

**DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES TO SYSTEMIC CHANGE:
A STUDY OF INDIA'S DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE
UNITED STATES, 1991-1996**

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

VELPULA RAMANUJAM



**Diplomacy and Disarmament Division
Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi 110067
2019
INDIA**



Centre For International Politics, Organization And Disarmament
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi -110067, India

Date 30-12-2019

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**Diplomatic Responses to Systemic Change: A Study of India’s Diplomacy towards the United States, 1991-1996**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

V. Ramanujam
VELPULA RAMANUJAM

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

J Madhavan Mohan
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अंतर्राष्ट्रीय राजनीति संगठन एवं निस्स्त्रोकरण केन्द्र
School of International Studies
अंतर्राष्ट्रीय अध्ययन संस्थान
Jawaharlal Nehru University
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
New Delhi/नई दिल्ली-110067

Manish S. Dabhadre
31/12/19

Mr MANISH S. DABHADE
(Supervisor)



Centre for International Politics
Organization and Disarmament
अंतर्राष्ट्रीय राजनीति संगठन एवं निस्स्त्रोकरण केन्द्र
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जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
New Delhi/नई दिल्ली-110067

Dedicated to
Professor C.S.R. Murthy
and
Professor Yeshi Choedon

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Velpula Ramanujam

ABBREVIATIONS

CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

FMCT: Fissile Material Cut off Treaty

GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

MEA: Ministry of External Affairs

MFA: The Multifibre Arrangement

MOD: Ministry of Defence

DOD: Department of Defense

MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NPT: Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty

PMO: Prime Minister's office

TRIMS: Trade Related Investment Measures

TRIPS: Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USTR: United States Trade Representative

WTO: World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“True power speaks softly. It has no reason to shout” (Mahatma Gandhi, quoted in Menon 2016:185)

In the post- Cold War era, India’s diplomatic responses towards the United States embarked on a dramatic change. This was mainly discernible in the period from 1991 to 1996. It was characterized by a major diplomatic breakthrough in bringing India and the US from a relationship of estrangement to firmly laying the foundation for engagement. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States could enjoy the position of the sole superpower in International Politics. This necessitates the redefining of India’s traditional diplomatic and foreign policy stand in the changing world order. This research delves into the aspect of transformation that India’s diplomacy has undergone due to the dramatic external changes in the post- Cold War era.

The question of how a state responds to different circumstances depends on the nature of the international system, be it bipolar, multipolar and unipolar order (Waltz 1979). In the world order, the occurrence of systemic change is a rare phenomenon. This change, if it happens, entails with it a structural transformation in the international system, changes at the systemic level which affects the realm of foreign policy’s analytical tools and the emergence of new actors and new issues that changes the diplomatic practices. This systemic change affects the diplomatic behaviour of states. States need to adopt different diplomatic strategies when they do not have the system shaping capabilities to protect their national interests. So this study deals with the question of how India used its diplomatic processes, such as representation, communication and negotiation in conducting political, economic and security diplomacy towards the US in the post- Cold War era. It also enunciates the role of several diplomatic responses such as summitry, economic diplomacy, track two diplomacy and the strategic dialogue used by India to lay the foundation for engagement with the US.

India faced a political challenge with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It had no trustworthy friend like the Soviet Union in the new international context. Indian diplomatic challenge was to cultivate a reliable political partnership (Singh 2014: 306). A similar opinion was expressed by an Indian diplomat Kanwal Sibal. He enunciated that since India had a comprehensive relationship with the Soviet Union, its disintegration led to a political predicament for India (Sibal 2015:139). Shivshankar Menon articulated that with the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the bipolar structure of the international system paved way for the new geopolitical reality. A unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower emerged in the International Politics (Menon 2017:165). According to Shyam Saran, the United States secured the dominant position in the Unipolar System in terms of power in the areas of the technological, diplomatic, political and economic fields (Saran 2017:262).

India was facing twin challenges at that period of time- the pressures of economic globalization and at the same time challenges at the developmental front. To meet the fundamental diplomatic predicament and to adjust to the realities of power politics, Indian diplomacy introduced a series of changes. It seeks to alter the operational functioning and overcome the ideological factor which for long held back India in meeting its economic and military challenges (Dixit 1996:14).

Therefore, the crisis India faced then was turned into an opportunity by the Indian political leaders. They resort to the diplomatic strategies available to create possibilities to build political relationships. The diplomats of India have also updated their diplomatic tools and sharpened their operational methods to meet with these challenges (Menon 2017:165).

According to Ambassador Meera Shankar, two factors led to changes in the relationship with the United States. The first factor is that with the end of the Cold War a new optimism is rekindled in redefining the world order. The second factor was that it opened up India's economy which until then was a closed one. India's political leadership opened up the economy to enable and provide India and the United States an opportunity to renew the rules of their engagement. It assisted India to reassess its relationship with the United States and to the undo the sense of estrangement that was present until then (Shankar 2015).

With the emergence of the US as a Unipolar power, Indian diplomacy's faced the biggest challenge. It had to build a cooperative relationship with the United States (Raja Mohan 1994: 19). To build and strengthen such a relationship at the bilateral level, different diplomatic tools are employed by states in International Politics. It includes the use of envoys, track two diplomacy, and summit diplomacy. India too resorted to such means. To build a comprehensive relationship with the United States at all levels, and to leverage the relationship in the political and security sphere, economic diplomacy is used as the core instrument. Negotiation is used as a means to resolve the differences in economic, political and security areas by different countries. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations were used by India to negotiate the assembly at various levels in its relation with the United States.

With the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) the bipolar world created in post World War II disappeared. Charles Krauthammer (1990/1991) describes the post-Cold War geopolitical structure of world politics as a unipolar world. He defines it as such because the “American pre-eminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself” (Krauthammer 1990:24).

According to C. Raja Mohan, India's politico diplomatic leadership discarded the diplomatic methods and instruments that were not suitable for the new international context. In his opinion, Indian diplomatic thinking transformed with the revolutionary changes at the international level and the domestic front (Raja Mohan 2003: Xiii). The first foreign policy document of India and the intellectual framework followed in carrying out the policies were written by Jawaharlal Nehru in “The “Discovery of India”. In his essay titled “Realism and Geopolitics, the World Conquest or World Association, The U.S.A and the USSR”. He reflected the basic rationale for the nonaligned movement that India's diplomacy follows towards the great powers. However, this philosophy changed with the end of the Cold War as India had to undertake a different stand in a unipolar world (Bajpai 1995: 49).

Sahni (2000) explains that the starting point for India and US relations in the post-Cold War period should be understood through the clarity of two concepts- great power and middle power. There is a vast power difference between both countries.

India falls in the category of a middle power, the US in the category of a Great power. India in the present century is in a transitional state. It in the near future has the potential to emerge as a major power. This constitutes one of the basic differences between the US and India. The US with its great power status has system shaping capabilities. India as middle power “may lack the capacity to challenge how the great powers run the international system, they are sufficiently powerful to defy any great power attempt to force them to behave in a contrary to their choosing...India is middle power on the ascendant that has the capability and intention of maneuvering its way into great power status, India system shaping role lays in the future” (Sahni 2000: 32-33)

Glen Johnson argues that with the end of the Cold War US foreign policy has lost the compass which had guided its foreign policy since the beginning of that war. It followed the strategy of containment until the Cold War was over. He was also of the view that India too had lost the sextant which guided its foreign policy since Independence. The Non-Alignment which was the bedrock principle of India after Independence no longer appeared to be relevant (Johnson 1991:1-2). Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo articulated that for India to safeguard its interests in the political and economic sphere in the Unipolar system, it was crucial to build a cordial relationship with the United States. The United States' position in the international system made this a necessary proposition (Bajpai and Mattoo 2000:7).

Diplomatic Options in Engaging with the United States

According to the former Prime Minister of India P.V Narasimha Rao's assessment, the post-Cold War international order is characterized by the emergence of one superpower in the military sense. However, in economic terms, the world is multicentric. He gives the examples of Germany and Japan and also various other economic powers that existed in the international system. It led to the emergence of an integrated global economy (Narasimha Rao 1991c:319-337). According to Abid Hussain, in the new international situation, new forces are emerging. India needed to adopt new diplomatic strategies to operate in the international system (Hussain 1990). P.V. Narasimha Rao's observation was that two important positive changes were introduced in this phase. The first change was that there was no division of the world as used to be during the Cold War. The second was that there is a de-idealization of

international relations which facilitated new ways of looking into international relations (Narasimha Rao 1995:456).

C. Raja Mohan argues that in the new international context, India's diplomatic challenge is a proper assessment of the United States' power. If Indian policymakers overestimate the power of the United States as larger than life image, it would lead to inappropriate policy responses that might lead to the surrendering of India's independent foreign policy. At the same time, India's appropriate policy responses could build cooperative relations with the United States to widen the scope of India's international relations (Raja Mohan 1991:10). The assessment of US power according to Varun Sahni can be termed as Unipolarity of "outright hegemony", or mere dominance. Kanti Bajpai's judgment is that the US is somewhere between primacy and dominance (Bajpai 1995:50).

K.P Vijayalaxmi enunciates that the strategic structure of the international system witnesses a new alignment in both political and security relationships. Hence, she suggested that Indian and American policymakers need to reappraise the relationship to build long term relationships (Vijayalaxmi 1994:29). Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao contemplates that in the post-Cold War world the rise of the US as a superpower is the critical question before India. The diplomatic options should just fall in line considering these changes (Narasimha Rao 2004:2) Nalini Kant Jha (1994) argues that India's diplomatic challenge in the unipolar world was to build a cooperative relationship with the United States. According to BJP Manifesto 1991 "a sound foreign policy will give us a secure base for a sound defense policy" (BJP 1991). India's diplomatic engagement must follow the broader Macro level of India's foreign policy framework:

- 1) "Preventing any threat to the unity and territorial integrity of India
- 2) Ensuring geopolitical security by creating a durable environment of stability and peace in our region,
- 3) Creating a framework conducive for the economic well-being of our people by encouraging a healthy external environment and
- 4) Trying to internationally restore the centrality and criticality of development in the evolution of political and economic policies all over the world" (Narasimha Rao 1991: 346; MEA 1991-1992: ii).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao in his address to Tirupati Congress Plenary articulated his deep concern to represent India and also preserve the civilization aspects. He articulated that, “We must realize that India is not just another state but a state that constitutes a civilization center... India is a concept, it is a vision, in that sense, ours is the experience of entire civilization adjusting to and assimilating the experience of another civilization” (Baru 2016: 193). India’s diplomacy goal is to preserve its core principles such as strategic autonomy. Indian diplomacy’s deep desire is to transform its political, economic and social sphere and also at the same time to become a system shaping global power (Sahni 2007: 21). In a debate on the international situation by the members of parliament, the issue emerged broadly on India’s reorientation of its diplomacy. It was concerned for the preservation of India’s agency, autonomy and independence of thought and also enlarging the scope of its role in the new world order. The Member of Parliament was seriously concerned about India's limitations of the hard power resource base. They emphasized that India at the time of Independence could win the world's attention by the founding fathers’ ideas, philosophy, ideals, principles, norms and moral courage. The world listened to India’s voice with respect and this factor need to play a similar role in the new international situation (Lok Sabha Debate 1991: 82, 190).

K. Subrahmanyam argues that India's diplomatic options during the bipolar period were based on nonalignment. India under the prevailing Cold War superpower competition had the option to navigate between both the powers and the diplomatic strategy it followed gave it the maximum manoeuvrability. He also suggests that in the new international situation, India’s diplomatic options should follow the dictum put forth in Kautilya’s Arthashastra. For Kautilya, in dealing with adversaries and friends a ruler should use all four strategies of Sama, Daam, Bedha, Danda (engagement or in other words cultivating friendship, buying off, dividing the enemies and force as a last resort). Thus, India’s first diplomatic strategy should be the strategy of engagement vis-a-vis the United States (Subrahmanyam 1994). According to Jasjit Singh (1991), India policymakers need to think about the strategic future of India keeping in view the operating architecture of International order. India’s policy options must be designed keeping India’s interests and principles in the unipolar system. The diplomatic choices in front of India in engaging with the United States are of cooption, confrontation or isolation with the United States. In his view,

confrontation and isolation are not viable policy options. The possible option is of cooption, that is, to engage with the United States where India and the United States' interests converge.

Bajpai (1995) argues that in the theoretical level the diplomatic choices for India in dealing with a big power like the United States are basically three basic policy orientations: balancing, bandwagoning and hiding. For instance, because of India's power limitations it cannot choose the balancing option. The second choice of bandwagoning may also not work due to power compulsions India may face. The third policy alternative is of hiding, which is historically in many instances used by the small powers. But for India's this strategy may not be a desirable option due to its large size. On the question of foreign policy option of an alliance, C Raja Mohan argues that the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty had many alliances like features. The option of an alliance should be open when India's interests necessitated it rather than blindly adhering to the Nonalignment policy it earlier did (Raja Mohan 2006: 29).

S.D Muni (1991) suggested that Indian policymakers need to seek cooperation with the United States in the area of economic and scientific areas. At the same time, the Indian political leadership also needs to "rediscover Nehruvian elan" to adjust to the post-Cold War world order (Muni 1991: 865-868). S.C. Sharma (1991) argues that India needs to continue with the policy of non-alignment and also continue to maintain its status as the third world leader. Seeing the changing realities, India needs to adapt to western market-oriented development to reach out to the West (Sharma 1991: 64). On the other hand, the Indian diplomatic option in engaging with the United States need to give primacy to pragmatism and national interest (Kumar 1991: 62). India and the United States need to have dialogue for establishing trust and to accommodate their differences in order to forge a new relationship (Azam 1991: 14).

United States Diplomatic Options for Engaging with India

Kissinger (1994), a US foreign policy analyst, in his book 'Diplomacy', enunciated that the current international system will consist of six major players namely the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan and Germany. In his assessment, India will probably emerge as an important player in the international system. India's potentiality can be realized if policymakers adopt appropriate policy responses that

enable India's rise in the system. Zbigniew Brzezinski is of the view that in the current Global circumstances the key geostrategic players are France, Germany, Russia, China, and India. In his view, India is crucial for maintaining a balance of power in Asia keeping in view China's rise. He advises India and the United States to make use of the method of progressive engagement to build security cooperation (Brzezinski 1996: 40-41).

Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy in their analysis characterize India as a pivotal country in South Asia. Pivotal states are, in their assessment, that state which has the capacity and influence in certain geographical regions (Chase, Hill and Kennedy 1996: 33). Tom Travis argues that the new world order offers a mixture of advantages and disadvantages to a middle-developed country. As a leading third world power, India will have a greater opportunity for increased leadership, status and influence in the third world, and to serve as a key negotiator for the South with the North (Travis 1994:14). Stephen P. Cohen argues that the U.S can choose among five strategic alternatives in engaging with India. He weighs upon all other strategies containment, appeasement, and co-option and in his judgment; the co-option will be the most effective policy to advance US interests at the same level of India's interests (Cohen 1993)

India' Quest for Just World Order: Democratisation of International System

The former US President George Bush proclaimed a New World Order when the United States achieved victory in the Gulf War. According to Amitav Acharya, President Bush's concept of this new world order was fundamentally reflected in there shaping of the entire international security system (Acharya 1992: 262). Henry Kissinger argues that the previous world order was relatively stable and peaceful which was attained through instruments like the Treaty of Westphalia and Congress of Vienna. Henry Kissinger further says that it was the policies of the three presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, and Bush, that America proclaimed its intention to shape a new world order (Kissinger 1994: 26-805).

For India, the existing International Political order is not favourable towards it. The diplomatic challenge is to accommodate its interests and to adjust it to the power realities and at the same time to change it in its favour (Sibal 2013:6). According to

Shivshankar Menon, India is not a revisionist power, a power which tends to overthrow the system. The Indian diplomatic strategy is trying to adjust and accommodate its interests in its favour (Menon 2016: 204). However, foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey put forward a more radical view. For him the existing international political order is unjust. It is unjust not only to India but also to an overwhelming majority in the third world. He advocated that it is in the moral obligation for India to change the international order (Dubey 2013:28). For Indian diplomacy, the dilemma is that India who acted as leader of the third world during the Non-aligned movement changed its stand. It is the post-Cold War era, due to its compulsions India reached out to the West. The challenges for Indian diplomacy are to maintain the Third world identity and at the same time to act as a responsible global power (Abhyankar 2018: 231).

According to Shivshankar Menon, the nonalignment movement's objective was to establish a just and equitable world order. However, in the new international situation difficulty arise in maintaining this non-alignment and at the same time keeping India's international options open in the international system (Menon 2017: 173). Narasimha Rao put forward his views about a new international order. Its fundamental concern is securing the democratization of political decisions in the international system and at the same time reducing the disparity between the north and the South (Narasimha Rao 1992d: 447).

Indo-US Relations: Structural Factors

Dennis Kux characterizes the relationship between India and the United States as 'estranged' democracies. The estrangement was caused due to the fact that India and the United States fundamentally did not pay attention to each other national security concerns during the bipolar world. The critical reason in this estranged relation was due to the United States military alliance with Pakistan and India's relations with the Soviet Union (Kux 1993)

Harold Gould and Sumit Ganguly articulated that the cause of the strained relationship between the two states was due to mainly two factors. On one hand, the United States being a leader of the free world undertook the containment strategy during the cold war and brought the cold war to South Asia through its military

alliance with Pakistan. On the other hand, former Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru's fundamental rejection of Cold War premise and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement is another reason (Gould and Ganguly 1992).

Chintamani Mahapatra examines that India and the United States' political leadership has a different approach to peace and security in international relations. Indian political leadership fundamentally believed that security could be achieved through peace and the United States leadership believed peace can be achieved through security. Added to this difference is the fact that India's approach to international relations based on Nonalignment (Mahapatra 1998).

Nalini Kant Jha argues that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India's foreign policy challenge is to build a new cooperative relationship with the United States. India and the United States should start the relationship on a clean slate in Indo-US relations (Jha 1994). Brahma Challeney argues that the conflict in the India US in the nuclear field is visible ever since India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion. India defied the discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime. The nuclear conflict continued even in the post-Cold war era with the US policy on the prevention of nuclear proliferation in South Asia (Challeney 1993).

Arthur G. Rubinoff argues that India and the United States policymakers focussed on each other images rather than each other's interests and this caused an asymmetry in the nature of India and the United States relationship. Power dynamics are obvious factors in Indo US relations (Rubinoff 1996-1997). Anand Mathur argues that India and the United States during the Cold war failed to respect the sensitivity to each other concerns. India failed to see the complexity of superpower conflict and the United States failed to see the predicament of the newly independent country's security concerns. With the end of the Cold War, the third country factor disappeared. With the economic reforms at the domestic level, India became a free-market democracy in the social-economic field. Though there are convergences in the relationship at the politico strategic field, however, the cold war irritants continue to remain (Mathur 2003). Bibhuthi Bhusan Biswas looks at the domestic debates in the US -India relations. In his argument in the US domestic debates, India is hardly mentioned. The United States being a superpower with its multifactorial compulsions is quite different from India which is a regional power with its different compulsions

at the regional level. But in India's political domestic debates the US looms large as was often evident in the emotional aspects of relationship during the Clinton administration (Biswas 2007).

David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee (2009) argue that with the end of the Cold war there was a fundamental change in the reconstitution of international relationships. There was a sense of rediscovering of common interests and political values which enabled India and the United States to conduct bilateral relations on the new plane (Malone and Mukherjee 2009). Ashley J. Tellis also puts forth an analysis of the transformation of India and the United States relations with the end of bipolarity. When the structural constraints were removed in the post-Cold War era, India and the United States had the opportunity to look into the relationship based on direct mutual interests (Tellis 2006). Paul S. Kapur and Sumit Ganguly argue the transformation of India and the US relations can be seen at the structural level with the end of the Cold war and the domestic level with economic reforms in India. The political leaders on each side have taken fresh initiatives in the Indo US relations (Kapur and Ganguly 2007).

Rudra Chaudhuri argues that Non-alignment was the soul of Indian diplomacy. Its main aim was the preservation of its independence, thought and judgment. He further argues that this relationship in the post-Cold war era between India and the United States are essentially forged in a crisis. It resembles the time when Indian leaders were asking military help during the 1962 crisis. However, Chaudhuri deeply rejects the idea of alliance kind of relationship because for him India represents an alternative approach or imagination in international relations. The alliance relationship will not be helpful for international politics. In a sense, he was apprehensive of India losing better alternative arguments in international relations that they are capable of. But he is not against the closer partnership and close cooperative relationship with the United States (Chaudhuri 2014).

Ayres (2018) argues that India and the United States represent the best model of the bilateral relationship on "conversation of equals". Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer (2016) articulate that in the unipolar system power, the United States is the sole superpower in terms of power. The relation between India and the United States is an unequal power relationship. India's tradition of strategic autonomy and the

desire for regional primacy are the key concern for seeking a relationship with the United States (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016).

International Theory-Based Thematic Review of Indo US Relations

Alliance, Non-Alignment, and Ambivalence Indo US Relations

Rajesh Rajagopalan (2000) explains the reasons for the lack of security cooperation between India and the United States. He arrived at conclusions by testing Kenneth Waltz's structural theory. For Waltz, structural forces determine state behaviour. The US policy towards South Asia is fundamentally based on the balance of power strategy. It aims to balance the Soviet Union rather than to attain the mutual security concerns that drive the US security approach towards India (Rajagopalan 2000).

However, other scholars believe that the fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of Non-Alignment caused a strain in the relationship between India and the United States. M.S. Rajan (1981) outlines that the foreign policy choices in the Post World War II international system led to the policy of isolationism, neutrality, the balance of power. Non-aligned states followed the friendly approach towards other countries. The Nonaligned countries fundamentally opposed power politics or military alliances (Rajan 1981: 39). K.P. Misra (1981) explains the concept of Non-Alignment as "The Non-Alignment is neither neutrality nor power politics it is a movement to transform the international order based on justice (Misra 1981: 37).

David W Kern, Jr. (2014) poses an interesting question in this regard. He asks that under what condition India and the United States achieve the formal Alliance relationship. He explains it based on the power transition theory, that is, the Transition of Power in the international system. The US decline or the China emergence will threaten the United States' pre-eminent position also threatens India indirectly. In his prediction China emergence is likely to result in the Alliance relationship between India and the United States (Kern 2014:129- 131).

Identity and Representation Insecurity in Indo- US Relationship

Zachary Selden and Stuart Strome argue that there is a close relationship between identity and security interests. The Indo -US relationship looked at India's identity as

anti-colonialism and Non-aligned state, inward-looking economy as opposed to the identity of the United States Western NATO-led economic liberal order. In the 1990s the Indian State identity has changed due to economic reforms that led to a cooperative relationship with the United States (Selden and Strome 2017). Priya Chacko (2014) argues that states seeking a special relationship with other states during power transition times results from not only the security concerns but also established ontological insecurities. To establish a special relationship the exceptional identities act as a barrier. For her “the American and Indian identities, the United States ability to exercise global leadership and India’s civilization exceptionalism gives rise to the understanding of India as a responsible state with a non-coercive, prudent, exemplar style approach to moral leadership that seeks to better path to modernity” (Chacko 2014: 343).

Runa Das (2017) examines India and the United States nuclear security relationship. The United States' approach to India's nuclear program is based on the post-colonial Orientalism theoretical perspective. She applies Edward Said’s concept of the West marginalization of the non-West, treating as nuclear oriental. India’s nuclear sovereignty in its post-colonial essence where India fundamentally views nuclear weapons as a sovereign symbol.

On the other hand, Himadeep Muppidi (1999) argues that the origin of the insecurity between India and the United States lies in the post-colonial security imaginary, the way India represents itself and the way it is being represented by others in the politics of meaning fixing. The postcolonial security imaginary was the main concern for the insecurity in the relationship. To overcome post-colonial security imaginary the views and identifies India holds about itself as a democratic identity will enable it to better US imaginary. The implication is that democratic identity rather than post-colonial representation is better suited to India and the United States for forging their relationship (Muppidi 1999:140).

Wesley W. Widmaier's constructive analysis of Democratic peace thesis is that democracies do not go war with one another. The fundamental assumption is examined with the case of 1971 when the United States aligned with authoritarian Pakistan against democratic India. He explains that in the security realm, the identity of democracy does not create cooperation or conflict but it has to be seen as the social

encounter where the actors learn from the social forces that act on them (Widmaier 2005: 448).

Cooperation and Conflict in Indo US Relationship

Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni argue that India and the United States relationship or any other bilateral relationship is fundamentally determined by the common interests. But common interests should be determined by the logic of the structure of the power in the international system (Rajagopalan and Sahni 2008:12). Kanti Bajpai (1999) argues that during the Cold War period India and the United States conflict at three levels. One is at the structural level, second is India's mixed economic model and the third is at the level of institutional and personality factors. With the end of the Cold war, structural factors disappeared for the cooperative relationship. And India's economic reforms enabled for cooperation. Jyotika Saksena and Suzette Grillot suggested that the strengthening the Indo US defense relationship and the concept of reciprocity may create a trusting relationship and may also result in cooperation (Saksena and Grillot 1999: 145).

The above survey of the literature, both empirical and theoretical analysis, does not adequately explain the transformation of India and the United States relations. However, many studies deal with India's diplomacy with the United States. But the most important point here is to note that none of these studies dealt with new attributes in India's diplomatic responses towards the US from 1991-1996. The value addition of this study is to analyze the aspects that brought India and the United States relation from a phase of estrangement to that of laying the foundation for engagement.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

Two main concepts come under the focus of study are: a) systemic change; and b) diplomatic responses. The term "systemic change" involves a change in the governance of the international system. It entails a change in the distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, the rules, and rights embodied in the system. Systemic change is the rise and decline of the dominant states that govern the particular international system. The evolution of any system has been characterized by the successive rise of powerful states that have governed the system and have determined the patterns of international interactions and established the rules of the

system. Thus, the essence of systemic change involves the replacement of a declining dominant power by rising power” (Gilpin 1981: 42-43). Diplomatic responses imply the range of strategies, instruments and use of a diplomatic process such as representation, communication, negotiation. The diplomatic response also includes engagement, “that word can connote eye-to-eye contact, a firm handshake, a pledge, or a long-term commitment but engagement can also refer to the crossing of swords, a clash of armies or warships or wills. Both elements present conciliation and contest” (Talbot 2004: 4).

Systemic change is a rare event in the life of nations. It is an intellectual challenge for statesmen and scholars in the field of international relations to conduct diplomacy during and after the systemic change. First, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru faced an intellectual challenge in the post- War international system. Indian diplomacy faced a difficult challenge when the bipolar world collapsed and economic reforms at the domestic front. This kind of diplomatic account becomes useful for diplomats, statesmen and IR scholars on how to shape diplomacy in a systemic change and shape world order.

The study will focus on India’s diplomatic responses towards the US, how India crafted economic diplomacy with the United States in the context of India’s economic reforms and various trade issues that have come up due to India’s economic integration with the world economy. Political and security diplomacy towards the US in the specific period of 1991-1996 is the focus of the research.

Research Questions

1. How was India’s diplomacy transformed in the post-Cold War era to cater to the needs of external changes?
2. How India used a diplomatic process such as representation, communication, and negotiation in political diplomacy with the US on the question of Kashmir and human rights issues?

3. How effective has been India's diplomatic instruments, process, and institutions in conducting economic diplomacy with the US?
4. How India conducted security diplomacy with the US on the question of India's Nuclear Program?

Hypotheses

1. The rise of the US as a unipolar power primarily drove India's diplomacy towards the US.
2. Summitry and economic diplomacy were the core mechanisms in India's diplomacy with the US that moved bilateral relations from estrangement to engagement.

Research Methodology

The study investigates India's diplomatic history towards the US from 1991-1996. It is a descriptive and analytical study. The research is based on both primary and secondary data. It employs the method of archival research. This study uses primary sources such as MEA Annual reports, memoirs of political leaders and diplomats. It analyses, interprets and investigates speeches, statements, interviews, government documents, and Parliament debates. Also, interviews with experts in the related field of research are a major source of information in this study. Since the study is an analysis of the various debates present, secondary sources of literature primarily books, journal articles, online articles, newspaper reports and others on this topic form the major source.

Chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction

The first chapter, with an overview of existing literature and, will introduce the proposed research problem. The chapter also introduces the objectives of the study and the methodology of the proposed research will explain in detail in this chapter.

Chapter 2: Diplomatic Responses to Systemic Change: Theoretical Perspectives

The Chapter will introduce diplomatic responses to systemic change theoretical perspectives, the focus on systemic change and its implications to diplomacy and exclusively deals with state response to unipolarity.

Chapter3: India's Political Diplomacy towards the United States, 1991-1996

This chapter focuses on Indian diplomatic initiatives in establishing and strengthening political relations with the US. P.V. Narasimha Rao negotiations at summit level with George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Focus on Kashmir issue distinct diplomatic feature Rao as a crisis manager in conducting political relations with the US. The chapter also deals with changes in the diplomatic establishment and critically examines the mechanics of diplomacy.

Chapter 4 India's Security Diplomacy towards the United States, 1991-1996

This chapter deals with India's establishing Indo – US defence cooperation and how did India negotiate security cooperation with the United States: The chapter also focuses on how India safeguarded its nuclear option in the context of the US-initiated policy on the cap, roll back and eliminates nuclear weapons of India. How India negotiated arms control, disarmament treaties at bilateral and multilateral institutions. Focus is on NPT extension negotiating nuclear program especially focussing on how the Rao government bought time on nuclear weapons testing and issues regarding CTBT, missile program, and MTCR. This chapter also focuses on defense officials' visits and institutional interaction on security cooperation on counter-terrorism addressing Asia balance of power, South Asian security concerns, etc.

Chapter 5: India's Economic Diplomacy towards the United States, 1991-1996

In this chapter, how India crafted economic diplomacy with the United States in the context of India's economic reforms and various trade issues that have come up due to India's economic integration with the world economy. How India negotiated at bilateral, multilateral financial and trade institutions? This chapter also looks at various business delegations that played a key role in consolidating economic relations with the US.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

The concluding chapter will explain the major findings of this study.

CHAPTER II

RESPONSES TO SYSTEMIC CHANGE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Introduction

Dealing with adversaries and friends a ruler should use all four strategies: Sama- engagement/ cultivating friendship, Dhana - buying off, Bhedha - dividing the enemies, and Danda- force as the last resort-Kautilya (Subrahmanyam 1994).

This chapter follows the levels of analysis to explain the responses to systemic change. The first part explains the responses to systemic change through the structural realist perspective. Structural realists explain that state behaviour is fundamentally determined by the structure of the international system. The second part looks at the liberal perspective to explain state behaviour through the second image which deals with domestic characteristics of a state. In this context, it looks at the democratic peace thesis. The final section of this chapter looks at the third image, the individual leaders and their qualities, that determine conflict and cooperation in interstate relations. The third image-based explanation is made through the theories of diplomacy, especially the theory of summit diplomacy. Political leaders use the summit initiative to establish a cooperative relationship.

Defining Systemic Change

There are two concepts that need to be discussed: structural change and systemic change. Structural change is the change in the distribution of capabilities in the international system. The systemic change reflects the change of polarity in the international system, the multi- to bi- to the unipolar system. Kenneth Waltz argues that “a structure is defined by the arrangements of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes” (Waltz 1979:80). Systemic change means “change in the structure of the balance of the power, in other words, the disappearance of the balancer in the international system” (Morgenthau 1948: 344). The dissolution of the USSR led to the disappearance of the bipolar structure of world politics. The system transformed into unipolar. Christopher Layne defines a unipolar system as

“one in which a single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of overwhelming balancing coalition against it” (Layne 1993:5). Kenneth Waltz states that systemic change affects how states provide for their own security (Waltz 2000:5-6).

Responses from Realist Perspective

Structural realists argue that the state’s responses and outcomes are determined by the structure of the international system. Randall Schweller examines the states manage the changes in the balance of power and states responses to threats two main strategies balancing response and under balancing responses, under balancing strategies are inefficiently response to threats (Schweller 2006:9).

Realists argue that systemic change does not transform the structure of anarchy in the international system (Wendt 1999: 314). In the anarchical structural condition, the primary aim of the state is self-preservation (Layne 1993:11). According to Waltz, all “States are guided by structural constraints and imperatives of anarchy, self-help, and balance of power, and must be if they hope to survive and prosper” (Schroeder 1994: 113-114). All States operate in the anarchical realm where the structure imposes a constraint on state behaviour for its strategies or for acquiring power in the international system. In other words, the systemic constraint fundamentally means the risks that are attached to policy options for the states. “A systemic constraint is a property of the international system that restricts freedom of action” (Wohlforth 2008: 3-4).

Waltz's fundamental claim on the balance of power formation in the international system is that it is natural that a state seeks to form balances against another power. States are bound to form balances because they have to balance for their survival. Because the imbalance of power threatens other actors in the international system Kenneth Waltz argues that “states will always or even usually engage in balancing behavior. Balancing is a strategy for survival” (Waltz 2000: 38).

Stephen Walt agrees with the fundamental logic of balance of power formation and its assumptions. Walt claims that the balance of threat theory does not form balances against power for the sake of it. States balances against threats in the international system. Walt puts succinctly a balance of power formation. He argues that the

“balance of threat theory predicts that states seek allies when there is an imbalance of threat” (Walt 1988: 281). On the other hand, Christopher Layne argues that in a unipolar system what concerns the states is the military capabilities of unipolar power, not its intention. Therefore, the need for states to balance against power or balance against threats hardly matters (Layne 1993:13).

Balance of Power Policies

The idea of a balance of power is fundamentally based on the assumption that states primarily seek their own survival and they strive for dominance in the system (Waltz 1979). Hans Morgenthau wrote on balance of power and considered it the struggle for power through which states try to put an end to the status quo. This, in turn, leads to a reconfiguration of power. The balance of power formation occurs for two reasons. First, it ensures the stability of the system. Second, if the states do not go for a balance of power, the imbalanced power will threaten the stability of the system and the interests of the actors. The balance of power theory follows two methods. While the first method relates to internal efforts to increase military capabilities, the second method is alliance formation against threatening alliances (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979: 118).

The problem of balance formation against the imbalanced power which is known as a unipolar power, the theory of alliance formation presumed to ally against the stronger. Strong states eventually provoke others to ally against them because their superior capabilities present a danger to weaker powers (Walt 1989: 4). Alliance formation is an available strategy for the state to check the imbalanced power and guarantee them for their security and survival of the system. Steven David classifies threats into two categories: primary and secondary threats (Schweller 1994: 78). In other words, alliance formation is fundamentally against the primary threats, not for the secondary threats that they face.

States not only follow the method of balancing by forming an alliance when it is unlikely to form alliances. States go for internal balancing formation which happens when states invest heavily in defence and military capabilities (Lieber and Alexander 2005: 119). T.V. Paul argues that second-tier great powers follow indirect balancing

strategies at the level of multilateral institutions through diplomatic strategies aimed at constraining American power. This is known as soft balancing (Paul 2005: 58).

The role of nuclear weapons technology fundamentally altered the way states ensure their survival. Nuclear weapons are fundamentally the force equalizers and acquiring nuclear weapons by states is the best means to guarantee their survival (Morgenthau 1948: 29). The nuclear age presented fundamental paradoxes in the international system. John Mearsheimer provides analyses for a balance of power. The state cannot threaten a country that possesses nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons alter the notion of understanding balance of power in the international system. The threat of nuclear annihilation presents the best means of protection against survival in the international system in a way that nuclear weapons work as a guarantor of survival and it eliminates the security competition among states (Mearsheimer 2001).

Self-help Strategies

States not only follow the balance of power policies for their survival and ensuring security in the system. States do follow other strategies for protection in the system. One such strategy is bandwagoning which is a sensible behavior where gains are expected since the balance of power strategies entails the costs attached.

Randall Schweller distinguishes between the concepts of bandwagoning and balancing. Both are opposite ends in their approach and means to achieve security. Balancing is essentially costly for the states that are engaged on the other hand bandwagoning is a sensible strategy when the states do not have the option of joining the alliance or the option of internal balancing to achieve security cooperation (Schweller 1994: 106).

Paul Schroeder views bandwagoning at the expense of independence and autonomy. He argues that states adopt bandwagoning for the sake of security but it also implies insecurity from the protecting power (Schroeder 1994: 117). Stephen Walt distinguishes between the bandwagoning and détente. On one hand, bandwagoning involves an unequal exchange between the vulnerable and the dominant state where asymmetrical concessions are involved. On the other hand, détente is based on the equality of the parties involved in the détente relationship where both countries benefit (Walt 1988: 282).

Paul Schroeder examines the neorealist theoretical assumptions using historical case studies and argues that states not only follow other self-help strategies. One commonly employed self-help strategy was hiding from threats. States hide from the threats from great power. In other words, they deliberately ignore the threats. States follow the strategy of transcending which is a strategy to overcome international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conflicting nature of international politics. States seek to restore faith in organizations and find institutional arrangements involving a formal agreement on norms and rules (Schroeder 1994: 117).

Randall Schweller argues that the state's responses to changes in the balance of power and under-balancing are not determined by international structures but by the domestic structures. The effective response of states depends on elite consensus. If the national elite establishes effective consensus and they agree on the threats and responses to the balance of power, responses will be effective. However, if the elite cohesion will be fragmented, the responses will be ineffective which would lead to under-balancing strategies. A third factor that is relevant is the social cohesion of the state. If the society is integrated and not cohesive enough, the mobilization of national response will be ineffective. The fourth factor is regime vulnerability which would determine the response to threats (Schweller 2006: 11-12). Robert Gilpin argues that the international system offers incentives and disincentives to change the international system. The ability of states to incur costs and their view of the existing international system augments or reduces the states' security interests. If the existing international system ensures the security of the state then the status quo state would thrive. On the other hand, the revisionist state will alter the international system if it does not benefit the system (Gilpin 1981:50).

Liberal Responses to Systemic Change

The transformational nature of structure and the possibility for cooperation is related to the idea that "fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors through their practices, change the rules and norms and constitutive of international interaction" (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994: 216). Alexander Wendt fundamentally disagrees with the nature of change. For Wendt, the international change at the end of the cold war caused great power behavior which reflects a cultural change in the

international system which transformed from the Hobbesian culture to Lockean. Another cultural change that occurred relates to the existence of peace among Western democracies. This is the Kantian culture (Wendt 1999:314). The neorealist argument is that despite the changes in distribution power the structure of anarchy has not changed. This view is that of the Waltzian system.

Kant's understanding of structure derives from the moral philosophy where seeds of progress lie within the structure. Because of competition and socialization affects, the structure is a force for progress and transformation (Huntley 1996:61). According to David Dessler, the transformational model of structure both enables action and constraints its possibilities. Second, the structure is the outcome as well as the medium of action (Dessler 1989:452).

Cooperation as Self- help Strategy

The existence of anarchy is the reason for conflict rather than cooperation in the international system. The existence of a security dilemma inhibits the possibility of cooperation. The security dilemma is a situation where the "means by which states try to increase its security and decrease the security of others" (Glaser 1997). Robert Jervis in his seminal article "cooperation under security dilemma" presents his central argument that the presence of a security dilemma is the reason for the states not being able to achieve cooperation even though cooperation will be beneficial for both the actors (Jervis 1978). Jervis (1976) argues that in the anarchic world of international politics, every state needs to guarantee its security through its own capabilities and security dilemma is the reason for the conflict between states. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that states are concerned about absolute and relative gains that hinder the cooperation in the military and security cooperation. The fear of cheating inhibits cooperation because of the nature of the offensive military capabilities.

On the other hand, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane argue that there exists in international society even the absence of government in the international system which prevents the possibility of cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985:226). Wendt argues that a security dilemma "is a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other's intentions" (Glaser 1997:196).

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye argue that power is obsolete because of interdependence in the international system and the interdependent nature of the system creates a possibility for cooperation. Interdependence does not necessarily lead to cooperation (Keohane and Nye 1987:730). Robert Jervis offers the prescription for overcoming the security dilemma. He advocates a situation where if the state actors develop trust and reciprocity and mutual bonds, the psychology of fear is removed (Jervis 1976: 82). Andrew Kydd offers a similar solution. Kydd (2000) argues that the security dilemma arises because of mistrust. Therefore, the strategies of reassurance are required for overcoming security dilemmas and achieving cooperation (Kydd 2000).

Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane's common assumption is that "cooperation occurs when actors adjust and anticipate behavior and actual preferences of others" (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 226). Oye (1985) argues that cooperation among states is fundamentally determined by the pay-off structure. In other words, the incentive structures would work if cooperation will be of mutual gain and therefore the states tend to cooperate. The presence of shadow of the future will determine the cooperation among actors. Mutual benefits lead to cooperation (Oye 1985). Mutuality of interests is an important factor in cooperation in military, security and economic relations (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 227).

Democratic Peace Thesis in Cooperation and Conflict

The assumption of liberal IR theory is that the "domestic nature of the state" is an important factor in determining the relations between states (Buchan 2002). Realists argue that the structure that determines international outcomes. However, the liberals believe in the second image that determines interstate relations (Snyder 2004). The domestic characteristics and internal makeup of the state are important to examine conflict and cooperation. In this context, the chapter looks at the democratic peace proposition and its various normative, institutional, and agent-based explanations. Proponents of democratic peace argue that "democracies seldom, if ever, go to war against one another" (Owen 1994: 87). Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett in their study found out that "democracies have rarely fought one another in violent conflict" (Maoz and Russett 1993:621).

Michael Doyle's modern interpretation of Kant's perpetual peace is that the liberal states believe that other liberal democracies are the natural selection for alliance formation and they respect and accommodate each other interests. They maintain peaceful restraint and follow a method of negotiation in resolving conflicts (Doyle 1992).

The question is whether democracies are peaceful or not. Democracies are peaceful in their relations with other democracies and non-democracies. The democratic state has the propensity to peace which is known as monadic peace. The monadic peace argument posits that democracies are peace prone and their domestic structures are conducive to peace (Joshi 2015). The basic assumption about the democratic peace, that democratic peace exists only in relation with other fellow democracies, is known as dyadic peace (Rousseau *et. al.* 1996). Bruce Russett explains democratic peace by asserting that democracies fundamentally follow cultural restraint on the conflict in the resolution of disputes. The assumption is that democracies think that it is wrong to fight a fellow democracy because they have similar structures and processes (Russett 1993).

Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger examines friendship and enmity in international relations. Alliance and friendship are formed among democracies when there is a threat from the autocratic states in the international system. Since democracies face a common threat from autocratic countries, their alliance endures (Gartzke and Weisiger 2013). Tobias Bachteler's examination of the evidence of democratic peace theory is that policy toward allies is based on the democratic nature of the states. Therefore, it is easy to secure the loyalty of fellow democracies. Athenians believed that the more democratic the alliance, the more stable the alliance (Bachteler 1997).

John Owen talks about the role of perception in understanding democratic peace theory. Liberalism gives rise to an ideology that distinguishes between states primarily according to regime type. In assessing a state, liberalism first asks whether it is a liberal democracy or not. This is in contrast to neorealist, which distinguishes according to capabilities. Liberalism looks for characteristics other than power, because liberal democracies are internally characterized by enlightened citizens, civil society and liberal democratic institutions. However, it is not sufficient to explain democratic peace. If its peer states do not believe it is a liberal democracy, they will

not treat it as one. History shows many cases where perception played a crucial role in determining interstate relations (Owen 1994).

About the threats that states perceive in their external relations, the proponents of democratic peace theorists believe that liberal states do not perceive other liberal states as a threat (Farnham 2003). The question is regarding the use of force as a means to settle disputes. John Macmillan argues that the liberals are unlikely to use force and they envisage different thresholds in the use of force (Macmillan 2004) The fear of surprise attack in the international anarchical world is the fundamental reason for lack of trust and reason for arms build-up in the international system. The realist assumption is that states live in perennial insecurity in an anarchical structure. For realists, states cannot be trusted as they might go for a 'surprise attack'. Liberal states have an institutional structure in their decision-making procedure and they do have institutional checks and standard operating procedures which prevent surprise attacks. Therefore, liberal states do not fear each other for a surprise attack. Christopher Layne asks then what are the properties that prevent using coercive threats against another state the general explanation of democratic peace it is because of institutional constraints and the democratic norms (Layne 1994).

David E. Spiro argues that the liberal states are likely to form alliances with liberal regimes to fight for the liberal cause to protect and defend democracy and freedom (Spiro 1994: 81). President Clinton declared in his 1994 state of the union address that "ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere" (Quoted in Owen 1994:87). Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao said in a speech to the French Institute of International Relations in 1992 that,

"I think our experience as democracies certainly does, democracy with nations is effective precisely because it offers a mechanism through which a national consensus can be evolved behind preferred policies. Democracy allows orderly change. These same principles must now be extended to interstate relations. International cooperation to deal with global challenges will be effective only if it is backed by international consensus. Such a consensus can only be evolved through a truly democratic and multilateral process, with the participation of sovereign states" (Narsimha Rao 1992: 398).

Immanuel Kant outlines the establishment of perpetual peace. He argues that there shall be a federation among the republican states known as the pacific union which is the first requisite for the establishment of peace. Michael Doyle provides a modern interpretation of Kant's idea of the pacific union and he argues that there is the existence of a "liberal zone of peace" among the liberal states (Doyle 1983: 213).

Normative Explanation of Democratic Peace

Michael Doyle argues that "these conventions of mutual respect have formed a cooperative foundation for relations among liberal states and liberal states are peace prone only in relation to the other liberal states" (Doyle 1983).

Norm-based explanations of democratic peace are based on the properties of the democracies such as principles of democracy, accountability and consensus. Democratic ethos is the reason why democracies are peace prone and peace-loving. Normative theory locates the cause of democratic peace in the ideas or norms held by democracies. Democracies believe it would be unjust or imprudent to fight one another (Owen 1994). Friedman Gil argues that "tolerance, accommodation, and adjudication are constitutive norms of democracy these norms form part of the democratic foreign relations (Gil 2008: 549). John Owen argues that "freedom of toleration is the best means to these ends. The liberal commitment to individual freedom gives rise to foreign policy ideology and government institutions that work together produce democratic peace" (Owen 1994).

Steve Chan argues in favour of democratic norms of tolerance, compromise and civic culture (Chan 1997:66). Weart found that the single most important factor for peace is the development of a conducive political culture for non-violent contestation of power (Cited in Chan 1997: 78). Domestic political norms of tolerance and compromise exist in their foreign relations. Thus, it automatically leads to peaceful relations with other democracies (Chan 1997:77).

Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett explain the democratic peace theory through the normative model. They suggest that because of norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their clashes from escalating into violent conflicts (Maoz and Russett 1993).

Owen (1994) argues that importance trust and respect in the conduct of interstate relations that democracies fundamentally trust and respect because their domestic systems are just and fair and the trust and respect difficult to establish in non-democracies and authoritarian states because their domestic systems are unjust. The democratic norms argument says that norms of tolerance and negotiation part of the democratic process. When a democratic state has a dispute with another democratic state, these norms facilitate the resolution of the crisis before the use of military force is necessary (Lektzian and Souva 2009).

Bruce Russett explains the democratic peace theory through the cultural explanation. In his view, the culture of democracy is more important in understanding the interstate relations that in a democratically governed country there is the existence of conflict resolution mechanisms. The reason is the absence of violence in domestic politics. Bruce Russett argues that a “more democratic a nation is, more peaceful it is in its relations with other democracies” (Russett 1993:127). Normative logic is that democracies are peace-loving because they believe in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett, argues democracies norms of cooperation and compromise prevents from escalating disputes into wars (Maoz and Russett 1993). Similar arguments Friedman Gil argues that democratic states in their internal process and institutional mechanism for resolution of conflicts and the in authoritarian states coercive methods use for the conflict resolution this norm creates fear and distrust in interstate relations (Gil 2008). Dina A Zinnes argues that democracies treat one another with respect and trust because of shared norms of non-violence and bargaining in resolving the conflict of interests and mutual differences (Zinnes 2004). Tarzi Shah explains the democratic peace because of common democratic political culture and shared democratic values are respected for individual freedom, human rights, civil liberties, due process of law (Tarzi 2007).

The norm of transparency which distinguishes democracy from other governmental forms 'transparency'. Democratic transparency - the openness of its political processes is a prerequisite for democracy (Starr 1997). Therefore the norm of transparency and further extension of the concept of open democracies in still confidence in other democracies.

Institutional Based Explanation of Democratic Peace

Bruce Russett argues that stable democracies unlikely to initiate a military conflict as a result of the restraining effect of institutions and practices (Russett 1993). Owen Kant, Doyle and Rummel explain democratic peace theory. The structural accounts attribute democratic peace to the institutional constraints within democracies. Chief executives in democracies must gain approval for war decisions from cabinet members and legislature, and ultimately from the electorate (Owen 1994). Michael Doyle argues that “the constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage war with one another” because of the liberal democratic states inherently peaceful because the citizens rule the polity and bear the costs of war that the liberalism essentially founded on the idea freedom of the individual. The citizens are treated as ethical objects. The liberalism based on the set of rights, freedom of conscience, a free press and free speech and equality before the law, Because of the liberal institutional procedures and shared commitments, practices that enable the peaceful conduct of relations (Doyle 1983: 205-225).

Immanuel Kant in his seminal philosophical thesis in perpetual peace sketches on to achieve peace between states. The constitution in every state shall be republican in other words the republican form of government there exists a civil constitution. In a republican form of government their decision making essentially governed by the constitution and the constitutional restraint on war initiation process. In his comparison with other forms of government, the monarchical form of government is based on the dynasty where the ruler is not elected (Kant 1897). The assumption is that the elected representatives are accountable to the electorate. The democratic peace depends on the stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, civil rights, free and effective press and the representative form of government (Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 530).

Immanuel Kant believes in the republican form of government is that where the “consent of the citizen” is an essential in war and peace decisions (Kant 1897: 113) Dictatorship, monarchy and autocracy “the ruler is not a fellow citizen but its owner”, the war decisions depends on the whims and fancies of the ruler. Henderson (2006) argues on citizenship is a distinctive feature of democracy. Democratic peace proposition conceives of the role played by citizens in facilitating or achieving peace.

Devin K. Joshi (2015) explains the Democratic peace theory of the popular and elite democracies. The level of democratization, in other words, the popular democracies based on the assumption that the citizen access to decision making structures and institutions. And the policy elite in reformulating the categories the policymaking elite receptive and the accessibility to the citizen feedback on the broader question of peace and war. “To the extent that a democracy's institutional structures reflect more popular than elite influence over policy, it should be less likely to initiate a militarized conflict against states of any regime type” (Joshi, Maloy and Peterson 2015).

Citizens in democracies fundamentally are repulsed by violence and so constrain their leaders from pursuing aggressive foreign policies because the costs of war need to bear by the citizens (Morrow, Siverson and Smith 1999). Democracies fundamentally cautious about using force, democracies respect one another and democracies work hard to promote peaceful relations with fellow democratic states. John Owen's explanation of democratic peace is because of the existence of liberal ideas as and the and existence of freedom to debate is the fundamental restraining power on the government (Owen 1994:103).

David Lektzian and Mark Souva (2009) explain the democratic peace theory through informational and preferential arguments. The informational argument is that in the conflict in relation to other democracies better-disseminating information with the result that the escalation of conflict can be controlled. The informational argument posits that democratic institutions facilitate the sending and receiving of costly signals, enables the de-escalation of conflicts. The preferences argument based on the assumption domestic institutions strongly influences its foreign policy preferences. Democracies, then, according to the preferences argument, similar decision-making institutions, and process foreign policy decision making similar foreign policy preferences, leaving them with little to fight about.

The effect of democratic institutions, the arrangement, the checks and balances in the political system acts as a restraining factor on the part of executive war initiation process (Zinnes 2004). A similar argument is provided by Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett in their opinion that “institutional constraints impose escalating conflicts between democracies” (Maoz and Russett 1993). Whan Choi-Seung argues that institutional or domestic political constraints known as veto players put restrain on the

aggressive foreign policy posture of the executive. Various veto players such as congressional legislatures, high courts and the media are institutional arrangements unique to democracies. Their acceptance is crucial for the policy acceptance and the implementation as they play vetoing and the scrutinizing role of the policy initiation process (Choi-Seung 2010).

Agent-Based Explanation of Democratic Peace

Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in a speech to the French institute of international relations in 1992 said, “there is certain temper, a certain way of thinking which lies behind the institutions of democracy. Democracy needs to be nurtured. It is no readymade garment that fits everyone, it needs to be consciously evolved and practiced” (Narsimha Rao 1992: 398).

John M. Owen argues that political leaders with liberal ideology whenever they rule relations between liberal democracies are harmonious. He gives the example of Liberals presidents like Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson. These presidents pursued the liberal foreign policies towards liberal states and their foreign policies not so harmonious towards the non- liberals (Owen 1994: 99).

Political constraints on the leader's conflict behaviour are explained through agent-based explanation is that leaders are the primary agents at domestic and international conflict resolution. Democratic leaders respect one another and trust other democratic leaders they internalize the normative behaviour because of the norms and values. Andrew W Bausch argues that democratic leaders are accountable to the electorate in comparison with autocratic leaders. The prerequisite of the leaders in a democracy stands for the re-election of the electoral predicament to win the elections and the constitutional requirement to the accountable to the electorate. The democratic leaders in conflict escalation engage in diplomacy and negotiation (Bausch 2015). Barbara Farnham explains that the threat perception and democratic leaders. He gives the example that democratic leaders do not perceive each other as a threat, but the democratic leaders perceive the non-democratic leaders as a threat. The Wilson perception the Hitler as a threat to American security because Hitler did not socialize into democratic norms, on the other hand, the liberal democratic leaders socialized into democratic norms, the democratic norms that shape the threat perception of the

democratic leaders (Farnham 2003). Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker (2006) in their article democratic leaders and the democratic peace in their comparison of the Tony Blair and the Bill Clinton that the democratic leaders have different operational codes that enable the democratic leaders to exhibit different leadership style in the management of conflict this is due to the democratic culture of the respective countries enable in conflict management. Democratic leaders do accommodate the operational codes of democratic leaders. Also, the political constraints on the democratic leaders the number of veto players the legislative constraints the opposition and public opinion will determine the democratic leaders' conflict behaviour and the beliefs and perceptions shape the democratic leaders towards the non-democracies and the threat perception (Schafer and Walker 2006).

Individual decision maker's psychological profile and traits are important in understanding behaviour towards interstate peace and conflict. Some leaders behaviour peaceful and democratic characteristics lead to stable relations between democracies, some individual leaders unstable psychological qualities which predispose them to choose more conflict behaviour by ignoring the democratic norms (Schafer and Walker 2006). Political leaders socialized within democratic political systems are more likely to use compromise and nonviolent means to resolve disputes than are leaders socialized in authoritarian political systems. On the opposite, autocratic leaders are socialized in a system encourages the use of force (Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter and Huth 1996).

Critical Assessment of Democratic Peace Proposition

The theoretical implication of the democratic peace proposition is in with the structural realist theory that realism main focus of the study is structural factors for realists the regime type is not the determinant of interstate relations. The proponent of democratic peace the focus of the study is the attributes of governments (Chan 1997: 60). Realism takes the view that "even if states change internally, the structure of the international political system remains the same. As the systemic structure is the primary determinant of international political outcomes (Layne 1994:12) Realists claim both the "states are condemned to exist in a constant state of security competition and its assertion that the structure of the international system, rather than the state type, should be central to our understanding of state behaviour." (Sebastian

Rosato 2003). “This would suggest that the clash of national interests at the systemic level remains a primary tool for understanding international conflict (Spiro 1994: 59).

Michael W. Doyle (1983) argues that peace is the outcome of prudent diplomacy not because of regime type. Peace is also there because statesmen are able to adopt negotiations for resolving the conflicts and adopt peaceful foreign policies. The Historical record indicates the democracies have failed to adapt their internal norms of conflict resolution in an international context. This claims first democracies can justify the use of force in a range of situations” (Rosato 2003). John Mearsheimer 1990 maintained that a possibility always exists that democracy will revert to an authoritarian state. This threat of backsliding means can never be sure of another democratic state will not change its stripes and turn on it sometimes in the future (Mearsheimer 1990: 66; Xenias 2005).

Raymond Cohen critiques the proponents of democratic peace thesis the explanation is given by Immanuel Kant on the question of the pacific union and the Michael Doyle’s interpretation of the zone of peace. Raymond Cohen gives the reasons for the existence of peace among the western liberal democracy because of the existence of the security community as termed by Karl Deutsch. The lack of war between the North Atlantic states the shared heritage and existence of security community North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the second explanation for the existence of economic interdependence and the economic integration are the fundamental factors that the existence of peace among democracies (Cohen 1994). Democracies are the existence of similar institutions and structures and processes in foreign policy and the national security decision making institutions and the conflict resolution they follow the method of negotiation and diplomacy and mediation. The theoretical implication of the study is structural realists focus on the systemic factors, states are sociological entities the role of perception does matter and democracies fundamentally believe the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Democracies produce democratic leaders even the most authoritarian personalities need to follow the norms and institution's constitutional procedures because the electoral compulsions and the socialization affect their counterparts in the international arena. Realists believe international relations are guided by the perceptions of national security and power the central determinant of political relations the alliances and the security. Since the time of

Immanuel Kant and Plato and the Aristotle concept of democracy have transformed its institutions and process and for example, the American democracy has its own pressures of lobby groups, manipulative media, military-industrial complex lobby, etc.

Role of Summit Diplomacy in Building Cooperative Relationship

Wheeler (2013) investigates the central problem in interstate security cooperation. How do leaders transform the interstate conflict into cooperation? The obstacle to cooperation between states is the security dilemma. Nicholas J Wheeler suggests the interaction between the states is the human agents; the human agents sympathize with each other security concerns. Heads of state at the summit level emphasize with other's side's security fears. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler used the term security sensibility to overcome the security dilemma (Wheeler 2013: 496). John Galtung argues in his article the summit meeting and international relations the relationship among states the cooperation and conflict model. The cooperation model reflects the levels of channels of communication that exist and their frequency of meeting is shows a healthy relationship.

Zartman and Maureen opinion that summits consist of process “[s]ummitry, that is, a formal programmed discussion between heads of state” Pre summits are prepared talks by Ambassador and diplomats and lower-level channels of communication and the second summits might lead to the future talks in another word post-summit consolidation of bilateral relations (Zartman and Maureen 1982: 219). David Reynolds defines summit diplomacy as ‘Summitry constitutes one form of diplomacy, which is essentially a dialogue between states’ (Reynolds 2007: 8). Indian diplomat Kishan S. Rana defines summit meeting is the apex of the bilateral diplomatic process (Rana 2002: 161) David H. Dunn defines summit as ‘the meetings of political leaders for official purposes, an activity which constitutes diplomacy at the highest level’ (Dunn 1996: 20).

According to Robert D Putnam summits “face to face communication encounters at the summit can lubricate international relations” (Putnam 1984:88). The purpose of summit meetings “is to get to know each other “the meeting of leaders to build rapport generated between the leaders of the will facilitate communication between

their countries (Schaetzel and Malmgren 1980: 133). Mellisen (2003) argues that the meeting of minds and personal chemistry can be a decisive factor in complex or difficult negotiations. For Hans Morgenthau, summit diplomacy is used for settlement of the conflict between states. Summit meetings are connected to lower levels of diplomacy and the process leads to further diplomatic interaction (Mellisen 2003: 7). According to Nicholas Wheeler, summit diplomacy is an “effective diplomatic transformation” and it is “a process in which two adversaries go through a series of steps of de-escalation which progressively reduces the role that the threat of the use of force plays in their relationship” (Wheeler 2013: 480).

Summit diplomacy serves the purpose of overcoming the suspicion that exists between the parties to the conflict. There are many diplomatic instruments that exist in conducting the dialogue. In modern times, summits are the preferred medium of conducting a dialogue with the parties to the conflict (Dunn 1996:248). Summits usually take the form of an informal meeting where leaders are not constrained by the formal procedural and bureaucratic hurdles. Furthermore, heads of states conduct diplomacy in order to strengthen understanding in a free and cordial atmosphere where leader already has a certain degree of informality in the absence of media (Mellisen 2003: 26).

The diplomatic process consists of backchannel communication. It has assumed the form of track II dialogue and they compliment the front channels of communication where the relations need to be sorted out at formal diplomatic communication or the summit level. However, formal diplomatic channels are closed at times. The Track II is the quiet form of diplomacy where things are sorted out in the absence of the media (Zartman and Maureen 1982:219).

In light of economic globalization, the agenda of the summit have transformed. The contemporary heads of states tend to promote trade and investments and therefore, the summit agenda has acquired an economic nature. The assumptions of international relations have acquired new characteristics with negotiations on trade disputes. Summit agenda is economic rather than political (Putnam 1984:74). The international system transformed the bipolar structure to unipolar power. International relations are no longer guided by the cold war transaction the high politics concentrated on arms control and alliance formation. Jan Mellisen argues that an international system

characterized by one superpower and the summit agendas are transformed to reflect economic content. Economic summits lead to relationship-building (Mellisen 2003:7-8).

Elmer Plischke argues that the summit agenda needs to be managed prudently to build a relationship between heads of states as well as the relationship among nations. Heads of states are the key agent and their qualities determine the success of summit (Plischke 1972).

Conclusion

Realism prescribes the security realm balance of power policies in the context of the threat of the use of force. In other words, the security dilemma exists between states as a fundamental obstacle to security cooperation. States do employ other strategies for survival in the anarchical international system. If the states do not have capabilities to follow the balance of power policies, they follow various other strategies transcending the policies and undertake bandwagoning. For the liberals and the constructivist, the structure has transformational nature and they are hopeful of achieving cooperation because of complex interdependence and the existence of institutions does facilitate cooperation. Summit diplomacy is the preferred means of conflict resolution. Heads of states do show security sensibility. In other words, state leaders show concern for the security concerns of each other. This is known as security sensibility. With systemic changes, the high-security issues to economic issues are becoming summit agenda and economic summits have transformed the nature of the relationship. Summit diplomacy is an effective instrument to transform the relationship from being conflict to a cooperative.

CHAPTER III

INDIA'S POLITICAL DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES 1991-1996

“Our two Republics share a common faith in democratic institutions and the democratic way of life...” (Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Kamath 1994: 3)

This chapter focuses on Indian diplomatic initiatives for strengthening political relations with the US. It looks Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's negotiations at summit level dialogue with President George H.W. Bush. This chapter also looks at how India used diplomatic communication to change the US perception of the Kashmir issue and human rights issues. The chapter exclusively focuses on the Prime Minister Rao and Bill Clinton summit, 1994 and looks at post summit initiatives, consolidation and strengthening of political relations.

The ending of the Cold war was instrumental in rapprochement between India and the USA (Dubey 1992). Stephen Cohen explains the relationship between India and the United States as interwoven with its relationship with the other powers, namely Pakistan, China and the Soviet Union (Mathur 2003: 2). The Cold war dynamic changed in South Asia after USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan became strategically less relevant to the United States, at the same time it had opened opportunities for both Indian political leadership and American leadership to look at it from a fresh perspective (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016).

On the other hand, the China factor inhibited India-US relations. While in the beginning it was for ideological reasons, subsequently, with President Nixon and the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for geopolitical reasons to contain the Soviet Union. Kissinger was instrumental in establishing diplomatic relations with China. However, Kissinger changed his outlook on China. He writes of the Tiananmen Square incident in his book

on China. China's authorities used force in order to control pro-democratic voices. The American foreign policy community viewed the authoritarian communist China as incapable of being a reliable partner for the United States (Kissinger 2011: 411-412).

In the context of the changed global circumstances where the Soviet Union no longer existed, the changed national circumstances and severe balance of payments crisis, Prime Minister Narsimha Rao understood that India needed to open up politically to the United States. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao advised the diplomats 'be pragmatic' in dealing with the United States (Shankar 2018). According to Prabhakara Menon, Prime Minister Rao was devoted to conceptualising India's relationship with the United States, and Rao was of the opinion that there was an absence of political, economic and strategic relations between India and the US (Menon 2012: 299-300). Abid Hussain who served as Ambassador to the United States compared India and the United States to siblings. Both countries shared similar institutions, yet a difference of perspective prevailed. There was a tendency to see India's fears of a neo-colonialist United States and the US viewing India as preoccupied with colonialism (Hussain 1994).

Foreign secretary J.N Dixit's observes that Prime Minister Rao's approach to the United States aimed to protect the fundamental interest of the country while also improving relations in the area of technological and economic cooperation with the United States (Dixit 1996:177). External Affairs Minister Madhav Sinha Solanki believed an identity of views must exist between India and the United States in order to strengthen diplomatic relations with the United States. Contacts at the official level had been initiated (The Times of India 1991b: 7).

Although, the political thaw of the United States began during President Regan's term, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's pragmatic approach created a positive trend in the relationship. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed President Ronald Reagan in saying, "To me every journey is an adventure I can say this one is in search of understanding friendship," she further said, "No two countries have the same angle of vision but each can try and appreciate the points of view of others. Our efforts should be to find out

common area howsoever small, on which to build and to enhance cooperation” (Gandhi 1982).

The relationship further strengthened after Rajiv Gandhi came to power and brought along his vision of a technological modern India. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi looked at the United States for friendship and close cooperation in the area of science and technology. The Regan administration reciprocated Rajiv Gandhi’s initiative (Mahapatra 1998:102). Foreign policy analyst Ramesh Thakur writes that Rajiv Gandhi followed the pragmatic approach in his effort to strengthen the bilateral relations. Due to the structural factors, Rajiv Gandhi could not improve at a substantial level. Rajiv Gandhi’s effort resulted in improving better atmospherics in diplomatic relations (Thakur 1996: 575). However, the real chance for improving relations with the United States began with the end of the Cold War. This event in some senses allowed for the removal of any structural constraints (Dubey 1992).

Negotiating Engagement

Srinath Raghavan writes that India’s political leadership grasped the unipolar moment in the international system. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s approach was to strengthen India’s strategic capabilities where India’s interests converged in economic and technological (Raghavan 2018:310).

Kanwal Sibal, who was deputy chief of mission in the Indian embassy in Washington D.C in the 1990s, held the opinion that the central concern in engaging with the United is the role of the power which induces the asymmetry in the relationship. The United States is a global super power and India is a regional power. For India, diplomacy is aimed at not losing autonomy while simultaneously building the relationship in political, economic, technological and military cooperation such that it is advantageous to India (Sibal 2013: 15-16). Similar arguments are made by Rajesh Rajagopalan and Varun Sahni in that the diplomatic predicament is the relationship is fundamentally asymmetric because the United States needs India less and India is structurally constrained. The structure of the international system offers India to closer ties and the political necessity to balance China (Rajagopalan and Sahni2008).

Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan's analysis suggests that India's foreign policy views are divided into pragmatists and nationalists. Pragmatists' views are those that India relations with the US are helpful and mutual advantageous for both the countries. On the other hand, nationalists are skeptical of the relation with the United States in the long-term interest because of a fundamental disagreement about the international system. The United States wants to retain its current position as a unipolar power, whereas the objective of India's foreign policy is a multipolar world (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011:151-152). .

Rajagopalan and Sahni (2008) argue that while engaging with great powers, India's foreign policy makers should take stock of normative component because India's ambition to attain the 'great power' status is fundamentally two component - the material and the ideational basis for power. Kanwal Sibal notes that India's concern is that in engaging with the United States there are certain divergent views on principles governing the international relations. For instance, India's views on sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, human rights, etc (Sibal 2013: 15-16). Indian diplomats are consciously protecting the dignity and the moral dimension of the state. The Indian negotiators approach is always conscious of representing the civilization aspects of the state (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016: 116).

While engaging with the United States, India's political leadership is deeply concerned with the need to safeguard India's foreign policy autonomy. Sharing his apprehensions and concerns, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's said "Foreign relations go out of your hands into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are not independent..." (Muthamma 1994a: 69). P.V. Narasimha Rao had been Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's External affairs Minister; he had participated in the Non Aligned movement and was conscious of the basic philosophy and principles that guard independence of judgement and autonomy in the foreign policy action (Narasimha Rao 1992a).

In his first interview to the American press, Prime Minister Rao conveyed that India's friendship with other countries should not be seen as an unfriendly gesture towards the

United States (Weinraub 1991). India's foreign policy analyst C. Raja Mohan argues that both the United States and India need to work on a framework for the relationship. Raja Mohan aptly points out that India does not want to be a junior partner. Since India guards' independence as an international actor, he suggests the relationship to be a mutually beneficial framework based on productive political partnership (Raja Mohan 2000).

Sanjaya Baru suggests India is a power in Asia on the basis that India's foreign policy makers need to work *modus vivendi* with the US (Baru 1994). Manoj Joshi opinion India and the United States relationship need to be based on an enduring, non-exploitative and mutually beneficial relationship (Joshi 1993). Jairam Ramesh asserts India want a special relationship with the United States but not the terms set by the United States implication of the statement deeper urge for independence, autonomy (Ramesh 1999:3532). The senior most official heading the South Asian Bureau John Malott's puts it the model for the bilateral engagement is the United States want to relationship with India based on the cooperative relationship that it has a similar relationship with the other Asian countries (Joshi 1993).

In an interview to news magazine India Today Kissinger said that India and the United States had the opportunity to build a constructive relationship. The cold war compulsions and political logic have changed (Kissinger 1995). In addition to there were new forces such as globalisation and the global interdependence is the fact of international life. These are the new imperative for changes in the United States' diplomatic practices (Talbot 1997). The US Ambassador to India Thomas Pickering, believed that the global transformation induced by the fundamental changes in the relationship has opened for building the relationship between India and the USA (The Times of India 1992k: 15).

US Ambassador Frank Wisner believes India's geopolitical position in Asia and India's global reach are attributes for the United States to build formidable partnership (Anand 1994). Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger acknowledges that India rise to major power and in his view India will important player in international politics and with the opening of the economy India's presence felt worldwide (Kissinger 1995).

United States Senator Larry Pressler writes in his memoir India and the United States are more similar than any other country in South Asia in terms of political values and stable democratic government. The United States has closest relations with the U.K and Israel. India and the United States need to have a super alliance and he advocates the United States should not treat Pakistan and India as diplomatic equals (Pressler 2017:53).

A convergence of Political Values

American foreign policy began recognizing the strategic usefulness of having similar political values act as the basis for a mutually beneficial relationship (Malone and Mukherjee 2009). India and the United States are the world's largest democracies, but their relationship has been characterized as estrangement rather than the engagement. The countries' relationship is fundamental for stability of the globalized world (Bajpai and Mattoo 2000). The India-US cooperative relationship is based on high ideal principles since President Clinton had expressed that the democracies are good trading partners and that the democracies do not go to war with each other (Raja Mohan 1993). A similar opinion expressed by Ramesh Thakur who notes that the United States policy makers viewed India as a stable democracy and as an important power which can act as a force for stability (Thakur 1996). President Clinton in his inaugural address outlined his foreign policy vision of promoting and strengthening democracy and the Clinton administration's stand on democracy is an important foreign policy agenda in the post- Cold War era (Mahapatra 1993). Carnegie think tank authors Harrison Selig and Geoffrey Kemp advised the Clinton administration to focus on building partnership with the world's largest democracy, India, which would be a potential partner in solving global problems (Selig and Kemp 1993: 32). US foreign policy makers and analysts hardly understood that the significance of India as democracy was important for the United States ensuring the promotion democracy, preventing terrorism and the global balance of power (Morgan, et al. 1995).

President Clinton's Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott argues engaging and building relationships with democracy fundamentally promotes national interest and international security. In the globalized world, the international community has enormous

stakes in how nations govern. In the close knit democratic world the American Citizen's would be safe (Talbot 1996).

Securing the Support of Jewish Constituency

Isi Leibler, International Jewish leader, in his meeting with Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao, convinced Rao to establish diplomatic relationships with Israel. Leibler persuaded Prime Minister Rao to not forge an alliance with Israel but urged Rao to recognise the world Jewish constituency as a potential ally. Leibler in his talks with Rao emphasized India's position in the UN resolution "Zionism with racism". Prime Minister Rao assured the Jewish leader that there would be a change in India's approach to the issue. Leibler offered to convene an Indo Jewish Scholar colloquium in order to strengthen understanding (Leibler 2007).

P.R. Kumaraswamy expert on Israel studies in India writes the end of the cold war altered of the new international configuration of power opened the strategic space for establishing friendly relations with Israel. India Prime Minister Narasimha Rao established diplomatic relations 29 January 1992 with the Jewish state (Kumaraswamy 2002: 192).

Vinay Sitapati, biographer of P.V Narashimah Rao, writes that Rao's refusal to support the resolution in the UN sent a clear signal to the West. Prime Minister Rao established diplomatic relations without antagonising the Arab countries in the region; India announced full diplomatic relations with Israel. The Jerusalem Post announced, "India joins the World" (Sitapati 2016: 261-263). Prime Minister Rao reaching out to Israel did consolidated and secured the goodwill of the Jewish constituency and the lone voice of India in Congress the Stephen Solarz and long term friend of India, he was one of the influential American foreign policy on the Asian scene. He served on Foreign affairs subcommittee and the Asian pacific Affairs (Leibler 2007).

Vinay Sitapati writes, "The road to Washington, D.C., ran through Tel Aviv". Vinay Sitapati in his interview with foreign secretary Krisnan Srinivasan observed that Prime Minister Rao understood that without good diplomatic relations with Israel it would be

difficult to strengthen relations with the United States (Sitapati 2016: 261). In Sanjaya Baru's opinion "the powerful Jewish lobby in the US held the key to many doors and along the US East coast" (Baru 2016: 146).

President Bush's Diplomatic Initiatives to Strengthen Political Relations with India

President Bush adopted changes in foreign policy postures towards the subcontinent (Kux 1993:425). According to Harold Gould, the South Asian expert, with the change in the structure of relations in South Asia, George Bush had the opportunity to leave the burdensome diplomatic baggage and reconstitute new political engagement in South Asia (Gould 1996: 3081-3082). The United States engagement in South Asia due to cold war politics and Pakistan had lost the strategic rationale that had cemented the relationship. With the end of the cold war congressional non-proliferation concern, President George Bush imposed Pressler nuclear sanctions against Pakistan (Kux 320).

President George Bush articulated his vision of a new world order after the winning of the Gulf war. "We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership of nations based on consultation, cooperation and collective action," (Quoted in Kissinger 1994:804-805). In order to strengthen the relations with India the Bush Administration sent highly reputable diplomats such as Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Former US ambassador, Patrick Moyinhan remarked, "A tribute to India's new importance in the eyes of Washington" (Dutt 1999:40).

Thomas Pickering, while presenting his credentials as Ambassador stated that he would strengthen economic ties between India and the United States (The Times of India 1992k: 15). Pickering's opinion was that under Prime Minister Rao, the government grasped changes in the international structure and that Prime Minister Rao had made a series of diplomatic initiatives towards strengthening relations with the United States (Adhikari 1992: 16).

President George H. Bush in his first diplomatic gesture conveyed to the US six senator delegation in order to improve political level contacts with P.V Narasimha Rao government in the changing international context. The delegation was led by former US

Ambassador to India senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and included Larry Pressler, Congressman James McDermott, former Senator Charles Percy, Congressman Mike Kopetski and the US trade representative, MS Carla Hills (MEA 1991-1992: 45).

Daniel Patrick Moynihan handed over President Bush's letter to Indian Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao. "President Bush conveyed to message saying India and the United States need to "work together and deepen bilateral ties in the changing international scenario, and Prime Minister Rao conveyed to the Daniel Patrick Moynihan that Indo US relations are improving to the expected level (The Times of India 1992a: 6).

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao- President George Bush New York Security Council Summit, 1992

India was elected as non-permanent member in the UN Security Council in 1992 (Dixit 1996: 342). The United Nations Security Council went on to become the most powerful institution due to interstate and intrastate conflicts. As a result, there was increased scope in UN peace operations and increased scope in P5 UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council decides the most important aspect of international peace and security. P5 decisions are binding and their decisions are not transparent (Choedon 2007). Indian policy makers grasped the UNSC's power structure and the UN security council resolutions are decided by the power consideration and India had the Soviet veto support and the diplomatic assurance. Throughout the Cold war, the Soviet Union exercised its veto on the resolution of the Kashmir issue. In the absence of its diplomatic support, India realised that it was in India's national interest to vigorously campaign for the UN Security Council reform (Abhyankar 2018: 206). For the functioning of the UN Security Council to be acceptable to the world community, the security council needed to be reformed (Murthy 1998). J.N Dixit's observation is that with the end of the Cold war and the dissolution of soviet Union, the international balance of power has changed with the changed power equations. This has implications for India as the cold war provided certain leverages. Restructuring the United Nations Security Council became the central focus for India (Dixit 1996:341).

During the Cold war period in the United States there were divergent approaches functioning of the United Nations. In the post-cold war era the United States remain the sole super power changed the dynamics of the functioning the UN and the Security Council particular (Murthy 2010). Indian political leadership recognised India's leadership role was of vital importance for the multilateral organisation (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016). India realised that for effective global leadership, becoming a permanent Security Council member was important, and India would pursue its membership at the global high table (Abhyankar 2018: 212).

C.S.R Murthy writes of India's case as a permanent member at the global high table. "India has nurtured abiding values of non-aggression, universal brotherhood and peaceful coexistence. As a society wedded to harmony between diverse groups among its huge population, it is a shining example of pluralism in progressive pursuit. Its political culture marked by free exercise and the multiparty system has not bestowed on it the honour of being the world's largest democracy but also constituted rare profile in Asia's political profile" (Murthy1998: 116).

Teresita C Schaffer and Howard B Schaffer discuss India's negotiating position at the multilateral institutions: "The legacy of India's ancient civilization; the competing visions of its place in the world; and institutions" (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016: 108). Alyssa Ayres's point of view is that to address the challenges of international peace and security requires effective coordination and close consultations of the important powers. The Indian diplomats' perspectives need to be heard on matters of peace and security along with the US, UK, China Russia and France (Ayres 2018:234).

Prime Minister Rao was aware of the changing power dynamics in the post-cold war period. His agenda was to refashion the Security Council in order to meet the post-cold war challenges (Chakrabarti1992b). Prime Minister Rao visited the UN Security Council summit in New York in 1992. Rao's agenda put forward his views on the proposals for the democratisation of the UN Security Council (The Times of India 1992, 30 January). President George Bush met Prime Minister Rao before the Security Council summit.

Prime Minister Rao suggested that ensuring moral and political effectiveness required broader and equitable representation in the Security Council (Chakrabarti 1992a).

President Bush described the United Nations lack of proper functioning as being due to cold war politics. In the context of the end of the cold war, United Nations security council to be effective internal reforms are required for the effective functioning of the United Nations (U.S. Department of State Dispatch; 1992: 76).

Prime Minister Rao addressed the U.N. Security Council summit 1992 “the actions by the security council must flow from that collective will and not from the views or predilections of a few” (Narasimha Rao 1992). India’s permanent representative to the United Nations C.R. Gharekhan writes in his memoir of the first ever post cold war security council meeting with 15 leaders of the member countries. India’s concern was that the security council needed to be confined to the actions of jurisdiction of the security council and should not encroach onto the other organisational functions (Gharekhan 2007). Prime Minister Rao pointed out at the security council summit that in order to function effectively in structuring of the new world order, it needed more representation (Dixit 1996: 341).

Krishnan Srinivasan writes in his memoir the “United Nations is the only global organisation and its reforms and functioning effect on global governance. In his observation there is a democratic deficit at the international level (Srinivasan 2012: 160). C.R. Gharekhan in an interview to foreign Affairs journal remarked in 1991 that India’s quest for the permanent membership in the UN Security Council advocated the new members will have an equal position of the existing permanent members (Gharekhan 2009).

J.N Dixit Diplomatic Engagement with the United States

Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and president George Bush agreed on issues at the sideline meeting at the New York security council summit, 1992 and reached an understanding to continue the dialogue at an official level. The US Ambassador to India, William Clarke, sent an invitation to foreign secretary J.N Dixit to visit Washington and

further broaden the political dialogue to follow up to the security council summit (Dixit 1996). Foreign secretary Mani Dixit was a pragmatist. His foreign policy views were shaped by the forces at the end of the cold war. He was not unlike other diplomats who were influenced by Nehruvian thinking on foreign policy (Baru 2014). Foreign Secretary J.N Dixit's visit to the United States to initiate a diplomatic dialogue to consolidate political relations (Dutt 1999: 38) involved talks with US State Department. Acting Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger was the counterpart in negotiations.

Eagleburger said: "putting aside nuances and semantics about issues on which India and the US disagree, it is time now to adopt a practical approach; our joint effort should be to adopt a problem-solving orientation" (Dixit 1996: 173). J.N Dixit conveyed to the President Bush state department officials that India was concerned about India's security interests in South Asia. State department officials responded positively to Dixit's concerns and agreed that constructive dialogue would continue regarding the mutual security concerns (The Times of India 1992b: 12).

The then Indian Ambassador to the United States Abid Hussain's tenure got over and he utilized his experience and expertise in consolidating Indo US economic relations (The Times of India 1992j:18). Ambassador Abid Hussain had considerable experience in working with the economic ministries and departments (Chakravarti 1990:1).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao had taken another diplomatic initiative to strengthen political relations with the United States senior congress leader Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray to the United States to signal the appointment of political representation to raise the level of relationship to a new plane (Shankar 2018). The appointment of the ambassador coincides with the US presidential an election in 1992. There was a likelihood of Bill Clinton being elected as the president. Ray said an ambassador plays an important role in building better relations between India and the United States (The Times of India, 1992j: 18).

Track II Diplomacy

In order to build a close relationship with US administration, diplomats needed to look for lobbying firms, these firms would do the diplomats' work (Pressler 2017:22). To open up more channels of communication to communicate with the US administration, India's Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray suggested that Prime Minister Rao hire on a public relations firm in order to provide access and communicate better with State department, White House and the Capitol Hill (Statesman 1994). US senator Larry Pressler writes in his memoir that the lobbying, or as it is called 'revolving door', public relations firms have access to executive and legislative branches of government (Pressler 2017:21). The McAuliffe Kelly lobbying firm provided the access to US congressmen and the Raffaelli provided a positive image. The Indian Embassy hired both firms; Daneil J. Edelman Inc, a PR firm was also hired by the Indian embassy (Vaidya 1994d:17).

Prime Minister Rao government took another diplomatic step to consolidate Political relations and maintain the continuity with the new administration. The Ministry of External Affairs sent the delegation to President Clinton's campaign headquarters in Little Rock, Arkansas, to meet members of President Clinton's transition team. This was done with intent to establish initial contact with the new administration to build a more meaningful relationship (MEA Annual Report 1992-93).

President Clinton's Diplomacy

As the first post-Cold war president, President Clinton's primary foreign policy was to repair and improve the relations with the major countries that had been estranged due to the cold war politics. India was the major nonaligned country that President Clinton's strategy sought diplomatic engagement wish to improve relations (Talbot 2004: 24-.25). President Clinton's foreign policy primarily focussed on Human Rights, Nuclear proliferation and the promotion of democracy (Kux 2001). US Ambassador Frank Wisner in an interview to Sagarika Ghose revealed that the Clinton administration had intended to forge a partnership with India. The rationale for partnership with India was foregrounded by similar values, commitment to democracy; rule of law and with the newly introduced economic reforms (Ghose 1994:15). US Ambassador to India Thomas Pickering grasped the significance of the close relationship with India. Pickering sent a

cable to the Clinton Administration stressing the significance of building close relations with India (Talbot 2004:24). Henry Kissinger's analysis with the changed international context was that there does not exist any conflicting interest between India and the United States, and in fact India's potential was in emerging as a major power (Kissinger 1995).

At State department level, there was an organisational issue, The South Asian region was clubbed under near east there was no separate bureau for South Asia. Due to this, state department policies were not given enough attention. The Senate foreign relations committee in the US congress followed the state department model. India's long time US congressional friend Stephen Solarz advised the US administration a separate bureau for the South Asian region for better policy making. It was Stephen Solarz's effort that a separate South Asia bureau was established (Rubinoff 1996-1997:502). President Clinton did not articulate policies towards South Asia in the election campaign. With the newly created separate bureau for South Asia, Clinton's nominee as the new bureau's assistant secretary was career diplomat Robin Raphel (Kux 2001:321).

The Senate foreign relations committee delegation visited after President Clinton was elected to office. The delegation was led by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Paul Simon and Howard Metzenbaum - all Democrats like President Clinton. This enabled the establishment of contacts with President Clinton's transition team (The Times of India 1993b:15).

The Clinton administration and the State department diplomatic failure to create trust and confidence with India were due to Thomas Pickering's transfer and appointment by the Clinton administration in April 1993. He was transferred to Moscow after only a few months as ambassador in Delhi (Singh 2006: 279). Indian diplomats and political leadership had not expected it from the Clinton administration. Furthermore, the Clinton administration withheld the name of Stephen Solarz from the post of Ambassador to India and caused a delay in appointing the New Ambassador to India for almost a year (Purdum 1994). The influential expert on the foreign policy Jaswant Singh writes in his memoir of the call to honour in service of emergent India. The Indian political and

diplomatic community viewed President Clinton's Ambassador Appointment in New Delhi with indifference. It strained the relations (Singh 2006: 279).

Robin Raphel the Instrument of Accession Controversy

US Assistant secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphel, made an apparently controversial statement during her interaction with journalists that the United States did not recognise the instrument of accession treaty. The United States was not recognising the Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. This statement also had an implied the US tilts towards Pakistan which led to a diplomatic crisis between India and the United States (Singh 2006: 279).

Robin Raphel's statement had this context since 1947. Pakistan's forces had made incursions into Kashmir and this was the basis for her statement. At another level, the former Indian diplomat's critical reading into the statement of Raphel was that it is not a statement but simply a reflection of US policy towards Kashmir, even President Clinton had written letters to a sympathiser of the Kashmir militants (Muthamma 1994a: 182).

Foreign secretary Dixit presented a different account that Robin Raphel might have influenced Alistair Lamb's book *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy* (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993). In addition to the controversy Pakistan had generated another apprehension of outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. The United States has fallen to Pakistan propaganda that the United States had the nuclear side of Kashmir to pressurise India (Dixit 1996:330).

The United States position is not new on the Kashmir issue, and ever since the Kashmir issue was taken to the United Nations by the first prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, it was on the assumption that the United Nations and the U N security council would resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner. To the dismay of Nehru, the U.N. security council decisions were fundamentally guided by power considerations, and the United States and its western allies sided with Pakistan due to the cold war considerations (Haider 2009 :119). The United States has its own agenda on the Kashmir policy during the cold war at

the United Nations it was the Soviet Union veto that helped to protect it from the U.N. Resolution (Muthamma 1994b).

When the Soviet Union exited from Afghanistan, Pakistan started incursions into Punjab, and Kashmir and Pakistan provided sanctuary to the terrorists and the terrorism led to displacement of three million Hindus and Sikhs and many other communities. CIA Director James Woolsey established Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir and Punjab and declared Pakistan a terrorism sponsoring state (Sibal 1994:7).

In order to diffuse the diplomatic crisis that had erupted due to the Rabin Raphel statement, American under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff wrote a letter to the Indian Ambassador S.S Ray that clarified to the Indian officials the misinterpretation of Raphel's statement and assured them that the Clinton Administration believes that India and Pakistan need to resolve at bilateral level through the Simla agreement (The Times of India 1993b: 1). The Clinton administration sent Robin Raphel in order to improve relations with India. According to diplomatic protocol, she would interact with the counterpart for negotiations Joint Secretary for America Hardeep Puri (The Times of India 1994c). On the announcement of her visit to India, there was criticism from opposition parties BJP, Janata dal and the CPI and CPIM. They were critical of the government's stand on Raphel's statement on Kashmir; it was considered it was an interference with internal affairs of the country and demanded clarification from the government (The Times of India 1994u: 28).

M.D Nalapat argued that the government of India need not confuse with Raphel and her statements as she did not represent the whole US administration, and that the US policy towards Pakistan was not long term oriented. President Clinton would later realise the strategic significance of India. In the United States, there were many layers of foreign policy decision making and there were many players involved. India needed to engage with the United States. If Indian diplomats faced difficulties at one level, India would have the option of engaging with another set of players in order to convey India's concerns (Nalapat 1994:11).

Another section in India had the favourable opinion to welcome Raphel as she possessed diplomatic significance and was a close aide of President Clinton. Having good relations with the Assistant secretary of State Robin Raphel would pave the way for Prime Minister Rao's visit to the United States. In order to strengthen the relations Home Minister S.B Chavan broke the protocol and received Raphel. He stated that Raphel had changed her position on Kashmir and she was of the opinion that India and Pakistan should resolve the issue at the bilateral level through the Simla agreement (Kirpekar 1994a:17).

Congress MP Murlu Deora said that the everyone in India would disagree with her statement on Kashmir but that in diplomacy that there was always scope for improving communications (The Times of India 1994e). Deora hosted a dinner party for Raphel and was apparently told about the Clinton administration amending Pressler legislation to deliver 38 F-16 deliveries to Pakistan and this one time waiver was to prevent Pakistan going nuclear (The Times of India 1994y: 1).

In her address at American centre, she clarified her statement on Kashmir and spelled out president Clinton was pro peace, pro reconciliation and pro settlement; President Clinton firmly believed in Simla agreement. Her genuine desire was to improve relations with India and that the "Clinton administration was committed to build partnership with India that can demonstrate how two countries with shared values but sometimes different perceptions can find new and imaginative ways to the future" (The Times of India 1994y: 1). Prime Minister Narasimha Rao changed the perception of congressional understanding on the Kashmir issue in the United States congress in his speech where he diplomatically communicated that the Kashmir issue is similar to Texas and the process with which it had become one of the states of the United States (Malhotra 1997:142). Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in his address said "The Indian position on Kashmir too is that juridical, constitutionally and on any perception based in law, Kashmir is an inalienable part of India" (Narasimha Rao1994d).

Diplomatic Intervention Human Rights Issue

The Clinton administration's post-cold war foreign policy was focussed on the promotion of human rights and as part of the policy the United States State Department started issuing the Annual report on country report on Human rights record. In the 1990s Annual report they pointed out human rights violations in Kashmir (Schaffer 2009:132-133).

Adding to the already troubled relationship, President Clinton in 1994 mentioned the human rights violations in Kashmir. Indian political leadership, diplomats and opinion makers severely criticised Clinton's claims. The Clinton statement considered lowering India's international standing (Jaswant Singh 2006:279). In order to internationalise and to justify its interference in the internal affairs of the country, Pakistan has used the American rhetoric in promoting human rights and pointing the human rights violations and further encouraged the secessionist forces in Jammu and Kashmir (Dixit 1996:351).

Stephen Solarz in his congressional memoir reveals that Dan Burton, a conservative Republican had made an attempt to offer a proposal to amend the development assistance to India on the question of human rights violations in Kashmir. Solarz particularly pointed out the Pakistan interference through terrorist groups in response to terrorist groups Indian security forces using force quell out the insurgency Solarz timely intervention prevented the Dan Burton amendment (Solarz 2011).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao government in order to protect a number of measures has taken such as the National Human Rights commission. Also, in order to promote transparency Indian government allowed foreign diplomats and the International organisation to visit the valley (Jha 1994: 100). Indian Prime Minister Speech in UN Security Council conveyed India's concern for human rights Prime Minister Rao said "I have profound respect for those who are crusading for the protection of human rights. A country with a history of over 5000 years, with a record of non-invasion and non-annexation of alien territories, with a shining example of a powerful monarch like Ashoka turning in to an apostle of nonviolence, another powerful heir apparent becoming the One and Only Budha, with a contemporary political system modelled on the best traditions of human rights and liberties- such is my country. Indian culture and human rights in their loftiest form are almost synonymous" (Dixit 1996:457).

Pakistan brought the issue of human rights to the United Nations Human Rights council. The Indian delegation was apprehensive about the United States diplomatic moves; apparently the Clinton administration responded to positively. The American officials and their delegation remained neutral, and the Clinton administration showed a genuine interest in improving the relations and Pakistan failed to win the support of the International community. Clinton gesture had a positive influence on the Prime Minister Rao preparation for the Rao summit (Khurshid 1994:118-119).

The Carnegie study group recommended three prominent suggestions to the Clinton administration: the first recommendation is that if the UN security council membership opens India permanent membership candidature need to be accepted. And the United States needs to give priority to like China and the final recommendation made on the nuclear question that India like China treats the nuclear weapons are an important aspect of national security . The report also recommended in order to unfreeze the stalemate in the relationship promote high-level diplomatic relations suggested summit level initiative (Selig and Kemp 1993).

The Role of Indian Diaspora in the Bridge between India and the United States

The Indian Diaspora played a decisive role in transforming the relations between India and the United States. The Indian American community is changing the perception of the US policy makers about India. The Indian Diaspora is also an acting vehicle for the carrier of ideas to transform the social and economic field in order to transform the Indian society (Rubinoff 2005). India's Ambassador to the United States Meera Shankar observes Indian American community accomplishments and professional ties and their circle of friendships and networking had transformative effect Indo US bilateral relations (Shankar 2015). The United States, as a democracy, is fundamentally a nation of immigrants. The US governments gave priority to the country with which it had professional and family ties (Granger, et al. 1995).

The Indian American community's active political participation and ability to mobilize funds for the political representatives and the Indian American actively participating in the American election process and representing their constituency building a close

relationship with the US congressmen. During the Clinton administration elections in 1992 it enabled to change the US congress laws that are not in the interest of the country (Malone and Mukherjee 2009). The Indian American community is also bridging the communication and entrepreneurial gap between India and the United States (Gould 1996). Indian American Diaspora is highly diverse, corporate, trade and commercial Diaspora (Ramesh1999). Indian Diaspora has a presence in California, New York, Illinois, Texas, and New Jersey and there were many faculty members in American universities (Thakur 1996:579). The new type of Diaspora is influenced by developments in information technology and the internet - the new types of Diaspora is digital Diaspora. The internet enabled instant interactions between Diaspora and the home country two democracies (Baru 2007:324).

The five-member Indian American delegation, comprised of “Mr Kumar Barve, a legislator in the Maryland Assembly, Ms Achamma Chandrashekarana a democratic party member and former president of the Indian American forum for political education, Ms Vani Singhal a Member of the national democratic policy planning division, Dr Asok Raina, vice president of the Indian American Kashmiri forum and Dr Suresh Gupta, member of the Maryland democratic party fund raiser”, presented the concerns of deteriorating Indo US relations to the Clinton administration (Vaidya 1994k: 13). The Indian American community were the active supports of the Bill Clinton candidate during the 1992 elections. They expressed concern deterioration US– India relations and urged the Clinton administration to take steps to improve relations (Vaidya 1994k: 13).

President Clinton wrote to Niranjana Shah, “ties between our two democracies are solid and that there is greater Potential for further growth and cooperation between us” (Raja Mohan 1994). “The NRIs to whom the president wrote were Mr Rajen S. Anand (California) and Dr Dinesh Patel (Massachusetts) The President of Kashmiri women for communal harmony, Ms Girja Kaul and Mr Sunil Aghi” (The Times of India 1994f: 13).

President Clinton told the federation of Indian Associations, “Indian and Americans have made and continue to make in the US as we work to build on our relationship with India

and resolve our differences, I welcome your continued interests and advice” (Raja Mohan 1994).

President Clinton Envoy Diplomacy

President Bill Clinton diplomatically signalled that America was interested in improving relations with India. Strobe Talbott’s visit was essentially described as a fence mending mission (Srinivasan 2012: 21). The Clinton Administration used “High level visits” to improve relations with India as a novel diplomatic response. President Clinton attached importance to India in the wake of India’s growing significance following the economic reforms (The Hindustan Times 1994). At the Strobe Talbott talks with the Prime Minister at his house on Race course Road, Talbott assured him that the United States had no prescription to offer to resolve the Kashmir issue and on the nuclear question Prime Minister was given assurance that nuclear delinking between India and Pakistan (Nalapat 1994). Talbott advised Prime Minister Rao to make the peace-making signal and the Prime Minister made two important policy initiative one is on the postponement of Prithvi missile test, and introducing new telecom policy for investment where the US multinationals AT&T,US West and Motorola looking for investment in the Telecom sector (Bobb 1994:43).

Foreign secretary Krishnan Srinivasan writes in his memoir that the Clinton administration thought that they could business with Prime Minister Rao in the context of economic reforms. Prime Minister Rao’s talks with Talbott were about the quiet diplomacy that deputy secretary communicated to Rao that he would not be pressurised on the issue of arms control. Prime Minister Rao agreed that Talbott was persuasive and reliable not unlike other politicians (Srinivasan 2012: 22).

Clinton’s envoy Talbott handed over an invitation to Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao for a visit to the United States; Prime Minister Rao accepted the invitation. The United States officials suggested 19 May as the date of the summit meeting between the leaders of the two world’s largest democracies (The Hindustan Times 1994).

Deputy Secretary of State Talbott told Prime Minister Rao that “Indo-US relations needed to emerge out of the mire of suspicion and neglect and turn a new leaf” (Baru 1994:10). Strobe Talbott assured the Prime Minister Rao administration would not pressurise on any issues and the Clinton Administration would not cause any embarrassing situation and administration high priority focus on areas of agreement rather than disagreement (Vaidya 1994f). Prime Minister Rao’s highest priority of his government to focus on the post-Cold war era to strengthen bilateral relations (Dhar 1994).The Prime Minister Rao visit will remove the misperceptions that developed between India and the United States and to improve bilateral relations that would benefit both the countries and the rest of the World (The Hindustan Times 1994). President Clinton was eager to meet Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. He was impressed by Prime Minister Rao’s skill and tenacity with which the economic reforms implemented through the system of the parliamentary democratic process. On the eve of the Prime Minister Rao visit to the United States, John F. Burns writes in the New York Times Prime Minister Rao as Deng Xiapoing of India (Burns 1994a). The Prime Minister Rao objective of visiting the United States to focus is on the transfer of technology and strengthening of bilateral economic relations (Sharma 1994). Prime Minister Rao’s itinerary includes interacting with US Businessmen, intellectuals, Politicians and the Indian Diaspora (The Hindustan Times 1994). Prime Minister Rao was invited to address the Harvard lecture where he was eager to give his intellectual view of the world and with the emergence of the US as a Unipolar world in the past the talks Non Aligned issues now these issues were put aside and the new issues on the nuclear non-proliferation and Human Rights issues (Santanam 1994). India with a view to examining the full range of bilateral issues and expanding cooperation in Indo US relations” (The Times of India 1994q: 1). Prime Minister Rao for the summit meeting is to avoid the contentious talks between the Indo US relations

Prime Minister Rao made important conciliatory gesture the delay in Prithvi test but the opposition made big issue that the Rao government succumb to president Clinton’s pressure prime Minister Rao had to convince that the Prithvi test was Postponement and it would be tested at appropriate time and the diplomatic community understood it was inappropriate test on the eve of the Prime Minister Rao visit (Menon 2013:331-332).

Prime Minister Rao called off the Prithvi Missile test to create a favourable climate for the summit level talks with US president Clinton (Kapur 2009 :300).

National Debate on Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao's visit to the United States.

Foreign secretary Krishanan Srinivasan observes that there was no national consensus on Indo US relation In India but he expressed hope there is a gradual consensus emerging in the recent past. He was of the view that Washington perception has not changed about India however the Clinton administration focus on commercial diplomacy in this context there was a window of opportunity for improving bilateral relations (Times of India 1995b:5).

To achieve diplomatic breakthrough the timing of the visit and preparatory work required given there were considerable. The political disagreement had created a Shakespearian dilemma to go or not go to Washington D.C (Katyal 1994:6). Bharatiya Janata Party President L.K Advani was critical of Prime Minister Rao's visit to the United States. In his opinion that Prime Minister should cancel the visit because the Clinton Administration was forcing India on regional capping and was delivering F-16 the nuclear delivery aircrafts to Pakistan against India's security interests (The Times of India 1994b). Therefore, L.K Advani was of the view by cancelling the visit Prime Minister Rao visit should express displeasure over US pro Pakistan stand (The Hindustan Times 1994). However, senior congress leaders expressed Prime Minister Rao should be cautious while engaging with the Clinton Administration. Congress leaders believed Prime Minister Rao would follow the Tirupati line where Prime Minister Rao expressed there was no need of confrontation and would follow the method persuading and convincing the United States on the areas of disagreement for instance on the nuclear Non-proliferation treaty on India's point of view and on Kashmir issues India would follow on the Simla agreement and there was no need for third party intervention or mediation by the United States on Kashmir issue (Kirpekar 1994b:11).

Within the congress there was a divergence of the opinion the AICC need to convene before the Rao visit to the United States informed K.K Tewari given the non-congress opinion the BJP and the left parties opposed the arm twisting tactics of the US on the

Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and on Kashmir issue. Another section within the ruling congress party expressed that Prime Minister Rao was “intellectually and temperamentally well equipped to engage with the American interlocutors” (The Hindu 1994a).

M.D Nalapat argues that the opinion of pragmatists and Nationalists on the Prime Minister visit. Pragmatists of the opinion US is the largest trading partner and source of foreign investment and the source of technology and so Prime Minister Rao’s visit to the United States to strengthen bilateral relations. On the other hand nationalists have taken a critical view of Clinton administration’s pro Pakistan line and supply of F-16s the reason for the Prime Minister needed to cancel the visit. Prime Minister Rao and his diplomats had taken the view of Pragmatists (Nalapat 1994a). BJP senior leader and the leader of the opposition and Parliamentary foreign Affairs Chair Atal Bihari Vajpayee said to Prime Minister Rao that the visit to the US in the context of US pressure on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Prime Minister Rao told to Atal Bihari Vajpayee that he would not agree under pressure against the country’s interests. Prime Minister Rao assured that he would visit after taking parliament into confidence and the Atal Bihari Vajpayee was convinced and advised Prime Minister Rao do not succumb to American pressure on nuclear issue and he also convinced the BJP leaders L.K Advani not to oppose the visit since Prime Minister Rao accepted the visit and the summit meeting had been finalised (Singh 1994). Former Prime Minister Chandra Shekar was extremely sceptical Rao visit and in his opinion Rao should cancel the visit because of United States interference in the internal affairs of the country in the context of Kashmir and the Human Rights (The Times of India 1994t).

Prime Minister Rao’s reading of international relations and understanding of the shifts in global balance of power and Prime Minister Rao ignored the old diplomats whose foreign policy were shaped by the Nehruvian and Prime Minister Rao made an attempt to reaching out to the younger diplomats like the Shyam Saran, Ronen Sen and Ramu Damodaran whose foreign policy views are practical view of international affairs and the Indian interest is to be protected reaching to the United States and the west in particular

given the changed global context the foreign policy views of these younger diplomats and the Prime Minister Rao views are aligned in other words similar (Baru 2016 :138).

The former external Affairs Minister Natwar Singh's point of view that no Prime Minister had visited the United States since Rajiv Gandhi visit in 1985 and the no US president visited India since 1978. Indo US relations in the context of economic reforms there is a scope for economic cooperation and in the cooperation in science and technology. There were political disagreements some concerns are being addressed by the Strobe Talbott and Prime Minister Rao must pay the visit to the United States and sort out the differences at the highest level. Natwar Singh further said "Diplomacy does not offer the solutions but it does offer the hopes" (The Hindu 1994b).

According to foreign secretary J N Dixit Prime Minister Rao approach was on issues differences were there on such as nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, on trade between India and the US, a practical approach was to be adopted to gradually identify areas of agreement then to build up a mutually beneficial relationship (Dixit 1996:177). Prime Minister Rao's foreign Policy approach spelt out that at the Tirupathi session of Congress, "India's foreign policy delineated by Nehru and consolidated by Indiraji and Rajivji is entirely valid and no basic change is called for" (Baru2016:187).

Prabhakar Menon in an interview to Indian foreign affairs journal that Prime Minister Rao was conscious of the visiting to the United States that he would be going to a country that is economically and technologically advanced nation on earth. There was unfulfilled potential in the partnership. There was great promise in the relationship. If India and the United States discover each other mutual worth and India and the United States bilateral relationship would take off, due to the ill-conceived policies the promise has not been realised. Prime Minister was convinced in order to fulfil the promise need to be pursued for strengthening the bilateral relations (Menon 2013: 331-332).

The Prime Minister Rao summit agenda to establish rapport with president Clinton and in order to unfreeze the stalemate in the relationship by iron out the differences (Dutt 1999: 49). Prime Minister Rao purpose of the summit diplomacy was also reaching out to other US policy making institutions such as reaching out the US legislature, the US

business community and reaching to US public opinion In order to build relationship and pursued India's policies and at the same time firm on issues that were vital interest to India (Dixit 1996: 177).

The summit initiative's primary purpose was a get to know visit and Prime Minister Rao had had the opportunity to convey his views at the highest level. According to Senior official inviting Rao to deliver the Joint address to the US congress was considerable honour (Vaidya 1994f).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao Reaching out to US Congress

Arthur G Rubinoff writes that there had been basic continuity the United States congress and the executive foreign policy approach towards India. US legislators had not changed their perception about India with the changing international situation till the Brown Amendment, However there was growing Indian American community in participation in American democracy and their individual accomplishment due to the economic reforms in India there was a change in the congressional attitudes (Rubinoff 2001). In the US congress there was a bipartisan team started forming Caucus on India. This was an attempt to prevent any legislation that come to the US congress against the interests of India also an attempt to create good will for India in the US congress. The United States law makers of the view that India is the beacon of hope and the because of India's democratic traditions and the Independent judiciary The founding members included Fank Pallone, George Jhochbrueckner, Robert T. Matsuit, Mr Jim A Mcdermott, Scotty Baesler , M R.G Menendez and Herb Klein and Bill Mccollum (Republican) (The Times of India 1993c: 17). The caucus it was in recognition of India's importance advocate policies in favour of India) (Statesman 1994; The Times of India 1993c: 7) The bipartisan caucus almost had 50 members and India it was Farnk Pallone the US lawmaker chief coordinator and in order to counter the laws that brought against the interests of India and Stephen Solarz another US congress man played a constructive role (Rubinoff 1996-1997: 502).

Prime Minister Rao given the honour to address the US congress by the Clinton administration Prime Minister Rao's view that Congressional understanding is essential

for strengthening of Indo US relations Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao addressed the US congress on May 18 on the congressional address apt titled speech “ Indo US relations threshold of bold new era” Prime Minister Rao address to the Joint session of the congress starts in his speech forging a new relationship with civilization linkage and relationship of mutual well-being. Prime Minister Rao quotes Indian spiritual leader, Swami Vivekananda that on Fourth of July the spirit of America’s Declaration of Independence so moved

“Move on, O Lord, in the resistless path!

Till the high noon overspreads the world,

Till every land reflects thy light...” (Narasima Rao 1994d :481)

Prime Minister Rao’ articulation of Indo US relations based on Democracy and democratic partnership unlike the earlier Prime Ministers and presidents viewed India as a nonaligned and the United States as capitalist mutually non congruence of Identity and Prime Minister Rao imaginative and force of new articulation of identity based on democracy and democratic Partnership to strengthen the cooperative relationship. Prime Minister Rao in his address mentioned “I submit that the basic and most essential agenda of the world hereafter, perhaps thorough the next century, is the consolidation and the concretisation of democracy. On this single plank, directly or indirectly will depend the prospects of peace, disarmament and development in one word the survival of human kind” (Narasimha Rao 1994d: 488)

Prime Minister Rao addresses to Harvard University where he interacted the intellectual community and put forth his intellectual view of the world. From Harvard the Prediction of the Post-cold war conflict has predicted Prime Minister Rao essentially articulated in his speech How India views the coexistence of Civilizations:

“It is difficult to delineate these strains along the so-called fault lines between civilization, whatever the superficial evidence, India cannot think of superficial evidence, India cannot think of a division of a Civilisations...” (Narasimha Rao 1994e :469).

President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao Washington Summit, 1994

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's point of view that Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao came to the United States with a new vision and prime Minister brought the new approach to the relationship unlike the earlier visits that were characterised by the routine exchange there was no intention to bring qualitatively new changes to the relationship (Talbott 2004: 34). However, there was differences approach to the bilateral relationship. Foreign Secretary Krishnan Srinivasan writes in his memoir *Diplomatic Channels* "the heart of the problem for India and the United States that they had no meeting point of expectations of both the countries. India's expectation that India wanted due respect as a world power and India's world views and interests needed to be accommodated. On the other hand, America's one-point agenda is capping India' nuclear programme and the United States wanted India to give up the weapons option (Srinivasan 2012: 23).

The main objective of the summit purpose was to establish rapport between the leaders of world's largest democracies and achieve understanding and reach better coordination for instance if any crisis occurs or any issue comes at the United Nations that the leaders could communicate on a phone call says the US official witness to the Summit (Vaidya 1994c :1). Prime Minister Rao visit to the United States designated as an official working visit to the United States, President Clinton has changed white House diplomatic practices adopted more business-like approach in receiving the foreign dignitaries (Dhar 1994). The summit meeting purpose is in a one and one meeting both leaders gets an opportunity to understand each other's perspective on issues that divide and as well to find common ground (Vaidya 1994c: 1). The atmosphere of the situation, when Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and President Clinton met in the Oval office, looked like tense but once they meet inside the oval office ice melted there was a sense of warmth in the conversation writes Dilip Bobb who covered the visit (Bobb 1994).

Foreign secretary Krishnan Srinivasan observes Clinton had a one – to- one meeting in the oval office at the white house. Clinton must have thought about the inscrutable east and quaint about the deviousness of the Indian mind; and both about the propensity of

Indians to deliver lectures to others” (Srinivasan 2012: 20). President Bill Clinton asked curiously to know the reasons for the estrangement of the relationship and what could be the reason bilateral relations gone wrong? Prime Minister Rao answered in amore matured and futuristic orientation of the relationship prime Minister Rao explained that importance of the democracy in the post-cold war era and he establishes a relation between development ,security and the democracy (Bobb 1994)

Diplomat Prabhakar Menon asked Prime Minister Narasimha Rao what were the talking points and what were the discussions President Clinton that he had explained at length Prime Minister Rao explained to the Clinton that the potential inherent in the bilateral relations and emphasized the common goal should realise that potential in inherent in the bilateral relationship. Prime Minister Rao was also of the opinion that both countries should not waste their energies and work for the mutual benefit (Menon 2013: 331). Clinton administration officials observes Prime Minister Rao possessed characteristics and the traits more pragmatic and that Rao was free from ideological baggage; these traits enabled the American president and his officials enabled to forge the relationship (Bobb 1994 :66)

Rao’s son Rajeshwara, observation Vinay Sitapati biographer notes President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Rao after the oval office meeting President Clinton was appreciative of Prime Minister Rao and his efforts (Sitapati 2016: 274) President Clinton, after at the end of the talks in oval office, “...put his hands on Rao’s shoulders and declared that the two could do business together” (Bobb1994).

U.S officials who participated in the talks were the “treasury secretary Mr Lloyd Bentsen, the commerce secretary, Mr Ron Brown, the President’s National security advisor Mr Anthony Lake, the deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott, the US trade representative Mr Mickey Kantor, the U.S Under Secretary of defence policy and Ambassador designate to India, Mr Frank Wisner, the Assistant Secretary of State Ms Robin Raphel, Former Ambassador to India Daniel Patrick Moynihan” (Vaidya 1994c : 1).

The Indian Team included the” Finance Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, the Minister of State for External Affairs Minister Salman Khursheed, the Finance secretary Mr Montek

Singh Ahluwalia, the Foreign Secretary Mr K Srinivasan and the Indian Ambassador to the US, S.S Ray” (Vaidya 1994c: 1).

President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao Press Conference was held on May 19, President Clinton began in his opening remarks: “Today we began what I hope will be a very close working relationship as our two countries forge a stronger partnership. Our nations share many common values. And speaking as friends, we explored ways to deepen our ties and expand our cooperation” (Clinton 1994: 1). President Clinton acknowledged Prime Minister Rao in strengthening of democracy President Clinton said “he struck me as a leader of great wisdom and experience... and under his leadership, India is taking its rightful place as a major world economic power and partner in world affairs and we look forward to working with India in that way” (Clinton 1994: 1).

Prime Minister Rao in his address said “The President and I agreed that we have an unprecedented opportunity to free India- US bilateral relations from the distortions induced by the cold war... Prime Minister Rao further said to look for areas of converging interests in the changed international situation and work together for mutual benefit” (Narasimha Rao 1994a: 2).

After Prime Minister Rao and Bill Clinton summit level talks were complete, President Clinton advised his Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “I think I may have softened him up,” Now give him the hard message”. Talbott conveyed Clinton’s message that the Indian strategic community might be preparing for a change of policies and preparing for Missile test and perhaps nuclear device as well, Strobe Talbott hoped Rao would not go for missile testing. Prime Minister Rao did not reveal any information or in other words Rao did not give any assurance (Talbott 2004:34). Prime Minister Rao met Defence Secretary William Perry and the he also met Ron Brown who accepted the invitation visit India, the U.S vice president Al Gore told: “There is a reason why the United States and India should be able to count on one another” (The Times of India 1994g: 13). Prime Minister Rao addressed the Indian NRIS , Indian Diaspora could play a vital role to strengthen bilateral relations Prime Minister Rao told “Strong and cooperative and friendly relationship with India and the United States between two

largest democracies. This is not for you but for mankind, the dialogue between the two countries was utmost importance” (The Times of India 1994o: 1).

Krishnan Srinivasan (2012) observes Prime Minister Rao and the Clinton administration joint communiqué did not contain the nuclear issue. Prime Minister Rao and Bill Clinton the emphasis was on to manage differences effectively .Two memoranda of understanding were signed during Prime Minister’s visit to the US, on “Cooperative support for the effort to combat production, Distribution and use of illegal Drugs and on Planning, conservation and Management of Natural and cultural heritage sites” (MEA Report 1995-1996 P. 72-77). Significant gains of the visit are the Six MOUs were signed and these pertain to the following: “(1) Revitalising the Indo US Joint commission to enhance the cooperation between the two countries; (2) having regular foreign office consultations. These consultations will be held at the level of Minister, secretary and division head, alternatively in India and America” (Malhotra 1995: 141-142).

According to foreign policy analyst the summit outcome both leaders they managed differences in a more matured way (Raja Mohan, 1994). Rao said his parleys with Clinton had been “Constructive, useful and Candid” (Mathur 2003:43). Prime Minister in an interview to Press conveyed that as India and the United States there were differences but the differences would not be matter in the overall understanding of the relationship Prime Minister Rao said “ our desire to work with this country could strengthen global peace and stability and promote development worldwide (Narasimha Rao 1994: 502).

President Clinton Designate Frank Wisner as Ambassador to India

The Clinton administration decided to nominate Frank Wisner, the current Under Secretary of Defence for policy planning as the next US ambassador to India. Frank Wisner a career diplomat he was on deputation to the defence department Wisner was the Undersecretary for International Security Affairs (Bhushan 1994). Frank Wisner due to credibility and good credentials The senate confirmation process was quick Wisner carries a good reputation (Vaidya 1994h: 14).

President Clinton gave the Frank Wisner as ambassador to India this was the significance achievement of Prime Minister Rao summit level talks with President Clinton it was a big build up in bilateral relations (Shankar 2018). In the United States foreign policy analysts Frank Wisner as an Ambassador was in the class in terms of seniority and experience and the reputation of Thomas Pickering who served India's Ambassador (Vaidya 1994h: 14).

Frank Wisner's perspective India and the US relations Clinton administration faced difficult in its building diplomatic relations, India and the United States had lacked the strategic content in the relationship. Clinton's nuclear policy to prevent India from going nuclear and on the other hand Clinton administration dilemma improve relations in the sphere of economic through commercial diplomacy in the context of economic reforms (Keeley 2000: 36). According to Natwar Singh, Frank Wisner's opinion for a bilateral relationship based on transactional relationship also Wisner believed in strong India good for the United States (The Economic Times 2018).

Ambassador Wisner said in an interview to Sagarika Ghose that the United States bilateral relationship was based on amicable relationship, while with other Asian countries such as with Japan; it was based on economic cooperation. Frank Wisner told India and the United States relations cannot be compared to any other relationship model in Asia they had their own principles. There was a strategic and intellectual basis in the relationship (Ghose 1994).

Ambassador Wisner revealed in interview to Tania Anand that they American intention to forge relationship Frank Wisner reply was it had political and security relationship businessmen demand for only sensible policies but they cannot dictate the United foreign and security policies Frank Wisner also told that India had many friends academics, intellectual and friends in US congress and the Indian American Frank Wisner indicated about business lobby (Anand 1994).

The United States support was critical India's candidature in the expansion of the UN Security Council reforms, remark that against India's long desire to be at the global high table. The United States Ambassador apparently made that the Clinton Administration had no plan to expand the UN Security Council reform and the Indian diplomat replied

the no country was going to be a permanent member because one country says so (Vaidya 1994).

Prime Minister Rao invited to New Delhi former US secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to share his understanding of international situation and to strengthen India and the United States relations to interact with India's think tank tanks and foreign policy community in order to exchange ideas and promote understanding Kissinger heads the highly influential firm, Kissinger Associates , Kissinger gave interview to the India Today editor A. R Rahaman in 1995. Kissinger expressed hope for strengthening the relations "India is a country which speaks English, and which can communicate more easily with Americans, and there should be dialogue at every level in order to strengthen the Indo US relationship" (Rahaman 1995)

Role of Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray Stitching the bond between India and the United States

India's Ambassador to the USA, Sidhartha Shankar Ray made an important contribution in order to strengthen the relations between India and the United States. He made an attempt to reaching out to the Indian Diaspora his interaction at Gymkhana Club in Potomac Mary Land in his interaction. Ambassador Ray pointed out that Indian American nearly one million families in the United States it was possible because of the efforts and the contribution of the daughters of India "that the daughters of India keeping up India's tradition, India's culture, .That the daughter of India kept the family unit firm" (Tuteja 1994). Ambassador Ray also wanted to introduce the diversity of India to America and represent each Indian state in away group of Indian were asked 26 Indian states arrange favourite dish from each state " That it would take 52 shapes the American Guests would have a taste of India (Tuteja 1994).

The Clinton administration recognised the services Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray, made in improving relations between India and the United States Hillary Clinton Hosted at the white House. Hillary Clinton presented Ray with a copy of her book "It Takes a Village" (Chandran 1995:15). India caucus group of 68 members many were US lawmakers. They presented the commemorative plaque whose citation read the "caucus

recognises Ambassador Ray for his outstanding work of the United States of America and the people of India.” (Chandran 1995:15) Prime Minister Rao appointed Ambassador Naresh Chandra India’s civil servant. Jaswant Singh writes given the importance of the relationship “Naresh Chandra presence in a way reassurance consolidating the relations and protecting India’s interests” (Jaswant Singh 2006: 275).

First Lady Hillary Clinton Diplomatic Tour to South Asia

President Clinton requested the Hillary to visit India to consolidate political relations with India, Hillary Clinton opinion is that the administration should make “a new opening to India a hall mark of its foreign policy.” (Talbot 2004:24). Hillary Clinton writes in her memoir that the president and vice president could not make a trip to the region where the political problems are pressing. To convey the political signal that President Bill Clinton committed to supporting democracy, expand free markets and promote tolerance and human rights, including the rights of women (Clinton 2003). Hillary Clinton visit to South Asia primary focus of the visit to “give human dimension to politics” she wanted herself experience the How the women in South Asia creating opportunities creating services educational and economic opportunities However American first lady Hillary Clinton considerable importance to the India press reported American first lady had the access to ear of the head of the Government that is the only existing super power (The Times of India 1995e: 11)

Hillary Clinton accompanied by her daughter Chelsea and the Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel, Hillary Clinton said “ India is a marvellous example of love and affection where people of all shades live in harmony with each other and purpose of her visit also learn more about India’s heritage and culture and civilization (The Times of India 1995f : 7).

Hillary Clinton writes in her memoir she wanted to raise the concerns of the women in India , she was facing the problem of her speech writing at women’s luncheon organized at the US embassy in New Delhi Sri Ram college principal Meenakshi Gopinath gave the Poem written by her student Anasuya Sengupta to the Hillary Clinton the poem starts “ Too many women in too many countries speak the same language – of silence” Hillary

emphasised the women's voices need to be heard she emphasised the women's welfare is at the centre of development (Purdum 1995).

Hillary Clinton recalls her most important visits In Ahmadabad in Gujarat, Hillary Clinton visited Mahatma Gandhi's simple Ashram, where "he sought a meditative retreat from the roiling struggle to create an independent India" (Clinton 2003: 279). M.S. Maya Ray, the wife of Mr Sidhartha Shankar Ray, presented to the Hilalry Clinton A set of books selected verses of Mahtma Gandhi samples of handmade paper produced at the Ahsram and a replica of Hridaykunj (The Times of India 1995c: 7)

Liz Moynihan, senator Moynihan's wife had introduced the Hillary Clinton to the Ela Bhatt founded SEWA taking inspiration from Gandhi in order to empower women, SEWA had provided Microfinance, literacy skills and the professional skills SEWA had redefined the roles of women (Hillary Clinton 2003). Hillary Clinton met Prime Minister Rao her focus of conversations with Prime Minister Rao was confined to improving governance and the economic development (Purdum 1995).

The Pakistan Factor

The Clinton administration renewed the effort to engage with Pakistan. The Clinton South Asia policy was claimed to be even handed approach. The Clinton's South Asia policy was fundamentally ill conceived India was not treated power on its own; thereby brought every issue that linked to Pakistan (Jawant Singh 2006 :285).

Jairam Ramesh and Malavika Singh in 1994interview Frank Wisner told in an Interview to the American policy towards South Asia is that US government wanted to influence in both countries on the question of Terrorism the United States concern about the American law had the provision to deal with the State Sponsoring terrorism but the consequences for the US government was not willing to severing of ties and in turn the United States would lose the influence in Pakistan (Ramesh and Singh 1994).

Sagarika Ghose interview with US Amabssador to India Frank Wisner said on the question of mediation Frank Wisner expressed his opinion was that the United States not willing to be arbiter or mediator in resolving the India and Pakistan , the way to resolve in

his opinion was the quite exploration of ideas and discuss with Pakistan for ensuring peace and stability in the region (Ghose 1994).

Harold Gould South Asian experts write Pakistan had enormous clout in the US system because of Cold war subculture that Pakistan exploited and Pakistan built many coalitions and the lobby groups in the United States Capitol Hill, the state department, especially in Pentagon and the defence industry and even its lobby spread to the segments of scholarly community (Gould 1996: 3081-3082) Dennis Kux writes Robin Raphel's opinion that she was sceptical about improving India – US relations she believed Pakistan remained useful friend for the United States defence department was also viewed Pakistan was an important partner in West Asia not to be alienated (Kux 2004).

Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited Washington in order to demand the Clinton Administration the delivery of F 16, She asked President Clinton that the United States was not fair to keep the equipment that was already paid Benazir Bhutto's demand president Clinton amend the Pressler for one time exception to deliver the F 16 (Kux 2004:330).However the senator Larry Pressler presents the reason for the weakening of Pressler Amendment was the military industrial complex It was called the Octopus , the Octopus worked its way into weakening the Pressler amendment . the US congress passed the Brown amendment (Pressler 2017 :6-7).

External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee visit to the United States Consolidating Political Relations

US Ambassador Frank Wisner while describing Mukherjee's visit said that it was a fitting first anniversary the statement issued by the Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao and The US president Bill Clinton calling for the close cooperation between India and the U.S (The Times of India, 1995j:1). the official announcement of about his visit was Focus on strengthening bilateral relations and discuss on regional on international issues of mutual interest would be discussed with the Clinton administration (The Times of India, 1995k: 11) Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee visited the United in May 1995 in order to consolidate political relations with the Clinton Administration. He held talks with the secretary of State Warren Christopher National Security advisor

Anthony Lake and Deputy secretary of State Strobe Talbott USA in May 1995 He also held discussions with the policy community and Indian American community (MEA 1995- 1996 77-78).

External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee told a press conference, at the end of a series of meetings with administrative and congressional leaders, that all his discussions were very fruitful and constructive. Secretary Christopher conveyed on the Kashmir issue He replied, “We think that it is a bilateral issue between the Parties and we urge them to meet to resolve it. I think that it is the way to resolve the problem” (The Times of India 1995 1: 7).

Conclusion and Assessment

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao government followed diplomatic engagement with the United States; India established multiple channels of communication with the Capitol Hill through Congressional caucus and the employing the lobbying firm influence the Whitehouse and State Department, Clinton envoy diplomacy Strobe Talbott prepared the groundwork for a summit meeting. Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao ability to establish a personal rapport and the mutual understanding between President Clinton at the summit level established the working relationship between India and the United States.

According to J N Dixit Prime Minister Rao visited Washington, he did not conquer, convert or convince his U.S interlocutors. Nevertheless he indicated the possibilities of some convergence of interests and cooperation some respects with which the Americans agreed (Dixit 1994) Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray’s opinion there were problems between India and the United States it cannot be solved instantly and India and the United States are democracies there had to process in a democracy In India Prime Ministers may come and go but democracy will live on forever. Sidhartha Shankar Ray further said “greatest democracies of the world should work together hand in hand” (Tuteja 1994). Henry Kissinger in 1995 interview remarked, “We should assess together what interests we have in common and where, if we disagree, we handle the disagreement in such a way it does not impair our common interests” (Rahaman 1995).

Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray' s opinion was that in order to strengthen Indo US relations if the problems exist at political level the economic relations would be factor stability of relations and diplomatic solution is there would be opening of more channels of communication. The university level interaction would be another channel of communication needed to be opened (Chandran 1995:10).

CHAPTER IV

INDIA'S SECURITY DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES 1991-1996

“When the two nations are friends, it does not mean that they agree on everything, or that they should. But in the context of their friendly relationship, they are then able to discuss differences, problems or issues between them” (Clinton 1994).

This chapter focuses on India's security engagement with the United States in order to build security cooperation, and at the various levels of engagement -from service to service cooperation to strategic dialogue and other initiatives in achieving security cooperation. The chapter also addresses the key research question of how India negotiated the nuclear issue with the United States in order to safeguard India's nuclear option.

India's Security Predicament

According to India's former Foreign Secretary J.N Dixit, in the 1990s, India's national security challenges included the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and India's immediate security concerns were the hostile relations with the Pakistan, the military challenge of China and the foreign military bases in India's vicinity (Dixit 1996: 399-402).

During the Cold War, India depended on defence supplies from the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the supplies of defence equipment disrupted due to the dispersal of defence equipment across the post-soviet republics (Ramesh 1993: 831). With the revolution in military technology, demonstrated during the Gulf War by the United States, India's defence needs became difficult to meet. The Indian defence establishment needed to open to the United States. India's foreign policy posture prevented close military and defence relations with the United States. There was a brief security and defence cooperation during the Chinese attack in 1962 when India approached the United States for military assistance (Subrahmanyam 1996: 84).

In the opinion of J.N. Dixit, the end of the Cold War created the opportunity for dialogue for defence cooperation with the United States (Dixit 1996: 408).

Abid Hussain argues that threat reduction through diplomacy is required in order to overcome India's security challenges. Hussain's view is that cooperative engagement with the democratic states is an investment in affordable defence posture "since democracies rarely if ever fight each other, an alliance of democracies is an important condition for international peace" (Hussain 1994: 37-39).

Geopolitical and Strategic convergence of interests

Swaran Singh argues that cascading changes in the international security environment and the new context was imperative for India's national security and had created an opening for building new strategic partnerships (Swaran Singh 1995: 522-532).

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a new momentum in improving relations with the United States (Mathur 2003: 2). With the USSR's withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan strategically became less relevant to the United States. The Pressler Amendment was passed, which enabled the suspension of military and financial aid for reasons of nuclear proliferation (Kux 2001). Indian realists assess the US suspension of military assistance to Pakistan created the opportunity for India to address strategic challenges in South Asia and offered greater opportunity for India's strategic engagement with the United States (Malik 1991:55).

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recommended both India and the United States have a greater opportunity for the establishment of military cooperation with the end of the Cold War and its new geopolitical reality. The report gave a model of cooperation in the form of the military to military ties, similar to the security ties that the US has with other Asian countries (Selig and Kemp 1993: 35). There was also a mutual desire among the policy community and the United States for improving military and security cooperation with India (Mahapatra 1991: 965). India's political leadership gave the US armed forces refuelling facilities during the Gulf War; however, it was short-lived due to protest from the opposition parties and public outcry on the objection that it was a deviation from the Non-Alignment Policy (Malik 1991: 853).

The United States had another strategic ally - China. The United States and China had aligned against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. With the Soviet Union's collapse the strategic basis was irrelevant. China's Human Rights situation worsened during China's Tiananmen incident and the suppression of pro-democratic voices. Henry Kissinger observes the liberal concern in the United States over partnership with China (Kissinger 2011: 411-412).

Defence Minister Sharad Pawar writes in his memoir that there were twin challenges faced by the India's defence with the break of the Soviet Union: the supply of defence production and India's domestic defence technology production. It was difficult to supply to India's armed forces when defence Minister Shard Pawar met Prime Minister Rao suggested explore the possibility of cooperation with the United States (Pawar 2016: 105).

Strategic autonomy

India's political leadership has been concerned about strategic autonomy. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's concerns were "to keep away from the power blocs or groups, aligned against one another," as the power blocks led to international tension and global instability. Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao articulated the concern for strategic autonomy, in the words of George Tanham: "India retains a long-term unshakable commitment to strategic independence and autonomy in its decision making and military capabilities; although it's economic, industrial and technical shortcomings continue to limit the success of such a strategic design." Prime Minister Rao said the Primary focus was to meet the challenges of India's defence needs (Narasimha Rao 1994c).

Track II Diplomacy

India and the United States initially established a track II level dialogue for defence cooperation. According to then IDSA director Jasjit Singh, the objective was to have a professional approach to understand each other security concerns followed in confidence building to understand India and the United States security concerns and that inputs will go into policy making. The defence think tanks like IDSA and the National Institute for Strategic Studies initiated strategic symposiums and security experts participated in the dialogue (Jasjit Singh 1994b:2). Discussions in the

symposium had covered the perceptions and issues related to the strategic and security interests of the USA and India, especially exploring policy options for an enhanced Indo-US cooperative relationship in the future (MOD Annual Report 1991-1992:119-120).

A US delegation led by a senior US department of defence (DOD) officials including Admiral Chuck Hardisty, the commander in Chief, Pacific Command, George Tanham, Stephen Cohen and Teresita Schaffer. The Indian side included Jasjit Singh, General K. Sundarji, A.P. Venkateswarn, Defence Secretary N.N. Vohra, scientific advisor V.S. Arunachalam and other members of the Indian Strategic community and Raja Mohan, issues that were broadly discussed were Weapons of Mass Destruction, China, Pakistan and Terrorism (Bhaskar 2015:557).

Negotiating Defence Cooperation

India and the United States are fundamentally diverse in security roles for example; the United States is the leader of the free world. The United States security challenges are global in nature. They had allies to defend and protect worldwide, and India as the leader of the Non-aligned movement fundamentally characterised security concepts and roles that were limited in nature. India's security negotiations revolved around core values, sovereignty and strategic autonomy (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016:154).

Strategic engagement between India and the United States was based on cooperative security, shared objectives of the changed global context, protection of global markets and ensuring the global stability (Granger *et al.* 1995: 168). Ambassador Frank Wisner articulated a similar concern in his speech at an Indian defence think tank: the strategic challenges faced by the international community and in this new era difficult for any country to ensure security. Ambassador Wisner observes that the United States needs strategic partnership with likeminded countries like India and Ambassador Wisner said that cooperation is necessary among the United States, Russia, China, Japan and India for ensuring global security (Wisner 1994: 440).

Defence secretary William Perry said, in a speech delivered to India's defence community, that India and the United States security cooperation is based on a common security interest in ensuring security and stability of the Persian Gulf region and share common political and economic interests open South East Asia and Western

Pacific region (Perry 1994:4). The Carnegie Think Tank report suggested on the basis of India defence relations with the United States. The United States defence relations with similar cooperation that it has with the Asian countries (Selig and Kemp 1993: 35). George Tanham wrote that the Indian strategic culture envisioned for India to play global role. Jawaharlal Nehru writings particularly, appealed to the policy community in the United States (Tanham 1992: 46; Mattoo 1996).

The India-US security cooperation began with the Kicklighter proposal; among other things it included visits by Chiefs of Staff on an annual basis to alternating countries. Setting up of an India and US Army executive steering council, holding regular strategic symposiums (Mahapatra 1991). “Indo US defence cooperation framed in the light of the General Kicklighter proposals which aim to propel Indo US cooperation to the level of partnership by 1995” (The Hindu 1992: 9).

According to Guha, “The proposal not only confined mere technical exchange between security forces but it will call for a political understanding between India and the US (Guha 1991:1). The Indo US defence cooperation is not based on the Partnership of NATO member countries. The security cooperation or it does not contain similar security agreement related to Indo US soviet friendship treaty. India and the United States will be equal partners “mutually supporting the path towards achieving a common objective for Peace and stability in the region” (Guha 1991: 1).

General S.F Rodrigues army Chief and Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee said “The Indo US defence cooperation is based on shared strategic perception which will evolve into mutual arrangement that benefits both equally” (Sawhney 1991: 1) Union defence Minister said in Parliament “India and the U.S will begin the Indo US strategic cooperation to lift the bilateral relations to advance plane” (Adhikari 1991: 1). “India and the United States need to clarify each other security concerns. There are two fundamental issues the nature of US- Pakistan relationship and the United States position on India’s nuclear and missile programme. The understanding will benefit mutual cooperation (Chaudhury 1996).

The Process of Engagement

According to General S.F Rodrigues: the first substantive discussion on the chief of the Indian Army and American counterpart in a long time will evolve into a durable

mutually beneficial relationship between the largest democracies of the world (Guha 1991: 1). The United States defence establishment suggested preliminary defence proposals such as exchange of officers, conducting joint military exercises (Sawhney 1991: 1).

The US formed an Indo-US army executive steering committee specialised training staff and staff exchanges to understand the tactical, operational, doctrinal to enable the long-term army to army cooperation (The Times of India 1992e:1). General Rodrigues met the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and other top military officials during India's thinking on strategic questions and the International situation were discussed (Guha 1991: 1). The Chief of Air Staff Marshal, N.C Suri visited to promote cooperation between Air Arms of the two countries and to form steering committee (Dinesh Kumar 1992:10). As envisaged in Kicklighter proposal established a joint steering committee to strengthen Indo US defence cooperation (The Times of India 1993a).

Indian Defence Minister's Visit

Union Defence Minister Sharad Pawar met the US Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and sought cooperation through bilateral defence cooperation. And resumed talks on technology transfer (The Times of India 1992c). The Union Defence Minister Sharad Pawar visited the United States to meet his counterpart Defence secretary Dick Cheney India and the United States defence cooperation in defence research and technology the new area both India and the United States need to explore the new areas of cooperation Defence Minister Shard Pawar visit to the United States to explore the possibilities for the exploration of new cooperation defence technology procurement (Pawar 2016).The United States leader in military and defence technology the bright prospects for the meeting of mutual security needs (Manchanda 1993: 1637). According to L.K Sharma (1992), The Union defence Minister visit to aimed at intensifying bilateral contacts in the defence field. And to observe the US defence department observation the significance attached to India.

Union defence Minister Sharad Pawar had been given the access to meet US vice President Dan Quayle. The visit came at a crucial background in the wake of the leaked Defence planning document that document referred the preventing the Indian

hegemonic aspirations in South Asia (Gautam1992). US Defence secretary explained to Defence Minister Sharad Pawar, “US post cold President Bush strategy in the wake of the post-cold war altered security environment looking for countries that share common security interests. In the Post-cold war era, the regional cooperation is based on operational cooperation as and when threats arise in the shared region the Asia Pacific”. Pawar said the end of the Cold war eliminated the extraneous factors and there was “greater desire for mutual cooperation in the armed forces of the two countries and there exists a common interest in maintaining peace and stability South Asian and maintaining freedom of the sea” (The Times of India 1992h).

Addressing the defence Minister Sharad Pawar, he said it was his belief that in the changing world order to improve it is important not only come forth on political and economic but also generate confidence on the military front (The Times of India 1992i: 1). Pawar held extensive discussions with US leaders, including the Vice President Dan Quayle, and the Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney. After his return from Washington said India and the United States will hold joint naval exercises, the US which has the largest Naval presence in the Indian ocean (The Times of India 1992g: 1).

According to former foreign secretary J.N Dixit, in his interaction with the U.S National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, the new international situation provided for India and the United States to restructure the security relationships where possible. For India, stable democracy, India, security cooperation with the US was vital for achieving stability and peace in the Asian region (Dixit 1996: 183).

Indo US Naval Diplomacy

The naval cooperation between India and the United States introduced the concept of Interoperability – the free Movement of naval ships in each other waters but in the Indian Ocean region, India guards had its exclusive sphere of influence. It was also understood as India’s primacy in the Indian Ocean region (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016).

The United States viewed India as a major player in the Indian Ocean region and the Southeast Asian region. With the changes in the geopolitical realities that both United States loss of naval bases in South East Asia and China’s assertive role and the in this

context to guard the sea lanes of communication and observes in the region the United States views India as a potential partner (The Times of India 1991c:13). The United States needs the regional allies to protect its sea lanes of communication in the wake of post-Gulf war (Sawhney 1992).

The Indo-US naval cooperation began with US Pacific fleet, Admiral David Jeremiah in September 1989, the then commander-in-chief of the US Pacific fleet, Admiral David Jeremiah, presented a set of proposals to the then Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral JG Nadkarni. The proposal aimed at improving the naval cooperation, this resulted in establishing a steering committee and in the year 1992, India and the United States conducted the joint naval exercises (Chaudhury 1996). The Indian Navy representative Captain Uday Baskar said the naval interaction would benefit the Indian navy to latest and advanced naval technology and joint naval exercise get the opportunity to know each other potential. The naval interface is natural the strategic convergence of interests to ensure the security of the sea lanes of communication Persian Gulf to Asia Pacific (The Times of India 1992l: 1). The second part of Indo US joint naval exercise Malabar 1995 more advanced Naval warfare techniques were conducted including the submarine warfare technology (Chaudhury 1996) Senior Ministry of External Affairs official said the limited cooperation should continue despite the differences in defence relations. During the Malabar III exercises the problem of the Brown Amendment and pressure India to sign on nuclear proliferation (Kumar 1996: 7).

Agreed Minutes of Defence Pact

The US Under Secretary of Defence Walter Slocombe visited India to prepare the ground work for the US Defence Secretary William Perry. K.P.A. Nambiar said to Slocombe the institutional level of Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defence are working towards institutionalising the bilateral security cooperation. Ministry of Defence and the US Pentagon will interact gradually reaching a strategic understanding of security and defence ties (The Times of India, 1994x: 15).

The US defence secretary William Perry, in his concept paper to Ambassador Siddhartha Shankar Ray notes that, "India's nuclear option should not compare to that of Pakistan but China" (The Times of India 1994w).

John F Burns writes in the New York Times, “India wants to retain its nuclear capability to deter the Chinese military, which is superior to India.” This was noticed by IDSA chief Jasjit Singh (Burns 1995a).

The defence secretary visits were undertaken to fundamentally understand each other’s security interests. Shekar Gupta compared the diplomatic Chess game to the defence secretary interaction primarily. The Defence secretary signed the agreed minutes of the defence pact and a three-tier mechanism for Interaction between the Indian and military establishment was agreed to (Gupta 1995).

The agreed minutes were signed by defence secretary and William Perry and the Minister of state for defence Mallikarjun for a security cooperation for the mutual benefit, and envisaged the UN Peace Keeping operations between India and the United States the defence fact cooperation at the civilian leadership and the uniformed services and the defence production level (Cherian 1995).

“The signing of an agreed minute on defence cooperation leading to the establishment of defence policy group and the joint technical group, enhanced civilian to civilian interaction, service to service cooperation, and defence research and production cooperation” (MOD Annual Report 1995-1996).

Defence secretary William Perry addressed the core concerns in the security cooperation in a speech addressed to the at the USI to the Indian defence officials:

“No two countries can have an exact identity of interests, and certainly our two countries do not have the exact identity of interests. But with these very real, very pragmatic mutual interests serving as the basis of our relationship, we can build an American- Indian security relationship that is both strong and stable” (Perry 1995 :4).

Shankar Rao Chavan said the agreement “to come closer together and forget the past” (Burns 1995a). Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee told in an interview Indo US security cooperation evolved US defence secretary’s visit to India in January 1995, India and the US agreed to evolve “civilian to civilian cooperation, service to service cooperation and defence research and production cooperation” (Ved 1995b: 15).

India's Perception of Nuclear Threats

India and the United States relations considerable progress has been in the spheres of economic and political. The U.S.-Indian non-proliferation differences are an obstacle in the comprehensive improvement of Indo US relations (Chelone, 1994).The Nuclear weapons are primary tools in achieving security, their central role lies not in its use but its possession they function as instruments of terror and will be used as diplomatic coercion in achieving political objectives (Jasjit Singh 1998).Strategic Affairs expert P.R Chari of the view that the United States Nuclear coercion during the 1971 Bangladesh war still resonates in the Indian security calculus (Chari1999:3).

According to Jaswant Singh, the nuclear weapons are the currency of power international politics they are important aspect of state power (Jaswant Singh 1998) Amitabh Mattoo argues that nuclear weapons are the political equalizers in correcting asymmetry in the in the international system (Mattoo1996). Nuclear weapons role as a military deterrent (Jaswant Singh 1998) the Soviet Union remain principal security guarantor for India with the dissolution of the Soviet Union Indian security became more vulnerable (Hussain 1994).

Amitabh Mattoo argues that India's principal threat comes from China. India is concerned about the growing nuclear relationship between China and Pakistan. What is even frightening for Indian security establishment is that Chinese might have given the blueprint for the nuclear weapons designing to Pakistan (Mattoo 1996:50) According to Shivshankar Menon (2016), the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia by Pakistan and China the international non-proliferation regime not addressing these issues (Menon 2016:158). China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan's strategic objective is that India and Pakistan remain locked in a nuclear conflict. This enables China to play a global role. Pakistan strategy building of nuclear weapons was that it would have leverage on Kashmir issue (Subramanyam 1998).

According to Jaswant Singh, India's nuclear insecurity because of the five global nuclear powers are being legitimised through NPT and that the global high priests of the nuclear powers did not grasp India's enormous security challenges India is the only country in the world that is strategic challenge is compounded because it is sandwiched between the two nuclear adversaries Pakistan and China and their close

security cooperation (Jaswant Singh 2006:115). the United States activism in the post-Coldwar era to prevent further proliferation of Nuclear weapons the United States views that Nuclear weapons threat to Unipolar hegemony (Sitapati 2016:283).

Strategic analyst K Subramanyam writes that the global nuclear order, the entire industrial world security cover of the Nuclear weapons the organisation of security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) covered by the United States, Britain and France and the US nuclear extended deterrence to US allies (Subramanyam 1998).

Amitabh Mattoo's analysis is that ever since India tested nuclear weapons in 1974, the progress of India's nuclear programme hardly known, India policy of strategic ambiguity because the security planners in China and Pakistan cannot risk attacking India because of opaqueness and secrecy prevents the policy of military adventurism of the Pakistan and China (Mattoo 1996). The United States in its renewed non-proliferation efforts sought to cap, reduce and eliminate the Nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan (Subramanyam 1998). The United States military objectives prevent India to secure nuclear and missile technology these are important for achieving the robust deterrence (Sitapati 2016: 280). Dennis Kux 1993 writes threat analysis by the U S defence planners for the post-Cold war world US defence strategy is to prevent the nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent, bring India and Pakistan under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and put India's nuclear programmes under the IAEA inspection (Kux 1993). President Clinton preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons became fundamental foreign policy objective president Clinton addressed UN General Assembly "non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction one of our nation's highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of our relationships with the world's nations and institutions" (Chari 1999: 4).

Foreign secretary J.N Dixit writes that the USA regarding South Asia is "1) ensuring regional Nuclear non-proliferation; 2) persuading India and Pakistan to cap their nuclear technological capacities; 3) abjuring further experiments and tests to increase their respective capacities; and 4) the objective of persuading India and Pakistan to stop production of fissile material and to place their nuclear facilities and fissile stockpiles under the full protection of IAEA's safeguards" (Dixit 1996: 179).

The US Ambassador to India, Thomas Pickering said the foreign policy goal of the president George Bush to prevent the nuclear threshold countries testing nuclear weapons in South Asia, The United States objective is to bring India and Pakistan under the non-proliferation treaty (Gautam Adhikari 1992a:16).

India's Nuclear Diplomacy with the United States

According to Jasjit Singh, India's nuclear diplomacy must achieve two objectives first is to achieve stability in the nuclear environment, and the second objective is to ensure the diplomatic posture to reduce the associated costs of nuclear deterrence (Jasjit Singh 1998: 287). Strobe Talbott argues that the "Engagement gave the Indians a chance to resist the Americans pressure face to face. In that sense, the dialogue could be its own reward, as both a means and an end" (Talbott 2004:5). Nuclear weapons owed to the theoretical concept is the deterrence is the primary concept of nuclear weapons the west in general and the United States in particular believes in the Nuclear weapons deterrence logic. India arguments are if Nuclear weapons work in the west why does not work in the South Asian context (Jaswant Singh 1998).

"The adverse asymmetry, therefore, became an important factor in shaping the responses of the country which was put under pressure. But the basic choice was whether India would be willing to live in a state of permanent nuclear adverse asymmetry as a de facto non-nuclear weapon state, without the notion of benefits of NPT membership, or choose to be defector nuclear weapon state with a minimum weapons capability as an insurance policy against potential nuclear coercion and nuclear threats." (Jasjit Singh 1998). Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna argue that American Policy makers view that India's image is that of a revisionist state and threat to the continues status quo US as a global power. The authors dispel these are misperceptions leading to the tensions between India and the United States. In order to remove the tensions, there must be constructive dialogue in the area of Non-proliferation and Nuclear disarmament (Ollapally and Ramanna 1995:13).

US Policy towards the South Asia Nuclear proliferation

The United States Post-Cold war draft document clearly laid the objective: The United States policy prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia The United States would keep India and Pakistan Nuclear facilities under the IAEA

inspection and India and Pakistan to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (The New York Times, 1992a). Seymour M Hersh wrote an article about India and Pakistan were a brink of a nuclear exchange in the 1990s crisis both countries possessed the nuclear weapons. The situation in the 1990s crisis was more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis Seymour Hersh quotes the CIA official's sources informed in Pakistan the civilian leadership Benazir Bhutto was side-lined from the nuclear decision making and the Pakistan General Mirza Aslam Beg had the control over the Nuclear Button. Seymour M Hersh's opinion was because of the military control over the nuclear programmes in Pakistan increased danger level and the more likely use of nuclear weapons (Hersh 1993). During the 1990s crisis President George Bush sent his deputy National security advisor Robert Gates to India and Pakistan this was known Gates Mission in order to de-escalate the nuclear crisis situation (Raghavan 2017: 200).

Devin T. Hagerty logically critiques the presentation of Seymour Hersh's article the 1990 crisis of the 1990s the interpretation of the crisis is from the logic of nuclear proliferation and the logic of nuclear deterrence. The Seymour presentation is viewed from the logic of proliferation Devin T Hagerty on the other hand interprets the 1990s crisis the logic of nuclear deterrence the 1990s crisis of India and Pakistan is that both countries having the knowledge of possessing the Nuclear weapons prevented going to war (Hagerty 1995-1996).

George Perkovich expert on nuclear issues in South Asia put forward his argument that the soviet and the US model managing the nuclear weapons stability and security not viable for India and Pakistan that their Nuclear arsenals even leading to first strike and then and ability of both countries to survive and keep the nuclear arsenals under civilian control it appears in the Pakistan case nuclear decision making in the military leaders and they do not have effective control over the nuclear weapons (Perkovich 1993). Strobe Talbott argues that in South Asia is difficult to manage the nuclear crisis the arguments the US and the Soviet model of nuclear deterrence not applicable to South Asia. He explains from the rivalry the United States and the Soviet Union had no historical rivalry and they did not fight directly any war on the other hand India and the Pakistan rivalry deep seated having fought many wars and the continuing territorial claims. India and Pakistan capital cities and population centres

missiles could reach within minutes there is hardly scope for the crisis de-escalation (Talbot 1999). Therefore, both the accounts clearly make the case for the preventing nuclear proliferation in South Asia the United States proposed Nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. Kanwal Sibal argues that nuclear weapons are a threat to global security. The Nuclear weapons free zone is an artificially constructed it is not a practical step to achieve nuclear disarmament. And other nuclear weapons countries are bordering the South Asian region (Sibal 1993).

India's Ambassador to Siddhartha Shankar Ray writes in an article reply to the New York Times India and Pakistan the best way to prevent nuclear war or the exchange is the bilateral solution is Nuclear CBMs in other words building nuclear confidence building measures India offered the nuclear CBMs to Pakistan not to attack each other nuclear installations and the not to attack populations centres and the most important CBMs was no first use agreement (Statesman 1994).

Five Nation Conference Nuclear Weapons Free zone

The United States had proposed nuclear weapons Free zone in South Asia, Strobe Talbot's opinion the nuclear experts in India argued the South Asia free zone is an artificial construct and India's concern is extra regional powers. Strobe Talbot would bring China to discuss the five Nation conference in order to provide the dialogue on the proposal for Nuclear weapons free zone (The New York Times 1994).

On the other hand, the China becoming the member in five power conference was objections on the ground it was the China that had provided the Nuclear and Missile assistance to Pakistan and on the other hand China's presence of along the Indian subcontinent was the main reason for India acquiring the nuclear deterrence (Schulz 1993). The similar opinion expressed India's nuclear expert Brahma Chellaney India's fundamental objective acquiring the nuclear weapons is to counter the Chinese threat India's Military and the nuclear response 1962 war was the primary reason (Chellaney 1991:50).

Ambassador William Clark said the United States in its non-proliferation efforts the United States make sure that India signs the NPT; India was against the nuclear Non-proliferation treaty. The Ambassador of the view that at the regional level strategy to work out the five nation conference in that process (Raja Mohan 1992). The central

intelligence agency in its report that a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent informed US perceptions that CIA categorised as the South Asian the nuclear flashpoint the most likely use of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent” (Chari 1999). The US Assistant Secretary for State for International Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, proposed on the five Nation conferences on the nuclear free zone proposal with External Affairs Minister Madhav Sinha Solanki and the foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey (The Times of India 1991e: 1). Mr Reginald Bartholomew, the US under-secretary of state for political affairs proposed a five-power conference on non-proliferation and South Asian security in 1992. Bartholomew main concern on getting arms limitation in the subcontinent (Raja Mohan1992). Five nation power conference include India China, Pakistan, the US and the Soviet Union (The Times of India 1991e: 1). The Foreign Minister Madhav Sinha Solanki and Minister of State for External Affairs Eduardo Faleiro, criticised the, five power conference initially put forward by the Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (Subrahmanyam 1992).

Jasjit Singh’s observation India and the United State view that the Nuclear weapons must be eliminated. India believes its security interests served in a non-nuclear environment in its neighbourhood. India and the United States believe that the spread of nuclear weapons poses a threat to both countries. Jasjit Sing of the view strategic reality is that nuclear weapons do exist in the hands of the five nuclear powers. So, India will not abandon nuclear weapons because the Nuclear weapons are essential for national security (Jasjit Singh 1994a). K. Subramanyam suggests that India ‘s position on the Nuclear weapons and missile capability as long as these weapons exist in the hands of the nuclear powers India should retain the nuclear option and India need to convince the United States that India will not compromise on fundamental national security issues. (Subramanyam 1994b). P.R. Chari argues that India views the nuclear option is a symbol of Nuclear sovereignty that India needs to engage in dialogue where in India negotiating strategy must keep the nuclear option open in its bargain that India will not go for overt nuclearization and the also not deploying the nuclear weapons for the weapons purposes. India should put forward the United States should not use Nuclear weapons as a primary object in its defence posture (Chari 1999:17).

India of the view that the regional approach will not solve the nuclear proliferation issue the problem can be sorted out the global level. India views engaging in dialogue with the United States to remove the misperceptions and misunderstanding. It gives India an opportunity to convey to that the US sanctions target on civilian space research organization such as ISRO (The Times of India 1992d: 1).

India's security concerns that differ from that of Pakistan, Pakistan argument is that it signs the nuclear non-proliferation treaty if India signs, this argument sends the wrong signal to US and international non-proliferation community that India is the main obstacle for the holding the Non-proliferation treaty. So, the United states strategy and mechanisms to evolve outside the NPT (The Times of India 1992f: 7).

K. Subrahmanyam analysis of five power conference China, Russia and the United States and Pakistan. In this five power conference the major Nuclear threats are coming from Pakistan and China India will not have fair treatment for the economically weaker Russia will not be diplomatically any assertive role and the United States has been the alliance relationship with Pakistan the past and have shown bias towards the other party in the conference India will not have a fair treatment for India but India needs to engage in dialogue with the United States the prominent member of the five power conference (Subrahmanyam 1992).

Ronald Lehman, Director of the Arms control and disarmament agency. Lehman visit to Delhi in 1991 foreign secretary J.N Dixit conveyed on the proposed five Nation conference and its approach "First, the proposed agenda desired only India and Pakistan to undertake non-proliferation obligations, whereas China, Russia and the USA would assume a patronising security guarantors role without accepting any non-proliferation obligations themselves. Secondly, given the strategic nuclear environment around India after the end of the end of the Cold War, our threat perceptions clearly required us to keep our nuclear option open" (Dixit 1996: 181-182).

P.R Chari argues that the United States and India believes that the outcome or progress of the talks will not lead to any agreement for say but the talks are important India and the United states both benefits from the bilateral engagement and the convince the United States to understand India's security concerns the benefits of the

talks is enable both countries to narrow the gap between perceptions lead to better understanding (Chari 1992).

Indian foreign Minister Madhav Sinha Solanki in his talks with James Baker American secretary of state James Baker Solanki said India will not sign the NPT and US regional level initiatives both initiatives are unsuitable for addressing India's security concerns (Raja Mohan 1992).

Prime Minister Rao in Rajya Sabha said that the regional approach for the nuclear disarmament is flawed because extra regional concerns to the Nuclear threats emanate from the outside the region, in that situation India security will be jeopardized. In the absence of India's security guarantee India's approach only global and he further said he was aiming at something bigger than the regional initiative to envelop the whole world for nuclear disarmament (Narasimha Rao 1994h: 175).

Amartya Sen argues that the western countries were concerned for the nuclear proliferation in the South Asian region and aiming at global disarmament, instead of looking at the ethics of their own approach towards the nuclear weapons and their status quo legitimisation of nuclear weapons (Sen: 258).

The Clinton administration initiated a process of dialogue on the important issues at the bilateral level disarmament, nuclear non-Proliferation and regional security issues (Adhikari 1992:18). The formal bilateral level engagement has been initiated. Chari (1992) writes that India and the United States formal dialogue aimed at addressing India and the United States mutual understanding each other strategic challenges.

The Indian delegation led by "Chandra Shekar Dasgupta and the US side John Malott. The US deputy assistant secretary of state Ms Teresita Schaffer, will be leading the US team at the wide ranging in talks the Indian side headed by MR C Dasgupta, additional secretary in the External Affairs Ministry. The US delegation includes Schaffer's successor. Mr John Malott. Mr Bob Einhorn, Steve Aoki and Mr Gary Samore of the state department Mr N Woul of the arms control and disarmament agency" (Raja Mohan 1992). According to the state Department "the talks are part of the ongoing are efforts by the United States reduce the global spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and to promote peace and stability" (Chari 1992). India had adopted a very sober and measured negotiating stance on the

issues which was that India was willing to enter into negotiations with all the concerned nuclear weapons powers, both politically and technically, to move forward non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation, in the process, India's nuclear option should not be eroded till a time bound non-discriminatory programme came into being (Dixit 1998).

Senator Larry Pressler visited India in 1992 and he interacted with Prime Minister Rao and Defence Minister Sharad Pawar and foreign secretary J.N Dixit. In his press briefing sensitized the Nuclear threats from the former soviet republics the Nuclear material might fall into the hands of extremists pose a serious challenge to international security and due to geographic proximity near to former soviet republics in the central Asian region (Pressler 2017:155).

Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and President George Bush Nuclear Negotiations

Prime Minister Rao and George Bush met at the sideline of UN Security Council meeting. The meeting with Bush was held on 31st January. President Bush was assisted by his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, Under- Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Arnold Kantar, and Prime Minister was assisted by J.N. Dixit and Amarnath Verma (Dixit 1996:75).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao and President Bush had a 30 Minutes meeting. Both leaders discussed the nuclear, bilateral and security issues. President Bush proposed the Nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. Prime Minister Rao rejected the plan of nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. Prime Minister Rao explained to the president about India's position the proposed nuclear weapons free zone leaves the vulnerable in the other two fronts the one on Northern border and another on Indian ocean. President Bush changed the topic diplomatically and Prime Minister Rao explained the economic reforms offered opportunities for strengthening economic and trade relations (Chakravarti 1992:1). Prime Minister Rao, however, ensured a more broad – based discussion on the possibilities of Indo- US economic, political and technological cooperation (Dixit 1996 :76).

Mr Rao made it clear that the Pakistani proposal to make it clear that the proposal to declare the South Asia Nuclear weapons Free zone, since India shared a border with which had nuclear weapons all that India wanted India is not against non-proliferation but it should not discriminate against India (Chakrabarti 1992a).

The Bush administration's proposal for the five-nation conference initiative the UN Security Council was thinking of taking control over the nuclear issues. India's arguments are nuclear issues should be discussed outside the Security Council (Dixit 1998) president Bush administration strategy cap the nuclear weapons in South Asia. President Bush asked Prime Minister Rao on the nuclear free south Asia (Dixit 1998: 370). Prime Minister Rao in his speech to the Security Council in 1992 said "What measures of preventive or punitive action on a selective basis will not achieve the results ... technical fixes or regional arrangements no longer suffice?... In our view, the only logical route available to us is to pursue a global approach" (Dixit 1992: 457) Foreign Secretary J.N Dixit writes in his memoir the meeting with Bush and Prime Minister Rao resulted in India and the US would engage in official discussion on non-proliferation and disarmament issues (Dixit 1996: 76).

Foreign Secretary J.N Dixit Nuclear Negotiations with US Interlocutors

After the New York summit meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Rao agreed to help further discussions at the official level. For follow up talks, Prime Minister Rao sent his envoy J.N. Dixit with the invitation of Bush administration on the nuclear issues the foreign policy analyst C. Raja Mohan writes foreign secretary level initiative is about talks on talks on the proposed five power conference (Raja Mohan 1992). Barbara Crossett (1992) writes in the New York Times on the eve of foreign secretary J.N Dixit's visit to the United States. The United States has leverage on Pakistan. Pakistan receives financial and military assistance from the US. The United States has no leverage influence on the nuclear weapons of India. India had the nuclear know how. India conducted peaceful nuclear tests in 1974 (Crossettes 1992).

Arnold Kanter, undersecretary of state for political Affairs in the State Department Dixit informed Kanter that India will not sign the NPT regardless of the pressure exerted on India (Dixit 1996: 178-180). Both, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Congressman Stephen Solarz, were knowledgeable about India and Indian

sensitivities. As far as non-proliferation was concerned, both of them, while accepting India's logic on not signing the NPT, also felt that India could cooperate with the United States in fashioning some interim measures towards ensuring nuclear and space non-proliferation even if India did not sign the NPT. They were of the view that it was crucial to give an encouraging boost to a new pattern of Indo US relations which were emerging after the Cold war (Dixit 1996:185). The possibilities of India and the US reaching an accord together again on Non-proliferation matters would be entirely dependent on the willingness of the US to respect India's strategic interests and security concerns (Dixit 1996: 373).

The Foreign Minister Madhav Singh Solanki after his meeting US secretary of state James Baker, stated that US has mounted no pressure on India to sign the NPT on the other hand America agreeing to discuss the problem of nuclear proliferation outside the frame work of NPT constitutes a new flexibility on the US side (Subrahmanyam 1992).

President Clinton's Envoy Strobe Talbott Nuclear Diplomacy

President Bill Clinton's renewed his effort on nuclear non-proliferation. He sent his envoy Strobe Talbott to conduct diplomacy with the India and Pakistan, the understanding reached with the Bush administration reached a dead lock president Clinton's top foreign policy agenda to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. John Cherian writes, The Clinton administration's South Asia's policy is spelt out in his report to the Congress in April 1993. The aim is "First to cap, then overtime reduces and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery". President Clinton sent his envoy Strobe Talbott to South Asia in order to initiate the process of dialogue (Cherian 1994:27).

President Clinton's envoy deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott's argument is that delivering Pakistan F16 in exchange of Pakistan government agreeing to cap its nuclear weapons program (Burns 1994). India's Ambassador Siddhartha Shankar Ray argued fundamentally the move by the deputy secretary of state was not convincing what could Be the rationale for the United States delivering F16 which could carry the Nuclear material and the United States proposal to regional disarmaments in South

Asia, what could be the reason jeopardizing India's security and at the same time asking India to cap nuclear programme (Statesman 1994).

Strobe Talbott interacted with Minister of State for external Affairs Salman Khursheed according to him, the US wants to compartmentalise the issue by first making Pakistan cap its nuclear programme and then asking India to stop its nuclear programme. Salman Khursheed disagreed with Strobe Talbott approach of nuclear weapons preventive approach the United States supplying one-time exception to Pressler amendment F16 nuclear weapons capable of carrying the weapons delivery in exchange of capping Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

Strobe Talbott in his interaction with Prime Minister Rao, stated his views on the Nuclear weapons programme, and that he followed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's approach on the nuclear issue with a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Talbott's observed that Finance Minister Manmohan Singh view was that security is dependent on economic prosperity and for the success of economic reforms and India's integration with the world market, it is necessary to build US cooperation. It is in the best interest of the country to be going slow or in a low key manner in dealing with the Nuclear issue (Talbott 2004: 31), Talbott seemed to have offered proposals in his talks with Prime Minister Rao, that included Defence and technology packages such as early Warning systems to India to in the context of delivery of F 16s to Pakistan (Bobb 1994: 64; Talbott 2004: 31).

Prime Minister Rao excerpts from reply to the discussion on working of Defence Ministry in Rajya Sabha, New Delhi, 3 May 1994 Prime Minister Rao in his address to the Rajya Sabha clarified the close discussions with Talbott. Prime Minister Rao said Talbott did not bring any pressure on Prime Minister either to agree to cap the Nuclear weapons or put pressure on him to sign the NPT. Rao said there are only disagreements between India and the USA, these areas of disagreement needed to be sorted out (Narasimha Rao 1994:176).

Talbott says that the Indian perspective on the nuclear weapons in the matter of sovereignty security and equity on the other hand America viewed in terms of the global nuclear order stability, that there will be demonstration effect or in other words the domino effect If India goes nuclear other countries will follow and the global

nuclear order will be in dangerous situation (Talbot 2004: 24). With the bilateral engagement it seemed to have softened the US attitude on nuclear weapons proliferation.

K. Subrahmanyam's analysis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Report by Harrison Selig and Geoffrey Kemp advised both the US government and the Indian government in order to solve the nuclear proliferation issue. That there is a considerable change of the Clinton administration not to pressure India to sign the NPT that the given India's security concerns at the same time India should send some positive signal that they abide by the NPT provisions (Subrahmanyam 2005: 228).

Talbot proposed the multilateral talks on the nuclear non-proliferation issues at official level additional member countries has been proposed Germany and Japan. US strategy is that probably Germany and Japan are the economic powers without Nuclear weapons. The Problem for India whether Germany and Japan would consider India's security concerns at another level Japan Germany is the key economic powers their support India requires for the economic development for foreign investment (Cherian 1994).

London Conference - Nuclear Diplomacy

According to Strobe Talbot Prime Minister Rao agreed to have expert level talks in London the American proposed conference for the American point of view the prevent Nuclear weapons program in South Asia. Strobe Talbot says talks for the sake of talks only concern is to continue the dialogue and enable understanding, the purpose was no agreement willing to reach at official level talks (Talbot 2004: 33).

An expert on Indo US relations Summit Ganguli said that Prime Minister Rao had Deputy secretary of State level talks which were out of media attention also that these talks were continuing constructive dialogue on nuclear disarmament. The nature of the talks' secrecy was because of sensitive matter being involved in the subject being discussed (Vaidya 1994g: 17).

The Indian delegation at the talks was led by "N Krishnan, a former diplomat who had served as India's permanent representative at the United Nations. Other members of the delegation include Rakesh Sood, Director in the UN division of the external

affairs Ministry and Satish Chandra, India's permanent representative to the U.N. K Santhanam, additional secretary in the defence research and development organisation and Meera Shankar, head of the commerce wing at the Indian embassy in Washington. The US team comprised Mr Robert Einhorn the deputy assistant secretary of state of politico military affairs, Mr Michael Lemon, director of the South Asia Bureau in the state department bureau and Mr Norman Wolf heading the US arms control and disarmament agency" (Vaidya 1994g :17).

The Indian embassy officials Meera Shankar, heading the embassy commerce wing was attending Indo US security Talks in London that were being as a part of being a continuing dialogue between the two countries. India and the United States were conducting secret talks on nuclear Non-proliferation ostensibly to prepare the ground for the further discussion Prime Minister Rao visit to the United States (The Times of India 1994q).

The Indo-US talks in London rocked the parliament but the government maintained there was absolutely no rethinking on the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty and India would never succumb to US Pressure. In the Upper house, the Minister of external affairs Salman Khurshid, said the talks were part of a continuing bilateral discussion for the achievement of the Late Rajiv Gandhi's plan for a global non-discriminatory non-nuclear order (The Times of India 1994i: 1).

The Indian government conveyed to the US administration India is committed to engaging in Multilateral process which is global and objective is to achieve global nuclear disarmament (Raja Mohan 1994d). The US may have begun historic shifts in its policy towards South Asia by deciding to deal separately (Joshi 1994a, 1994b).

India and the US have broadly agreed to continue their bilateral dialogue, despite the sharp divergence between the non-proliferation matters during the preparation before the official level dialogue between Indian Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao and the president Clinton Indian agreed to disagree on the current American non-proliferation initiatives.

The Indian foreign secretary K Srinivasan had a round of meetings with senior administration officials including the national security advisor Anthony Lake, the Undersecretary for secretary for political affairs, Peter Turnoff, the Under Secretary

of State for International Security, Lyn Davis and the Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, Frank Wisner (Raja Mohan, 1994d).

Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's and President Clinton's Nuclear Negotiations

Prime Minister Rao in his address to the US congress Conveyed India's security concerns to the US legislators:

“Every nation, large or small, rich or poor is sovereign and possesses an inherent right and responsibility to its people to ensure their security. I firmly believe that the way of ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction lies in creating a world order based on the universal principles of equality and non-discrimination as a means of enhancing security. The answer that we as a nation choose will shape the destiny of the world in the coming century” (Narasimha Rao 1994d: 483-484).

President Clinton clarified his concern for India's security during press conference president Clinton said:

“So, any dialog we have with India on this would be in this context of what is pivotal for India's security: How can we enhance your security, not diminish it? It would be wrong for the United States to tell your great nation, or the smallest nation on the face of the earth, that we recommend a course of action for them that would reduce security. We should be in the business of increasing security. But I believe you can increase your security and avoid becoming Nuclear power. Japan did it. A lot of other countries have done it. We can do it together” (Clinton 1994).

President Clinton said at the end of the talks that in order to improve Indo US relations the way is to manage the difference through constructive dialogue in the context of common interest's Indian foreign secretary Salman Haider. The US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Turnoff talks on the NPT review. The American has been pressurising everyone to agree to an indefinite extension (The Times of India 1993d:1).

India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Secretary of State Nuclear negotiations

External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee is scheduled to meeting in Washington with the secretary of State Warren Christopher. He will also have a discussion with National Security advisor Anthony Lake and State Strobe Talbott(The Times of India 1995a:11). India has once again urged the United States to satisfy itself on the export controls and safeguards what are being exercised “considering the dual-purpose technology. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee told the course of an interview. We discussed the dual purpose of technology. We told then “the track record of the safeguarding of our export controls has been quite satisfactory. We want technology for peaceful purposes” (Ved 1995b:15).

Frank Wisner in 1994 in an interview to the Jairam Ramesh told on Indo US differences on nuclear non-proliferation “This issue operates at several levels. There is effective Indian engagement with the US internationally on a number of global regimes (Ramesh 1994: 47). Sagarika Ghose Interview with US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner Said as far as the NPT is concerned US government's commitment to it. When it comes up for renewal in 1995 treaty to be extended (Ghose 1994).

India's Disarmament Diplomacy and Strategic ambiguity

India needed to safeguard its nuclear weapons option at the global multilateral nuclear regimes and global nuclear disarmament initiatives. The United States remain the key state behind many of the initiatives. India's disarmament diplomacy has two main objectives India's unwavering commitment for the nuclear disarmament also ensuring India's national security. Since Indira Gandhi period India's nuclear policy characterised as an ambiguity (Chari 1999: 17). Dr Manpreet Sethi's observation is India has been sincerely committed for the Disarmament for world peace. Indian leaders in various world forums advocated disarmament cause. India's activism on disarmament reveals India's unique perspective on achieving India's national and international security. Indian leader 'advocacy on nuclear disarmament is a political necessity for securing peace. India of the view that nuclear disarmament is a moral

necessity and increasing the nuclear arsenals is against the very spirit of humanity (Sethi 1998:76).

India's foreign and security policies are ethically rooted and India's leaders followed the same ethical approach in dealing with Nuclear weapons first prime Minister Nehru wrote in 1954 "fear would grow and grip nations and peoples and each would try frantically to get these new weapons or some adequate protection from it" (Ghose 1997: 240) India's disarmament diplomacy and the strong moral strain since India's independence Mahatma Gandhi was shocked by the United States using of the nuclear weapons on Japan according to Amitabh Mattoo India's disarmament diplomacy the ethical approach includes "rejection of the military uses of nuclear energy; active support for the liberal pacifist critique of nuclear weapons; and emphasis on nuclear equity, fairness and justice" (Mattoo 1996:54)

Jasjit Singh argues that the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of few countries creates inequality in the international order. The only way to democratization of international order is possible is because of elimination of nuclear weapons, in order to ensure the stability of the world order (Jasjit Singh 1998:287). Jaswant Singh similar view that Indian believes is India's security ensured if every country abides by the nuclear disarmament commitment. If the nuclear disarmament is not feasible proposition India's approach must be ensuring the legitimate right for ensuring the security (Jaswant Singh 2006:112). Jasjit Singh argues ensuring India's national security is the primary concern in India's policy on disarmament. The nuclear disarmament is looking at an ethical and moral perspective is understandable the central concern the moral and ethical perspective will not ensure India's security. India's strategic interests need to be protected (Jasjit Singh 1998: 288). Prime Minister P.V Narsimha Rao said in the UN Security council on the pressing question of nuclear proliferation in the Post-Cold war era the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi put forward the action plan in 1988 at the United Nations. The Rajiv Gandhi advocated the complete elimination of threat or use of nuclear weapons. The 1988 action plan became the blue print for India's global Nuclear disarmament initiatives (Narasimha Rao 1992; Dixit 1996).

Jaswant Singh argues that India advocacy for the disarmament initiative should not erode India's nuclear option which was safeguarded subsequent Prime Ministers.

The erosion of the nuclear option will place India at risk. He further argues India's nuclear policy the dilemma is "its sovereign security needs and global disarmament instincts, between a moralistic approach and realistic One, and between a covert nuclear policy and an overt one" (Jaswant Singh 1998: 52).

Multilateral Nuclear Diplomacy

Strobe Talbott argues that the testing of nuclear weapons would not increase the security because Pakistan would inevitable in testing nuclear weapons. He advised India and Pakistan stop nuclear testing and joining the US initiated nuclear arms control treaties CTBT and the fissile material control treaty (Talbott 1999).

Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan have put forward views on India's arms control policy Nationalists and pragmatists foreign policy views: Pragmatists' views that on the Nonproliferation is a global threat and threat to India pragmatists willing to adhere to the global Universal nuclear disarmament but they critique the US initiatives were proliferation rather than nuclear disarmament measures on the other hand the Nationalists were suspicious of multilateral arms control initiatives were only aimed at capping India 's nuclear program me and Multilateral initiatives were halfhearted measures they were not aiming for the universal nuclear disarmament therefore India should not sign the NPT and the CTBT (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011: 151-156). Kanwal Sibal, an Indian diplomat posted as deputy chief of mission in the United States embassy writes in the Journal of Arms Control: in a multilateral nuclear negotiation India's basic negotiating position on the Nuclear disarmament first, "India as a threshold state not to cross the threshold and the nuclear weapons countries eliminate their Nuclear weapons" and it must be based on universality and non-discrimination (Sibal:1993). Brahma Chellaney argues that United States logic towards nuclear proliferation reveals the double standards. The United States politicization of horizontal proliferation and preventing the exclusion of vertical proliferation the permanent five (Chellaney 1991).

The United States initiated the multilateral global nuclear regimes primarily aiming at the capping of the nuclear weapons of the nuclear threshold states. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came for the review and extension at the United Nations in New York in April 1995. C Raja Mohan argues the challenge before the international

system is only five nuclear weapons powers are being legitimised through this global non-proliferation treaty (Raja Mohan 1994).

The then External affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, said in UN general Assembly when the NPT was proposed that there was a shared commitment was that those who have nuclear weapons will not amplify their nuclear arsenals and gradually move towards the Nuclear disarmament. Non-nuclear states would not possess nuclear weapons. This commitment was blatantly violated by nuclear power countries (Ghose 1997:51). Jasjit Singh argues global non-proliferation treaty is that first it needs to be examined the purpose of the treaty that is achieved ever since it initiated in the 1970s. The principles on which the treaty was founded and it has not achieved the goals on which it is founded and the non-Proliferation treaty the treaty affects the negatively on India's security (Jasjit Singh 1992).

Manpreet Sethi's argument is that the NPT treaty was founded on the principles, rights and obligations by the nuclear weapons that commitment did not honour by the five nuclear weapons powers and the treaty did not achieve the stated objective is nuclear disarmament. In fact, India is outside the treaty ever since India tested the peaceful nuclear explosion. India maintained nuclear restraint since 1974 not use for military purpose and it was a clear demonstration of India as nuclear responsible power (Sethi 1998: 90).

In India's view, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi critiqued the treaty: "India's refusal to sign the NPT was based on enlightened self-interest and the considerations of national security" (Ghose 1997: 242).

K. Subrahmanyam (1995) argues the US administration might think in unipolar world it could exert pressure on India by denying the equipment to the Indian power reactors and derail the Indian atomic energy and R& D India might find other ways to develop India's indigenous research and equipment supply to the Indian atomic energy programmes (Subrahmanyam1995). The United States indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty. NPT legitimised the nuclear weapons the permanent five countries (Jaswant Singh 1998). The United States understands that India will not sign the Non Proliferation treaty but United States expects that India 's cooperation is

required NPT extension (Jasjit Singh 1992). K. Subramanyam argued that the international community could not debate repercussion on the indefinite extension and the legitimisation of nuclear weapons (Subramanyam 1998). Chintamani Mahapatra argues that the NPT indefinite extension has two implications the one is the legitimisation of five nuclear weapons power and another extreme example is that any country other than five acquiring and possessing of nuclear weapons considered illegal (Mahapatra 1995).

Negotiating the CTBT

The United States initiated comprehensive test ban treaty under the watch of President Bill Clinton almost 183 countries have signed the treaty (Sood 2016). The conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral body for disarmament and arms control. The CTBT comprehensive test ban treaty was opened for the signature. The positive effect of the treaty also creates the norm of conducting the nuclear tests India's commitment for the creating non-violent world order, India was not willing to accept any treaty that is short of universal nuclear disarmament (Pant 2002). Jaswant Singh argues with the suggestion of China that there was a coercive clause was introduced to the CTBT that India to sign the treaty. Vienna convention of the treaties explicitly says that if a country unwilling to enter a treaty. it should not be done against its consent (Jaswant Singh 1998: 46). Jasjit Singh (1996) argues that CTBT will not prohibit the countries already the nuclear weapon countries developing and modernising the nuclear forces.

Chintamani Mahapatra (1996) argues India fundamentally committed for nuclear disarmament but given India's nuclear neighbourhood it was forced to forego disarmament. Since the 1974 nuclear explosion India maintained the self-restraint. India strategy of the soft approach of sharpening negotiating strategy is not working. India should not sign the CTBT and India should conduct nuclear tests and declare a voluntary moratorium on testing so the world at large come to India's approach universal global nuclear disarmament.

Subrahmanyam (1996) expressed the similar argument India to keep the nuclear option open and to maintain the deterrence posture is India should conduct series of nuclear tests or India to keep the nuclear option to open not to sign the treaty and remain outside the treaty.

The foreign secretary, Salman Haidar to Geneva on a conference on Disarmament India's major negotiating strategy is that India will ask the time bound framework for abolishing nuclear weapons, and the Second position the CTBT must be aimed at disarmament and not nuclear proliferation (Raja Mohan 1996). Rakesh Sood argues that India would not subscribe to proposed form treaty CTBT because the treaty is not aiming to achieve the disarmament (Sood 2016).

Arundhati Ghose put forward India's point of view that India committed for the goal of the nuclear free world. For India to commit to the treaty first the CTBT stated goal must be disarmament and the time frame for the elimination of nuclear weapons (Ghose 1997: 252).

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao thinking on the keeping nuclear option open. He explained to the international community "combustible nature of the region in which India located as well as over India's strategic concern over Pakistan and China. In such a predicament, India forswears all strategic options, including the nuclear option was unthinkable" (Prabhakaran Menon 2013: 305).

On 20 June 1996, India's Permanent representative to the conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, stated explicitly that "India would not subscribe to the treaty in its present form" (Mattoo 1996). Arundhati Ghose says in her oral history interview at the conference on disarmament in Geneva "I pressed the red button the explanation of vote we will not sign this now, not later" (Ghose 2013: 222).

Amitabh Mattoo, justifies India's disarmament diplomacy at Geneva not signing the CTBT. The CTBT and The FMCT these are the treaties primarily aiming to disarm India. "The United States has no intention of giving up its reliance on Nuclear as the most potent instruments of national security policy. Nor is it shut the door on modernising its nuclear forces because of the CTBT" (Mattoo 1996:10).

The Minister of external Affairs Gujral wrote to the secretary of state that India and the US differences on the CTBT would not affect the ties because India US relations Christopher communicated through the US ambassador Frank Wisner in a demarche that the CTBT is multilateral treaty the differences on the treaty will Not affect Indo US bilateral relations (Nair 1996).

Negotiating FMCT

FMCT is basically aiming to ban the global production of fissile material (The Times of India 1995 28 February 1995). The US assistant secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphel said that India and the United States sign the bilateral treaty in banning the production of fissile material which is used for the production of nuclear weapons. Raphel advocacy is primarily a bilateral treaty before the international treaty on fissile material production treaty would be open for signatory. The Indian analysts critiqued it by saying this proposed treaty is equal to signing the NPT. It will close India's nuclear option (Dixit 1995 :14).

US arms control and disarmament agency Director John Hilum before congressional committee said, "The Treaty is the best hope of putting a cap on the potential nuclear programme of the so called nuclear threshold states India, Pakistan and Israel that are outside the nuclear non Proliferation Treaty" (The Times of India 1995d).

Indian's pragmatist's views that India need to acquire the sufficient fissile material before signing the Fissile Material cut off treaty (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2011:151). Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao said in an interview to the far eastern economic review that the India and the United States common concern of eliminating the nuclear weapons the fissile material cut off treaty that talks were initiated at the official level in order to reach consensus (The Times of India 1995p).

Negotiating the Missile Technology Control Regime

A.P.J Abdul Kalam was the scientific advisor to the Ministry of defence critiques the missile technology control regime the main motive behind the create technology gap and in turn creates a dependency on the western countries that would have a chain reaction on regarding India's economic freedom, national security and the foreign policy independence (Abdul Kalam 1997: 24). Kanwal Sibal argues that India is against any technology denial regimes because technology denial cartels are new forms groups such as NSG, the nuclear supplier groups and he advocates the United States and its allies that instead of technology denial cartels there must be cooperation in peaceful application scientific technology (Sibal 1993). The United States had

threatened trade sanctions against Russia and India if the Russians sell missile technology to India. Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao had responded India would develop its own technology (Hazarika 1992).

India's Ambassador Abid Hussain responded New York Times editorial stating the United States imposition of sanctions against India's space Programme. India's space programme primarily aimed at the civilian application of technology it was not aimed at the Military application and Russian technology was used for the civilian application (Hussain 1992).

Chintamani Mahapatra argues the United States in its effort to prevent India acquiring the nuclear capability series of non-proliferation measures initiated to forego the Nuclear option and the United states focus has shifted preventing India acquiring the Indigenous research and missile capability the United States also imposed sanctions on Russia and denying the cryogenic engine rocket deal to India (Mahapatra 1996).

India's scientific Defence advisor AP J Abdul Kalam in wings of fire writes the conflict between nations reached new level the struggle for technological supremacy and the technological capacity is an important aspect for securing the political power in the international system all major powers strategy to deny the technology to the developing countries for their development in civilian and for defence technology. The technological advantage was the major reason for achieving global supremacy. Brahma Chellaney argues India urge for technological independence; the major powers are denying the advanced technologies for India in the name of security considerations (Chellaney 1994).

K. Subramanyam argues China has supplied M-11 missiles to Pakistan and the United States blind eye to the China and Pakistan Missile cooperation which has serious implication for the Indian security (Subramanyam 1998). Brahma Chellaney argues the regional security concerns propelling India to achieve missile based nuclear deterrence, The United States initiated the technology export controls at bilateral level disrupted India missile, space developments. The United States and its allies initiated the technology cartel Missile technology control regime at the global level (Chellaney 1994).

The Bush administration-imposed sanctions on Indian space research organisation Richard Boucher state department official said in order to curb the missile development. US administration brought changes in the export control laws and asking the American companies not to export the dual use material for the missile development and the United States brought out changes in the technology transfer laws (MEA 1992-93).

The US-led MTCR and the export control severely hampered research and development. As a result, Indian scientists delayed Indian civilian space research programs and also another technology needed Indian missile development. With the export controls sanction Scientists cannot purchase the dual use technologies abroad they had to develop indigenous technologies (Chellaney 1994).

K. Subrahmanyam (1995) criticise the United States double standards on Missile proliferation and said that it remains silent on the issue of Pakistan and Chinese proliferation of missiles. For example, the Chinese supply of the M-11 missile to Pakistan and the United States transfer of F 16 to Pakistan and imposing sanctions India's missile development. India missile development is only for the self-defence Prithvi missile development is the only means to protect the Chinese and Pakistan missiles (Subrahmanyam 1995).

C. Raja Mohan argues that international concern on India's missile development is lack of understanding of India's security concerns. The missile proliferation in the Central Asian and West Asia and South Asia were present India faces missile threats from all these regions India to counter missile threats, "first develop and deploy missile force to deter the threat and second eliminate all the missile and the third build missiles against missiles" (Raja Mohan 1993).

Jasjit Singh argues MTCR guidelines will not apply to India because India is not a member to MTCR and the United States domestic laws on export control laws will not apply to India. India has the right to develop ballistic missiles for national security considerations and it can use in self-defence according to the UN charter provision says states have the right to protect in self-defence (Jasjit Singh 1996).

The US continues to put pressure on India's missile development. India has developed medium range missile Prithvi missile testing will lead to tensions in the South Asia

External affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said “India’s defence preparedness was for the protection of its national interests and territorial integrity and India cannot compromise its security requirements” (Vaidya 1994a: 7).

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao impending visit to the United States he delayed the Prithvi tests developed by Defence research and development organisation in order to create a cordial atmosphere for the summit level talks Prime Minister after the return from the United States order to deploy the Prithvi in to Indian army (Sitapati 2016: 286). The US Ambassador Frank Wisner warned India on the deployment of Prithvi Missile in the Indian army but Frank Wisner did not criticise the China’s missile development and this bias towards India’s missile development severely criticized the US strategy is to curtail India’s missile technology (Raja Mohan 1994e).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao in Joint session of the US congress articulated India’s security concerns affected by the US technology control regimes. “Export controls on technology, while once a useful means for controlling weapons technology, now hinder developing countries in their efforts improve the lives of the People. Much of what is termed as dual use technology in fact has vital applications in modern civilian society. Many special materials and complicated computer processors found in missile control systems are also found in hospital intensive care units and global telecommunication systems” (Narasimha Rao 1994d).

Jaswant Singh says the challenge before India’s disarmament diplomacy and the nuclear weapons are concerned the problem the statesmen face how to address the international concerns achieving world peace and the global stability and at the same time ensuring India’s national security (Jaswant Singh 1998).

Senator Larry Pressler writes the fundamental conflict between India and the United States the nuclear conflict. The United States did not understand India’s concern is India’s main motive was to acquire the nuclear weapons against the nuclear armed adversary China. India was also concerned about the Pakistan nuclear programme. India wanted to be recognised as a mature nuclear power and Senator Larry Pressler believed India’s policy initiatives regarding defending against China and Pakistan (Pressler 2017).

Exercising India's Nuclear Option

Foreign secretary J.N Dixit writes in his memoir due to pressures from global and regional nuclear arms control measures India's nuclear ambiguity policy no longer viable. India cannot say forever that it is potential nuclear power, the potentiality needs to be realised India's nuclear ambiguity no longer seemed to work. India going for nuclear weapon testing certainly has backlash from the international community India might face the economic and diplomatic pressures. In spite of these pressure tactics and the associated fears concerns. If India as a nation show unity and nuclear policy backed by political consensus. India will not be taken for granted by the nuclear Powers. India will be treated along with other nuclear powers as an equal (Dixit 1996:374). Vinay Sitapati, biographer of P. V Narasimha Rao, writes that during Prime Minister Rao period, "India's policy of strategic ambivalence on its nuclear capability was under threat" (Sitapati 2016: 283). Strobe Talbott argues India's decision to go nuclear is a fundamental disagreement on rules governing global nuclear order (Talbott 2004: 4).

India's ambassador to the United States Abid Hussain, in his lecture on the United Service institute on affordable defence posture says it is in the absence of the Soviet Union military support and the cost of weapons acquisition given India's economic crisis in his view acquiring the nuclear capability forever guarantees India's national security.

Sumit Ganguly argues that several factors caused Prime Minister Rao decision to go nuclear in December 1995: The United States' removal of the nuclear sanction on Pakistan the Brown amendment and the same time US renewed effort supplying the nuclear capable aircraft F16 to Pakistan and the NPT review extension was the reason India's strategic nuclear option was under threat (Ganguly 1999: 168).

Shakti Sinha narrates the events while he was Private Secretary to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's opinion that it was important for the country to be respected by the world community for its ability to defend itself. So, India wanted to tests nuclear weapons P.V Narasimha Rao, who had asked Vajpayee to bring in APJ Abdul Kalam to organise the tests. Rao wanted to do the tests in 1995 but could not (Sinha 2018).

Prime Minister Rao's decision to undertake nuclear test was delayed because of American satellites discovered the nuclear test sites also Americans developed human intelligence that nuclear programme was come to known by the US administration (Subramanyam 1998). American Ambassador Frank Wisner said that Satellite photographs taken to the Prime Minister's office. He had a meeting with Prime Minister's principal secretary Amarnath Verma (Sitapati 2016: 290) The former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said the true father of Shakti nuclear tests of 1998 (Subrahmanyam 2004: 593).

Jaswant Singh says the reason for the nuclear tests was "The basis of Indian nuclear policy was therefore, that a world free of nuclear weapons would enhance not only India's security, but the security of all nations. In the absence of universal disarmament, India could scarcely accept a regime that arbitrarily divided nuclear haves from the Nuclear have nots" (Jaswant Singh 2006: 112-113).

Conclusion:

India and the United States in achieving the security cooperation between both governments initiated for confidence building in the security realm such as naval diplomacy Malabar naval exercise and Strategic dialogue. United States defence Secretary William Perry in 1995 agreed on the minutes of the defence pact which was signed; it became the basis of India and the United States Defence cooperation.

India and the United States relations continued to be tense in the nuclear non-proliferation and missile proliferation with the renewed efforts of the Clinton administration to cap India's nuclear programme to bring India and Pakistan in the non-proliferation treaty regime fold. India's political leadership willing to engage dialogue at multiple levels bilateral and multilateral nuclear negotiations on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty and comprehensive test ban treaty P.V Narasimha Rao Government convinced the United States India willing to negotiate for the nuclear disarmament universal and non-discriminatory, time bound elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. India was able to withstand negotiations at multiple levels in keeping the nuclear option open in convincing the US government India's nuclear threats emanating from Pakistan and China and India's sovereign right to keep the nuclear option.

CHAPTER V

INDIA'S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES, 1991-1996

“Obstacles that come in the way of allocating foreign investment on a sizable scale will be removed. A time bound programme will be worked out to streamline our industrial policies and programme to achieve the goal of a vibrant economy that rewards creativity, enterprise and innovativeness” (Narasimha Rao 1991b: 4).

This Chapter looks at how India crafted economic diplomacy with the United States in the context of India's economic reforms. The central question which is put forward in this chapter is how effective India's diplomatic instruments, process, and institutions are in conducting economic diplomacy with the US. This chapter also addresses President Clinton's commercial diplomacy and various business delegations that played a key role in consolidating economic relations with the United States.

At the political level, the relations with the United States still had hurdles to overcome and Prime Minister Rao understood the recently transformed global circumstances after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. At the domestic level, the economic crisis was still to be overcome. In this context, Prime Minister Rao understood the need to open up to the US. Ambassador Meera Shankar was employed in the PMO before she was posted as a commercial officer at the Indian embassy in Washington D.C. She notes that in a private dinner hosted by the Prime Minister at his residence, his advice to diplomat was to 'be pragmatic' in building relations with the USA (Shankar 2018).

India's Ambassador to the United States Abid Hussain, who was an old hand on economic matters and had served as a bureaucrat in finance departments (Chakravarti 1990: 1). He opined that India and the United States converged their interests after India's economic reforms and India's economy was integrated with the world economy. President Clinton's domestic level priority was economic renewal. In this context, India and the United States had bright prospects for improving economic relations (Hussain 1994).

India needed an IMF loan in order to overcome the balance of payments crisis. Ambassador Naresh Chandra suggested the government of India to have cordial relations with the US. US hold the largest share in the IMF and there should be US approval for any decisions made by IMF. The United States cooperated with India. The IMF fund was made available to India in order to overcome the balance of payment crisis (Baru 2016: 22-24).

Shaping Domestic Environment, Investment and Industry Friendly

In the post-Cold War era, international relations were shaped by the considerations of economic factors. International relations primarily became economic relations (Mahapatra 1998). India was able to build its international economic relations with the introduction of economic reforms under P.V. Narsimha Rao and Manmohan Singh at the time of economic globalisation (Menon 2016: 4). Commerce Minister Chidambaram and Commerce Secretary Montek Singh Ahluwalia reformed the trade policies. Prime Minister Rao, who kept industry portfolio policy, reformed these important reforms in trade and industry, which made India's economy an outward looking one and which facilitated trade and investment (Das 2000: 238-241). Ahluwalia opined the need for a fundamental shift in the way how India's economy was managed. The first and foremost was to open up the economy, and the second, it had to free the private sector, in other words, the creation of free entrepreneurial spirit (Ahluwalia 2017).

Sanjaya Baru writes Prime Minister Rao's vision was to integrate economic development at a global platform. Prime Minister Rao's first addressed stated "The Government is committed to removing the cobwebs that come in the way of rapid industrialization. We will work towards making India internationally competitive, taking full advantage of modern science and technology and opportunities offered by the evolving global economy" (Baru 2016).

Manmohan Singh's economic reforms changed the nature of India's foreign policy, its activity by giving new orientation for Indian diplomacy. Indian diplomats no longer played the traditional role and they were there to explore the commercial opportunities for the Indian business and Industry, to negotiate the transfer of

technology, find markets for Indian products and attracting foreign investment to India (Singh 2006: 189-189).

According to Jairam Ramesh, the old industrial policy of India was inefficient. Prime Minister Rao who kept the industrial portfolio, abolished industrial licensing except for sensitive and security related industries. Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao and finance Minister Manmohan Singh cleared the hurdles for foreign investment (Ramesh 2015).

The United States is the centre of the global economy and commerce (Kennedy 1989: 535). India followed the inward-looking economy. This did not profit the country from global trade. India's economic engagement with the United States was necessary in order to overcome developmental challenges and profit from the global markets (Jaswant Singh 2006: 274). Economic diplomacy is becoming a primary vehicle to build relations. According to I.P Khosla the economic diplomacy is "using the economic instruments to achieve the economic aims and achieve the non-economic aims" (Khosla 2006: 12-13). The then-Indian Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee said that liberalised trade policies and economic reforms created opportunities for investment in India. It was a critical factor in attracting United States businessmen and industrialists to India (Mukherjee 1995: 24).

According to Jairam Ramesh, the reason for India to engage with the United States is to follow the US's policy of open markets and free trade. For India to strengthen the relationship and acquire influence and clout in the US system, investment and trade are important tools to engage with the US. And all the major powers have economic linkages with the United States (Ramesh 1999: 3533). For India to achieve economic development it needs technology, investment. The United States is an important source of foreign direct investment. The United States is the central position for all the financial and trade institutions of the world. The US businessmen have a keen interest in investing in India (Thakur 1996: 577-579).

Economic Engagement and Strategic Autonomy

India has distinct economic negotiating principles are on sovereignty, equality and state centeredness and based on history and tradition strong roots in trade policies (Schaffer and Schaffer 2016). Prime Minister Rao dispelled the fears of India's

autonomy and surrendering of policy. He stated “India will not bow down to anyone for money or technology but if they come as friends India will respond to friendship” (Narasimha Rao 1992: 82). K. Subrahmanyam observes the fears not to have leverage with the United States. In his assessment, the nature of international economic relations has changed the western industrialised countries that are competing for investment and the market for the competition would benefit India. If the United States does not invest in India, other countries do invest. India would have significant leverage with the United States because of India’s market size and potential of the economy (Subrahmanyam 2005: 240). There were apprehensions regarding the protection of the Indian industry. Prime Minister Rao dispelled fears the Indian industry will be protected and able to compete with the MNCs Multinational companies. The world is moving toward an integrated global economy and Multinational companies would bring technology to India (Narasimha Rao 1991: 163).

The fears of Indian and business communities regarding the United States' position are able to exert pressure on India. The United States would exercise pressure and fears regarding the MNCs. Finance Minister Manmohan Singh said in an interview that that there was no doubt about the international politics, and it is natural that the strong dictates the weak. India’s size and its market potential and the fierce public opinion are able to influence the United States’ economic policies. India will follow the multilateral rule-based trading order (Singh 1997).

Prime Minister Rao addressed the concerns regarding foreign investment. India welcomes investment only if it suits the conditional ties (Narasimha Rao 1991: 83). Minister of State Commerce Minister P. Chidambaram advised Indian traders and the business community need to shed the psychology of the fear to compete in the world market. In the global competition for trade and investment, India needs not to lag behind world markets (The Times of India 1991: 15).

Vinay Sitapati, the biographer of Prime Minister P.V Narsimha Rao writes that there was resistance from the established business groups called Bombay Club as their business has grown and expanded due to the absence of the external competition. They were resistant to the reforms and the finance Minister international competition hurts some industries which are inefficient and the efficient companies that are able to

meet the needs of the market will benefit from the opening up the economy (Sitapati 2016: 110). Sanjaya Baru the well-known economist and policy analyst advises that the Indian industry need not fear the competition. The Indian industry prepares for competition from international companies. The Indian industry needs to aim for catering to the global markets not just the local markets. Indian companies would gain from the economy of scale hence opening up the economy the Indian industry must think it is an opportunity rather than an obstacle for growth (Baru 2016).

According to the Prime Minister's media advisor P.V.R. K. Prasad, in order to create a conducive environment for the flow of investments, Prime Minister Rao neutralised the anti-American diplomatic stance at domestic level (Prasad 2012:133). Prime Minister Rao in an interview with American reporter sent a signal to the US government and business community by saying that the United States needs to change the perception about the Indian economy "Sky is the limit" in terms of potential for American investment. US Embassy officials expressed a positive response (Weintraub 1991). Indian Commerce Minister P. Chidambaram told "Indian government has eased restrictions on foreign investment as a part of a broader strategy of reducing the governments' role in the economy". The Commerce Minister approved the joint ventures between I.B.M and Tata industries. Dennis Kux's analysis shows that the I.B.M Company that left India due to the 1970s foreign ownership, which was not more than 40percent, was not be allowed due to lack of a business-friendly environment (Kux 1993). The new trade policy and the foreign investment policy were more than 50 percent equity which allowed on the ease of doing business atmosphere facilitated in India (Bradsher 1991b).

Ensuring the Credibility of Economic Reforms Reaching out to US Investors

Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in order to restore confidence in the economy and the international investors, his first budget speech stated, "I suggest to this august house that the emergence of India as a major economic power in the world happens to one such idea. Let the whole world loud and clear India is now wide and awake. We shall prevail and we shall overcome" (Baru 2016).

Prime Minister Rao took several measures in order to ensure the credibility of the economic reforms and restore the confidence of the Indian industrialists. Prime

Minister in his address to the nation said “trade builds pride; India has been trading for several years. There is no need for fear of international trade” (Narasimha Rao 1991).

Meera Shankar was heading the commercial wing in Indian Embassy Washington D.C immediately after the economic reforms July 1991 as she was posted as a commercial officer of the Indian embassy in Washington D.C. Initially there was scepticism from the U.S side whether the reforms were real or just for show the credibility of India’s reforms programs. So, it was her effort to remove those doubts. India has opened many foreign direct investments. Many proposals were pending, Meera Shankar hinted the Government of India to take decisions on FDI proposals that need to be cleared, and it provided the impetus in a sense of hard evidence that these reforms were real (Shankar 2018).

Minister of State for Commerce, P. Chidambaram in order to reach out to the US corporate and business, he organised in co-sponsorship with the Bank of America at the premises of Los Angeles Times on April 8, 1992 and Chidambaram as the representative of India. In order to woo the business companies P. Chidambaram, assured the economic reforms undertaken by the government of India. Prime Minister Rao government was a pro investment and industry friendly which and he focussed more on business opportunities in India (MEA Foreign Affairs Record 1992).

As soon as India went for economic reforms, the immediate task was to ensure the credibility of economic reforms. P. Chidambaram visited the United States to attract the US investors to India, the commercial officer of India Meera Shankar who was heading the commercial wing of the ministry along with Commerce Minister P. Chidambaram conducted trade fair in the Chicago to attract the US investors and industrialists the opportunities that Indian economy offers for the investment and ease of doing business in India. Reaching out to the US investors by the Commercial officer Meera Shankar and the commerce Minister did ensure the credibility of economic reforms (Shankar 2018).

Minister of State for Science and Technology P.R. Kumaramangalam visited San Francisco from April 17 to 21, 1993. During his visit, Kumaramangalam established personal contacts with CEOs of Silicon Valley, electronic companies like Apple

Computer, Minister Kumaramangalam also made an effort to reach out Silicon Valley Indian professionals association (SIPA) and the newly formed Indus Entrepreneurs Club. The Minister had explained the Indian governments to welcome foreign investment in the electronics sector. The government of India offered various incentive packages establishment of electronic hardware, technology parks, etc (MEA Foreign Affairs Record 1993).

Track II Diplomacy

For India's developmental needs and to meet the pressures of the global economy, India needed technology, Markets and capital (Baru 2016:149). Vinay Sitapati writes to Prime Minister Rao to choose Manmohan Singh as finance minister since the west could trust him. Because of his academic credibility he received his economic doctoral degree from Cambridge University and he has vast experience in dealing with government and international financial institutions (Sitapati 2016:112-115). Jairam Ramesh's observation on Manmohan Singh's persona and dignified conduct, Sobriety added the values of Singh's academic records and administrative experience (Ramesh 2015:25). Prime Minister Rao has chosen global investment platforms. Davos in order to reach out to the Global CEOs in 1992 visit, Prime Minister Rao asserted to investors that India is the best destination for investment (Baru 2016: 110-111). Prime Minister Rao in his effort to create an international environment was conducive for the Indian business. CII chief Tarun Das and other business delegations travelled with Prime Minister in order to charm the investors and thus, he played the role of a travelling salesman (Sitapati 2016:151-152).

Foreign secretary J.N Dixit jotted down in his memoir about the South block years of economic liberalisation reform programme which created new norms to have a close working relationship with the government and the industry (Dixit 1996: 392). Indian diplomat Kishan S. Rana's observation on the Prime Minister Rao's creation of new relationship with the industry's apex bodies such as FICCI and CII to make sure the apex business delegation to accompany him in his foreign trips so that he could make business deals and joint ventures, and this relationship between the government and the industry's apex bodies has been continued by the successive governments (Rana 2011). Prime Minister Rao's strategy is to have a close cooperation with industry apex bodies and the CII is the main link of the corporate India (Sitapati 2016) Secretary

General of the CII, Tarun Das, who was chiefly instrumental in getting the Indian private sector and government involved in India's economic diplomacy (Dixit 1996: 392).

Prime Minister Rao strategy Apex bodies of Indian industries such as ASSOCHAM, CII, FICCI have business delegation which would interact with the American industry and the business leaders to give a signal to American industrialists that Indian Industrial leaders were supporting the economic reforms (The Times of India 1994b: 15).

Foreign secretary J.N Dixit in his memoir states that Prime Minister Rao made an effort to create institutional architecture such as the establishment of economic policy division in the Ministry of external affairs, and the foreign investment promotion board was created and advised the diplomats to focus on India's economic relations. India's diplomatic missions and embassies abroad had to explain, rationalise India's economic policies in order to build an economic partnership with the countries (Dixit 1994: 390-395).

For strengthening India-US economic relations at the track II level, multinational companies in the United States established Indian Interest Group. The establishment was possible because of 26 US firms such as AT& T, Coca Cola, Enron, IBM, Ford, General Electric, International equity partners, Morgan Stanley, etc, which acts as an interest group in the US congress to strengthen US India Business relations and to protect commercial interest (Kim 2006). Many of the companies represented in the Indian interest group belong to fortune 500 companies (Statesman 1994).

The Vice-president and senior council of the general electric company Michael Gadbow, one of the Chief proponents of IIG Gadbow, said that the primary function of these groups was to create communication channels with the government and business leaders in order to protect its commercial interest in India (The Times of India 1994a: 19).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao's Economic Summit Initiative

Prime Minister's media advisor P.V R. K Prasad gave his view that for India's economic reforms in order to succeed needs the forge of business and commercial

relations with the United States and the US important source of foreign direct investment which will cater to India's developmental needs (Prasad 2012 :132).

Prime Minister Rao recognised the significance of having business ties with the United States. The Prime Minister decided to visit the USA along with India's business leaders (Mathur 2003:171). Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao has accepted President Clinton's invitation to visit the United States for the summit level talks. He used the opportunity to build an economic relationship with the United States to meet the US business community, investors and industrialists and the Indian American Community. Opinion of the business community on the Prime Minister Rao's visit to the USA, the senior director of Confederation of Indian Industry, S. Sen expressed "will herald a new era of industrial and trade cooperation between the US and India and help forge synergistic partnerships and linkages in Indo US relations", and the ASSOCHAM Spokesman S.D Mehta viewed that Prime Minister Rao would get the opportunity to convince the business community of United States to invest in India (The Times of India 1994b).

Journalist Dilip Bobb observed strategy of Prime Minister Rao reaching out to US business in the United States strong business lobby commonly known as "If big business talks, the White House listens" (Bobb 1994: 43).

Prime Minister Rao's first strategy is reaching out to corporate America to strengthen commercial relations. The business delegation accompanied by the Prime Minister Rao included S.K Bhargava, one of the Confederation of Indian Industry, Jamsed Godrej, Rahul Bajaj, Dr J.J Irani, M.V Subbiah, Tarun Das, Dr N.M. Dhulhoya, Arun Bharat Ram, M.R Chabbria, K.L Chugh, Raunak Singh, Mr V Raghavan (The Times of India 1994l: 17).

The US business community was interested in forging the commercial dimension of the relationship, while US investors were willing to see India in a new light, which showed a positive signal despite political differences at the government level relations (Joshi 1994: 13).

The inclusion of the finance Minister Manmohan Singh in the business delegation indicated Prime Minister's thrust to forge economic relationship (The Times of India 1994p: 15). Journalist Dillip Bobb analyses that the Finance Minister has given a new

dimension to Indian diplomacy to acquire the economic power, which was the new currency of power in the international politics (Bobb 1994a: 44). The advisor to Indo-US business council Mr I.S. Chaddha said the visit would also “provide a rare opportunity for Indian businessmen to interact with US industrialists and government functionaries” (The Times of India 1994p: 15).

Prime Minister Rao's visit to the United States in 1994 was to take action on 301. If they take action on 301 the possibility of mature dialogue would be disrupted and the media would vitiate the atmosphere. Meera Shankar and her embassy colleagues met Senator Patrick Mohinyan, the Chairman and Senate Finance commission spoke to White House proposal to put India under 301 was dropped. Senator Mohinyan was invited part as the US delegation by Meera Shankar and Prime Minister Rao Narasimha Rao gave the green signal to Meera to “carry on” the summit. Meera Shankar and her colleague's timely approach of Daniel Patrick Mohinyan created a favourable atmosphere for the summit (Shankar 2018).

Media advisor P.V R. K Prasad says Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao's economic summit and its success story entirely depends on the cooperation of the fortune 500 companies (Prasad 2012: 132-133). US undersecretary of commerce Jeffrey E Garten's suggestion to the Indian government and private sector was that India's economic reforms and the making the Indian companies as the global strategy must have “strategic alliance with American firms hold key to India's economic integration in to the global economy” (Garten 1994).

Forbes magazine on the coincidence on the eve of Prime Minister Rao's visit to the United States covered India's business opportunities. The Forbes praised India as the best investment destination than china to the American investors (Mathur 2003: 172).

The New York Times and Washington reported Finance Minister Manmohan Singh visit or the Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao visit the indication is that Manmohan Singh presence is overshadowing Prime Minister Rao's visit (Vaidya 1994f). Prime Minister Rao to ensure the credibility of economic reforms, he took Finance Minister as the key architect of the economic reforms, leading Indian industrialists to interact with US business community to create confidence in the economic reforms, and draw the investment from the industry community (Jha 1994: 1043).

On the occasion of the Prime Minister's visit to the United States, John. F Burns writes in the New York Times about the Manmohan Singh's qualities, his expertise in the economic subject and his reforms process that enabled India to move from the Stagnation (Burns 1994). Journalist Dilip Bobb's observation on finance Minister Manmohan Singh being part of the delegation was a shrewd move by the Prime Minister Rao. US business community expressed "We respect Rao but we love Dr Manmohan Singh in US boardrooms". Prime Minister Rao himself said that the economic reforms' designer was Manmohan Singh and whenever he gets into political trouble, I bail him out and whenever I get in to economic trouble he bails me out" (Bobb 1994a: 44-47).

Prime Minister Rao spoke to the business community that his government's economic reforms will not be reversed and "If assurance is needed from the Prime Minister of India you will have it" (The Times of India 1994m). He has given this statement to National Manufacturing Association and he further said, "Take advantage of economic reforms and invest in India". The NAM and CII signed an agreement in trade, technology and economic cooperation (The Times of India 1994m) Prime Minister Rao met several CEOs of the Multi-National Companies in Houston and talking about business and economics. The United States emerged as the biggest investor and the trade partner since the economic reforms (The Times of India 1994n).

Prime Minister Rao's schedule of the meeting included visiting Washington and meeting president Clinton, visiting Houston industrial city and meeting commerce secretary Ron Brown and to have an interaction with financial newspaper wall street journal (Vaidya 1994b: 15).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao's visit started with meeting leaders of American industry leaders. "I have come here to invite you, in person, to invest in India and be honoured partners in India's development.... By investing in our economy, benefits would accrue to us as well as to the American industry" (Narasimha Rao 1994: 467-468). Prime Minister Rao confidently assured American industrial leaders at Houston that the economic reforms opened by India were apparently not viable anywhere in the world. Rao ensured the investors to take the advantage and opportunity available in India (Mathur 2003: 172).

Prime Minister Rao's addressed to the US congress, conveyed the message to the US legislators and senators as:

“[t]he momentum of these reforms will carry India in to the next century as the single largest free market in the world...The impact of the changes in India has had a profound effect on Indo US economic relations and has benefited both countries. American firms have been the forefront of forging a new economic relationship” (Narasimha Rao 1994d: 483).

Prime Minister Rao addressed to Harvard University trying to reach out to economists and Intellectual community in order to dispel India globalisation of economic programme

“In the meantime, India has to find employment for its teeming millions through industrialisation and needs huge investments in infrastructure, agriculture and irrigation, apart from roads, railways and ports. I have to come to extend my hand of partnership in this adventure” (Narasimha Rao 1994e:477).

President Clinton and Rao Economic Summit

President Clinton press conference at White House said “I told the prime Minister that we heartily support his ambitious program of economic reforms that brings India's economy to the global market place. This important reform plan will be the engine of growth in our relationship (Clinton 1994: 1).

Prime Minister Rao conveyed to President Clinton, “as the growth and size of the Indian economy expand with the stimulus of international linkages and competition, we expect India to be in a position to make increasingly important contributions to the shaping of the world in both its political and economic dimensions” (Narasimha Rao 1994a: 2). Prime Minister Rao further said “We look forward to working with the U.S. administration on the many areas in which our interests converge” (Narasimha Rao 1994a: 2).

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao reached out to corporate American, the advisor to Indo-US business council I.S Chaddha and both of them had an interaction with the national association of manufacture on 17 May 1994. On 18 May, a meeting has been arranged with the Indian interest group. The Indian interest group was set up with a group of a corporation in India, who supported India's liberalisation process and has

helped to raise the visibility of bilateral relations with policy and decision makers in Washington (The Times of India 1994p: 15).

Prime Minister Rao told the captains of the American industry at Dow Jones Group that there would be no going back path from the liberalisation. He assured the investors' Indian economic reforms have political consensus (Chandran 1995: 10).

Prime Minister expressed with confidence that India and the United States would converge on economic and commercial relations, paving the way for the strategic foundation for the relationship, and the economic ties between the two countries as the strategic foundation for new relationship (Mathur 2003:172) Prime Minister Rao primary objective of reaching out to US industrialists is getting technology from US (Sharma 1994).

Prime Minter Rao's interaction with National Association Manufacturing Association, he told to investors to take the full advantage of economic liberalisation in India. Mr Rao who was joined by Dr Manmohan Singh and the Montek Singh Ahluwalia stated that the reforms have been advanced on a day to day basis (The Times of India, 1994n: 17).

Prime Minister Rao approached the non-resident community, especially the prosperous NRIS in the US, and urged them to step up their share of investment for a bigger leap to promote industrialization in India (The Times of India 1994o: 1). Rao addressed at a reception hosted by the Indian NRIs that India means business you can play your legitimate role and take your decisions. He told the NRIs to devote to economic progress. Prime Minister said that there were leaders of the Indian community comprised of more than one hundred organisations (The Times of India; 1994o: 1). Prime Minister's interview with the Wall Street Journal revealed that the Indian American community will facilitate a benefit to India (Narasimha Rao 1994: 502).

Assessment of the Visit

Finance Minister Manmohan Singh described Narasimha Rao with President Clinton's economic summit was successful. President Clinton explicitly supported the economic reforms (Sharma 1994: 1). Journalist Dilip Bob describes Prime Minister Rao's

statesman like qualities enabled the trust worthiness of the US business community (Bobb 1994:45).

S.K Bhargava said that the interaction of the US business delegation at various levels had not only improved mutual awareness' about the opportunities and able to establish channels of communication (The Times of India 1994: 17). Chintamani Mahapatra's observation is that Rao's economic diplomacy influenced US business leaders and industrialists in investing in India (Mahapatra 1998: 20). Anand Mathur opined that since the economic reforms initiated by the government of India made better ambience in the overall bilateral relationship (Mathur 2003: 172).

President Clinton Commercial Diplomacy

President Bill Clinton as the first post-Cold War president prioritised for the economic renewal of America. In his domestic and external policy, economic renewal is long term oriented for ensuring prosperity and secure the future American position in the world (Huntington and Moynihan *et. al* 1992). Jeffrey Garten's view the American commercial diplomacy expansion is considered to be the extension of America's core value manifest destiny (Garten 1997).

United States commerce department is the key nodal agency to engage commercial diplomacy with the foreign governments and the commerce department's primary objective is to preserve and safeguard the American industry competitiveness in the world (Franklin 1992).

The commercial diplomacy aims are to succeed in the effective coordination of the US commerce department. In other words, the effective coordination between the government and the business community helps the US Business community to win major contracts through the networks of US State department and embassy networks and the commerce department networks (Garten 1997). American companies have an advantage over other companies in the world is because of talent for innovation and entrepreneurial spirit (Franklin 1992).

President Clinton saw India as a potential partner because of stable democracy, technology base and huge market potential which will benefit India from the globalized economy (Talbot 2004). President Clinton's observation of economic

power would play primacy than political and security and therefore, President Clinton primarily used economic engagement as a foreign policy tool to secure the economic power and build economic partnerships. President Clinton saw a “world defined in large part by global economics” (Vickery 2011: 9-10). President Clinton said in his inaugural address that “communications and commerce are global, investment is mobile, technology is almost magical and ambition for a better life is universal” (Clinton 1993). The undersecretary of commerce Jeffrey E Garten the author of the ten big emerging markets, They have a large resource base and the vast market potential they are also regional powers. India was classified as the best among the emerging markets because of India’s established laws on commerce and trade (Garten 1997: 12-14).

President Clinton’s administration introduced the institutional and functional reforms for the promotion of commercial diplomacy. US undersecretary of commerce was behind the new reforms in the US commerce department who built an economic war room with trade specialists to win the firms for the US companies. Intelligence agency CIA started to focus on the new functional aspect to gather economic intelligence and risk assessment. The State Department started training diplomats’ trade and investment and win contracts for US firms (Sanger 1995).

President Clinton in a talk with Prime Minister Rao discussed to promote commercial and business relations. President Clinton said “I have asked our secretary of Energy, Hazel O’Leary to visit India July further talks on renewable energy. And I have asked the Secretary of commerce Ron Brown to go to India to promote further growth in trade and investment” (Clinton 1994). US Ambassador Frank G. Wisner’s analysis is that in the changing international economic environment it is difficult for any national economy to sustain in isolation. In this context, India and the United States need to work together and grow economies together and share prosperity together (Wisner 1995).

Prime Minister Rao asked the Indian business community and the apex organisations of the industry to receive the US business delegation and asked them to build trade, commerce and economic ties (The Times of India 1994: 17). Marshal M. Bouton suggested Indian companies were new to engage in global markets, American companies had the experience running the companies at a global level, Therefore for

Indian companies' alliance with American companies enable the Indian companies to share an experience (Bouton 1994).

Towards Indo US Energy Dialogue: US Energy Secretary, Ms Hazel O'Leary's Visit to India

C. Raja Mohan argues that after nearly two decades of estrangement, India and the United States are possibly looking towards possible cooperation in the civilian nuclear power sector. The initial focus of the Indo-US nuclear dialogue was on the safety aspects of power. The US energy secretary stated that the talk between Delhi and Washington had begun the discussions at the informal level to cooperate between the nuclear regulatory agencies of two countries. N.K.P. Salve, the Union Minister of power, led the business delegation to the United States. The Nuclear regulatory commission in the United States oversees the safety aspects of nuclear plants and its counterpart in the atomic regulatory board. Hazel O' Leary suggested the two sides will cooperate in data collection on nuclear safety (Raja Mohan 1994).

President Clinton sent the first Cabinet secretary to promote cooperation in the energy sector. The energy secretary stated the importance of her visit was to prioritise on sustainable energy development. Issues such as renewable energy efficiency and independent power production, coal technology, and transfer project financing (Vaidya 1994b).

Hazel O'Leary oversaw the entire nuclear complex of the United States, had a discussion with five energy related departments under the aegis of Indo- US Energy Commission. O'Leary met her Indian counterpart, the minister for energy N.K. P Salve and negotiated India's regime of guaranteed investment in the power sector. She also favoured the plan for the market-oriented system to attract investment in the power sector. (The Times of India 1994s: 19). Minister of energy N.K.P Salve agreed to give a counter guarantee, a guaranteed rate of return, protection from the exchange rate and risk (The Times of India 1994k: 10).

Ms Hazel O'Leary and Indian government's important policies and decisions were taken relating to private investment in the energy sector (The Times of India 1994h: 12). The US Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary met Prime Minister Narasimha Rao agreed to establish an institutional arrangement shaping the Indo US sub commission

to monitor the cooperation of the energy sector. The Prime Minister stated that the possible measures would be taken to sort out the problems between the two countries and to remove the administrative bottlenecks to ensure the projects in India which were speedily implemented (The Times of India 1994h: 7). O'Leary during her talks with Chidambaram the then-Chairman of the Indian atomic energy commission, discussed to cooperate in exchanging commercial nuclear sites and how they will benefit nuclear safety and power production, and cooperation in ensuring nuclear safety. The July 7-15 1994 presidential mission on sustainable energy and trade culminated and signed of 13 Memoranda of Understanding, the institutional arrangement which created for Indo-US sub commission on sustainable development and energy development was established, and 11 joint ventures in the private sector was reached to sign the agreement (Vaidya 1994e).

The problems and hurdles for energy cooperation from the Indian perspective that the United States that the holding on the transfer of technology, the flow of technology from the US is restricted, even India generously offers the markets to American business (The Times of India 1994k:10). U.S Secretary of Energy O'Leary and the Government of India signed 11 agreements on the Private sector on conventional and renewable energy projects (Granger *et al.* 1995:159).

Presidential Trade Development Mission - Commerce Secretary Ron Brown visit to India

The Indian Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray extended the invitation to commerce secretary Ron Brown acceptance indicated importance to overcome the current political obstacles to the Indo-US relationship, and giving it to a new economic and commercial focus for bilateral relations (Raja Mohan 1994). Meeting with Commerce secretary Ron Brown Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray had discussed the ongoing trade liberalisation and the opportunities for more expansion on economic cooperation between India and the US. Mr Brown told the Indian Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray to lay the ground work for the US business interests in India (Vaidya 1994a: 21).

President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao agreed at the summit level to increase the exchange of frequency of high-level delegations between India and the United States. President Clinton's cabinet officials were sent to India and the State Department

followed “Two country rules”, that is all cabinet were asked to visit both India and Pakistan. The State department opined that Pakistan has been a long-term ally and it has not to be left out or being neglected. All delegations sent by president Clinton and the State department made sure that the Islamabad (Raja Mohan 1994). India’s Ambassador Sidhartha Shankar Ray and Meera Shankar who was the then-commercial officer in the embassy met the US State department officials in Washington, and convinced the commerce secretary Ron Brown to visit India as being part of the commerce department strategy to strengthen the relations with big emerging Market, since Pakistan is not a member of BEM Meera Shankar and her colleagues’ effort was successful and the commerce Secretary Ron Brown’s business development Mission visited India but not Pakistan (Shankar 2018).

Undersecretary of commerce for International Trade Jeffrey E Garten visited India to lay the ground work for commerce secretary Ron Brown. Garten in his study considered India the best among the BEMs. In his estimation of India-US trade potential, the US trade is expected to be greater than the combined trade with Europe and Japan by the year 2010 (The Times of India 1994d: 17). Garten said “we want to have a very realistic, very practical, very forward looking, and very future oriented relationship with India” (Vaidya 1994a: 13). Jefferey E. Garten spoke at the Chamber of Indo- American chamber of commerce, since the inception of the economic reforms the US allies such as Britain, Germany and Singapore, Russia and paying more attention. He felt the US attention is ill afforded (The Times of India 1994r: 1).

The Ron Brown presidential delegation includes captains of the American industry and the senior most government officials dealing with economic and commercial departments. The purpose of the presidential development mission to promote US commercial diplomacy that benefits both economic opportunities for Indians and Americans (Business America 1995a, 1995b).

Brown Said the delegation had served as a capstone for a new relationship between India and the United States’ commercial delegation to promote the business-business relations. Prime Minister Rao government facilitated the foreign investment in the high-tech sectors like petrochemicals, power sectors and telecommunications as these industries highly profitable for the US industries (Burns 1995c).

A letter from US president Bill Clinton to Rao had expressed his keen desire to work with the Indian Prime Minister to consolidate the US position as the biggest partner and investor. US secretary of commerce Ronald H Brown stated that the growing commercial ties with India began anew era of partnership between two countries. In his opinion foreign policies, commercial policies, domestic policies are all interlinked. Mr Brown made this theme of his talks with both Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao and finance Minister Manmohan Singh (The Times of India 1995b: 1).

Ronald H. Brown said in an interaction with Indian political leadership and the business community:

“We are laying the ground work for the future economic vitality of both the United States and India. As we move forward in to the Twenty first century and world of increased global interdependence, alliances and relationships will be judged on how strongly we are linked commercially” (Business America 1995b:26).

Mr Brown expressed that these contracts would result in providing more jobs for the people of the two countries. His visit to India and his discussions with Indian leaders would prove to be a watershed in the history of the trade relationship between the two great democracies (Rodrigues 1995). A total of 25 agreements envisaging the investment of \$7.1 billion deals were made (Rodrigues 1995).

Institutionalization of U.S India Commercial Alliance

According to the US undersecretary of commerce Jefferey E Garten’s commercial cooperation government level the existing institutional structures Joint business council, and Indo US joint commission on trade and commerce. There were no institutional mechanisms to promote a business to business dialogue such as Indo US commercial Alliance where the government and private sector from both countries interact and solve the problems on both sides (Dash 1994: 21).

According to Ron Brown:

“The commercial alliance is a private sector entity that will act as the focus point for US and Indian business to form cooperative ventures, including meetings, roundtables, work programs, and training, the goal of the commercial alliance is to provide a mechanism for US private industry to work with their Indian counterparts to increase

business ties and trade between the two countries (Business America 1995: 27).

In January 1995, the US commerce secretary signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the then-Indian commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee to create an Indo US commercial alliance with a super forum for bilateral consultations (Mahapatra 1998: 22). The Indo US “commercial alliance initially was envisaged dialogue of a two years period. The term of the alliance has been extended for two more years (Mathur 2003: 168). Commercial alliance facilities India and the US business apex organisations like the national associations of manufacture of the United State and the confederation of Indian industries to cooperate (Business America 1995: 27).

Brown described the alliance as “a concrete example of the US commitment to solidify the foundations of an already existing US Indian relationship. The commerce minister Pranab Mukherjee said that the alliance, the shared objectives of further development and the strengthening of commercial trade and investment ties (Mathur 2003: 168).

Towards Cooperation in Financial Services- Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin Visit to India

According to David E. Sanger, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin ensured the international capital markets were planning to establish the security and exchange commission. India's protective laws, insurance and banking sectors were restricted for foreign participation. These were run by the government owned firms. He urged Prime Minister Narsimha Rao to introduce reforms and open the insurance markets (Sanger 1995).

Chidambaram emphasised the need to accelerate investment flows and the projects which were already approved. Mr Rubin noted the positive trends in bilateral trade and opportunities created in the liberalised environment of trade and investment. Robert Rubin mentioned the opening of the financial sector is crucial for India for attracting the portfolio investment (The Times of India 1995m).

Negotiating Indo -US Trade Disputes

Ever since India initiated the economic reforms in 1991, the US response was positive and the US companies came forefront to invest in India (The Times of India 1995g: 1). However, at the government level and the private sector, there were conflicts in the area of trade and investment. The United States by means of the domestic law of 1988 listing India under the category of the countries that followed unfair trade practices. The United States has a problem with India regarding India's trade policies which are not conducive to promote US exports. Import duties were kept high in order to protect India's domestic industries and India's limiting investments to the vital sectors whereas the US companies are competent to make profits (The New York Times 1990).

India's commerce minister Pranab Mukherjee in a speech to the Indian institute of foreign trade said that the United States has some concern regarding the intellectual property rights, non-tariff barriers and the Clinton administration objection regarding the US companies, are eager to enter into the service and the consumer sectors, however, there were obstacles to the restrictive foreign investment policies in these sectors (Mukherjee 1995). Geoffrey Allen Pigman argues the role of power in determining the negotiations in economic and commercial disputes. The United States' dominant position in the international economy and India on the other hand as a developing country has less clout in the international economy therefore India can be subjected to commercial pressures (Pigman 1996: 731).

The United States Ambassador to India Frank G. Wisner acknowledges that there was a conflict between India and the United States in the area of commercial and trade relations. He further said "we have the ability to address differences of view talk them through and to negotiate them, to engage in the essential process of giving and taking, and to achieve balanced out come at the end" (Wisner 1995: 33).

Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights and U S Domestic Law 301

The United States' Trade Representative in its annual report, India was listed as one of the countries that violate the US's Intellectual property rights such as patents and Copies rights. The United States trade representative has the authority to recommend to the government and to impose the trade sanctions. The USTR has empowered to impose 100 percent tariffs and restrict India's exports to the United States, in other

words the United states can deny market access. USTR has the authority to take punitive measures against companies that violate US intellectual property rights. The US grievance against India was that there were no protective laws in India against the violation of copyrights and patents (Bradsher 1991a). US multinational companies have grievances regarding the trade marks in order to promote products, Indian government apprehensions, fears and concerns that the domestic companies would lose in the competition with US companies because of trademarks. Prime Minister Rao's government changed the laws on trademark sand the US companies can use the trade marks in Indian markets. This allowed American companies further incentives to promote a healthy environment for American companies (New York Times 1992).

Super 301 provisions act could be misused for increasing the market access for US products by denying the market access of the competitors by naming their domestic laws on intellectual property rights which are inadequate to meet the international standards (Banik et al 1996: 64). A.V. Ganesan commerce secretary participated in Uruguay round negotiations on behalf of India. In his opinion the United States is acting unilaterally on intellectual property rights. The US is trying to universalize its domestic law super 301. The issue was being dealt with by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and India had the option for dealing the intellectual property rights at a multilateral level (Ganesan 1994).

Pigman (1996) argues that the United States used the super 301 and US domestic law in order to pressurise India to open markets for US companies. Initially, the trade act was constituted in 1988, however the charges were withdrawn because of India's engagement with multilateral trade negotiations in Uruguay round talks. The United States' Super 301 laws relating to intellectual property rights, United States representative Carla Hills used the Super 301 laws against India. USTR listed India in 1991 and 1992 as a priority country meaning that the priority of foreign countries are the countries that they were violating the US intellectual property rights or the countries do not have safeguard mechanism protects the US intellectual property rights (USTR Annual Report 1991). "The omnibus act requires the intimation of retaliatory action when any foreign trade practices are regarded as unfair or inequitable by the US authorities regardless of whether the practice in question is consistent with international trade agreements or not" (Banik et. al 1996: 64).

From the American point of view, the transfer of technology is linked to India providing higher levels of IPR protection. The US would like India to provide product patents for Pharmaceuticals and chemicals and food items etc (The Times of India 1995 h: 1).

IPR issued an impediment in achieving cooperation in the area of science and technology. There were delays in the technology collaboration envisaging investment on several billions of dollars. India and the US signed agreements in the energy sector although these cannot be implemented without the two countries agreement on science and technology (The Times of India 1995h: 1).

Elinor Constable, the US assistant secretary of state for international environmental and scientific affairs' argument was that the intellectual property rights issues between India and the United States created an obstacle for cooperation in science and technology, for example India and the United States signed the agreement in 1983 and created joint funding in 1987. There were almost 50 research projects in India and US collaboration with joint financing started in 1987 (Jayaraman 1994). Commerce secretary Ahluwalia drew attention to the vital aspect of that intellectual property issue affecting the technology transfer to India. The Indian scientists also recommended the changes in the patent laws and commerce secretary reassured that the government is looking for amending the Indian patents act (Das 1991: 15).

Sumit Ganguly argues regarding patents India and the United States differences in the negotiations were regarding the process and the product of patent. India's negotiating position was that it would accept the product patent in certain agreed period of time after those Indian companies can use reconstitute the production. The then director Arthur Dunkel provided the 10 years transition period to meet the domestic laws in compatibility with the international standards (Ganguly 1992: 180).

Negotiations with US Trade Representative Carla A. Hills

The finance minister Manmohan Singh appreciated Carla A. Hills for her supports extending to India by the US government in multilateral financial assistance such as the IMF. He went on to add that enlarged access to the markets of developed countries would create a favourable international environment for the success of India's economic reforms. Carla Hills appreciated the economic reforms introduced by the

Government of India (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Record 1992). Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh and the US trade representative Carla Hills agreed to work out the modalities for the mutual satisfactory solution to protect India's national concern in addressing the intellectual property rights issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Record 1992).

Commerce minister P. Chidambaram conveyed to Hills that India's stand on the intellectual property rights, and 250 MPs across the sections of the political parties opined that India is sensitive about the protection of the intellectual property rights and signed on the IPR bill to become the law. India was willing to discuss the intellectual property rights at the bilateral level in order to promote a better understanding of India's concerns (Das 1991: 15).

The commerce minister P Chidambaram conveyed to Carla Hills regarding the issues related to Pharmaceuticals and foods relating to IPRs, and the implications on the common masses and make available the essential drugs at affordable prices (The Times of India 1991a). Commerce secretary Ahluwalia, on the question of copy right violation of India, the United States has differences but the copy right violations took place at the individual level not at the government level. However, the best possible way to resolve is the private legal action (Das 1991: 15).

Foreign secretary J.N Dixit told Carla Hills in 1992 that the political rationale of India's stand on these issues was based on the requirements of the Indian public, the economic constraints which affected them to take India's government position meeting the US domestic laws relating to intellectual property rights (Dixit 1996: 182-183).

The then commerce minister Pranab Mukherjee argues that India fulfilled the international obligation. India has initiated the process of addressing the patent laws. The Amendment to Indian patent law introduced in the Indian Parliament to meet international standards (Mukherjee 1995). Indian diplomat Asoke Mukerji highlights the significance of the intellectual property rights in the new international economic order to promote technological innovation and protect the rights of inventors and violation of intellectual property rights which adversely affects the transfer of technology to meet the developmental challenges in the global south (Mukerji 2000).

A.V. Ganesan argues that the technology and the technological edge is the key determinant factor competition in the international world markets, Protection of technology would give the advantage to control over the market and market power. The technology was also becoming a commercial asset and protecting intellectual property rights which became an important factor in determining commercial relations. The United States is a technologically advanced nation and it has the advantage over all other countries and the US key concern was to protect intellectual property rights and brought the issue at the multilateral organisation Such and GATT and WTO (Ganesan 1994).

India had signed the Trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement as part of the larger document establishing the world trade organisation (WTO). Under this agreement, India promised to adhere to a time table for bringing its intellectual property laws into conformity with the TRIPS agreement (Nath 2008: 128). Pranab Mukherjee in his memoir mentions making domestic laws conform with international laws. For instance, India amended the 1971 copyright laws in order to meet WTO's intellectual property rights laws (Mukherjee 2016: 168).

India's copy right laws were amended in conformity with the TRIPS agreement. So, the United Response in the 1995 USTR reported that India was not put under the unfair trade practices but was put under the lesser category known as priority watch list country (Mathur 2003).

Negotiating Textiles Quota Restrictions and Multifibre Agreement

The conflict between India and the United States in the area of textiles was two fronts on the market access and quota restrictions. In the Textile sector, India has a competitive edge over the United States. The United States tried to deny market access to the Indian textile industry, and contrary to the United States which is under its own textile lobby demanding to open the Indian market for US textile Industry (Mathur 2003).

Another area of conflict with the United States is regarding the quota restrictions under the Multifibre agreements. India's textile products account for nearly 30 percent of total exports (Ganesan 1994). India had the bilateral agreement in textiles with the

United States for one-year period from 1st January to 31st December 1992 (Bradsher 1991a).

The Multifibre agreement is a multilateral agreement that governs trade in textiles. The agreement was followed by methods of fixing quotas for exports, in other words, a fixed quota of textiles was allowed to the US markets. Beyond that, Indian textiles cannot access the markets. However, there was a proposal at the multilateral level, the Marrakesh agreement wanted WTO to phase out the quota restrictions (Mathur 2003: 182). Mukerji (2000) analyses the quota system which was bilaterally negotiated, textile related issues were kept out of the Purview of the GATT and the Multilateral agreement, this was later demand of the textile exporting countries under the WTO agreement from 1994 to 2004 within the ten-year period quota restrictions were phased out.

India and the United States worked out modalities to overcome textile market access through the bilateral agreement. First, India would remove the market barriers to US textile products. In return, the United States would remove quota restrictions for the Indian textile products (The Times of India, 1995i)

The textile agreement was signed by the-then Indian diplomat who was posted at commercial officer Meera Shankar and the US trade representative Ambassador Jennifer Hillman was the chief negotiator. India's Ambassador Siddhartha Shankar Ray said the bilateral textile agreement was resolved to the irritants in Indo-US relation bilateral agreement which addressed the concerns of both countries (The Times of India 1995i) The then commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee narrates India was also gone for the multilateral solution in order to resolve the issue India signed The Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) agreement in January 1994 and it was operational from 1 January 1995 (Mukherjee 1995).

Negotiating Market Access: Tariff and Non -Tariff Trade Barriers

India and the United States had trade barriers in the form of Tariffs and quantitative restrictions in order to protect their domestic industry. These trade barriers were the main reasons for not achieving economic cooperation at expected levels. India had removed considerable trade barriers as part of 1991 economic reforms programmes. The Narsimha Rao government brought several steps to open a transparent Trade

(Statesman 1993). According to Mukerji, the developing country like India needed a supportive external environment for achieving economic growth and development. But the developed countries created markets access barriers through unilateral measures in the form of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers (Mukerji 2000: 51).

The United States Trade Representative Carla Anderson Hills demanded that India reduced tariff barriers that were above the international standards (Hills 1994). The World Trade Organisation in order to facilitate and improve among member countries removed the trade barriers from the member countries by 1 January 2005 (Mathur 2003: 185).

Non-Tariff barriers

India, like any other developing country, faces developmental challenges due to unorganised small-scale industries and the lack of technology made it difficult to compete with developed economies like the United States. In addition to this, the United States used more neo protectionist measures to deny the market access for the developing country like India in the name of Child labour, the environmental factors and the Human Rights situation (Mathur 2003: 185).

Regarding child labour, one of the United States' main objections then, commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee in 1995 expressed serious concern regarding child labour, he warned industries strictly follow the child labour laws passed by the government of India (Mukherjee 1995).

However, President Bill Clinton pressed for the inclusion of the social clause during WTO formation. He brought the Labour rights into WTO purview. Clinton put forward his argument for the social justice, market economies and democracies (Mathur 2003: 185). On the other hand, the Subramanyam Swami argued that there was no problem for India's inclusion of social clause in the WTO, he was of the opinion except on the child labour, the issue of child labour It is amoral question that no country wants to employ the children and every government wants the children to put in schools (Swami 2000).

Human rights and the trade debated at the domestic level between the United States' idealists and the realists. The idealists would believe that the Human rights record is

fundamentally a determining factor for the United States' relations with other countries and for the realists, the relations were determined by the strategic consideration. Jefferey E. Garten the undersecretary of commerce viewed that the commercial competition was fierce by the industrialized countries if the United States follows the human rights situation as the criteria. The United States would make an important market for the United States. The United States' dilemma was preserving the values like human rights and at the same time the commercial competition with industrialised countries (Freidman 1994).

The US undersecretary of commerce Jefferey E Garten narrates his experience while meeting with Indian Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao, the commerce department officials were carrying the briefing books on human rights, non-proliferation and the child labour etc. Prime Minister Rao was conscious of the fact these were the problems that were difficult to find the solution. Prime Minister Rao advised a focus on the possibility of improving the relations (Garten 1997: 78).

Commerce Minister advised on the question of market access to industrialists that the manufacturers and exporters should not be compromised the quality of the products and the environmental standard needs to be maintained for instance packaging (Mukherjee 1995: 28).

Pharmaceutical companies pressed the US government that the Indian Pharmaceutical companies were not meeting the international standards. The US trade representative Carl Hills withdrew the support for a general system of preferences for the Indian exporters (Ganguly 1992: 180).

The generalized system of preferences (GSP) is a fundamentally bilateral arrangement between India and the United States. In other words, the donor country gave a concession to the exporting country. So, the issue cannot be taken to multilateral organisation WTO (Mukherjee 1995).

Regarding the market access for the service sectors, the commerce secretary Ron Brown proposed that India and the United States should have equal market access for India and the United States (Bansal 1995). There was trade -off between India and the United States in providing the market concessions. If India agreed to open its banking and insurance sectors for the US companies in exchange for service Personnel the

United States. And the second negotiations would-be the transfer of technology by the US if India guarantees the protection of Intellectual property rights (The Times of India 1995h: 1).

On the question of market access after the WTO came into being it has to be based on multilaterally agreed principles of international trade and it should not be based on unilateral decisions (Mukerji 2000: 39).Pranab Mukherjee writes that the tariffs would be reduced considerably and the non-tariff barriers rose in the name of social clause India would resist at the multilateral level (Mukherjee 2016: 167). World Trade Organisation in the spirit of the globalisation prescribed the International standards and technical standards to promote the equal market access for promotion but the developing countries like India face difficult in meeting the international standards and the technical regulations (Mukerji 2000).

The problem of Restoring Confidence in Foreign Investors-ENRON Power Project

The United States Company, Enron Power project was the most challenging episode between India and The United States. The Enron has invested billions of dollars in the state of Maharashtra at a place called Dabhol. It was the largest foreign policy investment by any foreign company in the area of the power sector (Burns 1995b:1-4). Research analyst Bouton at the Asia Society could frighten companies that were planning to invest in India. The Enron incident also raised the apprehension about the economic reforms that would carry forward in the next government (Myerson 1995).

the then Maharashtra Chief Minister Sharad Pawar writes that there was political one-upmanship. It was not just about one project which went wrong; it was about the image of India as a safe destination which was a severe setback. It was also the problem of investor confidence severely shattered (Pawar 2016: 145-146) “, after the event of Enron the US companies and investors asked for the counter guarantees for the investment where the large-scale investment and projects have involved. This proposal was also put forward by the then -commerce secretary. The Indian government had to convince India a safe place to invest (Rodrigues 1995).

To protect foreign investment is also governed by trade related investment. TRIMS measures would not be applied to India because there was no discrimination in legal

policy structure, and investment policies are Transparent and meet the international standards (Ganesan 1994).

Rao and Manmohan Singh adopted the middle path in welcoming the foreign direct investment and allowing the consumer goods. It was prudent policies of the Rao and Manmohan Singh that controlled the trade deficit (Mathur 2003: 174-175).

Multilateral Negotiations WTO

The end of the Cold War had implications for the new global economic order. The United States became the sole superpower and the United States wanted to restructure the global economic order by reforming the world trading institutions such as GATT to facilitate economic globalisation (Baru 2016). India's integration with the global economy and at the same time challenges of the international economic system facing protectionist tendencies. To reap the benefits for the economic globalization which function of the rule based multilateral system is necessary for the establishment of WTO, met the challenges for a large extent (Mukerji 2000: 73-74).

The Narsimha Rao government made an effort to be part of the rule based economic order. The Rao government engaged in negotiations at the Uruguay round negotiations were held in the areas of intellectual property rights, patents, textiles, subsidies and agriculture and also the Rao government made conscious efforts to meet the domestic laws inconformity with WTO laws (Sitapati 2016: 162).

A.V Ganesan, commerce secretary to the Government of India from 1991 to 1993, participated in Uruguay Round negotiations. The problem of the new economic order faced many challenges for instance Industrial leaders, agriculturists, a trading community that Negotiation at the Uruguay round was crucial these policies do not stop at the national borders there were apprehensions that they would impinge on India's national sovereignty. However, apprehensions were not able to understand the agreements at being negotiated (Ganesan 1994: 3).

The agreement to establish the World Trade organisation (WTO) in Marrakesh, on 15 April 1994, the Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee was accompanied by commerce secretary Tejendra Khanna who signed the WTO agreement on behalf of India. According to Pranab Mukherjee "the establishment of the world Trade

organisation should lead to a more open trading system the Rule Based multilateral trading system and negotiated in good faith, will bring in large element of discipline in the realm of international trade and it would not be possible for any country, howsoever powerful it maybe, to veto any of the decisions taken by a majority of the member countries” (Mukherjee 2016: 164-167).

The institutional feature of WTO was the dispute settlement mechanism, but the dispute mechanism and equal access to the legal framework of the conflicting parties could take the issue of WTO dispute settlement mechanism (Mukerji 2000: 64). For instance, India’s commerce minister Pranab Mukherjee faced the dilemma of addressing the issue of US domestic law on super 301 relating to patents and intellectual property rights. The US domestic law on the US senate has jurisdiction and the commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee replied that he did not have any legal instruments with the US however he assured the members of Indian parliament to address at the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (Mukherjee 1994).

Asoke Mukerji mentions the challenges of the international economic order to establish a coherent structure of international economic relations, “It was felt that the economic prosperity was an international component of international peace and stability and the economic order had to be the foundation of a new political and security framework” (Mukerji 2000).

Conclusion and Assessment

The Indian government initiated economic reforms in 1991 and it became an open economy in order to profit from the evolving economic globalization. Prime Minister Rao's economic summit was reaching out to the US corporate and business community in order to attract foreign investment. US President Bill Clinton proposed for commercial diplomacy with India, he had sent three of his key economic cabinet secretaries: energy secretary, commerce secretary and treasury secretary to India to promote business relations. Commerce secretary Ron Brown and the largest presidential US business delegation visited India. Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee and the commerce secretary Ron Brown signed the Indo-US commercial alliance in order to promote commercial relationships where government and private sector engagement and facilitate trade, investment and business relations between

India and the United States. India United States governments played the facilitating role commercial relationship fundamentally driven by the US corporate and the Indian private sector.

India and the US trade have conflict in the intellectual property rights and non-tariff trade barriers, human rights, child labour continued to hinder the India-US trade cooperation, United States developed the economy and India as a developing country has incompatible power relations to dictate Indo-US trade relations. India also chose the bilateral cum multilateral negotiating strategy engaging at the bilateral level and at the same time engaged at the multilateral level. For example, in the United States domestic law on intellectual property 301, India was listed for unfair trade practices and violating intellectual property rights with the establishment of WTO trade disputes mechanism and at the same time establishment of US-India commercial alliance became the important platform in bilateral trade disputes to resolution.

Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee conveyed to Ambassador Frank Wisner regarding the trade disputes as “this is the area where we shall have to exchange our views, try to understand the difficulties. If we can do this, we can improve our relationship. Our relationship is multifaceted which is not only confined to trade and commerce, and economic cooperation” (Mukherjee 1995).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In engaging and redefining its relation with the United States, India used its economic and summit diplomacy as the principal instruments. It helped India in moving forth its bilateral relation from estrangement to engagement in the post-Cold War era, particularly the period from 1991 to 1996. The meeting between Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and President Bill Clinton at a summit level in 1994 set it in motion the process of reframing the relationship. It, however, could not entirely reset the framework of the relationship, as there was a time lag in the relationship also a hangover of the Cold War mindset. P.V. Narasimha Rao was a very erudite and learned person. He could steer India at a very difficult time pass the worst dangers India faced. There was a collapse of the Indian economy at that point in time. India's entire foreign policy framework became more vulnerable with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It needed a new approach to deal with the susceptibility it was facing at that point of time. Rao was the person who understood the situation and so he put a reformed dimension of foreign policy into motion (Shankar 2018).

C. Raja Mohan, a leading foreign policy analyst, describes Prime Minister Rao as a diplomatic genius. The summit level engagement of Rao with President Clinton transformed the relationship between both the nations (Raja Mohan 1994:20). According to Prabhakar Menon, this effort of Rao in implementing innovative diplomacy while approaching President Clinton resulted in a fruitful relationship in subsequent years with the United States (Menon 2012: 300-301). Rao's summit diplomacy with president Clinton created a more peaceful ambiance in the bilateral relations. The summit also facilitated an understanding between the two leaders (Jha 1994:1036).

The success of Washington's summit particularly is that both the leaders learned to 'agree to disagree' (Malhotra 1995:144). According to Chintamani Mahapatra, this summit had

the resolve to establish political understanding between both the states. It resulted in strengthening political cooperation between them (Mahapatra 1998:82). The quality of diplomacy has also played a central role in transforming the relationship. Sidhartha Shankar, India's Ambassador to the United States, enunciates that Indian diplomatic effort further focussed on opening more formal channels of communication with the US Congress, the White House and the State Department. In addition to the efforts of the embassy, various informal diplomatic channels were also used such as India interests Group, the Indian caucus, the NRIs and the lobbyists or public relations firms (Chandran 1995: 1).

Prime Minister Rao's economic diplomacy towards the United States was essentially characterized as the one that shaped the domestic environment of India and made its industry investment-friendly. For the first time in Independent India, Bharat Ratna was awarded to an industrialist, J.R.D Tata. The world and particularly the United States have taken particular note of this fact. Rao was appreciated as a Prime Minister who was willing to honor a diverse aspect in the making of the nation, namely industry and entrepreneurship (Baru 2017a).

Shivshankar Menon was of the view that India was no longer an autarkic economy. The economic reforms enabled India to conduct its economic diplomacy and pushed India's economic interest in a broader and wider sense. India's investment was set up in Indian missions abroad and there was economic diplomacy division in the MEA too. There was a more robust engagement of the private sector. A reservoir of goodwill was built in the Senate with Rao's effort. This was considered quite an achievement for his government in building a relationship with the United States (Menon 2018). Prime Minister Rao was reaching out to corporate America and forging business links with them. This business and commercial links acted as a stabilizing factor in the relations between India and the United States (Raja Mohan 1994: 22; Jha 1994: 1043).

Ambassador Meera Shankar enunciates that India's economic engagement with the United States also resulted in building cooperation in frontier areas of technology. This, in turn, enabled India to achieve high levels of economic development (Shankar 2015:

130-37). According to Vinay Sitapati, a biographer of Prime Minister Rao, the focus on commercial and business relations assisted in building a long-term relationship with the United States (Sitapati 2016: 274).

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's media advisor, P.V. R.K Prasad, articulates in his memoir that the success of economic reforms required attracting foreign investment. Prime Minister Rao wanted to leave an “indelible mark on Indo American relation by holding talks with President Clinton in a cordial atmosphere and impressing as many corporate heads as possible” (Prasad 2012: 132-133). The business and commercial relations between both countries were assisted by a commercial lobby formed in the US Congress. Its chief aim was to protect the business interest in India. The then Commerce Secretary of the United States Ron Brown and India's Commerce Minister signed the US-India commercial alliances between the private sector to take the initiative and solve the trade disputes that arise between the two countries. On the occasion of 25 years of economic reforms, Strobe Talbott articulates that he was a part of the then Clinton's envoy who played a critical role in summit level initiative between Rao and Clinton. In his opinion, President Clinton was determined to transform India and the US relationship. He further made an observation of India's economy after the summit. He summed up the India-US economic relations in the following words, “That transformation has not only been a boon to the people of India, it has also contributed to the progress of the human enterprise as a whole” (Talbott 2017: xvii).

Indian Defence Minister Sharad Pawar in his memoir on Prime Minister Narasimha Rao articulated that India should explore the possibilities it would have with the United States through military cooperation in the new geopolitical realities (Pawar 2016:105). India's security engagement can be at multiple levels, namely naval diplomacy, Track II strategic dialogue in order to understand each other security predicaments and also of exploring the possibility of security cooperation through insights provided by the security experts. The high-level visits are undertaken by the Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air force of India and the United States is also a crucial factor in this military cooperation. The visit paid by the Defence Minister then was another important factor that played a crucial role in establishing an understanding and forging security cooperation between both the states.

The interests of both the countries converge at many points. This made India and the United States come closer and sign the agreement on Military Cooperation. Chintamani Mahapatra participated in the Indo-US strategic dialogue with the Institute for Defence Studies and the National Defence University of Washington D.C. It is the strategic dialogue that helped both the states to understand each other security concerns in the post-Cold War era. Strategic dialogue also paved the way for agreed minutes of defense pact along with the culmination of Defence Secretary visit to India (Mahapatra 2017).

However, India and the United States has intense security differences on the question of nuclear proliferation and missile technology. President Clinton came up with a strategy of eliminating nuclear weapons from South Asia. Prime Minister Rao faced a difficult challenge in safeguarding India's nuclear option. In his semi-autobiographical novel reveals that “[t]his is the age of coercive diplomacy, when the projection of forces is intimidatory, the deterrent and defensive roles have become inextricable aspects of international relations” (Narasimha Rao 1998:398). According to Commodore Uday Bashkar, Prime Minister Rao was convinced with K. Subramanyam's idea that India cannot deal with the US without nuclear weapons (Bashkar 2017). However, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's assessment of the international and the domestic context made him halt the nuclear tests in 1995. When questioned by the Defence Minister on this decision of the Prime Minister, it was said that India was not in a conducive economic situation to allow to conduct nuclear tests. Whenever this situation improves, India would have the capability to conduct its nuclear tests (Pawar 2016:108).

Henry Kissinger articulates that, “no nation can negotiate about its survival for the sake of harmony” (Kissinger 1957:170). The United States differs from India on its security concerns. Its nuclear program became a contentious issue. Kissinger further wrote that "No statesman can make the survival of his country entirely dependent on the assumed goodwill of another sovereign state” (Kissinger 1957:45). The United States continued to put pressure on India Nuclear weapons programs, its missile technology and seek to put restrictions on its dual-use material. Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao's diplomatic success lies in his concern for genuine global nuclear disarmament. At that point in time, India's nuclear option was given a backseat to further avoid pressures from the US. Rao's

persuasive diplomatic skills kept India on a consistent position in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).

India's maintained the strategic ambiguity about its nuclear option and also advocated the principle of universal global nuclear disarmament (Mattoo 1996a: 46). This further helped India in its multilateral and bilateral engagements. However, given the nuclear realities of permanent five, India's nuclear neighborhood and its security predicaments India resorted to a different path later on. According to Jaswant Singh, the negotiation undertaken at the bilateral and multilateral level was solely to make them understand India's security concerns regarding that the nuclear option (Jaswant Singh 2006: 271).

In spite of different approaches to the nuclear program, C. Raja Mohan (1994) describes that "the ability of any two nations to conduct a broader dialogue amidst intense differences over a particular issue is a mark of diplomatic maturity" (Raja Mohan 1994). Chintamani Mahapatra enunciates that given the divergent security approaches of India and the United States it was quite difficult for achieving security harmonization. However, the economic relations between both the states acted as an important factor for forging relations between them. This relation could further be extended to cooperation at the security level (Mahapatra 1998: 135).

In order to recollect the words of the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, "we believe that any change should come about through our own volition, as a result of our own experience" (Nehru 1963: 461). Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao guided the ship of state from rough diplomatic waters, during the systemic change. There was no guidance or precedent in shaping the diplomacy. It had fewer options and he carefully chooses those options. If other alternative options would have been given preference by him, then India's destiny and its relations with the United States could be completely different. Prime Minister Rao inherited a legacy of India's diplomacy through his vast experience as Minister of External Affairs from the late 1980s. His success lies in choosing an expert team and his philosophy of approaching the whole world friendly. He possessed certain persuasive diplomatic skills which assisted him in making friends with the most important player in the unipolar system, that is, the United States. He proficiently

anchored India's diplomatic and strategic legacy. He steered India's destiny in the changed international context. According to Hans J Morgenthau, the quality of diplomacy is an important factor for the strength of a nation. He wrote that “of all the factors that make for the power of a nation, it is the quality of diplomacy. All the other factors that determine national power as it were the raw material out of which the power of a nation is fashioned” (Morgenthau 1949:140).

The United States is politically, economically and militarily the dominant power in the unipolar system. Prime Minister Rao's conduct of diplomacy in the economic, security and political sphere with the United States is commendable. Statesman chose the wise course of action and prudently managed to steer through the inevitable change by preserving its peace. He indeed managed to make a historic move at that period (Kissinger 1994: 27-28). Today the foreign policy options India has are increased manifold. Its strategic independence in engaging with the world and with the United States has also enlarged. In the present decade, India is a leading power in the international system. According to Shivshankar Menon, the way India engages with the world and its approaches to international relations has also changed. India has retained its agency in the International System (Menon 2016: 2-6).

In the unipolar system, it was India's diplomacy that primarily drove it towards a better relationship with the United States. The economic diplomacy was the key driver in stitching the bonds between India and the United States. In the Indo-US commercial alliance, the corporate sector in the US became an important lobby in the US Congress. It strived to protect its commercial interests in India's political diplomacy with the United States.

There was also convergence on the idea of democracy. In the post-Cold War world, the main organizing principle that shapes the world in a friendly and enabling environment is democracy. Clinton's doctrine of democratic enlargement and Prime Minister Rao's advocacy of building the international environment supportive of democracy has a crucial role to play in the building up of their bilateral relationship. The common concern for world order and systemic stability was the dominating factor for understanding the

relation between India and the United States. India's economic integration with the world economy, its economic freedom, the choices it made, its spirit for innovations and its initiative for entrepreneurial spirit were enlarged. Indian firms and companies could thus become globally competitive.

However, there are differences of opinion at the political level on President Clinton and his State Department policies regarding South Asia. According to Jaswant Singh, India's national security interests are in South Asia. The United States needs to move away from its South Asian Policy equating India and Pakistan (Jaswant Singh 2006). Harold Gould, a South Asian expert enunciates that the Cold War subculture was the main irritant of Indo- US relations. The US Cold War perception is colored in its official thinking on South Asian policies.

The Policy Implication of the Study:

The systemic change of 1991 was characterized by the bewildering changes at all spheres, be it political, economic or security. For International Relations scholars, the theoretical tools have become inadequate to understand these changes. The treatises that were written to guide diplomacy also became insufficient to deal with the then prevailing circumstances. The way we understand the diplomacy and diplomatic practices have changed. At that point in time, economic diplomacy became a more important element in guiding and strengthening the relationship.

India's diplomacy and its unique historical past will be useful in understanding the relationship that developed at that point in time. History cannot always guide us to the future, but it certainly can give us an insight into it. It will further enable us to think clearly by taking a glimpse of the lessons learned and the memory retained of India's diplomacy in the past. The systemic change is characterized by the end of the Cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, unification of Germany, the emergence of independent sovereign republics in central Asia and Eastern Europe, the Gulf War, the EU unification and globalization. India at that point in time was weak militarily, collapsed economically and also lost its political, diplomatic and military support of the Soviet Union. That was the peak phase of India's diplomatic, economic and security predicament.

Prime Minister P.V Narasimha Rao through his grand diplomacy with the United States could rescue India in all the areas of security, economic and political sphere. Diplomacy then acted as an important element in India's rise in the international sphere. It could regain its status and relationship with the world's powerful democracy through its unique convergence at both the geopolitical and geo-economic interests. The policy implication is that at this period of systemic change diplomacy could act as a vehicle to guide India in the international sphere.

In the opinion of Sanjaya Baru, it was Prime Minister Rao's diplomat Mani Dixit, who played a critical role in changing the course of Indian diplomacy. He helped India in navigating efficiently through the post-Cold War era (Baru 2016:139). Pranab Mukherjee, the then Commerce and External Affairs Minister, in his memoir wrote that the leadership qualities of the Prime Minister and also the support of his core team which include he and Dr. Manmohan Singh could collectively shape India's future at that period. They focussed on a new, open and liberal India in the post-Cold War era (Mukherjee 1986: 183).

Theoretical Implication of the Study

The realist school of thought essentially recommended that the balance of power policies and the systemic change in the nuclear age led to prudent policy responses. In the absence of a balancer in the unipolar world, states resort to only its internal military build-up and thus seek to achieve nuclear deterrence. For the liberal theory, a response to systemic change is also characterized by globalization and economic interdependence. It leads to a prudent build-up of a cooperative relationship with the unipolar power. The worldly-wise statesman thus needs to adopt a combination of both, that is, upholding a balance of power and the implementation of diplomatic instruments to build the relationship. It thus needs to adopt an eclectic approach.

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