

**The Defence of Island Territories : A Politico-Military
Study of the Anglo-Argentine Falklands War**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

BIJU PAUL ABRAHAM

**WEST EUROPEAN DIVISION
CENTRE FOR AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI—110067**

1990





जवाहरलाल नेहरु विश्वविद्यालय
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067

DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled "THE DEFENCE OF ISLAND TERRITORIES: A POLITICO-MILITARY STUDY OF THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE FALKLANDS WAR" submitted by BIJU PAUL ABRAHAM is for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Dr. Christopher S. Raj
Supervisor


Prof. B. Nafayanan
Chairman

PREFACE

The protection of island territories has always posed unique problems for nations possessing them. Often separated by long distances from the mainland, their defence requires both political will and a willingness to divert resources. Governments all over the world have been forced to take diplomatic and military action to defend their island possessions as more and more of these territories have been caught up in disputes over sovereignty. Situated as they are in the middle of seas and oceans, control over many of them have been claimed by more than one state, creating tension in many regions and sometimes even armed conflict.

Disputes over island territories have caused tension between states in many parts of the world. Conflicting claims over ownership of the Kurile Islands has been a major factor preventing a formal peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. France's possession of, and nuclear tests on its island territories in the South Pacific have been opposed by many of the littoral states. The Spratly and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea have been claimed by no less than five states and led to a brief naval clash between China and Vietnam in 1988. There have been conflicting claims over the Abu Musa and Tunbs islands in the Persian Gulf, causing tension between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The protection of its island territories in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal has caused concern to defence planners in India too.

In spite of the fact that island territories have been the cause of disputes and wars between nations, the armed-forces of many nations find themselves handicapped when it comes to

defending these territories against outside aggression. Mainly because governments and strategic planners have given very little thought as to how one should go about defending these possessions and ensure that potential adversaries do not feel emboldened enough to try invade them. Enough attention has also not been paid to considering how the armed forces should be equipped for their task of defending island territories. The protection of island territories very rarely involves national survival or the protection of vital national interests and values. Therefore the armed forces often have no choice but to try to deal with possible threats to these territories with the forces and equipment that have been designed and acquired for quite different tasks. It is in this context that the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands has been studied here. The aim has been to study the course and conduct of the war, as a first step towards drawing lessons from it regarding the protection and defence of a nation's island territories.

The Anglo-Argentine war for control of the Falkland islands was both unexpected and unique. Unexpected because nobody expected the two nations to fight over an island territory whose possession would yield few economic benefits in the short run, while the long term benefits were uncertain. The war was unique because it was the first conflict since the Second World War which saw the use of modern high-technology weapons by the air, land and naval forces on both sides. As such the war provided much needed information on the performance of these weapon-systems, as also their ability to perform certain specified tasks. But above all the performance of the air, land and naval forces of the two sides provided certain insights as to how the armed forces of any nation can be better prepared when it comes

to dealing with threats to their island possessions.

The study has been divided into five chapters. Chapter I is actually a prelude to the main study, and it considers the position of island territories in international law, and the benefits that international law confers on a nation that owns these islands insofar as the exploration and exploitation of ocean resources is concerned. Four disputes over island territories that have broken out in various parts of the world have also been considered briefly.

Chapter II traces the history of the Falkland islands from the mid-sixteenth century and examines the factors that forced Argentina to resort to military force to recover the islands. The misconceptions on the Argentine side that led it into a war are considered, as is the failure of the British government to foresee in advance the Argentine invasion and move to deter it. The attempt has been to consider the vital question: whether the failure was one of British government policy on the islands as such, or was a failure at the level of intelligence collection and analysis.


The British diplomatic and military response to the invasion is detailed in Chapter III, as are the efforts made by the United Nations, the United States and other allies of both Britain and Argentina to settle the dispute peacefully. An analysis has been made of the factors that led to the event that finally destroyed all chances of a peaceful solution to the crisis -- the sinking of the Argentine cruiser 'General Belgrano'. The compulsions on both sides to resort to military moves which sabotaged peace efforts and encouraged the slide towards an all out war has also been considered.

The course and conduct of the air and naval conflict between British and Argentine forces is considered in Chapter IV. The

attempt has not been to give a day by day account of the war as it developed, but rather to consider the strategies and tactics employed by the air, land and naval forces on both sides insofar as they are unique to operations involving island territories. An attempt has been made to examine the vital question: whether the weapon-systems used were supportive of the strategies employed as well as the performance of the weapons themselves.

Chapter V concludes the study with an analysis of the lessons that the conduct of the war provided to nations that have island territories of their own to defend. The question as to how threats to island territories can be dealt with in a way that deters potential adversaries is considered. Some suggestions are also made as to how the armed forces of a state can best be equipped and prepared to deal with threats to island territories that might arise in future.

I must express my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr.Christopher Sam Raj who patiently read through all the chapters and made valuable suggestions for improvement. My thanks also to Dr.J.L.Ferreira of the Latin American Division of the Centre for his help in the initial stages of the study. But needless to say I remain solely responsible for all mistakes of fact and interpretation.



Biju Paul Abraham

New Delhi
7-7-1990.

CONTENTS

	PAGES	
PREFACE	i - iv	
List of figures	vi	
CHAPTER		
I	SOME ISLAND TERRITORIES AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS	1 - 43
II	THE ORIGINS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR	43 - 78
III	EFFORTS AT PEACE AMIDST WAR	79 - 112
IV	THE FIGHT TO THE FINISH	113 - 146
V	CONCLUSION	147 - 160
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	

List of Figures

1.1	Island territories and Exclusive Economic Zones.....	7
1.2	Islands in the Kuriles chain disputed by Japan and the USSR.....	19
1.3	The Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.....	27
1.4	The Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands in the Persian Gulf.....	32
1.5	The Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus after the Turkish invasion.....	42
2.1	Map of the South Atlantic and part of Antarctica showing the Argentine coast and the Falklands.....	47
3.1	Argentine Naval Moves. 29 April to 2 May.....	111
4.1	British Positions. May 14 - June 8, 1982.....	143
4.2	The Assault on Argentine Positions around Port Stanley.....	145

CHAPTER I

SOME ISLAND TERRITORIES AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Conventionally men view the world as comprising a limited number of land masses, named and grouped differently. Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America are referred to as continents. Though Australia and Antarctica are also normally included in the general continental category, some experts insist on defining them as subcontinental in nature.¹ However due to their immense size and extensive configuration, these land masses are usually referred to as the "mainlands" of the earth. The mainland areas are thus grouped in the conventional concept of seven continents.

Smaller in size than continents, but situated above mean high water at all times are more than one half million pieces of distinctly subcontinental land territory defined generically as islands. With a combined area exceeding 3,823,000 square miles, they range in size from mere dots or outgrowths, virutally without measurable surface to extensive land masses, such as Greenland possessing an area of more than 840,000 square miles, greater in size than all but eleven countries of the world. In fact 61 islands have areas in excess of 4,000 square miles (approximately the area of the independent states of Jamaica, Cyprus, and Lebanon); and at least 123 are larger than 1,000 square miles (approximately the area of Western Samoa and Luxembourg).²

The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone defined islands as:

-
1. Robert D.Hodgson, "Islands: Normal and Special Circumstance" in John King Gamble, Jr.and Giulio Pontecorvo, Ed,Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of Oceans, (Cambridge, 1974), p.139
 2. Ibid.

...a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide.³

The contemporary doctrine is well established that an artificial installation (such as a lighthouse, beacon, oil-platform, defence-tower, etc.) or an island artificially formed by engineering works which, building from the seabed, provide an emerged land mass, cannot be considered an island under international law.⁴ The expression "natural islands" or "naturally formed" may refer either (a) to the material composing the island, or (b) to the way the island is formed. The artificiality of an island therefore depends either on the nature of the material composing it or in the way it is formed, as for instance where land is artificially placed on the seabed.⁵ Likewise only high tide elevations are considered to be islands. Low tide elevations are not considered to be islands, though those which lie within the territorial sea of a nation may be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the outer limit of a nation's territorial sea.⁶

Why islands cause disputes.

Islands, especially the small ones, are in a sense abstractions. They have little or no value in themselves. They constitute the smallest integral marine-geographic feature, often too small to be shown accurately on even the largest-scale maps and charts. Their utility to the state that possess them creates

-
3. Ian Brownlie, Ed, Basic Documents in International Law (Oxford, 1969), p.72.
 4. Derek W. Bowett, The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law (New York, 1978), p.2.
 5. Nikos Papadakis, The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands (London, 1977), p.93.
 6. Bowett, n.4, p.6.

their value. Since even the smallest island is legally entitled to a territorial sea around itself, it is not surprising that that the primary source of difficulty in delimitation of maritime boundaries has stemmed from islands. While the islands themselves may very often be useless to a nation possessing it, the benefits that such possession confer on a nation that owns them have very often proved irresistible. This has naturally led to a proliferation of disputes over island territories all over the world.

For some time now it has been realised that the sea is a reservoir of immense living and non-living resources which offers the hope that it could solve the problems of mankind for many years to come.⁷ With the increasing importance of the oceans and its resources, several new disputes between states have developed. In order to appropriate the rich mineral and fishing resources available in the sea most of the states have been claiming larger and larger areas not only in the form of traditional territorial waters, but also as continental shelves, Exclusive Economic Zones, or fisheries jurisdictions. Not only continents, but the smallest islands have been recognized under customary international law to claim such jurisdictions. Since an island is ordinarily understood to mean, as defined in Article 10 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide" a country can claim not only territorial waters, but continental shelf jurisdiction for even the tiniest rock which is not even inhabitable.⁸

7. K.Jayaraman, Legal Regime of Islands (New Delhi, 1982), p.1.

8. R.P.Anand, Ed, Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond (New Delhi, 1978), p.11.

In the 1930's and 40's a growing awareness of the importance of marine resources led to a scramble for its exploitation. This also focussed attention on the fact that there was a lack of a properly codified rule of law.⁹ It was at the 1958 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that the first legal regimes emerged for control of the seas and its resources. Over the years these laws have been modified during the various UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea, and today a nation possessing island territories can claim several jurisdictions around these possessions. Three jurisdictions that a nation can claim in seas around an island make its possession advantageous for any nation. These are territorial seas around the islands, continental shelf jurisdiction, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

As per the provisions of the 1958 Convention on Territorial Seas, an island which is wholly or partly within the territorial sea of a mainland or another island, causes a seaward bulge in the territorial sea. An island situated outside the territorial sea of a coast, but not beyond double the breadth of the territorial sea causes, in effect, a seaward extension of the territorial sea.¹⁰ For islands which are remote, the position is that they are treated as separate entities. They can generate their own maritime zones.¹¹ The effect of island territorial possessions on the territorial seas of nations, and their use in extending claims when they belong to a country in possession of

9. R.P.Anand, "Winds of Change in the Law of the Sea", International Studies (New Delhi), Vol.16, No.1, 1977, p.209.

10. V.S.Mani, "Towards Codification of the Legal Regime of Islands" (A project done for the Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi, 1975), p.7, cited in Jayaraman, n.7, p.39.

11. Ibid.

the mainland is shown in Figure 1.1. The figure shows the manner in which Chile's claims are extended by ownership of Islans Juan Fernandez, Sala y Gomez and Easter Island. Alien islands offshore, limit the claims which can be made from the mainland. This is a disadvantage which has been faced by Turkey, Papua New Guinea, Cameroon, Mozambique, Somalia, Cambodia, North Korea and Madagascar.

In addition to a territorial sea around the islands, international law permits a nation to claim a continental shelf for exclusive exploitation of marine resources. The 1958 Geneva Convention also gave a definition as to what exactly constitutes a continental shelf. It said:


For the purposes of these Articles the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. (12)

This definition gives a state owning an island the right to exploit the resources of the continental shelf adjacent to the island to the depths mentioned, but if a nation has the necessary technology to exploit resources even beyond this depth then it is free to do so. Though the article does not give the state owning the island sovereignty over the continental shelf, it is given "sovereign rights to explore and exploit it".¹³ The state must therefore extract oil, for example, before it can claim any right over the continental shelf. But once a state starts exploiting the resources it has exclusive rights to the resources. The

12. P.W.Birnie, "The Law of the Sea Before and After UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II", in R.P.Barston and Patricia Birnie, Eds, The Maritime Dimension (London, 1980), p.21. Emphasis added.

13. Ibid, p.22.

Figure 1.1



Island territories and Exclusive Economic Zones

Source: J.R.V.Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (London, 1985), p.18.

resources that can be exploited extends not only to the mineral resources and oil and gas, but also to all living and non-living natural resources. The convention also gives the states the right to construct and operate installations and other devices on its shelf as necessary for its exploration and exploitation, and also to constitute 500 metre safety zones around these installations.¹⁴

The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a zone beyond and bordering on the territorial waters of an island and within this region the coastal state has complete rights over the economic exploitation of marine and fisheries resources.¹⁵ The concept of the EEZ was formally introduced into international law in 1982 at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), though the concept had been presented at the conference as early as 1974. Over fifty-six countries had declared 200 mile EEZ's adjacent to their territorial seas by the time the concept was accepted as part of the UN Law of the Sea.¹⁶ International law gives the state the exclusive right to manage the living and non-living resources of the sea to a distance of 200 miles around the islands. Alien states would have the freedom of navigation and overflight, and the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines. States which do not have access to the sea were also given certain fishing rights in the zone.¹⁷ The EEZ is different from the continental shelf and also the fisheries zone as far as the range of resources coming within its purview are concerned. While

14. Ibid, p.23.

15. J.R.V.Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World(London, 1985), p.38.

16. Ken Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea (London, 1985), Note 2, p.58.

17. Ibid, p.22.

the continental shelf jurisdiction is related to natural resources, including fisheries, the fisheries zone which was allowed earlier was limited to just living resources. The EEZ that is now permitted under international law on the other hand includes both living and non-living resources. EEZ jurisdiction is much broader than others in that it includes within itself all types of resources - recoverable and non-recoverable.¹⁸

Island territories and the scramble for ocean resources.

Conflicts over island territories have broken out for a variety of reasons. Security concerns, concerns over the fate of ethnic minorities in these islands and the desire to repossess territory that has been lost to other nations have been some of them. But another cause for such disputes, the desire to exploit the resources of the ocean, in an increasingly resource scarce world, could be the cause for more such disputes in various parts of the world in future. The advantages in terms of the right to exclusively exploit the resources of the sea, that international law confers on nations that possess island territories could possibly lead to more such disputes in future. As a potentially enormous source of food, oil, natural gas, minerals, and other resources the oceans could hold what may one day prove to be the problems that have haunted the world for generations.¹⁹ The area of the Exclusive Economic Zone, for example, has rich potential for hydrocarbons and marine fisheries. Experts have also testified that most of the known reserves of hydrocarbons and marine fisheries are also to be found in this area.²⁰ The

-
18. M.K Nawaz, "On the advent of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Implications for a new Law of the Sea" in Anand, n.8, p.189.
19. James L.Malone, "Who Needs the Sea Treaty", in Foreign Policy (Washington), No.54, Spring 1984, p.47.
20. Nawaz, n.18, p.181.

resources that the oceans could provide a nation are potentially huge, resources that could mean the difference between economic growth and economic decline. And in this race to exploit the ocean's resources, nations that possess island territories will have a decided advantage. The resources include huge reserves of oil, natural gas, undersea and seabed minerals, and ocean fisheries. While the availability of these resources could solve many of the world problems they could also destabilise the international situation if it leads to increasing tension and conflict between nations over the question of control over island territories.

Oil and natural gas reserves in the world's oceans.

Hydrocarbon resources like oil and natural gas are found almost everywhere in the world, and beneath the sea-floor, they can be found to any depth of water, except where favourable geologic conditions are not known to occur, such as the deep-²¹ ocean basin. Petroleum resources are largely confined to the continental shelves, continental slopes, continental rises and²² the small ocean basins. Because these areas in general contain a greater thickness of marine sediments, from which most of the world's petroleum production comes, than do the land areas taken as a whole, the shelf and slope areas are more favourable for petroleum extraction than land areas. The continental shelf and slope areas are located just off the coast of nations and islands, and international law gives the state that owns the coast or the islands exclusive rights to oil exploration in the

-
21. William Crain, "Hydrocarbons from the Seafloor" in Don Walsh and Marjorie Cappellari, Eds, Energy and Sea Power: Challenges for the Decade (New York, 1981), p.24.
 22. M.P.M.Reddy and V.Hariharan, "Energy Resources from the Ocean: Oil and Gas", in K.N.Subrahmanya, Ed, Energy Problem and World Economic Development with special reference to India (New Delhi, 1983), p.157.

continental shelf or slope.

Over the past two decades, the world has been consuming more oil than it has been discovering. Since 1960 the world has been finding only 15 billion barrels of new oil each year while consumption is approximately 20 billion barrels.²³ This pattern is expected to continue

An estimate of the offshore reserves, which includes both discovered and prospective reserves, is 480 billion barrels of oil and 2,400 trillion cubic feet of gas.²⁴ This is about one third of the world's total reserves of both onshore and offshore reserves.

By the early 1980's worldwide offshore production had grown to around 17 percent of the total world daily output of 5.5 million tonnes of oil, and offshore reserves amounted to 21 percent of the total world reserve of 60 billion tonnes.²⁵ A Stanford Research Institute Study released in March 1980 contains more optimistic projections of offshore oil reserves and production. In their view, peak offshore oil production will not occur before the year 2000 and will reach 28 billion barrels of oil and 85 billion cubic feet of gas.²⁶ This is twice the amount that was produced in the early 1980's. It is clear from these estimates that offshore production will play a dominant role in future worldwide oil production. The seabed contains a large part of the world's petroleum potential and its development in the regions where little or none of it is produced at present

23. Bank of America, Economics-Policy Research, "World Petroleum Outlook", September, 1981 cited in Subramanya, n.22, 170

24. Crain, n.21, p.24

25. Reddy and Hariharan, n.22, p.157.

26. Crain, n.21, p.27

could change significantly the outlook for petroleum production for individual countries.

One factor that has stood in the way of exploitation of oil and natural gas from offshore regions until now, was the lack of the necessary technology. But the technology of offshore oil and gas exploration and production has developed rapidly over the last one decade.²⁷ As the technology further improves oil exploration and production will gradually move further offshore. In the case of coastal continental shelves which is not disputed such a move may not be controversial. But around island territories that are in dispute such action could provoke tension, perhaps even armed conflict.

Seabed Mineral Resources.

It has been known for a long time now that nodules of rocklike materials lay at the bottom of the Atlantic, the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The nodules were also known to be rich in several minerals, but they remained unexploited because it was much more expensive to mine these minerals from the sea than from the land, and also because the technology for sea-bed mining was often not available. Rising prices of metals and advances in technology have in recent years generated interest in these mineral resources.²⁸ The possibility of exploiting them commercially have also been examined.

Nodules consist mainly of iron and manganese, but they also contain smaller amounts of more valuable metals such as nickel, copper, and cobalt plus traces of about twenty other elements.

-
27. For an appraisal of the technology of offshore oil and gas exploration and its future, See F.W.Mansvelt Beck and K.M.Wiig, The Economics of Offshore Oil and Gas Supplies (Lexington, 1977)
28. Ross D.Eckert, The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea (Stanford, 1979), p.214.

They form either in clusters or are strewn across the sea-bed, partly embedded in it. No accurate estimate has been made of the amount of nodules present in the sea. Estimates for the Pacific Ocean alone amount to over one trillion tonnes of these nodules.²⁹ If the mineral resources of all the oceans are taken together, nodules could possibly constitute "the largest mineral deposit on this planet".³⁰ In the north and central Pacific, an extraction unit with a capacity of 3 million metric tonnes of nodules per year would yield about 35,000 mt of nickel, 30,000 mt of copper, 5,000 mt of cobalt and 600,000 mt of manganese. It is estimated that each extraction unit should have a capacity of at least this amount for economical recovery.³¹ This level of output would satisfy the bulk of world demand for cobalt and manganese and a significant portion of the demand for nickel.

However the exploitation of these resources will be a long, complex, and capital intensive project, and these could possibly lead to tensions between nations as well. Legal exploitation under international law would involve the state involved, the International Sea-Bed Authority and various Trans-National Corporations.³² The procedures are complex. It involves registration, research and selection of mining sites, the formulation of contracts, production ceilings, payment of fees, transfer of technology and fulfillment of contractual

-
29. John L.Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Amsterdam, 1965), pp.121-124.
30. Bruce C.Herzen and Charles D.Hollister, The Face of the Deep (New York, 1971), p.423, quoted in Eckert, n.28, p.214.
31. Raymond F.Mikesell and John W.Whitney, The World Mining Industry: Investment Strategy and Public Policy (Boston, 1987), p.152.
32. Yogesh K.Tyagi, "The System of Settlement of Disputes Under the Law of the Sea Convention: An Overview" in Indian Journal of International Law (New Delhi), Vol.25, No.2, April-June 1985, p.196.

obligations. Distribution of benefits would involve interpretation and application of the complex provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.³³ Disputes could break out at any stage, especially since many nations have not accepted the provisions of the Convention. But any such disputes are unlikely in the near future, since sea-bed nodule production has not started at present, mainly because of the costs involved. An important factor determining the feasibility of nodule mining is the cost of such mining relative to that of land-based output. Under current conditions sea-bed mining would not have a cost advantage over land-based mining. But it is expected that as land-based reserves decline, the relative cost of seabed mining would improve.³⁴ Possession of island territories do not help a nation directly in deep-sea mining since this is undertaken in the deep-sea which are considered to be part of international waters. But island possession in the middle of oceans could considerably lessen the infrastructural problems that a nation faces when undertaking deep-sea mining.

There are however mineral deposits in the sea with immediate relevance to islands. There are large amounts of minerals contained in crustal formations on the continental shelf. Exploration is just beginning and not much is known about their potential. But because these formations are not as deep as sea-bed nodules, some believe that they may be more economic to mine. Since these resources are within the 200 mile EEZ of the island, ownership of the island would automatically make a nation eligible to exploit these mineral resources.

33. Ibid.

34. Mikesell and Whitney, n.31, p.154.

Fisheries.

Until the Second World War there was a slow but steady development of fisheries, brought about by gradual mechanisation and improvement of the methods of catching, processing and transportation of fish. Since the war this type of modernisation has dramatically increased the world fish catch. Improvements in fishing vessels include sophisticated electronic fish-finding and navigational equipment, automated gear handling and high capacity freezing equipment, all of which has brought about a significant increase in fishing efforts.³⁵

Long-range fishing is one other factor that has led to the growth of the world fish catch. The USSR and other Eastern bloc countries use large self-contained fleets for catching, processing, supply and transport of fish. The Japanese and the Koreans use trawlers of 5,000 tonnes to fish in the Pacific, catching and processing over 100 tonnes of fish every day.³⁶

Until the codification of the law of the sea and the creating of the Exclusive Economic Zone, fishing on the high seas was unregulated. But the creation of the 200 mile EEZ has created problems for developed nations especially those for whom fish constitutes a substantial portion of their food intake. More than 90 percent of the worlds catch of fish is taken within this 200 mile area. The introduction of the 200 mile EEZ therefore presented the devloped nations with the problem of maintaining their fish supplies, and delivered into the ownership of certain underdevoped nations fish stocks which they did not have the capability to harvest.

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea gives certain

35. Paul A.Driver, "International Fisheries", in Barston and Birnie, n.12, pp.27-29.

36. Ibid, p.29

rights to nations over fisheries in its Exclusive Economic Zone. Each nation that claims an EEZ should determine the allowable catch in its zone as well as its own capacity to harvest the fish. The coastal country is to develop a management programme with optimal use of fisheries resources in mind, and then allow access by other countries to the surplus including landlocked or other geographically disadvantaged states.³⁷ It is this provision that could lead to disputes between states. As the demand for fish grows and developing countries develop their fisheries resources a situation is likely to develop where these nations no longer have the surplus catch that they can sell to the developed nations. It is in such circumstances that island possessions could become more important since they would give a nation exclusive rights for fisheries in the 200 mile EEZ around it.

A good example of such a conflict is the one over Jan Mayen, a small and remote Norwegian island which lies north-east of Iceland between the Atlantic and the Barents Sea. In the early 70's Norway proposed to establish a 200 mile EEZ around the island. Iceland, which traditionally fished in this area, disputed the legality of the action, claiming that Jan Mayen forms part of the Icelandic continental shelf and that the fish stocks in the zone are part of Icelandic stocks.³⁸ Another such conflict was the one between Britain and Iceland over cod-fishing which broke out in the North Atlantic in the mid-70's. British warships escorted British vessels fishing off the Icelandic coast after Iceland threatened to use force against

37. Victor B. Millan and Michael A. Morris, Conflicts in Latin America: Democratic Alternatives in the 1990's (London, 1990), p.41.

38. Driver, n.35, p.47.

foreign vessels that fished close to Icelandic waters.

One of the most intractable disputes over resources that is likely to develop in future is the one over Antarctica. This huge, largely ice covered and largely uninhabited continent is believed to have huge valuable resources worth exploiting. The area has been subject to territorial claims by seven countries, with several of these claims overlapping. The 1959 Antarctic treaty did not directly consider the exploitation of Antarctic resources, since in the 1950's no one believed that there would be any commercially exploitable resources on this island continent.⁴⁰ Some believe this is still true. But regardless of objective realities, there is a widely held perception that such exploitation will be feasible in the not too distant future, especially if there should be technological breakthroughs that make mining in the harsh Antarctic environment possible. After the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, countries with claims on these islands have found natural resources in the area increasingly attractive and have moved to strengthen claims in the area. Great Britain, which also has a claim to parts of the Antarctic continent, based its claims on its control over the Falkland Islands. It was a dispute over ownership of these islands that led Britain and Argentina to war in 1982.

Island territories and contemporary International Disputes.

With the oceans of the globe containing over half a million islands, and their possession conferring so many benefits on nations that control them, it is not surprising that island territories have been the cause of disputes between nations. In

39. Booth, n.16, pp.40-41.

40. Millan and Morris, n.37, p.41.


almost all regions of the world island territories and disputes over their ownership have caused regional tensions, and sometimes even armed conflict. Four disputes that have broken out in different parts of the world ever since the second World War, are representative of many of these disputes. They are (a) the dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over the Kurile Islands, (b) the conflict in the South China Sea over possession of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, (c) disputes in the Persian Gulf over the ownership of the Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands, and (d) the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The causes of these disputes range from difference of perception regarding who owns an island, to disputes over which ethnic community should have control over the affairs of an island. But all of them have one thing in common. These disputes have either caused armed conflict between nations, very often in the islands themselves, or have the potential to provoke such conflict. And all of them focus attention on the need for nations that possess island territories to prepare themselves for the possibility of having to go to war in order to defend them.

The Kurile Islands

Ever since the end of the second World War the ownership of four islands off northern Japan, in the Sea of Okhotsk has been disputed by Japan and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gained the Kurile islands at the end of the second World War as part of the final peace settlement. The dispute is over whether the four islands belong to the Kurile chain. The four islands are named Iturup, Kunashir, Shikhotan and the Hannibal Group, and they are located off the west coast of Hokkaido, as figure 1.2 shows.

41. Prescott, n.15, pp.246-47.

Figure 1.2



Islands in the Kuriles chain disputed by Japan and the USSR

Source: J.R.V.Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (London, 1985), p.247.

Japan got her territorial sovereignty accepted in the islands of the Kuriles chain closest to Japan, the Kunashiri and Etorofu in her first territorial settlement with Russia in 1855. As per the terms of the settlement she conceded Russian sovereignty over Uruppu and the islands to the north of Uruppu in the Kuriles chain.⁴² In the Treaty of 1857 at St.Petersburg Japan got possession over the whole of the Kuriles chain of islands.⁴³

The situation changed however after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 in which Japan was victorious. Russia ceded South Sakhalin to Japan as per the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth, and the validity of this treaty was accepted in the Basic Convention concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1925.⁴⁴ South Sakhalin along with the Kuriles continued to be in Japanese possession.

Japanese defeat in the second World War saw the islands change hands once again. During Yalta conference of February 1945 the Soviet Union had formally agreed that it would enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, and as part of a secret agreement the United States agreed to the return of Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ Defeat in the

-
42. Savitri Vishwanathan, "Peace Without a Peace Treaty with the USSR", in Savitri Vishwanathan, Japan: The New Challenges (New Delhi, 1982), p.4.
43. For full text of the Treaty see G.A.Lensen, The Russian Push Towards Japan (Princeton, 1959). pp. 501-6.
44. For the full text of the Basic Convention, see G.A.Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the USSR (Tallahassee, 1970), pp. 177-95.
45. Saburo Ionaga, The Pacific War 1931-45: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II (New York, 1978), p. 149. The US acceptance of the plan to 'return' the Kuriles to the Soviet Union is actually without any foundation in fact since the islands, especially Habomais and Shikhotan had always been under Japanese sovereignty.

war meant that Japan lost both sovereign rights and territory in the north to the Soviet Union. The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers issued a directive on 29 January 1946, depriving Japan of all administrative rights in the Kuriles, Habomais and Shikhotan.⁴⁶ The residents of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands were forcefully removed from the islands to the mainland by Soviet forces after the Japanese surrender.⁴⁷ Ever since the provisions of the settlement at Yalta came to be known, Japan has held on to its position that the islands are Japanese territory and that they must be returned. This is in spite of the fact that under the provisions of the San Fransisco Peace Treaty, Japan abandoned territorial rights to the islands. The issue of the islands has held up the signing of a formal peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union since the end of the second World War. When negotiations for the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan started in 1955 Japan was prepared to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union only on condition that the Habomai Island Group and the Shikhotan islands would be returned to Japan unconditionally. Northern Kuriles and South Sakhalin were included in the agenda only for bargaining purposes.⁴⁸ The Soviet Union was also prepared for such a compormise. But dissensions within the Japanese cabinet and between the various factions of the still to be formed Liberal Democratic Party prevented such a settlement. The hardliners argued that a peace treaty should be signed only when all four of the Kuriles island were returned to Japan. This

TH-3214

46. Vishwanathan, n.42, p. 6.

47. Ionaga, n.45, p. 238.

48. Vishwanathan, n.42, p. 7, and Savitri Vishwanathan, Normalization of Japanese Soviet Relations 1945-1970, (Tallahasse, 1973), pp.72-85.

forced the Japanese government to increase its territorial demands, thus preventing the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.⁴⁹

In 1960 at the time of the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which extended the stay of American troops in Japan, the USSR declared that the Hanbomai and Shikhotan islands would be returned only after all the American troops were returned from Japanese territory. As far as the Soviets were concerned the other two islands in the Kuriles chain were not even negotiable. The USSR has maintained this position since 1960.

The Japanese have considered the threat posed to Japan by continued Soviet possession of the island to be real. Their own past experience has taught them how valuable bases on the islands can be. The Pearl Harbour strike force which attacked the US Navy on 7 December, 1941, leading to US entry into the war on the side of the allies, was hidden by the Japanese Navy in Hitokoppu Bay in the Kurile islands under the strictest secrecy, before sailing towards Pearl Harbour.⁵⁰ Japanese fishing boats are still forbidden from fishing in the waters of the Kuriles and there have been confrontations between Japanese and Soviet fishermen in the waters off the Kuriles.⁵¹ These are likely to continue until there is final settlement of the dispute.

In August 1978 China and Japan signed a Peace Treaty formally ending World War II, further isolating the USSR in the East Asian region. Though Japan assured the Soviet Union that

49. Increasing the territorial demands in talks with the Soviet Union was a price the Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro had to pay for bringing about a merger of conservative forces in Japan and forming the Liberal Democratic Party. Vishwanathan, n.42, p.8

50. Ionaga, n.45, pp. 135-36.

51. Jacques Pezeu-Massabuau, The Japanese Islands: A Physical and Social Geography. (Rutland, 1978) p. 131-32.

the treaty was not detrimental to Soviet security interests, the Soviets saw it as a threat. Soviet military activity in the region increased afterwards and a strong military force was stationed in the Kurile islands, which had until then supported only a token force.⁵² It has been suggested that one of the reasons for the strong Soviet military presence on the islands could be the need to control the sea lanes out of the Sea of Okhotsk, which is one of the operating areas of Soviet missile submarines.⁵³ This would also seem to be one of the reasons why the Soviet Union is reluctant to give up control over the islands. Another possible reason could be the Soviet desire to increase the size of its EEZ by virtue of its control of the islands. In 1977 the Soviets proclaimed a 200 mile EEZ based upon their claim to the Kuriles.⁵⁴ Since 1978 the Soviet military presence in the island has been continually increasing. The 1981 Defence White Paper for example reported that units stationed on the islands, which totalled about one division were actively engaged in military exercises of various kinds.⁵⁵

Though increased military activity in the Pacific and the stationing of troops on the islands, would seem to signal a Soviet determination to hold on to the islands at all costs, there are positive attractions of closer relations with Japan that could lead to the Soviets agreeing to return at least two of the islands to Japanese control. Trade with Japan and normalised

52. Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, "Japan's Foreign and Security Policies" in Michael Leifer, Ed, The Balance of Power in East Asia (London, 1986), p. 76.

53. Ibid.

54. P.Lewis Young, "Straws in the Wind: 1991 - Time for Gorbachev's Next Initiative in the Asia Pacific Region?", Asian Defence Review (Kuala Lumpur), No.1, January 1990, p.14.

55. J.W.M.Chapman, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence - Diplomacy - Dependence (London, 1983), p.109.

relations with this new world economic power would seem to offer the Soviet Union greater chances of ensuring security in the North Pacific, than anything offered by a continued military presence on the islands themselves.⁵⁶ The disputed islands are an emotional issue in Japan and no Japanese government would consider overlooking this issue for the sake of greater trade with the Soviet Union. This is despite the fact that a normalisation of relations with the USSR could open up resource rich Siberia, with its huge resource base of timber, oil and natural gas, to the Japanese market, considerably easing the problems of Japanese industry, which is forced to import almost all its requirements of raw materials, often from more distant parts of the world.

In recent times there has been some movement forward in attempts to resolve the question of ownership over these islands. During a visit to Japan in 1988, Eduard Sheverdnaze the Soviet Foreign Minister said that though the islands were Soviet, the USSR was willing to discuss its future.⁵⁷ This was an important Soviet concession on the issue since until then the Soviets had been maintaining that the islands were Soviet territory and were not negotiable. Of even greater significance was the hint given by Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Soviet President's senior foreign policy aide during a visit to Japan in November 1989 that there was a 'third way' to resolve the issue.⁵⁸ Though he did not elaborate, it would seem that President Gorbachev is determined that the islands should not remain in the way of improving relations between the Soviet Union and Japan.

56. Gerald Segal, "The Soviet Union in East Asia" in Leifer, n.52, p. 53.

57. Young, n.54, p.14.

58. Ibid.

The Sprately and Paracel Islands.

The Sprately and Paracel islands are situated in the South China Sea, one of the six seas that lie between the mainland of Asia and the islands that lie offshore to the mainland. These seas which stretch from the Indian Ocean to the Arctic Ocean, are called the Andaman Sea, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.

The South China Sea is however different from all the other seas in four important ways. (a) It is the largest of the six seas, with an area of 648,000 square nautical miles. (b) It is surrounded by eleven coastal states, while none of the other seas have more than five along its coasts. (c) The South China Sea is the only one of the six seas that has two important groups of islands in its middle, and (d) the island states which form the eastern margin of this sea contains more islands spread over a wider zone than any of the other seas.

The South China Sea stretches from Singapore in the south-west to Taiwan 1500 nautical miles away to the north-east. The Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of Tongking lie to its west. The littoral states consist of China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand on the continent, and Taiwan, the Phillipines, Brunei and Indonesia on the adjoining islands. Malaysia, through its sovereignty in the Malaysian Peninsula and the northern part of Borneo stretches across the continent to the islands.

The two island groups in dispute comprise two archipelagos and the area of dangerous shoals known as Macclesfield Bank which lies midway between the Chinese island of Hainan and the Phillipines. North-west of the bank lie two tiny clusters of

59. Prescott, n.15, p. 209.

60. Ibid, pp. 210-11.

islets which make up the Parcel islands. The second group, the Sprately islands, consist of islets with a total area of no more than one square mile.⁶¹ (See figure 1.3) These islands are surrounded by some 50,000 square miles of shoals lying south of Macclesfield Bank and west of Palawan in the Phillipines. In all, these small islands are spread over an area which is roughly 1,400 miles from north to south and about 600 miles from east to west. It is the vast area which these islands occupy that has led to disputes over their possession since any country having sovereignty over them could claim vast areas of the South China Sea for exclusive exploitation of marine and undersea resources. Moreover the islands are located in a strategically sensitive area, astride the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.

The Paracel Islands had been a cause of dispute between Vietnam and China ever since the early years of the century. Before the second World War the dispute was between the French, who had colonised Vietnam, and the various governments who ruled the Chinese mainland.⁶² After the departure of the French and the ascent to power of the Communists in mainland China the dispute became one between the communists in power in China and the South Vietnamese government allied to the United States, which maintained its claim to the islands. By 1973 the Chinese had occupied the north-eastern group of the Parcel islands and Vietnam the south-western group.⁶³

The Paracels were the first islands to be the scene of a

61. Captian John Moore, "China Seas" Defence and Foreign Affairs (Alexandria, VA), Vol.XVII, No.9, September 1989, p.14.

62. For a study of the historoical background of the dispute over the Parcel islands, see Marvyn S.Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York, 1982), especially Chapter 3.

63. Moore, n.61, p. 14.

military confrontation between China and South Vietnam. Although the clashes took place in the Paracel islands the crisis began in the summer of 1973 when Saigon awarded oil exploration concessions in the vicinity of the Sprately islands, and later absorbed the islands into the administrative structure of mainland (South) Vietnam. Saigon's award of the oil concessions was a continuation of its quest for offshore oil begun as early as 1969. In the spring of that year Saigon obtained a 4000-mile seismic survey of the continental shelf off the coast of Vietnam with the help of a Houston based company. But it was not until 20 July 1973 that the concessions were awarded.⁶⁴ The prospect of oil discoveries around the Sprately's and the realisation that South Vietnam could pre-empt any Chinese moves to exploit the resources of the seas around the islands, spurred the Chinese to action. In January 1974 the Chinese made an amphibious landing on the islands. After three ships had carried out a bombardment of the islands, a squadron of over a dozen gun-boats of various sizes attacked as a prelude to the landing of over 500 troops. Vietnamese forces were forced to surrender. The Chinese capture of the Paracels is important in that it is one of the five occasions since the second World War when a nation successfully⁶⁵ launched an amphibious operation to take over an island.

Following its defeat in the Paracel Islands by the Chinese navy the South Vietnamese abandoned their positions there and fled 450 miles southward to the Sprately Islands. Though the

64. Leon Howell and Michael Morrow, Asia, Oil Politics and Energy Crisis (New York, 1974), p.125-29.

65. The other successful operations were the Iranian seizure of the islands of Greater and Lesser Tumbs in the Persian Gulf in 1971, the South Vietnamese invasion of the Sprately islands in 1974, the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974, and Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975. James Cable, Diplomacy at Sea (London, 1985), p. 180.

Chinese made no attempt to evict the Vietnamese from their new positions they once again reiterated their claim to both the Paracel and Sprately archipelagos.⁶⁶ The dispute regarding sovereignty over the Sprately islands is even more complicated than the Paracel islands in that they are claimed by no less than five states. The entire Sprately chain of islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. The Phillipines claim an area known as Kalayaan, which excludes some islands in the west and reefs in the south.⁶⁷ Malaysia claims the islands and reefs in the south.

China, Taiwan and Vietnam base their claims to the islands on the premise that it has been part of their state from time immemorial. Vietnam has provided hard evidence of French annexation of the islands in the 1930's. while China has drawn attention to maps produced by the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1975 which showed the islands as Chinese territory.⁶⁸

The conflicting claims on the island have very often led to clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Spratelys. The most recent clashes were on 14 March 1988, when Chinese and Vietnamese warships exchanged fire in the South China sea. Two days later the official Voice of Vietnam radio reported that two Vietnamese coastal freighters and a reserve ship had been set afire in the attack by Chinese warships. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments accused each other of starting the clash, with Peking warning Vietnam to stop its "armed provocation" or else face "full responsibility for all the consequences". Vietnam for its part claimed that the Chinese

66. Samuels, n. 62, p. 1.

67. Prescott, n. 15, p. 218.

68. J.R.V.Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in South-East Asia. A Commentary and Map. (Honolulu, 1981), p.35, cited in Ibid, p. 222.

warships were "cruising illegally" in Vietnamese waters.

Soon after the clash Vietnam sent a note to the Chinese government proposing talks to settle the territorial dispute.⁷⁰

But it is difficult to see how the various conflicting claims to the islands will be resolved peacefully. No less than five countries claim the islands or part of it. And no country seems willing to relinquish its claims, because all realise that the strategic and economic stakes are too high. If only two countries were involved it would have been possible for a joint zone to be created to allow development of resources before the claims were settled.⁷¹ The involvement of five countries seems to make this unlikely.

Meanwhile chances that a conflict will break out for control over the islands remains high. This aspect of the situation was highlighted by Brigadier General Lee Hsien Long, Singapore's Minister for Trade and Industry and second Minister for Defence. He said:

There are potential problems that could lead to conflict involving these powers, like the Spratlys. The islands are claimed by Malaysia, China, the Phillipines, Vietnam and Taiwan. The stakes will not be the little atolls, but the hope of oil in surrounding waters. If oil is discovered conflict can hardly be avoided. China and Vietnam have already exchanged blows over the islands. Any escalation of the conflict over Spratly's will threaten the sea lines of communication in the South China Sea. If this happens, powers with commercial or strategic interests in the region will not sit still and watch unconcerned. (72)

-
69. Facts on File (New York), Vol.48, No.2470, 25 March, 1988, p.201
70. Ibid.
71. Prescott, n.15, p.222.
72. Interview with Brig.Gen. Lee Hsien Loong in Armed Forces Journal International (Washington), Vol.127, No.7, February 1990, p. 53.

The Abu Musa and Tunbs islands.

On 4 November, 1971 the Iranian Navy seized two island chains at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, the Abu Musa and Tunbs, adding one more to the long list of conflicts that already plagued the region. The Iranian invasion of the islands strengthened Iran's strategic position in the Persian Gulf and established Iran as a power to be reckoned with in the region.


Historically Persia was always concerned about the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. But by the late 60's, the Gulf, notably the narrow exit from it through the Straits of Hormuz into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean had become much more important for Iran because through it was shipped the Iranian oil that was the base of Iran's growing power and prosperity.⁷³ The Abu Musa and Tunbs islands lie at the entrance to the Strait in the Persian Gulf (See figure 1.4) and it is not surprising that Iran desired to have its control over these islands.

Until 1971 regional rivalries between states in the Gulf region was restrained by the British presence in the area. Until the early seventies, the independent nationalist powers in the region, notably Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq were also kept in check by their preoccupation with the process of nation building and serious internal threats.⁷⁴ But in 1968 the Labour government in Britain decided that it would pull back its forces east of the Suez before the end of 1971. This would have meant granting independence to the Trucial States, which had been administered until then by Britain. There were a great number of territorial disputes between the states of the region, and

73. William E.Griffith, "Iran's Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era", in George Lenczowski, Ed, Iran Under the Pahlavis (Stanford, CA, 1978), p.378.

74. Malcolm C.Peck, The United Arab Emirates. A Venture in Unity (Boulder, Colarado, 1986), pp. 36-37.

Figure 1.4



The Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands in the Persian Gulf

Source: J.R.V.Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, (London, 1985), p.170.

once the British forces withdrew there was certain to be a reassertion of these territorial claims possibly leading to conflict.⁷⁵ Even before they withdrew, Iran's reassertion of its claim to the Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands was to cause uncertainty and tension in the area.

The Iranian claim to these three small islands strategically located at the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz were weak. Abu Musa had been ruled as part of the Gulf sheikhdom of Sharjah and the Tunbs as part of Ras-al Khaimah for at least a century before. Both these sheikhdoms were among the Trucial States being administered by Britain. On numerous occasions in the past Iran had asserted its claims to these islands, all of which had been rejected by the British, who under the 1892 Treaty with the Trucial States had an obligation to defend them from aggression. In fact an Iranian occupation of the islands in 1904 was ended by the British who asserted the sovereignty of Sharjah and Ras-al Khaimah over these islands.⁷⁶ Iranian claims over the islands had remained dormant after Second World War mainly because of Iran's preoccupation with internal problems as also the realisation that Britain would not countenance any Iranian takeover of the islands.

The announcement of Britain's decision to withdraw from the Gulf was to change all this. The Shah was by then committed to establishing Iran as a protector of the Gulf and its approaches to the Indian Ocean. It must however be admitted that the Shah was genuinely fearful of the threat from radical elements to the region, and did not trust what he thought would be weak and

-
75. Alvin J. Cottrell, "Iran's Armed Forces Under the Pahlavi Dynasty" in Lenczowski, n.73, p.404.
76. Mohammad Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London, 1978), pp.244-45.

unstable Arab states to secure these strategic islands against the threat of hostile forces.⁷⁷ The Shah was not ready to let go of an opportunity to assert Iranian control over these islands, especially since the British were now about to leave, thus removing any obstacles in his path.

The British in the face of Iranian threats that it would occupy the islands by force if necessary, tried to promote a compromise solution. On 29 November, 1971 the issue of Abu Musa was settled through British efforts. Although both Iran and Sharjah did not formally give up their claims to sovereignty over the islands, the two agreed that (a) Sharjah would maintain jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the island through its police and other pertinent offices; (b) Iran would deploy its troops on agreed-upon sites on the islands; (c) the two parties would equally share the income derived from oil and other minerals; and (d) Iran would extend financial aid to Sharjah to the tune of 1.5 million pound sterling per annum for nine years or until Sharjah's annual oil revenues reached 3 million pound sterling.⁷⁸ But no such agreement was possible for the Tunbs.

Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammed of Ras-al Khaimah refused to make a deal with the Shah and on 30 November, 1971, the day before the British treaty of protection was to expire and the United Arab Emirates, the newly formed federation was to become independent, the Iranians seized the Tunbs by force, killing four Ras-al Khaimah policemen and loosing three of their own men. The same day they made a peaceful landing on Abu Musa as well, ostensibly according to the agreement that had previously been reached with

77. Peck, n.74, p.53.

78. Ali Mohammed Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates. Unity in Fragmentation (Boulder, Colorado, 1979), pp. 152-53. For the text of this agreement see, Rouhollah K.Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role. (Charlottesville, 1972), p.140.

79
 Sharjah. The Iranian takeover of the islands was unopposed. The Gulf sheikhdoms had insufficient military power to challenge the Iranians, and the Britain which was still the protecting power refused to get involved, since they were just a day away from formally withdrawing from the territory. Britain suffered the brunt of Arab anger, with Iraq breaking off diplomatic relations and Libya nationalising British Petroleum's assets and oil production interests in the country. Libya also withdrew all
 80
 its deposits from British banks.

Following the Iranian takeover of the islands in 1971, the issue remained dormant until the overthrow of the Shah during the Iranian revolution in 1978. Sharjah and Ras-al Khaimah however continued to claim sovereignty over the islands. Following the revolution, Arab nations, particularly Iraq, asked the new regime to return the island. The request was refused. The new Iranian regime has even threatened to reconsider assurances given by the Shah about Iranian acceptance of the independence of Bahrain. These were assurances which were given in 1971 in return for the agreement that assured Iranian control over Abu Musa island. Sadiq Bouhani, a leader of the conservative religious wing of Iranian leadership in April 1980 threatened to renew Iranian claims to Bahrain if Iraq continued to ask Iran to pull out of the three islands, saying that "the Shah's parliament which abandoned Iran's claim to Bahrain in 1970 was an illegal
 81
 parliament." The new Iranian government gave notice of its intention to retain full control of the islands by forcing

79. Peck, n.74, p.53.

80. Ibid.

81. The Iraqi-Iranian Conflict: Documentary Dossier (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Iraq) January 1981, p. 10, quoted in John Muttam, Arms and Insecurity in the Persian Gulf (New Delhi, 1984), p. 84.

exploration off the Abu Musa islands in the summer of 1984, in spite of the fact that the agreement with Sharjah had given Iranian control over the islands but allowed such concessions to Sharjah. It has been reported that this was done due to Iranian sensitivities about its build up of military facilities on the island.⁸² Until the status of the islands is permanently settled to the full satisfaction of all sides, they will probably continue to be a potential source of regional tension. The fact that the islands still continue to be claimed by more than one state in the region makes their future even less uncertain.

Cyprus.

The island of Cyprus is an island of modest size -- 222 kilometers long and 95 kilometers broad at its widest point -- with very limited natural resources. It is located just 80 kilometers off the south coast of Turkey and 100 kilometers west of the politically turbulent Middle East, it lies alongside three major inter-sea routes, the Black Sea in the eastern Mediterranean via the important straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorous; the Suez Canal, and through it the Red Sea; and the Persian Gulf overland through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.⁸³ This important strategic position has invited the interest of almost all the imperial powers who have ruled the region, and in many ways these invasions by imperial powers have contributed to the present problems of this island.

Populated largely by Greek speaking Christians, it was colonized under the Ottoman empire by the Ottoman Turks. The two communities lived in isolated communities in the island without

82. Middle East Economic Digest (London) Vol.28, No.32, 10 August, 1984, p.54.

83. Richard A.Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-71 (Waterloo, Ontario, 1976), p.3.

fully integrating among themselves. The Greek-Cypriots outnumbered the Turkish-Cypriots by about three to one. After the island became a Crown Colony in 1925, they reasserted their influence. Nationalist Greeks sought enosis, or union of the island with Greece. The Turkish-Cypriots were determined to prevent this. A Greek Cypriot guerilla war against the British for unification of the island with Greece provoked a violent campaign for seperation of the two communities and partition of the island.

In 1958 the British government came to the conclusion that the island was now more a liability than an asset, and decided to withdraw provided its security interests in the island could be maintained. It was decided that Britain 'no longer needed Cyprus as a base but only bases in Cyprus'.⁸⁴ The British government let it be known that it was prepared to accept any solution that was acceptable to both Greece and Turkey. In February 1959 the Greek and Turkish governemts negotiated a settlement package, which was later agreed to by Britain. The package consisted of three treaties (Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance), plus a complex power sharing constitution. Though Cypriot leaders attended the talks, it was not to their full liking and Archbishop Makarios, who represented the Greek Cypriots even claimed that he agreed to it under duress.⁸⁵ Cyprus became independent on 16 August, 1960.

It was clear from the very beginning that only goodwill on both sides and a strict adherence to the provisions of the power-sharing constitution would guarentee peace in the badly divided

84. Stephen Xydis, Cyprus: A Reluctant Republic (The Hague, 1973), p.65.

85. Robert Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms (London, 1966), pp.163-67.

island. But hardliners in both the Greek and Turkish communities were to ensure that peace was not to prevail. Perpetual friction in the government, alongwith pressure on Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, from those favouring union with Greece prompted him to intorduce extensive constitutional amendments which removed all safeguards for the minority Turkish-Cypriot community. In December 1963 fighting broke out between armed militias from both communities and in the first few days at least 500 people were killed.⁸⁶ Talks held between the two communities in London could not resolve the dispute, and in March 1964, for the first time United Nations troops were stationed in the island to maintain peace. But this did not solve the political problem of tense relations between the two warring communities. The Greeks asking for union with Greece, and the Turks demanding the division of the island. Turkey refrained from invading and forcefully partitioning the island primarily because of the pressure of other NATO members who did not want to see war break out between two of its members. To deter a Turkish invasion Greek troops were clandestinely transferred to the island, and this forced the Turkish-Cypriots to establish a parallel government in areas where they were concentrated.⁸⁷ Talks were held between the two sides to settle the dispute peacefully, and Archbishop Makarios was even ready to negotiate a new constitution ensuring the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The talks began in June 1968 and continued intermittently for the next six years. The willingness of Archbishop Makarios to negotiate for something less than complete union with Greece, divided the Greek community on the island,

86. Patrick, n.83, p.96.

87. Ibid, pp. 83-86.

with a militant section, under the control of the Greek military leadership even going to the extent of launching terrorist attacks against members of their community who favoured negotiations and compromise with the Turks. There were even several assassination attempts against Archbishop Makarios.⁸⁸

The talks which began in 1968 were deadlocked over the degree of political autonomy that the Turkish-Cypriots would be allowed to have. It was at this juncture that the Greek government was overthrown in November 1973 by Brigadier Dimitros Ioannides, the chief of Military Police. Ioannides, hated both Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish Cypriots equally, and as soon as he came to power he drew up plans to overthrow Makarios and forcefully unite Cyprus with Greece. On 3 July, 1974 Makarios moved to head off this threat. He issued an open letter to the Greek junta attacking Athens for backing the "criminal activities" of those who were fighting for union with Greece, and demanded that all Greek officers be removed from the islands.⁸⁹ On 15 July 1974, the Cypriot National Guard, which though nominally independent was actually an arm of the Greek army, stormed the Presidential palace in a bid to kill Archbishop Makarios. Though he managed to escape, his government was overthrown. It appears that the aim of Brigadier Ioannides was to install a puppet regime in Cyprus after overthrowing Archbishop Makarisos, and then move to negotiate with Turkey the union of Cyprus with Greece. In return Turkey was to be given important concessions, such as military bases on the island.⁹⁰

88. Robert McDonald, The Problem of Cyprus. Adelphi Paper No.234, Winter 1988/89 (London, 1989), p.16.

89. Leigh H.Bruce, "Cyprus: A Last Chance", in Foreign Policy (Washington), No.58, Spring 1985, p.126.

90. Polvios G.Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation. 1960 - 1980 (London, 1980), p.154

But the repercussions of the coup were entirely different. The Turkish-Cypriots feared for the worse since the new leaders of Cyprus were men who were against any concessions to the Turkish minority and for complete union with Greece. Turkey seized this opportunity to invade the island, invoking in justification, the Treaty of Guarantee. The invasion was presented as peacekeeping operation, designed to secure the safety and rights of Turkish-Cypriots.

At the time of the invasion, Greece and Turkey were already in dispute over territorial waters and seabed rights in the Aegean Sea. Greece extended its six-mile territorial waters to 12 miles, which Turkey said would block the passage from its western ports to the Mediterranean, and would lead to war. Greece insisted that each of the islands had a continental shelf of its own while Turkey argued for a natural prolongation of its mainland shelf, something that would have given it greater access to the Mediterranean.⁹¹ This dispute when added to the one over Cyprus convinced Turkey that an invasion of Cyprus was necessary if it was to protect the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots and protect its interests in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas.

Turkey envisaged a two stage operation: first to establish a beachhead on the island followed by consolidation and occupation of a substantial zone in northern Cyprus. In the initial period of the attack between 20-22 July, the Turkish troops secured some territory around the north coast town of Kyrenia and a corridor to the Turkish enclave north of Nicosia. At first some 6,000 men⁹² with 30 tanks were landed from the sea and by a para-drop.

91. For details of the dispute over the Aegean, see Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute. Adelphi Paper No.155 (London, 1979)


92. McDonald, n.88, p.18.

They met with much stiffer resistance than expected and when the UN appealed for a cease-fire Turkey quickly accepted. Talks were again held between Greece and Turkey with the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan mediating from 25-30 July, and again from 9-14 August. The talks were not only futile, but Turkey used the cease-fire period to strengthen its position on the island. Between 14-16 August, some 40,000 men with 200 tanks poured through the Kyrenia salient and other landing points to seize almost 40 percent of Cyprus north of a 180-kilometer line running from Famagusta in the east to the Morphou Bay on the north-west coast. ⁹³ (See figure 1.5).


In September 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot provisional administration on the island set up after the invasion declared itself as the Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Administration. The following February, the northern territory was declared to be the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Though it was presented as a federal unit, a potential constituent of a federal Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriots simultaneously created all institutions of an independent state: constitution, executive, legislature, courts, police and an army. In November 1983 even the facade of federation was thrown away and it declared itself to be the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey is the only nation to recognize this state. The United Nations, and all its member states, with the exception of Turkey, recognize the Greek-Cypriot government as the legitimate government of the Republic.

The election of George Vassiliou, an independent, as president of Cyprus in February 1988 has raised hopes that talks can begin to reunify the country once again. Vassiliou favours a

Figure 1.5



The Eastern Mediterranean



Cyprus after the Turkish invasion

Source: Kyriacos C. Makridis, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (New Haven, 1977),

settlement, though not at any cost. The complex task will be to take care of Turkish-Cypriot concerns, while ensuring that the desire of the Greek-Cypriots for union with Greece is at least fulfilled. But the problem has been an intractable one. Each community, while insecure, is at the same time intransigent. The Turkish Cypriots are a minority in the island, but have the support of the major regional power, Turkey. This renders the Greek Cypriots, a majority on the island, a minority in the region and so they turn to Greece for help, which itself fears becoming a disadvantaged local power in the region.⁹⁴ This tangle of mutual suspicion and hostilities is likely to ensure that the island remains a regional trouble spot for some time.

94. A.J.R.Groom, "Cyprus: Back in the Doldrums" Round Table (Surrey), No.300, October 1986, p.380

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR

When the crisis over the Falkland Islands broke out in March/April 1982 it is said that many Englishmen found it difficult to locate the islands on a map. Such was the level of ignorance in Britain of the public at large. Nevertheless the islands were the remnants of Britain's colonial possessions. In Argentina there was greater public conviction of Argentina's sovereignty over the islands. Argentines learn about 'Las Malvinas'¹ from their childhood. The restoration of Argentine sovereignty over the islands had been a national obsession for decades, and the resort to force to recover them came at the end of a long drawn out series of negotiations that had made little progress and threatened to drag on for ever. This chapter, in addition to tracing briefly the history of these islands from the mid-sixteenth century, will examine the factors that influenced Argentina to resort to military force to recover the island. An attempt has been made to analyse the miscalculations on the Argentine side that led it to believe that Britain would not respond in a similar manner, and also the failure of the British government to foresee in advance any Argentine resort to force. Simultaneously the question as to why Britain did not opt to deploy reasonable forces in the area to deter any Argentine resort to force has also been examined. Eventually the vital question of whether the Argentine invasion of the islands was the result of British government policy towards the islands or the failure of intelligence has been examined.²

-
1. Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands", Foreign Affairs, (New York), Vol.61, No.1, Fall 1982, p.198.
 2. Intelligence for the purpose of this study, is understood to be "a product resulting from collection, collation, evaluation, analysis integration and interpretation of all collected information". See Amos A.Jordan, American National Security Policy and Process (Baltimore, 1981), p.127.

Geography of the islands.

The Falklands/Malvinas³ islands are situated in the South Atlantic about 480 miles north-east of Cape Horn. The whole group comprises around 200 islands, the two largest being East and West Falklands. There is only one town, Stanley, with a population of 1,583, and the next largest settlement in Goose Green, with a population of 95.⁴ Both these settlements are on the East Falklands. The total land area of the islands is approximately 4,700 square miles. There are few trees, but substantial grasslands.


The principal territories of the islands are the Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the mainland peninsula of Graham Land, and a segment of the Antarctic mainland delineated according to the sector principle.⁵ With the exception of South Georgia, which has an area of approximately 1,450 square miles, the other islands lie within the Arctic circle. (See Figure 2.1)

A history of the conflict.

If we take an extended historical record as a frame of reference the Anglo-Argentine conflict dates back to 1833, when Britain occupied the Falklands after a brief period of Argentine rule and, ultimately to the early sixteenth century, when the

-
3. The islands are called the Falkland islands by British and the Malvinas by Argentina. The islands will be referred to as the Falklands throughout the study except while citing sources which use the Argentine name for the islands.
 4. Raphael Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook (London, 1983), p.2.
 5. Different nations have claimed overlapping areas of the Antarctic continent basing their claims on sector principles which they themselves lay down. The British have defined their sector as including all lands and islands south of latitude 58 degrees South between longitude 50 degrees and 80 degrees West. For a discussion of the various claims and the different sector rules on which they are based, see F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics (Bloomington, Indiana, 1982)

Figure 2.1



Map of the South Atlantic and part of Antarctica showing the Argentine coast and the Falkland Islands

Source: Fritz L. Hoffman and Olga Mingo Hoffman, Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982 (Boulder, Colorado, 1984). p.2.

islands were first discovered by navigators.

In April 1502 the islands were probably sighted by a Portugese sea captain and were noted at the time in the record of Amerigo Vespucci. Other sightings were subsequently recorded and by 1550 these islands off the Patogonian coast were known to Spanish, Portugese and English navigators⁶ British sources state a probable first sighting by an Englishman as the one made by Captain John Davis in 1592. These sources maintain that the first recorded landing occoured in 1690 by Captian John Strong, who named the islands after Viscount Falkland, then Treasurer of the British Navy.⁷

Argentine sources note the designation of the islands on numerous Spanish maps, the first of which appeared in 1522, and they attribute the first discovery to Esteban Gomez of Magellan's exdpedition in 1520. The Argentines reject the alleged British discovery by Davis (1592), and cite the absence of any reference⁸ to the islands in the British cartography of the period. But there is no dispute over the fact that the first to settle on the islands were the French, who arrived on the islands in January 1764, and carried out a formal ceremony of possession on 15 April, 1764.⁹ This was Louis Antonine de Bougainville's

-
6. For a historical study of the early sightings of the islands and of the controversy surrounding its colonisation, see Fritz L.Hoffman and Olga Mingo Hoffman, Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982 (Boulder, Colarado, 1984)
 7. For a British view of the islands history, see Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Falkland Islands. The Facts (London, 1982).
 8. Paerl, n.4, pp.4-5.
 9. Christopher Bluth, "The British resort to force in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, 1982: International Law and Just War theory", Journal of Peace Research (London), Vol.24, No.1, March 1987, p.6.

settlement at Port Louis. The French thus became the first to exercise sovereignty over the islands and hence was in a position to legally claim sovereignty over the islands.

However Spain protested against the colonisation of what they considered to be their territory by right. The Spanish claim was based on the Pontifical Concession of 4 May, 1493, when Pope Alexander VI promulgated the 'Bull Inter Caetera', awarding to the Crown of Castille (the Spanish monarchy) all the mainland and the islands of the sea, discovered and to be discovered in future beyond the imaginary line dividing the world at the time, and the subsequent Treaty of Tordisilles in 1494.¹⁰ Negotiations followed between Spain and France and in 1767, France ceded the title to Spain in lieu of compensation. At that moment Spain¹¹ became the legitimate owner of the title.

The whole issue was however complicated by the fact that on 12 January, 1765, one year after the French established their settlement, Captain John Byron (an English naval captain) claimed the islands in the name of King George III and established a settlement at Saunder's island, named Port Egmont. Thus for a time there were two nations claiming sovereignty and maintaining settlements on the islands at the same time. After getting rid of the French in 1767, Spain in 1770 tried to evict the British settlers from Port Egmont by force. This action brought the two nations to the brink of war and talks were held to resolve the dispute.

10. Under that agreement however, it appears that Spain got rights west of the 48th parallel and Portugal to the east of it. According to such a reading, South Georgia, the South Sandwich and South Orkney islands would be under Portugese sovereignty and not Spanish sovereignty. Furthermore it is maintained that these documents define respective spheres of annexation between the parties only. Paerl, n.4, p.21.

11. Bluth, n.9, p.7.

On 22 January, 1771 two declarations were signed by the representatives of the kings of Spain and Great Britain. The main points of the Spanish declaration were:

1. Spain agreed to restore the settlement to Britain.
2. Spain disavowed the attack on the Port Egmont settlement, and,
3. Spain did not accept that its rights with respect to sovereignty over the Malvinas islands were affected in any way by the declaration.¹²

This was a face saving exercise for Britain because, as per the conditions of a second agreement that was kept secret, Britain abandoned the Port Egmont settlement for economic reasons. But they left behind a plaque claiming British sovereignty.¹³ Thus by 1774 Spain had complete control over the islands, but sovereignty over them was still disputed.

A third actor was introduced into the affair when parts of mainland Latin America gained independence from Spain in the nineteenth century. In 1816, the United Provinces Government in Buenos Aires (whose territory included present day Argentina) declared sovereignty over the islands and in 1820 took formal possession.¹⁴ A colony was established in the islands in 1828. But in 1833 the Argentine governor on the islands was forced to leave the islands, along with the settlers and the British once again established their sovereignty which they exercised from then on, without interruption until 2 April, 1982.

The Argentine position on sovereignty.

According to the Argentine government, the British

12. Ibid, p.6.

13. Ibid, pp.6-7. Emphasis added.

14. Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War, 1982 (London, 1985), p.24.

occupation of the islands in 1833 was an act of usurpation of its national territory, carried out by unacceptable and illegal means. Argentine claims to sovereignty over the islands rest primarily on the following main points:

1. Its discovery by Spain.
2. French and British acceptance of Spanish sovereignty over the islands in several treaties.
3. The peaceful occupation and administration by 19 Spanish governors of the islands since 1774 until Argentina's independence
4. The succession of states (a provision in international law whereby the possessions of a colonial power automatically pass on to its successor state when it gains independence).
5. Recognition of Argentina's independence by Britain in 1825 without any claim to the islands, which were then under the rule of an Argentine governor living in the islands, and
6. Peaceful and undisputed occupation, and administration by five Argentine governors until 1833. (15)

Sovereignty: The British position.

Britain maintains that its claims had been recognized by Spain in 1771 and that Britain had not legally abandoned her claim to the islands when she left the islands in 1774. Britain also states that Argentine claims are based mainly on her claim to have been the successor state to the Spanish Viceroyalty of the River Plate, and emphasize that the viceroyalty governed most of what is today Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile.¹⁶ The implication is that if the Falklands does not belong to Britain, it does not belong solely to Argentina either.

The current British position on its claim to sovereignty over the islands is based on the following historical facts:

1. Early and probably first sighting and discovery (sighting by John Davis in 1592 and Sir John Hawkins in 1594).
2. The first known landing in 1690 by Captain John Strong who

15. Paerl, n.4, pp.23-24.

16. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Facts, n.7, p.2.

named the islands after Viscount Falkland, then Secretary of the Navy.

3. Establishment in 1776 of a settlement of about 400 people at Port Egmont in the West Falkland (this settlement remained until 1774 when the British withdrew on grounds of economy but left behind a plaque declaring the Falkland Islands to be British property).
4. Withdrawal of Spanish settlement on West Falkland Islands in 1811
5. British protests to the fact that a governor was appointed for the Falkland islands by Buenos Aires government noticing the Spanish restitution of Port Egmont and asserting that the British evacuation of 1774 had not constituted abandonment.
6. British repossession of Port Egmont in 1832 and the occupation of Port Louis in 1833.
7. Open, continuous, effective, and peaceful occupation since 1833. (17)

Later an additional element was added to the whole dispute. The wishes of the Falkland islanders, who were originally settlers from Britain. The tangle of claim and counter claim, and the unwillingness of both sides to compromise, ensured that efforts at negotiations to end the dispute peacefully would fail.

The negotiations for a settlement. 1965 - 1982.

The 'modern period' of the Anglo-Argentine dispute can be traced back to 1965 when the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 2065 asked the British and Argentine governments to start negotiations in order to find a "peaceful solution to their respective claims about sovereignty".¹⁸ Meetings took place nearly every year afterwards and by 1977 a few agreements had been reached between Britain and Argentina, mostly pertaining to

-
17. Great Britain, Reference Services, Central Office of Information, "The Falkland Islands and Dependencies" 7 April 1982, and FCO, The Facts, n.7, cited in Raphael Perl, n.4, p.28. Emphasis added.
 18. John Laffin, Fight for the Falklands (New York, 1982), p.5.

services that Argentina would provide for the islanders. The Argentine government also licensed the state oil company to provide fuel for the Falklands. The 1972 meeting led to an agreement by the Argentines to extend sea and air links and postal services for the islanders. In addition, educational and medical facilities for the Falkland islanders were provided in Buenos Aires.¹⁹ A year earlier, a joint declaration had been initialled, providing for the the execution of measures leading to the establishment of communications between the islands and the Argentine mainland.²⁰ These included telecommunications, postal services, legal papers needed for travelling, ship schedules and air travel.

Welcome as these agreements were, especially for the Falkland islanders, the talks did not bring the two sides any closer on the crucial question of sovereignty. Both sides refused to relent on this basic issue. The British consistently upheld their position that they could not go against the wishes of the islanders (who wanted to maintain their links with Britain). To the Argentines, the British reasoning was inconsistent, as they reiterated their position that the British occupation of the islands was illegal in the first place. The British approach to the talks, at least in the earlier years of negotiations was positive, as successive British governments had been trying to negotiate with Argentina, some means, acceptable to the islanders, of accomodating Argentine claims regarding sovereignty. Possibly the British calculation had been that the islands had long since lost their importance as a coaling station

19. Ibid., pp.5-6.

20. Hoffman and Hoffman, n.6, pp.114-115.

and base from which to control the sea route round Cape Horn. Economically they were deemed to be of only marginal value, at least in the short term. However long term British interest in the islands appeared to be related to British claims over Antarctic territory on the basis of its proximity to the Falklands²²

But for Argentina the stakes were much higher. The islands had high strategic relevance to Argentina. This aspect was reiterated by Nicanor Costa Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister during the war. He said, "The meaning of Argentine presence in the islands is that Argentina controls an area in the South Atlantic, politically and economically."²³ Possible Argentine jurisdiction over the islands and the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) would give Argentina two important advantages:

- Argentina would have increased the size of its patrimonial or historic sea and therefore its control over area fisheries and seabed mineral resources, and,

- Argentina would have stabilized its southern sea frontier in a strategic sense. The islands would have provided wider diplomatic and military options.²⁴

For Argentina, an additional incentive to settle the dispute in its favour was provided by a report of the Shell oil company

21. Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in Latin America (New York, 1985), p.28.
22. For Britain's interests in the Antarctic, see Peter J. Beck, "Britain's Antarctic dimension", International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.3, Summer 1983.
23. The Economist (London), 24 April, 1982, p.14
24. Marshall Van Sant Hall, "Argentina's policy motivations in the Falklands War and the aftermath", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.36, No.6, November/December 1983, p.6.

disclosing high oil prospects in the area. Indeed the survey speculated that there was enough oil between the Falklands and the Patagonian (Latin American) coast to justify the label of 'New Kuwait'.²⁵ However Shell warned that the report was 'merely an unsubstantiated estimate' but it caused some excitement in Buenos Aires.

Less unsubstantiated was the potential for fisheries in the area around the islands. Though the sea had been overfished and required conservation, the most abundant marine creature in the seas around is the small shrimp like krill which has considerable economic potential.²⁶ During the seventies the Soviets, Japanese and East Europeans among other fishing nations had been increasingly active in krill harvesting around the Falklands.

Argentine impatience with lack of any movement forward on the sovereignty dispute led to periods of increased tension between Britain and Argentina in the seventies. In 1976 the Argentines illegally established a scientific research station on South Thule, an island in the South Sandwich group, a part of the Falkland Islands Dependency, 900 miles to the east.²⁷ The British made several protests about the Argentine presence on Thule, all of which were ignored. For the Argentine's who were on the lookout for any sign of weakening British resolve, this was an encouraging sign.

In 1977, another crisis was to result in a more active British response. During talks in July of that year in Rome when the Argentine delegate, Gualtar O.Allara raised the question of sovereignty, the British delegate Hugh A.Cortazzi said that he

25. Laffin, n.18, p.5.

26. Hall, n.24, p.6

27. Laffin, n.18, p.8.

was not authorized to discuss that point. The British refusal to discuss the crucial issue of sovereignty hardened the Argentine position. Subsequently intelligence reports reaching London indicated that the Argentine government believed Britain was pursuing delaying tactics and that there was every likelihood of Argentina adopting a hard line during the forthcoming talks. Meanwhile the weak and ineffective response of the British government to the establishment of an Argentine research station on South Thule encouraged the Argentine navy, and in September of 1977 it began detaining foreign vessels fishing in Falklands waters. The Argentine naval attache in Britain was directed to inform the British government that a similar fate would also await British vessels that fished in Argentine waters.²⁹

In November 1977, the Joint Intelligence Committee in London perceived the danger of an Argentine invasion of the islands in the event of failure of the talks on the islands future, scheduled for December. Hence contingency plans were formulated which was to remain secret. These plans provided for a military presence in the area consisting of a nuclear powered submarine near the islands, and two frigates about 1000 miles away.³⁰ This token force was to take up station during the talks in December. The military planners were aware that the envisaged presence would not have repelled a large attack force, but it could effectively deal with a limited attack. As soon as the British deployment became effective the Argentines most probably reconsidered any plans for an invasion of the islands.³¹

28. Hoffman and Hoffman, n.3, pp.130-32.

29. Ibid, p.133.

30. Lord Franks, Falkland Islands Review: A Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors (London, 1983), p.6.

31. Laffin, n.18, p.6

At the December talks it was decided to separate the talks into two sections -- one to discuss sovereignty and the other to discuss economic cooperation. Any hope that the sovereignty issue would be solved during the Lima talks in 1978 (15 - 17 February) would have been futile, given the constraints of the British delegation. Indeed the British negotiators had little choice because the British Parliament had tied their hands by supporting without reservation, the stand of the Falkland islanders that they wanted to remain under British sovereignty. As Lawrence Freedman says, by early 1982, the "British could offer neither compromise to Argentina nor a credible long term commitment to the Falkland Islands. The only negotiating position left was prevarication."³² By now it had dawned on the Argentines that negotiations would not result in a transfer of sovereignty.

Meanwhile, to keep the issue alive in the minds of the Argentine people, the government proclaimed a 'Week of Malvinas' from 3 - 10 June, 1979 to celebrate the establishment of the first Argentine government on the island on 10 June, 1829. The day was declared a national holiday. More ominously for Britain was when the Argentines began to speak of restoring the islands to Argentine control by 2 January, 1983, the sequicentennial of³³ the British seizure of the islands.

The Argentine decision to invade.

In March 1982, talks that were held between Britain and Argentina once again ended in failure. The two sides had precious little to show for seventeen years of on-going

32. Freedman, n.1, p.198.

33. Hoffman and Hoffman, n.6., p.133.

negotiations. While complaining that Britain's unwillingness to set a time frame for negotiations was merely procrastination, Argentina declared that it was "not prepared to let things drag on indefinitely".³⁴ However this statement was not taken seriously by Britain. But indifference was to have serious repercussions as later events were to show. For by then Argentina had decided that the time had come to settle the dispute once and for all, if necessary by using force.

The decision to use force to resolve the dispute was due to Argentine perception of itself as a victim of colonial aggression, as well as by a feeling among the leadership that the current international situation favoured a resort to force. A characteristic of Argentine geopolitical thought, which had considerable significance in terms of its international relations, was the view that Argentina as a country had suffered geopolitical aggression from its neighbours (Chile and Brazil) as well as from outside powers like Spain and Britain.³⁵ In the case of the first two countries there had been a feeling that Argentina gave up far too much territory in the nineteenth century. Should there be no recovery or compensation for these territorial losses, Argentine geopoliticians felt that the nation will never regain the greatness of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. Geopolitical writers in Argentina spoke of their country as "pais agrededo geopoliticamente",³⁶ (a nation that has suffered geopolitical aggression), and one that had endured violation of its territories in the past.

34. Paul Eddy, Magnus Linlater and Peter Gillman, Eds, War in the Falkland Islands: The Full Story (New York, 1982).

35. For a discussion of Argentine geopolitical views, see Child, n.21.

36. Ibid, p.42.

A sense of geopolitical mutilation has potential, in the hands of a 'demagogic and irresponsible leader' of being used to justify any aggressive posture or even direct action against perceived enemies.³⁷ In December 1981 probably such a leader had come to power in Argentina. General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, the Army Chief of Staff, succeeded Gen.Roberto Viola as President. A staunch anti-communist and strong supporter of the United States, Gen.Galtieri had full support of the military junta, which consisted exclusively of uniformed men who were hawkish by nature and prone to adventurism.

While there is still some disagreement among scholars as to when the actual decision to invade was taken, it is generally agreed that the preparations for an invasion began in late 1981.³⁸ Gerald W.Hopple in his study of the genesis of the war attribute the decision to an intellectual syndrome in Argentina which relied on certain reassuring, but misleading political and strategic assumptions.³⁹ These assumptions were to do with 'facts' about ones own capabilities and the adversary's capabilities, intentions and risk calculations.

In Argentina three preconceptions of the leadership led it to believe that an invasion of the Falklands would be successful:

1. A feeling that Britain was losing interest in retaining the Falklands.
2. An underestimation of British military capability, especially naval capability, that led the leadership to

37. Ibid, p.43.

38. Harlan K.Ullman, "Profound or Prefunctory: Observations on the South Atlantic Conflict", in Robert E.Harkavy and Stephaine G.Neuman, Eds, The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World (Massachusetts, 1985), p.239.

39. Gerald W.Hopple, "Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War" in World Politics (Princeton), Vol.36, No.3, April 1984, p.341.

believe that Britain could not respond militarily to an invasion if it wanted to, and,

3. A firm belief that the United States would remain neutral in case of an Anglo-Argentine conflict, perhaps even giving tacit support to the Argentine position.

Though in retrospect all these assumptions seem far fetched, at the time there were several signals from Britain that made at least the first two assumptions look valid.

It appears that the predominant consideration of the Argentinians in their calculations had been a sign that Britain was overwhelmed by the liabilities of the Falklands. In 1980 Nicholas Ridley, a Foreign Office minister, who had visited the Falklands had strongly suggested a compromise involving the ceding of titular sovereignty to Argentina in return for full British rights for a certain period -- the 'Hong Kong arrangement'⁴⁰. The islanders rejected the idea, but in Buenos Aires the proposal was taken note of. Indeed the British proposal was misread by the Argentines with the presumption that the British were not going to negotiate the islands away, but were willing to let them pass on to Argentina by default if Argentina moved swiftly and cleanly so as not to embarrass the United Kingdom.⁴¹ One of Argentina's intelligence documents for example, reported that "Great Britain is in a desperate situation and would be able to cut off the Malvinas. If we occupy the islands without violence the British will make a great deal of noise, but will do nothing. They will be glad to get rid of one more colony especially when all their military strength is

40. Laffin, n.18, p.7.

41. Kenneth R. McGruther, "When Deterrence Fails: The nasty little war for the Falklands Islands", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.36, No.2, March/April 1983, p.48.

committed to NATO and Northern Ireland".⁴² The Argentine intelligence analyst also noted that the British had never said "no" over the Malvinas while they often said "perhaps" and "in-⁴³time". The British decision in 1981 to withdraw HMS Endurance, sole navy patrol ship in the Falklands -- and not to replace it - - was also seen by the Argentines as yet more evidence that the British were withdrawing.

In fact during a meeting with President Galtieri on 20 January, 1982, Ortiz de Rozas, the Argentine ambassador in Britian said that in resorting to the ploy of taking into account the 'wishes' of the inhabitants of the Falklands, the British were using a delaying tactic. Ortiz de Rozas also predicted that the negotiations would last a very long time.⁴⁴

Galtieri in his only published report after the war asserted that de Roza gave his opinion concerning an eventual Argentine invasion of the islands, indicating that there would be no British counter-attack if the military action was carried out "cleanly". He said that the British "would not even twist an⁴⁵ ankle".

But more than the attitude of the British government with regard to the Falkland islands, it was the state of the British navy that provided much encouragement to those in Buenos Aires who wanted a military solution to the dispute. For it was

42. Laffin, n.18, p.7.

43. Laffin in his book does not give the sources from which he obtained these reports and hence they must be treated with caution. But the analysis is in line with statements by Argentinian leaders after the invasion when they discounted any military response by Britain. The British decision to send a task force came as a surprise to them.

44. Oscara Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum and Eduardo Van der Kooy, Falklands: The Secret Plot (Surrey, 1987), p.31.

45. Ibid, p.32.

believed that even if Britain decided to respond, the naval capabilities that they could muster would not suffice to fight an Argentine force firmly entrenched in the islands. This optimism was not without foundation. The Royal Navy had undergone a steady erosion in its capabilities over the years. In the 1960's a Labour government justified successive defence cuts by, among other things, withdrawing from east of Suez and declaring that Britain would never again conduct an opposed amphibious landing.⁴⁶ Simultaneously much of the military airlift capability that a global role had made imperative was also abolished. In 1981, Conservative Defence Secretary John Nott introduced a new look strategy concentrating on NATO's Central Front and anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. It also called for a reduction of even existing amphibious and airlift capabilities.⁴⁷ More important, from the viewpoint of the Argentinians was the British decision to phase out the two Amphibious Warfare Ships, 'Fearless' and 'Intrepid'. This would have left the Royal Marines without specialised transport for their role of carrying out amphibious operations.⁴⁸ Operations of this sort would be crucial if Britain was to retake the islands after an Argentine invasion. The number of anti-submarine warfare aircraft-carriers, capable of carrying Sea-King helicopters and Sea-Harrier aircraft was also to be reduced from three to two.

It is therefore not at all surprising that Argentinian embassy in London informed its Foreign Ministry that the British

46. Rodney Willox, "The Military Three Step: Trends in Rapid Deployment", Defence & Foreign Affairs (Alexandria, VA), Vol.XVII, No.9, September 1989, p.34.

47. Ibid, p.35.

48. Keith Speed, "The Royal Navy in NATO" Nato's Fifteen Nations (Brussels), Vol.6, No.4, August/September 1981, p.65.

were militarily weak and that its navy was "virtually non-existent".⁴⁹ From a military standpoint therefore it looked as if an invasion would be successful and would not be challenged. But there was one other factor that had to be considered. The attitude of Argentina's northern neighbour, the United States.

Support of the United States for any action in the Falklands was crucial for its success. US neutrality would not only bolster the Argentine position internationally, especially in the Organisation of American States, but it would also preclude any military help to Britain that would be indispensable if Britain was to have any chance of retaking the Falklands. In the late 1970's US-Argentine relations had deteriorated due to President Jimmy Carter's policy of restricting military and economic ties with countries that had a poor human rights record. But the election of Ronald Reagan as US President was to change all that. High level contacts between US officials and the Argentine government began shortly after the elections with a view to improving collaboration between the two countries in safeguarding South Atlantic security.⁵⁰ A geo-political doctrine of South Atlantic security was developed in order to justify the strengthening of relations with South American nations, even with those that had a poor human rights record.⁵¹ With hardline anti-communist governments in power in Washington and Buenos Aires it looked as if relations would improve further. Galtieri when he was Army Chief of Staff had shown keen interest in Argentine participation in setting up a Multinational Peace Force in the

49. Laffin, n.18, p.8.

50. C.Mechling, "The Argentine Pariah", in Foreign Policy (Washington), No.45, Winter 1981-82, p.75

51. A.Pierre, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy", in Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.60, No.1, Winter 1981-82, p.278.

Sinai as part of the Camp David agreement signed by Egypt and Israel with the US as guarantor. When questioned in Washington by American reporters during a visit to the US in November 1981 about collaborating with the Reagan administration's plans, Galtieri said: "For the Argentine Army there is no problem in giving that support because we can give it and much more".⁵² Galtieri also stated that Argentina was prepared to contribute troops to Central America, in order to fight communist insurgencies there.⁵³ Just a month later Galtieri became President of Argentina.

On assuming the Presidency in December 1981, he offered assistance to President Reagan in his struggle against communism in Central America once again. This strengthening of relations with the US put Galtieri in close contact with Gen.Vernon Walters, America's ambassador-at-large. President Galtieri reportedly asked Gen.Walters about the possible US reaction in case of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands. Gen.Walters reportedly mentioned a hypothetical US neutrality with the precondition that the Argentines would not kill British citizens while capturing the islands. It might have been by intention or coincidence, but the Argentines scrupulously avoided fatalities among the islanders during the invasion.⁵⁴

The Labour M.P. Tam Dalyell in his book on the conflict also

52. Cardoso, et.al, n.44, pp.7-10.

53 Latin American Weekly Report (London), November 13, 1981, p.1, cited in David Lewis Feldman, "United States Role in the Malvinas Crisis, 1982: Misguidance and Misperception in Argentina's Decision to go to War" in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Florida), Vol.27, No.2, Summer 1985. Feldman in his article argues that the timing of the Falklands invasion and Argentina's subsequent miscalculation that the US would tacitly assist Argentina was the result of US policies in the region under Ronald Reagan.

54. Cardoso, et.al, n.44, pp.7-10.

refers to such an assurance of US neutrality by General Walters.

He wrote:

Walters was in Buenos Aires, intermittently for many days, between October 1981 and February 1982. He discussed, inter-alia, the establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization. He also discussed the advantages for such an organization of an island base in the Falklands, somewhat along the lines of Diego Garcia. However the understanding was that the agreement on Hemispheric and other grounds should be between the United States and Argentina, the bulwark of American policy in the South Atlantic and not between the US and Britain. Asked by the Argentine military what Britain would do, the American replied to the effect that the British would huff, puff and protest, and do nothing, with the implication that the Americans could soothe ruffled British feathers. (55)

Convinced that Britain had neither the will nor the military capability to challenge an Argentine invasion, and assured of US neutrality in case of such an eventuality, the military junta in late 1981 decided that plans for an invasion must be prepared. The exact dates for launching such an invasion was not decided.

The plans for the invasion.

The preparations for an invasion began soon after General Galtieri took over as President. On 15 December, 1981, Vice-Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, the Commander of Naval Operations was asked by Admiral Jorge Issac Anaya, the Chief of the Navy, "to prepare a plan for an Argentine landing on the Falkland islands"⁵⁶ Within five days a plan was prepared by a four member group that included, in addition to Vice-Admiral Lombardo, Chief of Naval Aviation, Carlos Garcia Ball, Commander of the Fleet, Guetar Allara, and Chief of the Marines, Carlos Bussar. The

55. Tam Dalyell, One Man's Falklands (London, 1982), Appendix A. pp.133-34. Oscar Cardoso and others, in their book on the conflict says that when interviewed for the book, Gen.Walters denied that during his contacts with the Argentinians they, at any time hinted at his intentions regarding the Falklands. See Oscar Cardoso, et.al, n.44, p.12.

56. Cardoso et.al, n.44, p.3.

plan they worked out was largely based on the one that had been prepared by Admiral Anaya himself in 1977, when he was Commander of the sea fleet. Reporting to Anaya on 20 December, Lombardo said that the recovery operation could indeed be carried out with relative ease, considering the existing naval strength. But he emphasized that two factors were absolutely essential: tactical surprise and strategic secrecy.

The Strategic Military Directive worked out by the junta set out in the first place a limited operation followed by the withdrawal of Argentine troops. The initial forecasts envisaged for D-Day was the second half of May with landing to be completed five days later. The document stressed two main points.

1. If Great Britain did react to the landing, it was assumed it would be in a fashion intended to force negotiation. It would therefore only send a small symbolic force. In that eventuality, it was envisaged that an army, air-force and naval contingent of not more than 600 to 700 men should be left on the islands, under the command of a colonel. That Argentine garrison would serve as a deterrent to the Royal Navy to prevent recovery.

2. Great Britain it was assumed, would prefer or would accept negotiation until it was convinced that the question of sovereignty was no longer open for discussion. It would then seriously evaluate the situation in order to decide whether to attempt reoccupation by force.

In the period that followed, various alternative diplomatic courses of action were suggested:

- a. A very intense bilateral negotiation with Great Britain in order to convince Her Majesty's Government of the fait accompli.

b. The fait accompli to be accompanied by concessions to British subjects. These would range from indemnities to the Falkland Islands Company and to islanders who wished to emigrate, to offers of closer economic co-operation with British companies. These companies might wish to exploit the petrochemical deposits of the southern basin with Argentina as well as stocks of fish and krill.

c. The United States to be involved in the negotiations, either directly or as guarantor of the agreement that might be achieved.

d. To increase contacts with the countries of the Western World, especially those of the EEC, in order that, together with the United States, they might assist in convincing Britain that there was no going back and that the situation had to be accepted.

e. To intensify contacts with the Soveit Union, China and countries of Eastern Europe in anticipation of possible problems
58
in the United Nations.

By March 1982 the plans for the invasion was ready. But the dates for the invasion had still not been decided. It was in such circumstances that the landing of Argentine scrap-metal dealers in the South Georgia islands forced the junta's hands.

The South Georgia Incident.

Ever since the success of their operation to occupy the Thule island in 1976 the Argentine navy had been preparing for another operation codenamed 'Alfa' to station a military detachment in South Georgia, east of the Falklands. On 9 March, 1982, Senor Davidoff, an Argentine scrap merchant, informed the British embassy in Buenos Aires that 41 of his workers would go

to South Georgia to dismantle a whaling station there. Since this was allowed under the terms of an agreement between Davidoff and the British company that owned the station in 1979, the British embassy did not object. The Argentine navy had been informed beforehand of the Davidoff mission through a note sent from the Argentine Foreign Ministry. The Navy then decided to merge 'Operation Alpha' with this perfectly legal operation, making it a pretext to land troops on the island. On 19 March, four British scientists who were on a field trip in the islands first noticed the presence of Davidoff's men on the island.⁵⁹ The Argentine landing team which also included Argentine navy marines had also raised the Argentine flag. Though the ship that brought the men to the islands left the next day, about 10 men were left behind.

Britain saw this incident as a violation of her sovereignty over the islands and protests were made to Buenos Aires asking for the men to be withdrawn. The sole navy patrol ship in the area HMS Endurance was also asked to proceed to the islands. Though the initial orders were to sail to South Georgia to evict the Argentines, a subsequent order asked it to head for Grytviken harbour in South Georgia (about 20 miles south of Leith, where the Argentines had landed) and await further orders.⁶⁰ But when in spite of repeated protests the Argentines refused to pull back their men, fresh orders were issued to the captain of the Endurance on 23 March to proceed with the eviction of the men on South Georgia. On the same day the military junta met in Buenos Aires and decided on a counter-measure. They ordered the nearest Argentine navy ship, the ice-breaker ARA Bahia Pariso to sail to

59. Ibid, p.66.

60. Virginia Gamba, The Falklands Malvinas War. A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention (Boston, 1987), p.118.

South Georgia, not to take away the men from the islands as Britain had requested, but rather to obstruct the Endurance and protect the Argentines on the island.⁶¹ By now it had become clear to the junta that domestic pressures were forcing the British government to take some action. Rather than give the British more time to prepare for and take steps to counter a possible Argentine invasion, it was decided that the invasion plans would be brought forward. Though the decision to invade was taken on 26 March actual orders were issued only on 1 April.⁶² On 2 April, Argentine troops started going ashore near Port Stanley, the capital of the Falklands.

The plans that were prepared for the operation, and the assumptions on which they were based, makes it clear that the junta expected it to be a short, quick, unopposed operation, that would not tax the military's resources too much. It was certainly not expected that a full scale war would break out. If the junta had foreseen the eventual British response, they would perhaps not have launched the invasion in the first place. It has been argued that Argentina misread signals from the British government and mistook British indifference towards the Falklands was a sign of disinterest and weakness. But the British failure to foresee and deter the Argentine attack was no less due to misconceptions about Argentina and a failure to take the necessary policy initiatives to warn Argentina that an attack on the islands would not go unchallenged. So much so that when the invasion finally happened, it took the British government completely by surprise.

61. Ibid, p.119.

62. Lawrence Freedman, "Intelligence Operations in the Falklands" Intelligence and National Security (London), Vol.1, No.3, September 1986, pp.316-18

Why Britain failed to deter.

Any analysis of why the Argentine invasion took Britain by surprise must consider both the failure of British policy decisions and statements to deter Argentina from going ahead with the invasion, as well as the failure of British intelligence to warn the government sufficiently in advance that the invasion was about to take place. While successful deterrence would have prevented the war, successful warning would have ensured that Britain was better prepared to counter Argentine actions both militarily and diplomatically.

While in retrospect it may look as if it was the Argentines who miscalculated the British response to an invasion, the British miscalculations of the effect of its policies on Argentina was to result in equally disastrous consequences. The British miscalculations was in believing that the recent cutbacks in defence spending and reductions in the navy would save money and have no other effect. Little did they realise that the image it created in Buenos Aires was of a nation "speaking softly and carrying a very small stick".⁶³

The Argentines perceived the British weakness in its failure to defend the islands by stationing well equipped troops in sufficient numbers on the island, or at the very least to provide a convincing deterrent to attack. Ever since the end of the second World War, Argentina had demonstrated both the seriousness of her purpose and her readiness to use force. Britain at the same time had only shown increasing willingness to negotiate, while steadily reducing the size, the capability and the relevant deployment of her armed forces, particularly her navy.⁶⁴

63. James D.Hessman, "The Lessons of the Falklands" in Sea Power (Arlington), Vol.25, No.7, July 1982, p.15.

64. James Cable, Diplomacy at Sea (London, 1985), p.105.

Apparently it was not realised in London that it was not sufficient merely to have the will to project power over distances, there must also exist a force in being to carry out that projection of power.⁶⁵ Cuts in the British defence budget ruled out the creation of any such deterrent force. The "total obsession with money"⁶⁶ meant that the resources allocated to defence was based purely on domestic economic considerations, not on a realistic assessment of what was needed to support espoused foreign and defence policies.

Yet even in an economic sense it would in the long run have been much more cheaper to defend the islands with adequate force that to fight a war to retake it. As James Cable says, "Deterrence is fallible and defence expensive, but both are in every way preferable to counter attack".⁶⁷ Not only did the recapture of the Falklands cost far more -- in terms of ships and equipment as well as money -- than many years of peacetime defence, but the peacetime defence that is currently provided for the islands is at a much higher level than would once have been sufficient.⁶⁸

The question remains as to why this was not foreseen and why Britian did not devote adequate resources to defend the islands. One reason was that the British government and its intelligence and armed services were so preoccupied with the Soviet threat that they were indifferent to the possibility of threats to British interests arising in other regions of the world. As Ashely J.Tellis puts it:

65. Willox, n.46, p.34.

66. "Falkland Islands: The Origins of a War", The Economist (London), 19-25 June, 1982, p.36.

67. Cable, n.64, p.105

68. Ibid, p.107.

Although the rise of regional studies was premised on the belief that the bipolar model of international behaviour was becoming increasingly diffused [and hence legitimised the study of regional sub-systems], it did not engender [in this case in the British political and military leadership] the requisite insight that might have warned them that no part of the globe is now so remote or so militarily primitive that it can be ignored by a great power with impunity. (69)

The Royal Navy, which normally should have played a role in the defence of the islands, was preoccupied with the Soviet threat and its resources were devoted to planning and preparing for a war with the Soviet Union in the North Atlantic. This preoccupation with the 'single threat' and the 'single scenario' was forced on the navy by the political necessity to justify their continued existence in terms of their contribution to NATO strategy. ⁷⁰ When combined with financial stringency, it caused an erosion in the flexibility, the versatility and the autonomous capability of the Royal Navy. The navy was gradually reduced to the auxilliary role of a specialised anti-submarine force.

Yet it has always been easier to argue that the Soviet Union had neither the intention nor the incentive to invade Western Europe than it has been in the Argentine case to say that it had no intention of attacking the Falklands. ⁷¹ From 1948 onwards it was openly proclaimed by every public and official means at Argentina's disposal, that Argentina intended to recover the Falklands by force if need be. However the British remained indifferent to such threats. In March 1982 they finally realised that the Argentines had not been bluffing. But by then it had become too late to deter the Argentines.

69. Ashely J.Tellis, "Latin America's Navies: A Strategic Survey" Naval Forces (Bonn), Vol.8, No.11, Special Issue. The Naval Balance 1987, p.200.

70. Cable, n.64, p.107.

71. Ibid, p.113.

Early intelligence warnings of an invasion.

The first public warning of a possible invasion of the islands came in late January 1982. The leading Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa printed a long article which told of how Gen.Galtieri had promised to retake the Malivinas islands before 3 January, 1983, so that the British and the Falkland Islanders would not have the chance to celebrate the 150th anniversary of British settlement on the islands. The author of the article, Jesus Iglesias Rouco, wrote that "the possibility that the islands would be recovered by military action was virtually certain".⁷² While the threat itself was well known in Buenos Aires it was not taken quite seriously in London. The Permanent Staff of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office considered⁷³ the Argentines to be an emotional people, incapable of action. Talk of an invasion was ignored as brave rhetoric from the junta. Moreover Argentina with its weak economic base, one of the highest inflation rates in the world and considerable domestic dissent was considered to be in no position to go to war. It was apparently not realised in London that it was precisely because of the staggering inflation and the problems it was causing that the leadership needed a diversion.

A second incident, which should have raised suspicions that a possible invasion would occur was the 11 March incident, when a Hercules C-130 aircraft of the Argentine Air-Force made an emergency landing at Port Stanely airport in the East Falklands. The excuse of the plane's captain was that he had detected faults in the aircraft when he was flying towards an Argentine research

72. La Prensa, January 1982, p.1, quoted in Guillermo A.Makin, "Argentine Approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas" in International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.3, Summer 1983, p.399.

73. Laffin, n.18, p.11.

base in the Antarctic. The question remains as to whether this was actually an intelligence operation intended to check the condition on the ground for landing the C-130 transport aircraft. Such aircraft carried out the hard task of ferrying men and supplies to the islands during and after the invasion. The British embassy in Buenos Aires which was carefully monitoring Argentine attitudes, immediately informed London of this strange episode.⁷⁴ Mark Heathcote, the First Secretary of the British mission sent a coded cable to London evaluating the incident. However hard evidence is lacking to conclude that this incident was considered by the British to be a warning of imminent Argentine action.⁷⁵

The Latin American Weekly Report, a private service to the press published from London reported the incident on 19 March, linking it with a possible imminent invasion:

Observers in Buenos Aires hint that the incident was planned. With rumours of a possible Argentine invasion of the islands, the reasoning is that the air-force is testing the possibility of disembarking troops on the islands with Hercules aircraft. The landing occurred just after Alejandro Orfila, the Argentine Secretary General of the OAS, had predicted that the Argentine flag will soon fly over the Falklands. (76)

The failure of British intelligence to warn the government that an invasion was likely, in spite of many danger signals from Buenos Aires, was due in part to the unique way in which the agency that was responsible for intelligence collection -- the SIS -- was integrated in the government structure. In this system, the SIS has no assessment function, apart from advising

74. Cardoso et.al, n.44, p.59.

75. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London, 1983), p.59. The Franks Report which went into the failure of British intelligence to foresee the invasion does not even mention the incident.

76. Latin American Weekly Report, 19 March, quoted in Cardoso et.al, n.44, p.59. Emphasis in original.

on the reliability of sources. Responsibility both for assessment and assignment of intelligence gathering priorities rested with the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO) which is based in the Cabinet Office and served by Current Intelligence Groups, organized geographically. Ministers are advised by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), whose members are drawn from officials and serving officers, seconded from their parent departments. There is, therefore, no fully independent body involved in the assessment of intelligence reports.

Chairmanship of the JIC was from 1939 to 1983 vested in the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary was answerable in the Cabinet for SIS. The funds for the SIS were part of the Foreign Office budget. Within the Foreign Office itself it had long been the practice that the same department that makes policy recommendations is also responsible for assessing intelligence.⁷⁷ The link between these two responsibilities, together with the intelligence organization structure already described was one factor responsible for the failure to foresee the Argentine invasion.

This unique structure meant that the defence attache in Buenos Aires did not have direct access to British military intelligence. He could report only through the ambassador and through him to the Foreign Office.⁷⁸ There was thus no independent agency in the British government checking on the Foreign Office's assessment of a given situation. The Foreign Office's prejudices coloured intelligence assessment and this was an invitation for the sort of failure that occurred in the

77. Robert Cecil, "The Assessment and Acceptance of Intelligence: A Case-Study" in K.G. Robertson, Ed, British and American Approaches to Intelligence (London, 1987), p.167.

78. Freedman. n.62. n.312.

Falklands.

The final days of the pre-invasion crisis.

On 20 May the British Antarctic Survey reported that the ship chartered by Senor Davidoff had arrived at Leith harbour in South Georgia. HMS Endurance was sent to South Georgia to find out what was going on. On 21 March the Argentine ship left, leaving ten Argentine personnel behind, even though the Argentine's had informed the British Foreign Office that only equipment had been left behind.⁷⁹ This was the start of the crisis, since the Argentines on the island were unauthorised intruders and thus a challenge to British sovereignty. The Endurance, which was also a Signal Intelligence ship reported two further pieces of information that should have alerted the British government. The first was that the Argentine ship which transported Senor Davidoff's men had maintained radio silence during its stay in South Georgia and second, that Naval Headquarters in Buenos Aires had signalled its congratulations to the ship.⁸⁰

When the Argentines showed no sign of pulling back their personell in South Georgia inspite of repeated requests to do so, Mrs.Thatcher called the first crisis meeting on Wednesday, 22 March. The meeting concluded with a decision to evict the men,⁸¹ even with force if necessary. A note was also sent to the Argentine Foreign Ministry informing them of the cabinet decision.⁸²

Attempts by British intelligence to assess whether Argentina

79. Ibid, p.315.

80. Ibid.

81. Feldman, n.53, p.347.

82. Gamba, n.60, p.119.

was planning an invasion was complicated by the fact that on 23 March, units of the Argentine navy put out to sea on what were said to be routine manoeuvres, including joint exercises with the Uruguayan navy.⁸³ Though the US was at the time providing large amounts of signal intelligence which allowed Britain to monitor Argentine naval activity,⁸⁴ a concrete assessment of whether the units were part of an invasion force was difficult especially because the exercises with Uruguay had been scheduled long before the current crisis began. Some sources maintained that evidence that an invasion was imminent had been passed on to London by British intelligence in Buenos Aires and that this was confirmed by the US embassy in London.⁸⁵

It was only on 29 March that hard evidence emerged that an invasion was likely in the next forty-eight hours. Signal intelligence indicated that Argentine submarines were reconnoitring beaches in the Falklands and that an amphibious force was being prepared.⁸⁶ Though on 31 March intelligence assessments confirmed that Argentina was in a position to launch an invasion within forty-eight hours, no hard evidence of orders for an invasion being issued was provided. On 1 April the British defence attache in Argentina, quoting from press reports, gave details of air-force transports being prepared to lift troops to the south of the country and of a general

83. Freedman, n.62, p.313.

84. Hastings and Jenkins, n.75, p.58.

85. Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: The Full Story (London,1983), pp.77-78. Alexander Haig, the then US Secretary of State in his autobiography however says that the US was convinced that the Argentines were going to invade the Falklands only on March 30. See Alexander Haig Caveat (London,1984)

86. Freedman, n.62, p.317.

87 mobilisation. Though the decision to invade had by then been taken in Argentina, the troops en route to the Falklands were not told of their destination, and the plans for the entire operation was very tightly guarded by the Argentine army.⁸⁸ The air-force for example played no part in the planning of the operation. This ensured that secrecy was kept till the last moment, preventing Britain from responding in time to deter an invasion.

It was only on 2 April that the British government came to know that orders for an invasion had been issued to the Argentine armed forces the previous day. But by then the invasion was already in progress, and the government was now forced to consider the possibility of going to war with Argentina. It was a war that they had not expected, and as they were to find out, one that they had not been preparing to fight.

87. Ibid, pp.317-18.

88. Norman Friedman, "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Unlearned" in Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol.26, No.4, Winter 1983, p.908.

CHAPTER III

EFFORTS AT PEACE AMIDST WAR

In her book 'Practicing History', Barbara Tuchman, the American historian commented on the reluctance of policy makers to believe what they don't want to believe. "Men will not believe what does not fit in with their plans or suit their pre-arrangements", she said.¹ Until 31 March 1982, British policy makers refused to believe that an Argentine invasion of the Falklands was possible. Hard intelligence information was scanty and the Argentine leadership was still undecided on the exact date for an invasion. Nevertheless the Argentine invasion of the islands brought to a head the differences between the two countries which had been simmering for decades. More than that it turned the conflict into a zero-sum game which forced the protagonists to take extreme positions. Both sides realised that in the new situation one side's losses would be the other side's gains. A fight to the finish seemed inevitable.

But geographical realities were such that a full scale conflict could not break out immediately. The islands were over 8,000 miles away from mainland Britain, and the time it would take to despatch a fleet and sail towards the islands gave diplomacy a last chance to diffuse the crisis before fighting actually began. Allies of both Britain and Argentina, especially the United States, were eager to see the dispute settled short of war, since outbreak of fighting would result in them facing a difficult choice of neutrality or support to one or the other side in the war. The month of April saw hectic diplomatic and military activity on both sides, with each trying to play its diplomatic and military cards so as to avoid war, and still come out on top. But ultimately the strategies failed and the stage

1. Barbara Tuchman, quoted in Walter B. Wrinston, "Technology and Sovereignty", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.67, No.2, Winter 1988-89, p.63.

was set for an all out confrontation.

This chapter proposes to give an account of the nature and course of the invasion of the islands, and the British diplomatic and military response to the hostilities, as well as the efforts made by the United Nations, the United States and other allies of both Britain and Argentina to settle the dispute peacefully. An analysis has been made of the factors which led to the event that finally foreclosed the chances of a peaceful solution -- the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, 'General Belgrano'. An attempt has been made to provide an analysis of the reasons for the failure of diplomacy to prevent a war, as well as the compulsions on both sides to resort to military actions which sabotaged efforts at peace and encouraged the slide towards an all out war.

The Argentine invasion of the Falklands.

Though the invasion of the islands itself was carried out by elite troops of the Argentine army and marines, the manoeuvring which preceded the invasion saw both sides using their naval forces as a way of expressing their national interests over the islands.² In March the Argentine navy used the scrap merchant's presence on South Georgia as pressure on both the British and Argentine governments to react. The Argentine navy also deterred the British from attempting to reverse the situation by deploying two powerful frigates between South Georgia and the Falklands.³ The presence of the two ships effectively prevented Britain from taking any action to evict the Argentines from the island. As Mrs. Thatcher later said, "We know there was a threat that if we took them off by force, Endurance (the only Royal Navy ship in

2. Geoffry Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age (London, 1984), p.239.

3. Ibid, p.240.

the area) might well have been stopped...."⁴ The Argentines thus presented Britain with a fait accompli which in the Argentine view had solved the issue. The Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez told the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires on 1 April: "I judge pointless the despatch of a person to examine the events in South Georgia since Argentina⁵ considers the issue resolved".

It was to crown one fait accompli with another that Argentine troops started their invasion of the Falkland islands on 2 April. The attempt was to repeat the success of South Georgia on a larger scale. The size of the forces involved, the hardness of Argentine diplomacy afterwards and the attempt to change the way of life of the islanders suggest that the invasion of the islands was not merely a symbolic effort designed to improve the Argentine negotiating position, but an attempt to alter the situation once and for all.⁶

The detailed planning for the capture of the Falklands was carried out by the Armada Argentina -- the Argentine navy. Most of the navy's ships had been out at sea since 28 March ostensibly taking part in joint manoeuvres with the Uruguayan Navy. The Falklands landing force, called 'Task Force 40' was based around a tank landing ship carrying⁷ nineteen large American built amphibious landing vehicles. Escort and gunfire support were to be provided by three destroyers and a frigate. Another group of navy ships, 'Task Force 20', grouped around Argentina's only

4. The Telegraph (London), 7 May 1982, quoted in Ibid.

5. Falkland Islands Review, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (London, 1985), para 244. Hereafter cited as The Franks Report.

6. Till, n.2, p.240.

7. Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War, 1982 (London, 1982), p.41.

aircraft-carrier Vientincinco de Mayo would give distant cover to the north.

The landing force was provided by the specialist Buzo Tactico marine commando unit composed of sixty or so men, and the 600 - 700 strong 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion. At dawn on 2 April Argentine troops went ashore south of the Falklands capital at Port Stanley. The troops then split into two groups, one attacking the Royal Marine barracks at Moody Brook and the second attempting to capture Government House, the office of the British Governor of the islands, Rex Hunt. The barracks were deserted since the seventy-nine marines stationed on the islands, anticipating an Argentine attack, had moved to Government House and the airport at Port Stanley to defend those vital installations. The attack on Government House started at 6.15 am with the marines ignoring calls to surrender. At about the same time another Argentine force launched an attack on the airport and overcame opposition from the few marines stationed there very easily. Two hours later C-130 transport aircraft of the Argentine air-force began landing at Port Stanley airport, bringing in men of the Argentine army's 25th Regiment. The marines stationed at Government House tried to resist Argentine attacks and even managed to kill five Argentine soldiers.⁸ But it was soon clear that they were hopelessly outnumbered. Major Mike Norman, head of the Royal Marines on the island formally advised Governor Hunt that Government House could not be held

8. The Argentine troops used minimum force during their operations in the Falklands in order to avoid British casualties. General Vernon Walters, the American ambassador-at-large had apparently given General Galtieri the impression that Britain would not respond to an Argentine attack on the Falklands provided that there were no British casualties. See Oscar Raul Cardoso, Ricardo Krischbaum and Eduardo van der Kooy, Falklands -- The Secret Plot (Surrey, 1987), p.12.

indefinitely against the heavier weapons that the Argentines were now using. Eventually Governor Hunt ordered the marines to cease fire and the Argentine invasion of the islands was complete.

The decision to recover the islands.

The invasion of the Falkland islands humiliated Britian and outraged public opinion in the country. This naturally led to calls for tough British action to evict the Argentines from the island. Thus one condition that could have helped to resolve the crisis between Britain and Argentina -- that decision makers are relatively free from domestic pressures -- was absent from the very beginning.⁹ Though the pressures were equally severe on the Argentinian side, the pressures on the British government forced it to react with military force almost immediatly. Soon after the invasion the House of Commons held an emergency session -- the first weekend session since the Suez crisis of 1956. Mrs.Thatcher had to fact a very hostile House, with the Labour Party members arguing that when in office it had protected the islands from Argentine threats.¹⁰ Both government and opposition members of parliament were virtually unanimous in asking the government to recover the islands by force, if negotiations failed. And there were enough signs that Parliament would hold Mrs.Thatcher personally responsible if the crisis was not resolved in Britain's favour. The Ulster M.P, Enoch Powell said: "In the next week or so we will learn what metal the Iron Lady is made of".¹¹

Once a decision to recover the island from the Argentines

9. Phil Williams, "Miscalculation, Crisis Management and the Falklands Conflict", The World Today (London), Vol.39, No.4, April 1983, p.148.

10. Ibid.

11. Time (Chicago), 12 April, 1982, p.21.

was taken a broad plan of action was worked out. It was a flexible one, based on applying incremental political, diplomatic, economic and propaganda pressure on Argentina to force it to withdraw its troops.¹² The flexible course of action was in sharp contrast to the one adopted by Argentina, which saw its invasion of the islands as a legitimate action to which Britain would not respond. In drawing out a plan for invading the islands, the Argentinians had not even considered the possibility of Britain responding with military force to the invasion. Such a failure to foresee and deter a British military and diplomatic response was to prove a serious handicap since Argentina was forced to go on the defensive from the start of the conflict.

The decision to organize and send a task force to the South Atlantic immediately raised questions about the composition of the fleet. Preliminary planning for the despatch of a task force took place on 1 April, during a meeting of the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach and his senior operations staff. The main question they considered was the course of action to be taken if the government decided that a task force would have to be sent to retake the islands.¹³ The opponent's military capabilities were formidable, at least on paper. Argentina possessed a substantial navy, with surface, underwater and air capability. She had at least six ships fitted with sea-skimming missiles, also the main weapon of the Royal Navy. The Argentine navy had four submarines, two of them formidably difficult to detect with

-
12. Harlan K.Ullman, "Profound or Prefunctory: Observations on the South Atlantic Conflict", in Robert E.Harkavy and Stephaine G.Neuman, Eds, The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World (Massachusetts, 1985), p.241.
 13. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London, 1983), p.80.

14 sonar, and an air-force with more than two hundred planes capable of striking at a British sea or land force. The logistics and strategic difficulties of undertaking operations against such a force 8,000 miles distant would be immense. With ships available to the Royal Navy it seemed suicidal to take to sea against a force of this strength. The meeting therefore decided immediately to reject any task force inventory which did not embrace all resources available, including aircraft-carriers, submarines and amphibious assault elements.¹⁵

But even the organization of such a task force posed problems. The fact was, Britain was ill-equipped to fight such a sea war in the South Atlantic with its own resources. This lack of well balanced military capabilities was partly the result of an excessive emphasis on countering the Soviet threat which meant that the British armed forces, especially the navy, had integrated itself into the NATO military structure, leaving Britain woefully short of capabilities needed to fight sustained campaigns by itself. The navy lacked an adequate satellite communications network and was short of capabilities to acquire signals and other intelligence. The navy also lacked good

14. Much was made of the fact that the British had nuclear powered submarines, while the Argentine navy had only diesel-electric submarines. But while operating in waters close to home port, diesel-electric submarines are very powerful instruments of naval warfare. Nuclear powered submarines have only the advantage of long ranges without surfacing. In almost all other factors modern diesel submarines have an advantage. For a comparative assessment of the two see Lewis P. Young, "Modern Conventional Submarines: Present Trends and Future Developments in the Asia Pacific Region -- Part I", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.10, October 1987, pp.62-78, and Anthony Preston, "Diesel Electric Submarines", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.3, March 1990, pp.36-42.

15. Hastings and Jenkins, n.13, p.80.

Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability.¹⁶ It was also short of air-to-air missiles that would have given Sea-Harrier aircraft on board its aircraft-carriers enough punch to fight it out with Argentine Super Etendard and Mirage fighter aircraft.¹⁷ Above all it had no bases in the vicinity of the Falklands, and would need huge quantities of fuel to be able to fight 8,000 miles away from home and 4,000 miles away from its midway staging point on Ascension island.¹⁸ One factor that could have changed the scenario considerably was active military support from the United States. But US professions of neutrality in the conflict was to foreclose even that option.

This lack of adequate resources was acknowledged, and it was decided that British military moves would be in successive stages with forces for the operation being built up in successive stages. Forces for the operation would be built up along the way in the theatre of potential conflict. The initial strategic move that was initiated was the despatch of two nuclear powered submarines, along with Special Boat Service detachment to the area. These submarines were fast vessels which were difficult to

-
16. The Royal Navy had not equipped its fleet with AEW systems since it was felt that future naval operations would be part of joint NATO action, in which case the Royal Navy would benefit from AEW systems on board huge American aircraft-carriers. This dependence on the US navy was a handicap as far as independent operations were concerned. For an analysis of how the Royal Navy's autonomous capabilities were compromised as a result of its integration into the NATO military structure, see James Cable, Diplomacy at Sea (London, 1985), pp.105-107.
17. The Economist (London), 3 March 1984, p.24.
18. Ascension is a small island of volcanic origin, of 34 sq.miles, about 500 miles off the coast of North Africa. It is midway between Britain and the Falkland islands. It is a British colony and has an airport. During the Falklands war the island was used as a base for long range Nimrod anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft and Vulcan bombers. For a description of the islands and its history, see B.Stonehouse, Wideawake Island (London, 1960)

detect and would provide an early British presence near the area of conflict. This was to be followed by a naval task force, a brigade of Royal Marines and a necessary air complement. Subsequently, land, naval and air forces would be built up for the final landing on the Falklands. These steps could be clearly discerned as relating to surveillance and gathering of intelligence; naval and air blockade of the islands, while concentration of the forces and a logistics build up was underway; and enlargement of the battle zone, eventually leading to the landing of troops on the islands itself.¹⁹

This strategy, while it was slow, would enable Britain to retain the initiative at the theatre level at all times, while providing enough time to organize a credible force for recapturing the islands.

The Falklands crisis at the United Nations.

The invasion of the Falklands also signalled the start of hectic activity at the United Nations, with both Britain and Argentina trying to drum up support for their positions, especially in the Security Council. The Security Council has fifteen members, of which five are permanent (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China), and any one of them can, by its veto cause a motion to be cast out. The remaining members are chosen for periods of two years and in April 1982 the council had Poland, Spain, Panama, Japan, Togo, Jordan, Uganda, Zaire, Ireland, and Guyana as its non-permanent members.

In order for a resolution to be passed, it was necessary to obtain two thirds of the vote. The Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez arrived in New York on 3 April, the day when

¹⁹ Virinder Uberoy, "Falklands War -- A macro view", USI Journal (New Delhi), Vol.11, No.471, January-March 1983, pp.19-20.

the Argentine government announced in Buenos Aires that South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands were now under Argentine sovereignty.²⁰ By then the Security Council had been in session for more than twenty-four hours. It had been called at the request of the British ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, as soon as he had confirmation of the Argentine landing at Port Stanley. He had also introduced into the agenda of the council a draft proposal that was to become Resolution 502. While introducing the resolution Sir Anthony had insisted on a vote within twenty-four hours of tabling.²¹ It was with great difficulty that the Argentine representative at the UN, Eduardo Roca managed to get a vote on the resolution put off until Costa Mendez arrived in New York.

Initially Britain's task seemed difficult, if not impossible. While it could count on the backing of its western allies, support from socialist nations and the non-aligned group in the Security Council seemed impossible to achieve. In fact the Jordanian Ambassador to the UN Hazem Nuseibeh assured Eduardo Roca the "Great Britian will not get the necessary votes".²²

However events were to prove how the Jordanian ambassador was wrong. While support for Britain among the non-aligned nations was muted, support for Argentina was also not very strong. On 3 April, Costa Mendez had a meeting with ambassadors of non-aligned countries at the UN. But he did not find a sympathetic audience. Many of them were perfectly well informed on violations of human rights in Argentina; on the special links

20. Cardoso, et.al, n.8, p.105.

21. Sir Anthony Parsons, "The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March - 14 June 1982", International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.2, Spring 1983, p.170

22. Cardoso, et.al, n.8, p.107.

that Argentina had with South Africa; on how the Argentinian military had assisted in the repression in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador; and the positions that Buenos Aires adopted on the Middle East in siding always with Israel.²³ They were also aware of the reluctance of the military junta to support anti-colonialist causes in international assemblies.

The apathy of the non-aligned bloc made Sir Anthony's task a little easier. Of the western bloc he could be sure of the support of the United States, France and Ireland as well as Japan. The communist states, the Soviet Union, China and Poland had to be ruled out as was Latin Spain. Panama had already agreed to support Argentina's cause. That meant Britain needed all the remaining five for her two thirds majority -- Jordan, Togo, Zaire, Uganda and Guyana.

Guyana gave her vote to Britain, hoping that this would deter Venezuela from pursuing a border dispute with her. Zaire did the same, as its representative holding the presidency²⁴ of the Security Council called for restraint on both sides. France was persuaded to get Togo to vote for the resolution. Uganda remained doubtful until the last moment, but eventually sided with Britain on grounds of Argentinian 'aggression'.

The Jordanian ambassador had been instructed by Amman not to vote for a colonialist cause, and it had been expected that it would vote against the British resolution. It was at this juncture that Sir Anthony Parsons asked Mrs. Thatcher to make a

23. Ibid, p.110.

24. On Thursday 1 April, even before the invasion of the Falklands had occurred, Sir Anthony Parsons announced that an Argentine assault on the islands was imminent and secured an immediate call from the Security Council's President, Zaireian Kamanda wa Kamanda for both sides to show restraint. When the invasion was carried out by Argentina, despite her representative's calls for restraint, Zaire naturally felt offended, and gave her vote to Britain.

special effort with King Hussein. Mrs. Thatcher telephoned King Hussein and personally pleaded with him to support Britian.²⁵ A little more than an hour later Hazem Neusebeh received a telex from Amman instructing him to vote with the British. Britian now had the necessary nine votes.

Argentina's last hope was a Russian veto. But Oleg Troianovski, the Russian ambassador was non-committal. It was Russian policy not to use the veto except on resolutions specifically related to their interests. The way was now clear for the British resolution to be passed.

Resolution 502 was passed by 10 votes in favour (Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Ireland, Togo, Jordan, Uganda, Guyana and Zaire). There were four abstentions (the Soviet Union, Poland, China and Spain) and only one against (Panama).²⁶ The resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council:

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the Council on 1 April 1982 calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina.

Determining that there exists a breach of peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)

1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities.
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces

25. Hastings and Jenkins, n.13, pp.122-23.

26. Cardoso et.al, n.8, p.114.

from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)

3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.²⁷

British diplomats consider their diplomacy at the UN to be one of their best performances in the post-war period.²⁸ By demanding on the parties that they respect "the principles and propositions of the Charter" they gave London the necessary leeway to introduce the principle of self-determination for the islanders into any future negotiations and moreover permitted them to appeal to Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 says:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective self defence if armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain peace and security.... (29)

British and Allied sanctions against Argentina.

As soon as it became clear that the invasion of the Falklands had commenced, Britain froze all Argentine assets in the United Kingdom, stopped imports from Argentina, and banned the export of military supplies to that country.³⁰ Export credits to Argentina were also suspended.

In retaliation the Galtieri government declared a freeze on British assets in Argentina, which amounted to \$4 billion as

27. Ibid, p.115.

28. Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: The Full Story (London, 1983), cited in Ibid, p.116.

29. Cardoso, n.8, pp.115-16.

30. Fritz L.Hoffman and Olga Mingo Hoffman, Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493 - 1982 (Boulder, Colorado, 1984), p.165.

against \$1 billion of Argentinian assets in Britain.³¹ In addition, Argentina announced that it would suspend all payments to British banks -- including the interest and principal due on \$5.8 billion it had borrowed from London financial institutions.³² Though the British banks could have called Argentina into default, they were not eager to do so for fear of its effect on the British banking system. To reduce the danger of being called into default, Argentina maintained that it was channeling payments as and when due into an escrow account in New York.³³

Once Britain won a vote in the UN Security Council in favour of its resolution, it moved swiftly to get allied support for its campaign to recover the islands. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization it was surprisingly easy for Britain to convince her partners that sending a force to the South Atlantic was necessary to stop aggression, even at the cost of weakening NATO's defences elsewhere in Europe. Article 51 of the UN Charter came in handy because Britain used it to constantly emphasize that it was defending its territory against aggression, making it easier to receive the approval of NATO.³⁴

On 6 April, the British government formally requested that the European Economic Community (EEC) join in the sanctions. On 14 April, the EEC agreed to impose a month long ban on imports

31. M.S.Daoudi and M.S.Dajani, "Sanctions: The Falklands Episode", The World Today (London), Vol.34, No.4, April 1983, p.150.

32. See "Sanctions: Who'll call default", The Economist (London), 10 April 1982, p.26.

33. Joan Pearce "Economic Measures", in Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Falkland Islands Dispute: International Dimensions (London, 1982), p.15. An escrow account normally holds funds in custody until a legal dispute between two parties has been settled.

34. Hoffman and Hoffman, n.30, p.165.

from Argentina. It was decided that the sanctions would be reviewed at the end of the period. It was also made clear that the EEC's support to Britain was a response to Argentina's act of aggression rather than an indication of agreement with British claims of sovereignty over the islands. The Japanese government, more concerned about protecting trade with Argentina, decided not to join the EEC's import ban.³⁵ The EEC boycott was subsequently joined by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Hong Kong on 17 April.

In retaliation against these EEC sanctions, Argentina banned all imports from the EEC countries.³⁶ But inside the country the sanctions had the effect of creating a liquidity crisis in the financial system, as depositors withdrew nearly \$1 billion from the banks in anticipation of worsening economic conditions. To offset these withdrawals, the Galtieri government on 16 April injected through the Central bank, millions of dollars into the banking system.³⁷

On 17 May, just before the thirty day EEC ban was set to expire, Britain succeeded in persuading the European Community to extend its economic sanctions for another seven days. The British argued that negotiations at the United Nations to bring about a peaceful solution were at a critical stage and that lifting sanctions might endanger them. Convinced that continuing sanctions was essential to bring about a peaceful solution, the common market nations agreed to extend the trade ban under

35. The Economist (London), 17 April 1982, p.26.

36. Daoudi and Dajani, n.31, pp.150-51.

37. Ibid.

Article 113 of the EEC treaty. Italy³⁸ and Ireland³⁹ however refused to go along with its partners in the EEC. They maintained that they would observe Article 225 which provided for co-operation so as to avoid market distortions.⁴⁰ Both agreed not to undermine the effect of sanction by other EEC countries and to ensure that Argentine imports would not be diverted elsewhere in the European market.

As the extended one week ended, the eight other member countries of the EEC agreed on 24 May to extend the trade sanctions against Argentina indefinitely. EEC support was aimed specifically at bringing Argentina back to the negotiating table. The British Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym welcomed the accord on sanctions, saying that it showed "a degree of support which we're very appreciative of at this stage of the conflict".⁴¹ Argentina continued to block imports from the EEC in retaliation.

The US dilemma: Active support or passive neutrality?

The prospect of war between Britain and Argentina posed a serious dilemma for American policy makers. Britain was a close and trusted ally of the United States and public opinion was also sympathetic to Britain.⁴² But at the same time Argentina was a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), and an

38. There are an estimated 2 million Italians in Argentina and the country is Italy's second largest trading partner in Latin America. Public opinion in Italy had been largely critical of the British handling of the Falklands crisis.

39. The Irish government was reluctant to back sanctions for fear of compromising its neutral status. Furthermore there was concern that Ireland might appear to be giving tacit approval to Britain's use of force. The Irish official view was that suspension of sanctions would be more helpful in finding a diplomatic solution.

40. Daoudi and Dajani, n.31, p.151.

41. Ibid, p.152.

42. The Economist (London), 24 April 1982, p.27.

important ally as far as the Reagan administration's Latin America policy was concerned. Moreover the US had obligations to Argentina under the Rio Treaty.

The Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty was signed in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro (hence called the 'Rio Treaty') by the then existing 21 South American states as a regional defence treaty which provided for the exclusion of foreign influences from the America's.⁴³ It was aimed at preventing a modern European power from gaining dominant political control by low intensity conflict. While the treaty was framed to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence in South America this was not specifically mentioned in the treaty. In Argentine eyes it applied to British influence in the South Atlantic as well.

Sympathy for Argentina was also emerging on the conservative end of the American political spectrum. Some of it came from politicians like Senator Jesse Helms, the Republican Senator from North Carolina, who may have been motivated as much by a desire to keep up pressure on the administration from the right, as much by a sympathy for the Argentine military junta and by anglo-phobia.⁴⁴ But there were others, including conservative democrats, who began invoking the Monroe doctrine, the declaration by President James Monroe that European and other nations must stay outside the Western hemisphere.

Initially the administration itself was confused over the course of action it should follow. There were those who advocated leaving the crisis to the OAS or at least to individual Latin American nations. Some saw the United Nations as a proper

43. Ashley J. Tellis, "Latin America's Navies: A Strategic Survey", Naval Forces, Special Issue. The Naval Balance 1987 (Bonn), Vol.8, No.11, pp.200-216.

44. The Economist (London), 24 April 1982, p.28.

forum for mediation. Others regarded it as a US function to bring its two allies together in negotiations. Key officials, such as the US ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick took an openly pro-Argentine stance. She said, "The Argentinians have been claiming for 200 years that they own those islands. If they own those islands then moving troops into them is not armed aggression."⁴⁵

The difference of opinion even caused a split in the State Department. Thomas Enders the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs argued that for America to sacrifice its new and hard won position in Latin America, where a number of states were performing the American job of fighting Marxist insurgencies, was sheer lunacy.⁴⁶ Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, who shared Secretary of State Alexander Haig's Atlanticist views, felt strongly that the certainty of support for a NATO ally was crucial to European security. Eventually it was decided that an US offer of mediation was the best policy to be pursued. Its advocates argued that it would postpone for the moment any administration tilt to one or the other side. Haig himself decided to act as mediator and informed the White House. On 7 April President Reagan gave Haig a mandate to mediate between the two allies who were about to go to war.

The American decision to mediate was based on the belief that neither Britain nor Argentina wanted to fight a costly air and sea war over an almost valueless group of islands. Although America accepted the British contention that Argentina was the aggressor, few in Washington believed that Britain would not

45. Jeane Kirkpatrick, quoted in Christopher Greyling and Christopher Lagoon, Just Another Star? Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1988), p.19.

46. Hastings and Jenkins, n.13, p.126.

compromise to a sufficient extent to avert hostilities. Britain had after all been negotiating a transfer of the islands to Argentina for years. At least in the beginning the prospects for successful American mediation seemed bright.

The Haig mission.

47

Haig left Washington on the evening of 7 April. His mission received the prompt support of the Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez, but Mrs. Thatcher would agree to it only on the understanding that Resolution 502 of the Security Council would be honoured before any negotiations, and that Haig would be supporting efforts towards this end. To emphasize this point the British cabinet announced a 200 mile 'maritime exclusion zone' around the Falklands from 12 April, the estimated date of arrival of the first British nuclear powered submarine, HMS Spartan, in the area.⁴⁸ The zone was declared while Haig was on his way to London.

Haig brought with him to London on 8 April the three themes which were to dominate the whole negotiating phase of the war: military withdrawal by both sides, an interim administration for the islands, and a long term settlement. The proposals for a long term settlement included proposals which had been thrown up in earlier negotiations between Britain and Argentina over the future of the islands.

In London the Haig team was first briefed at the Foreign Office by the Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym on Britain's stand regarding a peaceful solution of the crisis. Later at 10 Downing

47. The following account of Haig's attempts to mediate in the dispute is based on Alexander Haig's autobiography, Caveat (London, 1984); Oscar Raul Cardoso, et.al, Falklands: The Secret Plot (Surrey, 1987); and Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falkland Islands (London, 1983).

48. Hastings and Jenkins, n.13, pp.127-28.

Street they had a working dinner with Margret Thatcher, who appeared intransigent to the Americans. Haig tried to impress upon Margret Thatcher the fact that America could not have two allies in a war and stressed the fact that both sides would have to compromise to give him room for manoeuvre. The British response was to reiterate its position that it would return to the negotiating table only when Argentina honoured Resolution 502. Until then Britain would have no other option but to exercise its right to self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The same night Haig left for Buenos Aires, convinced of the strong British stand on the issue.

In Buenos Aires Haig found the junta utterly taken aback by the speed and strength of the British military response. They could not believe that it was anything but bluff. The fact that the predictions of their diplomatic intelligence had been faulty until now did not seem to have bothered them. No amount of persuasion by Haig would convince them that Britain would attempt to retake the islands by force if attempts at a negotiated settlement failed. This failure of the Argentinians to accurately comprehend the British seriousness of purpose was to complicate the Haig mission throughout.

Haig spent four hours with Costa Mendez and had two meetings with General Galtieri. He left with a feeling, at least from his talks with Costa Mendez that the Argentinians might withdraw their troops alongside the withdrawal of the British task-force, provided some symbol of the islands changed status was left behind. They accepted that Britain could not be expected to concede sovereignty in advance of negotiations. But they insisted that the Argentine flag should fly over the Falklands even after an Argentine withdrawal.

This perceived flexibility gave Haig some room for

manoeuvre. His task now was to postpone the sovereignty issue for the time being and find a formula for an Argentinian withdrawal which did not look like a climbdown, and for a British return to the islands which did not look as if Argentina had profited from aggression. In other words he had to create an interim administration for the islands, prior to restarting talks on sovereignty on a basis acceptable to both sides. On the face of it the task looked very simple. But time and again the talks were to break down on the most emotive issue of all -- sovereignty.

Haig headed back to London on 11 April, very much concerned about the tough positions adopted by both sides. In a radio-telephone conversation with President Reagan -- later leaked to the press, much to the administration's embarrassment -- they discussed whether Mrs. Thatcher's desire for 'retribution' might be vindicated by the sinking of at least one Argentine ship. The White House was now openly questioning the wisdom of committing any further American prestige to an apparently hopeless mission. But Haig still felt that there were chances of bringing both sides to the negotiating table. He landed up in London once again on 12 April.

In talks with Haig, Francis Pym indicated that Britain might agree to some sort of joint administration on the islands and would accept sovereignty on an agenda for later talks. But there would be conditions attached. Argentina had to honour Resolution 502 first; there would be no tight deadlines on a long term solution; no Argentine access to the islands in the interim; and affirmation of the principle of self-determination for the islanders. Meanwhile Mrs. Thatcher indicated that any compromise would not involve softening in a pro-Argentinian direction.

Haig's team was now in regular communication with Buenos

Aires, where the Argentine cabinet met that evening (12 April) to consider the latest British proposals. Haig had assumed that it was discussing the final terms for an interim administration. To his dismay Menendez told him that his government was now demanding a fixed timetable for a transfer of sovereignty. This was in contradiction to the understanding with which Haig had left Buenos Aires. For the first time the American negotiating team began to sense that the Argentinian junta was confused about any future course of action. Haig postponed his departure from London and saw Mrs. Thatcher again on the morning of 13 April. Her sole concession was a shift from a demand for the status quo ante, to just a recognisable British administration, and a downplaying of the British demand for paramountcy for the wishes of the islanders. But Britain would not agree to a deadline for resolving the question of sovereignty. Meanwhile the British government was becoming impatient with the slow progress of the peace mission. Francis Pym told a news conference while Haig was still in London that he was sure "the US wouldn't be neutral between a democracy and a dictatorship".⁴⁹

Haig now returned to Buenos Aires by way of Washington, saying that the situation was now exceptionally difficult and dangerous. He saw Reagan and told him that it was now time to threaten Buenos Aires with American support for Britain if Argentina did not honour Resolution 502. Reagan agreed. It was with this trump card in hand that Haig arrived in Buenos Aires. Sensing a change in the US mood, General Galtieri telephoned Reagan before Haig's arrival to assure him of his desire for a peaceful solution and expressed the hope that Washington would

49. Ibid, p.132.

not desert its new ally.⁵⁰ But by now the military junta was divided and confused. General Galtieri wanted to negotiate his way out of a situation which would have led to war, but he was dissuaded by the hard line arguments of Admiral Anaya, the navy chief, who said that the Argentine people, having expected and suffered so much, would not stand for it.⁵¹ Admiral Anaya was convinced that his service was on the brink of major a victory and hence would not agree to any concession for Britain. Without his approval a concession made by Costa Mendez was no concession at all.

Haig's ideas had by now begun to coalesce into a five point plan. This involved withdrawal by both sides; a three-flag administration (composed of the United States, Britain and Argentina) to last until December; restoring communications with the Argentine mainland; talks in the new year on a long term settlement; and consultations to ascertain the islanders views. Military working groups discussed the Haig plan well into the night. Only the air-force seemed willing to compromise.

On Sunday, 18 April, Haig played his final trump card in person before the full junta. He told them bluntly, with particular emphasis towards Anaya that Britain was not bluffing in her determination and that America could not see two friends at war. He said Washington would not tolerate the fall of Mrs. Thatcher's government. Argentina had to enter realistic negotiations on the basis of Resolution 502, or America would side with Britain. But Admiral Anaya was not impressed. He stated his view that the British had no stomach for a fight, that democracies could not sustain casualties and that the task

50. For a transcript of the telephone conversation, See Cardoso et.al, n.8, pp.165-68.

51. Till, n.2, p.244.

force ships would simply break down in the South Atlantic winter. Anaya was also aware, through his own independent intelligence sources, that the administration was divided on the question of support to Britain. He did not believe that Haig could deliver a Washington 'tilt' towards Britain. In a dramatic rejoinder, he leaned across the table and told Haig to his face that he was lying.

The fifty-four man army council met at least twice over the weekend under General Jose Antonio Vaquero, head of the general staff. General Galtieri declared that his troops would "stay on the Malvinas, dead or alive". No senior Argentine commander seemed to have doubted their ability to inflict unacceptable losses on the British task force. They were convinced that the Malvinas were theirs, and they were convinced that they could defeat Britain if it came to war because they had air-superiority, submarines, EXOCET missiles and 8,000 men on the islands themselves. With so much in their favour, any concession to Britain seemed ridiculous.

This Argentine self-confidence, misplaced as later events were to prove, signalled death to Haig's attempts at mediation. By Monday, 19 April, Haig realised that he was dealing with a regime that over-estimated its capabilities, and was unable to take coherent decisions, let alone stick to them. He set out with Costa Mendez what he considered to be Argentina's 'bottom-line': a shared Anglo-Argentine administration under UN supervision, a shared island council, and sovereignty to be resolved at the UN by the end of the year. This was formulated into a 'Costa Mendez Plan'. The plan was telegraphed to London on the evening of 19 April, where it was received with hostility by the British war cabinet. None of the new ingredients was acceptable to Britain. Haig was called during a refuelling stop

in Caracas, Venezuela and told that there was no point in heading for London. Britain would not agree to the plan, nor would it make more concessions. Haig's mission had ended in failure.

The United States finally abandoned its mediation efforts on 30 April and declared its support for Britain, ascribing the failure of the peace mission to Argentine intransigence. In a press conference held on 30 April, President Reagan stated that the US had for the moment "gone as far as it can go" in trying to find a compromise solution. He blamed Argentina for resorting to armed aggression, adding "I think the principle that all of us must abide by is, armed aggression of that kind must not be allowed to succeed".⁵² In addition to offering military support to Britain the Administration also imposed limited economic sanctions against Argentina and suspended all military exports to the country. The help when it finally came was decisive in the British war effort, and without it the final outcome would have been vastly different.⁵³

The recapture of South Georgia.

The realisation that Argentina had still not realised the seriousness of British intentions spurred the British government into authorising the first amphibious operations of the war, even before the Haig mission ended in failure. This was the recapture of the South Georgia islands.

The recapture of the islands began on 21 April when reconnaissance patrols were landed near the main town of Grytviken by helicopter. Though it has been officially denied, reliable sources maintain that units of the elite Special Boat

52. Daoudi and Dajani, n.31, p.151.

53. David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London, 1988), p.315.

Squadron carried out reconnoissance on the islands even before
⁵⁴ that. On the way back from depositing the patrols, the
 helicopters spotted an Argentine submarine on the surface and
 about to enter port. The submarine was attacked and badly
 damaged. The arrival of the submarine, an American 'Guppy' class
 boat, the Santa Fe was fortuitous for Britian because the attack
 crippled the submarine, one of four the Argentine navy had, and
 this made the task of British ASW operations that much more
⁵⁵ easier. The British assault force commander then decided to
 speed up the landing. British ships began a bombardment of
 Argentine positions, and the main landing force was put ashore.
 By five in the afternoon, the Argentine garrison surrendered. A
 part of the landing force ferried up the coast and attacked Leith
 harbour, also on South Georgia where another small Argentine
 force was holding out. That force surrendered the next morning.
 Nobody on either side was killed and the British force took 156
⁵⁶ military and 38 civilian casualties.

The recapture of South Georgia gave a boost to British
 morale and ended Argentine hopes that the despatch of the task
 force was just a British bluff. The failure to foresee such
 British actions meant that Argentine troops on South Georgia were
 ill prepared for deterring British actions or countering it. The
 lack of air support proved a handicap to the Argentine force
 defending the islands. The islands were too far away from the
 mainland for Argentine air-force planes to provide support and
 the island itself has no facilities for basing aircraft. But a

54. The Economist (London), 1 May 1982, p.27.

55. Commander Nick Kerr, "The Falklands Campaign", Naval War
 College Review (Newport), Vol.35, No.6/294, November /
 December 1982, p.18.

56. Middlebrook, n.7, p.113.

lengthened runway at Port Stanley on the Falklands and refuelling facilities there could have served as a base for air-force planes to support troops on South Georgia. Lack of air cover meant that the small Argentine force was no match for British troops who were much better equipped and trained in ground fighting and moreover could call on the support of helicopters and strike aircraft from its two aircraft carriers. In contrast to the efficient takeover of the islands Argentina's lethargic build up of defences against a possible British counter attack showed how little foresight had been put into the whole Falklands operation.⁵⁷ The doubt arises that nobody in Buenos Aires had thought very seriously about strategic priorities, or prepared plans to meet any possible British counter-measures. The utter Argentine disregard for proper planning was to be disclosed throughout the Falklands campaign.

The sinking of the Belgrano.

The failure of the Haig mission to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis, once again brought into focus the military dimension of the conflict. Now that talks had failed, it seemed as though only an all out conflict could resolve the issue one way or the other. It was in such circumstances that the British task force, under orders from the British cabinet carried out one of the most controversial military actions of the war, the sinking of the Argentine naval cruiser, General Belgrano.

The events that led to the sinking of the cruiser actually began on 12 April when a British declared 200 mile Total Exclusion Zone around the Falklands came into force. This declaration preyed on the Argentine fear of British nuclear

57. Martin Douglas, "Naval Lessons from the South Atlantic", Japan's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.1, No.13, 7 April, 1984, p.519.

powered submarines in the area. The inherent stealth of the submarines would have allowed the declaration to be effective even without actual deployment of British submarines in the area.⁵⁸ But despite this fear there was tremendous pressure on General Galtieri from his fellow generals and also the navy to send ships into the 200 mile exclusion zone that Britain had placed around the islands. They believed that the zone was a British bluff which did not mean anything. The only thing that held General Galtieri back had been Haig's warning that Mrs. Thatcher meant what she said.⁵⁹

But once the Haig mission failed, and the US openly came out on the side of Britain, the only option that the Argentines now had was to challenge British moves around the islands and regain the initiative. The failure of peace moves also caused a change in British perceptions. While there was still the chance of a negotiated Argentine withdrawal, the British government tried to establish rules of engagement which would minimize casualties.⁶⁰ The attempt was to maintain as much control and direction over the actions of the task force commanders as possible.⁶¹ But once peace attempts failed, military considerations became dominant, especially when it became clear that the exclusion zone was no longer a bargaining chip, but only part of a traditional contest of military force. It is in this context that the sinking of the Belgrano must be understood.

Though the British Exclusion Zone had been in force around

58. Robert J. Delsey, "Manoeuvring in the Falklands", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.108, No.9/55, September 1982, pp.36-37.

59. The Economist (London), 17 April 1982, p.15.

60. Williams, n.9, p.148

61. Ibid, p.149.

the islands since 12 April, it immediately raised questions about the right to attack Argentinian warships outside this 200 mile⁶² limit. To clear up this point, the Swiss government, which was now looking after British interests in Buenos Aires following the break in diplomatic relations was asked to convey the following message to the Argentine government:-

In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to threat of interference with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. (63)

In simple words the British were stating that any warship or aircraft was likely to be attacked if it threatened the safety of the British ships approaching the Falklands war zone, even if the Argentine ship or plane was outside the 200 mile exclusion zone already announced around the Falklands.⁶⁴ The world press did not pay much attention to this statement, concentrating instead on the news from South Georgia which had just been retaken by the British. This unconcern was to cause much misunderstanding later.

On 27 April, when the British task force was judged to be approaching the Falklands, the main Argentine warships sailed⁶⁵ again from their base at Puerto Belgrano, sailing south towards

62. Douglas, n.57, p.519.

63. Middlebrook, n.7, p.142.

64. Ibid. Emphasis in original.

65. After the Falklands invasion most of the navy had returned to their home ports. The aircraft-carrier Vientincino de Mayo is known to have suffered mechanical problems and she probably was repaired while at port.

the Falklands. The force included the aircraft-carrier Vientincino de Mayo, one cruiser, some seven destroyers, three frigates and three or four tankers. The cruiser was the 13,655 ton General Belgrano, an ex-US navy ship which had been modified⁶⁶ to carry EXOCET missiles.

The main group of Argentine ships, centered around the Vientincinco de Mayo was sent north of the Falklands. The cruiser Belgrano, with two destroyer escorts was sent south. The Argentinians later claimed that it was never intended to be an attack unit, but was screening the area between the Falklands and Tierra de Fuego (the area from which ships could enter the South Atlantic from the Pacific Ocean), to ensure that Chilcan navy ships or ships sent from New Zealand or Australia did not come round Cape Horn and join the task force. Thus according to the Argentinians the Belgrano posed no threat to the task force.

But the British saw things differently. Three submarines of the British task force had been shadowing the Argentinian naval force and they knew that the Vientincinco de Mayo had already located the British task force, around 300 miles to the south-east of the Argentinian ships and had armed its Sky Hawk attack aircraft for an attack at dawn on 1 May.⁶⁷ But the Sky Hawk's could not be launched because the wind was unfavourable. But now the danger as the British saw it, was that the Belgrano could evade its shadowing nuclear submarine, HMS Conqueror, and sail through the 200 mile exclusion zone and attack the task force with EXOCET missiles.

Concerned about this danger, on 2 May, Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander of the task force asked that the Conqueror be

66. Middlebrook, n.7, p.143.

67. Ibid, p.145.

given permission to attack the Belgrano.⁶⁸ At noon the war cabinet met and authorized the attack. British submarines were authorized to attack any warship that was seen as a threat to the task force.⁶⁹ As soon as he received the authorization Commander Wredford Brown of the Conqueror began the attack sequence. For the attack itself he chose the older second World War model Mark 8 torpedo because it had a bigger warhead and therefore a better chance of penetrating the warship's armour plating and anti-torpedo bulges.⁷⁰ The Belgrano was struck by two torpedoes and a large amount of internal damage was caused. The ship was abandoned within thirty minutes and sank fifteen minutes later. Of the 1042 men on board, 368 lost their lives. But more than that it signalled the end of peace efforts and the slide towards an all out war.

The British attack on the cruiser caused uproar in Latin America and caused concern in many nations including Britain. The main criticism has been that the sinking was a deliberate attempt by the Thatcher government to scuttle all peace moves and force a war on Argentina. The controversy had raged on ever since.⁷¹ While in retrospect the sinking might seem unnecessary,


68. Admiral Woodward's fear was genuine because if the cruiser had sailed through the shallow waters of Burwood Banks, the submarine HMS Conqueror could not have followed it since the seas were too shallow. This would have given the cruiser a free hand to attack the British task force. If even one of the British aircraft-carriers had been sunk, the entire task force would have had to be withdrawn. See Figure.3.1.

69. Middlebrook, n.7, p.147.

70. The Conqueror was also equipped with the more modern Tigerfish Mark 24 torpedo. But this advanced torpedo had a much smaller warhead and was found during the war to be of no great use against bigger ships like the Belgrano. For a comparative assessment of the torpedoes, see Douglas, n.57, pp.519-23.

71. For criticism of the government's decision to sink the Belgrano see, Desmond Rice and Arthur Gavshon, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London, 1984), Tam Dalyell, Thatcher's

Figure 3.1



Argentine Naval Moves. 29 April to 2 May 1982

Source: Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War. 1982 (London, 1982)

there is no doubt that the fear about Belgrano's intentions were genuine. If those fears had come true Britain would have found it impossible to sustain the naval task force in its attempts to recapture the Falklands islands.

By early May it became clear that the Argentinian gamble in invading the Falklands had failed. The junta had hoped for a passive British response, but the response was strong and strident. They had hoped for US support or at least neutrality, but the US ultimately sided with Britain. Their last hope now was that their troops on the Falkalnds would be able to fight back a British amphibious landing. It was to such ends that Argentine efforts were directed after the sinking of the cruiser, General Belgrano.

Torpedo: The Sinking of the Belgrano (London, 1984), Duncan Campbell and John Rentouc, "Belgrano Papers", New Statesman (London), Vol.108, No.2711, 24 August 1984, and Duncan Campbell, "Falklands: The Belgrano Cover Up", New Statesman (London), Vol.109, No.2810, 31 August 1984.

CHAPTER IV

THE FIGHT TO THE FINISH

The sinking of the Belgrano and the horrific loss of life the British action caused, effectively put an end to hopes for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Positions hardened on both sides and the stage seemed to be set for an all out military confrontation. Such a confrontation between the armed forces of these two nations was to be unique. A war in the South Atlantic would be different from most of the conflicts that had taken place in the past several decades, in so far as it pitted a northern European power against a southern Latin American nation. The British armed forces, oriented primarily towards strategic deterrence, and conflict in Central Europe and the Atlantic against Warsaw Pact forces, found themselves confronting Argentine forces which were equipped with most modern weaponry and well trained by Latin American standards. Overall, they should have been equal in strength.¹ But British lines of communications were 20 times larger than Argentina's, and Argentine forces in the Falklands were twice as numerous as the British.² For people staffing the defence ministries and weapons manufacturing companies around the world a war would be a unique experience, since actions of the British Task Force around the Falkalands would have represented the only major naval battle involving weapon systems developed in the years since the Second World War.

This chapter mainly deals with the war as it developed since the sinking of the Belgrano until the final Argentine

-
1. Captain C.W.Koburger, "The Falklands: Lessons in Modern Naval Warfare", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.88, No.1, January 1983, p.6.
 2. Fred Haynes, "The Falklands: A Victory for Sea-Power", Sea Power (Arlington), Vol.26, No.5, 15 April 1983, p.90.

surrender. The strategies and tactics employed by the air, land and naval forces of both sides are discussed. An attempt has been made to examine the question whether the weapons used were supportive of the strategies employed, as well as the performance of the weapons themselves.

The options open on both sides.

The sinking of the Belgrano, and the failure of peace moves forced both sides to accept the fact that a conflict was inevitable. Both sides had not expected the conflict to break out in the first place and therefore it is not surprising that the options available to both were not as wide enough as both would have wished. The British military plan for the Falklands campaign had four main objectives:

- 1.The establishment of a sea blockade around the islands
- 2.The repossession of South Georgia.
- 3.The gaining of sea and air supremacy around the Falklands.
- 4.The eventual repossession of the Falklands.

By 2 May (the day the Belgrano was sunk), the British had successfully carried out the second objective of their plan. On 22 April the Argentine troops on South Georgia had surrendered to the British. But fulfillment of the remaining three objectives posed numerous problems for British task force mainly because the British forces had not been well equipped for such operations. The maintenance of an effective sea blockade around the islands was complicated by the fact that though the islands were 400 miles away from the Argentine mainland, it was within range of the Argentine fighters and light bombers, both naval and air

3. David Miller and Chris Miller, Modern Naval Combat (London, Salamander, 1986), p.182.

force. Without airborne early warning, the task force commanders could have no more than a few minutes warning of an impending attack.⁴ But an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability was what the British task force sorely lacked. The Royal Navy had not been provided with an integral AEW capability for its aircraft carriers, because the assumption on which British naval acquisitions were made was that the Royal Navy would in future fight a major naval conflict only in association with the US Navy against Warsaw Pact forces in the Atlantic, in which case AEW aircraft aboard the huge US carrier fleet would provide the navy with necessary AEW. But this assumption was now proved wrong since the British were forced to fight a war for protecting what they perceived to be vital national interest without the help of the United States. This meant that the British task force commander had to keep most of the blockading surface ships 50 to 100 miles to the east of the Falkland islands in order to make the Argentine reconnaissance and strike aircraft operate as close to the limit of their range as possible.⁵ If the task force had been kept any further away it would have been impossible to maintain a blockade at all.

Gaining sea and air superiority over the Falklands posed even greater problems for the British task force. The sinking of the Belgrano effectively bottled up the Argentine navy, with the exception of her submarines, at Argentine ports. But the Argentine Air Force was to prove much more difficult to counter. When the war began, the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA) was among

-
4. Commander Nick Kerr, "The Falklands Campaign". Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.35, No.6, November/December 1982, pp.17-18.
 5. The Economist (London), 1 May 1982, p.26.

the finest in Latin America. It contained about 225 combat aircraft, including sixty-eight Douglas A-4 Skyhawk single-engine jet fighter bombers, twenty six Israeli built copies of Dassault Breguet Mirage IIIs called "Neushers" in Israel and "Daggers" in Argentina, twenty one French built Mirage IIIs, and a number of Argentine built IA-58 "Pucara" counter-insurgency aircraft. Two KC-130s provided limited aerial refuelling capability. The Naval Air Force included eleven A-4Q Skyhawks and five of the fourteen⁶ Dassault Breguet Super Etendards ordered in November 1981. These planes posed a serious threat to any British surface fleet operating within its range. Though the limited range of these Argentine aircraft considerably eased the danger to the British fleet, at least when operating at the edge of their operational limits, there was always the danger that the AAF would operate a few of these aircraft from the small air strip at Port Stanley, although Britain in its blockade announcement had threatened to attack any aircraft found anywhere in the Falklands.⁷ But air superiority was absolutely necessary if the British were to carry out the final objective of their mission, the recapture of the Falkland islands from Argentine control. Thus the first priority of the British task force was to protect the fleet from Argentine air attacks. The second objective was to provide Close Air Support (CAS) for the Army and Royal Marines who went ashore.⁸ As the fighting evolved in the next few weeks, this task of protecting the fleet became the main concern for the

-
6. "The Military Balance", Air Force Magazine (December, 1981), p.108, quoted in Earl H.Tilford, "Air Power Lessons", in Bruce W.Watson and Peter M.Dunn, Eds, Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.37
 7. The Economist (London), 1 May, 1982, p.26.
 8. Earl H.Tilford, "Air Power Lessons", in Watson and Dunn, n.6, p.43.

British because its destruction became the primary objective of the Argentine air and naval air forces.

Argentina for its part had considerably more options in dealing with the British threat, inasmuch as its forces were already in control of the island and all that was needed was to protect it from amphibious landings from the British fleet. Argentina adopted a very simple air strategy from the very beginning to destroy British ships. Bombing and strafing of the British troops as they came ashore would seem to be the simplest way to defend the islands, given the lack of natural cover on the islands itself. However, because the Argentine aircraft were operating at the extreme end of their combat radii, they did not have the fuel to search for troops on the move.⁹ The best way to get over this handicap was to sink the ships in the hope of either killing the troops before they went ashore or making the losses to Britain so high that the British government would be forced to withdraw the force, or negotiate.¹⁰ For Argentina, strategy was determined by the limitations imposed on it by the limited capabilities of its air force.

Operation 'Black Buck'.

The greatest concern of the British task force commanders was that Argentina would lengthen the runway at Port Stanley airport, thus preventing the British from establishing air and sea control over and around the Falkland Islands. One of the

9. Though the British were not aware of it at that time the Argentines had no intention of lengthening the runway at Port Stanley in order to base their advanced fighters there. This was to prove a boon to the British forces since aircraft on the islands would have made the British task almost impossible.

10. Tilford, n.8, p.44.

earliest military operations carried out by the British was designed to counter this threat. On 1 May, in a pre-dawn attack, a single Avro Vulcan bomber dropped twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs on Port Stanely airfield after a nine hour flight from Wideawake airfield on Ascension island. The mission required inflight refueling on both the outbound and inbound journey from Victor tanker aircraft. Ten of these Victors were required to support a single Vulcan in this mission, codenamed 'Operation Black Buck', because the Victors themselves required refueling in some cases.¹¹ Several hours later British carrier based Harrier jets straffed supply dumps at the Stanely airbase and at another airbase at Goose Green, about 55 miles west of Stanely. A British spokesman later claimed that the local airstrip was damaged together with a number of Argentine military aircraft parked in the vicinity.¹² Later 1 May, British warships -- a guided missile destroyer and two frigates -- bombarded the Stanely airfield once again from about 10 miles offshore, seeking to prevent any repairs being carried out. The ships were attacked by Argentine planes and they were engaged by British Harriers.

A second attempt was made to disable the Port Stanely airport on 3 May, when another Vulcan reached Port Stanely with the intention of attacking the runway once again. But a problem in the bomb aiming mechanism resulted in the bombs falling just fifty yards west of the runway's end.¹³ Thus the first British

-
11. Lawrence S. Germain, "Appendix: A Diary of the Falklands Conflict" in Watson and Dunn, n.6, p.149.
 12. Facts on File (New York), Vol.42, No.2164, May 7, 1982, p.318.
 13. Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War, 1982, (London, 1982), p.154.

attempts to disable the runways were only partially successful. Less than total success in this operation was partly due to lack of fixed-wing strike aircraft on board the aircraft-carriers and lack of suitable airbases nearby. Ascension island was so far away from the war zone that aircraft based there could spend only a very limited time over the Falklands area thus complicating the bomb aiming and dropping operation.¹⁴ But if the British initially thought that the greatest threat to them came from aircraft based in the Falklands they were soon to be proved wrong. It was an Argentine bomber flying from the mainland that on the same day, 3 May, inflicted one of the heaviest losses on the British fleet, the sinking of the Type 42 destroyer, HMS Sheffield.

The sinking of the Sheffield.

As mentioned earlier, the task force's main handicap was the lack of AEW aircraft, with the Nimrod IIIs that were designed to provide AEW to the fleet still under development, and not due to enter service until 1983.¹⁵ As a result the task force had to deploy destroyers on radar picket duties. But such deployment was fraught with dangers as the experience with Sheffield was to show. The danger was in using insufficiently armed ships, as radar pickets, without providing them with adequate air cover. The weak spot in the air defence organization was that the ships

-
14. Norman Friedman, "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Mislearned", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol.26, No.4, Winter 1983, pp.917-18.
 15. Sir Patrick Wall, "The Falklands: Information Management" Navy International (Surrey), Vol.82, No.10, October 1982, p.135. Development problems later forced Britain to cancel the Nimrod programme and buy American AWACS instead.

16

on radar picket duty were themselves vulnerable to air attacks. This weakness was exploited by the Argentines on May 4 when an attack on the destroyer HMS Sheffield was carried out by two Argentine Super Etendard aircraft using EXOCET missiles. Two of these aircraft approached the task force, flying as low as 60 feet over water in order to get under the radar coverage of the British destroyers. As soon as they neared the task force's expected position, the Super Etendards pulled up to search with their radar. Once a target was identified, its position was automatically transferred to the EXOCET missile. In a couple of seconds, the missile was fired, and the aircraft turned away at high speed and headed for home.

TF-3214

HMS Sheffield was on close picket duty, about 15 miles from the aircraft carriers at the heart of the task force, facing the direction from which an attack was judged most likely. The Sheffield, an anti-aircraft destroyer, was equipped with the Sea Dart missiles, which can shoot down missiles like the EXOCET and was thus considered to be ideal for radar duties. So what went wrong?

The EXOCETs trajectory is so low that any ship is unlikely to acquire it by radar until it is very close. However sophisticated ships like the Sheffield could receive a few more seconds of warning by intercepting either the EXOCET's own acquisition radar, or the radar of the launching aircraft, prior to the missile being detected visually or by the ship's air

-
16. Charles W. Koburger, Sea Power in the Falklands (New York, 1983, p.76, cited in Richard N. Papworth, "Soviet Navy Reactions to the Falklands Islands conflict", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.38, No.2/Sequence.308, March/April 1985, p.59.
17. The Economist (London), 8 May 1982, p.29.

defence radar. But at 600mph the missile is travelling at ten miles per minute, so a launch at a range of twenty miles provides¹⁸ the defenders with a maximum warning of only about 120 seconds.

The first clue to the Sheffield's crew that the ship was about to be attacked should have been provided by emissions from the Super Etendard's Agave radars searching for their target aircraft. But at the time of the attack the Sheffield's radar had been switched off in order to allow the ship to talk with¹⁹ London via the Skynet satellite communications system. If not the aircraft, then at least the missile could have been detected by the destroyer's Sea Dart weapons system that had been designed to deal with aircraft, but could also identify missiles such as EXOCET's. But it has been reported that the ships electronic warfare officers forgot to modify the Electronic Warfare system's programming to delete the radar characteristics of the French built Super Etendard aircraft and EXOCET missiles from the built in list of "friendly" weapons systems and add them to the threat²⁰ list. A final hope for any ship that is attacked by missiles such as the EXOCET is a point defence weapons system that could shoot down low flying missiles. But in 1982 Royal Navy ships were not provided point defence. The theory was that suitably armed frigates would provide protection against air attacks. Certainly Sea Dart could have identified and attacked the aircraft. But because the ships main radar had been shut off the

18. William J. Ruhe, "Smart Weapons", in Watson and Dunn, n.6, p.86.

19. Ezio Bonsignore, "Hard Lessons from the South Atlantic Conflict" Military Technology(Bonn), No.6, August 1982, p.36.

20. Doug Richardson, An Illustrated Guide to the Techniques and Equipment of Electronic Warfare (London, 1985).p.9.

Super Etendards were not located at all. And a last ditch defence measure, a point defence system was not available on the Sheffield. And she had to pay a very heavy price for it.

The air war after the Sheffield.

The sinking of the Sheffield shook the task force commanders out of their complacency regarding the capabilities of the Argentine Air Force. In fact on 5 May the task force commanders informed their government in London that the task force could be kept operational for only another month, given the capabilities of the armed forces, as also the fast approaching winter in the South Atlantic.²¹ At the start of the war the British had assumed that air superiority over the Falklands would be established quickly and maintained by the Royal Navy's air arm and that their naval and ground operation would have little to worry from enemy air attack. But the sinking of the Sheffield was to change all this. Some sources maintain that the entire operation would have been called off if the British had lost one more major ship.²²

Fear of Argentine air attacks was further deepened by the realisation that Argentina could use the runway at Port Stanley even without lengthening it. The runway was 4,100 feet long, shorter than any pilot would like for a jet fighter. But it was known that Argentine Mirage and Dagger fighters had drag parachutes that can shoot out on touch down, to reduce their landing roll. With those they could have landed on such a runway. This would require precise and risky flying, but

21. Germain, n.11, p.151.

22. Mark A. King, "Our Dangerous Assumption", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.115, No.11/1041, November 1989, p.45

American instructors who had trained Argentine pilots were of the
²³
 opinion that Argentine pilots were capable of it.

Taking off from Port Stanley airport would have been a much greater problem. But it was feared that with the cool climate prevailing at that time of the year (which give the jet engines a bit of extra thrust), both the A-4s and the Mirage/Dagger aircraft would be able to take off with full fuel and a light weapons load. Another option available to the Argentines, as long as they could keep the runway operational, would be to launch strikes from Argentina itself, and land the aircraft on the Falklands to take on fuel for the return trip. But this would have required large and very vulnerable fuel stocks on the
²⁴
 islands itself.

The only way in which the British task force with its limited anti-air capability could deal with the threat was to have at least a rudimentary AEW capability. As a stop gap measure it was decided that a number of Sea King anti-submarine aircraft would be modified to carry Thorn EMI Searchwater maritime surveillance radar, to provide at least some early
²⁵
 warning capability to the task force. The systems were ordered rapidly and brought into service by cutting out some of the
²⁶
 bureaucratic checks and monitoring processes. However this was still not a complete solution since the helicopters that were so modified still lacked range and endurance, and the vibration of the helicopters reduced its capability to detect hostile aircraft

23. The Economist (London), 24 April 1982, p.28.

24. Ibid, p.30

25. Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.2, No.8, 1 September 1984, p.350

26. Desmond Wettern, "Lessons Learned from the Falklands Conflict" Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.8, No.4, 1 August, 1987, p.196

27

sufficiently early.

The limitations of airborne early warning meant that the task force commanders had to depend much more on both the anti-aircraft weaponry available on the ships for close protection of the ship as well as the Sea Harrier aircraft on board its aircraft carriers. A total of forty-two Harriers (28 Sea Harriers and 14 Harrier GR3s) were deployed to the Falklands to provide air cover and ground support. Considering the nature of the threat from the Argentine Air Force it may seem that the British took a calculated risk in dispatching such a small number of aircraft. But the British had no choice. Air Force planes did not have the range to fly to the Falklands, and more Harriers could not be committed to the war at least in the initial stages because of other commitments. However once the full extent of the threat to the task force became clear, a further 22 Harriers were flown to Ascension islands and then on to the two British carriers.²⁸

In the absence of any AEW capability the task of detecting hostile aircraft approaching the ships fell on the shoulders of the Sea Harrier crews. But their task was complicated by the limited capabilities of the Sea Harrier aircraft. Normally a carrier task force detects hostile aircraft by mounting Combat Air Patrols over it. But this is supported by radars on board ships as well as airborne ones. In the absence of airborne radars, the Harriers themselves were expected to acquire and attack all incoming hostile aircraft. Although the Harriers could maintain a CAP about one hundred miles from the carrier,

-
27. Paul Beaver, "The Air Lessons: Post Falklands", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.88, No.4, April 1983.
28. Richard A Evin, "Harrier and Sea Harrier Operations in the Falklands Crisis", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.10, October 1982, p.81.

in the Falklands conflict this was impractical since there were not enough Harriers to cover the entire perimeter of a hundred miles around the task force.²⁹ Thus the task force had to employ a mixture of CAP and Deck Launched Intercept (DLI) in order to deal with approaching hostile aircraft.³⁰ This was the reason why during the first major air battle between the Royal Navy and the Argentine Air Force, intercepts were carried out over the fleet itself. Given the limitations of the aircraft the Sea Harriers performed well during the entire war, and none was lost to enemy air action.³¹ Armed with the newer AIM 9-L Sidewinder missiles supplied by the United States, the Sea Harrier accounted for more aircraft than any other single weapons system. Moreover the ski-jump fitted to the carriers permitted the Harriers to remain airborne significantly longer. The AIM 9-L heat-seeking missile proved to be more capable than earlier models. In addition to homing in on the exhaust of the enemy aircraft, they allowed the Sidewinders to have an all aspect capability which meant that the pilot did not need to get into the enemy fighters tail before firing, but could also fire on approaching targets.³²

The war also brought out the differences in training and experience between the British and Argentine air crews. Despite its training and the courage of its crews the AAF was not prepared for the kind of sophisticated air defence system put

29. Norman Friedman, "Surface Combatant Lessons" in Watson and Dunn, n.6, p.28

30. Deck Launch Intercept was a defence measure used by the British task force in which Harriers were kept ready for launch on board the carriers, to be launched when there was warning of an enemy aircraft approaching. This was necessary since there were not enough Harriers to provide CAPs at a considerable distance from the ship.

31. Friedman, n.29, p.28

32. The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (London, 1982), p.9.

up by the Royal Navy. Furthermore the AAF crews had no combat experience, except of a few members who had flown counter-insurgency operations against guerilla forces. The military traditions of the AAF and the Naval AF were thus limited to domestic strife.

The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force on the other hand have a rich military tradition. Like their Argentine counterparts they also had virtually no opportunities to fight in the preceding two decades. Yet they maintained a high level of proficiency by training in NATO exercises, and flying against "aggressor squadrons", at home. The process of staying ready to fight Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces demands a high level of readiness, and this was of tremendous help to the British air crews in the Falklands.

The Argentines knew that they would be fighting against a well trained and well equipped force, and also that their own aircraft would be fighting at the end of their combat radii when flying from the mainland bases. Yet they did not even attempt to base their aircraft in the Falklands. That made all the difference in so far as the battle for control of air space over the Falklands was concerned. Why then did they not do it? According to one source, while aluminium runway material to lengthen the runway was available, there was no time to ship it to the islands.³⁴ Moreover the size and weight of the materials required a large vessel which was not available. Whatever the reason, the failure to base aircraft on the islands put the Argentines at a considerable disadvantage by limiting

33. Tilford, n.8, p.38

34. "El Teatro de Operaciones" Aerospacio (Septiembre/Octubre 1982), p.25, cited in Ibid, p.40.

their flexibility and scope of operations. This again revealed what was to be a constant feature of whole Argentine conduct of the war. A total lack of planning to counter a possible British military reaction to the Argentine seizure of the islands. This once again reinforces the feeling that the Argentines never expected the British response and when it came were totally unprepared to counter it effectively.

The war at sea

If the British were a little handicapped in countering the Argentine Air Force, they were on much firmer ground when it came to meeting the challenge posed to the task force by the Argentine navy. The British declaration of a 200 mile exclusion zone around the Falkland islands had been designed to take advantage of the Argentine concern for British nuclear powered submarines in the area. The inherent stealth of these submarines made the declaration effective even without actual deployment of the submarines in the exclusion zone.³⁵ The inability of the Argentine surface fleet to protect itself against the British nuclear submarine force became evident on 2 May, when the 'Belgrano' was sunk by the 'Conqueror'. Although the 'Belgrano' was screened by the destroyers 'Bouchard' and 'Piedra Buena', the Conqueror was apparently able to attack completely undetected. For the Argentines the problem was one of using inferior sonar equipment against a quiet enemy platform (the British nuclear powered submarines). Realising the futility of trying to operate the navy against such advanced weaponry, the decision was taken to recall all surface ships to port. As a result the British effectively neutralised the entire Argentine

35. Robert J. Kelsey, "Manoeuvring in the Falklands", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.108, No.9/55, September 1982, pp.36-37.

surface fleet in a single stroke. Thus the entire Argentine surface fleet was neutralised by preventing the fleet, or the individual units comprising it from getting on to sea. For the rest of the war the surface units of the Argentine navy, which were quite considerable, were confined to an area twelve miles from the Argentine coastline.³⁷ It appears that the Argentine navy attempted to sail after the loss of the Belgrano. Admiral Anaya the hardline member of the junta and chief of the navy tried to use the aircraft carrier, the 'Vienticinco de Mayo' against the British fleet. But he was restrained by his colleagues in the junta who realized that the carrier was too important a national asset to be placed at risk.³⁸

If the nuclear powered submarines allowed the British to neutralize the Argentine surface fleet, the Argentine submarines were a completely different story. When the Falklands crisis developed into a full scale war the Argentine submarine force was in a state of transition. It was preparing to induct into its fleet new submarines being built in West Germany, and many of its experienced personnel were in Europe undergoing training.³⁹ The submarine force controlled four boats, two old 'Guppy' class vessels and two modern German designed 'Type 209s'. Both the Guppy class vessels suffered from the effects of old age. One of them, the 'Santiago del Estero' had been decommissioned in

-
36. Keith E. Wiseler, "Argentina's Geopolitics and her Revolutionary Diesel-Electric Submarines", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol. XLII, No. 1/325, Winter 1989, p. 99.
37. Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea Power: An Introduction (London, 1987), p. 59.
38. Friedman, n. 29, pp. 23-24.
39. Robert L. Schenia, "Where were those Argentine Subs" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol. 110, No. 3/973, March 1984, p. 115.

September, 1981 and was now being used for static training. The operational capabilities of the 'Santa Fe' were considerably reduced. In particular the submarines sensors were unreliable, and the batteries could take only a limited charge. Argentine efforts to keep these boats operational had been severely hampered by the US arms embargo, which had been in effect since 1976.⁴⁰ The strength of the Argentine submarine force its two "Type 209" submarines. The 'Salta' was undergoing major yard work and the work was speeded up when the war broke out. But during sea trials the Salta made excessive noise which rendered her unfit for combat operations. The Salta could not be made ready before the conflict. That effectively left the Argentines with only one submarine, the 'San Luis', which was fully operational.

Throughout the war the threat to the British task force from the Argentine submarines, though light was ever present.⁴¹ The Argentine commander of the San Luis in later interviews claimed that he had no problems getting near the British task force in spite of the quite considerable British anti-submarine warfare capabilities. On 1 May the submarine actually fired a torpedo at the British task force, but the wire connecting the torpedo to the submarine's fire control computer broke after three minutes, thus rendering the attack ineffective. A British counter attack, lasting around twenty minutes could not damage the Argentine submarine. The inability of the British task force to locate and destroy the submerged submarine, in spite of the fact that the Royal Navy is a force that specialises in anti-submarine warfare, is a tribute to the modern diesel-electric

40. Ibid.

41. Kerr, n.4, p.18.

submarines. In fact the British task force commanders took the threat from the single Argentine submarine quite seriously. Throughout the war there were numerous false alarms regarding possible Argentine submarine attacks and a considerable amount of depth charges were fired in order to counter them. During the war stocks of both anti-air and anti-submarine weapons were used up at a rate much faster than had been earlier anticipated.⁴² But though the submarines posed a considerable threat to the British task force they did not succeed in their objective of either sinking any of the British warships or in forcing the British to withdraw by inflicting unacceptable losses on the British fleet. This would seem to suggest that the capabilities of middle power or regional power navies in submarine operations are rather limited, especially when they confront a developed naval power.⁴³ The problem is not so much lack of operational capability as the limitation in numbers and the quality of weaponry available on these submarines, caused mainly by resource constraints and a lack of political will to develop the submarine arm as an effective deterrent force.

The British success in employing its submarine force is a study in contrast. The nuclear powered submarines that it possessed gave it an unmatched capability during the course of the war. The nuclear powered subs were the first to reach the scene of the conflict and they succeeded in their task of bottling up the Argentine ships at sea. Later on in the war they undertook a new and critical function: lying off the coast of the Argentine

42. Wettern, n.30, p.196.

43. Ken Booth and William L. Dowdy, "Structure and Strategy in Indian Ocean Naval Developments: Taking Stock", in William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood, Eds, The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena. (New Delhi, 1987), p.84

air bases and using electronic equipment, and visual sightings to report the takeoff of aircraft sorties towards the Falkalands.⁴⁴

US and Soveit help to the two sides.

As mentioned earlier, the outbreak of the war found the United States caught between its obligation to fulfill commitments to its NATO ally, Britian, and the desire not to put at risk relations with Argentina, a fellow member of the OAS and a vital part of the Reagan administration's policy towards Latin and Central America. Though at first the US administration professed neurtrality in the conflict and attempted to mediate in the crisis, the British started receiving tacit military assistance from the very first days of the crisis. The assistance came not from the administration, but from the Pentagon, anxious about the damage that a British defeat would do to the credibility of NATO defences.⁴⁵

In the early days of the Falklands war, at a time when Alexander Haig was attempting to maintain the illusion of even handed neutrality in his negotiations with both London and Buenos Aires, the Pentagon under Casper Weinburger, was shipping sizeable amounts of much needed military supplies to the British staging post of Ascension island. And the flow of supplies increased after the administration gave up attempts at mediation and came out openly in support of Britain. The former US Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, says that the Falklands war would certainly not have been won by Britian without US help.⁴⁶

-
44. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falkalands (London, 1983), p.184.
45. Christopher Greyling and Christopher Langoon, Just Another Star: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (London, 1988), p.20
46. David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart (London, 1988), p.315.

The United States provided vital support to Britain. This included important intelligence information, 12.5 million gallons of fuel, and with essential weapons systems, including anti-ship missiles, the latest generation of Sidewinder missiles for use by British Harrier aircraft, as well as with ammunition and explosives. In addition to this the Pentagon provided Britain with communication satellites. The decision to sink the Argentine cruiser 'Belgrano' was probably conveyed to the submarine HMS Conqueror through an American communications network made available while the United States was still neutral. And the Pentagon made an unofficial offer that if one of the British carriers, HMS Invincible or HMS Hermes was sunk by the Argentines, they would replace it immediately with an American⁴⁷ ship the USS Guam, to be manned by American navy personnel.

But intelligence information provided by the huge American intelligence collection network probably helped the British more than anything else. The United States moved a photographic reconnaissance satellite to cover the Falklands even though it shortened the satellite's endurance.⁴⁸ In addition to signals intelligence from the United States, listening posts in South America, and breaking of Argentine military codes, the real⁴⁹ intelligence breakthrough came from traditional human sources Argentine officers and officials who believed in American declarations of neutrality provided a steady flow of intelligence to the CIA station and the American military attaches in Buenos

47. The Economist (London), March 3, 1984. pp.23-24

48. Ibid. But according to the leading American analyst Professor Andrew Burrows, for much of the war weather conditions prevented effective photographic coverage of the Falklands area. See William Burrows, Deep Black (New York, 1986), p.250.

49. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA (New York, 1986), p.212.

Aires, who forwarded it to Washington. It was then only a matter of time before the information was passed on to London. The CIA station in Buenos Aires is reported to be in the same block as the Argentine High Command and is thus able to listen in to the High Commands discussions through agent penetration and electronic eavesdropping.⁵⁰

As the Falklands crisis developed both the Soviet Union and Cuba took pro-Argentine positions. Tass, the official Soviet news agency said on 3 May that US support for Britain had bolstered the "agressiveness" of British policy. The Falklands dispute, Tass said, reflected the "global imperialist" line of the Reagan administration which sought to extend "US and NATO influence and presence wherever possible"⁵¹

A Cuban official 5 May, said that Cuba would provide Argentina with help in every possible way, including military to deal with the Falklands crisis. Cuba for years had poor relations with Argentina, but Cuban Vice-President Rafael Rodriguez said that the offered support was "for the Argentine people, for the Argentine cause, not to the junta in Buenos Aires."⁵²

Though statements of support for Argentina came from the Soviet Union the exact nature of military help given, if any, is not clear even now. It has been said that the Soviets sent two spy satellites into space after the war started and relayed

50. Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London, 1984), p.82.

51. Facts on File (New York), Vol.42, No.2164, May 7, 1982. p.319

52. Ibid.

information to the government in Buenos Aires. But such reports have been vehemently denied by the Argentine government.

Recapturing the Falklands: The initial preparations.

The air and sea war that followed the sinking of the Belgrano and the Sheffield was just the initial stages of a long drawn out campaign for the British which had to culminate at some time or the other in a landing on the islands itself with the aim of recapturing it. Any landing on the islands itself would require the Royal Navy to have both landing ships to land troops on the islands itself, as well as aircraft to give close air support to the troops that went ashore. It was with this in mind that the British government in early May despatched a second batch of navy ships and Harrier aircraft to the Falklands. The new force included the Atlantic Conveyor, an 18,000 ton container ship modified to carry 18 Harrier jump jets, as well as Boeing Chinook heavy-lift helicopters to provide mobility to the troops once they went ashore. This modification of container ships to carry aircraft was carried out as per the specifications of the ARAPHO plan, which involved the modification of civilian ships, in times of war, to enable it to carry naval aircraft and thus serve as 'bargain basement' aircraft carriers. To land the troops on the island the British government also despatched two amphibious assault ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, both of which were recommissioned since they had been retired from

53. Robert E.Harkavy, "The Lessons of Recent Wars: Toward Comparative Analysis" in Robert E.Harkavy and Stephanie G.Neuman, The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World (Massachusetts, 1985), p.32.

54. Time (Chicago), 26 April 1982, p.15.

55. Captain Gerald O'Rourke, "What's in store for Arapho?" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109, No.7/965, July 1983, p.118.

active naval service as part of naval cost cutting efforts. Over the years the British navy had been required to assume that it would never again fight without allies and, in future would not make an opposed amphibious landing.⁵⁶ The two assault ships along with their landing craft had been earmarked for disposal. It was only due to parliamentary pressure that they were retained.⁵⁷ Without them the Falklands landing operation could not have been carried out at all.

The Argentines too had been preparing for a possible British invasion. In keeping with a trend that had been followed in most of Latin America the defence of the islands itself was to be left to the troops that Argentina had stationed on the islands. But what the Argentines did not realise, or deliberately ignored was the fact that the Falklands favoured an invasion force against a defending one.⁵⁸ The two main islands, about the size of Wales could not have been defended adequately by 50,000 troops against a determined invasion force. A flexible and versatile navy would have given the Argentines the appropriate force needed to defend the islands. Five island groups or parts of islands had changed hands in the seventies through the application of force that was appropriate, limited and naval.⁵⁹ But naval and air-force development had been given a low priority in Argentina, as in most of Latin America, in favour of maintaining huge armies. This is surprising considering the fact that the military geography of the continent is dominated by a few core areas, with

-
56. Frank Uhlig, Jr., "Amphibious Lessons" in Watson and Dunn, n.6, p.53.
57. Sir Patrick Wall, "The Falklands: Lessons for NATO" Navy International (Surrey) Vol.82, No.10, October 1982, p.1351.
58. The Economist (London), 17 April 1982, p.24.
59. James Cable, Diplomacy at Sea (London, 1985), p.106.

essentially empty areas in between, and considerable distance in between these core areas. This situation is compounded by the fact that the South American military establishments have only limited logistical means with which to overcome these formidable obstacles and have not made any efforts to solve this basic logistical problem of transportaion, communication and supply.⁶⁰

Because of the distances and the hostile terrain it would seem logical that the Latin American military establishments should emphasize their air forces and navies over their ground forces. But for a number of historical, political and cultural reasons, this is not the case, and this has always stood in the way of the South American nations efforts to effectively project and employ their forces.⁶¹ This was the situation in which the Argentine military junta found itself in the final days of May. Their air force and navy had not succeeded in forcing the British to pull back their task force. This failiure was at least in part caused by the reluctance of successive governments over the years to pay adequate attention to a balanced development of the two services. It was now left to the army to try to hold back the British from retaking the island.

Ever since the task force began its long journey south from Britain, British commanders had been trying to work out plans for an amphibious landing on the islands. It was clear from the very beginning that against the powerful force that the Argentines had assembled in Port Stanely, an assault landing, would be impossible. The other option available was to be content with

60. Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in Latin America (New York, 1985), p.8

61. Ibid, p.9.

raids on the island, or with a landing on West Falkland where there were few Argentines, so that the British could claim that they had under their control at least a part of the island, and challenge the Argentines to push them off.⁶² But that was not what the British government had in mind. The intention was to push the Argentines off the islands completely. Therefore it was decided that the landing would be made on the main island, East Falklands itself, but at a distance away from the Argentine troop concentrations at Port Stanely.

The invasion site chosen was Port San Carlos, on the north-western coast of East Falkland Island. The harbour opened up on Falkland Sound, the strip of water between East and West Falkland,, and offered some protection against attack by submarines. Falkland Sound was unmined and Port San Carlos was only lightly guarded.⁶³ The terrain between Port San Carlos and Port Stanely was boggy, and wheeled vehicles could not pass. But since the British forces that was to be landed had few vehicles and planned to travel on land either by foot or by helicopter, this was not a handicap. But to the Argentines who depended on wheeled vehicles it would be a handicap.

The invasion site offered other advantages as well. Because of the high hills and short over-water distances, Port San Carlos offered protection to ships from Argentine missiles such as the EXOCET, because anti-ship missiles needed long, open stretches of water and can be distracted by such things as hills. But to ordinary bombs delivered from aircraft the hills did not matter. And bombs were what the Argentine aircraft would

62. Uhlig, n.56, p.59.

63. The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons., n.36, p.7

deliver. In choosing to land on East Falkland the British would be taking a calculated risk, since their Harriers, the only British weapon system capable of giving ground support to British troops once they landed on the islands, would be heavily outnumbered by Argentine jet aircraft flying from the mainland and less capable planes flying from bases in the island itself. Not only would the Harriers be vastly outnumbered by the Argentine aircraft, they would also not be able to take advantage of being close to the ships of the amphibious force under their protection. If the carriers were not to be risked they would have to be at such a distance from the amphibious force that the Harriers could stay on station above the force only for brief periods. But the British had one advantage that they could count on, that of complete surprise. The Argentines had considered the San Carlos area an unlikely landing spot, because the San Carlos estuary not only provided little space to contain an amphibious force, but also hindered radar warnings concerning approaching hostile aircraft.⁶⁴

The preparation for the landing at Port San Carlos began on the night of 14-15 May when a party of Special Air Service troops was lifted by helicopter from the carrier Hermes to Pebble Island at the north end of West Falkland Island. There, assisted by gunfire from a British destroyer, they blew up six Argentine light attack planes and five other aircraft before flying back to the carrier.⁶⁵ The destruction of these planes on Pebble island was important because they could have effectively hindered the landing at San Carlos that was about to begin a few days later.

-
64. Peter J. Beck, "The Falklands: 1930 Insights", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.82, No.10, October 1982, p.1390.
65. "The Falklands Crisis, Operation and Progress after May 7", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.82, No.7, July 1982, p.1160.

Just a day before the landing, there was a transfer of troops at sea about 200 miles from the objective. One of the three battalions of troops who had been transported to the Falklands in the passenger liner, the Canberra was moved to the landing ship the Fearless and a second to the Intrepid, thus reducing the danger that a major part of the landing force would be lost if the Canberra was to be sunk.⁶⁶ Once this transfer had been effected the task force was now set for the landing on the islands itself.

The landing at San Carlos

On the evening of 20 May the British amphibious task group, screened by destroyers and frigates, began the 200 mile run to Port San Carlos. Keeping radio silence, they steamed northward around East Falkland and into Falkland Sound, arriving off Port San Carlos. Although the skies were clear, the ships remained undiscovered as they began to load the invasion force by landing craft. There was a small fight ashore when the Special Boat Squadron encountered an Argentine outpost, but that soon ended with the Argentines dead or dispersed.⁶⁷ At dawn the amphibious ships were moved in to San Carlos Water, an arm of the Sound protected by hills on both sides, and the invasion continued, using both landing craft and helicopters. Destroyers and frigates stood by to provide gunfire support and to defend the invasion force and their transports from the expected Argentine air attacks. Those attacks began at about 10:00 a.m. Some of the ships had medium-range SAMs some had short range SAM's: but none

66. D.V.Nicholls, "Amphibious Victory", Globe and Laurel (July/August 1982), p.220, cited in Uhlig, n.6, pp.221-222

67. Ibid. pp.222-223.

had what they all needed, which was both. For a day the ships and aircraft had to battle it out. There was a day's pause and then two more days of attacks, this time met by British missiles fired from shore as well as from ships. There were heavy casualties on both sides, with two frigates going down and six other ships damaged. But all the British amphibious ships and transports remained unharmed. At high cost to themselves, the ships had shielded the landing forces while the latter were establishing themselves ashore.

Within five days of the landing Britain had lost four ships to Argentine air attacks. The Argentine aircraft had to pass through the British air defence screen comprising of Rapier SAMs, Blowpipe shoulder fired SAMs and Seacat and Seawolf missiles on board the British ships - all this if they succeeded in evading
68
Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrols. Since the San Carlos area was hemmed in by hills, sea-skimming missiles which required long stretches of sea to acquire their targets could not be used against the British landing force. So the Argentines used conventional iron bombs against the ships. In the war fourteen British ships were sunk or damaged by rather outdated attack aircraft using old-fashioned iron bombs of which only about half
69
exploded. The failure of so many bombs to explode is partly due to the tactics adopted by the Argentine Air Force pilots in the approach to air attacks. The Argentines had two British built destroyers armed with Seadart missiles and therefore knew the capabilities of similar missiles on board the British ships. In order to avoid attack, they flew low on the bombing run, which

68. Simon Durwen, "Lessons from the Falklands Conflict", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.9, September 1982, p.81.

69. Jan Connell, "Nott - Badly Misunderstood", Sunday Times, 5 September 1982, in Booth and Dowdy, n.47, p.85.

made them difficult targets but also meant that many of their bombs failed to arm in time before they hit their target.⁷⁰ The British lost as many ships as they did during the landing at Port San Carlos mainly because the hills around the landing site reduced warning time of approaching aircraft.⁷¹ In addition to this many of the weapons that the British forces used to defend themselves were not well suited for such tasks, and when they were suited they very often produced reprecussion which had not been envisaged when they were designed.


One such weapon was the chaff launcher used to confuse sea-skimming missiles such as the EXOCET. When the British believed that an air attack was imminent and that EXOCET might be used, a continuous chaff barrage was laid at some distance from major ships to decoy the missiles away from their intended targets. Chaff is, in effect, chopped up silver foil which reflects radar. Large clouds of bits of foil make the missiles radars see a larger target than the ship it should home in on; hopefully the missile will lock on to the chaff and fall harmlessly into the sea. But this was not what happened on 25 May, when two Argentine Super Etendards attacked the British fleet. The Argentines launched two EXOCET missiles from long range at what they believed was a British carrier. The EXOCETs were decoyed by the chaff clouds thrown up a mile or so away from the carriers position. The missiles then passed on through the chaff clouds⁷² and then locked on to the container ship Atlantic Conveyor. The missile then hit the container ship which was about five

70. Wall, n.57, p.1351

71. Cable, n.59, p.79.

72. Ruhe, n.18, p.87.

Figure 4.1



British Positions, May 14-June 8, 1982

Source: Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, Eds, Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War (Boulder, 1984).

kilometers away from the carrier. The loss of the container ship was a heavy loss for the task force since they were carrying the Boeing Chinook helicopters which the British landing force had counted on to provide mobility once they had landed on the islands, over terrain where wheeled vehicles could not move.

The march from San Carlos to Port Stanely


Once the landing on San Carlos had been concluded successfully the government in London began putting pressure on the commander of the landing force, Brigadier Julian Thompson, to immediately engage the enemy at Goose Green. ⁷³ The Argentine garrison at Goose Green was not a significant target as far as military operations to recover the islands was concerned. But this was chosen as the initial target by the government so that there would be an immediate tactical victory, which in turn would boost public morale at home. As one source put it, "London needed a tangible victory. If there ever was a politician's battle, this was it". ⁷⁴

To achieve the Whitehall objectives the landing force was split up into two groups. The 2nd Paras (2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment) were to attack the Argentine force at Goose Green. The 45 Commando (45th Battalion, The Royal Marine Commando Regiment) and the 3rd Para were to move on foot some fifty miles overland to begin the attack on Port Stanely, the final objective of the war. Political considerations thus forced a militarily unwise move, the breaking up of a force in the face of a numerically superior enemy.

73. Harry G. Summers, "Ground Warfare Lessons" in Watson and Dunn, n.6, pp.68-69.

74. Hastings and Jenkins, n.48, p.231.

Figure 4.2



The Assault on Argentine Positions Around Port Stanley

Source: Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, Eds, Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War (Boulder, 1984).

Once the Argentines failed in their attempt to prevent the British forces from establishing a beachhead at San Carlos, their chances of preventing a British advance on Port Stanley was remote. Not only were the British troops much better trained in ground warfare, the Falklands terrain was such that a defending force would find it difficult to hold out against a well trained and well led attacking force. The Argentine garrison at Goose Green surrendered on the morning of 29 May. By 13 June the British troops were in full control of the mountains around Port Stanley where the Argentine garrison was holding out. By the time the landing force was in this position to launch their final attack, they had taken six days to establish the bridgehead at San Carlos, fourteen days to travel a distance of about 44 miles, and another four days to prepare for the final assault.⁷⁵ The rate of advance had averaged around 3 miles per day. The final assault was however successful and there was no need for an attack on Port Stanley itself. White flags sprang up throughout Argentine positions. At 9 p.m on 14 June the British land force commander, Major General Jermey Moore, accepted the surrender of Major General Mario Benjamin Menendez and the entire Argentine Malvinas force -- almost ten thousand soldiers with their arms and equipment.

75. E.H.Dar, "Strategy in the Falklands War", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109, No.9, March 1983, p.134.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The defence of a nation's territory has been a priority area for allocation of resources by governments worldwide. Even when it has been economically expensive, increased allocation of national revenues for the armed forces has been one of the ways in which governments have sought to reassure the people that the security of the nation is being well looked after. But in this rush to spend more and more money, ostensibly for the nation's security, one crucial question is very often overlooked, both by the government itself, as well as by independent observers outside: whether the armed forces are being suitably prepared and equipped for the task that the political leadership has laid out for them. Very often political decisions on the tasks that the armed forces have to carry out are taken without any consideration of whether the armed forces have been prepared and equipped for it. Unprepared armies, navies and air-forces, struggling to carry out government decisions for which they have not been trained or equipped has been a feature of many military campaigns. It is within this context that the question of defending a nation's island territories has been examined.

The protection of island territories very rarely involves national survival or the protection of vital national interests. Island possessions are sparsely populated and sometimes even uninhabited. These possessions are generally not of immediate economic benefit to a nation that owns them. Hence there is a tendency among strategic planners to give very little thought as to how one should go about ensuring that these territories are adequately defended. The armed forces often have no choice but to defend them with the forces and equipment that have been designed and acquired for quite different tasks.

Island possessions in recent years have tended to become much more valuable than they had been hitherto been. With the steady depletion of land based resources like oil, gas and minerals, the sea is emerging as a potential alternative source for these resources. Even though the exploitation of resources from the sea is likely to be much more expensive, the demand for these resources could only go up since without these resources, continued economic growth and prosperity appears to be doubtful. As the hunt for resources moves from land to sea, island possessions are becoming valuable assets for any nation. International law gives a nation that possesses islands exclusive rights to exploit the marines resources in the seas around them. Such possessions could also considerably reduce the infrastructural problems that the exploitation of deep-sea resources create. But the increased importance of island territories could also create problems for a state if ownership over it is disputed.

Situated as they are in the middle of seas and oceans, ownership of many islands have been claimed by more than one state, often creating tension and sometimes even armed conflict in many parts of the world. Disputes over island territories caused by a variety of reasons have broken out in almost all oceans of the globe. But the war which broke out between Britain and Argentina in 1982 was unique in the sense that this was the first time since the second World War that a full scale war broke out between two nations for control of an island chain, involving the air, naval and land forces of the two nations. It also represented the only naval conflict in modern times which saw the use of recently developed high-tech weaponry. As such the war provided certain insights as to how a state could be better

prepared for countering threats to its island territories that could arise. Moreover it also provided insights as to how an adequate attention to defending these territories and deterring possible attacks on them can prevent a conflict breaking out in the first place.

The British failure to foresee and deter.

The Argentine invasion of the Falklands was clearly a setback to British interests because the British government failed to deter Argentina from using force to settle the long standing dispute between the two countries regarding sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. A peaceful resolution of the conflict had been the main aim of British government policy towards the islands ever since 1965, when the United Nations had called on both nations to settle their dispute peacefully. The question remains as to whether the failure was one of government policy as such, or was merely a failure of intelligence collection and analysis. To an extent the two issues are mixed since intelligence collection is in itself governed by government policy. Intelligence analysts reflect the political premises and bias of decision makers -- either because they have no choice or because they share the views of the political leadership. But the distinction is important. While successful intelligence collection and analysis would at best have forewarned the British government about the exact date of an invasion, and thus would have given more time for the armed-forces to prepare for recapturing them from Argentine control, successful government policy would have deterred Argentina from invading the islands in the first place. Successful deterrence would have been expensive in the short run, inasmuch as it would have involved stationing

more troops on the islands, but not as expensive as what it cost the British government to recapture the islands in the end.

The available evidence would point to a failure of British government policy on the islands far greater than any possible failure in the collection and analysis of intelligence. While successive governments had stated that they were sincere in wanting a negotiated settlement of the dispute, the British negotiating stand was rigid, especially on the question of sovereignty. Whether it was due to pressure from parliament or from the islanders, it had the effect of convincing the Argentines that Britain was not serious in her desire to settle the dispute peacefully and that alternative methods would have to be sought to settle the dispute. A rigid stand would have had the effect of successful policy if it was backed with the necessary military strength. But successive governments since the 1960's had reduced defence budgets, and resource constraints affected providing of adequate forces to back commitments in far flung areas. And troop presence on the islands was at a level inadequate to protect the islands against a determined attack or even to deter such an attack. Plans for a reduction in the naval fleet announced in 1981 was bound to reduce its power projection capability. The decision to withdraw HMS Endurance, the last remaining naval patrol ship in the Falklands area also sent the wrong signal to Argentina. The military junta saw this as an admission of the British losing interest in holding on to the islands. It was inevitable that the Argentines, reading all these developments, would have concluded that Britain would not challenge with force an invasion of the islands.

The failure of British intelligence to take note of indications that Argentina was considering an invasion of the

islands was also due in part to government policy. An excessive preoccupation with the Soviet threat, especially in the early eighties, when the Euro-missile crisis and the Afghan crisis broke out, alongwith resource constraints, tended to affect priority and attention to other areas where Britain had vital interests. The manner in which the various intelligence agencies were integrated into the government structure also made objective analysis difficult. The various intelligence agencies were under the control of, and had to report through, the Foreign Office, making it the sole agency responsible for analysing intelligence information. Assessments were naturally coloured by the perceptions of the Foreign Office, and the British government did not have the advantage of an independent assessment of any given situation from another agency. An alternative assessment obtained from another source could perhaps have given a more balanced view.

The failure to predict, reasonably in advance, the time of the actual invasion was not a failure as such because the final decision to invade was taken by the Argentine government only the day before the invasion actually took place. The fact that the Argentine navy had been out at sea for a week before the invasion was not sufficient reason enough to be considered a sign of an impending invasion since the exercises had been scheduled long before. Argentine capabilities had been correctly assessed. It was however much more difficult to assess intentions, especially since the Argentine government itself had not decided on them until the last moment.

Britain had been secure in the belief that Argentina would not use force to take over the islands. The Argentines under

Galtieri would have behaved according to British prediction, but for the failure of the British to take account of the precarious position of the military government in the Argentine polity. Alongside a growing misperception in Argentina that Britain would not respond to an Argentine takeover of the islands, was a serious domestic crisis that threatened to topple the Galtieri government. Not surprisingly the generals in Buenos Aires decided to kill two birds with the Falklands stone. Annex a territory that they had claimed for two hundred years, and drum up domestic support at home for a popular cause, thus ensuring breathing space for the government to consolidate itself. The Argentine invasion provided a reminder that it is not sufficient merely to have the will to project power. There must also exist a force in being as a manifestation of that will. A strong force presence in and around the islands would have convinced Argentina of the seriousness of British intentions and would probably have deterred her from launching an invasion.

The first month of the the war.

The invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and the shrill and strident reaction it evoked in Britain made a conflict between the two inevitable. While a conflict was not in the economic, political or security interests of both nations it also came at an inconvenient time for the allies of the two nations, especially the United States, which was forced to make difficult choices. Therefore it is not surprising that the US had to put in so much of time and effort to resolve the crisis peacefully. But the very factors that caused the crisis to erupt, ensured that it would not be resolved peacefully, and both Argentina and Britain found themselves sliding uncontrollably towards a war that

both had not foreseen, nor were well equipped to fight.

All would have gone well for the Argentine junta provided the British had not reacted so vehemently. Significantly when the strong British reaction came it exposed the flaws in Argentine planning and strategic thinking and simultaneously resulted in the passing of the initiative to the British. The first mistake that was made was to time the invasion for April. If they had waited for a few more months many of the British ships that had formed the task force would have been scrapped without being replaced, and the Argentine armed forces would have taken delivery of significant quantities of air and naval armaments which would have ensured a far better Argentine performance in any conflict.¹ Perhaps the onset of winter in the South Atlantic would have made the dispatch of a British task force difficult. But divisions within the Argentine leadership forced different members of the junta to act independently and thereby caused both confusion and preemption. There is enough evidence to indicate that Admiral Anaya, the Chief of the Navy, forced the government's hand by authorising on his own, the landing of scrap dealers in South Georgia which forced the government to prepone the invasion. The invasion had been originally planned for July, but this rouge operation of the scrap merchants forced the Argentine junta's hands, because any delay in the operation then would have only alerted the British to send more forces to the islands thus making an eventual invasion even more difficult. The plans for the invasion itself were perfect and was carried out with a precision which appears

1. For a description of how the strategic scenario and the balance of forces would have changed in the next few months, see Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age (London, 1984), pp.246-47.

to be surprising, considering the fact that it was carried out at short notice. But the follow-up planning was poor, haphazard, and at worst non-existent.

The biggest blunder was the failure to plan for a possible British military response to the Argentine invasion. The entire planning for the invasion by the Argentine armed forces had been based on the understanding that the British would not respond with military force. But when Britain reacted militarily, plans were not at hand to counter it. In retrospect the failure to base Argentine air-force planes at Port Stanely airport would seem to have been the costliest mistake. This would have meant lengthening the runway and creating refuelling facilities there. The technology was available to carry out both these tasks relatively easily.² But no plans were made and no equipment procured for such tasks. The result was that the advantage that Argentina had in the air, with its Mirage and Dagger aircraft much superior in performance to British air assets, could not be brought to bear against the task force. The basing of aircraft on the island would have had a force multiplier effect, ensuring that Argentine air-force aircraft were used to the limits of their capability. But without such basing, the aircraft were forced to fly from the mainland, reducing their range and the time they could spend over the islands. The island of South Georgia was completely out of the range of Argentine aircraft flying from the mainland, and this made the British task of recapturing it that much easier.

2. For a description of how the Argentine's could have modified Port Stanely airport as a base for airforce planes, see "The balance of forces", The Economist (London), 24 April 1982, pp.28-30.

Diplomatically too Argentine efforts were a failure. Apart from counting on the support of all members of the OAS including the United States, Argentina also tried to get moral and material support from the western bloc and the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that she succeeded in getting moral support from many nations. Yet she could not influence the issue because crucial nations, especially in the UN Security Council refused to side with her when it came to actual voting on issues. Argentina overestimated its importance to the Reagan administration's policies in Latin and Central America, in thinking that it was so important that the US would not risk alienating it by supporting Britain in a war. But the US attitude to the war was to prove that the certainty of support to a NATO ally was much more important to the US in inter-alliance terms than maintaining good relations with Argentina. Britain on the other hand managed to get the right kind of support. Economic sanctions by the EEC and other western nations hurt the Argentine economy as well as the country's morale. Support from the UN Security Council members allowed Britain to get Resolution 502 through the council giving her a handy stick to beat the Argentines with. By demanding on Argentina that it support the UN Charter, the resolution painted Argentina as the aggressor and Britain as the victim, allowing Britain to claim self righteously that it was only protecting itself against aggression as permitted by the UN Charter. Diplomatically the British succeeded where the Argentines failed.

The conduct of the war.

The sinking of the 'Belgrano' and the 'Sheffield', and the heavy loss of life these military moves caused effectively scuttled whatever chances there had been for a peaceful

resolution of the crisis. Even then the two sides did not relish the prospect of having to go to war over an island territory that would be of little strategic or economic benefit in the short run. But by then national emotions had been raised to fever pitch and any compromise by either side would have been domestically unpopular. A war appeared the only way out and both sides had to evaluate their position carefully before they could decide on the strategy to meet the imminent outbreak of full scale war. Both sides had few options for dealing with the emerging situation. For the Argentines the only option that remained was to either beat back the British task force, or failing that, to defend the islands themselves against a British amphibious landing. For the British, the fast approaching South Atlantic winter meant that the task force could not be sustained for an indefinite period. Hence the only option open to them was to organize an amphibious landing on the islands themselves in order to retake them from Argentine control. But it was not an all out war between Argentina and Britain in the sense that neither government wanted to overthrow the other. To that extent it was a limited war fought to decide the vital question who would control the islands.

It is in the context of a war with limited objectives that the question must be considered as to how far the two sides were really equipped and trained to fight it. The British and Argentine forces had no choice but to fight with weapons and equipment that had been designed and acquired for quite different tasks. This was a limitation that both the British and the Argentine forces operated under during the Falklands war.

The British navy had over the years been reduced to the status of an anti-submarine force, designed to operate in

conjunction with other NATO forces against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the Atlantic. This had resulted in a gradual erosion of the Royal Navy's capability to undertake independent operations. And in Argentina the army had been built up at the expense of the other two services for domestic political reasons. Whatever gains may have accrued to the respective governments from these lopsided efforts at guaranteeing security, fighting a sea and air war in the South Atlantic was not one of them.

Even though it had been in the forefront of planning the whole Falklands campaign, in many ways even responsible for it, the Argentine navy was not much better prepared to fight a war either. In spite of being one of the best in Latin America the navy was neither prepared nor equipped to fight against a modern force like the Royal Navy. Anti-submarine capabilities of the fleet were inadequate, if not non-existent. This was fully exploited by the British who used their nuclear submarines to bottle up the entire Argentine fleet at port.

British planning for the conflict proved to be much better than that of the Argentines as the final outcome of the war was to demonstrate. But the fact remains that while planning a response to the Argentine threat, the British were handicapped by the lack of certain weapons and capabilities. One capability that the navy sorely lacked was that of Airborne Early Warning for the fleet. In the absence of such a capability the air defence of the fleet was degraded, and against a force that was marginally more capable than the Argentine Air Force, or one which did not operate with the AAF's limitations, it would have been suicidal to go to war with the rudimentary air defence capabilities that the fleet possessed.

The greatest threat that the British fleet faced during the entire war was that from sea-skimming missiles like the EXOCET and the war pointed out deficiencies in modern warship design that reduced its capabilities to deal with it. The success of sea-skimming missiles like the EXOCET once again emphasized the fact that modern navies, especially those of third world states would do well to equip their navies with such missiles. The missiles are not only cheap to acquire, they have the capability to impose unacceptable damage on the naval forces of even well equipped adversaries. The attack on the Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor pointed out the difficulty of trying to deal with the sea-skimming missile once it had been launched. The best way to deal with such a threat is to destroy their launching platform before the missile itself is launched. Identifying and destroying the launching platform would seem to be a primary task that modern navies must be prepared for. This would require navies to invest much more in fleet air defence capabilities, including airborne early warning, and if possible more aircraft carriers carrying aircraft capable of maintaining combat air patrols at a considerable distance from the carriers itself. The experience of both Britain and Argentina during the Falklands war would seem to reinforce the point that nations that have to defend island territories at a considerable distance from the mainland would do well to maintain effective carrier forces, even though in the short run this could prove expensive. Any attempt to cut down on defence costs by gradually reducing the true sea-control capabilities of a navy could have disastrous consequences in future

The Argentine navy at the start of the war had been equipped with an aircraft-carrier. But the poor quality of weaponry and

sensors on board, and the limitations of the aircraft it carried meant that it could not be used against the much better equipped and trained British task force. Once the Argentines failed to ensure that the British task force did not establish a beachhead on the islands itself, it was only a question of time before the islands fell to the British. Given the nature of the Falklands terrain it would have been difficult to adequately defend the islands, even with fifty-thousand troops. As the Argentines were to realise soon, the failure of the navy and the air-force to hold the British landing force at bay had sealed the fate of the ill-fated Falklands campaign.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

- Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Falkland Islands. The Facts (London: HMSO, 1982).
- Lord Franks, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Cmnd 8787 (London: HMSO, 1983).
- Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1984-85. Events of the Weekend of 1 and 2 May, 1982 (London: HMSO, 1985).
- House of Commons, The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons, 2 April to 15 June, 1982 (London: HMSO, 1982).
- House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 1982-83, Handling of the Press and Public Information During the Falklands Conflict, Vol.I and II (London: HMSO, 1982).
- House of Commons, Third Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1984-85. Events Surrounding the Weekend of 1-2 May 1982 (London: HMSO, 1985).
- Ministry of Defence, The British Army in the Falklands (London: HMSO, 1982).
- United Kingdom, The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward (London: HMSO, 1981).

Secondary Sources:

Books

- Adams, Valerie, Falklands and the Media (London: Macmillan, 1985).
- Anand, R.P., Ed, Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond (New Delhi: Radiant, 1978).
- Alfred, Jonathan, Ed, Sea Power and Influence. Adelphi Library 2 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980).
- Arthur, Max, Above All Courage: The Falklands Frontline. First Hand Accounts (London: Sidgewick & Jackson, 1985).
- Barnaby, Frank, and Borg, Marlies ter, Emerging Technologies and Military Doctrine: A Political Assessment (London: Macmillan, 1986).

- Barston, R.P., and Birnie, Patricia, Eds, The Maritime Dimension (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980).
- Bayliss, John, Ed, Alternative Approaches to British Defence Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1984).
- Beck, F.W.Manovelt and Wiig, K.M., The Economics of Offshore Oil and Gas Supplies (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977).
- Beck, Peter, The Falkland Islands as an International Problem (London: Routledge, 1988).
- Bishop, Patrick and Whitherow, John, The Winter War (London: Quartet, 1982).
- Booth, Ken Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).
- Borgan, Patrick, World Conflicts: Why and Where they are Happening (London: Bloomsbury, 1989).
- Bowett, Derek W., The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law (New York: Oceana, 1979)
- Braybrook, R., The Battle for the Falklands (3): Air Forces (London: Osprey, 1982).
- Brown, James and Snyder, William P., The Regionalization of Warfare (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984)
- Brown, David, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (London: Arrow Books, 1989).
- Burns, Jimmy, The Land that Lost its Heroes (London: Bloomsbury, 1987).
- Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Application of Limited Naval Force (New York: St.Martins, 1981).
- _____, Britain's Naval Future (London: Macmillan, 1983).
- _____, Diplomacy At Sea (London: Macmillan, 1985).
- Calvery, Peter, The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs (London: Frances Pinter, 1982).
- Cardoso, Oscar Raul, Kirschbaum, Ricardo, and Kooy, Eduardo van der, Falklands -- The Secret Plot (Surrey: Preston, 1987).
- Chickester, M and Wilkinson J., The Uncertain Ally: British Defence Policy, 1968-1990 (London: Govier, 1982).
- Child, Jack, Geopolitics and Conflict in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1985).
- Dalyell, Tam, One Man's Falklands (London: Cecil Wolfe, 1982).

- _____, Thatcher's Torpedo: The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Cecil Wolfe, 1984).
- Dobson, Christopher, et.al, The Falklands Conflict (London: Cornet Books, 1982).
- Dowdy, William L. and Trood, Russell B., The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1987).
- Eckert, Ross D., The Enclosure of Ocean Resources (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979).
- Eddy, Paul, Linlater, Magnus and Gillman, Peter, Eds, War in the Falklands: The Full Story (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).
- English, A and Watts, A., The Battle for the Falklands (2). Naval Forces (London, Osprey, 1982).
- Ethel, Jeffrey and Price Alfred, Air War South Atlantic (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1983).
- Fowler, W., Battle for the Falklands (1). Land Forces (London: Osprey, 1982).
- Fox, Robery, Eyewitness Falklands (London: Methuen, 1982).
- Frank, Thomas, Nation Against Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
- Freedman, Lawrence, Ed, The Troubled Alliance: Atlantic Relations in the 1980's (London: Heineman, 1983).
- Frost, John, 2 PARA Falklands (London: Buchan & Enright, 1983).
- Gamba, Virginia, The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
- Godden, John, Harrier: Ski-Jump to Victory (Oxford: Brassey's, 1983)
- Goldblat, Jozef, The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Spur to Arms Buildup (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1983).
- Grabendorff, Wolf and Roett, Diordan, Latin America, Western Europe and the US: Re-evaluating the Atlantic Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1985).
- Greyling, Christopher and Lagoon, Christoper, Just Another Star: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (London: Harrap, 1988).
- Grove, Eric J., From Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II (London: Bodely Head, 1987).
- Haig, Alexander, Caveat (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1984).
- Harkavy, Robert E., and Neuman, Stephaine G., The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World (Massachusetts: Lexington, 1985).

- Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon, The Battle for the Falklands (London, Michael Joseph, 1983).
- Hill, J.R., Anti-Submarine Warfare (London: Ian Allen, 1984).
- _____, Air Defence at Sea (London: Ian Allen, 1984).
- _____, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (London: Croom Helm, 1986)
- Hilton, Frank, The Paras (London, BBC, 1983).
- Hoffman, Fritz L., and Hoffman, Olga Mingo, Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/ Malvinas, 1493 - 1982 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984)
- Jayaraman, K., Legal Regime of Islands (New Delhi: Marwah Publications, 1982)
- Kavanagh, Dennis, Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987)
- Koburger, Charles W., Sea Power in the Falklands (New York: Praeger, 1983)
- Laffin, John, Fight for the Falklands! (New York: St.Martins Press, 1982).
- Lee, Christopher, War in Space (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986).
- McManners, Hugh, Falklands Commando (London: Williams Kimby, 1984).
- Mero, John L., The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1965).
- Middlebrook, Martin, The Fight for the Malvinas (New York: Viking, 1989).
- Miksell, Raymond F., and Whitney, John W., The World Mining Industry: Investment Strategy and Public Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
- Millan, Victor and Morris, Michael A., Conflicts in Latin America: Democratic Alternatives in the 1990's. Conflict Studies No.230 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1990)
- Miller, David and Miller, Chris, Modern Naval Combat (London: Salamander, 1986).
- Modelski, George and Thompson, William R., Seapower in Global Politics, 1493-1993 (London: Macmillan, 1988).
- Moineville, Hubert, Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow (London: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
- Morris, Michael A., Expansion of Third World Navies (London: Macmillan, 1987).

- Mujal, Leon, Ed, The USSR and Latin America: A Revolutionary Relationship (Boston: Unwin & Hyman, 1989)
- Munoz, Hiraldo and Tulchin, Joseph S., Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
- Newfarmer, Richard, Ed, From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New US Policies for Latin America (Washington: John Hopkins, 1984).
- Papadakis, Nikos, The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands (London: Sijthoff, 1977).
- Perl, Raphael, The Falklands Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook (London: Oceana Publications, 1983).
- Perret, B., Weapons of the Falklands Conflict (Poole, Bladenford Press, 1982).
- Pimlott, John, British Military Operations: 1945-84 (London: Hamlyn, 1984).
- Prescott, J.R.V., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (London: Macmillan, 1985).
- Preston, A., Sea Combat off the Falklands (London: Macmillan, 1983)
- Rice, Desmond and Gavshon, Arthur, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Secker Warburg, 1984).
- Robertson, K.G., Ed, British and American Approaches to Intelligence (London: Macmillan, 1987).
- Royal Institute of International Affairs, Falklands Dispute: International Dimensions (London: RIIA, 1982).
- Rock, David, Argentina 1516 to 1982: From Spanish Colonisation to the Falklands War (London: I.B.Tauris, 1986).
- Speed, Keith, The Battle of the Falklands and the Future of Britain's Navy (Bath: Ashgrove Press, 1982).
- Stokesbury, James L., Navy and Empire (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1983).
- Subramanya, K.N., Ed, The Energy Problem and World Economic Development (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1983).
- Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: The Full Story (London: Sphere Books, 1983).
- Thompson, Julian, No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigades in South Atlantic (London: Leo Cooper, 1985).
- Till, Geoffrey, Modern Sea Power: An Introduction (London: Brassey's, 1987).
- Tinker, Lt.David, A Message from the Falklands (London: Junction Books, 1982).

- Uderwood, Geoffrey, Our Falklands War (London: Maritime Books, 1983).
- Veldman, J.H., and Oliver, F.T., West European Navies and the Future (Dan Hilder: Royal Netherlands Naval College, 1980).
- Villar, Roger, Merchant Ships at War: The Falklands Experience (London: Convoy Maritime, 1984)
- Walsh, Don and Cappellari, Marjorie, Energy and Sea Power: Challenges for the Decade (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).
- Watson, Bruce W., and Dunn, Peter M., Eds, Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
- Williams, Geoffrey, Global Defence: Motivation and Policy in a Nuclear Age (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984).
- Zoppo, Ciro E., and Zorgibibe, Charles, On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear (Bordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985).

Articles:

- Alford, Jonathan, "Conventional Conflicts in the Nuclear Age - Falkland Islands: The Limited Use of Limited Power", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (Jerusalem), Vol.7, No.1-2, 1984.
- Archer, Peter, "Falklands II: Right of Reprisal" New Statesman (London), Vol.108. No.2789, August 31, 1984.
- Avicado, Domingo E., "US Measures Against Argentina Resulting from the Malvinas Conflict", American Journal of International Law (Washington), Vol.78, No.2, April 1984.
- Baker, A.D., "Sealift, British Style", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109/6, No.964, June 1983.
- Baral, J.K., and Mishra, S.K., "Falklands War and US Hemisphere Diplomacy" Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), Vol.32, No.9-10, September - October 1983.
- Barnett, Anthony, "Franks Report: To be absolutely Franks...", New Statesman (London), Vol.105, No.2705, January 21, 1983.
- Beaver, Paul, "The Air Lessons. Post Falklands", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.88, No.4, April 1983.
- Beck, Peter J., "Cooperation and Confrontation in the Falkland Islands Dispute: The Anglo-Argentine Search for a Way Forward, 1968-1981", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Florida), Vol.211, No.1, February 1982.
- _____, "The Falklands -- 1930 Insights" Navy International (Surrey), Vol.82, No.10, October 1982.

- _____, "Britain's Antarctic Dimension", International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.3, Summer 1983.
- _____, "Britain's Falklands Future: The Need to Look Back", Round Table (Surrey), No.290, April 1984.
- Beri, H.M.L., "Falklands Crisis: An Assessment", IDSA Journal (New Delhi), Vol.14, No.4, April/June, 1982.
- Bilveer, S., "Flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific Region", Asian Defence Review (Kuala Lumpur), No.9, September 1989.
- Bluth, Christopher, "The British Resort to Force in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, 1982: International Law and Just War Theory", Journal of Peace Research (London), Vol.24, March 1987.
- Bonsignore, Ezio, "Hard Lessons from the South Atlantic", Military Technology (Bonn), No.6, August 1982.
- Bridge T.D., "Official Report on the Falklands Campaign: An Appraisal". Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Tavistock), Vol.113, No.1, January 1983.
- Cable, James, "Falklands Conflict" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.108, No.9, September 1982.
- Campbell, Duncan, "Whose Sovereignty", New Statesman (London), Vol.107, No.2711, April 30, 1984.
- _____, "Falklands: The Belgrano Cover Up", New Statesman (London). Vol.108, No.2789, 31 August 1984.
- _____, "Falklands War - The Chile Connection", New Statesman (London), Vol.109, No.2810, 25 January 1985.
- Campbell Duncan and Rentouc, John, "Belgrano Papers", New Statesman (London), Vol.108, No.2788, 24 August 1984.
- Colombo, Jorge Louis, "Super Etendard Naval Aircraft Operations During the Falklands War", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.37, No.3, May/June 1984.
- Connell-Smith, Gordon, "OAS and the Falklands Conflict", World Today (London), Vol.38, No.9, September 1982.
- Coote, John O., "Send Her Victorious..." US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109, No.1, January 1983.
- Copely, Gregory R., "How Argentina's Air Force Fought in the Falklands" Defence and Foreign Affairs (Washington), Vol.10, No.10, October 1982.
- Craig, Christopher, "Falklands Operations II: Fighting by the Rules" Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.37, No.3, May/June 1984.

- Daoudi, M.S. and Dajani, M.S., "Sanctions: The Falklands Episode", The World Today (London), Vol.34, No.4, April 1983.
- Dar, E.H., "Strategy in the Falklands War" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109, No.9, March 1983.
- Dodd, Normal L., "Lessons from the Falklands", Defence Today (Rome), Vol.5, No.10, October 1982.
- Doug Richardson, "War in the Falklands", New Scientist (Elmondt), Vol.94, No.1302, 22 April, 1982.
- Douglas, Martin, "Naval Lessons from the South Atlantic", Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.1, No.13, 7 April 1984.
- Duffner, Robert W., "Conflict in the South Atlantic: The Impact of Air Power", Air University Review (Washington), March/April 1984.
- Durwen, Simon, "Lessons of the Falklands Conflict", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.9, September 1982.
- Emanuiloff-Max, Alphonse, "Defence of the South Atlantic", Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.1, No.13, 7 April 1984.
- Ewin, Richard A., "Harrier and Sea-Harrier Operations in the Falklands Crisis", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.10, October 1982.
- Ezperanza, Duran, "Mexico and the South Atlantic Conflict: Solidarity or Ambiguity", International Affairs (London), Vol.60, No.2, Spring 1984.
- Feldman, David Louis, "United States' Role in the Malvinas Crisis 1982: Misguidance and Misperception in Argentina's Decisions to go to War", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Florida), Vol.27, No.2, Summer 1985.
- _____, "United States Role in the Origin and Development of the Malvinas Dispute: Implications for the 1982 Conflict", Journal of Peace Research (London), Vol.19, No.1, January 1987.
- Foot, Paul, "Falklands -- How the Peace was Torpedoed", New Statesman (London), Vol.105, No.2721, 3 May 1983.
- Freedman, Lawrence, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.61, No.1, Fall 1982.
- _____, "Intelligence Operations in the Falklands", Intelligence and National Security (London), Vol.1, No.3, September 1983.
- Friedman, Norman, "Naval Missile Improvements", NATO's Fifteen Nations (Brussels), Vol.27, Special Issue, 1982.
- _____, "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Mislarned", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol.26, No.4, Winter 1983.

- Goldblat, Jozef and Millan, Victor, "In the Wake of the Falklands/Malvinas War: A New Cycle of Arms Race", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (London), Vol.14, No.3, 1983.
- Goldrick, Lieutenant J.V.P., "Reflections on the Falklands" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109/6, June 1983.
- Gordon, Denis R., "The Paralysis of Multinational Peace-keeping" Peace and Change, (Kent), Vol.12, No.1/2, 1987.
- Gordon, Steve, "Thoughts on the Falkland Islands War", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.108, No.9/55, September, 1982.
- Grabendorf, Wolf, "Interstate Conflict Behaviour and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Florida), Vol.24, No.3, August 1982.
- Gueritz, E.F., "Falklands: Joint Warfare Justified", RUSI Journal (London), Vol.127, No.3, September 1982.
- Guertner, Gary L., "74 Day War: New Technology and Tactics", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth), Vol.62, No.11, November 1982.
- Haffa, Annegret and Werz, Nikolas, "Falklands Conflict and inter-American Relations", Aussen Politik (Hamburg), Vol.34, No.2, 1983.
- Hall, Marshall Van Sant, "Argentina's Policy Motivations in the Falklands War and the Aftermath", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.36, No.6, November/December 1983.
- Haynes, Fred, "The Falklands: A Victory for Sea Power", Sea Power (Arlington), Vol.25, No.7, July 1982.
- Hessman, James D., "The Lessons of the Falklands", Sea Power (Arlington), Vol.25, No.7, July 1982.
- Hewish, Mark, "Falklands Battle Dents Warship Designs", New Scientist (Elmont), Vol.94, No.1307, 27 May 1982.
- Higginbotham, Robert D., "Case Studies in the Law of Land Warfare: The Campaign in the Falklands", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth), Vol.64, No.10, October 1984.
- Hipel, Keith W. et.al, "Hypergame Analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas", International Studies (University of South Carolina, Columbia), Vol.32, No.3, September 1988.
- Hope, Adrian F.J, "Sovereignty and Decolonisation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands", Boston International and Comparative Law Review (Massachusetts), Vol.6, No.2, Spring 1983.
- Hopple, Gerald W., "Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falklands War", World Politics (Princeton), Vol.36, No.3, April 1984.

- Humphries, Arthur A., "Two routes to the Wrong Destination: Public Affairs in the South Atlantic War". Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.36, No.3, May/June, 1983.
- Hurrell, Andrew, "Politics of South Atlantic Security: A Survey of Proposals for South Atlantic Treaty Organization", International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.2, Spring 1983.
- Kelsey, Commander Robert J., "Manoeuvre Warfare at Sea", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.108, No.9/55, September, 1985.
- Kenny, David J. et.al, "Falklands Postscripts" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109, No.6, June 1983.
- Kenny, Captain David J., "The Fascinating Falklands Campaign" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109/6, No.964, June 1983.
- Kerr, Nick, "The Falklands Campaign" Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.35, No.6, November/December, 1982.
- King, David E., "Intelligence Failures and the Falklands War: A Reassessment", Intelligence and National Security (London), Vol.2, No.2, April 1987.
- Knight, Michael, "Airtanker Comes of Age", Pacific Defence Reporter (Sydney), Vol.9, No.12, June 1983.
- Koburger, C.W., "The Falklands: Lessons in Modern Naval Warfare", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.88, No.1, January 1983.
- _____, "Falklands: A micro-study in sea power" Navy International (Surrey), Vol.88, No.1, January 1983.
- _____, "Argentina in the Falklands: Glory Manque", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.88, No.5, May 1983.
- Kouquie, Alain, "The Departure of the Military -- End of a Political Cycle or Just Another Episode", International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.4, Autumn 1983.
- Lake, Julian S., "South Atlantic War: A Reivew of the Lessons Learned", Defence Electronics (Washington), Vol.15, No.1, November 1983.
- Layman, C.H., "Duty in Bomb Ally", US Naval Institute Procdeedings (Annapolis), Vol.109, No.8, August 1983.
- Lebow, Richard Ned, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War", The Journal of Strategic Studies (London), Vol.6, No.1, March 1983.
- Levitin, Michael J., "The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada, Falklands and Humanitarian Intervention", Harvard International Law Journal (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1986.

- Makin, Guillermo A., "Argentine Approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas", International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.3, Summer 1983.
- Malone, James L., "Who Needs the Sea Treaty", Foreign Policy (Washington), No.54, Spring 1984.
- Manners, Geoffrey, "Mines still prevent return to normality in the Falklands", Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.1, No.7, 25 February 1984.
- _____, "Falklands soldier's best friend was his MILAN", Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.1, No.13, 7 April 1984.
- Mason, R.A., "Hay for the Hobby Horses: Reflections on the Air War in the South Atlantic 1982", RUSI Journal (London), Vol.127, No.4, December 1982.
- Mastny, Vojtech., "Soviet Union and the Falklands War" Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.36, No.3, May/June 1983.
- McGeoch, Sir Ian, "The Falkland Operation: Problems, Considerations, Lessons", Nato's Fifteen Nations (Brussels), Vol.27, No.3, June/July 1982.
- McGruther, Kenneth R., "When Deterrence Fails: The nasty little war for the Falkland Islands", Naval War College Review, (Newport), Vol.36, No.2, March/April 1983
- McGwire, Michael, "Battle for the Falklands I -- The Stakes", New Republic (Washington), Vol.186, No.19, 12 May 1982.
- Mechling, C., "The Argentine Pariah", Foreign Policy (Washington), No.45, Winter 1981-82.
- Menaul, Stewart W.D., "Falklands Campaign: A War of Yesterday?" Strategic Review (Washington), Vol.10, No.4, Fall 1982.
- _____, "British Defence Perspectives After the Falklands War", Strategic Review (Washington), Vol.12, No.1, Winter 1984
- Mensel, Howard M., "Soviet Perspectives on the Falklands War", Round Table (Tavistock), No.288, October 1983.
- Moore, Jermy, and Woodward, John, "The Falklands Experience", RUSI Journal, Vol.128, No.1, March 1983.
- Moore, Captain John, "China Seas", Defence & Foreign Affairs (Alexandria, Virginia), Vol.XVII, No.9, September 1989.
- Moore, Captain Richard S., "Blitzkrieg from the Sea: Manoeuvre Warfare and Amphibious Operations", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.36, No.6/300, November/December 1983.
- Moorer, Thomas H., and Cottrel, Alain J., "In the Wake of the Falklands Battle", Strategic Review (Washington), Vol.10, No.3, Summer 1982.

Murgizer, Juan Carlos, "South Atlantic Conflict: An Argentinian Point of View", International Defence Review (London), Vol.16, No.2, February 1983.

_____, "The Future of the Submarine in Argentine Naval Policy", International Defence Review (London) No.4, April 1984.

O'Ballance, Edgar, "Other Falklands Campaign", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth), Vol.16, No.2, February 1983.

O'Rourke, Captian Gerald, "What's in Store for ARAPHO", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109/7, No.965, July 1983.

Parsons, Anthony, "Falklands Crisis in the United Nations: 31 March to 14 June 1982", International Affairs (London), Vol.59, No.2, Spring 1983.

Peterson, Charles C., "Aircraft Carrier Developments in Soviet Naval Theory", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.37, No.1, January/February 1984.

Pierre, A., "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.60, No.2, Winter 1981-82.

Popov, Viktor, "United States and the Falklands Crisis", International Affairs (Moscow), No.4, April 1988.

Reisman, W.Michael, "The Struggle for the Falklands", Yale Law Journal (New Haven), Vol.93, December 1983.

Rovere, Andrea Dalla, "Operation Corporate", Defence Today (Rome), Vol. XIII, No.2/3, February/March 1989.

Russell, Brian J., "Falklands Hovercraft: A Platform Worth Consideration", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.87, No.12, December 1982.

Schenia, Robert L., "The Argentine Navy's Third Attack Squadron" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109/6, No.964, July 1983

_____, "Where Were those Argentine Subs", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.110, No.3/973, March 1984.

Smith, G.C., "The OAS and the Falklands Conflict" The World Today (London), No.38, 1982.

Speed, Keith, "The Royal Navy in Nato", Nato's Fifteen Nations (Brussels), Vol.26, No.4, August/September 1981.

Stewart, Nora Kinzer, "South Atlantic Conflict 1982 -- A Case Study in Cohesion", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth), Vol.69, No.11, April 1989.

Tellis, Ashely J., "Latin America's Navies: A Strategic Survey", Naval Forces; (Bonn), Vol.8, No.11, Special Issue, The Naval Balance 1987.

Train, Harry D., "Analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas Campaign" Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.41, No.1, Winter 1988.

Trotter, Neville, "Campaign Command and Logistics", Armed Forces Journal (Washington), Vol.120, No.11, June 1983.

_____, "The Falkland and the Long Haul", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109/6, No.964.

Turner, Stansfield, "Unobvious Lessons of the Falklands War" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.109, No.4, April 1983.

Tustin, W.J., "Logistics of the Falklands War -- Part I" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Tavistock), Vol.114, No.3, October 1984.

Tyagi, Yogesh K., "The System of Settlement of Disputes Under the Law of the Sea Convention: An Overview", Indian Journal of International Law (New Delhi), Vol.25, No.2, April-June 1985.

Villar, G.R., "Change of direction is needed. Lessons of the Falklands War", Jane's Defence Review (London), Vol.3, No.6, 1982.

Wall, Patrick, "Falklands: Lessons for NATO", Navy International (Surrey). Vol.27, No.10, October 1982.

_____, "The Falklands: Information Management", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.82, No.11, November 1982.

Walters, Brian, "The Falklands Campaign: Another Chapter" Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.2, February 1983.

Wettern Desmond, "The Falklands: Damage Control Experience", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.82, No.12, December 1982.

Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Lessons for Britain: Post-Falklands", Navy International (Surrey), Vol.88, No.3, March 1983.

_____, "Lessons Learned from the Falklands Conflict", Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.8, No.4, 1 August 1987.

Whitley, G., "'Just War' Tradition and the Falklands Conflict", RUSI Journal (London), Vol.131, No.4, 1 August 1986.

Williams, Phil, "Miscalculation, crisis management and the Falklands Conflict" The World Today (London), Vol.39, No.4, April 1983.

Willox, Rodney, "The Military Three Step: Trend's in Rapid Deployment" Defence & Foreign Affairs (Alexandria, Virginia), Vol.XVII, No.9, September 1989.

- Wixler, Keith, "Argentina's Geopolitics and Her Revolutionary Diesel-Electric Submarines", Naval War College Review (Newport), Vol.XLII, No.1/325, Winter 1989.
- Wood, Derek, "Reshaping the Royal Air Force", International Defence Review (London), Vol.15, No.3, March 1982.
- Wood, Derek and Hewish Mark, "Falklands Conflict -- Part I: The Air-War", International Defence Review (London), Vol.15, No.8, August 1982.
- Wood, John E., "The Royal Navy Since World War II", US Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), Vol.108, No.3, March 1982.
- Wrixon, Tim, "Helicopter experience in the Falklands Conflict", Jane's Defence Weekly (London), Vol.1, No.13, 7 April 1984.
- Young, Elizabeth, "The Falklands Fall-Out", The World Today (London), Vol.38, No.9, September 1982.
- Young, Lewis P., "Reflections on the Falkland Islands Dispute", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.6, June 1982.
- _____, "Reflections on the Falklands Crisis - Part II: Tangle of Rivalries and International Reaction", Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur), No.7, July 1982.

Newspapers and Periodicals:

Daily Telegraph (London).

Facts on File (New York).

Financial Times (London)

Keising's Contemporary Archives (London).

The Economist (London).

The Observer (London)

The Times (London).

Time (Chicago).

956