

**REGIONAL SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: THE ROLE OF
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANISATION (CSTO),
2001-2015**

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SUBAS CHANDRA SETHY



Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies

School of International Studies

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

New Delhi-110067

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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies

School of International Studies

New Delhi-110067

Tel.: (O) +91-11-2670 4365

Fax: (+91) -11-2674 1586, 2586

Email: crcasjnu@gmail.com

Date: 10-06-2019

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "Regional Security in Central Asia: The Role of Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), 2001-2015" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


Subas Chandra Sethy

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.



Prof. PHOOL BADAN

(Chairperson)



अध्यक्ष/Chairperson
एसी और सेंट्रल एशिया केंद्र
Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies
अंतर्राष्ट्रीय अध्ययन विभाग
School of International Studies
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University
नई दिल्ली, New Delhi - 110 067



Prof. AJAY PATNAIK

(Supervisor)



PROFESSOR
एसी और सेंट्रल एशिया केंद्र
Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies
अंतर्राष्ट्रीय अध्ययन विभाग
School of International Studies
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University
नई दिल्ली - 110 067

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SUBAS CHANDRA SETHY

*Dedicated to my Grand
Father & Grand Mother*

Abbreviations

ATC	Anti-Terror Center
ATU	Action against Terrorism Unit
CCS	Council on Collective Security
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMFA	Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
CMD	Council of Ministers of Defence
CPF	Collective Peacekeeping Forces
CRRF	Collective Rapid Reaction Force
CSSC	Committee of Secretaries of the Security Councils
CST	Collective Security Treaty
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
EAG	Eurasian Group on Combating Money
LFT	Laundering Financing Terrorism
EU	European Union
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EST	European Security Treaty
FSB	Federal Security Service
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GUAM	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	Permanent Joint Council SG Secretary-General
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN	United Nations

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CHAPTER-1

***INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK***

Chapter-1

Introduction and Conceptual Framework

Introduction

After the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Central Asia, an enclave region, acquired geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic importance. It is home to an ancient and highly developed civilization. Central Asia has become a security concern in Asia during the last decade of the 20th century. This emergence itself was novel, coming as it did nearly as though unintentionally and with the Republics accepting freedom reluctantly. In the current period Central Asia is gaining significance, notwithstanding the fact that throughout the previous seventy years it was a small part of the bigger Soviet domain (Banerjee, 1992).

Central Asia occupies an important space of geopolitical significance in the post-Cold War time. A landlocked region of the Asian mainland, it borders six vast states of Russia to the west, China to the east, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India in its southern periphery. Its neighboring landmass nearly from all sides is touched by warm waters, either of Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Bay of Bengal or of the Indian and Pacific oceans. So these littoral states bordering Central Asia have sea linkages with the world. Central Asia however depends just on the land routes. Depending upon the approach, there are differing views of Central Asia (Banerjee, 1993). A moderate approach limits the region to a territory between the Caspian Sea and the Tien Shan Mountain, covering for the most part the ethnic Muslim areas, while a maximalist approach endeavors to incorporate the region into “Inners Asia” which is essentially a bigger zone of nomadic civilization that covers the Border of Russia and China, the Middle East and, furthermore, northwestern India. In any case, taking into account the geopolitical dynamics of the region, it is better and more vital to incorporate a more extensive territory (Armstrong, 2007).

This will reflect the impact of power games in the region and in adjacent areas. However, in the context of this investigation, the fixation would focus was been on five republics of Central Asia, which were part of the Soviet Union before its disintegration. Accordingly Megoran, in 2004, “these five states are Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The rise of Central Asia was

largely the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to an influx of strategic discourse that posed several problems after the opening up of the region after the Cold War. They move from ideological issues to the specific problems of state building, financial reform and ecological crises, democratization and human rights, ethno nationality and religious resurgence terrorism and arms trafficking, regional integration and security” (Megoran 2004: 25-26).

This landmass acquired from its Tsarist and Soviet ancestors certain “geostrategic trauma”, According to Robyn, in spite of its civilizational background, Central Asia is looked upon as a troublesome place and questions are raised as to whether Central Asia has ever been a core region. During significant parts of its history the region remained a periphery of the major settled human settlements of Europe and Asia. A progression of political and social characteristics were forced over the region, the last two being Islam and Marxism (Robyn 2000: 32-33).

Generally, Central Asian cultural cohesiveness, and also its success, depended to a great extent on the assorted communication with the neighboring nations, viz., China, India, Russia and the Middle East. Then again, these connections have likewise shaped the political history of its neighboring areas. In the contest of India as well, its initial peopling and the ensuing political history were influenced by Central Asia. Sodikoya stated that, “The current situation gives the impression that an open game is playing on the Central Asian chessboard, whose final result or, failing that, a more stable balance does not seem to emerge. Central Asia can become a stable and prosperous region because of its vast reserves of oil, natural gas and other mineral and metallurgical resources, as well as a skilled and talented workforce, whose merit is largely related to the inculcation of a scientific and secular approach over the long decades of the Soviet state” (Sodikoya 2010).

It is also conceivable that the benefits are diminishing between interethnic conflicts and clashes around oil and gas pipelines, which may also create financial imbalances in the region. If the governments of the Central Asian states play a wise, harmonious and developmental role, and external forces also play a positive role and do not complicate existing inconsistencies in the region, the main benefits may be realized. One thing is certain, it is impossible for a single power or group of powers to accumulate restrictive control over the region (Roy 2002:45-46). Addition of different new successor states of the former USSR has actually and metaphorically changed the map of Asia. This change is more significant in the new worldwide political condition

in which they have developed. International politics in the Cold War decades was influenced by the huge ideological battle between communism and the democratic world in which worldwide connections of states were frequently limited by the divisive pull of powers in East and West. With the demise of communism, that factor in the global alignment is currently gone. While we can welcome the end of the global ideological struggle, international politics has now become boundlessly more complex, first time since the end of the First World War (Bakshi 1998:130).

The new idea of international politics in Asia is portrayed by some as “the back to the future” of nineteenth century politics. The greater part of these recently emerging states has never before experienced independent modern statehood except for a brief interval for the three states of Transcaucasia after First World War. For Central Asia the very idea of Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kyrgyz or Tajik as the premise of statehood was completely new under early Leninist policies and was also to some extent artificial since the fundamental components of real sovereignty were completely denied to them during the entire time of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in any case, though their new freedom since 1991 is to the satisfaction of their national desire, the basic fact is that separation came far sooner than anybody could have expected, and presumably quicker than most would have needed, compelling them, without political, economic or mental planning, to confront the world. In this background of Central Asian states started with developing a comprehension of the most basic components of statehood (Bakshi 1996:337).

What is the social character of the new states? What are the expectations and dispositions of the states encompassing the former Soviet Union? By what method will they survive financially? What are the most potent outside and inside threats to their national consolidation? These inquiries are extremely complex, but at least tentative answers must be attempted if the new geopolitical substances of the region are to be suitably adapted. The unraveling of the Soviet Union likewise required every Central Asian states to deal with Russia, and additionally with each other. Russia rapidly made its presence felt by extending security protection to these vulnerable states. It was difficult to decline a Russian security guarantee as they needed Russian financial support (Olcott 1998).

Geographical Perspective

Central Asia refers to the territory occupied by former Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Populated by around 60 million people, Central Asia extends over a huge territory of roughly 4 million sq. km from the coasts of the Caspian Sea to the west, China to the east, Russia to the north and Afghanistan and Iran to the south. As far as physical geology is concerned, Central Asia can be represented as part of the Asian island far from the planet's oceans in the middle of the earth's surface. Topographically Central Asia is central to Eurasia (Hauner 1999:32-33). It is a zone of integration of major geo-cultural areas of Eurasia with its security relations covering both these mainlands. The limits of these states, drawn initially in mid-1920 by the Commissariat of Nationalities under Stalin are considered by some as discretionary. The area of Central Asia alongside West Asia has kept Central Asia in a condition of ceaseless turmoil and instability. What's more, in the altered geo-political condition, according to Hauner, it isn't totally improbable that the Central Asian Region (CAR) may now be dragged into these contentions (Hauner 1999:42-43).

Considering the geographical location of Central Asia, Heartland theory of Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) is of enormous significance. He propounded this theory in 1904 and consequently modified it in 1919 and in 1943. In his renowned "Heartland Theory", he hypothesized, "He who administers the heartland, rules Asia. Whoever governs Asia directs the world. Mackinder, the founder of the geopolitical hypothesis of the heartland, had glorified the mass of Central Asia with extraordinary significance. For the pioneer of geopolitics; Central Asia was the central point of the world" (Mackinder 1904:421). Mackinder said it was the best regular fortification on the planet protected by ice caps, deserts, mountain ranges and dry lands. It is the largest landmass in the world and the one that controls it has acquires enormous power, because in this way, it does not rely upon ocean control. This was the central point of political gravity because it covered a larger number than other parts of the world and the borders of India, China, Europe and the Middle East were in Central Asia in contrast to the trendy doctrine of navalism (Olcott 1999:25).

Mackinder anticipated the leadership of the new "pivot zone for Central Asia", called by him as "Heartland". Accordingly Mackinder, "It had to resist the immediate threats of maritime power and thus become the geographical premise of future world

domination, either under the exclusive control of Russia, or a Russo-German mixture, even usurped by the “yellow danger”, whereby China and Japan joined”. The limits of Mackinder’s only pivotal area in 1904 included drainage of the Arctic and the river for all intents and purposes, which impeded access to the area by sea. He wanted to secure the maritime attack or the blockade. This maritime detachment would be counteracted by the rapid improvement of the transcontinental railways in Central Asia, which predicts. This transcontinental railroad had to move the steppe zone from a low-performance monetary zone to one of the highest geostrategic potential areas in terms of population, wheat, cotton, energy and metals. Mackinder has therefore given meaning to the region of Central Asia, geographic axis of history (Mackinder 1943: 421-422).

As stated by William, “two spatial weights are currently working in central Eurasia, at the intersection of two spatial polarizations where the new north-south axis intersects the historical East-West link. Some components of the North-South polarization center are obvious. In addition to the cauldron of Muslim Central Asia, any army may be overly engaged in the widespread war in Afghanistan and unpredictable political events in Iran and possibly Pakistan” (William, 2009).

Conceptual Framework

There are different explanations behind locating Central Asian states inside a geopolitical and regional security structure. Above all else it is the conspicuous reality of geography. There is Turkmenistan bordering on Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan border on Afghanistan, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Samarkand, Almaty and Bukhara, are nearer to Kabul and Peshawar than to any Russian urban centre. Setting aside social and religious ties, nearness alone guarantees that strife in one state will encroach upon others in the area as a result of overflow of displaced people trying to escape, which was exhibited in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The ecological disasters that have affected the states of Central Asia are not limited to national borders. The need is to create workable plans for access to scarce water resources, oil and gas pipelines and building common routes to ports for linking these landlocked nations to each other and to their southern neighbours (Stobdan 1995).

The second factor is that each of the five successor republics has historic, ethno-linguistic and religious connections to the 300 million individuals who reside in the

four neighboring Muslim nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. These ties, to a great extent cracked under Soviet rule, are being re-built, as much through the endeavors of their neighbours as by the Central Asian states. Other than their normal adherence to Islam, there are numerous other ethnic and cultural bases for the hardening of relations between the peoples of Central Asia and the Turkish, Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan populations (Dash 1992:25-26).

The Tajiks are Persian-speaking people with historic roots in Iranian culture. They have considerable affinity to 4 million Tajiks in Afghanistan. The 2.5 million Turkmens have their ethnic brethren in Iran and Afghanistan. There are also notable cultural, linguistic and religious ties between various groups in East Central Asia and groups in Xinjiang, China. The Regional powers, including Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, as well as China, Saudi Arabia and India have taken a dynamic enthusiasm for recent development in Central Asia, each power trying to advance its own cultural, political and economic interests. While being careful about aims and activities of others, they have arranged new trade agreements, extended consular arrangements, and effected cultural and academic exchanges. Turkey and Iran, in their contention for status as regional powers, project an essential ideological competition between a pro-Western Turkey versus an anti-Western Iran with its radical Islamic identity (Stobdan 1995:301).

The third justification for investigating Central Asian advancements inside a geopolitical system is on the grounds that every republic characterizes its own identity independently from or in a similar manner with its neighbours. It is probably going to have huge implications for the geopolitics of the whole area, as emphasis on partitioned ethno-linguistic identities of Kazakh, Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Turkmen groups can lead to both unity and conflict inside states and between them (Bruce, 1994).

Regional Security Concerns of Central Asia

Regional security is amongst the most imperative ideas and patterns in contemporary international politics in which sovereign states meet up and make aggregate reaction towards territorial dangers and difficulties. The idea of regional security has turned out to be noteworthy since it helps in limiting threats in the region and it tries to provide territorial security mechanism to such impending threats. With regional

security system, states may prevail with regards to dealing with the issues, for example, ethnic, communal, sub-national and socio-economic pressures which frequently bring about conflict situation in the area. There exists a presumption that a regional security system can be advanced inside the territorial group to manage clashes at whatever point it happens (Dash 1992). The regional security mechanism looks for power and duty to give security to the region, which can strengthen the region and secure the states from different threats; i.e. traditional and non-traditional. In the period of globalization, the absence of security in one state has its ramifications for overall security in the region. To this extent, regional security is the aggregate engagement of differing regional actors. The territorial security framework is inseparably interwoven with the security of the universal framework. For the most states in the international system, for example, the regional level is essential for the analysis of security (William Bruce 2000:89).

The possibility of regional security can be put within the setting of global security and national or local security. Security at the regional level turns into a key local issue. Regional security in Central Asia is directly associated with the nation-state development process. The Central Asian states have just begun to create regional security mechanisms. At first, it will undoubtedly be by experimentation. Each progression ahead uncovers new issues. The people of Central Asia have not accomplished the status of cutting edge states, so there will be difficulties and missteps. During the Soviet period, sovereign authority was centralized in Moscow. But right now, with the development of civil society and the creation of a political state in Central Asia advance has been made towards mutual relationship with Russia (Dononbaev 2000: 28).

Accordingly William Bruce, in 1999, “since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states in Central Asia, there have been wide consultations over building up a regional security mechanism for the Central Asian Region. Regional security issues assumed significance in the context of Central Asia after independence, and it was not an accident. As political experience since the fall of the USSR, Central Asian states did not have enough assets to sustain on their own a desired level of stability and security in the region. As a result, the political, military and, to a large extent, economic security in the region was maintained by external actors, which included US, China and Russia. They have implicit and explicit role in the system of regional security, and the condition of Central Asia was favorable for

their involvement. In this respect, the major powers, for example, Russia, China, and the United States have contributed fundamentally to the rise of regional security architecture. These great powers commitments can guarantee the long-term security and stability of the region. However, dispute between these three major powers on the issue of regional security in Central Asia can also be noted. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of new conditions in Central Asia transformed the entire geopolitical, economic and security scene into Eurasia” (William Bruce 1999:52-53).

The Regional Security Complex

It is useful to use the ideas of the regional security complex and the security features taking into account the final objective of examining the relevance of the new types of regional security mechanisms in Central Asia and the impact of the interface between the external powers. The idea of a regional security complex allows us to observe the transaction between two levels of review: the regional or national level and the global level.

Barry Buzan describes the security complex as a congregation of states whose basic security concerns are sufficiently intertwined so that their national values can not be considered reasonably different from the others (Buzan 1983:106). The states in regional complex are bound into common security concerns and connected to each other in such a way that the activities of one state to propel its security are probably going to have outcomes for different parts of the complex. A security complex can exist and function independently of the fact that the included artists recognize it (Jonson and Allison 2001:05). The conditions of complex might be connected by security concerns, whether the leaders of these states perceive the conditions or not. Alexander Wendt (1999) called attention to security complex theory, “based on constructivist roots, in light of the fact that the arrangement and activity of Regional Security Complex (RSCs) rely on examples of friendship and enmity between the units of the system, which make the regional systems dependent of the activities and elucidations of the actors, and not just by a mechanical reflection of the movement of power”. Buzan uses the terms ‘enmity’ and ‘amity’ to portray the poles along the lines of division. Buzan’s terms can be viewed as connections going from authentic

friendship to desires of assurance and support, while enmity can be comprehended as connections set by doubt and fear (Dononbaev 2000: 47).

The examples of relations of these sorts reflect issues, for example, border disputes, interests in ethnically related population, ideological alignments and long-standing historical connections. Buzan calls attention to the fact that the fundamental qualities of a regional complex can be found in the lines of division amongst states and in the power adjust between them. The interchange of internal and external factors brings about a structure for communication between states in the region and with external forces. A connection in the economic or even cultural field may develop into a common enthusiasm for creating participation in security and military affairs as well. An increased system of contacts and exchanges may significantly create common values and interests and thus bring about close security cooperation as a security community of states (Jonson and Allison 2001:08).

Theoretical Framework of Regional Security

In the middle of 1950s idea of 'security community' was developed by Karl Deutsch who investigated the changes in international relations by recognizing the conditions under which states avoid the repeat of war and set up a solid peace. The idea of security community depicts a group of states which have built up a propensity for long term peaceful association and preclude the utilization of power in settling problems within different units from the group (Acharya, 2001). In any case, this idea is limited in the context regional security in post-Cold War period. In the previous period it involved action and incorporation of politically close states, which were not really near each other geographically, but were placed in a bipolar international system. Accordingly, this work of Deutsch may not be helpful for examining of regional security in some other context (Hooman 1998: 15-16).

The studies on regional security amid the Cold War time frame has been basically directed with regards to East-West relations or to analyses how it influenced the predominant thought of bipolarity during that time. A few researchers, for example, Miller, have pondered upon regionalism and security with regards to their treatment of regional organization. Since this model is restricted to the deliberate formation of security game plans and collaboration among politically close states, which were not basically near each other geographically in a bipolar universal framework. As a result,

this model may not be valuable for the examination of regional security in some other context.

However, Gavin Boyd, who concentrated on East-West relations in the Cold-War time, has viewed regionalism as a mechanism supported by the superpowers, and particularly by the United States, as methods for decreasing the cost of containing the Soviet Alliance. Boyd assessed as positive the ascent of “regional community” in various regions and urged the United States to be associated with and bolster these organizations. He contended that, in spite of their economic nature, they also had security dimension as they organized their member states to address the danger of Soviet entry into their areas. In addition, the U.S. could help with their security capacities since Washington needed to manage the outcomes of instability and Soviet infiltration in the Third World. However, Boyd’s investigation of regional system is constrained to the extent that it made the security of the superpowers dependent or influenced by regionalism (Hooman 1998: 08-09).

Ronald Yalem has examined the connection amongst regional and universal security, focused on intraregional politics. Yalem analyzed small state regionalism (where there is no main state among the concerned states) and regionalism that includes a noteworthy state, and additionally the connection amongst regionalism and universalist security endeavors. Yalem contends that global-regional balance can be best advanced by the subordination of regional agencies to universal organizations. He stressed that the political balance between universalism and regionalism will be created when the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations reach an agreement and the superpowers abandon their ideological contradictions. However, Yalem isn’t pertinent to the post-Cold War period since his proposition on the subordination of regional organizations to the UN does not fit in with the substances of the multi-polarity. It is useful to use the ideas of the regional security complex and the progress of security, taking into account the final objective of analyzing the relevance of the new types of participation for regional security in Central Asia and the effects of cooperation between external forces (Yalem 1998: 09-10, 11-12).

As indicated by Jonson and Allison (2001), so as to comprehend the outcomes of the engagement of external forces better in Central Asia, it is important to analyze with more attention all the more intently the progress of the region with respect to conflicts and cooperation and to consider what impacts those elements have. A qualification

can be made between cooperative dynamics, which hamper conflicts, stimulate cooperation and strengthen peaceful relations between states of the region, and conflictual progression, which ushers in clashes and strains. The interchange between the commitment of the external powers in the Central Asian region and their progress are both useful and conflicting (Roy 2011:28).

The regional pulls are frequently so solid that they make outside forces fall in accordance with the current flow for example, of energy relations draws powers to synergies with regional aspirations. Nonetheless, outside forces do have an impact over the regional security complex. This is possible by impacting the states of the region, through influences on the policy decisions and policy arrangement of the states, which brings about a further chain of external influences. In addition, the competitive relations between external forces may overflow into the region, which implies that contention and pressure from outside forces can penetrate the region and in this manner impact on regional dynamics.

Collective Security in Central Asia

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an organization that was created to play an important role in Eurasia, including security in Central Asia. Currently, six countries are members of the Organization: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikist. Roy Allison argument by (2011), “the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states in its former territory have raised the challenge of finding a security model adapted to the new realities. Military cooperation in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has evolved along three main lines, namely, military and multilateral military-technical cooperation in the framework of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS member states; And secondly, the politico-military and military-technical under the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of multilateral military cooperation Third, bilateral cooperation in the military field on the basis of treaties and bilateral agreements. So far, the most advanced are military-political military and military-technical cooperation in the framework of the CST and the CSTO” (Roy Allison, 2011). Since 1992, Russia has been constantly working on creating an effective system of collective security based on CST. As for the post-Soviet space, the large-scale idea of collective security is hampered by the absence of a clearly

articulated external threat that could have been countered in particular instruments of the collective security system, as well as serious disagreements among CSTO Member States on a number of issues.

According to Syroezhkin Sergei, (2002), “the newly independent states do not trust them because of the dissolution of the USSR of the goals and long-term intentions of Russia, often seen from the perspective of the possible recurrence of the crisis of Russian traditional imperialism. The Collective Security Treaty was signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent. Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were the first members of the treaty, which was later joined by Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia. The licensing procedure was completed in April 1994 and the Treaty entered into force. Subsequently, in accordance with the requirements of Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, the Treaty was registered with the United Nations Secretariat on 1 November 1995. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was established in 2002 -2003 and is based on the original agreement signed in 1992. It was created with seven countries including Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The CSTO is currently the main framework for the politico-military integration of the New Independent States (NIS)”. In recent years, the CSTO has consolidated its role as an organization and by supporting the Plan for the construction of the military coalition for 2010 has taken a first step and entered a new phase of its development. The main task of the first phase was to establish military links at the interstate level and establish a structure for political cooperation. The second phase consists of integrating the military forces of the participating countries at a universal level.

Accordingly to Roy Allison, in 2014, “Russia remains the main provider of military support and security for most Central Asian states. Russia’s main objective in the region is to maintain the security of the Central Asian states, while ensuring that the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces leave the region to carry out the operation in Afghanistan. Russian military assistance to the weakest states of Central Asia can be described as a reciprocal agreement, in which Russia provides political and military support to the regimes in place in exchange for rights of Russian diaspora and a certain level of agreement on the priorities of the Union. All Central Asian governments have increased their spending on military and security forces. This improvement was particularly visible in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This increase in expenditure translates into a gradual increase in capacity, although the

degree of improvement varies considerably from one country to another. While Russia's military and security support to the Central Asian states is relatively limited, the small size of the market and the limited initial capabilities of Central Asia's military and security forces mean that even relatively limited assistance has a substantial security and stability in the region"(Roy Allison,2014).

The coexistence of the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Central Asia is a paradoxical situation for Moscow and could limit its objective to position itself as the most important pole of power in the region. Although the CSTO was an effective tool for military and political addition and administration between Moscow and Central Asian states, if the political and security role of the SCO became more important, it threatened to take the place of the CSTO and hurt the agenda of Fundamentalist of Moscow. In such a case, the CSTO could eventually become insignificant, so that the CSTO was no more than a training vehicle and cheap military equipment. However, the objectives of both organizations need not be contradictory and may be regional security partners.

The CSTO and CSO have real and rational security responsibilities in the region. But for some, if not all, member states, this includes the possibility of general support for the regime's security and support for the international legitimacy of their governments. As a result, Roy Allison (2004) argued that, "the scope of cooperation in the fight against new transnational threats and extremism agreed in the CSTO or SCO forums can easily be extended to unconstitutional group activities. Opposition or groups that can be defined as linked to illegal Islamist movements or simply as terrorists. This can be used at national and internationally to justify authoritarianism and perpetuate centralized political control is that radical religious ideas and movements have begun to spread in parts of Central Asia at different times. While radicalism has appeared in parts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the first half of 1990s, through some regional Islamic leaders preachers, it emerged in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the 2000s, with the return of educated students from abroad, this has influenced by young people. People of different social and ethnic origins from other regions have established links with some of their "brothers" in Kazakhstan and with some members of Central Asia's criminal underworld".

Religion is the backbone of Central Asia. As a result, the role played by Islam in the personal and social life of Central Asians, regardless of ethnic origin or nationality, has increased considerably and will continue to grow in the future. In this region,

however, the expansion of the radical Islamic political movements in Tajikistan is due in large part to the growing interaction between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Islamic radicalism was the force behind the fight against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-89) and spread to Tajikistan, where important political movements emerged on an Islamic basis. The CSTO annual report in 2011 indicated that “in 2003, the CSTO had created its military program, which included the creation of a rapid reaction force for Central Asia and provided for coordinated action in the area of security and defense. Central Asian Uzbekistan avoided the CSTO in 2003-2005 and, while remaining outside the organization, expects the CSTO to be ineffective in Central Asia. One of the possible advantages of CSTO members from Central Asia is the supply of cheap weapons from Russia, though it was unclear whether this benefit was significant. For Russia, the goal seemed to be to use the CSTO as a macro-regional platform and to project its international position as a security provider for Central Asia” (CSTO Report, 2011).

Accordingly Nalin Mohapatra, in 2008, “Uzbekistan withdrew from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in June 2012, shortly after the President of Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership agreement with China on the sidelines of the SCO summit. These circumstances, combined with a previous visit to Tashkent by the Chinese Chief of the General Staff, suggest that Uzbekistan has decided to strengthen the partnership with China at the expense of traditionally strong links with the collective security system of the Russian army. So far, China has not indicated that it is willing to deepen its relations with Uzbekistan in security sphere more than its relations with the other four Central Asian states. This is reflected in the proclaimed agreement on common challenges and threats. A Directorate of Political Cooperation of the CSTO has been tasked with promoting the position of the Common Foreign Policy and coordinating the global activities of its Member States” (Mohapatra 2008).

The development of the Chinese presence in Central Asia seems relentless. Energy, industry, infrastructure, security and culture: nothing seems to escape the influence of Beijing. According to Nalin Mohapatra, in 2007, “the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the negotiation of oil pipelines have helped to strengthen Beijing’s influence in the region. However, China’s growing influence in Central Asia has generated strong geopolitical concerns between local states and Russia, which share the fear that the region will fall under the influence of this

powerful neighbor. China has improved its position in the region in several areas, mainly in the areas of economy and energy, not only through bilateral relations, but also through multilateral initiatives taken by the SCO. Despite fears, relations between Russia and China in the region have improved considerably in recent years, as evidenced by their cooperation within the SCO and their projects aimed at strengthening links and coordination between the CSTO and the SCO. Even Russia and China are working on a possible free trade agreement between Beijing and the Eurasian Economic Union to harmonize the Silk Road project in Central Asia and the Russian project of integration of Eurasia” (Mohapatra,2007).

Review of Literature

Although, it is not possible to divide regional security in Central Asia into different parts, but for a better understanding of this topic, a thematic study has been made by splitting into three major areas i.e. Regionalism, Regional structure and Security Management in Central Asia; Collective Security Treaty Organization: problems and prospects of military cooperation in the CIS; The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other security organizations in Central Asia.

Regionalism, Regional Structure and Security Management in Central Asia

The new Central Asian states were shaped by and subjected to the security dynamics that developed later in the region, but were not well positioned to direct these processes. According to Roy Allison in 2004, “the ability of these states to limit the intrusive influence of regional hegemonic Russia grew only gradually in the 1990s under uncertain and contradictory formulation of regional agendas or security cooperation structures. The development of the second wave, or “new regionalism”, which began in the 1980s, was motivated in particular by the efforts of many regional or sub regional units to create a consensus on security in a given region without using a great power”. For a variety of reasons, the Central Asian states have found this goal particularly difficult to achieve; the even limited coordination of its security and defense policies as a separate “unit” of Central Asia is a growing struggle.

James Mittelman and Richard Falk argue that, “the coordination of security under the influence of at least one dominant power is more common. Several regional and macro-regional entities have been developed with a central group of Central Asian States. Some of these regional frameworks, structures and processes have a clearly defined security agenda; in other cases, the security function is only nascent. They have been different, generally unattractive and unconsolidated, and sometimes in opposition to each other” (Mittleman, 2002). Roy Allison, in 2004 examines that “the security dimension of these regional structures, whether they involve or exclude the major powers, and their ability to meet the security requirements of the states of Central Asia. He also analyzes the interaction between these efforts and the policies of the major powers involved in the region”.

According to Neil MacFarlane (2004), “the American power that had grown since 2001 has declined and the growing influence of Russia is shaping the establishment of a new regional order in the Central Asian states. The systemic restriction related to the development of regional security projects is linked to the pursuit of aggressive dynamics between the major powers. However, focusing on the competition from the outside can provide a unique explanation for the limits of security-related regionalism in Central Asia”. Andrew Cottey, argues that the diversity of factors at the intraregional and national levels has had an impact on the propensity for regionalism in security and other areas. The upward conditions needed to develop a moderate regionalism are functionally negated by networks of criminal and illegal associations (Cottey, 2002).

According to Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, “the weakness of security-related regionalism in Central Asia except in forms based on hegemonic patronage, reflects factors largely beyond the control of local states: first, inheritance or presence of Russian regional hegemony, which may or may not eventually be displaced by the projection of the hegemonic world power of the United States into this theater; secondly, the phenomenon related to the varied effects of the competitive participation of the main powers of the region; thirdly, the grueling demands made on local states seeking to consolidate national sovereignty in a peripheral region of the world system. State capacity has had a vital influence on the sustainability of regional projects”. Accordingly Karlin Armstrong, in 2000, “when regional projects deliver concrete and identifiable security benefits for cheap arms through the CSTO or trust-building measures at the common borders with China through SCO, they can attract

the interest of the Central Asian leaders but, if not, local leaders. But, local leaders have also given priority in their security and defense policies to building bilateral bridges with strong states: Russia and the United States. The priority of Central Asian leaders is less on multilateral consultations on security or the creation of joint military structures that exclude the major powers and the assets or guarantees they can provide” (Barnett and Armstrong, 2000).

Neil MacFarlane argues that, “despite disparities, bilateral agreements with powerful states can be used to help strengthen national military forces prepared to deal with emerging threats. For example, collaboration among provincial states is more likely to refer to internal security issues than to conventional forms of foreign defense policy. Security issues in Central Asia are generally more worrisome than those of the other, which create difficulties within States as well as between cross-border communities” (MacFarlane, 2004).

Collective Security Treaty Organization: Military Cooperation Problems and Prospects in CIS

Regional security is the most important issue for the Central Asian states, that are facing multiple challenges but have inter-state problems that need a collective mechanism. “After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regional security and defence policy issues in the Post-Soviet space are among the most focused objectives in the studies of international relation. At the same time that the formation of national forces started, armed conflicts also sprung up. It also became clear that the concept of joint armed forces is condemned to failure, whereas an attempt to reanimate or transform the Soviet army failed”. In 1993 the joint command was merged into the CIS headquarters for coordination of military collaboration, and only in nine years a new military structure was created that embodies and reflects the goals of Russia in the East. In this context, Grazvydas Jasutis (2005) argues that, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Belarus signed an agreement in Chisinau on the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The establishment of this organization is associable with the strengthening of Russia’s power in the Eastern zone that not only enhanced its impact in the CIS space, but also acquired additional traction when solving the issue of security with the NATO, and affected the USA’s impact in the Central Asian region. This organization is the main

driving force that promotes and generates military integration between the member states by developing new structures, objectives of the armed forces and thus impacting the regional security situation. The goal of this organization as a military integration instrument affects the balance of forces and security situation in the CIS space. Accordingly Jastutis in 2005, “The main goal of this organization is practical cooperation and compatibility of task implementation that results in the functional dependence of the national military forces of the CIS regions. Its evolution can be divided into four stages. The first stage can be defined as one where national states begin legal cooperation and form military integration that defines strategic tasks, aims, military integration ambitions and requirements” (Jasutis, 2005).

Syroezhkin Sergei argues that, in 2002, “the military collaboration documents, military cooperation between the republics, exchange of experience in control in armed forces and creation of a legal base for armed forces, defence policy, and strategy are part of this first stage. The second stage includes establishing common working groups that identify the needs of interoperability military integration and force, possible drawbacks in inter-institutional relations, which are strengthened and members start coordinating the defence policy on a strategic international level and plan actions at the tactical and operational levels. Third stages can be defined as one of training of land forces and troops for performing peace keeping tasks in the international unit”. According to Boris Gryzlov (2004), “Intensive participation in training internationalizes military forces and gradually integrates. Training helps to harmonize actions of different military capabilities and assures sufficient individual military preparation levels, which help to overcome obstacles related to the national military components, inner procedures and task interpretation that inevitably appear while using military force in particular actions. Training gives possibilities to take one more step towards military integration and to implement common operations both within the state and abroad” (Gryzlov, 2004).

Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs (2003), “argue that after assessing the stages of military integration and armed forces a conclusion could be made that military integration dominates and usurps the CSTO formation process that could neutralize the shortcomings and achieve the results. At the time of creating these joint military units, a common exercise is of immense importance. Military interoperability has deepened and is strengthening collaboration between the airborne, seaborne and land-based forces encountered with compatibility during the procedure. The process of

internal military integration itself was regulated in the plans on military collaboration and tactical level arrangements in the CIS space” (Stairs, 2003).

The Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other Security Organizations in Central Asia

The Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have proved to be instruments of coordination and security training in Central Asia. According to Alexander Frost (2009), states that “from a strategic point of view, the dual existence of these two organizations, presents both Russia and China important strategic advantages and disadvantages. Dual existence affects the three strategic objectives of Central Asia to promote itself as a center of power in the region, to preserve pro-Russian regimes and to exclude or limit American and Chinese influences. The two organizations responsible for regional securities are the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”.

The Russian-dominated group formed in 2002, comes from the former military association of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) between the former Soviet states. The SCO a Chinese initiative began to resolve border disputes between Beijing and the states of Central Asia in 1996 but later transformed into a regional group. In terms of security, both organizations have an obvious advantage for Russia by having effective systems of coordination, training and assistance to help Central Asian states fight terrorism, ethnic radicalism and religious, as well as drug trafficking. Accordingly Allison Roy, in 2012, “Since its inception in 2002, the CSTO has not only been used to train Central Asian leaders in Russian military academies and in the Russian Army for the counter-insurgency strategy as part of their “*Rubezh*” (*Frontier*) military exercises but also a framework for the delivery of more modern military equipment for the Central Asian Armed Forces at domestic prices in Russia. It also houses the annual “*Kanal*” drug control operations (*Channel*) throughout the region”.

Bordiuzha (2005) “argues that the CSTO has also given Russia the opportunity to increase its control over the Central Asian military establishments through its joint staff and command structure. On a planning level, all CSTO military exercises are proposed and planned by the Anti-Terrorism Centre (ATC) in Bishkek, which is

officially supervised by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Directorate. As such the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) may be considered to be under de facto Russian command. Not only does this have consequences for military operations, but it also has an effect on the Central Asian states' abilities to exercise military policy independent of Moscow".

According to Kaczmarek, "the co-existence of the CSTO and the SCO in Central Asia is an elusive situation for Moscow and one that does little to improve its goal of positioning itself as the sole power in the region. While the CSTO is a successful tool for military and political integration and coordination among Russia and the Central Asian states, if the SCO's security and political roles grow in importance, it threatens to succeed the CSTO and damage Moscow's integrationist agenda. Potentially the CSTO could become a sort of European Union, which becomes secondary to NATO and then eventually pales into insignificance, leaving the CSTO as nothing more than a vehicle for training and cheap military hardware". Conversely, if the SCO security component grows then its importance as a forum for regional political coordination will also grow and the Central Asian states will be able to distance themselves further from Moscow's political positions (Kaczmarek, 2007).

Thomas Ambrosio argues that, "the effect of the CSTO-SCO co-existence on this Russian goal is therefore negative. However, this must be balanced against the benefit it provides in terms of maintaining Central Asia's pro-Russian regimes and in preventing further American and Chinese penetration of the region. Though Russia have to surely desire the CSTO to remain the key Central Asian security mechanism Moscow cannot, in a time of post-Soviet weakness, oppose China's new role in this area and so it might as well be a major partner of China as a SCO member. After all, the SCO does perform the vital strategic function of maintaining the Moscow-friendly regimes of Central Asia and is valuable in terms of presenting a united front in opposing the American presence in the region as its military exercises serve to demonstrate Russia's military might and sustain her prestige" (Ambrosio,2008).

However, it also should not be assumed that the SCO marks the foundation of a strong Chinese-Russian friendship or alliance. It is a provisional arrangement and one Moscow will seek to keep elementary on a regional level. For the moment the co-existence of the two organizations is the best situation. Since the Ekaterinburg Summit (2009), the CSTO has formed a joint command and coordination center, organizes annual exercises and has established a permanent military force, while the

SCO has only one Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) and Regional cooperation and security declarations. It is inconceivable that the SCO will quickly grow and overtake the CSTO in regional security importance anytime in the near future. Since the West shares with the Russians the desire to combat terrorism and organized crime in both Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics, the logical course of action is coordination and cooperation with the CSTO as the primary successful regional security body.

Gleason and Shailutdinov (2005), “argue that the West should recognize Central Asia as firmly inside Russia’s security sphere, Moscow is unlikely to be dislodged as the regional security coordinator any time soon and recognition of the CSTO’s regional role would allow cooperation between Russian and Western agencies and international bodies. Giving the CSTO the nod as the regional security coordinator would provide a partner in the fight against terrorism and organized crime and prevent either a potential Russian-Chinese front against America or, more disturbingly, a potential Sino-Russian military or political conflict in Central Asia”.

Definition, Rationale, and Scope of the Study

The concept of collective security has been adopted. It covers the training of the national armed forces of the CST member states, the implementation of military and technical cooperation programs and the adaptation of the laws that govern the operation of the collective security system. It was also decided to establish joint military allies and plan their use, create a common anti-aircraft military system and evaluate the possibility of forming joint armed forces. A well-institutionalized structure will help put into practice those plans that have become an organization with a separate state, members and deeper integration plans. Regional security in Central Asia is manifested by the military alliance and the armed forces of the CIS region. While the downsizing of US forces and the coalition in Afghanistan accelerated preparations for the end of Operation Enduring Freedom, the approach has evolved to the point that the U.S. withdrawing from Afghanistan will be also absent in the province. At the same time, the Central Asian states that extended the agreements of the Russian military base in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan drew attention to the extent to which Russia provides military tools and other forms of security support in this region.

This raises questions about the extent of external support for military and security forces in Central Asia and the potential impact of the increase of these forces on regional security. A very important factor that influences the relations of Central Asian states with the United States, Russia and China is the myth of competition among the major powers of the region, which implies that the Central Asian region was deliberately turned into the theater of the opposition, but not of cooperation. In general, the growing importance and influence of unconventional threats and risks creates new challenges for the region and the global community in the area of regional security.

The CSTO has decided to create three military groups for Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, which should form a broad defensive and offensive alliance. Normative change in security and military cooperation in this area is subject to many other influences. In this situation, the decision to create an analytical information structure within the CSTO, which will develop strategies and concepts of the organization, gives hope for its future development, including dealing with Western organizations such as the NATO and the EU. However, the OSCE and the SCO have a more clearly defined normative agenda than other regional security organizations and a special focus on Central Asia which allows them to be seen as influential actors and competitors in the region. Some states, such as Russia, the United States and China, also have a significant impact on the discourse that causes changes in the region. Security issues related to the vulnerability of Central Asian countries to natural disasters and complex emergencies that may arise from territorial conflicts, ethnic violence, drug trafficking, fight against terrorism and Extremism requires regional cooperation to solve common problems. However, geopolitical interests, rivalry and competition from Central Asian states are the result of disinterest and ignorance of security issues.

The dual existence of the CSTO and the SCO is a double-edged sword. Though SCO military exercises serve to weaken America's military prestige and increase that of Russia and though the SCO creates a united political voice calling for American withdrawal from Central Asia, the other side of the coin is expanding Chinese influence.

Research Objectives

- To examine the major influences of Russia in Central Asia.
- To study the potential spread of Islamic radicalism and political instability in Central Asia.
- To study the reasons for Russia's involvement in CSTO and SCO in this region.
- To study U.S and Western security attention in Central Asia.
- To study China's involvement in the Security of Central Asia.
- To study the mutual relation between CSTO and SCO.
- To examine how the CSTO has emerged as the main regional security provider in Central Asia.

Research Questions

The proposed study would attempt to address following research question:

- Why Central Asian states have been so hesitant in developing collective security in their region?
- What are the major influences of U.S, Russia, and China in Central Asia?
- What are the military integration problems and prospects of cooperation in the CSTO?
- How the dynamics of CSTO-SCO relation impact on Central Asian Security?
- How effective the CSTO has been in the security sphere in Central Asia?

Hypotheses

- The closure of American bases in Central Asia and U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan without stabilizing the situation there have made CSTO the main military-security mainstay in the region.

- CSTO's ability to build cooperation with the SCO has ensured that China does not challenge Russia's role as the leading military power and security provider in the Central Asian region, thus making CSTO the most effective security Organisation.

Research Methodology

The study adopts qualitative method and will be descriptive and analytical in nature while assessing the regional security of Central Asia, which depends on the role of Russia and other powers in the region. Although the five countries are generally grouped together, they differ greatly in resources and face very different threat environments and security perspectives. Security issues in Central Asia do not only concern border management, drug trafficking and the fight against terrorism, but are linked to complex emergencies related to ethnic conflicts, territorial conflicts and border tensions between the Member States. Here, the attempt has been to collect valuable data from primary as well as secondary sources. The former sources include research reports, statements, government documents and interviews. The secondary sources include books, which are published in the area of study, articles in noted journals and magazines and authentic reports released by various organizations. These relevant literatures cover different areas like political, economic, strategic and security studies which provide a comprehensive and explicit understanding of this area. The analysis of all available primary and secondary sources is supplemented by information generated through field work and consultations with academicians, local and professionals. Interview with academicians, professionals and policy makers will be conducted during the field studies, have a helped in a better understanding of the issues involved.

Chapterisation:

Chapter-1 Introduction and Conceptual Frame Work

This chapter is designed to touch up the theoretical overview and provide a conceptual framework on Regional security in Central Asia. It also discusses the security situation in Central Asia.

Chapter-2 Geopolitics and Regional Security of Central Asia

This chapter discusses the broad role of the major powers and how despite the relatively poor state of cooperation between the countries, Central Asia contains a number of regional groupings and initiatives. Russia and China have been the two main powers engaged in Central Asia. The United States, India, and the EU have all established an interest in the area, but their engagement, arguably, cannot compare with that of Russia and China.

Chapter-3 CSTO and Central Asian Security

This chapter highlights Russia's role to preserve the status quo, i.e regional authoritarian regimes, following the Russian model; establish bridgeheads for military bases and have the right to intervene if necessary through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It also touches upon major energy and other investments to tie Central Asia economically to Russia.

Chapter-4 CSTO, SCO and other Security Organizations in Central Asia

This chapter delineates the various regional and international organizations and their role in Central Asia to deal with regional security issues. Some of these are promoted by international organizations or states from the neighbouring regions. However, exploring the positions of major powers engaged in Central Asia and their roles in the regional organizations like CSTO, NATO (PfP), SCO, Special Programme for the Economics of Central Asia (SPECA) and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) are the focus of this chapter.

Chapter-5 Major Issues and Challenges for CSTO in Central Asia

This chapter highlights the major issues and challenges of the Central Asian region and declining influence of the NATO in the region. The states involved in the region are extremely concerned about what will happen in Afghanistan after the US leaves. On a global scale, Russia and China are fighting against the United States, its interests, values and policies. This chapter analyzes if China is a challenger or a partner to Russia's power projection through the CSTO in Central Asia.

Chapter-6 Conclusion

This chapter summarizes and analyses the findings of the study

CHAPTER-2

***GEOPOLITICS AND REGIONAL SECURITY
OF CENTRAL ASIA***

Chapter-2

Geopolitics and Regional Security of Central Asia

Aims and objectives of this Chapter

This chapter talks about the wide role of the major powers and how in spite of the moderately poor condition of cooperation between the nations, Central Asia contains various regional groupings and activities. Russia and China have been the two primary forces engaged with Central Asia. The United States, India and the EU have expressed enthusiasm for the region, but their commitment does not seem comparable to that of Russia and China. Another factor is that the interests of the market and the resources of the United States are not the same as those of Russia and China for energy in Central Asia. However, there is an interest in expanding the military security of the United States in the border region of Russia and China, which represents a real threat to the objectives of the United States. The other major player in the energy sector in Central Asia is China. With respect to the energy strategy, the economic interests of the republics of Central Asia and China are globally complementary. While Central Asia has natural assets; China has a market, capital and innovation. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are the main focus of China. This is especially motivated for accessing their natural assets and guaranteeing China's own particular view of geopolitics and energy security in this region.

Introduction

The region of Central Asia was dragged into geopolitical games in the second half of the nineteenth century. After the defeat of the Crimean War, the Russian tsar Alexander II addressed the regional expansion of Russia into the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Russia created the Hordes of Kazakhstan (Jhuzes) and gained a vital advantage for expansion in this region. Accordingly Fishelson, in 2006, "the principal consideration of Russia was to set the geostrategic stage for expansion towards British India and Persia, along with the agricultural centers of cotton in Bukhara khanate and other outlet for Russian

items. In the second half of 19th century Russia put under its control all of Central Asia and, after suppression of Turkmen and Afghan clans, accomplished the southernmost fortification of Kushka on Afghan border. This development began Afghan push amongst Russia and the British, which ended in 1885, when Russia-English treaty was agreed upon. Central Asia for over 100 years remained under the control of Russian and later Soviet domination” (Fishelson 2006).

The breakdown of USSR opened again this region to the world. Russia needed to acknowledge the opposition of different powers in this vital region with its unexplored oil and gas reserves and potential that led to talk about new “Battle of Heartland”, as was characterized a few times in the past, to be projected to the future (Fishelson 2007:35). McDermott, 2010 argues that “While a significant part of the current geopolitical battle over the area is hued by the past, it is important to give some background of its political history. The greater part of the Central Asian republics, and additionally Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, were manifestations of the Soviet nationality policy. Kazakhstan was controlled by Russia in stages and by the mid-nineteenth century was altogether under the Emperor’s control. Present day Turkmenistan was completely absorbed by the last part of that century. Before this, parts of the two nations were under smaller khanates and neighborhood rulers. Industry and large scale cultivation were initiated in these nomadic areas under the USSR. However, self-reliance was less developed as all major roads and railways were focused northward to Russia for example, it was relatively difficult for movement between the areas of East and West Kazakhstan without going via Moscow” (McDermott 2010).

To a limited extent, because of this orientation to Russia, the economies of the Central Asian states suffered as borders were closed down in the wake of independence autonomy in 1991. Obtaining real freedom has become a particularly difficult problem for Kazakhstan, which shares a huge land border with Russia, populated at that time by Russians. Later, the Kazakhs turned most of these boundary regions into populated areas of Kazakhstan. Laumulin argues that, “For some time there was even discussion in Russia about attaching northern Kazakhstan. This objective was successfully squashed when Kazakh President Nursultan Nazerbayev moved the capital from Almaty in the South West to the then small steppe town of Astana in the North. Notwithstanding this step, because of the still close economic ties Russia is its largest trade partner, which has demonstrated how difficult it is for Kazakhstan to

separate itself too far long a way from Russia. With respect to the improvement of democracy in the region, that is something of a misnomer. The late Turkmenbashi and the first President, Saparmurat Niyazov, led Turkmenistan from 1991 until his passing in December 2006". His projection of himself was strange: Turkmenbashi drew a 12-meter gold-plated statue of him that turned towards the sun. Like Niyazov, Nazerbayev in Kazakhstan was the leader of his country in the fall of the USSR and exercised control after independence till his voluntary resignation in 2019 (McDermott 2010: 15). In the contemporary subject stated that Sodikova in 2008, "Nazerbayev, a long way from being a democratic leader, held full control of the press, the judiciary, the congress, and the entire political framework. Nonetheless, the relative opportunity he permitted his people, the way that he has managed the rise of Kazakhstan as a regional financial powerhouse, and the achievement he had in forestalling ethnic strife between the Russian and Kazakh population, make him a tall personality in contrast with other Central Asian leaders".

Accordingly Roy Allison, in 2008, "the mixture of the abundant energy of the nation and the world's growing interest in energy has come to symbolize the geopolitics of the twenty-first century; Refusing nations to depend on military and political power. Today, energy is part of geopolitical competition, like nuclear weapons or the vast forces of the cold war. The methods for universal influence have proved to be more varied and complex, but the objectives remain very similar: national security, power, projection and control of property and territory. In many ways, energy is fundamental to the rise of the United States, Russia, and China as great powers. For Russia, the possession of huge oil and gas assets offers a capacity comparable to that of its nuclear weapons of the Soviet period" (Roy 2008). The increase in world oil prices after 1999 has favored the resurgence of Russia as a great power. These assets have allowed Russia to play a more important role in world politics. At a time when the Kremlin authorities are talking about Russia as an energy superpower, they are really saying that Russia has become a multidimensional world power. Energy is seen not only as an instrument of impact in itself, but also as a reinforcement of the different types of military, political, economic, innovative, social and social forces (Johnson 2000: 42).

Accordingly Mahaveer Singh, (2000), "energy is no less essential for China, even geopolitically. The change and rise of China as a superpower depends on ensuring reliable access to resources, including energy. Beijing responded by making general

energy research one of its strategic needs. Similarly, given that Russia will depend on energy trade in the near future, China will remain a net importer of oil and other forms of energy, such as gas and nuclear fuel. Energy and geopolitics are as strongly attached to the situation in China as to Russia, apart from the fact that energy is not for Beijing an instrument of geopolitical purpose, but rather a key factor for an external approach of external scope. Perpetually selfish from an energy point of view, the relationship between Russia and China should be in a straight line. Russia is the largest hydrocarbon producer in the world” (Bert 2009). China is one of the largest and most prominent developing energy markets in the world. In addition, the two countries are neighbors, which imply that the exchange of energy is generally simple and does not require dangerous maritime shipments or pipelines crossing several countries. A long-term vital energy links between the two aspects imaginable from the industrial point of view and not surprising (Stobdan 1999). Accordingly Mahaveer Singh (2000), “European strategic planners have in the past responded to Russia’s rise by creating hurdles at every point, while Russian specialists have suggested the alternative of turning to the east by diverting oil and gas streams from Europe and towards developing markets in Asia, essentially China. For the EU, which depends on Russia for a third of its oil imports and around 40 percent of its gas imports, such an exchange could represent a threat to energy security. The United States similarly feels uncomfortable around an energy interface amongst Russia and China, however for different reasons: it fears that energy could be at the core of a key reengagement amongst Beijing and Moscow. Be that as it may, the energy relationship amongst Russia and China is significantly more intricate than their individual positions as producer and consumer would suggest”. In fact, the reciprocal energy connection between the two nations is to a great degree undeveloped. Their primary energy relations are a circuitous one, through partners in Central Asia (ibid.p.86).

The Logistics of Caspian Oil

Accordingly professor Singh in 2000, “Kazakh and Turkmen reserves are genuinely large. Kazakhstan has assessed reserves of 79.6 billion barrels (bbl) of oil and 3 trillion m³ (trm) of natural gas, though in contrast Saudi Arabia has 264.3 bbl of oil. Turkmenistan has relatively little oil at 500 million barrels (mbl); however it has estimated resources of 2.9 trm of gas. Besides, since a full, open investigation of

Turkmenistan's Caspian Sea bed has not been completed, we can accept that Turkmenistan's genuine gas reserves are positively far more in quantity. The economic analyst Knowledge Unit has estimated Turkmen reserves at 10 trm, while the Turkmen government has asserted that it is in excess of 13 trm, which would put the nation in the top four nations for natural gas reserves" (Singh,2000).

Some time ago, the Soviets established a small oil pipeline that transported oil and gas from Central Asia to Moscow. In any case, this system is far from meeting the needs of export of the accessible energy. Accordingly Tulsiram, "Several pipelines have been assembled after the fall of the Soviet Union: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).The linking between the oil fields of Tengiz with the Russian port system Novorossiisk of the Black Sea; the Korpezhe-Kurt Kui gas pipeline from connecting the Turkmen fields to Iran; and the Kazakhstan-China Atasu gas pipeline in Alashankou, China". As stated by Robyn (2000), "Transportation, geography and international relations pose two main problems. For the sake of strategic analysis, there is no direct route for oil and gas from Central Asia to reach shipping routes and major markets, such as Europe. To move in a straight line to the west, avoid the Caspian Sea, gradually increase the length of any pipe or build an underwater pipeline, which greatly increases the cost of a pipeline. The Pacific Ocean is oriented to the east. However, the expected 6400 miles of pipeline would require complex construction designs. Running southeast to the Indian Ocean would mean navigating the mountains devastated by the war in Afghanistan, the borders and politics they symbolize, which is a much more difficult problem".

In this context, Roy Alison (2002) stated that, "each country crossed by an oil pipeline can charge transportation costs and can kill the watercourse for any reason, whether for political or economic reasons. For trans-boundary pipelines to be built, treaties and agreements and financial agreements must be signed, often with different countries, which may not be friends. The signing of such agreements is deeply political, which explains, for example, that Kazakhstan is concerned about the shipment of its oil by Iran and the annoyance of the United States. To further complicate the problem, oil pipelines tend to be built by consortia of governments and oil companies, and the requirements of a country's laws generally do not correspond to those of private companies. Another related issue concerns the differences between rights over the Caspian Sea and its seabed, particularly as to whether the Caspian Sea should be

treated as a lake or sea under the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Environment law of the sea”.

Like a lake, each coastal state would be allowed to travel in a limited area along several kilometers of coastline, but the central point of the Caspian Sea would be a collective area for each coastal state. In any case, if the sea were recognized, the entire Caspian Sea would be divided as indicated by the total limits of each state. As indicated by Stobdan (1999), “Russia and Iran consider it a lake, while Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan support the state of the sea. According to current norms, the Caspian could be judged wisely as any of them; 1921 friendship between Persia (now Iran) and the USSR further complicates this problem. The treaty divided the Caspian between these two states and announced that no modification of the agreement of this treaty could be made without the understanding of each littoral State. Russia and Iran consider that this regulation is relevant, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, not being signatories, do not feel bound by this regulation”.

Because the Caspian property remains unresolved, the exploration and extraction of oil and gas generates tensions. The issues of Russian and Iranian treaties are beginning to weaken year after year, but the problem is far from over. As indicated that the report on Eurasian Survey (2010), “Iran sent a warship and two fighter jets to prevent an Azeri company from exploring a gas field near the central point of the Caspian, but for Azerbaijan it believes it is in its territorial waters. While Russia agrees with Iran on the issue of the Caspian division, it has not taken any serious measures. Russia has established a reciprocal agreement with several states, for example, in 2005, signed a production sharing agreement with Kazakhstan in the oilfield of Kurmangazy, located in the northern part of the Caspian segment of Kazakhstan”.

Geopolitics and Energy

As stated by Ptnaik, (2016), “After the revolution of Andijan events and Tulip Revolution in 2005, most of the Central Asian states approached Russia and called for the closure bases in the United States. This has led to strategic export calls, such as Ariel Cohen, for the development of non-Russian energy routes, the expansion of trade and security relations with Central Asian states and the adoption of detailed solutions to deal with governments. With whom the relationships were bad.

According to them, this would ensure that energy security and the fight against terrorism are not influenced in the opposite way” (Patnaik 2016:86). Accordingly Cohen, in (2006), “To guarantee the strategic interest of US, Cohen said that United States should promote alternative energy markets for Central Asia, which are not exactly the same as those in Russia and China. The other political objectives should integrate the US military presence in the border region of Russia and China, which represents a real danger to US interests. Cohen also stressed the need for a liberal democratic system and the promotion of the free market to have a lasting and profound impact. These measures are considered essential because Russia and China are coordinating to limit the US impact on Central Asia. The purchase of energy resources Cohen underlined would allow these two powers to take the lead over the United States” (Cohen 2006).

Energy has thus become one of the main characteristics of the geopolitics of Eurasia. The bulk of the energy is not only its incentive to acquire in many parts of the world, but also its role as an instrument to promote the essential objectives of the world and regional powers in the Eurasian space. According to Ajay Patnaik, “Individual states that can’t play it in key terms and look to the region only as a source of oil and gas will undoubtedly wind up as negligible actors. No big surprise that despite offering Central Asia shorter routes to world markets and access to adjacent expansive markets, South Asia have so far remained without any energy pipeline. At the same time, energy is a part of a bigger rivalry between three principal players like Russia, the US and China with some regional powers playing second fiddle in the process. It has been the legitimizing factor that shrouds the real strategic goals. The additions of the energy producing and transit nations of Eurasia are helpful for these goals. These post Soviet states could be utilized as pawns, due the advantages of being on various sides of the superpower partition could be attractive”.

As stated on Bhadrakumar (2016), “The Eurasian region has seen more militarization and clashes as an outcome of power competition. In the journey for strategic expansion, every instrument, from energy diplomacy to regime change and stationing of troops and bases, has been utilized. These have not expanded the possibilities of security in the Eurasian region. Actually, as in the case of Ukraine in 2014, the Eurasian region stays defenseless against strife and aggression as the key interests of the West include segregation of Russia in its ‘Near Abroad’. Central Asia, in any case, may not see a situation like in Ukraine, since the states in this region have

figured out how to strike a better balance between the interests of external powers”.Accordingly by Patnaik (2007), “this is conceivable because they have not tried to pressure their relations with the West or China to the detriment of Russia. In fact, due to the consequences of the Ukrainian situation, including sanctions, Russia has approached China on energy and economic issues. This leaves less space for the West to enter the region using an energy strategy. For China, energy is becoming a fundamental instrument of its geopolitical strategy, which must become a major impact in the region without challenging other world powers, especially Russia”.

As stated on Patnaik, (2016), “In any case, it would be difficult for China to replace Russia as a major power in Central Asia. The reason is that China still does not have the military capacity to secure the region, the militants and the terrorists, or different powers, or in clashes between the Central Asian states. Only the United States and Russia can take this stake in Eurasia.China’s hard-line interests are focused on securing its own neighborhood in Northeast Asia and the South China Sea. In general, given the historical context of the war and the border conflicts with China during the Soviet period and the fear underlying Chinese migration, the Central Asian states would be better off comfortable with the security guarantee of Russia than of the Chinese. Only the United States could be an opponent of Russia in the region. Be that as it may, the recommendation of the United States regarding a political or economic model is a real detestation for the regimes in Central Asia.The withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan also raises questions about its continued enthusiasm for Central Asia in the future.This leaves Russia as the most attractive power, with unchanging enthusiasm for the region” (Patnaik 2016: 77).

Geopolitical Strategies in Central Asia

The end of bipolar political and ideological international system has prompted the rise of globalization of economies of the world including those of Central Asia. Along these lines the market oriented economies of Central Asian states have attracted different powers because of their immense assets of oil and natural gas.The three noteworthy states: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan possess some of the world’s largest areas of oil fields and natural gas (Joshi 2003). As a result on Sally, in 2012,“Due to its geopolitical fame in the 19th century, the ‘Great Game’ was played between the English and Russian empires for influence and regional control,

especially in Afghanistan. Over a century later, another rendition of the ‘Great Game’ started in the mid-nineties for control and impact over Central Asia. The fall of communism and the breaking down of the Soviet Union in 1991 with the withdrawal of the Soviet power from Central Asian region activated the trigger for the Great game” (ibid). This season of competition began with moves to guarantee financial control by the west of the energy assets of Central Asian hydrocarbons. By looking for control of this strategic commodity, the life line of the industrialized nations, an attempt was also being made to contain Russian influence in the region and advance Western value system (Roy 2004).

The shapes of the rising ‘Great Game’ are subjectively unique in relation to the first from multiple points of view. The United States, as the unchallenged sole super power which had no part in earlier great game is leading the move with the United Kingdom going along with it just as an auxiliary partner. The primary reason for existing game isn’t to control an area for imperial expansion, but to utilize the energy and strategic mineral resources, as an important component for the US global hegemony and mastery. On the opposite side, there is a relatively weak Russia followed by China. Other regional powers like India, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan additionally have their respective economic and strategic enthusiasm for the region (Bohr 2004:102).

Globalization and Geopolitical Narrative in Eurasia

With the breaking down of the Soviet Union and the rise of new states in the region there was a restoration of certain geopolitical ideas and models that had turned out to be outdated to a great extent in the current situation, especially in the Eurasian context. The revival of geopolitical moves took after the development of geo-financial interest, which implied that a substantial part of engagements in the Central Asian region were by and by characterized as conforming to conventional geopolitical ideas. The possibility of ‘New Great Game’ turned into a relentless one that insinuated a repeat of the struggle for control over the ‘heartland’. Till the 1990s the use of the term and idea of the ‘New Great Game’ and the ‘Heartland’ eclipsed the investigation of reality in Central Asia and the Transcaucasia (Paul 2004:65). While in the 1990s the metaphors were utilized to denote geo-economic rivalry, especially for oil and gas, 9/11 events initiated another aspects of geo-strategy. A large part of these Great Game narratives had geopolitical references or made them appear as significant. It has been

contended that a great part of the analysis that utilized these ideas however did so without much basis. The term 'New' was an incredible diversion in itself since it alludes back to occasions that are absolutely divergent from the current period (Edwards 2003:122-123).

Specifically, the connecting of the present circumstance in the area with geopolitical projections that underline the centrality of Central Asia in world politics is driven more by sentimentalism than any right comprehension of the ideas of geopolitics. In the post 9/11 period, with the acknowledgment of the essentialness of the region in any war against terror, 'Heartland' theories again re-emerged in an expansive manner in the context of the region. This was as valid for the post-Soviet world as for the narratives in the West. Actually, the state identified by Halford Mackinder as possessing the most attractive geopolitical position as far as gaining influence over the 'heartland', was Russia (Sengupta 2010:374). At the end of the Cold War, Russia's post communist minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, noticed that the Russian administration had appreciated the fact that geopolitics was replacing old ideological system. Kozyrev also contended that of late geopolitical accounts like the 'conflict of human civilizations' and the 'axis of evil' have turned into the focus point of consideration in Foreign policy circles. This demonstrates that while from one viewpoint a pragmatist perusing of global politics as a 'chessboard' re-developed especially in the Eurasian context, then again a 'civilizational' exchange emerged as noteworthy discussion in discourses of international relations and global security (Roy 2014:56).

The Quest for Central Asian Security in the New World Order

The collapse of socialism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the resulting withdrawal of Soviet power from Central Asian region placed the Central Asian nations in incredible difficulty to manage their environment and external relations in this new circumstance. The fall of USSR likewise heralded the circumstance of "Uni-Polarity" and the end of "bipolar world". Numerous underdeveloped nations which felt shielded by tie up with USSR came under extraordinary despondency in the regional and economic sphere (Chung, 2004). The fate of third-world political, economic and cultural organization like Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and other organizations turned out to be exceptionally uncertain

after the disintegration of USSR. The Central Asian nations ended up with extraordinary problems to cope with the circumstance because of the loss of former Soviet security umbrella for advancing their own interests. The Central Asian nations tried to create regional organizations with Russia and others as well. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), etc. (Cummings 2002: 204). The 21st century introduced a noteworthy vital test as far as the Central Asian region is concerned. With the fall of former U.S.S.R and ensuing Russian withdrawal from the Central Asia, the region had to move along a new way. The involvement of a number of regional players and the potential for instability in the neighborhood likewise altogether changed the key condition (Bakshi 1999). Alongside this was the fact that a great part of the Central Asian borders are fluid having been divided out of political expediency instead of any ethnic contiguity. To a large degree, in any case, this new adjustment with underdeveloped nations particularly shaped India's strategic policy towards this neighborhood. This was reflected in proclamations that kept on repeating a "shared world outlook" between the two regions that had proceeded uninterrupted as the centuries progressed. While generally noteworthy "commonalty of perception" remained the cornerstone for establishments of what was a rising relationship, India approached the region without any proactive move on strong economic relationship (Stobdan, 1998).

As a result, Mahaveer Singh (2000), "In the current world order, the Central Asian states and the region itself are in a transitional phase and face complex problems, including problems related to such as the characterization of their national status and the management of its economy, challenges and ecological crises, democratization and human rights, ethno-nationalism and religious revivalism, transnational crimes and proliferation of weapons, territorial integrity and security problems, etc. One of the real problems of the Central Asian states is the issue of national and regional identity. The recognition of the new conditions of Central Asia in its current national framework at the new crossroads of its freedom was the most important more vital that ensured the proper functioning of its national construction process". As noted in Mohammad (2000), "In addition, the measures taken by the Central Asian nations themselves, for example, their efforts to strengthen the bilateral agreement with Russia, the development of the mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States of Collective Security It has helped these countries a lot. With the exception of

the special case of Tajikistan, stable stability has generally developed in Central Asia. From a transitional perspective, Central Asia is now entering another phase of peace and development” (Mohammad 2000 : 10).

Nowadays, the progress of national formation seems to be more ingrained than among the transitional powers. Each of the Central Asian states seems to have monitored national stability as part of a political system of concentration of power. In fact, external factors have proven to be effective devices for polarizing social orders along inter-ethnic, sectarian and other global lines of fracture (Joshi, 2003). Accordingly Allison Roy, (2004), “The security in such conditions has been essential. The extension proposed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the East. The efforts of the United States and Europe to determine the future of the region within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) are also related to the geopolitics of energy. Conflicts in Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan and even conflicts in Afghanistan are gradually mixing with oil interests” (Roy 2004:35). The United States is progressively building its own strategic conditions as a method to fill the political and security space of the region. Having contributed to the military potential of Kazakhstan, the United States considers that Uzbekistan is the main candidate for a pivotal role. On another front, China has also invested in the struggle for energy in Central Asia (Shams-ud-din, 2003).

Chinese state oil companies won the contract to develop two of Kazakhstan’s largest oilfields. China has infiltrated its activities sufficiently to meet the immediate needs of the Central Asian states. Beijing is no longer worried about the fear of instability in Central Asia that is overflowing in Xinjiang, but is looking for a common strategy to manage security and other problems in Central Asia. China has resolved its regional problems with these states and is discussing the construction of a vast infrastructure and the necessary connection to restore the ancient ‘Silk Road’ (Singh 2000: 64).

Central Asian States and Regional Powers

Accordingly Ajay Patnaik, (2016), “Central Asia attracts the attention not only of two great powers, Russia and the United States. Its strengths, its ethno-linguistic composition or its geographical area close to Afghanistan have aroused the interest of some regional powers for Central Asia. The three regional powers, such as China,

Turkey and India, are emerging economic and military powers. Iran is a regional power, and once international sanctions are lifted, it should play a much more important role in the region. The Central Asian states share common concerns with their Asian neighbors. India, concerned about cross-border terrorism from Pakistan and Afghanistan, sees Central Asia as an area in which its security interests coincide. In the early 1990s, China took the necessary steps to resolve the border disputes that led to the creation of the Shanghai Five in 1996, which later became the SCO". Iran played a vital mediating role in ending the civil war in Tajikistan. In addition, India and Iran, together with Russia, helped the Northern Alliance fight the Taliban regime in power. Turkey has helped the countries of Central Asia to increase their energy resources by offering a different option from the Russian route (Patnaik 2016: 123).

As stated on Dash, (2012), "Given their financial potential and their discernment of risk, these four regional powers could assume their own security commitments in Central Asia. China, India and Iran play a role in the non-traditional security sphere through the SCO. Turkey does the same as part of NATO's PfP program. However, these commitments are not likely to make them important geopolitical actors in the region. Only China, which has deep bilateral relations with each of the countries of Central Asia, can in the long term use its financial resources to become a challenger for Russia and the United States. The disadvantage of China is that it is not prepared to assume large security responsibilities towards the Central Asian states or to open military installations in the region" (Dash 2012:45).

The regional powers, however, have aggressive and competitive components in their respective relations, which find an articulation in the commitment of these nations in Central Asia. Accordingly Sanjay Deshpande, (2013), "This factor would further limit their ability to become driving forces in the region. However, the rivalry between them would not affect regional stability. Once again, their dynamic commitment augurs well for the region, as they offer more alternatives to Central Asian states for economic benefits. China and India are looking for energy resources and have several means to advance the Silk Road. The same goes for Turkey and Iran, which are trying to expand their impact through rival regional groupings. While Turkey has benefited from being a Western partner in the energy sector, Iran has been forgotten due to Western pressure. In any case, Iran can give the closest access to the sea and has a cultural impact on the Persian-speaking population of the region" (Deshpande 2013).

Limitation on Security Concerns in Central Asia

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states have been so reluctant to create activities and procedures to change the security apparatus in their region. Central Asia and its enthusiasm for the promotion of supranational structures are a legacy of the consequences of the 'superposition' of the Superpower of the Cold War period (Biekenov 2010: 46). It has been argued that Russia's role as a regional hegemon is more a requirement of regionalism than the role that the United States can play as a global hegemon. However, Neil MacFarlane contended convincingly that, "this changed with American power since 11 September 2001 progressively shaping the rising regional quest in Central Asia. This perception prompts the second and related fundamental requirement on the improvement of regional security: the presence of focused attention of significant powers" (MacFarlane 2000:20).

Accordingly Schultz,(2001), "In the case of Central Asia, However, a neo-pragmatist view centered on control and political rivalry in the region as viewed from outside can provide only a fractional clarification of the imperatives on security-related regionalism in Central Asia. An assortment of intraregional and state-level elements have influenced the penchant for regionalism in security, even if there is limited 'bottom up' conditions essential for growing an soft regionalism. These different components are distinguished by scholars who position Central Asia and the Caucasus as regions of a kind similar to the Middle East, the Balkans and South Asia: regions with little space for collective leadership, steeped in internal or regional conflicts, frequently with generally powerless or subordinate economies, and swayed by strong nationalism and an emphasis on sovereignty" (Schultz 2001:264).

These elements described above amount to foundational limitations, because of which it is not really astounding that progress towards expanded cooperation, integration, convergence, and common identity has not been a conspicuous element of security policy interactions in Central Asia. As stated by Weiss, in (2000), "Its absence has not discouraged Western states, international organizations and NGOs from taking responsibility regarding a standardizing plan for advancing self-supporting regional security cooperation in Central Asia, while encouraging a regional security group through normative values. Further, contrast between the European and the Central Asian experience turns out to be clear from the fact that an important part of the mission of a several larger post-Cold War sub-regional groupings in Europe has been

to democratize power connections, especially amongst East and West. This goal has implied that these groupings could and ought to incorporate significant major powers like Russia. The partitioning lines in Central Asia amongst Russia and its southern neighbours, which generally keep up close relations with Moscow, are more subtle, and in spite of the fact that Russia has taken an interest in some of the groupings in this region it have reliably looked to coordinate the region on its own terms” (Weiss 2000:411). Additionally, in the Central Asian region the focused elements between major powers in the security field are impact of Russian inclusion in territorial groupings.

Accordingly Roy Allison, (2004), “Since Central Asia falls in a peripheral zone on the world system we can’t expect regional groupings inside it to contribute fundamentally to the advancing design of regionalization. Previously, one pillar of this architecture has been the expectation that regional groups could progressively go about as security providers inside their separate regions and add to task-sharing or meet auxiliary goals advanced by the United Nations. Yet, the foremost non-UN peace building activity in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan, was basically a Russian effort, and was undertaken to counteract five years of Civil War. In light of security concerns the Central Asian states have, as demonstrated as follows, kept an eye on either with Russia, under the mantle of the CIS, or progressively since 11 September 2001 with the United States” (Roy 2004:463). The real security problems in Central Asia have been solved only at the regional level, without the participation of external powers. Given the various contextual consultations, regionalism is not a promising solution to resolve conflicts outside Europe. The study of regional frameworks indicates that the states of the region are unlikely to be the main actors in the true security emergencies in Central Asia (MacFarlane 2004: 37).

Russian Policy towards Central Asia

As already mentioned, the five new independent Central Asian states find it’s very difficult to deal with the importance of independence. In the wake of trying every one of the endeavours to build up contact with the outside world, by mid-1990’s the Central Asian nations wound up mindful that quitting the political, economic and military relationship with Russia, which had worked over the earlier century, would take additional time. Accordingly these nations have selected a paradoxical

circumstance: proceed with the economic and other important ties with Moscow while in the meantime they work for political autonomy in the long term.

For over a time Moscow did not have any well throughout policy towards the newly emerged Central Asian states as it was obsessed with developing new forms of relationship with the West. A school of thought known as 'Atlantist' was noticeably influential in the foreign policy circles of Russia. In any case, by 1992, Moscow all of a sudden understood that its lack of involvement with respect to these countries had made a geopolitical vacuum which was filled by the neighbouring Islamic world (Mohanty 2016:132). Accordingly Dash, (2014), "Nationalistic circles in Tashkent, Dushanbe and Ashkabad started to dream of restoring a 'Greater Turkistan', dissecting Afghanistan, making possible confederations (with the cooperation of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) and framing regional economic union. Moscow at long last perceived the mounting threat of an Islamic political union on its southern border and responded by undertaking a flurry of activities to re-establish its ties with the regimes in Central Asia" (Dash 2014:78).

This choice was articulated by the Asiatic or Oriental school which says that Russia ought to settle on close ties with Asiatic nations. Russia feels that it has to acquire majority of the obligations in policy making for the Central Asian states since it is the normal successor state of the Soviet Union. Alluding to its specific duty conferred on it by history, Moscow has affirmed that the nation won't stop to be a reliable power (Buzan 2004). For example, Moscow understands the geo-economic and geo-historic significance of Central Asia. It began giving significant attention in its foreign policy to post-Soviet space, particularly Central Asia. Russia under Yeltsin attempted to set up a type of co-activity with these Central Asian republics. There are different variables that have changed Russia's point of view towards Central Asia. As a matter of first importance, Andrei Kozynev, a pro-Atlanticist Foreign Minister was replaced by Y. Primakov who advocated fortifying relations with the Central Asian Nations. Primakov had foreseen that an alienated Central Asia would threaten the security of Russia since it lay in the underbelly of Russia. Furthermore, during the Soviet period, the Central Asian republics gave resources to the industries that were based in Russia (Primakov 2010:65).

But after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the supply of natural resources to Russia from the Central Asian states halted. Thus, to guarantee the supply of materials to Russian industries some sort of co-operation with these nations was required.

Thirdly, there was a rise of ultra-nationalistic movements in Russia which urged that Russia's predominance over the former Soviet republics ought to be asserted. There are many Russians who live in the Central Asian states. Their security and prosperity could be guaranteed only if Russia engaged with these nations.

Adopting civilization oriented approach that has been gaining more and more prominence in the modern Social Geography, it can easily be said of the Central Asian state that their future has a place in Asia (Roy 2004:17). After gaining independence, none of the nations in Central Asia wants to end up as a European state. None of the states are of European origin. Islam has been the overwhelming religion. During the Soviet rule, despite the fact that Islam was seriously smothered by the Government, people there figured out how to survive. In the wake of independence, the relation of these nations with Islamic neighbours has been progressively restored. Under the leadership of Putin, however, the Russian policy in Central Asia has turned out to be more self-assured. He has taken a two dimensional approach in managing the Central Asian Nations. Putin sought to push for both political and economic linkages amongst Russia and Central Asia. Russia gave more financial aid to Central Asia following this approach (Sengupta 2016:132). EvgeniaVanina¹ partially explains the security situation in Central Asia, "Central Asia is a key region with important security challenges. In recent years the five Central Asian countries have witnessed conflicts over borders, political revolutions, violent labour unrest and inter-ethnic violence. There are concerns about the development of international extremist networks that link Central Asia to neighboring states, particularly Afghanistan. As the NATO-led alliance expressed intention to withdraw from Afghanistan, regional powers mainly Russia are stepping up their military participation in the region. On the other hand, it has sent a fractious fault line through the coalition against international terrorism, which runs deep through Russia's partners in Central Asia".

Through this assertive strategy, Moscow could ward off the Western impact in Central Asia to a specific degree. After that Russia concentrated on bilateral military arrangements with the Central Asian states through supply of military equipment at less expensive rates. Russia is also spreading its impact in the Central Asia through

¹. Prof. EvgeniaVanina is a Faculty of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science. Interview with Prof.Vanina on 8th June, 2018, 12:00 p.m at the institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Moscow.

multilateral discussions. In order to demonstrate its military presence in Central Asia, it led Commonwealth Southern Shield Exercises in March 2000 that required around 10,000 troops from Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (Sengupta, 2009). Through this operation it showed that it is a dynamic player in its traditional sphere of influence. In October 2000, a Collective Security Force Agreement was signed among six different CIS members that were aimed against foreign military aggression. The signatories furthermore agreed to do joint military activities. The developments after September 11, 2001 through which America positioned its troops in the Central Asia in the garb of anti-terrorist tasks made Moscow feel uncomfortable. A few researchers have named these occasions as the 'New Great Game' for supremacy in Central Asia. They draw similarity between the present race for supremacy in Central Asia with the nineteenth century "Great Game" being played between Great Britain and Russia. There are however researchers who feel that the current circumstance in Central Asia ought not be interpreted as the continuation of the nineteenth century struggle between Britain and Tsarist Russia (Mohanty 2016:144).

The newly independent republics are not any more the feudal monarchies of nineteenth century. They are free sovereign nations, not at all like the nineteenth century. In the present circumstances the role of neighbours and proximate neighbours like Iran, Turkey, China, Pakistan and India are vital in Central Asian region. Another reason of difference with the nineteenth century great game was that during that time Central Asia was sought after as a buffer zone not at all like the present time when it is the hydrocarbon resource like oil and natural gas that attract outside powers (Mohapatra 2016:619). At first, Russia supported the American led anti-terrorism operation; however it understood that the American led anti-terrorism activity was just geopolitical. To build co-activity and incorporation, Russia has demonstrated its keenness to resolve the differences with the Caspian Sea littoral states over the division of the resources. Kazakhstan and Russia have consented to separate the Caspian Sea in such a way that both the sides should profit (Despande 2015:54). This agreement which occurred in May 2002 when the Kazakhstan's leader Nazarbayev visited Moscow. The agreement additionally stipulated that Moscow and Astana divide the Kurmangazy, Tsentrnlray and Khvalynekoye oil fields on an equal basis. (Despande 2015).

Russia regards the security of the Russians living outside the country as a top priority. One reason why the Central Asian states give top priority to relations with Moscow is their economic dependence on Russia. The efforts of the regional leaders prompted the formation of Central Asian Common Market in 1993. Moscow also showed its commitment regarding the formation of an economic structure between Russia and the five Central Asian Nations. In the late 1990's Russia had shown a sharp desire to look for nearer reconciliation with Central Asian states as a result of certain geo-strategic developments (Mohanty 2016:135).

Accordingly by Chenoy, (2010), "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) eastward development has made Russia's western border vulnerable. As such its security relies upon the strategic depth that can be given by the "Near Abroad". Under no situation would Russia like to have a vulnerable southern and eastern border. In any case, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Center has given the NATO Russia relations another direction". In spite of the fact that the NATO and Russia's connection has seen numerous highs and lows, this time it was different. However, despite immediate cooperation, the long-term presence of NATO on Russia's eastern and Southern flanks was not to Russia's advantage. While fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Russia did not want long-term presence of the U.S. in Central Asia.

At the point when Taliban became successful in Afghanistan, its destabilizing impacts were felt in Central Asia and the Caucasus nations. The security of the Central Asian nations became essential for the territorial integrity of Russia. As such, Russia took active interest in promoting closer integration between the Central Asian nations, advancing security as well as economic integration among the CIS nations as well. In October 2000, in Astana in Kazakhstan, the leaders of five countries viz. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus which made up the CIS Custom Union changed the name of their group to Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) (Mohanty 2016).

The members of the EEC pledged to form a common foreign trade border and foreign monetary policy and to collectively regulate the export import tariff. On 11th October, 2000, the presidents of the six states of the CIS Collective Security Arrangement met in Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek to talk about expanding the military and political coordination among them. They also talked about the possibility of forming a regional armed force. Under Putin, Russia is enhancing and uniting its actions with Central

Asia. It has made its presence felt in the Central Asian states in a robust way (Mohanty 2016:154). The idea of National Security of the Russian Federation which was adopted on 19th January 2000 shows how much significance Russia attaches to Central Asia. It is imperative that Russia appends significance to the Central Asian states as well as to all the former Soviet Republics which are referred to as 'Near Abroad'. Russia expects to deal with the current issues and furthermore keep track of the emergence of new issue. Under Putin, the Russian policy with the 'Near Abroad' Nations has turned out to be more confident; in this context it is relevant to note that Russia had written up the energy debts of Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (Phool Badan 2001:58). The Customs Union was elevated to European Economic Community. Visa free travel was given to those states which were willing to collaborate. A military exercise named Commonwealth Southern Shield was held on an extensive scale in 2000 in the mountains of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in which the troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan participated. By different strategies, Russia showed that it has resolved to ensure stability in the Central Asian nations (Buzan 2004:75). While formulating the strategy for Central Asian nations because of the current circumstance of economic, political and military weakness, however, Russia is not able to impose its will completely on the new republics. But Russian compulsion to play a main part in this region is because of its ethnic, political and geo-strategic concerns. Formulating the foreign policy for Central Asian nations became easier task for Russia because of its problems with the West and expanding nationalist sentiment, the significant loss of 'Westerners' or the 'Atlanticis' in 1993-1994, made other new schools of foreign policy like the Eurasianists, the 'geo-politicians' and the 'nationalist' gain prominence and upper hand (Phool Badan,2001:55). It creates the impression that the nation's policy making foundation, in the pursuit of perceived national interests, is continually combining the differing perspectives among the Russian political class and strategic groups. Under Putin Russian policy in Central Asia turned out to be significantly more self-assured.

Putin advanced another foreign policy doctrine, which argued for reinforcing Russian relationship with Central Asia states. Putin tried to seek adopt a more consistence procedure in building political and economic linkages amongst Russia and Central Asia that can advance more extensive geo-political goals. In 2000, for example, Russia consented to a bilateral military agreement under the provision of which Russia would supply military equipment to Kyrgyzstan at less expensive rate. It is the

basic standard of Russian foreign policy objective towards the Central Asian states to combine political, economic and defense ties (Marantz 2004:182).

Russia's Geo-Political Interest in Central Asia

Russia's relations with Central Asia are older than the birth of Soviet power in 1917. Together with Russia, the Central Asian region was part of a single state system for almost three quarter of century. The economic and cultural ties were considerably more intense. Russia's relations with the 'Near Abroad' have a history extending over a millennium. Russia and Central Asian Republics share certain qualities, which is basic for maintain relations. Every one of them is multi ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious state. They are trying to advance 'Unity and Diversity'. Different issues require cooperation with Russia to manage Central Asian nation building viz., ethnic issue, to guarantee wellbeing for ten million ethnic Russians who are dwelling in Central Asian countries. On the economic front, the Central Asian states are less developed in their economic development and require Russian support (Meena 2001:32).

The prime concern of Russia in the region is to develop infrastructure and extend its market. The geo-strategic area of Central Asia is essential for Russia with regards to its Asiatic outreach especially and in view of United States military presence in the region (Weitz 2010:22). In this 'Great Game' situation, political and security dynamics in Central Asia keep on remaining inseparably connected to the attitude of Russia. During Yeltsin time, Central Asian states experienced uncertain circumstances where Russia was both a guarantor and a threat to their security (Marantz 1999). Putin's foreign policy reflect a two-pronged approach, where in Russia continuously shows outward help for 'democratic values' yet additionally does endeavour to reestablish its global status and create a substitute to the U.S-led 'New World Order'. The main thrust behind making an alternative order won't be ideological or religious but based on the solidarity of shared objective (Dark 2004:42).

China's Position in the Great Game

Because of its topographical area China shares its borders with three Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is not only essential for China to

maintain a peaceful geostrategic area with Central Asian States but it is necessity for Chinese economic development to access markets in all Central Asian nations and sell its merchandise. China is particularly investing in Central Asian markets especially in the energy assets (Mishra 2001:36).

In the diplomatic sense, China's future course will be the most significant strategic challenge to Asian security. China has all the hallmarks of possible move toward two different extremes, either it will fall to democratic instability or it will develop as a major power through successful economic changes. As stated by Mahavir Singh, (2000), "A considerable number of issues are managed by the US and China bilaterally as if the interests of Asian states did not exist. The decrease in Russian power has enhanced China's security position, as well as offered a "breathing space" to review its military program. Chinese planner from the beginning has been contemplating how to benefit, in any event for the time being, from the Soviet disintegration. On the Central Asian front, the rise of a few new neighbors in its vulnerable north west was a matter of concern to the Chinese". Their nervousness was intensified by the expanding insecurity in Central Asia, especially following the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan and ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan's Farghana valley. A generally stable area during the Soviet rule, China's main concern in Central Asia was the ascent of Islamic Ideology filling in the vacuum left by the Soviet retreat.

As Gidadhubli (1999) stated, "From 1992 onwards, China has been organizing trade fair in Urumuchi and different towns in Xinjiang for promoting trade and economic ties with the neighboring states. Beijing has revived the old "Great Silk Route" and utilized the analogy to open up China's northern land border for coordinated connections with Europe and the Middle East via Central Asia. Various Eurasian rail and pipeline structures are being arranged which will guarantee a long term role for China in Central Asia. The opening up of trans-Eurasian railways through Central Asia in 1990 and the connecting of Almaty and Urumuchi by Railway line in 1992 have brought about astonishing changes in Sino-Central Asian border region".

China's Policy initiative towards Central Asia

Accordingly Singh in 2000, "in spite of its extended engagement in the region compared to the Soviet period, China's enthusiasm for Central Asia must be put into

perspective. Central Asia does not lie at the cutting edge of China's main international, economic, and security concerns. Generally, and even more so in recent years, China's self-confident proclamations and activities have concentrated on more basic zones of interests, specifically the relation with the United States, Sino-Japanese relations, relations with Taiwan, strains in the Korean landmass, and relations with India. The view that China has pernicious intentions in Central Asia and is seeking to force geopolitical changes for extensive control and predominance over the region is excessively exaggerated. China has neither the capacity nor the aim to be Central Asia's hegemony". What there is, however, an intersection of the considerable number of engagements of multifarious actors, which, regardless of what Beijing needs or doesn't need, implies that China is regardless the most consequential actor in the region" Others have argued that China's moves towards Central Asia might give an idea of Beijing's larger strategic push beyond the country's borders, in search of a lot of natural resources coming in and a great deal of trade going out (Gidadhubl, 1999).

In any case, the absence of a grand plan does not mean that China's external strategy in Central Asia is neither practical nor vital, nor does it have any geopolitical connotations. There are a number of realistic issues and interests related to the relations between China and Central Asia. Researchers and experts who consider China's commitment to Central Asia in general do not agree with the main factor, especially if the economic problems, especially the extraction of natural resources, or internal security problems, that is the question of Xinjiang are the main priority (Roy 2014: 92). What is clear is that both interests have an immediate relationship with China's internal problems and are predictable. After decades of high rates of growth, urbanization and social adjustment inward, with only 1% of the world's oil reserves, China needs sustainable energy sources. The countries of Central Asia, particularly those with huge reserves of hydrocarbons and mineral deposits, have grown to become China's main destination. Given their geographical proximity and opportunity, they also provide safe energy supplies, which reduce Beijing's dependence on shipping routes (Roy 2014).

Accordingly Omelicheva, (2011), "In any case, China's Central Asia strategy rises above only undertakings for resources. As confirmed in the 2011 White Paper on China's Peaceful Development, the central objective of China's strategy is to make a peaceful and steady global condition for its rise. In the meantime, through promoting

economic development, China also intends to stabilize the Central Asian states, which are significant for the security of the region, including the Chinese region of Xinjiang that borders former Soviet Central Asia. There is an innate connection associating China's moves in Central Asia to the Uyghur question. China needs the region to develop because the underdevelopment, instability and conflict imaginable could spread and undermine its efforts to connect Xinjiang more closely with the rest of China. It also needs its neighbors in Central Asia, who have the largest Uyghur population in any state other than China, to participate more actively in the fight against Uyghur separatism. All the riots in Kyrgyzstan, which has a 1,000 kilometer border with China, and in the Fergana Valley, which stretches across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, run the risk of disrupting trade, supplying power, but it could also threaten its internal stability in Xinjiang" (Omelicheva 2011:182).

The five Shanghai forums were the most important training that promoted China's strategic initiative for the Central Asian region. The forum brought together China, Russia and the three Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This process was defined at its first summit in Shanghai in April 1996. The essential motivation for its formation was indecisive borders and heterogeneous ethnic groups being the main obstacle to peace and development. The establishment of the border with China was particularly imperative for the construction of the nation among these new states of Central Asia. In this context, Robyn (2000) stated that, "the diplomatic front, China has adopted a reasonable policy after the independence of the Central Asian states together with ten other republics of the former Soviet Union. In January 1992, China signed separate communiqués on the establishment of diplomatic relations with five Central Asian states. China has been sufficiently reasonable to get the Central Asian support for China's regional stature and also its 'One China Policy' as a precondition for political outreach". For the countries of Central Asia, it is China's military and economic growth that is generating interest and concern. Accordingly Mishra, (2001), "It is principally these two basic components of national strength that have been absent in Central Asia's nation building activity; and it is the absence of these essentials that has been responsible for attracting so much external attention and obstruction, which has both negative and positive implications. To specify a positive case, while the Central Asian regions look forward to China for use of its market and entrepreneurial abilities, China remains attracted towards Central Asian region's rich sources of hydrocarbons like petroleum, natural gas and

also other minerals and metals, access to which is vital for China's fast industrial development" (Mishra 2001:15).

America's Interest in the Great Game

After the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 United States had set up, what appeared like a permanent military presence in Afghanistan and had set up bases in two Central Asian republics of Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. The politics of oil initially was the thrust of American foreign policy objective. American enthusiasm for the Central Asian republics had been enacted not long after the disintegration of the Soviet Union with the Central Intelligence Agency and USAID being among the first to translate this enthusiasm into programmatic action. Later the United States developed important stakes in Central Asia and in the periphery region which will demand continued American influence and conceivably a physical presence for the future (Cummings 2003:20).

The strategic concerns for USA is the importance of creating fresh markets for American products and services, and the need to prevent the supremacy of probable rivals China and Russia. Accordingly Chintamani Mohapatra, (2016), "The other essential interests of the United States apply; first, to what can be called an open door or equivalent access to U.S. firms for energy extraction, refinement, and exports. Central Asia's enormous energy holding were traditionally controlled by Russia due to the lack of pipelines. Alternative oil and gas routes were needed for successful economic and foreign policy independence. Hence energy contracts on equal terms to American and other Western firms were identified with the larger target of conservation of these states independence, strategic autonomy, and prospects for secure development" (Mohapatra 2016:628).

Accordingly the U.S. Energy Report, (2016), "strategy has been to advance the development of several pipelines and various connects to outside buyers and suppliers of energy, including, more in recent times, electricity, to Afghanistan and beyond. The Central Asian energy producing states identify that their safety measures and development lie in expansion of pipelines, so U.S. and Central Asian interests are in synchronization on this. Washington has looked to lessen dependence on Russian pipeline or Moscow's overall control in the oil markets with considerable achievement, while it has had substantially less accomplishment in the natural gas

sector. In the meantime, America has sought to separate Iran from Central Asian energy by building pipelines that bypass Iran and enforcing sanctions upon those states and firms who are dealing with Iran” (US Energy Report, 2016).

Accordingly Anuradha Chenoy, (2007), “The example of pipelines bypassing Iran and Russia are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline where the Unified States long has encouraged Kazakhstan to go along with it and to contribute to the building of a pipeline under the Caspian Sea. The projected Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) line, which could conceivably be thorough Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, then again is a potential pipeline utilizing recently discovered sizable Turkmen energy resources to the Subcontinent; and the current effort to interface Central Asian and South Asian power systems. To be sure, U.S. and Western firms have been comparatively effective in accessing Kazakhstan’s oil fields by securing contracts for extraction or refinery, and marketing. Taking everything into account, Washington has a major interest in influencing domestic policies in all these five former Soviet republics and Afghanistan to orient them after some time to democratization, open markets, open society, good governance, and eventually therefore to their enduring security against both internal and external challengers” (Patnaik and Chenoy 2007:82-83).

Threats of Geopolitical Competition

In this context expressed by Nalin Mohapatra (2015), “The prospect of integration of the CIS was under extraordinary pressure as the Caspian energy attracted external forces in the mid-1990s and the geopolitics of the Caspian region changed. The American association in the Caspian region, which some consider began the ‘New Great Game’, has complicated the regional situation by aggravating intraregional divisions. Competition for the control of Caspian energy resources and the geopolitics surrounding it have rendered the Caspian Sea region less stable than it was at the time of Soviet disintegration. This competition resulted in rival regional security groups, external military presence arms race and others” (Mohapatra 2015: 62-64).

As a result, Robyn (2000), “stated that the control over local administrations and the change of regimes, if any, are methods used to promote the geopolitical aspirations of external forces and Some Caspian states, such as Russia and Iran, consider that US activities in the region are an important aspect of the ‘containment’ policy that aims to

limit as far as possible the economic benefits of the Caspian Sea resources to them. The contribution of external powers has complicated inter-state disputes, and internal dispute resolution made much more difficult, spending on defense and acquisition of weapons has increased in many ways, despite the fact that the region is confronted with problematic circumstances". The Russian-American cooperation at the beginning of the American campaign in Afghanistan was really tested when the Caucasus and its surroundings moved to the American political geological orbit. "The CIS, which was a multilateral structure to economic and security cooperation between Member States, was weakened by the inclinations among some states for integration. This led to regional groupings seeking military alliances outside the structure. Such situations increase the risk of instability between and within the CIS States" (Cummings 2003: 22).

In this context, Omelicheva (2011) stated that, "While Central Asia has remained generally stable despite the presence of foreign troops and bases; the situation in the Caucasus is more unstable. There are hostilities between states and relations of some of them with Russia became uncomfortable because of the West's policy since the energy of the Caspian Sea and the containment of Russia remain the central point of the Western geopolitical objective. This would have a serious impact on the entire CIS area. The unstable circumstances within a nation or between states of a same region may overspill towards neighboring countries. The conflicts in the Caucasus have affected a wider region including other Slavic states, the Caucasus and Central Asia". Our argument is that "For example the conflict between Azerbaijan and the Armenia led to difficulties in former's relation with Russia, which created the conditions for the formation of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), which also complicated Russia's relations with Ukraine and Georgia". The strong pro-US orientation of Uzbekistan between 1999 and 2005, including its incorporation into GUAM, led some of its neighbors to seek deeper reconciliation with Russia. As a result, even non-Caspian states have been drawn into the geopolitics of the Caspian Sea and any resulting instability" (Omelicheva 2011:25).

Turkey and the Geopolitics of Caspian Oil

Regarding Turkish strategy towards the Caspian region and its hydrocarbon resources, different and even contradictory prepositions have been displayed by Turkish,

Western and Central Asian researchers. As stated on Laumulin, (2008), “However, the energy security constitutes one of the critical parts for economic growth; Turkey has turned into a potential market for oil and gas of the Caspian region and Russia. Its energy demand has been progressing quickly and will proceed in future too. Turkey was assessed to import around 28 million tons of crude oil in 2001 and more than 40 million tons by 2011. The increase in the interest for natural gas is all the more striking. It was projected to ascend from 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2000 to more than 30-40 bcm in 2013” (Laumulin, 2008). Our argument is that “At present, Turkey depends upon imports roughly 62.6 percent of its energy needs. The significant sources of supplies of crude oil for Turkey’s domestic utilization are the Persian Gulf nations and Libya, and the major supplier of natural gas is Russia. This pattern has pushed Turkey to expand its energy supply source and to regard the Central Asian and Caucasus states as important energy partners”.

In any case, Turkey has encountered solid rivalry from other regional powers for the transportation of Caspian oil. In this specific situation, Turkey has adopted an approach which is additionally influenced by environment concerns and political considerations. However, apart from various existing pipelines to transport Caspian energy, Turkey supported efforts to build a pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan known as Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline (Khan 2016:96). Turkey energetically promoted the BTC venture, which will maintain a strategic distance from all transports via sea through the Black Sea and the Turkish straits. The United States interests lie in isolating both Iran and Russia. The United States views the BTC oil pipeline route as an essential factor in the long term geopolitical orientation of the region. Aside from financial advantages and extensive amounts of the oil transiting through the BTC pipeline, Turkey does not have any desire to antagonize Russia; Moscow is Turkey’s major economic partner and its most essential energy provider (ibid).

Iran’s Policy towards Central Asia: Regional and Geopolitical Dimension

Iran’s strategy towards Central Asian republics is influenced by regional and domestic determinants that include Russian-Iranian relations; the geopolitical role of Islam; the steady US military presence particularly after 9/11 and Iran’s centrality and its location on the Persian Gulf in deciding transportation of Central Asian-Caspian

hydrocarbon resources. In addition, the first Gulf War had forced Iran to assume a regional hegemonic role in the Persian Gulf (Roy 2014:99).

The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Republicans in Central Asia have not only relieved Tehran of the military presence of a superpower and the ideological challenges of Marxism, but have also increased its ideological impact and created cooperation of Cultural, ethno-linguistic and to frame regional economic groups. As a vital market for consumer merchandise made in Iran, hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia gave extra economic reasons to intensify connection between the Central Asian republic and Iran (Khan 2016:93). As stated on Alam, (2008), “To advance its interests while adjusting to the regional powers in Central Asia, Iran has embraced a policy not to alienate Moscow. Russia has been and will keep on being a source for purchasing arms and technology as well as economic and trade cooperation for Iran. Even after Washington’s serious concerns over transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, Russia has given high priority to the bilateral relations and also Russia-Iranian nuclear cooperation has been the most important for Tehran” (Alam, 2008).

To present the image of a self-confident country with an independent foreign policy and to make Iran a leading partner in the expansion of NATO into Central Asia, Moscow has decided to deepen its bilateral relations with Iran. In addition, following the militarization of Western Asia and Central Asia as a result of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the disturbing ramifications of NATO activities in the region, Iran gained the status of a strategic partner and an important political place and foreign policy Russia. Though Central Asian republics with Russian and Chinese help have attempted effectively to secure themselves from nuclear threats and make an atomic free zone, the continuous Iranian nuclear programme and its nuclear weapons delivery system in the near future will be a major risk for Central Asian regional security accordingly to one Kazakh Scholar (Laumulin 2016:102).

Iran and the Caspian Pipeline Diplomacy

Iran’s strategic location in Eurasia as a continental bridge has gained extraordinary significance for transportation of Central Asian and Caspian hydrocarbon resources. Iran has effectively actualized a few transportation ventures that are not exclusively

limited to transportation of Caspian oil but also to facilitate exchanges of raw materials and finished products between West, Central and South Asia. Iran has additionally taken initiatives towards regional cooperation and development of the New Silk Route.

Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as of now take an interest in so-called oil swap deal by which Iran imports their oil for domestic use while pitching equal measures of Iranian oil to the world market on their behalf. In any case, Iran's role in the transportation of Caspian hydrocarbon resources has been limited by deteriorating bilateral relations amongst Tehran and Washington. After the discovery of the enormous untapped hydrocarbon resources, Central Asian-Caspian region has turned into an oil and gas frontier for the United States (Roy 2014:96). Washington put solid pressure on both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to bypass Iran for a pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Washington perceived Tehran as a 'Rogue State' and has forced various measures to change Tehran's domestic and foreign policies, while additionally focusing on the Iranian oil sector. Nonetheless, worried about Iran's strategic location as a energy gatekeeper in the Caspian basin, the US government has effectively campaigned and unequivocally advanced the east-west pipeline from Baku-Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (Khan 2016:109).

By countering the role of Russia and Iran in Caspian energy projects, the US is making another geopolitical signal as a strategic counterbalance to China and Russia. However, with regard to geopolitics, Russian political elites recognize that the presence of Western oil companies in Central Asian-Caspian region and the US led war against terrorism have attracted the long term political and military presence of the US in these regions. US military and commercial ties with the greater part of the Central Asian-Caucasus republics in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and in the coalition against international terrorism, including the US supported Train-and Equip programme for improving the Georgian military counter-terrorism capacities, and the US military presence in the two regions, strengthened Russian fear that the US presence will substantially decrease Russia's influence over this strategically important area. As a result, Russia exerts significant pressure on the oil and natural gas producing countries of the Caspian basin to use only Russian energy transport routes (Alam 2016:87-88).

Iran and US military Security Strategies in Central Asia and Caucasus Region

Under the pretext of military activity in Afghanistan, the United States has built innumerable bases in and around the Central Asian and Caspian region. The extension of the US military presence and the likelihood of their long-term presence have not only added a new dimension to the geopolitics of Central Asia; He also greatly influenced Iran's strategies in the region. The presence of the United States in Central Asia has been defended to strengthen the regional financial perspectives, contain the risk of Islamic extremism; stop the development of terrorism and support democratic reforms in the region. But Iran sees these as indications of American expansionism (Kushik 1999:13).

Iran and Russia did not oppose US military efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. However, both countries are concerned about the threat posed by US armed forces near their borders, which would affect the political situation in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf in the long term. The profile of the United States in the region has expanded since the overthrow of the Taliban regime. In addition, the US choice to help Azerbaijan to get better its maritime capability to protect its oceanic border has threatened Iranian positions in the Caspian area. This move also threatens maritime security in the Caspian Sea region and its increasing militarization. In addition, the proposed creation of 'Special Operation Forces' in Georgia has nothing to do with fighting Al-Qaeda terrorists around the world. In fact the US 'Special Operation Forces' would help to enforce a Washington pipeline strategy pointed at neutralizing Iran and Russian impact in oil-rich Central Asia and Caucasus region (Scott 2002:18-19).

The expulsion of the Taliban regimes from Afghanistan and Saddam Hussian from Iraq after US-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' and 'Operation Iraqi Freedom', have positive impacts for Iran. To some extent, Iran is feeling alleviated by the ouster of intensely hostile regimes against Iranian and against Shia population. Nevertheless, the US military activities both in Central Asia and Gulf area have by implication undermined the security of Iran. After its inclusion in the 'Axis of Evil' by President George W. Bush, Iran progressively felt being circled and threat of US military aggression. Be that as it may, preceding 'Operation Enduring Freedom', the US military was not a long way from Iranian border. The presence of US Naval forces in the Persian Gulf, its army bases in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations, and US air

base on the Turkish Mediterranean Sea was not an immediate security threat toward the Eastern or Northern part of Iran. But ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ totally changed that perception. Presently Afghanistan has turned into a de facto US protectorate (Aneja 2002:21-22).

Other than US power positioning at Bagram and Kandahar bases of Afghanistan, Pakistan has facilitated US troops in the area of Baluchistan, near the border of Iran. Kyrgyzstan had in 2001 allowed a US air base. Azerbaijan and Georgia are accepting US military help and training forces. Besides, after ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ the security perimeter of Iran has been finished. Presently US power has adequately encompassed Iran (Scott 2002:42). To counter US military threats in the present geopolitical context, Iranian policymakers planned a strategy to build Tehran’s profile in Central Asia that has been hostage to a mix of protective alert and constrained control of the United States. Tehran likewise has been attempting to build up its strategic relations with Tajikistan and is also trying to build bridges with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, to get an expansive offer of oil contract in the ‘Caspian Sea’ (Kushik 1999).

Central Asia and India’s Energy Strategy

Since the beginning of the 21st century, which confirms its rise as an economic power, India is ready to embark on political and economic projects abroad. Observers have indicated that India is competing with China in the search for external energy security. By strengthening its links with resource-rich countries, India wants to improve its energy security. Therefore, Indian oil and gas companies are invited to invest abroad and develop close relations with the countries involved. Pushing the companies upstream, India has embarked on the participation of energy in some countries, including a ‘strategic energy partnership’ with Saudi Arabia. India is obviously looking for ‘specialized markets’ that have so far been inaccessible to Indian oil companies.

As stated by Amiya Chandra (2015), “India’s significant state owned oil company is ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation), which has an international backup, ONGC Videsh ltd. (OVL).ONGC accounts for 77 percent of India’s crude oil and 81 percent of its natural gas production, and is right now the most profit making company in the nation. During the last few years, India’s public sector oil companies, for example, ONGC and IOC (International Oil Company) have made effective bids in oil

exploration and production in various nations, including Australia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Ivory Coast, Libya, Burma, Syria and Central Asia". Since it started its forays abroad in 2001, ONGC has procured by 2006 interests in no less than 14 oil and gas projects in eleven nations around the globe. As the report on OPEC (2006), "The biggest stakes so far are the company's 25 percent share of the more noteworthy Nile Oil Venture in Sudan in which CNPC of China is the major stakeholder, and ONGC 20 percent share of the Sakhalin 1 project in Russia led by Exxon Mobil Company. In December 2005, OVL finished a 741 km multi-product pipeline connecting Khartoum refinery to Port Sudan. Among OVL's exploration stakes are a 100 percent share of Iraqi Block 8, a 100 percent offer of Qatar's Najwat Najem, a 70 percent share of Egyptian North Ramadan and a 49 percent share of Libyan NC 188 and 189. This record appears to be amazing, yet as per a Reuters report, ONGC has only obtained minority shares in ventures like Sakhalin 1, Iran's Yadavaran oilfield and Sudanese properties relinquished by Western financial investors, and thus the organization presently can't seem to play a lead role in any concession". As on expressed "The ONGC must boost its reserve-to-production proportion or the quantity of years its reserves will last with the present level of output by enhancing its drilling technology and administration practices" (OPEC Report,2006).

Accordingly Mahalingam (2004) stated, "With a specific goal to help meet its growing demand for gas imports India has additionally obtained overseas gas resources in Vietnam and Burma.OVL as of now holds a 45 percent share in the Vietnamese block 6.1 (where Vietnam state oil company used to have a share), which produces 7.5 million standard cubic meters of gas every day. Together with Korean companies, Daewoo international and KOGAS, the Indian companies OVL and GAIL (Gas Authority of India Limited) are additionally partners in the Burmese offshore gas field".As on stated that, "The OVL has further been consulting with Russia's Gazprom over a string of major oil and gas bargains, including the production and sharing of gas, and also petrochemicals and oil. The two companies have signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly develop energy projects in India, Russia and different countries. One of the arranged tasks includes gas extraction in the Russian Sakhalin field and building LNG facilities on the pacific coast" (Mahalingam 2004:111-112).

In the contemporary situation, India is hopeful about a strong involvement with the Central Asian republics in the energy sector. This confidence additionally comes from

the way that India has a big potential for enhancing its energy proficiency which is a promising zone for technological cooperation with the CAR's. Some Indian and outside analysts and researcher have proposed that steps need be taken to moderate the ascent of oil and gas in energy utilization in India, particularly encourage the development of alternative energy. Accordingly Amiya Chandra (2015) stated, "This is countered by others since per capita energy utilization, in fact, is substantially higher in the mature economies of North America, Europe and Japan than in India. However, in recent years the growing concern for energy security and rising oil prices has prompted a much expanded discussion on the significance of energy efficiency among Indians, which is subsequently viewed as a key measure for improving energy security and developing cooperation in this field with the outside world".

Given the growing internal energy demand and unstable circumstance in the world energy sector caused by 'The Iranian Crises' and high costs for hydrocarbons, India is seeking to develop close cooperation with the biggest Asian providers of hydrocarbon resources. Toward this path, India has started various large scale ventures for advancing cooperative activity with concerned states in the oil-and-gas sphere. In this regard, construction of two proposed of pipelines, i.e., Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) are under consideration. Be that as it may, the issue of Afghan crises and its elusive settlement remain an obstacle for the progress of the TAPI project. The second one, the IPI, additionally creates a chance of energy transportation from Central Asia through Iran and Pakistan. This project is more favorable from the economic perspective. Yet, because of the drawn out Iranian crises that has generated concerns with respect to completing this projects in the near future, the TAPI project remains a mere reasonable objective to be sought after in the Indian energy policy (Saipov 2013:96-97).

The difficulty of Central Asian regional security planning

Despite their impact on the region, Russia and China could face turmoil to ensure security in Central Asia. "First, one of the main weaknesses of the CSTO is that it can't be described as a global multilateral organization in the field of regional security, since Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are two of the countries bordering Afghanistan. ; Tashkent retired from the organization for the second time in 2012. Secondly, the two regional security organizations, CSTO and SCO, expressed their

reluctance to mediate during the internal crisis in Central Asia in 2010” (Osh, 2010). Accordingly Gretskey (2011) stated, “During the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, both organizations justified their military inaction due to the absence of a foreign hostility. Both CSTO and SCO were not designed to manage internal security issues or conflicts between member-states, but to fight against external threats or threats originating from Afghanistan. The CSTO and SCO charters list among their objectives fortifying regional security and stability through joint exercises (Articles 3 and 8 of CSTO’s charter) and joint operations against terrorism, separatism and extremism in every one of their documents (Article 1 of SCO’s Charter)” (Gretskey 2011:55).

Thirdly, SCO limitedly affects security issues since individual members did not attempt concrete shared activities, unlike the CSTO (for example, CSTO undertakes collective counter narcotics operations or joint border controls) and SCO has never been occupied with basic military activities. As stated on Peyrouse, (2011) “For this reasons, SCO is characterized as a ‘paper tiger’ in security issues, even on the grounds that Russia plans to benefit its own security organization, while China might want to build up the SCO as the primary instrument of its economic engagement in the region, restricting its security dimension to the fight against the ‘Three Evils’. According Western commentators, integration of Crimea into Russia and the hostility with Ukraine have vigorously harmed Russia’s image in Central Asia, spreading genuine concerns about Russian integration projects in the security (CSTO) and political-economic fields (Common Economic Space and Eurasian Economic Union). Moscow’s aim to ensure the safety of Russian-speaking population in the post-Soviet space is perceived as a looming threat for the five Central Asian states, which are home to sizable communities of ethnic Russians” (Peyrouse 2011:25). Accordingly Sharip (2012), “The measures of cultural and administrative segregation in Turkmenistan against Russians could offer a pretext to Moscow for intervention, also allowing Russia to push back Turkmen’s projects of energy supply to European markets. Ukraine, Kazakhstan shares long border with Russia, with large ethnic Russian minorities (22 percent of the population)”. Also, Putin’s claim that “pro-Russian troops in Crimea were just securing Russian military facilities is perceived as an incumbent threat for Central Asian republics, for example, for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which have Russian and CSTO military bases in Kazakhstan, which has the Baikonur Cosmodrome. However, these concerns do not really prevent most Central

Asian states in moving closer to Russia or to Russia-led regional organization” (Sharip 2012:08).

Efforts for Promote the Regional Security in Central Asia

In this context, According by Moldaliev, (2007) “The difficulties for regional security in Central Asia necessitated cooperation among the Central Asian nations to create cooperation among them. Neighboring Afghanistan and the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan have become the main concern of the region. Another concern related to the disputed borders, which was formally taken into account in the 1991 Almaty Declaration, was that the borders of the former administration within the Soviet Union are sacred and cannot be changed. As a result, states in the region have envisioned a cooperative security dynamic to ensure the security of their countries” (Moldaliev 2007: 260).

As stated by Moldaliev, (2007) “The authorities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan discussed the situation in the region and in 1994 established the Central Asian Union (CAU) to encourage cooperation among Central Asian states. In July 1998, the Central Asian Union was renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). With the accession of Tajikistan to created strengthen the intraregional trade, the CAEC quickly began working on security and military cooperation”. In December 1995, the Joint Defense Council (JDC) was established following “the CAEC decision to deal with regional cooperation in the area of security and defense, including the coordination of air defense, military exercises and others, and participation was also discussed in the NATO PfP program was also discussed. In the same year, Centrasbat, a peacekeeping battalion established in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, was established” (Moldaliev 2007: 27).

The incursion of the extremist Islamist groups, especially the IMU in 1999 in southern Kyrgyzstan, posed a threat to common security. Foreign Ministers and National Security Officers of CAEC agreed that, “Terrorism is the international and global threat as also to all regions. In April 2000, the Presidents of Central Asian States signed an agreement on the fight against terrorism, extremism and cross-border crime”. As a result, in 2000, “The IMU’s incursion into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan helped to consolidate the CAEC. At the Bishkek meeting in August, leaders of the four countries asked Russia to join the anti-terror agreement (Toktogulov 2007: 30).

As a result, the CAEC began to develop close ties with the CIS Collective Security Council to fight terrorism and began acting more independently, albeit in partnership with Russia and the CIS”.

Accordingly Moldaliev (2007) stated, “The prevention of drug trafficking and its effects on the economy were also discussed by the CAEC member states, known as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) in 2001. Due to the lack of information on the link between trafficking, corruption and national economies, this question was left only on paper. CACO initially replaced CAEC to operate in a single security zone in Central Asia and to ensure security in the region. However, the result was discouraging and was perceived as a tool for the control of the entire region by Uzbekistan, which was perceived as a potential hegemonic power by other Central Asian states” (Moldaliev 2007:73).

As stated by Diamont and Jackson, “The inclusion of Central Asian leaders in the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ZCANWF) in 2002 has become a milestone in the world of disarmament and arms control launched by Uzbekistan on February 28, 1997. In the Almaty Declaration, the leaders of three states declared their goal of supporting this enterprise. The ‘6 + 2’ group of neighbors and friends was created by the Uzbekistan’s activity in 1997 to address the Afghan problem as Central Asian governments perceived the instability and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as an immediate risk to their national values (Jackson 2005: 182). The group included six countries bordering Afghanistan, the United States and Russia as additional members. At the Tashkent meeting in 1999, the group signed key principles for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Afghanistan. In February 2000, it requested the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to take steps to reduce illicit drug trafficking from Afghanistan, and on 13 September 2000, 6 + 2 group approved in New York a regional plan of action to prevent drug trafficking from Afghanistan. However, despite the group’s efforts, it was not very effective in resolving the Afghan conflict and reducing drug trafficking from Afghanistan” (Diamont and Jackson 2005: 56).

As stated on Toktogulov (2007), “Central Asian countries, in particular Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have worked together to establish regional security frameworks in the region. As a result of the civil war that continued between 1992 and 1997, Tajikistan could no longer be interested in these agreements before the signing of the peace agreement in 1997 by two opposing parties and the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General of United Nations. However, due to inconsistent of interests, low levels of trust and tensions between Central Asian states, they have not been able to cooperate effectively” (Toktogulov 2007: 32).

Summary of this Chapter

This Chapter analyzed the geopolitical and territorial security challenges and the development of energy diplomacy for more export routs. The Russian route will not be adequate, though it will stay an important dimension. However the republic will enhance their energy transport capacities to China, US, the EU and the South Asian states. After the Gulf nations Central Asian region is one of the biggest producers of oil and gas including in the post-Soviet domains, China and South Asian States. Many efforts have been made by the Central Asian republics to overcome their small population and limited market and rise as suitable financial investments destination. They have endeavored to accomplish improvement in transportation connectivity’s by outside participation and through creating regional level organizations as well as collaborating in global endeavors driven by the EU and the United States to interface landlocked nations of Eurasia with the more extensive world. In the security sphere CSTO has emerged as an important organization in the region.

This chapter discusses the issues of Central Asian states and their push to advance security in the region. “The accomplishment of a regional security entirely relies upon a key precondition that requires contribution of Central Asian countries to the process, by sharing political and military duties with a specific goal to deal with and tackle the current security threats. The disappointment of the endeavors to meet the challenges from Afghanistan reiterates the common need of all Central Asian states to coordinate activities and security cooperation, overcoming regional rivalries and distrust among leaders which have hampered the elaboration of a Central Asian approach to deal with the regional security. The advancement of a cross-breed structure of security participation including NATO, CSTO and SCO could possibly herald an important advance so as to construct new regional security architecture”. Multilateral organizations with relevant interests in the region could cooperate to accomplish the common objective to counteract insecurity in the region. The next Section will be devoted to CSTO’s role in Central Asian region and its activities in guaranteeing security of its member states.

CHAPTER-3

CSTO AND CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY

Chapter-3

CSTO and Central Asian Security

Aims and Objectives of this Chapter

This chapter tries to look at the security worries in the Central Asian states. It is an expansive idea with various dimensions like traditional and non-traditional security threats in this region. It would be analysed in this chapter from different dimensions. The chapter focuses on Russia, CSTO and its member states also. Positive and negative aspect of CSTO and the prospects of Central Asian security concerns through the CSTO are explained. The argument is that the CSTO is an ineffective and dynamic key functional organization as a security provider in the Central Asian region. Russia is the leading partner in the CSTO and has invested in a multiplicity of resources to address the security concerns of the Eurasian States.

Introduction

The Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) on 15 May 1992, less than a year after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. “The signatories were six Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The number of member states expanded to nine when Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus additionally joined the arrangement. The Treaty went into force on 20 April 1994 for a period of 5 years with a conceivable extension. It was recognized by the United Nations on 1 November 1995” (Saat 2005:22).

Accordingly to Jonson, “At first look it might create the impression that a large number of Former Soviet Republics, not long after receiving their independence marked an arrangement, which bind reinforced them yet again in the essential field of security. However, despite the treaty the recently independent states were looking to strengthen their sovereign status. The separation of the Soviet Union happened despites the Endeavour’s by the authority of the general staff of the Soviet Military to hang on to business as usual. Also, in the division of the collective armed forces among former republics happened. The Newly Independent republics went on to set

up national armed forces and were not inspired by holding components of the old military that was outside their ability to control. In any case, the separation started various regional clashes that had smoldered for quite a while, but were constantly covered by Moscow”. Most of the republics arrived at an Understanding that while their national defense forces need to be strengthened, it was also essential to have a type of collective security and defense structures that could protect their security on the off chance that this was threatened. The Treaty specifically stated that if a member state is attacked other states will consider this as an attack against all of them (Jonson 2001:52). In this context Oliver Roy, (2001) argues that, “In any case, some observers have pointed out that while this could be a valid reason to join the membership, it was not what convinced each of them. Some nations would have been forced to adhere to the Treaty by a Russia that obviously thought it was difficult to cope with the loss of its superpower status. With the specific objective of maintaining its immediate weight among the number of republics that could reasonably be expected to go to Russia, he said, Moscow has implemented the CST. However, nine countries adhered to the Treaty, which makes it an important regional entity in the former Soviet republics”.

In practice, it quickly became clear that, despite the language used by the Member States, the Treaty did not meet the requirements of the collective security structure, with two members, Armenia and Azerbaijan, who had used force. To decide the state of Nagorno-Karabakh, another member of Russia subtly supported Armenia. In this context Buzan (2004) emphasized that “The Treaty was a free structure that was tested during the Crisis. It frequently turned out to be clear that issue within the CST member states instead of CST structure, parties would look for Russian Support. In Tajikistan the pro-Russian President Rakhmonov was helped during the civil war that led to regime’s victory. In Nagorno Karabakh, Russia helped Armenia to gain upper hand and Georgia ended up losing control over Abkhazia. In both Tajikistan and Abkhazia, peacekeepers from the CIS were available, to a great extent made up of troops from Russia. It was this sort of advantage or disadvantage some nations value the participation in what they affirmed to be a pro-Russian organization. In 1999, when the treaty was up for renewal, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan chose to pull back from the treaty. Eduard Shevardnadze, at that point president of Georgia, guaranteed at the time that Georgia declines to participate in the Treaty on Collective Security in the CIS, since it just exists on paper and there are no genuine pragmatic outcomes at all”.

Before the end of the 1990's in light of genuine concern the job of the CST amplified due to both the progression of Taliban activity in Afghanistan and the psychological militant assaults in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. "The result of different exercises was proposed to fabricate the capacity of the CST individuals. At a get together in Minsk, Belarus, in May 2000, the Council on Collective Security set up the three separate security areas, the European, the Caucasus and Central Asia". Accordingly Stephen Black, (2004) "In Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, the Council furthermore settled on a plan of Collective Security. In May 2001, in Yerevan, Armenia, it was consented to make a CST Rapid Response Force for the Central Asian area. In 2001, the settlement part states in like manner set up Rapid Deployment Forces and to raise Rapid Reaction Forces. The last one was expanded with Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Russia and Tajik units and was given satisfactory air limits, for instance, transportation and battles flying machine, notwithstanding helicopters, military flying machine, etc".

In this context our argument is that, "The financial troubles experienced by all member states, including Russia, the biggest CST nations, along with a considerable number of other internal and external issues, made it difficult for the CST to take advantage of all opportunities. Russia couldn't finance regular training of outside military forces, nor was it is able to supply new equipments to supplant the old and obsolete equipments for the other CST member states. It was this absence of budgetary impact that caused some CST member states to look somewhere else, to be specific towards NATO and specifically the US, for more monetary help". The terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 affected the circumstance in the region. Buzan (2006) argued, "The Central Asian states acquired strategic significance for the United States in the battle against the Taliban regime of the Afghanistan that harbored Osama bin Laden. Within a brief span U.S and NATO bases opened up in the Central Asian region. For instance, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, the US and its partners set up the Gansi airbase with a staff of around 1600 servicemen and women from particularly NATO nations and with 30 aircraft. It has been reported that Kyrgyzstan received up to 7000 USD per aircraft that took off from Gansi. In the war on terrorism, the US additionally bolstered the military in various CIS member states by providing equipment".

Regardless of, or "more probably because of the collaboration amongst Washington and the Collective Security Treaty member states after 11 September 2001, Russia endeavored to build closer integration among the CST nations. On 15 May 2002, on

the tenth anniversary commemoration of the CST, at a session of the Treaty, the council members concurred that the new activities were important to carry out CST exercises and measures on a larger scale". Accordingly to Weitz (2012), "it was the fear over an unstable circumstance in Afghanistan that set off the CST member's states to change the Treaty status and set up a Collective Security Treaty Organization in place of the Treaty, for turning it into a vital organization in the field of regional security. One of the principal motivating forces for change was the desire to set up a joint structure for enhancing the military powers of the CSTO member states, so the organization could viably ensure the individual and collective security needs of its members. Following their choice to change the structures and functions of the CST, the leaders of the treaty member states committed their administrations to frame guidelines by 1 July 2002 and to plan draft agreements to direct the activities of the organization and its components by 1 November 2002".

In this context our argument is that, "The member states likewise consented to enlist the CSTO with the United Nations as a regional organization. Moscow trusted it could utilize the CSTO to tackle a few issues as the CSTO was ready to successfully counter threats to the security of the member states especially, the one posed by the remainders of the Taliban regime. It appears that Russia sees the organization as a conceivable counter to NATO's eastward extension". In this context Saat (2005) argued that "In 1999, three former Socialist States of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had effectively joined the Alliance and at its Prague Summit in 2002, the North Atlantic Cooperation welcomed the different nations to begin participation process in future, including the three Baltic Republics. Besides, NATO had moved to the Caucasus and Central Asia, where a few states were additionally inspired for cooperation. In spite of these moves, partnership amongst NATO and Russia under the Putin administration CSTO achieved another level when in May 2002 the foundation of the NATO-Russia council, an organ in which the NATO members and Russia are participating as equivalents was laid. Russia was not excited by the prospect of NATO extension eastwards significantly further near to Russian borders". Moscow comprehended from the beginning that guarantees and announcements would not be sufficient to keep the other CSTO member states away from NATO participation. In a political circumstance in which the US and other NATO nations on the basis of the war on terrorism furnished the Central Asian states with extensive budgetary help, Moscow needed to make the CSTO attractive and effective for the

other five member nations (Giragosian 2004). Accordingly Frost (2009), “Russian activities that can be translated to have been pointed specifically at this issue are: firstly, Russia’s readiness to offer military equipments created by Russian manufactures to its CSTO accomplices. Moreover, Russia has announced that cadets and junior officers from the CSTO states can be sent for training in Russian military institutes at unusually decreased costs. Clearly this forces to some degree a weight on Russia’s military spending plan, yet Russia is still by a long shot the most prosperous members of the organization, with a military spending that is much more than the aggregate yearly spending of all other members in the organization”.

After the difference in the CST into a legitimate military organisation, political and inventive cooperation among the CSTO part states developed. A tolerable instance of this extended association was the opening of a Russian airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, in October 2003. The base has different SU-24 and SU-27 aircrafts and furthermore a couple of military coach flying machines and transport planes. Russia does not pay rent for the base yet rather hopes to spend up to 4 million USD a year for the base’s regular tasks. The base is organized as a piece of the Ural territory aeronautics based military and has its staff in Yekaterinburg (Danford 2007:28).

The CSTO and its Structure

The Organization’s Charter gives generally speaking structure of the system of the organisation. “The significant bodies that are pair with political and military issues of worry to the CSTO states are the Council on Collective Security, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the gathering of Council of Ministers of Defense and the Committees of Secretaries of the CSTO Security Council. The regular organization of the association is the commitment of its Secretary-General, who is helped by the Secretariat”.

Accordingly by Weitz, (2012) “The most fundamental essential basic leadership body of the association is the Council on Collective Security that includes the Heads of part States. Furthermore, if so required, sessions of the Council may likewise be gone to by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, and the Secretaries of the Security Council’s part expresses, the association's Secretary General and other pertinent gatherings”. The Council surveys imperative issues as for the working of the CSTO and it picks what ought to be done to accomplish the endeavors that should be


embraced by the association (Weitz 2012:162-163). The Chairman of the Council is the Head of State says that, “ the country on whose domain the Board is meeting. The Chairman stays in office until the point that the following session happens, yet in the event that he can’t satisfy his obligations, another Chairman will be chosen for the rest of the period until the following meeting. In the period between Board sessions, the permanent Council with the organization is in charge of the coordination of communication between the member states concerning the usage of choices to be taken up by the organization” (Jasutis 2005).

The Council of Ministers of remote issues, “the Council of Ministers of Defense and the Council of Secretaries of Security Councils are independently responsible for discourse between the part states and utilization of decisions to be taken as to outside and protection methodologies, and furthermore on issues of essentialness to their national security interests. All choices are taken in the structure of the Council on Collective Security, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers of Defense and the Committee of Secretaries of Security Council, are aside from procedural issues assumed the premise of accord. These bodies hold normal gatherings to discuss issues important to the CSTO or to one of the part states” (Saat 2005).

The everyday organization of “the association is (as has been indicated above) done by the Secretary General of the association with assistance of a Secretariat. The Secretary General is a national of one of the CSTO part states and is chosen for a period of three years on the proposition of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary General is the Head of the Secretariat of the association that contains staff from their national organizations or explicitly enrolled by the association dependent on contracts”. In April 2003, the Council of Defense Ministers concurred that “the more powerful advancement in the field of international strategy required the development of a military body that encourages the entire military fragment of the association. It was chosen that this body would be known as the Joint Staff and it has been operational since 1 January 2004. Its central commitments are planning the forces and assets of CSTO individuals, the improvement as a team with the Defense Ministers and the officers of the territorial troop courses of action to hold joint activities concerning the battle preparation in the light of a real worry for aggregate barrier” (Buzan 2006:118).

The figure below provides the following basic outline of the most important elements of the Organization:

Figure-1 Structure of the CSTO



CSTO’s Role and Actions in Central Asia

As discussed by the CSTO report on (2011), “October 2002 the Charter of the CSTO was adopted by the Heads of States in Chisinau (Moldova) keeping in mind the end goal to change Collective Security Treaty to a global regional organization, and on September 23, 2003 the Sanction and the Understanding of CSTO were confirmed by all member states and came into effect. Financial related matters and the bodies of CSTO were created during the Dushanbe (Tajikistan) Summit of the Council of Collective Security on April 28, 2003. Because of the circumstances inside the border of the CIS in late 1990’s, the primary undertaking of the CST was to keep in check the terrorist efforts to destabilize the situation in the region”. Furthermore, following the 9/11, terrorist attack the member states chose to set up the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) to fight against terrorism. Accordingly Roy Allison as discussed earlier, “after the 9/11 events, Central Asian nations consented to have US military forces on their domains. The following year, it was decided to open Russia’s air base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan under the system of CSTO, and 5,000 troops were placed in a new base in Tajikistan in 2004. The objectives of those bases were to upgrade security in the region that was confronting a relentless increment in radical Islamic actions, and furthermore adjust to the US power in the area. The same year in December 2004, UN General Assembly accepted a resolution that gave observer status to CSTO in the UN General Assembly” (CSTO Report 2010).

David Brill as on discussed, “the following the Andijan events on May 2005, Uzbekistan left GUAM in 2005, and in 2006 Islam Karimov, then president of Uzbekistan, signed the Treaty to join the CSTO. In view of U.S. criticism of state action in Andijan, Uzbekistan became suspicious about military presence of US on its territory. Another explanation behind that perception was subsequent ‘Color Revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. So it was decided by Tashkent to close US base in Karshi-Khanabad (K-2)”. The Senate or Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan endorsed the participation in CSTO and other related multilateral mechanism on June 23, 2008. The CSTO holds yearly military exercises for the CSTO countries to have a chance to enhance collective military participation (Goldman 2008:69).

The CSTO Report on 2011 is analysed that, “the principal of large scale CSTO military exercise is ‘Rubezh which in 2008 was held in Armenia where 4,000 troops from all member states displayed, key and strategic preparations with an accentuation towards promoting effectiveness of the collective security component of the CSTO partnership. There was a crisis inside the CIS in 2008 with Russian attack on Georgia and Moscow’s recognition of two breakaway region’s independence (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The events were talked about in CSTO Summit; however Russia announced that it won’t pressurize its partners to recognize independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia”. The Journal *Apsny*, in Abkhazia, quoted Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov who stated:

“As for the official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the CSTO member states, this is the sovereign matter of each state. Naturally; we are interested in our partners making this step. They are well aware of this. But we cannot and will not put pressure on them, which we have repeatedly declared” (Lavrov 2009:11).

The CSTO report on 2012, “this attack forced the withdrawal of Georgia from the CIS, which was the first such in CIS history. On August 2009, an ultimate decision to keep Georgia out of the Commonwealth was taken. Following the events in South Ossetia, in August 2009, military exercises started in southern Kazakhstan to test the preparedness of the new Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) built up under the system of the CSTO. CRRF is viewed as a further integration inside the organization,

though some of its members opposed the formation. The choice was made in a brief span by the activity of Russia during that year. The biggest drills of CRRF including 14,000 troops, and 7,000 firing ground operations were held in 2010. However, it ought to be noted that the 95% of the troops were soldiers of Russia and Kazakhstan, while different members took only in a limited way part. Uzbekistan even declined to participate” (CSTO Report 2012).

Accordingly Polina Vladimir in (2011), “An important step, Declaration on Cooperation was launched on March 28, 2010 between two Secretary Generals of UN and CSTO, Ban Ki-moon and Nikolai Borduja respectively. As indicated by this Declaration, CSTO was perceived by the UN as a regional organization alongside different organizations, for example, NATO. There was another uprising in Kyrgyz Republic on 2010, which led to power change and to unrests inside the country, killing more than eighty persons”. General Secretary of CSTO, Nikolai Borduja, announced “the holding of CSTO meeting with the delegates of various political parties and social movements of Kyrgyzstan, alongside the leaders of the force agencies of the member states to analyze the events and prepare a report for the Council of Collective Security. He additionally underlined that one of the main tasks of the organization was to assist the organization of the dialogue process for building up peace in Kyrgyzstan and limit the effects these tragic events. Also, the main task was to stop violence and guarantee peace inside the Kyrgyzstan. The other tasks that were laid out included engagement with every single political force” (Novye 2011:17).

Then Kyrgyz Acting Minister of Defense, Ismail Isakov, stated that “creation and impression directly after the power change in the nation that the Kyrgyzstan would entirely meet its commitments to the CSTO, and announced that the Ministry would proceed in cooperation with the Secretariat of the Organization on military and regional security issues”. He met with the CSTO’s delegation to Bishkek led by the CSTO Deputy Secretary, Valery Semerikov, made the statements about “the situation in the nation after the exercise of Rubezh-2010, the military exercises were held at Chorukh-Dayron in Tajikistan between April 22-26, 2010 and included CRRF battalion’s troops”. Accordingly the Tajik Minister of Defence, Sherali Khairullayev:

“Emerging trends suggest that in the 21st century,
Central Asia is gradually turning into the centre of

shifting global processes. Our aim is to not allow the region to turn into a place of conflict” (Khairullayev 2011:17).

He additionally focused on the significance of “these drills for Tajik national security. In excess of 1,000 troops took part in the exercises from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan sent only observers because of its objection to Russian base in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan” (CSTO Report 2011). Zasedanie Analysis that, “The primary concerns of this drill were battled against psychological warfare, fringe security, and unlawful medication dealing. Six pioneers out of seven met at a casual gathering of the Heads of States on May 8, 2010, in Gorki, Moscow Oblast. The leader of the Kyrgyz Republic was missing a result of the unrests in the nation and change of intensity. Two joint records were received amid the gathering the Statement of the part states on the condition in the Kyrgyz Republic and the Affirmation of the part states on the understanding among Russia and USA on Kyrgyz circumstance. Following the power change, there was another shocking occasion in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 as interethnic strife among Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks. Amid the occasions in Kyrgyzstan, the use of Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) was tired to a lot, regardless of whether it would be used when there is sharp destabilization of situation in a part territory of CSTO (Zasedanie, 2011). Kyrgyz pioneers of the Interim-Government mentioned for assistance amid the Osh occasions, be that as it may, it was denied by the CSTO”. The senior journalist Bordyuja of Central Asian Newspaper, *The Times of Central Asia*, expressed that:

“Our organization owns the potential force (CRRF, peacekeeping forces of CSTO) that can be used. It can be used if there is external threat, which is not the case of Kyrgyzstan. We are completely aware of the situation and hold meetings with all leading forces, and prepared report to the Heads of States. The use of force is out of discussion, as it is an internal matter of Kyrgyz people. We are not policemen” (Bordyuja 2018:14).

That is as demonstrated by the Treaty on Collective Security, where security depends on aggregate reason, and if one of the part states is looked with dangers to its security,

regional honesty and power, from outer sources, by then joint instrument to take measures to meet the risk will be summoned by the part states. The occasion of Kyrgyzstan was not seen as an outside danger to the security of a part state since the Charter of the CSTO states that:

“Matters falling within the national jurisdiction of the member state shall be strictly respected, along with the territorial integrity of the member” (CSTO Charter, Article-5).

Accordingly Mikhail Gosudars, “the Kyrgyz case demonstrated again the inadequacy of the Organization during emergencies inside the member states. So in August, 2010, the Heads of States of CSTO gathered for an urgent meeting in Erevan, Republic of Armenia. The fundamental motivation of the Summit was the idea exchange of the group and efforts of member states to quieten down the circumstance in Kyrgyzstan”. The Secretary General of the organization, Nikolai Borduja stated that, “recommended the formation of ‘crisis reaction mechanism’ inside the system of CSTO. The issue was left to further discussion during the subsequent official meetings of the Collective Security Council on December 10, 2010 in Moscow. Along with it, other real issues analyzed were the participation of the member states and ensuring security cooperation which were talked about during the Summit”. The next one was the 2011 meeting to be hosted by Belarus (Ledovsky 2012:45).

In Moscow meeting of the Collective Security Council on December 10, 2010 setting up the ‘crisis reaction mechanism’ was the primary plan, alongside the improvement of the CRRF and peacekeeping forces of CSTO in preventing crisis and meeting emergencies. As indicated by then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who stated:

“The late events in Kyrgyzstan obviously points to the necessity to improve effectiveness of our Organization to prevent the modern challenges” (CSTO Summit, 2011).

He also stressed the need to review of the Organization and its foundation document during Erevan emergency meeting of the leaders of the states. As per the CSTO Charter:

“The organization is open to accept new members and observers, and the current members may leave the organization if they wish, so the Charter also states that the participant states may join other military alliance, and aggression against one member state will be perceived as an aggression against all” (CSTO Charter Article-5) .

Accordingly Akimbekov in 2010, “ the CSTO has 3,500 personnel in its peacekeeping forces: the Organization holds antiterrorist operation ‘Kanal’, operation ‘Nelegal’ against the illegal migration, and operation ‘Proxi’, against Cyber Crime and criminal utilization of web server. The Organization agreed to be open and to think about alternate candidates and recommended Iran to join the organization as observer. What’s more, its members additionally agreed to a major extension that would bolster CSTO peacekeeping forces which could be under UN mandate or that of its members. It has also consented to an agreement with Shanghai Cooperation Organization keeping in mind the end goal to have more extensive participation on issues of security, crime and drug trafficking in Central Asian States”.

CSTO and Eurasian Security

Accordingly Roy Allison (2011), “It was with respect to the dangers of transnational radical fanaticism, fear-based oppression, dissidence, and composed wrongdoing that a totally new dimension of participation among the legislatures of the Eurasian states created after 2001. The councils agreed to reestablish existing security relations and develop new ones. A piece of the exercises was supra-local, for instance, the CIS itself. Others were sub-local, including only a foreordained number of states. A portion of the exercises have brought about or incited the establishment of provincial global associations. The various associations differentiate in their experience, targets, components, and effect”.

Accordingly Betts (2012), “Under the sponsorship of the CIS, a Collective Security Treaty was first marked in May 1992. The CST, while not viable in making a security umbrella for the locale, encircled the reason for resulting understandings. The most recent stage in this collaboration is the CSTO. Individuals at first included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CSTO has made the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force

(CRDF) that involves around 1,300 military from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, under Russian authority. The CSTO is planned to respond to circumstances, for instance, the taking of prisoners or psychological militant assaults. The CSTO continues being basically an instrument for coordination of national militaries. It is expected to propel interoperability and fill in as a system for military participation” (Betts 2012:43).

Under the aegis of the CIS exists is the Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC). “The ATC was at first situated in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, yet later it was chosen to move the ATC to Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Individuals from the understanding included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The ATC fills in as an educational and information vault on global fear based oppressor and fanatic associations, their pioneers, and supporters”. The ATC is overseen by Russia’s Federal Security Services (RFSS) Executive. The ATC is fundamentally a discussion for the trading of data on the exercises of psychological oppressors, separatists, and lawbreakers. There are other local associations like SCO and The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) that supplement the CSTO (Roy 2011:10).

Another regional organization, the SCO, was set up in October 2001, as an outgrowth of border negotiations that initially ended in the Shanghai Agreement of 1996. As stated on “the SCO incorporates China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan started with observer status in the organization. The SCO is a multipurpose global organization, which looks to advance through cooperation in science and innovation, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection through regional peace, security, and political accommodation. Financing of the organization is based on contribution of members to the organization. The SCO has not yet grown to have full-time professional staff with expectations of continuity. Consequently the organization tends to work in the context of ministerial meetings and that of heads of states”.

In June 2002 Kazakhstan hosted the first meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Accordingly Mikhail Jackson (2013), “The meeting brought about the Almaty Act of 2002 making CICA a permanent mechanism. The possibility of CICA began in 1992 with recommendations of Kazakh president Nazarbaev. The group includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Mongolia, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine,

Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. The CICA is a multipurpose universal organization, which looks to build up an organization in Eurasia comparable to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)". It works as a diplomatic forum and functions through international diplomatic and military cooperation all through the more prominent Eurasian region (Akimbekov 2010:88).

In this context our argument is that, "The Eurasian security relations as of now are made or adjusted to stand up to dangers from non-state actors that have emerged as key players in the international relations of post-communist region. These are not mechanisms that will be overseen by any one central authority. These security relations are decentralized in plan and capacity. Given that coordination without centralization is the basic test in any collective effort, it is imperative to ask to what extent these institutions are appropriately moving to accomplish the targets of their new mandates" (Zasedanie, 2011). Allison Roy in (2000) said that, "The threats posed by non-state actors are diverse and different from the threats posed by interstate rivalries and interstate conflict. State-to-state collective security agreements are set apart by five essential basic highlights: (1) the supposition of rational calculations by unitary actors (2) the lucidity of the negotiating forum (3) the utilization of bargaining for signaling and correspondence (4) moderately transparent burden sharing; and (5) effectively identifiable measures of achievement".

As stated by Schelling in (2011), "the above all else, the viability of well defined alliance structures is regularly estimated by the adequacy of prevention, that is, the capacity to discourage certain kinds of undesirable conduct with respect to an enemy. The objective might be inciting from time to time to a specific conduct by an enemy through certain actions. In any case, in either case the objective is to evoke a normal reaction and not to totally eliminate the adversary. Cold War era alliance structures were planned fundamentally to accomplish the goal of dissuading future threats. They were not intended to dispense with the source of those threats". Accordingly Ledovsky in (2012), "NATO's compelling reason during the time of the Cold War was to make Warsaw Pact aggression self-defeating and pointless. The Warsaw pact had the similar goal. But, neither one of the organizations had as a component of its public mandate the entire disposal of the adversary. However, today, the difficulties posed by non-state actors, for example, terrorists are particularly extraordinary in nature. Collective security cooperation restricting terrorist threats visualizes their total neutralization or disposal. This is a different alternate sort of conflict. It is a battle that

has to be pursued with uncommon methods and whose achievements must be measured in unusual ways”.

Second, transparency of the negotiating forum is basic in traditional security arrangements. In the context of traditional collective security organizations, the negotiating forum is open, transparent, and acknowledged. Accordingly Roy Allison (2000), “There is no ambiguity in regards to authentic representation. In the case defence security organizations, the adversary is particularly represented by a delegation or organization which has the authority of representing the organization’s objectives and has the expertise to conclude agreements. Thirdly, dealing can occur, however, even in situations where understandings are not reached but have a more imperative capacity of flagging basic information about threats and non-negotiable issues”. The most critical part of bargaining might be that it is an approach to motion to the opposite side with respect to flash points. Accordingly Akimbekov in (2010), “Thusly, possibly foolish choices that may pursue from the reason of erroneous conclusion, blunder, or misperception can consistently be avoided. Fourth, the aggregate security association can formalize with some clearness on how the weight of security inside an association together can be shared. Gatherings realize their responsibilities are open data and that powerlessness to impartially finish their obligations may likewise end up open”. Finally, the gatherings can agree on what may be the achievement of comprehension, or on account of contentions, what may establish a condition when the contentions can be seen as settled (Akimbekov 2010:88).

As stated on Betts in (2000), “these standard elements are absent when collective security organizations deal with uncommon, informal or difficult to recognize cells, groups of cells, or inchoate ideological and religious movements. Terrorist organizations frequently act in ways that run counter to the expectations of normal behavior. Their most effective weapon, suicide action, fundamentally confounds rational choice model. Second, there is little clarity concerning the negotiations. Who represents the group? Who is the dependable representative of the organization’s will? Is it rational to try and expect that the organization has anything specific as a goal or define of objectives other than a terrorizing? Notwithstanding, when bargaining takes place between formal organizations and informal representation of the non-state actors, there is little communication or common ground”.

A signal from a formal organization, which articulates threats toward an informal terrorist organization, may be perceived as a sign of weakness by the terrorists. Third, burden shared inside the organization to fight against non-state actors are not regularly shared transparently and openly (Allison 2000:10). As stated on Ledovsky in (2004), “On the off chance that the terrorist militants witness some problem in the sharing of burden among states, they might have the capacity to utilize that to use the inner contradictions in the collective organization. Therefore, burden sharing inside collective security organization has a tendency to be non-transparent. Fourth and above all, the new setting of collective action by state actors against the threats posed by non-state actors is set apart by a basic component of continuous operations. At the point when a terrorist rival is vanquished, what might constitute a sufficient level of certainty that new terrorist threats would not re-emerge after a time”.

Accordingly Chenoy, “these structural features set apart traditional security settings from the new, Post-Westphalian setting of contemporary Eurasian security. There are basic contrasts while evaluating the versatility of this organization to the threats they stand up to. Traditional coalitions push rationality, prevention, signaling, territory and compliance with the attention on the enemy. These new coalitions must discover approaches to deal with the irrational adversaries, coordinate burden sharing, and strive toward the end of risk”.

CSTO and Military Integration Process in Central Asia

The most minimal phase of military coalition builds up the legal/ contractual grounds of military joint efforts and decides the aspirations and limits of a future organization together. The general political aspects of military integration were part of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States of Eight members. The Commonwealth member states would cooperate in guaranteeing international peace and security, implementing effective measures, reducing armament and lessening combat hardware and defence costs. Later, CSTO military coordination had its genesis in the Collective Security Treaty of 1992. This treaty (spelled) out at the Convention of 1992 on the Expansion of the Collective Security Treaty, that the treaty will be renewed and expanded (Akimbekov 2010:92).

This is the first multilateral defence agreement among post-Soviet states that set out the establishments for the security and defence policy and decided the rules for

advance participation in this field. The provision of this treaty is basically in view of the common defence that determines further military joint effort between the states and military integration. Article 4 of the treaty stipulates that an attack on one state will be considered as an attack on all members of the organization together and that different states will give a wide range of help, including military support. Looking to consolidate and organize regular activities, a Collective Security Council, and different bodies were to be framed as per articles 3 and 5 (Betts 2000:28).

It was also noted that the Joint Commonwealth Armed Force would arrange regular activities until the point that the basic foundations conceived are set up (article 5). By this clause an emphasis was made that some common military structures that are in operation may develop close integration which would be normalized later on. Despite the fact that the agreement itself did not concretize and characterize any target or plans of military integration, this is inferred in the fourth article of the Treaty wherein common reaction and regular activities are put forward. Looking to set up a typical military response, it is important to ensure common plans, training, staff preparedness, compatibility of armaments and so forth. These were issues that were solved in the second and third phases of military integration (Jackson 2013:35).

Sergej Minasjan underlined that the essential objective of the bargain was to serve the reinforcing of the CIS integration, and to reflect on the military component of Commonwealth states. In Alma-Ata on 10 February 1995, the Collective Security Council embraced a Declaration, wherein it was pronounced that the states will look for more mutual participation (clause 1) and will attempt to join their efforts while making the collective security system (clause 4). The legitimate structure is characterized by additional agreements on the strategic and vital levels. During the CIS summit on 24 May 2000, a Memorandum on upgrading the efficiency of the Collective Security Treaty and its Adjustment to the Current Political Circumstance was agreed upon. The states concurred that measures must be actualized on the ground by making a collective security framework and setting up new control structures (clause 3) (Minasjan 2013:72).

The primary defining moment occurred on 7 October 2002. The states adopted the Chisinau Charter on which premise the Collective Security Treaty Organization was built up and the CSTO Statute, and in addition, a concurrence on the CSTO legitimate status was endorsed. The introduction of the CSTO Statute puts forward that the states are prepared to proceed and increase their military and political cooperation and to

prepare against any threats. These key strategic level steps really characterized the extent of military combination that is associated with the improvement of the regional collective security system. A comprehensive analysis of the interim and strategic level documents helps reveal the nature of the collective security framework and military integration process (Akimbekov 2010:108).

In 2010 was a time of crisis in Kyrgyzstan: in April, the nation encountered a violent government change and interethnic conflicts amongst Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks in the Southern region. The last circumstance would have been an ideal open door for CSTO intervention. Russia in any case, responded with non-action, making no one-sided ventures to control the situation and thus avoided CSTO intervention (Cheterian 2012). There was, above all, an absence of political will to mediate. For Russia, Kyrgyzstan did not have Georgia's strategic geopolitical significance and the emergency in 2010 happened during the reset stage between Russia and the United States. Russia was additionally anxious that its intervention could disturb relations with Kyrgyzstan's neighbours, Uzbekistan and China more specifically (Bhadrakumar, 2010). Russian communities in Bishkek could have conceivably turned out to be vulnerable as a fall out of Kyrgyzstan's response to external intervention; Russia had no mandated procedure in this situation. Unwilling to act singularly, Russia could have encouraged CSTO intervention in Kyrgyzstan. Russian authorities, however, contended that there was no legitimate justification for such an intervention, as the conflict was an internal issue and the CSTO could only act upon the official request of the imperiled member state on account of outside aggression against it. The CSTO then was not a key strategic partner of the area, which ought to mediate each time something isn't right in a CSTO state (Matveeva 2013:12-13).

Other CSTO states were additionally unwilling to mediate. Armenia and Belarus have declined to take part in CSTO exercises in Central Asia. The Central Asian states likewise restricted CSTO's intervention. Some of them are seeking power and regional status, while the administrations are typically anxious to project their sovereignty, which could be undermined by CSTO intervention in internal conflicts on their domains (Nikitina, 2013). The CSTO intercession could have been interpreted as its help for another 'Colour Revolution'. There was also another peculiar issue. It would have been relatively inconceivable for CSTO contingents to recognize on the ground between the member who required protection and the aggressors in an internal conflict. However, the CSTO was the first international multilateral organization to

send its delegation to evaluate the circumstance on the ground and it also organized consultations with the UN, the OSCE and the EU (Deyermond 2009). It gave assistance and strategic help to the leaders in Kyrgyzstan. The Moscow Council of Collective Security Organization session in December 2010 saw the introduction of changes to the CST and CSTO Charter and addition to agreements on the legitimate reasons for intervention in similar cases. Nevertheless, the primary issue was that in the absence of political will, a more lawful reason for intervention was required. In the expressions of the spokesperson of the Minister of defence, Semyon Bagdasarov, during a Russian *Duma* session:

“What prevented us from taking measures on Kyrgyzstan even without these alterations to the document, when the political will is lacking, nothing will be solved” (Bhadrakumar 2010:22).

Russia’s policy during Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic conflicts was an instance of non-action and using the CSTO to talk about the circumstance, address the conflicts by giving humanitarian relief and technical help, and eventually to legitimize Russia’s obligation in crisis situations in CIS.

Operation Rubezh-2004

In August 2004, “the CSTO organized a broad military anti-terrorism exercise entitled Rubezh-2004. The motivation behind this exercise, held in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, was to test the CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force in action for the first time. Earlier exercises were for the most part carried on with units and regiments of the national armies of member-states, assigned to a joint command for a brief timeframe. However, units of the CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force are permanently assigned and are already part of one command, which should add to more effective and expanded capabilities against terrorism. Another new aspect of this exercise was the way that it prefaced of the idea of pre-emptive strikes, while past CSTO exercises were of a responsive and protective nature”. The new technique was meant to take into account a more noteworthy adaptability and effectiveness since it anticipates pre-emptive measures to prevent terrorist groups causing distress and chaos in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Border 2005:57).

Rubezh-2004 comprised of two separate stages: a command post exercise about the planning and joint activities to stabilize the circumstance in the Central Asian region. “The first part of the exercise was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Its motivation was to test the capacity of the participating nations to fulfill their military needs so as to secure the safety of the region. The command post exercise also centered on the strategies to mutually make political and military choices to respond to threats posed by illegal armed formations to the CSTO states”. However, the military organizations of the member states, and different members of the CSTO ministries of foreign affairs, examined their internal issues and services, as well as their special services and border guards. A few groups of states had participated as observers during this phase of the exercises that represented the General Staffs of the Armed Forces of the CIS members nations, agents from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and furthermore from the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center in Central Asian region (Roy 2014: 88).

The second, “operational phase of exercise Rubezh-2004 occurred in Kyrgyzstan in the Issyk-Kul territory in the south-western part of the country. In this exercise, the military of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) that were positioned close-by were activated. Special Forces started the chase for the mock terrorists, while crises groups of the ministries evacuated civilians from this region. The terrorists turned out to be exceptionally determined not to pull back and it required a considerable measure of endeavors to defeat them. The forefront of the terrorists was subjected to a mounted guns siege, trailed by an air force”. In this way, paratroopers lunched search operation to capture the mock rebels who escaped. In this situation, the consequence of the whole activity was the entire demolition of the rebel group (Ledovsky 2012:49).

Accordingly Soltobaev (2004), “Inside and out, approximately 2000 staff partook in exercise Rubezh-2004. Despite the CSTO's Rapid Deployment Force, the part states have restricted limits. Kyrgyzstan was helped by a unit of uncommon battle forces and moreover gave tanks, fortified staff transport support and prepared infantry fight vehicles and also various types of firearms; Kazakhstan took an enthusiasm with an airborne tempest detachment of the air-portability powers, and besides with an armada of Mi-8 helicopters and SU-27 military air ship; Russia gave extraordinary powers from the Volga-Urals Military Area and Tajikistan was spoken to by an organization of a contingent of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force. Diverse country's

eyewitnesses were available and were joined to different agents of the CSTO individuals” (Soltobaev 2004:67).

As stated on Richard Weitz, “From an operational perspective, the goals of the exercise Rubezh 2004 were above all else the further cohesiveness of strategies to frustrate the activities of illegally armed formations, training of paratroopers behind adversary lines; the evacuation of residents; the freedom of hostages and enhancing arms and amannation capabilities. The exercise committed extraordinary emphasis on the aviation based armed forces in every one of its appearances: transport aircraft, military aircraft and planes, all of which assumed a vital part in this activity. The assumption was that in mountainous zones the aviation based armed forces are the most appropriate to fight with terrorists with negligible setbacks among the troops”.

The situation depended on genuine security worries that the CSTO states confront. In this perspective Richard Synder says that, “the political-military circumstance in this region and all the more particularly in Central Asia isn’t exceptionally steady and there is a genuine probability of clashes between the states in Central Asia and separatist movements. Furthermore, terrorist organizations remain dynamic in the area and their training camps are still working. In view of this activity Rubezh-2004 went for enhancing systems to stop terrorist organization’s attempt to build up a radical Islamic state in the Ferghana valley, a highly undesirable development that would influence all states in the region”.

It is our argument that the motivation behind the exercise was to allow the soldiers to test their abilities that may one day be required in reality, and to increase important bits of knowledge about the genuine operation and potential shortcomings. As stated on Tulsiram, (2007) “The intrigue appeared by individuals was incredibly positive in their assessment of the movement and drew some productive exercises from this experience for future CSTO assignments. The partaking states were clear and unequivocal in their suggestions to the Council on Collective Security for the use of its military unexpected. Rubezh-2004 has demonstrated that the CSTO is an association that is set out to assume a long haul job later on in the national and territorial security of its part states”.

Bilateral Cooperation between CSTO and Central Asian States

We can make case studies of various cooperation under the CSTO mechanism, especially in bilateral terms.

CSTO and Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country with a long land border with Russia. It has closed economic and trade relations with Russia and a large Russian minority lives in Kazakhstan. It is most likely the nearest partner of Russia and an extremely dependable partner in Russia-led CIS and the CSTO. During Kazakhstan's turn to administratively manage the CSTO, the protection of information and further reinforcing of Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) were advanced as the major needs of CSTO states. As the then president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev expressed:

“Kazakhstan considers the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an important institution for mutual cooperation in the sphere of military construction, protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states, as well as a tool providing national security” (Iniutin, 2006: 288).

Kazakhstan has been extremely committed to the CSTO. For example, it was in August 2006, that CSTO held its biggest military exercises in Aktau in Kazakhstan, named Rubezh 2006. As many as 2500 defence staff, and also numerous armed vehicles and warplanes, participated from CSTO states. All the CSTO's significant structures including its standing joint central command, permanent joint staff and secretariat took an interest in the activity (Weitz 2008:22).

CSTO and Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is situated in Central Asia. It is situated in an exceptionally pivotal zone for drug trafficking and potential terrorism. It also has its proving to Afghanistan though not sharing the border directly. Therefore, Russia has established its full military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. The Kant Airbase of Russia has been regularly extending and upgrading. Soviet-style Su-25 ground attack aircrafts and Su-27 combat crafts have been deployed. The quantity of fighter aircrafts has additionally

been expanded and so has the expansion in the number of personnel. The Kant airbase is of extraordinary centrality as it contributes significantly in terms of assignments during the exercises of CSTO. While investigating CSTO's part in the 2010 events that occurred in Kyrgyzstan where it did not make powerful strides, the importance of the CSTO was reiterated nevertheless.

During the emergency in Kyrgyzstan, the provisional government of Kyrgyzstan looked for assistance from Russian troops. This Kyrgyz emergency was then referred to CSTO by Russia. Yet, the CSTO demonstrated helplessness in reacting to the Kyrgyzstan emergencies, on the grounds of the Article 2 of the CSTO charter, the organization could only help in a circumstance where the security, sovereignty and regional stability of one or a few members are undermined and that the emergency additionally debilitates global peace and security (Richard 2004:85). In addition, Article 4 of the CSTO sanction expresses that "on the off chance that a demonstration of animosity is conferred against any of the Part Expresses, all Part States will give essential help, including military and additionally offer help with the methods available to them in an activity of the privilege to collective guard as per Article 51 of the UN Charter". Thus, the official reason given in regards to CSTO's non-action in this emergency was that the circumstances involved were internal political turmoil and domestic concerns instead of any external threat, so the CSTO was not in a position to react in a concrete way (Bektour Iskender 2010:25-26).

CSTO and Uzbekistan

The relations between the CSTO and Uzbekistan have not been smooth. Uzbekistan had been one of the founding members of the Collective Security Treaty, which was once known as the Tashkent Treaty; yet the name became void once Uzbekistan pulled back from the agreement in 1998 and went to join GUAM. In any case, it later rejoined CSTO once more. CSTO'S relations with Uzbekistan were not so stable and Tashkent again pulled out of the CSTO on 28th June 2012. During the CSTO summits, the uncertainty with respect to the participation of Uzbekistan was in fact raised. In October 2011, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko put forth an exceedingly provocative expression towards Uzbekistan for the 'triple game' the nation plays in its foreign policy. In addition, the Belarusian President cautioned that without the CSTO, it will be troublesome for Uzbekistan to shield its autonomy, "we

shouldn't joke here, the world today is exceptionally precarious". Lukashenko called attention to two things when he started that member with the exception of Russia and Belarus was wellsprings of divergences and disunity (Roy 2014: 102).

Belarus president also singled out Uzbekistan for causing problems for the CSTO. He suggested that Russia and Belarus have the most similar positions inside the CSTO, while Uzbekistan was particularly problematic. The president of Belarus highlighted the perseverance of geopolitics and equivocalness concerning forms of cooperation in relation to external powers in the post-Soviet space. These conditions were particularly challenging for Uzbekistan. In this confounded setting, Karimov's cooperation in the CIS and CSTO summits on one hand, recognized the "historical part" the CIS has played all through the post-Soviet period. He recognized that it was hard to envision what might have happened if the CIS had not existed. Then again, Tashkent's participation at the CSTO summit was more nuanced. Its positive thinking about the CIS and at the same time the 'no-veto approach' to the CSTO's choice in regards to stationing of foreign army bases in the territory of member states, once again reflected, according to Tolipov, Tashkent's "one step forward, one step back" stance within these two post-Soviet structures (Farkhod Tolipov 2012:129).

At the CIS summits, Tashkent's position was communicated regarding its long-term national interest associated with Uzbekistan's requirement for modernization and for collaboration in tune with its national enactments and universal commitments. Karimov affirmed that Uzbekistan stays in the association, yet does not show any desire to diminish its cooperation with the US. With an understanding with the U.S., Uzbekistan together with all CSTO members joined the NDN². In addition to other things, NDN requires mutual trust and cooperation between the CSTO members as well as amongst them and the U.S. and NATO. The CIS and CSTO summits in Moscow appear to have indicated that Belarus and Russia have nudged Uzbekistan to settle on a decision with respect to the course of its foreign policy. The summits harmonized in time with the new key developments in Afghanistan and expressed desire to facilitate arrangements before the Russian presidential race in 2012 (ibid.p.130).

²Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is a series of commercially based logistical arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

According to Russian Scholar Alexander³, “Uzbekistan resigned from the CSTO for the first time in 1999. It then resumed membership some years later, but Uzbekistan was not ever a dynamic member in the activities of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. This organization is a purely symbolic military organization. It ensures that it’s not having any important activities in the field, except antiterrorism drills on a small scale. The CSTO is mostly characteristic of Russia’s ambition to become a great power and to be observed as the leader of an alliance. Russia has its individual bilateral cooperation with each member nation of the CSTO, which is essentially a system of bilateral or multilateral cooperation forum. It shadows the model of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact, which was equally the sum total of bilateral dealings between Moscow and every individual member state”.

In any case, Uzbekistan has at long last suspended its participation in the CSTO. The result of its separation from this safeguard coalition would prompt new security dynamics in the region and it appears that the US may be in a favorable position because of this changing direction of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s choice favours the US by creating a gap in the general security architecture created by Russia in the Eurasian region. In any case, from the beginning Uzbekistan has not been an exceptionally steady and loyal member of the CSTO and been making issues within the organization. By its departure, at any rate, Russia would now be able to integrate the CSTO closely and intensify participation among the remaining members of CSTO. It is expected that all things considered, CSTO’s significance will gather pace once the US-led powers pull back finally from Afghanistan (Vladimir Radyuhin, 11 July 2012, The Hindu page 11).

CSTO and Tajikistan

Tajikistan is a small, mountainous and landlocked Central Asian nation. It is also an extremely dynamic member of the CSTO. Tajikistan is most influenced by developments in Afghanistan as it shares a long and permeable border with it. Tajikistan takes an interest in all Russian-led the integration and regional security

³. Alexander is a Research Scholar of Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science. He is working on “India-Russia relation: The role of US”. Interview with Alexander on 18th June, 2018, 13:00 p.m at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Moscow.

plans, including the Russian-led CSTO. Tajikistan contributes an infantry brigade to the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF). In April 2010, Tajikistan facilitated the CRRF's military exercises. However, the CSTO Agreement on Foreign Bases restrains Tajikistan's choices to build up relations with non-CSTO nations and let those nations set up bases and consequently reaffirms Russia's hold on the nation. This affirms how powerless the Tajik state has become to Russian political pressure. Tajikistan is too much dependent on remittances from its migrant laborers in Russia, and the Kremlin has more than once indicated that the presence of these workers in Russia is contingent on Dushanbe's readiness to accept Moscow managed foreign policy directives. As to participation with the CSTO, an anti-terror drill for the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) and Central Asian group, named Rubezh-2010 and Frontier-2001 was held in northern Tajikistan (Sodiqov and Alexander 2012:122).

Terrorism and instability in Afghanistan

Accordingly Alexander Yaacov in (1999), "The end of the Soviet Union opened a space for religion in the previous Soviet farmland and made ready for an extreme gathering to enter the CIS nations. In any case, Islam has truly been viewed as a hazard by Moscow, and even in the Tsarist time frame, it was intended to be repressed and subjected. Despite all endeavors of Soviet pros, it was hard to shed Islam, especially in rustic territories of Central Asia and North Caucasus. Nevertheless, the Soviet organization did not predict any authentic hazard until the 1960s and mid-1970s. It was a period when some 'radical' Muslims were going to be 'against Soviet' and 'against communism and mentioning various areas not to join the Soviet outfitted power and not to send their adolescents to be Pioneers or the Komsomol (Children and Young Groups)".

As expressed by Roy Allison (2004), "Islam began to acquire criticalness during the 1980s especially by the assistance of some Muslim developments that rose amid that time and which were arranged in country regions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan however with a couple of people in it. Uzbekistan saw the main signs of these developments through requests to extend the job of Islam in administrative issues, in which Tahir Yuldashev, the supporter of Adolat Party and later the pioneer of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), took the main part. The Adolat Party was confined by the enactment in 1992, and its followers alongside Yuldashev moved to

Tajikistan and took a functioning part amid the Civil War, supporting Islamic Resistance. The finish of the Civil War in Tajikistan with the concurrence on National Reconciliation made Yuldashev and his followers, close by IMU's military strategist Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovich Khojaev otherwise called Juma Namangani, to join the forces of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan”.

As on analysis by Yaacov in 2013, “After the 9/11 events underlined the significance of the Central Asian region to global security, these nations acquired more prominence for global actors. Geographical proximity and economic unsteadiness of these nations made them vulnerable to Taliban Afghanistan and terrorism (also extremist religious movements), drug traffic activity through these nations to Russia, Europe and US; human trafficking and the unfeeling human rights abuses (Andijan events 2005) and so forth. The issue of global terrorism has been on the CIS radar since the Tashkent bombing and terrorist attacks in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan-Batken in 1999. The increasing number of Islamic radical organizations, for example, IMU and Huzb ut-Tahrir, is another issue for the region of Central Asia”.

Following the disintegration of Soviet Union, the border with Afghanistan was protected by Russian troops, yet, there were instances of drug and weapon trafficking. As we discussed that “Today it is also home to numerous Islamist radical groupings, which is debilitating the security of the neighbouring nations. During Taliban rule, Afghanistan, which shares borders of 2087 km with three Central Asian nations, also became home for some other non-Afghan radical Islamist groups, for example, IMU and Huzb ut-Tahir. So the instability in Afghanistan poses serious threats to CIS member states, and their collective strength is vital for regional security” (Pinar 2005:97).

The Afghan question had begun long before the Taliban took power in 1996. It was based on the ‘Great Game’ among colonial powers at the end of the 19th century, while the Durand Line, designed by the British Empire left countless Afghan clans from different sides of the border (Akimbekov 2002: 69). In addition, the Russian and English agreements of 1873 and 1887 refer to the agreements concerning the populated areas of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Hazaras in Afghanistan, which also affected the start of the Afghan civil war in Afghanistan. In 1978, overthrow of the president of the Democratic Party of the Afghan people, Muhammad Daud (PDPA). In 1979, and Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and USSR embarked on a prolonged civil war and in 1989 reduced its forces (ibid.p.97).

In mid-1992 “the conflicts in Afghanistan reached the end despite both Soviet Union and Pakistan supplying weapons to different sides. What’s more, by April of that year, the communist administration under President Najibullah fell. Leader of Islamic Party of Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmtyar, tried to set up authority and take control over Kabul until the Taliban appearance in 1994; however, because of the constrained powers it was unsuccessful against the Taliban. The end of the Cold War diminished enthusiasm of US and Russia in Afghanistan and the factions partitioned the nation into discrete zones, controlled by field commanders and military-political fractions”. More than 60,000 Tajik evacuees crossed the Afghan outskirt in light of the common war in Tajikistan in 1992, and afterward once more, countless Afghan outcasts fled toward the north and settled in Central Asia. Subsequently, Afghanistan is immovably interconnected with the Central Asian Region (Yaacov 2001:15).

Accordingly Hyman, “The 1996 seizure of Kabul in September by radical Islamic Taliban increased Central Asian pioneers fear of radical changes in the locale. So the pioneers of these republics, beside Turkmenistan, met with the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in Almaty on October 4, 1996. Abruptly since freedom, Central Asia went up against an outer hazard considerably more with Taliban development; so these countries approached Russia for help. Along these lines, Russia before long transformed into a dynamic political shield and casual political pioneer in the Central Asian district since the destruction of the Soviet Union. This united the gathering’s threatening to the Taliban alliance in northern Afghanistan. Northern Afghanistan transformed into a cushion Zone between Taliban Afghanistan and the CIS south”. Akimbekov in (2000), “All of the spaces of Afghanistan, beside Panjshir valley, were constrained by Taliban routine. On August 20, 1998, Osama container Ladens bases were besieged by US voyage rockets in southern Afghanistan, and the Taliban was accused for having relations with Osama canister Laden and Al-Qaeda”.

In 1999 and 2000, with the plan to set up an Islamic Caliphate in Fergana Valley, shared between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, IMU moved into Uzbekistan and Southern Kyrgyzstan. Its inspiration of controlling the Ferghana valley was to control the medication dealing courses, and the two assaults it did were from Tajikistan, not Afghanistan (Cornell 2002:196). Accordingly Russian Scholar Alexander Jackson, “The military wing of IMU and its supporters joined Islamic Tajik opposition in the wake of leaving Uzbekistan in 1992-93, and the IMU still

stayed in the region of Tajikistan after the end of civil war, regardless of Tajikistan's claims. The IMU developed relations with Afghan groups, including Taliban, during these conflicts, which made Afghanistan an immediate security risk to the area. However, it is trusted that the IMU's bases were seriously damaged during US-led war in Afghanistan in 2001. Be that as it may, there is another radical group, Hizb-ut-Tahrirall Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation), which arouses concerns to security in Afghanistan and Central Asia".

Accordingly Roy Allison (2014), "Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a broader organization, which includes jobless, disappointed youth. Regardless of being set up in 1952 in the Middle East, it became known in Central Asia since late 1990's, and as of now works in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. HT additionally has an indistinguishable objective from IMU that is to build up an Islamic caliphate in Ferghana valley. Unlike the IMU, however HT propagates its authoritative opinion through pamphlets and flier, not by utilizing force. Insecurity in the region, weak economy, corrupt authorities, large scale unemployment, the absence of information about traditional Islam and past, diminishing health and social welfares, and poverty create positive conditions for the extremist movements to attract individuals to its fold".

China and Russia: Two Guardians of Regional Stability in Central Asia

The Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China have vital participation for the present and the future of Central Asia. Both have had to face radical extremism, either in Chechnya, where Russia waged two wars against secessionists and a coalition of Islamist guerrillas, or in the territory of Xinjiang, where China still faces secession issue (Weitz 2011). Accordingly Voloshine (2011) "The two nations comprehend the limits of multilateral activity yet at the same time tend to arrange their activities inside the structure of regional organizations to manage terrorism, extremism, separatism, and collective security. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), established in 2002 based on the 1992 Tashkent Treaty, is the primary international forum for former Soviet republics to use their shared advantages on an extensive variety of security issues. Initiaed by Russia, the CSTO was established to reinforce peace and regional security and stability, and to guarantee the collective protection of the sovereignty, and stability of the member states, in the

achievement of which the member states might offer even to coordinate political measures. Russia's military capacities and the backdrop of its engagement in Tajikistan during the 1992-1997 civil war (when it secured the Tajik-Afghan border) make it a dominant partner in guaranteeing a well-working system of regional security in view of shared objectives of peace and regional integrity" (Voloshin 2011:117).

The CSTO Report mentioned that "In the meantime, the bounds of Russia's power are very clear, and they originate from the very idea of the CSTO as it was at first imagined. As affirmed at the 2002 Tashkent summit of Heads of States, the CSTO Charter (Art.5) explicitly states that the organization might work based on strict regard for the autonomy, intentional obligations and fairness of rights and commitments of the member States and strategic distance on issues falling inside the national jurisdiction of the member States" (CSTO Report 2011). In practice, this clause has been interpreted to confine the Organization's operational abilities. In May 2010, CSTO Secretary General and former KGB officer Nikolay Bordyuzha said that "the CSTO did not think of it as important to send peacekeepers to Kyrgyzstan and would abandon it to the Kyrgyz government to deal with the emergency. As rules in operation then, if Kyrgyzstan were ever to be overwhelmed by an Islamist tide, no conceivable activity in the interest of the CSTO could be imagined" (Weitz 2011:122).

China's primary lever of impact in Central Asia is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), established in 2001 by the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Accordingly Sharip, (2000) "Utilizing its huge financial potential and always developing military power, Beijing tries to pull in its Western neighbours into multilateral participation reaching out in many ways except the assurance of military help in the instance of external hostility. It incorporates, for instance, escalated cooperation in regional trade and joint investment projects. All things considered, the SCO's real command is its fight against all types of radicalism, as set up in the 2001 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism". The Convention perceived that Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism constitute threats to international peace and security, the advancement of peaceful relations among States and additionally to the maintenance of human rights and diversities (Weinstein 2007:180).

As stated on Laumulin "China's present day inclusion in Central Asian security undertakings can't be judged as broad, as it has maintained its own particular role as a

minor actor in comparison with Russia's conventional mission of ensuring collective security over the region of its previous satellites. However, this does not preclude the potential for a more dynamic Chinese part later on, given the present setting of financial and political interaction amongst Beijing and Central Asian capitals. Securing stable day to day supplies of oil and gas from Caspian Sea deposits to the Xinjiang region on its western border has turned into a vital issue for China. On the off chance that Russia were ever to find itself unable to guarantee security in the area (or on the off chance that it essentially loses interest in this muddled and frequently uncertain part), China would undoubtedly need to take the lead, as it would some way or another be a hazard to lose control of the security situation inside its neighbours on the border, apart from being a test on its own dependability". China is prepared to mediate in Kazakhstan's internal issues to overcome the developing risk of religious radicalism and political extremism with a specific end goal to protect its own particular financial interests. In spite of the continuous talks about China's consistently expanding desire for regional leadership, chances of Chinese intervention in the sovereign issues of Central Asian neighbours is far-fetched (Weinstein 2007). As a result of Roy Allison "Although China has refined its strategy of slow infiltration and projection of its soft power as an unparalleled regional financial power, it has never prevailed with respect to the introduction of trust, but of fear sown distrust among its western neighbors In mid-2011, Kazakhstan witnessed a series of demonstrations against China that planned to enter into a ninety-nine-year lease for one million hectares of arable land in the country. In this way, China's role in 'resurrecting' regional security, if it does, is probably not an initiative but a reaction".

Present Situation & Future Prospects

It has been specified that the CSTO is exceptionally willing and endeavors to expand its concentration and capacities. "In January 2004, the Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organization outlined an operational plan in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The exact duties of the Staff have been set, in addition to those of the military units that take their requests from the Staff. In late 2003, at its session in Moscow, the Council of Defence Ministers had officially chosen to increase twofold the number of these forces from 1500 to 3000 by the start of January 2004" (Voloshin 2011:122). These progressions resulted in creating a successful detachment with enforcement

measures, for example, tanks, big guns, helicopters and fighter aircraft positioned at the Russian airbase in Kant. The Secretary General of the Association, Nikolay Bordyuzha, expressed that:

“The increase in manpower was not caused by specific military plans in the Central Asian region, but that it was a result of the concept for development of the military component of the collective security system of the member states”(Bordyuzha 2007:72).

Nonetheless, Bordyuzha called attention to the fact that the circumstances in the area were exceptionally tense. “Clearly, narco-trafficking is an issue for the region, yet what was far more terrible as per the Secretary-General was the way that the Taliban in Afghanistan was progressively regrouping and recovering strength. NATO’s effort to control and settle the condition in Afghanistan was only limited to the capital and its surrounding areas and had little impact beyond Kabul. International terrorism had not been vanquished there. It had just migrated itself and was still planning terrorist organizations and actions for a wide assortment of undertakings, including suicide bombings. The new generation terrorists are now active in a wider area like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These terrorist are additionally looking towards Central Asia as a potential target, or they consider it to be entry point to Russia. To prevent these terrorists from accomplishing their objective, that military cooperation with NATO must be enhanced” (Yaacov 2008:32). “However, until the Council on Collective Security so chooses, the organization isn’t allowed to directly deal with NATO. The Secretary-General also said that further endeavors were in progress in the CSTO system to enhance participation, fine tune structures and strategies of the organization” (Weitz 2011).

It is important that the CSTO states have common positions on essential regional and global developments; keeping in mind the end goal to ensure that they share a similar appraisal of occasions. The second essential course is countering threats and dangers. Bordyuzha said that, “this implies the coordination of efforts by the law enforcement organizations and militaries of the member states to counter such threats as terrorism, radicalism, narco-trafficking, organized crime, and so on. The third priority area is the relations between military forces. Above all else, this implies the framing and

exchange of troops in the western part involving Russia and Belarus, in the Caucasus between Russia and Armenia and furthermore of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces in the Central Asian region (ibid.p.89)”.

In June 2004, at important sessions of the Council on Collective Security and of the Council of Defence Ministers members laid out their plans for the military segment of the organization up to 2010. Accordingly Yaacov, (2008) “The CSTO states have concurred on the need to build up a joint air defence framework, to enhance defence exchanges, to expand information gathering capacities and knowledge sharing. The states have likewise chosen to additionally enhance the current regional troop arrangements and to develop the Rapid Deployment Collective Security Forces. It has also been concurred that innovative interoperability needs development and it is critical that there is an expansive supply of vital assets for the aggregate force. Keeping in mind the objective to proceed with advancement of military and innovative collaboration, the states have chosen to have one single standard for preparing and equipping members with particular kinds of combat hardware and military gear” (Yaacov 2008:28).

Apart from the exercises of a military sort, the CSTO states have additionally consented to settle on political-military issues. As stated by Voloshine, (2011) “For instance, in what capacity can the experience of individual CSTO states in peacekeeping activities be utilized to enhance the peacekeeping abilities of the CSTO. It isn’t unthinkable that the organization will choose to set up collective peacekeeping forces. This could be contingent upon decision by the UN Security Council on peacekeeping missions in the CSTO region, or even beyond this region. It’s implied that these possibilities could indicate the future direction of the CSTO” (Voloshin 2011:78).

Summary of the Chapter

This section examined the establishment, structure and functioning of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the inclusion of Member States in military exercises due to the impact of the organization on the national and regional security of these organizations. Nations the chapter is divided into two parts: collective security agreements in the structure of the CIS and in the context of Central Asia. The CSTO had exceptionally decisive moments in 2005 and 2010. However, there are no major

snags internally and externally while formulating its objectives and dealing with some of the issues that could be excessively troublesome. Distinguishably a critical issue was the finance related circumstances of the organization as some of the planned activities may essentially turn out to be too expensive. There are also different other concerns. There were a few issues of a political nature given Russia's detached behavior all through the previous decade that had given the US and Western European states a chance to drive a wedge amongst Russia and other CSTO states. As a result, the organization found it troublesome on occasions to arrive at a mutually acceptable perspective among the members.

The reality of the situation is that the US, Russia and China have turned out to be more dynamic in their engagement with the Central Asian region. For instance while Kazakhstan hosted the Rubezh-2004, it was also the scene of the "Eagle Steppe" exercises in which Kazakhstan coordinated with the United States and the United Kingdom. Some of the leaders of the CSTO member states seem to use their association with Russia as a way of forcing the United States to signal to Moscow that it must maintain its impact in the region. The other part of this agreement concerns the entire CIS and the enormous contrasts that currently exist between its member countries. It is essential to understand where the collaboration in the Commonwealth is going, as this could become a very important factor for the CSTO.

There is other aspect that could be said to have all the hallmarks of another Cold War like development. "However, the heads of states of the CSTO member countries have called over and over for the Organization to coordinate with a number of other organizations, for example, the CIS, Eurasian Economic Union, OSCE and the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO), the Anti Terrorists Committee of the UN Security council. Every now and then, the CSTO makes proclamations that Russia is keen on participation with NATO, through there are no genuine strides towards cooperation. NATO participates with individual CSTO member (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) or has unique partnership relations with Russia, yet not with the CSTO as a whole. This is something beyond an oversight from the side of the CSTO and it is by all accounts based on individual choices of Central Asian States".

The CSTO's Charter clearly characterizes various threats and challenges on which the organization is to center its focus. One criticism could be the way the Organization ceaselessly looks to expand the scope of its interests, rather than concentrating on the

current issues, which is something that slows down its progress in the Central Asian region and abroad. Whether the CSTO will advance into a permanent and very important organization in Central Asian security landscape depends upon the capacity to center around those focuses specified in the Charter. However, more than anything it relies upon the CSTO member state's sincerity in their desire to coordinate, with each having different orientation and also being part of different organizations, especially in the case of the Central Asian States.

Nor can the CSTO be compared with the organization of the Warsaw Pact (of the Soviet era) or with the SCO. It does not cover the entire CIS, since it only affects six countries. The CSTO is an organization that has generated a debate among researchers and observers in the region about their esteem and capacity. Most observers tend to believe that, since its inception, the CSTO has not found a way to achieve anything on a large scale. He was not ready to end the civil war in Tajikistan, or to control the fighting in Abkhazia and Karabakh.

A few observers have expressed that the CSTO was formed not to seek a dynamic policy strategy towards Central Asian states. It appears to be however more probable that states basically consider the CSTO as something that presently can't seem to demonstrate its utilization, while NATO has a long and for the most part effective history. Despite its activities, the CSTO remains primarily a regional organization that forces its member states to protect the southern borders of the CIS, rather than a collective security organization in the true sense of the word, an organization capable of both from the outside and from the security threats and problems within Member States, for example, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, drug trafficking and human trafficking in Central Asia. The Following Section will examine the CSTO, SCO, EU, OSCE, NATO and other regional and international organizations and their role in guaranteeing security in Central Asian states and neighborhood.

CHAPTER-4

***CSTO, SCO, AND OTHER SECURITY
ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA***

Chapter-4

CSTO, SCO, and other Security Organizations in Central Asia

Aims and Objectives of this Chapter

This section portrays the different regional and international organization and their role in Central Asia to manage regional security issues. Some of these were advanced by international organizations or states from the neighbouring regions. Their participation is likewise liable to develop and adapt to the new non-traditional threats to security in the region, for example, trafficking in illegal arms, relocation and restoration of refuges in border regions. The developing contrast in the role of Western powers and Sino-Russian concerns on terrorism will undoubtedly bring about the advancement of regional mechanisms to counter this risk with the joint endeavours of the US, Russia, China and the Central Asian republics. But the location of the US air base and military presence near Central Asia in Afghanistan even after the end of the first period of US military activity in Afghanistan frightened Russia, China and other Central Asian Republics which are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) too. Nonetheless, the role of different powers occupied with Central Asia and their impact in this area, and that of other regional organizations additionally would be the central point of this section.

Introduction

The CSTO and SCO are the significant organizations of Central Asian states as the main mechanisms for regional security. Presently Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are the most vibrant regional security organizations in the Central Asian region. The SCO covers the biggest territory occupied by more than one third of the total world population. As stated on “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can be said to have emerged out of endeavour’s between the former republics of the USSR and the People’s Republic of China which proceeded after the disintegration of the USSR and began with the development of the Shanghai Five framework in 1996. With the

inclusion of Uzbekistan as the sixth member, it entered the global scene as the SCO in 2001 at its Shanghai Summit in 2001”.

The organization, which include decided in 2015 to elevate India and Pakistan as permanent members of the SCO. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is set apart by its transparency and congruity with the norms on regional security through non-military means by advancing regional economic cooperation. The organization is likewise exceptional in so far as it incorporates nations which are neighbours in and around the vast Eurasian continent. The SCO is working as a regional cooperation organization attempting to handle the non-traditional threats to regional security in Central Asia. The organization, in a few regards, seems to be coordinating with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This might be seen as an Eurasian cushion together with the CSTO, avoiding as much as possible the NATO which is ceaselessly expanding eastward.

Accordingly Tulsiram (2010) “The other vital exercises of the CSTO are participation in the fight against international terrorism, radicalism and different other dangers, for example, drug and weapon smuggling, organized crime, illegal migration. A multitasked establishment for coordination of exercises and concerned activities has been made toward this goal. A Coordination Council that comprises of authorities of CSTO’s bodies has been set up in the structure of the battle against drug smuggling and preventive measures have been taken to fortify counter narcotics operations. Russia is today in a situation to enable the Central Asian nations to counter threats of terrorism and instability from Afghanistan in the event of complete US troop pullout. Uzbekistan, thought not in the CSTO, likewise thinks of Russia as the most ideal guarantor for the stability of the region. Presently the principal goal of the CSTO is guaranteeing national security, guarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states, reinforcing of military by tending to military and technical issues, keeping of an assembled arrangement for air defense, communication and collaboration in the field of joint border management with the states which are not members of the CIS”.

Emergence of the Shanghai Five and the SCO

When pressures from Europe were mounting on Asia in the 1952-55 period through Western undertakings in the form of a Middle East Command, the Northern Level System, the US military help to Pakistan, the formation of Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Baghdad pact, India under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru tried to address this aggressive push by advancing the idea of Non-Aligned Movement. Against the Dullesian procedure of collective Security through military agreements, Nehru turned out the idea of collective peace which was a further elaboration of his “area of peace concept” (Stephen 2002:27). India mutually with China articulated the method of accomplishing security through cooperation on the basis of the Panchsheel or the five principle of peaceful co-existence, which typified the way to deal with security through quiet concurrence for the conservation of peace as against military rivalry among countries. New Delhi went for making a structure of peace in Asia based on common commitment by the states to shared regard for sovereignty and equality, non-interference in internal issues, peaceful settlement of disputes. The 1955 Bandung meeting of Afro-Asian states put its seal of endorsement on the way to deal with security advanced by India and China (Kaushik 2004).

After a long gap since then the possibility of Asian security got revived with the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This procedure began in 1989 with negotiation on confidence building measures on the Soviet-Chinese border to help talks officially going ahead between the two nations to settle their border issues. These negotiations were later changed over into discussions on Confidence Building Measures and Decrease of Armed forces between China and four former Soviet republic Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Stephen 2002:62). In this regard, the respective talks that began in 1989 between the USSR and China multiplied in 1993 in multilateral agreements between Russia, China and three Central Asian states. On April 26, 1996, the leaders of these five states met in Shanghai. In subsequent meetings, 14 agreements were concluded on confidence-building measures and on the reduction of military deployment in the border regions of the Central Asian States. After border agreements were concluded, Shanghai five invited Uzbekistan as an observer in July 2000 at its Dushanbe summit. At this point it had developed into a

Eurasian Regional Organization to address the difficulties of inter-state relations in this region (Kang 2003:68).

The Shanghai five names was coined after the principal summit of the five states bordering Eurasia met in Shanghai in 1996 to consent to “Agreement on reinforcing Military Confidence Building Measures in Bordering Zones”. The second meeting of the three Central Asian states, Russia and China occurred in Moscow in 1997 when they closed a “Concession to Common Reduction of Armed Forces” in border areas. The understandings marked at Shanghai and Moscow affirmed that “the military forces stationed in the border regions would remain confined to barracks and the nations affirmed they would not utilize “force against each other” and that “no party to the agreements looks for unilateral military security” (Kaushik 2004:32).

The heads of state agreed that the foreign affairs and defense ministers of the SCO countries would meet annually to coordinate their participation in international and regional affairs, including those related to security and stability in Central Asia. They considered that steps should be taken to accelerate the process of negotiating and signing the relevant documents to encourage the establishment and future activity of the Bishkek anti-terrorist organization (Kumar 2010). The heads of State also requested that other reports on the fight against crime be ready to be considered at the routine meeting of the authorities responsible for implementing the law and security in Kazakhstan. Along these lines, starting with an activity towards confidence-building measures in the border region of the five states, the early regional system of the Shanghai five made extensive progress in a brief timeframe.

The spirit which prompts the upgrading of the Shanghai five formed in 1996 into a regional organization was the realization that regional security can best be achieved through the genuine endeavour’s of a group of neighbouring states in an area and who consider their relationship as basically harmonious instead of being antagonistic (Kaushik 2004:36). The security issues including environmental protection, water administration and cooperation and development of energy and transport links, other than counteractive action against trafficking in drugs, arms and illegal migration, are best managed through the participation of the states in the region themselves instead of a security structure situated outside the regions. The feedback of the SCO by Western observers like Stephen Blanc who argue that the organization has been a disappointment as a “security provider” with a long list of abortive attempts to revamp Central Asia under Russian initiative, is not justifiable (Kumar 2010:41).

It isn't reasonable to say that the SCO has played no role in the fight against terrorism in Central Asia and Afghanistan. In fact in August 1999 at the first summit of the Shanghai five held in Bishkek, it was decided at the Russian recommendation to hold regular meeting of the Heads of law implementation agencies and Special Forces other than ministers of defence and foreign affairs (Kang 2003). In November 2000 a meeting of the delegates of the five member states was held in Moscow for special consultation on the circumstance in Afghanistan. As Russian scholar Alexander Lukin rightly pointed out, "Two years earlier to the terrorist attack in New York, the Shanghai five had begun taking a shot at the Tradition on fight Against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism". He was referring to the background of the June 2001 Shanghai Five summit held in the city of Shanghai, where SCO was formed (Lukin 2008:52). The Shanghai Convention obliged the parties to hold consultations, examine their business prospects and discuss relevant issues in the fight against the acts mentioned in Article 1 of the SCO Charter on Counter-Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism. Article 6 urges the parties to share their resources and cooperate with each other through the exchange of information, the implementation of decisions related to operational activities, the implementation of agreed measures to prevent, eliminate and repress the acts referred to Article 1, suppress funding, the supply of arms and ammunition or other information related to its practical implementation, cooperation in the field of counter terrorism actions (Kumar 2010: 59).

As stated on Mahaveer Singh, (2008) "The joint declaration of war on terrorism and religious radicalism by the six SCO states unquestionably made a commitment to improve the atmosphere necessary to successfully fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The SCO has not just added to creation of a climate for a powerful fight against terrorism in Central Asia, it has additionally made a concrete contribution to this struggle by holding in 2004 the Sino-Kyrgyz joint military exercise in Kazakhstan in August 2005 with the cooperation of five members following the Shanghai Convention of 2001. The SCO summit of 2002 saw a critical progress in the setting-up of a firm lawful basis for a Eurasian regional security and cooperation organization when the SCO summit embraced the Charter of the SCO and Declaration of Heads of states of the members from the SCO. This progression was made in the wake of Russo-American agreement in Moscow for reduction of nuclear arms and the Rome Declaration establishing the Russia-NATO joint Council that caused some misgiving about Russia's pro-US tilt. However, President Putin during

his meeting with President Bush in St. Petersburg rushed to underscore the important role of the SCO” (Singh 2008).

This was again underscored by Putin in the press conference along with the President of Finland when he repeated that Russia keeps on having ‘major interests in the East’ and China was one of ‘Russia’s critical partners’. While proceeding with a permanent dialogue with the United States over the global security framework, Putin has also turned out with the idea of a ‘stable arc’ of a ‘buffer zone’ along the NATO in the West, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of the CIS in the centre and the SCO in the East, with Russia as a member from both the latter organizations (Kumar 2010:38). On the eve of St. Petersburg summit, the Russian media featured an integral multi-directional policy followed by Russia towards the United States, Europe, China and Central Asia to manage the present difficulties. Seen in this point of view it will be uncalled for to regard SCO as ‘NATO of the East’ a union of Russia, China, and Central Asian states to checkmate American impact in Central Asia. The Shanghai Spirit has projected to the world that an arrangement of regional security can be based on participation (non military rivalry) bringing about a ‘win-win’ situation for all (Kang 2003:40).

SCO Outreach

The SCO has made significant progress in China’s participation in the states of Russia and Central Asia. Another mechanism of multilateral cooperation to overcome the restriction of bilateral cooperation, China and other member states initiated the SCO after many years of exploration under rapidly changing global conditions. Accordingly Amiya Chandra, (2010) “Since its inception, it has made tremendous progress in the overall cooperation between China and the Central Asian states. All its member states support the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ of shared trust and common advantage, of cooperation in an equitable balance, of consideration for different societies, of fundamental progress, of a new point of view of security and new methods of international relations and regional cooperation. After agreeing on its underlying missions and focusing on economic and security cooperation, the SCO began its general development and collective participation in the fight against the ‘three evils’ and economic and trade cooperation, thus particularly contributing to peace, stability and prosperity of the region. At the Bishkek Summit in 2008, all Member States

approved the Implementation Plans of the Economic Cooperation Code, which covers 127 cooperation programs in 11 fields, including transport, transport and energy, telecommunications and agriculture. The proper cooperation mechanism and the future planning of the SCO have officially demonstrated their essential character”. The reality is that the SCO is in line with the interests of all the Member States that, through effective cooperation, have also strengthened their relations of cooperation (Lukin 2008: 57).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Retrospect and Prospect

During the period of its existence since 2001 the organization has had a vital impact in protecting security and stability and encouraging collective participation in the Eurasian region. The SCO was conceived on 15 June 2001 as a permanent inter governmental international organization comprising of six Nations China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Litovkin, 2006). “It was established on the basis of Shanghai five mechanisms. The principal objectives of the organization included fortifying common trust and good neighbourliness among members states for advancing their cooperation in political affairs, economy and trade, scientific-technical, cultural and educational spheres and in addition to energy, transportation, tourism an environment protection fields. Additionally, joint defending and protecting of regional peace, security and stability endeavouring towards formation of law based, just and reasonable new international political and economic order are promoted by the SCO” (Starr, 2005).

In the global level the SCO is guided by the spirit of ‘Shanghai five’ consisting of mutual trust and advantage, equality, mutual consultations, regard for the multi-faceted cultural diversity and yearnings to achieve joint progress. Accordingly Litovkin, (2006) “In external relations the SCO isn’t a closed alliance and isn’t coordinated against any state and region. The Council of Heads of States is the supreme body of SCO for decision-making. It meets once per year and identifies all the vital issues facing the organization. The Council of Heads of Government of SCO member states holds a regular meeting once a year to talk about strategy of multilateral cooperation and priority direction within the SCO framework to settle genuine issues in regards to financial and economic cooperation, in addition to spending plan of the organization. Additionally, meetings of Council of Heads of States and Heads of Governments,

there also is the mechanism of annual meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Economy, Transport, Culture, Defense and Security, Public Prosecutors and in addition the Heads of Border Organization of member states” (Litovkin,2006:112).

The central point of national coordination of SCO states is efficient planning system inside the SCO structure. As stated on Kumar, (2010) “The SCO has two permanent bodies Secretariat in Beijing and Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. The secretary general and the Director of the Executive Committee are selected by the Committees of Council of States for a period of three years. In China, the Year of Russia was celebrated during 2006 followed by Year of China in Russia in 2007. The two cultural programmes included a wide range of activities including cultural, educational, economic, and show casing of traditional customs” (Kumar, 2010). The China Year in Russia which was organized with extraordinary enthusiasm and energy in 2007 included bigger number of programmes, for example, cultural festivals and presentations and a function denoting the commemoration of the foundation of the diplomatic ties. The bilateral trade amongst Russia and China surpassed \$20 billion mark 2004 rising to \$ 29 billion in 2005. Russia’s trade with China has been expanding impressively faster than the Russian trade with other countries in general. Russia was one of the main trading destinations of China. Shared activities have additionally assured further growth. Around 19 Chinese ventures jointly with Russian were cleared with a total investment of \$ 2 billion in 2005. Russia’s investment in China surpassed \$ 500 million in the same period (Kulikova 2006:85).

In August 2005 Sino-Russian joint military exercise in the Far East under the aegis of SCO included advanced aircrafts, sub marines and marine landing tasks that had little pertinence to the anti-terrorists activity for which the organization was essentially created. This gave rise to speculations about the expected transformation of the SCO into a military alliance. With the ensuing purchasing by China of the Russian made IL-76 transport planes and IL-78 refueling planes and submarine class destroyers, these speculations were additionally reinforced (Kumar 2010:81). American observers Ariel Cohen and John J. Tkacik JR. have viewed the Sino-Russian war games in 2005 as a logical result of the Sino-Russian Settlement of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation marked in 2001 and the common world view and developing economic ties between the two Great powers. To check it, the American specialists

proposed reinforcing of US military, security and economic participation with India and Japan including cooperation in joint business ventures in the Russian Far East and Central Asia (Weitz 2008).

SCO and Central Asian Energy Strategy

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which had showed up on the international scene as the 'Shanghai Five' mechanism with the target of settling the border issues amongst China and Russia and the three Central Asian Republics as discussed in the previous chapters, has made a noteworthy commitment to change of the security situation in Central Asia with its confidence building measures and de-militarization of the border areas in the region (Starr 2005). It has been as of late progressively concentrating on regional economic cooperation among the member states. The SCO nations have great potential for useful cooperation in trade and investment which require greater focus. The SCO members had been performing well in their financial aspects with a combined average of 6.8 percent growth rate in 2005 (Kulbaev, 2005). China's growth rate during the three years (2003-2006) remained at over 9 percent, Russia's Gross domestic product grew in 2005 by 6.4 percent, and Kazakhstan enlisted a development of 9 percent every year during the 2003-2006 periods, while Tajikistan's growth was 8 percent and that of Uzbekistan 7 percent. Trade turnover of SCO in 2003 was 19.7 billion dollars. In the middle of the initial five months of 2004 it had gone up by 68.7 percent over a similar period during the previous year. But in terms of absolute figures it was a long way from being significant among the SCO members (Kumar 2010:95).

Accordingly Gasp, (2014) "In 2004 the SCO adopted an action plan with 127 clauses, out of which 19 were identified with energy cooperation, and 20 with transport cooperation, and around one third with education, science and technology. Energy production, improvement of new oil and gas fields and pipelines are priority areas of cooperation within the SCO. Then Prime Minister Daniel Akhmetov of Kazakhstan stated that the plan was to build up another energy network in the Asian region. Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are region's biggest exporters of hydro-carbon resources. These states require a solid energy outreach. The neighbouring China is the world's biggest oil consumer, and was anticipated to import 200 million tons of oil by 2010 and 250 million tons by 2020. Given the global growth

of energy utilization, energy partnership is turning into the key zone of global cooperation. Some SCO members can turn into customary and stable sources of energy supplies for China. Kazakhstan alone is required to supply China 15-20 million tons of oil every year. An oil pipeline connecting Kazakhstan with the Xinjiang region of China (Atasu-Alashankou) has already been completed; overhaul of the Kyrgyz pipeline was in progress and a Russia-China pipeline venture was under Discussion” (Gasp 2014:48).

The Chinese showed enthusiasm for energy cooperation at the SCO forum meeting held in 2002. China requires the Caspian region energy resources to meet the needs for its quickly developing economy. With 30,000 barrels a day moving to China by means of Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline is effectively useful, and Sino-Kazakhstan energy relations have changed the energy map of the area. For Kazakhstan this guarantees expansion of outlets contributing towards more flexibility and independence (Yakovlev 2006:45). For China it is a part of the drive to increase energy supplies from a source closer home accessible through the overland route that is not vulnerable to the US Naval’s aircraft carrier led battleships patrolling the Chinese oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf and Sudan. China’s energy search picked up a vital achievement when it closed in April 2006 a deal with Turkmenistan to construct a pipeline for transporting gas. China consented to purchase 30 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan every year. In the first stage the gas will be delivered through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Urumqi in Xinjiang and beyond it to Shanghai (Singh 2006:81).

The volume of supplies is expected to expand up to 50 bcm later. Then Turkmen President Niyazov seemed to have broken the strangle hold of Russia imposed business model over its gas holds by having another alternative route in the East to China bypassing Moscow. China’s energy engagement with Central Asia is expanding quickly through different agreements with Almaty, Tashkent and Ashgabat. It was assessed that soon from Kazakhstan alone 1 million barrels of oil every day (one-fifth of future) would flow to China (Pant 2005). Beijing additionally made an arrangement worth \$4 billion to buy petro-Kazakhstan Company. The Chinese state oil giant CNPC has also gone into a partnership with the Kazakhstan National Oil and Gas Company (KazmunaiGaz) for building up the division that is estimated to contain 480 million tons of oil reserves. In Turkmenistan out of 37 Chinese investment projects totaling \$ 383 million, about \$221 million are in the oil

and gas sector. The Chinese company is already exploring oil and gas fields in western Turkmenistan with expected yield of 2.3 million tons of oil annually. America is worried over China's expanding weight in the energy segment in the Central Asian and Caspian region (Kumar 2010:102).

Beijing is additionally expanding its engagement with Iran in the energy sector and endeavouring to produce energy ties with Saudi Arabia, a close American partner. China's strong influence and control of the energy assets in Central Asia is likewise anticipated that would encourage its expansion to the neighbouring West Asian region. To keep the Americans out who are to a great extent guided by the market forces, the Chinese firms might pay more to the Central Asian Republics (Starr, 2008). China's petro-Kazakhstan bargain has been seen as reprisal against Washington for obstructing the Chinese acquisition of the UNOCAL Company. Washington was accused to have pressurized Kazakhstan to postpone the development of the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to China which is considered to be an opponent to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Chinese authorities reportedly told the Tashkent Summit of SCO in 2004 that Beijing had an arrangement to put \$4 billion in the Central Asian nations. China additionally announced its intention to pay the full cost of about \$1.5 billion for construction of a highway from China to Central Asia through Kyrgyzstan (Kulbaev 2006:13). China's stagnant energy output and fast growing consumption is probably going to grow in the coming decades. China has turned out to be one of the world's biggest purchasers of oil and natural gas and nuclear technology. Energy has been dependably an imperative agenda at the SCO summits with the Russian-Chinese prodding's. China's oil consumption is anticipated to develop to 15 billion barrels for each day by 2030 from 7.4 billion barrels in 2006. In the instance of natural gas it is expected to increase to 198 bcm from 49 bcm during the same period (Pant 2008:15).

SCO and Central Asian Security Measures

The rise of SCO as regional organization of another sort, endeavouring to convey strength and security to the huge Eurasian region, is based on commonly gainful participation and inclusivity and transparency is an empowering environment. This organization has since its existence, demonstrated a specific potential to adapt to the difficulties of non-traditionally threats to security in this part of the world (Ledovsky

2010). The organization especially contributed in addressing the non-traditional threats to security from drug trafficking, illegal immigration and illicit traffic in arms. Its contribution to the battle against terrorism through anti-terrorist organization called RATS which is situated at Tashkent is worth mentioning. The SCO has contributed in a big way to the training and equipment of security forces of the member countries. It has been instrumental in raising the level of their readiness through various military activities. The organization has the RATS military exercises. The SCO held two Conventions on Counter Terrorism between 2000-09. The first Convention was held at its establishing summit in Shanghai in 2000. At the summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, another more far reaching counter terrorism Convention was organized by the member states (SCO Summit Report 2007).

In 2005 summit in Astana, the US and other Western governments criticized Uzbekistan for utilizing power to smother protests in the city of Andijan, whereupon the Uzbek President Islam Karimov asked the US forces positioned at the Khanabad base to leave inside six months. At this summit, the SCO Presidents issued a joint statement calling upon the US to give time table for closing down the military bases it had set up in Central Asia in the wake of 9/11 (Ledovsky 2012:17). Washington withdrew its forces from Uzbekistan and consented to pay more to hold its base in Kyrgyzstan. Be that as it may, the above anti US stance among Central Asian members from the SCO seemed to have weakened soon. Early 2008 saw the reengagement of the US with Uzbekistan. But this happened not as a result of any issues in the Uzbek-Russian relations. Karimov started getting concerned over the deteriorating situation in neighbouring Afghanistan and thought it to be in his nation's advantage to fix up the difference with the US.

The SCO's record has not been considered great in terms of advance in such fields as addressing the danger of terrorism and trafficking in drugs by virtue of resurgence of the Taliban resistance in Afghanistan in the post-2007 period. A few observers think this to be a result of decrease in Russian impact, bringing about debilitating effect on the organization. Despite what might be said, this period has also seen an expanded enthusiasm for the undertakings in Afghanistan by the SCO as was evident by convening of an uncommon SCO Conference on Afghanistan in Moscow. This conference was a notable contribution towards organizing the anti-terrorist endeavours of the SCO members by prescribing a few solid measures like additionally reinforcing the SCO counter-terrorist centre (RATS) based in Tashkent (Marx

2010:75). The Moscow Conference (2009) proposed more investment by observer states and additionally other interested states in the joint anti-terrorist military exercises led by the organization. The commitment made by the SCO in the post-2006 period, in the field of improvement of ideas of security and regional cooperation, the conclusion of the Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization at Bishkek in 2007, made the organization a perfect model of regional security and cooperation (Kumar 2010:108).

The SCO stands separated from its counterpart model of security organization NATO with regard to creating new ideas and thoughts having a strong bearing on the issues confronting the international community. The SCO member states pondered truly at their different meetings over the on-going world economic crisis and the topic of global security. These thoughts have led to a few useful recommendations which have evoked wide consideration throughout the world (Singh 2007:72). The existence of the Russian supported Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which does exclude China among its members and the SCO which has other than all the CSTO Central Asian member states both China and Russia, have prompted critics of the SCO to view this bifurcation as an indication of undercover Sino-Russian competition over the common Eurasian space (Litovkin 2008:110). In any case, there isn't much substance in this criticism as in October 2007 the SCO and CSTO signed a document of shared comprehension to incorporate regional and international security cooperation and the next month both concurred to a collaborative approach on Afghanistan. That a regional security and cooperation organization like SCO, whose member states have generally unique interests and aspirations, has achieved during a short span of time a solid stature in the international system is quite appreciable. However, fortuitous developments emerging out of various logical inconsistencies at times give rise to a positive direction in history (Singh 2007: 72). The SCO is a valid example; the pragmatic and transient considerations bringing about the development of another regional security organization in Eurasia have fortified further by objective factors. Such factors are probably going to impact their actions into a visionary model of international activity for ensuring security with the endeavors of the concerned countries of the region through equivalent and commonly gainful participation and non-military means.

The SCO and the United States

Accordingly Ajay Patnaik, (2010) “Because of the complex relationships between the interests of major powers in Central Asia, any attempt to strengthen bilateral relations may not have positive impacts; only with multilateral participation instruments that draw in every single major power can their cooperation be more viable and sustainable. Presently, there exist three essential multilateral cooperation organizations in Central Asia, to be specific the NATO Association/partnership system, the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai cooperation Organization (SCO)”.As stated on Gabdullin, (20114) “The first somehow linked for some time the US, Russia and Central Asia; the second includes only Russia and Central Asian states. The third links China to Russia and Central Asia. But none of the three connects with China and the United States of America. Since the end of the Soviet Union, the US has been assuming a dynamic role on Central Asian issues. Not only has it begun its cooperation with Central Asian states through the NATO Partnership for Peace Plan, it also reinforced relationship through joint counter-terrorist activities in the Afghanistan War. The SCO is the most essential forum through which China assumes its part in Central Asia. In the course of recent years, SCO members have figured out how to build up mechanisms for multilateral mutual trust, and also cooperation in regional security, and they are extending their economic cooperation at present. China hopes to advance its cooperation with the US based on the SCO expansion” (Gabdullin 2014:45).

According by Tulsiram and Patnaik, (2013) “In the light of imperative US interests and impact in Central Asia, the future advancement of the SCO must consider the US.Under current conditions, two means can be used to begin with one is cooperation between the two regional international Organizations, NATO and the SCO, the other is between the SCO and only the US. However, the SCO does not coordinate with NATO in its structures and bodies, and operation. The issue of US turning into an SCO observer state can be examined, as the organization has been joined by two new members: India, which is viewed by the US as a strategic partner; Pakistan which works with US as a counter-terrorism supporter, may not be unfavourable to the idea. In any case, the lack of opposition from the US to SCO activities would unquestionably help increase the position and impact of the SCO” (Tulsiram and Patnaik 2013:52).

Complementary Multilateral Options: The CSTO, SCO and NATO

In the post-2014 security condition, Kazakhstan will keep on pursuing a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy aimed to avoid preferring any one partner state above others. “A few specialists had observed that this strategy will come under pressure after 2014. In spite of the fact that Russia is without a doubt Kazakhstan’s closest defense and security partner, many Kazakhstani security experts trust this relationship will turn out to be more one-sided after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. However their reasons are steeped in ‘geopolitics’ analysis. In this specific situation, they believe that Astana considers the ramifications of Vladimir Putin’s reassuming presidency in May 2012 on Russian foreign and security arrangement in Central Asia could be frosty” (Roger 2013:97). Accordingly by Laruelle, (2012) “Other Kazakhstani specialists trust that there is no genuine consistency or general strategy in Russian security strategy in Central Asia, which may leave scope for the Kremlin to apply expanded pressure upon Central Asian nations indiscriminately or on a case by case basis. Earlier when Putin had come to power in 2000 he modified Russian foreign policy on Central Asia, and there is additionally nervousness that he may do so once more, maybe to reinforce Russia’s part in regional security or to apply weight on different actors or to shield Russian strategic interests from encroachment by others” (Laruelle 2012:108).

Our argument is that “Russia might use the chance to help its own impact in Central Asia, yet this does not imply a genuine and substantial move in the region to threaten security of Central Asian states. If Kremlin follows such a way, it would pressure Central Asian nations to coordinate all the more intimately with Russia on security issues following NATO exit from Afghanistan. This would be to their own advantages and help the regional elites of Central Asia. This ‘geopolitical’ understanding of the presumable course of Russian foreign and security approach in Central Asia is supported by Moscow’s efforts to broaden its military basing leases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which were effectively negotiated in the fall of 2012. The Russian authorities are additionally thought to be troubled with the absence of help from its Central Asian partners inside the CSTO following the Five Day War with Georgia in August 2008 and following Kremlin’s unilateral recognition of the autonomy of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, none of the Central Asian CSTO members took after Russia in perceiving these two break-away regions ‘Independent states’.

Referring to this strain in relations with Russia, Kazakhstani experts additionally take note of the fact that Moscow is worried about Kazakhstan's level of participation with NATO partnership, and this could be a reason for Moscow to be more proactive in its foreign, defense and security strategies in Central Asia" (Murat 2009:108).

According by Sergei Niktova, (2011) "One conceivable method for staying away from the possibly longer term negative effect of geopolitics on the area, or counterbalancing the effect of the Kremlin reasserting its regional hegemonic role, Central Asia needs to balance between the US and Russia or to hope for cooperation between these two global powers. However, experts in Kazakhstan see minimal practical prospect for any meaningful US-Russia security cooperation inside the region" (Sergei, 2011). As stated on Valeriya, (2011) "In spite of the fact that Moscow and Washington may have shared objectives in Central Asia, the issue is one of coordination, with little desire in either capital for genuine security cooperation between these powers. This also spills into multilateral systems that include the United States or Russia, particularly NATO and the CSTO, where political differences prevent security cooperation" (Valeriya, 2011). In this perspective accordingly Konovalov, (2010) "Some alliance members protest on political grounds to any official participation involving NATO and the CSTO, which is considered as a component to support Russia's role in the region. The inner divisions on such policy issues are not liable to be settled at any point in the near future. Kazakhstani security authorities believe that despite there being no genuine contrasts as far as advancing regional security, Washington and Moscow are probably going to seek very limited cooperative courses of action in Central Asia" (Konovalov, 2010).

Meanwhile, Astana is seeking further changes in the CSTO, since 2008. In any case, the efforts to enhance the level of security participation and choices for the CSTO making genuine moves during an emergency are not driven by factors connected to Afghanistan. Astana sees the CSTO as a basic multilateral security organization that should react to the developing and potential instabilities encompassing the CSTO (Roger 2013:31). Accordingly Gabdullian "Like Moscow and Minsk, policy-makers in Astana have turned out to be persuaded lately that the CSTO must be changed from being only a collective security organization against external dangers, and assume new powers to act in the case of potential internal security crisis. In spite of the fact that the CSTO was at that point executing radical changes to its structures and potential areas of activity in a future security crisis, the riots in southern Kyrgyzstan

in June 2010 gave an extra boost to this demand for change. For sure, changes to the organization from that point on have attempted to create a 20,000 strong multilateral quick response forces to augment the degree of intervention in humanitarian and environmental crisis situations” (Gabdullin 2014:22).

Accoeringly Aleksander, (2009) “The CSTO experienced its very own internal emergency following the de facto withdrawal of Uzbekistan from the organization, bringing up numerous issues over its capability to act during a regional security crisis. However, the changing role comes from far reaching understanding among the CSTO members that they should upgrade their military abilities, meet current and emerging threats and challenges, and enhance the organization’s legal framework to encourage activity in light of a future security emergency that overstretches the capacities of any member state and in this way requires multilateral tasks. As a feature of this procedure the CSTO will likewise endeavor to strengthen information security among its members, and some have even pushed for multilateral help if a part state is faced with an ‘Arab Spring’ type of situation” (Aleksandr 2009:10-11).

The CSTO’s Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (KSOR in Russian) “it must also not be seen as a fundamentally Afghanistan oriented force. The making of KSOR happened when Obama Administration declared its goal to end combat operation in Afghanistan. The force structure isn’t designed on counter-insurgency operations, and in principle it can be utilized as a part of various activities. In any case, the yearly military exercise since 2009 in which KSOR has participated doesn’t present proof of a more prominent accentuation upon counter-insurgency. CSTO authorities and Russian government officials advocate a more noteworthy role for the organization in preparing Central Asian security strategy. However, beyond the political talk, there is no genuine relationship between the presence of KSOR and the distant and theoretical danger of an invasion into Central Asia coordinated from Afghanistan. It is left to the host country in the CSTO to ask for help from the organization during a security crisis; it would need to be on a scale that overstretches its own defense and security forces” (KSOR Report 2013:25). “This situation may arise is smaller Central Asian states where the militaries, security structures and intelligence agencies are weakest, to be specific Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, it does not seem to be so in case of either Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. The latter countries are absolutely fit for managing such a low-intensity threat without calling for action to a multilateral system” (Konovalov 2012).

In such situations Tashkent is unlikely to acknowledge any weakness of its power projection capacities. “This would leave the CSTO to act in the region because of an Afghanistan-connected security threat originating from an attack into Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan as the main probable cases. Inside the CSTO Security Council, agreement amongst Kazakhstan and Russia would be essential for any activity, yet the procedure is probably going to be complex and may not bring about a quick result” (Laruelle, 2012). Accordingly the report on KSOR (2013) “With a specific end goal to convey a sizeable collective power utilizing the KSOR to eliminate or contain the security crisis, the size of the intrusion from outside need to be of a comparable scale. In addition, careful examination of the KSOR military exercise since 2009 reveals that the plan embraced by the commanders looks substantially more like a consolidated arms task against a conventionally armed adversary. Therefore, for the situation to be played out and for the KSOR to be at its best, the ‘Taliban’ or ‘Taliban-motivated’ invasion would be needed to incorporate the hard power components most likely procured through the concurrence of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Anything on a smaller scale or more modest could be managed by supporting host country forces in a joint operation led at a respective level” (KSOR Report 2013:38).

Nevertheless, one of the crucial shortcomings in the CSTO is that the circumstance and the readiness for military operation including by the new rapid reaction forces depend vigorously on Russian planning and Russian threat appraisal. “In addition, in Astana’s view, if theoretically a group from Afghanistan brought about a security crisis within Kazakhstan, it is far-fetched that any multilateral force reaction would be required” (Belousov 2010:18). “Astana supports the need for the CSTO with all due consent and security agreements; however this is absolutely not due to an assessment of threat from Afghanistan or a conceivable weakening in internal security. Similarly, Kazakhstan has ended up being a dynamic member in the security dimension of the SCO. In any case, its leading specialists consider the role of the SCO in connection to Afghanistan to be more confined to economic issues” (Valeriya, 2011). As stated on Roger, (2013) “Astana sees no reasonable prospect for the SCO ‘intervening’ or taking concrete action in the improbable case of a security crisis originating from Afghanistan-related situations. This is due to the basic problem at the core of the SCO, with Moscow and Beijing having diverse aspirations for its future growth. Moscow might want to see the SCO rise as a security organization, though Beijing confines its engagement for the most part to the economic sphere. In a security crisis,

accomplishing agreement amongst Moscow and Beijing, not to mention characterizing the strategic aims of such operation, is highly doubtful” (Roger 2013:75).

Accordingly Laruelle, (2012) “Along these lines, among security specialists in Kazakhstan, if not inside the corridors of power itself, inquiry is raised regarding what precisely the SCO could do during Central Asian security crisis. Besides, a few specialists in Kazakhstan visualize the role of the SCO as limited to intervention on humanitarian issues. Its scope to contribute positively if a security crisis were to happen instead of the CSTO is limited. These security specialist trust that the main source of conflicts in Central Asia is established in poor economic conditions and that the SCO could accomplish more to add to economic advancement and resolve water issues, among different concerns, or to go about as a forum in which to examine the region’s most urgent security challenges” (Laruelle 2012:109).

CSTO and Central Asian States

The foundation of a CSTO’s RRF and a larger Central Asian military grouping support Russia’s objective to make such a force. Accordingly Rizvi, in (2016) “As per the former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev , as far as fighting potential is concerned, it needs the same sort of training as the troops of the North Atlantic Alliance, strengthening the conviction that Russia plans to recreate an organization together like the previous Warsaw Pact to balance NATO and Western impact in the region. Second, the Kremlin is concerned over developing insecurity coming about because of the activities of Islamic radicals in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is likely to spread to Russia and other Central Asian states. Since 2006 overall security circumstance in Afghanistan has essentially worsened after the reconstitution and redesign of the Taliban, Al Qaida, and other extremist groups working all over the country. In spite of the efforts of the United States and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force to subdue the violence, Russian security authorities also worry about the security situation in Afghanistan as aggressor groups and criminal components keep on escalating their assaults against Afghan civilians and coalition powers”. Unstable security conditions in the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have repercussions beyond their borders, are also worrying for Russian leaders”. CSTO members are increasingly concerned that Islamic attackers fleeing northwest Pakistan

are moving to safe areas in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. However, of the three Central Asian states that share borders with Afghanistan, only Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO. Uzbekistan withdrew from the group in 2012. Russia has three military bases in Tajikistan, near Kulob, Qurgonteppe and Dushanbe, which are part of the 201 Motorized Rifle Divisions (Danford 2014: 28).

Accordingly to Alikber Alikberov,⁴ Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, “Presently no counter-terrorism cooperation exists between Central Asia and the US, which will have broader implications for Western efforts to involve the Central Asian states. International intelligence cooperation subtleties are motivated to a better or minor degree, through links and with the close support from states in this region. Kazakhstan will not risk harming its connection with US by entering into too many joint security relations with Moscow, which could create uncertainties about Western security strategies. However, every Central Asian CSTO member state can move nearer to Russia without being critical of Washington and by acting responsibly through the CSTO. This was visible during the unexpected detonation of conflicts, which showed the practical elements of the CSTO future during events in Bishkek and Dushanbe”.

Accordingly Novye, (2011) “The leader of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, for instance, was in control of politics in that nation since he was PM of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic back in the mid-1980’s, and a considerable number of the leaders of other Central Asian countries can also trace their political career back to the times of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, however, a few of these countries have outlined their own path in recent years, particularly because of the War on Terror” (Novye, 2011). In this context accordingly Vladimir (2011) “For quite a long while, the United States rented one airbase in Uzbekistan that had been utilized for missions in the war in Afghanistan and there have been rumours that other Central Asian countries were utilized for CIA activities for the War on Terror. However, with evident exemptions, like the situation in Georgia and the conflicts in Chechnya and

⁴. Prof. Alikber Alikberov is Deputy Director of Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science. Interview with Prof. Alikberov on 13th June, 2018, 15:00 p.m at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Moscow.

Nagorno-Karabach, these countries have remained inside the Russian range of leadership. Given the extent to which ISIS has extended from Iraq and Syria and into Libya, it is natural that countries in the region share common threat perception with Russia” (Vladimir 2011:74).

The way Putin is utilizing that plausibility to enhance Russia’s power is simply inescapable. “It is important that China has taken an unmistakable fascination in the Afghan settlement, sending signals to Kabul that peace in the nation can animate Chinese financing of different energy and infrastructure projects. Given this context, it’s not by any stretch of the imagination amazing that Moscow would utilize a threat like the rise of ISIS to consolidate its hold over the region” (Rizvi 2015:17). As stated on Rizvi, (2015) “Russia and its Central Asian partners see a domino theory that could work with respect to Afghanistan. They expect that the Islamic State, the Taliban or home-grown terrorists could use the open door to dispatch a revolt northward into Central Asia. Both Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev publicly expressed concern about Tajikistan’s stability at a summit in 2012 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Putin also warned that the circumstance in Central Asia had turned out to be worrisome and that terrorists were trying to break through to the region. In response, apparently inside the system of the CIS, Russia has managed another military concurrence with Central Asian states until 2020, and called again for coordinated action against terrorism while at the same time delineating the US strategy in Afghanistan as a failure in Central Asian region” (Rizvi, 2015:15).

Regional Security Organizations and Central Asia

A concise review of the CSTO, the SCO and the OSCE and their weaknesses during the Kyrgyz crisis highlights a discrepancy between the underlying underpinnings of the development of security problems in Central Asia and the weak institutional boundaries and current regional security organizations. The governments of Central Asia are becoming more involved in these partnerships to promote the survival of their regimes, extract rents and obtain universal legitimacy, instead of participating resolutely in the critical security threats that are developing.

As mentioned the report on PONARS, (2011) “Currently, all these regional security organizations are composed as intergovernmental organizations to facilitate exercises

against external or external threats. However, as we have seen in the context of the ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan, it is likely that the reasons for the destabilization and fragility of the region are simply the fault of the Central Asian states themselves. More than two decades after independence, the real problems of the political systems of the region are clearly emerging. Kyrgyzstan's experience of parliamentary democracy can give hope to the West. However, the nation has gradually emerged as an institution where Bishkek institutions have neither the power nor the authenticity to govern the South” (PONARS, 2011). “It can be considerably more remarkable situation in Tajikistan is of particular concern. Insurgent attacks have increased, including a suicide car bombing and a well-planned and coordinated trap by a Tajik military section and several attacks on civilian and governmental targets in 2010. The clash between Dushanbe and the provincial leaders appears to threaten the integration of Tajikistan as the country sinks into confusion at a time when northern Afghanistan also shows increasing signs of instability and insecurity” (Cooley 2011: 06).

The most squeezing security issues in Central Asia come from the particular shortcomings of the locale's district, its savage authoritative organizations, its breaking down framework, its permeable outskirts, and its ungoverned territories, and not between state security dangers customary, or even transnational, exercises that are of most worry to OSTC and CSO. In any case, it is genuine that the frail nations of Central Asia to really dread to address the crumbling of foundations and, then again, fortify the outside help of their routines through different outer tasks and charming exercises that strengthen the issues of inside and provincial security. Even with authentic worry to advance "local dependability" proposed by Central Asian governments and aimlessly recognized by outer on-screen characters, multilateral undertakings normally underwrite the uncommonly profound institutional abnormality that lies at the foundation of an enormous number of individuals present in the area of Security challenges (PONARS 2011: 122).

Additionally, “the external security outlook, particularly rivalry among Russia, the United States, and China for impact in the area, may also restrict the development of more powerful regional security systems and further encourage patterns of rent-seeking and forum shopping by Central Asian governments and their security services. Some positive steps were taken by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, who together underlined the significance of settling Kyrgyzstan and keeping up operation at Manas for the duration of the Afghan operations” (Cooley

2011:15). Accordingly Vladimir, (2011) “However, below the presidential level, the militaries of the two nations proceeded to pressure and promote themselves as the only security guarantor to their Central Asian partners. As a result, Russia, the United States and China all now give security training and help under the pretext of capacity building. In view of the regional record, it is doubtful that such bilateral external intercessions will have any more of a stabilizing influence over the long term than the regional security organizations that have endeavored to engage the Central Asian governments for the sake of advancing stability” (Vladimir, 2011).

European Union and Central Asia Relation

The EU and Central Asia association were set up to begin inside the 1990s. From that point forward the EU-Central Asia relations have passed a couple of stages. In the underlying post-Soviet period Europe had no interests in the area and Europe’s strategies had no particular vision and system. As of now, the EU proposed to enable territorial compromise in Central Asia. In the second 50% of the 1990s, Europe (especially Germany) started by attempting to understand the geopolitical setting in the Central Asia locale. The most unique individual from the EU, Germany, was worried about explicit issues, especially, the advancement and course of action of the EU by standard outside security procedure (Umarov, 2011).

The second phase of the EU and Central Asia relations began when Europe started to give careful consideration to Central Asia in 2000. Accordingly Dash, (2011) “The developing interests of Europe in Central Asia was caused by different concerns in Central Asia like drug trafficking, illegal migration, the growth of social instability, skewed democratic process, and economic down fall in a few republics. In addition, the development of a radical and militant Islam, was fueled by internal instability and social discontent. The EU’s advantages in advancing its model towards a politically and financially ‘emerging’ performer was a part of the EU’s global strategy and technique. In the meantime in 2001, the Central Asian countries acknowledged positively the dynamic European policies” (Dash 2011:33). As stated on Gidadhubli, (2011) “During President Karimov’s and President Nazarbayev’s visits to Germany, a few understandings for partnership with Germany were agreed upon. Then again 2001 became critical for Germany’s policy towards Central Asia and relations between them began to develop. Chancellor G. Schroeder in November 2001 has called on all

interested departments to take interest Central Asia. The Afghan approach of Germany and the EU began to place Europeans security concern in the Central Asian region” (Gidadhubli 2011:23).

Along these lines, the zone is of key geopolitical interests to the European Union. After September 11, 2001, a certified scan for vitality sources had begun. The 2001 crises expedited the issues of Europe’s reliance Arab oil to the European plan. Caspian oil is apparently an extraordinary alternative in such manner. This reality will choose the improvement of relations between Central Asia nations (especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and certain European states and furthermore with the EU all in all (Umarov 2011:101). Accordingly Chouhan (2011) “On November 13, 2004 at the first EU, Caspian and Black Sea countries Energy Ministerial Conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, the ‘Baku Initiative’, which is an upgraded energy and transport cooperation between the EU, Black Sea and Caspian Sea, was adopted. On November 30, 2006 at the second Energy Ministerial meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, a new energy road map was agreed. Its objective was to prepare a thorough legitimate and administrative framework for the EU-Black Sea and the Caspian Sea in a common energy strategy. The road map was agreed by the European Commission and governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan” (Chouhan 2011:87).

The third stage of relations between the EU and Central Asia began in 2007 with the program of the EU Administration in 2007; Germany launched another program with Central Asia for the period 2007-2013 to strengthen the political and financial partnership and invited Central Asian countries to join the program. “The 2007 EU programme gave a general structure to the EU relations with Central Asia and expanded on the usage of different understandings, the EU assistance programme and different activities undertaken by the EU to engage with countries of Central Asia. The strategy characterized the EU needs for participation with the states of the region, in all areas including in the fields of human rights, rule of law, good governance and democracy, education, economic development, trade and investment, energy and transport, environmental policies, common threats and inter-cultural dialogue” (ibid.p.90).

The EU program moreover required an expansion of political talk with all of the five countries of Central Asia, including holding up ordinary gatherings at remote clergymen level and yearly gathering of EU heads of Mission in the territory. When

all is said in done the advancement on executing the EU and Central Asia organization has been engaging. After only a solitary year, the dimension of collaboration created between Central Asia and the EU. The new EU and Central Asia association for the 21st century was having its impact (Vladimir, 2011). As stated on Gidadhubli, (2011) “In the countries of Central Asia, there is great enthusiasm for more EU participation at all levels and in all areas of interest. Concrete actions have been agreed and are being implemented or planned, bilaterally with the five Central Asian republics, on key regional issues such as education, education and training. Rule of law, Water and Environment. All the states of Central Asia have agreed to participate or continue an organized debate on human rights with the EU. The national coordinators for the strategy have been selected by all the Central Asian states, which show that the Central Asian partners are owners and fully participate in the cooperation and that the high level political dialogue has clearly intensified” (Gidadhubli 2011: 27).

The fourth stage of relations between the EU and Central Asia concerns the security point of view, especially the question of reconstruction and peace in Afghanistan, which are fundamental interests of the United States, Russia, and China, the EU and neighboring countries, including the countries of Central Asia. It is also important to integrate the EU, the CSTO, the SCO, as well as India, whose economy is growing and which has helped Afghanistan in any dialogue. As stated on Frigerio, (2011) “Border cooperation and dynamic investment in Central Asian countries could be useful to tackle some issue originating from Afghanistan. Security and economic stability of Afghanistan is critical for the eventual stability of Central Asia. The EU, the OSCE and NATO proclaimed to have an unmistakable enthusiasm for steady, prosperous and independent states in Central Asia. They additionally have a noteworthy need to collaborate with these states regarding regional and international security and on energy. In the meantime, the NATO and the EU are confronting some difficulties in their relations with these states. The NATO and the EU have also faced trouble in finding a reasonable harmony between, from one perspective, the strategic and economic interests of their own member states and the other long term objective of advancing essential democratic political change in the Central Asian region” (Frigerio 2011). Accordingly Dash, (2011) “Moreover, they have to accommodate regional and specific interest to deal with the exceedingly disparate interests of altogether different states, apart from the growing rivalry from different power,

Russia and China and rising India. With respect to the advancement of democratic rule and human rights in the region, it is essential for the EU and NATO to have clear and straightforward goals keeping in mind the end goal to refrain from arousing misconceptions or suspicions” (Dash 2011:33).

The West’s activity in the sphere of democracy and human rights promotion is regularly seen in the conditions of the region as a coercive strategy, which tries to ultimately effect regime change. As indicated by NATO’s report (2011), “the EU and the NATO ought to abstain from posing unacceptable demands, instead adopt practical and adaptable approach, creating in the meantime, if conceivable a discourse both with the scholars and with independent groups and the civil society. It would also be valuable to re-evaluate the effect of too much focus on normative aspects and adopt a coordinated and consistent policy. Central Asia’s engagement with the EU, NATO, and other global organizations is essential for advancing the capacity and security of the Central Asian countries and to aid their quest for financial growth and poverty reduction. At the same time, stabilizing and restoring the economy of Afghanistan is the key goal” (NATO Report 2011).

European States and Multi-lateral Organizations in Central Asia

NATO and European states have been engaged with various organizational and training activities with Central Asian states. As stated on McDermott (2012) “Every one of the five states is a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. However just Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have been engaged with the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), Participation with Uzbekistan was suspended from 2005 to 2010 in view of the Andijan episode. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have both sent troops to NATO exercises. Turkmenistan has not been associated with any military exercises with NATO because of its neutral status. Kazakhstan has the broadest relationship with NATO and is the main nation to have an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the organization” (McDermott 2012:78). Accordingly Zhetysu, (2010) “It is the main Central Asian state to have facilitated NATO exercises on its soil. In addition to the Steppe Eagle exercises, Kazakhstan facilitated a disaster response exercise called Zhetysu in 2009 as a feature of its work with the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). Since 2008, NATO has a training centre in Almaty, though a few experts

trust that the organization's effect on the working of Kazakhstan's armed forces is marginal at best" (Zhetysu 2010:09).

The OSCE also participates in security cooperation in Central Asia. The organization has offices in each of the five countries. Its activities in Kazakhstan focus on the fight against international terrorism, the management of security at the borders, the control of small arms and police reform. "In Uzbekistan, the organization is working to combat terrorism, violent extremism and drug trafficking by training police and interior ministry soldiers. In Turkmenistan, the OSCE has formed a force composed of border inspectors, customs services, interior services and national security services to combat terrorism and organized crime, prevent drug trafficking and the fight against terrorism to deals with human beings and strengthening border security" (Lewis, 2013). As stated on Mc Dermott, (2012) "In September 2012, he organized a training course to strengthen maritime patrol capabilities. OSCE training in Kyrgyzstan focused on law enforcement, border security and the fight against terrorism. In Tajikistan, the focus is on the fight against terrorism and police assistance, border management and arms clearance exercises. The OSCE has assumed primary responsibility for the preparation of Tajikistan's border guards since the end of Russia's border protection function in 2005. This includes establishing a national border strategy and training border guards to recognize and prevent illegal movement at the border. The OSCE has also established a College of Border Management Executives, which provides training to senior border officials in the region" (McDermott 2012: 85). Regardless of a long convention of participation with the Central Asian states to give security help, OSCE projects have confronted the absence of a more extensive technique to change the prospects for security help. Help with security and activity of security administrations. This has now and again driven the association to help ineffectual activities that could undermine the focal mission of the OSCE to advance equitable standards and human rights (Stein, 2012).

Accordingly Zhetysu, in 2009, "A few NATO member states have created their own specific relations with Central Asian states. Turkey has the longest history of participation, giving training to officers from the region since the 1990s. Turkey and Kyrgyzstan have built up a broad military training programme. The two nations have a course of action that enables Kyrgyzstani officers to get free training from Turkey. In recent period, Turkish instructors have imparted training in Kyrgyzstan on flight landing and diversionary tactics; while Kyrgyz authorities were sent to Istanbul for

training in communications. Turkmenistan has sent officers and security services personal to Turkish military academies. France additionally led regular activities in Central Asia, including annual activities with Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani military forces. France has stationed forces at Dushanbe airport terminal since 2002 to help its Afghanistan operations. Since 2002, Germany has offices at Termez in Uzbekistan that are utilized as a support base for its operation in Afghanistan. It kept on utilizing this base during 2005-09, when EU sanctions against Uzbekistan were applied due to the Andijan massacre, and permitted US forces to use this base beginning in 2008". In fact this gives the impression that access to the base is part of Germany's successful efforts to lift sanctions. Germany has also trained Uzbek officials all these years. In fact, there is some evidence that this training will sustained throughout the phase of authorizes (ibid.p.13).

Security Dimensions of India's Interest in Central Asia

According to Ajay Patnaik, "India's vital concerns are tied up with Central Asia due to latter's geographical location and geopolitics of the region. As a result, India is deeply concerned with the security and political stability of Central Asia. However, in the 1990s, India did not appreciate the significance of the region, though some limited credit lines were given to various Central Asian states. The triumph of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the middle of 1990s changed the geopolitical circumstance in Central Asia. The security of Central Asia and that of India turned out to be firmly associated. The post Soviet states feared any destabilization originating from Afghanistan, while India's worries about Pakistan's efforts to gain strategic influence forced Delhi to change its demeanour towards Central Asia" (Patnaik 2016:127).

Understanding that conditions of Central Asia could be significant accomplices to get control over Pakistan's expanding sway in and past Afghanistan and the danger of a creating belt of fundamentalism that supports cross outskirt fear mongering in Delhi gave money related assistance toward the Northern Alliance driven by Ahmad Shah Massoud. India as far as anyone knows gave the Alliance high disposition fighting hardware; worth about US\$ 8-10 million somewhere in the range of 1999 and 2001, and sent resistance guides and helicopters, Taliban was removed in 2001 by America and its partners. "But the instability in Afghanistan continues, making cooperation amongst India and Central Asia extremely critical. To guarantee its own security,

India needs to play a more prominent role in the Central Asian region. Yet, it was with India's economic achievement and the establishment of a friendly government in Kabul that New Delhi's moves in Central Asia started to change since 2001" (Patnaik 2011:173).

As stated on Ajay Patnaik, (2016) "The political profile of India as a balancing out factor has developed in the region because of its ventures, aid and help to Afghanistan since 2001. The ouster of the Taliban from control in Kabul gave India some breathing space; however the security concerns identified with international terrorism still remain. This and the growing role of its regional rivalries like China incite India to assume a more proactive part when the new century rolled over. Its economic engagement with the region has developed in the security and energy sectors. India's rise as an economic and military power has empowered it to assume a more dynamic role in its 'expanded neighbourhood' in quest for its interests. India's way to deal with regional organizations in Central Asia had been tepid before. While China led the regional states in shaping and maintaining the SCO, India was neither active nor demonstrated enthusiasm for joining the SCO until recently. There has been readjustment in New Delhi's approach recently; India joined the SCO as an observer following quite a few years of dithering. In 2014, India applied for full membership and was accepted to join the organization in 2016" (Patnaik 2016:145).

In this context, as stated on Tulsiram, (2012) "SCO is a standout amongst the most important regional organizations (along with CSTO). It is forming into a solid regional cooperation mechanism and has been dynamic in tending to the issue of Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan remains a common concern for all SCO members and observer states. The SCO role in Afghanistan would serve India's interests, and India drastically changed its attitude toward SCO, since it gives a valuable forum to draw in China and Pakistan on the issue of regional security" (TulsiRam 2012:349). SCO decided incorporate into its ambit as full members a few nations in Central Asia's neighbourhood, particularly India and Pakistan. Accordingly Patnaik, (2016) "The present members display an amazing case of unity among neighbours through settlement of border disputes and demilitarization of border. The expansion of SCO can uphold the conviction that all is good among the present members of the organization. Since the greater part of the insecurity is identified with ethno religious extremism mostly from the southern periphery of the SCO member states, the battle against international terrorism can be successful if the new SCO

states like India, Pakistan and observer states like Afghanistan and Iran cooperate with each other on this issue” (Patnaik 2016:128).

Security Challenges in Central Asia and Regional Organizations

Regional cooperation in Central Asia and the Eurasia can turn into a vital factor in the upkeep of peace and security in the region, which is essential for a stable economic development and progress. Any Regional organization needs to concentrate first of all on further regional integration in Central Asia itself and engages in cooperative relations with multilateral organizations like the EU, ASEAN and other experienced frameworks and creates with them effective multilateral relations. There are various issues among different on-screen characters in Afghanistan, including NATO, the EU, OSCE, and other global and provincial organizations due to their unmistakable investigation and comprehension of the circumstance. The issue of reproduction and harmony in Afghanistan are fundamental goals of the US, Russia, China, and the EU and to neighboring countries including the Central Asian nations. It is additionally important to incorporate the involvement of the EU, CSTO, SCO and India. Through border cooperation and with dynamic cooperation in other areas, Central Asian countries could be taking care of the security issue in Afghanistan. Secure and financially stable Afghanistan, according to Rakhimov, is essential for the eventual fate of Central Asia (Rakhimov, 2011).

The EU, the OSCE and the NATO pronounced that they have an unmistakable enthusiasm for steady, prosperous and democratic states as well as for security (regional and global) and energy. At the sametime, the NATO and the EU have additionally been having trouble with finding a reasonable harmony between their strategic and economic interests and the long-term goal of advancing major political changes in region. Moreover, they need to accommodate mutual and reciprocal ways to deal with the exceedingly unique interests of different states (Patnaik and Tulsiram 2011:320).

Role of Regional Organizations in Counter Terrorism Efforts in Central Asia

The dilemma of the Central Asian region stems from its geographical closeness to Afghanistan and the confounded circumstance around it. Today, inside of Central Asia, many arrangements of countering international terrorism are being evolved.

This incorporates both the activities inside the states through national projects, and various reciprocal agreements and understandings, and furthermore collective efforts through such organizations as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Anti-Terrorist Centre (ATC) of the CIS (Rakhimov, 2011). Considering the participation in anti-terrorists arrangements in the region, it is noticeable that the Central Asian states have not made their own inter-state system of counter-terrorism; this alludes to the CIS states also. It is important to underscore the part of the Russian Federation which supports all the regional level anti-terrorist ventures. China is a member in the framework. Various specialists contend that stability along the edge of its border and controlling rebellion inside China are part of the struggle against international terrorism (Karatayeva, 2012).

The issue is that technology against cyber terrorism threats and counteracting mechanism can become quickly obsolete. It is important to take note of that in informational, as well as in other counter-terrorists structures, their techniques keep pace with advancements in counter-terrorism system. It isn't unreasonable to focus on the adequacy of the organization of security, their chances to succeed in the proclaimed mission. Central Asia is incorporated into activity of such organizations as SCO, CSTO, NATO, CICA and ATC of the CIS. Throughout the previous years in Central Asia there have been various cases which could be viewed as a risk to the security of the states and region. These are the occasions of 2005 in Andizhan, 'Tulip Revolution' in Kyrgyzstan, issue in the People's Republic of China before Olympiad, South Ossetia conflict of 2008 and so forth. (Frigerio 2011:113). The central point of destabilization in the area is Afghanistan. In addition to other things there are problems in relations between the states of Central Asia, for example, boundary disputes and issues of water, power sector and economy.

Central Asian states find it difficult to take care of such issues freely without association of multilateral mechanism. With respect to the participation in every one of the organizations, it turns out to be clear that it is basically indistinguishable. It primarily alludes to the SCO and CSTO. Then again, structure and motivations behind these organizations are substantially complementary. It was clearly visible while working out the common list of terrorists and terrorist organizations. To answer the inquiry regarding how much the Central Asian republics' counter terrorism system is competent and sufficient, it is necessary to discuss how the Afghanistan issue is being comprehended and who tackles it. It is additionally critical that the Western coalition

does not consider inclusion SCO and CSTO as partners by any means. Summing up, it is conceivable to contend that the counter terrorist system in Central Asia is a combination of particular components with poor interrelation (Dash 2011:35).

NATO Activity in Central Asia

Since the presence of new independent states in Central Asia, NATO has turned out to be one of the main vehicles of American policy and regional stability management in the region. NATO security outline in Central Asia was developed on premises of conditions within the region, apart from rejecting such organizations like Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The most forthcoming member of NATO programs in the region appears to be Kazakhstan (Karkmaz 2007). In 1994 Kazakhstan joined 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) and participated in training manoeuvres of Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRASBAT) under the aegis of NATO. In 2004 USA and Kazakhstan entered into a bargain on long term military cooperation, like the American-Kazakh agreement to fortify Kazakh naval forces in the Caspian Sea. Consequently, Kazakhstan agreed on US aviation based armed forces to utilize bases in Taras, Semey and Shymkent (Patnaik and Tulsiram 2010:336).

In January 2006 Kazakhstan and NATO began the individual partnership programme design. Along these lines, Kazakhstan turned into the first nation which signed such a plan. It included Kazakh military specialist's planning by NATO experts, border surveillance cooperation. Kyrgyzstan had no dynamic participation with NATO until 2001, when the base of the U.S. was hosted in that state. In 2001 Tajikistan turned into a member of PfP program (Dash 2011:38).Tajikistan provided American air forces the possibility of utilizing airdromes in Kulab (south of country), Kurgan-Tube (south of the country) and Khujand (north of country).The fundamental measurement of NATO-Tajikistan interrelation moved toward joint activity in narcotics drugs issue. Neutral Turkmenistan for all intents and purposes did not participate in NATO exercises (Dundich 2010:336).

New Security Environment in Eurasia and its Impact on Security Regionalism in Central Asia

Eurasia as the name of the area isn't a new innovation. Over that last two centuries, the Eurasia region has developed utilizing the complexities of geography (division of the region). Because of certain developments, Eurasia ended up being a territorial zone in which the security activities of Russia and Soviet Union occurred. To a lesser extent, Eurasia also developed as a region showing an existential contrast toward the West, which is the reason, before the end of the Cold War, it was hard to discuss the territorial aspects, independent policies and personalities of the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact that Eurasia itself had a notional regional entity and identity of its own (Karkmaz 2007).

The combination of Eurasia identity with Soviet identity did not, obviously, make an antagonistic effect on the regions of Eurasia. This combination, be that as it may, ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. However some legacy of Eurasianism from nineteenth and twentieth century still remains. Eurasia as an area, with the SCO as a regional security organization, has risen as a fascinating case of the new pattern regionalism. Inside the structure of new regionalism, adaption to the new security condition has all the hallmarks of being the fundamental inspiration for developing new regional groupings for the area because of the end of the long stability of the Cold War period (Sengupta 2011). In this post-cold war period, three new types of threats, terrorism, internal unrest and drug trafficking, have begun to challenge the tranquility of the entire area of which the point of convergence, from the viewpoint of security, is currently Central Asia and the Caucasus region. The conditions of this area have thus been liable to an unstable back and forth movements related to nation building forms and to new security issues with critical cross-border dimensions, convincing state leaders to consider regional solution (Matveeva, 2008).

According to the leaders of these new states, the most genuine threat is the one posed by Islamist and Jihadist terrorists group. Obviously, there are diverse takes with reference to what the underlying driver of fundamentalism might be, whether it is socio-economic, ethnic or secessionist in nature. Yet whatever be the idea of its manifestation, religiously inspired terrorism, for example, that of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and comparable groups has turned out to be one of the most serious trans-state threats to the area. Without a doubt because of the spread

of global terrorism, the IMU threatens not just the security interests of regional powers, for example, China and the Russia, but also the more distance actors, for example, the USA and Israel. The effect of this transnational issue has expanded after the operations in Afghanistan (Karkmaz 2007:12).

The war in Afghanistan was a defining moment in Eurasian security as far as external forces involvement is concerned. Because of Operation Enduring Freedom, regional states appeared to be persuaded of the requirement for international cooperation in the battle against radicalism and terrorism. The Operation also simultaneously associated Eurasian security necessities with those of the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. The issue is whether responsibility lies with the regional states or with the hegemonic powers in fighting against the threats coming from the state failures or failed states. For example, Afghanistan situation has significance on this widening regional scene, which accounted for the mostly bilateral, strategic ties amongst Washington and Central Asian capitals (ibid.p.17).

Furthermore, aside the US war on terror and its strategy of keeping military bases in the region, the possibilities of external actor's intervention in regional undertakings has expanded because of the development of the Western standardizing mechanisms, reflected in, for instance, OSCE election-monitoring mission or EU affirmations against human right violations in the regions. Every one of these progressions in regional security situation has expanded the possibility of legitimacy crises for the regional states (Frigerio 2011). Building a regional organization so as to oversee security regionalization and make a regional pattern of co-operative behaviour while saving sovereign rights is an effective standard of legitimization for political and key activities of the states. Inside this system, the SCO which partly covers the geographical area of the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia security nexus has emerged. Moreover, it would also be an adage to comment that amid the most recent years, the SCO has made important steps in the method for systematization (Matveeva 2008).

Summary of the Chapter

This Chapter discussed the rise of SCO, CSTO, NATO, and EU as undeniable regional organizations of substance endeavouring to bring stability and security to the vast Eurasian and Central Asian region. These efforts are based on equality and

mutually helpful collaboration and inclusivity and receptiveness with an empowering environment. Those organizations have, amid their brief time of presence, demonstrated a specific potential to adapt to the difficulties of non-traditional threats to security in this part of the world. From numerous points of view, as this chapter has explained, the SCO testifies to the fruitful perfection of the approach of peaceful co-existence and the Bandung spirit together advanced by the two incredible Asian powers, India and China. It has additionally drawn intensely upon the Soviet approaches to deal with regional security in conformity with the standards of the UN charter and international law. As a regional organization removing itself from universal power politics and entering upon multi-dimensional cooperation among the regional actors and the different useful ways to deal with regional security in Central Asia, SCO is emerging as an important grouping to deal with non-traditional threats. It is too short a period to discuss the success and disappointment of regional participation in Eurasia by means of the SCO and CSTO. It might likewise be too soon to assess any future progress as far as hard regionalism or the form of regionalism the SCO and CSTO will take. The SCO may keep on keeping the two highlights till it builds up its own particular free security culture, which can be founded on any number of variables, for example, the scope of cooperation between the Russian federations and China. It can even be contended that the SCO and CSTO are right now considered by some as close to a discussion shop. In any case, both the prospect of border conflicts in the region and the keeping up of (relative) peace, which is clearly the case right now, despite the fact that there are number of instability sources alive, underline that even this sort of talk shop on pertinent regional security issues is essential for actors confronting the trouble of nation-building and regional integration process at the same time in the Central Asian region. However, the unilateralism in security policy and globalization, which expedites new threats on the scene, can't facilitate the appropriation to the new security situation of this region. Therefore, regional instruments, for example, the SCO and CSTO, became vital factors which make adjustments while engaging with the region. These organizations rise as new standards makers and create framework for the voices and strategies of regional states, whether they be big or small powers. This is the reason why an endeavour at security regionalism is more essential than its future bearing in locales, for example, Eurasia, where the regional limits are consistently reproduced by the power demonstrations of both regional and extra- regional actors. The SCO stands

separated from its contrary model of security organizations like NATO and CSTO in regard to producing new ideas and thoughts having an incredible bearing on the pressing issues confronting the international community like world economic crisis, multipolar world order and global security. Emphasizing the non-military way to deal with security by the SCO and the CSTO way to deal with security were sketched out at the different summits. However statements embraced at summits dismissed any endeavour to reinforce a nation's own security at the cost of others, which was considered as detrimental to global security and stability.

As expressed earlier, the SCO and CSTO support a comprehensive way to deal with security by considering the interests of all included and incorporating them all in the negotiation procedure. The divergence of the Russian supported Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which does exclude China among its members and that of SCO which has CSTO members states as well as both China and Russia has frequently been point out by some commentators as an indication of Sino-Russian competition over the common Eurasian space. However, there isn't much substance in this critique. The SCO and CSTO mark a reminder of shared comprehension to coordinate regional and global security cooperation and of concurrence on a cooperative oriented approach on Afghanistan. The following chapter will examine the real issues and difficulties for CSTO in the Central Asian states and furthermore talk about the role of US, Russia and China in the security sphere of these republics.

CHAPTER-5

MAJOR ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FOR CSTO IN CENTRAL ASIA

Chapter-5

Major Issues and Challenges for CSTO in Central Asia

Aims and Objectives of this Chapter

This part would feature the significant issues and difficulties of Central Asian states and the impact of CSTO and NATO in the region. NATO association with the region is extremely unclear after the United States clears out of Afghanistan. At the global level, Russia and China contend with the United States and its interests, values, and policies. The CSTO has been around for more than about two decades, yet it remains a substance that isn't outstanding in the eyes of the West. This chapter gives a fundamental review of the organization, its present status and its future potential as a regional member in the field of Euro-Asian security. This section would analyse if China is a challenger or an accomplice to Russia's power projection through the CSTO in Central Asia and Afghanistan. In this context as mentioned that, "The situation depended on genuine security worries that the CSTO members states confront. The political-military circumstance in this region and all the more particularly in Central Asia isn't exceptionally steady and there is a genuine plausibility of the rise of armed conflicts between the states in Central Asia". The CSTO members are exceptionally positive in their examination of its activity and draw some profitable lessons from their experience for future CSTO tasks.

Introduction

There are major issues and difficulties for Central Asian security and challenging factors for different CIS nations. In this perspective the regional security of Central Asia depends on the level of stability inside Afghanistan and its outside relations with its neighbouring states. Afghanistan isn't just critical for regional security, but at the same time is significant to the area's economic and political improvement. As Ashraf Ghani, Director of the Afghan Progress Commission expressed, "The region needs to settle on a decision, a stable Afghanistan is significant. However, there is approaching uncertainty with regards to the capacity of Afghan forces to safeguard the state against internal and external extremists and to maintain advances in counterterrorism

and counterinsurgency that the U.S. sponsored NATO led the international Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan under UN orders, since the United States started military activity against the Taliban in 2001. The year 2014 is the due date that was set for ISAF troops to pull back from the war torn nation and hand over the duty regarding guaranteeing security in the country to the Afghan Security Forces” (Kang 2015:72).

To this day, the powers of the United States of America and NATO are moving from a battle mission to an assistance mission. According by Lukin, (2013) “The members of the ‘Bonn+10’ conference recognized 2011 as the separating point from Progress to the Transformation Decade, amid which the weight on the international community to help Afghanistan in keeping up peace and proceeding to build up its administrative changes ought to steadily reduce. A few essential inquiries require informed and intelligent reactions. During this transformation decade, what will the security picture in Afghanistan resemble? That will supplant the Afghan security and US forces to achieve fundamental stability in Afghanistan, in order to contribute to political and financial progress in the country and the region” (Lukin 2013: 19).

As stated on Litovkin, (2015) “The Central Asian states have been worried about the situation in Afghanistan after U.S., NATO and ISAF powers decided on large scale withdrawal in 2014. Through a study of local media and appraisals from prestigious security organizations, the interests and political will of every Central Asian state are to protect their own particular security and that of the region as a whole in dealing with Afghanistan. They additionally portray and look at the regional trade and security participation endeavors with respect to Afghanistan and to external threats to each Central Asian state. These interests are then contrasted and each state’s individual and collective ability to satisfy them, considering an assortment of qualities identified with administration, economic strength, security and armed forces capacity, and national foreign policy strategy, alongside different factors that may hinder future regional cooperation endeavors. Finally, relative examination of these characteristics helps with deciding future engagement approaches with Afghanistan of every Central Asian state” (Litovkin 2015).

Because of our investigation it is contended that the low dimensions of security powers measure, both existing and anticipated, their contrasting dimensions of political will and targets concerning security activities in Afghanistan, and the nonappearance of effective collaboration among the Central Asian states on a variety

of related security issues will constrain their capacity to arrange in a comprehensive push to develop strength in Afghanistan. In this manner, collective security and Central Asia will assume just a minor part after 2014 in comparison with the U.S. and ISAF security activities in Afghanistan before 2014, thus influencing the regional security of Central Asia as well (Weitz 2016). As on Expressed by Weitz, (2016) “Rather, the nations will proceed as they have been doing, so far making a buffer zone of security against any negative spill over impacts because of any conflicts that may escalate in Afghanistan. These conflict possibilities include invasions from terrorist’s organizations, drug trafficking, and other organized crime. Besides, they will build their dependence on either bilateral or multilateral security relations with bigger superpowers and regional organizations, for example, the U.S., Russia, or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organizations (SCO) to supplant their weak military, drug control, and border security situation, and also different insufficiencies inside their individual security segments” (ibid. p. 62).

The Role of Russia in CSTO

Russia’s policy towards the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has attracted significant attention in the previous few years, for the most part because of this organization’s non-intervention in Kyrgyzstan’s interethnic emergency (2010), its part in post-2014 Afghanistan (Lamulin 2012) and, in addition, its ability to address internal conflicts in a few CSTO member states. As the quantum of security challenges develops, numerous questions arise as to the part that the CSTO can truly play in its region. As the CSTO’s biggest and most strongest part, Russia and its policies have to a great extent characterized this current organisation’s progress (Pedersen 2002:19). Questions arise as to why Russia draws in with the CSTO and how it connects with individual CSTO members, how Russia is attempting to utilize it in specific cases and with what outcomes. There is much indecisiveness around these issues (Breslin 2012).

The most across the board contention is that the CSTO is incapable and fractured as a security provider in the post-Soviet region. However, the concept of Russian foreign policy defines the CSTO as one of the key elements of the modern security framework in the post-Soviet space. Russia is the engine of the CSTO and devotes a

range of resources to the maintenance of the organization. The CSTO Secretariat is situated in Moscow and the greater part of its forces is composed of Russian nationals. The CSTO Secretary General, Nikolay Borduzha, is usually regarded even by critical, liberal Russian researchers as someone with genuine potentiality of reinforcing the CSTO (Allison 2004:12). Russia also uses global forums, for example, the UN, the OSCE and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to elevate the status of the CSTO. So for what reason does Russia put differed assets in the CSTO and keep on engaging with it? It is also that the CSTO has essential utility in Russia's overall policy other than regional security provision and these should be examined (Nechepurenko 2013:25).

Sanjay Rajhans⁵ of the faculty of Higher School of Economics expressed his views on Russia's role in Central Asia, "There is a common opinion that Russia's foreign policy towards Central Asia always had 'neo-imperial' flavour and scarcely different since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The assumption is positively far from specific. Indeed, Central Asia has been recognized for a long time as Russia's historic sphere of influence, however, Russia's foreign policy suffered several major setbacks, even affected by shifts in ground situation in its near abroad. Thus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have come to play a pivotal role in Russia's regional policy. Kazakhstan is one of Russia's most dependable and significant ally, and is a partner in the CU (together with Russia and Belorussia) and CES (Common Economic Space), as well other Russian-led organizations such as Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are associates of both the CSTO and EurAsEC forum, and have declared their aspiration to join the CES. Both countries are deeply depending on their bilateral security and economic relations with Russia".

The other across the broad discussion on the CSTO centers on the subject of whether it is a real international organization or 'a kind of mythical outfit'. Most researchers contend that the CSTO constitutes an essential forum for Moscow's arm twisting approach and that it is an instrument for domination, unilateralism and authority. In any case, perspectives of Russian specialists and policymakers are more varied but are

⁵. Dr. Sanjay Rajhans is a faculty of Higher School of Economics, Department of Public policy. Interview with Dr. Rajhans on 14th June, 2018, 14:00 p.m at the Institute of Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

clear that everything that Russia needs to overcome in the CSTO it will get past successfully (Torjesen 2009). If this isn't the situation, failure to managing constraints or missteps of Russian approach to the CSTO can turn it into a democratic anarchic organization. Without anybody overwhelming inside it to work out a typical position, decision-making would be a long and troublesome process in CSTO. By exploring how Russia participates in the CSTO with other individual members, this study shows that there are different kinds of engagement inside this organization from non-activity to unilateralism from through bilateralism to multilateralism (Basharatyan 2012). This can be traced by a review of Russia's interests in the CSTO. The chapter considers types of Russian engagement inside this organization. Further on, the spotlight will be put on Russia's practical use of the CSTO in its foreign policy. The connection between Central Asian nations and CSTO approach towards 'multilateralism' and in addition, the prospects for this international governmental organization in regional integration (Nechepurenko 2013:26).

Overall Trends in Central Asian Military and Security Force Capabilities

As on Expressed by Marat, (2010) "In recent years, all Central Asian governments have expanded spending on their military and security forces (see table-1). This expansion has been most articulated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The utilization of this extra financing has fluctuated from nation to nation. Kazakhstan has spent fundamentally on equipment, including both purchases of new armaments and modernization of existing equipment. Uzbekistan has spent principally on officer salary hikes and enhancing conditions for conscripts, in order to ensure their motivation. Given the distinctions in the size of every country on national spending, plans shift the focus away from defense spending" (Marat 2010:56). One report IISS Information indicated that, "In 2010 showed that in terms of defence spending as a percentage of every nation's GDP (Gross Domestic Product), Uzbekistan was the most leading in the region, spending 3.5 percent in 2010. Turkmenistan was close, at 3.4 percent, with Tajikistan at 1.5 percent. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan spends the most on defence in absolute terms, due to the large size of its economy, it amounts to only 1.1 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. Kyrgyzstan spends the minimum, at just 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product" (IISS Information 2013).

The consequence of expansion is a continuous increment in abilities, despite the fact that the degree of change shifts from nation to nation. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan seem, by all accounts, to be enroute to building military forces that are moderately proficient by creating international guidelines, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still have critical issues keeping up even a small quick response force in a high state of preparedness (Thomsen 2010). According by Markowitz, (2011) “Turkmenistan has significant problems to develop a serious military force. Without the human resources it finds difficult to build up a strong military that meets its security needs. Beyond access to military bases, the fundamental security enthusiasm of most outside actors in Tajikistan remains limited to keeping up internal stability and guaranteeing narcotics prohibition” (Markowitz 2011).

Table.1. Annual defence spending in Central Asian states, 2004-2012

(Figures are in US\$ millions)

Country	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year
State	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005	2004
Kazakhstan	2270	1770	1120	948	1610	1183	648	458	357
Kyrgyzstan	105	102	96	44	46	41	36	73	64
Tajikistan	164	146	84	88	79	87	72	50	45
Turkmenistan	_____	210	261	250	84	209	183	173	165
Uzbekistan	_____	1420	1420	1240	_____	94	84	55	54

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2013,

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.ZS?>

Of course, defense spending is only part of the equation for evaluating the armed forces of Central Asia. Given leaders concerns about threats such as terrorism, internal political opposition and major dissidents, it is not surprising that a significant number of Central Asian states are devoting internal security (Marat 2010). “In most

states of Central Asia, service in the police and in various security services is clearly more preferred and more lucrative than in military service. According to some experts, this situation is essentially the consequence of more possibilities of corruption in these services. For most security guards, the ability to collect bribes is a stable source of income. Border control agents also benefit from sources of income related to drug trafficking” (ibid.p.75).

As on Expressed by Thomsen, (2010) “The link between the security forces and the ruling elites is changing from one state to another in the region. In poorer countries, security forces tend to fragment, provoking a civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s and limiting the state’s ability to exercise control over the remote areas of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the other three resource-rich countries, security forces are more closely linked to the state. This was particularly the case in Uzbekistan, whose resources were of a type that required state investment, a situation that favored dependence on the regime for both local elites and individuals belonging to the state. The security device the division of labor between the army and the security services in Central Asia is similar to that observed in other countries of the world. While the military focuses mainly on external threats, the security services cover internal threats. Given the apparent risks of internal unrest in the region and the fear of terrorist acts by radical Islamist forces, it is not surprising that security forces have a higher status and mobilize more resources” (Thomsen 2010: 32).

Challenges to CSTO in the Central Asian Region

The ascent of new worldwide issues has made it problematic for states to deal with them all alone and states have in this manner looked to unite, with others through various associations. Russia, just as other part conditions of the CSTO, sees the solid bit of leeway in cooperating against such dangers, especially in the financial and security fields. Because of the weakening monetary and security circumstance since the finish of the Cold War, different territorial foundations have been comprised in the post-Soviet space (Robert 2011).

Accordingly Patnaik, “for Russia, the present security regime essentially does not appear to be sufficiently competent to handle new and complex threats with Afghanistan being the most striking illustration. In fact, Russian authorities have pushed for multilateral cooperation between the CSTO and NATO basically with a

specific goal to deal with the issues exuding from the circumstance in Afghanistan. This also runs in accordance with the neoliberal approach which claims that by joining forces, states try to amplify total impact. Since stabilizing Afghanistan is in the basic interest of both NATO and the CSTO, cooperative participation is by all accounts could be a pragmatic decision. For the members from the CSTO and particularly Russia, the significant worry with respect to Afghanistan is the enormous increment of around 40,000 percent in the opium cultivation, a decade since the coalition attacked Afghanistan in 2001, and the consequent surge of opium and heroin". As reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), published in June 2010, "hard drugs produced from opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan kill around 100,000 people per year. Russian authorities say that between 30 and 40,000 of those killed are Russian citizens and that the vast majority of drug addicts, who number around 2 million in Russia, are young (18 to 39 years old).The Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s".

Accordingly Anuradha Chenoy, "Russia has long criticized NATO's inability or even unwillingness to handle this issue of opium production. NATO's strategy on destroying poppy fields has ended up being exceptionally insufficient. Opium poppy field's eradication operation are left in the hands of Afghan counternarcotics agencies, which utilize manual primitive methods, while NATO focuses for the most part on crushing the rebellion and re-building up a more secure government in Kabul through U.S. and NATO forces. NATO's position on the narcotic issue is that with the progress of the Afghan economy and society, Afghans will start to acquire their livings through different means than being dependent on drugs (Kang, 2015). Russia instead believes that the grass-root issue should be dealt with in the first place, to be specific the drug production, before Afghanistan can have any possibility in improving its economy and society. Actually, in a handful of areas where the CSTO has really proven its value, these are anti-drug activities". As a result, this problem could be a practical alternative to regional cooperation. However, the best way to deal with this problem seems to be to prevent opium poppy cultivation.As on Expressed by Weitz, (2008) "This is consistent with conventional pragmatic thinking that states only collaborate on the basis of shared interests and face common threats.For Russia and its CSTO partners, one of the biggest threats emanating from Afghanistan is the increase in the production of drugs flow the region, while for the United States and its

American partners. In NATO, the fight in Afghanistan is part of a larger war against terrorism initially driven by the Bush administration” (Weitz 2008).

Accordingly, Anderson⁶ explains, “the end of the American military initiative in Afghanistan and the closing down of that overland supply route through Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan will have all kinds of ramifications. Most notably, it will remove one of the major interests that the United States has in Russia”.

Accordingly Mahaveer Singh, (2000) “Russia has been for quite a while endeavouring to acquire parallel status with global powers like the US or China, and one of its methods for accomplishing it might be through the formal international legitimization of the CSTO. By legitimizing the CSTO, Russia could both measure up to balance with the US as a prevailing powers leading a regional security organization like the US inside NATO and furthermore shore up its impact with the CSTO member states, conceivably undermining their current bilateral ties with the PFP or the EAPC. NATO would then have to manage the CSTO as a whole, risking jeopardizing the effectiveness that bilateral ties can achieve”. As stated on Gasp, (2014) “Given that the CSTO is based on a consensus among the Member States, similar to that of NATO, the risk of Member States voting or opting for potentially useful cooperation could be too high. Neoliberal institutionalism asserts that institutions can reduce transaction costs, but considering the possible collaboration between the CSTO and NATO, it is likely that the transaction costs. In the sense of signing agreements and a consensus would be too high and would therefore prevent the cooperation. In this case, from a neo-realist point of view, given that national interests outweigh the interests of the organization as a whole, only one State could be motivated to use its veto” (Gasp, 2014).

Afghanistan Factor

As on Expressed by Rizvi, (2015) “Russian and Central Asian anxieties about potential threats from Afghanistan and the probability of associated disappointment are long standing and existed before the fighting at Kunduz in 2014. As it were, they

⁶. Aleksandr Anderson is a Research Scholar of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science. Interview with Anderson on 18th June, 2018, 13:00 p.m at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Moscow.

are not just strategic articulations of the present Russian hostility to American role in the region. In September, 2014, i.e., prior to the seizure of Kunduz but after the violence in Tajikistan, Putin cautioned that the circumstance in Afghanistan was falling apart. He required not just a global coalition there as he had in his diplomacy with respect to Syria. In addition he was for regional ventures and robust action by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)” (Rizvi 2015:47). Woodrow Wilson International Centre’s Kugelman says that, “while Washington dislikes to allow its geostrategic rival to be active in a greater part in Afghanistan, their interests are to a great extent convergent there and a bigger Russian involvement may demonstrate accommodation from Washington. The uncomfortable truth is that Moscow and Washington share fundamentally the same interests in Afghanistan. Both are for helping the region to acquire greater strength, they both help a peace procedure with the Taliban, and they both look for a dependable and capable Afghan government. Moscow can end up helping Washington in Afghanistan in a big way even if indirectly. However, in light of the Russian actions in expanding its impact in Central Asia, then US Secretary of State John Kerry, on a travel to the Central Asian states, said that the U.S. is looking to boost trade and security ties with nations in danger of falling further under the influence of Kremlin”.

The Strength of CSTO in Central Asia

The CSTO is a relatively young organization that is still developing, unlike NATO, which has almost 70 years of experience. The CSTO has not finished 20 years since its formal creation. In any case, its period of development coincided with the most recent period of reinvention of NATO and a period in which both institutions addressed the comparative difficulties of the security administration in a country. It should be able to apply to the CSTO some of the same tests and surveys formally used with NATO to study the basic concepts and perspectives of the organization in the light of different international experiences (Zehfuss 2001).

Accordingly Tulsiram, in 2010, “the estimation of the CSTO is most clearly seen in a pragmatist light when perceived from Moscow. All through the history Russia has been strongly sensitive to threats from its borders and the danger of encirclement. Connecting whatever number as could be expected under the circumstances of its Western and Southern neighbours through the CSTO serves the triple defensive

purpose of making it harder for them to assault Russia or fight among themselves enabling Russia to help openly or indirectly in reinforcing their external borders and preventing or restricting the establishment of another regional hegemony like the USA and China (Waltz 2008:102). These inform the major efforts Moscow has made for CSTO's prosperity, yet it doesn't necessarily mean that Moscow has pursued its pragmatist advantages in the most intelligent and effective way. In the close term its strategy is complicated by its inclination to keep up separate bilateral relations with each member state for most critical use, which makes it harder for the rest to combine against Russia but also additionally conflicts with solidarity and convergence of procedures in the group".

In this context, Boonstra said that, "Given the fact that the states of Central Asia lack natural cohesion and most of them have complicated relations, Russia did not help with its biased practices and its sporadic, indifferent and proactive strategies to restore friendly relations between them. For example, given that Kazakhstan's economic development has made it one of the major states in Central Asia, a state that Uzbekistan once held as the most populous in the world, relations between the two have often been the test" (Boonstra, 2008). The appearance of hostilities between Uzbek and Kyrgyz ethnic groups in mid-2010 is also an indication of the weak relations between the Member States. According by Weinstein, (2008) "Although they may be neighbors and members of the same organization, this does not mean that they have developed a natural friendship. The relationships are mostly strategic and each strategy aims to strengthen their national benefits. These conflicts with the possibility of creating a sustainable organization based on shared interests. In the longer term, the future shared by the local states, that is, the more or less authoritarian regimes, and the realistic choice of the policies and structures of Russia to support these regimes could also All the safety net fragile and somehow ineffective. The Russian authorities said that Russia's willingness to help authoritarian regimes in the region was a necessity, since states with powerful leaders are seen as the best option for developing societies and out of financial difficulties" (Weinstein, 2008).

Accordingly Zehfuss, in 2001, "Further, by ignoring the misdeeds of member countries, Moscow has attracted them away from Western partnership, in this manner enabling it to develop its strategic camp in the area to a status more equivalent to the Western one. As expressed all through this research, the fundamental objective of Russia is by all accounts is to make CSTO a cohesive group of states that regards the

principle of sovereignty and non-interference as most desirable. The inconvenience is that a grouping of dictatorships is characteristically non-cohesive. Authoritarian regimes are probably prone to follow their national interests above and often against the group's common benefits. This policy seems therefore to fall short and might not lead to the construction of stable security architecture as long as possible. The willingness of smaller members to remain in the CSTO and of Uzbekistan to rejoin it after Andijan events can also be framed in pragmatist terms. In a global framework in the light of political reactions and self assertions, states are cautious over the hegemonic propensities of bigger neighbours". As the pragmatic idea of "balance of power" suggests, states can join associations and coalitions to adapt to a state or group of more powerful states that they consider threatening (Kurt, 2010). They will probably want to do this by working with accomplices who probably will not send them, but in some conditions they are forced to follow the movement of the highest possible state, in the hope that it protects them at least or will divert the rival actions (Robert 2011).

This analysis makes sense in the context of "the CSTO if one considers that non-Russian members are primarily concerned with protecting themselves from the Western political agenda, or the US 'superpower' role and the global strength of the US. Probably, this may be an adequate explanation for a case like Uzbekistan from one point of view, and Belarus faces an enlarged NATO on its border with the other. From the point of view of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the main attraction of the CSTO could be the Russian offer to sell military supplies at a lower cost and the Russian army can make its appearance, as the main pragmatic leaders of the country's stability" (Thomsen 2010). As on Expressed by Zehfuss, (2001), "States facing threats from another neighboring state are only one aspect, but to the extent that Central Asian countries also plan to use the CSTO against non-state and transnational opponents, their relations with Moscow could be more stable than traditional gangs. However, it is clear from the experience of states such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which also use NATO and other external relations to compensate for their unequal dependence on Russia within the CSTO. In this way, they adapt to Russia and increase the potential threats from other Central Asian states" (Weinstein 2008).

The Weakness of CSTO in Central Asia

In the event that the CSTO is perceived from the point of view of neo-progressivism, one can cite Russian rhetoric aimed at establishing a broader security framework that respects the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSCO), “Thus limiting the scope of decisions and unilateral actions of certain States. Over the years, the Russian authorities have the idea of modifying and recreating the current structure to address global problems, further encouraging cooperation and mutual assistance of States to address global problems. This is in line with neoliberals, which proposes that states can better manage global companies within the institutional structures in which all member states come together, taking into account the ultimate goal of a more successful meeting Challenges and current problems” (Das 2013). Accordingly Arun Mohanty, (2016) “This type of thinking was available in the Russian Foreign Policy in 2008, describing the CSTO as an organization with irrefutable responsibility for its own region, in a standardized multilateral manner and in accordance with the relevant standards of the United Nations and the OSCE Perfectly with this idea of the Russian idea of global governance” (Mohanty 2016).

As on Expressed by Chenoy, (2007) “Russia’s official policy has been to strengthen multilateral norms in world politics and strengthen the central role of the United Nations in a multi-polar system of international relations. However, both Russian activities and Russian announcements in different contexts raise questions about the validity of Moscow’s transformation into institutionalism or its recipe for changing the current world order. The use of organizations by Russia and the advance of the international perspective, as also observed in the case of the SCO, seem too related to the potential benefits of strengthening the state itself, particularly in terms of Central Asia” (Patnaik and Chenoy 2007). For example, Russia has generally opposed any recommendation from different states about the transformation and restructuring of organizations in which Russia now occupies an important place, which would mean debilitating for Russia itself would weaken or lose a truly achieved state. The ideas of reform of the United Nations are an example. Russia is part of the narrow circle of favored countries that fear that a reform of this kind will lead to the loss of their right of veto in the Security Council (Das 2013).

Accordingly Vladimir, in 2007, “Another logical inconsistency in Russia’s position is its way to deal with the OSCE and abolishing block formations within that

organization acquired from the Cold War time frame. From one perspective, Russia's proposition for another European Security Treaty (EST) has been censured in the West as featuring the politico-military and security elements. This proposal can be viewed as an expression of Moscow's and that of its friends against Western infringement while disregarding the principles of sovereignty that are also vital to the newly independent states (Weinstein 2008:124). Russia itself has been exceptionally skeptical of the OSCE and dynamic in its quests for transforming the organization, contending in addition to other things that it should concentrate more on politico-military discourse and participation and less on its human rights dimension, which Moscow sees as a simple reason for Western pro-democracy intervention in Eastern states. Russia has also been favourable to standardize the OSCE and concede it a legitimate identity and pursue a goal to change it into full-fledged regional organization. Then again, while criticizing blocs Russia has been dynamic in framing and fortifying new elite groupings of similarly inclined states, for example the CSTO".It is difficult to understand why this organization can be considered an organization superior to NATO for the countries of Central Asia, simply describing the first as good and the second as bad. In this way, it seems that Russia's general attitude towards institutions is simply to use them to increase their impact, impart authenticity and respectability (Thomsen 2010:312). As on expressed by "By strengthening the structure of the CSTO as the perfect counterpart to NATO, it is possible for Russia to frustrate the Western-led institution by an Eastern organization and show the Russian-led organization Equivalent to NATO in the region".

For the other Member States, the willingness to establish multilateral links through the CSTO has allowed some to use it as a step to escape the pressure of unequal bilateral agreements with Russia. Participation in the CSTO has benefited some events for the benefit of the Member States and has used it to make their voices heard effectively. Participation in security within the CSTO allows for regular interactions and actions. Afghanistan's risk management seems more viable if Member States try to do it together (Boonstra 2010: 85). "Efforts to secure the border with Afghanistan have been a very important aspect, bringing together the states within the organization. Neoliberal institutionalism also predicts that institutions contribute to the establishment of guiding principles and basic rules for the best way to cooperate in the global field, making the relationships between institutional individuals more stable and predictable, which prevent the use of violence" (Waltz 2008). The insecurity and

frequent conflicts that continue to affect the Western and Southern Zones of the former USSR, whether with Russia or among other member states suggest that the institutionalization and internalization of the security links of the members have not yet been completed and they may require a repair time before the organization can reach them? The Member States have come together for the specific purpose of maintaining balance in the region and better securing their area, but they have not managed to maintain their internal stability in a few accounts. The unstable states that work for the stabilization of the planet are quite contradictory. The bilateralism that still prevails between Russia and the post-Soviet neighbours also weakens the neoliberal view that states would prefer to consolidate their multilateral relations (Robert 2011).

As expressed by Roy Allison,(2001) “One of the primary difficulties for neoliberal institutionalism is additionally the issue of deserting from collaboration and how to maintain a strategic distance from this in an anarchic universal framework.The instance of Uzbekistan leaving and rejoining the CSTO has made it hard for member states to trust it won't occur once more. This prompts scrutinizing the full responsibility of member states other than Russia to the organization. Though the Central Asian states are still to achieve high level of cooperation, nevertheless institutionalism does assert that if the advantages from participation are alluring, it will push states to cooperate” (Roy 2001). Accordingly Arun Mohanty, in 2016, “Defecting partners inside the CSTO show that there are better alternatives to attract them. This has however likewise occurred with NATO when France chose to leave NATO's military charge in 1966 and did not rejoin it until 2009. There is basically very little that leading members inside organizations can do to stop the sovereign choices of other member's states. Social constructivism can add some different experiences to dissect the strengths and weakness of the CSTO.Constructivists accentuate the part of common identity and culture, and member states of the CSTO have had seventy years of establishing some kind of commonality through Soviet cooperation. They have a comparatively similar military culture and common Russian vocabulary, and a political culture having a similar vision of a strong authority. This however just one side of the story is, and inside dissents at different circumstances in all CSTO member states raise questions whether it speaks to the will of subjects who have differences with the state. In that sense, despite the fact that member state's

authorities do command respect to a specific point, if fruitful internal societal transformations were to happen in future this legitimacy could be eroded”.

As on stated by Boonstra, “The riots in North Africa and the Middle East have been identified by the development of social movements that have allowed citizens to make their voices heard and show their progressive interest in the fight against dictatorial rulers. At an informal summit of CSTO Heads of State in August 2011, members agreed to take action to address the potential threats that information and the Internet can represent” (Boonstra 2012). At the summit, the president of Kazakhstan said that an unregulated data space could represent a danger to the security and stability of the CSTO states, especially in light of recent events around the world (Joshua 2011). In their respective countries, in the light of a more open exchange of data on social sites focused on the weaknesses of their leaders, although the reach of the web cannot be completely contained and people around the world are pushing to achieve its more individual freedoms.

In the event that the CSTO had been truly dynamic and efficient and had met regularly in this type of institutional and global activity, it could have been gradually strengthened as an old integration mechanism based in the USSR. However, there is practically no evidence of this trend. Russia has proposed joint action and has also witnessed rivalries between the military and non-military populations of the member states since 2008 (Robert 2011). The CSTO General Secretary even proposed that, “The creation of a military sports club for the improvement of youth” that would push the advance of patriotism at an earlier age and also provide the military part of the CSTO more positive profile in the Member States. For example, top-down efforts mobilized to create a shared culture have not yet emerged as a natural process, and according to Arun Mohanty appear to be probably not going until something changes the mentality of local residents” (Mohanty 2016: 125).

The Situation around Afghanistan

Instability in Afghanistan is a serious threat to both Central Asian security and, by means of Central Asia, to Russia. The security of the southern border of Central Asia is viewed as an issue of domestic security not only due to Russian perception but also pragmatism. Russia is worried about drug trafficking from Afghanistan and the spread of Islamic radicalism. This is the reason Russia perceives that the International

Security Assistant Force (ISAF) has made a positive contribution in the region (Laruelle 2009). The Taliban would have moved further into Russia's Southern underbelly and after that into Russia and CSTO has been worried about the circumstance in Afghanistan since it is the zone of instability with outcomes for states bordering it. Numerous radical organizations are working in Afghanistan, for example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which targets Central Asian states. There is a drug trafficking issue and expanding numbers of Central Asian residents are associated with training by extremist organizations in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Islamic state of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) also known as ISIS additionally began to challenge the Central Asian region (Panfilova 2015).

In our view that there are constructive outcomes from ISAF presence in Afghanistan, but the CSTO has been negative on this issue. Russia was worried about the possibility of the United States setting up military base in Afghanistan after 2014 and expanding its military presence and political impact in Central Asia. While Belarus supported this position, the Central Asian states did not endorse Russia's basic explanations about the US presence for the most part has been ineffective as they didn't look for a genuine contrasting option to the West regarding the arrangement of security in Afghanistan. Central Asian nations expect at the best material advantages from potential US presence near their regions and their relations with the United States and NATO also provide some check on the Russian influence. Numerous inquiries views have been expressed on the CSTO's potential commitment to confronting the dangers originating from Afghanistan. In the first place, Russian commitment to CSTO is based on the assumption that the military from the CSTO states won't be physically present in Afghanistan, and the Central Asian states share this position.

However, Afghanistan is being talked about more as often as possible at the top CSTO level and a working group on Afghanistan under the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has also been set up. The CSTO imagined a negative situation in and around Afghanistan after the ISAF withdrawal. Both Russia and other members expressed agreement on the CSTO taking more responsibility in the area by taking strong steps at the border without meddling in Afghanistan's internal situation, but to deter, for example, some militant group trying to launch military attacks from Afghanistan into Central Asia. The military units of the CSTO as a rule should be particularly prepared to respond to such episodes. In case such a circumstance

develops, the CSTO should be willing and ready to intercede in the area (Yurgens 2016:28).

Moreover, there has been training for border security personnel inside the CSTO and members of Afghan security forces are also taking part in it. The CSTO is working not only on 'hard security' measures, like how to neutralize conceivable insurgence from Afghanistan to Central Asia, but also additionally on 'soft security' measures for effective border security and counteractive actions (Feshchenko 2013) . The CSTO relates in this sense to its principal commitment to the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border, in the process offering help to Tajikistan as its most valuable member. The CSTO can also add to counteracting trafficking in armaments and narcotics. The CSTO's activity 'Kanal' has been perceived by the UN as the biggest and the best effective measure in neutralizing Afghan trafficking (Yurgens 2016:10). In the years of 2003 and 2012, in excess of 273,000 kg of different drugs and 11,000 kg of combat hardware were caught. This operation has attracted observers from different nations including the United States, Spain, Italy, China and Turkey. The operation's only shortcoming was its failure to evolve into a comprehensive action. While Russia advances CSTO efforts in the sphere of counter-narcotics operation and additionally multilateral endeavors between the CSTO and NATO, the United States has attempted to set up its own counter-narcotics programme (Peyrouse et al. 2012:20).

Accordingly Blank, "the United States and Russia have censured each other in a zone of common interest. While it has been utilizing the CSTO effectively in connection to Afghanistan, Russia isn't willing to assume full liability for Afghanistan related security issues. This is the reason it is occupied with load sharing inside the CSTO, if this organization is to progress as a security provider. The CSTO is likewise utilized for information exchange tending to instability and threats in the region. In the meantime, the CSTO is additionally utilized by Russia for power projection, legitimating its part in the region, and counterbalancing US and NATO strategies in Central Asia. Due to this situation, the CSTO has turned into a forum supporting Russian foreign policy objective" (Blank 2012:72).

Resolving Border Issues in Central Asian region

The border issues are more unpredictable and recalcitrant in the experience of decade's long conflicts all through the years since World War II. The Arab Israel

conflicts, the India-Pakistan conflicts, the Sino-Russian conflicts, the Indo-China conflicts, the Trans-Denester struggle, the boundary issues of the Ferghana valley in Central Asia, the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan conflicts, the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgia-Russia clashes, Chechnya and numerous different hotspots over Eurasia tell us the story of issues among neighbouring states hindering their relations and attempts to resolve the issues through regional and international organizations. Uzbekistan has most extensive border disputes with every one of the neighbours. Since it borders with every other nation of Central Asia in addition to Afghanistan, much will rely upon how Uzbekistan would carry on with others in respect to all its regional issues (Das 2010:39).

In the context of hotspots in Eurasia, Christina Zuraiva⁷ said, “Today two spatial weights are at work at the central point of the Eurasian heartland, which lies at the novel cross-intersection of two spatial polarizations where the recently developing north-south axis cuts over the historical west-east nexus. A few components in the north-south hub of polarization are self-evident. In addition to the cauldron of Muslim Central Asia there is the danger of military over-commitment in light of the extended war in Afghanistan and the unpredictable political developments in Iran, and likely in Pakistan as well”.

The inter-state border issues amongst Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the one hand and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on the other will decide the future state of good or bad relations among these neighbouring nations. Ferghana valley where all these three nations have been sharing borders may become a difficult region in the years to come. The enclave issue might be settled through bilateral negotiation; however, dialect and ethnic issues will keep on prevailing alongside religious sentiment and will add fuel to the fire of border conflicts. Encounters and hostilities could be avoided through bilateral relations and multilateral frameworks like CSTO and SCO and other regional organizations that appear to be the main options to border clashes in this region (Robert 2011).

⁷. Christina Zuraiva is a Research Scholar of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). She is working on “Eurasian region on Geopolitics”. Interview taken on 14th June, 2018, 12:00 p.m at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow.

The US, Russia and China will remain potential players in the developing of relations inside the CSTO and SCO structures. In future China would move closer to all Central Asian neighbours through different arrangements. Countering cross border terrorism, narcotic trafficking and illegal money will complement the objectives of stringent control over border movement starting with one nation then onto the next. Regardless of these challenges and conflicts, Central Asian States will remain multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual that show their maturity as plural societies (Das 2013).

The Future of Afghanistan and Central Asia's Role

Accordingly Mohapatra, "The fate of Afghanistan remains uncertain, while the world powers remain committed to the emergence of Afghanistan in a nation that considers the rule of law is paramount and has equitable success. The United States and United Nations authorities in Kabul point this out in the most ideal situation. Afghanistan may only advance in a few decades to become what is now a large part of its Central Asian neighbours. This model could follow Tajikistan, which is not really a model of government or majority progress". The choice is stacked; positions bought and sold in the government, and limited open market for products and services. "The Taliban could claim that their strengths are insufficient to allow the United States and the influence of the coalition to disappear in the region. Mohammad Qorban Haqjo even believes that the Taliban consider the withdrawal of troops as an annihilation for foreigners" (Boonstra 2012: 32).

Accordingly Yurgens, in 2016, "The part of the Central Asian states could play in Afghanistan after the U.S, NATO and ISAF forces finish their withdrawal in 2014 appeared to indicate a more indirect protective approach. Without radical change in the Central Asian states' security and armed force capacity, and commitment by outside powers that reflect cooperative participation instead of encouraging differences between neighbouring governments, any collective arrangement of intercession in Afghanistan toward a common regional security objective profoundly far-fetched to succeed. Rather, the Central Asian nations will proceed as they have been, deliberately making a buffer zone of security against any negative overflow impacts coming about because of the instability that may deepen in Afghanistan". As on expressed by Boonstra, (2012) "These negative impacts include invasions by

terrorist organizations, drug trafficking and various types of organized crime. In addition, they will strengthen their dependence on bilateral or multilateral security relationships with the main superpowers and regional associations, such as the United States, Russia, CSTO and SCO, to assist the military forces, their governmental control and security at the border and several deficiencies in their individual security systems” (Boonstra 2012:54).

The answers for territorial security do not fall on the shoulders of Central Asia. Iran, China, Pakistan, India and other neighboring countries will also play an important role. At the Third Ministerial Conference of the Paris Agreement, the UN Secretary-General declared that, “The international community will depend on the UN’s duty to guarantee the stability and practical advance of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the ISAF 2014. However, much of the global participation would be based on the results of the 2013 and 2014 legislative and presidential elections in Afghanistan, as well as on the consequences of various changes related to the economy and security in development. If Afghanistan’s recent initiatives will create a hostile or useful environment, determine the level of commitment and security commitments, in financial or general terms. Although it would strive to develop through its bilateral or multilateral partnership” (CSTO Report 2015).

Russia & Central Asia against Taliban

Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and ensuing deterioration of the situation in Soviet Union, Afghanistan has remained a difficult spot for Russia and the Central Asian states. “Afghanistan has common border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Among them Tajikistan has been the country most concerned about political changes in Kabul since adversaries of the current government in Tajikistan work from northern Afghanistan. The capture of Kabul by the radical Islamic forces was a discomfoting development for Moscow in light of the fact that the Russian state for the most part trusted that the spread of radical Islam from the Muslim majority states from the south was a threat to Russia.” Another factor is, Russia could control radical Islamic forces in Tajikistan, but with Taliban’s seizure of Kabul, Tajikistan was again debilitated by the Islamic fundamentalist forces which Russia would not be able to control since it emanated from Afghanistan (Nevers 1994).

Since Russia was the successor state of the former Soviet Union, there was agreement in Russia that Moscow had a special responsibility and commitment to monitor the regional integrity of the considerable number of individual states from CIS. While the Baltic States declined to be members of CIS, Azerbaijan and Georgia were relatively compelled to be a part of the Collective Security System of CIS. In 1992 and 1993, Moscow managed a web of respective security concurrences with the former republics of the Soviet Union enabling Russia to be a part of their security framework. Russia made it clear that it would keep up its peacekeeping activities in the problem areas of the CIS while efforts would also be made to draw military from different individual states of CIS (Mohanty and Patnaik 2016). The CIS additionally looked for an international order for its peacekeeping operation in the former soviet republics. In our argument, however, actually Russia has from the beginning felt that its borders must be secured by protecting the CIS borders beyond just the Russian one. The issue was quickly raised after fall of the Soviet Union when lawless circumstances were created in the Caucasus. Subsequently the Russian administration was gravely concerned about the developing military powers of the Taliban, which gained control in Afghanistan. It needed to secure Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan since adversaries of the Tajik government had their sanctuaries in northern Afghanistan (ibid.p.82).

Moscow has had unpleasant recollections of military adventure in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. In this background it couldn't have mulled over direct military intervention in Afghanistan to install a friendly regime in Kabul. In 1996, Russia and Afghanistan signed a protocol as per which the Afghan side made an exclusive zone of 140 Km long and 25 km wide on its territory, into which Tajik Mujhiddin or opposition were not to be permitted. At the same time Russia additionally proposed to reinforce its powers on the Tajik-Afghan border in light of the fact that around 3000 opposition fighters were then massing on the Afghan side of the border prepared to move into Tajikistan to strengthen their powers in the central Tajik district of Tavildara (Mohapatra 1998:45-46). Rather than the muted Russian reaction to the fundamentalist threat in Tajikistan in pre-winter 1992, the Russian reaction this time to the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalist forces represented by Taliban in Afghanistan was quite timely.

External Power Influences in Central Asia

In this context, expressed by Anderson, (2000) “In the post-Cold War time the scope of ‘Great Game’ has experienced change. Today the Great Game is amongst extending and contracting domains. A weakened Russia still endeavours to keep a grasp on what it regards as its natural frontier Central Asia and control the flow of Caspian oil through pipelines that navigate Russia. On the other hand, USA is pushing itself into the area on the back of alternative oil pipelines, which would, by pass Russia. Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have been building their own corresponding connectivity with the area and favour routes decision for future pipelines, heading east or south. China needs to secure stability for its anxious Xinjiang area populated by similar Muslim ethnic groups that occupy Central Asia” (Anderson 2000).

But the instability in Afghanistan and the emergence of Taliban added another dimension to the global rivalry and turned into a significant factor for the ‘New Great Game’. “Afghanistan had held Central Asia in embrace for quite a long time; however its contiguity with Central Asia became irrelevant after the 1917 Russian revolution when the Soviet Union fixed its border with its southern Muslim neighbours. The reviving of these borders in 1991 heralded the beginning of the so called New Great Game”. In spite of the fact that there are many global and international actors including US in the West to China in the East, Russia would play the influential role in the Central Asian region (Rashid 2000). The United States of America since the end of World War II has been an international force whose role and impact reaches all parts of the world. The Western liberal democratic states led by the US, which were extremely shocked by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, shook hands with the Afghan mujahideen to fight back the Soviet intervention by making it costly for the USSR as far as cash, material and human lives were concerned. The American commitments were purportedly coordinated by Saudi Arabia. Pakistan managed to organise the flow of help to the mujahideen cautiously in order to limit the threats of extension of the conflict to its territory, yet radicalism got bolder with time and experience (Mahapatra 1998).

In the post-Cold War, however, US didn’t make a big deal about the developments in Afghanistan; it disguised its part of supporting the Pakistani involvement in the Afghan internal power-struggle, particularly Pakistani sponsored training and equipping of the Taliban. Steadily a few different components seemed to have

instigated the US change in approach to revive its role in Afghanistan and support to the Taliban. One has been the oil factor. As US oil productions stagnated and the American oil companies started searching for resources in various nations, the Central Asian countries looked extremely lucrative as a territory where the US could explore the possibility of putting resources into the energy sector (ibid.p.89). Peace and stability in Afghanistan was viewed as essential to the development of pipelines through alternative courses other than through Iran and Russia. Therefore the Central Asian nations were encouraged to go for alternative oil routes to diminish their dependence on Russia. Besides, the US wants to deny the Russians control and influence over Central Asia and to build up an American presence in this region, which carries in its ambit the potential of tapping into the unexplored energy resources. These factors persuaded Washington's strategy makers to update the nation's Afghan policy (Anderson 2000).

The conflict in Afghanistan has kept the new Central Asian states from building up oil and gas outlets toward the south. It gives another push to Pakistan-India rivalry. It nourishes Iranian fear of being encompassed by a disagreeable American administration. Lastly it additionally advances a hazardous condition in Afghanistan. Along these lines, the region is important to US. Coming to Pakistan, analyzing its interference in Afghanistan becomes very important. In spite of the fact that Pakistan isn't an immediate neighbour of Central Asia, it has always been an important factor in the region. India and Pakistan have tried to overcome the economic disadvantage inherent in geographic separation. Developments in Afghanistan have an immediate bearing on Pakistan, and also its approach towards Central Asia (Rashid 2000:94).

In this context, expressed by Symonds, (2001) "Pakistan's Taliban venture was an inclusive mix of Islamic claims, economic compulsions and strategic desire, Pakistan has always been careful and concealing about any overt help for the Taliban, yet the connections are very open. The Taliban have had close associations with the Jammiet-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), a Pakistani based Islamist extremist party, which ran its own particular madrass in the border regions with Afghanistan. The most telling indication of outside contribution was the military accomplishments of Taliban. In only a span of a year it developed from a handful of students to an efficient militia that could assemble up to 20000 fighters, backed by tanks, artillery and air support, controlling vast swathes of southern and western Afghanistan. Pakistan was not by any means the only source of assistance. Saudi Arabia also provided substantial

financial and material support. On the political plane, Taliban's fundamentalist ideology was close to Saudi's own Wahabbism. It was threatening to the Shiite section and thus to Riyadh's major provincial adversary Iran" (Symonds 2001:76-77). On a more material level, "the Saudi Oil Company, Delta Oil, was an accomplice in the UNOCAL pipeline and was basing its expectation on a Taliban triumph to get the undertaking off the ground. The above mentioned outside contributions created hostile conditions for the Central Asian states. What the newly independent states required were appropriate conditions with respect to their relations with external actors, whether the US or Pakistan".

NATO's Withdrawal: Reshaping a New Geopolitical and Security Scenario

According by Chenoy, (2007) "For Central Asia, NATO's withdrawal was bound to influence the lucrative usage of the multi vector policy in external strategy, which has enabled them to adjust Sino-Russian impact in military, economic, energy and political fields. Given their key geopolitical position, Central Asian nations have effectively used the competition among outside players, involving themselves in a gainful economic and military participation with NATO powers which also brought them political and discretionary help". As stated by Peyrouse, (2012) "The association of Central Asian republics in the Northern Distribution System (NDN) through a network of Central Asian rails, highways and carriers to supply NATO troops in Afghanistan has represented a key chance to expand their engagement with the West and to grow new structures of cooperation. With the exception of Turkmenistan which declined to consent to a transit arrangement in the NDN system, permitting just refuel tasks for US military planes, other Central Asian nations have benefited from the concession of lucrative over flight charges of 500 million dollars for each year, along with gains from the possibility to refuel and to sell local products to military forces engaged with Afghanistan" (Peyrouse 2012:32).

Besides, "NATO has centered its participation to upgrade the transport infrastructure of railways, roads, bridges necessary to execute the NDN route which has supported the weak and landlocked Central Asian economies. In the NATO's strategy, Uzbekistan assumed a significant part as key transit center in the NDN and defense against regional Islamic insurgency. Thus, Uzbekistan has profited from modern military equipment and from political help by NATO and the US, enabling Tashkent

to contain Russian impact and to legitimize Uzbekistan's desire for regional leadership" (Gretsky 2016). Following the ISAF redeployment, "Central Asian republics will intelligently lose these financial and fundamental advantages: along these lines, these countries will endeavor to expand these regional points, raising the charges for the turnaround travel of troops and hardware from Afghanistan to Europe through Central Asia. Notwithstanding the way that NATO has more than once confirmed its commitment in the area after 2014 regardless of whether through another type of duty, this decision will reshape the territorial security plan and the geopolitical competition among outer players in Central Asia. NATO separation, be that as it may, would unfavorably impact the US technique towards Central Asia, crippling its impact in the area" (ibid.p.115).

In this situation, "Russia and China as capable regional geopolitical players are willing to assume responsibility to provide security in Central Asia post 2014, through bilateral and multilateral relations, for example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russia shows up as the main security provider for Central Asian states with military cooperation and through the CSTO, a Russian led regional organization in the security field, sometimes characterized as the Eastern NATO, in light of the fact that it is considered as a counter balance to Western impact in the former Soviet space" (Indeo 2010:182). Accordingly ICGA Report on (2013) mentioned that, "Russia considers the Eurasia region as an exclusive sphere of influence to be shielded from external interferences. Inside the CSTO frame work, Moscow intends to assume the part of regional security provider by engaging in joint military activities, sale of latest military equipments at Russian internal prices, as well as the presence of CSTO military equipment in Central Asian republics located at the Anti-terror Center in Tashkent, the Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian 201st Motorised Rifle Division at Kulyab in Tajikistan" (ICGA Report 2013:17).

As on stated by Indebo, (2010) "China fears an expansion in terrorist activity in the region following the NATO military withdrawal from Afghanistan, which could turn into a base for separatists in Xinjiang, additionally influencing trade and energy participation with Central Asian nations. However, China's effect on regional security architecture seems constrained, considering that Beijing has no army base in the region. China's military aid is for the most part coordinated to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan" (Indebo, 2010). Our argument is that, "China and Russia are the two

pioneers and prime supporters of SCO, another multilateral organization which intends to guarantee territorial integrity and security, apart from fight against the alleged ‘three evils’ of ethnic separatism, religious extremism and terrorism. Possibly, SCO could better assume the part of security provider in the region, other than the CSTO, considering the fact that SCO also includes Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia (as observer members) and Turkey, Belarus and Sri Lanka as dialogue partners. India and Pakistan are its latest members”.

Mission and Capability of CSTO in Central Asia

The CSTO’s initially pronounced concentration was countering outside military aggression against member countries; however its administrations have since been approving the CSTO’s push for a more extensive scope of conceivable missions. The organization’s publically expressed destinations are maintaining the national and collective security of its members, advancing participation among them in the political-military sphere, planning their foreign policies, establishing collective mechanism for coordinating member’s abilities, and fighting present day transnational threats, for example, international terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, organized crime, and misuse of information space (Mohanty and Patnaik 2016:42). The members of the CSTO have decided to inform each other of any defense link with non-members, in particular the option of buying weapons in these states or of hosting foreign military bases in their territory. Here again, the Russian authorities turned to the CSTO to legitimize their own military presence in other former Soviet republics. For example, they projected that the Russian military base in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic contributed to the multinational CSTO missions (ibid.p.43).

The CSTO is occupied by hostile and defensive information tasks. When they meet, CSTO leaders generally establish common ground on several international security issues, such as missile defense, Iran and Syria. The hope is to harmonize the effect of their individual voices by speaking in a collective voice, trying to show broad support for their policies. However, these joint statements often support the position of Moscow, but can also support the policies of other members. For example, after the pressure exerted by Armenia in 2014, the CSTO issued a collective proclamation denouncing the control of the Syrian city of Kessab, populated by ethnic Armenians, by an extremist group linked to Al-Qaeda. The CSTO member governments, which

exercise different kinds of surveillance of the national media, have expressed concern about how terrorists and other opponents of the regime are abusing the Web to recruit members and organize subversive exercises. Following the leadership of Moscow, the CSTO governments tried to use the organization to strengthen their digital resistance (Symonds 2001: 77).

With respect to military capabilities, the aim of the CSTO was to activate massive multinational war coalitions under joint command. In addition to its initial objective of regional collective defense, the CSTO has established joint peacekeeping and rapid response forces, composed mostly of first-rate military units, to combat terrorism and support internal forces of CSTO and, due to changes in the CSTO contract. Since the ethnic conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, we have avoided social upheavals in member countries (Cornell and Regine 2014). The Rapid Reaction Collective Forces (KSOR) is expected to perform a large number of tasks, including peacekeeping, counterterrorism, drug trafficking counterinsurgency, emergency response and other transnational criminal activities. KSOR troops remain in greater availability and, if necessary, will operate under multinational authority. Unlike the three large multinational groups of the CSTO, KSOR participates in traditional activities, particularly in Central Asia, where the main transnational threats are concentrated (Gyurosi 2012: 108).

It incorporates extraordinary powers of response, as well as classic combat activities. The agreement has very little time with its accomplices of the CSTO as well as a joint exercise with the Central Asian states. As a carrot and a means to keep its members in the military unit, the Russian government provides the CSTO staff with financial preparation and preparation within the Russian military organizations and allows the CSTO partners to buy Russian arms at similar costs to those of the Russian army. The CSTO strengthens and collaboration among individual member's defense industries, many of which were firmly associated Soviet military-industrial complex (ibid.p.112).

The Combination of CSTO, NATO and SCO's strategies in Central Asia

The CSTO authorities, strongly supported by the Russian government, have attempted to receive official recognition from NATO as a counter part for regional partnership. The CSTO had made numerous recommendations to set up formal helpful projects with that organization to oversee regional security issues, particularly in Afghanistan.

These have concentrated on joint counternarcotics, anti-drug-trafficking and anti-religious radicalism endeavors. The CSTO being a Moscow led institution and an instrument to help Russian leadership in Central Asia prevents NATO collectively and its individual members to institutionalize relations with the CSTO and SCO on an organization to-organization premise. Russia has reacted by compelling NATO presence in Central Asia including in Kyrgyzstan to end, including the U.S. army installation in this state (Laumulin 2007:150).

The occupation of Crimea by Russia has caused a significant weakening of relations between NATO and the CSTO. NATO called on Russia to withdraw from Crimea, while CSTO leaders blamed NATO for abusing its agreement with Russia by extending to Eastern Europe. Having refused to join the other world powers in Afghanistan, the CSTO acted mainly against drugs, terrorists, small arms and light weapons and other diseases emanating from its territory. The CSTO governments have recently expressed concern about the impact of social unrest in the Middle East and civil war in Syria that has recruited, trained and empowered many activists, including Russia and Central Asia (Mohanty and Patnaik 2016: 48).

The statement issued by the CSTO further indicates that any foreign military intervention in Syria would be unacceptable and illegal unless it is approved by the United Nations Security Council. Focusing on external military threats is evident to CSTO members as the organization struggled to combat internal threats within a member state. Despite the fact that the new Kyrgyz government has asked the CSTO to help put an end to the 2010 ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, the CSTO leaders have ruled out sending their forces to control the violence alleging that the CSTO did not have a legitimate basis to do so. Although the organization has since obtained a broader legal mandate, its administrations are, for the most part, embarrassed to see external countries, especially Russia, meddling militarily in their internal problems, as evidenced by their discomfort during military intercessions Russians against Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 (ibid.p.52).

Debates among CSTO members have consistently debilitated the organization's lucidness. Border conflicts prevail in the Ferghana Valley, an ethnically-diverse and thickly populated agricultural region that under the Soviet Union was divided between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The current Tajik-Kyrgyz border skirmishes have made Central Asia more helpless against narco-terrorism. Kyrgyzstan's parliament has scrutinized the CSTO's utility and value because of its inability to

address the threats (Gretsky 2016). Nevertheless the issue of border conflicts among member states fall outside the CSTO's mandate. The organization can intervene in individual situations; however it requires the express assent of the groups in conflicts. The Tajik-Kyrgyz conflicts has died down for the time being, with the two sides pulling back equipped units from their border and a joint-commission tending to border division with CSTO help. Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CSTO in 2012 has likewise made it less demanding for Kazakhstan, an intermittent opponent of Tashkent for regional leadership, to team up with Moscow in advancing regional security responsibility. Now Kazakhstan has to deal with Uzbekistan bilaterally (Akimbekov 2010:86).

Russian policymakers may think that these internal conflicts allow Moscow to assert its own advantages, since a considerable number of group members need Russia's help against their regional opponents. Once again, the disappointment that CSTO has not spoken with a common voice for Russia is probably less exciting in Moscow (Markowitz 2011: 156). Belarus only supported Moscow in its support for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Armenia also expressed concern about the reluctance of the CSTO to accept Yerevan in its territorial disputes with Azerbaijan. The Russian integration with Crimea, territorially defended to some extent by genuine and ethnic ties, has shaken many people in the other CSTO member states. Russia and the CSEC secretariat had to promise their members that they would not need to send troops to fight for the benefit of Russia in Ukraine. The diminishing presence of NATO in Afghanistan creates a vacuum that the CSTO is unlikely to fill (Rashid 2000: 105).

The contention with Ukraine is likewise showing new security challenges for CSTO members. Moscow's drive to set up a strong Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) additionally complicates the picture. The new structure incorporates all the CSTO members except Tajikistan making the CSTO a probable parts of the EEU, similar to that the European Union, which is discussing Common Security and Defence Policy (Olcott 2005).

Future Prospects of CSTO in the Central Asian Region

The CSTO has been increasing its defence abilities, legitimate command, and scope of missions as of late, and has risen as the principal collective regional grouping in

Eurasia. In any case, the continuing instability in Afghanistan poses the most potent challenge for CSTO members. As expressed by Arun Mohanty, “At the same time, Russia’s recently self-assured position in Ukraine and Moscow’s emphasis on building a Eurasian Economic Union that may expand its own military dimension could also pose challenges for the CSTO members in coming years. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is one of the cutting edge associations in the matter of regional security and stability of this mainland. The United States was employing sanctions, other economic threats, hiring armed forces and controlling the cyber field to debilitate Russia and other contending forces in the field of energy resources. Even with such a hostile power in mind, the CSTO would consider on forestalling and resolving conflicts in its Eurasian region by tending to border tensions, transnational terrorism and rivalry for water and energy resources” (Mohanty and Patnaik 2016:88).

Russian reported that, “the CSTO had suspended contacts with NATO as a result of the Ukraine emergency and NATO’s endeavors to coerce Russia and all its CSTO partners. This move was to a great extent meaningless, since NATO had studiously abstained from engaging the CSTO since its help earlier on Afghan operations. The U.S. and other NATO authorities have been hesitant to formalize relations with the CSTO because of a paranoid fear of fortifying Moscow’s predominance in Central Asia. The Western security specialists have for the most part considered the organization as an ineffective organization that Moscow uses as an instrument to impact its border safeguard arrangements” (ibid.p.89). According to Tulsiram on (2007) “The reality of the matter is that the CSTO led by a Russian general and with a staff situated in Moscow, has filled in as a key component in Russia’s bid to reinforce Moscow’s impact in the former Soviet Union. In this case Belarus and Armenia furnish the CSTO with security interests in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, though the organization’s essential concentration in Central Asian regions”. We argue that, “the CSTO has supported Moscow’s impact by defending Russia’s bases in the region, giving dedicated forces from Central Asian militaries to collaborate with Russia, and possibly giving legitimacy to Russian military interventions. In any case, the other member governments are prohibited from joining NATO or some other military organization, and have seen benefits in taking part in the CSTO and SCO. A considerable number of its members expect that the Arab Spring will spread north and undermine their own control, while NATO’s declining

presence in Afghanistan is driving Central Asian states to depend more on Moscow for their security. Obviously, the particular intention in participation differs for each state”. In this context Gretskey expressed that, “While Belarus fears Western-backed endeavors to supplant its current government, Armenia sees the CSTO as a way to fortify its military potential against rival Azerbaijan. In the interim, the Central Asian governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan feel undermined by narcotics trafficking and terrorist groups trying to supplant the region’s secular governments with unmistakably Islamist structures” (Gretskey 2016).

Summary of the Chapter

This chapter emphasizes that there were both practical reasons and political reasons to believe that the CSTO was trying to cooperate with NATO, since its position changed afterwards. The procedure of development of bilateral and political collaboration within CSTO is continuing to evolve. The increments and revisions at the level of the services and offices are made every year. “Both the Russian and Central Asian nations searching for common relations in the sphere of military cooperation, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have a key bearing on the region”.

The subject of Central Asian cooperation is today essential in the advancement of relations between US, Russia and China, “especially in the sphere of military and protection, including the field of Military Technical Cooperation (MTC). In the Military Convention the universal needs are precisely set by Collective Security Treaty Organization. The accentuation is on military participation with Russia and on Russian technologies”. The reciprocal participation in the field of security and its necessary military and military specialized segments is conceivable due to the creation of shared comprehension of military needs. At the present stage there is a decrease in emphasis on military political participation and interests on military defensive partnership and emphasis on joint economic efforts for innovation and improvement of high technologies.

Another central point examined in this part is NATO, CSTO and SCO preference to utilize the global technique in countering terrorist threats in Afghanistan that is totally unconcerned about the specific nature of countries’ geography, ethnic, social and religious variables. From one viewpoint NATO troops still can’t give assurances to

Afghan citizens against terrorists. The frail control of air space security, on the grounds that Taliban still has in excess of thousand stingers and Salafist groups have acquired SA-7 which specifically targets helicopters, civil and military air cargoes. In addition, the NATO led ISAF mission in Afghanistan has additionally neglected to counter drug trafficking because of weak control over the Pakistan and Afghanistan border. In 2001 security threats from the Afghan region compelled CSTO members to create the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) from Russia and Central Asian states.

The decision was taken a year prior to the 9/11 events in the US and the dispatch of the international coalition activity in Afghanistan. In 1999-2000, activities of militants from the Afghan turned out to be more dangerous in Central Asian states and the CSTO and SCO ended up being the main regional instrument that could be utilized to counter radical threats from Afghanistan. In Central Asia the CSTO can dispatch a force simply after a formal demand from an imperiled member state. The CSTO members, however, would like to deal with internal security threats by themselves protecting their sovereignty from external intervention. But, as situation in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 showed, the CSTO may on the request of a member state intervene to quell internal instability. In that sense it has been distinguished from all other regional organizations or mechanisms in the Central Asian region.

CHAPTER-6

CONCLUSION

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Conclusion

The thesis looks at issues related to the arrangement of Collective Security in Central Asia, which can't be resolved over night. It will require significant time and exertion by all the Central Asian states as well as by every one of the individual regional actors who esteem the need for peace and cooperation on the Eurasian landmass. Despite the fact that an answer to the issues of security in Central Asia must be fundamentally accomplished through the joint Central Asian endeavors, the role of outside forces for the security of the region cannot be underestimated. In the present Central Asian conditions a regulated type of regional security must be a long haul to be achieved step by step through an arrangement of reciprocal and multilateral settlements of non aggression nature and for mutual cooperation.

The present low level of intra-regional exchange and economic collaboration in the region come in the way of accomplishment of Collective Security in Central Asia. On the other hand, regional economic collaboration can be promoted through collective Central Asian security. Once a measure of security is accomplished through deliberate political activities, it will undoubtedly encourage economic collaboration which would merge with the structure of collective security. Political activities, as illustrated above, can be conclusive in accomplishing a leap forward in regional security and economic cooperation by creating an atmosphere of trust among the Central Asian countries.

Central Asia is a region with numerous security challenges and unsteady components, including both external and internal threats. The security structure of the region has changed since 9/11, prompting a new round of geopolitical rivalry. However the key security relations between nations in the area have not been completely reshaped. Confronting the old and new difficulties, Central Asia is in a more complicated security circumstance. It is normal for China, a neighbour to Central Asia and a state that is holding numerous economic and security interests, to be occupied with Central Asian issues. Central Asia faces a significantly more extreme security situation which is additionally complicated by the opposition between different forces and the divergences in their security strategies and interests. Central Asia has many problems

that are begging to be addressed like terrorism, radicalism, drug trafficking, and division of Caspian energy. The likelihood that the disorganized circumstance of the Middle East could be transplanted to Central Asia ought not to be ignored. The future security structure of the region will be vital for the neighbouring countries. Whether U.S, Russia, China, India and Turkey can assume a dynamic part in the structure is as yet obscure.

In the First Chapter, the frame work of regional security, historical and geographical background of Central Asian states and the structure of the CSTO, SCO, NATO and other regional organization are discussed. With the development of agreeable and extensive security standards alongside the traditional standards of national military regulations, debate on reexamining of the idea of security has started. There are changes which have occurred in the act of security participation in contemporary global framework. The most critical element of these progressions is the declining focus on military alliances and rising significance of composite security structures at the regional level. Buzan presented the idea of regional security complex to characterize conflict relations in geographic gatherings of states, yet neglected to perceive the presence of specificities and patterns at the regional level. The analysis of regional security amid the Cold War time frame has been fundamentally directed with regards to East-West relations or how it influenced the overwhelming thought of bipolarity amid that period. A few researchers, for example, Miller, Gavin Boyd, Mackinder, Allison and Buzan, have thought upon regionalism and regional security with regards to their treatment of regional organization.

In the Second Chapter, geopolitics and strategic aspects of post-Soviet Central Asia have been discussed. In the Post-Cold War period, the world saw a surge in the utilization of geopolitical systems by states to valorize the significance of any region or state from their own viewpoint. As various new states appeared in the place of the Soviet Union and as East Europe moved toward autonomy and away from Russia, new spaces opened up for impact. A few regions have assets, as well as key resources. Eurasia may not be what Mackinder imagined it to be, but rather it borders on states like Russia, China and Iran that could be major players in the post Cold War period. Central Asia's emergence on the geopolitical scene in the post-Soviet space has resulted in numerous fascinating discourses, including the so called New Great Game. Overlooked at first, this region came into worldwide lime light with the discovery of new Caspian energy resources and the coming to power of the Taliban in

neighbouring Afghanistan. The Western powers are displaying great interests in the oil and gas and on the divisions among the Caspian nations. American strategic specialist discussed limiting Russia in the region by building alternative pipeline routes and building cooperation with pivotal states.

The engagement of the United States in the Eurasian region created new security challenges for Russia. Following achievement in the Baltic States, the United States moved to bring under its impact the Caucasus-Caspian states. When Russia did not pay much attention to the Post-Soviet states and was economically in a frail position, the United States figured out how to obtain energy bargains, build separate pipeline routes and make surrogate states to advance its advantage. A noteworthy worry for Moscow was the accomplishment of “Colour Revolution” in some Post-Soviet states that brought Pro-US leaders to power and even hostile to Russian interests. As the Caucasus-Caspian geopolitics progressed toward hindering Russia’s interests, the fear of ‘containment’ worried Russian policy makers and political authorities. With Putin assuming leadership in Russia in 2000, there was a change in strategy, and bit by bit, Eurasia came to involve the central space in Russian key strategic priority Putin reviewed the awkwardness that described Russian policy under the past administration.

The vital choices of the Central Asian states have expanded while their strategic autonomy stays in place. This is for the most part in light of the fact that the region has so far stayed free of wars and conflicts that could polarize the local states. Without polarization, Central Asian states do not require to align with any outside forces or make their engagement with external powers zero-sum, as is occurring in some different parts of Eurasia. Be that as it may, the region is vital for some powers like Russia, China, the United States, India, Iran and Turkey. There is unavoidably rivalry among these forces for impact both among significant powers and additionally among regional forces. Adjusting to the interests of such a large number of external powers is not easy, yet the Central Asian states have managed to accomplish this to a substantial degree by avoiding interstate clashes and following multi-vector policy extensively. In the meantime, relentlessly and incrementally, Russia has risen as the preeminent power in the region’s geopolitics; however it doesn’t control the vital orientation of Central Asian nations. The fascination for Russian power stems from an assortment of components, including historical and cultural ties that bind the region with Moscow. The benefit of close ties with Russia additionally developed as Russia

appeared under Putin as a balancing power against external pressure on the Central Asian states, be it on the issues of democracy, human rights, civil society, and freedom of press, legitimacy of leadership or political stability.

Russia is also in a situation to advance hard power security against radicalism, terrorism and drug trafficking. It is driving the main multilateral security organization in the CIS that has bases in Central Asia. After the United States chose to minimize presence in Afghanistan, there were questions in Central Asian capitals if America would keep on having a similar level of enthusiasm for the region. Then again, it is unmistakably obvious that Russia can't allow instability in Central Asia to pervade into its own border and in this way would maintain a perpetual enthusiasm for the region's security. Russia has additionally been effective in creating a shared view with Central Asian states in the political sphere also. The political frameworks have turned out to be pretty much compatible with more centralization of power and absence of institutional framework. Every one of these states like Russia offers priority to stability over democratic government. Russia likewise has been instrumental in the legitimization of the current authority in Central Asia, also their elections and different steps to restrict civil society.

Along these lines, as specified in the Third Chapter, "Russia's policy to that extent is indistinguishable with those of the other CSTO member states. It has analyzed the security coordination procedure of the CIS states inside the structure of the CSTO by concentrating on the development of the reintegration procedure of the former Soviet states. Initially, the Chapter deals with the early years after the end of the Cold War, the foundation of the CIS, and additionally investigated the security challenges perceived and faced by the post-Soviet states, and later endeavors by Russia to guarantee security in the region and relations among the nations". The reasons for foundation of the CSTO as a different regional association and its relations with other organization in the region are discussed in detail in the Chapter.

Further, this section covers the procedure of arrangement of the CIS, first at that point as a coordinating organization. As on mentioned that the CIS turned into Russia's fundamental remote outreach in mid 1990s, when Russia understood that it is losing its 'traditional' territory of impact and furthermore needed to regain back its lost super power status. The CIS isn't a supranational structure; it does not have single citizenship, any common currency and joint military. Also, now and then, it causes confusion among its member states due to the loose interaction and sometimes

conflict with each other. The organization manages the domain of trade, finance, lawmaking and security. Likewise, it advances democratization and in emergencies takes counteractive action, as well as takes an interest in UN peacekeeping forces. Eurasian Economic Community, Common Economic Space, and Common Monetary Zone inside the system of the CIS are meant to advance economic cooperation among its member states.

The most successful institutional arrangements of the CIS were Collective Security Treaty of 1992. The pioneers of six CIS nations signed a Treaty on collective security in Tashkent summit in 1992, that later changed itself into regional security organization, CSTO. With the formation of CSTO, the CIS had two parallel military structures: the Council of Ministries of Defense and the Tashkent Treaty. What's more, until the 1999 and 2000 terrorist incursions in Central Asia, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and organized crime were on the agenda of the CIS Prime Minister's meetings. So the chapter discusses about the function of the CIS in managing security in the region in detail.

The examination the CSTO as a different regional security organization, that intends to guarantee security and stability in the region is the purpose of this Chapter. This Post-Soviet security alliance is a successor to the CST or essentially to the Tashkent Treaty under the system of the CIS, and it was set up following the expanding transnational threats, particularly 9/11 events, activities of the terrorist groupings, and their invasion in to this region. In this part, the Chapter talks about the transformation of the CST into CSTO. The establishment of CSTO as a result of Russia's security concerns shared with seven members. Uzbekistan, which was a part in GUUAM, backed by the West, joined the CSTO in 2006 after the Andijan events. The organization holds yearly military command exercise to enhance participation among its members. 'Rubezh 2008' hosted in Armenia was a vast scale exercise, and 'Rubezh 2010' was held in Tajikistan and incorporated the Concil on Foreign Relation (CFR) force. The fundamental aim of the recent activity is to combat terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, and to improve border security.

As we discussed in this context, "Following Russia's acknowledgment of the Georgia's breakaway regions freedom (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in 2008, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) was formed by initiative of Russia, in spite of resistance of some member states. Kyrgyz events again reestablished discourses on CRRF's utilization, and notwithstanding the demand of

the interim government of Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the utilization of CFFR was denied and events in Kyrgyzstan were portrayed as internal issues of the nation. Also, following this interethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, the issue of utility of the organization came up, and it was decided to make alterations to the mandate of the CSTO in the following Summits”. One of the recommendations was the creation of the emergency response system under the CSTO, which is being discussed.

Russia concluded that the trademark instrumental conduct of the CSTO members does not take into account an effective regional security organization in Central Asian states. Regardless of the ability to additionally build up the alliance, communicated by all CSTO members at the CSTO’s tenth commemoration summit in 2012, it has not possessed the capacity to get former Soviet-type consultation and coordination systems, and keeps on moving amongst hegemonic and protectionist instrumentalization and explanatory proclamations to true Russian unilateralism and usage shortfalls. Bilateralism seems to be easier and more beneficial. Eurasia clearly faces numerous threats to security that may commonly bind each other, but are not being satisfactorily tended to by collective security approach. Rather, the circumstance is overwhelmed by national unilateralism, and permits the rise of security vacuums. Deterioration of the Uzbek-Tajik relationship in April 2012, the expanding ethno-political and socio-economic strains in South Kyrgyzstan and the flourishing drug trade in the “Islamic Triangle” (borderlands between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), it is difficult for a developing interdependency among the Central Asian states as a principle essential for multilateral administration of security Central Asia.

This Chapter also gives a short review of the security difficulties in the post-Soviet states, and distinctive views of the CSTO member states. The post-Soviet states have confronted transnational threats to security, which have terrible effect on the political and economic conditions of those nations with negative results that spread to different areas. The issue of border security and border demarcations has different impacts on the security of the region that prompts increase in drug smuggling, weapon trafficking and free border intersection of the terrorists groups. Illegal drug has a serious negative effect on the inhabitants in those nations by affecting the health, increasing crime, and funding for the extremist groupings. Besides, the frail border security is the reason for the illegal exchanges and unlawful migration.

In this context as mentioned in this chapter the resurgence of religion after independence got new significance for the inhabitants in the Central Asia, and new Islamic movements became active inside the region. These movements endeavoured to expand the role of Islam in governmental spheres and even form an Islamic caliphate in Fergana valley. The economic instability of these nations with vast number of jobless individual made young people joins the different religious movements. The action of the IMU and its incursion into domains of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 influenced specialists to understand the gravity of this issue. The 9/11 events further confirmed the reality and pushed states to have closer cooperation in combating the global threat of terrorism.

Subsequently, as specified in the Fourth Chapter, the role of outside forces, which are in the region's vicinity, is unavoidable, since they have comparative worries about threats emanating from the Central Asian states. Some of these forces have been instrumental in elevating comprehensive cooperation to participation in regional organizations inside Central Asia in which neighbouring states also participate. Regional cooperation can be accomplished either through bilateral or through multilateral instruments. There are diverse sorts of territorial organizations advanced by various powers in the region. Some are identified with key security perspectives; others deal with economic and non-traditional security challenges. Russia is the main power behind the cooperation in the CIS area in security and economic terms. China initiated SCO is likewise moving towards more prominent collaboration with the CSTO, OSCE, CACO and the EAEU.

Afghanistan-centered enthusiasm of the United States and its partners generally decide the eventual fate of a number of organisations and instruments sponsored by the West. Since the choice of the United States to pull back from Afghanistan a couple of years back, the dependence on Russia-driven structures has developed. Moscow, through these organizations, has acquired the capacity to enhance relations amongst Russia and Central Asian countries and additionally help enhance relations among the states inside the region itself. This does not imply that other regional organizations are of less significance. Some of those are managing non-conventional difficulties and facilitating infrastructure and transportation links. Despite the fact that funding for a number of these plans isn't satisfactory; they are still significant for the Central Asian states.

The major role of Russia in the region does not imply that Central Asian states are caught in a relationship of dependence. They have utilized different techniques like multi vector approach, neutrality, shifting key accomplices and equidistance strategy to shield their interests and boost their advantages by the engagement of major global and regional powers. Their self-sufficiency rather than reliance on any one power makes for a more stable condition, since this liberates them from being pawns in the power rivalry. In any case, eventually, territorial stability would rely upon the relations between states inside Central Asia. Interstate collaboration is basic given the way that numerous issues are to be tended to by working together with neighbours. Rivers pass through borders of various states, which make interstate cooperation and trans-boundary plans unavoidable. Ecological concerns, like the contracting of the Aral Sea, influence water availability in some states, but arise due to excessive water use by various riparian states.

A similar ethnic group is dominant in one state yet turns into a minority in another. Boundary settlements are not yet complete. This leaves scope for interethnic and interstate questions that can be settled only through collaboration. Constrained by lack of reciprocal collaboration in any case, the weakest part of regional stability is the absence of more profound intra-regional cooperation. The significant relief however is the nonappearance of any geopolitical polarization so far on the unresolved issues confronting Central Asian states. Still, there are non-traditional security challenges the states need to address, and these require a larger amount of interstate participation than that which exists at the moment. Discussion in forums like the SCO and EAEU can be useful in advancing respective relations.

As is obvious from the investigation in this thesis, many conditions are a long way from being met at present for regional security. NATO's failure to handle or regard Russia's view of NATO's extension being a risk to its own particular security is one clear case of an absence of common understanding. Furthermore, the CSTO and NATO member states have varying perspectives on how the inward undertakings of specific states ought to be taken care of, with the CSTO members having faith in strong authority and sovereignty and in contrast NATO advancing liberal Western values and rights on the other.

They additionally have a contrasting perspective on how world order ought to be and global relations directed. Russia for instance furthers the possibility of the world getting to be multi-polar with three or four driving shafts, one of them being driven by

it. The US on the other hand, has clung solidly to its perspective of a unipolar order. There is however signs that the world is as of now moving to a multi-polar framework and that the US will in the long run need to adjust to such reality in like manner.

The basic issue of misconception and strain amongst Russia and the West has its good and bad times, and it is not inconceivable that a future noteworthy unwinding could open more discussion for reassessing the role of CSTO. During 2010 when NATO was looking for re-set in its own particular relations with Russia, Western states raised no complaint to moves made by the Kazakhstan to Chair the OSCE that by and by gave the CSTO more noteworthy acknowledgment and portrayal than before in that organisation's work. A more particular and more grounded pragmatist view in any rate for an enduring role of CSTO may emerge after possible full NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, when the assignment of containing terrorism and non-state threats from that nation would fall on others. In this context, there is greater chance that the CSTO would expand its adequacy based on a show of joint enthusiasm of its members in addressing these threats, and its expanded role would be in Western interests even while its techniques may outrage Western sensibilities.

Therefore as specified in the Fifth Chapter, "geographical nearness of the CIS to Afghanistan makes security in Afghanistan essential for the region, as all conflicts and instability there would spill over to the region of the CSTO member states. This was the reason why US activity against terrorism in Afghanistan was supported strongly, and some Central Asian states consented to have US military on their domains. In addition, there have been endeavours to advance security in the region and organizations, for example, '6+2' gathering of neighbours and friends of CACO, SCO, and CSTO were built up. Those organizations are endeavouring to centre their attention in this specific zone and expanding activities of other regional security organizations in post-Soviet states and their collaboration with the neighbouring and regional actors in this area with similar objectives. The Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO PfP Program are talked about in detail inside the structure of this Chapter". In addition, 9/11 tragic events expanded the significance of the region for the global security and all of previously mentioned organizations nearly participated with the regional actors to combat international terrorism.

In this context as we discussed in this chapter "The SCO, established as Shanghai Five, was built up to address the issues of borders amongst China and former Soviet

republics, and it incorporated five out of eight members from the SCO. Most of the 11,000 km border was disputed, so China rushed to coordinate with recently independent states to settle border issues directly after the end of the Cold War. By 1997 Shanghai Five started to change itself into a standardized organization, and in June 2001 it moved towards forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countering the three evil forces like terrorism, separatism and extremism, alongside potential key collaborations in other spheres were illustrated as the central thrust of cooperation”. Therefore China’s participation inside the SCO can be layout on three levels: on national level, Beijing’s worries about the Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Area, which threatens stability of China; on regional level, China coordinates with Central Asian states on border issues and fight against terrorism; and last, external level to constrain US influence in the region.

The OSCE has three fundamental measurements of participation as mentioned, “Military measurement, economic and natural measurement, and human measurement, which is the central goal of the organization. In post 9/11 period, OSCE changed its approach regarding the issue of international terrorism. However following the events in Kyrgyzstan (color revolution) and Uzbekistan (Andijan violence), it reconsidered its position regarding peace promotion and emergencies aversion. The organization has additionally been dynamic in peace-building following Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Civil War in Tajikistan. The OSCE also sent to observers to Kyrgyzstan because of the uprising in the nation and inter-ethnic violence in the southern part in 2010. The greatest test to the neutral approach of the OSCE has been since the Russia-Georgia war in South Caucasus in 2008”. On 24 June 2010, the then administration of Kyrgyzstan requested that the OSCE to send universal policing force; however mass protests against such choice halted the arrangement of police forces.

Three phases could be laid out in NATO’s relations with Central Asian states. First period is between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 events. “This was the period when NATO coordinated with the regional actors through PfP Programme, however Central Asia was not its objective. Circumstance changed after the 9/11 and ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which is the second stage that kept going until 2003. The last stage is 2003 onwards, when NATO’s impact diminished after the unrests in post-Soviet domains. It ought to be likewise emphasized that the cooperation between Central Asia and NATO was chiefly centered on Afghanistan and not on NATO’s

global security policy”. So the chapter examines collaboration of post-Soviet states with the three main regional security organizations.

In general, this thesis shows that in spite of the fact that the CSTO keeps on being a Russia driven regional security organization, Russia’s impact over the other CSTO members states has been bit by bit constrained all through the 2000’s because of the expanding assorted variety of threat perception of the other CSTO member states and the expanding influence of the other regional security organizations into the post-Soviet space. Most issues in CSTO are started and chosen by Russia. As on expressed that “In any case, because of the different internal issues of the member nations and diverse perceptions of the difficulties to their security, the CSTO member states likewise maintain relations with other regional security organizations. The CSTO member states have different expectations from the organization, for example, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia, energy security for Belarus, and international terrorism for Central Asia. Divergence of interests prompts debate and discussions inside the organization”.

Additionally, talk about the Eurasian space notwithstanding, we can hardly observe any multilateral grouping that could effectively contain the predictable, developing security threats in the Ferghana Valley and on the border of Afghanistan. A useful US and Russian relationship could make a specific essential push forward. However, in the run-up to the NATO summit 2012 in Chicago it was made adequately clear exactly how minimal political will there was to work collectively in Central Asia and Afghanistan, because of differences on Missile defence and different issues, for example, Syria and Iran. Neither the OSCE nor the EU has the political power or capabilities to assume a persuasive part in the region. Internal or domestic conditions in the post-Soviet states not just set limits on the viability of any security approach, at the end of the day additionally limit the actions of external actors, for example, the OSCE and the EU, constraining these relations to be ineffectual. Within a reasonable time-frame, security strategy in Central Asia will most likely be controlled by Russia. This perspective is based on various grounds. To start with, Moscow has an enthusiasm for interest against transnational threats, especially from Afghanistan, yet it has not sought after a cognizant, dependable course up to now. The sensitive transaction of Russia is at best down to regional strategy and locally spurred strategic adjusting and fleeting overtures with respect to all CSTO members, which does not make an appropriate stable basis for security arrangement. Second, the key

standardizing rule of non-interference in internal issues and the hesitance to surrender power by members put solid limits on viable mediation. Hence, it will be exceptionally troublesome for outside actors to deal with the conditions of the region and its regional organizations in light of a legitimate concern for viable security policy. Right now, the main prospect from Central Asian perspective is the potential outcomes of different collaborations and approaches to defeat the current security vacuums on various levels. Enthusiasm for a security discourse with the CSTO may be one component in such a system.

For the present, “the recognition of a system of a collective security space appears to depend excessively on the relations between the United States and Russia as they both hold the leading part in their respective organizations and each does possess the capacity to utilize that situation in getting a number of advantages over the other, even or particularly when utilizing the organizations as multipliers for local impact. By examination, NATO’s dealing of the SCO is not confrontational, as the latter is a young organization driven by both China and Russia. Despite the fact that there were doubts before all else about the expectations and intentions of the SCO, NATO’s approach towards the SCO has been considerably more open and moderate than it has been towards the CSTO. There are two main purposes behind this: firstlysssss, the SCO isn’t exclusively overwhelmed by Russia and presumably owes its principle motivation and progress to China which has not had an adversarial relation with NATO before”. Also, the SCO isn’t a military alliance but much rather a regional organization covering an extensive variety of non-traditional security issues in addition to economic and energy sector cooperation.

Secondly, the SCO presents itself as another sort of restricted organization, covering a space which has no universal institutional conventions from the Cold War period, and is not the slightest bit endeavouring to replicate NATO with respect to structure and operational capacity. The CSTO however has been patterned on NATO as a proper security organization attempting to reflect its structure and duplicating its operational procedures.

Afghanistan still remains unstable and terrorist groups there impact the stability of adjoining Central Asian countries. Following substantial US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and closure of American bases in Central Asia, the security worry of Central Asian states increased manifold. China is not willing to become a hard

security provider in the region. As a result, Russia-led CSTO remains the main military-security mainstay in the region, as was stated in our first hypothesis.

The CSTO's effectiveness and influence has also grown due to China's acceptance of Russia as the main military power in the post-Soviet space. Since Beijing is also worried about US influence next to its border, it has accepted Russia's military and security leadership in Central Asia. This is reflected in the various cooperation agreements between CSTO and the SCO. Bringing China on board has made the organisation more effective, since China otherwise is also a major player in the region, especially in economic and non-traditional security matters. The thesis in that sense discusses these aspects and establishes our second hypothesis.

In conclusion it can be said that today CSTO has emerged as the leading and most effective security organisation in the post-Soviet space, though it is not the only organisation there. However, it needs to expand its membership to other important states and bring back former member Uzbekistan, which has suspended its membership in CSTO since 2012. Though CSTO has a peace-keeping mandate, its effectiveness will be tested in future if a similar situation like the one in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 were to happen again within any member state. Since internal issues are more complex, CSTO would be quite hesitant to involve itself in such crises. But its mandate to intervene in the domestic sphere to thwart aggression by terrorist groups or drug cartels and so on makes it a very important security guarantor in the region.

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