

Pakistan People's Party (1971 – 1977)

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J. Ranga Rao



**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH-EAST ASIAN
AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067**

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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067


CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH-EAST
ASIAN AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC STUDIES.


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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (1971-1977)" submitted by Mr. J. RANGA RAO is in partial fulfilment of six credits out of a total requirement of twenty four credits for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of an M.Phil. degree in this University or any other University. This is his own work.

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DR. KALIM BAHADUR
SUPERVISOR


Prof. I.N. MUKHERJEE
CHAIRMAN

Chairperson
Centre for South, Central and South-east
Asian and South West Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

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PREFACE

The Pakistan People's Party came to power in 1971 after the separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan (now Pakistan). It was a time when the political system was virtually in shambles and the country was facing serious socio-economic crisis. It was a formidable task for the PPP to reconstruct the socio-economic and political system of Pakistan. This study of the Pakistan People's Party (1971-77) provides an opportunity to help understand better the political dynamics of Pakistan.

This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter presents a theoretical analysis of political parties which includes types of parties, their roles and functions. It also analysis the political situation when the Pakistan People's Party came into existence. The second chapter studies the organizational pattern including membership of the party, Central Committee members and party activists. It also presents the ideological orientation of the party, and its leadership pattern. The third chapter is a study of the PPP government's socio-economic and political policies and programmes and their implementation. Chapter four presents a brief review of the 1977 elections, the PPP and PNA confrontation, causes for the PNA agitation and the ousting of the PPP led government. The concluding chapter

deals with the successes and failures of the party during 1971-77.

The sources used in this study includes books, articles in periodicals, government publications and newspaper cuttings. The methodology followed in this dissertation is primarily descriptive and analytical.

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(J. RANGA RAO)

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER - 1

INTRODUCTION

Political Parties have become a common feature of our daily life. However, the puzzling as well as interesting, point in this direction is that they are both taken for granted and constantly criticised, continuously discussed and unsystematically assessed. Political parties are at present indispensable in a democratic society. In democracy sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. Peoples representative play an effective role in Legislature as well as in Executive, to maintain in an organised manner and present their ideas before the masses. They build public opinion and strive to win elections. Political parties have become an integral part of democracy. However, the number of political parties vary from country to country. Before further analysing political parties it is necessary to define a political party.

" A group of citizens more or less organised who act as a political unit and who, by the use of their voting power aim to control the government and carry out their general policies". --- Siltao (1)

1. Farooq Akhtar Najeeb, Politics and State (Lahore, 1983), p.470-71.

" A body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed". --- Burke (2)

" The political parties are organised bodies with voluntary membership, their concerted energy being employed in the pursuit of political power". --- Bryce (3)

" The political party is an organised group of citizens who profess to share the same political view and, who by acting as a political unit try to control the government". --- Gulcriest (4)

In light of the above mentioned definitions, we can draw inference to the distinctive characteristics of political parties in general. These are:-

1. Consensus on fundamental principles (Manifesto of the party).
2. Organization.

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2. International Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol.11, pp.428-30.
 3. Farooq Akhtar Najeeb. pp.470-71.
 4. ibid. pp.470-71.

3. Strive to achieve the objectives defined in the Manifesto.
4. To prefer the Nation's interests while achieveing the political goals.
5. Capturing the government power.
6. Building public opinion on social-political issues.

It is pertinent here to see the contribution of Maurice Duverger in the study of the organisation and membership of a political party. He has taken the view that a political party "is not a community but a collection of communities, a union of small groups, dispersed throughout the country (branches, caucuses, local association etc.) and linked by coordinate institutions".⁵ In other words, he takes a very comprehensive view of the horizontal and vertical elements of a political party. He includes every organization operating through a party by terming it an ' indirect party ' the examples of which can be found in numerous groups, associations,

5. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London, 1969), p.17.

unions, corporations, professional bodies, etc. Not only this, an empirical examination of the organization and working of a political party shows the role of several 'inner circles' that may be termed as caucuses, cells, branches, militia, etc. Moreover it is their meaningful role that enables us to distinguish between democratic, fascist and communist variants of a political party.

Duverger suggests the following basic elements of a party's organization.

1. **Caucus:** It is a small unit like clique, core committee, coterie and the like, it is a very small entity having a limited nature. Its size is deliberately kept as small as possible. Its strength does not depend upon the number of its key members but upon the quality they possess. It is, indeed, a group of notabilities chosen because of their influence. It plays a very important part in the decision-making process, though it reaches its peak on the eve of elections. Thus, it may be linked with an institutional elite.

Caucuses may be of direct and indirect types.⁶

2. **Branch:** It designates a basic element which is less centralised than a caucus. While the latter deliberately seeks to live away from the masses, the former appeals to them and also appreciates its growing proximity with them. It is by and large an invention of the socialist parties which desire to maintain their intimate touch with the people at large. It is found that the leaders of the socialist parties come to the branch members and talk about their problems and then a free exchange of ideas takes place. An attempt is also made to recruit more and more members with the help of branch organizations and to disseminate political education among the people. The result is that the branches

6. They belong to the direct type where they are composed of notabilities, chosen for their individual qualities and personal influence: They belong to indirect type where they are composed of the experts in the art of fighting elections.

of a political party become very important in the day-to-day functioning of the party.

3. Cell: It is an invention of the Fascist and communist parties where the occupational units of the ruling party are scattered in every nook and corner of the country and every cell has a much greater hold on its members than the caucus or a branch. The members of a cell carry much more importance than the members of a party. The cell have an ideological orientation and they are a source of every clandestine action. The entire network of the cell is controlled by the highest unit of the party composed of the real decision-makers at the top.

4. Militia: The Fascist Party of Mussolini in Italy and the Nazi Party of Hitler in Germany made another experiment by taking militia as the basis of their party's organization. The members of these organizations remain civilians, though they are given military training, wear prescribed uniform, hold party flags and act

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at the behest of the party leaders working under the supreme command of the chief of the organisation.

The entire idea of Maurice Duverger is contained in his affirmation: " The branch allows only a slack, superficial, intermittent discipline, the cell, on the contrary, because of its size and its permanence, ensures a regular, tight and sound discipline. It is certain that the work of the cell deters many from becoming its members. They prefer the branch debates. But these are precisely the less good, the less sincere, the less dependable members. The others, on the otherhand find in the cells, a means of immediate, precise, serious action as well as a means of education. The cell system certainly constitutes one element in the strength of the communist parties. But it will be seen that because of it the centre of gravity of political action is changed. The caucus is essentially an electoral and parliamentary organization, an instrument suited for winning over electors and bringing pressure to bear on those elected; it makes it possible to organise an election and to put citizens in touch with their representative ".⁷

7. Duverger. p.35.

Besides the basic elements of organization, Duverger also studied the membership pattern of political parties. It is true that every party has a very large number of its own members, but the nature of the membership varies from one political party to another. Therefore, he suggests two types of parties:

1. **Cadre Party:** It is a grouping of notabilities who constitute the structure of a political party. It believes in the principle of selection. The notable figures take a very important part in the formation of its policies and programmes, nomination of candidates for elections, prosecution of electoral campaigns, collection of funds for the part and the like. Here quality is the most significant factor. Prestige of a person, his expertise in the techniques of fighting elections and his power of gathering financial sinews for the organisation count very much.⁸

8. Communist Parties are best examples for cadre based parties.

2. Mass Party: The growth of Universal Adult Franchise is responsible for converting cadre parties into mass parties to a very great extent. Different from a cadre party, a mass party is one that believes in the principle of 'election' so as to win the title of popular legitimacy. It tries to enroll more and more members and act with their confidence and consultation. The membership is an open affair that is available to any one who subscribes to its basic policy. Regular subscription is the source of its finance and the vast size of its membership is the stuff of its activity. Thus, the mass party technique replaces the capitalist financing of electioneering by democratic financing.

That was the difference between the cadre based party and mass based party as pointed out by Maurice Duverger. This is quite antithetical to Lenin's view of political parties. In Lenin's view the Communist Party belongs to the category of a cadre party on the ground

that it is a People's Party and its ultimate purpose is to replace the bourgeois democracy with the people's democracy.⁹

Let us see the political parties in Pakistan in general. On the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, there existed only one party, it was the Muslim League but later on different political parties came into existence and it is surprising to note that at one time around 87 political parties were working in the country. As multi-political parties can not suit a developing nation so on different occasions individual parties combined to make up joint platforms. Unfortunately these platforms dispersed after their immediate objectives were deemed to have been achieved. United Democratic Movement (UDM), Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) became uniting forces at different times. It taught the political parties good lessons of cooperation and joint action,eroded their individual personalities. It is significant that Pakistan People's Party, the most popular and organized among the lot, has acknowledged the necessity of conjoining with others in

9. In the view of Lenin every political party except that of the communists, is a bourgeois and petty bourgeois organization.

its struggle for full and undiluted democracy.¹⁰

The 1962 constitution of Pakistan was made ignoring the need for political parties, and in 1985 the parliament elections were held on Non-party basis. But it was very soon realized that political parties are an indispensable and integral part of Democracy. The political parties can play a greatly important and developmental role in Pakistan's political, cultural and Religious setup. In Pakistan some parties have a purely political setup while the others manifesto is Islam. Pakistan has thrice witnessed Martial Law which reflects the failure of Democracy and political parties in solving the political problems like legitimacy, participation, distribution, integration etc. The method of political activity followed by the political parties so far was conceived when the task was to demolish a state and its government in British rule. Now the task of political parties in Pakistan is to re-establish a state, to firm up its foundations and erect upon them a democratic edifice that will stand the test of time.

10. Nisar Haider, The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), 6 August 1986.

Political parties play a very important role in developing countries, particularly in a country like Pakistan. Political parties nourish political culture, democratic norms like freedom and equality. They help flourish the personalities of citizens. Political parties play an important role in smooth running of the government machinery, avoid radical and abrupt changes. They provide political training to individuals. Parties locate the personalities and leadership, develop political thinking and inculcate interest among people regarding the nation's affairs. They also play the role of opposition. This is a check on government functionaries to avoid the tendency of dictatorship and other malpractices. People convey their feelings and demand to the government in a constitutional method and also build up healthy, useful and comprehensive public opinion. Moreover, the political parties choose appropriate persons for elections. The selection is made very carefully, as the highest offices of the government are filled by these representatives.

The Pakistan People's Party one of the largest political parties in Pakistan was launched on 1st December, 1967 in Lahore under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had a long political experience and had held a variety

of portfolios in Field Marshal Ayub Khan's regime from 1958-66. The People's Party came into being in large part as a result of political process and emerged in a response to socio-political and economic climate of Pakistan.

The Pakistan People's Party was born when the country was ruled by military dictator Field Marshal Ayub Khan who came to power through a military coup on 7th October, 1958. Pakistan's political system virtually died between 1958 till the formulation of a new constitution in 1962. During this period, he abrogated the constitution, (which was adopted on 29th February, 1956.) banned political parties and dissolved the National Assembly which could not be challenged in any court under the Martial Law. When Ayub took up as a Martial Law administrator, he declared on 8th October, 1958, that " our ultimate aim is to restore democracy of the type that people can understand and work ".¹¹ But instead of restoring democracy he brought a series of repressive measures in order to abolish civil liberties. Political stalwarts were arrested and held without bail. With the

11. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan (New York, 1971). p.10.

help of these repressive measures, he tried to eliminate his political opponents. Later he introduced what he called " Basic Democracy " in which democrats were elected on a Non-Party basis. Under the 1962 constitution, the real executive powers were kept in the hands of President who was elected indirectly by 'basic democrats' for five years. In 1962, president Ayub Khan lifted the ban on the political parties after a lot of pressure and persuasion from his Cabinet Colleagues particularly Bhutto. This was done on the conditions that political parties should not deviate from the Islamic ideology, should not admit the people into their parties those who were dismissed by the government. The moment this ban was lifted on the political parties, they started raising their heads and formed alliances and fronts. Almost all opposition parties rallied under the banner of National Democratic Front (NDF), under the leadership of Suhrawardy.¹² After the death of Suhrawardy and Khwaja Nuzimuddin who was another opposition stalwart, the opposition parties received a severe jolt in their anti-Ayub movement. Their death created a leadership vacuum in the combined opposition parties, this was clearly visible in the 1965 presidential

12. *ibid.* pp.38-39.

elections. They could not get a presidential candidate in the 1965 Presidential elections to face Ayub Khan. Finally, they requested Miss Fatima Jinnah who was the sister of M.A.Jinnah, to contest against Ayub Khan; Ayub Khan won the elections and his party (Pakistan Muslim League) won the majority of seats in 1965 National Assembly elections. With that electoral victory, his problems were not solved but further aggravated by signing the Tashkent Declaration with India and suffered another setback with the resignation of his foreign minister Z.A.Bhutto in 1966. The formation of the Pakistan People's Party by Bhutto in 1967 gave a severe blow to President Ayub Khan's survival.

Pakistan People's Party quickly gained popularity in west Pakistan precisely because there was a sense of accumulated resentment especially among the new middle class and there was the lack of a viable alternative to Bhutto in the opposition ranks. The other parties, including the three factions of the Muslim League, the Jama at-i-Islami and the various Jamiats were led either by old and discredited politician like Main Mumtaz Daultana and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan or by obscurantist

mullahs whose political appeal was extremely limited.¹³ According to Meenakshi Gopinath, political parties emerge out of a crisis in the political system. Pakistan People's Party appeared on the political scene when the country faced a number of crisis like integration, legitimacy, participation, penetration and justice.¹⁴ Pakistan People's Party under the leadership of Bhutto convinced the people that the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) can survive and sustain, by incorporating the aspirations of the people in its policies and programmes and can solve the crisis which Pakistani people faced.¹⁵ The growing discontent against the Ayub regime, reached its peak, but the opposition parties were not able to capitalize this rising discontent to topple the Ayub regime. But credit goes to Pakistan People's Party under the leadership of Z.A.Bhutto for utilizing the discontent for the down fall of Ayub Khan regime and emerged victorious in the 1970 National Assembly elections and subsequently in the provincial elections (Sind and Punjab).

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13. Mohammed Ayoob, "Profile of a Party: PPP in Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol.7, no.2, February 1972 (Annual Number).
 14. Meenakshi Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition New Delhi, 1975), pp.2-3.
 15. How far the PPP implemented its policies and programmes incorporated in its election manifesto of 1970 will be discussed indetail in third chapter.

Let us analyse the background of the origin of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the political situation when it came into existence.

The phenomenal showing of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in Punjab and Sind in the elections of December 1970, brought to the notice of the world for the first time that the traditional political structure of West Pakistans society was undergoing rapid transformation. The PPP, with its clear cut majority in the National Assembly after liberation of Bangladesh had emerged as the ruling party in that country and its founder and chairman, Z.A.Bhutto became the President and later prime minister of Pakistan.

That the PPP had become the vehicle through which the new social forces found expression during the last few years (since 1967) in West Pakistan was underivable despite the fact that Bhutto and his party (PPP) collaborated with the Yahya Khan's regime during the first phase of the confrontation between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. But representing completely West Pakistan interests as it did and having become the most authentic voice of West Pakistan after the December 1970 elections, it was in fact, inevitable.

By winning the polls in Punjab and Sind "the bastions of power" as Bhutto termed these provinces, PPP had come to represent the new social force that had emerged in West Pakistan (and which had been especially strengthened during the Ayub Khan decade).¹⁶ While Bhutto had broken with Ayub Khan in mid-1966, it was not until the end of 1967 that he decided to launch his party, the (PPP) and it was not until the last quarter of 1968, when Ayub Khan's regime started to face serious trouble in West Pakistan, that the PPP became a force to reckon with. It was proved by the fact that despite Bhutto's fulmination against the Field Marshal and his government during 1967-68, it was not until November 13, 1968, that he was arrested. It was only when Bhutto had managed to make the student's grievance his own and had capitalised upon the general urban unrest in West Pakistan that he was put behind bars. Before we analyse the urban unrest during 1968-69, first let us have a brief look at Ayub Khan's system which was able to alienate the urban strata of Pakistani society.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan's strength was basically rural in character and it was done systematically through

16. Mohammad Ayoob, p.215.

the institution of basic democracies which converted the local notables like middle landlords and big farmers into the economic and political supporters of his system. The urban strata went without any representation in the system which Ayub Khan had created for his own benefit. The elections of 1965 held under the basic democracies system had demonstrated that President Ayub was relatively less secure in urban areas than in the rural.¹⁷ There were a number of reasons for this, in fact the traditional channels of communication and influence did not work in the urban areas as they did in the rural areas. The growth of a strong urban middle class which had resulted from the relatively rapid industrialization of West Pakistan during the 1960s, the decrease in the real wages of the industrial workers over the same period, the repressive policies of the regime regarding educational institutions, the alienation of the emerging entrepreneurial class from the regime because of the latter's support to the established monopoly houses. All these had combined to make a oppressive political system with a rural bias in

17. While in Karachi and Lahore Ayub Khan had polled respectively only 44 per cent and 60 per cent, whereas he secured around 73 per cent in rural Pakistan.


West Pakistan. Thus discontent erupted in the closing months of 1968. Bhutto very intelligently manoeuvred himself into a position where he became the first 'martyr' of an anti-Ayub movement.

Before we proceed further to analyse Pakistan People's Party (PPP), it is essential to have a brief look at its founder and chairman Z.A.Bhutto. He was a Sindhi from Larkana, who started his political career at an early age, he had not only held a number of portfolios including fuel, power and natural resources and of foreign minister but also as General Secretary of Ayub Khan's Pakistan Muslim League till 1966 when he resigned from the government and party. He projected himself as a great patriot by opposing the cease-fire after the September 1965 war and denounced the subsequent Tashkent Declaration of 1966. He mobilized strong public opinion particularly students against the Tashkent Declaration. Bhutto attacked the Tashkent Declaration for not resolving the Kashmir problem and not taking tough stand on the Kashmir issue by Ayub and he portrayed Ayub Khan as a national traitor. When he started gaining unequivocal popularity among the students, leftists and the younger generation he convinced himself that the Ayub Khan regime was about to fall,

therefore came out of the Pakistan Muslim League as national hero. When he came out, the country faced one of the most severe economic crisis in which massive exploitation was prevalent and wide disparities between classes and regions with the twenty two big industrial families possessing two third of Pakistan's wealth. The workers found themselves working at low paid wages, higher rate of inflation, inflow of people from rural to urban areas who faced unemployment problem and housing facilities. All this aggravated the discontent against the Ayub Khan regime.

✓ Ayub Khan's regime (1958-68) was portrayed by the government as one of economic prosperity and stability and termed as a "decade of development". Of course, the decade of development to some extent witnessed increase in the GNP.¹⁸ This economic growth rate benefited only the miniscule capitalist class, but large chunks of the have nots remained where they were. The government measures like subsidies, loans and other facilities were monopolized by the landed aristocracy and capitalist class.

18. Hassan Gardezi & Jamil Rashid, ed. Pakistan: the Roots of Dictatorship (London, 1983), pp.274-75.



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Thus, the government measures led to interpersonal and inter-regional inequalities. The economic grievances of the people converted into political movement in the name of the Pakistan People's Party for the down fall of Ayub's regime. The classes which rallied under the banner of Pakistan People's Party were agricultural labourers, artisians, educated unemployed youth, professionals like lawyers, engineers, doctors and urban wage labourers.

The opposition parties failed to provide a platform to these dissatisfied classes due to high disorder and defections among the parties. It was the Pakistan People's Party under a charismatic leader like Bhutto who strategically and tactically articulated the demands of the dissatisfied classes of the society. Bhutto extensively toured West Pakistan and talked to the various people and ascertained their grievances and addressed numerous public meetings.¹⁹ In this way he started anti-Ayub feelings while holding direct contacts with people by his tremendous oratory and attracted people, making the Pakistan People's Party a strong political force in West Pakistan.

19. The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), 3 November 1967.

By the end of 1968, the growing discontent, dissatisfaction and resentment against the Ayub regime reached its peak. It could be seen at Hyderabad which was the venue of the convention of Pakistan People's Party attended by more or less 10,000 delegates where Bhutto announced his party's decision to contest the 1970 general elections. Students played a significant role in the down fall of Ayub's regime and popularity and success of Pakistan People's Party. They started agitations for reduction in tuition fees, restructuring the existing examination system and the repealing of the university ordinance restricting students activities.²⁰ Initially, their agitation was non-violent, later on it turned violent against Ayub's regime. Bhutto was invited to the colleges and universities to address the students. Police fired at the agitating students in which a student died and several received injuries, Bhutto immediatly released a statement condemning police brutality and attended the memorial prayers for the dead student. In this way, he brought the students into the national mainstream against Ayub's down fall and for the success of the Pakistan People's Party in 1970 elections. In November, 1968, People's Party's

20. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London, 1970), pp.156-64.

leaders including Bhutto and Wali Khan of National Awami Party were arrested under the defence rules of Pakistan. Wali Khan was arrested for his open and direct support for a separate Pakhtoon province, on the contrary, Bhutto and other Pakistan People's Party leaders were arrested because of the government's fear that they would launch a mass movement against Ayub's regime. Overnight Bhutto became a hero of the students for whose causes he was fighting, therefore students became more and more restless. His arrest was followed by large scale demonstrations all over West Pakistan.²¹

On 14th February, 1969, Bhutto announced along with his People's Party stalwarts that they would fast unto death unless and until Ayub's regime lifted various repressive measures. The move got tremendous support from the people who promised to join in. Bhutto was released on 18th February, before he could start his fast unto death. The entering of Bhutto into the political scenario, activated the party stalwarts and workers. Thus, the anti-Ayub agitation forced him to announce to not contest the 1970 general elections and offered to hold a

21. The Pakistan Times, 14 November 1968.

dialogue with opposition political leaders in order to solve the political crisis, but Bhutto straight away opposed any dialogue with Ayub Khan's regime. The talk with other opposition leaders failed. By March, the situation was more extreme due to the taking part of women and the white collared government employees in the anti-Ayub movement, frustrated by the politicians and disloyalty by the bureaucrats and military junta forced him to resign from the office of the President of Pakistan and he handed over power to General Yahya Khan who reimposed Martial Law, banned the political parties and abrogated the 1962 constitution.²² Later he announced that he will restore democracy by holding direct elections in October, 1970, then handover power to the democratically elected representatives. Elections were held on 7th December, in West Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) emerged victorious by capturing 82 seats out of the 144 filled by direct elections.

If one looks at the way the election campaign was carried, one draws the inference, that the campaign was for and against a particular personality rather than on

22. The Statesman (New Delhi), 24 March 1969.

partie's manifesto's or issues. Though ofcourse, these also played a significant role in the election campaign. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had an advantage over the rest of the political parties in West Pakistan because of its charismatic leader Z.A.Bhutto, which was lacking in the opposition parties, Bhutto cultivated his personality during anti-Ayub agitation as a champion of the causes of masses and as a nationalist. He talked to the masses in their own language. In Punjab, he used to talk in Punjabi. In Sind, he used to talk in Sindhi and he was also very fluent in both Urdu and English. His speeches touched the sentiments of the masses, that is why, he drew large crowds wherever he went for election campaigns. Thus, his oratory power greatly contributed to his success and that of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Apart from his charismatic qualities, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) incorporated the aspirations of people in its election manifesto which promised to fight against feudalism and capitalism and to establish a democratic society which would benefit the peasants, workers and other weaker sections of the society and its was also promised to distribute the surplus wealth among the poor people.²³

23. Meenakshi Gopinath, p.73.

The election manifesto of the Pakistan People's Party begins with the fourfold motto; "Islam is our religion, socialism is our economy, democracy is our polity and all powers to people". In the election manifesto there was a severe criticism of the existing socio-economic and political system of Pakistan which was either directly or indirectly a consequence of the exploitative capitalistic structure that had prevailed. The manifesto declared that the ultimate goal of the People's Party was to attain a classless society which was possible only through socialism. These were broad principles of the People's Party election manifesto.²⁴ Let us take a brief look at the election manifesto proposals in different fields.

In the economic field, it advocated a mixed economy in which both the government and private sector work together for the growth and development of the national economy. All the major sources of wealth would be placed under the control of government, what we call public sector, and rest would be left to the private sector. The election manifesto listed around twelve sectors of industries which would be nationalised in the name of basic and key industries.

24. Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning Pakistan 1969-1971 (London, 1975), p.79.

Some of them were iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, heavy engineering, equipment for electrical power production, electronics, production of arms, ammunition and armament for defence of the country, cement and paper. And the public sector would completely control the major means of transportation viz. railways, shipping and airways. On the other hand, private sector was not completely free from government control, but it would operate under the broad guidelines set by the government. In the financial field, the manifesto made an unequivocal commitment to nationalization of all major banks and insurance companies. In the agrarian field, it advocated to destroy the feudal lords who became a "formidable obstacle to progress" and also promised to bring land ceiling measures.²⁵

In foreign policy, it advocated an independent foreign policy which was possible only by getting out of entanglements with "imperialist and neo-colonialist powers". In other words withdrawal from SEATO* and CENTO*. It advocated a confrontation policy with India until the problem of Kashmir is solved. It advocated "complete and unreserved support

25. See for more details "Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People's Party", 1970.

*SEATO - South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)

*CENTO - Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

to Arab States and the Palestinian movement in their fight against Israel". It expressed solidarity with oppressed Afro-Asian people. Moreover, it also promised to formulate a progressive constitution which can maintain unity and integrity and prosperity of the country. The People's Party's conception of a progressive constitution included full democracy, parliamentary form of government, federalism and local self-government. Thus, the election manifesto of Pakistan People's Party identified with the causes of downtrodden strata of the society and promised a new era in the history of Pakistan.²⁶

Z.A.Bhutto systematically pronounced the People's Party ideology as "Islamic Socialism" which was not visible any where in the party election manifesto. Bhutto had seen no contradictions between principles of socialism and Islam. He said that "the first seeds of socialism had flowered under Islam". In other words, the principles of socialism were product of the principles of Islam. In public meetings he used to say that, if there was any conflict between socialism and Islam, I would prefer to give up the former for the sake of latter as a true Muslim.²⁷

26. Whether the PPP implemented its election promises or not will be discussed in detail in third chapter.

27. Z.A.Butto, Awakening the People: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1966-1969 (Rawalpindi), pp.54, 179 & 193.

Thus, the Pakistan People's Party used both the concepts precisely because according to it both of them have the same goal what we call "egalitarianism". Moreover, People's Party held the Islamic principles while advocating socialism to attain and retain the conservative mass and orthodox ulema who had a lot of political weightage in the society which People's Party could not ignore. Therefore, it attracted people from all walks of life from conservative to radical elements by its famous fourfold slogan. The People's Party constantly advocated the Islamic character of socialism to show the people that it was next to no one in upholding Islamic sentiments and to protect it from the rightwing parties. Thus, the Pakistan People's Party promised something to every strata of the society: to win the sympathy and strong support of the leftists, it offered a socialism which called to revolutionize the existing socio-economic order. At the same time it added Islam to socialism which identified as a Musawat-e-Mohammadi.²⁸ Moreover, whichever province Bhutto visited, he talked in favour of it, for instance, in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), he recalled the glorious history of Pathans

28. Z.A. Butto, Marching Towards Democracy: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1970-71 (Rawalpindi), pp. 21, 30 & 157.

and promised prosperity for the province. In Sind, he promised to curtail the feudal aristocracy and ameliorate the plight of the peasants and workers. And in the Punjab he promised to help the merger of Bhawalpur with Punjab. At the same time, the People's Party did not ignore the landed gentry, to pacify them, it provided party posts to some of the landlords viz. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi from Sind, Ghulam Nustafa Khan of Multan and Hayet Mohammed Khan Sherpao, who came from a landlord family of Peshawar.

\ The Pakistan People's Party was always strongly opposed to regional sentiments and parochial feelings, it stood for a strong and unified Pakistan; it projected itself as a national party rather than a regional party from Sind Province. With this image, the People's Party contested the 1970 elections and came to power by securing 37.7 per cent of the votes and winning 81 out of 138 seats filled by direct elections. That is to say, People's Party bagged almost three-fifth of total votes polled inspite of not contesting all seats. In Sind it contested 25 seats out of 27 and secured 18 seats. In Punjab, it contested 77 seats out of 82 and secured 62 seats, it failed to secure even a single seat in Baluchistan and in NWFP

it contested 16 seats out of 25 and secured only one seat.²⁹

According to Baxter's analysis of the 1970 election results in Asian Survey, the People's Party did extremely well in the prosperous and developed areas rather than the backward and tribal dominated areas in West Pakistan.³⁰

S.J.Burki, in his article which appeared in Asian survey, classified West Pakistan into two regions, one as industrialized, urbanized and with a literate population, the other as a backward and with illiterate population. He defined urbanization in terms of rural-urban population and industrialization in terms of industrial output. On the basis of the above classification Punjab, Sind and some parts of NWFP and Baluchistan belonged to the more advanced areas while rest of them were backward regions. The election results shows that the People's Party did best in the more advanced areas and it suffered in the backward areas, what is notable is that it suffered in less advanced areas particularly in Punjab and Sind. The PPP's performance was relatively good in the developed areas

29. Dawn (Karachi), 19 & 20 December 1970.

30. Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes-1970", Asian Survey, vol.XI, no.3, March 1971, pp. 213-17.

because urbanization and industrialization produced more and more professionals and middle classes who were willing to accept radical measures in the existing system, that is why, they choose the People's Party, it was rejected where this was missing because backward areas were dominated by the tribal people who did not want to do away with their values and were therefore, not willing for radical changes in the existing socio-economic and political system.³¹

Thus, the victory of the People's Party was mainly based on its overwhelming influence among newly mobilized groups that were increasingly politicised. Though, the Pakistan People's Party's successful candidates came from social strata ranging from lower middle class to sections of old landed aristocratic houses, a majority of them were middle class families. Significant support came from urban middle class professionals which indicates that the People's Party had become the vehicle for the involvement of these middle class groups in West Pakistan politics. That was the macro level explanation for the People's Party (PPP) victory in the 1970 elections.

31. S.J.Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation" Asian Survey, vol.12, no.3, March 1972, pp.201-12.

Let us take a brief look at the micro level analysis of the PPP victory in 1970 election. The People's Party greatly benefited from the disunity that prevailed among the opposition and ruling Parties. Not only were they unable to form a strong united front against Bhutto, but also their internal conflicts reduced valuable election campaigning time. Thus, the factions of Muslim Leagues and other parties found it impossible to cooperate with each other. Even with the Leftist NAP (Wali) the Achakzai faction with its demands of Baluchi separatism constantly warred against the Khair Bakhsh Marri faction.

Serious defections took place in the Muslim League, while the People's Party increased the number of its supporters. For instance, when Sadiq Ali Menon, a former member of the National Assembly from Thatta joined the PPP, several of his supporters followed suit. Another interesting case of defection was of Raja Amir Anwer Hussain a National Assembly candidate from Rawalpindi of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Thanvi) to the People's Party. Throughout the election campaigning period, newspapers and periodicals reported defections from the QML to the Convention Muslim League (Nawabzada Azmat Ali), and to the Awami League. The Qayyam Muslim League (QML) faced one of the most serious

rifts within, owing to factional strifes. The People's Party also benefited, the way the Rightist Parties filled the candidates for various constituencies. Out of the 82 National Assembly seats from Punjab, there were around 14 constituencies where none of the three factions of the League contested which cleared the way for PPP's victory, while in some of the constituencies, all of them filled one candidate each which created a lot of confusion among the electorates. Moreover, the success of the PPP could also be attributed to the support of the independents in whose constituencies the PPP was not so strong. Notable among these was People's Party support for Ali Hassan Manghi, in the National Assembly contest from a Sukkur constituency. Some of these independents later joined the People's Party like Zararullah Chowdhary, a National Assembly elected member from Jehaniam. Thus, the PPP greatly benefited where its opponents floundered.³²

After assuming power Pakistan People's Party government under the leadership of Bhutto had taken a series of political steps in order to show the people of Pakistan that the old

32. Meenakshi Gopinath, pp.100-3.

regime which was indentified as an "agent of exploitation" was destroyed and the PPP government was in full control.

The first step in that direction was against the ex-President Yahya Khan and the Chief of Army General Abdul Hamid Khan and appointed a Enquiry Commission to look into the failure of the army in the East Pakistan crisis. Bhutto removed Lt. General Gul Hasan an acting commander-in-Chief since December 1971 and Air Marshal Rahim Khan along with six other military leaders. According to Bhutto these steps were taken in order "to prevent professional soldiers from becoming professional politicians". Hasan and Rahim Khan were placated with ambassadorial posts. He replaced Hasan with his confidential General Tikka Khan.³³

Apart from the military shakeup, Bhutto dismissed 1,300 bureaucrats under the Martial Law order 114 to show that he would not tolerate any obstructions to his policy and programme implementation. By 1972, he eliminated potential rivals from the military and bureaucracy who were dismissed and replaced by his loyalists. By this

33. In the view of Bhutto, Tikka Khan was apolitical and a reputation of putting down an uprising in Baluchistan in 1962-63 and later in military operations in East Bengal.

drastic step, the "viceregal system" which was continued in Pakistan by the military bureaucratic complex even after the withdrawal of the British had come to an end.

The first year of PPP rule was marked by "bold" economic reforms. These economic measures gave it a chance to clamp down on the "agents of exploitation". These economic reforms included land reforms, nationalization of major financial institutions, new labour policy and educational reforms.³⁴ The PPP government also succeeded in formulating a "consensus constitution" which guaranteed a federal, parliamentary and democratic form of government. The spirit of Islamic Socialism pervades and for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the preamble to the constitution emphasized economic justice to the people.³⁵

34. All these economic reforms will be discussed in detail in third chapter.

35. The Pakistan Times, 29 April 1973.

CHAPTER - II

ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

CHAPTER - 2

ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

In modern political parties organization and leadership hold great importance, it constitutes the general setting for the activity of members, the form imposed on their solidarity, it determines the machinery for the selection of leaders and decides their power. An organization comes into existence when explicit procedures are established to coordinate the activities of a group in the interest of achieving specified objectives. The collective efforts of men may become formally organized either because all of them have some common interests. It also shows the strength and efficiency of certain parties; on the other hand, the weakness and inefficiency of other parties.¹

The Pakistan People's Party was a Polyglot Party - it includes diverse elements ranging from sections of aristocratic families, trade-union leaders, urban middle class to students. Even though the key posts in the organizational hierarchy were occupied by members of the

1. Maurice Duverger, Political parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London, 1969), pp.4-17.

upper middle-class (landlords, and small capitalists), however, farmers, students, labourers, small shopkeepers and merchants from cities and villages were the active workers of the party and they occupied lower positions at the constituency and polling-station level. The party workers came from variety of professions such as doctors, insurance managers and agents to lower middle and working-class professions, like tea-stall owners, food grain agents, railway clerks, fruitsellers, electricians, fitters and workers from the mint and railways. In between the members of the National Assembly and the member of the Provincial Assembly and the lower-level polling-station workers stood the active party organizers, most of them had organizational experience, learned either from the Muslim League or from other Left Parties.

Nevertheless, it can not be denied that it broadly represented some new social forces. No doubt these forces had gathered strength under the Ayub dispensation, but they had, more often than not, been deprived of participation in the all important process of decision-making. The PPP's main strength during the elections of 1970 in urban areas was the middle and lower-middle class and organized labour. At the same time, the Party's strong commitment to destroy the feudal domination in rural Pakistan built up for it

significant support in rural Pakistan. Another great strength for the PPP in the elections of 1970, was the student community. It was student activities more than any other single group of supporters who mobilized votes for the PPP candidates in the elections.² "the successful PPP deputies come from a broad enough social spectrum, ranging from lower middle class to sections of old aristocratic houses: but a big majority of them are from the urban middle class".³ The PPP in Sind was dominated by landlords while in the Punjab the party was less dominated by landed elements, the feudal elements in the Sind Party was "a new type of landlord who is anxious to mechanize, to improve his lands, and intelligently to invest his income". All these factors indicates that the political and social base of the PPP was certainly different from the constituency to which the military-bureaucratic establishment had catered in 1960s.

The Pakistan People's Party, particularly in Sind had quite a few of the "progressive landlords"⁴ as they were

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2. Mohammed Ayoob, " the New Political Structure of Pakistan", International Studies (Bombay), vol.12, no.2, April-June 1973, pp.183-206.
 3. M.B.Naqvi, "West Pakistan's Struggle for Power", South Asian Review (London), vol.4, no.3, April 1971,p.222.
 4. They were called as a "Progressive Landlords" because their outlook was modern and the fact that they were in professions (mostly barristers-at-law) and not living off the land exclusively.

called even by the non-landed elements within the party. Other than the Chairman Bhutto himself, several other leading stalwarts of the Sind PPP, including Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Chairman of the Karachi PPP, and was Minister for Information and Education, Ali Ahmed Talpur, Chairman of the Sind PPP, and Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Governor of Sind were leading feudal political families of the province. But at the same time the Sind PPP, particularly its Karachi branch consisted quite a few middle and lower-middle class radicals and trade unionists like Mairaj Mohammed Khan and Shamim Zaimuddin. Mairaj Mohammed Khan was appointed Presidential adviser on Public Affairs in order to neutralise his belligerent anti-establishment attitude".⁵ This had time to time created a factional rivalry in the PPP as happened at the Hala Conference before the 1970 elections.

Radicals like Miraj Mohammed Khan argued in the Hala Conference of July 1970, that elections and Assemblies would not bring food and shelter to the people and that, the party would be captured by the capitalists and the feudal landlords. It was in this Conference that one heard

5. Mohammed Ayoob, "Profile of a Party: PPP in Pakistan", Economic and political Weekly (Bombay) vol.7, no.2, February 1972, (Annual Number), p.217.

both the left and center groups fighting the methods of capturing political power. When Miraj arguing against taking part in elections, Hamif Ramay, reported at the behest of Bhutto arguing infavour of taking part in forthcoming elections. By and large, this had also succeeded in giving the PPP in Sind Province an image of a progressive party which stands for anti-establishment and change, at the same time making it some what acceptable to certain traditionally powerful elements which would otherwise have felt their interests seriously threatened by a party of committed left.

Unlike, the PPP in Sind, the PPP in the Punjab did not have any major representation from the feudal families. In fact, the powerful landlords of Punjab were in 1970 almost equally divided between the Council and Qayyum Muslim Leagues and were able to neutralize each other. The Punjab PPP was largely a party of the middle and lower middle class radicals, trade unionists and student leaders. Ghulam Mustafa Kher, Governor of the Punjab, Mahumad Ali Kasuri, Khurshid hasan Mir, Mukhtar Rana and Ahmed Raza Kasuri all belonged to this category.⁶ Mukhtar Rana and Ahmed

6. Mukhtar Rana was a labour leader of Lyallpur and Ahmed Raza Kasuri was a student leader.

Raza Kasuri had broken off from the parent PPP because of the Party's collaboration with the regime and the alleged lack of radicalism in the party.

The PPP's main strength in the urban areas had been the middle and lower middle class and organized labour. At the same time, the PPP's commitment to destroy the feudal structure attracted significant support in the countryside. The PPP's "anti-monopoly houses" stand attracted up and coming indigenous bourgeoisie of Punjab and Sind who had always felt frustrated by the monopoly houses primarily located in Karachi.

Another important and great source of strength for the PPP, which greatly contributed to its victory in the 1970 elections was the student community. The student activists had been responsible for mobilising votes for the PPP candidates in the elections more than any other single group of supporters. The students successfully spread the party's promises as well as anti-Ayub feelings in the countryside as well as in the urban areas. Thus, the students mobilized massive support for PPP in the 1970 elections.

Moreover, there were significant indications to suggest the PIP had enjoyed a considerable support within the armed personnels, particularly among the younger officers and other ranks of the army. This clearly showed in the election of Rawalpindi National Assembly constituency, which encompassed the Army Headquarters and the cantonment, was won by a thumping majority by Khurshid Hassan Mir a relatively unknown PPP candidate.⁷ He defeated the former Air Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan. A number of retired generals of the army including Umrao Khan and Sarfraz Khan who contested on the tickets of the "Islam-Pasand" parties received severe setback at the hands of the PPP candidates who were at that time relatively unknown characters.

However, the PPP did not do well in Karachi city which was dominated by Muhajirs. These people identified the PPP as a Sindhi speaking party. The Urdu speaking Muhajirs identity crisis was great. The obvious emotional and psychological refuge for them was Islam and therefore, they voted for the "Islam-Pasand" parties, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami.

7. Khurshid Hassan Mir was^a Kashmiri lawyer.

The central committee of Pakistan People's Party which was the core of its organizational set up, consisted of Miraj a leftist, Rashid and Rahim were left of center, Ramay and Mubashir were centerists, Pirzada was right of center and Makhdoom was a rightist.

Miraj was a good orator whom the Yahya Khan government considered too dangerous to non-leftists during the election, a pro-China supporter of the PPP and at one time Bhutto named him along with Kher as two of his successors. Later Miraj, resigned from the party. Rashid, a former peasant leader, a communist, was the Minister of Health. Makhdoom strengthened and widened Bhutto's relations with the waderas and religious leaders without whose support a overwhelming victory in Sind would not have been possible. Pirzada represented modern Sind and won his predominantly non-Urdu speaking constituency in Karachi. Mubashir, a refugee and an engineer by profession, supported Bhutto from the early days and was the Finance Minister. Ramay, the former editor of Nusrat and Manager of Masawat, was formerly with the Convention Muslim League and later was Chief Minister of the Punjab in PPP's rule. Rahim came from the diplomatic service, was a bitter critic of Ayub Khan's regime, the principal draftsman of party statements, and the Secretary General

of the Party. He was also, central Minister but he was removed from the party.⁸

Let us analyse how Bhutto emerged as a strong and popular leader in Pakistan in general and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in particular.

The overwhelming victory of Pakistan People's Party in the first general elections held in 1970, elevated Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a popular political leader. Bhutto's emergence, consequent upon popular mandate, came as a significant departure from the familiar bureaucratic-military regimes. Perhaps, after Mahammad Ali Jinnah, Bhutto was the only leader who could sustain popular claims to national leadership, as was soon evident when Bhutto came to be referred to as Quaid-i-Awami (leader of the people). Eventually, he became the first political leader to have continued in power for over five and a half years. He also attained international recognition as an astute third world leader which was not an inconsiderable accolade. The fact was that he was not an imposed leader but a leader by popular choice.

8. Khalid B. Sayeed, "How Radical is the Pakistan People's Party", Pacific Affairs (London), vol.48, no.1, pp.44-50.

During Ayub Khan's military regime, Bhutto came to be recognised, first as an important member of the Cabinet and later as an astute leader of the opposition. This phase showed how Bhutto weighed political issues and alliances exclusively in furtherance of his own political ascendancy. Until 1965, Bhutto utilized the patronage of General Ayub Khan and in the post-1965 phase, Bhutto had no qualms to transform himself into a staunch critic of Ayub's military dictatorship. President Iskandar Mirza was keen ever since 1954, to enlist Bhutto as a political activist. At the first available opportunity, Bhutto was sent to New York in 1957 as a member of the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations. Again in 1958, he was sent to Geneva as leader of the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.⁹ After the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan on 7th October 1958, President Iskander Mirza suggested Bhutto's name to be included in Ayub Khan's Cabinet. On 27th October 1958, Z.A. Bhutto became the Minister of Commerce and Industries. General Ayub was impressed by Bhutto's arduous application to his assignment. In January 1960, Bhutto

9. Surendra Nath Kaushik, Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership (New Delhi, 1985), p.74-76.

became Minister of Information and National Reconstruction. A few months later Bhutto was given the additional charge of the vital ministry of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources. Bhutto's dream of becoming Foreign Affairs minister was fulfilled in January 1963 when Muhammad Ali Bogra then Foreign Minister (also former Prime Minister) expired. In fact, during Muhammad Ali Bogra's sickness Bhutto had informally taken over the responsibility of looking after Foreign Affairs in November 1962.¹⁰ As Foreign Affairs Minister, Bhutto was apparently in his element. He tried to give a new perspective to Pakistan's foreign policy and reformulated its priorities and alternatives. From an overt pro-US commitment, Bhutto succeeded to an extent, in normalizing Pakistan's relations with both the Communist Countries, the Soviet Union and Communist China.¹¹ Bhutto also reasserted Pakistan's alleged claims over disputed Kashmir, becoming overtly critical of India. In keeping with the sustained anti-Indian stance, Bhutto alleged that India had never reconciled to the creation of Pakistan and was intent upon its annihilation. He alleged that India

10. *ibid.* pp.76-77.

11. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military rule or People's Power (New Delhi, 1970), p.138.

sought to exploit all available avenues to weaken Pakistan.¹² When Bhutto realized that Ayub Khan's days were numbered, because Ayub had lost some credibility with the USA and secondly because the conflict with India had created immense problems on the domestic front. However, Bhutto himself was in no hurry to take the decisive plunge and he waited for the most favourable opportunity to get out of the Ayub circle without harming his own political credibility. But, Bhutto had other ideas to stage a decisive comeback to national politics. By November 1967, Bhutto had prepared the groundwork by strengthening his political contacts at the grass-root level for the formation of a new political party. At the inaugural convention, held at Lahore, on November 30 1967, the Pakistan People's Party came into being. The first ever, general elections were held on December 7th, 1970, election results proved a severe setback to the religious and reactionary right-wing parties. Bhutto's PPP emerged victorious by capturing 83 out of a total 144 seats in west Pakistan. The preceding analysis sought to present the sequence of Bhutto's emergence as a national Political leader. The events show that Bhutto took every step to extend and consolidate his power.

12. See for details, Z.A.Bhutto, Politics of the People: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches (Rawalpindi, 1972), pp.36-71.

Bhutto was at the helm of national politics for about five and a half years. His tenure (December 20 1971-July 5 1977) revealed a complex amalgam of capacity for political manoeuvres and an authoritarian streak. Bhutto had inherited a cut and dried authoritarian powerstructure. It was apparently beyond Bhutto's temperament to renounce authoritarian power once he had tasted it. His style of functioning could be evaluated by his policies and actions. Bhutto persisted with martial law, primarily to deter his political opponents. Therefore, he took initial steps to curb the privileged position of the army, bureaucracy and the capitalists class. He replaced suspected officers and installed trustworthy and loyal persons. In order to gain favour of workers, labourers and lower middle class, Bhutto also announced a series of economic reforms such as land ceiling and control over private concerns. Employers were directed to take steps to improve the living standards of workers and provide them with educational and housing facilities. Thus, Bhutto consolidated and extended his own power. His authoritarian style of functioning^{was} revealed at the time of appointing a committee to draft a permanent constitution under his chairmanship which was against democratic norms.¹³

13. Surendra Nath Kaushik, pp.100-7.

The constitution making phase witnessed intra-party differences in the Pakistan People's Party. On October 6 1972, the Law and Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Mahmmd Ali Kasuri, submitted his resignation as a sequel to his differences with Bhutto on the basic aspects of the proposed constitution.¹⁴ Bhutto wanted to have a modified version of parliamentary system, providing unchallenged powers to the Chief Executive. Mahmmd Ali Kasuri was insistent upon an unqualified parliamentary system based on the British model. Bhutto accepted Kasuri's resignation and asked him to quit the constitution-drafting committee as well as the National Assembly. Subsequently, Kasuri was expelled from the PPP in February 1973.¹⁵ Another prominent PPP leader Mairaj Mahmmd Khan Minister of State for Political Affairs, also resigned on October 13 1972, on account of differences with Bhutto's policies on Labour and political affairs. One of the young leftist leaders, Amanullah Khan, who supported severe curtailment of land holdings, a position advocated by Sheikh Rashid, was removed from the party. This led to so much bitterness among the party organizers of Punjab and

14. Dawn, 21 October 1972.

15. Meenakshi Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition (New Delhi, 1975), pp.114-17.

Bahawalpur.¹⁶ The policies followed by Bhutto led to cracks within the PPP. The Governor of Sind, Mir Rasul Baksh Talpur, resigned in protest against what he called " a wicked power hungry clique ".¹⁷

In the initial period, Bhutto was preoccupied with consolidating and extending the influence of the Pakistan People's Party. He exercised unlimited powers as the CMLA even when he did not belong to the armed forces. Subsequently his powers were further enhanced on his assuming the office of the President. As President of Pakistan under the interim consituation, Bhutto exercised almost unlimited powers in the government as well as in the party. The NAP-JUI coalition was allowed to form provincial government after persistent pressures by the opposition parties. But, within less than a year, Bhutto dismissed the NAP-JUI governments in Baluchistan and the NWFP and imposed direct central rule in February 1973. Moreover, the office of the prime Minister was made very strong and powerfull as against the parliamentary norms of responsibility.¹⁸ Thus, during the initial stage Bhutto

16. Javid Iqbal, Pakistan People's Party: Mazi, Hal our Mustaqbil (Past, Present and Future) (Rawalpindi) p.9.

17. Time, 5 March 1973.

18. Surendra Nath Kaushik, p.111.

concentrated mainly on safeguarding and ensuring
his own political sustenance.

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) attained popularity and dominant position in the political system of Pakistan, it however, remained exclusively identified with Bhutto's personal quest for absolute power. The PPP instead of becoming a cadre based party on viable ideology and organization, revolved exclusively around Bhutto's charisma, the socialist and reformatory pronouncements of the PPP and Bhutto's intolerance of criticism of his radical association. As Bhutto consolidated his power, infighting in the PPP became more acute. Gradually, Bhutto took measures for ousting radical members (most of them were the founding members) of the PPP and permitted massive entry of reactionary and feudal elements. He seems to have been motivated by the exclusive consideration of ensuring his own unchallenged position in the PPP. He came to legitimise his quest for personal power.

The Pakistan People's Party was formed at the house of Mubashir Hassan, a left-wing supporter of Bhutto on November 30 1967.¹⁹ The foundation documents of the PPP were not

19. See for details, Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography (New Delhi, 1980), pp.86-92.

Bhutto's own creation. They were formulated in collaboration with leftist members like J.A.Rahim, Mubashir Hassan and Harif Ramay. But after consolidating his power, Bhutto expelled all these members from PPP. In its initial phase, the PPP continued to show a tilt towards the left. Enchanted by Bhutto's radical pronouncement, a large number of socialists and Marxist of various views joined the PPP. The common objective of the leftists was to dislodge Ayub Khan from power. After Ayub's fall, intra-party differences came up in the PPP on the issue of contesting the general elections as already mentioned.

After assuming the power Bhutto acknowledged his gratitude to the party for placing him at the helm of affairs. However, his posture underwent almost instant transformation and by 1973, the PPP was relegated to secondary importance whereas Bhutto's charismatic personality came to be glorified and idolised. Bhutto's infinite ambition and intolerance for criticism grew in intensity. Throughout his tenure Bhutto showed little concern for institutionalising the party process.²⁰ Growing trends of a personality cult and authoritarianism made it obvious that Bhutto was more concerned with short-term gains rather than achieving long-term objectives

20. Surendra Nath Kaushik, pp.123-26.

of party building. His pronouncement bearing upon socialistic and democratic society became secondary in the operational phase. The unfortunate stance gradually emerged as Bhutto often stated at party meetings "I am the people's party and they are all my creatures".²¹ Thus, Bhutto's domination over the party exceeded that of Jinnah's over the Muslim League. Bhutto failed to carry with him the radical elements within the Pakistan People's Party. The radicals were apprehensive of Bhutto's inclusion of reactionary forces in the party and in the government. They assailed Bhutto's apathetic attitude towards loyal PPP workers. They were rumbling against Bhutto's holding of two offices simultaneously, that of the head of the government and chairman of the PPP. Moreover, PPP's organizational ambivalence persisted owing to Bhutto's mounting personalization in party affairs on one pretext or the other, Bhutto continued to avoid the issue of holding party elections. His plea was that party elections should be held only after the general elections. Bhutto, however, continued to believe that it would be possible to reorganise the PPP by enforcing discipline and

21. Lawrance Ziring, "Pakistan: A Political Perspective", Asian Survey, July 1975, vol.xv, no.7, p.632.

organizational viability. He launched a massive drive for reorganization of the party at central, regional, district and tehsil levels. Membership of the party was thrown open to all. The influx of members with different ideologies throughout 1976, created additional problems, adversely affecting the party's organizational structure.

Though Bhutto's PPP got a sweeping electoral victory in the March 1977 general elections, it lost the faith of the people of Pakistan. The opposition parties alleged that the PPP had indulged in massive rigging. They refused to accept the legitimacy of the people's party's electoral victory. After prolonged confrontation between the PPP and opposition parties, Bhutto was deposed from power by the military on 5th July 1977.²²

22. Surendra Nath Kaushik, pp.130-32.

CHAPTER - III

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICIES
AND PROGRAMMES OF THE PARTY

CHAPTER - 3

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF THE PARTY

After the election and the subsequent Bangladesh debacle, the People's Party emerged as the ruling party of the new Pakistan in 1971. The results of 1970 elections were explicitly or implicitly manifested in People's Party's future role definition, the kind of policy adopted and the Party's programme of action.

Before, analysing the measures which directed socio-economic and political transformation, let us have a look at the political situation when Pakistan People's Party came to power.

✓ Pakistan People's Party was a product of the changing character of West Pakistani society of the late 1960s and had in turn acted as a catalytic agent for the forces of change, by mounting the relevant slogans and winning a massive mandate on the basis of a radical programme. The PPP came to power when the entire political structure of Pakistan with or without the veneer of parliamentary democracy, was built upon three main pillars.

- 1) the supremacy of the permanent executive over representative institutions.
- 2) the dominance of West Pakistan, especially the Punjab, over East Bengal so far as the inter-wing equation was concerned.
- 3) the financial autonomy of the military, which meant in real terms a very high level of defence expenditure on the upkeep of the armed forces.¹ Whenever, there was an attempt to change these characters, there was a massive reaction from the ruling elite. The reaction was violent. The degree of violence was based on the magnitude of the threat to change the statusquo and the source from which it came. As it turnedout, the Awami League's phenomenal victory at the polls in December 1970, threatened all these three characters as they had never been threatened before. This led to barbaric violence because of the subsequent reaction on the part of the ruling junta.

After 1971, when East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan, the equation between West Pakistan (which meant primarily the Punjab) and East Bengal, had been replaced by

1. Mohammed Ayoob, "The New Political Structure of Pakistan", International Studies (Bombay), vol.12, April-June 1973, pp.190-92.

the equation between the Punjab and the small Provinces. Before, the separation of East Bengal from West Pakistan, the small Provinces considered East Bengal as a balancer between them and the predominant province of the Punjab. In the new context, this problem had taken a new colour. Under the new democratic system which was based on "one man, one vote" (which was the demand of the Bangalis during the Ayub regime), the Punjab cannot be denied the lion's share of seats in the National Assembly along with civil administration and armed force because around 60 per cent of present-day population lives in the Punjab. This would mean a permanent Punjabi majority in the more powerful chamber of the legislature. This gives greater legitimacy to the Punjab's political dominance over the rest of Pakistan. Therefore, it was natural that the smaller provinces of NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind not only resent this position but also seek to neutralize the Punjabi's domination through various means. Thus the problem of Centre-Province (or in other words, the Punjab versus the rest) relations was evident from what happened soon after the Pakistan People's Party's assumption of office following the December War. The PPP government took nine months to resolve the Centre-States problem (or Punjab and rest). The PPP government and the

representatives of the NWFP and Baluchistan arrived at a constitutional accord on 20 October 1972.²

Another major settled fact of Pakistans political life before PPP came to power was the equation between the permanent executive and the representative institutions. For the past two decades the permanent executive gained more weight than the representative institutions. This was one of the major factor which contributed for the failure of democratic institutions in Pakistan in the 1950s and 60s. The tradition of executive supremacy was started by Governor General M.A.Jinnah, who had set the tone for the pattern of government. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the "hierarchies"³ - the top echelons of the bureaucracy supported by the Army top brass, took over control of the decision-making process while keeping the politicians more for purposes of ornamentation than the think-tank. The October 1958 military coup simply removed the politicians from the arena of symbolic governance which they had retained till then. From October 1958 to December 1971, Pakistan was virtually ruled by an executive fiat.

2. *ibid.* pp.193-94.

3. The term hierarchies was used by Philip Deane of the *Observer* to explain the character of Pakistan's top decision-makers after Liaquat Ali's assassination.

The two National Assemblies elected under Field Marshal Ayub Khan's constitution were nothing more than rubber stamping agencies and some time not even that. This state of affair was extremely undesirable to East Bengal which ultimately led to its secession from West Pakistan. As long as there was a presence of parliamentary form of government till 1958, East Bengal's representation in the National Assembly was atleast on a par with that of West Pakistan. The Bengali middle class in 1958, saw that the representation of East Pakistan in the army and the bureaucracy was limited and in crucial sectors of decision-making non-existent, its feeling of non-participation in the political process became complete. The defeat of the Pakistani army in the East Bengal crisis in 1971 brought a significant change in this equation between the permanent executive and representative institutions. It was widely realized by the politically conscious people in Pakistan that the "viceregal system"⁴ which continued even after the British withdrawal was greatly responsible for the separation of East Pakistan from the West Pakistan. Moreover with the military-bureaucratic complex discredited, there was a vacuum which could be filled only by the elected

4. The term viceregal system was used by Khalid B. Sayeed to describe the character of the Ayub Khan regime in Pakistan in his book Political System of Pakistan (Boston, 1967) p.125.

representatives of Pakistan led by PPP, NAP and JUI. These parties had advantage of having some political and social base which is a prerequisite for any political party to survive under any political system. This was in striking contrast to the situation that had obtained between 1947 and 1958, when the political parties in Pakistan were completely inactive and with virtually no political-social base of their own.

Due to the events of 1971 and the greater representative character of the political leadership it became possible at least in theory to evolve a new equation between the executive and the elected representatives in the truncated Pakistan of 1972 and Pakistan People's Party and some of the political parties were committed to bring back the parliamentary form of government into the Pakistani political system.

Another serious problem which was faced by Pakistan when Pakistan People's Party came to power was the armed forces and their place in the political life of Pakistan. Wayne Wilcox has aptly summed up the situation in Pakistan before the events of December 1971 in the following words "The army in Pakistan has been at the centre of power for two decades. Its power within the country is the product

both of its command over the means of violence and its willingness to use them politically. Alternatives to military authority are few because of the nature of the country and of its security environment".⁵

The October 1958 military coup represented no fundamental departure from the system that had obtained earlier because it was essentially the same military-bureaucratic coterie that ruled the roost in Pakistan even prior to the October coup that was behind the Ayub regime. All that happened in 1958 was the armed forces, rather than the politicians, came to provide the basis of legitimacy to the political system of Pakistan. The Army GHQ's involvement in the crucial decision-making process, particularly when decisions concerning defence and foreign affairs had been taken for granted since 1951. It was 1951 when General Ayub Khan was elevated to the office of Commander-in-Chief of the army. He was the first Pakistani to rise to this height in the army. Earlier Army Chiefs were British. Iskandar Mirza, who was then Defence secretary, was an

5. Wayne Wilcox, "Political Role of Army in Pakistan " in Varma and Narain, n.11, p.44.

important member of the civil service establishment and next to prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan (who also held the Defence portfolio), the most important person in the Defence establishment.

It was common knowledge that Ayub Khan was President Iskandar Mirza's General. With the elevation of Ayub Khan to the Chief of Army, the links between the army and bureaucracy were consolidated. There was enough evidence that Ayub Khan by virtue of being the Chief of Army was the prime mover in Pakistan's decision to enter into a military pact with the USA in 1954. In fact, he had been thinking on these lines since he assumed as Chief of Army in 1951.⁶ Field Marshal Ayub Khan's involvement in the domestic politics of Pakistan was corroborated by the fact that the constitution of 1962 was based upon a sort of working-paper, a blueprint he had drawn up while sitting in a hotel room in London as far back as 1954.⁷ However, it was on the request of Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad that Ayub Khan agreed to become the Defence Minister for Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of Bogra.

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6. See for details, Colonel Mohammad Ahmed, My Chief (Lahore, 1960), pp.73-74 and Major General Fazal Mueen Khan, The story of the Pakistan Army (Karachi, 1963), p.154.
 7. See for details, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, A Political Autobiography (London, 1967), pp.186-91.

The involvement of Army in Pakistani domestic politics was clear following the coup d'etat of 1958. However, despite certain trappings of military rule and the induction of three senior Generals in Ayub Khan's first cabinet, the nature of the administration remained civilian in character. Of course, the share of GHQ in the political and economic affairs was assured with Ayub Khan in the President's House. The financial autonomy of the Army continued to remain sacrosanct and the vital political and economic interests of the military officers were adequately protected.⁸ The Martial Law which was imposed by General Yahya Khan in 1969 was a much more naked military regime than the one it had replaced. The most important factor which contributed to this decision was the state of affairs in East Bengal. The Bengali leadership led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman rejected the concessions made by Ayub Khan in the Round Table Conference in March 1969, because these concessions did not meet the desire of political and fiscal autonomy of East Bengal.

8. This became evident in Ayub Khan's land reforms in West Pakistan, which put a high enough ceiling to exempt lands held by most military officers from this ceiling. It was also reflected in the policy that made irrigated land in the barrage areas of Sind available to military officers at direct - cheap prices.

The demand for political and fiscal autonomy gravely threatened the entire fabric of the state. The Army High Command came to the conclusion that army intervention was very necessary at this juncture to maintain and run the administration and to preserve the unity and integrity of Pakistan as well as the vital interests of the armed forces.

The basic difference between the 1969 army's intervention and 1958 army's intervention; was that whereas in 1958 the army was brought in primarily to legitimize the unbridled rule of a predominantly civilian coterie, in 1969 it was bent on running the country as the major partner in the military-bureaucratic combine. The effectiveness of the bureaucracy was limited to routine matters and it was certainly relegated to the position of a junior partner. Serving Generals were put in charge of provincial administration (a break with the Ayub tradition, where Generals appointed to cabinet or civilian posts had to resign their commissions), and Yahya Khan himself continued to function as Chief of the Army as well as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. The army's involvement in the running of the government for a solid period of a decade did not succeed in finding a solution to Pakistan's political and economic problems. In fact, it

was largely responsible for the disintegration of the country. The army intervened in the decision-making process precisely because of lack of a broad-based consensus among the political parties on the vital constitutional and political issues facing the country. In the absence of such a consensus among the major political forces on fundamental issues the temptation for the military to intervene would be greater. Only the PPP government could for the first time control the actions of the army by evolving a consensus on the fundamental issues in making of the constitution in 1972. Such a consensus was the only sure way of limiting the possibility of a military intervention in Pakistan's political process.

It would not be wrong to say that while some radical and fundamental changes had occurred in the political life of Pakistan, there were at the same time certain disturbing elements of continuity in Pakistan's polity which bound it to the "viceregal system" that had operated prior to the break up of Pakistan. These elements of continuity which have been pointed out in the preceding paragraphs had plagued Pakistan's political life during the last two decades and prevented the evolution of a healthy, democratic political system for that country.

The People's Party's government had taken a series of political measures in order to show the people that the old regime which was considered as an "agent of exploitation" was finished and the government was in full command of the situation. The PPP leader followed a very conscious plan in the military and bureaucratic shakeup, because, he had observed the army functioning at first hand. Bhutto's experience in the Field Marshal Ayub Khan military regime and his collaboration with Yahya Khan during the war in Bangladesh had given him unique knowledge in the mentality and operation style of the army top brass.⁹ Aware that the army had been gravely discredited in the country, he saw this as an opportunity to reinforce civilian rule. Therefore, he moved against ex-President Yahya Khan and Army Chief of Staff, General Abdul Hamid Khan and appointed a Enquiry Commission to look into the failure of the Pakistani army in the Bangladesh crisis. Bhutto also tried to eliminate potential rivals long before they had the opportunity to plot against him and the PPP government. In the name of preventing professional soldiers from becoming professional politicians, he removed

9. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? the death of a State (Penguin, 1983), pp.100-1.

Lt. General Gul Hasan, acting C-in-C since December 1971 and Air Marshal Rahim Khan along with six other military top brass. Bhutto pacified them with providing ambassadorial positions. The post vacated by Hasan and Rahim Khan were filled respectively by Tikka Khan and Zafar A. Chawdary.¹⁰

Along with the severe military shakeup, Bhutto also overhauled the bureaucratic system. He dismissed around 1,300 civil servants under the Martial Law order 114 to show that he would not tolerate any obstructions to the implementation of PPP's policies and programmes. Thus, by April 1972, he replaced, imaginary opponents in the civil service and the military by his close loyalists. Moreover, the 1973 constitution which was formulated by the PPP government, did not provide any guarantees of tenure and status to higher civil servants which found place in earlier constitutions of 1956 and 1962.

The constitution of 1973 includes the main manifesto demands of the Pakistan People's Party. The framing of the constitution should be viewed in the context of implementation of policies and programmes of the People's Party. Unlike the

10. Meenakshi Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition (New Delhi, 1975), pp.112-13.

1962 constitution which was imposed by an army general who had come to power through a coup d'etat, the 1956 constitution was worked out by a constituent assembly formed undemocratically on the basis of indirect elections. The 1973 constitution was framed by a body which had come into power as a result of the only general election held in the country on the basis of Universal Adult Franchise. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the 1973 constitution declared that Islam is the state religion.¹¹ Like the 1956 and amended 1962 constitution, the 1973 constitution stated that unless and until he is a Muslim, a person shall not be qualified for the election as President of Pakistan. Article 91 of the constitution makes for the first time a constitutional obligation that the Prime Minister is to be elected from among the Muslim members of the National Assembly. That is to say, the Prime Minister, like the President has to be a Muslim. Article 227 lays down that " all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam". No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunction laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Like early constitutions, Article 228 in the constitution of 1973, reiterated in the provisions regarding the setting up of Council of Islamic Ideology.¹²

11. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan (Delhi, 1984), pp.84-105.

12. *ibid.*

The 1973 constitution had introduced parliamentary form of government, the most important features are the responsibility of the government to parliament and the election of the president by the supreme legislative organ. It may be recalled that for more or less 15 years Pakistan had an omnipotent presidential form of government. Under the 1973 constitution, the real executive powers was kept in the hands of council of ministers. Article 48 stated that the president must act on and in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and such advice is binding on him. In spite of that the 1956 and 1973 constitutions provided parliamentary form of government. In contrast to the constitution of 1956, under the present constitution, the President does not appoint the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, he does not have the supreme command of the armed force, does not have the right of suspensive veto and was not part of the supreme legislative authority. In this way, the President's powers were even more restricted than under the 1956 constitution.¹³

Under the 1973 constitution, Pakistan is a federation consisting of four provinces. It met the interests of the provinces to a definite extent. It was the first time,

13. Y.V.Gankovsky and V.N.Moskalenko, The Three Constitutions of Pakistan (Lanore, 1978), pp.126-30.

Pakistan now has an upper house of parliament representing the interests of the provinces. No bill which has the effect of altering the limits of a province can be introduced in parliament unless it has been approved by not less than two-third of the total membership of that Assembly. And the constitution provided a Council of Common Interests consisting of the Chief Ministers of the all the Provinces and an equal number of members from the federal government nominated by the Prime Minister. The main function of the Council of Common Interests was to formulate and regulates policies regarding the development of industries, railways, minerals, Oil and natural gas, enterprises of the public sector. Article 156 provided the National Economic council, which formulated plans for the country's economic development, has equal representation from all the provinces.¹⁴

On the other hand, the 1956 constitution provided for a federal form of government in which powers were divided between the central government and provincial governments, but the head of the province was appointed by the central government, the head of the province (Governor) can authorise

14. See for details The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, pp.165-71.

the President to impose President rule in respective province which is similar to the Indian constitutional setup. The 1956 constitution kept the real executive powers in the hands of cabinet headed by the Prime Minister. The President under clause 6 of Article 37 was required to act on the advice of the council of ministers headed by Prime Minister except where he was empowered to act in his discretion. The preamble of 1956 constitution recognised the sovereignty of God and gave a spiritual basis to the constitution. It was also stated that the constitution of the Republic of Pakistan was based upon the principles of Islam and modern parliamentary democracy. Therefore, the 1956 constitution was given the name of the constitution of the 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan'.

Islam was given practical place in the 1956 constitution in two ways. According to Article 32 (2) a person can not be qualified for election as President unless he was a Muslim, Article 197 stated that the President was obliged to set up an organization for Islamic Research and instruction in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis. And Article 198 stated that the President was expected to appoint (within one year of the promulgation of the constitution) a commission of experts to make

recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws in conformity with the injunctions of Islam.¹⁵ On the other hand, the concept of Islamic state suffered the severest blow from the 1962 constitution promulgated by Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The constitution of 1962 dropped the word Islamic from the name of Pakistan, yet Islam remained the basic feature of the constitution by providing two Islamic bodies. The constitution says that there shall be an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology. The basic function of this council is to make recommendations to the central government and the provincial governments as to means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam. And the second body is Islamic Research Institute, the basic function of the institution is to undertake Islamic Research and instructions in Islam for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction of muslim society on a truly Islamic basis. On 24th December, 1963 the national Assembly changed the name of state back to the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" by the first constitutional amendment of the 1962 constitution. After amending, the constitution had provided for Muslims,

15. Parmatma Sharma, Political system of Pakistan (Meerut, 1967), pp.46-49.

individually and collectively to order their life in accordance with teachings and requirements of Islam. However, Islam has been given a place of pride and a special status in Pakistan. In both the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 (after first amendment), Pakistan has been proclaimed an Islamic state, yet it has never been a theocracy in the strict sense of religion which means government by the religious priests.

The 1962 constitution introduced a Presidential form of government paradoxically opposite to the 1956 constitution which provided parliamentary form of government, the real executive powers vested in the hands of President by the 1962 constitution. He was both the real and nominal head of the state. The 1962 constitution introduced Federal form of government. Article 1 says that Pakistan consists of the Provinces of East and West Pakistan. But these provinces had not been given the name 'state' as in the case of India. Like the 1956 constitution, the 1962 constitution also introduced three separate lists of federal, provincial and concurrent power. The 1956 constitution greatly extended the concurrent list, thus making the scope of provincial autonomy dependent upon federal policy. On the other hand, the 1962 constitution short listed the central powers and

transferred maximum powers to the provincial governments. In short, formal provincial autonomy in the sense of a federal division of powers has now been eliminated and the Central-Provincial relations had returned to normalcy. But the 1973 constitution satisfied more the interests of the provinces than the early two constitutions. The constitution of 1973 was characterised by such fundamental principles as a parliamentary republican system, federal state structure, proclamation of democracy which were the election manifesto demands of the Pakistan People's Party in 1970.¹⁶

When the Pakistan People's Party came to power on 20 December 1971, Pakistan faced an uncertain economic future. There were three main reasons for the bleak economic future. The industrial growth rate in Pakistan based basically on import substitution, had already begun to stagnate by the end of the second five year plan (1960-65) and the agricultural sector had at no stage ever seemed to overcome the pattern of low production and productivity, based upon a structure of agrarian property which combined the dominant semi-feudal form with fragmented small-scale proprietorship. Then the War with India in 1965 and the

16. *ibid.* pp.81-95.

protracted political turmoil (1968-69). The separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from the West Pakistan (now Pakistan) in 1971, aggravated the entire gamut of economic crisis.¹⁷ The disintegration of Pakistan led to number of co-related economic crisis. Firstly, it created a foreign exchange crisis, secondly, of commodity markets, thirdly of money supply generally and fourthly and finally disrupted the entire production and trade. Before, the division of Pakistan, export of tea and jute had earned most of the foreign exchange, after the division West Pakistan had to develop new alternative export commodities in order to earn foreign exchange, because, most of the jute and tea cultivated land had gone to East Pakistan. In the same way, East Pakistan had previously consumed 40 per cent of Pakistan's finished good, now West Pakistan had to find alternative market facilities for her finished goods but these finished goods could not be exported to the foreign markets due to their inherently uncompetitive character. For instance, by 1965, 84 per cent of Pakistani finished goods relied largely on protection and on an average, the Pakistani products were sold in the domestic market at prices 150 per cent higher than the prevailing world market prices. West Pakistan could not absorb these commodities

17. Tariq Ali, p.101.

which were previously absorbed by East Pakistan, because of the centralization of wealth combined with poverty, had severely curtailed the development of the home market. Thus, manufacturings had to decline drastically. Moreover, the Pakistani government spent around \$ 2 billion on the counter insurgency operations in Bangladesh, the War with India and the subsequent reorganization of the armed forces. Then, after independence, Bangladesh promptly nationalized the capital assets of West Pakistan which caused a severe setback for the monopoly houses of West Pakistanis like Adamjee, Dawood and Isphani whose investments were located there. These enormous losses and the bad shape of the economy needed a complete restructuring of the economy.¹⁸

The Pakistan People's Party under the leadership of Bhutto brought drastic changes in the country's economic and social institutions which was promised in the 1970 election manifesto. Under this uncertain and dim economic conditions, the new President (later Prime Minister) Bhutto proclaimed that socialism would be adopted as the economy of Pakistan; aimed at introducing a mixed economy in the country. Therefore, in January 1972, Bhutto's government nationalized 31 industrial

18. Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, ed. Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship (London, 1983), p.109.

units in ten basic categories.¹⁹ Those were iron and steel, heavy engineering, heavy electrical goods, electricity generation, gas etc. In the same year, the government nationalized 32 life insurance companies. In 1974, under the Banks Nationalization Act, almost all scheduled banks, which were major constituents of the banking sector, were nationalized. The government announced time and again, it was committed to a mixed economy rather than total socialization or nationalization of wealth.²⁰

In 1972, People's Party's government announced major land reforms. Under this land reforms, the ceiling on the land holding was lowered down to 12,000 PIUs (produce-index-units) or interms of irrigated and unirrigated lands was 150 acres and 300 acres respectively. PIUs, was defined interms of real production from the soil. In December 1976, the government introduced agricultural income tax, and land revenue as well as Sardari System²¹ were abolished. In 1977, the government brought another land reforms act in order to reduce the maximum holding of land to 100 acres interms of unirrigated land. Of course, the 1977 land reforms could

19. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 17 August 1973.

20. See for details, Eric, W. Gustafson, "Economic Reforms under Bhutto's Regime", Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol.8, July-October 1973, pp.241-58.

21. A system of extracting land tax by the Chief of Tribals in Baluchistan.

not be implemented due to the military coup in July 1977.

Aijaz Ahmad compared Bhutto's land reforms with the 1959 reforms announced by the military regime of Ayub Khan. In the reforms of 1959, only 2 million acres of land out of the total of 48.6 million acres were taken over by the government. But the government paid adequate compensation. After compensation, the landlords, thus lost only 4 per cent of their lands, half of what they turned over to the state consisted of waste land, hills, riverbeds, etc; less than 3 per cent of the peasantry benefitted from redistribution of land. On the other hand, under the land reforms of 1972, only 67,420 peasant households had received 660,000 acres of cultivable land under these reforms, on an average of roughly 10 acres per family. Here what was notable was the 1959's Ayub land reforms did not touch the revenue system. In November, 1975, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, PPP government brought reforms in the revenue structure, whereby, owners of up to 12 acres were exempted from all land revenue and rates were upwardly adjusted for the bigger landlords. In other words, 71 per cent of all proprietors would be fully exempted from government dues, 22 per cent would have paid the existing rates and the top 7 per cent had to pay additional Rs.153 million in revenue.

Aijaz Ahmad analysed three significant features in January 1977 land reforms which could not be implemented. Firstly, the ceiling on landholding was now brought down to 100 acres of irrigated and 200 acres of unirrigated land. Secondly, owners of up to 25 acres of land were now fully exempted from revenue payments which benefited around 91 per cent proprietors. Thirdly, agricultural income tax was introduced, for the first time in the Pakistan, for owners of over 25 acres of land.

A much more significant outcome of the nationalization of banks and insurance companies was that it gave good opportunity to the government to control the investment priorities, creation and distribution of credit and currency in circulation. On top of that, the nationalization of commercial banks led also to the expansion of banking; that to, primarily in the rural areas which benefited marginal and small farmers. We can see the rapid expansion in the rural credit which was granted by Agricultural Development Bank from the following table.

ADB Loans		(in millions of Rs.)				
Item	1971-71	72-73	73-74	74-75	75-76	
Tractors	370.41	430.65	1800.30	1390.54	2200.00	
Tubewells	180.41	260.42	510.33	860.67	---	
Other farm needs	130.53	470.25	1230.46	930.38	---	

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Thus, the nationalization and other agricultural measures led to increased utilization of farm machinery, better regulation of water supply, increased aggregate outputs, and higher productivity which rose around 50 per cent for rice, wheat and corn, the main staples.

The Pakistan People's Party had won the support of some of the workers' Unions in 1970 elections, on the basis of promises that included a substantial improvement in working conditions as well as substantial increase in the minimum wages. These promises also won endorsement from those elements

in the Party that considered labour reforms as essential steps towards improving the distribution of incomes in urban areas; therefore, the People's Party's government announced the comprehensive labour reforms in June 1972. The labour reforms greatly benefitted the workers either in monetary or non-monetary terms. Non-monetary benefits included contributions by the employers to pension, medical and welfare funds as well as worker's participation in some management decisions. Due to the reforms, the total cost around Rs.250 million had to be borne by the employers; that is to say, 12.5 per cent of the share of wages in the value of industrial output. At the time of 1972 labour reforms, only a quarter of industrial labour force worked in registered enterprises because they were registered by the Ministry of Labour as being responsible for following the labour legislation on the statute book. The definition used was that of the labour laws ordinance of 1964, according to those enterprises that employed ten or more persons or used power, of the 2.2 million persons employed in the manufacturing sector, some 570,000 worked in these registered enterprises. On the other hand, the 1972 labour reforms changed the entire definition of registered firms by reducing the threshold from ten to five workers. Thus, government's labour reforms

benefited large section of industrial workers in the urban areas.²³

Another important legislation that was taken by Bhutto's government was announcing the New Education Policy in 1972. The main thrust of the New Education Policy was to prepare Pakistan's educational sector for meeting the demands of a modern and dynamic society. The new policy on education placed special emphasis on the expansion and strengthening of technical training in a wide variety of fields, its main aim at private schools and colleges, its principle purpose was to bring these institutions under the control of state. By September 1972, around 175 private colleges were placed under the management of the provincial departments of education and private schools more numerous and diverse, were nationalized in a phased manner, completed by 1974.²⁴

Let us have a look at the situation that prevailed in the educational sector at the time that the Bhutto administration took office, only 43 per cent of children of school age were enrolled in schools. This meant that some 7 million children

23. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-77 (Delhi, 1980), pp.120-21.

24. See for details, Henry J.Korson, "Bhutto's Educational Reforms", Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol.8, July-October 1973, pp.179-306.

were not attending schools; out of these nearly 5 million were girls. The total expenditure in education was going into construction of buildings, staff and equipping institutions of higher education. These centres of advanced education were not making the best use of the resources being made available to them. This was causing deterioration in the quality of education. Bhutto's education policy had some success in catering to the aspirations of the urban poor. The policy called for a two phased programme to make education free and universal for all children up to the age of fifteen. During the first phase, which began in October 1972, education for all children up to the age of thirteen was made free but not compulsory. The second phase started in 1974 when the goal of compulsory education was to be finally achieved. Free education provided great relief to those parents who were prepared to send their children to schools but could not afford even the small fees that were charged by schools in the state system.

Another area where Pakistan People's Party's government brought reforms was the health sector. Before, the PPP came to power, the health sector was in a bad state. For instance, the rate of infant mortality was estimated at 120 per 1000 live births, the rate of mortality for children between the

ages of one and five at 25 per 1000; the rate of general mortality at 14 per 1000 of the population and life expectancy at birth of 54 years. If we compare this health standard with other developing countries particularly in South Asian Countries like India and Sri Lanka it was very low. As in the case of education, People's Party government announced a comprehensive public health care programme in August 1972 with a strong rural bias. The scheme was developed around the Basic Health Units which was to serve between 8000 to 15,000 people as a sub-unit of a larger Rural Health Centre. The significant feature of this health care programme was to make use of existing health workers in the place of fully trained doctors to provide basic coverage. The health care programme substantially improved the standards of health.²⁵

Coming to the external policy, Bhutto's regime followed the foreign policy known as "interdependence" and "bilateralism" as a guiding principles in international affairs.²⁶ Other central features of Bhutto's foreign policy were, third world mobilisation through the creation of a new economic order, criticism of nuclear proliferations and establishment of

25. Shahid Jave Burki, pp.120-30.

26. See for details, Lawrence Ziring, "Bhutto's Foreign Policy", Journal of Asia and African Studies vol.8, July-October 1973, pp.216-40.

special relations with the Muslim countries of the world on the basis of " Pan Islamism ".²⁷ These value postulates notwithstanding the operational aspects of Bhutto's foreign policy was not very different from that in the past; because he followed Pakistan's long standing bias with regarding India and Afghanistan. Despite, his bitter criticism of foreign interference in the developing countries, Bhutto himself relied on foreign powers for economic and military assistance and Bhutto showed definite leanings in external affairs towards " Pan.Islamism ". Thus he formulated the foreign policy depending primarily on how, far it suited his objective to consolidate internal policies and economic stability of Pakistan.²⁸ Precisely for this, he always suspected India as a potential threat to the existence of Pakistan. Right from the Simla Agreement (July 1972) to Indo-Pak agreement (14 May 1975) for the resoration of full diplomatic relations, the spirit of coexistence did not take deep roots. As his predecessors, he also continued to project the Kashmir issue as a bone of contention between the two

27. Surendra Nath Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan, with Special reference to Rise and Fall of Bhutto (Jaipur, 1985), pp.61-62.

28. See for details, Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London, 1969).

countries in order to create a favourable public opinion and to dilute political opposition at home.²⁹ Bhutto signed the Simla Agreement in 1972 in order to get the release of Pakistan's 93,000 POWs, interned in India to pacify the Punjabis and Sindhis because most of the prisoners of war belonged to these regions and the withdrawal of Indian troops from the occupied areas of Pakistan.

Bhutto's regime persisted with seeking better and special relations with Muslim Countries of the world except with Afghanistan. The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan remained tense and strained on the question of self-determination of Pakhtoons' residing in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, and Durand Line (1893) which divides Pakistan and the Afghanistan. Bhutto talked about self-determination of Jammu and Kashmir people but at the same time, he did not accept the right to self-determination of the Pakhtoons. Afghanistan strongly supported the separate pathan State in the NWFP.³⁰

In the constitution of 1973 which was promulgated by Bhutto, Article 40 specifically mentioned that Pakistan would

29. Dawn, 6 September 1976.

30. See for details, Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (New Delhi, 1978), Chapter 7 & 8.

strive for the preservation and strengthening of fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on "Islamic-unity and brotherhood". That is why, Bhutto's regime held a Islamic summit in 1974 at Lahore which gave considerable popularity to Bhutto and his party PPP, in Arab countries in particular and Islamic world in general. By reaffirming Pakistan's commitment to the CENTO, Bhutto had developed close political, economic and cultural relations with Iran and Turkey. Pakistan's relations with the Arab countries, provided massive economic assistance, by 1975, the economic assistance was around \$ 1,000 million.³¹

Bhutto's regime succeeded in developing balanced relations with the two super powers and other major powers with the phobia of India's hegemony in South Asian region in general and the Sub-continent in particular. It was true, during the 1965 war with India, USA did not give substantial and decisive military hardware to Pakistan but during the 1971 war, the role of America was much more specific; sale of armament rose to about \$ 82 million even before lifting the arms embargo (in 1975) which forced Bhutto to lean towards China and France for military and economic assistance and

31. Dawn, 4 March 1976.

compelled him to go for nuclear reprocessing plant (1976) from France. Moreover, during the Bhutto period, Pakistan and China relations became more cordial than ever before. Pakistan heavily relied on Chinese military and economic assistance, it also got maximum support regarding political issues and in 1971 China agreed to provide Rs. 1,000 million of free loan for developing projects in addition to Rs. 540 million pledged in the past to Pakistan. At Bhutto's request, China also agreed to cancel a \$ 110,000,00 debt growing out of the 1965 Indo-Pak War.³² Thus, China helped Pakistan not only to make up the War losses suffered during the 1971 but also to build up capacity for increasing arms production and in modernization of Pakistan's government which played a significant role in formulating and implementing domestic policy and also gave a fresh and realistic perspective to Pakistan's foreign policy.³³

However, Pakistan People's Party failed to retain what it gained from the people after five and a half years . There were a number of reasons for failing to retain and sustain what it gained from the people. Let us see from the socio-economic point of view, how the People's Party government

32. Surendra Nath Kaushik, pp.66-69.

33. See for details, Shirin, Tahir-Kheli, "Foreign Policy of New Pakistan", Orbis, vol.20, February 1976. pp.733-59.

policies affected people. Before coming to power, the PPP and its leader Bhutto cultivated himself as an anti-imperialist, but after coming to the power he made an extensive compromise with the imperialist forces in order to survive in power by accepting an IMF package which included, 130 per cent devaluation of Pakistani currency, lifting of import restrictions for over 300 commodities, exemption of foreign capital from nationalization and usurious capital to the extent that Pakistan's debts doubled in the next four years.³⁴

The outcome of the 1972 reforms was to push the large landlords towards a more active interest in capitalist farming. Cash crops became immensely profitable and many landlords began to eject tenants and replace them with hired labour. Even conservative observers have criticised Bhutto for strengthening the big landlords at the expense of the kulaks. The real political and economic significance of the 1972 measures was that it resulted in the vertical integration of the agricultural sector in the sense that the landed aristocracy now had a share not only in producing a sizable part of the output traded in the market, but also in the marketing, processing and distribution of the output.

34. Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, p.101.

The fact that the 1972 land reforms were utterly inadequate was to be admitted by the PPP regime itself five years later. In January 1977, a further series of reforms were announced. Since this was election year, the reforms had a dual functions. They were more radical, in order to convince those in the lower strata of rural Pakistan that the seemingly immutable pyramid of power was to be altered; the decisive instruments for implementing change were left in the hands of the administration.

The Pakistan People's Party government failed to destroy the grip of landlordism, either in rural Pakistan or in national politics, this constituted a rank betrayal of those whose votes had elected it to office. When the PPP came to power in 1972, infant mortality was among the highest in Asia (120 per 1000 live births). In 1977, the figure had not undergone even the slightest alteration. The bulk of the country's population was rural, there had been no qualitative change in their lives since 1947, despite frequent changes in government, military dictatorships and now the People's government.³⁵

35. Tariq Ali, pp.103-5.

The introduction of machinery in agriculture had further aggravated the crisis of rural unemployment and Pakistan had generated an exodus of workers, artisans and bankrupt farmers to the oil rich Gulf countries, taking with them the whole infrastructure of skills which the Pakistani People took decades to develop. Some estimates suggest that by mid-1977 as many as 8,000 of these wage earners were leaving Pakistan every week.

As a result of the 1972 Labour Reforms, the small entrepreneurs found that they were now subjected not only to the new legislation that was being introduced, but also to a number of other regulations concerning labour welfare. It was argued that the cost of conforming to the new labour regulations would be much greater for small owners than for large enterprises. The smaller units were being included in the category of registered enterprises for the first time and as such they would have to rebuild their functions in order to conform to the health and environmental standards prescribed in the legislations that had hitherto not applied to them. Thus, the labour reforms got resentment from the small industrial owners who once were the strong electoral base of People's Party. Now they felt, alienated from profit,

withdrawing their support to Bhutto's government. The urban middle classes were clearly dissatisfied with the PPP government's inability to meet their demands for an improvement in health facilities. In the case of education, the government had nationalized schools that were meeting the middle classes requirements for quality education, but in the case of health, the private institutions, catering mostly to the high-income groups and out of reach of the middle classes, were left untouched. The lack of symmetry in these approaches was clearly perceived by the groups that were adversely affected and contributed towards their disenchantment with the PPP government.³⁶

Nationalization of companies in the more important basic industries, government take over of the insurance and banking industries, labour reforms, establishment of public sector, control over private schools and colleges have strong urban bias. By these measures of Bhutto's regime, only small section of the people benefited whose political weight was not as great as that of the groups which did not benefit or suffered.³⁷ Thus, the combined strength of industrial labour in the large

36. Shahi Javed Burki, p.121.

37. *ibid.* pp.133-35.

manufacturing sector, the recipients of credit from the financial institutions now under PPP government control and college teachers were considerably less than that of the small-sized industrial entrepreneurs who had to bear the cost of labour reforms, the urban middle classes who were not denied opportunities for obtaining quality education and the urban classes who demanded for improvement of the health system was not satisfied. Serious repercussions of socio-economic measures of Bhutto's regime became visible in the 1977 elections.

Moreover, throughout his tenure, Bhutto assailed the opposition and held them responsible for Pakistan's disintegration in 1971 and Bhutto resorted to coercive and repressive tactics towards the opposition instead of following a democratic approach of competitive politics and of implementing policies of welfare and development. It was not merely that he belittled the opposition on the specific issues, his whole approach towards the opposition parties was that of intolerance and vilification. Through various statutory laws, emergency regulations and constitutional amendments, Bhutto succeeded in suppressing the opposition at the level of national politics. His parliamentary, democratic rule, such as it was turned out to be not very

much different from the military authoritarianism of his immediate predecessors Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan.³⁸ Thus, some of the policies pursued by Pakistan People's Party (PPP) caused its own downfall in 1977.

38. Surendra Nath Kaushik, Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership (New Delhi, 1985), pp.116-17.

CHAPTER - IV

PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE

CHAPTER - 4

PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced on 7th January, 1977, that general elections for National Assembly will be held on 7th March, and on 10th March for the Provincial Assemblies, the National Assembly would be dissolved on 10th January. The President dissolved the National Assembly as scheduled. After the dissolution of National Assembly, in a surprise move, the nine opposition parties announced their intention to form a new opposition alliance called Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which in fact, came into existence on 11th January, 1977 to contest the elections at the national and provincial level. The nine party Pakistan National Alliance comprised of the Muslim League (Pagaro), Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat-ulema-i-Islam, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Pakistan Democratic Party, the National democratic Party, Khaskar Tehrik and Muslim Conference.¹

Before, further analysis of the 1977 election, it would be pertinent to have a look at the postulates which

1. Surendra Nath Kaushik, Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership (New Delhi, 1985), pp.264-65.

led Bhutto to take the decision to hold the first general elections under the 1973 constitution which was formulated by his government.

When he announced land reforms in 1977 (which aimed to reduce maximum holding of land to 100 acres of irrigated and 200 acres in case of unirrigated land), the announcement received not a whimper of protest from the land-lords. The absence of protest from the landlords was an indication of the fact that very few people were prepared to challenge Bhutto and his party in the forth-coming elections and Pakistan did not have any viable alternative to the Pakistan People's Party.

There were, of course, good reasons which prompted Bhutto to seek another mandate. In early 1976, the economic scenario seemed very encouraging. For instance, the rate of inflation which averaged 25 per cent per annum from 1973-75 had declined to a mere 6 per cent in 1976.² The agricultural sector came out of prolonged stagnation, the agricultural output had increased significantly in 1976, the wheat production recorded around 8.6 million tons.

2. See for details, M. Weinbaum, "The 1977 Elections in Pakistan where Everybody Lost", Asian Survey, vol.17, 1 July 1977, pp.598-618.

Due to the good performance of the agricultural sector, the GNP significantly increased from the sluggish 2 per cent of the period 1972-75 to nearly 4 per cent during 1975-76.³ The large number of skilled and semi-skilled workers who had migrated to the oil rich Gulf Countries began to remit their earnings to their families back in Pakistan. This remittance amounted to \$ 500 million of the total foreign exchange earnings of Pakistan.

With this, 1976 came to a close, the economic situation looked very encouraging to Bhutto and his People's Party with some good reason for rushing into another mandate. But the economic measures which were introduced by PPP's government, adversely affected in the long term. The inability of the large and growing public sector to generate from within the resources required for investment, the persistence of higher deficit financing, the deterioration in the ratio of capital to output, the high rate of unemployment particularly in the educated youth, the failure of the rate of fertility to decline from high levels despite heavy investment by the state in the family planning programmes. All these created difficult economic situation during the

3. Anwar H.Syed, "Pakistan in 1976: Business as usual", Strategi Digest vol.7, April 1977, pp.58-66.

election (1977). Not only these structural difficulties, it had also to face a series of unanticipated setbacks in the public sector. Three large government owned cement factories had to shutdown because of mechanical problems which led to a decline of 5 per cent in the total cement production which affected the construction of industries and caused a 50 per cent rise in the price of cement and rendered a lot of workers jobless.⁴

Thus, the economy had performed well in 1976; but it was not expected to do well in 1977 the election year chosen by Bhutto. On 30th June, 1977 the government announced the economic performance five days before the military assumed power, which showed the worst phase of Bhutto's five and half years period. This could be seen through the following table.

Growth rates at constant 1959/60 factor cost (annual rate %)

	1971-72	72-73	73-74	74-75	75-76	76-77
G D P	0.95	7.03	6.84	1.94	3.80	0.83
Agriculture	3.47	1.67	4.18	-2.12	4.45	3.26
Industry	-1.86	9.45	6.63	-0.59	0.18	-0.91
Services	5.05	5.23	5.45	5.65	5.74	-2.94

Source: Computed from Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1976-77 (Islamabad, Finance Division, 1977), Table 5, pp.10-11, Statistical Annex.

4. Shanid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-77 (London, 1980) pp.175-76.

The above table indicated that the output of the industrial sector had declined by 1 per cent. There was a 3 per cent decline in the growth rate of the service sector which showed tremendous performance in 1974-75. Agricultural production also declined from 4.45 to 3.26 per cent in 1977. In 1977, the rise in GNP was less than one per cent which was 3.80 per cent in the year 1976. Since the population had grown by 3 per cent, the average income had declined by more than 2 per cent. This was the real economic situation during the year of election.⁵

The downward trend of the economy was politically very significant in the election year. The adverse reaction to the government's measure of nationalization of wheat, rice and cotton processing units had caused a great deal of resentment among the small businessmen. The sharp decline in the output of lint cotton and the failure of the textile owners to modernize their units led to severe recession in the textile industry. For the first time in the industrial history of Pakistan, the number of hired workers declined drastically and also registered deep decline in the output of cloth and yarn from 550 to 440 million

5. *ibid.* p.177.

square metres which caused for higher rate of inflation in basic commodities. With these economic conditions, the small businessmen, marginal and small farmers, and industrial labour who supported Bhutto and PPP in 1970 elections now found themselves being badly hurt by Bhutto's economic policies.⁶ Some of them were hurt by the rise in the prices of basic commodities, some of them were hurt by the inability of the government to provide them with employment they needed, and for which they had trained, some of them were hurt by a sharp decline in their profits from their small enterprises.

In this economic scenerio, with exception of the urban poor, all the other groups joined the nine opposition parties viz. Pakistan National Alliance and later caused the ousting of Bhutto from power. Ignoring this economic reality. Bhutto announced the date for general elections, being confident of getting support from the classes who had either benefited from the various socio-economic and political measures taken by the PPP government or who were attracted to him because of his remarkable charisma. And he was also very confident that his opponents would not

6. *ibid.* p.178.

be able to put together an organization that could effectively oppose the Pakistan People's Party in the coming elections. Therefore, he announced the dates for general and provincial elections.

The nomination papers were filed on 19th and 22nd of January, 1977 for the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies respectively.⁷ After the scrutinization of the nomination papers, it was found that the Pakistan People's Party had secured 17 National Assembly Seats and 39 Provincial Assemblies seats unopposed.⁸ Here what is noticeable was that Bhutto was also declared elected unopposed from Larkana (Sind) constituency which caused a big controversy. Pakistan National Alliance challenged Bhutto's unopposed election and alleged the PPP government for kidnapping their candidate Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi. Thus, prevented him from filing his nomination papers. These allegations of kidnapping and arrest of the PNA candidates were suppressed.

On 24th January, 1977, Bhutto announced the People's Party election manifesto⁹ promising wide-ranging socio-

7. The Pakistan Times, 11 January 1977.

8. ibid. 5 & 6 January 1977.

9. See for details, Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan-the Campaign before the Storm", Asian Survey, vol.17 no.7, July 1977, pp.581-98.

economic welfare measures and a strong defence mechanism, if it was voted back to power.¹⁰ The election manifesto promised self-reliance in steel, petroleum, fertilizers and wheat, 50 per cent increase in the national production. It promised to contain the menace of inflation. It rededicated itself to the four fundamental principles of Pakistan People's Party (which have been already mentioned in the first chapter) and also promised job opportunities for the unemployed youth and housing facilities for the weaker sections of the society both in rural and urban sectors. On the other hand, the Pakistan National Alliance released its manifesto which clearly expounded Islamic orthodoxy. It stated that all laws must conform to the teachings of the Quran and the Sunna. In foreign policy, it promised a strict neutral foreign policy and if it were voted to power it will quit the CENTO. The election manifesto declared its dissatisfaction with the 1966 Tashkent Declaration and 1972 Simla Agreement with India. Moreover, its manifesto promised the introduction of Zakart (Islamic Tax), denationalization of industries.

10. Bhutto stated "we in the past five years restructured the economy and from this will follow, in the next five years, a qualitative improvement in the living standards of our people. This manifesto is inspired by the idealism with which we launched the movement against dictatorship and the capitalist system and balanced by realism derived from experience", Dawn 25 January 1977.

With this clear cut election manifesto, the PNA entered into the electoral battle. The president of National Alliance alleged severe irregularities in the scrutinising of nomination papers and demanded the election commission to deploy the army to supervise and ensure a free and fair elections.

The entire election campaign, lasting two months caused estrangement between the ruling Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan National Alliance. In this violent climate, the elections were held for National Assembly on March 7, 1977. Results indicated a sweeping victory for the People's Party over the PNA. The People's Party bagged 155 seats out of 200 seats.¹¹ The PNA bagged only 38 seats, Independents captured 8 seats and one seat had gone in favour of Pakistan Muslim League (Q).¹²

11. See for details, Salamat Ali, "Bhutto Bandwagon Rolls Again", Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 March 1977, pp.8-9.

12. Dawn, 9 March 1977.

The party position was as follows:

Party Position in the National Assembly.

	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
Seats	116	43	34	17	200
P.P.P	108	32	8	7	155
P.N.A	8	11	17	-	36
P.M.L (Q)	-	-	1	-	1
Independents	-	-	8	-	8

Source: Dawn, 9 March 1977.

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Due to the severe setback in the National Assembly elections, Pakistan National Alliance boycotted provincial elections which were held on 10th March, 1977. The boycott of Provincial elections by Pakistan National Alliance facilitated a sweeping victory for the Pakistan People's Party in the provinces also. Thus, the People's Party capture 437 seats out of 460 seats of the four provinces. Two seats had gone in favour of PML (Q), 17 seats had gone in favour of independents and one to JUI (Hazafui group), What is interesting here was that People's Party

bagged cent per cent of seats in the Sind Province and secured majority of seats in the rest of the provinces.¹⁴

Let us have a look at the positions of the various political parties in the provincial Assemblies.

Party positions in the four Provincial Assemblies.

	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
Seats	240	100	80	40	460
P.P.P	232	100	71	34	437
P.N.A	---	---	---	--	---
PML (Q)	---	---	2	--	2
Independents	7	---	5	5	17
JUI (Hazarvi)	-	---	1	--	1

Source: Morning News, 12 & 13 March, 1977.

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But the Pakistan National Alliance, rejected the National Assembly elections and alleged that the People's Party rigged the elections and demanded free and fair elections.¹⁶ This allegation caused a serious setback

14. Surendra Nath Kaushi, Politics in Pakistan with special Reference to Rise and Fall of Bhutto (Jaipur, 1985) pp.94-95.

15. Surendra Nath Kaushi, Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership (New Delhi, 1985), p.271.

16. Morning News, 12 & 13 March 1977.

to Bhutto's image. The PNA urged its elected representatives in the National Assembly to resign and demanded fresh elections under the supervision of army and made a condition that for any free and fair election Bhutto's resignation was necessary and the constituting of an interim government. On the other hand, the People's Party leader initially described the election rigging charges as baseless and completely false and claimed that People's Party won the popular support in a free and fair elections. Bhutto ruled out any fresh elections while addressing the nation on television. In view of growing violence, on 12th March, 1977, Bhutto offered a dialogue with PNA leaders to sort out their greivances if at all any thing genuine was there. The Pakistan National Alliance leaders wondered at Bhutto's offer for dialogue. The moderates like Maulana Mufti Mahmud of PNA agreed for a dialogue with Bhutto, but the radicals of PNA insisted on not holding any dialogue with Bhutto's regime. Nevertheless, the PNA opposed Bhutto's offer and continued their demand for Bhutto's resignation and free and fresh elections.

Here it is very pertinent to see the background for PNA agitation. The struggle between PPP and the PNA in

Pakistan had reached the inexorable climax of tragedy. The reasons for the tragedy however, lay embedded in the very foundations of Pakistan's political system. After assuming power, the PPP had to face two challenges. First challenge was regionalism, the problem was complex because Punjab has over 60 per cent of the population and therefore, dominated the political life of Pakistan. But the provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP were politically sensitive because their involvement in the unresolved Pakhtoonistan issue and their geographical and ethnic proximity to Afghanistan. The PPP had no place in these provinces where National Awami Party predominated. These seeds of conflict existed due to the way the power was distributed.

The second and more acute challenge which the PPP government faced was the disparate nature of the PPP itself. The Party emerged as a movement opposing Ayub Khan. Although the PPP secured overwhelming victory in 1970 elections, it was organizationally chaotic. To weld the PPP into a political machine was another formidable task.

The manner in which Bhutto handled the regional challenges and PPP organizational problem gave an indication

of his attitude towards the governance of the country. His approach to the Baluchi problem was particularly instructive. A genuine effort was made to usher in social changes despite feudal opposition. The age-old Sardari and begari systems were abolished and private jails done away with. But little was done to attract industries and capital into that province to improve its economy and achieve greater national integration. Moreover, the dismissal of democratically elected NAP-JUI government and the opposition boycott of the elections in Baluchistan exacerbated the political situation in the Pakistan. Whatever the reasons, Bhutto and his party failed to achieve the integration of Baluchistan and NWFP into the body politics of Pakistan.

Bhutto's failure to counter regionalism and forge the PPP into a political instrument was compounded by his authoritarian forms of dissent. His authoritarianism revealed itself in five different ways.

Firstly, the PPP government was brought to heel by an arbitrary scheme of removals and arrests. Mubashir Husan was removed from the Mubashir cabinet in October 1974 and later Mohammad Harif Ramay was sentenced to four

and a half years' imprisonment by a special tribunal.¹⁷
The charges against Ramay had a familiar but unconvincing ring. They included causing disaffection among the armed forces and inviting hatred and contempt against the democratically elected government.

Secondly, the manner in which, Bhutto shuffled PPP members in order to prevent the growth of any alternative foci of influence. The manner in which power was shifted between Harif Ramay and Ghulam Mustafa Kher in Punjab was an noticeable example.

Thirdly, government in both the provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP were undemocratically dismissed. Rather than seeking compromise a uniformity was sought to be imposed disregarding popular sentiments.

Fourthly, the civilian bureaucracy was totally demoralised by the whimsical policy of dismissals and retirements. Lateral entry of political personages was widely resorted to, whereby Bhutto's hold on the bureaucracy was further strengthened.

17. Mubashar Hasan was one of the founder members of the PPP. Mohammad Harif Ramay was a prominent member of the PPP in Punjab and its former Chief Minister of Punjab.

Fifthly, after assuming power, Bhutto replaced many senior army officers and later purges served to consolidate his hold over them. Bhutto promoted a Junior Lt. General Ziaul Haq as chief of the army staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was revived under new chairman Lt. General Sharif from the Army, emphasizing, thereby, the predominance of the major service over the Navy and Air Force. At the same time, Tikka Khan was elevated as special Assistant for National Security to Bhutto. Yusuf Buch was appointed as special Assistant for Defence with Aziz Ahmed as Minister for Defence. This created an in-comprehensible working hierarchy in such a way that the forces would be unable to exert their influence unitedly on the PPP government.

The exercise of authoritarian control over the Political system led Bhutto to institutionalize the suppression of dissent. Instances of intimidation, even assassination of opposition leaders increased.

In these circumstances it was, perhaps, inevitable that protest would emerge in formless, violent manner. The opposition parties focussed on the proximate issue of poll rigging. But there were deep-rooted reasons for the opposition agitation, stemming from Bhutto's authoritarianism

and suppression of dissent. The protest represented a bursting of the dykes of popular resentment. A similar sequence of events led to the overthrow of Ayub Khan and later, Yahya Khan.¹⁸

Let us look back to the PNA agitation. On 14th March, 1977 the alliance decided to launch protest rallies all over the country for their twin demands. Firstly, resignation by Bhutto and members of election commission and reconstitution of election commission. Secondly, arrangement of fresh and free elections under the supervision of army and judiciary. The protest rallies led to massive violence and clashed with the armed forces which took a lot of a lives. In order to contain the violence, on 19th March, 1977 Bhutto announced the imposition of curfew in trouble-torn towns after having arrested important PNA leaders. The PNA carried on with demonstrations inspite of the presence of heavy security personnel everywhere. On 11th April, the PNA gave a call for civil disobedience to protest against the rigging in the 7th March, general elections. The Pakistan National Alliance leaders called upon the citizens

18. F.R. Chari, "Dynamics of the Pakistan Revolt", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.1, no.3, June 1977, pp.5-9.

not to pay taxes to the government, withdraw their bank deposits, not to buy rail tickets and other transport tickets. Therefore, the civil disobedience movement drew large crowds which shook Bhutto's regime. On 13th April, Bhutto agreed to dissolve the National Assembly, if the Pakistan National Alliance wins two-third of seats in the provincial assemblies, which was again rejected by PNA. The General Council of PNA gave another call for holding mass demonstrations on 19th April. In order to counter this mass demonstration, the People's Party also gave a call for demonstrations on April 18. But Bhutto's efforts were in vain to control the PNA demonstrations on the proposed date which had strong backing of 26 labour organization and several student organizations.¹⁹

After having failed to contain the PNA violence Bhutto's regime imposed Martial Law in major cities like Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad on 12th April, which was later extended to Lyallpur.²⁰ In spite of the imposition of Martial Law,

19. Surendra Nath Kaushi, p.276.

20. According to the government press release, "the Martial Law had been imposed because internal disturbances posed a grave danger to Pakistan's integrity and all efforts to solve the political problems by legal and constitutional bent on creating anarchy in the country". The Pakistan Times, 22 & 23 April 1977.

the business centre closed on the call given by the PNA for the nation wide strike on 22nd April,²¹ On 23rd April, the PNA leaders decided to meet the Chief of the army, general Zia-ul-Haq to explain that the imposition of Martial Law was a part of wider conspiracy against the people and the army. Before, the leaders of PNA met the chief of the army, Bhutto's government arrested them and prevented them from meeting the chief of the army. The General Council of the PNA adopted a resolution on 25th April, condemning proclamation of Martial Law to "protect the illegal and unconstitutional government of Bhutto".²²

On 5th May, 1977, the moderate leaders of Pakistan National Alliance, announced a 32-Point Plan for resolution of constitutional deadlock which was divided into two phases. In the first phase, they demanded the lifting of Martial Law, release of the detained PNA leaders, giving more time to opposition on Radio and T.V. and end to press censorship. In the second phase, the PNA leaders demanded the dissolution of National Assembly, resignation of Bhutto and holding

21. Dawn, 20 April 1977.

22. Surendra Nath Kaushik, p.278.

free and fair elections for National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies simultaneously. Moreover, complete restructuring of the election commission, appointment of acceptable governors in the provinces and supervision of the elections by the army personnels. Meanwhile, Bhutto suggested to the PNA to have a vote of confidence through a nation-wide referendum to prove wrong the opposition claim that the People's Party no longer commands popular support which would decide, whether Bhutto should continue as a Prime Minister or stepdown.²³ The General Council of the Pakistan National Alliance accused Bhutto of "foisting one party hegemony and condemned the referendum move as a fraud upon fraud".²⁴

The People's Party and National Alliance resumed negotiations on June 3rd, 1977 in order to resolve the three months long political crisis. On the demand of PNA, Bhutto's regime ordered the release of 2,000 PNA workers including top PNA leaders, and Martial Law was lifted. In the process of negotiations, Bhutto agreed for fresh elections. In a joint-statement, the PPP and PNA declared on June 15, 1977, that "they had agreed on a date and arrangements for the fresh general elections, putting an

23. The Times of India, 6 May 1977.

24. ibid. 15 May 1977.

end to the country's three month old political crisis". A two member committee was set up on June 15th, by the PPP and PNA to work out details of the basic issues of the agreement. On June 18th, 1977, the government spokesman announced that fresh elections will be held in first week of October. On July 2nd, the government representatives and PNA representatives held a final round of negotiations and agreed over technical aspects of the elections. The representatives of PNA Ghafor Ahmed placed the agreement in the General Council of PNA, the extreme wing led by Air Marshal Asghar Khan refused to sign the approval of the agreement owing to Bhutto's amendments in the original agreement reached between the PPP and PNA. Bhutto accused the PNA of violating the agreement which was signed by the government and PNA representatives. Thus, the PNA and PPP government failed to resolve the three-month old political turmoil.²⁵

On July 5th, 1977 Chief of the army staff General Zia-ul-Haq deposed Prime Minister Bhutto and replaced the civil administration by the Martial Law administration. General Zia-ul-Haq in his first address to the nation on television stated that the times needed military intervention

25. Surendra Nath Kaushik, p.281.

in order to save the interest of the people and country.²⁶ Let us look at various factors which led to this military coup. The bloodless coup of 1977 was not unexpected, but was on the cards ever since Bhutto tookover the civil administration in 1971, due to thorough purges and periodic overhauling of the military setup, Bhutto's moves, not only adversely affected the morale of military leaders but also diluted their faith in the civilian leadership. PPP government largely depended on the army regarding the administration of NWFP and Baluchistan and imposition of Martial Law in order to contain the PNA agitation which provided a great opportunity to the army top brass to regain its self-confidence which was seriously affected in the 1971 War. Declaration of Martial Law in April 1977 in four major cities served as a dress-rehearsal for army personnel for the future take over of the civilian administration. The three month long political turmoil where the PPP and PNA were involved, helped the army top brass to take over the civilian administration. The Pakistan National Alliance called for dissolution of National Assembly and holding fresh and free general elections under the supervision of armed forces which highlighted the reliability and honesty

26. The Times of India, 6 July 1977.

of the army by none else but the political leaders themselves. All these precedents encouraged the army top brass to recapture the political power, And, in this context, it was none else but Bhutto's chosen army Chief who betrayed him ultimately.

After the imposition of Martial Law on July 5th, 1977 in Pakistan, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia-ul-Haq arrested important political leaders of PNA and PPP including Bhutto and stated that these leaders were taken in protective custody and suspended the 1973 constitution and guaranteed the citizens of Pakistan that fresh elections to the National Assembly would be held by October 1977. On 6th July, General Zia released two important religious leaders of PNA viz. Pir pagaro (Pakistan Muslim League) and Main Tufail Mahammad (Jamaat-e-Islami) from "protective custody".²⁷ Soon after their release they demanded an open trial of Bhutto before any free and fresh elections to the National Assembly. Newly appointed Chief Election Commissioner, justice Mushtaq Hussain announced on August 1st that the fresh elections will be held on October 18th, for both the National and Provincial Assemblies.²⁸ Nomination papers were filled during August 8 to 18, The Chief Martial Law

27. *ibid.* 2 & 20 August 1977.

28. The Pakistan Times, 22 August 1977.

Administration had ordered to release Bhutto and other prominent political leaders from the protective custody on July 28th. Bhutto announced his party's decision to contest the forthcoming elections, on August 3rd. Later he filed his nomination papers from three National Assembly constituencies viz. Lahore (Punjab) Larkana and Thatta (Sind). At the same time, General Zia appointed an enquiry committee against different institutions and officials of the former (Pakistan People's Party) government. Zia ordered a full fledged enquiry into charges of corruption and misuse of power by the officials during Bhutto's regime.²⁹

After being released from the protective custody, Bhutto started touring and addressing public meetings, when Zia realised the wide spread popular support Bhutto was regaining steadily, the military top brass and prominent rightist PNA leaders feared Bhutto's comeback in the promised October elections. So, the PNA members insisted upon Bhutto's trial before the general elections on the charges ranging from corruption and misuse of power to political murders which were under investigation. On the other hand, the PPP and its leader Bhutto cautioned

29. The Statesman, 1 September 1977.

the Chief Martial Law administrator on August 31, 1977, that any attempt to postpone the promised elections would deepen and accentuate the political turmoil.

The Federal investigation Agency arrested Bhutto on September 3rd, for alleged involvement in the murder of Nawab Ahmed Khan father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, member of National Assembly. The Director General of Federal Security Force, Masud Mahmmod accused Bhutto of ordering him to kill Ahmed Raza Kasuri in an ambush in which Nawab Ahmed Khan was killed instead of Raza Kasuri in 1974.³⁰ In the last week of July, 1977, Raza Kasuri had lodged a FIR in Lahore High Court against Bhutto for his direct involvement in the killing of his father. The Lahore High Court granted a bail to Bhutto on September 13th, 1977. Again on September 17, Bhutto was rearrested only two days before the starting of the election campaign.³¹ Begam Nusrat Bhutto filed a habeas corpus petition in the Pakistani Supreme Court challenging the detention of her husband and ten of the co-accused. Chief Martial Law Administrator questioned the Supreme Court Jurisdiction and publisized alleged proofs showing Bhutto's involvement



30. The Times of India, 14 & 18 September 1977.

31. Surendra Nath Kaushik, p.290.

in number of illegal and subversive activities. Meanwhile, General Zia-ul-Haq removed the Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court and appointed Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq who was close to him. The newly appointed Chief Justice refused to dismiss the murder charges filed against Bhutto. Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia announced on October 1st, 1977, that the general elections would be held on October 18th and banned all political activities throughout the country. At the same time, he announced that Bhutto and co-accused would be tried in open civilian courts rather than by military courts.

Bhutto's first trial started on October 11th, 1977, at the Lahore High Court. After a protracted five month trial, the High Court found Bhutto guilty and sentenced him to death on March 18, 1978.³² Thus, the five member bench of Lahore High Court convicted Bhutto and four of the ten co-accused awarding them death penalty. The Court also ordered payment of a sum of Rs.25,000 as compensation to the family of the man killed.³³

32. Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A political Biography, pp. 179-83.

33. Surendra Nath Kaushik, p.293.

Bhutto filed an appeal before the Pakistani Supreme Court. In May 1978, a nine-member bench which was later reduced to seven members began hearing Bhutto's appeal. After nine months of prolonged proceedings the Supreme Court upheld the Lahore High Court judgement on awarding the death sentence to Bhutto and four co-accused namely Muhammad Abbas (Director Operations and Intelligence), Ghulam Mustafa (Inspector), Arshad Iqbal (Sub-Inspector), and Rana Iftikar Ahmed (assistant sub-Inspector). Later, Bhutto filed a review petition which was unanimously rejected by the seven member Supreme Court bench on March 24, 1979.³⁴ However, Bhutto did not appeal for executive clemency since that would have meant admission of guilt. Despite, the number of national and international appeals for granting clemency to Bhutto, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia-ul-Haq chose to put his seal of approval on the sentence of execution. The sentence was carried out at 2 a.m. on 4th April, 1979 in Rawalpindi Central Jail.³⁵

34. The Pakistan Times, 25 March 1979.

35. The Times of India, 5 April 1979.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION .

CHAPTER - 5

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the Pakistan People's Party 1971-77, reveals certain achievements and failures. The Pakistan People's Party is one of the largest political party in Pakistan. It came to power with an overwhelming victory in the 1970 general elections. It reveals that the Pakistan People's Party came to power when the political parties including Muslim League, failed to stand up to the aspirations of the people. The Muslim League disintegrated soon after the demise of its leaders M.A.Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. The other parties were mostly regional in character. After the Muslim League the only party which can be credited with an equivalent, if not wider mass base, was the Pakistan People's Party. The Pakistan People's Party emerged due to the repressive nature of the Ayub Khan regime in the late 1960s.¹ His repressive measures affected students, workers, middle classes.² These sections of people turned up in solid

1. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan (New York, 1971), p.10-30.

2. Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi, 1970), p.306.

strength for the Pakistan People's Party in early 1970s. In spite of that, the PPP electoral victory was primarily confined to the areas of industrial development and agricultural prosperity.³ The Pakistan People's Party also obtained much higher electoral support in districts that were relatively more urbanised and literate.⁴ The Pakistan People's Party's mass appeal, was mainly due to its efforts under the leadership of Z.A. Bhutto to transfer the political power from the elite to the masses. The absence of any other strong mass based political party further strengthened the position of the PPP.

When the PPP came to power in 1971 the country was facing a serious socio-economic and political crisis. It was a formidable task for the PPP government to reconstruct Pakistan. The PPP government took several measures in order to overcome those crises.

In this direction, the first and foremost step taken by the PPP government was framing a parliamentary constitution having secured consensus of all the political

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3. S.J.Burki and Craig Baxter, "Socio-Economic Indicators of the People's Party Vote in the Punjab: A study at the Tehsil Level", The Journal of Asian Studies, no.34, August 1975, pp.913-30.
 4. Herbert Feldman, The End and Beginning Pakistan 1969-72 (London, 1975), p.94.

parties.⁵ The credit goes to the Pakistan People's Party for evolving a consensus on the fundamentals of a constitution. This was a positive step in the direction of stabilising the issue of federalism which had troubled the constitution makers in Pakistan and had contributed to a crisis of Participation. With the signing of the constitutional agreement on October 20 1972, Pakistan was again back to a parliamentary form of government.⁶ Thus the PPP government had played an important role in stimulating democratic experiments in Pakistani political system. The Pakistan People's Party won the 1970 elections precisely because of its ability to project itself as a force of radical change.⁷ It was the first time, in the political history of Pakistan, the PPP government succeeded in bringing about striking changes in some aspects of the political system of Pakistan.

For the first time since 1947, there was a change in the character of Pakistan's ruling elite, and elected representatives of the people were at the helm of affairs

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5. See for details, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 (Karachi, Government of Pakistan, 1973).
 6. Y.V.Gankovsky and V.N.Moskalenko, The Three Constitutions of Pakistan (Lahore, 1978), pp.126-30.
 7. Mohammed Ayooob, "Profile of a Party:PPP in Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) vol.7, no.2, February 1972 (annual number).

both at the centre and in the provinces.⁸ Bhutto had attempted to smash the "viceregal system" which was perpetuated in Pakistan even after the withdrawal of the British and had successfully undermined the position and prestige of the military-bureaucratic establishment. This led to a shift in the locus of power in Pakistan, which was not welcomed by the military-bureaucratic establishment.⁹

It was the People's Party's government which took the major steps towards socio-economic transformation as a pre-requisite of political stability. The People's Party election manifesto for 1970 elections promised the people bread, clothes and shelter. For which it initiated a lot of measures which included nationalization of private industries, banking and insurance companies. Reforms were initiated for the labour and workers, banking and currency, land, educational system.¹⁰ It was true that Bhutto and his government had to make various compromises in order to overcome the economic situation which it inherited from a

8. Meenakshi Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition (New Delhi, 1975), p.132.

9. See for details, Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York, Praeger publishers, 1980), p.125.

10. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-77 (London, 1980), pp.114-34.

protracted military and bureaucratic rule and a disintegrated Pakistan.

It was a significant achievement of the PPP government that feudal interests were attacked through a land reform bill which reduced the land ceilings. PPP also claimed that it reduced by seventy per cent the holdings permitted under earlier land reforms which was a clear break from the Pakistani political tradition, another such step was the abolition of all special services in government employment. It also intended to depose the civil service from its role of an important power elite in Pakistani politics. Yet another significant change came from PPP government's educational policy announced shortly after assuming office. This substantially changed the educational system in a short period. Education, especially higher education, will no longer be a monopoly of the middle and upper classes, because PPP government appears to have set the case of educational enterprise in the direction of egalitarianism.¹¹

The Pakistan People's Party gave a pragmatic shape to Pakistan's foreign policy for safeguarding Pakistan's

11. Meenakshi Gopinath, pp.142-43.

national interest. Due to the domestic compulsions, it was compelled to constantly remind the people of the potential of India's powerful presence and still it suggested bilateralism as a basic operative reality to maintain stable Indo-Pak relations. People's Party under the leadership of Bhutto formulated a foreign policy which ensured maximum national advantage.

In this context, a notable achievement was developing close relations with China and West Asian countries which was done without adversely affecting relations with the USSR. Nevertheless, he was dissatisfied with the US perceptions of Pakistan's nuclear ambition and Bhutto did not hesitate to express his displeasure irrespective of the long record of US-Pak cordial relations. The People's Party government did all of this merely for the sake of national interest.¹²

Thus, PPP government was the first government to visualize a self-respecting role for Pakistan in the area of international politics. One of the spectacular shows which the PPP government hosted was the Islamic Summit conference at Lahore in February 1974, it was a great

12. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "The foreign policy of new Pakistan", ORBIS, vol.20, no.3, fall 1976, pp.733-59.

achievement in many other directions but the scene of fraternal and friendly feelings witnessed in Lahore helped inspire and restore confidence, faith and courage among the people of Pakistan.¹³

However, the Pakistan People's Party failed to retain what it gained from the people after five and a half years and could not but surrender over the power to a military dictator in 1977. There were a number of reasons for failing to retain and sustain what it had gained from the people. Socio-economic measures followed by Pakistan People's Party led to its own destruction.¹⁴

Before, the 1973 constitution came into existence, it was the practice that the leader of the majority party would naturally reflect the faith of the majority of the people, there was no constitutional bar to a non-Muslim becoming the head of the government in Pakistan, but, the third constitution (1973) made provision that only Muslims can become a head of government. In this way, it certainly offended the liberty of a sovereign parliament to elect any

13. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan (Delhi, 1984), pp.89-91.

14. Shahid Javed Burki, pp.115-35.

one it liked as its leader. In the parliamentary form of government, the prime minister normally stays in power, as long as he enjoys confidence in the National Assembly, otherwise he had to stepdown, but Article 96, in the third constitution made an unusual provision which did not exist in any of the previous constitutions. A no-confidence motion against the prime minister could not be moved unless and until by the same resolution the name of another prime minister was put forward as his successor. An identical provision was made in the case of provincial Chief Minister.¹⁵ But such steps were antithetical to the practice of any real democracy.

Bhutto's concept of Islamic socialism was very vague, the religious orthodox ulemas condemned it and propagated that Pakistan People's Party was secularizing the Islamic country. The people who were discontented with the People's Party turned to rightist parties like Jammat-i-Islami, Muslim League, Jamaaiat-ul-ulama-i-Islam and others, which later formed an alliance called Pakistan National Alliance in 1977 to topple the People's Party government.

15. Y.V.Gankovsky and V.N.Moskalenko, pp.127-30.

The PPP government faced regional challenges like its predecessors but it also failed to resolve the regional challenges and the problem of national integration. In fact, the PPP government witnessed more regional challenges than ever before. The government always tried to maintain the status quo. PPP government failed to convince the citizens of the two backward provinces of Pakistan namely, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.¹⁶ These two provinces had always expressed their grievances that the two prosperous provinces, of the Punjab and Sind gained maximum benefits from the PPP government owing to the electoral victory gained by the Pakistan People's Party in those provinces.

The whole approach and attitude of the Pakistan People's Party and its leader Bhutto in the 1977 general elections undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the PPP's electoral victory and created a doubt in their widespread popular support. Bhutto handled badly the PNA allegation that the PPP resorted to rigging the elections and his decision further to ignore the Chief Election Commissioner's admission after due investigation, that

16. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive: The Death of a State (Penguin Books, 1983), pp.107-23.

the March 1977 general elections were rigged in more than half of the constituencies. Later Bhutto agreed to free, fair and fresh elections this gave an indication of his acceptance of rigging in the 1977 general elections. All his petty tactics to pacify the PNA agitators caused for more damage to the legitimacy of both the PPP and Bhutto himself. Finally on 5th July, 1977, the military coup gave a fatal blow to the Pakistan People's Party government.¹⁷

Nevertheless, events show that the Pakistan People's Party is one of the largest mass based political party in Pakistan's political system. Under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto, the People's Party once again came to the centre stage of power in Pakistan in the November 1988 elections.

17. Surendranath, Kaushik, Pakistan under Bhutto's Leadership (New Delhi, Uppar Publishing House, 1985), pp.141-45.

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