

**SELF, OTHER AND INTER-SUBJECTIVITY: A STUDY IN
CARE ETHICS**

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled "Self, Other and Inter-subjectivity: A Study in Care Ethics" submitted by Ms. Aradhana Kumari, for the requirement of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi -110067, is her original work. It has not been submitted, in part or in full, for any other degree or diploma of this or any other University, to the best of our knowledge and belief.

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PREFACE

In the present thesis, I have attempted to discuss ‘Self, Other and Inter-subjectivity’ in the ethics of Care. As a matter of fact, moral self has evolved out of Enlightenment rationality during late 18th century. There are certain features contained in the moral self, such as: autonomy, free-will, sovereignty, rationality and universality. Moral self is also andocentric, individualist and has right to property, public or private spheres and tolerance as well. Ethics of care is a critique of the enlightenment rationality, its totalitarian and the absolutistic aspects. Ethics of care puts women at the centre and emphasizes on the well-being *albeit* emotional well-being and pays attention to caring and sharing. It is concerned about desires, wishes and emotions with patience.

The basic concern in the thesis has been regarding feminism as a social/political movement and a philosophical approach. Even feminists cannot agree on a single definition. Ample of thinkers define feminism in their respective contexts. On a very basic podium feminism can be conceived as movement where gender equality is the prime ambition. It is true that feminist research focuses on the difference between what is constructed (e.g., gender) and what lies underneath this construction (e.g., the biological, sexed body). But the history of women struggling to change their lives is a long one. Feminist theory is relevant both to contemporary women and to philosophical debates that reach far beyond explicit discussions of gender and sex. Feminist theory extends feminism into theoretical or philosophical discourse.

I am thankful to the authors whose works have directly or indirectly helped me. I have always tried to supply exact quotations and full references to original works, and in the Bibliography/ Webliography, I have also furnished suggestions for further reading. In referring to the works of Plato, Aristotle and Kant, Tagore, Mohan Rakesh and others, I have used the most accurate available English translations. I am thankful to those translators of the texts.

INTRODUCTION

In the present study I will discuss Self, Other and Inter-subjectivity in ethics with special reference to Care. Moral self has evolved out of enlightenment rationality during late 18th century. There are certain features contained in the moral self, such as: autonomy, free-will, sovereignty, rationality and universality. Moral self is also andocentric, individualist and has right to property, public or private spheres and tolerance as well. Ethics of care is a critique of the enlightenment rationality, its totalitarian and the absolutistic aspects. Ethics of care puts women at the centre and emphasizes on the well- being *albeit* emotional well-being and pays attention to caring and sharing. It is concerned about desires, wishes and emotions with patience.

Morality, in the sense of the attempt to formulate codes and principles of human behaviour, has always been a necessary feature of cultures. Alasdair MacIntyre mentioned that with the change in social life our moral concepts also changes. For instance, in British India or before that 'sati-pratha' was not an immoral act but later in 18th century questions raised against it and in favour of women empowerment and consequently it is abolished now and in laws it is a crime. Undoubtedly the feminist movement has been one of the biggest social changes in the contemporary world, so it is not unexpected that these social changes are growing and promoting to philosophical level, and demand changes in the field of moral philosophy.

Let us begin with the basic question - What is feminism? Is it a social/political movement or a philosophical approach? Even feminists cannot agree on a single definition. Rebecca West remarked, sardonically: "I myself have never been able to find out what feminism is; I only know that people call me a feminist whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat or a prostitute."¹ Even in *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* we can see this uncertainty. It says that feminism is based on the idea that women are suppressed as compared to men and this suppression is not legitimate, even not the bases of their biological formation. On the basis of this argument there are various interpretation of oppression of women, thus one cannot attribute feminism as an only philosophical doctrine. There are many images in which one can paint liberation and this is why there are various colours in feminism which comes under the roof of subjugation. It is true that feminist research focuses

¹ Rebecca West, "Mr. Chesterton in Hysterics." ed. Jane Marcus, *The Young Rebecca: Writings of Rebecca West*, p. 219.

on the difference between what is constructed (e.g., gender) and what lies underneath this construction (e.g., the biological, sexed body). But the history of women struggling to change their lives is a long one. Feminist theory is relevant both to contemporary women and to philosophical debates that reach far beyond explicit discussions of gender and sex. Feminist theory extends feminism into theoretical or philosophical discourse.

However, there are four different feminist ethical developments in the following areas: first is care ethics, next is applied ethics, third one is the ideal of autonomy, and the last one is discourse ethics. Among those approaches, I'll focus exclusively on ethics of care because self, the other and the inter-subjectivity including the moral relationship between them are more broadly considered in this theory.

It should be noticed that Feminism does not reduce philosophy to politics. But it does criticize the reduced version of the type of academic philosophy that seeks to legitimize itself by imposing hard borders to separate 'real philosophy' from other fields of inquiry. Feminist philosophy, instead, can be viewed as a project that is loyal to the originally conception of philosophy as a quest to deepen self-reflection in all human inquiries. Feminist theory is an approach to ethics that builds on the belief that traditionally ethical theorising has undervalued and/or under-appreciated women's moral experience and it therefore chooses to reimagine ethics through a holistic feminist approach to transform it.

Feminist theory has attempted to advocate the thought that traditional ethical theories are build on masculine experiences and the consequence is theses traditional ethical theories devalued feminine characteristics in theorising morality or excluded women's aspect of moral experience. By taking a holistic feminist path feminists choose to rethink ethics.

Alison Jaggar in one of her famous essays discusses five specific ways in which makes traditional ethics problematic. First, they believe that in traditional ethics the focus is on the rights of men at the cost of women's. Indeed traditional ethics has developed the women's virtue like patience, self-sacrifice etc but these virtues are also not encouraged rather they become reasons for women subjugation. Second is more dangerous because it claims that traditional ethics gives justification for neglecting women's interests by questioning the audibility of women's world. They say that significant moral questions are beyond domestic sphere. Women's concerns like double-workday, pregnancies or any other sexual vulnerabilities were treated as private problems, thus were given little significance to moral domain. Third, women are often treated as moral inferiors in comparison to men. Since

ages, from Aristotle to Freud, philosophers have described women have limited moral capacity, thoughts and action. Fourth limitation of traditional ethical theories are that they overrated so called masculine traits like autonomy, independence, dominance and underrated feminine traits such as sentiments, dependency etc. Last, traditional ethics endorse masculine way of thinking like, impartiality, rule and so on as the universal criterion to fit in , in a moral society.

As a cure for the chauvinism in traditional ethics, the feminist approaches suggestion in ethics are: first, start acknowledging the fact that men and women can have diverse experiences and circumstances in their respective lives.; second one is, there should be a guide to one's action which will help to end the subordination of women; third, this will provide a guide that will enable one to handle matters in both the spheres be it public or private; and the last one suggests that moral experiences of women should be consider seriously, though it is not necessary to take it critically. Care ethics gives a more neutral aspect which is beyond this frame of masculinity or femininity rather than based on individual needs.

One can find the trace of care ethics in the works of David Hume and Adam Smith. Moral sentimentalism is the place where the beginning of care ethics can be seen. According to moral sentimentalists morality is based on human emotions or sentiments rather than reason and autonomous self. Though none of the thinkers have used the term 'care' but they have used only benevolence, sympathy and compassion.

According to care ethicists an individual lives in a web of relationships and their primary need is dependency. By limiting the requirement of autonomy and independence care ethicists raises the concern which are subjective and that can sustain the novelty of human being. In this context one can say that it is contrary to enlightenment and libertarianism. Care ethicists also claims that it is ethics of care is different from utilitarianism and justice theories. Utilitarianism weighs to future consequences of action and overlooks history, whereas in care ethics there is a thick inclusion of history. Similarly injustice theories, its abstract principles consider the past but that which is clear and different, on the other hand, care ethics is concerned about indefinitely multifarious system of relationships that is build over the years within a family or society. One can say that since last few decades care ethics has emerged as a promising replacement to the traditional ethical theories. It has changes the moral perspective altogether by approaching moral issues with a different perspective. By giving extensive body

to feminine traits it has changes the working of moral inquiries. The interpretation of moral problems has initiated from the basic level and then climbed to issues which come to public sphere.

It has challenged both the dubious religious claims as well as claims of universal norms. The subjectivity of moral theories which was lost in autonomy and rationality were taken in the view again. This is why care ethics is an approach which is able to deal with subjectivity of experience and receptivity of reflection. Care ethics tries to provide moral values in its most basic at the same time comprehensive way.

In late 19th century feminists started questioning the core concerns of traditional ethical theories. In the thesis i will be discussing care ethics with the perspective of three eminent thinkers: Carol Gilligan (1936-), Sara Ruddick (1935-2011) and Nel Nel Noddings (1929-).

Carol Gilligan in her seminal work challenged “justice-based” aspects of morality. She suggests that moral psychology needs a new dimension of moral development which gives a more appropriate and wider perspective to morality. She unboxed a new perspective to moral philosophy from physiological backgrounds.

Sara Ruddick writes from epistemological perspective about mothering and care. She contends that mothering needs to be a conscious activity and has choices. With mothering you need to become conscious about your calls for choices and you must have alert reflectiveness. She deconstructs the stereotypical aspects of mothering and demands a fair and more emancipated version of mothering should be floated.

Nel Noddings is influenced by Carol Gilligan. She talks about feminine approach to ethics and argues that care should be the foundation of all the moral theories or for ethical decision making. She emphasised on the role of education that can enhance the life of human being. She begins by saying that “care is basic in human life - which all people want to be cared for”.

The method that I am going to follow in the present study is historical, comparative, analytic and critical from feminist perspective. It is historical because ethics of care is deeply rooted in general discourse of virtue ethics which could be traced back to Plato on the one hand and philosophy on the other. It is comparative because there are several philosophers and philosophical schools which have created discrepancies in the respective field. I want to

resolve the discrepancies by critical evaluation of andocentric normative notions by analytical tools of feminism. I will also propose a critique of the morality of enlightenment rationality.

Accordingly the thesis I will evaluate these problematic issues in the following four chapters.

First chapter of thesis will be concerned with the problematic issues related to the moral self, the other and the inter-subjectivity in the context of enlightenment. A moral self by definition involves other moral selves-the others- and develops inter-subjectivity, so that it is a being that is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong, a person's responsibility for making moral judgments and taking actions that comport with morality. But in traditional moral philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to enlightenment, the moral self has masculine traits such as autonomy, free will, sovereignty, rationality, individuality and it claims that its rules are universal and impartial. This can be philosophically contested. Ethics of care is one of the moral theories that critique these traits of moral agent. Moral self in the ethics of care emerges and revolves around the ontological, epistemological and ethical aspect of a "woman" as "self" with the "other" in the relationship. Ontological aspect of care includes well-being of the people in the relationship and the community, collective, not individual. Epistemological aspect is concerned about understanding of the desires, wishes, emotions, etc. developing the concern to overcome neglect or ignoring attitude. And the ethical aspect is focused on Care as a virtue of all other virtues like prudence, justice, tolerance, liberality, etc. This can be contrasted with the andocentric approaches. I inquire the effects of Enlightenment on feminism and feminists critiques on it, and then I discuss the moral sentimentalism of Hume and Adam Smith as the ancestors of ethics of care and not Kant who was andocentric.

Second chapter will be discussing the critique of virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism from feminist perspective. There is discrepancy on moral self within female ethicists themselves. They are wary of rights- or duty-based ethics (e.g. those offered by Kant, Rawls, Nozick). The latter ethical theories try to propound agency based a logically constant principle and also on maxims based on actions in order to specify the hierarchy where some rights "triumph" over other rights. "Male" ethicists often presuppose or posit a completely impartial "rational" or "prudent" agent / person who is alleged to be representative of all members of the community. Anyone who fails to agree may be dismissed as "irrational" or "immature" in ethical development. Female ethicists, by contrast,

take respect for and attentiveness to possible difference, instead of formal consistency, to be a hallmark of ethical maturity. Respect for difference, however, is ethically important.

In the third chapter I am trying to develop the contending positions on care ethics. The study is to offer a critical conceptual analysis of the conventional ethical theories such as virtue ethics, deontological, and consequentialist. The primary concern of the present study is to draw conceptual insights for the understanding of the foreseeable presence of care as fundamental in morality. Annette Baier asked the need to have a moral theory which has to be in harmony with justice and care. Similarly, Virginia Held construes care as the most fundamental moral value which is inherited by every human being which is being devalued by conventional ethical theories.

In the last chapter I will examine care ethics in the context of happiness and education with reference to Nel Noddings, the American feminist, educationalist, mathematician and philosopher who grew and developed the ethics of care, and followed it to its logical conclusions in ethical, educational and political theories. The questions concerning the relationship between caring and ethics will be examined. The evaluation of the relations between ethical education and care theory will address the issues concerning i) Happiness; ii) From Home to Society and; iii) Practical Lessons for Educating Citizens for Global Awareness. The basic research questions will be how Nel Noddings' ethic of care goes along with the educational system.

I will be investigating the philosophical concepts and issues concerning inter-subjectivity and other, thus we come across the claims of feminist philosophers specially Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Ruddick and some other feminist philosophers in ethics of care. Their specific positions are examined in ontological, epistemological and ethical contexts in three specific parts. In the last part moral obligation, aim of human life, relativism and essentialism in ethics of care will be inquired. In the last part, ethical approaches like moral obligations and right and wrong will be evaluated and I will be discussing needs-based concept of rights. And lastly I will discuss common features of various versions of care-focused ethics.

CHAPTER 1

**SELF AND THE OTHER: A CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT FROM THE
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE**

This chapter will be dealing with the issues related to the moral self, the other and the inter-subjectivity in the context of enlightenment and its critique from feminist perspective. A moral self by definition involves other moral selves-the others- and develops inter-subjectivity, so that it is a being that is able to act with a perspective of right and wrong. It is a person's moral responsibility to make a moral judgement by taking actions which comport with morality. But in moral philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to enlightenment, the moral self has masculine traits such as autonomy, free will, sovereignty, rationality, individuality and it claims that its rules are universal and impartial. This can be philosophically contested. Care Ethics is one of the moral theories that critique these traits of moral agent. Moral self in the ethics of care emerges and revolves around the ontological, epistemological and ethical aspect of a "woman" as "self" with the "other" in the relationship. Ontological aspect of care includes well- being of the people in the relationship and the community, collective, not individual. Epistemological aspect is concerned about understanding of the desires, wishes, emotions, etc. developing the concern to overcome neglecting or ignoring attitude. And the ethical aspect is focused on Care as a virtue of all other virtues like prudence, justice, tolerance, liberality, etc. This can be contrasted with the andocentric approaches.

This chapter is divided in two parts:

Part-I Moral Self and the Other in Enlightenment:

Andocentric Rationality, End-in-itself

Part-II Feminist Critique of Enlightenment:

Inter-subjectivity- Care, Moral Obligation, Right and Wrong

Enlightenment has a bilateral effect on women's situation and feminist movement. On the one hand, the age of reason, improves women's situations which have been influenced by superstition and false religious beliefs about women and their agency in western societies. But on the other hand the enlightenment emphasised the masculine bias of its ideas and cultural institutions. This period of enlightenment discussed morality with the male specs.

This chapter is an attempt to inquire the effects of Enlightenment on feminism and feminists critiques on it, and then it will discuss the moral sentimentalism of David Hume and Adam Smith as the ancestors of care ethics and not Kant who was andocentric.

Part-I

Moral Self and the Other in Enlightenment:

Andocentric Rationality and End-in-itself

Within the enlightenment period numerous important issues and positions of contemporary philosophical ethics took shape. This part of the chapter will be dealing with the enlightenment as one of the main sources of different movements in west, more significantly ethics and its andocentric biases.

Prior to Enlightenment, ethical reflections were oriented itself around religious doctrines like god or life after death. Accordingly, the highest good of humanity and moral duties are grounded and conceived in immediate religious terms. Before enlightenment ethical, social and natural discourses were in the custody of religion. Churches were the decision maker of what is right and wrong. Reason, autonomy and education were in the back foot. Enlightenment came as a response to these problem attempted to mark a stop on orthodox and superstitious tradition. It questioned the biases made by religious institutions and the morality for the propagators of religious institutions.

Immanuel Kant in his eminent article “what is Enlightenment?” writes “majority of mankind-among them the entire fair sex-should consider the step of maturity, not only as hard, but as extremely dangerous”.²Further he elaborates in order to answer the question “what is enlightenment?”

“Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one understands without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. the motto of the enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! have courage to use your own understanding.”³

The enlightenment period can be stretched approximately from the mid-decades of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century. These revolutions flounced away the medieval view and ushered in new world which was modern western world. It was a revolution that embraced science, politics, philosophy and society.

² Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”. p.52

³ Ibid., p. 51.

Enlightenment and its background, has bilateral effects on women situations and feminist movement. On the one side, the age of reason, improves women's situations which have been influenced by superstitions and false religious beliefs about women and their agency in western societies. On the other, feminists criticize the enlightenment because of emphasising the masculine bias of its ideas and cultural institutions.

However, the biggest reason for the shift in the thinking during enlightenment period was due to development in modern natural sciences. The understanding of nature and cosmology provided the base for eclipse of Christianity and ethical discourse based on Christianity. Now ethical system was more taking a naturalistic approach. Morality was independent from any religion largely. Citizens were able to find rational reasons behind the actions they are doing. To illustrate, the classification of the good⁴ with real was hard to square with the enlightenment conception of nature; similarly, Aristotelian teleological understanding of natural things was facing the same problematic. The basic philosophical problem appeared in the enlightenment were:

1. What is the understanding of the sources and basis of ethical duties?
2. Within the perspective of a transformed context of natural world, what can be assigned as the highest good for humans?

In that era majority of people were content with the guidelines drawn by Church or Monarch. They were not willing to develop an autonomous thinking as a dearth of individuality was there. The most difficult task was making people uncomfortable which a dogmatic life to create a rational and moral self. According to Kant if we want to come out with cultivated minds then we have to reject spoon-fed dogmas. A healthy mind is one which has ability to think rationally. Humans should raise voice and question their actions rather than stuck into dogmas recited in the past. This is how one can cultivate his mind and thus can cultivate their moral self.

To develop his moral philosophy which is solely based on fundamental concepts of reason and also universal in its application, Kant generated a set of general principles: First, an action is moral if and only if it is undertaken only for the sake of morality; second, consequences will not be the judging element for a moral action, but the motive or intentions with which that action has been produced; third and last principle says that an act is moral if

⁴ Good is being used in the context of Greek philosopher Plato. According to him "the form of good is ultimate object of knowledge, although it is not knowledge itself, and from the good, things are just, and gain their usefulness and value".

and only if it is conducted in respect of moral law rather than any motivation or desire which is contested by Hume later on).⁵

Kant, thus, brings forth deontology as one of the best means to address ethical issues. He formulated two principles which act as the basis of morality observed as a categorical imperative (universal command): first, human beings are rational beings and second, rational beings are autonomous. Kant's agent is a rational and free being who has the capacity to pursue his /her goals without any personal inclinations but for the action itself. Agents should and ought to act in accord to principles or set of rules rather than natural inclinations. These principles could be followed by acting in freedom as per one's will. Only an agent who is autonomous and rational can work in accordance with his will.

Every individual has a sense of what is right and wrong. While reflecting on primary passions like gratitude, pity, passion, one can find those who are opposite we tend to dislike them and approve those who are akin. As Hobbes writes:

“When we reflect on first-order passions such as gratitude, kindness and pity, we find ourselves approving or liking them and disapproving or disliking their opposites. We all have a sense of right and wrong. By virtue of our receptivity feelings mentioned above we develop this virtue of right and wrong. The conflict within the breast of the person between the requirements of morality and self-interest is canonically a conflict between the person's reason and her passions.”⁶

The historical correlation between the enlightenment and the surfacing of feminism has been recognised since long but the extent and nature of their connection is still not clear. Many historians attribute the surfacing of feminism to the enlightenment liberalism.. “Enlightenment feminism” is considered the foundation of feminism movements, especially in Europe and North America. One can still trace its legacy in the contemporary feminists campaigns.

Enlightenment did not improve social conditions of women or increase intellectual opportunities for them. Enlightenment often perceived as a masculine phenomenon which attempted to question the empowerment of monarchy and churches. Religious stigmas regarding women were still had there. As Hobsbawm writes, “it is a conspiracy of dead white

⁵ Kant, Immanuel. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Pp. 34-35

⁶ <https://iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/>. Accessed 23/04/2019.

men in periwigs to provide intellectual foundations for western imperialism.”⁷ Taylor and Knott also writes “men seen as misogynists in new dress’ while women like Wollstonecraft were seen as ‘colluding with oppressors’”⁸. It is understood that enlightenment itself was not able to look into several and significant problems society was facing at that time. So, one can say that enlightenment period was a beginning where one was allowed to question and come out of their “sleeping slumber”.

According to Hume, morality is completely grounded in our sentiments. He is also known as primary originator of “ethical subjectivism”⁹. Ethical Subjectivism alleviates itself from the responsibility of explaining the objective order of values that fit in to the natural world as it is being reconceived by natural science in the period; though, it has another challenge of explaining the how inaccuracy and disagreements are possible in moral judgements. In an ethical aspect, feminist recognize David Hume as a friend from past. In a historical review on the early enlightenment and feminist thought we reach to Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature* as intellectual ancestors of feminist ethics.

However, as we have been seen, feminists partly agree with the existence of some resemblances between feminist care ethics and Humean ethics and sentimentalists moral theory, but they explain that the care ethics emphasises on the relations among persons. Though a valuable relationship largely depends on characteristics of persons in them, but individual valuable characteristics may fail to build a good relationship among them.¹⁰

By the seventeenth century, the idea of the “equality of the sexes” became an indivisible component of the talks and discussion of numerous educated Europeans, more specifically in France, and more likely elsewhere as well. Though, mainstream educated people were sustained with the idea of male dominations while mainstream educated opinion continued to take male dominations in their lives for granted, the number of people were increasing to accept the difference as “natural” or “divine” command of the world. Now, intellectual life eagerly waiting for women to enter and many people started to believe that these opportunities should be unlocked for women at large. The conception of the “equality of the sexes” generally foregrounds the equivalent cognitive potential of both men and

⁷Eric Hobsbawm, *On History* (1997; London: Abacus Books, 1998), p. 336. Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob, ‘Enlightenment Studies’, in Kors, *Encyclopedia of Enlightenment*, 4: 418–430.

⁸ Taylor and Knott. *Women, Gender and Enlightenment*, p. xvi

⁹According to ethical subjectivism, moral judgments or evaluations (regarding actions or character) do not make claims about independent facts but merely express the subject’s feelings or attitudes with respect to actions or character.

¹⁰ Held, Virginia. *The Ethics of Care*, p.52.

women. It is also very important to mark that this feminist voice imprinted their existence well earlier than the onset of this enlightenment. Siep Stuurman, the historian, explains that:

“Seventeenth-century feminism made two seminal contributions to the early enlightenment; it contributed to the invention of a modern, Universalist concept of equality. It also made gender into an essentially, and publicly, contested concept. By their “deconstruction” of the ancient notion of a timeless, god-given and natural hierarchy of the sexes the feminists paved the way for the enlightenment idea that gender was the product of the social environment, and could therefore be discussed in terms of political theory, the transformative power of education, and the conjectural history of humanity.”¹¹

Held asks “what is a person who is a moral subject?” and explains that according to numerous writings in recent times about neo-Humean perspectives, one cannot trace unity of the person; rather, there are collections of psychological events. She contends that care ethics begins with self-awareness. She rules out a moral burden like parenthood experience. According to her, one must not create such helpless moments even though it attracts most of us. Every individual should be morally compelled in order to congeal into an individual who is capable of agency.

The dispute between enlightenment and feminist movement is based on the diverging perspectives in regard to the conditions under which reason operates. That is, does reason operate best under conditions of detachment, autonomy, and "distanciation" from tradition, mystery, emotion, authority, etc? Or is its reverse true? When we talk about enlightenment, than, we also talk about its association with scientific method, a method which is based on suspension of various dogmatic beliefs and is origination of an openness and doubt. Thus, this theory can be categorised as truth-committed.:

“Of course, feminism has never been intrinsically aligned to progressive or democratizing causes, and before the 1780s some important advocates of female equality remained impervious or even hostile to the democratizing zeal of the Enlightenment.”¹²

Meanwhile, care ethicists like Nel Noddings explains, in contrast to Kantian position, David Hume maintained that feeling makes morality an active virtue. He writes, “This final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species. For what else can have an influence of this nature?”¹³ Care theory also accepts

¹¹SiepSturrman, “The Deconstruction of Gender: Seventeenth-Century Feminism and Modern Equality”, p.317.

¹² Taylor Barbara. “Feminism and the Enlightenment 1650-1850”, p. 268.

¹³ Hume, David. *Treatise of Human Nature*, p.136.

Humean position of motivation and upturn Kantian priorities. The connectivity among the terms Caring-for and Caring about is significant to understand. A natural desired state of human being is caring-for and its emotional derivation is caring about.

Part-II

Feminist Critique of Enlightenment

In the enlightenment era women were not mere victims, they are also subjects and significant object. Feminist critics have emphasised that during enlightenment there were masculine biases in cultural institutions; and many of the enlighteners were still uncomfortable with the presence of female voice. They are uncomfortable with the thought of intellectual and ambitious women. “Dare to know!” was the most inspirational quote and motto of men and women, but thinkers like Kant were still had inappropriately dangerous thoughts to women. With all the in appropriations about the rise of women still enlightenment poured great energies in order to define gender. Nations that used to fall under enlightenment orbit like North America, France etc gave thinkers who were vocal about importance of family and connected social functions with it. There were other discussions as well like duties in domestic life being husband and wives, the psychological formations of the sexes and also biological differences. How sexuality has its impact on both the sexes in both the manner moral and psychological.

Despite numerous development taking place yet there were exaltation as well as degradation of women. Though, enlightenment was different from polarised images of their predecessors in different way. Firstly, the philosophical schemata of their elaboration were sophisticated. Secondly, the cultural weight enlightenment thinkers acquired, as they confronted by what the Scottish philosopher John Millar condemned as “the 'habits of selfishness' induced by capitalism, turned to women to counter this egoism while continuing to blame them for some of the worst excesses of possessive individualism”¹⁴.

“Yet the Enlightenment world resisted feminist ideas as much as it encouraged their emergence. It is not perhaps surprising that disciples of Rousseau and admirers of Sparta should have opposed moves toward female equality, or that the Jacobins should have closed down the women's clubs. But it is more surprising to find that Kant, despite his modernist

¹⁴ John Millar, *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks*, p. 128, 144, 150

liberal stance, should have adopted such a brutally negative position with regard to women's rights. Such hostile responses to egalitarian initiatives cannot be explained in terms of timeless prejudices, but require investigation on the same comparative historical basis as the initiatives themselves.”¹⁵

Enlightenment moral philosophy focused above all on the human personality-on such as sexuality, role of constitutional and cultural impacts in the development of subjectivity, emotions and the nature of mind. It was the time where discourse of self-fashioning and more significantly the attitude towards women was reshaping.

We can see that ethics of care has been rooted in the works of David Hume and Adam Smith. They are the prominent defender of moral sense theory. In their eminent works they gave a positive account of moral sense. However, the moral sentimentalists never coined the term caring, but are limited to benevolence, compassion and sympathy. Critics such as Slote claim that even though we didn't configure a name for it but in twentieth century or little before empathy was a known phenomena. Though, empathy was never coined in the works of Hume and Smith in particular. Hume's was an empiricist, on the bases of it he gave four assertions for his empiricist theory: “

1. Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passion”.
2. Moral distinctions are not derived from reason.
3. Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action.
4. While some virtues and vices are natural others, including justice, are artificial. There are heated debates about what Hume intends by each of these assertions and how he argues for them. He articulates and defends them within the broader context of his meta-ethics and his ethics of virtue and vice.”¹⁶

Hume emphasised on the fact that human beings have instinctive intelligence which is habit bound and emotional. He emphasises that it is humbleness which differentiate humans from other creatures, not autonomy of mind which has capacity to stand apart from material life or social life with unique ideas.

Certainly, this enlightenment intelligentsia was dominated by males and patriarchal thinking. But the failure in giving equal citizenship to women by republic of citizen would have led them in troubles for their social and technical development. As there was a rise of

¹⁵Jakobsen, Janet R. “Deconstructing the Paradox of Modernity: Feminism, Enlightenment, and Cross-Cultural Moral Interactions.” *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1995, pp. 333–363. *JSTOR*, JSTOR,

¹⁶,<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/>,9sep 2017.

print culture since late seventeenth century onwards, its expansion was promoting woman of letters. Again, one can mark this phenomenon in Britain. Britain's was gradually transforming into a commercial society which was dominated by middle class unlike traditional elite. This was promoting men and women of talents and the new economic and cultural transformation was taking place. It was a time of rise of professional writer and many artists in other fields. This was the most significant factor that influenced women to participate in enlightenment intelligentsia.

Why does the Enlightenment legacy create contradictions for feminist ethics and politics? Many feminist critics have rightly located the problem in an inherent gender-bias in Enlightenment thought and its implicitly adult, privileged, male moral and political agent. At this time women's were asked to raise their voices but the traits which were expected them to wear are male oriented. Though empathy and care were being discussed but not to an extent of women's trait.

The understanding of empathy was seen as the feeling of caring for others with a consciousness about the feelings of others. While making decisions one was able to relate with the particular situation is what empathy was understood as. But now thinkers like Smith and Hume takes the perspective of empathy as an integral part of human kind. It has both human experience as well as self-interest. It is said that:

“In spite of their [the rich] natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own convenience, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants...”¹⁷

According to Hume, morality can be traced in our sentiments. This is why Hume is regarded as the originator of “ethical subjectivism”, which advocates that moral judgements or evaluations do not make claims about independent facts but merely express the subject's feeling or attitudes with respect to actions. Hume's ethics is exemplary of philosophical ethics in the enlightenment by virtue of its belonging to the attempt to provide a new, empirically grounded science of human nature, free of theological presuppositions.

¹⁷ Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pp. 145-46.

“Women's roles are sometimes reassessed in ways that under-value their contributions to Enlightenment thought (for instance, the salonnières are rescued from oblivion only to be described as those who merely provided a context for the intellectual work of men). And the long shadow of a token woman here or there can obscure the many contributions of other eighteenth-century women.”¹⁸

The borders and characters of the postmodernist feminist critique of Enlightenment, its various forms, and its relation to modernism are themselves topic of continual debates. But as Sandra Harding says, feminist postmodernism itself may well subscribe to too many Enlightenment assumptions.¹⁹

“These political ideas - in common with the Enlightenment mentality as a whole - were founded on universalist assumptions about the nature of Man which had complex and often contradictory implications for notions about Woman. Enlightened philosophical anthropology (the 'Science of Man' in the language of the time) posited universal reason as the chief human attribute and in so doing provided a claim. Demands for reform in women's education - probably the issue commanding the greatest support among Enlightenment intellectuals in Britain - insistently drew on this rhetoric of universal rationality to make the case for female intellectual equality. Yet Enlightenment theorists were as likely to emphasize differences between the sexes as similarities, often garbing traditional prejudices in new theoretical dress. The fields in which gender was explored then, carried no inherent feminist biases; yet they frequently produced insights with feminist applications. Here there is space only to mention some of the theoretical innovations which will be examined in depth.”²⁰

Alison Jaggar questions traditional ethics for showing less concern to women's issues where she takes care of house hold things, children.²¹ Traditional ethical theories overrate traits that are considered masculine like intelligence, autonomy, war, death, domination and devalue “culturally feminine” traits such as interdependence, immanence, trust, body, emotions. Mary Wollstonecraft also concluded in her work *Vindication of the Rights of Women* that moral virtue is unitary: women are obligated to practice the morality given by or practiced by men because men morality is supposedly a “human morality” which is best for

¹⁸Bostic, Heidi. “Literary Women, Reason, and the Fiction of Enlightenment.” *The French Review*, vol. 85, no. 6, 2012, pp. 1024–1038.

¹⁹ Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?*, p. 186

²⁰ Taylor Barbara, “Feminism and Enlightenment 1650-1850”, p.p. 165-66.

²¹ Jaggar Alison. *Feminist ethics*. Pg. 42

all.²² As Virginia Held points out that moral theory cannot be asked to be universal as one can understand morality best contextually. She writes in her work:

“It need not invoke religious beliefs that carry divisive baggage. It does not rely on dubious claims about universal norms of reason to which we must give priority in all questions of morality. Instead, it develops, on the basis of experience, reflection on it and discourse concerning it, an understanding of the most basic and most comprehensive values.”²³

Margaret Walker questions the notion of universality in the dominant moral theories because moral issues vary from individual to individual and moral understanding entails ‘attention, contextual and narrative appreciation and communication in the event of moral deliberation’²⁴. Traditional moral theory emphasises that only an independent and autonomous agent is able to act morally. Jean Keller points out that a moral agent is a “burdened self”; he is always seen in relationships with others and is also partially constituted by those relationships.

Care ethics brings out feminine characteristics strongly as a moral value. First care ethicists talk about relational selves rather than human beings being discretely individualistic. Human beings by nature are embedded in a host of voluntary or involuntary, social relations which enable the self to define itself. Another important aspect which was regarded as a weakness of an ethical theory is benevolence for those who are vulnerable. Male ethics (traditional ethical theories) stress on individual freedom where duties of benevolence is minimal upon agents. On the other hand, female ethics argue for duty of benevolence towards the vulnerable members of society. Care ethics also strengthens the voice for private sphere instead of public sphere. Philosophers fixated on the issues like defending particular rights, need of relational aspect for one to nurture in an empathetic way and so on.

Ethics of care questioned Kantian notion of impartiality and rationality. Kantian moral theory requires that everyone should be treated equally. There should not be any difference between loved ones and strangers. Marcia Baron, a Kantian thinker argues that understanding of impartiality consists on two levels: at the level where general principles are chosen; and other is impartiality at the level of our actions.²⁵ As long as our general principles allow partiality, one can show partiality. Virginia Held responded to it by saying

²² Wollstonecraft, Marry. *Vindication of the Rights of Women*. Ch. 2

²³ Held, Virginia. *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, And Global*.. Pg. 14

²⁴Collins, Stephanie. *The Core of Care Ethics*. Pg. 19.

²⁵By Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote. *THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE*. . Oxford: Blackwell, 1997

that Baron's response lacks because the division in impartiality won't be able to place relationship properly. Say for instance X honours her father. Kantian reason for X honouring her father will be because he is elder and any child should honour their fathers. On the other hand, care ethicist's answer that X should honour her father because he helped her in raising her over the years.²⁶ The difference between care ethics and impartiality is of particular person and their involvement in a relationship between them not the general principle which will provide the reason for honouring.

Now, one can understand the role of autonomy in relationships where one chooses to enter or leave like in friendships or romantic relationships. But how can one exercise their autonomy in 'discovered' relationships (familial) where one cannot choose to enter or leave on their own? This drawback of relational autonomy remained unanswered. But Meyer's points out that a care agent can decide by questioning herself about the kind of care giving that will not hamper her integrity and self-respect.²⁷

Care ethics has been contrasted with several claims. One such claim stated that care places women's autonomy in jeopardy. Diana Meyers' responded to this claim. She said that moral agents reflect on their conduct and are concerned about their integrity. The capacity of choice making shows that a person is independent. One can be autonomous by choosing to be a relational being or being socially constituted. Being autonomous does not mean being asocial. Autonomy is possible by our social relations only. In order to develop an account of a relational autonomy one needs to meet the three key criteria of autonomy. One can be thoroughly socially situated and can be relationship oriented and yet that person can act autonomously. Secondly Meyers' says that autonomy is not in contradiction with expression of partiality for one whom we love in the sphere of interpersonal relationships. Lastly, she focuses on skills of autonomy learned socially. Thus, autonomy is attuned with moral life where caring relations are most valuable. Autonomy and care are not two opposite terms but care ethics needs autonomy so that one can exercise the skills related to autonomy and helps in examining critically the care she is providing so that she can ensure herself that she is engaged in appropriate caring.

²⁶"Care Ethics and Impartial Reasons". Postow. B, C.Hypatia, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2008), pp. 1-8

²⁷Joram Graf Haber, Bartlett "Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84 (1987), pp. 619-628, reprinted in Ethics in the 90s, ed., 1997

I would say gender was highly mythologized as there was no line drawn or fixed among the sexes and male desires and insecurities played major role in delimiting the role of women. During enlightenment these problems were started floating. The derogatory roles of women were being questioned and her participation in other strata of society were initiated. She is more than an object to be kept in the house. Enlightenment was the time where both suppression and revolution taking place. On some places women were being welcomed but with hesitation about their emancipation.

Inter-subjectivity: Care, Moral Obligation, Right and Wrong

Morality encompasses values, perspectives and the analytical tools to identify actions and conducts which are promoting or curtailing right and good for society and individuals. In order to understand morality we need to first understand the Inter-subjective perspective attached to it. This section will be discussing how morality is embedded in care and care embedded in Inter-subjectivity which helps to understand situations and individuals in the situation in a better way. For this I will be taking a novel by Rabindranath Tagore *Gora* (1909).

Inter-subjectivity (is the shared or mutual understanding among agents. Edmond Husserl first developed the concept of inter-subjectivity as a critique of René Descartes' problem of other minds)²⁸ is a significant aspect of ethics of care or morality.

The novel *Gora* has plethora of emotions. Each character has different ideologies and code of conduct yet again they are weaved together. They are all facing self-developed moral obligations and at the same time caring for each other in their own respective ways. They all were relating with each other's situations and feeling empathised in their own individualistic way. *Gora* is one of the largest and the most complex novel among 12 novels written by Rabindranath Tagore. *Gora* is a classic novel which debated several issues which is relevant in today's world and also applicable in current scenario. We can say that it is a reflection of colonial India. It has multifarious analysis of Indian society and impact of British rule over it. It also shows the development in ideologies and how the transformation in ideologies leaves one concerned and connected at the same time detached. *Gora* is a question on stigmas based on moral role of sexes. It has culmination of caste, class and gender discrimination and thus

²⁸<https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/intersubjectivity/v-1>, accessed on 2/11/2018

layers to explore the tension a society go through and also shows the path that care can only eradicate this tension. Here we are taking the aspects of Inter-subjectivity and care which is brilliantly depicted in this novel.

The novel has the acceptance for Hume's claims of morality. According to him our moral evaluations about people and about their character traits take place from their sentiments. These moral traits have unique phenomenological quality inculcated in moral sentiments and they too have special causes. Hume gave sympathy a very significant place in human's life. Sympathy is very powerful trait of human nature which has potential to bring moral sentiments in possible artificial virtues. Hume says that "from sympathy we can have extensive concern for society; consequently in that principle, that can take us far from ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the character of others, if that had a tendency to our own advantage or loss"²⁹.

In the novel, Tagore presented two perspectives one used to see women from. Gora was a Hindu and a strict follower of *Shastras*, Gora says, women are "*pujarhagrihadeeptayah*"- which means women should be worshipped as she is the one who lightens the house. He adds, "The proper place to worship women is where they are installed as Mother- the altar of the pure-bodied right-minded mistress of a household"³⁰. He is not comfortable with the western concept of women where women are regarded as the one who lightens up the hearts of men rather in Indian customs women are worshipped as a goddess. He further points out that "effusion about women in English books has its basis in nothing else but sexual desire". The cultural clash of Indian and western thoughts pertains in the notion of ideal women. In both the culture ideal women is defined without consent of women is the irony. Binoy, a friend of Gora, befittingly says, "These are merely two different reactions of two different kinds of people. If you condemn one, you cannot excuse the other". He further points out, "If all that poetic fantasy produced by the British is false, how do you judge your own excessive stress on shunning woman and gold as evils"³¹. Tagore's woman or woman in India has seen on a high pedestal. Women in India visualised as *śakti*, "the living symbol of divine energy whose inner shrine is in the subconscious depth of human nature and outer manifestations in sweetness of service, simplicity of self dedication and silent heroism of daily sacrifices"³². According to Tagore women is tied in the web of relationship and

²⁹ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 316.

³⁰ Tagore, *Gora*, p.171.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³² *Ibid.*, p.46.

because of this web she is misrepresented. The social construction of women is the mythical conception and is far more different than the actual women herself. Gora's idea of modern woman is seized by "a low opinion of her dress without having really looked at it"³³.

Other significant character in the novel is Krishandayal. He perceives women as irrational and not competent to come out in society. Krishandayal, believes that "elaborate discussion" of religious matter "would be beyond the understanding of women". The objectification of women which is done by society systematically can be easily seen in the novel; he writes, "Among lower castes, girls could be obtained for marriage only by offering a fairly large bride price"³⁴. The presentation of women as a burden is portrayed in the Bengali society but is relevant to many of parts of the country or in the world. This notion of women is not aliens to Asian countries and for that matter many other countries. Woman is presented as a burden in the Bengali Hindu society of those days. Mohim, another character of the novel, is worried about "the high price of bridegrooms in the marriage market" and the trouble of getting a daughter married. Madhav also claims to be into all bad things to save "enough money to be able to afford good marriages" for his daughters. Harimohini is the victim of patriarchal society. She suffers because she is a mother to a daughter. Sucharita, thinks that, men, in general are the reason for women's sufferings. She claims that men don't let their women to learn. Men want their women to be confined to home only and women can be moulded according to the comforts of men. By limiting women to four walls of house men restrict their mental growth. In this case, women "are bound to hinder and spoil the work sought to be done by men, pull that down and thereby take their revenge"³⁵. In the novel variation of thoughts are presented among the role of men and women. Social and moral responsibilities are being imposed on women without their consent.

Gora set in disruptive times talk about women and their conditions with deep significance and moral conflicts women face due to biased society. In this one novel one can find numerous aspects of women. Also it has answer to the question why caring is fundamental to moral philosophy. Being unique and individualistic is the property of women in the novel carries at the same time they are capable to take moral decisions of their roles towards different relationships. In fact, Tagore beautifully looms upon different concerns of

³³ Ibid., p.131.

³⁴ Ibid., p.434.

³⁵ Ibid., p.127.

society. This novel is weaved in different sub-plots and each sub-plot is weaved in an intimidating way.

Women, in India today negotiate their identities and assert their choices through the dynamics within their family relations, religious tradition and culture or within the institutions which are often not very easy. Anandmoyi is the biggest example in the novel. A woman nullifies caste, religion and gives significance to humanity. She debarred all the rules given by society and lives a life which satisfies her the most not society. She also preached a lesson of self-care. By following her own religion and living on her own terms but not to please anyone. Despite of enlightenment and progress in society the condition of women was akin to what it used to be. In twentieth century feminist movement took a structure and raised voice against moral biases. They claimed ethics of care is not an adjunct but it is fresh start.

Care ethics refuses the idea of an independent individual. Its perspective is those human beings are social animals and thus cannot be seen without a relational aspect of it. This is how care ethics is different from traditional ethical theories. As Virginia Held writes beautifully:

“It need not invoke religious beliefs that carry divisive baggage. It does not rely on dubious claims about universal norms of reason to which we must give priority in all questions of morality. Instead, it develops, on the basis of experience, reflection on it and discourse concerning it, an understanding of the most basic and most comprehensive values.”³⁶

The vast spectrum of gender regulations are intricately embedded in our mundane everyday routine. Ethics of care believes that we all are interdependent and because of this interconnectedness we are obligated to proactively help those who are in need. Being interdependent is universal as at various times in our lives we are dependent on other for their care. As Engster wrote “we all depend upon the caring of others to reproduce society and to make civic life possible . . . we are all unavoidably and deeply dependent upon the care of others”³⁷. Thus a theory of caring should be adopted, where an agent is responsible for providing basic needs to others.

Moral theories, according to care ethicists, need to be grounded in empathy instead of duties or principles. Michael Slote in her book *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* states that empathy is an essential aspect of care ethics which stimulates a caring attitude towards the

³⁶Virginia, Held, *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, p.3

³⁷Gheaus, Anca. "The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory, by Daniel Engster." P.23

individual whereas principle theories devalue personal relationships and portray relatedness as a weakness of a moral agent.³⁸ According to traditional moral theorists moral agents should be rational and autonomous so that they can execute their will and act morally. Stephanie Collins writes:

“that at least some responsibilities aim at fulfilling the particular needs of vulnerable persons (including their need for empowerment), rather than the universal rights of rational agents; and that morality demands not just one-off acts, but also certain ongoing patterns of interactions with others and certain general attitudes and dispositions. Most importantly, care ethicists claim that morality demands cautions and attitudes of care, in addition to or even more importantly than those of respect, non-interference, and tit-for-tat reciprocity (which care ethicist see as over emphasised in other ethical and political theories”).³⁹

Virginia Held refutes that care is a sentimental disposition or a virtue and says that care is both a practice and value. Further she says that Ethics of Care has relevance not only in moral domain but also in political, social and global domains. Care can be conceptualized in the medical domain as well. She also writes that care ethics has superior ways to deal with power and violence which can imbues all relations be it personal or all those global issues. She defines care as “more a characterization of a social relation than the description of an individual disposition”⁴⁰. Like Nel Noddings who emphasised that caring is equally concerned with taking care of oneself besides caring for others, Maurice Hamington also talks about *Embodied Care* where he defines care as performative and attributed care not just as a moral theory but also an ontological and epistemological theory. He defines it as:

“Care denotes an approach to personal and social morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective knowledge in a manner that can only be fully understood if care's embodied dimension is recognized. Care is committed to flourishing and growth of individuals, yet acknowledges our interconnectedness and interdependence”⁴¹

Care Ethics is based on values like engrossment and empathy. Care ethicist Michael Slote argues that in cases where care ethics differs from other traditional approaches, care ethics is superior. Free speech, say for instance, grounded in the value of autonomy can permit too much harms for others in the name of free speech, harm that care ethics would not

³⁸ Slote, Michael. *The Ethics of Care and Empathy*. Pg.7

³⁹ Collins, Stephanie. *The Core of Care Ethics..* Pg. 5

⁴⁰ <http://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/#SH1a>

⁴¹ Hamington, Maurice. *Embodied Care*, p.32.

permit. Slote's ethics of care is located in 'moral sentimentalism'⁴². Slote endorsed empathy as an important element of care. Slote writes:

"Empathy is a crucial source and sustained of altruistic concern or caring about (the well-being of) others. In particular, differences in strength or force of empathy make a difference to how much we care about the fate of others in various different situations."⁴³

Besides this, traditional ethical theories stress on deductive reasoning as the significant trait of moral reasoning. They derive our duties from either Kantian categorical imperative or from a state of nature or from some original position. Care ethicists on the other hand emphasised on imaginative insights. Care ethicists also emphasised on difference among individuals and how one should respect the difference. Marilyn Friedman elaborates this point eloquently:

"Our common rational nature would seem to make us indistinguishable and, therefore, mutually interchangeable. Specific identity would be a matter of indifference, so far as absolute value is concerned. Yet it would seem that only in virtue of our distinctive particularity could we each be truly irreplaceable".⁴⁴

The sense of belonging makes one closer to his or her "self". Sense of belonging eliminates the idea of humiliation and provokes the commitment for a greater aspect of life and once the commitment is there it frees the self from humiliation. Tagore presented strongly the impact of cultural interference on one's identity. He attempted to bridge chasm among modernity and civilization. This novel shows the impacts of Bengal Renaissance in two directions. In one dimension the impact of western ideologies which were giving wings to women but also limiting them in a comfortable patriarchal world. Other dimension was the rejection of present India. Rejection of the very notion of rationality: it was the theme of the movement. By acknowledging past and rejecting what needs to be rejected and accepting what needs to be accepted is what *Gora* is all about. A process of transcending was portrayed in the novel. Tagore gave his vision of new and syncretistic India. He shows the change in condition of women in nineteenth century as well as in twentieth century. Tagore's primary concern was to bring a society which is more responsible towards both the sex and is able to bring an integrated society.

⁴²Tradition originated in the work of Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Smith, and Hume who believes that the Fundamental moral distinctions arise from sentiment rather than from reason.

⁴³Slote, Michael. *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* . p. 16

⁴⁴Friedman, Marilyn. "What are friends for?: feminist perspectives on personal relationships and moral theory." (1993). Pg. 24

Influenced by Nel Noddings and Gilligan, Virginia Held presented an account of ethics of care which is universal and claimed that care is more fundamental to morality than justice. Held gave five features of Ethics of Care which she claims is an answer to the question of why Ethics of care is a legitimate alternative to traditional ethical theories. First, ethics of care focuses on the morality as significant in order to meet the needs of others we take responsibility for. Second, ethics of care epistemically gives priority to emotions and feelings. It appreciates the relational capabilities of people and their ability to empathise with each other's situation. Third, ethics of care promotes and accepts the claims of individuals and the relationship shared with them. It rejects the view of dominant moral theories that deals in abstract moral problems and their claim that abstract reasoning will help in achieving better moral solutions in order to achieve impartiality. Fourth, ethics of care introduced a significant and new conceptualisation of the private and public sphere with their respective importance. Fifth and final feature is that care ethics adopts the relational conception of individuals in contrast to Liberal individualism⁴⁵.

Care ethicists claim that morality can be partial yet rooted in reasoning. Held takes the example of beloved. She says that one's attitude towards his/her beloved is based on their love relation rather than making any exemplification for a universal notion. Any particular relationship cannot be the base of moral reasons as some partiality is involved in it. Held insists that impartial evaluation is not possible in evaluating relationships. As Virginia held rightly says: "We need care as a value to pick out the appropriate cluster of moral considerations, such as sensitivity, trust, and mutual concern, with which to evaluate . . . practices [of care]"⁴⁶.

Care ethicists largely talks about women in one dimension. They failed to explore that women differ to each other in many different ways. It seems that in care ethics there is a uniform picture of moral development and it reinforces sex stereotypes. Care ethics often called an essentialist. Women and men are different and they are differently chained on the basis of class, caste, race, age et cetera. Say for instance, in India upper caste women and lower caste women are situated differently in terms of choosing whom to give care and from whom to receive , the degree of care she will be receiving and so on but one who is of lower caste will pain less as care worker. Thus, we cannot overlook the other dimensions. Yet another illustration is of sexual orientation of women, a woman who is lesbian will have

⁴⁵ Liberal individualism is an ideology which signifies the moral worth of individuals.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 38

different burdens and benefits of marriage from the heterosexual women. They will differ as care-givers.

Care ethicists talk about dependency and relational aspects of moral values instead of egalitarian themes of egalitarian theories which are autonomy, rationality. Eva Feder Kittay points out that justice is very much embedded in the fundamental principles and practices of caring activity. Kittay writes that:

“To each according to his or her need, from each to his or her capacity for care, and such support from social institutions as to make available resources and opportunities to those providing care”.⁴⁷

Wendy Hollway explores a subject that is largely absent from the topical literature on care. She advocates that human being are born with an innate notion of care but the capacity of care has to be achieved by them through experiences where they are receiving primary care of parenting and then gender development and so on.

The author talks about the assumption that individuals have innate capacity to care in one of her books. She argues that in the early development of infants the notion of care builds up as the infant's starts relating and understanding his/her surroundings and starts developing an inter-subjective experience. *The Capacity to Care* also takes in account the notion that women are better care giver as compared to men. She discussed in detail about the shift in roles of gender in contemporary times. Similarly, she also discussed about the domains of care and what all can make a good family.

Women have been eliminated from the main stream philosophy and it cannot be denied. When we look back in the history of philosophy women are not a subject matter for discussion but an object which is futile. Debates and discussions used to be among males and about males. Women were attributed non-intelligent, impractical, emotional, and immoral. Eminent classical philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Kant and many more claimed that women lack in moral development. These claims contended by feminists. Ethics of care is a consequence of one of response against traditional moral thinking. It questioned the ethical theories that used to understand society as an aggregate of rational, autonomous beings where rules, duties, utility, principles, justice are the tools. On the other hand, a new moral theory developed by talking about understandings among individuals, interdependence and relational beings. Virginia Held, care ethicists writes:

⁴⁷Kittay, Feder, Eva. *Women and Moral Theory*. P. 113

“In the past few decades, the ethics of care has developed as a promising alternative to the dominant moral approaches that have been invoked during the previous two centuries. It has given rise to an extensive body of literature and has affected many moral inquiries in many areas. It is changing the ways moral problems are often interpreted and changing what many think the recommended approaches to moral issues ought to be.”⁴⁸

Virginia Held also gave a qualification criterion that in order to meet the moral requirement, caring must lack domination and include mutual concern, trust and sensitivity of individuals. She claims that traditional moral thinkers oversee the emotional aspect of morality. This claim of Held is not completely satisfactory as traditional moral thinkers like Mill who claims that feelings are the ultimate internal sanction which guided one to be moral.⁴⁹ Similarly Alan Gibbard also believes that emotions are central to moral theories.⁵⁰ Thus, one cannot claim that there had been a complete omission of emotions among traditional ethical thinkers.

While talking about caring relations and a relational approach to ethics, Virginia Held also clarifies that relations should not be modelled on the social patriarchal relations that currently exist. She writes:

"Care ethics does not advocate the actual family relations of patriarchal societies but the morally valuable aspects of human relationships of which we can sometimes get a glimpse when we pay attention to the relationships we experience.”⁵¹

According to her, care ethics has made a valuable contribution to ethical theories because it brings forth the need of dependency and substantial care in human life. Any moral theory which does not talk about dependency and the distribution of responsibilities of human beings is incomplete. The dominant moral theories devalue women’s perspectives and experiences. However, Held is not claiming that the two conceptions of care and justice are mutually exclusive. Though these two notions have different domains where they take priority over other, each has relevance to other domains. Further she pointed that care is the (deepest) fundamental value. Introducing care as central to morality changes the moral concerns that are to be prioritised. To illustrate, a society which is organised to support caring practices as a public concern results in a change in practices of childcare, healthcare and

⁴⁸ Virginia, Held. *Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*. p.3

⁴⁹ John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, Ch. 3

⁵⁰ Alan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* Cambridge, p.56

⁵¹ *Ibid.* pg. 55.

environmental protection. This also indicates that since care ethics first developed, it has expanded to other domains as well.

“This does not mean imply that all women will accept it nor that most men will reject it; indeed there is no reason why men should not embrace it. It is feminine in the deep classical sense- rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness. It does not imply either that logic is to be discarded or that logic is alien to women. It represents an alternative to present views, one that begins with the moral attitude or longing for goodness and not with moral reasoning.”⁵²

While developing a conceptual perspective, Nel Noddings attributes the notion of care as basic to human existence. Like Gilligan she also advocates that men and women enter the practical domain of morality from different doors. Similarly, it is difficult to study ethical behaviour from only a rational-cognitive approach because this kind of study is carried on in abstraction from the different facets of human existence. Nel Noddings pointed out that traditional ethical theory are derived by Logos (the masculine spirit) whereas the more natural spirit which is derived through Eros (the feminine spirit) has been suppressed. By critiquing traditional moral theory Nel Noddings reversed Kantian priorities as she claimed that ‘natural’ caring where is ‘want to’ care is above ‘ethical’ caring where one ‘ought to’ care; latter works as an instrument for establishing the former.

To bring the chapter to a close, I have attempted to provide the biases of enlightenment which unwillingly gave rise to new dimensions for women to explore their lives and demand a fair treatment for themselves too. After enlightenment women realised that the biases are deeply rooted in our moral upbringing as well. They raised voices against being morally suppressed. They fought and introduced a new theory which was there in morality but never got the acknowledgement. Care perspective which promotes Inter-subjectivity and sympathy for each other and persuade one to live a life in a society which is interconnected. Having dealt with the limitations of an essentialist account of traditional moral theories and postulating a fair possibility of a new discourse of ethics which is care ethics, the study attempted to provide a detailed analysis of ethics of care in the light of gender dichotomy.

Thus, an ethics of care call for a radical re-thinking of the ways we attribute values based on our actions. In a world where each person is different faces troubles painted in many

⁵²Noddings, Nel. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pg

shades. Set of rules and principles cannot be applied homogeneously in a society. Morality which is rooted in fairness may not be able to present a morally fair decision with theories laded with gender hierarchies. Care theory does not offer only possible answer to the question of how we should structure human lives. Seeing what care theory offers, however, can clarify our thinking, allow us to engage others in debate, and allow us to see more clearly how assumptions about the proper shape of human life shape moral reasoning.

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CHAPTER 2

ETHICS OF CARE:

CRITIQUE OF VIRTUE ETHICS, DEONTOLOGY AND CONSEQUENTIALISM

This chapter is concerned with care ethics as a critique of virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism from feminist perspective. There are discrepancies on moral self within female ethicists themselves. They are wary of rights- or duty-based ethics (e.g. those offered by Kant, Rawls, Nozick). The later ethical theories try to propound agency based on axiom of action from set of logically consistent principles and to specify hierarchy of rights in which some rights “triumph” over other rights. “Male” ethicists often presuppose or posit a completely impartial “rational” or “prudent” agent / person who are alleged to be representative of all members of the community. Anyone who fails to agree may be dismissed as “irrational” or “immature” in ethical development. Female ethicists, by contrast, take respect for and attentiveness to possible difference, instead of formal consistency, to be a hallmark of ethical maturity. Respect for difference, however, is ethically important.

This chapter will be dealing with the dearth of attentiveness in the conventional ethical theories with respect to feminine approaches of moral being. Morality is subjective where ethical decision making cannot be calculated akin in arithmetic with a perfect and universal code of conduct. In order to support this statement this chapter will be dealing with a critical approach to conventional ethical theories. It is divided in three parts which are as follows:

1. Critique of Virtue Ethics
2. Critique of Deontology
3. Critique of Consequentialism

Part I

Critique of Virtue Ethics

The relationship between the care ethics and virtue ethics is one of the most celebrated debates in ethics. Care Ethics often regarded as a subset of virtue ethics. But many care ethicists like Annette Baier, Carol Gilligan and Nel Nel Noddings attempted to draw distinctions between these two theories. They emphasise the independency of care focussed ethics as moral theory. In order to understand how care ethics is different from Virtue ethics first we need to understand what is virtue ethics, its origin and characteristics and thus we can understand how it is different from ethics of care.

There are three important approaches in normative ethics and Virtue ethics is one of them. Virtue ethics is different from other approaches as it focuses on virtue instead of duties or role (deontology) or on consequences (consequentialism).

By virtue we mean “excellence in trait of a character”. One can find the trace of virtue ethics in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Modern virtues ethicists often claim Aristotle as an ancestor. However, Aristotle is following an agenda which was laid down by Socrates and Plato. Virtue Ethics is hidden in the heart of a question asked by Socrates ‘how should one live?’ and all the three thinkers were on the same page in order to answer this question which was ‘virtuously’. According to them, the task of philosophy is to guide people that the best way to live one’s life is ‘virtuously’.

Virtue ethics is rooted in the ancient Greek Philosophy. One can find any of the three concepts in all kinds of virtue ethics which are: *arête* meaning virtue or understood as excellence, the second significant concept is, *phronesis* which is understood as moral wisdom or practical wisdom, and the last one is *eudaimonia*, which means happiness or well being or flourishing.⁵³ Virtue ethics accepts that virtue is central and practical wisdom is required for normative philosophy, they differ in combination of one concept to other in order to illuminate what we supposed to do in particular circumstances. On the basis of difference in combinations we can sketch three types of existing virtue ethics: first is eudaemonist virtue ethics, second is agent-based or exemplarist virtue ethics, third one is target-centred virtue ethics.

⁵³ <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/> 16.04.2019.

First type of virtue ethics is eudaemonist virtue ethics. This version defines virtue ethics in terms of its relationship with eudemonia⁵⁴. According to it, to attain a eudemonistic life one needs to be virtuous. It is an essential part of a harmonious life. On the other side, the second type of virtue ethics which is agent-based (exemplarist) argues that any form of normativity can be traced back in accordance with the dispositional or motivational qualities of agent. In contrast third aspect target virtue ethics says that every human being has some idea of traits that have virtue and they try to involve it in their lives. According to it one can map virtue in four different ways which is its field, its mode of responsiveness, its basis of moral acknowledgement, and lastly its target. Fourth kind of virtue ethics is Platonistic virtue ethics, which can be defined as “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good”⁵⁵.

Elisabeth Anscombe in her article “Modern Moral Philosophy” argues against the increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontological and utilitarianism then prevailing normative theories. She claimed that virtue ethics is capable of claiming a number of moral concerns regarding motives, moral character, moral education, friendship, discernment, family relationship etc. she also took inspiration from Aristotle like most of the virtue ethics theories and claimed that one who has ideal character trait is a virtuous person. These ideal traits originate from natural internal tendencies such as justice, courage, temperance and so on.

Aristotle, considered originator of virtue ethics has been criticised widely for considering one sex completely rational and other irrational. His ethical theory and its modern offspring, virtue ethics, have both been criticized by feminist thinkers for several flaws.

In his eminent work *Nichomachean Ethics*, he comments that the proper relationship between husband and wife is one in which the husband rules in accordance with his worth in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matter which befits a woman he hands over to her. The relationship in which the man rules over every matter, continues, and fails to reflect the respective worth of the parties. In specific cases, and particularly with the respect to household duties, women may be capable of exhibiting a limited form of excellence.

⁵⁴ The concept of *eudaimonia*, a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.”

⁵⁵ Timothy, Chappell. *Values and Virtues*. P-14.

Aristotle's perspective of women is an essential subject to feminist critics' to develop an understanding of his ethical theory. It is also argued that Aristotle's idea of human nature is reliable as it questions the inherently hierarchical and imposed model of human relationship. It has ever been argued that female inferiority as a central, crucial component of the entire Aristotelian worldview, without which Aristotle's metaphysical, is incoherent.

“Nor are contemporary appropriations of Aristotle free from sexist biases. Recent discussions of virtue ethics generally adopt an Aristotelian account of rationality and the virtues. They also (not universally but to a fairly high degree) adopt a communitarian or traditional position, a natural result of accepting Aristotle's account of ethical reasoning”.⁵⁶

Nor is it entirely correct to claim that all virtue theorists are blind to oppressive nature of traditions. The exclusion of women from Aristotle's conception full human flourishing is recognized by MacIntyre for example, and criticised as a typical ideology of domination. But MacIntyre goes on to argue that what Aristotle gets wrong is not the belief that the best kind of social organisation will be hierarchical, but rather the belief that one can exclude either women or foreigners from the hierarchy because of a supposed inferior nature. This brings up a related criticism of Aristotle's ethics: that is objectionable nature lies not so much in its specific conception of women's nature, but rather in the political structure the theory necessarily produce. Aristotelian ethics is perfectionist and makes political participation dependent on a virtuous character. It also necessarily incorporates a hierarchical conception of politics. Such a conception it is argues, is at odds with a central feature of feminist thought, namely a rejection of hierarchies, imbalance of political power and more general rejection of socially imposed moral standards altogether.⁵⁷

Feminist criticisms of Aristotle are so extensive including a different area of his work. His ethical theory makes theoretical rationality necessary for fulfilment of true human excellence. It is believed that more than any other reason, sins are committed because of men. When this conception is placed together with Aristotle's account of women's nature which is characterised, in his view by a defective capacity of rationality, one finds that an ethical theory that excludes women from ever exhibiting true human excellence. Aristotle's political theory is inherently hierarchal. He writes “some should rule and others be ruled, is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for

⁵⁶ Ruth Groenhout, “The Virtue of Care: Aristotelian Ethics and Ethics of Care”. p. 175

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 176-177

subjection others for rule”⁵⁸. And all Aristotle’s theorising seems infected by an objectionable hierarchy with women placed on a fairly low level.

Aristotle also has an ethical theory that seems congenial to the feminist conception of self as situated, particular and enmeshed in social relationships, because his theory recognizes the particularity and situatedness of ethical decision making. Next part of the chapter will be a defence of independency of care ethics in the light of feminist ethicists.

The typical motivations for merger of two theories are that similarities between care ethics and virtue ethics attracts them to combine with each other and frame one more strong and systematic approach to ethics which will have a systematic approach to justice at the same time it will be able to retain its features. Even in Routledge encyclopaedia of philosophy, when they talk about virtue ethics we see this tendency to remark the similarities and relation between virtue ethics and care ethics. This view has been revived in virtue ethics. Thinkers like McDowell argue that it is not possible to postulate virtuous and non-virtuous in a world together and then explaining moral agencies to possess special desires. Since moral rules run out, any object of desire could not make explicit. McDowell quotes Wittgenstein to sustain his stand of rational actions are independent not rule-governed. It is one of the strings in care ethics as critique of traditional ethical theories. Carol Gilligan contends that the moral sensibility among women is less rule-governed than that of men, and has influenced the ‘care ethics’..

The primary thinkers who defended proposals, which follow the idea of combining the ethics of care and virtue ethics, are Michael Slote, Raja Halwani, and Margaret McLaren.

Slote, Hirani, McLaren are three ethicists who advocate that ethics of care and virtue ethics combination is constructive because both are two compatible theories, and with their culmination care ethics will become a more comprehensive theory and also it will be more defensible. Though, the detail of their arguments varies from each other but the bases of their defence for the culmination of these two theories are same. They all advocate that care ethics has goodness of care which can be a motive and an end at the same time virtue ethics will emphasise on a virtuous relationship which is inevitable for a flourishing life and society. Another argument is that, without any substantial loss both the theories can be complied together.

⁵⁸ Aristotle Politics, book1, Part V.

Slote argues that both the theories are based on care as the fundamental feature of moral theory. This similarity among these theories make them interconnected and presents a agent based virtue ethics. Further he says an agent based virtue ethics also talks about care as intuitive judgement that enables one morally capable of making decisions. This intuitive way of moral judgement is best understood as *aretaic* qualities. Slote explains that by agent based he indicates that the measure of virtue is based in *aretaic* qualities⁵⁹ and the collective virtues can be reduced to virtuous motives that can make them up. Slote stipulates that a moral approach “counts as virtue ethical if and only if it focuses more on agents than on their actions, and treats *aretaic* notions like admirability and moral goodness as prior to deontic ones like permissibility and wrongness.”⁶⁰ Slote contends that ethics of care is intact an agent-based theory, because “the very expression morality of caring implies the primacy of motivation”. Virginia Held in response to Slote writes:

“I welcome his decided appreciation if the value of care and his effort to unify ethics. But I think Slote misses the centrality of caring relations for an ethics of care. A caring person, in my view, will not only have the intension to care and the disposition to care effectively but will participate in caring relations. If person lack the capacity to do so, they can be the person who are trying to be caring, but they are not yet caring persons. To be caring person requires more than the right motives or dispositions. It requires the ability to engage in the practice of care, and the exercise of this ability. Care, as we saw, is work as well as an emotion or motive or intention”.⁶¹

McLaren agrees that ethics of care and virtue ethics are similar enough to facilitate a convenient union as both the theories emphasise an overlapping concerns in ethics and politics at the same time they are also focusing on personal sphere and public existence. According to her, “virtue ethics and care ethics also have similarity in understanding of self as relational, stress contextual particulars in moral assessment”⁶².

On the other hand Halwani produced another perspective which suggests that both the theories have relational compatibility. He argues that the most impressive aspect of treating care ethics as virtue ethics will be the protection of valuable elements like appeal to partiality, and valuation of emotive components will remain relevant in moral areas which were neglected by traditional ethical thinkers since ages. However, these thinkers agree on

⁵⁹ From the Greek ‘Aretai’ meaning ‘virtue’ or ‘excellence’ such as the motivations, dispositions, and character traits of moral agents.

⁶⁰ Micheal, Slote. “Caring in the Balance”, p. 23.

⁶¹ Virginia Held. *The Ethics of Care*. p-51

⁶² Margaret A McLaren. “Feminist Ethics: Care as Virtue”. pp-108-110.

compatibility aspect of both the theories but they have disagreements on theoretical details of it. They disagree on four theoretical details the possible alliance between ethics of care and virtue ethics. As Raja Halwani writes:

“I want to suggest that CE be part of a more comprehensive moral framework, namely, virtue ethics (VE). Doing so allows us to achieve two general, desirable goals. First, by incorporating care within VE, we will be able to imbed CE within a comprehensive moral theory and so accommodate the criticism that such an ethics cannot stand on its own. I will argue that has an important regulative role to play in intimate relationships, and that a virtuous person is equipped, given that she has the intellectual relationships, and that a virtuous person is equipped, given that she has the intellectual virtue or practical wisdom, to evaluate whether intimate relationships are morally desirable. Second, we can preserve those elements of CE thought to be most valuable, namely, its appeal to partiality as a legitimate moral concern, its application to specific individuals in the agent’s life, its emotive component and its relevance to areas in moral life that have been neglected by some traditional moral theories.”⁶³

On the other hand Slote, Halwani and McLaren further disagree on the influence of ‘care’ within virtue ethics. The culmination of care ethics with virtue ethics can be afforded only when care will be the significant part of virtue ethics. Among these three thinkers, Slote treats care as the primary element and demands that care will retain its place as it does in care ethics than does other two thinkers considers it. In order to support his idea Slote adopts Virginia Held’s aspect which says that care is the most primary virtue among other virtues in virtue ethics. According to Slote care is fundamental to moral theories thus it should be a central part in virtue ethics. He adds further that care is an underlying force in ethics itself because for any desire is moral if and only if its motivational posture is care. Caring makes an individual responsible towards self and others. Thus, one needs to give substantial importance to care while merging both the theories. Slotes position is that merging of virtue ethics with care ethics will lift the foundation of care ethics and care ethics will become a more contended theory then it could be.

Halwani disagrees with Slote and claims that Slote’s conception is ambitious and it will make care overly loaded and thus conceptually weak. Halwani concedes that virtues should be kept conceptually distinct from care though he also accepts that care cannot be extricable from virtues like justice, courage, honesty etc. He also accepts that care is a

⁶³ Raja, Halwani, “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics”. p-162.

significant disposition as well as virtue but at the same time it cannot be overloaded with other virtues as other moral concepts and virtues are capable to perform their own roles. McLaren also accepts his idea of care and construes that care is one virtue and there should not an overlapping among virtues themselves as it will confuse their roles.

According to Halwani any ethics merely based on care can be trapped in various severe difficulties and to avoid there difficulties the culmination of both the theories important. These theories are dependent on each other.

“I have so far argue that (1) by construing care as a virtue and incorporating it within the theoretical structure of VE we are able to preserve the desiderata of CE, while also (2) explaining how caring need not clash with the requirements of impartiality and universalizability. I have argued that VE preserves and emphasises the social embeddedness of human beings, that it allocates a central role to friendships and family relationships, and that it gives the emotional component of caring actions the importance it deserves. I have also argued that VE is able to emphasise the importance of partiality in our moral lives so long as partial actions do not conflict with other moral demands, such as justice, and that this answer is what ought to be expected from a theory that calls itself moral”.⁶⁴

In the major part of objection to ethics of care Slote, Halwani, and McLaren agree that on its own care ethics reflects and promise a number of injustices.

Slote starts the debate by observing that whether caring itself is able to provide a complete framework of moral thoughts and actions, given care emphasises on intimate relationships with particular others and also over big scale of strange people. Slote finds care ethics is in a better position than its critics have expected because virtue ethics is capable to provide required elements of justice. He says that caring can be best articulated in a virtue-ethical style and that once one does there “is a specifically virtue-ethical way to widen its concerns”⁶⁵. Slote writes:

“The theory of justice of an ethics of caring, and finds that his approach sits well with ethics of care while offering reasonable conditions for a theory of justice. By merging with virtue ethics, ethics of care receives a way to deal with relationships between strangers, namely, through caring for intimate others we become more broadly concerned for those distant from

⁶⁴ Raja Halwani. “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics”, p.181.

⁶⁵ Michael Slote, “The Justice of Caring”. p.171

us. In this way, the virtue of care can lead to the virtue of justice, as well as be applied to more public states of affairs.”⁶⁶

Halwani mentions two other versions of the critique of justice. He is influenced from Claudia Card and Victoria Davion’s objections to Nel Noddings. Halwani contends that care ethics cannot satisfy the conditions for justice. Nel Noddings’ introduced two essential concepts ‘engrossment’ and ‘motivational displacement’. According to her, ‘engrossment’ is understood as one-caring being is moving far from self-centredness by observing the needs of other, while “motivational displacement” indicates that one-caring inherits the goal of cared for and this helps oneself to transformed by the other. Halwani disagrees with these definitions of Noddings and argues that these concepts may lead to injustice.

According to them ‘engrossment’ has potential to overlook the obligations of unknown others and it can take issue with other concept of ‘motivational displacement’ as one-caring can easily be manipulated or can become an accessory of evil deeds. According to Davion the account of Nel Noddings’ care has a conception of reciprocity, but it is not powerful enough to prevent problems as it demands mutuality. Though Davion agrees that this one-sidedness is appropriate for parent child relationships, but is not appropriate for mature relationships because she writes; “in ...relationships between equals, something is wrong when one person does all the caretaking and the other receives all the care”⁶⁷. None of the both be it caring engrossment of motivational displacement is appropriate if they are making one an object to evil deeds. She considers integrity and autonomy as the two boons of care ethics by assuming that these two traits are not an integral part of care ethics but are there in the sense of separateness in caring relationships. She demands for a stage which is prior to caring where one can scrutinise a person to determine the adequacy of a person.

Halwani says that care ethics of Noddings needs to retain its insights and should be collaborated with virtue ethics. Virtue ethics has a normative framework which will complement care ethics and will be able to eliminate the possibility of biases by executing the virtues like practical wisdom, care and justice. It will also help is evaluating the desirability in intimate relationships and also made capable of judging the partial and impartial relationships.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 185-191.

⁶⁷ Victoria Davion, “Autonomy, Integrity, and Care”. *Social Theory and Practice*, cited in Halwani, “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics”, p.176

McLaren raises questions against care ethics by asking the elimination of role of social and political context in it. Though she desires to have a satisfactory feminist ethics, she emphasised that the way care has been portrayed as feminine virtue, it has facilitated unjust portrayal of women: “Care ethics reinforces stereotypical ‘women virtues’ because it draws on the idea of women as caretakers and nurturers”⁶⁸. She claims that care ethics fails to be a feminist ethics, and “is less attentive to the social and political context than virtue theory is”⁶⁹.

Aristotle’s account is also not free from biases. His virtue is based on patriarchal thinking where men and women are treated unequally. But neo-Aristotelian theory of virtue can be a compliment to care ethics. Neo-Aristotelians provides a social and political context to care and also ways to addresses problems of care ethics. According to McLaren with the inclusion of a feminist virtue ethics care ethics will be able to include both social and political aspect in it.

Nel Noddings, on the other hand, denies care as a virtue. She says allocating care as a virtue we will somehow get saddled for paying huge attention to personal traits rather than making it a necessary trait in relationships with others:

“Caring is not in itself a virtue. The genuine ethical commitment to maintain oneself as caring gives rise to the development and exercise of virtues, but these must be assessed in the context of caring situation. It is not for example, patience itself that is a virtue but patience with respect to some infirmity of a particular cared-for patience in instructing a concrete cared-for is virtuous”.⁷⁰ She instead gives care to the status of a primary ethical concept, the concept which grounds our moral thinking, behaviour, and emotion. Her two reasons for doing so seem to be that caring relationships are ethically basic and in conjunction with the first reason, that caring is innate to human beings.”⁷¹

Nel Noddings formerly took an account of the idea of caring as a virtue and then rejected it because construing care as one of the virtues give its consent to preserve what is important about care ethics while avoiding its problems.

Maureen Sander-staudt agrees with Nel Noddings’ point of view, in “The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics” evaluates critiques as “justice critique” and

⁶⁸ Margaret A McLaren, “Feminist Ethics: Care as Virtue”. p.10

⁶⁹ Ibid. p.10.

⁷⁰ Nodding, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, pp:96-97.

⁷¹ Ibid. p3,5,83.

maintains that in the dearth of adequate consideration to care ethics that whether it will be able to respond to the critiques of justice the philosophers jumped on the conclusion of inadequacy of care ethics. She argues that considering care ethics as blind to justice indicates that the literature of care ethics has not been discussed in depth. It is a more comprehensive development to moral theories and it has an internal sense of justice. Tronto defined care broadly as “a species activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible”⁷². This definition resolves the objection raised by Card that says that care is not able to view relations with strangers. She claims:

“It seems rash to conclude that ethics of care is incapable of addressing the justice critique and that virtue ethics offers the requisite supplement. Not every virtue ethics attends to the social and political contexts of gendered care, and many struggle to conceptualize the virtues of justice and care in a way that resists practical gender dominance. If neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics can reform traditional ideas, why not ethics of care?”⁷³

Sander-Staudt further argues that care ethics has responded to the critiques regarding justice in different ways: First, there should be navigator which can navigate the relationships, be it relationship to oneself or to others or to unknowns. It should navigate relationships not only has affection but also which is neutral. It is possible to have such navigations as the private relationships are rooted in public relations and vice-versa. Care ethics that is vitally placed in political and social framework construes that justice and care are tangled ideals. It is false to say that care is not able to respond to justice as a politically based care ethics must look for justice for achieving care. It is because any caring relation which has lack of justice is not care but evil. The one who is unjust is not able to care and because of such notions the wrong in society prevails like marital rape, abuse, murder. Above all, a caring practice which is unjust is not able to achieve the centre of care and it is not care at all. For a morally consistent care ethics one needs to avoid care as a blindfold to injustice rather care develops common understanding to justice.

Maureen Sander-Staudt took two ways to show that how ethics and justice care is intertwined. First way is that care ethics cannot respond to injustice. Injustice is an obstacle for caring relations. The second way shows that care ethics has its internal sense of justice which is developed by its possibility as feminist ethics. She further clarifies that there is no

⁷² Maureen Sander-Staudt, “The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics”. p.10.

⁷³ Ibid. p.30.

surety for any of the ethics be it virtue ethics or care ethics be termed as feminist ethics. She writes:

“Although there is no guarantee that any given ethics of care or virtue ethics will be feminist, an ethics of care, like virtue ethics, is capable of generating feminist qualities by situating care in its social and political context, one of which is sex and gender. Furthermore, feminist ethics of care will highlight certain aspects of practical reasoning that feminist virtue ethics may not.”⁷⁴

As mentioned earlier feminist care ethicists, from Nel Noddings to Held, reject this idea that ethics of care became part of virtue ethics and advocate it as an independent moral theory. Sander-Staudt argues even if virtue ethics meets the criterion of giving care a central position in all the virtues than also there are three important points of distinction which makes care ethics an independent moral theory. First, the very concept of care ethics and virtue ethics varies. In care ethics the concept feature is care and in broader concept virtue comes in prominent position whereas in virtue ethics virtues are the holders of prominent position. She continues and says that it care ethics never denies the existence of virtue from it but care ethicists denies care as one of the virtue. Care ethics needs virtue in order to achieve best of care for a good and harmonious life. She writes:

“This difference is substantial because for many individuals, especially those with social privileges, a flourishing life precludes caring responsibilities that are burdensome, dirty, tedious, whereas ethics of care is committed to the practice of care on all levels. The flourishing of some individuals, including many women, is purchased by the caring servitude or employment of others, most of who are comparatively disadvantaged women, but all of whom may nonetheless be judged virtuous by some community standards.”⁷⁵

She further elaborates that in virtue ethics care is placed as a practice but in care ethics care is tied with the difference between care as actual practice and practical reasoning. Her second reason is that the care ethics is more pragmatic about care as compared to virtue ethics. Care ethics is different from virtue ethics as virtue ethics accentuate the significance of caring practice in human life. Moreover, if we will emphasise more on virtue it may fuel impractical desires and expectations on care givers to themselves and also by others. Care as a practice needs to be understood in a more practical manner which should be both manageable and justly dispersed.

⁷⁴ Ibid p.31

⁷⁵ Ibid. p.47.

The last reason to Sander-Staudt is, even when virtue ethics adopts a relational ontology, the ontological role in virtue ethics is absolutely different from the one placed in care ethics. In virtue ethics relational ontology emphasise on individuals to develop their virtue, on the other hand in care ethics the relational ontology is emphasised on the relational aspect of human being which is much more boarder. According to relational ontology of care ethics the virtue is important to enhance the quality of relationships and helps one to nurture it appropriately. Care ethics embraces the potential to extend relational ontology in a wider aspect of familial identities and communal identities as compared to virtue ethics. Care ethics presents an independent meta-ethical framework by applying relational ontology to moral theory in order to understand good and evil. It can also offer a structure for ideal theoretical relations.

In the end she concludes that “In assessing the prospects for a happy union between ethics of care and virtue ethics, there can be no doubt that ethics of care benefits from thinking about care in the context of virtue ethics, and that both theories benefits from the addition of feminist ethics. However, I contend that the reasons for merging these theories are overstated.”⁷⁶ She believes while the marriage between care ethics and virtue ethics carries a potential for mutual benefit, it also opens the door for the early decline and obfuscation of care focused ethics.

⁷⁶ Maureen Sander-Staudt. “The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics”. p.37.

Part II

Critique of Deontology

Deontology or deontological ethics is the normative moral position based on duty or rule(s). It is derived from the Greek word ‘deon’ meaning “obligation” or “duty” and “logos” meaning “science”. The guiding question behind this theory is ‘what we ought to do?’ Deontology works on the assumption that there are certain acts such as killing, injuring, lying et al which are inherently wrong or at least prima facie wrong. It sometimes resembles moral absolutism⁷⁷ when it claims that certain actions are wrong besides whatever consequences it is able to produce. Ex: killing the innocent is worse than letting innocent people die. On the other hand, act utilitarianism refuses such distinction on the ground-floor level. One can say that utilitarianism is a matter of beneficence.

Deontology is divided into agent-centred and victim-centred theories. Agent-centred theories are rooted in the idea that morality is very much ‘personal’⁷⁸. In these theories permission and obligations of an action are based on ‘agent-relative reasons’⁷⁹. For example: parents have special obligations for his/her child which cannot be shared by anyone else. It is further divided into action focused and mental states. Victim-centred or patient-centred moral theories are grounded on people’s rights. This version of deontology talks about an agent’s core right, say for instance, right against being used or killed and so on.

Deontological ethics emphasise the value of every human being. It works on a universe of rules which are moral. Say for instance, according to a deontologist, lying is wrong even if one lies in order to save an innocent person from murder. It also provides certainty in moral choices made by rational and autonomous people. It values human beings and deals with intentions and motives they are concerned with rather than the consequences of an act.

Various philosophers have propounded deontological ethical theories. In the 17th century, Samuel Pufendorf, a German philosopher, brought forth an ethical discourse based on duties. He separated duties in three forms: duties to god which can be either practical or theoretical; duties to oneself which is further divided into duties to soul and duties to body;

⁷⁷ It is a moral belief that there exist absolute moral principles or standards which allow us to judge rightness or wrongness of an action regardless of its context.

⁷⁸ Personal is intended here as our obligations are to keep our own agency free and focus on our own actions rather than observing how are actions are influencing other agents to do evil.

⁷⁹ Agent-relative reasons are those which are related to agent only not anyone else.

and lastly, duties to others encompass the avoidance of wrong doings, treating everyone equally and promoting the goods of others. He presented a moral theory which can encompass individuals on a larger scale by dividing duties in three different levels.

Another duty based approach could be found in John Locke. According to John Locke's approach, every individual has a right not to be exploited. This right also produces the duty of not to exploit. According to him, rights and duties are interrelated in a way that a right of one person implies the duties of another person. Thus, rights and duties are interrelated i.e. Right of A implies duties of B. Locke contended that rights are natural to human beings and they are universal and equal irrespective of gender, race or any disability.. It is, however, in Immanuel Kant that we find deontology as the main principle of morality. Kant, influenced by Samuel Pufendorf, introduced an ethical theory solely based on duty and is regarded as a central philosopher of deontological moral theory. According to him, a moral system should be consistent with reason and all choices must be based on imperatives which are given and which are not dependent on the consequences of the choice. He emphasises that human beings should be considered as an end not as means as he writes:

“ ..man and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings always be viewed at the same time as an end”.⁸⁰

To develop his moral philosophy which is solely based on fundamental concepts of reason and also universal in its application, Kant generated a set of general principles: First, actions are moral if and only if they are undertaken for the sake of morality alone (without any ulterior motive); second, the moral quality of an action is judged not according to the action's consequences, but according to the motive or intentions with which that action has been produced; third and last principle is that actions are moral if and only if they are undertaken out of respect for the moral law (as opposed to some other motivation such as a need or desire which is contested by Hume later on).⁸¹

Kant, thus, brings forth deontology as one of the best means to address ethical issues. He formulated two principles which act as the basis of morality observed as a categorical imperative (universal command): first, human beings are rational beings and second, rational beings are autonomous. Kant's agent is a rational and free being who has the capacity to

⁸⁰ Ibid. Pg. 428

⁸¹ Kant. Immanuel. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Pp. 34-35

pursue his /her goals without any personal inclinations but for the action itself. Agents should and ought to act in accord to principles or set of rules rather than natural inclinations. These principles could be followed by acting in freedom as per one's will. Only an agent who is autonomous and rational can work in accordance with his will.

Other important deontologist is David Ross. He presented a pluralistic deontological approach of morality where he discussed “prima facie duties” over a formal single principle for deriving duties and are self-evident.⁸² He objected Kant’s deontology and claimed that it is abstract and virtually seraphic. He argued that Kant gave an absolute theory which makes his theory impractical and opposite to common-sense morality. He writes:

“The only safe way of applying Kant’s test of universalizability is to envisage the act in its whole concrete particularity, and then ask ‘Could I wish that everyone, when in exactly similar circumstances, should tell a lie exactly similar to that which I am thinking of telling?’ But then universalizability, as a short cut to knowing what is right, has failed us. For it is just as hard to see whether a similar act by someone else, with all its concrete particularity, would be right, as it is to see whether our own proposed act would be right.”⁸³

Among all the above deontological adherents, Kant was the pioneering name. Kant’s formulation is ideal and till today it remains dominant in many ethical theories. Though, it must be noted that there are several objections raised on Kant’s notion of deontology by care ethicists and consequentialists. Kant’s categorical imperative has been criticised for being idealistic as well as formal. It is idealistic because it talks about a moral agent to be rational and work without any inclinations and feelings. Marcia Baron, responded this criticism and writes in her work that “in Kant’s ethics, categorical imperative can be seen in various formulations which is consistent with a sympathetic or other focused moral practice and which is very much practical and applicable”⁸⁴.

In conflict with deontology, another most significant moral theory came, which is consequentialism. Thinkers like Jeremy Bentham, J.S Mill, Sidgwick and Robert Nozick questioned the application of the approach by pointing out that this moral theory prevents the acts that maximize overall welfare. They pointed that Kant’s moral theory talks about moral absolutism which make certain actions wrong even if it is performed in order to save someone. Say for instance, lying is wrong even if one is lying on order to save someone’s

⁸² Ross, W.D. *Kant's Ethical Theory: A Commentary on the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954 pp. 108

⁸³.Ibid. pp. 10

⁸⁴ Baron,W, Marcia. Pettit, Philip. Slote, Michael *Three Methods of ethics: A Debate..*

life. Jeremy Bentham, criticised deontology on the grounds that the objective principles that are attributed as natural law or universal reason are more of a subjective opinion. J. S. Mill, a 19th century utilitarian, argued that deontology is not able to specify the priority of principles when rights and duties are in conflict. Thus, it fails to give a complete moral guidance.

Another problem is that Kantian moral duty seems to contradict our natural inclinations and common sense. It sidelines the most significant attribute of human beings like caring. Deontological ethics also fails as an ethical theory when it comes to informing us how to live well or developing virtues of character. This limits our understanding of morality itself.

Despite disagreements with duty based theory in the 20th century, many thinkers like John Rawls took inspiration from Kant's conception of deontology and introduced his theory of justice. He gave a contract based theory which will be discussed in the later section of the chapter. As aforementioned, in contrast to deontology a new theory originated which was consequentialism and would now be discussed in the succeeding section.

Kant, a propagator of deontological theory is largely criticised by many care ethicists. Andrea is one of the critiques of Kant. She writes:

“His work has been cited as a primary example of alienated masculinity and fraudulent universality. they found a failure of universality both in Kant's early pre-critical aesthetics where women are treated as objects rather than as human ends and in his late Anthropology where women 's potential is limited to their role in reproduction. Problems with gender infect Kant's moral agency from narrow group of men of his own time, class, and nationality, men who are self-willed and grasping, which derive to independence and mastery and a fear of affiliation and intimacy.”⁸⁵

Care ethicist questions Kantian priorities and invalidate it by arguing that natural caring is above ethical caring. They suggest that in ethical caring works as an instrument in developing natural caring. Indeed, the role of ethical caring is significant as we often draw upon ethical caring which helps to remove the blockages of natural caring. For being a caring person one needs to develop it through the experiences of life and then need to make a commitment to be a caring person.

The other important departure from Kant's theory is that care ethicist does not look for logic or a category imperative rather they look for an ideal character. Looking for a

⁸⁵ Andrea Nye, *Feminism and Modern Philosophy*. p.112.

character does not indicate that care is a virtue rather it is for the elevation of natural caring above the caring which needs guidance and efforts. Though one cannot deny that the initial structure of caring seems to have a resemblance with Kantian theory and virtue theory but the roots of care ethics is more wider and deeper than both of the theories.

This is the sort of self-sufficiency Kant seems to endorse when he writes that there must be a limitation on intimacy in friendship, and friends must be very cautious in terms of sharing confidences with those whom they take to be their friends. The reason is that respect will be the proper bound of friendship, which requires the right balance of love and respect: “love can be regarded as attraction and respect as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of respect requires them to stay at a proper distance from each other”⁸⁶.

Annette Baier also distinguishes feminist approach from Kantian and questions the claims of Kant that women are not capable of being a moral human as she is epitome of emotions and she relies on emotions rather reasons. She writes,

“Where Kant concludes ‘so much the worse for women,’ we can conclude ‘so much for male fixation on the special skill of drafting legislation, for the bureaucratic mentality of rule worship, and for the male exaggeration of the importance of independence over mutual interdependence.’”⁸⁷

She questions that emotions are the bonding factors in human relations. Thus the three questions asked by “what can I know, what should I do and what can I hope for?”⁸⁸ Among these three questions feminists took second question in account while other two questions were left to feminist epistemology and feminist aesthetics.

Kant’s second question is “what should I do? For this moral question Andrea raised several questions:

“Is there an account of moral agency given by the philosopher that accommodates visionary and effective action especially in relations between the sexes, where so much behaviour is instinctual, programmed, and seemingly outside the bounds of normative theory? Does the philosopher provide some way of closing the apparent gap between feeling and caring on the one hand and justice and rights on the other in a way that acknowledges principle and human relation? What is final good that should be aimed at? Where might one look for inspiration?

⁸⁶ Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*. p.261.

⁸⁷ Annette Baier, *Moral Prejudice: Essays on Ethics.*, p.26

⁸⁸ Immanuel, Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*. p.34.

Can it be found in the past, as Kant suggests, in a study of the Greek and Latin classics, or should other ancient course be canvassed such as the Kabbalah?⁸⁹

She asks that the most eminent aspect of morality has been overlooked since ages. Ethicists were revolving around the notions of autonomy and universality which is not the primary requirements of moral philosophy. The primary requirement for any moral theory is care and to preserve relational values to create a harmonious world.

Part III

Critique of Consequentialism

Hasting Rashdall said there is “a general consensus... that Ethics must be “teleological” or “consequentialist”⁹⁰. In the 20th century, consequentialism is the dominating moral theory.⁹¹ There are divisions among the adherents of the theory like utilitarianism⁹², hedonism⁹³ and other forms of consequentialism which differently elaborate upon how people should maximize the satisfactions of their completely informed choices and rational preferences.

In a wide sense, consequentialism is divided into rule consequentialism and act consequentialism. The Former talks about ethical rules derived from the general consequences of a particular type of act, like lying is wrong as generally it produces bad consequences and the latter looks at every single moral choice as new and says that each action is morally good if and only if it produces maximum overall good as compared to other alternatives. Consequentialism tries to give a flexible account of morality in the form of act consequentialism where each action will be assessed by its own consequences rather than a formal formulation of principles.

Consequentialism is an action based moral theory which has more practical application as compared to other ethical theories. It, in a way, can be defined as “of all the

⁸⁹ Andrea, Nye. *Feminism and Modern Philosophy.*, pp. 124-125

⁹⁰ Rashdall, Hastings *Theory of Good and Evil.* Pg 41

⁹¹ Internet encyclopedia of philosophy: consequentialism

⁹² Is based on utility where one should maximize human well-being

⁹³ It is a theory which states that pleasure is the highest good and aim of human life.

things a person might do at any given moment, the morally right action is the one with the best overall consequences”.⁹⁴

There are two principles on which consequentialism is largely based: The rightness and wrongness of an action depends on the consequences of that particular action

The degree of rightness of an act depends on degree on consequences it is able to produce.

These principles reveal that actions are neither moral nor immoral but, rather the consequences of the action are attributed as moral and immoral.

The Consequentialist position can be best understood with the help of these two illustrations: first, a trolley hurtling towards five innocent and immobile people at the end of the track, where the only way to stop the trolley and save the five is by throwing a fat innocent man in the front of the trolley. Consequentialists will justify the throwing of a fat innocent man in order to save five lives. Another example is of a billionaire who needs an organ transplantation to be done for him. He makes an offer to the clinic that if he will get the best suitable organ for himself then he will fund 1000 hip-replacements each year for the next 10 years. Now by donating an organ to Mr. Y the clinic can receive his offer which will be helpful for a large number of people. Here, a consequentialist will argue that one person's human rights can be sacrificed as that will result in well-being of thousands of people in future. Thus, by exploiting one person Mr. X will get satisfaction and many others will get their hip-treatment but consequentialists will overlook the suffering of one person and his family.

Henry Sidgwick, one of the most influential ethical philosophers, in his masterpiece the *Methods of Ethics* marked classical utilitarianism as the fundamental normative way of morality. According to him none of the ethical principles except consequentialism are self-evident. He used the term ‘dogmatic intuitionism’⁹⁵ for other moral theories. He emphasised that deontological principles are left as ‘somehow vague generalities,’ as they do not satisfy the clarity condition. They appear self-evident and have a definiteness as required by science which, however, disappears once qualifications are added, i.e. By adding qualifications that will make their application determinate and resolve conflicts between them, the consensus

⁹⁴ <https://iep.utm.edu/conseque/>. Accessed on 27/10/2019.

⁹⁵ “A theory that tries to systematise common-sense morality while retaining its deontological character, so it contains both principles about promoting the good and principles constraining how we may do so.”

disappears and their self-evident status 'becomes dubious or vanishes altogether'.⁹⁶ Thus, Sidgwick claimed that none of the moral theories satisfy his condition of self-evident moral theory except consequentialism. Moreover, Sidgwick asserts that deontological principles are unclear individually, or have vague boundaries. He also criticised the pluralistic approach of deontology and writes that to weigh duties like promise keeping and many more cannot be talked by deontologist.

J. S Mill defines utilitarianism (one form of consequentialism) as "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."⁹⁷ Mill emphasised on the utility of an action and argued that his theory presents a natural standard of moral binding, unlike Kant's abstract conception of morality. He argues that utilitarianism coexists with natural sentiments that originate from human beings' social nature,. Though his work is one of the most powerful explanations of utilitarianism, it is criticised for being incapable of protecting individual rights. Though consequentialism tries to present a rational yet universal set of rules in order to come upon better moral solutions, it has both philosophical and moral limitations. Questioning the ethical relevance of the theory, many argue that intentions are more important than the consequences. Besides, the uncertainty of the consequences is another issue which has been criticised by many thinkers. Moreover, the central feature which highlights maximum happiness for maximum number of people is inconsistent with human rights wherein each individual commands a right that cannot be forsaken for the benefit of a large number.

In the case of consequentialism, feminists' ethicist are at the forefront in criticizing traditional ethical theories for their commitment to impartiality and, the resulting problem of the demanding nature of these impartial norms. Traditional theories such as utilitarianism and Kantian ethics have been criticised for being too abstract and thus removed from the particular experiences and concerns of women. Virginia Held. For example, has noted:

"Utilitarianism suppose that one highly abstract principle of utility, can be applied to every moral problem no matter what context. A genuinely universal or gender-neutral moral theory would be one that would take an account of the experience and concerns of women as fully as it would take an account of the experience and concerns of men. When we focus on women's experience of moral problems, however, we find that they are especially concerned with

⁹⁶ Hurka, Thomas. "Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology: A critique." Pg.130-135

⁹⁷Mill, John, Stuart. Utilitarianism. Pg. 16

actual relationships between embodies persons and with what these relationships seem to require.”⁹⁸

Consequentialism has been criticised for its uncertainty of future consequences, as it is difficult to predict the future result of an act. The other problem which consequentialism faces is the possibility of being biased towards one group of people. In a contract the one who is powerful can make a contract according to his comfort. And the most important drawback of all the three ethical theories discussed above is that they overlook human beings in one way or other. Deontology ignores a section of agents who are not rational. Consequentialism ignores and sacrifices human rights if an act will result in a better or maximum consequence by ignoring human rights.

Above mentioned normative ethical theories advocate three traits of morality which are rationality, autonomy and universality. A human being is morally sound if he is a rational being and his actions are considered to be morally right if they are universal in nature. There are several points of disagreements in the three theories. Deontology provides an ethical theory from an absolutist point of view which is contested by consequentialists who say that it is not possible to execute formalism in moral theories. Contractarianism on the other hand talks about a contractual way to live in a society where no one should intrude in one others life⁹⁹.

Traditional theories offer and advocate ample rules to regulate a society morally but there are a few aspects of morality which are not discussed by the traditional ethical theorist - the private sphere of human life, emotions and circumstances. They evaluate morality as mathematics or science where a set of rules are applied in order to know if an action is moral or immoral. Each theory has its own flaws and merits. Traditional theories also have some drawbacks.

Consequentialism has been criticised for its uncertainty of future consequences, as it is difficult to predict the future result of an act. The other problem which consequentialism faces is the possibility of being biased towards one group of people. In a contract the one who is powerful can make a contract according to his comfort. And the most important drawback of all the three ethical theories discussed above is that they overlook human beings in one way or other. Deontology ignores a section of agents who are not rational. Consequentialism

⁹⁸ Virginia Held, “Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory”, p-330.

⁹⁹ As the members of society are assumed to be a rational being

ignores and sacrifices human rights if an act will result in a better or maximum consequence by ignoring human rights Contractarians face the problem that one who is more powerful will rule the contract

Since Carol Gilligan¹⁰⁰, the question of traditional moral theories as biased or ignoring women's voices in matters of morality came into light. Later many philosophers like Nel Noddings, Virginia Held, Eva Kittay, Annette Baier and many more criticised the dominant moral theories and asked for a new theory that is more inclusive. Annette Baier points out this lack of traditional moral thinking in her work, specifically criticising liberal morality:

“Liberal morality, if unsupplemented, may unfit people to be anything other than what its justifying theories suppose them to be, ones who have no interest in each other's interest.”¹⁰¹

Alison Jaggar questions traditional ethics for showing less concern to women's issues where she takes care of house hold things, children.¹⁰² Traditional ethical theories overrate traits that are considered masculine like intelligence, autonomy, war, death, domination and devalue “culturally feminine” traits such as interdependence, immanence, trust, body, emotions. Mary Wollstonecraft also concluded in her work *Vindication of the Rights of Women* that moral virtue is unitary: women are obligated to practice the morality given by or practiced by men because men morality is supposedly a “human morality” which is best for all.¹⁰³ As Virginia Held points out that moral theory cannot be asked to be universal as one can understand morality best contextually. She writes in her work:

“It need not invoke religious beliefs that carry divisive baggage. It does not rely on dubious claims about universal norms of reason to which we must give priority in all questions of morality. Instead, it develops, on the basis of experience, reflection on it and discourse concerning it, an understanding of the most basic and most comprehensive values.”¹⁰⁴

Gilligan raised the question of moral status as gender biased by questioning morality and its principles. She claimed that women have a different perception of society and they have different ways of solving t moral dilemmas. She writes that men and women enter in the

¹⁰⁰ Carol Gilligan, A psychologist and feminist who contended the traditional moral developmental theory.

¹⁰¹ Baier, Annette *Moral Prejudices..* Pg. 29

¹⁰² Jaggar Alison. *Feminist ethics.* Pg. 42

¹⁰³ Wollstonecraft, Marry. *Vindication of theRights of Women.* Ch. 2

¹⁰⁴ Held, Virginia. *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, And Global..* Pg. 14

practical domain of morality from a different door, thus their perception of moral issues are different. She also questioned Kohlberg's theory of moral stages where he showed that women are morally inferior to men. Later Nel Noddings like Wollstonecraft raised the question regarding women's education. She says that men seem to be more practical and rational to women because of the education they get. Women should also be educated so that they can develop their own way of thinking.¹⁰⁵ To understand one's right and moral responsibility education plays the primary role.

Margaret Walker questions the notion of universality in the dominant moral theories because moral issues vary from individual to individual and moral understanding entails 'attention, contextual and narrative appreciation and communication in the event of moral deliberation'¹⁰⁶. Traditional moral theory emphasises that only an independent and autonomous agent is able to act morally. Jean Keller points out that a moral agent is a "burdened self", he is always seen in relationships with others and is also partially constituted by those relationships.

Now, the question arises: Is there another way to deal and solve all these problems within the domain of these ethical theories? In answer to this question, care ethicists argue that these theories have eliminated one gender and that needs to be dealt and presented as another alternative theory. Traditional ethical theories are tuned to the ears of men and talks about justice, autonomy independence and rationality. They devalued the qualities like relatedness, emotional and so on. Women are often addressed by many classical thinkers as incapable of moral development.

The origination of a new theory in ethical discourse can be traced with the second wave of feminism, in the mid 20th century worldwide. Where, women started questioning for their human rights of reproduction and family issues which indirectly turns to moral responsibilities towards society and towards them. Simone De Beauvoir, Mary Wollstonecraft and others are the parts of first Wave Feminism and wrote about right to equality for women. The traditional moral theories were claimed inadequate by several feminists and non-feminist care ethicists and they offered several alternatives. The first and foremost question was about the need for a theory which can eradicate gender bias from moral philosophy itself. As Fiona Robinson claims that traditional moral theories value independence, autonomy, independence, non interference, self-determination, fairness, and

¹⁰⁵ Noddings, Nel. . ch.1. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*.

¹⁰⁶ Collins, Stephanie. *The Core of Care Ethics*. Pg 19

rights and devalued private life where one is related to each other and their positive involvement in the lives of other. By overlooking the private sphere of human beings, traditional ethical theories lacked one aspect of morality which is interdependence that enables a kid to be a morally responsible individual. This section will try to show the necessity of a new moral theory over traditional ethical theories.

In the third chapter, how the beginning of the theorisation of feminist ethics came into being in the work of Carol Gilligan in the form of care ethics will be discussed. The origination of new ethical system demanded to raise female voice in the language of morality which was missing since decades or which was suppressed. The care ethicists' goal was to provide a new synthesis of normative commitments. They argued against principle theories in order to come on a theory which is more contextual and relational. Thus, this new theory shed light on dependency, emotions, and relations as significant moral aspects of human life. Morality cannot rest on abstract principles. The Care ethical approach is not only significant in the moral world; it also has a great impact in analysing real-world ethical problems and political problems. As Virginia Held says care is both practice and value. It is practice as it is based on a mosaic of insights and she writes:

“It has been developed as a moral theory relevant not only to the so-called private realms of family and friendship but to medical practice, law, political life, the organisation of society, war and international relations”¹⁰⁷

By questioning a stagnant methodology based on deductive and mathematical approach of dealing with human conduct, Carol Gilligan in her work *In a Different Voice* tried to present an inductive, contextual and psychological way of morality.

The Need of a new theory was required because of the exclusion of one gender. The great philosophers like Immanuel Kant claimed that women are not fully moral beings because they use emotions over reason. For this, Annette Baier aptly writes:

“where Kant concludes ‘so much the worse for women,’ we can conclude ‘so much the worse for the male fixation on the special skill of drafting legislation, for the bureaucratic mentality of rule worship, and for the male exaggeration of the importance of independence over mutual interdependence.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global. Held, Virginia. Pg.9.

¹⁰⁸ Baier, Annette C. 1994. *Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. P. 26

Thus, to conclude this chapter discussed widely the need of new moral theories which is fair and all inclusive. In order to arrive with an ethics which have the capacity to embrace humanity as well as emotions and be fair in its respective form. Thus, here we need an ethics of care which is based on the nature relatedness.

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CHAPTER 3

CONTENDING POSITIONS ON ETHICS OF CARE

The third chapter will talk about the contending positions on care ethics. It will offer a critical conceptual analysis of the conventional ethical theories such as virtue ethics, deontological, and consequentialist. The primary concern of the present study is to draw conceptual insights for the understanding of the foreseeable presence of care as fundamental in morality. Annette Baier asked the need to have a moral theory which has to be in harmony with justice and care. Similarly, Virginia Held construes care as the most fundamental moral value which is inherited by every human being which is being devalued by conventional ethical theories. By giving women a voice in morality Gilligan Raises the concerns conventional ethical theories are neglecting. The basic nature of care giver is often symbolised by mother. Sara Ruddick talks about motherhood and mothering. This chapter attempted to raise the concerns of care in different layers.

This chapter is bifurcated between Carol Gilligan and Sara Ruddick. The two eminent care ethicists. Further division of the chapter is as follows:

- I) Carol Gilligan
 - a) Kohlberg's Moral Development theory
 - b) Between Voice and Silence
- II) Sara Ruddick
 - c) Mothering in Feminist Theories
 - d) Internal Critiques on Maternal Thinking: Eva Feder Kittay and Virginia Held

In a world where men are standard makers in social, political and moral philosophy, women are still occupied in making their presence felt. It has been accepted that genders may vary in every aspect but a problem arises when masculine traits are taken as universal and men's opinions are the only ones heard in moral matters. It is in this context that Ethics of Care seeks to provide a new normative commitment which has not been asked and raised in the conventional ethical systems.

Care ethicists are following a sentimentalist tradition of moral theory. The Emergence of care ethics as a distinct moral theory can be seen in Carol Gilligan and Nel Nel Noddings' work in mid-1980s. The Roots of care ethics can be seen in feminist thought but it is not synonymous with feminist ethics. Ethics of care emphasises the significance of contextual details while making a moral decision rather than seeking universal truths that are androcentric. Annette Baier, points out that care ethics does not completely discard the need of moral obligations rather she makes space for acceptance and acknowledgement of virtues

like trust, love, emotions, bonding, and relatedness. Virginia Held also emphasised that human values consist in dependency rather than independence and autonomy.

"...men tend to embrace an ethic of rights using quasi-legal terminology and impartial principles ... women tend to affirm an ethic of care that centers on responsiveness in an interconnected network of needs, care, and prevention of harm. Taking care of others is the core notion."¹⁰⁹

Gilligan and Nel Noddings raised the issue that conventional ethical theories undermined feminine values in moral developmental and ethical theories. Both provided a theoretical work on ethics of care and endorsed a noble way for dealing with ethical issues. Gilligan in her seminal work *In A Different Voice* claims that there is a difference in ethical voice of genders and our conventional moral developmental theories are able to efficiently raise the voice of male but female voice remained unheard. Her work helped to crystallize women's disagreement towards conventional ethical theories. It helped in presenting the problems in conventional ethical theories in a more concrete manner.

The need of a new ethical theory arises because of the realisation that the responsibilities one can fundamentally channelize from relationships between individuals instead of abstract rules and formal principles are not discussed in ethical regime. It must not be ignored that morality is, after all, meant to be society oriented, thus highlighting the fact that we all are interdependent individuals. One can trace the presence of the idea of care in one way or another in classical moral theories. Aristotle is famous for his idea of man as a "social animal"; Hume is famous for seeing reason as the slave of the passions; Kant is famous for his account of the duty of beneficence; Hegel is famous for his emphasis on human inter-subjectivity.

Moral theories, according to care ethicists, need to be grounded in empathy instead of duties or principles. Michael Slote in her book *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* states that empathy is an essential aspect of care ethics which stimulates a caring attitude towards the individual whereas principle theories devalue personal relationships and portray relatedness as a weakness of a moral agent.¹¹⁰ According to conventional moral theorists moral agents should be rational and autonomous so that they can execute their will and act morally. Stephanie Collins writes:

¹⁰⁹Beauchamp, L, Tom and Childress, F, James *Principles of Biomedical Ethics...*Pg 371

¹¹⁰Slote, Micheal. *The Ethics of Care and Empathy*. Pg.7

“that at least some responsibilities aim at fulfilling the particular needs of vulnerable persons (including their need for empowerment), rather than the universal rights of rational agents; and that morality demands not just one-off acts, but also certain ongoing patterns of interactions with others and certain general attitudes and dispositions. Most importantly, care ethicists claim that morality demands cautions and attitudes of care, in addition to or even more importantly than those of respect, non-interference, and tit-for-tat reciprocity (which care ethicist see as over emphasised in other ethical and political theories”¹¹¹.

Part I

Carol Gilligan

In her seminal work *In a Different Voice*, Carol Gilligan focussed on two issues: first, men and women are different and they have different orientations to life. Second, developmental theories and existing ethical theories, in particular, undermine female interests and values. Locating the difference between two sexes she claimed that men and women have general psychological differences from infancy. She points out that a woman’s moral orientations and sensibilities involve a sense of concern or care where she feels connected with others. Men, on the other hand, perceive themselves as individuals, separate from others and are more concerned with abstract notions like justice. Gilligan says that this difference in orientations is because of the social environment in which the upbringing of child takes place.¹¹²

Carol Gilligan was influenced by Nancy Chodorow’s psychoanalysis account of reproduction She writes “mothers tend to experience their daughters as more like themselves, and more continuous with themselves”.¹¹³ In contrast, mothers treat sons quite differently by emphasising their masculinity in opposition to the mother’s femaleness. Boys, in defining themselves as masculine, separate their mothers from themselves, and “thus curtail their primary love and sense of emphatic tie”¹¹⁴.

Chodorow in order to explain individuation and relationship writes:

¹¹¹The Core of Care Ethics. Collins, Stephanie. Pg. 5

¹¹²*In a Different Voice: Psychological Thoery and Women’s Development*. Gilligan, Carol. Pg. 148

¹¹³The reproduction of mothering.Chodorow, Nancy. Pp. 24

¹¹⁴ Ibid. pg. 23

“Do not mean that women have ‘weaker’ ego boundaries than men, or are more prone to psychosis... girls emerge from this period with a basis for ‘empathy’ built into their primary definition of self in a way that boys do not”.¹¹⁵

Since two genders have different inclinations and also the way they perceive morality is different. Former related herself from relational values and compassion. On the other hand later associates himself from independence and separation finds relationships secondary. Gilligan also questioned Jean Piaget for equating male development with child development and she claimed that it is the upbringing that how one gender associates itself from the outer world. As Gilligan writes it:

“...for boys, and men, separation and individuation are critically tied to gender identity since separation from the mother is essential for the development of masculinity. For girls, and women, issues of femininity or feminine identity do not depend on the achievement of separation from the mother or on the progress of individuation”.¹¹⁶

Gilligan used an illustration in order present a thematic perspective. She took ‘Heinz dilemma’ from Kohlberg’s study. There are two children X (boy) and Y (girl). ‘Heinz’ is a man who has stolen an overpriced drug, as his wife is ill and he cannot afford to buy that drug. Both the children were asked for their perspectives on the dilemma Heinz was facing. X perceived the situation as a mathematical problem where he reasoned that Heinz ought to steal the drugs as the right to life is superior to the right to property. On the other hand, Y responded to the dilemma from the manner of a narrative and said that Heinz should be imprisoned for the crime of stealing the drugs as the situation could have been tackled by explaining to the druggist about the situation. Y was confident that the druggist would have agreed to help Heinz out.

Gilligan presented an approach which is an alternative to dominant moral theories. She said that there is a correlation between gender and morality. As, the above illustration suggests men are mostly concerned with moral reasoning dealing with principles that are abstract and universal in scope. In contrast, women are concerned with compassion, personal relationships and benefit for others.

In order to arrive at a theory which is different from the conventional approaches Carol Gilligan conducted several enquiries and tried to investigate the thought processes of

¹¹⁵ Ibid. Pg. 167

¹¹⁶ Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development..* Pg. 8

women who are facing moral dilemmas in their personal or professional lives. By comparing it with the enquiries conducted about men by Kohlberg, Gilligan concluded that the difference in approaches are similar to how men address to each other and the kind of language they use. Men are more inclined to making general principles and categorical assertions in order to make decisions of right and wrong. On the other hand women tend to use conceptions like responsibility and also narrow their focus on particular resolutions.

After Gilligan several feminist thinkers and philosophers like NelNel Noddings, Annette Baier, Virginia Held and so on challenged the dominant ethical theories and claimed that conventional ethical theories are modelled according to men and their needs.. Further they point out that our ethical reasoning has been presented in the quasi-mathematical form whereby ethical reasoning is considered to be developed only if it can employ universal principles. As Dryhl Kohen writes:

“ethical reasoning is not distinguished by any effort at consultation with others but rather by a desire to state, defend and apply universal principles. “ethical reasoning’ gets identified with one particular sort of thinking about human actions- namely, a principled, universalistic mode of reasoning... women treat situations and human character as fluid, paying attention to parties’ feelings and struggling to find some resolution of dilemmas acceptable to all parties. From the standpoint of male ethical theories, women’s reasoning appears to be ethically undeveloped, and women themselves immature and childlike”¹¹⁷

Carol Gilligan revealed one of the most important aspects of care ethics as moral deliberations. She investigated that there is difference in thought process of men and women in addressing moral dilemmas. Conventional ethical thinking is based on principles where it understands moral problems as conditionals say for instance if X, then Y statement with an imperative, on the other hand, women did not adhere to general principles of right and wrong. Gilligan talked about a world where humans embrace each other through connection rather than through rules and principles.

Gilligan asserted that care is a legitimate alternative but she did not deny the relevance of justice theory as well. She pointed out the lack in moral development theory especially proposed by Kohlberg. He gave six stages of moral development. First is where an individual avoid to be punished; second, where individuals starts understanding there are different individuals with different point of view; third, individual starts making good

¹¹⁷Koehn, Daryl. *Rethinking Feminist ethics: Care, Trust and Empathy* Pg.132

interpersonal relationships. Fourth, understandings and get awareness of wider rules of society; fifth, understands there are moral principles and should be abided in order to live in a society peacefully; sixth, there are a set of rules and principles which can guide everyone. The problem in the stages of moral development is that it is andocentric because sample made to arrive at the stages of moral theory is based on all-male samples. These stages reflect a male definition of morality.

a. Moral Theory: A Comparison Between Kohlberg and Gilligan

Lawrence Kohlberg claims that moral development is a six -stage process. In his investigation, Kohlberg divided moral development into three levels (Pre- Conventional, Conventional and Post- Conventional) and a six stage process. Stage one is the "punishment and obedience orientation". To avoid the pain of punishment and /or to receive the pleasure of reward, children do as they are told. Stage two is "the instrumental relativist orientation". Based on the notion of reciprocity -- scratch my back and I'll scratch yours-- children meet others' needs only if others meet their needs. Stage Three is the "good boy- nice girl" orientation. Adolescents adhere to prevailing norms to secure others' approval and love. Stage Four is the "Law and Order orientation". Adolescents develop a sense of duty, defer to authority figures, and maintain the social order to secure others' admiration and respect. Stage Five is the "Social -contract legalistic orientation". Adults adopt a utilitarian moral point of view according to which individuals may do as they please, provided they do not harm other people. Stage Six is "the universal ethical principle orientation". Adults adopt a Kantian moral perspective that transcends all conventional moralities. They are no longer ruled by self- interest, the opinions of others, or the fear of punishment, but by self- imposed universal principles:

Level-1(Pre- Conventional)

1. Obedience and punishment orientation

(How can I avoid punishment?)

2. Self- interest orientation

(What's in it for me?)

(Paying for a benefit)

Level 2 (Conventional)

3. Interpersonal accord and conformity

(Social norms)

(The good boy/ good girl attitude)

4. Authority and social -order maintaining orientation

(Law and order morality)

Level 3 (Post- Conventional)

5. Social contract orientation

6. Universal ethical principles

(Principles conscience)

Kohlberg took a survey according to which women were able to climb only till stage three whereas men were climbing till stage four or five.

Heinz's dilemma is a famous and frequently used example in many ethics and morality classes. One well- known version of the dilemma, used in Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development, is stated as follows:

“Heinz's was near death, and her only hope was a drug that had been discovered by a pharmacist who was selling for an exorbitant price. The drug cost \$20,000 to make, and the pharmacist was selling it for \$20,000. Heinz could only raise \$50,000 and insurance wouldn't make up the difference. He offered what he had to the pharmacist, and when his offer was rejected, Heinz said he would pay the rest later. Still the pharmacist refused. In desperation, Heinz considered stealing the drug. Would it be wrong for him to do that?

Should Heinz have broken into the store to steal the drug for his wife? Why or why not?

From a theoretical point of view, it is not important what the participant thinks that Heinz should do. Kohlberg's theory holds that the justification the participant offers is what is significant, the form of their response. Below are some of many examples of possible arguments that belong to the six stages: Stage one (obedience): Heinz should not steal the medicine because he will be consequently be put in prison which will mean he is bad person.

Or: Heinz should steal the medicine because it is only worth \$20,000 and not how much the druggist wanted for it; Heinz had even offered to pay for it and was not stealing anything else.”¹¹⁸

Stage two (self- interest): Heinz should steal the medicine because he will be much happier if he saves his wife, even if he will have to serve a prison sentence. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine because prison is an awful place, and he would more likely languish in a jail cell than over his wife's death.

Stage three (conformity): Heinz should steal the medicine because his wife expects it; he wants to be a good husband. Or: Heinz should not steal the drug because stealing is bad and he is not a criminal; he has tried to do everything he can without breaking the law, you cannot blame him.

Stage four (law- and- order): Heinz should not steal the medicine because the law prohibits stealing, making it illegal. Or: actions have consequences.

Stage five (human rights): Heinz should steal the medicine, because everyone has a right to choose life, regardless of the law. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine because the scientist has a right to fair compensation. Even if his wife is sick, it does not make his actions right.

Stage six (universal human ethics): Heinz should steal the medicine, because saving a human life is a more fundamental value than the property rights of another person. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine, because others may need the medicine as badly, and their lives are equally significant. As it was mentioned before Gillian was Kohlberg's assistant but eventually she became independent and began to criticize some of Kohlberg's work.

b) Gilligan against Kohlberg

Gilligan believes changes in women's rights change women's moral judgements, seasoning mercy with justice by enabling women to consider it moral to care not for others but for themselves. The issue of inclusion first raised by the feminists in the public domain reverberates through the psychology of women as women as they begin to notice their own exclusion of themselves.

¹¹⁸ Carol Gilligan. *In a Different Voice*. p.134.

"When the concern with care extends from an injunction not not hurt others to an ideal of responsibility in social relationships, women begin to see their understanding of relationships as a source of moral strength. But the concept of rights also changes women's moral judgements by adding a second perspective to the consideration of moral problems, with the result that judgement becomes more tolerant and less absolute."¹¹⁹

Gilligan asserts that women have differing moral and Psychological tendencies than men. According to Gilligan, men think in terms of rules and justice and women are more inclined to think in terms of caring and relationships. She asks that Western society begin to value both equally. She outlines three stages of moral development progressing from selfish, to social or conventional morality, and finally to post conventional or principled morality.

According to Gilligan the stage on a scale of increasing moral maturity calibrated by the logic of the boy's response misses the different truth revealed in the judgement of the girl. To the question 'what does he see that she does not?' Kohlberg's theory provides a ready response, manifest in the scoring of boys. She writes:

"The contrast between a self-defined through separation and a self-delineated through connection, between a self-measured against an abstract ideal of perfection and a self-assessed through particular activities of care, becomes clearer and the implications of this contrast extend by considering the different ways these children resolve a conflict between responsibility to others and responsibility to self. The question about responsibility followed a dilemma posed by a woman's conflict between her commitments to work and to family relationships. While the details of this conflict between her commitments to world and to family relationships. While the details of this conflict color the text of Amy's response, Jake abstracts the problem of responsibility from the context in which it appears, replacing the themes of intimate relationship with his own imagery of explosive connection".¹²⁰

Gilligan is certainly aware of anti-essentialist criticisms, and has responded to them both theoretically and methodologically. This makes her an unusual and instructive figure in the essential debates. many feminist philosophers are content to pursue the theoretical issues subsumed under "essentialism" without giving thought to how they might inflect practice, while many feminist social researchers remain intent on pursuing methodologies that are uncritically second wave. Thus the preoccupation of most of Gilligan's third wave readers with exclusively critical analyses of *In a Different Voice* does a disservice to the increasing

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.149.

¹²⁰Ibid., p-32.

nuance and sophistication of her prolific work during the fourteen years since the book's publication.

The challenge facing third wave of feminist theory lies in the observation that neither interminable deconstruction nor uncritical reification of category "women" is adequate to the demands of feminist practice. The task we have inherited is to take seriously the commitments entailed in anti-essentialism but to find ways effectively to incorporate them into resistive political projects. Gilligan's *Between Voice and Silence* represents departure from her earlier work in its explicit consideration of race and class in the context of articulating girls' psychology. Yet Gilligan continues to make strong general claims about gender, as a basis both for important analytical distinctions in psychological development and for feminist political mobilization.

Gilligan does not deny that some men use the ethic of care in thinking about moral problems, or that the ethic is shaped by conditions of oppression. She does not simply describe a universal and "essential feminine", but instead delineates a resistant and critical ethical perspective that challenges womanly self-sacrifice and unqualified caring and struggles to incorporate a self-protective attitude with the desire for relationship with others. Indeed, in her later work she is increasingly explicit about how patriarchal oppression creates the necessary conditions for female crises of connection, and she construes her research as an explicitly feminist intervention.¹²¹

While talking about feminism and subjugation of women we cannot overlook the dispute which is going among feminists themselves. The privileged and white women are being called an 'essentialist' for talking about gender without addressing the problems of caste, class, and race and about sexual and cultural difference among women themselves. Both white and black women criticise them by saying that it is a biased society driven by class and caste and race and those who are on dominant position remains blind about the problems of subordinates which extends to women in the society as well. Women from privileged position set higher standards for women but they are more forgiving towards men.

Often the choice of being silent or speak up everything seems a false dichotomy. The possibilities for women either to fight fruitlessly with the infinite political complexities or give up fight altogether and be a part of subjugation surrounds her often. Though Gilligan attempted to resolve the issues of anti-essentialism but she could not implement completely

¹²¹Cressida J. Heyes. "Anti-Essentialism in Practice: Carol Gilligan and Feminist". p-149.

in epistemological and political concerns. While talking about voice and silence she tries to build a political feminist concerns which is dwindling between race and class among women themselves.

Gilligan refutes the claims that she is building a dichotomy of universal claims about girls and boys. According to her she is trying to bring an interpretative method which can sketch the different alternative ways to conceptualise a relationship rather than fixing it to a gender schism.

Gilligan is more concern about the finding the facts about girls which is untouched and still waiting to be discovered. With the past enquiries she also says that her pre-conceptions have changed. Her methodology plays a very crucial role in arriving to theoretical conclusions.

“But Carol Gilligan’s method does predispose the investigator to elide or overlook how race, class, and other salient group differences shape processes of theory construction. This seems representative of those shortcomings and second wave feminists often exhibit in trying to respond to third wave anti-essentialist critiques. Difference is often incorporated into second wave feminist’s projects in a formulaic way, placing disproportionate emphasis on formal inclusion (adding participants from “other” social groups, for example) and less on examining the deeper methodological implications of anti-essentialist criticisms.”¹²²

As we have found the roots of intolerance- whether racist, sexist, or homophobic in the traumatic rupture of intimate relationships that marks the initiation into patriarchy, so the splits between mind and body, thought and emotions, self and relationships signal a dissociation that keeps us from knowing what we otherwise would know. it impedes the voice of experience, grounded in the body and in emotion and fostered by relationships, that would speak to the voices of authority, thus posing a threat to democracy in much the same ways that totalitarianism targets the functions of human mind. We see children, boys around five and girls at adolescence, resisting an initiation that would confuse their ability to read the human world and impede them from saying what they feel and think and know. In recent advances in the human sciences, most notably in developmental psychology and neurobiology, we see evidence of a paradigm shift, reframing what once was seen as a resistance to development as a resistance to losing the grounds of our ethical and emotional intelligence.

¹²²Cressida J. Heyes. “Anti-Essentialism in Practice: Carol Gilligan and Feminist”. p-154

Moral reasoning always takes place from some standpoint or other: there is no neutral place from which one can appreciate fully all the various aspects of a situation. Gilligan's earliest psychological studies demonstrate the significance of this fact; she traces moral development in a way that delivers results that contrast significantly with the findings of her mentor, Lawrence Kohlberg.

In her research, Gilligan records the ways in which people tend to respond to moral dilemmas from different, and mutually exclusive, point of view, thus can be seen as lending support to the sort of perceptual account of moral reasoning espoused by Murdoch since the mid-1950s. Needless to say that, the idea was not entirely original with Murdoch either. Murdoch's view of moral experience was strongly influenced by Simone Weil, and it is thus no surprise to find in a number of Weil's writings that she too rejected the notion that our experience typically consists in an objective perception of the world to which we then give an interpretation.

Tong to discover Gilligan's moral development theory through focusing on the asymmetrical role of intimacy and self-individuation in men's and women's lives, Gilligan notes that the importance of separation and autonomy for men often leads them to centre discussions of morality around issues of justice, fairness, rules, and rights, whereas the importance of family and friends for women often leads them to centre discussions of morality around people's wants, needs, interest, and aspirations. Gilligan also suggests that for women, much more than for men, moral development means learning how to integrate other-directed demands with self-centred concerns. During the process of their development, women supposedly move in and out of these three stages:

1. An overemphasis on self
2. An overemphasis on others;
3. A proper emphasise on self in relation to others.

Although a woman's moral development from an overly self-centred position to an overly other directed position, and finally to a self-in-relation-to –others position is never final, as woman morally matures, an increasing number of her decisions will follow Level Three patterns.¹²³

¹²³ Rosemarie Tong. *Feminine and Feminist Ethics*.p-85.

Part II

Sara Ruddick

Sara Ruddick is the author of *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (1989). Ruddick is most famous for her analysis of the practices of thinking and epistemological perspective that emerges from the care for children. She argues that mothering is a conscious activity that calls for choices, daily decisions and a continuing alert reflectiveness. She is one of the most important philosophers which turn both feminists and non-feminist understanding from motherhood.

Feminist philosopher, Sara (Sally) Ruddick, taught philosophy at the New School of Social Research. She is the author or editor of a number of books but well known for her theory about mothering in her early paper, "Maternal Thinking" and her influential work, *Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace*. She advances a view on mothering as active, ethical and engaged with the world, correcting conventional conceptions of motherhood as passive, automatic and thoroughly private. As she wrote:

"I speak about a mother's thought—the intellectual capacities she develops, the judgements she makes, the metaphysical attitudes she assumes, and the values she affirms. A mother engages in a discipline. That is, she asks certain questions rather than others; she establishes criteria for the truth, adequacy, and relevance of proposed answers; and she cares about the findings she makes and can act on... To describe the capacities judgements, metaphysical attitudes, and values of maternal thought does not presume maternal achievement. It is to describe a conception of achievement, the end to which maternal efforts are directed, conceptions and ends that are different from dominant public ones".¹²⁴

Although care-focused feminism informed primarily by ethics of care as developed by Carol Gilligan and Nel Nel Noddings but at the same time ethics of care is also a basis for care-focused feminist theorising on maternal ethics. Critical of how society engenders caring labor, theorists Sara Ruddick, Virginia Held, and Eva Feder Kittay suggest caring should be performed and care givers valued in both public and private spheres. Their theories recognise caring as an ethically relevant issue. But before starting to examine Ruddick's theory, we should have a look at history of the way that other feminists thinking and writing about mothering.

¹²⁴ Sara Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace*. p-24

a) Mothering in Feminist Theories: The Second Sex

We start with De Beauvoir's claim in *Second Sex* that "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman"¹²⁵. This entails an elimination of the claim of biological determinism, the authoritative claim of psychological and anatomical fixity of reproductive diversity among two sexes. It says loud that men and women are different biologically but femininity and masculinity is socially developed character of the sexes. The primary quest raised by feminist theory is that how a woman or a man can be provided best by a socially constructed approach in order to identify formation? This is why, the feminist constructive approach distinguishes in two terms 'sex' and 'gender'. Sex can be seen as anatomical and physiological distinctions among humans whereas gender is derived from social and political significance imposed by society.

In the first wave of feminism gendered body become a part of phenomenological investigation. Beauvoir is the flag bearer of that. She changed that. She argued for equality in two different ways. First, she exposed the way masculine ideologies exploits the biological difference to create a system of unequal society. Second, the ways of conduct of arguments to present masculinity as the only human type thus the question of inequality remains silent. She targeted Plato. According to Plato sex is just an accidental quality. Further he says that men and women both can become a part of guardian class but women have to qualify that class. This training will be based on her way of living and conducting herself like a man does. This shows a complete enforcement of patriarchy or masculine traits on woman. His argument qualifies masculinity as universal. This is why one can say that sexual difference was always there. Beauvoir always emphasised on equal roles of sexes. She urges that men and women both must treat each other equally in order to overcome with this crisis of inequality and subjugation.

Simone De Beauvoir in *The Second Sex* argues about the freedom of women. However, the whole idea of equality and freedom does not come to practicality in terms of the society and therefore, according to Beauvoir it is very difficult to see equality between the 'first sex' and 'the second sex' yet it seems impossible to ignore this belief. As a 'phenomenologist' she is compelled to examine women's unique experiences about their bodies. Along with that she also concluded how these experiences are 'co-determined' by what 'phenomenology' calls it as "the everyday attitude (the common-sense assumptions that we unreflectively bring to our experience)." As a feminist phenomenologist assessing the

¹²⁵Simone, de ,Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, p-301.

meanings of the female body, Beauvoir explores the ways that ‘cultural assumptions frame women’s experience of their bodies and alienate them from their body’s possibilities’. For example, it is assumed that women are the weaker sex. What, she directs us to ask, is the ground of this assumption? There is hardly any basis for such kinds of assumptions and therefore she seems to be defying such beliefs.

“One is not born but becomes a woman”, is one of the most researched and noted saying of her. It seems to be the most believed as well as it is the society which makes a woman a woman. What is not a matter of dispute is that *The Second Sex* gave us expressions for analysing the ‘social constructions of femininity’ and ‘a method for critiquing these constructions’. By not accepting the common sense idea that to be born with female genitalia is to be born a woman, she draws a clear line to depict the difference a male society creates. In this way *The Second Sex* pursues the first rule of phenomenology: “identify your assumptions, treat them as prejudices and put them aside; do not bring them back into play until and unless they have been validated by experience.”

Taken within the context of its contemporary philosophical scene, *The Second Sex* is suggested to be a phenomenological analysis ‘waiting to happen’. It was a woman who taught us to bracket the assumption that the lived body’s sex/gender was accidental to its lived relations, positions, engagements, etc. is a matter of history. What was a phenomenological breakthrough became in *The Second Sex* a laboratory tool: by attending to the ways that patriarchal structures used the sexual difference to deprive women of their “can do” bodies, Beauvoir made the case for ‘declaring this deprivation oppressive’. Taken within the context of the feminist movement, this declaration of oppression was an event for the women. It opened the way for the consciousness-raising that characterised ‘second-wave feminism’; it validated women’s experiences of injustice.

Several concepts are crucial to the argument of *The Second Sex*. The concept of the ‘Other’ is introduced early in the text and drives the entire analysis. It has also become a critical concept in theories that analyse the oppressions of colonised, enslaved and other exploited people.

Beauvoir bases her idea of the ‘Other’ on Hegel’s account of the ‘master-slave dialectic’. Instead of the terms “master” and “slave”, however, she uses the terms “Subject” and “Other”. “The ‘Subject’ is the absolute. The ‘Other’ is the inessential.” Unlike Hegel who universalised this dialectic, Beauvoir distinguishes the dialectic of exploitation between

historically constituted Subjects and Others from the exploitation that ensues when the Subject is Man and the Other is Woman. In the first case those marked as Other experience their oppression as a communal reality. They see themselves as part of an oppressed group. Here, oppressed Others may call on the resources of a common history and a shared abusive situation to assert their subjectivity and demand recognition and reciprocity.

Between the statement and the question we discover that the ethical-political issue of fulfilment does not concern a woman's happiness. Happiness may be chosen or accepted in exchange for the deprivations of freedom. Recalling the argument of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* we know why. It seems, as a child they experience the happiness brought about by bad faith—a kind of happy state for not being responsible for themselves, of not having to make substantial choices.

Beauvoir keeps on moving between the statements that women are pleased with their alienated status as the other and the question, "How can women achieve human fulfilment" Beauvoir argues that women's exploitation is historical, and therefore amenable to change. As an existential situation, however, women are responsible for changing it. Further, though Beauvoir alerts us to the tensions and conflicts that this will create between men and women, she does not envisage a permanent war of the sexes. Here her Hegelian-Marxist optimism prevails. Men will (ultimately) recognise women as free subjects.

This idea of being a subject is itself a question mark as per Beauvoir. She takes into consideration the mental state which is directed by the physicality of a woman (at least in a woman's context) in order to give her thoughts away in a systematic way. In this way, Beauvoir's analysis of a woman's body is through the social point of view and the physical features of a woman. It seems to a fact as well to agree with to an extent.

By addressing an approach which is phenomenological she targets the completeness of women drawn by society. Women's motherhood, makes her complete (supposedly). She questioned the role of mothering and the desire of being mother which is not universal and also is a criteria opted by women according to their will rather than enforcement.

Motherings have been a central focus of feminist theory. She writes:

"Analyses processes through which gender identities are socially constructed have examined the relationship of exclusively female mothering and social reproduction of masculinity in men and femininity in women. Explorations of the sources and forms of women's oppression have focussed on its relationship to the social assignment of the role or work of mothering

women, and some feminist thinkers have argued that this division of labour is historically and culturally pervasive. Analysis of women's oppression in relationship to the organization of societies around a public and private dichotomy and to the development of the modern nuclear family also suggests that women's oppression is in some way connected to mothering.”¹²⁶

Feminist theory's has contributed both social and political empowerment to women. The social constructivism by feminists developed a perspective to analyse mothering. Before this mothering was restricted to biological analysis which was destined naturally or is based on the notion that mothering is destined to women and is a function of “maternal instinct”. Besides this, under patriarchal arrangement women were limited to reproduction capacity. Her identity was crushed into one role of her being a womb bearer but nothing more than that.

The most dominant concepts of femininity and mothering are the major developments in history. The distinction culturally rooted concept of mothering came in focus and people started understanding that biological aspect of mothering provides a sense of neutrality over culturally constructed functions of mothering. Another significant development of this social constructivism is that is also enabled one to comprehend the variations between reproduction, or the activities of child rearing etc. The distinction of private and personal sphere was also taking shape in a different way. This is how it was providing a base for redefining mothering altogether. Deconstruction and reconstruction was a huge part of it.

The deconstruction of mothering was also spreading the political sphere. This new social constructivism was providing mobilization to women impacting a common identity of women. Huge range of arguments were surfacing the perspective of women in this 21st century can feel the change and breathe in less suffocated air. For example, de Beauvoir, there is no such a thing as a maternal instinct. It is a patriarchal fabrication which can instil maternal guilt because women's reactions to their motherhood are very variable. “No maternal instinct exists the mother attitude depends on her total situation and her reaction to it”¹²⁷.

After de Beauvoir, many feminist scholars wrote about motherhood and being a mother, one of the most influential is Adrienne Rich. Her works about motherhood, is a significant work which influenced the perception of whole generation of scholars think

¹²⁶ Simone de Beauvoir. *The Second Sex*.p-326.

¹²⁷ Ibid, p-526.

about motherhood. Rich opens her book with an observation “we know more about air we breathe, the seas we travel, than about the nature and meaning of motherhood...”¹²⁸. In the book she claims that the meaning of motherhood is neither natural nor inevitable, it is the human condition any more than rape, prostitution and slavery are, rather motherhood in Rich’s words, has a history, it has ideology.

Adrienne Rich in her autobiography mentions that “the personal is political”, and highlights on the maternal aspect which according to her is a complex and thoughtful concept. She claims that even mothering is defined and constructed on the basis of patriarchal ideology rather than femininity. Her perspective of motherhood can be understood in two ways: one is as “experience” and other is as an “institution”. Rich classifies motherhood into two dimensions and defines them accordingly. In two definitions one is superimposed motherhood and other is potential relationship between women and mothering. Potential relationship comprehends her power to be mother and thus enable her to build a healthy relationship between being mother and child. The second one which is institutionalised is one which tries to dominate this potential relationship and guides her to be in control of a male. For Rich, the term motherhood is used to signify the patriarchal institution of motherhood while mothering refers to women’s live experiences of childrearing as they both conform to or resist the patriarchal institution of motherhood and its operative ideology. She writes:

“To destroy the institution is not to abolish motherhood; it is to release the creation and sustenance of life into the same realm of decision, struggle, surprise, imagination and conscious intelligence, as any difficult, but freely chosen work.”¹²⁹

In addition to this contribution, Rich also spells out “the corporeal ground of our intelligence”. Rich’s interest in motherhood as an on-going corporeal relationship process. She elaborates “we are neither inner nor outer constructed; our skin is alive with signals, our lives and our deaths are inseparable from the release or blockage of our thinking bodies”¹³⁰. This emphasis on embodied acts of thinking and politicization is extended in Rich’s later writings, in which she becomes more conscious of the partiality of her location as a feminist writer and the need to turn from declarations of “the body” toward inscriptions of “my body”?

¹²⁸ Andrea, O’Reilly, *Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution*. p-11.

¹²⁹ Adrienne, Rich, *Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution*. p-280.

¹³⁰ Colleen, Bradshaw. “Thinking Through the Body: Phases of Feminism” in Adrienne Rich’s Later Poetry. p-284.

In *Of Woman Born*, Rich names her experiences as part of a critical interpretive process activating memory and speech by “thinking through body” which is a part of her larger understanding of “thinking as an active, fluid, expanding process; intellection, and knowing are recapitulations of past processes.

Rich not attempted to theorised mothering but she essentially distinguished the two terms which are mothering and motherhood. She says that mothering is an empowered position a woman hold. The narrative of motherhood is deconstructed by her. She says mothering gives power to women to resist against the patriarchal frame of motherhood. Motherhood is deeply rooted in patriarchal society which tries to make women to be controlled by men.

b. Internal Critique on Maternal Thinking: Eva Feder and Virginia Held

Eva Feder Kittay is another prominent care ethicist who extended Gilligan and Ruddick’s theories and we have noted many times to her critiques and opinions. Initially her personal experience of mothering will be referred to and then her new achievements in ethics of care will be looked through. Kittay took a narrative of her daughter Sesha, who is affectionate and like any other human being she loves good dresses, she enjoys music, she admirers people etc. But she cannot walk, read or talk and in future the chances are almost zero. Because of the congenital cerebral palsy and also severe mental retardation she is completely or largely dependent on others. Sesha at the same time needs companionship, love and care. Here Kittay pinpoints that Shesha’s need for care is an important criticism to dormant theories of social justice and she urges that there should be a change in re-conceptualization of both social justice and political arrangements.

The conjunction of theoretical, social and personal perspectives is partly a matter of Kittay’s wide interests and a useful organisation of the material; first the theory, then the politics, then the personal story. However, the power of the conjunction seems more interesting than that, as retrospectively, each perspective appears to include or be imbued with the others. Ruddick says: “*Love Labour: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency*” is a welcome addition to feminist critiques of liberal theory and of the idea of equality. It will surely contribute to a feminist ethics of care that is committed to justice for and among caregivers. She writes “I attribute the power of this focus to the book’s conjunction of

differing perspectives-theoretical, social/political, and personal-that create a rich and variegated understanding of what dependency means and requires”¹³¹.

Ethics of care believes that we all are interdependent and because of this interconnectedness we are obligated to proactively help those who are in need. Being interdependent is universal as at various times in our lives we are dependent on other for their care. As Engster wrote “we all depend upon the caring of others to reproduce society and to make civic life possible . . . we are all unavoidably and deeply dependent upon the care of others”¹³². Thus a theory of caring should be adopted, where an agent is responsible for providing basic needs to others.

The notion of caring in medical field is evident but it is almost ignored when it comes to theoretical work on caring for dependent. Kittay raised the concern that care of dependent is a very crucial issue and it should be discussed theoretically like any other moral theory. By ignoring this aspect of care we are unintentionally trivializing an emotional, personal and bodily need of dependents. This is also one of the ways to confront dominant theories by dismissing such attitudes of dependency. Kittay gives two ways to understand the concept of care of dependents: first is “connection-based equality” which is rooted in relationship. Secondly, the engagement of John Rawl’s political theory. She urges for the amendment of principle of justice by making an addition of principle of social responsibility for care. Kittay argues that

“The ability to acknowledge dependency and dependency workers is a criterion for the adequacy of any theory claiming to be egalitarian, that Rawls’s theory judged by this criterion is inadequate, and that dependency must be faced from the beginning of any egalitarian project that hopes to include all persons within its scope”¹³³.

“Humans are social animals” indicates one of the most significant features of humans that Kittay is also pointing that is ‘dependency’. We all know that dependency is the basic criterion for our survival. We all are dependent on others. Though dependency is not an exceptional condition to human beings it is also not a persistent condition to us. We all are dependent on other at some point of time in our lives and we are always liable to become dependent on someone.

¹³¹ Sara, Ruddick, *An Appreciation of Love’s Labor*. p-214.

¹³²Gheaus, Anca. "The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory, by Daniel Engster." P.39.

¹³³Ibid., p-29.

By saying that dependency is an inevitable part of human survival I also mean that there are degrees of dependencies. This degree varies from our bodily ability. Say for instance, an infant is highly dependent on its parents for the survival whereas a young child needs someone to care but his/her degree of need of care will be slightly low than that of an infant. There are exceptional dependencies as well that comes in absolutely different circumstance. Like in Sarah's case the dependency from the begging of her birth till the time she will live is inevitable. She needs an affectionate environment full of care to make her survival healthier and easier. Here both the dependent and the care giver both are committed to each other. Dependency is a need or requirement for the survival of each other in society. It can be directly or indirectly each one of us is always connected with the thread of dependency.

According to Kittay the normal variations of dependency insure the existence of dependents that have needs that "must" be met. For the most part, down the years and across the world, women have been assigned and have accepted tome-consuming, life-shaping responsibilities for the care of dependents. The consequences of taking on this work differ enormously in different cultural and personal circumstances.

Ruddick writes that:

"Kittay restricts dependency work to meet the needs of someone who cannot, in principle, meet them by themselves. Bringing food to a healthy but grieving friend presumably would not count but bringing a bedpan for a bed confined patient would. This restrictive definition is meant to emphasise the work of meeting needs. It also excludes women's conventional service to others, especially to healthy adult. An indirect virtue of this restrictive definition is to remind us of the neediness the helplessness, of the charge whose needs must be met by another."¹³⁴

Virginia Held asserts, on the other hand, that mothering is perhaps the most culturally influential activity of all. It is essentially the activity of creating new social persons who will potentially transform society. She acknowledges that:

"All human beings are both animal and human, but that it is absurd to make the distinction between "man" and other animals without also distinguishing between "woman" and other animals. We all perform biological functions, but none of these is completely separable from the cultural context in which they are done. Consider nursing an infant, often thought of as the

¹³⁴Ibid., p-221.

epitome of a biological process, and with which mothering is associated and women are identified. there is no more reason to think of human nursing as simply biological than there is to think this way of, say, a businessman's lunch. Eating is a biological process, but what and how and with whom we eat are thoroughly cultural."¹³⁵

However, Held's approach of maternal thinking is different from Sara Ruddick. According to her women dedicate a huge amount time in mothering and she should develop moral theories which is appropriate for developing moral theories that suits the kind of relationships that is characterise as private rather than public domain. although Held knows that not all women live in the private world, and although she does not believe that all women are determined by nature to have a distinctive set of moral experiences, she nonetheless claims that a sizable gap exists between women's and men's moral experience. it concerns her that conventional western ethics not only discounts women's morality but presents what amounts to men's morality as gender neutral, however, it would not favour paradigms- for example, the contract model-that speaks much more to men's experience than to women's. In Held's estimation, too many conventional western ethicists bless a human relationship as moral to the degree that it serves the separate interests of individual rational contractors. Yet life is about more than conflict, competition, and controversy-about cooperation, consensus, and community-about meeting other people's needs. held speculates that were the relationship between mothering person and a child, rather than the relationship between two rational contractors, the paradigm for good human relationship between two rational contractors, the paradigm for good human relationships, society might look very different.¹³⁶

Held concedes, that the kind of relationships that exists between mothering persons and children can be just as oppressive- indeed, even more oppressive-than the relationship that exists between two rational contractors. For example, it is sometimes harder to recognize abuses of power in a father-son relationship than in an employer-employee relationship. A father's subtle pressure that his artistic son gives up the theatre and goes to law school may not be as evident an abuse of power as the executive who steals his assistant's ideas and presents them as his own, but both situations exploit and undercut the autonomy of the two relatively powerless agents involved.

Held also admits that, in their attempt to celebrate the positive features of maternal Ethics, some maternal thinkers unnecessarily reject the valuable features of conventional

¹³⁵ Virginia Held. "Feminist Reconceptualizations in Ethics".p-103.

¹³⁶ Virginia Held. "Feminism and Moral Theory", pp, 112-127

ethics. a maternal ethics can handle the concerns that surpass the “moral minimum” of considering every individual’s rights with seriousness does not imply that it can bestow with “moral minimum”. She further adds that the mothering woman is both fair and compassionate; she is rational and emotional. Mothering persons has the capability to make generalisations as well as articulate the uniqueness in human relations. Like principles the relationships can also be categorised as good and bad and they are too subject to these qualifications and evaluations. Unlike some maternal thinkers, Held believes that:

“Men as well as women can be mothering persons. Just because men cannot bear children does not mean that they cannot rear children. Men as well as women can, indeed should, appropriate the moral outlook of those who care for others. Leaving care giving to women alone produces boys with relatively combative and insensitive personalities. Because bellicose, unfeeling boys usually mature into bellicose, unfeeling men in positions of power, Held claims that human survival may depend on our ability to recognize the way we parent. Equal parenting, based on men’s and women’s equal respect and consideration for each other’s equal rights of self-determination must become the order of the day.”¹³⁷

To conclude in this chapter we discussed two very significant issues which are both feminist and non-feminist. Mothering and care both the concepts carry a huge weight of moral values. The dependency worker does deserve respect and equality. The historical study of the notion of mothering through feminist thought and in feminist thought elaborates how our moral theories give no attention to women and their moral inclinations. This chapter spread light on different kinds of dependency and also different interpretation of mothering.

¹³⁷ Virginia Held. “The Obligations of Mothers and Fathers”.pp- 9-20.

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CHAPTER 4

RE-THINKING ETHICS OF CARE: HAPPINESS AND EDUCATION

In this chapter, I will examine care ethics in the context of Happiness and Education with reference to Nel Nel Noddings, the American feminist, Educationalist, mathematician and philosopher who grew and developed the ethics of care, and followed it to its logical conclusions in ethical, Educational and political theories. The questions concerning the relationship between caring and ethics will be examined. The evaluation of the relations between ethical education and care theory will address the issues concerning i) Happiness; ii) From Home to Society and; iii) Practical Lessons for Educating Citizens for Global Awareness. The basic research questions will be how Nel Noddings' ethic of care goes along with the educational system. This chapter has been bifurcated into two parts:

1. Happiness: An Elementary Aim of Education
2. Nel Noddings: Ethical Education and Care Theory.

Part I

Happiness: An Elementary Aim of Education

Education is a significant aspect to mankind. It allows one to explore their inner being and extend its essence to others with humility. Moreover, at its core, education allows one to nurture their strengths, which is an addition to well-being or happiness. Happiness is one of the most contested terms in philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we will be looking at happiness defined by Aristotle and its significance to education narrated by Nel Noddings. Happiness, widely, understood into two subject matters:

- a. State of mind (understood as psychological disposition).
- b. A perfect life for a person who is leading it.

In the first case the concept of Happiness is nothing but an emotion. And in the later definition it is a value.¹³⁸ We will discuss Happiness according to the later definition. Happiness is understood as well-being, welfare, utility and so on.

Aristotle in his most influential work *Nicomachean Ethics* presented the theory of happiness. He emphasised on the questions 'what is the ultimate aim of human existence?' 'What is the ultimate end towards our activities are directed?' human beings are seeking

¹³⁸<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/> 18.9.2019.

wealth, pleasure, reputation and so on. But after attaining these attributes satisfaction is absent. Thus, Aristotle defined happiness as the final end because an ultimate end must be self-sufficient. He writes “that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else”¹³⁹.

According to him happiness is the end which every individual seeks to attain and is self-sufficient. Human’s greed for money, honour, pleasure is because these goods make humans happy. This is why; all good are just means towards happiness, whereas happiness is an end in itself. The goal of one’s life is to be happy. Happiness encompasses the entirety of one’s life. Happiness is different from pleasure. Happiness is more stable position one attains in life whereas pleasure is temporary based on sensation. This is the reason why one cannot declare about his life to be happy until it ends like one cannot say in half of a cricket match that it is a great match but after it finishes one makes the declaration that the match was great. Similarly we cannot say children are happy. As Aristotle says, "for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy"¹⁴⁰.

Aristotle also conducted biological investigations in order to explain human happiness. He distinguished nature into four different categories. Each category has different purpose and nature:

Mineral: are inanimate and without soul. Rocks, metals and other lifeless things come under it. The sole goals of these objects are to a rest.

Vegetative: it is the category of plants and wildlife. They are alive as they can feel and they need nourishments.

Animal: this category talks about higher level of life. Animals can feel and also they seek pleasure and they reproduce too. They can be classified in happy and sad creatures. Animal kingdom is inclusive of all the animals.

Human: Aristotle mark humans different from animals as the according to him humans have the capacity to reason. Humans are the only creatures which can act according to the principles. Thus, humans are free to make choices. Say for instance, if Rabia is stealing candy we can blame her for it as she knows the difference between wrong and right.

The unique function of humans is that that they can reason: by reasoning things out we attain our ends, solve our problems, and hence live a life that is qualitatively different in

¹³⁹ Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, p. 156.

¹⁴⁰Ibid. p. 286.

kind from plants or animals. Humans are capable of rational thinking and implementing this capacity in different situations of life. This is why only pleasure cannot make human life happy, as animal seeks pleasure but humans have higher capacity than animals. Humans are able to channel their physical urges in relevant directions but animals lack in this. Thus Aristotle defines happiness,

“...the function of man is to live a certain kind of life, and this activity implies a rational principle, and the function of a good man is the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed it is performed in accord with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, then happiness turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”¹⁴¹

In the above definition the connection between virtue and the concept of happiness is evident. Aristotle claims that happiness can be achieved over the lifetime by having good friends, wealth, health and knowledge. By making choices that at times are difficult to make takes us to the path of happiness. Good choices and less good choices define our level of happiness and pleasure. Say for instance eating unhealthy food may give pleasure to your tongue but it will deteriorate your body and will make you restricted to eat desired food but if you will be eating healthy food it will give a balanced health thus a healthier and happier life in long term.

The virtues are virtues of good life. Virtues help us to overcome the weaknesses and pain. For this Aristotle used the term *akrasia*, or weakness of the will. Humans often make wrong choices in the influence of pleasures they get like drug addicts. But with habit centres they are being cured similarly by exercising a virtuous life one can regain the happiness.

Happiness is also discussed by care ethicist Nel Noddings. She partly takes her concept of happiness from Aristotle and she avoids the rationality attached to his definition. Nel Noddings worked widely to bring forth the coherent existence of Happiness and moral Education. She contested the traditional education system and demanded an inclusion of moral teaching which should be unbiased. In her one of the major works on education *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education* contested educators and society and urged to reframe the aims of schooling. She likewise demanded that one should present a case for Happiness as an objective of a good Education, which, thus, ought to

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 298.

contribute fundamentally to individual and add an aggregate satisfaction, also believes that the “main aim of Education should be produce competent, caring, loving and loveable”¹⁴².

Nel Noddings develops the notion of happiness as the goal of education. She raises the questions like ‘how schooling helps in attaining happiness?’ she explores happiness with a perspective of care ethics. She begins happiness by taking the account of Aristotle where he defines happiness in theoretical or contemplative. He emphasises the intellectual wisdom as the way to attain happiness. By taking the account of intellectual position Noddings tries to root happiness as the goal of education. She posits that there are several forms of Happiness and its pursuit.

“It seems to occur in different domains of everyday life; I can be happy in one and unhappy in another. It has a normative aspect and a spiritual one; I am affected by what my community expects of me, and I can be deeply affected by spiritual connections or lack of them. It is influenced by personality. Although it seems to occur episodically, we seek Happiness for our lives as a whole. It involves pleasure, but there are many forms of pleasure, and some seem less conducive to long-term Happiness than others. Still, pleasure or fun, it is not harmful, should be freely enjoyed. Happiness, we saw, is often identified with the satisfaction of needs and wants and, especially, with the desire to be free of suffering.”¹⁴³

She concludes that Happiness occurs daily and in different domains: community, personality, and spirituality. According to her, if one will be educated in qualitative manner that person will be able to live a happy life. But unfortunately happiness is missing both from society as well as from education system. Nel Nodding also makes notes that globalization and economic successes which is at the heart of Educational life today, is a real threat to human Happiness and flourishing.

Nel Noddings maintains, that in our education system we are teaching student to learn mathematics and science but we are not focusing to teach them the requirements of harmonious life. She is not denying the enormous significance of mathematics or algebra for some purposes in one’s life. But she is asking to make awareness of the needs of companionships and also how to enjoy life with all its pros and cons. Other subjects are additions and are important in life but teaching happiness is the essential part of education which is barely seen the curriculums of school as well as in the teachings of parents.

¹⁴²Nel, Noddings, *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education*, p.8

¹⁴³Ibid. p. 38.

By introducing happiness as the goal of education, Noddings raised questions to the role of schools. Education is a part of harmonious life and being educated indicates this but in our education system a rat race is going on. It is more quantitative and less qualitative. She challenged the traditional way of education and proposes that the roles of schools should be changed. She emphasised that one should education into more historical and societal context rather than in an abstract style.

Part II

Nel Noddings: Ethical Education and Care Theory

Nel Noddings had made a significant contribution to our appreciation of education. In particular her explorations of the ethics of care – and their relationship to schooling, welfare, and to learning and teaching within families and local communities came at an especially apposite moment. She has been able to demonstrate the significance of caring and relationship both as an educational goal, and as a fundamental aspect of education. As a result Nel Noddings' work has become a key reference point for those wanting to reaffirm the ethical and moral foundations of teaching, schooling and education more broadly. This part will explore her contribution in education and its relationship with ethics and thus arriving at the highest end which is happiness. Ethical education should be motivated for gaining happiness. As described above happiness should be the primary purpose for gaining education and schools play a significant role in that. To gain happiness the first move is always towards society and then global aspects of it.

Nel Noddings sees education (in its widest sense) as being central to the cultivation of caring in society. She defines education as 'a constellation of encounters, both planned and unplanned, that promote growth through the acquisition of knowledge, skills, understanding and appreciation'. Given the above, it is not surprising that she places a special emphasis on the home as a site for educational encounter. Indeed, she views the home as the primary educator and argues for the re-orientation of social policy to this end. This is not to side-line

the role of schools but simply to recognize just what the home contributes to the development of children and young people.

Noddings view home as the first place for education and thus family members are the primary educator who taught their children about society. But this social upbringing follows two recommendations. These are that first, every child should “live in a home that has at least adequate material resources and attentive love; and second, that schools should include education for home life in their curriculum”¹⁴⁴. Both of the recommendations have a long way accomplishing consequences. For example, in the first case, even as a few governments have tried to make sure that there's something like good enough resources in houses wherein there are children, there's little proof of policymakers critically grappling with how attentive love is probably fostered? Similarly, the query of education from home life is not addressed adequately. Indeed, the entire orientation of education structures in most ‘advanced capitalist’ countries is in the direction of skilling the needs of economy. Small attention is paid to social, public life of children. For example, John Dewey takes schooling system as the training ground for public dealing or public life. Education system can be seen in terms of public life but an account of personal well-being is completely eliminated from it. Children are not aware what the requirements of a flourishing life are.

A third element can also be seen as following from viewing the home as the primary educator, which “schools should, as far as possible, use the sort of methods found in best homes to educate”¹⁴⁵. This has far reaching consequences and takes us into the arena of informal education – and the appreciation and facility to move beyond understandings of education that are centred on notions such as curriculum into more conversational and incidental forms.

When Noddings talk about personal education she indicates home. Personal life revolves around home and home is the place which nurtures the character of individuals. Each one of us largely dependent on our upbringing for designing are character. A child’s future is dependent on the home he/she is born in. She says that home is a place for pleasure and here one learns to love the surroundings and people around rather global economy. She says that home is the place which satisfies the basic needs of privacy and personal identity. This is how home becomes an extension of self. Over time, home no longer becomes an efficient form of shelter, but rather an extension of our bodies into a built place and

¹⁴⁴Nel Noddings., *Starting At Home: Caring and Social Policy*. p. 289.

¹⁴⁵Ibid. p. 289.

possessions. According to her the purpose of education is making students realise and appreciate their surrounding and the place they are born in.

Nel Noddings places the raising of caring human beings at the centre of a policy agenda. She says that one develops care from their home and also at home one receives the guidance of how social policies help in coping up with social issues. She uses an extensive literature in order to arrive on this conclusion. Many philosophers ask for an ideal state then about look at families that will build this ideal state. On the other hand Noddings begin with an ideal family which will be extended into ideal states. Plato also proposed the idea of an ideal state will be able to create an ideal family. For that Noddings asks “what might we learn if, instead, we start with description of the best homes and then move outward to the larger society?”¹⁴⁶

She emphasises on care ethics as the need of morality where caring is the primary individual concern on the other hand traditional liberal thoughts talk about rights. She claims that care ethics has the capacity to elevate the harm caused to others and thus a better society it can build. She critiques the liberal rational individuals by emphasising coercion can be necessary to meet inferred needs, such as preventing individuals from harming themselves. Moreover, in insightful critiques of liberalism’s focus on rights, she argues that rights must be based on needs.

“An ethics of care also seeks, more broadly, to identify and respond to needs. In the dominant current social theories, harms to others are prevented through the enforcement of rights. This move is often made without considering or even mentioning needs. An ethic of care does not reject the concept of rights, but it logically construes rights as originating in and anchored in needs”.¹⁴⁷

Thus needs must be understood before rights can be established. According to Nel Noddings one of the essential features of education is to inculcate virtues. She argues that a child learns and develops her character, it isn’t something pre-given. Thus, Parent and teacher’s role becomes significant in the development of character. Nodding establishes a link between character and spirituality by placing happiness at the heart of character development and learning. This relation gets manifested through some of the accepted virtues such as honesty, courage and perseverance. For her, spirituality has to be looked at from the perspective of everyday life experiences, where one, keeping the religion aside, can

¹⁴⁶Nel Noddings. *Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy*. P. 1.

¹⁴⁷Ibid. p. 53.

experience a kind of spiritual happiness resulting from the practice of these virtues. Noddings takes the example of gardens as places of recognition which can turn human spirit to “virtue of sanctity”. She suggests that one’s personal experience of such places can be discussed in the classroom, so that the capacity of spirituality to augur happiness can be actualised.

Further, Noddings emphasises on the role of interpersonal growth in order to claim that human relationships are essential component of happiness. She opines that people with certain agreeable qualities such as good manners, physical attractiveness, wit, modesty, extraversion, and capacity for decent pleasure are better placed to achieve personal happiness. Noddings believe that there are certain ways through which schools can help to develop and nurture some of these qualities. A caring and self-contained classroom is the place where such agreeable qualities can be nurtured. Such self-contained classrooms can be developed with the commitment to social learning and an arrangement where students and teachers remain in “loop” for substantial number of years. With the help of preliminary data one is able to see the benefits of students and teachers continuous proximity and shared experiences. For this purpose, Noddings suggests, an arrangement could be established where a team of teachers directs a cohort of students for at least two-three years.

Noddings explores in detail the relation between character education and moral education. She is of the view that character education is often seen as an approach to moral education. This goes back to Aristotle’s writings on education, where thinkers seem to have discussed whether virtues can be taught or not like some other subject such as arithmetic. One of the empirical study by Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) clearly says that virtues cannot be taught in the similar fashion as subjects like arithmetic and geometry.

By 1950s character education virtually disappeared. But today, we see that it has resurfaced with greater strength. Although the questions rose earlier remains the same. Nonetheless, the questions aren’t just about the efficacy of character education, but the ways in which it is put to practice- which could be both noble and ignoble. For example, Fascist governments, as history suggests, have often used education as a means of socialization. Thus, it is imperative that character Education has a strong community and not necessarily a good one.

This way, Noddings suggests us an alternative to character education. It is an education that is sympathetic and derives its tenets from care ethics. Indeed, some scholars classify care ethics as a form of virtue ethics, which is distinct from both the Kantian principle-based ethics and utilitarian forms of consequentialism.

Noddings seem to agree with most of the care theorists that the way to better world is not so much depend on better principles but on better people. But, a question arises as to how we might produce better people. For care theorist, the way is to evolve and establish conditions which are likely to encourage goodness, and not a direct teaching of virtues. It is not that the group undermines the role of fine principles, but as history suggest that the perspective use of principles has not really been effective. When one acts morally, it is rare that the person think of an abstract moral principle. Thus, both care theorists and character educators are of the view that moral motivation arises from within. So the only hope is that the principle which provides the perspective will translate as descriptive in actual behaviour.

Further Nel Noddings highlights the relationship between the involvement in public life and Happiness. She specifically discusses occupation as key to Happiness. Noddings argues that rather than the financial rewards it's the enjoyment and recognition of all the work as important that should be emphasised. After all, every work is valuable and has a purpose in the society. She asserts that educators must emphasis on the development of rich, diverse and relevant curricula and a mechanism to advice students qualitatively so that they can choose wisely, any program that helps them in the preparation towards the work they enjoy.

Noddings also stresses that curricula should focus both on personal and professional life. Nel Noddings proposes a strategy to deal with students who cannot or refuse to keep academic pace. Somewhat controversial, but she opines that instead of using coercive teaching methods, there needs to be a separation of those who want to learn and those who do not. And students and parents who are committed to facilitative behaviour should be provided with and a kind of education that provides the most conducive learning environment. Secondly, educators should work diligently with students who are disenchanted with care and trust and provide them with relevant curricula while simultaneously convince them to join the set of learners who are willingly participating into educative processes.

Further in a final section of Happiness and Education, the focus is on educating for the public sphere. Here, Nel Noddings argues that too much value is placed on abstract mathematical-linguistic talent over all else; these are important talents, but other things may be equally or more important in life for many students. She disapproves of the separation imposed by vocational academic tracks and claims early schools did not do this. People were educated broadly in both the practical and the abstract. Children need to be educated to be

critical thinkers who can use that critical thinking to build good, strong community ties. Educators and parents should listen to children and be concerned about their present Happiness as they prepare them for the future. When schools neglect the present-children's current needs and wants-they become unhappy places, or at least not as happy and conducive to learning as they could be.

Nel Noddings' goal is to revolutionize how educators think about the school curriculum and the learning environment in classrooms and schools. The following quote makes this clear:

“What I am arguing for is an on-going, serious examination of everything we do in schools. Is the aim worthwhile? Are the goals logically derived from defensible aims? Are our pedagogical methods likely to promote the goals and aims? How do our routines stack up under this sort of evaluation?”¹⁴⁸

She maintains that the best schools should resemble the best homes. The best homes are capable to provide caring relationships and this caring relationships will be able to provide a healthy and positive mind and the individual needs will be inferred and thus will be able to respond appropriately and it will protect one from any harm without inflicting to any deliberate pain. In this way an ideal home is the origin of genuine soul and spiritual development. And best homes will be able to make happy schools.

She also emphasises on social policies and how these policies should cope with social problems. She develops the concept of a relational self that challenges the liberal concept of a rational individual by emphasizing interdependence over autonomy. She asserts that “the self is a relation, that it is dynamic, in continual flux, and that it is a centre of affect and meaning”¹⁴⁹.

The concept of relational selves leads to the next section, which sets policy guidelines by establishing how ‘strong selves’ are developed in ideal homes. Basic needs like shelter and adequate material resources are integral to all ‘ideal homes’. Further, career must never inflict unnecessary pain and must attempt to remove or alleviate pain. In regard to shaming behaviour, she makes a distinction between positive and negative desert. With negative desert pain is deliberately used to discourage unwanted behaviour. Instead, she argues for positive desert, which structures positive incentives for acceptable behaviour.

¹⁴⁸Nel Noddings. *Happiness and Education*, p. 258.

¹⁴⁹Nel Noddings., *Starting at Home*, p.99.

“No one, I argued, deserves the deliberate infliction of pain, but all of us- through carelessness, ignorance, or moral lapses-sometimes bring pain on ourselves. Under the best conditions we learn from these experiences. The best homes reject the notion of negative desert (the idea that one who has done wrong pain) and use positive desert (an incentive for doing what is acceptable) instead. Carers do not inflict unnecessary pain but, rather, offer to remove it, relieve it, or offer consolation for it. In the next chapter we will concentrate on how children learn to care.”¹⁵⁰

Further Noddings talk about three social problems that arise in the formation of ideal homes. They are homelessness, deviance and third is education. Homelessness is a basic need and it must be eradicated from a society as a home is a place which enables one to build his/her identity. Second is deviance, in contrast to homelessness it is inferred need. Policies aimed at punishing deviance should be reconceptualised to meet the concept of positive desert. For example, instead of maintaining what is increasingly a destructive drug policy, policies should address the social problems that lead to problematic drug use. Finally, education, by which she means that one should be educated about private as well as public life. Education should be inclusive of cooking as well as knowing about policies.

Nel Noddings first takes in account best homes which will enhance private education. Then, she investigates how a caring society might ensure that all children live in at least adequate homes. Finally, she makes a specific recommendation for social policy. She writes:

“Schools should educate not only for public life but also for home and private life. This last is an admittedly radical suggestion. I am not talking about an occasional course that might be labelled “home economics” or “child development”. Rather, I am suggesting a curriculum that gives serious and pervasive attention to the development of young adults who will be capable of establishing better homes.”

Nel Noddings agrees with Dewey on the techniques of teaching. She also accepts that the correct method of teaching is taking into account what are the interests of students and what they are already aware of. But Dewey forgets to talk about imagination which according to Noddings is an essential feature of education. She talks about education by taking four key components of it: modelling, dialogue, practice and confirmation.

Modelling: Within a care perspective, not unexpectedly, educators are concerned with the growth of people as carers and cared-for. Unlike cognitive developmentalists, for example,

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.206

they are not primarily interested in moral reasoning (although there is recognition that reasoning is important. Educators have to show in their behaviour what it means to care. “We do not merely tell them to care and give them texts to read on the subject, we demonstrate our caring in our relations with them”¹⁵¹

Dialogue: The intent is to engage people in dialogue about caring. As Nel Noddings has pointed out, ‘dialogue is such an essential part of caring that we could not model caring without engaging in it’. In addition, it is also important to talk directly about, and explore, our caring – as it can be manifested in very different ways. It can, thus help people to critique and better understand their own relationships and practice. In other words, it allows us to evaluate our attempts to care: “As we try to care, we are helped in our efforts by the feedback we get from the recipients of our care”¹⁵². Furthermore, and crucially, dialogue contributes to the growth of cared-for.

Practice: Nel Noddings argues that the experiences in which we immerse ourselves tend to produce a ‘mentality’. ‘If we want to produce people who will care for another, then it makes sense to give students practice in caring and reflection on that practice’.¹⁵³

Confirmation: This particular component, it is suggested, sets caring apart from other approaches to moral education. In making her case Nel Noddings draws particularly on the work of Martin Buber. He describes confirmation as an act of affirming and encouraging the best in others. When we confirm someone, we identify a better self and encourage its development. To do this we must know the other reasonably well. Otherwise we cannot see what the other is really striving for, what ideal he or she may long to make real. Formulas and slogans have no place in confirmation. We do not posit a single ideal for everyone and then announce ‘high expectations for all’. Rather we recognize something admirable, or at least acceptable, struggling to emerge in each person we encounter. The goal or attribute must be seen as worthy both by the person trying to achieve it and by us. We do not confirm people in ways we judge to be wrong.

¹⁵¹Nel,Noddings,*Philosophy of Education*, p.190.

¹⁵²Ibid., p.191.

¹⁵³Ibid., p.191.

Significantly, such confirmation involves trust and continuity. The latter is needed as we need knowledge of the other and the former as the career needs to be credible and to be capable of handling explorations and what emerges sensitively.

Noddings' ethics of care is also directed towards moral education of the school system. Education is a significant part of human upbringing and helps one to grow as compassionate and responsible individuals. She suggested that in education the relationship of a teacher and his/her student should be based on caring. Care should not be just a onetime virtuous decision but it should be an ongoing process for a student's welfare. Educators should function through 'motivational displacement'¹⁵⁴ for students. She further emphasised that care is not just a tool to contextualize educational decisions but a method with which teacher feels being connected to students and vice versa. Thus, caring should be an element of the curriculum. This will make the education system competent and moral as there will be a shift from the long raised traditional ethical questions of 'what is right or wrong' to educating children 'how to care'.

Noddings' work is a benchmark in moral philosophy. By criticising the traditional dominant ethical system she gives a new way of thinking and presented an ethics of care as a complete theory in itself which does not need the support of any other theory. Care has been largely used as a virtue or a mental disposition and she succeeded in bringing a systematic theory out of it. Not only in moral philosophy but she also emphasised care as an essential part of the education system. She emphasised that care ethics promotes is relational values.

According to her the curriculum should be carefully designed by including topics which will also enhance skills and temperaments of students. Personal and professional life's training is very significant part of education system which is often missing from it. Also one should be trained to deal with difficulties in relationships like marriage, friendship etc. It is useful in maintaining a healthy marriage, parenting, friendship, and professional life, and its generalizability should be pointed out at every opportunity. It is almost always better to ask, what the problem is and how we can solve it, than to seek out and blame the guilty or dwell the guilty or dwell on the mistakes of others. Thus, educators can contribute to global citizenship even when the topic at hand is something very different, and it is part of our responsibility as Educational theorists to consider the generalizability or transferability of the skills and attitudes we seek to develop.

¹⁵⁴ It is a state where one's caring behaviour depends on the need of the person to be cared for.

Other skills that should be generalizable include listening, couching criticism in constructive terms, and extending sympathy to those in pain. Not long ago, I heard a father severely scold his little boy for riding his bicycle into a sand drift on the boardwalk. The child fell, of course, and got a scraped knee, but the father expressed no sympathy for the hurt. Instead, he shouted coldly, ‘didn’t I tell you to watch for these sand patches?’ it would have been far better for their relationship if the father had kissed the hurt knee and said, “We’ve got to watch these spots”. Similarly, on the world scene, perhaps we spend too much time fixing blame and refusing sympathy to those who in our opinion are getting their just deserts.

Criticism can be given both sympathetically and constructively. Too often criticism is either destructive or withheld entirely. “The skill of giving constructive criticism is best learned from the example set by parents and teachers, but children need lots of practice in developing their own skills at criticism. Formal opportunities to respond to peers should be provided in most courses, and the responses should be preceded by explicit instructions: first, listen carefully so that you are sure of what has been said; ask for clarification if needed; identify strong points; make suggestions that might make the presentation even stronger. If you locate an error, point it out gently: I think that date may be wrong, or, I think that poem is by Frost, not Sandburg, or let’s check again these figures again. Above all, if we want students to develop the skills of constructive criticism, we have to model the skills. The result should be eager students who are unafraid to express themselves in public”.¹⁵⁵

Nel Noddings is aware of that questions of gender, religion, and national origin are not easy to separate, but she believes that in liberal democracies, there is a growing commitment to the equality of men and women, and although much still needs to be done, a majority of our citizens express at least verbal assent to the commitment. These who openly disagree usually refer to religious precepts to support their position. Should public schools advocate openly for gender equality?

Nel Noddings claims if this issue is discussed, students will need to be reminded that moral relativism is not a logically viable option. As we pointed out earlier, almost none of us would be comfortable shrugging off cannibalism, gruesome torture, slavery, honour killings, or child abuse as “just their way”- a cultural difference to be tolerated. Further, careful study should convince students that human beings have made some moral progress over centuries. We no longer hang young children for thievery, exhibit the heads of executed prisoners on

¹⁵⁵Ibid., p.125.

pikes, confine the mentally ill to filthy cages, disembowel condemned prisoners, enslave subordinate populations, forbid women to own property, or insist that there is no such thing as marital rape. It could be argued that some of these changes are motivated more by aesthetic than moral sensitivity. We just don't have the stomach for flaying people alive, burning them, or disembowelling them. If our decision were motivated by moral conviction, then we wouldn't do these things at a distance by dropping bombs or planting land mines. Still, the progress is not all and simply aesthetic, and there is no reason to denigrate the aesthetic if it enhances our moral sensibility.

Is it right, then, to regard the equality of men and women as a moral imperative—something we should advocate and work toward globally? We should not simply shrug off gender inequality anywhere as “just their way” or as justified by religious beliefs. Students should be reminded that even in this country—and not long ago—women were legally denied equal rights on religious grounds. But neither should we impose our views by political force. Conversation, patience, friendship, and Education provide avenues to progress.

This topic, religion, is perhaps the most difficult of all subjects for teachers to approach. The connection between religion and gender should be studied carefully, and this can be done through biographies, essays, and histories. It is unusual, however, for people to develop critical appreciation for even their own religions. Many people grow up believing that any form of criticism is a sign of heresy or incipient apostasy. For perhaps the majority of adults, the two words critical and appreciation are at odds; they cannot be reasonably joined.

“Teachers should not preach appreciation. Rather, they should help students to recognize the possibilities by reading and hearing powerful voices that exemplify critical appreciation. Studying other religions sometimes triggers reflection on one's own students in the United States are sometimes upset when teachers refer to the myth of Adam and Eve. “That not a myth!” some will protest. They must be helped to understand that the label “myth” is not an insult but, instead, an acknowledgement of universal interests in the origins of life. Teachers interested in the connections between religion and mythology can find many books to help them for present purposes, we should emphasize that an appreciation of the role of myth in religion (including one's own religion) may contribute substantially to the attitudes required for global citizenship”.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p.129.

In the case of discussing war and violence, Nel Noddings argues that American students read and hear a lot about wars. Indeed, the history curriculum is sometimes described in war-referenced chronological terms, for example, since the revolution to the Civil War. But what young people need to consider are matters relevant to their own lives—such matters as the meaning of patriotism, an understanding of propaganda, the psychology of war and the way it dulls or destroys moral responses, and compassion for the enemy. If these matters can be addressed in a unit on the Vietnam War, the study may come alive for students and contribute to their growth as global citizens.

According to Nel Noddings we should teach them what it means to be patriotic? Does patriotism consist of flying the flag, reciting the pledge of allegiance, and claiming that one is “proud to be a national of their country”? Teachers need not dismiss these familiar signs of patriotism as irrelevant, but they must help students to understand that genuine patriotism may take very different forms.

She emphasises every citizen should acquire an understanding of propaganda and its power to influence opinion. Not incidentally, such understanding can be extended to a study of advertising and its effects on consumer behaviour.

“Propaganda works in two directions. It makes the enemy into monsters and one’s own military into heroes. On the later, students should be asked to consider whether young people automatically becomes heroes by putting on uniforms and being sent into battle. How is it that in time of peace many of these young people are regarded as poor students who enter the military because they need discipline and direction?”¹⁵⁷

She claims possibly the most important issue for high school juniors and seniors to study and discuss is the psychology of war as well. Does everyone hate war? Mostly we heard our leaders say repeatedly, No one wants war! The implication is that “we” will fight only if war is forced on us. Although it is true that national leaders have sometimes tried to avoid war, it is clearly not true that no one wants war. Greedy and power-hungry people often want war, because war offers both money and power. In addition, there are those who thirst for the glory and excitement of war.

“After reading many accounts of military action, students may suspect that the division between humanities and brutes is fragile and depends more heavily than we would wish on circumstances. Preparing students through study and open discussion cannot guarantee that

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p.137.

they will not behave badly in horrible circumstances, but it may make such a descent into brutish behaviour less likely. Better yet, it may convince some young people that war must be rejected as a means of resolving human conflict.”¹⁵⁸

At the end of her article she argues many educators advocate the use of art and literature in teaching for cultural sensitivity, moral reflection, and global understanding. However, in making this recommendation, we must recognize that the case for art and literature in the formation of attitudes is ambiguous.

There are many novels, in every nation and cultures that can help students to feel what people have gone through as a result of discrimination. For American students she has suggested Laura Hobson’s *Gentleman’s Agreement* (1947) similarly by Indian authors like Rabindranath Tagore, Prem Chandra, Mohan Rakesh in their respective works like *Gora* or *Nirmala* or *Badi Bahu* or *Ashad Ka Ek Din* one can trace the biases society had since ages.

However, in every language and culture there are thousands of books, and several hundred of them could be useful as prologues to discussion on cultural, religious and gender difference. Nel Noddings’ system of Education invites parents and teachers to engage their children and students in open, honest dialogue-sharing, guiding, and staying with them as they struggle with problems we have not solved.

In “Caring and Exploitation”, Barbara Houston, critiques ethics of care as exploitation and claims that the intractability of the problem of self-sacrifice emerges when we ask the questions, how is the one caring to know when her ethical self is in danger? What if protection of her ethical self is put in conflict with protection of her physical self? Nel Noddings’ answer involves an appeal to our ethical idea, but, as I have argued elsewhere, Noddings’ account of ethical ideal is such that it provides people who have been exploited or victimised an inadequate measure of protection because their ethical ideal has already been shaped in terms of self-sacrifice. For such people my concern is that there is nothing in the ethic to resist or to challenge a lack of mutuality in their current relationship.

She explains that Nel Noddings does say: “I do not behave in a caring manner if I let another exploit me because this exploitation diminishes the autonomy I need to go on caring and it diminishes the ethical self of the other”¹⁵⁹. Here we face most complex and difficult

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p.131.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p.133.

point. These should not be genuine examples of caring. However, it is not clear how the ethic itself can support this conclusion.

But according to Houston we cannot know what counts as another's well-being without having recourse to other values such as autonomy, justice, mutuality, and respect for persons. Nel Noddings readily admits that in order to make caring decisions one must have resources of these other ethical notions, yet she gives them a secondary status that appears inconsistent with their role. It is not an exaggeration to say that these values are, in some sense, constitutive of our well-being.

“Houston believes the philosophical point here is simply that if we stick to a formal account of caring, then we have no way to rule out undesirable caring relations. We must appeal to their moral values to keep caring morally decent. Caring is not an ethic that can stand alone. This is a rich and interesting book, but I think it poses an ethic which, in the last analysis, can only be, at best partial.”¹⁶⁰

On the other hand, criticism of Nel Noddings “Ethics of Care”, in regards to Education, is that it advocates little importance to caring for oneself, except as a means to provide further care for others. As we knew earlier she believes that the best way to learn about ethical caring, the best way to develop relational virtues such as caring and to learn to exercise them, is to engage in relationships with teachers. These teachers must embody caring in their relationships with their students, both in and out in the classroom, thereby modeling what care is all about. Critics believe, in regards to Education, the teacher-student relationship could be jeopardized because the educator might not engage in self-care and instead, devote all their energy into meeting their students' needs. Hoagland states that the caregiver would be defined as a “martyr, servant and slave” by the philosophy in the ethic of care.¹⁶¹

Another criticism of Noddings' argument may result not only in the exploitation of the care giver, but also in a smothering paternalism. Goodin writes that “the trouble with subsuming individuals into relationships of ‘we’-ness is precisely that we then risk losing track of the separateness of people”. In addition, also she states that Nel Noddings' criteria

¹⁶⁰ Houston, “Caring and Exploitation”. p.119.

¹⁶¹Sara, Hoagland, “Some Thoughts about Caring”, p.255.

for implicit and explicit needs to assume that needs are transparent to the caregiver and that the caregiver's perceptions are privileged in the process of interpreting needs.¹⁶²

Further, Grimshaw explains that it is important to consider that good care always entails an element of distance between individuals. She states "Care and understanding require the sort of distance that is needed in order to see the other as a projection of the self, or self as a continuation of other". Thus, a clear distance between the self and the individual that is being cared for needs to exist in order to keep the personal care for both the individuals in mind.¹⁶³

According to Martha Nussbaum, the liberal tradition holds that emotions should not be trusted as guides to life without being subjected to some sort of critical scrutiny' and urges people to ask whether their emotions are appropriate. Such critical scrutiny, such questioning, would help women avoid or end some of the injustices and oppression that follow on excesses of emotional commitment; and Nussbaum goes on to criticize Nel Noddings views on caring for recommending emotional attitudes that are not sufficient self-critical, and for regarding the critical attitude recommended by liberalism as involving 'one thought too many'. She then concludes by claiming that love and deep caring are fine, so long as you think first.¹⁶⁴

Lastly, Victoria Davion's criticism of Nel Noddings has as its starting point the moral dangers attending engrossment and motivational displacement. If one cares for someone who is evil, then the one caring might himself become evil. For if engrossment and displacement are, respectively, allowing oneself to be transformed by the cared-for and adopting the goals of the cared-for, then in caring for someone who is evil the one-caring allows himself to be transformed by the cared-for and to adopt immoral goals, such a person, the one-caring, simply cannot viewed as a moral paradigm. Hence, something is needed to regulate care and to ward off the possibility of such moral corruption.

Davion opts for integrity, and her argument is that integrity is essential to one's ethical ideal, since "(s) seeing oneself as a being with moral integrity is part of seeing oneself

¹⁶² Robert, Goodin, "Structures of Political Order: The Relational Feminist Alternative", pp. 116-120.

¹⁶³ Jean, Grimshaw., "Philosophy and Feminist Thinking", p.183.

¹⁶⁴ Martha, Nussbaum., *Sex and Social Justice*, p.74.

as one's best self. Since caring is sometimes incompatible with maintaining integrity, caring simply cannot be the only absolute moral value, as Nel Noddings would have us believe"¹⁶⁵.

In the last part, we close our internal critique with an examination of Nel Noddings' point of views in ethics and moral Education, I began with her representation of caring ethics and what she called 'relational ethics' which is an alternative moral theory to ethics of principal; Like Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings accepts that justice based approaches, which are supposed to be more masculine, are genuine alternatives to ethics of care. However, unlike Gilligan, Nel Noddings' belief that caring 'rooted in receptivity. Relatedness, and responsiveness' is a more basic and preferable approach to ethics.

Ashad Ka Ek Din: Education and Harmonious Society

All the dramas of Mohan Rakesh share a realistic vision. His characters have been selected from the realistic modern society full of chaotic circumstance. He presented how humans are sufferer because of inner conflict. *Ashad Ka Ek Din* is a drama which will present a tussle of psyche and society. To do so Mohan Rakesh took a historical character and its relevance to society today. Though, this drama pours light on the stigmatisation of role of men and women, Mohan Rakesh efficiently portrays his feminine characters bold and strong and autonomous.

Rakesh depicted Kalidas as a character suffering from internal conflict and mental contradictions. Men's egotism is also another depiction of this drama. This drama has various female characters among which Mallika is the protagonist. She is a woman who has strong will and she rejects the norms made by society.

Rakesh's women are exceptionally strong in dealing with the pressures of convention or circumstance, and so memorably vital that he has often been accused of rendering his male characters too weak and vacillating. Yet, despite his obvious sympathy with these extraordinary women, he makes some very stereotypical assumptions about womanhood. Furthermore, with Rakesh a mythic base reinforces the stereotype. Thus, whatever the flavour of modernity, the woman is limited and defined by her biological and primordial role. She is fertile and nurturing; more affective or expressive and less intellectually or spiritually inclined than man. Her psyche tends to be more involved with the physical and concrete

¹⁶⁵Victoria, Davion, "Autonomy, Integrity, and Care", p.175.

rather than with abstract entities. Finally, when too aggressive, too "unfeminine," she emasculates her men.

In many ways Rakesh's portrait of Mallika is a sensitive attempt at delineating the emancipated woman. Because she is convinced of the rightness of her actions, she dismisses the social conventions that require her to justify her love through marriage. Thus, she challenges the conventional Indian belief that marriage as a religious sacrament sanctifies a woman's life. Mallika's insistence that marriage is merely an outward symbol of a private commitment, the ceremony itself no more than a social contract, re-presents a radical departure for a society where marriage remains the prime good even for the educated woman, a society whose traditional philosophical and religious literature asserts that the unmarried girl goes through no ritual purification and is no better than a shudra--a member of the lowest caste. The strength of these convictions gives Mallika the inner security to exist without the props of familial and social approval that most traditional women find so necessary. A free spirit herself, she respects Kalidasa's anxiety at being bound by marriage.

Rakesh heightens our sense of Mallika's uniqueness through a contrast with Ambika, her broken, widowed mother. Here he also depicted that social nourishment of women and role of education in liberating her from society. Ambika is passive, resigned, and also fearful of her daughter's fate. As a widow she well knows the dependent place of women in a society which excludes them from any significant role of their own. It is said in India that a woman should pray to die before her husband, and Ambika's anxious and joyless existence is a vivid symbol of the plight of unprotected women. Also, though Rakesh does not exalt virginity-we never view Mallika as a fallen woman-he carefully delineates the precarious position of a single woman. Ambika's attempt to find a match for Mallika fails because Mallika has lost her reputation through her association with Kalidasa. (In any case, as an impoverished widow, Ambika is in a poor bargaining position to marry off her daughter.) Mallika's descent to prostitution in the last act, although totally inexplicable because out of character, is further evidence of a single woman's marginal place in Indian society. Rakesh is equally unsparing in his exposure of the double standards by which the best of men operate in this society. While Kalidasa, who had vowed "never to marry," has succumbed to the lures of the establishment and married the Gupta princess, he nevertheless expects unwavering devotion from Mallika. In the last act, as he explains to her why he failed to see her on his earlier return home, he tells her: "I knew how this would affect you, what others would say to you. But, still, I was

sure that you would understand. "¹⁶⁶4 Yet he himself refuses to understand and leaves as soon as he discovers that Mallika has a child.

There is much in Mallika's portrait, however, which suggests that Rakesh cannot altogether free himself of some traditional preconceptions about femininity. Mallika is neither passive nor self-effacing, but paradoxically yet typically, her self-assertion takes the form of self-sacrifice. A culture whose institutional structures encourage women to adjust and accommodate tends to glorify altruism as a particularly feminine virtue. The greater the self-sacrifice the higher the acclaim accorded to her in the traditional view. Because Rakesh expects us to admire Mallika's self-denial, we may question if he has fully freed himself from the traditional concept of *pativrata*- a woman's complete loyalty to the man she marries, in this case, loves. For whatever the respect granted to women like Mallika, such an ideal assumes that self-sacrifice is not repressive and that the woman finds fulfilment in such subordination of her personal happiness. These archaic assumptions embedded in Rakesh's play are still prevalent in Indian society.

An even more significant instance of this unresolved duality of Rakesh's response to women is his handling of the so called conflict between art and love. Kalidasa is torn between his unfulfilled destiny as a poet and his love for Mallika. Whether, consciously or unconsciously, Rakesh renders this opposition as one between nature and culture, even as he associates nature with the woman and intellection and abstraction with the man. Mallika's world resonates with images of fertility. The wary title of the play evokes these associations: the first day of *Ashadh* when the rains come to recreate the green world. The stage instructions ask for the sound of rain and thunder for a few moments after the curtain rises, and Mallika is the first character that emerges from this backdrop. Our first view of Mallika shows her soaked with rain, and her first words focus on the rain: "The first day of Ashadh and such rain, mother, what a downpour"¹⁶⁷. For Mallika the rain is a welcome part of herself. This is her element, and she revels in it: "My whole body is saturated, mother! . . . The soaking did not bother me. I would have been deprived today if I hadn't got wet"¹⁶⁸. When Kalidasa returns to Mallika in Act 3, he returns to experience the rain, and his words very deliberately echo Mallika's earlier lyric to rain:

¹⁶⁶ MohanRakesh, *AshadKaEk Din*. p.108.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p.6.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., P-p 6-7.

"Don't worry about my being wet. Did you know that to get soaked like this could be a vital need of life? I have been drenched after years. I don't want to dry up yet . . . this rain has removed all my tiredness."¹⁶⁹

There is no rain in Act 2, which is dominated by the public, social, political world of the court. Other elements of the play carefully supplement this association between the woman, the earth, and fertility. There is, for instance, the wounded fawn of the first act. While still in harmony with Mallika, Kalidasa tends the wounded fawn with her. Both carry and fondle the fawn as if it were a child. Within the play, such associations sustain our sympathy with Mallika. Rakesh suggests that the woman's world nurtures whereas the public and political domain is dry and sterile. Through Mallika, Kalidasa is associated with his feeling, creative self. When he returns to experience the rain, he also realizes that his creativity as an artist is interlinked with his feelings for Mallika. First he admits the connection between the rains of Ashadh (nature) and his creativity: "To write, I should have returned years ago to get drenched in the rain"¹⁷⁰. Kalidasa leaves without accepting her gift, and his alienation from her fecund creativity is complete. Now even as we commend Rakesh for such positive use of the archetype of the fecund, natural woman, we must recognize that he uses it unrelentingly to support a stereotype about women. As a recent anthropological study comments, woman's traditional social roles-imposed because of her body and its subject to its functions- come to define her psychic nature. And a closer reflection should make it clear that both the archetype and the stereotype are essentially limiting of women. If culture may be defined as products of human consciousness (art, religion, and law) by which the human race has succeeded in rising above the natural existence of a mere animal, then culture in its ability to transmute nature must indeed be seen as superior to nature. While the male shapes the permanent and transcendent objects, the female in our patriarchal culture has had to rest content with only indirect participation in this process of transformation. The idealization of motherhood, so characteristic of Indian society, goes hand in hand with a devaluation of woman's ability to succeed in the public domain. Of course, as a human being, the female too feels the urge to go beyond her biological function. But traditionally she has been conditioned to confine her creativity to the less prestigious domestic domain. Thus, Mallika only prepares manuscripts on which the great Kalidasa will write. One may argue that Rakesh is bound by the outlines of the Kalidasa story. Nevertheless, his uncritical use of the feminine stereotype reveals the limits of his modern vision.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p.96.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., p.104.

Rakesh's gallery of strong women has added a new dimension to modern Indian drama. In some measure, his portraits are responsive to the changes now taking place in Indian society. He handles his women with sensitivity and awareness far beyond that of the average man. Yet his perceptiveness is limited by his reliance on somewhat archaic and stereotypical assumptions of the feminine. The unresolved quality of these images is, indeed, typical of the divided reality of women in contemporary India. The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 provides for freedom of choice, divorce, and remarriage; the Indian Constitution of 1950 and the Succession Act of 1956 grant equal property and inheritance rights. But legal rights do not describe the social position. Despite the prominent positions held by a few women, the role relations within the family have been very slow to change. Just as the deeply-rooted traditions of subjugation of women, characteristic of the last two thousand years undermine the gains made by women in modern India, so too traditional preconceptions about women compromise Rakesh's largely sympathetic treatment of the emerging new woman.

His play portrays the picture of educated women who can bring harmony in her family and thus to society. The most significant depiction is that his women are educated and confident. As Nel Noddings also emphasise that education is the significant element which can bring harmony in world. This is why the purpose of education should be about making oneself happy and comfortable.

I evaluated some different critique both on her ethical theory and her educational one and to my view the most important issue was that it advocates little importance to caring for oneself, except as a means to provide further care for others. As a woman from third world country, specially, I think that caring reproduces traditional female role in life; giving while receiving little in return. But at the same time I think her idea about the moral Educational aim to grow care-givers by making changes in the curriculum is remarkable. She recognizes one of the main problems of our Educational system and challenges its basically economic goals which do not pay attention to concrete Happiness in daily life.

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CONCLUSION

The present thesis has discussed issues in morality in the light of Self, Other and Inter-subjectivity in ethics with special reference to Care. The thesis has attempted to answer the questions regarding moral self and its interconnectedness. The thesis emphasised on the presence of relational self against autonomous self. A moral self was a critique of the enlightenment rationality, its totalitarian and the absolutistic aspects. It puts women at the centre and emphasizes on the well-being *albeit* emotional well-being and pays attention to caring and sharing. It is concerned about desires, wishes and emotions with patience.

Morality, in the sense of the attempt to formulate codes and principles of human behaviour, has always been a necessary feature of cultures. Alasdair MacIntyre mentioned that with the change in social life our moral concepts also changes. For instance, in British India or before that '*sati-pratha*' was not an immoral act but later in 18th century questions raised against it and in favour of women empowerment and consequently it is abolished now and in laws it is a crime. Undoubtedly the feminist movement has been one of the biggest social changes in the contemporary world, so it is not unexpected that these social changes are growing and promoting to philosophical level, and demand changes in the field of moral philosophy.

The scope of the study itself is open to progress and would remain-in-process so that one can formulate better understanding of these notions. With all intents and purposes we cannot deny the fact that we all are ethical beings. We are social animals and commended to be ethical. We cannot operate outside of a social structure and context and we cannot stop caring. Caring is intrinsic to human being and dependency is universal. One in his/her life time needs to be cared for. The interests and values of a society which is wide generate a perspective which is caring. We need morality because we care. While we are situated ourselves as caring being at the same time we have a sense of ourselves too where we are isolated and independent and ethics of care never undermined this aspect of human behaviour.

The fundamental of morality is that we are dependent on each other. The reason why we need a new ethical theory is the absence of female voice from the traditional ethical theories. Their voice has been since the beginning of the moral theories. Their moral incapability has been discussed but they were never a part of their own discussions. They failed the exams which they never attempted. Their private realms remained private. In last few decades a voice raised for them. It was a psychologist Carol Gilligan. She heard the unuttered biases

and the suffocations women were living with. Nel Noddings gave this voice more fuel and claimed that we need to be caring not rational in order to be moral.

There are four important feminist ethical developments in the following areas: (1) care ethics, (2) applied ethics, (3) the ideal of autonomy, and (4) discourse ethics. Among those approaches, it has been exclusively focused on ethics of care because self, the other and the inter-subjectivity including the moral relationship between them are more broadly considered in this theory.

It should be noticed that Feminism does not reduce philosophy to politics. But it does criticize the reduced version of the type of academic philosophy that seeks to legitimize itself by imposing hard borders to separate ‘real philosophy’ from other fields of inquiry. Feminist philosophy, instead, can be viewed as a project that is loyal to the originally conception of philosophy as a quest to deepen self-reflection in all human inquiries. Feminist theory is an approach to ethics that builds on the belief that traditionally ethical theorising has undervalued and/or under-appreciated women's moral experience and it therefore chooses to reimagine ethics through a holistic feminist approach to transform it.

An effort is made in order to bring forth an inclusive way of moral thinking. Care is not limited as virtue but is largely and widely has capacity to embrace all the moral theories in one thread. The need of morality comes when we want to live in a society and in a society individual needs and requirements and preferences varies from each other. Say of instance, the debate of vegetarian and non-vegetarian is never ending course. In such situations care asks to bridge the gap between two ways of thinking and thus land on a harmonious place.

Similarly care ethicists like Alison Jaggar who claims that traditional ethical thinking has always ignored the need and voice of women in moral domain. The moral rules and codes are based on patriarchal set of thinking. Men’s traits are decorated as the highest virtue and women are asked to follow and adopt that. Women’s nature and her perspective of morality remained untouched by philosophers since ages. Rather women were tagged as incapable of moral development. The thesis rejects the notions where women are treated as incapable. The subjugation of women begins from home and is extended to society we live in. The theses deeply discuss the role of home and the essential role of education in one’s life.

As a remedy for the sexism in traditional ethics, the feminist approaches suggestion to ethics: (1) begins by acknowledging that men and women have different experiences and situations in life; (2) provides guide to action ‘that will tend to subvert rather than reinforce the

present systematic subordination of women'; (3) offers action guides and approaches to handle issues in both the public and the private realms; and (4) 'takes the moral experience of all women seriously, though not, of course, uncritically'. Feminist approaches call upon women *and* men to overcome gender inequality and oppression. Therefore, they offer something of value to all human beings - for care, justice, and moral value can flourish only in a truly equal and balanced world.

Care ethics is historically rooted in the moral sentimentalism of Hume and Adam Smith. Moral sense theory (also known as sentimentalism) is a view according to which morality is somehow grounded in moral sentiments or emotions but Hume and the other sentimentalists never spoke about caring, only about benevolence, compassion and sympathy.

Care ethics deconstructs the idea of the independent individual and instead stresses that persons exist in web of relationships or inter subjectivity. In this respect, it is the polar opposite of enlightenment and libertarianism. It is different from utilitarianism and justice theories because it works with what is called a thick conception of history. Utilitarianism is concerned with the future, not with history, because it decides on the basis of probable consequences of action. The abstract principles of justice can take the past into account, but only clear and distinct aspects of the past. Ethics of care tries to be sensitive to the indefinitely complex system of relationships that build up in a community over time or even within a family over time.

In the past few decades, the ethics of care has been developed as a promising alternative to the dominant moral approaches that have been invoked during the previous two centuries. It has given rise to an extensive body of literature and has affected many moral inquiries in many areas. It is changing the ways moral problems are often interpreted and changing what many think the recommended approaches to moral issues ought to be.

It need not invoke religious beliefs that carry divisive baggage. It does not rely on dubious claims about universal norms of reason to which we must give priority in all questions of morality. Instead, it develops, on the basis of experience, reflection on it and discourse concerning it, an understanding of the most basic and most comprehensive values.

In the 1970s and 80s feminist writers began to question the assumptions behind many of the traditional ethical theories, but three of the most important philosophers, which my work focuses on them, are: Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick and Nel Noddings. Carol Gilligan's work in moral psychology *In A Different Voice*, challenged "justice-based" approaches to

moral discussion and continues her work to open a new perspective in moral philosophy by physiological backgrounds.

Sara Ruddick is the author of *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (1989). Ruddick is most famous for her analysis of the practices of thinking and epistemological perspective that emerges from the care for children. She argues that mothering is a conscious activity that calls for choices, daily decisions and a continuing alert reflectiveness. She is one of the most important philosophers which turn both feminists and non feminist understanding from motherhood.

Nel Noddings' first major book *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (1984) followed close on the Carol Gilligan's ground-breaking work in the ethics of care. Nel Noddings is closely identified with the promotion of the ethics of care; the argument that caring should be a foundation for ethical decision-making. Her first work *Caring* explored what she described as a feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Her argument starts from the position that "care is basic in human life - which all people want to be cared for." Nel Noddings extends ethics of care in education as an educationalist and reinforces the philosophical and practical foundations of care focused ethics. In the earlier phases of feminism, advocates focused largely on the reform of women's social position, arguing that they should have access to education, work or civil rights. During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, feminists have become increasingly interested in the great range of social practices (including theoretical ones) through which our understandings of femininity and masculinity are created and maintained. As a result, the scope of feminist enquiry has broadened to include, for example, jurisprudence and psychoanalysis, together with many areas of philosophy.

The chapters of the thesis have discussed issues related to moral self in the context of enlightenment. First chapter has talked about moral self and its evolution while interacting with others. A moral self by definition involves other moral selves-the others- and develops inter-subjectivity, so that it is a being that is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong, a person's responsibility for making moral judgments and taking actions that comport with morality. But in traditional moral philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to enlightenment, the moral self has masculine traits such as autonomy, free will, sovereignty, rationality, individuality and it claims that its rules are universal and impartial. This can be philosophically contested. Ethics of care is one of the moral theories that critique these traits

of moral agent. Moral self in the ethics of care emerges and revolves around the ontological, epistemological and ethical aspect of a "woman" as "self" with the "other" in the relationship. Ontological aspect of care includes well-being of the people in the relationship and the community, collective, not individual. Epistemological aspect is concerned about understanding of the desires, wishes, emotions, etc. developing the concern to overcome neglect or ignoring attitude. And the ethical aspect is focused on Care as a virtue of all other virtues like prudence, justice, tolerance, liberality, etc. This can be contrasted with the andocentric approaches.

An attempt has been made to bring forth the need of care ethics in contrast of traditional ethical theories. This chapter has discussed the critique of virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism from feminist perspective. There is discrepancy on moral self within female ethicists themselves. They are wary of rights- or duty-based ethics (e.g. those offered by Kant, Rawls, Nozick). The latter ethical theories try to propound agency based on maxims of action from set of logically consistent principles and to specify hierarchy of rights in which some rights “triumph” over other rights. “Male” ethicists often presuppose or posit a completely impartial “rational” or “prudent” agent / person who is alleged to be representative of all members of the community. Anyone who fails to agree may be dismissed as “irrational” or “immature” in ethical development. Female ethicists, by contrast, take respect for and attentiveness to possible difference, instead of formal consistency, to be a hallmark of ethical maturity. Respect for difference, however, is ethically important.

I have offered a critical conceptual analysis of the conventional ethical theories such as virtue ethics, deontological, and consequentialist. Here I have attempted to bring forth the conceptual insights for understanding of the foreseeable presence of care as fundamental in morality. Annette Baier asked the need to have a moral theory which has to be in harmony with justice and care. Similarly, Virginia Held construes care as the most fundamental moral value which is inherited by every human being which is being devalued by conventional ethical theories. A comparative account of Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan is being discussed to understand that morality is based on social conditioning not biological. In agreement with Gilligan’s account of moral development I have also taken account of Sara Ruddick with a maternal perspective where she is advocating how care is based on social nourishing rather than gender specific. Ethics of care is based on fundamentals of care which is subjective and not based on a set of rules.

I have advocated about the role of education the development of moral self. Nel Noddings developed here the ethics of care with the help of ethical, educational and political theories. She emphasises on the development of moral self and her moral self seeks happiness as an end. This end can only met when education will be understood as a tool to happiness. The evaluation of the relations between ethical education and care theory will address the issues concerning Happiness which is further extended to society and global world..

Thus the role of ethics of care is extending to political theories and thus to global peace. The thesis celebrates the nature of care which can embrace difference and empathise with it. Caring can build a world of harmony. Nature of morality is to bring human realise that they are dependent of each other. While taking various narratives and thinkers i have discussed how globally the core of care is an urgent need.

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