Tracing the Figure of the 'Poor' in Colonial, Nationalist and Post-Colonial Discourses, 1858-1990

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Date: 22-07-2019

DECLARATION

This is to declare that the thesis entitled "**Tracing the Figure of the 'Poor' in Colonial, Nationalist and Post-Colonial Discourses, 1858-1990**" submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** is the result of original research, and it has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

Prashant Kumar

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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

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

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

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The errors, faults or flaws in the thesis are all mine and I take its full responsibility.

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Introduction

The present work seeks to trace the history of that idea or concept of poverty which has remained central to the discourses of modernity, legality, governance and policy regimes of colonial state, as well as to the nationalist discourses and developmental programmes of post-colonial Indian state. The eradication of poverty and welfare of the poor have been one of the most explicit and pressing concerns of modernity and arguably, an integral part of the raison d'être of the modern state. Although the poor had a certain presence in pre-modern religious and moral discourses; the concern of the present work is to track it thereafter, in the wake of modernity, colonialism and Classical Political Economy. Following Enlightenment, the emergence of Classical Political Economy was an important phenomenon which felicitated the shift from medieval to modern in western Europe. Classical Political Economy was the precursor of a new economic philosophy which later became responsible for the rise of a new system of thought completely replacing the medieval ways of thinking. The formulations, findings and advocacies of Classical Political Economy changed the way 'poverty' or the 'poor' was conceived. Poor was no longer located into the moral or religious domain, but it became a (sociological and historical) subject as well as an object of knowledge (in the scientific discourses which accompanied modernity and rise of capitalism and colonialism). Poverty was turned into a secular concept. During pre-modern period, poor or the idea of poverty didn't have any specific signification, they were generally located in moral or religious discourses along with a parallel network of social interdependence. But with the rise of English Classical Political Economy, poor was conceptually eschewed from the moral and religious domain was now situated into a triad of concepts constitutive of 'poverty,' 'labour' and 'population.' English Classical political economy made some important departures from the French physiocrat in terms of conceiving the notion of 'wealth' (though it should be noted here that both school of thoughts conceptualized 'poverty as antonym to wealth'). While French physiocrats thought that wealth consists of natural resources (thus, the lack of possession of natural resources is the sign of poverty); English political economists argued that "labour is the only source of wealth" (therefore, the lack of productive capacity is the real marker of poverty). With the formulation that the labour is the only source of wealth, what Classical political economy manages to establish for the first time is the relationship of poverty with labour. Foucault writes, "In the first phase of

industrial world, labor did not seem linked to the problems it was to provoke; it was regarded, on the contrary, as a general solution, an infallible panacea, a remedy to all forms of poverty. Labor and poverty were located in a simple opposition, in inverse proportion to each other."[1] Ernst Bloch argues that, "during this period of transition which is roughly around the passage of eighteenth century, along with 'labor', one another concept namely 'population'[2] emerged which changed the way 'poverty' and 'poor' was thought out. Classical political economy linked the concept of population with subsistence."[3] He continues, "one of the major proponents of Classical political economy, Thomas Malthus argued that population grows exponentially, while means of subsistence grows arithmetically. Malthus reasoned out that the causes of misery lies in the 'natural' contradiction between man's boundless striving for propagation and the limited increase in means of nourishment."[4] Hence, Malthus argued that the overpopulation and proletarian lechery is responsible for the existent poverty and misery; and not capital. With these formulations, poverty was linked to the idea of 'work' and 'idleness'; and a new discourse of pauperism emerged with a moral grafting over the whole notion of poverty and poor. These formulations linking poverty and population was a departure from mercantilist discourses which considered the rise of population with increased productive capacity and thus a means to achieve a higher level of prosperity. Malthus with his formulations also rid Classical political economy of its moral bearings which it carried during the early phase of its emergence. Remember Adam Smith talking of moral sentiment and considers the growth in population as a sign of prosperity. These above-mentioned theoretical abstractions had a huge bearing upon how poverty was treated in the discourses of the modern state (of both metropole and colonies). Principles of Classical political economy was duly adhered by the administrators of colonial state in India. To locate the figure of the 'poor' within the tapestry of concepts it was situated during colonial period in India, it is important to situate the transition which took place in Great Britain in particular and in

[1] Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the age of Reason*, London: Routledge, 1989. P. 55.

[2] The earliest use of the word 'population' with a semblance of its modern connotation goes back to mid-eighteenth century when it was used by David Hume in his book called *Political Discourses*. Francis Bacon is credited to be the first one to use this word by many sources but he didn't not use it in a way which had much similarity with the modern usage of the term.

[3] E. Bloch, *The Principle of Hope Vol. II,* trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986, p. 467.

[4] Ibid.

Western Europe in general as a result of the rise of Classical political economy. The principles of Classical political economy were responsible for the reform in Old Poor Law and its eventual replacement with the New Poor Law. The underlying rational of the transition from Old Poor Law to New Poor Law in Great Britain had a huge bearing upon the changing attitude of colonial states towards poverty and poor during long nineteenth century in India. The effect of these underlying rational could be observed clearly in the bureaucratic discourses of colonial state regarding famine relief programmes, the introduction of famine code, emergence of work-houses, poor-houses and lunatic asylums, the widespread phenomenon of disciplining vagrants and moving communities and tribes through incarcerating and sedentarising them during the last three decades of nineteenth century.

Colonial state in India slowly restructured the existent pre-colonial (Mughal) economy in order to make it perfectly amenable for colonial intervention and exploitation. A certain field of economy in a modern sense of the term was created which was characteristically different from the pre-colonial economy which was structured upon monarchical values and principles of governance. The colonial construction of economy was distinctly different from pre-colonial conception of economy in at the least two ways: a) 'economy' emerged as a separate domain (from society), whereas no such distinction was maintained in pre-colonial conception of economy (rather society and economy were inalienable to each other); b) it was an 'economy' which was not meant to serve the need of its own people but of the people of a foreign land. This transition of pre-colonial to colonial economy also has its historical specificities which cannot be ignored. We need to distinguish between the nature of colonial power which existed between 1757 to 1858 and 1858 to 1947. As this distinction characterize the nature of colonial power in India and its underlying governmental rationality. The first period was essentially based on mercantilist principle and governed by the representatives of the Crown, whereas the Crown herself took charge of governance post-1858 so the emergence of a modern (colonial) state in the proper and full-fledged sense with colonial governmentality as the underlying logic and basis of it. Drawing from Foucault's notion of governmentality, U Kalpagam has argued that this new conception of economy ushered in a quantificatory episteme which set off the process of objectification and quantification on a hitherto unknown scale. Recording, measurement and standardisation became the prime tool of colonial governance. It is

through these set of practices quantificatory regime became operational. Accounting and statistics were part of the discursive networks where this quantificatory episteme was situated. These set of practices and scientific discourses were designed to serve the purpose of coloniser and felicitate the colonial exploitation of Indian people and extraction of Indian resources, but in course of time the statistical and numerical figuration of economy made the drain of resources from India to Great Britain through colonial economic mechanism and consequent poverty of India apparent to nationalist intelligentsia. The same process of quantification which usher in by colonial state in order to exploit the Indian masses and resources was turned against the colonial power by nationalist intelligentsia and the nationalist conducted rigorous national accounting in order to calculate the exact amount of drain taking place from India to Great Britain, and estimate the national income and per capita income which highlighted the actual material condition of Indian people. The nationalist claim of growing poverty of India under British Raj was backed by the statistical evidences. Dadabhai Naoroji produced the first statistical estimate of average per capita income[5] in 1870s and showed how despicable was the actual material condition of masses. Naoroji's estimation of national income and per capita income made the incidence of poverty quantifiable and the actual material condition of Indian people and Indian economy comparable with other economies and general well-being of their people e.g., now the per capita income of India could be compared with the per capita income of Great Britain. The statistical and numerical figuration of economy could also give us a sense of material growth and decline over a period of time. The quantified economic evidences were used by early nationalist intelligentsia as an instrument to challenge the legitimacy and so-called wise rule of the colonial state. Thus, prevailing poverty of the nation and the welfare of the masses who were largely poor became a key concern for nationalists and elimination of poverty served as the basis for decolonization. In nationalist thought the problem of poverty was articulated in varied ways. The early nationalist saw the problems of poverty in terms of decline in 'productivity, capacity and energy', faulty distribution, lack of income, lack of economic growth et cetera. The nationalist leaders of later period like Gandhi linked the question of abolishing poverty with that of nation's progress and sovereignty, thus the question of eradicating poverty was no longer only

[5] Dadabhai Naoroji estimated that per capita income of Indian masses were merely 20 rupees for the year 1867 to 68.

a political economic question but it also became a ‘social question’, a moral obligation. Since the freedom struggle was fought on the ground that foreign rule was the source of all the causes of the nation’s backwardness and poverty, the abolition of poverty becomes the raison d'être of the post-colonial state. The policy discourses of post-colonial state have remained occupied with the problem of poverty throughout since its emergence till now. The eradication of poverty became the first and foremost objective of the post-colonial state.

Since the present work is a work of ‘conceptual history’ and not of ‘social history’, its task is primarily twofold: (a) chronicling, and (b) evaluating. Chronicling implies here the systematisation of thoughts and narratives around poverty in a historical time frame as per the outlined context. Evaluating means the historicisation of the given *problématique*, statement or concept in order to grasp their deeper meaning and situate them in proper context. While discussing the history of ideas in economic thought, S. Ambirajan once argued that chronicling and evaluating may seem two different issues but they are symbiotically connected. He further pointed out or rather cautioned us that there are not wanting historians of economics who follow a relativist viewpoints which considers economic ideas as merely reflecting the contemporary history or as result of the economic needs of dominant pressure groups; as opposed to the ahistorical absolutist approach.[6] Though Ambirajan’s note of caution should be kept in mind, but it should be noted that our concern here is not the same as Ambirajan’s. He was particularly delving over the development of the discipline of Economics and ways of looking at the history of economic ideas. We intend to look upon the intersection of (political) history and economic ideas and how the history of the emergence of some particular concepts (‘population,’ ‘poverty,’ ‘labour’) which if put together would form a tapestry informing the discourses taking place around the figure of the poor and the concept of poverty.

Though there has been much scholarship on the question of poverty in terms of studying the systemic nature of capitalist production and reproduction of poverty, studying the shifts– continuities and breaks– in the form of capitalism, modes of production, policy regimes, aid mechanisms, and rights discourses, there has not been sufficient attention given to the discursive history in which the idea of the poor underwent several changes

[6] S. Ambirajan, “Economic Thinking of Dadbhai Naoroji”, in P. D. Hajela edt. *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji*, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, 2001. p.4.

through varied forms of construction and contestation. The present work intends to study this discursive history and how it informs the present imagination of the poor. How did 'poor' figures as the central problematic in the discourses of the modern statecraft (both colonial and post-colonial) and politics in India? What was the underlying governmental rationality which set the tone and tenor of the state's attitude towards the poor? How the figure of the poor is constituted through objectifying imperative of labour (in the light of the principles of Classical political economy)? The wider concern is to study what figure is emerging from the state's discourses and policies around the poor, what are the ways of knowing the poor and how does the existing body of knowledge and practices, including political practices, help us to understand this category. What is proposed here is an attempt to reread the path of existent discourse on poverty which entails looking again into those materials which the mainstream history has relegated to oblivion, and to gather the new clues and insights which such a re-reading can offer us vis-à-vis poverty and its relation to the process of formation of colonial, nationalist and post-colonial discourses on poor and poverty. The objective of the present work is to study not any one particular concept of the 'poor' but what figure of the 'poor' is being constituted through multiple concepts coming from varied sources, and to make bare the historically mutating character of the term 'poverty' or 'poor'. In other words, the task of the present work is to construct a genealogy of that idea of poverty which has remained instrumental in colonial discourses, which set off an anti-imperialist and nationalist cry against colonialism and that which served as the basis for de-colonisation and the emergence of a post-colonial state. The secondary literature capturing the historical debates will be read with an attempt to shore up relevant insights from the extant discourse. However, the research calls for different reading strategies, keeping in mind the difference in the nature of the material, while trying to bring together insights that bear upon their shared concern. The primary sources will be looked with utmost care[7] and in light of existent discourse around them. In the present work, Government records, Commissions' reports and Acts, Speeches and Writings of the nationalist leaders, key texts of Classical Political

[7] Care should be taken in terms of reading government records. They should not be taken as the articulation of the truth of an event but rather as a truth claim, as a governmental statement. The gaps and silences should be read. Bureaucratic discourses typically represent the interest of the State (and more so in the case of colonial state whose primary interest was to govern India at any cost) so before deducing any conclusion on their basis, they should be put in proper historical context.

Economy, Plan Documents like Bombay Plan, Gandhian Plan, Five Years Plans &c. serve as the primary sources.

The present work is divided into five chapters. First Chapter initiates a discussion over very basic questions concerning this work as who are the 'poor'? and what is 'poverty'? It maps the historically changing meanings and connotations of the term 'poor' and 'poverty'. This chapter also briefly surveys the shifting meaning of these two terms during the transitory phase between late medieval and early modern age in western Europe (particularly Great Britain) so that the shift in notion of poverty with changing times could be made intelligible. During middle ages, poverty was located in the domain of religious and moral discourses; but with the commencement of early modern age poverty becomes a more secularised concept, detached from religious attribution and treated as a social and economic subject. Further, the chapter analyses the conceptual figuration of poverty and its historical constitution as an object of knowledge in the discourses of Classical Political Economy, which played a prescriptive role in terms of shaping the imaginations and the policies around the poor during eighteenth and nineteenth century England. Classical Political Economy left its lasting impact on the forms and the direction of the discourses around poor, not only at the political economic scenario of eighteenth-nineteenth century England but also in the context of colonial India. The debate which took place within the framework of Classical Political Economy and the theoretical insight that was generated thereof was responsible for the movement for reform in Old Poor Law (in Great Britain) in the name of efficient use of population and the maximization of the 'wealth of the nation'. The effect of this new-found interest in Classical Political Economy could also be clearly seen in the bureaucratic discourses of the colonial state in India. It was so not only because the civil servants who were trained at Haileybury had imbibed the principles of political economy but also because it was deemed reasonable and modern to govern through the principles of political economy owing to the contemporary belief of its universal applicability by the proponents of Classical Political Economy[8]. In a larger sense, the purpose of the first chapter is not only to see how poverty through its emergent relationship with labour is constituted as an object of classical political economy, but also to explore what could be the possible components and the domains

[8] During the early phase of the emergent discourses of political economy, it was also considered as the science of legislation as well as the science of augmentation of wealth.

through which a discourse of the poor could be made intelligible. Change in the attitude toward poor in the wake of modernity and industrial revolution was also symptomatic of the emergence of a new governmental rationality (of which political economy was an inseparable part). A relatively new set of principles of government came into existence. Mercantilism gave way to a new set of liberal principles. Thus, this chapter will also focus on the conceptual aspect of the figuration of the 'poor', by exploring the new meanings and related concepts generated by developments in Classical Political Economy which gave rise to concepts like 'population', 'labour', and 'poverty'. In other words, the figure of the 'poor' will be located within the triad of concepts called Population-Labour-Poverty in Classical Political Economy and the discourses emanating from this triad as a result of interaction between these three concepts.

The second chapter primarily seeks to situate the place of poverty and unpack the processes of its constitution as a governmental category in the official discourse of the colonial state. It makes an attempt to highlight the linkages between the processes of knowledge formation and the governance of poor during nineteenth century colonial India. The main concern of this chapter is to make the discourses around the poor intelligible by showing the inalienable link established between poverty, labour and population in the wake of classical political economy, which had obvious ramification on the official attitude of colonial state vis-à-vis poor and their governance. The chapter shows that the emergence of new branches of knowledge e.g., political arithmetic (or statistics), ethnography, Psychiatry, Medical Sciences &c. were directly linked with colonial statecraft and governance. While statistics was used to map the inhabitants (more precisely, the population) and the resources of the country, psychiatry and medical science was used to discipline the natives, ethnography was used to know the Orient. The chapter argues that the process of fixing, framing, standardization, rationalization and objectification were instrumental to colonial regime and inherent to the project of colonial state, and colonial modernity in general. In other words, modernization of the idea of poverty during colonial rule, the methods of knowing and governing the poor, the emergence of colonial governmentality, the link between labour, population and poverty in the colonial context of India are the central concerns of this chapter.

The third chapter dwells upon two main things: firstly, the process of emergence of 'economy' as a separate domain (from society) or a category and as a field of

intervention for colonial state during the period ranging from 1757 (marking the formal initiation of colonial rule as a result of the defeat of Indian ruler at the hand of East India Company at the battle of Plassey) to the 1858 (when the Crown formally took over the charges of administration from East India Company following the mutiny of 1857, thus inaugurating the rule of the colonial state in proper sense); secondly, specifying the historical contexts and the discursive framework in which the early nationalist responses and contestations of colonial rule took place. The first part of the chapter argues that the period from 1757 to the first half of the nineteenth century is a kind of gestation period when the colonial power gained root, created a certain field of economy and developed a complete hold over India towards the end of this period. The second part of the Chapter tries to capture the impact of western economic philosophy on the mind of nationalist economists and leaders and situate the epistemic paradigm in which the nationalist response was articulated especially with regard to poverty. It also studies the formulation of Drain Theory by Dadabhai Naoroji and the contemporary nationalist intelligentsia and the consequences of economic drain on the general poverty of India and its specific implication upon the actual material condition of the masses who were largely poor. The chapter further explores how a certain national space was historically produced through the discourses generated by early nationalist intelligentsia's economic critique of British Raj in India. It shows how the notion of a bleeding economy became the carrier of nationalism in late nineteenth century colonial India. In other words, the chapter seeks to understand the modalities through which a 'nation' was 'imagined' during late nineteenth century India.

The fourth Chapter studies the shift in conceiving poverty within the late nationalist discourses and thinking, particularly a shift from the early economic nationalist discourses to the discourses taking place towards the end of the first quarter of twentieth century till independence. The underlying assumption of this chapter is that the question of poverty during later phase of nationalist discourse was posed in terms of a 'social question'[9] rather than a political economic one as was the case during early nationalist

[9] Here the term 'social question' has been borrowed from the French sociologist Robert Castel. Castel argues that a particular question becomes the social question when the cohesion of whole society in the given form comes to rest upon the resolution of that question and if that question is not resolved the society faces the danger of its disintegration. The emergence of social question is also coterminous with the emergence of a new rationality. Italian historian Giovanna Procacci has argued that 'poverty' became a social question in France in the immediate backdrop of French Revolution as a new rationality imposes itself upon the existent socio-political scenario of France. She writes that after the fall of ancient regime, a new rationality emerged "which implicated society in the cause of poverty and in its resolution; a

discourses over poverty. Social question here refers to a particular question which unites the different sections, populations and strata of society; if not united society faces a danger of disintegration. The problem of poverty and the presence of colonial rule was clearly linked to each other by the anti-imperialist or nationalist intelligentsia during the last quarter of nineteenth century. Like early nationalists Gandhi argues that 'if India is poor it is only because of the constant and long exploitation of colonial rule in the country', but unlike them he asserts that until and unless the colonial state is driven out, the eradication of poverty is not possible as the presence of alien rule is the very root of the problem. This chapter particularly focuses upon Gandhi's approach to poverty and labour. Gandhi articulated the eradication of poverty in terms of getting rid of colonialism as well as becoming self-reliant through the use of swadeshi. Though Gandhi like Naoroji considers the economic drain as the chief reason behind India's poverty but he unlike Naoroji didn't appeal to good conscience and reason of British ruler, rather Gandhi integrates the economic logic of poverty into a logic of sovereignty and independence from the British rule. Gandhi's conception of labour was also unique. He articulated labour in moral terms and as a tool of gaining swaraj and eliminating poverty. Urging to use Khadi as a tool of poverty eradication and spinning as mode of contributing universal daily labour as a contribution to the nation-making were the

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rationality which tied the existence of poverty to the destiny of society itself." But here in this work, the concept of 'social question' has been used differently but drawn originally from Castel and Procacci. Here I argue that poverty was turned into a social question by Gandhi during late nationalist periods as Gandhi made a clear departure from the paradigm established by Naoroji who first showed the despicable problem of poverty and its principal causes being intrinsic to colonial economic mechanism through which the resources and wealth of India being siphoned off by colonial regime but he only pleaded for a truly British rule (though towards last decade of his life, Naoroji spoke of Swaraj occasionally). Gandhi kept the basic assertion of Naoroji intact as Gandhi always maintained that the reason behind the existent poverty is the presence of colonial power and the drain of resources from India to Great Britain taking place owing to it. In fact, Gandhi in his speeches and writings during non-cooperation movement and civil Disobedience movement constantly cites the annual drain estimated around 60 crore rupees taking place from India to Great Britain. He urged the people to adopt swadeshi in order to stop this drain. But Gandhi made a shift from early nationalist leaders by tying the elimination of 'poverty' with attainment of 'freedom'. Gandhi asserted that there was no way to come out of poverty while being unfree. The attainment of sovereignty (swaraj) and abolition of poverty was linked. A nation cannot be prosperous and unfree at the same time. In Gandhi's scheme of things attainment of swaraj, nationhood and elimination of poverty were the part of the same process. Freedom and self-sufficiency (aatmnirbharta) were integral to each other for Gandhi. Gandhi prescribed Swadeshi, as a means to come out of economic dependence, for attainment of Swaraj (freedom from British rule). And attainment of swaraj was a social question as it involves everyone and it was everone's affair, a collective and social process.
For further discussion on the concept of social question. See, R. Castel, *From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question*, London: Transaction Publishers, 2003.
G. Procacci, 'Notes on the Government of the Social,' in *History of the Present*, Fall 1987

prime example of Gandhian way of conceiving and bringing the nation into being through collective efforts and participation.

The fifth chapter primarily studies the formation of post-colonial state's discourses over poverty, particularly in relation to the concept of population. The chapter also seeks to know what figure of the poor emerged through these discourses and what are the constituent elements of these discourses which takes place primarily with the objective of abolition of poverty? The chapter also studies the relationship between 'poverty' and 'population' and see how 'poor' has been perennially implicated into it since the very beginning of colonial rule. Poverty-Population-Poor together constitute a *problématique* which dominated the bureaucratic discourses of colonial state and continue to be the centre of focus of poverty alleviation programmes of post-colonial state. The chapter seeks to historicise this perennial *problématique* which has been at the core of 'India's overpopulation' narrative throughout modern period. The chapter further studies how economic planning became symptomatic of the post-colonial governmental rationality and Five years Plans became the carrier of that rationality. Does the post-colonial nation state make a break with colonial state in the ways of knowing the poor, identifying them and measuring their poverty? Does the post-colonial state engage in epistemic re-conceptualisation or carry the same epistemic foundation espoused and established by colonial state? Do the concepts and ideas put forward by nationalist thinkers and leaders in opposition to colonialism/colonial rule or colonial state find any place in the policy regime and political actions of the post-colonial state? How much of the nationalist legacy persisted with the post-colonial government and state?

Chapter I

'Poor' as a figure[1], 'poverty' as a concept

The present chapter has primarily twofold concern: First, it seeks to set off an enquiry into very basic questions as Who are the 'Poor'? and What is 'poverty'?; Second, it maps an overly complex trajectory of changing meaning and connotations of the term 'poor' and 'poverty', and how these terms assumed the status of a 'concept' in the wake of modernity, industrial revolution and colonialism as well as the rise of Classical Political Economy. The chapter also briefly surveys the changing meaning of these two terms during the transitory phase between late medieval and early modern age in

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[1] The term figure has been derived from the Latin word *figura*. Here, the term figure has been borrowed from literary theory and used in a certain context of studying poverty and to denote a particular subject called Poor which escapes any fixed ascription but still have some qualities that is ascertainable in general. As per Oxford Dictionary, the term *figura* is a noun and it means "a person or thing representing or symbolizing a fact or ideal."
A detailed discussion of the term '*figura*' (tracing its etymology and the philological usage of the term right from the Roman period till the middle ages) has been undertaken by Erich Auerbach in his book *Scenes from the drama of European literature*. Auerbach writes, "originally *figura* meant "plastic form."" But with the Hellenization of Roman education in the last century B.C. three authors played a decisive part in its beginnings: Varro, Lucretius and Cicero. In Varro's writings *figura* sometimes means "outward appearance/shape" or even "outline" and thus the meaning of the term is beginning to move away from its earliest signification, the narrower concept of plastic form. However, in Varro's writings these development was not very pronounced. Auerbach further writes, "Varro was an etymologist, well aware of the origin of the word (*fictor cum dicit fingo figuram impoint* ["The image maker (fictor), when he says *fingo* (I shape), puts a *figura* on the thing"]), and thus when he uses the word in connection with living creatures and objects, there is usually a connotation of plastic form. Lucretius uses *figura* in the Greek philosophical sense, but in an extremely individual, free and significant way. Lucretius starts with the general concept of "figure," which occurs in every possible shading from the plastic figure shaped by man to the purely geometric outline; he transposes the term from the plastic and visual to the auditory sphere, when he speaks of the *figura verborum* ("the figure of words") … In Cicero's frequent and extremely flexible use of the word, every variation of the concept of form that could possibly have been suggested by his political, publicistic, juridical, and philosophical activity, seems to be represented. Often he applies it to man, sometimes in tones of pathos. He writes that the limbs and inner organs, animals, utensils, stars, in short all perceptible things have figura, and so do the gods and the universe as a whole. The sense of "appearance" and even "semblance" contained in the Greek *schema* [in classical Greek literature *schema,* which is the purely perceptual shape, is clearly distinguished with *morphe* and *eidos* which are the form or ideas which informs matter. In *Metaphysics*, VII, 3, 1029a, where Aristotle discusses *ousia* (essence); he defines *morphe* is defined as *schema tes ideas*, the ideal form; thus Aristotle employs *schema* in a purely perceptual sense to designate one of the qualitative categories. In the learned Greek terminology- in grammar, rhetoric, logic, mathematics, astronomy- schema was widely used in the sense of "outward shape," *figura* was always used for this purpose in Latin] emerges when he says that the tyrant has only *figura hominis* ("the semblance of a man") and that immaterial conceptions of God are without *figura* and *sensus* ("appearance and perception"). Cicero's contribution consisted mainly in introducing the word in the sense of the perceptible form to educated language. … The juridical literature of the first century has a few passages in which *figura* means "empty outward form" or "semblance."" In Propertius and also in Ovid, *figurae* (*"forms"*) at times means "kind," "manner," as opposed to "class," "sort". See, Erich Auerbach, *Scenes from the drama of European literature*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 1984, pp. 11 - 27, 230 - 31.

western Europe (particularly Great Britain) so that the shift in notion of poverty (during middle ages poverty was located in the domain of religious and moral discourses but with the advent of classical political economy and the emergence of modern state during early modern age poverty becomes a more secularised concept and detached from religious ascriptions as it was posed now as a social question and a matter of governance) made intelligible. The chapter also seeks to understand how poverty is constituted in the discourses of Classical Political Economy, and how poor are being constituted as an object of study to produce a body of knowledge which could be used for governing them? Further, we intend to analyse the conceptual figuration of poverty and its historical constitution as an object of knowledge in the wake of Classical Political Economy, which played a prescriptive role in terms of shaping the imagination and the policies of the government regarding poor, which left its lasting impact on the forms and the direction of the discourses around poor, not only at the political economic scenario of eighteenth-nineteenth century England but also in the colonial context of India. The debate which took place within the framework of Classical Political Economy and the theoretical insight that was generated thereof was responsible for the movement for reform in Poor Law (in Great Britain) in the name of efficient use of population and the maximization of the 'wealth of the nation'. The effect of this new-found interest in Political Economy could also be clearly seen in the bureaucratic discourses of the colonial state in India. It was so not only because the civil servants who were trained at Haileybury had imbibed the principles of political economy[2] but

[2] The knowledge of Principles of Classical Political Economy was an essential requirement for becoming a civil servant or Viceroy of India right from the Company days till the direct rule by Crown. S. Ambirajan writes, "In the early days of the East India Company, the Directors were forced to act as economic theorists in order to defend the very existence of the Company. The writings of the employees of the Company defending its commercial activities and by the critics of the Company attacking its trading operations both contributed to the development of English economic thought in the seventeenth century … *An important factor which conditioned the mental attitudes of those involved in formulating and executing economic policies in India in the nineteenth century was the acceptance of the British public of the value of political economy as an aid to policy making* (emphasis added). In J F C Harrison's words, many of the educated class in nineteenth-century Britain had great faith in the principles of political economy as 'truths to be explained and accepted, not hypotheses to be debated'. Early in the eighteenth century, the Utilitarian aim of diffusing useful knowledge found much favour. Political economy as founded by Adam Smith and developed by the Classical School of Economists was deemed part of this useful knowledge. It was the view of David Ricardo that 'By an adherence to these (Principles of Political Economy), Governments cannot fail to promote the welfare of the people … Apart from the senior statesmen, even the ordinary civil servant who came in search of a career to India was likewise armed with a knowledge of political economy. Considering the favourable climate towards political economy as an essential prerequisite for policy making, it is hardly surprising that the Court of Directors decided to add a study of these 'immutable laws of society and economy' to the syllabus for the training of officials who were to rule India. When the East India Company decided to start its own training centre for civil servants, years at the East India College, which was established at Haileybury in Hertfordshire

also because it was deemed reasonable and modern to govern through the principles of political economy owing to the contemporary belief of its universal applicability by the proponents of Classical Political Economy[3].

In a larger sense the purpose of the present chapter is not only to see how poverty through its relation to labour is constituted as an object of political economy, but also to explore what could be the possible components and the domains through which a discourse of the poor could be made intelligible. Change in the attitude toward poor in the wake of modernity and industrial revolution was also symptomatic of the emergence of a new governmental rationality (political economy was a part of that rationality). A relatively new set of principles of government came into existence. Mercantilism[4] gave way to a new set of liberal principles. Thus, this chapter will also focus on the conceptual aspect of the figuration of the 'poor', by exploring the new meanings and related concepts generated by developments in Classical Political Economy which gave rise to concepts like 'population', 'labour', and 'poverty'. In other words, the figure of the poor will be located within the triad of concepts called 'population'-'labour'-'poverty' in Classical Political Economy and the discourses emanating from this triad as a result of interaction between these three concepts.

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in 1805. The study of law and political economy was to form an essential part of the education provided at this institution, and the Company appointed no less an economist than the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus as the first incumbent of the Chair of Political Economy. When Malthus died in 1834, Richard Jones, another famous economist, was appointed in his place. Jones taught till 1855, and was succeeded by Sir James Stephen, but the college itself was abolished in 1858. Political economy, however, was retained as a compulsory subject for the candidates of the covenanted Indian civil service selected through open competition. After 1892, it became an optional subject but two thirds of the candidates took the option of political economy. After 1858, when the selection of the civil servants was thrown open to competition, the selected candidates had to take an examination in political economy among other subjects at the end of their probation. John Cosmo Melvill, a senior official of the India Office claimed in 1853 that 'Law and Political Economy are the most important subjects of instruction for persons destined for the civil service of India.'" See, S Ambirajan, *Classical Political Economy and British Policy in India,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 2-12.

[3] During the early phase of the emergent discourses of political economy, it was also considered as the science of legislation as well as the science of augmentation of wealth.

[4] "Mercantilism is not an economic doctrine; it is something much more than and very different from an economic doctrine. It is a form of government. It is a particular organization of production and commercial circuits according to the principle that: first, the state must enrich itself through monetary accumulation; second, it must strengthen itself by increasing population; and third, it must exist and maintain itself in a state of permanent competition with foreign powers." See, M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France 1978-79, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 5.

The historical and conceptual configuration of the 'poor': tracing the shifts in approaching the term 'poor' and 'poverty'[5]

In this section, the main concern is not to map all the traditions of thinking about poverty and its representation but historically specific changes brought about by industrial revolution, beginning of the process of primitive accumulation of capital and the rise of Classical Political Economy in the ways of conceiving poverty and poor. Michel Mollat studied the poverty of the middle ages. He points out that the poverty was considered inevitable in traditional society. Poverty was considered part of one's fate. The notion that poverty is a social problem emerged after renaissance. Mollat writes,

> Poverty, understood in the usual sense of "destitution," was a permanent feature of the Middle Ages. From classical antiquity through the social and economic regression of more barbarous times, poverty was thought to be inescapable. Not until the Renaissance and Reformation, when contemporaries began to feel ashamed at the sight of people living in a state considered unworthy of human beings, did anyone dream of eradicating it.[6]

Mollat's observation shows the shift through which the idea of poverty underwent with the coming of Renaissance (succeeded by Enlightenment), which brought reason, rationality, and a certain sense of awakening, progress and modernity, into play. Now poverty was no longer located only in the religious and moral discourses restricting it to the social domain, but also became the concern of the state and the affair of government. Giovanna Procacci writes in the context of France that during "the *ancien régime*, poverty was read in terms of mendicancy. Poverty belonged to the varied order of individual destinies: there were those who won and those who lost, those who merited a favorable destiny and those who did not."[7] Before French Revolution, poverty belonged to personal domain of individuals as one's misery was considered part of their individual destinies. The concept of 'voluntary poverty' dominated the moral and

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[5]Here it should be kept in mind that pauperism and poverty were two clearly differentiated terms in the nineteenth century. "In the text of Marx's contemporaries, the term "poverty" designates a natural state from which one could free oneself by means of work and savings; it is a remediable state of lack. The term "pauperism" designates the set of behaviours and beliefs of those poor people who claim poverty as a permanent condition or culture with its own morality and codes of conduct; it is a state of alterity that is not reducible to a condition of having less." See, P. Greany, *Untimely Beggar: Poverty and Power from Baudelaire to Benjamin*, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, p. 11.

[6] M. Mollat, *The Poor in the Middle Ages*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 1.

[7] G. Procacci, 'Notes on the Government of the Social,' in *History of the Present*, Fall 1987, p. 5.

religious discourses. There were very prominent religious orders which advocated asceticism and wholeheartedly embraced the life in poverty. One such famous religious order in Christianity was the order established by Saint Francis of Assisi during the first quarter of thirteenth century and remained quite popular throughout the middle ages. Before French Revolution, poor was conceived as problem for society only in the form of presenting a threat to public order and maintenance of peace. They were still not seen as a class which can overthrow the established order. With French Revolution poor emerged as a conglomeration of different sorts of people constituting together into a definite collective which were definitely not part of ruling order. Later this conglomeration took the form of a class in the wake of capitalist transformation set in after the end of ancient regime. Poverty was now conceived in economic terms and as a result of prevailing inequality in society. It is in the context of the capitalist transition that the poverty became a social question and was eschewed from the religious domain and became an affair of the whole society. In the Western Europe, the ideas of poverty went through such significant transformations and changes, after the age of Enlightenment, French Revolution and the subsequent Industrial Revolution, that a dichotomy emerges between 'medieval *systems and ideas* of poverty' and 'modern *concept* of poverty' in historians' analyses and philosophers' readings of events and the processes of change. The changes which were introduced in the ways of understanding poverty were not merely speculative. These changes in ways of conceiving poverty were the result of the emergence of "a new rationality which implicated society in the cause of poverty and in its resolution; a rationality which tied the existence of poverty to the destiny of society itself."[8] These changes not only had a concrete historical root and a real past, but they were history in themselves. While poverty was acknowledged as a 'problem' at the end of middle ages in general in Western Europe, the responses it generated were not unanimous and differed according to particular historical context of the nation in question. For instance, in France the problem of poverty was debated in terms of 'social question'[9] with an immediate backdrop of Physiocracy,[10] but in

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Robert Castel defines the term 'social question' as following: 'The "social question" is a fundamental aporia through which a society experiences the enigma of its own cohesion and tries to forestall the dangers of its disintegration. It is a complaint that interrogates, calls into question the capacity of a society (known in political terms as nation) to exist as a collectivity linked by relations of interdependency.' See, R. Castel, *From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question*, London: Transaction Publishers, 2003.

[10] Physiocracy (from the Greek for "Government of Nature") is an economic theory developed by a group of 18th century French economists who believed that the wealth of nations was derived solely

England the terms of discourse were set in by the newly emerging science of classical political economy with an immediate context of the reform in Poor Laws. Though the specificity of the historical context needs to be maintained, it should be kept in mind that Western Europe as a whole was going through widespread changes and the constituent nations were undergoing more or less similar larger historical processes like Enlightenment, modernity, and capitalism. During this transitory and intervening period (between high middle ages and early modern time), the newly emerged notion of work and the concept of wage labour played an important role in changing the meaning of poverty and for the first time in history poverty got linked to work and labour.

Before the emergence of classical political economy as a science of economic activities and wise administration, poverty was a general and a rather abstract concept referring to separate domains and carrying different meanings.[11] One way of locating the successive historical changes in societies' perception of poverty is to trace the semantic changes the word 'poverty' underwent. Mollat writes that the study of vocabulary is quite revealing.[12] The change in the perception of poverty could be seen in the varied uses and employment of the word during middle ages and the subsequent period. One paragraph from Mollat's *The Poor in Middle Ages* is worth quoting in detail in this regard:

> The words *poor* and *poverty* functioned as adjectives before being used as nouns. Originally, a person was poor (*pauvre*) but later he or she became a pauper (*un pauvre*). Poverty referred first to the quality, then to the condition of a person subject to some deficiency, regardless of that person's social status. People spoke of a poor man, a poor woman, a poor peasant, a poor serf, a poor cleric, a poor knight, a poor journeyman; though belonging to different social orders, all were in some way below the condition normally associated with their estate. Beyond that, the use of *the poor* as a collective noun signified awareness of the existence of a de facto social group whose numbers aroused feelings of pity or anxiety. Still a third stage was reached when the adjective *poor*, the concrete noun *pauper*, and the collective noun *the poor* were supplemented by the use of the word *poor* in an abstract sense to evoke not only an image of the

from the value of "land agriculture" or "land development" and that agricultural products should be highly priced. Physiocrats believed that natural resources are the source of all wealth.

[11] E. A. Wrigley, *Poverty, Progress, and Population*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 212.

[12] Mollat, *op.cit.*, p. 258.

> afflicted individual and the state of his or her afflictions but also an affective component of compassion or horror, which carried with it considerable potential to provoke rebellion or social fear. Though rather difficult to trace in all its complexity, this process of semantic change continued up to the sixteenth century at an ever-accelerating pace closely correlated with the development of pauperism itself.[13]

A set of modern critics perceive a simple dichotomy in the meaning of later medieval poverty, based on an antithesis which Mollat perceived between the poor as *pauperes Christi*[14] and as needy individuals, but some historians argue that close study of texts reveal that fourteenth-century writers made more subtle distinctions. One author points to at least five separate ways of considering poverty which covers "the inevitability of poverty as a harmful social condition; the requirement that it should be alleviated, though not eradicated; the virtuous nature of poverty patiently borne; the religious vocation of voluntary poverty lived in imitation of Christ; and, finally, detachment from possessions seen as a philosophical good that brings peace of mind."[15]

In the period between late middle ages and early modern period, at least two aspects went centrally into the changing configuration of the 'poor'- one of criminality that needed to be policed and governed, the other of the question of labour. As for the first, we see a whole range of discourses around charity and assistance toward the poor because the poor as a collective was becoming a potential threat to the social and political order. To tackle and administer this dangerous subject called 'poor' we witness

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[13] Ibid., p.2.

[14] The term "*pauperes Christi*" has been in use for centuries. From the beginning it meant the involuntary poor, the indigent who had no money or property, who depended upon others for their sustenance, who were on the rolls of a certain church and cared for by that church. In Carolingian times "the poor of Christ" embraced widows and orphans as well as indigents, all of whom made up a sort of special class of people to be protected by the law and supported by the Church. Thus, Jacques de Vitry in the thirteenth century referred to all the poor, the sick, the wretched, the starving, lepers, etc. as *pauperes Christi*. In other words, *pauperes Christi* refers to the little people, those called *anawim* in the Old Testament, for that is exactly what *pauper* means: one who has produced (*peperit*) little (*paucum*), one who is considered a person of little worth. From the beginning, however, "poor of Christ" possessed within it the seeds of ambiguity. It could extend to a spiritual reality that went beyond the vulnerability of economic poverty. "Poor of Christ" became a title for monks, the voluntary poor, whose communities might or might not be poor. In the eleventh century the term also included individual hermits, in the twelfth century canons regular (clerics who lived in community according to the Rule of Saint Augustine and served the apostolic needs of the local Church), and in the early thirteenth century a community of Carthusians. The term contains the idea of service of Christ through renunciation, and is linked with the adage of St. Jerome, "naked, follow the naked Christ". See, http://www.quies.org/quies_pclc.php (accessed on 10-06-2018)

"The phrase *pauperes Christi* was extended beyond the cloister and applied to indigents." See, Mollat, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

[15] A.M. Scott ed., *Experiences of Poverty in Late Medieval and Early Modern England and France*, England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012, p. 5.

a set of measures trying to assist and govern them, thus 'the discourse on pauperism' – "Assisting the poor is a means of government, a potent way of containing the most difficult section of the population and improving all other section".[16] However, the institution of charity based on old relations of kinship and associational ties and practices was also going through a period of significant change and transformation. This could be seen in the transition from the old Poor Law to new Poor Law in British context. In order to economize the expenditure, the assistance under poor law was made qualifiable and selective. It created new strata within the poor themselves by introducing identifiable categories like able-bodied poor and non able-bodied poor. This aspect of classifying poor in different categories for the sake of providing assistance to a certain type of poor and disqualifying the other type of poor from availing assistance will be discussed later in detail in the next chapter while discussing the famine relief programs of colonial state in Indian context. As for the second, we see a transformation in the concept of 'labour' in the wake of the emergence of classical political economy. Robert Castel argues that "labour is no longer just a duty imposed by religious, moral or economic demands. Instead, 'labor' now becomes the 'source of all wealth', and in order to be most socially useful, it must be reorganized and reconceived in light of the principles of classical political economy."[17] It is with this transformation in the concept of 'labour' that poverty was seen as intrinsically linked with labour– as a condition of 'absence of work'. Now if poverty is read in terms of the absence of work then it becomes the responsibility of the state to provide work to everyone. Thus, giving rise to a juridical and right-based conception of poverty intrinsically linked to changed understanding of labour as well as the emergence of wage work. This philosophical-juridical understanding of poverty was something which can be characterized as a modern attitude toward poverty. At this juncture, traditional forms of assistance started to appear as themselves a cause of poverty because they opposed the absorption of poverty into labour. This recognition in turn made possible a 'moral' rehabilitation of the poor, one that was expected to open their way to economic and social integration.

[16] A famous quotation of French philanthropist Jean Firmin Marbaeau from his book *Du pauperisme en France* (1847). Quoted from G. Procacci, "Social Economy and the government of poverty," in G. Burchell et al ed., *Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. p. 151.

[17] R. Castel, *Manual Workers,* pp. 140-141.

Distinguishing the 'poor' with the 'worker'

The meaning of the term poor has been constantly changing over different periods of time as discussed in the previous section. The term 'poor' denotes a particular subject or figure which escapes any fixed ascription but still have some qualities that is ascertainable in general. Philosopher Jacques Ranciere says that "the 'poor' does not designate an economically disadvantaged part of the population; it simply designates the category of people who do not count. Those who have no qualifications to par-take in *arkhe*, no qualification for being taken into account."[18] Ranciere defines poor not as someone who is economically disadvantaged but someone who has no say in the affairs of society; whose voice is dispensable; whose ontological value is minimal. Nandini Gooptu in her work *The Politics of urban poor in early twentieth century India* uses the term 'poor' as an appellation to denote varied social groups, while distinguishing it with the 'working classes' or 'labour' which does have a general connotation mainly of the organised, formal sector industrial workers. She writes,

> the appellation 'poor', rather than the 'working classes' or labour', is used to refer to all these groups, for the latter terms have connotation mainly of organised, formal sector industrial workers. The epithet 'poor' also avoids the suggestion of the existence of urban workers or labour as a distinct social class arising from a particular set of production relations, as the term 'working class' often implies. 'Poor' here also does not refer to any particular economic measures of poverty nor does it denote only the 'casual poor' or a residual underclass, supposedly existing on the margins of the industrial labour force, which has been the common use of the term in many other contexts, especially when discussing Victorian Britain.[19]

Nandini Gooptu deploys the term 'poor' in the above-mentioned work in "a largely descriptive sense to encompass various urban occupation groups and to highlight the diversity and plurality of their employment relations and working conditions in an urban setting during the second quarter of twentieth century."[20] She writes that "the use

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[18]J. Ranciere trans. Rachel Bowlby and Davide Panagia "Ten Theses on politics", Theory & Event 5, No. 3, 2001.

[19] Gooptu, N., *The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. pp. 1-4.

[20] Ibid., p. 3.

of the term, however, does not arise from any assumption that the diverse groups of the poor were conscious of being a cohesive class with shared interests and plight. Economic relations, conditions of labour or experience at the workplace alone did not constitute the entire universe of the urban poor. Non-economic modes of domination, exclusion and oppression, based on caste or religion for instance, contributed to the nature and form of poverty."[21] Guptoo makes an important point while identifying the poor in urban setting that the poor is not a homogenous group of people or class, and it is also not synonymous with the working class. She points out that in the administrative discourses of colonial state during 1930s and 1940s the labouring classes of the cities has been identified as a homogenised category of the 'poor'. She further highlights that "in contrast to the rural masses, the urban poor were often seen as a distinct social segment, sharing undesirable traits and posing a threat to moral and social order, public health and social stability."[22]

There has been a tendency in the wake of capitalism to conflate the 'poor' with the 'worker'. In usual sense of the word, 'worker' is someone who subsists by selling his labour power for wages, whereas the term 'poor' refers to a conglomeration of diverse individual groups who either live by their labour (not necessarily wage labour) or survive on assistance. Worker is just one component of the poor population. In a general sense it could be said that all the worker are poor, but the category of worker does not subsume all those who are poor. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya writes that Marxist theorizations were responsible for generating "the larger than life image of the industrial proletariat, as compared to the rest of the labouring poor, and it is due to the attribution to it of a historical role in a highly teleological view of 'things to come'. This teleology elevates the industrial proletariat to a higher position than the rest of the labouring poor."[23] Bhattacharya also argues that since "the sale of labour power in the non-wage form is not a part of the formal definition of capitalist wage work"[24] so those labouring poor who didn't satisfy this condition were not recognized as worker in the Marxist theorization. Historians like Bhattacharya and Rajnarayan Chandavarkar points out the shifting identities of workers who work at the urban industrial hub in India.

[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] S. Bhattacharya, lecture delivered at V.V. Giri National Labour Institute at the inauguration of the Integrated Labour History Research Programme on 24th July, 1998.
[24] Ibid.

They argue that different forms of labour existed simultaneously and the workers shifted between these forms of labour periodically. For instance, there could be poor peasant, share cropper or agricultural wage worker who could be employed into a factory as a wage worker in the non-agricultural season and when the season comes he would go to village to work on the land, or in some other cases the same workers who worked in factory in a fixed period of the day would also do some other petty job in order to earn the living for himself and his family. So, it could be said that the identity of a worker in Indian context is also quite porous. However, there is no doubt that the 'poverty' was inevitably linked to 'labour' in the wake of modernity and capitalism. Historically, there have always been those sections of poor like beggars, indigents, delinquents, or madmen, who do not work or engage in any direct form of labour or work but survive on charity, assistance or interdependent social networks. These sections of poor were criminalised as per the new capitalist formulation where poverty and labour was linked to each other. These sections of poor population were also persecuted from time to time by state authority on account of parasitic behavior and idleness, in order to set them to work. Bhattacharya writes that "these sections of the poor were also classified as the 'dangerous classes' and the people whom Marx called lumpen proletariat. Admittedly, not all who are poor perform labour, though all who mainly live by labour are presumably poor. Those who do not labour in the same sense as wage-workers include criminals, beggars and prostitutes etc., but surely they labour in a different way?"[25] He further argues that "perhaps one can say that the poor who have no material resource except their person, can be said to be performing labour in some form, or using their body to produce goods or services, of which the evidence is their income and survival."[26] However, it should also be kept in mind here that those whom Marx called lumpen proletariat also constituted the reserve army of labour whose existence were necessary for the capitalist production to take place. This aspect has been dealt in detail in the later parts of this chapter.

In the present work, the distinction between the 'worker' and the 'poor' has been maintained throughout. While the term proletariat will be used to represent a social class comprising those who do manual labour or work for wages; the term 'poor' has been employed either as an appellation when used here in a sociological, economic or

[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

political sense, or as analytical category when used theoretically or epistemologically. The object of political economy was not only the productive section of the poor but the poor in general, thus forming the discourse on pauperism. It is a contention of this research that the figure of the poor is not reducible to the figure of the worker, despite the former's inextricable linking with labour, because the worker was/is an instantiation of figure of the poor, a socio-economic, political, and most importantly moral resolution of the contested figure of the poor through the objectifying imperatives of labour. In order to go beyond this sociological and economic instantiation, however important and central as it may be, it is necessary to retain an analytical space where several other factors can be seen playing out in making the figure of the 'poor', both an essential and always evasive concern, befitting a project of modernity.

What is poverty? Or, what is the concept of poverty[27]?

E H Wrigley in his book *Poverty, Progress, Population* argues that "Poverty is a general or rather abstract concept."[28] But if poverty is studied carefully as a category and not only literally then neither it appears as a general concept nor it seems abstract at all. Almost all the definitions given to the word 'poverty', in the wake of modernity, are based upon the conception of "lack", "deficiency" or "deprivation". For Oxford Dictionary, poor means "deficient in the proper or desired quality". The French Robert Dictionary defines the poor as one "who lacks the necessary or has only the strict necessary".[29] Yet, if the lack or deprivation is the basis for defining the poverty then there must be hardly any person who would not lack something or the other. So what distinguishes the 'poor' from the 'non-poor'? Perhaps, the nature or the perception of the lack distinguishes the poor from the non-poor. Everyone lacking something or the other cannot be called poor. Therefore, the nature of the deprivation along with the time and space in which these deprivations are taking place determine who is poor, and what

[27] Here it should be kept in mind that pauperism and poverty were two clearly differentiated terms in the nineteenth century. "The term "poverty" designates a natural state from which one could free oneself by means of work and savings; it is a remediable state of lack. The term "pauperism" designates the set of behaviours and beliefs of those poor people who claim poverty as a permanent condition or culture with its own morality and codes of conduct; it is a state of alterity that is not reducible to a condition of having less the socio-economic category of poor." See, P. Greany, *Untimely Beggar: Poverty and Power from Baudelaire to Benjamin*, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, p. 11.

[28] E H Wrigley, *poverty, Progress, Population*, p. 212.
[29] M. Rahnema, "Global poverty: the pauperizing Myth" *Interculture* No. 111.

is called poverty. What we mean to say is things or qualities which might be seen as signs of poverty in middle ages cannot necessarily be the signs of poverty in modern age as well.

As it was mentioned in the previous section, the words *poor* and *poverty* functioned as adjectives before being used as nouns. Mollat points out that "poverty referred first to the quality, then to the condition of a person subject to some deficiency, regardless of that person's social status."[30] Thus, poverty during High Middle Ages was characterized by the negativity of a situation or as a condition suffering some lack but it was not construed as a negative valuation or as an evil because poverty was still taken as given or natural (part of the providential order). It was only after Enlightenment that the concept of poverty was freed from its givenness and inertia, and turned into a negative valuation because the causes of poverty could be diagnosed as societal and the source of poverty was society itself. The difficulty in terms of defining poverty is not only limited to the historically mutating character of the term but also in distinguishing between the varied semantic connotations of the word. In early middle ages, poverty was seen in absolute terms (as given and pre-ordained) but by the period of Enlightenment it was employed to give a relative sense.

When the word 'poor' started being used not only as a proper noun but also as a collective noun, the poor was beginning to be seen not only in terms of their misery but also as associated with 'power' which it derived from its collective character. Furthermore, 'poor' was being used not merely to refer to a collective identity or a class, but also as a relationship between classes themselves. Patrick Greany cites historian Louis Chevalier who argues in his book *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* that "the term "poverty" does not designate the condition of a distinct "unfortunate classes", but a "far more complex relationship between those classes and other classes."[31] When poverty is seen in terms of a relationship between the classes, then poverty gets inevitably linked with power. By twentieth century, any attempt towards defining or representing poor had to take into account this newly developed inevitable association of poor with power which was more or less the byproduct of the changes introduced by Industrial Revolution (but the changes effected were by no measure the product of only Industrial Revolution, the

[30] Mollat, *op.cit.*, p. 2.
[31] Greaney, *op.cit.*, pp. xii-xiii.

lineages go back to French Revolution). Patrick Greany sums it up in the following words:

> In the nineteenth century the poor were associated with power. They were destitute, but they also embodied productive and destructive forces. Their labor power and revolutionary potential situated them in the center of any wider consideration of Europe's political and economic reality as well as any reflection upon its future. If the treatment of the poor in literary and philosophical texts was to be faithful to their "powerful" constitution, they had to be represented not only in their actual state but also in relation to their potential.[32]

As it is evident from the above quote poverty got linked with the power not owing to the actuality of their situation but the potentiality which the poor carry within themselves. They carry both, the productive and destructive forces. It is this relation with potentiality which turns the poor in dangerous classes, their capability to start a revolution. Hannah Arendt describes this aspect of poverty in her book *On Revolution* in following terms:

> Poverty is more than deprivation; it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute dictates of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate of necessity as men know it from their most intimate experience and outside all speculations. It was under the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolution.[33]

However, here we need to take into account the historically specific conditions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century which is making the contemporary authors to respond in a certain manner vis-à-vis poverty. What were the economic and political changes brought about by industrialization and primitive accumulation of capital that turned 'poor' into an inherently powerful subject which resisted its isolation as a subject and their poverty as a phenomenon? And how such a situation arisen that poor were perceived in collective terms, as a class, or more precisely poverty being situated at the interstices of the relationship between two classes.

Greany writes, "the poor have been stripped of their humanity and subjected to the "dictate of necessities," which they eventually come to represent politically. Hannah

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[32] Ibid., p. x.

[33] H. Arendt, *On Revolution,* New York: Viking, 1963, p. 54.

Arendt credits Marx with the elaboration of this Revolutionary insight "that poverty can be a political force of the first order.""[34] The formulation that "the poor exists not only as their misery but also as a power" is inevitably linked to the process of primitive accumulation of capital and the poor being the reservoir of labour-power or someone who embodies labour-power. But here it should also be kept in mind that the present work distinguishes between the poor and the worker and argues that they cannot be treated as synonymous with each other. This aspect that the category of poor and the worker cannot be conflated *as all the workers can be taken as poor but it does not subsume all the poor, whereas the poor subsumes all the worker* will be discussed later in details. The linkage of the term "poverty" with the labor power that is usually associated with a specific group of the productive working class in Marx's understanding of the relations among different groups of the poor will be discussed here. Marx argues that,

> capitalist societies reach a stage at which they require a "reserve army" and "relative overpopulation" of potential workers just as much as they need an active population of actual workers. Those who do not work and even those who cannot work are essential to the process of production in the stage of the accumulation of capital. To belong to the working class does not require employment or active, direct participation in production, but, instead, a relation, no matter how estranged or latent, to the process of production.[35]

Greany argues that in Marx's texts, the proletariat is not a fixed group joined by the activity of work or by an identity or set of characteristics. They are united only in their usability, which Marx famously calls their "freedom" to sell their labor-power.[36] Marx attempts to establish a rigorous categorization of the diverse population of the relative overpopulation into groups that are more or less removed from the process of production: the urban unemployed who are searching for work; the rural population on the verge of moving to the city; and the old and infirm who can no longer work. Greany further argues that

> Marx's characterization of these groups fails to distinguish "pauperism," the unproductive, obstinate, and disabled poor, from the groups of the working class that are actually or potentially productive. *For this reason it is possible to say not only that,*

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[34] Greaney, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., p. xvi.

> *in Capital, every worker is poor but also that the poor are all workers (emphasis added).* A similar line of reasoning leads Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri to insist, in *Multitude,* "there is no qualitative difference that divides the poor from the classes of employed workers"[37].[38]

The nature of the fluctuating reserve population that Marx tries to classify results into terminological overlap between the poor and the working class. There appear to be idle, unproductive social groups, but the process of production is able to accommodate them and even needs them for its proper functioning. Greany quotes the following passage from *Capital* where Marx formulates this in the form of a "law" that relates the working poor to the unemployed reserve army and the most destitute groups of the poor:

> The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productive power of its labor, the greater is the industrial reserve army. *The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, also develop the labour power at its disposal.* The relative mass of the industrial reserve army thus increases with the potential of its wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to the amount of torture it has to undergo in the form of labour. The more extensive, finally, the pauperized sections of the working class and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. *This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.*[39]

The general law of capitalist accumulation posits the interdependence of capitalism's power of expansion, the intensification of the proletariat's power, and the growth of a part of the working class that no longer can or no longer wants to sell its labor-power: those who are grouped under the rubric of pauperism. A few sentences later, Marx reformulates this law*: "Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery."* The poor and even the most destitute appear here in a complex network of forms of power– productive power, labor-power, the expansive power of capital, power in reserve– that determines their presentation in Marx and the

[37] In *Multitude* Hardt and Negri argue against the misleading term "industrial reserve army," because "there is no 'reserve' in the sense that o labor power is outside the process of production.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., xvii

other authors in this study. Instead of an identity or an attribute, poverty names a changing position constituted by relations among forms of power.[40]

In the previous paragraphs we have seen how labour power and expansive power of capital is interlinked with each other and at the intersection of this relationship stands poor and worker. However, this formulation of Marx also sounds paradoxical as he declares that all the non-working poor is associated with the process of production as they constitute reserve army but at the same time, he treated pauperism as a marginal phenomenon. For Marx, pauperism– a term used to group together the lumpen proletariat, criminals, the disabled, the unemployed, and others– seems at first to constitute a merely marginal phenomenon, but Greany argues that the treatment of pauperism is essential to the concepts of the proletariat and labor power in *Capital.* Pauperism is "dead weight" and yet also a "necessary condition" for capitalist production, Marx tells us, says Greany.[41] In order to develop further analysis of pauperism and the repercussions of this seemingly paradoxical coincidence of nonproductivity and production in *Capital*, he turns to Foucault's notion of disciplinary power and biopower, which focus expressly on those groups of the poor that are not economically fruitful. This approach of Greany will be discussed in the present section briefly and later in great detail. But before moving to this discussion we would briefly talk about the paupers' place in Marx's writing upon capitalist accumulation as relative overpopulation and the inverse relationship between accumulation of capital and accumulation of poverty. The twenty-third chapter of Capital, titled "The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation," links the accumulation of capital to the "accumulation of poverty":

> Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital.[42]

To explain this link, Marx traces capitalist accumulation and its effects on the composition of the working class through three historical stages. He begins by relating how, during the initial phase of the accumulation of capital, "the ratio of constant capital

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[40] Ibid

[41] Ibid., p. 1.

[42] Marx, *Capital* I:799.

(the value of the means of production) to variable capital (the value of labor-power)" remains stable: the demand for new workers increases at the same rate as the development of the means of production. Then, in the second subchapter, he describes how the continued reinvestment of surplus value in the means of production eventually allows for such an intensification of productivity that the composition of capital changes. Fewer workers are needed to produce a greater amount of surplus value. With the accelerated accumulation of capital, the number of required workers continues to grow, but this occurs in an ever-reducing proportion to the growth of constant capital. This change in the makeup of capital creates a new kind of worker population, which Marx presents in the third section of chapter 23:

> Capitalist accumulation produces, and produces indeed in direct relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working population i.e. a population which is superfluous to capital's average requirements for its own valorization, and is therefore a surplus population[43].[44]

The sudden expansion of capital "produces" a surplus worker population, which, far from being excluded from production, then becomes a necessary component of the continued expansion of capital. The "available industrial reserve army" of workers can be moved from one branch of industry to another, "released" and used somewhere else or not at all: "Modern industry's whole form of motion therefore depends on the constant transformation of a part of the working population into unemployed or semi-employed hands."[45] The acceleration of the accumulation

of capital takes place only as long as there is the constant demobilization, dispersal, and redeployment of its variable component, which is forced in this way to respond to the transforming needs of the process of production.

[43] The fourth section of chapter 23 of volume I of the Capital specifies three groups that make up the relative overpopulation: they are "floating," "latent," and "stagnant." The floating population exists at the "center of modern industry" and is constantly repelled and absorbed by industry's fluctuating needs; "latency" characterizes the rural population that is "constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat"; the "stagnant [stocked] form" is employed, but only erratically, and its wages are lowest, its conditions the worst. It is important to note that for Marx, stagnancy does not at all denote a lack of productivity, and, in fact, he insists expressly on the necessity of this final group as "an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labor power" and "a broad foundation for special branches of capitalist exploitation." All three groups of the reserve army of the proletariat are included in their very distance from production in the accumulation of capital, because this distance is what allows them to be dismissed and redeployed elsewhere.

[44] Ibid., pp. 782-83.

[45] Ibid., p. 786.

Greany writes that 'Pauperism and poverty were two clearly differentiated terms in the nineteenth century. In the texts of Marx's contemporaries, the term "poverty" designates a natural state from which one could free oneself by means of work and savings; it is a remediable state of lack. The term "pauperism" designates the set of behaviours and beliefs of those poor people who claim poverty as a permanent condition or culture with its own morality and codes of conduct; it is a state of alterity that is not reducible to a condition of having less.' The mid

Nineteenth century saw a number of attempts to understand and include the poor in a new society that valued, above all else, useful work and production, because poverty's alterity represented a menace. Since pauperism claimed another set of values, it seems to present the possibility of another society, and it thus appeared to many nineteenth-century reformers to be "virtually revolutionary."[46] Marx's presentation of pauperism reveals, at first glance, at least a terminological proximity to this tradition:

> Pauperism is the hospital of the active labour-army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army. Its production is included in that of the relative surplus population, its necessity is implied by their necessity; along with the surplus population, pauperism forms a necessary condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist development of wealth.[47]

The first sentence here seems to exclude pauperism from the process of production: it is the "hospital" and "dead weight" of the working class. But the next sentence places pauperism at the very centre of production: it is a necessary condition of capitalist production. With this move, Marx departs from the traditional understanding of pauperism. In *Capital,* pauperism denotes a specific group within the relative overpopulation that is excluded as "dead weight" from the active working class but that is nonetheless essential to the process of production.[48]

For Hardt and Negri, the poor are "the figure of a transversal, omnipresent, different, mobile subject" because of their "indispensable presence in the production of a common wealth." This is clear in *Capital,* which shows us how their indispensable presence is never the presence of an identity. Greany writes, "the sphere of pauperism emerges in *Capital* to bring together a heterogeneous group joined only by movements

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[46] Greany, *op. cit.,* p. 11.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.

of inclusion/exclusion and potentialization/depotentialization."[49] Marx shows how capitalism's development "produces" a relative overpopulation and pauperism, and he reveals how the continued accumulation of capital requires disabled and able members of these groups. This notion of capital as productive and not merely as repressive served as a model for Michel Foucault's articulation of his notion of power. In an interview following the publication of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality,* he makes what he calls a "presumptuous comparison" of his notion of power to Marx's, and he presents as exemplary in this respect Marx's examination of poverty:

> What did Marx do, in his analysis of capital, when he encountered the problem of the poverty of the workers? He rejected its usual explanation as the effect of natural scarcity or planned theft. He said in essence that, given what capitalist production is, in its basic laws, it cannot not produce poverty. Capitalism does not have as its raison d'etre the starvation of workers, but it cannot develop without starving them. Marx substituted the analysis of production for the denunciation of theft. Mutatis mutandis, that's a bit like what I wanted to do.[50]

Foucault is speaking specifically here of his own inquiry into the relations of power and sexuality, but the notion of power as productive is not unique, in his works, to the *History of Sexuality.* Foucault's relation to Marx's notion of the productivity of power and the problem of poverty extends far beyond this cursory comparison. For Foucault, poverty was a grand problem. For Foucault, poverty was "*le grand probleme … du XIX siècle* (the grand problem of 19th century". Foucault writes about how the kind of work performed by "the insane, the sick, prisoners . . . has a value that is, above all else, disciplinary" and that "the productive function is clearly 'zero' for the categories that concern me." In the eighteenth century, Foucault argues, the function of work exceeded the merely economic benefits and created disciplined individuals whose productivity was not the primary concern. The close link that joins production and non-productive individuals is central to Foucault's work, and this is where Foucault's relation to Marx overlaps with his sustained interest in poverty. Foucault describes the discovery of the power of the poor in *Madness and Civilisation* in following words:

> The eighteenth century discovered that "the Poor" did not exist as a concrete and final reality; that in them, two realities of different natures had too long been confused. On

[49] Ibid., p. 17.
[50] As quoted in Greany, p. 18.

> the one hand, there was *Poverty*: scarcity of commodities and money, an economic situation linked to the state of commerce, of agriculture, of industry. On the other, there was *Population*: not a passive element subject to the fluctuations of wealth, but a force which directly contributed to the economic situation, to the production of wealth, since it is man's labor which creates—or at least transmits, shifts, and multiplies—wealth.[51]

The perception of the poor is split, as the condition of poverty and the force of a population become visible separately. The poor, as population, are productive and, as in Marx's analysis of the relative overpopulation, essential to the expansion of the economy. But, unlike Marx, who insists on the inclusion of the sick and disabled poor in the pro cesses of production, Foucault summarily excludes them from production:

> The sick man is dead weight and represents a "passive, apathetic, negative" element, and he takes part in society only as a consumer. … He is the negative element par excellence, poverty with no way out and no options, no virtual wealth. He alone demands total care. But how to justify it? There is no economic utility in the care of the sick and no practical necessity.[52]

In this passage from Madness and Civilization, Foucault seems to limit the role of the poor to that of "dead weight" and "consumer," while Marx emphasizes the necessity of this "dead weight" in the accumulation of capital. But the sick poor, being "without virtual wealth," are

excluded here only to be included elsewhere, in the new apparatus of assistance developed in the eighteenth century: "All human life, from the most immediate sensations to the most elaborated social forms, is taken up into the network of the obligations of care."[53] Foucault's analysis of the poor in Madness and Civilization ends with the discussion of the discovery of the power of the population, because it is at this point that the poor are perceived as distinct from the mad.[54]

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[51] M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason,* trans. Richard Howard, New York: Vintage, 1965, p. 231.

[52] As quoted in Greany, *op. cit.*, p. 20. Originally from Foucault, *Histoire de la folie a l'age Classique,* Paris: Gallimard, 1972, p. 433, 435. This book is the original French work which has been published in English by Routledge in 2006 with the title *History of Madness*, edited by Jean Khalfa and translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. *Madness and Civilisation* is an abridged version of the original book mentioned here.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., p. 23.

In these senses, both the relativization of the concept of poverty and its reformulation in terms of potentiality, the idea of seeking any one definition of poverty becomes inherently problematic because poverty could not be reduced to any essence or to some essential features or traits. There could be no pre-ordained defining properties of poverty. Poverty as an idea or concept is not located in any particular discipline or subject or any one branch of knowledge. It has to be located at the intersection of several branches of knowledge. In other words, an underlying "episteme"[55] or a discursive framework has to be sought in order to map the linkages which poverty has with different branches of knowledge. Since poverty is not just an 'idea' but has its own materiality, so the definition of poverty could not be arrived at just by following the schema of a discursive framework where poverty is situated as an object of knowledge, but also had to take into account the material registers of poverty. If poverty has physicality, it should be measured. And to measure poverty, its physical register should be made quantifiable. Once poverty is quantified, it becomes measurable. The progress and decline of poverty in material terms becomes visible. The present state of things in terms of poverty could be compared to the past, for instance, the decreased mortality rate could be read as the sign of prosperity and health of population and the persistent hike in unemployment rate would indicate toward the worsening living standard and a consequent misery of the population. But as soon as these 'facts' are located in a historical context and a discursive framework; we are reverted to the 'problem' of not being able to find a consistent and once-settled-for definition of poverty and the poor.

Poverty is perceived as a virtue when it is voluntary or when it represents the free choice of the subject. Voluntary poverty constituted an important element of the religious discourses. Within Christianity, the Franciscan order which was founded by the Saint Francis of Assisi embraced voluntary poverty. Majid Rahnema argues that, "while pauperism[56] was perceived as abnormal and calling for remedial action, poverty, in vernacular and pre-industrialized societies, was considered, by contrast, as a rather

[55] An ordering or organizing principle of its knowledge. See, M. Foucault, *The Order of Things.*

[56] Pauperism describes "a category of people unable to maintain themselves at all, or to maintain themselves at the level conventionally regarded as minimal, without outside assistance… Pauperism arose historically beyond the border of the functioning primary social group (e.g. the kinship group within which the economically independent can expect assistance or maintenance without social institutional provisions. It therefore reflects the fluctuating fortunes of such primary groups". Poverty, as a social phenomenon, implies only economic and social inequality, "that is, a relation of inferiority, dependence, or exploitation. In other words, it implies the existence of a social stratum definable by, among other things, lack of wealth". See, Majid Rahnema, "Global Poverty: A Pauperizing Myth", *Interculture* Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Spring 1991. p. 11.

natural human predicament, if not an irremediable and unavoidable fact of life."[57] However, in the present work our concern is to trace the concept of poverty in the wake of modernity. Even in the context of modernity it could be said that poverty is a concept which functions relatively as the common denominator of any perception or notion centered around "lack" or "deprivation". When poor is defined as lacking a number of things "necessary" to life, the question could be asked: What is necessary to life? Obviously, the need of an urban poor and the rural poor are not the same, the person living in one geography can have very different necessities from the person living in another geography. So, the poverty is always rooted in the nature of social, economic, cultural relationship of a particular society. But there are some absolute necessaries of life lacking which makes someone poor irrespective of place, space or time.

Amartya Sen defines poverty in terms of 'lack of entitlements.' The notion of "entitlement relations" was coined by Amartya Sen, first in 1967, later elaborated in his book *Poverty and Famines* in 1981. For Sen, "an entitlement relation applied to ownership connects one set of ownership to another through certain rules of legitimacy… Each link in the chain of entitlement relations 'legitimises' one set of ownership by reference to another, or to some basic entitlements in the form of enjoying the fruits of one's own labour". Sen states, "entitlement relations accepted in a private ownership market economy include the following: trade-based, production-based, own-labor, inheritance and transfer entitlements". Sen notes that "a person can exchange what he owns for another collection of commodities in a market economy and the set of all the alternative bundles of commodities that he can acquire in exchange for what he owns may be called 'the exchange entitlement' of what he owns."[58] Sen further argues that "the 'exchange entitlement mapping' is the relation that specifies the set of exchange entitlements for each ownership bundle… A person will be exposed to starvation if for the ownership that he actually has, the exchange entitlement set does not contain any feasible bundle including enough food."[59] Although the materiality of basic needs could be relative to various societies and cultural spaces, it could however be argued that "there is an irreducible core of absolute deprivation in our ideas of

[57] Majid Rahnema, "Global Poverty: A Pauperizing Myth", *Interculture* Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Spring 1991. p. 11.
[58] A. Sen, *Poverty and Famines*, Oxford University Press, 1984. pp. 1-3.
[59] Ibid.

poverty, which translates reports of starvation, malnutrition and visible hardship into a diagnosis of poverty without having to ascertain first the relative pictures."[60]

Adam Smith defines poverty in terms of basic necessities which are rendered essential by the prevalent customs of society. For Adam Smith, the necessaries were, interestingly enough, "not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without".[61] Amartya Sen writes,

> Smith placed the ideas of inclusion and exclusion at the centre of poverty analysis, when he defined the nature of "necessaries" for leading a decent life. *By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without* (emphasis added) … Custom has rendered leathered shoes necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them.[62]

Soumyabrata Choudhury argues that in the particular context of economic sociability[63] a poor person has been traditionally considered someone who is not credit-worthy or creditable, someone who cannot be given credit as he cannot guarantee that he can pay back. But he takes up the example of Mohammad Yunus's Grameen Bank which precisely provides micro-credit to the poor and considers them credit worthy. These credits are given with the logic that poor will use these credits to utilize their potential. Choudhury argues that the "poor has become the new subjects of economic sociability and credit-worthiness."[64] Such an inclusion into a kind of *economic sociability* , a new space of banking enterprise and corporation becomes possible, an enterprise with a new agency, that of "socially sensitive" capital, and a corporation with a new substance and figure , those of *poverty itself.*[65] Soumyabrata further points out that both Yunus and Amartya Sen is wrong in considering the poor as capacity deprived. Rather, poor are full of potential. "From the point of view of law, administration, economy etc. the poor

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[60] Ibid.
[61] A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of Nations* 1776, p. 351.
[62] The above-mentioned quote is the full basis of Sen's choice of affective criterion for social inclusion and poverty alleviation. See, Amartya Sen., Social Exclusion: Concept Application Scrutiny, New Delhi: Critical Quest, 2004, p. 4-6.
[63] By the term economic sociability, we mean the space of economic activities.
[64] S. Choudhury, "Political sociability and the theatre in the subcontinent: The Poverty of Appearance, Appearance of Poverty. p. 2.
[65] Ibid.

are clearly resource and potentiality (exactly the reverse side of Amartya Sen and Yunus' argument about the poor as capacity deprived). In this view, poverty is a transitional stage in a process and logic of 'creditable' appearance. Amartya Sen cites in the course of his analysis of poverty's social exclusion to the effect that escaping exclusion is to be "… Able to appear in public without shame". What Adam Smith says about the particular (and generic poor) person, the policy of state supported by law declares for the poor as a collective productive capacity, as an aggregate population and as *a space of appearance.* If for the individual the fact that he/she can appear in the public without shame is a kind of lived demonstration of capability, correction, emancipation from the condition of poverty and social inclusion, for the policy of state (and society, why not) the objective demonstration of shameless well-being is co-terminus with the purification of spaces of the *signs of the poor*, of the fragments of the pathos of poverty's public incarnation."[66] Choudhury takes up the example of Delhi Commonwealth games when slums and the dwelling of poor people were covered across Delhi to make the poor and poverty invisible. In other way, poor were taken away the right to appear in public despite being a full citizen and having access to Law, Society, Administration and Productivity of the nation. That is the situation of the "commonwealth" in the context of the commonwealth games scheduled for October 2010. Choudhury's arguments proceed further as follows:

> the commonwealth in the incarnation of the games represents a *municipal* and *sovereign* decision on the question of ontological equality and its question of appearance and sociability. This is the decision to exclude the poor (which in this case includes the manual laborers engaged in the construction work before the games, who are often migrants, and stay in make shift locations , beggars on traffic islands, etc) from the appearance of the "commonwealth" in the specific geo-political form of the metropolitan city. But the crucial question is what is the modality of this decision and exclusion? One can improvise the following answer (which is frankly polemical): The poor are excluded from the space of appearance which is the city (Delhi) and in the same move, are exposed to this very appearance and its norm.[67]

Soumyabrata Choudhury criticises Smith, Sen and Yunus through stating the following:

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[66] Ibid., p. 4.
[67] Ibid.

> Everything in this emancipatory economic thinking depends on either the *measurement* or the *testimony* of the individual who is measured and/or judged to appear successfully or not, so to have thus overcome poverty and its attendant exclusion or not. Everything depends on an economic subjectification and sociability that rescues or condemns the poor. This is the subjectification of the poor individual to the "creditable" social and entrepreneurial agent (Adam Smith) with the right to public appearance, without shame, to the "credit-worthy" poor (Mohammed Yunus) with the right to upward mobility in an "open economy".[68]

What is striking in Soumyabrata Choudhury's argument is the point that he doesn't define poverty in terms of a state of lack or deprivation and poor as someone who personifies such a state of being, but he puts forward some elements of a definition of poor which is not based on capacity deprivation or lack but the very reverse of it "*poor as the source of potentialities*." This definition is in contrast to the definition advanced by Smith, Sen and Yunus.

From charity to policing of the poor

Several historians of Middle Ages point to the hardening of attitudes against the poor in the period following Black Death, on account of their purported idleness, propensity to crime and susceptibility to disease. Mollat attributes the hardening of attitude towards poor to the rise of humanism during this period. He writes, "Some people were outraged, others dismayed, by the development of pauperism after the second half of the fourteenth century – and not without reason. More than ever there was a sharp contrast between the idealization of spiritual poverty and the visibly sordid realities of material poverty."[69] People were afraid not so much with the prevalent indigence and poverty but with the numbers and anonymity of the poor. They no longer knew with whom they were dealing. There was an environment of lack of trust because of the poor's susceptibility to crime in the wake of large-scale misery and uprootedness. Mollat further wrote, "What justification allowed able-bodied men to go begging, contrary to the natural of labour? How was society to cope with the destabilizing threat of vagrancy? And why should unconscionable sums be given as alms to the indigent,

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[68] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[69] Mollat, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-52.

perpetuating their abasement and prolonging the offense to human dignity?"[70] The prevalent mode of private charity had to be withdrawn and there was an attempt made to set the poor to work through several statutes and ordinances all over the Europe. In this context, Silvia Federici writes:

> In the aftermath of the Black Death, every European country began to condemn idleness, and to persecute vagabondage, begging, and refusal of work. England took the initiative with the Statute of 1349 that condemned high wages and idleness, establishing that those who did not work, and did not have any means of survival, had to accept work. Similar ordinances were issued in France in 1351, when it was recommended that people should not give food or hostel to healthy beggars and vagabonds. A further ordinance in 1354 established that those who remained idle, passing their time in taverns, playing dice or begging, had to accept work or face consequences; first offenders would be put in prison on bread and water, while second offenders would be put in the stocks, and third offenders would be branded on the forehead. In the French legislation a new element appeared that became part of the modern struggle against vagabonds: forced labor.[71]

The root cause behind the gradual disappearance of private form of charity and the policing of the poor lies in the secularized conception of poverty. Gertrude Himmelfarb argues, "as the idea of poverty became secularized, the poor tended to become the charge of the state."[72] The secularized conception of poverty meant the involuntary, ignoble poverty of the "lower orders." Before, every aspect of poverty and charity was penetrated by religious meaning and the church was a principle actor which bears the task both of social amelioration and spiritual salvation. "The Elizabethan poor laws, dating from the late sixteenth century, had not only established the principle of a legal, compulsory, secular, national system of relief; they had also given England the reputation of a country where compassion had become public policy. The locus of moral responsibility had shifted from the private domain (private charity) to the state."[73] But the Elizabethan poor laws were not just a result of compassion. There were provisions under the law to punish the able-bodied vagrants and at the same time to

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[70] Ibid.
[71] S. Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body And Primitive Accumulation*, New Delhi: Phoneme Books, 2013, pp. 57-58.
[72] See, G. Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty:England In The Early Industrial Age*, London: Faber and Faber, 1984.
[73] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

give relief to the disabled and the aged. They were deliberately distinguishing between two kinds of poor and devising policies which, as they saw it, dealt appropriately with each.

Locating the figure of the 'poor' in the triad of concepts called Labour-Poverty-Population in the discourses of Classical Political Economy

In the present section we intend to explicate the conceptual figuration of the poor in the discourses of classical political economy through making the relationship between the three concepts namely poverty, labour and population intelligible by showing that how poverty through its relationship to labour and population is constituted as an object of knowledge and governance in classical political economy. Principles of Classical Political Economy played a prescriptive role in terms of shaping the imagination and policies vis-à-vis poor or poverty and left its lasting impact on the forms and the direction of the discourses around poor, not only at the political economic scenario of eighteenth-nineteenth century England but also in the colonial context of India. The debate which took place within the framework of Classical Political Economy and the theoretical insight that was generated thereof was responsible for the movement for reform in Poor Law in the name of efficient use of population and the maximization of the 'wealth of the nation'. The effect of this new-found interest in Political Economy during nineteenth century could also be clearly seen in the bureaucratic discourse of the colonial state in India.[74] This section also argues that the changes in the attitudes towards poor and the treatment poverty in the wake of modernity and the rise of industrial revolution was symptomatic of the emergence of a new governmental rationality of which political economy was a chief constituent element. It was this time when mercantilism gave way to a new set of liberal principles.

Since political economy from its very inception was concerned with the maximization of wealth and happiness, it left a huge impact upon the discourses around poverty and

[74] This aspect will be dealt in detail in the next chapter which discusses the historical constitution of poverty in the bureaucratic discourses of colonial state in India, the specific mode of intervention by colonial state and its peculiar governmental rationality vis-à-vis poor or poverty. Introduction of Famine Code, Famine relief measure, the phenomenon of lunatic asylum, the introduction of extramural work in jails, the construction of Poorhouses et cetera will be taken as examples to show how deeply the principles of political economy influenced the discourses of colonial state regarding poor or poverty.

population. Karl Polanyi in his book *The Great Transformation* argues that "the problem of poverty centered around two closely related subjects: pauperism and political economy… Pauperism and political economy formed part of one indivisible whole: the discovery of society."[75] Polanyi argues this point in detail in his above-mentioned book and shows that how with the discovery of political economy as an economic science and its principles becoming a chief regulator of economic affairs of the society or nation replaced the whole set of earlier economic and social principles (e.g., the Physiocrats and the mercantilist believed that the physical resource alone is the source of all wealth; the wealth is finite and increasing wealth is a zero-sum game; the increasing population is a sign of wealth and prosperity et cetera.). Thus, a new concept of society was also discovered along with the discovery of political economy. Polanyi writes, "Up to the time of Speenhamland[76] no satisfactory answer could be found to the question of where the poor came from. It was, however, generally agreed among eighteenth- century thinkers that pauperism and progress were inseparable. The greatest number of poor is not to be found in barren countries or amid barbarous nations, but in those which are the most fertile and the most civilized, wrote John McFarlane in 1782. Giammaria Ortes, the Italian economist, pronounced it an axiom that the wealth of a nation corresponds with its population; and its misery corresponds with its wealth (1774). And even Adam Smith in his cautious manner declared that it is not in the

[75] K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. p. 108.

[76] The Speenhamland system, also known as the Berkshire Bread Act was a form of outdoor relief intended to mitigate rural poverty in England and Wales at the end of the 18th century and during the early 19th century. The law was an amendment to the Elizabethan Poor Law. It was introduced in 1795 and later replaced with New Poor Law in 1834. The authorities at Speenhamland approved a means-tested sliding-scale of wage supplements in order to mitigate the worst effects of rural poverty. Families were paid extra to top up wages to a set level according to a table. This level varied according to the number of children and the price of bread. For example, if bread was 1s 2d (14 pence) a loaf, the wages of a family with two children were topped up to 8s 6d (102 pence). In 1834, the Report of the Royal Commission into the Operation of the Poor Laws 1832 called the Speenhamland System a "universal system of pauperism". The system allowed employers, including farmers and the nascent industrialists of the town, to pay below subsistence wages, because the parish would make up the difference and keep their workers alive. Thomas Malthus believed a system of supporting the poor would lead to increased population growth rates because the Poor Laws encouraged early marriage and prolific procreation, which would be a problem due to the Malthusian catastrophe (where population growth would exceed food production); however, food production actually steadily grew by a third between 1790 and 1830 albeit with a smaller section of the populace able to access it due to mechanization, and the population growth that actually happened was due to growing demand for child labor and not Speenhamland. David Ricardo believed that Speenhamland would create a poverty trap, where the poor would work less, which would make food production fall, in its turn creating the space for a revolution; however, the poverty that existed back then was not caused a supposed Speenhamland "poverty trap", as "wage earners were permitted to keep at least part of their allowances when their earnings increased", but instead was the result of price hikes resulting from England returning to the gold standard, a policy Ricardo himself had recommended.

richest countries that the wages of labor are highest."[77] Polanyi further writes, "while the poor in the middle of the sixteenth century were a danger to society, on which they descended like hostile armies, at the end of the seventeenth century they were merely a burden on the rates. On the other hand, this was no more a semi-feudal society but a semi-commercial one, the representative members of which were favoring work for its own sake and could accept neither the medieval view that poverty was no problem, nor that of the successful encloser that the unemployed were merely able-bodied idlers. From this time onward, opinions about pauperism began to reflect philosophical outlook, very much as theological questions had before."[78] Polanyi further argues that "at the time of Speenhamland the true nature of pauperism was still hidden from the minds of men. There was complete agreement on the desirability of a large population, as large as possible, since the power of the state consisted in men. There was also mostly agreement on the advantages of cheap labor, since only if labor was cheap could manufactures flourish. Moreover, but for the poor, who would man the ships and go to the wars? Yet, there was doubt whether pauperism was not an evil after all. Neither the new wealth nor the new poverty was yet quite comprehensible."[79] The new wealth and new poverty became comprehensible with the emergence of the new science called Classical Political Economy. Karl Polanyi writes, "when the significance of poverty was realized, the stage was set for the nineteenth century. The watershed lay somewhere around 1780. In Adam Smith's great work poor relief was no problem as yet; only a decade later it was raised as a broad issue in Townsend's Dissertation on the Poor Laws and never ceased to occupy men's minds for another century and a half."[80] Polanyi points out that the "nature in the physical sense was consciously excluded by Smith from the problem of wealth."[81] Polanyi summarises Smith's arguments regarding wealth which served as a departure from the Physiocrat's conception of wealth was as follows:

> whatever be the soil, climate or extent of territory of any particular in that nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply, must, in particular situation, depend upon two circumstances, namely, the skill of labour and the proportion between the useful

[77] K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. p. 108.
[78] Ibid., pp. 109-110.
[79] Ibid., pp. 114-115.
[80] Ibid., p. 116.
[81] Ibid.

> and the idle members in society. Not the natural, but only the human factors enter. This exclusion of the biological and geographical factor in the very beginning of his book was deliberate. The fallacies of the Physiocrats served him as a warning; their predilection for agriculture tempted them to confuse physical nature with man's nature, and induced them to argue that the soil alone was truly creative. Nothing was further from the mind of Smith than such a glorification of *Physis*. Political economy should be a human science; it should deal with that which was natural to man, not to Nature.[82]

However, Townsend, Malthus and some other proponents of political economy introduced the problematic of Nature again in the discussion over food, hunger and population but overall Political economy made a significant departure from the physiocracy. In this section we will discuss in detail how the problem of Poverty and the figure of the poor is entangled in the problematic of labour-poverty-population in the science of classical political economy. Giovanna Procacci argues, "political economy, which was constructed as a discourse on the increase of wealth, never evaded the problem of poverty."[83] She continues to explain, "in the highest stage of social prosperity, the great mass of citizens will most probably possess few other resources than their daily labour, and consequently will always be near to indigence. One thinks of the consideration of poverty in Adam Smith's *Draft of the Wealth of Nations*, and on the 'subsistence wage' in Ricardo. Poverty is the counterpart to wealth in as much as it is the territory of unfulfilled needs, or of needs not yet invented."[84] But Political Economy was not just a set of economic principles, it was by its very nature of enquiry, always linked with governance. Michel Foucault writes:

> Between 1750 to 1810-1820 the expression "political economy" oscillates between two semantic poles. Sometime this expression aims at a particular strict and limited analysis of the production and circulation of wealth. But, in a broader and more practical sense, "political economy" also refers to any method of governance that can procure the nation's prosperity. And finally, political economy- the term employed by Rousseau in his famous article in Encyclopedia- is a sort of general reflection on the organization, distribution, and limitation of powers in a society. Fundamentally it was political economy that made it possible to ensure self-limitation of governmental reason.[85]

[82] Ibid., p. 117.
[83] G. Procacci, 'Social Economy,' p. 154.
[84] Ibid.
[85] M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 13.

By eighteenth century, the phrase “political economy” was used to refer “the general study of the ‘wealth of a nation’, its distribution and the causes of its increase or decline.” During this period, classical political economy was also known as ‘the science of the legislation’.[86] The authors of eighteenth century didn’t distinguish the study of wealth of nations as separate from the study of politics, justice and morals. These elements were intertwined. Even Smith talks of ‘moral sentiment’ in his writings. Bentham argues that, “Political Economy is at once a *science* and an *art.* The value of the science has for its efficient cause and measure, its subserviency to the art (to Adam Smith, the science alone has been the direct and constant object in view: the art the collateral and occasional one).”[87] Bentham further writes:

> According to the principle of utility in every branch of the art of legislation, the object or end in view should be the production of the maximum of happiness in a given time in the community in question. In the instance of this branch of the art, the object or end in view should be the production of that maximum of happiness, in so far as this more general end is promoted by the production of the maximum of wealth and the maximum of population.[88]

This early understanding of growth in population being an indicator of the prosperity of nation, which was held by Smith and Bentham, was later discarded and heavily disputed by Malthus. Whereas the previous notion sees the increase in population as an increase in human resource and a subsequent potential for growth, Malthus sees this increment in population as a source of misery because ‘population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio’. This aspect will be discussed later in detail.

Foucault talks about the inevitable relation between political economy and the art of government. Though he agrees with their being separate and having distinct features,

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[86] There’s been a tradition among a certain section of economists and economic historians to treat Smith’s *Wealth of Nation* as belonging to “moral economy” and not particularly to “political economy” because of Smith’s emphasis upon a “moral philosophy” which could be seen in his theorization in *The Theory of Moral Sentiment* and owing to his insistence upon moral values like sympathy. “A close reading of the *Wealth of Nation* itself suggests that political economy as Smith understood it was part of a larger moral philosophy, a new kind of moral economy. Schumpeter complained that Smith was so steeped in the tradition of moral philosophy derived from scholasticism and natural law that he could not conceive of economics per se, an economics divorced from ethics and politics.” See, Himmelfarb, *op. cit.,* p. 48. The completely demoralized political economy is associated with Thomas Malthus.

[87] J. Bentham, *A Manual of Political Economy,* in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 3*, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843, p. 60.

[88] Ibid.

he says that the essential function of political economy in eighteenth century was to ensure the self-limitation of governmental reason which was inherent in the doctrine of the *raison d'Etat*.[89] He explicates,

> Unlike sixteenth and seventeenth century juridical thought, political economy was not developed outside *raison d'Etat*. It was not developed against *raison d'Etat* and in order to limit it, at least not in the first place. Rather, it was formed within the very framework of the objectives set for the art of government by *raison d'Etat,* for what objectives did political economy set itself? Well, it set itself the objective of the state's enrichment. Its objective was the simultaneous, correlative, and suitably adjusted growth of population on the one hand, and means of subsistence on the other.[90]

Classical economist John Ramsey M'Culloch wrote that,

> The object of Political Economy is to point out the means by which the industry of man may be rendered most productive of those necessaries, comforts, and enjoyments, which constitute wealth; to ascertain the proportions in which this wealth is divided among the different classes of the community; and the mode in which it may be most advantageously consumed. The intimate connection of such a science, with all the best interest of society, is abundantly obvious.[91]

From the above observation made by M'Culloch it is clear that political economy is not just about management of wealth but a certain prudence which should be exercised for the purpose of maximizing happiness. Mitchel Dean argues that, "for political economy, the 'poor' are among those which should be subject to the wise administration of the state. The discourse of the poor is concerned with linking the general propositions of 'political economy' with the practical problems of the governance of the poor. It addresses the poor as an object to be classified, about which information can be had, and ultimately, as a terrain to be governed."[92]

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[89] See, Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, pp. 3-4.
[90] Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 14.1
[91] J.R. M'Culloch, *The Principles of Political Economy: With a Sketch of the Rise and Progress of the Sciences*, Edinburgh: Printed for Williams and Charles Tait, 1825, p. 7.

[92] M. Dean, 'A Genealogy of the Government of Poverty,' *Economy and Society,* Vol. 21, No. 3, August, 1992, p. 233.

Diagram I.
Conceptual figuration of 'poor' in the discourses of Classical Political Economy

- Rate of population always grows in inverse proportion to the means of subsistence (Malthusian formulation)
- Population – Land – Food Supply
- Poor procreates more than they could have for subsistence
- Checking the growth of population as a means to enhance the material well-being, thus the measures of birth-control



- As opposed to Physiocrats who considered natural resources as the source of all wealth, Classical Political Economy discovers 'labour' as the source of all wealth
- One of the pre-conditions for capitalist development is the "accumulation of bodies" (through disciplining and other means) apart from the "primitive accumulation of capital"
- Poor are idles. They don't want to work. They need to be disciplined (Benthamite idea)
- Absence of work leads to criminalization of the Poor

- Poverty, essentially, is a negative property/valuation
- Poverty as a 'social' problem in the wake of Enlightenment, modernity and the emergence of Classical Political Economy
- Establishing poverty as antonym to wealth
- Since labour is the source of wealth, the cure of poverty lies in work (industriousness)
- Poor as the bodies, reservoirs of labour power
- Poverty and misery always increase in proportion to the quantity of indiscriminate charity (moral grafting on Poor)

Labour[93] defined as source of all wealth

During middle ages poverty was situated in the moral and religious discourses. Poverty and labour got intrinsically linked to each other only after the emergence of Classical Political Economy, which contrary to Physiocrats' belief that nature alone is the source of all wealth, established that labour is the source of all wealth. If labour became the source of all wealth, then the prevalence and causes of poverty could not have relegated to the natural/given order of things as labour now had the potential to ward off poverty. Work became the ultimate cure of poverty. This realization gave rise to a whole range of right-based juridical discourses during late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. We can see an intense debate happening in France in the context of 1848 revolution in France and the change in old poor law in 1834 upon the inextricable link between labour and poverty. Poverty and labour also got linked owing to the general historical conditions which gave rise to capitalism. Silvia Federici in her book *Caliban and the Witch* argues that for the capitalist transformation to take place the accumulation of capital alone was not enough but the accumulation of laboring bodies was also vital. She writes, "one of the precondition for capitalist development was the process that Michel Foucault defined as the 'disciplining of the body,' which consisted of an attempt by state and church to transform the individual's power into labour-power."[94] When it was discovered that body is the container of labour-power, the poor was subjected to a disciplinary regime and enormous persecution in order to set the poor to work. Federici argues, "Poor occupied a unique position as they were seen as riotous mobs and dangerous class but also at the same time as a social subject who increasingly appeared as the source of all wealth. The body, then, came to the foreground of social policies because it appeared not only as a beast inert to the stimuli of work, but also as the container of labour-power, a means of production, the primary

[93] Hannah Arendt in her book *The Human Condition* distinguishes between Labour and Work. She says "Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The human condition of labor is life itself." Whereas, "Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species' ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an artificial world of things, distinctly different from all-natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself meant to outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness." See, H. Arendt, *The Human Condition* Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1998. p. 7.

[94] S. Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, The body and primitive accumulation*, Delhi: Phoneme, 2013, p. 133.

work-machine."[95] However, here it should also be kept in mind that even before the concept of value of labour entered the pantheons of economic thought as a discovery of political economy, work in the sense of industry (more than land or any other natural wealth) was considered the primary source of accumulation as the low level of technological development made human beings the most important productive resource.[96] Body were the condition of existence of labour-power. As I have discussed in the previous section that it was not without reason that the mercantilist (the early capitalist or the first economist of capitalism) considered the maximization of population as sign of prosperity. However, this mercantilist formulation was later rejected by Malthus and other proponents of classical political economy.

The change in Elizabethan Poor Laws in 1834 was also symptomatic of the changing meaning and conception of labour and its emerging relationship with poverty. The New Poor Law distinguished between deserving and undeserving poor, able-bodied and non-able-bodied poor. Now the charity was supposed to be given only to those who were unable to work. Federici notes, "the secularization of poverty, together with the rise of money-economy, brought about a decisive change in the attitude of the Church towards the Poor. Earlier, the Church exalted poverty as a holy state and engaged in distribution of alms, trying to convince the poor to accept their situation and not envy the rich. The 'exaltation of *sancta paupertas*' ('holy poverty') also served to impress upon the rich the need for charity as means for salvation."[97] The practice of charity made the Church one of the richest institution of Europe as the Church got a vast amount of donations in terms of money, buildings and land which were supposed to be distributed among those who were living without bare necessities of life. Federici further points out that "when poor grew in numbers and "the heretics started to challenge the Church's greed and corruption, the clergy dismissed its homilies about poverty and introduced many 'distinguo'." The practice of charity was made qualifiable by Church, beneficiary had to now qualify some criteria like their physical ability to work among many others. Church linked the status of one's poverty with one's ability to work. Labour and poverty was linked for the first time. "Starting in the 13th century," Federici writes, "Church affirmed that only voluntary poverty has merit in the eyes of God, as a sign of humility and contempt for material goods; this meant, in practice, that help would now be given

[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid., p. 137.
[97] Ibid., p. 53.

only to the 'deserving poor,' that is, to the impoverished members of the nobility, and not to those begging in the street or at city gates. The latter were looked upon with suspicion as guilty of laziness or fraud."[98]

In course of time, the linking of poverty and labour gives rise to a new discourse centered around the right to work. If one's poverty was the result of not working, then how the category of those who were unemployed and needy were to be taken as they were ready to work but there was no work. Giovanna Procacci argues that during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century France, right to labour emerged as juridical means to alleviate poverty. She writes, "in 1848 the revolutionary movement claimed a right to labor as the political solution to the problem of poverty in the French lower classes. Such a claim implied an interpretation of poverty as being connected to labor, and the solution offered was juridical."[99] Procacci further enunciates, "if guaranteeing labour was to be the solution to poverty, then poverty would result only from a lack of work. One could therefore claim that no assistance to the poor was needed other than to provide the means to work. In so doing, the theory of the right to labour reactivated the revolutionary theory of assistance, formulated already before the Great Revolution of 1789 in the intellectual atmosphere of the Enlightenment."[100] In the noetic climates of Enlightenment, "labour was viewed as the regulator of an 'ethics of prosperity', conceived as a morality for both individual and society. Accordingly, any kind of assistance other than labour would lead to moral degradation in a cycle of charity-idleness. In this view, poverty was the effect of irrational social organization such as the Ancien Regime, which was unable to provide its own members with sufficient work."[101] Procacci beautifully elucidates how the link between labour and poverty was presumed in the discourses centered around right to work. She writes, "labour seemed the best way to organize the reciprocity of rights and duties. Only through labour could the poor return to society what the latter had given them in the terms of rights. Labour alone seemed able to integrate the poor into a grid of social exchange, where rights compensated work and vice versa."[102] The impact of these discourses upon labour, poverty and work was not only limited to France but it could be felt all across western

[98] Ibid.
[99] G. Procacci, "Sociology and its Poor," *Politics and Society*, 1989, p. 166.
[100] Ibid., p. 167.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid., p. 175.

Europe. These discourses were the precursor of a more widespread debate upon the labour, poverty and wealth in classical political economy.

Now we would specifically see the place of the concept of labour in Classical Political Economy. English Classical Political Economy made two important departures from the French Physiocrats: firstly, 'labour' was conceived as the only source of all wealth; secondly, there was an immense effort made since Smith to arrive at a *Theory of Value* which would render a basis for exchange to take place. 'Value' was so central to the classical economist's thinking that some of them wanted to call it a *Science of Value*. How the early classical economist arrived at the formulation that 'labour was the source of all wealth' will be discussed here in some detail because this formulation has an inevitable link with poverty, which after this formulation, began to be seen in terms of its relation with labour whereupon it could be alleviated by subjecting it to the wise principle of social and economic organization, fundamentally displacing poverty from the natural order to the social order. Contrary to the notion held by physiocrats, Adam Smith argues 'labour' as the only source of wealth. M'Culloch describes Smith's observation in *Wealth of Nations* in the following words:

> He has shown that labour is productive of wealth when employed in manufactures and commerce, as well as when it is employed in the cultivation of the land: He has traced the various means by which labour may be rendered most effective; and has given a most admirable analysis and exposition of the prodigious addition made to its powers by its *division* among different individuals, and by the employment of accumulated wealth, or *capital*, in industrious undertakings. Dr. Smith has also shown, in opposition to commonly received opinions of the merchants, politicians, and statesmen of his time, that wealth does not consist in the abundance of gold and silver, but in the abundance of the various necessaries, conveniences, and enjoyments of human life.[103]

Such a rethinking of labour through the lens of value, took place alongside a rethinking of production as well. M'Culloch stated,

> By production, in the science of political economy, we are not to understand the production of matter, that being the exclusive attribute of Omnipotence, but the production of *utility*, and consequently of value, by appropriating and modifying matter in existence, so as to fit it to satisfy our wants, and contribute to our enjoyments. The labour which is thus employed is the only source of wealth. Nature spontaneously

[103] M'Culloch, *The Principles of Political Economy*, p. 53.

> furnishes the matter of which commodities are made; but until labour has been applied to appropriate matter, or to adapt it to our use, it is destitute of value, and is not, and never has been, considered as forming wealth.[104]

The importance of labour in the production of wealth was very clearly perceived by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. M'Culloch cites their key passages on the same,

> The *nutrition* of a commonwealth consisteth in the *plenty* and *distribution* of *materials* conducive to life. "As for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by nature to those commodities which (from the two breasts of our common mother) *land* and *sea*, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to mankind. For the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetables, minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour and industry of receiving them. Insomuch that *plenty dependeth on the labour and industry of man*. Locke, however, had a much clearer apprehension of this doctrine. In his "Essay on Civil Government," published in 1689, he has entered into a lengthened, discriminating, and able analysis, to show that labour gives to the products of the earth almost all their value. "Let anyone consider," says he, "what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are the effects of labour; nay, if we will rightly consider things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.[105]

What the discussion so far shows are how the physical activity of laboring gets abstracted from its materiality, through its reconfiguration in terms of 'value', making it a potentially universally applicable question, historically so for the purposes of addressing the problem of poverty and thereby pursuing national progress. This implied a corollary rethinking of past and extant poverty as inbuilt in the very structure of the traditional society – "Poverty in traditional society could not have been overcome whatever the institutional forms of social and political life prevailing; that societies

[104] Ibid., pp. 61-62.
[105] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

dependent upon the land, organic societies, were subject to physical restrictions[106] that ensured this outcome."[107] Thus, in light of the universalist and scientific imperative of political economic thought, poverty and labour were reconstituted for both, the future and the past. This is well illustrated by the following formulations of Smith as cited by E.A. Wrigley, wherein the scientific objectification of human activity in terms of productivity, holds out great possibilities for reducing poverty, while at the same time making all those activities suspicious which fared poorly on the principle of productivity and thus harboured problems for reducing poverty:

> When the great majority of the workforce labours on the land, a big rise in overall productivity must involve a major increase in individual output amongst those living and working on the land. An escape from poverty, therefore, must begin in this way. Without it there will be no significant demand for products other than the four main necessities, and no major surge in employment off the land. An escape from poverty hinged upon the possibility of securing a major improvement in output per head in agriculture. This was the key. Why was it so hard to achieve? One answer to this question which has influenced subsequent thinking powerfully was given by Adam Smith… Smith was anxious to illustrate the sensational increases in output per head that might be obtained even without major changes in production techniques if there were division of function. Specialisation could bring immense benefits… [However] The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business from another, as manufactures… The spinner is almost always a distinct person from the weaver; but the ploughman, the harrower, the sower of seed, and the reaper of the corn, are often the same… The most fearsome dragon in the eyes of the classical economists who followed Adam Smith, such as Ricardo and Malthus, was the spectre of diminishing marginal returns.[108]

Inventing 'population' as a concept; preparing the tool for making an intervention into the social body

[106] Traditional society was heavily dependent on the produce of land for its subsistence and growth. Since the size of overall land is constant and the productivity of the land is subjected to law of diminishing marginal returns, traditional society suffers a physical constraint.
[107] Wrigley, *op. cit.*, p. 226.
[108] Ibid., pp. 214-16.

As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, the linkage of the poor with the work, or poverty with labour, does not exhaust the field of considerations in figuring the poor. A detailed review of the conceptual trajectory of 'population' through the periods of cameralism, mercantilism, physiocracy, and political economy, culled out from the writings of Foucault, can help in understanding how poverty and the configuration of the poor got constitutively tied up with the new liberal mode of government, far from being settled and for all by the objectification of labour. Procacci writes,

> By eighteenth century it was realized that 'the poor' did not exist as a concrete and final reality; that in them, two realities of different natures had too long been confused. On the one hand, there was poverty: scarcity of commodities and money, an economic situation linked to the state of commerce, of agriculture, of industry. On the other, there was population: not a passive element subject to the fluctuation of wealth, but a force which directly contributed to the economic situation, to the production of wealth, since it is man's labour which creates– or at least transmits, shifts, and multiplies– wealth.[109]

The emergence of a new governmental and economic rationality was responsible for the change in conception of population and its relationship with poverty. Foucault writes that "if we look at the use of the word 'population' in the oldest text,[110] we can see the problem of the population was raised, almost continually, for a long time, but in an essentially negative way. What was called the population was basically the contrary of depopulation. That is to say, 'population' was understood as the movement by which a deserted territory was repopulated after a great disaster, be it an epidemic, war, or food shortage, after one of these great dramatic moments in which people died with spectacular rapidity and intensity. Let's say that the problem of population was posed in relation to the desert or desertification due to major human catastrophe."[111] The change in the conception of 'population' was also owing to the reason that the mode of power changed along with the change in governmental principles or rationality

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[109] G. Procacci, "Social Economy," Graham Burchell et al ed., *Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. p. 154.

[110] The author is alluding here to the writings of Francis Bacon, credited by a number of dictionaries with the invention of the word "population". The first occurrence of the English word seems to go back to the *Political Discourse* (1751) of David Hume, and the French term only began to circulate in the second half of the eighteenth century. Montesquieu was still unaware of it in 1748. He speaks of the "number of men" instead of population.

[111] M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78, London: Palgrave Macmillon, 2007, p. 67.

during eighteenth century. A sovereign form of power was replaced with disciplinary form of power as it has been well argued and established by Foucault. This was also the time when the early signs of emergence of modern state started emerging. Monarchy started collapsing and democracy emerged as the new form of polity which was essentially based upon the idea of representation and rule by people. Instead of king, now "the people" (*dêmos*) became the sovereign. Foucault explains that till seventeenth century population figures as one of the key elements of sovereign's power. A large population was symbol of sovereign's strength as it allowed the sovereign to make "its presence felt by the fact that it provided many troops, that the towns were populated, and that the markets were busy."[112] These were the markers of traditional ways of conceiving population. Foucault further enunciates,

> Things begin to change in the seventeenth century, at the time distinguished by cameralism[113] and mercantilism, not so much as economic doctrines as a new way of posing the problems of government. Anyway, for the mercantilists of the seventeenth century, the population was no longer simply a positive feature that allowed it to appear in the emblems of the sovereign's power, but appeared within a dynamic, or rather, not within, but as the very source of a dynamic strength of the state and sovereign. The population is a fundamental element, that is to say one that conditions all the others. Why does it condition the other elements? Because the population provides manpower for agriculture, for manufacture… the population is a fundamental component of the state's power because it ensures competition within the possible workforce within the state, which of course ensures low wages. Low wages mean low prices of products and the possibility of export, and hence a new guarantee, a new source of the state's strength.[114]

However, it could be said that the mercantilists were the last to see 'the population as the source of wealth, as a productive force, of course, with disciplinary supervisions,'[115]

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[112] Ibid.

[113] "Cameralistics, or cameral science (*Cameralwissenschaft*), designates the science of finance and administration that developed from the seventeenth century in the "chambers" of princes, the organs of planning and bureaucratic control that will gradually replace traditional councils. In 1727 the discipline obtained the right to enter the universities of Halle and Frankfurt an der Oder, becoming an object of teaching for future state functionaries. A.W. Small summarizes the thought of the cameralists in the following way: "To the cameralists the central problem of science was the problem of the state. To them the object of all social theory was to show how the welfare of the state might be secured. They see in the welfare of the state the source of all other welfare. Their key to the welfare of the state was revenue to supply the needs of the state. Their whole social theory radiated from the central task of furnishing the state with ready means." See, Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 25.

[114] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, pp. 68-69.

[115] Ibid.

consistent within the thought, project, and political practice of the mercantilism. By eighteenth century, when mercantilism was waning, physiocrats had already started adopting an anti-populationist attitude and the physiocrats attitude was later inherited by classical political economy. Mercantilists still believed that large population is source of wealth and power but the things begin to change with physiocrats as they are said to have adopted a qualified position. Foucault argues that "the mercantilist and cameralist project was situated within the relationship of the sovereign's will to the subjected will of the people, in relation to subjects of right, subject to a law, subjects who can be framed by regulations. Now with the physiocrats and, more generally, with the eighteenth-century economists, the population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right, as a collection of subjects' will who must obey the sovereign's will through the intermediary of regulations, laws, edicts, and so on. It will be considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes."[116] Foucault further explains that, "population henceforth was to be seen, not from the standpoint of the juridical-political notion of subject, but as a sort of technical-political object of management and government."[117] In eighteenth century governmental practice, the population is not the simple sum of individuals inhabiting a territory. Nor is it solely the result of their will to reproduce. Nor is it posed any longer vis-à-vis sovereign's will that may encourage or shape it. In order to understand the changed governmental rationality and economic thinking vis-à-vis population during eighteenth century, a long discussion on changing conception on population is worth quoting here in detail. Foucault elucidates the change as follows:

> In fact, the population is not a primary datum; it is dependent on a series of variables. Population varies with the climate. It varies with the material surroundings. It varies with the intensity of commerce and activity in the circulation of wealth. Obviously, it varies according to the laws to which it is subjected, like tax or marriage laws for example. It also varies with people's customs, like the way in which daughters are given a dowry, for example, or the way in which the right of primogeniture is ensured, with birthright, and also with the way in which children are raised, and whether or not they are entrusted to wet nurses…Population varies with the moral or religious values associated with different kinds of conduct; the ethical-religious value, for example, of the celibacy of priests and monks. Above all, of course, it varies with the condition of

[116]Ibid., p. 69-70.
[117] Ibid.

> means of subsistence… all show that it is obvious to this way of thinking that the population is not that kind of original datum, that kind of material on which the sovereign's action is to be exercised, that vis-à-vis of the sovereign. The population is a datum that depends on a series of variables, which means that it cannot be transparent to the sovereign's action and that the relation between the population and sovereign cannot simply be one of obedience or the refusal of obedience, of obedience or revolt.[118]

During eighteenth century, population emerged as a new concept and soon became an important part of analysis of wealth. The concept of population was not only introduced to the field of economic theory but into economic practice as well. Population with its demographic aspects became a means to intervene in social body in order to regulate the specific role of producers and consumers, owners and non-owners, those who create profit and those who take it. Foucault also points out that "with the entry of this subject-object of population, it became possible within the analysis of wealth, with all its disruptive effects in the field of economic reflection and practice, then I think the result was that one ceased analyzing wealth and a new domain of knowledge, political economy, was opened up…"[119] He further explains, "for Malthus, the problem of population basically has to be thought as a bio-economic problem, whereas Marx tried to circumvent the problem and to get rid of the very notion of population, but only to rediscover it in the no longer bio-economic form, but in the specifically historical-political form of class, of class confrontation and class struggle. That is the source of their disagreement: either population or classes, that is where the split occurs, on the basis of an economic thought, a political economic thought, that was only possible as such with the introduction of the subject-population."[120]

Ernst Bloch wrote in his book *The Principle of Hope*, "Malthus decided in his 'Essay on the Principle of Population', 1798, that the reason for misery lies in the 'natural' contradiction between man's boundless striving for propagation and the limited increase in means of nourishment. Malthus argued that mass misery will only exist until a nation sensibly recognizes this connection and restricts reproduction to a degree which corresponds to the degree of loaves of bread available. Thus, it is proletarian lechery, not capital, which produces social misery; and the so-called law of diminishing crop yield plainly passes sentence on the proletarian scapegoat. The crisis also simply

[118]Ibid., p. 71.
[119] Ibid., pp. 75-77.
[120] Ibid.

appears as a shortage crisis, on the assumption of very slowly increasing forces of production, not as one of surplus."[121] Bloch further argues that "since Malthus was convinced that mankind was apt to find indolence more attractive than labour it was important both that indolence should not be made easy and that labour should be well rewarded. The new framework arose by deduction from the two postulates with which Malthus began his famous pamphlet: *that food was necessary to the existence of man, and that the passion between the sexes could be regarded as a constant* (emphasis added). In conformity with these postulates, Malthus regarded it as safe to assume that any rise in population would have to be matched by an equal proportional rise in the supply of food, and that populations would tend to rise at a constant rate unless checked."[122] Malthus's formulation became one of the most salient features of classical political economy. It was Malthus owing to whom classical political economy got rid of its moral inflection. But when Malthus put forward his proposition for the first time it was strongly at variance with the dominant view of the time. In fact, "it was widely held both that rising numbers were an index of national well-being, and that the future of a nation lay in the abundance of its offspring, a view embraced both by those who directly equated larger numbers with greater strength and prosperity and also by many others on less specific grounds."[123] Adam Smith had written that "the most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase in the number of its inhabitants."[124] Such a belief implies a special debt to parents of large families who undertake a burden which benefits the community as a whole, but may involve them in hardship. Bloch explains that Malthus departed from the earlier view on population as advocated by Smith and other early proponents of political economy. Bloch writes that, "for Malthus this was folly. Given that real income per head is a ratio measure with national income as the numerator and population as the denominator, and given further that the numerator could not be expected to expand *pari passu* with each rise in numbers, to provide an incentive to enlarge the denominator was the height of irresponsibility, above all because it meant creating an inexorable downward pressure on the living standard of the labourers."[125] Malthus's formulation was responsible for the change in

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[121] E. Bloch, *The Principle of Hope Vol. II,* trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986, pp. 467-69.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid.
[124] A. Smith, *Wealth of Nations,* p. 79.
[125] Bloch, op. cit., p. 469.

Old Poor Law of England. He criticizes the practice of charity and doles prescribed under Old Poor Law in the following terms:

> The poor laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the poor in these two ways. Their first obvious tendency is to increase population without increasing the food for its support. A poor man may marry with little or no prospect of being able to support a family without parish assistance. They may be said, therefore, to create the poor which they maintain; and as the provisions of the country must in consequence of the increased population, be distributed to every man in smaller proportions, it is evident that the labour of those who are not supported by parish assistance, will purchase a smaller quantity of provisions than before, and consequently more of them must be driven to apply for assistance.[126]

Thus, with Malthus, political economy is rid of its moral dimensions in addressing the question of poverty, primarily so by deploying the category of population in a highly scientific manner oriented towards statecraft. Its implications for reform in Poor Laws is a formidable illustration of the inextricable link now set in place between political economic thought, population as an interface of government, and poverty as an arena of intervention.

Towards the government[127] of poverty/ Making the Poor governable

The first task in order to govern or make poverty governable or administer it is to produce an objective knowledge of the poor. Poverty became an object of study to generate a body of knowledge which could be utilized for better and smooth exercise of power over subjects by not only employing the repressive method of governing but also by cultivating the practice of self-regulation within the subject itself. The discourse of poor is also about the relations between specific forms of theoretical and strategic knowledge. It is about the practical inscription of the scientific discourse within specific policies and means of administration of poverty. A certain kind of moral grafting on the political economy and state discourse gives rise to a new domain of study and discourse called social economy, which was linked to the question of 'the social',

[126] T. Malthus, *The Essays on Population*, London: John Murray, 1826, p. 365.
[127] To govern here means, "to structure a possible field of action of others".

located at the interface of the state and society. For instance, Benthamite formulation of linking poverty with idleness. Foucault writes:

> Prior to the problematic of population, the art of government could only be conceived on the basis of the model of the family, in terms of economy understood as management of the family. When, however, the population appears as absolutely irreducible to the family, the result is that the latter falls to a lower level than the population… The family therefore will change from being a model to being an instrument; it will become a privileged instrument of the government of the population rather than a chimera model for good government. The shift from the level of model to that of instrument in relation to the population is absolutely fundamental…the population will appear above all as the final end of government. What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity and its health.[128]

What we have from the discussion so far is that– on the one hand, the linking of poverty to labour required the government of individual bodies; on the other hand, the universalizability of the principles of political economy by abstracting labour in terms of value, allowed for the government of individual bodies to be generalized across the social body/population.

[128] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, pp. 105-106.

Chapter II

Knowing and governing 'the poor': Making of a governmental category in colonial state's discourses

The present chapter studies how poverty was constituted as governmental category in the bureaucratic discourse of the colonial state in India during eighteenth and nineteenth century. It makes an attempt to highlight the linkages between the processes of knowledge formation and the developing art of management of poverty during nineteenth century colonial India. The emergence of classical political economy and its influence over the political economic scenario of eighteenth-nineteenth century England in terms of the reform in Old Poor Laws had direct impact upon the treatment of the problem of poverty and the means of its administration by colonial state in India. English economic thought had huge bearing upon the British colonial policies in India. The chapter argues that there is a certain relation between the production of knowledge and their application in actual policy matter. The discourses around the poor in colonial India has to be located at the interstices of specific forms of theoretical and strategic knowledge, and their practical inscription within the policy regimes of colonial state. It has been shown in the chapter that an alienable link between poverty, population and labour emerged in the wake of classical political economy and it had obvious ramification on the official attitude of colonial state vis-à-vis poor and their governance. Though colonial state framed a range of rules and followed sets of varied principles, depending upon the requirement and context, in order to govern the natives, a certain consistency (in terms of a method or mode of government) is apparent in their policies and action which could be termed as colonial governmentality[1]. Borrowing from scholars, the chapter explicates that, "in a Foucauldian sense, colonial state combined

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[1] Foucault says by the term governmentality, he means three things: 1) The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the circulations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 2) the tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and on the other, in the development of a whole complex of saviors. 3) The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized'. M. Foucault, "Governmentality," in Graham Burchell et al ed., *Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 151-168.

aspects of the modern state – focused on controlling a 'population' and wielding strategies of individuation and surveillance – with those of the pre-modern territorial state."[2] It further states that the eruption of rationalization was embodied in the adoption of so-called scientific policing methods, such as combining stammering statistics with colonial ethnography. Drawing from David Ludden it has been shown that, a certain "system of institutional controls– over transactions, behavior, identity, movement, occupations, bodies, association, thought, and property– was built in South Asia during eighteenth and nineteenth century."[3] In sum, this chapter deals with the modernisation of the concept of poverty during colonial era, the methods of knowing and governing the poor, the emergence of colonial governmentality as well as the questions of labour, population and poverty vis-à-vis poor in colonial India.

Emergence of Classical Political Economy, changing concept of poverty and the colonial statecraft

Poverty assumed a status of concept during colonial period. It was taken out from the previous network of dependence based on traditional, customary or community rights. Vagrancy was persecuted and charity was discouraged by colonial regime. Poverty was no longer located in the moral economy of the peasants, but was eschewed from it and was made subject to a new set of guiding principles. There were two main and immediate causes for this change in attitude towards poverty: first, colonial regime ushered in a capitalist transformation of Indian society; second, with colonial state a new governmental rationality was instituted which functioned in accordance with the need of British colonialism. Capitalist transformation ushered in a major reorganization of the existing social and economic relations. In the wake of this capitalist transformation, the manual labourers became wage workers. They were freed from the feudal ties and were supposed to earn their survival by selling their labour power. However, it should be noted here that colonialism came with its own set of racial biases, capitalist ethics and moral framework and this was very crucial in guiding the behavior of the colonial state towards poor. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya argues that, 'a concept of

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[2] A. Tambe and H. Fischer-Tiné eds., *The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia: Spaces of Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region*, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 1.
[3] David Ludden, "History outside civilisation and the mobility of South Asia", *South Asia, Vol. XVII, No. 1*, 1994. pp. 2-3.

‘poverty’ was transmitted from Europe, particularly post-Industrial Revolution England, to India by British Colonial administrators. The ideas of Jeremy Bentham and other Utilitarians left their mark on the bureaucratic discourse vis-à-vis poor and poverty, and one of the most prominent examples of this approach is the approach to ‘Famine Policy’.”[4] Here in this work it has been argued that it was not only Bentham and Utilitarians who left an impact on the bureaucratic discourse of poverty of colonial state but there was an intrinsic relation between English Economic Thought (the developments in Classical Political Economy, more specifically) and the colonial policies regarding poor. However, Bhattacharya further adds:

> It has been demonstrated by a series of authors from R. H. Tawney (*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, 1938)* to Gertrude Himmelfarb (*The Idea of Poverty, 1984)* that in England poverty was conceptualized in a totally new way since the advent of modern capitalism. The substance of their findings is that under the influence of capitalistic ethics poverty is increasingly regarded as a mark of economic efficiency; failure to act efficiently in a competitive world being identified as the cause of poverty, the poor was regarded as a burden on the national economy insofar as their being inefficient (and, in the case of the unemployed poor or vagabonds, totally unproductive) caused the consumption of a part of national wealth. From the Mercantilists to the Utilitarians, it has been argued, this approach to poverty was retained. What I propose to call the Colonial Paradigm of poverty and its ‘management’ was derived from this source.[5]

Later in this chapter, ‘Famine Code’ is taken as a symptomatic piece of legislative instructions guiding official attitude of colonial state towards the poor, and as a direct instance of the influence of underlying principles of reformed poor law over colonial bureaucratic discourses of poverty. But before moving to this aspect I would briefly show the intrinsic link between British economic thinking and colonial administration which persisted from the very outset. S. Ambirajan in his book *Classical Political Economy and British Policy in India* makes this connection very clear. He writes,

> In the early days of the East India Company, the Directors were forced to act as economic theorists in order to defend the very existence of the Company. The writings of the employees of the Company defending its commercial activities and by the critics

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[4] S. Bhattacharya, ‘The Idea of Poverty and Dadabhai Naoroji: The Colonial and the Nationalist Paradigms,’ in P. D. Hajela ed., *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji*, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication Pvt. Ltd., 2001, p. 92.
[5] Ibid.

> of the Company attacking its trading operations both contributed to the development of English economic thought in the seventeenth century.[6]

Adam Smith is fairly known for his strictures on the East India Company's monopoly. Ricardo was a shareholder of the Company and used to attend the General Court of Proprietors, and there were occasions when he addressed the General Court on economic problems. Thomas Robert Malthus and Richard Jones were two important economists who were employed by the East India Company to teach their young civil servants at the East India College established at Haileybury. James Mill made his name with a massive history of India, and later joined the East India Company as an examiner. John Stuart Mill also joined the Company as a writer and finally rose to the position of chief examiner. "Thus, there was a significant body of thought (composed variously of monographic writings and policy documents as well as formal and informal discussions with policy makers and would-be civil servants) developed by generations of British economists relating to Indian economic problems. To this should be added their contributions to the theory of economic policy providing general guidance for the policy maker".[7] The question immediately arises as to the extent of the impact of these efforts of the economists on the actual policies pursued in India. 'The possibilities of British economic ideas being applied to concrete Indian economic policies were considerable particularly in the hundred years after the publication of the *Wealth of Nations,* in view of the unusual circumstances in which India and its rulers were placed.'[8] This idea that Britain's moral, intellectual and political power should be used to transform India continued to dominate British attitudes throughout the nineteenth century. When the Crown assumed the responsibility for the Government of India, the influence of the Home Government became more pronounced. This curtailed the power of the local authorities even in minor details, and they naturally resented such interference. That the Indian officials resented political interference in Indian policy was a source of great irritation to the officials of the India Office**.** Ambirajan argues as follows:

> An important factor which conditioned the mental attitudes of those involved in formulating and executing economic policies in India in the nineteenth century was the

[6] S. Ambirajan, *Classical Political Economy and British Policy in India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 2.
[7] Ibid., pp. 2-3.
[8] Ibid.

> acceptance of the British public of the value of, political economy as an aid to policy making…In a modern commentator's words, many of the educated class in nineteenth-century Britain had great faith in the principles of political economy as truths to be explained and accepted, not hypotheses to be debated. Early in the century, the Utilitarian aim of diffusing useful knowledge found much favour. Political economy as founded by Adam Smith and developed by the Classical School of Economists was deemed part of this useful knowledge. It was the view of David Ricardo that 'By an adherence to these (Principles of Political Economy), Governments cannot fail to promote the welfare of the people'.[9]

Considering the favourable climate towards classical political economy as an essential prerequisite for policy making, it is hardly surprising that the Court of Directors decided to add a study of these 'immutable laws of society and economy' to the syllabus for the training of officials who were to rule India. The East India Company decided to start its own training centre for civil servants because, first, it was found increasingly difficult to recruit properly trained candidates through open competition; and secondly, owing to the 'crass ignorance and gross apathy about Indian subjects at the Universities'. Future civil servants were required to spend two years at the East India College, which was established at Haileybury in Hertfordshire in 1805. The study of law and political economy was to form an essential part of the education provided at this institution, and the Company appointed no less an economist than Thomas Robert Malthus as the first incumbent of the Chair of Political Economy. When Malthus died in 1834, Richard Jones, another famous economist, was appointed in his place. Political economy as understood in the nineteenth century was an amalgam of the three technically separate branches of economics, namely economic analysis, applied economics and economic policy. After 1858, when the selection of the civil servants was thrown open to competition, the selected candidates had to take an examination in political economy among other subjects at the end of their probation.

Though there was a definite relationship between the theory of Political Economy and colonial policy formulation, it should be kept in mind that there were a whole set of non-doctrinal factors which went into the process of actual policy formation. And sometimes it is difficult to say whether the reasoning, based on principle of political economy, was being forwarded just to reinforce already taken decisions or was it being

[9] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

used for the just cause of political economy. But our concern here is not to go into the subjective details of individual decisions but to diagnose a certain tendency in the process of policy formulation itself. German economist Klauss Knorr in his book *British Colonial Theories 1570-1850* aptly observes the character of colonial theory:

> Until the last quarter of the eighteenth century the most prevalent view among the colonial theorists was that the value of colonies depended on their commercial possibilities. Colonial policy was to them but an aspect of the larger goals of the nations, for whom economic objectives were mainly the growth of trade and increase in national power. Colonial policy, then, has to ensure that the colonies made the fruition of the national economic goals possible. Colonies were not coveted just for the love of possession, nor were they desired as an outlet for the surplus population. Their functions were to supply certain goods and receive certain other goods. In other words, the colonies were conceived as subordinate spheres of development for the mother country.[10]

Poverty in the bureaucratic discourses of the colonial state

The famine policy adopted by colonial state during late nineteenth century clearly exhibits the continuities and parallels with New Poor Law in Great Britain. The New Poor Law was the product of a consistent movement for reform in the Elizabethan Poor Laws in the wake of industrial revolution and the new insights thrown up by political economy. The Old Poor Law in the light of new developments was thought to be an archaic institution and it needed to be reformed because its effects were now thought to be contrary to the purpose it was supposed to serve. The contemporary political economist pointed out that the support structure it provided to the poor was actually responsible for keeping them idle, was a strain on economy, and contributed to population growth which further aggravated the condition of the poor.[11] The New Poor Law as a legislative peace was also a marker of a new moral regime, and was

[10] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[11] Malthus wrote, “The poor laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the poor in these two ways. Their first obvious tendency is to increase population without increasing the food for its support. A poor man may marry with little or no prospect of being able to support a family without parish assistance. They may be said, therefore, to create the poor which they maintain; and as the provisions of the country must in consequence of the increased population, be distributed to every man in smaller proportions, it is evident that the labour of those who are not supported by parish assistance, will purchase a smaller quantity of provisions than before, and consequently more of them must be driven to apply for assistance.” See, Malthus, *op.cit.*, p. 365.

symptomatic of a certain 'moral grafting' on political economy. However, the concern here is not to discuss New Poor Law in itself, but to draw an ideological lineage of the Famine Code devised by Famine Commissions constituted during late nineteenth century; to trace the Benthamite core of the poor laws which is transmuted in the Indian Famine Code. Once we discover this ideological lineage, working out the genealogy of the colonial bureaucratic discourses of poverty is not too difficult.[12] Looking at the official pronouncements of the colonial state during periods of famines, particularly the last half of the nineteenth century, periods reveal the colonial attitude towards poor. Two major explanations regarding British famine policy during late nineteenth century have been advanced. S. Ambirajan demonstrates "the influence of the classical economists on British thinking in India on the question of famine policy. It is clear that many officials at the time were convinced by the arguments of Adam Smith et al. about the inadvisability of interfering with the grain trade: their minutes and letters give ample evidence."[13] The second explanation is advanced by B M Bhatia who concludes that "a major concern of the British was to keep famine relief as cheap as possible, so that new taxes did not have to be raised. Behind the smokescreen of laissez-faire lay the fear that new taxes would undermine the British hold on the landowning and mercantile classes whose support was required to hold India."[14] There were a number of similarities between the debate around relief of the poor in Victorian England and the famine relief in India as noted by Brennan:

> Should people needing support have to work for it in workhouses or on special public works; how could administrators, identify those who needed relief using self-administered and deterrent tests of labour for basic subsistence, separation (in England), and distance (in India); and whose responsibility was it to fund and control provisions for the poor or the famished? Those responsible for policy, both in England

[12] Sabyasachi Bhattacharya writes, "What were the basic ideas concerning poverty behind the so-called famine policy of the British Indian Government? I will argue that an ideological lineage can be traced through the Poor Laws of 19th century England to Bentham. This connection may appear remote and implausible at first sight. Eric Stokes (*Eight Utilitarians and India, 1959)* in his highly perceptive analysis of the impact of utilitarianism on Indian policies which were more overt. The historians of famines in India have been equally silent on the question of the idea of poverty and the impact of Benthamite "Panopticism" (Foucault's phrase) in British India. Yet when one reads the Poor Laws of 19th century England and the Famine Code and the Famine Commission Reports of 19th century India the continuities and parallels become obvious. That is not the least surprising for the English Poor Law (1834) owed much to Bentham and the Poor Laws and Bentham likewise influenced the famine policy-makers in British India (e.g. Strachey, the Chairman of the 1880 Famine Commission which framed the Famine Code)." See, Bhattacharya, 'Idea of Poverty,' p. 93.

[13] See, Ambirajan, *op. cit.*

[14] See, B. M. Bhatia, *Famines in India*, Bombay: Asian Publishing House, 1967.

> and in India, also shared a concern about the possible 'demoralizing' effect of reliance upon relief. Endemic pauperism was perceived as of a different order from poverty.[15]

Bhattacharya explains that “the new poor law brought into existence a regime of poor relief which applied eligibility conditions that would deter the poor, from drawing relief, confine the pauper in work houses, and systematize a state controlled machinery in place of charity.”[16] But there lay also a crucial difference, as Brennan notes: “While the British were committed to the maintenance of the eligible poor in England, they refused to consider this as a possibility in normal times in India, preferring to rely upon the private charitable institutions and practices of the people over whom they ruled. They were prepared to interfere only when whole populations were endangered by widespread famine. The last thing they wished to consider was an Indian equivalent of the New Poor Law.”[17] The colonial state’s discourses on poverty and its relationship with the changes in Poor Laws become quite clear after considering the introduction of Famine code as per the recommendations of first Famine Commission which submitted its report in 1880. Famine Commission introduced “the concept of ‘test’ of relief-worthiness of those in distress. Forms of relief other than gratuitous relief are appropriately regulated by a self-testing test, a labour test, a distance test, a residence test.”[18] Bhattacharya argues, “this meant that any person starving in famine affected area would have to perform a certain amount of labour in the public works and/or travel a certain distance (upto 15 miles), or accept compulsory residence in a special area away from the home village. This was expected to deter those who did not really need the wages in government works programmes for the famine affected.”[19] Famine Commission of 1898 record that “this idea was first put forward in 1877 by Lord Lytton during the famine in South India: The obligation to do a full day’s work at a low rate of wage, and to go some distance to work, keeps from seeking relief those who can support themselves otherwise.”[20] Bhattacharya argues that “the idea was to distinguish the poor from the really destitute, in the same manner as the English Poor Law of 1834 distinguished ‘the indigent’ entitled to relief from the ranks of poor. The Secretary of

[15] L. Brennan, ‘The Development of the Indian Famine Codes: Personalities, Politics and Policies,’ in B. Currey and G. Hugo eds., *Famine: A Geographical Phenomenon,* Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984, pp. 92-93.
[16] Bhattacharya, ‘Idea of Poverty,’ p. 94.
[17] Brennan, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[18] *Famine Commission Report*, 1901, p. 45.
[19] Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[20] *Famine Commission Report*, 1898, p. 239.

State endorsed this principle of discouraging 'relief of applicants not in want' and the requirement of a distance test which can 'without undue hardship be used as a *test of destitution*'."[21] Bhattacharya further explains, "the Famine Commission of 1880 under the utilitarian Stratchey devised a famine code in which 'the fact of his (i.e. the relief seeker) submitting to the test of giving a reasonable amount of work in return for a subsistence wage is considered to be sufficient proof of his necessity'."[22]

These discussions about eligibility were certainly a direct influence of the New Poor Law in England. The Royal Commission of 1832-34 spent a great deal of its time distinguishing the common poor from the "indigent". It records that "those who work, though receiving good wages, being called poor, are classed with the really indigent and think themselves entitled to a share of the poor funds."[23] Indigence was defined as "the state of a person unable to obtain, in return for his labour, the means of subsistence". Bhattacharya states that "this was the concept that the famine commissioners in India extended to those who under famine conditions were unable to find subsistence and thus became entitled to subsistence wages in government public works. As for the mechanism for enforcing this principle the English Poor Law Commission used a 'self-acting test of the claim of the applicant'– the very same words the Famine Commissioners used in India; public works in India was the mechanism in place of the work houses in England and the 'work house test' in England was replaced by various relief tests in India relating to distance, work test, etc. mentioned earlier."[24] He further elucidates, "Since the work house was by definition, less eligible than any other mode of life, only the most severe destitution would induce a man to enter it. Thus, compliance with work house terms of relief was itself a test of entitlement, just as the severity of Indian famine-works employment would filter out those not truly in distress."[25] Regarding the phenomenon of poor-houses and work-houses, Bhattacharya writes,

> The 'poor houses' in India were not meant to be permanent institutions like the English "work house". They were really temporary institutions to 'collect and relieve paupers

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[21] *Famine Commission Report,* 1898, p. 84.
[22] Bhattacharya, 'The Idea of Poverty and Dadabhai Naoroji: The Colonial and the Nationalist Paradigms,' in P. D. Hajela ed., *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji*, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication Pvt. Ltd., 2001, p. 95.
[23] *Poor Law Commission,* 1834.
[24] Bhattacharya, 'Idea of Poverty,' pp. 95-96.
[25] Ibid.

> sent adrift by contraction of private charity'. They were also used at a late stage in the famine 'for contumacious idlers', i.e. 'contumacious persons fit to work who refused to labour'. The condition in the poor house being unattractive to say the least, 'a certain amount of pressure may be required to induce people to remain in poor houses', or else they revert to vagrancy. It was the Commission of 1880 which suggested that supplicants for relief 'in case of doubt as to eligibility' could be sent to the poor houses. The century old English Laws against vagrancy have an obvious relevance to the policy of the British Indian administrators, going well beyond Bentham to Tudor times. [26]

Sabyasachi Bhattacharya drew a clear similarity between the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1834 constituted in England and the recommendations of the several famine commissions constituted during the last quarter of nineteenth century. He writes, "another form of famine relief in India, gratuitous relief in village, were similar to 'out-door relief' under the old Poor Law in England. As per the Benthamite principles such relief was undesirable and the Poor Law Commission of 1832-34 dis-recommended it. However, in view of the public outcry and local level opposition to the abolition of outdoor relief, it was retained on a reduced scale in England. In India this form of relief was totally unavoidable under famine conditions though the famine officers were uncomfortable with it. They were uncomfortable because of their awareness of 'that most dangerous popular vice - the disposition to force the government to grant public charity'."[27] So, the influence of Utilitarian thought of Bentham and Mill and the experience of Poor Laws in Britain could be seen on the colonial bureaucratic thinking. It has been argued that some of the basic category of thought in the Indian Famine Code and the New Poor Law in England are similar. Apart from the similarity in terms and notions, it was the approach which was adopted by the Famine Commission and the colonial state which was characteristic of Classical political economic thought.

'Knowing' and 'governing': the emergence of 'population' as a category

Population appeared in the first chapter owing to its relation to political economy, and poverty being a central knot between the two because of the purported inevitable relation between population and national wealth. Till the time of Adam Smith, the increase in the size of population was considered as a sign of prosperity, but later

[26] Ibid., p. 96
[27] Ibid., p. 96.

Malthus saw population in terms of bio-economic necessity and linked it to the availability of means of subsistence. Thus, a disproportionate increase in the size of population vis-à-vis means of subsistence would result in misery. In the present section the concern is to locate how population emerges as an essential category for the colonial project of governance. How in colonial India a certain relation between the ways of knowing and governing was instituted? This particular relation between knowing and governing has been quite central for the category of poor since late middle ages. When it was realized that the source of all wealth is labour the poor became the container of labour power. But a large section of the poor depended on the relief mechanism for their survival so there ushered in an era of policing the poor because now the augmentation of wealth depended also on setting more and more people to work and increasing productivity by subjecting them to capitalist work-ethics. The persecution and confinement of beggars, vagabonds, mendicants, and madmen became a part of governmental reason. And for all these a certain knowledge of the population was vital. Though 'population' as a concept in India started evolving in the backdrop of mercantilism,[28] and the project of knowing the territory and the people was carried as a policy throughout the East India Company regime, it was intensified after the Crown taking over the administration because it was believed that the 1857 rebellion could have been dealt with more efficienctly if the empire had a better knowledge of the Indian territory and population. The project of knowing was also vital for the maximum exploitation of colony. U. Kalpagam aptly describes the relation between governmentality and population and its specificity in colonial context:

> Colonial governmentality was premised on a unique relationship of the State to the economy. Whereas the modern State defined its relationship to the economy that it sought to manage in terms of the objective of increasing the national wealth, the colonial State established a parasitic relationship, of increasing not the national wealth but the wealth of the alien rulers. Correspondingly, its relationship to the population, though based on increasing the productivity of labour, was set within the parameters of increasing disciplinary control over labour rather than through the enhancement of human capital, despite its attempts to introduce modern education, sanitation, and modern medicine. Colonial governmentality thus needed to know the characteristics of the population in detail so as to evolve its regulatory mechanisms. Thus, the sporadic

[28] This aspect of emergence of population as a category in the backdrop of mercantilism will be discussed in Chapter III in relation with quantificatory episteme.

enumeration of population that had existed till the mid-nineteenth century was made systematic and regular with the decennial censuses from 1871. A crucial aspect of population data was the size of the labouring population and of those who were dependants, i.e. the non-labouring population. While such aggregate categories as 'labouring' and 'non-labouring' erased the many nuances of workforce characteristics, it was an important step in establishing the connections between population and wealth. Occupational classification also preoccupied the census administrators in providing a sectoral overview of the population, as did other aspects such as age, civil status, caste, religion, and birth and death rates, among others. Colonial censuses thus served the epistemic function of rendering perceptible 'economy' and 'society' as entities that could grow or decay.[29]

The category of 'population' functions as a correlate of power and object of knowledge in colonial context. It was intrinsically linked to the concept of economy and the emergence of statistics as a science. Here it should also be kept in mind that it was widely believed by the colonial administrator that such knowledge which was constitutive of the technologies of government were universally applicable. The colonial order of difference was thus fitted into universalistic frameworks of knowledge through a process of 'normalizing' the colonized terrain. To cite Kalpagam again, "'Normalizing' the colonized terrain was done through the dual techniques of disciplinary power and risk-based or actuarial power. While disciplinary power entailed the creation or specification of a general norm in terms of which 'individual uniqueness can be recognized, characterized and then standardized', risk-based techniques of normalization sought to set norms by dividing the 'population into statistical and behavioural categories organized around risk'."[30]

These techniques of normalization often entailed erasing differences through a process of constructed uniformity. While tracing the emergence of a new art of government, Foucault makes the link between *population*, *wealth,* and *new form of knowledge* intelligible.[31] He writes:

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[29] U. Kalpagam, 'Colonial Governmentality and the 'Economy,' *Economy and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2011, p. 432.
[30] Ibid., p. 420.
[31] In his article entitled 'Governmentality', Foucault points out that the art of government underwent a transformation in the modern West from the 18th century onwards. Until then, the general principles of public law derived from the theory of social contract provided the basis for government. This changed when through a subtle process of interlinked developments in the economy, the idea of governing the population assumed centre stage, thus transforming the art of government into a science of government.

> From the sixteenth century the theory of the art of government was linked to the development of the administrative apparatus of the territorial monarchies (the emergence of government apparatuses and relays, etcetera). It was also linked to a set of analyses and forms of knowledge that began to develop at the end of the sixteenth century and increased in scope in the seventeenth century; essentially knowledge of the state in its different elements, dimensions, and the factors of its strength, which was called, precisely, 'statistics,' meaning science of the state. Finally, we cannot fail to link this search of an art of government with mercantilism and cameralism, which are efforts to rationalize the exercise of power, precisely in terms of the knowledge acquired through statistics, and also, at the same time, a doctrine, or rather a set of doctrinal principles concerning how to increase the power and the wealth of the state.[32]

The practices of governance regarding population as a target of interventions introduced by the modern colonial state in India, and elsewhere as well, ushered in a new quantificatory 'episteme'.[33] Here it is important to note that statistics was understood as science of the state before acquiring the full-fledged status of a discipline. What is important to understand here is how certain forms of practical knowledge are intimately linked with the task of governance and how 'population' emerged as a governmental category through statistical mapping of the quantified details of the inhabitant (subjecting the human activities to a regime of objectification and quantification), and at the same time by its (population) own discovery heightened the status of statistics as a science. Ian Hacking notes, "'Political Arithmetik'[34] is an important aspect of modern power, and the significance of the 'avalanche of numbers' ushered in by the modern state in most parts of the world does not appear to have as yet been fully comprehended. The use of classificatory frames, objectification and counting as an aspect of

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The basis of government shifted from 'law' derived from notions of social contract and the juridical basis of sovereignty, to 'order' based on the idea of governing and managing population. Population thus emerged as a datum, or field of intervention and as an objective of governmental techniques. The juridical and institutional form given to the sovereignty that characterizes a modern state now changed, ushering in a new triadic link of sovereignty–governmentality–discipline replacing the older link of sovereignty–territoriality–discipline. See, Burchell et al ed., *The Foucault Effect*.

[32] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, pp. 100-101.

[33] This aspect will be discussed in detail in the third chapter in relation to the emergence of economy as a field of intervention.

[34] In early time the meaning of Statistics was limited to information about states. The German word Statistik, first introduced by Gottfried Achenwall, originally designated the analysis of data about the state, signifying the "science of state" (then called political arithmetic in English. By the 18th century, the term "statistics" designated the systematic collection of demographic and economic data by states. For at least two millennia, these data were mainly tabulations of human and material resources that might be taxed or put to military use. In the early 19th century, collection intensified, and the meaning of "statistics" broadened to include the discipline concerned with the collection, summary, and analysis of data).

normalizing power is something quite unique to the modern state."[35] The discovery of population made possible the release of 'the art of the government' in Western Europe, the emergence of a new modality of power. Foucault says that, "the perspective of population, the reality of phenomena specific to population, makes it possible to eliminate the model of the family and to re-focus the notion of economy on something else."[36] He links the emergence of the new mode of power to the emergence of a new correlative episteme. Along with 'political economy', 'statistics' was also a part of this epistemic regime which ushered in the governmentalization of the state.[37] Foucault shows how statistics as means of governance or a practical form of knowledge remained instrumental in instituting the art of government and introducing a shift in the model of government based on family to the one based on population in the following words:

> In fact, statistics, which had hitherto functioned within the administrative frameworks, and so in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, now discovers and gradually reveals that the population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of disease, its regularities of accidents. Statistics also shows that the population also involves specific, aggregate effects and that these phenomena are reducible to those of the family: major epidemics, endemic expansions, the spiral of labor and wealth. Statistics [further] shows that, through its movements, its customs, and its activity, population has special economic effects. Statistics enables the specific phenomena of population to be quantified and thereby reveals that this specificity is irreducible [to the] small framework of the family. Apart from some residual themes, such as moral or religious themes, the family disappears as the model of government. On the other hand, family now appears as an element within the population and as a fundamental relay in its government. In other words, prior to the emergence of the problematic of population, the art of government could only be conceived on the basis of the models of the family,

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[35] See, I. Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

[36] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 104.

[37] "Though there has been a tendency to confound Political Economy with Statistics, it is easily separable. The object of the statistician is to describe the condition of a particular country at a particular period; while the object of the political economist is to discover the causes which have brought it into that condition, and the means by which its wealth and riches may be indefinitely increased. He is to the statistician what the physical astronomer is to the observer. He takes the facts furnished by the researches of the statistician, and after comparing them with those furnished by historians and travellers, he applies himself to discover their relation. By a patient induction-by carefully observing the circumstances attending the operation of particular prin ciples, he discovers the effects of which they are really productive, and how far they are liable to be modified by the operation of other principles. It is thus that the relation betyween rent and profit-between profit and wages, and the various general laws which regulate and connect the apparently conflicting, but really harmonius interests of every different order in society, have been discovered, and established with all the certainty of demonstrative evidence." See, M'Culloch, *op.cit.*, pp. 59-60.

> in terms of economy understood as management of the family… the family will change from being a model to an instrument; it will become a privileged instrument for the government of the population rather than a chimerical model of good government.[38]

The above discussion may seem to be related more with the rise of modern state in Western Europe but it is highly important in the context of colonial India. Though, as it has been noted earlier, the colonial state combines the aspects of both the modern state and the pre-modern territorial state, it had all those characteristics which we associate with the modern state and, in any case, it was a precursor of modernity and modern form of power. But what is more important for the present work is not to dwell over the character of colonial governmentality itself but to see how the poor or poverty as a category is constituted in the complex ensemble of the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections of colonial regime; to identify the points of intersection between theoretical and strategic knowledge and the domain of colonial policy and practice with a concern to locate a discourse of the poor. What is more important in this regard is to see "[t]he manner in which the link between population and wealth was sought to be translated into policy. As modern industries were established, not only was labour time regulated in terms of the working hours, but labour itself emerged as an efficiency category which the state sought to monitor. Even such aspects as the leisure time of the workers were sought to be structured and monitored by the State. It is important to note that the colonial State did not consider population itself to be wealth, and hence aspects such as education, health, and nutrition that figure so prominently in contemporary development discourses were in fact quite marginal."[39] Kalpagam argues, "while population emerged as a field of intervention and an object of governmental techniques, the problem of the economy was reconfigured from the domain of the household to one in which the specific problems of the population relating to the economy provided the framework for government."[40] She further explains, "the link between population and national wealth provided for a greater co-ordination between different administrative departments even as it, for the first time, brought together a whole ensemble of institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculations, and tactics. The statistical framing of political economy rendered possible by this ensemble simultaneously made possible 'a certain strategic field of

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[38] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, pp. 104-5.
[39] Kalpagam, 'Colonial Governmentality.' P. 418.
[40] Ibid.

manipulation of individuals also'."[41] Perhaps the best instance of how colonial governmentality sought to establish a discourse linking population, resources, and wealth is to be found in the famine policies of the colonial government. This led to the idea of how labour could be regulated and poverty could be managed and governed, which was symptomatic of the colonial problematic of the economy, the population and the management of poverty.

Labour, Legality and Poor in colonial state's discourses

The colonial state tried to mobilize the labour power, in order to utilize it more effectively, in two ways. One was to channel untapped demographic resources in order to create a new and ever-expanding workforce. The other was to raise the level of productivity of already employed labourers in agriculture and industry by modernizing the workforce, for e.g., through training in terms of adhering to some work-ethic, efficient time management, bettering the material condition of work and more resources in terms of investment. The underlying concern of this section also remains to make bare the link between colonial governmentality and labour. The modality in which the colonial power functioned was constituted of two basic governmental techniques, first by constituting a range of committee and commissions on several subjects like labour and agriculture which provided a body of knowledge which was used to map and structure a particular domain of colonial economy. The Second was to pass several Acts and laws necessary to create a suitable 'colonial subject' which could be further harnessed in the interest of the empire. This link would become very clear while talking about the modernization of the labour subject in colony. Creating a disciplined work-force was vital for the economic interest of the Empire. Though colonial state had set in the capitalist transformation of Indian economy but for this transformation to take place, only accumulation of capital was not enough but the accumulation of laboring bodies was also vital. Federici writes, "One of the preconditions for capitalist development was the process that Michel Foucault defined as the 'disciplining of the body', which consisted of an attempt by state and church to transform the individual's powers into labor-power." The task before the colonial state was also how to transform the peasant's body into the body of a worker. Since a peasant's body was accustomed to a different set of work in agriculture. There was a significant place of leisure in their

[41] Ibid., p. 419.

work culture. They had to be accustomed to a new industrial clock-time. We see also a set of measures taken to discipline the population in order to make the natives industrious and set the idle population to work. Thus, we see a regime of disciplinary technique being applied to settle the moving tribes which were also carriers of pre-colonial system of exchange, and confine the vagrants, beggars and madmen in order to instill capitalist work-ethic in them. Colonial rulers believed that natives are lazy, given to physical and carnal pleasure and not interested in moral upliftment. "Making the barbarian productive through a work ethic based on reason, so was the British imperialist project in India and Asia."[42] Targeting vagrants and taming the circulating labour by framing Banjaras, Sansi and other tribes as criminal tribes in order to sedentarise them and make them available for local exploitation. The sedentarised masses after being branded generally took agriculture as a profession which would further contribute to Lancashaire. Radhika Singha points out this aspect in one of her articles, "by 1840s imperial interests lay not only in settling disorderly communities, but also in mobilizing demographic resources to key economic sectors of the empire. Within India, labor had to be prised out for public works, plantation and mining enclaves and new area of agricultural colonization. Indian labor also entered the global market to replace slave labour in overseas plantation."[43]

Poor framed as the pathology of the 'social' and Confinement functions as a means of disciplining population and extracting labour: the case of work-houses, poor-houses, lunatic asylums and jails

The phenomenon of confinement is central to any bureaucratic discourse around poor in colonial India because it is situated at the interstice of a network linking moral discourse, racial discourse and the discourse of political economy. The practice of confinement, as a corrective tool or reforming device or as a technique to arrest the disturbances of the population, is situated at the discourses connecting poverty and labour, idleness and work.[44] Confinement during colonial India was a potent mode of

[42] L. D. Satya, 'The British Empire, Ecology and Famines in Late 19th Century Central India,' *The IUP Journal of History and Culture,* July, 2007, p. 1.
[43] R. Singha, 'Settle, mobilize, verify: Identification practices in colonial India,' *Studies in History,* Vol. 16, No. 2, July-December, 2000, p. 154.
[44] "Confinement, that massive phenomenon, the signs of which are found all across eighteenth-century Europe, is a "police" matter. Police, in the precise sense that the classical epoch gave to it-that is, the totality of measures which make work possible and necessary for all those who could not live without it" See M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, London: Routledge, 2001.

intervention into the population in order to discipline and keep a check on the disorderly elements. But it was also an instrument of extracting labour. The work was necessary for the inmates in the jails, lunatic asylums, and work-houses. Jail inmates also used to be employed on extra-mural labour on the public works. Confinement also functioned as technique of surveillance over morals by instilling a work-ethics. The practice of confinement in colonial India had a lineage in terms of its continuance as an official policy from the metropole. The kind of use the practice of confinement was put to by colonial rule was unknown before. Particularly the phenomenon of work-house, strangers' home and lunatic asylum was peculiar to colonial governmentality and is characteristic of modern power. The confinement of vagrants, madmen, beggars and homeless, and the insistence upon work cannot be associated with economic reasons only, but they were rooted also in a moral and racial framework. Foucault explicates the relationship between labour and poverty in *Madness And Civilisation* in following terms:

> In the first phase of the industrial world, labor did not seem linked to the problems it was to provoke; it was regarded, on the contrary, as a general solution, an infallible panacea, a remedy to all forms of poverty. Labor and poverty were located in a simple opposition, in inverse proportion to each other. As for that power, its special characteristic, of abolishing poverty, labor-according to the classical interpretation possessed it not so much by its productive capacity as by a certain force of moral enchantment. Labor's effectiveness was acknowledged because it was based on an ethical transcendence.[45]

During colonial regime it was an official policy that the work-houses and lunatic asylums for the Europeans and native vagrants would be established separately. Throughout 17th and 18th century confinement remained a massive phenomenon in western Europe. In England, the origin of practice of confinement could be traced back as early as sixteenth century to an act of 1575 covering both "the punishment of vagabonds and the relief of the poor" which prescribed the construction of houses of correction, to number at least one per county.[46] While explaining the phenomenon of confinement in Europe, Foucault writes:

[45] Foucault, *Madness and Civilization,* p. 51.
[46] Ibid., p.40.

> The first houses of correction were opened in England during a full economic recession. The act of 1610 recommended only joining certain mills and weaving and carding shop to all houses of correction in order to occupy the pensioners. But what had been a moral requirement became an economic tactic when commerce and industry recovered after 1651, the economic situation having been re-established by the Navigation Act and the lowering of the discount rate. All able-bodied manpower was to be used to the best advantage, that is, as cheaply as possible… But outside of the periods of crisis, confinement acquired another meaning. Its repressive function was combined with a new use. It was no longer merely a question of confining those out of work, but of giving work to those who had been confined and thus making them contribute to the prosperity of all. The alternation is clear: cheap manpower in the periods of full employment and high salaries; and in periods of unemployment, reabsorption of the idle and social protection against agitation and uprisings. Let us not forget that the first houses of confinement appear in England in the most industrialized parts of the country: Worcester, Norwich, Bristol; that the first hopital general was opened in Lyons, forty years before that of Paris; that Hamburg was the first German city to have its Zuchthaus, in 1620. Its regulations, published in 1622, were quite precise. The internees must all work. Exact record was kept of the value of their work, and they were paid a fourth of it. For work was not only an occupation; it must be productive.[47]

The population of the lunatic asylums in India at any time during nineteenth century was not more than five thousand but it doesn't undermine asylum's effect on the Indian population. Lunatic asylums could be seen in terms of the effect they generated and the role they played in the disciplinary regime of the colonial state. My concern here is not to discuss that colonial psychiatry functioned in colonial construction of knowledge (or how psycho-science was an important aspect in the disciplinary regime) but to locate the asylum alongside the police and prison systems in the matrix of institutions and policies devised by the government in India to control the population and limit its mobility and perceived volatility. This link becomes clearer by the fact that most of the inmates of the asylums were vagrant. In case of curbing the European vagrants, there was provision to establish asylums under Section 14 of European Vagrancy Act 1869. Asylums are important for how the regime inside the asylum was designed to give the medical officer command over the incarcerated Indian's body and behaviour so that it

[47] Ibid., pp. 47-49.

could be remoulded and produced to be efficient and obedient.[48] As it was discussed in the previous section, there is no denying that there is an inevitable link between the body and labour. The body of the peasant needed to be transformed in the body of the worker and the accumulation of bodies were as important as the primitive accumulation of the capital. A Superintendent frequently made the following admission about asylum:

> 'The three classes whence the largest number are received are ryots, servants and beggars.' The evidence on the case notes from the Lucknow lunatic asylum confirms this, as the usual entries under occupation are 'beggar', 'labour', and 'cultivator' and where caste information is given low-status categories like 'chumar' and 'ahir' are common. In other words, it seems that the asylum was dealing with subaltern groups in Indian society and it is the interaction of such groups with the colonial institutions which will be considered.[49]

The second half of the nineteenth century was the most intensive period for the phenomenon of confinement. J. H. Mills writes, "for example, in the realm of law it was a period of important activity. Act XXXVI of 1858 was the first act specifically designed to provide a legal framework for incarcerating those Indians considered mad by the British who had not come to the attention of the authorities through criminal behaviour. The legal provisions for criminal lunatics of the various administrations of India were also standardized in Chapter XXVII of the Criminal Procedure Code which was passed in 1861."[50] The period of 1857 to 1880 is the most important for the history of asylum in India. Mills further elaborates "while the British in this period were establishing a legal framework in which those Indians they considered mad could be dealt with, they were also setting up an institutional network in which those Indians could be detained. With the opening of the Lucknow Lunatic Asylum in 1859 there began two decades of unprecedented activity in providing buildings to contain those the British encountered as 'mad' in the Indian population. Of the twenty-six asylums which operated in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Government of India in this period no less than sixteen have their origins in the 1860s and 1870s."[51]

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[48] J.H Mills, *Madness, Cannabis and Colonialism: The 'Native-only' Lunatic ASYLUMS OF British India, 1857-1900*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 9.
[49] Ibid., p. 10.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., p. 12.

If we look at the statistics of native Lunatic Asylum in India, the most of the inmates are from lower rank. The causes for insanity in Annual Lunatic Asylums' report are generally divided under the moral or physical reason. A significant number of people are confined owing to cannabis induced psychosis. Marijuana smoking was often cited as reason for the absence of labour or idleness. In pre-colonial society madmen were never associated with work but it was made mandatory to work in the Asylum. In fact, work was thought to be the means of cure. Mitchell Dean argues that "the widespread use of the work-house has profound links with the biopolitical aims of mercantilist practices and technologies of governance, and the representation of the nation within the distributional framework of political oeconomy."[52] The workhouse may well aim to herd the vagrant micro-populations (the 'rogues, sturdy beggars, and vagabonds') off the streets and highways, but it also attempts to enhance the process of circulation by augmenting the numbers of trading households of the nation. Dean further argues that "the suppression of vagrancy combined three distinct actions: the arrest of the mobile population, typified by the putting of vagrants in stocks; the recording of them within hierarchical relations by brandings and other inscriptions on the body; and the reinsertion of the idle within the political order by transporting them to their 'proper' place, usually of birth or residence." Though in India there was no permanent system of work-house or poor-house. The work-houses were opened either to confine vagrants in normal time or to release distress during famine period.

The employment of jail prisoners on extra-mural works in public works departments construction sites were a significant instrument of extracting labour. Temporary jails were constructed for at least two years and prisoners were employed for a period which was not to be less than one year. The jail authority had devised a mechanism in terms of stages which were penal, industrial and advance or intermediate based on the criteria of earning marks which will earn the prisoners a gradual remission and also gratuity. It was a mechanism which was based upon earning the marks for good conduct and the marks were deduced heavily on any kind of bad conduct. The mechanism was such that it was very hard for the prisoners to get remission or any kind of relaxation or earn gratuity. The rules as framed in Appendix 2.2 would specify the case.

[52] Dean, Mitchell. "A genealogy of the Government of poverty." *Economy and Society,* Vol. 21, No. 3, 1992.

Chapter III

Economy, Poverty, Nation in the early nationalist discourses

Though there are many who views the Mutiny of eighteen fifty-seven as the first war of independence and the first expression of nationalism, and there are many who doesn't think so; but there is not much doubt regarding the fact that it was not the result of any consistent critique with a pan-India nationalist organisation and consciousness, rather it was the result of spontaneous reactions of some sepoys which actually set off a series of rebellion by different princely states (while claiming the leadership of last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Jaffar) against British colonial rule across the country. The Mutiny of eighteen fifty-seven changed the nature of colonialism in India forever. While Mughal empire was formally dissolved by British colonialism along with Mughal emperor being dethroned, incarcerated and exiled, the nature of colonialism also changed as the East India Company was replaced by Crown herself. A consistent and organised nationalist critique of colonial rule began during last quarter of nineteenth century and continued till independence in different forms and at different pace. But here it should be kept in mind that in order to properly situate the emergence of early nationalist responses and contestations to the colonial ideas and theories as well as the official policies pursued by the colonial state, one will have to understand the specificities of the historical context, the discursive framework in which the initial nationalist responses took place, and also the period preceding those responses so that no hiatus emerge in terms of understanding the lineages of the colonial discourses and the official polices of the colonial state and their contemporary contestations by nationalist intelligentsia and leadership on varied levels. The period from 1757 to the first half of nineteenth century should be treated as a kind of gestation period when the British colonial power gained root and developed a complete hold over most parts of India towards the end of this period. During this period when East India Company was ruling over India on behalf of the sovereign Crown, a certain field of 'economy' was created. The newly constructed category of 'economy' was primarily based upon mercantilist principles under the supervision of a mercenary enterprise called East India Company which served the imperial needs of mother country and was completely faithful and subservient to the Crown. However, we should keep in mind here that the nature of colonialism changes in the wake of Crown directly taking over the

administration of India post 1857 rebellion. Company rule was replaced with a full-fledged colonial state (which no longer was supposed to rule in the name of Crown unlike East India Company but) as the direct representatives of Crown who were directly responsible to the British Parliament. Mercantilism which was the guiding principles of Company rule gave way to Classical Political Economy which served as the Raison d'être of the colonial state in India.

By early nineteenth century the first nationalist response and their engagement with western economic philosophy emerged in the wake of positive and adverse effect of the alien rule, and towards the last quarter of nineteenth century the nationalist critique had become quite organized and systematic in its criticism of colonial power. The Drain theory as explicated by Dadabhai Naoroji and other contemporary nationalist thinkers and economist was the beginning of a process which ended only with the full independence from colonial rule. The insights generated by Dadabhai Naoroji never lost sight of even late nationalist leaders like Mahatma Gandhi. Early nationalist realized that "the object of mercantilism was not merely state-making in the narrow sense, but making the national economy through proper regulation of agriculture, industry, trade, shipping, banking, etc."[1] However, during late nineteenth century the systematisation of economy as a separate field of intervention by colonial rule provided the nationalist with a certain edge in their critique of colonial rule. The same quantificatory episteme which ushered in India to systematise exploitation by colonial rule was put to use by nationalist leaders and economists to argue against the colonial exploitation as the nationalist leaders and economists were now able to show the material exploitation with exact quantitative estimates. The statistical and numerical figuration of the economy could show the exact material growth or decline. These quantified evidences were used by early nationalist leaders as an instrument to challenge the legitimacy and so-called wise administration of colonial state. The discourses of poverty provided the colonised with a common identity of exploited and enslaved which helped in imagining a new unified community which was otherwise heterogeneous, disparate and fragmented. Hence, the bleeding (colonised) economy became a rallying point of nationalism and a desperate cry for freedom from the yoke of colonialism.

[1] B. N. Ganguli, *Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives* New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Co. Ltd. 1977, p. 5.

The present chapter mainly deals with two main themes: Firstly, it studies the historical context in which 'economy' emerged as a separate domain and as a field of systematic intervention of colonial rule in India during late eighteenth century and early half of nineteenth century. The category of 'economy' was constructed in distinction with the term 'society'. The pre-colonial epistemology in India did not distinguished between economy and society. Economy was considered inseparable part of society. The economy emerged as a separate field of intervention for colonial rule, thus making the exploitation of the colony more systematic in economic sense. Foucault's concept of governmentality has been deployed here in order to show how colonial governmentality reconfigured an economy and instituted the new episteme altering the previous one. It's important to take this discursive history into account as it enables us to locate the nationalist intelligentsia's engagement with the underlying rationality of the colonial state with more clarity.; Secondly, it sets out to examine the discursively constructed notions of a national economy as well as the historical production of a national space and economy in late nineteenth century colonial India. It also seeks to understand the modalities through which a nation may be 'imagined'. It maps the discursive terrain under which the drain of resources from India to Great Britain and the consequent poverty of the Indian masses became the rallying cry for nationalists and the notion of bleeding economy became the carrier of nationalism. It also tries to capture the nationalists' engagement with the western economic philosophy, as well as situating the the epistemic paradigm in which the nationalist response was articulated especially with regard to poverty. One another concern of the chapter also remains to see whether the key text of economic nationalism carry a continuity in epistemological sense with the colonial discourse of political economy; Or are there significant breaks between colonial political economic idea of poverty and economic nationalist discourse of poverty? The chapter also investigates whether the search for an Indian Economics or Indian Political Economy by the early nationalist intelligentsia could be characterized as the emergence of a new (nationalist) paradigm of though?

Emergence of 'economy' as a separate domain and a field of intervention and regulation by colonial state in India

The advent of colonialism in India was accompanied with the commencement of a vast documentation project of mapping the Orient. In order to govern, it was imperative to know the territories as well as the activities and lives of the people inhabiting them. Bernard Cohn terms the ways and methods of knowing as investigative modality. In his book *Colonialism and its Form of Knowledge*, he provides us with a classification of this investigative modalities through which the knowledge of Indian society was gathered by British colonialism. He groups them as follows: "the historiographic," "the observational travel," "the survey modality," "the enumerative," "the museological," "the surveillance" and "sanitary modalities." The branches of knowledge like statistics, demography or ethnography, and calculative practices like book-keeping or accounting functioned as a correlate of colonial power. Colonialism in India not only introduced new ways and methods of 'knowing' but also the content of knowledge and the institutions that produced them were new as well. U. Kalpagam argues that, "in the colonised non-Western world the techniques of government instituted by the colonial state gave rise to a whole set of scientific discourses about society; often these discourses were constituted in terms of competing discourses of the so-called 'moral and material progress' of these societies."[2] She further enunciates that "the techniques of government instituted by the colonial state differed greatly from pre-colonial states both in the nature of accountability procedures and in the recording of information. These called for the setting up of new institutions, procedures, calculations, reflections and tactics giving rise both to a modern state form and to a modern regime of 'power/knowledge'."[3] Kalpagam further explains the shift from pre-colonial epistemology to colonial epistemology in following terms:

> The dense administrative discourses of colonial governance were not merely representations of modern power enabling certain kinds of interventions but served as carriers of Western categories of space, time, measure, reason and causality that constitute modern sciences and that were not hitherto part of the epistemological fabric of those societies. New categories of thought that were introduced as part of colonial

[2]U. Kalpagam, "The Colonial State and Statistical Knowledge", *History of the Human Sciences*, *Vol.* 13 *No.* 2, 2000, p. 39.
[3] Ibid.

> administrative practices rendered it possible to conceive of 'economy' and 'society', and these representations enabled both new modes of interventions as well as a body of social scientific discourses. In so doing, the epistemological domains of precolonial times were irretrievably altered.[4]

Kalpagam further elaborates that the new forms of knowledge like "statistics was not merely a means of representation of the colonized world but was crucial in their construction as well, and enabled the development and accumulation of instrumental capability. It also became the most important language in the narrative legitimation of modernity, that is, for telling stories about progress, of accumulation of wealth, control of nature, the wellbeing of humanity, and equally to counter those stories as well."[5] While talking about enumerative and classificatory technique employed by colonial state, Appadurai links the increasing quantification and commoditization with the modern techniques of control. He writes:

> Although early colonial policies of quantification were utilitarian in design, I would suggest that numbers gradually became more importantly part of the illusion of bureaucratic control and a key to a colonial imaginary in which countable abstractions, of people and resources at every imaginable level and for every conceivable purpose, created the sense of a controllable indigenous reality. Numbers were part of the recent historical experience of literacy for the colonial elite who had thus come to believe that quantification was socially useful…By this time, statistical thinking had become allied to the project of civic control, both in England and France, in projects of sanitation, urban planning, criminal law, and demography. The idea that enumeration is a central instrument of social control of the modern state had become a commonplace.[6]

However, it should be kept in mind here that the objective of the present section is not only to outline the specificities of colonial governmentality and its role in instituting a new regime of discipline and control in order to appropriate or utilize the demographic or physical resources, but to outline a certain historical context and discursive framework in which the new quantificatory episteme emerged. Since by the time nationalist thoughts and responses started coming, a certain colonial episteme has already gained root.

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[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p. 44.
[6] A. Appadurai, 'Number in the colonial imagination', in *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization,* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 117.

The East India Company was the precursor of a new governmental rationality. A certain field of 'economy' in modern sense of the term was created by colonial power in India during late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. It is not to say that India did not have anything like economy before in the usual sense of the term. Of course, a certain pattern of production, a system of exchange and a regulated dispersion of money used to take place, trade and commerce was in a good state. In fact, during sixteenth and seventeenth century India alone accounted for the quarter of World GDP. Mughal Empire had one of the most comprehensive mechanism of revenue generation and tax collection in the whole world. But, pre-colonial regimes in India never treated 'economy' as a separate category or a field of intervention. Economy and society were inalienable to each other in pre-colonial epistemology. It is with the arrival of British colonialism that 'economy' was constructed as a separate category and a separate field of intervention and regulation. To say that 'economy was a constructed entity'[7] is to mean that the coming of the colonial state ushered in a new quantificatory episteme[8] never known before. "Foucault's notion of governmentality initiates an understanding of how, in the development of the modern state, the 'economy' could be constituted as an object of government."[9] While discussing the linkages between colonial governmentality and the concept of economy, Kalpagam writes:

> The quantificatory episteme ushered in by the colonial state was indeed unique. While pre-colonial states such as those of the Mughals, the Mahrattas or even Tipu Sultan had streamlined administrative practices and were indeed noteworthy for systematic record-keeping, none of them introduced a quantificatory episteme. The pre-colonial reckoning of worldly affairs was less objectified and quantified. It is only with the colonial practices of governance that measurement and quantification assumed

[7] Thinkers like Dumont and Foucault have pointed out that the 'economy' is a constructed entity. Dumont notes, 'It should be obvious that there is nothing like an economy out there, unless and until men construct such an object' See L. Dumont. *From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1977, p. 24.
Though the idea is present in Foucault's writings at several places, for a detailed and precise discussion See M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at College de France* 1977-78. & *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at College de France* 1978-79.

[8] "The 'episteme' is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities." For a detailed discussion, See M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* London: Routledge Classics, 2002.

[9] U. Kalpagam, "Colonial Governmentality and the 'economy'" *Economy and Society*, 29:3, 2011, p. 418.

> predominance; modern social scientific thought in India is of colonial origin and in fact traceable to it.[10]

The root of this quantificatory episteme was in mercantilist thought. "The underlying mercantilist philosophy was that the wealth of the world was finite and an increase in any one nation's wealth is a zero-sum game. The rational for the programme of government in the mercantilist era was the orderly movement of resources internally and externally."[11] To keep track of the movement of resources or circulation of wealth[12], details of the economic activities has to be recorded and the wealth needs to be measured. That is why, "the valuation of goods traded, which included both the units of measurement as well as the prices, and the use of money in the transactions, as well as the manner of accounting, form the complex mercantilist discourse of early European trade in India."[13] Thus, we can see that accounting, standardization and measurement were those set of practices through which the quantificatory regime became operational. Accounting and statistics were the part of the discursive network in which the quantificatory episteme was situated. Here it should be kept in mind that this quantificatory episteme is related with the two discoveries which are symptomatic of a new governmental rationality; first the creation of economy as a separate field of intervention, Second, the emergence of population as a category. When the link between 'population' and 'wealth' became apparent, "colonial governmentality with population as its target, needed the population to be enumerated, spatially demarcated and classified according to a whole range of attributes thus transforming what were once fuzzy communities into enumerated communities. The census classification of population into religious groups, castes, tribes and occupational categories provided this conception of society."[14] Appadurai points out that though pre-colonial regime had also developed the vast and sophisticated machinery of record-keeping for the purpose of taxation and revenue extraction they never actually counted the number of individuals inhabiting the territory. The colonial state was the first to conduct body count. Kalpagam argues that "colonial governmentality, with its singular aim of

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[10] U. Kalpagam, "The Colonial State and Statistical Knowledge", *History of the Human Sciences*, *Vol.* 13 *No.* 2, 2000, p.41.

[11] U. Kalpagam, "Colonial Governmentality and the 'economy'" *Economy and Society*, 29:3, 2011, p. 422.

[12] The notion of 'wealth' was the privileged category of mercantilist thinking, and this was represented in the quantity and quality of precious metals that could be accumulated through trade.

[13] Kalpagam, *op. cit.*

[14] Ibid.

augmenting the economic strength of the State, performed its extractive and regulatory functions on individual and mass bodies not directly with force but through modern forms of regulatory discipline."[15] She further states, "colonial governmentality in India thus made it possible to conceive the Indian economy in the modern economic categories of income, wealth, production, exchange, distribution, and consumption."[16] Not only were spatial and temporal categories reconstituted through colonial administrative practices, but also it became possible to discursively constitute even entities such as 'economy' and 'society'. Kalpagam argues that "positing accounting as the metaphor of economics, accounting was the most important discursive practice of colonial discipline. As colonial commerce and industry expanded, the density of accounting discourses permeated the entire colonial economy. The enormous diversities in the units of measurement of land, commodities and money needed to be standardized in the interests of administration. The form of accounting itself was to undergo significant shifts from the early trade accounts, which were simple kinds of book-keeping to track goods flows, to the latter more complex ones, involving double-entry and permitting capital budgeting as the requirements of modern capitalist enterprises were then different."[17] It is in these accounts that one can trace the idea of macroeconomic accounting and consequently a discourse of national income in India. Also, systematic mapping of economic domain created a field of intervention and regulation for colonial state in India.

Imagined national economy as a carrier of nationalism: Drain Theory, the reasoning of poverty and the logic of sovereignty (swaraj) and progress in early nationalist discourses

Sarvapalli Gopal argues in his article "The Emergence of Modern Nationalism: Some Theoretical Problems in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries" written in 1980 that "the emergence of modern nationalism in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a phenomenon 'which lay primarily outside Europe and was a consequence of the encounter between western imperialism and non-western

[15] Ibid., p. 420.
[16] Ibid., p. 421.
[17] Ibid.

peoples.'"[18] This argument is very much true for the Indian context where nationalism primarily developed as a direct result of encounter between the British imperial pursuits and Indian interests. A certain sense of particular national space and economy with a delimited territoriality emerge in nineteenth century colonial India in the wake of growing consciousness among natives of colonial exploitation and the drain of resources. The nationalist arguments against colonialism and Swadeshi movement reflects the increasing naturalisation of the link between nation, economy and territory during late nineteenth century and early twentieth century colonial India. Manu Goswami argues that "the historical emergence, self-understanding, and trajectory of institutional nationalism in colonial India was inseparably tied to colonial spatial practices and capitalist expansion."[19] She further argues that "the first sustained articulations of nationalism in colonial South Asia crystallized around the notion of a territorially delimited economic collective, a national economy during the 1870s and 1880s, and stresses the link between the colonial production of India as a spatially delimited entity and the formation of national imaginings of India as a national economic space."[20] Manu Goswami argues that the colonial state framed the social relations within a geographically delimited state structure through various practices which included the following:

> the constitution and regulation of a centralized monetary system; the institution of territorially uniform and standard taxation, tariff and custom policies; the institution of a massive infrastructural web of railways and communication technologies; the classification and hierarchical ordering of administrative-territorial units; the development of census and survey agencies that systematically surveyed, mapped and measured both land and people; the production of built environments and architectural forms that made visible the presence of the colonial state; and complex bureaucracies oriented towards the collection and assessment of land revenue.[21]

The conception of a (spatially determined) national economy, welded to popular affective imaginings of India as a bounded national space, represented the point of

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[18] Cited from S. Deshpande, 'Imagined Economies: Style of Nation-Building in Twentieth Century India', *Journal of Arts & Ideas*, Volume 25, Issue 26, 1993, p. 6.
[19] M. Goswami, 'From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), p. 611.
[20] Ibid.
[21] M. Goswami, 'From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), p. 612.

departure for nationalist critiques of colonialism.[22] However, Goswami at the same time also claims that "the nationalist movement did not contain within itself the principle of its emergence and organization. Specifically, nationalist imaginings of India as a spatially delimited national economic space emerged at the precise historical juncture after 1858 in which the colonial state and an increasingly globalized, imperial economy were simultaneously consolidated."[23] This claim made by Goswami holds true to an extent only as it is true that post-1858 colonial state emerged in a full-fledged sense, a certain notion of economy distinct with society as such emerged during this period (as discussed in the first section of the present chapter) and the colonial state became an architect of distinctly modern forms of social, economic and territorial closure. But at the same time this is also true that the production of a delimited national space through colonial governmentality was not responsible alone for a nationalist imagining of India as a particular national economy but also the nationalist consciousness of a bleeding and enslaved economy at the hand of colonial power became a rallying point for nationalist critique of colonialism and the consequent reason for the demand of self-rule and a liberated self-sufficient national economy. However, it should also be kept in mind here that while a territorially bounded national whole was being created, a simultaneous process of incorporating the colony in a deterritorialised global space was also on. The colonial socio-economic and spatial restructuring was part of the late-nineteenth century formation of a global space. Manu Goswami argues that, "the bounded economic and territorial whole of colonial India was inserted within the deterritorialising dynamic of the world market. The production of a territorially bounded economic space was embedded within the global division of labour centered in emergent metropolitan Britain. The spatial reorganization of production was manifest, for instance, in the transformation of colonial South Asia into a territorial unit for the production of raw materials (tea, wheat, oil seeds, cotton, jute, opium) and as a massive captive market for British manufactures. By the mid-nineteenth century, colonial South Asia became the single largest market for British cotton goods. In 1860,

[22] M. Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press. 2004. p. 209.
[23] Ibid., pp. 611-612.

it absorbed 31 percent and, by the close of the nineteenth century 50 percent of Lancashire cotton textiles."[24]

The nationalist critique of colonialism significantly emerged during late nineteenth century (particularly during 1870s and 1880s) and it was driven by a claim of a common, territorially defined economic collective, a national whole and an enslaved economy which was constantly bleeding at the hand of colonial rule. The critique was spearheaded by the likes of Dadabhai Naoroji, Romesh Chunder Dutt, Mahadev Govind Ranade, G V Joshi et al. These figures remained the canonical bearers of the emergent nationalism in late nineteenth century colonial India. Manu Goswami points out that "these early nationalists shared a common object of analysis. They focused on the accelerated 'impoverishment' of the nation, its territorial integration within a global world-system dominated by British capital; and they sought to specify analytically and historicize the production of a 'dependent colonial economy'."[25] The term "dependent colonial economy" was first employed by Ranade in his 1893 essay 'Present State of Indian manufacture and outlook on the same' in order to refer to the structural location of colonial India in the emergent global division of labour. This term was first employed by Ranade and it referred to the structural location of colonial India in the emergent global division of labour. Ranade argues that India had been transformed into a "plantation, growing raw produce to be shipped by British Agents in British ships, to be worked into Fabrics by British skill and capital, and to be re-exported to the Dependency by British merchants to their corresponding British firms."[26] Nationalist leaders and Economist critiqued the colonial regime on mainly three fronts: firstly, the economic "drain" of the nation as elaborated and argued by Dadabhai Naoroji, G V Joshi and others; secondly, the increasing "deindustrialisation" as a result of exploitative and expansive colonial economic policies as fleshed out by M G Ranade; thirdly, critiquing the so-called universal principles of Classical Political Economy which was clearly the part and parcel of governmental rationality of the colonial state. Economic questions formed the indispensable part of nationalist discourse in India. During late nineteenth century category of 'economy' became a rallying point for

[24] M. Goswami, 'From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), p. 613.

[25] Ibid., p. 615.
[26] Ibid.

imagining the Indian nation. The nationalist critique of colonial rule discursively constructed the notions of a delimited national economy. Drain theory as propounded by Naoroji portrayed the realistic image of an enslaved economy which was constantly bleeding as a result of colonial extraction and transfer of resources from India to Great Britain. Satish Deshpande argues that "During the colonial period the major impetus behind the nationalist struggle - giving it an all-India character – is the notion of an enslaved economy. The goals of attaining a fully sovereign state and of liberating the economy are seamlessly interwoven with the yearning for nationhood."[27] The emerging discourses on poverty and the debates on poverty of nation in general (as a result of drain theory and the general nationalist critique of colonial exploitation, deindustrialisation, ruralisation and recurrent famines et cetera) provided an opportunity to Indian people for assembling the technical means for imagining the Indian nation. Though Satish Deshpande caution us here that "at no point was the Indian nation synonymous with imagined national economy: the figure of Mother India, despite the ubiquitous references to her poverty, is surely much more than an economic metaphor." [28] Deshpande further argues that, "it has often been remarked that the British created 'Indian' as a meaningful administrative, political and economic entity. From the nationalist point of view, however, what is even more important is the fact that British *exploitation* helped to identify as Indian not only the national economy but also the millions of producers– peasants, artisans and workers- who were otherwise a hopelessly disparate and fragmented constituency. By nurturing the collective recognition of a shared status as exploited producers, the nationalist movement extracted from the very apparatus of British imperialism, the concrete and practical means with which the nation could be imagined."[29]

Economic questions formed the indispensable part of nationalist discourse in India. The effectivity of economic questions in forging a sense of nation-ness must be understood not only in terms of actually existing economic relations, but also the register of the imagination. Deshpande argues that, "to put it differently, an imagined economy is at least as powerful a technical means as print-capitalism for producing an individually

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[27] Imagined Economies: Styles of Nation-Building in Twentieth Century India, *Journal of Arts & Ideas, Numbers 25-26*, 1993, p. 13.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., p. 14.

assimilable sense of a collective national community."[30] Bipan Chnadra states that, "apart from the development of a common economy, etc., […] it was the existence of a common oppression by a common enemy and the struggle against it which provided important bonds uniting the Indian people. Perhaps no nation could have been formed without such a struggle, though the struggle itself was inherent in the nature of colonial domination. Looked at from this point of view, the nation was not a datum prior to the nationalist movement."[31] "British exploitation and the discourses of poverty generated by nationalist economists and leaders helped in forming a common identity of Indian as an exploited and oppressed community as millions of producers– peasants, artisans and workers– who were otherwise disparate, segregated and fragmented constituency."[32] The common identity of sufferer and exploited at the hand of colonialism helped to bring the inhabitants of this colonised economy at one platform in order to fight colonialism and imagine a new nation. The discourses of poverty, and the poverty of nation in general as a result of drain of wealth, provided the colonised with a common identity of exploited and enslaved which helped in imagining a new unified community which was otherwise heterogeneous and segregated. Hence, the bleeding (colonised) economy became a rallying point of nationalism. In the words of Satish Deshpande, "one of the dominant modes in which the Indian nation has been imagined is as a community of producers, as an *economy*."[33]

"One of the concrete ways in which the economy entered the nationalist imagination, and in fact helped shape it, was through the medium of commodities. The Swadeshi movement of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century marks the moment when the consciousness of economic exploitation on an 'all-India' level proves catalytic for the emerging nationalist movement. …Sumit Sarkar has shown how the Swadeshi movement invested commodities- mundane articles of everyday use- with a new ideological charge. The idea that a credible claim to national identity necessarily involved explicit and visible loyalty to the national economy, even at the cost of considerable expense or inconvenience to oneself, took

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[30] Ibid., p. 16.
[31] Bipan Chandra, ''Nationalist Historians' Interpretations of the Indian National Movement' in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.) *Situating Indian History* Delhi: Oxford university Press, 1986, pp. 194-238.
[32]Satish Deshpande, 'Imagined Economies: Styles of Nation-Building in Twentieth Century India,' *Journal of Arts & Ideas, Numbers 25-26*, 1993, p. 14.
[33] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

hold of the middle classes. These educated classes thus began to be active on both fronts of the Swadeshi movement, that of initiating indigenous *production* of hitherto imported goods, and that of boycotting the *consumption* or purchase of foreign goods. The Swadeshi movement strikingly illustrates how an invisible social process that produces its effects 'behind the backs' of social actors can be transformed into a visible one. This movement's recognition of commodities as 'social hieroglyphics' that enable the conscious invocation of the nation as (also) an economic community to which loyalty is owed, thus explicitly harnesses to the nationalist cause what is usually an unexamined part of everyday life…."[34]

"The point to note about the Swadeshi movement is the way in which commodities acquired the potential of becoming crucial mnemonic devices, serving to invoke in a convenient shorthand an entire nationalist philosophy."[35] "The Swadeshi movement, by anticipating much of Gandhian economics made it possible to think of the nation as also *a locus of production*, and to look at commodity relations as also implying certain mutual social and moral responsibilities."[36] Deshpande contends the Anderson's famous definition of "the nation as an imagined political community that is sovereign and exclusive."[37] Deshpande points out that the writings upon nationalism are excessively preoccupied with the cultural and the authors insulate economic processes from the cultural modalities they analyse so well. In other words, "while they correctly insist that the nation is primarily a cultural construct, they needlessly limit the materials that are involved in this construction- the substantive content which the modality of the cultural moulds into 'nation-ness'- to 'extra-economic' conditions and processes. Given that the economy is an important, perhaps even the primary, source of the raw material for the nationalist imagination in India, this one-sided culturalism tends to understate the peculiarities of these contexts."[38]

Imagined national economy also brought temporal consciousness to the members of the collective community. 'Economy' became a source of nationalist imagination and a means for visualising the nation, a collective (political) community of the natives.

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[34] Ibid., p. 16.
[35] Ibid., p. 19.
[36] Ibid., p. 20.
[37] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* London: Verso, 1983, pp. 15-16.
[38] Deshpande, op. cit., p. 7.

The problem and causes of poverty of India was viewed by early nationalist leaders and economists in varied terms e. g., the drain of resources, the lack of productivity, the stagnant nature of the society, inter-sectoral imbalance, and above all the exploitative nature of the Raj. The early nationalist leaders believed that India is rich in terms of resources but those resources are not being put to effective use. In other words, the reason behind India's poverty was the static nature of its society. The dominant frame of looking at the problem of poverty in early nationalist economic thought remains the lack of production rather than faulty distribution (as in the west). While analyzing the problem of poverty Bipan Chandra argues, "The problem when viewed from this angle hinged on the incapacity of India to produce enough and to retain inside the country whatever was produced. The Indian economic thinkers, therefore, laid stress on the need for increasing the total production in order to increase economic welfare of the people." He further says, "The problem of poverty was also viewed by many Indians as that of decline in 'productive capacity and energy' and the relatively low rate of economic growth as well as a cause for the absence of economic development." G. V. Joshi denied that Indian poverty was due to the absence of 'the equitable distribution of wealth, as in some countries of the West. He wrote, "the problem, thus, with us," he continued, "is not a socialist problem, admitting of the application of any socialistic remedies", "with us, the evil of poverty is not confined to any particular classes….we have here no chasm to bridge over, dividing off class from class; we have no claims of Labour" to urge, no "Duties of Capital" to enforce, and no "Rights of property" to plead'.[39] Joshi further writes, "Ours is an exceptional case, it is the case of a whole community, opposed to rival communities…What is wanted here is not the poor law of Elizabeth nor the Ateliers nationaux of the Provisional Government (of France)…but a comprehensive scheme of collective action … ."[40] What is remarkable about Joshi's statement is how he traces the causes of poverty not only in its economic reason but to the political roots as well. He urges for collective action in order to eradicate poverty and he links it to the question of sovereignty by saying that "…Ours is an exceptional case, it is the case of a whole community, opposed to rival communities…" While discussing the colonial famines and colonial economic policy, Mike Davis argues "if

[39] G. V. Joshi, *Writings and Speeches of the Honourable Rao Bahadur G. V. Joshi* Poona: Arya Bhushan Press, 1912, pp. 753-819. As cited in Bipan Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India,* New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1969, p. 12.
[40] Joshi, *Ibid.,* p. 819. As cited in Chandra, *op.cit.,* p. 13.

the history of British rule in India were to be condensed into a single fact, it is this: there was no increase in India's per capita income from 1757 to 1947. Indeed, in the last half of the nineteenth century, income probably declined by more than 50 percent."[41] He further points out, "It was the state itself, as Naoroji and Dutt had argued in their pioneering critiques, that ultimately ensured that no productivity-raising benefit could flow from export booms to direct producers. On the expenditure side, a colonial budget largely financed by taxes on farm land returned less than 2 percent to agriculture and education, and barely 4 percent to public works of all kinds, while devoting a full third to the army and police."[42] For Ranade, the root cause of poverty in India was lack of growth, particularly mobility and absence of freedom of thought, initiative and enterprise. Ranade characterize Indian situation as "Stagnation, dependence, depression and poverty these are written in broad characters on the face of the land and its people."[43] He considers lack of industrialization and India's unbalanced economic structure also as the main cause of poverty. In an essay, Prussian Land Legislation and the Bengal Tenancy, 1883, Ranade opined "with a growing population and limited resources the struggle of existence is being already felt as a strain on the social system."[44]

Dadabhai Naoroji made the most important contribution to the early nationalist debates upon poverty by assessing the poverty of the nation in quantifiable terms through measuring the exact amount of drain taking place from India to Great Britain and calculating the Per Capita Income of Indian along with the broad estimation of gross national income of India. The statistical and numerical figuration of the economy which took place in order to systematise the colonial exploitation and extraction of Indian resources could also give a sense of material growth and decline. What this statistical estimation of national income and Per Capita Income does that it makes the incidence of poverty quantifiable and with this move the Indian economy now became comparable to other economies. It meant that now the per capita income of the Indian masses could be compared with any other economy of the world. For instance, now the per capita income of the Indian could be compared with the British. It gave a strategic

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[41] Davis, Mike., *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and The Making of the Third World* London: Verso, 2001, p. 311.
[42] Ibid., p. 323.
[43] M. G. Ranade, *Essays on Indian Economics: A collection of essays and speeches*, Bombay: Thacker and Company Ltd., 1898, p. 23.
[44] Bipan Chandra, *Ranade's Economic Writings* New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990, p.

advantage to the nationalist in their argument against colonial rule, because now it was possible to show the despicable situation of India vis-à-vis Britain and its other dependencies on the basis of statistical evidences of the fact. On 27th July 1870, Dadabhai Naoroji read a paper entitled "The Wants and Means of India" before the Society of Arts, London, where he presented his calculation of gross annual national income and per capita income for the first time. The figures he arrived at revealed the actual poverty of the masses of India. These figures were further worked out and presented again by Naoroji before the Bombay Branch of the East India Association on 28th Feb 1876. The figures Dadabhai had presented were the first statistical estimate of average per capita income using the official data available at that point of time. Dadabhai argued as follows:

> The whole produce of India is from its land. The gross land-tax is put down for 1870-71 a little above £21,000,000. Now, I suppose I shall be within the mark if I say that Government takes for this land-tax, on an average, one-eighth of the gross produce, if not more. This gives for the gross production of the country, say, about £168,000,000; add to this– gross opium revenue about £7,000,000; gross salt revenue, £6,000,000; gross forest, £600,000. The total, thus, of the raw produce of the country amounts under £182,000,000, to be on the safe side, let us say £200,000,000 to include the produce of half a million tons of coal, of alienation lands, or anything else there may be. Now, the population of the whole of British India is nearly 150.000,000; giving, therefore, less than 27s. a-head for the annual support of the whole people. I then further raised the production from £200,000,000 to £300,000,000, to include the value of manufacturing industries, excise on spirits, and a large margin for any omissions, making 40s. a head for the gross production of India as a high estimate.[45]

Naoroji took into account only the territories directly administered by colonial state and for which the data, however inadequate or unsatisfactory they were, was available. Ambirajan writes that "as he was convinced that the whole produce of India was from its land he concentrated upon measuring agricultural output."[46] Ambirajan points out that, "Naoroji's official critique like Juland Danvers found fault with him for omitting the 'Service' sector in his reckoning of the national income."[47] V.KR.V Rao has argued

[45] C. L. Parekh (edt.), *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of the Hon'ble Dadabhai Naoroji*, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 161.
[46] S. Ambirajan, "Economic Thinking of Dadbhai Naoroji", in P. D. Hajela edt. *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, 2001. p. 16.
[47] Ibid.

that Naoroji based his calculations on the "old physiocratic concept of the materiality of income" and by not treating services as income "Naoriji has seriously impaired the utility of his estimates".[48] Rao was right to an extent in critiquing Naoroji as services were considered to be furnishing utility, in the wake of emergence of classical political economy and the consequent change in the conception of 'labour' and its role in creation of value and wealth, hence services were treated as income and as part of the process of wealth creation. Rao's criticism had appeared in 1930s. However, it should be noted here that Rao accepted Dadabhai's figure of the value of agricultural produce as an accurate estimate. Rao himself calculated the per capita income in 1867-68 around Rs. 23, thus revising Dadabhai's estimate by just 15 per cent. Naoroji's contemporary Mahadev Govind Ranade had supported his argument by stating that "these classes produce no wealth, they only distribute with more or less fairness the wealth already produced."[49] However, Ambirajan suggests that a better defence would have been to claim that the structure of the economy was such that the method used by Naoroji was quite adequate. Citing Russian economist and statistician and the author of *The Income of Nations* Paul Studenski, Ambirajan further argues that Studenski in his thorough study of the methods of national income has pointed out that "national income restricted to material production may be an adequate measure of the economic production and economic welfare of an extremely primitive society which is almost wholly concerned with the production of material goods for the satisfaction of the elementary physical needs of its members."[50] If the economic system has to care for "a wide range of human needs" the service sector expands in which case it has to be included in national income computation.[51] P. Jegadish Gandhi cites Paul A. Baran in defence of Naoroji's non-inclusion of services given the nature of Indian economy and argues that it didn't impair Naoroji's estimation. As per Paul Baran,

> Without going into the theoretical merits of Dadabhai Naoroji, it may be briefly pointed out that a strong case for the usefulness of this approach of identifying national income with gross national physical product in case of backward countries can be made on the basis that as a result of the prevalence of disguised unemployment combined with the

[48] V.K.R.V Rao, *An Essay on India's National Income, 1925-1929* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939. Pp. 21-22.
[49] Mahadev Govind Ranade, *Ranade's Economic Writings* edited by Bipan Chandra, New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990. P. 185.
[50] Ambirajan, op. cit., p. 16.
[51] Ibid.

> socially parasitic character of a large part of the 'service sector', and rapid structural and institutional changes– for example, increase of monetisation or commodity production– which these countries have been undergoing ever since they came into contact with the West, only measurements of actual physical production can serve any comparative or other purposes in economic analyses.[52]

Asim Karmakar also points out the similarity between Naoroji's Drain theory and Baran's surplus theory. He writes, "to Baran, the colonial drain was a mercantilist concept- India's loss of economic resources and their transfer to British was a consequence of her political subordination. Thus asymmetrical power and political relations, rather than natural endowments or comparative advantage, determined the economic history of underdeveloped countries."[53] Karmakar cites Baran in order to reveal the effects of colonial drains on Indian society and economy, "far from serving as an engine of economic expansion, of technological progress, and of social change, the capitalist order in these countries has represented a framework for economic stagnation, for archaic technology, and for social backwardness."[54] Naoroji's prime argument that "the drain prevents India from making any capital"[55] remain relevant as it always reminds us the colonial economic situations which made possible the vast amount of transfer of capital from India to Britain by the mechanism of imperial rule and kept India deprived of developmental opportunities. Ambirajan states that notwithstanding the many criticisms, Naoroji's estimates have stood the test of time well because they never lost their credibility.

The quantification of Indian economy provided the Indian intelligentsia with a more precise sense of the material condition of the masses in general and the poverty and the exploitation of the nation more apparent. Earlier there was no way of comparing two or more nations, if it was compared it was done only in abstraction. The quantification made the comparison possible between two or more nations on a particular scale. For instance, 20 rupees (or 40 shillings) per head was the average Per Capita Income of Indian, whereas it was Rs. 420 in Britain and Rs. 375 in USA. These quantified

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[52] P. Jegadish Gandhi, "Dadabhai Naoroji– A Macro-Economic Thinker", in *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* edited by P. D. Hajela, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 83.
[53] Asim K. Karmakar, "Dadabhai Naoroji, Drain Theory and Poverty", in *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* edited by P. D. Hajela, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 75.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*, New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of information & Broadcasting, Government of India, 1962 (Originally published in 1901). p. 38.

evidences of abysmal condition of the masses and bleeding economy were used by early nationalist leaders as an instrument to challenge the legitimacy and so-called wise administration of colonial state. Dadabhai argued that even a labourer considering his most basic necessities of life needed 34 rupees. The expenses over a jail inmates was more than 20 rupees which was the average per capita income of Indian during that time. Bipan Chandra writes that this figure of Rs. 20 as the per capita income became the rallying cry of the national movement and was widely used in the nationalist discourses and propaganda against British rule. Naoroji's arguments was so powerful that colonial official were compelled to bring forth their own estimation of per capita income in order to challenge and contradict Naoroji's estimation of the same. "In 1882, the Government of India issued an estimate prepared by Major Evelyn Baring, Finance Member, and David Barbour, in which the total income of British India was calculated at 5.25 billion rupees and per capita income at Rs. 27.72. In 1901, Lord Curzon announced that in 1897-98 per capita income in India was Rs. 30.73. When this figures was attacked by William Digby with an array of statistical arguments, the cudgels were taken up by Fred J. Atkinson, a high official in the Accounts Department of the Government of India, who, in a paper read before the Royal Statistical Society in 1902, computed the average income per head in British India to be Rs. 39.5 in 1895 as compared to Rs. 30.5 in 1875."[56] Naoroji didn't accept Evelyn Baring's figure of Rs. 27 as per capita income as giving the correct picture because "out of the total annual income of British India all that portion must be deducted which belongs to European Planters, Manufacturers, and Mine-owners, and not to the people of British India, excepting the poor wages they receive."[57]

The figures of average per capita income was derived by dividing the total annual national income by the total population. "This reduction of economic welfare, or lack of it, to a single index could be used to highlight and dramatize the problem as well as to compare levels of living over time and across space."[58] "The Indian nationalist leaders argued that since poverty was, in a way, both a comparative as well as a relative term, the real nature of Indian poverty might be brought out and grasped only when

[56] Bipan Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India,* New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1969. p. 17.
[57] S. Ambirajan, "Economic Thinking of Dadbhai Naoroji", in P. D. Hajela edt. *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, 2001. p. 17.
[58] Ibid., p. 15.

Indian income was compared with that of the other nations or contrasted with the bare minimum needs of a human being. This comparison was once again most often expressed in easily intelligible statistical term, often in a tabular form."[59] One such Table has been reproduced here from the writings of G V Joshi on Indian situation (See Table 3.1). "As per the Indian leaders, the tabular comparison threw 'a lurid light' upon the economic condition of the people; it showed that 'even such mis-governed country as Turkey produces twice more per head per annum than India produces;, or that 'India is nineteen times worse off than England', 'even the most oppressed and misgoverned Russia is prosperous than India'."[60]

Table. 3.1.

Country	Agricultural income			Non-Agricultural income			Total income per head
	Rural population	**Total population**	**Income per head**	**Population in other industries**	**Total income**	**Income per head**	
United Kingdom	12 Millions £	266 Millions £	£22.5	22.6 Millions £	981 Millions £	£ 45	£ 35
France	18 ,,	444 ,,	,, 25	19.4 ,,	521 ,,	,, 27	,, 25
Germany	23 ,,	456 ,,	,, 20	22.2 ,,	394 ,,	,, 18	,, 18
Russia	56 ,,	509 ,,	,, 9	28.4 ,,	251 ,,	,, 9	,, 9.9
Austria	25 ,,	322 ,,	,, 13	12.8 ,,	280 ,,	,, 23	,, 16.3
Italy	17 ,,	178 ,,	,, 10	11 ,,	114 ,,	,, 10	,, 10.7
Europe	174 ,,	2,617 ,,	,, 15	138 ,,	2,823 ,,	,, 21	,, 18
United States	25 ,,	604 ,,	,, 24	25 ,,	816 ,,	,, 32	,, 27.2
Canada	2.5 ,,	58 ,,	,, 21	22 ,,	60 ,,	,, 40	,, 26.2
India	160 ,,	331 ,,	,, 2	40 ,,	210 ,,	,, 5.2	,, 2.7

Source: G. V. Joshi, *Writings and Speeches of the Honourable Rao Bahadur G. V. Joshi (edt. By C L Parekh)* Poona: Arya Bhushan Press, 1912, p. 776.

So we can see here the link between the quantificatory episteme which functioned as a correlate of the colonial power since its inception and the application of the same branches of knowledge by early nationalist economists and leaders to argue their case against colonial policies and regime. Thus, in the long run, the statistical data generated

[59] Ibid., p. 18-19.
[60] Ibid.

by the colonial administration in order to intensify their control over the colony had also opened up the possibility of rigorous national accounting of the exploitation of India by the colonial power.

Apart from average per capita income, another index used by contemporary nationalist leaders in order to show the actual material conditions and poverty of India was average per capita necessary expenditure for subsistence. The nationalist leaders and economists argued that in order to get an accurate idea of the existent poverty, "average income must be judged in terms of the existing cost of living and that if it could be shown that what the average Indian earned was not sufficient to meet even his bare wants as a human being, the case regarding the existence of poverty in India would rest on unassailable ground."[61] As the studies regarding cost of living or nutritional standards were almost non-existent in those days, the nationalist relied upon the broad estimates of the necessaries of life of emigrant coolies, labourers employed at famine relief works, native sepoys, agriculturalists, and prisoners in jail. "In all these cases, the per capita income was found to be less than what would have met the needs of any of the categories of men enumerated above. The most effective comparison of the per capita income with the diet and other maintenance expenses of a jail prisoner. Dadabhai Naoroji calculated from the different provincial reports for the year 1867-68 that the official cost of food and clothing only for prisoners in jail was Rs. 31 for the Central Provinces, Rs. 27 and As. 3 for the Punjab, Rs. 21 and As. 13 for the North West Provinces, Rs. 31 and As. 11 for Bengal, Rs. 53 and As. 2 for Madras and Rs 47 and As. 7 for Bombay."[62] "When the per capita income was compared with the figures of cost per head in jails, the conclusion was obvious and telling. That 'even for such food and clothing as a criminal obtains, there is hardly enough of production even in good season, living alone all little luxuries, all social and religious wants, all expenses of occasions of joy and sorrow, and any provision for bad season. It might, therefore, be rightly concluded that a large number of Indians were chronically starved and lived below the margin of subsistence."[63]

S. Amirajan writes, "Naoroji was concerned about poverty which took the form of concern about the basic minimum requirements of the Indian citizen. It is not clear what

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[61] Ibid., p. 19.
[62] Ibid., p. 20.
[63] Ibid

theoretical positions he adhered to– whether an expenditure approach or an income approach to look at poverty. It is possible that though he was interested in understanding the standard of living of the masses, as he had no way of looking at their actual expenditures, he decided to study income as a proxy for consumption."[64] Naoroji defined poverty in starkly simple terms as inability to secure a minimum standard of living. In other words, Naoroji considers what is necessary for the bare wants of a human being to keep him in ordinary health and decency. In the absence of detailed sampler surveys, and elaborate consumption enquiries, Naoroji took recourse to official reports on cost of living of labourers as well as the necessary items for the survival of emigrants and prisoners under different conditions. This study of absolutely necessary consumption required for the sustenance of ordinary health was for the year 1867-8 as this was the year for which Naoroji studies the per capita production in his famous essay *Poverty of India* read before the Bombay Branch of the East India Association on February 28th, 1876. Naoroji looks at 'the basic minimum food requirement for the emigrant coolies during their voyage while living in a state of quietude' as specified by Surgeon S. B. Partridge, Government Medical Inspector of Emigrants in a statement dated Calcutta, 26th March 1870.[65] The following scale of diet was proposed by S. B. Partridge to supply the necessary ingredients of nourishment for the emigrant coolies during their voyage, living in a state of quietude:

Table. 3.2.

Rice Diet for One Man		**For Flour Diet**	
	Ozs.		**Ozs.**
Rice	20.0	Flour	16.0
Dhal	6.0	Dhal	4.6
Preserved Mutton	2.5	Preserved Mutton	2.5
Vegetables	4.27	Vegetables	4.27
Ghee	1.0	Ghee	1.5
Mustard Oil	0.5	Mustard Oil	0.5
Salt	1.0	Salt	1.0
Total	35.27	Total	29.77

Source: Reproduced here from Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics)* Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 184. (Originally, The *Indian Economist* of 15th October 1870, Statistical Reporter, p. 45.) Note: Oz is abbreviation for Ounce.

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[64] Ambirajan, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

[65] During 1870s, the only journal in India which published statistics or data related to agriculture, minerals and other sources of national income or wealth was the *Indian Economist* edited by Robert Knight. The other source was *Material and Moral Progress Report of India* which used to publish data related to Indian economy.

This scale of diet, as per Naoroji, "is absolutely necessary to supply the necessary ingredients of nitrogen and carbon; not the slightest luxury – no sugar or tea, or any little enjoyment of life, but simple animal subsistence of coolies."[66] Naoroji further worked out the cost of living according to Surgeon Partridge's scale for the year 1867-8 at Ahmedabad prices. Naoroji calculated the annual cost of living or merely subsistence at Ahmedabad prices as Rs. 62 and 2 Annas. You can see the monthly figures of cost of living mentioned in the table reproduced below:

Chart. 3.1

Cost of necessary living at Ahmedabad prices, on 30th January 1868, as given in the "Bombay Gazette."	
Rice, second sort, 20 oz. per day, or 37.5 lbs. per month, at 15 lbs. per rupee	Rs. 2 8 0
Dhal 6 oz. per day, or 11.5 lbs. per month, at 20 lbs. per rupee	,, 0 9 0
Preserved mutton 2.50 oz. per day, or 4 lbs. 11 oz. per month, at 6.5 lbs. per Rupee	,, 0 11 7
Vegetable 4.27 oz. per day, or 8 lbs. per month, at 20 lbs. per rupee	,, 0 6 5
Ghee 1 oz. per day, or 1 lb. 14 oz. per month, at 2 lbs. 1 oz. per rupee	,, 0 11 0
Mustard Oil 0.5 oz. per day, or 1 lb. 8 oz. per month, at 6 lbs. per rupee	,, 0 4 0
…. 1 oz. per day, or 1 lb. 14 oz. per month, at 38 lbs. per rupee	,, 0 0 10
Per Month	Rs. 5 2 10

Source: Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of The Hon'ble Dadbhai Naoroji (With Life and Portrait)* edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 186. Note: oz and lbs are abbreviations of ounce and pound respectively. The monetary calculations are shown in contemporary measure of Rupee prevailing during the specified period. During British regime, anna and pice (or paisa) were fractional monetary units of Rupee. One rupee was equal to 16 annas and one anna was equivalent to 4 pice (or paisa) which meant a rupee is worth 16 annas or 64 paise.

After discussing the absolute necessary food consumption, Naoroji moves further to include clothing and lodging while estimating the barest minimum cost of living in order to just survive. Naoroji took help of the estimate provided by Kazee Shahabuddin "of the lowest absolute scale of necessaries of a common agricultural labourer in the Bombay presidency."[67] The following is an estimate of the lowest absolute scale of necessaries of a common agricultural labourer in the Bombay Presidency annually as provided by Mr. Kazee Sahabuddin:

[66] Naoroji, Dadabhai, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses And Writings (On Indian Politics)* Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. pp. 184-185.
[67] Ibid., pp. 186-187.

Chart. 3.2.

Food	
1.5 lbs. Rice per day, at Rs. 2 to Rs. 2-8 per maund of 40 lbs., say	Rs. 28 8
Salt, including waste, about 1 oz. a day	,, 1 0
¼ lb. Dhal	,, 9 0
Vegetables	,, 0 0
Food-oil	,, 5 0
Condiments, chillies, &c.	,, 0 0
Tobacco	,, 5 0
	Rs. 48 8

Chart 3.3.

Clothing	
3 Dhotees a year	Rs. 3 0
1 pair champal (shoes)	,, 0 12
½ a turban	,, 1 8
1 Bundee (jacket)	,, 1 0
2 Kamlees (blankets)	,, 1 8
1 Rumal (handkerchief)	,, 0 2
1 Rain-protector	,, 0 4
Total	Rs. 8 2

Chart 3.4.

The dress of the female of the house	
1½ Saree (dress)	Rs. 3 12
1 Cholee (short jacket)	,, 0 12
Oil for head	,, 1 8
Bangrees (glass bangles)	,, 0 6
½ Champal (shoes)	,, 0 4
Extras	,, 1 0
Total	Rs. 7 10

Chart 3.5.

Lodging	
Hut (labour taken as his own)	Rs. 25 0
Hut repairs (bamboos, &c.), per annum	,, 4 0
Oil for lamp, per day	,, 0 0 1/8
Barber, per month	,, 0 1
Domestic utensils per annum	,, 0 12

While calculating the cost per head of family Naoroji lessen Kazi Sahabuddin's estimates by one-quarter in order to rule out any exaggeration or avoid any methodological aberrations. Naoroji keeps the cost of food per head Rs. 36, clothing per head Rs. 6, and Lodging per head Rs. 3. Adding all these would amount to Rs. 45 as annual cost of living per head which is still quite above from the average per capita income which was Rs. 20 for the same period. And remember this calculation of Rs. 45 per head as annual cost of living was without any provision for social and religious wants, letting alone luxuries, and anything to spare for bad seasons.

Table. 3.3.

Provinces	**Value of the produce of Cultivated Land**	**Population**	**Produce per head**
	£		**Rs.**
Central Provinces	16,000,000	9,000,000	18
Punjab	36,000,000	17,500,000	21
North-West Provinces	40,000,000	30,000,000	14
Bengal	96,000,000	67,000,000	15
Madras	36,000,000	26,500,000	14
Bombay	40,000,000	11,000,000	36
Oudh	13,000,000	9,500,000	14
Total	277,000,000	170,500,000	

Source: Naoroji, Dadabhai, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics)* Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. P. 182.

Table. 3.4. The Absolute necessaries provided at Jails.

Jails			
Provinces	**Cost of Living**	**Cost of Clothing**	**Total**
	Rs. a. p.	**Rs. a. p.**	**Rs. a. p.**
Central Provinces	25 8 0	5 8 0	31 0 0
Punjab	23 6 0	3 13 0	27 3 0
North-West Provinces	18 8 0	3 5 0	21 13 0
Bengal	28 3 0	3 8 0	31 11 0
Madras	49 2 7	3 15 9	53 2 4
Bombay	41 13 0	5 10 0	47 7 0
Oudh	------	--------	--------

Source: Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of The Hon'ble Dadbhai Naoroji (With Life and Portrait)* edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 189.

Naoroji argues that the cost outside jail, or for the whole mass per head, will be about three-fourths of inside the jail, allowing the jail for adults only. Thus, taking the cost of 3 persons in the jail, or of 3 adults, to 4 persons, or of the mass, it comes to the following:

Table. 3.5

Production per head		**Three-fourths of Jail Cost of Living, or Cost per head outside Jail**
Central Provinces	Rs. 21 ¾ or say Rs. 22	Rs. 23
Punjab	,, 24 ¾ ,, ,, 25	,, 20
North-West Provinces	,, 17 ¾ ,, ,, 18	,, 16
Madras	,, 17 ¾ ,, ,, 18	,, 41
Bengal	,, 18 ¾ ,, ,, 19	,, 23,12.
Bombay	,, 39 ¾ ,, ,, 40	,, 35
Oudh	,, 17 ¾ ,, ,, 18	…………

Source: Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of The Hon'ble Dadbhai Naoroji (With Life and Portrait)* edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 190.

As the figures provided by Kazi Sahabuddin was applicable to Western India by and large, Naoroji makes an attempt to do a comparison with other parts of the country.

Naoroji used "the cost per annum per inmate of jails in the various Provinces because there was a rough congruity between his estimate of subsistence required per head in the Bombay Presidency and the total annual expenditure per prisoner in Bombay Presidency. He reduces the actual jail cost of living by 25% to get the cost of living of people outside the jail because whereas all the prisoners are adults, outside the children who cost much less have to be accounted for."[68] He get the following figures:

Table. 3.6

	Expenditure on Jail Per inmate 1867-68			**Three-fourths of Jail cost of living or cost per head outside Jail**		
Central Provinces	31	0	0	23	0	0
Punjab	27	3	0	20	0	0
North-West Provinces	21	13	0	16	0	0
Bengal	31	11	0	23	12	0
Madras	53	2	4	41	0	0
Bombay	47	7	0	35	0	0

Source: From S. Ambirajan, "Economic Thinking of Dadabhai Naoroji" in P. D. Hajela (edt.) *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 13.

Note: Monetary valuations are as per the cotemporary measure of rupees. Anna and pice or paisa was subunit of rupee.

"In comparing the inmates of the jail and those who live outside the jail, the prisoners did not have to spend from Rs. 12 to 15 estimated as expenditure on lodging. Thus, Naoroji comes to the conclusion that the required expenditure for people in terms of the actual jail expenditure is considerably lesser than what would be the minimal standard of living."[69]

[68] S. Ambirajan, "Economic Thinking of Dadabhai Naoroji" in P. D. Hajele (edt.) *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 13.
[69] Ibid.

Naoroji's construction of statistical profile of India's national income, calculation of per capita income and production along with measuring the cost of living were meant to highlight the poverty problem of India.[70] The Table reproduced below using the statistics prepared by Dadabhai Noaroji makes the problem of poverty amply clear.

Table. 3.7

Provinces	Value of production per capita	Expenditure per prisoner	¾ of jail cost of living to account for children as outside cost of living
Central Provinces	22	31	23
Punjab	25	27-3-0	20
NWT	18	21-13-0	16
Madras	18	53-2-4	41
Bengal	19	31-11-0	23-12
Bombay	40	47-7-0	35

Note: Value are in Rupees, Annas and Pies.

Source: From S. Ambirajan, "Economic Thinking of Dadabhai Naoroji" in P. D. Hajela (edt.) *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 19.

After much consideration, Naoroji has worked out a minimum cost of living. The minimum cost is what he calls as necessary for the bare wants of a human being, to keep him in ordinary good health and decency. Taking 1867-68, same year for which production was chiefly calculated, as the year for ascertaining the necessary consumption, Dadabhai takes recourse to 'jail cost of living' and summarises his calculation has giver the above Table. The minimum cost calculated on the basis of bare

[70] Almost a century later, when the post-colonial India grappled with the problem of poverty and the economists and statisticians like B S Minhas, V M Dandekar, Nilkanth Rath et. al. were given the task to study the poverty problem and asked to construct the "Poverty Line", they came up with methods conceptually similar to Dadabhai Naoroji. In order to determine the Poverty Line, these economists have done the following:

(1) They tried to determine the minimum nutrition required for subsistence;
(2) They estimated the cost of achieving this minimum nutritional requirements for subsistence; and
(3) They drew the poverty line on the basis of the per capita consumption expenditure.

Naoroji estimated the bare minimum required for subsistence along with calculating the cost of living, though he never attempted to find out how many were actually below the minimum required sustenance as he was aware that on an average nobody except the very few was fortunate enough to be above the poverty line, for the national output too less than it ought to be.

minimum 'jail cost' was much higher than Rs. 20, the average per capita income at the current prices. The value of per capita production figures for the various provinces of British India were hardly sufficient to sustain even the jail cost of living. Naoroji writes, "as the figures indicate that even for such food and clothing as a criminal obtains, there is hardly enough of production even in a good season, leaving alone all little luxuries, all social and religious wants, all expenses of occasions of joy and sorrow, and, any provision for bad season. It must, moreover, be borne in mind that every poor labourer does not get the full share of the average production. The high and middle classes get a much larger share, the poor classes much less, while the lowest cost of living is generally above the average share. Such appears to be the condition of the masses of India. They do not get enough to provide the bare necessaries of life."[71]

The leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji, G. V. Joshi, G. Subramaniya Iyer, and Surendranath Banerjee also realized fully well that the word average, being an economic fiction, hides a multiplicity of sins and that the poorer sections of the population did not get the full share of the average income. Naoroji was aware that per capita income was not a realistic depiction of the income of the common masses. The poor obtained much less than per capita income as the distribution of income was highly uneven or skewed. "… The richer section of the population obtained much more and deductions had to be made for the economic drain."[72] "The average per capita income included the incomes of the foreign capitalists and the highly paid foreign civil service, the big Zamindars, the city merchants and the rural and urban middle and upper middle classes. And, therefore, for the lower strata of the population the real income must be a lot below the average and the struggle for life much more difficult than the per capita figure would indicate."[73] Dadabhai talks about marked disparity in income between the 'classes' and the 'masses'. He estimated per capita income at Rs. 20 per annum but he said: "It must be remembered that the mass of the people cannot get this Rs. 20, as the upper class has the larger share than the average; also this Rs. 20 per head includes the income or produce of foreign planters or producers in which the interest of the natives does not go

[71] Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of The Hon'ble Dadbhai Naoroji (With Life and Portrait)* edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 190.
[72] B. N. Ganguli, *Dadabhai Naoroji and the Drain Theory,* Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965. p. 116.
[73] Bipan Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India,* New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1969. pp. 20-21.

further than being mostly common labourers at competitive wages. All the profits of such produce are enjoyed by, and carried away from the country by foreigners."[74] Naoroji further observed: "In reality there are two Indians– one the prosperous, the other poverty-stricken. The prosperous India is the India of the British and other foreigners. They exploit India as officials, non-officials, capitalists in a variety of ways, and carry away enormous wealth to their country. To them India is, of course, richer and prosperous. The more they can carry away, the richer and more prosperous India is to them… The second India is the India of the Indians– the poverty-stricken India. This India bled and exploited in every way of their wealth, of their services, of their land, labour and all resources by the foreigners– this India of the Indians becomes the poorest country in the world after one hundred and fifty years of British rule."[75] Dadabhai never looses sight of the actual material condition of Indian people. One clear example of this is Dadabhai's *Memorandum on Mr. Danwers's papers of 28th June 1880 and 4th January 1879*. Dadabhai argues that if the total material production of a year increases the next year then only the prosperity and the capacity of the people would increase. He says:

> Suppose on the 1st of January 1880, we have in India a certain amount of material wealth in all its various forms, and we take complete stock of it; that during the year following the country works in all its varieties of ways, consumes for all its various human, animal and instrumental wants from the store existing on the 1st January 1880; and that after the end of the year, on 1st January 1881, we gather together or take stock of every possible kind of material production (agricultural, mineral and manufacturing and addition from profits of foreign tra.de) during the year. This production during the year will have to meet all the wants of the next year. *If this production prove less than what would be wanted for the next year, then there would be a deficiency, and either the original wealth or capital of the country will have to be drawn upon, or the people will be so much less supplied with their wants in some shape or other; in either way showing a diminution of prosperity– both as property and capacity* (emphasis added). If on the other hand, *the whole material production of the year prove more than what would be necessary for the next year for all ordinary or usual wants, then a surplus*

[74] Dadabhai Naoroji quoted by B. N. Ganguli, *Dadabhai Naoroji and the Drain Theory,* Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965. p. 103.
[75] Ibid., pp. 103-4.

would accrue, and so far in some permanent form, add to the capital of the country and increase its prosperity (emphasis added).[76]

Dadabhai further argued that annual material production is not increasing the successive years as the capital was drained out to Britain which meant that India was growing poor day by day under British regime. Dadabhai urges Mr. Danvers to work out the total production and wants of India for the last dozen years on the correct principles and calculations from such materials as are already available at the India Office. He says that such tables would show what the actual material consition of the country is, and whether it is increasing or diminishing in prosperity. While responding to Mr. Danvers in his *Memorandum on Mr. Danwers's papers of 28th June 1880 and 4th January 1879*, Dadabhai points out the role of foreign trade of India in its diminishing material condition. Naoroji writes,

> Mr. Danvers is quite right that the foreign trade of a country adds to its annual income or production. But unfortunately the case with India is quite otherwise. The present system of British Administration not only sweeps away to England the whole profits of the foreign trade, but also drains away a portion of the annual production itself of the country. So India, instead of making *any* addition from its "profits of foreign trade" to its yearly production, a deduction has to be ma.de from such production in estimating the actual quantity that ultimately remains for the use of the people of India. A portion of the actual production, through the channel of foreign trade, goes clean out of the country to England, without an atom of material return. The foreign trade of India becomes the channel through which India's present greatest misfortune and evil operates. Instead of there being any addition from foreign trade to the annual production of India, there is actually a diminution or drain of it, clean out of the country to England, to the extent of some £18,000,000 a year, together with and over and above all its "profits of trade." I grieve, therefore, that I have nothing to *add* (emphasis original) from "profits of trade" as Mr. Danvers suggests, but much to *substract* (emphasis original)[77]

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[76] Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of The Hon'ble Dadbhai Naoroji (With Life and Portrait)* edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 442.
[77] Ibid., p. 443.

At another place in the same essay Dadabhai states that Mr. Danvers says:

> Mr. Dadabhai makes out the total value of the produce of the Punjab to be Rs. 27,72,56,263 and that from manufactures and mines Rs. 4,11,40,058. To this he adds, to meet any omissions, a further margin of three and half crores, making the whole produce of the Punjab 35.25 crores of Rupees, "which for a population of 17,600,000[78] gives Rs. 20 per head per annum at the outside for the year 1876-77," to which year the figures he has taken refer. At page 27 of his tables he shows that the cost of absolute necessaries of life of an agricultural labourer is Rs. 34 per annum, but he omits to explain how, under these circumstances, the people of the Punjab managed to live, and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions how, with only Rs.20 per annum, he can provide for an expenditure of Rs. 34.[79]

Dadabhai responds by saying that "this is the very question he wants government to explain– how they can expect people to manage to live, under such circumstances, without continuously sinking in poverty."[80] He further adds, "the first real question is, – are these facts or not? If not, then what are the actual facts of the 'means and wants' of the people of India? If they are, then the question is for Mr. Danvers and government to answer how people can manage to live. The answer to the question is however obvious, viz. that as the balance of income every year, available for the use of the people of India, does not suffice for the wants of the year, the capital wealth of the country is being drawn upon, and the country goes on becoming poorer and poorer, and more and more weakened in its capacity of production; and that the American War, for a little while, gave, and the various loans, give a show of prosperity to end in greater burdens, and great destruction by famines."[81] Dadabhai invokes Lord Lawrence and says that these facts of insufficiency of the means for the wants prove late Lawrence's statements made in 1864 as viceroy and in 1873 before the Finance Committee. In 1864 Lord Lawrence said that "India was on the whole a very poor country and the mass of the people enjoyed only scanty subsistence; and in 1873 he repeated that the mass of the people of India were so miserably poor that they had barely the means of subsistence, that it was as a man could do to feed his family or half feed them, let alone spending

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[78] This figure of population is from the Census Report of 1871.
[79] Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of The Hon'ble Dadbhai Naoroji (With Life and Portrait)* edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 448.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.

money on what might be called luxuries or conveniences. Such then is the manner in which the people of India manage to live; scanty subsistence, and dying away by millions at the very touch of drought."[82]

For years, "the Indian leaders had taken the position that not only was India poor, but that she was growing poorer day by day. They hammered incessantly at the theme of the ever-growing, ever-deepening poverty of the Indian masses. For example, G. K. Gokhale made this the keynote of his famous budget speech of 1902 and, after examining the question from all angles, came to the conclusion that the material condition of the mass of the people in India was 'steadily deteriorating'."[83] "To the national leadership, famines were clear proof of India's poverty, and their ever increasing intensity, extent, and mortality, an 'infallible index' of the growing impoverishment of the country. R. C. Dutt wrote, 'the famines which have desolated India within the last quarter of the nineteenth century are unexampled in their extent and intensity in the history of ancient or modern times.'"[84] Bipan Chandra points out that "only two taxes whose yield could serve as an index of the country's material condition were income tax and salt tax – the former in respect of the middle classes and the latter in relation to the masses. The revenue from income tax, it was pointed out, had remained more or less stationary over the years, while the yield from salt tax had not expanded in proportion to the increase in population. This latter fact, pointing to a fall in the per capita consumption of such a basic and essential ingredient of human consumption as salt, was in realty a major witness to the deteriorating condition of the masses."[85] The drain of resources and the recurrent famine was a co-existent colonial phenomenon.

One major contribution of Dadabhai Naoroji to the study of Indian economy has to elaborate the structure and operation of colonial economic mechanisms and its effect upon the Indian economy. Naoroji held that "Drain" was at the very heart of the colonial economic mechanism. Ambirajan writes that "Economic Drain" is the model by which Naoroji analyses the nature of the 19th century economy, and gives an explanation of

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[82] Ibid., p. 449.
[83] Bipan Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India,* New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1969. p. 27.
[84] Ibid., p. 29.
[85] Ibid., p. 35.

the poverty observed amidst a predominant section of Indian population."[86] "The Drain Theory suggested that the colonial economic system enabled a vast transfer of income and wealth from India to Britain for which nothing was received in return. On the contrary this continuous outflow of resources resulted in economically ruining the country. The burden of drain was not seen solely in the amount of resources transferred without receiving any benefit. Naoroji saw in this an element of opportunities forgone as he wrote: "The loss of India must be measured by how much more India would have benefited, had this enormous drain of all the years been put to India's own disposal and fructified in Indian pockets". The Drain was not merely to be equated with one-time plunder, but something far insidious and deadly. Naoroji making a reference to the 11th century Afghan invader of India, Mahmood of Ghazni said that at least after the 18th invasion the plunder stopped, but the British colonial drain seems to have no end."[87] Bipan Chandra argues that, "in the opinion of the Indian national leadership one of the most important cause of the poverty of India was the drain of wealth to England. As per them this drain was the very fountainhead of all economic evil in India. In fact, a great deal of the early nationalist agitation during the period under study was based on the 'drain theory' or the belief that a part of India's national wealth was being exported to England for which India got no adequate economic or material returns. Or, in other words, India was being compelled to pay an indirect tribute to the English nation."[88] G.V. Joshi also viewed drain as a loss of capital. Joshi argued that "the drain should be regarded not as a proportion of the annual gross national product but as a proportion of the annual net potential surplus or saving."[89]

But it should also be kept in mind here that the discourse over the drain of resources in varied forms from India to Britain through the instrument of colonial rule pre-existed Dadabhai Naoroji's writings. Though there is no doubt that Dadabhai made the whole debate more rigorous. Quoting James Stuart, Kalikinkar Datta has written that India's economy could not naturally remain stable and ceased to be conducive to the happiness of her people, when a vast amount of her wealth flowed out of the country with 'no

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[86] S. Ambirajan, "Economic Thinking of Dadabhai Naoroji" in *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* edited by P. D. Hajela, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 20.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Bipan Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India,* New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1969. p. 636.
[89] Pratima Trivedi, "Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji", *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* edited by P. D. Hajela, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 184.

equivalent returns.' Huge drain on India's resources from the post-Plassey years, described by some as the *Plassey Plunder*, was indeed a highly regrettable feature in her economic history and inevitably caused her impoverishment. Though the amount of drain during early periods of British regime in Bengal is impossible to measure accurately but still some authors like Montgomery Martin, Brooks Adams, William Digby along with some other authors have roughly estimated and have affirmed in general that a vast amount of drain took place after the defeat of Indian ruler at Plassey. Montgomery Martin, after examining the records of the India House and after minute survey made in 1807-1814 of the condition of some provinces of Bengal and Bihar stated in his book *Easter India*: "It is impossible to avoid remarking two facts as particularly striking– first, the richness of the country surveyed, and second, the poverty of the inhabitants."[90] Even James Mill wrote that, "… It is idle to talk of a surplus revenue being the sole source of the benefits derivable from India. On the contrary, it is, and it ought to be, the least even of our pecuniary advantages, for its transfer to England is an abstraction of Indian capital, for which no equivalent is given; it is an exhausting drain upon the resourcse of the country, the issue of which is replaced by no reflux; it is an extraction of the life-blood from the veins of national industry, which no subsequent introduction of nourishment is furnished to restore…"[91] To think Kalikinkar Datta says that, "According to Verelst[92], during the five years following the grant of the *Diwani*, goods and bullion of the total value of 4,941,611 pounds sterling went out of the country."[93] Quoting Alexander Dow (who was known for writing *History Of Hindostan*), Kalikinkar Datta wrote that, "about 1770 Dow writes that the English East India Company began to drain Bengal and observes that Bengal lost yearly

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[90] As quoted by K. Ramamurthy in "Dadabhai Naoroji's Contribution to Indian Economic Thought", in *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* edited by P. D. Hajela, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 128.

[91] James Mill, *The History of British India Vol. VI.* Fourth Edition, With Notes and Continuation by Horace Hayman Wilson, London: James Madden and Co., 1840. p. 672.

[92] Harry Verelst was a colonial administrator with the British East India Company and served as the governor of Bengal from 1767 to 1769. In 1772, he wrote a book called *A View of the Rise, Progress and Present State of the English Government in Bengal: Including a Reply to the Misrepresentation of Mr. Bolts, and Other Writers*. He discussed the drain out of Bengal to British settlements in this book. He estimated the total amounted of drain as 4,941,611 pounds sterling, from Bengal to other English settlements, which consisted of the following: the supplies of bullion from Bengal to other English settlements as 1,284,008 pounds sterling; the value of goods, stores, bills, etc. sent from Bengal to other English settlements as 620,337 pounds sterling; and charges on the European ships of the English as 3,037,266 pounds sterling. See, *A view etc. of Bengal*, 1772. p. 81.

[93] Kalikinkar Datta, *Survey of india's Social Life and Economic Condition in the Eighteenth century, 1707-1813*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1978. p. 156.

to Europe on account of this drain 1,477,500 pounds sterling."[94] Another writer J C Sinha estimates that during the period 1757 to 1780 the amount of drain on Bengal's resources was around 38 million pounds sterling.[95] This figure of 38 million pounds sterling of drain from Bengal to Britain or other English settlements is based upon taking into account only principle items as the data related to other items were not available.[96] Kalikinkar Datta mentions Montgomery Martin who, in 1838, referred to the desolating effects of an increasing exhaustion of the capital of Bengal due to economic drain out of the province during the preceding half century amounting to three or four million pounds a year.

James Grant mentioned in his *Analysis of the Finances of Bengal* that the drain of wealth from Bengal in 1786 was around Rs. 18,000,00[97] (excluding the amount of not less than twenty lacks sent annually to the other Presidencies of India).[98] R. C. Dutt writes, "perhaps the greatest evil from which the country suffered was the continuous Economic Drain from Bengal, which went on year after year for the profit of the Company, or for their expenses in other parts of the world. A statement of the revenues

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[94] Ibid., pp. 156-57.

[95] J. C. Sinha, *Economic Annals of Bengal,* London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1927. pp. 51-52.

[96] This amount has been arrived at as follows:

(1) The drain to England resulting from the purchase of bills on foreign companies at the average rate of one million pounds sterling per annum (*Ninth Report*, 1783) during 24 years from 1757 to 1780 … … £24,000,000

(2) The drain to England on account of the Company from 1757 to 1765, say, … … … … £2,000,000

(3) The drain to England caused by the export of silver to China by the East india Company at the average rate of £100,000 per annum (*Ninth Report*, 1783) during the 24 years from 1757 to 1780 … … £2,400,000

(4) The drain arising from the "investment" out of surplus revenue and out of the proceeds of the sale of bills on the Court of directors during the period 1766 to 1780 … … … … … … … … … … £10,000,000

Total: £38,400,000

Sinha further says that: To this sum of £38,400,4000, should be added the money value of the drain to England, caused by the export of bullion (1) to China, by private English individuals, and (2) to Madras and Bombay, by the Government of Bengal, in providing the Company's investments from those places. As this cannot be determined, even approximately, it had to be omitted from the calculation. Nor for the same reason could shipping charges and other invisible items of export and import be considered. See, J. C. Sinha, *Economic Annals of Bengal,* London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1927. p. 52.

[97] The components of the total amount was as follows:

Prime cost of piecegoods exported by the English East India Company	Rs. 10,000,00
Yearly supply for China Trade	Rs. 2,000,00
Other European Companies and mercantile adventures	Rs. 6,000,00
	Total: Rs. 18,000,00

See, Kalikinkar Datta, *Survey of india's Social Life and Economic Condition in the Eighteenth century, 1707-1813*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1978. p. 157.

[98] Kalikinkar Datta, *Survey of india's Social Life and Economic Condition in the Eighteenth century, 1707-1813*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1978. p. 157.

and expenses of Bengal during the first six years after the grant of the Dewani to the East India Company is given in the Fourth Report of the House of Commons, 1773, from which the figures are compiled here as follows:[99]

Table. 3.8.

Year	**Gross Collection**	**Nett revenues after deducing tribute to the Great Moghul, allowance to the Nawab, charges of collection, salaries, commissions, &c.**	**Total expenses, civil, military, buildings, fortifications, &c.**	**Nett annual balance**
May April	**£**	**£**	**£**	**£**
1765 to 1766	2,258,227	1,681,427	1,210,360	471,067
1766 ,, 1767	3,805,817	2,527, 594	1, 274,093	1,253,501
1767 ,, 1768	3,608,009	2,359,005	1,487,383	871,622
1768 ,, 1769	3,787,207	2,402,191	1,573,129	829,062
1769 ,, 1770	3,341,976	2,089,368	1,752,556	336,812
1770 ,, 1771	3,332,343	2,007,176	1,732,088	275,088
Total	**20,133,579**	**13,066,761**	**9,027,609**	**4,37,152**

Source: R. C. Dutt, *Indian Trade, Manufactures And Finance*, Calcutta: Elm Press, 1905. p. 29.

R. C. Dutt further writes that "these figures show that nearly one-third of the net revenues of Bengal was annually remitted out of the country. But the actual drain from the country was much larger. A large portion of the civil and military expenses consisted in the pay of European officials who sent all their savings out of India. And the vast fortunes reared by those who had excluded the country merchants from their legitimate trades and industries were annually sent out of India. The actual drain from Bengal is perhaps more correctly represented in the figures for imports and exports for the years 1766, 1767, and 1768, compiled by Governor Harry Verelst which are as follows– Imports: £ 624,375; Exports: £ 6,311,250."[100] "In other words, the country sent out about ten times what imported. Mr. Verelst himself saw the magnitude of the

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[99] R. C. Dutt, *Indian Trade, Manufactures And Finance*, Calcutta: Elm Press, 1905. pp. 28-29.
[100] Ibid., p. 29.

evil, and was never tired of describing its lamentable consequences on the material condition of the people of Bengal,"[101] continued R. C. Dutt. There were several forms of this economic drain during later half of eighteenth century, and Bengal was chiefly affected by it, as the income of Madras and Bombay were less than their needs during those days. It was not incidental that Bengal was the first to be hit by a great famine in 1770, the first great famine in the long series of famines which took place post 1757 till the British left in 1947. The advent and departure of British Raj was marked by famine, and both the times the famines took place in Bengal (Great Bengal famine of 1770 and 1943). According to Dadabhai Naoroji between 1814 and 1865 about 350 million pounds sterling went to England by way of Drain. He estimated this figure from India's export surplus over her imports during the said time period. Different nationalist leaders made attempts to estimate the amount of drain annually flowing out of India to England. There is considerable variation in these estimates because different authors adopted different methods for calculating the drain and because India's export surplus was undergoing continual change in the ascending order. It was also estimated that one-fourth of all the revenue derived in India was annually remitted to England as home charges. According to Dadabhai Naoroji;s estimates the drain which was to the tune of 3 million pounds sterling in the beginning of the nineteenth century increased year after year with the result that the annual average for the period 1835-39 amounted to £ 6,000,000 and in the period 1870-72 it came to be £ 31,000,000 (See Table). By the end of the century the drain remained around 30 million pounds sterling.

Table. 3.9.

Years	**Yearly average in £**
1835 to 1839	£6,000,000
1840 to 1844	6,600,000
1845 to 1849	8,700,000
1850 to 1854	8,400,000
1855 to 1859	8,700,000
1860 to 1864	19,000,000
1865 to 1869	27,500,000
1870 to 1872	31,000,000

Source: Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (On Indian Politics) of The Hon'ble Dadbhai Naoroji (With Life and Portrait)* edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh, Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1887. p. 288.

[101] Ibid., p. 30.

G. V. Joshi estimated that during the period 1834 to 1838, India was drained to the extent of nearly 800 million pounds sterling. D. E. Wachha in the year 1901 estimated the drain to be of the order of Rs. 30 to 40 crores per year. S.N. Banerjee estimated the average annual drain for the last 30 years of the 19th century to be about £ 30 million. R. C. Dutt's maintained that the drain was about £ 20 million per year during the early years of the 20th century. R. C. Dutt writes, "During the decade 1887-1897 there has been in the British Isles an accumulated net remission of taxation of £21,000,000, and during this decade there has been no remission of taxation in India (except a modification of cotton duties, made in the interests of Lancashire), but there has been an accumulated imposition of new taxation amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 29,000,000. This is the essential difference between the financial policy of England and the financial policy of India in times of uninterrupted peace. The strain of taxation is relaxed in England in times of peace; the strain of taxation goes on ever increasing in India."[102] M. G. Ranade observed that more than one third of the national income of India was taken away by the British as drain in some form or the other.[103] The effect of the drain on Indian economy and on its people were disastrous. The public debt policy of the government and payment of annual interest on them meant increasing tax burden on Indian people. Highly regressive taxation was imposed on people for servicing the Government of India's debt raised in England. As per Dadabhai Naoroji, tax burden in India for the year 1886 was 14.3 per cent of income, whereas it was merely 6.92 per cent of income in England at the same period of time.[104] Dadabhai also pointed out that public expenditure had increased from £ 32 million (in 1856) to £ 49 million (1870-71). A substantial part of this expenditure was being met by increasing the tax on salt (a highly regressive form of taxation which affected the poor masses directly).[105] The tax burden became more repressive for Indian people as the tax proceeds were used to make payments to British creditors and Indian people hardly got anything by way of social

[102] Romesh C. Dutt, *England And India: A Record of Progress During a Hundred Years 1785-1885* London: Chatto & Windus, 1897. p. 161.
[103] Pratima Trivedi, "Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji", *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* edited by P. D. Hajela, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication, 2001. p. 181.
[104] As per Dadbhai Naoroji, England raised £ 70,000,000 in taxation out of an annual income of £ 800,000,000 thus taxes constituting around only 8 per cent of national income, while India the amount of taxes came to be £ 50,000,000 out of a national income of £ 340,000,000 thus constituting about 15 per cent of the national income.
[105] One of Dadabhai's calculations shows that nearly 75 per cent of the tax revenues of the Government of India was derived from sources that impinged upon the poor masses of the country. Further on, only 15 per cent of the total proceeds were spent upon the public welfare services, while the costs of defence and maintenance of internal order account 60 per cent of the total public expenditure.

services and welfare activities in return for the payment of taxes. The contemporary nationalist intelligentsia argued that when tax proceeds are spent abroad it means siphoning off the resources out of India, thus impoverishing India's trade, agriculture and industries and leaving the economy stagnant and masses poor and miserable. The drain also meant a permanent loss of employment and opportunities which would have cropped up if the resources siphoned off to Britain were spent internally. R. C. Dutt argued "when taxes are raised and spent in a country, the money circulates among the people, fructifies trade, industries and agriculture, and in one shape or another reaches the mass of the people. But when the taxes in a country are remitted out of it, the money is lost to the country forever, it does not stimulate her trade or industries or reach the people in any form."[106]

In his recent book *An Era of darkness*, Shashi Tharoor writes, "at the beginning of the eighteenth century, as the British economic historian Angus Maddison has demonstrated, India's share of the world economy was 23 per cent, as large as all of Europe put together. (It had been 27 per cent in 1700, when the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb's treasury raked in £100 million in tax revenue alone.) By the time British departed India, it had dropped to just over 3 per cent. The reason was simple: India was governed for the benefit of Britain. Britain's rise for 200 years was financed by its depredations in India."[107] Aditya Mukherjee argues that colonial Indian made the modern Britain. Mukherjee writes that, "at the heart of colonialism lay surplus appropriation from the colony to the metropolis or the colonisers. It was neither a "fit of absent mindedness" nor the desire to take on "the White Man's Burden" to "civilise" and "modernise" the "child" people of the colonial countries which led to sustained colonialism."[108] The colonial economic mechanism was such that the Indian exports remained unrequited as they were paid back by Indian rupees only. This unrequited exports along with Home charges (as explained by Dadabhai Naoroji) constituted the drain from (colonial) India to Great Britain. The drain assumed a significant size and volume after East India Company taking over the collection of revenues in the wake of defeat of Indian Ruler at Battle of Plassey in 1757 and the extraction of resources and

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[106] Romesh C. Dutt, *The Economic History of India In the Victorian Age From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of The Twentieth Century Vol. II.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, 1904. p. xiv.
[107] Shashi Tharoor, *An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India* New Delhi: Aleph, 2016. p. 4.
[108] Aditya Mukherjee, 'Empire: How Colonial India made Modern Britain', *Economic & Political Weekly, December 11, 2010, Vol. XLV. No. 50.* p. 74.

drain became more systematized after 1857 when the Crown herself took over the charge of administration. This drain of resources in the form of Home charges and through other means along with the flow of unrequited exports continued till 1947.[109] During this period colonial power also destroyed Indian home industry in order to felicitate the creation of a market for Lancashire products. In other words, the so-called (British) Industrial revolution was financed by Britain's exploitation of its colony and at the cost of complete destruction of Indian industry. Mukherjee points out that the "British net foreign investments as a percentage of her net domestic capital formation in fixed assets was as high as 86 between 1880 and 1889 and had peaked at 114 between 1905 and 1914. India's tribute alone was estimated to have financed more than two-fifths or 40% of Britain's balance of payment deficit in this period."[110] Mukherjee further states that, "it has been calculated that between 1871 and 1916 the surpluses transferred from India, calculated after applying a compound rate of interest of 4%, amounted to a conservative estimate of about £3.2 billion. If one compares this figure with an estimate of about £4 billion as what constituted total British foreign investments abroad in 1913 (including reinvestment of interests and dividends) it becomes clear what a preponderant role India played in British capital transfers abroad which made it the "economic hub of the world between 1870 and 1913"."[111] I am quoting here the data of unrequited transfer of resources from India to England because it was precisely during this period three great famines occurred. If one wishes to understand the real causes of occurrence of famines one will have to delve deeper and see how the transformation from India having a share of 19.7 per cent of total world manufacturing output of raw cotton textiles and being one of the largest producer of raw cotton textiles in the world till end of eighteenth century; to India becoming insignificant in the field of raw cotton textile production under the colonial regime. By 1860, India's share of raw cotton textiles in total world manufacturing output fell to 8.6 percent. And it reached the dismal level of merely 1.4 per cent by 1913.[112] A country which was once the most prosperous in the world had been pushed to the constant threat of being on the verge of hunger, starvation and famine owing to its progressive deindustrialization in the wake of colonial rule. In the backdrop of the recurrent famines, Dadabhai Naoroji

[109] Ibid., p. 76.
[110] Ibid., p. 77.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid., p. 78.

initiated the debate upon poverty of India (which was later known as Drain theory) towards the last quarter of nineteenth century. Naoroji argued that annual drain of resources from India to Great Britain is the chief cause behind the Poverty of India. The colonial extraction of surplus and drain of resources from India to great Britain was not as systematized till the revolt of 1857 as it became after the revolt being crushed and Crown herself taking over the colonial reign. The annual drain from India to Great Britain was estimated to be 30 million pound after the revolt, whereas earlier it was merely three million pound. Between 1860 and 1880, there were seven famines and scarcities in the country which took the life of millions of people. Naoroji attributed these famines as well as the poverty of Indian people to the British system of government in India and the colonial practice of drain of wealth from India that Great Britain had engaged in since the very beginning of colonial regime in India. The composition of the Drain, Naoroji said, consisted of the following:

(i) Remittance by European officials (a) of their savings, and (b) for their expenditure in England from their salaries and pensions.
(ii) Indian government's expenditure in Britain including purchase of government stores and salaries and pensions paid in there. (This was also known as Home charges.)
(iii) Remittances by non-official Europeans like planters and businessmen.
(iv) Interest payments in England for English capital invested in India like Railways.[113]

Tharoor argues that "Britain's Industrial Revolution was built on the destruction of India's thriving manufacturing industries."[114] Textiles served as an emblematic case in this regard. The British colonial regime systematically destroyed India's cotton textile manufacturing and exports, substituting Indian textiles with British textiles manufactured in England. From a leading manufacturer of cotton textiles, India was turned into a producer and exporter of raw cotton and consumer of British fabrics. Tharoor points out that, "the value of Bengal's textile exports alone is estimated to have been around 16 million rupees annually in the 1750s, of which some 5 to 6 million rupees' worth was exported by European traders in India. In addition, silk exports from Bengal were worth another 6.5 million rupees annually till 1753, declining to some 5

[113] S. Ambirajan, 'Economic Thinking of Dadabhai Naoroji', in P. D. Hajela (edt.) *Economic Thoughts of Dadabhai Naoroji* New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 2001, p. 22.
[114] Shashi Tharoor, *An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India* New Delhi: Aleph, 2016. p. 7.

million thereafter. During the century to 1757, while the British were just traders and not rulers, their demand is estimated to have raised Bengal's textile and silk production by as much as 33 per cent."[115] India enjoyed almost 25 per cent share of the global trade in textiles during early eighteenth century. But after the East India Company took over the Diwani rights of Bengal following the defeat of Indian ruler at Battle of Plassey in 1757, the Indian textile manufacturing industry was slowly destroyed by colonial power. After taking over the revenue administration of Bengal British started paying the Indian exports of textiles and silk with Indian rupees generated from the revenue collection of Bengal. The payment done with rupees, instead of pounds proved disastrous as it lowered the price of Indian textiles further. Also Indian exports remained unrequited thereafter. "British exports of textiles to India soared further. By 1830, these had reached 60 millions yards of cotton goods a year; in 1858 this mounted to 968 million yards; the billion yard mark was crossed in 1870 – more than three yards a year for every single Indian, man, woman or child."[116] "As late as 1896, Indian mills produced only 8 per cent of the total cloth consumed in India. By 1913, this had grown to 20 per cent, and the setbacks faced by Britain with the disruptions of the World War I allowed Indian textile manufacturers to slowly recapture the domestic market. In 1936, 62 per cent of the cloth sold in India was made by Indians; and by the time British left the country, 76 per cent (in 1945)."[117] "India's share of world manufacturing exports fell from 27 per cent to 2 per cent under British rule. … Under the British, the share of industry in India's GDP was only 3.8 per cent in 1913, and at its peak reached 7.5 per cent when British left India in 1947. And at the end of British rule, modern industry employed only 2.5 million people out of india's population of 350 million."[118]

Huge amount of Drain took place during colonial regime in India. Tharoor points out that British extracted from India approximately £18,000,000 each year between 1765 and 1815. Naoroji had argued that "India had exported an average of £13,000,000 worth of goods to Britain each year from 1835 to 1872 with no corresponding return of money; in fact, payments to people residing in Britain, whether profits to Company shareholders, dividend to railway investors or pensions to retired officials, made up a loss of £30 million a year. Paul Baran had calculated that 8 per cent of India's GNP was

[115] Ibid., p. 8.
[116] Ibid., p. 9.
[117] Ibid., p. 10.
[118] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

transferred to Britain each year."[119] In 1901, William Digby calculated the net amount extracted by the economic drain in the nineteenth century at £4,187,922,732. Remember that this amount is only for the nineteenth century. A comparative look at statistics tell the nature of British colonialism in India and narrates the story how one of the richest and the most resourceful country of the world, "which together with China accounted for almost 75 per cent of world industrial output in 1750, was transformed by the process of the imperial rule into one of the poorest and socially and economically one of the most backward country in the world at the time of independence in 1947."[120] "The annual revenue of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (1618-1707) were vast. Indeed, tax revenues aside, his total income at the time is said to have amounted to $450,000,000, more than ten times that of (his contemporary) Louis XIV."[121] "In 1600, when the East India Company was established, Britain was producing just 1.8 per cent of the world's GDP, while India was generating some 23 per cent. By 1940, after nearly two centuries of the Raj, Britain accounted for nearly 10 per cent of world GDP, while India had been reduced to a poor 'third-world' country, destitute and starving, a global poster child of poverty and famine. Ferguson admits that 'between 1757 and 1900 British per capita gross domestic product increased in real terms by 347 per cent, Indian by a mere 14 per cent'. Even that figure masks a steadily worsening performance by the Raj: from 1900 to 1947 the rate of growth of the economy was below 1 per cent, while population grew steadily at well over 3.5 per cent, leavened only by high level of child mortality that shrank the net rate of population growth to the equivalent of economic growth, leaving a net growth rate near zero."[122]

Search for an Indian Economics or Indian Political Economy: Early nationalists' engagement with Classical Political Economy and List's System of National Political Economy

B. N. Ganguly writes, that "early in the nineteenth century, when educated Indians began to reflect on the economic impact of mercantilist imperialism in India they appealed to Adam Smith's liberal economic doctrines to deal with contemporary economic problems."[123] Rammohun Roy, for example, pleaded for non-discrimination

[119] Ibid., p. 24-25.
[120] Ibid., p. 253-254.
[121] Ibid., p. 257.
[122] Ibid., p. 254.
[123] Ganguli, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

between the India and other dependencies, such as Canada. He was, indeed, the first Indian who served as a medium through which the critical economic philosophy of Adam Smith mingling with Benthamite liberalism, found vivid expression in India. Smith's *The Wealth of Nation* reflected on the transforming condition of the western world's economic structure in the wake of capitalism which gave rise to the economic principles like competition and free trade. But what appealed the nationalists most was Smith's anti-mercantilism and his condemnation of monopoly. Smith's stance on mercantilism and monopoly won a kind of general approbation among Indian. Ganguli explicates, "once it was understood that it is wrong to identify the interests of merchants with those of the *nation,* one could begin to think of the national economy as a whole and the increase of national wealth– the keynote of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations.*"[124] What was also implicit in the book was the idea of the emergence of a new form of nation-state as a result of structural economic transformation. This had in no sense any resemblance with the Indian context but it enabled educated Indians to conceive the people or the country as a whole. Ganguli points out that, "in one of Rammohun Roy's essays we do come across the phrase "national improvement.""[125] He further explains:

What did make sense to the educated Indians was Adam Smith's seminal idea that the real source of a country's wealth is its annual labour and that its wealth could be increased only by making its labour more effective and by husbanding and accumulating the products of labour. Fundamentally, this is the essence of the economics of development ...We find clear evidence in Indian thinking of a tendency to regard "industrialisation," as a part of economic modernisation, in the broad sense of widening and deepening of capital in the economy as a whole. There was also emphasis on the spread of education and on the abandonment of the outmoded way of life and attitudes. A rational agrarian system was advocated on grounds of equity as well as for the sake of capital formation and the consequent increase of the per capita productivity of the bulk of the population. This was a kind of emphasis which was clearly inherent in Adam Smith's basic doctrines.[126]

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[124] Ibid., p. 56.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.

Rammohan Roy was aware of the economic distortions caused by a combination of government with monopoly trade and monopoly profits and a system of production and trade which had prevailed in Britain prior to the industrial revolution was later discarded there, but continued in the new British possessions in India. Nevertheless, he also foresaw the pontentiality of a modern, progressive Indian economy on the rational basis of partnership between the British and the Indians and not on colonial servility and tutelage. In any case, he regarded the British rule as providential in the sense that it afforded an opportunity to India to develop her unity and nationhood and the reform her social system, in order to modernize and grow into a free nation in the course of time.[127] At this time the thought of nationalists were imbued with the ideas of social and economic modernism. But the educated Indians' belief that British colonial state could prove a carrier of economic development was soon to be evaporated. The "Revolt of 1857" marked a watershed in this regard. It destroyed the atmosphere of thought in which Lord Bentick wrote his famous Minute. Ganguli highlights that, "the ideas of trusteeship, in the sense of state initiative for the modernisation and development of Indian society and economy, was considered not only inconsistent with the principle of *laissez-faire*, but also politically dangerous. The attitude of British ruling class hardened during the second half of the nineteenth century for economic and political reasons."[128] The event of 1857 brought a rupture in Indian economic thinking. There remained a short period of little engagement and activity. But, again towards the end of the nineteenth century Indian economic philosophy turned to the basic problems of economic and social modernization. The impact of western economic thinking on nationalist thought was more direct this time but now there was more appeal to European schools of thought (German Political Economy and French Enlightenment) rather than English economic philosophy. There were two deepest concerns before nationalist economist in this period: First, "A search for an "Indian economics" which could provide, on the lines of Friedrich List's National System of Political Economy, a conceptual frame for the prevailing spirit of economic nationalism which had grown in the wake of the Indian nationalist movement."[129]; Second, "the need for unmasking the liberal face of British imperialism, in order to isolate and identify the political element

[127]Ibid., p. 23.
[128] Ibid., p. 58.
[129] Ibid., p. 59.

in the "political economy," which lay hidden behind the theory."[130] By this time, Indian thinking was under influence of the ideas of French Enlightenment, the spirit of Positivism in western social thought and orthodox liberalism as a humanist frame of reference. But what should be noted here is the quality of nationalist thinkers to not just remain on the receiving end of these ideas but an effort to filter these ideas and to judge the utility of these ideas by applying it to Indian context and situation and see whether it is suited for the interest and development of Indian society. They were barely a passive receiver.

Now, we would want to discuss how Malthus was received in India and what reaction he generated here. The reason behind discussing Malthus here is twofold; the influence of Malthus was strong and enduring in India as in England, and Malthus's propositions on population had huge impact on the developments in political economy and the 'poor' was directly implicated in his theoretical schema.[131] Rammohun Roy was a contemporary of Malthus. The earliest response in India to Malthus's population theory came by Rammohun Roy as early as 1831: "Does the population increase rapidly in India?" His answer was as follows: "It does increase considerably from the early marriage of the people and from the males so seldom leaving their families." He referred, in this connection, to "the occasional *positive checks* to this superabundance" and added that the decimation caused by the cholera epidemic had "greatly reduced the surplus population, and condition of the labourers has since been greatly improved, in comparison with what it was before the people were thinned by this melancholy scourge." Prithwish Chandra Ray notes that Malthus had referred to Indian demographic situation in following terms:

Malthus, in his treatise on the Principle of Population tells us that, though the Hindu laws encouraged population increase, "strict and absolute chastity," "the hard conditions imposed by law in choice of a wife," "the celibacy of an elder brother," "the difficulty for lower classes of people to obtain wives," "dreadful famines," "the practice of female infanticide in certain tribes," have always acted as very powerful factors in checking it. In spite of all this, the population has always been very large.[132]

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[130] Ibid.
[131] Malthus's population theory has been discussed in detail in Chapter II of the present work.
[132] Prithwish Chandra Ray, *The Poverty problem in India: Being a dissertation on the causes and Remedies of Indian Povertry* Calcutta: Thacker & Spink, 1895. pp. 167-68.

But Ganguli notes that Bankim Chandra Chatterjee had given a more sophisticated analysis of the bearing of an increase of population on the wages of poorest sections of population (in his incisive essay on plight of Bengal peasant). Ganguli writes:

> It was sophisticated analysis, because he showed an awareness of the connection established by Malthus and James Mill (following Adam Smith[133]) between Malthusian population theory and the classical wage-fund theory. Bankim Chandra started with assumption that the growth of social wealth was divided into two shares: (1) wages of manual labour and (2) incomes of brain-workers, which he called "profits." Wage-earners never received any share of profits; they only earned wages. Thus, whatever accrued as wages would be divided amongst the labourers, irrespective of their numbers. If the "fund" available for wages increased, as the result of an increase of wealth, and if population did not increase more than in proportion, the working class would be able to maintain its standard of living. If population outran the increase of social wealth, there would be decline in wages and the labourers' standard of living.[134]

The most remarkable response to Malthus's population theory came from G. V. Joshi. Joshi attacked the logic of Malthusian population theory and said that it's hypothetical and rests only on assumption and it doesn't possess a truth claim in general. G. V. Joshi observed:

> The Malthusian doctrine of over-population is only a hypothetical truth, essentially resting on an assumption, and is not by means of general and unqualified validity…There is always a normal ratio between population and production which determines the average standard of life of every community.[135]…When both population and production advance at an equal and normal rate, the ratio is maintained and there is no disturbance of the national standard of living. When, however, population multiplies at an *abnormal rate*, while production keeps up its normal level, there is properly speaking the evil of overpopulation. But when production falls off while the

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[133] It should be kept in mind here that Adam Smith did not give any theory of population. In fact, the category of population as a concept in political economy was introduced by Malthus only. Before him, instead of a concept of population, there was a notion of populousness. Smith did not see the increase in population as a sign of misery, but more as a sign of prosperity. Even mercantilist saw population as a source of wealth. Malthus linked the population to the means of subsistence and said that the human population increases geometrically but the means of subsistence is subject to limitation and it could grow only till a point. In fact, Smith argued for higher wages for the poor so that their condition improve but Malthus argued that the higher wages lead to a consequent misery because when the wages are higher poor tend to become idle and produce more.

[134] Ganguli, *op. cit.,* p. 65.

[135] This was an echo of Henry Carey's contention that human numbers regulate themselves sufficiently in a well-governed society. Indian writers were fond of setting Carey against Malthus and Ricardo.

> population is advancing at its *normal* rate, we have what we may call the evil of *under-production*. The Capitalist Political Economy of the West, looking only to one term of the ratio, confounds the two evils, in their nature so different, and styles them as *over-population* in either case. In India, as we have seen before, population is not increasing beyond its normal rate, and if the total production of the country does not come up to the level of its requirements, where there is such a wealth of material resources, we have clearly not what Political Economist call the evil of *over-population* to deal with, but the evil of *under-population* which they do not recognize.[136]

In the conceptual figuration of poor in classical political economy the poor is figuring more as an universal category. The theoretical abstraction from the Western European historical experiences could not be reduced to a generalized or universal concept and applied to colonial context to yield the same result. The search for an Indian economics or Indian political economy provides is an instance that how nationalist leaders dealt with the contemporary epistemic paradigm. The nationalist leaders believed that the problem with the classical economics is that it could be apt to explain static situation but could hardly cope with dynamic situation. Keeping this in mind it was believed by the nationalist leaders "that the principles or laws of economics were not abstract and universal like those of physics or mathematics, but were relative and historically conditioned and derived; they differed in time and space. Hence, the specific stage of economic development of a people and not abstract economic theories should be the decisive factor in determining economic policies for a country." The idea of Indian political economy set in systematically after a lecture delivered by Ranade at Deccan College entitled *Indian Political Economy* in 1892 which was later published as an essay. He complained that, "the claim that the postulates of classical political economy were universally and absolutely and demonstrably true for all times and places and for all stages of economic development was far from true. Classical economy was based on assumption which were not universally applicable; they had been borne out of specific conditions of England and in fact they were true of no existing society. In particular they had hardly any validity in a backward stagnant agricultural country like India where not competition but status, custom and tradition ruled."[137] He further

[136] As quoted in B. N. Ganguli, *Nineteenth Century India* G. V. Joshi, 'Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha', January and October 1890.

[137] Bipan Chandra, *Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of Indian National Leadership, 1880-1905* New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1969, pp. 709-710.

enunciates the fundamental proposition in the following words: "the laws of economics cannot be of universal application; they are, to a considerable extent reflections of the circumstances and the environments in which they develop; there is a fundamental difference between the physical and the social sciences and the laws of social sciences have to be applied not universally, but relatively, to time and space; and the method in economics must not be purely deductive but historical."[138] Ranade said that "economics being a social science its principles to be derived historically through the study of specific economic activities and not deductively so that they were closely linked with historical experience, practical observation, and social reality."[139] Chandra points out that, "earlier in 1881, Ranade had criticised English economists for looking at the question of Free Trade 'solely from the economic point of view' and ignoring 'the political and social elements which enter into the question', and averred that the economic aspect ought to be subordinated to the higher interests and aspirations of a people 'if political economy is to be anything more than schoolmen's metaphysics'."[140] But having known his basic proposition it should be kept in mind that Ranade's position must be accepted with some qualifications also. Firstly, economies do differ from one another and will continue to differ in several particulars. But, if some of them become subject to similar technological and structural transformations, they begin to have many similar features. North America and many Western European countries have today very similar economic structures, though each country retains its own individuality. In such economies the same laws of economics would be generally applicable. It must also be recognized that environments do not always explain or are not the sole cause of the theories that arise in them, but that there is a certain process of ideation itself which also can give rise to theories. As a discipline becomes more and more scholarly and ceases to be a plaything of pamphleteers or practical politicians or men of public affairs, it gradually acquires a basic theoretical structure. The more academic it becomes, the more it tends to follow a logic of its own, and this fundamental structure seems to be rather impervious to events and happenings, unless the latter are pervasive.

In course of time Ranade's critique of Classical economists came to be widely accepted by other nationalist leaders and economist. Bipan Chandra writes, "this development

[138] N. V. Sovani, 'Ranade's Model of Indian Economy' *Artha Vijnana, Journal of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics,* 1991, p. 1.
[139] Chandra, *op. cit.,* p. 711.
[140] Ibid.

was in the main the product of two factors: (a) Ranade's conclusion- derived from a belief in the relativity of economic doctrines, in their close dependence on social reality, and in their quality of reflecting economic practice- that since India's economic interests and conditions differed from England's principles of economics applicable to it must also be different; and (b) the acceptance of Ranade's premises and conclusions by a large number of other nationalist contemporaries."[141] In his paper on 'The Poverty of India', Dadabhai Naoroji argued that "political economy might be 'all right in a Native-governed country', but was not strictly applicable to a dependent country which had to make 'home remittances and charges'"[142] The sweep and extent of the transition that was taking place in India under the British was overestimated by Ranade mainly because of his failure to appreciate the significance and nature of European or British imperialism. Ranade perhaps believed in the civilizing mission of European imperialism, what later on came to be called the White Man's burden. Ranade might have been influenced by Adam Smith's analysis of the difference between the rule of a commercial company like the East India Company and that of the British Crown. N. V. Sovani writes, "so far as Ranade was concerned, the real character of imperialism remained obscure to him. He was thinking of British rule a Providential dispensation. It is however clear that the central objective of the British colonial policy never changed from the mercantalist days, in its basic purpose and aim though its forms were changed to suit the changing conditions in the metropolitan country."[143]

Ranade wrote, "the change which we should all seek is thus a change from constraint to freedom, from status to contract, from authority to reason, from unorganized to organized life from bigotry to toleration, from blind fatalism to a sense of human dignity. This is what I understand by social evolution, both for individual and society."[144] Ranade wanted State to become the instrument of that change. His views in this respect were very much akin to List's. The Listian analysis of stages of development of a country and the impossibility of reaching higher stages of development if not temporarily protected by state intervention from the full blast of competition from economies which had already reached that stage, were completely accepted by Ranade and applied to the Indian case. The experience particularly during the second half of

[141] Ibid., p. 712.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Sovani, *op. cit.,* p. 14.
[144] M. G. Ranade, *Miscellaneous Writings* Bombay: Manoranjan Press, 1915, pp. 116-7.

the nineteenth century was such that it generated an anti-laissez-faire sentiment among nationalist. Ranade argues, "while the truly liberal and humanist core of the British political economy (especially the ideas of John Stuart Mill) was absorved, it was the German Historical School, and particularly the *anti-laissez-faire* doctrines of List, which, for obvious reasons, became the principle focus of attention."[145] Sovani points out that, "Ranade like German thinkers accepted state as an organic whole not an algebraic sum of the economic units, but had its own life and spirit. Economic laws are derived on the basis of individual response not on universal basis."[146] Accordingly, Ranade criticized the classical economist like Adam Smith, Ricardo, J. S. Mill and others. He not only agreed with the German thinkers that a state was more than the sum total of its constituent members, but that economic rationality was not as universal a thought forge as had been assumed by the British Economists. Ashwin kant Jha further states that, "Ranade did not favor the abstract deductive method of reasoning, therefore, he could not agree with traditional advocacy for free trade and laissez-faire…According to classical economist, hypothetical stationary economics in which deductive method of analysis had a legitimate place, but in the dynamical study of the progress of wealth, the value of the deductive method is almost nil."[147]

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[145] Sovani, *op. cit.,* p. 24.
[146] Ashwin kant jha, 'State Action and Economic Planning: A View of Ranade' in Debendra kumar Das ed., *Great Indian Economists: Their Sketch and Contribution for Socio-Economic Development Vol. 2. Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901)* New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd. 2004, p. 237.
[147] Ibid.

Chapter IV

Poverty as a 'social question' in late nationalist discourses seeking Swaraj

This chapter seeks to study the shift in conceiving poverty within the nationalist discourses and thinking, particularly a shift from the early economic nationalist discourses to the discourses taking place towards the end of the first quarter of twentieth century till independence. The underlying assumption of this chapter is that the question of poverty during later phase of nationalist discourse was posed in terms of a 'social question' rather than a political economic one as was the case during early nationalist discourses over poverty. A social question unites the different sections, populations and strata of society. In the present work, the term 'social question' has been borrowed from the French sociologist Robert Castel. Castel argues that a particular question becomes the social question when the cohesion of whole society in the given form comes to rest upon the resolution of that question and if that question is not resolved the society faces the danger of its disintegration. The emergence of social question is also coterminous with the emergence of a new rationality. Italian historian Giovanna Procacci has argued that 'poverty' became a social question in France in the immediate backdrop of French Revolution as a new rationality imposes itself upon the existent socio-political scenario of France. She writes that after the fall of ancient regime, a new rationality emerged "which implicated society in the cause of poverty and in its resolution; a rationality which tied the existence of poverty to the destiny of society itself." But in this work, the concept of 'social question' has been used differently but drawn originally from Castel and Procacci. Here I argue that poverty was turned into a social question by Gandhi during late nationalist periods as Gandhi made a clear departure from the paradigm established by Naoroji who first showed the despicable problem of poverty and its principal causes being intrinsic to colonial economic mechanism through which the resources and wealth of India being siphoned off by colonial regime but he only pleaded for a truly British rule (though towards last decade of his life, Naoroji spoke of Swaraj occasionally). Gandhi kept the basic assertion of Naoroji intact as Gandhi always maintained that the reason behind the existent poverty is the presence of colonial power and the drain of resources from India to Great Britain taking place owing to it. In fact, Gandhi in his speeches and writings during non-cooperation movement and

civil Disobedience movement constantly cites the annual drain estimated around 60 crore rupees taking place from India to Great Britain. He urged the people to adopt swadeshi in order to stop this drain. But Gandhi made a shift from early nationalist leaders by tying the elimination of 'poverty' with attainment of 'freedom'. Gandhi asserted that there was no way to come out of poverty while being unfree. The attainment of sovereignty (swaraj) and abolition of poverty was linked. A nation cannot be prosperous and unfree at the same time. In Gandhi's scheme of things attainment of swaraj, nationhood and elimination of poverty were the part of the same process. Freedom and self-sufficiency (aatmnirbharta) were integral to each other for Gandhi. Gandhi prescribed Swadeshi, as a means to come out of economic dependence, for attainment of Swaraj (freedom from British rule). And attainment of swaraj was a social question as it involves everyone and it was everyone's affair, a collective and social process. The problem of poverty and the presence of colonial presence was linked to each other and posed as if colonialism and poverty of India is intrinsically linked to each. If India is poor it is because of the constant and long exploitation of colonial rule in the country. Until and unless we drive colonialism out, the eradication of poverty is not possible because the presence of alien rule is the very root of the problem. Thus, the present chapter studies how the problem of poverty was articulated in terms of a social question in overall nationalist discourse. Afterward, we have tried to make apparent the contradiction which existed within the nationalist discourses during this period. On the one hand, there was Gandhi and J C Kumarappa who were advocating the eradication of poverty primarily in terms of self-reliance, self-rule, programmes of reconstruction. On the other, there were those like Nehru, Jayprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev and others who formed Congress Socialist Party advocated reforms in modern terms within the Congress. During this phase Gandhi's conception of poverty becomes the most interesting. Eradication of poverty is articulated in terms of self-reliance, self-rule meaning coming out of dependence. Gandhi uses Khadi as a tool of poverty eradication and spinning as mode of contributing universal daily labour as a contribution to the nation-making. In Gandhian thought, labour has been articulated as a moral act. Kumarappa and Gandhi's view sharply differed from the members of Congress Socialist party. Kumarappa tried to provide a philosophical and theoretical framing of Gandhi's economic ideas. Kumarappa headed the key institution established by Gandhi for Gandhian reconstruction programme.

On 6 Sept 1928, Gandhi wrote an article in *Young India* with the title "Our Poverty". Gandhi mentioned a list of questions related to poverty which was sent by someone called Prof. Sam Higginbottom. Prof. Higginbottom had sent Gandhi a set of four questions which were as follows: 1. What are the tests of poverty? 2. Whether India is richer or poorer today than 25 years ago or a longer period. 3. Is poverty in India general or confined to particular groups? 4. Causes and remedies.

In response to these questions Gandhi says that he could give evidence on the questions but without carrying conviction to a critic so he asked his economist friends to answer these questions raised by prof. Higginbottom. Prof. C. N. Vakil answered these questions in his articles related to India's problem of poverty and later wrote a series entitled "Remedies of Poverty" which was later published by Gandhi in *Young India* in September 27, October 4, 11 and 18 Issue of 1928. Gandhi quotes Prof. Vakil's arguments and says,

> The articles (Prof. Vakil's) show clearly and I venture to think conclusively that India is poorer today than 25 years or a longer period ago and that the poverty is general and not confined to groups. Prof. Vakil has applied two tests for approving his proposition. *He has shown that though during the past 40 years our average income has increased in the ratio of l to 2.74 (and he has accepted top figures in every case) the cost of living has increased in the ratio of 1 to 3.78; in other words we are poorer today to the extent of 2/7 than we were 40 years ago* (emphasis added). He then examines the population figures and arrives at the same conclusion by showing that, whilst the population has increased, the capacity for coping with the increase has not only not kept pace with the increase but has probably deteriorated.[1]

Gandhi Further says, Prof. Vakil has enumerated the following six causes for this growing poverty:

> 1. Not enough work for the vast mass of the agricultural population during the off season.
> 2. The social system which imposes the burden upon one person of supporting a large family.
> 3. The presence of a large number of able-bodied beggars miscalled sadhus.
> 4. Enervating climate.

[1] Mahatma Gandhi, "Our Poverty", *Young India*, 6-9-1928. Vol. 42: 2 May, 1928 – 9 September, 1928. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 98 Vols., New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1999, p. 439.

5. Resignation to fate and consequent want of determination to fight against poverty.

6.Faulty educational system.

After quoting these enumerated causes of poverty, Gandhi rejects Prof. Vakil's arguments except the first one in the abovementioned list. Gandhi argues that

> Whilst these are contributory causes or more or less value, With the exception of the first none seems to me to go to the root of the matter. *There is no doubt that foreign exploitation of India is a cause of poverty. This exploitation is a hydra-headed monster taking a variety of shapes to suit given occasions. The marine, the military, the currency, the railway and the revenue policy of the foreign Government is directed deliberately to promote an exploitation such as the world has never before witnessed. Poverty of India will never be removed so long as the exploitation continues unabated. Even the spinning wheel or any other subsidiary occupation that may be provided for the millions of peasantry will bring only partial relief, if the terrible drain, as Dadabhai Naoroji called it, is not stopped. He, therefore, who would explore the remedies for removing poverty has to tackle first the question of stopping the continuous drain* (emphasis added).[2]

The above paragraph makes it clear that Gandhi never lost sight of the original cause of poverty of India. The debate over Drain generated during 1870s by Dadabhai Naoroji was still relevant and the most dominant frame of looking at problem of poverty in India. On 28th Nov. 1929, Gandhiji wrote a short comment entitled "Public Finance and Our Poverty" in *Young India*. Here again he draws attention towards foreign rule and colonial drain as the prime reason behind poverty of masses. His reasoning of poverty again resembles the early nationalists' reasoning of poverty but with a quest of independence and political sovereignty and not appealing to any so-called British ethos of rule as pointed out and argued by Naoroji in the early nationalist or anti-imperialist discourses started during 1870s. Quoting Sjt. Coomarappa, an account and statistician who had come to live at Gujarat Vidyapith at that time, Ganhdhi wrote, "according to Sjt. Coomarappa India spends 93.7 % on debts, military and administrative expenses as against 48.8 % spent by America. The money thus spent by India largely goes out of it; what is spent by America remains in it. Thus, the richest country in the world spends about half of what India the poorest country in the world spends on administration. So long as this crushing burden is not removed there is no swaraj whether one knows it by

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[2] Ibid., p. 440.

the name Dominion Status or Independence."[3] These figures remain the most salient statistics of Gandhi against British rule throughout 1930s.

Gandhi was acutely aware of the drain of resources from India to Great Britain through existent colonial economic and political mechanism and its impact upon the actual material condition of India people in general, but Gandhi unlike the early nationalist didn't appeal to good conscience and reason of British Rule but rejected them altogether and instead sought a solution to constant drain of resources and India's poverty in India's sovereignty and complete independence from colonial rule. Gandhi accepts the economic logic of early nationalists but transform it into a logic of sovereignty, self-rule and self-reliance. Gandhi's particular form of swadeshi drew upon various sources. The above reference from Gandhi's writings, it is clear that drain theory not only provided the basis for a short-lived political movement in Bengal known as "swadeshi," but also for Gandhi's later movement of the same name. There were various technologies and means devised by Gandhi in order to serve is purpose of Swadeshi and Swaraj; Khadi was one of them. Lisa Trivedi argues, "Gandhi promoted khadi as both a commodity and symbol of the swadeshi movement, which sought to establish India's economic autonomy from Britain as the basis of self-government."[4] In a speech delivered, in the wake of a call of non-cooperation on part of Indian National Congress, on January 6, 1921 Gandhi urged the people present there to stop using the foreign clothes and take out time for spinning as it will end our dependence on foreign clothes and stop the drain of 60 crores of rupees per annum. He says,

> the Congress has placed special emphasis on swadeshi. The foundation of India's freedom will have been laid only when the import of Lancashire cloth has stopped … Our freedom will be won through the spinning-wheel. It is necessary to introduce it in every home. If every person in the country– man, woman and child– takes a vow today to give some little time of his to spinning, within a very short time we may cease to depend on others for clothing our people and save sixty crores of rupees for the country.[5]

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[3] Mahatma Gandhi, "Public Finance And Our Poverty", *Young India*, 28-11-1929. Vol. 48: 21 November, 1929 – 2 April, 1930. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 98 Vols. (Electronic Book), New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1999. p. 34.

[4] Lisa N. Trivedi, *Clothing Gandhi's Nation: Homespun and Modern India*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007. p. xvii.

[5] As quoted in Lisa N. Trivedi, op. cit., p. 1.

Image 4.1



Source: Khadi Bulletin, 1931.

Lisa Trivedi highlights that "nationalists correctly pointed to the emergence of a colonial style of dress and linked the impoverishment of India to the urban and colonial elites" preference for foreign, manufactured goods.[6] By the early 1920s, Gandhi too was linking India's economic dependency on foreign cloth to her political subjugation:

> India cannot be free so long as India voluntarily encourages or tolerates the economic drain which has been going on for the past century and a half … When the East India Company came in, we were able to manufacture all the cloth we needed, and more for … export … India has become practically wholly dependent upon foreign manufacture for her clothing.[7]

It was in this context that the swadeshi movement, khadi in particular, became so significant. Moreover, Gandhian nationalists rendered khadi a discursive concept by defining it in terms of the contemporary politics and economics of swadeshi.[8] Gandhi

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[6] Ibid., p. xx.
[7] Mahatma Gandhi, "Secret of Swaraj," Young India, January 19, 1921.
[8] In the period of mass nationalism in India (1920–1947), Gandhi promoted swadeshi politics through three institutions: the Satyagraha Ashram, the All-India Khaddar Board, and the All-India Spinners'

writes, “Lancashire cloth is a symbol of our helpless exploitation whereas khadi is the symbol of self-help, self-reliance and freedom, not merely of individuals or groups, sects or clans, but of the whole nation.”[9]

Image 4.2



Source: An advertisement for boycott and bonfire of Foreign Clothes published in *The Bombay Chronicle*, 30 July, 1921.

Gandhi interlinked the concept of Swadeshi with the Concept of Swaraj. Swadeshi and Swaraj functioned as a watchword of Gandhian nationalist politics and turned the question of poverty from a political economic question to a social question. In a speech delivered at Calcutta’s Harish Park on September 8, 1921, Gandhi said “there was a good deal of difference between the swadeshi movement in the days of the partition of Bengal and the present movement… At that time the movement was set on foot to get redress of certain grievances but the present had a higher and nobler object in view, namely, the attainment of swaraj.”[10] During late1920s, the introduction of wearing

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Association. It was in the ashram that Gandhi transformed his swadeshi program from one focused on weaving and handloomed cloth to one defined by hand-spinning and khadi. The coordinated efforts of the Khaddar Board and the Spinners’ Association made it possible for Gandhi and his supporters to introduce the ashram’s experiments to the broader public. Beyond Gandhi’s control, the swadeshi movement and khadi were put to a wide variety of uses by people, many of whom did not subscribe to Congress, much less to Gandhian, views. Thus, over the course of the 1920s, khadi itself was transformed from the emblem of Gandhi’s utopian politics into a broader symbol that would endure long after the politics of Gandhi and his era. See, Lisa N. Trivedi, op. cit., p. 2.

[9] Mahatma Gandhi, “Be in Time,” Young India, February 10, 1927.

[10] Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 21, p. 78.

Khadi and hand-spinning it as the necessary requirement for anyone who wanted to join Congress, swadeshi became more than a boycott of foreign goods; it became a moral system of labour and consumption for the nation. Gandhi continued to advocate the economic autonomy of India as a prerequisite of her political freedom. He wrote, "India's economic freedom depends on the spinning-wheel and the hand-loom . . . Without economic freedom the very hope of freedom of any other kind is futile."[11] By asking everyone to use and produce Khadi, Gandhi put the idea into practice that it is everyone's responsibility to labour for the nation. By arguing that every Indian should spin at least half an hour a day, Gandhi sought to challenge the traditional divisions of labour based on the principles of caste system; and put forward the idea of universal labour. The ashrams became laboratories where principle of equality and universal labour was practiced and these experimental micro units was supposed to become the harbinger of social reform and economic independence in Gandhi's view. These experiments were further carried out in Indian National Congress. To ensure the mass participation Gandhi argued for lowering the membership dues to 4 annas (a quarter of a rupee), and later the revised franchise required that Congress membership had to be earned, not just paid. In December 1924, the Belgaum session adopted spinning franchise which meant that hand-spun thread donated to the Congress's Khaddar Board was to become part of the price of Congress membership. Now, those who wanted to become member of the Congress committee or organisation should contribute 2,000 yards of evenly hand spun yarn of his or her own spinning.[12] The resolution passed in December 1924 stated: "Without universal spinning India cannot become self-supporting. Therefore: No one shall be a member of any Congress Committee or organisation who is not of the age of 18 and who does not wear hand-spun and hand-woven cloth. . . and does not make a contribution of 2,000 yards of evenly spun yarn per month of his or her own spinning."[13] Clause 3 of part A of the Congress Unity Resolution reads:

[11] Ibid., p. 9.

[12] However, within nine months of its adoption, the spinning franchise was successfully repealed, and the Khaddar Board was disbanded. The AICC meeting on 22nd September 1925 reduced the requirement for membership from 2000 yards per month to 2000 yards per year or annual payment of 4 annas. While one could still qualify for membership by spinning yarn but the requirement of yarn was reduced so much that it only amounted a token show of support for swadeshi.

[13] As quoted in Lisa N Trivedi, p. 26.

> the Congress expects every Indian man and woman to discard all foreign cloth and to use hand spun and hand-woven khaddar to the exclusion of all other cloth and personally to spin at least half an hour a day till boycott of foreign cloth and foreign yarn is attained and hand-spinning has been restored to its original status as the universal cottage industry of India.[14]

Clause 4 continues, "the Congress expects all Congress men and Congress women to concentrate their attention on the spread of hand-spinning and the antecedent processes and the manufacture and sale of khaddar."[15] Congress Unity Resolution which was part of the annual report submitted by Rajendra Prasad, Saifuddin Kitchlew and Jawaharlal Nehru at Belgaum session in December 1924 attempted to clarify the relationship between swadeshi and independence:

> [The Congress] is further of the opinion that such capacity (for vindicating their status and liberty) can … only be developed by universalising hand-spinning and the use of khaddar and thereby achieving the long deferred exclusion of foreign cloth; and therefore as a token of the earnestness and determination of the people to achieve this national purpose, welcomes the introduction of hand-spinning as part of the franchise and appeals to every person to avail himself or herself of it and the Congress.[16]

Khadi was not only the key to establishing India's independence from Great Britain in economic terms, it also was viewed as a concrete means through which people could prove themselves worthy of the great responsibility of self-government. Monthly contributions of hand-spun thread offered evidence of self-sufficiency, which Gandhi regarded as the basis of self-rule. Only universal daily labour for the nation would achieve India's independence. Rhetorically, the "spinning franchise" offered a significant opportunity to create a national community, if not through the realization of social equality, then through the attractiveness of the principle of universal labour performed on behalf of the nation. Gandhi was clear in his vision of economic independence. He didn't want to embrace industrialism based upon western model which functioned at large-scale and was centred around cities and produced alienated individual and individualised spaces, but favoured a swadeshi, village-based, cottage industries which created a relationship of interdependence among people and draws upon community support and participation. Expounding upon his conviction that local

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[14] Lisa N. Trivedi, op. cit., p. 163.
[15] Ibid.
[16]As quoted by Lisa N. Trivedi, op. cit., p. 27.

interdependence was the key to home rule and freedom, Gandhi explained, "Swadeshi is that spirit in us which restricts us to the use and the service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the more remote."[17] Gandhi argues that "true swadeshi is that alone in which all the processes through which cotton has to pass are carried out in the same village or town. The town in which this is done will prosper and win its freedom."[18] He argued that only the restoration of local, village economies would reverse India's growing impoverishment and its political subjugation. Hand-spinning became crucial to his larger vision of swaraj because he considered textile production to be the most significant traditional industry of India. Gandhi's vision for regenerating India through the revival of hand-spinning both marked a substantial break from previous Congress policy and produced a tension between those who supported village and small-scale production as the bases of community and those who viewed cities and industrialization as the foundation of India's future.[19]

Shriman Narayan Agarwal in *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India* points out that Gandhiji argues in *Hind Swaraj*, "the true test of modern civilisation lies in the fact that people living in it, make bodily welfare the object of life … Gandhiji states that our real happiness and health consist in a proper use of our hands and feet."[20] "I do not believe," observes Gandhiji, "that multiplication of wants, and machinery contributed to supply them is taking the world a single step nearer its goal." While opposing mindless mechanisation, Agarwal points out that "Productivity and national wealth are to be increased for man and not at the cost of man."[21] Opposing machinery, Gandhi wrote in *Hind Swaraj* "When I read Mr. Dutt's *Economic History of India*, I wept; and, as I think of it again, my heart sickens. It is machinery that has impoverished India. It is difficult to measure the harm that Manchester Has done to us. It is due to Manchester that Indian handicraft has all but disappeared."[22] Gandhi continued "But I make a mistake. How can Manchester be blamed? We wore Manchester cloth, and that is why Manchester wove it. I was delighted when I read about bravery of Bengal. There are no cloth-mills in that Presidency. They were, therefore, able to restore the original

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[17] Ibid., p. 10.
[18] Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 20, pp. 37-38.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Shriman Narayan Agarwal, *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India*, Bombay: Padma Publications Ltd, 1944. p. 16.
[21] Ibid., p. 6.
[22] M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings* edited by Anthony J. Parel, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 107.

hand-weaving occupation. It is true, Bengal encourages the mill industry of Bombay. If Bengal had proclaimed a boycott of all machine-made goods, it would have been much better. Machinery has begun to desolate Europe, and that whirlwind is now sweeping over India. Machinery is the chief symbol of modern civilisation; it represents a great sin."[23] On 29 September 1940, in *Harijan* Gandhi wrote that "My views on national planning differ from the prevailing ones. I do not want it along industrial lines. I want to prevent our villages from catching the infection of industrialism."[24] Agarwal argues that apart from the moral and psychological values of simplicity in life, Gandhiji discourages, to use Plato's phrase, 'reckless pursuit of wealth' by means of industrialism because without maximum self-dependence through manual labour, we are liable to get intricately involved in the chain of economic serfdom. Gandhiji, therefore, abhors all kind of centralisation so far as the necessaries and minimum comforts of our daily life are concerned, and insists on the desirability of everyone becoming self-sufficient as far as possible through his or her manual labour.[25] Agarwal lists three fundamentals of Gandhian Economics: Simplicity, non-violence and sanctity of labour. He says that Gandhiji holds that violence, in any shape or form, cannot lead to any kind of lasting peace and socio-economic reconstruction. He further writes that "Gandhiji's economics may also be called Non-Violent Economics, because it is the creed of non-violence which colours his economic ideas all along the line. The basic of Capitalism is the exploitation of the 'surplus value' of human labour, which is sordid violence. Machine is the hand-maid of Capitalism; it ousts human labour and concentrates wealth and power in the hands of a few. Wealth is, thus, accumulated by violence and requires to be preserved by violence. Gandhiji, therefore, wants to have no truck with lop-sided mechanisation and large-scale production, which to him, are the roots of the present world catastrophe."[26] Gandhi discountenanced any use of force or coercion for bringing about 'economic equality' in the society. In the non-violent society of Gandhiji's conception, there was no room for exploitation as the production will be for immediate use, and not for distant profitable markets. Each village will be self-sufficient and self-governing and there will be no need of centralised planning as was being advocate by others.

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[23] Ibid.
[24] As quoted by Shriman Narayan Agarwal, op. cit., p. 19.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., p. 21.

The most important aspect of Gandhi's economic thinking was his unique conception of labour. Agarwal wrote that the dignity and sanctity of manual labour was the most important underlying principle of the Gandhian economic civilisation. To Gandhiji, labour is the law of nature and its violation is the pivotal cause of our present economic muddle: "It is a tragedy of the first magnitude that millions have ceased to use their hands as hands. Nature is revenging herself upon us with terrible effect for this criminal waste of the gift she has bestowed upon us as human beings."[27] Gandhiji hold that intelligent manual labour is essential for the proper development of the mind; hand-culture is indispensable for mind-culture. This fact is amply borne out by modern psychology. The scheme of Basic Education, popularly known as the Wardha Scheme, which was adumbrated by Gandhiji, is based on the same psychological principle of 'learning through doing.'[28] Physical labour, to Gandhiji, was man's dignity, his sacred duty and obligation. Gandhiji had a firm and unwavering faith in the dignity of Labour. Agarwal points out that 'Gandhiji does not underline the necessity and desirability of physical labour only on moral and psychological grounds. He is anxious to strike at the very root of economic exploitation by insisting on everyone becoming as self-sufficient as possible. The present economic disorder is due to the unjust exploitation of the labour of others, with the result that there is, on the one hand, an 'idle rich' class with no physical work at all, and, on the other, the overworked labour-class crying for more leisure. But if we have almost self-sufficient Village Communities in which everyone works for his or her living on a co-operative basis, there will be gradually eliminated.'[29] Gandhiji advocates 'production by masses,' as against 'mass production'. Gandhiji states: "under my system, it is labour which is the current coin, not metal. Any person who can use his labour as that coin is wealthy. He converts it into cloth, he converts his labour into grain. If he wants paraffin oil, which he cannot himself produce, he uses his surplus grain for getting the oil. It is exchange of labour on free, fair and equal terms-hence it is no robbery. You may object that it is a reversion to the primitive system of barter. But is not all international trade based on the barter system?"[30] 'Bread-labour' is an article of faith to Gandhiji. He insists that in an ideal society of his conception everyone must have adequate scope for eight hours' work a day. Eight hours' sleep,

[27] Young India, 17-02-1927.
[28] Agarwal, op. cit., p. 24.
[29] Ibid., p. 26.
[30] *Harijan*, 2-11-1934.

eight hours' work and eight hours' leisure for other social and cultural pursuits- is an ideal distribution of time as per Gandhi.[31] Explaining to Rabindranath Tagore his idea of compulsory labour, Gandhiji says: " 'Why should I, who have no need to work for food, spin?' the question may be asked. Because I am eating what does not belong to me. I am living on the spoliation of my countrymen. Trace the source of every coin that finds its way into your pocket, and you will realise the truth of what I say!"[32]

Throughout the inter-war years, a certain ambiguity lay at the heart of the social policy of the INC with respect to poverty. In a letter written in 1936, Nehru says:

> You seem to separate the three objectives - India's independence, the creation of a socialist state, and the solution of the problem of India's poverty and un employment and you suggest that the last named should be tackled first. I am afraid this whole conception of our struggle is wrong. If all of us in India devoted ourselves to fighting poverty under the present system - political and economic - we shall not get rid of it. If we could get rid of it then the problem is a simple one and even the need for swaraj is not very apparent.[33]

This would seem to put poverty eradication at the centre of the political agenda. Yet the Karachi resolution of 1931, not particularly socialist, as Nehru rightly surmised, but widely regarded as the first major statement of the INC on social policy contains no explicit reference to the problem. Particular poverty related policies seem to have been little discussed by the INC, and this trend continued into the deliberations of the National Planning Committee when it was set up. The more 'radical' Presidents, Nehru in Faizpur, Bose in Haripura made references to it in their presidential addresses but little more thought appears to have been given to the matter. P. Chaudhury argues that poverty eradication per se was never a central agenda for Indian National Congress. INC remained growth-centric in its official attitude towards poverty.

The Gandhian view, which found a high degree of relative poverty morally more reprehensible than absolute poverty, might have been one of the reasons why this was so. A village society was thought by some to be adequate to provide for the simple wants of the poor. Less conjecturally, there was the INC view that colonial policies kept India poor by disabling it from developing its potential wealth through industrialization,

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[31] Agarwal, op. cit., p. 27.
[32] *Young India*, 1-10-1921.
[33] Nehru Papers

as most western economies had done and as the so-called white Dominions were then doing. This inevitably leads to a somewhat macro-view of economic policy, where industrial growth will lead to a reduction in poverty over time by increasing the incomes of the poor along with per capita income. Such a view naturally makes it unnecessary to discuss policies relating to poverty eradication per se and it was not wholly inappropriate for the times. It was, of course, reinforced in the minds of some of the INC that a 'socialist pattern' of industrialisation that they favoured will make economic development more 'pro-poor'. In an important area of policy, that of agriculture which provided the livelihood for the majority of Indians, it did not even then appear to be wholly adequate. Chaudhuri highlights that, "it was apparent that the colonial powers had created a structure of land ownership and land tenure which was highly unequal and highly inimical to the interests and welfare of the rural poor and which would not automatically come to an end with independence. These matters were clearly highlighted by the two reports on agrarian distress of the United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee. They pointed clearly to the need for policy interventions in post-colonial India other than the advocacy of 'trusteeship'."[34]

Nandini Gooptu argues that a significant section of urban poor participated in the later phase of nationalist movement (particularly starting from the Civil Disobedience movement) for the liberation from colonial rule owing to the changing ideology and practice of Congress nationalism which lent themselves to contextual interpretation by the poor in terms of their own local and specific concerns.[35] She writes, "One of the most striking features of the Civil Disobedience movement was the gathering of large crowds along routes of, and often accompanying, Congress processions, as well as at meetings and at sites of pickets outside foreign goods'shops. While nationalist demonstrations were organised and initiated by, a handful of Congress activists and volunteers, these occasions were frequently characterised by the presence of large crowds. It was usually through these crowd gatherings that various groups of the urban poor participated in the Civil Disobedience movement."[36] "Crowds of people joined Congress processions, attended nationalist meetings and were present at pickets of

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[34] P. Chaudhuri., "Changing Perception to Poverty in India: State and Poverty", *Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics*, Series B (1960-2002), Vol. 55. No. 3, Special Issue Dedicated to the Memory of P C Mahalonobis (Dec., 1993, pp. 315.

[35] Nandini Gooptu, *The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. 323-24.

[36] Ibid., p. 324.

foreign goods' shops and at bonfires of foreign cloth, or at the drills, parades and flag-hoisting ceremonies of the Congress volunteers. From mid-April 1930, soon after the beginning of public campaigns for the Civil Disobedience movement in the previous month, Police Abstracts of Intelligence began to report the presence of thousands at meetings, processions and pickets, demonstrations, hartals or at the site of bonfires of foreign goods."[37] She further discusses that Congress had largely concentrated its propaganda campaigns in the bazar areas of the towns and it was here that the largest crowds were formed by local people. The local people who became involved in Congress demonstrations and 'events' prominently included the bazar poor– the daily congregation of labourers, workmen, vendors and hawkers, many of whom were lower-caste Hindus.[38] However, it should be noted here that Gooptu has particularly made these observation on the basis of her case study of Kanpur but going through other sources as well it could be said that these was also a general case across other cities also. "Police and government reports referring to the crowds during the Civil Disobedience movement mentioned the 'bazar scum', 'vagabonds', 'irresponsible classes', people of a 'very poor quality', 'forces of discontent' in the bazars and 'low class elements', 'unemployed or loafer classes' or 'disorderly elements in the city'. In official parlance, these epithets were usually reserved for the labouring poor and those who were labelled as the 'floating population'. This unmistakably points to the manual labourers, job hunters, hawkers and street-vendors who thronged the bazars."[39] Another government report drew attention to 'shopkeepers', 'a sprinkling of beggars' and people in 'miscellaneous occupations'. Gooptu points out that a corroboration of these official observations can be found in an article on political agitation in the bazars, published in the Silver Jubilee Souvenir of the Bazar Karmchari (Employees) Federation of Kanpur in 1977. In this article, Rewa Shankar Trivedi, a shop employee and former office bearer of the union of bazar karmcharis, mentioned that bazar workers had lent support to Congress picketers during the nationalist movement in the 1930s. He wrote:

> Congress volunteers were picketing shops; arrests and lathi charges were happening … In the course of their daily work, when pickets were in progress, workers always gave their support and participated by joining in the slogans and protecting volunteers from the police. In carrying goods or in walking in and out of shops, the workers would

[37] Ibid., p. 325.
[38] Ibid., p. 326.
[39] Ibid., pp. 326-27.

> have to trample over the prostrate bodies of the volunteers [who lay down in front of the shops to stop business]. But the workers were not willing to do this and disobeyed the orders of their employers. Many workers were dismissed for this offence.[40]

Gooptu writes that bazar labourers, including those employed in small workshops, transport drivers and street-vendors were, clearly, some of the key participants in the Congress agitations. She further highlights that the descriptions or reports of crowd demonstrations, even when isolated from the official understanding of them, as well as coming from other sources, confirm that crowds were composed not of mere idle and amused onlookers, or people looking for trouble, but of those who expressed considerable active support for Congress processionists or picketers.[41] Official reports constantly describes the participants or protestors involved in the movement as predominantly composed of 'low class elements'. Even though the Congress engaged only its volunteers and activists to stage processions or pickets, the crowds became part of the action, often giving active assistance such as in compelling merchants to stop the sale of foreign goods and attempting to prevent the police from arresting Congress volunteers or leaders. Gooptu also highlights the cultural aspects of poor's participation in nationalist movement. She says that the enthusiasm of the poor for nationalist action expressed in crowd gatherings was reflected in popular cultural forms, especially contemporary urban folk music and other artistic modes of performance like *nautanki*. Political repression and economic exploitation as the two props of illegitimate foreign rule were ubiquitous and prominent in the political propaganda of the Congress against colonial rule. "On 23 April 1930, the *Satyagraha Samachar* held the British government responsible for the poverty of 90 per cent of Indians and for destroying the trade, commerce and industry of the country, thus causing widespread unemployment and hardship. This message was powerfully enacted in the public arena."[42] "The campaign against foreign cloth was, of course, projected by Gandhi as the struggle against colonial exploitation and against the consequent deprivation and dispossession of the large majority of Indians. The commoditisation of cloth was held up as the most poignant symbol of the adverse consequences of colonialism. In Gandhian thought, cloth was central to the harmonious, self-sufficient local economy of India, but the colonial economic system reduced cloth to a mere commodity for exchange. By

[40] As quoted by Gooptu, Ibid., pp. 327-28.
[41] Ibid., pp. 329-30.
[42] Ibid., p. 333.

challenging transactions in foreign cloth, Gandhian nationalism held out the promise of the restoration of a putative past golden age of economic interdependence, mutuality and neighbourliness as well as purity and godliness, which homespun cloth was projected to signify."[43] The message broadcast by the Congress through all these media (like newspaper and pamphlets et cetera) was simple and direct: the British government was responsible for India's poverty and for the misery and deprivation of its masses. "Two aspects of British rule were highlighted: first, state oppression, police atrocities, brute force and coercion as the bases of colonial power and rule; second, the economic foundations of power, and colonial economic domination as the reason for the poverty of the Indian people and the underdevelopment of the economy. The ultimate and rather uncomplicated message of the Congress appeared to be that British rule was the root of all evil. All Indians must, therefore, join the Congress to fight British rule by attacking the twin pillars of government strength– trade in foreign goods and the police, as well as the government's indigenous allies, such as those in the institutions of local administration. The general nature of this message meant that it could be understood in a variety of ways by diverse social groups or political constituencies. For the urban poor, in particular, the themes of political control, police repression, the tyranny of the local authorities and above all economic hardship could be understood in terms of their own experience. Colonialism could be seen not simply as the source of the deprivation and powerlessness of the nation, but also as the cause of their own specific plight."[44] "Nationalism lent ammunition to political action by enabling the poor to devise a legitimising ideology and marshal the moral courage to confront merchants. Moreover, the trade in foreign cloth elicited such great passion because Congress rhetoric had constructed foreign cloth as the symbol of the decimation of the Indian economy and, hence, of the deprivation of the people. In addition, the significance of pickets of foreign cloth lay in resistance not just against cloth of alien origin, but also crucially against the economic transactions underlying the sale of cloth. These transactions exemplified the commercial culture of the bazars and the nexus of exchange, credit and profits, which were at the heart of the economic exploitation faced by the urban poor."[45] "To the poor there was a nexus between the colonial state and economic exploiters."[46]

[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid., p. 335.
[45] Ibid., p. 338.
[46] Ibid., p. 340.

In an article written on 13 August 1934 in *Bombay Chronicle* in response to another article which was previously published in the same newspaper on 10 August 1934 by S. K. Patil, Jayaprakash Narayan argues that, "there are two main ideas on which the Congress Socialist Movement is based. First, that the goal of the Congress must naturally be a free socialist state, and second, that in order to achieve even its present objects the Congress must accept a socialist programme."[47] In this long rely to Patil, Jayaprakash Narayan went on to criticise the Congress for the lack of a clear objective and partisanship. He says that "the Congress claims to represent the masses of India, i.e., the workers and peasants. It has been the fashion recently to speak of the Congress as representing all classes of people. Such talk is in keeping with the general backward swing of the Congress pendulum, but is it justified? Is it possible that an organisation can represent groups whose interests conflicts? Or shall we deny the existence of this conflict itself?"[48] He further argues that the Congress cannot represent and fight for the rights and freedom of all classes and satisfy their respective demands. Jayaprakash states in clear terms that "in the event of a conflict of group interests, the existence of which cannot be questioned, the Congress must, if it is true to its own professions, side with the vast millions– the masses, the peasants and workers. They are its strength and it is for their freedom that it fights or at least should fight."[49] Jayaprakash does not stop here but goes on saying that "what is the freedom of the masses? Is it merely complete independence? No, along with political freedom they must also have economic freedom, i.e., an economic system in which there is no exploitation and the producers are the owners of wealth and the instruments of its production. In other words, if we want a Swaraj for the masses that Swaraj must be based on socialism. There is no other alternative."[50] Jayaprakash points out that there is a lot of mystifying talk these days of the vagueness of socialism and the peculiar conditions of India. Referring to the contemporary talks of the idea of indigenous socialism mainly propounded by Gandhi and largely advocated by his followers, Jayaprakash says that "indigenous socialism seems to be a favourite topic in certain quarters."[51] Jayaprakash emphasises that a socialist system must differ from country to country, its basic principles remain the same everywhere. And the basis of socialism in spite of the much talked of differences

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[47] Prasad, Bimal, *Jayprakash Narayan: Selected Works Vol. I.*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. p. 75.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., pp. 75-76.
[51] Ibid., p. 76.

in socialist camps is the social ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. He further reasons out that the present opposition of the Congress to socialism is due to the fact that it is not an organisation of the masses, but is dominated by middle class elements. The more the Congress becomes a mass organisation, the nearer will it move towards socialism. He goes on claiming that the Congress socialist movement aims at converting the Congress into a real, mass organisation. But Gandhi's tone during the same time is completely different. Here I refer to the text of the meeting which took place between Gandhiji and the Zamindars in Cawnpoor in 1934 (See Annexure I). It is one of the most important article to know Gandhi's view over the structural relationship (economic-political-social) which determines poverty. The meeting took place in the midst of an intense political campaign going on against Raj and a various serious debate going on within the nationalist over the mode and objective of struggle. This news report precisely shows the rift between Gandhi along with other old leaders of the party and the self-declared socialist Jayprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev along with having the Nehru broadly on this side. Gandhi puts an emphasis upon the need of evolving "indigenous socialism" and advocated the idea of trusteeship to the landlords who were there to meet Mahatma in Cawnpore on 25th July 1934. In the course of a talk with the U.P. landlords deputation at Cawnpore Gandhiji urged the landlords to create a radical reform in their relationships with the ryots. "If you only do this," he said "you may be sure that we shall be able to evolve indigenous socialism of the purest type". "Socialism and communism of the West", he proceeded "is based on certain conception which are fundamentally different from ours. One such conception is their belief in the essential selfishness of human nature. I do not subscribe to it for I know that an essential difference between man and brute is that the former can respond to the call of the spirit in him, can rise superior to the passion he owns in common with the brute and, therefore, superior to selfishness and violence which belong to brute nature, not to the immortal spirit of man. That is the fundamental conception of Hinduism which has years of penance and austerity at the back of the discovery of this truth. That is why whilst we have had saints who have worn out their bodies and laid down their lives in order to explore secrets of soul, we have had none as in the West who have laid down lives in exploring the remotest or highest regions of earth. Our socialism and communism should, therefore, be based on non-violence, on harmonious co-operation of labour and capital, landlord and tenant."

Jayaprakash also differed with Gandhi on the nature and objective of constructive programme which was being spearheaded by Congress during the early years of 1930s. In the same article, written in response to S K Patil, mentioned above, Jayaprakash wrote that the present constructive programme of the Congress is wholly inadequate for developing a movement which is required to bring the working class and peasantry to its fold. Jayaprakash argues that Khadi, Harijan, prohibition work while all right as far as they go, cannot create a powerful mass movement in India. For creating the powerful mass movement Jayaprakash argues that the workers and peasants be organised as class on the basis of their economic interests. The political consciousness and the organisational strength required for developing a mass movement can only be developed in the course of their economic struggle. On 16 September 1934, a resolution was moved at a meeting of Bihar Provincial Congress Committee held at Patna. The Bihar Provincial Congress Committee led by Jayaprakash who was also the leading figure behind Congress Socialist Party passed a resolution as follows:

> While not disapproving of the constructive programme as outlined by the All India Working Committee, this Committee feels that it is totally inadequate as a programme intended for the achievement of independence. This Committee is of the opinion that such a revolutionary mass movement can only be developed by the Congress taking up the economic problems of the masses and fighting courageously for their solution. It therefore considers it necessary that the chief constructive programme of the Congress should be the creation of or participation in workers' and peasants' organisations based on the demands of these classes.[52]

In the speech delivered in favour of the Resolution on Constructive Programme of the Congress on 16 September 1934 during the meeting of Bihar Provincial Congress Committee at Patna, Jayaprakash argued for a new approach towards the reconstruction programme. He said that up till now the approach has been of social service and it is obvious that a new approach is necessary. He states with an emphasis that "reconstruction can only follow from political power and we have to see if our present programme is calculated to secure that power. I do not understand what Gandhiji implies when he criticises the political exploitation of labour. The truth is that mere trade unionism is not enough; workers must also be made politically conscious. The basis of the new approach which I am advocating is economic. That is to say, if we

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[52] *Searchlight*, 19 September 1934. As cited in Bimal prasad, op. cit., p. 77.

could organise the Kisans on the basis of their grievances and encourage them to fight for their rights, they would create a force that would know how to assert itself. The Kisans, who submitted to the Zamindars, could not be relied upon to fight the mightier force of Government. Only those would fight, who knew how to stand up for their rights. It is absurd to talk of Khadi to the Kisans of Gaya where the agrarian problem is well nigh appalling. In fighting for their rights the Kisans are bound to realise that it is the Government which stands in the way of the realisation of their rights and that these can never be achieved unless the system of present Government is brought to an end. Thus will be created real political awakening among the masses, who will soon learn how to organise themselves effectively in the course of the struggle.[53]

Jayaprakash was firmed in his views that social and economic restructuring of the society is necessary for any larger welfare of the masses. Jayaprakash was playing the leading role in organising the activities of Congress Socialist Party in Bihar and elsewhere as well as articulating the idea behind Congress Socialist Party within the Congress and outside it in public domain. In May 1934 a meeting was called of Bihar Socialist Party for discussing the agenda for the first Congress Socialist Conference which was supposed to take place on 21st and 22nd October 1934 at Bombay to deliberate and adopt the constitution, programme and resolution of the newly formed Congress Socialist Party. The meeting of Bihar Socialist Party in Patna discussed two prime agenda: I) Considering plans for creating an All India Socialist Movement within the Congress[54], II) Considering proposals to be place before the A.I.C.C.. A resolution was passed in the meeting which was to be moved on at the upcoming Congress Socialist Conference at Bombay. The resolution wanted that A.I.C.C. must commit itself to a socialist point of view. Following was the draft resolution passed at Patna in Bihar Socialist Party meeting:

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[53] Adapted originally from the report of the speech at a meeting of Bihar Provincial Congress Committee at Patna, published in *Searchlight*, 19 September 1934. As cited in Bimal Prasad, p. 78.

[54] This was the view of the Party that it would be premature to form an All India Socialist Party or group at the given time. The proposals regarding this agenda suggested that an Organising Committee, with regional secretaries, be formed in order to prepare the ground for an All India Party. Regional secretaries were supposed to be fully responsible for the work as directed by the Organising Committee. In the same meeting the Party prescribed the following course of action for regional secretaries: (a) To get in touch with the Left Wing Congressmen and induce them to form, depending upon their strength, socialist nuclei, groups or parties; (b) To organise propaganda on behalf of socialism in their region– particularly among Congress, Labour and Kisan workers. See Bimal Prasad, *Jayprakash Narayan: Selected Works Vol. I.*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. p. 259.

> This Committee (A.I.C.C.) declares that the interests of the exploited mass of India cannot be served nor their economic, political and social salvation be secured by the achievement of political freedom unless it is accompanied by fundamental changes in the existing economic and social structure of society. In the view of this Committee such changes can be brought about only if the following programme is adopted by free Indian State when it comes into being:
>
> (1) Socialisation of key and principle industries (e.g. Steel, cotton, jute, railways, shipping, mines, banks, public utilities) with a view to the socialisation of the entire economic life of the country.
> (2) Development of the economic life of the country to be planned and controlled by the State.
> (3) Elimination of princes, zamindars, talukdars, landlords, capitalists, moneylenders and all other parasitic and exploiting interests.
> (4) Redistribution of land so that no one may possess more land than is necessary for the maintenance of an average family on an average standard of living.
> (5) Liquidation of agricultural indebtedness.
> (6) The State to encourage and promote co-operative and collective farming with a view to the ultimate collectivisation of all agriculture in the country.[55]

One another draft resolution was also passed at the Patna meeting which was again supposed to be tabled at the upcoming All India Conference of the Congress Socialist Party at Bombay.[56] The second draft resolution was about the change in the Congress's method of movement for organising the masses for complete independence from colonial rule. Bihar Socialist Party led by Jayaprakash wanted that the masses be organised on the basis of their economic interests. The following draft resolution was suggested:

> In the opinion of this Committee the only effective method for creating a mass movement is to organise the masses on the basis of their economic interests and accordingly this Committee (A.IC.C.) calls upon Congressmen to take up the work of organising *kisan and mazdoor sabhas*, or entering such *sabhas* where they exist, with a view to participate in the day-to day struggles of the masses and lead them eventually to their final goal.[57]

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[55] Bimal Prasad, *Jayprakash Narayan: Selected Works Vol. I.*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. pp. 259-60.
[56] These draft resolutions were to be finally tabled at the next scheduled annual national conference of Indian National Congress, after getting passed at the first national conference of Congress Socialist Party scheduled on 21-22 October 1934 at Bombay.
[57] Prasad, op. cit., p. 260.

The advocacy of socialism by the members of Congress Socialist Party (who were also at the same time the members of Indian National Congress) created a huge uproar in Congress's middle-class members, zamindars and bourgeoisie in general who supported Congress for its struggle for Independence against colonial rule. They interpreted the advocacy of socialists for adopting the socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange once India gets independence as well as the reorganisation of national mass movement on the basis of economic interests of the masses, as the advocacy for eventual abolition of private property. In the meeting held at Bombay on 17-18 June 1934, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution terming the socialists' argument for a change in the method of mobilisation of masses and the adoption of socialist pattern of life when India gets independence as loose talks and being contrary to the Congress creed of non-violence. The Committee denounce the advocacy of class struggle and abolition of private property. On 22nd June 1934, a joint statement upon the Congress Working Committee Resolution was issued by Narendra Deva, Jayaprakash Narayan, Sri Prakash and Sampurnanand from Banaras. The statement was as follows:

> The resolution of the Working Committee regarding the Congress Socialist movement came as a painful surprise. … The Working Committee speaks of loose talk on our part. If there has been any loose talk it is the Working Committee which has indulged in it. The committee talks of confiscation of private property and the necessity of class war as being the programmes of Congress Socialists. In the programme that was adopted at the Patna Conference there was no mention of confiscation of private properties with or without any just cause. What the Patna programme speaks is the progressive socialisation of means of production, distribution and exchange. This does mean a gradual abolition of private property in the sphere named. It does not mean abolition of all private property. As for the first cause, the welfare of the greatest number and the human society as a whole is sufficient a just cause for us. As regards class war, to speak of the necessity of creating a thing which is ever present is meaningless. The question is not of creating a class war but deciding which side we should take in that war, the side of the oppressed or oppressor. There is no other alternative. The Socialists aim at the ultimate abolition of all class struggle by having a classless society. … The Working Committee is further of opinion that confiscation and class war are contrary to the Congress creed of non-violence. This is the most surprising assertion which, we feel, it will be difficult for the majority of the Congressmen to accept. The creed of the Congress is the attainment of Purna Swaraj through legitimate and peaceful means.

There is nothing in our programme as adopted at Patna, which in any sense whatever can be said to be contrary to this creed. … Here it is worthwhile to remind the Working Committee that even the Karachi resolution advocates state ownership of the key industries. How does the Working Committee reconcile this confiscation of of property with its high conception of non-violence? How do we who merely want to extend this principle of nationalisation to other economic activities become rebels against the Congress creed? … The Working Committee says that it is contemplating a wiser and more just use of private property, to stop the exploitation of the landless poor. We shall awaits the results of its contemplation and in the meantime want to warn the masses [that] there can be no solution of their problems and no end to their exploitation unless the economic organization is brought under social control. There can be no adjustment of class interests. …"[58]

[58] Ibid., pp. 261-62.

Chapter V

Poverty-Population-Poor: Historicising a perennial problématique[1] of modern India

The present chapter primarily seeks to study two main themes: Firstly, studying the formation of post-colonial state's discourses over poverty (particularly in relation to the concept of labour and population) and seeing what figure of poor emerged through these discourses. What are the constituent elements of these discourses which takes place primarily with the objective of eradication of poverty? What was the governmental rationality which was at work in the government discourses and action over poverty during the period specified for this study? How economic planning became symptomatic of the post-colonial governmental rationality and Five years Plans became the carrier of that rationality? What were the dominant paradigm under which the abolition of poverty got articulated? In other words, what were the epistemic foundation of these discourses?; Secondly, whether post-colonial governmental rationality (governmentality) carries a continuity or make a break with colonial governmentality (colonial art of government and statecraft) vis-à-vis the question of administering or governing poverty or in the way of addressing the problem of poverty? Does the post-colonial nation state make a break with colonial state in the ways of knowing the poor, identifying them and measuring their poverty? In other words, was the official attitude adopted by post-colonial state towards the poor or the problem of poverty was similar or different from the official attitude adopted by the colonial state? Does the post-colonial state engage in epistemic re-conceptualisation or carry the same epistemic foundation espoused and established by colonial state? Do the concepts and ideas put forward by nationalist thinkers and leaders in opposition to colonialism and colonial state find any place in the policy regime and political actions of the post-colonial state?

The effort in the present chapter is to study how certain concepts or categories like 'population', 'poverty', 'labour', 'development' were deployed in the policy regime of

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[1] Problématique is a French term whose etymological origin could be traced back to the Latin term *problematicus* and Greek word *problēmatikós*. The English equivalent of the term *problématique* is problematic when used as a noun. The French term has been used here deliberately in order to convey specifically the conceptual meaning and connotation of the term as it is a methodological concept. Problématique (or problematic) when used as noun signify 'not any one particular problem', but 'a complex of problems'.

post-colonial state, surveying and narrating the discursive history, constructing the genealogy of the imagination of the poor in the discourses of post-colonial state? How did poverty and the figure of the 'poor' become a central problematic in modern statecraft and politics in India? The wider concern is to study what figure is emerging from the state's discourses and policies around the poor, what are the ways of knowing the poor and how does the existing body of knowledge and practices, including political practices, help us to understand this category. What I intend to do in this chapter is to construct a 'genealogy' of that idea of poverty which remains instrumental in making the poor governable in the discourses of the post-colonial state. For this purpose, the chapter first delves at some length into the colonial constructions and shifts within the colonial discourse itself vis-à-vis the central colonial preoccupation with the question of poverty, population and labour. This would help in marking out continuities and breaks in the post-colonial period.

Colonial construction of a 'Population Problem': Historicising 'India's Overpopulation' narrative and locating its link with Poverty

The 'population problem'[2] constructed by colonial bureaucracy continues to dominate the policy regime of post-colonial India as well. There is a long history of nationalists' deliberation as well as bureaucratic discourses of colonial state over 'population', stretching from late nineteenth century to late twentieth century. In this section, the policy and shift which emerged within colonial policy regime will be discussed. There are broadly two phases of the official attitude toward the problem of population. First phase starting from 1870s and continuing till the first decade of twentieth century, the other starting from 1920s and continuing even after independence. In Chapter II, I have shown how 'population' as a category or concept figured prominently in the discourses of Classical Political Economy and later it emerged as an important category in the official discourses of colonial state through several means of governance like Census, Survey, Mapping et cetera. Here my concern is to show the manner in which the concept of population was deployed in the bureaucratic discourses of colonial India. Almost

[2] The term 'population problem' was coined in the reports of Bhore Committee constituted by Government of India in 1946, and was subsequently used by Mudaliar Committee constituted in 1962. Both the reports devoted a full separate chapter with the title 'Population Problem'.

entire nineteenth century was replete with numerous major and minor famines. Till the last quarter of nineteenth century 'depopulation' was problem rather than 'overpopulation'. The official attitude of colonial bureaucracy towards the problem of overpopulation had much to do with the prescriptive knowledge of classical political economy. The application of this prescriptive knowledge was considered essential for the wise administration. With the Crown taking over the colonial administration, the knowledge of political economy for the administrator was made mandatory as the colony was now being governed directly in the name of Crown. The colonial administration had to function as the administration of a modern state. During 1860s and 1870s colonial state constructed a category called 'population' through famous census of 1871. By 1880s Malthusian premonitions started reflecting into the official discourses of colonial state, the rate of population growth was linked with stable means of subsistence and consequent misery. A myth of India's overpopulation was invented and linked to its poverty. As time passed, this myth of overpopulation was made part of colonial governmental rationality. By the first quarter of twentieth century there were few who did not believe in India's overpopulation and it being a prime reason for India's poverty. During 1940s the problem of overpopulation dominated the policy regimes of colonial state as well as the minds of nationalist. Post-colonial state continued with the colonial formulation of population growth and consequent increase in poverty, though the strategy and methods to curb the population growth kept varying as the time proceeded.

In 1888, Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy of India, expressed concern over the rising population of the colony and accused the nationalist, the native public bodies and the mass media of not paying attention to the enormous danger of overpopulation.[3] He upheld Malthusian formulations, termed 'overpopulation' a enormous danger and said that "the inhabitants of the country are multiplying beyond the numbers the soil is capable of sustaining". Lord Dufferin made the following statement:

> No one can pass even a few months in India without being aware that we are sitting *under the shadow of an enormous danger- the overpopulation of the country*, or all events of large districts and territories, *whose inhabitants are yearly nay monthly and*

[3] Lord Dufferin was not the only Viceroy to express such a concern. Lord Linlithgow also voiced the same concern as the Chairman of Royal Commission on Agriculture published in 1928. Lord Linlithgow became the Viceroy of India in 1936 and held the office till 1943.

> *weekly, multiplying beyond the numbers the soil is capable of sustaining (emphasis added)*,- yet during the four years I have been here, this most important subject has not attracted the attention of a single native newspaper, still less of any native public body. Again, where is there a population whose rise in the scale of social comfort and prosperity is more checked and impeded by excessive and useless expenditure on the occasion of marriage and other similar ceremonies than that of India? . . .[4]

The problem posed by population growth found prominent mention in the reports of the Royal Commission on Agriculture published in 1928. Its chairman and a future governor-general and viceroy of India, the Marquess of Linlithgow wrote:

> Throughout our investigation, we have constantly been impressed with the thought that mere material improvement alone will not bring lasting benefit to the agricultural population. Increase in yield by better seed and better cultivation; security of the harvests gained by the expansion of irrigation; immunity from losses due to pests or pestilence; higher prices from improved communications and conditions of marketing; *everything in short, which we have advocated for the material advancement of the people will merely postpone the effects of the growing pressure of the population on the soil. No lasting improvement in the standard of living of the great mass of the population can possibly be attained if every enhancement in the purchasing power of the cultivator is to be followed by a proportionate increase in the population* (emphasis added).[5]

Despite the striking similarity in terms of implicit conceptual formulation and presence of Malthusian premonitions between the two statements quoted above by the topmost authority of British empire in India, the two statements are given in two completely different kind of milieu. When the first statement was given by the Viceroy Dufferin in 1888, there were very few takers of that idea and that formulation in nationalist circle. There was still someone like G. V. Joshi who logically and vociferously rejected such statements and the faulty premises on which they were built upon. Even Dadabhai Naoroji argued against the false charge of population growth and it being the reason for the misery of the masses and poverty of India. When the second statement was articulated very much on the same line and on the same premises as part of Royal

[4] Lord Dufferin's Minute on the Pretensions of the Indian National Congress, November 1888. Originally in C.H. Philips, with H.L. Singh and B.N. Pandey, The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947: Selected Documents, London, 1962, p. 144. Quoted from Irfan, Habib, *Indian Economy 1858-1914* New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2006.

[5] Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, *Abridged Report* London: HMSO, 1928. pp. 58-59.

Commission on Agriculture in 1928, there were very few even among nationalist who did not believe in that statement, that formulation. Before moving to a close examination of the intellectual and official milieu of 1920s (and the shift even in the thinking of the nationalists then onwards) in which the above-quoted statement of Royal Commission on Agriculture was made, I would wish to briefly show the nationalists' outlook vis-à-vis the problem of overpopulation during 1880s. I quote the statement made by G. V. Joshi, one of the most prominent nationalist thinker of the time, countering the colonial attitude on population, 'population-poverty' link and their hidden agenda behind them. G. V. Joshi advanced the most logical nationalist rebuttal of the colonial framing of the population problem. Joshi's statement has been discussed in third chapter in detail. Joshi clearly argued that what colonial India is facing is not the problem of overpopulation but the problem of underproduction. The underproduction, the Drain of resources and the nominal expenditure on the public welfare like education, health and social security were the real reason behind the poverty and misery of the vast population of India and perhaps also a more realistic reason behind the increasing rate of population growth. The lack of education and social-legal reforms contributed to the abnormal growth of population, but British never interfered at that front in the name of inner domain. Recently Mike Davis has argued that "modern case-studies corroborate the position of nationalist critics of the Raj, like G. V. Josh in 1890 who argued that the problem of India lies not so much in the fact of an alleged overpopulation as in the admitted and patent evil of underproduction." Joshi had estimated that half of the net savings of India was confiscated as revenue. If cultivators in the Deccan and other drought-prone regions were relentlessly pushed onto marginal lands where productivity was low and crop failures were inevitable, the culprit was less likely overpopulation than the "British land revenue system itself."[6] Davis further argues that, "forcibly imposed trade deficits, export drives that diminished food security, over taxation and predatory merchant capital, foreign control of key revenues and developmental resources, chronic imperial and civil warfare, a Gold Standard that picked the pockets of Asian peasants were among the key modalities through which the burden of "structural adjustment" in the late Victorian world economy was shifted from Europe and North America to agriculturalists in newly minted "peripheries"."[7]

[6] M. Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World* New York: Verso, 2001. p. 307.
[7] Ibid., p. 306.

However, Davis also points out that the system of partible inheritance was an important factor behind the diminishing food security in nineteenth century India. Davis further argues that Malthus's influence over the economic historians till as late as mid twentieth century were such that they were bound to misconstrue the actual reason of poverty and continued viewing population growth as responsible for existing poverty. Davis writes, "Princeton's W. Arthur Lewis, one of the leading authorities on nineteenth-century world economy, assumed as a matter of course in an influential 1978 study that the underlying cause of famine in Victorian India was not the "drain of wealth" to England as alleged by contemporary critics, but a large population that continued to live at subsistence level on inadequately watered marginal lands, without a profitable cash crop."[8] Recent studies has thrown up a more complicated relationship between demography and subsistence in Asia. As Neil Charlesworth points out, "It is indisputable that land was, in absolute terms, hardly under great pressure from population in the Deccan of the early British period."[9] Through the 1840s, at least, "only about half of the cultivable land in most Deccan districts, according to formal British estimates, was being tilled." Davis points out to statistical figure which further complicates the Malthusian claim of overpopulation in India. He explains, "although population grew rapidly in the 1850s and 1860s, partly as a result of the cotton boom, the demographic momentum came to an abrupt halt with the catastrophe of 1876. In India as a whole during the half century between 1870 and 1920 there was only a single decade (1880s) of significant population growth. South Asia's percentage of world population declined from 23 percent to 20 percent between 1750 to 1900, while Europe was rising from 17 percent to 21 percent."[10]

Royal Commission on Agriculture (1928) made a shift from the colonial state's attitude vis-à-vis population which tended to link the frequent occurrence of famines with the population growth in the respective regions. During inter-war period, the notion that India's overpopulation functioned as a hindrance to imperial plan of development lacked the tone and tenor of nineteenth-century colonial discourses on poverty and population. There were two reasons behind the change of this attitude regarding population: a) the relative absence of major famines in the first two decades of the

[8] Ibid.
[9] N. Charlesworth, *Peasants and Imperial Rule: Agriculture and Agrarian Society in the Bombay Presidency, 1850-1935,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. p. 13.
[10] Ibid.

twentieth century; b) Indian indentured labour migration was put to an end. Another very important factor was the slow growth of population between the period 1881-1931. In fact, the total increase over this period of 50 years remain less than forty per cent.[11] During 1920s, a shift within the official discourses of Government of India could be noticed regarding the question of population. Around this time, it was not the officials from the department of land, agriculture or finance who had traditionally argued for the acknowledgement of population problem, but the officials dealing with the public health pressed upon the Royal Commission to acknowledge the problem population growth posed in terms of development.[12]

Table 5.1. Population Growth in India, 1891-2001

Year	**Population (crores)**	**Increase (crores) during the decade**	**Percentage increase during the decade**
1891	23.59	-0.04	-0.2
1901	23.55	+1.6	+5.7
1911	25.2	-0.1	-0.3
1921	25.1	+2.8	+11.0
1931	27.9	+4.0	+14.2
1941	31.9	+4.2	+13.3
1951	36.1	+7.8	+21.5
1961	43.9	+10.8	+24.8
1971	54.8	+13.5	+24.7
1981	68.3	+16.1	+23.5
1991	84.4	+12.0	+14.2
2001	100	+15.6	+21.34

Source: Census of India, GOI

[11] Contemporary Indian authors noted that compared with population growth in countries in industrialised Europe and America during the same period, India's population growth was relatively small. See, Sarkar, *Sociology of Population*, p.17. While the population increase for 1921–31 was 10.6 per cent, in 1911–21 it was only 1.2 per cent and for 1881–1931 it was only 39 per cent. See, Government of India, *Census of India*, 1931, p.85.

[12] The absence of mass famine after 1902 may have painted a rosier view of the potential of Indian agricultural production for officials in the agriculture and land departments. Improvements in famine codes and expansion of transport and communication networks may have bred complacency in these officials that led them to discount the threat of mass-famine and to overestimate their ability to deal with it. Consequently, they were less inclined to parrot the familiar link with population growth and food supply that was characteristic of the nineteenth century. As Mike Davis has pointed out recently, rather than having 'solved' the problem of food availability (or more importantly access to it) as colonial officials and 'some gullible modern historians' believe, famine's absence merely concealed the widespread immiseration of the Indian peasantry and coincided with the fortuitous absence of extreme El Nino events. Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, p. 58.

Table 5.2

India's percentage rates of inter-censal population increase	
Period	Rate of increase Percent
1872-1881	1.5
1881-1891	9.6
1891-1901	1.4
1901-1911	6.4
1911-1921	1.2
1921-1931	10.6
1931-1941	13.6

Source: From Chapter XXVIII, p. 477. Vol. II, Report of the Health Survey and Development Committee constituted under Chairmanship of Sir Joseph Bhore by colonial government in 1946.

While debating the Government of India Act, 1935 at the House of Commons, Stanley Baldwin (the Lord President of the Privy Council and Prime Minister in waiting) argued in support of the constitutional reform as proposed under the act in following terms:

> When you have irrigated the last acre of land that remains to be irrigated and when you have brought into being all the schemes that you may have, *the growth of population, stimulated again by the Pax Britannica* (emphasis added), by our improvement in the health services, by our measures for dealing with pestilence, will still continue to press harder and harder upon the means of subsistence. We are reaching the point, if we have not reached it already, when nothing will avail but profound changes in those deep-seated customs and habits of thought, which we are powerless to touch, because they have their sanction in religion. They are matters with which only Indians can deal, and unless we place responsibility upon their shoulders and furnish them with a constitutional means for dealing with these matters, we incur the risk of making ourselves responsible for the perpetuation of conditions that must always stand in the way of an improvement in the condition of the people.[13]

Rahul Nair argues that "Baldwin's pronouncement expressed certain key understandings prevalent among the British colonial rulers with regard to India's population growth. First, that India's population growth was the unforeseen outcome

[13] The statement as quoted in R. Nair, "The Construction of a 'Population Problem' in Colonial India 1919–1947" *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2011, pp. 227-28.

of the very success of British rule, especially its provision of public health. Second, it was the growth of population that nullified the material advances that British rule enabled. Third, it was India's peculiar religious and cultural traditions that drove population growth. And finally, while there was an urgent need to check the growth in population, the British on their part could not do anything under the current constitutional framework since that would constitute undue interference into Indian affairs, about which they expressed strong reservations at least in their political rhetoric."[14] Baldwin is not alone in making these formulations and pronouncements that "the growth of population is stimulated by Pax Britannica", the early exponents of Indian population history such as Vera Antsey and Kingsley Davis also held it 'axiomatic that wherever and whenever British rule was established, the order and peace it provided led to a rapid rate of population growth.'[15] Davis frames the issue of population in India historically, and in so doing, he provides both a date when the Indian population became overpopulated (with the 1921 Census), and gives an overview and analysis of population in India from prehistoric times until 1941. Davis' analytical rhetoric is itself steeped in a rich history. The first sentence in the book: 'The Indian subcontinent has long been known for its problems.' frames the population and its relation to Indian poverty as the latest problem in a long and illustrious national heritage. Significantly, Davis' history and framing of the problem of population in India is riddled with tensions.[16] While he takes pains to posit findings of a modern, objective science of demography which would suggest that reliable census data was only available after 1921, the year that he asserts that India's population problem 'started,' unlike other census analysts, Davis denies that the population's growth rate is the problem per se. Instead he argues that the 'true' problem was pre-existing: 2000 year-

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[14] R. Nair, "The Construction of a 'Population Problem' in Colonial India 1919–1947" *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2011, p. 228.

[15] I. Habib, *Indian Economy 1858-1914,* New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2006. p. 1.

Also see, Vera Antsey, *The Economic Development of India* London. 1952.

Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* Princeton. 1951.

[16] Here It should also be kept in mind that Davis's work took place in a particular international scenario in which overpopulation logic was being popularised world over and American demographer and eugenicist were taking huge interest in institutionalising 'Population Studies' post-Second World War. American demographer Frank Notestein was taking a lead in this institutionalisation. Notestein was hugely aided in his project by a number of studies which were about India. Most germane to this discussion was Kingsley Davis' 1951 work The Population of India and Pakistan produced in coordination with the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Princeton University's Office of Population Research and funded by the Milbank Memorial Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Milbank Memorial Fund was concerned that too 'population pressure' (i.e., too many people in relation to available resources) might cause unrest leading the call for redistribution of national (and perhaps global) resources in the shape of a communist movement.

long unbroken tradition in India of a large population. Davis presents complex calculations based on travellers' accounts and medieval Indian records to substantiate his claims about the essentially massive and timeless nature of India's population. Yet he also asserts that dynamic population growth was only possible with the onset of a colonial *pax brittanica*.[17] However, it should be kept in mind here that it was not only British administrator who kept bringing the issue of population growth but there was some Indians also who believed in this narrative of overpopulation. Hossain Imam, an Indian member of the Council of State in India tabled a resolution that the colonial government should "take practical steps to check the increase in the population of India" in the meeting which took place on 18 March 1935.[18] Explaining his motivation later, Hossain Imam claimed "it is a necessity for India, a dire necessity, that this increase in population should be checked".[19] He later declared that "his intention was not to force legislation on the government, since public discussion was yet to occur. So, he hoped government could undertake measures to make the country conversant with the evils of the unchecked increase [of population] and to inculcate in their minds the possibility of using birth control."[20] The government of India opposed the proposed resolution by Hossain Imam and reject it with the support of a large bloc of government nominated members to the Council. M. G. Hallett, the then Home Secretary, who led the discussion on behalf of the government, expressed how it would be 'very difficult and dangerous for them (the colonial government) to step in and take an active part in measures of this kind' given the social, religious and political complications intertwined in such an issue.[21] Rahul Nair writes, "responding to the resolution, M.G. Hallet, the Home Secretary, focused on the alleged overpopulation in India and the controversial nature of birth control. Hallet put the fears of overpopulation in the context of the ongoing economic depression affecting industry and agriculture and predicted they would be transitory. He termed the expression 'overpopulation' as a 'very vague one'[22].

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[17] S. Hodges, "Governmentality, Population and Reproductive Family in Modern India" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39, No. 11 (Mar. 13-19, 2004), p. 1162.

[18] The text of the resolution read, 'This Council recommends the Governor General in Council to take practical steps to check the increase in the population of India'. Government of India, *Council of State Debates*, 18 March 1935, p. 601.

[19] Ibid., p. 610.

[20] Ibid., p. 600.

[21] Ibid., p. 624.

[22] It should be noted here that Hallet's response (terming the expression 'overpopulation' as a 'very vague one', saying that there is no certainty of the population increasing as it has increased in previous decades and it may be just some transitory phenomenon, further arguing that it cannot be ascertain whether India is overpopulated) on behalf of Government of India while opposing the resolution tabled by Hussain

While India's population had increased in the last decade there was no certainty that it would continue to do so. Nor was there any way to ascertain whether India was overpopulated."[23] Hallet continued, Nair quotes, "given the potential for social, religious and political controversy, Hallet pleaded it would be both difficult and dangerous for the government to take an active role. It was up to voluntary agencies, in his view, to take up the propagation of birth control if they deemed it the 'cure' for overpopulation."[24] Nair further points out that, "despite the unfavourable outcome, one can view the debate in the Council of State as an important marker of how successfully public health officials had pushed the 'population problem' to the centre of public consciousness. Councillors who backed the resolution such as Sir Phiroze Sethna, a Bombay industrialist, and Sir Nasarvanji Choksy, a well-known Bombay medical practitioner, echoed Megaw's views closely in proposing a broad approach. The reports of John Megaw, J. H. Hutton, the Census Commissioner, and A. J. H. Russell, the Public Health Commissioner figured prominently in their arguments as did Megaw's earlier suggestion of constituting a commission of experts to examine every aspect of economic life in India."[25] Nair in the same article states that the official discourses around population control was located in the public health policies of British colonial state during the last three decades of imperial rule in India. Nair argues that, "the intellectual trajectories that constituted the centrality of India's population growth as an obstacle to economic growth and as a signifier of India's widespread poverty, in the minds of colonial policy-makers and the popular imagination. And it was British officials in the public health arena who took the leading role in framing a 'population problem' for India during late colonial period, particularly between 1919 to 1947."[26] During the inter-war period a shift occurred in the way population problem was seen in the official discourse of colonial India. Throughout the last half of nineteenth century the thinking around population remains dominated by Malthusian formulations, and it

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Imam was in complete contradiction with usual colonial stance regarding India's overpopulation right from the beginning of the last quarter of nineteenth century and the views expressed not less than a Viceroy (Lord Dufferin's above quoted 1888 statement) and the Royal Commission on Agriculture (above quoted statement of 1928) headed by a person who became the Viceroy of India just the next year of this statement made in Council.

[23] R. Nair, "The Construction of a 'Population Problem' in Colonial India 1919–1947" *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2011, pp. 238-39.

[24] Ibid. p. 239.

[25] Ibid.

[26] R. Nair, "The Construction of a 'Population Problem' in Colonial India 1919–1947" *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2011, p. 228.

remained confined to some certain famine-prone regions to which the problem of overpopulation was attached. A shift also occurred within the official discourses of colonial state. This has been pointed by David Arnold in his article "Official Attitudes to Population, Birth Control and Reproductive Health in India, 1921–1946". He points out the important role of John Megaw[27], the officer from Indian Medical Service serving in Public Health Department and J. H. Hutton, the census commissioner. These two officials were the pioneer of the change in official thinking. But Nair says that "Arnold's focus on these officials does not explain how and why Indian population began to figure in the calculus of official thinking as a problem. Although Arnold points out to a shift in thinking about population that takes place, he does not address the context and reasons why in the 1920s an important section of the public health officialdom publicised a 'population problem' for India. For instance, although Arnold focuses on the census reports as 'important in tracing the production of and changes in official attitudes towards population, birth control and reproductive health', it is clear from his own discussion of the census reports of 1921 and1931 that the impetus for the change in attitudes lay elsewhere."[28] Nair further argues, "in fact, the census reports were often inert rather than active facilitators in framing official attitudes towards population, echoing and reflecting the prominent voices rather than generating them. The 1921 census reported no marked departure from the pattern of decades of population growth alternating with those of relative stagnation. The census commissioner J. T. Marten duly reported that Indian vital statistics and mortality rates reflected its predominantly agrarian nature and he felt it unlikely that human intervention could make any impact on the high birth or death rates."[29] However, by the next census in 1931, Hutton noted that the population had increased by 10 per cent, which he termed 'a cause for alarm rather than for satisfaction'.[30] Till the end of the

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[27] Most notable in the efforts to crystallise the 'population problem' in public health was John Megaw, a senior IMS official who became Director-General of the IMS in 1930. For Megaw, the position capped a long medical career in India that began in 1900 when he stood first in the IMS examinations and joined the Bengal Civil Medical department in 1903. Over the years, he rose up the ranks of the IMS occupying various positions such as Principal of the Lucknow Medical College, Surgeon- General of Madras, head of the provincial services in Punjab and becoming the first Director of the Calcutta School of Tropical Medicine where he helped found the All India Institute for Public Health and Hygiene. Together with like-minded colleagues such as A. J. H. Russell, he utilised his official position, institutional resources (such as editorship of the IMG, oversight of medical institutions, research and education and authorship of various health reports) and professional and academic networks to generate, highlight and publicise the discussion on India's population as a central problem to public health.

[28] Ibid., p. 230.

[29] Ibid., pp. 230-231.

[30] GOI, *Census of India*, 1931, p. 29.

second decades of twentieth century the major problem of India's public health was high mortality rate. For the officials of the Public Health Department like John Megaw, the high incidence of mortality was an indicator of overpopulation. Megaw wrote the following in the Indian Medical Gazette in 1929: "A high birth rate must inevitably be followed sooner or later by a high death rate unless some fresh sources of income can be tapped or emigration restores the balance between food and population."[31] So controlling high birth rate was necessary in order to control the population growth as well as check the high mortality rate. In other words, "to redress the issue of overall health, any attempt made to reduce overall mortality would necessarily be counterproductive, so long as high birth rates persisted." Hence, it was necessary to first address the issue of the high birth rate. Nair points out that, "the exact role that birth rates played in population dynamics was a contested one and these differences of opinion were reflected among the medical fraternity also. However, under Megaw's influence, the public health department tilted towards the interpretation that emphasis should be placed on checking the birth rate. Maternal and infant deaths, Megaw was able to portray, were the sacrificial victims of an unchecked birth rate. These constituted not only a terrible waste of human life but also the squandering of scarce resources."[32] In a widely circulated note Megaw wrote:

> Millions of infants are being born every year at the cost of much suffering to their mothers, most of whom are immature girls, and half of these infants are destined to die before they reach the wage-earning age. Even if we were to take no account of the vast amount of pain and damaged health, which are endured by these millions of girl-mothers, *there still remains the heavy bill of costs, in the shape of the extra food which is consumed by the mothers and infants. This food is not merely wasted, it represents a toll, which is levied on the community for the purpose of providing an endless supply of victims for child sacrifice* (emphasis added).[33]

The 'population problem' became more apparent after linking the maternal and infant mortality figures along with high birth rates. This linking pointed out not only bioeconomic aspects of population problem but also into the socio-economic aspect of the problem. If Indian women were married at premature age and remained underfed

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[31] A. D. Stewart, "The Problem of Population" *Indian Medical Gazette 64*, no.2, 1929. p. 91.
[32] Nair, op. cit., p. 234.
[33] Education Health and Land Department, Health Branch, 1932, No. 269/32-H, National Archives of India, New Delhi.

and malnourished, the high mortality rate of both mother and child would continue to persist. We are discussing this aspect here because later in the policy regimes of post-colonial state women became the centre of population control programme. Nair writes, "the focus on infant and maternal mortality in delineating the nature of India's 'population problem' would in time come to influence the deliberations over birth control for Indian women. As a consequence, the initial advocacy of birth control on primarily health and physiological grounds was soon joined and supplanted by one that extolled it as a socio-economic measure for population control."[34] John Megaw was among the first to establish a relationship between the average health conditions of masses and the problem of overpopulation. Megaw linked "economic well-being" with "public health". His argument that the infant and maternal mortality rates owing to preventable disease and malnutrition in economic terms amounted a loss in millions of rupees, where improving public health would only cost a fraction of these losses. Nair points out that, "the Public health officials who gave evidence before the Royal Commission on Agriculture also adopted a similar approach of linking economic prosperity with improved public health."[35] Rahul Nair sums up Megaw's contribution to public health policy and the population problem in following words:

> Redolent of earlier Malthusian rhetoric, Megaw's arguments were now tempered in the new language of international health and population statistics. Megaw described the situation in India as already one of 'grave emergency'. Over the past decade, its population had increased by 34 million despite indicators, such as life expectancy, infant mortality and morbidity figures pointing to deteriorating conditions of life. Unlike other officials, he was not sanguine about the adequacy of food supplies to meet the needs of India's growing population. Megaw had made a pioneering study of the extent of malnutrition in India, sending questionnaires to a large number of doctors working in typical agricultural villages. Summarising his findings, he estimated that only 39 per cent of the Indian rural population could be regarded as being 'well nourished', while 41 per cent were 'poorly nourished' and 20 per cent were 'very badly nourished'. It confirmed that even in normal years a large proportion of the rural population went without adequate nourishment and consequently were more susceptible to diseases and infection.[36]

[34] Nair, op. cit., p. 234.
[35] Ibid., p. 235.
[36] Ibid.

Megaw's views and formulations echoed with native intelligentsia as well. There was numerous Indian academic who in the 1920s had independently concluded that "the existing food supply was inadequate to feed the population in India." Megaw's report was merely an official confirmation of a feature that Indian social scientists in the 1920s had frequently commented upon. As early as in 1922, D. S. Dubey, an economist at the University of Allahabad, published an article in the Indian Journal of Economics, asserting that "two-thirds of the population always get only three-fourths of the amount of food-grains they should have' and that around '100 million, in spite of hard labour, may be getting for a greater part of the year less than 60 per cent of food-grains that are given to the worst sort of criminals in the jails of the United Provinces and Central Provinces."[37] B. T. Ranadive, another economist whose book on the population problem was referenced in Hutton's census report, had pointed out to "the inability of Indian agricultural productivity to keep up with population growth."[38] In his paper at the World Population Conference in Geneva in 1927, another Indian economist Rajani Kanta Das concluded that "there was a mismatch between population and food supply."[39]

Consolidating the Population-Poverty Link

In the previous section I have shown that how the problem of Overpopulation and its link with poverty was brought into discussion by colonial administrator and heavily debated during late nineteenth century. Then we see a resurgence of the population problem and its link with poverty during late 1920s onward. During this time the lead was taking by colonial public health official in the context of devolution of power taking place through several legal reforms like Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 and Government of India Act, 1935. In this section, I wish to show that how Population-Poverty link was institutionalised in the discourses and practices of colonial regime as well as the discourses and policies espoused and advocated by the nationalist thinkers

[37] D. S. Dubey, ''The Indian Food Problem II,'' *Indian Journal of Economics* 3, no. 2 (1920–22): 167–82. p. 180.
[38] B. T. Ranadive, *Population Problem of India* Calcutta, Bombay and Madras: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1930. p. 105.
[39] R. K. Das, "Population and Food Supply in India,'' *Modern Review* 42, no. 4 (1927): 453–56. p. 456.

and the leaders of the time who served as the antecedent of post-colonial nation-state and its policy makers.

By the 1920s, it was commonplace to begin discussions on Indian economy by announcing that India was now the poorest country in the world. Following the work of R C Dutt, some economists like P K Wattal, B T Ranadive, Brij Narain, or D G Karve saw India's poverty as a symptom of colonial misrule. In this framework, Indian famines were the result of excessive taxation coupled with inadequate investment in agriculture and industry, and not an extreme Malthusian effect of too many people creating pressure on the land. Therefore, their solution to the problem of Indian poverty lay mainly in increased food production and industrialisation. In this scenario, while a large population may have been liable to experience a high death rate during times of crop failures, a large population was not the cause of its own high death rate. This marked a crucial difference from subsequent overpopulation discourse. In fact, schemes for industrialisation depended on the availability of a large labour force.[40] This is not to say, however, that during the 1920s and 1930s, population per se went completely unproblematised. For example, in 1936, D G Karve in the preface of his book *Poverty and Population in India* wrote the following:

> It would appear to be clear that numbers, instead of being a cause of the unwelcome phenomenon of disease and poverty, are but a symptom and an effect of a much deeper evil, that of social and economic backwardness and cultural and psychological passivity.[41]

Karve explained that the problem of population could not be understood simply as a series of symptoms- in this case India's high levels of mortality and fertility, or 'numbers.' Rather, he situated population figures in the same discursive field as child marriage or other social evils. However, there were still few people during 1930s who considered the lack of industrialisation as the chief impediment in the ways of India's economic progress, and not the the problem of overpopulation. But by the 1940s several nationalist had started advocating Poverty-Population Link.

[40] S. Hodges, "Governmentality, Population and Reproductive Family in Modern India" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39, No. 11 (Mar. 13-19, 2004), p. 1159.

[41] D. G. Karve, *Poverty and Population in India* London: Humphrey Millford Oxford University Press, 1936. p. 7.

The 1940s witnessed even Indians taking up the cry of overpopulation, or population control, as crucial to building an economically viable independent India. Among the most influential economists of the time advocating the overpopulation logic were Gyan Chand and Radhakamal Mukherjee. In 1944, Gyan Chand, a Professor at Patna University published a book called *The Problem of Population*, in which he argued that "the gap between our means and needs is so large, and is so evident in the shrivelled bodies of the vast majority of our men, women and children, that it is the path of ordinary prudence and wisdom to add to our means but not to our needs." And in closing Chand wrote:"…we have to reduce the birth-rate in India if we are to succeed in solving the problem of want and misery."[42] Radhakamal Mukherjee, professor and head of the department of economics and sociology at Lucknow University, in his book *Food Planning for 400 Millions* published in1938 argued similarly that India could only plan for its future if it was able, among other things, to control its birth rate and bring it into line with national production. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Chand and Mukherjee emerged as key figures in the institutionalisation of an Indian population studies. Such prominent advocates of "overpopulation" theory served as advisors to the National Planning Committee of the Indian National Congress, constituted under chairmanship of Nehru, before independence, and then as advisors to the government in independent India. Hodges writes that, "in combination with mounting international concern about global overpopulation, the intellectual and institutional work of economists like Chand and Mukherjee went far in displacing Indian poverty as an object of economic investigation. That is to say, poverty came to be regarded not as a root cause of India's various problems, but as an effect of a too-large population. Thus, approaches to India's economic problems could be reworked as effects of overpopulation."[43]

The 1943 Bengal famine was studied by a Famine Inquiry Commission itself instituted out of the colonial government's late 19th century experience of trying to manage and prevent famine). Beginning their work in 1944, the commission's major set of inquiries concerned the relationship between food supply and population. They asked the Bengal Presidency officials following questions:

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[42] As quoted in S. Hodges, "Governmentality, Population and Reproductive Family in Modern India" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39, No. 11 (Mar. 13-19, 2004), p. 1160.
[43] S. Hodges, "Governmentality, Population and Reproductive Family in Modern India" *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39, No. 11 (Mar. 13-19, 2004), p. 1160.

> Having regard to the present size of the population of your province and its potential growth and having regard to the present and potential resources of your province, are you concerned that measure should be now undertaken for securing a limitation on the rate of increase of the population? If so, state and discuss the measures you would recommend for the purpose.

The respondents by and large saw no need for population control. But what is so interesting in this document, when read alongside earlier famine inquiry commission reports, is that there is a significant change in thinking about the cause of famines, and thereby their preventability. If the cause of famines was not nature itself, but a potentially controllable population, then the whole approach to famines could change drastically. The 1943 Bengal famine is thus crucial to a history of the idea of population in India because its interpretation, by colonial and nationalist thinkers alike, is that it was caused not by mercurial elements, but by people. Indeed, much contemporary scholarship on Indian famine buys into this distinction by dealing only with late 19th century Indian famines, citing the 1943 Bengal famine as 'different,' and inappropriate to include in the discussion, precisely because, unlike the earlier famines, they claim, it was 'man-made'.[44] This diversity of opinion aside, after the 1931 Census report authored by J H Hutton, there was a growing weight of opinion behind claims that India's rate of population growth posed an obstacle to her progress. Hodges points out a very important aspects of population problem as per which population growth was not a problem per se but the problem was that the wrong sorts of people are reproducing. It implicated the poor directly in population control program. Hodges argues as follows:

> *But even the 1931 Census report tells us that the population problem was not a matter of a total increase in the population, nor was it a question of food production, rather that the wrong sorts were reproducing. It was the poor agricultural labourers who posed the problem. While they had strength in numbers, they were unable to contribute their share to India's productivity. Certainly Hutton's influential proclamations were linked to 1930s discourses on population, eugenics and modernity, even if he framed the population problem in a way which made it available for subsequent appropriation by overpopulation discourse* (emphasis added).[45]

[44] Ibid., p. 1160.
[45] Ibid.

Sarah Hodges brilliantly summarise the convergence of several discourses going on at the time with the discourse on overpopulation and how the logic of overpopulation and the need for birth control flowed into each other:

> Overpopulation discourse was able to function as a gathering point for discourses and institutions of birth control advocacy, eugenics, public health (maternity and infant welfare especially) and conjugality as a model for modern family life because it provided a new selling point or justification, articulated as 'the pressing need of our day: population control.' Certainly Hutton's 1931 Census report added the weight of statistics to this agenda, but the discursive consolidation around overpopulation also served to solve a number of problems, chiefly the criticisms of morality faced by birth control advocate. Birth control advocates pursued the connections and shared agendas with population policy people because it allowed them to hitch the birth control wagon to an agenda that had little if any of the moral approbation that they had earlier faced. Indeed, overpopulation discourse needed birth control as much as birth control needed overpopulation. Its successful consolidation could not have worked without birth control as the localised technological solution to a national economic problem. For as we have seen, overpopulation discourse functions smoothly because it posits both a problem: India's poverty is due to overpopulation, and a solution: birth control.[46]

The overpopulation and birth control logic were further affirmed by the subcommittee on population, set up by Jawaharlal Nehru, under the chairmanship of Radhakamal Mukherjee which submitted its report in October 1940 as well as the Health Survey and Development Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Joseph Bhore constituted by Government of India in October 1943 and submitted its report in 1946. The subcommittee on Population was part of the National Planning Committee constituted by Indian National Congress in October 1938 under the chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru. While subcommittee on Population was part of a nationalist institution, and the Bhore Committee was constituted under the aegis of colonial state, but both the Committee made more or less similar recommendation and agreed with the basic nature and formulations of the problem. The subcommittee recommended in its provisional report in October 1940 that extensive social legislation be introduce along with the measure of eugenic sterilisation and the spread of contraceptive knowledge among masses.[47] Owing to impending political crises in 1942 and the increased intensity of

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[46] Ibid., p. 1161.
[47] Indian National Congress, National Planning Committee, Population, p. 130.

national movement National Planning Committee along with its subcommittees remained defunct as the main leaders were in jail or busy with the national movement. Subcommittee published its final report in 1947 by which time most of its assumptions and recommendations became defunct. The Subcommittee considered "family planning" important for the individual well-being and social progress. The committee recommended "the establishment of birth control clinics and other necessary measures such as raising the age at marriage and a eugenic sterilization programme." Here we can see how the birth control programme was already present in nationalist scheme of things even before independence. However, the significant shift within the nationalist discourses be noted here. The early nationalist discourses which started during 1870s completely rejected the charges of overpopulation and this position was maintained throughout the nineteenth century and continued till 1930s when the late nationalist intelligentsia and leadership started falling to the logic of overpopulation which was essentially a colonial logic.

Nair points out that, "Bhore Committee was appointed by Government of India as part of the planning for post-war developments in the health field. The committee was charged with undertaking 'a broad survey of the present position in regard to health conditions and health organization in British India' and to make 'recommendations for future developments'."[48] In 1946, Bhore Committee recommended that "the control of disease and famine and improvement of health would cause a serious problem of population growth. It considered deliberate limitation of births desirable." Bhore Committee found the "population problem" so urgent that it devoted a full chapter to this. The committee made two most important recommendations to control the growth of population: first, measures to improve the standard of living of general masses; second, encouraging people to adopt the methods of birth control. In order to make birth control economically viable for the poor masses, the committee argued "that state should control the manufacture and sale of contraceptives and fund research for the production of a safe and reliable contraceptive… It thus paved the way for the eventual adoption in independent India of an official population policy in 1952 to check population growth. The organisation of the family planning programme in independent

[48] Nair, op. cit., p. 240.

India came closely to adhere to the framework outlined in the Bhore Committee report."[49]

The discourses which were taking place on historical demography and demography internationally had a huge influence over the economists and policy makers of post-independent India. Even though I have discussed the project of Princeton's Professor Frank Notestein and Kingsley Davis theorisation on population regarding India and Pakistan in earlier section, here I would wish to give another example of the level of influence these international discourses in demography were exercising upon the national discourses and planning in India. During late 1940s the demographers of Office of Population Research at Princeton altered the predominant "transition theory". Rebecca Williams explains that, "the predominant demographic theory of the era, transition theory presented both an explanation for the demographic patterns of industrialized societies and a model for possible future patterns in the problematic "underdeveloped" nations."[50] Rebecca Williams writes,

> The "classic" formulation of transition theory suggested that all populations passed through three principal demographic stages: a "traditional," preindustrial stage characterized by high birth rates balanced by high death rates, when population grew very little; a period of large population increase caused by the onset of industrialization and modernization, which brought improvements in living standards that led to a reduction in mortality without a concurrent fall in the birth rate; and finally, a decline in the birth rate following the combined impact of modernization, urbanization, and industrialization. Such factors as enhanced survival, a growing culture of individualism, and rising consumer aspirations induced people to limit their fertility, and population growth stabilized. It thus followed that, by encouraging industrialization and associated social transformation, population growth could also be curtailed.[51]

But the classical form of transition theory as explicated above was altered by Princeton demographers. During nineteen forties, they proposed a reworked version of the theory which reconfigured the fundamental link between population growth and (under)development as well as the successive order of the two. The classic version of

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[49] Ibid., p. 241.

[50] R. J. Williams "Storming the Citadels of Poverty: Family Planning under the Emergency in India, 1975-77" *The Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 73, Issue 02,* May 2014, p. 479.

[51] Ibid.

the theory upheld that "the fertility would only fall as a result of the effects of full-scale industrialization and modernization. But, in order to provide a more immediate solution to Third World population growth, demographers "inverted" transition theory: they began to argue that in non-industrialized countries, high fertility itself was impeding economic development. Under this new formulation, fertility would need to be controlled in order for economic development to proceed."[52] Frank Notestein, director of the Princeton Office of Population Research, argued in 1948, that "gains in production will be largely consumed by increasing numbers and that the processes of population change will function, like the governor of a machine, to keep the system in a stable equilibrium of poverty and ill health". Williams points out that "in his influential work *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Kingsley Davis also argued that India's enormous population itself shows signs of becoming a dampening factor on industrial progress."[53] The inverted version of transition theory was integrated to the basic conception of India's First Five-Year Plan, which stated as follows:

> While a lowering of the birth-rate may occur as a result of improvements in the standards of living, such improvements are not likely to materialise if there is a concurrent increase of population. It is, therefore, apparent that population control can be achieved only by the reduction of the birth-rate to the extent necessary to stabilize the population at a level consistent with the requirements of national economy.[54]

Rebecca William further states that, "the necessary reduction in the birth rate, the plan stated, could be secured by family planning. In the early 1950s, still there were people in power in India who were fully convinced that contraception was the solution to high fertility. However, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru argued that economic development, rather than family planning, would lower population growth."[55] While maintaining that such growth "comes in the way of the higher standards for our people that we seek to attain," Nehru stated:

> I do not agree with those who suggest that we should attach even more importance to population control than to economic growth. There is no conflict between the two and

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[52] S. Greenhalgh, "The Social Construction of Population Science: An Intellectual, Institutional, and Political History of Twentieth-Century Demography" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38(1), 1996. pp. 26–66.
[53] Williams, op. cit., p. 479.
[54] "Population in India's First Five-Year Plan (1951–56)" *Population and Development Review* 23(2) New Delhi: Government of India, 1997. p. 401.
[55] Williams, op. cit., pp. 479-80.

> we have, therefore, to proceed on both lines. I am sure, however, that economic growth is essential even from the point of view of birth control. An increase in the standard of living of the people will help in reducing the rate of population increase.[56]

Alongside Nehru, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, the then Union Minister of Health (who oversaw the national family planning program) was also reluctant to prioritize family planning over economic development. In January 1954, she wrote to one family planning advocate, "We do not need to be unduly alarmed about what is a very normal growth in our population. We have to concentrate on raising the standards of living of the people which will ipso facto bring down the birth rate."[57] Williams points out, "however, by the end of the 1950s, such ambivalence had largely given way to consensus: that population growth was impeding economic development, and that a state-led family planning program was necessary for the progress of the nation. This consensus owed much to the work of two more Princeton academics, Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover's Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries."[58]

In 1951, the draft outline of the First Five Year Plan recognized "population policy" as "essential to planning" and "family planning" as a "step towards improvement in health of mothers and children". The draft outline of the First Five Year Plan said, "the increasing pressure of population on natural resources retards economic progress and limits seriously the rate of extension of social services, so essential to civilized existence. A population policy is therefore essential to planning. This policy emphasized three components: fertility, mortality and migration."[59] The policy objective of the First Five Year Plan had clear provisions for reduction in mortality and migration but it was the curtailment in fertility which was given the top priority in the Family Planning Programme. In fact, India became the first country in the world to officially adopt family planning programme. Venkatsubramanian argues that, "it was acknowledged that progress depended on creating a sufficiently strong motivation in

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[56] Jawaharlal Nehru in the "Foreword" of S. Chandrasekhar, *Population and Planned Parenthood in India* London: George Allen & Unwin. 1961.
[57] As Quoted in R. J. Williams "Storming the Citadels of Poverty: Family Planning under the Emergency in India, 1975-77" *The Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 73, Issue 02,* May 2014, p. 480.
[58] Ibid.
[59] K Venkatsubramanian, Population Control- Where has the strategy faltered? Planning Commission, Government of India, p. 1.
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/articles/venka/index.php?repts=m-popu.htm
accessed on 28-04-2019.

favour of family planning in the minds of the people and on providing advice and service through acceptable, efficient, harmless and economic methods. With this end in view, the plan set out these objectives: (a) to obtain an accurate picture of the factors which contribute to a rapid increase of population; (b) to gain a fuller understanding of human fertility and the means of regulating it; (c) to devise speedy ways of education of the public; and (d) to make family planning counselling an integral part of the services in hospitals and health centres."[60] He notes that, "in 1952, the final First Five Year Plan document noted the 'urgency of the problems of family planning and population control' and advocated a reduction in the birth rate to stabilize population at a level consistent with the needs of the economy."[61] He further writes, "the Second Five Year Plan gave an even more prominent place to population assessment. A national programme launched had four main components: (a) Education to create the background of contraceptive acceptance; (b) Service through rural and urban centers, including the provision of sterilization facilities; (c) Training of personnel; and (d) Research."[62] Subramanian argues that the population control remained one of the top agenda of post-colonial state since the very beginning and continues to remain so even now. He points out the bidget estimates for population control in Five years Plans which were as follows: "the Third, Fourth and Fifth plans also laid emphasis on the population policy and its implementation through family planning. The expenditure on population control in the Second Plan was Rs. 2.16 crores, in the Third Rs.284 crores and rose to Rs.497 crores in the Fifth."[63]

Body of the Poor: The overpopulation claim, family planning and poverty removal

In this section I wish to show two things: a) How slowly the colonial logic (with Malthusian concern about the effects of population pressure on the food supply and other means of subsistence) of overpopulation slowly became the part of late nationalist ideology and the concept of 'population problem' was accepted and incorporated in the

[60] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[61] Ibid. p. 2

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

discourses and administrative rationality of post-colonial state; b) How 'population' as a whole was constituted as an object of intervention through several means and how in this process of intervention the bodies of the 'poor' were directly affected and remain at the receiving end of state's measures, experiments and excesses to check the population growth.

As I have shown in the previous section that how the claim of overpopulation and the logic of inverse relationship between rise of population and material prosperity dominated not only the mind of colonial administrator but also the imaginations and thoughts of majority of nationalist economists and leaders, there was an overwhelming unanimity over the need to check the population growth during late nationalist period as well as after Independence. The measures of birth control were accepted but its implementation was restricted to the Westernised minority in the cities during 1940s. Population remained one of the key policy objective of post-colonial India. Population control remained one of the most salient features of economic planning in India. Body of the Poor was disciplined amidst the claim of overpopulation, needs for family planning and the abolition of poverty through direct or indirect intervention.

Malthusian concerns regarding the inverse ratio of population growth and the growth in means of subsistence dominated the colonial state's discourses and policy throughout late eighteenth century and nineteenth century. Malthus was among the chief exponent of English Classical Political Economy along with Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and others. It has been shown in Chapter I & II, how Classical Political Economy functioned as the prescriptive science of governance for colonial Indian state. Malthus found the reason behind recurrent colonial famines the growth of population and not the artificial tampering with the supply chains of food in colonial India.[64] Caldwell & Caldwell have rightly noted that Malthus and his successors "insured that generations of British officials and scholars in India saw that country's society in Malthusian terms."[65] As I have shown in the beginning of the previous section that till

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[64] Oscar Harkavy and Krishna Roy, "Emergence of Indian National Family Planning Program" in Warren C. Robinson and John A. Ross ed. *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policy and Program*, Washington, D.C: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /World Bank Publications, 2007. p. 301.

[65] John Caldwell and Pat Caldwell, *Limiting Population Growth and the Ford Foundation Contribution* London: Frances Pinter, 1986. p. 4.

the end of the nineteenth century there persisted a tendency to negate the Malthusian formulation of an inverse relationship between population growth and food supply along with other means of subsistence, still there were leaders who pointed out that rather than suffering with the problem of overpopulation India suffers with the problem of underproduction. With the beginning of twentieth century, even Indians significantly started getting disconcerted with population problem. This reflected a shift within nationalist intelligentsia as the nationalist leaders and economics of nineteenth century never agreed with the logic of overpopulation being the chief cause of poverty or famine, rather they held the dismal growth rate and drain of resources as the chief cause for famines and poverty of India. By the second decades of twentieth century, many native authors and nationalists started writing about the danger of population growth. However, it should be kept in mind here that the most prominent nationalist leaders like Gandhi and Nehru still didn't agree with Malthusian logic of overpopulation. Rather Gandhi and Nehru adopted a stance that with economic development the population problem would slowly dissipate. Harkavy and Roy points out that, "in 1916, for example, an Indian scholar, Pyare Kishan Wattal, published *The Population Problem in India* portraying dire consequences of the population growth India was enduring. In 1928, a neo-Malthusian league[66] was organized in Madras. Five years previously, India's first birth control clinic had been opened in Poona, but was restricted by Gandhian opposition to artificial methods of birth control."[67]

Hidam Premnanda in his article "Administration, Statistics and Population" argues that there is an acute need to study the population control in India beyond the traditional and privileged field of demography or "population studies". Indeed, "population control is not merely a programme but also a mechanism that produces particular "objects" of administration and specific relations between experts and their object or, in other words, the state and population. India's population control programme is constitutive of the manner in which the growing population has come to be viewed as a problem for government. It is within this context that various kinds of knowledge are produced

[66] Sarah Hodges in her book *Contraception, Colonialism and Commerce: Birth Control in South India, 1920–1940* writes in detail about Neo-Malthusian League and its function and devote an entire chapter to it.
[67] Oscar Harkavy and Krishna Roy, "Emergence of Indian National Family Planning Program" in Warren C. Robinson and John A. Ross ed. *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policy and Program*, Washington, D.C: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /World Bank Publications, 2007. p. 301.

about the population as a whole (production of demographic data), the notion of "target population" (demographically established social groups and classes) and expert advice on the manner of dealing with them (in the form of family planning clinics or mass sterilisation camps). An understanding of these relations would allow us to see the relationship of the population to administrative and planning rationality particularly in the case of sterilisation camps in the administrative discourse of population control in India."[68] When remarkable mass sterilisation camps came into being between 1961 at the start of the Third Five-Year Plan to the beginning of the 1970s, they were hailed as the most successful administrative and managerial venture in the field of population control. Premananda further argues that 'the purpose of studying sterilisation camps during this period is to see how the sterilisation camp can be understood seen beyond the conventional setting of a successful administrative experiment and to view it as a form of power that offers complex relations between statistics, administration and population.'[69] "Sterilisation camps in the administrative discourse of population control during the period under study tended to focus on a specific end, i.e, to build mass awareness that would subsequently lead to mass participation in family planning campaign. For example, the Planning Commission in its report *Evaluation of Family Planning Programme* in 1965 emphasised on the role of the camp as an educational agency.[70] There were two important, interrelated elements – "incentives" and "targets" – through which to realise this end. Incentives were normally offered to those who voluntarily came for sterilisation to family planning clinics that were running in large numbers even at the beginning of the official family planning programme in the early 1950s. The logic of incentives, however, had a significant role when it was used at the sterilisation camp as it helped to identify specific pockets of the target population and to promote their participation in the camps. Incentives were redefined not merely in the way they were used for the purpose of compensation and motivation but as an administrative strategy in order to ensure proper management of the target. Indeed, payment of incentives was instrumental in mobilising the target population and therefore prescribed and enforced by many governmental agencies. For example, in April 1964 the Government of India took serious note of the intensifying sterilisation

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[68] H. Premananda, "Administration, Statistics and Population: Sterilisation Camps in the Early 1970s" *Economic and Political Weekly,* Vol xlviiI no 12, 23 March 2013, p. 69.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Planning Commission, *Evaluation of Family Planning Programme* New Delhi: Government of India, 1965. p. 79.

drive as a part of population control and planning. Subsequently, a scheme was sculpted to provide incentives in the form of a certain amount of money to be paid to any per son willing to undergo vasectomy, to the surgeon performing the operation, and to anyone who motivated others to undergo sterilisation. However, the process of target setting operated in a different manner. While the prescription of a specific numerical target was to measure the performance of the family planning programme, the target was also set as the number of people or the ratio of eligible couples to the target population, to be "protected", in a specific period, mostly on an annual, basis. At the same time, the number of people to be brought under the periodic target was also specific to the kind of couples in particular areas, age groups, economic and social backgrounds, etc. The numerical figure that was set to be achieved was also based on the identification of specific population groups as a target. Indeed, the notion of target was thus constructed both as a numerical and demographic figure. Again, within this administrative construction of target, those who had adopted sterilisation as a method of family planning would be known as "protected" as against the "unprotected" couples who had not yet undergone sterilisation. This administrative division of demographic identities would again be statistically transmogrified into a numerical figure as targets achieved during a year, and a demographic figure that would need to be targeted."[71]

The fundamental rationale behind the sterilisation camp was to expand administrative surveillance as well as to popularise family planning techniques, particularly sterilisation. Setting targets was thus a calculated move to identify the performance of the functionaries of the family planning department. And once the numerical objectives to be achieved had been set, it helped to determine which population groups, localities and activities needed intervention. For example, the "most eligible" candidates for incentives were those in the lower income groups who had an earning of below Rs 150 per month. More elaborate calculations were later devised in order to incorporate the growth rate of specific categories of population, their living conditions, income, and level of literacy. Accordingly, quotas were distributed on a range of population groups to be brought under various agencies. Consequently, specific places where the poor usually lived became visible sites of population control intervention. Slums, labour colonies, plantation and mining zones were covered by sterilisation camps**.** Behind these efforts was the belief that in order to popularise family planning, it was necessary

[71] Ibid., p. 70.

to make it easy for the target population to get the service at their doorstep, as it were, than "expecting the people to come to a distant clinic"[72] (Planning Commission 1965: 60-61). It was with this concern that the camp came to be a part of a larger concern of special programmes of population control over the identified areas where target populations lived. The administrative idea of the camp was in this sense a way of evoking a mass response in the form of expanded targets that had to be achieved. Here, popularity was a fundamental concern for the administrators when they proposed strategies to organise sterilisation camps.

Sayantani Sur in the beginning of her article "Bodies in Poverty: Family Planning and Povrty Removal in India" quotes the texts of an advertisement on family planning that appeared in *Yojana Parika* in 1971 which is as follows: "the advertisement featured a conversation between two men—a practitioner of family planning and a non-practitioner. One man says to the other, "Tell me, brother, how can you live so well while I can hardly make both ends meet?" The other man replies, "I have few mouths to feed—only two children." The first man confesses, "My wife has a baby every year! What should I do?" To this, the other replies, "Do what I do—use Nirodh." The tagline of the advertisement reads, "A family you have planned is a family you can provide for."[73] As it has been discussed in the previous section of the present chapter, family planning was part of the First Five Year Plan and continued thereafter. During nineteen sixties it was widely publicised by Government of India and new methods of birth controls like condom, loops, contraceptive pills et cetera were made available through public health system. Sur argues that, "Family planning soon became a blanket term for population reduction as well as economic growth and poverty alleviation. The advertisement described above exemplifies how poverty and economic hardship were linked with family planning, and how contraceptives became the immediate prescription for the removal of poverty. Official family planning advertisements portrayed an idea of inadequacy and overall distress as the result of failure to practise family planning. Contraception, in effect, emerged as an economic virtue instead of a corporeal one."[74] The body of the poor was directly implicated in the discourses of family planning which linked the economic and the corporeal. Family planning became

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[72] Ibid., p. 71.
[73] S. Sur, "Bodies in Poverty: Family Planning and Poverty Removal in India" *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol LII No. 40. 7 Octb 2017, p. 48.
[74] Ibid.

a means to alleviate poverty. Family planning which was conceptualised in order to check the population growth in the beginning somehow seems to become the integral part of the governmental rationality of the post-colonial state. Sur highlights the increased consolidation of the link between the corporeal and the economic. She writes, "the corporeal is also crucial in this context, as in the late 1960s and 1970s, under Indira Gandhi's electoral agenda of *Garibi Hatao* (poverty removal), the state attacked the bodies of the poor through interventions that ranged from disincentives to slum demolition and forced sterilisation. When material poverty flowed into bodily poverty and transformed into an identity, Garibi Hatao became Garib Hatao (removal of the poor)."[75] Family Planning programmes lied at the intersection of the bodily, the social and the economic. Towards the beginning of 1970s, it became difficult to ascertain whether poverty was the main target of the family planning or the body of the poor. During emergency, it seems the objective of poverty abolition gets transformed into the elimination of poor themselves. Sur writes, "it was during the Emergency (1975–77) that state interventions made such violent and insidious inroads into the domain of the intimate that it brought down the Congress government in the Lok Sabha elections of 1977. This ''political will'' in family planning, adopted through the electoral agenda of "Garibi Hatao," soon transformed into "Garib Hatao.""[76] Gangadharan first pointed to the elimination of the poor by attacking their body and habitats directly. They write, "in the name of beautification, the poor were being evicted. 'Garibi Hatao' was getting a new interpretation: eliminate the poor".[77] There are other authors like Rebecca Williams who argues that "during the Emergency that Garibi Hatao transformed into Garib Hatao. For Williams, Garibi Hatao meant not "an attack on the roots of poverty but an assault on the bodies of the poor"."[78] But Rebecca Williams does not explicates the process through which this change occurred, rather she traces the genealogy of overpopulation narrative and how it got institutionalised in the reasoning of post-colonial state through Five Years plans. Sur's article mentioned above particularly focusses upon the implication of body in family programme in India and also the ways different bodies (like the body of Dalit, Muslim, Tribes, Poor et cetera were treated by

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[75]Ibid.

[76] Ibid., p. 49.

[77] K Gangadharan, P J Koshy and C N Radhakrishnan, *The Inquisition: Revelations before the Shah Commission*, New Delhi: Path Publishers. 1978. p. 33.

[78] R. J. Williams, "Storming the Citadels of Poverty: Family Planning under the Emergency in India, 1975–77," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol 73, No 2, 2014. p 471.

the state with the firm objective of disciplining them as they were conceptualised as the source of overpopulation and poverty. Sur points out, “Garibi Hatao became an engulfing agenda. Together with the new-found zeal in family planning, the state created a new language of governmentality which was institutionalised in poverty and played out in the bodies of the poor.”[79]

Locating poverty and poor in the discourses of Family Planning in post-colonial India

Sur argues that, “poverty and family planning both emanate from a series of common anxieties. Gradually, family planning emerged as a quick solution to ending poverty. The history of poverty and family planning is heavily loaded with overlapping interactions of eugenics, birth control, Malthusianism and planning, primarily aimed at controlling the subaltern population.”[80] By the end of the 1940s, “Indian eugenics dovetailed with family planning and was subsumed by it because both agreed that the most pressing problem of the day was Indian poverty, and that this poverty could be alleviated by the judicious application of eugenic birth control”.[81] Sur also highlights “the ideological alliance between neo-Malthusianism and eugenics. Malthusian arithmetic was deployed to support the overpopulation claim and the Indian middle class/upper-caste male advocates of birth control in the name of the nation and also the Hindu community attempted to institute various ‘reforms’ aimed at marginalising subaltern groups while simultaneously preserving the existing structures of the elite privileges”.[82] Poor which emerged as the prime object of colonial governmentality and its disciplinary project continued to be treated in the same manner by the post-colonial state. The early nationalist leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji and G. V. Joshi understood the falsity of colonial claim of overpopulation and argued vociferously against it. But the nationalist intelligentsia fell prey to colonial logic during 1930s and 40s. Gandhi and Nehru were alone in their conviction that economic progress is the requirement to check the overpopulation and not the otherwise. Sur writes, “the Indian National

[79] Sur, op. cit., p. 49.
[80] Ibid.
[81] S. Hodges, “Governmentality, Population and Reproductive Family in Modern India,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 39, No 11, 2004. pp. 57-60.
[82] S. Ahluwalia, *Reproductive Restraints: Birth Control in India 1877–1947*, University of Illinois Press. 2007. p. 35.

Congress set up the National Planning Committee in 1938. In May 1940, this committee, under Radhakamal Mukherjee, warned that "disparity in the natural increase of different social strata shows a distinct trend of mis-population" and recommended "selectively sterilising the entire group of hereditary defectives"."[83] Actually, the notion that overpopulation and poverty are linked to each other and an impediment to modernity and economic prosperity had started gaining root in the beginning of twentieth century through social-scientific discourses. In fact, the Planning Commission inherited the logic of overpopulation and the consequent poverty from the official discourses of 1940s particularly from the official recommendations and discussions set off by Bhore Committee. Bhore committee was set up in 1943 to enquire about the larger condition of public health in India under the chairmanship of Joseph Bhore who was also the member of Viceroy's executive council. Sur argues that, "Bhore Committee report published in 1946 directly linked poverty to overpopulation and made it clear that steps had to be considered to curb population growth as the census recorded a steep rise."[84] Later Planning Commission adopted the same logic as it declared the family programme the core of its initiative towards poverty removal. Sur further points out, "a subcommittee of the Planning Commission in April 1951 recommended fertility limitation both for the sake of the mother and child and to stabilise population 'consistent with the requirements of national economy.' It recommended free sterilisation and contraception on medical, social and economic grounds. Through the 'science' of planning, the leaders sought to reduce population and bring about material progress, something which colonialism had failed to generate. Thus, poverty was institutionalised within the scope of family planning."[85]

Consolidation of Poverty: economic measures and the indirect disciplining of the Body

During 1960s, the concept of economic incentives was introduced by Mudaliar Committee as part of an effort towards checking the population growth through disciplining the bodies of the Poor. In line with the altered transition theory proposed

[83] Sur, op. cit., p. 50.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.

by the Princeton demographers as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, some other American Demographers A J Coale and E M Hoover published a work called *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*. In this work, they argued that "a reduction in population growth would produce "important economic advantages" and the sooner a reduction in fertility occurred, the greater the benefits would be."[86] The book played an important role in influencing the Indian policymakers. Coale and Hoover's formulations were also reflected in the official government reports of the Mudaliar Committee which was published in 1962. The committee warned that "if the growth in population does not show any significant downward trend during the next five years, the introduction of appropriate legislative and administrative measures will have to be considered".[87]

Owing to deepening economic turmoil, a plan holiday was declared in 1965. During mid nineteen sixties, a full-fledged campaign was launched on part of government to control the rising population. The government implemented the idea of economic incentives and disincentives as formulated by Mudaliar Committee in order to encourage the Poor to adopt the family planning. Sur argues that,

> the members of the Health Survey Committee could not come to a unanimous decision on the "right" method of family planning, and came up with two sets of recommendations: (i) The general recommendation suggested intensifying the existing family planning programme by measures such as training, education, demographic studies, free supply of contraceptives and voluntary sterilisation. They also suggested the formation of an independent ministry at the centre to deal with the problem of population, or enlarging the ministry of health by appointing a minister of state for family planning. (ii) The second recommendation was for a more drastic family planning programme, signed by five eminent physicians who recomended legislative action to accelerate family planning. These recommendations included: (a) graded rate of taxation from the fourth confinement onwards, (b) removal of disadvantage in income tax for unmarried persons, (c) withdrawal of maternity benefits for women

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[86] A. J. Coale and Edgar M Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1958. p. 335.

[87] Mudaliar Committee, *Report of the Health Survey and Planning Committee* Ministry of Health: Government of India. 1962. Pp. 405-6.

refusing to accept family planning, and (d) the introduction of abortions for socio-economic reasons.[88]

Sur very convincingly argues that, "bodies are central to the discourse of family planning. Bodies are also fundamental to the idea of poverty. Poverty remains an empty category unless embodied. The body serves as the intersection, the interface between family planning and poverty, and the bodies of the poor are dominant in family planning discourse. In the 1960s, the state introduced certain incentives and disincentives to alleviate poverty. The incentives and disincentives were conditional to certain conditions of the body, which were redeemable for money, and therefore directly affected the integrity of the body. The body of the poor was at the centre of family planning discourse. While reproductive sexuality is generally looked upon as respectable sexuality, for the poor, charged with 'overbreeding', reproduction claimed no respect."[89]A certain biopolitics of bodies of the poor emerged during Emergency. The use of incentives, disincentives along with slum demolition as measures for implementing family planning and alleviation of poverty was the marker of a new policy regime under which poor became an object of post-colonial governmentality. The creation of a category of "worthy" and "non-worthy" poor or "deserving" or "un-deserving poor" was reminiscent of colonial governmentality and the logic under which Old Poor Law in England were amended.

[88] S, Sur, "Bodies in Poverty: Family Planning and Poverty Removal in India" *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol LII No. 40. 7 Oct. 2017, p. 51.
[89] Ibid.

Image 5.1

An advertisement published in *Yojna Patrika* in 1971 to promote family Planning.

The text of the conversation between the two men are as follows: One man says to the other, "Tell me, brother, how can you live so well while I can hardly make both ends meet?" The other man replies, "I have few mouths to feed—only two children." The first man confesses, "My wife has a baby every year! What should I do?" To this, the other replies, "Do what I do—use Nirodh." The tagline of the advertisement reads, "A family you have planned is a family you can provide for."

This advertisement (10 January, 1971) was one among several others that were published in the Yojana Patrika (http://yojana.gov.in/) in the 1960s and 1970s. It shows how India's family planning programme, officially launched in 1952, linked poverty and economic hardship to

family planning. It also exemplifies how, during the period, contraceptives became the immediate prescription for the removal of poverty.

Image 5.2

A 1976 Sterilization Ad Banner with Incentives in terms of Price Chart.

Conclusion

The present work studied the history of the change in conception of poverty in the wake of industrial revolution and the emergence of the Classical Political Economy as a new science of wealth in western Europe and its implication upon the colonial rule in India particularly after the crown taking over the administration of India in 1858. Then it goes on locating the place of poverty in the nationalist discourses during colonial regime and in the developmental discourses of post-colonial state in India after independence from the long British rule. The work focussed mainly upon the discursive history of the concept of poverty with the objective of tracing the historically mutating character of the term poverty and its consequences over the figuration of the poor in bureaucratic and political discourses.

First chapter starts with the historical configuration of the term 'poverty' and 'poor'. It traces the shifts in approaching these two terms, particularly in context of the transition from late medieval to early modern period in western Europe. The history of this transition has a great bearing upon the change in the ways of conceiving poverty. The transition from late medieval to early modern period was effectuated owing to the factors activated in the backdrop of industrial revolution. The two primary factors behind this transition were: the beginning of the process of primitive accumulation of capital; and the rise of classical political economy. These two factors changed the way poverty was imagined or thought out. Primitive accumulation of capital set off the process of proletarianisation which meant the creation of a distinctly modern social class and the clear division of capital and labour, thus paving the way for capitalism. The emergence of the science of classical political economy entailed a changed conception of labour vis-à-vis notion of wealth. Classical political economy made a departure from the French physiocrats who considered the possession of physical resources as the measure of wealth. Classical political economy stated that labour is the only source of wealth. While earlier the lack of physical possession was considered a sign of poverty (as per the formulations of Physiocrats); now the lack of productive capacity became the real marker of poverty (owing to the advances made of classical political economy regarding its conception of labour). Poverty and wealth was put into an inverse relationship with each other. They had become an antonym to each other. The principles of classical political economy along with the process of primitive

accumulation became the precursor of a new governmental rationality not only in Great Britain and other parts of western Europe but also in the colonies which existed at that time. The debates which took place within Classical Political Economy and the insight generated thereof was responsible for the change in the Poor Laws in Great Britain. The change from Old to New Poor Law also transpired through the colonies and its effect could be seen in the bureaucratic discourses of the colonial state in India (e.g., the framing of Famine Code to regulate Famine Relief, the construction of work-houses, poor houses and lunatic asylums during the last quarter of nineteenth century). The chapter also discusses the conceptual figuration of 'poverty' in the discourses of classical political economy and shows how the concept of 'poverty' was linked to concepts of 'labour' and 'population'. It is further delineated in the Chapter that the figure of the poor is situated at the intersection of the triad of these three concepts called 'poverty,' 'labour,' and 'population.' The chapter also argues that the idea of poverty underwent a change in the wake of enlightenment. Enlightenment played a major role in eschewing poverty from its religious and moral attribution. This has been instantiated in the chapter through showing the linguistic and semantic change in the usage of the word poverty and poor throughout the transitory period from late medieval to early modern period. The chapter further discusses the discourses upon pauperism as it took place during the period of proto-capitalism. A clear distinction has been maintained between the poor and the worker as it has been the contention of this work that all the workers can be taken as poor but they do not subsume all the poor, whereas the category of poor subsumes all the worker. The term worker has a specific history and special attributes in the context of the rise of capitalism but the term poor predates capitalism and evades any fixed ascription. The institutions of charity and phenomenon of policing the poor has also been discussed in this chapter.

The second chapter sought to situate the place of poverty and unpack the process of its constitution as a governmental category in the official discourse of the colonial state in India. It highlighted the linkages between the processes of knowledge formation and the treatment of poverty in the colonial statecraft during nineteenth century colonial India. The chapter also traces the development within classical political economy regarding poverty and labour and its clear ramification over the bureaucratic discourses upon poor in colonial India. It further dealt with the study of colonial governmentality with a specific reference to the emergence of the category of population and its link

with the question of poverty. It was also argued that extraction of labour through creating a productive work-force through disciplining and modernising the labour subject and instituting the institution like work-houses, poor-houses, lunatic asylums were the key objectives of colonial governmentality. Colonialism ushered in a new mode of power in the form of modern state which felicitated the vast reorganization of social and economic sphere and relationship. In light of this organization the idea of poverty also underwent a change. Poverty was eschewed from the previous network of dependence based on traditional, customary or community relationship. Poverty was no longer located in the moral economy of the masses but made an object of the colonial governance. In other words, a colonial paradigm of poverty was created. In this chapter It has also been argued that the phenomenon of confinement functioned as a means of disciplining population and extracting labour and this could be substantiated by taking example of work-houses, poor-houses, lunatic asylums and jail prisoners employed upon extra-mural labour in colonial India. The phenomenon of confinement has been central to the bureaucratic discourses of poor in colonial India as it is situated at the interstices of moral discourses, racial discourses and the discourse of political economy. The practice of confinement functioned as a corrective tool or reforming device and as a technique to arrest the disturbances of the population, is situated at the interstices of discourses connecting poverty, labour, idleness and work. The practice of confinement in colonial India had a direct lineage in terms of its continuance as an official policy from the metropole. The confinement of vagrants, madmen, beggars and homeless, and the insistence upon work cannot be associated with economic reasons only, but it was rooted also in a moral and racial framework. Confinement was used to instill a certain work-ethics in its subject. And it was an official policy of the colonial state that the work-houses and lunatic asylums for European and natives were established separately.

Third chapter dealt with particularly three things: firstly, with the historical context in which economy emerged as a separate domain and as a field of systematic intervention of colonial rule in India during late eighteenth century and early half of nineteenth century; secondly, the early nationalist' engagement with the propositions and principle of classical political economy as well as situating the epistemic paradigm in which the nationalist response was articulated especially with regard to poverty; thirdly, the example of Drain Theory and the arguments of nationalist intelligentsia of constant drain was taken to show that how the conception of bleeding economy became the

carrier of early nationalism towards the last quarter of nineteenth century during colonial regime. The chapter traced the emergence of idea of macroeconomic accounting employed by colonial state during the period between late 18th and late 19th century in order to regulate the economy and how this microeconomic accounting was turned by early nationalist leader like Dadabhai Naoroji into a rigorous accounting of economic drain of resources from India to Great Britain and generated the whole discourse around estimating the national income in order to show the worsening material condition of the masses. Dadabhai Naoroji's estimation of actual material condition was the most important as he calculated for the first the minimum amount of money required for the nutrition needed for bare survival. The poverty estimation measures even today cannot ignore the method employed by Dadabhai during those days.

Fourth Chapter studied the shift in approaching the question of poverty within the nationalist discourses and it argued that a considerable shift took place with the advent of Gandhi in national movement for liberation from colonial rule. The chapter further argues that two explicit changes took place within the nationalist discourses around poverty with Gandhi holding the centrestage of national freedom movement which are as follows: firstly, poverty was no longer articulated as an economic problem and a mere byproduct of colonial rule rather it has become a social question, a question involving the whole of society; secondly, the problem of economic drain and consequent poverty of the nation and the masses got directly linked to the attainment of Swaraj, a complete sovereignty, no longer appealing to the good reason and conscience of British rule as the majority of early nationalist intelligentsia did. Another element of the nationalist discourses over poverty during this time was Gandhian articulation of poverty and labour. Gandhi didn't consider poverty in merely economic terms but in moral terms as well, his conception of voluntary poverty is an instance of that. Gandhi also redefined the idea of labour. Gandhi advocated that labour is a moral act and everyone should contribute their share in nation-making, thus introducing the concept of universal daily labour and making the contribution of certain yards of yarn spun by oneself as necessary for acquiring the membership of Congress. The idea behind spinning franchise was that a national community be built through the principle of universal labour performed on behalf of the nation. Gandhi urged that coming out of poverty is only possible by becoming self-reliant and self-sufficient through adopting

the principle of swadeshi and seeking swaraj. He advocated Khadi as a means to come out of poverty and dependence. Though it should be noted here that Gandhi never lost sight of basic problem of economic drain through colonial economic mechanism as articulated by Dadabhai Naoroji, but Gandhi thought that the physical labour is important to create a national community as he believed that at the root of economic disorder is the unjust exploitation of the labour of others which result into a society divided into two class: on the one hand, an 'idle rich' class with no physical work at all; and, on the other, the overworked labour-class crying for more leisure, living hand to mouth. Gandhiji states: "under my system, it is labour which is the current coin, not metal. Any person who can use his labour as that coin is wealthy. He converts it into cloth, he converts his labour into grain. If he wants paraffin oil, which he cannot himself produce, he uses his surplus grain for getting the oil. It is exchange oflabour on free, fair and equal terms– hence it is no robbery."[1] 'Bread-labour' is an article of faith to Gandhiji. He insists that in an ideal society of his conception everyone must have adequate scope for eight hours' work a day. Eight hours' sleep, eight hours' work and eight hours' leisure for other social and cultural pursuits- is an ideal distribution of time as per Gandhi.[2] Explaining to Rabindranath Tagore his idea of compulsory labour, Gandhiji says: "'Why should I, who have no need to work for food, spin?' the question may be asked. Because I am eating what does not belong to me. I am living on the spoliation of my countrymen. Trace the source of every coin that finds its way into your pocket, and you will realise the truth of what I say!"[3] Gandhi considered the idea of compulsory physical labour as a prerequisite for the creation of a national community.

Fifth and the last chapter was primarily centred upon the discourses of poverty in post-colonial India. Since the abolition of poverty and creation of a prosperous society was the principal demand of nationalist movement against colonial regime and served as a basis for decolonisation, they became the raison d'être of the post-colonial state in India. The abolition of poverty and the welfare of the poor is still the part and parcel of the political discourses of colonial India. The chapter argued that the idea of development was posed as an antidote to poverty in the political discourses as well as the bureaucratic discourses of post-colonial state in India. The chapter showed how economic planning

[1] *Harijan*, 2-11-1934. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 98 Vols., New Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India, 1999.
[2] Agarwal, op. cit., p. 27.
[3] *Young India*, 1-10-1921.

became symptomatic of the post-colonial governmental rationality and Five years Plans became the carrier of that rationality till the recent past. The chapter started with historicising 'India's overpopulation' narrative and its link with poverty discourses particularly espoused by the state. Till the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975 and ending in 1977, the overpopulation narrative was the inalienable part of state's discourse on poverty. It was only after the Emergency when torture of sterilisation programme became a huge matter of political controversy, the overpopulation narrative was left aside by political parties and the successive governments. However, it has been argued in the chapter that the 'population problem' was a construction of colonial bureaucracy in order to hide its own failure to deal with the existent poverty of India and mask its own exploitative face. The chapter further showed that the body of the poor becomes the site of an intervention for through constituting the 'population' as a category and a domain of intervention. The official and political campaign of Gharibi Hatao has taken as an example to substantiate the claim made above.

Appendices

Appendix 2.1

Rules of management and discipline for vagrants admitted to Government work-houses in the Central Provinces

I. When first admitted into the work-house, the vagrant shall be examined by the Medical Officer in charge of the Central Jail, who shall pronounce whether he is in good health and able to work.

II. If, on his admission, a vagrant be destitute of clothing, he shall be supplied with a frock or coat, a pair of trousers, shirt, cap and boots.

III. Every vagrant will be supplied with bedding, and with soap and a towel for his ablutions.

IV. The vagrant, during the time he may be in the work-house, must obey all the orders of the Superintendent, given either direct or conveyed through a subordinate officer.

V. He must rise at sun-rise, thoroughly wash his body at least once a day, and keep his prison clothing, the ward, and furniture clean and in good order.

VI. For purpose of nature, he must use the latrine attached to his ward, and conform to the Conservancy rules existing at the jail. The jail sweeper will attend to the latrines.

VII. He must behave himself orderly and quietly, not using loud and abusive language.

VIII. He must not quarrel with other inmates, nor strike, nor threaten any officer or other person connected with the jail or work-house.

IX. He must perform the tasks set him by the Superintendent, who will be guided by the ability and previous occupation of the vagrant, giving him, when possible and convenient, work to which he has been accustomed, and when this cannot be done, work of medium or light character, which can be performed within the ward or enclosure.

The work to be sufficient to occupy the man six hours in the hot weather from April 1st to July 1st, and eight hours during the other months of the year.

Notice: Any vagrant who knowingly disobeys or neglects any of the above rules is punishable with three months rigorous imprisonment.

Note: These rules were *prescribed under Section* 14 *of Act XXI of* 1869.

Source: Government of India, Home, Public, 1871, Proceedings, Sept 23, No. 124, Enclosure.

Appendix. 2.2

Draft Rules for the Management and Discipline of Vagrants admitted into the Stranger's Home at Allahabad

I. The governor of the work-house shall receive into his custody any vagrant delivered over to him with an order for detention, under Section 5, Act XXI of 1869, signed by a Justice of the Peace exercising the full power of a Magistrate.

II. Vagrants shall, on addition, be searched by an officer of the work-house, and all money or other effects shall be taken from them. The Governor of the work-house shall take charge of such money and effects, and shall, within twenty four hours, submit a statement to the Committee of Management, for the information of Government, of the value of the property brought in by any vagrant, with a view to the amount being applied towards meeting the cost of his maintenance in the work-house.

III. Vagrant shall, on admission, and before being placed to labour, be examined by the Medical Officer, who may direct their clothing to be removed and burnt if necessary and may order their hair to be cut for the sake of cleanliness. The personal cleanliness of the vagrants shall be enforced during their stay in the work-house, for which purpose a proper supply of soap, towels, combs &c., shall be afforded. If the clothing of vagrants is insufficient, or has to be destroyed on their admission, such vagrants shall be supplied with a plain suite of a coarse material. They shall also have bedding provided in sufficient quantity for health.

IV. Employment of some sort, and, if possible, profitable employment, shall be provided for all inmates of the work-house. If any vagrant earns more by his labour than the cost of his maintenance, the surplus shall be given to him on his discharge from the work-house. When possible, vagrant shall be employed in work to which they are accustomed, or in which they are skilled. Those for whom no other sort of work can be found, shall be employed in oakum-picking or in any work decided to be suitable and the task shall be fixed by the Committee of Management. Any vagrant who does not perform his full task on the plea of physical inability, will be kept at sedentary labour in a cell on the cell diet, as prescribed by Jail Regulations.

V. Vagrants shall have every opportunity allowed them of having interviews, at reasonable hours in the work-house, with employers of labour seeking to engage them.

VI. The relatives of vagrants desirous of seeing them shall be admitted, on a written order of the Magistrate of the District, or other member of the Committee of

Management, between such hours as may from time to time be fixed. Such interviews to be in the presence of an officer of the work-house, and not to exceed half an hour at one time. Vagrants may write letters to their relatives, or to persons likely tom employ them.

VII. Vagrants shall be made to attend divine service regularly, and shall be visited by the Chaplains of their respective persuasions.

VIII. Vagrants in the work-house shall behave in respectful manner to all officials; shall not make use of bad language; shall avoid quarrelling with their fellow inmates; shall not be idle or negligent at work; shall not damage work-house property; shall abstain from disorderly conduct and from singing or making any other noise; and they shall obey all other rules made for their guidance in the work-house. Disobedience of these rules shall be punished as the Act directs.

IX. Vagrants who are guilty of violence, or who are abusive or refractory, may be put in handcuffs by order of the Governor, and may be placed in solitary confinement until they can be brought before a Magistrate, which shall not be later than 24 hours after the act of violence, &c., for which the vagrant has been confined.

X. A copy of these rules and of sections 11, 15 and 20 of Act XXI of 1869, shall be kept in the wards in which vagrants are confined.

Source: Government of India, Home, Public, 1871, Proceedings, July 8, No. 87.

Appendix 2.3

Rules for the Employment of Convicts on extramural labor in the Provinces of Mysore and Coorg

Selection of Locality for Temporary Jail:

1. Gangs of prisoners to be employed on extramural labor will be accommodated in temporary jails at places where large public works are being carried on.

2. No temporary jails shall be established till it is ascertained from the Department of Public Works.

1st. That a gang of at least 300 prisoners can be employed on the work for a period of two years, or upwards.

2nd. That the work is of such a kind that prisoners can be usefully employed upon it.

3rd. That it will not be necessary to associate prisoners with free laborers.

4th. That the prisoners will be employed in a body, and that it will not be necessary to scatter them into numerous detached gangs over a large space.

3. On a report being made that these conditions can be complied with, the Chief Commissioner may direct that a temporary jail be constructed according to plans and estimate approved of by the Department of Public Works and the Judicial Commissioner.

Selection of Prisoners for Employment on Extramural Labour:

5. Prisoners to be employed on extramural labour should be those sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of not less than one year, and who are in good health, physically strong, andcapable of undergoing hard labor. Desperate characters or those who have attempted to escape should not be employed on extramural labor.

5. Along with every gang dispatched from any jail, a certificate, signed by the medical officer in charge of the jail, is to be forwarded to the Officer in charge of the temporary jail, to the effect that the prisoners have been individually examined by him, and are, in his opinion, capable of enduring hard labor.

Supervision and Management:

6. Wherever a temporary jail is established, it shall be placed under the executive charge of a European or Eurasian Officer specially selected for the above duty.

13. The prisoners are not to be allowed to be associated with free laborers in any description of work. There will, therefore, be but little risk of infectious disease being directly communicated by the free population. But, as infectious disease may be communicated to them indirectly, it will be the duty of the Officer in charge of the jail to report at once the occurrence of any case of sickness of this nature, and to cause all necessary measures and precautions to be adopted to prevent the spread of the contagion.

15. the prisoners will commence work at 7 A. M., and give up at 5 P. M. At mid-day, they will be permitted to rest for an hour, or in the months of March, April, and May for two hours, and at such time they may eat any portion of the morning meal that may remain.

23. In the execution of public works, the Convict Department should stand to the Department of Public Works precisely in the position of contractors. The Executive Engineer, or Department of Public Works Officer at the head of the work, will give precise instructions and specifications regarding the work to be executed to the Officer in charge of the jail, who will have the power, without being interfered with, to carry out the work in the manner best fitted for the discipline of the convicts. The value of the labour performed should be ascertained as

nearly as possible, as if it had been performed by contractors, and should be charged for accordingly. No actual cash transactions need be involved.

24. All the menial duties of the jail will be performed by the prisoners.

28. the time of imprisonment of all long-term convicts of two years and upwards will be divided into three stages-1. Penal. 2. Industrial. 3. Advanced or intermediate.

The 1st will be simply punitive. In the 2nd the convict will make reparation for his crime by his industry, and be allowed in consideration thereof, to earn a remission of a portion of his sentence as well as a gratuity. The 3rd stage will be made preparatory for his return to liberty as much as can be.

29. The penal period of a prisoner's imprisonment shall not be less than one month for every year's sentence. During this stage he will be kept at hard penal labour in the ordinary jails and his circumstances generally made punitive. On the expiration of this term he will, if his conduct be satisfactory, enter the industrial stage, when he will be considered eligible for extramural labour, and will be permitted to earn a remission of his sentence, as well as gratuity, by means of marks indicating his daily industry and conduct.

30. with this view a register will be opened, and every prisoner who has performed a certain allotted work, which will be estimated at three-fourths of that of a free labourer, will be entitled to one mark a day, and for every ten such marks consecutively gained, he will have earn one day's remission of his sentence. For extra industry, a proportionate fraction of a mark will be given (as ¼ or ½) but not to exceed half. For any deficiency not attributable to idleness or neglect but to some excusable cause, a proportionate fraction will be deducted to the extent of ½. Where idleness or neglect of work has been detected, a bad conduct mark will be given. One bad conduct mark will cancel 10 good ones.

31. the industrial stage will be divided into two periods. The first will embrace the time in which the prisoner will have the opportunity of earning a remission of one-twelfth of his sentence. During this period the marks will count for remission only. The 2nd will continue until he has earned the whole of the sanctioned remission or one-sixth of his sentence; and in this period, the marks will reckon for gratuity as well for remission. The money value of every 10 marks will be one anna. Warders, work-overseers, head cooks, monitors, will be selected, while in the latter period, from the best-behaved prisoners. When so employed, the money value of their marks will be doubled.

32. should a prisoner gains a full remission before the time at which he could be released expires, he will enter into the advanced or intermediate stage. In this stage he will be divested

of his irons, exempted, as much as possible, from prison discipline, and permitted other indulgences according to the good behaviour, zeal, and industry he will continue to display. The money value of his marks will be two annas for every 10 marks.

Source: Government of India, Home, Judicial, 1871, Proceedings, April 1, No. 6.

Appendix 4.1

Gandhiji's view on Socialism

- Mahatmaji believes in coordination of Capital and Labour
- He wants Landlords and tenant to cooperate.
- "Workers have share in ownership of mills."
- "Landlords should hold property for benefits of ryots."
- "Class war is foreign to genius of India."

Mahatmaji's talk with Landlords

Benares, Aug 1.

A deputation of about seven eight landlords waited on Gandhiji on Cawnpore on the 25th July with a view to understanding Gandhiji's attitude on the relation between landlords and tenants. They had just a few questions, which they read out to Gandhiji, who replied to them at length. There was no discussion. The following is the full report of the talk as revised by Gandhiji:

Question: The Karachi Congress passed a resolution laying down fundamental rights of the people and since it recognized private property' nationalist zamindars have supported the Congress. But a new Socialist Party in the Congress threatens the existence of private property. How it would affect Congress policy? Do you not think it will precipitate class war? How will you prevent it?

Answer: The Karachi Congress resolution can be altered only in next party congress, but let me assure you that I shall be no part to dispossessing propertied classes of their private property without just cause. My objective is to reach your hearts and convert you, so that you may hold all your private property in trust for your tenants and use it primarily for their welfare. I am aware of the fact that within the ranks of Congress a new party is coming into being and I cannot say what would happen, if that party succeeds in carrying the Congress with it. But I am quite clear that if a strictly honest

and unchallengeable referendum of our millions were to be taken, they would not vote for wholesale expropriation of propertied classes. I am working for the co-operation and co-ordination of capital and labour and of the landlord and the tenant. It is open to you to join the Congress as much as it is open to the poorest by paying the fee of annas four and subscribing to the Congress creed.

Note of Warning: But I must utter a note of warning. I have always told the millowners of the mills. Workmen are equal sharer in the ownership. In the same way I would tell you that the ownership of your land belongs as much to the ryots as to you and you may not squander your gains in luxurious or extravagant living, but must use them for the well-being of ryots. Once you make your ryots experience the sense of kinship with you and sense of security that their interest as members of a family will never suffer at your hands. You may be sure that there cannot be a clash between you and them and no class war. Class war is foreign to essential genius of India, which is capable of evolving communism broadly based on fundamental rights of all on equal justice. Ramrajya of my dream ensures rights alike of the prince and the pauper.

You may be sure that I shall throw the whole weight of my influence in preventing class war. I do not know what I am going to do after the termination of my self-imposed restrictions on August 3, but I shall try my best to avoid going back to prison. But it is difficult to predict anything with certainty in the situation of which I am unaware today. But supposing that there is an attempt in justly to deprive you of your property you will find me fighting on your side.

Question: We propose to support the Congress candidates in the next-Assembly elections. But we have our misgivings about the policy they will adopt in the Assembly. Could you persuade parliamentary board to dispel our fear?

Answer: 'Indigenous Socialism'

I invite you to discuss this thing with the members of the parliamentary board. I know, however, that no member will talk of expropriation or extinction of private property. They will not … on radical reform in your relations with the ryots, but that should be no new thing to you. Ever Sir Malcom Hailey and Lord Irwin appealed to you to realise and live up to the spirit of times. If you will only do this, you may be sure that we shall be able to evolve indigenous socialism of the purest type. Socialism and communism of the West is based on certain conception which are fundamentally different from ours.

One such conception is their belief in the essential selfishness of human nature. I do not subscribe to it for I know that an essential difference between man and brute is that the former can respond to the call of the spirit in him, can rise superior to the passion he owns in common with the brute and, therefore, superior to selfishness and violence which belong to brute nature, not to the immortal spirit of man. That is the fundamental conception of Hinduism which has years of penance and austerity at the back of the discovery of this truth. That is why whilst we have had saints who have worn out their bodies and laid down their lives in order to explore secrets of soul, we have had none as in the West who have laid down lives in exploring the remotest or highest regions of earth. Our socialism and communism should, therefore, be based on non-violence, on harmonious co-operation of labour and capital, landlord and tenant.

There is nothing in the Congress creed or policy that need frighten you. All your fears and misgivings, permit me to tell you, … are those of a guilty conscience … wipe out injustices that you may have been consciously or unconsciously guilty of and shed all fear of the Congress and Congressmen. Once you turn a new leaf in the relations between zamindar and ryots, you will find us on your side jealously guarding your private rights and property. When I say this I have Pandit Jawaharlal also in mind, for I know that on this essential principle of non-violence there is no difference between us. He does indeed talk of nationalization of property but it need not frighten you.

A nation cannot own property except by vesting it in individuals. It simply ensures its just and equitable use and prevents all possible misuse and I do not think you can have any possible objection to holding your property for the benefits of ryots. Ryots have themselves no greater ambition than to live in peace and freedom and they will never grudge your possession of property provided you use it for them.

Question: You have been almost avoiding us and villages. Why not have candidates belonging to rural classes?

Answer: You may be sure that we are going to penetrate all villages and establish healthy relations with you.

Source: Tribune vol. LIV. No. 178. Lahore, Friday, August 3, 1934.

Appendix 4.2

Programme and Objective of Congress Socialist Party:

Objective

1. Transfer of all power to the producing masses.

2. Development of economic life of the country to be planned and controlled by the State.

3. Socialisation of key and principal industries (e.g. Steel, Cotton, Jute, Railways, Shipping, Plantations, Mines), Banks, Insurance and Public Utilities with a view to the progressive socialisation of all the instruments of production, distribution and exchange.

4. State monopoly of foreign trade.

5. Organization of co-operatives for production, distribution and credit in the unsocialised sector of economic life.

6. Elimination of princes and landlords and all other classes of exploiters without compensation.

7. Re-distribution of land to peasants.

8. Encouragement and promotion of co-operative and collective farming by the State.

9. Liquidation of debts owed by peasants and workers.

10. Recognition of right to work or maintenance by the State.

11. 'To everyone according to his needs and from everyone according to his capacity' to be the basis ultimately of distribution and production of economic goods.

12. Adult franchise on functional basis.

13. No support to, or discrimination between, religions by the State and no recognition of any distinction based on caste or coomunity.

14. No discrimination between the sexes by the State.

15. Reduction of the so-called Public Debt of India.

Plan of Action

1. Work within the Indian National Congress with a view to secure its acceptance of the objects and programme of the Party.

2. Organization of peasant and labour unions, and entry into such unions where they exist, for the purpose of developing and participating in the day to day economic and political struggle

of masses and of creating a powerful mass movement for the achievement of Independence and Socialism.

3. Organization of, and participation in Youth leagues. Women's organizations, Volunteer organizations, etc., etc., for the purpose of getting their support to the programme of the Party.

4. Active opposition to all imperialist wars and the utilisation of such and other crises for the intensification of the national struggle.

5. Refusal to enter or any stage into negotiations on the constitutional issue with the British Government.

6. Convening after the capture of power of a Constituent Assembly elected by local communities of deputies of workers, peasants and other exploited classes for the purpose of formulating a Constitution for the Indian State.

Political

1. Freedom of speech and of the Press.

2. Freedom of association and combination.

3. Repeal of all anti-national and anti-labour laws.

4. Re-instatement of all farmers and tenants deprived of their lands owing to their participation in the movement of restraint on political grounds.

5. Release of all political prisoners detained without trial and withdrawal of all orders of externment, internment or restraint on political grounds.

6. Free and compulsory primary education and the liquidation of adult illiteracy.

7. Drastic reduction, by at least 50% of the military expenditure of the Government of India.

8. Regulation and control of religious endowments.

Economic

9. Municipalisation of Public Utilities.

10. Control of usury, direct and indirect.

11. Liquidation of debts owed by workers and peasants.

12. A steeply graduated tax on all incomes including incomes from agriculture above a fixed minimum.

13. Graduated death duties.

Concerning Labour

14. Freedom of labour from serfdom and conditions bordering on serfdom.

15. The right to form unions, to strike and to picket.

16. Compulsory recognition of unions by employers.

17. A living wage, a 40 hour week and healthy quarters and conditions of work.

18. Insurance against unemployment, sickness, accident, old age, etc.

19. One month's leave every year with full pay to all workers and two months' leave with full pay to women workers during maternity.

20. Prohibition against employment of children of school-going age in factories, and women and of children under sixteen underground.

21. Equal wages for equal work.

22. Weekly payment of wages whenever demanded.

Agrarian

23. Elimination of landlordism in zamindari and talukdari areas without compensation.

24. Encouragement of co-operative farming.

25. Liquidation of arrears of rent.

26. Complete exemption from rents and taxes of all peasants with uneconomic holdings.

27. Reduction of rent and land revenue by at least 50%.

28. Abolition and penalisation of all feudal and semi-feudal levies on the peasantry.

29. Penalisation of illegal exactions and forced labour.

30. Freedom from attachment in execution of rent or money decrees of homestead, agricultural resources and that portion of a peasant's holding which is just sufficient to maintain an average peasant family.

Image 4.3



Source: A poster with tagline "Concentrate on Charkha and Swadeshi", Popular Bazar poster, 1930.

Image 4.4



Source: Industry's advertisement to encourage people to buy swadeshi (home-made) items produced by indigenous industries.

Image 4.5

Two words uppermost on people's lips are

Swadeshi And Swaraj

You can observe the Swadeshi pledge implicitly when you buy cloths manufactured with Swadeshi Yarn by Swadeshi Capital, under Swadeshi Management.

Dhoty
Sadi
Patal
Dupatta
Mulmul
Voiles

See that these Cloths bear Khatau Makanji Mills tickets which are your guarantee for pure Swadeshi Cloth.

Shirting
Twill
Longcloth
Satin Duck
Drill
Towels
Etc., Etc.

KHATAU MAKANJI MILLS

1. Luxmi Building, Ballard Estate,
2. Gowraj Gully, Mulji Jetha Market,
3. Haines Road, Byculla.

Source: Khatua Mills advertisement with the tagline Swadeshi and Swaraj, Bombay Swadeshi League Catalogue, 1930.

Image 4.6



Source: Calcio Mills advertisement promoting Swadeshi by asking to Patronise Indian Industry, 1930

Image 4.7



Calcio Mills advertisement promoting Khadi.

Image 4.8

Bharatudhhar, Gandhi depicted as protector of India.

Source: Lisa N. Trivedi, *Clothing Gandhi's Nation: Homespun and Modern India*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.

Appendix 5.1

Timeline of major events regarding Population and Family Planning

1916: Pyare Kishan Wattal publishes The Population Problem in India, warning of the dire consequences of uncontrolled population growth.

1921: Decennial population censuses indicate the beginning of continual and rapid population growth, alarming politicians and intellectuals.

1923: India's first birth control clinic opens in Poona.

1928: A neo-Malthusian league is established in Madras symbolizing an organized start of population control measures using artificial methods.

1937: Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Raina, the Ministry of Health's first director of family planning, sets up a maternal and child health and family planning center named Help Our Mothers Society that offers free medical services.

1940: A government commission, set up to examine the causes and consequences of the Bengal famine in the early 1940s, warn of an unprecedented projected increase of population by 100 million between 1945 and 1960.

1943: The Health Survey and Development Committee (popularly known as the Bhore Committee) is established and calls for a national family planning program to improve the population's health status.

1947: The government adopts the National Programme of Family Planning.

1949: The Family Planning Association of India is established under the leadership of Lady Rama Rau and oversees the distribution to clinics of family planning funds allocated to the Ministry of Health during the First Five-Year Plan.

1950: The government appoints the Population Policy Committee, chaired by the minister of health. The government creates the Family Planning Cell in the Office of the Director General of Health Services.

1951: R. A. Gopalswami, director of the 1951 population census, projects a 1981 population of 520 million (the actual figure was 690 million). He urges Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to support a nationwide vasectomy program. Minister of Health Rajkumari Amrit Kaur requests a World Health Organization mission to advise on promoting the rhythm method.

1952–57: The First Five-Year Plan, which includes a chapter on population, allocates Rs 6.5 million to the Ministry of Health for research on population issues and on the acceptability of natural family planning and other contraceptive methods and adopts a clinic-based approach.

1955: The Ford Foundation arranges for a consultancy to advise on efforts to extend family planning beyond natural family planning.

1961: An estimated 4,000 birth control clinics offer contraceptives.

1956–61: The Second Five-Year Plan commences and extends the clinic-based approach.

1961–66: India's Third Five-Year Plan calls for a 10-fold increase in funds for family planning over the amount allocated in the preceding plan.

1962: The futility of the clinic-based approach is demonstrated by the unabated population growth uncovered by the 1961 population census. The government sets the goal of reducing the crude birthrate from 41 live births per 1,000 population to 25 by 1970. Studies by the Gandhigram Institute for Rural Development and Family Planning further confirm the failure of the clinic-based approach and recommend an extension approach.

1963: An extended family planning campaign is started, involving extension educators, assistant surgeons, family welfare workers, auxiliary nurse-midwives, and contraceptive depot holders (those responsible for storing and dispensing contraceptives) at the village level.

1965: The Indian Medical Council approves the intrauterine device.

1966: The target of a crude birthrate of 25 live births per 1,000 population was to be reached as quickly as possible instead of waiting until 1970.

1966–67: All-India targets for contraceptive use, together with demographic goals for drastic reduction in population growth, that led to the so-called HITTS (Health Department operated, incentive-based, target-oriented, time-bound, and sterilization-focused) model in 1962 proved futile within a short period.

Late 1960s: The Ministry of Health is renamed the Ministry of Health and Family Planning and includes a Department of Family Planning. The position of secretary of state for family planning is created.

1965: The Central Family Planning Institute is established. With the collaborative involvement of the National Institute of Health Administration and Education, established in the early 1960s, and the Central Family Planning Institute, 19 intensive family planning districts patterned after intensive agricultural districts are set up. An intensive program for training family planning

administrators in the United States is set up, jointly sponsored by the government and the Ford Foundation.

1968: A crude birthrate target of 23 live births per 1,000 population by 1978–79 is set.

1969: The All-India Hospital Postpartum Programme is created.

1970–73: During the Fifth Five-Year Plan, the Hospital Postpartum Programme serves 1.2 million obstetric and abortion patients and more than 18 percent accept a birth control method.

1970–77: Vasectomies, together with substantial monetary and in-kind incentives, become the defining feature of the family planning initiative. Vasectomy camps become a major instrument for achieving large number of acceptors.

1971: Secretary of State Dr. S. Chandrasekhar successfully lobbies Parliament to legalize abortion.

1971: The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act is passed, legalizing abortion.

1972–73: Some 23,000 abortions are performed annually in authorized hospitals and clinics.

1972: The Family Planning Foundation is established and starts funding high-quality social science research relevant to the national family planning program.

1974: The Family Planning Foundation funds a major volume that influences the Indian delegation to the 1974 World Population Conference.

1975: The Hospital Postpartum Programme enrolls 255 hospitals. Between 1956 and 1975, more than 20 million births are averted. The birthrate of 42 live births per 1,000 population in 1960–61 declined to 35 in 1974–75.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declares an emergency because of an economic crisis and proposes a 20-point program not including population control; however, her son, Sanjay Gandhi, promotes his own four-point program for population control. States raise their sterilization targets and introduce coercive methods. Under the intense coercive campaign, sterilizations conducted during the previous 12 months escalate to 8.26 million.

1976: A national population policy is formulated and adopted by Parliament that calls for a frontal attack on population problems.

1977: The National Institute of Health Administration and Education and the Central Family Planning Institute merge to form the National Institute of Health and Family Welfare. The 19 intensive family planning districts are scaled down to 4. The national population policy

legitimizes the excesses of the sterilization campaign and coercive measures and finally results in the collapse of Indira Gandhi's government.

A revised population policy is inaugurated. Family planning is renamed as family welfare to promote education and motivation highlighting birth spacing rather than lowering fertility. Sterilization targets are drastically reduced. The government raises the minimum marriage age to 18 for girls and 21 for boys.

Source: Oscar Harkavy and Krishna Roy, "Emergence of the Indian National Family Programme" in Warren C. Robinson and John A. Ross ed. *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policy and Program*, Washington, D.C: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /World Bank Publications, 2007. pp. 303-5.

Appendix 5.2

Indira's Gandhi 20 Points Programme

Attack on rural poverty
Strategy for Rained agriculture
Better use of irrigation water
Bigger harvest
Enforcement of Land Reforms
Special Programs for rural labour
Clean drinking water
Health for all
Two child norm
Expansion of education
Justice for SC / ST
Equality for women
New Opportunities for women
Housing for the people
Improvement for slums
New Strategy for Forestry
Protection of environment
Concern for the consumer
Energy for the villages
A responsive administration

Note: The Twenty Point Programme (TPP) was initially launched by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975 and was subsequently restructured in 1982 and again on 1986. With the introduction of new policies and programmes it has been finally restructured in 2006 and it has been in operation at present. The Programmes and Schemes under TPP-2006 are in harmony with the priorities contained in the National Common Minimum Programme, the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations and SAARC Social Charter. The restructured Programme, called Twenty Point Programme – 2006 (TPP-2006), was approved by the Cabinet on 5th October, 2006 and operated w.e.f 1.4.2007. The basic objective of the 20-Point Programme is to eradicate poverty and to improve the quality of life of the poor and the under privileged population of the country. The programme covers various Socio-economic aspects like poverty, employment, education, housing, health, agriculture and land reforms, irrigation, drinking water, protection and empowerment of weaker sections, consumer protection, environment etc.

Appendix 5.3

The restructured twenty Points in 2006 had following Points:

Poverty eradication
power to people
Support to farmers
Labour welfare
Food security
Clean drinking water
Housing for all
Health for all
Education for all
Welfare of SC/ ST/ OBC and minorities
Women welfare
Child welfare
Youth Development
Improvement of slums
Environment protection and afforestation
Social security
Rural Roads
Energising of rural areas
Development of Backward areas
IT enabled and e-governance

Image 5.3

A stamp issued in 1966 by Government of India popularising Family Planning Programme.

Image 5.4

A stamp issued by Government of India popularising the happiness of small family.

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