

        Daniel Pipes , "Oil Wealth and Islamic Resurgence in Dessouki n.37,pp.45-51.

prepare one for the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979?[53]

In fact the events of 1967 and 1973 and Islamic revolution of Iran (1979) should be seen as moments intensifying a long term ongoing historical process of Islamic revivalism in which questions of 'identity', 'modernization', 'cultural authenticity', socio-economic grievances, political participation and foreign domination are all involved.

The complex phenomenon of Islamic resurgence can be properly discussed under the two subtitles:-

1)   The failure of Contemporary adopted ideology of Modernization :

All contemporary ideologies of modernization viz. Kemalism in Turkey, Western liberalism in Egypt during the inter-war period, Arab Socialism of fifties and sixty's and the Marxism in Afghanistan and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen - practised in the last quarter century failed to meet the fundamental needs of public life - political stability, social and economic justice and military success. The Kemalist drives towards westernization and secularization affected

53.   Richard P. Mitchell, "The Islamic Movement :
         Its Current Condition And Future Prospects"
         in Stowasser, ed. n.10, p.76.

mainly the military and bureaucratic elites and intellec-
tuals, the countryside remained mostly traditional
and Islamic in orientation. Thus with the death of
Kemal Ataturk, the supressed Islamic Conrciousness
surfaced to the close of forties which culminated
in the emergence of NSP (National Salvation Party)
in seventies. The western liberalism in Egypt ended
with the creation of Zewish state of Israel - a
symbol of western imperialism and a continuous bone of
contention between the Muslim East and Ch ristian
west. The Arab Socialism represented by Nassirism
(Egypt), Bathism (Syria and Iraq) and Bourguibism (Tunisia)
claimed their ideology to be grounded in Arab-Islamic
heritage and aimed at synthesis between Islamic tradi-
tion and western science. But they failed to produce
ideological synthesis. Instead, they imposed the western
socialist values under the garb of Islamic modernism
and reduced Islam to the level of legitimising -
instruments to their socialistic policies. Indeed
Islamic socialism was a mere religious justification
of socialist laws. In a process they alienated the
mass-culture and themselves became a Victim of imitation
of western model. People came to realize the gap between
their claim of cherishing, Islamic values, morality and
ethics and the objective social reality. The disparities
between slogans and realities, freedom in concept and

despotism in reality, Arab unity in principle
and Arab disunity in fact and socialism
in theory and the wealth were very apparent. This
dislocation between what people were told and what they
saw resulted in the complete loss of credibility of
all ideologies of socialism. Hence "fundamentalism sym-
bolized the revolt of the civilization they left behind;
it was a desire to close the glaring gap between the
claim of authenticity and realities of every day, life."[54]
Or as one writer commented "the very vitality of the
current Islamic militancy reflects the failure of the
State in the last several decades to produce a credible
synthesis between tradition and modernity.[55]

2.   Cultural Confrontation : Superiority - Inferiority
        Complexes :

        The Muslim world has been in confrontation with
the western world since the crusades in the Middle ages
all the way until modern colonialism and imperialism
in contemporary Muslim societies. In order to dominate,
the West, in the name of its culture, launched the most
severe attacks on the source of power in the Muslim

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54.   Foud Ajami, The Arab Predicament : Arab Political
        Thought and Practices since 1967 (Cambridge 1981);p.171.

55.   P.J.Vatikiotis, "Religion and State" in Gabriel R.
        Warburg and Uri Kupferschmidt (ed); Islam, Nationalism
        and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan (New York,1983)p.68.

heart, namely Islam. Their misjudgements included the negation of Islamic revolation, the forgery of the Quran, the epilepsy and polygamy of Muhammad, Islamic Propagation by Sword, Ahl-El Dhima as second class citizen, Mohammad as an imposter ....[56] Islam was held responsible for under-development in Muslim Societies- and said to be against progress, Science and modern life. Philosophers of history made the western culture the peak and the model of all human cultures.

Indeed, the notion of 'Cultural Colonization' or 'cultural alienation' has always been a dominant theme in the history of 20th century Islamic revivalist movements. Thus Hasan al Banna warned his followers that "formal political independence was worthless unless accompanied by intellectual, social, cultural independence."[57] Qutub warns the Brothers that

Spiritual and mental imperialism is the true danger for, unlike military or political imperialism which inspires opposition; this type dulls calms and deceives its Victim.[58] In recent period, Muhammad Jalal Kisk

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56.   Philip K. Hitti, Islam and The West : A Historical Cultural Survey (London, 1962), pp 48-62. Also see, Habib, Chatty "Islam Finds Itself" in Stowasser n.10, pp.217-220.

57.   Richard P. Mitcheel, Society of Muslim Brothers (London 1969), p.230.

58.   Ibid.

wrote four books on the cultural invasion - one on general cultural penetration, two volumes on Marxism and nationalism as variations of cultural penetration and one on connection between the cultural penetration and Six Day War.[59] The Iranian revolutionary propaganda and rhetoric paid much more attention to the liberation of sexual mores than to repressiveness, cruelty and corruptions of the Shah and Khomeini characterized westernized intellectuals as individuals who wanted to look at 'naked women."[60]

It is against this historical background of the paucity of social, economic and political justice, the cultural subjugation and the military defeats, that Islam has emerged as an "alternate crisis-management ideology/system to the variety of approaches ranging "from communist totalitarianism, to socialist-etatist, mixed capitalist and theocratic system."[61] In fact given the historical continuity of reform and renewal Muslim traditionalism in present phase is a natural reaction to Western modernism. Traditionalism in this

59.   Ajami, n.54, p.52.

60.   Kielstra, n.27, p.17.

61.   Hrair R. Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival : Legitimacy Crisis, Ethinic Conflict and the Search For Islamic Alternatives", Middle East Journal Vol.34, no.1,1980 p.8.

sense implies rejectionism, the defence of authenticity against alien form of thought and not conservatism in thought. Islam appeared as the only viable political system for the Muslims in the modern world.

It is within this broader common framework of Islamic resurgence which all the Muslim countries share that the responses, of Islamic resurgence differ from country to country depending upon the nature of political system, the level of socio-economy evolution, the degree of external penetration, the historical role of Islam, the demographic structure and the nature of challange of relationship between secular and religious elitics. The responses also reflect: the remarkable continuity in the tradition of the concerned country.

Thus, in Egypt, Muslim militants oppose the imposition of western culture and civilization. Besides, the resurgence has its roots in Sadat's policy of de-Nassirization. In Syria, the Islamic militancy, represented by Muslim Brotherhood and the Higher Command of the Islamic Revolution, represents Sunni hostility towards the Alawi bias of regime and the deepening erosion of the status and power of the sunni community. In Saudi Arabia they oppose too great a deviation from Wahabism and the massive introduction of the artifacts of western technological civilization. The Islamic

movements in Algeria (Collectively called Ahl-el Da'wa) and Tunisia (MTI, The Islamic Vanguard etc.) have their origin in seventies in the socialistic policies of Bourmedenei and Bourguiba respectively. They reflect the spirit of reformist Salafiyya movement and oppose the official Islamic establishment for their subordination to nationalist raison d' etat. The militants in Lebanon are engaged in Violent activities for different reasons - partly a question of collective self-preservation, particularly among the Shia of Southern Lebanon and partly to achieve a political, social and economic position within the Lebanese political system. The Islamization of Pakistan under Ziaul Haq seemed to be a combination of personal belief on his part and a means of legitimising his rule. Qaddafi's interpretation of Islam reflects both a desire for what might be called extra political or spiritual legitimisation and simultaneously a profound distrust of independent religious organizations. The Iranian revolution (1979) was a response to Shah's atrocities and his too much identification with the western culture. The revolution was in tune with the historical role which cleregy had always played in Iranian political system. Apart from resisting the coercive imposition of an alien political and cultural ideology through

the mobilizing means of Islam, the Afghan resistance also represents a long tradition of opposition to attempts by any central government to establish control over the disparate ethinic and tribal groupings, which remain important foci for particularism.

In the majority populated region, the militants demand the application of the Sharia whereas in the Muslim - minority regions like Soviet Union and Phillippines, they demand self-rule and the exteremists among them, seperatism. Thus the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Phillippines, concentrated in Muslim populated southern region of archipelago, has launched a secessionist movement with a wider call for Islam and appeal to Islamic world since the failure of the Tripoli Agreement (1976) to grant internal autonomy to them. The Pattani seperatist movement in Thailand appears to be same, though it has also an ethnic strand in that the Thai Muslim community is made up of Malayas.

It is within this broader conceptual framework of Islamic resurgence that an effort has been made to analyze and explain way the Islamic militant movement in Egypt. Egypt was the first Muslim country to witness the onslaught of the European civilization viz., cultural encroachment, economic penetration and military - politico domination. It has beentheexperimenting ground of many

ideologies and policies such as western democratic-
liberalism, Nasserite socialism, Pan Arabism and
Sadat's open door and Egypt - first policy. The defeat
of 1967 war had much wider impact on the Egyptians
than the people of any other Arab country. Al-Azhar
stands out as the greatest symbol of Islamic educational
establishment in the Muslim world. But its subservient
role to state has caused much pain to the common people.
All these factors have affected the course of revivalist
movement in Egypt.

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Chapter - II

EARLY ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN

EGYPT

The history of Islamic revivalist movements in modern era in Egypt startswith the impact of Jamal-Al-Din Al-Afghani's Islamic reform movement - widely known as Pan-Islamism. He, whose place of origin is disputable, has been described as Philosopher, Writer, Orator, Journalist, Political activist,...... father of modern Muslim nationalism, Proponent of Pan-Islamism and the main inspiration for the reform movements in Islam! He seems to have been the first Muslim revivalist to use the concept of "Islam" and the "West" as Connoting Correlative-- and of course antagonistic - historical phenomena which has since become quite standard in virtually all Islamic thinking.[2]

He led ceaseless agitation against the corrupt Muslim rulers, polemics against the conservative theologians and aroused the political consciousness of Muslim masses against the corruption and inefficiency of decaying traditional Islamic institutions and the external danger of European colonization.

To the close of the third quarter of ninteenth century the Europeans (The French in North Africa,

1.   John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito "Islam in Transition : Muslim Perspectives (New York, 1982), p.16.

2.   W.C.Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, N.J. 1957) p.49.

Britain in India and Africa, Russia in Central Asia
and Holland in South-East Asia) had come to dominate
the Muslim World and posed a serious threat to the
"Cultural-identity" of Islam. Therefore, he appealed to
the Muslims of Islamic world to unite on the basis
of religious faith irrespective of races, nationalities
and sects not only to withstand the onslaught of
European cultural and political invasion - but also
against the corrupt rulers of Muslim world.[3] "For
Muslims no sort of natural solidarity, not even
patriotism, can replace the bond created by Islam. Real
unity in Muslim nations, rests on common religious
conviction. If that goes society itself dissolves."[4]
And he found justification for political revolution
in the saying of Quran - "Verily God will not Change
the State of a People Until they Change their own State."[5]
It seems that he sought for Muslim unity and the
liberation of all Islamic countries from European
control under the leadership of the strongest Muslim
state of the time; the Ottoman Empire. The theme of

3.   Charle C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt,
        (London; 1938), p.59 .

4.   Albert, Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal
        Age (1798-1939), London,1970 ,p.119.

5.   Adams, n.3, p.16.

'unity' runs throughout al-Afghani's work. Even the Chief purpose of the Arab weekely called al-Urwahat - Wuthqua (The Indissoluable Bond), published by Afghani alongwith Abduh during their brief exile in Paris, was to arouse the Muslim peoples to the need of uniting their forces against western aggression and exploitation.[6]

He elavated "Islam" to the level of civilization on par with European civilization and tried to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with modern science. Thus in opposition to Renan's thesis of incompatibility between Islam and modern civilizations, he maintained that Islam was in harmony with the principles discovered by scientific reason. "Islam was the one true, complete and perfect religion, which could satisfy all the desire of the human spirit[7]. He emphasized the reinterpretation of Islamic doctrine within the basic structure of Quran and the Tradition of "Salaf" to cope with modern problems and new challanges, to overcome the "Stagnation" within the Muslim Societies. "To refuge to do this is to be guilty of stagnation or imitiation and

6. Adams, n. 3, p.9.

7. Haurani, n.4, p.123.

these are enemies of true Islam just as materialism
is an enemy".[8]

It is because of his radicalism, his Islamic
justification for the over-throw of corrupt monarchical
Muslim rulers, his rejectionism of Western political,
economic and social order and his image of indefatigable
fighter against Western imperialism that since the
late 1960's Afghani, the sage of East; has been the
object of particular attention and controversy in both
the west and the Islamic world, particularly in Egypt.[9]

Although Jamaleedin Afghani travelled widely
from India and Afghanistan to Istanbul, Cairo, Paris and
and London, it was in Egypt where his influence has been
most far-reaching. He became a most vital element in
the Egyptian repository of nationalist symbols. He
shares that quality with Salah-al-Din and Muhammad
Ali, though for different reasons. Where Salah-al-Din
links Egypt with the Arab world in common struggle against
the West and Muhammad Ali Symbolizes the dawn of modern

8.   Hourani, n.4, p.127)

9.   Rudi Mathee, "Jamal-Al-Din Al-Afghani And The
    Egyptian National Debate" International Journal
    of Middle East Studies, vol. 21,no.2, May 1988,
    p. 151.

Egypt, Jamaleedin Afghani combines Egypt, the
Arab world and the Islamic community, in a self-
image that traces Egypt's modern national identity to a
ninteen century story of renewal and resistance.[10]
Thus he has been rightly characterized as embodiment
of synthesis of three elements - religious feeling,
national feeling and European radicalism.[11]

During his eight year of Sojourn in Egypt
(1871-79), Jamaleedin Afghani delivered lectures at al-
Azhar university, held extended conversations with both
students and teachers on how the revival of Islam could
be achieved through an application of Philosophy to
religion, modern education and above all, unity under
a strong leadership in order to preserve the political
freedom of the Muslim world against the menace of
European imperialism. In the process, he greatly impressed
upon the young journalists like Adib-Ishaq, Ibrahim al
Laqqani and Abdullah al-Nadini as well as younger
Azharites like Muhammad Abduh and Saad Zaaglul for
the necessity of reform as the basis of national
solidarity and as the only way to strengthen their
position against European encroachment and control.

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10.   Ibid. p. 153.

11.   Hourani, n.4, p.108.

He became a leader of al-hizb al-Watani, a secret
society of some 300 young Egyptians who were discon-
tented with the mal-administration of the Khedive
Ismail and with ever-increasing hold of Europeans
over that country.[12] He headed a delegation o f Egyptians
to the French Consul general to demand the deposition
of Ismail.[13] He even proposed to Muhammad Abduh that
Ismail should be assassinated![14].

However, his preaching about the rational-
scientific reform of Islam earned Afghani the charge
of agnosticism. Fearful of his revolutionary ideas
and his anti-British sentiments, Tawfiq Pasha expelled
Afghani from Egypt in 1879.

Indeed Afghani's Pan-Islamism had succeeded in
creating the Muslim - consciousness against the external
danger of European colonialism. As Adams quoted Michel
saying - "Wherever he went, he left behind him a hot
bed of contention and it can be said without exaggeration
that all the movements of national emancipation, of

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12.   Sylvia G. Haim, eds., Arab Nationalism : An
        Anthology (London 1976), p.8.

13.   Ibid.

14.   Ibid.

reaction against European enterprise,... have their origin directly in his propaganda.[15] Thus he was a primemover not only in the Orabi Pasha revolution in Egypt in 1881-82 but also in constitutional experiments launched by Turkey in 1876 and Persia in 1905.

Muhammad Abduh And Islamic Modernism

Shaykh Mohammad Abduh, an Egyptian, was the principal disciple of Jamaleedin Afghani. For a while, he even collaborated with Afghani in publishing al-Urwahat Wuthqua - whose purpose was to create a united political Islam against the cheristian West. But soon, particularly after having experienced West during his brief exile (1882-1888), he abondoned the means of "political revolution" in favour of gradual legal-educational reform to ameliorate the existing condition of Islam and to achieve the 'moral unity', as distinct from 'political unity' of Jamaleedin Afghani, of Islamic Ummah. His brand of legal-educational reform, which was to remain within the basic structure of Islam as

15.   Adams, n.3, p.13.

grounded in the Holy Quran and in the saying of Four
Rightly Guided Caliph (Salaf), Widely came to&known
as Islamic modernism - which stands for the synthesis
of western political and scientific values and Islamic
traditional ethos.

As different from Jamaleedin Afghani, Muhammad
Abduh was throughly nationalist and deeply rooted in
the tradition of his own country.[16] He was more
concerned with the Arab nationalism, particularly with
the question of Egyptian independence. His "Pan-Islamism"
was limited to the linkage of national - political
plurality with spiritual function of Caliphate. "There
should be a chief of our Egyptian nation, acting under
the religious sovereignty of the Caliphate."[17]

Abduh saw a need to reconcile and reunite the
two main strands in Muslim and Egyptian thinking:the
traditional, which offered stagnation, Slavish
imitation of Muslim tradition and resistance to change;
and the modernist/secularist, which offered uncritical
acceptance of western ideas and culture almost to
the exclusion of indigenous culture. He overcame this

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16.   Hourani, n.4, p.156.

17.   Ibid. p.156.

crisis by linking the process of change with the
principles of Islam [18]   and by insisting
the need of infusion of western science and technology
into the traditional - Islamic thought. Explaining
the secrets of phenomenal development of West, he says,
"We see no reason for their progress to wealth and
power except the advancement of education and the
Science among them. [19] Thus, unlike the secular
positivists in Europe, who sought to replace theological
religious doctrine with a rational scientific inter-
pretation of universal pheno mena, he insisted upon
retaining the essentially Islamic character of Egyptian
society while at the same time permitting it to accept
the benefits of a secular ethic to guide its social
and political conduct.

Abduh wished simultaneously to defend Islam
and to reconcile it with modern science. The key to
his defense of Islam was a distinction between what
was essential and unchanging in it and what was
inessential and could be changed without damage. Thus
in opposition to Antun, who took stand that Islam had

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18.   Ibid, p.139.

19.   Adams, n.3, p.39.

killed the philosophic spirit, Abduh held that the only real infidel is he who closes his eyes to the light of truth and refuses to examine rational proofs and said. "Islam... is... the friend of all rational inquiry and all sciences."[20] He went further, saying that "Islam is above all a religion of reason and belief in the existence of God is based upon reason."[21] In fact his efforts to create a symbiosis between the Islamic scriptures and modern rationalism was to produce a synthetic but viable social Philosophy which would permit the conscious formation of a modern social and political reform programme."[22]

As an influential member of al-Azhar, a member of the Ulama class, a well known writer, teacher, and finally a Mufti (1899-1905) he could influence policy and public opinion in three crucial areas of Egyptian society. First, he sought to improve the quality of the written Arabic language both through his editorials and articles in the Gazette and his lectures on Arabic composition and grammar at Dar-al-Ulum Teachers College. Second, he sought to reform the curriculum and

20.   Hourani, n.4, p.148.

21.   Adams, n.3, p.129.

22.   P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (London, 1969), p. 185.

administration of the Azhar educational complex.
Third, he sought a reform of religious doctrine,
practice, and the legal application and interpretation
of the religious law, the Sharia. Thus he invoked the
notion of ijitihad i.e. the right of the individual
to interpret and reinterpret the rules of Sacred Law
in the light of changed condition. Indeed, in his
capacity, as the Mufti, Abduh applied his reformist
ideas to the interpretation of the Sacred Law and Specific
Islamic practices viz. the wearing of hats and
European clothes, food rites, depositing money in
Postal Saving Banks which yield interest and so on.[23]
It was largely as a result of his efforts that the
government created in 1895 an Administrative Council
for the Azhar on which Abduh served. The Council was
responsible for both the academic and administrative
supervision of the Azhar. The promulgation of a curriculum,
the choice of texts, the establishment of a central
liberary, and the setting of examinations were to be
supervised by this council.[24]

Similarly, as Mufti of Egypt he prepared reports
on the better education and training of judges, the

23. Majid, Khaudri, The Political Trends in the Arab
    World : The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics
    (Baltimore, 1962) p.62.

24. Vatikiotis, n.22, p.186.

reform of legal rules to meet the needs and interests
of changing society, in short; to ensure that the
courts should seek to render justice in litigation
rather than merely to apply the letter of law. In his
attempt to identify certain traditional concepts of
Islamic thought with the dominant ideas of modern Europe;
Abduh equated 'mashala' with 'utility', 'Shura' with parlia-
mentry democracy and 'ijma' with public opinion.[25]

Eventhough the question of the reformation of
Islamic doctrine remains unresolved, Abduh's reformist
activities had a lasting effect upon latter generations
of Egyptian leaders. Assessing the impact of Abduh,
A. Hourani writes, "He was to become a more systematic
thinker than his master and have more lasting influence
on Muslim religious and political thinking, not only
in Egypt but far beyond."[26] This blend of modernist
and reformist thought also inspired the Salafiyya
movement in Egypt, the Arab Middle East and North Africa.

Muhammad Rashid Rida and the Salafiyya movement

Muhammad Rashid Rida, the most devoted disciple
of Abduh and his biographer, stands out as the founder

25. Hourani, n.4, p.144.

26. Ibid. p. 130.

of the Salafiyya movement, so called because of their
adherence to the guidance of <u>al-Salaf-al Salih</u> (the
Pious elders). He found the solution of decadence
of Islam in the return to the simple doctrine and
practices of Islam as interpretated and understood by
the elders of Islam. "Muslim should return to the
practice of the early days of the first four <u>Caliphs</u>,
whose <u>Sunnah</u> together with his own <u>Sunnah</u>, the Prophet
Commanded, Muslims to hold fast to, and they should lay
aside everything that has been introduced into Islam
that is contrary to that practice."[27]

At the outset of his career, Sayyid Rashid Rida
sought only to implement the same reformist programme
as formulated by his master Abduh which was :-

(i)   The Purification of Islam from corrupt influences,
particularly the superstitions and excessesof various
Sufi orders,

(ii)   The reform of Muslim higher education to adapt it
to the modern age,

(iii)   The reinterpretation of Islamic doctrine in the
light of modern thought and,

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27.   Adams, n.3, p.191.

iv) the defence of Islam against European influence and
Ch. ristian attacks. However, while Abduh's primary
concern was the third point, Rashid Rida concentrated
his most intense attention upon the fourth. Nothing
is more dangerous, Rida argued, than the desire of the
nationalist westernizers to replace the sentiments
of Islamic solidarity with national and racist pride.[28]

The journal Al-Mannar, which Rida founded in 1897
and edited until his death in 1935, served as an organ
of the Salafiyya movement which he also headed.
Although Al-Mannar disseminated the views of a progressive
but orthodox Islam, it was distinctly influenced by
the rationalism of the Abduh's theology especially as
developed in his 'Essay on the Onenese of God'.[29]
In fact, it began as a vehicle for the propagation of
the Islamic views of Shaykh Abduh. It called simultaneously
for the reform and improvement of the Islamic community
everywhere and the political rally of Muslim around
their heritage. It hoped for the solidarity of an Islamic
bloc of nations. As Adams wrote, "the Central motive
behind the publication of Al-Mannar was a thorough
reform of the religion of Islam to attain the ideal of

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28.   Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of a Political
          Community (London, 1961), p.82.

29.   Valikiotis, n.22, p.187.

unity of Islam under one Caliph".[30] It rejected the revolutionism of Afghani and differed from Abduh's modernism in his insistence on Islam as religion and legal system - the basis of polity, his extent of support to the institutions of Caliphate and his greater attachment to Traditions which promoted him to formulate even more precisely the very principles that rendered those Tradition no longer adequate for the ever growing demands of succeeding generation.[31]

Rida took an important part in Islamic politics and attended the Islamic conference of Mecca in 1926 and Jerusalem in 1931. He bitterly denounced the Kemalist reform, particularly, the abolition of the Caliphate and led a polemical war against .. liberal secluralists like Abd al-Raziq and Taha-Hussain. He even declared the latter's work on "Pre-Islamic Poetry" as an act of heresy and demanded his expulsion from Egypt. On the other hand, he welcomed the Wahabi conquest of the Hejaz and the holy cities and said - "Ibn Sa'ud indeed was maintaining and defending the essential principles of Sunnism better than almost anyone since the first four Caliphs."[32] In fact, the

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30. Adams, n.3, p.187.

31. Khoudri, n.23, p.69.

32. Hourani, n.4, p.221.

Salafiyya came to provide the major opposition to
secularism in the 1920s and 1930s in politics, social
reform and nationalist programmes. However in the face
of nationalist movement led by Saad Zaghlul and the
destruction of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924, the
followers of Salafiyya were compelled to incorporrate
an Arab eth nic-national idea into their Islamic movement
in order to accommodate themselves with secular nationalism
to which they were originally opposed.[33]

Even though the Salafiyya became, in t he first
quarter of this century, the spokesman of Islamic conser-
vatism in Egypt and the neighbouring Arab countries
that were succumbing to more secular views in politics
and socio-economic organization, Rida was perhaps
socially more successful than his teacher Abduh. And
although he and his followers were no more than a little
group of the first reformers and a few of the later
generation,[34] his work had a great impact upon educated
Muslims in convincing them that Islam could have social
significance. Rida himself established an Islamic
organization called "Society for Propaganda and Guidance",

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33.   Haim, n.12, pp.25-8.

34.   Adams, n.4, p.204.

in the form of school at Cairo in 1912 with the objective
of improvement in the method of Islamic teaching and
imparting religious training and for counteracting
the activities of Christian mission in Muslim lands.[35]
Indeed, the Salafiyya gave impetus to the founding of
more modern Islamic organizations with socio-economic
reforms programme. Thus, the founding of the YMMA
(The Young Men's Muslim Association), in 1927 as a
social, athletic and cultural counterpart of the YMCA
and its Journal of Muslim Youth, founded in 1929 under
the direction of Ahmad Yahia al-Dardiri, were not only
an antidote to the religious indifference of a rising-
Europeanized urban generation but also a social, and
intellectual - albeit unsuccessful - retort to the
secular liberalism of the times. The Salafiyya inspired,
among certain groups of educated Muslim, a purposeful
and socially significant Islamic faith and sentiment.
It was none than Shaikh Hassan al Banna who upon the
death of Rashid Rida, took over the publishing and
editing of Al-Mannar.

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35.   Ibid., pp. 195-8.

Hasan al Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood

The society of Muslim Brothers (Jamaiyyat al Ikhwan al-Muslimin), - Commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Ikhwan, is the first militant and activist religio-political movement in the modern history of Egypt which has successfully managed to politicize Islam since its inception in late 1920s despite the brutal suppression by the Egyptian regimes. The society was founded by Hasan-al-Banna in 1928 in the Suez Canal zone city of Ismailiya along with the six members of British Camp labour who came to him having feeling of resentment at their inferior cultural, social, and economic position as compared to Britishers.[36] The motive behind the establishment of Ikhwan was to create an ¡Islamic Order" - based upon the following three principles :-

(i)   Islam ((in its totality as Islam) complete unto itself and as the final arbiter of\ life in all its categories,

(ii)   An Islam formulated from and based on its two primary sources :- the revelation in the Quran and the Wisdom of the Prophet in the Sunna,

(iii)   an Islam applicable to all times and to all places.[37]

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36.   Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers. (London,1969), p.222.

37.   Ibid., p.14.

Thus, the Brothers saw themselves clearly in the line
of the modern reform movement identified with the
names of Jamaleedin Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and
Rashid Rida and like them the Brothers also sought
to imbue the present with some sense of the part and to
redefine the past in terms meaningful for the present.[38]
But, although the Brothers shared their (particularly of
Abduh's) perception of simplifying Islam' and educational
reform' as the basis of Muslim progress, they differed
with them in the spirit and mood. As one Brother said
"Our message mean, Jihad, struggle and work,... it is not a
philosophical message"[39] Hasan-al-Banna himself defined
the movement as "a Salafiyya message, a sunni way, a sufi
truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a
cultural educational union an economic company and a
social idea."[40]

In Hasan-al-Banna's view the ills which had befallen
Egypt - and indeed the entire Muslim world - were the result
of Centuries of corrupt practices, innovations and deviations
combined with political, cultural, religious, legal and
economic imperialism, which had an external and internal
form. More precisely, he found the 'illness' of Egyptian

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38.   Ibid, p.321.

39.   Ibid, p.326.

40.   Ibid., p.14.

society in the disunity resulting from the political
disputes between the Wafd and the Liberal constitutional
Party, the drift away from Islam to apostasy and
nihilism; opposition to tradition and orthodoxy; the
current of secular thought in the newly organized Egyptian
University, secular and libertarian societies; and the
widespread circulation of books, newspapers and magazines
which were overtly anti-religious or irreligious.[41]
To escape this un-Islamic state of affair', Banna advocated
the return to the original and simple doctrine of Islam
as grounded in the Quran and the Tradition.

Aided by such factors as British colonialism,
political instability, economic hardship aggravated by
the First World War, the economic depression and the
Second World War, the cultural-lag and finally the
'Zionist threat', the Ikhwan spread very rapidly all over
Egypt. Local branches increased from 4 in 1929 to 2000
in 1949 and membership rose up to 600,000 in the period
of 1946-48.[42]   As society spread and came into conflict
with opposing forces in the country, it moved towards
growing militancy and political action. Hamid Enayat
marked out the 'zionist threat' to the Arab land in Palestine'

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41.   Ibid, p.4.

42.   Ibid. p.328.

as the greatest single factor which encouraged Banna
to turn society into the political organization.
"The Arab general-strike of 1936-9 provided the society
with an unprecedented opportunity to relinquish; its
pious campaign of 'Propaganda, communication, and
information' in favour of political activism."[43]
Thus, having realized the necessity of the acquisition
of political power to attain the goal of creation
of "Islamic Order", the Muslim Brotherhood under the
leadership of Banna initiated a series of programmes for
the reform and development of the political system; a
new Islamic constitution, the abolition of political -
parties, new electoral procedures, an overhauling of the
machinery of government and so on. Simultaneously, it
also advocated educational, moral and economic reforms
and sought to establish a number of practical society-
funded enterprises to provide for member's needs and to
demonstrate the effectiveness of Islam as a total system -
catering for all the spheres of human life. These
factors and Brotherhood's active opposition to European
(particularly British) imperialism and their 'Worldy
consideration of bread and status[44] explain the undeniable

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43.   Hamid Enayat, <u>Modern Islamic Political Thought</u>
       (London, 1982), p.85.

44.   Mitchell, n.36, pp.327- 8).

mass appeal of the society, despite the fact that the acti-
vists were predominantly urban and middle class. Indeed,
by the end of 1940's the Brotherhood emerged as a power-
ful contender for political power and posed a serious
challange to the semi-liberal-secularist regime.
Fearful of the possible coup d'etat by the Ikhwan, the
government not only dissolved the society of Muslim
Brothers in December 1948 on the charge of 'consiptracy
against the state' (as evidenced by the assassination of
Judge Khazindar in March, the confiscation of arms on
Fraghali's izba and other violent activities) but resorted
to extra-legal means by assassinating Hasan-al-Banna, the
founder of Muslim Brotherhood, in 1949. Commenting on the
eventof dissolution, the organ of the Sa'dist government,
Akh-irsa'a said that "the government had regarded the
society as its strongest opponent. It was not just a
party but rather resembled a state with its armies,
hospitals, schools, factories and companies."[45] In
retaliation to Muslim Brother's dissolution, an Young
Veterinary student and a member of the Brotherhood Killed
the Prime-Minister Nuqrashi Pasha.[46] The four famous
court cases associated with the Violent activities of

45.   Ibid, p.66.

46.   Ibid. p.67.

society and which shook the very existence of the
organization were the Jeep case, the Nuqrashi murder case,
the cells case and the Hamid Juda case.[47]

But it does not mean that the society was
primarily a violent and terrorist organizations. In fact
arms, training and literature on weapons and warfare
only showed the militant interests of the society in the
defence of Egypt, Arabism and Islam against Britain and
Zionism.[48]   Enayat Hamid also commented, that the stresses
and frustration caused by the war and the Arab defeat
of 1948, incited the activist to fresh violence inside
Egypt, but most of the blame for this was put on the
Brothers.[49]

After the assassination of Banna in 1949, the
moderate wing of the society tried to retrieve its legal
status by electing as its leader Hasan Ismail Hudaybi,
a judge of more than twenty years standing and an outspoken
opponent of violence and terrorism - and an antagonist
to the 'Secret-apparatus' of the Muslim Brotherhood.
"There is no secrecy in the service of God. There is no
secrecy in the Message and no terrorism in religion."[50]

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47.   For details, see Ibid, pp.72-75.

48.   Ibid., p.76.

49.   Enayat, n.43, p.85.

50.   Mitchell, n.36, p.88 .

The court restored the legal status to society and on
18 December 1951 the government released its confiscated
property including its press and all its building.[51] However
under Hudayabi's leadership the society had become 'a
party of aristocrats, a movement of words, not of action.'[52]
But this was a temporary diversion, and the militants soon
took over again.

In 1952, the Free officers revolution took place
leading to the abolition of monarchy. The Brothers
supported the Free officers' revolution in the hope that
they would transform the 'Islamic ideal' into reality.
Earlier they came into contact with each other at
the Battle of Faluzah where the Brothers helped to indoc-
trinate the Free officers and the latter helped the
Brothers with military education.[53] However, the honeymoon
between them was bound to be shortlived because of the
following reasons:-

Firstly, there was a deep personal antipathy
between Nasser and the Supreme Guide of Muslim Brothers,
Hasan Ismail Hudaybi. Secondly, RCC (Revolutionary
Command Council) rejected the name of Hasan al-Ashmawi
and Munir-al-Dilla as Brothers' representation in the

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51.   Ibid., p.84.

52.   Ibid, pp.116- 7.

53.   Ibid., pp. 89, 99.
        also Anwar. el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (London,1978),
        pp.22-4.

new cabinet to be formed by the Free Officers group.
Thirdly, the RCC-sponsored Liberation Rally, which was
to perform the function of regime's 'civil security force'
was perceived by Brothers as a counterforce to under-
mine the Brother's position of 'Civil protector'.
Fourthly, both had their base among industrial labourers,
peasants and urban middle class. The RCC did not like
the presentation by Muslim Brothers of their programme
of radical socio-economic and agrarian reform to the
people - chiefly aimed at undermining the young revo-
lution's popularity. Indeed, the Brothers' reformist
programme was almost similar to the reforms undertaken
in later years by Nasser's regime .[54] Fifthly, the RCC
refused to bow before the Brothers' demand of the Islam-
based constitution. And finally, the RCC itself
increasingly began to associate with Islamic quality
and started legitimising its policies in the name of
Islam which led one scholar to remark that "the military
leaders were moving toward a religious solution which
had eluded the Ulama, Islamic reformers such as Muhammad
Abduh and Rashid Rida, the Ikhwan and the Secular -
liberal nationalist. The state itself would assume res-
ponsibility for the revival of Islam."[55]

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54. See,C.P.Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt:
      The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. (The Hague,
      1964,) pp.195-202.

55.   Daniel Creeelius "The Course of Secularization
         in Modern Egypt" in John L. Espisoto,(ed.): Islam
         and Development: Religion and Socio-political
         change. (Newyork 1980) p.65.

Thus, impatient with the slow pace of reform
and suspicious of the Officers' Secular intention, a
brother and member of secret organization, Mahumud
Abd al - Latif attempted to assassinate Nasser while
he was addressing some 10,000 workers in Alexanderia
on 26 October 1954. The events providedagolden opportunity to Nasser to do away with both Naguib* and
the society. Along with the dissolution of society,
several of its leaders and activities were executed
or condemned to long terms of imprisonment.[56]

The Muslim Breth ren could resume its
political activities on full-scale only in the wake of
release of Sayyid Qutub in 1964 - the radical ideolouge
of the Muslim Brotherhood who was elected to the Brothcren's
leadership council in 1952 and was named head of the
department of the Propagation of Islam.[57] But it does
not mean that there were no activities of the Brother-
hood during the intervening period of a decade. In fact
the society of Muslim ladies led by Mrs. Zaynab al-Ghazali

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56. **For** details See, Mitcheel, n.36, pp.151-62.

57. Gilles Kepel, **Muslim Extremism in Egypt : The Prophet and Pharoah**, (London,1985), p.41.

* Naseer also believed that Negdib was trying to come closer with Ikhwan to counter Nasser's position in Egypt.

asssumed the charitable task of providing for the released
Brothers. With the active participation of Mrs. Zaynab,
various study cells and Groups of former Muslim
Breth ren were established in Cairo, Alexanderia and
other provinces. She was also the prime link between
Sayyid Qutub in prison and the Breth ren. Thus by the
time the leaders of the Brotherhood began to be released
during early 60's wide network of Brothers' cells was
already re-established.[58]   Sayyid Qutub bitterly
denounced the Nasserite regime as 'un-Islamic' and
attacked the very ideological foundation of political
system. He also said that Arab socialism and any solidarity
based on clan, tribe, nation, race, colour and land
were 'rotten', according to the Prophet.[59]   In
fact, by extending Maududi nation of   Jahiliyya
(period of the ignorance and paganism in pre-Islamic
society) to all the existing regimes, - Muslim or non-
Muslim - Qutub equated the Nasserist state with pre-
Islamic barbarism - thereby placing the regime beyond
the bounds of Islam.[60]

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58.   Ibid. pp.29-30.
       Also see Eric, Davis, "Ideology, Social Class
       and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" in
       Said Amir Arjomand, ed; From Nationalism to
       Revolutionary Islam, (London,1984), p.153.

59.   Gabriel, R. War burg, Egypt And The Sudan :
       Studies in History and Politics (London, 1985)p.215,

60.   Kepel, n.57, p.27.

It was in the light of this background, that the
Nasseriteˌregime accused the Breth ren of once
again plotting to assassinate Nasser and to
overthrow the r egime and came down heavily upon
the Brethren in 1965-66 leading to the execution of
three leaders including Sayyid Qutub. Twenty six
were tortured to death.[61] But perhaps Kepel has rightly
commented on the motive behind the military's
crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood by Saying, "with the
fiasco of the Yemen expedition and the bulimia of a
state bureaucracy that devoured everything in sight
and succeeded only in reproducing itself - the
'new conspiracy of the Muslim Brotherhood' offered an
ideal scapegoat that would enable the leader to
reunite the people behind him."[62]

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61.   Ibid., p.215.

62.   Kepel, n.57, pp.31-2.

Chapter - III

REVIVAL OF ISLAM UNDER SADAT

Nasser sought to curb the political influence
of religion and narrow the autonomy of Islamic insti-
tutions by systematic smashing of the Ikhwan, confis-
cations of extensive Waqf lands, Secularization of
Schools and Courts and finally the supervision, subsi-
dization and the appointment of the personnel of the
main mosques.[1]   In contrast, Sadat sought to re-islami-
ze   politics and relaxed the state control over mosques
and religious societies despite his consistent advocacy
of seperation of religion from politics. Indeed, there
was a marked increase in the religious activities under
Sadat's regime ranging from apolitical Sufi order to
the religio-political Muslim Brotherhood. Thus the
registered members of the Supreme Council of Sufi
orders who have the privilege of participating in the
annual parades (procession) have tripled between 1970
and 1985.[2] During the same period the state-supported
mosques have more than doubled their number of religious

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1.   Morroe Berger, Islam in Egypt Today; social and
        Political Aspects of Popular Religion (London,
        1970), pp.44-61.
        Also see, Daniel-Crecelius "The Course of Seculari-
        sation in Modern Egypt," in John L. Esposito ed,
        Islam and Development : Religion and socio-poli-
        tical Change (New York, 1980), pp.63-5.

2.   Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic activism in
        1980's." Third World Quarterly vol.10,no.1-2,1988,
        p.639.

educational institutions while their students intake has more than tripled. Finally, the number of hours of religious programme (on radio and television) has quadrupled during this period. Publications issued by Al-Azhar, MRE and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA), which affirm the officially approved version of Islam, have also increased four fold.[3] Similarly,

Whereas the number of private mosques in 1970 was 20,000,by 1981 that number had more than doubled.[4] Alongside the Muslim Brotherhood, a host of small Islamic militant groups surfaced on the Egyptian political scene in the seventies. These included such groups as Munazzamat-el-Tahrir al-Islam (Islamic Liberation Organization) founded by Dr. Salih Sarriya, Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight) group - founded by Shukri Mustafa and responsible for the assassination of the Minister of Endowment in July 1977, Shabab Muhammad,Hizb al-Tahir al-Islam (Islamic Liberation Party), al-Jihad (Holy-War) - the group responsible for the assassination of Anwar-al-Sadat and Jund al-Allah (God's Soldier) and so on. Thus, there are ample evidences to suggest that Islamic revival had taken place under Sadat's regime.

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3. Ibid., p.637.

4. Hamid Ansari, Egypt : The Stalled Society (Albaney; 1986); p.218.

At the outset, the Islamic militant phenomena
in Egypt is very much the byproduct of. Sadat's policy
of de-Nassirization. However, a few scholars have
also noted the 'factor of petro-dollar' of Conservative
oil states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well as
of Libya, in the growth of religious revivalism in
Egypt.[5] The 1967 Arab defeat had already discredited
the Nassirite system and exposed the myth of Pan-Arabism.
Besides, the War produced the economic hardship and
humiliation leading to inferiority complex. In short,
factors like financial dependency on Saudi monarchy,
reopening of the Suez Canal, return of the Sinai oil
fields, disenchantment with the limited supply of arms
by the soviets, growing conviction in the USA as peace
broker, need for the creation of a new social base and

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5.   See, Dessouki, "The Islamic Resurgence : Sources,
Dynamics, Implications in Ali.E.Hillal Dessouki
ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York,
1982), pp.22-3.
Daniel Crecelius, n.1, p.68-9.
Harier, R.Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival",
Middle East Journal, vol.24, no.1, 1980, p.7.

a) Daniel Pipes - " Oil Wealth and Islamic
   Perspective" in Dessouki ed., Islamic Resurgence
   in the Arab World, p.48

b) Daniel Pipes - In the Path of God: Islam and
   Political Power (New York, 1981), p.302.

a 'separate identity' to enhance his personal legitimacy etc. - were some of the factors that shaped the mental framework of Sadat which finally led him to embark on de-Nassirization measures. These were reflected in all fields - political, economic and foreign policy. At political level the de-Nassirization measures manifested in Sadat's Corrective movement. This was officially proclaimed to correct any deviations from the 23rd July revolution, but primarily intended to wipe out the leftist and Nasserist elements from government sector particularly Al-Sabri's group. It also led to the release of Muslim Brothers from Prison, closing of detention camps, complete cessation of the activities of the socialist Vanguard, repudiation of government power to seize private property, removal of Muhammad Hassanein Haykel, the influential editor of Al-Ahram, and replacing him by a rightwing journalist Ali-Amin, the granting of limited political freedom including the abolition of primary membership of ASU (Arab Socialist Union) for National Assembly candidacy and 'multi-party experiment' which replaced the ASU with a party of the right, a government party of the centre and a party of the left and so on.

At the economic level, Sadat enacted de-sequestration measure aimed at restoring the property and land to their original owners[6] the policy of economic

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6. See, Ansari, no.4, pp.179-84.

liberalization (infitah) i.e. the liberalization of
trade, an end to punitive taxation of high incomes and
on limits on land ownership, permission to foreign
banks to operate in Egyptian markets, reduction of the
public sector in favour of private enterprise etc.

In the realm of foreign policy, Sadat dissociated
Egypt from Soviet Union, expelled the soviet advisers
from the Suez zone in 1972 and from the rest of
Egypt in 1976 when the friendship treaty was abrogated
by the Egyptian Parliament. He even expelled Soviet
ambassador in 1981. Egypt came closure to conservative
oil states of the Gulf and finally aligned completely
with the United States and signed the peace treaty with
Israel ● In short, Sadat completely rejected the
ideal of "Pan-Arabism" in favour of "Egypt first".
It was this principle of "Egypt first" which finally
drove him to conclude the sinai disengagement. treaty
(1974) and to initiate peace process with Israel -
leading to the conclusion of the Camp David Agreement -
(1978) in disregard to the question of Palestinian
self-determination - which invited the Egyptian expulsion
from the Arab League and all major Islamic Organizations.

Eager to establish a power base of his own and
to counter the Nassirites and leftist oppositions,
Sadat extensively used Islam at both domestic as well

as foreign policy level. At domestic level, his
"Islamization Process" reflected in the release of
Muslim Brothers from prison, encouragement to Islamic
groups (Jama'at) on University compuses, legalising the
periodicals al Dawa (1972) - the mouthpiece of Ikhwan,
his projection of himself as "believing President",
the naming of October war as battle of 'Badr', often
finishing speech with Quranic quotations, making Sharia
'a major' source in the constitution of 1971 which
in 1981 became "the major" one, setting the parlia-
mentary committees to codify the Sharia, etc. While
commenting on giving the Islamic colour to the October
war, one scholar remarked that "Sadat's frequent reference
to the 'miracle of October, the miracle of the crossing
and the miracle of the Israeli Collapse, were reflections
of the metaphysical concept of a military power
imbued with faith."[7]

At foreign policy level, he sought Islamic justi-
fication for his visit to Jerusalem (1977) and his seperate
peace treaty with Israel (1979). He also succeeded in
getting the 'fatwa' from the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and

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7.   Raphael Israeli "The Role of Islam in President
      Sadat's Thought", The Jerusalem Journal of Inter-
      national Relations (Jerusalem), no.4, Winter 1980,
      p.5.

other Islamic institutions - upholding his peace-
initiative with Israel as true Islamic act.[8] He
employed Islam against the Soviet Union to the extent that he
propagated the Afghan Crisis as 'Islamic - Soviet
conflict.[9] On the other side, Sadat believed in the
commonality of interests between the Islamic states
and the West, oil in exchange for technology and the
common interest against the Soviet threat.[10] However,
Sadat's Islamic tone became more assertive in the
post-Camp David agreement. Indeed, the establishment
of the League of Arab and Islamic peoples in 1980 was
a reaction to Egypt's isolation from Arab and Islamic
countries in the aftermath of the Camp David accord.[11]
Similarly, when Islamic meeting decided to consider
Egypt's suspension from membership, Hasan al-Tuhami,
Egypt's deputy Prime Minister, denounced it as illegal,
claiming that Egypt was not only one of the most

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8.   Gabriel R.Warburg, Egypt And The Sudan :
      Studies in History & Politics (London,1985),p.210.

      Also see, Dessouki "The Limits of Instrumentalism :
      Islam in Egypt's Foreign Policy" in Adeed
      Dawisha, ed ; Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge,
      1983), p.90.

9.   Dessouki, n.8, p.91.

10.   Ibid.

11.   Ibid.

important pillars of Islam but had also contributed
most to the preservation of Islamic heritage.[12]

The above mentioned Islamic posture of Sadat does
not mean that he was a champion of Islamic cause. In
fact Sadat was a vehement critic of Ayatoulah Khomieini. "What
happens in Iran is a disgrace to Islam, to humanity,
and to human dignity... it is a crime against Islam,
irrational and Khomaini is involved in petty revenge",[13]
he said.

While Sadat's relaxation of police controls and
the encouragement he initially gave to Islamic revival
as a way of winning mass legitimacy and defeating the
threat from the left, gave Islamic groups the opportunity
to organize their activities without government moles-
tation, it was Sadat's economic and foreign policies
which mobilized the Islamic movement against the regime.
Though the criticism against Sadat's regime ranged
from left to right, yet it was the religious groups
which came to provide the main oppositional forces and
posed direct challange to Sadat's authority. The
Westernization and inequality spurred by infitah were
perceived as a threat to Islamic values and Islamic
social justice. Alliance with the United States and

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12. Warburg, n. 8, p.209.

13. Dessouki, n.8, p.90.

peace with Israel was seen as a Capitulation to infidel powers. It was against this background that one has to see the action of the small Islamic militant group Al-Jihad that killed President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981.

The limited victory in the October War, as signified by the title of 'Hero of Crossing', enabled Sadat to give a concrete shape to his programme of infitah. The idea of economic liberalization and political pluralization was finally incorporated in the October paper of 1974,though reaffirming the Nassirite idea that the public sector would remain the main pillar of the economy. A multitude of forces converged to produce this policy transformation. First was the Egypt's economic crisis in the early seventies. The country laboured under a staggering debt load, estimated at from $4 billion to $10 billion. In 1974, debt service absorbed 40% of export earnings.[14] The population growth surged ahead of a stagnant agriculture. The west appeared as the only viable source to provide the required food and economic aids. In fact, on many parts, the conviction grew that Nasserism had failed and the Egypt could not survive without an economic bailout which only the rich Arabs and the

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14. Reymond A. Hinnebusch Jr. Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian - Modernizing State,(Cambridge 1985), p.58.

West could provide.[15]   Secondly Sadat believed that
Egypt had a rightful claim to share in the revenues
accumulated by the oil producing countries in the
wake of 'Price-hike.'   The legitimacy of his claim
was expressed by the phrase "blood money". Indeed,
the Egyptian elites perceived a unique opportunity to
spark a new economic takeoff combining western technology,
Arab capital and Egyptian manpower.[16] Thirdly, and
finally, Sadat's own preference and political needs played
a critical role in the new policy. Most decisive, Sadat
viewed infitah as inseperable from his foreign policy.
He believed that the kind of American commitment needed
to recover the Sinai from Israel–was contingent on
Egypt's reintegration into the World capitalist system,
and that the greater the economic opportunities opened
to American investors, the more sympathetic the American
government was likely to be.[17]

The Law 43 of 1974, 118 of 1975, 97 of 1976 and
32 of 1977 were enacted to give a practical shape to the

15.   John Waterbury, "Egypt : the Wages of Dependency"
       in L.Udovitch, ed. , _The Middle East : Oil
       Politics and Hope_ (Lexington, 1976), pp.322-5 .

16.   Hinnebusch, n. 14, p.58.

17.   Raymond Baker, _Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under
       Nasir and Sadat_ (Cambridge, 1978), p.137.

policy of infitah-which, in essence, implied a cutback
in etatist controls permitting an opening of Egypt's
economy to trade and investment relations with the
informational capitalist market.[18]   The infitah did
produce a dramatic influx of financial resources. Arab
grants, in part a reward for Sadat's move away from the
USSR and his economic liberalization, soarred to $1.2
billion in 1974 alone. Egypt received about $7 billion
in aid from Arab states in the 1974-1977 period.[19]
As Egypt withdrew from the Arab-Israeli conflict, it
dropped off, but this withdrawal made Egypt eligible
for massive aid from Western resources, especially the
U.S.A. By 1982, Egypt had received $4.1 billion in loans
and $ 2.5 billion in grants from the U.S. and several
billion more in loans from western Europe, Japan and
international banks.[20]   Under Sadat's economic and foreign
policy, Egypt also recovered or developed several other
major domestic sources of revenue, namely the Suez Canal,

18.   Hinnebusch Jr. n. 14, pp.272-3.

19.   Marvin Weinbaum, "Politics and Development in
        foreign Aid : US Economic Assistance to Egypt,
        1975-82", Middle East Journal Vol. 37, no.4, 1983
        pp.637-8. .

20.   Hinnebuseh Jr., n.14, p.276.

petroleum (partly from recovered Sinai oil fields), and tourism. Together with worker's cash remittances return from these sources pushed foreign exchange earnings from $ 385 million in 1970 to more than $5 billion in 1980-1981.[21]

Thus Sadat indeed engineered a massive influx of capital which enabled the country to breakout of the stagnation of the 1967-1973 period. The growth rate increased from 5-6% in 1973-1978 to 8-9% in 1979-1980 - which was a higher rate of growth for a longer period than the etatist period under Nasser which averaged 6% between 1960 and 1965.[22] The tretiary sector (transportation and communication), trade and finance and industry grew rapidly at rate of 19%, 8% and 12%, respectively. The per capita income rose from 3% to 6% a year.[23]

However the infitah had its bad consequences also. The liberalization of foreign trade and foreign exchange set off an explosion in the importation of consumer goods, frequently luxury items, which ate up big chunks of Egypt's potential savings. Thus while about 70-80% of the investment in the sixties was financed by domestic savings,

21. Eliyahu Kanovsky,"Egypt's Economy Under Sadat in Colin Leagum and Hami Shaked, eds. ,Middle East Contemporary Survey (London 1981),p.364.

22. Ibid., p.365.

23. Hinnebusch, Jr. n. 14, p.278.

this was true of only about 14% by 1979.[24] The deficit

in its balance of payments grew from $250-300 million

per year in 1964-69 to around $1.7 billion in 1978.[25]

As a result Egypt's foreign debt grew from $1.6 billion

in 1970 to $12.5 billion at the end of the decade,[26]

the policy of infitah served the interest of "haves"

and created a wide gulf of economic inequality and

cultural dualism. As Ajami pointed out, the investors

under infitah were either from pre-1952 upper classes or

those who made fortunes in the Arabian Gulf in the fifties

and sixties.[27] It was the westernized, more educated

upper Strata which profited most by the policy of

infitah as agents of foreign firms, middlemen or imports.[28]

It is widely believed that some 2,50,000 held millionaires

emerged at the top of stratification system,[29] and

there was a disproportionate increase in the income

of the top income strata. Thus, by 1974, 2000 families

were reportedly receiving over $E 25,000 which by 1976

had increased to over 45,000.[30] On the other hand the

large majority of the lower middle class and lower classes

24.   Ibid. 277.

25.   Kanvosky, n. 21, p.363.

26.   John G.Merriam, "Egypt-After Sadat" Current History
       (Philadephia pa), vol.81, January 1982, p.8.

27.   Foud Ajami, The Arab Predicament : Arab Political
       Thought and Practice-since 1967 (Cambridge,1981) pp.495-6.

28.   Hinnebusch,Jr. n. 14, p.278.

29.   Yvonne Y.Haddad,"Islamic Awakening in Egypt" Arab
       Studies Quarterly (Belmont), Vol.9, no.2,Summer 1987,p.244.

30.   Waterbury , n.15, p.311.

suffered a decline in their living standards under
pressure of the rapid inflation unleashed by infiteh.
Dr. K.Mustafa, in a report to the 4th Annual
symposium of Egyptian Economists, Cairo, May, 1979
showed that 66.8% of Egyptian families spend less than
£E1 per day, at a time when a kilo of beans cost
35 piasters and a pack of cigarettes, 30 piaster
(£E=100 piasters).[31] Overall rural income inequality
also increased from 0.35 in 1974 to 0.46 in 1977-1978
- most likely the result of concentration, rent increases
and the inequitable effects of the crop rotation system.[32]
The employment absorping capcity of state declined from
80% before 1967 to 50% by 1974.[33]

Apart from this negative distributive conse-
quence of infitah it had also cultural consequence which
had more lasting impact on the emergence of Islamic
revivalism in Egypt in the seventies. According to
Amin, the economic growth of the 1956-1964 period was
a product of a 'remarkable psychological change' in
which a 'feeling of national pride' replaced the earlier

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31.   Hinnebusch Jr. n.14, p.308.

32.   Ibid., p.282.

33.   Ibid., p.62.

'feeling of inferiority to the foreigner.'[34] However
under infitah, by contrast, there was an unmistakable
reversion to the'colonized consciousness' which resulted
in the erosion of cultural bases of motivation. Thus
the attitude that "everything western was superior,
everything baladi inferior" was beautifully depicted
by the cartoonist Salah Jaheen showing - two Egyptian
marveling over the Great Pyramid : 'Fantastic it must be
imported'[35] Ayubi alleged that the corruption and
wheeler dealer mentality encouraged by infitah was
eroding honesty and the work ethies even among the
masses.[36] Similarly, commenting upon the erosion of
'cultural heritage', Amin Said - "Foreign Capital may
one day be nationalized, taxes made more progressive, and
land redistributed. What can never be corrected,however,
if it is allowed to proceed too long, is cultural dis-
integration."[37] The socio-economic problem was further
affected by the migration, from the rural to the urban

34. Galal Amin, "Some Economic and Cultural Aspects
    of Economic Liberalization in Egypt", Social
    Problems (New York), vol.28, 1981, p.439.

35. Hinnebusch, Jr. n. 14, p.286.

36. Nizeh Ayubi, "Implementation Capability and
    political Feasibility of the Open Door policy
    in Egypt in M.H.Kerr and E.S.Yassin, eds.,
    Rich and Poor States in the Middle East (Boulder
    1982), p.298.

37. Galal Amin, n. 34, p.440.

area. The population of rural areas declined from 81
percent in 1960 to 56 percent in 1976,[38]

Along with Egypt's identification with the
west and its peace with Israel, it was these negative
fallout(both economic and cultural) of _infitah_ which
contributed to the reemergence of historical process of
Islamic revivalism in Egypt in the seventies - which
finally turned out as a main oppositional force to the
very regime of Sadat which had lent its support to Islamic
forces in the early seventies.

All Islamic groups in Egypt seek the creation
of an Islamic state, headed by a pious Muslim, enforcing
Islamic law and social justice. For them, the solution
to Egyptian "ills" lies in the true adherence to
Quran and implementation of the Sharia. They share
a rejection of foreign ideologies - whether liberal
capitalism or Marxism - and attribute Egypt's disaster
to attempts to imitate these foreign models. Though
these groups range from those that are more conservative
and tolerant of the status quo to the new radical activist
groups which aim at violent overthrow of what they call
"_Jahiliyya_ System", they reflect the same demographic

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38.   Ansari, n.4, p.212.

and socio-economy features - i.e. predominantly students
and professional graduates and mainly from lower-middle
and middle class backgrounds[39]

Among the centrist faction of Islamic movement
were the Ikhwan and its various factions, the Jamaat
al-Islamiyya in Universities campus and the individual
Islamic preachers. Imprisoned, broken or exiled under
Nasser and amnestied under Sadat; most of the Brethren
avoided open confrontation in favour of the peaceful
evocation of Islamic goals and the rebuilding of their
movement. The dominant faction of Ikhwan led by the
third Supreme Guide and editor of Ikhwan paper, al-
Dawa; Omar Tilmisani, initially cooperated with the
regime and opposed the anti-regime violence of the radical
wing of the movement. Al-Dawa, whose circulation is
estimated to reach between 80,000 and

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39.   See a)   Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Islamic Militancy
                  as a Social Movement, the Case of Two
                  Groups in Egypt in Dessouki, ed, Islamic
         Resurgence in the Arab World (New York, 1982),
                  pp.125-130.

         b) Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "The Anatomy of Egypt's
            Militant Groups" : Methodological Notes
            and preliminary Finding, International
            Journal of Middle East Studies vol.12,
            no.4, December 1980, pp.437-40.

         Dessouki, n.5, p.23.

         Eric Davis, "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic
         Radicalism in Modern Egypt" in Arjomand Said
         Amir, ed., From Nationalism to Revolutionary
         Islam (London,1984) p. 140-3.

and 150,000,[40] came to represent the dominant ideological
orientation of Islamic movement in seventies in Egypt.
The Jamaa'at al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Associations)
which was reported to command the allegiance of 100,000
members or the one-fifth to one-third of the student
body,[41] came to dominate the student unions in the
seventies. For instance, in the 1978 union election
of Alexendria university, the militant Jamaaat captured
60 out of 60 seats in the faculty of medicine and engi-
neering, 47 out of 48 in agriculture, 44 out of 48 in
law, 42 out of 48 in the Pharmacy and 43 out of 60 in
science.[42]

Though ideologically and strategically they did
not seem to differ much from that of the mainstream of
Ikhwan, yet they attacked Muslim Brotherhood for its
willingness to reach a modus vivendi
with the authorities. Indeed, they were less circumspect
in their dissent from the status quo.[43] But as one
writer commented on the relationship between Ikhwan and

40. Hinnebusch Jr, n. 14, p.205.

41. Friedemann Buttner, "Political Stability Without
Stable Institutions:the Retraditionalizations
of Egypt's polity", Orient (Humburg), vol.20,1979,
p.66.

42. Anthony McDermott, Egypt : From Nasser To Mubarak:
A Flawed Revolution (London 1988), p.188.

43. Israel Altman, "Islamic Movements in Egypt ",
The Jerusalem Quarterly (Jerusalem), no.10, Winter
1979, pp.96-7.

Jama'at, -"despite their diversity they were rooted in the Ikhwan and many Jamaat members were either former members of the Ikhwan or came from the same social origin".[44] Perhaps for this reason, Sadat himself denounced the militant Jamaat as Secret army of the Ikhwan.[45] The individual Islamic Preachers denounced official corruption, immorality and the growing gap between rich and poor. The notable among them were blind Shaikh Imam, of Cairo, Shaikh Abd al-Hamid Kishk, Mahalawi in Alexendria and Hafiz salamah in Suez whose sermons in mosques or cassette tape attracted wide popular following in the traditional urban quarters. The Islamic militants were frequently in contact with them.[46]

At the radical end of Islamic movements were many clandestine small militant organizations. Among them three organizations viz., Shabab Muhammed, Al-Jihad and Al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra are well known. They are supposed to be break away groups from the main body of Ikhwan in the early seventies,[47] and have been alleged to enjoy the external support, especially of

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44. Ansari, n.4, p.214.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., p.218.

47. Ibrahim, n.2, pp.649, 653.

Qadhafi's Libya.[48] The first two are anti-regime
and the third is anti-established society in nature.

The period of voluntary cooperation between
Sadat's regime and the Islamic movement particularly
Ikhwan, lasted until 1976-77. Relations deteriorated
after the Camp David Accords of September 1978.
Till 1976-77 Sadat's portrayal of Himself as the
'believing President', his expulsion of the Soviet
advisers, his alignment with the more conservative Arab
States, his support for the Islamization of legislation,
the release of many Ikhwan leaders and the re-legalisation
of Al-Dawa, the Ikhwan's mouthpiece, pleased the
Islamic leaders. To this extent the Muslim Brother-
hood supported the Sadat's regime and supplied the
Islamic ideological backing to his policy of denegrading
Pan-Arabism. "The history text books taught in Egyptian,
Syrian and other Arab schools were in facts a war
against Islam. Arabism had replaced Islam in these
text books, while the Pre-Islamic Jahiliyya was being
extolled because of its Arabism, despite its barbaric
and anti-Muslim nature."[49]

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48. Altman, n.43, pp.97-9.

49. E.Sivan,"How Fares Islam?" The Jerusalem
    Quarterly, no.3, Fall 1979, pp.39-40.

In turn, the regime abstained from obstructing
the movement's capture of the student union in
1977 and blamed only the 'Nassirists and Marxists"
for the "food-riot crisis" of 1977 despite the
fact, that the ^{I}slamic groups were equally Vehement
in their criticism against Sadat's "Open door policy".
In fact Islamic groups were allowed to preach
and organize so long as they eschewed opposition
politics, violence and secret cells. But as western
penetration, the American alliance and Sadat's
accomodation with Israel became more overt, regime's
relation with the Islamic movement soured. The peace
treaty with $\bar{I}$srael and the break with Saudi Arabia
marked a watershed in the development of antagonist
relationship between the regime and the Islamic
movement.[50]

The Ikhwan denounced the new creed of 'Egypt
First' as a "pagan" Pharaonic approach"[51]. For the
Brethren, the historical clash between the Muslim
and the Jews are longstanding and insoluble in which
"every Muslim was religiously obliged to take part

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50.   Altman, n.43, p.88.

51.   Warburg, n.8, p.220.

in the Jihad against the Israeli threat.[52] The editor
of al-Dawa,Umar al-Tilmisani,denounced the agree-ment
as it did not explicitly compel Israel to withdraw
from Muslim Jerusalem and according to Islamic
law, it was a sin to leave any Muslim land.. in the
hands of Usurpers.[53]   Announcing the incompatibility
of peace treaty with the Quran, the Muslim Brother-
hood declared "Islamic history would pass the judgement
on those who were willing to sell their dignity and
beliefs for questionable materials.[54]   The present
scenario of the world appeared to al-Dawa as one
dominated by "Judeo-Ch ristian-Communist alliance"
against Islam and the Muslim.[55] In early 1979 they
even accused Sadat of collaborating with the United
States and Israel against all Muslim movements
including first and foremost the Brethern themselves
and alleged that Sadat had decided to implement a
secret report, prepared by Dr. Richard Mitchell for
CIA, which aimed at liquidation of leaders of Muslim

52.   Ibid, pp.94-'5.

53.   Ibid., p.221.

54.   Ibid.

55.   Dessouki, n. 8, pp.93- 4 .

movements.[56]   The government vehemently denied
the allegation, ordered the closureof the magazine
al-Dawa and accused Muslim Brotherhood of creating
'a state within a state.'

Back in 1974, the Sadat regime had a bloody
confrontation with a militant Islamic group known
as Shabab Muhammad, an offshoot of the Islamic
Liberation Party. Led by a Palestinian, Dr.Salih
Siriya, the group attacked the Military Technical
Academy in 1974 as a prelude to a coup d' etat against
the political leadership assembled at ASU (Arab
socialist Union) headquarters. But it failed and its
leaders were either executed or imprisoned.[57]

A second sign of divergence between the
regime and the political Islam took place during the
January 1977 food riot crisis. This crisis was
sparked by the steep rise in prices of popular commodities
resulting from the IMF - imposed cuts in government
subsidies. In the riots 79 protestors were killed,
800-1000 wounded and 1,500 jailed.[58]   Islamic elements,
protesting western cultural penetration and imported

56.   Warburg, n.8, pp.221-2   also see Gilles Kepel,
        Muslim Extremism in Egypt : Prophet and
        Pharoah (London 1985),p.118.

57.   For details, see Ibrahim, n.39a, pp.118-25.

58.   Hinnebusch n.14, p.71.

immorality, burned down nightclubs and attacked
luxury shops.[59]   The Brethern denounced Sadat's
so called 'economic open door policy' - resulted
in the concentration of wealth among the 5% top
elite and acute austerity among the wider section
of the population at bottom, and · claimed that only
Islamic based economic system could increase productivity
and turn labour from a chore into a religious activity.[60]
In the summer of 1977, another major challange to
the regime came from a militant Islamic organisation,
al-Takfir Wal - Hijra - which was estimated to have
had 3000-5000 active members with cells in upper
Egyptian villages, mosques, campuses ánd in the
desert.[61]   Influenced by Qutub's notion of 'Jahaliyya',
the group led by Shukri Mustafa denied legitimacy not
only to the regime but to the whole social order
including the religious establishment. So alienated
was this group that it sought the complete with-
drawal from the 'Jahaliyya' society and even
attempted to create the "model communities" in the
desertinwhich all modern innovationswere rejected in
favour of return to natural Islamic simplicity. The

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59.   Ibid.

60.   Sivan, no. 49, pp.41-2.

61.   Merriam, n.26, p.6.

Sadat regime, however, soon uncovered the society,
arrested many of its active members and executed some
including Shukri Mustafa - following the groups
kidnapping and assassination of the former minister
of waaf, Shaykh Husayn al-Dhahabi.[62]

Sensing the potential of oppositional Islamic
force, Sadat's regime kept on rejecting the Ikhwan's
requests to form an Islamic political party, insisting
on the seperation of politics and religion. The
regime tried to contain rising Islamic opposition
first through overt Islamic symbolism and the
sponsorship of Islamic legislation. Failure of these
mechanismsled Sadat to resort to coercive controls
on Islamic political activity. Thus, in November 1979,
the regime proposed the formation of 'Supreme Muslim
Council' which was assigned the function of 'supervision
and integration' of all Muslim associations and
institutions and was expected to "overcome the growing
opposition to Sadat which had begun to raise its
head among the Muslim Bretheren and other extremist,
religious and subversive groups."[63] In 1980, he suspended

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62.   See Kepel, n.56, pp.96-8.
       Also Ibrahim, n.39b, pp.442-3.

63.   Warburg, n.8, p.204.

all Islamic associations in the universities,
accusing them of Promoting religious fanaticism,
extremism and communal unrest.[64]

However, encouraged by the Iranian revolution,
the Islamic movements in Egypt - spread and intensified
its activities. The Ikhwan and other militant Islamic
groups vehemently criticized the refuge offered by
Sadat to the Shah of Iran.   But it was al-Jihad, a
more militant and ideologically committed organization,
which posed the gravest threat to the regime's survival.
The group derives inspiration from its leader Mohammed
Abdel Salam Farag's work, al Faridha al-Gha eba (The
Absent Commandment).[65]   The Jihad group is by far the
bloodiest and most deadly in its confrontation with the
state. Despite the Preventive arrest of hundreds of its
members by the state in September 1981, it successfully
carried out the assassination of President Anwar-al-Sadat
on 6 October 1981. And, despite a second round up of
its members in the aftermath of the assassination,
the Jihad was able to storm the main police headquarters
in the Governorate of Assyut and kill or wound tens
of state security men.[66]

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64.   Dessouki, n.8, p.92.

65.   On Farag's view, See Michael Youssef, - Revolt
        Against Modernity : Muslim Zealots and the West,
        (Netherlands, 1985), pp.146-177.

66.   Ibrahim, n.2, p.651.

At this juncture it is important to ascertain·
the impact of Iranian revolution on the Islamic
movement in Egypt. It is true that success of Islamic
revolution in Iran and Khomini's rhetoric of "Neither
East nor West, Islam the Best" - have intensified the
course of Islamic movements throughout the Muslim World.
In the case of Egypt, it seems fair to speak that the
impact of revolution was confined to "the source of
inspiration" and the matter of strategy. Thus Ibrahim
has noted that it was in the light of the Iranian
example that the use of popular uprising as a mechanism
for toppling the regime was more seriously considered
in late 1978 and early 1979. Until then such organizational
weapons were perceived by the Islamic militants as
essentially "Communistic."[67] At his trial, Lt. Col. Abduh
al Zumur, an intelligence officer and military commander
of al-Jihad admitted that events in Iran taught him
that it was futile to recruit members of an underground
into the armed forces. The strategy must rely on an
uprising of the masses. "We learned from Iran that the
army and police cannot withstand a popular rebellion.[68]

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67. Ibrahim, no. 39b, p. 443.

68. Emmanuel. Sivan, Sunni Radicalism in The Middle
East And The Iranian Revolution "International
Journal of Middle East Studies vol.21, no.1,
Feb. 1989, p.25.

Although Muslim Brethren held a rally in Cairo in
February 1979 to celeberate Khomeini's accession to
Power,[69] al-Dawa ruled out the appropriateness of a
Khomeini type revolution for Egypt.[70] The late Supreme
Guide of Muslim Brethren, Omar al-Tilmisani, emphasized
difference between Sunni and Shia Islam.[71] Even though
several members of Al-Jihad had read Khomeini's 'The
Islamic Government', the ideas of the group were
based on 'The 'Absent Precept" a work by Jihad mentor
Abd-al-Salam Faraj, which was inspired by Ibn-Taymiyya,
the avowed enemy of both Mongol paganism and Shia apostasy.[72]
And during, the police interrogation, one of the four
assassins of Sadat said "to compare us to Khomeini
is to try to discredit the authentic Islamic regime
to which we aspire[73]. In fact the Egyptians themselves
are proud of their own Islamic heritage as stated by
one of the surviving leaders of the attack on the Technical
Military Academy, who said - "we believe that the Egyptians
are basically the most religious of all Islamic peoples.
They were so before Islam, from the time of the
Pharaohs. They have continued to be very religious.

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69.   Pipes, n.56, p.325.

70.   Altman, n.43, p.95.

71.   Shireen T.Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of
       Revolutionary Islam,"Third World Quarterly
       vol.10, No.1-2, 1988, p.743.

72.   Sivan, n.68, p.26.

73.   Ibid.

Egypt would therefore, be a good base to start the
world Muslim revival. All that the religious Egyptian
need is a sincere Muslim leadership.[74] It was this
inner conviction which had a decisive impact on shaping
the Islamic militant movement in Egypt.

The 1967 Arab defeat has proved to be a decisive
factor in the growth of religious revivalism as people
had lost faith in Nasserism. The Copts in Egypt are
no exception. The marked increase in their religiousity
can be seen in the reported appearance of the Virgin Mary
over the Churches in the suburb of Cairo in the immediate
aftermath of Arab defeat and in Shoubra (1968) where
fifteen people were reported to death.[75] In April
1969, a million of Egyptian Copts and Overseas Visitor
participated in a ceremony held to mark the first
anniversary of the apparition.[76]

In part, the coptic revival led by Pope Shenouda III
reflects a reaction to the parallel revival within
the Muslim population under Sadat's regime. In past
also, the Islamic revivalism had a direct bearing on the

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74.   Ibrahim, n. 39b, p.431.

75.   Mcdermott, n. 42, p.182.

76.   Ibid.

coptic revivalism. Thus the Sunday School Movement
of 1930's and 1940's was ostensibly a reaction to the
emergence of the Ikhwan. In protest against the
Brethren's demands of implementation o f Sharia, especially,
the hudud, and Sadat's making of Sharia "the major"
source of legislation, Shenouda ordered for an official
boycott of Easter services in the Cairo Cathedral on
31 March 1981 which coincided with Sadat's visit to
Washington.

Frequent clashes took place between the militant
Muslims and Copts throughout the seventies so much as
that Minya and Assuit (Copts Concentrated cities in upper
Egypt) were turned into centres of nearly constant anti-
government and anti-copt agitation. The June 1981
confrontation between the Muslims and the Copts proved
to be decisive for Sadat's regime. In September 1981,
the regime heavily came down upon the Muslim Brethren
and other militant Islamic associations, accusing them
of creating a state within the state. The crackdown
involved the arrest of some 1,536 persons, including
Omar Telmassani, the Ikhwan Supreme Guide, and Sheikh
Kishk - the blind Imam of Cairo Mosque, the closing
down of two Islamic Journals and the seizure of the
Brothers' funds and assets.[77] The regime also arrested

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77. Dessouki, n.8, p.92.

some 160 coptic members, placed the ban upon the Patriarchate's news sheet al-Karaza and the coptic weekly, Watani .POpe Shenouda was confined to a monastery in Wadi Natrun.[78]

Thus Sadat's policy and the revival of religious forces in Egypt not only led to growth of radical Islam but also radical coptic movements thereby under-mining not only the basis of the regime but also that of the Egyptian society itself.

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78. McDermott, n. 42, p.194.

Chapter - IV

ISLAM AND THE POLICY OF HUSANI

MUBARAK

The Plebecite held in October 1981 brought
Husani Mubarak at the helm of state's affairs. He
succeeded President Anwar-al-Sadat. With the ascendency
of Husani Mubarak as the President of Egypt, the nature
of relationship between the regime and the Islamic mass
movement entered into a new Phase.. It was characterized
by regime's greater tolerance of Islamic criticism and
Ikhwan's accomodation within the then existing Egyptian
Political System. Though continuing Sadat's policy of
infitah, peace with Israel and closer alliance with
the United States, Mubarak adopted different political
tactics from those employed during Sadat's presidency in
his dealing with the various moderate and radical Islamic
groups. Thus, whereas his predecessor, 'the believer
President' had muzzled all political expression while
giving full rein to Islamic groups, especially in the
Universities, in order to confront the Nasserist left
on the campus and elsewhere and force it into silence,
Mubarak encouraged political debate, authorizing
opposition parties and press which led one scholar to
remark that by the middle of the 1980's Cairo could
claim that given the destruction of Beirut and excluding
the 'offshore' Arab Press produced in Europe, it had
the liveliest and most varied Press in the Arab world.[1]

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1. Anothony McDermott, Egypt : From Nasser to
   Mubarak, A Flawed Revolution (London, 1988), p.76.

Having set Islamic discourse in the midst of
a pluralistic oppositional debate, the regime strove to
divide Islamic ranks by isolating the extremist from
the moderate and by encouraging the expression of
certain of its leaders in various organs of the Press.
In fact, the policy of isolating the radical militant
Islamic organizations; whom Mubarak dubbed as "terrorist
extermism", has been the hallmark of Mubarak regime
throughout the eighties. In meeting with Khaled
Mohemedin, head of Marxist Nassirist (NPUP), Mubarak
said-"The Fundamentalist will kill you before they
kill me" - stressing the common interest in combating
the militant Islamic threat.[2] More recently in January
1990 while speaking on the occasion of police day at the
police Academy in Abassiya, Mubarak cautioned the people
against the threat posed by "terrorist extremist"
to the Stability and the social fabric of the country
and appealed to all the national political parties to
fight against the threat of terrorist extremism.[3]

In short, Mubarak's approach has been a combination
of reconciliation with moderates and toughness with

2.   Mohammed Sid Ahmad, "Egypt, The Islamic Issue",
      Foreign Policy(Washington D.C.) no.69,Winter 87-88,p.28.

3.   Egyptian Gazette, 26 January 1990 .

those radicals who were threatening the country's
security.

It was in line with this approach that he adopted
the policy of caution and the 'selective' release of
political elite detained earlier. By the end of January
1982 he released many people including such figures
as, Hasanain Heikal, the old Wafdist leader Fuad Siraj
al-Din, eleven members of the Progressive Unionist
Rally, the Marxist economist Ismail Sabri Abdallah,
the Ikhwan leader Omar Talmasani, the owner of the
magazine al-Da wa, Salih Ashmawi and Sheikh Kishk,
the blind Imam of the Cairo Mosque. In January 1985 the
regime also annulled the decree confining Pope Shenouda
to his monastry at Wadi Natrun and allowed him to
return to Cairo to celeberate Coptic Christimas Mass
on 6-7 January. It is because of his limited political
liberalization measures that besides the semi-official
press-al-Ahram, al Akbar, and al-Gumhouriya, several
opposition Press including al-Liwa al-Islami, al-
Mukhtar al-Islami, al-I'tisam and al-Nur resurfaced
on the national scene. Al-Nur became the virulent
champion of the Islamisation of Practices and
mores. However the ban on al-Da'wa has not been lifted
so far. In fact the political freedom enjoyed by these

press was confined to the free debate and discussion
over the relevance of Islamic social custom - a
policy which regime aimed at creation of divisions
within the Islamic ranks. The President and his
policies were not to be exposed to direct criticism.
Thus the confiscation of 'The Thousand and One
Night's' Provoked numerous scandalized reactions in
the Press. Likewise, Egypt Air's decision on 22 March
1984 to forbid the consumption of alcholic beverages
on all its flights was held up to ridicule in the
regime's favoured weekly, al-Musawwar. Moreover,
intellectualslike Tawfiq-al-Hakim, Yusuf Idris and Zaki
Nagib Mahmud did not hesitate to attack the wearing
of the Veil or raise other issues considered taboo by
the partisans of Islamisation.[4]

The same factors which contributed to the prolifer-
ation of militant religious groups in Egypt during
Sadat's regime in the seventies were also at work
during Mubarak's regime in the eighties. In the
economic sphere, Mubarak continued Sadat's policy of
infitah - which further widened the level of economic
desparities between the top 5% elite and the mass.

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4. Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt :
Prophet and Pharoah (London, 1985) p.248.

Marvin has noted that by comparison the income of
the highest 5% dipped slightly to 17.4% from 17.5%
between 1960 and 1965 but increased markedly to 22% after
several year of Sadat's Policies.[5]   Investment in
productive activities has been steadly diminishing.
Thus the total share of fixed capital invested dropped
from 63.5% in 1973 when Egypt was at war, to 54.4% in
1983 when Egypt was at peace, with agricultural share
down from 46.9% to 35.5% and industry's share
remaining constant.[6]   In fact the fall in oil prices
during early eighties, the mounting external debt
which reached to ≴ 3.5 billion in mid - 1985,[7] combined
with the factor of growing population, produced a
severe economic crisis in Egypt with 1986 as the watershed.
At present, the Egyptian external debt is estimated at
about ≴40,000 million excluding loans from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe.[8]   On the other hand, the
'fat cats', i.e. the thousands of millionaires produced
by the infitah, are not shy about showing off their wealth,

5.   Marvin G.Weinbaun, "Egypt Infitah and the
       politics of US Economic Assistance" Middle
       Eastern Studies (London), vol.21, no.2, April
       1985, p.

6.   Richard U.Moench, "Oil, Ideology and State
       Autonomy in Egypt", The Arab Studies
       Quarterly, vol.10, No.2, Spring 1988, p.180.

7.   McDermott, n.1, p.79.

8.   Charles Tripp and Roger Owen, ed., Egypt Under
       Mubarak (London and New York, 1989), p.126.

with all its western trappings which contrasts sharply
with the poverty found in many parts of the country.

Similarly there is no change in the essentials
of Sadat's foreign policy - peace with Israel and
closer alliance with the United States. Though slowly
and gradually, Egypt under Mubarak has improved its
relation with the Arab World including Syria and the
PLO (Plastenian Liberation Orgaisation) Chairman Yasser
Arafat. In recent years, particularly since the
Palestinian National Council resolution on accepting
U.N. resolution 242, renouncing Violence and explicitly
recognising the right of Israel's existence, Egypt
has actively been offering its 'mediation' to secure
the legitimate rights of Palestinian Arabs. She
had already been voted back in OIC (Organisation of
Islamic Conference) in 1984, and more recently in the
League of Arab States, thereby regaining its 'lost' Arab
character. Egypt under Mubarak has also improved its
relation with Moscow as evidenced by the conclusion
of a five year trade agreement of Worth $ 855 million
in 1987. Moscow also gave Cairo 25 years in which to
pay them off at interest rates far below those required
by Washington for its arms sales.

But all these Egyptian gains have not been at
the cost of losing 'peaceful friendship' with Israel or
breaking alliance with the United States. Though
relations with Israel deteriorated in the wake of
latter's entanglement in Lebanon, that was not enough
for Egypt to break off its diplomatic relations with
Israel . She only withdrew her ambassador ffrom Israel
in protest against the massacre of the Palestinians
in the Sabra and Shatila camps near Beirut. Egypt, under
Mubarak, also faced very embarassing situation when
the US fighters forced down an Egypt Air Boeing carrying
the Palestinian hijackers in Italy in October 1985 and
also when USA bombed Libya in April 1986. Relation
between them did not deteriorate beyond the level of
verbal complaint.

Thus 'peace with Israel','Americanization of Egypt'
and the cultural and economic consequences of the infitah
continued to provide the environment which was conducive
to arouse the Islamic opposition to Mubarak's regime.
Indeed in many demonstrations against the Mubarak
regime, the slogan such as 'Sadat's Mafia' or 'Mubarak is
Sadat' sums up the prevailing antagonist state of
affairs in Egypt.

Despite the destruction of the infrastructure of
the Islamic movement in the repression of autumn

1981, the Muslim Brotherhood, the main body of the
Islamic movement in Egypt, managed to emerge as the
main opposition force to Mubarak regime in the eighties.
Encouraged by the conciliatory attitude of the ruling
regime, the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of
Omar Telmessani increased its membership and opted
for political pluralism and Parliamentary democracy as
the road to achieve their ideal goal of establishment
of 'Islamic Order', discarding the path of violence.

However, handicapped by the law of 114 of 1983,
which stipulated in Article 17 that any party whose
slate had not won a minimum of 8% of the Valid votes
at the national level could not be represented at the
People's Assembly, Brotherhood entered into alliance
with other parties in coalition arrangement for Parliamentary
elections. Thus in 1984 the Brethren formed an alliance
with the most secular party of Egypt, the Wafd; Winning
65 seats out of 450. It came second only to Mubarak's
National Democratic Party (NDP) and thus served as the
major opposition in the People's Assembly (Egyptian Parlia-
ment) for three years. However, because of antagonistic
ideologies, the alliance was bound to break and soon
Sheikh Abu Ismail withdrew from the Wafdist Parliamentary
group in 1985. In March 1986 the Brethren showed that
they were not just a formidable minority when more than
100 members of People's Assembly defied party boundaries

to sign a petition calling on the government to honour
its pledge to pursue further the issue of making
the Sharia the sole and binding source of law for the
country. The growing pressure of pro-Islamic force
in the parliament resulted in the abolition of 1979
Women's Right Law (also called Jihan's Law) in May
1985 which declared that Polygamy was legally harmful
to a first wife and automitically gave her the right
to divorce her husband.[9] Perhaps this concession
was a build-up to a calculated end to four years of
comparative benevolence by the government towards
outspoken religious opposition.

However the government's decision of indefinite
postponement of the application of the Sharia on 4 May
1985 provoked the strongest criticism against
Mubarak regime. Various individual Muslim preachers
and the Islamic groups started mobilizing the movement
against the very decision of the government. Among the
individual preacher, the two most prominent figures
were - Sheikh Ahmad al Mahallawi, the Imam of
Qa'id Ibrahim mosque in Alexandria and Sheikh Hafiz
Salama. However, it was the latter who embodied the

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9.   Mcdermott, n.1, p.200.

Islamicist confrontation with the regime in the
first half of 1985. Speaking from al-Nur mosque in
Abbasiya, Cairo, which had become the prime Islamic
stronghold, and a centre of pro-Islamic pronouncements
and criticism of the government, Salma announced in
June the plan of 'Green March' at the Presidential
residence to make certain the implementation of
Sharia. However, the proposed March was called off in
the face of strong security deployment. Salma was
arrested but soon released on the occasion of the
annual pilgrimage to Meeca.

It was against this background of rising
Islamic opposition forces that the government issued
a decree placing some 60,000 or all private mosques
in Egypt - under the supervision of the Ministry of
Waqf (religious endownments), which was also to
supply the Imams to preach more orthodox Friday sermons
than the politically inclined versions which had been
purveyed hitherto.[10]

In the 1987 parliamentary election the Brother-
hood shifted its alliance from Wafd to two small
parties - the socialist Labour Party (SLP) and the
Liberal Party (LP) and formed a new coalition called

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10.   Kepel, n.4, p.256.
        Also, Mcdermott, n.1, p.93, 201.

Islamic Alliance (IA). With the slogan - 'Islam is
the solution', Implementation of Sharia, was their
first priority. The IA won about 60 seats and
came second only to the pro-government NDP. While all
major parties, namely, the NDP and the Wafd registered
a net loss in votes cast in 1987 as compared to 1984,
the Brotherhood increased its number of seats from
seven to thirty-eight. In fact, the 1987 Parliamentry
election has clearly shown that a large number of
Egyptian became disenchanted with the "American
solution" and with "Infitah" and therefore opted for
'Islamic solution', symbolized by IA. As a dominant
partner in the IA, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as
the single largest legal opposition to the Mubarak
regimes. They continued on the path of moderation,
gradualism and constitutionalism to realize their
goal of 'application of Sharia' and the creation of
'Islamic order'. By the same token, the Brotherhood
has painstakingly distanced itself from the violence
oriented Muslim groups, such as Repentance and Holy
Flight (al-Takfir Wa al Hijra) and Holy War (al-Jihad).
However they never fail to point out that had the
state allowed its own organisation political rights,
these fanatic groups would not have flourished under-
ground.

In Eighties the Brotherhood has also changed
its position viz.-a-viz the Copts. In fact the
second demand of ten-point election plateform was
the unequivocal affirmation of the IA's desire for "full
equal rights and obligation between Muslims and their
coptic brothers"[11] And the only Copt who was put at
the top of a Party list and was elected in the 1987
election was with the IA.[12] Thus the Brotherhood
has gradually improved its relation with the Coptic
minority through the policy of accomodation.

Another Islamic Phenomena which has rocked
Mubarak's administration is the emergence of a host
of - Islamic economic enterprises like Islamic Banks,
investment companies, factories, large-scale farming,
agribusiness and so on. In Keeping with Brotherhood's
tradition most of these economic enterprises were
started by the original Muslim Brothers themselves in
the 1970's with the objective of establishing
concrete Islamic alternatives to the socio-economic
institutions of the state and the capitalist sector.
In the 1980's these enterprises, particularly the

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11.   Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism
       in the 1980s, The Third World Quarterly vol.10,
       no.1-2, 1988, p. 647.

12.   Ibid.

Islamic investment companies like al-Rayyan,came to
dominate the Egyptian economy so much so that the IMF
Warned the government that "any rescheduling of Egypt's
debt would be contigent on the government's ability to
control the Islamic companies whose assests was
estimated by the Middle East Times at £20 billion and
by Al-Ahali at £ 60 billion."[13]

Apart from the economic enterprises, the
Brothers are also engaged in educational and other
social services. Among the most Widely used facilities
of the Brotherhood are the medical services clinics
to be found in more than 20,000 non-governmental mosques,
many of which have operating facilities for minor surgery.
The Islamic clinics charge their clients a nominal
or modest fee for a generally better and more
compassionate service than their state-run-counterparts.[14]

It is alleged that the power of Ikhwan lies
in its support from these fundamentalist financial sources
and the Ikhwan's success in 1987 parliamentary election
owes much to the rise of "petro-Islam" i.e. the Saudis'
backed Islamic companies.[15] Since direct confrontation

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13.   Moench, n.6, p.179.

14.   Ibrahim, n. 11, p.643.

15.   Moench, n.6, pp.184-7, 190.

is too risky, Mubarak has chosen the strategy of
publicizing at every occasion the companies' financial
manipulations and ridiculing their pretence to being
Islamic.

The Islamic militant groups remained outside
the Egyptian political system and attacked the Muslim
Brotherhood for their accomodationist posture towards
the ruling regime. Even though Mubarak regime
tried its level best to control the violence of the
radicals by implementing the emergency laws and
other harsh measures including mass arrest, imprisonment
and torture, yet several militant groups including -h
al-Jihad managed to resurface on Egyptian scene in the
middle of the eighties and started putting pressure on
the government through the act of defiance and violence.
The militant Islamic groups remain powerful in university
campuses. In the student elections of November 1985
at Cairo University, candidates from "Islamic Societies"
won over 80% of the contested seats in the Law School,
70% of the seats in the school of Information sciences,
and 70% in the school of Arts and letters.[16] The
increase in militant activities resulted in the killing
of an Israeli diplomat in Cairo and of several Israeli
tourists in Sinai in 1985, as well as attacks and bombing

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16. Henry Munson Jr.,Islam and Revolution in the
    Middle East. (London 1988), p.82 .

incidents against night clubs, video shops, alcohol
stores etc. in 1986 and the assassination attempts on
the lives of two former ministers of the interior -
Hasan Abu Pasha, El-Nabawy Ismael and leading
journalist Makram M. Ahmed in 1987. In May, the
militants attacked the car of two American diplomats
- Dennis William, the US Embassy Security Chief and
deputy John Huckel. Besides, in October 1986 the security
authority claimed to foil a militant plot to storm
the state radio station in Alexandria and on 1 December
1986 the government accused the 33 Muslim extremeists
(which were to go on trial) with the charge of over-
throwing the state. In a few cities in upper Egypt,
namely, Assyut, Sohag, Menia and Bani - Souef, the
Islamic militant students have been reported to engage
in harassing the christian Copts. The government responded
to the 'militant threat' by arresting some hundreds of
Islamic militants.[17]

Despite the government's crackdown on militants,

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17. On militant activities and government
    responses, see,

    Macdermott, n.1, pp.88, 199, 201.

    Also, Ibrahim, n.11, p.651.

    Ahmed, n.2, p.22.

they are still in a position to rock the administration
by isolated violent incidents. Recently there was a
report in the paper that the Muslim extremist
(militants) have launched a terror campaign against the
Egyptian belly dancing, which they regard as anti-
Islamic.[18]

Thus, in Mubarak's Egypt, the Islamic groups -
moderate and the radical still exist in various forms- the
legal, semi-legal or underground. However it seems
that they are in a less powerful position t han in the
years preceding the assassination of Sadat. Indeed,
their capability for Islamic militancy as an eventual
challange to the state has weakened.

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18.   <u>Egyptian Gazette</u>, 4 February, 1990.

Chapter - V

CONCLUSION

The phenomena of Islamic resurgence has not
only revealed the inadequacy of the Marxist and non-
Marxist, models but also of secularism, based upon the
classic principle of the seperation of church from
state, to analyze and explain away the process of social
change in the Third World, of which the Muslim World
constitutes a substantial portion.   Under the liberal
capitalist and Marxists literature, religion is often
treated as an isolated reactionary force, a ritualistic
dogma, or a legitimising instrument of the political
system. It is seen as - an anathema to socio-politico
and economic development. Indeed, under the impact
of dominant western models many western as well as
oriental literatures of the fifties and early sixties
on West Asian affairs found Islam as a declining
force in the political process and seemingly announced
the inevitable victory of the then progressive
Arab ideologies like Nasserism, Bathism and Arab
Socialism over the conservative and monolithic
Islam.[1]   However, the recent upsurge of Islam as a

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1.   For instance see, Daniel Lerner, The Passing
        of Traditional Society (Free Press, 1958),
        Manfred Halpren, Politics of Social Change
        in Middle East and North Africa (Princeton,
        1963).
        J.H.Thompson and R.D.Reischaur, ed.,
        Modernization of the Arab World (Princeton,
        1966).

political force has belied these predictions and
negated the above simplistic characterization of
religion. In addition, the Islamic resurgence has
questioned the generalized treatment of individual
as merely a'juro-politico entity'in the liberal
capitalist framework or merely 'economic entity' in
the Marxian usage. Indeed, it has forced the Western
as well as the oriental scholars to rethink and to
reorient their approach towards the complex issue of
relationship between religion and Politics in the Third
World.

In fact, the process of secularization may
take different forms in different countries depending
upon the nature of Socio-economy formation. Majid
Khaduri has noted the possibility of four forms of
secularization in the Islamic context which may be
applied to other religions of the Third world. These
include the adoption of measures which have little or
nothing to do with Islam, the adoption of measures
which are in principle consistent with Islam but are
not dealt with in such detail as would fit existing
conditions, the adoption of measures which may sub-
stitute certain aspects of Islam that have become
obsolete and finally the seperation of religion from

the state.[2] Donald E.Smith has also opined that
"the dominance of polity over religious beliefs,
practices and ecclesiastical structures in itself
is a form of secularism".[3]

Whatever be its implications at theoretical
level, the preceding historical analysis of 'Islamic
resurgence, with special reference to Egypt's Islamic
movement, clearly negates such characterization as
by Manfred Halpren who says that Islamic movement
like Muslim Brotherhood are "backward looking neo-
Islamic totalitarianism and the fascist organization
which concentrate on mobilizing passion and violence
to enlarge the power of their charismatic leader and
the solidarity of the movement."[4] Instead, as
reflected in history, the present Islamic movement
represent the continuation of the long chain of
reformist Islamic movements in the past. It is modern,
progressive and reformist in as much as that it aims
at reconstruction of "fundamentals" of Islamic
thought i.e. the Quran and the Tradition, to cope
with the multi-dimensional crisis situations - moral,

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2.   Majid Khaduri, Political Trends In The Arab
      World (Balitimore 1972), p.214.

3.   Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political
      Development (Boston : 1970), p.86.

4.   Halpren, n.1, p.135.

cultural, political, economic and social. These
crisis situations in modern era are the product of
western interaction with the Muslim world in the
preceeding centuries and their continued economic,
military, political and cultural domination in indirect
forms - over large part of the Muslim World.

A few scholars have, however, tried to perceive
the phenomena of Islamic revivalism largely in socio-
cultural terms. Thus one scholar remarked that "What-
ever the exact form of European economic and political
penetration all the Muslim elites had a political
or cultural orientation and tended to define the
problems of European intervention in socio-cultural
rather than economic terms."[5]   But such an inter-
pretation of Islamic resurgence gives only one side
of the picture of resurgence, as it completely ignores
the political and economic dimension of Islamic
struggle - which has been as much the basis of anti-
colonialist and anti-imperialist movement in the
Muslim world as the factor of 'cultural erosion'.
In fact, it was combined factors of cultural erosion,

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5.   I.M.Lapidus, "Islam and Modernity in
        S.N.Eisenstadt ed.; Patterns of Modernity,
        Volume II, Beyond the West (London,1987)
        pp.94-5.

Political suppression, economic exploitation and the
degeneration of Islam that led to the emergence of
Afghani's Pan-Islamism, Abduh's Islamic modernism,
Banna's Muslim Brotherhood and the present militant
Islamic groups in Egypt.

Egypt experienced the earliest contact with
the West starting from Napoleon's conquest to the
military-centered modernizing rule of Muhammad Ali,
whose successors took Egypt into ever-closer involvement
with and dependence upon Britain and France, leading
to the direct economic, political and military
control of Egypt by the British. As a result a new
class, mistakenly identified as 'westernized - secular',
emerged which came to dominate the political authority
of Egypt. With this development the periodic religious
upheaval increasingly came to be seen as a manifesta-
tion of conflict between the secular forces and the
religious forces. But contrary to such assumption,
a careful analysis reveals the fact that the twentieth
century Islamic revivalism, particularly in the case
of Egypt, reflects the conflict between Afghani's
absolutist Pan-Islamic model' and Abduh's 'nationalist
assimilationist - Islamic model", as secularism in
the Western sense never had dominant hold over the
Muslim minds except in a tiny section of westernized

liberal and Marxists. The present phase of Islamic
revivalism is closer to Afghani's model, who came to
be symbolized as a 'third worldist leader' in his fight
against the western imperialism.

Militant Islamic movement and the ultimate
goal of the creation of 'an alternate Islamic model
with Sharia as its central piece', in part, also
reflects the Third World's desire to be free from the
yoke of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism and to
carve out a seperate identity on the international
map. As Mohammad Ayoob has commented, "since the
Third World's aspiration for autonomy from the managers
of the international system is the result of its
dissatisfaction with that hierarchically organised and
highly stratified systems, the reassertion of their
Islamic or Muslim identity on the part of Muslim
countries has also come to symbolize aspirations for
autonomous political and cultural development.[6]
Sharia provides the distinct Islamic identity in the
midst of christian and communist dominated world.
According to Mitchell, "Muslim civilization without
the Sharia as its central inspiration was meaningless,
a 'loss of cultural direction' and a contradiction in

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6.   Mohammad Ayoob "The Discernible Pattern" in
       Ayoob, ed., The Politics of Islamic Reassertion
       (New Delhi, 1982), p.289.

terms leaving ' a society of cultural mongrels and
spiritual half - castes[7].

The phenomena of Islamic resurgence also
reflects the contemporary pattern of relations between
the state and religious institutions. While the poli-
tical elite preserves the cosmopolitan and non-Islamic
forms of culture, the Islamic revival evokes the heritage
of personal religious identity and communal responsi-
bility. In fact, Islam remains in the hearts and minds
of individual Muslims as an essential component of
personal and political identity. Thus Hamid Enayat
has rightly noted, "the contemporary Islamic revival
becomes merely an optical illusion : Islam has always
been there as a powerful force behind the periodic
political upheavals in the Muslim world."[8]

Modern Egyptian state has control over
religious institutions, has asamed responsibility for
religious interpretation, determines what role Islam
would play in political life and organizes the religious
life of the nations. The main task remains the re-
interpretation in Islamic language of the regime's
aims and ideals - modernization, patriotism, secularism
and socialism. However, despite the state's control

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7.   Richard P.Mitchell,The Society of Muslim Brother
        (London,1969), p.236.

8.   Hamid Enayat,"The Resurgence of Islam :
        The Background",History Today, (London)Feb.1980,p.16.

of religious institutions, traditional belief,
practices, and values reign supreme among Egypt's
rural population and even among the majority of its
urban masses. In fact, adherence to Islamic tradition
is not confined to any single class or group of occu-
pations, but is characteristic of broad spectrum of
all Egyptian social classes. To this extent, religious
revivalism in Egypt denotes the failure of the
ruling political elite to evolve a symbiosis of tradi-
tion and modernity.

The thrust of Islamic resurgence is trans-
national and aspires for the political unity of
Islam. But given the diversities of political regimes,
social custom and tradition, sectarian division and
the growth of different types of institutions
across the spectrum of Muslim countries, it seems
unrealistic that Muslim World would ever adopt a
'common Islamic ideology or political system; thereby
presenting a concrete 'third alternative' to the
communist and the capitalist world. One can envisage
a range of roles for Islam in the modern political
system from Khomeini's theocratic models to consensual,
integrative and normative advisory functions such as
envisaged by Sadat.[9]

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9.   Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development
        in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development :
        Religion and Socio-political Change (New York,
        1980), p.5.

A survey of historical development since
the founding of Islam reveals that there are no
forms of government proper to Islam other than the
Caliphate, for Sunni Muslims and the Immate, for
Shia Muslim. But the institutions of Caliphate
and the Immate have become a matter of bygone age
and are hardly relevant in the present context of
divided Muslim world where Islam has assumed the
character of what is called saudi-zation of Islam,
Egyptianization of Islam, Libyanization of Islam and
so on. Therefore, the question as to who will decide
what is 'True and Authentic Islam' is a precarious
one. There is Wahabi's version of Islam, Qaddafi's
version of Islam and so on. Even the labelling of
'Islamic' to Iranian revolution is subject to dispute.
The revolution has retained many Western forms in
its institutional framework such as the party system,
elections, refrendums, fundamental rights, a republican
form of government with a combination of presidential
and parliamentary forms etc. Thus one scholar has
rightly remarked, "What has come about in Iran today
is an Islamic state, almost a theocratic state, in the
garb of a western-type, liberal, democratic and
constitutional form of government.[10] Thus at official

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10. K.R.Singh, "Constitutional Basis of Religious
Power in Iran, International Studies (New Delhi)
vol.25, no.2, 1988, p.130.

level, the Islamic resurgence becomes merely the
'politics of Islamic legitimization.'

However, at popular mass level, the ideological
pronouncements of Islamic resurgence reveals a hostile
attitude towards both traditionalism and official
religious institutions. It aims at overthrow of
reactionary, conservative, monarchial and status - quoist
regimes, thereby also undermining the western's
political, economic and strategic interest in the region.
It was this 'Islamic threat'which came to be increasingly
seen by the West, according to M.Ayoob, as politics
of 'Islamic Reassertion.' But contrary to such negative
terminology, the Islamic resurgence, in essence, reflects
the genuine desire of deprived masses to improve their
condition (both material as well as spiritual) of
existence. Islam appeared to them as the only viable
alternative in the modern world as others model had
failed to produce the desired results i.e. socio-
economy development, political participation and the
question of self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs.
Being intimately connected with the social, political,
economic and cultural aspect of the society and in the
absence of development of any popular political ideology
parallel to Islam, atleast in the Arab World, Islam
becomes 'a God-given channel' to release the historically
accumalted tension. In the process, a few violent

incidents are bound to take peace. Violence is not inherent in the very nature of Islam as western (particularly United Statesof America) media and scholars have depicted. Rather it stems from the sum total of chaotic situations prevailing within the society. The resurgence in Egypt in the seventies also reflected that pattern.

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