

American Presidency and Public Opinion: A Study of the War in Afghanistan

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DECLARATION


I declare that the thesis entitled “American Presidency and Public Opinion: A Study of the War in Afghanistan” submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this university of any other University.


Vijay Singh

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Chairperson, CCUS&LAS

Dedicated To

MY SUPERVISOR

DR. SAUMAYJIT RAY

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Preface

In the very first year of 21st century United States has been terribly attacked by terrorist, which left the whole nation in grief and fury. There was a widespread demand of counter attack and to bring the culprits to justice. In response to public opinion President at that time George W. Bush deployed troops to Afghanistan after the information from CIA that Taliban backed Al-Qaida (a terrorist organization) was behind the attack.

Before the discussion of the War in Afghanistan the chapter will be primarily discussing the President's powers related to war in the backdrop of the 'Checks and Balance' principle of the Constitution of the United States. According to this principle, the President can wage war and deploy troops outside America but the right to declare war is possessed by the Congress. How the President gained more and more powers in comparison to Congress despite the existence of the 'Checks and Balances' principle will also be discussed.

Further, the all-important War Powers Act (1973) will also be looked into, a legislation that sought to make the president answerable to Congress in case he went to war against any nation. In this introductory chapter, the issue of the American presidency and its relation to public opinion shall also be discussed. At war time, the most important thing for any President is his leadership. The President's role during war as a factor in gaining popular support through his leadership shall also be explored in this chapter, including the methods adopted by the President to obtain maximum support from the public.

Second chapter of this thesis shall be discussing the relationship between the Afghanistan War and the presidential elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012. The focus shall be primarily analyzing the ways through which the Afghanistan war affected the mandate in these presidential elections in contrasting colors. When we look back to the 2004 elections in the backdrop of 2000, it becomes very clear that the public opinion and thus, the mandate supported the war in Afghanistan. In the 2000 elections, George W. Bush won with a narrow margin of votes but his popularity grew in 2004 with the Afghan war in the spotlight. But gradually, the public opinion changed colors and there were certain catalysts involved. The Afghan war started with the main objective of capturing Osama and establishment of a peaceful democracy in Afghanistan. But even after a prolonged state of war, it seemed void of any conclusion with a state of restlessness and anarchy

in the region. Moreover it started to grow a bigger burden on the American people with increasing casualties and fiscal costs. That's why in 2008, the public opinion favored Obama who came up with the promise to end the war and in the election of 2012 he had been re-elected.

In third chapter there shall be a discussion about 'war costs'. Also, the interrelation of 'war costs' and public opinion will be analyzed. The role of national security in molding this interrelation between war costs and public opinion will be analyzed in this chapter. The circumstances in which the people are convinced to bear the costs of war will also be discussed in this chapter. War in Afghanistan could not get constant support from the public. The reasons behind it, on the backdrop of costs of war, will also be analyzed in this chapter.

In forth chapter, the interrelation between the public opinion and its changing effects on the president and President's behavior will be analyzed. Also, the extent of inclusion of public opinions in the Presidents' decision making will be studied with references from the analyses of Afghanistan War.

Chapter-1

War Powers of President and Congress: Theoretical Aspects

Introduction

In the course of antiquity the United States of America has professed five times war. Though, several wars were fought by the American nation without an authorized announcement. The circumstances and the situations which have aroused in the wars gave origin and shaped the authorities of the American President. The United States of America got the independence, and new constitution of America was framed, moreover the powers were less in the original constitution if we compare with the today time, with the passage of time especially after the independence, the criteria, definition and powers started to change of the president of America. However the most crucial changed transpired throughout the era of Cold War.

During the course of American history, every war has been constructed and shifted the public faith and belief from the states to the federal government, with the emphasized and credence that the federal government is the appropriate government to save the integrity, the unity and sovereignty of the nation. Particularly after the commencement of Cold War, the working of the presidential office and president started to transmute into imperialistic way and put more focused on foreign affairs. During the process, many times conflicts originated with the public opinion, which constantly helped in the development of the Presidency of America in the democratic fashion. In the earlier days of George W. Bush the myth (foreigner cannot attack on U.S) was smashed with the incident of 9/11 terror attack.

9/11 terror attack persuaded the impressions of anger among the citizens of America, and the offenders were wanted to be fetched to justice court. Then president of U.S after watching the mood of the U.S people proclaimed that the offenders of the 9/11 terror

attack will be penalized and indicted guilty for the terrorist attack which is committed on American soil. Immediately after the attack, U.S army unfastened the fronts against the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; in the consequence of retaliation of U.S army the pro-terror Taliban Government was overthrown.

President Bush enlarged the public support after the attack on Taliban in Afghanistan War, the people mandate was with the Bush, and it became visible in the 2004 election result, citizen of U.S were satisfied with the actions taken by the President Bush, however the satisfaction level among the people of U.S started to decline regarding the Bush administration during the Presidential election of 2008. On the other hand the Barack Obama the presidential candidate of Democrat party came in power with the promise to end the Afghanistan war including to call assigned U.S. troops back. After resuming the office Obama followed the same policy like Bush regarding the Afghanistan war, but under the enormous pressure from the public, eventually he announced the time frame to exit U.S troops till 2014, immediately after killing the main leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden.

9/11 attacks on Pentagon (an important defense system institution) and World Trade Centre shook the entire U.S. and pushed the feeling of insecurity among the citizens, thus this was the reason behind the popularity of Bush during the Afghan war. Therefore the afghan war was deliberated as significant to counter the similar kind of attacks in the future. With the passage of time the public opinion related to Afghanistan War in the U.S had changed and shifted its momentum against him constantly during the second term of Bush. After all it reflected in the presidential election of 2008, as Republican candidate running for presidency defeated clearly against Obama. Democrat candidate won the election as he promised US voters to end the Afghanistan War and return the troops back.

Although, after coming in the power president Barak Obama couldn't keep his promise to get back US troops from Afghanistan instead he increased the combat troops there. But in 2011 Al-Qaeda's most wanted leader Osama-Bin-Laden was killed in a navy seal operation. It was a great relief for Obama's presidency during running again as a Democratic candidate for the office, and he got elected again for the president office and

soon after acquiring the office he announced a time table for getting back combat troops from Afghanistan.

The citizen of U.S. criticize and support the wars based on its consequence and expenditure on war, the president of U.S. also got backing by the common people on the name of national interest and national security. During the initial years of war the public opinion was in the favour of war against Afghanistan, however in the later phases the war was criticised on the issues of growing casualties, impact on the domestic economy, and the expenditure on war. President Obama and his administration were frequently under the pressure of public, and eventually he declared the time limit of 2014.

In the recent studies of international relations have produced the idea that the war is the significant contributor in the elections to generate the public opinion and presidency behaviour. Moreover, the war has been accountable for the occurrence of a conspicuously modern presidency. It is a belief that during the time of war President is backed by the members of congress. The Afghanistan war produced the major shift or change during the elections along with public opinion and voting. The U.S. troops were involved in the Afghanistan war since 2001 along with the support of Canada, United Kingdom and other NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members. Since the U.S. has acted against the Taliban actions in the Afghanistan, hence many actions started for this specific war to keep in control.

Powers of the American President related to waging war:

To study and analyze the relationship between the public opinion and presidency during the period of war, it is an essential to comprehend the relations between the presidential ratings, media and congress alongside with the War Powers Resolutions of 1973. Therefore it is also important to closely understand the exchanges among these aspects. From the fact sheets it can be understand as the presidential inherent powers reached to acceptance and legitimacy.

President of U.S: Constitutional Power related to war:

The political system of the United States provides and bestowed the powers to both the president and the congress, which is shared equally between them. The chief commander of the U.S. Armed forces is the president as per the United States constitution. The president is directly answerable for the people of United States. According to the article I under section 8 power are vested to proclaim the war in the congress. There are 11 enactment has been taken place by the congress so far in the history of America recitation to five different wars. In adding, the Congress in the matters of declaring wars has approved many sanctions for the utilization of military force. Even the congress has also disseminated various ruling including the (War Power Resolution 1973) to strengthen the nation's capability to deal with armed conflict and in the situation of war as well. All these rulings were to converse standby authority on the president which is basically initiated through the existence and declaration of war and during the period of national emergency. (Elsea and Weed 2014).

In distinction with Article 1, and U.S constitution Article II remarks the peculiar powers, states that "the executive power is vested in the President of the United States of America." The commander in chief of the armed forces is the President. President develops the relations with other nations and makes treaties as well, he/she also appoints the federal officers those who are subject to the authorization of the Senate, and he/she also appoints the judges. The President of U.S. is also associated with the charged duty to, "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." In the article 1 the president has granted the vote power and this power play a significant role in the legislature. With the broad national appeal, the Electoral College system has preferred the selections of Chief Executives with wide range of national appeal. The Electoral College System before the amendment did not support just a majority in the case of selection of chief executives since it can be drawn from one segment of the nation. (First Principles Series 2012)

The constitution of U.S. conferred the powers of the President through the various articles, these powers known as 'the declared powers' under the constitution. However on the other hand many other powers which have acquired by the president of U.S. has not explicitly defined in the constitution, these additional powers may have acquired through

the exercise and practice of the Presidential authority in the various situations, these powers known as ‘inherent powers.’” The exponents of the inherent powers contend that these conditional powers are ‘inherent’ in compare to the power given in the constitution. The constitution explicitly states about the expressed powers. The powers which can be drawn from the express powers in such a way that they are implied as well as implicit can be known as implied powers. On the other hand the intrinsic authorities are strained inversely from the direct powers. Intrinsic power can be understood as “An authority possessed without it being derived from other powers over and beyond those explicitly granted in the Constitution or reasonably to be implied from expressed powers.” (First Principles Series 2012)

The constitution of U.S confines and declares the authority and powers of the government and its allied agencies with respect to the liberties and rights of citizen by means of delineating the implied and expressed power. Therefore, it is an essential to find out some questions such as, what kind of power are inherent in the President’s office. As per the standard collegiate dictionary, inherent designates the “essential character of something: belonging by nature or habit.” Moreover it is too complex as well as subjective to describes and understand what is inherent and what is not. Due to the intricate nature, the abuse of powers in the political realm is possible and endangered individual liberties by means of appropriate justification for unconstitutional and illegal actions.

Many expertise’s argued that the functions and the powers of the Congress will be prominently drenched down if the president of U.S performed his/her tasks on the base of intrinsic powers which are strained from the Article II of the constitution. Thus, this kind of situation generated a clash between the president and the congress only because of the dilemma over the power sharing. Moreover, it is argued that the statutory powers must be fundamentally subordinated to the powers of constitution, this is the counter argument. However when the President of U.S quotes the inherent power drawn from Article II of the constitution, it is just an explanation for his/her actions, or it is just an assertion or claim for his actions. Hence to preserve the constitutionality of the constitution, the implied and the expressed powers must be recognized reasonably with due admiration for

the responsibilities of many other subdivisions of the government, including the liberties and rights of every individual citizen. (Fisher: 2009)

The actuality of inherent powers may give the answer of the question such as, what are the foundations of Presidential power. There is a supposed that the given vested powers in President are not appropriate to meet the overwhelming expectations which are mounded on him/her as the head of the state. Consequently, there is an argument that a strong President is not at all only depend on his/her constitutional powers but it is his/her skills, abilities, experience ,and temperament which makes him/her to become effective and preserve the prestige of the president. (Neustadt: 1960)

The United States constitution should not be seen as autonomously arranged document. This document was framed with the familiarities of the colonial period in the background; it must be comprehend under this particular scenario. The experience which they got from the colonial era and the many articles of federation had reinforced the necessity for a durable central government. Nevertheless the biggest task was in front of the makers of the U.S constitution to craft the system of check and balance and moreover to safeguard misuse of the power from any single entity. By the end product of this process results in the federal form of government and divide into three coequal organs which are independent of each other to preserve the essence of democracy and maintain the system of checks and balances. (Moe and Howell: 1999)

As it can be seen in the federal polity the conception of shared power structure regulates to maintain the checks and balances between the different branches of the state; the war powers division in the U.S. constitution was framed by the makers of the constitution. The framers of the U.S. constitution were very much aware about the miseries that wars can perpetrate on the people of the U.S and hence they were cautions to give more power in the hand of any single individual. The makers of the U.S constitution sought to distribute the power on the matter of declarations of wars and on hostilities among Congress and the U.S President. Though, the makers of the constitution wanted to provide some crucial powers in the case of emergency to the President. As the Madison describes it as the ‘power to repel sudden attacks’ and to evade the misperception of

'making war' with 'conducting' war in actual sense is the prerequisite of the President. All these provisions were inculcated in order to protect the territories of the United States and also to perform as a sturdy against any form of intimidating intervention, as well as to preserve coherence and peace within the nation. (Moe and Howell: 1999).

War Powers Act 1973 and responsibility towards Congress:

The above mentioned problems outline the complicity of war powers are not a new matter. Most of the problems rose during the times of war in the Vietnam. In the reply, Congress ratified the 'War Powers Resolution' (WPR) in the year 1973 over the exercised veto performed by the President Richard Nixon's. The War Powers Resolution constructed a mutual procedure outline to decide that when can United States forces intervene and "introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," this introduced to satisfy the determined intention of the makers of the constitution and to insure the provision of cooperative decision of together the President and the Congress must relate to introduce the Armed of the U.S into those circumstances where forthcoming engrossment in antagonisms is evidently designated by the settings, moreover to use the forces in crises and hostile situations.

The 1973 WPR implemented but it has not solved the original determination and did not expedite the collective judgment of the political subdivisions. It is consists with the provision of 'sixty-day clock' (self-executing provision) necessitating the President to withdraw the armed forces from the hostile areas within a time period of sixty days (or in case of military necessity it can be extended up to ninety days) after the armed forces deployment if not the President has attained Congress approval through declaration or by particular use-of-force legislation. The 1973 WPR failed due to the many reasons like this resolution describes the war powers of the President too narrow and defensive, many loopholes remains in the reporting and consultation provisions which have exploited by the President. It has never been used the provision of veto based on two-house in case usage of potency that is totally an unauthorized afterward the Supreme Court decision in 1983 to detect a veto of one-house. More the clock of sixty-day provision also

misinterpreted to provide the President of U.S. a 'free pass' of sixty days to use the force without the approval of Congress and restrict the Congress authority to do nothing.

The WPR: It's Scope:

Subsequently the WPR 1979 firmly proclaims that the President is the Commander as well as chief to present the armed forces of the U.S. into concrete and impending resentments used such as (i) particular statutory approval, (ii) in case of national emergency because of the foreign attack on United States, possession of its territories (iii) a declaring war.

Even though this declaration seems merely in the WPR's obsolete declaration of determination and plan, it resides the operative requirements underneath a constitutional veil from the initial by overlooking the constitutional powers regarding war of President to preserve against coming up outbreaks and to liberate and shield Americans in a foreign country. The WPR is consequently under all-encompassing comprehension by inadequate to recognize the Presidential power of defense contained by the possibility of the control of President to "repel sudden attacks" and admitted by historic rehearsal.

2. The WPR: Consulting and Reporting:

The President is required for WPR and in every case "in every possible instance to consult with Congress before, and should report to the Congress within the time frame of forty-eight hours after the deployment of U.S armed forces into the real or imminent hostilities, in the foreign territory, waters, airspace, or in quantities which considerably expand the Combat equipped U.S forces in the already placed foreign nations". Every report must set forth the conditions which are significant to introduce the forces, the authorization for the introduction of the forces, and the approximate scope, including the period of the hostilities or participation, however the report of the disposition into real or forthcoming resentments initiate the "sixty-day clock" running.

However the President Nixon approved that the reporting and consulting necessities were productive procedures which would nurture the inter-branch coordination and cooperation while in exercising the war powers by expanding the movement of

information to the congress from the executive branch of the government, the presidents has frequently abused the obscurities in these requirements to condense them effectually meaningless. The WPR have not describes the consultation process adequately and not specifies whom president to admittance, therefore presidents of the U.S have repeatedly professed to turn along congress through notify a little chosen members, many-times just earlier the few hours when the forces are going to engaged in the hostilities conditions. Since, only the antagonisms reports initial the sixty-day-clock, every president after the President Ford have defer to information and those are tactically quiet regarding the subsections beneath that they are defer. And these reports do not mentions the conditions, the identification of the authorization for the deployment of the forces, their scope as well as assessment and time period of the hostilities are typically obligatory boilerplate. Routine reports of the WPR infrequently filled up the details.

2- The Sixty-Day Free Pass:

The inability in fulfilling the reporting and consulting supplies, though, it not only alone the fundamental attribute to faults in their conscripting. In its place it result from the factors of “sixty day clock” which at the centre of the WPR. The time of sixty-day clock starts when the hostilities report is succumbed or need to be succumbed. Many opponents of the WPR have also argued and showed their consensus with the President Nixon that the sixty-day clock provides the ability to the congress to handcuff the any upcoming president by not taking any actions, only sitting also.(also said it is bad policy and unconstitutional law). Therefore the Presidents have constantly crushed the envisioned automaticity of the clock period of sixty-days by repudiating the occurring of hostilities or impending or only refuting to acknowledge the rules beneath which report has stand up to and by keeping the clock-stopping in the uncertainty regarding the hostilities of report submission or by placing the dilemma like one was need to be submitted.

Paradoxically, many times the deployment of the forces in the hostilities without the authorization of the congress fortified on the basis that the WPR provides authority to the President to usage the armed forces in the conflicts for all most sixty days and for this there is no requirement of the congress approval and it does not need to withdraw their forces before the sixty-days. However the WPR denies any kind of converse authority to

the president that would lack in its non-existence, the imprint preserves that it provides the sixty-day free-pass or in other words that the president have inherent authority to regulate the armed forces minimum for sixty-days.

Moreover flaw at the Centre in the WPR is that it offers powers in cooperation between congress and the president and gives them the reputed free-pass. In the modern times the implementation of the powers related to war has become the veracity for the congress and the media members and many other members of the congress ignored the WPR's renunciation of authority. Therefore, certain exponents of one-sided presidential action raise the reputed free pass for the sixty day as a license to regulate the armed forces in abroad without prior approval from the congress. Congress on the other hand, created misconception of false duty to constitution in regard to decide on the matter of usage of power in overseas by doing nothing.

In some cases the usage of belt forces which is other than a restricted assortment of self-protective tenacities is not constitutionally valid if not the president has taken the prior approval from the congress. Although, the President, Nixon was also correct in saying that "Congress cannot responsibly contribute its considered, collective judgment on such grave questions without full debate and without a yes or no vote." The reputed sixty-free day pass allow the congress to adjourn the process of collective judgment, perpetually when a regulation of the force is established earlier the prescribed period, as it can be seen in the case of Grenada invasion in 1983, and another incursion in Panama in 1989. In the case of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 it passed the particular auxiliary arrogations for the air campaign after passing of fifty-eight days.

4. The Clear Statement Rule:

In actual sense the WPR necessitates the congress approval for the overview of the United States armed forces resolution into the conflicts conditions or in such circumstances where the imminent involve in conflicts is explicitly specified by the conditions, any emergency which is created by the attack or by the declaration of war, it also precise indicate the form of the approval. It also forbids any kind of interpretation of authority from the provisions of any statute it includes an appropriation unless these

provisions particularly approves the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into the hostilities conditions or into the similar kind of situations, states it is proposed to form the particular legislative approval contained by the sense of the chapter. Moreover it likewise forbids the extrapolation from an accord, if not that accord is executed by the lawmaking of the similar particularity. However, the many scholars have shown their disagreement regarding the issue of Congress obligates the WPR and congress to usage the specific word related to WPR, while the WPRs persistence on some peculiar authorization solely reiterates the constitutionally-derived clear statement provision.

At last, it can be understood in a sense that WPR includes many components of a very sensible process for war powers decision making it includes , a clear statement rule, consultation, reporting, with a constitutionally debatable sixty day clock period, and a beneath comprehensive of the President's defensive war powers and its definition. Subsequently, the presidents have provided only 'lip-service' to even the some advantageous shares of the course and evade the break. On the other hand, Congress has taken many the sixty-day clock period is pretext to do act nothing, as an alternative to reach a collective judgment regarding the use of forces. While the courts, attentive that Congress regularly finds the other way when the presidents initiate to misuse the WPR process, have observed away themselves.

The WPR many times understand and have the ability to stab the principles of the various political divisions in "use-of-force" by advertising certain evidence through the process of dialogue and develops the acquiescence with the WPR procedures, if not related to the matter of merits in relation to use of force. The advantageous are somehow considerably compensated by the WPRs underneath the all-encompassing assessment of the "defensive war powers" of the presidents and "sixty-day clock" interpretation to provide the "free pass" to the political organs as well as by persisting the disregard for the general "rule of law" bred through the general law of desuetude.

The matter of the security and peace is revolved and remains continue in the twenty first century, the interrogation becomes significant that "how should decide to use armed forces in the other nations" becomes very difficult to answer. All through the epoch of cold war the struggle of power between two super powers gave the method to an ended

“war on terrorism”, and the conception of the nation-state has been swapped through the inadequate distinct the “ “international criminal enterprises” in the war as an opponent. However self-defense of the nation also includes the preventive form of military action against the intimidating enterprises and states. The grown atmosphere of responses and threats has incited the debate inn U.S. and more or less everywhere the globe almost the sincere use of “American Military Strength”.

In order to rectify the milieu, the “constitution project” was initiated at the “Georgetown University’s Public Policy Institute”, and constructed the “War Powers Initiative”. The Wits was started with the prescription and analyses that how the United States Regime must use the armed forces in the abroad through the constitutional way. The premise of the Initiative was that if we can simplify and advance that how the U.S should decide to use the force in the abroad areas, then need to wisely think that whether need to use force.

The constitution of the U.S divided the War powers between the executive and legislative branches. Congress got the powers in the Article I and section 8 gives the authority to the congress to decide about the war and raised the fund for armed forces. Moreover the Article II and section 2 allocates the role of the president as the “Commander-in-chief”. However, it is becoming putative now that the President contains the authority to deter unexpected attack on U.S and its armed forces. Even in the recent engagement also where the military has been sent for the combat fight such as in “Afghanistan and Iraq”, conflict over the adequate separation of wars authorities and the role of every division of government in the decision making process become the matter of forefront.

In 1973 congress put effort to solve the matter by passing the War powers resolution to control and against the veto of the President Nixon. However, since that time presidents have constantly preserved that resolution part unconstitutionally intrude on the Presidents war powers. On the other side many congress leaders have argued that the executive section of the government has failed to oblige either by the resolution provision or to restrict the presidential authority on the basis of constitutional limitations. Moreover the federal court of U.S. have tried to decline to be referee on the war powers disputes and settle the cases with restrict vision that put very less light on the broader aspect of war powers questions.

The Constitutional Role of President during War.

The president has given the tactical command and central point of the war power of the president is concluded in a solo verdict: he/she “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. The makers had already experience the incompetence of “command by committee” at the time of “Revolutionary wars”. The Congress also has been seen as inappropriate authority to act the function as a “Council of war”. (Samuel Chase). The structure of the congress is too large and its functioning is too slow and the resolutions in the congress can never be remaining secret.

The object lesson was vibrant: a legislative body would have power to declare war; however a legislative body cannot make it. Consequently, the makers designated to alternate the projected constitutional text bestowing war power in Congress in the restrict sense from the “make War” to “declare War.” Alone a “commander in chief” possibly will make the prompt and correspondence strategic assessments required to “make war” efficaciously. Similarly, commander in chief from the civilian background could reassure the political accountability and civil supremacy which the makers anticipated would distinguish the American war power from the traditional military despots and monarchs.

The Clause for the “Commander in Chief”, thus implies dispenses to the President in relation to power in the matter to use the forces and to conduct war. It is not Congress, but the President of U.S who takes all the strategic verdicts in the war disposition of belt forces. Certainly, once it finishes a usage of forces by reducing the assets, constitutionally the Congress cannot hinder with the “Commander in Chief’s” premeditated pronouncements for the innocuous removal of the belt forces. Nevertheless it declares as commanding as the command expert is the makers has the vision to keep projected that the “Commander in Chief” would aggregate similar nonentity other than the highest command in the forces and guidelines of the naval and military forces, considered as “Admiral of the Confederacy” and the first General, Alexander Hamilton also mentioned in the Federalist Papers. According to the Article II the President is the “Commander in Chief”, the framers figure it out “what they documented as an imperfection in the

comportment of the Revolutionary War”. It did not conciliate their perseverance in Article I on the basis of the collective judgment in the matters like the decision for war.

The Commander in Chief did not get any “constitutional right” to disregard the reports of a congress approval for the “use of force”. However, at the time when Congress provides the right to the President to conduct combat, at that moment the president requisite demeanor it within domain of that given power, for instance the President necessitate to oblige all laws that is constitutionally construct. According to Justice Paterson, “in a case of interpreting the legislative authority for the nation-state first war against another other sider state, as far as congress tolerated and authorized the war on our part, so far may we proceed in hostile operations.” After a one year , Chief Justice John Marshall argument in other case which arose because of war, “The whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry.”, during the war with France, limited role of the authorities displayed which was imposed by the Congress and it restrict both ways first the form of “force the President” may usage navy alone and in some aspects where he might utilizes it in includes the “coastal waters”, at first spot, and after that he can utilize at the higher seas point came in the later priority. While one “presidential order” to the Navy advanced and surpassed the legislative restrictions, that time the Supreme Court consistently institute that the ruling controlled.

“Defensive War Powers” –

Similarly, the makers were very much knew about “the decision for war is not at all times ours to make. In case of other nation-states attack and war against us, the President as a Commander in Chief is authorized to fight it. The president must guard, with force if required”. Certainly, James Madison’s summaries of the deliberation associated the variation from “make to declare War elucidated that this would lead to leave to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks, a power that, in any case, may be implied by his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States”. The President as a “commander in chief” must take decision about the force requirement in order to counter the actual attack. The practices which developed during the course of history and logic have provided the sense to the defensive war power to the conception of

“repel sudden attacks,” contingent from the clause of Commander. In adding to deterring spasms, this power encompasses questionably also to forthcoming attack when there is no availability of the stretch, in the form of everyday matter, for Congress to take decision. Additionally, Congress has over all and traditionally complied in the usage of limited power in the matter of force in abroad, without detailed aforementioned congress approval, to rescue and protect the U.S citizens when the local authorities becomes fail to protect them. The power which mentions in the “protective intervention” can be understood as the unit of the “constitutional common law” which basically is delineating the defensive war power of the President, though Congress has also enacted to control the authority to liberate captives.

The proliferation of mass destruction weapons and the current threat of terrorism position a contest to our indulgent of “constitutional war powers” because of the sources and the kind of intimidations which people are facing, allow understanding the context and scenario. Terrorist attacks typically are propelled without cautionary threaten once it becomes as well late to preserve alongside the real attack, are proposed to create resident fatalities, and are conceded out distantly or by some of the “suicide attackers”, and it is not leaving any recognizable targets for vengeance in any case. For instance the 9/11 attacks validate that even without the Weapon of Mass Destruction, the terrorists groups can perpetrate mass civilian casualties in a large numbers. Without any doubt with the involvement of Weapon of Mass Destruction, the enormousness of an attack can be even broader and larger. However if the channel of the attackers or Weapon of Mass Destruction is an old-style operational state, then the state may be susceptible to military deterrence and pressure, economic, traditional diplomatic. On the other side if the channel is an abortive or compulsive “rogue” state, conversely, such preemption definitely, in actuality “nuclear deterrence” may be less operative. Moreover if the channel is an associated with the “international terrorist group” such as “al Qaeda”, or one of its subset groups, then “traditional deterrence” will not reach to successful point. When all the conventional deterrence becomes ineffective including military, economic, and political diplomacy deterrence, then United States acts as a proactive actor with the strategy to strike in order to do self-defense

Various kind of operation in the Proactive manner has started to counter the terrorist through the several measures ranging from intelligence collection, to covert operations in a secret manner, and undercover “clandestine operations”, to straight forward “open military operations”. Many normal “counterterrorist intelligence operations” are reinforced by both authorities includes the President’s intrinsic “foreign affairs powers” and by the statutory authorities. The operative “Covert operations”, targets to influence the “conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly,” it might comprise the usage of force or violence in contrast to activated terrorists groups against their groups as well. They are currently accompanied underneath a legislative administration that disguised and approves them; it is matter to statutory necessities for transcribed presidential outcomes and information to the congress conducted “intelligence committees”. Some operations are out the domain of the statutory bodies such as military operations like “clandestine military operations” are underground operations these are not basically credibly deniable and thus perhaps fall separate from the legislative administration. Occasionally categorized as “preparing the battlefield”, these operations have conventionally been auxiliary or preliminary for “uncluttered military operations” (the defense section has explicated that the target of “clandestine activity” is predominantly in provision of “military operations”, undertaken or planned, or their repercussion).

It raises the question there is that if this kind of open military operation is constitutionally approved, either it cascades under the “President’s defensive war power” or by the statutory body, and then it is clear that any “clandestine operation” that is preparatory and auxiliary for them? Any type of “clandestine deployment of Special Operations” in the year of 2001 forces in Afghanistan or in 2002 in Iraq from introductory to “military operations”, for instance would have been approved, correspondingly, Congress by the year 2001-2002 used use-of-force resolution. In the joint resolution in 2001, it endorsed the use of vigor lone counter to the groups, persons or states that had contributed in or assisted the “9/11 attackers”. The other terrorist “Clandestine operations” counter to be not necessarily approved by this determination. Moreover this type of clandestine operations does not fit contentedly beneath the customary tag, “preparing the battlefield.” Principally, this kind of actions is not making and “preparing the battlefield” for

impending “military operations”; which can be understood culmination in them. An embattled assassination of a supposed terrorist frontrunner by a “Predator missile” does not “prepare” any battleground, nor is it precisely pronounced as in some way “ancillary to a war on terrorism”. It is also the heart of the military war. Second, it is not necessary clandestine operations transpire on a “battlefield” as according to the traditional understanding been. In the modern and global war on terror, there is no specific geography remains out the reach of this kind of operation.

Even a “clandestine operation” operate short of the legal approval and it points the armed forces at a particular threat from terrorists, even though all members are agree on this point that the power to exercise this operation cataracts in the interior domain of “President’s defensive war power”. There is a negligent of detailed coming up terrorist danger, besides, a majority of the “War Powers Initiative” believes and accomplish their analyses on the clandestine operation that the amount of “armed force usage” counter to an external object may institute a practice of strength on such a measure that it needs aforementioned “congressional approval” contains in the U.S. Constitution. While here is no significant outline available to determine that which clandestine operations fall into the horizon of “counter-terrorist actions”, the subsequent issues, are noteworthy for fortitude: the degree and the nature of the target according this “the target is identified with its state military response capability ;the advantage and period of the operation; the danger of violent reply that the clandestine operation offers; the description of the operation under international law; the probable international penalties of the action; the assets required for the operation, and; the threat of together U.S. and foreign casualties postured by the operation. In case these aspects recommend that congress approval is prerequisite for a clandestine operation to counter the terrorist, nonetheless, the requisite for secrecy and rapidity may make precise sanction of clandestine counter-terrorist operations unfeasible. The majority members of the War Powers Initiative consequently considers that Congress may sanction such type of operations more usually, as it started did anti-pirate operations at the beginning of the nineteenth century, however it need still follow the rule base on clear statement. The some other dissenters reach to agreement that the President should contemplate the preceding factors, but not that the President wants

Congress approval to deploy clandestine force of any proportions and interval to meet of any kind he or she considers a terrorist danger to the national security”.

Deployments during the Peace Time.

Eventually, the president gives the orders to the belt forces during the war, but he/she is also official authority to set up the armed forces for the various tenacities such as the peacekeeping forces for non-violence, for humanitarian relief, for the possible military action, as further the deployment of the forces does not proceed the decisions relating to the usage of force from approval of Congress. Many times the deployment of the armed forces for the peaceful purpose can be authorized by the congress.

For instance according to the ‘noncombatant assistance’ and the provisions under the “United Nations Participation Act” approved to the “President to detail” up to 1000 U.S armed force members to the United Nations in a ‘non-combatant capacity’, several kinds of assistance can be performed by the armed forces under these provisions like civic and humanitarian assistance in the other nations. Even inattentive detailed advance to statutory authorization has granted from Congress, however one argument is related to congress is that, congress has consented in those cases where the President uses of the armed forces by approving collateral facilitating legislation, arrogating for such funds uses for the purpose without the objection from the locals, and it do not object them once it taken the occasion to do so.

Further it uncertain, yet, that “Congress can be said to have conceded generally in any executive practice of deploying the armed forces abroad for ‘peace-enforcement’ or for other peace or stability operations that expressly contemplate the use of force (other than for force-protection). For example, Congress responded critically to the President’s use of armed forces in Somalia to track down a local warlord and eventually only authorized the deployment subject to time limitations and other restrictions. Some of the restrictions adopted were made applicable more generally to any significant... peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement operations.”

Limits: The President's War Power

In totality, though the President's power as "Commander in Chief" is momentous, it can be restricted as well. "The President might constitutionally usage the force in abroad for an assortment of defensive tenacities, containing some counter-terrorist actions, conditional on their range and period and other aspects recorded above. Nonetheless the President then cannot constitutionally demeanor war, or preventive war, without attaining erstwhile congress authority. Further than this assortment of defensive war powers, the encumbrance lies on the President to acquire the authorization. The constitutional law declares that President can legally contest wars for other than a sort of defensive devotions only if Congress has approved it, not that the President might contest it up until Congress has clogged it. Furthermore, when Congress has approved the usage of force, the President is constitutionally obligatory to stand for by the standings of the approval; it also contains the Constitution, laws, and accords of the United States". To conclude, Presidents cannot expend currency for war apart from followed to arrogation, and mostly entirely reliant on Congress for arrogations. Consequently, nonetheless the President is constitutionally certified to deter genuine and anticipate coming up outbreaks, the period and range of this kind of self-protective tasks may be restricted by the obtainability of usurped capitals, as well as by the concrete necessity for backing from the political class when there is need to extend the tasks.

War and Responsibility towards the public

Political system in the United States is that the President is accountable to public straight. Since, he/she is in a straight way in election, elected by public votes. On the other hand when it comes at conducting and supporting a war then whole thing works contrarily.

Public Opinion Trends

After the inclusion of American participation in the Vietnamese civil war happened, in 1955, real little U.S. people were conscious of it. Many of the consultants and the volume of military aid increased above the following nine years, community consciousness of American starring role there rose gradually. Even in 1964, when the United States raised dignified on the verge of major military participation, with thousands of consultants

already in Vietnam and the size of American role there a movement issue, two-thirds of the American people said they paid little or no consideration to developments in South Vietnam. This remains as would be predicted from the theories of Almond, Rosenau, et al. As long as the government seems to have foreign affairs in hand, and nothing seems excessively alarming, the vast popular of citizens are contented to follow the President's leadership. As we intend to see, even when these conditions no longer succeed, the old pattern of dispirited followership often overcomes for unexpectedly extended eras.

The adornment grips for utmost of the antiquity of American participation in "Vietnam (if involvement is understood as beginning in 1955)". It is clear that the American participation is silent to obligate underway with the evolution of "military activity" in 1965, ample of the subsequent epoch imitates to the expected associations. For instance, an "academic study team", measuring defiance in 1966, completely eleven years afterward the leading American groups had left to Vietnam, might report that utmost Americans would survey "presidential leadership" in this zone, up the stairs near war, or dejected to certain procedure of transferred disbursement. In addition, script in particular year, Seymour Martin Lipset "could say of public opinion about the war in Vietnam: surveys do not make policy so much as follow policy in most zones of international affairs. The President makes estimation, he does not follow it. The surveys tell him how good a politician he"

This is a decent declaration of the conservative point on the connection of "foreign policy and public opinion." The past of the seven years which trailed appears to mark selected modification of this vision essentially.

"The main symptom that part of the American general (or mass) public was beginning to depart from the expected outlines of opinion about Vietnam began to seem within about a year of the 1965 escalation, though it could hardly be familiar as such at that time. Now, in clearer hindsight we can see that popular apprehension certainly began to set in by 1967, and perhaps as early as mid-1966. Growing numbers of people began to tell pollsters that it was a "mistake" for the United States to become complicated in the Vietnamese war. In this relatively mild manner, doubt about the Vietnam war begins to seem in public opinion polls on the matter. Nevertheless, very uncommon people were

bold enough to favor any actual change in American policy in Vietnam. The preliminary popular reaction to appreciation of the U.S. role there was to support government policy even more than earlier. After a little less than a year of this position, more Americans began to favor increase of the war, and in 1967 this became the ideal policy of most Americans for a short time. Even in this, it might be contended that the general public was following the lead of the President, since government policy was to slowly deteriorate American effort in Vietnam ‘more men, more money’ as time went along. Still later, only after years of punishment from the war, did the American people begin to support extraction in a major way. By the time direct American connection in the Vietnam War over in 1973, complete withdrawal had become the majority predilection, despite administration disapproval to this course”. In advance determining these tendencies in public view around the war in part, however, it is fundamental to distinguish how outlook was distinguished and what glitches of implication look as if to the statistics on this topic. There have delineated the main methodological complications below.

“It is significant that by the end of American participation in Vietnam, popular opinion had taken a clear position in disapproval to administration policy on further aid to that country and that this opposition did not later change in the face of demands from President Ford for further aid to the American-backed regime in Saigon. In light of maintenance from the public for Presidents when crisis situations have happened in the past, this resolute or persistent position by the people would have been mainly difficult to predict using the standard model of public opinion. In the past, presidential resolutions in times of international crisis have been not only established but mentioned by the public - no matter what the nature of the decision was. Kennedy extended the highest peaks of public approval during his supervision quickly after the devastating Bay of Pigs invasion while Eisenhower was helped in the 1956 election by his conciliatory response to the Suez crisis”.

How can this fresh method be clarified? What were the subtleties in arrears this setback of predilection, from gratitude to removal, from reception to confrontation of management policy? To reply this query, we need to reoccurrence to the commencement,

to understand how responses to the inaccuracy query and policy predilections fit composed. Once this is completed, four phases can be distinguished in American response to the war in Vietnam. There is, “first, the "virtue" phase, which starts with the initial polls about Vietnam in 1964 and extends to the "rally-round-the-flag" phenomenon in mid-1965. The second era might be called the "permissive majority" phase, it is noticeable from mid-1965 for nearly a year, until incompletely the spring, 1966. The third stage could be called the "escalation" phase, and it spreads from mid-1966 until late 1967 or early 1968. The late period, the "withdrawal" phase, comprises most of 1968 and the years which followed, until direct military participation was concluded in 1973”.

Front guiltlessness to rally-round-the-flag

Previously the outline of American combat troops into Vietnam, as renowned directly above, utmost persons here were truthfully uninformed of the condition in the particular country. Amongst persons who had remunerated consideration to increases there, certain hesitation around the American character is redirected in the year 1964 in the month of November opinions for taking out and appreciation, in cooperation of which were developed previously the United States intensified its part in the Vietnam War in 1965 than subsequently that era. The affected proceedings adjacent the outline of particular two hundred thousand “American troops” into Vietnam produced two spectacles to overhaul the policy predilection statistics simultaneously. Principally, the “rally-round-the-flag” sentimentality manifested this one amongst persons who had detained an approximation at probabilities with the administration earlier the gratitude, and second, huge figures of residents who would obligate then sustained ignorant of the developments in “Southeast Asia” instigated to wage specific consideration. Their preliminary response stood to sustenance the President and the authorized strategy of engrossment. The segments for together removal and intensification unconfined off surrounded by a month of the main American commitment.

A permissive majority

This era, which expands for nearly a year, discovers together obligation and removal sentiment condensed. Through this period, since the mid of 1965 till erratically the spring of 1966 that Americans were observant to the government's defense of United States involvement in "Vietnam war". In result, it is situated the era once utmost inhabitants were prepared to stretch the "new war policy" an accidental to effort. As soon as the merchandises of this sustenance were not inspiring, intolerance and vacillation inaugurated to set in, in the procedure of higher figures that initiated to say that U.S. participation in Vietnam remained an error. Among March and May 1966, the fraction of sustenance for the war sedates in this mode unconfined ten ideas. By the side of the similar period, intensification emotion was formatted to shape up. Throughout the spring and initial summer 1966, thoroughly wholly Americans were conscious of progresses in Vietnam; once the "University of Michigan" organized its two-yearly study in 1966, it took to forbid merely 7 percent of the defendants from responding queries around Vietnam in arrears to absence of acquaintance with the subject.

A preference for escalation

The year of the belligerent was 1967. Appreciation converted the partiality of utmost Americans whereas taking out emotion released off to exact minor degrees. It can be that the American publics documented the knowledge that here was a requirement for American contribution in the "Vietnamese war", nonetheless utmost stroked that our exertions were not adequately energetic to transport it to a speedy decision. Through this era the uppermost neck and neck of "American troop" attentiveness in Vietnam remained extended. Uncertainty and concern around this part in "Southeast Asia" are reproduced in a residual. By the mid of 1967, once intensification of sentiments was at its supreme idea, the amount of residents who reinforced involvement in Vietnam "(by responding that the war was not a mistake)" throw down enduringly below 50 percent. Over and done with this epoch, nonetheless, the distinctive retort of the eminent man in the path was to sound for supplementary martial fortitude.

Disillusionment and withdrawal

From side to side November 1967, once intensification of sentiments stretched its foremost idea, around over partial a million “American troops” in Vietnam and the U.S. administration was outlay extra than a billion dollars a month for the war. Quiet, no expiration to the war appeared in spectacle. “The American public started to shift its predilection from escalation to withdrawal. Through November 1968, withdrawal sentimentality had regained its old high-water mark at 19 percent and after the election it continual to increase. One change which made this modification in attitudes possible was that by 1968 opinions about the war had created to crystalize. Philip Converse and Howard Schuman distinct the process with respect to Vietnam: Although there was a time when most Americans lacked enough information about Vietnam to form solid decisions on the nation's involvement there, participation has mounted steeply in terms of deaths, taxes, and militaries not home for Christmas. The central adjustment after the 1968 election was credit by mass publics that there were elites, perceived as authentic, who contrasting the war and wanted to withdraw. Antiwar complaints had not convinced most citizens that the United States was morally wrong in being in Vietnam and may have even slowed the development of withdrawal sentiment by acting as a negative reference point. Conversely, during the 1968 presidential campaign, political leaders such as Robert Kennedy and Richard Nixon began to question the wisdom of our contribution in the Vietnamese war. Political figures such as these, apparent as legitimate, apparently had an important impact on the thinking of Americans who measured themselves loyal and partisan”.

One clarification of the people view info afterward 1968 would highlight that in 1969, President Nixon instigated a strategy of deliberate, phased taking out of “American troops” from Vietnam, so this substitute had specific sustenance uniform in the “White House”. Additional clarification of the outpouring in removal emotion strength that in possession with the view illustration originated by “Converse and Schuman”, defiance instigated to crack contrary to constant engrossment in the “Vietnam conflict” principally sovereign of management policies. Through 1969,1970, such visions definitely institute additional sustenance and stimulus from further conventionally reasonable opinion

frontrunners than in previous years, and so documentation with the ostracized "protestors" sort out not posture such a delinquent for the distinctive resident.

“No substance what the clarification of this dovish move (and we believe that both processes were at work instantaneously) - the result of these proceedings and experiences can be seen in the fact that between November 1964 and November 1968, withdrawal sentiment never rose above 19 percent, and from the low point touched in May 1967 at 6 percent, it took eighteen months for it to regain that place. The subsequent analogous period withdrawal sentimentality rose at a much faster pace. Put another approach, from May 1967 to November 1968, sentimentality for withdrawal grew at a pace of roughly seven tenths of a percentage point a month. Among November 1968 and September 1970, withdrawal sentiment increased from 19 to 55 percent, or at a monthly rate more than doubles the previous one the expiration of American military participation in Vietnam, the mistake and policy alternative questions congregated again. In January 1971, Gallup found that only 31 percent of his respondents felt that the war in Vietnam was not a mistake, and at the same time a dichotomized question which asked if respondents favored or opposed withdrawal from Vietnam found only 28 percent opposed to withdrawal. Four months later Gallup found precisely the same percentage of his defendants who still felt that the war in Vietnam was not a mistake. Although the mistake inquiry shows slow, steady erosion in support for the war over an era of many years while the changes in policy partialities were far more theatrical, both questions finally established to a very similar low level of war support”.

A Post-Script: Wishing it would all go away

Subsequent the extraction of “American combat troops” from Vietnam, utmost Americans seem to need occupied an insolence of considered triviality or even violence to actions in “Southeast Asia”. As described above, “when the Paris peace accords were signed, Gallup found widespread opposition to any continuing U.S. military role in South Vietnam. Later, as the American-backed regime in Saigon collapsed, more than three-quarters of the American people contrasting sending it military aid, and a majority opposed even allowing the former U.S. clients to transfer in the United States. Estimation around Vietnam may be a special case because of the great domestic discontent

associated with that country; it might still be that on other foreign policy issues elites preserve the freedom of action they enjoyed previous to the Vietnam war, but it may also be that domestic public opinion now establishes a greater constraint for foreign policy makers, at least where the decision is perceived as having insinuations of U.S. military participation. No matter what the actual disposition of public opinion about foreign policy, elites may constrain themselves if they believe a negative public response would be registered at the next election. This familiar law of anticipated reactions is crucially important to the operation of demonstrative polities. That American leaders are more cautious in the post-Vietnam era was replicated in reports out of Washington during the 1973 Middle East war. Richard Rovere, the expert political reporter, wrote, American opinion, as understood here, will tolerate interference no longer- at least when the combat zone is so remote”.

Presidential leadership and war on terrorism

The terrorist occurrence on the U.S. (11 September 2001), and the ‘war on terrorism’ was a critical phase in the presidency of George W. Bush. In the result of the attacks, President Bush launched an attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan and evicted the Taliban along with Al Qaeda, who was its sponsor. The war in Afghanistan accepts more significance when analysed in the background of more traditional geopolitical concerns in the central, south, east and Southeast Asia. Many issues such as the Kashmir conflict, tension in the south-china Sea, maturing nuclear threat from North Korea, applies a new meaning and role in the war on terrorism. (Tellis: 2004)

Additional perspective on the Afghanistan war shows that the U.S. foreign policy, during the War on Terror, functions within the challenge of balancing the war on terrorism and the conservation of U.S. pre-eminence. President Bush expected office in the post-Cold War, in a veritable foreign policy vacuum. Until sometime before the foreign policy of the United States waste large part based on the containment of the perceived communist threat and gaining an upper hand on the Soviets.

Subsequently September 11, the U.S. hastily recognized radical Islam as the new priority threat, which also served well in more forcefully maintaining U.S. supremacy in the region and elsewhere. It is discoursed that this must be seen as an accomplishment of the Bush administration. (Tellis: 2004)

Bush's period as the President of the U.S. was later criticized, for his management of the Afghanistan war, failure in covering the threat of radical Islam, failing to reduce its support and rather infuriating the problem making terrorism a threat worldwide, and the venomous effect on the U.S.'s position in Asia and world over. However, the most important question that remains is whether the U.S. under the Bush administration was successful in recognizing the root cause of the terrorist threat. It appeared indecisive on the method, manner, and tools in formulating an effective response to radical Islam. It can be positively determined that the U.S. needs to rethink and re-strategize its foreign policy of the Afghanistan, Middle-east and elsewhere to arrive at an effective and complete strategy to defeat terrorism. (Miller: 2006)

Decision Points In his book, George W. Bush writes about his heritage saying that the position of the United States amended transnationally between 2001 and 2009 and U.S. is more secured now. It contrasts with the conventional opinion which of the view that the position and security of America was set on the path of decline much due to the excessive pride and overconfidence of President Bush. Bush says that this postulation is false as it is based on the belief of the 1990's that the power of the United States is infinite. He says that the U.S. power was never unlimited and presents take Iraq 1991-2003, the complications of the Balkans and intermediation, and North Korea as cases in point.

He goes on to say that the response of the U.S. to most international problems remains oratorical or reluctant and that America does not lack strength, rather it lacks the will. He views the Bush government to be more cautious and less unilateral as contrasting to what it is often charged. Relating himself to his predecessor Bill Clinton, he calls himself far less unilateralist than Clinton who is normally called an 'internationalist' in his approach to foreign policy. (Bush: 2010)

Providing a short instantaneous of his interferences and their outcomes, Bush says that in Afghanistan the U.S. proficient what it had set out to do. He highlights on the point that the Taliban and the Al Qaeda were routed and the U.S. stayed in the country with the motive to preserving the peace it had created. He points out that it is unlikely that the U.S. troops would be withdrawn as long as the government of Hamid Karzai becomes sufficient strong to combat insurrection and contain it on its own. In addition, Special Forces would stay in the country to contest international terrorism.

Particularly, President Barack Obama has followed unplanned policies of the Bush administration. He points out at Obama's policy of establishment American-Indian corporation and his policy of Iraq and Afghanistan in this affection. The Obama government carry on a parallel policy for Afghanistan and as well as Iraq similar like the Bush administration. (Bush: 2010)

Afghanistan currently is a democratic nation with a national assembly and with the conditions of a market economy. In 2002, President Bush and the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai recognized the U.S.-Afghan women council to expedite the freedom of the women of Afghanistan nation. Children are joining school and furthest notably girls, who were barred from the classrooms, have resumed. Utmost vitally, women have added voting rights and are enthusiastically donating to the economy and society. However, Afghanistan presently also faces severe encounters as a nation-state and more so as trying to be a democratic nation, it is gradually scraping its way back. (Highlights of Accomplishments and Results, by the Administration of President George W. Bush: 2012)

Under the Bush government the U.S. has reinforced the national technology for its security. In adding, numerous new institutions and trappings were fashioned for this. The Cold War period apparatuses and security structure was refurbished and restructured to ensemble the contemporary day wants to retain the state harmless from the newfangled threats. As outlines, several variations and footsteps have been revealed, such as aggregate the security funding by 73 percent to surge the all-volunteer force and to obtain fresh defense technologies, uplifting the National Guard to an operative standby from the rank of a strategic replacement, amending the arrangement of

the military command by forming the U.S. Africa Command and U.S Northern Command. Innumerable additional steps have been cited as reforms that have authorized the special-forces and maintained the U.S.'s exertions to contest the threats modeled by terrorist groups. In addition, the Bush management fortified the intelligence congregation system of the United States. Laterally with the Congress, President Bush ratified four sections of lawmaking that has assisted in consolidation the safety of the U.S. both inside and outside. They are: 1. It includes the U.S.A. Patriot Act, 2. Another one is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 3. One more act was introduced called The Protect America Act, and 4. In order to strengthen the foreign surveillance the Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was formed. Away from all this, President Bush formed the National Counterterrorism Centre, condensed the crack that occurred between the law implementation agencies and the intelligence, recognized the Director of National Intelligence, and moved the attention of the F.B.I. in the direction of combat terror rather than concentrating on just averting them. Therefore, under the presidency of Bush, it can be henceforth detected that the agencies of the Armed Forces of the United States as well as many Intelligence agencies have taken an ample active deportment rather than being unreceptive. This can be straight accredited to the vigorous presidency of Bush. (Behav:2007)

Presidency and Public Opinion

At wartime time elections we understand that the inescapable Presidents have done very sound in those elections. George W. Bush was effortlessly re-elected and so similar done by Obama. For certain additional instances: Abraham Lincoln was straightforwardly re-elected in 1864 in the course of the civil war, Franklin D. Roosevelt was without difficulty re-elected in 1944 in the mid of the World War II, James Madison in the course of the war of 1812, Nixon in 1972 at the time of the Vietnam war. The wartime thoughts of the American people were unsurpassed apprehended by Lincoln's re-election motto: "Don't change horses inmidstream". (Behav: 2007)

Observing at the elections that transpired afterwards the wars, we perceive that the occupants lost utmost of the time in viciousness of the war being efficacious. For instance, George H. W. Bush lost the 1992 election despite of the First Gulf War in actual was effective. As a result, the elections afterwards a war cannot be understood as a plebiscite on whether the war was effective or not. The instance of the 2004 election is a little multifarious. The election was held after the powerful combat in Afghanistan the election was held. It is further suitable to realize that this election was occurred as a wartime election as the war was going on in Afghanistan was far from over, nevertheless powerful military encounter has decided. (Morgan and Schwebach: 1992) elections during the Wartime period also turn out to be a referendum on the leadership and behavior of the President during the course of the war. Prerogatives that Presidents get re-elected in wartime elections is a precise naive claim. Utmost of the time Presidents who are not self-assured in winning an election, frequently wrench out of the competition. Truman in 1952, in the course of the Korean crisis and Johnson in 1968, throughout the Vietnam War can be understood as illustrations. (Mesquita and Siverson: 1995)

The election in the wartime of 2004 is precise significant in any research of this form due to the attribute of the war. Distinct from other wars, the war on terrorism was not a conformist battle with two contrasting wings hostile a inclined encounter. It was likely Cold War arrangement, in which a slackly controlled group of militants grabbed on a superpower. Away from each other from the choice of going to war, the adversaries of the obligatory President and the war demanded that the condition and approaches afterwards the war were not being controlled or executed appropriately. The opposition parties distinguish that the inescapable is very assured to profit from the war due to enlarged auspicious attitudes among the common public. As a result, the departing party comprehends that it necessity widen the discussion outside the war together with making the assertion that they can grip the war enhanced than the individual presently in office. (Russett: 1993). The crucial subjects on which the election of 2004 was contested were the cultural and economic crisis, matters in contrast to the positions of moral questions, which was awakened by the gay rights movement, and lastly the Afghanistan war. The Republicans moderated them economic crisis. The United States was quiet lurching under it and certain significant conditions were predisposed by it. The foremost program of the

Republicans was the nationwide security and the ethical issue. The Democrats contested the elections highlighting on the economic recession and the war scenario in Afghanistan. (Behav: 2007). It is a overall observation that throughout the wars, the people in a democratic arrangement are exact subtle to the amount of fatalities. Once it upsurges, the persons start triumph tired of the war and start drawing their backing for it. The common public is reluctant to tolerate the expenses of the war, further so the human costs as it is the common public that contests as fighters in the wars. Ray (1995) shapes that; the "first point" of view concerning a war in an independent set up is that "the public opinion in democracies will exert a pacifying impact, because the masses pay the heaviest cost of interstate wars." (Morgan and Campbell 1991).

President's response to public opinion on the ongoing wars

In general, the magnitude of the public opinion on foreign policy outcomes is inadequate to the start of public interest. In the way of the policy end topics are expected a wide banquet media courtesy in a way that it is compatible to the public covering of orientations. High trustworthiness critics on them TV news are vital in this respect. Usually, media stretches out the situations that are uttered by the government representatives. Though, when these critics instigate evaluating the government, the government pursues popular backing. This is gradually tricky since then rhetoric is used more regularly to overwhelm the reasonable and statistical arguments of the professional critics. (Adams, Clark, Ezrow and Glasgow 2004)

President George W. Bush preferred a plan that was troubled with guiding the public opinion as his administration contended with the interior position of the country and outside criticism. Yet, it was principally seen that Bush was very receptive to the belief of the people nonetheless was not proficient adequate in pointing it. (Rajwade 2006)

Whereas in the previous times, Presidents have been heading by the credence of the individuals and are still progressively doing so in the contemporary times, it does not get sense that the Presidents brand their strategies according to the views of the more masses. The growths in the political arrangement in the current eras has twisted the comparisons in such a way that Presidents and their parties get additional inducements if they are

effective in promoting or casting the public opinion in a specific fashion. An appropriate sample would be the tenure of George W. Bush throughout Afghanistan war. (Brewer and Voeten 2004), (Boyle 2008). As far as the association of re-election and the reply of current President is related, it has been understood that persons who are to pursue a reelection are added watchful of public opinion in the subsequent half of their expressions. (Worne and Shotts: 2004), (Herron, and Shotts 2001)

Particular specialists and observer's opinion lead in the direction of the personal quality of the persons who embrace the office. It is the issue that regulates whether the President will pursue to effort in such a way as not to infuriate the public or to thrust onward a strategy with belief if they trust it is for the worthy of the country even if the prevalent opinion is not helpful of it. (Roberts 2007)(Gaibulloev 2008). The studies propose that it is the circumstantial transformation that substances more than the personal modifications. It contends that the noticeable consequence of prevalent opinion and nearness of the elections designate that there are numerous bases that stimulus such a procedure. (Worne and Shotts 2004)

Public Opinion and Afghanistan War

It advances very significant at this occasion to comprehend how the Vietnam battle was lost. How it is characterized in public spaces. This Vietnam War forged the national myths that "America is God's country" and that "America has never lost a war". When one scrutinizes the Afghanistan war, can discover that the bequest of Vietnam War has acclaimed the premiership to the right method. One should not be astonished when W. Bush was absorbed in generous the war's informs and Obama's subsequent to public view. (Gershkoff and Kushner 2005) Numerous reviews in the years succeeding the 9/11 have originated high levels of sustenance from the public with respects to war connected policies. Several specialists' opinion that this inscription makes a change and pause away from the extended stand-up of American ideals deals. This may despicable that an overall American inclines to reason in a more severe way when there is a high neck and neck of apparent menace to their security. (Hetherington and Suhay: 2011)

Various anti-war activities and civil libertarians and have uttered tremor on such a transformed situation, where common community sustenance to those facets of the war on terror which position in infringement to the venerable American Ideals. Though, indication recommend that this need not be astonishing as public are more compassionate for wars if they observe extortions to national security (Davis and Silver 2004), (Huddy 2005). Nevertheless, through the olden times of America, many Presidents have criticized about the inadequacy of power in the fingers of the Presidents conferring to the prospects. These recommendations portray the workplace as everything but imposing. Thomas Jefferson once excellently named the office “a splendid misery,” (Koenig 1981)

Views of the academia on the presidential leadership during war on terrorism

The terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, on the US and the campaign started on ‘war on terrorism’ demarcated the presidency of George W. Bush. In the repercussion of the outbreaks, President Bush propelled a spasm on Taliban Afghanistan and dispossessed the Taliban sideways with Al Qaeda, who was its promoter. The war assisted in intensifying the grounding rights of the U.S. in the South-Asia as well as in Central Asia, for the first time. In a rapid sequence, the Bush government also confronted Saddam Hussein in Iraq, shorn of the United Nations authorization, and beaten it. Consequently, after the 9/11 world, fresher and severer intimidations than the Al Qaeda have arose in the middle-east as consequences of devastated state apparatus left by these wars. Currently there are serious jeopardies modeled by the propagation of weaponries of mass obliteration and mushrooming terrorist groups. (Ashley J. Tellis 2004.)

The Afghanistan war undertakes additional implication when examined in the background of added old-style geopolitical apprehensions in the south, south-east Asia, and central Asia. A number of matters such as the Kashmir conflict, stiffness in the south-china Sea, maturation nuclear danger of the North Korea, etc. discovery a new connotation and part in the war on terrorism in the entire world. (Ashley J. Tellis 2004.)

Additional viewpoint on the Afghanistan war demonstrations that the US foreign policy, throughout the War on Terror, utilities inside the encounter of harmonizing the war on terrorism and the preservation of U.S. domination. President Bush presumed office in the

post-cold war, in out-and-out foreign policy blankness. Up to one-time earlier the foreign policy of the US was to a huge share founded on the inhibition of the professed communist menace and attainment and higher indicator on the Soviets. Subsequently September 11, 2001, the U.S. quickly recognized fundamental Islam as the fresh precedence threat, which also assisted sound in more categorically upholding U.S. sovereignty in the area and in another place. It is preached that this necessity be seen as an accomplishment of the Bush management. (Ashley J. Tellis 2004.)

Bush's tenure as the president of U.S. appreciated and on the other side he has been condemned later, for his treatment of the Afghanistan war, disappointment in encompassing the danger of fundamental Islam, deteriorating to decrease its sustenance and somewhat annoying the delinquent making terrorism a universal hazard, and the harmful consequence on the U.S.'s situation in Asia and all over world. Conversely, the utmost imperative inquiry that a leftover is whether the U.S. underneath the Bush management was effective in classifying the source cause of the terrorist danger. It appeared irresolute on the tactic, method, and outfits in expressing an operative answer to radical Islam. It can be efficaciously established that the U.S. requirements to reconsideration and re-strategize its foreign policy especially for middle-east and Afghanistan, and in another place to reach at an operative and inclusive strategy to overthrow terrorism. (Chris Miller: 2006.)

The confrontation on terror has turn out to be the crucial story of the U.S. and the Bush Government. The war is further frequently than not foretold to impact the foreign policy of the United States straight or incidentally for eras to come. (Ashley J. Tellis 2004.)

George W. Bush in his book name Decision Point transcribes about his bequest saying that the situation of the U.S. enhanced worldwide between 2001 and 2009 and U.S. are additional protected now. It divergences with the conformist opinion with the view that the location and safety of America was set on the trail of weakening considerable due to the unnecessary superiority and pride of President Bush in his management. Bush utters that this supposition is fabricated as it is founded on the trust of the 1990's that the influence of the United States is unrestrained. He articulates that the U.S. supremacy was not ever unrestrained and presents take Iraq 1991-2003, the difficulties of the Balkans

regions and peacekeeping forces, and North Korea as circumstances in fact. He goes on to at a guess that the reaction of the US to maximum global problems remnants rhetorical or reluctant and that America does not absence asset, somewhat it absences the will. His opinions the Bush management to be further watchful and less one-sided as opposite to what it is frequently stimulating. Associating himself to his precursor Bill Clinton, he appeals himself far less unidirectional than Clinton who is usually named an 'internationalist' in his method to foreign policy. (George W. Bush: 2010.)

On condition that a small precipitate of his interferences and their consequences, Bush speaks that in Afghanistan the U.S. proficient what it had set out to do. He highlights on the theme that the Taliban and the Al Qaeda were directed and the U.S. remained in the country with the reason to preserving the peacetime it had won. He sockets out that it is improbable that the U.S. troops would be reserved as long as the government of Hamid Karzai converts durable sufficient to fight insurgency and encompass it on its own. Adding, Special Forces would break in the country to fight with international terrorism.

Bush on the matter of Iraq speaks that the U.S. had interfered to lastly resolve the danger that Saddam Hussein modeled in the area. Later ejecting Saddam from Iraq, he accentuates that the U.S. functioned to shape the state back and hold insurrection. Although acknowledging that the forthcoming of Iraq after Saddam vestiges uncertain due to a number of causes, as he did with the incident of Afghanistan, he says the US gained the battles it tussled in the state. The Major war was to eliminate Saddam and another was in contrast to the factional extremists, predominantly the Al Qaeda. With respects to the U.S. foreign policy somewhere else he says that the United States was gifted to enclose Russia while possession a promising relationship with China with the choice of a yet to come alignment unlocks. (George W. Bush.: 2010.)

Remarkably, the President Barack Obama has shadowed spontaneous policies of the Bush management. He opines that Obama's policy of consolidation American-Indian relationship and his policy of Afghanistan and Iraq are respectable. The Obama government sustained a comparable policy for Iraq and Afghanistan as the bush government. (George W. Bush.: 2010.)

Afghanistan in the present time is a democracy with a national assembly includes with a market economy. President Bush and Afghani President Hamid Karzai in the year 2002 recognized the US Afghan women council to enable the liberation of the Afghanistan Women. Most the Children are joining school and furthest prominently girls, who were barred from the classrooms, have resumed. The Utmost outstandingly, women have extended voting rights and are vigorously donating to the economy and society. Nevertheless, Afghanistan still handles exterior encounters as a nation and added more problems to be as a democratic nation, it is gradually scraping its way hindmost. (Highlights of Accomplishments and Results, by The Administration of President George W. Bush 2012)

The George W Bush the former president of U.S. has designated the Iraq war. He speaks, the alliance controlled by the United States confronted Iraq to eliminate Saddam Hussein, who was a ruthless tyrant who was a danger to its neighbors and since of the deed of the alliance forces, 25million Iraqis were unbound from despotism. In the present day Iraq has the greatest liberal constitution in the Arab world and is a friend of the US in its war in contrast to terror. He utters that afterwards Saddam Hussein was exiled from authority; the responsibility of the alliance forces was to aid the Iraqis protect their liberty from religious extremism. He praises the US president's choice to refer in extra troops into Iraq at critical times in the war and not removing for a withdrawal under pressure from the public views. He presents January 2007, when the president proclaimed a fresh policy with the sustenance of supplementary forces, as an example. He acclaims this decision to have intensely condensed violence in Iraq and had fashioned an atmosphere of peace where economic and political development instigated to take dwelling. With a steady upgrading in the disorder, the US has also progressively distant its troops from the Iraqi land under the President's 'return on success' plan. (President George W. Bush update in the war on terror: September-7, 2003)

The Bush government reinforced the national apparatus for its security. In adding, several different establishments and tools were shaped for this. The cold war era apparatuses and security outline was refurbished and rationalized to ensemble the contemporary day needs to retain the nation safe from the fresher dangers. As high spot, numerous

variations and stages have been stated, such as cumulative the defense subsidy by 73 percent to upsurge the all-volunteer force and to obtain new defense expertise, uplifting the national guard to an functioning standby from the position of a strategic reserve, adapting the edifice of the military command by generating US Africa Command and US Northern Command etc. Several other footsteps have been cited as improvements that have authorized the special-forces and reinforced the US's energies to contest the threats modeled by weaponries of mass destruction. In tallying, the Bush government fortified the intelligence gathering system of the US. Laterally with the congress President Bush ratified four parts of regulation that has aided in consolidating the security of the US both outside and within the country. They are: 1. The first piece is The USA Patriot Act, 2. The second piece is The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 3. The third piece is The Protect America Act, and 4. Lastly the Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Separately from all this, President Bush formed the National Counterterrorism Centre, condensed the breach that occurred between the intelligence agencies and the law enforcement agencies, recognized the Director of National Intelligence, and moved the emphasis of the FBI in the direction of combat terror rather than concentrating on just averting them.

Relation between War, public opinion and presidency

When we have a look at time of war elections we understand that the obligatory presidents have completed very sound in those elections. George W. Bush was effortlessly re-elected and so did same Obama. The other illustrations like Abraham Lincoln was straightforwardly re-elected in 1864 in the course of the civil war, Franklin D. Roosevelt was with no trouble re-elected in 1944 during the mid of the World War II, James Madison all through the war of 1812, and Nixon in the period of 1972 for the duration of the Vietnam war. The period of war feelings of the American people was unmatched apprehended by Lincoln's re-election slogan: "Don't change horses midstream". (Polit Behav: 2007)

Observing at the elections that transpired afterwards the wars, we understand that the officeholders misplaced furthestmost of the time in spite of the war actually efficacious. For instance, George H. W. Bush nowhere to be found in the 1992 election despite of the gulf war being popular. Therefore, the elections subsequently a war cannot be understood as a vote on whether the war was prosperous or not. The instance of the 2004 election is a while intricate. The election was held after the extreme combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is further suitable to appreciate this election as a period of war election as the war in both these nations was distant from over, however concentrated military fight has settled. (Morgan and Schwebach 1992)

The elections during the wartime also converted a plebiscite on the governance and comportment of the president throughout the war. Assertions that presidents get re-elected in time of war elections is a precise unsophisticated assertion. Many times the presidents who don't deliberate they can triumph the election. In 1952, the President Truman in the time of Korean crisis and in 1968 Johnson, throughout the Vietnam War can be understood as illustrations. (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). The period of war election of 2004 is very significant in several study of this form due to the attribute of the war. Distinct from other wars, the war on terrorism was not a conformist fight with two contrasting side's belligerent a slanting battle. It was mostly like a Cold War fight, in which a slackly organized band of militants took on a superpower. Separately from the decision of going to war, the adversaries of the obligatory president and the war demanded that the situation and strategies after the war were not being handled or implemented appropriately. The opposition distinguishes that the incumbent is exact assured to advantage from the war due to amplified favourable opinions among the common public. Thus, the opposition -parties understands that it essentially widen the discussion outside the war together with making the assertion that they can handle the war better than the person currently in office. (Russett 1993.)

The important subjects on which the election of 2004 was contested were the cultural and economic crises contrary to the outlines of ethical issues, which stimulated by the gay rights movement, and eventually the Afghanistan and Iraq war. The Republicans softened the economic crisis. The US was still lurching under it and certain crucial states were

inclined by it. The chief program of the Republicans was to protect the national boundaries and to maintain the moral issue. The Democrats contested the elections highlighting on the economic recession and the post-war situation in Iraq. (Behav et al. 2007).

It is a complete discernment that from end to end the wars, the persons in a democratic situation are very delicate to the amount of fatalities. When it upsurges, the persons start receiving tired of the war and start drawing their sustenance for it. The common public is disinclined to tolerate the expenses of the war, further so the human costs as it is the common public that battles as soldiers in the wars. Ray (1995) conditions that the first point of question related to a war in a democratic set up is that "the public opinion in democracies will exert a pacifying impact, because the masses pay the heaviest cost of interstate wars." (Morgan and Campbell 1991).

Chaptr- 2

Afghanistan War and the Presidential Elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012

Introduction

Extant narratives on elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012 reflect a lacuna in terms of a critical explanation of the war in Afghanistan, and the complex ways in which that event influenced subsequent elections. That will accordingly, be the focus of the current chapter/study. 9/11 undoubtedly paved the way for a generous expansion of Presidential powers vis a vis national security affairs. George W. Bush, fresh out of a controversial victory, would ultimately ride on its (9/11) back to smash through political opposition and neutralize all adversaries. Armed with Article II of the Constitution – that which delineates Presidential prerogatives as the Commander in Chief – as well as congressional ratification, Bush got the nation to rally around his vision. Reflecting widespread support, approval ratings for Bush shot up to a historical high of 90%. (UVA, Miller Center, Gary L. Gregg II – available at: <https://millercenter.org/President/gwbush/foreign-affairs>)

The immediate election following the commencement of the war that is, of 2004, evidently captured overwhelming support for the offshore offensive, conjoined with upwardly mobility in popularity of President Bush. The latter certainly reflected in the superfluous electoral margin secured, compared to those in 2000, the year of Bush's ascendancy. Originally centered on capturing Bin Laden, while simultaneously democratizing Afghanistan, the expedition soon dissipated away from that axis. The killing of Bin Laden marked the beginning of an ever stretching climax of that is yet to find closure. However, much more than the ground situation in Afghanistan, it was the steadily climbing cost of the war that ultimately forced the American people to discern it as a clear disincentive. The discernment led to deliberation and the election of Barack Obama into office, won on express promises of ending the war.

With Bin Laden's death, terrorism climbed down the scale of electoral priorities in 2012. It was overtaken by economic concerns, employment, healthcare, education and so on and so forth. Pew Research Centre recorded a steady decline of terrorism as an electoral rallying point, from 2004 through 2008 to 2012: 75%, 68% and 58%, respectively. The decline was accelerated in no meager measure by Obama coming on the cusp of fulfilling his electoral promises in totality in regarding to Afghanistan War: during his tenure he achieved both, extermination of Bin Laden, as well as troop withdrawal from Iraq. With terrorism taking a back seat, Obama was finally left with scope to deal with Iran.

Party convention leading up to Presidential elections mostly focus on domestic and intra-party concerns, with considerable attention diverted to national security and foreign policy issues. Ever since 9/11, every convention has brainstormed over the *War on Terror* (hereafter, WoT), situations and Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rising specter of nuclear proliferation. I seek to focus on ideas formulated in course of these conventions and their subsequent impact on elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012.

For the US, as for any other nation-state, foreign policy concerns and the liberty to deliberate on them, are invariably tied with state of domestic affairs. But for a ubiquitous power like America, foreign policy is always one of the most immediate electoral objectives. While 2004 elections were contested primarily around this objective, the 2008 exercise provided for more context: while the Republican Manifesto opened with chapter titled "Defending Our Nation, Supporting Our Heroes, Securing Peace," (Republican Platform: 2008) its Democratic counterpart commenced with internal economic reform, relegating foreign policy, and the WoT, to the second chapter. (ICPSR: Voting Behavior in 2008 Election.)

By 2012, with domestic economic concerns eclipsing all other, foreign policy and related issues were duly relegated to the concluding sections of both manifestos. (David Lauter: 2012, Los Angeles Times: Central Issues of 2012 Election.)

Despite their radical retrogression on the electoral register, foreign policy, as always, remains a powerful tool in the hands of the opposition, especially in light of the President's designation as the Commander in Chief. One is reminded of retired Gen.

Norman Schwarzkopf's assertion during the 2000 Republican convention, that outgoing President Bill Clinton allowed for global decline of American military prowess. Few days down the line, Clinton defended his tenure by showcasing the end of hostilities in Northern Ireland, closure of ethnic purging in Bosnia and Kosovo, and greater harnessing of regional stakeholders in the Middle East, achieved during his tenure. (Jonathon Masters and Gopal Ratnam: 2016.)

Terrorist Attack, September 11

Tuesday, September 11th, 2001, began for George Bush like any other day: with a quick scan of the Bible and morning jog. Michael Jordan's emergence from hibernation to join the NBA (National Basketball Association) hogged all National headlines. Later in the day, while making a scheduled visit to Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, Bush was informed of a *possible* crashing of an airplane into the World Trade Centre, information that was yet to be confirmed. That confirmation came in the form of an interruption in his read-out session with the school children, delivered by his Chief of Staff who told him about the fall of the second tower. Bush would later recount his reaction thus: "I made the decision not to jump up immediately and leave the classroom. I didn't want to rattle the kids. I wanted to project a sense of calm, I had been in enough crises to know that the first thing a leader has to do is to project calm." (G. W. Bush: 2010)

En route Air Force One, Bush was informed by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice about the third plane crash, into the Pentagon, just outside Washington DC. It was made known to Vice President Cheney that the President would be airborne for indeterminate amount of time and that all Executive decisions would be relayed to the VP's office which will implement it on ground. The very first wartime decision by the President was aimed at total restriction of air traffic: rules of engagement were chalked out for unresponsive passenger liners in vicinity of DC and New York City. Planes were ordered to be shot down if found airborne despite sounding out grounding instructions. (George. W. Bush: 2010)

Irrespective of the President's reluctance to appear as 'on-the-run,' return to Washington was strictly off the books because of intelligence pouring in, of more planes being hijacked. However, with pressing fuel requirements on the horizon, Air Force was ultimately diverted to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.

Bush conveyed to Secretary of Defense (SoD), Donald Rumsfeld, his decision of declaring a state of war, followed by a go-ahead to raise military readiness alert to DEFCON Three. The SoD was instructed to focus at once on the present fallout, and prepare for a military response in the aftermath. Presiding through video-conference, in a meeting on national security, from the Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, the President formally declared his WoT. (Black Hounshell: 2010)

Returning that evening to Washington DC, Bush clarified his position, in an address to the nation: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." (George W. Bush: 2001) He discerned three objectives, set to be followed in the days to come: 1. Nipping prospects of further attacks on US soil; 2. Impress both locally and globally that this marks the dawn of a new kind of war; 3. Achieve optimum restoration in affected areas, while reducing as much as possible, economic and social risks.

14th September, 2001 was declared as National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, commemorating nearly 3000 Americans lives lost on 9/11. Addressing the crowd from atop a pile of mangled metalworks, at Ground Zero, Bush memorably shouted back an emphatic "I can hear you!" to audiences yelling "We can't hear you." The attacks on American Soil, provided the Bush Presidency with a clearly focused dual objective: protect American lives at home, fight terrorism overseas; resolute military offensive overseas, and strong defensive measures back home.

The War in Afghanistan

A war cabinet was constituted on the fast track, consisting of Vice President Dick Cheney, NSA (National Security Agency) Condoleezza Rice, SoD Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and CoS (Chief of Staff) Andy Card. Prompt action by CIA Director George Tenet helped zero in on Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden as the perpetrator and the source of the attacks. The latter, along with Al-Qaeda's numerous training camps, was provided sanctuary in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime. Bin Laden in turn, assisted the Taliban in sustaining its extremist Islamic rule. Despite being on CIA's radar, as well as having a contingency dedicated to him, Bin Laden was hitherto never perceived as a threat to homeland security. (Brain Ross: 2010)

Pre 9/11 American deliberations were limited to providing CIA funds to the chief anti-Taliban force, the Northern Alliance, which simultaneously fought the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. While it was clear post-9/11 that developments called for direct US offensive, the contours of such a response was yet to be approximated till late September (2001). While some advisors called for broad military actions encompassing Afghanistan and Iraq, the cabinet was largely internally divided: while the SoS opposed any intervention in Iraq, both, the Vice President and the SoD envisioned ouster of Saddam Hussein as part of the larger framework of the global WoT. While currently keeping it at bay, Bush would soon revisit the prospect of intervening in Iraq. (Daved Hastings Dunn: 2005)

The quantum of American response was undoubtedly determined by a personal belief of Bush that credibility of American military might has been steadily declining in terrorist perceptions ever since the 1990s. He was convinced in 9/11 as terminal fallout of that perception. Such a belief was made stronger in light of Bin Laden's illustration of Americans as "paper tigers" who could be persuaded to quit in under twenty-four hours.(Peter Bergen: 2016). With Presidential decreeing of the use of military force obtained on 18th September, 2001, air strikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda installations on Afghan Soil commenced on 7th October.

Christened “Operation Enduring Freedom,” General Tommy Franks’ war plan consisted four phases. The first phase involved joint operations by Special Forces and the CIA, paving the way for conventional troops. Massive air raids against Al Qaeda and Taliban targets would follow next. The third phase would see American and NATO troops pour into the country and cooperate with allied Afghan forces, obliterating adversary strongholds. The final phase would involve holding ground while fostering democracy in Afghan society. (RAND Publication, Research Brief: 2005)

The Taliban was sounding retreat by early November; vacating Kabul and seeking refuge in the southern and eastern ranges. Mazar-I-Sharif, along with other key northern cities, fell to the combined onslaught of the US Special Forces and the Northern Alliance. Enveloped by the Marines, Hamid Karzai took over Kandahar on 7th December, 2001, pushing residual Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants to the eastern fringes. By early 2002, total expulsion (from Kandahar) was achieved in course of *Operation Anaconda*. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the Al Qaeda mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was apprehended in spring of 2003. The quest for capturing Bin Laden, and completely neutralizing the Taliban continued.(Adam Geibel: 2002)

Realization soon dawned on Washington that the Afghan campaign is invariably a long drawn and expensive one. Attacks increased consistently throughout the summer of 2006. Discerning shortfall in the multilateral approach, Bush decided to increase US involvement. Fall 2006 marked the commencement of US troop increase, in phases, swelling from 20,000 to over 30,000 over the next two years. Simultaneously, American aid was doubled, the Afghan National Army increased, intelligence networks expanded, and struggle against governmental corruption ensued.(Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon: 2015)

Next in pipeline was neutralizing Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.(Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen: 2008). Commitments of crackdown were extracted out of President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan. It was secured in lieu of US commitment of not involving US troops lest it might stoke political tension in Pakistan. However, internal political stalemate as well as prospects of a potential conflict with India proved to be

inimical to the realization of these commitments on ground. Holding back on ground forces, the United States instead chose to increase missile strikes and droned surveillance over terrorist hideouts in Pakistan's tribal tracts.(K.Alam Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman: 2008).

Unveiling a post-9/11 foreign policy, before a Congressional joint-session convened on 20th September, 2001, Bush said: "Our WoT begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."(Bush: 2001), (The White House: 2001). He committed to declaring a *hostile regime* in any nation that was found harbouring terrorist elements. In his January, 2002 State of the Union speech, Bush Christened as the "Axis of Evil,"(The White House: 2002), (Bush: 2002) the adversarial troika of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. This polar disposition of Bush, specific to American perceptions, was received with tepid response from Britain and France.

Formally tracing back to September 2002, what is now referred to as the *Bush Doctrine*, was the composite outcome of the above disposition and its multiple variants. It essentially had three aims: *First*, preemptive war, indicating pre-emptive strikes against perceived threats; *Second*, securing unilateral action, if required, to secure US interest at home and abroad; *Third*, spearheading liberal socio-political and economic reforms the world over: free market, free trade, individual liberty. (Christopher Muscato)

The doctrine received mixed responses. Neoconservatives ubiquitously supported unilateral deliberation to ensure national security and protect national interests anywhere in the world. The overtly bellicose tone and insistence on preemptive strikes constituted the pivot of opposition which considered *assisted* democratization fantastic and naïve. With Iraq plunging in downward spiral, the doctrine eventually dated out.

Interrogation and Surveillance

Post-9/11, preemption and prevention occupied most of American foreign policy exercises. Many of these were deliberated through Presidential prerogatives secured by Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution (concerning powers of the Commander in Chief) (Constitution of America). Quite a few of these were controversial. Two such issues concerned domestic surveillance, and the treatment of captured prisoners.

The Authorization for Use of Military Force Act, signed by Bush on signed on September 18, 2001, and ratified by the Congress few days after, enabled the President to embark on preemptive strikes. The Patriot Act was signed into effect in October, 2001, allowing for expansive domestic surveillance, crackdown on financial contingencies of terrorist elements, and bolstering efficiency within the US intelligence community (Brian A. Jackson: 2009).

Military tribunals were established by Presidential orders dated November 13, 2001, for trying captured Al Qaeda elements of non-US nationalities. Such individuals would be held at the Guantanamo Bay facilities, sans the provision of *Habeas Corpus*. This was made possible by these individuals being classified as *unlawful enemy combatants*, instead of *prisoners of war*, the former category being without the pale of the Geneva Conventions (Jennifer K. Elsea: 2012).

Further, the Bush administration managed to secure justification for *enhanced* interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation, slapping, waterboarding (simulated drowning), and so on. The obvious trope of torture unavoidable, such methods ran into controversies questioning their legality, ethics, precedence, and effectiveness (Oliver Laughland: 2015).

The law finally made entry with *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* (2006), in which the US Supreme Court (USSC) held that setting up military tribunals without Congressional approval constituted Presidential overreach. Thereafter, Bush hammered out these dents by securing Congressional approval for the passage of the Military Commissions Act (2006),

part of which was later declared unconstitutional owing to its suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (Linda Greenhouse: 2006).


With evidence of inmate abuse and maltreatment in Abu Ghraib prison emerging in 2004, global limelight now focused upon wartime excesses of American forces. It also came to fore that the CIA exploited the *policy of rendition* to transfer captured individuals to various secret locations worldwide, rendering them beyond the pale of US legal system so as to subject them to unethical interrogation techniques. Although used is modest measures, this method had been in vogue at least since the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, and was used during the tenure of Bill Clinton as well (Reed Brody: 2005).

The Terrorist Surveillance Program drastically enhanced scope for the NSA to monitor electronic communications *en masse*. When publicized in 2005, it raised concerns of violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, a *post-Watergate* legacy, passed by Congress after the scandalous revelation of President's Nixon's orders of widespread domestic espionage. The Act limited espionage to foreign intelligence gathering, and mandated governments to obtain warrants from FISA courts for such exercises. Bush administration justified its actions on the basis of Article II of US Constitution, and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act (Adrienne LaFrance: 2015).

It was basically the perceptible chaos and unpredictability in the wake of the *WoT* that the Bush administration pointed to, in order to justify its *extraordinary* measures. Speeches alluded to Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, exemplars of executive strength and resolve in times of uncertainty. Similar grounds were shared by critics who argued that founding principles of rule of law, presumption of innocence, and protection of civil liberties were largely at risk if interrogations continued in abeyance of legal safeguards. (UVA, Miller Center, Gary L. Gregg II- available at: <https://millercenter.org/President/gwbush/foreign-affairs>)

The Afghanistan War and the Presidency Election 2004


The first victory was marginal, one that brought George W. Bush to the White House. His second incumbency, if not ensured, was certainly bolstered substantially by the *WoT*. In his second campaign, Bush defeated Democratic rival John Kerry, the then junior U.S. Senator from Massachusetts. Foreign policy, at the time eclipsed by the *WoT*, dominated the campaigns. Controversies, including of electoral irregularities precipitated the elections. Victory for Bush was declared with Sen. Kerry throwing his towel in, and providing the former with a *walkover* in the king-making state of Ohio. Later, it was contended in Democratic quarters that had it not been for *unfair* polling in Ohio, they (Democrats) could win that state and thus, the elections. Controversies in these elections however, were modest compared to those during the 2000 exercise (Lisa Trei: 2004).



❖ *State wise result of 2004 Presidential Election*

Margin of Victory

The shades in the map indicate the popular vote difference between the two nominees, capturing the relative competitiveness of each candidate.



❖ *George W. Bush Presidency's Job Approval Ratings*

Economic Issue

Unemployment and job losses figured large in 2004 electoral campaigns and subsequently became the focus of the Democratic campaign. In a trip to Illinois, Senator Kerry exclaimed that over jobs were lost since Bush took over in 2001. For the former however, focus on the issue and promises to that end did not yield electoral victory. (Job Losses Become Major Issue in U.S. Presidential Election - 2004-03-15, October 29, 2009)

Republican nomination in 2004 turned out to be a cake walk for Bush; 49% of voter opinion prioritized security and terrorism as major concerns going into polling.

John Kerry opposed both, unilateral action as well as hasty intervention in Afghanistan; he was off board on the invasion of Iraq. Instead, he favored alliance, highlighting legitimacy and mandated authority (Alicia P. Q. Wittmeyer: 2013).

2. War in Afghanistan and Presidential Election 2008

Approval ratings for Bush were at their lowest in the run up to the 2008 elections. The critiques of his tenure could be summed up as follows:

Was Bush's Foreign Policy Revolutionary

There was hardly anything novel in foreign policy under Bush administration. Dissemination of liberal values of democracy et.al had for the longest time, been intrinsic part of US foreign policy, harking back to the Puritan vision of a *city upon a hill*, realizing a Jeffersonian vision of an empire of liberty. These were integral to Woodrow Wilson's quest for making the world "safe for democracy." They embody the *four freedoms* of Franklin Roosevelt (Melvyn P. Leffer: 2009).

It was the Founding Fathers themselves who decided to eschew such alliances as might embroil the nascent nation into *Old World* controversies. Acting unilaterally, Bush presumed, would allow *better* pursuit of interests, reinvigorating fundamental principles, and the carving of a separate legacy, away and distinct from European heritage. (Melvyn P. Leffler: 2009, Think Again: Bush's Foreign Policy)

It is frequently argued that Bush era foreign policy largely disavowed multilateralism that emerged post- Second World War and consistently upheld American vision during the Cold War. It could in fact be contended that while during the Cold War the US cultivated collective security, erected NATO and various other blocs and multilateral institutions, spearheading globalization, it never really forfeit the *right* to unilateral action. Instead of institutionalizing it however, subsequent governments paid lip service to commitments of multilateralism while silently agreeing within the corridors of power, to engage unilaterally where and when deemed necessary, as was famously in the case of Vietnam (Andrew Moravcsik: 2006).

It is more style than substance that determined the difference between Bush and his predecessors. It was more a battle of competing strategies than goals, of modular judgments than competing worldviews. Despite unprecedented increase in unilateralism, US core interest in proliferating liberal values of freedom, self-determination, and open market remained unchanged (David Lai, John F. Troxell, Frederick J. Gellert: 20018)

The Bush Doctrine of Preemptive War Is Unprecedented

Preemptive or anticipatory action in order to secure national frontiers is an old military strategy. In 1818, Gen. Andrew Jackson's siege of Spanish Florida, and the execution of two Englishmen, was justified by Secretary John Quincy on grounds of Spain's failure to check disruption along the borderlands (Jackson Adrew, Monroe James: 2002).

It was actually quite commonplace during the Cold War, to embark on preemptive operations, mostly into Third World countries; vigil in Europe was not adequate and did not forestall the scope for intervening elsewhere in the world. In reality, such perceptions were simultaneously the effects as well as the conditions for the ubiquity of *Pax Americana*. The theatre of unilateral actions encompassed Central America, the Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. *Freedom* always remained at the forefront of justificatory regimes (C. Bergsten: 1990).

Preemptive actions are however not a universal resort for the American State. Prudent calculations have prevented such expeditions in Iran and North Korea. Like Vietnam, the invasion of Iraq was driven by desire rather than necessity (Michael E. O'Hanton: 2018)

Bush's Policies Are a Radical Departure from Clinton's

During Bill Clinton's tenure, US military actually increased perceptibly across the world. Late 1990s witnessed an exponential rise in US military expenditure. The overarching goal, as explained by the Joint Chief of Staff, was to raise a military capable of optimal maneuvering in a *full spectrum* conflict (Michael E. O'Hanton: 2003)

Refused acknowledgement either in the liberal or the neoconservative quarters, Clinton administration did in fact share in the prospect of unilateral action. This was writ large in the last strategy paper produced in its last days: "We will do what we must," declared the national security team. It certainly encompassed unilateral military action (John Hoff: 2008).

Presidential Decision Directive 39, signed in June, 1995, while mostly still classified, does indeed indicate a similar disposition. It envisions identification, isolation, and heavy reprimand handed out to groups or states harboring terrorist intents. Following Al Qaeda attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, Clinton ordered bombing of the Al-Shifaa chemical plant in Sudan, suspected of serving Osama bin Laden. Questions were raised concerning ethical fallout of preemptive strikes upon civilian targets in a nation that never expressly threatened the United States. To these, NSA Sandy Berger retorted: "What if we do not hit it and then, after an attack nerve gas is released in the New York City subway? What will we say then?" (A. Trevor, Thrall and Erik Goepner: 2017).

While complicity across the board marked unilateralism's journey before, it was during Bush Presidency that it was formally institutionalized as a national doctrine.

September 11 Transformed the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy

Prior to 9/11, the Bush administration swore by realism. Yet to be designated the NSA, Condoleezza Rice proclaimed during the 2000 Presidential campaign that American power shall not be deployed for *second order effects* such as *enhancing humanity's well-being*. The President insisted that freedom, democracy and peace would follow concerted pursuit of US' national interests; it would thus exemplify principles of "the modesty of true strength, the humanity of real greatness" (Condoleezza Rice: 2004).

In light of such precedence therefore, the mutation in the government's position post-9/11 is even more striking. Instead of realistic calculation of interests, it was curiously ideological principles that determined apparently, the journey forward. The overall goal of U.S. foreign policy was declared as achieving a *balance of power favoring freedom*. It was further resolved that advancement of *principles* rather than *interests*, would

determine state policies. Emerging from core beliefs, the national security strategy of the US ought to pan out, discerning possibilities of *expanding liberty*. (Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd: 2007).

It is rather an old game, alluding to ideological paradigms to muster popular support in times of crises. The language however, was perceptibly more rhetorical than usual. Prior to 9/11, scant attention was paid to terrorism while diverting most of it to deal with thwarting the emergence of peer competitors like China and Russia. And although desiring a regime change in Iraq, the administration was yet far from deliberating on it. September 11, explained Condoleezza Rice, produced an *acute sense of vulnerability*. Said Donald Rumsfeld, that it was not the dramatic new evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq that prompted action; it was rather the new light cast upon this evidence in the aftermath of 9/11, that ultimately reified the desire of intervention. Failure to prevent something as humongous as the 9/11 siege considerably lowered the administration's threshold for sitting on risks, with a matching rise in temptation to use force (B. Manin: 2004).

Bush's Foreign Policy Has Inflamed Anti-Americanism Worldwide

Global demonstrations of antipathy against *Pax Americana* have been fairly common for a long time now. Vice President Richard Nixon tour of Latin American in 1958 was ubiquitously marred by violent demonstrations. President Dwight Eisenhower visit to Tokyo in 1960 was withheld on account of expectations of rioting. While Vietnam marked a peak in global anti-American sentiments, Reagan's deployment of newly devised intermediate range nuclear weapons, more than a decade later, made short of any ebbing that followed withdrawal from Vietnam (Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick: 2012).

The expanse of current anti-American sentiments however, does indeed seem unprecedented. A recent poll by the Pew Research Center tries to capture approval ratings for the current American administration; accordingly, approval has dropped in Britain from 75% to 58%, in France from 63% to 37%, and in Germany from 61% to 38%. These are even dismal across the Muslim world where perception on the ground generally

discerns overreach and excess in America's design of the WoT. The ubiquity of the mood evidently encompasses US allies in the region: 59% Turks, 36% Pakistanis, 27% Moroccans and 24% Jordanians believe suicide bombings against American and Westerner targets in Iraq to be justified.

These numbers do not surprise in light of abundant precedence of American foreign policy prioritizing ideology over carefully calculated political and strategic goals. The greater it (America) exerts itself in pursuit of declared ideological goals, the more it grows suspect in those very terms. The counter-productive churning of preemption and unilateralism are amply borne out by surges in indoctrination following immediately after, no doubt thriving on emasculating experiences of humiliation and powerlessness. Institutionalizing such excesses by enshrining them in legislations, would only work to prepare America further as the target of global extremist activities. As expressed in a recent State Department report, terrorism is *waxing* instead of *waning* (Melvyn P. Leffler, 2009: Think Again: Bush's Foreign Policy).

Strategies, by definition, are goal oriented. Bush courted criticism in equal parts for reneging from set precedence, and for failing to succeed on that endeavor. Specifically, in his policies, Bush deployed means far outreaching the perceived ends.

Rice rests the Bush administration's strategy rests on three pillars: neutralizing targeted individuals and rogue regimes; creating harmony among the *great powers*; harnessing prosperity and democracy across the globe. The latter two goals are however continually held hostage to unilateralism and preemption in terms of achieving the first one (Patrick M. Cronin: 2009).

It is ironic that in *liberation* that follows the strikes, any notion of participative policy making flies right out of the window. Universal human rights only makes episodic and aim bound appearance. Much as noble the call for democratization may seem, objective concerns compel the US to forge alliances with forces with dubious political pursuit and even more suspect methods of deliberation. The conjecture requires of it, more patience, imagination, and resources. Foreign policy under Bush would fail to yield if domestic

calls for lower taxes bore fruit. A conservative estimation of time, human resources, and money is the last thing which comes to mind when pondering on domestic governance during Bush era. Neither did he (Bush) show any signs of readjusting at home in order to achieve national objectives abroad (Lane Crothers, Charles Lockhart: 2018).

Bush is Reagan's Next

How does one appraise the assumption of Bush as the second coming of Reagan? Certainly the former adores any such parallel. According to Rumsfeld, like Reagan, Bush too stood up to the occasion when it came to denouncing the evil, in its current form of terrorism. Bush believed Reagan to have been emboldened by a combination of moral and military superiority, managing to defeat communism and end the Cold War (Jonathan William Pidluzny: 2012).

Multiple scholarly narratives however, contest these perceptions considerably, insisting instead that the most profound and determining US initiative during the era was spearheaded by diplomat George F. Kennan who chose to aim at *containment* Soviet power instead of broad arching goals of reconfiguring societies from the *outside*. He followed it up by doubling down on domestic governance. Conversely, Kennan advised against express militarism, ideological rhetoric, and excess commitment in any term (George F. Kennan: 1987).

National security document NSC-68 (1950), emphasizes on *moral clarity* and *military prowess*. Emerging against the contexts of Soviet atomic threat, onset of McCarthyism, and the outbreak of the Korean War, the document simultaneously upped the ideological ante and triggered an arms race. *Moral clarity* and *ideological purity* however, prove inimical to objective assessment of threats in a bipolar world. *Ideological exclusivism* disallowed US officials from wrapping their minds around the causes for the Sino-Soviet split, or the multi-faceted contingencies of Third World revolutions which were in excess of utilitarianism (NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 1950). Profound confusion and misplaced convictions led to support of tyrant regimes across Central America in the 1980s, along with Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In exhilaration

that followed Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the Reagan administration failed to register any prospects that may result out of the ensuing power vacuum, a shortfall that ultimately led up to the birth of the Taliban. (Akbar Ganji: 2014)

Scholars also do not readily make much of the effectiveness of arms buildup and rhetoric during the Reagan years. Rather, they insist upon his ability for a drastic change of course to a much more realistic conversation with a new Soviet leadership, as well as his vision for a nuclear arms free world, as ultimately having ended the cold war. In a similar vein, Mikhail Gorbachev embarked on the dual strategy of Glasnost and Perestroika, not under duress from American pressure but by a deep desire for acute reforms. In this desire, Gorbachev was guided by European social democracy rather than by Continental democratic capitalism. He was inspired by non-governmental pursuit of human rights rather than by the ideological raging of US neoconservatives. (Hugh Mehan, Charles E. Nathanson and James M. Skelly: 1990)

Both moral clarity and military prowess are of scant use if not expressed judiciously. In absence of such bulwarks, both elements are certain to expose a people to abuse of power. Careful appraisal of interests and patient comprehension of the ways of the adversary are required in offensive maneuvering. Asymmetry between means and ends would neutralize any benefit accruing out of moral clarity and military might.

In November, 2008, Barrack Obama outperformed rival John Kerry to win the Democratic nomination. There were however substantial variation in support across a number of indicators. Herein, I propose that these variations (county level) in terms of the issues of economic condition, the cost of the WoT, and approval among African American and Hispanic voters were instrumental in the victory of Obama. It is believed that the WoT, along with massive downward spiral in real estate ended up favoring Obama, increasing his vote shares by at least 5.8%. His approval among African Americans registered its sharpest rise among the Southern States. (Seth J. Hill Michael C. Herron Jeffrey B. Lewis: 2009).

In his narrative, Obama termed the war in Afghanistan as *the good war*, clearly deriving out of the ethical entitlement derived out of the tragedy of 9/11. In contrast, Iraq stood as

a continuing reminder of militaristic fatalism. In his Primary speech, Obama had chastised rival Hillary Clinton for voting to authorize the war on Iraq and found this to be of profound resonance among voters. Replying to moderator Jim Lehrer's enquiry on prospects of troop increase in Afghanistan, Obama replied in the affirmative, adding that he has been harboring the same opinion for quite some time. For a candidate with scant foreign policy vision, this was a way of driving home the point for voters worried with both, national interests and its costs (Christine Fair, an Afghanistan scholar at Georgetown University), (Don Gonyea: 2009).

I present here, a brief overview and analysis of Obama's foreign policy address at the Ronald Reagan building in Washington, DC:

Obama commences his speech with an ode to the legacy of the Marshall Plan, a theme he keeps returning to throughout the duration of his speech. To be specific, in his reference, Obama focuses on the contingent and instrumental nature of military deliberation in the course of the Marshall Plan – George Marshall was imbued with impressive ability to not just project present interests into the future, but also reconfigure the present in order to ensure that projection. He understood the persistent nature of ideas as opposed to the brute and blunt compulsions of militarism. In order to project American interests into the future, America had in fact to project *itself* in the world. It envisioned a future that will not be isolated and in no dearth of allies to lead and prevail upon. Such alliances however, had necessarily to be secured through proliferation of ideas and hegemonisation of regimes of ideas and ideologies; before capitalism could be a way of life, it had to be a way of thought. Military, would essentially be deployed to secure the outwardly expression, or the praxis of those ideas as reflecting in democracy, free trade, secular education and so on and so forth. While assisting FDR in waging war, Marshall had one eye set on home front, mindful of exploiting scopes as may be provided in and through the war, to reconsolidate and if need be, reconfigure the society from within.

Next, Obama calls out the WoT on its shortfalls, and its sheer myopic design. From the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, to the dismal performance of Iraqi petro-currency in cultivating democracy and development, to nuclear proliferation,

Obama paints a graphic picture of the abject condition of the WoT. In this however, Obama does not once question the moral worth of the war himself. Instead, he makes his argument in light of a trillion dollars spent, an assessment of the objective impact on the average American tax payer, and what has been achieved in lieu of that monumental commitment. Instead of less, Obama in fact contends that indeed more could have been achieved. He however opposed the invasion of Iraq, against the grain of the current administration and in his speech, tallied his predictions against the existing condition (in Iraq).

In articulating his opposition to the war in Iraq, Obama does much more than to highlight fallouts such as the emergence of extremism, sectarian violence, and the general decimation of the Iraqi social order. He takes this opportunity to drive home a few pertinent points: that terrorism is of contingent nature and cannot be determinately neutralized without deep acute socio-political development; it flows from this assertion that military can be effective only up to a certain extent; that it is an objective reality that troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan are actually part of the problem. (James Traub: 2016).

Obama unfurls his vision on the future of the WoT in a formulaic manner, rendering success in the campaign at one with his personal commitment of troop withdrawal. In his own words, “True success will take place when we leave Iraq to a government that is taking responsibility for its future” Quite perceptibly in Obama’s vision, the most rigorous, as well as the penultimate task in the campaign would involve assistance in nation building instead of running blazing guns across the desert landscape. Afghan and Iraqi self-determination were intrinsic to any roadmap for peace in the Middle East (McGreal: 2011).

As a primary step, Obama proposed a deadline of sixteen months, starting summer 2010, for troop withdrawal out of Iraq. Beyond this, there would remain a minimum amount of residual forces which would perform limited goal bound tasks, securing the Iraqi polity and society scope to develop. He proposed an immediate increase in troops to 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 marines (Mark Landler, 2011). He further asserted that costs of redevelopment of the war-torn economies, and welfare and restoration of rights of

affected civilians ought to be borne evenly by global powers, and not by America alone. It was probably one of the most important takeaways from the speech when Obama made it clear that national self-determination for Iraq cannot be based on American tax payer's money but had to be sustained with Iraq's own petro wealth (Obama: 2013).

Next in the speech, Obama proposes refocusing the military lens away from Iraq, and on to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Contending Senator John McCain's claim that invading Iraq has not in fact come at the cost of the Afghan campaign, Obama claimed ground conditions to be expressly evidencing the opposite; the Taliban and Al Qaeda are considerably rejuvenated on account of US forces thinning down across the Afghan theatre. Reiterating imperative to intensify military efforts in the Af-Pak region, the President declared increase of forces in Afghanistan by at least two additional combat brigades. Further, he vowed to compel NATO allies into committing more resources (History.com: 2019).

Extending the scope of developmental assistance, Obama committed to strengthening the Afghan judiciary, and provide further resources and incentives to American personnel involved in such missions. To this end, he proposed an annual increase of \$1 billion in non-military assistance, such funds tied to perceptible results of anti-corruption efforts and inclusive development (Anthony H. Cordesman: 2009).

Turning to Pakistan, Obama reiterated the need for intensifying military action along that country's tribal-intensive borders. Stressing on democratic aspirations of the Pakistani people, and in an oblique reference to Bush administration's dealings with President Prevez Musharraf, Obama said that the US needs to do more than just issuing blank cheques to a general who has lost popular confidence. He announced cosponsoring of a bill with Joe Biden and Richard Lugar, tripling non-military aid to Pakistan, in line with his vision of an encompassing alliance, including but not limited to military cooperation (Bruce Riedel: 2017).

On Iran, the President was clear in his vision of a concerted global pursuit. Referring to Sen. McCain's policy, Obama pointed out that the same has achieved nothing in terms of its objectives while Iran has embarked on its nuclear program, stockpiling low enriched Uranium up to 150 kilos. Instead, he proposed laying all cards out on the table; further pursuit of a nuclear program, support to terror, and threatening of Israel would lead to debilitating sanctions (on Iran), both unilateral and multilateral. Conversely, compliance would bring about meaningful incentives, restore and mainstream Iran's national economy, and help its society merge with the global mainstream (BBC News, 7 May 2019) (Zachary Laub: 2018).

Obama closes the speech by reverting back to legacy of the Marshall Plan, and American pragmatism. With the post-Cold War vacuum filled with the rise of religious extremism, there is no reason to assume that Marshall's wisdom would fall short of abating the new war which, akin to its predecessor, is after all a war of ideologies. Quoth Obama: "Today, the dangers and divisions that came with the dawn of the Cold War have receded. Now, the defeat of the threats of the past has been replaced by the transnational threats of today. We know what is needed. We know what can best be done. We know what must get done. Now it falls to us to act with the same sense of purpose and pragmatism as an earlier generation, to join with friends and partners to lead the world anew" (Lili Bayer: 2016).

Afghanistan War and Presidential Election 2012

Democratic Incumbent, Running mate Joe Biden

Restoring Afghanistan at the crosshair of the WoT, a revamped Af-Pak strategy was unveiled in March, 2009. Troops in Afghanistan were increased by 33,000 (USA Today). Withdrawal from Afghanistan would commence by the last quarter of 2011, with an initial departure of 10,000 troops, and comprehensively wrapping up by year 2014 (Abdul Basit: 2017).

Only with the neutralization of Bin Laden in Abbotabad in 2011, did Obama realize the timely worth of diverting attention back on to Afghanistan, and away from Iran, resulting in the near total extermination of the Taliban. In early 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta speculated that US combat missions may end as early as mid-2013, entire involvement thereafter limited to assistance roles (Jonathan Mahler: 2015).

The Strategic Partnership Agreement- determining the contours of US assistance in security and development over the ten years following complete troop withdrawal in 2014- was signed during a visit (of Obama) to Afghanistan in (?). In August 2012, following a spate of so called *green-on-blue attacks*- in which a total of nine US personnel were killed by Afghan national force personnel- the President was compelled to reiterate US commitments, in order to quell anxieties within the Afghan establishment, of Americans backtracking following their encounter of *same side belligerence* (Guillaume Lasconjarias & Jeffrey A. Larsen: 2015).

In his National Convention speech in September, 2012, Obama emphatically determined 2014 as the year that will mark a definite end of the longest war fought in US history. In his third Presidential debate, occurring in October that year, Obama

declared that funds freed up by eventual abatement of the WoT in Afghanistan would be extensively used for shoring up domestic programs like upgrading dated infrastructure, development of public education system, universal healthcare and so on and so forth (Ben Parker, Stephanie Stelnbrecher, Kelsey Ronan: 2018).

Republican Candidate *Mitt Romney*, Running Mate Paul Ryan

In a white paper published in October, 2011, Mitt Romney claimed that he would ask Hamid Karzai to match US commitments with his (Karzai) own commitment of battling governmental corruption, ushering in electoral transparency, and coordinating with the US in ensuring that the Afghan economy is neither limited to, nor held hostage, by narco-currency as the latter by this time, has come to be the main financial lifeline of insurgencies of all brands (Bette Dam: 2014).

Romney opposed any prior declaration of dates of withdrawal from Afghanistan lest it might enlighten adversaries to an *open season* following US troop withdrawal. However, in a debate in November, 2011, the Presidential candidate did in fact express that the correct time for complete withdrawal of troops would ostensibly be by end-2014. He reiterated on several occasions that his decisions on these matters would be heavily contingent upon assessment of ground situation by US military authorities. Only a phased transition, believed Romney, would develop Afghan Security Forces appropriate to its security concerns and those of America's own in the region. "Our effort there is to keep Afghanistan from becoming a launching point for terror against the United States," he said (Mark Landler: 2018).

Speaking to Fox News in February, 2012, Romney said the US ought to assist in raising a viable Afghan national military which can secure its own national sovereignty against Taliban onslaught. The US, he added, does not desire Afghanistan to return to being a sanctuary and breeding ground for Taliban and Al Qaeda (Robert Burns: 2019).

At a speech made in New Hampshire in 2012, Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Paul Ryan warned against any prospective move of diverting military resources to other areas such as nation-building, while combat season was in full swing. Arguing that Obama's plan reflected more political calculation than bonafide national security concerns, Ryan said: "We want them (US soldiers) to fulfill the mission in the safest way possible and that, to me, means you make decisions based on what is right for the country, for our national security" (Steven Ertelt: 2012).

While repeatedly committing to facilitate a smooth transition of authority to Afghan Forces (*WSJ: 2012*), Romney never really elaborated in the specifics of his plans, or how his vision drastically differs from the extant one. Further, he chided President Obama for not speaking enough on the successes achieved in the WoT (*New York Times: 2012*), while himself stopping short of mentioning it in his GOP convention speech in late August 2012. In a foreign policy address made later that same year, Romney vowed not to be deterred by political considerations in deciding on the specifics of troop withdrawal; he reiterated that a politically motivated hasty retreat would open up the US mainland to further attacks, and abandon the Afghan people amidst those same forces that held the country hostage for so long and used it base the 9/11 attacks (Ewen Macaskill: 2012).

Conclusion:

9/11 occurred in less than a year after the unconvincing incumbency of George W. Bush. The attack was simultaneously on American soil and American belief. The myth of the *impenetrability* of the American mainland was laid to waste, and the nation was virtually brought to its knees. It led to the UN sanctioned and US led “War on Terror,” assisted by NATO allies. The campaign was destined to have a deep impact on the forthcoming elections in America.

The WoT was no doubt in large parts, an outcome of ubiquitous outrage as well as panic among the American people who called for concerted attacks against terror outfits across the world. Quite early into the first phase of the global WoT, investigating agencies identified the perpetrators of the attack (9/11); it was followed by Bush declaring war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Statistics prove that it was when approval ratings for Bush rose to an unprecedented 85% (approx.); the American public were resolutely standing behind their President in the War.

A squarely opposing scenario stared back at the Bush administration when it came to the war in Iraq. Despite absence of any substantial proof of the existence of stockpiles of chemical weapon, Bush stood on those very grounds to declare (and subsequently justify) war on Iraq. American voters perceptibly felt deceived. Although persistently at the receiving end of academic critique, the war in Iraq still continued to garner adequate public support. Of course, no trace of biological weaponry showed up even after the arrest of Saddam Hussein. However, the campaign did not put a significant dent in the Bush’s efforts in securing a second term; the memories of 9/11 were fresh as ever, and so was the palpable national panic in apprehension of prospects of further attacks; in other words, the terror spoke and was translated into electoral support. Bush instituted multiple counter-terrorism organisations and task forces while widening the scope of domestic surveillance. Other than fringe and sparse oppositions, these measures were largely approved by the public. The campaign in Iraq was in its early days and was yet to come to a shove; the one in Afghanistan was operating with a near-total mandate (of US voters) behind it, and was largely living up to those expectations.

As evidenced by the Republican Party's defeat in the 2008 elections, by this time, the WoT had reached a saturation point, with not much to show for all the efforts and resources spent; Osama Bin Laden still remained at large; democracy was far from striking roots in Afghanistan. Essentially, Bush fell short of delivering on any of his promises. Gauging the domestic mood to close proximity, Obama proposed bringing back troops, and found overwhelming support at the very mention of it. Indeed, his second term was overwhelmingly predicated on his handling of the WoT which evidently found favour among large sections of the US electorates. Laden was neutralized in 2011, and Obama had advanced as far ahead as to declare a timeline for the completion of troop withdrawal.

Chapter 3

Costs of Afghan war and public opinion

Introduction

In the contemporary world nation states are more and more becoming inter-dependent for their cultural, economic and political activities. The interests and objectives that govern the relations of a country with others at various level, is generally called its foreign policy. By and large the foreign policy of a State is determined by a unique combination of domestic as well as peripheral factors. They include its geo-strategic understanding, historical background, and need to live in peace and cooperation with the neighbors. Neighboring states plays a greater role in the international society and international affairs (Bojang: 2018).

On the international juncture, Afghanistan is a very small power whose geo strategic location has influenced the Great power's attitude towards it. The case of Afghanistan presents on interesting profile of a small power. As Erling Bjøl has noted, "It makes a lot of difference whether a country is an immediate neighbor of the Sates like Soviet Union, Poland, or Hungary or whether it is at a comfortable distance, like Albania". Afghanistan shares borders with Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan, which imparts great significance to it. After the conclusion of the II World War, the strategic significance of Afghanistan assumed additional dimensions, especially during the time of cold war when United State sponsored military alliances "SEATO" and "CENTO" joined by Pakistan. But Afghanistan despite its long borders with soviet Russia as well as Pakistan pursued independent and non-aligned policy (Wittmeyer: 2013).

Following the Russian invasion into Afghanistan since December 1979, the strategic location of Afghanistan assumed greater significance in the US foreign policy towards

this region. It is important to note, however, that all the rulers of Afghanistan pursued the policy of stringent neutrality which kept the country free from foreign intervention even during the First World War as well as the Second World War (Steel: 2011).

This historical experience went a long way in the shaping of the foreign policy of Afghanistan in the post Second World War period. Afghanistan, having a long border with the Soviet Union could not afford to follow a pro-west policy. At the same time, it also could not pursue entirely a pro-soviet foreign policy for apprehension of being dubbed as communist. Shift to either side could mean an end of active nonaligned and independent foreign policy of Afghanistan. Prior to the advent of the communist coup in April 1978, Afghanistan had actively participated in the Non Align Movement summit and remained a staunch supporter as well as adhered to the policy of non-alignment.(Mcglinchey: 2017)

Afghanistan knock down under American's tactical compulsion to contain the "Soviet communism" first, and then, the "Chinese" communism. Afghanistan, as traditionally believed, was a 'cross road of Asian country', and a Centre of political prominence. This notion had advanced by America throughout Second World War. And for the 1st time it was reinstated and prepared popular in the hearing of US congress of 1951. George McGee stated that "Afghanistan is an important country of South Asia and its strategic location further augments its significance". (Ouden: 2013).

In view with this intention to maintain Afghanistan under its complete control, the US started providing moderate monetary help for different progressive schemes. In the starting years later warfare, from US government gradually sufficient monetary assistance underway coming in from the initial 50s. Purpose behind this assistance was to retain the Afghanistan's nonalignment and to possess the country beneath the US influence, so that in future conflict, Afghanistan can be a base for US armed forces against the USSR and People's Republic of China. American aid was intended for this goal. on the other hand USSR started providing both military and economic aid about more than twice that of the US aid. Because of this the latter maintained restraint from the rivalry with the former. But American aid keeps on flowing in up to 1979, when the soviets invaded that country (Blum: 2014).

The country's volatile history had fostered the development of conventional patterns of violence that had a definite role in society. There was no modern tradition for war of great magnitude in Afghanistan. No one predicted at that time that local rebellions of late 1978 would develop into warlords and will be reason for national devastation and which will completely change the direction of the world history.

Zahir Shah assumed power at a time when the external threat to Afghanistan was very minimal. However, within the country there was a breakdown of state control and reemergence of tribal power. The sources of revenue had diminished, as taxes on agriculture had declined. For development the country sought foreign aid. It had to look for an ally within close proximity of its frontiers. The withdrawal of the British from India, and the partition of the latter into two sovereign states, had left the infant state of Pakistan on its Eastern borders. The relations between the two turned hostile with the emergence of the issue of Pashtunistan, the home of the Pashtuns. This led to Afghanistan circumventing its dependence on Pakistan for access to the international market. Since transport route to Iran had not been developed, the only alternative was through Soviet Central Asia (Mashal and Rahim: 2017).

When Daoud became the Prime Minister in 1953 he accepted the Soviet offer of assistance. It led to international realignments in South Asia. As Rubin states, "India and Afghanistan received military equipment from the Soviet Union, which supported their position on regional issues, while Pakistan received similar supplies and support from United States and, later, China." (Barnett R. Rubin, 1995 p. 65.)

Afghanistan had exploited its geo-strategic location to secure foreign aid and support. The foreign economic aid was instrumental in financing the governmental expenditure. Every year from 1958-68, and again from the mid 1970s up to the withdrawal of the aid in 1991, about forty percent of the state expenditure came from foreign aid. The country had become in Luciani's term an "allocation state," a state where about forty percent of the state is dominated by oil or other foreign sources, or the state expenditure constitutes a substantial part. Afghanistan had exploited its geo-strategic location to secure foreign aid and support. The foreign economic aid was instrumental in financing the governmental expenditure. Every year from 1958-68, and again from the mid 1970s up to the

withdrawal of the aid in 1991, about forty percent of the state expenditure came from foreign aid. The country had become in Luciani's term an "allocation state," a state where about forty percent of the state is dominated by oil or other foreign sources, or the state expenditure constitutes a substantial share of the GDP.(Giacomo Luciani, 1987). Afghanistan, however, fulfilled only the first criterion and not the second one, as its state expenditure did not constitute a large share of the GDP (Barnett R.Rubin, 1995).

Though the Soviet invasion was sudden the ground work had begun in the mid-1960s. The invasion rested on numerous expectations nearly the Socialist idea, its party-political system & its part as a world superpower. It's aim of worldwide communist revolution, in particular through support of class wars and socialist and national liberation movements promoted her entry into international conflicts. The Soviet Union was optimistic about a Marxist- Leninist Revolution in the Third World societies where it had invested heavily.

If we examine the US strategic dependence on Afghanistan, Soviet extension & the socialist diffusion in the area, formers stands seems shallow and overstated then this latter. America's power continued more influential, especially in Iran and Pakistan, than the Soviet power. Both Islamabad and Teheran joined the US sponsored security alliances and were known as the 'two pillars' in the region to further American objectives and protect its interests. On the other hand, despite soviet strategic interest in and substantial aid to Afghanistan, the latter pursued a policy of non-alignment, a policy that was more tilted towards the west than the east. So all the Northern Tier states such as Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, had combined common borders on soviet territory of over 2,666 miles and were under the American influence. All that America remains uncommitted with reference to Afghan region. It's a straight safety assurance that it allready has with the other 2 country. Afghani neutral strategy is mostly related to his leaders reasonably then the Cold War fighters that are US and the USSR (Kugelman: 2018).

The events around the Soviet American rivalry on Afghanistan during the decade of 'communism in Afghanistan' (1979-89) are significant to understand the US policies in US-Soviet Relations in the era of Détente. Afghanistan. During this period, Americans made the Mujahiddin instrumental to defeat Soviets. To win the cold war, they align with

militant groups with motivation and values alien to Afghans and their long-term security consideration (Baker: 2019).

C.J. Chivers remarked in his article in The New York Times that the 1980s honeymoon between the American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the Pakistani ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) in mid 1990 resulted into a brainchild named Taliban. (The New York Times, 2001) Human Rights Index of 1998 ranked the US as the 92nd worst offender out of a total of 196 states. Among developed states, the US emerged as the second worst offender. (Observer, 28 June 1998.)

Theoretical Aspect

It is well known fact that only a united nation can prosecute a war successfully and can come with justice. The constant conifiltration of internal issue, combined with disapproval of this position can have only consequence that is to demolish the society's moral to split the country and to impose downfall on it. Since unity is all important, so the plea goes, discussion should be limited and criticism avoided. These arguments come naturally and sincerely from the leaders of a nation in every war period. The time has now come when we can challenge these beliefs. When we can establish the value of the free and open discussion of all affairs of government, military as well as administration and decide whether or not public opinion is worth listening to in time of war as in time of peace.

When we come to public opinion it is referred to majority opinion, which must not be confused with the noisy outbursts of minority groups and of individuals who usually get the headlines but seldom represent the collective judgment of the citizens of the country. Fortunately, today we have developed a technique and a machinery to sound the opinions of all the people of the nation; both those who shout and those who whisper. In recent years public opinion has been ascertained on almost every policy bearing on the war, not only on America but in other democracies. We are in a good position to judge the quality of public opinion on war time issues. On the basis of a great volume of evidence, we can answer the question of whether public opinion should be listened to as eagerly in time of war as in time of peace.

In an exit from the typically partisan divide that had been with most of the U.S. military expeditions over the previous decade, the president established strong and vocal bipartisan hold in the wake of the 9/11 attack and in support of his statement regarding his administration's intended response. The president's job endorsement rating also skyrocketed, in part due to the nature of the crisis and in part because of the bipartisan support for his administration's efforts to meet the challenges of terrorism. Thus, as a result of the 9/11 attack a "global war on terrorism" (GWOT) was launched that embattled not just Al-Qaeda but also other terrorist organizations with total global reach. This combat would include armed actions of varied scope and level in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Iraq with the distinct possibility of military action elsewhere (Osnos, Remnick and Yaffa: 2017).

U.S. DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

The attack on the "World Trade Center" and the Pentagon building on 9/11 by nineteen men led to the immediate collapse of the Taliban. The rapid defeat and decimation of the Taliban and the formation of the agreed Afghan regime under the leadership of Hamid Karzai brought to an end one of the most tragic phases in the history of Afghanistan. These terrorist attacks on the US pointed the finger of suspicion to Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization for this heinous crime. The reason that it was widely believed that Laden was responsible for the attacks was that no other terrorist group had the resources, organization and the technical expertise to launch such a venture. President Bush responded swiftly to the attacks on the Twin Towers and retaliated by declaring a war on international terrorism and those who harbored terrorists. (Bahadur: 2002).

Only a few people on the world stage welcomed these attacks, for most of us condemned them without any reservation. Quickly the international mood turned toward grief and many wonder how anyone could have been so heartless as to do this act. (Bahadur: 2002). US President Mr. Bush did not help the matter when he spoke for these men as Evil and Ghost, and when he did not give any attempt to understand the social forces that drive people to such actions he completely denied it. If the actors are adjudged to be Evil,

then there is no way to deal with them but to destroy them to grant that they might be misguided in their policies and strategies, but that they may represent a genuine grievance was tantamount to heresy. One can condemn an act without reservation, and yet attempt to analyze the act to see how it can happen. Analysis is not a justification, but a method to determine the causes of an act. Definitely acts of terror cannot change anything for the betterment or freedom. Indeed it enhanced the suffering of masses. Right after 9/11, US started comparing it to the Pearl Harbor incident, the attack of the Japanese armed forces on 7/ 8December, 1941 that brought the US into the scene of World War II. President F .D. Roosevelt then called it a 'day of infamy,' and this was the phrase that many used to describe 9 /11 and justified that it is the Taliban which compel US to come into action (Beinart: 2010).

The Bush administration after few hours of the attacks, said Al Qaeda and 'Osama Bin Laden were prime suspects,' and CIA Director George Tenet pointed out by way of evidence that only Osama Bin Laden and his networks had the capacity and tenacity to conduct 'multiple attacks with little or no warnings.' With the kind of planning, skill, training, finance logistics involved in the attacks, suspicion was almost immediately drawn towards Osama Bin Laden, the master mind of previous attacks on American Embassies in 1998 (Maranzani: 2018).

Cost of the War in Afghanistan

The past 3 eras of warfare & destruction had very shattering impacts on the Afghanistan's citizens. Million people died, millions enforced to escape from the region. The Afghanistan's framework, forests, connectivity & health system had been devastated. The societal fabric of Afghanistan is completely broken and organizations are fragile & meek. USSR troops withdrew from 1989 in the region of Afghanistan, departure of administration gradually dependent on guerrillas (local warlord's army) to keep governor. Though Afghanistan's peoples were hopeful that withdrawal of USSR troops will carry harmony but was other way around the country became even more unstable. In the starting of the 1990s, as "mujahedeen" groups rotated on against another one for obtaining the control and waged bloody battles. This led to the subjection of civilians to

haphazard, reciprocal and frequently unplanned forcefulness comprising burglary, torment, captivity and sexual abuse (Hayes and Sedra: 2008).

Taliban is the product of the turmoil of the “Afghan civil war”, swiftly seizing region & encouraging safety to a conflict exhausted peoples. In its place, their cruel strategies outcome in elevated scarcity, ethnic persecution, extensive “human rights” misuses, and killings and shift of immigrant in neighborhoods countries like Iran and Pakistan. After the collapse of the regime of “Taliban” in the end of 2001, Afghan peoples were repeatedly optimistic that the brutality will end and the life of Afghan people will improved. The year of 2006 the safety condition worsened and brutality at its maximum peak from 2001. Approximately 50% of the citizens is living under poverty, approximately 25% of the citizens persisted in the country because of these critical condition. And approximately 3 million only remained displaced in the region of Iran and Pakistan (Donnelly: 2005).

After 11 September, United State administration had perused a “national security policy” that is very expensive in “blood and treasure”. Even this United State security spending were very Hugh in respect of other powers. After 9/11 the spending as well as the casualties have mounted very abruptly. (Anthony Gregory, 2011)

There is no true indication that US “national security policies” would transformed in the coming time. In a period announced by US govt. that it terminated Osama-bin-Laden. The president Barak Obama announced that he will continue the “war on terrorism”. Besides it was warned by one and the other the United State government and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda that Osama’s death can bring out punitive action by the terrorist networks and terrorist organisations. Osama’s death didn’t brought down a quick decline in security spending or a speedy drawing of United States’ troops overseas and Afghanistan. Though it was true that many of the United State activities since September 11 was very helpful in tracing Osama (Paye: 2014).

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had been very expensive and very deadliest for the U.S. government starting the “Cold-War” and also “Vietnam-War”. Many US citizens assume it is a result of a specific plan by Bush government especially in Iraq. When Obama

elected as the president of United State of America, he had time to appliance changes in his 2 terms for Afghanistan and his approach of external policy and the “war on terrorism” (Fallows: 2015).

The President Obama has alter its effort from region of Iraq to Afghanistan, but has remain the path of United State after September 11 security doctrine that were undertaken during leadership of Bush. The water down in the area of Iraq had been the only relative signs of restraint, and it’s a uncertain instance, as it’s been whatever but decisive, quick, or unequivocal, and is frequently on sequence with what the President Bush government precisely approved to at the end of its tenure. The increase in “war on terrorism” in the region of Afghanistan had directed towards United State expenditure and casualties. Death toll has not declined it is closely as much as numerous president Obama supporters had wished. The economic price of Iraq and Afghanistan wars joint is sophisticated than it was during the times of President Bush tenure. It is hard to assume the financial and soldier life costs of president Obama’s war with Libya, without informing Congress, forming a straight agenda, or persuasively clarifying its necessity to United State domestic safety, seems to be in confrontation with president Obama’s judgment of former president Bush’s policy. though most US citizen and people over the world celebrate the killing of Osama. few of president Obama’s policy were closely joint to that objective, as it was designated by the government’s resolution to remain onward with the “war on terrorism”, involvement in the state of Libya, and an hostile move toward nation safety. In particular United State plan has continuous even on such contentious questions as the use of armed suppliers, permanent military bases, and universal human rights misuses. United State plan is as costly and interventionist in nature and United State security mechanism is larger than ever. Obama policy continued on the path settled by the completion of the Bush tenure, which formally focused the water down in the region of Iraq but not an further escalation in area of Afghanistan, can have meant uncertain footmark, price has been shaped by the existing government (Schmitt and Barnes: 2019).

The war on terrorism started in 2001 in Afghanistan, since then around 26,270 peoples have been executed by through “war-related violence” and approx. 29,900 peoples have been wounded. The health system in Afghanistan remained stressed by warfare because

of the devastation of Afghanistan's base and the incapability to reconstruct in few places. Afghanistan continued to struggle from a "humanitarian crisis". Humanitarian workforces still experience violence from terrorist and it is usually dangerous situation. In Afghanistan approximately 92,000 people effected from "direct war violence". Nearly 21,500 peoples killed in Pakistan (Crawford: 2015).

America officially ended the war in the region of Afghanistan in the year of 2014, United States armed personnel persist in advisory position to the Afghan security forces and engaging in combat. The intensity of war has not diminished. Somewhat, in many ways, in the figures of citizens and soldier and Afghan-police executed in the warfare that has been escalated. In 2015, the United States designated that it would slow the speed of its departure. "The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan" started to counts systematically of war generated death and injury in Afghanistan (Victor: 2018).

After September 11 military actions have been engaged in substantial quantity of external procurements of US liability, about 40 percent. The outcome of September 11 war expenses included constant "tax-cuts" and internal borrowing. Capital relocation possible took and entailed a allocation of capital from middle income individuals & low revenue to rich persons. This reverting relocation moderated because of economic weakness, the augmented armed forces expenses and resultant shortages did not result into warfaretime rise. While the considerable role of overseas liability holders does not encourage savings within the United States, it didnt essentially outcome in a national relocation of wealth (Dormandy: 2013).

War finances had deeply impacted US society by the different tactics used by the United States. Public inequality is either condensed or often enlarged. The way warfare is financed for too impact the rates of price rises. It can have additional imperative re-distributive effects, as poor people bear a uneven load for price rises (Zielinski:2018).

War funding procedures employed during United State history, shortfall expenses with the exemption of warfare-bond campaign, subsidiary tolls, and reproduction of currency contributed to disparity. The outcome of war, shortage financing transmissions capital away from people who transfer the liability to those people who hold it. In now a day

case, that causes transference of money from mid & low income citizens to American elite who would increase disparity in the society.

Shortfall expenditure, printing money and subsidiary taxes has contributed to warfare rise, falling the buying capacity of low to middle income households. This tendency has led to great inequality in the society. In contrary to this war financed by direct taxation and bond campaigns targeted towards low income individuals which prompted towards progressive wealth redistribution. As households with higher income service the cost of war, where as households with lower income receive returns on their savings and investments, and war's tendency is always to lead to inflation. In contrast to this wars financed through direct taxation and bond campaigns targeted the low income individuals. It promote a redistribution of wealth which is progressive in nature




Figure 3.1. War Finance, Inequality, and the Share of US Wealth Held by the Wealthiest One Percent of Americans, 1913-2015

Spource: Data from World Inequality Database (WID) (2018).

According to Peace Science Digest This figure demonstrates that the share of national income held by the wealthiest “Americans dramatically dropped during the “World War I, World War II, and the Korean War” when bond campaigns and direct taxation characterized US war finance strategy. These wars are associated with progressive redistribution of wealth. During the Vietnam War, the relationship between war finance and inequality varied. The 1965 tax cut, deficit war financing and subsequent inflationary effects resulted in greater inequality. But once the 1968 tax increase was implemented and inequality declined as the tax increased which mitigated rising prices and reduced dependence on deficit financing. The Gulf War, due to its financing via allied grants and short duration, created few if any redistributive effects. The era of the “Global War on Terror”, which started with a tax cut, followed by more tax cuts, saw its war funded by foreign debt and generally floated domestic debt. It appears to be linked with rising inequality as the share of fiscal income held by the “top one percent of wealthy Americans” has trended upward”.

Human Costs of War

The war in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan is linked since 2001. It has become more and more intertwined. The terrorist fighting are more and more spilling across the "Af-Pak" border. According to renowned author Neta C. Crawford stated that “To assess the human cost of these two wars, as if they were totally separate, a more correct evaluation is required by examining the region as a whole. The collective total civilian and combatant deaths in Afghanistan and Pakistan is about 149,000 personal killed in wars related violence and those who are seriously injured amounted to be 162,000. The total number of personal killed by direct war violence in Afghanistan from late 2001 through 2014 is estimated to be about 92,000 civilians and combatants. It is estimated that about 100,000 people have been injured in the Afghanistan war. The sudden augmentation in the number of civilians killed and injured in recent years, and the fact that the US has slowed its withdrawal, underscores the fact that the war in Afghanistan is not ending, it is getting deadlier day by day.

The human casualties of war has been shocking in Afghanistan. Of course these numbers are just the indicator of much more dramatic stories. One in every five persons have been

displaced. Both mental and physical disorders are undertreated due to the lack of health infrastructure. The human casualties of this war has been devastating in neighboring areas. Alone in Pakistan more than 60,000 civilians have been killed and injured in war related violence. More than 58,000 combatants militants and Pakistani security forces have been killed and injured in war related violence. In Afghanistan it is believed that more than 31,000 civilians have been killed in direct violence since October 2001 invasions by the United States of America”. In reality this number is necessity an approximation and actual no is much morebigger than this. Since the long duration in the warfare once there was slight or nocounting of citizens murdered or wounded as a result of the war.

The ISAF created “Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell” in the year of 2008, that became the “Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team” in the year of 2011. ISAF has made a database of civilian death and injury, but it has not constantly made the data public. The data is released to commanders and soldiers so that they can learn from incidents where civilians have been harmed. In 2007, when the war began to intensify, the Human Rights arm of the “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan” began to thoroughly highest losses in the region of Afghanistan. The year of 2008 UNAMA began to public the summary counts and analyses of the civilians Injured and killed in Afghanistan war. UNAMA has also systematically attempted to create acknowledgements of obligation of the losses and damages. Other nongovernmental organizations track civilian harm, but “UNAMA” information atmost of the detailed facts on the effect of the warfare on peoples of Afghanistan. UNAMA endeavors to investigate every incident and is also largely transparent about its reports’ methods.




Fig 3.2 Number of Civilians Killed in Afghanistan from 2001 to through 2015

Source: UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) data for 2008-2015.

UNAMA acknowledges Uncertainty and that they "may be under reporting civilian casualties given limitations inherent in the operating environment". UNAMA excludes in its count of casualties the individuals for whom their combatant/non combatant status is uncertain.

In the late 2000s, when air strikes were slaughtering a growing number of locals, the UN and other humanitarian organization urged ISAF to change their rules of involvement. More warning rules in case of adjacent aerial assaults has caused in a decrease in the amount of personal executed per year in areal assaults, firstly in mid 2009. UNAMA notes "these gains made in curtailing injury and death were not maintained in 2015. The UN accredited 1,766 civilian deaths to aerial operations by pro Government missions in 2008 to 2015 out of a total of 4,258 casulaties credited to pro Government forces. This increase in civilian death in 2015 was due to the fact that Afghans are now carrying their own missions, and may be using less stringent rules of engagement and more dumb, unguided, gravity bombs are used". More than 40,000 Afghan civilians have been seriously injured since the US invasion in 2001, although it is difficult to know the

number with any accuracy. UNAMA count more than 40,900 Afghan civilian injuries since January 2009.

Shocking deletions comprise a noteworthy problem of the warfare for Afghani citizens. More than 9,200 new patients that the International Committee of the Red Cross registered in 2015 for limb fitting and physical rehabilitation 1,261 were amputees. The Red Cross also assisted more than 1,600 people with spinal cord injuries in 2015.²⁵ In 2015 Handicap International assisted more than 7,000 new patients. Of those, about 20 percent 1,400 people had lower limb amputations that were "a result of land mines, improvised explosive devices and by other weapons."

The United States has reduced its armed forces in Afghanistan since May 2014 from 33,000 to 9,800, but despite the drawdown, 22 US soldiers other Department of Defense (DOD) personnel have died since January 2015. All told, over the war course 2,371 US military and DOD civilian workforces had been executed in the region of Afghanistan and additional places "associated with the war. In addition to this 21,100 allied troops and more than this have been killed in war, with the British forces comprising the largest share of those losses. U.S. fatalities could have been much higher. The introduction of body armor for all soldiers and Kevlar helmets may have saved many lives. Advances in battlefield medicine, and the decrease in evacuation times, have led to higher survival rates of wounded soldiers who would have otherwise have likely died in the field. For example, traumatic amputations have, in previous eras, often led to death. More than 833 soldiers had major limb amputations from among the 17,000 U.S. soldiers who were injured from 2001 to mid 2015.

Cost of Blood war and Treasure

The United States of America, according to Neta C. Crawford, "has approximately appropriated an estimated of \$5.9 trillion dollars on the war on terror by Fiscal Year 2019 including direct war and war related spending this also includes future obligation on post-9/11 war veterans. This number differs significantly from the Pentagon's estimate of post 9/11 wars, because it includes not only war appropriation made to the Department of

Defense expenses in the war zones of Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in other places this also includes spending across the federal government which is a consequence of these wars. If the US continues like this, war spending will keep on growing. The Pentagon currently projects around \$80 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) spending through 2023. Even if these wars are ends by 2023 the United States of America would be still on track to spend additional money of \$808 billion to total of at least \$6.7 trillion, which does not include future interest costs. But the costs of war will be likely greater than this because, the number of veterans associated with the post-9/11 wars will also grow unless US ends it immediately”. Incapacity expenditure of Old-timers and the awareness on borrowing charge to wage for the warfare, will include a huge quantity of the expenditures of the United States after September 11 war.




Figure 3.3 US Costs of War: \$5.9 Trillion of Current Dollars Spent and Obligated,

Through FY201910

Irregularly issues digests by Pentagon of the expenses of the wars. According to the Crawford “in March 2018, the United States Department of Defense (DOD) calculated that it had spent \$1.5 Trillion in what it calls war-related appropriations since the 9/11 attacks. At that time, the DOD projected that Pentagon war spending on the post-9/11 wars would be \$1.7 Trillion through Financial year 2018, the fiscal year just ended. This number only includes a little portion of total war-related budget and war related expenditure”.




Figure 3.4 DOD Representation of Cost of War, March 2018

Department of Defense. Cost of War Update as of March 31, 2018. (p. 9)

John McCain said and wonder if, “After 16 years, should the taxpayers of America be satisfied for what is done with their money”. The expenditure of these wars is getting higher and higher than every last year and it is to intensify further if the United States is going to alterations it’s policy related to war expenditure.

According to some official reports The “US Department of Defense” is one of the largest single users in the world of crude fuel goods. As Crawford Says “Between 2010 and 2015 the DOD had purchased an average of 102 million barrels of fuel per year. The Pentagon thus emitted an average of 44 million metric tons of Carbon dioxide per year during this period. So this had made it one of the largest sources of greenhouse gases in the United States. The high costs spending in war and on war related direct and indirect spending pose a national security concern because they are non-developmental and unsustainable”. Citizens will be assisted well by increasing clearness & by the growth of wide range strategies and to end the wars and deal with other most urgent national security priority items. We have much more to do to understand the human toll of the long wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan and their interrelationship. There are gaps in the counting of tolls, and likely some manipulation of the official reports of the numbers killed and injured (United States General Accountability Office. 2016, September). For instance, although UNAMA reports that the Afghan National Army has killed and wounded civilians in its operations, the Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan reports insurgents killed and wounded in operations, but does not release reports of the number of civilians killed. Nor does the Afghan Ministry of Defense note the numbers of their own forces wounded in their attacks on militants. Further, the US still does not report its drone strikes in Pakistan, nor provide detailed information about the process of the strikes, estimates of civilian casualties, or analysis of the effects of the strikes on surviving civilians. Further, we still know too little about the indirect effects of the wars on long term health and welfare.

Despite these areas of uncertainty, there is no doubt in this detail that the war of Af-Pak maintain to be catastrophic for peoples. After nearly fifteen years of war, the combined deaths in the Afghanistan and Pakistan war zone is more than 173,000 and more than

183,000 seriously wounded? The initial 2 month in years of 2016 suggest, here are much warfare allied conflict in the region of Afghanistan in the year of 2015. unluckily, if the fighting in Afghanistan diminishes, the increased intensity of Fighting in Afghanistan will likely to spill over into Pakistan.

President Obama argued that great armed personnel company in the region of Iraq, a reason for inadequate occurrence of troops in the Afghan region. Anthony Gregory says that “While overseeing the reduction of ground forces in Iraq, in accordance with his campaign promises, Obama has greatly increased the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Before 2006, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan hovered between 10,000 and 20,000, with the exclusion of a peak in some time July 2005. In the beginning of 2006 the number began to increase though slowly. But at the end of the Bush administration in early 2009, there were fewer than 33,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. On numbers of occasions, Obama announce increase in U.S. troops in Afghanistan. In February 2009 he announced that 17,000 more soldiers and Marines forces will be deployed to Afghanistan. In November, he announced another deployment of 30,000 troops by mid of 2010. President Obama’s decision of induction of more troops in Afghanistan is compared to the president Bush’s surge strategy in the Iraq, some pressurised the president to augment the number of troops presence. Republican politicians have accused president Obama of dithering for his lackadaisical troop deployment in Afganistan and Iraq. By the middle of 2010, even the top U.S. general Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan spoke out in public that more troops were needed than then president Obama was willing deploy. Within eight months of the Mr. Obama presidency, there were as many as more than twice U.S. troops present in Afghanistan as when the president Bush left his office. Anthony Gregory has stated that As of June 2010 there were 91,775 U.S. troops there 58,975 more than at the end of the president Bush presidency. It represented nearly a threefold increase, with four to five times as many troops stationed in Afghanistan as were there during the initial five years of war. The combined U.S. troop present in both countries increased during Obama’s first year and has only declined from its peak by about one fourth in the end. In vowing to go through the federal budget, line by line, and eliminating programs that don’t work, which president Obama emphasized on savings in his campaign during his elections. He said

that one of the biggest savings we can make by changing our policy of war in Iraq. Obama campaign basically echoed the position of 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry on Afghanistan. He argued that Bush administration had neglected Afghanistan front in the war on terrorism. Whereas on Iraq issue, the Obama's campaign was anti-war as compared to Bush and the Republican candidate John McCain. The Obamas stance was more pro-war and pro-U.S interventions on the question of war on terrorism in Afghanistan”.

Where as numerous supporters of the us president had voiced displeasure because president Obama's government had engaged such a aggressive attitude for Afghan issue, no reason there was to be surprise without it's estimated that president Obama's political promotion has been a complete lie. In a main part of promotion writings, the Obama's movement stressed that “Obama has been calling for more troops and resources for the mission in Afghanistan for years”. This was the stance of Obama's campaign, Obama and Biden compaign was focused on that they will refocus on America's greatest security threat to that is the reemergence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Af-Pak region. Particularly, Barak Obama in his campaign illustrated some linkage among the crises in Iraq and the ignored truth in Afghanistan.

As Anthony Gregory stated “As U.S. troops in Iraq reduced in number, so too the fatalities. The United States bloodiest years in Iraq were 2004 and 2007 and saw 849 and 904 U.S. deaths respectively. In 2009 the number dropped to 149, and in 2010 there were 60 U.S. solders deaths in Iraq less than 10 percent of the average number of U.S. troop's deaths in Iraq per year of war under George W. Bush. During that time U.S. fatalities had only increased in Afghanistan. Before Obama became the president and took his office, 2008 was the deadliest year for the United States of America, with deah toll 155 means that on an average 88 of American troops died per year in Afghanistan in the period between 2002 and 2008. And after the Obama's enhancement of troops in war, the figure has sky rocketed so more troop eventually led to more casualties. In 2009 317 died and in 2010, 499 died that was three times more than the number during the bloodiest year of war in Afghanistan under George W. Bush, and it was five times more than and a half times the average number of deaths during that period. The total number of casualties of

U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan in the year 2010 was significantly smaller than the total number of casualties in each of the four years from 2004 through 2007. More U.S. troops have died in Iraq and Afghanistan combined in 2010 than in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2008. The hope for a dramatic decline in U.S. casualties appears subject to a complete withdrawal of forces from both the wars otherwise there is the continuous risk. Events, such as heightened conflict with Syria or Iran could immensely complicate the problem in war zones and can escalate the issue further can complicate it. According to new data released by the Pentagon during president Obama's presidency and with Barack Obama as commander-in- chief, there has been a 23% increase in the number of Private Security Contractors working for the Department of Defense in Iraq in the second quarter of 2009 and 29% increase in Afghanistan, which correlates to the buildup of forces in the country. In Iraq, the Pentagon attributes the increase to better accounting. But, these numbers relate explicitly to DOD security contractors. Companies like Blackwater and its successor Triple Canopy work on State. This means, that the number of individual security contractors could be quite higher, as could the scope of their expansion.

A basis constituent of Obama's critique of Bush's foreign policy was its huge expense on war. By withdrawing troops from Iraq Obama promise to save money which could be further be used for domestic priorities and to help relieve America's debt problems. The Iraq war indeed under Obamas administration was costing less per year than it did under Bush administration". In the fiscal year of 2008, as Anthony Gregory has illustrated "the U.S. spent more than \$140 billion on the Iraq war the highest expenditure, in fact, since the war had begun. The direct cost of U.S. involvement in Iraq had dropped each year since Obama has taken office it was \$95.5 billion in financial year 2009 and \$71.3 billion in financial year 2010 and was projected to be \$49.3 billion in financial year 2011 and \$17.7 billion in financial year 2012.

On the other hand at same time, expenses on Afghanistan war have ruthlessly burdened. The most expensive year during the presidency of President Bush was the financial year 2008, with a huge price tag of \$43.5 billion. In financial year 2009, that number rose quickly to \$59.9 billion. In Financial year 2010 the war was costing the United States \$93.8 billion, and the cost is projected to be \$118.6 billion for financial year 2011 and

\$113.7 billion for financial year 2012. For the two wars, the U.S. is now exhausting more than what it did except in 2007 and 2008, the 2007 and 2008 were the most expensive years under George W. Bush. Spending for most years under Bush was less, in terms of financial costs for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, than the war price tag under Obama presidency". Though Obama announced that the bulk of operations would be taken over by NATO, the United States of America provided most of the funding and muscles to NATO alliance. According to a senior Democrat "Norm Dicks" the defense appropriations of Operation "Odyssey Dawn" has priced around \$550 million and which was expected to price around 40 million dollar in a month. On 12 May, "Defense Secretary" Gates projected that the spending of the "Libya war crises" had gone to 750 million dollar to date. (Gates: 2011).

According to Gregory "Many of president Obama's supporters were concerned not just with American fatalities and financial costs, but also with the result of Bush's war on foreigners lives and world opinion. This consideration is not absent from Obama's war in Afghanistan. According to many reports and researches, 2009 was the deadliest year for Afghanistan since 2001. There was increase in civilian deaths toll since the invasion and there was an increase in the number of air strikes. Although many of these deaths were at the hands of Talibans. The world opinion toward U.S. global influence has generally improved under Obama, although some of this trend has reversed somewhat in Western Europe. The Arab world still after so many years of war looks upon the U.S. with suspicion. Egypt has particularly become suspicious and Arabs living in other corners of the world had said that they would prefer to be in China, France, Russia or elsewhere rather than in the United States of America. Arab's support for Obama's foreign policy towards gulf nations took a sharp dive in 2010.

Internal Displacement in Afghanistan and Refugees

War definitely stresses health when medical system, water treatment and sanitation infrastructure is damaged and remaining health system is exhausted with the number of injured personals and when basic preventive care, such as vaccinations, first aid cannot occur. Cluster bombs, improvised explosive devices and land mines may destroy livestock, keep farmers out of their fields and make gathering wood risky. Internally

migrated or displaced people and refugees are more susceptible to malnutrition and diseases, and are often less able to access medical care and medical facilities. Effects of war may lead to devastation, indirect illness and deaths. War related indirect deaths in any war and also in Afghanistan are caused by many factors, including disease, lack of access to safe drinking water, malnutrition, and reduced access to health care facilities. Environmental disasters and natural calamities like landslides, drought, and floods make living even more worst in war zones and create a very risky situation what the humanitarian relief community calls complex emergencies. The state of Afghanistan is the least unhealthy places in the world to live on the earth of twenty first century.

Afghanistan is the kind of state which has a inheritance of drought, landslide and a poor nutrition. Conditions of the people there have been imposed on Afghanistan by the conflict and poor economic condition badly affected the healthiness. Afghanistan has been at war continuously since 1979 and it is thus extremely difficult to disentangle the long term health effects of previous wars as compared to the current on-going war. Any assessment and appropriation of the effects of the current war is also made more difficult to understand, by the dearth of pre-war data on even basic health indicators. It gets very difficult to get data in war zone and areas of active fighting. In spite of ongoing armed conflict, some indicators public health has gradually improved. The Health Ministry of Afghanistan and the United Nations, the ICRC and many donor nations and non-governmental organizations have attempted to assess the health system of Afghanistan and have made a major effort to improve it. The very most important transform was the development of a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) by the Ministry of Health, working in conjunction with the World Health Organization in 2002, and the gradual implementation of BPHS by 2003". But healthiness has no better through the panel, for instance, tuberculosis is widespread in Afghan region and the occurrence of trouble had been increased.

Crawford suggested "The 2005 National Disability Survey in Afghanistan conducted from 21 December 2004 to 20 August 2005 founded that the war related disabilities accounted for 17 percent of all disabilities in Afghanistan. While the ICRC runs the majority of orthopedic facilities centers, Afghanistan's Ministry of Public Health also

treats the war-injured. Yet, even with the induction of resources, Afghanistan's public health sector has been insufficient to meet the needs of all those with disabilities". Another author Sigar stressed that "The US has funded some improvements in Afghanistan's public health infrastructure, including the construction and maintenance of hospitals. Some of the United State's investment in health care has been wasted according to the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. The US funded Salang Hospital in Parwan Province, which cost about \$600,000, which opened in January 2013 in spite of this construction was inadequate, incomplete, unsafe and unhealthy"(SIGAR: 2014).

Official reports of UNHCR indicated that "displacement is continues in areas of ongoing fighting. Afghans people have been on the move to escape from war almost constantly since 1979. The escalating war in these years has led to the displacement of people, violence or are unable to return home. As of mid 2014, there were nearly 2.7 million Afghan refugees. While Afghan refugees can be found all over the world, most Afghans have taken refuge in Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. On the other hand, more than 5.8 million Afghans have been able to return to Afghanistan since March 2002, in what is the largest ongoing repatriation operation in the world. More than 3.8 million of those who have returned have come from Pakistan, where they had taken refuge. The UNHCR noted in January 2015 that shelter remains a problem for returnees.

About 1 Millions of Pakistanis have been on the move, attempting to escape violence since 2004. In 2009, more than 3 million Pakistanis were internally displaced in the northwest region of Pakistan, many staying in approximately 30 camps for internally displaced people. While among them some have returned home while millions are still displaced. In July 2014, before the peak of the flight due to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, 1.2 million internally displaced persons were counted by the UNHCR in Pakistan. Additionally, from the neighboring countries there were more than 1.5 million refugees (primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia) in sum they were nearly 3.0 million refugees and displaced internally people within Pakistan.

Further in 2014 an additional around 176,000 Pakistanis had fled the country and sought refuge elsewhere. That displacement follows government offensives is foreseeable and foreseen in Pakistan. Just a week into the long offensive in Waziristan, on 22 June 2014, the Pakistani Military's Public Relations Service web site requested assistance and donation to help the internally displaced people of Waziristan. It is extremely difficult to assess the impact of the fighting in Pakistan on public health. Most of the most severe fightings occurs in the FATA. The FATA is governed by restrictive laws and few outsiders, including the media, are allowed into the area”(UNHCR: 2015). It is so enormously problematic to estimation the subsidiary fatalities of the hostile in the Pakistan’s northwest region.

Tax burden

U.S. had used drone in Afghanistan and Pakistan for air strikes. Drone are being used in greater warfare on terrorist. Crawford said that “it was aimed to kill mujhadien in Pakistan who fled from Afghanistan or who attempted to destabilize and overthrow Afghanistan's government. Drone strikes has created devastation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, it has caused lot of casualties in of civilians and their intentional targets. The United States supported Pakistan in ground and air war strikes against militant organizations, such as the Pakistani Taliban, which has led to the growing numbers of civilian casualties in Pakistan. Attacks by Pakistani forces on militants also included the cross border gunfire and shelling into Afghanistan. This across border sheeling and gunfire has led to the internal displacement of people and has also caused deaths and injuries in Afghanistan. U.S. and international military forces transported fuel, food and military equipment through Pakistan to Afghanistan, and the vehicles were repeatedly attacked by militants which led to lot of civilian casualties (Crawford: 2015). Wars financed through bond campaigns targeted the low and middle income populations and direct taxes such as income, property, and corporate taxes had resulted into greater social equality(Zielinski: 2018).

Another contributor to deficit financing for war is what an well known economist Linda Bilmes had termed the credit card wars. This credit card war financing is used pay for the Global War on Terror in Iran, Afghanistan, and Other Operations. In addition to allowing the federal government to raise funds quickly to confront an adversary. In comparison, both the Vietnam War and the post-9/11 wars began with a tax cut. The role of external finance, allied grants and foreign borrowing has become increasingly prominent (Zielinski: 2018).

Figure 1. Variation in United States War Financing Strategies¹¹




Figure 3.5: Variation in United States War Financing Strategies

Source: Adapted from Cappella Zielinski, Rosella. (2016). *How States Pay for Wars*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 4.

War Psychology and Hostility within American Society

A whole generation of Afghanistan has grown up never having experienced peace. Many Afghans are struggling to cope with the psychological, economic, social and physical ramifications of the conflicts of past and present. Approximately two in five (43%)

individuals reported having property destroyed, a quarter (25%) land destroyed and one in three (34%) were robbed during the conflict. The causes and perceived motivations behind these violations were varied but often this was tied to larger patterns of violence deliberately targeting civilians, making many individuals feel unsafe, and negatively affecting their ability to earn an income or feed their family.

Three in four people (76%) reported being forced to leave their homes at some point during the conflict, Of these, 41% were internally displaced, 42% were externally displaced and 17% were both internally and externally displaced. Security is the most crucial thing for survival and displaced of people multiple times, moving from one place to another in search of security have disturbed people and their life very badly. Migration is a critical survival strategy for most Afghans. Notions of choice are complex, given the protracted nature of the conflict and how deeply intertwined the violence is with poverty for many Afghans. When asked about the current conflict, 17% stated that they are currently thinking of leaving the country. More than one in ten (13%) individuals reported being imprisoned. Detention was most often described as random and linked with extortion, harassment and threats from parties to the conflict or local power holders, and many survivors describe family members playing bribes or elders negotiating for their safe release.

One in five (21%) of individuals reported being tortured. Roughly half of the reported cases of torture were linked with imprisonment and most often, torture was driven by perceived ethnicity, political affiliations or, in the case of many women, the perceived affiliations or actions of male family members. Just 1% of individuals reported receiving any compensation or apology for the harm done to them. None of the reported instances of compensation or apology were provided by those perceived to be directly responsible for causing harm. Rather, these actions were undertaken by individuals, such as community elders or neighbors, who expressed regret at not having been able to offer greater protection for those harmed. Seven in ten (70%) individuals saw unemployment and poverty as a major cause of the conflict, while almost half (48%) pointed to the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government. Other factors that individuals identified as major drivers of the conflict were: the Taliban (36%); interference by other

countries (25%); Al Qaeda (18%); the presence of international forces (18%); lack of support from the international community (17%); warlords (15%); and criminal groups (14%).

The psychological impact of conflict is extremely difficult to measure, particularly during such a prolonged period, nevertheless, the subject was frequently raised by individuals in the course of interviews or group discussions. Individuals often described memory loss, fear and anxiety or expressed concern about the psychological impact on children. There was a clear link between fear and anxiety, and insecurity associated with the current conflict. Many individuals, even in areas that are considered to be relatively secure, indicated that the continuing conflict impeded their ability to heal psychologically or forced them to relive painful experiences. One example of this is airstrikes. Some individuals felt the current airstrikes brought up bad memories of the pervasive and indiscriminate bombardments by Soviet forces during the communist period. Mental health is a significant concern in Afghanistan. Psychological wounds are pervasive and undertreated, and mental illness in Afghanistan has been high in comparison to other war-affected populations (Neta: 2011). According to Haqmal Daudzai While the experience of political violence has not been the only cause of emotional suffering in Afghanistan, many of its other causes, such as displacement, family violence, food insecurity, and poverty are indirectly and directly related to war. The impact of these stressors, including war-related violence, varies depending on the community and family support systems (Daudzai: 2008).

Surveys have found a range of mental health problems among Afghan adults, including anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress and disorder in the post-2001 era. A survey of Afghans over 15 years old in 2002 found that about 70 percent of respondents had depression and anxiety symptoms, while a 2003 survey that inquired about traumatic events over a 10-year period found symptoms of depression (39 percent), anxiety (52 percent), and post-traumatic stress disorder (20 percent). In 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health cited statistics that 66 percent of Afghans suffer mental health problems. Those who lost limbs or suffer other disfiguring injuries were more prone to anxiety and depression. The Ministry of Public Health, with the support of non-governmental

organizations, has tried to build capacity to address mental health needs. These groups started with almost nothing the main psychiatric hospital was destroyed in 2001 and the country had two psychiatrists for 25 million people. Mental health was included in the BPHS in 2003, and the focus has been on providing mental health care by integrating it with primary care. While there have been some improvements in access to mental health care, psychiatric services remain inadequate throughout the country. Mental health training has been added to medical training for health care providers, but there are very few health care providers. In 2011, there were 0.2 physicians per 1,000 people. By comparison, in the same year, the US and UK respectively had, according to the World Bank, 2.5 and 2.8 physicians per 1,000 people”. There is wide gap between requirement of health facilities and provided.

Social distribution of pro- and antiwar opinion and U.S foreign policy

According to Val Burris “Depending upon the historical context and the framing of foreign policy issues by political leaders and the news media, public attitudes toward the use of military force can also be highly volatile. This makes any predictions based on past American wars inherently hazardous unless they are tempered by an appreciation of these complexities. With these caveats in mind, the trends in the social distribution of attitudes toward military intervention for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and for the prospects and likely contours of political mobilization on issues of war and peace.

Like the Vietnam War, support for military action was stronger among men, whites, and the more affluent, and younger persons in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the post-Vietnam era, men have remained consistently more supportive of military action, despite recent changes in gender roles and gender politics. Racial differences have remained strong, but not uniformly so. The gap between whites and nonwhites has been most pronounced in periods of intense partisanship or when military events have sparked a rally round the flag response that affected whites more than nonwhites.

Education and income differences have generally followed a similar pattern, although there are signs of a weakening of differences in attitudes to war on the education variable. Another change in the post Vietnam era has been the relative decline in support for

military action among younger persons. There are diverse causes and meanings of attitudes toward the use of military force and to assess the implications of the social distribution of pro and antiwar opinion for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and political mobilization on issues of war and peace. Controversy over American military intervention in Afghanistan made patterns of public support for and opposition to war the focus of extensive research in the late 2000s. The current U.S. military action in Iraq, and the accompanying debate over the justification, consequences, and strategies for pursuing or ending that war, have again made public attitudes toward the use of military force a topic of pronounced social scientific interest (Eichenberg and Stoll: 2004) (Feaver and Gelphi: 2004). The analysis and interpretation of between group differences in public opinion for example, differences between men and women or between whites and nonwhites in their support for the war. There was some attention to this question in the spate of studies that followed the first Persian Gulf War especially on the gender issue but almost none regarding other U.S. military actions in the post-Vietnam era, including the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Public attitudes toward the Vietnam War were the subject of extensive study during the 1960s and early 1970s. Overall opposition to the war increased during the course of the conflict. Different polls yielded different estimates of the strength of this opposition. Val Burris stated that Alternative explanations were offered as to its underlying causes. Nevertheless, the many studies of this topic were in general agreement regarding the relative levels of pro- and antiwar sentiment among different segments of the American public. Two of the most consistently supporters were the greater incidence of antiwar sentiment among women and among racial minorities (Verba: 1967).

Sex-role socialization and gender differences in the propensity toward aggression were cited to explain the lesser militarism of women. Different interpretations were given to the high incidence of antiwar sentiment among racial minorities. Some attributed this to the disproportionate casualties that the war imposed upon nonwhites, whereas others saw it as a sign of a more sweeping alienation from American society. Most researchers found that support for military initiatives was stronger among the more educated and affluent segments of the public especially during the early years of the war. Ecological studies of

local referenda on the Vietnam War also found that opposition to the war was weakest in voting districts that were highest in socioeconomic status (Hahn: 1970).


Explanations given for the greater pro-war sentiment of high-status groups included their stronger integration into the mainstream political culture, their closer identification with and susceptibility to the appeals of government leaders, and their greater attentiveness to the initially hawkish Lending credence to the importance of the news media in bolstering pro-war sentiment among high status groups was the fact that the correlation between socio-economic status and pro war sentiment attenuated during the later years of the war at a time when many of the leading news media switched from hard-line support for the war to a moderate antiwar stance (Wright: 1972).

The greater support for military initiatives among younger Americans. Contrary to the widespread perception of youth as strongly opposed to the war, it was found that young people were actually more likely than their elders to support military intervention According to the 1968 ANES, for example, 42 percent of those below the age of 35 favored escalation in Vietnam and Afghanistan , compared with 30 percent of those age 60 and over (Wright: 1972). In all 14 Gallup Polls taken between March 1966 and October 1969, a higher percentage of those age 50 and over agreed that the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight than of those age 29 and under (Erskine: 1970).

The greater experience of older persons with the horrors of war, the closer proximity of younger persons to the patriotic indoctrination of the schools, the weaker attachment of younger persons to political ideologies and affiliations that might mitigate the impact of wartime propaganda, and the propensity of those most exposed to the privations of war to avoid cognitive dissonance by embracing opinions that justified those privations. What is undeniable is that the civil rights movement has waned as an oppositional force in American politics. The wars coincided with an historic peak in minority activism and radical turn in the civil rights movement. Minority leaders of the late 1960s and early 1970s articulated a sweeping critique of American society that linked domestic racism with imperialism in Southeast Asia (Fairclough: 1984).

To the extent that minority opposition to the Vietnam War was enhanced by high levels of political mobilization and the exposure to radical views, we might expect minority opposition to U.S. military action in the post-Vietnam era to be weaker or less stable and this trend was visible in post Afghanistan war on terrorism as well. Vietnam syndrome, it is argued, has been reflected in the greater range of debate on foreign policy issues in the news media and a softening of the jingoistic tenor of the school curriculum (Joseph: 2007).

Earlier speculation that the influence of the women's movement and changes in the social status of women would lead to a convergence of male and female attitudes on the use of military force is not well supported. There is a sharp difference between male and female attitudes toward military intervention within the younger population, since this is the age group that has been most affected by recent changes in gender roles and gender consciousness (Wilcox: 1990). In either case, the modest tempering of gender differences in support for military action in Afghanistan and Iraq is likely a conjuncture-like phenomenon rather than the harbinger of a new trend in women's attitudes to war. During the Vietnam War, race was consistently among the strongest predictors of support for the war. In the post-Vietnam era and war against terrorism racial differences have remained important, although their significance has varied from one foreign policy context to another. In the 1980s, much of the debate over U.S. military intervention focused on Central America. Race played little, if any, role in the alignment of public opinion toward Central American policy. This changed, however, in the wake of the Iran/contra scandal, when white support for intervention in Nicaragua increased relative to that of nonwhites. Racial differences were also evident whenever the United States took military action involving the overt use of U.S. ground troops, as it did in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama.




Note: Positive coefficient indicates stronger support among whites than among nonwhites.

Figure 3.6: *Association between Race and Support for Military Action (Average Gamma Coefficients)*

Val Burris said that racial differences in support for the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are among the largest of any conflicts in the post-Vietnam era. For example, in an ABC News/Washington Post poll, conducted in November 2001, during the first month of the U.S. air assault on Afghanistan, 95 percent of whites approved of the action compared with 71 percent of blacks; 78 percent of whites also supported sending U.S. ground troops compared with 43 percent of blacks. In the CBS News/New York Times polls of March 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, 81 percent of whites approved of the invasion, compared with 45 percent of blacks. In both cases support for military action among other racial and ethnic groups was intermediate between these extremes. Considering the intensity of the patriotic upsurge that followed the 9/11 attacks, the reluctance of substantial numbers of minority Americans and especially African Americans to endorse

retaliatory action is a testament to the profound racial divisions in American society in the predisposition to rally round the flag in times of perceived national crisis.

These findings reinforce the thesis that the stronger support that high-status groups expressed for sending U.S. troops to the Gulf was more the reflection of a follower mentality than of hawkishness in the sense of a general preference for tough military action (Mueller: 1973). In the final weeks leading up the invasion of Iraq, income differences in support for an offensive began to crystallize. By then most Americans had come to see war with Iraq as inevitable and imminent a view that was reinforced by the build-up in U.S. troop levels and approval of a U.N. resolution establishing a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.



Note: Positive coefficient indicates stronger support among younger age groups.

Figure 3.7: Association between Age and Support for Military Action

The tendency of younger persons to express stronger support for military action was one of the most robust findings of opinion polls during the Vietnam War. Younger persons also expressed more hawkish attitudes during the Korean War (Mueller: 1971). In the years since Vietnam, however, polls have shown no such tendency toward increased support for military action among younger age groups. The post-Vietnam i.e. war on terrorism lera has seen both continuity and change in public attitudes toward military intervention. The strongest continuity has been the persistence of gender differences in support for military initiatives. With only occasional exceptions, women have expressed weaker support for the use of military force than men” (Crawford: 2015). The robustness of this pattern, despite the changes in gender roles and gender politics in the post-Vietnam era, suggests that it is rooted in relatively enduring aspects of gender identities and sex-role socialization.

Conclusion

After looking upon the different phases of the war in Afghanistan, we can affirm that while the main countries of the alliance saw similar evolution in public opinion, each country has its own unique specificities. The main aim of the study is to explain the reasons that led to an unavoidable decline in support from the French people, even though France presented certain characteristics that distinguished it from the other European countries in the coalition. These characteristics should have created more continual support. After several decades of studies carried out on the factors that contribute to the erosion of public support to a military intervention, the conclusion is that there is no one cause that can explain a fall in popularity when it appears. The disappointment in public opinion is a phenomenon caused by factors that interact with one another.

In conclusion to justify the war, they should be able to anticipate the public's loss of interest, especially when losses become too high or when success is no longer certain. The analysis of the narratives in France justifying the war in Afghanistan shows that the latter were lacking. They did not provide sufficient accounts of the evolution of the conflict and were unable to explain to the public why the intervention was becoming increasingly belligerent. Secondly, these narratives did not show the progress made

despite the human losses, which is fundamental to maintain favourable public opinion. Furthermore, the term “war” was very slowly incorporated into the narratives, which made them incoherent with the reality in the field as perceived by the public through the media. The counter-narratives of those opposing the intervention therefore found more fertile ground in France, where the people were increasingly less convinced that the situation in Afghanistan concerned French interests⁴ and values directly. This dynamic contributed to the progressive rejection of this war.

The role played by military casualties was somewhat placed in perspective in recent studies on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The losses alone are not enough to explain the drop in support from the public, but they are even less tolerated when objectives are not reached and success appears to be unattainable. Although military losses are usually considered from the angle of the decision to withdraw troops, as they are a contributing factor to an unpopular intervention, the French situation reveals another phenomenon which has been neglected until now in studies on the impact of losses. It is not the losses themselves but the insufficient articles published in the media which, together with public disinterest, had negative effects. France is confronted with a contradictory situation in which, even if the image of the armed forces has never been as positive, service members consider that their fellow citizens are indifferent to their fate and this is particularly worrying when soldiers die in combat.

The war in Afghanistan revealed a potential weak point between society and its armed forces. It helped plant the feeling of a lack of recognition among the service members. While we can easily envisage that peacetime estranges citizens from the concern of having to defend the nation’s values and interests, it is generally accepted that war brings civilians closer to its military. Fallen soldiers, on top of the pain this causes within the families and regiments that suffer the losses, can have a damaging effect on trust, a fundamental sentiment between the military and the society it defends. This lack of trust enhances the sense of isolation caused by the civil-military divide. The war in Afghanistan serves as an example to explain the change in public opinion alongside the evolution in an overseas operation”. It is also a good example of the importance of the

narrative of political leaders and the media to maintain the support of the public and a positive morale in the armed forces.

Lastly, there is certain proof that resident's views on world matters, mainly on matter of peace and war, share certain widespread decisions. People in all nations worth the world validity that drift on from the confirmation of world organizations. People in all nations afraid-away of dangerous movements and of the probable cost of human in conflict. Nonetheless it is too right that approaches are shaped considering a state standpoint. People of wealthy and dominant countries are much happy with the practice of might in foreign affairs. People of worse and poor nations are too fewer keen.

Chapter- 4

Presidential reopens to public opinion

Introduction-

Afghanistan has been attracting a range of comments and reaction globally these days as we know that US military forces are present there, and are fighting in the region since 2001. The conflict has witnessed a constant undulation in terms of scale, human cost, salience and interference of elite powers and politics. Due to these differences in the conflict, it has emanated unique patterns of popular support, geopolitics, estimation of progress, and partisan division. Many analyzations and documentation have been done to understand the public perception, multiple aspect and tenets of this war. In general, have done the task of understating diverse perceptions and opinion on the ongoing conflict too. After the terrorist attacks took place on September 11, 2001, in Washington D.C. and New York, United State decided for war in Afghanistan within the leadership of Bush. Since then, it has only seen an escalation in terms of military presence and fiscal cost, and has culminated into a humongous presence of the army in the Afghanistan region. Now, the conflict that started way back in 2001 has ushered in 2009 where Obama administration has intensified the number of troops in Afghanistan; 17000 troops in February(Barbara Starr: 2009), followed by 13000 in October(The Guardian: 2009) and 30000 more in December(Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Helene Cooper: 2009) that amounts to a number of one lakh troop working in the region for the operation against Taliban. When President Obama was asked about the surge in the number of troops, he justified it on the basis of declension in the current crisis and called it a necessary step. He further added that the infusion of more army has been a calibrated step done with due diligence. As Barak Obama clarified succeeding the 1st flow of armed personal in the month of Feb, the fusion was important to steady a worsening condition that had not established the tactical consideration, the way and capitals it immediately necessitates. Though the U.S.A has been war at in the region of Afghanistan since soon after the 11 September attacks, President Obama made the struggle a top most importance. The increase was

endorsed in the name of conquering the “Taliban” and averting “al-Qaeda’s” recurrence.(Amy Belasco: 2009)

This part tries to analyze the presidential leadership, reactions and rhetoric which surfaced after September 11 and added the problems that the Obama government had to confront in the later years of the conflict. It will also look into the methods and strategies that Obama resorted to embolden and muster public sympathy and support for increasing the number of troops. For the Obama government, this was necessary in order to wipe out the fear of rhetoric that his government can face, on the pretext of fighting terror. This massive campaign though successfully understood and manoeuvred the mood in general perception of US public and successfully created a favourable political media discourse. Once the discourse was crafted on the issue of Afghanistan, it became convenient for the Obama government to go for escalation on the basis of anxiety inducted by terrorism. So, the threat of terrorism was fully exploited in order to generate a favourable public opinion and to re-strategize the conflict.(Gary C. Jacobson: 2010), (Rathnam Indurthy: 2011)

The Shockwave of September 11

There is no denying that September 11 changed the social-political life of the country and it surely started a new era in United States foreign policy. Those attacks were a nightmare for Americans as it shook the life of Americans with a never-ending fear. It wasn't only the US but the whole world was shocked and petrified at that juncture of time (Thomson: 2016). Those who were direct victims of the attacks, their emotional damage were beyond any reconciliation. News clips of planes attacking the twin towers and repeated visuals of buildings crumbling in media generated a sense of horrific fear and ravaged hope. Devastated hopes and colossal emotional loss turned in to immense anger and paved the way for military retaliation. It was found in a poll conducted in mid-September of 2001 that 51% U.S citizen were deeply concerned for the security reason and affirmed the vulnerability of being a victim in a terrorist attack. The American was prompt and swift in responding to the attacks that took place even before the American government under Bush decided to make an intervention in Afghanistan. In polling done in mid-September, Americans called the act as an “act of war”, and appealed for new legal framework and enforcement approach to deal with the act. After the attacks support for

the war was very strong and the majority of the population was in favor of going for military action. Seventy-five per cent responded in favor of attacking Afghanistan, a country that they believed was responsible for giving patronage to the terrorist. However, no cogent evidence was found that Afghanistan itself was involved in the attacks. Thus, the conditions then allowed the bush to go for war and he had almost no issue in auction warmongering proposal (Thrall and Goepner: 2017).

Going to the War

President Bush started the operation, where fear of terrorism was fully harnessed to create a favorable position. President reminded the Americans about the very serious threat and unseen consequences that they might confront in future. Repeated messages and visual media selling the fear was very well used by the government, and pro-war conditioning was materialized ultimately. After the public supports surfaced, Bush began the campaign in favour of war. Meanwhile, American grew exponentially as the president repeatedly talked about the unseen dangers of terrorism. Bush addressed the American population in his speech dated 11th September and officially announced the beginning of “war on terrorism”. In the speech, he told American people that America was targeted as we are the pioneer and harbinger of freedom, opportunity and equality in the world. In the American media, the attacks were defined as pure evil and gruesome act. Bush promised an exemplary retaliation and said that no leniency would be adopted. He further added that anybody who was involved or harboured the act will face the same retaliation. Bush assured the Americans that these attacks were grim in nature and Osama bin Laden and his supporters don’t want America to grow and shine as a superpower. Bush reiterated that even those countries that unknowingly became the base of terrorist wouldn’t be left and they will meet severe consequences too (Central Intelligence Agency: 2013).

The president made an official declaration for the war on September 20, 2001. Afghanistan, al Qaeda, Laden and the Taliban were the primary targets. However, he demarcated the line between those terrorists who blindly believed in Islamic extremist and the majority of Muslim clerics who were against al Qaeda ideology calling it against

the fundamentals of humanity and Islam too. He made a clear impression that war wasn't between Christians and Muslims and the focal point would be remain on fighting terrorism (Tierney: 2016).

However, some reactionary contemporary thinker played a key role no less than promoting religious hatred and animosity by labelling Islam itself as a threat to humanity and American security. The president vented his anger out on al-Qaida based in Afghanistan and many more countries where he believed that these terrorists were taking proper training and running camps to execute terrorism. He added that these terrorist are given full economic support and thus they hide in a different part of the region to plan terror & devastation. US President Bush also attacked the "Taliban" for creating a society of regimentation and repression. He added that the Taliban has a parochial mentality and it acts against the evolution of human intellects and fundamental rights. He reacted that the Taliban has only aided and admired act against humanity and life. After the incident, he tried to negotiate with the Taliban by asking them to stop the act of terrorism. He demanded that all terrorist should be immediately delivered and all the leaders of al Qaida should be given for custody with the immediate ban of all terrorist activities in Afghanistan (Kamolnick: 2014).

Bush speech made a larger implication that the Campaign against terror will not limit itself to al- Qaida but would eliminate terrorism from every part of the globe. He notably mentions that the Taliban is just going to be the primary target in the course of action; it will include everyone globally who harbours or supports terrorism in any form. Bush committed that this war will lead to ultimate devastation of the global terror network. He ensured that this campaign would not immediately end with an immediate factor rather it will go till the ultimate end of global terror. So there was a tacit message this campaign is going to be very lengthy in nature and could be one of the most stretched anti-terror campaigns that this world has seen ever. We have seen this assumption working out, as military forces have maintained their presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in many other countries. The drone strike of US military forces has continued in the last ten years, and the world happened to see a war which was technologically much ahead than its previous

campaigns (Byman: 2017).

One thing that must be included here was the warning of the U.S. asking unconditional support from the rest of the world for the campaign of “war on terror”. One of the comments that gained wide media report was the bush demand: “every nation need to make it clear: either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” The nature of the statement was absolutely clear and uncompromising that lead to creating a binary between good and evil. It also gave allusions that any country which wasn’t in favour of the U.S. would have labelled as pro-terrorist. Soon, Bush took the next stride and ordered the military strikes once found no compliance from the Taliban on the warning.

Bush proposed military action the region of Afghanistan ensuing the “Taliban’s” nonfulfillment with United State appeal. United States attacks began on 7th October 2001, made a strong impact and the Taliban was overthrown. It also sabotaged the base of al-Qaeda, and also weakened their operating system. Although bin Laden managed to escape, al Qaeda had to lose its operation base in Afghanistan. It was reported that many of its members fled to neighbouring country Pakistan for strengthening their base further. A new situation emanated where Taliban itself got embroiled into a conflict zone as northern alliance warlords increased their influence and captured the Afghan capital Kabul by the middle of November. In December, the “Pentagon” had declared that “the Taliban” army was conquered, though the war in contradiction of the “Taliban” to be continued (Lambeth: 2005).

Media Supported ‘the War on Terror’

After the attack of 9/11, a journalist gave full support for the cause of this warfare. Articles and reportage supported the troop’s responses started by President Bush. Moving forward to the Bush point of view, the media gave full support to the war, as well as emphasized the speculations where the threat of terror was shown (Hersh: 2006).

On the ground of hope, people were assured that war may bring back the dignity of democracy. However, the President himself did not create fear because there was already panic in the people. Yes, Presidential rhetoric definitely helped to increase the support for the war. The media ensured that the President stood fully with the public at the moment of this fear. The major newspaper made a clamour to support the president for this bigger cause.

President was supported by all the major newspapers. The editor of the New York Times on 15 September declare: American military power might be effectively used against Afghanistan where Taliban led government is host to Osama bin Laden. The newspaper added that Osama Bin Laden influence can't be easily contained, however, it can be done through the military campaign. The military campaign would surely weaken their military capability and interrupt the use of Afghanistan as the base for Taliban terrorist activities. The Post managing editor announced: "military force must certainly play a role in the coming campaign and Afghanistan now looks like one place where it may be needed. The United States can no longer allow Osama Bin Laden to operate there much less his training camps for aspiring terrorists." So it was very clear that both the newspaper openly supported the attack on Afghanistan which enabled the president rhetoric of crisis and hope (Hicks: 2019).

The content published in Media were sympathetic towards military action. Front page in the Washington Post earlier of the war were 4th times higher probably to talk about armed personal campaigns and preparation compared to the effort for negotiation with the Taliban. They were more in favor of war rather than asking for the extradition of Bin Laden. The main media more discussed the preparation of war and ignored the news of opposition to the war from the allied side. The reporting was more focused to highlight the attack on a scale where only war could be a solution and didn't focus much about the law-order crisis. It was reported in the newspapers that the United States was fully prepared for the war even before the inception of the war. If we go by the historicity of media reporting on issues like this, American media previously reported attacks on foreign soil, for example, US embassies attacks in Tanzania and Kenya by the name of crime or disaster but this was inevitably presumed as the war on terror. It was very visible

that television coverage preferred to show a war frame and a frame about law and order was shown very less. American *exceptionalism* was too used as a tool to demonstrate the strength of America and its unique and unparalleled way of fighting against terrorism. Media gave a moral proclamation of the U.S. and its goodness, and severe condemnation of foes. Articles usually ascribe sinful, fraud, state-supported extremism in orientation to the “Taliban’s housing of al Qaeda” (Rubin, 2019).

It needed to be mention that the human cost of life was not given due attention. Even, Times took the cause of showing Taliban overthrow more than the issue of humanitarian crisis and other gross realities that emerged post attack. Headlines stressing military advancement few of these ascribe Afghanistani people mortality by 18:1. (DiMaggio: 2009). On Cable News Networks, thirty-eight per cent of armed personnel reporting highlighted: “the technology of the conflict” and sixty-two per cent engrossed on “general military activity,” while seventeen per cent debated citizen fatalities. (Jasperson and El-Kikhia: 2004). Some correspondents stressed public-spirited worries for the discourse of anxiety and optimism were presented as a gist (Marai: 2017).

Nationalistic and patriotic constraints backed the defeat of humanitarian concerns. Editors directed journalist to escape narratives maintaining Afghan suffering and to highlight the U.S crisis.

After 9/11, Cable News Network Head Walter Isaacson commanded correspondents “to adjust images of civilian casualties in Afghan cities with notices that the Taliban shelters murderous terrorists. It seems too unreasonable to focus too much on the casualties or grief in Afghanistan.” Walter Isaacson warned journalists not to “ignore it is that country’s leaders who are liable for the circumstances Afghanistan is now in.” Rick Davis, the chief of “standards and practices at CNN”, restated Isaacson’s statement: “Military operations are a reply to a terrorist assault that destroyed thousands of innocent people in the U.S. The Pentagon has frequently accentuated that it is trying to depreciate fatalities in Afghanistan, even as the Taliban regime extends support to terrorists suspicious in the attack of the September 11.” (FAIR: <https://fair.org/take-action/action-alerts/cnn-says-focus-on-civilian-casualties-would-be-quotperversequot/>).

The pressure of nationalism and American supremacy accelerated coverage of military progress. Davis's comments insinuate that reporting was grossly incorrect and shown wrong numbers of the humanitarian crisis. It was so rare to see a top US newspaper claiming that military intervention was not warranted and many more steps could have been taken. To suit the purpose, many a time unofficial sources were deliberately ignored so that the second dimension of the story could be concealed (Swiderski: 2013). Polling after September 11 affirmed that antiwar views were widespread in most Americans, however, these perspectives were not given due coverage in the media. Echoing the public opinion, it was more projected as the brutal act of war not as the law order issue. It was perceived by reporters and the public as a condemnable attack as the targeted the democracy and freedom of America which the US values the most. Columnists and the people encouraged the use of force in Afghanistan. Media strengthened the views of the public and restated the need for war for a safer future of American society. Although, it would have created a different public discernment about the decision of war if other ways to lessen and tackle the crisis would have been covered in media (Brady, Fishkin and Luskin: 2003).


Public fear of terrorism was increased and amplified by media and political officials. Much of Bush's victory in garnering support for the attack was much seen in his speech dated 20th September (Thrall and Goepner: 2017).

After the speech, it was followed that most of the Americans reacted in line with what Bush said. The reactions were positive and enabled the rhetoric of fear and nationalistic crisis. (Huddy and Feldman: 2011).

Bush speech of 20th September was a taken on a very positive note as most of them who follow the speech around 80 per cent of them responded in favour of speech. Those who responded in a very neutral manner were very less number and constituted only 3 per cent of the opinion. Eighty per cent of Americans felt more confident after listening to the president's speech. It clearly suggested that Bush earned more support after the speech as it gave a sense of hope and confidence in the population. It can be seen in Figure- 1 that public support grew after Bush's rhetoric increased. Those who listened to the speech were significantly tilted to support Bush's idea of September 11, where a larger motive of

war on terror was shown along with military force against terrorism. Understanding the essence, it can't be denied that presidential rhetoric emboldened the public support that was already in support mode (Bush: 2007).

Figure- 1




Source: ABC/Washington Post survey 2001

The administration and the government intensified public concern of terrorism. The public opinion was also strongly influenced by the media. We can see in figure- 2 that concern and fear of the public actually increased and media discourse actually helped in generating more fear of terrorism. It also made an impression that non-violent methods were too discussed in media. This relationship can be meticulously seen after including the diversity in respondent issues such as gender, ethnicity, ideology, earnings and party-political. This relationships was statistically important afterwards supervisory additional issues such as plaintiffs' gender, ethnicity, schooling, salary, philosophy, and party-political. Figure- 3 confirms that majority US citizens was watching the broadcast on the Afghanistan problems; 80 per cent of Americans reached to a conclusion ensuing broadcast on American troops struggle and took the favor of military action. In the gap of one year, from 2001 to 2002, the support for military action increased. It can be seen in Figure- 4 that most Americans actually believed that war was going very well and supported the current scenario of war. It can be again noticed that increasingly concerned society on war was favoring the Bush decision and again it rightly ruled out the fact that no alternative was discussed. If we see figure- 5 then it can be figured out, political media actually helped the people perception and enthusiasm to grow in the support of the war.


Those giving friendlier response to political media discussion were more likely to realize that the purpose of fighting terror was heavily successful. Support for war increased by ten per cent across the population who have constantly followed the mass media dialogue (Mueller and Stewart: 2018). The results in the figure- 5 are getting noteworthy later supervisory the respondent factor like age, education, and race.

Figure- 2 “public attitudes on terror threats and alternatives to war”




Source: Pew Research Center Survey October 2001

Figure- 3 (public attention to War in Afghanistan)




Source: Pew Survey

Figure- 4 (public support for war after 9/11)



Source: CBS, New York Times, Newsweek SConclusion Surveys

Figure- 5 "political-media effects on public opinion of War on Terror: November 2001- January 2002"



Source: Pew Research Center

Discussion about the Afghanistan Conflict

The support for the Afghan-war came short of any detailed and concerned reporting by media. The panic that instilled by media and rhetoric of terror and hope was more than enough for justification of war and it actually increased year after year. Although, there was preexisting support, bush after giving speeches and media presenting the rhetoric; popular support increased significantly. September 20 speech was decisive in making a public opinion and surely garnered more support for war and military action in Afghanistan. The authority of the United State president and mass media to nurture warmongering stances in difference to the disappointment of the U.S premier to continue backing in starting to middle of the year 2009 (Wilesmith: 2011).

Out of Control: Afghanistan in 2009

Afghanistan was the forgotten phase, with public recognition directed towards Iraq for much of the 2000s. Reporters ignored the war reporting as things turned uglier in Iraq; casualties increased significantly. Despite extensive reporting of the region of Afghanistan in dawn of 2001 and start of 2002, the struggle was no more in headlines. It also gradually reduced even from the public mind from late 2002 onwards. Once the Obama administration in the 2008 election again took the cause of forgotten war and promised to defeat the Taliban, it reemerged in the public perception. It again gained significant attention in public discourse as military casualties increased in 2009. This was the time when media attention was again directed and focused towards Afghanistan (Goodman: 2017).

For the Obama administration, the year of 2009 was a very disappointing phase as instability increased in Afghanistan due to the revival of Taliban assaults on United States troops. It was the time when the leading volume of United States citizens were executed and 317 casualties took place. In the wake of these casualties, Afghanistan again became the central front in the war on terror (Landler: 2017).

This year witnessed too much of disturbance and it witnessed increased death during period of 2008 to 2009. Since the Guardian published in in the month of January, 2009

“the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” figures implied thirty-one per cent rise in brutality thru 2008, by around 7,000 “Violent episodes.” United States. alliance deaths increased between 2007 and 2008 by 32%, while Afghan mortality grew by nearly 40%. it was explained by one NATO officials on Violence: “We have seen a tactical change with the radicals utilising roadside bombs and related tactics upon Western troops while striking local forces, such as policemen or elders, more conventionally.” Disturbance and level of violence remained increased, with a 14 per cent increase in Afghan deaths from 2008 to 2009 and a 105 per cent increase reported in American deaths (Lasconjarias and Larsen: 2015).

The Afghan government was threatened due to increased violence and there was a risk of country political system been overthrown. Two days before the 2009 American presidential election, “the Taliban” advanced up fedayeen attack and also used the missile bombs to counter the administration. As the Times stated: “The assaults, directed right in the mid of the capital and the office of President Hamid Karzai, rendered yet another suggestion of the insurgents’ will to keep people distant from the polls and weaken Thursday’s election”(Katzman: 2009).

Following the installation of hundred of thousands more United States armed personnel into the region of Afghanistan was General David Petraeus’s guidance that the anti-terrorist operation wouldn’t displayed on instantaneous drop in attack. Petraeus prognosticated little increase in Violence because “a likely Taliban resentment in the spring and summer of 2010 means officials and the public should wait until December 2010 to assess the growth of the U.S. military tactics.” Notwithstanding ideas of increasing attacks, President Obama also pledged an inevitable drop in assault in Afghanistan (Petraeus: 2017).


Rising Antiwar Feeling

Starting to middle of 2009, indicated a meaningful shift in people sentiment and perception opposition of war. In the month of January, citizens of United State were divided, 45 % to 45 %, on in case the Afghanistan war was going “very” either “reasonably well” on the other side and “not too great” either “not at all great” on the one side.“ In the month of Feb, 47 % supported the warfare, while 51 % rejected this. U.S.

citizen's view in starting of 2009 was tilted at a tipping point; a major population also have grown antagonistic to or helpful towards the war. If we see figure 1.6, during the year of 2009, backing to the ongoing hostility decreased through various questions. In most inquiries, backing plummeted from farther fifty per cent from starting to middle of 2009 to fewer than popular backing in the October months (Miller: 2010).

Why the US citizens started to protest against war in the year of 2009? Voting from previous years discovered the fact that small majorities protested the conflict at several times in the recent past. for example, in January 2007 and July 2008, these sentiments were noticed but it was not until 2009 that polls confirmed preponderance of opposition month after month.


Figure- 6 (declining support of war, December 2008- November 2009)



Source: ABC/Washington Post, CNN/ORC, CBS/ New York Times and Marist Survey

As shown by figure 1.7, larger populations of Americans were strictly keeping a view on the struggle in area of Afghanistan in one by six “Pew Research Center surveys” carried in the year of 2009. Consideration to the Afghan region suggested that news reporting carried out by ample possibilities and prospective to alter approaches in whichever a supportive or hostile way. it all weighed and depended the way information was communicated in reports. Frequently cynical news, nevertheless, was most obvious and common as coverage of American deaths increased exponentially.

Figure- 7 “public attention to Afghanistan: March – December 2009”




Source: Pew surveys.

We can see that public attention increased and it has a stronger association with U.S. casualties taking place. Eventually, public sentiment arose against the ongoing conflict. Figure 1.8 reports the connection between rising fatalities and hostility. Reasonable drop in fatalities was followed thru decline in the reporting of fatalities from Feb to April 2009. The slump in reporting matches through a drop in resistance to the warfare amid the month of March to May. Another tendency, revealed in figure 1.8, is the increase in fatalities and reporting of fatalities which was lesser than 10 deaths in a month of April which increased to 60% by the month of October. Reporters reacted by writing fatality accounts more frequently. Citizen sentiment went into adverse direction; opposition for war grew from 50 per cent of U.S. citizen in March to approximately sixty per cent in

November.

It was soon recognised by journalists that war's credibility was under threat due to growing casualties. Times came with the editorial page that Americans are no more supportive of 8 years only tiring war. It was also reported that situation in the region of Afghanistan its was deteriorating & alarming. The Washington Post editors reported “U.S. fatalities this summer gives a hint that Mr. Obama will apparently come under the significant pressure to withhold the further troops he asked and revise the course.” Summary, two of the newspapers confessed that people are annoyed with the increasing number of deaths.

Figure- 8 (the interplay between casualties, reporting and war opposition, Afghanistan 2009)



Source: LexisNexis Academic Database, and CNN/ORC survey


President Obama’s Acceleration and the Growth of Opposition

Anti-war disagreement increased in the time of wars on Iraq and Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks generated huge people support for G.W. Bush, who had a ninety per cent support ranking. Americans believed that Bush would penalize those guilty of the 9/11 invasion. Over time, though, backing of the U.S. president decreased Most citizen complained of President Bush’s styling of attack on Iraq in the middle of 2004. Most of them reasoned that the war on Iraq didn’t justify the causality lately by 2004. Most of them backing for

reversing “a large number” of military appeared in the wake of 2004, and most of them backing for complete removal of armed personnel was visible in the middle to dawn of 2005. In Afghanistan region, the 1st suggestions of mainstream hostility developed in the year of 2007 & 2008, and maintained most of the disapproval visible by middle to dawn of 2009 (Butt: 2019).

Opposition against warfare has unfolded during the time. Although inquiries from twain stages imply that resistance developed against the war sooner in the Iraq war whereas it took more time in during the period of Vietnam War. As Gallup stated, “a majority of Americans started to call Iraq a ‘blunder’ in about a year and three months of its inception, while it took over three years for a majority to say Vietnam a mistake.” People’s disappointment with the President and his administration increased drastically afterward the appearance of the Pentagon Documents, indicating that America’s Political leadership misinformed the citizens about the War of Vietnam and the “Watergate scandal” (Bert: 2011). Figure 1.9 discloses that a robust mainstream of U.S. citizens in the initial to middle of the 1960 accepted that United States administrations was “run for the benefit of all and that they could trust the government to do what’s right most of the time”. Early this ranking took a slump to a down of roughly twenty per cent for two of the questions in the year of 1980. Civil faith increased over the incident of 9/11, though in future it weakened.

Figure- 9 (public trust in government over time: 1964-2008)



Source: American National Election Study survey

It was questioned by Dalton whether the distrust for a government-developed after pentagon papers and Watergate scandal appeared. He observed that a similar trend is prevalent throughout the other western nations which hinted that apposing government feelings are not limited to only United States civil society. Dalton's results should not be observed to propose that governmental actions are inconsequential in illustrating why the citizens of United States oppose going into a conflict. Intellectuals talked much about "Vietnam Syndrome," this suggested about American's opposition of warfare with endless in view and defined by mounting human loses. United States' citizens were reluctant to give their commander-in-chief much freedom in attempting overseas disputes like Vietnam Warfare. Vietnam syndrome was recognized by President George H. W. Bush prior to the 1991 Gulf War. "Powell doctrine" was used well by Bush that was based on overwhelming force. It also ensured a definite timetable for the structure of army actions. The Powell Doctrine emphasized and talked of "a clear exit strategy" expressed "right from the beginning," by using forces "the last resort" (Burns and Novik: 2017).

Foreign policy under the government of George H.W Bush was influenced by the Powell syndrome. It was influenced because Powell didn't strive for Iraq's military occupation. In divergence, Bush's job was built on the refutation of judgments between Vietnam War and War of Iraq. President Bush was negligent with pacifist opposition which can be well observed in the fact that he sent a supplementary 30 thousands armed personals in the year of 2007 in the "surge" & decided to decline Sectarian Violence in Iraq (Corneye Council for Ethics in International Affairs: 2019) .

Ignoring American's emotion, President Bush degraded his executive legacy. With the wake of 2009 the approval ratings of President Bush on Iraqi issue was reaching to its nadir and it touched lowest ever 34 per cent. It was a significant decline which described 44% point reduction from Bush's 78% support rating in April in the year of 2003. Overall support rating of Bush touched a low of 22% in the wake of 2009, that why CBS listed him "one of the most despised departing presidents in history." Barak Obama looked worrisome about ongoing war of Afghanistan and about his presidential heritage after

observing Bush administration's involvement in War of Iraq. Those who were policy adviser under the Obama administration were attentive of the importance that accidents decide in materializing for those who were opposing the Afghan War, Linked with Press reporting about rising human losses: "Demand from the public and hostility towards politicians is increasing as soldiers' bodies return home. Europeans and Canadians are now strained of the war or at least their engagement in combat operations?"

President Obama expressed his concern over those soldiers who died during the December 2009 escalations. It was also highlighted in Obama's discussion with advisors of foreign policy that how has he handled and coped with the casualties and crisis. Obama mentioned the fact during the trip when he went to see the injured soldiers in Washington. He mentioned that the memoir and also said that he would not want to go to the water reed again. Obama also talked about victims, in December 2009, Obama delivered a speech which was based on Afghanistan situation, to U.S. citizens: "As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you a mission that is explicitly outlined" (Obama: 2009).

Obama promised that troops will return after 18 months. Obama very well realized that people were getting sensitive about increasing casualties. He said: "recognized Americans' sensitivity to mounting casualties: We saw and witnessed this war at the expense of many lives and resources, as president, I have tried to reach every family who lost his son in the war, I personally signed in condolence letters. Those people who have put their lives in danger for this battle, I have read their families and their loved ones letters too. I have met our brave injured heroes at Walter Reed Hospital. I have walked down to Dover to see the draped coffins of 18 Americans. I see a disappointing state of life all around me. If I did not believe that the safety of the United States and the security of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would heartily direct every single one of our companies to come back tomorrow." In Obama's remarks, it clearly shows that the general public wanted to see the war ending by seeing unending casualties (Feaver: 2015).

It can't be denied that a public culture of dissent was emanated during Afghan war. Historical landmark was created in Obama's December 2009 speech. It was unprecedented as president escalated the forces along with giving a fixed time to call

back the troops. So both the sentiments were taken care and it took a new turn in the entire episode. Proposed reduction in number of armed personals was taken as contradiction to Bush's Iraq upwelling in the year of 2007. Though, Bush administration didn't plan anything about withdrawing troop and more focused on the plan of military escalation. Bush said that any decision would be taken after evaluating the war progress. As the Times stated, "any decision would be taken after considering the factor of security and the stability of the Iraqi government." Although Bush announced an outline of removing troops in the year of 2008 as a part of Iraqi and the U.S. status of forces sharing; it was a result of pressure by from the Iraqi government (Baker: 2009).

But later we saw that the American administration never intended to follow the pressure of Iraq.

Promises of Obama's withdrawal in 2011, gave a suggestion that now U.S. government was really concerned that it wouldn't continue the war with the cost of human lives. The persistent increasing number of death toll in the year of 2009 enlarged the antiwar exponentially above of all the probable times, Moreover, why apparently repudiate that schedule, as done by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, by keeping after the speech in December 2009 by Obama that deletion would be managed by ground reality of Afghanistan? This antithetical view gave Obama's administration a comfortable schedule for extraction that suited President Obama to give response to the opinion of Americans. It also allowed the government to think about emerging situations in United States and Kabul in the wake of 2012 presidential election. If the Afghanistan war was a threat to Obama winning the elections again then troop withdrawal would have been accelerated and entertained while Democrats portrayed themselves as the "antiwar" party. a clear demonstration of anti-war position was central to the 2012 election as the government in pressure due to the commitment of fighting terrorism along with the removal of troops. This war-opposing perception varied through the "Romney campaign", which stimulated ongoing control; Obama's announced support for removal of troop and his qualification where withdrawal would be based on the actual situation on the ground. If Republicans were succeeded in the election of 2012 in urging Americans of the requirement of persisting in Afghanistan region, leaders of Democratic Party tried to keep the status quo left out of concern of people's bitterness. To show themselves strongly on the security

grounds, Democratic Party could “out-hawk” Republicans by evolving the conflict as mandatory because of new scenario and developing “conditions on the ground” (Landler: 2011).

Rhetoric of the Election of American President 2008:

In this election, Barak Obama depicted Afghanistan region as a ignored conflict and formulate Saddam Husain’s Iraq as a breach of concentration from the “War on Terror”. in July 2008 President Obama said: “If another attack on our homeland comes, it will likely come from the same region where September 11 was designed and yet today, we have more troops in Iraq than Afghanistan.” “Talking about Iraq's strategic outcomes and the dominance of foreign policy, Obama said that the occupation” distracts America from each threat we are facing, this Iraq war diminishes American safety, U.S. reputation in the international politics, United States’ army, trade, American businesses and the resources. He definitely talked about the perils of war that one country has to face with an increased possibility of military escalation. We need to face the difficulties of the new century of 21st, by anyhow and want to stay welcoming and critical in order to survive our great heritage (Brill: 2016).

He also maintained the position that the strategy which U.S. has adopted for Iraq is not sound in nature and has nothing to do much about our security”. Obama didn’t seem to give too much importance to a war which has absolutely not much to do with 11 September attack. However this opposition was more based on the concern for the reputation of U.S. worldwide that actually happened due to bush’s reluctance to listen world opinion. Actually if we try to analyses the bush warning where he said that “either you are with us are you are with the terrorists.” Obama’s soft and mature take on war actually pleased the voters who didn’t resonate much with the rhetoric of war and policy of polarization. When citizens found unhappy from Bush’s rhetoric of war and static policy then Obama statement came as a fresh air of hope and change. The sense of hope and change in actuality became the symbol of politics by Obama (Butt: 2016).

In 2008, in month of July, President Obama delivered an idea about the "war on terror" where he promised that he will lead this country to a new direction. Obama also talked about rapprochement with allies as many countries felt berated and sidelined due to

Bush's polarizing rhetoric. Obama vowed to withdraw “combat brigades” from Iraq within sixteen months. He added that only residual force would be left to tackle any remnants of Al- Qaeda, to take care of diplomats, and to give support to Iraqi security forces. For the issue of Afghanistan, Barak Obama decided that the terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda & Taliban would be in the center of importance and to accentuate the claim he would send 2 supplementary combat troops to the region of Afghanistan. Obama asserted that to “focus on training Afghan security forces and supporting an Afghan judiciary”, people of Afghanistan would “take out terrorist camps” & “crack down on cross border insurgents.” President Obama stated that a fresh fiscal support was imperative in order to deliver army brigade and to protect investments in Afghanistan. On that note, Obama cited an amount up to more than \$ 1 billion so that their economy can be reestablished in a new way. Concern of Barak Obama was basically on peace and stability of Afghanistan & Pakistan region. It clearly suggested that fiscal development and humanitarian matters were subsidiary matters. Barak Obama kept emphasizing that army’s aspect of the operation was given priority above maintaining peace and stability in the nation (Tarpley: 2008).

The December Increment

Military escalation was used in Obama's campaign for political gain which he did in an orthodox way in September 2009. This was the time when Obama was under public pressure for troop increase as this was proposed by General Stanley McChrystal. It took the form of a national discussion in December 2009 when he made the case of increasing 30,000 additional U.S. troops. The controversy clearly gave a message in public domain that the Obama administration was all set to go for a military escalation. The real addition that took place in October 2009 of 17,000 troops gave clear directions of further escalations in media also. Troop was increased in February and October but miserably it wasn't trailed by a presidential campaign to promote the war for the political benefits. The oratorical promotion would not take place before ending of 2009. General McChrystal’s confidential advice to President Obama cautioning for "mission failure in Afghanistan” was exposed by the Washington Post in September 2009. McChrystal stated: “Failure to obtain the lead and reverse insurgent force in the imminent term (next

12 months) may possibly come with an outcome where crushing the insurgency is no longer viable. The Post published that Obama showed no judgment would be taken about pumping in more troops until he gets an absolute idea of the further strategy.” Media somehow got this McChrystal’s advice thus it wasn’t a formal and careful portion of Barak Obama’s promotion to sell upsurge. The disclosed report indicates an actual test to the Obama’s administration that is built basically on tactics, approach and plan than principle. His Administration assured to increase armed personals in Afghanistan’s terror affected areas, while he was contesting for the presidency and he achieved that everywhere and all the time during 2009. The Obama’s administration debates in 2009 were constructed on the fact that how many troops should be added (Schmitt and Shanker: 2009).

The Washington Post asserted that Barak Obama and his team consumed few months to strategies on Afghanistan’s situation after McChrystal’s report was released. “On this day, Nov. 11, the president looked the choices with a tinge of annoyance. a meeting that was held two weeks earlier, he directed towards a plan to deploy and pull out troops. This was very much in consonance with the plan where a surge was done by his Republican predecessor in Iraq. What was in front of Obama scenarios in which it took too long to get in and too long to get out was not what he wanted.” Reportedly, slow adding of troops under the plan of McChrystal’s escalation was main concern of Obama. It added to the concern of Obama as it didn’t mention the timeline of withdrawal, and suggested adding more troops than president recommendation (Schmitt and Shanker: 2009)..

Speech by Obama at West Point Military Academy

President Obama’s speech at the Military Academy was the central theme in the effort to politically promote and sell the incensement. Barak Obama had gone forward to the initiative. Obama used the discourse of terror for the justification of the act. While rhetoric concentrated by President Bush on Iraq’s chemical weapons of mass destruction and connection to the al-Qaeda, the Afghanistan situation varied. Nobody accused Taliban of giving Weapons of Mass Destruction to the al-Qaeda. Relatively, Barak Obama cautioned and enlighten about the need for making Afghanistan safe and free of

any external vulnerability. He also mentioned about confronting Taliban and to destroy the entire al-Qaeda base (Hlavsova: 2019).

These objectives demonstrate the spirit of the operation of hopefulness, President Obama promising to protect U.S. citizens against the danger of extremism. There was a strong similarity between Obama's speech and Bush rhetoric after September 11. Both of them demanded their unwillingness vow to the war. Barak Obama proclaimed, "We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men captured four airplanes and used them to kill nearly 3,000 people. They hit our military and economic nerve centers. They killed innocent men, women, and children without considering reverence to their faith or race or station." The mentioning of 9/11 was wished-for to retain combat in opposition to the al-Qaeda that President Obama indicated could converted reviving deprived of a new actions. Trying to establish the relationship of terrorism with the surge were controversial in light of 2009 when it was found that the al-Qaeda wasn't capable to operate in the country (Roth: 2017).

President Obama seemed to recognize the point in his speaking, asserting that "al-Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were sheltered by the Taliban." Identifying the dislocation of the al-Qaeda from this region, President Obama observed the result of the very first year of 21st century's American military operations: "within a matter of months, al Qaeda got rattled and many of its operatives were murdered. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its feet. However, Obama expressed the surge as required to curb al-Qaeda's control by suppressing the germination of Taliban Violence against the Afghan government; after fleeing across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda's leadership discovered a safe refuge there. Over the last several years, the Taliban has managed common ground with al Qaeda, as they both endeavor sabotaging of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has started to take charge over swaths of Afghanistan, while involving in increasingly shameless and disastrous deeds of terrorism against the Pakistani people" (Laub: 2014).

Obama used factor of hopefulness to justify the American military operations as Indispensable to defense the U.S. safety. Obama also stated Afghanistan and Pakistan as the center-point of the radicalism and terrorism and shelter to practice terrorism for the al-Qaeda. Barak Obama warned that “new attacks are being plotted as I speak, he said: there is no idle danger; no fragile threat.” lack of awareness and failure to think and act indicated that the threats “will only increase if the region goes backwards and al Qaeda can proceed with impunity. We must ensure that pressure is maintained on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must think about the stabilization of the region also our partners capacity in the region. Obama alleged a direct relationship between the Afghanistan war and terrorist threats on U.S. soil. He announced that last few months”, it has come in the notice that we have arrested radicals and extremists in our borders that were sent from the outside region with a potential intent of committing a new terror act. (Aslam: 2012)

Taliban violence against the afghan movement was not posed as an immediate threat by Obama. He portrayed Taliban violence as a rising one. “There is no immediate danger of the government being toppled, but the Taliban is continuously rising as a potential threat”. He added that Al Qaeda has not attained the same reemergence which it did before September 11 but they are still functioning safely within the borders of Afghanistan. It was surely left to the imagination for the public when Obama referred to al-Qaeda reemergence in contrast to September 11. The comment that Obama gave was probably suggesting that Al-Qaeda always maintained a potential presence in Afghanistan and its seriousness was never addressed competently (Pandey: 2019). Even if inferred least, this obscured framing suggested that Al-Qaeda would have grown much more in case United States didn't interfere. A statement was made by the secretary of Defense to, Obama, Leon Panetta in his late 2009 announcement that intrusion into Afghanistan by Al-Qaeda fighter is an ongoing reality. He said that their presence is something which can't be ignored today. Obama too emphasized and reflected the view. Obama too followed the pattern of bush rhetoric and decided to relegate humanitarian rhetoric on secondary level. Obama made the population of America believe that government was promoting democracy and freedom. Obama warned: we are fighting against violent radicalism; it is going to be our test whether we succeed or not in this mission. (Kaspersen: 2015)

Postsurge Rhetoric

In the last of November 2010, Obama talked about his promise that withdrawal of forces will begin very soon, by July 2011. Obama spoke of the counter insurgency campaign too. He said that U.S. forces has strongly disrupted the growth of al-Qaeda as an emerging threat and has stabilized the country. He didn't forget to mention the allies and thanked them for their unconditional support and commitments in fighting against terrorism. Obama reiterated that after the fearful and intimidating phase of violence, Afghans are looking forward for a new future; a future that represents schools and new markets. He proudly mentioned that our Special Forces, intelligence and military have done a tremendous job, we killed Osama bin laden, the only known leader of Al-Qaeda. (Roberts, Ackerman and Rasmussen: 2015)

Challenges to the Surge

The fear and concern of al Qaeda were given to justify the surge. However, on the other hand, rising deaths caused less enthusiasm in the minds of people for war. The ongoing war was criticized on the premise of humanitarian and strategy concern. While the president portrayed the Afghan government as an important U.S. partner, charges of official corruption raised questions about whether the surge would succeed. Nation magazine reporter Christian Parenti, made a report on the war after he traveled to Afghanistan. He said that corruption is a major issue there and escalation is absolutely unwise decision. Other charges like narcotics, corruption, interference of warlords in the policy and disturbing human rights were too mentioned in the report (Jackson: 2019).

The warlords always had a bad public image and were grossly involved in inhumane right and acts. In the province of Helmand, where U.S. military was very active, the warlords were found responsible for raping, kidnapping pre-adult boys and girls. However, U.S. official confessed the fact of working with warlords as they believed this to be helpful for gaining tactical information of the region. Although Obama agreed that there were certain problems with Afghanistan government but he didn't consider corruption as an obstacle in tackling terrorism. Other challenges emerged after the claim of U.S. intelligence that less than 100 al-Qaeda operatives were only active Afghanistan. The

estimates were confirmed by the General David Petraeus who concluded that al -Qaeda really suffered a setback and a significant loss.(Krause: 2018)

So the fragile presence of al-Qaeda only raised doubts about the military escalations. The question was raised whether Afghanistan was really an important front to tackle terrorism.

It should be examined that was it appropriate to go for troop's infusion in a country which was no more a host to the terrorist outfit? These were some genuine questions raised by some prominent war critics. Finally, the last thing which created obscurity regarding the will and commitment was Obama statement where he mentioned the dismantling, defeating and eliminating the entire base of al-Qaeda. Obama statement about dismantling the al-Qaeda base was not very convincing as he claimed that they were no more functional in the region. (Bacon: 2018).

Many more scholars like Juan Cole from Middle East questioned the commitment and possibility of wiping out Taliban as Taliban has also got support in Pashtun areas and decimating Taliban would be only possible through genocide.

To wipe out them completely, Afghanistan would need around \$ 12 billion a year which doesn't seem plausible. So it raises a question whether it has actually got the resources to execute what the U.S. wants it to do. Humanitarian criticism was also raised due to increased strain that Afghanistan's public faced due to war. Civil casualties were also increased after the surge went up. It was reported that from 2009 to 2010, civilian death increased by 31 percent, and the number of death were maximum since 2001. Although the defenders of war said that most of the casualties, almost 75 per cent happened due to Taliban, and only 16 per cent due to American forces, however, the seriousness of the issue was undeniable. However, there were reports claiming opposite narrative that casualties have actually decreased caused by United State from 2009 to 2010. Central Asia and Taliban expert Michael Semple made a point about Geneva conventions, where he believes Geneva Convention was out- rightly violated by the approach that U.S. has taken for Afghanistan (Bacon: 2018).

Echoing the very same concern, International Relations scholar Robert Pape explained that despite infusing more troops and concentrating more control in the Pashtuns, U.S.

has only witnessed an anti-American sentiment and violence with no decline in causalities. Some other concerns were raised by intelligence officials as Graham Fuller mentioned that escalations had made the Middle East and Afghanistan more dangerous for Americans overseas. He added that the afghan war has created a hostile perception for Americans and a lot more people are joining some terrorist organization as the situation remains radicalized.

U.S. Representative James McGovern (D: CT) claimed that infusion of more military makes reconciliation and normalcy more challenging and difficult. He said that U.S. lacks a clearly defined vision and mission with no end of ongoing conflict.

Humanitarian concerns remained the most striking factor, it actually created a perception binary, in a February BBC poll it was found that seven in ten felt positive that U.S. overthrew Taliban in 2001, but only 33 percent were positive about the ultimate victory of U.S. in another survey. Most of them believed that Taliban would emerge triumphant or the conflict will continue like this only. Some of them had a third view that Afghanistan and Taliban would go for settlement on a larger compromising level. Most Afghans rejected the surge as seventy percent of the population supported the fact that U.S. airstrikes for defeating the purpose of Taliban emergence is unacceptable as it caused severe civilian casualties. When it comes to condition of infrastructure, bridges, roads; it was alleged that these were really in a very bad condition. It was also commented that escalations have only led to destabilization in Afghanistan.

Undermining the Complication of the War

Objectivity in journalism always designs the future of media coverage throughout the globe. Objectivity without any critical assessment promoted the old rhetoric for war. It tacitly supported the very nature of war as it created a unilineal dimension. The case study of Afghanistan also highlights the fact that hostility and opposition to the war have increased only after continuous violence and casualties. Although, there have been cases where reporting has been seemingly free from government control but it doesn't suggest that it was absolutely free from government. Despite the media acted a dependent

medium or a free one; it played a crucial role as an independent or dependent actor in encouraging anti-war dissent. Accepting the fact that journalism can really amplify the criticality through its camera lenses, I am not insinuating that journalists were going for propaganda. (Cockburn: 2018)

Editorial for the War

If we go by what TIMES and the Post, has offered these two have supported Obama escalation but with a pragmatic criticism. *Times* wrote in favor of devising a strategy to come out with a better result as things were getting critical from Taliban side. It also demonstrated its liberal side when it commended the addition of troop but also talked about civil casualties and other humanitarian crisis. The paper supported Obama's choice of General Stanley McChrystal as the military commander in Afghanistan. The appointment created a paradigm change in principled position and focused more protecting Afghans civilians from violence. If we see objectively, the afghan people have least interest in war as it creates only a hell like situation for inhabitants of Afghan people. Protests of common civilians in Afghanistan were very genuine and justifiable as 2,000 Afghan civilians were killed in the war. A survey which was conducted by the *Washington Post* in 2010, 56 percent of Afghan civilians showed their reluctance for the United States.

Helmand and Kandahar region gave a favorable view on improved security but 79 percent of them living in those regions said that withdrawal of U.S. troops must be done by summer 2011. However, we cannot conclude that opposition to war was driven by the perception that American forces were playing a negative role there. Hostility to war was based on the feeling that there could be some alternative possibilities for mitigating the crisis. 83 percent of Afghans supported government efforts which were brought to negotiate and dialogue with armed anti-government element. General David Petraeus reiterated the need that U.S. government needs to convince the civilians of Afghanistan that this mission doesn't only involve an anti-Taliban narrative but also welfare of Afghan local people and their betterment.

The Times suggested that government was on a wild goose chase where no clear determination was manifested. The president stated that U.S. can't withdraw from war

and it needs to bolster the afghan government so that withdrawal of American forces can be done eventually. On president's statement, the *Times* felt positivity about Obama's approach and criticized the Bush policy which it believed lacked the direction and accountability. However, *Post* also supported the surge but found the commitment of government dubious sometimes.

Obama's commitment was questioned by The Post when he displayed obscurity about escalations. In September 2009, the paper found it unexpected that Obama was apparently fluctuating in his commitment. Dubiousness in beginning gave way to embrace following the December speech. The Post appreciated the equanimity of Obama in planning a strong but careful commitment. The *Post* wrote that Americans should believe that stabilization of a country requires political acumen with continuous effort which will involve pain of casualties too.

Human rights violations and destruction due to escalation in troop was denied by *Post* and *Times*. But none of these papers took notice of what guardian published stating that U.S. and allied planners visualized the campaign as a part of promoting destruction and violence against civilians so that they develop animosity and anger against the Taliban. Those stories were not reported in 2009. However, both papers were well informed of volatility and civil casualties as a possible result of the surge.

Intensifying Official, Sidelining Dissent

If we see the trend of reporting then we find that it highlighted the increased violence in Afghanistan in early to mid-2009. However, coverage of late 2009 was considerate to the surge. Decline in military casualties in November and December helped Obama in making a climate favorable to escalation. Journalistic objectivity also assisted U.S. narrative of war. Surge got support from both the parties. Since objectivity demands release of official discourse, the two-party agreement on the surge introduced the premise for a desirable coverage. (Amini: 2019)

Table 1.1 explains presidential control in reporting. This dominance brought the benefits of framing the news. It should be mentioned here that Republicans were in support of Obama surge, but the timetable for calling back troops was questioned by Obama. Republican didn't succeed in earning too much attention for their refusals and

reservations. Table 1.1 implies that stories presenting Obama side were appearing 3.9 to 6.2 times more in comparison to congressional Republicans. Foreign political actors such as Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif al-Zardari emerged intermittently as well. In a nutshell, the national discourse approved president Obama predominantly.

We can see in figure 1.0 that Obama was successful in creating desired narrative of terrorism. One more factor should be added here where association between Afghanistan, terrorism and al- Qaeda was increased. It happened even after U.S. declared that the terrorist organization “al-Qaeda” was not able to operate anymore in Afghanistan.

Table 1.1. Coverage of Major Actors in Afghanistan during the Escalation (November 15–December 31, 2009)

Actors	Mentions of each actor as a percent of all actors						
	Media Outlet						
	<i>New York Times</i>	<i>Washington Post</i>	<i>Houston Chronicle</i>	NBC News	CBS News	Fox News	MSNBC News
Obama administration	58%	65%	64%	74%	72%	73%	56%
Congressional Republicans	15%	11%	14%	12%	16%	16%	25%
Karzai	23%	18%	21%	13%	12%	11%	16%
Zardari	4%	5%	1%	1%	0%	0%	3%


Source: LexisNexis.

Primetime cable portrayal of Afghanistan and discussion related with the issues were different from conventional and mainstream reporting. Primetime stalwarts were capricious in their debate as they favored and criticized Obama concurrently. For example, Fox News advocated the surge, but criticized removal plans of Obama. Sean Hannity didn't favor the timetable and Bill O'Reilly called the "exit strategy" as spurious. But in case of MSNBC'S primetime, the pundits supported Obama. Ed Schultz showed her concern for the time frame and said that escalation can be supported but war has to end in 18 months.

Keith Olbermann out rightly criticized the denial from Pentagon general's to begin for a systematic and phased withdrawal. Talks of the surge among stalwarts of cable manifested an anticipated partisan prejudice. There are grounds to query that to what extent public perception and attitude can be altered by these biases. At the end of the chapter, this point is discussed.

Figure 1.10 U.S Conflict in Afghanistan: Framing a Terrorist Threat (June-December 2009)


Figure 1.10. U.S. Conflict in Afghanistan: Framing a Terrorist Threat (June–December 2009)



Source: LexisNexis.

In the above figure, we can see that from June till December, the reporting relating with al Qaeda and terrorism is increasing. December 2009 suggests the peak time when reporting and coverage has taken place in two main newspapers News York Times and Washington Post.

Figure 1.11. Framing Terrorism and Afghanistan in Cable News (June–December 2009)



Source: LexisNexis.

There are some points that need to be discussed here. Did news cover up the reporting related with humanitarian crisis and strategic criticism of war? We can see that *Times* did the story two times and *Post* did no story on Afghan civilian deaths. So it can be concluded that these stories remained dormant and were not taken in much consideration. This was absolutely nothing or a miserable coverage in comparison to the coverage that was done regarding terrorism and Afghanistan.

We can see in figure 3.8, coverage of U.S. casualties also weakened to an extent that it was absent from any reporting by the end of December. This was also noticed that those who discussed the alternative ways of negotiations and reconciliation were rarely discussed.

It can be understood that reconstruction, reconciliation, humanitarian issue were absolutely not discussed as it was not the concern of political class. None of these issues were published much in newspaper. If we compare this to news on relation of terrorism and al-Qaeda then we see an ample reporting on this issue. It was understandable that


any view which was not buttressed by political class was absolutely marginalized.

It can be said that increasing causality played a role of generating antiwar sentiment in public whereas news selling positive facts increased the support.

Selling the Surge

From October 2009 through January 2010, surge was supported by most of the Americans. Although public opinion for war was not that clear and favorable by December but administration managed to create a positive environment for escalation and war. Figure 1.12 implies that majority support was shown in every question of survey. The trend seems to be same for other surveys too. 62 percent of Americans were in favor of adding the troops whereas only 45 percent suggested in removal of troops. We can't conclude that increasing support for surge happened due to charismatic personality of Obama as support could be observed even before president delivered his speech in December.

Figure 1.12. Public Support for Afghan War (October 2009–January 2010)



Sources: NBC/Wall Street Journal, CNN/ORC, ABC/Washington Post, and Quinnipiac surveys.

We can see that less number of military casualties from October to November also reduces the opposition voices. Coverages which were pro-war in nature basically included partisan newspaper editorials, negligence of dissent and opposition and too much emphasis on terrorism. We can imagine the popularity of the Afghan war by the coverage that it received. It was mostly covered story in 2009 claimed by the project for excellence in journalism.


Afghanistan received more attention than other competing stories such as the economic crisis, health care, Obama's Nobel Peace Prize, and the swine flu. Between August and October, Afghanistan was the third most heavily covered story behind U.S. economic troubles and the health care debate. In November it was the second most heavily covered story.”

American journalist soon migrated to Kabul as they knew that possibility of the surge was imminent. Television news channel set up their small outlets there, the major newspaper has increased the interest and number of their staff in anticipation of covering the story. So many journalists visibly were part of Afghanistan land in hope of covering the change and escalation that was likely to take place very soon. The issue became a heated one during 2009 escalations.

Figure 1.13, summarizes data collected by Pew and the Project for Excellence in Journalism, suggested that media played a very important role in setting the agenda. We can see that when attention was given to Afghanistan, public attention increased too. It can conclude very clearly that the media made a narrative of the war in public perception. Public attention aided Obama in cultivating war support. From the December Pew survey in figure 1.14, we can see that individual who watches much of media discourse was more likely to support the war on every dimension. Once the respondent's partisanship, ideology, age, education, sex is controlled we can see that attention and support was clearly visible. The Pew data gives a clear suggestion that the media played a crucial role in nurturing war support.


In the questions from figure 1.14, we can see that partisanship plays an important role in the predictor on the opposition of war. Republican partisanship generated support for the war, as most of them, 60 per cent, agreed that war was justifiable. Only 47 per cent of Democrats favored the war openly and that too was probably an expression of popular nationalistic view related to American security. Seventy-four per cent of Republicans supported the surge, compared to 55 per cent of Democrats. On the other hand, just 39 per cent of Republicans had faith in Obama to handle the Afghan war. This criticism likely was related to apprehension toward Obama's timetable, which Republican officials and conservative media pundits rejected. However, opposition to Obama's long term withdrawal agenda was separate from support for his short term plans for a surge. The surge received bipartisan support and was published sympathetically in the media. The lesson with Afghanistan is that for policies such as the surge receiving the bipartisan agreement, the president is able to cultivate media and public support.

Figure 1.13. Media Agenda-Setting on Afghanistan: Attention to the War as a Function of Reporting (2009)



Source: Pew surveys.


Figure 1.14. Mass Media and Public Opinion on the Afghan Surge (December 2009)



Source: Pew survey (December 2009).

As we can see that Obama was successful in convincing or handling the surge or explicitly selling the surge, dissent voices emanated in following years. Figure 1.15 implies that by early 2013, majority opposition was apparent for each survey question. We can see the growth of dissent voices and opposition from 2010 to 2013; this surely doesn't indicate that Obama failed. Then it was promised by Obama that a short escalation would take place and a reduction in troop afterward. It can be easily concluded from the above picture that Obama had very well managed the situation and succeeded in creating a favorable situation for war and escalation. Role of media and other print mediums can't be ignored and surely it had done tremendous interference in shaping public perception. Even in other references and pictures, we have seen the trend that how media groups has very well managed to show one part of story which worked in the favor of Afghanistan.

Figure 1.15. Growing Opposition to the Afghan War (December 2009–March 2013)



Sources: CNN/ORC, ABC/*Washington Post*, and Quinnipiac surveys.

Conclusions:

It can be surely suggested that even in the Obama regime, the rhetoric of fear and hope survived. President earned media support on a very positive note and public support was too increased in the favor of the surge. It changed the negative perception of casualties and coverage of negative effect. This chapter gives many lessons about how media and administration can be helpful or hostile for each other. It also gives additional lessons about new emerging techniques of discourse dissemination and perceptions.

Coming to the topic of media, yes, we can say that journalist can really alter the presidential agenda as long as they go beyond working as the mirror of showing ground realities. When this critical substance waned, however, as one saw with the drop of fatalities, journalists failed to dispute official euphuism. This is to be supposed when objectivity is described as submission to official opinions. Following the drop of

casualties from October to December, journalists became a conduit for communicating the president's words.

For public opinion, this chapter confirmed that public sentiment was sane in that Americans responded in anticipated ways to the emerging new erudition denying an increasingly gory war and welcoming a president who managed the Afghanistan narrative while casualties eventually receded. Compatible with the elite theory the people exhibited a lack of acumen in its evaluations of the surge especially in Americans' absence of engagement with dissident opinions. If free thought demands state of a spectrum of analytical and supportive viewpoints on war, then Americans failed to reach this realization. Messages scattered in the media were psychologically, culturally formed to privilege the president and remove critiques of war. Claims that Afghanistan was an essential aspect in the War on Terror were included, while diplomatic and compassionate studies were not given due importance. Finally, this chapter explains that the media were powerful in not only determining what the public believes about but also in shaping policy positions. By controlling what issues the public opinion about in this case the improved connection linking terrorism and Afghanistan the president also turned Americans' administration approaches in support of the war.

Conclusion

In the first year of the 21st century, the United States suffered the terror attacks of 9/11. These attacks targeted the Twin Towers which symbolized the strong American economy and the Pentagon, which was a symbol of mighty American military capability. The message was clear that terrorists are now capable of attacking anything in America. The effect of this message also appeared in the American public. Fear of terrorist attacks anywhere in the America penetrated in U.S citizen and demanded to strengthen the country's security system.

President George W. Bush named the terror attack as second-century Pearl-harbor. He not only promised to strengthen security, but adopted an aggressive security strategy to prevent such attacks in the future. Keeping in mind the feelings of the American public, they ordered an attack on Afghanistan, and also declared that any country in this world is either with us or against us. On September 12, 2001 he addressed the nation stated; “The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient. We’ll be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination. This battle will take time and resolve, but make no mistake about it, we will win.” And on September 20, 2001 he addressed Congress and announced the “War on Terror” by saying “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

With this the Afghan War started. U.S. Fought a lot of war in its history but War in Afghanistan itself has been different in because there is no defined enemy here. The American army is fighting a pseudo war here. The definition of nation-state in Afghanistan does not apply here. Because these fighters are not like any country's traditional army. They are organized on tribal basis and get inspiration from Islamic extremism. To a certain extent this war is like the Vietnam War. As far as the manner in which the war is concerned, it is quite like the Vietnamese guerrilla fighter, but in the

case of their organization and control they are absolutely new. That's why this war had to face a lot of economic and humanitarian damage to America. However, with the help of the US, the government is somewhat stable there. But still it lacks the characteristic receptive abnormalities.

With the launch of this war, there was also a demand for a change in the American Constitution and the Balance of Power. U.S President; behind this, in the war condition, there was a plebiscite, many new institutions were formed, and in some cases they started demanding more power than the Congress.

Presidential Powers Regarding to War

According to the United States Political System, the war Power vests in both the President and the Congress. According to the US The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is the President. The President is directly accountable to the American public. As section 8 of the first article of the Constitution says that the Congress has the right to declare war. So far, 11 declarations have been made by the Congress during the five wars in American history. In addition, Congress passed a number of sanctions regarding the use of Military Forces. War Power Resolution 1973 is the most important of all. All these declarations were made to reverse all those rights with fees, due to the circumstances of the war and the national crisis that the President had received.

In contrast to the U.S. The Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution vest in the President with special powers. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is responsible for relations with other countries. He is responsible for maintaining law and order.

As has been discussed in the first chapter, the existing dispute between the President and the Congress affiliated with War came open in the time of the Vietnam War. That is why Congress in this regard passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) 1973 even after vetoing President Nixon. It was clarified that there could be a clear possibility of the threat or threat created when the troupe could be run by the President. By this, the

objectives of constitution makers were explained more clearly. So that any dilemma that arises can be eliminated. This led to the decision of making the President and Congress more helpful to each other.

But the War Powers Act 1973 could not complete its purpose completely. Because in this 'sixty-day clock' an empty space was left. Under this provision it was made that the President will have the right to administer the troupe without approval of Congress for 60 days and during this period the trumpets will be brought back. This 60-day pass is a self-execution provision arrangement. And if it is needed for the military then this period can be extended up to 90 days in that specific situation. This 1973 war power resolution also became inappropriate, it defines President's warfare very narrowly and leaves a lot of dilemma between reporting and advice on which the President decides. Veto based on both houses could never be used. And later, in 1983, after the Supreme Court's 'Single House Veto' decision, the possibility of its use could also be exhausted. Apart from this, 60 days pass was also incorrectly defined and it was assumed that during this period the President was completely free from the approval of the Congress and it came to be understood that in this free pass the Congress has no right to do anything.

The Constitutional Role of President during War

In the constitution, the President has been considered as a strategic command and central point of war. The power of the president is decided in a single verdict; he or she "will be Commander of Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. The constitution makers put such a provision because they felt that during the time of the Revolutionary wars a committee or group can quickly take a decision. That is why it was considered inappropriate for Congress to make Council of War. Because the structure of the Congress is elaborate, its way of working is very slow; resolutions passed or passed in Congress can never be hidden. Therefore, the President was considered as Commander-in-Chief. Although the Congress has the right to declare war but they can't deploy the military. In comparison to the Constitution makers, the President has been able to war, enable the army to deploy, make quick decisions and respond quickly. At the same time, the President, the Commander-in Chief, is selected from a civil background and because

of this he is also accountable to the public for his decisions. At the same time, he is also a symbol of the supremacy of political leadership in the form of a Janapatinidhi. This feature makes the US out of military rule and absolutist rule. In the President, he has been appointed as the supreme representative of the nation, not only during the war but also in the peaceful.

Factors that Influenced Public Opinion during an Ongoing War

The cost is an important element in any war. If its cost is much higher than its result, then it is very difficult to maintain public support for such a war. The cost of any war consists of two main elements; human costs and fiscal cost. Only by keeping these two costs in mind, any leadership can expect support of the people at the time of war. As has been analyzed in the third chapter. Based on this, we find that if an outside attack is committed on American soil or the risk on the lives of the American people, then the public supports the President to deal with this crisis because the president is the commander in chief of the military and in such an emergency, the president's approval rating is always the highest. But when the war is far away from the US, the American public does not pay much attention to it, unless the war costs (economic or human) have been greatly increased. We can see it in connection with the Vietnam War. Vietnam war started during John F. Kennedy time, but the President did not have an important role in this war It became important in the time of Lyndon B. Johnson , when the bodies of American soldiers started coming from there. And besides them, the injured soldiers coming back from there. As a result, public began to fight against the war. In the year 1968, 'Tet Offensive' was completed. With this, anti-war movements were still going on in the American society, the Lieutenant-Libelist turned into a people movement. A famous slogan war became a symbol of protest- hey 'hey LBJ! Anger and opposition from this point of view in the public also increased as the Johnson administration tried to hide the right information from the public. We find that the American public considered this war as unnecessary because it was being fought a war against communism, which was causing the burden on the treasury and the loss of American soldiers was going on. Although the government was telling it necessary for the protection of American

interests. As a result, the President had to announce the return of Troupes. The result of this protest was that Johnson had to abandon the re-election idea.

In this regard, another element here is sometimes proven to be great, that is the timeline of war. At such a time, the President encourages the feeling of nationalism to garner voting in favor and that an unanimous nation can only fight a war and can win it. If there is internal disagreement and leadership is being criticized, it divides the public and this symptom only invites defeat for any country. Since unity is very important. So plea and discussion should be done in the limit and should be avoided by criticism.

When we talk about the public opinion, it is directly applied to the majority of Opinion. But we should not be confused with a minority group which is the most vocal here. This minority group or person often lives in the headline. It does not represent the collective idea or thinking of most of the majority of the country's citizens. However, nowadays a technique like survey is being used. Therefore, people who have become headlines now go ahead and get the real opinion of the public. It has started to be used not only in the US but in other democracies, whether it is an issue of peace or warfare.

As it was seen in the past decades that the party-based partition on various issues was occupied throughout the country and the public opinion was also divided. The incident on Sept 11 was very different from this. During this time, bipartisanship would have ended and the full support of both parties was received to the President. At the same time, the President's plan to respond to this incident also got full support from both the parties. So we see that the President's Job Approval Rating is the highest level. There were two reasons for this; First, the crisis generated was of this nature that it was horrifying to every American. Second, because both parties have given full support to the plan to deal with this problem of terrorism in a difficult time. As a result of September 11, "global war on terrorism" was launched. In this, it was decided to target al-Qaeda as well as target terrorist organizations all over the world. It was decided that military action was taken at various levels in different areas of Afghanistan, Philippines and Iraq. It was also decided that in addition to this, military campaign will be carried out if necessary. All

these factors have been the importance of War on Terror. Under this policy, the policy adopted was supported by the whole nation. The policies that the United States made under the leadership of Bush were very costly. It includes two types of costs - human and economic. Even before the problem arose, the US defense budget was much higher than the global level. The reason behind this was that from time to time, America was constantly interfering in various places in the world militarily.

Human Costs of War

George W. Bush started the war in Afghanistan in 2001. In the next few years, it became clear that this war is constantly getting entangled and its objective is very far away right now. Soon after the American attack, the Taliban were defeated and forced to run away in the hilly areas. But they would soon have to strengthen their position on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The soldiers have been able to carry out frequent attacks. This led to a constant increase in human costs. Together with Afghanistan and Pakistan, about 149,000 armed personnel were killed during the clashes in this war and 162,000 suffered serious injuries. When all these figures, whether they were soldiers or killed by ordinary citizens, reached the public through the media, the logic of those people was strengthened, which believed that the war should be abolished soon. Of course, from all these figures, there is more to human damage than in reality. Fei also shows how much humiliation humanity has to face in this war.

Cost of Blood and Treasure

As chapter 3 has been discussed, Afghanistan War not only has caused much human loss but its fiscal cost is also very high. During this war, during Bush's tenure, the most economic cost came in 2008. In 2008 the cost was \$ 43 billion. In addition, \$ 59 billion was in the financial year 2009. In 2010, the economic cost was \$ 93.8 billion. The economic cost was \$ 118 billion in 2011. Apart from this, \$ 113 billion was in 2012. If Afghanistan and Iraq see both in common, then in the following years the financial cost continued to increase, even if Obama had come to the Presidential Office with the aim of cutting costs. If you look at the fiscal cost in Afghanistan and Iraq, then George W. During Bush's regime, the expenses incurred during the war were less than the fiscal cost of the Obama administration.

In this way, we see that there is a above mentioned factor in Afghanistan war, which has been continuously influencing the opinion in different ways throughout the entire time. Public opinion is not always the same in relation to this war. At the beginning of the war, President Bush received Bipartisanship support. The main reason behind this was the nature of the terrorist attack on 9/11. It was about to shake the American public. Therefore, the overwhelming hostility and fear of the people is expressed in the form of job approval in relation to the President's War of Afghanistan. This sentiment was so strong that after the attack on Iraq in 2003, when the truth of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) surfaced, still in the 2004 election George W. Bush did not have any difficulty in winning the election. Hostility and fear was the main reason behind the horrific terrorist attack that took place three years ago, after winning the election with a fresh majority of Bush.

President Bush could not extract public support over time. In the mid-term election of 2006, the Republican Party of Bush was defeated. And in the 2008 presidential election, his party's candidate lost the election. In the last days of Bush's tenure, his popularity rating among the public had reached the lowest level. The main reason behind this was that the Afghanistan War was very long stretched Osama bin Laden was still far from the American reach and the other targets of this war were not seen to be sufficient. Due to such a long war with the human and financial costs of the human costs, the public started demanding to bring back the troupes. By promising to meet this changed demand, Barack Obama became president in 2008. Although they could not reduce the war costs, but in 2011, US Navy Seal killed Osama bin Laden. As a result, this success has played a significant role in the re-election of President again in 2012. In this way, we find that during the Afghanistan War, Opinion has been changing from time to time in relation to public events.

The Leadership during Afghanistan War

The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and then in response to the war on terror George W. Bush's Presidency proved to be the most important. The result of this attack was that Bush launched the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Soon the Taliban were forced to run away with Al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the attack. War on Terror became so important that any other international issue went into the setting; Whether it is a South East or South East Asia, Kashmir issue, or a continuous threat to growing in South-China Sea, or North Korea's danger of making nuclear weapons. It is clear that other issues were also forgotten in the public as well as in the Bush Presidency, especially during this war.

Shortly after 11th of September, extremist Islam was identified as the main enemy of the mainland. Who was challenging American supremacy. The Bush administration considered it a primary victory over a clear victory over it. In this, public support received them as validity of this policy. They also succeeded in this. However, the defeat of the Republican Party in the mid-term election of 2006 proved that the American public was not accepting the result as a result of the time period of this war and its cost. But George W. Bush has been consistently trying to convince the public about its importance, from time to time, briefing people about the smallest successes in the war, His intention was to do so that the support of the public could be achieved in relation to war, although he could not succeed in it for a long time. Eventually, until Jan 2008, public could not agree with Bush's policy of expansion (growth), its frankness came in the form of the defeat of the Republican Party. The Bush administration was criticized on the grounds that he could not handle this war properly. The basis of criticism was that it did not eliminate the threat of extremist Islam, even the administration did not completely eliminate the aid it received. And other important issues were not given due importance to its prominence. At the same time, the Bush administration has not properly utilized its methods and means to defeat extremist Islam. This way we find that George bush. The bush received the support of the public opinion in connection with Afghanistan War. Although sometimes the people followed the populist Opinion, they once tried to bring public opinion to their support by using media tools. In this endeavor he also succeeded

in the first term. But in the second term, Bush is not so lucky. In the first term, where the public opinions were in their favors, on the other side they could not succeed in dragging the Opinion of the public. Because of their long run in the second term and the public failed to achieve any goal, the people started becoming dizzy with the Afghanistan War. In such situation George w. Bush could neither follow the public opinion nor attract the opinion of the public to the Afghan policy. More than following the Public Opinion, they preferred to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.

After Bush, Barack Obama was elected president in 2008 as his successor. Keeping the public's demand in mind, they promised to end the war on Afghanistan only during their campaigns. . It proposed to bring American Troops back to Iraq war as soon as possible. Although Obama could not fully fulfill his promise, and at times he increased the number of American soldiers in Afghanistan, but he gradually adopted the policy of withdrawing Troops.

Barack Obama proposed to reduce the number of American soldiers there till 2013 and promised full retirement of troops until 2014. Obama fulfilled this promise, after the withdrawal of Troops in 2014, the role of US troops in Afghanistan was limited to the training of Afghan soldiers. Obama emphasized on the cooperative role of Bush with other countries in place of the unilateral role of America in Afghanistan.

Manipulation of Public Opinion about the Afghanistan War

After the terrorist attacks in 9/11, along with the American leadership The American public also belief that "America cannot be attacked" , but the entire American public was in shock because of this terrible assault. In American society, the atmosphere of panic and rate could clearly be felt. The newly elected President George bush win with very little margins. This proved to be an opportunity for Bush Keeping in mind the public sentiment, it has announced that anyone responsible for this incident and anything is hidden, we will catch them and they will have to face justice. And within the tenth day on 19th September, he announced the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the address

of Congress Bush not only took military action on Afghanistan but also used the same hostility and fear to convince the American public to interfere in Iraq.

However, it is different from that later the Bush administration had to become a victim of criticism because of not receiving weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Gradually this state of mind came out of society, then the people began to rely on the safety of the country and the use of hostility and fear of society became impossible for the President

Manipulating through media

The media is the best tool for the president, through which the public agrees to convert the Opinion to the support of its policies. The media gets them as a platform. Through this, he wants to get his supporters reaching out to the public and to tell them about their policies and the need and goodness of their people, they want to get their support in relation to that policy. George bush during the Afghanistan War Both bush or obama have done the media to influence the public opinion in their favor. George bush in his first term, was very successful in this objective. As a result, the people are confident that they are handling this war in a proper manner and eventually, he continued to support the public in relation to War. The President refuses to support the public in the context of his policies only when there is little opposition to the demands of the people and the policies of the President and they are mostly equal. That is why in their second term, they did not get support for the people in Afghanistan. Because the demand to bring back the troupes among the public was increasing, and President Bush was increasingly increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan.

Obama, has always continued to complain that Afghanistan continues to support people on the policy of war. They came to power only after reducing the number of troops in Afghanistan and gradually ending the war, according to the demands of the American public in their election campaign. Although he came in power soon after he increased the number of tropes but he continued to reassure the public that this growth was temporary and gradually the number of troops in Afghanistan would be reduced. Obama succeeded throughout his tenure for this purpose as the US killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, and in

the following year, he set a final date for the withdrawal of Troops from Afghanistan. In addition, he also set a time schedule for the process of this deficiency.

Therefore, we find that it is necessary for the President to constantly maintain contact with the public in order to maintain public support with its policy. But simultaneously, it is also necessary to make changes in their approach keeping in mind the need of policies and public demand to manipulate public opinion.

Public Opinion Influences the Presidency during an Ongoing War

If public support continues in the context of policies, then it is very convenient for the chief executive officer in any country. They can apply their policies with their full potential. This also applies to the Afghan War. Based on the analysis given in chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4, we arrive at the conclusion that, while the President enjoys convenient public support, they assume extraordinary power. And the unitary form (like Monarch) takes action. So let us George w. The Presidency of Bush gets to appear during Afghanistan War After the terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001, Bush started Global War on Terror. Whose center is Afghanistan After the announcement of the war against the Afghan Taliban, George w. Bush's job approval rating reaches around 90%.

The result of this highest approval rating was that bush became independent of handling Afghanistan War as if he understood it fairly. But the negative aspect of it was that, they created many new laws and regulatory bodies in the name of American security. The Patriot Act was very important in all of this. The surveillance set up on the citizens was also made legal, though many of its people later started to oppose it. The second aspect of negativity was the bush's foreign affairs. Mainly in Iraq war and Afghan war can be incorporated. The American Army was sent to Iraq by allegations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Saddam Hussein was captured and later sentenced to death . But even after the end of Saddam's regime, when the Weapons of Mass Destruction could not be found, the bush administration was charged that Iraq was attacked on the basis of misinformation, and the American public was also given false information. Even after the attack, the presence of American soldiers remained there, while many American civilians protested against maintaining Iraqi American soldiers, and demanding to bring Troops

back as soon as possible. Yet the US military remained in Iraq until the next president arrived.

In 2008, Barack Obama came to power only after the promise of fulfilling the same protests and demands. That's why their job approval rating was high. Although Obama came to the President's Office, the number of American Troops in Afghanistan increased. But in order to calm the opposition voices from this, they reiterated the need to bring back Iraqi troops from Iraq at the earliest and stressed that this is a rich bone in the number of troops, and the number of soldiers gradually reduced. Will go After Osama bin Laden's death in 2011, President Obama tried to convince the American public that the US should reduce its efforts in Afghanistan by focusing on other areas of the world, such as; Syria crisis and emerging new challenges in South China Sea

Eventually President Barack Obama announced the end of Afghanistan War to prevent the protests from rising. . He assured the American public that American Troops will be recalled until November 2014. For this, he also set a timetable which was gradually proposed to cut down the number of troops. But to eliminate the possibility of the Taliban government not returning to Afghanistan again, they insisted that the number of American soldiers would be reduced but that the American soldiers at a minimum level to train and assist the Afghan Security Forces They will remain there.

In this way we address that not only do the President public manipulate but also; Having high mass support, they try to assume Extraordinary powers, as in George w. Bush's time was seen in the behavior of the President. But the ultimate power in a democracy is ultimately in the public, which governments use. Therefore, the public controls the President through his own power. Looking at President Bush's job approval rating, when Obama came to power, he was trying to keep his behavior confined.

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Review

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