

**FREEDOM IN SITUATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF  
PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR AND DAYA KRISHNA**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of the degree of*

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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**INDIA**

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## DECLARATION

I, **Shikha Kumari**, hereby declare that the thesis entitled “**Freedom in Situation: A Comparative Study of Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and Daya Krishna**”, submitted by me for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is my original work. The thesis has not been submitted so far, in part or in full, for any other degree or diploma to this university or any other university.



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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled “Freedom in Situation: A Comparative Study of Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and Daya Krishna” submitted by Shikha Kumari, in the fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is her original work. It has not been submitted so far, in part or in full, for any other degree to this university or any other institution.

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*Dedicated to all readers who have already read  
this thesis and those who will*

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## Introduction

My being in this world was not my choice. However, this existence provides me the wide opportunities and possibilities of choices, which I constantly make or will continue to make in my life. Apart from these two experiences, I also realize that each decision and choice itself involves two kinds of experiences. I cannot make a choice or a decision without any motive. Each choice and decision have had its own motive or reason. The relation between decision and motive itself has been a long philosophical discussion. What I want to express here without going in detail discussion about decision and motive is that I experience my decision and choice closely related to my desire or what I want to pursue. My desires are always associated with needs which I experience as a lack. Thus, my decision and choice are made by my lived experience where I feel both mind and body working together.

Each moment of my life experience is the experienced unity of mind and body. I feel sick or hopeless when I am suffering from fever or any disease. When I feel well my capacity to think, work is increased, and I feel very hopeful and enthusiastic. My experience of all activities, decisions, actions, or choices itself is a mixed feeling where I always feel in some sense free and determined at the same time.

I have other experiences where I feel both free and limited in is my relationship with others. I experience that my existence with other human beings is not always my choice. I experience my possibility of freedom is limited by other people at many times. Whatever I want in sense of admission, job, including several other things, I am not the only one who wants these things, but there are many others who also want same things. Other than this experience, my existence with others on institutional, or family level is also limited by others where I am dependent on others' approval for doing somethings academically or personally. Apart from negative sense or other being a limitation, I experience my existence with others also gives me wide opportunities and possibilities. Without others I cannot imagine my society,

culture, nation, and world. This is where I got lot of facilities, sense of security, medical facility, educational facility and many others.

In my experience with others on institutional or family level, I got huge support and co-operations that made me what I am today. Hence my experience with others is also mixed with the feeling of freedom and limitation. With exception of my imagination, my all life experiences are a combination of freedom and limitation in varying degrees. This acted as motivation to research freedom within limitation in my academic pursuit. Most of the work that I will deal in this dissertation is a direct or indirect result of this motivation. In my pursuit, I found both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of freedom very interesting and very close to explaining freedom within limitation. Both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of freedom is regulative freedom where feeling of freedom is always associated with limitation and condition.

Before going into detailed issues and questions, which I have explored in my respective chapters, I want to discuss about synoptic information regarding the two philosophers, their works and how their conception of freedom is different from the traditional metaphysical conception of freedom.

Paul Ricoeur is a contemporary Western philosopher and used existential phenomenological method and hermeneutic method for philosophizing his thought. My research of freedom in situation is focused on his early writings, especially his doctoral dissertation *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and The Involuntary* (1950). It is the first and the opening volume of a projected three-volumes of *Philosophy of The Will*. His second and third volumes were published in 1960 under the titles *Fallible Man* and *The Symbolism of Evil*.

His first volume is devoted to something like an eidetic phenomenology of the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary in human existence. His goal is to grasp meaningful freedom through the central notion of the voluntary and involuntary. His second and third volumes deal with empirics and poetics through hermeneutic phenomenology. In these volumes, his focus contrasts with his first volume, where, he explores existential possibilities of human being, specifically, the possibility of evil through the experienced fact of evil that is expressed in symbol and myth. However, my investigation of freedom in situation is mostly concerned to his first volume.

Daya Krishna is contemporary Indian philosopher and adopted existential methods for philosophizing his thought. The idea of freedom is central in philosophy of Daya Krishna. His conception of freedom defines human being, enterprise of knowledge, action, and will. My research of freedom in situation is concerned with his several books like, *The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze over Three Decades* (1989), *Indian Philosophy: A New Approach* (1997), *New Perspective in Indian Philosophy* (2001), *Bhakti: A Contemporary Discussion* (2000), *Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna* (2011), *Civilization and Nostalgia and Utopia* (2012), and his many articles such as “Bondages of Birth and Death: Emerging Technologies of Freedom on the Horizon and the Hope of Final Release from the Foundational Bondage of Mankind (2006)”, “The Cosmic, Biological and Cultural Conditionings, and the Seeking for Freedom (2006)”, “Indian Philosophy and Mokṣa: Revisiting an old Controversy(1984)” etc.

My investigation of freedom in situation is a comparative study of Paul Ricoeur and Daya Krishna’s conception of freedom. They both are contemporary philosophers and they both adopted existential methodology. But Paul Ricoeur belongs to Western tradition and Daya Krishna belongs to Indian tradition. However, Daya Krishna was familiar and trained in different Western philosophical schools of thought, due to colonial rule in India. However, neither of them has written anything about each other. It is my research that will explore the similarity and dissimilarity between their conception of freedom. I found both of their conception of freedom arises within situation, where one has felt freedom within biological and social situations. Ricoeur’s conception of freedom is the unity of the voluntary (mind) and the involuntary (body) and Daya Krishna’s conception of freedom is revealed within the bio-social situation. Both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna’s conception of freedom is entirely different from their traditional metaphysical conception of freedom.

In Western tradition, dualism of mind and body is initiated since Plato. He discussed three parts of human soul in *Republic* as reason, spirit, and appetite. His idea of tripartite souls give primacy only to rational soul that is superior to all other parts of soul. The rational soul controls other parts of soul. The rational soul controls some desires altogether and provides moderate degree of satisfaction to other parts of soul. Only rational soul has the capacity to choose what is really good. According to Plato, human being is basically divided in two parts

rational and non-rational where rational is recognized as soul and only it has the capacity to choose and rules on non-rational. Non-rational is recognized as body which is inferior and obeys to the rational part. For Plato, idea of freedom is incorporated only in rational soul or part.

We see the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of metaphysical freedom culminates in the Middle Ages. In Middle Ages Thomas Aquinas is a philosopher whose philosophical thought is influence by Aristotelian conceptions of form and matter, actuality and potentiality. According to Aquinas, human being is both pure spirit and matter. The soul is an immaterial form and the entelechy of the body. The soul is intelligent, sensitive, and organic. Therefore, the soul has vital principle of the body in three form as the moving principle, the sensitive principle, and the intellectual principle. For Aquinas, it is the soul who possesses different capacity and function.

Aquinas believed that human being has sensuous and rational desire or will. One is not absolutely determined by one's desires, actions, and sense-impressions, but one has the faculty of self-determinations which gives one power to act or to not act. The notion of good must lie in the will before this decision to act or not to act is made. For Aquinas the will is "the prime mover in the kingdom of the soul."<sup>1</sup> In this sense, the will prompts intelligence and sensibility to action over organic life, but the will has no control. According to Aquinas intelligence and will, mutually determine one another. But the will is moved by intelligence and the intellect takes priority over the will. The will determines what intelligence conceives to be the good by a rational purpose. However, the intelligence is not compelled to the will because compulsion exists where a being is inevitably determined by the external cause. Human being chooses between the means of realizing good or the purpose which one's reason conceives because one is free and rational, and one is not pushed into action by an external cause without one's consent.

In this tradition, Descartes is another prominent philosopher who has given well-known argument for dualism. He distinguished mind and body as different substances that can exist without each other. These two substances are created by God and they only depend on God for their existence. Both mind and body has own principal attribute. Hence, thought is principal attribute of mind and extension is principal attribute of body. Apart from the dualism of mind

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<sup>1</sup> Thilly, Frank, 1924: 198.

and body, Descartes's idea of freedom is revealed by his epistemological discovery of truth and error that is similar to ability to do or not to do.

For Descartes, we observe that error depends on the concurrence of two causes, one is understanding that is a faculty of cognition and another the will that is an election or power of free choice. Our understanding alone neither affirms nor denies anything but only recognizes. In this case, God has given the will that is freedom of choice. The will is sufficient and perfect in which we are conscious of will so sufficient and superior to all limits. Therefore there is nothing so great and perfect to understand more than the will. The faculty of understanding has very small extent and is limited but the will is sufficient and infinite. The power of will makes us "able to do or not to do the same thing (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or shun it)"<sup>2</sup>

Descartes proposed that possession of freedom is not necessarily such that we are alike or indifferent toward each of two opposites. However, on the contrary, we are inclined toward the one because we clearly know it, that there is the reason of truth and goodness. In this case, God internally motivates our thought more freely, through which we choose and embrace truth and goodness. And this divine grace is natural knowledge that is very far from less liberty. If we always know clearly, what is true and good, we should have no difficulty to what judgment we ought to take and what choice we ought to make. Thus, we should be entirely free without ever being indifferent. What we clearly conceive true is not forced by any external cause. However, this is simply great clearness of understanding that is succeeded by strong inclination in the will.

In the Western tradition, generally philosophers have explained metaphysical freedom where freedom of choice and action is determined by either soul or God. In these cases, the body is always considered secondary, inferior, and only corporeal and mortal contrary to mind or soul which is immortal.

I find that Ricoeur's conception of freedom resolves the dualism of mind and body and explains human freedom through the reciprocal relation of mind and body. The reciprocal relation of mind and body is explained through the triadic interpretation of the act of will. "To

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<sup>2</sup> Descartes, 1962: 115.

say “I will” means firstly “I decide,” secondly “I move my body,” and thirdly “I consent.”<sup>3</sup> The will is same which is explored from three points of view but each point of view reveals respectively legitimacy, efficacy, and patience of the will together with the body (the involuntary).

In Indian tradition, Metaphysical conception of freedom is accepted by Classical Indian philosophers. Classical Indian philosophy is usually comprised of six ‘orthodox’ schools which are designated as Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, and three ‘unorthodox’ schools as Buddhism, Jainism, and Cārvāka. With exception of Cārvāka all schools of ‘orthodox’ and ‘unorthodox’ have accepted *moksha*-centric freedom. In Classical Indian traditions, “*Moksha*-centric” freedom is an “*atman*-centric”<sup>4</sup> where the soul or *atman* is absolutely free from all bondage and suffering. The bondage of soul or *atman* is result of one’s birth where the soul associates with body and mind, intellect, and senses. What is commonly accepted by all philosophers, is that bondage arises due to ignorance of real nature of the soul and human being can be liberated from this bondage (mind, body, intellect, and senses) through the right knowledge that is explained by each philosopher in a different way.

Indian concept of *Moksha* or absolute freedom is sought of freedom out of world and out of society, which is sought of his/her transcendent being. Daya Krishna explained his conception of freedom different from this traditional metaphysical conception of freedom. He explains the ideal freedom exists within bio-social situation. Where an individual always finds his/ her existence in the world with the body and others. In this sense, human being’s feeling of freedom is associated with successful achievement of one’s biological needs (eat, excrete, reproduce) and social needs (need for love, domination, prestige, power, and social approval). He explores individual reciprocal freedom with others, where each one is dependent on others’ co-operation in society for one’s realization of successful actions and choices.

Daya Krishna’s conception of freedom is divided in two realms active and contemplative realms or values. The active realm is always related to reciprocal freedom where

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<sup>3</sup> Ricoeur Paul, 1966: 6.

<sup>4</sup> These words are used from Daya Krishna’s book, *The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze over Three Decades*, 1989.

each individual depends on other individuals for one's successful actions and choices. In this realm, individual is always affected by other's choices and actions at institutional and family levels. On the contrary, the contemplative realm is related to one's own state of mind. Where individual is not dependent on others for one's contemplative state. In this realm, one experiences state of consciousness through one's imaginations. Therefore, I find that Daya Krishna not only rejected his traditional conception of metaphysical freedom but is also influenced by his traditional freedom in sense of seeking some ideal state beyond biological and social situation.

My investigation of the concept of freedom is based specifically on freedom in situation. In this attempt, I have explored a comparative study of philosophies of Paul Ricoeur and Daya Krishna, specifically their conception of freedom. I have organised and dealt this study into four main chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusion.

Chapter One is deals with "Embodied Existence," where I have discussed questions like: what is embodied existence/subjective existence? What is Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence? What is Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence? How Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception embodied existence explores the nature of embodied existence which is both free and determined and is different from absolute freedom or absolute determinism? What are the similarities and dissimilarities between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence?

Chapter One is divided into three sections. Section One deals with Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence and following questions: Is his notion of embodied existence absolutely free or absolutely determined or both free and determined contrary to absolute freedom and absolute determinism? Ricoeur's embodied existence is the unity of mind<sup>5</sup> and body<sup>6</sup>. He explores this unity of mind and body in three dimensions respectively as character, unconscious and life. Each of these three dimensions (character, unconscious, and life) are

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<sup>5</sup> Paul Ricoeur uses mind interchangeably with consciousness, will, freedom, and soul

<sup>6</sup> Paul Ricoeur uses body interchangeably with nature and necessity.

bodily involuntary and conditions of the will or freedom. Each of these bodily involuntary and conditions are always related to voluntary will for its meaning and understanding.

I have tried to explicate Ricoeur's conception of character as an embodied existence through uncovering issues like; what is the nature of character, according to Ricoeur? Can character be understood with/without freedom? How is character always associated with freedom? According to Ricoeur, character is first dimension of embodied existence and is always related to voluntary will for its understanding. We find that our ordinary conception of character is associated with ambiguity where it is understood as either malleable or fixed and determined. But Ricoeur's notion of character can be meaningful only with freedom. Character is one's own personality type or one's own way of choice through which one is recognized as a particular individual. However, character does not determine one's freedom, but it is only one's own way of thinking that makes one's freedom one's own. Character hold freedom without destroying it. But one's all freedom is possible in particular way.

Unconscious is second dimension of embodied existence that is associated with conscious life or intentional consciousness. Here I have dealt with issues like: what is the nature of unconscious, according to Ricoeur? Is unconscious something that is out of consciousness or in consciousness. How do Ricoeur explain unconscious with conscious life or intentional consciousness. Ricoeur explores unconscious as not something like hidden drama but it is obscure given matter in consciousness that gives form of our intentional consciousness. However, obscure given matter or unconscious does not determine our conscious life but is always associated with conscious life and provides content to our choice and our freedom.

Life is third dimension of embodied existence that is discussed by Ricoeur in two senses. In one sense, life is absolute bodily involuntary that is always associated with absolute voluntary consciousness and freedom for understanding. In other sense, life is the unity of both absolute bodily involuntary and absolute horizon of voluntary consciousness. In these two senses, I have tried to explore issues like: what is Ricoeur's conception of life? How do Ricoeur explain life as the unity both absolute bodily involuntary and absolute horizon of consciousness? Or how does he explain life as absolute bodily involuntary that is always related to absolute consciousness?



In first sense, life is absolute bodily involuntary that is always associated with absolute voluntary consciousness and freedom for understanding. In this sense, Ricoeur described life as ultimate layer of involuntary necessity like none other, because it stands at the core of consciousness. It is an absolute horizon of consciousness. Where one's all consciousness acts, all values, and all one's acts of free volition are dependent on one's being in life, but even this absolute horizon is necessary, and it is at the time absolute bodily involuntary. In this sense, one does not choose to exist in life, but one simply finds oneself there. In this case, Ricoeur uses life as bodily life which is different from the intentional relation of consciousness to its objects, this use of bodily life is lived through rather than being an intentional object that are known. The bodily life is enjoyed rather than known. We sense ourselves alive before we know ourselves as human being.

In second sense, life is the unity of both absolute bodily involuntary and absolute horizon of voluntary consciousness. Ricoeur analyzes embodied existence of life through three objectifications of it. One is a structure that regulates my body, second is a temporal development through the process of growth, and third the ultimate facticity of my birth. Each of these dimension objectifications, Ricoeur observes that objectifications of life is involved in the triple states of necessity outside of subject and subsequently of covering freedom itself there. In case of structure, the will appear as an effect of structure. In case of growth, the will is product of evolution of the living. And in the last case of birth, the will is result of its heredity. All these three dimensions of life as bodily involuntary or objectification of life always maintain the will and freedom in each case. Embodied existence of life always maintains subjective experience of life in which the bodily involuntary dimension of life is interwoven with voluntary will and freedom.

In Section Two, I explore Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence and deal with issues like: what is embodied existence, according to Daya Krishna? How is Daya Krishna explained embodied existence both free and determined? How is embodied existence different from the idea of absolute freedom and absolute determinism? According to Daya Krishna, the embodied existence is inseparability of mind and body. The embodied existence of being is both biologically alive with constraints and opportunities. It is both conscious and self-consciousness that makes one not only biological but also a mental or thinking being.

Daya Krishna says that human being has self-consciousness, but it does not mean that human loses his biological framework with the achievement of self-consciousness. They eat, excrete, and reproduce like other animals. Human beings like other animals feel free when they successfully pursue the goals and unfree when they fail to achieve their goals. In this respect, human beings are only a clever animal, more intelligent, more cunning and more successful, but they remain animal. What makes human being different from all other animals is the fact, they are not only biological animal, but they are also social animals. They have a particular way in which they make love or want to eat, However, the satisfaction of the primary biological needs can have preference in diverse sociological patterns. But whatever sociological pattern, it is always woven around the primary biological needs.

Daya Krishna explores bio-social and situational existence of a human being through one's feeling of freedom. Human beings accept both frameworks biological and social. The social framework is valuation pattern as one accepts and within the biological framework, one lives. The reason for both cases is the same, one happens to be born into biological and one is shaped by society he/she inherits. Within these two frameworks one makes self-conscious choice and feels free most of the time. He denied that freedom is absolute or given or something ontological or transcendental or God given but he proposes that freedom is exercise that can be increased and decreased by oneself and others.

In Section Three, I have tried to explore the similarities and dissimilarities of both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence with investigation of these issues: what are similar facts in both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence? What are dissimilar facts in both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence? As I have discussed that both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception embodied existence maintained that the nature of embodied existence is not only what human being is, but also what human being will be. What human being will be, is explored through the role of consciousness of human being with one's embodied existence.

Chapter Two deals with "Role of Consciousness", where I have explored questions like; what is the role of one's consciousness? Is the role of consciousness embodied subject? How do the idea of creativity, imagination or freedom arise? What is the role of consciousness, according to Ricoeur? What is the role of consciousness, according to Daya Krishna? Is there

similarity and dissimilarity between Ricoeur and Daya Krishns's conception of consciousness. These questions are dealt with help of three sections.

In Section One, I have explored Ricoeur's role of consciousness with questions like: what is the role of consciousness, according to Ricoeur? How does Ricoeur explore role of consciousness through consent? How does the idea of consent become possible? Is the idea of consent different from absolute negation? How is Ricoeur's idea of consent shifted from phenomenology to metaphysics? Ricoeur explored the role of consciousness with comparing it to wound or lesion that is referred as "the wounded *Cogito*." The *Cogito* or the consciousness is always experienced through the bodily necessity of its existence which he called as a "experienced necessity" or embodied existence. Ricoeur's idea of embodied existence resolves the problem of reflection where consciousness initially finds itself given in the world, but there exists a conflict between human existence where both mind and body or freedom and nature mutually negate each other. This mutual or reciprocal negation of freedom and nature is described by Ricoeur as "wounded *Cogito*."<sup>7</sup>

Mutual negation of freedom and nature is described by Ricoeur in three senses, "sorrow of finitude," "the sorrow of formlessness," "the sorrow of contingency", in all these three cases freedom and nature mutually negate each other. Ricoeur reconciles the division in self to itself through consent. Freedom and nature to the extent are seen to be incompatible, the only possibilities for the will or consciousness in face of nature are defiance or acquiescence. In this sense, the consent will either be impossible in sense of there would always be 'no' and never a 'yes', or it will be a surrender. Thus, consent requires some kind of transcendence of initial refusal, without which would be only continuum of nature. The possibility of refusal opens the way for an acceptance as making necessity or nature its own. He asserted that "the yes of consent is always won from the no."<sup>8</sup> Consent must be wrested from refusal to necessity or nature.

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<sup>7</sup> Ricoeur holds that the union of soul and body up to a certain point is a lesion in being itself or it is a secret wound in human existence. (Paul Ricoeur, 1966 : 444)

<sup>8</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 354.

Ricoeur explains that consent as reconciliation of freedom and nature is possible through initial refusal of limitation or situation. But the question arises: Is a yes possible in the face of necessity or nature, when freedom's primary response is no? What would be case to say yes? Does the affirmative declaration succeed in restoring a unity between one who is consenting and one possessing the nature or necessity? Who in this case consents? Does it restore the broken unity between one, oneself and one's world? Ricoeur explored this sort of unity using metaphysics. Ricoeur explained that phenomenological eidetic must be transcended by metaphysics which is associated with fault and Transcendence. He does not abandon his guiding principle the "primacy of conciliation over paradox"<sup>9</sup> and rejects the dualism of mind and body as well as shows inadequate uses of Transcendence. He explored his idea of reconciliation of freedom and nature through Transcendence is different from Stoics and Orphic idea of reconciliation of the two through Transcendence.

In Section Two, I have explored Daya Krishna's role of consciousness with dealing these issues: What is role of consciousness, according to Daya Krishna? How is his role of consciousness revealed through imagination and creation? how do imagination or creation provide human freedom? How is imagination or creation made possible human enterprises of knowledge, action or will?

Daya Krishna explains that there are two activities of consciousness, one as the source of consciousness and other as the product of consciousness. These two activities can be understood through activity of consciousness and self-consciousness. The nature or the source of consciousness is different from self-consciousness because the nature of consciousness is spontaneous activity whereas self-consciousness is reflective self-awareness. First level of consciousness (or source) is spontaneous activity that becomes evident at secondary level (or product) of reflection which is self-consciousness or self-awareness. At first level of consciousness, one has no cognitive role. Cognitive role arises only at second level of consciousness. Daya Krishna differentiates these two levels of consciousness as well as associates them through the idea of imagination.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 341.

The two activities of consciousness can be understood as source of imagining and is very nature of consciousness or *prima facie*, it is necessarily postulated other as the result of the felt resistance or check to one's activity of changing it called as the self-consciousness. The self-consciousness is always felt unsatisfying with respect to imaginative activity of consciousness. Everything that brings into being and whatever is brought into being is always found unsatisfying in nature by self-consciousness. The two activities of consciousness are themselves contingent in their nature. Daya Krishna explains idea of freedom through the two activities of consciousness where they are differentiated from each other as well as related to each other at advance levels.

The idea of imagination with two activities of consciousness explore two conflicting ideals of human beings as knowledge and action or will. One ideal is associated with the idea of knowledge that is based on reason or *Logos*. Reason or *Logos* proclaims the truth, which can never be more than what it is. The truth is always something timeless, eternal, and unchanging. On the contrary the other ideal, idea of action or will is based on experience and it cannot be thought without the notion of time, associated with past, present and future along with the notion of freedom or with the notion of creations. Daya Krishna discusses the two opposing ideals with idea of imagination and limitation. He declares that human beings cannot reject one ideal for other or give primacy to one over the other. The two ideals provide important values to human being as truth and Good. Daya Krishna asserts that imagination is fundamental activity of consciousness and wherever is life, there is imagination or heart of creation itself. But the idea of creation is not to be understood as pure attraction or pure possibility without any restriction or limitation.

In Section Three, I have analysed the similarities and dissimilarities between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's idea of consciousness with the questions: What are similarities between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's idea of consciousness? What are dissimilarities between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's idea of consciousness? Further, I have tried to explore that how Ricoeur explores his conception of freedom through reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary. And how Daya Krishna explores his conception of freedom through reciprocal relation of individual and others.

Chapter Three deals with “Freedom and Reciprocity,” where I have discussed questions like: What is reciprocal freedom, according to Ricoeur? What is reciprocal freedom, according to Daya Krishna? What are strengths of reciprocal freedom? What are limits of reciprocal freedom? These issues have dealt with three sections.

In Section One, I have tried to explore Ricoeur’s conception of reciprocal freedom dealing with these questions: What is reciprocal freedom, according to Ricoeur? how does reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary work in decision, movement, and consent? According to Ricoeur, freedom is reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary in decision, movement, and consent. These three are acts of the will which are always reciprocal of three forms of the involuntary as motive, ability and necessity or nature. “Deciding is the act of the will which is based on motives: moving is the act of will which activates abilities or power; consenting is the act of the will which acquiesces to a necessity.”<sup>10</sup> Ricoeur describes these three acts of will as the same will, but from different point of views.

In Section Two, I have tried to explore Daya Krishna’s conception of reciprocal freedom with these issues: What is reciprocal freedom, according to Daya Krishna? Is individual’s freedom reciprocal with others’ freedom? Is there other type of freedom in-spite of reciprocal freedom of individual and others? According to Daya Krishna, human being is social being where individual’s freedom is reciprocal with others. Individual always finds his/her existence in the world with others. Freedom is the one thing that perhaps everybody wants, if everybody wants freedom then freedom becomes impossible because each one gets freedom to extent one wants it. Daya Krishna writes, “One’s freedom seems to be essentially limited by the freedom of others and thus nobody can be free, for each is limited by the other.”<sup>11</sup> The problem of freedom may only be solved by giving up the dream of absolute freedom. Each one accepts the limitation of one’s freedom by others.

With exception of this negative sense, each one’s freedom may enhance the freedom of others and this positive sense in many cases works. Neither children will not grow and adult, nor will society function and men survive if there is no positive relation with others. Daya

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<sup>10</sup> Ricoeur, 1966: 341.

<sup>11</sup> Krishna, Daya, 2012: 33.

Krishna elaborates individual's reciprocal freedom with others whether one's freedom is reciprocally limited and enhanced by other's freedom. This reciprocal freedom of individual's with other individuals is either heaven or hell it depends on their positive and negative relation of one another.

Further, Daya Krishna conception of freedom is related to two different realms active freedom and contemplative freedom. His idea of freedom is not only limited to reciprocal freedom of one's with others. However, he explores freedom beyond reciprocal freedom where one always tries to achieve one's ideal state of one's own consciousness and moves from active freedom to contemplative freedom. His idea of contemplative freedom gives possibility of transcendental freedom where one is very less depended on worldly things. That will be my purpose in next chapter to explore contemplative freedom as a possibility of transcendental freedom.

In Section Three, I have tried to give some argument regarding to strengths and limits of reciprocal freedom with these questions: What are strengths of Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal freedom? What are limits of Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal freedom? What are strengths of Daya Krishna's conception of reciprocal freedom? What are limits of Daya Krishna's conception of reciprocal freedom? Is notion of freedom possible beyond reciprocal freedom? if the notion freedom is possible beyond reciprocal freedom then what is the nature of that freedom.

Chapter Four is based on "Possibility of Transcendental Freedom," where I have tried to explain Daya Krishna's idea of contemplative freedom that provides the possibility of transcendental freedom. In this chapter I deal with questions like: is freedom possible beyond reciprocal relation of individual's with others? How does the contemplative freedom give possibility of transcendental freedom? What is the conception of transcendental freedom? How is transcendental freedom different from absolute freedom or transcendent freedom or *mokṣa*-centric freedom? These questions have been dealt in three sections respectively.

In Section One, I have discussed Daya Krishna's conception of real and unreal, real and ideal, the distinction between two are explored in two different values of human beings as

active and contemplative. The two values are related to two realms of freedom active and contemplative. I have tried to explore the two realms of freedom as active and contemplative with some issues like: what are active values? What are contemplative values? How does active value explore active realm of freedom? How does contemplative value explore contemplative realm of freedom? What is the significance of active and contemplative realms? Can active and contemplative realms be understood with moral ought and axiological ought?

The distinction between real and unreal, real and ideal are associated two distinct realms of human being. Real and ideal are distinction between one's active values where one tries to make things, the way one feel they ought to be. But distinction between real and unreal is metaphysical headache where one finds things are not as one had taken them to be. This discrepancy gives feeling of unreal, but one always seeks real as values and avoids unreal that is considered as disvaluational. The problem is common in both cases real and unreal, real and ideal. They both real and unreal, real and ideal appear apparently insoluble. However, the unreal and the ideal both have still to be granted some sorts of reality. What is common between the two distinctions real and unreal, real and ideal both deny the value is given only in reality.

Daya Krishna explains that in case of active values there is always an intrinsic gap or leap between real and ideal. This leap can only be bridgeable or healed through contemplative values. Further, these two values provide two realms of freedom. The two realms of freedom give two different significance of human life. Daya Krishna also explains that the two realms of freedom can be understood with moral ought and axiological ought. Where active realm of freedom is related to moral ought and contemplative realm of freedom is associated with axiological ought.

In Section Two, I have tried to discuss how does Daya Krishna's conception of contemplative freedom give possibility of transcendental freedom? How is transcendental freedom different from transcendent freedom or absolute freedom or *mokṣa*-centric freedom? Daya Krishna's idea of contemplative freedom provides total freedom that arises from love, friendship, appreciation of nature, aesthetic contemplation and mystic meditation. But he still maintains that this ideal notion of freedom is not absolute freedom from one's mind and body as accepted by classical Indian philosophers. But here, one is situated concretely but one is not



depended on others reciprocally for realization of one's own ideal freedom in contemplative realm. One's consciousness itself provides this freedom through self-awareness or imagination of others without others concrete or present engagement. In this case, I have discussed the best example of the contemplative realization of love as ideal freedom or transcendental freedom is given in *bhakti* tradition of India. Daya Krishna explains ideal state of *bhakti* through *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* and the *Gītā Govinda*. Where the *gopīs* are the perfect example of the ideal realization of love with ideal freedom.

In Section Three, I have tried to critically evaluate Daya Krishna's conception of contemplative freedom dealing with these issues: can we have contemplative experience of friendship and love without other's co-operation? Can we appreciate the nature without natural beauty or nature? Can aesthetics contemplation be possible without other? Does mystic meditation convert transcendental freedom into transcendent freedom? Can we understand active and contemplative realm reciprocal or depended on each other for their realization?

I have dealt with the above-mentioned issues and questions in the following four chapters, and subsequently the synoptic account of the discussions is in the conclusion.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Embodied Existence**

This chapter will focus on exploring the nature of embodied existence. This philosophical position is in stark distinction from a dualist perspective of mind and body. Embodied existence is a complex concept which acknowledges both, the unity of mind and body as well as the inseparability of the two. It also explores human being's subjective existence. It is concrete existence of human being, as the way one finds his/her existence in the world with one's body. An individual's body is neither completely determined nor fixed like an object. However, the body itself is subjective existence – that is a unity of consciousness and body. The unity of mind and body reflects the idea of embodied existence or subjective existence. This subjective existence is neither completely determined nor absolutely free. Instead, embodied subjective existence is both free and determined and is different from either complete determinism or absolute freedom.

Conception of embodied existence is developed by phenomenological and existential methods. In this chapter, we will explore the embodied/subjective existence of human being explained by Paul Ricoeur and Daya Krishna. The idea of embodied existence explains individual as unity of both mind and body. Unity of mind and body reveals human freedom within situations and deals with issues like: what is an embodied existence of a human being? How this conception of embodied existence is different from pure objective and pure subjective existence? Is embodied existence both free and determined?

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section One explores embodied existence and its three dimensions which are character, unconscious, and life as explained by Paul

Ricoeur. Each of these dimensions of embodied existence are discussed in following three sub sections respectively.

Section Two explains the bio-social and situational existence as described by Daya Krishna. According to him, bio-social and situational existence are embodied existence of human being. One's embodied existence is revealed through feeling of freedom and unfreedom within bio-social framework.

Section Three deals with comparative analysis of Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conceptions of embodied existence. In this section, I will discuss the similarities and dissimilarities between these two conceptions of embodied existence.

## **I. Embodied Existence in Paul Ricoeur**

Ricoeur explains that embodied existence of human being is different from pure subjectivity and pure objectivity. In a pure objective world, one is without freedom. There would be nothing to understand, because there would be no one to understand it. However, a pure subjectivity without objectivity is also unintelligible because it exists in itself beyond the world and the body, and it is only an act of willing or rational choice. For Ricoeur, embodied existence is related to bodily existence, as the way we are and experience our existence in the world and it always exists together with consciousness and voluntary will. This embodied existence is a subjective understanding of human being that is paradoxical unity of both bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness.

Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence is revealed through three figures of "bodily involuntary"<sup>12</sup> in form of character, unconscious, and life. Each of these figures introduce a passive dimension into the consciousness. Yet this description of the bodily involuntary does not abandon consciousness to the realm of the involuntary necessity and not deny role to subjective experience. Instead, Ricoeur's notion of embodied existence or "experienced necessity"<sup>13</sup> leaves an active role for the consciousness to play in the constitution of the

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<sup>12</sup> Ricoeur, 1966: 343.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 355.

meaning of bodily involuntary and this active role of consciousness is different from an absolute consciousness. Here the active role of the consciousness emerges only in response to a prior set of conditions imposed by the bodily involuntarily. This interplay between activity and passivity takes place in embodied existence or experienced necessity and is a paradoxical relation or a unity of both the bodily involuntary and the voluntary consciousness or will. In this section, I will discuss the three dimensions of bodily involuntary in form of character, unconscious, and life. Each of these specific dimensions of the bodily involuntary hold together the consciousness and the will. I will deal with each of these dimensions in following three sub sections A) B) and C) respectively.

### **A. Character**

Character is the first dimension of embodied existence that is always related to voluntary will or freedom for its meaning and understanding. Moreover, it is the unity of both voluntary will and bodily involuntary and nature. Our ordinary conception of character is associated with ambiguity. On one hand, we think of character as something malleable that can be formed and later changed, but on other hand, we also say it is a kind of personal destiny or fate that is fixed and determined. Therefore, questions arise regarding character as to what character really is? Is character freely malleable or is it a determined fate or destiny of a human being? Is character both malleable and determined?

Ricoeur explains character through the interrelation between character and freedom. He utilizes the tools of Husserlian phenomenology as character cannot be understood adequately in terms of intentional consciousness. Character is not a content that can be modified by consciousness. Character is not something that we can identify as an object and then freely choose to accept or reject. Ricoeur writes, “I should be greatly mistaken if I proposed to change my character: I cannot know it in order to modify it, but in order to consent to it”<sup>14</sup> In spite of being something that we actively create, our character can be described phenomenologically as a material given that is our uniqueness of self and particularity. In this

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 370.

way, phenomenology of character states that it does not identify the self as general type, rather indicates the uniqueness of the self.

Ricoeur adopts Merleau-Ponty's notion of perceptual style and insists that character must always be understood in relation to a concrete situation. Our character leads us to encounter possibility of freedom in a determinate way or in our own style. Our character therefore does not refer to the content of what we think but to a particular way of approaching concrete situations. In other words, we can say that character is the lens, through which we are able to see our options and choose them. In this way, character is a personal style of handling situations, and is not "a class, a collective type, but my unique self, inimitable . . . a singular essence."<sup>15</sup> Consequently, our character is not a necessary fate that would determine what we do, but it is an opening for our freedom.<sup>16</sup>

Ricoeur explains the embodied existence through character, is always related to movement of will for its understanding or meaning. As such, we can never perceive character itself, but character always interweaves with some movement of the will or freedom in relation to its motives and its powers. This interrelation between freedom and character appears in such way, we first believe in our total responsibility and our unlimited freedom and then we recognize that we can use our freedom according to our given situations as the way we are with our finite and immutable mood or circumstances. We find that our character always appears through our movement of the will or freedom. Character is always incoercible aspect of our coercible powers, and it is also an invincible aspect of our controllable motives, these incoercible and invincible aspects of character are non-willed aspects of our decision and our effort. Thus, freedom is always presented in form of decision and effort.

Ricoeur discusses the subjective existence of character through a bond between character and the involuntary of our capabilities and motives. Our desires and our habits are our principal powers that have an order of life in sense of how they are arising, functioning, surviving, becoming extinguished and does not change at all as long as we live. This style and permanent way do not say anything about which desires and habits, are related to us at any

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 367.

<sup>16</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 160.

given time. Thus, character represents our embodied subjective existence through the finite structure that is always associated with our infinite possibility of freedom and each one does not limit each other, although they are present for each other or in each other.

We can understand this relation of character in form of finite and infinite that are presented to each other or in each other through our life of motives. What makes our choice and action good or evil? Alternatively, what make us cruel or charitable? We have full freedom to what we choose there is no reason inaccessible to us or no virtue or vices restricted to us or imposed on us in spite of our passion. Motivation is unlimited, but our character forces us to choose virtue or vice or good or bad, this value is only related in our own way, as what type person we are. All values are accessible in some respect to all human beings. No one is excluded from all morality; each value is given universally which individual can stamp it with his/ her individual mark. If character does not appear in the course of motivation, it is because of deliberately not thinking of this special mark. But the purpose of value is our reasons of the individuality about which we never think. Therefore, character is always our own way of thinking irrespective of what we think.

A subjective existence of character influences our effort and our decision in no other way. Our character is not in some respect inferior to ourselves, it is not a part of all, or nothing escapes individuality. Without particularity of character, we cannot understand structure of our freedom or our will. Capabilities, motives, willing and all within us bears the mark of a character type. Freedom itself as “possible existence”<sup>17</sup> has a structure that makes it a given character or nature. Ricoeur explains presence of character by synthesis of the universal and the individual where all values are given universal, but through our individuality or particularity all values are accessible in the world. Through the syntheses of freedom and nature or individuality all decisions are at the same time an unlimited possibility as well as a constituted particularity. This idea of embodied existence in sense of character is always associated with finite and infinite dimensions of character. On the other hand, character is a situated consciousness that is not completely determined, but always exists through its given situation. This embodied subjective understanding of character does not destroy our freedom,

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 370.

but it holds our freedom without destroying it. Here, all our freedom is possible in a limited and narrow sense.

Ricoeur denies the notion of objective character that considers that only character as we are with our body and rejects the role of freedom or consciousness, this idea of objective nature or character makes character meaningless. This is why, Ricoeur explores dialectic conception of character type where only shelter of freedom can make character meaningful and be restrained from turning into psychological determinism. Consciousness yields and can only become its own when consciousness is appropriated through what we do. For this reason, consent is not the unstoppable autonomous act. But consent is the opposite of an initiative that is actively assumed by consciousness. And we only have right to recognize the conditions and limits of freedom when we actually exercise it.<sup>18</sup>

Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence through character describes the paradoxical unity of freedom and nature or bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness or will. We can understand both freedom and nature through each other. Both freedom and nature have no meaning if we try to understand them separately. Ricoeur uses descriptive phenomenological method and explores meaning of embodied existence where both involuntary character and voluntary freedom become meaningful and perceivable only when we understand one regard to other or vice versa.

Ricoeur's interpretation of embodied existence of character is neither completely objective understanding of character, nor completely subjective understanding, rather it is unity of both as bodily involuntary and voluntary will or freedom. However, I find the problem in the way Ricoeur discusses character as both bodily involuntary and voluntary freedom or will, and character as bodily involuntary that is always associated with voluntary consciousness (will or freedom). There are always conflicts and overlaps between the use of freedom and character or character itself and bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness. This raises questions; is character itself both bodily involuntary and voluntary will or freedom? Alternatively, is character always related to voluntary will or freedom? If character is always related to freedom, then how character can be both free and determined as discussed by

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 371.

Ricoeur. If character is both bodily involuntary and voluntary will (freedom), there is conflict between his use of interrelation between character and freedom.

## **B. Unconscious**

Unconscious is the second dimension of embodied existence that is always associated with conscious life or intentional consciousness for its meaning and understanding. Moreover, it is the unity of given matter and intentional consciousness. Ricoeur's discussion of unconscious is critique of his contemporaries, including one of his former teacher Roland Dalbiez, who objectifies the unconscious and ascribes thought to the unconscious. Ricoeur's other critiques are related to "realist" interpretation of the unconscious, the "physics" of the unconscious, and Freud's "geneticism."<sup>19</sup> According to Ricoeur, realist interpretation of the unconscious is result of psychoanalysis that is displacement of the human being from consciousness and freedom to unconscious and the involuntary. And the unconscious appears through causal force that determines the content of consciousness. In this case, the unconscious is the essence of the psyche while consciousness is reduced to its after-effect. But, Ricoeur rejects the notion of realist that it is the discovery of the unconscious which forces us to choose between either the absolute self-transparency of consciousness or the absolute obscurity of the unconscious<sup>20</sup>. We can escape these alternatives through Ricoeur's notion of embodied existence of unconscious that is paradoxical unity of the obscure matter and conscious will.

Ricoeur uses Husserlian phenomenology that separates the given matter or *hyle* from the corresponding apprehension. Ricoeur borrows this notion and suggests that thinking about unconscious, it is also possible to distinguish between the impressional matter and intentional consciousness. "By associating the unconscious with the hyletic material of consciousness, this implies that the unconscious is not another scene of thought; it is not a repressed set of representations that stand behind the scenes of conscious life and determine it."<sup>21</sup> Different from this idea, according to Ricoeur,

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<sup>19</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 161.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 161



A hyletic material, it can be associated with the pre-reflective dimension of conscious life that is passively given prior to any intentional act or apprehension of that material. The unconscious, as simply the matter of lived experience, is thus qualitatively different from intentional consciousness that is guided by representations.<sup>22</sup>

We can understand this notion of given matter and conscious life through hidden potentiality of unconscious that is the unity of given matter and conscious life. This study of hidden leads a similar thought like character, that is a unity of infinite freedom and finite particularity where “all freedom is an infinite possibility tried to a constitutive particularity. It is inseparable capacity of being and a way of being given.”<sup>23</sup>

The study of hidden or unconscious leads us to similar thought like character. In case of hidden, we are responsible for the form of our thoughts and at the same time our thought is nourished by an entire obscure matter and hidden presence. This hidden presence makes each initial act a consequence of what we have been. Therefore, unconscious or hidden is a paradoxical synthesis of “*definite form and indefinite matter*”<sup>24</sup> that can be understood in one irreversible direction like our character which is immutable nature and can be recognized merely under the protection of the affirmation. This protection of the affirmation makes our will and consciousness as “I am, I will—in the same way the existence, appeal, and even power of the hidden can only be proffered in the context of the thought which affirms itself as consciousness and will.”<sup>25</sup>

Like idea of embodied existence of character is always understood and meaningful through what we do and is unity of our freedom and nature. The same idea goes to unconscious that is associated with indefinite matter and definite form of conscious life where the indefinite matter shapes affective drives, needs, emotions, and this affective realm gives content to our choice and our freedom. This affective realm of unconscious does not determine our conscious

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>23</sup> Ricoeur, 1966: 407.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 407.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 407.

life, but only becomes appropriate to our conscious life and our conscious life is always outside of its control.

The same problem emerges in the case of unconscious as embodied existence, the way we see character as embodied existence. We find the conflict and overlap between the uses of unconscious that is the unity of given matter and conscious life. Alternatively, unconscious is always associated with conscious life. If unconscious is always related to freedom, then how can unconscious be both given matter and conscious will. If unconscious is the unity of both given matter and intentional consciousness, then how can unconscious be separate from conscious life or freedom.

### **C. Life**

Life is third dimension of embodied existence that is discussed by Ricoeur in two senses. In one sense, life is absolute bodily involuntary that is always associated with absolute voluntary consciousness and freedom for meaning and apprehension. In other sense, life is the unity of both absolute bodily involuntary and absolute horizon of voluntary consciousness. I will discuss these two senses of embodied existence of life in two sections respectively.

#### *Life as absolute bodily life with absolute consciousness*

Life is ultimate layer of involuntary necessity like none other, because it stands at the core of consciousness. It is an absolute horizon of consciousness. Our all conscious acts, all values, and all our acts of free volition are dependent on our being in life, but even though this absolute horizon is necessary, and it is at the time absolute bodily involuntary. In this sense, we do not choose to exist in life, but we simply find ourselves there. Ricoeur uses life as bodily life which is different from the intentional relation of consciousness to its objects, this use of bodily life is lived through (*erlebt*) rather than being an intentional object that are known. I am going to discuss how Ricoeur explains bodily life together with freedom and intentional consciousness as a whole.

Bodily life with phenomenological knowledge of human being is where bodily life is no more than the spontaneity of motives and power that is certain necessity of existing that we cannot hold longer at an arm's length to examine and control. Bodily life is not only a lower part of our selves over which we rule, but we live as a whole, and we have to be alive in order to be responsible for our bodily life. And being alive in our very freedom and what we control is what makes us exist. Therefore, bodily life is initiation of consciousness in which we have remarkable characteristic. It is not a value per se rather it is the condition of all values. If we destroy our bodily life then all the values are scattered. In this trait, we can already sense the peculiar necessity which belongs to bodily life. Bodily life is extra systematic motive on which all other motives depend even when we prefer them over bodily life. The potentiality of bodily life is the grace of bodily life whose flow constitute the force or weakness of our courage. Bodily life is manifested yet in other traits, all potentialities, all motives have a more or less precise outline which stands out as a form out of the ground. We experience our bodily life at the core of our consciousness and sense the invincible and irrefutable positing of an existence which escapes us.

Bodily life is enjoyed rather than known: a certain large affectivity reveals our bodily life before our reason which can explain it to us. In this case, we sense ourselves alive before we know ourselves as human being. However, the state of bodily life or affectivity is difficult to establish because it can be said that it is devoid of intentionality, in which we intend nothing, it is an essential characteristic of a perceived object that present itself in multiple ways; whether we turn it or it turns before us, provides plurality of aspects. Yet our bodily life is in no sense an object which presents itself under different expression, we understand our bodily life always without perspective. We experience our bodily life as very center of perspective in which all perspectives of objects exist. We do not observe our bodily life, but we can observe things in our bodily life. Ricoeur represents bodily life as experience and non-perspective of consciousness of our body. Here the consciousness and the body are not two heterogeneous substances but the elementary form of the apperception of ourselves.

This affectivity of consciousness of ourselves as body reveals bodily life to us as indivisible and we as living totality. In this case, bodily life is the unity that circulates among the functions like feeling and idea, but it is never plural. The consciousness gives itself to

enumeration of parts, function, and acts. Only freedom and bodily life are willed existence and existence undergone and transcend enumeration. Ricoeur says,

I exist as one. We can see this in all the forms of organic or “proprioceptive” affectivity: the best localized synesthetic sensations arise out of a global, non-localizable affective ground. Pain while wounding me here or there, affects me as a vital totality (experienced totality whose objective symptom is the radiation, the diffuse reflexes and the generalized reactions which disperse the localization). This is why I can say, “I have a pain in my foot” and not “my foot has a pain.” There is a special pain consciousness which is not strictly somewhere *in* the body—as the individuality of experienced space—and which brings together local feeling of pain.<sup>26</sup>

In this sense, all hunger, thirst, and other needs are mixture of the local or bodily and non-local or mental. Therefore, we are divisible as space and as a machine, and indivisible as bodily life. Bodily life is susceptible to levels and tonalities, but not to parts, it is the indivisibility of extension and of movement in the first person. We fear for our bodily life in sense of death or its divisions is its end. As Ricoeur writes, “My death itself presents itself to me as a return to the divided object par excellence: dust.”<sup>27</sup>The necessity involved in bodily life is a consequence of these two characteristics, one is what we felt as invincible is non-willed positing of ourselves and other is the brute fact of existing as we find that we exist.

### *Life as Unity of Both Mind and Body*

Ricoeur explores life as embodied subjective existence where it is the unity of “both willed and undergone”<sup>28</sup> We see how Ricoeur explains life is the unity of both willed and undergone that is absolute unity of soul and body. “To live is to alive (*Leben*) but it is also to have the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 412.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 413.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 414.

lived experience of being alive.”<sup>29</sup> Embodied existence of life can be understood in two dimensions “as a being that is in life as a subject that experiences life.”<sup>30</sup>

Ricoeur analyzes embodied existence of life through three objectifications of it. One is a structure that regulates my body, second is a temporal development through the process of growth, and third the ultimate facticity of my birth. Each of these dimension objectifications, Ricoeur observes that objectifications of life is involved in the triple states of necessity outside of subject and subsequently of covering freedom itself there. In case of structure, the will appear as an effect of structure. In case of growth, the will is product of evolution of the living. And in the last case of birth, the will is result of its heredity. All these three dimensions of life as bodily involuntary or objectification of life always maintain the will and freedom in each case. Embodied existence and experienced necessity of life always maintains subjective experience of life in which the bodily involuntary dimension of life is interwoven with voluntary will and freedom. And I will explain these three dimensions of embodied existence of life respectively.

Life as a structure marks the static component of Ricoeur’s analysis. Living creatures are distinct from objects because they carry out of biological functions. The structure of life creates a balance among the various function of life, in sense of respiration, digestion, temperature regulation, and so on. Each these functions are necessary to sustain life and they happen automatically without our input. These structure functions are as Ricoeur holds “a problem resolved as though by a greater wisdom than myself”<sup>31</sup> we can say that we do not need to do anything voluntarily to regulate these structure functions. In the sense that they function in us but without our voluntary effort. These structural functions establish and maintain an equilibrium between our surrounding environment and ourselves.

Although our biological life is under the guide of instinct and is a problem that is resolved completely by our life. This biological life is different subjective life that is unsolved problem for us. However, our life in sense of biological or bodily that has been already solved

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<sup>29</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 162.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 162.

<sup>31</sup> Ricoeur, 1966: 418.

in the sense that we have nothing to do with our biological or somatic processes of the body. But yet we do have an important role to play in caring of our body. For example, we do not have to be concerned with the beating of heart, but we do have to care for the health of our heart. We do not have to be concerned with our digestion. But we do have to be concerned of what we eat. We see that these two aspects of our life await our embodied subjective existence. Ricoeur refers this aspect of our life is at the same time both “a task and a resolved problem.”<sup>32</sup>

This relation between the two meanings of our life is still a vague feeling and as ambiguous as life reveals. In this case, Ricoeur must give up harmonizing the subjective experience of willing and the objective knowledge of structure in a coherent knowledge. He explores only within the Cogito resides willing where the relative involuntary and the absolute involuntary are mysteriously harmonized. However, this mysterious agreement cannot express directly, it always exists at subordinate place of life in consciousness. Ricoeur concludes the finite manner (character) and indefinite matter (the unconscious) are conditions of will or consciousness. In the same way, he concludes, “*life is the condition sine qua non of the will and consciousness in general.*”<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, Ricoeur does not accept any pure objective significance of the concept of condition *sine qua non*. Literally, it expresses a form of partial causality. Therefore, a sort of reverse impact of phenomenology on biology can limit the totalitarian claim of explanation. This concept of condition *sine qua non* is revealed only in this limitation. Therefore, Ricoeur’s method of the laws of structure are different from biology or Gestalt psychology which generalizes the laws of structure. For him, the laws of structure do not explain the whole man because we discover our life as a part of ourselves. The laws of structure are an index of experiences of our life as the absolute involuntary: this experience is always a subordinated and entailed experience. Ricoeur holds, “It is the *total* experience of the Cogito which declares the experience of necessity partial.”<sup>34</sup> We find that this condition *sine qua non* provides some

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 417.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 421.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 422.

intelligibility into the experience of necessity. Thus, the concept of condition *sine qua non* is an index that is different from pure objectivity.

Ricoeur discusses the second dimension of life as process of growth.<sup>35</sup> This temporal dimension of life presents a methodological challenge for the eidetic method of life. Because eidetic describes essence, and essences are not temporal. This eidetic method deals with embodied existence of a human being through a maturity and adult. They take place in between the process of becoming as adult and that of becoming old. Ricoeur focuses that the temporal dimension of life and becoming is important in its own right. For this reason, Ricoeur accepts a genetic phenomenology is also necessary. Because it works in the opposite direction from an eidetic. Eidetic approach explains the lower points of development in terms of the higher. On the opposite, a genetic approach explains growth historically and it explains the higher by way of the lower. In this sense, we find that embodied existence of life is both its history and the necessity of growth.<sup>36</sup>

Ricoeur engages “a psychology of ages”<sup>37</sup> and he tries to make a balance between the eidetic and genetic approaches. As every age deals with its own perfection and it is a peak in its own way. This makes every age possible to respect the multiple aspects of humanity. And multiple aspect of humanity avoids to reduce the general type of growth to a single paradigm in sense of single development point. Each age includes the developmental stage on the way to becoming an adult as well as those of aging. As a result, there is ultimately no opposition between a genetic and an eidetic approach. Each age is only paradoxical in sense when we speak of personal development, in which a person becomes him/ herself.

For Ricoeur, growth and aging are comparable to character. Our aging has an element of fate in the sense that aging takes place regarding of what we might happen to do or want. However, there is also an attempt to objectify age and move towards it into a general type. This

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<sup>35</sup> Ricoeur discussed life as a continuous segment in the development of the living and each instant life behave in particular way towards equilibrium and adaptation. Understanding of process of growth introduces a new dimension of life as embodied/ subjective existence. Life as process of growth is always associated with a temporality of aging as adolescence and senescence to set it more strongly.

<sup>36</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 164&165.

<sup>37</sup> Ricoeur, 1966: 428.

happens, when we think about individuals as members of generations. This is of course, the case that our age presents a specific style by which we are able to engage the world and interact with situations. But, even though we grow up and eventually grow old, and we see that age is not simply a matter of constraint and limitation, but it is also an orientation of freedom: “the field of an unlimited freedom open only within these finite bounds.”<sup>38</sup> Once again, we understand our growth and age through the dialectic of the voluntary and involuntary. The time of aging is both a resolved problem and a task. Where on the one hand, growth and aging take place regardless of what we do. But this organic involuntary, on the other hand, is shaped by the decisions that we make. Therefore, aging presents a situation and an opportunity to choose what we become how we age.

The third and last aspect of life as embodied existence is our birth. Our birth as accomplished holds the full growth of the necessity and casts an outline of our freedom. In this sense, our birth is the beginning of our life in which we are placed once and for all in the world. So, it is posed in being before we are able to posit any act voluntary. We are always after our birth in a sense analogous to that of being always before our death. In this way, we find ourselves alive – we are already born. We can say that our birth is precisely what is always hidden from our consciousness. Therefore, we cannot say that we are alive before our birth because we are after our birth. Ricoeur says that our birth is not only the beginning of our life, but it expresses its dependence with two other lives (our present), we do not posit ourselves because others have posited us. Others have willed this brute existence which we have not willed. Therefore, we have not received only a beginning that we are not willed, but a nature that is the law of growth, the structuring principle, an unconscious, and finally the form of a personality type. In this sense, to be born means to receive the “capital of heredity.”<sup>39</sup> We find this by our ancestors who are a donor and this legacy is a mortgage. Thus, all forms of necessity become entangled.

Ricoeur gives up the objective meaning of the idea of beginning and accepts a subjectivity of birth. He holds that by strange paradox, it is only subjectivity that birth can be beginning and not only connection. He believes that it is only our subjectivity which makes us

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 432.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 434.



unique and only unique entity can begin rather than merely to be always some other entity. Yet it is subjectivity that misses a beginning. On the contrary, for biology birth is only an incident between the intra-uterine and external life of the same individual and it is only union of two cells which themselves continue the start of life growing. In this case, there is no sense of beginning in the radical sense we begin to be. But the idea of beginning, passing to the objective point of view is supposed to have disappeared here already.

Ricoeur accepts that one's beginning is the center of an absolute perspective, extends our ancestry upward from us just as our descendants spread out downstream from us. In this case, our being will be alienation. We leave ourselves in order to place ourselves in a being outside our control, our ancestor, and follow out a chain of effects simultaneously to ourselves. This chain of effects has the remarkable quality that is not the chance of indeterminism, but chance defined as encounter of independent causal series. In this way, we appear ourselves as an effect of chance. Even if we do not know anything about genetics, we will already be bothered by the idea whether we as one derives from two beings who it will be seem at first, have been other and they have made us other. Therefore, we ourselves will appear as a possible combination out of considerable number of combinations that did not come about. The magic of objectivity has become the magic of combinations. Ricoeur writes, "On the descending trajectory of causality I am derived from the other, and discover that I could myself have been another, as the other possible combinations are other. This is the alienation which I inflict on myself in genetics."<sup>40</sup>

This establishes our relationship with our ancestors that alienates us at the same time places us on a level suited to a science of heredity. Once we speak in term of genes it is the history of these genes, which is already differentiated in ontogenesis that alone can be interests of individual. And the individual no longer comes into consideration except as the bearer of the seed that is itself coming from parental seed. In this sense, this new posture develops a consistency as the posture of the species. In this case, the individual is basically servant of the species. This level of necessity a self-sufficient understanding of a human being becomes possible. Ricoeur believes that "on this last level the same encroachment of the objective

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 436.

necessity on certitudes of subjectivity, that is, on the self-affirmation of freedom, can be consummated: I am an effect produced by my heredity.”<sup>41</sup>

Ricoeur examines philosophical consideration of our birth as the capital of heredity that binds us to ourselves as the only two aspects of our beginning. In beginning as an “I” it participates in a lineage. Our ancestry is another name for the beginning of our existence. And our study of necessity comes to an end. This beginning which escapes memory is not rationally understood that biology hides in the succession of generations. This must be suggested in the heart of consciousness as the short-lived limit beyond our oldest memories. At first sight, it seems that we have no hope of finding in consciousness, the testimony to its birth. Even the most obscure consciousness finds us already alive. Ricoeur describes this as

This flight from my birth which escapes the hold of my memory is precisely the most characteristic trait of my experience—if we can call this lack of experience experience. This flight illuminates the nature of a living being such as I. I experience life as having begun *before* I began anything whatever.<sup>42</sup>

Anything that we can decide comes after the beginning and before the end of death. In this way, all beginning by freedom is paradoxically tied to a non-consciousness of the beginning of our existence itself. The word beginning like the word existence has a double meaning. In one sense, there is beginnings which are always imminent, and this is the beginning of freedom as our beginning of act. And in another sense, there is a beginning which always precedes, and this is the beginning of life as our beginning a state. Ricoeur explains, “I am always in the process of beginning to be free, I have always begun to live when I say, “I am.” As birth, all necessity is prior to any actual act of the “I” which reflects on itself. The “I” is at the same time older and younger than itself. This is the paradox of birth and freedom.”<sup>43</sup>

Thus, our birth is a beginning with a fixed limit. Our birth is the terminus which we sense as limit by the spacing of the last points of memory in its direction. We cannot reach at birth by our consciousness as an experience event, however, this obstacle is not purely negative,

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 436.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 441.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 442.

but it reveals the lower limit of the Cogito. We never reach it as a memory, our birth cannot repeat through memory as a choice that we have made. In the way, a limit can only integrate into consciousness in consent. This consent to being born is to consent to life with its opportunities and its obstacles.

I have discussed how Ricoeur has elaborated embodied existence of a human being associated with character, unconscious, and life. These three are invincible conditions of a human being within which a person's freedom of the will arises. This type of human freedom is not a creative freedom, but it is a willing freedom which is possible by embodied subjective existence of human being that is as both "a resolved problem and a task."<sup>44</sup> We have a biological body that sustains and maintains some functions independently from our will and freedom. And it explains in sense that our will and freedom have a role in shaping the meaning of bodily involuntary. In other words, it is only within a given life circumstance that we can become the particular individual who "I am, that I can value what I value, that I can accomplish what I accomplish"<sup>45</sup>

## **II. Bio-Social and Situational Existence in Daya Krishna**

Daya Krishna elaborates nature of embodied existence that is inseparability of mind and body. Embodied existence of human being is being biologically alive with constraints and opportunities. It is both conscious and self-conscious that makes one not only biological but also a mental or thinking being. Daya Krishna explores bio-social and situational existence of a human being through one's feeling of freedom. He holds that human being biologically possesses same characteristics as all living beings in sense of being pre-programmed by his genetic make-up. All living beings repeat the life of their species and follow the journey to old age and death. On the contrary, a human being possesses self-consciousness of himself or herself and others.

Individual human has self-consciousness of birth and death that makes him different from all other living beings. One's self-consciousness of birth and death is always related to

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.,417.

<sup>45</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 166.

oneself and everyone else who is perceived as 'other'. The other is seen as inevitable necessities of being born and one see death happening around one all the time. The case of dying is something that is not only happening with oneself, but with other also. One cannot see oneself as being born, but one must accept it on grounds which are well known. Yet one really has no 'lived' experience of one's birth. One is always surprised to see one's photographs as a child or an adult or an old age. One does not like one's picture of old age, but one still lives with the belief that no one is forever young or youthful.

Similar case happens with death; one may imagine oneself dying but can hardly believe it. As Daya Krishna refers,

one 'lives' in a consciousness which seems to be 'timeless' confined to a 'perpetual present' where the past and the future occur only as 'ghostly presences' and that too only fitfully and marginally as 'memory' and 'anticipation' projected backwards and forwards by the 'living present' in which one 'lives' and which alone is real as one 'lives' in it.<sup>46</sup>

One perceives others, grow old and die as children are born, grow up and become old. Old are getting older day by day as young do not remain younger any longer. It is body that weakens and decays and is always subject to illness, disease, and disability and finally death. One has to go through his/her biological conditions and limitations. One or everyone does not choose biological limitations and conditions, but individual and all human beings must go through biological conditions and limitations. In case of death, human beings have at least a matter of choice that is not freedom from disease or illness or disabilities from which they can try to recover by medicine. However, they have a choice to use modern technique and can be kept artificially alive for longer period. As we all realize that there are some cases in which no one wants to live with intensive care. For instance, coma or paralyzed patients or in many other diseases in which patients live many years. Also, everyone around that knows, no one is living in these conditions with his/her desire but anyone in these conditions are living in despair, hopelessness and helplessness. No one knows what to do in these conditions. Therefore, life

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<sup>46</sup> Krishna, Daya, "Bondages of birth and Death: Emerging Technologies of Freedom on the Horizon and Hope of Final Release from the Foundational Bondage of Mankind" p. 2.

expectancy has increased through modern techniques, but the biological limitations of disease and disability of old age remains, and no one knows what to do about it.

Daya Krishna discusses a human being's freedom is not only constraint biologically, but one has consciousness and self-consciousness that give opportunity of freedom. Similarly, one is not only limited by others, but one's freedom is also enhanced by others. Human beings do not lose their biological framework with the achievement of self-consciousness. They eat, excrete, and reproduce like other animals. Human beings like other animals feel free when they successfully pursue the goals and unfree when they fail to achieve their goals. In this respect, human beings are only a cleverer animal, more intelligent, more cunning, and more successful, but they remain like animals. However, there is one aspect that make human beings different from all other animals. That is from the fact, human beings are not merely biological animals, but they are also social animals. They have a particular way in which they make love or want to eat. However, the satisfaction of the primary biological needs can have preference in diverse sociological patterns. But whatever sociological pattern, it is always woven around the primary biological needs.

The biological needs are always satisfied within the social pattern. The existence of society with its inter-group and interpersonal relation provides new needs such as needs for love, domination, prestige, power, and social approval. These needs although are less insistent than the biological ones. However, human beings' biological needs are persistent and color the whole life of sociological being in such way that other living beings do not. Therefore, the feeling of freedom in human beings depend also on the successful satisfaction of these social needs. If these do not satisfy then it gives a feeling of frustration and unfreedom. Both the inter-group and interpersonal nature of society is determined by the society in which one happens to be born. One accepts both frameworks social and biological. The social framework is valuation pattern as one accepts and within the biological framework, one lives. The reason for both cases is the same, one happens to be born into biological and one is shaped by society he inherits. By the same bio-social forces which one now comes to accept. "The more differentiated a society has become, the more it would be the mores and norms of the *group* in

which one happens to be born that determine one's valuational perspective rather than that of the whole of society."<sup>47</sup>

Daya Krishna accepts that freedom is only within bio-social frameworks and these frameworks are mostly accepted by individual. He says that no one feels unfree because he cannot fly or reach the moon. It is wrong conclusion, but we can be thoughtful of that one was not free when there were no airplanes, or no cars, no motor, no radio, television, and thousand other amenities of modern life. Human beings did not feel less free, or they did not feel at all lack of these things. Therefore, the existence amenities of modern life do not make us feel freer, however, we have accepted these within the framework of modern life. If we ignore this fact, then this leads to two fallacies, one is called as the retrospective and the other as prospective. In the case of retrospective, our belief will be that people of past were less free than people of today. In the case of prospective, people of future will be freer than they are today. For Daya Krishna, "As people mostly accept the perspective of bio-social situation within which they are born, they experience their freedom or unfreedom within the limits set by the perspective and not by the limits of the perspective itself."<sup>48</sup>

According to Daya Krishna, the consciousness of a person is not only egocentric, but it is also a point-centric. Point-centric consciousness confines itself in the present. In this way, the problem regardless one's feels free or unfree is always at the moment, past and future failures or successes are irrelevant. Therefore, the feeling is independent of specific nature of the problem with which one's mind happens to be concerned at the moment. The solution of problem depends more on success or failure in the present. In this way, there is no total feeling of freedom or unfreedom, but a feeling that continuously varies of freedom or unfreedom; it is a result of a change in nature of problems that occupy the present of one's consciousness.

Daya Krishna discusses the perspective of failure can adjust in two ways, one way is giving up the goal sought, and another way is accepting the limitations that the perspective imposes on the individual related. These two, of course, do not exclude each other; in fact, they

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<sup>47</sup>Krishna, Daya, 1989: 223.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 223.

are complementary to each other. Yet, they are in some sense different to each other. For instance,

A paralytic does not exactly give up the goal of becoming well but he also, on the other hand, accepts the limitations imposed and exercised his freedom within those limitations. His problems, if he is a paralytic of fairly long standings, are no more concerned with the paralytic perspective, for that he has come to accept as his framework of living. Similarly, the man who is in jail, the man who is born blind, the man who has had an accident, the man who has lost a near and dear one—these and a hundred others, who find themselves in similar situations, accept the perspective of their living and do not feel free or unfree because of it, excepting in some vague generalized way—the way, perhaps, in which a person feels unfree because he has a body, because he has to work within the limitations of space and time, because he grow old.<sup>49</sup>

For Daya Krishna, a human being accepts his bio-socially determined end within the framework of the cultural patterns one has been born and he is accepted by most of persons. Moreover, the feeling of freedom or unfreedom mostly depends on the achievement of success or unsuccess of these ends. He says that bio-socially determined ends appear as freedom only when we as participant contrary to the objective observer, believe that a human being is much determined as any other animal.

However, a human being is capable of achieving self-consciousness that raises question of the ends. The notion of ends is related to either particular group of ends or with the whole notion of ends itself. To the first case, belong a reformer or revolutionary and in the second case, one comes to question the biological base of life itself. This biological framework is formed by birth and death. In this case, human beings stand before their ultimate freedom as freedom to deny their whole being or life. Daya Krishna describes as, “Man is the only being who can choose not to Be. Therein lies his greatest freedom—the freedom from ends, from life, from conscious Being. He is the only animal who can commit suicide, a self- conscious annihilation of itself.”<sup>50</sup> This case of self-annihilation is a choice that is the ultimate foundation

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 224.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 225.

of freedom in a human being. But, the horizon of self-annihilation makes possible the freedom of being that is conscious. This freedom is not realized by death or for death. However, death is merely the attainment of being and therefore no question of freedom or unfreedom arises.

According to Daya Krishna, suicide is not a free choice but only a choice that one has been constrained to make because there has been frustration or failure in life. However, it is life that triumphs in a suicide. As “it is not annihilation that has been accepted, but the values of the life, *for the sake of which* one chooses annihilation.”<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, suicide is also one’s choice in situation when one really decides to choose death, not because of he has failed to achieve his expectations, but one chooses it. Therefore, one can choose otherwise his inmost freedom not to be. One can accept biological framework of birth and death and seeks to realize posited ends on the secondary level. Thus, the feeling of freedom does not depend on the fact whether the ends are posited by us or for us, but only the fact whether the ends have been accepted by us, so the question of positing becomes irrelevant. According to Daya Krishna, the fact of death does not give us feeling of freedom, rather the conscious transcendence of life through death provides feeling of freedom. In most cases, death, and life occur to one as same in which one involves and not chooses. But in case of death, there is at least the possibility of choice by which one can preclude life.

Daya Krishna explains that a self-conscious acceptance is as much free as self-conscious rejection. Freedom therefore, does not lie in the acceptance or rejection of this or that, however, it is a self-conscious choice of either. And the self-conscious choice is always made within a perspective. The perspective forming the framework is accepted by all human beings in which they feel free most of the time. However, in case of biological framework, one has life that is not chosen by one and one has ultimate choice by which one can prevent life, the two great facts in which the consciousness of a human being can come to face within itself. But one is not taken from oneself and one exists before any choice of to be or not to be.

Daya Krishna not only discusses individual’s biological framework, but also emphasizes on social framework where he explains the facts of dependence and inter-dependence. No one can even escape the fact of dependence and inter-dependence, yet one

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 225.



feels free and believes that he/she can have more of it if one wills and makes the effort. A human being is different from other living beings, in sense he/she has to be acculturated, educated in the mores of the society in which individual is born and learn the language in both sense verbal and non-verbal. By society individual is made to learn as what to do and what not to do. An individual is accepted by others through a pre-determined formal process whether one has condition that is given by others as one's name and religion. The name of individual is given when one was born into the world. One grows up gradually and thinks one is a Christian, a Muslim, a Hindu or a Buddhist before to be a human being. One finds these given identities by others. It does not mean that one is only determined by these given identities or conditions. However, one may of course have possibility to change one's name and convert to another religion or adopt another nationality, but first one has to go through a pre-determined process in order to which one is accepted by others. Daya Krishna explains,

But whatever the restriction or compulsion there is always the possibility of a change and this defines the difference between 'nature' and 'culture' both of which constitute the 'determining and the 'conditioning' circumstances of man as a biological species, as also a social-cultural being which he alone is, and which differentiates him from all other species.<sup>52</sup>

Daya Krishna asserts that an individual human is born as individual in the biological sense like all other living beings, but an individual becomes individual in strict human sense by the help of others. Others were also helped to become individuals among human beings by others. Individual's emergence of "I" or self-hood that is related to freedom, itself is connected to others. Individual feels responsibility and accountability to others in self-consciousness where one is treated as an individual who is free and responsible for what one does, and one is responsible for praise or blame and reward or censure for what one has done. Individuation, freedom and responsibility go together in learning to become an individual by help of imitation or mimesis. "The mimesis or imitation thus is not an endless repetition by successive generations in sense of what they learnt from their predecessors, but rather, of the innovations and the changes that had been found interesting and worthwhile by them."<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

However, each generation passes on its innovations and changes to succeeding one and challenges past generations to at least try to approximate them if not surpass them. Therefore, for Daya Krishna, the freedom of creative contribution though conditioned and circumscribed, is nevertheless real enough to itself. Every conditioned and circumscribed become conditioning and circumscribing factors through what it brings into being and those who come after feel the same uncertain and ambiguous relation toward it. Daya Krishna denied the unconditionality of freedom which is supposed to be free from limitations. He says that “to be a ‘free being’ is first to be a ‘being’, and the ‘freedom’ has to be constrained and constituted by the ‘form’ of one’s being.”<sup>54</sup> A human being is not in a vacuum or a vacuous kind of being, but a human being is a specific kind of being. And this being happens to be not only biologically alive with limitations and freedoms, but it also possesses both consciousness and self-consciousness. Creative contribution of freedom come out through the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness that is itself conditioned and circumscribed but the conditioned and the circumscribed are contingent in itself or nevertheless real enough to itself. However, freedom itself becomes conditioning and circumscribing factors through what it brings into being.

Freedom is denied the facticity of conditioning because it is the freedom that feels itself to be unconditioned and always demands to be unconditioned. Limitations and constraints are seen contingent in character and freedom is limited and constrained by the circumstances of its being situated in empiricity that itself is contingent on character. Freedom cannot be empty and is not changed or affected by anything. Freedom without limitation is impossible in principle. The dream of freedom without condition of anything else turns into an absurdity, as there is nothing left to be conditioned by freedom. Daya Krishna comments on the idea of ‘ideal’ ‘omnipotence’ or the notion of freedom involving the possibility and necessity of being free from everything else, including one’s own desires, seeking, and aspirations. One’s freedom can be limited or enhanced by one’s own and other’s freedom. We see that the nature of freedom is always enhanced or lessened by oneself and others. Human beings are enterprise of knowledge, action, and willing and it is possible only through freedom. In all cases freedom is limited and conditioned by itself, because what is brought into being by freedom is

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

contingent on its presuppositions. Freedom's presupposition restricts freedom itself and presupposition of freedom must accept the creation of anything further new. Therefore, the successive acts of creation not only go on restricting freedom but increasing the constraints on creation and brings into being.

Freedom is always associated with what freedom brings into being and what freedom presupposes. These two dimensions are always related to what is 'ideal' and not in present that are realized by the actions of both individual and collective level. This is presupposed by any and every achievement of human beings which they engage or challenge about something that is already achieved. Yet to be achieved and be challenged and never be achieved once and for all or can even possibly be achieved. This dilemma in deeper level defines the relationship between temporality and non-temporality, time and timeless or empirical and the metaphysical or the phenomenal and the noumenal both coexisted in consciousness and rooted in it. Freedom lies in double capacity of consciousness at the human level to move outward or return inward

As it pleases, bound neither by the one or the other, and hence at another level, feeling itself 'free' from both. Neither of these can define it exclusively or exhaust its reality as it 'appears' to itself as transcending both, no matter if this is 'judged' to be illusory by the consciousness itself when it 'sees' the situation 'objectively' and tries to understand it. Both the 'outward' and the 'inward' movement seem to have in-built limitations not exactly known to man, and perhaps, 'unknowable' in principle,<sup>55</sup>

The outward movement is explained in two ways, on one hand it is givenness of the body and physical world and on the other hand it is the socio-cultural and political-economic worlds. While the inward movement is the result of the very nature of consciousness and self-consciousness. It is also result of the interactive inter-relationship between the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness.

According to Daya Krishna, freedom is possible only within bio-social situations. He says that human beings have consciousness of itself and others. He explained freedom is exercised or maintained or changed for something which has already been there. "Thus,

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

presupposed as an a priori precondition of the ‘exercise’ of freedom that makes us feel and realize that we are free. But what is thus presupposed is itself in most cases a result of the exercise of freedom by others or oneself in the past.”<sup>56</sup> This is the result of exercised freedom given around one all the time and where one finds acceptable or unacceptable, desirable or undesirable. Freedom confronts itself with its own creations and finds itself bounded or freed by them. Individual’s freedom in the world is not alone all the time, but intrinsically and inevitably with the other rather others. Others can be the source of enhancement enjoyment of one’s freedom or in negative sense, others can be constriction, lessening or one’s feeling of bondage. These two feelings of individual with others are both hell and heaven. The difference is between a negative and a positive relationship of individual’s with others. Individual’s freedom alone and with others are embedded in the large world constituted by living being with infinite variety.

All conditions of freedom are not related only to the individual, but to humanity as a species and all that is signified by society, culture and civilization. Daya Krishna explains, freedom always exists but not the way it feels itself to be or one thinks itself to be. Freedom is a matter of degree where it always can be more or less. Freedom is like everything else that is real or exists. “It also can have qualitative differences within it, and its differences along the value dimension are enormous. It can become evil or good, increase or decrease; it is a function of indeterminately numerous factors, including those that are in oneself or others.”<sup>57</sup> Freedom in the world doesn’t exist once and for all. It is not something which one is born with, or innate to one or something which one, can never lose.

Daya Krishna believes that freedom can be developed and enhanced through one’s retrospective experience and it can be lessened or destroyed by oneself or others. There are some events over which one has no control for example paralysis, coma, loss of memory or other such type of events. He describes freedom as

Thinking about ‘freedom’ has to be ‘freed’ from illusion of its being there as something ‘given’ as something ontological, or transcendental, or non-natural, or something God-‘given’ to man alone, ‘given’ as fixed and final, rooted as it is in

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<sup>56</sup> Krishna, Daya (2005) “Eros, Nomos, and Logos,” p. 172.

<sup>57</sup> Krishna, Daya, 2005&2006: 50.

the nature of human reality itself; forgetting that there is no pre-given, unchanging nature of man, or of anything else, and that the 'dream' of power associated with it.<sup>58</sup>

According to Daya Krishna freedom is empirical, determined, limited, constrained and conditioned, but not in the strong sense where one has no possibility of changing or feeling of freedom. Although it is conditioned and determined by conditions that influence, affect, or give rise to, but it is also act of creations or brings something into being that is always incorporated in feeling of freedom. The feeling of freedom is never completely achieved, but it can be possibly achieved by oneself or others.

### **III. A Comparative Analysis of Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's Conception of Embodied Existence**

Ricoeur and Daya Krishna both explain the embodied existence of human being; however their treatment of this concept differs widely. As discussed above, Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence is explored in two sense, one involuntary body which is always associated with voluntary mind (or consciousness or soul), and the other embodied existence which is the unity of both body and mind. This embodied subjective existence of one's makes one both free and determined at every moment. As discussed in section one, Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence is association and union of bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness. We see this union and relation of bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness through three figures character, unconscious, and life. These three dimensions of bodily involuntary are not only always associated with conscious will and freedom but are also the unity of both bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness. And this union and relation of bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness are always present with freedom and limitation.

However, Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence is different from Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence which is the unity of body and mind. Ricoeur focuses on how this unity of mind and body gives meaning or understanding together and are two dimensions of human beings. Daya Krishna has not focused and discussed the unity of

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 51.

body and mind through two dimensions of human beings, although embodied existence is inseparability of these two. For him, a human being is not merely a biological being like all other living beings. But also has self-consciousness of oneself and others that makes a human being different from all other living beings. However, one does not lose one's biological and social frameworks with the achievement of self-consciousness. The self-consciousness of one give feeling of freedom and satisfaction or unfreedom and unsatisfaction of biological and social needs. The feeling of freedom and satisfaction are related to when one successfully achieves one's biological and social needs. And the feeling of unfreedom and frustration are associated with when one fails to achieve biological and social needs.

After explaining the differences in their conception of embodied existence I will explore similarities between them. They both, accept that nature of embodied existence is both free and determined at every time. They both, reject complete determinism and absolute freedom of human being. For Daya Krishna, freedom is either exercised, maintained or changed with respect to something already given which is never complete in itself. Although it persistently tries to make itself complete through one's exercise of freedom and action. For Ricoeur, nature of embodied existence is the unity of body and mind. He explains this unity in three dimensions as character, unconscious, and life. We see that these three are not completely determined but are conditions and limitations of the consciousness or the will where the consciousness or the will is yielded. Individual's freedom is always related in a specific manner, where one's freedom is not determined but one makes its own freedom.

We can see that both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna accept individual's biological nature as well as the role of consciousness. They both accept that every individual is biologically different from other individuals in form of his/her individuality. An individual is personality type as well as one has some inherent tendency that one finds given. Given facticity is also the unity or inseparability of consciousness by the nature of unity or inseparability of the two, whatever given is itself contingent. Daya Krishna holds that a human being is specific kind of being that is not only biological being as well as a conscious and self-conscious being. A human being's self-consciousness always denies whatever is given, conditioned and makes it contingent. For Ricoeur, one cannot change one's character or given nature, but it can only understand or make meaningful with the consciousness (the will or freedom).

We also find another similarity between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna in their conception of embodied existence through the sense of life. They both accept that life starts with birth and ceases in death. In case of birth or life one has no choice for one's birth, but it is the foundation of all choices and wills. Both of them assume life is given in two senses, in one sense, it is state and condition of freedom and in other sense, it is always act of freedom. In Ricoeur's two senses, one sense, is the unity of consciousness or soul and body and the other sense, is absolute bodily life with absolute consciousness. In former sense, life is objectively given as structure, process of growth, and birth. These three dimensions are objectification of life which is simultaneously incorporated in freedom. Life in these three dimensions is partially given objectively that would be meaningful and complete through the consciousness or freedom of will. In later sense, the nature of embodied existence reveals life as pre-given material with some tendencies. Yet at the same time, pre-given is not causally determined consciousness although the consciousness retains the resources to respond what is given and provides meaning to given nature. According to Daya Krishna, life is foundation of one's biological life as well as nature of consciousness and self-consciousness. In life one finds oneself is given biologically and socially as state of being or condition of being that is presupposition of self-consciousness or freedom. It is life that gives creation and freedom but every creation and freedom themselves are constrained and limited by their presupposition.

Daya Krishna's idea of freedom reveals his conception of embodied existence. On the contrary, Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence reveals his idea of freedom. Daya Krishna's notion of freedom is not only related to individual, but he always discusses individual freedom with others. Individual finds oneself with others in his/her society and environment. Where one's feeling of freedom is not only enhanced or lessened by oneself but is also increased or decreased by others as well. Daya Krishna's idea of freedom is not only associated with biological needs but is also related to social needs that arise through inter-group or interpersonal relation of one and another. Ricoeur's notion of freedom is associated with individual. He explores his idea of freedom through first person centric. Where one's freedom of action, decision, and consent can be understood through embodied existence that is the unity of mind and body or freedom and nature.

In this Chapter I have discussed the nature of embodied existence that is unity and inseparability of body and mind. Here I have only focused on the unity and inseparability of the two. In next chapter, I will explore the role of consciousness that is not separate from body. I will also explore how one's freedom becomes possible or brings something new into being that can be understood through the role of consciousness.



## Chapter 2

### Role of Consciousness

Identity of a human being is not only defined by what one is, but also with what one will be. The idea of what one will be, is always related to one's role of consciousness. In this chapter, I will explore the role of consciousness as explained by Paul Ricoeur and Daya Krishna. According to Paul Ricoeur, the role of consciousness is mutual negation of freedom<sup>59</sup> and necessity<sup>60</sup>. This mutual negation of freedom and nature always reconciles through consent. His idea of consent is act of will that is acquiescence of necessity which comes through the initial refusal of necessity. He describes consciousness as "wounded *Cogito*" because the act of consciousness is always limited by bodily necessity. Whatever makes consciousness particular or limited is always negated by consciousness. This continuous refusal of necessity is wrested by consent and results in reconciliation of freedom and nature. On the other hand, according to Daya Krishna, a human being is not only conscious, but is also self-conscious. Both consciousness and self-consciousness play different roles in shaping a human being. Consciousness is root of imagination or creativity in human being. Creativity or imagination is the source for freedom at human level. Self-consciousness of human being has the power to move one towards the world and object. It shapes and molds oneself and world, to become a worldly human being. In this chapter, I will discuss these issues: what is the role of one's consciousness? Is the role of consciousness embodied subject? How do the ideas of creativity, imagination, or freedom arise?

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<sup>59</sup> .Paul Ricoeur uses freedom interchangeably with consciousness, will, and soul

<sup>60</sup> .Paul Ricoeur uses necessity interchangeably with nature and body

I will deal with these issues by exploring Paul Ricoeur's and Daya Krishna's idea of consciousness in two sections. In Section One, I will explain Ricoeur's idea of consciousness which deals with concept of consent. The idea of consent will be explained in two sub-sections. Sub-section A describes mutual negation of freedom and necessity or nature. Sub-section B will describe the process from refusal to consent.

In Section Two, I will elaborate Daya Krishna's idea of consciousness through imagination or creativity. The idea of imagination or creativity will be discussed in two sub-sections. Sub section A explores the idea of imagination through consciousness and self-consciousness. Sub-section B will describe the ideas of imagination in knowledge and action or will. In Section Three, I will comparatively analyse both Paul Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's ideas of consciousness.

## **I. Consent in Paul Ricoeur**

Ricoeur explores the role of consciousness with comparing it to wound or lesion that he referred as "the wounded *Cogito*." The *Cogito* or the consciousness is always experienced through the bodily necessity for its existence which he called as a "experienced necessity". The experience necessity or the embodied subjective existence brings out the paradox or ambiguity of the human condition, which is the dichotomy of mind and body or freedom and nature. The embodied subjective existence is both the experiencing subjects who lives "for the world" and the objects who "live in the world." Ricoeur's idea of embodied existence resolves the problem of reflection where consciousness initially finds itself given in the world, but there exists a conflict between human existence where both mind and body or freedom and nature mutually negate each other. This mutual or reciprocal negation of each other is described by Ricoeur as "wounded *Cogito*",<sup>61</sup> or "the pathos of the involuntary."<sup>62</sup>

The wounded *Cogito* is always healed by consent. Consent must be wrested from refusal to necessity or nature. Ricoeur uses consent in more technical way, different from

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<sup>61</sup> Ricoeur holds that the union of soul and body up to a certain point is a lesion in being itself or it is a secret wound in human existence. (Paul Ricoeur, 1966 : 444)

<sup>62</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 166.

common use where it is understood as granting permission for something to be done. Instead, consent is the will's acquiescence to the involuntary. Ricoeur describes the idea of consent is involved in fault and Transcendence. These two dimensions of consent be a shift from phenomenology to metaphysics. It is his new methodology which resolves the conflict between freedom and nature through the hope of Transcendence which he called, a "fraternal tension within a unity of creation."<sup>63</sup> Consent is the reconciliation of freedom and nature that is possible only through initial refusal of necessity or nature. We can understand consent through the role of consciousness played in the process of arriving to consent. I will explore this process in following two sub-sections A and B respectively.

### **A. Mutual Negations of Freedom and Necessity or Nature**

Necessity or nature is active negation of freedom or consciousness. Necessity makes one particular or limited and represents the possibility of non-being. According to Ricoeur, necessity of consciousness lies in three bodily conditions namely character, unconscious, and life which are involuntary. These three bodily involuntary conditions are always related to consciousness and remain external to the will or consciousness. But these external conditions do not simply leave the will or consciousness unaffected or unmoved. Instead, these are wounds of being or *Cogito*. The embodied subjective existence is the union of the dualism of mind and body or freedom and nature

There is always a rift in embodied subjective existence due to discordance between the voluntary desires which tries becoming absolute and the conditioning or limiting role of the involuntary. "To be a living self, then, is to be divided by "experience necessity" and also to suffer from this self-division"<sup>64</sup> as Cogito always experiences the bodily necessity for its existence. Ricoeur elaborates how these three dimensions of bodily involuntary relate to their own modality of wounding *Cogito*. Each one corresponds to pathos of involuntary in *Cogito*. Ricoeur calls this as, "the sorrow of finitude", "the sorrow of formlessness", and "the sorrow

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<sup>63</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 481

<sup>64</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 169.

of contingency.” These three pathos of involuntary are mutual negation of freedom and nature that I will discuss one by one.

### *Sorrow of Finitude*

Ricoeur’s analysis of character indicates that it is the condition for one’s originality. One’s character emerges from the gap that separates the infinite realm of possibility from the finite reality of one’s actuality. If one would be only pure possibility, then one would be no one particular and would not be distinguishable from anyone else. It is the one’s character that determines something particular in one. Character makes one distinct from others. This originality of one, at the same time gives a wound in the consciousness. The particularity of one’s character is wound of the will that limits one’s aspiration to be absolute. One’s character establishes one’s own uniqueness that makes one, at the same time one cannot be anything and everything.

This double negation in terms of necessity can be understood through role of character. For Ricoeur, having a character is one of freedom’s mode of being and it makes one’s exercise of freedom finite. But this finite mode of freedom is itself infinite possibility of freedom, in way to becomes someone rather than others. One suffers from all of other missed possibilities that cannot be realized and that one cannot become. Having a character is negation of all otherness. Every choice of individual intensifies one’s individuality or particularity but makes one more and more not other. All possibilities are open as totality for human experience, but only few are open to one. One’s particular choice stops countless other possible choices. One always suffers from the fact that one can only be oneself and no other one else. Ricoeur calls this as the sorrow of finitude.

### *The Sorrow of Formlessness*

The unconscious for Ricoeur is not a hidden drama that exists behind the scenes of consciousness. Instead, unconscious enters into one’s experience but in a way that is concealed from intentional consciousness, it touches one’s affectively by shaping one’s needs, desires,

and drives. This influence of the unconscious, points to an obscure influence on one's conscious life that stands outside of consciousness. And this realization of unconscious obscure influence creates a wound in the *Cogito*. Because the unconscious always challenges to conscious desire for self-mastery and self-transparency. When one becomes aware of unconscious influence over one, the unconscious pushes one into the abyss of the boundless. The self or *Cogito* is put at risk to the extent that "its power is my impotence, its spontaneity is my passivity that is, my non-activity."<sup>65</sup> Therefore, one would become possessed the obscure drives of the unconscious that threatens one with the risk of a loss of oneself. "The depth of the unconscious gives rise to a pathos that Ricoeur calls "the sorrow of formlessness." It is a pathos that emerges from the loss of any established boundaries that would demarcate myself from what is not myself."<sup>66</sup>

### *The Sorrow of Contingency*

The above two sorrows derive from embodied subjective existence and are described very briefly by Ricoeur. On the other hand, he discusses the third and final pathos in detail, because it arises from the deepest level of the involuntary. Life for Ricoeur is the ultimate figure of the involuntary because it "sums up all that I have not chosen and all that I cannot change. It is the sheer positing of fact at the root and at the heart of freedom. All that we have tried to think of as a moment of the *Cogito* must now express its non-being."<sup>67</sup> Therefore, life marks the complete facticity that precedes and situates one's freedom. "This realization produces a wound as a result of the tension between my desires for aseity, or to be self-sufficient, and my dependency on the involuntary dimension of life"<sup>68</sup>. Ricoeur calls this wound of *Cogito* as "the sorrow of contingency" and its pathos is elaborated with three objectifications of life namely, structure, growth, and birth.

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<sup>65</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 449.

<sup>66</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 167.

<sup>67</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 450.

<sup>68</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 167.

Life as structure is the bodily processes that maintains one's life. The bodily processes are maintained automatically without the influence of one's will. But at the same time, somatic functioning is entirely contingent, the various systems of body can break down or cease operating at any time without any warning. The failure of the organization and regulation of one's bodily systems provides pain and illness. This experience of pain is negated by consciousness in such a way that the body is subjected to pain. When one suffers from pain, one's body is divided from oneself as "it is non-self, non-thought, non-willed."<sup>69</sup> One's experience of suffering from pain is the wound that teaches one's exteriority of the body or it is a lesson about one's contingency. This contingency of body forecasts that one's body will one day cease and be reduced to dust. This pathos of body results from the contingency and is called as the sorrow of contingency by Ricoeur.

Life as growth is human development which demands distention of the self over time. According to Ricoeur, "growth is not only the major key that follows the process of becoming an adult; it also includes the minor key that follows the process of becoming old, and the negative effects of aging are 'the shadow which accompanies' growth"<sup>70</sup> we, by aging encounter the wound of becoming. In growing old, we experience the irreversibility and discontinuity of life that Ricoeur says is "more often a cocophony than a melody"<sup>71</sup>. Human distention is more than unity. We are tied to the passing of time, opened by the irreversibility of time. We cannot go back and undo the past, whatever we have done, cannot be erased. At the same time, we also cannot cling to the present. We cannot cling time passage even if we would want to. Our aging produces the sorrow by the fact that time will move on without us and independently of our will.

Life as birth indicates the absolute contingency of one's own bodily existence. One's contingency is highlighted by the pure fact of one's existence. This pure fact of existence is not defined in terms of aseity, or self-sufficiency. One does not posit one's own existence, in spite of that, one is thrown into the world. This factual situation is the situation of one's birth

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<sup>69</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 451.

<sup>70</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 168.

<sup>71</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 453.

and has a contingent character. When one looks back into one's ancestry only to discover that one is not the product of any necessary chain of events rather a chain of contingent relation that could have been otherwise. This contingency makes one aware that one's life situation cannot exist at all: "I am here and that is not necessary."<sup>72</sup> One experiences the wound that arises out of the tension between one's desire to be a necessary being and one's reality as a contingent. This preceding objectification of life produces the wound of *Cogito* and One suffers from the realization of one's contingency. This fact of contingency goes on without one's will.

One is associated with each of these three layers of involuntary with a distinctive wound to *Cogito* or self, caused by its own distinctive pathos of involuntary. These wounds are the product of the involuntary that prevents the desire of consciousness to become absolute. Ricoeur describes the clash between the voluntary and the involuntary as "suffering acquires its philosophical significance."<sup>73</sup> in sense, "what is suffered is not a physical wound or a physical pain, instead, what is suffered is a rift in the self, due to experience necessity. This analysis of embodied *Cogito* is one's life. It can be explained in two senses as both a subject that experiences life and the body that is situated in life. Ricoeur borrows Maine de Biran's expression that suggests, "life is a source of unity as well as division. The division between the voluntary and the involuntary dimensions inscribes a secret wound or a fracture that divides the self from itself, as we have seen with regard to the three figures of the involuntary."<sup>74</sup>

## **B. From Refusal to Consent**

Ricoeur reconciles the division in self to itself through consent. He describes consent as "Refusal marks the most extreme tension between the voluntary and the involuntary, between freedom and necessity. Consent must be wrested from it: it does not refute it, but transcendent it."<sup>75</sup> Therefore, there are two possibilities open in case of necessity or nature as refusal and

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 456.

<sup>73</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 169.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>75</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 466.

consent. The act of consent is saying “yes” to the inevitable and overcoming the initial refusal or “no” to the nature that seems to indicate the will’s acquiescence to necessity. On the other hand, without consent refusal is only an option that reduces freedom into the words as a refusal, and a rejection. This refusal and rejection are highest expression of freedom where one is not bounded by any necessity. This ultimate expression of freedom can be seen in the act of suicide a freely performed destruction or mastery over the situation and over life itself. This express of freedom makes life totally absurd.

According to Ricoeur, this kind of freedom is not victory, but an escape from freedom. He suggests another posture of freedom is one of patient courage to face necessity or situation and continue to accept the responsibility of freedom. This affirms a different type of “no” or refusal that is a “no” to non-being of necessity, which is but to say “yes” to necessity itself as being in the world with the body or the nature. This can be understood in short, as every consent is born from the initial refusal of limiting conditions of the human situation as “the sorrow of a finitude, imposed on me by my character, the sorrow of formlessness which one suffers in virtue of the unconscious, and the sorrow of contingency and dread and ultimately of death...which is the lot of humanity born in a particular time and place and circumscribed there by”<sup>76</sup>

Ricoeur elaborates consciousness or *Cogito* always experience its bodily necessity in three dimensions as discussed above. These necessities are passive or given and always actively negated by consciousness or freedom. This process of active negation of freedom itself continues to restore its necessity. This continuous process of freedom’s negation of nature itself is continuously restored in nature. This process of restoration of freedom and nature will never be completely achieved by a human being. The continuous reconciliation, affirmation or unity of freedom and nature is possible by consent. In consent, one passively undergoes necessity or nature which one bears it, and one reunites freedom and necessity by saying “yes” to the necessity.

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<sup>76</sup>Bromley, T. Edward, 1973: 55.



We see that necessity or nature is always a condition, a limit, or even a destruction as a negation of freedom. Freedom and nature to the extent are seen to be incompatible, the only possibilities for the will or consciousness in face of nature are defiance or acquiescence. “Thus, consent will either be impossible (for there would always be a ‘no’ and never a ‘yes’) or it will be a surrender. Consent requires some kind of transcendence of initial refusal, without which there would be only the fact of the continuum of nature.”<sup>77</sup> Ricoeur describes that the possibility of refusal opens the way for an acceptance as making necessity or nature its own. He writes, “the *yes of consent is always won from the no*”<sup>78</sup>

Ricoeur elaborates consent as patience which is different from possession. When he speaks of patience with respect to the inevitable then he says that freedom makes necessity its own, we should not confuse patience with a kind of possession. Possession invariably implies a certain potential for manipulation that is exercise of power and it does not guarantee permanence. One can dispose of one’s possessions, but necessity or nature on other hand, always resides with oneself as long as one lives. One tries to make necessity as its own in some particular way, however because its already one’s own as some kind of permanent possession, one cannot get rid of. To make necessity or nature one’s own involves a certain receptivity a “powerless effort” to convert a hostile nature into one’s own nature called the freedom of nature. To consent the body or necessity is one’s own is inauguration, “the ultimate reconciliation of freedom and nature.”<sup>79</sup> This reconciliation of freedom and nature is really “at stake” in consent.

Ricoeur explains that consent as reconciliation of freedom and nature is possible through initial refusal of limitation or situation. But the question arises: Is a yes possible in the face of necessity or nature, when freedom’s primary response is no? What would be case to say yes? Does the affirmative declaration succeed in restoring a unity between one who is consenting and one possessing the nature or necessity? Who in this case consents? Does it restore the broken unity between one, oneself and one’s world? Ricoeur explores this sort of unity using metaphysics.

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 32.

<sup>78</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 354.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 346.

## *From Phenomenology to Metaphysics*

Ricoeur describes his eidetic phenomenological description in first volume, *Freedom and Nature : The Voluntary and The Involuntary* of the book, *The Philosophy of The Will*. He also touches on unity of above sort in this volume, but very briefly. His other two volumes of the book, '*The Philosophy of The Will*' are associated with empirics and poetics. Empirics is dealt in the volume, *Fallible Man*. and poetics in '*The Symbolism of Evil*'. The unity which he wants to seek moves from phenomenology to metaphysics in the second and third volume of *The Philosophy of The Will*. In his final pages of *Freedom and Nature*, he explains that phenomenological eidetic must be transcended by metaphysics which is associated with fault and Transcendence. He does not abandon his guiding principle the "primacy of conciliation over paradox"<sup>80</sup> and rejects the dualism of mind and body as well as shows inadequate uses of Transcendence. He asserts that the overcoming of dualism cannot be achieved without invoking the ontological dimension of the fault and Transcendence.

A human being is fallible by the conflict between freedom and nature or mind and body. As described above, the choice of "yes" or consent is a choice over refusal. It is a choice involving both these dimensions, fault and Transcendent. Ricoeur explains this choice of all with respect to fault as, "This choice implies the destruction of the wish for totality and is thereby a confession that the faulted human condition is to be taken into account, since it is that condition which contradicts the wish for totality"<sup>81</sup> At the same time, the choice of "yes" tends to empty consent of all its voluntary overtones that reduces it to an assent, to a fact or a nature. Consent oscillates between the desire for total freedom and the desire to give up or to surrender and return to slavery of necessity or nature. The interference of the fault drags one away from one absolute freedom and makes one determined in one's situation or nature. Ricoeur's ambition is to transcend both freedom and nature together in consent, but in fault one's freedom reduces in necessity or nature.

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 341.

<sup>81</sup> Bromley, T. Edward, 1973: 57.

The choice in consent also involves Transcendence that justifies the “yes” of consent. In this sense, one discovers whether the universe itself is terminus of consent or it is sort of place where freedom is not, but an optical illusion. If the world is a stage where freedom may participate or if the world for a human being then to consent does not imply giving up one’s freedom; all world becomes one’s stage. One can then assert that this world is designed in some sense for oneself, and the world is as it was for one’s disposal. One does not deny the world, although one makes use of the world in one’s own service and in the service of others. Ricoeur describes, “To consent does not in the least mean to give up if, in spite of appearances, the world is a possible stage for freedom. When I say, this is my place, I adopt it, I do not yield, I acquiesce.”<sup>82</sup> He concludes that philosophy of the subject is engaged in as a first Copernican Revolution where there is leap between the object to subject, in the same way, second Copernican Revolution is also a leap between subject to object. It can be completed only to the extent that one performs a philosophy of Transcendence. All that has gone before is a prelude to Ricoeur’s second volume of *The Philosophy of the The Will* as a poetics of the will<sup>83</sup>

He admits that his idea of Transcendence involves a real “leap” “somewhat in the manner of the Cartesian methodic progression from defiant doubt to self-affirmation and from self-affirmation to the affirmation of God which allow him, ultimately, to reaffirm the world and the body, which he had hitherto “bracketed”.<sup>84</sup> Ricoeur does not reveal this exercise in his first volume, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and The Involuntary*. But, he simply shows that the two inadequate philosophies of Transcendence provide the insufficient reconciliation of freedom and nature. As we have discussed that consent oscillates between two poles, the desires for total freedom which would rise above the ordinary existence being the first and a total surrender to necessity or nature, being the other. For Ricoeur, the Stoic is reflected in the first and acceptance of total detachment of one from one’s own nature or necessity. The second may be seen in the Orphic attitude to lose oneself by immersion into the nature or necessity.

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<sup>82</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 467.

<sup>83</sup> Consent as Transcendence is explored by Ricoeur, in his third volume of *Philosophy of The Will* as the poetics of the will. It is a creative dimension of life and promises poetics of life that can reconcile the division of the voluntary and the involuntary or freedom and nature and produces a new unity in the life of the subject.

<sup>84</sup> Bromley, T. Edward, 1973: 58.

These two invincible approaches articulate that any reconciliation can be achieved only in a “consideration of the totality of the world, not, to be sure, as knowledge, but as a cipher of Transcendence.”<sup>85</sup>

Ricoeur explores his idea of reconciliation of freedom and nature through Transcendence that is different from Stoics and Orphic idea of reconciliation of the two through Transcendence. Below we will describe the Stoic’s and Orphic’s idea of reconciliation through Transcendence. Dealing with Stoic’s, Ricoeur quotes Marcus Aurelius as well as Epictetus. Stoics dictum divides all things in two categories, things those are under control and others that are not, and one’s body is among others. Where the body is considered as an inert or as a thing, and effort or freedom exclusively negate it through struggle against resistance of body. Stoics also restore the body and all necessity as a value which is taken as positive. As result, bodily necessity is taken as whole that can be loved and adored. Ricoeur disagreeing says that this is not the way of union, a human being seeks. It is rather the withdrawing of the soul into itself. The detachment of consciousness from body or particular thing, in order to contemplate or adoration is divinity which may be found in the total order. For him, the Stoics consent losses itself in a pan-theism, but it is different from the “black existentialism” of a Nietzsche, For Nietzsche, consent is still a non-involvement with the corporeal and saves itself from its bodily tendencies only by a respect admiration for the ineffable whole.

The value of the Stoics concept of the whole lies in raising strongly the idea of Transcendence. Stoic ideas of Transcendence is like second Copernican Revolution that is a “leap” from existence to Transcendence.<sup>86</sup> For Ricoeur, once we discover this Transcendence, we will no longer consent or we will no longer be free. Ricoeur adopts Jasper’s suggestion as “if Transcendence were revealed to us directly, we should not be able to be free for

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<sup>85</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 469.

<sup>86</sup> Ricoeur’s idea of subjectivity lead us beyond the first Copernican Revolution which “restores to subjectivity its due” which Ricoeur thinks as “the beginning of philosophy” and its “first achievement” is to give second Copernican Revolution which would “displace the center of reference from subjectivity to Transcendence.” (Ricoeur,1966: 472) Ricoeur’s idea of Transcendence is different from the Stoics and Orphism. He accepts that Transcendence is “fraternal tension within the unity of creation” (Ricoeur, 1966: 481).

Transcendence would dominate us completely.”<sup>87</sup> This discovery of Transcendence would lead us the whole, but in the whole there is little particularities as well and Stoicism is doomed to remain “on the threshold of the poetry of adoration and it is be forever an ‘imperfect consent’”<sup>88</sup>

Ricoeur discusses other inadequate idea of consent, Transcendence by Orphism. Orphism is specially associated with lyrics of Goethe, Rilke and Nietzsche that is a form of consent which is doomed in one’s necessity or nature. This modern lyrical tradition of Orphism is the “hyperbolic consent”<sup>89</sup> Where the *Cogito* submerges in the intoxication of the command as “die and become!”<sup>90</sup> and all necessity can be overcome in “the song which conjures up and celebrates”<sup>91</sup> Ricoeur re-examine the dialectic between the *Cogito* in the first person and Transcendence, a whole as the universe – is an index. Ultimate consent must retain both the *Cogito* and the whole. Ricoeur’s Consciousness or *Cogito* borrows assurance of sovereignty from Stoic consent and impetus to recognize the limits of the sovereignty from Orphic consent.

Consent for Ricoeur must be wrested from refusal – it is a negation of a negation that is a primary affirmation. If *cogito* or consciousness yields by negation or refusal, then it will always be undergone and overcoming. Now refusal is a resistance and the resistance are responsible for fault where one surrender one’s freedom into necessity or nature. Consent suggests a patient acceptance of one’s condition. Refusal is also rejection of opposite or other and consent implies an act of humility before divinity that is expressed in the “avowal” of sin, which in a human being fallible, will be no longer on the periphery, but it is in a continuing act of hope in a future reconciliation. This hope of future reconciliation can convert all conflicts or all refusals into what Ricoeur thinks of as a “fraternal tension within the unity of creation.”<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Bromley, T. Edward, 1973: 59-60.

<sup>88</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 469

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 473.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 473.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 474.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 481.

## **II. Imagination in Daya Krishna**

According to Daya Krishna, imagination is the foundation of freedom. It becomes possible only because a human being is conscious and self-conscious being. This capacity of being self-conscious makes a human being not only aware of oneself and one's situation in the world but also makes one to understand one's ideals in sense that what one ought to be. One finds oneself in the world with not only inanimate objects, but also other human beings like oneself as well as other living beings like plants and animals. One's relationships with other living beings always challenges one to think how other living beings can be better than what they are. In other words, one always finds dissatisfaction with one's own situation that is essentially associated with the world and the world is comprised of the inanimate objects as well as all other living beings. A human being is conscious and self-conscious being through which new things bring into being as well as whatever has brought into being is always critically evaluated by self-consciousness.

By the imminent evaluation of consciousness, one always finds feeling of dissatisfaction that continuously modifies and changes through activity of consciousness. We can understand Daya Krishna's idea of imagination being the foundation of freedom or indeterminacy or uncertainty behind everything what comes into being at human level. The idea of imagination or creation is possible through the nature consciousness and self-consciousness. Human's realm of knowledge and action or will are possible by imagination or creation. Imagination is the power to think beyond what is given or what it is. I will elaborate Daya Krishna's idea of imagination that emerges through consciousness and self-consciousness, in sub-section A. And how the idea of imagination constitutes human's the realm of knowledge and action or will, is discussed in sub-section B.

### **A. The Idea of Imagination through Consciousness and Self-consciousness**

Daya Krishna explains that there are two activities of consciousness, one as the source of consciousness and other as the product of consciousness. These two activities can be understood through activity of consciousness and self-consciousness. The nature or the source of consciousness is different from self-consciousness because the nature of consciousness is

spontaneous activity whereas self-consciousness is reflective self-awareness. First level of consciousness (or source) is spontaneous activity that becomes evident at secondary level (or product) of reflection which is self-consciousness or self-awareness. At first level of consciousness, one has no cognitive role. Cognitive role arises only at second level of consciousness. Daya Krishna differentiates these two levels of consciousness as well as associates them through the idea of imagination. He says, “Once imagination is freed of its dependence on objective factors and seen as the most natural and spontaneous activity or consciousness, it too will be thought of a different way. It will begin to be seen as that primal activity of consciousness that lies at the foundation of the other activities.”<sup>93</sup>

The foundation of consciousness is not cognitive at all, it is only activity that imagines and feels. What it imagines or feels is either satisfying or dissatisfying. In case of dissatisfying, it longs for something else. He explains imagination through the two activities of consciousness where consciousness is source of imagination as well as an immanent evaluative activity that is always reflective in itself. Imagining is not only confined to mental activity that results in creation of images or only which is consisting a form or shape or organize to them, though the two activities are distinguishable in mostly simultaneously in character, but the same activity may be seen in two sides.

Imagination is not supposed to have anything with the world that is constituted by nonliving in its nature. Nonliving is supposed to simultaneously provide the basic material to the living world. Without nonliving, livings cannot be livings. In the sense, a human being himself/herself, primarily the body that feels both the solidity and the resistance as well as the persistence through other senses that also belongs to the body. However, a human being is not only the body, but the body is also the living body. And life is not only encountered with resistance that is matter, but it is more of that which is living. The living has not only some kind of a unitary and unifying center, however, it also strives to maintain and perpetuate itself against odds. The nature of living beings is purposive and teleological and whatever is purpose or teleology, there is always imagination, and this can be understood through what is not there. That is brought into being by imagination.

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<sup>93</sup> Krishna, D., 2011: 179.

Imagination plays a central role in whatever human beings create. The imagining activity is not anarchic or arbitrary that is generally assumed. Instead, it has subject to an immanent internal critique determined by what it has brought into being and it is the function performed in the survival, development, and growth of that is brought into being. Therefore, the source of imagining and its product both are simultaneously affected by an immanent evaluative activity. There is continuous critical evaluation of modifying everything, an activity that encounters a limit, check or resistance which does not provide the desired result or even if it provides the desired result is never found satisfying. There is unending cycle, but at each step, imagination is continuous source of the transformation of non-being into being. “But the being that is brought into being is itself infected with non-being and the feeling of something else that function as a check or limit or resisting giving rise to that idea of reality that is felt and experienced as independent of that which is the source of the imagining.”<sup>94</sup>

The two activities of consciousness can be understood as source of imagining and is very nature of consciousness or *prima facie*, it is necessarily postulated other as the result of the felt resistance or check to one’s activity of changing it called as the self-consciousness. The self-consciousness is always felt unsatisfying with respect to imaginative activity of consciousness. Everything that brings into being and whatever is brought into being is always found unsatisfying in nature by self-consciousness. The two activities of consciousness are themselves contingent in their nature. Daya Krishna explains idea of freedom through the two activities of consciousness where they are differentiated from each other as well as related to each other at advance levels. He writes,

Yet the two activities are so different, even if each may have an element of the other, particularly at advanced levels where the activity itself becomes an object of reflection. reflection makes both thinking and imagining objects to itself and sees them simultaneously as that which brings something into being and that which itself has been brought into being, for if it were not so, then it should not have been there to be known at all.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 181.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 185.



Imagination exemplifies the freedom, indeterminacy, or “unknowability” that is given behind anything coming into being. Daya Krishna holds that thinking presupposes imagining and both thinking and imagining are presupposed by the activity of reflection or in self-consciousness and no one thinks that which presupposed is more important than, one’s dependent on it. This appears in case of knowledge and action where philosophers give preference for knowledge above action.

The two diverse activities of consciousness bring different kinds of objects into being. The diverse activities of consciousness are also explained through Indian names *pravṛiti* and *nivṛtti*. Where *pravṛiti* is “the movement of the consciousness outward, toward the world, toward objects, movement that shapes, molds, in sense creates the world and oneself as “worldly” human person.”<sup>96</sup> And *nivṛtti* is “ingoing, or reversal movement of consciousness, away from objects and from the world; a movement of introversion of consciousness within itself.”<sup>97</sup> The two activities of consciousness can be little doubtful where one is fundamental activity through which something is brought into being and other is withdrawal or refusal from engaging in this activity. In the sense, the two activities of consciousness are diverse, and have deep relation between them. As the nature of consciousness or *nivṛtti* is precondition for self-consciousness or *pravṛiti*. Self-consciousness or *pravṛiti* provides impulse and temptation for the nature of consciousness or *nivṛtti*. The movement between the two activities of consciousness provide the tension and the dialectic that creates both the internal and external worlds of human level, at root of which lies imagination.

The idea of freedom lies in human beings through imagination, the primal activity of consciousness and self-consciousness. The self-consciousness itself is embedded in a body but it is not affected so much from the body. Self-consciousness has power through which it can change in itself by imagining things. Most of cases affecting change in consciousness are relatively independent of the body. The body is certainly involved in these cases in minimal manner. The capacity of the consciousness to move out of itself and to move back to itself is the most inexplicable fact, that the self-consciousness faces difficulty when it reflects on itself.

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<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 187.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 187.

This capacity of consciousness provides the foundation of feeling of freedom which self-consciousness always finds in itself. On the other hand, there is also feeling of constraint or determination by something outside itself. Particularly the dual movement of consciousness is not only a free act itself but is determined and influenced by factors that are outside of itself or the inner world over which consciousness has little control. This simultaneously awareness of freedom and constraint defines the structure of self-consciousness, existentially felt and lived in human consciousness.<sup>98</sup>

The idea of imagination with two activities of consciousness explore two conflicting ideals of human beings as knowledge and action or will. One ideal is associated with the idea of knowledge that is based on reason or *Logos*. Reason or *Logos* proclaims the truth, which can never be more than what it is. The truth is always something timeless, eternal, and unchanging. On the contrary the other ideal, idea of action or will is based on experience and it cannot be thought without the notion of time, associated with past, present and future along with the notion of freedom or with the notion of creations. Daya Krishna discusses the two opposing ideals with idea of imagination and limitation. He declares that human beings cannot reject one ideal for other or give primacy to one over the other. The two ideals provide important values to human being as truth and Good.

### **B. The Idea of Imagination in Knowledge and Action or Will**

For Daya Krishna, the nature of human consciousness is not only conscious, but also self-conscious that gives power to imagine beyond what is given or what has been thought or brought into being by oneself or others. Imagination is central activity of consciousness that finds shape or form by the self-consciousness. By the two activities of consciousness, all innovation and creativity happen at human level. As imagination is generally confined only to art. Daya Krishna asserts that imagination is fundamental activity of consciousness and wherever is life, there is imagination or heart of creation itself. But the idea of creation is not to be understood as pure attraction or pure possibility without any restriction or limitation.

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<sup>98</sup> Krishna, D., unpublished work, *Toward a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusion*, P. 1- 4.

The activity of consciousness is itself paradoxical in nature where it simultaneously involves or presupposes both freedom and causality. These two activities of consciousness are united and Daya Krishna explores the notion of freedom not only involves the notion of causality, but also the idea of rule or restriction. Without the idea of rule or restriction nothing regulative rules or without it, one cannot delimit, demarcate or get out of pure nothing or pure being. This idea of pure nothing or pure being is discussed by Hegel as there can be no real predication except an infinite extensive “not this”, “not this”. In the same way, Indian name *nirguna brahman* is discussed as *neti neti* or as absolute quality less being. In other words, it is pure possibility without limit or restriction. On the contrary, Daya Krishna says that if something is to be, there must be restriction on it. In this way, the Greek word *Logos* or reason brings the notion of law that explains whatever happened is governed by law through which anything occurred. Whether we know the law, or we do not know. This is revolutionary suspicion arises in one’s self-consciousness. One tries to know the reason that may be understood through “why it is what it is.”<sup>99</sup> This question cannot be dealt with single answer because whatever the choice – the choice will vary with one concerned or whatever something will bring into being whose effects cannot be predicted by oneself or others.

Once whatever has come into being however reason or *Logos* obtains a reality of its own that is independent of human beings. Whatever has been brought into being becomes a part of natural world order. Even it is not possible without human beings or occasioned, through which it comes into being. However, results for its being that has been seen as an object among other objects in the world, demands of being always understood in two senses “what it is and what it can do to others.”<sup>100</sup> Coming into beings have both a structure and causality like everything else, except its origin lies in one’s choice which is understood in sense of something that has an integral essential indeterminacy and plurality.

A structure and causality both are discussed in fields of natural world as well as in knowledge and action or will. A human being supposes the natural world as completely independent from one. And one supposes that the natural world has been determined by an

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<sup>99</sup> Krishna, D., 2005: 167.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 167.

initial limiting condition that may be referred as “God” or the “Big Bang” or “x” to avoid wrong association that the natural world cannot have this indeterminacy or plurality unless it is understood similar of what one finds in the human world. Both the natural world and human world have same problem as physics supports, suggests structure or prima facie for the evolution of matter and the material universe. Where plurality and indeterminacy do not weaken causality, but only makes it a different way. As matter has different form or levels and each presupposing the other is not completely determined by each other, but there exist different types of causality at different autonomous levels of organization which yet are not free from each other. Daya Krishna writes, “The freedom present in any level is not compromised by the fact that it is limited by the causality of what is presupposed at another level, Similarly the autonomy of each level is consistent with the freedom of the other levels presupposed by its being, reality or existence.”<sup>101</sup>

This interpretation of freedom and causality provide two alternatives. First alternative gives causality where the absolute contingency or freedom determines everything else. In the sense, it can be predicted or foretold in its minutest detail by one who knows the nature of causality. The second alternative between contingency and freedom are the postulation of initial limiting condition that is latter seen to be illusory or only verbal in nature. Only the second alternative is dealt with the world of living beings which itself is radically divided between plant life, animal life, and human life. There is the continuity between these three forms of life and they are obviously dependent on matter. But there are also differences between them and each of the successive life forms is dependent on the previous one to an extent. The study of ecology reveals this unthinkable dependence and difference among three forms of life are brought in self-consciousness of human beings.

One finds either the world of matter or living world both are associated with the idea of creation. Idea of creation as we all know like all previous theory of evolution of matter are challenged by time to time and provide some new forms of evolution of matter that have never existed before. Daya Krishna says that creation is an activity whose nature is difficult to grasp. Anything comes into being by any reason becomes independent in sense of having its own

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.,168.

nature. The nature of being always consists the impulse of self-maintenance, resistance to change and has the capability of becoming a creative itself. This creative nature gives rise to other beings that may be similar or dissimilar to itself. The capacity to brings other beings depends perhaps on the fact whether other beings originate from itself alone, or in combination with others.

Daya Krishna holds that the problem of causality is more complex than the simplistic way in which it is thought of a category necessity for understanding any phenomenon. For instance, the relation between part and whole where the parts contribute to maintenance of the whole. The parts are effectively functioning as a unitary entity in relation to other as whole. Both parts and whole are in interrelationship and they all mutually influence one another. The perspective of the parts and the whole provides the idea of the universe that is explored by Daya Krishna as

*all that* is, as one whole which has no other besides itself to influence or be influenced. It hence functions as determining, causing, or influencing only the parts which constitute it, as it is one without a second, and the second or others that are there only its parts. They are hence taken to determine, or cause, or influence only the parts which constitute it as it is, one without a second. On this view, any the second or others are only its parts. This is the notion of a universal order or *ṛta*, which govern everything and thus determines whatever is to be what it is.<sup>102</sup>

For him, this is not to forget that parts are themselves not only whole but also active agents of universe which maintains and functions in the universe. The universe is not itself a complete whole as it is continuously interacting with its parts. It is also influencing as well as being influenced by parts. In process of changing parts, the universe itself is changing. The parts and the whole are inter-dependent on each other for their understanding. There is no whole which has no part with which the whole does not has interactive relationship or there is no part that is not whole. These ideas make human reason to believe that there are ultimate elements that they together make a form of ultimate whole as idea of the universe. Without noticing the contradiction involved in it. Daya Krishna writes,

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 170.

The 'elements' could surely have had different organization and thus could result in different universes. It is bound to be objected that even though the possibility of alternative combinations cannot be denied, the fact is that the universe as we 'know' it at present is the only universe we have and that we have to understand it. Its 'seeming contingency' arise from 'vacuous possibilities' and the postulation of a universal causal principle avoids this and shows its necessity to be what it is.<sup>103</sup>

He declares that the necessity of what is also entails the necessity of what will be and the necessity of what will be makes all human effort and action meaningless. If truths can be overcome or transcended or refuted by freedom of action or will then truths become an illusion. A human being is self-conscious being who understands this contradiction or conflict between knowledge and action or will. One accepts that the truth of *Logos* is overcome or negated by the truth of freedom that is self-consciously felt and experienced through when one intends or wills, making the physical and mental effort to act. Daya Krishna writes "if this be an illusion as *Logos* insists, then we can only say that it is an effective illusion, an effectiveness that is a sign or something being real and not a Nothing, or absolute non-being which the *Logos* itself thinks of and characterizes as such."<sup>104</sup>

Daya Krishna suggests that a human being has two opposite and conflicting ideals or purusārthas for realization, where one is always in the notion of reason, *Logos* or knowledge and the other is always in action or will. The notion of reason or *Logos* insists the notion of action or will is based on a foundational illusion or ignorance and accepts the reality can never be other than what it is and has always been something timeless, unchanging, and eternal. The notion of action or will is also based on experience that is experienced or felt with the notion of time in terms of past, present, and future along with freedom. In this sense, one has power to do or one can change things or situations and accept one's own responsibility regarding what it does is its own and not anybody else's. This an ownership of responsibility for what one does with one's freedom. It is not one's freedom in itself, but freedom is always associated with freedom to do. Freedom from to be or freedom brings something into being that is not already

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 170-171.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 171.

there or maintains what is there that will be changing into something undesirable for some reason.

For Daya Krishna, the exercise of freedom is about what to be maintained or be changed. This idea of freedom presupposes that something must be already there. The exercise of freedom makes one feel or realize that one is free from that or able to change or maintain one's given situation. In this case, what one presupposes is most of the time a result of one's or other's past exercise of freedom. One always finds oneself around the results of its freedom which are acceptable or unacceptable, or desirable and undesirable. In this way, one always confronts with its own creations and one finds oneself bound or freed from its own creations. Thus, the exercise of freedom may itself restrict or enhance. Through this exercise of freedom, one finds increasingly limited, constrained by what one has created. Daya Krishna says that a human being is like "a spider caught in its own net. But the net that one weaves may involve others and thus, inadvertently, one may become the cause or the occasion for the enhancement or restriction of the freedom of others and not only of the freedom of oneself."<sup>105</sup>

Freedom is like all other skill that can be enhanced or lessened by the exercise of freedom and exercise of freedom is self-governed in which the affected others are as important as oneself. The idea of being as a subject also related to others whether each one is a subject for each other. This idea is called by the Greeks as *Nomos* and by Indians as *dharma*. The idea of other as a subject is dealt by both traditions in both positive and negative sense. One's action emanates from self-consciousness and are inevitable self-centered. The other is seen from one's own interests that naturally appear in oneself. The other-centric consciousness is structurally understood through self-centric or I-centric. The self-centric consciousness is perennial problem with other-centric consciousness. However, one cannot become human or be humanized without others. The relation between one and other becomes central problem of freedom. Others are not only an individual or object for one, but also a subject who also have self-consciousness and they exercise their freedom as oneself. Each one has some moral obligation toward others. The moral obligation provides feeling of restriction or bondage to self-centric feeling of freedom where one wants to become free from this obligation.

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 172.

Seeking freedom from obligation towards others take different forms. Such as those who renounce the world with all obligations, it involves to the willful law breaker or criminals, or those who think they will be clever enough or lucky to escape their crimes or somehow get around the net that they have woven for themselves. In these cases, they are in illusion that they are enhancing their freedom, but even they make their freedom in the minimal sense without obligation towards others. One's obligation towards others is not only restriction or bondage but also one's enhanced feeling of freedom with others. Human being is self-conscious and not only has awareness about oneself but also others. The multiple others and one's obligation towards others are not to hurt, harm or injure in any way whatsoever, if not help others to extent one can. At same time, one can be helpful in the best way one can and become freer or feel more better with other-centric freedom.

Daya Krishna tries to reveal the two opposing ideals of human beings with the notion of creation. One is related to individual's action or will and is always associated with others. Other is related to *Logos* or reason, independent from human beings and totally unaffected by what they do or don't. There is deep gulf between the two presupposed orders. If former or *Nomos* has only reality then other cannot be case, because truth is something unchanging or eternal. In latter case, if only *Logos* has reality then former is an illusion, though it is an effective illusion misleading human being through the ages. Human beings are victims of conflict between the two ideals. They can neither give up one or other because one is required for knowledge and other for action. Human beings are self-reflective and become aware of the problem between the two ideals. The conflict between the two ideals is related to two ultimate conflicting values as the truth and the good. Both values are important in certain sense that must be sought and realized within the human situation in which one is lived and experienced. Daya Krishna explains the two values with the idea of creations and explores the conflict between the two as

There is no such thing as the Truth or the Good, given and found for once and all and what is perhaps even worse, even among the known or the discovered at any time or place, there always are many truths and many goods pertaining to diverse field. Moreover, there is conflict of opinion about them and differences regarding the importance or the primacy one should accord them. This, though disheartening



to those whose want certainty and finality of faith in these realms, is, however, the basis of that continuous exploration and experimentation that lies at the heart of human enterprise both in the field of knowledge and action.<sup>106</sup>

Daya Krishna explores the idea of creation with presupposition of some conditions or limitation in which something new are brought by imaginations. As he discusses that exploration and experimentation, it requires some base to start with, which itself must be incomplete and inadequate to permit open ended challenge for its construction, correction, and transformation along with the thirst for novelty. This thirst for novelty creates dissatisfaction with what is already there or has been attained and provides urge to individual to seek something new in whatever is to be. For him, urge to seek something else in a human being is called *Eros*. *Eros* has been explained in both Western and Indian traditions with different ways and different names. He uses *Eros* in sense of unending challenges in one's self-consciousness that feels unsatisfying of its present state or situation and continuously imagine something new or brings something new in its present situation. It is explained by him as,

the ever-outward oriented, positive, valuational, consciousness of man which is fascinated by the unending challenges posed to it by the incessant demand and the resulting obligation it feels for bringing the ideals vaguely apprehended into palpable living reality and is prepared to endure with immense fortitude and patience the unbelievable effort that is involved in it.<sup>107</sup>

Human beings are always trying to find more satisfactory result of *Logos* or knowledge and *Nomos* or action. It always lies in each succeeding generation, called civilization to define that human beings are different from all other beings in the world. Behind the construction of civilization lies the dissatisfaction and frustration that human beings feel in respect of whatever is, as for their consciousness, it will always be thought of or imagined different from what it is and hope that it will be better for oneself or others.

Daya Krishna asserts that the idea of imagination is not only given in knowledge and action, but also found in one's thinking. The activity of thinking is not only distinctive of one

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 176.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 181.

but also a given root of one's all other activities. Yet the activity of thinking itself is often directly paid attention to what one knows and the result of it as a thought. Activity of thinking with thought is usually concerned with others thought through language that one knows. One has knowledge about what others have already said or discovered, but one's activity of thinking has power to think beyond what others have said or discovered and explores with some other concepts and meanings to challenge or critique revealing with what is meant by that knowledge. The understanding of what others have said, and one is finding fault with them, constitutes the largest part of intellectual activity in the world. Daya Krishna holds that the creativity is possible when one believes that it is not only confined to certain persons, periods, countries or civilizations and the rest are only repeated or approximated what they have achieved. Instead, "every human being is capable of entertaining a new thought, of asking a new question, of seeking a new problem is almost a priori condition for fostering creativity and letting it emerge in the life of the mind."<sup>108</sup>

For him, Imagination is "the capacity to go beyond what is given and lies the root of all innovation and creativity. "'What is not' is therefore, more important than 'what is' or 'has been.'"<sup>109</sup> Imagination is creative activity that lies in human consciousness and human consciousness is not only conscious but also self-conscious. The two activities of consciousness itself explores both freedom and bondage or something always given and something always beyond given. The root of creativity in the world becomes manifest at human level. Where one is surrounded by one's own creation in one's historical journey through the ages. One forgets the fact that all this is one's own creation.

One is obsessed by one's own creation and feels bounded to it in such a way that one feels that one can never be freed from it. A human being can recover his/her freedom only by becoming aware of the root from which creative illusion has taken in the past and it is the real freedom that one forgets. The discovery of one's source of freedom lies in becoming aware of the effective illusion of creation that is arisen by the consciousness and self-consciousness. Therefore, through one's consciousness and self-consciousness one has creative power to think

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<sup>108</sup> Krishna, D., 2018: 32.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 34.

or to imagine or to bring beyond whatever is or whatever is given that is a human civilization itself where every generations are indebted to the past generations those who had built what they have inherited and responsible towards the future generation for whom they will be leaving the world as their ancestors have done.

### **III. A Comparative Analysis of Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's Idea of Consciousness**

We see that Ricoeur and Daya Krishna both accept the act or role of consciousness is not only freedom or creativity, but also a regulative freedom or creativity. As there are always some rule, restriction or limitation within it that makes this freedom or creativity different from absolute freedom or absolute creativity. However, their methods to explain this role of freedom or creativity within limitation and restriction are entirely different from each other. I will analyse the similarities and dissimilarities between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's idea of consciousness.

For Ricoeur, consciousness has its own wound due to bodily necessity or nature. A human being is free and determined in every act of consciousness that is initial affirmation or unity of consciousness (or freedom or will) and body (or nature or necessity). This initial affirmation or unity of freedom and nature always mutually negate each other due to discordance between them and is always reconciled through consent. His idea of consent must be wrested from the refusal of necessity in freedom for its bodily necessity. This process of reconciliation of freedom and nature can never be achieved in totality, it is always a future hope in which both freedom and nature are fraternal tension within unity of creation. In case of Daya Krishna, the nature of consciousness is both a free activity of consciousness as well as critical evaluation of itself that always examines, limits or resists itself through the self-consciousness. Of the two activities of consciousness, the free activity of consciousness is always dissatisfying to self-consciousness and one's self-consciousness can never be completely satisfied whatever been brought in the reality. Here, Ricoeur and Daya Krishna

both accept act of freedom or creativity is always within limitation or resistance of bodily necessity or dissatisfaction within it through self-consciousness.

After discussing the similarity in Ricoeur and Daya Krishna which essentially deals with freedom within limitation or restriction, I will explore the differences on how they pose this imitation or restriction. Ricoeur holds that a limitation or a resistance of consciousness or freedom lies in its bodily necessity or nature (in form of character, unconscious, and bodily life) which always contradicts with freedom or consciousness. Freedom or consciousness want to become absolute, but its bodily necessity or nature makes freedom limited and narrow in way. For Daya Krishna, role of consciousness is itself both as absolute free activity as well as absolute resistance and limitation. Obviously, his idea of self-consciousness is embedded in the body. But it is not to extent affected from the body. Self-consciousness has power by which it can induce change through imagining things. And in most of the cases, affecting changes in consciousness are relatively independent from the body. According to Daya Krishna, self-consciousness has capacity to go outside of itself toward the world and objects as well as its withdrawal from outward and return in itself which is itself most inexplicable fact of self-consciousness. This provides one, feeling of freedom as well as feeling of constraint and determination. For Daya Krishna, restriction and limitation in freedom or consciousness arise from the self-consciousness. His idea of self-consciousness has outward movement where it encounters itself with the body.

In addition to above dissimilarities between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna, we find another important difference between them. Ricoeur's idea of consciousness is wounded consciousness where consciousness always experiences its bodily necessity out of itself. This invincible conflict between freedom and nature always gives another invincible dichotomy between freedom and nature in its understanding. Even freedom and nature are not meaningful without each other, but their understanding of unity itself gives two invincible form of a human being. In case of Daya Krishna, the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness both represents an act of free activity and internal and external limitation or restriction arises from self-consciousness. His idea of self-consciousness has the capacity to represent a human being in both outward as well as inward dimensions. In case of outward, it encounters to one's body

and natural worlds on the one hand, and the socio-cultural and political-economic on the other hand. In case of inward, it is the nature consciousness and self-consciousness and the interactive inter-relationship between them. For Daya Krishna, the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness make a human consciousness as whole, which is itself both a free creativity within limitation or restriction and is different from Ricoeur's idea of consciousness that is wounded consciousness due to its bodily necessity, always opposing consciousness.

## Chapter 3

### Freedom and Reciprocity

In this chapter, I will explore the reciprocal relation of human freedom in two senses. In one sense, freedom is reciprocal relation of the voluntary (or consciousness or will) and the involuntary (or body or nature) as described by Paul Ricoeur. He explains freedom is reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary through decision, movement, and consent. These three are the acts of will and are always reciprocal of three forms of the involuntary as motive, ability and necessity or nature. “Deciding is the act of the will which is based on motives; moving is the act of will which activates abilities or power; consenting is the act of the will which acquiesces to a necessity.”<sup>110</sup> Ricoeur describes these three acts of will are the same will, but from different point of views.

In other sense, human freedom is reciprocal relation of individual and others as explained by Daya Krishna. He describes a human being as a social, moral, and cultural being. In this sense, an individual’s freedom is essentially dependent on others. Individual’s actions and choices are affected by others and others are also affected by individual’s actions and choices at social, moral and cultural contexts. I will explore both Ricoeur’s and Daya Krishna’s ideas of reciprocal relation of freedom described as above and try to answer following questions: how does reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary work in decision, movement, and consent? Is individual’s freedom reciprocal with others’ freedom? Is there another type of freedom in-spite of reciprocal freedom of the voluntary and the involuntary and individual and others?

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<sup>110</sup> Ricoeur, 1966: 341.

This chapter has three sections. In Section One, I will explore Ricoeur's notion of reciprocal freedom through the voluntary and the involuntary, which I will explain through three sub-sections A, B, and C. Sub-section A deals with the voluntary act of deciding with motives. Sub-section B will explain the voluntary act of moving with abilities or power. Sub-section C deals with the voluntary act of consenting with nature or necessity. In Section Two, I will explore Daya Krishna's idea of reciprocal freedom of individual in social context. In Section Three, I will analyse strengths and limits of reciprocal freedom, which is reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary, and the Individual and others.

## **I. The Voluntary and the Involuntary in Paul Ricoeur**

Ricoeur accepts embodied existence of a human being and avoids the dualism of mind and body. His idea of freedom derives from the reciprocal relation of the mind and body which is also exchangeable with the voluntary and the involuntary. His ambition is to reveal meaning of human actions through descriptive approach of diagnosing human action. The meaning of human action is derived from our intelligibility of lived experience or meaning that allows us to make up human action in terms of the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary in our lived experience. He writes, "the voluntary is *by reason of* the involuntary while the involuntary is *for* the voluntary".<sup>111</sup> This reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary he describes through decision, movement and consent. These three are the acts of the voluntary, and are reciprocal of the involuntary motives, abilities (capability), and nature. I will explain reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary in form of decision, movement, and consent, in following three sub-sections.

### **A. Reciprocity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary in Decision**

Ricoeur describes decision as an act of thought in the wider sense that is different from Descartes idea of thought. Descartes defines thought in terms of self-consciousness which is looking for something other than what we are. Descartes uses thought as a proof that gives to itself of being an indisputable existence when even things are subjected to doubt. Ricoeur's

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., XV.

idea of decision is closer to Husserl, when he explains decision as a form of intentionality. Here decision focuses more on the intended, wanted, projected object than on the one who decides. The moment of decision is not only reflective act where one's attention turns toward oneself, but one's attention in the moment of decision turns toward what one is projected to do. Consciousness throws outside of itself in decision. The subject absorbs in what it is projecting when it decides to do something. "The teaching of a phenomenology of decision is not the discovery of "a transcendental ego" placed in the position of a spectator, but that of a shattered consciousness that is turned toward the objects it intends."<sup>112</sup>

Ricoeur describes decision is "a future action which depends on me and which is within my power."<sup>113</sup> This is double reference to the "ego" as not only with the deciding subject, but also as both I remain present in the decision despite being out side of myself and despite being absorbed in the project to be done. Decision as act of thought is different from other acts of thought such as wishes or commands. In case of wish, it is not a project that one decides to accomplish, nor is it an action that can be attributed to one's decision. Ricoeur admits, in certain exceptional situation, where one's wish can see quasi-decision. For example, "an emotion can deprive me of my self-control to such an extent that, in relation to myself, I become like a falling stone, an explosion, or a tempest. Then my decision to confront it expresses itself as a wish: 'Oh, if only I could master that event! If only I could hold out.'<sup>114</sup> In the case of a command, one is given, although it is one who act, but the decision is someone else's where another person is deciding in one's place.

In wishes, the action to be accomplished depends on the anonymous course of thing. In commands, the action to be done depends on the power of another. But, in the case of decisions, the action to be done depends on one's project and on one's ability to do it. There is no decision without an implied subject; it is precisely the degree of engagement of the subject that distinguishes a decision from a wish or a command.

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<sup>112</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 111.

<sup>113</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 43.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 47.



This relation of the project to a personal action gives decision an exceptional position among all practical judgment: decision points me as the agent in my very intention of the action to be done. Hence its existential import is considerable: it is I who projects and does in projecting or doing something.<sup>115</sup>

According to Ricoeur, the involvement of subject in the decision is closely linked to the feeling of being able to accomplish it. When one makes plan that is a form of project to do something. One includes in one's projection a being able to do that and thus engages one's being. The subject here cannot be outside of what it is projecting: "for in doing something, I make myself be, I am my own capacity for being."<sup>116</sup> So when one projects an action, it is at the same time oneself that one is projecting. The subject's involvement in decision culminates in the possibility of imputing a projected action to oneself. Deciding is not just deciding something, but it is making up one's own mind. By the virtue of this ability to self-impute, one can say, "it was me that planned to do that" "I was the one who wanted to..." "I take full responsibility for that decision."<sup>117</sup> One takes responsibility of one's action by the reflexive nature of the decision, where the subject has explicit awareness of it. In decision one has a kind of internalization of the other that is not necessarily a person, but it is a form of conscience, (for example, regret, remorse, self-justification, etc.) This reflexive act reveals oneself to oneself as a deciding subject and made one able to take right decision.

Ricoeur's idea of deciding leads to the next act of voluntary, the motivation. As he says, "There are no decisions without motives."<sup>118</sup> Here he distinguishes motives as different from cause. He explains motives in terms of their basic meaning, what they are not. Causes can be known and understood prior to their effects, but same is not true for motives. Motives only make sense or only have meanings in relation to decisions. We cannot talk about motives apart from some decisions, and any decision cannot be possible without questions about its possible motives. Therefore, the relation of decisions and motives are reciprocal. Ricoeur describes the

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>117</sup> Davidson Scott, 2018: 113.

<sup>118</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 66.

reciprocal relation of decisions and motives as “a motive determines the will only as the will determines itself.”<sup>119</sup> For him, motives provide a base for decisions or a way to justify, to make decisions look legitimate.

Ricoeur explores motives in broader sense where motives are related to values. There is always an implicit evaluation of any motive. Values first appear to us as possible motives for decisions. The value-oriented motives suggest, there is an ethical dimension always implicit in or bordering a human action. Ricoeur does not develop ethical dimensions of motives in depth here. Instead, he only insists that the major point here is that willing as deciding is never a pure act on our part: “I do my acts to the extent to which I accept *reason* for them.”<sup>120</sup> There is always a receptive moment in one’s voluntary action, something one often expresses through metaphors: one opens oneself to or closes oneself off from; one turns toward, adopts, attaches to. Again, these all things are one can think and talk about, particularly when they are marked by a feeling of responsibility, something emphasized whenever one says that something is one’s act.

Ricoeur introduces the involuntary in sense of body which is the basic source of one’s motives and as organic values. He writes, “the involuntary in terms of my body as the most basic source of my motives and reveals a primordial stratum of motives: the organic values.”<sup>121</sup> He explains the reciprocity of the voluntary will and the involuntary body as “the involuntary is *for* the will and the will is *by reason* of the involuntary.”<sup>122</sup> He explains the reciprocal relation of the voluntary will and the involuntary body by one’s lived experience. Where the body is not objective knowledge of body, but it is lived experience of the body. The reciprocal union of the voluntary will, and the involuntary body is the embodied subjectivity that represents the same body in two points alternatively. One as a personal body inherent in its consciousness and other as an object-body that is presented among other objects.

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 86.

Ricoeur seeks lived experience of body through a discussion of need and pleasure. Where need in most abstract sense relates to a living organism's need to appropriate and assimilate things, say food, in order to exist. Need should not be reduced to just an inner sensation, but they refer to something other than oneself. Needs have a kind of intentional relation to something other than themselves. At the same time, needs are experienced as referring to something that one lacks. Needs as experienced lack is also characterized by an impetus, a drive to remove it. There are distinctions between Needs where some needs can be experienced as painful and any need can overlap with motives for action. However, needs are not something an automatic reflex, but needs become a motive which inclines one without compelling. Or one can resist or even reject one's needs. "Though I am not the master of need in the sense of lack, I can reject it as a reason for action. For example, I can choose whether to eat if food available; I do not choose whether to be hungry."<sup>123</sup> Needs are not just one motive among others, but they especially connect one to one's embodied existence.

What is noteworthy here, one's needs connect with possible motives. One find needs with possible motives to oneself in terms of particular objects. This is explained by the role of the imagination. Here the role of imagination provides another link to time through one's imagination. One can anticipate something that might be something currently absent at the base of the world. Imagination links up with the effective dimension connected with the basic idea of a project. Ricoeur explains that imagination stays closer to the level of something like virtual knowledge. However, pleasure in fact enters motivation through the imagination. pleasure is something one both can anticipate and imagine and is also worth considering. If only pleasure indicates something about the nature of desire beyond the level of basic needs. Then "*Desire is the present experience of need as a lack and as urge, extended by the representation of the absent object and by anticipation of pleasure.*"<sup>124</sup> Here is interesting again the reference of future.

The pleasure in one's experience is as much something one anticipates as something one currently feels. This is pleasure which tied to the idea of value. "To anticipate a pleasure

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 101.

means to be ready to say, ‘this is good.’”<sup>125</sup> But here again one may deceive oneself, yielding to the temptation or fascination that goes beyond or misconstrues one’s actual needs or good. At this point one would be ready to go beyond the brackets imposed by the attempt at pure description. Ricoeur holds that pleasure in relation to the imagination may be an invitation to the fault. Instead of pursuing this possibility, he focuses on some more general comments on how motives and values relate to the organic level of one’s life. “For example, pain is not the opposite of pleasure, but something heterogeneous with it. Similarly, what is difficult, and thus not always pleasurable, may have a positive value in the way that it relates to a freely chosen action.”<sup>126</sup> What one finds in relation to organic life is a plurality of values, some of which are divergent with others. Ricoeur expresses, “there is something ambiguous about organic life that will resist all our attempt to make complete sense of it – for example, by trying to organize such discordant values into a single hierarchy.”<sup>127</sup>

Ricoeur’s important conclusion here is that “bodily existence transcends the intelligibility claimed by the essences of the Cogito.”<sup>128</sup> Any attempt to think about one’s life as ultimate constitutive of one’s lived experiences will always run into difficulties. Because the organic values one considers are themselves subject to change over time and place. “Life, at least on human level, is a complex, unresolved situation, an unresolved problem whose terms are neither clear nor consistent.”<sup>129</sup> In other words, the reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary reveal one’s experience in sense of why one has to make choices and not how one makes choices. One makes choices because one is both mind and body without being able to reconcile these two ways of being completely. One also recognizes such choices are situated with regard to time and place. One would have to be understood in ways that acknowledges the reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary.

Ricoeur sees deeper side of reciprocity between the voluntary and the involuntary in order to provide description of decision. What he calls the history of decision making as a

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>126</sup> Pellauer, David, 2007: 18.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>128</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 120.

<sup>129</sup> Pellauer, David, 2007: 18.

movement from hesitation to actual choice. Here, he expresses something dramatic about this history. “Existence moves forward only through the double movement of corporeal spontaneity and voluntary control. This process has two aspects: it is both undergone and carried out.”<sup>130</sup> Here, one finds the tension between continuity and discontinuity in choice.

Ricoeur describes that the event of choice is involved in both continuity and discontinuity that are interchangeably with termination of attentive deliberation and an eruption of the project. These two ideas of event or choice are discussed by two readings of events of choice. The first reading is discussed by the classical philosophies that is also discussed by medieval scholastic tradition and early modern philosophy. They accept that the event of choice is continuity in two propositions affirmative and negative. In affirmative proposition, “*To choose is nothing other than to cease deliberation.*”<sup>131</sup> here, to resolve on an alternative is to resolve motivation. Choice is a process of rational deliberation that ends in a practical judgment. Here the attention is receptive to reason. In the negative proposition, “*the act of choosing is nothing except the cessation of deliberation.*”<sup>132</sup> They accept the fixation of attention is the same as choosing. The act of choice is nothing other than becoming maximally receptive to reasons.

The second reading of the event of choice is explained by some modern existentialist philosophers like, Kierkegaard, Bergson, and Sartre. They believe that the discontinuity exists between motives (process of deliberation) and the event of choice in two senses. In one sense, to choose (in the authentic sense) has nothing to do with receptivity to reasons and values. In other sense, choice is a positive thing, an event that is completely free of original act, an upsurge of a spontaneous, sovereign freedom (being-for-itself). This freedom is undetermined or motiveless and exists by nihilating motives (Sartre’s being-in-itself).

Ricoeur in contrast to both readings of the classical and modern believes that the event of choice involves both continuity and discontinuity they are interchangeable with termination of attentive deliberation and an eruption of the project. Ricoeur adopts something from both

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<sup>130</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 136.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 168.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 168.

readings of event of the choice. He takes something from the first reading of the event of choice's the affirmative proposition. Where the self chooses because of reason that is motive. The self-choice inclines to motives without compelling of motives. Ricoeur affirms the receptivity of attention as a critical ingredient in the process of choice. There is availability to the contents of the duration of the decision that contributes to the resolution of hesitation and deliberation.

But he rejects the negative proposition of first reading of the event of choice, where the act of choosing is nothing except the cessation of deliberation. Ricoeur explains that choice is a positive thing as an event made possible by an effort of attention. "Through the effort of attention, choice is a *sursum* that interweaves universality and novelty (alterity) perceived (received) in the situation in a self-determination that is based on determination of motives (in a reciprocal process)." <sup>133</sup> There are somethings more of the event of choice that involve sometimes a radical creativity in the determination of motives, sometimes even a reversal of values. It is the self's attention to possible motives that orients and directs the temporal process of deliberation which guides the maturation of decision from hesitation to choose. The act of attention guiding the duration also determines how the contents are received. This is something more of the event of choice is the *fiat* (*categorical* affirmation) that completes whole of the duration. In the fiat, the self feels the effort of attention of the will in fixing attention on one set of motives, but at the same time it actively ceasing to look at other motives.

In any case, self 's attention culminates in an event of choice that is commitment or conviction in a radical self-affection in the becoming of the self. The effort of the self's is becoming triple indetermination (of motive, self, and project) to a triple determination. Ricoreur writes,

...the novelty of choice has the appearance of categorical modality within the network of a consciousness which unfolds itself in a conditional mode. Thus discontinuity concerns a change of modality: through choice the three dimensions of decision—the triple relation to project, to self, and to motives—surge forward into a categorical mode. The project, for one, becomes a genuine imperative: I

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<sup>133</sup> Davidson, Scott, 2018: 101.

command the event in general. The indicator, “to be done by me,” itself becomes categorical....At the same time, while the project becomes categorical, I determined myself categorically. I choose *myself* in determination *what* I shall be in my doing. The projected myself gives consistency to my self, to the self which is at present projecting. Before the choice, I was only the unity of a wish to choose and the unity of painful consciousness of my intimate division. I create myself as an actual living unity in my act: is the moment of choice I come to myself, I come out of the internal shadows, I irrupt as myself, I ek-sist. Finally, in the choice the constellation of motives itself is fixed in its definitive order. Motivation itself becomes categorical: I choose because....A preference becomes consecrated beyond return. All the “but’s” disappear...<sup>134</sup>

This is the novelty of choice, where this triple determination or resolution is the irruption of choice that determines one’s project. One’s reasons become determinate, and one becomes determined in this way.

Ricoeur describes that decision or choice can be a source of novelty as “The event of choice always permits two reading: on the one hand, it is tied to the preceding examination whose end or, more exactly, *resolution* it is; on the other hand, it genuinely *inaugurates* the project as a simple intention of future action.”<sup>135</sup> These two reading of the event of choice as a resolution of choice and inauguration of project as future action is a paradoxical unity. As Ricorur describes,

Authentic choice assumes an authentic debate among values which are not invented but encountered. *The power of receiving and hearing the good* is what raises consciousness to the point of tension from which it is delivered by choice. Hence the leap of option has as its obverse the sudden appearance of a preference in the web of conflicting motives. To choose an alternative is to prefer the reason for this alternative to the reason for another. This is why the debate is not in vain: the chosen alternative has no value other than that which motivation brought to light. To risk is something quite other than to wager: we wager without reason,

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<sup>134</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 172.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 164.

take a chance when the reasons are not sufficient. The irruption of choice and the resolution of attention on a group of motives which give value to choice are paradoxically identical.<sup>136</sup>

Paradoxically, the event of choice is our attending to the process of reaching a decision that resolves this process by identifying choice. This is the reason why we can never fully reconcile the two readings of the event of choice. One is the resolution of choice and the other is choice genuinely inaugurating a future project. We can see this once we recognize that, on the one hand, hesitation plays with different possibilities and reasons for acting and yet these reasons only become operative once our choice is made. Without that choice being able to be conceived of it results in something like completely unmotivated. Therefore, decision occurs not only by attention to perceived motives, but also by an effort of detachment from all other possible motives. No matter how other motives are attractive to human consciousness. Ricoeur's idea of decisions, introduces a certain indeterminacy into one's definition of freedom which should not be thought of as an indeterminacy of indifference. We claim that to decide and to choose and to be undetermined are one and the same thing, this is possible through the paradoxical unity of the voluntary and the involuntary.

Thus, decisions do not reveal the whole of voluntary action, although they are just one aspect of them. The second aspect of voluntary action will explore the test of being carried out through movement of ability or capacity. This is the second aspect of the reciprocal relation of voluntary movement and the involuntary ability or capacity of the body.

## **B. Reciprocity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary in Movement or Effort**

The second aspect of the reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary is revealed through the idea of movement or effort. Ricoeur describes the idea of motion as being separated from decision only by abstraction. Here, he denies the classical analysis which distinguishes the several phases of voluntary activity, deliberation, decision and execution in time. Ricoeur explains that decision does not follow deliberation purely nor does action follow decision. His phenomenological approach will try to isolate the phenomenon as much as possible in order to

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid., 180.



capture something like its essence. Most acts are happened as soon as we think of them, but action can also be delayed. If a project is never endeavoured, it will be mistaken about calling it action. In action, there is a basic value operative that is willed acts and refers to something that ought to be. As Ricoeur holds that “the project anticipates the action and the action tests the project.”<sup>137</sup>

Again, Ricoeur’s basic insight here is to reveal bodily involvement along with the imagination. But here body as organ of action is more than itself being the end of action which is in question. What is at support is that we can call effort. Effort is both trying to carry through on our decision by means of our body and even in representing this to ourselves as something desirable. Ricoeur explains this “I cannot represent the content of the value to myself unless I master the movement of the body and the movement of the idea. The first function takes place in the register of practical representation, the second constitutes the original relation of will to reality which is *acting* strictly speaking.”<sup>138</sup>

Ricoeur describes a number of different phenomena in trying to explicate action. Many of them present themselves as obstacles to description as much as they advance its progress. He explains that whether we can make sense of the object of acting in idea of intentionality. That is, what is at issue is not just that one intends to do something in the sense of willing it. But it is also in the sense that in willing it. One refers to something, one’s project or act, which we can recognize and name. The intended object is not always clearly given as the way an object is given in perception. The intended object comes closer to evoking something like a non-representative consciousness. One that Ricoeur tries to capture by saying this intended object is the ‘pragma’ of acting. But this term is not very satisfactory, and it disappears from his later work. However, “the problem is a real one and is connected to idea of consciousness as somehow involving representations, a problem that will continue to Ricoeur’s later work, until he finally concludes that it is a helpful way to approach things after all and simply needs to be abandoned”<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 202.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>139</sup> Pellauer, David, 2007: 20.

Ricoeur describes body is the organ of our acting more than objects of action. The question here is, how do we make sense of our experience of moving our body? This reveals first of all, a capacity we possess, as consequently something potential. However, we recognize this capacity through using it. This means that “capacities are at the same time residues of action and promises of action.”<sup>140</sup> These capacities of something we can reflect upon them, but we have not to think of in order to use them. In other words, these capacities are not things that we observe. This is different from objects of perception. Here again, Ricoeur rejects disembodied consciousness and expresses-

Cartesian dualism cannot be overcome as long as we assign thought (project, idea, motive, image, etc.) to subjectivity and movement to objectivity,’ The question therefore is how to reintroduce the body into the Cogito ‘as a whole and to recover the fundamental certitude of being incarnate, of being in a corporeal situation.<sup>141</sup>

Here, Ricoeur argues that both Gestalt and Behaviourist psychologist have ended up trying to objectify the ego. He argues that it cannot be done. Both Gestalt and Behaviourist psychologist have suggested a helpful way of thinking about voluntary motion and embodiment as a dramatic relationship that they show as “every voluntary hold on the body repossesses the body’s involuntary usage.”<sup>142</sup> However according to Ricoeur voluntary motion is not simply given, although it is something one learns to do through something as a dialogue with one’s body. He seeks this position by considering three relevant examples such as preformed skills, emotions, and habits.

Preformed skills are one’s ability to stand upright that refer to something prior to reflexes but they are not instincts. They indicate to “a primitive pattern of behaviour of our body in relation to perceived objects.”<sup>143</sup> They regulate movement but do not produce it. They are defined as “an initial unlearned power of acting.”<sup>144</sup> These capacities are sensory motor

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<sup>140</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 215.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 217.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 227.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 232.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 266.

units known from developmental psychology. Where one is following an object by moving one's eyes and head. One is stretching out one's hand toward an object that attracts one's attention. One is avoiding an object that threaten to hit oneself by moving the whole of one's body, extending one's hand and arms before falling. These capacities are different from reflexes for example, protective reflexes like the blinking of the eyelids, the flowing of tears when the eyes are irritated, sneezing, coughing, etc. Therefore, preformed skills are capable of variations which are flexible complexes of one's behaviour. However, preformed skills do not respond to simple stimuli, but they are the meanings that one grasps in one's surroundings. The preformed skills can be understood neither in mechanical nor teleological terms. They have an intelligible and variable structure that can become an object of further development of learning and can be turned into relatively stable acquired dispositions. Before, one has learned or acquired anything, one already has certain limited, but working powers over one's bodies and the world.

Next, is emotions that presuppose a more or less implicit motivation. Motivation precedes and sustains emotions. Thus, emotions give an added physical aspect to already conscious ends. This is a point that indicates to nascent movement. Therefore, emotions are more basic than acquired habits. Ricoeur suggests that we can recognize basic emotional attitudes like: wonder, shock, joy, and sorrow, which can be described by our affective imagination and culminate in desire. Emotions are thus "echoing and amplifying in the body a rapid, implicit value judgment."<sup>145</sup> Ricoeur's phenomenology of emotions suggests that "for the idea of a spontaneity of consciousness, we have to substitute the idea of a "passion" of the soul from the fact of the body."<sup>146</sup> Whenever there is a possible action there is passion of the soul from the fact of the body. This implies that "willing only moves on the condition of being moved. The body has to go first and willing must moderate it afterwards."<sup>147</sup> Consciousness can already be seen to have the capacity to bind itself in the sense of making itself the prisoner of imaginary evils, that is nothing at all, except something we call vanity. At the same time,

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 256.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 275.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 276.

emotions are partly subject, and not only reflexes, although they are giving one's reflexes meaning and responding to reflexes which is already a kind of wisdom.

Habits like emotions give an alteration of one's intention, they are both learned or acquired and related to how one acts. Habits as learned, they build on one's preformed skills, not one's reflexes. Habits have use-values. They have a specific kind of spontaneity which is associated with one's familiar gestures and customary thoughts. We can say that habits give a form to one's sources of action, but they are not precisely willed. One can make an effort to change habits. At one extreme case, habits can become automatic and reduce one's willing to zero. On the other hand, habits enable action in sense they give action a form or pattern through which action expresses itself.

The question arises here, what kind of being may acquire a habit? Ricoeur describes the subject of habits is a unique, real unity. This a being which has its structure in space (it is an organism) and time (its temporal structure constitutes a unique life). Ricoeur's *Philosophy of the Will* is based on the idea of Cogito. Each form of one's behavior (willing, deciding, acting, in being emotionally moved) always presents a Cogito in the form of an intentional act. There is always a self that wants something, decides to do something, or is moved by an emotion. All the voluntary acts (decision, action, consent) are comprised under conditions that the voluntary cannot change. Ricoeur calls them the involuntary and distinguishes two subclasses of the involuntary. One is the relative involuntary (such as motive for a decision) and the absolute involuntary (such as aging, death, character). Habit is the relative involuntary which comprises also the complex structure of motivation, preformed skills, and the emotions. The involuntary is understandable only in relation to respective Cogito. For instance, motives are not intelligible in themselves, but only as a part of particular decision. Habits are not understandable or intelligible in themselves, but only in relation to a certain willing and acting that Ricoeur calls as an organ of willing. Habits combined with preformed skills and emotions help one makes sense of what it means to set one's decisions into motion.

Effort, first of all, has a sensory aspect, one only really becomes aware of this through reflection. Ordinary actions are things we just do, but sometimes one encounters resistance either from one's body or from the world that one can focus one's consciousness on. In this

case, the body is no longer a docile organ of action. One no longer experiences oneself as a simple unity, as experiences that in extreme cases can turn into something as vertigo. Yet one can encounter resistance to one's projects only when one can say yes to projects. For these reasons, there is a kind of joy in acting when it succeeds. Thus, one's voluntary initiative carries over into what we can call a motor intentionality that connects one's lived body. Through motor intentionality that connects one's lived body, one's act sets into motion. "This motor intentionality is transitive; it does not terminate in the body but reaches out to the world in a way that differs from seeing or hearing."<sup>148</sup> In both cases, where motor intentionality connects to lived body and reaches out to world, one experiences as 'there for one'. This "there for one" of the world Ricoeur says is mystery that is adopted by Gabriel Marcel. Gabriel Marcel "distinguishes between a problem, which is something to be solved and that can be solved, and a mystery which is something that can only be acknowledged and marvelled at."<sup>149</sup> Ricoeur always maintains that there is something given to one, which is the problem of the truth of the reality. This problem of the truth of reality cannot be solved solely through a consideration of one's will or one's reflective consciousness. Once, we reach the stage of movement, third aspect of the reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary emerges that Ricoeur calls as consent.

### **C. Reciprocity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary in Consent**

Ricoeur describes, "consent is the act of the will which acquiesces to a necessity."<sup>150</sup> These are terms or forms of the involuntary that moves one from something like a relative to an absolute involuntary like character, the unconscious, and life itself. Here, consent is not just a judgment, although it is a constitutive part of human freedom given the reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary. Consent involves a form of patience before what one cannot change, but also sets the stamp of effectiveness on what one can do. By this reason, one's

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<sup>148</sup> Pellauer, David, 2007: 22.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>150</sup> Ricoeur, Paul, 1966: 341.

choice becomes legitimate. Ricoeur explains that “consent is the asymptotic progress of freedom towards necessity.”<sup>151</sup>

His idea of consent is reuniting one with nature or necessity. This model of subject and object can be understood through the answer of following questions: how can these two terms be reunited? How can one finally say that there is no incompatibility between freedom and nature? Or that all forms of freedom finally agree with one another? This is what a philosophy of the voluntary and involuntary seeks to resolve, even if this unity happens only asymptotically. Ricoeur explains the unity of freedom and nature paradoxically where each one negates each other. Therefore, reconciliation will always be incomplete due to inherent ambiguity in the idea of necessity. Necessity both points a condition of one’s existence and also its limit. Still, Ricoeur maintains, “the ‘yes’ of consent is always won from the ‘no’ and this cannot be denied by attempts to objectify everything.”<sup>152</sup>

This is victory for reflection where consciousness already finds itself given, but not yet one for existence. There is still incompatibility between freedom and necessity, because freedom and necessity negate each other. Ricoeur differs from Sartre and refuses to consider freedom to be the sole source of negation. He says, “as if freedom were brought about by nothingness, by the very act in which it breaks away from the blind innocence of life.”<sup>153</sup> Ricoeur describes that negation has to be seen as both positive and negative. In negative sense, it is injurious in that it appears as an active negation of freedom. In positive sense, it is freedom’s response to the ‘no’ of necessity. After all freedom is the possibility of not accepting oneself. This makes sense as the question of determining who one is, one self, will become a constant negation is something, one can hope to overcome. This claim fills out by one’s experience of necessity in sense of three moments.

The First moment is what Ricoeur calls “the sorrow of finitude.” Here, one suffers from one’s finitude when one realizes that this is only one’s one perspective on the world and values. Similarly, one can suffer from having to make choices, which not only emphasizes one’s

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 346.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 254.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 445.

particularity but also removes one's from other possibilities. In this sense, one becomes more and more one as one makes more and more choices. With this comes the second moment, that Ricoeur calls "the sorrow of formlessness." In this case, there is something about one that one does not choose yet that affects one's. Something one can try to give form by calling it the unconscious. The unconscious is "the spontaneous power of unrecognized tendencies in us."<sup>154</sup> Finally, there is third moment that Ricoeur refers "the sorrow of contingency." One did not choose to come into existence, to live. As Heidegger refers, one is 'thrown' into existence and into the world and with it into a space and time that associates between birth and death. Ricoeur differs from Heidegger and does not define existence in form of its being toward death. There is no doubt, he accepts death as "an irrecusable necessity," but "this necessity cannot be deduced from any characteristic of existence. Contingency tells me only I am not a necessary being whose contradiction would imply a self-contradiction; it allows me to conclude at most that I cannot be one day, that I can die – for what *must* begin *can* end – but not that I *must die*."<sup>155</sup> The idea that one will die is gained not only as the sorrow, but also the anticipation increases. For this reason, freedom respond to this 'no' of one's existential condition with the 'no' of refusal.

This 'no' of one's existential condition is most clearly seen in its most exaggerated form of one's freedom. Where the freedom is a wish for totality or for complete self-transparency, and in one's desires to say that one in fact posit oneself in positing one's consciousness. But Ricoeur explains, "any *ideal* derivation of consciousness is a refusal of its *concrete* condition."<sup>156</sup> This response of freedom's 'no' to necessity, in other words can turn into a form of vanity. He concludes that consent is not a way of refusing necessity but rather of transcending it. This transcending is particularly regarding evil, through a poetic response rooted in hope. Ricoeur describes two opposed, imperfect form of alleged consent here, which explains some content of this idea of hope. One is Stoicism, which is an effort at detachment of freedom and necessity rather than conciliation. Other is Orphism or the hyperbolic consent represent by Nietzsche and much of Rilke's poetry. This is a kind of dancing over the abyss.

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 449.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 458.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid, 365.

Hope lies between freedom and necessity and the polar extremes of exile and confusion. But, still sustains one in sense that it allows one to hope that one at least is on the way to conciliation.

For Ricoeur, there is something radically paradoxical about human freedom as he writes, “in reality each moment of freedom – deciding, moving, consenting – unites action and passion, initiative and receptivity, according to a different intentional mode.”<sup>157</sup> The paradox lies not between these three moments of the will, but between the form of initiative and receptivity that characterize each aspect of reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary. What the reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary reveals is that one’s freedom is ‘only human’ and that we can understand it only in certain limited concepts that function like regulative, not constitutive ideas. In this sense, human freedom is not creative freedom like divine freedom, and a human being is unlike God.

Secondly, a human freedom is a motivated freedom, but not in an exhaustive, transparent, and absolutely rational way, like some classical and Modern philosophers have described. Thirdly, this freedom is an incarnate freedom, where one is capable of graceful acts. Finally, this is the idea of human freedom where one would not be limited by the idea of a given fixed character, but it is a particular finite form. “These limit concepts have no other function here than to help us to understand the condition of a will which is reciprocal with an involuntary.”<sup>158</sup> As such, the reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary belong to the level of an attempted description of lived subjectivity. This lived subjectivity teaches us that human freedom is not divine, it does not posit itself because it is not Transcendence. To will is not to create, but it is infinite possibility of freedom with finite mode of existence.

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 483.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 486.



## II. Individual, Social, and Reciprocal Freedom in Daya Krishna

According to Daya Krishna, human being is social being where individual's freedom is reciprocal with others. Individual always finds his/her existence in the world with others. Freedom is the one thing that perhaps everybody wants, if everybody wants freedom then freedom becomes impossible because each one gets freedom to extent one wants it. Daya Krishna writes, "One's freedom seems to be essentially limited by the freedom of others and thus nobody can be free, for each is limited by the other."<sup>159</sup> The problem of freedom may only be solved by giving up the dream of absolute freedom. Each one accepts the limitation of one's freedom by others. On the opposite side of this negative sense, each one's freedom may enhance the freedom of others and this is the positive sense that actually works in several cases. Neither children will grow and adult, nor will society function and men survive if there is no positive relation with others. Daya Krishna elaborates individual's reciprocal freedom with others whether one's freedom is reciprocally limited and enhanced by other's freedom. This reciprocal freedom of individual's with other individuals is either heaven or hell and it depends on their positive and negative relation with one another.

For Daya Krishna, a human being is not merely biological being, but he/ she is also a social being which defines human being different from all others living beings. Human being cannot be understood without biological structure and psychological, social, economic, and culture precondition. To become an individual human, it means that one is free and responsible for what one does. Whatever one has done is either subject of praise or blame or reward or censure on moral grounds. Individual's freedom is always reciprocal with others' freedom. The individual is not particular kind of being as a subject, but he/ she also other as an object in his/her environment.

Each individual is a subject in his/ her own right. "Where each thinks and feels oneself to be a subject and all the others to be objects whose very being is supposed to be dependent on ones being conscious of them and which would dissolve or disappear the moment one would turn one's consciousness from them."<sup>160</sup> Individual's actions are always reciprocal to others

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<sup>159</sup> Krishna, Daya, 2012: 33.

<sup>160</sup> Krishna, Daya, 2011: 295.

actions. Each one has self-awareness of others as subjects as one has oneself. This conflict of subject and object can be explained through ontological and epistemological independence. For ontological independence each one as subject finds resistance offered by the object. It is at the same time proved epistemological independence as each subject is also an object for that we mistakenly understood only an object.

Daya Krishna explains the inalienable and irreducible subjectivity of the other through language. He says that language has an essential inter-subjectivity aspect that reveals clearly when one is always either addressing someone or is being addressed by someone. He explores inter-subjectivity of human beings in realm of action and feeling. This inter-subjectivity is generally denied by both Indian and Western philosophers. Where all philosophical thought starts from the reflexive activity of self-consciousness which discovers self-certainty and indubitable of one's as a subject and all others as the object. However, Daya Krishna says, "one forgets that, at least some of the objects amongst those that appear to be such also evince this capacity and hence will have to be granted this same subject-hood as one grant to oneself."<sup>161</sup> Here, an individual feels the same capacity of the other individuals in relation to oneself. One's relationship to others alone makes one acutely aware of the freedom of the other.

Daya Krishna says the idea of freedom in itself does not mean anything. Freedom is exercised or used for whether it is freedom from, freedom to do, or freedom to be. It always needs the power to bring something into being which is not there or maintain what is there. The exercise of freedom itself is somethings that is maintained or changed, but what is maintained or changed already exists or it is precondition of the exercise of freedom. This makes one feel free. But what is presupposed as a precondition of exercise of freedom is in most cases a result of exercised of freedom by others or oneself in the past. It is a result of exercise of freedom that one finds around one all the time. There is always conflict within exercise of freedom where freedom finds itself bound or free by its own creations. Therefore, the very exercise of freedom itself may restrict or enhance itself. In the very exercise of freedom, one always finds other's involvement where inadvertently, one may become the cause or the occasion for the enhancement or restriction of the freedom of others.

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 294.

Individual's self-consciousness is not only aware of oneself but also has awareness of others. This defines that one is not only thinking being, but one is also self-conscious being. One's self-consciousness always involves doubts and uncertainty. What is worse, a human being faces trouble with the permanent burden and the necessity of making the distinction between right and wrong, good and bad. One's moral or ethical consciousness is always giving rise to an unending suspicion where one may perhaps be really guilty, even when one is not.

But the realm of values is not exhausted by the moral or ethical distinction alone. But value pursues one continuously questioning or asking whatever is there, how it can be better. A human being's self-consciousness is always associated with "*aucitya-bodha*." Daya Krishna explains meaning of *aucitya-bodha*, "the inalienable and intrinsic property of self-consciousness which see all that it is aware of in terms of what it is not, detached from the pleasantness or unpleasantness or even the neutral feeling that all consciousness-qua-consciousness usually has towards it."<sup>162</sup>

The term *aucitya* does not convey the negative centrality of the aspect of self-consciousness. Although self-consciousness itself is continuously dissatisfied with what has been brought into being by its own activity. This state of self-consciousness gives rise to angst or alienation that is explained by existentialists and some other modern thinkers. Daya Krishna insists that existentialists and modern thinkers have much talked about angst or alienation, but they have not adequately appreciated the intrinsic negation involved in self-consciousness. This not only gives dialectic, but also gives perpetual doubt about one's own authenticity, honesty, and sincerity. One is never satisfied whatever one has done and a challenge is posed by this awareness that something should be or ought to be. This obligation is always imposed on oneself to realize it or to bring it into being.

The negative critique involved in self-consciousness leads not just to the desire to know oneself but rather to change or transform oneself. This method to know oneself is called "know Thyself" or *ātmanam viddhi*. But the deeper problem revealed in this method is articulated in sense of changing or transforming oneself in sense of one ought to be. They are faced from the

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 303.

axiological and ontological problems. Daya Krishna explains this problem as “Transforming the world to conform to one’s heart’s desire, or to the value that one holds and so to make it better, is a goal for most human beings. But it is seldom asked how the world can become better if the human beings constituting it do not try to also become better.”<sup>163</sup> All preformist and revolutionary thought have accepted this assumption and explained that a human being is a function of the sociocultural environment and that, unless the political, economic, and legal institutions are changed, individual’s thought that he/she can change himself/ herself is just an utopia. They also argue that private vices may lead to public good and that individual goodness may stand in the way of development and progress of societies, politics and socialization. Greed and ambition, competition and the lust for power, prosperity and war lead not only human beings to achieve their utmost goals, but also encourage heroic virtue, entrepreneurship and risk-taking which the pursuit of good. All that at the individual level can never give.

What Daya Krishna tries to say here is that there are always some contradicting terms that appear in conception of freedom because freedom is not in a vacuum or of a vacuous kind of being. human being’s freedom is involved in both opportunities and constraints. The self-contradiction is involved in cases of one’s freedom at deeper level. One cannot self-realize one’s own exercise of freedom without restriction, rule. However, one is also dependent on others without whose help and co-operation or even competition exercise of freedom cannot be possible. The other self-contradiction is related to the ontological problem. The idea of pure being does not make any sense at all. Because being in order to actualize itself has to accept the limitation of being as particular being or *this being*. What is surprising is that “this being” is simultaneously to be different from what this being is. This being is not to be an extensionally finite, what Daya Krishna describes that “denumerable set and if the possibility of new beings is to be there, the entire thing would have to be essentially an open one, destroying the usual metaphysical formation at its foundation.”<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 303.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 304.

The reason for the restriction and the necessity for acceptability of limitation lies in the very notion of freedom itself. This can be understood through the idea of omnipotent. Freedom will cease to be such if it were to be really omnipotent then there will be no other reality to it. If there is to be another for freedom, then it feels meaningfully significant in respect of itself. Therefore, freedom has to feel the freedom of other not just as restriction but as fulfilling one's own freedom by this restriction itself.

Other is not one other, but many others including not only human beings but all beings, the universe is open for them, it is not limited or closed one. The openness is ontological precondition of freedom itself, as without it, meaningful action would become impossible. The fact that freedom is founded on reciprocity among a plurality of beings. This plurality of beings is indefinitely open plurality where each conditioning of being is conditioned in the other. The responsibility of each for the freedom of others becomes central to this way of thinking. In this thinking, the other's freedom is not abstract, empty, and contentless, as it has been usually discussed in philosophical thought generally. Instead, other's freedom is seen as a concretely situated center for the realization of something mutually meaningful through its exercise. Daya Krishna explains "thus, help in the creation of an inter-subjective world which not only seems meaningful and fulfilling to each but also gives one the feeling that one can do something worthwhile even on one's own as others..."<sup>165</sup>

He describes that freedom is related to action or conduct or behavior in an essential sense that is associated with good or value in general. Therefore, there is not only other or others in an essential sense but, reflexively to oneself as the agent of the action also. The exercise of freedom is not only affected others but also in essential sense freedom is affected to itself. Freedom can increase or become less or even lost by its effect on itself through its very exercise without others. Daya Krishna explains this state as "conditions within which freedom is exercised condition its exercise, but the direction that this exercise takes and the way it is exercised create those very conditions that retard or enhance it in an essential way."<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid., 305.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 306.

One's freedom itself partly creates both the facilitating and obstructing situations. On the other hand, one's exercise of freedom has enhanced the freedom of others. In this way, Daya Krishna rejects existentialists, postmodernists or even the *moksa-seeker* ideas of freedom. Daya Krishna idea of freedom is embedded in a plurality of interactive beings that is associated with all living beings and human beings. He dines such kinds of freedom that is given for once and for all time. But he believes that freedom is something that is continuously lost and gained by the dynamic interplay of the interacting constituents of the dynamics.

This reciprocal freedom of one's with others as restriction and enhancement, is felt by all at family, institution, and nation levels. Whether one finds others either facilitators or restrictor for one's exercise of the freedom. We see that Daya Krishna insists that one has not merely interpersonal situation, but there a lies still deeper limitation to the human situation that he characterizes as the psychological limitation. Consciousness of human being is essentially "egocentric" and "point-centric." In case of egocentric consciousness, each individual is alone in his/her consciousness. Other's suffering is not one's suffering, in same sense other's joy is not one's joy. One has not felt the total loneliness of pain when others are felt as others are really others. Daya Krishna refers, "I am I and you are you—and we can only signal to each other on mountains farthest apart. The desire to feel what the other one feels, the desire to be what the other one is, the impossible impulse to be all and feel all—who has not known it."<sup>167</sup>

On the other hand, one's consciousness is not only egocentric, but it is also point-centric. One's consciousness is inevitably confined to the "specious present." one's all past pains obliterates through the present joys, in the same one's all past joys obliterates through the present pains. All memories and anticipations do have their joys and sorrows, but only when the present allow them. Therefore, not only each one is alone in his/her consciousness but is also alone in each moment of his/her consciousness. These two psychological limitations of consciousness makes "human situation as felt as experienced, that is radically different from the same situation as objectively known and understood."<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> Krishna, Daya, 1889: 208.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 208.

Apart from the physiological limitation of human being, what makes an individual as a human being is where one fights for others right. One's eyes has tear when one listens and sees something miserable happen with others. What makes an individual restless when something wrong occurs in society or with others? What is impulse that makes one's able to sacrifice own happiness for others? Why one always imagines and acts for a better society, family, nation, and world? These are questions which all human beings may feel and effort for not only better life of one's own self, but also for others those who are related to one or not. All questions that I have raised is sought in two ways in Western and Indian philosophy. Where one feels responsibility or obligation to others' action. Again this, one's relation with others are only accidental or trans-social where one's seeks one's own transcendent being and finds others or society as facilitator or obstructer.

Daya Krishna explains the two ways of seeking one's relation to others and society through two perspectives of human being like "socio-centric perspective"<sup>169</sup> and "*Ātman*-centric perspective."<sup>170</sup> The two perspectives are dealt with in both Western and Indian cultures. According to socio-centric perspective, human individual "having nothing in himself that he does not owe to society and, therefore, from seeking the justification for each of his acts in terms of its social consequences. In this perspective, the individual is basically defined as a social animal."<sup>171</sup> An individual achieves his/her humanity only through the social and cultural tradition in which one grows and becomes a human being. A human being is ephemeral which come into being and passes away. What long lasting is the society, in which one is only a member. Greek, the Christian and the Communist versions are merely variations of socio-centric perspective. Where a human being essentially and intrinsically is not just responsible for oneself, but also for others. This does not mean that one is free and one's action has consequences for others. But, because one is social or communal at the very heart of one's being. One cannot be understood apart from society.

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<sup>169</sup> Krishna, Daya, 2012: 13,

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 12.

Daya Krishna gives example of Christian, and communist socio-centric perspective of human being where Christ has to redeem Adam's sin, but Christ was the son of God. However, Marx vision is different from Christian faith, but still both accept, one may be responsible for action that is not taken by one's own self and even one is essentially responsible for others action's consequence without one's relationships with others. Daya Krishna gives example of Communist and Christian respectively,

...it is man—conditioned by the society and the class into which he is born—who is expected to usher in the reign of freedom and hold himself responsible if he does not do so. For man to have such a burden of others' actions on his shoulders is certainly to develop a sense of community, but it is a community more in guilt than in redemption. Christ, it is true, is supposed to have redeemed humanity by his supreme sacrifice on the Cross and thus established a community in Redemption. However, first, the humanity which is supposed to have been redeemed by Christ's sacrifice is basically confined to the circle of those who have faith in Christ and, second, even after the supposed redemption of the faithful, it is more the original sin which weighs on the individual and collective consciousness of the West than the freedom from that guilt, which the Redemption presumably provided.<sup>172</sup>

*Ātman*-centric perspective is dealt with in Indian cultures where, the doctrine of *karma* is the basic presupposition. The presupposition of *karma* is explained that the world would be an immoral if one suffers from someone else's action consequence. This monadic morality of the Hindu tradition is understood in an essentially asocial manner. Doctrine of karma does not derive from other-centred consciousness in which the consequence of one's actions on others are the subject of one's focus of attention. Instead, it is the consequence of one's action upon oneself which gives the main ground for morality. This idea is focused only on whatever happens to one can be only the result of one's own action. Here, any type of sufferings or joys of one's either related to one's genetic, family personal advantage or disadvantageous. Or social, political, economic all are result of one's own action.

The two perspectives are exemplified by two different traditions and the two are basically two ways of conceptualizing society. Both socio-centric perspective and *Ātman*-

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 13.



centric perspective are formulated and accepted by a significant number of people that shapes the society in that direction. The two perspectives to the extent, they are actualized give two fundamental predicaments as socio-centric predicament and *Ātman*-centric predicament.

Daya Krishna refers that socio-centric predicament in Western culture is derived by the foundational guilt-consciousness that is exemplified in Christian and Marxist ideology, although their ideology is logically understandable. But yet they are found to be empirically contingent. The Greek, Judaic and Islamic culture are also essentially socio-centric in their nature, but they do not believe any essential guilt-consciousness. They all believe that a human being is social animal. One is deprived by all the trapping of transcendental faith reduces one essentially through the society. The society makes one to be what one to be or society permits one what one to be.

Against of socio-centric predicament, *Ātman*-centric predicament is derived by Indian culture, where a human being is basically seen as a transcendent being. One's sociality is only an accidental feature. In this sense, one is either the son of God or God itself. Here, the society is ultimately secondary in this perspective and one is essentially asocial or rather trans-social in nature. One's relationship with the other is also secondary. Both others and society are means for the realization of the higher and the deeper obligation to one's own self. At worst, both others and society are seen as a hindrance in the realization of one's own transcendent self. For example, Buddha, leaves his wife, child and kingdom because he feels dissatisfaction with one's own state of affairs. But Buddha's own state is dissatisfied by the sight of something outside his own self. It is the sights of suffering, old age and death that make him renounce the world. Buddha example is entirely different from the ideally constructive Hindu example where one is not renouncing family or society because of any concern with the specific condition of some others human beings, but one renounce family or society with one's condition of life. Buddha's return to save the suffering humanity and sets in motion the wheel of *dharma* that is non-Hindu in character.

Society in the *Ātman*-centric perspective is seen only as a midway term of thought and not the last one in terms of which everything else is to be understood and justified. Here society helps one to get way from one's ego-centred consciousness which is always concerned with

the satisfaction of personal desires. “As against this, one moves towards an awareness of obligation to others and towards the sustaining of those institutional mechanisms that makes human living possible.”<sup>173</sup> This others-oriented concept is classically denoted by concept of *dharma* in Hindu thought. This is moral realm per excellence where one has obligation for others. Others in the Hindu tradition is not only a human being, but also ancestors, God, plants, animal, earth, sky and so on. The concept of *dharma* is so wide that it includes all these realms, where others appear to be an empirical other with whom one has relationship.

The concept of *dharma* is only associated with one empirically. One has to transcend through detachment from others and society. Society is road of one’s withdrawal, but it does not end there, as in cases of socio-centric perspective. The Hindu hierarchy of values, especially in the *Ātman*-centric tradition, devalues the realm of social and moral. In this perspective, one should give up the whole network of social, moral and political obligation because these are only worldly things or instrument that is the satisfaction one’s biological needs. “This whole world, it is recommended, ought to be given up for the sake of the transcendent Self about which it is as meaningless to say it is one’s own as it is to say it is someone else’s.”<sup>174</sup> On the other hand, they suggest that the lower obligation like the family and village are sacrificed for a higher totality such as the country or the whole of humanity itself.

What Daya Krishna is trying to reveal through two predicaments? According to socio-centric predicament, one is only what society makes one. One has nothing in oneself which is not derived from society. At the same time, to be a social being makes everyone responsible for all that happens in society. In this case, one is responsible for actions that is not one’s own, but one redeems someone else’s action. In this case, the problem is that one redeems only sin or responsible to only bad action or condition that is result of other’s actions. Apart from the positive side, where one may be responsible for good and right actions of others. Or one has good condition or freedom that is given by others. This perspective makes one determined by others or society.

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 17

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 18.

On the contrary *Ātman*-centric predicament, makes human being a transcendent being that is withdrawal or detachment from all worldly things. This perspective leads one's attention away from an active concern with society. He refers,

when a society's best brains are concerned with the pursuit of something that is essentially a social or trans-social and which requires an active withdrawal from the institution that sustain it, the road is prepared for the inevitable take-over either by those who are interested only in their own gain or by those who bent on *transforming* the world in the image of their own good.<sup>175</sup>

He accepts Gresham's law in human affairs, "which may be formulated in terms of the tendency of the evil to drive out the good."<sup>176</sup> Daya Krishna believes that "It is not only the bad money that drives out the good, but also bad people who tend to drive out the good. The intrinsically good have a natural impulse to withdraw from the social world, as the most meaningful things are usually realized outside it."<sup>177</sup>

It is not difficult to understand that what Daya Krishna want to suggest, is bad or wrong tendency is more superior than good or right tendency. Or both good and bad, right and wrong tendency one learns and experiences within society. But, to say the intrinsically good have a natural impulse in detachment from social world. It somehow seems unreasonable because one's good impulse many times depend on what one's social situation is. If someone is deprived by others, society, and nation then there is less chance for one to realize intrinsically good impulse without social world. However, many times one's realizes good intrinsic impulse when one finds more acceptance or positive response through others, society, or nation. It is really difficult to say that which one perspective defines human reality adequately, both socio-centric and *Ātman*-centric have their own dark shadows the way they define one's relation with one own self as transcendent being or one's relation with others or society.

Daya Krishna suggests that the two predicaments are derived from the ways in which the relation between the society and the individual may be understood. Each of the ways

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 20.

extremely affects the direction of the society in which a society moves and develops. The two predicaments cast their own dark shadows. To be aware of the two predicament we feel challenge of avoiding them, if possible. But it is really difficult to avoid two perspective because one is always associated with two situations. The problem is that to accept one to the extent that may create problem. Because a human reality is neither completely determined by society or others nor one can survive without others or society too long. The person who renounces the family, village and society for one's own self-realization. This is itself question; does one realize one's own transcendent state after withdrawal from society or not?

Daya Krishna explains similar distinction in the realm of values that are associated with active and contemplative values. In this case, he has not explored the relation between individual and society and how one realizes two different values between the realm of action. One has felt continuous dissatisfaction with one's own self, other persons, and natural and social states of affairs. This dissatisfaction of one's with one's own self, and others, and social and natural states of affairs provide the dynamics for change, exploration and experimentation. Both Eastern and Western philosophers have given continuous attention to the distinction between self, and others, and social and natural states of affairs. Daya Krishna says that mainly phenomenological and existentialist thinkers left the one's experience of values in which one is encountered and involved. He explains dilemma between values that are experienced by one.

He elaborates division among values through active and contemplative values. In active values one faces problem that is associated with other persons, natural, and social states of affairs. In contemplative values, one faces problem associated with one's own self. In this case, one central concern is related to one's own self. On the contrary, in active values one always engages in active interrelationship with something other than oneself. The division between two values is not only division, rather it is in an intrinsic opposition between the two values. Where seeking one obstructs the seeking for other. This distinction is important for axiological reflection.

Daya Krishna explains this distinction and the dilemma at each level of human seeking and concern. One face this dilemma in case of appreciation of nature, where the sky, the hills, the trees are found almost everywhere. There is hardly a place which is deprived of the beauty

of a sunrise or sunset each day. One can contemplate the stars shine and the breeze blows and moon-light floods and so many others natural things. But against this, there are slums in the cities which is far off the moon and greenery of nature. The moon is hidden by sky scrapers and the breeze that blows is foul with the stink of choked drains and everywhere lie the excreta of man and animals. Cleaning all these is not easy job, one feels endless and fruitless job. What is worst in this case, “ the dirt and the stink get into one’s mind and the consciousness is filled with thoughts of what is to be done, what needs be done, what demands to be done and it has no time to contemplated and commune with the beauty that lay everywhere...”<sup>178</sup> Daya Krishna is suggesting that what moral consciousness only knows is only need, pain and suffering and these cannot be contemplated. But one can only try to remove them through the action.

The realm of human being is a moral realm par excellence where one’s consciousness moral is not only disturbed by a hundred claims, but it is also deprived freedom of others. There is not only an other, but are infinite others. Each other is free and yet equally dependent on the others for its freedom and success of its actions. Every individual as plurality of free beings and each one has the essential anomaly of the life of action. Each one essentially depends on others for the success of its the action and realizes the value for which one usually undertakes it. What Daya Krishna writes, “The value achievement in the realm of action is constantly threatened by the non-cooperation of others and even by their willful perversity.”<sup>179</sup>

Daya Krishna explains individual’s reciprocal freedom with others in community and society where one’s realizes active value that leads to feeling of dependency upon others. One’s dependency upon others leads one’s feeling of membership in community where one finds the others co-operative in nature. If one does not find others co-operative, then one feels hampered and frustrated at the center of one’s pursuit. One’s pursuit is persisted if other’s co-operation is felt essential to its success. Daya Krishna provides two examples in this context. His first example is associated with dictatorship. Where one achieves others co-operation by the force, cajole, and manipulation. Others are not freely and willing prepared to give co-operation of themselves. This example is seen history of Hitler and the Stalin. In this case, coercion and

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<sup>178</sup> Krishna,Daya, 1989: 213.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 214.

manipulation violate the central value of the freedom of the others. “But the logic of action tends to dissociate it not merely from the consciousness of the one who acts but also from the consciousness of those for whom the action is undertaken.”<sup>180</sup>

His second example is related to impersonal institutions, where effectiveness of action leads one away from the freedom of the other. There is general motive which leads identification with impersonal institution though which alone large-scale effective action seems possible. “Normally, one’s action is in the context of a role within an institutional structure and even where great charismatic personalities emerge, they or their disciple have to institutionalize themselves if they want continuous and effective action.”<sup>181</sup> In institutional context action has been undertaken by the institution, individual is not responsible for that action. The assumption of individual’s responsibility of action is associated with the policies and decisions for which one individually judges to be wrong.

The two features of action within an institution context has discussed in two sense. In first sense, others freedom of action determined by one’s dictatorship. In other sense, each one’s action is reciprocally dependent on other person’s co-operation for general motive. What Daya Krishna tries to reveal in both cases, is when one is a member of a family or nation, then one’s behaviour inevitably involves a certain amount of hypocrisy. One inevitably must adopt attitudes and take position on matters which one understands to be definitely wrong. One has to response or to defend action which have not been undertaken by oneself or one considers wrong. To be member of particular group others identity is one. Individual’s private sense of responsibility gradual mergers into collective feeling of responsibility where one considers the action has been taken by group is to be wrong, but still one is responsible for that action.

This collective sense of responsibility in certain sense, may seem similar to the Christian idea of one’s responsibility for the sins of others. What is difference between the two. The Christian conception approves one’s feeling of responsibility only for sins of others not their virtues also. Second, Christian conception is concerned only with the individuals, not of

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid., 214.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 215

institution or collectives in general. No one can actually feel the responsibility for the actions undertaken by process of group. This responsibility is so widely spread that can be pinpointed by one's action under multiple pressure. That Daya Krishna explains as

The decision has emerged out of such a collective process that none basically feels it to be his decision. Even where the decision is ultimately made by a single individual in the first instance, as in monarchies and dictatorships it seldom is felt to be so as, in most cases, it is the result of multiple pressures and consideration. There are many things one would never do in an individual or personal capacity but which, in the context of a family or notion or institution, become right or are even felt an imperative for one's action<sup>182</sup>

Therefore, the involvement in institutional action always leads inevitable to an erosion of individual responsibility. An individual's responsibility in institutional level is replacement by the collective responsibility. The collective responsibility may be felt that processes of collective decision-making lead to the realization of some objective, impersonal reason. This impersonal reason emerges out of the individual private reasoning of one and issuing in general will in which everyone participates. Daya Krishna calls this "*participation mystique*."<sup>183</sup> The realization of the active values leads one's essential involvement in temporality, historicity and sociality. Rather one gradually begins to view oneself and become what one views. The active values are defining essential of one's being, and the culture built around them reinforces in a hundred ways. Their perpetuation and consolidation are involved in myriad forms.

On the other hand, the contemplative values lead in a different direction where one achieves one's own state of consciousness which is valuable, meaningful and free in oneself. One's contemplative values is the stilling of time and the withdrawal from society. In other words, it is the transcending of History that is essence of the matter. In this case, the relationship with others is involved as in romantic love. The realization of contemplative values is focused on a felt feeling of togetherness. This perhaps is the tragedy of romantic love. Where the others obviously may not remain still or may not make that synchronous movement

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<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 216.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 216.

toward stillness which is so essential to the maintenance of that state of being. Here, the other is really the other and one is too so. One has an independent being that is “too concrete, too finite, too independent, and too imperfect.”<sup>184</sup> Each one is at the mercy of the other, vulnerable at the very centre of one’s being. Daya Krishna explains one’s this state of being through Divine love, “The divine was in one’s own heart; he dwelt in one’s own thought, even in one’s own being. And he was perfect and infinite and concrete only to one’s feelings, thoughts and imagination.”<sup>185</sup>

In contemplative values one is basically taken away from others. Daya Krishna explains this state through two extreme poles like the drug addict and the mystic share. In both cases, one has a minimal relationship to the world objects and the world of others. This state is only a departure for the achievement of one’s own state of consciousness. In first case, the drug addict depends on the physical availability of one’s chosen drug in the external world for the achievement of the state of consciousness. This is one’s limitation where one is depended on chosen drug for long achievement of own state of consciousness. In second case, the mystic overcomes even the worldly limitation. One requires nothing in the world to help one achieve that state of consciousness. Here, one’s will, and imagination suffice for all that one wants for long achievement for own state of consciousness. “The well-known controversies regarding the ultimate status of God among mystics can only be understood in the light of the contemplative seeking for a state of consciousness which is related only in a minimal manner to anything other than itself, whether actual or imagined.”<sup>186</sup>

Daya Krishna tries to reveal distinction between human values where both active and contemplative values are opposed and divided to each other. But there is not complete absence of one another. They both are integrated in very minimal manner. Each one permits other only an instrumental to the realization of its own values. The primacy and direction in which the pursuit of particular type of values leads one that makes difficult to pursue the other type of values. Daya Krishna asserts, “the pursuit active values leaves little time or capacity or even

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid., 217.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., 217.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 218.



inclination to ‘stand and stare’ while the pursuit of contemplative values makes action meaningless except when transformed into a ritual.”<sup>187</sup> An Individual action is closely linked to causality, that is matter of present. One has to be continuously involved in the present all time. Where one’s commitment is not only involved but continuously multiplies. One’s commitment makes one’s time away from one’s own hand. One is booked for months, sometime for years in advance and feels responsible for that. This reveals one’s importance and one’s greatness

Daya Krishna says that “the world of action seems meaningless to those who have opted for the contemplative value....The world of contemplative values, on the other hand, seems too shadowy and vague and nebulous to those who have given their heart and soul to the realm where active values reign.”<sup>188</sup> The contemplative values seems subjective phantom where one’s mind creates hallucination and imagination in which one’s mind has self-hypnotized and lost in themselves. One’s seeking things or others in contemplative values are either superficial or unreal.

It is true that their integration can only be achieved in terms of the one or other because the two values are antagonistic, and each denies a long subordination role to others. However, we can understand that the two values in their stream cases may be originator causes of one another. For example, individual active values always involve with others, society, and natural matters. The three are originator sources of one’s contemplative values also. In natural case, one’s mind completely indulges in natural beauty or mystery of nature and one’s mind cannot be conceived the mystery or stream beauty of natural things. The natural mystery and beauty may be originator cause of one’s contemplative values to extent and give faith on God as creator of all-natural things.

Similarly, one action always is involved with others in society where one’s stream busy life or stream frustration that is arisen by others none co-operation, may be originator cause of one’s inclination towards drug or towards God. Where one’s chooses one’s contemplative

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<sup>187</sup> Ibid., 218.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 219.

values apart from active values from which one has hopeless or frustrated. Not only others none co-operative behaviour is caused of contemplative values, but also one's own miserable state or others miserable states may be caused of one's contemplation. Many cases one's choice of one or other values is not for one's whole. One chooses one values for years, months and realizes the importance of other values. For example, Buddha leaves his family and chooses contemplative values for realization of his own state of consciousness or God after some time he returns in society and starts preaching others. We can also say that many times one does not leave one's active values for one's realization of contemplative values. But one feels exhausted to one's active life and one wants some rest from active life and chooses some places that provide contemplation and peace of own state mind.

Daya Krishna's conception of freedom itself is related to active freedom to contemplative freedom. His idea of freedom is not limited only reciprocal freedom of one's with others. However, he explores freedom beyond situation freedom where one always tries to achieve one's ideal state of one's own consciousness and moves from active freedom to contemplative freedom. His idea of contemplative freedom gives possibility of transcendental freedom where one's has very minimal awareness worldly things. That will my purpose in next chapter to explore contemplative freedom as a possibility of transcendental freedom.

### **III. Strengths and Limits of Reciprocal Freedom**

Ricoeur and Daya Krishna both accept human freedom is reciprocal whether freedom is reciprocal relation of the voluntary (mind) and involuntary (body) or individual and others that I have discussed in above two sections respectively. Now I will explore strengths and limits of reciprocal freedom in two senses, the voluntary and the involuntary, and individual and others.

#### *Strengths of Reciprocal Freedom*

Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal freedom of human being through the voluntary and involuntary, represents human being as embodied subjective being. This idea of reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary solves long lasting problem of dualism of mind

and body where mind is achieved primacy over body. But the idea of reciprocal relation of mind and body reveal dependency of one another. This dependency of mind and body I have discussed in case of decision, movement, and consent. The three dimensions are initiated with voluntary will and reveals simultaneously the three dimensions of the involuntary that makes the three dimensions of voluntary will meaningful.

The reciprocal relation of voluntary and involuntary reveals through decision, movement and consent. Decision is considered by Plato, Thomas Aquinas, and Descartes as a form of judgment and rational decision that taken by will, reason, or intellect without influence of bodily or external impulse. The idea of value is associated with rational good that is a rational choice. One's emotions, needs, pleasures, and desires all controlled by rational mind, intellect and will. The idea of motion is capacity of the mind or capacity of rational soul that is identified with transcendent being or immortal being. This capacity provides motion in body, body is merely ephemeral or mortal worldly objects or a different substance. Against this, Ricoeur explains one's concrete lived embodied existence is paradoxical unity of mind and body.

Ricoeur explains this unity through reciprocal relation of the voluntary (mind) and the involuntary (body) with three different points of view. His first point of view of reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary is explained through decision. Decision is reciprocal unity of motive. Ricoeur's idea of motive is not rational motive that is determined through rationality, intellect. But motive is organic values that is lived experience of needs. Needs is experienced by imagination of pleasures and desires. Ricoeur's idea of decision and motives does not determine each other but becomes complementary to each other. Decision without motives is unintelligible and motive without decision is meaningless.

Ricoeur separates decision from action through abstraction. This separation of decision from action reveals second point of view of reciprocal relation of the voluntary and involuntary. The voluntary motion depends on bodily capacity and ability in movement or effort. The voluntary motion is not given and uses body as object of action. Although the voluntary motion is learned through practice of bodily organ. Bodily organ is not object of action, but it is capacity and ability of body organ. This capacity or ability of body organ is revealed through

performed skills, emotions, and habits with act of willing. Each three dimensions are associated with capacity of body organ and the motion voluntary will. In case of performed skills, one experiences this reciprocity when one stretches one's body or protects oneself from sudden threaten objects, even there are many gestures one uses without reflection or observation. In case of emotion, it is basic motivation in forms of wonder, shock, joy, and sorrow, behind every action. In other word, it is passion of soul that lives together in very actions.

In case of habits, it is also learned or acquired and is associated with how one acts. The three dimensions of the bodily organ capacity are always related to act of willing. Habits merge to performed skills and emotions to help one to put one's decision into action. One sets one's decision into action, there is always some efforts involved. Effort is sensory aspect that one realizes through reflection. There are some extreme cases when one feels one's body is not only a docile organ of voluntary motion, but it itself a resistance also. But one encounters resistance when one makes a decision. The voluntary act of willing carries over motor intentionality that represent one's lived unity. In this lived unity, there is always somethings which is a mystery or unresolved that can only be acknowledged.

Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal freedom resolves a long argument of free will and determinism whether one's action and choice are complete free or completely determined. The argument of free will and determinism explain human actions and choices out of empirical context. However, Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal freedom of the voluntary and the involuntary reveals one's freedom empirical and lived experience. Human being feels, one's action and choice and is neither complete free nor complete determined. Even one's experience of freedom of choice and action themselves experience of both free and determined. One always experiences, one is bounded with one's particular personality (character), particular way of inclination, and even one's own life itself. Life gives together both experience either contingent or determined. One experiences one's contingency of life through one's reflection of age as to be child, adult, and old. On the contrary, one also experiences in each age of one has been made decision that determined one's each stage of age respectively.

Daya Krishna's conception of reciprocal freedom of individual's with others' reveal human beings as social, cultural, and moral beings. Individual human is conscious and self-

conscious being. One's self-consciousness has awareness of oneself and others. This self-conscious awareness of one to others make each individual as subject and object in one's society. One as subject feels other as object in one society, although one has also self-awareness that there are others as subject for whom one is object. This experience makes each one aware of others freedom also. Each one's freedom in society is reciprocal freedom of one's with others. The reciprocal freedom of individual's with others also represents human's civilization, society, culture, and history.

One's self-awareness of others makes one moral or ethical being. Where one is responsible for whatever one has done. One achieves reward or punishment and praise or blame by others for whatever one has done. Apart from this, one feels one's obligation towards others. Because of one's self-consciousness one not only wants own's life better, but one also wants others life to be better. It is the concept of *dharma* which is moral realm par excellence. Where one remains not merely morally obligated to others human being, but also ancestors, God, plants, animal, earth, and sky. One's moral obligation towards ancestors, God, plants, animal, earth, and sky are not concrete mutual reciprocity in sense of give and take relationship but one emotionally feels obliged to one's ancestors by which one is a being in this world. Similar feeling goes towards God, plants, animal, earth, and sky one feels morally obliged to these things because one realizes one's dependency on these things also. One expresses one's obligation towards ancestors, God, plants, animal, earth, and sky through worships, sacrifices, and charities.

As we experience that the very exercise of freedom itself provides both restriction and opportunity. This restriction and opportunity if felt by all individual at personal level and social level. Therefore, one's feeling of freedom through one's very exercise of freedom itself can be decreased or increased not only by oneself but by others as well. We all feel the two dimensions of freedom by oneself and others. We feel bounded with our own decision and choice that we have made, despite this, we also feel our experience of freedom enhanced through our constant choice and decision. Similarly, one's exercise of freedom does not only decrease or increase one's feeling of freedom, but others' also. This is we all feel in family, society, and institutional levels. Where each one's feeling of freedom increase or decrease

through others individual's decision and choice. Apart from decision and choices, others co-operation and non-co-operation also increases or decreases each one's feeling of freedom.

### *Limits of Reciprocal Freedom*

As I have said that the idea of reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary resolves long lasting problem of dualism of mind and body and the primacy of mind over the body. But at the same time, this reciprocal relation of mind and body reveals another form of dualism in sense of freedom and determinism. Reciprocal freedom of human being through the voluntary and the involution makes human being every moment free and determined.

Similarly, Daya Krishna's conception of reciprocal freedom of individual with others' also gives positive and negative aspect of human freedom. Each individual's exercise of freedom constantly restricts others' freedom. The active realm of individual's freedom is always reciprocal with others. Ambition of individual's worldly pleasure, greed, power can make others life hell. As we all know and experience this feeling of others as hell or resistance when we do many things in our life that we do not actually want, but we need to do because others want. The negative aspects of reciprocal freedom are not only limited with only others person, but it is also related to other living beings, natural things and universe also. This dependency on each other is explained by studies of ecology. Deprivation of one person to other persons, person to other living beings, person to natural things, have raised many different kinds of problems. For example, the problem of poverty, crime, war, pollution, depression and many other types of diseases, are driven through human's ambition of greed and power.

We know that the classical Indian philosophers were aware of this problem and gave idea of absolute or transcendent freedom beyond the reciprocal or situation freedom. This is freedom from one's mind and body and others which they referred *moksa*. The concept of *moksa* is absolute freedom from one's worldly desires including one's mind and body and others. It is complete detachment from worldly things and seeking one's own state of consciousness or transcendent being.

Ricoeur explains his idea of freedom only through the reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary. He does not describe the idea of freedom beyond reciprocal freedom of the voluntary and the involuntary or lived experienced of freedom. However, in case of Daya Krishna, I find that he explains his idea of freedom beyond reciprocal relation of individual and others. He was well trained in both traditions Indian and Western. His idea of freedom is not only influenced by Western tradition and methods, but he is immensely influenced by his own tradition and methods. This influence reveals when he describes the idea of contemplative values or distinction between active and contemplative values. There is no doubt that his conception of freedom is entirely different from his traditional conception of *moksha*-centric freedom. But he is still influenced by the traditional methods which seek and realize values beyond the given reality. This is my purpose for next chapter where I will only engage with Daya Krishna's conception of freedom through the distinction between active and contemplative values. Where his idea of contemplative values reveals the possibility of transcendental freedom.

## Chapter 4

### Possibility of Transcendental Freedom

Human being always feels dissatisfied with his/her present state and seeks something more satisfactory out of reality. Seeking something more satisfactory from one's reality or present state indicates one's feeling beyond the given reality. In other words, human consciousness always seeks ideal and unreal beyond given reality. Daya Krishna explains this carving through the distinction between real and unreal, and real and ideal. The distinction between real and unreal are associated with one's state of consciousness where one finds things that are not as one had taken them to be. One finds oneself in a situation and feels unsatisfied with situation and it gives the feeling of unreal. One avoids feeling unreal and seeks the real one. The unreal is not just not-existent, although it has some sort of reality. It is still considered as less valuational or disvaluational than the real which is alone considered as value.

The distinction between real and ideal is associated with things as "they are or at least as they appear to be, and the way we feel they ought to be, or ought to appear to be."<sup>189</sup> This distinction is another form of seeking for ideal out of present reality. In this case, the values are closely related to reality and their association is attested by experience. Daya Krishna asserts that human's seek values are not only limited to reality, but they also appear outside of the reality. Real and unreal, or real and ideal are never apparently insoluble. The distinction between real and unreal, real and ideal provide themselves important understanding of the two different values as active and contemplative. Both the active and contemplative values deny values that must be given only in some sort of reality.

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<sup>189</sup> Krishna Daya, 1989: 179.



Daya Krishna explains the unity of real and unreal, real and ideal is possible only through the contemplation values. His idea of contemplative values provides the possibility of transcendental freedom that is total freedom at psychic level. However, transcendental total freedom is different from transcendent absolute freedom from mind and body as explained by classical Indian thinkers. This chapter will deal with these issues and answer following questions; is human freedom possible beyond reciprocal freedom of human being? What is the conception of transcendental freedom? How is transcendental freedom different from transcendent freedom or *mokṣa*-centric freedom? This chapter is divided in Three sections.

I. Real and Unreal, Real and Ideal

II. Contemplative as Transcendental Freedom

III. Critical Appraisal of contemplative Freedom

## **I. Real and Unreal, Real and Ideal**

The distinction between real and unreal, real and ideal are associated with two distinct realms of human being. Real and ideal are distinction between one's active values where one tries to make things, the way one feels they ought to be. But distinction between real and unreal is metaphysical headache where one finds things are not as one had taken them to be. This discrepancy gives feeling of unreal, but one always seeks real as values and avoids unreal that is considered as disvaluational. The problem is common in both cases real and unreal, real and ideal. They both appear to be apparently insoluble. However, the unreal and the ideal both have still to be granted some sorts of reality. What is common between the two distinctions real and unreal, real and ideal is that they both deny the value that is given only in reality.

The two distinctions of reality and value are associated with active values and contemplative values. The active and the contemplative values themselves are related to two realms of human freedom. These two realms of freedom are explained by Daya Krishna with different significance and with different ought claims, which I will explore in three sub-sections. Sub-section A will deal with distinction between active and contemplative values.

In sub-section B, I will explore significance of the active and contemplative realms. In sub-section C, I will discuss active realm as ‘moral ought’ and contemplative realm as ‘axiological ought.’

### **A. The Distinction between Active and Contemplative Values**

What is reason behind the history that does not past over but goes on and on from one generation to another, and still is new for each generation? The impulse that has to widen the realm of the real. The real is beyond the existent diverse sources of truths and reasons. Human being’s enterprise of understanding and action lead to widen the realm of the real beyond the existent. The postulation of the reality of values arise from the enterprise of human action that seeks ideals at self-conscious reflective level. The self-conscious reflective ideals are continuously associated with only the present. The dilemma which the postulation faces are the simultaneous addition of reality and unreality to the value or ideal. Where one’s exercise of action influences the ideal (value) and yet exercises this because the ideal is not actual. The actualization of exercise of actions are only the things or the events, the state of affairs that is not value or ideal. One’s constant dissatisfaction of one’s present exercise of action is oriented towards the ideal which one wants to achieve but can never actually realize.

Daya Krishna refers, “we wish to assert is that the essence of reality is its capacity to trip us and surprise us and thus prove its reality as essentially independent of us. Not only has that which is real the capacity to show all our knowledge to be incomplete but also inadequate and wrong.”<sup>190</sup> The impulse to the postulation of entities are essentially non-existent that derive ultimately from situation. There are genuine objects of knowledge to which the considerations of existence or non-existence appear completely irrelevant. For Daya Krishna, the reality of values is not completely or adequately known. If one says that one knows, then it is a wrong supposition. The irrelevance of existence to some sort of entities does not make them unreal or exhaustible because of one’s incompleteness or adequacy of the knowledge. However, values are non-existence in their essence and reveal their reality through continuous discovery

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 181.

of faulty understanding about themselves. The fact of faulty understanding of reality and its subsequent correction gives the intrusion of the unreal into the realm of value.

On the other hand, Daya Krishna explains nature of values in negative way. The dissatisfaction with any actualized value does not derive from the fact that one has understood a value which one regards and considers as truly or really a value. Rather it is the felt dissatisfaction that make one doubt the reality of value that has been actualized and one wishes to get rid of it, sooner the better. In this sense, the reality of values become inadequacy or falsity when it begins to be actualized. This is the reason for so many ideals of human being seem to be attractive when it is abstractly conceived. But the same ideals become boring in actuality when it is concretely realized.

The value of reality is not the result of direct apprehension, but only the shadowy counterpart of the real dissatisfaction which makes one aware that the value which one had thought to be real and genuine is not such. The criterion of reality of a value is not its conformity with some real value in an ideal sphere. Rather the criterion of the reality of value is the deep, inner fulfilment that is realized by actual living human being. This criterion of reality of value is analogous to the pragmatic criterion of the realm of truth. As this pragmatic criterion of the realm of truth is essentially different in the sense that there is no external criterion of success, nor is it even possible to conceive of it in those terms. In this sense, fulfilment or realization of truth is ultimately something purely internal or something deeply subjective where it is very being of the self itself.

Daya Krishna gives the example of *mokṣa* in Indian thought which is symbol of this very feeling about value. This feeling of *mokṣa* can merely be considered truly and really a value in which human being finds his/her lasting and abiding fulfilment. Apart from this feeling of lasting fulfilment, the rest is only an illusion or an appearance which promises but never fulfils itself. The concept of illusion is called *māyā*, which ever allures, yet always turn back and laughs at the one who pursues it. *Māyā* is merely the gesture promisingly once more if one tries to turn away.

Fulfilment itself is something ideal and *mokṣa*. The Indian name *mokṣa* is itself the logical limit of a conceived possibility. Many people dispute this. In fact, the religious ideal is the only one that people have claimed to realize or achieve in their lives completely and absolutely. So many people have claimed that they have realized *mokṣa*. But nobody believes that a single scientist or artist or moralist or lover have realized the ideal that he/she seeks to realize.

Further, Daya Krishna explains that the fulfilment is not merely of one type, however, it is of many types. He writes, “the values that we become aware of in our life, we become aware of in different contexts, and thus, the diverse dimensions of values merely reflect the dimensions of the life we live through.”<sup>191</sup> Human being’s all activities are classified into three-fold divisions like knowing, feeling, and willing that correspond to three respectively divisions of ideal or values like Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. But division of values along with reality may prove more illuminating. In other words, the values relation to reality are to be the centre of attention. The separation of reality into the actual and ideal is itself a result of human action. However, the separation of reality into actual and ideal can be felt or experienced as a unity only in contemplation.

Therefore, the realm of values is divided into the active values and the contemplative values. The contemplative values are explained by “love or friendship or aesthetic contemplation or appreciation of nature or mystic meditation.”<sup>192</sup> These all share a common feature and direction which radically oppose to active values. The active values are explained by “justice or goodness or knowledge.”<sup>193</sup> The active values lead one away from the self to action in the external realm for the pursuit of an ideal. In this case, one understands the ideals only vaguely. The contemplative values turn the self to itself and centre it on a state of consciousness. In this case, one’s desire is to never fall and remain there for ever and ever.

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid., 183.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 184.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 184.

“Daya Krishna suggests accordingly a new division of values, which puts the tension between values and reality as its core. He distinguishes between ‘active values,’ which relate to other human beings and ‘contemplative value,’ which are self-centred.”<sup>194</sup> Elise describes that Daya Krishna’s distinction between active and contemplative values do not constitute the hierarchy between them or decide which one is more primary than other. However, Daya Krishna’s analysis of the two values explores the role of otherness. Active and Contemplative values are two poles referring to the other. The active values imply an intrinsic necessity to the other, the contemplative values are a search for liberation from the bondage implied by the other. In former case, one is directly concerned with others. In later case, one is negatively related to others.

According to Daya Krishna, the distinction between active and contemplative values are important. Because if we confine our attention merely at the active values then we are led to an intrinsic dichotomy between the actual and the ideal which appear essentially as unbridgeable. This essential bifurcation of actual and ideal are only healed when we turn to contemplative values. The contemplative values heal the gulf between the actual and ideal and we begin to be aware of a fusion of the two. This fusion of the actual and the ideal are felt to be the only reality. Daya Krishna illustrates, this unity of actual and ideal through Indian concept of *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda*. He writes,

the concept of the ‘real’ refers primarily to this fused sense of the actual and the valuational achieved in the transparent immediacy of consciousness. The Indian formulation of ultimate Reality as *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda* perhaps reflects this realization as it is only when the actual and valuational are fused in consciousness that the experience of Bliss arises.<sup>195</sup>

According to Daya Krishna, in contemplative values we not only realize the unity of real and valuational (ideal), but there also occurs another unity that is more important than the former. The other unity is the unity of subject and object in the contemplative act where the

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<sup>194</sup> Coquereau-Saouma, Elise, 2016: 138.

<sup>195</sup> Krishna, Daya, 1989: 184.

value is realized or rather realizes itself. Lessened distance between the subject and object is simultaneously the occasion for the actualization of the feeling of Bliss and experience of reality at the same time. Here the distance does not mean physical distance, rather it is something psychic or something felt. That can be explained in short as something which makes the object appear indifferent, neutral, or even hostile to us.

The fact of distance between subject and object is clearly revealed in situations where contemplative values are sought to be realized. The non-realization of contemplative values exists because the fact of this distance between subject and object. When the distance between subject and object is lessened then the contemplative values is continuously and concretely realized there. Also, as the distance between subject and object is purely psychic in nature. The removal of the distance between subject and object is like the removal of a veil which reveals something which was already there. The reality reveals through the abolition of the distance between the subject and the object. This abolition of distance is also the unity of the actual and the ideal in the immediacy of consciousness that seemed to have been eternally there.

Daya Krishna explains the abolition of distance and the fusion of real and ideal is possible only as extrapolated limits of what we experience. But these extrapolated limits of our experience are only partial. Anyone can realize the truth of this assertion who has reflected on one's experience of love or friendship or nature or art or God. Daya Krishna says, "What we actually experience is not an abolition but only a lessening of the distance between the subject and object; what is actually experienced is not a complete fusion, but only more or less of it."<sup>196</sup>

Daya Krishna explains the realization of fusion of subject and object, real and ideal through extrapolated limit along with a limit of direction. This experience, of course, is that of a perfected human being. For Daya Krishna, the experience of perfected beings is not out of reality. But perfected beings are themselves treated as existing instead of being seen merely as the distinction between good human beings and better human beings.

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid., 185.

Therefore, the contemplative ideals are as much ideal as the one's deriving from the active values. "If justice or moral goodness or scientific truth is intrinsically unattainable in its complete ideality, so is friendship or love or aesthetic absorption or rapport with nature or mystic contemplation. The latter are as unattainable as the former – or, if they are attained to some degree, so are the former also."<sup>197</sup> What Daya Krishna emphasizes between two values, here is that in both cases of active and contemplative values, there are similarities. If active value is unattainable its ideality then contemplative value is also unattainable. If the contemplative value is attained in some degree of its ideality then active value is also in similar degree.

Apart from this similarity between two values, he emphasises that we should not forget the deep difference between them. The realization of active values does not seem to close the hiatus between the actual and the ideal. But the contemplative values seem to do, although, they are attained only to a little extent. This hiatus between actual and ideal happens in contemplative values through the felt immediacy of consciousness. In the case of active values, the hiatus is closed, it is always closed or lessened in the realm of the object alone. In active value, the hiatus between subject and object is concerned, is not healed at all. Because of this reason, the subjective situation of human being seems to remain seeking the same knowledge even when one has really increased objective knowledge.

The distance between subject and object is lessened along with the distance between actuality and value in the realization of contemplative values. In the contemplative values, the fissure seems to be completely healed. Here, the reality and value are identical in being and essence. "This is not merely said but felt and realized in the immediately felt reality of consciousness than which there can be nothing more real to the apprehending awareness."<sup>198</sup>

Furthermore, active values are explained by Daya Krishna through tension between the heart reality and the essence of time. Daya Krishna explains that the active values are located in acts of particular times and spaces. In this case, there is time-apprehension between

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 185.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 186.

individual and cultures and there is always division between subject-object, reality-ideality. This division reunions happens only in the contemplative values because the contemplative values aim at the reunion of body and consciousness into the pure and eternal consciousness.<sup>199</sup>

The distinction of active and contemplative values may be characterized through individual and society or culture and their prominent pursuit of one or the other. The reality of time and tension between actuality and ideality will then be a function of the active values. Further, the sense of reality itself will be different for those who pursue the active values or contemplative values. The two values of human being itself reveals the two realms of human actions and choices as active and contemplative. In the next sub-section, I will discuss, how, the two realms of human being provide ‘significance’ of human life.

## **B. The Significance of Active and Contemplative Realms**

Daya Krishna explains that human being seeks the significance of life. Seeking significance of life is associated with the two structures of human being’s active and contemplative. “The word ‘significance’ has been used, advisedly, in place of the usual term ‘value’.”<sup>200</sup> The search of value is primarily a search for significance. The search of significance is the secondarily a search for the specific ‘this’ and ‘that’ of values. Therefore, values seem to have a nuance, at core which is expressed by the word significance. What is important is the realization of significance may only be achieved within human situation and its structure. In other words, human being’s realization of significance would be possible within the provided framework of human situation that is explained by Daya through active and contemplative structures.<sup>201</sup>

Human situation has been interpreted in different dimensions by different thinkers. Daya Krishna explains that some common core that all thinkers seem to point can be described

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<sup>199</sup> Coquereau-Saouma, Elise, 2016: 142.

<sup>200</sup> Krishna, Daya, 1989: 187.

<sup>201</sup> Coquereau-Saouma, Elise, 2016: 127-128.



as “the immanent-transcendent aspect of human situation. F.S.C. Northrop has distinguished between the ‘intuitional’ and the ‘postulational’ aspects, while Whitehead has talked of the ‘mode of presentational immediacy’ and ‘the mode of causal efficacy.’”<sup>202</sup> There are important differences between the divisions. For Whitehead, the mode of causal efficacy is more primary, than the mode of presentational immediacy. Such is not the case with Northrop, he does not accept postulational aspect as more primary. For him, if some aspect is to be considered as more primary and fundamental, then it is the intuitional.

Whitehead and Northrop’s two different ideas created the mystery surrounding the word transcendent. Daya Krishna explains the use of word transcendent is merely another name for the fact of self-consciousness in human being. The self-consciousness of human being itself is an inevitably related to imagination and ideation. The consciousness of the beyond is surrounded by focal immediacy of present which is not any specific ‘this’ or ‘that’ consciousness, but it is only of a vague indeterminate generality. The term transcendent does not refer to any determinate ‘this’ or ‘that’, but to a general pole of all experience. This general pole of all experience is as much a fact of immediate apprehension as the specific or concrete determinate pole is.

Daya Krishna divides the two angles of human situation in which significance must be realized. One angle is the immanent-transcendent and other angle is the intuitive-postulation. “These two divisions cross each other and, we get the human situation structured into four different aspects – the immanent-intuitive, the immanent postulation, the transcendent-intuitive and the transcendent postulation.”<sup>203</sup> The intuitive or the immediately apprehended aspect provides unchanging background of human experience. For example, “the ‘green’ that we immediately apprehend and the ‘green’ that our ancestors apprehended a few hundred thousand years ago, is the same, though our postulation knowledge about what the ‘green’ really consists of is entirely different.”<sup>204</sup> The intuitive aspect provides an increasing articulation, but what is articulated is already there and immediately apprehended. In this case,

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<sup>202</sup> Krishna Daya, 1989: 188.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., 189.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 189.

articulation only brings the attention of others in sense of what they apprehended apart from, what they had apprehended or paid attention to.

The increasing articulation is associated with the immediately apprehended and the conceptually postulation. Both the immediately apprehended and the conceptually postulation gives rise to another world, the world of communication. Midway between these, arises the distinctively human world. Daya Krishna refers, the distinctively human world through the world of imagination, which alone is a specific human creation. He writes, “Man, here, neither immediately apprehended nor conceptually postulations in order to explain or understand to immediately apprehended but creates a world of fancy and imagination which seems to him to have a significance of its own.”<sup>205</sup>

Human situation is intrinsically limited by the structure of his/her consciousness, which is inevitably egocentric and point-centric, in its intuitive aspect. As the experiencing consciousness is certainly one’s own. In the same way, the experiencing consciousness certainly is confined to what psychology known is as the ‘specious present.’ Here, the word one’s own does not indicate any metaphysically or empirically persistent identity, but only the experiencing consciousness which has a locus. This locus is the experience that is always experienced epistemologically as an object to it. In other words, it only states the fact that another person’s experience can never be one’s own. The point-centric experiencing consciousness does not reject the differentiations within the experienced consciousness. However, it merely states, that confined experiencing differentiations happens within present moment. Daya Krishna explains the egocentric and point-centric nature of experiencing consciousness is not inference. However, it may legitimately claim as the ultimate situation from which human being cannot escape.

The question of certainty does not arise in the world of imagination. The world of imagination exists in its own right as the free creation of human being and does not seek anything outside of itself. There is no limit of deductive or empirical coherence that exists in the world of imagination. In this case, felt is a new type of coherence that is the aesthetic

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid., 181.

coherence. This coherence is as much the creation of human being as the world itself supposed to cohere and organize.

Therefore, there are three aspects of the human situation which are the intuitive, the postulational, and the imaginational. In these three series, the certainty and freedom seem to be inversely correlated with each other. The intuitive aspect seems to be the most indubitable. We seem to be least free with reference to the intuitive aspect, as it can only be acknowledged and not discussed. The postulational aspect is never certain, but it must be deductive coherent in most cases. The deductive coherent nature of the postulational aspect leads to verifiable consequences through epistemic correlation. In the imaginational aspect, the question of certainty is meaningless. “As to freedom, even the demand for aesthetic coherence is not necessary to this realm and the demand, even when fulfilled, is of a creative character.”<sup>206</sup>

The important significant experience of all three aspects do not seem to be uniform. The intuitive aspect gives the invariant base on which the signification experience is reared. Signification can be achieved only on the base of intuitive consciousness. The postulational aspect seems mostly irrelevant to significance. The intuitive aspect however, being an invariant, does not give rise to the change and development of the signification experience of human being. But one’s intuitive aspect is affected most by the imaginational aspect of one’s consciousness.

“The emergence of a feeling for aesthetic form in respect to ‘imaginal contents’ reacts and transforms our experience on the ‘intuitive’ level by giving it a shade, a nuance from the aesthetic experience itself.”<sup>207</sup> For example as we all experience, the poet who sings about love gives to our love a nuance, if we would not have heard or read the poem, then we would have an absence of a tone or a significance. In human life, art always existed in various forms such as song, dance, pictorial or non-pictorial patterns. These different forms of art alone raise human life significantly different from merely biological being. Religion has always been

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<sup>206</sup> Ibid., 191.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., 191.

associated with the art that gives other the path to significance. Without art and religion human being cannot feel his/her distinctive character. “‘Significance,’ therefore, can be realized on the ‘intuitive’ and the ‘imaginational’ level only. It develops by a continuous interaction between two.”<sup>208</sup>

The effort to live and realize significance involves certain postulational elements on which human being’s action is based. Certain postulational element is only the pragmatic failure of one’s action that makes one change one’s postulational theory. Though the pragmatic success provides no logical base for one’s belief in its truth. For example, one feels physical pain that may conceive to have different postulational reasons for its existence. In field of postulational elements there is continuous, failure or rather the increasing success of an alternative postulational theory that makes people leave one for the others. There are certain cases where the alternative postulational system may persist side by side. We see this postulational system side by side in the case of homeopathic and allopathic system of medicine. The postulational system is not interesting for itself, but it always has a close relation to action. The postulational system is retained or given up in so far as it either led or do not led to successful action.

However, the postulational aspect is necessarily involved in action. Actions are permanent feature of the situation of human being. “The awareness of the probable multi-linear effects of alternative mode of causal action does make us desist from one course of action rather than another. The probable chains of consequence are, therefore, important in our decision concerning choice among alternative modes of action within a situation.”<sup>209</sup> The causal efficacy provides more important function of action, it gives our consciousness a sense of continuity in time. It means that action is conspicuously and almost inevitably absent from consciousness in the mode of presentational immediacy. The point-centric limitation of consciousness exists only in intuitive aspect, where all felt, lived and experienced are existed in almost eternal present. The eternity of time is always associated with the prospect into the future and the retrospect from the past.

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 191.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 193.

The intuitive or immediate aspect of consciousness then seems to be outside time. The passage of time is more a matter of inference or in realm of action rather than immediate awareness or intuitive consciousness. “A sense of unreality pervades our experience of time. We seem to be growing old and changing – and yet we are never aware of it. It is only when we see children growing into boy and boy growing into men and men giving birth to other children.”<sup>210</sup> Or when one compares the present with the remembered past and feels compelled to infer that one must have changed. Yet one cannot escape from time, but one feels inexorably involved in time.

Time is supremely real for consciousness in the mode of causal efficacy, where human being is essentially involved in action and in time also. However, time achieves significance only when it ends. Human being can pursue time only asymptotically. Time gives one’s life a sense of continuity and purpose and also gives lacks and pieces of fulfilment. The chains of time are not completely secure, one can always escape from them by changing into the mode of presentational immediacy. Time in mode of presentational immediacy does not exist. There exists only the eternal present in which one can always realize significance.

Daya Krishna concludes the three aspect of human situation as something where significance can be realized directly on the intuitive and the imaginative planes of human being’s experience. The interaction of the intuitive and imaginative planes provides the basis for the dynamic development in one’s experience of significance. This kind of an experience is essentially non-temporal due to the reason of the point-centric limitation of one’s intuitive consciousness. Incomplete pursuit of an end gives to one’s life a significance in the dimension of time. “Such a pursuit involves postulational elements which need not be completely adequate or correct but, in any case, should leave some margin of pragmatic success for action based upon them.”<sup>211</sup>

Daya Krishna explains significance in relation to the transcendent pole of experience. Whether the transcendent pole is intuitive or postulational aspect, is the other great fact of life.

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid., 193.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., 194.

Because the two aspects themselves are associated with two different realms (structures) of human being as active and contemplative. We find, such an orientation has been a perennial feature of world religions. Apart from this, art has also par excellence, the great signification experience for human beings. He says “any society or individual that denies or cuts itself off from the transcendent pole of experience merely deprive itself of one of the profoundest sources of ‘significance’ that is possible to man.”<sup>212</sup> Human being is rooted in the transcendent and if one remains indifferent or develops a negative relationship to it, one is bound to feel empty and alone in one’s wide world. The rejection of the immanent aspect would be equally fatal. Daya Krishna asserts that “it should not be forgotten that, without ‘immanence’ the experience of ‘significance’ can never arise.”<sup>213</sup>

What Daya Krishna emphasises noticeably here, is the challenge of the present to assert together the validity of both the aspects of human being’s thought and his/her life. These two dimensions of human being are simultaneously ignored by prophets and thinkers. They tended to place an undue emphasis on one aspect rather than other. Daya Krishna says that the wisdom of the age has not become old by the recent acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge. What remain, is human being’s immanent situation that can never change. This immanent situation still makes Buddha, Christ, and Confucius relevant for there remains the fact of suffering, of love, and of life. “So also exists the transcendent pole in life. One can become increasingly aware of it and love it or be overawed by it – and that is religion.”<sup>214</sup>

The world of colours, sounds, tastes, and smells exist equally. In this sense, there remains the world of imagination where these are modified into a realm where beauty reigns supreme. All these belong to the world of interpersonal communication where mind strains for mind. Daya Krishna says that it is easy to deny the one (active) or other (contemplative) realms. It is easier to give the supremacy of one and the subordination of other. But what remains challenge in modern times is to assert both realms simultaneously and with equal validity to all the aspects and to hold them indissolubly in both life and thought. “The demand may seem

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid., 194.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid., 194.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., 194.

impossible, even contradictory – but, even if it so, consciousness can hold and comprehend them, for that is its very function. To *experiencing consciousness*, there are neither opposites nor contradictions.”<sup>215</sup> Opposites and contradictions are such only in their determinate objectivated aspects. As they are experienced, they always get a unity through the experiencing consciousness. The experiencing consciousness holds them together in its comprehending awareness.

The situation of human being with respect to significance is almost an invariant except in the imaginal aspects of one’s existence. Daya Krishna holds that the significance is like value, a bi-polar category. It has always a negative pole which may be characterized as dis-significance. In this sense, one can fail to realize significance in all situations. However, human being’s realization of significance is possible only within the structures of active and contemplative values of one’s situation. Awareness of this structure will provide one the limits of the possible in the realization of significance.

As the realization of contemplative significance can be attained through art, religion and contemplative enjoyment of nature within the limits of egocentric and point-centric limitation of consciousness. This contemplative significance that human being can achieve if only she/he desires and wills. The realization of actives significance can be attained through action in the pursuit of asymptotic ends. These asymptotic ends give to human being’s life a significance unity in time. Where interpersonal communication can crown one’s experience of significance by an intense give and take and each feed on other and increases a thousand-fold. Each one feels others as heaven and hell through positive and negative relation to each other.

Daya Krishna’s constant attempt is to explore human reality through conception of freedom. Human freedom itself is related to two different realms active and contemplative. In active realm, one seeks ideal through action with interpersonal relation to others. On the contrary, in other realm of contemplative, one seeks ideal through the experience of reality which does not focus toward the world, but toward oneself. He constantly tries to maintain the

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid., 195.

two realms of human being simultaneously without complete integration of one and other. I find, Daya Krishna equally focuses both realms active and contemplative through different dimensions and concepts. Now I will discuss the two realms of human being is associated with two kinds of ‘ought’ as active realm is related to ‘moral ought’ and contemplative realm is incorporated in ‘axiological ought’.

### **C. Active as Moral Ought and Contemplative as Axiological Ought**

We can also understand the two realms active and contemplative with another concept and dimension, through the distinction between the moral and the axiological ought. Daya Krishna only explains the distinction between two kinds of ought. Apart from “the general nature of ought or even with the question whether it exhausts the notion of value with which it is so intimately connected.”<sup>216</sup> The field within which the ought is considered to be applicable divides itself into two parts moral and axiological. In moral ought, one is primarily concerned with the other person among whom one finds oneself. In axiological ought, the other is oriented to aspects, objects and situation which have no direct relevance to person other than oneself. Daya Krishna says that “there are some important differences between the two and that this has consequence, generally neglected, for ethical theory.”<sup>217</sup>

Daya Krishna analyses the process of how values ascribe significance into one’s life. His perspective goes clearly beyond an ethical interpretation because “it does not give us an account of how to act ‘properly’ or ‘morally.’ Rather, it questions how our accounts of values influence our idea of reality in its historical and cultural variations (and *vice versa*) and how they condition our relation to otherness and to our own human situation.”<sup>218</sup> This investigation is presupposition of our moral ought and axiological ought. The two ought claims at the same time are explored in meaning of values beyond the limited scope of the moral realm.

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<sup>216</sup> Krishna Daya, 1989: 196.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., 297.

<sup>218</sup> Coquereau-Saouma, Elise, 2016: 128.



Daya Krishna points out the distinction between the two ought is not considered in the way, human being finds oneself among others as a situational feature of one's life. The situation is always structure in terms of different roles. The different roles are oriented to different value-patterns. Recent studies in sociology and social anthropology have shown that "the interactive behaviour of person is always oriented to role-expectations which are defined in terms of patterned norms."<sup>219</sup> There are complementary expectations which give rise to an ought. This ought is generalized fulfilment and is the *conditio sine qua non* of the functioning, and thus, the very existence of any social system.

However, in case of the axiological field, there is obligatoriness that arises from the ought and has no such complementary character. There is no complementary obligatoriness because there are no complementary role-expectation. Here, the obligatoriness is felt with respect to value, which is neither primarily derived from other person nor oriented to other person. The axiological ought reveals, perhaps more clearly the nature of value-obligatoriness, apart from the essentially interpersonal situation of human being.

The moral ought is contingent in a double sense. In one sense, the existence of other person in relation to whom the ought arises. In second sense, one's at least relative fulfilment of the complementary role-expectations without which there cannot be interactive relationship between human beings. He gives example "the ought that arises with respect to one's friend is not merely contingent on the friend's existence but also on his fulfilment of the relevant obligation that follow from his role as a friend."<sup>220</sup> Daya Krishna's types of contingency in moral ought is different from Kant's distinction between duties of perfect and imperfect obligations. Daya Krishna asserts that the obligations arising with respect to persons may be either perfect or imperfect in both cases of moral and axiological situations of human being. He says that the moral and axiological ought are "ought-to-do rather than ought-to-be."<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Krishna Daya, 1989: 197.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., 197.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., 198.

The contingency that he expresses in the case of moral ought is not so much a contingency, in case of axiological ought where the ought arises with respect to object. The axiological ought does not share such characteristics. Therefore, the axiological ought does not possess that type of contingency. Further another point of view, the content of the moral ought seems to be fairly specific and determinate, in contrast to the content of the axiological ought. The axiological ought appears to be general and indeterminate in character.

The moral ought is associated with the social patterning of norms with respect to mutual interaction of human beings in which they are oriented. Human being's social patterns and norms provide the specific determinateness without which there will be no complementary interlocking of behaviour expectations, and interactions. This type of situation is not entirely absent from the axiological ought. The artist, scientist and mystic are not only oriented to have the patterned behaviour expectations of these roles as socialized in society. But they also must have methodological and evaluative norms as practised and formulated within their own field. In this sense, the obligatoriness is felt within these field which is fundamentally to one's own vision apart from what others think or say or value. Here, the loyalty is purely to the trans-personally considered value and not to what another person thinks, says or feels about it. The claim of the value understanding may be felt to be so absolute as character. "That the scientist, the artist or the mystic may feel compelled to assert it even against the whole world and at the cost of his life. The locus of value prehension is, thus, seen to be in the individual and the 'ought' claim of values is revealed to be essentially non-social in nature."<sup>222</sup>

However, in the moral ought, any successful interaction between human beings presupposes mutually complementary behaviour expectations. This can only be so if human beings' behaviour is oriented to patterns which is presupposed and accepted by human beings. In some exceptional cases, two human beings may explore a new pattern of interpersonal relationships, but there would also be mutual acceptance and certain limits. Without mutual acceptance or certain limit, the exploration cannot be explained.

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid., 199.

Daya Krishna asserts that it would be too much to say that no new pattern can be explored in human interrelationships. Recent works in contemporary anthropology and group dynamic reveals some new patterns in human interrelationships. But what Daya Krishna is pointing here, is the moral obligatoriness in society that presupposes a pre-existent role-pattern which is only to be fulfilled and not explored.

The ought obligatoriness arises when we become aware of the necessity for new types of behaviour patterns in human interrelationship with different type. In this case, we do not have to observe or fulfil a pre-existence pattern but creatively be aware of a new value. This new value translates into the world of uncooperative fact. It means a limitation which is absent both from the field of the moral to the axiological ought. “The values that is creatively prehended has to be realized in the world of interpersonal relationships but in order that such a realization may occur it is necessary that it be *accepted* by the persons or the groups concerned.”<sup>223</sup> What Daya Krishna emphasizes here, is such a situation is not achieved either in the case of the moral or the axiological ought. Because in moral ought, the role-situation has already a pre-existent pattern which has been internalized through the familiar process of socialization. In axiological ought, the question of others’ acceptance does not arise because they do not enter into the picture at all.

There are some compulsions or forces in moral ought where moral prophet try to realize the ought by imposing it forcibly on others. Coercion rather than persuasion has always seemed a tempting short-cut to many moral prophets. But the use of force precludes the willing acceptance of new value. The essence of value is not comprised in compulsive coercion but in a claim that is acknowledged and approved to a claim. This demands yet does not necessitate, its own realization. However, in the axiological ought there is no use of coerce or force for the realization of ought. There does not exist direct relation to other person so the question of the use of force does not arise.

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<sup>223</sup> Ibid., 200.

“The prehension of a new value in the field of moral ‘ought’ may be regarded as providing a transition between the ought arising from role situation, or what Bradley has called ‘my station and its duties’, and the ought arising from the so-called axiological situation of man.”<sup>224</sup> The transitional ought reveals clearly that it is primarily obligatoriness. This primary obligatoriness is to the value and it is the locus of value understanding that lies not in the society but in the individual. Apart from the transitional new value, the traditional ought is still bounded to the structurally differentiated social situation of human being. For the realization of the traditional moral ought other human being acceptance is the absolute necessity. This type of a limitation does not operate in the axiological ought.

Daya Krishna explains that there are deep differences between the moral and the axiological ought. The two ought are seen in many cases as essentially conflicting with each other. If the artist, mystic, or the intellectual neglects one’s social or domestic duties, one does so because of the call of a higher and conflicting value. Daya Krishna explains this higher and conflicting value by the example of Buddha and revolutionary.

Buddha leaving his wife and child and kingdom at the dead of night for the sake of a possible realization whose glimpse even he had not yet received is the eternal symbol of the call of the supra-moral and the supra-sociological in man’s life. The revolutionary, too, may neglect his social or domestic duties but his loyalty remains oriented towards them, though on a different level.<sup>225</sup>

Revolutionaries must weave a new pattern of social interrelationships in which they too would be a partaker rather than a silent spectator. The artist and truth-seeker also feel the loyalty to their vision and “if there should be any conflict between these and the duties of personal or social obligation, there is little doubt in their minds as to their choice or, at least, as to which they ought to choose.”<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., 201.

Human being's social situation is just a precondition for the realization of supra-sociological values. Human being must live in order that values relevant to social structuring as may arise. Therefore, there must be some order in social structure through which principle of reciprocity arises. Daya Krishna comments on many eminent social and psychological thinkers who say that the whole complex social structure is merely an elaborate and roundabout means for being biologically alive. They believe that the pursuit of supra-sociological values is still more indirect way of making the social structure function. Daya Krishna asserts that "to understand the supra-sociological values as performing a lubricating function in the functioning of the social structure is, then, to misunderstand their essential nature."<sup>227</sup>

Daya Krishna explains the relation between the two ought through Hartmann's terminology. Hartmann's terminology distinguishes 'stronger' and 'weaker' values. According to Hartmann, the stronger value does not need for its existence another value. The other value necessarily presupposes the 'stronger' and is, thus characterized as the 'weaker.' So in Hartmann's system, the stronger value is always the lower. On the contrary, the weaker is correspondingly the higher in the scale of value. Thus, the axiological ought presupposes for its realization relative fulfillment of the moral ought. Daya Krishna says that "there seems also little that the intellectual, aesthetic, or spiritual value for which people give up personal and social obligation is undoubtedly a higher value than the day-to-day fulfillment of customary obligations."<sup>228</sup> He accepts that there some cases where human beings choose axiological value as a primary rather than interpersonal relationship. As the martyr who stakes one's life rather than give up the value whose claim one understands in these different fields.

Daya Krishna's purpose behind providing distinction between moral and axiological ought is to explore the nature of value-obligatoriness. Many ethical thinkers have tried to understand the nature of value-obligatoriness through the moral rather than the axiological ought. Moral ought has become primary in ethical discussion and the supra-personal and supra-social nature of values have been entirely forgotten. Ross or Kant they all accepted only the moral ought at par excellence. Even thinkers who have found the concept of the 'good life'

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid., 202.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 203.

their central focus has been on ethical thought. They also failed to see that the ought claim of axiological values is not exactly the claim for good life. Daya Krishna says that “the life of many an artist can in no wise be described as a good life—nor was it in any sense a pursuit of such a life. Yet the claim that they prehended—a Bandelair, a Van Gogh, a Dostoevsky or any other name that you can think of—seems to reveal more the nature of value than the so-called leaders of ‘good life.’”<sup>229</sup> Daya Krishna explores the differences in the nature of moral and axiological ought which give some important consequences for both value theory and value attitudes.

Through the two ought claims Daya Krishna constantly maintains human being’s two realms active and contemplative in ethical thinking. However, he never tried to explain the two realms of human being with complete unity. Even though the two are not completely separate from each other, but they use each other as instrument for the pursuit of their own state. I find that Daya Krishna’s conception of contemplative realm explores ideal freedom that is total freedom where one is not depended on others for the pursuit of one’s own ideal freedom. One is self-sufficient and autonomous in one’s own state of experiencing consciousness.

His idea of contemplative realm provides total freedom that arises from love, friendship, appreciation of nature, aesthetic contemplation, and mystic meditation. But he still maintains his ideal notion of freedom is not absolute freedom from one’s mind and body as accepted by classical Indian philosophers. But at same time one is situated concretely and is not dependent on others reciprocally for realization of own ideal freedom. One’s dependence on other is only limited for experienced moment with others. In other words, one’s dependency on others is very minimal. In this sense, I find his conception of contemplative realm provides the possibility of transcendental freedom.

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid., 203.

## II. Contemplative as Transcendental Freedom

Daya Krishna's conception of contemplative realm gives the possibility of transcendental freedom. This idea of transcendental freedom should not be misunderstood with transcendent freedom. First, we need to understand the difference between transcendental freedom and transcendent freedom. Idea of transcendent freedom can be understood through the Indian concept of *moksha*. The concept of *moksha* is realization of ultimate reality or real form of soul that is recognized as transcendent being. The idea of *moksha* is explained by all classical Indian philosophers except Cārvāka. All classical philosophers believe that human beings' existence in world with the body and mind are real bondage of human beings. Whole effort of classical Indian philosophers is to reveal absolute truth or absolute reality through the concept of absolute freedom or transcendent freedom that is called *moksha*.

There is no doubt that the process of realization of *moksha* described by all philosophers are different. But what is common in all of them is that they all believe *moksha* is freedom from all bondage including one's mind and body. This bondage is arisen from worldly desires of pleasures. Desire is the cause of bondage which not only provides pleasure but suffering and pain also therefore, the worldly pleasures are always mixed with pain and suffering. *Moksha* is the absolute freedom from all bondage including desire, mind and body. The question arises that why bondage is arisen. In this case, they all accept the same cause that is ignorance or *avidyā*. Due to the ignorance, human beings do not realize the ultimate reality or ideal form of soul. Their realization of ultimate reality or ideal form of soul is possible only through attainment of knowledge which is explained by every philosopher in a different way. Some philosophers accept that the realization of *Moksha* as absolute freedom is possible only after death and called it as *videhamukti*. And some philosophers believe it's only after both death and birth in life that are called *videhamukti*, and *jīvanmukti*.

I will not be discussing here the broad concept of *Moksha* with each school of classical Indian philosophers. But what is common in all philosophers is what I have discussed. My purpose is here to explore Daya Krishna's idea of contemplative freedom as transcendental freedom which is different from traditional conception of *Moksha*. Daya Krishna's conception

of contemplative realm exposes human realization of ideal freedom in reality with ideality. These two dimensions, reality and ideality are always closely connected to human beings in all realm of activities like knowing, feeling, and willing. Human beings always feel the distance between real and ideal in their active realm. Where individual is always dependent on others for one's realization of ideal freedom. In this case, one never realizes the unity of real and ideal that is also the unity of subject and object. Opposite from active realm, there is also another realm or values that Daya Krishna referred as contemplative realm where individual realizes the unity of real and ideal, subject and object.

Daya Krishna's contemplative realm is sought of ideal freedom that is unity of real and ideal, subject and object at psychic level. This is individual's realized immediate state of consciousness through love, friendship, aesthetic contemplation, appreciation of nature, and mystic meditation that provides one feeling of transcendental freedom.<sup>230</sup> These all contemplative realms share a common feature and direction in which one feels freedom out of time, space, and causal restriction. Even each contemplative realm itself has different huge signification. But they all share a common realization of the unity of reality and ideality, and unity of subject and object in one's own state of consciousness. It is transcendental freedom because one is still existing in situation, but one's consciousness is not engaged with concrete others. According to my understanding his idea of contemplative realm gives possibility of transcendental freedom, which means that one's consciousness itself provides this freedom through self-awareness of others without others concrete or present engagement. Another important signification of this freedom is that all human beings more or less realize this contemplative freedom in their life.

The best example of the contemplative realization is of love which provides transcendental freedom is given in *bhakti* tradition of India. Daya Krishna explains ideal state of *bhakti* through *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* and the *Gītā Govinda*. Where the *gopīs* are the perfect example of the ideal realization of love with ideal freedom. *Bhakti* as a *puruṣārtha* is supposed to seek this realization in the Indian tradition. Daya Krishna explains this ideal feeling of *bhakti*

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<sup>230</sup> Krishna Daya 1989: 184.



through *gopīs* and Rādhā. His exemplification of the ideal freedom is divided into two separate parts. The one part reveals when Kṛṣṇa lives in Vṛndāvana. The other part disposes when Kṛṣṇa leaves the eternal abode of love and the *gopīs* have to live without him. The former part is the land of eternal dalliance and the latter of the eternal memory which recreates and relives in it. In former state, there is some doubt that Kṛṣṇa seeks the *gopīs* as much as they seek him. The text does not clarify whether the seeking on both the sides are complementary, equal, and reciprocal. However there can be hardly any doubt about its second state. Where only the *gopīs* pine when Kṛṣṇa leaves Vṛndāvana. Kṛṣṇa hardly remember *gopīs* and scarcely if ever, remembers the delightful days he had passed in their company.<sup>231</sup>

However, the *gopīs* are shown as living eternally in the memory of those days they had passed with Kṛṣṇa. *Gopīs* never make the slightest effort to seek him out and meet him once more or even try to find where he is or how he is. However, not only *Gopīs* who seem totally disinterested in finding where Kṛṣṇa is, although Nanda and Yośodā who are both his foster parents and with whom he has grown up as a child, do the same. The same is true of all his boyhood friends as none of them try to meet him. Even Nanda and Yośodā or boyhood friends are shown as they are not remembering or pining for him when he leaves Vṛndāvana. As *gopīs* do all the time, they remember him all the time and in fact, live in his memories.

Daya Krishna tries to explore the emotional realm and the possibility of conceptualizing a notion of contemplative freedom through *mādhurya bhakti*.<sup>232</sup> Daya Krishna distinguishes *mādhurya bhakti* from *sakhya*, *vātsalya*, or *Dāśya*.<sup>233</sup> In *mādhurya bhakti* there is no jealousy from side of *gopīs* husband, nor from within *gopīs* where Rādhā is preferred one by Kṛṣṇa, Daya Krishna writes,

Ultimately, the message of the *gopī* episode in the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* is that the ideal of love is the loving state of consciousness which can only be cultivated

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<sup>231</sup> Krishna Daya 2011: 276-277.

<sup>232</sup> “Sweet devotion”; treating god as one’s lover” Krishna Daya, 2011: 284.

<sup>233</sup> “*Dāśya*, *sakhya*, *vātsalya* —Different types of *bhakti*: taking god as one’s master( the devotee is the servant), as a friend or as a child( the devotee’s love is paralleled here to the love of a parent)” Krishna Daya, 2011: 284.

through a constant remembrance of and dwelling in the memory of those moments which one fortunately had with person one love. It is the imaginative reliving and embroidering of those subtle shades of consciousness which lie between the anticipation and fulfilment.<sup>234</sup>

The imagined world is more real as far as the realm of feeling is related rather than real world that alone is supposed to be the object of the cognitive enterprise of human being. In this sense, we can understand the imagined world is more real as the realm of feeling that is an evidence in case of *gopīs* love for Kṛṣṇa. But such a view of *bhakti* assumes that one had the experience in the remembrance of which one lives. This remembrance is imaginatively recreated in diverse ways that becomes even more real than one that was originally experienced. “The *gopīs* were fortunate in this as they had at least some time with Kṛṣṇa before he left Vṛndāvana forever.”<sup>235</sup>

In the realm of feeling *bhakti as puruṣārtha* is different from *puruṣārtha* of knowing and willing. The realm of feeling is explained by *gopīs* experience and is described in *Śrīmad Bhāgavatā* as a model for the experience to be relived and imaginatively recreated by devotees who come after the world. What is of significance in the realm of feeling, is the experiencing consciousness wants to become totally free of the object so that it does not depend on object for its being what it is. The experience consciousness is itself considered as intrinsically valuable. And experience consciousness is essentially independent of it and is felt as a limitation which is to be absolutely overcome if moksha in this realm is to be achieved.

For Daya Krishna, no ideal can ever be completely achieved and there is always a challenge to explore the *puruṣārtha* that alone makes human life worth living. A human being seeks for the freedom from all bondage, is also not completely achieved but it can be partially achieved. He explains as following

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<sup>234</sup> Krishna Daya, 2011: 282.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., 282.

The freedom man seeks from space-time causality nexus in which biological life is lived and to which it is necessarily a subject is, however, only partially achieved through these art-creation as the world of feeling one desires or aspires to have, is still too closely dependent upon and bound up with the object that is created.<sup>236</sup>

One seeks freedom from oneself and bondage, one would like to live in a world of feeling, “which is completely autonomous, self-subsistent, and self-sufficient.”<sup>237</sup> This is the *puruṣārtha* of ideal *bhakti* in Indian tradition and *gopīs* seem to symbolize this way. The route of this experiencing freedom is independence that was sought through pure imagination. In this sense, one completely feels free from all-biosocial constraints of space, time and causality.

Daya Krishna’s conception of contemplative realm gives transcendental freedom due to the very nature of consciousness. One’s consciousness itself is object in self-consciousness. Due to the very transcendental nature of consciousness one constantly seeks ideal in realm of reality. This constant seeking of ideal in realm of reality is always dependent on objects. This dependency of subject on object is only lessened in field of feeling where one’s consciousness itself is self-sufficient, and autonomous. Daya Krishna never accepts the complete unity of reality and ideality or subject and object which is accepted by traditional concept of transcendent being or ultimate freedom as *moksha*. But he tries to reveal how contemplative realm gives feeling of freedom that is less dependent on other persons or objects rather than its own state consciousness. For this reason, he accepts the realm of love, friendship, appreciation of nature, aesthetic contemplation, and mystic mediation share a common feature that are based on one’s own experienced consciousness and that is transcendental freedom.

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<sup>236</sup> Ibid.,284.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid, 284.

### **III. Critical Appraisal of Contemplative Freedom**

Daya Krishna always attempts to maintain the two realms of human being, active and contemplative with different dimensions and concepts and that is really a great effort. But he always explains the two realms of human being's as divided and separated. Each one uses the other realm only for its own realization as an instrument. There is, of course, no doubt that the two realms or values are contradictory to each other due to very different nature to each other. Active realm is always reciprocal relation to individual and others. In this case, individual always depends on other co-operation for one's successful action when one finds others' co-operation then one feels one's freedom successfully. On the contrary, in contemplative realm, one does not depend on other's co-operation for one's realization of contemplative state of consciousness. But it is really difficult to understand how one can experience state of love and friendship without others co-operation. In love, one experiences state of love through imagination only when one has some positive experience to loved one. I think Daya Krishna's conception of love in realm of contemplative, is only limited to tragic love, where one has lost one's beloved. One experiences the state love through imagination on basis of memory. But this experiencing state itself does not provide real blissful state, one also experiences the absence of beloved one that provides pine in experience of that state also.

Even in case of friendship, one cannot understand contemplative state of consciousness through friendship without co-operation of friends. I did not find any glimpse, in my reading to Daya Krishna's conception of contemplative realm where he explained such friendship, except mentioning friendship is part of contemplative realm. I think feeling of friendship itself depends on others co-operation. Daya Krishna himself explains this in case of moral ought. Without the complementary role-expectation there can be no interactive relationship between human being. But this complementary role-expectations is itself contingent.

Further, In case of appreciation of nature, aesthetic contemplation, one's experience also depends on others (in sense of other objects and other persons) co-operation and effort, but definitely this dependency is different from reciprocal dependency that one faces in active realm. The appreciation of nature does not only depend on one's experiencing consciousness,

but also on the nature. And the beauty of nature is also maintained by human efforts. Apart from this dependency, our experience of contemplative state of nature itself depend on our body or physical fitness. We cannot appreciate and experience beauty of nature when we are unwell. Daya Krishna's idea of inseparability of mind and body explores very nature of consciousness and self-consciousness. Where self-consciousness itself is both outward and inward movements and one's body is also outward aspect of consciousness. But he never discusses, where one's self-consciousness affects one's body in outward aspect. As we all experience that our thought and action both undergo is also dependent on the fitness of our body.

Our aesthetic contemplation also depends on other objects like arts, music, song, dance, and so on. In all these cases, our experience of contemplation depends on created objects, behind these created objects, there are is always other human being's effort. Definitely, in case of mystic mediation, we experience something out side of reality, but this experience arises when one finds something which happens unexpectedly in positive or negative senses. How, and where, one experiences this, is itself a mystery. We find that Daya Krishna gives the example the Indian formulation of ultimate Reality as *Sat*, *Chit*, and *Ānanda* that is the state of ultimate realization of reality. Where one experiences bliss that arises through the unity of reality and ideality and is also the unity of subject and object. It is itself question or mystery, for who realizes this state of unity in consciousness. Because this realization is the state of oneself as transcendent being or it is realization of *moksha*. Thus, the contemplation of mystic mediation transforms into transcendent freedom, freedom from all worldly desires and become Brahman.

My purpose of exploration here is to understand active and contemplative realms as explained by Daya Krishna and I derive to conclusion that they are complementary to each other. In this case, I find K. C. Sogani's comment on Daya Krishna's notion of the active and contemplative values very relevant. Sogani tried to explain the two values together through giving examples of Mahavira, Buddha, Christ, Gandhi and said that they were engaged with

the contemplative and active realms together.<sup>238</sup> In my opinion as well the two realms (values) together explore the paradoxical unity of active and contemplative values in Ricoeurian sense.<sup>239</sup> Without others co-operation or society, we have no experience of love, friendship, appreciation of nature, aesthetic contemplation. Without these contemplative experiences we will also not be human being. These experiences give us feeling to do or to think something beyond our day to day life. Active and contemplative realms are complementary to each other. Both the realms reciprocally depend on each other for their realization, either in the field of action or in the field of thought. History is the product of generations of human actions in the active realm. The active realm further provides content for contemplative realm. And each generation achieves something more innovative because of individual's contemplative thought, which in turn bring new meanings and values to life and society.

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<sup>238</sup> Sogani, 1971: 264.

<sup>239</sup> I say the active and contemplative values are paradoxical unity because they are by nature opposed to each other. Active values are associated with necessarily to others and contemplative values are related to self-centered. But the two values are depended on each other for their meaning or understanding. As Ricoeur's notion of mind and body, the mind and the body are by nature paradoxical to each other, but they cannot be understood or meaningful without each other.

## Conclusion

Human being's experience of freedom is always incorporated in embodied/subjective existence. Embodied existence resolves the dualism of mind and body. The dualism of mind and body is long history in both Indian and Western traditions. Generally, the dualist perspective of mind and body is explained by philosophers who proposed metaphysical conception of freedom. Where mind is considered as rational, immortal or transcendent being similar to concept of God and is always superior than body. The body is mostly considered as non-rational, mortal or corporeal, and always inferior or lower than the mind. In this case, the soul or mind only has the capacity to choose or act for what is really Good or right.

In Indian tradition, the idea of freedom is not related to freedom of choice or action, but it is self-realization of one's own transcendent being. In this case, the freedom is freedom from sufferings or sorrows that is arisen due to the bondage of mind and body or ignorance of one's ideal nature. Here the soul is considered as *atman* that is different from mind and body. Due to the bondage or ignorance one considers oneself as mind and body. In this case, freedom is considered as absolute freedom from one's own mind and body and one's own realized transcendent nature that is called *moksha* or absolute freedom.

The nature of embodied existence is entirely different from what I have discussed above. The nature of embodied existence is considered as the unity and inseparability of mind and body as explained by Ricoeur and Daya Krishna, is contrary to the dualist perspective. According to Ricoeur, the nature of embodied existence is unity of mind and body. He explains the nature of embodied existence through three bodily involuntary as character, unconscious, and life. Each of specific dimension of bodily involuntary hold together the consciousness or voluntary will.

According to Daya Krishna, the nature of embodied existence is inseparability of mind and body. He explores bio-social and situational existence of a human being through one's feeling of freedom. He asserts that human being biologically possesses same characteristic as all living beings in sense of being pre-programed by one's genetic make-up. All living beings repeat the life of their species and follow the journey to old age and death. Human being possesses self-consciousness of oneself and others that makes his/her different from all living beings. Therefore, human being's feeling of freedom is not only constraint biologically, but one has self-consciousness that gives opportunity of freedom. Similarly, one's feeling of freedom is not only limited by others, but one's freedom is also enhanced by others.

I have noticed some differences between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence. Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence is association and union of bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness. We see this union and relation of bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness through three figures character, unconscious, and life. These three dimensions of bodily involuntary are not only always associated with conscious will and freedom but are also the unity of both bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness. And this union and relation of bodily involuntary and voluntary consciousness are always present with freedom and limitation.

However, Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence is different from Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence which is the unity of body and mind. Ricoeur focuses on how this unity of mind and body gives meaning or understanding and together are two dimensions of human beings. Daya Krishna has not focused or discussed the unity of body and mind through two dimensions of human beings, although embodied existence is inseparability of these two.

For Daya Krishna, a human being is not merely a biological being like all other living beings. But it also has self-consciousness of oneself and others that makes a human being different from all other living beings. However, one does not lose one's biological and social frameworks with the achievement of self-consciousness. The self-consciousness of one give feeling of freedom and satisfaction or unfreedom and unsatisfaction for biological and social



needs. The feeling of freedom and satisfaction are related to when one successfully achieves one's biological and social needs. And the feeling of unfreedom and frustration are associated with when one fails to achieve biological and social needs.

Further, the difference between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence appear in their methodology, the way they have explored the nature of embodied existence. Daya Krishna's conception of freedom reveals his conception of embodied existence. On the contrary, Ricoeur's conception of embodied existence reveals his idea of freedom. Daya Krishna's notion of freedom is not only related to individual, but he always discusses individual freedom with others. Individual finds oneself with others in his/her society and environment. Where one's feeling of freedom is not only enhanced or lessened by oneself biologically but is also increased or decreased by others as well. Daya Krishna's idea of freedom is not only associated with biological needs but is also related to social needs that arise through inter-group or interpersonal relation of one and another. Ricoeur's notion of freedom is associated with individual. He explores his idea of freedom through first person centric. Where one's freedom of decision, action, and consent can be understood through embodied existence that is the unity of mind and body or freedom and nature.

I have also observed some similarities between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence. They both, accept that nature of embodied existence is both free and determined at every time. They both, reject complete determinism and absolute freedom of human being. For Daya Krishna, freedom is either exercised, maintained or changed with respect to something already given which is never complete in itself. Although it persistently tries to make itself complete through one's exercise of freedom.

Ricoeur holds that the nature of embodied existence is the unity of body and mind. He explains this unity in three dimensions as character, unconscious, and life. We see that these three are not completely determined but are conditions and limitations of the consciousness or the will where the consciousness or the will is yielded. Individual's freedom is always related in a specific manner, where one's freedom is not determined but one makes its own freedom.

Both, Ricoeur and Daya Krishna accept individual's biological nature as well as the role of consciousness. Daya Krishna holds that a human being is a specific kind of being that is not only biological being as well as a conscious and self-conscious being. A human being's self-consciousness always denies whatever is given, conditioned and makes it contingent. For Ricoeur, one cannot change one's character or given nature, but it can only understand or make it meaningful with the consciousness (the will or freedom).

Another, similarity between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna in their conception of embodied existence is the sense of life. They both accept that life starts with birth and ceases in death. In case of birth or life one has no choice for one's birth, but it is the foundation of all choices and wills. Both of them assume life is given in two senses, in one sense, it is state and condition of freedom and in other sense, it is always act of freedom.

Ricoeur explains that the notion of life in two senses, in one sense, it is the unity of consciousness or soul and body and in other sense, is absolute bodily life with absolute consciousness. In former sense, life is objectively given as structure, process of growth, and birth. These three dimensions are objectification of life which is simultaneously incorporated in freedom. Life in these three dimensions is partially given objectively that would be meaningful and complete through the consciousness or freedom of will. In later sense, the nature of embodied existence reveals life as pre-given material with some tendencies. Yet at the same time, pre-given is not causally determined consciousness although the consciousness retains the resources to respond what is given and provides meaning to given nature.

According to Daya Krishna, meaningfulness of life is combination of biological life closely shaped by consciousness. Consciousness is not something separate from biological life, but it is embodied in the biological life itself. In life one finds oneself as given biologically and socially as state of being or condition of being that is presupposition of self-consciousness or freedom. It is life that gives creation and freedom but every creation and freedom themselves are constrained and limited by their presupposition.

Both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of embodied existence provides freedom through role of consciousness. This role of consciousness is not separated from body, although it is associated with body. How the role of consciousness reveals freedom is explained by both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna. For Ricoeur, the role of consciousness is mutual negation of freedom<sup>240</sup> and necessity<sup>241</sup>. This mutual negation of freedom and nature always reconciles through consent. For Daya Krishna, a human being is not only conscious, but is also self-conscious. Both consciousness and self-consciousness play different roles in shaping a human being. Consciousness is root of imagination or creativity in human being. Creativity or imagination is the source for freedom at human level. Self-consciousness of human being has the power to move one towards the world and object. It shapes and molds oneself and world, to become a worldly human being.

They both accept the act or role of consciousness is not only freedom or creativity, but also a regulative freedom or creativity. As there are always some rule, restriction or limitation within it that makes this freedom or creativity different from absolute freedom or absolute creativity. However, their methods to explain this role of freedom or creativity within limitation and restriction is entirely different from each other.

Ricoeur describes that consciousness has its own wound due to bodily necessity or nature. A human being is free and determined in every act of consciousness that is initial affirmation or unity of consciousness (or freedom or will) and body (or nature or necessity). This initial affirmation or unity of freedom and nature always mutually negate each other due to discordance between them and is always reconciled through consent. His idea of consent must be wrested from the refusal of necessity in freedom for its bodily necessity. This process of reconciliation of freedom and nature can never be achieved in totality, it is always a future hope in which both freedom and nature are fraternal tension within unity of creation.

In case of Daya Krishna, the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness are both a free activity of consciousness as well as critical evaluation of itself that always examines, limits

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<sup>240</sup> Paul Ricoeur uses freedom interchangeably with consciousness, will, and soul.

<sup>241</sup> Paul Ricoeur uses necessity interchangeably with nature and body.

or resists itself through the self-consciousness. Of the two activities of consciousness, the free activity of consciousness is always dissatisfying to self-consciousness and one's self-consciousness can never be completely satisfied whatever been brought in the reality. Here, Ricoeur and Daya Krishna both accept act of freedom or creativity is always within limitation or resistance of bodily necessity or dissatisfaction through self-consciousness.

Ricoeur and Daya Krishna essentially deal with freedom within limitation or restriction, but they both pose this limitation or restriction in different ways. Ricoeur holds that a limitation or a resistance of consciousness or freedom lies in its bodily necessity or nature (in form of character, unconscious, and bodily life) which always contradicts with freedom or consciousness. Freedom or consciousness has the tendency to be absolute, but it is the bodily necessity or nature that makes freedom limited and narrow in way.

For Daya Krishna, role of consciousness is itself both as absolute free activity as well as absolute resistance and limitation. Obviously, his idea of self-consciousness is embedded in the body. He does not see body as the actual restriction to freedom. Rather it is self-consciousness that is foundational to freedom and unfreedom. Self-consciousness has power by which it can induce change through imagining things. And in most cases, affecting changes in consciousness are relatively independent from the body. For Daya Krishna, restriction and limitation in freedom or consciousness arise from the self-consciousness. His idea of self-consciousness has outward movement where it encounters itself with the body.

I have discussed another important difference between Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's idea of consciousness. Ricoeur's idea of consciousness is wounded consciousness where consciousness always experiences its bodily necessity out of itself. This invincible conflict between freedom and nature always gives another invincible dichotomy between freedom and nature in its understanding. Even freedom and nature are not meaningful without each other, but their understanding of unity itself gives two invincible form of a human being. In case of Daya Krishna, the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness both represents an act of free activity and internal and external limitation or restriction arises from self-consciousness.

His idea of self-consciousness has the capacity to represent a human being in both outward as well as inward dimensions. In case of outward, it encounters to one's body and natural worlds on the one hand, and the socio-cultural and political-economic on the other hand. In case of inward, it is the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness and the interactive inter-relationship between them. For him, the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness make a human consciousness as whole, which is itself both a free creativity within limitation or restriction and is different from Ricoeur's idea of consciousness that is wounded consciousness due to its bodily necessity, always opposing consciousness.

have found that both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna describe their conceptions of freedom through reciprocity. Ricoeur explains his conception of freedom through reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary from three points of view respectively as decision, movement, and consent. These three are acts of the will which are always reciprocal of three forms of the involuntary as motive, ability and necessity (nature)). Daya Krishna explains his conception of freedom through reciprocal relation of individual and others. For him, a human being is social and moral being. In this sense, individual's freedom is essentially dependent on others. Individual's actions and choices are affected by others and others are also affected by individual's actions and choices at social and moral contexts.

I have discussed some strengths and limitations of both Ricoeur and Daya Krishna's conception of reciprocal freedom. I have noticed some strengths of Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal freedom. The reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary solves long lasting problem of dualism of mind and body where mind is achieved primacy over body. This idea of reciprocal relation of mind and body reveal dependency of one another. This dependency of mind and body I have discussed in case of decision, movement, and consent. The three dimensions are initiated with voluntary will and simultaneously associated with the three dimensions of the bodily involuntary for their meaning and understanding.

The reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary resolves a long argument of free will and determinism whether one's action and choice are either completely free or completely determined. The arguments of free will and determinism explain human actions

and choices out of empirical context. However, Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary reveals one's freedom empirically through lived experience. Human being experiences his/her choice and action that are both free and determined in every moments, contrary to absolute freedom and absolute determinism. One always experiences, one is bounded with one's particular personality (character), particular way of inclination, and even one's own life itself. Life gives itself both experience either free or determined. One experiences oneself determined in life through one's reflection of age as to be child, adult, and old. On the contrary, one also experiences at each age, one has choice and decision that are made by one at specific ages.

I also observe limit of Ricoeur's conception of reciprocal freedom as I have said that the idea of reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary resolves long lasting problem of dualism of mind and body and the primacy of mind over the body. But at the same time, this reciprocal relation of mind and body reveals another form of invincible dichotomy where our decision, action, and consent are both free and determined. Reciprocal relation of the voluntary and the involuntary makes human being every moment both free and determined.

I have observed some strengths and limits of Daya Krishna's conception of reciprocal freedom as he explains that the reciprocal relation of individual's with others' in social and moral contexts. Where an individual is conscious and self-conscious being. One's self-consciousness has awareness of oneself and others. This self-conscious awareness of one to others make each individual as subject and object in one's society. One as subject feels other as object in one society, although one has also self-awareness that there are others as subject for whom one is object. This experience makes each one aware of others freedom also. Each one's freedom in society is reciprocal freedom of one's with others. The reciprocal freedom of individual's with others' also represents human's civilization, society, culture, and history.

One's self-awareness of others makes one moral or ethical being. Where one is responsible for whatever one has done. One achieves reward or punishment and praise or blame by others whatever one has been done. Apart from this, one feels one's obligation towards others. Because one's self-consciousness not only want to one's own life should be better, but

one also wants others life to be better. This feeling of obligation towards each other is the foundation of human civilization and society.

As we experience that the very exercise of freedom itself provides both restriction and opportunity. This restriction and opportunity each individual feel at personal level and in social level. Therefore, one's feeling of freedom through one's very exercise of freedom itself can be decreased and increased not only by oneself but others also. We all feel the two dimensions of freedom by oneself and others. We feel bounded with our own decision and choice that we have made, in spite of this, our experience of freedom enhanced through our constant choice and decision. Similarly, one's exercise of freedom does not only decrease or increase one's feeling of freedom, but others' also. This is we all feel in family, society, and institutional levels. Where each one's feeling of freedom increase or decrease through others individual's decision and choice. Apart from decision and choices, others co-cooperation and non-co-operation also increase and decrease each one's feeling of freedom.

Daya Krishna' conception of reciprocal freedom of individual with others' also gives positive and negative aspect of human freedom. Each individual's exercise of freedom constantly restricts others' freedom. The active realm of individual's freedom is always reciprocal with others'. Ambition of individual's worldly pleasure, greed, power can make others life hell. As we all know and experience others as hell or resistance as when we do many things in our life that we do not actually want, but we need to do because others want. The negative aspects of reciprocal freedom are not only limited with only other persons, but it is also related to other living beings, natural things and universe also. This dependency on each other is explained by studies of ecology.<sup>242</sup> Deprivation of one person to other persons, person to other living beings, person to natural things, are raised to many different kinds of problems. For example, the problem of poverty, crime, war, pollution, depression and many other types diseases, are driven through human's ambition of greed and power.

I have observed that Rcoeur's idea of freedom is only limited to reciprocal freedom of human being through the voluntary and the involuntary. However, Daya Krishna explains

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<sup>242</sup> Krishna Daya 2011: 311.

human freedom beyond reciprocal freedom individual and others. He describes the idea of contemplative values that is his inclination toward contemplative freedom which provides the possibility of transcendental freedom.

Daya Krishna explains the distinction between real and unreal, real and ideal. The two distinctions are associated with two distinct realms of human being. Real and ideal are distinction between one's active values where one tries to make things, the way one feels they ought to be. But distinction between real and unreal is metaphysical headache where one finds things are not as one had taken them to be. This discrepancy gives feeling of unreal, but one always seeks real as values and avoids unreal that is considered as disvaluational. The problem is common in both cases real and unreal, real and ideal. They both appear to be apparently insoluble. However, the unreal and the ideal both have still to be granted some sorts of reality. What is common between the two distinctions real and unreal, real and ideal is that they both deny the value that is given only in reality.

Daya Krishna explains the active and contemplative values with distinctions between real and ideal and real and unreal. The active values are explained by "justice or goodness or knowledge."<sup>243</sup> The active values lead one away from the self to action in the external realm for the pursuit of an ideal. In this case, one understands the ideals only vaguely. The contemplative values are explained by "love or friendship or aesthetic contemplation or appreciation of nature or mystic meditation."<sup>244</sup> These all share a common feature and direction which radically oppose to active values. The contemplative values turn the self to itself and centre it on a state of consciousness. In this case, one's desire is to never fall and remain there for ever and ever.

According to Daya Krishna, the distinction between active and contemplative values are important. Because if we confine our attention merely at the active values then we are led to an intrinsic dichotomy between the actual and the ideal which appear essentially as unbridgeable. This essential bifurcation of actual and ideal are only healed when we turn to

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<sup>243</sup> Krishna Daya, 1989: 184.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., 184.



contemplative values. The contemplative values heal the gulf between the actual and ideal and we begin to be aware of a fusion of two. This fusion of the actual and the ideal is also fusion subject and object and the two fusions are felt to be the only reality.

Daya Krishna never tried to explain the active and contemplative values (realms) of human being with complete unity. Even though the two are not completely separate from each other, but they use each other as instrument for the pursuit of their own state. I find that Daya Krishna's conception of contemplative realm explores ideal freedom that is total freedom where one is not depended on others for the pursuit of one's own ideal freedom. One is self-sufficient and autonomous in one's own state of experiencing consciousness.

His idea of contemplative values provides total freedom that arises from love, friendship, appreciation of nature, aesthetic contemplation, and mystic meditation. But he still maintains his ideal notion of freedom is not absolute freedom from one's mind and body as accepted by classical Indian philosophers. But at same time one is situated concretely and is not dependent on others reciprocally for realization of own ideal freedom. One's dependence on other is only limited for experienced moment with others. In other words, one's dependency on others is very minimal. In this sense, I found his conception of contemplative realm provides the possibility of transcendental freedom.

I observed some problems regarding to Daya Krishna conception of contemplative freedom and tried to explore integration between active and contemplative freedom. Daya Krishna always attempts to maintain the two realms of human being, active and contemplative with different dimensions and concepts and that is really a great effort. But he always explains the two realms of human being's as divided and separated. Each one uses the other realm only for its own realization as an instrument. There is, of course, no doubt that the two realms or values are contradictory to each other due to very different nature to each other. Active realm is always reciprocal relation to individual and others. In this case, individual always depends on other co-operation for one's successful action when one finds others' co-operation then one feels one's freedom successfully.

On the contrary, in contemplative realm, one does not depend on other's co-operation for one's realization of contemplative state of consciousness. But it is really difficult to understand how one can experience state of love and friendship without others co-operation. In love, one experiences state of love through imagination only when one has some positive experience to loved one. I think Daya Krishna's conception of love in realm of contemplative, is only limited to tragic love, where one has lost one's beloved. One experiences the state love through imagination on basis of memory. But this experiencing state itself does not provide real blissful state, one also experiences the absence of beloved one that provides pine in experience of that state also.

Even in case of friendship, one cannot understand contemplative state of consciousness through friendship without co-operation of friends. I did not find any glimpse, in my reading to Daya Krishna's conception of contemplative realm where he explained such friendship, except mentioning friendship is part of contemplative realm. I think feeling of friendship itself depends on others co-operation. Daya Krishna himself explains this in case of moral ought. Without the complementary role-expectation there can be no interactive relationship between human being. But this complementary role-expectations is itself contingent.

Further, in case of appreciation of nature and aesthetic contemplation, one's experience also depends on others (in sense of other objects and other persons) co-operation and effort, but definitely this dependency is different from reciprocal dependency that one faces in active realm. The appreciation of nature does not only depend on one's experiencing consciousness, but also on the nature. And the beauty of nature is also maintained by human efforts. Apart from this dependency, our experience of contemplative state of nature itself depend on our body or physical fitness. We cannot appreciate and experience beauty of nature when we are unwell. Daya Krishna's idea of inseparability of mind and body explores very nature of consciousness and self-consciousness. Where self-consciousness itself is both outward and inward movements and one's body is also outward aspect of consciousness. But he never discusses, where one's self-consciousness affects one's body in outward aspect. As we all experience that our thought and action both undergo is also dependent on the fitness of our body.

Our aesthetic contemplation also depends on other objects like arts, music, song, dance, and so on. In all these cases, our experience of contemplation depends on created objects, behind these created objects, there are is always other human being's effort. Definitely, in case of mystic meditation, we experience something out side of reality, but this experience arises when one finds something which happens unexpectedly in positive or negative senses. How, and where, one experiences this, is itself a mystery. We find that Daya Krishna gives the example of Indian formulation of ultimate Reality as *Sat*, *Chit*, and *Ānanda*, which is the state of ultimate realization of reality. Where one experiences bliss one also experiences the unity of reality and ideality, and the unity of subject and object. This is itself a mystery. The question is: who realizes this state of unity in consciousness? Because this realization is the state of oneself as transcendent being (realization of *moksha*). Thus, the contemplation of mystic mediation transforms into transcendent freedom, freedom from all worldly desires and become Brahman.

The exploration here is to understand active and contemplative realms as complementary to each other. Without the others, we have no experience of love, friendship, appreciation of nature, aesthetic contemplation. Without these contemplative experiences we will also not be human being. These experiences give us feeling to do or to think something beyond our day to day life. Active and contemplative realms are complementary to each other. Both realms reciprocally depend on each other for their realization, either in the field of action or in the field of thought. History is the product of generations of human actions in the active realm. The active realm further provides content for contemplative realm. Each generation achieves something more innovative because of individual's contemplative thought, which in turn bring new meanings and values to life and society.

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