

**IS LOVE ‘WITH’ OR/AND ‘WITHOUT’ REASONS?  
A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION**


*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of the degree of*

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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## CERTIFICATE


This is to certify that the thesis entitled “Is Love ‘With’ or/and ‘Without’ Reasons? A Philosophical Investigation” submitted by Archana Verma, in the fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is her original work. It has not been submitted so far, in part or in full, for any other degree to this university or any other institution.

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I, **Archana Verma**, hereby declare that the thesis entitled “**Is Love ‘With’ or/and ‘Without’ Reasons? A Philosophical Investigation**”, submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is my original work. The thesis has not been submitted so far, in part or in full, for any other degree or diploma to this university or any other university.

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**Dated:**

*To all who love and support me*

*“Loving someone or something essentially means or consists in, among other things, taking its interests as reasons for acting to serve those interests. Love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons. It creates the reasons by which his acts of loving concern and devotion are inspired.”*

**– Harry G. Frankfurt**

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**Archana Verma**

# INTRODUCTION

Concept of love is a philosophically interesting concept because it is an essentially contested concept. Essentially contested concepts, according to W.B. Gallie, are “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users”.<sup>1</sup> The users employ the same terms in their discourse but interpret them differently. The central bone of contention among them is the consideration that their interpretations are more appropriate than the interpretations given by other users. In the words of Alan Soble, “all parties to the dispute might (indeed, do) claim that...they are describing genuine love while the others are describing something that does not deserve the name.” This promotes the idea of a contested concept. As provided by Gallie, the examples of such concepts are justice, democracy, rule of law, citizenship, crime, war, abortion, hate, love, etc. Love is manifested in several ways. We experience familial love for our family members, romantic love for our partners, brotherly/sisterly love for our fellow beings, etc. We experience love in a multitude of ways in varying degrees. We even experience love for God and for other things like ideas, works of art, and other inanimate objects. We do not even think of love in the same manner, it may differ from person to person. Someone considers it as a feeling; others may take it to be an emotion, an attitude, or a type of relationship.

Love and reason have their own commands and necessities and both have great significance in our lives. As Frankfurt states, “The former (reason) guides us most authoritatively in the use of our minds, while the latter (love) provides us with the most compelling motivation in our personal and social conduct. Both are sources of what is distinctively humane and ennobling in us. They dignify our lives.”<sup>2</sup> There is an ongoing debate between love and reason(s)<sup>3</sup> which dates back to Greek philosophy of love. In the light of this debate between love and reasons, this thesis will attempt to analyze different

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<sup>1</sup> Gallie, 1955: 169

<sup>2</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 64

<sup>3</sup> With the use of “reason”, we provide good “reasons” for action.

accounts of love with special attention to the complex relation between love, reasons, and the objects of love.

On the basis of the relation between love and reason, love can be categorized as rational love, irrational Love and arational love. Imagine a person x, who is in love with another person y. If x loves y due to certain characteristics of y, say, for her beauty or her strong personality, it is rational love. If x loves y by seeing only certain good qualities of y and ignoring his bad characteristics, say, her cruel behavior, her abusive nature, it is irrational love. And if the love of x for y is not based on reasons or certain characteristics, it is arational love. The thesis promotes arational love and holds that love can create reasons but is not based on reasons. The drawback with rational nature of love is that if the element on which such love is based, ceases to be or fades away, there is the possibility of love also to fade. There may be situations where love can turn into distaste or hate if the reasons for love do not exist anymore.

We are social animals, and being social animals, we all depend upon each other. But, it seems in present society as if we have lost the feeling of basic human affection or a sense of relatedness and closeness to each other as human beings. Love is analyzed as an element of social action. The intensity and depth through which love creates a bond between two people can be an essential element in a decision or action. Love is a powerful motivator for being good. It can be an effective guide to good action. Human beings must coordinate their activities with other human beings in order to live well and the most basic mode of such coordination, as rightly put by Harry G. Frankfurt, is through love.

Since the time of Socrates, the status of love has been devalued, deemed inferior to the human faculty of reason. In the contemporary discussion of love too, the role love plays in advancing the lover's well-being has been underdeveloped when it has not been completely denied. Some of the contemporary analytical philosophers such as David Velleman deny any role of love in benefitting the lover. However, since Velleman's conception of love is modeled upon Kantian respect he likely shares Kant's belief that virtue and love make no

necessary contribution to the virtuous person's well-being.<sup>4</sup> He claims that it is not required in love to constantly lookout to promote the well-being of one's beloved. He also claims that love can flourish even without sharing much with our loved ones. Velleman claims that "love can have an object but no aim"<sup>5</sup>. An account of love without any aim to benefit the beloved does not seem to be an ideal account of love. Other such philosopher who does not pay much attention to the role love plays in promoting one's well-being is Niko Kolodny. He also does not explore the role of love in benefitting the persons in love.<sup>6</sup> In contrast, Harry G. Frankfurt seems aware that love contributes to the lover's well-being, and his writings influence my account of value of love: love's role in providing final ends. In the light of this contemporary understanding, the present study will attempt to understand love as a necessary component of our life.

The following aims are set for the thesis:

1. The proposed research, firstly, focuses on the contemporary debate on rationality and love, specifically within the Analytic tradition. In the light of contemporary debate, the central issues concerning love: the sort of state love is, the nature of love, the role and value of love in our life, and the relation between rationality and love should be re-examined in order to expand the understanding of love. For instance, preliminary questions on love can be raised as: What is the nature of love? Why do we love? It should be speculated what impact does it have on philosophical discussions if love is taken as physical or emotional or spiritual, rational or irrational or arrational. A few more questions can also be raised: Do parents have reason to love their children? Do we need reasons to prize our love for someone? Kolodny maintains that relationships are reasons for love. So it should be asked: Whether relationships are reasons for love or love itself gives reasons for relationship (as maintained by Frankfurt). Zangwill holds that one might have prudential reasons to follow particular objects of love rather than others, but love itself is not based on reasons.

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<sup>4</sup> See Chapter 1, Sections 2 and 3

<sup>5</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 355

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 1, Sections 2 and 3

2. We encounter many people in our life but why do we feel love for someone, not for all. In virtue of every person's peculiar qualities we may respect them, yet we do not owe love to everyone. What explains the selectivity of love? Velleman's and Kolodny's evaluational and rational account of love would consider it incoherent to love someone who has many flaws in him. "It is even possible for a person to come to love something despite recognizing that its inherent nature is actually and utterly bad."<sup>7</sup> It should be then enquired whether there are conditions for love or love is unconditional. When we apply reasons in love, love can be replaced for such reasons. So, it can be asked: Whether someone with the similar values of the beloved (which were the reason of love) can replace the beloved.
3. It is a necessary feature of love, for Frankfurt, that it is not under our direct and immediate voluntary control.<sup>8</sup> It is not up to us to choose whom to love. It may be asked then: Does love happen to us? Do we have no choice in loving someone? If we have no choice in love, this may be questioned then: Is our will limited? Is love subject to volitional constraint or rational requirements? What impact does love make on the autonomy of both the lover and the beloved?
4. There is an ongoing discussion on *Euthyphro* problem since the time of Plato. In this dilemma related to love, the question arises whether the lover loves the beloved because she is valuable or the beloved comes to be valuable to the lover as a result of his or her loving him or her. The former view is appraisal of value and the latter is bestowal of value. Love is a necessary component of human life. So, it can be asked: What role does love play in providing final ends? And whether love enables us to lead a meaningful life? We do not love someone's differentiating properties or love them for their differentiating properties, even though the awareness of those properties might cause us value their love. When we take love as evaluational, value becomes an indispensable formative or grounding condition of the love. But people do change, their values change. This poses a serious question whether love also

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<sup>7</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 38

<sup>8</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

changes with the change of values of a beloved? Is love a response to any evaluation? If love is evaluational, certain questions arise: Whether one is loved for *who* one is or is loved for *what* one is? Whether *oneself* (one's particularity) is loved or one's virtuous properties? "It is entirely possible for a person to be caused to love something without noticing its value, or without being at all impressed by its value, or despite recognizing that there really is nothing especially valuable about it."<sup>9</sup>

In the light of the above aims of this study, the chapters of the thesis are formulated. The thesis is comprised of four chapters with each chapter comprising of three sections. I may not be able to offer a detailed description, but I will try to give a vivid description of the relation between love and reason.

The first chapter of my work aims to discuss the history of the reasons debate and the implication it makes on the ongoing contemporary debate on love and reasons. Because of the centrality and power of love in human experience, this topic has been a matter of concern ever since the time of Plato. The ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, were of the view that love is one of the significant human virtues. They had distinguished between three kinds of love: *eros*, *agape* and *philia*.<sup>10</sup> *Eros* is conceived as a response to the merits of the beloved- especially the beloved's goodness or beauty. It is, hence, a reason-dependent sort of love<sup>11</sup>. In contrast to *eros*, *agape* does not respond to the value of its object, rather, it creates value in its object as a result of loving it. So, *agape* is not based on reasons. Like *eros*, *philia* is also understood to be responsive to (good) qualities in one's beloved which serve as reasons for love. The relation between love and reason as discussed in the classical accounts of love opens up debate on the possibility of rationally justifying and evaluative conception of love.

Well, it is worth mentioning here that I also wanted to work on the Indian philosophy of love but, as my work is focused on the contemporary debate between love and reason, I

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<sup>9</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 312

<sup>10</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2005

<sup>11</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: xv

couldn't discuss the Indian accounts in this regard. But I have attempted to incorporate the views of some of the Indian philosophers on the question of the distinction between love and other personal attitudes.

The second section of this will attempt to discuss the relation between love and reason in medieval western philosophy. There are many notable medieval philosophers who worked on love, like St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Goethe, Stendhal, and Shelley. However, since my work is focused on the relation between love and reason, I have specifically discussed two of them- St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. This section will attempt to explore the views of these two theologians on love and its relation with reason.

The third section of this chapter will be focused on the role love plays in the modern western philosophy. The prominent philosophers of this period who worked on love were Kant, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Nietzsche, and Freud. However, this section discusses the works of Kant and Kierkegaard with special attention to the relation between love and reason as manifested in their works.

The fourth and the last section of this chapter discusses the contemporary debate on love and its reasons. Particular emphasis has been made to explore the ongoing contemporary debate on love and its reasons, especially in the Analytical tradition. The contemporary philosophers referred to in this section are Harry G. Frankfurt, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny, and Nick Zangwill. Love is an essential part of human life. It is an integral part of our well-being as it motivates us to achieve not only our well-being but also of our loved ones. Reason too plays an important role in human lives as it guides us in our conducts. Reason makes us different from other creatures as we can rationalize our actions and can perform accordingly. An attempt has been made in this chapter to look into the relation between love and reason. Where love seems to be related with affective state, reason is associated with cognitive state. So, the question arises, can there be any relation between them, and if yes, how are they effected by such relation. The discussion on the relation between love and reasons in contemporary philosophy of love is based on two views: the reasons view and the no- reasons view. The proponents of the reasons view are

Velleman and Kolodny. Love, for Velleman, is a response of our rational nature to the value of rational nature in another person, which all persons share equally. Kolodny too argues that there are reasons for love. For him, love is a response to value. The value to which love responds is the value of the relationship and of the ongoing history of shared concern and activity between individuals. The most famous proponent of no-reasons view of love is Harry Frankfurt. He claims that love itself creates reasons of love, and love is not based on reasons. The other proponent of no-reasons view is Nick Zangwill. He claims that love is arational.

The second chapter of my work focuses on the grounds for contemporary reasons debate. These grounds are normative experiences associated with love. So, this chapter has attempted to show how these experiences are considered integral parts of love. The first section of this chapter deals with the selectivity of love. The contemporary reasons debate is based on the view that love seems to be selective. This implies that love directed at a particular object of love. The discussions on the selectivity of love have induced a growing attention among philosophers, over the past few years, on the question whether partiality or particularity shown in love can be justifiable. My proposal on the conflict arising between impartiality of moral commands and partiality shown in love is that when love becomes all-inclusive, like *agape*, it is in line with the impartial commands of morality. When our love is no more limited and when it includes the whole of humanity, it becomes all-inclusive and impartial in nature.

In the second section, the irreplaceability of love is discussed as one of the grounds for contemporary reasons debate. The reasons theory of love is susceptible to the problem of replaceability or substitutability because the reasons for selecting the beloved can become the reasons for replacing him or her on finding a better substitute. Even the no-reasons theory of love can also be susceptible to this problem as there are no exact reasons for how the beloved is different from others. Somebody else can replace the beloved if love is associated with the generic value of the beloved. Let me explain it in the following ways: Let us take a situation where x loves y and z is an exact replica of or similar to y. Now, the problem of replaceability in the reasons view of love can be understood in the following way: If x love y for her distinctive properties, x may replace y by z, if the properties of z are



better than y or similar to y. The problem of replaceability can also arise in the no-reasons view of love and can be understood in the following way: If the love of x for y is not based on y's properties, x may also love z or replace y by z, because there are no fixed grounds. The problem of replaceability can be tackled by asserting that: If x genuinely loves y, x will not substitute z for y even if z is a better option.

The last section of this chapter is focused on the reciprocity of love. The contemporary debate on love and reasons pay much attention to reciprocated love. Reciprocity of love denotes the desire to be united with our beloved and a desire for love to be reciprocated. The idea of reciprocity is associated with the desire for mutual love. Since majority of the contemporary philosophers have based their theories of love on mutual exchange of love, they have ignored unreciprocated love. Kolodny is one of them. So, it has been examined how Kolodny's relationship theory of love do not account for unreciprocated love. However, Frankfurt considers unreciprocated love as a genuine account of love. So, an attempt has been made in this section, to understand the notions of reciprocated and unreciprocated love and their importance in our lives. I have maintained that love, reciprocated by the beloved, is something that is not under the lover's control at all. He or she cannot demand for it. Moreover, it is also asserted that unreciprocated love too is a genuine account of love.

The third chapter presents love as volitional. This view inspired by Frankfurt maintains that volitional necessities determine specific final ends of love. The first section of this chapter deals with love and volitional constraint. I agree with Harry G. Frankfurt that love is not under our direct and immediate voluntary control.<sup>12</sup> In this section, I have discussed about the volitional constraint imposed by love on the lover. Following Frankfurt, I have attempted to maintain that love is subject to volitional constraint. But this constraint is liberating. It will also be discussed in this section whether love is subject to rational constraints? Clearly many emotions are subject to rational constraints: fear, anger and pride, for example. Actually to feel fear it is not necessary that we believe that we are in danger. Perhaps we must at least imagine that we are in danger if we are actually to feel

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<sup>12</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

fear; we must entertain the thought, not necessarily believe it. But we ought to believe it. It is irrational not to. Similarly with anger and pride: if a person has these emotions, then there are rational constraints on their beliefs; and perhaps there are things that we must at least imagine in order to have these emotions. By contrast, in my view, and following Hamlyn and Zangwill, I have attempted to claim that we do not love for reasons. Love is not subject to rational requirements. It should be maintained that love happens with no reason and is arational.

The second section of this chapter is focused on the status of personal autonomy in love. The main question raised in this section is: What happens to autonomy of lovers in love? This section will look into the freedom of choice we exercise in love. This section will attempt to understand the status of human agency in love. This section gives due importance to the freedom of choice in love. This enables a more comprehensive understanding of love and human agency. It is widely agreed that love does not accidentally happen to us. Love is volitional (a configuration of the will). As Frankfurt writes, “love is a defining element of one’s volitional nature”<sup>13</sup>. This proposes that love upholds the autonomy (which involves a kind of independence on the part of the agents, such that they are in control over whatever they do) of the lovers as people act autonomously only when their volitions derive from the essential character of their will. It should therefore be acknowledged that love has an active significance to many facets of our lives and experiences. It is worth noting that the aim of this study is to back the understanding of love as a necessary component of our life. In this section, I have discussed that love, according to Frankfurt, is not under our direct voluntary control. It may seem as if the lover’s autonomy is hampered in love, but since love is a configuration of will, lover’s autonomy is not hampered. Whatever the lover decides, whatever choices he or she makes, he or she would not find himself or herself able to perform those actions; rather, his or her actions are determined by the necessity of love.

In the last section, I have attempted to propose that in order to possess the virtue of love, the lover needs to integrate his or her psyche. If the desires of a person towards his or

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<sup>13</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

her beloved are intensely conflicted, or if those desires are not practically integrated into the person's will, the person does not said to be have the virtue of love. It is not possible for a person to pursue consistently the good of others or union with others if his or her desires towards them are not integrated.

The fourth chapter of my work is based on the relation between love and value. The first section of this chapter deals with appraisal and bestowal of values. As it is discussed in Chapter 1 that *eros* and *philia* are conceived as response to the values or worth of a person, while *agape* creates value in its object as a result of loving it. In *eros*-style love, the lover values the beloved because she is valuable, while in *agape*-style love, the beloved comes to be valuable to the lover as a result of his or her loving him or her. The former view understands love as the "appraisal of value" of the beloved, whereas the latter view understands love as the "bestowal of value" onto the beloved. Irving Singer has provided the distinction between appraisal and bestowal in *The Nature of Love*, Vol.1<sup>14</sup>. I have attempted to give an intermediary position. The lover should not be deluded about the beloved's qualities. Acknowledging the beloved for who he or she is will make the beloved much more satisfied as he or she would no longer have to live up to lover's bestowal of values onto him or her. The beloved then would be himself or herself, and would no longer struggle to be a perfect mate.

The second section of this chapter promotes love as a non-propositional attitude. This view inspired by Nick Zangwill maintains love is not a propositional attitude but an attitude to a particular, typically a person. But even when love is an attitude to a particular person, we do not love their differentiating properties or love them for their differentiating properties, even though the awareness of those properties might cause our love.<sup>15</sup>

The third and the last section of this chapter discusses about the value of love. In the contemporary discussion of love, the role love plays in advancing the lover's well-being has not been completely denied, but has been underdeveloped. Most of the contemporary philosophers have not said much about whether or not love benefits the persons in love.

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<sup>14</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.1, 2009: 3-22

<sup>15</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 305

David Velleman and Niko Kolodny are among those philosophers. In contrast, Harry G. Frankfurt seems aware that love contributes to the lover's well-being. In this section, it is established that possessing the virtue of love necessarily provides the lover with final ends as eudaimonia. The ends of love benefit the lover by adding meaning and purpose to the activities needed to accomplish them.

# Chapter 1

## Relation between Love and Reason

*“There is a striking and instructive resemblance...between love and reason.”*

—Harry G. Frankfurt<sup>16</sup>

Love and reason have their own requirements and necessities and both have great implications on human lives. As Frankfurt states, “The former (reason) guides us most authoritatively in the use of our minds, while the latter (love) provides us with the most compelling motivation in our personal and social conduct. Both are sources of what is distinctively humane and ennobling in us. They dignify our lives.”<sup>17</sup>

There is an ongoing debate between love and reason(s)<sup>18</sup> which dates back to Greek philosophy of love. Some of the ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, were of the view that love is one of the significant human virtues. They had distinguished between three kinds of love: *eros*, *agape* and *philia*. *Eros* is conceived as a response to the values or worth of a person. Plato takes this worth as the goodness or beauty of the person. It, hence, implies that love is dependent on reasons. In contrast to *eros*, *agape* is not responsive to the merits of its object; rather, it creates value in its object as a result of loving it. So, *agape* is not based on reasons. *Philia*, like *eros* and unlike *agape*, is also perceived as a response to the goodness of an individual which serves as a reason for love. The relation between love and reason as discussed in the classical accounts of love opens up debate on the possibility of rationally justifying and evaluating love. This chapter is primarily focused on understanding the contemporary debates in philosophy of love with a view to explore the strengths and weaknesses of different positions taken by philosophers such as Harry G. Frankfurt, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny and Nick Zangwill.

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<sup>16</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 64

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> With the use of “reason”, we provide good “reasons” for action.

The first section of this chapter will focus on the study of relation between love and reason in classical Greek philosophy. This section will attempt to analyze the Greek notions of love- *eros*, *agape*, and *philia*. An attempt would be made to explicate the role of love and the impact of reason on love in that period.

The second section of this chapter will be dealing with the relation between love and reason in medieval western philosophy. There are many notable medieval philosophers who worked on love, like St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Goethe, Stendhal, and Shelley. However, since my work is focused on the relation between love and reason, I have specifically discussed two of them- St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. This section will attempt to explore the views of these two theologians on love and its relation with reason.

In the third section of this chapter, an attempt would be made to discuss the role love plays in the modern western philosophy. The prominent philosophers of this period who worked on love were Kant, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Nietzsche, and Freud. However, this section discusses the works of Kant and Kierkegaard with special attention to the relation between love and reason as manifested in their works.

The fourth and the last section of this chapter is on contemporary debate on love and its reasons. Particular emphasis will be made to explore the ongoing contemporary debate on love and its reasons, especially in the Analytical tradition. The contemporary philosophers referred to in this section are Harry G. Frankfurt, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny, and Nick Zangwill.

Before discussing in detail the various notions of love, let us firstly ponder upon the criteria for evaluating them as suggested by Eric Silverman in his book *The Prudence of Love*<sup>19</sup>. First, an adequate conception of love must be flexible enough in order to explain the first-person experience of love within a wide range of partial caring relationships. An appropriate conception of love should be able to explain the basic structure of the type of

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<sup>19</sup> Silverman, Eric, 2010: 17-18

love it is dealing with, whether it is romantic love or love between friends or love in familial relationships between parents, children, and siblings.

Love generally is partial in nature, as it promotes disproportionate care for specific persons whom one loves. On the other hand, ethical principles give value to an agent's impartial care or love for humanity in general. So, an ideal account of love should be broad enough to reconcile between partial love and impartial concern towards humanity.

An ideal account of love should be in the position to explain some common psychological experiences associated with love. Such an account should be in sync with the experiences such as the unique irreplaceability/non-tradability of the beloved, the constancy of loving relationships, emotional vulnerability in loving relationships, commitment, or caring attitude towards the beloved and the joy found in the union with the loved ones. The irreplaceability of the loved ones denotes that no other person can replace the beloved persons without the significant loss of value. The constancy of loving relationships maintains that a loving relationship endures through time and even lasts through many changes in the beloved and changes in the outer situations. The emotional vulnerability in loving relationships indicates that we open up and reveal our inner feelings, motivations, and our very own nature and become vulnerable with the beloved. Caring attitude towards the beloved signifies that we develop care and concern for those whom we love. A commitment towards the beloved requires a feeling of devotion to his/her well-being. The delight a lover seeks in the union with her beloved refers to the positive emotions that accompany interaction with the beloved.

Furthermore, a credible account of love should be in the position to address love in the sense that love is different from other personal attitudes, such as attraction, liking, infatuation, lust, care, respect, and so on. I am not dealing with the classical Indian accounts of love in detail. But, on the question of the distinction between love and other personal attitudes, I have attempted to discuss some of the Indian philosophers. The classical Indian accounts of love do not pay much attention on the distinction among attachment, attraction

and love (in general).<sup>20</sup> In *Indian Psychology*, vol. II, Jadunath Sinha treats attraction and love as more or less synonymous while explaining the *Nyāya* account of emotions.<sup>21</sup> But love is different from attraction. A person gets attracted to the other person for certain characteristics X, Y, Z, but loving is not directed to certain characteristics of persons rather it is directed to the person herself. Loving for X, Y, Z will lead to the problem of fungibility. As love is different from attraction, there is a difference between love and lust too. Love is broader concept in comparison to lust. The Indian philosophers such as Vātsyāyana and Rāmānuja have made distinction between love and lust. They consider lust (*kāma*) as the desire for sex-union.<sup>22</sup> Love has a different degree of bonding in comparison to the above-mentioned attitudes. Bennett Helms claims that when we love someone, we identify ourselves with him/her.<sup>23</sup> But, when it comes to liking, identification is not there. In the words of Martha Nussbaum, “The choice between one potential love and another can feel, and be, like a choice of a way of life, a decision to dedicate oneself to these values rather than these.”<sup>24</sup> Liking does not have such kind of “depth”. Care is different from love in the sense that we can care for others without loving them particularly. So, in comparison to care, love has more directedness towards specific objects of love. In case of respect, it is generally based on some attributes of the objects, while love need not to be based on such traits. Respect too, is in a generic sense, while love is specific in nature as it is directed to specific persons.

Harry G. Frankfurt too stresses on the importance of avoiding the confusion of relating love with other attitudes, such as infatuation, lust, obsession, possessiveness. People generally confuse these attitudes with love. These attitudes are generally used in narrower sense, while love is a broader concept. So, according to Frankfurt, love is different from

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<sup>20</sup> Sinha, Jadunath, 1986: 179

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 91

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2005

<sup>24</sup> Nussbaum, M., 1990: 328



these attitudes in the sense that love is a mode of disinterested concern, while the above-mentioned attitudes lack this essential nature of love.<sup>25</sup>

In this context, I would like to call attention to a few of the peculiarities that characterize my approach to the topic of love. Following Leo Buscaglia, I hold that there may be degrees of love, but “love is of one kind. Love is love.”<sup>26</sup> There is some essential element of love which is common in all phenomena of love. For example, the caring attitude is common in all experiences of love, it may differ in degrees or the way we express it in different love relations, but it is an integral part of love.

One of the other idiosyncrasies of my approach is that I am concerned with love itself. And I am not really concerned whether it is love for persons or for nonpersons. We tend to love (to an extent) so many things in our lives, such as one’s aim, one’s country, humanity, and even life itself. After all, it is possible for an individual to dedicate her life to her country or to devote herself to serve humanity. This dedication and devotion can be a result of her love for her country or humanity. Some philosophers, like Irving Singer (*The Pursuit of Love*), R. Brown (*Analyzing Love*), and Troy Jollimore (*Love’s Vision*) hold the view that the crucial and deep difference between love for persons and for non-persons is based on the nature of the object of love. Singer believes that things and ideals do not have feelings to which we can respond. He also maintains that “the love of persons is frequently central to love in general”<sup>27</sup>. And Troy Jollimore, in this context, states:

...one can get an initial sense of the difference by noting the obvious but nonetheless crucial fact that loving a person is unlike loving a sport, a cuisine, a pastime, a cause, or a country, in the crucial sense that when one loves a person, one loves something that can care whether it is loved; one loves something that can, if one is fortunate, love one back.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 43

<sup>26</sup> Buscaglia, Leo, 1982: 96

<sup>27</sup> Singer, Irving, 1995: 136

<sup>28</sup> Jollimore, Troy, 2011: xii

In response to these views, I would like to maintain that it is not necessary to love an object by personifying it. Rather, we can love the object as it is. It can also be proposed that love does not need to be reciprocated or requited. One can love someone or something without any desire for getting love back. History reveals that there are people who loved their country and fought for their countrymen without desiring anything back. This is the unconditional nature of love where we do not put or set limitations on love.

However, before giving an account of my approach to love, we will examine the prominent alternative accounts of love.

### 1.1. Relation between Love and Reason in Classical Greek Philosophy

Well, the philosophy of love is dated back to the ancient Greek times. The Greek philosophers have traditionally distinguished three notions that can properly be called “love”: *eros*, *agape*, and *philia*.<sup>29</sup> Forms of love are distinguished from one another by different sets of desires and emotions that accompany each form.

- *Eros* (*érōs*) generally means love that denotes “sexual passion”. Although *eros* begins from feeling towards the body of an individual, Plato holds that, with rational insight it ascends to the beauty within that individual and eventually ascends to the Beauty itself. In the *Symposium*, one of the pioneer works on love, Plato presents Socrates arguing that *eros* helps the soul to ascend the metaphysical ladder in pursuit of the absolute Beauty and thus claims that even that passionate love aims to the Ultimate Good and leads to transcendence.
- *Agape* (*agápē*) especially means the love of God for man and of man for God. It also denotes brotherly love, and charity. *Agape* is the significant feature of God’s love and is unconditional. Thomas Aquinas, one of the main proponents of this notion of love, claims that *agápē* begins with charity and promotes the well-being of the fellow

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<sup>29</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2005

beings.<sup>30</sup> Acknowledging *agape* as a form of spiritual love, Aquinas considered it to be the most significant type of love. This type of love is directed more towards others than towards ourselves.

- *Philia* (*philía*) generally means an affectionate bond between friends. This notion of love is developed by Aristotle. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, one of the famous works on ethics, he presents *philia* as the type of love that unites people together within family, community, and state. The perfect form of *philía* is based on goodness and it develops among them who share common ends and are similar in their goodness.

Because of the central role love plays in human life, this topic has been a matter of concern ever since the time of Plato. *Eros* is interpreted in many ways. So, it is important to make the distinction between the literal meaning of the word and the way Plato uses it. Alan Soble maintains that the original formulation of *eros* is developed and applied to our present experiences to formulate “*eros*-style” love.<sup>31</sup> So, the “*eros*-style” love is generally conceived as passionate and sexually driven. However, Plato describes love as passionate, but in a less sexualized manner. The description of *eros* in the *Symposium* is sexual, but for the lower levels of the metaphysical ladder. Irving Singer clarifies this by explaining Plato’s description of love as “the greatest of all ideals, and a key to understanding the nature of reality, but did not think that love fully showed itself in relationships between men and women”<sup>32</sup>. Plato maintains, through Socrates, that reason is embedded within *eros* and it is in the ascension of the metaphysical ladder that this reason enables the person to ascend *scala amoris* (the metaphysical ladder of love which begins from the beauty of body, passing to the beauty of Soul, then to the beauty of knowledge, and finally to Beauty itself)<sup>33</sup> in pursuit of true beauty and the highest good. *Eros* is to be understood as a process of elevation from physical to metaphysical. This process begins with the physical aspect, but eventually transcends that aspect to reach to love for the Form of Beauty. Plato holds

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<sup>30</sup> Aquinas, Thomas, 2005: I, q.60, a.4

<sup>31</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: xxiv

<sup>32</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.2, 2009: 23

<sup>33</sup> Plato, 1970: 210c

that the Form of Beauty is not transient or temporal. So, love as the realization of absolute Beauty is also eternal.

Plato has laid emphasis on the role of desires. Love, for Plato is desire or at least cannot exist without desire as for him, love desires that which is the Ultimate Good. Desires can lead us to distress, but, if regulated properly, can help us transcend our impulses and lead us to divine or Good.

The roots of the classical philosophy of love go back to the Platonic dialogue, *Symposium*. It presents a symposium on the nature of love or *eros*. The setting of the symposium is an after-dinner drinking party at the home of the Greek tragic playwright, Agathon. This symposium contains a series of five speeches in the praise of love. Two of these five speeches have drawn much attention of philosophers over the years. One of them is that of the comic playwright Aristophanes and the other is that of Socrates. In this context Lydia Amir states, “Of the five speeches..., the speech delivered by the great playwright Aristophanes has perhaps been the...most in accordance with people’s romantic desires. Yet, it is to Socrates...that Plato entrusts with the task of explaining his own theory of love.”<sup>34</sup> The speech of Socrates in praise of love is what he says to have heard from Diotima (A wise woman of Mantinea whom Socrates claims to be his instructress in the art of love, likely to be a fictional character).

Well, Aristophanes begins his speech by giving an account of the origin of human nature. The human race originally had three sexes— man, woman, and the union of the two (also known as “androgynous” or hermaphroditic). “These being were globular in shape, with rounded back and sides, four arms and four legs, with one face one side and one the other, and four ears, and two lots of privates.”<sup>35</sup> These humanoids had terrible might and strength. They dared to attack upon the gods. The gods were in doubt whether to kill the humanoids for their arrogance or to spare them because they feared that if they kill them then who will offer sacrifices and worship the gods. Finally, after much reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He split the humanoids in two in order to diminish their strength and to

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<sup>34</sup> Amir, Lydia, 2017: 182

<sup>35</sup> Plato, 1980: 190a

make them more profitable to the gods. The two halves looked for each other and after finding each other they longed for becoming one again. They were on the verge of dying from hunger and self-neglect as they liked nothing but to be whole again. This would have been the end of the story, if Zeus had not taken pity upon the bisected creatures. “He moved their privates round to the front, for of course they had originally been on the outside-which was now the back.”<sup>36</sup> This was the beginning of sexual reproduction. The sex between men and women was used specifically for reproduction. The sex between two men was used for pleasure and satisfaction. “Ever since these prehistoric events, every human being has been only half of himself, each forever seeking the opposite portion that would make him whole again.”<sup>37</sup> According to this myth, since those times, the human beings long for completion by uniting with their second half. The humans are searching for the wholeness they had before they were separated and believe that through love they can become one again. This myth has promoted the idea of “better-half” in romantic relationships.

Socrates begins his speech by questioning Agathon. He concludes after the questions that love is directed towards something. And love lacks the things which it desires. It is because nobody desires what he has; rather the desire is always directed towards what we don't have or that which we want more. Love is directed towards beauty. So, this means that love lacks beauty. Beauty, according to Plato, is the good. Plato holds that beautiful and good are not different from each other and both complement each other. So, in desiring beauty, love also desires the good. Socrates reveals that he had asked the same questions to Diotima and had received the same answers from her. Like Agathon and other previous speakers who have praised Love, Socrates too had the view that Love is a fair mighty God, but Diotima revealed that love is neither fair nor foul, neither good nor evil, but is in a mean between them. She further holds that among the most beautiful things, wisdom is one, and love being directed towards beautiful, also is the lover of wisdom or a philosopher. And, hence, love is in a mean between the wise and the fool. She further clarifies that Love is not a God, but is the medium to convey to the gods the prayers of humans and to convey their commands to humans.

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<sup>36</sup> Plato, 1980: 190a

<sup>37</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol. 1, 2009: 51

A question is further raised on the desire of possession of beauty in love: What is it that the possession of beauty gives? Socrates maintains that love desires the beauty and beauty is good. Good leads to happiness. So, it is the happiness which love eventually desires. Love is here acquisitive in nature as human beings continuously long for the things that satisfy their desires and provide them happiness. Moreover, love is not only the love of beautiful but also the love of generation and birth. Generation and birth is a kind of immortality to the mortal creatures like us. And as the humans desire for the eternal possession of the good in love, they will necessarily desire immortality along with the good. So, love is then directed towards immortality. This is not only limited to humans, but is also extended to the animals. This is because animals too have an inherent aptitude of immortality.

Love begins, for Plato, with the beautiful body. Then it proceeds to the beauty of soul where the lover appreciates the beauty of institutions and laws, and eventually realizes that the beauty of all laws is of one kind. Humans should further proceed to the beauty of the sciences where they ultimately reach to a single science, which is the science of universal beauty. In this process, they ascend to the supreme nature which is everlasting, and which is good-in-itself. Plato calls this purest Form Good or absolute Beauty. So, this absolute Form or Good is the ultimate object of love. But this purest Form cannot be achieved by passion but by reason.

The discourses in the *Symposium* manifest that the homosexual relation, especially the relation between two men was not considered as taboo in the group or society of Athens to which Plato belonged. Aristophanes considers that after the humanoids got split by Zeus, there could be three modes of union among them. One could be the union of male with female, the other could be between two females and the third bonding could be between two males. According to Aristophanes, the best union is the one between two males. The common relationship in the Athenian society as discussed in the classical accounts is the one between older and younger males. The elder male offered wisdom to the younger one in exchange for sexual relationships and pleasure. Plato critiques this sort of relationship, especially in *The Laws*, and maintains that true love thrives as the contemplation of the

highest Form or Good. Moreover, Plato proposes that the lover attains the true form of love only when he overcomes his passions through reason.

The *Symposium* is not the only myth of love that Plato describes. Other dialogues on love are found in his another middle work, *Phaedrus*. *Phaedrus* seems to follow the *Symposium* in the sense that both the dialogues deal with *eros* in a detailed degree. The translator of *The Complete Works of Plato*, Benjamin Jowett claims that the whole philosophy of Plato on the nature of love is explicated by these two dialogues. In both of these dialogues, love is described in the form of ascension to higher realms. In *Phaedrus*, love is described as turbulent and overwhelming, “He that loves beauty is touched by such madness he is called a lover”<sup>38</sup>.

The first part of *Phaedrus* consists of three speeches. It is in the third speech (the second speech of Socrates) that Plato enquires into the nature and power of love. Socrates mentions four types of madness in his story. First madness is prophecy or the art of divination; second madness is the art of purification by mysteries; third is the madness of those who are inspired by the Muses. The fourth kind of madness is that of love. This is divine madness. Plato’s glorification of madness shows that madness can be ranked higher than sense. We need to understand the nature of the soul in order to explain the divine madness of love.

The Chariot Allegory in this dialogue figuring a pair of winged horses and a charioteer helps the reader understand the nature of soul and of *eros*. Both, the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods, are of noble descent, and the horses pull their chariots very easily to soar above. But in case of human beings, the soul is conceived to be made of a noble horse which is white in colour, a base horse which is black in colour and a charioteer. Socrates asserts, “First the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome”.<sup>39</sup> The black horse is the soul’s appetites and desires that are driven towards earthly pleasure such as sex.

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<sup>38</sup> Plato, 1980: 249e

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 246b

The white horse is the rational part of the soul. When the perfect part of the soul soars upward, the imperfect part falls down towards the earth, thus making the ride a turbulent one. Before falling to the ground, the charioteer catches the glimpses of the divine and this motivates him to soar again. The wing is the earthly element which is similar to the divine. The wing tends to soar upward to the divine, which exists in the form of Beauty, Wisdom, Goodness. It is by the possession of these Forms that the wing of the soul is nourished, but by the possession of evil the wing falls away.

The black breed of the horse is unruly and mean but “Plato never suggests that the black horse must be destroyed or the chariot driven by the white horse of spirituality alone”<sup>40</sup>. Rather, the charioteer must learn to balance himself and the chariot and raise it to heights. Plato states:

...their happiness depends upon their self-control; if the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life here in happiness and harmony - masters of themselves and orderly - enslaving the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements of the soul<sup>41</sup>.

The black horse too is a part of the chariot and the chariot will not move if it is left behind. This allegory can be understood in the way that we all have two forces in us- reason and desire. Where reason prevails, there is temperance; but where reason is subdued and desires rule, there is irrationality or intemperance. Reason is highly prized in Platonic concept of love, but desires too have their role to play in attaining the purest form of love. So the balance between them and self-control can lead us to the realm beyond the physical, i.e., Goodness. Singer tells that French scholars call this view *amour platonicien* which means to respect and “seek to harmonize the vital energies of sexuality”<sup>42</sup>.

Both the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* present the picture of *eros* as the response to Beauty or Good. *Eros* is passionate in nature, but, with the use of reason, it can rise to the highest Form. Love, for Plato, is rational. On this, Irving Singer, in *Plato to Luther*, states, “Since

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<sup>40</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol. 1, 2009: 74

<sup>41</sup> Plato, 1980: 256b

<sup>42</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol. 1, 2009: 74



the object of love pertains to a category of metaphysical explanation, Plato assumes that love fulfills itself through an exercise of reason. Far from associating love with feelings...Plato sees it as rationality and a craving after wisdom.”<sup>43</sup> He further asserts that the true lover controls his sensuous feelings with reason to attain the purest Form. Even in case of true love which is considered as a divine madness, the relationship developed between the soul and the highest Form is intellectual as it is based on the knowledge of the highest Form.<sup>44</sup>

The Platonic tradition of love is continued by Aristotle, though with some modifications. Aristotle, like Plato, holds that bad or evil things cannot be loved. And also like Plato, Aristotle conceives *philia* as a search for goodness. But, there are some differences in their approach to philosophy. As Singer puts it, “Where Plato is suggestive, probing, imaginative, and seminal, Aristotle is thoroughly commonsensical, cautious, exhaustive in proof, more interested in analysis than original thinking.”<sup>45</sup>

Using a virtue ethics approach, Aristotle considers virtue as the objective proper base of *philia*. *Philia* is considered to be the most important element for living. In Aristotle’s own words, “It is not only a necessary thing but a splendid one. We praise those who love their friends, and the possession of many friends is held to be one of the fine things of life.”<sup>46</sup> Aristotle asserts that friendship is valuable and people long for it even if they possess other valuable things. *Philia* also incorporates a bond which is not only limited to friends but also includes even communities, societies, and nation. But Aristotle makes it clear that friendship is not there with non-living things because there is no reciprocity of affection in such cases. The object of affection in case of *philia* is that which is “lovable”. By saying lovable, Aristotle considers them who are either good or pleasant or useful. So, the *philia* can not develop for everybody; rather it looks for the “worthy” candidate. It is rational in nature and is directed to the good and the pleasant. For the friendship based on virtue, there seems to be a limit on the number of friends one can have. A strong friendship can only be

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<sup>43</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol. 1, 2009: 72

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 72-73

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 88

<sup>46</sup> Aristotle, 2004: 1155a, 5

developed with a few people. Romantic love is a sort of excess of friendship, so it can only occur with one person.<sup>47</sup>

Aristotle describes three kinds of friendship:

### **Friendship based on utility**

In the friendship based on utility, people seek for some benefit from each other. Such friendship is not based on their personal values that make them who they are. According to Aristotle, such friendship is common among elderly people, middle-aged people and among those who are in their early phase of life and are driven by their own good. Such friendship does not last for long because the grounds on which this friendship is based are not permanent in nature. Since, this friendship is based on utility, the friendship dissolves if similar interests are not reciprocated or if there is no more need for such utilities.

### **Friendship based on pleasure**

Such friendship is based on the usefulness or pleasure. So, this relationship between people is motivated by the people's own sake. This type of friendship is commonly found between young people and is induced by their own pleasure. This friendship is momentary in nature and there can be no guaranty of constancy of love in such relationships.

### **Perfect Friendship**

Perfect friendship is a kind of virtue. It thrives between them who are equal in the sense of their goodness. Such friends love each other for who they are. This type of friendship, according to Aristotle, is not temporary and lasts till they remain good; and goodness is eternal for him. This love is an impersonal love. In the friendship based on goodness, the lover does love the beloved but this love is ultimately directed to Goodness.

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<sup>47</sup> Aristotle, 2004: 1172a, 35

The third Greek notion of love is *agape* which is also an impersonal love as this divine love is not based on the particularity of a person. The original formulation of *agape* can be traced from the passages of the New Testament. Anders Nygren's tabulation of the differences between *eros* and *agape* presents *agape* primarily as God's love for human beings but it can also be extended to human beings to include love for humanity in the same impersonal manner as the divine love of God is for humans. It is unconditional love as it is not based on any personal trait, or any intrinsic or extrinsic property related to humans. Unlike *eros* and *philia*, it does not look for "worthy candidates" for love. Everybody, irrespective of their worth and value, deserves *agape*. In *Agape*, there is bestowal of value in the sense that it does not appreciate the value of the beloved; rather it creates value in him. *Agape* is unselfish in nature as maintained by Nygren as it is not motivated by the lover's self-interest, rather, directed to the beloved's interest. *Agape* is extensively promoted in the medieval philosophy of love by two eminent philosophers, St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Through the apprehension of both of the philosopher's writing style, the effect of *eros* and *agape* can be seen on their writings. St. Augustine's treatment of *agape* makes it similar to *eros* in the sense that it seems to be, "an erotic passion, awe, and desire that transcends earthly cares and obstacles".<sup>48</sup> Thomas Aquinas' treatment of *agape* makes it similar to *philia*, considering God the most rational being and worthiest recipient of one's love.<sup>49</sup>

To conclude this section, let us have a look on the relation between love and reason as manifested by these Greek notions of love. *Eros* is a rationally-induced love. As per this account of love, to love is to love the Platonic form of Beauty and not a particular individual. Moreover, reciprocity is not necessary to Plato's view of love. It is because the desire is for Beauty rather than for the shared values and pursuits between the lover and the beloved. *Philia* too is rational according to Aristotle. But reciprocity is a condition of Aristotlean love, although parental love can involve a one-sided fondness. Reciprocity is not required in *agape*. As per the interpretation by Thomas Aquinas, *agape* seems to be rational as he gives reason for loving God because He is the most rational Being. "Finally,

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<sup>48</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol. 1, 2009: 285

<sup>49</sup> Moseley, Alexander, 2010

*eros* is an ascending love, the human's route to God; *agape* is a descending love, God's route to humans."<sup>50</sup>

In this section, I attempted to present the classical stand on the relation between love and reason. The classical tradition of love has made great impact on the later traditions. *Eros*, *agape*, and *philia* find echo in the medieval philosophy of love where the medieval philosophers mingle these notions of love to present their own doctrines of love.

## **1.2. Relation between Love and Reason in Medieval Western Philosophy**

Platonism has great influence on the western philosophy of love and it thrives in the later periods through Plotinus as Neo-Platonism. Platonism in the western philosophy of love has its origin in Plato's writings on love, mainly *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. Neo-Platonism originates in the Greco-Roman world and flourishes through Plotinus who is generally considered as the father of this philosophical school of thought. Plotinus inquired into the philosophical position of Plato (regarded as Platonism). He defended the theories of Plato and revived Platonism in the form of Neo-Platonism. Neo-Platonism marked its influence on the medieval western philosophy of love in the sense that his religious philosophy was imbibed by the Christian theologians of this era. The medieval western philosophy of love was greatly influenced by Christian theology and among the main philosophers of this period were the Christian theologians, St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. St. Augustine applied Plotinus' philosophy to his writings to rationally analyze Christian theology. Thus, both the Neo-Platonism and the Christian theology had impacted medieval philosophy of love which enabled medieval philosophers like Augustine and Aquinas to give the rational interpretation of Christian faith and love.

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<sup>50</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: xxiii

Neo-Platonism's effect on Augustine's doctrine of love enabled him to present biblical God as the eternal entity with absolute perfection, omnipotence, non-temporality as described by Plato for the Absolute Beauty. This rational interpretation of God and His love for human beings marked a different approach in the Christian faith. Augustine inquired into the nature of Divine love. He questioned whether God loves human beings as object of use or enjoyment. But then he himself maintains that God is self-sufficient and He does not need any external virtue or Goodness for love. This explains that God does not love human beings as an object of use or as an object of enjoyment; rather He loves them unconditionally. St. Augustine maintains that God's love is not based on the virtue of the object of love.<sup>51</sup> Augustine considers God as absolute, perfect, and eternal. As it is already mentioned that Augustine was influenced by Plato's ideas through Neo-Platonism, his idea of God as absolute was motivated by Plato's idea of the purest form of love. His theory of Divine love is manifested in the Trinity which holds that God is one but exists in three divine persons: the Father, the Son (Jesus Christ), and the Holy Spirit.<sup>52</sup> The Holy Spirit in the Trinity unites the Father with the Son.

Augustine further maintains that God is the creator of all the creation and love is the source of this creation so love gets reflected in everything of this creation. The creatures get connected to their essence through their devotion to God. As inspired by Plato, Augustine considers God as Goodness, Absolute Beauty, and the Supreme Being. He asserts that those human beings who manifest or seek these divine elements can attain divinity. He holds that since human beings are not absolute, they have both the opportunities: to go into darkness or to choose light; whether to love the limitedness or embrace the limitless divinity. He contends that when human beings get inclined to darkness or sin, God showers his goodness and love upon them so that they can come to their true self. Though Augustine's theory of love follows Neo-Platonism, there are dissimilarities between some of their views. In this context, Daniel Day Williams states:

St. Augustine...moves within the neo-platonic vision, but with a difference created by Christian faith. For the Platonists all love is yearning toward the good; it is spirit

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<sup>51</sup> Schaff, Philip, 1886: 2: 1109

<sup>52</sup> Augustine, 1963: 243

moving toward fullness of being. But for St. Augustine God himself is love, therefore love is not only aspiration, but is also the outpouring of the divine being toward the creatures.<sup>53</sup>

Plato's effect on St. Augustine can also be seen in Augustine's despise for sexual relationship between man and woman. Plato considered sex as passionate and related to lower appetites, and not based on reason. St. Augustine maintains that the sexual relation between man and woman is based on lust and lust entails "enjoying oneself and one's neighbor without reference to God"<sup>54</sup>. But, for Augustine, true love is different from this in the sense that it flourishes when "the enjoyment of oneself and one's neighbor is in subordination to God"<sup>55</sup>.

As Augustine's theory of love is inspired by Neo-Platonism, Thomas Aquinas derives his inspiration from Aristotle's conception of love. Aristotle's conception of love holds that love for others gets generated from the feelings we have for ourselves. In the same vein, Aquinas promotes self-love as the basis of love for others. David M. Gallagher explains how Aquinas understands the views of Aristotle and how he applies those views in his doctrine of love. Gallagher states:

Thomas does not understand this text, moreover, in a means-end fashion such that one starts with love of self and then loves others merely as contributing to one's own individual wellbeing. Rather, he understands the principle in the sense that self-love is a principle of a love that seeks the good of the other for the other's sake, i.e., a love of friendship or benevolence.<sup>56</sup>

In his book, *Agape and Eros*, Nygren explains Aquinas's doctrine of love with the help of two propositions: "(1) everything in Christianity can be traced back to love, and (2) everything in love can be traced back to self-love."<sup>57</sup> According to Aquinas, a person

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<sup>53</sup> Williams, Daniel Day, 2003

<sup>54</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.2, 2009: 24

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Gallagher, David M., 1999: 23-44

<sup>57</sup> Nygren, Anders, 1953: 643

desires for the well-being of any other person only when the person is concerned for the other person in the sense that there remains no difference between his and the other person's well-being. And this happens only when he loves the other person. In such relationship, the lover is self-satisfied. This love, according to Aquinas is similar to the Aristotle's description of the love relation between friends.

God, for Aquinas, is love. He considers love as the movement of the will and of the appetitive faculty. He further asserts that the acts of the will and those of the appetitive power are directed towards good and evil. Good is primary and evil is secondary as evil does not have its own existence; rather it exists as the absence of good or as an opposite of good. Good and love are in the first place and are essential for the well-being of persons, while evil and hate are their opposites and are less desired by the will and the appetite. It is by the human beings' nature that they prefer goodness over evil. In this regard, Aquinas states:

...the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths... Love...regards good universally...Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin.<sup>58</sup>

Aquinas believes that love can be broadly categorized into three kinds:

### **Natural Love**

Aquinas maintains that this love arises in the "natural appetite".<sup>59</sup> It is the tendency of the natural things to seek what is appropriate or required for them according to their nature. These appetite do not require reason and thus, such love is not based not reason. This love flows naturally without the application of reason. He explains this love by giving an example of a heavy body which tends to come to the centre of the earth due to its heavy weight. Reason is not applied here; rather the body naturally performs.

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<sup>58</sup> Aquinas, Thomas, 2005: I, q.20, a.1

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., II, q.26, a.1

## **Sensitive Love**

Aquinas holds that this love arises in the “sensitive appetite”.<sup>60</sup> Such appetite is an active part of irrational animals, but human beings can be privileged to have freedom from such faculty if they apply reason. Such love generates from necessity, but not from free will. This love is passionate. In such love, the creatures face some conflict in them because of the struggle of their sensitive appetite in choosing between good and bad. But, since good is preferred over bad, the creatures tend to move towards some good.

## **Rational Love**

Aquinas asserts that this love arises in the rational or intellectual appetite which is “will”.<sup>61</sup> This love follows reason. In such love, the creatures tend to move towards absolute good. There arises no conflict in choosing between good or bad as this love is based on intellectual assessment of good as the only true object of love. He called this rational love “dilection”.

Aquinas holds that human beings can come closer to God through love, not because of their reason. He clarifies that “it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of dilection.”<sup>62</sup> For him, love is “more Godlike than dilection”<sup>63</sup>.

As Aquinas’s conception of love is motivated by Aristotle’s view, Aquinas holds that there is an ardent longing in the human beings to seek good and perfection as they are not perfect beings. But Aquinas differs from Aristotle on the point that everyone is in quest of his own good, but then he maintains that as creatures are part of God so it is their natural urge to get united with God and love him more than anything. God is the common good that everyone strives for. Human beings strive for the divine perfection that God possesses.

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<sup>60</sup> Aquinas, Thomas, 2005: II, q.26, a.1

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., a.3

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.



God's love, for Aquinas, is an act of the will and is a passionless love. Divine love is therefore considered as benevolence.

Before, closing this section, let us have a look on the similarities and dissimilarities between the doctrines of love as proposed by Augustine and Aquinas. Both Augustine and Aquinas consider divine love to be unaffected by external factors such as worthiness of the object of love. God neither enjoys nor uses the objects of love. This love is caused by God Himself and this love is rational as it is according to God's will. Both Augustine and Aquinas assert that the only true object of human love is God as He is absolute Goodness.

Nygren objects Augustine's approach of amalgamating biblical *agape* with Platonic concept of human being's everlasting longing for the highest Form. According to Nygren, only *agape* can be considered as true Christian love. He finds faults in both the Augustine's and Aquinas' view that the human beings, due to their imperfection, strive to get connected with God as He is Perfect being. Nygren argues that these theologians wrongly presented God as the Being who motivates (indirectly) human beings to strive for His absolute Goodness. Rather, Nygren holds that *agape* is "unmotivated" and is "indifferent to value".<sup>64</sup> So, in *agape*, there is no desire or longing. This Christian *agape* or the Divine love creates value in its object of love. In contrast to Divine love, human love is desirous. Divine love does not desire for anything in love, but humans ardently desire for the union with God. Human love longs for reciprocity. In divine love, there is bestowal of value and in human love we can see appraisal of value.

In this section, the medieval western philosophy of love has been discussed. The medieval western philosophy of love was influenced by Neo-Platonism and Christian theology. Christian *agape* was presented in this period with the influence of Platonic *eros* and Aristotle's *philia* on it. This enabled the medieval philosophers, especially Augustine and Aquinas, to promote rational presentation of *agape*. The modern western philosophers, like Kant, also promote rational interpretation of love. On the other hand, philosophers, like Kierkegaard promote love in the form of *agape* as a matter of faith.

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<sup>64</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: 85-86

### 1.3. Relation between Love and Reason in Modern Western Philosophy

Modern western philosophy of love witnessed the decline of the Church authority and the increasing authority of Science. This led to an important historical event in Europe which is called as Renaissance. It is generally accepted that Renaissance began in Italy. This period in European history started from the middle of the 14th century and continued till the beginning of the 17th century. This period actually focused on the revival of the ancient Greek philosophy. The philosophers of this period believed that the ancient wisdom of the Greek and Roman philosophers had the potentiality to structure human life full with values and reason. The revitalization of the ancient literature and philosophy revived the concept of Roman *humanitas* (humanism). This concept put a high value on human dignity and reason. This led to the Modern philosophy with the high emphasis on reason. This period held practical knowledge in high regard. The impact of Greek philosophy on modern western philosophy is evident from the fact that modern western philosophy too, like Greeks, laid emphasis on rational interpretation of truth and regarded reason as the highest authority. One of the leading philosophers of modern times, Kant, promoted rational and impartial inquiry in matters of knowledge and even in the matters of love and respect. Another prominent modern philosopher, Kierkegaard, inspired by Greco-Christian notion of love, i.e., *agape*, presented love in the form of *agape* and claimed that such love enables a person to rise above their lower appetite.

Kantian Ethics plays an important role in recent discussions of love and its role in our moral lives. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Doctrine of Virtue), Kant lists four moral endowments “such that anyone lacking them could have no duty to acquire them. They are *moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and respect for oneself (self-esteem)*.”<sup>65</sup> Kant asserts that consciousness of these feelings should follow from our consciousness of the moral law in order to consider these feelings duty. These feelings are as follows:

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<sup>65</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 1991: 399

## Moral Feeling

Moral feeling, according to Kant, is “the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty.”<sup>66</sup> Everyone has moral feeling in him. Had we not possessed moral feeling, we would have turned to mere animals. So, according to Kant, there can be no moral duty to possess moral feeling as we already have it by the virtue of our human nature. Moreover, Kant maintains that moral feeling can not be understood as moral “sense” because “sense” is related to one’s perception towards an object; while, on the contrary, this feeling is subjective. Kant admits that since there is no moral obligation in this feeling, and since it is subjective, we are free to choose whether to follow practical reason or not.

## Conscience

Just like moral feeling, conscience too does not need to be acquired as we all have it as a moral being. So, there is no moral duty to possess it. Conscience enables us to recognize our duties. In the words of Kant, conscience is “practical reason holding man's duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law. Thus it is not directed to an object but merely to the subject (to affect moral feeling by its act).”<sup>67</sup> Moreover, Kant holds that sometimes it is said that someone “has” no conscience, but this does not mean that the person does not have it in him; rather it implies that he does not pay attention to it. Kant states:

...when it is said that a certain man *has* no conscience, what is meant is that he pays no heed to its verdict. For if he really had no conscience, he could not even conceive of the duty to have one, since he would neither impute anything to himself as conforming with duty nor reproach himself with anything as contrary to duty.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 1991: 399-400

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 399-401

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 401

## Respect

Respect, again, for Kant, is not an objective imperative; rather it is subjective. It is not subjected to duty. But, we can have a sense of duty only if we have “respect” for the duty. Respect, according to Kant, is directed to the law and to the rational nature of human beings as human beings are rational beings. Kant maintains that the law within the human beings binds them to protect their self-esteem.

## Love of Man

Love, for Kant, is a matter of feeling. One can not be made or forced to love. It is not, therefore, a matter of will. So, there is no moral obligation on love in this sense. It is, therefore, pointless to think of “Duty to love”, according to Kant. He claims that there is a sense of necessitation in every duty. There are some constraints and some commands to be followed in duty. But, it is not the nature of love to be caused by a command. However, then he says that love in the form of unselfish “benevolence” towards other beings can be a matter of duty.<sup>69</sup> In this love, people do not merely wish for the happiness of their loved ones, but they dedicate themselves completely to fulfill the ends of the loved ones.

In *Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant categorizes love into two kinds: *pathological* love and *practical* love. Even in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, he mentions practical love as the maxim of benevolence and makes it clear that only such love can be a duty. Kant’s distinction between these two types of love is as follows:

...love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from duty - even though no inclination impels us to it and, indeed, natural and unconquerable aversion opposes it - is *practical* and not *pathological* love, which lies in the will and not in the propensity of feeling, in principles of action and not in melting sympathy; and it alone can be commanded.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 1991: 402

<sup>70</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 2006: 4:399

Based on these distinctions, we can analyze these two forms of love.

### **Pathological love**

Kant defines pathological love as a desire for the happiness one gets with or one gives to the loved ones. This love is based on pleasure one gets in the perfection of the object of love. In such love, the lover gets delighted in the beloved's perfection. There is no moral obligation in such love. Hence, pathological love cannot be commanded.<sup>71</sup> This love is merely related to feeling, not willing. Since pathological love is based on sensitive appetite, this love, for Kant, is not rational. Pathological love, according to Kant, does not follow reason; rather it follows senses.

### **Practical love**

Kant does not consider love as the pleasure one seeks from the perfection of the loved ones. In this context, Kant asserts:

love is not to be understood as *feeling* (*ästhetisch*), that is, as pleasure in the perfection of other men; love is not to be understood as *delight* in them (since others cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of *benevolence* (practical love), which results in beneficence.<sup>72</sup>

Love, according to Kant, can be understood in the terms of benevolence, which he calls practical love. By practical love, he means that this love is in line with the maxim of actions.<sup>73</sup> This love results in beneficence.

Kant's presentation of love as benevolence makes his account of love similar to that of Aristotle and Aquinas. Aquinas holds that, in love, the lover considers the good of the beloved as his own, and the well-being of the lover ensures the well-being of the beloved.

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<sup>71</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 2006: 4:399

<sup>72</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 1991: 450, Div.25

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., Div.26

In the same vein, Kant too presents the duty of love for one's neighbor as the duty to consider the neighbor's ends as one's own. But, then he puts a condition here that the ends of the neighbor should not be immoral.

Practical love, for Kant, is a desire to benefit other beings in response to a command of duty.<sup>74</sup> This love is moral and rational. It lies at the ground of morality. In this love, there is rational representation of the dignity of other beings. The rational interpretation of human nature enables us to treat the other beings as end-in-themselves. When we treat others as ends, and not as means to our happiness, and when we dedicate ourselves to help others fulfill their ends, we act virtuously in acting from duty. This presents human being's good will, in the sense of their virtue.

Kant maintains that doing good to others is a duty and it is through benevolence that we do good to others as our duty. We can do good to others even if we do not love them. In benevolence, it does not matter whether we love somebody or not, we do good to him. According to Kant, even if we hate somebody because of his bad qualities, we should do good to him. This will lead to beneficence and beneficence will eventually make us love even them whom we dislike. In this context, Kant says:

In accordance with the ethical law of perfection "love your neighbor as yourself," the maxim of benevolence...is a duty of all men toward one another, whether or not one finds them worthy of love. For every morally practical relation to men is a relation among them represented by pure reason, that is, a relation of free actions in accordance with maxims that qualify for a giving of universal law and so cannot be selfish.<sup>75</sup>

Kant bases this notion of love on the divine command to love one's neighbor as oneself. Such love is benevolence, which he calls practical love. It is the practical love which Kant considers as moral and rational and which enables us to get connected to us and to others by following pure reason. This love follows universal moral law and is unselfish.

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<sup>74</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 2006: 4:399

<sup>75</sup> Kant, Immanuel, 1991: 451

Where Kant considers love as a limiting principle, Kierkegaard considers it as an essential element of human life. Unlike Kant, Kierkegaard does not approve of love being constrained by moral demands; rather, he believes that Christian love is transcendental in nature. However, there are some similarities between their doctrines of love. Like Kant, Kierkegaard too considers love as a duty. He asserts that when we follow the divine command to love one's neighbor as oneself, it is then when love is a duty. When there is duty to love, love becomes constant. Such love enables us to overcome all our despair. In Kierkegaard's own words, "You shall love. Only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured against every change, eternally made free in blessed independence, eternally and happily secured against despair."<sup>76</sup>

In *Works of Love*, Kierkegaard investigates the role love plays in Christian life. He admits that works based on love are necessary part of Christian life. Kierkegaard claims that God is love and since God is indescribable, hence he considers that love too, is indescribable. Moreover, Kierkegaard also asserts that we should not think about the recognition of love; rather, we should work in such a way that love itself gets recognized due to its "fruits".

In order to explain his notion of love in a broad dimension, Kierkegaard attempts to discuss *agape* in relation to *eros* and *philia*, where he considers that *agape* is the only true love.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, he argues that erotic love is based on reason or virtue of the loved object. For Kierkegaard, in erotic love, the lover does not consider the beloved's ends as his own:

The person aflame with erotic love, by reason or by virtue of this ardor, can by no means bear redoubling, which here would mean to give up the erotic love if the beloved required it. The lover therefore does not love the beloved as himself, because he is imposing requirements ...and yet the lover thinks that he loves the other person even more than himself.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Kierkegaard, Soren, 1998: 29

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 8

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 21

Love, for Kierkegaard, is not a matter of reason; rather, he attempts to explain love in the form of faith and he considers love as a matter of conscience. “*Love is a matter of conscience and thus is not a matter of drives and inclination, or a matter of feeling, or a matter of intellectual calculation.*”<sup>79</sup>

In this section, we have discussed the modern western philosophy of love. We have examined Kant’s rational account of love of in the form of benevolence. Another modern western philosopher, Kierkegaard follows some of the aspects of Kant’s theory of love. But differs from him in the sense that he does not base his notion of love on reason. In the next section, we would deal with the contemporary analysis of love. There is an ongoing debate on the relation between love and reason. So, the next section will attempt to study this debate advanced by Harry G. Frankfurt, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny and Nick Zangwill.

#### **1.4. Contemporary Debate on Love and its Reasons**

The debate on rationality and love in the contemporary philosophy of love, specifically within the Analytic tradition, got attention over the last decade, especially since Harry G. Frankfurt wrote *Necessity, Volition, and Love* in 1999 and *The Reasons of Love* in 2004. These works have opened up new areas of discussion related to love and reasons. Frankfurt continues the debate by opposing Aristotle. On the question of the relation of love and value, both Aristotle and Frankfurt rest their ultimate positions upon their implicit notions of objectivity. While Aristotle favors realism, Frankfurt supports subjectivism. Aristotle affirms an objective Good. He presupposes an objective reality and value as already there, independent of the self, not constituted by the self. On the contrary, Frankfurt presupposes an objective, value-free reality that is already out there upon which one projects one’s own significance, meaning, and value.

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<sup>79</sup> Kierkegaard, Soren, 1998: 143



Frankfurt's theory of love is somewhat inspired by Kantian autonomy. The Kantian conception of love is further advanced by Frankfurt as he based his theory of love using Kantian autonomy (obedience to self-selected rational dictates of moral law). But, unlike Kant, he affirms that the unconditional commands of love are essentially integral to a person's will, "for what a person loves is a defining element of his volitional nature"<sup>80</sup>. Love being a fundamental element of one's volitional nature satisfies the (Kantian) conditions for autonomy. Frankfurt contends that love is a structure of desires and it does not require any justification. Since, love is a response to the particularity of the beloved, it is not based on generosity or some general principles that the beloved has. For Frankfurt, love is partial; it is partial in the sense that it is directed towards the particular individual whom one loves. Love, for him, is the source of practical reasons but there are no reasons for love.<sup>81</sup> He has therefore construed the possibility of an intimate link between love and practical reasons.

Frankfurt's ingenious account of love fueled much discussion and in response, J. David Velleman and Niko Kolodny presented their own theories of love and advanced the debate in new and interesting directions. Velleman offers criticisms of Frankfurt's account and provides an alternative understanding of love and reasons. He rejects Frankfurt's no-reasons view of love by arguing that love is based on reasons and the value of the beloved acts as the reason. Kolodny too criticizes Frankfurt's account of love by arguing that love is a response to the relationship between the lover and the beloved. The debate between love and reasons continues, with numerous moderations, adaptations, and reconciliations. The debate has recently been rejuvenated and enriched by Nick Zangwill. Zangwill sides with Frankfurt on the question of love's justification as for him, love is arational. And in the process of devising an amoral and arational account of love, Zangwill refutes the claims of Velleman and Kolodny that love is based on reasons.

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<sup>80</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

<sup>81</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 37

The accounts of love of these contemporary analytical philosophers can be classified as:

- **The Volitional Theory of love**

Harry G. Frankfurt is associated with this theory of love. This theory is called “volitional” as it highlights the role of the will in love. This theory of love maintains that the object of love becomes valuable to the lover due to his or her love for the loved object. This value is not dependent on the beloved. As for instance, the love of parents for their children is not a function of the children’s quality or their intrinsic value. The volitional account holds that there are no reasons for love. Moreover, this account of love considers love as the source of reasons.

- **The Responsive Theory of Love**

J. David Velleman promotes the responsive theory of love. This account of love asserts that love is a response to the value the lover sees in the beloved. This love is directed to the rational nature of human beings. It is a response of one’s rational nature to other’s rational nature. According to this account of love, the rational nature of the beloved acts as a reason for love.

- **The Relationship theory of Love**

Niko Kolodny promotes the relationship theory of love. This account of love depends on the relationship between the lover and the beloved, where by "relationship" is meant an on-going connection, with a history of interactions between the persons so connected. As per this account, the lover values both the beloved and the relationship with him or her.

- **The Non-Rational theory of Love**

Zangwill advances the non-rational theory of love. Love, for him, is not based on reasons. He believes that love is caused, and it is caused by habit, shared history, and

attraction. As Frankfurt maintains that love is the source of reasons, in the same vein, Zangwill too believes that love is not a response to reasons, love gives rise to reasons.

These accounts can further be grouped into two main categories on which the discussion on the relation between love and reasons in contemporary philosophy of love is based. These categories are: the reasons view of love and the no- reasons view of love

### **1. The reasons view of love**

This view of love considers love as a response to reasons. The main proponents of this view are Velleman and Kolodny.

#### *Velleman's Responsive Theory of Love*

Velleman's "Love as a Moral Emotion" proposes that love is a kind of valuation of rational nature of an individual. Love, for him, is a response of our rational nature to the value of rational nature in another person.<sup>82</sup> And this rational nature is shared equally by all persons. Velleman, following Kant, claims that every person has a "dignity" based on her rational nature and everybody shares the same value. According to him, we maintain emotional defenses that check other persons to affect us. In love, those defenses are disarmed and we become vulnerable to others.

Velleman's view of love takes a somewhat moralized Kantian form. His notion of love resembles Kant's notion of "reverence". He maintains that as reverence is directed towards the rational will of a person; love is directed towards the essence of persons in the same manner. He identifies the beloved's essence with her rational nature. He states, "...reverence as the awareness of a value that arrests our self-love. I am inclined to say that

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<sup>82</sup> Velleman, J. David, 1999: 365

love is likewise the awareness of a value inhering in its object; and I am also inclined to describe love as an arresting awareness of that value.”<sup>83</sup>

Velleman considers that Kantian respect is not impersonal; rather it is partial in the sense that it is an attitude towards the personhood. In the same manner, he considers love to be personal. He maintains:

The result is that reverence for the law, which has struck so many as making Kantian ethics impersonal, is in fact an attitude toward the person, since the law that commands respect is the ideal of a rational will, which lies at the heart of personhood. This result puts us in a position to consider how Kantian reverence might resemble another moral attitude toward the person, the attitude of love.<sup>84</sup>

Love, in his view, is the “optional maximum response to one and the same value” to which Kantian respect is the “required minimum response”<sup>85</sup>, namely, the value of a person as a "rational nature" or "capacity of appreciation or valuation- a capacity to care about things in that reflective way which is distinctive of self-conscious creatures like us"<sup>86</sup>.

Velleman’s love is directed towards the persons believing that they are “self-existent” ends. A self-existent end, according to Velleman, is not generated by action and is not a substitute to other producibles. It is the basis for respecting the end as the end-in-itself. His model of love is similar to Kantian respect in the sense that respect for persons is required as an attitude to believe that the persons are not means to an end; rather are ends in themselves. In his own words:

Respect for others is required, in Kant’s view, because the capacity for valuation cannot take seriously the values that it attributes to things unless it first takes itself

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<sup>83</sup> Velleman, J. David, 1999: 360

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 348

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 366

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 365

seriously; and it cannot first take itself seriously if it treats instances of itself as nothing more than means to things that it already values.<sup>87</sup>

Velleman's notion of love is modeled on Kantian respect but this does not mean that love is respect. His view of love is different from Kantian respect in the sense that respect is a response to the rational nature of a person that we know intellectually. But, love, according to him, is not a response to any intelligible aspect of a person; rather the object of love is the embodied subject. "Grasping someone's personhood intellectually may be enough to make us respect him, but unless we actually *see* a person in the human being confronting us, we won't be moved to love; and we can see the person only by seeing him in or through his empirical persona."<sup>88</sup>

Velleman further believes that it is our tendency to maintain emotional defenses toward others so that we cannot be affected by them. But, it is in love that we open up emotionally toward the object of love by disarming our emotional defenses toward it. We open up to a person as a response to his or her rational nature. Velleman asserts that rational nature of persons is not the only essential feature of love as he believes that love can be felt for many other things than human beings as possessor of rational nature. But, then he maintains that when we love a person "*as a person*", and not as an aesthetic object, we respond to his or rational nature."<sup>89</sup>

Since, Velleman's responsive theory of love attempts to reconcile the conflict between the partial love and the impartial morality, it presents love in a generic sense. He claims that love is a response to personhood which is an integral part of every human being. So, it can be objected, how exactly love is directed to some and not to all when all possess the same personhood. He would say on this that it is because we open up emotionally to some and not to all. But, it is still not clear from his account, how exactly we are vulnerable to some and not to all when all are equally worthy of our love. Kolodny too criticizes Velleman's account of love by maintaining that this account considers non-relational features of a

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<sup>87</sup> Velleman, J. David, 1999: 366

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 371

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 364-365

person as the reasons for love, but such features are universal in nature and cannot be distinctive features of a particular person whom we love rather than others. Kolodny argues:

In J. David Velleman's provocative and ingeniously argued proposal, the reason for love is the beloved's bare Kantian personhood, her capacity for rational choice and valuation. But no such nonrelational feature works. To appreciate just one difficulty, observe that whatever nonrelational feature one selects as the reason for love will be one that another person could, or actually does, possess.<sup>90</sup>

### *Kolodny's Relationship theory of Love*

Kolodny refutes the Frankfurt's no-reasons account of love by maintaining that love appears to be reflexively appropriate and this appropriateness demands reasons. He, like Velleman, presents a rational account of love. But he refutes the Velleman's responsive theory of love too by arguing that love is not based upon any generalized attribute that is inherent in every person. Rather, love, for him, is focused on relational features. In order to give a detailed description of Kolodny's account of love, I am quoting Nick Zangwill. Zangwill properly puts it:

Probably the most plausible view according to which there are reasons for love is Niko Kolodny's view that relationships are reasons. Such a view avoids many of the difficulties with the idea that the reasons for love are intrinsic properties of the person that we love. (Moral qualities of the object of our love would be such intrinsic properties.) Instead, on this view, our relational properties, in particular, our relationships to people, give us reasons to love them. Kolodny thus hopes to occupy a middle ground between the view that the reasons of love are non-relational features, such as qualities of character or non-relational features such as Kantian personhood, and the complete denial that there are reasons for love, as Hamlyn and Frankfurt think.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003: 135

<sup>91</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 309-310

Kolodny contends that there are reasons for love as there are reasons for the desires that constitute love; we cannot distinguish loving desires from other, non-loving desires aimed at helping someone.<sup>92</sup> Kolodny's "Love as Valuing a Relationship" proposes love as a psychological state. He claims that there are reasons for this state and interpersonal relationships between the participants act as those reasons. He further maintains that love is a form of valuing. Kolodny states, "More specifically, love is a kind of valuing. Valuing X, in general, involves (i) being vulnerable to certain emotions regarding X, and (ii) believing that one has reasons both for this vulnerability to X and for actions regarding X."<sup>93</sup> Kolodny, hence, like Velleman, argues that love is the response to value. But unlike Velleman, he assumes that the value to which love responds is the value of the relationship and of the ongoing history of shared concern and activity between individuals. Love is, according to him, made appropriate not only just by the presence of such a relationship but also "partly consists in the belief that some relationship renders it appropriate, and the emotions and motivations of love are *causally sustained* by this belief (except in pathological cases)"<sup>94</sup>. This account holds the view that love is based on the specific relational history one shares with the "relative" (Kolodny uses this term to denote the person with whom one has the relationship). But this alone does not make love appropriate. The lover should also have the belief that some relationships make love appropriate. Eric Silverman, in his work, *The Prudence of Love*, explains Kolodny's account by stating that, "The desires and feelings associated with love are strengthened by a belief that the nature of the lover's relationship with the beloved will make these desires and feelings appropriate."<sup>95</sup>

Moreover, Kolodny makes it clear that the urge to help a stranger does not count as love. It is because love is not directed to generic attributes of a person. The relationship itself becomes the reason for love. Kolodny maintains that his account of love explains constancy of love and nonsubstitutability of the beloved as the relationship remains, even if

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<sup>92</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003: 143

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 146

<sup>95</sup> Silverman, Eric, 2010: 34

the qualities of the beloved changes. I find this claim of Kolodny paradoxical since he himself maintains that love includes the belief that some relationships make love appropriate. What if a husband loves his wife in the initial years of their marriage and eventually becomes abusive to her? The status of their relationship may remain the same as husband and wife, but this relationship does not render love appropriate.

The relationship theory holds that every interpersonal relationship cannot be termed as relationship. Relationships which are ongoing, historical, and sustained between particular persons over time fulfill the condition of “relationship” as per Kolodny’s theory. He further makes the distinctions of what he means by relationship clear by stating, “Attitude-independent relationships, such as family relationships, can exist independently of any historical pattern of concern. Whether Ivan is my brother does not depend on how we feel about one another; it depends on a biological tie, or a fact about our upbringing.”<sup>96</sup>

Kolodny presents his account of love through a number of evaluative beliefs.<sup>97</sup> His presentation is as follows:

More precisely, A’s loving B consists (at least) in A’s:

- believing that A has an instance, *r*, of a finally valuable type of relationship, *R*, to person B (in a first-personal way—that is, where A identifies himself as A);
- being emotionally vulnerable to B (in ways that are appropriate to *R*), and believing that *r* is a non instrumental reason for being so;
- being emotionally vulnerable to *r* (in ways that are appropriate to *R*), and believing that *r* is a non instrumental reason for being so;
- believing that *r* is a non instrumental reason for A to act in B’s interest (in ways that are appropriate to *R*) and having, on that basis, a standing intention to do so;

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<sup>96</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003: 149

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 151



- believing that  $r$  is a non instrumental reason for  $A$  to act in  $r$ 's interest (in ways that are appropriate to  $R$ ), and having, on that basis, a standing intention to do so; and
- believing that any instance,  $r^*$ , of type  $R$  provides (a) anyone who has  $r^*$  to some  $B^*$  with similar reasons for emotion and action toward  $B^*$  and  $r^*$ , and (b) anyone who is not a participant in  $r^*$  with different reasons for action (and emotion?) regarding  $r^*$ .<sup>98</sup>

Eric Silverman explains these six requirements for love by maintaining that the first requirement holds that the lover believes the beloved possesses an instance of an intrinsically valuable type of relationship with him. The second and third requirements specify that the lover is emotionally vulnerable both to the beloved and to their specific relationship in the ways which are appropriate to that kind of relationship. Emotional vulnerability causes the lover to have a tendency toward experiencing a range of positive emotions concerning love's object. The fourth criterion demands that the lover believes his relationship with the beloved is a sufficient reason to act on her behalf in relationally appropriate ways, and that the belief causes an ongoing intention to do so. The fifth requirement is that the lover believes his relationship with the beloved is a reason for acting in the relationship's interests and has ongoing intentions to do so. The sixth requirement is that the lover believes that anyone within the same type of relationship has similar reasons for emotion and action within that relationship, and believing that anyone outside of that type of relationship necessarily has different reasons for action and emotion.<sup>99</sup>

Kolodny's relationship theory of love is based on relational features of person with whom we share a relation. Taking relational features of a person as reasons for love make his account less vulnerable to the problem of substitutability of the loved objects. But, there are some objections to his account of love. Silverman criticizes Kolodny in the following statement:

A more appropriate objection to Kolodny's account is that it simply has too many criteria for love. Must the lover have a detailed theory of love? His sixth requirement for love requires that the lover hold a "theory of love" applying to everyone,

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<sup>98</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003: 150-151

<sup>99</sup> Silverman, Eric, 2010: 35

everywhere and not just to his own relationship. Many people are less theoretically inclined than this account requires.<sup>100</sup>

## **2. The no-reasons view of love**

The no-reasons view of love holds that there are no reasons for love. The main proponents of this view are Frankfurt and Zangwill.

### *Frankfurt's Volitional Theory of love*

Frankfurt forwards four necessary features of love for a person. “First, it consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the well-being or flourishing of the person who is loved.”<sup>101</sup> Love is not instrumentally motivated according to Frankfurt. Since, it is a disinterested concern, it promotes the well-being of the beloved that is desired for its own sake. “Second, love is unlike other modes of disinterested concern for people—such as charity—in that it is ineluctably personal.”<sup>102</sup> Love, being personal, is directed at a particular person. Unlike other disinterested concerns such as charity, love is based on the particularity of a person and hence, the lover cannot substitute someone else for his or her beloved, no matter how similar the replacement can be to the beloved. The lover loves his or her beloved for his or her own sake, and not as a member to some class where anyone can be substituted for anybody else. “Third, the lover identifies with his beloved: that is, he takes the interests of his beloved as his own.”<sup>103</sup> The lover fulfills the beloved’s interests, as the interests of the beloved become the lover’s own interests. He suffers if the interests of the beloved are not adequately fulfilled, and in the same way, he rejoices if the interests are properly fulfilled. “Finally, loving entails constraints upon the will. It is not simply up to us

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<sup>100</sup> Silverman, Eric, 2010: 37-38

<sup>101</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 79

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 80

what we love and what we do not love. Love is not a matter of choice but is determined by conditions that are outside our immediate voluntary control.”<sup>104</sup>

Frankfurt holds that love is part of our disposition as persons. He considers love as the basis of the structuring and ordering of our lives. It is often thought that in order to conduct our lives appropriately, we require living according to reasons or requirements of reason such as prudence. Frankfurt’s philosophy offers a new resource to draw upon when answering questions about how we should conduct our lives, i.e., through love.

Frankfurt’s theory of love presents various essential features of love to highlight the practical nature of love. An essential element of love, as per the views of Frankfurt, is that love is personal. By labeling love as “personal”, Frankfurt means that love is rigidly focused, i.e., the object of one’s love is not replaceable.<sup>105</sup> The most important feature of love in Frankfurt’s theory which seeks our attention is that love is not a response to reasons, rather it gives itself rise to reasons. In Frankfurt’s own words, “love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons”.<sup>106</sup> It is an integral feature of this kind of love that the lover takes her beloved’s interests as offering her reasons for action. Even more radically, Frankfurt advocates that practical reasons are grounded in love.

Frankfurt also believes that love is not based on the value of the beloved. He claims that love is “not equivalent to or entailed by any judgment or appreciation of the inherent value of its object. To love something is quite different from considering it to be especially appealing or precious.”<sup>107</sup> For example, in the case of the parent’s love to their children, love is not necessarily a response to value.<sup>108</sup> This kind of love, rather, bestows value, meaning and importance on what is loved and on the life of the person who loves. It is only when we love some ideal, object, end, or person that we care about their interests, and that we shape our lives accordingly.

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<sup>104</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 80

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 79-80

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 37

<sup>107</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 129

<sup>108</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 38-39

Since, for Frankfurt, love is the source of practical reasons. He opened the possibility of linking love with practical reasons. He is obviously not the first philosopher to look for such possibility. Plato has already construed such possibility. However, both differ in their positions. Where, Plato considers love to be based on reasons, Frankfurt holds that there are no “reasons for love”; rather love creates the “reasons of love”. Frankfurt’s position on the relation between love and reasons fueled much discussion and gave rise to responses such as Velleman’s and Kolodny’s. Velleman offers criticisms of Frankfurt’s account and provide an alternative understanding of love and reasons. Velleman rejects Frankfurt’s no-reason account of love by arguing that love is a response to the value of the beloved. According to Velleman, this value is the dignity of the beloved as a person. For him, accounts such as Frankfurt’s express a sentimental fantasy, where love “necessarily entails a desire to ‘care and share,’ or to ‘benefit’ and be with”.<sup>109</sup> Velleman continues, “...it is easy enough to love someone whom one cannot stand to be with”.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, when we think of the persons we love, we do not think of ourselves as agents of their interests.

#### *Zangwill’s Non-Rational theory of Love*

Zangwill criticizes the views of Velleman and Kolodny by pointing out that love does not have the logical form of an evaluation and can therefore not be a response to reasons. The object of an evaluation is a proposition (a value predicate is applied to a thing), whereas love’s object is not a proposition but a particular thing or person. Moreover, thinking of love as an evaluation gives rise to the possibility of trading up one’s love for another person or relationship which is believed to be valuable to a greater degree. This is contrary to the love that we find valuable in our lives, according to Zangwill. Love is thus not a response to reasons; it is caused by factors such as a shared history, habit, and attraction.<sup>111</sup> Finally, Zangwill argues, although we do not love for reasons, love may nevertheless be subject to evaluation by reasons such as prudential reasons, and love gives rise to reasons.

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<sup>109</sup> Velleman, J. David, 1999: 353

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 312

In response to all these views, I propose the view that love is a direct emotional response to a person. On this view, inspired by Zangwill and David Hamlyn<sup>112</sup>, love happens with no reasons. Love does not require any basis or requirement to happen. In particular, love is not subject to rational constraints. I further maintain that the value of love depends on the following two principles; only if love lacks evaluative and rational content. Thus – to put it in a plain way – it is rational to value love but love itself is not rational.

This point is important because evaluation is propositional. “Can we not talk of valuing a thing? Is not valuing sometimes objectual as well as propositional? No.”<sup>113</sup> When we talk of valuing a thing, this means thinking that a thing is valuable; and that is to ascribe a value to that thing, which is propositional. Hence there are no real objectual evaluations. Evaluation is essentially propositional. As a consequence of this, an evaluational account (like Velleman’s or Kolodny’s) ought to give love a propositional object – that X has a certain value, or that X has certain evaluative characteristics. But, according to Zangwill, such a love would be propositional and this would defy the logical form of love. He says that love denies to be propositioned:

To put the argument in a crisp form:

- (1) Evaluation is propositional. We think of the objects of evaluation as having evaluative properties. That is the logical form of evaluation.
- (2) If love is evaluation, it has a propositional logical form.
- (3) But it does not. Love cannot be held towards a propositional object. That is essential to love.

Therefore, Love is not a form of evaluation, and it does not imply an evaluation.<sup>114</sup>

We may attribute value to particular things or may appreciate their intrinsic values but still may not love them. There are great personalities whom we admire a lot, but this does not

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<sup>112</sup> Hamlyn, D.W., 1978: 16

<sup>113</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 305

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

necessitates that we are in a loving relationship with them. When we love someone or something, we find them attractive, we appreciate their values, but love is not based on those values. So, following Frankfurt, I propose that there are no such reasons for love as values of the beloved; rather, love for the beloved becomes the reason for our actions that we take for his or her well-being. To put it in a plain way, there are no reasons *for* love; rather love itself creates the reasons *of* love.

In this section, we have discussed the contemporary accounts of love. We have specially looked into the contemporary debate on love and reasons. An attempt has been made to show that love is not propositioned. Love is not evaluative. It is “gloriously arational”, in terms of Zangwill.

### **Concluding Note**

Love is an essential part of human life. It is an integral part of our well-being as it motivates us to achieve not only our well-being but also of our loved ones. Reason too plays an important role in human lives as it guides us in our conducts. Reason makes us different from other creatures as we can rationalize our actions and can perform accordingly. An attempt has been made in this chapter to look into the relation between love and reason. Where love seems to be related with affective state, reason is associated with cognitive state. So, the question arises, can there be any relation between them, and if yes, how are they effected by such relation.

To examine the relation between love and reason, this chapter has discussed the ongoing debate between love and reason(s) which is broadly based on two views: reasons view of love and no-reasons view of love. Where the reasons view of love presents love as the response to reasons, no-reasons view deny such claim and maintains that love is independent of reasons.

Following Frankfurt and Zangwill, I maintain that love is not dependent on reasons; rather it can produce reasons for our acts of love. Love is arational. Love is not even evaluative. It can rationalize the values of the beloved, but the values of the beloved are not the reasons for love.

In the next chapter, we will examine the grounds for contemporary reasons debate. These grounds are normative experiences associated with love. So, the next chapter will attempt to show how these experiences are considered integral parts of love.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Grounds for Contemporary Reasons Debate**

The contemporary debate on love and reasons is grounded in some of the normative experiences associated with love. These experiences are: the selectivity of love, the irreplaceability of loved ones, and the reciprocity of love. The contemporary philosophers like Frankfurt, Velleman, Kolodny, and Zangwill (whom I have discussed in chapter 1 in regard to the debate on the relation between love and reasons) are divided in their views related to these normative experiences. On the selectivity of love, they have different opinions on the reasons for selectivity of love. On the irreplaceability of love, they are divided as some of them consider that irreplaceability of loved object is based on his or her generic values while others believe that it is the particularity of the loved object which makes the object of love irreplaceable. And, finally on the reciprocity of love, almost all of them favor reciprocated love which is mutual love. However, Frankfurt differs on this and maintains that reciprocity calls for self-inclined motivations in love, and such motivations do not fit in the ideal account of love. The main questions on which this chapter is focused are: whether love is partial or impartial in nature, whether loved ones can be replaced if options for their replacement are available, and whether love needs to be reciprocated.

The first section of this chapter raises the question that we are surrounded by so many people around us, but why it is the case that we love some and not all. Other important questions raised in this section are: What explains the selectivity of love? What are the reasons for this selectivity? Love is partial in nature so this gives rise to a conflict with morality. In this section, we will look into the conflict between partial love and impartial morality. An attempt will be made to reconcile the partiality of love and the impartiality of moral commands.

The second section of this chapter deals with the irreplaceability of loved objects. Irreplaceability is considered morally as an integral part of love. It is discussed as one of the grounds for contemporary reasons debate. The main focus of this section will be to



discuss the grounds for irreplaceability. The problem of replaceability or substitutability will also be discussed in order to understand what makes the theories of love susceptible to this problem of replaceability.

In the last section of this chapter, attention will be paid to discuss love and its reciprocity. The central question on which this section is focused on is: whether the desire for love to be reciprocated is integral to love or is associated with particular love relationships? An attempt will also be made to discuss unreciprocated love.

## **2.1. The Selectivity of Love**

We encounter many people in our life but why do we feel love for someone, not for all. In virtue of every person's peculiar qualities, we may respect them, yet we do not owe love to everyone. What explains the selectivity of love? What are the reasons for this selectivity?

The selectivity of love is one of the grounds for contemporary reasons debate. The contemporary philosophers are divided on the question of reasons for selectivity of love. The philosophers like Velleman who promote rational account of love, claim that love is directed to the incomparable or priceless value persons hold by the virtue of their rational nature. Such assertions are refuted by the philosophers who promote non-rational account of love. Zangwill who promotes non-rational account of love rejects such theory of love by asserting that "...there is something wrong with a love that is a reflection of an awareness of priceless worth. If that is love it is defective love."<sup>115</sup> According to Zangwill, in Velleman's account of love, one wants to be loved as the recognition of his/her worth. But, for Zangwill, love based on virtue or worth is not a true love. Zangwill proposes the romantic theory of love which is based on shared history and habit. The selectivity of love, according to Zangwill is not dependent on one's personal attributes.

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<sup>115</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 302

Since, Frankfurt also promotes non-rational account of love, he believes that certain inherent properties of other beings do not cause our love for them. Rather, he claims, “What we love is shaped by the universal exigencies of human life, together with those other needs and interests that derive more particularly from the features of individual character and experience.”<sup>116</sup> Love, for him, has nothing to do with the properties of the loved objects rather he emphasizes on the fact that it is because of our upbringing and experiences that we fall for someone and not for others. He also claims that what we love is directed for us by “biological and other natural conditions” which are not directly under our control.

Love based on reasons is a response to the perceived value of the beloved. On this account, love is aroused by an appreciation of certain values of the beloved or by the distinct relationship between the lover and the beloved. The problem with such an account is that makes love to be conditioned. If we love someone because of his/her worthiness, it implies that we may stop loving him/her if somehow he/she no longer possesses the worthiness. Rational account of love would consider it incoherent to love someone who has many flaws in him. But “it is even possible for a person to come to love something despite recognizing that its inherent nature is actually and utterly bad”<sup>117</sup>. Even Hamlyn and Zangwill claim in the same vein that it is not necessary in love that we even value the personhood of a person. And one may even realize that what caused him or her to love were the flaws of the loved one. In the words of Zangwill, “One may even grow to love the flaw”<sup>118</sup>.

The contemporary reasons debate is somehow based on the view that love seems to be selective. This implies that love is focused to a particular object of love. The discussions on the selectivity of love have induced a growing attention among philosophers, over the past few years, on the question whether partiality or particularity shown in love can be justifiable. Frankfurt raises this issue in the following statement:

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<sup>116</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 47

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 38

<sup>118</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 307

There has recently been quite a bit of interest among philosophers in issues concerning whether our conduct must invariably be guided strictly by universal moral principles, which we apply impartially in all situations, or whether favoritism of one sort or another may sometimes be reasonable.<sup>119</sup>

If we consider love to be partial in nature, it does not go in line with the necessities of morality. How can we then reconcile our partial concern for some with our impartial moral obligations to all? All persons are considered equal in terms of morality, so on what grounds can we prefer some to others? Velleman talks of the same situation in the following statement:

If love is a way of valuing persons, then in loving some people but not others, we must value some people but not others. The upshot seems to be that love really is partial in a sense that conflicts with the spirit of morality, which insists that people are equally valuable.<sup>120</sup>

Velleman maintains that the question of selectivity of love has more to do with the beloved than to the lover. He asserts that as the objects of love we want to be treated special in preference to others. We want our lover to value us more than he value others. This, according to Velleman, makes love discriminatory and in conflict with impartial morality.

We do experience such situations where we show some partiality to our loved ones. This partiality does not mean that others are not worthy of our concern but we naturally feel more concerned for our loved ones. We do not do intellectual calculation while preferring our loved ones to others. The selectivity of love has nothing to do with the worthiness of an object of love. In this regard, Velleman asserts, “We...have many reasons for being selective in love, without having to find differences of worth among possible love objects.”<sup>121</sup> Velleman maintains that we do not love everyone but this does not mean that those people whom we do not love are not worthy of our love. He further maintains that we do not love all but we can respect all and by giving them respect is in no means considering

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<sup>119</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 35

<sup>120</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 362

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 372

them less worthy. He says that respect and love are two emotions and if we do not happen to express one emotion to others, we can appreciate their value through the other emotion, i.e., through respect. We do not compare people in respecting them rather than loving them.

Velleman's proposal on the selectivity of love is criticized by Daniel Callcut: He comments, "Everyone deserves a response that constitutes a full apprehension of his or her value but, in practice, it is only possible to love some. This is *an* explanation of why we love only some people, but it is awfully far-fetched."<sup>122</sup>

The selectivity of love as explained by Frankfurt maintains that love is partial in nature as it is directed to a particular object of love. He submits, "We commonly think that it is appropriate, and perhaps even obligatory, to favor certain people over others who may be just as worthy but with whom our relationships are more distant."<sup>123</sup> Now, the question arises, whether it is plausible to prefer one over other. However, Frankfurt asserts that the philosophers are not concerned with the question whether such preferences are ever plausible or not. Rather, they are concerned about the ways in which such preference may be justified.

In order to discuss the selective nature of love, Frankfurt mentions a widely discussed example in which a man sees his wife and a stranger on the verge of drowning. Now, the situation is this that the man can save only one of them. Frankfurt clearly says that in the situation like this, the man should not think of impartiality; rather he should definitely save his wife. As he puts it very clearly:

We are strongly inclined to believe that it would be far more appropriate for him, in a situation like this one, to put aside considerations of impartiality or fairness altogether. Surely the man should rescue his wife. But what is his warrant for treating the two endangered people so unequally? What acceptable principle can the man invoke that would legitimate his decision to let the stranger drown?<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Callcut, Daniel, 2005

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 35-36

Frankfurt discusses the analysis given by Bernard Williams in this context. Williams argues that if the man looks for a principle that can justify saving his wife, it is wrong on his part. He further claims that the thought that she is his wife, not a stranger to him, will definitely prompt him to save his wife. The bond that the man shares with his wife is the sufficient for him to save her. If the man still look for a justification to save his wife, Williams says that he has “one thought too many”<sup>125</sup>. This means that that there is something wrong with the man that he is looking for a justification even after seeing that his wife is drowning.

Frankfurt finds fault with the analysis given by Williams. He argues that the sufficient reason provided by Williams (the thought that the drowning woman is the man’s wife) may not be satisfactory. For Frankfurt, the marital status is not a satisfactory reason because in spite of being in the relationship with the woman, the man may not be in love with her. Frankfurt puts his point that it is not the civil status that acts as a reason for saving the woman; rather, it is the “love” between them that is the sufficient reason.<sup>126</sup> Frankfurt asserts that the man needs no further reason. Love, in itself is a reason. He claims that when we love somebody, we will do anything to help our beloved. The fact that our loved ones are in problem and they need us is a “more powerful reason” to help them. He agrees with Williams’ line of thought that looking for a reason in a situation like this is really to have “one thought too many”. If the man does not find the misery of his wife as the satisfactory reason to save her then the man does not truly love her. He believes that “loving someone or something essentially *means* or *consists in*, among other things, taking its interests as reasons for acting to serve those interests.”<sup>127</sup>

Velleman too comments on Williams’ analysis. He says that woman in the example would hope to be preferred by her husband instead of the stranger. It is because if the husband saves the stranger instead of his wife, it would interfere “with her being loved in the way that she would hope”<sup>128</sup>. Velleman claims that Williams may be thinking that the woman in the example would blindly wish her husband to save her out of love. But, love

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<sup>125</sup> Williams, Bernard, 1981: 18

<sup>126</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 37

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 363

would not be the reason for the husband's partial behavior of saving her instead of the stranger. He says that it is not about love but it is about the commitments and trust between them.<sup>129</sup>

It can be maintained that Velleman's account of love attempts to reconcile the partiality of love with the impartial morality. But, Eric Silverman objects that Velleman's account does not seem to resolve this tension between partiality and impartiality. Silverman claims this in the following statement:

While Velleman clearly works toward resolving the tension between impartial morality and partiality, it is not obvious that his account resolves the central issue of this debate. When ethicists worry about love's partiality, they aren't concerned with the partiality one shows through emotional vulnerability to friends, but with the practical benefits the lover offers the beloved.<sup>130</sup>

Silverman elaborates the matter of emotional vulnerability by discussing William's analysis. Silverman maintains that "it is not the man's emotional vulnerability to his wife that is ethically troubling, but the husband's preferential treatment of her in saving her life rather than the stranger's life".<sup>131</sup> Silverman examines Velleman's position in this case. He claims that Velleman attempts to present love as impartial by maintaining that the partial behavior of the man is due to his commitment to his wife and not because of love. Silverman says that Velleman's position does not resolve the conflict.

Velleman, however, asserts that the situations, like the one discussed by Williams, make it clear how one wants to be loved. He believes that it is right from our childhood that we are treated as special by our parents, siblings, relatives, and friends who love us and who make us feel that we are irreplaceable. They make us believe that nobody else can take our place. But, when we grow up, we realize through moral teachings that everybody is special and non-substitutable. Velleman, on the basis of this illustration, raises a question

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<sup>129</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 373

<sup>130</sup> Silverman, Eric J., 2010: 30

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

that when everybody is special, what special do we find in someone that we fall for him or her instead of others.

Velleman maintains that the problem in the selectivity of the object of love arises when we are told that we are loved for our certain qualities that we realize are only accidental and not essential part of our personality. He refers Yeats' poem "For Anne Gregory" in this context. He explains the way the girl in the poem wants to be loved. She does not want to be loved for her hair, sense of humor, or her mind. That is to say, that she does not want to be loved for her personal properties that are contingent in nature. Rather, she wants to be loved for her "essence", for "herself". Now, Velleman enquires about the nature of "herself" for which the girl wants to be loved. Velleman claims that one wants to be appreciated as beautiful not because of his/her distinctive personal features but for his/her beautiful inner self. "One doesn't want one's value as a person to be eclipsed by the intrinsic value of one's appearance or behavior; one wants them to elicit a valuation that looks through them, to the value of one's inner self."<sup>132</sup> She wants her inner self to be appreciated, not her contingent properties.

Daniel Callcut challenges the view of Velleman that we love someone for his or her generic attribute and not for his or her specific attributes. He claims that we cannot separate the personal features of a person from him or her. If a person is loved, he or she is loved wholly. Callcut goes on to say that people change with the change in their properties, even then we love them. But this does not mean that those qualities of the beloved did not matter at all. It just means that we love other person wholly, not just his or her personhood, but also his personal qualities. He argues:

...the person we treasure is not totally separable from his or her particular features. That is, I do not love my partner merely because she instantiates features of personhood (as if any features would do); I love her, at least in part, because she has *these* features...we do feel that real love endures through fairly substantial changes in one's beloved. But the fact that you would continue to love your partner through

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<sup>132</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 372

changes in his or her distinctive features in no way shows that your love for him or her is a love that *transcends* his or her distinctive features.<sup>133</sup>

I would like to put forward Velleman's views in this regard that would be a response to this objection. Velleman explains that love for someone is directed to one's personhood but it is also directed to his or her incomparable virtue through his or her empirical persona. So, Velleman does not deny that we do not love somebody's personal features. We value the person not only through his personhood, but also through his empirical persona. We appreciate these personal features of a person as we value him or her as a person. However, Velleman makes it clear that such features are not the reasons for love. As Velleman states:

Hence there remains a sense in which we love a person for his observable features—the way he wears his hat and sips his tea (in the lyrics of the jazz era), or the way he walks and the way he talks (in the lyrics of rock and roll). But loving a person for the way he walks is not a response to the value of his gait; it's rather a response to his gait as an expression or symbol or reminder of his value as a person.<sup>134</sup>

The above mentioned statement of Velleman makes it clear that the appreciation of the specific properties of a person or his/her empirical persona enables us to value him or her as a person. Moreover, according to Velleman, we love some people rather than others because when we get to know a person “*as a person*” through his or her “*empirical persona*”, we are moved to love him or her rather than others. This is clearly put forward by Velleman:

One reason why we love some people rather than others is that we can see into only some of our observable fellow creatures. The human body and human behavior are imperfect expressions of personhood, and we are imperfect interpreters. Hence the value that makes someone eligible to be loved does not necessarily make him lovable in our eyes. Whether someone is lovable depends on how well his value as a person is expressed or symbolized for us by his empirical persona. Someone's persona may not

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<sup>133</sup> Callcut, Daniel, 2005

<sup>134</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 371



... speak very clearly of his value as a person, or may not speak in ways that are clear to us.<sup>135</sup>

Velleman proposes that we love some particular people because we see into only some of them. Only some can “open us up emotionally”<sup>136</sup> and this vulnerability to some exhausts the chance to see into other people. “We are constitutionally limited in the number of people we can love; and we may have to stop short of our constitutional limits in order to enjoy the loving relationships that make for a good life.”<sup>137</sup>

Velleman’s presentation of love in the way of emotional openness does not provide sufficient reasons for the selectivity of love. As Silverman rightly puts it, “It is also possible to be emotionally open to other person but otherwise abusive. Such relationships do not manifest the ideal of love.”<sup>138</sup> For Silverman, emotional openness is not even a satisfactory ground for an ideal account of love

On the basis of Silverman’s explanation of the possible ways in which emotional openness can be seen and discussed, it could be maintained that emotional openness is not the sufficient reason for love. I do agree that there are some relationships as between a teacher and a student where emotional openness can develop a loving and caring relationship between them. However, it would be too naive to say that emotional openness is a sufficient condition for a loving relationship. If we follow Velleman’s account of love as emotional openness, it seems to imply that some relationships should be recategorized as “loving.” For example, as per this account, then a client who is seeking therapy or counseling from a psychologist seems to be loving toward the psychologist as clients are someone who come to the psychologist vulnerable, and with complete trust, and are emotionally open. So long as the client is vulnerable to the therapist, she should then be said to “love” the therapist as per this model.

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<sup>135</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 372

<sup>136</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 303

<sup>137</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 372

<sup>138</sup> Silverman, Eric J., 2010: 29

In order to investigate about the value of a person for which one wants to be loved, Velleman categorizes ends. Based on the distinction between price (that is attributed to things) and dignity (that is essential to persons) given by Kant, Velleman categorizes ends as ends which are not self-existent and self-existent ends.<sup>139</sup> According to Velleman, the ends that are not-self existent can be replaced by other ends that are more valuable. There is scope for preference and comparison in case of the ends that are not self-existent as their worth is dependent on the actions or results they are associated with. But, in case of self-existent ends, their worth is not calculated by the actions they are associated with and hence are non-comparative. Such ends are desired for their own sake, not for the sake of other ends.

Velleman's account of love, hence, does not promote the selection of the object of love on the basis of his/her accidental properties. Velleman asserts that we love someone as we consider him or her as self-existent end. When we love persons as self-existent ends, we love their personhood which is universal. In his own words, "All that is essential to love, in my view, is that it disarms our emotional defenses toward an object in response to its incomparable value as a self-existent end."<sup>140</sup> He further elaborates that when we love a person "*as a person*" and not as an aesthetic object, we respond to his/her rational nature. Kant inspires his position of taking love as a response to the rational nature of human beings. Kant maintains that we value persons by their virtue of being rational beings. Velleman further clarifies that the rational nature of a person is not intellect; rather, it denotes his/her capacity of appreciation in a reflective way. He maintains that the rational nature enables us to care about others.

On the question of how do we come to love somebody, Velleman proposes that in love, we open ourselves to the object of love against our tendency to protect ourselves from other persons. He asserts that it is the human tendency not to open up emotionally to others, as we fear of being affected by them. It is our self-protection. However, in case of love, we break our defenses against others. In this sense, we become vulnerable to them. He states:

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<sup>139</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 364

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 365

If respect arrests our self-love, as Kant asserts, then what does love arrest? I suggest that it arrests our tendencies toward emotional self-protection from another person, tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by him. Love disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other.<sup>141</sup>

But, then it puzzles our mind that if all persons by the virtue of their dignity are self-existent ends and are rational beings, why do we “disarm our defenses” and become vulnerable to some, not to all? What explains the selectivity of love then? There must be some reasons for selectivity of particular people in our life whom we love. If there is no ground for selection, how do we come to love only some, and not others? Does this selectivity have anything to do with our subjectivity or is it only dependent on the object’s virtues? If it is dependent on the object’s values, what are those values of a particular person that make us vulnerable to them only, and not to others? Velleman’s stand in this regard is:

...love for others is possible when we find in them a capacity for valuation like ours, which can be constrained by respect for ours, and which therefore makes our emotional defenses against them feel unnecessary. That’s why our capacity for valuation, when facing instances of itself, feels able to respond in the manner constitutive of love, by suspending our emotional defenses.<sup>142</sup>

Velleman proposes that we feel love for someone only when we realize that he/she too has the capacity for appreciation or valuation like ours. So, according to Velleman, “what we respond to, in loving people, is their capacity to love: it’s just another way of saying that what our hearts respond to is another heart.”<sup>143</sup>

On the questions of being vulnerable and being selective in love, Frankfurt’s position is that we are finite creatures, so we need to be careful in loving somebody. He refers to God in this case and asserts that only Infinite and Omnipotent agents can afford to be carefree in loving anybody. It is because they do not fear anything. They have no fear of losing

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<sup>141</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 360-361

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 366

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 365

anything. On the other hand, human beings are susceptible to such fears. In the opinion of Frankfurt:

Finite creatures like ourselves, of course, cannot afford to be so heedless in our loving. Omnipotent agents are free of all passivity. Nothing can happen to them. Therefore, they have nothing to fear. We, on the other hand, incur substantial vulnerabilities when we love. Consequently, we need to maintain a defensive selectivity and restraint.<sup>144</sup>

So, for human beings it becomes important to be careful in selecting our object of love. Further, on the question of the role of our subjectivity in the selectivity of love, Frankfurt maintains that we do not have immediate voluntary control over the selectivity of loved object. We cannot directly decide or select whom to love. Love is volitional, according to Frankfurt, so it is by the necessities of love that we come to love somebody. Since, love happens as per the configuration of will, we do have some role in the selectivity of love, but we cannot directly determine whom to love. According to Frankfurt, this may pose danger to us as we cannot directly control whom to love, and we may be affected if the selection of the loved object goes wrong. In this context, I agree with Harry G. Frankfurt that love is not under our direct and immediate voluntary control.<sup>145</sup> We do have options available to us, but we are not free to choose whom to love.

My proposal on the conflict arising between impartiality that should be shown to all based on moral commands and our partial behavior that we show in case of our loved ones is that when love becomes all-inclusive, like *agape*, it is in line with the impartial commands of morality. I would further like to maintain that the partiality of love varies from relationship to relationship. When our love is limited to particular relationship, we are partial toward them. But, when love includes the whole of humanity, it becomes all-inclusive and impartial in nature. When our love is no more limited and is devoted to all, the distress of any of them will fill our heart with pain and we will do whatever we can to relieve them of their distress. I agree with Frankfurt on the point that the distress of our loved ones is the strong reason for us to help them in need instead of a stranger. It is natural

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<sup>144</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 63

<sup>145</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

that we feel the pain suffered by our loved ones more than that of a stranger. But when love includes all, no one remains stranger in the sense that we get connected to them as human beings. Such *agapic* love will be directed to all. I would like to quote Erich Fromm, in this regard:

Love is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one object of love. If a person loves only one other person and is indifferent to the rest of his fellow men, his love is not love but a symbiotic attachment, or an enlarged egotism.<sup>146</sup>

This section attempted to discuss the grounds for the selectivity of love. The central question around which this section revolved was whether the selectivity of love is based on reasons like the values of the object of love or is it the case that it is not within our control whom to love. The next section is in a way continuation of this section in the sense that the grounds for the selectivity of love play a deciding role whether any other can replace the loved one if the other fulfills the grounds on the basis of which we love our beloved.

## **2.2. Love and Irreplaceability**

The irreplaceability of love is one of the grounds for contemporary reasons debate. The reasons theory of love is susceptible to the problem of replaceability or substitutability because the reasons for selecting the beloved can become the reasons for replacing him or her on finding a better substitute. Even the no-reasons theory of love can also be susceptible to this problem as there are no exact reasons for how the beloved is different from others. Other person can replace the beloved if love is associated with the generic value of the beloved. This can be understood in the following ways: Let us take a situation where x loves y and z is an exact replica of or similar to y. Now, the problem of replaceability in the reasons view of love can be understood in the following way: If x love y for her distinctive

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<sup>146</sup> Fromm, Erich, 1995: 36

properties, x may replace y by z, if the properties of z are better than y or similar to y. The problem of replaceability can also arise in the no-reasons view of love and can be understood in the following way: If the love of x for y is not based on y's properties, x may also love z or replace y by z, because there are no fixed grounds. The problem of replaceability can be tackled by asserting that: If x genuinely loves y, x will not substitute z for y even if z is a better option.

As William Shakespeare rightly said that “love is not love which alters it when alteration finds”, it is an important aspect of love to not change even when the chances for change are available. It is deeply believed that the objects of our love are irreplaceable. The problem of replaceability of our loved ones can be thought about with the help of this question: If we get the exact replica of our loved one, with the same characteristics, would we be able to replace our loved one? This thought is disturbing. This explains that there is something essential in our love for our beloved that we would not even think to replace him or her by his or her exact replica.

Bennett Helm proposes a new way of understanding irreplaceability. He claims that the irreplaceability of our beloved is not to be understood in terms of whether it is justified to love a replacement of our beloved; rather it should be understood in terms of whether our loved one is replaceable “without loss”. It is evident in our society that people love the replacements of their loved ones, in case of separation or death of their loved ones. And it may be the case that these replacements gradually become important to us and replace our old loved ones in the sense that we start loving these replacements more than we would have loved our old beloveds. But, Helm maintains that these attitudes do not imply that someone failed in keeping the commitments he or she had made to his or her old loves. Helm even says that our loving the replacement of our old love is not unjustified. These things are not the matter of concern. The central point, however, is that in losing someone we love, we lose some value that cannot be compensated by the replacement of that person. Helm says, “...in loving someone you find her to have a kind of worth such that to lose her

is to lose something of value for which we cannot simply be compensated by a new love, even of someone with similar properties.”<sup>147</sup>

The uniqueness of love is that “love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics, even to one who scores higher for these characteristics. And the love endures through changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it. One loves the particular person one actually encountered.”<sup>148</sup> So, it can be maintained that even if we find a replica of our loved one, we would not replace our loved one by the replica. It is because, the love which we have for that particular person is unique in itself, it can be developed for somebody else exactly in the same sense. Christopher Grau, in the same vein, says, “...we are hesitant to swap a loved one for another who possesses identical properties or even superior properties. The beloved is, in an important sense, irreplaceable.”<sup>149</sup> Even if we come to meet someone with better qualities than our loved ones, we would not think of substituting our beloveds.

Frankfurt says that in love, we consider the object of our love as an end, not as a means to achieve something else. We love someone for his or her sake. When we love something as a means to something else, there may be chances of replacing the loved object with the other that can prove as a better means to us. But when we love someone as an end, he or she is desired for his or her sake. Nothing or nobody else can replace him or her.

Frankfurt also maintains that like love, there are also other types of concern that are “disinterested” in nature. But such concern are entirely different from love as these concern are impersonal while love is personal. When we help the poor or needy, we may not be connected to them through their individuality. This concern, like love, is also directed towards the objects of concern for their own sake. But such charitable concern is not love, according to Frankfurt. This can be generosity, not love, as it is not concerned with the particularity of the object of concern. Such concern is not directed at their personal features. Such concern is devoted to all the needy and poor whom we help. So, this implies that it

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<sup>147</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2010: 180

<sup>148</sup> Nozick, Robert, 1999: 168

<sup>149</sup> Grau, Christopher, 2006: 113

does not matter whether the poor is Ram or Ramesh. Their particularity matters when we love them. Generosity is different from love in this sense. Such concern is susceptible to the problem of replaceability as Ram can be substituted for Ramesh as both are poor and needy. We are not connected to their individuality as Ram and Ramesh; rather both are just the members of a poor and needy class and can be substituted for each other. In the words of Frankfurt:

The situation of a lover is very different. There can be no equivalent substitute for his beloved. It might really be all the same to someone moved by charity whether he helps this needy person or that one. It cannot possibly be all the same to the lover whether he is devoting himself disinterestedly to what he actually does love or—no matter how similar it might be—to something else instead.<sup>150</sup>

The objects of love are irreplaceable. It does not matter how similar other object is, the object of love cannot be replaced by the other.

Frankfurt considers love different from other concern in the sense that love is particular. It is not based on some general properties. As he states, “The focus of a person's love is not those general and hence repeatable characteristics that make his beloved describable. Rather, it is the specific particularity that makes his beloved nameable”<sup>151</sup>. Frankfurt maintains that the particularity of one person cannot be shared by someone else. The general properties are same in all but the particularity of one person is different from that of other. As he states, “In virtue of this particularity, which cannot conceivably be duplicated or shared and therefore cannot possibly be available elsewhere, the well-being of what a person loves is for him an irreplaceable necessity.”<sup>152</sup> Alan Soble comments on these views of Frankfurt in the following statement, “Uniqueness-by-description (rather than uniqueness-by-name) may be quite enough to explain both non-substitution and why the well-being of what a person loves is for him an irreplaceable necessity.”<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 44

<sup>151</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 170

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Soble, Alan, 2005



Soble objects the views of Frankfurt on particularity that particularity gives rise to uniqueness or irreplaceability. He argues:

Particularity...is important in Frankfurt's account because it generates uniqueness and irreplaceability....Uniqueness does not strictly depend on particularity if uniqueness can be generated by appropriate descriptions, and Frankfurt has not told why we should prefer one way of securing uniqueness to another.<sup>154</sup>

Soble maintains that particularity is not not required in order to be unique or irreplaceable. He further clarifies that uniqueness does not imply irreplaceability. Both are different. He says that we all are unique with regard to our distinctive properties. We all are also unique in the ways we display our general properties differently.

I agree with Soble that everyone is particular and unique and the uniqueness of one particular person is not the satisfactory reason for irreplaceability. So the question now arises that what explains it that we come to love “this particular person” and not “that particular person”. The answer to this may be that the love we have for “this particular person” is unique in itself and it cannot be exactly in the same way how we love “that particular person”. So, I would propose that it is the uniqueness of our love for our loved ones and not the uniqueness of the beloved which accounts for irreplaceability of our loved ones.

Frankfurt understands particularity to be mysterious, as he states, “it is the specific particularity that...is more mysterious than describability, and that is in any case manifestly impossible to define”<sup>155</sup>. On this, Soble argues:

If I love the particular that you are, for whatever reason, your particularity is the object/basis of my love for you. Frankfurt admits that particularity is mysterious and

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<sup>154</sup> Soble, Alan, 2005

<sup>155</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 170

impossible to define, which might be taken as a defect of his account of love, since it generates what is perhaps an unsolvable puzzle.<sup>156</sup>

Soble objects that Frankfurt's consideration of particularity as mysterious is a defect in his account of love because it mystifies particularity and makes it incomprehensible. In the same vein, Gary Foster also finds Frankfurt's approach to the problem of substitutability unsatisfactory. He states, "Although Frankfurt's nonsubstitutability criterion strikes us as intuitively correct in some way, instead of qualities he offers only mystery and indefinability as characterizing the specificity of the beloved object."<sup>157</sup>

Frankfurt further maintains that love is vulnerable to situations. Options are always available, and some may find these options attractive. There may be situations when people think of loving someone else whom he or she admires. And even think whether it would be preferable to love them rather than the one whom we love. However, Frankfurt asserts that despite the availability of better or superior options, we would not think of loving those options rather than our loved ones if we are devoted to pursue the final ends that are associated with our loved ones. Frankfurt contends that these final ends are determined by the volitional necessity. The necessity of volition is much like the necessity of reason. As the necessities of reason constrain us in what we do, the necessity of volition constrains us in what we love. There is no scope for personal inclination or choice in determining what or whom to love. The object of love is determined by our volitional necessity and we are devoted to serve the ends of our beloved as defined by the necessity.

Frankfurt further indicates about the relation between love and reason by asserting that our practical reasoning follows the commands of love by making us pursue the final ends determined by our love for us. He states, "What we love is not up to us. We cannot help it that the direction of our practical reasoning is in fact governed by the specific final ends that our love has defined for us."<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Soble, Alan, 2005

<sup>157</sup> Foster, Gary, 2009: 156

<sup>158</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 49

Love cannot be controlled by us, but there may be times when we indirectly have control over it. We may bring about such situations that may cause us to love someone or to stop loving someone. But, when we love someone wholeheartedly, we would not even think of bringing ourselves in such situations to replace him or her even if options are available. When the love is wholehearted, it does not matter whether the options are better or not. It does not arise in our mind to think about the options. The question of replacing our loved ones does not come to our mind when we love them wholeheartedly. For Frankfurt, “it makes no sense for a person to consider accepting a substitute for his beloved”<sup>159</sup>

Love, for Frankfurt is a disinterested concern. Love is not directed to the values of loved ones; rather loving makes our loved ones valuable. Kolodny offers a criticism of Frankfurt, claiming,

Besides having other problems, however, this view fails to characterize love as a distinctive state. Without in fact loving Jane, one can desire to do the same things for her that her lover desires to do. For example, one can desire to help Jane out of, say, duty, or self-interest, or simply because one is seized by a brute urge.<sup>160</sup>

According to Kolodny, if love is distinct and the actions associated with love can be engaged in for nonloving reasons, at least part of love’s distinctiveness must be located in its reasons. He claims that since Frankfurt’s account gives no reasons for love, it cannot give distinct reasons for the actions of love. Therefore, as per Kolodny’s views, the actions of love become indistinguishable from other unloving actions in Frankfurt’s account of love.

Kolodny further objects Frankfurt’s account for not suggesting any value on which love might be based. He comments, “He explicitly contrasts his account with one according to which love is basically a response to the perceived value of the beloved, and he suggests no

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<sup>159</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 170

<sup>160</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003:135

other perceived value to which love might be a response.”<sup>161</sup> Kolodny claims that in order to avoid the problem of replaceability, Frankfurt explains love in terms of those feature that no one else could possess.

As we have already seen that in order to avoid the problem of replaceability, Frankfurt has argued that love is not based on general properties of a person which make them describable; rather it is focused on the particularity of a person that makes him or her nameable. And such particularity cannot be found in somebody else than the one who have it. This means that a particular person cannot be substituted by somebody else as he or she lacks the particularity that the former person has. Kolodny objects on this:

The focus of love, on Frankfurt's view, is the beloved's bare identity: her being Jane, her being this very person, her being she. Thus, love has no causal tendency to transfer to substitutes or, although Frankfurt does not mention this implication, to alter as it alteration finds. The beloved's bare identity, however, cannot serve as a reason for loving her. To say She is Jane is simply to identify a particular with itself. It is to say nothing about that particular that might explain why a specific response to it is called for.<sup>162</sup>

Though Frankfurt’s account of love attempts to avoid the problem of replaceability, it fails to produce proper grounds for love. As Kolodny claims that the bare identity of our loved ones cannot be the reasons for our love for them. So, Frankfurt’s account of love fails to answer the question that what are those grounds on which love is based.

The problem of replaceability is also seen in Velleman’s account of love. Let us consider this claim by Velleman, “The way to bring love into convergence with morality is not to stop thinking of morality as impartial but to rethink the partiality of love.”<sup>163</sup> If love is to be taken impartial in this way, there is no reasonable basis for loving one person more than or in a distinct way from any other person. This type of implication is problematic since some there are some aspects of love which obviously differ from relationship to

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<sup>161</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003: 142

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 342

relationship. As for say, love for a friend, a spouse, a child, and a parent differ significantly. And an account of love should offer some explanation for this common experience.

Niko Kolodny offers objection to Velleman's account of love by maintaining that Velleman's account becomes susceptible to the problem of irreplaceability by considering non-relational feature as the base of love. Kolodny objects:

... In J. David Velleman's provocative and ingeniously argued proposal, the reason for love is the beloved's bare Kantian personhood, her capacity for rational choice and valuation. But no such non-relational feature works.... The claim that non-relational features are reasons for love implies, absurdly, that insofar as one's love for (say) Jane is responsive to its reasons, it will accept any relevantly similar person as a replacement.<sup>164</sup>

As Kolodny emphasizes, love is not transferable to others just because they have similar nonrelational traits. This problem is especially severe on Velleman's account since its reason for love is an attribute possessed by all persons. One may have the same reason for loving a stranger that he or she may have for loving his beloved. Anybody can be substituted for the beloved as everyone has the same personhood.

Zangwill also claims that Velleman's account of love is susceptible to the problem of replaceability. He argues that if "we love others because (1) they embody universal dignity, which (2) happens to get through to us emotionally due to their non-universal characteristics, then we seem to be vulnerable to what has become known as the trading-up objection."<sup>165</sup> If we love someone for some qualities then it seems we should exchange him or her for another person who would have better qualities. "But it is distinctive of love that it is not tradable in this way."<sup>166</sup> Such objection is generally applied to those accounts of love that are based on physical attributes of people. But, Zangwill says that this objection is also applicable to Velleman's moral account of love. "All of us are equal in regard of (1).

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<sup>164</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003:135

<sup>165</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 303

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

But as far as (2), some people get through to us better than others, and if so, it seems that we should trade-up and swap to a better object of our love.”<sup>167</sup>

The problem with Velleman’s account of love is its difficulty in explaining the non-substitutability of the beloved and the various types of loving relationships. Since Velleman holds that love acts identically in every loving relationship by restricting the agent’s self-protective motivations, differing only in the degree of emotional openness based on our ability to see into the beloved’s personhood, the beloved becomes too easily replaceable. The lover may recognize the personhood of her spouse and her child, but the normative experience of love clearly indicates that we should not accept them as substitutes for one another. Yet it is difficult to see what reason Velleman’s account can give for not accepting such substitutions.

To conclude this section, let us recall what Helm suggested for the problem of replaceability. The heart of the matter in the problem of replaceability is not whether it is justified to love someone else rather than our loved ones; but it is whether the “loss” caused by losing someone can be compensated by their replacements. Following Helm and Frankfurt, my proposal would be that if we genuinely love someone, the loss caused by losing him or her cannot be compensated by someone else. Let me elaborate this point with the help of the situation I have discussed in the starting of this section where x loves y and z is an exact replica of or similar to y. My proposal is that if x genuinely loves y, x will not substitute z for y even if z is a better option. It does not matter whether or not we have many options as substitutes for our loved ones. When one’s love is wholehearted, it does not look for options. However, there may be conditions when lovers need to part their ways. But even if love ends, it will not be true to say that it was fake or it never existed. The moment it was there between two people, it was real. As Alan Soble rightly puts it, “As much as we might like it to be true that love lasts forever, we realize that many occurrences of love come to an end yet are the real thing while they do exist.”<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 303

<sup>168</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: xx

In this section, we have looked into the problem of replaceability. It is deeply believed that our loved ones are irreplaceable. It is distinctive of love that they cannot be substituted even if their substitutions are found. In the next section, we will look into the possibility whether reciprocity is integral to love.

### **2.3. Love and its Reciprocity**

The contemporary debate on love and reasons pays much attention to reciprocated love. Reciprocity of love denotes the desire to be united with our beloved and a desire for love to be reciprocated. The idea of reciprocity is associated with the desire for mutual love. Since majority of the contemporary philosophers have based their theories of love on mutual exchange of love, they have ignored unreciprocated love. Kolodny is one of them. So, it would be examined how Kolodny's relationship theory of love do not account for unreciprocated love. However, Frankfurt considers unreciprocated love as a genuine account of love. So, an attempt would be made in this section, to understand the notions of reciprocated and unreciprocated love and their importance in our lives.

Aaron Smuts, in his article "Is It Better to Love Better Things", asserts that it is not guaranteed in love that our love will be reciprocated. He, furthermore, states, "One of the cold hard facts of life is that much love goes unrequited. Hence, love songs. Given the mere possibility of unrequited love."<sup>169</sup> Novels and literature are full with such love songs and love stories where lovers fall in love with them who cannot reciprocate their love. Sara Protasi, in her article "Loving People For Who They Are", claims that Romeo is lucky in this respect that his love, Juliet also passionately loved him back.

Notwithstanding his tragic end, Romeo was a lucky guy. Not only was he able to feel passionate and ardent love for a beautiful, noble, young maiden such as Juliet, but the maiden in question also passionately and ardently loved him back. Romeo was in this

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<sup>169</sup> Aaron Smuts, 2014: 93

respect luckier than Werther, or the many other literary lovers who incautiously fall in love with women who cannot reciprocate their love.<sup>170</sup>

However, it is surprising that unreciprocated love has not been paid much attention in philosophical literature on love. The reason behind this may be the fact that most of the philosophers present ideal concept of love. But Protasi says that “most loves that we experience and witness are not ideal: they are messy, painful, and imperfect. Many such loves are not reciprocated. And yet, many of these loves are also grounded in reasons.”<sup>171</sup> Unreciprocated love, too, is a genuine form of love. There may be relationships where a partner still love his wife even after her death. His love cannot be reciprocated as his beloved is not there to reciprocate it but this does not mean that his love is not a genuine form of love.

Protasi proposes to look at love “as it is” and claims that love “as it is” need not be reciprocated. Many of the philosophical accounts of love, especially Kolodny’s relationship theory of love, do not consider unreciprocated love as a genuine account of love. Protasi criticizes Kolodny on the basis of two objections:

The first is that the view inverts the order of justification between love and loving relationship, and as a consequence cannot account for unrequited love’s reasons. The second is that it does not account for unrequited love’s value, which lies in its peculiar disinterested appreciation of the beloved’s properties.<sup>172</sup>

Niko Kolodny claims that every form of love is based on valuing a relationship. This relationship is the source of reasons for love and for valuing the beloved. Relationships are based on commitments. The commitments, especially in romantic relationship, need to be fulfilled by both the lover and beloved. It is the nature of romantic love to develop through union. “It cannot be a unidirectional commitment—it must be reciprocated.”<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Protasi, Sara, 2016: 215

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 216



Protasi, in order to explain how Kolodny's view of love cannot account for reasons for unrequited love, differentiates the loving relationship from a social relationship and maintains:

A social relationship is often the context in which love develops, but it is not what can give normative ground to love. In the case of a loving relationship, instead, the only appropriate reason to be in one is that I love that person and that person loves me back. If my love is not reciprocated, I cannot enter into a loving relationship with that person, and I experience unrequited love. Nonetheless, I may still have reasons to love that person. Furthermore, I have reason to remain in a loving relationship only insofar as I am still in love with that person.<sup>174</sup>

Protasi objects that Kolodny's theory of love fails to provide such distinctions between a social and a loving relationship. Through this difference between a social and a loving relationship, Protasi claims this difference provides reasons for unreciprocated love. When I am in a relationship with someone "who does not reciprocate my love, I cannot be in a loving relationship with him or her, and yet I still have reason to love him or her and I have reason to wish that they loved me back."<sup>175</sup> Moreover, Protasi claims that Kolodny does not consider unrequited love as a form of love as his theory of love does not account for value of unrequited love.

As we have seen that Kolodny's view of love does not account for unreciprocated love because his view of love is based on the relationship between a lover and his or her beloved, and relationship demands reciprocity of love and care. On the other hand, Frankfurt's theory of love does not give much attention to the reciprocity of love. Love, for Frankfurt, is a disinterested, selfless concern. Love, being disinterested concern, does not allow to care for the beloved for the sake of the values like the desire for reciprocation. Motives that are directed to self interest are not considered integral to love. For Frankfurt, love for others must not be motivated by any instrumental concern. Reciprocity, on the other hand, involves instrumental concern. Frankfurt considers the benefits of

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<sup>174</sup> Protasi, Sara, 2016: 217

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

reciprocity as the benefits of being loved and does not include these benefits in a genuine account of love.<sup>176</sup>

Gary Foster, in his article “Bestowal without Appraisal: Problems in Frankfurt's Characterization of Love and Personal Identity”, objects Frankfurt's stand on reciprocity of love. Gary claims that Frankfurt's account of love reduces all love to a certain kind of caring. On the contrary, Gary holds that there are different types of love, like friendship, romance, self-love, parental love, love for one's country, love for a moral or political ideal, and so on. He asserts that friendship and romance “arguably imply some form of reciprocation (or the hope of such) if they are to be authentically experienced”<sup>177</sup>. The latter types of love do not need reciprocation in this sense. Gary argues, “The forms of love that we call friendship and romantic love are both social forms of love and do not genuinely exist in a one-way form. Not only must we have reciprocation in order for friendship or romantic love to be fulfilled, I want to claim that we want this.”<sup>178</sup>

In response to this objection and following Frankfurt, I would like to say that it is true that in some accounts of love, especially in romantic love and in friendship, the reciprocity of love is required. The relationship between romantic partners is based on mutual exchange of love, so there is requirement for fulfilling mutual commitments. However, love, reciprocated by the beloved, is something that is not under the lover's control at all. He or she can only desire for the union with the beloved and the reciprocated love from the beloved. But, it is upto the beloved whether or not he or she reciprocates the love. As Alan Soble says that love entails a desire to spend a good deal of time and to be with the loved ones. But, love cannot demand for reciprocation. Love may be reciprocated but it is not always the case.<sup>179</sup> Love entails a desire to benefit the beloved which leads to beneficial acts done for the welfare of the beloved. But, love cannot demand the beloved to reciprocate the beneficial acts done for her. Beloved may reciprocate those acts but it is not in the nature of love to demand for reciprocation of love.

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<sup>176</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 174

<sup>177</sup> Foster, Gary, 2009: 161

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., 162

<sup>179</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: xx

Gary suggests that reciprocation is to be considered an essential feature of friendship and romance. But, it can be objected that how something that cannot be guaranteed in love can become an essential feature of it. It is true that through reciprocation, we contribute in each other's well-being as social beings but it is also true that friendship and romantic relationships can develop even without reciprocation. There may be situations where the other partner may not reciprocate love even if he or she wants to (when someone is compelled by someone or by a situation to do so), this does not mean that such relationship would not be counted as a genuine account of love.

In this section, an attempt has been made to understand the significance of reciprocation and unreciprocation of love. Reciprocity denotes the desire to be associated with the beloved and the desire for the love to be reciprocated. It helps us to contribute in each other's development but it does not mean that unreciprocated love fails to contribute in each other's development. Love for someone not only ensures the beloved's well-being, but also promotes the lover's well-being.

### **Concluding Note**

This chapter has attempted to discuss some of the grounds for the contemporary debate on love and reasons. These grounds are some of the normative experiences associated with love which are: the selectivity of love, the irreplaceability of loved ones, and the reciprocity of love.

The selectivity of love shows that love is partial in nature. Love is directed to a particular object of love. This creates a conflict between partial love and impartial morality. An attempt has been made to reconcile the partiality of love with impartial morality by taking into consideration *agape*-style love.

The irreplaceability of love shows that the objects of love are irreplaceable. It has been maintained that in genuine love, one does not even think of substituting his or her loved one

by other person who proves to be better than the loved one. As proposed by Frankfurt, even if the options are available, wholehearted love, would not think of substitution.

The reciprocity of love maintains that in some of the relationships, especially in romantic relationship and friendship, people desire for merging with the beloved and their love to be reciprocated. But, reciprocation cannot be demanded. We can wish our love to be reciprocated but we cannot demand for it.

In the next chapter, focus will be on the role of volition in love. An attempt will be made to discuss the impact of volitional and rational constraints (if any) on love, the status of personal autonomy in love, and the importance of integrated psyche in love.

## Chapter 3

### Love and Volition

Love is generally taken to be affective. But, on the basis of contemporary debate on the relation between love and reasons, we have discussed different presentations of love. Frankfurt presents his notion of love as partial and volitional. Velleman presents love as moral, Kolodny promotes love as relational, and Zangwill's love is amoral and arational.

It is the volitional presentation of love that will be discussed in this chapter. Following Frankfurt, it is maintained that love is neither affective nor cognitive, it is rather volitional. Love is a configuration of the will. "This volitional configuration shapes the dispositions and conduct of the lover with respect to what he loves, by guiding him in the design and ordering of his relevant purposes and priorities."<sup>180</sup>

In the first section, I would discuss about the volitional constraint imposed by love on the lover. Following Frankfurt, I would attempt to maintain that love is subject to volitional constraint. But this constraint is liberating.

The second section of this chapter is focused on the status of personal autonomy in love. The main question raised in this section is: What happens to autonomy of lovers in love? This section will look into the freedom of choice we exercise in love. This section will attempt to understand the status of human agency in love.

In the last section, I would try to propose that love requires the lover to integrate her psyche. A lover does not have the virtue of love if his or her desires toward others are deeply conflicted. A person with well-integrated psyche leads a pleasant life in comparison to those with unintegrated psyche.

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<sup>180</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 43

### 3.1. Love and Volitional Constraint

Central to Frankfurt's view on love is the notion of volitional necessity. This necessity binds our will and exerts a command upon us. It is volitional necessity that defines the limits of a person's will, giving it a configuration that determines the specific final ends associated with love.

Love is subject to volitional constraint. Following Frankfurt, I maintain that love is volitional and hence it follows volitional necessity. As Frankfurt holds:

When we believe that the interests of our beloved are at stake, we find that there are certain things we must do and that there are certain things we cannot bring ourselves to do. These are special cases of the powerful volitional constraint that we naturally experience in matters concerning the advancement or protection of what we take to be our own interests.<sup>181</sup>

When we are subject to volitional constraint, we are required to do certain things as directed by our volitional necessity. This means that there is a limitation of the will. This limitation does not mean that our will is subdued or that it is subject to passions or any compulsion. It simply implies that "the constraint operates from within our own will itself. It is by our own will, and not by any external or alien force, that we are constrained."<sup>182</sup>

We know that the volitional constraint is itself imposed by our will. We do consider this constraint important, this is why we become free even in the submission.

when a person discovers that it is unthinkable for him to perform a certain action, or to refrain from performing it, he does not ordinarily experience the constraint as moving or obstructing him against his will. Although he may not know it, the fact is that the

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<sup>181</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 171

<sup>182</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 46

constraint is itself imposed by his will. For this reason he experiences his submission to it less as a defeat than as a liberation.<sup>183</sup>

When a person considers incapacity to do something to be very important to him, we would not feel constrained by his will to do it. For example, when we are compelled by someone or by something to that extent that we find ourselves incapable of following the volitional necessities, in that case, we do not feel the constraint imposed by our will. Since, we know that the constraint is applied by our will itself, so, we feel submissive to it.

The volitional necessity, in Frankfurt's account of love is presented as a decisive and formative element in the configuration of a person's free will. It combines freedom and necessity. Frankfurt claims that volitional necessities bind a person's will and thereby produce norms that are internal to the subject and represent liberation. For the same reason, they are representative of the commanding power that authentic elements constitutive of a person's will have upon him or her. Moreover, a volitional necessity, despite its internal nature, can be interpreted, in the whole of Frankfurt's theory on love, as an objective truth, or, part of the reality about the agent. Similarly, it provides the agent with categorical norms or imperatives which to obey. The authoritative nature of the commands of our volitional necessities springs from the fact that, in not obeying them, we are betraying our own selves. In betraying her own self, a person is not acting.

It is through this constraint that we are enabled to appreciate the value for us of loving. It is noteworthy that loving does not hamper our will. We have always nurtured the feeling of freedom as the freedom from all submissions, so we may we find it difficult to cherish freedom that involves a submission to a necessity. Frankfurt, claims on this difficulty that the appearance of conflict is misleading. He claims that "the key to dissipating that appearance lies in the superficially paradoxical but nonetheless authentic circumstance that the necessities with which love binds the will are themselves liberating."<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 112

<sup>184</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 64

Frankfurt, in order to explain how this submission is liberation, asserts that love, like reason, imposes commanding necessity upon us, but it is not to restrict us; rather, it is to liberate us. These necessities enhance our will.

When we discover that we have no choice but to accede to irresistible requirements of logic, or to submit to captivating necessities of love, the feeling with which we do so is by no means one of dispirited passivity or confinement. In both cases—whether we are following reason or following our hearts—we are typically conscious of an invigorating release and expansion of ourselves.<sup>185</sup>

It seems paradoxical that on one side we are enhanced through the enhancement of our will but on the other side, we feel confined or limited, as we are deprived of choice. The explanation given to this by Frankfurt is that an encounter either with volitional or with rational necessity eliminates uncertainty. It thereby relaxes the inhibitions and hesitations of self-doubt. When reason makes it clear for us what the matter is, that ends all irresolution on our part concerning what we are to believe. In his account of the satisfaction he derived from his early study of geometry, Bertrand Russell alludes to “the restfulness of mathematical certainty.”<sup>186</sup> By mentioning Bertrand Russell, Frankfurt claims that those modes of certainty that are based on fundamental truths, make us clear what to believe. There remains no confusion. The mind accepts the truth, and the conflict between what to believe and what not to believe comes to an end. “As long as we are uncertain, we hold ourselves back. Discovering how things must necessarily be enables us—indeed, it requires us—to give up the debilitating restraint that we impose upon ourselves when we are unsure what to think.”<sup>187</sup>

On discovering the truth, situations of doubt no longer prevail. On knowing it, truth is wholeheartedly accepted. We become free from irresolution and submit ourselves to the necessity of fundamental truth. We see similar assertion in Frankfurt’s following statement:

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<sup>185</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 64-65

<sup>186</sup> Russell, Bertrand, 1946: 7

<sup>187</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 65



the necessity with which love binds the will puts an end to indecisiveness concerning what to care about. In being captivated by our beloved, we are liberated from the impediments to choice and action that consist either in having no final ends or in being drawn inconclusively both in one direction and in another. Indifference and unsettled ambivalence, which may radically impair our capacity to choose and to act, are thereby overcome.<sup>188</sup>

It is the fact that we cannot stop ourselves from loving. And, hence we are bound to fulfill the interests of what or whom we love. This fills our life with aim and we do not hold ourselves back from meaningful things in our lives.

Love guides our volitional activities. The necessity of love guides our actions in the sense that it does not give scope to any kind of inclinations or diversions. “It may seem, then, that the way in which the necessities of reason and of love liberate us is by freeing us from ourselves.” Frankfurt states that the possibility of being free through submitting to constraints that are not under our direct voluntary control, is not a new idea; rather, it is among the most ancient and persistent themes of our moral and religious traditions. As Dante had written, “In His will is our peace.”<sup>189</sup>

I would attempt to explore how volitional necessities are described as the fundamental elements that produce reasons for action as they are claimed to be that which circumscribe the limits of a person’s will. The actions as directed by the volitional necessity are not chosen by us but are directed to us by the necessity. We cannot will to perform some actions that are not necessitated by our will. As Frankfurt says that it may be the situation when the person decides something as the best to be done in certain circumstances, but, he cannot bring himself to perform it. If he tries to perform that thing against the volitional necessity, “he runs up against the *limits of his will*”<sup>190</sup>. Even if all the non-volitional conditions (like, knowledge, opportunity, motivation) required for his action are fulfilled, he would be unable to perform that action.

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<sup>188</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 65

<sup>189</sup> Alighieri, Dante, 2000: 303

<sup>190</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 111

Loving is, hence, directly not in our control. It is not upto us whom to love and whom not to love. We find ourselves unable to form a determined intention. Whatever reasons we provide or choices we make, if we are bound by volitional necessity, we do according to that necessity. “The constraints imposed by volitional necessity are not constraints merely upon thought and language. Volitional necessity constrains the person himself, by limiting the choices he can make.”<sup>191</sup>

The view of Frankfurt that “love is not upto us” is objected by Gary Foster. He objects:

If this is the case, then how do we make the decision necessary for a resolution? The idea that love and self-love sometimes requires a resolution presents a problem for Frankfurt’s fourth criterion which suggests that love is involuntary. Common experience suggests that we might be generally drawn to care about or love two incompatible things or persons. We may want to have an exclusive relationship with two different people. It is not clear how one resolves this.<sup>192</sup>

This objection, however, can be responded by exhibiting Frankfurt’s stand that love is not under our direct voluntary control but there may be times when we become able to have some control on love by bringing about conditions to exercise one’s choice. When we are compelled by someone or something, so much so that we find ourselves unable to follow the volitional necessities, in such scenario, we do not feel the constraint imposed by our will. We can exercise our agency in such cases and make a decision.

Furthermore, Frankfurt asserts that love comes in degree. We may tend to love somebody more than we do love others. And accordingly, love necessitates our will. We may love someone but can hurt him or her if we have greater love for someone else or something else than him or her. For example, when parents scold their children and be strict with them, it does not mean that they do not love their children. It simply means that they love to see their children develop good habits and develop as a person. We sometimes value some ideal that much that we are ready to take pains to do it. When we value something

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<sup>191</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 113

<sup>192</sup> Foster, Gary, 2009: 159

higher than other things, we directly or indirectly harm those other things to achieve the preferred thing.

Love defines specific final ends for us. Whether we are inclined to follow those ends are not, we are in a way limited to fulfill those ends. As love is a disinterested concern, according to Frankfurt, love does not allow our self-interest to motivate our actions. There may be times when we become able to have some control on love by bringing about conditions to loving or to stop loving someone. But, when our love is wholehearted, we are happy to be in the grip of the necessity of love.<sup>193</sup> Even if we would be able to bring changes and would find better options available to us, we would not bring about those changes.

As we have seen that love is volitional, moving a step forward, and by following Frankfurt and Zangwill, I maintain that love follows the volitional necessity, not the rational necessity. Hence, love is subject to volitional constraint and is not subject to rational constraints. The view that love is not subject to rational constraints is inspired by Nick Zangwill, who maintains that we do not love somebody for reasons. This does not mean that love is irrational. It just means that love is arational. It is beyond reasons. However, love rationalizes our acts of love and our other mental states, such as beliefs, and desires. As Zangwill proposes, “Love lacks rationality conditions, in the sense that there are mental states that make it rational to love; nevertheless love does rationalize other mental states.”<sup>194</sup>

Love is different from many emotions such as fear, disgust, and sadness in the sense that these emotions are subject to rational constraints. Zangwill categorizes these emotions into rational and irrational. Irrational emotions lack beliefs that are associated with those emotions. For example, there should be something about which we would feel angry. To feel angry, there should be a belief that something is disgusting. Zangwill further clarifies that at least we must imagine that something is disgusting, so that the thought of that thing makes us feel angry. Since, these emotions are subject to rational constraints, this means

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<sup>193</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 49

<sup>194</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 299

that we must either imagine or believe something in order to have these emotions. Unlike these emotions, love is not subject to any rational requirements. Zangwill proposes, “Requiring that love has reasons leads to oddities.”<sup>195</sup> Hence, it can be maintained that love is a configuration of will, not of reason. Love does not follow the commands of reason. In case of our love to someone, we are necessitated, to promote his or her well-being, by necessity of love, not by necessity of reason.

In this section, we have discussed about the volitional constraint imposed by the necessity of love. To sum up this section, it can be maintained that love is volitional, not rational. Love is not subject to rational constraints, it is subject to volitional constraint. And this constraint enables us to liberate through submission to the necessity of love. As discussed in this section, love is the fundamental motivational force of free will. And volitional necessities bind a person’s will and thereby produce norms that are internal to the subject and represent liberation.

### **3.2. Love and Personal Autonomy**

This study considers the arational views of love propounded by Frankfurt and Zangwill. In doing so, it gives due importance to the freedom of choice in love. This shall enable a more comprehensive understanding of love and human agency. It is widely agreed that love does not accidentally happen to us. Love is volitional (a configuration of the will). As Frankfurt writes, “love is a defining element of one’s volitional nature”<sup>196</sup>. This proposes that love upholds the autonomy (which involves a kind of independence on the part of the agents, such that they are in control over whatever they do) of the lovers as people act autonomously only when their volitions derive from the essential character of their will. It should therefore be acknowledged that love has an active significance to many facets of our lives and experiences. It is worth noting that the aim of this study is to back the understanding of love as a necessary component of our life.

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<sup>195</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 309

<sup>196</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

## Personal Autonomy

I propose the view that personal autonomy is requisite in a person's overall growth. On this view inspired by Marilyn Friedman, personal autonomy is considered as good. It is personal "self-government". Personal autonomy is related to person's commitments, behaviors, and choices. Friedman explains personal autonomy in the following statement, "For someone to be autonomous in respect to a choice she makes, a commitment she undertakes, the way she acts, or the life that she lives, she must somehow make it hers in a deeper sense than that of simply being the agent of those undertakings."<sup>197</sup>

Friedman puts forward two requirements for personal autonomy. First, a person must contemplate on that which makes her realize her autonomy. Second, the person must make sure that the process of contemplation be free of such influences that may hinder one to achieve the autonomy. "A choice, commitment, behavior, or life is thus autonomous for someone if she has considered it in an autonomy-conferring manner, one which in turn has not been substantially affected by autonomy-diminishing influences."<sup>198</sup> Friedman considers autonomy as a trait of a person that enables the person to get connected with those dimensions of her personality that reflect her agency or her identity.

Autonomy is social in character, as proposed by Friedman. Both, the person who is capable of autonomy and the autonomy which the person is capable of, are social elements. "Autonomy requires that someone has been socialized to grasp herself as one among other selves, with a character and identity that she can only represent to herself in terms of available cultural resources for representation."<sup>199</sup> The person is also required to have the capability to reflectively consider her identity and her situations in an "autonomy-conferring manner-capacities that can only have been acquired through socialization into

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<sup>197</sup> Friedman, M. A., 1998 : 168

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 168-169

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., 169

such practices as questioning, doubting, evaluating, criticizing, defending, reinterpreting, and imagining alternatives.”<sup>200</sup>

The main question now arises is that in what ways does personal autonomy get affected in love relationships. Another question can also be raised: What role does autonomy play in love? Friedman claims that in love relationships, especially in romantic relationships, the union of the identities of the persons in love would definitely bring a change in the nature of their selves. Friedman maintains that the change would also appear in the lover’s identities and the ways in which each of their agency get manifested would also change. Friedman says that there are philosophers like Scruton, Solomon, Nozick, Delaney, and others who have presented the unification of identities in romantic relationships as a good thing. Friedman too considers the unification of identities a good thing, but the problem with the unification is this that it may diminish the autonomy of one and may enhance the autonomy of the other.

In order to understand what happens to autonomy in love, we will especially discuss Frankfurt’s approach to this. Frankfurt defines autonomy in a Kantian way. Like Kant, Frankfurt believes that a person may be free without having choices. Moreover, Frankfurt holds that the most genuine freedom requires necessity. Being necessitated does not mean that one is not free. Freedom can be experienced even without choices. Frankfurt disagrees with Kant on some aspects, “I do not share Kant's view, however, that autonomy consists essentially and exclusively in submission to the requirements of duty. In my opinion, actions may be autonomous, whether or not they are in accordance with duty, when they are performed out of love.”<sup>201</sup> So, for Frankfurt, acts that are performed out of love are autonomous.

Moreover, Frankfurt defines autonomy as self-government in the sense that autonomous beings are independent beings as they govern themselves. Frankfurt states, “The idea of autonomy is the idea of self-government. An autonomous political entity is one that is independent of external control; it manages its own affairs. Similarly, individuals are

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<sup>200</sup> Friedman, M. A., 1998: 169

<sup>201</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 130-131

autonomous to the extent that they govern themselves.”<sup>202</sup> He further elaborates that autonomy “is essentially a matter of whether we are active rather than passive in our motives and choices— whether, however we acquire them, they are the motives and choices that we really want and are therefore in no way alien to us.”<sup>203</sup>

As maintained by Frankfurt, an autonomous agent acts fully under one’s own control. It is obvious that the person acting under his or her own control will regulate his or her actions according to what seems important to him. Frankfurt holds that the interests of a person “...are governed and defined by what he loves. It is what a person loves that determines what is important to him.”<sup>204</sup> Moreover, what one considers important to him or her may not be important for others, or what one cares about may not be a matter of concern for others.

For an act to be autonomous, it needs to follow volitional necessities. Since, the acts of love are autonomous; love is a configuration of will. As Frankfurt suggests:

A person acts autonomously only when his volitions derive from the essential character of his will... the unconditional commands of love are not, as Kant suggests, adventitious elements of a person's will. They are essentially integral to it, for what a person loves is a defining element of his volitional nature. When he acts out of love, accordingly, his volitions do derive from the essential character of his will. Thus, the personal grip of love satisfies the conditions for autonomy that Kant believes can be satisfied only by the impersonal constraints of the moral law.<sup>205</sup>

The commands of love are integral to a person’s will. What is loved by a person is determined by the person’s volitional nature. The acts of love are in accordance with the lover’s will.

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<sup>202</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 130

<sup>203</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 20 (footnote)

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 85

<sup>205</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

The autonomous will, as Frankfurt explains, is related to Kant's "pure" will. It is in accordance with the requirements of the will. It must not be motivated by personal interests, preferences, and desires. "Now *this pure will* is a very peculiar and unlikely place in which to locate an indispensable condition of individual autonomy."<sup>206</sup> Pure will, is devoid of personal features, and hence, has no individuality. Such will is concerned with a priori universal truth. Pure will, as Frankfurt suggests, is same in everybody, and its volitions are also same everywhere. So, pure will, in Frankfurt's view, is "impersonal".

Furthermore, Frankfurt distinguishes autonomous from heteronomous based on the distinction given by Kant. For Kant, heteronomous is the one whose actions are motivated by his or her own personal interests. Frankfurt understands the distinction between autonomous and heteronomous in relation with the distinction between being "active" and being "passive". When a person acts according to his or her own will, he or she is active. On the other hand, when the person's acts are motivated by the considerations that are external to his or her will, he or she is considered passive. As Frankfurt explains:

Someone is heteronomous when what he wills is not determined exclusively by the inherent nature of his will but at least partly by considerations that are conceptually inessential to it. These conceptually inessential considerations are separable from his will, and in that respect they are logically external to it. Now insofar as a person's will is affected by considerations that are external to it, the person is being acted upon. To that extent, he is passive.<sup>207</sup>

Following Kant, Frankfurt asserts that personal interests are determined by the situations that are outside of one's control and hence, autonomy cannot be based on interests. Frankfurt makes an interesting point here by talking about the possibility to be autonomous "by virtue of submitting to the ruling passion of love"<sup>208</sup>. He maintains that it is possible to be governed by love without being passive.

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<sup>206</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 132

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., 132-133

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 133



Frankfurt makes a different point by maintaining that love is passive in many of its instances. Love is passive when the lover “is motivated by an expectation that obtaining or continuing to possess the object of his love will be beneficial to him”<sup>209</sup>. This expectation need not be derived from intellectual calculation. But, in the back of the lover’s mind is the consideration that the object is capable of bringing desirable situations in the lover’s life. Frankfurt, further claims that such lover’s “love is conditional upon his attribution to his beloved of a capacity to improve the condition of his life. What mainly binds him to the object of his love, whether he is prepared to acknowledge this or not, is a preoccupation with his own good.”<sup>210</sup>

Frankfurt holds that when we love someone, we care about him or her not as merely a means, but as an end. We consider our loved ones as important to us for their own sakes.<sup>211</sup> This importance enables us to act accordingly to satisfy their interests. Moreover, Frankfurt holds:

Caring is indispensably foundational as an activity that connects and binds us to ourselves. It is through caring that we provide ourselves with volitional continuity, and in that way constitute and participate in our own agency. Regardless of how suitable or unsuitable the various things we care about may be, caring about something is essential to our being creatures of the kind that human beings are.<sup>212</sup>

Through care, we not only get connected to our beloveds, but also get connected to ourselves. Care is indispensably a volitional act. So, through caring, we exercise our agency. Love, as a mode of care, hence, is volitional and through love too, we participate in our own agency.

Love motivates us to pursue the goals and aims determined by the necessity of love as they reflect our genuine will. When we are moved by the objects we care about, there is the possibility that they lead us to live a genuine and meaningful existence, which makes itself

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<sup>209</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 133

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 42

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., 17

possible in virtue of the possibility of its being firmly anchored in our capacity for reflexivity and self-reflexivity. Being active, a person is capable of refraining from acting upon her first - order desires. He or she is, therefore, able to form higher order desires and volitions of higher order to which he or she commits and realize his or her autonomy. The intimate connection between the concept of a person and the notion of care is based upon the premise that says that what we love – as a result of the configuration of our will – determines what we are able to do with ourselves as it shapes our identities. As Frankfurt says:

“The necessities of a person’s will guide and limit his agency. They determine what he may be willing to do, what he cannot help doing, and what he cannot bring himself to do. They determine as well what he may be willing to accept as a reason for acting, what he cannot help considering to be a reason for acting, and what he cannot bring himself to count as a reason for acting. In these ways, they set the boundaries of his practical life; and thus they fix his shape as an active being.”<sup>213</sup>

The agency of a person is limited by his or her will. But this does not mean that the agent is not free. The agent exercises his or her freedom which is guided by the volitional necessities. These necessities are required as they determine the actions necessary to the agent.

For Frankfurt, “it is a necessary feature of love that it is not under our direct and immediate voluntary control.”<sup>214</sup> It is not up to us to choose whom to love. It may be asked then: Does love happen to us? Do we have no choice in loving someone? If we have no choice in love, this may be questioned then: Is our will limited? What impact does love make on the autonomy of the lover? The following statement of Frankfurt needs to be considered in this regard:

The significance of volitional necessity in our lives is by no means confined, of course, to its role in cognition. It is manifestly pertinent as well to our attitudes, to our choices, and to our actions. So far as these are concerned, many people have believed that

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<sup>213</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 50

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., 44

constraining the will of the agent impairs, and at the limit may be altogether incompatible with, his freedom. In my opinion, this is far from being the case. The grip of volitional necessity may provide, in certain matters, an essential condition of freedom; indeed, it may actually be in itself liberating.<sup>215</sup>

As we have discussed that love, according to Frankfurt, is not under our direct voluntary control. It may seem as if the lover's autonomy is hampered in love, but since love is a configuration of will, lover's autonomy is not hampered. Whatever the lover decides, whatever choices he or she makes, he or she would not find himself or herself able to perform those actions; rather, his or her actions are determined by the necessity of love. It is not upto him or her to directly control his or her agency. Frankfurt maintains that in normal conditions, we act on our decisions, and we have choices. But, in case of love, we don't have choices. And we are made to act as per the necessity of love. In such a situation, it doesn't matter what reasons we apply, what we decide, and what we consider to be the best for us, nothing will change the situation. "In matters like these, we are subject to a necessity that forcefully constrains the will and that we cannot elude merely by choosing or deciding to do so."<sup>216</sup>

What distinguishes persons from other agents is their capacity to form a volition which means that they have a volitional essence. Persons are autonomous when they act upon motives that are eternal to them. Love provides reasons and drives the activity of reflection that is the proper responding to reasons and brings about meaning in the sense of the internalization of volition of necessities.

This section has attempted to look into the impact love makes on the autonomy of the lover. Following Frankfurt, it is maintained that the limit imposed on a person by his or her will does not hamper his or her autonomy. It has been discussed that the limit enhances one's will.

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<sup>215</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: x

<sup>216</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 45

### 3.3. Love and Psychic Integration

In this section, I would try to propose that in order to possess the virtue of love, the lover needs to integrate his or her psyche. If the desires of a person towards his or her beloved are intensely conflicted, or if those desires are not practically integrated into the person's will, the person does not said to be have the virtue of love. It is not possible for a person to pursue consistently the good of others or union with others if his or her desires towards them are not integrated.

The discussion on the relation between love and psychic integration stems from Harry Frankfurt's influential article "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." He presents a framework for discussing one's psyche, contradictory desires, and a hierarchy of desires. Frankfurt defines first-order desires as the desires to do or not to do something. He claims that many animals appear to have the first-order desires. But, only human beings can have the second-order desires. These second-order desires are the desires to have or not to have certain desires of the first-order.<sup>217</sup> He also distinguishes between second-order desires intended to move first-order desires, which he calls second-order volitions, and second-order desires that are not intended to shape first-order desires.<sup>218</sup> He claims that second-order volitions are indispensable for personhood.<sup>219</sup> He considers the ability to bring one's first-order desires in accordance with one's second-order desires as a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing free will.<sup>220</sup>

Eric Silverman has explained the position of Frankfurt on the relation between love and psyche. He says that Frankfurt presents psyche to be complex. To possess the virtue of love, a person must have both first-order desires and second-order volitions of love toward people in general. However, it is possible that she may have comparatively weak first-order desires that are counter to love, since love does not require that someone have a perfectly integrated psyche. In Silverman's words:

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<sup>217</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1971: 7

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., 10

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., 10-11

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., 14

Love also does not require that the psyche be integrated concerning absolutely all desires; however, there are a significant number of desires relevant to love, including a person's desires toward all other persons. Furthermore, excellence in love requires that the lover's desires concerning a wide variety of other topics be compatible with the desires of love. For example, someone may have both loving desires and a first-order desire for pleasure. While there is no direct conflict between loving desires and a first-order desire for one's own pleasure, the desire for pleasure must be integrated into the psyche in a way that does not conflict with love.<sup>221</sup>

Silverman claims that a person with an unintegrated psyche has a larger amount of unorganized or even mutually exclusive desires coexisting within the psyche. The integrated psyche enables the person to fulfill one's interests and have a more decent life than those who possess an unintegrated psyche. These claims are not only philosophically intuitive, but have been reinforced by the findings of empirical psychology.

Psychologists such as Robert Emmons also offer a description of psychic unintegration, which he describes as goal conflict. He says:

[Goal] Conflicts are problem situations that involve two competing and mutually exclusive alternative resolutions (McReynolds, 1990). A good all-purpose definition is provided by Heitler (1990): Conflict is a situation in which seemingly incompatible elements exert force in opposing or divergent directions". (p.5) Conflicts have a discernible grammar—they are expressed as oppositional statements ("I want to write this book but I also want to play golf").<sup>222</sup>

Competing goals as discussed here may be expressed as oppositional statements when they are set to be done at the same time. But of course, many competing goals are not truly incompatible. Emmons's conflicting first-order desires to write his book and to play golf are only truly incommensurable if he wants to do them both within a specific time frame. He cannot both write his book and play golf at noon on a particular day, but he certainly

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<sup>221</sup> Silverman, Eric, 2010: 108

<sup>222</sup> Emmons, Robert, 1999: 69

can play golf today and write his book tomorrow. He can even accomplish both goals in a single day by golfing in the morning and writing his book in the afternoon.

At least two distinct types of psychic unintegration are incompatible with love. In simple unintegrated psyches, the agent's desires form a set of potentially compatible but unordered desires. An agent's desires for high income, entertainment, relationships, success, and pleasure are not necessarily incompatible with one another. Many people achieve similar sets of goals. Yet without a well-ordered psychological structure prioritizing some desires over others, the individual may be unable to attain any desire if he is continually distracted by equally strong competing desires with no criteria for choosing among them. Such an agent lacks proper bonds to his goals since he is too easily distracted by other desires, and may suddenly abandon pursuit of one desire for another.

The dilemma of someone who is unable to choose between similarly attractive preferences is illustrated in the story of Buridan's ass, a fictional creature placed equidistant from two identical stacks of hay. The animal could eat from either stack of hay if it had some criterion for choosing between its desires, even if it were an arbitrary criterion such as flipping a coin (or whatever the equivalent is for quadrupeds), but without such a criterion he may fail to eat from either haystack. According to the traditional illustration, Buridan's ass will starve because it has no rational reason for choosing to eat from one stack of hay rather than the other.<sup>223</sup>

Like this fictional creature, a person with an unintegrated psyche has no firm criterion established for choosing between competing desires and is therefore less likely to achieve any of them. Even if he is not paralyzed by indecision and a lack of comprehensive prioritization between his goals, he will likely pursue his goals inconsistently. Even though the desires of an agent with simple psychic unintegration are compatible with one another, he is less likely to achieve any of his goals. Humans are finite beings with finite resources, and the lack of bondedness to goals experienced by those with unintegrated psyches causes them to use those resources inefficiently. Therefore, those who lack well-ordered psyches

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<sup>223</sup> Zupko, Jack, 2006

are less likely to accomplish their goals and preferences than are agents with integrated psyches. This experience also tends to be less pleasant.

Young children often have unintegrated psyches. A child may enter his room in search of a shirt to keep warm, but come out with his favorite toy car instead. The toy may then be abandoned if he notices cookies left out on the counter. By this time, the child may have forgotten the original reason he entered his room, but he still suffers from the cold since he never found his shirt. In young children, an unintegrated psyche is less harmful since adult supervision ensures they will get most of their important needs met. An adult with an unintegrated psyche is in a more undesirable position since no one ensures her needs will be met.

A well-ordered psyche does not merely prioritize desires in a simple rank order. An agent with a well-integrated psyche who values relationships over money does not choose relationship-building activities over money-making activities in absolutely every circumstance, but instead structures life as a whole to reflect his priorities. Such a person structures life's activities based on which ends he considers worthy of pursuit. Someone with a well-integrated psyche may sometimes exchange the pursuit of one desire for the pursuit of a desire with higher priority. A person with an integrated psyche may even temporarily postpone the pursuit of a more important ultimate goal for a less important, but more urgent goal. A religious person may value time in prayer over grocery shopping, but shopping for food may be more urgent if the refrigerator is empty. What makes grocery shopping more urgent is not its relative importance, but the fact that attaining the good grocery shopping helps achieve, relieved physical hunger, requires acting within a shorter time span. Yet such choices are in accordance with the agent's integrated priorities and do not reflect impulsiveness or internal psychic disorder.

A second type of unintegrated psyche is a deeply divided psyche with mutually exclusive highly valued desires. Someone may have first-order desires to lose weight and to consume inordinate amounts of fattening foods, or a woman may desire to marry two different men. As illustrated by Emmons's account of goal conflict, extremely disunified psyches not only lack prioritization and integration of desires, but also possess desires that

are inherently incompatible with one another. Accomplishing one valued desire necessarily thwarts another valued desire. In these cases, the divided psyche may completely paralyze the agent and prevent him from pursuing goals altogether. This case is not like the simple case of Buridan's ass, which can accomplish both desires by eating from one stack of hay after eating from the other. Instead, achieving one goal necessarily undermines the second goal.

Another potential effect of an extremely disunified psyche is that an agent may alternate between pursuing each of the incompatible goals, thereby undermining both goals. In some decisions, ambivalence between two attractive options can result in the loss of both opportunities. For example, a person may alienate two potential romantic partners through his inability to choose between them.

A particularly painful type of deeply divided psyche occurs when the internal conflict is between first-order desires and second-order volitions, rather than only between two first-order desires. In this case, the person is alienated from his own desires. He does not want to desire the things he desires. Frankfurt illustrates this psyche with the example of the unwilling addict, who desires drugs but does not wish to desire drugs.<sup>224</sup>

Experiencing a deeply disunified psyche can be heart-wrenching because a person who is unable to choose between two deeply valued goals will either become paralyzed in indecision or undermine at least one treasured goal. Such a person is less likely to achieve desires and her fulfilled desires will be less pleasurable than if goal attainment did not entail frustrating competing goals. Therefore, it is unsurprising that empirical psychology identifies goal conflict as a major source of pain and frustration. Emmons connects the internal goal conflict that accompanies psychic unintegration with painful emotional turmoil and physical illness:

Goal conflicts are part of the human experience. When there are choices to be made or decisions to be reached, competing desires are frequently involved. We desire many things in life—we want affection from loved ones, recognition from our peers, a

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<sup>224</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1971: 12



comfortable lifestyle. Other desires may keep us from achieving all that we want. We want to maintain our independence from others, we want to avoid calling attention to ourselves, we want to live a simple and frugal life. We wish to spend time with our family, but we wish to advance in our career. We want to take risks, but we want to be secure.... Research has confirmed that conflict is a major source of suffering and misery in people's lives. Conflicting motive systems are a source of self-regulatory failure. Poorly handled, chronic conflicts are at the root of many physical illnesses and poor mental and emotional health. Depression, anxiety, ulcers, and heart disease have all been associated with the inner turmoil that surrounds unresolved conflicts.<sup>225</sup>

Psychic integration is a hallmark of emotional health and successful self regulation of the internal person. Unresolved conflicting desires are destructive to both mental and physical health. The stress of mental conflict can express itself in observable physical consequences. An integrated psyche avoids this stress and ensures that there are no internal psychic barriers to goal accomplishment. A famous example of a radically disunified psyche is found in Augustine's Confessions. In Book VIII, leading up to his conversion, he describes himself as tortured and paralyzed due to his radically divided psyche. He portrays himself as deeply divided. He desires the worldly sexual delights of his past as well as spiritual pleasures that are incompatible with reckless sexual indulgence. This divided will paralyzes him in the frustrating pain of indecision. Augustine describes this experience:

From where did this monstrous state come? And how did it come here? Mind commands body, and it immediately obeys; but when mind commands itself it is resisted. Mind commands the hand to move, and the hand's readiness is so great that it is difficult to distinguish command from obedience. And mind is mind, while hand is body. Mind commands itself to will, but it does not obey. From where did this monstrous state come? And how did it get here? I say that will commands itself to will something: it would not order if it were unwilling, and yet it disobeys that command.<sup>226</sup>

Augustine found the experience of the divided psyche to be frustrating, painful, and even monstrous. His psyche held two incompatible goals and was at war with itself. Only when

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<sup>225</sup> Emmons, Robert, 1999: 67-68

<sup>226</sup> Augustine, 1960: 8.9.21

his will became integrated could he find peace. While this example illustrates the negative effects of experiencing a deeply divided psyche for a short time, a life-long divided psyche would inevitably lead to ongoing displeasure as any course of action would result in pain and goal frustration. A person with psychic unintegration cannot lead a happy life and hence cannot love his own self or his beloved purely.

The virtue of love requires considerable integration of the psyche since someone who both desires union with a person and desires distance from that same person does not love him well. The lover must also desire his own flourishing in a way that is compatible with the flourishing of all others. The lover must integrate his psyche so that the desires for union with the beloved and the beloved's good are compatible with other competing desires, and conflicting desires are subordinated or eliminated. Furthermore, since the loving person has such desires toward other persons in general, his desires in all relationships must have a high degree of integration.

The integration required by love benefits the loving agent. A person with a deeply divided psyche is in an undesirable predicament, since attaining one desire entails frustrating another strong desire. Furthermore, an agent with a deeply divided psyche is less likely to fulfill any of her desires since competing desires consistently undermine each other's pursuit. A self that is unable to integrate is left with mutually incompatible goals.

On any account of well-being that views desire fulfillment as a constituent of well-being, agents with integrated psyches have more advantages than agents with unintegrated psyches. If it is the case that an agent's psyche is unintegrated due to mutually incompatible goals, then any activity that might advance his or her well-being by fulfilling one's desire will simultaneously undermine his or her well-being by thwarting a competing desire. It is only when the preferred desires are well-integrated in the agent's will rather than other desires, the agent will successfully prioritize some desires over others, thereby increasing the opportunity for desire fulfillment without simultaneous desire frustration. Furthermore, living with an integrated psyche is more pleasurable than living with an unintegrated psyche, since fulfilling desires without frustrating other desires is more enjoyable than the alternatives.

Laura Ekstrom summarizes the benefits of psychic integration in terms of an increase in autonomy, which results in a more satisfying and self-directed life.

The thought is, the more self-directed one's life is, the more satisfying that life will be, as the less one will be pulled in different directions by external forces and unconscious drives and the less one will be plagued by inner tension, by confusion over what to do, and by alienation from certain of one's decisions and actions.<sup>227</sup>

She cites inner tension and conflict between conscious goals and unconscious drives as threats that undermine personal autonomy and personal well-being. Accordingly, the wholeheartedness love entails in one's desires toward other people increases autonomy in this wide ranging area of life.

One interesting question is whether humans can integrate their psyches around absolutely any goal, or whether there are only certain goals around which they can fully integrate their psyches. For example, Kant held that the will cannot integrate around desires that it recognizes as necessarily incompatible with personal well-being. He claims that an individual's psyche must view the practical rationality concerning one's well-being and moral duty as potentially compatible, and that no one could carry out moral imperatives that were assured to destroy the individual's happiness. If practical rationality concerning personal well-being clearly conflicts with the demands of morality then the person cannot integrate her psyche since desires for both personal well-being and to fulfill the moral law are necessary features of rational beings.

To illustrate how love benefits a person through psychic integration, consider the case of an alcoholic man who is married and father of a young child. He desires to quit drinking in order to be a more helpful husband, a good father, and a responsible provider, but he also desires to continue drinking in order to enjoy the pleasure of alcohol and the social atmosphere at his local pub. If he holds these desires with relatively equivalent strengths, fulfilling either desire will not increase his well-being. When either desire is fulfilled, he is no better off. He is in a hopeless state since fulfilling either desire entails frustrating an

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<sup>227</sup> Ekstrom, Laura, 2005: 158

equally strong desire. The virtue of love would enable him to integrate his psyche around a desire for the good of and union with his beloved family, which entails that he would subordinate his desires to frequent the pub. However, without such integration he may continually struggle with his competing desires, frustrating both goals. Even as he enjoys drinking at the local pub he may experience guilt at the neglect of his family. Yet, while he is with his family he may be emotionally absent, wishing he were at the local pub.

In this section, we have seen that love requires the lover to integrate her psyche around the desires of love. Love requires a significant degree of psychic integration since the desires of love must be held toward all persons. Someone who does not consistently hold the desires of love or whose psyche holds strong conflicting desires does not possess the full virtue of love. To the degree that a person has the virtue of love, her psyche must be integrated around loving desires. An integrated psyche advances a person's well-being, because she is better able to achieve a larger number of desires. Furthermore, wholeheartedness toward one's desires is more pleasurable than ongoing internal conflict.

### **Concluding Note**

Following Frankfurt, I have maintained that love is volitional. Love being volitional means that the lover's will is bound by volitional necessities. These volitional necessities define limit of a person's will.

Love guides our volitional activities and determines our actions that are directed to benefit the beloved. It does not promote self-interested motives. Loving is directly not in our control. It is not upto us whom to love and whom not to love. But the necessities of love guide us and in guiding, enhance our will.

As maintained by Frankfurt that love is not under our direct voluntary control, it seems to create a diminishing effect on the role of autonomy. But, it is proposed that the volitional constraint does not hamper the autonomy; rather enhance it.

In order to have wholehearted love, we need to integrate our psyche around the desires of love. A person cannot be said to have the virtue of love if his or her desires toward others are unorganized or intensely conflicted. A person with an unintegrated psyche has mutually conflicting desires coexisting within his or her psyche. The integrated psyche leads a person to a more pleasant life than the one that can be given by a disintegrated psyche.

In the next chapter we will discuss the relation between love and value. An attempt would be made to study appraisal and bestowal of value and to propose an intermediary position. An attempt would also be made to present non-evaluative conception of love. Moreover, it would also be examined whether love enables us to lead a meaningful life.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Love and Value**

There is an ongoing debate whether love makes the loved object valuable or it is the value of the object that makes it valuable. “From the ancients through the twentieth century, whether the beauty or goodness of the beloved is the basis (and/or the object) of love, or has little or nothing to do with love, has been thoroughly discussed.”<sup>228</sup> On the basis of this discussion, the contemporary philosophers, especially Frankfurt, Velleman, Kolodny, and Zangwill can be divided into two groups. Frankfurt and Zangwill come in one group that consider that love makes the object of love valuable. In the other group come Velleman and Kolodny, who believe that value of the object makes it valuable for the lover. This chapter attempts to examine the relationship between love and value, or the role of value in love.

The first section of this chapter discusses appraisal and bestowal of value. The appraisal view values the beloved because he or she is valuable. While bestowal of value bestows value on the beloved as a result of loving. An attempt has been made to develop an intermediary position between these two views.

The second section presents non-evaluative conception of love. Love cannot be evaluative. It is because evaluation is propositional, while love is not propositional.

The third and the last section of this chapter focuses on the value of love and attempts to discuss love’s role in providing final ends. It will be discussed how love enables us to lead a meaningful life. It will also be examined whether or not love promotes the well being of persons in love.

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<sup>228</sup> Soble, Alan, 2015: 26

## 4.1. Appraisal and Bestowal of Value

As we have discussed in Chapter 1 that *eros* and *philia* are conceived as response to the values or worth of a person, while *agape* creates value in its object as a result of loving it. In *eros*-style love, the lover values the beloved because she is valuable, while in *agape*-style love, the beloved comes to be valuable to the lover as a result of his or her loving him or her. The former view understands love as the “appraisal of value” of the beloved, whereas the latter view understands love as the “bestowal of value” onto the beloved. Irving Singer has provided the distinction between appraisal and bestowal in *The Nature of Love*, Vol.1<sup>229</sup>. The distinction presents us with a type of *Euthyphro* problem, discussed by Alan Soble in his work “Love and Value, Yet Again”:

Do I love Melinda because she is (or I judge or perceive her to be) beautiful or good, or do I think Melinda is beautiful or good because I love her? The problem remains if “beautiful” and “good” are replaced by any other valuable property (or set of properties), such as wit, charm, intelligence, and kind-heartedness.<sup>230</sup>

*Euthyphro* problem can be originally found in Plato’s dialogue *Euthyphro*. This dilemma is presented by Socrates when he asks Euthyphro whether gods love good actions because they are good, or actions are good because they are loved by the gods.

### Appraisal of Value of the Beloved

Singer defines appraisal as determining the value of a person or an object.<sup>231</sup> Singer considers appraisal as to “evaluate” the value of an object. This evaluation is a different mode of valuation than “valuing” the object. In evaluation, value is determined on various measures, while in valuing, there is no such estimation of value of the object. He categorizes appraisal into objective appraisal and individual appraisal. In objective appraisal, the value of an object is determined on various facts that exhibit the personal

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<sup>229</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.1, 2009: 3-22

<sup>230</sup> Soble, Alan, 2015: 27

<sup>231</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.1, 2009: 4

features of the object. These facts are then weighed up according to their importance to the appraiser. In the words of Singer, objective appraisal “seeks to find an objective value that things have in relation to one or another community of human interests”<sup>232</sup>. This value is “objective” as the value of object is estimated according to the object’s worth and the appraiser values it regardless of his or her own sentiments about the particular object. Individual appraisal, on the other hand, is subjective. In individual appraisal, a person does not merely estimate objective value; rather he or she determines the value of the object on the fact that what is worth to him or her. Here, the person weighs up the importance of his or her particular interests and accordingly estimate the worth of the object whether or not it can satisfy those interests. As Singer suggests, “Deciding what something is worth to *oneself* we may call an individual appraisal. It differs from what the appraiser does; it determines a purely individual value, as opposed to any objective value.”<sup>233</sup>

Singer holds that the appraisal model of love can be important in the initial phases of romantic relationships. Through appraisal of values, two people can come to appreciate each other’s values. This may bring them closer physically as well as emotionally. But gradually, it is realized by the partners that merely appraising the values of each other will not do. For Singer, love would not be complete in itself if it is solely based on the appraisal of value.<sup>234</sup>

It is clear from Singer’s definition of appraisal of value that it “evaluates” the worth of the person. Therefore, Frankfurt does not consider love as an appraisal of value because love, for him, is not due to the valuable properties of the beloved. As he clarifies:

It is true that the beloved invariably is, indeed, valuable to the lover. However, perceiving that value is not at all an indispensable *formative* or *grounding* condition of the love. It need not be a perception of value in what he loves that moves the lover to love it. The truly essential relationship between love and the value of the beloved goes

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<sup>232</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.1, 2009: 4

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., 10



in the opposite direction. It is not necessarily as a *result* of recognizing their value and of being captivated by it that we love things.<sup>235</sup>

Love need not be grounded in any judgment or perception concerning the value of its object. Appreciating the value of an object is not an essential condition for loving it. It may sometimes be the case that judgments and perceptions based on the values of the object arouse love, but “love is not necessarily a response grounded in awareness of the inherent value of its object”<sup>236</sup>. Such judgements and perceptions cannot be the reasons for love. Frankfurt maintains that people mistakenly take the causes of love as the reasons for love. However, love itself creates values and is itself the source of reasons. Therefore, for Frankfurt, appraisal of value is not integral to love.

For Frankfurt, the lover values the beloved, but it is not in the sense of appraisal. Love is not generated due to recognizing the value of the object of love and by being captivated by those values. Love, for Frankfurt, cannot be the result of weighing up one’s interests and estimating the worth of the object. Furthermore, it is certainly possible for love to happen without the lover giving a positive appraisal of the beloved, or appraising the beloved at all, or even appraising the beloved negatively. As Frankfurt holds:

It is entirely possible for a person to be caused to love something without noticing its value, or without being at all impressed by its value, or despite recognizing that there really is nothing especially valuable about it. It is even possible for a person to come to love something despite recognising that its inherent nature is actually and utterly bad.<sup>237</sup>

It is evident in our society that people do love them whom they do not consider worthy or whom they may even consider bad. So, it is not an essential feature of love to appraise the beloved. It does not matter in love whether the beloved is appraised positively or negatively, or not at all appraised. Further, Frankfurt maintains that even if one positively appraises an object, it does not mean that one loves or cares about that person. As Frankfurt

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<sup>235</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 38-39

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., 38

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

states, “To love something is quite different from considering it to be especially appealing or precious. The fact that a person recognizes that an object is valuable or that it is good does not imply that he cares about it.”<sup>238</sup> The person may not even have any particular interest in it at all. For Frankfurt, appraisal cannot provide sufficient reasons for love.

As we have seen that Frankfurt rejects the appraisal view of love, Velleman, on the contrary, promotes it. Velleman proposes the appraisal view of love in his papers, “Love as a Moral Emotion” and “Beyond Price”. He presents love as the appreciation of value of the object of love. “Love is...an appreciative response to the perception of...value.”<sup>239</sup> He understands love to be basically a matter of recognizing and responding to the value of the beloved in a distinctive way. Velleman’s appraisal view of love is inspired by Kantian treatment of respect and dignity. Based on the distinction between dignity and price, as given by Kant, Velleman claims that price warrants a mode of appreciation that involves preference and choice. While, dignity, on the other hand, “is a different kind of value because it warrants a different mode of appreciation, consisting of motives and feelings in which we submit to the object’s reality rather than strive toward its realization.”<sup>240</sup> This position of Velleman makes it clear that love is an appreciation of the object’s real values, and is not concerned with its realization. This means that Velleman’s notion of love appraises the value of the object, and is not concerned with bestowing value on it.

According to the Kantian view, which is promoted by Velleman in his account of love, our dignity is manifested through our rational nature. As suggested by Kant, it is through respect that we respond to the dignity of other persons. In the same vein, Velleman holds that love, like Kantian respect, is also a response to the dignity of persons. Love is, hence, an appreciation of a person as the rational creature he or she is. As Velleman maintains:

For Kant,...people have a capacity whose value we appreciate by respecting them; and that capacity, at its utmost, is *their* capacity for respect. I am suggesting that love is an appreciation for the same value, inhering in people’s capacity to appreciate the

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<sup>238</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 129

<sup>239</sup> Velleman, David J., 2008: 199

<sup>240</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 367

value of ends, including self-existent ends such as persons. For me, then, people have a capacity whose value we appreciate not only with respect but also sometimes with love.<sup>241</sup>

Love being a response to the rational nature of a person appraises the personhood of that person. This personhood is a universal as well as an objective reality and there is no bestowal of value on it.

It is noteworthy to mention that Velleman's notion of love is based on the appreciation of the value of an object, and is not based on judging the object to have that value.<sup>242</sup> Let me try to relate his distinction between appreciation of value and judgement based on that value with the distinction between objective and individual appraisal of value as discussed by Singer. Appreciation of the value of an object falls under the objective appraisal of value, while judging the object to have that value comes under the individual appraisal of value. This is because appreciation is based on objective reality, while judgement is more or less subjective and is based on realization.

### **Bestowal of Value onto the Beloved**

In contrast to appraisal of value, Singer proposes the idea of bestowal of value. In his own words, "I suggest that love creates a new value, one that is not reducible to the individual or objective value that something may also have. This further type of valuing I call bestowal."<sup>243</sup> Singer maintains that unlike appraisal, bestowal gives importance to the object of love, disregard of the fact whether or not the object has the capacity to satisfy one's interests.

As defined by Singer, bestowal implies placing value onto the beloved. The value bestowed promotes the expansion of identities of the persons in love. As Singer states, "In responding affirmatively to another person, the lover creates something and need loose

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<sup>241</sup> Velleman, J. David, 1999: 365

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol. 1, 2009: 5

nothing in himself. To bestow value is to augment one's own being as well as the beloved's."<sup>244</sup> According to Singer, bestowal involves a sort of bond and commitment to the beloved. Like Velleman, Singer too holds that in love, the lover considers the beloved as an end in himself or herself. In the process of bestowing value onto the beloved, the lover promotes the beloved's well-being. So, bestowal of value involves "caring about the needs and interests of the beloved,...wishing to benefit or protect her,...delighting in her achievements"<sup>245</sup>.

Singer's account of love is basically a bestowal account of love but his account does not totally deny appraisal of value. His bestowal account of love presupposes appraisal of value. Singer claims that through appraisal, we come to know whether our beloved possesses good qualities or bad qualities. And this ensures that our love is not blind in the sense of not paying attention to how exactly our beloved is. Only when we know how exactly our beloved is and what exactly is needed for his or her well being, that we become able to bestow value onto him or her. Bennett Helm explicitly explains this position of Singer:

For it to be intelligible that I have bestowed value on someone, I must therefore respond appropriately to him as valuable, and this requires having some sense of what his well-being is and of what affects that well-being positively or negatively. Yet having this sense requires in turn knowing what his strengths and deficiencies are, and this is a matter of appraising him in various ways. Bestowal thus presupposes a kind of appraisal. Nonetheless, Singer claims, it is the bestowal that is primary for understanding what love consists in: the appraisal is required only so that the commitment to one's beloved and his value as thus bestowed has practical import.<sup>246</sup>

Singer claims that if love is only dependent on appraisal of value, it would not give a satisfactory account of love. For, an account of love to be ideal, appraisal should go along

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<sup>244</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.1, 2009: 7

<sup>245</sup> Singer, Irving, 1991: 270

<sup>246</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2005

with bestowal. “Love would not be love unless appraising were accompanied by the bestowing of value.”<sup>247</sup>

Singer’s bestowal account of love is criticized by Helm. Helm argues, “More generally, a proponent of the bestowal view needs to be much clearer than Singer is in articulating precisely what a bestowal is. What is the value that I create in a bestowal, and how can my bestowal create it?”<sup>248</sup>

Like Singer, Frankfurt’s conception of love too is bestowal of value. According to Alan Soble, it is similar to Christian *agape*.<sup>249</sup> Soble explains how Frankfurt’s form of bestowal love is similar to Christian *agape* by presenting the *Euthyphro* love dilemma:

Frankfurt observes that love and the beloved’s value *invariably* go together. We must figure out the relationship between them, just as about the correlation between God’s commanding act *A* and act *A*’s being right we must decide whether God commands *A* because it is right or *A* is right because God commands it. Frankfurt’s solution to the *Euthyphro* love dilemma is analogous to saying that *A* is right because God commands it.<sup>250</sup>

Soble notes that Frankfurt’s solution to the *Euthyphro* problem presents his account of love as bestowal. Since, Frankfurt holds that love is not a response to reasons; it creates the reasons of love. Accordingly, love is not based on values, it creates values in the beloved. For Frankfurt, love is the bestowal of value onto the beloved and it is the bestowal that makes the beloved valuable to the lover. This position of Frankfurt is similar to Christian *agape* as *agape* in the form of Divine love is not based on human beings’ values; rather, it creates values in them.

Frankfurt claims that the beloved is inevitably valuable to the lover; however, the value possessed by the beloved is dependent on the lover’s love. As Frankfurt holds, “The lover

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<sup>247</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.1, 2009: 7

<sup>248</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2005

<sup>249</sup> Soble, Alan, 2015: 27

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

does invariably and necessarily perceive the beloved as valuable, but the value he sees it to possess is a value that derives from and that depends upon his love.”<sup>251</sup> The beloved is valuable to the lover because of his or her love for the beloved.

Frankfurt maintains that neither the general human attributes of the beloved, such as personhood and rationality, nor the particular valuable attributes of the beloved, like a sense of humor, insight, or beauty, are the basis for love. Instead, the necessary connection between love and value is that love becomes the basis for the lover’s valuation of a particular person. As Frankfurt states, “...what we love necessarily *acquires* value for us *because* we love it.”<sup>252</sup> Someone who claims to love another person but does not value him misunderstands the nature of love. There definitely is the value for the beloved but it does not depend on the beloved rather it is the love for the beloved which makes his/her presence in the life valuable. Love is not a response to anything valuable within the beloved. Instead, love becomes the basis for the lover’s valuation of the beloved. We do not love people because they are valuable, but they become valuable to us because we love them.

Frankfurt’s view of love gives no room to appraisal of value. The beloved definitely is valuable to the lover. But the lover does not love the beloved because he or she is valuable; rather the beloved is valuable because the lover loves the beloved. This opinion of Frankfurt is criticized by Gary Foster. He argues, “Viewing love in terms of bestowal alone and as coming in degrees of purity presents a misleading or at least inadequate model for many types of relationships.”<sup>253</sup>

### **Reconciliation between Appraisal and Bestowal**

I agree with Foster that love cannot be viewed solely as bestowal as it fails to present a satisfactory account of love. So, I would maintain, following Singer, that love would be love if it gives room to both appraisal and bestowal. Appraisal of value is required especially in romantic relationships or friendship. Through appraisal people come to know

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<sup>251</sup> Frankfurt, 2004: 39

<sup>252</sup> Ibid.

<sup>253</sup> Foster, Gary, 2009: 162

the other person exactly the way he or she is. And it is through bestowal, that the lover may bestow the required values onto the beloved for his or her well-being.

As we have seen in Chapter 2 that Velleman had referred to Yeat's poem "For Anne Gregory" where the girl does not want to be loved only for her beautiful properties; rather she wants to be loved for who she is. This is relevant here because a beloved does not want her lover only to appraise her for her beauty and look past her flaws. Neither does the beloved wants the lover to bestow value onto him or her and not appraising for who he or she is. Such bestowal of value would make the beloved feel that he or she is loved just because of the bestowal of values onto him or her, and that he or she deserves love not for who he or she is but because of the bestowed values onto him or her.

The reconciliation between appraisal and bestowal would be more satisfying for both the lover and the beloved. The lover should not be deluded about the beloved's qualities. Acknowledging the beloved for who he or she is will make the beloved much more satisfied as he or she would no longer have to live up to lover's bestowal of values onto him or her. The beloved then would be himself or herself, and would no longer struggle to be a perfect mate.

In this section, we have discussed the appraisal and bestowal of value. These distinctions are provided by Singer in *The Nature of Love*, Vol.1. In appraisal view of love, the lover loves the beloved because she is valuable, while in bestowal view of love, the beloved is valuable to the lover because the lover "loves" the beloved. In this section, an attempt has been made to present a reconciliation between these two views. Accepting and loving the beloved as he or she is, not because of some of his or her valuable properties or because of the bestowed values, would be more satisfying to both the lover and the beloved.

## 4.2. Non-Evaluative Love

Love is often considered as a response to the value of other person. This consideration shows that love is an evaluation as it evaluates whether the object of love is worthy of our love or not. It seems as if it is because of such evaluation that we love somebody and not because of who he or she is. It poses a problem: if the values, on the basis of which we evaluate the worth of the beloved, cease to be, would we stop loving the beloved?

Frankfurt comments on such problem by claiming that people often confuse the cause of love with the reasons for love. He maintains that the values of a person may stir someone to love him or her, but they are not reasons for love. The values may cause the person to get attracted the beholder of those values but these values do not justify love. Frankfurt writes, “...people often think of what causes them to love something as giving them reasons to love it. However, loving is not the rationally determined outcome of even an implicit deliberative or evaluative process.”<sup>254</sup>

Frankfurt offers solution to such problems by maintaining that love is not based on evaluations. He explains his point by giving the example of parental love. Here, he shares his own experiences of being a parent. He says that he is aware of the inherent values that his children possess, but he does not love them because of those values. He says:

At times, we speak of people or of other things as “unworthy” of our love. Perhaps this means that the cost of loving them would be greater than the benefit of doing so; or perhaps it means that to love those things would be in some way demeaning. In any case, if I ask myself whether my children are worthy of my love, my emphatic inclination is to reject the question as misguided. This is not because it goes so clearly without saying that my children *are* worthy. It is because my love for them is not at all a response to an evaluation either of them or of the consequences for me of loving them.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2006: 195

<sup>255</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 39



He claims that there are other objects in his life that he loves much less than his children, but this is not because he evaluates his children to have greater worth than those objects. He emphasizes on the point that he does not love his children more than other children because he finds them more valuable. Frankfurt elaborates his point by presenting a situation. He says that if his children turn out wicked to him, or if he realizes somehow that his loving his children prevents him from living a good life, he might regret on loving them. But, he claims that even after such evaluations, he would not stop loving them.

In contrast to Frankfurt's denial of love to be evaluative, Velleman presents evaluative conception of love. He writes, "In my view, appreciation for someone's value as a person is not distinct from loving him: it is the evaluative core of love."<sup>256</sup> In the same vein, Kolodny too asserts that love is a kind of valuation. He says, "Love is both a final valuation of a relationship, from the perspective of a participant in that relationship, and a nonfinal, noninstrumental valuation of one's relative (the covering term I will use for the other participant)."<sup>257</sup>

In contrast to evaluative conception of love, following Frankfurt and Zangwill, I would promote non-evaluative conception of love as Zangwill maintains that love "has no evaluation at all."<sup>258</sup> Zangwill begins by asking: What is the "logical form of love"? By "logical form" he means the analysis of the mental state of loving, and not, at least primarily, a semantic analysis of our concept of that mental state. Zangwill asserts that the formal object of love "is a thing – typically a person, but it could also be a team, or a place, or a time. Perhaps it can also take an activity as an object, such as dancing, skiing or kissing. What it does not take is a *propositional* object."<sup>259</sup> Zangwill makes a distinction between love and other emotions. He claims that like love, other emotions such as fear, anger and pride can also be associated with things, especially with persons, but "they can all take propositional objects. We can fear, be proud, be angry that p. We can fear a lion and also fear that it will eat me. But the logical form of love makes it clear that we cannot

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<sup>256</sup> Velleman, David J., 2008: 199

<sup>257</sup> Kolodny, Niko, 2003: 150

<sup>258</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 302

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., 304

love that p.”<sup>260</sup> Zangwill clarifies that in English language, we may say that “we love it that p”, it may just be a way of speaking. But it does not denote that love is propositional. As Zangwill maintains:

In English one can, perhaps, just about say “I love it that p”; but it sounds very strained. Maybe it just about makes sense. But the point is not really one about English. The point is to point to a family of intentional states that are standardly picked out as states of love, which can only have objects as their intentional contents and that cannot have propositional contents. The existence of such a grouping is reflected in the English use of “love” to a great extent.<sup>261</sup>

Love cannot be an evaluation as evaluation is propositional. To evaluate means to apply a value predicate to a thing. Zangwill claims that evaluation may be thought of as a projection of feeling but this also seems to be based on value proposition. Zangwill further raises questions whether we cannot then value a thing, whether valuing can ever be objectual as well as propositional. To these questions, he answers “no”. He further claims, “Although we may sometimes talk of valuing a thing, which really means thinking that a thing is valuable; and that is to ascribe a value to a thing, which is propositional. Hence there are no real objectual evaluations. Evaluation is essentially propositional.”<sup>262</sup>

In the evaluational accounts of love (like Velleman’s or Kolodny’s ), love has a propositional object in the sense that “X has a certain value, or that X has certain characteristics”<sup>263</sup>. Such consideration would imply that we love that our beloved has certain evaluative features. It may seem as if it is not the beloved whom we love; rather it is his or her certain value that we love. This would also imply that love is conditioned. This would present love in the form: “we love it that p”. This makes love propositional. But,

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<sup>260</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 304

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., 305

love in its logical form is not propositional, according to Zangwill. Love, Zangwill says, “refuses to be propositioned”<sup>264</sup>.

Zangwill presents his theory in the following form:

(1) Evaluation is propositional. We think of the objects of evaluation as having evaluative properties. That is the logical form of evaluation.

(2) If love is evaluation, it has a propositional logical form.

(3) But it does not. Love cannot be held towards a propositional object. That is essential to love.

Therefore, Love is not a form of evaluation, and it does not imply an evaluation.<sup>265</sup>

Zangwill maintains that it is the logical form of evaluation that its objects have evaluative properties. And, if we consider love to be evaluative, it too needs to be dependent on evaluative properties and that would make it propositional. But love denies to be propositioned, as maintained by Zangwill. He presents Velleman’s response to this, “Velleman might reply that even though love is a kind of evaluation, what one loves is the person X, and one does not love that X has the value in question. But I cannot see why this should be so on an evaluational view. It would be mysterious.”<sup>266</sup> If we say that our love is based on values, it seems to imply that we love the values in our beloved. On the basis of this, we can consider love to be propositional as well as objectual. And when love is considered to be evaluative, we can think of love having a propositional object. But, according to Zangwill, this is not the case. He asserts that emotions like pride and anger are based on reasons. Such emotions are associated with evaluative beliefs. Where pride is based on positive evaluative beliefs, anger is based on negative evaluative beliefs. We can be proud that X has certain positive values, in the same way, we can be angry that X has certain negative values. If we consider love to be evaluative, it would also have the same

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<sup>264</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 305

<sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

form as mentioned above. But, then it is not in the essential nature of love to be propositioned. As Zangwill says:

Love is not a propositional attitude but an attitude to a particular, typically a person. But even when love is an attitude to a particular person, we do not love their differentiating properties or love them for their differentiating properties, even though the awareness of those properties might cause our love.<sup>267</sup>

At this point Velleman's evaluational views need to be relooked. Consider Velleman's view that we must conceive of the beloved person as a locus of value. Perhaps this is true in a way, but only as a precondition of love. That does not mean that love is its precondition. This is one place where it is especially useful to remember hate. Hate has the same precondition. Hate does not deny the rationality, dignity and personhood of the person hated – indeed it essentially depends on it. As Zangwill claims, "We do not hate animals; we hate people as people. It is a metaphor to say the hater thinks of the object of hatred as sub-human, as vermin or whatever. Hate dignifies its objects as human beings, as persons, just as much as love. Something has to be worth hating!"<sup>268</sup> Love and hate share the same precondition, and that precondition may be a recognition of a certain value of a person. Yet love is a lot more than that precondition.

Zangwill claims that "to see love as a matter of value judgement is to misdescribe love, and in particular it misdescribes the fact that love is independent of much of our intellectual and cognitive mental life."<sup>269</sup> We can think of children's love or the love felt by those who are suffering from dementia in this matter. Their love is not evaluative, and it is pure. They do not love someone out of some respect or being struck by someone's values. Their love is not propositional.

It is not the case that we do not consider someone valuable, it is just that love is not based on evaluation of those values. As Zangwill maintains that the lover may speak of the

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<sup>267</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 305

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

value of the beloved: the lover may say “X is valuable”; but like the student relativist, the lover will quickly add “to me”, which shows how far we are from morality.<sup>270</sup> In love, we definitely appreciate other’s values. Their values may strike to be very appealing to us. But, to say that our love is based on those values would be demeaning to love.

According to Zangwill, love actually is “often untamed, raw, inappropriate and gloriously amoral”<sup>271</sup>. He maintains that these above-mentioned features fit in the romantic conception of love, these features are also imbibed in the other types of love. Zangwill asserts:

Was Romeo’s love across the wrong side of the political and familial divisions a moral response to Juliet’s universal Kantian rational self that somehow happened to get through to Romeo despite those divisions? No! And we should not want or value very much a love that was like that. Romantic love that is thought inappropriate, even by the participants, reveal this valuable amorality. That love is amoral in content and all the better for it. Similarly, the love of young children for their parents or the love of demented elderly parents for their children has no moral content. Contrary to a major theme in Kant’s moral philosophy, there are many valuable things that are not valuings. Love is one of them. Love as evaluation is love devalued.<sup>272</sup>

This section has attempted to present non-evaluative conception of love. Love being evaluative, becomes propositional. And it is not in the logical form of love to be propositioned. Following Frankfurt and Zangwill, it is maintained that love is non-evaluative.

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<sup>270</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 306

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.

### 4.3. The Value of Love

In the contemporary discussion of love, the role love plays in advancing the lover's well-being has been underdeveloped when it has not been completely denied. David Velleman does not say whether love benefits the lover, but since his conception of love is modeled upon Kantian respect he likely shares Kant's belief that virtue and love make no necessary contribution to the virtuous person's well-being.<sup>273</sup> Niko Kolodny also does not explore the role of love in the agent's well-being.<sup>274</sup> In contrast, Frankfurt seems aware that love contributes to the lover's well-being, and his writings influence my account of value of love: love's role in providing final ends. Frankfurt's account of love maintains that in love, the lover is concerned with the good of the beloved. Frankfurt asserts:

As in other modes of caring, the heart of the matter is neither affective nor cognitive. It is volitional. Loving something has less to do with what a person believes, or with how he feels, than with a configuration of the will that consists in a practical concern for what is good for the beloved. This volitional configuration shapes the dispositions and conduct of the lover with respect to what he loves, by guiding him in the design and ordering of his relevant purposes and priorities.<sup>275</sup>

This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the virtue of love results in an increase in pleasure that contributes to well-being according to hedonistic theories, an increase in desire satisfaction that contributes to well-being according to desire satisfaction theories, or both. However, an ambiguity still remains in the criterion for a benefit of love. Must the benefit of love necessarily result in all circumstances, or is it enough that the benefit be a likely result of love?

In "Love as a Moral Emotion", Velleman holds that love is an "attitude toward the beloved himself but not toward any result at all"<sup>276</sup>. According to Velleman, when love

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<sup>273</sup> See Chapter 1, Sections 2 and 3

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

<sup>275</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 42-43

<sup>276</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 354

entails a desire to “care and share,” or to “benefit and be with”, it expresses a sentimental fantasy which he describes as an idealized vision of living happily ever after. He claims that love does not require one to constantly lookout to promote the well-being of his or her loved ones. Love can also develop even without sharing much with our loved ones. The end of love is the beloved himself or herself. Velleman claims that “love can have an object but no aim”<sup>277</sup>. In love, the beloved is the object. Love does not entail any further aim.

I would attempt to maintain, following Frankfurt, that love is a defining element of one’s life and promotes the well-being of persons in love. Love involves risk. “A sensitivity to the risks and costs of loving does often motivate people to try to minimize the likelihood that they will come to love things that they regard as not especially valuable.”<sup>278</sup> People are not inclined towards love unless they expect that there will be relatively little harm—to themselves, or to whatever else they care about— in the loving. Moreover, people avoid putting their efforts unless they find it desirable for the well-being of their loved ones.

Frankfurt holds that what is loved by a person reveals the essential character of the person. “It reflects upon his choice and his character; or it may be taken to do so. People are often judged and evaluated on the basis of what they care about.”<sup>279</sup> It is said that the character of a person may be revealed by the group of friends he/she has. Frankfurt explains this:

...pride and a concern for reputation encourage them to see to it, insofar as they can, that what they love is something that they and others regard as valuable. What a person loves, or what he does not love, may be counted to his credit. Or it may discredit him: it may be taken to show that he has a bad moral character, or that he is shallow, or has poor judgment, or that he is in some other way deficient.<sup>280</sup>

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<sup>277</sup> Velleman, David J., 1999: 355

<sup>278</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 67

<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

People regard what they love as valuable. Love reflects their personality. If they value something beneficial, it reveals their good judgement, and if they value instrumental things, it shows their poor judgement of things.

### **Virtue of Love: Role in providing Final Ends**

One benefit of possessing the virtue of love is that it necessarily provides the lover with final ends. Since the lover desires the good of other persons and union with them as final ends she necessarily gains numerous final ends, desired for their own sake. Frankfurt argues that final ends are necessarily beneficial to human beings. He explains:

We are creatures who cannot avoid being active. Therefore, we will still be active even if we have no aims; but we will be active without purpose. Now being without purpose does not entail having no preferences concerning the possible outcomes of behavior, nor does it entail being invulnerable to harm. Someone who has no goals may be fully susceptible to suffering and to benefiting from his conduct. He may also be quite capable of recognizing the value of its effects upon him. This means that regardless of how empty we are of intent, what we do may nonetheless be important to us. It may serve our interests, or defeat them, even though our interests do not guide it.<sup>281</sup>

The first benefit of final ends is that they guide an agent's efforts to reflect her preferences, thereby, making it more likely that her desires will be fulfilled. Consider Frankfurt's implicit distinction between goals and preferences. Goals are ends that are always preferences, but preferences are not necessarily held as personal goals. Preferences are merely states of affairs preferred by a person. For example, an agent may prefer that one candidate win an election rather than another, but it is possible that this theoretical preference will never be pursued by any action. In contrast, an agent's ends are desired states of affairs that are integrated into her motivational structure and shape her actions. Someone who takes the election of a particular candidate as an end will have at least some tendency to act to help bring about that goal.

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<sup>281</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 84



For a person without final ends no activity or state of affairs is valued as an ultimate goal. Furthermore, without final ends no activity or state of affairs is instrumentally valuable, since instrumental value relies upon the value of the final goal promoted by the instrumental activity. If a person holds nothing to be valuable as either an end or a means then no activity has meaning for that person. A person whose life is devoid of meaningful activities will inevitably be characterized by boredom, emptiness, and purposelessness.<sup>282</sup> Such a person experiences less pleasure and achieves fewer preferences than one guided by final ends, which integrate the person's preferences into his motivational structure. A person without final ends typically satisfies fewer preferences because his actions are not guided by goals that help him fulfill his preferences.

Consider the difference between an agent with a mere theoretical preference for health and one who wholeheartedly embraces health as a final end. Poor health inevitably decreases well-being because it results in a more painful existence that limits the activities a person can engage in, thereby narrowing the scope of achievable desires. A person without final ends is not consistently motivated to pursue the activities necessary for maintaining health. Such a person will choose daily activities based on habit or momentary whim without considering whether or not they advance his health or other preferences. Unsurprisingly, some lives without final ends become marked by sedentary entertainment and pursuit of short-term whims without an interest in health guiding activities. This purposeless existence typically results in a shorter and less pleasant life span.

While the beneficial nature of final ends is established by Frankfurt's argument, it may seem that the benefits of love's ends are no greater than any other ends. This feature of love may seem as if it only provides a benefit over the relatively rare person with no final ends. Any person who takes typical human desires for vocational success, an exciting romantic life, a long life span, or economic success as final ends seems to be just as well off as the loving person because they both have final ends.

However, there is a second aspect of the virtue of love that gives the lover a prudential advantage over many who take ordinary goals as final ends. Since love is a virtue that

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<sup>282</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 84-87

requires a high degree of consistency concerning the pursuit of loving desires, it gives an advantage over any disposition that is half-hearted or less consistent in its commitment to its final ends. For example, many people desire vocational success as a final end. This end does guide some of their actions. Yet, their disposition toward pursuing this end may not be as consistent or wholehearted as the disposition possessed by the loving person. Such a person may desire success, but be easily distracted by short-term desires or lack the willpower to pursue these goals in less than optimal conditions. Since the virtue of love entails consistency in love's pursuits, the lover's actions are guided by her ends more consistently than agents with halfhearted commitments to their ends. This consistency increases the likelihood that the lover's desires will be fulfilled.

This advantage of the virtue of love as a final end would be shared by any similarly well-developed disposition that resulted in consistent pursuit of one's final ends. Other virtues might be similar in this respect. Some vices that are sufficiently well-integrated in their consistent pursuit of vicious final ends might be equally beneficial in this way. Some dispositions entailing the wholehearted pursuit of morally neutral final ends might offer an equal advantage. Yet, any half-hearted or inconsistent disposition would be prudentially inferior. And while few people completely lack final ends there are many more who are half-hearted and inconsistent in pursuing their ends.

While possessing the virtue of love is one of many ways to gain final ends, some final ends are more beneficial than others. For example, not every final end requires a sufficient amount of complex activity to endow life with ongoing meaning. Frankfurt explains:

Any rational decision concerning the adoption of final ends must be made partly on the basis of an evaluation of the kinds of activities by which the various prospective ends would be pursued. It requires a consideration not only of the value that is inherent in these activities taken by themselves, but also of the terminal value they possess as contributors of meaning to life.<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 91

The activities necessary for pursuing final ends vary greatly in type, quantity, and variety. Even a worthwhile final end might be achieved too easily. If a person in a technologically advanced society has the single end of protecting her children from polio this worthwhile goal can be achieved with little meaningful activity. A final end is also less beneficial if the actions required for pursuing it are dull, repetitive, or boring. For example, helping build the most advanced automobile might be a worthwhile final end. Yet if the sole action one can contribute to this goal is installing a single bolt to a car door on an assembly line every thirty seconds, this end will provide little complex and enjoyable activity.

Some final ends might require a sufficient amount and variety of activities to fill life with meaning, yet require inherently unpleasant activities in their pursuit. Goals that continually put one into conflict with others may hinder well-being because the required activities are unpleasant or undermine a person's other preferences. If one wants to become the head of a mafia family as a final end, he may need to harm or betray those close to himself to achieve this goal. He may never feel truly safe, and may need extraordinary vigilance to protect himself and those close to him. These activities are typically viewed as unpleasant and will likely undermine other common preferences in a person's life such as a desire for close relationships marked by trust.

Another reason that some final ends are less beneficial than others is that some final ends might be extremely difficult to achieve and result in frustration and disappointment rather than pleasure and achievement.<sup>284</sup> Becoming a world-class marathon runner may be a worthwhile goal requiring a variety of interesting activities, but it is an extraordinarily difficult goal to achieve. Even runners who dedicate years of hard work are more likely to fail than to succeed. Therefore, the achievability of one's final ends also effects how much they contribute to one's well-being.

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<sup>284</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 85

The best final ends require a considerable amount of pleasant, complex, and meaningful activities in pursuit of a valuable goal, yet the ultimate goal itself will be relatively attainable. How do the ends of love fare on these considerations? First, it should be noted that the activities promoted by love are numerous and complex. Since a loving person seeks the good of others she must understand what constitutes the distinctive human goods needed by humans generally and the particular desires of specific beloved people. Persons are complex entities whose good is multifaceted. The good for humans includes physical, mental, social, emotional, and perhaps spiritual well-being. Loving parents are excellent examples of people who seek to understand the multifaceted good of their children. They typically investigate how to engender their children's physical well-being: through proper nutrition, exercise, and medical care. They learn how to promote children's mental and emotional development through personal interaction, shared learning activities, communicating basic life skills, and so forth. While learning how to promote their children's well-being, parents are involved in a variety of complex activities that also provide tools for achieving their own interests through information they have gained that can be used to improve their own physical, mental, and emotional health.

In close relationships, love motivates a considerable variety of everyday activities, such as ongoing attentiveness to the beloved, careful continued development of relationships, shared time, attempts to meet the needs and desires of the beloved, and so forth. Furthermore, the loving person seeks to understand the individuals she loves to support them in attaining those goods. While some goods contribute to the well-being of any person, other goods will only contribute to the well-being of particular persons. In less intimate relationships of love, a desire for the beloved's good can also lead to numerous activities, including philanthropic activities for general charitable causes, aid to particular others in need, donations, volunteer work, social action, and so forth.

Attaining and maintaining union with persons requires a variety of ongoing activities. Union with other persons cannot be obtained without an awareness of the many facets of the beloved. This goal requires ongoing effort including shared time and experiences in a variety of circumstances. Persons are not static beings, but are continually changing. Therefore, maintaining and deepening union with a beloved person is a complex, ongoing

task. Since humans are relational beings, the interaction needed for promoting the good of others and union with them is enjoyable. Furthermore, love engenders activity within a variety of relational contexts, which leads to even further diversity in the activities required for achieving love's desires. A person acting out of love of his parents is involved in different activities than the same person in his relationships with his friends, children, or spouse.

More distant relationships of love, such as those with fellow citizens, co-workers, and members of a shared faith, also lead to a wide variety of enjoyable civic, vocational, and religious activities. Working for the greater good of others in these groups imbues these activities with meaning and purpose they would not otherwise possess. In these relationships love leads one to become more involved with, attuned to, and connected to these broader communities.

The desires of love require a considerable variety of complex, interesting, and ultimately self-beneficial activities. Furthermore, the final value most people attribute to relational goals is quite high. Persons and relationships with persons are frequently viewed among the most intrinsically valuable goods in existence.

Many, but certainly not all, of the activities promoted by love are typically judged to be pleasant rather than painful or distasteful. Interacting with other people, communicating with them, sharing time and attention with them, and seeking to promote their good are fundamentally pleasant activities. Of course, there are unpleasant activities that are sometimes required by love, such as nursing a sick child or spouse, and boring, repetitive tasks such as housecleaning. Yet even these tasks are not completely unpleasant since aiding close relatives in hard times fosters a deeper sense of connection with them. Repetitive tasks of daily life typically have beneficial results for ourselves as well as those we care for, such as a clean and functional home, which might even be desired by an unloving person.

## Attaining *Eudaimonia* as a Final End

Finally, an examination of Martha Nussbaum's discussion of love as a *eudaimonistic* emotion is relevant to this discussion of final ends. She argues that emotions like love have a direct connection to one's personal conception of *eudaimonia*. She claims:

A conception of *eudaimonia* is taken to be inclusive of all to which the agent ascribes intrinsic value: if one can show someone that she has omitted something without which she would not think her life complete, then it is a sufficient argument for the addition of the item in question.<sup>285</sup>

There is an interesting connection between Nussbaum's account of *eudaimonia* and Frankfurt's account of personal preferences. First, in suggesting that *eudaimonia* includes everything an agent views with intrinsic value, Nussbaum implies that *eudaimonia* consists of everything a person views as a worthwhile final end. To have no conception of *eudaimonia* entails that one has no final ends.

It is also noteworthy that her description of *eudaimonia* entails that its constituents include all of one's personal preferences whether the individual believes they have objective value for all or merely subjective value for the self. She explains, "But so far we have left out, or so it seems, the most important thing of all, something that lies deep in ancient *eudaimonism* but that is never explicitly recognized. Emotions contain an ineliminable reference to me, to the fact that it is my scheme of goals and projects."<sup>286</sup> It is this reference to the self that requires subjective desires to be included in one's conception of *eudaimonia*. For example, the person who believes that attaining a successful career in Philosophy is a central constituent in his or her personal good life has Philosophy as part of his or her *eudaimonia*.

While there are a number of obstacles that everyone faces in their pursuit of *eudaimonia* the most interesting barriers are created by the individual himself. Some accounts of *eudaimonia* are internally conflicted, cannot really be attained, or are not integrated into the

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<sup>285</sup> Nussbaum, Martha, 2001: 32

<sup>286</sup> Ibid., 52

person's motivational structure. Nussbaum elaborates, "In short, the ancient *eudaimonist* framework will be a good one for thinking about the emotional life only when we acknowledge that people's sense of what is important and valuable is often messy, disorderly, and not in line with their reflective ethical beliefs."<sup>287</sup> One's view of *eudaimonia* can be merely disorderly or deeply incoherent. Someone may hold values that are incompatible with one another, such as ethical values that are irreconcilable with her other goals. While any view of *eudaimonia* provides goals for an agent to pursue; when integrated into her motivational structure as ends, some views of *eudaimonia* are more orderly, coherent, and integrated than others. These accounts of *eudaimonia* will provide more beneficial final ends, because they are more easily pursued and have no internal barriers to their fulfillment.

Possessing the virtue of love ensures that an important central constituent of a person's view of *eudaimonia* is well-ordered, coherent, and integrated. Since love requires that the agent loves all persons in relationally appropriate ways, and since loving in each relationship must be compatible with love in every other relationship, possessing the virtue of love ensures a significant amount of order to one's final ends. This orderliness ensures that the agent's goals that stem from love are compatible with each other. Furthermore, as discussed in the next section, the lover's goals are well-integrated into her motivational structure, ensuring that her psyche has a significant degree of integration.

### **Importance of Love**

The world is aflame with contention right now. There are refugees fleeing terror, wondering where they will be accepted. There are discussions of bigotry, of racial and religious hatred, of the empathy gap between India and Pakistan, Paris and Iraq. There are airstrikes and talks of war. There is suspicion of the media's portrayal of recent events. There is fear, arrogance, sadness, and confusion. Being social animals, we all depend on each other. Morality says that we should think of the good of the whole planet and of all humanity. But, the present scenario shows as if we have lost the feeling of basic human

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<sup>287</sup> Nussbaum, Martha, 2001: 52

affection or a sense of relatedness and closeness to others. We prize material things above our basic human affection. Our society needs to place value on the idea of love. This is of vital importance, because this love is one of the most essential qualities, something truly precious and crucial for a human being. Love arises from the ability of our species to discover and create value in other persons, in things, and in ideals, as well as in oneself as possible beneficiary of this mode of response. Human beings must coordinate their activities with other human being in order to live well and the most basic mode of such coordination is through love. Once we recognize how vital it is, then we can cherish and enhance it, although the basic potential that we are accentuating is already naturally ours. Love is the ultimate resistance. It can diminish the boundary lines based on racism, nation and religion. It is pure and beautiful. It fills us with social satisfaction.

In this section, we established that possessing the virtue of love necessarily provides the lover with final ends that motivate a significant variety of interesting, complex, and generally pleasurable activities in pursuit of goals that are relatively attainable. We also found that ends meeting these criteria are relatively difficult to obtain. Therefore, the lover experiences more pleasure and more fulfilled desires than someone without such final ends. Furthermore, since love is constituted by a wide range of desires, the lover always has an ongoing supply of final ends and desires to be pursued. Someone with no desires, or with only unattainable desires, is in a worse situation since he possesses no desires that can be fulfilled. Finally, the ends of love benefit the lover by adding meaning and purpose to the activities needed to accomplish them.

### **Concluding Note**

This chapter aimed to discuss the role of value in love and to understand whether Appraisal view of value or Bestowal view of value presents the best way of valuation of the object of love. There are two types of appraisal. Objective appraisal includes commonly appreciated characteristics such as beauty and intelligence while individual appraisal is more subjective. The individual appraisal is based on traits that are personally desired by the



appraiser such as being career-oriented or having a cynical sense of humor. Singer promotes Bestowal view of value and claims that value is bestowed on the loved object.

Love is non-evaluational and is, hence, a non-propositional attitude. Evaluative accounts of love do not account for the logical form of love. Love, Zangwill says, refuses to be propositioned.

Love is considered a virtue. Love enables us to achieve our final ends. Love helps a person to advance his or her well-being. Possessing the virtue of love is sufficient to provide final ends that fill a lifetime with meaningful and enjoyable activities.

## CONCLUSION

To conclude this work, let us begin with the main aims of this work.

Rationality and the capacity to love are the central features of human nature. The former guides us authoritatively in the use of our minds, while the latter provides us with the motivations in our personal and social conduct. The main purpose of the study, thus, was to explore the possibility whether love follows the authority of rational mind or has its own commanding necessity which it is bound to.

The debate on rationality and love in the contemporary philosophy of love, at least within the Analytic tradition, got attention over the last decade, especially since Harry G. Frankfurt wrote *Necessity, Volition, and Love* in 1999 and *The Reasons of Love* in 2004. Frankfurt's ingenious account of love fueled much discussion and in response, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny and Nick Zangwill presented their own theories of love and advanced the debate in new and interesting directions. So, an attempt was made to analyze different accounts of love, duties involved in love and the complex relation between reason and love. For this, a systematic investigation was carried out that explored the development of the contemporary philosophical debates between the reasons view and the no-reasons view of love. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that love has an active significance to many facets of our lives and experiences so it is worth noting that this study aimed to back the understanding of love as a necessary component of our life.

Before examining the various notions of love, I have tried to focus upon some of the criteria for evaluating them. An adequate conception of love should be flexible enough to explain the first-person experience of love within a wide range of partial caring relationships. Some accounts of love are only useful for examining partial caring or loving relationships or a subset of partial relationships while some ethical traditions give value to an agent's impartial care or love for all humanity. So, it would be preferable to have an account that identifies the essential features of love in a broad range of relationships and towards humanity in general.

Further, an ideal account of love should explain common psychological experiences associated with love. Any plausible theory should be compatible with normative experiences

such as the unique irreplaceability of the beloved, the tenacity of loving relationships, emotional vulnerability in loving relationships, and the joy found in community with the beloved. Furthermore, a credible account of love should be in the position to address love in the sense that love is different from other personal attitudes, such as attraction, liking, infatuation, lust, care, respect, and so on. As love is different from attraction, there is a difference between love and lust too. Love is broader concept in comparison to lust. The Indian philosophers such as Vātsyāyana and Rāmānuja have made distinction between love and lust. They consider lust (*kāma*) as the desire for sex-union.<sup>288</sup> Love has a different degree of bonding in comparison to the above-mentioned attitudes. Bennett Helms claims that when we love someone, we identify ourselves with him/her.<sup>289</sup> But, when it comes to liking, identification is not there. In the words of Martha Nussbaum, “The choice between one potential love and another can feel, and be, like a choice of a way of life, a decision to dedicate oneself to these values rather than these.”<sup>290</sup> Liking does not have such kind of “depth”. Care is different from love in the sense that we can care for others without loving them particularly. So, in comparison to care, love has more directedness towards specific objects of love. In case of respect, it is generally based on some attributes of the objects, while love need not to be based on such traits. Respect too, is in a generic sense, while love is specific in nature as it is directed to specific persons.

I would like to stress on a few of the peculiarities that characterize my approach to the topic of love. Following Leo Buscaglia, I hold that there may be degrees of love, but “love is of one kind. Love is love.”<sup>291</sup> There is some essential element of love which is common in all phenomena of love. For example, the caring attitude is common in all experiences of love, it may differ in degrees or the way we express it in different love relations, but it is an integral part of love. One of the other idiosyncrasies of my approach is that I am concerned with love itself. And I am not really concerned whether it is love for persons or for nonpersons

Well, the philosophy of love is dated back to the ancient Greek times. The Greek philosophers have traditionally distinguished three notions that can properly be called

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<sup>288</sup> Sinha, Jadunath, 1986: 91

<sup>289</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2005

<sup>290</sup> Nussbaum, M., 1990: 328

<sup>291</sup> Buscaglia, Leo, 1982: 96

“love”: *eros*, *agape*, and *philia*.<sup>292</sup> Plato perceives love (*érōs*) as the proper, motivating force prompting the soul, especially reason, to ascend the metaphysical ladder (*scala amoris*, the scale or ladder of love which begins from Beauty of body, passing to the Beauty of Soul, then to the Beauty of Knowledge and finally to the Beauty itself) in pursuit of true beauty and the highest good. Love, for Plato is desire or at least cannot exist without desire as for him, love desires that which is the Ultimate Good. The Platonic tradition of love is continued by Aristotle, though with some modifications. Aristotle is perhaps the most famous expositor on *philia* in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, still following in the vein of *eros*, as Plato’s pupil. But Aristotle was more commonsensical and more interested on analysis compared to Plato’s metaphysical ideas. One of the first notable differences is that *philia* entails a “fondness and appreciation”<sup>293</sup> of the other’s values and virtues in contrast to the desiring and passionate yearning of *eros*. In cases of *philia*, people love each other because of who they really are. A condition for *philia* is self-love, not in an egoistic sense, but in wanting and reflecting on what is good and virtuous for oneself. Assuming (like Plato) that bad or evil things cannot be loved, Aristotle claims that the object of love is always useful, pleasant, or good. The next form of love, *agape*, is also impersonal as it is related to the Christian faith and one’s relationship with God. *Agape* is a form of love that refers to the paternal love of God for man and of man for God, also extended to include a brotherly love for all humanity.

The discussion on the relation between love and reasons in contemporary philosophy of love is based on two views: the reasons view and the no- reasons view.

The proponents of the reasons view are Velleman and Kolodny. Velleman’s evaluative view, takes a somewhat moralized Kantian form. Love, for Velleman, is a response of our rational nature to the value of rational nature in another person, which all persons share equally. Velleman’s idea is that the universal awe-worthy rationality and dignity is shared by all people, but only that of some people gets through to us and to our emotional vulnerabilities because of certain of their contingent qualities.

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<sup>292</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2005

<sup>293</sup> Moseley, Alexander, 2010

Kolodny refutes the Frankfurt's no-reasons account of love by maintaining that love appears to be reflexively appropriate and this appropriateness demands reasons. He, like Velleman, presents a rational account of love. But he refutes the Velleman's responsive theory of love too by arguing that love is not based upon any generalized attribute that is inherent in every person. Rather, love, for him, is focused on relational features.

The main proponent of the no-reasons account of love is Frankfurt. He forwards four necessary features of love for a person. "First, it consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the well-being or flourishing of the person who is loved."<sup>294</sup> Love is not instrumentally motivated according to Frankfurt. Since, it is a disinterested concern, it promotes the well-being of the beloved that is desired for its own sake. "Second, love is unlike other modes of disinterested concern for people—such as charity—in that it is ineluctably personal."<sup>295</sup> Love, being personal, is directed at a particular person. Unlike other disinterested concerns such as charity, love is based on the particularity of a person and hence, the lover cannot substitute someone else for his or her beloved, no matter how similar the replacement can be to the beloved. The lover loves his or her beloved for his or her own sake, and not as a member to some class where anyone can be substituted for anybody else. "Third, the lover identifies with his beloved: that is, he takes the interests of his beloved as his own."<sup>296</sup> The lover fulfills the beloved's interests, as the interests of the beloved become the lover's own interests. He suffers if the interests of the beloved are not adequately fulfilled, and in the same way, he rejoices if the interests are properly fulfilled. "Finally, loving entails constraints upon the will. It is not simply up to us what we love and what we do not love. Love is not a matter of choice but is determined by conditions that are outside our immediate voluntary control."<sup>297</sup>

Another proponent of no-reasons view of love is Zangwill. He criticizes the views of Velleman and Kolodny by pointing out that love does not have the logical form of an evaluation and can therefore not be a response to reasons. The object of an evaluation is a proposition (a value predicate is applied to a thing), whereas love's object is not a proposition but a particular

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<sup>294</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 79

<sup>295</sup> Ibid.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., 80

<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

thing or person. Moreover, thinking of love as an evaluation gives rise to the possibility of trading up one's love for another person or relationship which is believed to be valuable to a greater degree. This is contrary to the love that we find valuable in our lives, according to Zangwill. Love is thus not a response to reasons; it is caused by factors such as a shared history, habit, and attraction.<sup>298</sup> Finally, Zangwill argues, although we do not love for reasons, love may nevertheless be subject to evaluation by reasons such as prudential reasons, and love gives rise to reasons.

Following Zangwill, I have criticized the views of Velleman and Kolodny by pointing out that love does not have the logical form of an evaluation and can therefore not be a response to reasons. The object of an evaluation is a proposition (a value predicate is applied to a thing), whereas love's object is not a proposition but a particular thing or person. Moreover, thinking of love as an evaluation gives rise to the possibility of trading up one's love for another person or relationship which is believed to be valuable to a greater degree. This is contrary to the love that we find valuable in our lives, according to Zangwill. Love is thus not a response to reasons; it is caused by factors such as a shared history, habit, and attraction.<sup>299</sup> Finally, I have argued, although we do not love for reasons, love may nevertheless be subject to evaluation by reasons such as prudential reasons, and love gives rise to reasons.

In response to all these views, I have proposed the view that love is a direct emotional response to a person. On this view, inspired by Zangwill and David Hamlyn<sup>300</sup>, love happens with no reasons. Love does not require any basis or requirement to happen. In particular, love is not subject to rational constraints. I have further maintained that the value of love depends on the following two principles; only if love lacks evaluative and rational content. Thus – to put it in a plain way – it is rational to value love but love itself is not rational.

We encounter many people in our life but why do we feel love for someone, not for all. In virtue of every person's peculiar qualities, we may respect them, yet we do not owe love to everyone. Velleman's and Kolodny's evaluational and rational account of love would consider it

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<sup>298</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 312

<sup>299</sup> Ibid.

<sup>300</sup> Hamlyn, D.W., 1978: 16

incoherent to love someone who has many flaws in him. But, “it is entirely possible for a person to be caused to love something without noticing its value, or without being at all impressed by its value, or despite recognizing that there really is nothing especially valuable about it.”<sup>301</sup>

The contemporary reasons debate has considered love to be selective. This implies that love is focused to a particular object of love. The discussions on the selectivity of love have induced a growing interest among philosophers, over the past few years, in issues concerning whether our conduct must invariably be guided strictly by rational principles, which we apply impartially in all situations, or whether favoritism or particularity shown in love may also be reasonable.

My proposal on the conflict arising between impartiality that should be shown to all based on moral commands and our partial behavior that we show in case of our loved ones is that when love becomes all-inclusive, like *agape*, it is in line with the impartial commands of morality. I would further like to maintain that the partiality of love varies from relationship to relationship. When our love is limited to particular relationship, we are partial toward them. But, when love includes the whole of humanity, it becomes all-inclusive and impartial in nature. When our love is no more limited and is devoted to all, the distress of any of them will fill our heart with pain and we will do whatever we can to relieve them of their distress. I agree with Frankfurt on the point that the distress of our loved ones is the strong reason for us to help them in need instead of a stranger. It is natural that we feel the pain suffered by our loved ones more than that of a stranger. But when love includes all, no one remains stranger in the sense that we get connected to them as human beings. Such *agapic* love will be directed to all.

The irreplaceability of love is one of the grounds for contemporary reasons debate. Bennett Helm proposes a new way of understanding irreplaceability. He claims that the irreplaceability of our beloved is not to be understood in terms of whether it is justified to love a replacement of our beloved; rather it should be understood in terms of whether our loved one is replaceable “without loss”. It is evident in our society that people love the replacements of their loved ones, in case of separation or death of their loved ones. And it may be the case that these replacements gradually become important to us and replace our old loved ones in the sense that we start loving these replacements more than we would have loved our old beloveds. But, Helm maintains that these

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<sup>301</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 38

attitudes do not imply that someone failed in keeping the commitments he or she had made to his or her old loves. Helm even says that our loving the replacement of our old love is not unjustified. These things are not the matter of concern. The central point, however, is that in losing someone we love, we lose some value that cannot be compensated by the replacement of that person. Helm says, "...in loving someone you find her to have a kind of worth such that to lose her is to lose something of value for which we cannot simply be compensated by a new love, even of someone with similar properties."<sup>302</sup>

The heart of the matter in the problem of replaceability is not whether it is justified to love someone else rather than our loved ones; but it is whether the "loss" caused by losing someone can be compensated by their replacements. Following Helm and Frankfurt, my proposal would be that if we genuinely love someone, the loss caused by losing him or her cannot be compensated by someone else. Let me elaborate this point with the help of the situation I have discussed in the starting of this section where x loves y and z is an exact replica of or similar to y. My proposal is that if x genuinely loves y, x will not substitute z for y even if z is a better option. It does not matter whether or not we have many options as substitutes for our loved ones. When one's love is wholehearted, it does not look for options. However, there may be conditions when lovers need to part their ways. But even if love ends, it will not be true to say that it was fake or it never existed. The moment it was there between two people, it was real. As Alan Soble rightly puts it, "As much as we might like it to be true that love lasts forever, we realize that many occurrences of love come to an end yet are the real thing while they do exist."<sup>303</sup>

The contemporary debate on love and reasons pays much attention to reciprocated love. Reciprocity of love denotes the desire to be united with our beloved and a desire for love to be reciprocated. The idea of reciprocity is associated with the desire for mutual love. Since majority of the contemporary philosophers have based their theories of love on mutual exchange of love, they have ignored unreciprocated love.

Kolodny's view of love does not account for unreciprocated love because his view of love is based on the relationship between a lover and his or her beloved, and relationship demands

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<sup>302</sup> Helm, Bennett, 2010: 180

<sup>303</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: xx



reciprocity of love and care. On the other hand, Frankfurt's theory of love does not give much attention to the reciprocity of love. Love, for Frankfurt, is a disinterested, selfless concern. Love, being disinterested concern, does not allow to care for the beloved for the sake of the values like the desire for reciprocation. Motives that are directed to self interest are not considered integral to love. For Frankfurt, love for others must not be motivated by any instrumental concern. Reciprocity, on the other hand, involves instrumental concern. Frankfurt considers the benefits of reciprocity as the benefits of being loved and does not include these benefits in a genuine account of love.<sup>304</sup>

In response to this discussion on reciprocity of love, following Frankfurt, I would like to say that it is true that in some accounts of love, especially in romantic love and in friendship, the reciprocity of love is required. The relationship between romantic partners is based on mutual exchange of love, so there is requirement for fulfilling mutual commitments. However, love, reciprocated by the beloved, is something that is not under the lover's control at all. He or she can only desire for the union with the beloved and the reciprocated love from the beloved. But, it is upto the beloved whether or not he or she reciprocates the love. As Alan Soble says that love entails a desire to spend a good deal of time and to be with the loved ones. But, love cannot demand for reciprocation. Love may be reciprocated but it is not always the case.<sup>305</sup> Love entails a desire to benefit the beloved which leads to beneficial acts done for the welfare of the beloved. But, love cannot demand the beloved to reciprocate the beneficial acts done for her. Beloved may reciprocate those acts but it is not in the nature of love to demand for reciprocation of love.

Central to Frankfurt's view on love is the notion of volitional necessity. This necessity binds our will and exerts a command upon us. It is volitional necessity that defines the limits of a person's will, giving it a configuration that determines the specific final ends associated with love. Love is subject to volitional constraint.

Following Frankfurt, I maintain that love is volitional and hence it follows volitional necessity. When we are subject to volitional constraint, we are required to do certain things as directed by our volitional necessity. This means that there is a limitation of the will. This

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<sup>304</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999: 174

<sup>305</sup> Soble, Alan, 1989: xx

limitation does not mean that our will is subdued or that it is subject to passions or any compulsion. It simply implies that “the constraint operates from within our own will itself. It is by our own will, and not by any external or alien force, that we are constrained.”<sup>306</sup> We know that the volitional constraint is itself imposed by our will. We do consider this constraint important, this is why we become free even in the submission.

This study considers the arational views of love propounded by Frankfurt and Zangwill. In doing so, it gives due importance to the freedom of choice in love. This shall enable a more comprehensive understanding of love and human agency. I propose the view that personal autonomy is requisite in a person’s overall growth. On this view inspired by Marilyn Friedman, personal autonomy is considered as good. It is personal “self-government”. Personal autonomy is related to person’s commitments, behaviors, and choices.

According to Frankfurt, the agency of a person is limited by his or her will. But this does not mean that the agent is not free. The agent exercises his or her freedom which is guided by the volitional necessities. These necessities are required as they determine the actions necessary to the agent. As we have discussed that love, according to Frankfurt, is not under our direct voluntary control. It may seem as if the lover’s autonomy is hampered in love, but since love is a configuration of will, lover’s autonomy is not hampered. Whatever the lover decides, whatever choices he or she makes, he or she would not find himself or herself able to perform those actions; rather, his or her actions are determined by the necessity of love. It is not upto him or her to directly control his or her agency. Frankfurt maintains that in normal conditions, we act on our decisions, and we have choices. But, in case of love, we don’t have choices. And we are made to act as per the necessity of love. In such a situation, it doesn’t matter what reasons we apply, what we decide, and what we consider to be the best for us, nothing will change the situation. “In matters like these, we are subject to a necessity that forcefully constrains the will and that we cannot elude merely by choosing or deciding to do so.”<sup>307</sup>

Further, I have attempted to discuss the relation between love and psychic integration. The discussion on the relation between love and psychic integration stems from Harry Frankfurt’s

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<sup>306</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G., 2004: 46

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., 45

influential article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” He presents a framework for discussing one’s psyche, contradictory desires, and a hierarchy of desires. The virtue of love requires considerable integration of the psyche since someone who both desires union with a person and desires distance from that same person does not love him well. The lover must also desire his own flourishing in a way that is compatible with the flourishing of all others. The lover must integrate his psyche so that the desires for union with the beloved and the beloved’s good are compatible with other competing desires, and conflicting desires are subordinated or eliminated. Furthermore, since the loving person has such desires toward other persons in general, his desires in all relationships must have a high degree of integration.

There is an ongoing debate whether love makes the loved object valuable or it is the value of the object that makes it valuable. In *eros*-style love, the lover values the beloved because she is valuable, while in *agape*-style love, the beloved comes to be valuable to the lover as a result of his or her loving him or her. The former view understands love as the “appraisal of value” of the beloved, whereas the latter view understands love as the “bestowal of value” onto the beloved. Irving Singer has provided the distinction between appraisal and bestowal in *The Nature of Love*, Vol.1<sup>308</sup>. The distinction presents us with a type of *Euthyphro* problem, discussed by Alan Soble in his work “Love and Value, Yet Again”. *Euthyphro* problem can be originally found in Plato’s dialogue *Euthyphro*. This dilemma is presented by Socrates when he asks Euthyphro whether gods love good actions because they are good, or actions are good because they are loved by the gods.

Singer holds that the appraisal model of love can be important in the initial phases of romantic relationships. Through appraisal of values, two people can come to appreciate each other’s values. This may bring them closer physically as well as emotionally. But gradually, it is realized by the partners that merely appraising the values of each other will not do. For Singer, love would not be complete in itself if it is solely based on the appraisal of value.<sup>309</sup>

For Frankfurt, the lover values the beloved, but it is not in the sense of appraisal. Love is not generated due to recognizing the value of the object of love and by being captivated by those

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<sup>308</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol.1, 2009: 3-22

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 10

values. Love, for Frankfurt, cannot be the result of weighing up one's interests and estimating the worth of the object. Furthermore, it is certainly possible for love to happen without the lover giving a positive appraisal of the beloved, or appraising the beloved at all, or even appraising the beloved negatively.

As we have seen that Frankfurt rejects the appraisal view of love, Velleman, on the contrary, promotes it. Velleman proposes the appraisal view of love in his papers, "Love as a Moral Emotion" and "Beyond Price". He presents love as the appreciation of value of the object of love. "Love is...an appreciative response to the perception of...value."<sup>310</sup>

In contrast to appraisal of value, Singer proposes the idea of bestowal of value. In his own words, "I suggest that love creates a new value, one that is not reducible to the individual or objective value that something may also have. This further type of valuing I call bestowal."<sup>311</sup> Singer maintains that unlike appraisal, bestowal gives importance to the object of love, disregard of the fact whether or not the object has the capacity to satisfy one's interests. Singer's account of love is basically a bestowal account of love but his account does not totally deny appraisal of value. His bestowal account of love presupposes appraisal of value. Singer claims that through appraisal, we come to know whether our beloved possesses good qualities or bad qualities. And this ensures that our love is not blind in the sense of not paying attention to how exactly our beloved is. Only when we know how exactly our beloved is and what exactly is needed for his or her well being, that we become able to bestow value onto him or her.

Like Singer, Frankfurt's conception of love too is bestowal of value. According to Alan Soble, it is similar to Christian agape.<sup>312</sup> Soble notes that Frankfurt's solution to the *Euthyphro* problem presents his account of love as bestowal. Since, Frankfurt holds that love is not a response to reasons; it creates the reasons of love. Accordingly, love is not based on values, it creates values in the beloved. For Frankfurt, love is the bestowal of value onto the beloved and it is the bestowal that makes the beloved valuable to the lover. This position of Frankfurt is similar

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<sup>310</sup> Velleman, David J., 2008: 199

<sup>311</sup> Singer, Irving, Vol. 1, 2009: 5

<sup>312</sup> Soble, Alan, 2015: 27

to Christian *agape* as *agape* in the form of Divine love is not based on human beings' values; rather, it creates values in them.

Frankfurt claims that the beloved is inevitably valuable to the lover; however, the value possessed by the beloved is dependent on the lover's love. As Frankfurt holds, "The lover does invariably and necessarily perceive the beloved as valuable, but the value he sees it to possess is a value that derives from and that depends upon his love."<sup>313</sup> The beloved is valuable to the lover because of his or her love for the beloved. Frankfurt's view of love gives no room to appraisal of value. The beloved definitely is valuable to the lover. But the lover does not love the beloved because he or she is valuable; rather the beloved is valuable because the lover loves the beloved. This opinion of Frankfurt is criticized by Gary Foster. He argues, "Viewing love in terms of bestowal alone and as coming in degrees of purity presents a misleading or at least inadequate model for many types of relationships."<sup>314</sup>

I agree with Foster that love cannot be viewed solely as bestowal as it fails to present a satisfactory account of love. So, I would maintain, following Singer, that love would be love if it gives room to both appraisal and bestowal. Appraisal of value is required especially in romantic relationships or friendship. Through appraisal people come to know the other person exactly the way he or she is. And it is through bestowal, that the lover may bestow the required values onto the beloved for his or her well-being. The lover should not be deluded about the beloved's qualities. Acknowledging the beloved for who he or she is will make the beloved much more satisfied as he or she would no longer have to live up to lover's bestowal of values onto him or her. The beloved then would be himself or herself, and would no longer struggle to be a perfect mate.

Love is often considered to be based on values of the loved object. But such consideration makes love evaluative. Frankfurt maintains that love is not based on evaluations. He explains his point by giving the example of parental love. He shares his own experiences of being a parent. He says that he is aware of the inherent values that his children possess, but he does not love

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<sup>313</sup> Frankfurt, 2004: 39

<sup>314</sup> Foster, Gary, 2009: 162

them because of those values. Love cannot be an evaluation as evaluation is propositional. To evaluate means to apply a value predicate to a thing.

It is not the case that we do not consider someone valuable, it is just that love is not based on evaluation of those values. As Zangwill maintains that the lover may speak of the value of the beloved: the lover may say “X is valuable”; but like the student relativist, the lover will quickly add “to me”, which shows how far we are from morality.<sup>315</sup> In love, we definitely appreciate other’s values. Their values may strike to be very appealing to us. But, to say that our love is based on those values would be demeaning to love.

In the contemporary discussion of love, the role love plays in advancing the lover’s well-being has been underdeveloped when it has not been completely denied. I would attempt to maintain, following Frankfurt, that love is a defining element of one’s life and promotes the well-being of persons in love. One benefit of possessing the virtue of love is that it necessarily provides the lover with final ends. Since the lover desires the good of other persons and union with them as final ends she necessarily gains numerous final ends, desired for their own sake. Frankfurt argues that final ends are necessarily beneficial to human beings. Possessing the virtue of love ensures that an important central constituent of a person’s view of *eudaimonia* is well-ordered, coherent, and integrated. Since love requires that the agent loves all persons in relationally appropriate ways, and since loving in each relationship must be compatible with love in every other relationship, possessing the virtue of love ensures a significant amount of order to one’s final ends. This orderliness ensures that the agent’s goals that stem from love are compatible with each other. Furthermore, as discussed in the next section, the lover’s goals are well-integrated into her motivational structure, ensuring that her psyche has a significant degree of integration.

Love arises from the ability of our species to discover and create value in other persons, in things, and in ideals, as well as in oneself as possible beneficiary of this mode of response. Human beings must coordinate their activities with other human being in order to live well and the most basic mode of such coordination is through love. Once we recognize how vital it is, then we can cherish and enhance it, although the basic potential that we are accentuating is

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<sup>315</sup> Zangwill, Nick, 2013: 306

already naturally ours. Love is the ultimate resistance. It can diminish the boundary lines based on racism, nation and religion. It is pure and beautiful. It fills us with social satisfaction.

In our time, we have more or less transformed into a commodity, experiencing our life forces as an investment. The more we have invested our life forces in bringing the maximum profit obtainable under existing market conditions, the more we have become alienated from ourselves, from our fellow beings, and from nature.<sup>316</sup> We are living in society but are still isolated. Even in some of our relationships, we remain strangers all our lives, who never arrive at a "central relationship," but who treat each other with courtesy and who attempt to make each other feel better. So, the desire for *union* is one of the most powerful striving in human beings. It is the force which keeps the human race together, the family, the fraternity, the society. Love is directed towards a union- union with other human beings, i.e., "interpersonal fusion" in Erich Fromm, union as "we" in Robert Nozick, union with the "rational will" of a person in J. David Velleman. Love is an active power in man; a power which breaks through the walls which separate man from his fellow men, which unites him with others; love makes him overcome the sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be himself, to retain his integrity.

This thesis has attempted to contribute to the reason debate in the contemporary philosophy of love. I have tried to carry out a systematic investigation on the nature of love and the role of rationality in loving someone. This work was undertaken in order to reach to a non- evaluational and non- rational account of love. However, this is not a closure to this work. There is still a need to explore the dimensions of love in regard to the sub personal level, such as biological. Moreover, it also needs to be speculated what impact does it have on philosophical discussions if love is taken as physical or emotional or spiritual. Furthermore, concepts such as the justification of love, the role of desire in love, the role of sexuality in love, the distinction between love and hate, and so on, should be re-examined in order to expand the understanding of love.

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<sup>316</sup> Fromm, Erich, *The Art of Loving*, p.67

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