

**Securitization of Threats: The State and Internal Security  
Challenges in Pakistan, 2001-2016**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
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**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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
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Date: 22 July 2019


**DECLARATION**


I declare that the thesis titled “**Securitization of Threats: The State and Internal Security Challenges in Pakistan, 2001-2016**”, submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

  
Shivani Sharma

**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
Prof. Sanjay Bhargava  
Chairperson, CSAS

  
Prof. P Sahadevan  
Supervisor

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## ACRONYMS

<b>APC</b>	All Parties Conference
<b>ANP</b>	Awami National Party
<b>ATA</b>	Anti Terrorism Act 1997
<b>ATC</b>	Anti-Terrorism Courts
<b>CCNS</b>	Cabinet Committee on National Security
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>COIN</b>	Counter Insurgency
<b>CVE</b>	Counter Violent Extremism
<b>DCC</b>	Defence Committee of the Cabinet
<b>DERP</b>	De-Radicalisation and Emancipation program
<b>DPC</b>	The Dife-e-Pakistan Council
<b>FATA</b>	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
<b>FATF</b>	Financial Action Task Force
<b>FCR</b>	Frontier Crime Regulations
<b>FTO</b>	Foreign Terrorist Organisation
<b>GHQ</b>	General Headquarters
<b>HuA</b>	Harakat-ul-Ansar
<b>HuJI</b>	Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
<b>HuM</b>	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
<b>ICRD</b>	International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced persons
<b>ISI</b>	Inter Services Intelligence

<b>ISPR</b>	Inter Services Public Relation
<b>ITMD</b>	Ittehad-e-Madaris-e-Dinya
<b>Jaish-ul-Qibla</b>	Jaish-ul- Qibla al-Jihadi al-Alami
<b>JeM</b>	Jaish-e-Muhammad
<b>JI</b>	Jamaat-e-Islami
<b>JuA</b>	Jamaat-ul-Ahrar
<b>JuD</b>	Jamaat-ud-Dawa
<b>JuI</b>	Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami
<b>JuP</b>	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan
<b>JUAH</b>	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Ahl-e-Hadith
<b>KP</b>	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
<b>LeJ</b>	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
<b>LeT</b>	Lashkar-e-Taiba
<b>LIC</b>	Low intensity conflict
<b>LOC</b>	Line of Control
<b>Lt.</b>	Lieutenant
<b>MFN</b>	Most Favored Nation
<b>MMA</b>	Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal
<b>NACTA</b>	National Counter Terrorism Authority Act
<b>NAP</b>	National Action Plan
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NISP</b>	National Internal Security Policy
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council
<b>NWFP</b>	North Western Frontier Province

## INTRODUCTION

Carved out of British India on 14 August 1947, Pakistan was born out of a demand for a separate homeland for the South Asian Muslims. Officially known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the movement for the creation of Pakistan was premised on the notion of “two-nation theory”, proposed by the Muslim League under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The notion of the “two-nation theory” was premised on the logic that, “Hindus and Muslims constitute two different civilisations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions” (quoted in Cohen 2005:28). This “communal definition of nationhood was augmented with the emphasis on the distinct Islamic way of life” (Ahmed 1991: 3).

Located in the South Asian subcontinent’s north-western region, bordering Afghanistan in the West and India in the East,<sup>1</sup> Pakistan inherited a hostile neighbourhood. Disputed over a conflict with India on Kashmir and divided over the status of the Afghan-Pakistan border stretching over 2,400 km (Durand line), Pakistan faced an imminent security challenge from its neighbourhood. Therefore, since the time of its formation, Pakistan has defined its security policy around a narrow survivalist model of security. It also attempted to strive for strategic parity with its bigger Indian neighbour through arms build-up, alignment with great powers, offering a home base for transnational terrorist networks, initiating wars to extract territorial concessions, and acquisition of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it looked at its western neighbour, Afghanistan, as a mere client state “to gain strategic depth”<sup>2</sup> with respect to the Indian state.

Pakistan’s security environment however changed dramatically in the post-9/11 era. The country’s participation in the US-led global war on terrorism in Afghanistan against the perpetrators of the attacks of 9/11 introduced a tectonic shift in the state’s

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<sup>1</sup> “Pakistan”, Countries Studies, [Online Web] Accessed 21 June 2016 URL: [<http://countries-studies.us/pakistan/23.htm>]

<sup>2</sup> A policy to be pursued in order to respond to a potential military strike by India. The policy suggests transforming Afghanistan into a client or a subservient state that is beholden to the Pakistani security establishment.

security policy. The post-9/11 international security environment had put Pakistan between two fundamentally contradictory and competing situations, one-the international pressure to recant its strategic partnership with militant groups which the state has been long using as a policy instrument to achieve its strategic goals in the region vis-a-vis the Indian state, and second the fear of losing out on the support of the Islamist militant proxies on joining the US war efforts. This competing situation brought Pakistan into the global limelight.

Pakistan's geographical adjacency to Afghanistan and its alliance with the ruling Taliban regime, made it a vital frontline partner for the US in its war against terrorism. Sharing a porous border with Afghanistan, Pakistan witnessed a subsequent movement of Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants into the country's federally administered tribal areas (FATA). Being a semi-autonomous tribal region run by local chiefs, FATA became an attractive proposition for the foreign militant groups to escape the wrath of US operations in Afghanistan. The shelter thus provided to these groups not only helped the displaced militant groups to regroup and reorganise their forces, but also encouraged the growth of new terrorist groups that started an insurgent-cum-terrorist campaign against the Pakistani state for joining the US forces. This shift in the theatre of terrorist activities made Pakistan an "epicentre of international terrorism" (Rassler and Brown 2011: 51).

Having joined the coalition forces to fight the scourge of terrorism, Pakistan has today itself become a major victim of extremist and terrorist violence. The country claims to have suffered an "economic loss of more than US\$ 78 billion in last ten years of the war and the lives of around 50,000 Pakistanis, including civil, armed forces and law enforcement agencies personnels" (National Internal Security Policy Document 2014). Given the massive human and infrastructural loss, the country after 67 years of its formation and 14 years of being a part to the US led war efforts fighting terrorism, has brought forth its first ever National Internal Security policy document in the year 2014. The policy recognises the serious challenges to its country's stability and security from the various non-traditional threats such as violent extremism, terrorism, sectarianism and militancy which are breeding and emanating from within its soil. The

policy thus reflects a major shift in the state's security perceptions in Pakistan from defining its security policy from fighting the traditional Indian military threat to recognising the internal threats breeding within its society.

In this context, the study aims to analyse the effects of the global war on terrorism on the security environment of the Pakistani state. It focusses on understanding the nature of the two inter-related internal security threats of violent extremism and terrorism in Pakistani society. The study focusses on understanding the shift in state's security agenda from its policy of sponsoring terrorism in its neighbourhood to recognising it as a threat to its national security and internal stability. The study uses the conceptual framework of "securitization theory" proposed by the Copenhagen school of thought. The framework provides a theoretical understanding on security politics by providing an insight on how security is framed and practiced in a state or the means by which security threats emerge, spread, and dissolve. The Copenhagen school of thought argues that the essence of security studies lies not much in analysing the nature of a specific threat, but in analysing the way threats are discursively presented and tackled. Before discussing the nature and rise of extremist and terrorist threat in Pakistan, the following paragraph will briefly explain the term violent extremism and terrorism.

The term violent extremism refers to "advocating, engaging, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic, political, as well as religious objectives that are rigid, uncompromising, and intolerant". It originates from "polarised ideological attitudes and practices which seek to eliminate diverse identities, practices, and institutions of thought, knowledge and behaviour in a society through the imposition of violence, organised terrorism, insurgencies and militancy, that are legitimised within the in-group through carefully engineered destructive and inhumane ideological narratives" (Development Advocate Pakistan 2016: 2).

The US National Strategy (2011) explains the underlying cause of extremism as "radicalisation that includes the diffusion of ideologies and narratives that feed on griev-

ances, assign blame, and legitimise the use of violence against those deemed responsible”.<sup>3</sup> They often make use of religion or religious narratives to demonise the enemies by portraying them as evil, and as a result, forcefully reject “the existing means of political participation” and attempt “to create new ideologies and” narratives “to bring about a structural change in all spheres of life (social, political, economic, or ethnic) by challenging the legitimacy of existing institutions” (PIPS Report 2009).

Extremist ideology has often been found to be the cause of terrorist violence in recent years. In a way, there exists a cause and effect relationship between extremism and terrorism. Terrorism is one of the most complex and complicated phenomenon of the contemporary world. It, till date, lacks a precise, concrete and truly explanatory definition. The 2004 “Secretary-General’s High Level Panel” Report defines terrorism as “any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants when the purpose of such activities by nature or context is to intimidate a population or to compel a government of an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act” (quoted in Crenshaw 2011: 2). However, the 9/11 attack is said to have ushered in a “new wave of terrorism”. The new paradigm, “holds that modern terrorism has different motives, different actors, different sponsors, and greater lethality than traditional terrorism”. Organisationally, this new form of terrorism has a decentralised power structure with a flat networked apparatus, diverse membership that cuts across ethnic, class, and national boundaries. Moreover, guided by extremist ideology; religion and fanaticism are considered as the main motivating factors for new terrorism.

## **1. Security Challenges in Pakistan: A Historical Overview**

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has been afflicted with various external and internal challenges. Internally, the state faced many contradictions and fragmentation in terms of its state identity. Conceived on the basis of religion, Pakistan failed to define the role of Islam in determining its state identity. Being a complex plural society

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<sup>3</sup> “Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the US”, White House, US, August 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 13 June 2016 URL: [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering\\_local\\_partners.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf)

comprising of diverse religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups, Islam in Pakistan failed to serve as a unifying force. The ambiguity around the role of religion in the state popularised various discourses around Islamism that encouraged sectarian schisms and ethnic divides in the country. Externally, the very basis of the formation of the state of Pakistan based on the two-nation theory had put Pakistan at logger ends with its immediate neighbour, India, a Hindu dominated secular state.

Pakistan's security policy however has not just been shaped by national security interests alone but serves “as a vital compensation for Pakistan's lack of a clearly defined sense of nationhood” (Shaikh 2009:180). As a result, though confronted by both internal and external security challenges since its inception, Pakistan’s security policy is heavily tilted towards fighting its external enemy, India, around which Pakistan defines its national identity.

Originally envisaged to be a separate homeland for the South Asian Muslim population, Pakistan failed in forming a cohesive national identity for itself. After Pakistan’s creation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had once championed the cause of “two-nation theory”, committed himself towards building and making Pakistan a secular democracy. As part of his first address to the Constituent Assembly, he stated, “Religion has nothing to do with the business of the state. In the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims” (quoted in Ahmed 1991: 78-79). The speech made by Jinnah was in direct contradiction with the paradigm of the “two nation theory, the basis of the existence of Pakistan.

However, with the early demise of Jinnah and lack of a strong political leadership thereafter, Pakistan failed to define the role of religion in running the affairs of the new state. The enigmatic relationship between state’s identity with religion invited undue interference from a group of religious clerics who earlier had opposed the very idea of the creation of Pakistan. This paved way for the religious leaders to establish a pre-eminent role in the Pakistani society and polity. Claiming to have a foundational knowledge about Islam, the religious clerics took upon themselves the responsibility

of dominating the ideological discourse of the state, thereby defining the identity of the Pakistani state in Islamic terms.

However, due to the heterogenous composition of the Pakistani state comprising of diverse religious-ethnic groups and sects,<sup>4</sup> Islam in Pakistan failed to unify the country. The imposition of a particular strand of Islam and the exclusionary politics of the religious groups and dominant sects directly challenged and undermined the fundamental rights of the minority groups, leading to sectarian clashes and ethnic divides.

Thus, to divert people's attention from the internal state contradictions and tensions, Pakistan popularised the anti-India narrative and politicised the Kashmir issue. The anti-India narrative, was mostly popularised by the over-developed institution of military in Pakistan who exploited the anti-India perception to safeguard its institutional relevance and interests. Despite the major developmental challenges faced by the newly formed state of Pakistan, Pakistan's military popularised the notion of a 'security state' to draw huge allotment of resources to the defence sector and dictate the course of security policy making in the country. The pre-occupation with the perceived threat around India and the attendant priority for defence rapidly helped the institution to present themselves as the guarantor of state survival and emerge as the most cohesive and dominant institution of the nation at the expense of the civilian-political institutions.

To maintain some plausible reasons for its existence, the state further defined its identity as Islamic Pakistan in opposition to a Hindu India. Pakistan argued that the completeness of its nation depended "on the integration of the contiguous muslim-majority state of Kashmir into Pakistan" (Ganguly 1986: 60). By bringing in the religious discourse, Pakistan politicised the Kashmir issue by drawing an inextricable link between the accession of Kashmir and Pakistan state's identity. This, the state thought, would affirm Pakistan's Islamic identity and support the notion of South Asian state-

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<sup>4</sup> The state's ethnic diversity has been defined in terms of the existence of various historical groups such as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baloch. Religious groups present in Pakistan are Muslims (96.03%), Hindus (1.85%), Christians (1.59%) and Others (0.07%)



hood, making the issue of possession of Kashmir far more significant than a mere territorial claim.

However, India's dismissal of the two-nation theory, the secular viability of its state, and the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir presented a direct challenge to the *raison d'être* of the Pakistani state. Similar to its Pakistani counterpart, the assimilation of Kashmir into India was equally significant for the ideological underpinnings of the Indian state, to demonstrate to its citizens that people of "all faiths could live under the aegis of a secular state" (Ganguly 1995:169). Establishment of secular democracy in India thus generated a deep sense of insecurity amongst the Pakistanis around India's intentions of dismissing the idea of Pakistan. Therefore, by playing upon the narrative of India's dismissal of the idea of Pakistan and defining the state's ideological foundations around the Kashmir issue, Pakistan construed its struggle with India in 'existential' terms. This perception around the Indian state had set the stage for the future course of relations between the two countries, marked by insecurity, suspicion, animosity, and competitiveness.

In this, Pakistan neglected many of its new born state challenges which not only weakened the foundational base of the Pakistani state but laid down a religiously extremist state environment. The sectarian clashes against the minority sects, Baloch nationalist movement, and the creation of Bangladesh were all a result of the state's failure to manage its internal strife stemming from its weak ideological foundations. Moreover, the ambiguity around the role of religion was also exploited by domestic political forces to define, employ, and exploit different religious discourses to meet their personal and political interests. Religion in Pakistan thus became a basis for practising domestic statecraft and foreign policies.

Pakistan however resorted to religion not only as a means to define its inherent rivalry with the secular Indian state but used it as a policy instrument to reach its strategic and security goals in the region. In order to offset India's conventional military superiority, Pakistan has been using the tactics of guerrilla and proxy warfare to fight the Indian state in Kashmir. From the very beginning, Pakistan used religiously inspired

proxy forces as instruments of state policy. Indoctrinated with a blind hatred for India, the army of religious men was used as ‘militia forces’ by the state to pursue its strategic objectives in the region.

Pakistan’s strategy of using proxy forces, infiltrating local tribesmen into the enemy country, dates back to the state’s first war with India fought on Kashmir in the year 1947-48. Pakistan aided and supported the infiltration of 2000 Pathan tribesmen, who invaded from the Poonch area of Kashmir to ensure Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan (Ganguly 1986: 17). Since then, Pakistan has been making use of Islamic militants to keep Indian forces engaged in a proxy warfare. The initial phase of Pakistan’s 1965 Kashmir war plan, code-named “Operation Gibraltar, also relied almost entirely on irregular forces” (Kapur and Sumit 2012: 120). The political use of Islam and indoctrination of youth in religious extremist ideology has helped Pakistan raise a fanatic breed of jihadis to pursue the policy of ‘bleed India by a thousand cuts’

However, it was during the late 1970s that the epochal rise of religious extremism and the jihad culture developed in Pakistan. The Islamisation programme launched by General Zia-ul-Haq as well as the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 sowed the seeds of violent extremism in the country. The programme initiated by General Zia promoted “sunnification” of the Pakistani society and state. The promotion of exclusionary discourses and practices in the country encouraged a religiously extremist environment in the state which facilitated the growth of many sectarian factions in the state and the start of sectarian clashes between the minority Shia and the majority Sunni sects.

Acting as a frontline state to the US to defeat the Soviet military in Afghanistan, Pakistan at the behest of the US and Saudi Arabia, raised and trained an army of religious men, the mujahideen, to destroy the Soviet and Afghan communists from the region. Pakistan state’s indulgence in the Islamisation programme during the late 1970s helped the ideological mobilisation of people to support the jihad in Afghanistan. Jihad was defined mostly as an ideological and guerrilla warfare against the non-Muslims or a ‘holy war’ against the non-believers of Islam (Stern 2000:

19). The decade-long conflict in Afghanistan gave the Islamists a rallying point and a training field for the young Muslims around the world to join the Afghan war against the Soviet forces. Apart from the enormous funding that Pakistan received from external actors, the war provided an opportunity to the Pakistani state to contain India's influence and hegemonic ambitions in the region.

Victory in the war bolstered Pakistan state's confidence in fighting a Kashmiri proxy war. Therefore, after the war ended, the mujahideen forces that were trained to fight the Soviet red army were turned towards Pakistan's eastern front. More than 2.8 million religiously indoctrinated left over Afghan refugees were used as proxies to counter India on the Kashmir front. Thus, in the period after the war, Pakistan saw the rise of many sectarian and Kashmir-based militant groups in the country. While the sectarian groups concentrated their fight against the members of the minority Shia demographic in the state, the other militant groups (such as, "Hizbul-ul-Mujahideen", "Lashkar-e-Toiba", "Harkat-ul-Ansar", and "Jaish-e-Mohammad") were largely engaged in challenging India's claim over the state of Jammu and Kashmir and demanded its independence along with the enforcement of Sharia.

The militant groups committed towards waging jihad against India were looked at as strategic assets by the Pakistani army to keep the Indian forces challenged and engaged on the Kashmir front. Aided, abetted, and supported by the Pakistani establishment, the groups were used as proxies to counter the steep asymmetry in their material resources with the Indian state.

On its western front, Pakistan began to work on shaping Afghanistan's postwar strategic environment. Pakistan's Afghanistan policy "was dominated by two factors: The division of ethnic Pashtun heartland between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistan's competition with India, which has persisted since 1947" (Yusuf 2013: 4). In order to satisfy both its objectives, Pakistani State, especially the establishment wing rendered its support to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan under Mullah Mohammad Omar. The Taliban, which literally means 'students' shared close ties with the Pakistani government as most of the members were a product of the Pakistani madrasas.

Moreover, the establishment believed that the group primarily being united on the Islamist principle would be “uninterested in raising the issue of Pashtun nationalism” (Rashid 2010: 187). And in the regional context, a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan would help the state gain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan vis-a-vis the Indian state by using the Afghan territory to train and launch militants to fight the Indian state in Kashmir. Thus, during the period between 1996 and 2001, the Pakistani state provided their all out support to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by providing them funding, training, technical assistance, military advisers, fuel, and materials.

## **2. Pakistan’s Security Environment in the Post-2001 Period: Threats and Concerns**

Pakistan faced a new security situation in the post-2001 period. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the powerful American symbols by a group of terrorists, led by the Al-Qaeda, made the US launch a global war on terrorism. The presence of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan under the aegis of Taliban brought the conflict to South Asia, to Pakistan's doorsteps.

The US described the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon “as a transnational movement of extremist organisations, networks, and individuals and their state and non-state supporters, who exploit Islam to serve their violent political vision and use terrorism for ideological ends” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006).<sup>5</sup> The-then US President, George Bush, articulated and laid down the objective of the war in his speech to the US congress by stating, “the war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> US Department of State, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2001-2009)”, 20<sup>th</sup> January, 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2014 URL: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm#enemy>.

<sup>6</sup> “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation”, The Washington Post, 20 September 2001, [Online: Web] Accessed 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2014 URL: [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress\\_092001.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html).

As a result of the resilient and transnational nature of this terrorist attack, the Americans declared the war as a “global fight calling in for international help by showing its willingness to work with the willing and able states while enabling the weak and the reluctant ones to join the international community to fight the menace of terrorism” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003).

The American intervention in Afghanistan to defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime (shielding the Al-Qaeda network) had serious implications on its immediate neighbour, Pakistan. Pakistan being among the three nations, that recognised the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, was considered as an important member to the US-led coalition of forces in its operations against terrorism. Owing to its geographical adjacency to Afghanistan and strategic vitality, Pakistan was coerced into joining the coalition forces to serve as a frontline state to the US in the war against terrorism. While reluctant to collaborate with the Western camp, Pakistan succumbed to the American pressure of being thrown “back to the stone-age in case” of its refusal to support the war on terrorism. Pakistan thus joined the war efforts not out of any moral solidarity with the US but due to the fear of diplomatic isolation.

However, despite joining the war efforts to defeat the threat of terrorism, Pakistan did not make a complete reversal on its Taliban policy. The Pakistani army continued to protect and aid the pro-state anti-Indian Kashmir militant groups as well as the Afghan militant groups, such as Mullah Omar’s Taliban. Pakistan’s assistance to these groups was based on promoting its security interests and meeting its strategic objectives of finding parity and strategic depth in the region vis-a-vis its immediate neighbour, India.

However, following General Musharraf’s decision to support the US-led war in Afghanistan, many of the state sponsored militant proxy groups sharing ideological convergence with foreign terrorist organisations joined the Al-Qaeda and Taliban ranks in their fight against the US forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, the forced change in Pakistan state’s policy in terms of the crackdown on indigenous militant organisations, military operations against terrorist groups in country’s tribal areas, and the with-

drawal of state patronage to religious leaders at the behest of the US, turned many of the pro-state militant groups against the Pakistani state and gave birth to a new breed of anti-state militants in the country.

Opposing Pakistan's participation in the war, a strong cohort of militant groups, later to coalesce under the name "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan" (TTP), emerged and embarked upon a violent campaign against the Pakistani state. The group which emerged in 2007 considered Pakistan state's decision to side with the international community in the fight against terrorism as an act of aggression against a brotherly Islamic country. Since its emergence, the group has been posing a serious challenge to state's legitimacy and writ by proposing "to impose its puritanical version of sharia throughout the country". It has seized control of large sections of South Waziristan, and ran a parallel government in Swat. For example, in 2007, Fazlullah, the leader of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and the leader of Swat Taliban imposed Taliban rule in the Swat Valley. The imposition of their puritanical version of sharia had not only repudiated Islamabad's writ but has led to widespread extremist violence in the valley.

Following a rise in terrorist violence in the state after the growth of anti-state forces in the country, the Pakistani state, both civilian and military leadership, acknowledged the gravity of security challenges that come from the extremist and terrorist forces breeding within its society. Pakistan defined the security threat around fighting the TTP-Al-Qaeda combine and their affiliates. Whereas other outfits such as the traditionally anti-India groups, and Afghan proxy groups were looked at as strategic assets. In fact the establishment forces in Pakistan have attempted to use the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network on numerous occasions to temper the TTP and reorient its focus on Afghanistan in exchange of protection from military operations in FATA.

However, the incessant rise of terrorist violence at the Pakistani state institutions made Pakistan come up with its first ever "National internal security policy document" in the year 2014. The policy document for the first time officially recognised the acuteness of threats that emanates internally from Pakistan's society. It was in the context of the 16 December 2014, Peshawar Army school attack, which led to the

death of over 147 people, mostly children, that both military and civilian leadership in Pakistan jointly came together to frame a National Action Plan. The state in the policy document committed itself towards eradicating the terrorist infrastructure breeding in the country, without making any discrimination between good and bad terrorists.

However, despite the claims and pledges, Pakistan continues to host many of the terrorist groups, which are strategically significant for the Pakistani state in meeting its regional interests. Pakistan's policy of sponsoring and supporting terrorism has however brought the state under severe international condemnation and scrutiny. Pakistan's economy being in dire straits, and the threats of sanctions being raised by Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan today faces what Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly refers to as "Jihad paradox"; "the very conditions that made Pakistan's militant policy useful in the past now makes it extremely dangerous" (Kapur and Sumit 2012: 114).

### **3. About the Study**

Against this backdrop, the study attempts to understand the "Jihad paradox" in Pakistan, by attempting to analyse the politics of security in the country in the post-9/11 period. The study takes and understands security not as a natural objective given reality but as an outcome of a specific social process. It argues that issues and challenges do not become 'security threats' on their own, rather they are constructed and are highly context-dependent. The study borrows its theoretical framework from the "securitization" theory proposed by Copenhagen school of thought. According to the Copenhagen school of thought, security is an "act" itself i.e. it is in the practice of 'speaking' security that a development "becomes a security issue, not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is presented as a threat" (Weaver 1995).. By naming an "issue or a development as a security issue, the state representatives take the issue outside the normal bounds of political procedure by attaching an element of urgency and thereby claiming a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it" (Weaver 1995: 55). The study argues that qualification of issues as 'threats' depends upon the manipulation of security discourse by the

dominant state elites or the securitising actors who speaks security. Through speeches and representations, relevant political actors transform an issue into a security matter in order to allow for the use of extraordinary measures. Therefore, once an issue is securitised, actions are often legitimised under the language of ‘urgency’.

The study however looks at security beyond the ‘speech act’ theory i.e. the illocutionary act, taking into consideration the role of the crucial aspects of ‘context’, ‘audience’, and ‘process-tracing’ in analysing the securitisation process. The study looks at the process of securitisation from a sociological perspective, as proposed by Thierry Balzacq, who lays down significant importance to the element of ‘context’ in which security is spoken and on the ‘audience’ whose acceptance of a securitising move determines the success of a successful securitisation process. The context, in which security is spoken, helps influence security statements and articulations by making a relation to an external reality. Audience plays a crucial component in the study of politics as the mere act of speaking security doesn’t ensure securitisation until it convinces the target audience to accept the claim and swing the audiences’ support towards the policy response (Balzacq 2005: 173).

Thus, the work builds on understanding security as an interplay of power, language, and context. Using the conceptual understanding of securitisation, the study employs a political approach to analyse security agenda setting in Pakistan, i.e. how the choices and actions taken by the state actors shape and manipulate the security agenda and the responses thereafter.

The main objectives of the study are to examine security as a social construct than an immutable law. It aims to comprehend the politics of security in Pakistan by looking at the process of threat construction in Pakistan i.e. ‘how’ security threats are framed and responded. The study attempts to analyse the nature of the Pakistani State to be able to understand the different challenges and threats that the state confronts, the power relations in the society and the capacity of the state to respond to these threats.

The study also seeks to answer the following questions: How does the process of securitisation determine policy making in the state? Who decides the country’s security



policy and how? What has led to the change in the security policy of Pakistan from fighting the traditional Indian military threat to recognising threats from within its society? What has led to the rise of extremist and terrorist violence in the country? What hinders or imperils Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts? Whether Pakistan's overly militarised approach of "tackling the threats of violent extremism and terrorism has proved to be counter-productive"?

The study will test the following hypothesis :

- The Pakistani state's selective approach of securitisation towards the terrorist and extremist threats has imperilled its counter-terrorism measures.
- Heavy reliance on counter-terrorism operations without a corresponding soft political approach is not only capital intensive but also counter-productive.

#### **4. Review of the Literature**

Most of the literature available on the field provides explanation for the rise of terrorist and extremist violence in the state of Pakistan. It deliberates on the "nature of the threat and its impact on the Pakistani state and society". The study however aims to try and provide a theoretical explanation to describe and uncover 'how' and 'when' the threat of violent extremism and terrorism dominated the Pakistani state's security discourse.

Most of the available literature traces the roots of extremism in Pakistan "to General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation program in the 1980s". However, Iqbal and De Silva (2013) and Zaidi (2010) argue that "the rise of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan has intensified in the last one decade". Rashid (2000), Riedel (2011) and Rafique and Azfar (2014) state that the spill-over effects of the war in Afghanistan have brought the transnational terrorist groups of Taliban and Al-Qaeda in close contact with the local militants within KPK and the FATA regions of Pakistan. The alliance between the indigenous sectarian groups and the transnational terrorist organisations against the common enemy, the US, "has led to the mounting influence of Taliban in Pakistan". Rashid (2010) states that the militants in the FATA and the NWFP painted their strug-

gle in Islamic terms, which “has resulted in the formation of many new militant groups within Pakistan” and the existing ones siding with the ongoing Al-Qaeda’s war against the enemies of Islam. Mir (2010) posits that Al-Qaeda and Taliban network kept thriving by evolving a modus operandi of exploiting the disgruntled local affiliates to pursue their global jihadi agenda. Adding further, Gunaratna and Nielsen (2008) and Qazi (2011) argue that the Al-Qaeda threat has proliferated and “that the threat has been compounded with the addition of a new range of actors notably Pakistan Taliban”. Siddiqi (2011) further notes that the radical group of “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” acts both as a local franchise and coalition builder for Al-Qaeda. The norms, shared identity, culture, and experiences have led to the localization of Taliban norms in Pakistan.

Hussain (2012) argues that the state’s ban on the militant organisations in Punjab gave the foreign organisations the opportunity to take advantage of the circumstances in the name of religious fervour and receive full backing from local extremists and sectarian militants of Punjab. Kronstadt and Vaughn (2005) believe that the arrest of Abu Zubaydah in 2002 at a LeT safe house in Faisalabad highlights the fact that the members of the pro-state groups too have co-operated with Al-Qaeda and possibly have assisted the movement of cadres throughout Pakistan.

Rassler (2009) points out “that the Al-Qaeda assumed a role of a mediator and coalition builder among various Pakistani militant group factions by promoting the unification of entities that have opposed one another or had conflicting ideas about whether to target the Pakistani state”. Council on Foreign Relations (2009) reported that “Talibanization of the Pakistani Pashtun belt is gradually moving eastward into settled districts, creating new terrorist safe heavens in once tranquil locales”. The rise of “Pakistani Taliban, a loose conglomeration of militant groups of Punjabi origin, gained prominence after major 2008-2009 attacks in the cities of Lahore, Islamabad and Rawalpindi”. Although, they share the same ideology as that of the Afghan Taliban, they are essentially Pakistani “and aim at nothing less than cleansing Pakistan of all the liberal and secular elements to turn it into a pure Islamic state by enforcing Islam-

ic shariah”. Thus, the “group’s capacity to strike directly at the political leadership in Pakistan is a recurrent threats.

Behuria (2007) and Shehzad (2013) try to understand the challenge of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan by highlighting the relationship between the state and the militants. Fair (2009) argues that the apex Afghan leadership, along with Al-Qaeda who are responsible for the spread of terrorism in the state enjoyed sanctuaries in several areas of the country at the behest of the support rendered to them by the establishment forces. Abbas (2013) asserts that the root cause of terrorism in the country “is largely a consequence of military authoritarianism, the failure of the state to invest in the well being of its people, and a pursuit of controversial regional goals that undermine its internal social fabric”. Moreover, the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the limited control and “writ of the Pakistani government in that terrain led to rise of militancy and Talibanization in Pakistan”. Yasmeen (2013) and Ahmed (2008) make a notable contribution by analyzing the extremist and terrorist challenge in the dominant and parallel struggle of narratives “carried out in Pakistan in terms of its Islamic identity since the 9/11”.

Rassler and Brown (2011) deliberate upon a close alliance between the Pakistan establishment and the radical organizations which have led the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network to have sanctuaries inside Pakistan and cites intelligence reports about their links with the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Hussain (2007) cites evidence “of two former ISI Directors, General Hamid Gul and Javed Nasir’s involvement in Islamist radical movement linked to the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban”.

The rise in terrorist and extremist violence in Pakistan has opened debates on Pakistani state’s commitment towards eradicating the scourge of terrorism. The available literature provides an overview of the major debates on the subject. Jeremy (2010) argues that the attacks of 9/11 and Pakistan’s joining of war on terrorism brought about a paradigm shift in the military-militant nexus. The government’s decision to make a reversal of its policy on Taliban caused a breakup of their long standing relationship. Ali (2009) and Haqqani (2005) note that the marriage of convenience be-

tween the ISI and militant groups could not withstand after Pakistan joined the US forces. Jones (2007) argues “that despite the policy actions taken by the Pakistani government, the country’s record in dealing with radical groups has been highly duplicitous”. Rubin (2007) and Markey (2007) note that “since the Pakistani state was most intimately involved in the creation of the Taliban, Musharraf’s anti-terrorism campaign deliberately avoided any concerted targeting against them, and in particular its senior leadership”. The banning of militant organizations usually “implied a name change or a temporary suspension of operations”. Fair (2004) and Riedel (2007) further posited that “the Taliban network, just like the Pakistani aided terrorist groups operating in Kashmir, were deliberately permitted to escape the wrath of Musharraf’s counter-terrorism operations”. Tellis (2008), Cohen (2004) and Kronstadt (2003) further notes “that the Pakistani campaign focused primarily on the Al-Qaeda and foreign fighters, whom U.S. policymakers were most interested in but did not push hard against the Taliban”.

## **5. Rationale and Scope of the Study**

Pakistan is “looked at as the world’s most dangerous place”<sup>7</sup> and the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Pakistan has become a great cause of concern for the entire international community. Pakistan at present has been put under the ‘grey list’ of countries with inadequate controls over curbing money laundering and terrorism financing by the Financial Action Task Force.

The country which has been long sponsoring terrorist forces as an instrument of its state policy today experiences a concerted confrontation with Islamic radical militant groups. Furthermore, the challenge of combating the threat of terrorism has become even more daunting due to the ideological convergences and considerable fluidity in the group membership and scope of their operations. The presence of metastasis of a variety of Islamist militant outfits all over the country, with aims ranging from fighting the western forces, the takeover of the Pakistani state and elimination of minority

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<sup>7</sup> “Pakistan: The World’s most dangerous place”, The Economist, 3<sup>rd</sup> January 2008, [Online: Web] Accessed 15<sup>th</sup> October 2013 URL: <http://www.economist.com/node/10430237>.

groups, have created pockets of violence all over Pakistan. The distinction between the militant groups operating in Pakistan outlined earlier can no longer be fixed as both the composition and ideological orientation of these groups are constantly evolving. Thus, the current state of violence in Pakistan not just jeopardises the internal security situation in the country, but pose dangerous ramifications for the global security environment.

### **Scope**

The post-2001 period, as covered in the present study, ushered a new era in the realm of international politics. The destruction of powerful American symbols by a transnational terrorist organisation, Al-Qaeda, is said to have commenced a new wave of terrorism. The unlimited and amorphous nature of terrorism with the goals of new terrorists being derived exclusively from religious doctrines brings a new dimension in the realm of security studies. The period also saw a shift from the traditional security threats faced by nation states rooted in protecting one's borders militarily to the issues concerning transnational conflict, violence, globalization, and non-traditional threats. The transnational nature of the threat makes the war against terrorism a globalised conflict, wherein states not directly involved in the fight have become participants in the war to combat the "large network of terrorist groups operating in different parts of the world". This blurring of boundaries has made Pakistan succumb to the international pressure of "joining the US led coalition of forces in the war against terrorism".

The period since 2001 marked a significant effect on Pakistan's security environment. The shift in the theatre of terrorist activities from Afghanistan to Pakistan resulted in a massive wave of extremist and terrorist violence in the country. The ideological connectivity and relations between the indigenous militant groups of Pakistan (which the state was using to meet its regional interests) with the foreign terrorist organisations has made Pakistan a hotbed of assortment of Islamist militants.

In the light of the above, the study covers the period between 2001 and 2016 to assess the impact of a globalised war on Pakistan's security environment. It will analyse the

extremist and terrorist challenge faced by the Pakistani State and its responses in two phases, 2001-2007 and 2007 onwards. The study is divided into these two phases as they are marked by a distinct shift in the scale of terrorist violence within Pakistan, the state's outlook towards the threats and a consequent shift in strategy to fight terrorist forces. The year 2014 assumed significance as the Pakistani State made a shift from its traditional security discourse and introduced its first ever internal security policy. The threat was further reinforced after the horrific attack at the Army public school in Peshawar the same year, which brought both civilian and military authorities together to formulate the National Action Plan, committed towards making no distinction between 'good' and 'bad' terrorists.

However, in just about two years, Pakistan's commitment towards fighting all terrorist forces was put to question. The year 2016 saw two major terrorist attacks on the Indian state (Pathankot and Uri) by the Kashmir jihadi groups based in Pakistan. The continuous protection and inaction by the Pakistani state on the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks has raised apprehensions on state's commitment towards fighting all militants without any discrimination. The year 2016 further assumed importance as it also brought out into open the long-standing issue of discord between the civilian and military leadership over their approach in fighting the scourge of terrorism. Amidst the growing international condemnation of Pakistan for its involvement in supporting terrorist groups, the civilian leadership under former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, conveyed a terse message to the military led intelligence agencies to not meddle and interfere in the actions taken against militant groups. However, the proceedings of what may be referred to as a private meeting were leaked out in the public domain (popularly known as Dawn leaks), highlighting the conflict between the two main securitising agents.

The study will be carried by employing the securitization theory to understand the construction and nature of security threats in Pakistan. The proposed thesis would adopt an exploratory method of study. The study employs the critical discourse analysis method in assessing the language of security threats in Pakistan. It will testify whether the present trends of security threats in Pakistan and the state responses can

be studied from a constructivist school of thought. The study is based on both primary and secondary source materials. The primary data includes de-classified documents released by the US government, speeches, interviews, and government policy documents. As far as secondary sources are concerned, the data has been collected from books, articles, and journals. Due to the limitation of undertaking a field trip to Pakistan, the study primarily focuses on comprehending the politics of security in the state by carrying out a discursive analytical study on their policy documents, state official speeches or address to the nation, and the relevant opinion polls carried out in the state.

## **6. Chapters**

The study comprises of five main chapters:

### **Chapter 1: State and Security: A Conceptual Framework**

The first chapter draws upon the symbiotic relationship between state and security. It briefly discusses the evolving relationship between state and security, and assesses the various factors that determines the nature of a state, the state-society relationship and state's organisational capacity to deliver the political good of security. The study however understands security "through the lens of securitisation theory propagated by the Copenhagen school of thought". The study looks at security not as a given material objective reality "but an outcome of a specific social process". It argues that states "not only maintain its mandate to regulate security, but also decides upon what constitutes a security issue".

### **Chapter 2: Understanding the Nature of the Pakistani State**

The second chapter attempts at understanding the underlying nature of the Pakistani State. It discusses and analyses the various characteristics that define the state of Pakistan. By deliberating on the characteristics, the chapter attempts to analyse the functioning of the Pakistani State, and the challenges that the state is confronted with.

### **Chapter 3: Challenging the State: Threats to Internal Security**

The chapter attempts to locate the fundamental causes for the rise of extremist violence and terrorism in Pakistan. It highlights the main channels that engineer the spread of extremism in the society. The chapter discusses in detail the presence of various terrorist groups existing in Pakistan which pose a direct threat to the state's security and stability.

### **Chapter 4: Securitisation of Threats: Pakistan's Security Policy**

The chapter analyses the security paradigm of Pakistan in the context of its participation in the global war on terrorism. The chapter applies the theoretical framework of securitisation to understand Pakistan's security agenda setting in the post-9/11 period. In order to understand how the politics of threat design is relative to that of threat management, the chapter studies the issue of terrorism and violent extremism in Pakistan into two phases: 2001-2007 and 2007 onwards. It will also deliberate upon the reasons that led to the rise of extremist and terrorist violence in Pakistan, and inquire whether and how Pakistan's selective securitising strategy proved detrimental to its own state security.

### **Chapter 5: State Responses to Internal Security Challenges**

The chapter deliberates upon the various policy and strategic responses made by the Pakistani State at different stages of the war to counter the menace of terrorism. It will study the various institutional mechanisms and policies enacted by the state in order to combat the challenges of terrorism and extremism. The focus of the chapter will be to analyse the different policy responses made by the state and evaluate the various inefficacies and challenges that the state confronts in combating these threats.

### **Conclusion**

The concluding chapter will test the hypotheses of the study and will assess the challenges and the factors that deter the effective implementation of counter-terrorism



policies. It will conclude by listing some of the shortcomings in the state's security policies and draw some conceptual and policy insights and lessons.

## Chapter 1

### State and Security: A Conceptual Framework

#### **1. Introduction**

State and security share a symbiotic relationship with one another that has evolved over a period of time. The security of a nation supersedes all other broad objectives of a nation-state. It is, in fact, the most important element in ensuring national interest. One of the major challenges to the state is to guard its national frontiers against external attacks and internal dissent and provide security of life and well-being to its citizens.

In light of the above, the chapter provides a brief background to explain the development of an inextricable relationship between state and security. It attempts to understand how the historical evolution and development of the state have impacted its role and function of providing security.

Security as a problem, however, differs substantially from state to state. Most of the states share similar functions and characteristics, yet they differ and vary greatly in terms of their internal characteristics, the nature of the security threats that they confront, and their performance. The characteristics of states or the nature of the state determine the type of security challenges that a state encounters, and their capacity to respond. The study, therefore, will shed light on examining the factors that determine the state's capacity and the parameters reflective of their performance.

However, security is a complex and contested notion. The question of what qualifies as a security 'threat' is of much discussion and contestation. The study further looks at the relationship between state and security through the lens of 'securitisation theory' propagated by the Copenhagen school of thought. The school argues that, "states not only maintain its mandate to reg-

ulate security but decides on what constitutes a security issue and thereby dictates and manipulates the security agenda” (Fjader 2014:117). It understands security, not as a given material objective reality but an outcome of a specific social process; a product of the practices, context and the power relations that characterise the construction of images. Therefore, by understanding security as a discursive practice, the study draws a link between state power and the process of securitisation, analysing how security gets ‘framed’ and is an outcome of a constructivist ‘social process’ carried out by the state’s dominant elites.

## **2. Symbiotic Relationship between State and Security: A Historical Background**

The intractable relationship between state and security has evolved over time. Though most of the attention and research on the theme has been directed towards the expansion and changes in the issue areas of security studies, very little heed has been paid to the changing role of the state in performing the function of providing security. Brian Marbee argues that the “provision of security has historically changed with the development of the state and it is imperative to see the state beyond a static trans-historical institution” (Marbee 2003:136). Thus, the following paragraphs will briefly discuss the historical development of the state and its evolving relationship with security.

The historical development of the nation-state can be traced back to the context of the European State formation. Development of nation-states are mostly explained by the historians in the context of war-making. Charles Tilly, one of the most famous social scientists, remarked, “War made states and states made war” (Tilly 1990:67). He explained his model of state formation in the elite’s war-making efforts which eventually accentuated the state’s development. He professed that war and preparation of war give the rulers the power to extract and redistribute capital and monopolise coercion. To survive

in a world of aggressive neighbours and to acquire the means of war; the rulers extract “resources from individuals within the controlled territory, and redistribute that capital to use it in the development of standing armies which then ensures internal and external security” (Delatolla 2016:282). According to Tilly, a particular combination of both capital and coercion within the state explains the process of state formation.

The preparation of war and ineluctable extraction of resources helped the state elites to not only “monopolise the control over violence within their territories but at the same time helped the rulers to build up state infrastructure to regulate taxation, supply, police forces and an administration that requires maintenance” (Tilly 1990:20). The pursuit of war, therefore, led to the increasing level of bureaucratic management of the state which was met with resistance from the local elites. The resistance was most of the times suppressed by the rulers with coercion, capital or capitalised coercion paths.

However, to negotiate with the resistance forces, a need for a political system was realised. During this process, the rulers channelised their resources towards infrastructural development to serve civilian needs. It made attempts at homogenising the population and meeting their social and economic needs by creating a strong state-society bond. The increased socialisation and politicisation process of the state gave way to the principles of nationalism and sovereignty which created an inextricable link between the state and society, wherein state survival came to be closely linked to the protection of the local population. The development of the increased infrastructural power of the state by the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, therefore, heralded a more intensive relationship between state and society regarding the provision of security.

The 20th century period introduced an era of industrialised total wars. The period presented a new type of a protective state which enjoyed increased infrastructural power, ensuring a workable balance between the welfare state

and the warfare state. The early years of the Cold War led to the emergence of what is referred to as a 'National Security State', in which the state was bestowed with the responsibility of guarding the society against external aggression (Fjader 2014:115).

The age of total war, therefore, became a struggle for 'survival' which led the industrialised nations to organise their economies around the mobilisation of war efforts. Most of the nation's resources and talent were mobilised on behalf of the war effort. Military preparedness became a permanent feature of the state and assumed critical importance. For example, in the aftermath of World War II, the US declared itself as a security state locked up in a long term struggle for survival with the Soviet Union (Hogan 1998:12-13). Moreover, the politicisation of society around the principles of nationalism and sovereignty helped the policymakers to frame their national security ideology and identity in relational terms with the 'other'; to win both support or suppress dissent for their policy actions.

Thus, the phenomenon of 'security state' developed, which reflected the relationship between the state and society in which the state acts as an agent to guarantee security to its people against the impact of external contingencies (Mabee 2003:143). The war mobilisation efforts also led to a change in the relationship between state and society as the greater enfranchisement and development of social rights increased the expectations of civil society towards the state. The state therefore was looked at as the prime guarantor of security against contingency, with a strong militarised body as well as a provider of domestic well-being.

However, there are many inter-related meanings of the national security state. It is sometimes referred to as a "state that accords primacy to the protection of national boundaries, physical assets, and core values through military mean, or value territorial security and prioritise it over all other functions of

state, and subvert economic advantages, civil liberties, and other values to the provision of security” (Ripsman and Paul 2010:10-11).

Many theorists argue that the present trend of a globalised world has begun to dismantle the phenomenon of a national security state. It assumes that the state has outlived its utility as modern technology and porous borders have challenged the state’s ability to effectively counter the transnational nature of threats. They believe that the relative absence of inter-state war and the proliferation of non-traditional security challenges have affected the state power and paralysed its ability to effectively provide security.

The enthusiasts of globalisation also challenge the integral connection between state and society as they argue that with the fundamental transformation of the nature of threats, the states will no longer be able to ensure security to its people from external threats and that the transnational nature of challenges have made state boundaries redundant (Aydinli and Rosenau 2005:11).

Despite accepting the relative decline of the state’s role in the management of the economy in an era of globalisation, many argue that states remain the principal security provider; the only societal organisation that has both the capacity to act and the authority to define what represents a security threat.

Moreover, despite the presence of transnational non-governmental actors such as NGOs and global governance structures; states continue to be recognised widely as actors that can and will continue to play important management roles. Most scholars instead argue that the emerging multi-centric world has not replaced the state’s dominance, but suggests that the two worlds co-exist, sometimes cooperatively, often conflictual and always interactively. They argue that the “images and understandings of the state-centric world are still very much preoccupied with traditional security considerations such as the primacy of state interests, state to state alliances, balancing against the threat as well as many lingering geopolitical conflicts over geography, mili-

tary competition, and ethnic issues” (Aydinli 2005:237). Thus, the state’s role in handling new security threats has furthered bolstered its centrality and it continues to stay as the primary referent actor in the provision of security.

Though most of the states perform similar functions and have things in common such as fixed territoriality, symbols, and population yet the security situation varies from state to state. States are often categorised on the basis of their performance or in their ability to develop and implement policies to provide collective goods to their people in a legitimate manner. The following section discusses the different categorisation of states and the various factors determining its state capacity and performance. The factors will help determine the various kind of security challenges or threats that states encounter and its effect on the state-society relationship.

### **3. Categorisation of States: Types and Indicators**

The state’s prime function is to provide political good of security, both territorial and human. It aims to take measures to protect national security and maintain law and order in the society “to prevent any cross-border invasions and infiltrations, any loss of territory, eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure and prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security” (Rotberg 2013:3).

The states require a reasonable measure of territorial security to realise and deliver a range of other desirable goods. Along with safeguarding borders, states are to ensure the well being of its citizens and ensure human security. They are to provide the citizens with an environment to freely and openly participate in the political processes of the country, and ensure civil and human rights with a certain level of provision for social services such as building physical infrastructure, medical centres, educational institutions and others (Rotberg 2003: 3-4). State’s performance and their ability to carry out its objectives and functions with adequate societal support determines the criteria according to which nation states may be categorised as strong, weak or

failed. The parameters of each category of the state are briefly discussed below:

**Strong State:** States which indisputably maintain a hold on their territories and provide a good range of political goods to their inhabitants qualify the criteria of being a strong state. These states “perform well according to indicators like GDP per capita, the UNDP Human Development Index, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and others”. Strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and creates an environment conducive to the growth of economic opportunity (Rotberg 2002:132).

**Weak State:** Weak states have a mixed description. They perform better in some areas and perform poorly in others. Their performance is affected due to factors such as internal strife, external threats, declining economic indicators, corrupt political system, and management flaws. They “typically harbour ethnic, religious, linguistic or other inter-communal tensions that have not yet thoroughly become overtly violent” (Rotberg 2003:4).

**Failed State:** They are characterised by their failure to control their borders, and disharmonies between communities and are marked by occasional civil wars and dissent directed against the state. The continuous state of anarchy and growth of criminal element characterises the nature of a failed state. It is also typified by deteriorating or destroyed infrastructures, exhibiting the existence of flawed institutions serving as rubber-stamping machines.

In order to pose as an effective political force, states must exhibit or maintain high levels of social control. The greater entrenchment and control over the society by the state helps them to function without much disruption. Social control by the state helps it to mobilise their populations at the time of an external adversary. Whereas internally, it “helps the state personnel to determine their preferred rules for society by building complex, and coordinated bureaus and monopolises coercive means to suppress dissent and opposition



from other social organisations” (Migdal 2004:52). According to Migdal, the levels of social control can be defined in a scale of three indicators:

***Compliance:*** The states at the most elementary level demand compliance from its population. The strength of the state is determined by the degree to which the population confirms with its demands. However, the degree to which the state can demand compliance depends on the state’s control and hold on nation’s resources.

***Participation:*** Leaders of state organisation gain strength by organising the citizens of the state for specialised tasks in the institutional components of the state organisation.

***Legitimacy:*** The most important factor determining the strength of the state is the element of legitimacy. It “involves an acceptance of the state’s rules of the game, and its social control as true and right. It is the popular acknowledgment of a particular social order” required to ensure the state’s writ and maintain stability (Migdal 2004:52).

Thus, greater the social control, the more compliance, participation and legitimacy the state draws.

#### **4. Factors Affecting State Capacity: Causal Linkages**

State’s infrastructural power and bureaucracy are two extremely important determinants of state organisational capacity which ensures security of the nation, help maintain law and order, serve the needs of the people and look after the overall development of the nation. However, different states possess different infrastructural power which affects its capacity to perform. The following are the various factors that determines the nature and capacity of a state.

**4.1 Geography:** One of the key features of modern states is their fixed territoriality which undoubtedly affects state’s capacity to contain violence. The

population distribution and the neighbourhood environment play an important role in determining the kind of challenges that the states face.

**4.2 History:** The historical trajectory of a state has a strong effect on the state functioning. They carry the burden of the already established state structures. The nature of colonial political institutions and practices have therefore, left the legacies in the colonised states structurally weak as the bureaucratic structures developed then are less responsive to the new realities (Holsti 1996:100).

**4.3 The Social Composition of the State:** The social composition of a state is one of the most important variants that affect the capacity of the states. It determines the level of compliance and cohesiveness in the state. Homogenous composition of states are more likely to share a common national identity and accept state authority than a heterogeneous population having different ethno-nationalist identities of their own. The presence of “ethnic diversity can impede the construction of common identities and lead to ethno-national separatist movements” (Lange 2010:57).

Miller too argues that the social composition of a state might affect the state-nation balance. The state-nation balance helps states maintain social control. However, the balance is better achieved in an ethnically congruent state where citizens identify “with the nation-state in their current territorial boundaries as opposed to some loyalty based on subnational or trans-border ethnic ties” (Miller 2008:455). In incongruent states, the balance is low as the pre-existence of ethnic nations (sometimes called tribes) constrains the process of state-building.

However, Holsti argues that it is incorrect to assume that various nations, groups or categories are naturally hostile to one another. He postulates that hostility is a variable, not a constant and can be attributed to various sources among which a few are-“extended dominance of one group over another, exploitation, inequitable allocation or division of resources and forced assimila-

tion” (Holsti 1996:107). Most of the “ethnic wars” or any other social cleavages based on religion, caste, class, factions, language and so on are not the result of primal hatred but are a result of discriminatory state policies (Holsti 1996:107).

**4.4 Absence of a National Identity:** According to Buzan, a state is composed of three elements: “physical elements (Population, territory, wealth and resources), institutional elements( government, regimes, rules and norms) and an ideational element (an idea of the state)” (Buzan 1983:44). The ideational aspect is considered paramount as it helps grant popular legitimacy to the state as the “very idea of the state can generate a feeling of belonging, a notion of common purpose and a consensus on what the state should do and how it should be doing it” (Buzan 1983:44). In the absence of the idea of a state from the society, the state “fails to build up a secure foundation and becomes weak, for it is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the fate of the states is primarily determined” (Holsti 1996:84). Holsti argues that the instrumental capacities of statehood alone do not guarantee strength to the state until and unless it draws legitimacy from the political community over which it rules. Thus, as Buzan argues that, “Without a widespread and quite-deeply rooted idea of the state among the population, the state institutions by themselves would have great difficulty functioning and surviving” (Buzan 1983:39). In the absence of national identity, the state lacks political and social cohesion which will evoke repeated interference by different interest groups to practice their exclusionary policies. According to Buzan, “as long as the states fail to solve their nationality problem, they remain vulnerable to dismemberment, intervention, instability and internal conflicts in ways not normally experience by states in harmony with other nations” (.Buzan 1983:47).

**4.5 Personalisation of State and Consolidation of Power in the Hands of a Particular Group:** Personality politics take over the state structures in which leaders portray themselves as saviours or the incarnation of state and

the citizens confuse the distinction between the state and a ruler; such a trend tend to weaken the state structure (Holsti 1996:105). Moreover, another characteristic that weakens the state is the consolidation of state power in the hands of either one individual, group or a community. For example, military who usually come to power in order to provide unity, law and order, often end up destroying the state apparatus and its legitimacy in their search for means of staying in power (Holsti 1996:110).

Thus, a state's capacity is primarily determined by various factors ranging from the country's historical trajectory, social composition, institutional structure, and its ideological foundations. The structural weakness or the absence of a cohesive national identity or the state-nation imbalance contribute to the internal weakness of a state, making it vulnerable to challenges such as authoritarianism, ethnic, sectarian and communal wars.

However, not all challenges faced by the state become security threats. This takes us to our next section analysing the politics around security. The following paragraph discusses in detail the theory of securitisation proposed by the Copenhagen school of thought which looks at security as a special kind of politics, a social process with an interplay of various factors. The following section thus dwells on the theory of 'securitisation' to comprehend 'how', 'when' and 'why' political issues become security threats.

## **5. Securitisation Theory**

Securitisation theory, also known as the "Copenhagen school" of thought has developed into an effective mechanism to study and analyse security discourses and their relationship to security practice. The theory of securitisation draws its ideological inspiration from the critical and constructivist school of security theories. It provides a coherent critique to the scope of traditional security studies and suggests a shift from the objectivist rationalist approach of both realism and liberalism towards a more interpretive model of analysis. Thee school propose an epistemological shift in the way security is

to be understood, a shift from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to the role of ideas, norms, and values within which the process takes place. Keith Krause explains the research agenda under the three rubrics: “the construction of threats and responses, the construction of the objects of security, and possibilities for transforming the security dilemma” (Krause 1998).

The assumptions underlying this classification was the fact that security is about the identification of threats to a particular referent object, and the formulation of policy responses to those threats. Therefore, unlike positivism<sup>8</sup>, critical theories are “reflective” in nature and holds on to the fact that there exists “different critical narratives of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ and these alternative narratives of reality always indicate a potential for change, leading towards a ‘reflective’ society” (Floyd 2007:331).

The reflectivist strand of thought was also developed by the constructivist school of thought. Introduced by Nicholas Onuf, constructivists consider the world as “socially constructed, where states much the same as individuals live in a ‘world of their making’; where ‘social facts’ or ‘rules’ are made by human action, as opposed to ‘brute facts’ that do not depend for their existence on human action” (Onuf 1989). Thus, for constructivists the world is a “social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality” (Guzini 2000:149) in which “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt 1999:16). Constructivists define the international structure as social rather than a material phenomenon, “where the most fundamental fact about society is not the nature and organi-

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<sup>8</sup> Theories in natural science are “objectifying” and positivism produces non-selective structures of truth and knowledge; thereby denying humanity of the alternative conceptions of truth and knowledge

sation of material forces<sup>9</sup> but the nature and structure of social consciousness (the distribution of ideas or knowledge)” (Wendt 1999:24). On the basis of this fundamental principle the theory proposes that, “people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” (Wendt 1992:396-97).

Critical constructivist school of thought has affinities with the linguistic school but describes themselves as having a more deeper discursive approach to identity and security. Critical constructivists working in the linguistic tradition argue, “that the key realist concepts like the national interest are discursively constituted through representations (of countries, peoples, etc) and linguistic elements (nouns, adjectives, metaphors and analogies)” (Weldes 1996, 1999). For critical constructivists, “the state has no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that bring it into being” (Campbell, 2003:57). Identities are thus “performatively constituted” ( Campbell 1998:9).

Realist approaches to security studies were severely “challenged in the post-Cold War era by the more interpretive theories of analysis” (Krause and Williams 1996:241-242). One of the challenges was put forth by the Copenhagen school led by Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan, who broadened the field of security studies by introducing the conceptual analytical framework of “securitisation”.

Ole Weaver showed his discontent with the established ways of dealing with the concept of security. He contested the two basic premises of the traditional security approach: “one, that security is a reality prior to language, is out there (irrespective of whether the conception is objective or subjective,) is

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<sup>9</sup> At least five material factors recur in the materialist discourse: 1. Human nature, 2. Natural resources, 3. Geography 4. Forces of production and 5. Forces of destruction. These possibilities do not preclude the possibility of ideas having some effects, but the materialist claim that the effects of non-material forces are secondary.

measured in terms of threat or fear, and second, the more security, the better” (Weaver 1997). He further collaborated with Buzan in favouring the widening of the “agenda of security studies, encompassing more than just the military threats and defined security as uncontested, pushing instead in the direction of securitising still larger areas of social life” (Weaver: 1995:46).

While proposing to widen the realm of security studies and “broadening the security agenda to include threats other than military ones, Weaver favoured to retain the specific qualities characterising security problems such as: urgency, state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means, a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political ‘we’ from dealing with any other questions” (Weaver 1995:47). Through this approach he advanced that any sector, at any particular time might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities and defence, although the military sector remains the most paramount one.

Buzan further proposed to seek coherence by “exploring the logic of security itself to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitisation from that which is merely political”. Buzan along with others proposed that “threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguishes them from the normal run of the merely political. They therefore, are to be stated as ‘existential threats’ to a referent object by a securitising actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan et al:1998:4).

### **5.1 Understanding Securitisation**

The term “securitisation defines security as a social construction. It proposes that by “naming a certain development a security problem, the state can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. Power holders

can always try to use the instrument of securitisation of an issue to gain control over it” (Weaver 1995:55). Thus, security according to the Copenhagen school of thought is an “illocutionary act, a self referential practice, because it is in the practice that the issue becomes a security issue, not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al 1998:24).

The theory of securitisation points towards the discursive construction of particular issues as security threats (Weaver 2004). Securitisation draws some of the insights from the theory of constructivism. Despite some differences between the two theories, Buzan and Weaver claims that securitisation is ‘constructivist’ all the way down (Buzan 1997:245); while Weaver rather insists, that it is ‘radically constructivist’ (Weaver 1995: 204). The theory of securitisation “advances the constructivist research programme in two ways. On the one hand, it offers a creative terrain for the development of ontological and epistemological commitments of constructivism. On the other hand, securitisation theory has generated substantial results that might have broad applicability across international relations because they explain how public problems emerge, evolve, spread and dissolve” (Balzacq 2010:56). The theory argues that “language is not only concerned with what is ‘out there’, as realists and neo-realists assume, but is also constitutive of the very social reality” (Balzacq 2010:56). Therefore, “security” is considered as a “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitisation can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation, justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al, 1998:23). Moreover, the distinguishing feature of securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action) because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late to remedy the failure.

Weaver further propose that “security and insecurity do not constitute a binary opposition. ‘Security’ signifies a situation marked by the presence of a se-



curity problem and some measure taken in response. Whereas, insecurity is a situation with a security problem having no response. In the absence of a security problem, one does not conceptualise the situation in terms of security. Through this process, Weaver proposed two variables of security. One, the word 'security' is the act; the utterance is the primary reality and second, the most radical and transformational perspective, which nonetheless remained realist was of minimising 'security' by narrowing the field to which the security act was applied. Thus, Weaver's attempt was to move security from a positive to a negative domain, a critical track that assumes security is not a positive value to be maximised rather we require less of security" (Weaver 1995). Thus, Weaver propose "that, security should be seen as a negative value, a failure to deal with issues of normal politics" (Buzan et al.1998:29).

## **5.2 Main Tenets of the Securitisation Theory**

As a result, "securitisation study aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and under what conditions (i.e what explains when securitisation is successful)" (Buzan et al, 1998:32). Hence, the speech act approach to security renders an explanation and a distinction among three types of units that together form a security analysis :

- 1.The "Referent Objects: Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival".
2. "Securitising actors: Actors who securitise issues by declaring something a referent object as existentially being threatened. A securitising actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups".
3. "Functional actors: Actors who affect the dynamics of a sector, and significantly influences decisions in the field of security".

The Copenhagen school defines the social interaction as rhetorical, “a discursive exchange between a securitising actor and an audience in relation to an object, the referent, and that which threatens it”. However, “a discourse that takes the form of representing something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitisation but is referred to as making a securitising move, whereas the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al 1998:25)

Employing “an Austinian understanding of speech act, Copenhagen school argues that a successful securitisation process is facilitated by internal or linguistic factors and by external or contextual factors, the social capital of the speaker and the nature of the threat” (Buzan et al 1998:32-33).

In essence, the basic idea of the “speech act theory according to Austin is that certain statements do more than merely describe a given reality and, as such, cannot be judged as false or true. Instead, these utterances realize a specific action; they ‘do’ things; they are ‘performatives’ as opposed to ‘constatives’ that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity tests” (Austin 1962:95, 107). According to Austin, “each sentence can convey three types of acts, the combination of which constitutes the total speech act situation:

1. Locutionary: the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference;
2. Illocutionary: the act performed in articulating a locution. In a way, this category captures the explicit performative class of utterances, and the concept of the ‘ speech act’ is literally predicted on that sort of agency.
3. Perlocutionary acts, which consist of the consequential effects or ‘sequels’ that are aimed to evoke the feelings, thoughts or action of the target audience” (Balzacq 2010 :61).

This triadic characterisation “of kind of acts is summed up by Habermas as, to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something” (Habermas 1984:289).

Therefore, the major focus of security studies should be to decipher “When, why and how elites label issues and developments as security problems; when, why and how they succeed and fail in such endeavours; what attempts are made by other groups to put securitisation on the agenda; and whether we can point to efforts to keep issues off the security agenda, or even to de-securitize issues that have become securitised?”(Weaver 1995). However, McDonald professed that “this reliance on language as the exclusive form of ‘securitising move’ is problematic for two reasons. First, language is only one (albeit the most central) means through which meaning is communicated. A range of authors have suggested the need to take account of the role of images as potential forms of securitisation. Second, an exclusive focus on language is problematic in the sense that it can exclude certain forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that do not merely follow from securitising ‘speech acts’ but are part of the process through which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed” (McDonald 2008: 568-569). Cromby and Nightingale on the other hand, argues that, “language and thereby, security is not wholly self-referential” (Nightingale and Cromby 2002:705-706).

Balzac therefore questioned the high degree of formality in the discursive action of security proposed by the Copenhagen school and instead proposed a broader and wider approach to understanding the securitisation process. Moreover, “he proposes that securitisation is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction. Unlike the speech act, which seeks to establish universal principles of communication, the value of which is to be functional whatever the context, cul-

ture and the relative power of the actors, the strategic action of discourse operates at the level of persuasion and uses various artefacts (metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence and even lies)” (Balzacq 2005: 172)

Thus, speech act theory of security follows universal pragmatics which is primarily concerned with fundamental principles (or rules) underlying communicative action. Whereas, the strategic view of security work on pragmatics, dealing with language usage to attain a goal.

### **5.3 Pragmatic or Sociological Perspective of Securitisation**

The pragmatic view propounds a “discursive politics of security”; where “speech acts are successful not only to the extent that rules are followed by agents but as discursive techniques allowing the securitising actor to ‘induce or increase the public mind’s adherence to the thesis presented to its assent”. The usage of strategic purposes not only convinces a target audience “to accept the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy response but swing the audience’s support towards a policy or course of action” (Balzacq 2005:173).

Thus, the pragmatic view of security propose “that the political agency, audience and context are crucial aspects of securitisation process. The concept of security as a pragmatic act can be broken down into three distinct levels, that of the agent, that of the act and that of the context, each in turn having interwoven facets:

The agent level includes three aspects:

1. The power positions and the personal identities of those who design security issues, which is ‘a set of attributes, beliefs, desires, or principles of action’.
2. The social identity, which operates to both constrain and enable the behaviour of the securitising actor(s).

3. The nature and the capacity of target audience, and the main opponents or alternative voices within the relevant social field” (Mey 2001:214; Epstein 2008).

Moreover, the “level of the act has three sides, the first is the ‘action-type’ side that refers to the appropriate language to use to perform a given act, the second facet is strategic with heuristic artefacts shall a securitising actor use to create or effectively resonate with the circumstances that will facilitate the mobilisation of the audience, analogies, metaphors, emotions or stereotypes. The third factor is expressed by policy tools of securitisation i.e. ‘an instrument which, by its very nature or by its very functioning, transforms the entity (i.e. the subject or object) it processes into a threat’. Securitisation as a tool not only reveals how policymakers translate intentions into concrete action, it also projects how life of a policy instrument is affected by social processes” (Balzacq 2010:64).

Furthermore, the context is of significant importance “in the process of securitization. The Copenhagen school however insists that the concept of security modifies the context by virtue of a successful application of the constitutive rules of a speech act. i.e. the performative aspect of security changes, by itself, the configuration of a context. Whereas, Balzac considers that the context has an independent status, which allows it to influence security articulations in a distinctive way. Thus, the pragmatic perspective believes that in order to win an audience, security statements must, usually, be related to an external reality. It implies that the success of securitisation is contingent upon a perceptive environment. Balzac argues that, to move an audience’s attention towards an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitising actor need to resonate with the context within which his/ her actions are collocated.” (Balzacq 2011:13). Therefore, the positive outcome of securitisation, whether it be strong or weak, lies with the securitising actor’s choice of determining the appropriate times, within which the recognition, including the integration of the ‘imprinting’ object-a threat-by the mass-

es is facilitated (Balzacq 2005: 182). Discourse does not occur nor operate in a vacuum; instead, it is contextually enabled and constrained. ‘Discourse,’ according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997:277), ‘is not produced without taking context into consideration.’ Thus, as contrary to Copenhagen school’s rule governed use of concepts, Balzacq argued for an externalist approach to connecting security utterances to a context.

The sociological perspective proposed by Balzacq makes audience an important part of the securitisation process. For Balzacq “the success of securitisation is highly contingent upon the securitising actor’s ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests. Though, the philosophical approach view the audience as a formal-given category, which is often poised in a receptive mode. According to the scholars of the Copenhagen school, ‘the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such’, but the audience seems to be one of the least developed concepts in the initial formulation of the Copenhagen theory”.

The sociological view on the other hand “emphasises, by contrast, the mutual constitution of securitising actors and audiences.” In order to “persuade the audience, that is, to achieve a perlocutionary effect, the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience. Thus, identification is the perspective through which the cognitive and behavioural change induced by security utterances can perhaps be accounted far more explicitly” (Balzacq 2005:184). Therefore, “audience is not necessarily a fully constituted entity, but an emergent category that must be adjudicated empirically, before being set as a level of analysis” (Balzacq 2011:2). Kenneth Burke demonstrated that an “effective persuasion requires that a speaker’s argument employs terms that resonate with the hearer’s language by ‘speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying (her/his) ways with (her/his)’”. (Burke 1955:55)

Thus, securitisation “is a socio-philosophical approach. The pervasive ambiguity that lies at the heart of the theory of securitisation, namely, that security is at one and at the same time a self-referential activity as it is an intersubjective process”. Balzacq however argues that the Copenhagen school “leans towards self-referentiality, rather than intersubjectively. Thus, by mixing perlocutionary and illocutionary acts together, the CS obscures the role of audience(s) in securitisation theory. Moreover, a focus and emphasis on textualism has left it unable to account for the impact of context on securitisations” (Balzacq 2011:19). Moreover, McDonald argues that, in securitisation theory, “there is ‘a clear need to draw the role of audiences into the framework more coherently, but in doing so the Copenhagen school will almost certainly need to downplay either the performativity effects of the speech act or the inter-subjective nature of security” (Donald 2008, 573).

The sociological model of securitisation “contributes a new process-persuasive argument and reasoning-to understanding securitisation that explores how variations in security symbols determine the very nature and, crucially, the consequences of the political securitisation of threats” (Balzacq 2011:3).

In this light, securitisation is defined as a process:

Where patterns of heuristic artefacts (metaphors, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions etc) are contextually mobilised by a recognised agent, who works persuasively to prompt a target audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts and intuitions), that concurs with the enunciator’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised political act must be undertaken immediately to block its development (Balzacq 2011:3).

The process is “termed as a ‘pragmatic act’ because it devotes more attention to the context in which securitisation occurs, accounts of the status of the speakers and attends to the effects that security statements provoke in the audience than does the philosophical model of the Copenhagen school” (Mey 2001).

Moreover, the sociological perspective considers ‘process-tracing’ an important tenet of securitisation along with content analysis. Though, critiqued for its commitment to causal explanation, Balzac argues that “process-tracing can serve as a useful method for examining certain processes of securitisation. Process-tracing helps uncover the reasons why certain securitising moves were successful or are helpful for uncovering the scope conditions under which securitising moves are likely to obtain” (Balzacq 2011:47). Thus, the “core of process-tracing helps examine social mechanisms which brought a social phenomenon into being. It deals with issues of interactions, causal chains linking the independent variables to the outcome of the dependent variable, and the conditions under which causal paths obtain” (Checkel 2008).

Therefore, discourse analysis attempts to help understand ‘how’ securitisation operates, whereas, process-tracing help comprehend and uncover ‘why’ and ‘when’ certain securitising moves succeed. Thus, for Balzac the insights brought by process-tracing can contribute to laying the groundwork for developing a comprehensive theory of securitization.

Therefore, securitisation is looked upon “as a pragmatic act, i.e. a sustained argumentative practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to curb it. Thus, the Copenhagen School view can be referred to as philosophical, while the pragmatic approach to securitisation is termed sociological” (Balzacq 2010:60). Hence, “while the philosophical model prefers post-structuralist methods, the sociological view proposes a pluralist approach to securitisation wherein discourse analysis and process tracing work together”.

## **6. Conclusion**

The chapter provides a theoretical background against which the proposed study will be undertaken. The next chapter will deliberate on understanding



the nature of the state of Pakistan in the broader context of the different variables discussed determining the state's capacity. The study in the later chapters uses the securitisation theory to look and analyse 'how' and 'when' the issue of violent extremism and terrorism in Pakistan dominated the state's dominant security discourse.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Understanding the Nature of the Pakistani State**

#### **1. Introduction**

The state's prime function is to provide collective goods to its people in a legitimate and effective manner, untrammelled by internal or external challenges. This involves providing a certain level of security, both territorial and human, and thus requires adequate social control to carry out the affairs of the state. The state's performance is therefore primarily determined by the level of social control it maintains in the society and the level of compliance, participation, and legitimacy it draws from its people.

The debate about the nature and character of the Pakistani state has never been more important than it is in contemporary times. The state confronts major security challenges to its territorial integrity and sovereignty from internal forces, which have come to threaten the very legitimacy and writ of the Pakistani state. In the light of the above, the chapter attempts to understand the underlying nature of the Pakistani state. It argues that most of the security challenges faced by Pakistan today stem from the basic ideological underpinnings and functioning of the state since the time of its formation.

#### **2. Characteristics and Nature of the Pakistani State**

Pakistan state can be best understood by analysing the ideational basis of the state, the social composition, the geo-strategic position that the state holds, and its political structure. The following analysis sums up these factors.

##### **2.1. Islamic State**

The elusive ideological foundation of the Pakistani state was one of the central problems encountered by the state of Pakistan at the time of its inception. More than half a century after being carved out of British India, "Pakistan has been left holding at an identity, beset by an ambiguous relation to Islam" (Shaikh 2009: 1). Defined as the

“Islamic Republic of Pakistan”; the state till date lacks a clear explanation on what it stands for.

The inscrutability over the role and meaning of Islam in Pakistan have triggered questions about Pakistan state’s identity, whether it is a national state of Muslims or a theocratic state based on Islam or a modern democracy with a nationalist identity. The ambiguity over the state identity has thus been exploited by both civilian and military leaders who have capitalised on the dichotomy around the confused interpretation of Islam in order to legitimise their rule, draw support for their policies and use religion as an instrument of state policy. The elusive ideational basis of the state also gave enough scope and space to the religious groups, parties, and extremist forces in Pakistan to propagate and spread their own strand of Islam.

The Islamic aspect of the Pakistani state’s nature cannot be discerned without a brief deliberation on the genesis of the state and the state’s political trajectory. The basis of a claim of “two-nation theory” and the movement for a separate country for Muslims in South Asia was based on a communal rhetoric. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who spearheaded the movement for Pakistan, set forth the logic of Pakistan in his historic address of 23 March 1940, reinvigorating 900 year old notions from Alberuni:

The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. (quoted in Cohen 2005: 28)

Citing the above rationale and making religion a necessary condition for creating a new nation, the idea of the “two-nation theory” became an effective political movement which led to the birth of a new state ‘Pakistan’.

However, the efforts for the establishment of a separate state were thwarted by some religious groups. One of the major resistance came from the founding father of the

Islamic organisation, Jamaat-e-Islami. The leader, Syed Abul Ala Maududi was critical of Muslim League's idea of Islam and Muslim nationalism. By depicting Pakistan as "un-Islamic", Maududi argued that the idea of Pakistan excludes Islam from India, which eventually will lead to its extinction. He therefore pushed for revamping of the cultural and political foundations of the Muslim community of India and asked Muslims to "return to a pure and unadulterated form of Islam and embrace the struggle to defend Muslim communalist interests in India" (Kaul 2002: 359). Maududi, thus motivated Muslims to strive for a revolution at a global level, and transcend national boundaries to establish a worldwide "true Islamic State". He pressed for securing a safe heaven, a "Dar-ul-Islam", which he explained as, "only a Muslim cultural home and not a Muslim state, but if god wills it, the two may become one" (Sheikh 2009: 36). Due to the presence of different narratives, various ambiguities surrounded the purpose of the formation of Pakistan.

Pakistan, which was born on the basis of religion was not conceived as a theocratic state by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. After Pakistan was created, Jinnah, who once advocated the cause for a Muslim state with great perseverance and resolution, declared that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state but a modern democracy. Three days before independence, on 11 August 1947, Jinnah committed himself openly to secularism and democracy. In his Pakistan Constituent Assembly address, he stated:

If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, creed, caste, is first, second and last a citizen of the state with equal rights, privileges and obligations.... You are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or, to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the state. In the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state. (Quoted in Ahmed 1991: 78-79)

The discourse on a secular state made by Jinnah was in complete contradiction to the whole rationale of Pakistan movement based on Muslim nationalism, in which, Islam

was used as a legitimising tool for the creation of a separate state. However, it may be inferred that Jinnah might have wanted the replacement of the idea of a Muslim state with a territorially defined concept of a Pakistani nation state, inclusive of all people and religious communities living in Pakistan. For example, in one of the broadcasts to the people of US in February 1948, Jinnah noted, “In any case, Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christians and Parsis, but they are all Pakistanis.”<sup>10</sup>

However, the early and untimely death of Jinnah, and the failure of the successive political leaders to develop a consensus over Pakistan’s identity, invited interference of various religious groups and their leaders, who hoped to dominate the political reigns of a religious state. The major interference came from the Jamaat-e-Islami party leader, Maududi, who rejected Jinnah’s idea of a secular nation (embracing all citizens of the state irrespective of their religious convictions) to replace it with his own idea of an Islamic state based on the sovereignty of Allah (Ahmed 1991: 103).

### ***Towards Islamisation of the Pakistani State***

Throughout history, the nature of the Islamic state in Pakistan has been sharply contentious (Hoodbhoy 2007: 3303). The lack of consensus over state’s identity and ambivalence around understanding the role of religion in Pakistan was also reflected in the nation’s constitutional foundations. Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan as a secular democracy was repudiated as early as 1949 with the passing of the ‘Objective Resolution’ which provided an Islamic basis to the new country. The Resolution, as Farzana Shaikh argued, highlighted “the growing political muscle of the religious lobby” (Shaikh 2009: 84). In contrast to Jinnah’s vision, the resolution provided a base for the ideals of Islam and subverted everything to the sovereignty of God. As stated in “the resolution, ‘Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to god almighty alone and the authority which he has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by him is a sacred

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<sup>10</sup> Mujahid, Sharif, “Jinnah’s Vision of Pakistan”, [Online Web] Accessed 6 January 2014 URL: [http://members.tripod.com/~no\\_nukes\\_sa/chapter\\_5.html](http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/chapter_5.html).

trust'.<sup>11</sup> The Resolution also imposed an obligation upon the state to 'enable' Muslims in Pakistan to 'order their lives' in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunna". The wordings of the Resolution were left ambivalent, leaving it open for different interpretations. For the modernists, the "Resolution guaranteed a democratic constitution", whereas for the orthodox, "the sovereignty belonged to God and the legislation as prescribed in the Quran and Sunna is beyond the purview of any legislature in a Muslim country" (Sayed 1963: 282).

The resolution contained a few proposals made by Maududi and other Ulemas, yet it carefully rejected any possibility of the establishment of a theocratic state. Professing in one of his speeches dated 9 March 1949, PM Liaquat Ali Khan, noted, "Theocracy, which means a government by ordained priests, who wield authority as being specially appointed by those who claim to derive their rights from their sacerdotal position is completely and absolutely a foreign idea to Islam".<sup>12</sup> He further added, "Islam does not recognise either priesthood or any sacerdotal position; and therefore the question of theocracy simply does not arise in Islam" (Islamic Studies 2009: 93).

Deliberating upon the role of religion in the country, Pakistan took eight years to come up with its first Constitution in the year 1956. Passed after a period of eight years, the Constitution recognised the Pakistani state as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan". By introducing the word Islam in defining the state identity, the Constitution document transformed the status of Islam from that of a religion to a state ideology. Though, having declared Pakistan as a 'Islamic Republic', the Constitution document deliberately maintained a certain amount of ambiguity regarding the role of religion in Pakistani life (Iqtidar 2012: 1016).

The ambiguity around the role of religion in Pakistan was further exploited by the ruling elites of the state. It often became a mechanism for the ruling classes to capitalise upon the religious emotions of the people in order to safeguard their power position

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<sup>11</sup> Objective Resolution Document, 1949, [Online Web] Accessed 18<sup>th</sup> February 2014 URL: <http://historypak.com/objectives-resolution-1949/%20http>.

<sup>12</sup> "Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's Speech on "Objective Resolution", [Online Web] Accessed 11 January 2015 URL: <https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/liaquat-on-objectives-resolution-2/>

(Ali 2011: 123). The ambiguity around Islam has helped dominant state elites to use religion for legitimising their rule, suppressing the oppositional voices, mobilising people, and winning support for their policies.

Civilian and military authorities too have used Islamic causes for their short-term political gains. In order to prevent the opposition and interference of the disruptive and conservative Islamic forces, successive civilian and military governments have introduced the model of Islamic formalism, bringing in a liberal interpretation of Islamic injunctions. For example, In order to keep the religious groups under check, the 1962 Constitution under General Ayub, despite being secular, introduced a number of Islamic provisions. Khan announced the establishment of an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, which made recommendations to the central and provincial governments for “enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam”.<sup>13</sup> Though, having introduced an Islamic provision, General Ayub did not open the membership of the council to conservative and traditional Ulemas and also declared the council as a non-binding advisory body. Critical of the orthodox traditional perspective of the Ulemas, the General, in his autobiography, very succinctly remarked that, “there was obviously no place for a supra-body of religious experts exercising a power of veto over the legislature and the judiciary” (Khan 1967: 194). He therefore projected his notion of Islam for nation-building process. In 1966, General Ayub in a six-point programme for his party, the Muslim League, defined the purpose of Islam as “a prime mover in attaining the objective of progress, prosperity, and social justice”. However, critical of the Jammāt leader, Ayub in one of the speeches to a gathering of Deoband Ulemas who had migrated to Pakistan, stated:

Islam had started as a dynamic and progressive movement, but now suffered from dogmatism. Those who looked forward to progress and advancement came to be regarded as disbelievers and those who looked backward were considered devout Muslims. It is great injustice to both life and religion to impose on twentieth century man the condition that he

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<sup>13</sup> Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology: Constitution 1962, [Online Web] Accessed 12 February 2015 URL: <http://cii.gov.pk/aboutcii/history/con1962.pdf>

must go back several centuries in order to prove his bona fides as a true Muslim.<sup>14</sup>

Pakistan's emphasis on its Islamic identity increased significantly under the civilian semi authoritarian government of Z.A. Bhutto. Bhutto who came to power in 1971, completely renounced Jinnah's vision of Pakistan as enunciated in his Constituent Assembly speech. During his tenure, he recognised Islam as the "state religion of Pakistan" and enforced an "Islamic way of life under" the 1973 Constitution".<sup>15</sup> As a means to garner popular support, he also made use of religion as his governance strategy and employed it in all aspects of the state policies; economic, socio-political, defence and foreign. He pledged to establish "a socialist state based on the principles of Islamic justice" and coined the term "Islamic Socialism" and made the teaching of Islam compulsory in the country (Article 31(2)). He further established a powerful alliance with the Gulf on ideological ground and accompanied it by employing a deeply Islamic rhetoric of calling it as "Islamic brotherhood".

The Islamic measures carried out by Bhutto were primarily seen as political moves to avenge and counter the growing internal threats from the opposition party, Pakistan National Alliance, and their movement, "Nizam-e-Mustafa" (Islamic system of government).<sup>16</sup> Therefore, to keep the opposition party engaged in talks, Bhutto introduced Shariat laws, and implemented other Islamic provisions such as the closure of nightclubs and bars, gambling, and horse racing.<sup>17</sup> The party further amended its man-

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<sup>14</sup> Mohammad Syed Hussain, The Godfather of Pakistan [Online Web] Accessed 15 October 2015 URL: <https://mohammadsyedhusain.wordpress.com/2015/09/30/the-godfather-of-pakistan/>

<sup>15</sup> "Article 31 of the 1973 Constitution noted that, "steps should be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah" The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 [Online Web] Accessed 17 March 2015 URL: <http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/ConstitutionOfPakistan.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> The movement was carried out to oust Bhutto from power; especially by the orthodox and fundamentalists for whom it meant a polity which accommodated their religious-political views and guaranteed an effective role for them in the political system (Crisis Group Asia Report 2011:4)

<sup>17</sup> 'What goes around: the movement against Bhutto', Dawn, August 31, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 12 January 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1128830>



ifesto declaring Friday the weekly holiday and introduced a new newspaper “*Musawat*” to assert Islamic justifications for the PPP rule.

Military regimes in Pakistan on the other hand, have not only exploited Islam to acquire domestic legitimacy but have worked alongside the religious groups and parties, giving them a larger role and share in Pakistani politics. The military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq formalised the pre-existing state ideology based on Islam into an official policy of Islamisation, basing Pakistan’s legal (Shariat law) and educational system (Madrasa culture) on Islamic law (Kukreja 2003).

Zia was the first statesmen who persistently executed concrete steps for the “Islamisation” of the country. After glorifying the spirit of Islam, Zia declared, “It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country” (quoted in Isaphani 2015: 94). He therefore proposed and introduced laws, which he described as reforms to create “Nizam-e-Islam” (Islamic system of government) in Pakistan.<sup>18</sup>

The increased dependence on the use of Islam was a deliberate tactic employed by Zia to appease the right-wing political groups. He followed the Islamic political ideology of Jamaat-e-Islami and mixed religion with politics in order to realise his two point agenda, of legitimising his rule and to gain support for the Soviet-Afghan war.

Islam took a militant turn in Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979 in which Pakistan along with the support and aid of the American CIA and Saudi Arabia trained an army of religious men (mujahideen) to fight the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan. The war made Pakistan a heaven for foreign students who were excited by the prospect of attaining martyrdom by fighting the godless and satanical government of Afghanistan and Soviet Union (Jalal 2008: 277). The Jihadi movement during Zia’s tenure emboldened the social status of the Ulemas at an ideological level and provid-

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<sup>18</sup> In one of his speeches (2 December, 1978), Zia clarified that, “Nizam-i-Islam is a code of life revealed by Allah to his last Prophet 1400 years ago, and the record of which is with us in the form of Holy Quran and the Sunnah. Everyone who is known as Muslim, is bound to act upon this code of life in his individual and collective life” (Esposito 1998: 175-76).

ed them considerable importance in the political space of the country. JUI, who enjoyed support base among the Pathans of the NWFP and Balochistan provided the military regime a major support in the war by providing them with a fertile ground of recruiting volunteers for the war in Afghanistan (Osman 2009: 238).

Zia regime therefore brought religious parties in the forefront who were interested in imposing the full corpus of religious law (sharia) in the country. Whereas, on the other hand, the participation of a deeply Islamic Saudi Arabia increased the influence of the orthodox Wahhabi influence in Pakistan. The spread of Deobandi-Wahhabi strand of Islam and a rise of conservative extremist forces laid down an extremist infrastructure in the country. Most of these religious extremist forces were channelised to fight a proxy war against the Indian state. Whereas, violence against minorities or non-followers of the particular form of Islam was justified in the name of religion.

Dominant elites have been embracing orthodox values of Islam as a self-legitimation strategy, aimed at diverting the attention of the people away from the more important socio-economic issues and at discrediting political opponents. Islam has been filling political vacuums of bankrupt governments assuming a role aimed at obtaining a manipulated consensus and at justifying political choices (Corsi 2004: 42-43). The result of such manipulation is the political instability of the country, stormed by growing extremist and terrorist violence. Some of the state aided radical groups have turned against the Pakistani state, contesting their claim to Islamic-ness. Hence, the long use of Islam for personal and political reasons, the mullah-military nexus, the Islamisation programme, and the support for a well-run jihad industry has made Pakistan a victim of violent extremism today.

## **2.2 Majoritarian State in a Plural Society**

Pakistan was born as a Muslim majority state with a pluralistic society comprising of diverse religious-ethnic groups and sects. At the time of partition in 1947, almost 23%

of Pakistan's total demography comprise of non-Muslim citizens.<sup>19</sup> Mohammad Ali Jinnah who had maintained that religion has nothing to do with the running the business of the state envisioned a modern secular state with equal rights for all state citizens. Tolerance towards the minorities was a theme that remained constant in Jinnah's speeches. Reiterating the instances from Islamic history, Jinnah succinctly remarked "Our own history and our own Prophet have given the clearest proof that non-Muslims have been treated not only justly and fairly but generously" (quoted in Ahmed 1997: 195).

However, Pakistan could not keep up with its Quaid-e-Azam's vision and failed to establish a secular model for its country. Minorities in Pakistan today has reduced to a little over three per cent of the total population of the country due to widespread persecution, forced conversions and disappearances. Minority assertions has engulfed the nation with the rise in religious, sectarian and ethnic clashes. Most of the assertions were a result of a demographic imbalance in Pakistan's State structure, a tightly bound centralised nature of the Pakistani State and oppressive and discriminatory state policies.

### ***Minority Religious Assertions***

Though formed on the basis of the two-nation theory, Islam in Pakistan failed to serve as a unifying force in the country. Religion being a cementing force was soon challenged after the formation of a new state as other identity and cultural symbols became more significant. Pakistani people faced difficulty in subsuming their particular ethnic customs and identities into a single national narrative (Synnott 2009: 18). As a result, the meshing of a religious identity with that of a national identity quickly became a major problem in Pakistan as soon it was created (Bangash 2018: 199).

Pakistan always hinged on retaining a Muslim majoritarian bias. Calling itself a homeland for Muslims, the Pakistani state completely ignored the internal divisions

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<sup>19</sup>Isaphani, Farahnaz (2013), "Cleansing Pakistan of Minorities", Hudson Institute, [Online Web] Accessed 12 November 2016 URL: <https://www.hudson.org/research/9781-cleansing-pakistan-of-minorities>

amongst the Muslims and the fact that Muslims in Pakistan do not form a homogeneous community (Rana 2015: 2). With the early demise of Jinnah, the religious clerical groups and parties who called themselves as the custodians of the larger religious discourse and tradition in the country, made repeated demands on framing a constitutional definition of a 'Muslim' (Shaikh 2011: 61). Being a Sunni dominated state, the imposition of a particular sectarian definition of a 'Muslim' will automatically subvert the status of other muslim minorities in the state, subjecting them to oppression and violence. While depriving the other religious communities of their equal citizenship rights. The following paragraphs will briefly discuss the challenges faced by the minority communities in Pakistan.

### **Muslim Minorities: Ahmadis and Shias**

#### Ahmadis

Pakistan's Ahmadi population has been one of the major victims of state's oppressive policies and actions. Of Pakistan's 193 million people, 95% are defined as Muslims, 75% Sunnis and 25% Shias. Between 0.22% and 2.2% of Pakistan's population are Ahmadi. These communities were the victims of the first sectarian clash that broke out in the state of Pakistan as early as 1953. The anti-Ahmadi protests were led by the Sunni clerics who demanded the declaration of the community as non-muslims.<sup>20</sup> The protests that spread across Punjab resulted in the death of as many as 2,000 Ahmadis and posed a major blow to the new state of Pakistan.

However, to probe into the causes of the anti-Ahmadi movement, a judicial inquiry was established by the government headed by Supreme Court Justice Mohammed Munir and Punjab High Court judge Muhammad Rustam Kayani. The inquiry commission broadly reported that although all leading clerics demanded an Islamic State, their vision of such a state was in contradiction to one another. The report stated, "if we adopt the definition given by any one of the Ulema, we remain Muslims according

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<sup>20</sup> Ahmadis are a small religious group which calls itself Muslim and takes its name from its founder Mirza Gulam Ahmad. The Ahmadis are considered as non-Muslims because they do not believe that Muhammad was the final Prophet.

to the view of that slim (scholar) but Kafirs according to the definition of everyone else” (Justice Munir Commission 1954).<sup>21</sup> The Commission however concluded that even though all religious clerics differed on the nature of an Islamic State, they all agreed on their contempt for and opposition to non-muslims. The report therefore mentioned that, “the position of non-muslims in the Islamic State of Pakistan will be that of shimmies and they will not be full citizens of Pakistan because they will not have the same rights as Muslims. They will have no voice in the making of the law, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices.”<sup>22</sup> The Commission thus gloomily described the Islamic State model of the clerics as obscurantist and oppressive and warned of the consequences of exploiting Islam for political purposes.

Ahmadi continues to stay subjected to many discriminatory policies of the Pakistani state. For example, the 1973 Constitution promulgated by PM Bhutto reinforced the Islamic complexion of the state, requiring both the offices of Prime Minister and President to be taken up by ‘Muslims’. The legislation implicitly discriminated against the Muslim minority sects, especially the Ahmadi, as the law made it mandatory for office-bearers to publicly confess their faith as “believers” by acknowledging the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad. The very clause in the Constitution denied the minority sects the opportunity to contest for the higher state positions. Furthermore, as per the 1974 Constitutional Amendment, any position reserved for Muslims could no longer be held by a member of the Ahmadi community. Although it did not abolish Article 20 and Article 33 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the religious minorities “the right to profess religion and to manage religious institutions”.<sup>23</sup> The community was further prohibited to identify or pose as Muslims under the Islamisation pro-

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<sup>21</sup> “The 1954 Justice Munir Commission Report On The Anti Ahmadi Riots Of Punjab” [Online Web] Accessed 4<sup>th</sup> March 2014 URL: <https://archive.org/details/The1954JusticeMunirCommissionReport-OnTheAntiAhmadiRiotsOfPunjabIn1953https://archive.org/details/The1954JusticeMunirCommissionReportOnTheAntiAhmadiRiotsOfPunjabIn1953>.

<sup>22</sup> “The 1954 Justice Munir Commission Report On The Anti Ahmadi Riots Of Punjab” [Online Web] Accessed 4<sup>th</sup> March 2014 URL: <https://archive.org/details/The1954JusticeMunirCommissionReport-OnTheAntiAhmadiRiotsOfPunjabIn1953https://archive.org/details/The1954JusticeMunirCommissionReportOnTheAntiAhmadiRiotsOfPunjabIn1953>.

<sup>23</sup> The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 1973 [Online Web] Accessed 17 March 2015 URL: <http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/ConstitutionOfPakistan.pdf>.

gramme introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq's regime. General Zia amended sections 298-B and 298-C of the Pakistan Penal code. These amendments turned it into a criminal offence for the Ahmadis "to pose as Muslims, to preach and propagate by words and to use Islamic terminology of Muslim practices of worship" (Rais 2007: 456). He also introduced few ordinances that institutionalised discrimination against the Ahmadis by undermining their civil rights, and transformed their daily religious life into a criminal offence (Shaikh 2011: 63).

## Shias

Comprising 25% of Pakistan's Muslim population, Shias in Pakistan have been a major victim of sectarian strife in the country. The issue of sectarianism assumed prominence during General Zia-ul-Haq's regime and his controversial Islamisation policies. General Zia's Islamisation programme exposed the gap between the secular facade of the state and the growing dominance of a discriminatory realisation of Pakistani citizenship based on the exclusionary principles of Islam.

Religious sectarian divisions in Pakistan were fomented during his reign, as the Islamisation of the state moved inexorably towards 'Sunnification'. The clause of subscribing to sunni interpretation of Islamic law undermined the 'Muslimness' of the other muslim minority sects which had a direct consequence on their membership as equal citizens. Major impact of the programme was felt on the Shia population as many political outfits were born which openly indulged in the anti-shia rhetoric through their publications. Driven by the Deobandi school of thought, political outfits like "Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam" (JUI) of Mufti Mahmud, "Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan" (JUP) of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and "Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Ahl-e-Hadith" (JUAH) attempted to declare Shias as non-Muslims and Kafirs (Behuria 2004:159).

The imposition of the Islamisation programme in the country brought severe opposition from the Shias who refused to give in to Zia's zakat law<sup>24</sup> and led a demonstra-

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<sup>24</sup> Zakat law or alms giving is one of the five pillars of Islam and is considered as a personal responsibility for Muslims to ease economic hardship for other Muslims.

tion of around 25,000 protestors. This led to an anti-shia militancy in Pakistan in which two Shia Imbarahs were attacked by Sunni militants, precipitating serious sectarian clash in the country (Nasr 2000: 155). Reforms were also introduced in the education sector in which school curriculum was revised to entrench sunni resistance against the growing assertiveness of Shias. Many madrasas students were made to join Sunni militant organisations to thwart the growing fervour of Shia militancy. Among the earliest such organisations was the "Anjuman-i Sipah-i Sahabah" (Society of Companions of the Prophet) which later became the "Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan" (SSP). Thus, institutionalisation of Sunni teachings in madrasas served the strategic interest of the state (Nasr 2000: 157).

External factors also influenced the events of minority assertions in Pakistan. The Soviet war of the 1980s and a wave of Shia empowerment as a consequence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 affected the political environment of the Pakistani state. The Afghan war acted as a catalyst in consolidating the power and position of the Sunni-Mujahideen groups, who with Saudi Arabia's backing led to the spread of Wahhabi ideology in the country. The promotion of the Ahl-i-Hadith school of thought, an ultra-orthodox and puritanical school of Sunni Islam, patronised certain orthodox sunni sects which were strongly opposed to Shia ideology. Later on Wahabis became the primary sponsors of jihadist organisations and Deobandi seminaries in Pakistan (Shah 2005: 616) and helped curb emboldened Shia activities. Moreover, the Islamic revolution in Iran was perceived as a "Shia propaganda" against the Sunnis, which resulted in eight year long Iran-Iraq war. The war gave birth to many extremist Wahabbi groups such as Sawadi Azam (Greater Unity) who with government's support demanded Pakistan to be declared a 'Sunni' state, with having Shias, Qadianis, and Zikris be declared as non-Muslims.

Incidents of sectarian violence rose particularly in the post-9/11 period. The independently operating and state sponsored sectarian groups in Pakistan started to forge alliances with the transnational jihadi groups who migrated to Pakistan in the wake of the global war on terrorism. The ideological convergence between the groups (Crare

2014)<sup>25</sup> helped forge links between the local militants and global jihadis who not only rendered logistical support to one another but also shared hostility and intolerance towards the minority sects. For example: The banned Sipah-e-Sahaba ended up “gaining support of a Taliban commander from South Waziristan Agency named Qari Hussain. He provided logistics and militant training to sunni sectarian groups and also carried out violent strikes against Shia populations in Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and the nearby Punjabi city of Bhakkar” (Pakistan Security Report (PIPS) 2008: 14). The “sectarian groups, which were mostly exclusively Deobandi, also shared overlapping membership with other Deobandi militant groups including the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and the Kashmir militant groups” (Fair 2015 : 1139).

Shias are the worst hit victims of sectarian violence in Pakistan. Sectarian groups “such as Jaish-ul-Islam and LeJ wage an increasingly brutal campaign against Pakistan’s Shias, especially the Hazara Shia community in Baluchistan. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the community has borne the brunt of the Sunni militant violence from the foreign Jihadi groups who have escaped into Baluchistan. The nexus between the indigenous sectarian groups with Taliban and other foreign groups have further emboldened the domestic sunni extremist groups. For example, the 2011 Mastung shooting in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province by LeJ against 40 Shia pilgrims of Hazara community travelling to Iran to visit Shia holy sites caused death of 26 Shias” (Human Rights Watch 2014: 1). The incident marked the first but not the last perpetuation of mass killing of Hazara community after separating them from the Sunni populace. The Human Rights Watch recorded at least 450 killings of Shias in 2012 and at least another 400 Shias in 2013. The January and February 2013 bomb attacks by LeJ militants against Hazara in Baluchistan’s provincial capital, Quetta, killed at least 180 Hazara, recording one of the highest death tolls for individual acts of sectarian violence in Pakistan since Pakistan’s formation in 1947.<sup>26</sup> LeJ has taken

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<sup>25</sup> The Carnegie Situation Report on Pakistan can be accessed on world wide web at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/09/situation-report-pakistan/h7mc?reloadFlag=1>.

<sup>26</sup> “The Deadliest Sectarian Attack in Pakistan”, The Citizen Bureau, 2 February 2015, [Online Web] Accessed 13 May 2016 URL:<https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/1/2399/The-Deadliest-Sectarian-Attack-in-Pakistan>



responsibility for most of the attacks against Shias. The inefficiency of the Provincial government to combat such attacks indicate some kind of bias against the community. Some of the retired members of the paramilitary Frontier Corps, Baluchistan's principal security agency, describe Hazara as 'agents of Iran' and 'untrustworthy' (Human Rights Watch).<sup>27</sup>

## **Hindus**

The Hindu population comprise of a small minority of about 1.96 million, i.e. roughly 1.2% of the total Pakistani population. Most of the Hindu population is settled in the rural areas of Sindh, and work as landless bonded labourers to the Sindhi landlords.<sup>28</sup> However, the tiny minority of Hindus continues to find itself subjected to abuse and exploitation in the country. The worst affected are the Hindu women who are a major victim of the practice of enforced conversions. Though, there are no verified figures, but according to South Asia Partnership Pakistan, an NGO operating in the area, at least 1000 mostly Hindu girls in Pakistan are forcibly converted to Islam every year.<sup>29</sup>

Minorities in general do not receive the protection required from state institutions and lack access to justice. Pakistan's Human Rights Commission reports the failure of the state police machinery to deliver justice and punish the perpetrators. The report indicates that police authorities often turn a blind eye to reports of forced conversions and kidnappings. They either abstain from recording a First Information Report or distort the facts, thereby denying the families the chance to take their case any further.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> "We are the Walking Dead": Killing of Shia Hazaras in Baluchistan, Pakistan, Human Rights Watch, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 23 February 2016 URL: [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0614\\_ForUplad.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0614_ForUplad.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> Minority Rights Group International, "Pakistan", [Online Web] Accessed 18 June 2018 URL: <https://minorityrights.org/minorities/hindus-2/>

<sup>29</sup> Religious Freedom of Minorities in Pakistan: A Study, South Asia Partnership-Pakistan, 2015 [Online Web] Accessed 29 March 2016 URL: [http://sappk.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/eng\\_publications/Religious\\_Freedom\\_of\\_Minorities\\_in\\_Pakistan.pdf](http://sappk.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/eng_publications/Religious_Freedom_of_Minorities_in_Pakistan.pdf)

<sup>30</sup>"Forced Conversions and Forced Marriages in Sindh, Pakistan", University of Birmingham, 2018, [Online Web] Accessed 16 January 2019 URL: <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/ptr/ciforb/Forced-Conversions-and-Forced-Marriages-in-Sindh.pdf>

In order to combat the practice, the Sindh Provincial government passed a bill in November 2016 against forced religious conversion, which recommended a five year punishment for perpetrators, three years for facilitators of forceful religious conversions, and made the offence of forcibly converting a minor punishable. However, the provincial government decided to review the bill after an outcry by some hardliner Muslims religious groups who declared the bill as “un-Islamic” and demanded its withdrawal. Religious organisations in Karachi carried out a protest against the bill in order to compel the Sindh government to repeal it. The bill till date however has not been ratified.<sup>31</sup>

### **Christians**

Christians are one of the largest minorities in Pakistan, comprising about 1.6 % of the total Pakistani population. There has been an upsurge in anti-Christian violence in Pakistan. Most of the Christian girls are abducted and are converted. Whereas, many Christians are charged with blasphemy allegations. One of the most famous case in this regard is that of Asia Bibi, a Christian mother of five who was sentenced to death in Pakistan in 2010 for defiling the name of Prophet Mohammad as accused by her Muslim neighbours. The case has outraged many conservative Islamic groups who demands justice by pushing a case for her hanging. For example, the Islamist movement Tehreek-e-Labbaik took to the streets to protest Bibi’s release by the Supreme Court.

### **Implications**

Sectarianism has become a major security challenge for the state of Pakistan. Minorities in Pakistan have been facing all kinds of violence including “forced conversions, arson attacks, enforced displacements, blasphemy allegations, attacks on worship

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<sup>31</sup> ‘Forced Conversions of Hindu girls in Pakistan make a mockery of its constitution’, The Conversation, August 14, 2017 [Online Web] Accessed 15 August 2017 URL: <https://theconversation.com/forced-conversions-of-hindu-girls-in-pakistan-make-a-mockery-of-its-constitution-80420/> <https://www.dawn.com/news/1302797>

places and killings at the hands of religious extremists”.<sup>32</sup> Despite the constitutional safeguards, sectarian clash and violence has been a recurring theme in Pakistani society. For instance, the Constitution of Pakistan provides certain safeguards for the minorities such as “Article 20 (freedom to profess religion and manage religious institutes), Article 21 (safeguarding against taxation for purposes of any particular religion), Article 22 (equal rights to educational institutions in respect of religion), Article 25 (equality of citizens), Article 26 (no discrimination in respect to access to public places), Article 28 (preservation of language, script, and culture) and most importantly, Article 36 (protection of minorities)”, but these provisions are yet to be fulfilled in letter and spirit.<sup>33</sup>

Even though, the issue of minority rights and inclusive society dominates the election manifestos of most mainstream political parties, yet not much has been done or achieved. For example, PML (N)-Nawaz Sharif in his manifesto pledged to secure the rights of minorities by ensuring complete freedom of worship, initiating legislations to prevent forced conversions, to double the development funds for minorities and permit the christian community to run their educational institutions.<sup>34</sup> Despite committing to the cause of improving the status of minorities in Pakistan, the PML(N) government after coming to power failed to prevent the growing atrocities against them. For instance, in 2013, nine Hindu temples were attacked in the city of Larkana, in Sindh. In the same year, under great pressure from local clerics, police demolished minarets of Ahmadi places of worship. In September 2013, a suicide attack on the All Saints Church in Peshawar killed over 100 christians, whereas in March 2015, attacks on two churches in Lahore killed at least 15 people. In May 2015, gunmen attacked a

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<sup>32</sup> “Minority report: Parties emphasise religious pluralism”, The Express Tribune, 4 May 2013, [Online Web] Accessed 7 May 2015 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/544265/minority-report-parties-emphasise-religious-pluralism/>

<sup>33</sup> The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Modified document dated 28th February, 2012) [Online Web] Accessed 19 April 2015 URL: [http://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681\\_951.pdf](http://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> ‘Nawaz announces PML-N manifesto’, The Nation [Online Web] Accessed 10 January 2017 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/07-Mar-2013/nawaz-announces-pml-n-manifesto>

bus carrying Ismaili Shia pilgrims in Karachi, killing over 45 people (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2015:75).<sup>35</sup>

As a result of such related and unabated attacks on places of worship of religious minorities, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2014 directed the provincial governments to set up special task forces to protect places of worship of the minorities. However, a bill on Pakistani Minorities Right commission which is underway is yet to be introduced in the National Assembly. Despite the growing atrocities against the minority groups, the government of Pakistan has failed to enact legislations criminalising the offences against the minority groups or penalising the perpetrators. Moreover, with the rise of sectarian strife in the country, a grave and psychological implication for religious minorities intensified with the introduction of Blasphemy laws. Anyone committing offences such as “injuring or defiling places of worship with the intent to insult the religion of any class, defiling a copy of the Holy Quran, or using derogatory remarks with respect to the Holy Prophet of Islam” were met with long prison sentences and death by hanging (Rais 2009: 460). Non-muslim minorities are also targeted and charged under the allegations of Blasphemy. In March 2013, several thousand christians were forced to abandon their homes and flee in Lahore after allegations of blasphemy against a local resident.<sup>36</sup>

Hence, the lack of judicial protection for the convicts has not only failed to provide any legal or institutional safety net for religious minorities but has increased religious intolerance in the country, reducing the minority groups to a permanent state of insecurity.

### **Ethnic Assertions in Pakistan**

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<sup>35</sup> ‘A look back at our promises: Civil society mid-term assessment report, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, June 2015 [Online Web] Accessed 26 July 2016 URL: <http://hrctp-web.org/hrctpweb/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/A-look-back-at-our-promises.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> “The Deadliest Sectarian Attack in Pakistan”, The Citizen Bureau, 2 February 2015, [Online Web] Accessed 13 May 2016 URL: <https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/1/2399/The-Deadliest-Sectarian-Attack-in-Pakistan>

Pakistan inherited an ethnically plural state, comprising of various ethnic groups-“Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Baloch” (Khan 1999: 167). Out of the initial five ethnic groups, Punjabis enjoyed maximum control and dominance in the highest echelons of state power in the newly formed state of Pakistan.

The over-developed class of military-bureaucratic oligarchy inherited from British India mainly comprised of Punjabis. Punjabis enjoyed unchallenged control over state institutions in the newly formed state of Pakistan. For example, Punjabis have maximum representation in the military structure which comes to approximately 70% of the officers and rank and file of the armed forces, followed by Pashtuns who are nearly 25%. The composition of the dominant classes (the capitalists and the landowning class) are also unevenly distributed in favour of the Punjabis. Capitalists in Pakistan mainly consists of Punjabis and Mohajirs followed by Pashtuns who majorly controls the gun and heroine business in Pakistan. Hailing mainly from the lower and West Punjab, the state’s dominant classes dominated by Punjabis were closely integrated with the Punjabi ruling class (Lieven 2011). Thus, the uneven demographic representation and control over state’s apparatus has led to an extended dominance of Punjabis over other ethnic groups (Ahmed 1996: 640-641).

On the other hand, born as an exceptionally insecure State, Pakistan favoured the creation of a centralised state with strong bureaucracies and military force. Fearing an existential threat from India, faced with massive refugee crisis in the first few months of its formation, invested in a conflict over Kashmir with India, disappointed with an unequal division of assets by British India and facing demands for self-determination and regional autonomy, the state was driven towards establishing a more tightly bound centralised state. In order to survive the initial tests of independence, Jinnah favoured a highly centralised political system and favoured a unitary political system. However, the unitary political system retarded the growth of the parliamentary system, which was more suitable to the needs of a multi-ethnic society like Pakistan (Khan 1999:170). The drive to establish a strong centralised state further strengthened the position of Punjabis who controlled country’s central forces.

The dominance of Punjabis therefore brought resentment from other ethnic groups who have actively contested the legitimacy of the administrative structure of the Pakistani State. The first major objection to this arrangement came from Pakistan's eastern wing dominated by the Bengalis who registered their opposition to the highly centralised non-representative nature of the Pakistani State structure. Comprising of 53% of the total population of Pakistan, the Bengali speaking east-Pakistan desired the Pakistani state to be a loose federation with conducive and cooperative working relations between the centre and provinces. Bengalis who were poorly represented in the bureaucracy and made just 1% of the three armed forces of the country felt marginalised and oppressed at the hands of the dominant group, the Punjabis (Butt 2017: 47). The community further raised questions concerning the official or national language of the country as well as the legal, political and economic rights of Bengalis.

However, the Urdu speaking western wing controlling the state structures declared Urdu as a national language. They suppressed the demands of the Bengalis who wanted Bangla to enjoy a co-equal status with Urdu as a national language. They further were made to feel economically alienated as the state exploited most of the export earnings from east-Pakistan's resource stream such as jute and others to fund the industrial enterprises based almost exclusively in the western wing. The widening economic disparities between the two wings (the per capita income in the West was 61% higher than that in the East) and the feeling of being colonised motivated East Pakistan to oppose the Punjabi dominated western wing of the state and succeeded into forming their own state, Bangladesh. Moreover, the trans-border ethnic composition of Bengalis in the Indian State of West Bengal helped East Pakistanis seek support of their co-ethnic group across the border. The rise of Bengali nationalism was however not a result of any primordial hatred between the two ethnic groups (Bengalis and Punjabis), but was an outcome of an uneven representation and domination of one group over another in controlling state structures. The question of ideology therefore was less relevant in the case of East Pakistan and was majorly driven by a sense of political deprivation. It was the sense of political deprivation that increased the sense of a separate identity and the feeling of Bengali nationalism (Akhtar 2009:39)

Baloch national movement marked another nationalist struggle in Pakistan. Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan with minimum demography but richest in natural resources such as natural gas, copper, uranium, potential oil reserves and others (Alamgir 2012: 35). Balochistan has always desired to be an independent state. A day after the creation of Pakistan; the Khan of Kalat (the largest and most prosperous princely state in Balochistan) declared independence and refused to be a part of the new state of Pakistan. Being rejectionist of Balochistan's claim, the state of Pakistan launched a military operation and annexed Kalat in April 1948. Since the annexation, Pakistan has launched five military operations in the province and the region has come to be ruled by the central government whose administration is in the hands of Punjabis and other non-Baloch people (Ali 2005:45).

Despite the military operations, a strong sense of nationalism with a separate identity on account of shared history, language and other cultural aspects breeds amongst the Balochis. Balochis have long struggled for a separate state of Balochistan and have demanded a larger political autonomy to run their state of affairs. However, the Punjabi dominance of the Pakistani State and their ethnic exclusionist policies attempts to suppress the demands of Balochis for their greater provincial autonomy. Baloch resistance crystallises around the objective of protecting their population and their interests. State policies have brought in a lot of condemnation and dissent among the Balochis who have for long protested against the lack or transgression of provincial autonomy, social and economic neglect and exploitation of the province's resources for the benefit of others. The successive regimes in Pakistan have long suppressed the demands of the indigenous Balochis by initiating policies such as the "One Unit Scheme", the land distribution scheme to non-locals or people in services and running mega-development projects. Thus, as Frederic Grare explains, the ongoing spirit of

insurgency in Baluchistan is filled by expropriation, marginalisation and dispossession<sup>37</sup> (Grare 2006: 5-6).

Balochis have long raised their resentment towards the growing demographic imbalance and cultural encroachment in the province. The influx of three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan during Afghan war and around one million registered as voters in Balochistan have instilled fear and angst amongst the Balochis of being outnumbered in their province. For example, In Chaghai district, the refugees has outnumbered the local population and in some others their numbers have approached half. Moreover, the growing Pashtun demographic presence in the area has further led to a rise of radicalisation and sectarianism in Balochistan. The influx of Pashtuns bolstered the presence of religious parties in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan during Zia's regime. The Islamisation policy and a strong Taliban presence in Balochistan along with other sectarian outfits (who were pushed from Punjab) has caused a rise of sectarian incidents in the province.

Balochis have long complained against the economic alienation and exploitation at the hands of Islamabad State forces. Similar to the demands of east Pakistan, they too have for long demanded a 'genuine participatory process' (Ali 2005: 47) and sharing of economic growth. Balochis are critical of state's exploitative policy of depriving the natives of any share in their own wealth. For example, Sui gas in Balochistan, the biggest natural gas field in Pakistan, earns 84 billion rupees for federal government but provides only 4-5 billion rupees to the province. Nine out of ten people in Balochistan do not have access to gas. Moreover, most of the limited arable farmland in the province has been taken up by the Punjabi farmers with Islamabad's backing (Ali 2005: 50-56).

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<sup>37</sup> Expropriation relates to the Balochs' claim of their resources being exploited by the Punjabi dominated central government. Marginalisation relates to discrimination against Baloch labor in ongoing development projects. Whereas, dispossession is an issue as Balochs see the best of their land being taken over by "foreigners" from Islamabad.



The current form of the struggle has taken shape as an outcome of the present military establishment's initiatives to cement greater hegemony over the territory and resources of Balochistan. The lack of participation and involvement of the locals in the decision-making process has also embittered the Balochis. The plan of constructing military cantonments and the mega development projects such as the port of Gwadar on the southwestern tip of the province without involving the locals have reduced the Balochis to a status of second class citizens on their own provincial land. Moreover, the mega projects initiated in the province has further reaffirmed the fears among the locals of a greater influx of people from across the country (Khan 2009: 1078).

The resilience of Baloch nationalism results from the persistent economic and social inequalities among the provinces and the massive military repression and violation of human rights (Grare 2006 : 5). Pakistan's military establishment has intensified their military attacks in the province, especially in Sui by using violent measures of arson, looting, and gunship and by carrying out extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances of the Baloch youth. The incidents of extra-judicial killing and enforced disappearances in Balochistan has become a paramount feature of the conflict between government security forces and armed militants. Although, the exact number of the cases of enforced disappearances remain unknown. The Baloch nationalists claim thousands of cases, while the official numbers remain wildly contradictory. For instance, in 2008, Rehman Malik, Pakistan's then Interior Minister, admitted a "number of 1,100 victims", whereas, Balochistan's home minister, Mir Zafullah Zehri confirmed to a number of 55 people to the provincial legislators in January 2011 (Human Rights Watch 2011: 4).<sup>38</sup>

Baloch Human Rights Organisation in its 2016 Annual report reported the killing of 603 people (among which 113 mutilated bodies were found) from the period between January and December; while around 1809 people have been reported to be abducted and gone missing in different operations. The failure of the judicial system in Pakistan

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<sup>38</sup> Human Rights Watch (2011), "We can Torture, Kill or Keep you for fears:Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan", [Online Web] Accessed 13 May 2017 URL:<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711Web-Inside.pdf>

to correct the wrongs committed by the military officials has further given them impunity to practice such repressive policies.<sup>39</sup>

The clash between the Balochi nationalists and the authorities over the fate of Balochistan emerged not just in response to the violation of provincial autonomy but also in regard to cultural encroachment. As a result of the ethnic composition of the provinces, central-provincial issues develop an ethnic character, resulting in disgruntled ethnic groups accusing the centre of ‘Punjabi chauvinism’ (Fair et al 2010: 12).

The country today face another major national uprising from a new nationalist movement that emerges from Pakistan’s Pashtun tribes. Pashtuns were the major victim of the war that was fought in Pakistan’s tribal areas for more than a decade. Known as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, the movement brought all the Pashtuns together by overcoming their tribal divisions of being Achakzai, Yousafzai, Wazir, Mehsud, and Orakzai.

### **2.3 Security State**

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has adopted the model of a security state. The concept of security state envisages a state that accords primacy to the protection of national boundaries through military means, and values or prioritises territorial security and sovereignty over all other functions of the state.

Pakistan from the very beginning adopted a state-centric national security approach to counter perceived threats to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity from its neighbouring states, India and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s feeling of insecurity is majorly rooted in state’s historical past and its geo-strategic location. Pakistani threat perceptions towards India go back to the period even before its formation in the form of hostility that existed between the Hindus and Muslims in the pre-partition era and in the present context on the dispute over the status of Kashmir. On the other hand, it developed a strained and unstable relationship with its western neighbour, Afghanistan,

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<sup>39</sup> Baloch Human Rights Organisation, Annual Report 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 4 July 2018 URL:[https://balochhumanrights.org/?page\\_id=852](https://balochhumanrights.org/?page_id=852)

over the status of Durand Line<sup>40</sup> and the irredentist demands by Afghanistan over Pashtun territories in Pakistan. Therefore, surrounded by India on its east and Afghanistan on its west, Pakistan was born as an insecure state (Fair et.al 2010: 17).

Situated in the region of severe discontinuities and an enduring rivalry with its immediate neighbours, Pakistan's defence and foreign policy remained dominated by its security concerns with India. The state has made repeated claims over India's dismissal of the partition scheme and its eagerness to undo the existence of Pakistan as an independent state (Dwivedi 2008: 890). For example, Pakistan's PM, Liaquat Ali Khan in a letter to Indian PM, Nehru stated, "India has never whole heartedly accepted the partition scheme and is out to destroy the state of Pakistan which her leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India itself" (quoted in Rizvi 1974: 49).

Pakistan's insecurities were also governed by the large demographic size, manpower, economic-military resources and technological advancements of the Indian state which raised apprehensions among the Pakistanis around India's hegemonic ambitions and status in the region (Dwivedi 2008: 889-891).

As a result, in order to find parity with the Indian State, counter its hegemonic ambitions in the region, and to win over the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan turned itself into a 'security state'. It defined its security policy around protecting its national frontiers against external aggression, and prioritised military security as a means to protect territorial integrity and sovereignty. Indian-centricity in Pakistan's security policy led Pakistan to focus on two most significant areas:

1. To build military capability with the objective of challenging India's military might and providing for an effective defence.
2. To search for military oriented alignments which can assist primarily in dealing with New Delhi (Siddiq 2004: 169).

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<sup>40</sup> British Commission, led by Sir Edward Durand, unilaterally determined the border between Afghanistan and British India and divided the Pashtun tribal lands in two. The 2400 km long border, known as the "Durand Line", runs exactly along the line that marks the Afghan-Pakistan boundary today and sowed the seeds of an enduring border dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan was born militarily weak due to an unequal and unfair distribution of resources and denial of due share of financial assets by India. Thus, acquiring military technology and upgrading capabilities became necessary to bolster Islamabad's defence capabilities against the potential threat from India. For Pakistan it will help them ward off India's hegemonic designs as well as help the state in building up its capacity to pursue the Kashmir issue (Siddiqi 2004:166). The Kashmir conflict is the major source of tension between India and Pakistan and the two states have fought three major wars over it.

Therefore, in order to bolster its military capabilities vis-a-vis the Indian state, Pakistan from the very beginning invested majorly in their defence sector. Pakistan's defence expenditure has ranged from about 75% to 34% of total expenditure during the first three decades since its inception (1947-83). On average it was 53.48% (Rizvi 1983: 38). The acute insecurity syndrome may be envisaged from the fact that even "in 1949, the expenditure on defence was nearly twice the total amount spent on development projects" (Pattanaik 2001: 413).

In order to strengthen its defence capabilities and to stand up to India's military might, especially over Kashmir, Pakistan forged extra-regional partnerships and alliances with great powers to seek protection against a potential Indian threat. The geo-strategic location of Pakistan and the cold war power dynamics between the two super powers (US and USSR) greatly benefitted the newly formed state of Pakistan. With India's non-alignment policy, Pakistan emerged as an important strategic partner for the US in the South Asian region. US saw Pakistan as a first line of defence in South Asia against Soviet Union's expansionist designs in the region. Whereas, Pakistan perceived its alliance with the US as a bulwark against India.

The Indian obsession and Indo-centricity in Pakistan's policies was clear in its alliances with the Western wing. As early as in 1953, Pakistan became a signatory to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The Southeast Asian Treaty which was designed to maintain peace in the region and to facilitate economic cooperation, was committed to act only against communist aggression. Pakistan, which had joined the

Treaty to create safeguards for itself against any potential threat from the Indian state opposed the communist clause in the Treaty and threatened to leave it if US refused to apply it to the conflict between India and Pakistan (Jabeen and Muhammed Saleem 2011: 120). Pakistan became signatory to a few other military agreements with US, such as the Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty of 1954 and Bilateral Defence Agreement 1959. The Bilateral Defence Agreement signed between Islamabad and Pentagon assured US cooperation to the state of Pakistan with its security threats and defence requirements (Iqbal and Khalid 2011: 13). The defence related treaties and pacts signed by Pakistan resulted in country's arm buildup and modernisation of the armed forces.

Moreover, Pakistan's continuous competition with India and its attempt at finding parity with the Indian state also influenced the state's nuclear programme. With the objective of preserving its territorial integrity against an Indian attack, Pakistan justified its decision to go nuclear on the basis of providing a deterrence strategy to curb India's nuclear aggression, averting India's hegemonic ambitions in the region, and to counter balance its conventional military superiority. However, many prominent strategists from both Pakistan and India are of the opinion that a bomb owned by Pakistan would not only neutralise an assumed nuclear force, but also provide the backdrop against which the Kashmir issue could be reopened by Pakistan (Cohen 1984:153).

With the given military imbalance between the two countries and the military defeat of Pakistan in the 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistan realised the emergent need to go nuclear. For example, as early as 1965, when the 1965 India-Pakistan war began to heat up, the-then Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto in an interview with the Manchester Guardian said, "if India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no alternative."<sup>41</sup> Further asserting its message to the nation after India's nuclear tests in 1974, he said:

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<sup>41</sup> Singh, Khushwant, "FOREIGN AFFAIRS Pakistan, India and The Bomb", The New York Times Archives, July 1, 1979 [Online Web] Accessed 29<sup>th</sup> December 2015, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/01/archives/foreign-affairs-pakistan-india-and-the-bomb.html>

We are determined not to be intimidated by this threat. I give a solemn pledge to all my countrymen that we will never let Pakistan be a victim of nuclear blackmail. This means not only that we will never surrender our rights or claims because of India's nuclear status, but also that we will not be deflected from our policies by this fateful development. In concrete terms we will not compromise the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir nor we will accept Indian hegemony or domination over the sub-continent.<sup>42</sup>

Presenting India's nuclear program as a strategic threat to Pakistan's security and that of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan centred its security policy around how to balance, counter and if necessary, fight the Indian threat (Rais 2005: 145).

### *Afghanistan*

Pakistan's obsession for military security was also influenced by its relations with its western neighbour, Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the only country which voted against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations in 1947. The disconnect over the Durand Line had set the course of relations between the two countries.<sup>43</sup> In addition to the territorial dispute, Pakistan's insecurity was driven by any physical or political presence of India in Afghanistan. It feared a two-front threat from its eastern and western borders and desired to manipulate Afghanistan's domestic affairs to create a regime that will forge foreign policies favourable to Pakistan and limits India's action in Afghanistan (Fair 2014: 32).

Pakistan has had an unstable relationship with Afghanistan. The relations between the two countries reached an all-time low when Afghanistan's pro-Pashtunistan PM, Sardar Daud, broke off diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1961. Therefore, in order to combat the growing hostility, Pakistan State pursued interventionist strategies to neutralise the Pashtunistan movement in Afghanistan. For example; during the 1950s, Pa-

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<sup>42</sup> "Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Address To Nation After Indian Nuclear Tests", Published on YouTube on 3 September 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 15th November 2015 URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfddp2kSt-s>

<sup>43</sup> Calling it a 'geographical myth', Afghanistan claimed its rights over the Pakhtun territories on the Pakistani side of the state. Whereas, Pakistan considering itself as a rightful successor of British rights and duties in the territories that formed Pakistan declined Afghanistan's demand of revising the line.

kistan subverted the US efforts of giving military assistance to the Kabul government and sabotaged the economic development of Afghanistan by regularly impeding the movement of goods to landlocked Afghanistan from the Karachi port (Weinbaum and Harder 2008: 28).

However, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the Pakistani state an opportunity to increase its strategic presence in Afghanistan and meet its security and political interests. Acting as a frontline state to the US against the Soviet invasion, Pakistan saw the war as an opening to resolve the Pashtun problem by subsuming it under the banner of Jihad, propagating a pan-Islamic identity rather than an ethno-nationalist one (Kantha 2000: 1309). It also aimed at establishing a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan to challenge the old traditional India-Afghanistan ties and gain strategic depth in Afghanistan.

However, the war gave rise to a fanatic breed of fighters who virtually moved to Pakistan after the end of the war. Pakistan's fear about Kashmir made the ruling elites engage India militarily through a proxy war. In order to satisfy its strategic designs in Kashmir, Pakistan resorted to fundamentalist designs. In order to challenge India's claim over Kashmir, Pakistan sponsored a militant movement by playing the Muslim card to distort the secular image of India. It tried to indoctrinate the people with selected discourses on radical Islam (Mohanty and Mohanty 2007: 138).

Harping on the territorial dispute over Kashmir and basing the country's ideological underpinnings on it, Pakistan declared its need for military security as paramount. The support for the defence sector and national security agenda is supported and shared by both civilian and military leadership of Pakistan. Fearing the secular nature of the Indian state, and its greater military capacity, the country's political leadership considered the threat from India as Pakistan's foremost security challenge. For example, in October 1948, while the state was still in its infancy, the first PM, Liaquat Ali Khan stated that, "the defence of the state is our foremost consideration. It dominates all other governmental activities". While other successive leaders shared the same notion. PM Muhammad Ali Bogra (1953-55) once made a declaration stating that he would

“much rather starve the country than allow any weakening of its defence” (Rizvi 2000: 62). Thus, state security took precedence in Pakistan from the early years of its formation. The allotment of 70% of the estimated budget in the first year to the defence sector by the civilian leadership (Siddiqa 2017: 73), declared military security as paramount. The policy directive of strong defence thus was supported by the parliament; who neither questioned the high defence allocations nor questioned the detailed aspects of the defence policy (Rizvi 2000: 76). Defence expenditure therefore received the biggest share of the pie from the national budget of Pakistan until the 1990s. Though, later faced with debts, it was pushed to the second position (Rizvi 2000: 7).

Despite the arms build-up and foreign alliances, Pakistan in order to fill the conventional military gap vis-a-vis India uses proxy forces as instruments of state policy. In order to keep the Indian military forces engaged, Pakistan trains and aids a large number of militant forces to fight a proxy war with India in Kashmir. The policy of using militant forces to challenge India’s conventional military superiority has today made Pakistan a victim of terrorist and extremist violence. However, the threat around its traditional rival did not seem to have changed despite the fact that the threat from non-state actors appears to be a far more serious threat to the Pakistani state.

#### **2.4 Deep State of Pakistan**

The political reigns of Pakistan have effectively been in the hands of the army. Army in Pakistan has ruled the country directly for more than 38 years, while indirectly have made periodic political interventions. It justifies its rule under the cover of the principle of Law of Necessity, the principle of ‘*Salus populi est suprema lex*’ (interest of the state and for the welfare of the people) and seeks its validation from the superior courts of Pakistan to legitimise the illegitimate (Nawaz 2008: 24). Today, military in Pakistan, especially the army and the state’s Intelligence wing (ISI) runs what PM



Gilani once referred to as “a state within a state”<sup>44</sup>. The origin of Pakistan’s deep state structure can be traced back to the historical trajectory of the Pakistani state.

### ***Historical Legacy***

One of the major challenges that Pakistan faced after its formation was that of state building. The political leadership of the country failed to provide an Islamic blueprint for the state, and build strong and legitimate democratic institutions in the country. The political-ideological crisis and the under-developed political system in the country in the initial years of the state’s formation, paved way for the intervention of a well organised and disciplined institution of army, a product of a colonial force, to run the course of affairs in the country. Pakistan’s failure to establish democracy and its trend towards structural authoritarianism in Pakistan can be sought in the historical colonial legacy of the country.

According to Ganguly and Fair, “Pakistan’s propensity towards authoritarianism can be sought in the ideological, organisational and mobilisation strategy of the movement for the creation of Pakistan” (Ganguly and Fair 2013: 122-124). The authors argue that the poor organisational composition and support base of the only dominant Muslim party, the Muslim League, has been largely held responsible for the weak political foundation of political parties in the state of Pakistan.

Jinnah’s efforts at creating Pakistan based upon patronage and reciprocity, rather than democratic inclusion left the party largely unrepresentative which affected the state’s democratic future. The membership of the party mainly comprise of leaders belonging to the landed gentry class who were only interested in safeguarding their position in the newly formed state of Pakistan. For example, Jinnah attempted to convince some regional leaders in Sindh to join the party in lieu of receiving greater autonomy in Pakistan than in the united India in which the big Hindu industrialists of Bombay and Bengal would be too strong for them (Ahmed 1991: 77).

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<sup>44</sup> [Gilani's 'humiliating' about-face, N-World, \[Online web\] Accessed 16 November, 2017, URL: https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/gilani-s-humiliating-about-face-1.233359](https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/gilani-s-humiliating-about-face-1.233359)

Moreover, Muslim League unlike its Indian counterpart, the Indian National Congress, failed to promote itself from a nationalist movement to a national party. Despite having spearheaded the movement for Pakistan, the party did not enjoy a strong political base in the country. The dominant elite culture in the party organisation was reflected in the composition of the state assemblies which claimed to function in the name of democracy (Rais 2015: 106). As a result, Pakistan failed to effectively establish “political mechanisms for aggregating diverse interests and identities into a plural and participatory national framework” (Mukherjee 2010: 72).

Furthermore, by taking credit for the establishment of Pakistan, Muslim league did not encourage the evolution of other alternative political parties and personalities. After the untimely death of Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah and his successor Liaquat Ali Khan, the country lacked an effective political leadership which could keep the party together. From the period after PM Liaquat Ali's death to General Ayub's coup, the country witnessed seven times change in their political leadership, with no leader having completed a full democratic term of five years.

Due to the weak political foundations of the state, the civilian governments from very early on relied on the military-bureaucratic class to help run the political affairs of the state. The political leadership has sought help from the military to conduct large-scale nation building activities such as carrying out emergency operations during natural disasters, construction of public infrastructure, maintenance of law and order in the society and others. For example, during Ayub Khan's military tenure (1952-53), the army conducted many non-military operation based out of an instrument of “aid to the civil power” (Shah 2014: 67). Moreover, the political competition and confrontational nature of Pakistan's polity also provided army the opportunity to intervene in the country's political processes and act as power brokers (Rizvi 2000: 191). Thus, due to the absence of alternative political choices and the declining political culture in the state, the military-bureaucratic class took over the reigns of power and became the de-facto rulers of Pakistan (Chengappa 1999: 303).

### ***Building of the Deep State of Pakistan***

The political vacuum in the country, the failure of the civilian governments to maintain law and order in the society and build consensus over state's identity, all led to the early and periodic intervention of the military in the political processes of the country (Cohen 1998: 107). Military's pessimism about civilian incompetence deepened in Pakistan over the years which have led to many military coups in the country.

Military in Pakistan also benefitted enormously from the state's external security environment. Construing fears around a two-front threat from its immediate neighbours, India and Afghanistan, the army in Pakistan justified its strong and powerful role in the country as a safeguard against an insecure and antagonistic regional environment. The outbreak of the first Indo-Pakistan war in 1947-48 helped the army gain support from the people for its spirited defence of the country's borders against India. The construction around a perceived threat from India helped army to not only institutionalise its leading role in the making of country's security and foreign policies but also provided it greater room to satisfy its bureaucratic interests by keeping military security on top of every agenda.

Moreover, amidst the constitutional struggle in the state over the failure of the political leadership to build consensus over the nature of state's identity, army also imbued upon itself the responsibility of defining the state's ideology. Associating itself with a Muslim communal narrative, military in Pakistan defined its state's identity in opposition to India (Shaikh 2009: 7) As a result, the institution from the very beginning proclaimed to protect not only the territorial frontiers of the state but the very ideology of the nation. Presenting itself as a guarantor of state survival and a guardian of state ideology, the army in Pakistan dominates the course of the state's domestic, security and foreign policy making structures.

### ***Undermining Civilian Governments***

The political system of Pakistan has been largely subverted by a powerful military. Defending their military coups on the pretext of state necessity, army in Pakistan has long undermined the functioning of the civilian institutions. For example, Musharraf regime justified its ascendance to power on the basis of its ability to uphold the

Kashmir issue, which he felt was getting sacrificed by the Nawaz Sharif government (Siddiqi 2004: 169). However, after toppling the Nawaz Sharif government, General Musharraf resorted to legal legerdemain to avoid being classified as a martial law. He projected his rule as a gateway to the restoration of democracy in the country. In one of his address, Musharraf noted that, “there has never been true democracy in Pakistan”, and “if there had been true democracy, I would not have been before you”.<sup>45</sup> Raising his concerns further and defending his coup, Musharraf gave a message in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2000:

It remains an incontrovertible reality that Pakistan Army has always stood out as the last bastion of strength for the nation during times of emergency. Presently, the nation is confronted with grave problems like economic strangulation, ethnic strife, sub-nationalism and sectarian bigotry. Being the most well organised and focussed national institution, Pakistan Army has accepted the challenge to assist the nation in these trying and uncertain conditions. (Quoted in Shah 2014: 201)

However, in the wake of the legitimacy crisis and the growing protests against General Musharraf over the dismissal of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Pakistan saw an end of another autocratic regime in the country. The stepping down of Musharraf’s military government brought about a democratic shift in Pakistan’s polity. Since then, Pakistan has witnessed three democratic governments, with PPP becoming the first elected government in Pakistan’s history to complete its full term in office (2008-2013), followed by Nawaz Sharif’s government (2013-2017) and Imran Khan’s PTI at present. Despite the democratic shift in Pakistan, the military-dominated deep state of Pakistan continues to exert its power over the civilian institutions.

In order to recover from its lost image that its predecessor General Musharraf had left, the army in Pakistan signalled an intent of disengaging itself from active involvement in country’s political processes. For example, after PPP’s takeover of the civilian government, the then COAS, General Kayani, reversed an important

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<sup>45</sup> John Lancaster, “Musharraf Argues for Revision of Constitution”, Washington Post, July 13, 2002 [Online Web] Accessed 2 January 2015 URL: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/07/13/musharraf-argues-for-revision-of-constitution/97d7b9f7-e280-4171-a759-428e69d8d076/?utm\\_term=.3f8ffbcda130](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/07/13/musharraf-argues-for-revision-of-constitution/97d7b9f7-e280-4171-a759-428e69d8d076/?utm_term=.3f8ffbcda130)

policy of his predecessor, President Musharraf, over the induction of army officials in civil departments. The new Army Chief ordered the withdrawal of military officers from the government's civil departments and directed army officers to "stay away from political activities"; calling all serving military officials working under 23 civil departments to relinquish their charge and report back to the General Headquarters (GHQ).<sup>46</sup> Having made a conscious decision of keeping the military out of politics, General Kayani during the 106th Corps Commanders' Conference on 7 February 2008 stated that, "holding free and fair elections is the sole responsibility of the Election Commission, and that the army will meet only its constitutional obligations and help the civil administration maintain law and order, as and when required".<sup>47</sup>

During the post withdrawal period, the military attempted to confine itself to the democratic norms. However, given its institutional behaviour it often overstepped over civilian government's jurisdiction and functional powers where it felt that the actions and policies undertaken by the civilian governments undermined their political stability, institutional autonomy and national security. For example, On pretext of safeguarding military's institutional autonomy, the army vociferously opposed civilian government's reform of bringing country's intelligence agency, the ISI, under the administrative, financial and operational control of the Ministry of Interior. Given the fact that ISI is staffed with regular military officers,<sup>48</sup> and amidst the growing opposition in the defence circles, the decision was reversed within less than 24 hours, and the institution was placed back under the Prime Minister. Director General of the ISPR, Major General Athar Abbas, commented on the issue noting that, ISI is a "huge organisation" and "the interior ministry could not have handled its financial, adminis-

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<sup>46</sup> Syed Irfan Raza, "Army officers recalled from civil departments", Dawn, February 12, 2008 [Online Web] Accessed 11 April 2015 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/289089>

<sup>47</sup> Syed Irfan Raza, "Army officers recalled from civil departments", Dawn, February 12, 2008 [Online Web] Accessed 11 April 2015 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/289089>

<sup>48</sup> Javid Hussain, "Reforms of ISI", The Nation, August 5, 2008 [Online Web] Accessed 27 March 2015 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/05-Aug-2008/reform-of-isi>

trative and operational affairs” and that, “the decision was not taken in consultation with defence authorities, which caused great concern amongst the establishment and other defence organs”.<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, during the period of democratic control, the civilian leadership and military often conflicted on issues that formally didn't fall into military's domain. The military often intervened and interfered in areas which conflicted with their institutional interest. In the year 2011, the PPP led cabinet decided in principle to grant India the Most Favoured Nation status and gave approval for the complete normalisation of the trade relationship. Keeping the military out of the negotiations, PM Yousuf Raza Gilani noted, “the MFN issue does not involve the army, and it is only the business communities and stock exchanges of Pakistan and India that are its legitimate stakeholders”. However, notwithstanding the PM'S firm stance, senior civil and military officials held meetings at the foreign ministry to assess the implications of granting MFN status to India<sup>50</sup> and attempted to put pressure on the government to slow down the process. It was in the year 2013 that Finance Minister, Ishaq Dar, cited security tensions with India, an argument pushed by the military, to hold back state's decision of granting MFN status to India stating, “there is no immediate consideration to grant India MFN status”.<sup>51</sup>

The discord between the two institutions became all the more glaring with the change in America's one dimensional policy of dealing with the Generals. With Pakistan army's half-hearted approach in dealing with the terrorist groups present in the state, the US shifted its policy from dealing with army men to showing support towards

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<sup>49</sup>Syed Irfan Raza, “Government forced to withdraw ISI decision”, Dawn, July 28, 2008 [Online Web] Accessed 28 March 2015 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/313820>

<sup>50</sup> Abdul Manan and Kamran Yousaf, “MFN Status to India: Army not part of India trade equation”, The Express Tribune, November 5, 2011 [Online Web] Accessed 20 June 2016 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/288021/mfn-status-to-india-army-not-part-of-india-trade-equation-gilani/>

<sup>51</sup> “No immediate plan to grant India MFN Status: Dar”, The Nation, August 12, 2013 [Online Web] Accessed 30 May 2016 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/12-Aug-2013/no-immediate-plan-to-grant-india-mfn-status-dar>

strengthening democracy in the country. The US introduced the Kerry Lugar Berman bill, a civilian aid programme, to "strengthen democratic institutions, build civil society, and improve economic and educational opportunities".<sup>52</sup>

The bill provided democratic, economic and development assistance to Pakistan and offered the state \$1.5 billion in non-military development aid annually. The aid also intended to assist the state of Pakistan to "support the consolidation of democratic institutions in order to strengthen civilian rule and long-term stability" and support efforts to add strength to Pakistan's institutions. This was to include the capacity of the National Parliament of Pakistan as well. It also wished to enhance the capacity of committees to oversee government activities, including national security issues" (Title II –Security Assistance for Pakistan).<sup>53</sup>

However, the bill raised serious concern in the military circle, as it marked a major shift from Washington's "one dimensional policy" of supporting authoritarian regimes in Pakistan. The Military opposed the US Kerry Lugar Berman Bill or the 'Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009' and expressed serious concerns over civilian government's approval of the bill that tripled the non-military aid to Pakistan to \$7.5 billion over the next five years. The bill came under serious criticism mainly for the conditions attached to the aid and was condemned by the army over compromising "Pakistan's national sovereignty" and "national security" For example the clause to "control military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government" (Title II -Security Assistance for Pakistan)<sup>54</sup> was perceived as a deliberate attempt by the army to curtail its role in politics.

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<sup>52</sup>Joanna, "Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State: Campaign 2008", Council on Foreign Relations, January 22, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 30 September 2014 URL: <https://www.cfr.org/background/hillary-clinton-us-secretary-state>

<sup>53</sup>"Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009" , October 15, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 16 July 2015 URL: <https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ73/PLAW-111publ73.pdf>

<sup>54</sup> "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009" , October 15, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 16 July 2015 URL: <https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ73/PLAW-111publ73.pdf>

Moreover, the aid to Pakistan was made conditional upon the certification by the US Secretary of State in regard to matters such as:

1. Pakistan takes steps to “dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials”.
2. Pakistan “demonstrates a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups on matters such as:
  2. ceasing support, by any element within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against US or coalition forces in Afghanistan or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries”.

US government also remarked that the assistance provided to Pakistan since 2001 has failed to achieve its central goal of defeating the threats of extremism and terrorism from the country. It is believed that the aid received by Pakistan was often spent on weaponry that was only useful for “conventional military engagements, including fighter aircraft, anti-ship missiles, missiles defence, radar equipment and hundreds of air to air missiles” (Sadika Hameed 2013: 8). A representative in one of the many independent assessments of the US aid program study in 2012 noted:

International, particularly US, military and civilian aid has failed to improve Pakistan’s performance against jihadi groups operating on its soil or to help stabilise its nascent democracy. Lopsided focus on security aid after the 11 September 2001 attacks has not delivered counterterrorism dividends, but entrenched the military’s control over state institutions and policy, delaying reforms and aggravating Pakistan’s public perceptions over US interest in only investing in a security client. (Epstein and Kronstadt 2013: 2-3)

Though, Wikileaks reveals that unlike his predecessor, Kayani stayed back and used the parliament and the government to condemn the bill.<sup>55</sup> For example: during the 122 Corps Commanders conference, COAS noted that, “Pakistan is a sovereign state and

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<sup>55</sup>“Kayani behind conflict on Kerry-Lugar bill: Wikileaks”, Dawn, November 30, 2010 [Online Web] Accessed 16 November 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/587404>



has all the rights to analyse and respond to the threat in accordance with her own national interests”. While expressing concerns regarding clauses of the Kerry Lugar bill impacting the national security, General Kayani stated, “it is the Parliament that represents the will of the people of Pakistan, which would deliberate on the issue, enabling the government to develop a national response”.<sup>56</sup>

However, the US embassy cables reveal that COAS, General Kayani and DG, ISI, General Pasha showcased their resentment to the US Ambassador over the negative reactions that the bill raised among the Corp commanders and young officers. Pasha further showed his discontent over the ‘conditions’ imposed on the assistance at a time when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved. The US Ambassador however clarified and claimed that the bill did not put any conditions on the assistance and only demanded a requirement of certifications and assessments. Adding further, he professed that “the bill did not affect any real money going to the security forces as the provisions did not apply to Coalition Support Funds and was only applicable to foreign Military Financing funds”.<sup>57</sup>

A major rift in the relationship between the government and the powerful generals was witnessed with the release of a secret memo in which Mansoor Ajaz, a US businessmen of Pakistan origin, alleged the PPP government of soliciting his assistance in seeking help from the US to avert a military coup in the wake of Osama Bin Laden’s death. The alleged memorandum was believed to be written by the then Pakistan Ambassador, Hussain Haqqani, to Adm. Mike Mullen, seeking his assistance in installing a ‘new security team’ in Islamabad which would be friendly to Washington<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>56</sup> “ISPR Press Release on Kerry Lugar Bill”, PK Politics, October 10, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 15 December 2016 URL: <https://pkpolitics.com/ispr-press-release-on-kerry-lugar-bill/>

<sup>57</sup> “US embassy cables: Pakistan army angry at US aid bill but helping Israel”, The Guardian, December 1, 2010 [Online Web] Accessed 15 December 2016 URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/228747>

<sup>58</sup> “ ‘Memogate’ scandal reveals civil-military splits”, Dawn, November 18, 2011 [Online Web] Accessed 23 February 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/674146>

Military declared the memo a ‘national security’ threat and added that it “unsuccessfully attempts to lower the morale of the Pakistan Army, while young officers and soldiers are laying down their lives for the security and defence of territorial integrity”.<sup>59</sup> However, while Pakistan government denied the allegations; it conceded of having “no control on army and ISI operations”.<sup>60</sup> The incident marked an all-time low relationship between the civilian government and the Establishment.

Civilian government and establishment have conflicted and clashed majorly over controlling country’s security policy. The disconnect and divergence of interest between the civilian and military leadership is clearly reflected in their policies. The clash was once again witnessed over state’s counter-terrorism policy and the support to militant groups. For example, the growing international condemnation and diplomatic isolation of Pakistan on its selective terrorism policy alarmed the PML-N government. The persistent American demand for action against the Haqqani network and the continuous pressure from the Indian diplomatic circle to carry out investigations on the Pathankot attack, propelled the civilian government to make policy adjustments. In an undisclosed meeting during the All Parties’ Conference in October 2016, later reported in the Dawn leaks, the civilian leadership sent a terse message to the Establishment forces over its long standing support to the militant groups. The meeting also sought consensus from the establishment over certain policy actions. The civilian leadership declared its decision and suggested “the military led intelligence agencies to not interfere in case of an action by the law enforcement agencies against the militant groups that are either banned or are considered off limits for civilian action until now”.<sup>61</sup> The

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<sup>59</sup> Simon Denyer, “Pakistani scandal pits military against civilians”, The Washington Post, December 16, 2011 [Online Web] Accessed 10 October 2017 URL: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/pakistans-memo-scandal-pits-military-against-zardari-government/2011/12/16/gIQAQdDdFyO\\_story.html?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.8cef77d3011d](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistans-memo-scandal-pits-military-against-zardari-government/2011/12/16/gIQAQdDdFyO_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8cef77d3011d)

<sup>60</sup> “Pakistan government concedes in Supreme Court it has no control over army, ISI”, India Today, December 22, 2011 [Online Web] Accessed 19 October 2017 URL: <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/pakistan/story/pakistan-government-control-over-isi-army-149581-2011-12-22>

<sup>61</sup> Almeida, Cyril, “Exclusive: Act against militants or face international isolation, civilians tell military”, Dawn, 6 October 2016 [Online Web] Accessed 7 October 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1288350>

meeting further proposed PM Nawaz Sharif's intentions of making fresh attempts to conclude the Pathankot investigation and restart the stalled Mumbai attacks-related trials in a Rawalpindi antiterrorism court. However, according to the leaked Dawn report, the meeting sparked a conflict between ISI DG, General Akhtar, and Punjab CM, Shahbaz Sharif; in which Sharif criticised the military for protecting certain armed groups operating in Pakistan. The conflictual relationship between the two institutions was reflected with Sharif's assertions that, "whenever action has been taken against certain groups by civilian authorities, the security establishment has worked behind the scenes to set the arrested free".<sup>62</sup>

Despite the democratic shift in Pakistan and the changing contours of power equations, the army continues to be the most powerful state institution and assumes a significant position in the country over other domestic players. Even during the transitional phase of democracy, the government lacked control over state institutions and performed poorly. It failed to deliver on economy, governance, law and order and socio-political development of the state. The poor institutional capacity of the civilian government to lead from the front and the corrupt practices of the government has led to a social disconnect between the power elites in Pakistan and the general public, paving way for the military to rule the country.

### ***Politics of Institutional Dominance: National Security Council of Pakistan***

The question of who speaks security greatly depends on who controls and dominates the formal structures and institution of security policy making in the country. This issue has been a central cause of major power struggle between the civilian government and the military of Pakistan.

In Pakistan, the military has always tried inducting itself formally into the policy making structures of the state. For example, the proposal for the setting up of National

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<sup>62</sup> Almeida, Cyril, "Exclusive: Act against militants or face international isolation, civilians tell military", Dawn, 6 October 2016 [Online Web] Accessed 7 October 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1288350>

Security Council in Pakistan was initiated by the military officials in order to arrogate itself the top constitutional seat in the decision-making process of governance.

As Hasan Askari Rizvi notes:

In the states with a long tradition of military's assumption of political power, the NSC becomes a legal and constitutional cover for their expanded role in policy making and implementation after they are no longer directly exercising political power. It helps the military and the military dominated intelligence to protect their expanded role and continue influencing security affairs. (PILDAT 2012: 9)

National Security Council of Pakistan was first established under the military government of Yahya Khan (March 1969-December 1971). However, it was only under General Musharraf's rule that the bill for the establishment of NSC was passed in the National Assembly of Pakistan. General Musharraf proposed the formation of the NSC to establish a system of checks and balances which he argued would help restore democracy back in the state. He therefore suggested the council to comprise of President, PM, Speaker of National Assembly, all the CM of four provinces, leaders of opposition in Parliament, senate chairman, Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, and Airforce Chief.

Fearing an empowered role of the military in state institutions, the civilian opposition parties such as PPP, PML-N and MMA launched protests and walk outs and opposed the enactment of the NSC bill. Despite the protests, the bill was passed by PML-Q with the support of its allies.<sup>63</sup> As a result, the NSC was established through an act of the Parliament. The parties in favour of the institution argued that the institution will promote better coordination and consultation between the military and the civilian authorities and its non-binding nature will help keep the supremacy of the Parliament intact. However, with the growing opposition of few parties, NSC did not prove to be of much success.

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<sup>63</sup>"National Security Council in Pakistan, For or Against", Pak Tribune, April 6, 2004 [Online Web] Accessed 15 April 2017 URL: <http://paktribune.com/speakouts/National-Security-Council-in-Pakistan-For-or-Against-+-45.html>

In order to mark its opposition over the establishment of NSC, the civilian parties such as PPP and PML-N, signed a document of political action, called the Charter of Democracy in May 2006. The Charter condemned “military’s subordination of all state institutions” and alleged the institution to have “played havoc with nation’s destiny and created conditions for disallowing the progress of our people and the flowering of democracy”.<sup>64</sup> The document not only proposed the dismantling of the NSC, but stressed on the establishment of the “Defence Committee of the Cabinet”. This Committee was to be at the centre of all policy making related to defence and security. It was to be run by a permanent Secretariat, headed by the PM, and the Committee was expected to revive the “efficacy of the higher defence and security structure” and reaffirm the commitment towards undiluted democracy.

Apart from the PM, the DCC was suggested to include the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Commerce. On the other hand, the Air Force, the Army and the Navy Chiefs, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Chairman were not made permanent members. Also left out from the permanent position were the secretaries of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance ministries. They were all instead invited to attend to the meetings on a regular basis. PPP government therefore after assuming power in 2008 virtually abandoned the NSC. Since then no meeting of the NSC has been called.

DCC was reconstituted as ‘Cabinet Committee on National Security’ under PM, Nawaz Sharif, in the year 2013. The CCNS was declared to be chaired by the PM and included PM’s adviser on Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence, Interior and Finance, the Chairman JCSC and Chiefs of Staff of Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force. PM, Sharif also provided membership to key cabinet members in the CCNS who were although invited in the meetings of the NSC, but were never made formal members.<sup>65</sup> The Committee was set up with an objective to “focus on the national security agenda

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<sup>64</sup> “Text of the Charter of Democracy”, Dawn, May 16, 2006 [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2017 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/192460>

<sup>65</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The NSC bounces back”, The Express Tribune, August 25, 2013 [Online Web] Accessed 12 April 2016 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/595034/the-nsc-bounces-back/>

with the aim to formulate a national security policy that will become the guiding framework for its subsidiary policies-defence, foreign, internal security, and other policies affecting national security”.<sup>66</sup>

Political commentator, Hasan Askari Rizvi, however argued that the CCNS was more of a reincarnation of the controversial NSC established by the Musharraf government in 2004 than a reconstitution of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. He noted that CCNS turned all the ‘invitees’ of DCC as ‘official members’. Like the NSC, CCNS too gave the military’s top brass a status equal to the civilian members. The argument was further supported by a key strategic thinker in Pakistan, Amir Rana, who noted that the military establishment continues to dominate the policy inputs of the meetings held at the CCNS.<sup>67</sup>

Thus, by simply adding the term ‘Cabinet’, Sharif attempted to showcase CCNS more of as a democratic institution than the NSC. Though, considering the oddity over the inclusion of Service Chiefs under the banner of members of a ‘cabinet’ committee, the nomenclature of CCNS was changed to ‘National Security Committee, as notified in April 2014.

However, despite the civilian control over the institutions of policy making, the political governments lack real powers. The militarisation of security affairs in Pakistan compels the governments in Pakistan to share their power, resources and even responsibilities with military led institutions. Thus, given the political structure and system of Pakistan, the Military broadly controls and dominates the security apparatus of the state, with limited and little civilian involvement.

### **3. Conclusion**

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<sup>66</sup> “DCC Reconstituted as Cabinet Committee on National Security”, Geo News, August 22, 2013 [Online Web] Accessed 10 April 2016 URL: <https://www.geo.tv/latest/63027-dcc-reconstituted-as-cabinet-committee-on-national-security>

<sup>67</sup> Rana, Muhammad Amir, “Review of Security Doctrine”, Dawn, 14 January 2018, [Online Web] Accessed 14 January 2018 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1382841>

Pakistan today is in a crisis situation. Confronted by the extremist radical forces in the country, increasing secessionist movements, growing hostility with its eastern neighbour and crumbling faith in state institutions; the state is trapped in a “quagmire of weak governance” (Lodhi 2011: 45). The ethnic and religious sub divisions and the presence of a deep state has “undermined the coherence and integrity of the nascent Pakistani nationalism and the establishment of good governance subsequently” (Mur-taza 2012: 327). The state-nation imbalance and the crisis in governance has made Pakistan structurally weak and prone to internal dissent and challenges. The following chapter will deliberate on the two most challenging internal security threats of violent extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. It argues that the roots of the pressing challenges of extremism and terrorism lies in the ideational basis of the Pakistani state as well as in its state policies.

## Chapter 3

### Challenging the State: Threats to Internal Security

#### 1. Introduction

In its first ever National Internal Security Policy (2014), the Pakistani state identified internal security environment as a major security concern to Pakistan. The document identified four non-traditional security threats of violent extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy as having challenged the writ of the state and posing a security threat to the nation. The growing intolerance in the Pakistani society towards the minorities or the non-followers of the puritanical strand of Islam, propagated by the militants, has made Pakistan an international poster child for the extremist cause. Whereas, the inability of the state elites to counter these threats effectively has turned the country into a hotbed of terrorist and extremist violence.

Out of the four threats mentioned above, the study focusses on the two most critical threats - terrorism and extremism, and attempts at locating the historical reasons that have allowed these threats to thrive in the country. The first section of the chapter demonstrates how the state itself was responsible for sowing the seeds of terrorism in society through its doctrine of militant Jihad. It further looks in detail the militant situation in the country in the post-9/11 period by deliberating on the militant forces or groups which have turned against the Pakistani state, thereby bringing them under the state's security discourse.

#### 2. Roots of Extremist and Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: A Historical Perspective

Roots of extremist and terrorist violence in Pakistan can be found in the country's state policies. Extremist and terrorist violence in Pakistan is mostly carried out in the name of Islam. The growth of Islamist militants in Pakistan can be attributed to the "lack of a congealed national identity of the state because of the fractured ethnic and



religious nature of the Pakistani society and the security dilemmas that immediately developed with India after partition” (Kaltenthaler 2010: 817). The state of Pakistan, since the time of its inception, defined its security policy around the fighting of a perceived existential threat from the Indian State. In order to form a cohesive national identity and find parity with the Indian state, Pakistan resorted to the use of religion for meeting its political ends. The state therefore from the very beginning used Islamic militants as an instrument of state policy for meeting their foreign and security objectives vis-a-vis its immediate neighbour, India. It also took recourse to religion to find easy solutions to difficult political problems.

As a result, since its very inception, extremism in Pakistan was associated with periodic sectarian violence and the limited use of irregular forces to counter-balance India’s conventional military superiority. However, it wasn’t until the early 1980s that the incidents of extremism and militancy increased dramatically. The events, such as “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, both in 1979, coupled with opportunistic domestic politics in Pakistan, helped create a geo-political environment that gave birth to violent upheavals in the political landscape of Pakistan” (Saeed et al 2014: 209).

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave rise to a militant form of Islam in Pakistan. Acting as a frontline state to the US, Pakistan helped build an expansive mujahideen infrastructure in the country to battle the occupying Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Both the US and Pakistan saw this development as an effective means to defeat the Soviets Red Army. Pakistan, in order to draw financial gains from the US, raised an army of religious men trained in the doctrine of jihad. One of the core principles of Islamic faith and ethics, but at the same time most misused and misunderstood term, Jihad is defined as ‘striving for a worthy and ennobling cause’ (Jalal 2008: 3). However, the term is mostly exploited and defined as an ideological and guerrilla warfare against the non-Muslims or a ‘holy war’ against non-believers of Islam (Stern 2000: 119).

Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq, therefore promoted religiously inspired education and laws in the country and mushroomed many new madrasas or religious seminaries in the country that were funded and supported by Saudi Arabia and the US CIA. Considered as a strategy to mobilise mujahideen forces to fight in Afghanistan, madrasas were used as supply lines for jihad, “where students were encouraged to join the Afghan resistance and support a ‘holy war’ against the Soviets” (Zaidi 2013: 12). For example, during the first few years of General Zia’s rule (1979–82), “151 new madrasas were opened. However, the number increased to 1,000 in the span of next five years” (Ashraf 2009: 25).

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the main task of engineering jihad was given to the Pakistani army, especially its intelligence wing—the Inter-Services Intelligence—along with the Islamic groups. The Pakistani army thus began portraying itself as an “army of Islam”. This gave the army an opportunity to absorb Islamic revolutionaries, some of whom had even held tenure as the head of Pakistan’s ISI. Jamaat-i-Islami, a religious political party from Pakistan, on the other hand, played an important role in sowing the ideological seeds for the radicalisation of youth during the Afghan jihad. Areas bordering Afghanistan, such as the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan became ideal grounds for recruitments for jihad. In order to train new recruits, many of whom were underage pupils, religious political parties leveraged their madrasas, and turned them into military training centers. Sunni and Wahabi military officers, who were required to carry out the trainings, served the same fate to Afghan refugee camps. Thus, as the ISI became used to the influx of American and Saudi money, the maulvis became addicted to the business of jihad.

Moreover, the involvement of the deeply-Islamic Saudi Arabia in sponsoring the war increased Wahhabi influence and together with the state’s Islamisation program it spearheaded a culture of extremism and bigotry in the country. The increased Wahhabi-Deobandi influence not only created intolerance for the outside powers but also against people who did not subscribe to their puritanical brand of Islam. This practice led to the growth of many sectarian organisations, which exacerbated sectarian strife in the state.

Against this backdrop, it is worthwhile to see how the doctrine of Jihad took shape in Pakistan, even after the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and how it was ultimately disseminated to curious minds through an elaborate network of madrasas and other educational institutions.

### **3. Extremist and Terrorist Violence in Pakistan in the Name of Jihad**

Extremism and terrorism in Pakistan are justified on the principle of jihad. The narrative of jihad has been employed most commonly by the Islamist militants who use it to justify violent political actions. Though, the jihadi culture in Pakistan spread during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a new debate on the tenets of jihad and its link to terrorism commenced in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

The term jihad remains highly contested and evokes different orthogonal meanings. On one extreme, “the notion of jihad is considered as a peaceful personal struggle and on the other, it is interpreted as a militarised or violent struggle against the non-believers”. In a research conducted with the aim of understanding the notion of jihad amongst Pakistanis, many (44.6 percent) indicated that “jihad is both a personal struggle for righteousness as well as protecting the Muslim Ummah through war” (Fair et.al 2010: 498). However, leveraging the elusive understanding of the Islamic nature of the Pakistani state, radical groups have exploited various religious principles to mobilise people around fighting the infidels or non-believers of Islam. While engaging in and waging what they call ‘defensive’ struggle against the non-Muslims and infidels, all radical Islamic groups agreed on the principle of jihad as an obligation of every true Muslim believer.

The idea of militarised jihad established its firm roots in the Pakistani society in the broader context of the global war on terrorism. The US policies in the Af-Pakistan region, the collateral damage in the form of human and infrastructural loss, and an embittered experience with the US in the past, provided an opportunity and a context to the radical groups to exploit their discourse around jihad. Not only the American policies but the post-9/11 period also provided many organisations and councils an opportunity and space to propagate their ideology and capture political power by ex-

ploiting the religious factor amongst the already disgruntled Muslim population in Pakistan.

For example, “The Dife-e-Pakistan Council (DPC), comprising mainly banned militant outfits and certain religious groups”, was formed in order to wage jihad to oust the US from the region, break US-Pakistan ties, back Taliban militants, force the government not to give the most favoured nation status to India and stop the NATO supplies passing through Pakistan.<sup>68</sup> With the agenda of enforcing its conservative perception of Islamic ideology in Pakistan, the DPC carried out rallies in order to suppress the anti-Islamic, secular and liberal elements from the Pakistani society. At the same time, the terror group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan opposed the presence of the Awami National Party (ANP), a secular political entity. Presenting itself as a harbinger of Islam, and committed towards establishing Islamic Sharia law, the TTP attacked the political party for establishing a secular system. Presenting its conflict with the party as a battle between secularism and Islam, Hakimullah Mehsud, the former head of TTP, stated in his message, “It is my order to the Mujahedeens that once again elections are near to form a secular, democratic system in the country. The ANP followers are the members of the satan’s shura. Whenever you find members of the ANP, target them.” He further stated that the secular political parties have been supportive of the invaders and worship the US who have imprisoned Muslim Ulemas, women and have destroyed madrasas.<sup>69</sup> Many political leaders and workers, therefore, have become a major victim of terrorist violence. There were 56 and 41 terrorist attacks in the year 2014 and 2015 respectively against political leaders and workers in the country (PIPS 2015: 31). Leaders and “workers of Awami National Party faced the highest number of terrorist attacks (8) in 2015 compared to other parties”.

### ***3.1 Madrasas: Engineering the Spread of Extremism***

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<sup>68</sup> “The Difa-e-Pakistan Council”, The Express Tribune, 19<sup>th</sup> February 2012, [Online: Web] Accessed 6<sup>th</sup> March 2014 URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/338735/the-difa-e-pakistan-council/>.

<sup>69</sup> “Battle lines drawn between Pakistan Taliban and Awami National Party”, Rediff.com, 24<sup>th</sup> December 2012, [Online: Web] Accessed 30<sup>th</sup> January 2014 URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/report/battle-lines-drawn-between-pak-taliban-and-awami-national-party/20121224.htm>.

In Pakistan extremism and the indoctrination of jihad is believed to be engineered mainly through the madrasa education system. Madrasas “trace their traditions back through nearly a thousand years of Islamic teaching. Founded as centres of learning for the next generation of Islamic scholars and clerics, they now seem to have deviated from their original cause as they have built extremely close ties with radical militant groups and play a critical role in breeding extremism and sustaining the international terrorist network” (Singer 2001: 1).

Madrasas, looked at as a source of extremism, were used as ‘supply lines for jihad’ in the Soviet war. For example, “in an attempt to gain support from religious groups, the Zia regime began administering a formalised zakat (Islamic religious tax) process where money was automatically deducted from bank balances and dispersed at the local level to institutions, thus creating new incentives for opening religious schools” (Singer 2001: 1). Moreover, funded by the US-CIA and Saudi Arabia, Madrasas became a recruiting ground for the mujahideen forces. “The emphasis in Madrasa curriculum was subsequently shifted almost entirely from the standard pillars of faith, such as prayer, charity and pilgrimage to the obligation and rewards of jihad”<sup>70</sup>. The curriculum started emphasising the need for Islamic warriors of jihad “to liberate regions dominated by non-believers, as well as purify Islamic nations in order to establish a single Islamic caliphate where pure Islam would be followed” (Mir 2009: 195).

However, the Madrasas of the country have been at the heart of debates on radicalisation of society and extremism since Pakistan became part of “the US-led war on terror post 9/11”. They are often perceived as an effective medium for inculcating extreme religious views which leads to intolerance and bigotry. In 2004, the 9/11 commission released a report stating that “some of Pakistan’s religious schools or madrasas served as incubators for violent extremism in the world” (9/11 Report 2004: 367).

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<sup>70</sup> Kaushik Kapisthalam, Learning from Pakistan's madrassas, Asia Times Online, 23 June 2004, [online-web] Accessed 25 June 2015, URL: [https://www.asiatimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/FF23Df05.html](https://www.asiatimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FF23Df05.html)

Madrasas are often “tied to Islamist political parties, militant groups, or both, and their scholars have strong reasons to push a vision of jihad that is consistent with individual violent action. They utilise exegetical tools to undermine those verses in the Quran that emphasise jihad as an inner struggle and focus instead upon the verses that describe a militarised jihad” (Fair et al 2012: 695). Control of madrasas by the religious leaders and militant groups enable them to influence and shape the opinion of madrasa students. For example, MMA, which came to power in 2002 in two western provinces bordering Afghanistan, based its political campaign “on three demands: Support for jihad in all Muslim states, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir, expulsion of all US forces from Muslim lands, and the implementation of sharia in Pakistan” (Shah 2007: 92).

Pakistan political analyst, Amir Rana, notes that madrasas have played an important role in providing manpower to jihadi organisations. However, he draws a distinction between jihadi training and military training. While reflecting on the claims made by religious madrasas denying any provision for jihadi training on their premises, Rana stated, “If one takes jihadi training to mean military training, then it is true that 99 percent madrasas do not have this facility” (Rana 2004: 511). However, he claimed that jihad alone cannot explain the reason behind students of madrasas joining religious organisations. He adjoined earning an easy living or finding opportunities for job in Afghanistan as other reasons which make students associate themselves with the jihadi organisations. Jihadi organisations on the other hand have made full use of madrasas affiliated with them. For example, Jamia Binoria, the largest Deobandi madrasa in Pakistan is the backbone of jihadi organisations. Most of the top leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mullah Omar and members of Jaish-e-Muhammad, were products of it (Rana 2004: 512-513).

Though, madrasas have alleged links to extremist organisations, they are not the only place of recruitment of the jihadis. Indian security analyst, Sushant Sareen argues that even though madrasas “have played an important role in inculcating the jihadi fervour among students; the real nurseries of jihad have been the Pakistani state schools” (Sareen 2005:23). Quoting and inferring from the report released by the Sustainable Poli-

cy Institute in 2003, Sareen points out the role played by the Pakistani state in blatantly proposing a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hatred, violence and prejudice towards non-Muslims. The SDPI report pointed out “some of the most significant problems in the current curriculum and textbooks of the state-run schools, such as insensitivity to the actually existing religious diversity of the nation, incitement to militancy and violence, encouragement of jihad and Shahadat, perspectives that encourage prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards fellow citizens, especially women and religious minorities, and a glorification of war and the use of force” (Sareen 2005: 25). The report also exposes the literature used to indoctrinate students to hate Hindus and India and wage jihad against them. The curriculum documents a specific learning objective such as: “The child should be able to understand the Hindu and Muslim differences and the resultant need for Pakistan” and “Hindu-Muslim differences in culture and India’s evil designs against Pakistan” (Sareen 2005: 26). The textbooks (post 1979) eulogised “jihad” and “Shahadat” and encouraged students to become Mujahideens and martyrs.

Dr Rubina Saigol, an independent researcher based out of Pakistan, too points out the inefficiencies in Pakistan’s mainstream education system that deter any attempt at countering militants’ ideological onslaught. She argues that Pakistan’s education systems’ entire social knowledge-base is organised around state’s official narrative of the two-nation theory, which therefore promotes a religious national narrative in the school textbooks (PIPS 2014:7).

On the other hand, the syllabus taught in Al-Dawa schools is much different from those in other educational institutions and is based on Islamic belief and teachings. As Professor Zafar Iqbal noted, “For this purpose we have written an elementary reader replacing the secular perspective of the earlier reader. In the “earlier reader we had ‘Alif’ for Anar (pomegranate) and ‘Be’ for Bakri (goat) and so on. This has been replaced by the concept of ‘Alif’ for Allah and ‘be’ for Bandoq, ‘Te’ for toop (cannon) and so on”, Head of the Education Department of the Jammat-ud-dawa (Sareen 2005: 241).

Moreover, the indigenisation of Salafi thought originating from Saudi Arabia is equally evident in the narrative on jihad, disseminated by the JuD. Most apparent is the publication of *Al-jihad-al Islami: Jihad ke Ahkam wa Masa'il ka Encyclopaedia* in March 2004. The book assumes primacy as it explores the religious justification of jihad and finds a forward written by JuD leader, Hafiz Saeed. Saeed, who not only justified the need for such an encyclopaedia but clarified, “it was felt that information be presented to the audience to ensure that the commitment to jihad be based on information and not just emotions” (Yasmeen 2017: 85-87).

However, many believe that the poor condition of the government run schools, poverty and socio-economic status of madrasa students also makes madrasas an attractive proposition. The madrasas “became immensely popular amongst the lower class and refugee populations to whom the Pakistani state failed to provide proper access to education. One of the most popular and influential madrasa, Dur-ul-Uloom Haqqani (it includes most of the Afghan Taliban leadership among its alumni), illustrates that each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie for its 400 open spaces” (Singer 2001).<sup>71</sup> A survey by the “Institute of Policy Studies showed that 64% of the madrasa students come from rural areas and belong to poor agrarian families” (IPS 2002: 41). Thus, the inability of the parents to feed their children and afford education in government schools also dictate the rise in the number of students opting to study in madrasas.

However, Madrasas solely “cannot be blamed for the rise of extremism”. Though, some of the schools breed intolerance and give rise to fundamentalism, most of “the young Islamist militants are trained in secular institutions”. While pointing out the names of the militants involved in the 9/11 attacks, Oliver Roy points, “None (except for the Saudis) were educated in Muslim religious school. Most of them studied technology, computing or town planning” (Roy 2004: 310). Roy therefore believes that economic disparity or illiteracy alone cannot be held responsible or explain the rise of

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<sup>71</sup> Peter W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad”, Brookings , November 1, 2001 [Online Web] Accessed 10 June 2015 URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/pakistans-madrassahs-ensuring-a-system-of-education-not-jihad/>



extremism in the society. He rather suggests that the “de-territorialized Muslims in Western countries overwhelmed by the dominant Western culture around them, fall back upon their Islamic identity. Not guided by traditional texts or the Ulama, they find their own meanings from the fundamental texts of the faith and use the idiom of Islam to lash out in fury against Western targets, Western culture, and the elites in Muslim countries which support Western policies” (Rahman 2008: 78).

Many have argued that there isn't any direct link between the madrasa education system and the growing militancy, yet they often play a supporting role; either at indoctrinating jihad or as a recruiting ground for militant movements. Some “schools are affiliated with extremist religious/ political groups, who have co-opted education for their own ends and teach a distorted view of Islam and Jihadi values” (Singer 2001). Khalid Ahmed “claims that the madrasas create a rejectionist mind, one which rejects modernity and discourses from outside the madrasa” (Ahmed 2006: 45-67).

Others however believe that “the vast majority of Pakistan's estimated 20,000 or so Islamic seminaries are benign. Several hundred, however, teach extreme forms of Islam that experts say provide a training ground for military and jihad or holy war”.<sup>72</sup> Seeing madrasas as a symptom and not the cause for the rise of extremism, an expert on Pakistan state, Christine Fair, maintains “that the madrasa reputation is being tarnished by the unorthodox religiosity of a minority that finds roots in political rather than religious grounds” (Fair 2007).

However, there is no deniability to the fact that Pakistani religious seminaries are being used as breeding grounds for terrorists and suicide bombers. “Operation Silence” launched by the Pakistani army “against the fanatic clerics of the Lal Masjid in the heart of Islamabad” reinforces the notion. Moreover on 14th, July 2009, a massive explosion in a South Punjab village 129/15-L in the Mian Channu town of Punjab left 12 people, including 7 children, dead. The blast was actually caused by “a huge quantity of ammunition stored in a seminary that blew up, spewing death and destruction.

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<sup>72</sup> Mark Magnier, “Pakistan religious schools get scrutiny”, Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 10 October 2015 URL: <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/30/world/fg-madrasa30>

The man who used to run the religious seminary, Riaz Kamboh, was known to have militant links and the recovery of propaganda literature and suicide jackets from the debris provided further evidence of madrasas being used as a cover for organising a terrorist cell which brainwashed and trained young people to become terrorists and suicide bombers” (Mir 2009: 188).

Therefore, rise of extremist violence is a result of various causal links. It can be attributed to various factors, such as the rise of economic disparity, poverty and illiteracy amongst the youth, the exploitation of religious narratives for political gains, playing out the victimisation narrative over historic oppression of a community or governance lapse. Thus, due to the multifaceted nature of the problem, states must adopt a holistic and all comprehensive approach to tackle the problem of violent extremism. The state must look up and address the socio, economic and political grievances or counter the ideological or rhetorical narratives that the jihadists exploit. An extensive detail of the mechanisms and ways to counter violent extremism will be dealt in the fifth chapter.

#### **4. Coming of Age: How Pakistan Solidified the Madrasas-trained Jihadis into Violent Militant Groups**

The immediate withdrawal of the US “following their victory over the Soviets left behind a broken Afghanistan, a restive jihad and an embittered Pakistan” (Hussain 2009: 10). The development of an expansive religiously indoctrinated mujahideen infrastructure was however not dismantled upon Soviet Union’s departure from Afghanistan. The religiously trained veterans of the Afghan war were instead appropriated by Pakistan to produce jihadist mercenaries who could be sent to prosecute Islamabad’s own foreign policy objectives in Indian-held Kashmir and Afghanistan (Fair and Peter 2004: 41). Many Kashmir separatist militant groups, who were committed to waging jihad against the Indian state, were formed during this period.

The growing political void and insecurity in the state also gave rise to what is referred to as ‘Talibs’, a group of youngsters with rudimentary Islamic credentials and seekers of knowledge. Cashing in on their ethnic identity, the Taliban artfully co-opted “vari-

ous Pashtun tribes in the south and east of Afghanistan, thereby creating a sense of an artificial unity among Pashtuns” (Abbas 2014: 63). As a result, Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in 1994, and by 1996 it took control of most of Afghanistan.

Hoping for a Pashtun dominated regime in Afghanistan, which espoused an Islamist rather than a nationalist agenda, Pakistan considered Taliban to be a potential alliance partner to Islamabad. It hoped that Taliban-led Afghanistan would provide ‘strategic depth’ in case of the state’s confrontation with its arch-rival, India. The high ranks of the Taliban leadership had a strong Pakistani connection as most of them “had received their education in Pakistani madrasas and retained their links with the fellow Pashtun leaders and Mujahideen”. According to a declassified US confidential document dated 16 January 1997, Pakistan’s intelligence operators helped Taliban build alliances that were vital for its survival and initial growth and provided both military and financial assistance. It “instructed provincial governments of Balochistan and North West Frontier Province to not allow any political activities of Afghans which were against Taliban”<sup>73</sup>.

The documents further exposes the tactic acquiescence of the Pakistani government around the movement and participation of large numbers of Pakistani nationals into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban (Document 34, National Security Archive).<sup>74</sup> For instance, in a rebuttal to Pakistan ISI’s quoted claim of providing a minimal aid of only 20 million rupees (approximately one-half million dollars) to the Taliban through the end of 1996, the then US Ambassador to Pakistan, Thomas Simons, in a cable dated 27 August 1997, noted that, the amount quoted “did not include access to Pakistan wheat and POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants), or the trucks and buses full of adolescent mujahideen crossing the frontier shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ and going into the

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<sup>73</sup> “Pakistan: “The Taliban’s Godfather”?”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.227, August 14, 2007, [Online Web] Accessed 30 September 2015 URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm>

<sup>74</sup>U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Pakistan Support for Taliban,”, NSA Archive, September 26, 2000, Released on 14 August, 2007 [Online Web] Accessed 28th July 2017 URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/34.pdf>

line with a day or two of weapons training”.<sup>75</sup> The documents further divulge the role of Pashtun based Frontier Corps from NWFP and Baluchistan in their involvement in the training programs in Afghanistan. Frontier corps due to their ethnic composition blended well with the Afghan Pashtun population and were utilised for command and control, training and, when necessary, combat. These men were preferred by the Pakistani state over the army, who were primarily Punjabis (National Security Archive, Document 17 ).<sup>76</sup>

Taliban, in a drive to establish a pure Islamic rule in Afghanistan, soon allied itself with Osama Bin Laden, one of the most fervent sponsors of Afghan jihad and the founder of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda thereby joined forces with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and provided support to it with its Arab fighters. The growing closeness between the two enabled Al-Qaeda to run training camps in Afghanistan. With Taliban having consolidated its position in most of the areas in Afghanistan, many “militant groups operating in Kashmir, sunni sectarian groups operating in Pakistan and other rebel groups from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya and Arab countries poured into Afghanistan to receive training in the Al-Qaeda run training camps and joined them in their war of consolidation” ( Hussain 2007: 15–17).

The Afghan war therefore tightened the grip of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in Pakistan. In the process of Islamising the state and adopting the policy of proxy war to meet its strategic ends, Pakistan played host to numerous militant groups during the 1990s. Many sectarian and Kashmir separatist groups that emerged, enjoyed relative impunity and immunity from the state apparatus. The growth of these organisations coincided with the unrest and insurgency in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir which helped Pakistan seek support on its anti-India narrative and its policy

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<sup>75</sup> “U.S.Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan:[Excised] Briefs Ambassador on his Activities. Pleads for Greater Activism by U.N”, National Security Archives, March 19, 2004 [Online Web] Accessed 30th June 2016, URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/talib4.pdf>

<sup>76</sup> “From [Excised] to DIA Washington D.C.,” IIR [Excised] Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan,” National Security Archive, November 7, 1996, Released on August 14, 2007 [Online Web] Accessed 2 July, 2016 URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/17.pdf>

of proxy warfare. Exploiting the situation, Pakistan infiltrated its irregular forces into Kashmir to fight the Indian state along with the indigenous separatist groups.

Centred on fighting the Kashmir jihad, these groups were supported and funded by the Pakistani state, especially its army wing. One of the unclassified documents, released by US, uncovered Pakistan's involvement in directly funding the Kashmiri militant group, Harakat-ul-Ansar (HuA), to support its proxy war against the Indian forces. According to US sources, "Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate provided at least \$30,000 and possibly as much as \$60,000 per month to the HuA" (Document 10, National Security Archive).<sup>77</sup> Funded by the Pakistani government, HuA not only shared terrorist training camps in Taliban controlled Afghanistan but also shared close ideological convergence to Al-Qaeda. For example, HuA leader, "Fazlur Rahman Khalil, signed Osama Bin Laden's fatwa promoting terrorist activities against US interests" (National Security Archive, Document 26).<sup>78</sup>

There have been many other evidences too about Pakistan's direct or covert involvement and support in sponsoring terrorism in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. For example, a letter from the US Secretary of State, James Baker, in 1992, raised concerns about Pakistan's assistance to militants and threatened to declare it as a state sponsor of terrorism. It was in response to this letter that the then ISI Director-General, Lieutenant General Javed Nasir, admitted that Jihad in Kashmir was at a critical stage and could not be disrupted. He stated, "We have been covering our tracks so far and will cover them even better in the future" and further added that the United States could not declare Pakistan a terrorist state because of "our strategic importance" (Haqqani 2013: 273). However, as Ambassador Haqqani notes, the final call came from the Pakistan Army Chief, General Asif Nawaz, who held "that it was

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<sup>77</sup>Central Intelligence Agency, "Harakat-ul-Ansar: Increasing Threat to Western and Pakistani Interests", August 1996, National Security Archive, Released on August 14, 2007 [Online Web] Accessed 5 December, 2016 URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/10.pdf>

<sup>78</sup> "U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: [Excised] Describes Pakistan's Current Thinking" National Security Archive, March 9, 1998, Released on August 14, 2007, [Online Web] Accessed 4 October 2016 URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/talib6.pdf>

not in Pakistan's interest to get into a confrontation with the US, but neither will the state be able to shut down its military operations against India. He instead proposed to make changes in its pattern of support for Kashmiri militancy without shutting down the entire clandestine operation" (Haqqani 2013:275).

The post-Zia period did not bring about much change in the strategic paradigm of the Pakistan army. Many of Pakistan's strategic designs made way in the writings by army men. The 1991 Pakistan Army Green Book projected signs of the continuation of Pakistan's grand design of sponsoring jihadist networks. Commodore Tariq Majid wrote, "The Islamic state, apart from the standing forces, keeps a volunteer force of the people and employs the other lot of able-bodied manpower to strengthen the other elements of the military system during wartime."<sup>79</sup> The state described and presented the "volunteer force of people" as "freedom fighters", fighting a just war to liberate Kashmir from the illegal annexation by the Indian state.

The institution of army dominated the course of security policy making, in which Kashmir remained as the most dominant issue on the security agenda. For example, Despite PM Nawaz Sharif's efforts to build cooperative relationship with the Indian state in the late 1990s, the-then Pakistan's "Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, infiltrated regular forces and militants into the Kargil and Dras sectors of the state of Jammu and Kashmir without taking the country's political leadership in confidence" (9/11 Commission Report). Pervez Musharraf however denied the charges and argued in his memoir, the *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (2006) that the activities reported by the Indian State along the LOC were carried out by the mujahideens (freedom fighters). Denying Pakistan army's direct role in the attack, he alleged the Indian state of using the unprecedented reporting of attacks "as a casus belli to launch an operation against Pakistan" (Musharraf 2006: 88; International Crisis Group 2002: 1-2).

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<sup>79</sup> Swami, Praveen, "God's Soldiers: Pakistan army's ideology", Ministry of External Affairs, October 7, 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 9 February 2017, URL: <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/13152/Gods+soldiers+Pakistan+armys+ideology>

The aforementioned are only some of the strongest evidences of the fact that Pakistan put all its weight behind the violent extremist and terrorist groups originating from its soil, while denying its direct involvement in the process all along. By creating a fertile ecosystem for the indoctrination of extremist views, the state opened up a Pandora's box of violent warriors with extremely dangerous ideas - a combination that can seldom be controlled. It was only a matter of time before some of those elements turned against the state itself, and for reasons discussed in detailed in Chapter four, that is exactly what happened post 9/11. With this latest breed of militant groups, the plethora of extremist militant organisations now could be broadly categorised into three as follows:

- “Groups that have traditionally focused on Kashmir. This category includes Deobandi organizations, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM); Ahle Hadith organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and those groups under the influence of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), such as Al Badr and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)” .
- “Groups that have traditionally been sectarian in nature. These include the anti-shi’a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. Both are under the sway of the Deobandi organisation Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI)”.
- “Anti-state militant groups. Most prominent among these are the TTP, Al-Qaeda and Punjabi Taliban which perpetrate violence against the state in pursuit of their political objectives” (Fair 2009: 85).

<b>Terrorist Groups in Pakistan</b>			
S no	Organization Name	Primary Agenda	Area of Operation
1	Al Qaeda	Establishment of a global Caliphate	Multinational operations in more than 60 countries
2	Taliban	Enforce a “divinely ordered” Islamic system in Afghanistan	Afghanistan, against the US

Terrorist Groups in Pakistan			
3	Haqqani Network	Drive the US led coalition out of Afghanistan and help re-establish Taliban rule	Southeastern Afghanistan and the northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
4	Hizb-ul Mujahideen	Waging Jihad in Kashmir	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
5	Lashkar-e-Toiba	Waging Jihad in Kashmir	Kashmir and the rest of India
6	Jaish-e-Mohammad	Waging Jihad against the Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir	Kashmir and the rest of India
7	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Anit Shia and establishment of a Sunni Islamic State	Pakistan
8	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan	Sectarianism	Pakistan
9	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	Imposition of Sharia in Pakistan	Pakistan

In the following section, an extensive description is provided of the evolution and operations of the third group, the anti-state militants. There is a need to trace and understand the interplay of the geo-political events and Pakistan state's responses to those events which has paved the rise of the anti-state militant groups, who have been successfully challenging the state since inception.

### **5. Challenging the State: Extremist and Terrorist Violence in Pakistan in the Post-9/11 Period**

Pakistan's alliance with the US in the post-9/11 period deeply affected the security environment of the Pakistani state. The US led global war on terrorism against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban network operating from Afghanistan, made the Pakistani state initiate a policy reversal on its erstwhile ally, the Taliban. Pakistan though "did not send any troops into Afghanistan to fight the forces, yet it committed itself towards providing crucial intelligence and logistic support for US operations. The spillover effects of the US operations in Afghanistan shifted the gravity of terrorist activities from Af-



ghanistan to Pakistan”. The decision by Pakistan to support the war on terrorism led by the US was opposed by many religious groups and state sponsored jihadist outfits who later turned against the Pakistani state for fighting an American war on its own people.

Today Pakistan faces a major security threat from the religiously motivated anti-state terrorist groups which clearly challenges and questions Pakistan state’s writ and legitimacy. The country has become a major victim of suicide bombings as the attacks in the country have escalated dramatically since 2007. The country has also witnessed a shift in the theatre of terrorist activities from country’s tribal areas to the state’s urban centres. From 2002 to 2014, around 19,886 civilians have died in or from incidents of terrorism and militancy with an additional 6,015 security personnel who were killed at the hands of militants (Rumi 2015: 2).

The presence of extremist groups in the country has encouraged a culture of intolerance in the society. Minority communities are subjected to violence and are charged under blasphemy. For example, in 2010, Pakistani Christian woman, Asia Bibi, was convicted of blasphemy by a Pakistani court and was sentenced to death by hanging. While the woman was charged of blasphemy, the liberal voices in the country opposing the charge were perceived as traitors. The Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, who was committed to seeking a presidential pardon for her was gunned down by his own bodyguard. Likewise, two months later, Pakistan’s religious “minority minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian who spoke out against the blasphemy laws was shot dead in Islamabad on March 2, 2011”.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, the culture of religious intolerance in Pakistan gave birth to a far-right Islamist political party, TLP, in 2015. Since then, the party has weaponised the sensitive blasphemy issue in Pakistan.

Thus, in order to fully comprehend the extremist and terrorist challenge in Pakistan, there is a need to deliberate and assess the threats facing Pakistan on its own territory.

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<sup>80</sup> “Pakistan minister Shahbaz Bhatti shot dead in Islamabad”, The Guardian, 2 March 2011 [Online web] Accessed 6 November 2015 URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/02/pakistan-minister-shot-dead-islamabad>.

## **5.1 Pakistani Taliban**

A major threat to the Pakistani state surfaced with the formation of a relatively new and so far the largest and deadliest militant umbrella organisation, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or popularly known as Pakistani Taliban. An initial sympathiser to the Taliban regime, the group was formed immediately after Pakistan “led the military operation against militants ensconced in Islamabad’s Red Mosque, referred to as Operation silence”. Condemning Pakistani state’s military operations in the tribal belt and its attack on a religious seminary and symbol, the TTP confirmed itself towards waging a defensive jihad against the Pakistani state and its security forces to establish a Sharia based Islamic system of governance in Pakistan.<sup>81</sup>

Calling the Pakistani government a Western stooge, the group leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, justifies its militant attacks on the Pakistani state on two major grounds— Firstly, that Pakistan is a friend of America, and Ulemas (Islamic clerics) were killed and madrasas were destroyed in the country upon America’s command and secondly, the reason for waging jihad in the country is the prevailing Kafriana (infidel) system in Pakistan” (Pakistan Today October 9, 2013).<sup>82</sup>

The group however is not only committed towards challenging the state’s writ but is wedded towards establishing an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan. Products of Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan, the members of Pakistani Taliban follow the ‘demotic cocktail’ of Deobandi and Wahhabi interpretation of Islam (Behuria 2007: 704). It adheres to Al-Qaeda’s ideology of transnational jihad and the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate system (Basit 2014:5). However, in order to assess the security threat that the group poses to the Pakistani state, it is imperative to understand the phenomenon called Pakistani Taliban and trace its evolution in the country.

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<sup>81</sup> “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan : Incidents and Statements involving TTP,” [Online Web] Accessed 19 November 2016 URL: <http://www.satp.org/satporqtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ttp.htm>

<sup>82</sup> “No dialogue through media: Mehsud”, The Pakistan Today, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2013,[Online Web] Accessed 14<sup>th</sup> November 2013 URL: <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/10/09/national/no-dialogue-through-media-mehsud/>.

## **Talibanisation of Pakistan: Rise of Pakistani Taliban**

The Pakistani Taliban, factionalised into some 40 groups, “does not form a cohesive group but rather operates from different areas under different leaders” (Behuria 2007:704). Though officially “established in 2007, its members had been involved in the militancy against the US-NATO forces and the Pakistani Army since 2002” (Qazi 2011:578).

The US-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” was successful in destroying “Al-Qaeda’s infrastructure in Afghanistan and bringing down the Taliban regime in only 102 days after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. After the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan, scores of fighters and senior leadership of both Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban escaped to the semi-autonomous and tribal areas of Pakistan, where they shared strong ethnic and ideological connections” (Akram 2004). Pakistan because of its geo-strategic location, elusive state identity, multifarious ambivalent religious narratives and its old alliance with the Taliban became an attractive proposition for the foreign radical forces to use the state for expounding their cause. Most of the two groups’ leadership escaped to South Waziristan where the foreign extremist forces made a strong headway amongst the local tribesmen and jihadi groups.

The ideological hybridisation of religion and ethnic identity shared between the local and foreign groups helped the dislocated foreign groups to take refuge in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal areas. By identifying and affiliating itself with the local tribes around the ethnic Pashtun identity, the Taliban leaders painted their struggle around protecting their tribal culture and having to drive out the occupying forces of the foreign invaders from the country alongside challenging an unrepresentative government in Kabul dominated by non-Pashtuns. It thus exploited the feeling of abhorrence shared by locals towards outside interference in matters of internal affairs to garner support from the Pashtun populace both in Afghanistan and across the border in FATA region to fight the outside forces (Nawaz 2009: 6).

Thus, in order to organise insurgency in Afghanistan, the Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar and Mullah Dadullah looked for help from the “tribal leaders in FATA to

recruit Pakistani tribesmen and madrasa students to fight in Afghanistan. They allied themselves with various disaffected groups headed by former mujahideen commanders such as Nek Muhammad of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe and Abdullah Mehsud of the Saleemikhel Mehsud tribe” that operated in different regions of Afghanistan and FATA against foreign forces inside Afghanistan. For example, “Nek Muhammad, an Ahmadzai Wazir from South Waziristan was one of the first tribesman to host foreign militants in Waziristan after their withdrawal in 2001-02”. Having joined the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s, in the fight against the Northern Alliance around Kabul, Nek Muhammad enjoyed “control on areas around Wana, the administrative centre of South Waziristan”. He along with other members “formed a new jihadi group called Jaish-ul- Qibla al-Jihadi al-Alami (Jaish-ul-Qibla) and played an important role in preparing recruitment and propaganda material for the militants. The group also provided and facilitated para-military training for new recruits in facilities located in South and North Waziristan” (FFI Report 2006:15). According to Behuria, “the Afghan Taliban were interested in creating a Taliban chapter inside FATA to sustain the movement” (Qazi 2011: 579).

While Taliban cashed on their ethnic Pashtun identity, the Al-Qaeda manoeuvred support from the local Pashtun tribesmen by making an appeal to the Muslims to join jihad to expel the Americans (Kepel 2002: 318). Though it was not only ideological bonds that helped Al-Qaeda fugitives buy the support of the tribesmen but also money. Along with making a religious appeal, the group “gave large sums of money to locals to lease their compounds for training camps and command centres within FATA” (Hussain 2008:148).

Therefore, through both ideological and monetary incentives, the local tribesmen were encouraged to participate in the militant activities inside Afghanistan to avenge US-led invasion of the state. Apart from the individual tribesmen’s participation in the war, a culture of militancy was encouraged in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Terrorist groups often use religion to push their political campaign.<sup>83</sup> Thus, in order to mobilise the masses towards the war against the Western forces, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership discursively construed the fight as an ideological struggle in which propaganda remained critical. The jihadi ideologues and group leaders crafted their own narratives by interpreting, reinterpreting or misinterpreting religion with politics in order to develop its organisational structure, leadership and manoeuvre the audiences around its objectives. They declared their organisation's goal to "liberate the lands of Islam from unbelief and to apply the law of god almighty in it until we meet him and he is pleased with us".<sup>84</sup> While directing its fight against the West, Bin Laden issued a fatwa instructing people to take upon violent means; "to kill Americans and their allies, civilian and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it" (World Islamic Front 23 February 1998).

Al Qaeda discursively painted its struggle in Islamic terms in order to resonate some of the beliefs and ideology of the indigenous militant groups, thereby making them join the larger movement for global jihad. As Constructivist theorists like Amitav Acharya argued,

In the conflict between global and local norms, instead of displacement of the local norms, a process of localisation may occur. Without changing the basic social and political structure, a reconstruction may occur by fusing the outside norms with preexisting beliefs and ideas. Thus, entities in the international system may not adopt external or global norms in their entirety. Rather there will be a process of cultural selection of foreign ideas by the locals for myriad reasons. The foreign norms are then adapted to suit local conditions till they assume a certain legitimacy for themselves. (Gunaratna 2008: 776)

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<sup>83</sup> "Does Islamophobia feed radicalisation?", ABC News, 30 November 2015, [Online Web] Accessed on 8 December 2018 URL:<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-30/does-islamophobia-feed-radicalisation/6985440>

<sup>84</sup>The World Islamic Front speech made by Al-Qaeda and the copy of the Fatwa issued is available on world wide web at <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>

Though, local social and religious norms helped militarise and radicalise the locals, it was “Pakistan’s military operations in the tribal areas at the behest of the US that provoked intense anger among the local tribesmen”. The 2002 military operation marked the first intervention by the Pakistani state in country’s tribal areas in 55 years of its inception. The operation led by the Pakistani military to rout out Al-Qaeda and foreign fighters hiding in the tribal areas caused anger amongst the Pakistani tribesmen who not only refused to hand over foreign fighters to the army but saw the operation as an attack to their fiercely guarded autonomy (Hussain 2008: 145).

Other Pakistan led military operations in South Waziristan, such as ‘Operation Al Mizan’ and ‘Kalosha’ in Wana (2004) against the tribal militants for providing shelter to foreign terrorists turned the tribal elders hostile towards the army. For example, the March 2004 operation Kalosha launched by Pakistan military in response to the ambush of the Frontier Corps personnel in the Wana Valley of South Waziristan proved to be a major setback for the Pakistani Army. “The army during the operation incurred major losses and was made to surrender to a ceasefire agreement (the Shakai Agreement) with the Taliban leader, Nek Muhammad Wazir in April 2004”.<sup>85</sup> The peace deal came after a failed military operation by the Pakistan government to pressure Nek Muhammad to cease supporting foreign militants and to stop cross border attacks into Afghanistan. In return, “the government agreed to release Taliban prisoners, pay compensation to tribesmen for collateral damage as a result of the military operations, and provide money to the militants to repay their debt to Al-Qaeda”. The deal did not last for long as “Nek Muhammad refused to surrender foreign militants to the government or register foreigners with the authorities. It also began to assassinate tribal elders who helped negotiate the agreement. The deal undermined the position of tribal elders in the area, and emboldened the position of Nek Muhammad till the time he was killed by a US drone strike on 19 June 2004” (Khattak 2012: 1).

Pakistan’s destructive tactics and huge deployment of forces turned the locals against the establishment. The “Wazir Chiefs and elders of other tribes warned Pakistan of

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<sup>85</sup> Ghulam Qadir Khan Daur, “Position of Weakness”, The Tribal Times, May 16, 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 17 September 2016 URL: <http://thetribaltimes.com/position-of-weakness/>

retaliation and denounced the operations as US-sponsored. They also announced that any further operations in the tribal areas would be tantamount to declaring open war on all of the Pashtun tribes” (Shahzad 2011: 4-5). Thus, the “fight between the Pakistani army and foreign al-Qaeda insurgents soon turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani Army and rebel tribesmen”.<sup>86</sup>

However, the death of Nek Muhammad from a US Predator drone attack on 19 June 2004 caused a major blow to the Al-Qaeda’s leadership, but the void was soon replaced by Baitullah Mehsud from the Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan, who was appointed as Mullah Omar’s governor and “played a crucial role in the demolition of the tribal structure by forcibly displacing the tribal elders from their respective areas”. The Srarogha Peace deal (February 2005) between the Pakistani government and the Mehsud tribe “under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud further helped the pro-Taliban forces to maintain its stronghold position in the area”. The control over South Waziristan was of great strategic interest to the Taliban as “it enabled them to launch operations into Afghanistan’s adjoining Helmand province” (Shehzad 2011:35).

North Waziristan, on the other hand, “because of its geographic isolation, difficult terrain and relatively stable coalition of tribal militants” too became a safe haven for foreign fighters who took refuge in the heavily forested Shawal Valley. Many militants, including those from Al-Qaeda, moved to North Waziristan after being pushed out of South Waziristan due to military operations. The most important militant group in the agency has been the Haqqani network. Led by the legendary Afghan Mujahideen commander Jallaludin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin and geographically located in Southeastern Afghanistan, “the group wields a tremendous amount of operational and diplomatic influence over the provinces of Khost, Paktia, Paktika and Pakistan’s North Waziristan” (Gopal et al. 2013: 140). Besides the Haqqani network, the largest militant coalition in North Waziristan “is headed by Hafiz Gul Bahadur who enjoys strong tribal base in the rugged mountains between Miram Shah and the Afghan border”.

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<sup>86</sup> Zaffar Abbas, “Pakistan’s undeclared war”, *BBC News*, 10 September 2004, URL [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/3645114.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3645114.stm).

The growing dissatisfaction with the military led government of Musharraf who was seen as a puppet controlled by the US caused annoyance among the already existing radical organisations as well as among the newly formed local rebel groups. Though initially limited to the North and South Waziristan, the insurgency soon spread over to other agencies of FATA and Swat district. FATA became “the de-facto headquarters of the global jihad movement. While creating new structures and linking it up with the existing platforms globally, FATA became a hub, used for imparting training and providing direction to a new generation of transnational and homegrown cadre” (Gunnaratna 2008: 800). Developments outside FATA “contributed to the proto-insurgency brewing in Pakistan and strengthened the nexus between Pashtun militants, their brethren from various Punjabi groups who fled to FATA during the ensuing years, and those Afghan militants and Al-Qaeda members who sought sanctuary there following the US invasion” (Ali 2008:2).

However, it was after the Lal Masjid attack that a new group TTP announced its official formation under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. Based out of South Waziristan, the group was borne out of the Lal Masjid’s siege carried out by the Pakistani military. Hassan Abbas noted that, the transition “from being Taliban supporters and sympathisers to becoming a mainstream Taliban force in the FATA was initiated when many small militant groups operating independently in the area started networking with one another. This sequence of developments occurred while Pakistani forces were spending the majority of their resources finding ‘foreigners’ in the area linked to Al-Qaeda (roughly in the 2002-2004 period)” (Abbas 2008: 1-4). Thus by December 2007, the various militant chapters operating across FATA and neighbouring districts of KP came together to form an umbrella organisation, TTP (Siqqiqqa 2011).

### **Challenging the State’s Writ**

Pakistan came majorly in the grip of extremist forces in the year 2007 when the Taliban forces extended its political and military control over the tribal areas and established its rule in Pakistan’s Swat Valley. Swat Taliban ran a parallel government and imposed their austere version of Sharia on the people of Swat. The imposition of Tal-



iban style sharia resulted in a rapid decline in civil rights of the people in the valley. The group under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah took control of large areas in the Swat and ran a radio channel where he would broadcast his radical ideology.<sup>87</sup> The Maulana excoriated women education, shut down CD and music shops, burnt Budha statues and urged for jihad (Khattak 2013: 302). He primarily targeted schools and blew up around 173 schools out of which 105 of them were for girls,<sup>88</sup> attacked a teenage girl, Malala Yousafzai for propagating female education, banned women from shopping in bazaars, and forced them to completely cover themselves. While men on the other hand, were ordered to grow beards. Music and CD shops were shut down and deemed un-Islamic and those who failed to obey or challenged their version of sharia were either beaten down or murdered in the public.<sup>89</sup> The insurgency in the state gathered further strength as Taliban having established its rule in Swat attempted to extend its control by marching towards establishing its rule over the neighbouring district of Buner, just 70 miles away from the capital Islamabad, with armed patrols in several areas, capturing the towns of Daggar and some villages.<sup>90</sup>

Local militants running parallel governments invariably challenged the legitimacy of the Pakistani state. TTP however did not only carry out terrorist activities in the state but made attempts to replace the Pakistani state with their own version of Islamic law. Terming the Pakistani justice system as “un-Islamic”, the TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud stated “the legal system in Pakistan is secular and decisions made are totally

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<sup>87</sup> Terrence McCoy, “ ‘Mullah Radio’: The radical broadcaster leading the Taliban’s war on Pakistani Schoolchildren”, The Washington Post, December 17, 2014, [Online Web] Accessed 18 December 2014 URL: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/17/mullah-radio-the-radical-broadcaster-leading-the-talibans-war-on-pakistani-schoolchildren/?utm\\_term=.ede46bc8b764](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/17/mullah-radio-the-radical-broadcaster-leading-the-talibans-war-on-pakistani-schoolchildren/?utm_term=.ede46bc8b764)

<sup>88</sup> “Pakistani Taliban rule Swat valley”, Aljazeera, 3 Feb 2009, [Online Web] Accessed on 23 February 2014 URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/02/200922185636519955.html>.

<sup>89</sup> Roggio, Bill (2009), “Taliban rule Pakistan’s ‘valley of death’”, FDDS Long War Journal, 23 January 2009, [Online Web] Accessed on 14 April 2015 URL: [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/taliban\\_rule\\_pakista.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/taliban_rule_pakista.php)

<sup>90</sup> Watson, Ivan (2009), “Taliban Claims victory near Islamabad”, CNN, 22 April 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 12 September 2013 URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/22/pakistan.taliban/>

unIslamic and the decision makers are also infidels. It was Pakistani law that allowed the operation in Lal Masjid and Jamea Hafsa” (Rediff News April 2 2012).<sup>91</sup> He therefore claimed “God willing, the sharia system will be established only through jihad”.<sup>92</sup>

Justifying its violent attacks against the Western and Pakistani state forces, Waliur Rehman, one of the TTP member said, “Afghanistan and Pakistan is a single battlefield, we consider both as a war against America and are fighting against the crusader Zionist alliance which they have formed.” By proposing an Islamic system in Pakistan, he further stated, “through the sacrifices and martyrdoms of our martyrs, we have proved that whether it be the soil of Afghanistan or Pakistan, we have irrigated them with our blood. And this is all purely for the sake of Islamic system” (MEMRI, Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, 16 October 2009).

The continuous and direct TTP strikes on government and military institutions antagonised the Establishment forces in Pakistan. The tensions between the government and TTP became acute “in the wake of militant’s capture of the Sararogha fort in South Waziristan in January 2008. The capturing of the fort resulted in the death of some Pakistan security forces which led military to launch an operation, named Zalzalā”. Condemning the operation, Baitullah Mehsud noted, “Pakistan army uses the weapons it has against the people and against Muslims. Pakistan should protect Muslims with these weapons and defy enemies with them. However, the army has harmed the people and Muslims with its weapons” (Jones and Fair 2010: 59). Though, the ambush of a Pakistani security convoy by local militants in Loe Sam in September 2008 escalated military’s animosity, which resulted in another military operation in the Bajaur district.

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<sup>91</sup>“Mehsud vows to continue Jihad in Pakistan”, Rediff.com, 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2012,[Online Web] Accessed 16<sup>th</sup> February 2014 URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/report/in-new-video-mehsud-vows-to-continue-jihad-in-pakistan/20120402.htm>

<sup>92</sup> “Obama’s Peace Partner’s: Taliban Commanders discuss Jihad against America and the Crusader-Zionist Alliance”, [Online Web] Accessed 5<sup>th</sup> May 2014 URL: <http://pamelageller.com/2013/01/myjihad-video-obamas-peace-partners-taliban-commanders-discuss-jihad-against-america-and-the-crusade.html/>.

Opposing military operations in the tribal areas, the TTP claimed responsibility for many of the attacks. In a “reaction to a statement made by Rehman Malik, advisor to the PM of Pakistan’s Internal Affairs on 9 June 2008, about the collapse of the government’s peace deal with the militants, TTP spokesperson Maulvi Omar threatened that the TTP would take its ‘war’ to the federal capital”. He reportedly said:

“The US and its allies want the bloodshed to continue on our soil. But we have made it clear that if a war is imposed on us, we will take this war out of tribal areas and NWFP to the rest of the country and will attack security forces and important government functionaries in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi and other big cities.” (Siddique 2008:34)

TTP has claimed responsibility for some of the major terrorist attacks on the government and military institutions and cities in Pakistan. The 2009 brazen attack on “Pakistan’s most secure military complex-Army headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, just a few miles from the capital of Islamabad, resulted in the death of six soldiers including two senior army officials. The Crime Investigation Department of Punjab, a civilian law enforcement body reported the possibility of an involvement of TTP in collaboration with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad behind the attack”.<sup>93</sup> Whereas, TTP (Amjad Farooqi group) claimed responsibility behind the attack on Army headquarters.<sup>94</sup>

Moreover, the Pakistani state faced another backlash on its state institutional capacity during the US Navy SEALs operation in Abbottabad in 2011, which led to the death of Al-Qaeda Chief, Osama Bin Laden. The US raid in the country without the knowhow of the Pakistani government directly encroached upon Pakistan’s sovereignty and showcased Pakistan’s failure of safeguarding its territorial integrity. The operation undermined Pakistan state’s position both globally and domestically. It faced in-

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<sup>93</sup> Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering the attack on Pakistan’s Army headquarters”, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 16 August 2014 URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/11/deciphering-the-attack-on-pakistans-army-headquarters/>

<sup>94</sup> Shahid Rao, “Terror attack on GHQ”, The Nation, October 11, 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 23 August 2015 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/11-Oct-2009/terror-attack-on-ghq>

ternational condemnation for following a dubious terrorism policy of providing safe-guard to Al-Qaeda's chief; whereas domestically the state was condemned for governance failure. The failure however provided another opportunity to the anti-state forces to target the state in order to avenge Laden's death. The Pakistani Taliban therefore carried out a double suicide bombing that killed at least 80 recruits at a military training centre in the north-west of the country.<sup>95</sup>

The group thus declared a war on the state forces in one of the speeches addressed to the government and security agencies by the TTP leader, Hakimullah Mehsud:

We are believing men and Mujahideen, and our war against you is one based on creed, and it will continue as such. You have repeatedly duped the Muslim masses, sometimes by presenting democracy as a just system of governance and at other times misleading them by confusing religion with democracy. But if any true believers stood up against you, you unleashed a wave of barbarism upon them, as you did in the tribal areas, Lal Masjid, Swat, Buner and the Abbottabad operation. You are responsible for the bloodshed of innocent civilians in Afghanistan and for handing over Arab, Uzbek and other Mujahideen to the kuffar only so that you may please their leaders. To serve the interests of America and the kuffar, you have thrown away your lives in Peshawar, Waziristan, Swat and many other places. Our war with you will continue and soon you will be humiliated and disgraced in this very life, and Kuffar too will turn its back on you. For they have used you and can no longer see any strength remaining in you.<sup>96</sup>

## ***5.2 Punjabi Taliban***

The Taliban threat which emerged in Pakistan's tribal areas has slowly spread from the borders to the urban areas of Pakistan-Peshawar, Quetta, Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad. While searching new havens amid continuous US drone attacks in Pa-

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<sup>95</sup> "Pakistan Taliban strikes to avenge Osama Bin Laden death", The Telegraph, 13 May 2011, [Online Web] Accessed on 5 September 2015, URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8512196/Pakistan-Taliban-strikes-to-avenge-Osama-bin-Laden-death.html>

<sup>96</sup> "No end to war with Pakistan government, says Hakimullah Mehsud in statement", [Online: Web] Accessed 5<sup>th</sup> June 2014 URL: <http://haralddoornbos.wordpress.com/2013/03/04/no-end-to-war-with-pak-government-says-hakimullah-mehsud-in-statement/>.

kistan's tribal belt, the Taliban militants sought help of the local militant groups to push deeper into the country.

Pakistan has seen a major shift in the theatre of terrorist activities from the country's tribal areas to its heartland, especially in the post-2007 period. The shift however showcase that the Pashtun militants settled in tribal areas are not alone and are assisted by other jihadists and splinter groups who have played a crucial role in bringing the insurgency to Pakistan's heartland. These anti-state nexus of jihadists are often referred to as "Punjabi Taliban". "The Punjabi Taliban network is a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin, sectarian as well as those focussed on the conflict in Kashmir that has developed strong connections with TTP, Afghan Taliban and other militant groups based in the FATA and NWFP" (Abbas 2009: 1).

Sharing a common Deobandi ideology, the members of these organisations that have come together to form an anti-state network have their roots dating back to Pakistan state's policy of patronising militant proxy groups for their domestic and foreign policy goals. Members of Punjabi Taliban comprise of militants from groups such as "Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi". Most of these groups were created and backed by the Pakistani state during the 90s to fight a proxy war with India in what they refer to as Indian-Occupied Kashmir. Whereas SSP and LeJ, a product of Pakistan state's Islamisation process during General Zia's regime, were engaged in launching sectarian attacks against the minority Shia community in Pakistan. The group activists shared a strong alliance with the Taliban as most of the members were trained in Afghanistan along with other militant groups and fought against the Northern Alliance alongside the Taliban. Whereas, belonging to the Deobandi school of thought they also shared ideological affiliation with the Taliban and were reported to have massacred Shias living in the Hazara belt (Grare 2007: 138).

However, Pakistan's agreement to assist US in the global war against terrorism turned many of these loyal jihadists against the state. The forced ban of HuM, JeM, LeJ and

SSP turned these groups against the state, thereby calling it an agent of US. Therefore, these banned organisations not only deepened their ties with Al-Qaeda but began launching attacks against the Pakistani state. LeJ directly engages in terrorist and sectarian attacks in Pakistan and enjoys links to other terrorist networks in the country. It is believed to be the “lynchpin of the alignment between Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and sectarian groups. Largely Punjab based, LeJ was the first to join the Al-Qaeda ranks after their ban. Most of the mosques and madrasas linked with LeJ and SSP in Punjab are used as networking centres for Punjabi Taliban” (Abbas 2009: 2). Whereas, JeM, focussed on fighting the Pakistani militancy in Kashmir was seen as a good jihadist fighting for Pakistan State’s interests. However, General Musharraf’s policy of crackdown of pro-Kashmir fighters, including JeM at the behest of US, pushed the group to revolt against Islamabad’s policy (Chaudet 2010: 536). Criticising General Musharraf for betraying the cause of Kashmir after turning against the Taliban, the group turned against the Musharraf government and carried out two assassination attempts on him.

Violence in Pakistan’s heartland, mainly within Punjab province and in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, has escalated since 2007. The March 2009 assault on a police training centre outside Lahore, and the famous Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, are attributes of the local logistical support of the Punjabi Taliban network. Punjab hosts three main Deobandi outfits, SSP, LeJ, and JeM. Operating from South Punjab, the three main Deobandi outfits follow the Salafai-Deobandi Islamic school of thought, encouraging of a militant form of jihad, stipulating “the mandatory waging of violent jihad against non-Muslims and those who do not follow puritanical religious interpretation”. These groups have not only been critical of others who did not subscribe to their puritanical version of Islam but “also serves as a factory from which jihadis are exported to other parts of the country”. For example, Mujahid Hussein, author of the book Punjabi Taliban concluded that Punjab provides a majority of the terrorist and suicide bombers to various organisations active in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Quoting an intelligence agency, he claimed that 150,000 insurgents belonging to jihadi and fundamentalist organisations are active in Punjab province (Hussein 2010: 130).

Being anti-shiite in their ideological orientation, the groups go far beyond their sectarian activities to connect with foreign groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's former Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, once warned that South Punjab could become another Swat. The Punjabi splinters sometimes operate independently or "work in concert with one another, TTP and Al-Qaeda. For example, the TTP allegedly outsourced attacks in Punjab to the Badr Mansur group and 313 Brigade (splinters of HuM and HuJi respectively) in exchange for providing their fighters safe heavens in FATA, access to or space for training camps, and money" (Tankel 2016: 59). Therefore, militants from the Punjabi Taliban network with the support of other anti-state militant groups are committed towards waging jihad against the Pakistani state. The involvement of Punjabi Taliban network has helped the FATA based militants to project its power capabilities throughout the country. However, "ordinary Pakistanis have failed to notice the threat of terrorism and extremism because they do not necessarily equate sectarian violence, a hallmark of Punjabi groups, with growing jihadism" (Siddiqa 2009: 66).

### ***5.3 The Foreign Enemy: Al-Qaeda and Uzbek Terrorists***

Al-Qaeda affirms its principal aim of fighting the NATO forces in Afghanistan but Pakistan state's "military operations against the Al-Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas and on mosques and madrasas" has turned the group against the Pakistani state. The Lal Masjid attack by the Pakistani state not only "led to the emergence of new anti-state groups" but turned many existing groups against the state. For example, "Al-Qaeda and other militant groups have used the storming of the Lal Masjid as a rallying cry to fight the Pakistani government and military. In an audio message, Osama Bin Laden described Ghazi as a 'hero of Islam' and declared an all-out war against the Pakistani military".<sup>97</sup>

Al-Qaeda often "bears repetition that its terror tactics in Pakistan has the sole objective of neutralising Pakistan's support for the US led war on terror". It rationalises its

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<sup>97</sup> Zahid Hussain, "How Lal Masjid Changed Militancy", Dawn, July 13, 2017, [Online Web] Accessed 13 July 2017 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1345068>

attack on the Pakistani state as part of its 'commendable' type of terrorism which is directed against the tyrants and traitors who they think "commit acts of treason against their own country, their own faith, their own prophet and their own nation" (Esposito 2002: 24-25). It believes that it is important to target those muslim states who have become corrupt under Western stooge; "terrorizing those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and make them right" (New York Times 10 September 2006).<sup>98</sup> Directing its criticism and opposition to Pakistan's military operations in tribal areas, Laden cited a Quranic quotation "For Pharaoh and Haman and (all) their hosts were men of sin" (Quran 28: 8). He further professed, "I ask God, the one beside whom there is no god, the living, the eternal, to punish Bush and Pervez and their troops with what they deserve, and that he make use of one of the lions of Islam to kill Bush's slave boy in Pakistan" (Berner 2007: 290).

Though, numerically less in number, the group provides logistical, ideological and organisational help to other militants and in return enjoys considerable support of many indigenous militant groups in the country. It collaborates its actions by working with few allied groups. Allied groups are those who have established a direct relationship with Al-Qaeda, but have not become formal members. They remain independent and pursue their goals, but works with Al-Qaeda for specific operations when their interests converge (Hoffman 2005: 285-289). In Pakistan, TTP and LeT serves as allied groups. For example, Al-Qaeda developed an ideological and operational relationship with TTP and helped finance groups's insurgent activities as well as publicly sided with the group in calling for the overthrow of the Islamabad government-even while elements of Pakistan's military were sheltering Osama Bin Laden (Weinbaum 2017: 36).

LeT who "previously have had only local or regional aims started seeing their own struggle as part of Al-Qaeda's larger 'war against Islam' narrative". Though, LeT at the start of the war did not directly participate in the jihad against the US. Its focus

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<sup>98</sup> "What terrorists want", The New York Times [Online Web] Accessed 7<sup>th</sup> January 2014  
URL: [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/books/chapters/0910-1st-rich.html?pagewanted=print&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/books/chapters/0910-1st-rich.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0)



towards Kashmir jihad and its close alliance with the country's intelligence agency, ISI, were main influencers to its decision. However, Lashkar's proximity with Al-Qaeda and other militant groups changed incrementally and is marked by both conflict and collaboration. Belonging to the Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought (an even smaller minority than Deobandis), and having a close working relationship with the army; the group had developed an ideological disdain for the Deobandi militant groups who waged jihad against the Pakistani state (Tankel 2010: 3). However, critical of the West and having a well stretched network in the country, the group did help provide safe heavens to Al-Qaeda members in Pakistan. One of the reports by the US Department of State noted the involvement of LeT members in facilitating the movement of Al-Qaeda members in Pakistan as Abu Zubayda, a senior Al-Qaeda commander was found at a Lashkar safe house in Faisalabad in the year 2002 (Mir 2009: 63).

However, Lashkar's collaboration with Al-Qaeda and other groups developed increasingly since the end of 2006. The group had spread its activities in the tribal areas and was geared towards waging war in Afghanistan. For example, Hafiz Saeed (leader of the banned Lashkar-e-Toiba), provided support and assistance to the Al-Qaeda members. In his speeches, he "called upon the people to wage jihad against America in order to save Pakistan and Islam. 'Come to us, we will teach you the meaning of jihad, the time to fight has come'." (The Express Tribune, 6 April 2012).<sup>99</sup>

Moreover, the group became a key facilitator in enabling Al-Qaeda operatives to move around Pakistan. A report prepared by "interrogators of foreign and Pakistani nationals arrested from Township and other parts of the Punjab, (later made available to the Dawn newspaper) reported the involvement of LeT members in helping the Arabs enter Pakistan from Afghanistan via Khost, Meeran Shah and other places and having helped them coordinate their movements within the county".<sup>100</sup> Whereas, the

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<sup>99</sup> Tanveer, Rana, "Hafiz Saeed calls for Jihad against America", The Express Tribune, 6<sup>th</sup> April 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 24<sup>th</sup> February 2014 URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/360667/difa-e-pakistan-activists-protest-us-bounty-on-afiz-saeed/>.

<sup>100</sup> "Outlawed groups help Al-Qaeda suspects", Dawn, April 20, 2002, [Online Web] Accessed 16 May 2014 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/29519>

number three in the Al-Qaeda, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, “was arrested at the home of Abdul Qudoos, a Jamaat-e-Islami supporter in March 2003”.<sup>101</sup>

Al-Qaeda also enjoyed support of many indigenous jihadi groups who joined the group’s broader global jihad movement against the Americans in the wake of the US led war on terrorism. Owing to their old alliance build during the 1990s (during which major Pakistani groups flocked down to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban and also received their operational support and training in the Al-Qaeda run camps in Khost and Kandahar), the local jihadi groups rendered their support to the displaced foreign groups (Tankel 2016: 52).<sup>102</sup>

However, the involvement of the Pakistani indigenous groups in fighting the broader global jihad movement against the US made the Americans pressurise Pakistan to call for a ban of such organisations. A ban was imposed on few indigenous sectarian and Kashmir based separatist groups at the behest of the US. The crackdown of indigenous militant organisations by the Pakistani state caused disgruntlement among the groups and caused them to join the Al-Qaeda forces and support their ongoing war of jihad against the western forces. For example, the virulent Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was the first to join the ranks of Al-Qaeda in South Waziristan and supported its multifaceted operations in Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda also worked along with other units in Pakistan. Ilyas Kashmiri’s Brigade 313 is considered to be “one of the most dangerous and effective Al-Qaeda formations in Pakistan. The Brigade’s members were recruited from the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jundullah

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<sup>101</sup> Khan, Kamran (2003), “Alleged September 11 Planner captured in Pakistan”, The Washington Post, 2 March 2003, [Online Web] Accessed 10 October 2014 URL: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/03/02/alleged-sept-11-planner-captured-in-pakistan/a272974a-ed9d-4661-9793-11fd406febe5/?utm\\_term=.7228b9507b35](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/03/02/alleged-sept-11-planner-captured-in-pakistan/a272974a-ed9d-4661-9793-11fd406febe5/?utm_term=.7228b9507b35)

<sup>102</sup> According to credible estimates, around 30,000 students from JUI-controlled madrasas in Pakistan joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan (Matinuddin 1999:14).

and several other Pakistani terror groups”.<sup>103</sup> Moreover other groups such as the Pakistan Intelligence Agency supported HuM, was also alleged of having links with Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil, the leader of HUM and his group was found to be “involved in numerous acts of terror in the region, including the hijacking of an Indian airplane, an attack on the US consulate in Karachi, and the murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. According to one of the reports in the New York Times, one of Bin Laden’s most trusted couriers, who was killed during the Abbottabad raid, had phone numbers linking him to the HUM”.<sup>104</sup> It is believed that having deep roots in the area around Abbottabad, the group not only would have helped providing Bin Laden an opportunity to live in Pakistan but would have also helped enhance the channel of communication between Bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda members settled in different parts of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The group draws major support from the North Waziristan based Haqqani network. The network has been a major constant for the entirety of Al-Qaeda’s existence and has shaped its local trajectory in the region (Rassler and Brown 2011: 1). At the global level, Al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist actors rely on and leverage on Haqqani network with the latter providing space for Al-Qaeda and other militant groups to develop and initiate a campaign of attacks against the West.

The Pakistani state also faced threats from many other foreign fighters settled in the tribal areas “who opposed Pakistan’s role in the US led war on terrorism. Sheikh Essa, an ultra-radical Egyptian ideologue stayed on in North Waziristan and exercised great influence over some local clerics. He preached the need for a war against Pakistan, and held the Pakistan Army responsible for America’s success in the war against the Afghan Taliban. He further professed that the real battle should be fought against Pakistan’s ruling military establishment” (Shahzad 2011: 27). Marching on some similar

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<sup>103</sup> “Bin Laden Docs Hint at Large Al-Qaeda Presence in Pakistan”, Bill Roggio, 9th May, 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 27 November 2015 URL: <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/bin-laden-docs-hint-at-large-al-qaeda-presence-in-pakistan/>

<sup>104</sup> Carlotta Gall, Pir Zubair Shah and Eric Schmitt, “Seized Phone offers clues to Bin Laden’s Pakistani Links”, The New York Times, June 23, 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 29 June 2014 URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/world/asia/24pakistan.html?page-wanted=1&hp>

lines, the “leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yaldochiv, issued a fatwa, prioritising the fight against the Pakistan army over waging a war against the Western coalition in Afghanistan”.

Hence, “due to the advent of a new generation of ideologues, militant leadership and a variety of terrorist organisations and networks, the security landscape of Pakistan has become challenging” (Feyyaz 2013: 98). The growing nexus or coming together of the major sunni radical organisations in Pakistan have caused a daunting effect on Pakistan state’s security situation. Drawing sharp distinction between militant factions is no longer possible as most of the indigenous militant groups are now subsumed with foreign organisations. Samina Ahmed, an expert from International Crisis group argues that, “these groups have their separate identities and goals which could be local, regional and trans-regional, but there is a close alliance relationship and there is a flow of everything from funding to training to recruitment and methodology”.<sup>105</sup>

## **6. State Sponsored Proxy Groups**

While the Pakistani state securitises the threats from these extremist terrorist organisations, it continues to support, aid, protect and abet the anti-Indian and anti-West terrorist groups and networks in the country. Pakistan’s preoccupation with the Indian threat and its attendant priority for security guides its policy of supporting the anti-India and Afghan proxy groups.

The anti-India Kashmir separatist groups continue to operate freely in the state of Pakistan. These militant groups continue to justify their war with India in the name of jihad. “A declaration adopted at the ‘Defence of Pakistan Conference’, by a number of Kashmir militant organisations in 2010 declared ‘Jihad as the only way to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation’. These groups continue to inflict harm on the Indian State by extending their terrorist activities far beyond the theatre of Kashmir. A series of explosions were carried out by LeT in July 2006 in Mumbai and in 2008 on multi-

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<sup>105</sup> Wade, Matt (2009), “An unholy trinity”, *The Age*, 21 October 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 23 October 2014 URL: <https://www.theage.com.au/world/an-unholy-trinity-20091020-h6wt.html>.

ple locations in Mumbai which resulted in the death of 166 people. Whereas, JeM, the perpetrators of the 2001 Indian parliament attack, carried out an attack on an Indian Air force station in Pathankot on 2 January 2016” (D’souza and Bibhu 2016: 561).

Despite repeated requests made by the Indian State and pressure from the international community, Pakistan remains reluctant “to act against the terrorists based on its soil involved in the attack”. In fact jihad in Kashmir continues to receive support from Pakistani state, especially the country’s establishment wing. As pointed out by Stephen Tankel: “in addition to having recruited retired army and ISI officers into its ranks, Lashkar members had family members in the middle ranks of the army and various civilian security agencies” (Tankel 2011: 123).

Moreover, driven by its objective of establishing strategic depth in Afghanistan, Pakistan continues to shield the anti-West insurgent groups, the Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban. Declared as a terrorist body by the US in the year 2012,<sup>106</sup> the group enjoys considerable support of the Pakistani state. Pakistan has historically used the group as a proxy to exert influence in Afghanistan and to mediate disputes in Pakistan’s FATA areas. However, driven by an objective of driving the “US led coalition out of Afghanistan and establish Taliban rule in the country, the group carries out or assists in carrying out attacks against the western targets. The group is alleged to be behind a suicide bombing of a US base in Khost province in 2009, a 19 hour siege on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters in 2011, and an assault on a US Consulate near the Iran border in 2013”.

Moreover, the group is “also involved in providing logistical and operational support to the anti-state militant groups. It cultivated a closer personal relationship with Osama Bin Laden and facilitated Al-Qaeda’s escape during the US battle of Tora Bora in 2001, enabling the jihadists to move from Afghanistan to a safe haven in

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<sup>106</sup> “U.S. designating Haqqani network a terrorist organization”, CBS News, September 7, 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 13 April 2015 URL: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-designating-haqqani-network-a-terrorist-organization/>

Pakistan.”<sup>107</sup> The group also “acts as a force multiplier for the TTP, strengthening the latter’s campaign in Loya Paktia and elsewhere. Thus, the group functions as a reliable and effective platform through which violence, driven by the specific interests of each actor, can be interjected into Afghanistan or launched abroad”.

In the post-9/11 period, distinctions between different militant groups have become tenuous. Due to ideological similarities, the militant groups present in the state have overlapping membership and operational convergences. Ideological similarities often lead to operational convergences. For example, JeM essentially a jihadist group occasionally participated in sectarian violence, whereas, LeJ a sectarian outfit has allegedly sent men to Kashmir to wage jihad against the Indian forces (Grare 2007: 136).

Though, these groups share some common aims, they diverge widely in their allegiances, targets, strategies and most importantly over whether to attack the Pakistani state or restrict their target to foreign occupational forces. There has been deep ideological disagreement amongst the radical groups over strategic and ideological issues on deciding who is the primary enemy of Islam and against whom jihad can be waged. Pakistan state’s participation in the US led war on terrorism and its military operations against what the militants refer to as ‘jihadi forces’ have led some of these groups to consider the Pakistani government as an enemy and, therefore, a legitimate target of attack. Using the ‘Takfiri’ doctrine, these groups argue and justify that the Pakistan government’s collaboration with the Americans (viewed as infidels) makes them a justifiable target of defensive jihad (Mufti 2012: 19). The doctrine of Takfiri is defined as a “process by which radical Islamic groups excommunicates other Muslims, thereby rendering them subject to attack”.

Afghan Taliban were however uncomfortable with such an approach and wanted to keep their strategy limited to fighting the Western coalition of forces in Afghanistan. The group were therefore hesitant in fighting their former ally, the Pakistani Army. This approach however led to a division within the Taliban ranks. Afghan leaders

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<sup>107</sup> “Mapping Militant Organisations: Haqqani Network”, Stanford University [Online Web] Accessed 15 December 2017 URL: <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363>

were often divided over their affiliation with the Pakistani state and their support for the anti-state groups. After the death of Nek Muhammad, Haji Omar took over as the leader of the Wana Taliban in South Waziristan and supported the presence of Uzbeks targeting the Pakistani state. The support for anti-State groups brought a divide within the Taliban ranks as Taliban Commander, Mullah Nazir, who affirmed his commitment towards fighting the western forces, refused to attack the Pakistani state and expelled the Uzbeks and their supporters Haji Omar and Haji Sharif in 2007. The Uzbeks on the other hand, exploited the division in the organisation and instead sought refuge in Mehsud dominated areas of South Waziristan, joining Abdullah And Baitullah Mehsud's anti-Pakistan and anti-Western Taliban movement (Mahsud 2013: 167).

Discrediting the actions of the groups targeting the Pakistani state, "Hafiz Saeed, the founder of pro-state Lashkar-e-toiba and now the leader of Jamaat-Ud-Dawa, also argued that jihad is waged against Kuffar and not against other Muslims, even if they are hypocrites. The argument is based on a reading of prophetic practice and the need to focus on the primary struggle against the Kuffar, without being distracted with the need to address the secondary struggle vis-a-vis the hypocrites" (Yasmeen 2013: 166). The group also condemns the tactic of suicide bombing calling it Un-Islamic. Hafiz Saeed argues, "jihad for the sake of Allah is a vital pillar of Islam, yet there are certain specified rules for carrying out jihad, which does not include indiscriminate killing of everyone everywhere. Islam does not condone random blasts at public places, nor does it endorse the killing of every non-Muslim that one comes across" (Express Tribune 25 July 2011).<sup>108</sup>

## **7. Conclusion**

Pakistan today has become a major victim of terrorist violence as the militants who were before focused on fighting the Indian or Western forces have stepped up their onslaught against Pakistani state and society. Terrorism in Pakistan exists in the form

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<sup>108</sup> "J-u-D's Hafiz Saeed declares suicide bombings un-Islamic", The Express Tribune, 25<sup>th</sup> July 2011, [Online: Web] Accessed 21<sup>st</sup> January 2014 URL: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/217149/juds-hafiz-saeed-declare-suicide-bombings-un-islamic/>.

of both violent extremism and rebel governance. The former involves targeting people who are deemed un-Islamic or considered to be apostates, and ‘agents of the West’ such as security personnels, politicians and minorities. While the latter refers to the use of violence to run a government and parallel law system based on militant’s particular interpretation of the Quran and Islamic principles.

Islamist extremist militant groups have been in Pakistan for more than three decades. The groups were long used as strategic assets by the Pakistani state, especially its military wing, to meet their security and regional interests vis-a-vis the Indian state. However, in the last decade few of the state supported groups along with other foreign organisations have turned against the Pakistani state. This development led Pakistan for the first time to recognise terrorism and violent extremism as ‘threats’ to state’s security and stability.

The next chapter will evaluate how Pakistan, from being a major sponsor of terrorist violence has succumbed to becoming a victim of it in the post-9/11 period. It will also analyse the reasons that has led to the shift in Pakistan state's security discourse from defining its security agenda around fighting the Indian state to recognising the threats breeding within its society.



## Chapter 4

### Securitisation of Threats: Pakistan's Security Policy

#### 1. Introduction

The state of Pakistan has for long used terrorism as an instrument of state policy to meet its security interests in relation to its immediate neighbour, India. It has a long history of using Islamic militants to offset India's conventional military superiority as well as to counter-balance the state's growing power in the region. The state which has long depended on extremist militant forces and looked at them as strategic assets now claims to fear an 'existential threat' from them. The shift in Pakistan's traditional security discourse of fighting an external enemy to recognising existential threat from internal forces marks a major shift in the state's security agenda.

The chapter thus attempts to comprehend the change in Pakistan state's security discourse in the post-9/11 period. The study argues that Pakistan state's largely selective and self-serving approach towards fighting terrorist and extremist elements have made Pakistan a major victim of terrorism today. Against this backdrop, the chapter analyses state's securitisation process and its selective treatment of the different militant forces present in the country. It will trace the transition of how terrorism from being a 'politicised' issue turned into a 'securitised' one. The chapter employs a political approach and conduct discourse analysis to analyse security agenda setting in Pakistan i.e. how the choices and actions taken by the state actors shaped and manipulated the security agenda of Pakistan in the post-9/11 period. The study is carried out in the broader context of the global war on terrorism and Pakistan's participation in the war.

#### 2. Pakistan's Participation in the Global War on Terrorism

Pakistan state's security environment changed dramatically in the post-9/11 period. Owing to its geographical proximity with Afghanistan and diplomatic recognition of

the Taliban regime, Pakistan was thrust into becoming a “frontline state” to the US in the global war on terrorism. Pakistan’s decision to ally itself with the US in the war on terrorism signified a major shift in its security policy.

Pakistan, which enjoyed friendly relations with the Taliban and supported their regime in Afghanistan was made to turn against the group for supporting and shielding the perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks, the Al-Qaeda chief, Osama Bin Laden. Therefore, though reluctant to join the war efforts, Pakistan succumbed to the US pressures. With having declared the Cold War aphorism of ‘either you are with us or against us’, the US left the Pakistan authorities with no choice, but to join the international coalition of forces against terrorism. For example, the Bush administration had declared an ultimatum to all states, noting “other nations should either be with the US in the ‘war on terrorism’ or be against them as freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war and that god is not neutral between them” (Bush 2001).<sup>109</sup>

Thus, Pakistan’s decision to side with the US was not out of any moral solidarity with the state, as stated by the then army chief, Pervez Musharraf, but because of the fear of international isolation (Musharraf 2006). The government of Pakistan joined the coalition against the backdrop of an American threat from the then “US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage”, who vowed to send Pakistan “back to the stone age” in case of its refusal to support the war on terrorism (Musharraf 2006: 201).

However, despite international pressure, the decision of reversal on “Pakistan’s Taliban policy” was not easy to make as Pakistan had been sponsoring and aiding the group since its emergence. It was in fact then the “only country maintaining diplomatic relations with Taliban and their leader, Mullah Omar” (Musharraf 2006:200).

The given international, regional and domestic situation left the Pakistani state authorities in a dilemma. The weak infrastructural nature of the Pakistani state left it in no position to counter or go against the America's dictum. For example, General Mushar-

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<sup>109</sup> The White House, “Joint Session of Congress and the American People”, 20<sup>th</sup> September, 2001, [Online Web] Accessed 6<sup>th</sup> March 2014 URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>.

raf himself admitted that due to social, military, and economic weakness of the Pakistani state, the country would have failed to withstand the US onslaught (Musharraf 2006: 201-202). On the other hand, changing its stance on its policy towards Afghan Taliban would have invited domestic backlash as the mood and tide of people in Pakistan was mostly pro-Taliban. Pakistanis were greatly disgruntled and embittered with the US over its abrupt departure from the region in the post-1990 period and the imposition of the Pressler Amendment on Pakistan.<sup>110</sup> The political environment at the global as well as at the national level had left the Musharraf government in a dilemma, with a major challenge to gather and manoeuvre support of its people on its decision of joining the coalition forces in the war against terrorism.

Therefore, President Musharraf in order to buy support from his countrymen over his decision of joining the international forces discursively exploited the challenging international environment in which the global war on terrorism was launched.

Since ‘context’ helps influence security articulations, President Musharraf placed his security narrative around the broader political context of the threatening nature of the global war on terrorism and the US aphorism of ‘either you are with us or against us’. He tactfully declared his decision of joining the western forces as a “righteous call in the interest of the national ‘security’ of the state and argued that Pakistan’s non-participation in the war would prove detrimental to its existence”. Thus, in order to analyse ‘how’ Pakistan’s security agenda was ‘shaped’ in the post-2001 period, it is imperative to critically study the securitisation process in the country by examining President Musharraf’s speeches and addresses to the nation, justifying his decision of participating in the US-led global war on terrorism, which will be dealt with in the next section.

### **3. Securitisation Process: The Politics of Constructing Threats**

President Musharraf played around the political narrative of security by projecting his decision of joining the global war in the interest of country’s ‘national security’. Employing the word ‘security’, he presented the given situation as existentially threaten-

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<sup>110</sup> Pressler amendment banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the country’s President certifies on a regular basis that “Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device”.

ing. In his first address to the nation after joining the coalition forces on 19 September 2001, Musharraf justified Pakistan's participation in the war by providing a narrative around fighting for Pakistan's critical concerns, which included safeguarding the Pakistan state's interests in Kashmir vis-a-vis India, securing its nuclear asset, safeguarding state's sovereignty and reviving Pakistan's economy.<sup>111</sup> Like his predecessors, Musharraf too, discursively indulged in an anti-India narrative as a justification for the state's strategic policy action.

Presenting the decision of joining the international forces as urgent and serious, President Musharraf made use of various inferences to swing people's support towards its policies. For instance, projecting the time and situation as 'delicate', he reflected upon the need for Pakistan to be cautious in its decision making, showcasing that the refusal to join the international forces might land Pakistan in troubled waters and cause a direct consequence to its survival and territorial integrity. The deliberate use of the words 'survival' and 'territorial integrity' was intended to show that the refusal to join the US initiative might pose a direct threat to the country's 'existence' and jeopardise its image globally of being a responsible state.

Musharraf also used the rhetorical tactics of a 'diversionary war' to divert its domestic audience attention to an external threat to ensure unity and buy support. He professed that in case of its refusal to join the western forces, some of country's 'critical concerns' might be harmed. Employing the word 'critical', he professed that the country might lose upon some significant issues of national interest vis-a-vis its major security threat, the Indian state, which are paramount for its strategic calculus. In his speech, he laid particular emphasis on two issues; 'Nuclear Strength' and 'Kashmir' which Pakistan has been fighting for since its inception and holds a very high sensitive ground in the country (President Musharraf Speech, 19 September 2001).

In order to gather support, Musharraf made use of heuristic artefacts, such as invoking emotions and raising concerns on the Kashmir issue and the nuclear programme.

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<sup>111</sup> "President Address to the Nation", 19 September 2001, [Online Web] Accessed 12 March 2013 URL:<https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/13/address-19-september-2001/>

These two have for long been used as a tactic by the Pakistani state to manoeuvre support from its people on its Indo-centric policies. His deliberate reference to these issues was an attempt to evoke fear amongst the people that “Pakistan’s refusal to join the US in the war would damage the military parity that Pakistan had achieved with India by becoming a nuclear weapon state”. He further noted that, the non-compliance with the US would provide “the Americans the opportunity of an invasion to destroy such weapons. And India, needless to say, would have loved to assist the US to the hilt” (Musharraf 2006: 202). Further adding, that with Pakistan’s refusal “India would gain a golden opportunity with regard to Kashmir” (Musharraf 2006:202).

Musharraf thus very eloquently construed the ‘neighbourhood threat’ by reflecting that any wrong decision made by the Pakistani state will give opportunities to India to declare “Pakistan a terrorist state”, by readily “offering its bases, facilities and logistical support to the US”. He further added that Pakistan’s non-participation in the “global war on terrorism” will create an opportunity for the Indian state to place “an ‘anti-Pakistan government’ in Afghanistan”. Thus, the discursive representation of narratives, employed by President Musharraf, helped him construct a ‘security’ situation that required immediate attention and action plan, in the absence of which Pakistan might land up in an extreme form of insecurity on both side of its borders—eastern and western.

Musharraf’s decision to participate in the war however brought opposition from many religious parties and Ulemas in Pakistan. In 2002, many Islamist parties coalesced together to set up a party, called Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). The party fought the 2002 General Elections opposing American-led war on terror. It made a strong plea against the interference of the US in Pakistan and its vested interests. MMA stressed its campaign on the dire need of the enforcement of Prophetic order in the country and breaking the shackles of American slavery. It further projected that the forces objecting them were American agents and have facilitated the presence of the Americans and Jews at Pakistan’s airfields (Cheema et al. 2008: 41). Fighting the elections on opposing the US-led war on terror, MMA won “67 seats out of 342 in the

National Assembly” and emerged as the third major party, while it won a strong majority in the NWFP winning 47 seats out of 97.

However, turning down the opposition from the religious groups and parties, Musharraf specifically mentioned that the “global war on terrorism” that the Pakistani state agreed to support is not directed against ‘Islam’ nor ‘on the people of Afghanistan’. He also employed “a parallel discourse that justified his counter-militancy policy in terms of liberal/progressive interpretations of Islamic history” based on pragmatic wisdom (Yasmeen 2013).

The Musharraf regime justified its alliance with the US after 9/11 by employing Islamic symbols and deriving legitimacy for its actions from religion. Drawing upon “the Hudaibiah agreement <sup>112</sup>concluded between Prophet Muhammad and the kuffar (non-believers) of Makkah, President Musharraf argued that Islamic tradition allows for change by taking into account the ground realities and arrives at agreements that may contribute to long term benefits for the Muslim Ummah” (Yasmeen 2013). Thus, Pakistan’s policy of supporting US-led war initiatives appeared as merely reinforcing and reflecting of “its true, modern and Islamic identity through *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) and helping it claim its rightful position in the global community” (Yasmeen 2013).

Objecting to the opposition made by the religious class, Musharraf further clarified that the US and the corresponding war, has three targets:

Right from the beginning till now OBL and the Al-Qaeda movement are their first target”; “the second target is Taliban as they gave shelter to OBL and his Al-Qaeda network and rejected the demand made by the US to extradite him”; and the third that, “they intend to launch a prolonged war on international terrorism.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Prophet Muhammad had signed a no-war peace pact with his enemies in Mecca known as the Hudaibiyaa Agreement to thwart anti-Muslim conspiracies on the part of the Jews.

<sup>113</sup> President Musharraf Speech, The Middle East Media Research Institute, [Online Web] Accessed 8 September 2011 URL: <https://www.memri.org/reports/historic-post-911-speech-gen-musharraf-defends-collaboration-us-against-taliban-saying-hes>

While carefully treading his path, Musharraf very subtly pointed out his engagement with Taliban and expressed that the Pakistani state will make attempts to pursue the US to show restraint and balance towards Taliban. The move was not only an attempt to calm down the Taliban sympathetic forces in Pakistan but to signal to their former ally, the Taliban, that Pakistan will press for a policy of engagement and would move along with the international community to minimise the losses for both Afghanistan and Taliban. He therefore highlighted, that only by participating in the war, will the Pakistani state “be able to find a solution to the Afghan problem”. In this light he stated, “However, I would like to ask how can we save Afghanistan and Taliban from being harmed or how we can reduce their losses. Can we do by isolating ourselves from the international community or by moving along with them.” He further added, “We (Pakistanis) are also demanding from them (the US) the evidence they have about Osama Bin Laden.”<sup>114</sup> In an unclassified document released by the US, Musharraf is shown to have expressed his concerns upon having a friendly government in Kabul and sought clarifications from the US whether its counterterrorism mission is intended against striking Osama Bin Laden or the Taliban as well.<sup>115</sup>

Lastly, he justified his decision of joining “the US-led global war on terrorism” in the name of country’s national interest. The inferences, such as “I am only concerned about Pakistan”, “Pakistan is considered to be the fortress of Islam and if this fortress is harmed, Islam will be harmed”, “defeat the elements who are trying to harm the country for nothing” and “we have to foil the designs of the enemy to protect the interests of the county”, were used to lay down the argument that country’s national interest is above everything, be it the politics of oppositional forces within the country, such as that from Ulemas, or an external threat from the neighbouring state of India

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<sup>114</sup> President Musharraf Speech, The Middle East Media Research Institute, [Online Web] Accessed 8 September 2011 URL: <https://www.memri.org/reports/historic-post-911-speech-gen-musharraf-defends-collaboration-us-against-taliban-saying-hes>

<sup>115</sup> US. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Musharraf Accepts the Seven Points”, September 4, 2001, National Security Archive (Released on September 13, 2010) [Online Web] Accessed 15 July 2017 URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/index.htm>

(Most of these excerpts are from Musharraf's 19 September 2001 address to the nation).<sup>116</sup>

Despite laying down the possibility of threats that Pakistan might face in case of state's refusal to join the coalition forces, President Musharraf failed to side the public opinion in his favour. An unclassified document of the cable channel between the US Secretary of State and Head of the Department, dated 7 November 2001, revealed that in a poll survey conducted shortly after 11 September, the Pakistanis were seen to be more favourable towards Taliban than they were before the attacks of 9/11 and recognised no compelling reasons for the Pakistani state to cut off their traditionally strong links with the Taliban government.<sup>117</sup>

The state of Pakistan thus resonated and sided with its people and despite being a frontline state to the US, it did not make a complete reversal on its policy towards Taliban. It instead advised the "USA to deal with the moderates among Taliban ranks in order to isolate Al-Qaeda after a short military campaign in Afghanistan". However, America perturbed by the Taliban forces, who refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden, co-opted members of the Northern Alliance to take charge in Kabul.

Therefore, Pakistan establishment's fixation on rivalry with the Indian state fed worries in the country's policy circle about a 'two front threat' (Yusuf 2013: 7). Its suspicion and fear of having a pro-Indian government in Afghanistan made it look at India's robust relationship with Afghanistan as a deliberate strategy of encirclement to trap Pakistan between two hostile fronts (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25-26). Guided by this fear, Pakistan did not make a complete reversal on its former Taliban policy and instead continued to see the group as a strategic asset in its security competition with the Indian state.

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<sup>116</sup> "Text:Musharraf rallies Pakistan", BBC News, 19 September 2001 [Online Web] Accessed 6 September 2013 URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media\\_reports/1553542.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1553542.stm)

<sup>117</sup> "Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford, Jr, To Secretary Of State Colin Powell, :Pakistan- Poll shows Strong and growing Public Support for Taliban", November 7, 2001, National Security Archive, Released on August 14, 2007 [Online Web] Accessed 8 September 2017 URL: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEFF/NSAEFF227/index.htm#16>



#### **4. Contours of Pakistan's New Security Agenda**

Despite joining the international war efforts in the war against terrorism, Pakistan did not clamp down upon the existing militant infrastructure prevalent in the country. The state did not bring about any serious change in its security outlook as it continued to fear India's perceived expansionist plans in the region. Fearing a two-front threat from India and Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to render its support to the anti-India and Afghan proxy groups.

Having promised unstinted cooperation to the US in the fight against global terrorism, Pakistan's participation in the global war on terrorism was based on a selective securitisation process. Given the state's strategic relationship with some of the militant groups, and its erstwhile ally – The Taliban, Pakistan did not perceive the existing militant environment in the state as a threat to state's security. The state thus "tightened pressure on groups whose objectives were out of sync with the military's perception of Pakistan's national interest", while shielded others who helped them meet their strategic interests. Thus, depending on the groups's utility to the state, Pakistan perceived, defined and securitised the threats differently in order to meet its security interests and accordingly manipulated its security policies and actions.

The state did not opt for an offensive stance against Taliban too and in fact helped them seek safe hideouts in the tribal areas against the US operations in Afghanistan. For example, the US-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom', aimed at sandwiching and preventing the movement of radical forces outside Afghanistan, required sealing and closing down of borders, including the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan's Khyber agency. However, the two routes of Miranshah and Mirali in Waziristan were left open despite known to have been intensely used by the mujahideens during the Soviet war. The decision to keep them open was read as a deliberate move on the part of the Pakistan military establishment who did not wish to upset the Afghan Taliban forces (Tellis 2008: 6). Thus, the operation to defeat the Al-Qaeda-Taliban network was partially successful as many senior Al-Qaeda figures and Taliban forces crossed into Pakistan and sought sanctuary in the FATA of Pakistan.

However, being given an opportunity to break away from the terrorist groups, Musharraf did not force all the jihadi groups out of business. Despite the mounting continuous international pressure, the Pakistani State construed the security threat around fighting the 'Al-Qaeda' and other foreign fighters from Arab and Central Asia, while spared their former ally, the Afghan Taliban conglomerate and the Pakistani groups for most part (Tellis 2008:7).

Pakistan's selective approach towards its erstwhile ally, the Taliban, was evident through state's policies in terms of the military operations carried out to defeat the network of terrorists, and the corresponding peace deals. For example, the attack on the US fire base, Shkin, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border compelled the US to pressurise "Pakistan security forces to conduct operations against foreign militants and their support networks in FATA". Under international pressure, Pakistan commenced "Operation Al Mizan' in 2002, in South Waziristan", where the state's primary objective remained to clear notable portions of South Waziristan of foreign fighters, i.e., "to kill or capture militants, especially foreign militants which threatened the Pakistani government". Although "Pakistan military, police and intelligence services did capture or kill several senior Al-Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Zubaidah and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, it ultimately failed to clear South Waziristan of foreign militants". The situation in Waziristan continued to deteriorate and was therefore followed by another operation, 'Kalosha II' (2004), partly in response to the ambush of Frontier Corps personnel in the area. During the operation, Pakistani forces killed a number of local and foreign fighters, disrupted a major Al-Qaeda command and control centre but once again not many from the Taliban ranks were attacked during the operation.

The military operations carried out by the Pakistani state were often followed by peaceful settlements with the militants from Taliban ranks and local groups. The agreements clearly showcased state's selective approach in fighting the militants by acting soft on the leaders of Taliban ranks and hard on fighting the foreign fighters. For example, the peace deals between the government and the rebel groups were primarily directed at pressurising the Taliban leaders to 'cease support for foreign mili-

tants' (Shakai Agreement 2004), and 'to stop attacks on any government functionary' and 'official property' in return for the release of Taliban prisoners and an assurance of no attacks on the local groups such as that of Baitullah Mehsud's or his supporters (Sararogha Peace Deal 2005). Most of the signed deals failed as the militants violated the terms of the agreement and opted out of the deal.

However, much to Pakistan's liking, the US government too initially was primarily concerned and focussed on attacking Al-Qaeda forces and "not on capturing Taliban leaders, whom they considered as a spent force" (Jones and Fair 2010: 45). Therefore, Pakistani state clamped down on groups directly linked to the Al-Qaeda and apprehended foreign fighters, which US policymakers were most interested in capturing. Former "Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage noted that, Musharraf did not push hard against the Taliban but was only cooperative in targeting some key Al-Qaeda militants". Adding further, "Robert Grenier, the then CIA's station chief in Pakistan professed that though the ISI worked closely with us to capture key Al-Qaeda leaders, they however made it clear that they didn't care about targeting the Taliban" (Jones and Fair 2010: 45).

Thus, the major support and assistance to Taliban came from the elements of the Pakistan government, in particular from officials in Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence and Frontier Corps. As Richard Armitage, further noted, "We had substantial information that there was a direct assistance from the Pakistan government to the Taliban between 2002 and 2004" (Jones 2008: 31). The ISI provided weapons and ammunition to the Taliban and also supplied indirect assistance, including financial assistance to Taliban training camps. US and NATO officials have alleged the ISI of providing "intelligence to Taliban insurgents at the tactical, operational and strategic levels; including tipping off Taliban forces about the location and movement of Afghan and coalition forces, which undermined several anti-Taliban military operations" (Jones 2008: 32).

Protective of Afghan Taliban, Musharraf, however, from the very beginning, was critical of the sectarian groups operating in the country, which he considered were hurt-

ing the national interest of the state. Much before joining the “global war on terrorism”, Pakistan took a decision to ban groups, such as “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi” and “Sipah-e-Muhammad” and place “Sipah-e-Sahaba” and “TJP” under observation. Though, after joining the US efforts in combating terrorism, Musharraf exploited the opportunity to target some of the religious extremist parties and groups who opposed his decision of joining the war and carried out protests against him in the country. For example, in numerous protest rallies, Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamists argued that Al-Qaeda has been a victim of US-Israeli conspiracy and that the impending attack was to hurt Muslim brothers in Afghanistan.

Thus, in order to crush down the growing opprobrium, Musharraf exploited the external environment of the global war on terrorism discourse and suppressed those militant sectarian groups and parties that have long dampened the Pakistani society, and unlike other militant groups, failed to serve country’s national interest. By calling sectarian groups a ‘threat’ to nation’s unity, President Musharraf discursively construed a security discourse around the dissident groups and exploited the opportunity to call for a ban of SSP and TJP. More so in order to receive support on his decision, Musharraf in his address to the nation once again construed his policy decision around serving country’s ‘national interest’. He postulated that the religious extremist groups and parties who are opposing Pakistan’s decision are trying to create a divide in the society by “preferring their personal and party interest over national interest” and alleged them of creating not just sectarian hatred but also “misleading thousands of Pakistanis to their massacre in Afghanistan”.<sup>118</sup> While continuously harping on the territorial notion of nationalism and keeping his country’s interest as foremost, Musharraf noted, “We must remember that we are Pakistanis. Pakistan is our identity, our motherhood. We will be aliens outside Pakistan and be treated as aliens. Pakistan is our land. It is our soil. If we forsake it, we will face difficulties. This lesson we must learn.” He thus made it imperative for Pakistan to protect its country and its na-

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<sup>118</sup> “In Musharraf’s Words: ‘A Day of Reckoning’”, The New York Times, 12 January 2002, [Online Web] Accessed 17 May 2013 URL:<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/12/international/in-musharrafs-words-a-day-of-reckoning.html?mtrref=undefined>

tional interest<sup>119</sup> (Musharraf's Address 12 January 2002). However, the banned “sectarian groups that had a support base in Punjab began moving to FATA to seek safe heavens and establish new camps”. The crackdown on some of these organisations contributed to its fragmentation and led them to joining the Al-Qaeda forces (Tellis 2008).

While being protective of Afghan Taliban on one hand and critical of the sectarian groups on the other, the Pakistani state continued to render its long standing support to the radical outfits such as “LeT, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen” operating against India in Kashmir. Defining them as ‘freedom fighters’, the Pakistani state presented their fight against the Indian state as ‘legitimate’ and continued to provide shelter and patronage to Kashmir militant groups.

However, the December 2001 Parliament attack on India by the two government-funded terrorist organisations- LeT and JeM brought the state of Pakistan under scrutiny. The growing international pressure to ban the organisations indulging in cross border terrorism left Pakistan in a conundrum, to either stay silent or earn international condemnation. The US State Department in 2001 bracketed some of the Pakistan based organisations and groups under the Foreign Terrorist Organisation category, a status that freezes all assets of the organisations in order to curtail “the support for terrorist activities and pressurise the groups to get out of terrorist business”.<sup>120</sup>

Musharraf, in order to guard the country against international condemnation, refuted India’s claim of Pakistan’s involvement in the Parliament attacks. He professed that “Pakistan rejects and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world” and that India must bring an end to “state terrorism and human rights violations” in

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<sup>119</sup> In Musharraf’s Words: ‘A Day of Reckoning’, The New York Times, January 12, 2002, [Online Web] Accessed 14 April 2016 URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/12/international/in-musharraf-words-a-day-of-reckoning.html>

<sup>120</sup>“Foreign Terrorist Organisations,” US Department of State, [Online Web] Accessed 10 June 2016 URL: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

Kashmir.<sup>121</sup> However, protecting himself from people's condemnation of fighting an American war, Musharraf reiterated his commitment towards the continuation of "moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris" and once again appealed to the "international community, especially to the US, to play an active role in solving the Kashmir dispute".

In another address months later, Musharraf iterated his stand that, "Pakistan soil would not be allowed to be used for terrorism against anybody. I also want to tell the world and give the assurance that no infiltration is taking place across the LOC. But a liberation movement is going on in Occupied Kashmir and Pakistan cannot be held responsible for any action against the Indian tyranny and repression."<sup>122</sup> Further adding, "Pakistan will always fulfil its duty of providing moral, political and diplomatic support to the cause of Kashmir. Pakistan will always support the Kashmiri struggle for liberation"<sup>123</sup> (President General Musharraf's Address to the Nation 27 May 2002).

With the mounting international and domestic tensions, Musharraf did not leave any opportunity to play the Kashmir card to manage the growing wave of opposition in the country over Pakistan's participation in the war. In his address to the UN, he alleged India of "misusing the rationale of the war against terrorism, to de-legitimise the Kashmir freedom struggle, tarnish Pakistan with the brush of terrorism and drive a

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<sup>121</sup> "In Musharraf's Words: 'A Day of Reckoning'", The New York Times, January 12, 2002, [Online Web] Accessed 14 April 2016 URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/12/international/in-musharrafs-words-a-day-of-reckoning.html>

<sup>122</sup> "President Address to the Nation", May 27, [Online Web] Accessed 4 October 2015 URL: <https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/20/musharraf-address-27-may-2002/>

<sup>123</sup> "President Address to the Nation", May 27, [Online Web] Accessed 4 October 2015 URL: <https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/20/musharraf-address-27-may-2002/>

wedge between it and its coalition partners.”<sup>124</sup> Terrorist acts must be condemned, he said, but warned that, “the just struggle of people for self-determination and liberation from colonial or foreign occupation cannot be outlawed in the name of terrorism.”<sup>125</sup> Thus, the Pakistani state differentiated its support for Kashmir militant groups by discursively representing and recognising them as ‘freedom fighters’, presenting their terrorist acts as ‘struggle for liberation’ and justifying their war as a fight for ‘self-determination’ against the Indian state.

However, with increased allegations of involvement of indigenous militant groups in terrorist activities and the mounting pressure from the US, Pakistan issued an “Anti-Terrorist Amendment Ordinance” on 16 November 2002. The amendment led to the banning of six terrorist organisations in Pakistan, namely “Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Muhammadi and Tehreek-e-Islam”.<sup>126</sup> The ban, however, turned a few local groups, such as JeM, against President Musharraf and carried out assassination attempts at him. And, despite the policy actions undertaken by the Pakistani government, “the country’s record in dealing with such radical groups has been highly duplicitous as the banning usually implied a name change or a temporary suspension of operations of these organisations. For example, Pakistani intelligence gave advance notice of the impending ban to LeT’s Hafiz Saeed and the leaders of other militant groups. This advance notice allowed them to transfer their financial assets to new bank accounts and expeditiously to re-emerge under new names” (Fair 2019: 11). Lashkar-e-Toiba, an anti-Indian militant group was banned and regrouped under a new name of Jamaat-

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<sup>124</sup> “ Kashmir a threat to peace, warns Musharraf: World help sought for Indo=Pakistan talks”, Dawn, September 13, 2002 [Online Web] Accessed 5 October 2016 URL: ( <https://www.dawn.com/news/57035/kashmir-a-threat-to-peace-warns-musharraf-world-help-sought-for-indo-pakistan-talks>)

<sup>125</sup> “ Kashmir a threat to peace, warns Musharraf: World help sought for Indo=Pakistan talks”, Dawn, September 13, 2002 [Online Web] Accessed 5 October 2016 URL: ( <https://www.dawn.com/news/57035/kashmir-a-threat-to-peace-warns-musharraf-world-help-sought-for-indo-pakistan-talks>)

<sup>126</sup> “Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002,” South Asia Terrorism Portal , [Online Web] Accessed 5 May 2015 URL: [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/actsandordinances/anti\\_terrorism\\_ordin\\_2002.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/actsandordinances/anti_terrorism_ordin_2002.htm)

ud-Dawa (JuD), which presently operates as a humanitarian charity organisation in Pakistan. However, wanting a decisive action against the group, the US blacklisted JuD as a FTO, though the group continues to function openly in Pakistan.

With the mounting international pressure during 2006-2007, General Musharraf and ISI attempted to confine the activities of the Kashmir-based militant groups and made attempts to restrict them to their training camps (Haqqani 2005: 306). But rather than remaining inactive, some of “the militants from the Kashmir centric groups migrated towards the Afghan front via FATA to access the Afghan centric militant infrastructure. The westward migrating militants linked up with pro-state groups, most notably the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network rendered their support to the Al-Qaeda members and other foreign fighters” (Tankel 2013: 10).

Hence, during Musharraf's rule, Islamabad followed a selective security policy. He employed a narrative justifying some of the actions against and safeguards for different militant groups operating within the country. He justified and defended his policies against militant groups by making a discursive distinction between what he refers to as “good” and “bad” Taliban; wherein “those with ties to the ISI enjoyed protection, whereas the ones trying to operate independently or attacking Pakistan's security forces were targeted for elimination” (Haqqani 2013: 327).

Furthermore, Musharraf countered the war discourse emanating from the West and metamorphosed his liberal Islamic discourse into a declared policy of “enlightened moderation”. In his plea for enlightened moderation, Musharraf stated:

The world has become an extremely dangerous place.... The unfortunate reality is that both the perpetrators of these crimes are Muslims. This has caused many non-Muslims to believe wrongly that Islam is a religion of intolerance, militancy and terrorism. It has led increasing number of people to link Islam to fundamentalism, fundamentalism to extremism and extremism to terrorism. The idea for untangling this knot is ‘Enlightened Moderation’; a two-way pronged strategy for both the Muslims and non-Muslim world. The first part is for the Muslims to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socio-economic uplift. The second is for the West and the US in particular, to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice



and to aid in the socio-economic betterment of the deprived Muslim world.<sup>127</sup>

Presenting Islam as a religion and Pakistan as a nation which is both enlightened and moderate, Musharraf proclaimed to maintain a conciliatory approach to fight a belief that Islam is a religion of militancy and is in conflict with the ideals of modernisation, democracy, and secularism. President Musharraf noted that the root cause of the problem lies in political issues rather than in religion. He stipulated that Islam as a religion does not preach or infuse militancy and extremism, and instead the political disputes and the subsequent reactions from the West antagonise the Muslim masses and result in a total polarisation of their opinion against the US. He further added that Islam as a religion has always served as a flag bearer of a just, tolerant, lawful, and value-oriented society.

Despite the liberal narratives promoted by the state, questions have been raised at Pakistan's commitment to the "global war on terrorism". Pakistan is known to have sheltered and patronised various militant groups for different security related reasons. The establishment in Pakistan continues to show allegiance to the North Waziristan based Haqqani network, Afghanistan's most experienced and sophisticated insurgent organisation whose relationship with the Pakistani army dates back to the period of Afghan jihad. The documents discovered "from Haqqani compounds in early 2002 provide evidence of the network being historically dependent almost entirely on the ISI for cash, weapons, and virtually all supplies during the early 1990s" (Counter Terrorism Centre 2012: 17). Officially subsumed under the larger Taliban umbrella organisation led by Mullah Omar and his Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqanis enjoy being a major ally to the Al-Qaeda leadership. Despite being a major advocator of Bin Laden within Taliban and an anti-American group, the Haqqani network continues to enjoy considerable backing and support from Pakistan's establishment, primarily the ISI wing.

Therefore, from the period between 2002 and 2007, Pakistan's overall anti-militant strategy involved a mix of military actions, peace deals, and relative neglect. The mil-

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<sup>127</sup>Musharraf, Pervez, "A plea for Enlightened Moderation", Ministry of Defence, Pakistan, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2004 [Online Web] Accessed 19<sup>th</sup> January 2014 URL: <http://defence.pk/threads/a-plea-for-enlightened-moderation.282553/>.

itary operations against selective groups and the failed peace deals emboldened and strengthened the hold of the radical groups and fortified their confidence in contending the Pakistani state. For example, “with the aid of the foreigners, local militant groups made significant inroads in usurping the power of tribal maliks, increasing the importance of mullahs who espoused a Taliban worldview”. Moreover, the peace deals such as “Shakai Agreement of 2004, Sararogha Agreement of 2005” with Baitullah Mehsud and the Swat deal, all reinforced the position of the militant leaders vis-a-vis the state. One of the documents of the Interior Ministry in Pakistan noted, “that the general policy of appeasement towards the Taliban has further emboldened them” (Jones and Fair 2010: 55). However, Pakistanis in the period between 2007 and 2008 were supportive of the peace deals with the militants and were opposed to “army combat operations against militants in Pakistan” (Jones and Fair 2010: 31)

More so, Pakistan’s joining of the war against terrorism was not well accepted by the local militant groups who sought alliance with Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The pretext of these groups was that Pakistani forces were proxies of the American campaign in Afghanistan and are fighting an American war on Pakistani soil. Between 2004 and 2007, a strong cohort of anti-Pakistan militant groups, later to coalesce under the TTP brand emerged to command much of the FATA, running affairs on their own terms (Qazi 2011). The militancy challenge therefore remained no longer limited to just foreign fighters. These actors were the principal beneficiaries of the peace deals and used it to strengthen their position within the local social hierarchy to force their rivals into submission. Most of the FATA areas came under the rule of Taliban, who espoused a wave of ‘Talibanization’ in the region.

However, during the first phase, even though Islamabad made a slight change in its pro-Taliban policy, “it didn’t amount to de-recognising India as a major security threat in its national security consideration”. In fact, the Indian threat was quoted as one of the key reasons to justify Islamabad’s pro-US role in the war in Afghanistan. Even though Pakistan participated and carried out various military operations, it did not break away entirely from its old security narrative and continued to aid and harbour the pro-Pakistan or good Taliban groups, to meet its regional security interests.

Pakistan is also alleged of using the US security assistance funds for counter-terrorism operations to bolster its conventional capabilities against India while paying insufficient attention to counterinsurgency capacity.<sup>128</sup> Joining the war efforts, Pakistan became one of the United States' top recipient of foreign military assistance. Between 2002 and 2008, Pakistan received a funding of around US \$12 billion. Most of the aid received by Pakistan came in the form of the Coalition Support Fund, technically a reimbursement fund for logistical and military support to US military operations. The military and security aid provided by the US, made the army the incharge of the military operations, which did not see the war against extremists who target the US and Afghanistan as its own fight. Thus, most of the aid given to Pakistan was used in “purchasing helicopters, F-16s, aircraft-mounted armaments, and anti-ship and antimissile defence systems”, whose relevance to the state's counter-terrorism mission has been questioned. The apprehension and concern was also shared by the former US President, George Bush, who remarked, “Pakistani military spent most of its resources preparing for war with India. Its troops were trained to wage a conventional battle with its neighbour, and not counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas. The fight against the extremists came second” (Bush 2010: 221-212).

#### **4.1 Phase 11: 2007 and Beyond**

Pakistan's approach of being conspicuously selective towards various militant groups not only helped a few of them re-organise and re-group but also led to the growth and spread of new extremist forces in the country. The growing dissatisfaction towards the “military-led government of Musharraf”, who was seen as a puppet controlled by the US, led to the growth of new militant groups in the Pashtun tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan. The new Islamists, unlike the old ones (who worked along with the Pakistani state), turned critical towards the Pakistani state for supporting a US-led war against its own people. With the rise of TTP, the group embarked upon a violent campaign against the Pakistani government.

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<sup>128</sup> Bajoria, Jayshree (2009), “Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces”, Council on Foreign Relations , [Online Web] Accessed 17 June 2015 URL: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/realigning-pakistans-security-forces>

TTP carried out blatant attacks on military and intelligence personnel and installations in the country's high security zones. The direct attack on the state institutions and authorities created an alarming security situation in the Pakistani state. The group not only attacked the state's writ but also made direct challenges to the state's claim to Islamic-ness. In Pakistan, since both civilian and military leadership have relied extensively on instrumentalising Islam to manage Pakistan's security, and to protect the ideology of the state, the challenge to their Islamic claim created worries among the state's policy circuit.

Therefore, given the increasing tide of violence and attacks on state institutions and authorities, the dominant political elites in Pakistan decided to make a shift in their approach towards the presence of extremist and terrorist elements in the state. Acknowledging the gravity of the challenges emanating from the militant groups within the state, the former Army Chief, General Kayani, "addressing the 91st officers commissioning parade of Pakistan navy at the Pakistan Naval Academy in 2009, stated that while external threat continue to exist, the internal threats merit immediate attention". Further noting that, "Forces of extremism and terrorism pose a threat to our national security and stability."<sup>129</sup> The former President, Zardari, declared that the government will not succumb to any pressure by militants. He professed that, "military action is only one aspect of the solution and that the government is pursuing the 3Ds (Dialogue, Development and Deterrence) strategy".<sup>130</sup>

Despite being a partner in the fight against terrorism for long, it was then for the first time that Pakistan made a shift from politically tackling the issue of terrorism and extremism in the state to securitising it, bringing it in the 'security realm' by attaching an emergent need to use extraordinary measures to combat what it calls as an existential threat.

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<sup>129</sup> "Kayani says internal threat merits immediate attention", *The Dawn*, 4 July 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 18 October 2014 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/475476>

<sup>130</sup> Ahmed, Farzand (2009), "Window on Pak Press: Gilani thinks of new policy on terror", *The India Today*, 7 April 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 14 November 2013 URL: <https://www.indiatoday.in/column-window-on-pak-press/story/window-on-pak-press-gilani-thinks-of-new-policy-on-terror-43765-2009-04-07>

The shift in Pakistan's security approach came only in the post-2007 period when the state itself became a major victim of terrorist violence. Developments such as the change in the theatre of terrorist activities from country's tribal areas to the urban centres as well as an increased use of suicide bombings served as factors that helped the state win support of its people towards carrying out actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.

### ***Shift in the Theatre of Terrorist Activities***

The eminent challenge in terms of the shift in the theatre of terrorist activities can be attributed to the rise of a group, referred to as "Punjabi Taliban". The Punjab province which houses the greatest concentration of hard line madrasas provided a steady supply of young recruits to jihadist groups all around Pakistan.<sup>131</sup> Thus, being of Punjabi origin, these groups provided logistical support to FATA-based militants to conduct terrorist operations in Pakistan's sensitive cities, such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Lahore. For example, according to a translation prepared by the SITE Intel Group, a group called Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab claimed credit for a suicide car-bomb attack in Lahore on 27 May 2009, which resulted in the killing of 40 people and injured nearly 150, to retaliate the Pakistani army operations against the TNSM in the Swat Valley, signalling closing up of ties between Punjabi extremists and their Pashtun brethren.<sup>132</sup>

### ***Rise of Suicide Attacks***

The Pakistan state's changed policy response can also be broadly attributed to the dramatic rise of suicide bombings in the country. Pakistan increasingly became a victim of suicide bombings as the attacks in the country "escalated dramatically after the Lal Masjid operation in 2007 and has spread to stable parts of the country, including the state's heartland". Suicide bomber training camps were active in various parts of

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<sup>131</sup> "Pakistan: Punjabi Taliban rears its ugly head", [rediff.com](http://www.rediff.com/news/report/slide-show-1-pakistan-punjabi-taliban-rears-its-head/20110309.htm), March 9, 2011 [Online Web] Accessed 30 September 2015 URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/report/slide-show-1-pakistan-punjabi-taliban-rears-its-head/20110309.htm>

<sup>132</sup> Kagan, Frederick and Ahmad Majidiyar (2009), "Punjabi Taliban", *Critical Threats*, 28 May 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 1 February 2014 URL: [https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/punjabi-taliban#\\_ftn12](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/punjabi-taliban#_ftn12)

the FATA especially in North and South Waziristan and in Malakand division of the NWFP until the military operations in 2009. The first camp to specialise in training suicide bomber was the Kothai camp under Qari Hussain. It is also estimated that more than 90 per cent of suicide bombers who joined the training camps in Waziristan were Pashtuns.

Moreover, “according to an unpublished internal report from Pakistan’s Special Investigation Group in 2009, approximately 70 per-cent of these attacks were conducted by fighters from the Mehsud tribe”. Being trained to use their body as explosive devices, recruits were often brainwashed about the atrocities against Muslims and were fed with a feeling of revenge. They were motivated by the spirit of martyrdom or shahadat and believed that a suicide bomber wins paradise and enters the afterlife the moment the explosives detonate (Tajik 2010: 1-4).

(Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan (2002-2016)

YEAR	INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED
2002	1	15	34
2003	2	69	103
2004	7	89	321
2005	4	84	219
2006	7	161	352
2007	54	765	1677
2008	59	893	1846
2009	76	949	2356
2010	49	1167	2199
2011	41	628	1183
2012	39	365	607

YEAR	INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED
2013	43	751	1411
2014	25	336	601
2015	20	188	410
2016	19	401	935

South Asia Terrorism Portal

Source: <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm>

Suicide attacks increased enormously after the 2007 Lal Masjid siege carried out by the Pakistani army, but assumed an even more dangerous dimension in 2008 when it became a regular feature in an asymmetric warfare between the security forces and militants. In 2008, suicide bombers increasingly targeted the state's security apparatus and symbols of economic activity in the country (Pakistan Security Report 2008: 13). The attacks on Pakistan ordinance Factory in Wah, Federal Investigation Agency Headquarters, Navy War College in Lahore and Marriot hotel in Islamabad were some of the major attacks that targeted foreign nationals, sensitive organisations, and security personnel.

A steady rise of suicide bombings was witnessed in 2009 after the military launched the Rah-E-Nijat operation against Pakistan Taliban in South Waziristan. The attacks increased particularly against the state, and the pro-state clerics and tribal elders who opposed the Taliban forces. ISI officers were attacked in Lahore, Peshawar and Multan and religious scholar Mufti Sarfraz Naeemi (who presided over a conference condemning suicide attacks) was killed by a teenage suicide bomber who blew himself after the Friday prayer at Jamia Naeema (PIPS 2009:20-22).

However, in the following years there has been a slight reduction in the number of suicide attacks. The decrease can be attributed to the closing down of many suicide bomber training camps in the tribal areas of Pakistan after the military operations in the area. A new phenomenon was witnessed in which women were being used as sui-

cide bombers. The first ever suicide attack perpetrated by a female struck on IDP camp in Kohat in April 2010 (PIPS 2010:14-15).

Therefore, the shift in the theatre of terrorist activities to the urban centres and attack on non-combatants posed a direct challenge to state's functional legitimacy in their failure to provide security to its people. For example, the attack carried out by "Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (splintered group of TTP)" on the Wagah border post with India in 2014 killed around 60 people including three security personnel (Pakistan Security Report 2014: 25). As compared to the previous years (2014 and 2015), the death toll increased in 2016 as the attacks were planned targeting the minority communities and public places. "Most of the fatalities in suicide attacks in 2016 resulted from the attacks on Christian community members (mainly women and children) in a park in Lahore, in Civil hospital in Quetta, on pro-government tribesmen in Mohmand Agency and on police cadets in Police Academy near Quetta" (Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies 2016: 44).

The dismal security situation in the country thus helped the state authorities to manoeuvre support from its people towards taking a tough stance at the militants without losing the state's claim to Islamic-ness. Pakistanis who demanded a greater role of Sharia and Islamic principles in running the polity of the state also turned dismissive of the Taliban style rule and supported the government on their approach towards the extremist groups in the country. People in Pakistan as a nation seemed concerned about extremism affecting their lives, as 72 per-cent decried extremism in a survey in 2008.<sup>133</sup> This gave the government the required support to defeat the militant nexus without fearing a backlash from its citizens who initially opposed Pakistan's military operations against the militants. By winning over the support of the people, Pakistan conducted many military operations such as "Operation Rah-e-Haq", "Rah-e-Rast" and "Rah-e-Nijat" and "Zarb -e-Azb" during the period between 2008 and 2014 against the Pakistan Taliban in Swat district and South Waziristan to secure back "key

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<sup>133</sup> "Few in Pakistan support extremists", Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 17<sup>th</sup> March 2014 URL: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/03/12/few-in-pakistan-support-extremists/>.



lines of communication and weaken the TTP and its infrastructure, including its support base within the Mehsud tribe, one of the largest Pashtun tribes in South Waziristan". The Pakistan-led military operations will be discussed in the next chapter.

### **5. Changed Public Opinion: Support for Military Operations**

Public attitudes and opinions are critical for drawing support for any security policy action. The support is more critical in a democratic setup as the state actors requires legitimacy to carry out policies which are outside the normal bounds of political procedure. The state of Pakistan failed to manoeuvre support of its citizens on its security approach adopted during the first phase of the global war on terrorism. Pakistanis had not embraced state's approach of carrying out military operations in tribal areas till 2008. During the first few initial years of the war, they were divided over army-led military operations against militants in the NWFP and FATA, and were instead supportive of the infamous peace deals.

However, following the failed peace deals and overreach of the Taliban forces into the settled areas, public opinion changed dramatically since 2009. The shift in the theatre of terrorist activities to the urban centres, and the rise of suicide attacks resulting in the death of both combatants and non-combatants helped the military manoeuvre support of its people in carrying out military operations against the anti-state groups, targeting the Pakistani state. "Pakistani public attitudes are important to Pakistan's ability and political will to stay involved in military operations against the militants" (Fair 2009: 40). Therefore, the above stated factors helped the dominant state elites to transform the perception amongst the Pakistanis around the Taliban movement in Pakistan. By presenting it as an internal threat, the state justified the use of extraordinary measures (policing as well as use of military forces) as an appropriate response to the menace of terrorism in the country (Soherwordi 2011: 51).

The major change however came with the Swat offensive against the Taliban militants in April 2009. The army this time enjoyed complete support from the country's parliament and launched an effective information and awareness campaign to bring a paradigm shift in public opinion about militants. "The All Parties Conference (APC),

which was convened by the then ruling Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) on 18 May 2009, passed an unanimous resolution for the military operation in Swat”.<sup>134</sup> The government also issued 64 notifications through “Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), prohibiting any media coverage of banned organisations or those having links to the Taliban or other terrorist groups” (PIPS 2019: 28).

The support for military actions also went up considerably as the country suffered its worst year of terrorist violence in 2009. More than 3021 people were reported to have been killed and 7,334 to be injured in terrorist activities. The state witnessed a 45 per cent rise in attacks over the previous year<sup>135</sup> which caused a major shift in the attitude of people towards the terrorist organisations. The change in the attitudes of the people were also primarily because of the shift in the target audience. Previously, the terrorist attacks were mainly targeted against the police and military authorities and the state institutions but towards the end of 2009 purely civilian targets in the urban cities were also hit. Given the growing trend of attacks on the non-combatants, the year 2009 witnessed an upward rise in the unfavourable status of terrorist groups amongst the Pakistanis. The following table show the relative change in the attitudes of people from 2008 to 2009.

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<sup>134</sup> “APC endorses Swat operation”, *Dawn*, 19 May 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 26 October 2014 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/958711>

<sup>135</sup> Shah, Saeed, “Pakistan Suffers worst year of terrorist violence”, *The Telegraph*, January 11, 2010 [Online Web] Accessed 2 March 2016 URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/6968817/Pakistan-suffers-worst-year-of-terrorist-violence.html>


### Views on Terrorist Organisations in Pakistan

	2008	2009	Change
<b>Al Qaeda</b>			
Favourable	25	9	-16
Unfavourable	34	61	+27
Don't Know	41	30	-11
	2008	2009	Change
<b>Taliban</b>			
Favourable	27	10	-17
Unfavourable	33	70	37
Don't Know	40	20	-20

Source: Pew Research Centre <sup>136</sup>


The support for the extremist groups, both transnational and indigenous, has considerably gone down over the years. The following poll surveys project the decrease in the favourability quotient of few terrorist groups operating in the country.

### Views on Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan




<sup>136</sup> "Pakistani Public Opinion Overview", Pew Research Centre: Global Attitudes and Trends, August 13, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 12 October 2014 URL: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/08/13/pakistani-public-opinion/>

### Views on LeT




### Views on Taliban



Source: Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Centre, June 2012<sup>137</sup>

<sup>137</sup> "Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of the US", Pew Research Centre, 27 June 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 16 May 2015 URL:<http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Pakistan-Report-FINAL-Wednesday-June-27-2012.pdf>

The above mentioned surveys clearly indicate the overall rise in unpopularity of the terrorist organisations in the state. However, the relative differences amongst different groups indicate support for some groups over others due to the internalisation of state’s selective terrorism discourse.



The increase in the attacks on state institutions and suicide bombings, resulting in the death of non-combatants, have tuned people against “groups such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and especially Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan”. However, considered as a state tool in the fight against India over Kashmir, LeT, an anti-Indian outfit responsible for various attacks against the Indian state continues to relatively enjoy a more favourable status than other groups. The support for LeT is evident as even though Pakistanis have started to support the war initiatives against extremist elements within the country, they continue to perceive the threat from India as a major security challenge to the nation. For instance, in January 2013 an army spokesman clarified that even though the army recognises that the gravest threat to the country comes from the homegrown militants, “yet it does not mean that the ‘conventional threat’ (read: India) has receded” (Weinbaum 2014: 53). In a poll conducted in the spring of 2014, Pakistanis

seemed to be more wary of the Indian threat than of the terrorist groups, with 51 per cent of them recognising India as the greatest threat to the country, followed by Taliban (25 per cent) and Al-Qaeda (2 per cent) (Afzal 2015: 2).

### The Greatest Threat to the Country


	2009	2010	2011	2012
India	48	53	57	59
Taliban	32	23	19	23
Al Qaeda	4	3	5	4
All/None	7	11	9	7
Don't Know	9	10	10	7

Though, the traditional Indian threat continues to surface as a major security concern, a good majority in Pakistan categorise the American state as an enemy too. The US war narrative, the collateral damage caused by the drone attacks, the increased presence and encroachment of American forces in Pakistan have all contributed to a wave of anti-Americanism in Pakistan. The poll conducted by the New America Foundation in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas found that "almost 90 per cent of the respondents opposed US military operations in the region".<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Bergen, Peter, "Drones decimating Taliban in Pakistan", CNN, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2012, [Online Web] Accessed 18<sup>th</sup> February 2014 URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/03/opinion/bergen-drones-taliban-pakistan/>.

## Opinion on US in Pakistan



Source: Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (18 July 2013)

The growing discontent of the people of Pakistan towards America has raised concerns amongst both US and Pakistan policy makers. People in Pakistan from the very beginning have been critical about Pakistani state's participation in the US-led global war on terrorism. The human and infrastructural cost borne by the Pakistani populace has further turned the Pakistanis against the American state. Despite having exponentially invested in Pakistan's military assistance program since the 9/11, the growing anti-Americanism in the state has become a serious cause of concern for the American policymakers. Therefore, in order to counter the growing tide of anti-Americanism in the state, the US shifted its focus from providing security related assistance to investing in non-military aid. It introduced the Kerry Lugar-Berman bill in the year 2010, which authorised the release of \$1.5 billion per year for the next five years to the government of Pakistan in the form of civil-assistance aid.

Despite the policy initiatives, the relationship between Pakistan and US has been at its lowest ebb. In January 2011, the two countries clashed over the actions of Raymond

Davis, a contractor for the US CIA who killed two young Pakistani men in Lahore.<sup>139</sup> The incident enraged Pakistani intelligence officials “who demanded deep cuts in the CIA’s presence in Pakistan and insisted that Americans send home many special forces personnel who were involved in training Pakistani security forces” (Fair 2012: 101-102). While the relations were already troubled, the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden by US, in Abbottabad in 2011, near Pakistan’s cantonment area, inflicted a new catastrophic blow and raised serious concerns among US policy makers over Pakistan’s commitment towards the war against terrorism. Many in the US policy circle have questioned the utility of the aid provided to Pakistan and have raised questions over the dubious or complicit behaviour of Pakistan army. Instead of admitting the disturbing truth, the investigation commission report taken out by Pakistan called the US raid that killed Osama Bin Laden an “American act of war”.<sup>140</sup>

While, the Pakistani State was internationally condemned for supporting terrorist elements in their country, people in Pakistan too remained critical of US interference and encroachment in their country’s affairs. Many Pakistanis disapproved of the US military operation that killed Al-Qaeda leader, Laden. According to a poll released by Pew Research Centre, nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) expressed disapproval of the raid, while only 10 per cent said they approved it.<sup>141</sup> The raid also brought in question the institutional legitimacy of the Pakistani State as majority of people were disgruntled with their own country’s leadership. According to a public poll, 92 per cent of

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<sup>139</sup> The US government claimed that the two men threatened Davis with weapons and that he acted in self-defence. While a Pakistani based journalist reported that the incident was orchestrated by the Pakistan Intelligence wing to force the US government to curtail unilateral intelligence operations.

<sup>140</sup> Stange, Hannah, “US raid that killed Bin Laden was ‘an act of war’, says Pakistani report”, The Telegraph, 9 July 2013, [Online Web] Accessed 15 July 2014 URL:<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10169655/US-raid-that-killed-bin-Laden-was-an-act-of-war-says-Pakistani-report.html>


<sup>141</sup> “Death of Bin Laden and the Battle Against Extremists”, Pew Research Centre, 21 June 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 27 June 2016 URL:<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2011/06/21/chapter-3-death-of-bin-laden-and-the-battle-against-extremists/>



Pakistanis expressed dissatisfaction with the direction that their country was headed in.<sup>142</sup>

The increased encroachment on Pakistan's territorial sovereignty and integrity by the US, especially in case of drone at-

tacks and Abbottabad raid, antagonised the domestic populace. The 2009 Gallup poll showed "that only 9 per cent of respondents approved of the drone strikes in Pakistan" (Bergen and Katherine 2010: 1).



Therefore, in order to maintain its legitimacy and repose its faith back in people, the state in Pakistan condemns the US military operations and drone strikes in the tribal regions. The condemnation of drone strikes and Pakistan's selective approach to terrorism has time and again created friction in the relationship between the two states. For example, the drone strikes focussed on the North Waziristan tribal area, targeting the members of the Haqqani network in 2012 were condemned by the Pakistani officials, objecting them to be violative of Pakistan's sovereignty.<sup>143</sup> Moreover, the US led precise drone strike on the TTP chief, Hakimullah Mehsud, in North Waziristan in 2013, a day before government's initiative to send delegation for peace talks with the Taliban brought a lot of opposition from the Pakistani government. Condemning the strikes, the-then Interior Minister, Chaudhary Nisar said that the strike sabotaged efforts to establish peace in the country,<sup>144</sup> and that the prospect of dialogue with the

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<sup>142</sup> "Poll: Most Pakistanis Disapproved of US killing Bin Laden", *CNN*, 22 June 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 17 December 2015 URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/21/pakistan.bin.laden.poll/index.html>

<sup>143</sup> Nauman, Qasim, "Pakistan condemns U.S. Drone strikes", *Reuters*, June 4, 2012 [Online Web] Accessed 10 June 2015 URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa-drones/pakistan-condemns-u-s-drone-strikes-idUSBRE8530M-S20120604>

<sup>144</sup> Sherazi, Zahir Shah (2013), "Pakistani Taliban Chief Hakimullah Mehsud Killed in Drone Attack", 1 November 2013, [Online Web] Accessed 18 November 2013 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1053410/pakistani-taliban-chief-hakimullah-mehsud-killed-in-drone-attack>

militants was unfortunately no longer possible.<sup>145</sup> The PTI chief, Imran Khan, moved a motion in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) assembly to block NATO supply lines in KPK from 20 November 2013 onwards. Criticising the US actions, Khan professed that the strike on the TTP leaders had destroyed chances of peace and that Pakistan has suffered damages as a result of the war on terror.<sup>146</sup>

More so, Pakistan believes that drone strikes have been counter-productive to Pakistan as it drives more Pakistanis into the arms of militant groups. For instance, “Pakistan-born US citizen Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a bomb in Time Square cited drone strikes in Pakistan as one of the reasons for his grievances against the US policy makers”.<sup>147</sup> According to Pakistan, the killing of innocent civilians have radicalised more people to join the ranks of the extremist groups, while the US officials, on the other hand, claim that such strikes are a highly effective way of attacking militants and an important weapon in the war against militancy. Some of the most dreaded commanders such as TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud and his successor Hakimullah Mehsud, and some Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives were killed in missile strikes by US predator drones.

While Pakistan opposes excessive intervention of the American forces on its territory, it does recognise the challenges posed by few extremist groups on its own state security. Realising the potential of the threat emanating from within its soil, the Pakistani state for the first time officially came up with its National Internal Security Policy in 2014. The policy came in the wake of the consistent and direct attacks by the terrorist forces on the state institutions, which included the “beheading of 23 captured soldiers

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<sup>145</sup> “Peace Talks with TTP over, Chaudhry Nisar laments”, *The Express Tribune*, 4 November 2013, [Online Web] Accessed 2 March 2014 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/627003/peace-talks-with-the-ttp-over-chaudhry-nisar-laments/>

<sup>146</sup> “Will block Nato supply line from November 20 in K-P: Imran Khan”, *The Express Tribune*, 4 November 2013, [Online Web] Accessed 14 July 2016 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/627025/we-will-block-nato-supply-line-from-november-20-imran-khan/>

<sup>147</sup> Awan, Imran, “US drone attacks are further radicalising Pakistan”, *The Guardian*, June 2, 2013 [Online Web] Accessed 16 July 2015 URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/02/us-drone-strikes-pakistan-terrorists>

from Pakistan's frontier corps in February 2014",<sup>148</sup> the attack on "the Karachi airport which led to the killing of 28 airport security personnel in June 2014 and the failure of peace talks with the TTP.

Given the security situation in the state, the policy acknowledged the gravity of challenges that the state encounters from the "non-traditional threats of violent extremism and terrorism. In order to defeat an ideologically motivated network of terrorists", the policy envisaged both soft and hard interventions included in their comprehensive response plan and combined deterrence plan respectively. While the soft approach contained provisions to dismantle, contain, prevent, educate and reintegrate the terrorist outfits, the deterrence plan legitimised the use of military force.

In order to wipe out hotbeds of militants from the country's tribal areas, "the Pakistan military launched a full scale military offence Zarb-e-Azb on 15 June 2014", in the North Waziristan Agency. Called as a "war of survival" by the ISPR Chief, Major General Asim Bajwa,<sup>149</sup> the operation has been one of the biggest military actions carried out by the Pakistani army against its own people. Furthermore, the horrific "2014 Peshawar attack on the Pakistan army school which led to the killing of 140 children brought both civilian and military institutions together to devise a 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) which, apart from focusing on other key issues, asked for an across the board action against 'all' militant groups and announced an end to the moratorium on the death penalty for terrorism cases".<sup>150</sup> Pakistan officially made a reversal to its selective securitisation approach as the then Pakistan's PM, Nawaz

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<sup>148</sup>Pazeer Gul and Suhail Kakakhel, "TTP tries to justify ruthless killing of 23 FC soldiers", *Dawn*, February 18, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 10 September 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1087719>


<sup>149</sup>Syed Irfan Raza, "Zarb-e-Azb is war of survival, says ISPR Chief", *Dawn*, June 27, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 16 November 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1115371/zarb-i-azb-is-war-of-survival-says-ispr-chief>

<sup>150</sup>"20 Points of National Action Plan," ,NACTA [Online Web] Accessed 27 December 2017 URL: <http://nacta.gov.pk/NAPPoints20.htm>

Sharif noted, “in any action against the militants, there would be no distinction between ‘good and bad’ Taliban”.<sup>151</sup>

“Since then, the Pakistani security forces have targeted hundreds of suspected Taliban positions in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and claims to have killed thousands of militants”. Moreover, in one of the address at the All-Pakistan Academic Excellence Award ceremony 2013, Rawalpindi Corps Commander, Lt. General Qamar Javed Bajwa noted, “there was no threat from India and that threat is from the extremists among us”.<sup>152</sup> Given the state of extremism and terrorism in the country, Pakistanis showed considerable amount of support for military operations to fight extremists in the country.<sup>153</sup>

### Majority Support Using Military to fight extremists



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<sup>151</sup> “ No discrimination between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban: PM” *The Express Tribune*, December 17, 2014, [Online Web] Accessed 18 December 2014 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/808258/no-discrimination-between-good-and-bad-taliban-pm-nawaz/>

<sup>152</sup> “Threats from militants, not from India: commander” *The Nation*, January 27, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 26 January 2015 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/27-Jan-2014/threat-from-militants-not-from-india-commander>

<sup>153</sup> “Majority support using military to fight extremists”, Pew Research Centre, 30 March 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 1 June 2016 URL: [https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/prior-to-lahore-bombing-pakistanis-were-critical-of-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups/ft\\_16-03-30-pakistanmilitary/](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/prior-to-lahore-bombing-pakistanis-were-critical-of-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups/ft_16-03-30-pakistanmilitary/)

Not only did the people show support for military operations, they also became very critical of the terrorist organisations operating in the country. “A survey by Pew Research Centre in the year 2015, a year after the horrendous attack on Army School in Peshawar and the Lahore bombings”, indicated that Pakistanis holds a very negative view of the Taliban and TTP. Half of the Pakistanis (53 per cent) viewed Afghan Taliban negatively and have voiced their dislike for Al-Qaeda (47 per cent).<sup>154</sup>

The general trend of negativity around the terrorist groups have also raised tensions between the strategically convergent radical organisations. For instance, the declassified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid showed the discontent of Al-Qaeda’s top leaders with TTP over their operational methods, “lack of political acumen to win public support, and poorly planned operations which resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of muslims” (Combating Terrorism Centre 2012: 2). The Afghan Taliban “condemned the TTP for carrying out the Peshawar army school attack by calling the killing of innocent children as against the principles of Islam”.<sup>155</sup>

While the support for Al-Qaeda and Taliban moved considerably down, most Pakistanis (49 per cent) however did not voice out their opinion on LeT. Amongst all the terrorist organisations, LeT enjoyed the most favourable status with 14 per cent of the population showing support to it. Though the favourability of the group has come down as compared to the previous years (22 per cent in the year 2012), the group relatively enjoys a better status as compared to other organisations.<sup>156</sup> Most of the people resonate with LeT’s Kashmir propaganda, its anti-India stance, the support from its charitable wing-the JUD, which runs schools, ambulances and organises emergency

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<sup>154</sup> “Pakistanis critical of extremist groups, although many offer no opinion”, Pew Research Centre, 30 March 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 1 June 2016 URL: [https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/prior-to-lahore-bombing-pakistanis-were-critical-of-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups/ft\\_16-03-30-pakistanextremistgroups/](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/prior-to-lahore-bombing-pakistanis-were-critical-of-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups/ft_16-03-30-pakistanextremistgroups/)

<sup>155</sup> “Afghan Taliban condemn Peshawar School Attack”, *Dawn*, 17 December 2014, [Online Web] Accessed 18 December 2014 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1151407>

<sup>156</sup> Afzal, Madiha (2018), “What do Pakistanis think of anti-India terrorist groups?”, Brookings, 29 March 2018, [Online Web] Accessed 30 March 2018 URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/29/what-do-pakistanis-think-of-anti-india-terrorist-groups/>

relief, and most importantly Pakistan State’s support to the group.<sup>157</sup>

	Unfavourable	Favourable	Don't Know
Taliban	72%	6%	23%
TTP	60%	9%	30%
Afghan Taliban	53%	9%	38%
Al-Qaeda	47%	7%	45%
Le-T	36%	14%	49%

## 6. Implications of Pakistan’s Selective Terrorism Policy Approach

Despite internalising and acknowledging the internal security threats, Pakistan still confirms to a dubious terrorism policy. With the military operations carried out by the Pakistani establishment to uproot the terrorist organisations and the growing public support, Pakistan State has failed to counter the menace of terrorism from the society.

Following a selective and discriminatory approach of securitising threats, the Pakistani state conveniently chose to ignore the interrelatedness of the pro-state militant groups with other terrorist outfits which targets the writ of the state. Despite making a reversal on its selective terrorism policy, the state continues to aid and harbour few of the militant groups who they think are strategically important for meeting their security interests in the region.

For example, Masood Azhar, leader of the Al-Qaeda linked and anti-Indian militant organisation, JeM, enjoys relative impunity from the Pakistani establishment. Despite being implicated by the Indian government for an attack at an airbase in Pathankot in 2016, Pakistan has placed its leader under ‘protective custody’ instead of cracking down upon the group. Asked about Azhar’s detention, “Rana Sanaullah, the Law Min-

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<sup>157</sup> Poushter, Jacob, “Prior to Lahore Bombing, Pakistanis were critical of Taliban and other extremist groups”, Pew Research Centre, March 30, 2016 [Online Web] Accessed 5 April 2017 URL: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/30/prior-to-lahore-bombing-pakistanis-were-critical-of-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups/>

ister for Pakistan's Punjab Province, noted, Azhar will only face arrest and legal action if his involvement in the Pathankot attack is proved beyond doubt".<sup>158</sup> Azhar has been placed under house arrest and in protective custody at least three times in the past for the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the assassination attempts made against then President Musharraf in 2003 and in the wake of the Mumbai terror attack in 2008. Founded "with the help of Pakistan's ISI agency to fight the Indians in India-occupied Kashmir, the group has been openly recruiting Pakistanis to fight in Afghanistan".

Another group that enjoys considerable support from the Pakistan state is Hafiz Saeed's LeT. Anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan and non-sectarian nature of the organisation makes the group an important strategic asset for the Pakistani state. With the rise of anti-state militant groups, Hafiz Saeed is seen as a middle man between the anti-state militants and the security establishment of Pakistan. It was Hafiz Saeed's efforts which led to the "rise of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, a consortium of over 36 right wing and religious organisations". It is because of this very reason that Pakistan is unlikely to compromise on him despite sufficient evidence of his links in carrying out terrorist activities.<sup>159</sup>

Pakistan's strategic interests vis-a-vis the Indian state have made the state aid and protect the pro-Kashmiri group. For example, in context of the horrific Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, the Former "Pakistan Ambassador to the US", Mr Haqqani, reported the startling admission of then ISI Chief General Shuja Pasha, about the 26/11 attacks by establishing a close alliance between the ISI and the perpetrators of the attack. Haqqani revealed Pasha's admission stating that, the planners of the 26/11 attacks

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<sup>158</sup> Roggigo, Bill, "Pakistan again puts Jaish-e-Mohammad leader under protective custody", Long War Journal, 16 January 2016 [Online Web] Accessed 17 May 2016 URL: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/01/pakistan-again-puts-jaish-e-mohammed-leader-under-protective-custody.php>

<sup>159</sup>Nadim, Hussain, "Why Pakistan won't give up Hafiz Saeed", Foreign Policy, March 29, 2013 [Online Web] Accessed 1 April 2015 URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/29/why-pakistan-wont-give-up-hafiz-saeed/>

were “our people” but it wasn’t “our operation”.<sup>160</sup> While expressing his deep frustration over the duplicity of the Pakistani leadership on terrorism, the former CIA Director, Michael Hayden in his book, ‘Playing to the Edge’ revealed General Pasha’s admission of the role played by some of the retired ISI members in training those involved in carrying out the heinous 2008 terrorist attack against the Indian state.<sup>161</sup>

An admission of the presence of anti-India armed groups in Pakistan was also recently made by the former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in an interview to a leading Pakistani newspaper, *Dawn*. Referring towards the horrific 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, Sharif professed, “military organisations are active. Call them non-state actors, should we allow them to cross the border and kill 150 people in Mumbai?”<sup>162</sup>

The US too has shown disappointment over Pakistan’s response towards “LeT leader, Hafiz Saeed, who they hold responsible for masterminding the 2008 Mumbai terror attack”. The release of Saeed from house arrest on 24 November 2017, brought criticism from the US who stated that Saeed’s release “sends a deeply troubling message about Pakistan’s commitment to combating international terrorism and belies Pakistani claims that it will not provide sanctuary for terrorists on its soil.”<sup>163</sup>

Other indigenous groups such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen which enjoy links with Al-Qaeda is often used as an intermediary for exchange of communication by the Pakistani government, especially the military wing. Another letter by Rahman to Al-Qaeda's chief indicated a channel of communication between ISI and Al-Qaeda where the

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<sup>160</sup> Haidar, Suhasini (2016), “Our people planned 26/11:ex-chief of ISI”, *The Hindu*, 10 May 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 10 May 2016 URL: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Our-people-planned-2611-ex-chief-of-ISI/article14311776.ece>

<sup>161</sup> “Shuja Pasha admitted ISI’s role in Mumbai attack:ex-CIA chief”, *The Hindu*, 23 February 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 23 February 2016 URL: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/shuja-pasha-admitted-isis-role-in-mumbai-attack-excia-chief/article8271880.ece>

<sup>162</sup> Hashim, Asad (2018), “Pakistan’s ex-PM Nawaz Sharif slammed for Mumbai attack comments”, *Aljazeera*, 14 May 2018, [Online Web] Accessed 14 May 2018 URL:<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/pakistan-pm-nawaz-sharif-slammed-mumbai-attack-comments-180514112243611.html>

<sup>163</sup> “Pakistan: Extremism and Counter Extremism”, Counter Extremism Project, [Online Web] Accessed 7 June 2019 URL:<https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/pakistan>



intelligence agency used Fazlur Rehman Khalil, leader of Harakat-ul Mujahideen as a courier to make correspondence with Al-Qaeda. The letter reads, “We received a messenger from them bringing us a letter from the intelligence leaders including Shuja Shah, and others.” Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the then head of Pakistan’s ISI has however denied any such correspondence. Even though Rahman’s letter does not establish any direct links between ISI and Al-Qaeda’s chief, yet it clearly showed the possibility of them knowing ways to stay in touch with the chief’s top lieutenants.<sup>164</sup> Furthermore, “the haul of handwritten letters and notes collected from Bin Laden’s compound also reveals regular correspondence between Bin Laden and a string of militant leaders, including Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the founder of LeT and Mullah Omar of the Taliban, who are both ISI’s most important and loyal militant leaders. Therefore, any correspondence between the two men and Bin Laden would probably have been known to their ISI handlers”.<sup>165</sup>

Pakistan State has long protected the anti-West Haqqani network. Notwithstanding US criticism of the allegiance, establishment within Pakistan continues to “view Haqqani network as a useful ally and proxy force to represent its interests in Afghanistan”<sup>166</sup> and conveniently keeps the insurgent organisation outside the purview of a security threat.

Due to its stronghold in the tribal areas, the Haqqani network plays a powerful mediating role among the militants in North Waziristan and partners with and provides operational access to groups such as Al-Qaeda, TTP and other local and foreign entities. It often uses such access and its relationship with the TTP to hedge its position and

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<sup>164</sup> Shahbaz wanted to cut deal with TTP as long they didn't conduct operations in Punjabi: Report”, *The Express Tribune*, March 10, 2015 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/850789/shahbaz-wanted-to-cut-deal-with-ttp-as-long-they-didnt-conduct-operations-in-punjab-report/>

<sup>165</sup> Gall, Carlotta (2014), “What Pakistan knew about Bin Laden”, *The New York Times*, 19 March 2014, [Online Web] Accessed 20 March 2014 URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html>

<sup>166</sup> “The Haqqani Nexus and the evolution of al-Qaeda,” [ Online Web] Accessed 10 June 2017 URL: [https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/CTC-Haqqani-Report\\_Rassler-Brown-Final\\_Web.pdf](https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/CTC-Haqqani-Report_Rassler-Brown-Final_Web.pdf)

gain leverage over the Pakistani state (Rassler and Brown 2011: 48). For example, given its long historical association with the Pakistan Establishment, the Haqqani network has made attempts to convince the militants against attacking Pakistani forces and in staying united in the fight against the Western forces. The Haqqani network is reported to have played a significant role in February 2009 agreement between Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Mullah Nazir and Baitullah Mehsud that led to the establishment of Shura Ittihad ul Mujahideen, a united front among these three commanders who share oppositional views towards the Pakistani state.

The relationship between the Haqqani's and Pakistan army has often strained Haqqani's relationship with Al-Qaeda. In June 2006, Jallaludin Haqqani's office released a letter arguing that, "attacking Pakistan is not our policy. Those who agree with us are our friends, and those who do not agree and continue to wage an undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our ranks."<sup>167</sup> In exchange, Pakistan exempts targeting the entity in their operations in FATA. Pakistan authorities have conducted a number of raids on Haqqani compounds that have Al-Qaeda men and supplier (often leaving Haqqani commanders untouched) which has "prompted Al-Qaeda to grow gradually closer to militants in South Waziristan, such as Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud, who are also at war with the Pakistani government" (Gopal et al 2013: 142). However, despite the organisational support of the Haqqanis to the anti-state militant groups, the Establishment in Pakistan continues to shield and support the group despite international pressures. For example, a series of DIA cables (from 11 January 2010 and 6 February 2010) "indicate that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate gave \$200,000 to the Haqqani network for the 30 December 2009 jihadist attack on the Forward Operating Base Chapman, a CIA facility in Khost, Afghanistan".<sup>168</sup> Further drawing linkages,

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<sup>167</sup> Ismail Khan, "Forces, militants heading for truce", Dawn, June 23, 2006, [Online Web] Accessed 16 May 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/198292/forces-militants-heading-for-truce>

<sup>168</sup> "Supporters "Are in the Oil Industry": Declassified DIA Cables Show Haqqani Network Revenue Streams," National Security Archive, April 13, 2016 [Online Web] Accessed 23 August 2016 URL: <https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2016/04/13/supporters-are-in-the-oil-industry-declassified-cables-show-haqqani-network-revenue-streams/>

Admiral Mullen alleged the ISI of supporting the Haqqani militants on carrying out a truck bombing on a NATO base in Afghanistan that wounded 77 Americans, resulting in the assault of the US embassy and NATO headquarters in the Afghan capital in 2011”.<sup>169</sup> He thereby stated, “the Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency”.<sup>170</sup>

“The US department declared the Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) in 2012 and the US Treasury designated Haqqani leaders as Specially Designated Global terrorists in 2014, subjecting them to sanctions”.<sup>171</sup> In spite of the continuous political pressure from the US, the Pakistani army has consistently refused to launch a military operation in the North Waziristan agency despite the presence of Al-Qaeda leadership until 2014. In June 2014, the Pakistani army carried out the Zarb-e-Azb operation to wipe out hotbeds of militants in North Waziristan. Despite being one of the biggest military operations against the insurgent groups, the army continued to conform to a dubious terrorism policy. During the operation it ostensibly targeted the ‘bad jihadists’, such as the TTP, while many of the other terrorist leaders and cadres simply escaped. The Wall Street Journal had reported that, “both leaders and foot soldiers of the Haqqanis, based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan for decades, left the area just as the operation began on June 15”.<sup>172</sup> They are reported to have relocated to the Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies, adjoining the North Waziristan.

Pakistan’s efforts “in the war on terrorism” are highly determined by their own strategic interests. For example, the drone attacks in Pakistan launched by the US surfaced

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<sup>169</sup> “Nato base attacked:4 Afghans killed, 77 troops injured”, *Dawn*, September 11, 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 12 February 2014 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/658375>

<sup>170</sup> “Haqqani network is a “veritable arm” of ISI: Mullen.” *Dawn*, September 22, 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 12 November 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/660878>

<sup>171</sup> “Counter Terrorism Sanctions,” ,US Department of Treasury [Online Web] Accessed 26 November 2016 URL:<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/terror.aspx>

<sup>172</sup> Entous, Adam, “Militants Slip Away Before Pakistan Offensive” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 18 July 2014 URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/militants-slip-away-before-pakistan-offensive-1405637710>

as a highly controversial issue in the state. Started in 2004, the covert lethal use of drones inside Pakistan territory killed many key Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives. However, the fact that stays unknown is that most of the drone attacks were carried out with prior ISI approval. In a news reported in *New York Times* in the year 2013 revealed that the first fatal US drone strike that killed “local Taliban commander, Nek Muhammad (who was linked to an assassination plot against General Musharraf) was a part of a secret deal in which the CIA had agreed to kill him in exchange for access to airspace it had long sought to use drones to hunt down its own enemies”.<sup>173</sup> Ironically, the target hunt down was a Taliban commander, who had turned against the Pakistani state, and led a tribal rebellion against it.

Pakistani state was also cognisant of protecting the jihadi groups who were acting as proxies in their fight against India. For instance, for the first time journalist Mark Mazetti described that under secret negotiations between Islamabad and CIA, Pakistani officials asked for a tight control over the list of targets and insisted that drones fly only in narrow parts of the tribal areas. The Pakistani government wanted to retain control to ensure and protect its “nuclear facilities and the mountain camps where Kashmiri militants were trained for attacks in India”.<sup>174</sup>

## **7. Conclusion**

Pakistan since the time of its emergence has employed various discursive narratives in framing its security policy. It has for long framed its threats and security policy to meet its foreign policy goals such as to find parity with the Indian state in the region or to win over the Kashmir issue.

However, the 9/11 attacks and Pakistan’s joining of the US war on terrorism brought about a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s internal security environment. Despite being

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<sup>173</sup>Mazzetti, Mark, “A Secret Deals on Drones, Sealed in Blood”, April 6, 2013 [Online Web] Accessed 7 August 2016 URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>174</sup> “ The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004-2009”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, [Online Web] Accessed 15 June 2017 URL: <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/the-bush-years-pakistan-strikes-2004-2009>

made to cease its support for extremist elements, Pakistan's commitment to the “war against terrorism” remained selective and primarily driven by its strategic interests vis-a-vis its immediate neighbour, India. Fearing India’s hegemonic ambitions in the region, Pakistan continued to make encroachments in the internal affairs of its western neighbour, Afghanistan. For instance, Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai repeatedly alleged the Pakistani State for its dubious role in the fight against terrorism. He noted, “The Pakistan Islamic government has not cooperated with us to ensure peace and security in Afghanistan” and in fact plays a “double game” in the fight against militants.<sup>175</sup> Pakistan has always denied such allegations except recently when then Pakistan President, Musharraf, “admitted that during his tenure as the head of the state, Pakistan tried to undermine the government of former Afghan President Hamid Karzai because he had helped India stab Pakistan in the back. He was damaging Pakistan and therefore we were working against his interest. Obviously we had to protect our interest”.<sup>176</sup>

Nurturing the intractable security competition with India, Pakistani state did not cease its support for the anti-India groups in Pakistan. In a recent interview, Pervez Musharraf admitted supporting and training “groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) in 1990s to carry out militancy in Kashmir”. He noted, “In 1990s the freedom struggle began in Kashmir. At that time LeT and 11 or 12 other organisations were formed. We supported them and trained them as they were fighting in Kashmir at the cost of their lives.” While responding to a question about Hafiz Saeed, he said, “The Kashmir freedom

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<sup>175</sup> “Karzai accuses Pakistan of ‘double game’ over militants”, BBC News, October 3, 2011 [Online Web] Accessed November 12, 2015 URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15154497>

<sup>176</sup> Boone, Jon, “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s backing for ‘proxies’ in Afghanistan must stop”, The Guardian, February 13, 2015 [Online Web] Accessed 16 February 2015 URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afghanistan-ghani-taliban>

fighters including Hafiz Saeed and Lakhvi were heroes at that time”. Terrorists like Laden and the Taliban were heroes for Pakistan.<sup>177</sup>

Therefore, after joining the international forces in the war against terrorism, Pakistan confined itself mostly to fighting Al-Qaeda and its foreign affiliates and provided protection and aid to their erstwhile ally, the Afghan Taliban and other anti-India jihadist groups. Pakistan has for long denied its role in aiding and abetting terrorist organisation in their country and confirms its commitment to the cause of fighting terrorism, yet its dubious approach was evident through its selective securitisation process and its discriminatory counter-terrorism measures. Its role in harbouring Afghan Taliban was further reinforced during a recent interview, in which the former Pakistan President, Musharraf declared that the “spies in Pakistan’s ISI had given birth to the Taliban after 2001 because the government of Ghani’s predecessor had an overwhelming number of non-Pashtuns officials who were said to favour India”. He admitted, “We were looking for some groups to counter Indian action against Pakistan” and “that is where the intelligence work comes in. Intelligence being in contact with Taliban groups. Definitely there were in contact, and they should be.”<sup>178</sup>

However, the harbouring of few terrorist organisations to meet state’s security interests backfired at the Pakistani government in the post-2007 period. Today Pakistan has become a major victim of terrorist and extremist violence in the state and its half-hearted commitment in the war on terror has brought international condemnation. Two American congressmen recently initiated the “Pakistan State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation bill (HR 6069) to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism

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<sup>177</sup> “Osama Bin Lade, Taliban were heroes for Pakistan: Pervez Musharraf”, News 18, October 18, 2015 [Online Web] Accessed 19 October 2015 URL: (<https://www.news18.com/news/world/osama-bin-laden-taliban-were-heroes-for-pakistan-pervez-musharraf-1157198.html>)

<sup>178</sup> Boone, Jon, “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s backing for ‘proxies’ in Afghanistan must stop”, The Guardian, February 13, 2015 [Online Web] Accessed 16 February 2015 URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afghanistan-ghani-taliban>

and condemned the state for its “betrayal”.<sup>179</sup> Therefore, in order to re-affirm its position in the international realm and to prevent future international condemnation and global isolation, Pakistan must drift away from its selective terrorism policy. The discourse on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban, the harbouring of anti-US and anti-Indian groups and coming down strongly on the groups targeting the state of Pakistan must be reformed with a universalist approach to fight the menace of terrorism. Since, Pakistan itself has become a major victim of the scourge of terrorism, the state must seriously ruminate over its selective and discriminatory security policy in letter and spirit.

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<sup>179</sup> “H.R. 6069- Pakistan State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Act,” , Congress.gov, 114 Congress, September 20, 2016 [Online Web] Accessed 21 September 2016 URL: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6069>

## **Chapter 5**

### **State Responses to Internal Security Challenges in Pakistan**

#### **1. Introduction**

The presence and growth of various militant groups in the last one decade has infested the state and society of Pakistan with perils of terrorism and violent extremism. In the process of defeating the transnational network of terrorists settled in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region as part of the Global war on Terrorism, Pakistan itself has become a major victim of terrorism. The chapter therefore deliberates upon the various policy and strategic responses made by the Pakistani state at different stages of the war to counter what it now acknowledges as the gravest threat to its security. The chapter will provide a description of the various limitations faced by Pakistan in dealing with the threat of terrorism and extremist violence, and provides suggestions on the way forward.

#### **2. State Responses to Security Challenges in the Post-9/11 Period**

Pakistan, which became a focal point of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, initiated numerous policy initiatives to showcase its commitment towards an internationally coordinated effort of fighting the menace of terrorism. As early as 13 September 2001, Pakistan agreed to adhere to some of the demands made by the US which included:

1. “Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at the borders, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for Bin Laden.
2. Provide the US with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations.



3. Provide territorial access to the US and allied military intelligence as needed, and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbour them, including the use of Pakistan's naval ports air bases and strategic locations on borders.
4. Provide the US with intelligence, immigration information and databases immediately to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against US, its friends, or allies.
5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September 11 and any other terrorist acts against the US.
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits.
7. Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for Taliban, and assist US in the aforementioned ways to destroy OBL and his Al-Qaeda network" (Musharraf 2006: 204-205).

Although General Musharraf agreed to put in its efforts to curb the menace of terrorism in all its manifestations and forms, he however declared that Pakistan will not be able to fully comply with all the demands made by the US. Given the general opposition in Pakistan on state's participation in the Global war on terrorism, General Musharraf only agreed to offer a narrow flight corridor that was far from any sensitive areas. He refused to provide any naval ports or fighter aircraft bases to America except for Shamsi in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh, which he claimed was used for logistics and aircraft recovery purposes (Musharraf 2006: 206).

Despite repeated denials made by the Pakistan authorities, the few investigations carried out, such as that from the Times, discovered that the Shamsi base in Balochistan was used in carrying out "covert CIA drone attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda commanders in northwest part of Pakistan's tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan".<sup>180</sup> In

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<sup>180</sup> Coghlan, Tom et al. (2009), "Secrecy and Denial :Pakistan Lets CIA Use Airbase to Strike Militants", 18 February 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 18 December 2014 URL:URL:<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/151/26362.html>

fact, it was only after the NATO air strikes which mistakenly “killed 24 Pakistani soldiers” that the US was made to vacate the base in 2011.<sup>181</sup>

“Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the US and its NATO allies have been repeatedly pressing Pakistan to do more to prevent Afghan Taliban and the Al-Qaeda network from seeking safe hideouts in the country’s tribal areas and in the northern reaches of the NWFP” (Nawaz 2009: 1). This compelled Pakistan’s armed forces for the first time to hesitantly send its army into the largely ungoverned and semi-autonomous region of Federally Administered Tribal Areas to carry out military operations. Military operations followed by peace deals dominated the first phase of Pakistan’s strategic policy in its fight against terrorism.

## **2.1 Military Operations and Peace Deals**

Pakistan’s strategic responses to the threat of terrorism were a mix of military operations followed by peace deals. Pakistan has carried out various military operations in the country’s tribal areas since 2001. Some of the major military operations were “Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2002), Al-Mizan (2002-2006), Zalzala (2008), Sher Dil (Bajaur), Rah-e-Haq, Rah-e-Rast (2007-2009), Rah-e-Nijat (2009-2010), Rah-e-Shahadat (2013), and Zarb-e-Azb (2014)”. These operations were carried out by the Pakistani army along with the para military and the air force to defeat the militant infrastructure in tribal areas. However, many of such operations were carried out in the backdrop of the state’s selective securitisation process, targeting few groups, while safeguarding others which were of strategic importance to the Pakistani state.

The military operations carried out by the state during the first phase of the war often ended up making truces with the militants. The trend of forging peace deals only empowered and legitimised the position of militants in the region. Some of the major peace agreements signed between Pakistan and militants include “Shakai Agreement (2004), Sararogha Peace Deal (2005), Miramshah Peace Accord (2006), Swat Peace Deal (2008)”, and numerous other peace talks to deal with the threat of terrorism in

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<sup>181</sup> “US personnel vacate Shamsi airbase”, Dawn, 11 December 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 13 December 2016 URL:<https://www.dawn.com/news/679744>

the state. Most of the operations carried out by the Pakistani state in the initial phase of the war did not prove to be successful as they were launched against a few select groups. Since 2001, Pakistan has mostly apprehended low level Al-Qaeda operatives and foreign fighters but spared Mullah Omar's Afghan Taliban fighters for most part. The following paragraph briefly discusses the various military operations and peace deals undertaken by Pakistan state's forces.

Between 2002 and 2006, the Pakistani army carried out a military operation known as "Operation Al-Mizan" to completely flush out the foreign fighters settled in the country's South Waziristan area. However, the state's failure to oust the militants from the area resulted in the signing of a peace agreement (Shakai) with one of the local Pakistani militants, Nek Muhammad, who was one of the first militants to provide refuge to foreign groups in Pakistan's tribal areas.<sup>182</sup> The agreement signed with Nek Muhammad showcased Pakistan's half-hearted approach towards fighting the threat of terrorism. The state demanded the local militants to cease support for foreign fighters in exchange for the release of Taliban prisoners, payment of grant money to repay their debts to Al-Qaeda, as well as compensation to the tribesmen for the collateral damage caused by military operations.

Few other peace deals were inked during this period, such as the Sararogha Peace Deal (22 February 2005) and Miranshah Peace Accord (5 September 2006). Both these treaties, just like the earlier one, made temporary arrangements in which the government bargained with the militants to not wage attacks against law enforcement personnel and government property in exchange for release of individuals apprehended during the operation, removal of all newly established checkpoints on the roads, and due compensation for the collateral damage caused to the people. The general policy of appeasement followed in these treaties strengthened the hold of the militants in the tribal regions and helped them grow their forces. Moreover, most of these agreements were broken by the militants which failed to bring peace in the region.

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<sup>182</sup> Khan, Zahid Ali, "Military Operatons in FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan" [Online Web] Accessed 15 March 2017 URL: [www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1339999992\\_58398784.pdf](http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1339999992_58398784.pdf)

Thus, despite being in the grip of terrorist forces since 9/11, Pakistani state made half-hearted attempts in defeating the terrorist network operating from its country's tribal areas. Most of the military operations carried out by the state during the first phase of the war ended with making truces with the militants, further empowering and legitimising their position in the region. However, in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad, and the emergence of Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan decided to go tough against the militants in the post-2007 period.

The military operations carried out in the post-2007 period, were mainly directed against the anti-state militant forces especially Baitullah Mehsud's TTP, who had turned against the Pakistani state for joining the US-led war efforts against fighting terrorism. The escalation of violence in the country, the establishment of Taliban rule, the enforcement of Sharia law in Swat Valley, and the continuous attacks on the government institutions, security forces and civilians led the Pakistani state to securitise the threat around fighting the forces targeting the writ and legitimacy of the state. The securitisation of threat around TTP helped Pakistan manoeuvre support for its actions against the anti-state groups, which led them to carry out full-scale military operations in the areas dominated by Pakistani Taliban (South Waziristan and Swat Valley).

In 2008, Pakistan carried out 'Operation Zalzalā' to clear key towns in South Waziristan held by networks loyal to the leader of TTP, Baitullah Mehsud. The operation was mainly targeted against key individuals loyal to Baitullah, especially people like Qari Hussain Mehsud who led a campaign of suicide bombings with a mission to recruit, indoctrinate, and launch suicide bombers. The state also led another operation, named "Operation Sher Dil" (2008-2009), in order to gain control of the Bajaur tribal region as a rebuttal to the continuous attacks against the ISI, Frontier corps, government agencies and army personnel by the militants since 2007.

Between the period 2007 and 2010, Pakistan led three major military operations named "Rah-e-Haq", "Rah-e-Rast" and "Rah-e-Nijat" against the Pakistani Taliban. The Rah-e-Haq operation was carried out against TNSM in Swat valley with the collaboration of local police who carried out search and cordon operations to weed out

militants operating in the valley. However the operation came to an end with the signing of the “Malakand Accord” between the NWFP government and TNSM where the government conceded to TNSM’s persistent demand for the enforcement of sharia in seven districts of the Malakand division in exchange of restoration of peace in Swat.<sup>183</sup> Whereas, Rah-e-Rast was launched to clear areas in Swat under the influence of TNSM’s leader Mullah Fazlullah, who later became the Chief of TTP Swat. The operation was led in the backdrop of the failed peace deals and negotiations with the militants. Pakistan PM, Gilani noted, “the terrorist elements continued to challenge the writ of the government” despite meeting their long standing demand of “implementation of Nizam-e-Adl Regulation” in the Malakand division.<sup>184</sup> Condemning the militants, the then COAS, General Kayani noted, “this is not the war of Islam and Baitullah Mehsud and Fazllullah are not religious scholars”.<sup>185</sup>

However, Pakistan launched one of the biggest military operations in the year 2014. A full scale military offence named “Zarb-e-Azb” was launched on 15 June 2014 by the military with full support of the political government to wipe out hotbeds of militants in North Waziristan Agency. Despite US pressures for years, Pakistan military and its consecutive governments refrained from leading an offence against the Islamic insurgents in North Waziristan agency of FATA. The operation was launched in the wake of the consistent and direct terrorist attacks on military installations, the beheading of 23 captured soldiers from Pakistan’s frontier corps in February 2014,<sup>186</sup> the attack on

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<sup>183</sup>” Peace deal to legitimise TNSM”, The NEWS, February 18, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 13 August 2017 URL: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/161833-peace-deal-to-legitimise-tnsm>

<sup>184</sup> “Operation Rah-e-Rast”, Pakistan Defence, May 7, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 1 September 2017 URL: <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/operation-rah-e-rast-swat.28279/>

<sup>185</sup> “Operation Rah-e-Rast launched to bring astray people on track: Gen Kayani”, Pakistan Tribune, June 15, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 13 April 2017 URL: <http://paktribune.com/news/Operation-Rah-e-Rast-launched-to-bring-astray-people-on-track-Gen-Kayani-215998.html>

<sup>186</sup>Pazeer Gul and Suhail Kakakhel, “TTP tries to justify ruthless killing of 23 FC soldiers”, Dawn, February 18, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 10 September 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1087719>

the Karachi airport which led to the killing of 28 airport security personnel in June 2014 and the failure of peace talks with the TTP finally led Pakistan to carry out a military operation in the North Waziristan agency.

## **2.2 Evaluation of Pakistan's Strategy of Military Operations and Peace Deals**

Though, some of the military operations were effective in limiting the presence and influence of few militants in Pakistan's tribal areas, the military operations overall failed to clear the tribal areas from militant groups. The intrusion of the military in the tribal areas turned many of the local chiefs against the military. Whereas, the collateral damage and displacement of people from their homes created further animosity against the state forces. For example, operation Zalzala displaced around 200,000 locals from their homes. Whereas, operation "Sher-Dil" caused a significant exodus of locals to other parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The locals held the army responsible for destroying their houses as one IDP reported that the use of massive aerial bombardment and indiscriminate firing left many people to flee from their homes.<sup>187</sup> According to UN, as of August 2014, the estimated number of displaced people have crossed over one million.<sup>188</sup>

On the other hand, peace agreements have mostly been failed endeavours of establishing peace. Most of the peace agreements were made and signed after a failure of the military operation to oust the militants completely. The government was therefore in a weak position while signing the deals, an opportunity which the militants exploited to gain significant concessions from the government. Moreover, the selective securitised approach towards the militant groups, the pitching of one group against the other and the continuous concessions to selective groups led to the rise of terrorists and extremist elements in the country. For example, the peace deals signed with the Afghan Tal-

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<sup>187</sup>Farhat Taj, "Bajaur's IDPs-stories of the silent victims of the Taliban brutalities", LUBP, January 20, 2009 [Online Web] Accessed 30 April 2016 URL: <https://lubpak.com/archives/772>

<sup>188</sup> "Pakistan's IDPs reach record one million", Al Jazeera, September 1, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 5 December 2014 URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/08/pakistan-idps-reach-record-one-million-201482712311342575.html>

iban to cease support or surrender the foreign militants in return for compensation or release of Taliban prisoners only emboldened their position in the tribal areas. The government through the deals failed to get the militants to concede and disarm, and thus could not enforce its writ over the area. In fact the peace deals were mainly used as a tactic by the militants to buy time in order to reorganise and regroup themselves after a military operation as they never intended to give up on their violent actions (Ali 2013: 11).

Moreover, the “decisions on the peace agreements in the tribal areas were made entirely by the military, which made the agreements focus mainly on areas of concern for the military, i.e. attacks on security forces personnel” (PIPS 2011: 13). Therefore, the agreements were mainly limited to preventing an attack on Pakistani state forces and institutions but failed to include the cross border terrorist activities into Afghanistan or against Western forces. Moreover, the direct deals between the government and the militants undermined the position of the tribal leaders, as the agreements strengthened the hold of the militants by providing them equal status as a party with respect to the state. The signing of pacts in militants’ quarters further undermined the position of the government as per a tribal tradition of “Nanawatay”; which holds the government responsible for the entire crisis (PIPS 2011: 13).

Peace treaties and dialogues remained a dominant strategy during the initial years of the war. However, peace accords struck between the government and insurgents have miserably failed in ushering peace. With the failure of peace treaties and the rise of anti-state forces in the country, the peace process was replaced by offensive military operations, especially in the post-2009 period. Though, after coming to power in Pakistan in the May 2013 elections, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government under Mr. Nawaz Sharif pushed for the initiation of a peace dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban. In order to engage the group for peace talks, the government made an appeal to the military to cease all its operations against Taliban fighters in the

North-West and asked the US to put a halt on the drone strikes.<sup>189</sup> The military although agreed to cease its operations but in the wake of the death of two military officers in September 2013 in Upper Dir, the army under General Kayani made his position clear by stating, “while reaffirming army’s support to the political process, unequivocally, the terrorists will not be allowed to take advantage of it. Army has the ability and the will to take the fight to the terrorists”.<sup>190</sup>

A spate of lethal attacks by militants against law enforcement agencies in January 2014 had once again stalled the peace process. Despite the attacks, PM Sharif, continued pushing for peace talks with the militants. He, in his address to the National Assembly on 29 January 2014, made a proposal of giving peace another chance and therefore constituted a four-member committee to facilitate the talks. He called on the “militants to observe a ceasefire” in his televised speech.<sup>191</sup>

The TTP however called for a conditional ceasefire on 2 March 2014 and observed it till 10 April 2014. The 40-day ceasefire was observed in exchange for the release of prisoners captured by the government. Despite the release of 12 low level prisoners by the government, the militant attacks continued in the country resulting in the killing of dozens of civilians. The Pakistani Taliban claimed that the attacks in the country were carried out by a breakaway group, JuA,<sup>192</sup> who refused the proposition of peace talks with the government and did not observe the ceasefire. The group,

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<sup>189</sup> “Pakistan Taliban discuss peace talks offer by Nawaz Sharif’s government”, NDTV, 12 September 2013, [Online Web] Accessed 12 September 2012 URL: <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-taliban-discuss-peace-talks-offer-by-nawaz-sharifs-government-534398>

<sup>190</sup> Malik, Mehreen Zahra (2013), “Pakistani army, government at loggerheads over Taliban talks”, 20 September 2013, [Online Web] Accessed 10 October 2015 URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-army/pakistani-army-government-at-loggerheads-over-taliban-talks-idUSBRE98J0CD20130920>

<sup>191</sup> “PM Sharif announced another push for Taliban peace talks”, Dawn, 29 January 2014, [Online Web] Accessed 29 January 2014 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1083531>

<sup>192</sup> TTP’s participation in peace talks with the Pakistani government led to its division, where Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), under leader Omar Khalid Khorasani, broke off from the TTP in August 2014.



however, did not extend the ceasefire further by citing government's completely silent approach towards Taliban's initial demands.<sup>193</sup> The ceasefire ended on 17 April 2014 followed by an attack on the Karachi airport which ended all prospects for peace talks with the militants.

The biggest challenge facing the peace process is rooted in Pakistan Taliban's ideological dogma based on transnational jihad and the establishment of the "Islamic caliphate system". Ideologically, the group is "fighting the very system which the government is trying to secure by proposing talks with the group" (Basit 2014: 5).

Hakeemullah Mehsud, the TTP chief, while reiterating the offer for peace talks stated, "We believe in dialogue, but it should be taken seriously. TTP will not lay down weapons and its jihad in Pakistan will continue until the existing system is replaced with shariah" (Ali 2013:12). Since, the group is unwilling to compromise on its central demand of implementation of sharia in the country which is in direct opposition to the prevailing democratic system in Pakistan, any peace initiative would only serve as an ad-hoc arrangement to reduce violence in the state rather than eradicating the threat. Moreover, conceding to the demands made by the group such as prisoners' release to buy off temporary peace will only embolden the hold of the militant group in the society.

One of the major factors that hamper the peace process is the division in the Pakistani state over the issue of talks with the Pakistani Taliban. The top brass in the military is uncomfortable by the approach of providing concessions to the group responsible for the incessant killing of both civilians and military personnel. Moreover, the TTP does not serve as a monolithic group and shares a strong ideological and operational nexus among other local and foreign militant outfits. Therefore, a peace deal with one group will not ensure an end to violence. Peace talks at present do not serve as a viable solution to restore the problem of terrorism in Pakistani society.

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<sup>193</sup> "Pakistan Taliban announce end to ceasefire", BBC News, 16 April 2014, [Online Web] Accessed 16 April 2014 URL:<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27053267>

Apart from the military operations and peace deals, the state also promulgated different policies to strengthen the prevalent legal framework to better tackle the problem of terrorism in the country. Some of the laws are discussed below.

### ***Anti-Terrorism Act 1997***

The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 outlines the fundamental legal framework for prosecution of crimes related to terrorism. The changing nature of the terrorist threat has already led to seventeen amendments in the law, enacted in the Pakistani parliament in 1997. The law provides a framework for “defining offences of terrorism and terrorist acts” (Parvez and Mehwish 2015: 2). It also includes a provision on the establishment of anti-terrorism courts to try terrorism cases. However, despite being one of the most important laws in the realm of terrorist crimes, it suffers from major inadequacies and has therefore failed to prevent the terrorist attacks.

ATA provides a broad definition of terrorist acts which overstretch and undermine the functioning of the law. The ATA defines the law’s rationale as “providing for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences” (Anti Terrorism Act 1997). The addition of the word heinous offences has extended the applicability of the ATA to encompass cases apart from those directly linked to terrorism. In addition to terrorist activities, the act covers “arms trafficking, kidnapping, hijacking, extortion, sectarian violence, and targeted political killings” (Yusuf 2010: 24). The incorporation of other offences under terrorist acts has overstretched the already overburdened criminal justice system and the Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs). For example, “there were 2,902 cases of kidnapping for ransom and 79,863 abduction cases in Pakistan reported to the police between 2008 and 2013” (Parvez and Mehwish 2015: 4).

ATC’s themselves face internal challenges. Formed to ensure quick disposal of anti-terrorism cases, they lack sufficient infrastructure to do justice to the hundreds of militant suspects awaiting trial. Moreover, the ATA does not technically apply to the residents of FATA, from where most militants hail. The militants from FATA cannot be

legally tried under ATC “and instead have to be sent to their tribal agency to face justice under the Frontier Crimes Regulation” (Yusuf 2010: 25).

However, in the recent times another amendment is moved in regard to the ATA. The National Assembly Standing Committee on Interior adopted the government sponsored Anti-Terrorism (Amendment), Bill, 2018, seeking proscription of those individuals and organisations in Pakistan, which are facing sanctions of the UNSC. The amendment was introduced in the backdrop of the sanctions from the Financial Action Task Force which precipitated a need for Pakistan to bring in its laws in sync with the international legal norms. The unamended ATA 1997 demanded pieces of evidence from the individuals charged under the act; however, in the absence of such shreds of evidence, designated individuals were released by Pakistani courts several times. Whereas, the UN Security Act, 1948 on the other hand, requires no such evidence as they are already designated proscribed by the UN Security Council.

The bill was however opposed by the religious parties in Pakistan as they feared that the said amendment in the law would be used against religious parties and those involved in the freedom movement of Indian held Kashmir. The reservations were dismissed by the Interior Ministry ministers who proclaimed that, “Pakistan being a signatory to the charter of UN had to implement the said amendment in order to prevent itself from the sword of international sanctions heading on its head”.<sup>194</sup>

### ***Fair Trial Bill 2013***

In another attempt to deal with growing militancy threat, Pakistan’s National Assembly passed a “Fair Trial Bill” 2013, which authorised the Pakistani state to intercept private communications in order to find indiscriminating evidence against the terrorists.<sup>195</sup> The law is a local version of US Patriot Act and is considered as a stepping stone for the Pakistani government in order to counter the terrorist threats. As noted

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<sup>194</sup> Imran Mukhtar, “NA body adopts Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill, 2008”, The Nation, April 26, 2018 [Online Web] Accessed 26 April 2018 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/26-Apr-2018/na-body-adopts-anti-terrorism-amendment-bill-2018>

<sup>195</sup> “The Investigation for Fair Trail Act I of 2013”, NACTA, [Online: Web] Accessed 13<sup>th</sup> June 2014 URL: [http://nacta.gov.pk/Download\\_s/Rules/Investigation\\_for\\_Fair\\_Trial\\_Act\\_I\\_of\\_2013.pdf](http://nacta.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/Investigation_for_Fair_Trial_Act_I_of_2013.pdf)

by Khawaja Zaheer, the senior justice adviser to Prime Minister Nawaj Sharif, “This law is war, a declared war, against those who challenge the state” (*Washington Post* 8 November 2013).<sup>196</sup>

### ***Protection of Pakistan Act 2014***

The Parliament in Pakistan passed the ‘Protection of Pakistan Bill’, 2014, to “provide for protection against waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and the prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan”.<sup>197</sup> The bill gives the law enforcers additional powers and permit the security forces to shoot suspects on sight with the permission of a grade-15 official. The act provides a provision of “establishment of special courts” where a judge of the special court shall have all the powers of a sessions court and in the trial puts the burden of evidence on the accused. The law was however opposed by Pakistan’s SC who equated the ordinance with the draconian Rowlatt law passed by the British Empire. It argued that the “provisions of the ordinance were inconsistent with the fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan as it gives no protection to the citizens who are abducted by the law enforcing agencies in an unlawful manner”.<sup>198</sup> The law was approved in the National Assembly as the bill was considered necessary for ensuring national security. It was justified as being paramount for the nation to observe strict laws to counter terrorism across the country.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Craig, Tim, “Pakistan creates its own Patriot Act to deal with terrorists, human rights groups worried”, *The Washington Post*, [Online Web] Accessed 8<sup>th</sup> November 2013 URL: [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-creates-its-own-patriot-act-to-deal-with-terrorists-human-rights-groups-worried/2013/11/08/67ed58ca-4071-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-creates-its-own-patriot-act-to-deal-with-terrorists-human-rights-groups-worried/2013/11/08/67ed58ca-4071-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story.html).

<sup>197</sup> “ Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014”, Government of Pakistan [Online Web] Accessed 12 July 2017 URL: [http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1404714927\\_922.pdf](http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1404714927_922.pdf)

<sup>198</sup> Terence J Sigamony, “ SC moved against Pakistan Protection Ordinance”, *The Nation*, January 28, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 13 July 2017 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/28-Jan-2014/sc-moved-against-pakistan-protection-ordinance>

<sup>199</sup> Irfan Haider, “ Protection of Pakistan Bill 2014 approved in NA”, *Dawn*, July 2, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 13 July 2017 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1116529>

## *NACTA*

Having realised that the menace of terrorism and extremism is becoming an existential threat to the Pakistani state, the state authorities introduced the National Counter Terrorism Authority Act (NACTA), 2013. Though, NACTA was created in 2009 as an administrative wing within the Ministry of Interior, it was only in 2013 that the authority was granted administrative and financial autonomy and was created legally as a body corporate. The Act today is extended to the whole of Pakistan and the authority shall have the following functions:

- “To receive and collate data or information or intelligence, and disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism”.
- “To coordinate and prepare comprehensive National Counter terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies, and review them on a periodical basis”.
- “To develop actions plans against terrorism and extremism and report to Federal government about implementation of these plans, on periodical basis”.
- “To carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and to prepare and circulate documents”.
- “To carry out liaison with international entities for facilitating cooperation in areas relating to terrorism and extremism”.
- “To review relevant laws and suggest amendments to the Federal government”; and
- “To appoint committees of experts from government and non-government organizations for deliberation in areas related to the mandate and functions of the authority”.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> “NACTA”, National Counterterrorism Authority in Pakistan, [Online: Web] Assessed 14<sup>th</sup> June 2014, URL: [http://nacta.gov.pk/Download\\_s/Rules/NACTA\\_ACT\\_2013.pdf](http://nacta.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/NACTA_ACT_2013.pdf).

### **3. National Internal Security Policy of Pakistan**

Pakistan's federal government announced the first ever National Internal Security Policy of Pakistan on 24 February 2014. Unlike its predecessor government who couldn't bring out a policy framework, PML-N government formalised its approach towards countering critical security challenges by bringing in a policy document. National Internal Security Policy is first of its own kind, as the state for the first time formally acknowledged the grave security threats that emanate from within the country in the form of non-traditional threats of "extremism, sectarianism, terrorism, and militancy" (NISP 2014).

The policy recognises the human, economic, social, and infrastructural cost that the Pakistani state has incurred by being a participant and a significant player in the war against terrorism. By marking a loss in excess of US\$ 78 billion over a period of ten years and the loss of more than 50,000 Pakistan nationals, including Armed forces, Law Enforcement agencies as well as civilians. In fighting the war against terrorism, the policy lays down a comprehensive approach to counter the challenges of terrorism and extremism in the country.

NISP is divided into three parts: "strategic, operational, and secret". The strategic section is based on government's efforts to hold dialogue with militants who are willing to engage in peaceful talks and conduct precise military operations against those willing to fight. The operational component demonstrates that the government is keen on collaborative efforts, mainly joint intelligence sharing at the national and provincial level. The secret component is based on administrative and operational matters, which however stays discreet and classified.

Projecting a need for comprehensive and inclusive response to deal with the threats, NISP proposes to work on the principles of "mutual inclusiveness and integration of all national efforts", which includes three elements:

1. "Dialogue will all stakeholders"

2. “Isolation of terrorists from their support system”
3. “Enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus to neutralise the threats to internal security of Pakistan” (National Internal Security Policy, 2014).

The principles were majorly drawn from then PM, Yousuf Raza Gilani’s counter terrorism policy of 3Ds-Dialogue, Development, and Deterrence. As Gilani once remarked, “a comprehensive approach is required to fight terrorism, specially combining a political approach with development programs”.<sup>201</sup>

NISP in order to counter the internal security threats envisaged both soft and hard policy interventions. One of the major challenges that the Pakistani state faced from the early days of joining the war was to win public support for its policy decision of joining the international forces and to influence the public opinion against the militants. The discursive and exploitative use of religion by the militants to serve their objectives became a major challenge for the Pakistani state to counter.

More so, the military operations targeted against the militants only helped in containing and not eradicating the problem of extremism from the society. Thus, the Pakistani state proposed to introduce a “soft component of policy framework” which outlined an “integrated process of research and coordination on key issues”. It introduced a “Comprehensive Response Plan”; which focusses on “winning over trust and confidence of general public to combat extremism and terrorism”.

Comprehensive Response Plan thus looks at the elements of social, economic, and ideological domain which requires utmost attention and therefore focusses on following “a composite process based on dialogue with all sections of society”. It includes “infrastructure development, rehabilitation of victims of terrorism, national narrative reconciliation, reintegration, and legal reforms” (NISP 2014: 6). For example, the shift in the theatre of terrorist activities to Pakistan’s tribal areas have caused a major

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<sup>201</sup> Haider, Zeeshan (2008), “Pakistan PM urges “comprehensive” security strategy”, *Reuters*, 26 March 2008, [Online Web] Accessed 18 May 2014 URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa/pakistan-pm-urges-comprehensive-security-strategy-idUSISL12709420080326>

disruption in the lives of locals. The human and social cost and the widespread increase in the number of IDPs required sustainable efforts from the government to make adequate compensation to the lives affected.

Another dimension that the policy suggests requires an immediate and most urgent attention is the need for constructing a robust national narrative. Pakistan from the time of its emergence is fighting an ideological battle; where in religion is often exploited to meet political and personal interests. The ideological discursive use of religion has plagued the country of radicalism, extremism and sectarianism. Terrorists and militants make use of religious narratives and often exploit their interpretation of religious teachings to indoctrinate, and train the young youth. The madrasa education system in Pakistan has become a major victim of radicalisation; where young children are indoctrinated with a specific version of puritanical Islam.

Thus, to eradicate the perils of growing extremism and terrorism in the society, NISP suggests preparing an ideological response by inviting key stakeholders of the society; religious scholars, intelligentsia, educational institutions, and media to construct and disseminate what can be referred to as National Narrative. It will help dispel the wrong perceptions created by the terrorists on an ideological basis by engaging media, civil society organisations, and others. The inclusion of educationalists and scholars would further help to replace the outmoded Islamist curricula and replace them with a more tolerant non-sectarian version (SISA 2014: 22).

The reintegration plan also envisions the incorporation of madrasas in the mainstream educational framework which will enable the government to monitor the syllabus and running of the educational institution which at present have become a breeding ground of jihadists. The Internal Security policy document recommends “to design and implement a national de-radicalisation program for the people vulnerable to extremism so that they can be rehabilitated and reintegrated in the society”.

While CRP ostensibly aims to win the hearts and minds of people; the Combined Deterrence Plan seeks to change the posture of national internal security apparatus from reactive to proactive. It aims to improve joint intelligence sharing to fill coordination



gaps through the National Internal Security Operations Centre under the oversight of the federal government.

### **3.1 National Action Plan (NAP)**

After the horrific attack on Army Public School on 16 December 2014, a national consensus was evolved to come down strongly on terrorists and immediately curb the scourge of terrorism. Though NISP 2014 pointed out the broad guidelines and institutional reforms, an urgent need was sensed by the political actors to chalk out a specific, qualifiable and time bound Action plan to tackle the problem of terrorism. A 20 point NAP for countering extremism and terrorism was announced on 24 December 2014 by NACTA/Ministry of Interior in consultation with the stakeholders. After the implementation of NISP, NAP was the second consensual policy document approved by the government.<sup>202</sup>

Drawn from the guidelines of NISP, NAP set up a 20 point Action plan which primarily included:

implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism, special trial courts under the supervision of the army with a duration of two years, militant outfits and armed groups to not be allowed to operate in the country, strengthening of NACTA, censorship of literature promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism, and intolerance, eliminating all sources of funding of terrorism and terrorist organisations, ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media, establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force, regulation and registration of religious seminaries, zero tolerance towards militancy in Punjab, taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical end, administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs, and revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> “National Action Plan, 2014”, NACTA [Online Web] Accessed 14 December 2017 URL: <https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/>

<sup>203</sup> Anup Kaphle, “ Pakistan announces a national plan to fight terrorism, says terrorists’ days are numbered”, *The Washington Post*, December 24, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 26 December 2014 URL: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world-views/wp/2014/12/24/pakistan-announces-a-national-plan-to-fight-terrorism-says-terrorists-days-are-numbered/?utm\\_term=.95d8349db41a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world-views/wp/2014/12/24/pakistan-announces-a-national-plan-to-fight-terrorism-says-terrorists-days-are-numbered/?utm_term=.95d8349db41a)

NAP overall has been successful in bringing down the crime rate and terrorist activities in the state. The post-NAP data collected by NACTA claims around “1,808 terrorist deaths and the arrest of 5,611 people”. The US State Department data reports a “downward trend in the number of terrorist attacks from 1823 in 2014 to 1009 in 2015; a 45% decrease” (Crisis Response Bulletin 2017:11). Moreover, out of the 267 cases referred to the military courts by apex committee, around 153 terrorists have been awarded death sentence.<sup>204</sup> On the other hand, the progress towards the establishment of a Counter Terrorism Force seems satisfactory as 7,816 personnel were available by 20 March 2016 (Ramay 2016: 2).

According to Ministry of Information, “over 1,500 books and other hate material had been confiscated and 71 such shops been sealed so far”.<sup>205</sup> Since the implementation of NAP, all four provinces have developed special units under their respective departments of counter terrorism. While some progress is noted in counter terrorism operations, very little work is done on the regulation of religious seminaries. The government has failed to regulate the material being taught in madrassas, despite its claims of 90% of madrassas having being registered. More so while 87 seminaries in Sindh and 13 in KP have been banned for its links with proscribed groups; the state managed to ban only two in Punjab.<sup>206</sup>

The policy document once again has formalised and legalised the control of the army over security affairs, by accepting its two major demands- “one, lifting the 2008 moratorium on the death penalty, and second, establishing special military courts to try all terrorist suspects, including the civilians for a period of two year under the 21st

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<sup>204</sup> Malik Muhammad Ashraf, “ Tackling terrorism through NAP”, *The Nation*, January 6, 2017 [Online Web] Accessed 8 January 2017 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/06-Jan-2017/tackling-terrorism-through-nap>

<sup>205</sup> Saad Ahmed Dogar, “What has NAP achieved so far?”, *The Express Tribune*, January 30, 2017 [Online Web] Accessed 3 February 2017 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1307640/nap-achieved-far/>

<sup>206</sup> National Action Plan 2014, NACTA Pakistan ,[Online Web] Accessed 16 June 2015 UR:<https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/> and Malik Muhammad Ashraf, “ Tackling terrorism through NAP”, *The Nation*, January 6, 2017 [Online Web] Accessed 8 January 2017 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/06-Jan-2017/tackling-terrorism-through-nap>

amendment act” (Ramay 2016: 1). International Crisis Group, in one of its reports, denounced the policy document (NAP) by calling it a “hastily conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy” (ICG Report 2015: 1). It primarily opposed the “militarisation of counter-terrorism policy which it believes puts at risk Pakistan's evolution toward greater civilian rule, by enabling the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance” (ICG Report 2015: 1).

#### **4. Evaluation and Recommendation**

Terrorism in Pakistan has wrecked a terrible toll on Pakistani society. Most of the terrorist attacks in the country are carried out by the extremist forces who justify violence in the name of religion. Therefore, in order to combat the threat of terrorism, the state must work on eliminating the challenge of violent extremism from the society.

Pakistan has been following a hard military approach to tackle the problem of terrorism, especially since the post-2009 period. The state’s counter-terrorism campaign has largely focussed on carrying out military operations to oust the foreign terrorist groups from the region. Even though, the state has achieved relative success in bringing down the number of terrorist attacks in the country, it has failed to prevent the spread of extremist ideology and the mobilisation and recruitment of people into militant groups.

Military operations alone only provide a short-term solution to the problem of countering terrorism and therefore must be substituted with developing a holistic counter violent extremism (CVE) strategy. Since there are multiple underlying causes that contributes to the rise of violent extremism in the society, the approach to counter the threat must be all comprehensive. As an Assistant Professor at National Defence University, Dr Khurram Iqbal, noted that single factor theories fall short of explaining cases of terrorism in Pakistan. He professed that there is a “need to recognise that extremism is caused by multiple factors like vengeance, poverty, and religious funda-

mentalism playing various roles at the individual, organisational and environmental levels”.<sup>207</sup>

Before deliberating upon the aspects of a CVE strategy, a brief deliberation is required on listing the potential drivers of the rise of violent extremism in Pakistan. A few factors that drives the rise of extremism in Pakistan are as follows:


- ◆ State and Governance Failures: State failures and governance lapse create optimal conditions for violent extremism to erupt in the state. The weak infrastructural nature of the Pakistani state in terms of its failure to deliver basic services to its people, or to establish effective and legitimate social control in the society creates the physical space for violent extremists forces to thrive in the country (Development Advocate Pakistan 2016: 4).
- ◆ Security and Geo-strategic Drivers: Pakistan’s insecurity vis-a-vis its immediate neighbours, India and Afghanistan made the state resort to the use of Islamic militants as a means to achieve its strategic interests in the region. Moreover, the role of regional and global events also led to the rise of religious militancy in the state. Pakistan's participation in the Afghan jihad, and global war on terrorism or the Iranian revolution contributed enormously to the birth of a militant infrastructure in the country.
- ◆ Political-Religious Driver: The close link between religion and state’s identity had led to the politicisation of religion in Pakistan. The ambivalent nature of the role of Islam in Pakistan’s identity is exploited by both state and non-state actors to justify violence in the name of religion.
- ◆ Economic Drivers: Failure of the state to provide economic opportunities and the decades long economic deprivation create a sense of insecurity and neglect, inciting the vulnerable and at risk individuals to join the extremist ranks.

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<sup>207</sup> “National narrative on extremism finalised”, *The Express Tribune*, 31 January 2018, [Online Web] Accessed 31 January 2018 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1622499/1-national-narrative-extremism-finalised/>

- ◆ **Social Drivers:** Weak social cohesion and lack of development especially in Pakistan’s tribal areas provide ample ground for the radicals and extremist organisations to get full support from the vulnerable section of people living there. The marginalisation and lack of governance helps extremist groups to penetrate and spread their ideologies (Yaseen and Muhammad 2018: 36-38).

Whereas, a study carried out by International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) (where key Pakistani stakeholders and experts were interviewed) ranked the importance of a variety of potential drivers of violent extremism (International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy 2016: 6).



Source: International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy

Given the multifaceted nature of the threat, and the wide-ranging factors that drive the spread of extremist violence, the following paragraph deliberates on the possible ways of tackling the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in the Pakistani society.

#### **4.1 Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Pakistan**

Violent extremism in Pakistan has long existed. It, in fact has been mostly state-sponsored or have been a direct consequence of the oppressive state policies. Thousands of people have been killed in the past in the name of religion or sect. However, in the post-9/11 period, Pakistan has witnessed the emergence of a global violent extremist network in the country. To prevent the spread of extremism in society, the state must look beyond the hard military approach to incorporate policies and mechanisms which can help cleanse the society of extremist elements.

The state of Pakistan lacks a comprehensive counter violent extremism (CVE) strategy to prevent the threat of homegrown violent extremism. The term CVE was not widely used until 2010 when it was first put to practice in Australia and later in the US in 2015. Just like in the case of terrorism, the term too lacks a precise definition. The term CVE was officially embraced in the US in 2015 when the US government defined it as a “strategy aimed to counter violent extremist narratives and promote moderate Muslim narratives to prevent recruitment of young Muslims by violent extremists” (Orakzai 2019: 756). Whereas, one of the authors has defined the term as:

The use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilising towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives (Khan 2015).

Thus, the following paragraph deliberates on the various policy initiatives undertaken by the Pakistani state and their shortcomings.

##### ***Framing a National Narrative***

Introduced as one of the significant components of the National Internal Security Policy, the proposal of framing a national narrative is both necessary and challenging. Most of the present day terrorist attacks in Pakistan are justified in the name of Islam. The militants in the country make use of Islamic terminology to mobilise the masses and justify terrorist attacks against the minorities or non believers of Islam in the name of jihad. This tendency of using religion to meet parochial political gains goes

back to the period before partition. The enigmatic relation of Islam with state's identity has led all political elites, religious clerics and radical militant jihadi groups to use religion to meet their personal and political interests. The political construct of religion has resulted in creating some misconstrued religious beliefs in the society which are often exploited by the militant groups to legitimise violence and warfare against different groups. Thus, what Pakistan is fighting against today is a result of the state's own faulty policies of religious conservatism and militancy.

Since jihadis fight the war on ideological lines, it is imperative for the state to formulate an ideological response to annul extremists' religious ideological dogmas. In order to deal with the threat of terrorism and extremism, the state must attempt to reduce the appeal and influence of the jihadis and their radical narratives that directly or indirectly contribute to the growing cycle of violence and extremism in the country.

Muhammad Amir Rana, a renowned Pakistan political analyst argued that in order to counter the extremist ideology, Pakistan must model its CVE strategy around three components: "intellectual responses to critical ideologies, education reforms and cultural revivals, and rehabilitation and reintegration of extremists/militants".<sup>208</sup> Pakistan requires a robust national narrative based on tolerance and respect for diversity, which suppresses the religious extremist ideology propagated by the militants. These narratives should be aimed at explicitly "de-constructing, delegitimising, and de-mystifying extremist propaganda to de-radicalise those already radicalised and to dissuade 'at risk' audiences potentially being exposed to or seeking out extremist content" (Feyyaz 2015: 66).

However, the wide array of religious discourses prevalent in Pakistan makes the task of framing a robust national narrative daunting. Dominant state elites in Pakistan have employed various religious discourses in the society to either legitimise their rule or win support for their policies. The presence of multiple religious discourses have added to an intellectual confusion where people are left confused on the issues and

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<sup>208</sup> Rana, Muhammad Amir Rana (2016), "Countering Violent Extremism", *Dawn*, 6 November 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 7 November 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1294504>

meaning of terms such as jihad, extremism, Shahadat, and are therefore are more susceptible to extremist narratives.

Not only does the framing of national narrative pose a challenge, but the state also encounters problems in defining the scope of a 'Counter-Terrorism Narrative'. The selective application of terrorism discourse in the state to serve its security ends poses a major challenge in framing a counter-terrorism narrative. For example, defining the militants waging jihad against the Indian State as 'freedom fighters' rather than 'terrorists' clearly showcase Pakistan's selective approach towards terrorism. Moreover, the presence of multitude of conflicting viewpoints between the civilian and military leadership in their approach towards tackling terrorism further compounds the challenges of developing a cohesive national counter narrative. Thus in order to intellectually engage in constructing a tolerant and moderate national narrative, the state must break away from its old long standing policy of using religion for political gains. It must also breakaway from its selective terrorism approach and cease its practice of using terrorist forces as instruments of state policy.

Due to the above-mentioned factors, Pakistan has for long failed at the endeavour of pursuing a soft approach to counter the extremist ideology until now. NACTA has recently finalised a robust national narrative to deal with the threat of violent extremism breeding in society. The narrative has been developed in consultation with the academic scholars, ulemas, media personnel after a long effort of 18 months.

### ***Madrasa Reforms***

In order to combat the spread of extremism in the society, the state must look at the various channels that disseminate extremist narratives. In Pakistan jihadi narratives are disseminated through various channels such as vernacular press, social media platforms, and traditional religious curricula taught at the madrasas. Out of these, madrasas have surfaced in many studies as one of the main political drivers of violent extremism in the post-9/11 period. Despite being recognised as a major breeding ground for extremist ideology, madrasa reforms have not yet borne much fruit in Pakistan. Madrasas in Pakistan have a long tradition of Islamic teaching and to meddle



in a thousand years well entrenched old system was not an easy proposition. Though, under international pressure, after joining the war efforts, President Musharraf, pledged to carry out a few reforms in the madrasa sector in order to modernise their system of education. He also “pledged to reform the madrasa system as part of its anti-terrorism actions in fulfilment of UN Security Council Resolution 1373”.<sup>209</sup>

The government decided to regulate the conditions of existing seminaries, and lead by example by setting up a network of “model madrasas”. To this end, the Pakistan Madrasa Education Board was established in August 2001, and these responsibilities were given to its academic council. An attempt was also made towards the registration of madrasas as well as that of foreign students enrolled in it. The madrasas which registered formally with the government were promised funding under the “Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002”. They were also required to “expel all foreign students by 31 December 2005”. In 2005, Pakistan carried out an amendment to its “Societies Registration Act of 1860” and asked madrasas to provide audit reports and a list of funding sources. However, the “Ittehad-e-Madaris-e-Dunya” (ITMD), an umbrella organisation of madrasas, rejected the amendments and refused to cooperate.<sup>210</sup>

Moreover, opposition also came from the religious political parties who have often relied on madrasas for inciting political violence in the country. According to a report compiled by PIPS, more than 60 per cent of madrasas have political affiliation.<sup>211</sup> Thus, such attempts made by the government brought opposition from various Islamist groups, who emphasised that “measures like registration, change for curricu-

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<sup>209</sup> “Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military”, International Crisis Group, 29 July 2002, [Online Web] Accessed 1 January 2015 URL: <https://www.crisis-group.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-madrasas-extremism-and-military>

<sup>210</sup> “Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Pakistan”, Library of Congress, [Online Web] Accessed 18 December 2018 URL: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/pakistan.php>

<sup>211</sup> [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/SS\\_No\\_4\\_2015\\_Dr\\_Minhas.pdf](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/SS_No_4_2015_Dr_Minhas.pdf)

lum, and mainstreaming madrasas were aimed at depriving them of their independence and to destroy their islamic identity” (Iqbal and Sobia 2015: 44).

In April 2014, the government in its “National Internal Security Policy” noted the role of “certain madrasas as a vehicle for spreading extremism”. Though, the policy stated that, “not all madrasas are a problem but a few impinge on national internal security. There are some troublesome aspects of these madrasas which include financing from unidentified sources, publication and distribution of hate material, which has taken a dangerous turn in cultivating non-tolerant and violent religious attitudes”(NISP 2014: 28). The report further raises concerns regarding madrasas for women which has come under the microscope of security analysis in the context of the Jamia Hafsa incident. The policy therefore suggests incorporating the madrasas in the mainstream educational framework by integrating them within the national educational system by supporting their administration, financial audit and curriculum accreditation (NISP 2014: 8).

Madrassa educational reforms have become a major source of concern for both civilian and military leadership in Pakistan. For instance, PM Imran Khan in his first public address after assuming office called on the “madrassas to introduce a core curriculum including subjects like math, English and science”. Whereas, Gen. Javed Bajwa, chief of Pakistan’s army pondered over the fate of seminary students: “will they become maulvis”, he asked, in 2017, “or they will become terrorists?”.<sup>212</sup>

Despite the concerns and apprehensions raised by the policymakers in the country, the results in the madrasa sector are yet to be seen. Political analyst Amir Rana questions government’s approach of suggesting systematic reforms, instead of simply using existing laws to tackle seminaries known to preach radical ideologies. He said, “if some madrasa teachers or students are involved in terrorism, the law enforcement agencies have records of the madrasas, they know what they are doing, the they can increase

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<sup>212</sup> Sattar. Abdul (2019), “Pakistan wants to reform madrasas. Expert Advise Fixing Public Education First”, NPR, 10 January 2019, [Online Web] Accessed 11 January 2019 URL: <https://www.npr.org/2019/01/10/682917845/pakistan-wants-to-reform-madrassas-experts-advise-fixing-public-education-first>

the surveillance. And if they found some suspicious activity, then they can enforce the existing law.”<sup>213</sup>

Therefore, in order to seriously reform the education system, Pakistan must show the political will to bring about an inclusive and cohesive educational curriculum. Moreover, after the 18th constitutional amendment act, education has become a provincial subject and madrasas have come under the jurisdiction of the provinces. Therefore, in order to regulate the madrasas, the onus lies on the provincial governments, who must evolve certain mechanisms to regularly monitor and evaluate the working and content of these seminaries. However, a few reforms in the education sector will not help bring about a change in the mindset of people, therefore they must be complemented with an academic or intellectual discourse on Islam in the country.

### ***De-radicalisation and Rehabilitation Programs***

The Pakistani state has made modest progress in adopting a model of engagement through de-radicalisation, re-habilitation and re-integration. De-radicalisation is a process through which individuals can be made to abandon extremist world-views. Since there are more than just ideological reasons that explains youth’s participation in Islamist militant groups, and that many people due to their social and economic vulnerability commonly fall prey to the jihadi narratives (Zahid 2017: 11-12), the rehabilitation programs help the integration of detained jihadis into the mainstream society.

Pakistan launched its first De-Radicalisation and Emancipation program (DERP) in September 2009 after the successful completion of the military operation Rah-e-Rast against the Pakistani Taliban in Swat district. The state opened two rehabilitation centres, Sabaoon and Mishal, which were focussed on both juveniles and adult detainees respectively to address the ideological and social problems that had driven the boys to

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<sup>213</sup> Hashim, Asad (2014), “Pakistan mulls tighter controls on madrasas”, Aljazeera, 21 April 2014, [Online Web] Accessed 26 November 2015 URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/pakistan-tighter-controls-madrassas-islamabad-201442064231355458.html>

join the militant forces. These programs were intended to assist the detained jihadis to reintegrate back into the society.

Islamabad's militant detainee rehabilitation programme comprises of four main modules: psychological counselling, correction of their extremist views through religious education, imparting of formal education followed by vocational training, and reintegration to facilitate their transaction back into the society. The programme is based on a rationale of providing second life to militants who want to voluntarily surrender and disassociate themselves from their respective militant organisations. Since, many people join islamist groups for reasons that have very little to do with extremist ideology and are mostly governed by either socio-economic factors or family coercion, the program provides them with an opportunity to break free from such association and integrate back into the mainstream society. The Pakistani officials claims a 99 per cent success rate with more than 2500 former Taliban fighters now reformed.

A study carried out at the Mishal de-radicalisation program listed various socio-economic factors and psychological factors that contributed towards radicalisation (Azam and Fatima 2017: 13)

Socio-economic Factors	Psychological Factors
★ Low Socio-economic status	★ Low IQ
★ Broken Family	★ Emotional Instability
★ History of physical abuse as a child	★ Anxiety disorder and Depression
★ Lack of education or religious knowledge	★ Revenge seeking behaviour
	★ Inferiority complex

Given the fact that broken family and lack of family supervision are listed as factors, Pakistan also runs Project Saparlay for the family members of detained persons.<sup>214</sup>

Today CVE measures are undertaken by both government and non-government agencies. The worldwide concern towards increased terror threats in Pakistan have brought international bodies to provide financial aid for the implementation and development

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<sup>214</sup> "Militant's rehabilitation", Dawn, 31 July 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 1 November 2017 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/648319>

of CVE initiatives. For example, the military sought professional assistance from HUM Pakistani Foundation, a non-governmental organisation run by Dr Farieha Paracha.

Punjab government's Counter Terrorism Department took an initiative in partnership with Technical and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) in 2011 to "de-radicalise and rehabilitate militants of banned Kashmir Jihadist and anti-Shia militant groups".<sup>215</sup> Former militant of these groups were given technical training and vocational workshops to pursue alternative livelihoods. The Punjab government also provided "modest soft-loans to start small businesses or to set up their own workshops" (Zahid 2017: 13). The government in Punjab gave the program's participants Rs 500 per month as an allowance and provided Rs 30,000 interest free loan to individuals who successfully completed the program to support their livelihood (Noor 2013: 18).

Though, Pakistan's de-radicalisation programme with its focus on militant rehabilitation is a step forward in the right direction, yet it still is far away from its finality. As political analyst Amir Rana states, "Pakistan's rehabilitation program in Swat was not a part of a comprehensive policy but was in fact a counter insurgency initiative introduced by the Pakistani army, which if implemented judiciously, could provide the basis for a broader de-radicalisation strategy" (Rana 2011: 4). Thus, in order to strengthen the viability and effectiveness of these programs, initiatives must be taken by the government in Pakistan to expand and implement these initiatives at the national level. The state also encounters different structural problems such as limited financial and human resources and lack of religious credible religious scholars to implement the program countrywide.

CVE programs require considerable amount of investment to effectively implement a number of measures. Since the fight is based on war on ideas, an ideological response

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<sup>215</sup> Mahmood, Javed (2016), "Pakistan de-radicalised hundreds of young former militants", Pakistan Forward, 21 December 2016, [Online Web] Accessed 11 January 2017 URL: [http://pakistan.asia-news.com/en\\_GB/articles/cnmi\\_pf/features/2016/12/21/feature-01](http://pakistan.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_pf/features/2016/12/21/feature-01)

by the state has become imperative. Moreover, the death of Dr Farooq Khan, a key figure in developing the Sabaoon program, on 2nd October 2010 by the Taliban<sup>216</sup> for propagating an enlightened version of Islamic teachings posed a major challenge to the running of the project. Such incidents further dissuade intellectuals and other people in the future to openly participate in such programs. Whereas, few authorities point out the difficulties faced by the detainees after their reintegration in the society. For example, “the authorities at the Mishal Rehabilitation Centre stated that only 11 out of the 494 individuals released so far have received financial support to enable them to have access to livelihood opportunities” (Rana 2011: 4).

Pakistan must reflect upon and draw from the other CVE models running in other countries. For example, drawing from the US CVE strategy, Pakistan must involve various actors who are deeply entrenched within Pakistan society to execute its de-radicalisation program.<sup>217</sup> Along with the state authorities, the program must involve other stakeholders such as people from academia, social services organisations, communities, mental health providers, NGOs and private sector. Moreover, drawing from the Australian CVE model, the state must lay utmost importance to the role of the social policy agencies to implement policies aimed at promoting social inclusion. Example of social policies include: “education and training programs, individual support services, youth initiatives, including mentoring and job advice, family, peer and community support, and community outreach” (Lauland et. al 2019 16-17).

Since the fight is based on war on ideas, an ideological response by the state has become imperative. An important component of the counselling could be the use of religious dialogue with clerics well versed with mainstream Islamic concepts. This is critical as it provides correction to the radicalised views imbibed by the militants and help them cultivate more balanced and moderate views (Basit 2015:13). Saba Noor, a Professor at National Defence University, Islamabad, argues that the effectiveness of

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<sup>216</sup> Shah, Farhan (2011), “Dr Farooq: A light the obscurantists put out”, The Express Tribune, 24 January 2011, [Online Web] Accessed 4 July 2015 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/108242/dr-farooq-a-light-the-obscurantists-put-out/>

<sup>217</sup> Counter Violent Extremism, US Department of Homeland Security, [Online Web] Accessed 30 September 2018 URL: <https://www.dhs.gov/cve/what-is-cve>

religious rehabilitation is difficult to gauge without individualised assessment. She suggests drawing from the Singaporean CVE model which stresses on employing one-on-one discussion sessions between clerics and detainees, which are supported by detailed psychological assessments. This she argued would help moderate clerics to find out key issues and ideas motivating the radicalisation of youth, which will help improve framing the counter-narratives seeking to prevent the growth of radicalisation in Pakistani society (Noor 2013: 19). Therefore, if de-radicalisation is to meet with any success in Pakistan, the national narrative itself needs to change.

However, despite the various political and military efforts and initiatives undertaken, Pakistan has failed to dismantle the militant infrastructure in the country. The following paragraph evaluates a few other reasons for state's poor performance in countering the rising trend of terrorist and extremist violence.

#### ◆ **Lack of Political Will**

Pakistan to a great extent can be held responsible for the threat it encounters today. Its continuous protection, funding and training to the extremist terrorist groups in the society to meet their strategic interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan has made the country a victim of terrorism and extremist violence. The state lacks the political will to bring down the terrorist structure due to their regional and domestic utility.

Regionally, in order to maintain its stronghold in Afghanistan, the state remains reluctant to carry out operations against the North Waziristan-based Haqqani network, which has become a global hub for a plethora of terrorist groups. Despite repeated attempts made by the US, Pakistan refused to launch an attack in North Waziristan Agency until 2014 and cited operational limitations such as heavy deployment of troops in South Waziristan as a reason for their inability. However, writing in 2014, Former Army Spokesperson, Major General (retd) Athar Abbas, disclosed that, "the army was on the brink of launching a military offensive in North Waziristan three years ago, but given then army Chief General Kayani's reluctance, they were unable

to”.<sup>218</sup> He further added, that the delay in the operation has strengthened the hold of militants in the area, which has complicated the matter further.

Pakistan’s commitment towards fighting the threat of terrorism has been highly questioned. Pakistan has been using militant groups for both geo-political and domestic utility. Despite joining the international coalition of forces to fight against terrorism and being one of the major recipients of the war aid, Pakistan has largely failed to dismantle the militant infrastructure from its country.

This primarily can be attributed to Pakistan’s long standing approach of perceiving Islamist militant groups as strategic assets to engage its Indian neighbour in a proxy war. However, despite becoming a participant in the US led global war on terrorism, Pakistan did not break away from its policy of supporting proxy groups. It instead manipulated its security agenda to meet their geo-political interests by fighting select targets. The state therefore concentrated its efforts at capturing militants from low-level Al-Qaeda ranks and other foreign fighters, which did not fit directly into the state's strategic calculus. However, despite international pressure from the US, Pakistan continues to nurture the pro-state militant groups.

Moreover, decisions about which groups to patronise also depended upon the domestic utility of the groups to the state. For example, Pakistan often sought the help of pro-state militant groups to suppress the presence and influence of anti-state groups and were often asked to provide an alternative ideological model to the one suggested by the anti-state groups. Leaders from JeM and LeT claims that they were “provided additional resources to keep current members in line and induce former members who might be assisting anti-state militants either purposefully or inadvertently to return to the fold” (Tankel 2013: 15). ISI officers also reportedly “guarded LeT leaders to reindoctrinate former and current members against launching attacks in Pakistan, and

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<sup>218</sup>“Kayani was reluctant to launch N Waziristan operation three years ago”, The Express Tribune, June 30, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 5 August 2015 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/729162/kayani-was-reluctant-to-launch-n-waziristan-operation-three-years-ago/>



local clerics were encouraged to deliver the message that jihad against Pakistan was haram”.

The state has been pitching the pro-state groups against the anti-state groups. It seeks help from certain groups to mediate state’s conflicts with anti-state groups. Despite being declared as a Foreign Terrorist organisation by the US in 2012, Pakistan state continues to see Haqqani network as a useful ally and a proxy force which acts as a mediator to resolve conflicts between the Pakistani state and anti-state terrorist organisations. Given its domestic utility to the state, Pakistan keeps the insurgent group outside the purview of a security threat.

Thus, given the geo-political and domestic utility of few militant groups, the security establishment in Pakistan continues to aid and support the pro-state groups as the cessation of active support to them would lead to decreased influence and a concomitant rise in anti-state violence. However, extremism in Pakistan will not end until support to Kashmir-based jihadi groups or other proxy groups ends. As Hassan Abbas, a Pakistani strategic analyst points out, “violent extremism in Pakistan is a result of country’s decade long policy of exporting militancy abroad and extremism inside Pakistan in inherently and inextricably linked with the actions and ideology of jihadi groups operating in Kashmir” (Abbas 2004: 225).

#### ◆ **Political Factionalism**

A) Civil-Military Discord: Power sharing arrangements in Pakistan and Institutional Politics

B) Inter-party Politics

Power-sharing arrangements in Pakistan have long hindered state initiatives and effective policy execution. The over-developed state structure of military-bureaucratic oligarchy, over securitisation of threat around the Indian State, the weak political leadership, the corruption in the political system, and inter-party competition are some factors that have allowed the military in Pakistan to thrive as the key power-wielding force in the Pakistani society. The over monopolisation of power in the hands of the

military in Pakistan has long undermined the working of the civilian institutions and democratic leadership.

Thus, the discord, disconnect and lack of coordination between the two main stakeholders have imperilled most of the policy initiatives and actions in Pakistan. The institutional politics between the two agencies is clearly seen in the security sector of the state. Most of the counter-terrorism policies and institutional mechanisms, especially in the post-9/11 period, have suffered a major blow due to the power struggle amongst the political elites.

For example, The National Internal Security Policy (NISP) to counter critical security challenges faced a major challenge in terms of its power-sharing arrangements. The NISP document proposes to implement and accomplish the main objectives of the policy by suggesting to make “integrated efforts through an institutionalised monitoring framework under democratic leadership to elicit support and coordination of local and international stakeholders” (NISP 2014). However, the long standing militarisation of internal security affairs in Pakistan has undermined the role of democratic leadership. The proposed idea of a “Joint Intelligence Directorate” or a “Directorate of Internal Security” in NISP, wherein 33 civilian and military intelligence and operational agencies would coordinate intelligence data amongst themselves looks hard to achieve. Though, the disconnect between the civilian and military agencies remains a major obstacle to counter terrorism measures and seems important to be addressed yet the proposal looks less realistic. For example, given the civil-military discord in Pakistan, the military driven ISI would always remain skeptical to freely share their intelligence information with others in order to keep and maintain its stronghold in matters of intelligence, defence and security. Moreover, the policy also prescribes law enforcement functions for the ISI, which has received fundamental opposition from people in the policy circle. For example, PPP senator, Sen Farhatullah Babar, showed his surprise at ISI’s role in the policy document and remarked that, “ISI is an informa-

tion gathering body and not a law enforcement agency”.<sup>219</sup> Furthermore, the policy “rather than acknowledging the Interior ministry as one of the important part of the functionary, seeks to position the ministry as the supra-body that owns NISP and that ought to coordinate all functionaries and specialised agencies even though some are not under its command and deal with issues it has no expertise on”.<sup>220</sup>

The duality of control also belittles the counter terrorism body of NACTA and adds confusion to its functioning. According to the NACTA act, the organisation is under the control of the PM. However, a notification introduced by the federal government has put NACTA under the PM for administrative purposes and under the interior ministry for operational matters. “This belittles the counter terrorism body in the eyes of powerful entities including provincial governments, federal ministries and the IB and ISI with which it has to coordinate”.<sup>221</sup>

Moreover, there is an absence of a culture of centralised oversight of intelligence agencies, as well as the failure of different branches of the state to coordinate with each other and resolve their internal discord. In theory NACTA was created to oversee the workings of intelligence agencies including IB, FIA and ISI. Though, FIA and IB work under the interior ministry; ISI which formally reports to the PM is in reality under the control of the army chief. A recent attempt by the PPP government to subject the ISI to the authority of the Interior Ministry was immediately reversed at the behest of the opposition from the military class (Yusuf 2014: 96-97). Moreover, military's powerful position in the domain of security will hinder NACTA to carry out a prominent role in implementing the new security policy. For instance according to a stipulation built into NACTA, the security agencies get to veto any action not in consonance with the mandate of NACTA.

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<sup>219</sup> Iftikhar A.Khan, “ Security Policy draws more fire from experts and opposition”, Dawn, March 27, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 10 June 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1095845>

<sup>220</sup> Moeed Yusuf, “Flaws in NISP”, Dawn, April 1, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 11 June 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1096919>

<sup>221</sup> Tariq Parvez, “ Rejuvenating NACTA”, Dawn, July 1, 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 8 March 2016 URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1116157>

Furthermore, the dominance of military in the security sector has made the army a major beneficiary in the fight against terrorism. Allied with the US, the military in Pakistan received direct funds from the Americans. The US funding in the post-9/11 period was directed towards meeting five major purposes: “to cover the extra cost to Pakistan military for fighting terrorism; provide Pakistan with military equipment to fight terrorism; to provide development and humanitarian assistance; covert funds; and cash transfers directly to the Pakistani government’s budget” (Ibrahim 2009: 5). US assistance to Pakistan falls into three broad categories: “military aid, Coalition Support Funds and civilian assistance”. Military aid includes “Foreign Military Financing of US military equipment for Pakistani forces” to help Pakistan security forces to counter militant challenge. Coalition Support Funds “reimburse Pakistan for operations and maintenance costs incurred in direct support of OEF operations”. However, it is being reported that the Pakistani military did not use most of its funds for the agreed objective of fighting terror. For example, the US officials visiting FATA witnessed the poor state of Frontier Corps despite sufficient aid provided to the Army. One of the officials reported that the Corps were “standing in the snow in sandals” and carried barely functional Kalashnikov rifles with “just 10 rounds of ammunition each” (Ibrahim 2009: 5-6).

The direct aid to the military stalled the democratisation process in Pakistan. The direct handover of funds to the military increased their independence vis-a-vis the government and made them refuse to submit to the civilian rule. The direct control of funds also resulted in an increased level of corruption in the Establishment.

Not only did the foreign aid infused the military with more power; it also led to the incompetence of the civil leadership to take complete responsibility of the security challenges. For example, soon after assuming power, the PPP government made the Chief of Army Staff, “the principal authority for application of the military opera-

tions, and placed the other law enforcement agencies including Frontier Corps NWFO under the command of COAS for military operations”.<sup>222</sup>

Moreover, Army and Political leadership have often conflicted with the difference of opinion in their responses to counter militant threat. The recent flare up between the Nawaz Sharif government and the COAS, Raheel Sharif, on the issue of talks or operations have taken the relationship between the two branches of power at their lowest ebb.

The Nawaz Sharif government after assuming power in the year 2013, wished to pursue an approach deviant from army’s strategy of carrying out military operations. The government therefore intended to pursue a policy of ‘peaceful settlement’ and pushed for holding negotiations with the militants, especially the anti-state group, TTP. However, the military being directly targeted by the TTP; identified the group as a major internal security threat and decided to defeat the group through carrying out military operations against them. However, due to the constant failure of peace dialogue, the army chief decided to take matters into its own hands by overriding a plank of government’s strategy of holding dialogues.<sup>223</sup> Thus, taking charge over the security policy, the military leadership once again superseded PM’s decision by professing that the options of talks had expired.

## **B. Inter-Party Politics**

Inter-party politics and centre-province cooperation also undermines the process of policy framing and execution in the state of Pakistan. For example, one of the major challenge to the implementation of NISP stems from the issue of province-centre cooperation, and the distribution of authority between the two. Historically, the federal

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<sup>222</sup> Abrar Saeed, “COAS has final say on military action”, The Nation, June 26, 2008 [Online Web] Accessed 12 September 2014 URL: <https://nation.com.pk/26-Jun-2008/coas-has-final-say-on-military-action>

<sup>223</sup> Malik, Mehreen Zahra, “Pakistani government feels weight of army’s heavy hand”, Reuters, 23 May 2014 [Online Web] Accessed 25 May 2014 URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-sharif-army-insight-idUS-BREA4M09C20140523>

government has been supervising and looking after the internal security domain and taking counter terrorism measures. However, the 18th constitutional amendment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under the PPP led government entailed a major shift in Federation-provinces relationship; correcting the federal imbalances. With the support of all political parties in 2010, the act made 102 amendments, making key areas of policy exclusively provincial domains. Council of Common Interest, an inter-provincial body was strengthened and was authorised to act as an arbiter to resolve some of the issues which may arise among provincial or federal governments (Husain 2012: 83). Thus, during 2010 and 2011, a total of 103 functions out of 201 functions, organisations or institutions were completely devolved to the provinces (Rumi 2015: 5).

In Pakistan the primary law and order responsibilities are vested in their provincial governments; which might bring challenges in maintaining coordination with the federal government on the issues of security. Since NACTA, a federal body, is to establish coordination with many of the departments devolved under provincial authority, the relationship between the political party at the provincial level and the federal government becomes an important factor in marking the success of such a process. For example: Political party antagonist or in opposition to the federal government might be reluctant to share information or cooperate with the federal agencies or bodies which will create hinderances in the intended aim of establishing joint collaborative efforts (SISA 2014: 22). Even though, the provincial governments enjoy autonomy in maintenance of law and order; MOI doesn't suffer from any lack of authority either. For example, even though police forces are supervised at a provincial level, the MOI possess the power for an overall supervision. It has at its disposal “the services of the National Police Bureau to coordinate the activities of the different police forces across the country and is further tasked with assistance in the modernisation of the police forces of the provinces<sup>224</sup>.

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<sup>224</sup> National Police Bureau”, Ministry of interior, Government of India [Online Web] Accessed 12 December 2017 URL: <http://www.npb.gov.pk/index.php/introduction/>

Moreover, the inter-party competition for electoral gains also determines the policy framing and responses of the state. For example, the coinage of the term “Punjabi Taliban” and the discourse around it spurred a major controversy between the two political parties of Pakistan. Fighting for electoral gains, the leaders of the PML-N objected to the use of the term “Punjabi Taliban”; likely in part because of the party’s ongoing support to groups such as SSP and LeJ. Punjab Chief Minister, Shahbaz Sharif, further accused Interior Minister, Rahman Malik, of using the term, which has amounted to the condemnation of the people of Punjab and alleged him of intending to create a rift between the provinces. Furthermore, Nawaz Sharif also took exception to the term and showed his discontent over minister’s intention of painting terrorists and militants in ethnic and sectarian colours for political point scoring.<sup>225</sup>

However, muddled between political gains and fighting the security threats, Pakistan elites have often constructed threats and policies to suit their political aspirations. One of the files recovered from Osama Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad reveals Punjab CM, Shahbaz Sharif’s attempt at striking a deal with the TTP with the help of Al-Qaeda, asking the group to stop conducting operations in Punjab. In one of the letters to Laden from his top deputy, Rahman, noted that, “the Punjab government was ready to reestablish normal relations as long as the Pakistani Taliban do not conduct operations in Punjab”. Rahman clarified the deal proposed by Shahbaz Sharif was limited to the "governmental jurisdiction" of Punjab and did not include Islamabad.<sup>226</sup>

Thus, state sponsorship and pervasive climate of impunity given by the state officials weakens any effort of combating the spread of terrorist forces and instead enhance the power and operational tactics of such groups. For example, Southern Punjab hosts two of the most radical Deobandi groups in Pakistan, Jaish-e-Mohammad and the sec-

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<sup>225</sup> Yusufzai, Rahimullah, “ The discourse on Punjabi Taliban”, CSS Forum Pakistan, July 06, 2010 [Online Web] Accessed 16 June 2016 URL: <http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/news-articles/36007-discourse-punjabi-taliban-rahimullah-yusufzai.html>

<sup>226</sup>“Shahbaz wanted to cut deal with TTP as long they didn't conduct operations in Punjabi: Report”, The Express Tribune, March 10, 2015 URL: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/850789/shahbaz-wanted-to-cut-deal-with-ttp-as-long-they-didnt-conduct-operations-in-punjab-report/>

tarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. While the indiscriminate use of force against local criminal groups by the paramilitary units is rampant, the anti-India Jaish continues to operate freely.<sup>227</sup>

#### ◆ **Structural Limitations**

The increasing tide of insecurity in the state can also be attributed to the weak social control of the state, poor governance and state's structural weakness. The following will briefly cite the case studies for each to showcase the major roadblocks to state's performance in countering the security threat of terrorism and violent extremism.

##### *Weak Administrative Writ of the Pakistani state*

FATA which became a global headquarter of terrorist activities was left administratively weak by the Pakistani state since its formation. The weak administrative writ of the Pakistani state made the area vulnerable to outside interference and served as an operational base for Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda members and their foreign affiliates to seek refuge to continue their fight against the American forces and later against the Pakistani state in the post-9/11 period.

After joining the war efforts, and being pressurised by the US, Pakistan was forced to send its military for the first time since independence into the country's tribal areas. FATA, despite being a part of the Pakistani state had a very limited participation in the country's political system. As the region continues to follow the British made Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR), a distinct colonial traditional value and system (Gunaratna and Nielsen 2008), the state of Pakistan failed to establish its own writ in the region.

Since the region is ruled by local chiefs, representing the local population, the intervention of Pakistan military forces in the tribal areas brought disgruntlement among the local tribes. Pakistan's lack of legitimacy, effective social control in the state and

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<sup>227</sup> "Pakistan's Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab", International Crisis Group, Report No. 279/ASIA, May 30, 2016 [Online Web] Accessed 15 June 2017 URL: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-s-jihadist-heartland-south-ern-punjab>



inexperience in fighting the guerrilla insurgency affected the state's performance in their counter-terrorism measures.

Thus, the lack of experienced men, weak inter-services coordination and poorly strategised military operations proved detrimental to Pakistan's own security forces. For example: In a personal interview with political analyst, Shuja Nawaz, the then DGMO, Major General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, professed that, "Pakistan trained its soldiers in what it calls a Low intensity conflict (LIC) rather than adopting a counter-insurgency orientation. LIC demands no more than well trained infantry soldiers, whereas COIN operations requires indoctrination of both soldiers and officers, in addition to civil-military collaboration to win over the general population and isolate the insurgents" (Nawaz 2009).

Winning public support is of crucial importance for the success of counter insurgency operations. As British General Sir Frank Kitson, argued that the population is a critical element in counterinsurgency operations as "this represents the water in which the fish swims" (Jones and Christine 2010: 89). Pakistan until 2009 did not work on framing a counter insurgency approach to fight the militants. However, in 2009, General Kayani did work on creating public support before launching the Swat operation. Though, the state has achieved few successes so far, the challenge of implementing a comprehensive COIN strategy is ongoing.

The estrangement of the local populace has been a major failure of the Pakistani state. The displacement of people from their homes without any adequate rehabilitation and lack of genuine humanitarian relief and assistance has turned the locals against the state forces. Islamabad's resistance to embrace counter-insurgency doctrinally and operationally so far has proved fatal for the state (Fair and Jones 2009: 162). Hence, to genuinely fight the menace of terrorism, Pakistan must adopt an all comprehensive COIN strategy. The civilian-military institutions must come together and work towards revamping the administrative and legal system of the region and introduce social, economic and political reforms in the affected tribal areas. The military operations to root out the insurgent groups must be complimented with different develop-

mental, social and political reforms, ensuring immediate humanitarian relief, security against the insurgents, and political reconciliation.

The Pakistani state must fill the decades-long development void and take initiatives to politically integrate tribal areas with the mainstream society. The recent merger of the FATA with the KP province and the other pro-democratic amendments are a step forward, yet the alienation from the mainstream society for decades and lack of political reforms in the area has created a sense of deprivation of rights amongst the local tribesmen. Thus, addressing these problems will help prevent the tribesmen from falling prey to any anti-state organisation.

### ***Poor Governance and Humanitarian Crisis***

The problem of IDPs and the humanitarian crisis in the terrorist inflicted areas has become an issue of deep concern for the state of Pakistan. The military operations carried out by the Pakistani state, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, to uproot the terrorist infrastructure has caused displacement of local tribes from their areas. However, the failure of the Pakistani state to provide adequate assistance to the people affected by the military operations have generated a great deal of disgruntlement amongst the IDPs. It has in fact marked one of the major humanitarian crisis in the history of the Pakistani state. According to the FATA Disaster Management Authority, “87,778 North Waziristan families have been registered and verified as displaced due to the military operation in the North Waziristan Agency”.<sup>228</sup> More so, in parts of FATA, most notably Bajaur agency, families have been forced to flee repeatedly because of militant resurgence.<sup>229</sup> The increased vulnerability amongst the displaced people and the lack of social protection provides a good opportunity to the radical groups to persuade the displaced populace to join jihadi ranks. One of the re-

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<sup>228</sup> Younus, Uzair(2015), “Pakistan’s IDP Problem”, Foreign Policy,16 January 2015, [Online Web] Accessed 17 July 2015 URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/16/pakistans-idp-problem/>

<sup>229</sup> “Pakistan:The Worsening IDP Crisis”, International Crisis Group, 16 September 2010, [Online Web] Accessed 19 October 2014 URL:<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-worsening-idp-crisis>

ports released by International Crisis group concluded that, the failure of the government to address the humanitarian crisis could "reverse any gains on the battlefield and boost Islamist radical groups".<sup>230</sup>

However, military operations are only one aspect of a strategy, and provide immediate management of the conflict at hand. Therefore, the state must look deeper into the conflict and trace the root cause of the growing militant recruitment in the state. It must develop comprehensive countrywide rehabilitation and relief programs and concentrate on developmental governance to provide adequate infrastructural facilities and opportunities to the war affected people.

### ***Reforms of the Law Enforcement Organisations in Pakistan***

Problem of terrorism and violent extremism has engulfed the major cities and tribal areas of Pakistan. Reliance on military operations to dismantle the terrorist network does not provide a sustainable counterterrorism strategy. Thus, Pakistan's response to terrorism must be re-shaped to include police investigations, arrests, fair trials, and convictions (International Crisis Group 2009: 1).

For instance, a study carried out by RAND titled "How Terrorist Groups End", provides evidence "that effective police and intelligence work deliver better counter-terrorism results than the use of military force". States must adopt a preventive rather than a reactive approach to curb the incidents of terrorist violence. This necessitates the importance of police forces which are not just more accessible to the public but are deeply embedded in the society, and can prevent crimes using information provided by citizens to them (Perito and Tariq 2014: 5).

However, despite being a significant law enforcement organisation; police infrastructure is one of the poorly managed sector in Pakistan. The organisation is aptly described as "ill equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicised and chronically corrupt" (Abbas 2009). According to Hassan Abbas, "one of the overarching problems

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<sup>230</sup> Bajoria, Jayshree (2009), "Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces", Council on Foreign Relations, 17 June 2009, [Online Web] Accessed 11 January 2015  
URL: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/realigning-pakistans-security-forces>

that are obvious impediments to reform efforts is the dysfunctional relationship and a discernible lack of coordination among the police force, the civilian run-IB and the military controlled intelligence agencies” (Abbas 2016: 152-153). Moreover, the close relationship of intelligence agencies with the state-supported militant groups also fails the counter-terrorism efforts initiated by the police forces. For example, “police officers routinely mention apprehending militants and criminals but quickly receiving requests from intelligence agencies for their release” (Abbas 2016: 152-153).

Moreover, being understaffed and under equipped, the organisation needs funds to modernise and equip itself to the pressing challenges of terrorism. International aid and support can play a significant role in modernising the force with modern techniques and enhancing its capacity.

## **5. Conclusion**

State responses to security threats are mostly a result of the construction and manipulation of the security agenda. The selective securitisation policy of differentiating between 'good' and 'bad' Taliban and the long held practice of providing vast spaces on and from its soil to militant groups has made Pakistan a major victim of terrorism itself. Thus, in order to eradicate the menace of terrorist and extremist violence from its state, Pakistan must abandon the use of its dubious terrorism policy.

Moreover, the state deficiencies have plagued the institutional structure of the state. The political structures are mostly paralysed as they are either ill equipped or are often superseded by the military authorities. Thus, in order to effectively launch a counterterrorism policy, both civilian and military leadership must come together and bridge their gaps which will ensure an effective management of security policies. The practice of pursuing policies for drawing personal and institutional gains must be stopped for the broader interest of the nation. Moreover, no battle can be won without having the support of the people. Thus, it is imperative for the government to undertake genuine socio-political-economic reforms and initiatives to win back the support of its anguished populace.

Most importantly, the fight against terrorism and extremism is an ideological war and it can only be won by defeating the extremist narratives propagated by radical elements. Pakistan state's heavy reliance on counter-terrorism operations without a corresponding soft approach will not bear much results. It in fact will backfire with more and more number of disgruntled youth wanting to join the militant forces. Thus, Pakistan must take appropriate steps and have a multi-faceted approach, which fights the menace of terrorism and violent extremism not only through hard military means but also through disengagement strategies.

## Conclusion

The changes in the international security paradigm in the post-2001 period had a great impact on Pakistan's internal security environment. The recent wave of terrorism and violent extremism in Pakistan has raised a global concern. The state of Pakistan's troubled internal security environment is a result of the deep insecurities that the state was born to. The failure of the state to develop an inclusive form of nationalism and its inherent rivalry with India, a result of the exclusionary "two-nation theory" sowed the seeds of the many internal challenges that the state is confronted with. Pakistan's security institutions and dominant state actors have defined both the state's identity as well as its security threat around the Indian state. In order to meet its security interests and to maintain their institutional relevance in the state, Pakistani state, especially its military wing, has resorted to the use of Islamist militants, who they believed would counter-balance India's conventional military superiority. Since 2001, many of these proxy forces have sought alliances with the global network of Islamists and have turned their focus towards fighting the Pakistani state. Though, Pakistan today officially recognises the security threats that it face from extremist and terrorist elements in the state, it continues to nurture some militant groups who are seen as assets.

The following paragraph will therefore test the two hypothesis laid down at the start of the study:

### Hypothesis

★ *The Pakistani state's selective approach of securitisation towards the terrorist and extremist threats has imperilled its counter-terrorism measures.*

Pakistan's commitment towards the cause of terrorism has been questioned time and again. Despite joining the global war efforts against terrorism, the state has been caught covertly harbouring, shielding and aiding some of the terrorist groups. Given its insecurity vis-a-vis its immediate neighbour, India, Pakistan till date looks at terrorism as an effective mechanism to serve its national security interests. Thus, while

Pakistan agreed to join the US led coalition of forces to fight the menace of terrorism in 2001, it did not break away from its long practised strategy of using the pro-state and anti-Indian militant groups which served state's strategic interests in the region. Despite being internationally condemned, Pakistan, especially its military wing, did not see these groups as 'threats' and therefore restricted their counter-terrorism measures to a few selective foreign groups and fighters which did not fall directly under their strategic calculus as well as kept the Americans satisfied.

By making a distinction between "good" and "bad" terrorists, Pakistan harboured a few militant groups while attacked others. By being selective in its approach, the state deliberately remained oblivious to the growing ideological and operational interlinkages between the different militant groups. The pro-state indigenous militant groups rendered their support to the displaced foreign terrorist organisations and helped them re-group and reorganise their forces in Pakistan's tribal areas. In fact, most of them joined their broader global movement of jihad against the West.

With the blurring of operational boundaries between the domestic and foreign militant groups, Pakistan's half-hearted counter-terrorism operations proved to be a failure. The foreign fighters were mostly found hiding in the houses of the domestic militant groups or were helped by them in crossing the Afghan border to enter Pakistan or facilitating their movement across the country to enable them to have a close channel of communication with other militant groups. Whereas, few of the militant jihadi groups also helped by making emotional appeals for donations in cash for aid to "Afghan victims of the US terrorism" (Abbas 2015:223). For example: JeM's Zarb-e-Momin and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen's Al-Hilal contained messages for the people to support the war against the US. The logistical and operational support from the indigenous groups thereby stalled the US efforts of defeating the transnational network of terrorists.

During the initial phase of the war, Pakistan did not perceive the global war on terrorism as its own fight and therefore remained reluctant to fight the forces that they had once harboured. By being selective in defining its 'security threats', Pakistan not only

provided the scope to foreign terrorist groups to thrive in the country but also encouraged the growth of other militant forces in the country.

The birth of TTP, an anti-state group in 2007, posed an imminent threat to Pakistan's state security. The incessant terrorist attacks directed against the Pakistani state, resulted in it declaring a 'security' situation in the country. Both civilian and military officials defined its security agenda around fighting the terrorist and extremist forces breeding in the country and officially recognised them as a security threat in its National Internal Security Policy document. The state also committed towards breaking away from its policy of making a distinction between "good" and "bad" terrorists.

However, despite committing itself towards fighting the menace of terrorism, Pakistan continues to act soft on the pro-state terrorist groups or what they perceive as strategic assets. For example, the state continued to protect the anti-US Afghan based insurgent group, the Haqqani network, despite being aware of its close operational ties and alliances with the Pakistani Taliban. Due to TTP's critical stance on the presence of western forces in the country, the group receives sufficient logistical and operational support from the Haqqani network. The support received by TTP not only emboldens the organisational capacity of TTP, but has also helped terrorist groups like Haqqani network to gain leverage over Pakistani State in times of conflict between the state and the anti-state groups.

Whereas, in regard to the Kashmir based separatist groups, the state continues to harbour them despite committing otherwise. One of the main policies outlined in the National Action Plan was the closure of bank accounts of terrorist groups to disrupt militant operations in Pakistan. However, the state has not effectively implemented this policy against all groups. For example, LeT, a Kashmir separatist group raise its funds through its linked foundation of JuD.

Moreover, Pakistan continues to sponsor terrorism from its soil. The 2016 terrorist attacks on the Indian state of Uri and Pathankot by the anti-India Kashmir terrorist groups operating within Pakistan clearly showcase Pakistan's lack of willingness to commit itself towards ceasing its support for terrorist groups in the country. Terrorists



like Hafiz Saeed and others have been freely moving around the country, holding rallies and giving political speeches at public platforms. Whereas, Pakistan's constant support to the anti-West Haqqani network to maintain its strategic control over Afghanistan has raised fingers at the state over its lack of commitment towards fighting the terrorist forces in the country.

**★ *Heavy reliance on counter-terrorism operations without a soft corresponding approach is not only capital intensive but also counter-productive***

Counter-terrorism military operations in Pakistan is unlikely to succeed in eradicating the scourge of extremism and terrorism from its society. The military led counter-terrorism operations in the country's tribal areas merely acted as a combat strategy to contain the threat from extremist and terrorist forces. It however failed to 'prevent', 'eradicate' or 'address' the causes that leads to the spread of extremism. As discussed before, the roots of extremism lies mainly in the minds of the people as well as in the socio-economic-political fabric of the state. Therefore, a mere military driven counter-terrorism approach will not help address the problem whose causes are deeply rooted in the social fabric of the state.

Pakistan has devoted enormous amount of its resources in fighting wars. Most of the aid received by Pakistan from US is mostly security driven and defence related. However, the counter-terrorism operations carried out by the military only spurred more violence in the country's tribal areas. The study argues that a narrowly practiced counter-terrorism approach has proven to be more counter-productive as it has not only strengthened the hold of the militants in the tribal areas but have turned the local population against the Pakistani state, making them more vulnerable to join the militant ranks.

The hard core military approach followed by Pakistan in the semi-autonomous tribal areas, turned many of the local chiefs and tribesmen against the Pakistani state. Since the state lacked both effective social and political control over the tribal population, many of its operations were perceived by the locals as a direct encroachment to their autonomy.

Moreover, the indiscriminate use of military force inflicted a huge social and human cost on the locals living in the tribal areas. The collateral damage and the displacement of over million people from their homes in FATA without much human assistance and adequate rehabilitation resulted in alienation of tribal population. On the other hand, the use of heavy handed helicopter gunships, mortar fire and artillery against the militants by the Pakistani army and the use of Predator drone aircraft attacks by the US, led to a massive rise in the number of civilian deaths. The policy of collective punishment and extrajudicial killings of suspected militants by the Pakistani state further added to the number of atrocities committed against the non-combatants.

Moreover, most of the military led operations failed due to the parallel efforts made by the government to reach out to the militant groups to consolidate peace deals. The appeasement policy enabled and provided time to the terrorist forces breeding in the tribal areas to re-group or re-organise and expand their control over the region.

Therefore, due to the above mentioned factors, Pakistan failed to achieve much success in its counter-terrorism measures. In order to effectively fight the militant forces, Pakistan must make a shift from a mere counter-terrorism policy to an all comprehensive counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. The success of military operations alone are meaningless until and unless they are complemented by political interventions and good governance policies. Therefore, a comprehensive counter-insurgency initiative requires the involvement of both civilian government and military forces. An integrated approach of implementing a development program after a military operation help manage the damages of a war-torn region.

Moreover, building trust, and acceptance of the relevant population is the key to success of any counter-insurgency operation. Pakistan's failure at drawing support from the local population hindered the success of their military operations in the tribal regions. The locals not only denied any help to the state forces but in fact supported the militants in their war against the state.

Apart from a comprehensive COIN strategy, the state also needs to effectively implement a Counter Violent Extremism strategy (CVE). The state in order to prevent the growing tide of extremist and terrorist violence in the country, must look beyond its short sighted military approach and introduce a soft political approach which will be focussed on addressing the causes that drives the spread of extremism in the society.

As deliberated before, extremism is the foremost factor driving terrorism, and that extremist forces draw legitimacy of their actions through the help of religious narratives and discursive norms. Pakistan, which has been an ideologically puzzling state with an ambivalent nature of Islam provides enough scope and space to the radical extremist forces to grow and spread its extremist ideology across the country.

Thus, in order to counter the spread of extremism, Pakistan must implement a soft political approach. The state needs to work on drafting a national narrative to suppress the voices promoting puritanical version of Islam. However, due to the ambiguous nature of the role of religion in the state and the presence of multiple actors making different religious claims, the challenge of framing a national narrative becomes more profound and daunting. Therefore, to begin with, the “state must identify the existing narratives that run counter to extremist narratives, as well as those that seek to settle unresolved gaps in Pakistan’s original content” (Khan 2013:10).

Apart from the ideological factor, the poor state of education, high rate of unemployment and lack of good governance in the state also drives highly vulnerable section of people to join extremist groups and follow their extremist ideology.

Pakistan at present has the largest generation of young people ever in its history (approximately two-thirds of the total populations is below the age of 30). Despite that, the state has the highest number of youth unemployment in the region. The challenge is so severe that Pakistan will have to generate nearly a million jobs every year for the next 30 years, without interruption, to maintain the unemployment rate at the current

levels.<sup>231</sup> The growing vulnerability of the youth makes them an easy target for recruitment in the militant groups. Pakistan which has the 8th largest military in the world, positions at 150 out of 189 countries in the 2017 Human Development index<sup>232</sup> and ranks 113 out of 120 in UNESCO's Education for all development index.<sup>233</sup>

Thus, in order to prevent a complete rupture of the Pakistani society, the state needs to re-define its development priorities. It must carry out educational reforms to prevent a complete failure of the deplorable state of education sector in the country. Moreover, catering to a young unemployed population, Pakistan must cut down on its defence budget to allocate more resources in the development sector.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Pakistan's policy of selectively securitising the terrorist threats has costed the state its own security. Pakistan today has come under tremendous international pressure, both from the international community as well as from intergovernmental organisations like Financial Action Task Force to act responsibly towards defeating the terrorist network breeding within the country. Approaching towards becoming a dysfunctional state with staggering economic growth, poor performance in human development index, threat of sanctions and the growing international isolation, Pakistan is marching towards becoming a failed state. However, the question of what would make Pakistan undergo a transformation is important to deliberate.

Inferred from the chapters discussed, no amount of aid and inducements will bring about a change in Pakistan's approach. Pakistan has a blinkered vision and lacks political will to cease its support for the anti-India and pro-state militant groups whom

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<sup>231</sup> Pakistan National Human Development Report(2017), "Unleashing the Potential of a Young Pakistan", [Online Web] Accessed 12 September 2018 URL: <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/HDR/PK-NHDR.pdf>

<sup>232</sup> UNDP, "Human Development Indices and Indicators:2018 Statical Update", [Online Web] Accessed 21 January 2019 URL: [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr\\_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf)

<sup>233</sup> Education for All Global Monitoring Report (2012), "Education for All Development Index"[ Online Web] Accessed 23 June 2017 URL: <http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/pdf/gmr2012-report-edi.pdf>

they consider as important strategic partners in their fight against the Indian State. Thus, in order to defeat and eradicate the militant infrastructure from its country; Pakistan needs to bring about an internal change in their mindset as well as in their strategic design. It must willingly re-visit the course of relations with their neighbouring states and redefine its policy objectives.

In regard to India, the state must stop looking at proxy groups as strategic assets. It must realise that the presence of these groups will only harm the country's domestic interests by having to bear an economic cost of aiding an entire militant infrastructure. Moreover, building deeper alliances and dependencies on other states such as China to counter India's hegemonic presence in the region might unnecessarily entangle Pakistan into debt trap. On the other hand, Pakistan must stop looking at Afghanistan as a client state and cease its interference in the neighbouring state of Afghanistan by acknowledging their autonomy.

Moreover, the inextricable link between the external and internal security situation requires Pakistan State to undertake fundamental changes in the way it manages its external security policy and relations. Pakistan's security policy suffers from what Ayesha Siddiqi calls as a problem of "linearity"; which identifies security and national interest mainly as a response to an external threat. She argues that, "Indo-centricity of Pakistan's national security policy has imposed limitations on how the concept of threat and security are defined. For example, the Indo-centricity in Pakistan's security policy had made the state ignore many of its new-borne state challenges. In fact, the state officially looks at the internal security challenges as an extension of an external threat. Pakistan looks at the rise in ethnic and sectarian violence in the country as a development that can be attributed to the covert and nefarious activities of India's intelligence agencies" (Siddiqi 2004:175).

Moreover, the state must counter the various insecurities it has developed since the time of its emergence. In order to combat the challenge of terrorism and extremism from its society, Pakistan needs a serious rethinking on various issues such as framing an identity based on hatred for others, the use of religion in forging national unity, or

promotion of exclusionary narratives on Islam. It also needs to breakaway from its long held tradition of defining its state identity in relational terms with the Indian State. As an important Pakistan political analyst, Christine Fair remarked, “Pakistan’s apprehensions about India are more ideological than security driven and any attempt to appease Pakistan through territorial concessions on Kashmir may encourage Pakistan’s anti-status quo policies rather than temper them” (Fair 2014:40).

Thus, in order to prevent itself from the wrath of international condemnation, Pakistan must disrupt the terror factory in the country which it has long supported. It must also re-think and re-vamp its strategic designs. To conclude in the words of Tilak Devasher, a member of the Indian National Security Advisory board:

it is when Pakistanis, especially the military understand the issues involved, understand what is at stake is nothing less than the very survival of Pakistan as a state that perhaps the first tentative step would be taken in reversing its tragic trajectory. It is then that the leaders will start asking the right questions about what real security entails and what it means to be a Pakistani, and realise the benefits that would accrue from being at peace with itself and its neighbours (Devasher 2016:392).

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