

**CPSU POLICY TOWARDS COMMUNIST
MOVEMENT IN INDIA, 1947-1991**

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled **CPSU Policy Towards Communist Movement in India, 1947-1991** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	i
Abbreviation	iii
Chapter I:	
Introduction	2-8
Chapter II:	
Historical Background	9-58
Chapter III:	
Post-World War CPSU and CPI, (1947-53)	59-86
Chapter IV:	
De-Stalinisation, Great Debate and Split in Indian Communist Movement, (1953-67)	87-110
Chapter V:	
Reconsideration and Realignment, (1968-1985)	111-173
Chapter VI:	
CPSU Policy in the Gorbachev Era and Debates among the Indian Left Parties, (1985-91)	174-228
Chapter VII:	
Conclusion	229-238
References	239-263

ABBREVIATIONS

CC	-	Central Committee
CPC	-	Communist Party of China
CPCz	-	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CPI (ML-Liberation)	-	Communist Party of India-(Marxist-Leninist-Liberation)
CPI(M)	-	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPI	-	Communist Party of India
CPSU	-	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
GDR	-	German Democratic Republic
NCP	-	Non-Capitalist Path of Development
NEP	-	New Economic Policy
PB	-	Polit-Bureau
PRC	-	Peoples' Republic of China
RSDLP	-	Russian Social Democratic Labour Party
RSFSR	-	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) policy towards Communist movement in India has been researched from varied perspectives over the years. Naturally, there is no lack of studies on this theme. This, however, does not prohibit the prospect of looking into it from a fresh angle. The proposed research aims to investigate how the Soviet Policy played a significant role in the shaping of Indian communist movement. This study focuses on a fresh approach to a complex problem and understanding of the Soviet Policy towards the communist movement in India.

Since the CPSU has had a tremendous impact on the direction of strategy and tactics of the Communist Movement and the emergence of the Communist Party in India, the proposed research needs to look at, in critical detail, the nature of influences and trajectories of Soviet policy as well as the Indian communist movement's internal policies.

This research covers a 44 year-long period. In those 44 years, the communist movement went through highs and lows and was under the shadow of CPSU for the longest time. This research closely follows the ideological debates between the three streams of the Left Movement in India and simultaneously explores the impact of the CPSU guidelines on these ideological differences. Further, this research also analyses the impact of international debates and differences between CPSU and CPC on the left movement of India.

If seen carefully, most of the writers on the CPSU and the Left movement of India have adopted a unilateral approach. Either they discard it or write about it in a biased manner. This research reviews the policies of the CPSU and its impact on India's communist movement with a balanced approach.

There has been considerable debate among scholars about the policies of the Soviet Union and the role of ideology in its international approach. The debates in existing literature so far claimed that the policies of the CPSU towards the communist movement of India were motivated more by ideology. This research examines

whether the policies of the CPSU were motivated by an ideological commitment towards the communist movement of India or by a pragmatic national interest.

Soviet approach, especially foreign policy was, on paper, framed in terms of its self-proclaimed goals of 'ideology'. The Soviet policy saw the ideological domination and hegemony as its goal and claimed to tailor its policies around this goal of furthering the international communist movement. This stated purpose was often undermined on the ground by the actual policies, which tended to be guided more by Soviet 'national' interest rather than ideology. For instance, Robert Donaldson, in analysing the ideology, strategy and trends in shifting Soviet policy, avers that Soviet policy towards India was forged more by Soviet self-interests rather than Marxist-Leninist convictions (Donaldson, 1974: 34). The dichotomy of professed ideals and the adopted policies in a country like India plagued the natural growth of the communist movement in India, he argues. "The Soviet interest in India during the early 1920s was peripheral. Thus, as is documented by the author, both under Lenin and Stalin, the internal and external considerations relating to the survival and consolidation of the Soviet state and the socio-economic transformation of the Soviet economy were paramount elements in Soviet policy formation in general" (Donaldson, 1974: 37).

Harish Kapur similarly tries to trace Soviet policies towards the South Asian subcontinent in the post-war period (Kapur, 1972). He points out that during the pre-war period, the Soviet Union focused its policies towards its West European neighbours and on efforts to stabilise itself on the economic and geopolitical fronts. However, in the post-war period, the Soviet Union began to seriously concentrate and look at the South Asian subcontinent too, in its attempt to place itself more favourably in the global geopolitical scenario. Kapur (1972) raises questions over the "dual policy" of the Bolsheviks, firstly seeing the independence of the erstwhile colonised countries as a "sham" and secondly functioning in co-operation with these very countries, which rallied behind the non-alignment movement. The former was a result of consideration of Marxist-Leninist principles and the latter, which got primacy in the state of affairs, was the result of Soviet self-interest. All this, indeed, was reflected all too strongly in the Soviet policy toward India and in the evolution of the CPI's political and tactical line.

In analysing the contours of Soviet policy in India, it is impossible to ignore the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi's Congress in the 1970s in India. The CPI's support for the Emergency, at a time when most non-Congress parties were vehemently opposed to it, needs analysis and explanation. If the Soviet attitude to the British before independence influenced CPI's position towards Gandhi's Quit India movement, its reading of the Indian National Congress too influenced the CPI. As we know, during the Indian Quit India Movement of the early nineteen forties against British rule, the Soviet policy saw Britain as a key 'anti-fascist' ally. As Singh (2005) points out in his reading of India and the Soviet Union between 1917-1947, R Palme Dutt remarked, "Freedom or no freedom, the Indian communists must rally around the British government in order to secure victory of the Soviet Union". (Singh, 2005: 44) And thus, the CPI refused to support Gandhi's Quit India Movement. Similarly, in the 1970s, when the CPI had to take a position on Indira Gandhi's declaration of a National Emergency, it chose to be guided by Soviet policy.

Another disagreement among scholars was that the USSR's policies were more influenced by personal halo within the CPSU. Accordingly, it would be interesting to discover if influential personalities such as Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev strongly impacted policies in CPSU or there was a significant role of party or specific group as often claimed by the communist party. This research also observes whether the dream of the world revolution seen after the October revolution was pursued for a long time and if afterwards it was abandoned then which circumstances were responsible for it, or the world revolution was simply an ideological mask under the guise of which CPSU was pursuing its national interest. This research examines whether when the division of the world into two fronts of capitalist and socialist, led the CPSU into the same dark race of expansionist policies which were the reasons of CPC's main criticism and ideological differences. Moreover, where did the communist parties of India place themselves in these camps? How exactly did the polar opposite view of CPSU and CPC affect the tactics and strategies in the communist movement of India? Did this division affect the independent growth of the communist movement of India or whether this ideological struggle worked to refine them with ideological clarity? The research also examines whether CPSU policies have caused damage linking the Left movement of India to the objective reality, or provided it with the right direction. Did blind loyalty of CPI

towards CPSU policies debilitate India's Left movement by or pushed it in the right direction?

There are many debates about the state and its character in the three Left streams of India. However, these debates were also influenced by the guidelines of the CPSU. CPSU had a separate policy for India and its government at different times. From Lenin to Gorbachev, the policy of the CPSU towards the newly independent countries has been continuously changing, with the apparent impact on India's communist movement.

Rationale:

The primary rationale of this study is to explore the possibility of an alternative understanding of the history of Indian Communism based on facts. So, the proposed study aims to investigate the

original spirit of internationalism that went into the making of the Soviet policy. It was severely compromised in the period that followed Lenin's death. The proposed research aims at the meaningful reconstruction of the history of Indian communism during these periods because it is necessary to discard the traditional understanding that is full of dogmatic and uncritical assertions of the fundamentalist mindset which refuses to accommodate the voices of difference. This study would rethink the history of Indian Communism by going back to the basics, with the openness to look back at what happened and consider what could have possibly happened.

Hypotheses:

- The Policy of the CPSU towards the Communist movement in India was driven by the ideological, political and tactical understanding of the CPSU to support communist parties across the globe in their quest to acquire power.
- Change in the leadership of the CPSU had a direct impact on the policy of the CPSU towards the Communist movement in India.
- The trajectory of the communist movement in India was shaped by the debate within the CPSU and other communist parties in the world.

Research Methods:

The study is based on the historical, analytical and descriptive method. The study involves both descriptive and causal methods of inference. Both primary and secondary sources have been used. The research applies various primary sources for data such as the documents of the Comintern archives, research reports, statements, interviews, speeches, government reports. For the collection of source material in India, this research relied on the libraries of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Indian Council of World Affairs, Indian Parliament and National Archive of India, New Delhi. For Secondary sources, books and articles in noted journals and magazines, and authentic reports released by various organisations, newspaper reports, and web reports have been used. These relevant works of literature cover different areas like political, economic, historical and sociological studies which provide a comprehensive and explicit study on this area.

This dissertation is systematised in such a way that each of the seven chapters deals with a distinct aspect.

Chapters:

Chapter-1- Introduction: In the Introductory chapter, the significance of the CPSU policy towards Communist movement in India, the rationale of the study, hypotheses and method of research are dealt with. This chapter explores the existing literature on the relation between the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of India.

Chapter-2- Historical Background- This chapter explores the historical backdrop and relationship between the CPI and Communist International, which was formed in 1920 right after the second Communist International and then organised through a Party Conference in 1925. The policies of the CPI in the anti-British struggles and the influence of the Communist International on the question of national liberation movements have been examined in this chapter. The chapter also assesses how the policy decision of the Communist international to create independent class-oriented communist party led to the desertion of CPI from the Workers and Peasants Party in India. Later the chapter examines how the changes in policy by the CPSU after the Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty or the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty of 1939

affected the political line of CPI. In the last part, the chapter explores the shifts in the strategy and tactics of CPI due to the influence of the Communist International's call for Popular front against fascism during the Second World War.

Chapter-3- Post World War CPSU and CPI, 1947-1953: This chapter studies the eventful period of the post-world war policies of CPSU especially in the light of the position of the party towards national liberation movements till the death of Stalin. The chapter explores the abortive people's war led by the CPI in different parts of India, especially in Telangana and then the sudden change of policy with the formulation of National Democratic struggle.

Chapter-4- De-Stalinization, Great Debate and Split in Indian Communist Movement (1953-67): After the death of Stalin and the reformulation of the international policy of the CPSU under Nikita Khrushchev where the world was divided between two camps - the Capitalist and the Socialist - created fissures within the international communist movement. The differences were sought to be resolved through exchanges between the CPSU and CPC, the primary agents of the divergent opinions in the communist movement, which later came to be known as the Great Debate. It had tremendous influence on the CPI and in the background of the rise of the Non-Aligned movement under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, the dismissal of the first communist government in Kerala and the 1962 border conflict with China; the fissures within the party widened resulting in the split of the Communist movement of India in 1964. The chapter will try to understand the ideological-political positions of the different communist parties of India through the ideological resolutions and political positions taken by the CPI, CPI (M) and the CPI-ML vis-à-vis the policies of the CPSU and CPC.

Chapter-5- Reconsiderations and Realignment (1968-1985): The CPI-M which emerged as the largest communist party reconsidered several ideological formulations after the left-wing split in the wake of the Naxalbari in 1967 through the Burdwan Plenum 1968. Relation with the CPSU and the CPC and the assessment of their policies brought a new dimension to the functioning of the party. The role of an Independent party charting struggles according to the concrete conditions of the specific society was stressed. While the CPI continued with the official line of the CPSU and the CPI-ML characterised the CPSU as social Imperialist rapid changes in

the policies of the later parties followed after the death of Mao and change of course by Deng Xiao Ping. The imposition of emergency in 1975-77 where the CPI supported the Congress Party under Indira Gandhi in the backdrop of Jay Prakash Narayan's Movement was the last instance where the CPI-CPI-M stood at polar opposite positions. The formation of the Left Front Government in West Bengal in 1977 brought the two parties together.

Chapter-6- CPSU Policy in the Gorbachev Era and Debates among the Indian Left Parties, (1985-91): This chapter examines the implications of Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost and Perestroika on the Indian Communist Movement. It also assesses the reactions and disputations of Indian Communist Parties among themselves. During this period, the CPI-CPI-M and CPI-ML conducted a thorough assessment of their positions regarding the CPSU vis-vis CPC; this Chapter also reviews that.

Chapter-7- Conclusion: The last chapter gives the main findings of this study, which may always create academic interest among the scholars interested in these issues.

CHAPTER-II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Lenin paid great attention to the colonial expansion occurring around the world, with Asia in particular, and this interest that led Anti-Colonialism to become a fundamental component of the Soviet Foreign Policy after the October Revolution of 1917. To further base the understanding of Anti-colonialism, Lenin drew his theoretical reference from the works of Marx.

The Soviet Foreign Policy where Lenin applied it in a way often considered as the origin of Marxism-Leninism, time and again finds its reference in the early writings of Marx and Engels regarding the numerous Asian colonies present during that period. Marx also wrote several articles on India in an American newspaper, called the New York Daily Tribune. Earlier in 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' Marx and Engels wrote: "The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West ..." (Marx and Engels 1976: 14)

While exposing the character of the bourgeoisie, Karl Marx said in his writing 'The German Ideology': "While the bourgeoisie of each nation still retained separate national interests, the big industry created a class which in nations has the same interest and with which the nationality is already dead." (Marx 1974: 78)

Ever since the publication of the 'Communist Manifesto' by Marx and Engels in 1848, the concept of Anti-Colonialism in the domain of theorisation has always irked the minds of all revolutionaries. During the time of Marx, the driving force through the world remained feudalism, along with the bourgeoisie¹ emerging the strongest in

¹ "Engels described the bourgeoisie as 'the class of the great capitalists who, in all developed countries, are now almost exclusively in possession of all the means of consumption, and of the raw materials and instruments (machines, factories) necessary for their production' (Principles of Communism, 1847); and as 'the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour' (note to the 1888 English edn. of the Communist Manifesto)." (Bottomore 1983: 56)

North America and Europe. This, along with the advancement of the industrial bourgeoisie, prompted the problem which the newly born proletarian class had to face about its double battle against feudalism and bourgeoisie. This classical problem was correctly and very concretely observed by Marx and Engels, as they commented in the Communist Manifesto: “At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus, the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is the victory for the bourgeoisie.” (Marx and Engels 1992: 54) What was worth noting was the fact that in Britain and France, none of the European colonial powers that colonised Asia, Africa, and Latin America were themselves a fully advanced bourgeois state.

On the other hand, the colonised states themselves were burdened under the feudal system. This situation introduced a distinctive ideological problem before the philosophers of Communism. If the idea were to be taken as a benchmark of how the revolution can materialise in developed bourgeois states where the proletariats were stronger and more robust, then according to that logic, none of the colonies would have witnessed a revolution.

However, we are aware that revolutions did take place against the oppressor, in this context, the colonial power. This understanding should not be seen in contrary to what Marx had suggested, instead should be looked upon in an interesting manner, where Marx himself had recommended that a colony could be freed through a revolution occurring in the coloniser’s country. What Marx had said applied to many countries such as Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in mid- 1970’s after the overthrow of the colonial regime in Portugal but the proposition, however, cannot be seen as a universal reality.

However, several western academicians differed with Marx’s take on colonialism, which frequently created many complexities on this vital question. In this context, Demetrio Boersner reminds us: “... It becomes quite clear from an examination of their (Marx and Engels) theoretical writing and their correspondence that in the domain of the national question their field of observation and action was limited to

Europe and North America. They did not conceive of the Asian, African and South American underdeveloped areas as playing a potential revolutionary role in the same sense as the nations of Europe.” (Boersner 1957: 23) He further says: “While for the Marxists of the twentieth-century nationalism and colonialism have become fused into a single and indissoluble problem, for Marx and Engels they were two distinct phenomena, not directly inter-related. They regarded colonialism as a primarily economic issue. They were convinced that events in the overseas colonies of the capitalist countries could have positive or negative effects on the overall structure and behaviour of capitalism, but they never thought of the colonies as nations which were being more and more closely drawn into world politics, and which could produce world-shaking revolutionary movements. The fusion between the national and the colonial question in Marxist theory was not carried out until the second decade of the twentieth century, when Lenin taught that the Asian and African colonies of his day were destined to play a political role analogous to that of Poland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland and the Balkans at the time of Marx.” (Boersner 1957: 23)

There is a difference of opinion amongst various scholars, where many feel that Karl Marx had not been able to explain the concept of colonialism entirely. For example, E. H. Carr had maintained a similar viewpoint claiming “Marx had not dealt in detail with the colonial question. First International ignored them. The Second International remained for a long time equally apathetic.” (Carr 1953: 232). Even an eminent Soviet scholar R. A. Ulyanovsky has identified that “Karl Marx had not known imperialism. The historical merit of exposing its economic, social and political essence, and conditions and capabilities engendered by imperialism for revolutionary activity belonged to Lenin.” (Ulyanovsky 1978: 5).

The point of convergence of understanding revolution as indicated by Marx was revolved around the industrially advanced nations of Europe where the sharpness between class division and class struggle would be most acute. The proletariat would spearhead the revolution. One could see that for a socialist revolution, Marx banked on the disparities present in the industrially developed nations and that the colonised countries would be inconsequential. This was even echoed in the actions of the First International, led by Marx. In fact, the subject of colonialism was not dealt upon as a separate issue at the Congress of the First International; it was rather discussed as a

significant aspect of the international working-class battle against the capitalist class. (Belelyubsky 1979: 39) The reason that one could have had for such an understanding was that the global system of capitalism was still in the process of evolution.

One may not in totality agree to Marx's understanding of the colonial question. However, one cannot deny that no logical inconsistency existed between Lenin and Marx about the crux of the issue; in fact, Lenin's elucidation of colonialism was the augmentation of Marx's Proposition. The difference, if any, lays on the fact that both Marx and Lenin belonged to two different time periods, and that Lenin himself was from the era where he was witnessing "imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism" while the same situation did not exist during Marx's time. A Soviet scholar Komarov has correctly indicated "that in analysing the situation in colonial and dependent countries and the development of the liberation movement there, Lenin was guided by the scientific theory of dialectical and historical materialism, evolved by Marx and Engels. Lenin continued their work in new historical conditions. His works, including those dealing with the national-liberation movement, reflected the course and prospects of world developments at the turn of the 19th century." (Komarov 1986: 19)

In connection to India in an article, "The Future Results of the British Rule in India", Karl Marx said in 1853: "England needs to satisfy a twofold mission in India: One destructive, the other regenerating the annihilation of old Asiatic society and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia. Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moghuls who had successively overrun India, soon became Hinduized, the barbarian conquerors being, by an eternal law of history, conquered themselves by the superior civilisation of their subjects. The British were the first conquerors superior, and, therefore, inaccessible to Hindu civilisation. They destroyed it by breaking up the native communities, by uprooting the native industry, and by levelling all that was great and elevated in the native society. The historical pages of their rule in India report hardly anything beyond that destruction. The work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins. Nevertheless, it has begun." (Marx and Engels 1975: 82)

He further included: "The political unity of India, more consolidated, and extending farther than it ever did under the Great Moghuls, was the first condition of its regeneration. That unity, imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and

perpetuated by the electric telegraph. The native army organised and trained by the British drill-sergeant, was the *sine qua non* of Indian self-emancipation, and of India ceasing to be the prey of the first foreign intruder. Steam has brought India into regular and rapid communication with Europe, has connected its chief ports with those of the whole South-Eastern Ocean, and has revindicated it from the isolated position which was the prime law of its stagnation. The day is not far distant when, by a combination of railways and steam vessels, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the western world.” (Marx and Engels 1975: 82-83)

Despite the imprecision that could be drawn from Marx’s formulations, one could not overlook the fact that he did provide a basis of ideas for the successive generations of revolutionaries to build upon their respective policy. Some of the fundamental principles comprising certain ideas of the national and colonial question to be taken up by the subsequent generation of revolutionaries were related to the following:

- The particular character of Eastern society;
- The connection between colonial advancement and the primary accumulation of capital²;
- The contradictory and dual socio-historical role of foreign capitalist domination in the colonial world;
- The forms and methods of colonial exploitation;
- The interconnection between the national liberation movement in the colonies and the proletarian class struggle;
- The attitude of the working-class movement towards the national movements when it comes to regard the national problem as a national colonial one, etc. (Belelyubsky 1979: 32-33)

² “For Marx, the accumulation process would never be a smooth, harmonious or simple expansion. At times it would be interrupted by crises and recessions. But the barriers to capital accumulation are never absolute but are contingent upon the intensification of the contradictions of capitalism which may be temporarily resolved to allow a new phase of expansion.” (Bottomore 1983: 3)

Before one embarks on the details of Lenin's ideas on Colonialism and the anti-colonial movement, it would be pertinent first to examine cautiously the thought of certain western scholars having a different point of view. There have been claims made by a group of western scholars that have argued that Lenin's theoretical interest in the colonial question, which became apparent at the time of Second Comintern Congress in 1920, was the outcome of the disappointment of Russian revolutionaries with the decreasing prospects of revolution in the West. This argument can be supported by citing various examples, such as the vanquishment of the revolution of Germany, the crumbling of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the dismantling of Soviet regimes in several countries which were formerly members of the Tsarist empire, such as Finland. These combined could be attributed to the decline of revolutionary fervour throughout Europe, and discovering that the revolutionary prospects in the West were at a low ebb, Lenin turned his attention towards the East. (Lazith and Drakovitch 1972: 377)

Such an explanation has a major limitation, that being that the process of colonialism was spread over an extensive time frame and Lenin could not stand at a low ebb for failing to acknowledge the aspect of the sudden devastation of revolutionary possibilities in the west. "Lenin calculated that by 1876, the colonial powers would have enslaved 51.5 per cent of all the territories of Asia, 100 per cent of Australia and 27.5 per cent of Central and South America while Africa was in the tragic period of partition." (Gafurov and Kim 1978: 30) At the point when London Congress of the Second International in 1896 ratified the resolution acknowledging the right of nations to self-determination, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was the first socialist party which at its Second Congress in 1903, launched this slogan into its programme. (Belelyubsky 1979: 58)

Meanwhile, the Russian Revolution of 1905 affected all anti-colonial movements all through Asia. Lenin had correctly called this revolution as "dress rehearsal" for the October Revolution of 1917. In his work, "The Right of Nations to self-determination", Lenin wrote: "In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of bourgeois-democratic revolutions did not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkans war - such as the chain of world events of our period in our 'Orient' (East). Moreover, only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of

events the awakening of a whole series of bourgeois-democratic national movements, which strive to create a nationally independent and rationally consistent state.” (Lenin 1964: 406) As per another Russian source, “The first Russian revolution aroused the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries; it exercised considerable influence on the Chinese revolutionary democrats headed by Sun Yat Sen. Its influence was also felt by the leaders of young Turks in the revolution of 1908 and the revolutionary upsurge in India (1905-1908), and Persia (1905-11) was also connected with the revolutionary movement of the masses of the Russian people . Imperialism was experiencing a real shake-up in its colonial system.” (History of the USSR 1977: 308)

At the Stuttgart Congress of Second International, reacting on the colonial question, Lenin had severely criticised the absolute unscrupulousness of Hendrik Van Kol of Holland. His draft resolution to the effect that the Stuttgart Congress, in principle, did not directly contend with the colonial policy much, for even under socialism colonial policy that was perceived to take up a civilising role, was vanquished on the back of stubborn and constant demurral and objection of Lenin and his comrades. (Helene and Schram 1969: 129) Lenin confronted that “the draft resolution was signifying blatant bourgeois chauvinism and it utterly disregarded the interest of colonial people.” (Lenin 1964: 75-76)

Subsequently, in an article, “The Awakening of Asia”, published in Pravda on May 7, 1913, Lenin stated: “Following the 1905 movement in Russia, the democratic revolution spread to the whole of Asia to Turkey, Persia, China. The ferment is growing in British India. A significant development is the spread of the revolutionary-democratic movement to the Dutch East Indies, to Java and other Dutch colonies with a population of some forty million. World capitalism and the 1905 movements in Russia have finally aroused Asia.” (Lenin 1959: 141) He further said: “The awakening of Asia and the beginning of the struggle for power by the advanced proletariat of Europe are a symbol of the new phase in world history that began early this century.” (Lenin 1959: 86) Within two weeks after this publication, Lenin again wrote in Pravda on May 18, 1913, that “everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement was growing, spreading and gaining strength. No force on earth can prevent its victory, which will liberate both the peoples of Europe and the people of Asia.” (Lenin 1959: 99-100)

Likewise, in 1916, Lenin critically denounced the works of Rosa Luxemburg, for her inability to comprehend that “in the era of unbridled imperialism national wars waged by the colonies and semi-colonies would be a probable if not an inevitable situation. And it is these wars which would eventually take the form of national liberation against imperialism.” (Lenin 1964: 308-312)

Thus, we can assume that much before the October Revolution, Lenin’s writing and his understanding of Colonisation were originated from the study of imperialism. To put it clearly, imperialism was the crux of Lenin’s theoretical formulations upon which he based his understanding of Colonialism and National liberation movements.

Lenin’s idea of imperialism was an endeavour to elucidate as to why a revolution in the highest form had not taken place in the developed countries. Put across in simple terms; his theory seeks to explain that instead of having evolved internal contradictions to a point where Communist revolution would follow as an inevitable occurrence, Capitalism had found a way out. Capitalism now sought to expand into the world in search of cheap labour, cheap raw material, and a market made available for commodities and excess capital, which all could be exploited. Such an expansion was engineered to counter the falling rates of profits back at home, because of intense competition between companies eager to secure as much as manufacture as possible. Such an extravagant process ensured the maximum expansion of imperialism, which produced large profits from the dependent colonies. Large profits are managed to create a situation whereby it becomes possible for the capitalists to bribe parts of the proletariat, thereby forging a bond between them and Capitalism. (Meyer 1957)

To sum up, imperialism was taken as an apparatus of plundering the working-class of its revolutionary character - the capitalist-class in the modern countries had succeeded in preventing the increase in the misery of the masses through super-profits. The profits were used to pacify the proletariat, and an essential situation for the outbreak of the revolution was eliminated. However, as Lenin successfully argued, “This did not remove the irreconcilable contradiction that was an innate character of the capitalist society. Many of these existing contradictions were transformed on the international level, example - (a) Contradictions between the imperialist powers and (b) Contradictions between the imperialist powers and the colonial world.” (Lenin 1946: 402)

These problems were specifically discussed in the Comintern Congress, and efforts were made to put them into implementation. Regarding the substantial Soviet policy towards Asia, it started to take proper shape the next day after the October Revolution, when Lenin announced the famous “Decree of Peace” on November 8, 1917 in which he said: “The workers and peasants’ government created by the revolution of November 6-7 and backed by the Soviet of Workers, soldiers and peasants’ deputies calls upon all the belligerent peoples and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace.” (Lenin 1946: 401)

He further said: “The government considers that it would be the greatest of crime against humanity to continue this war for the purpose of dividing up among the strong and rich nations, the feeble nationalities seized by them and solemnly declares its determination to sign immediately conditions indicated, which are equally just for all peoples without exception... The government abolished secret diplomacy and for its part, expresses its firm determination to conduct all negotiations quite openly before the whole people. It will immediately proceed to the full publication of the secret treaties ratified or concluded by the government of landlords and capitalists during the period between March to November 7, 1917.” (Lenin 1946: 402)

The aforementioned declaration made it possible for the Soviet Government to annul all secret treaties initiated by the Tsarist regime and instead pay particular consideration to the Asian countries. The annulment of a secret treaty between the British and the Tsar about the separation of Iran and Afghanistan helped to build a positive impression for the USSR policy against colonialism in Asia.

Therefore, Lenin could institute both the theoretical and strategical links between (a) the colonial and national questions through the putting up arguments in favour of a typical policy for them, and (b) the United struggle of the working-class in the capitalist countries and national freedom movements in the colonies. Under no circumstances was he ready to regard the colonial question and the likelihood of the proletarian revolution in the West and the decisive triumph of socialism over capitalism as entities discreet from one another. He witnessed a dialectical relationship between the national democratic struggles and the socialist revolution. Lenin displayed that the popular masses, the proletariat, peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation were the cohorts and essential allies of the

conscious proletariat of metropolitan countries. Lenin put in black and white that the world social revolution would take place only in the form of an era of proletarian civil war dead set against the bourgeoisie in advanced countries fused with an entire series of democratic and revolutionary movements including those for national liberation in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations. (Imam 1969: 9) Concludingly, for an eventual triumph of socialism over capitalism, Lenin equally emphasised on the successful outcome of the socialist revolution in the West, and the indispensable need of national liberation in the colonies.

From the antecedent analysis, it is reasonably evident that the various facets of theory and strategy fused with each other quite splendidly in Lenin's redactions on the colonial question. Be that as it may, the primary purpose was never neglected. To put it a little differently; it was aimed to revitalise the proletarian movement in capitalist countries from the reformist bog that it had plunged into and incentivise it for a new concatenation of militant action to sabotage the foundation of capitalism. Secondly, it even ventured to institute an inextricable link between the Western proletariat and colonised peoples of the East, that is why national oppression and colonial exploitation were not distinguished from one another. These two different courses were drawn into a common objective - the final triumph of socialism and proletarian internationalism.

If we momentarily do not take the era of Gorbachev's Perestroika after 1985 into consideration, it will seem that the Soviet policies, whether it be domestic or foreign, had been gleaned from Lenin's past ideological formulations. These policies were met with doctrinaire treatment as far as the early decades posterior to the October Revolution are concerned. That period witnessed most of the Asian countries reeling under tremendous colonial domination; it resulted in Lenin taking an added interest in Asian affairs and him trying to ideologically strengthen these people in their quest to fight against colonialism. He opined that the national liberation movement burgeoned simultaneously with the growth of capitalism in these countries. That is why the revolutionary people of these countries had to espouse dual policy in their struggle against colonialism.

While, on the one hand, they had to wage a struggle against international colonialism, at the same time, they could not relent their fight against domestic capitalism. The

adoption of a ready-made policy during the height of the struggle for national liberation in such a complicated situation was not very unexacting. That is the prime reason as to why there seemed an urgent need to form the Communist International in 1919 to resolve all these complex problems.

Comintern was instituted during a period when the Soviet Union was viciously surrounded by hostile powers and subsequently involved in a fierce civil war which posed a potential menace to the very existence of the newly-formed revolutionary state. Consequently, diplomatically, the Soviet Union was not in a very strong position as opposed to almost all major powers of the world. Against this backdrop, the Comintern served as a crucial tool for the Soviets to make urgent appeals to international proletariats in the East and West both to amass support for the Soviet Union and to continue their struggles for national liberation in the colonies throughout the world.

The above appeals resulted in the coming together of thousands of revolutionaries from around the world - most of them had by then been living in Russia- to stand up and be counteracted against domestic as well as foreign invaders with Red Army. Particularly in the East, the struggle for the Soviet Union coincided with the cause of encouraging and stimulating national liberation and communist movements.

As far as this process is concerned, a Soviet scholar Ulyanovsky quite correctly pointed out that “the Communist International played a central role. The Comintern was conclusively instrumental in the unification of communist elements in the oppressed countries while playing an imperative role in arming the newly emerging communist parties in the East with the Marxist-Leninist theory and aiding and abetting them in recording their strategy and tactics and policy of forging alliances with the non-proletarian anti-imperialist forces.” (Ulyanovsky 1984: 5) He had further pointed out: “As the head of the Comintern collectives leadership Lenin guided the organisations’ activities in the post-October period when the proletariat launched an assault on imperialist citadels in the West, and there was a powerful upsurge of the struggle of the oppressed people against imperialist domination throughout the colonial East.” (Ulyanovsky 1984: 6) So we can infer from the above examples that the Third International played a very crucial role in shaping Lenin’s idea of foreign policy concerning the third world.

The role of the Third International and the USSR became rife, as was the conventional norm. This commonness between the two became all the more discernible with time when the aims and objectives of the Third International solely took a back seat to those of the USSR. Against this backdrop, this chapter seeks to analyse the historical and ideological background of Soviet policy towards the Communist movement. The traces of the emanation and evolution of this policy, which was strived for in an extremely efficient way by the USSR and Comintern can be found in an evolving form in the writings of Marx and Engels. Later from the early years of the present century, we see Lenin return to this question, time and again, enunciating his theory in a much more conspicuous form.

Anti-Colonialism as USSR's Strategy and Establishment of Third International in 1919

As validated in previous accounts that anti-colonialism was not only a foundational element of Soviet foreign policy but was also instrumental in the ultimate victory of World revolution which inspired the Bolshevik Party following the victory of October Revolution and it drove them to set up an agenda regarding the World revolution. Julius Braunthal (1967) indicated that "according to Lenin's ideas, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was only a part of World Revolution." He also believed that "it would play a vital role in igniting a huge revolutionary explosion with Europe's social tensions." (Braunthal 1967: 95) He further explains that Lenin affirmed that "the pre-conditions required for World Revolution already existed. On October 10, 1917, at the conference of the Bolshevik Executive, the need for an armed revolution was felt and decided in favour of the former." (Braunthal 1967: 96) Lenin felt that "an instant capturing of power was required which he rationalised by stressing, most importantly, the International basis of the Russian Revolution." (Braunthal 1967: 96)

The post-victory enthusiasm of the October Revolution encouraged the Bolshevik leaders to contemplate regarding a World Revolution. In this backdrop, Lenin extended his solidarity through a wireless message on behalf of the Eighth Congress of the Bolshevik Party to the Government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic on March 22, 1919, according to Lenin, "The Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party sends ardent solidarity to the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Our Congress is convinced that the time is not far distant when Communism will triumph all over the World. The

Working class of Russia is making every effort to come to your aid. The Proletariat throughout the World is watching your struggle with immense interest and will not permit the imperialists to raise their hands against the new Soviet Republic. Long live the World Communist Republic!” (Lenin 1976: 106)

While the Bolsheviks were meticulously preparing for a world revolution, the conditions were hostile. The colonialist west isolated the Soviet Union. The sufferers of the colonial rule were mostly the Asian, African and the Latin American countries, this universal phenomenon of colonial ascendancy further secluded the newly born Soviet state as it was clear in its anti-colonial stand. Under these situations, the Bolshevik developed and expressed their affinities with the colonised people, particularly in the East. With the call for national self-determination and freedom for the oppressed people of the world, the Bolshevik had a clear plan to achieve two things at the same time. Primarily they wanted to fuel the revolution in the colonies by agitating against the dominant colonial powers and secondly, to devitalise the economical and the military resources which belonged to the colonisers throughout the world. Eventually, the anti-colonial policy took shape which bloomed through the origination of the communist international or the Third International in March 1919. In this way, the anti-colonial policy of a single segregated state turned into the voice of millions of people throughout the world. In this regard, the Communist International was an exceptional achievement for the Soviet Union.

The foundation of Communist International was an evolutionary process. It was not an instantaneous event. It was the culmination and combination of two expired Internationals, which in history paved the way for the idea of world revolution. The former was the ‘International Working Men’s association’ which was set up on September 28, 1864, in London with Karl Marx playing a pivotal role in the foundation of the First International. Intriguingly, the historic meeting took place in SL Martin’s hall of London where the First International was instituted and was chaired by Prof. Edward Spencer Beesley of London University. In his inaugural speech, Prof. Beesley addressed the issue of “the requirement to fight against superpowers’ annexationist policy and completely exposed Great Britain’s foreign policy”. (Ponomarev 1980: 552-617) “The first two bodies to join the International was the ‘London, German Workers’ Educational Association’ and the New York

Communist Club of German Workers (joined in 1867) respectively.” (Ponomarev 1980: 560)

The world-renowned British intellectual R. Palme Dutt, one of the most prominent leaders of the Communist International, shared some fascinating description regarding the formation of the First International. According to him, “the title, which was decided first, was not ‘The First International’. He elaborated “that these technical terms, by which it is pronounced nowadays was only introduced after the formation of the Second International, and its official title was the International Working Men's Association, and locally it was simply called as ‘the International’.” (Dutt 1964: 45)

He further said that “during the previous two years several calculative and consistent measures were instrumental in the foundation at the St. Martin's Hall meeting in London on Sept. 28, 1864 and at the International Exhibition in London in August 1862, the elected delegation of French trade union representatives (the trade unions were allowed under Napoleon III, despite the fact that the political organisation was illegal) and the English trade union representatives met over a discussion of forming an international workers' organization and decided to have continuous contact with each other. In the following year, due to various reasons like the American civil war and the resulting cotton famine which brought adverse situations to the textile workers of Lancashire and in France, the idea of forming an international workers' organisation was levitated to a higher level. In July 1863, with the active participation of France and English workers' leaders, who maintained the contacts of the preceding year, a demonstration was held in London supporting the Polish insurrection. A combined meeting with the French, Polish and German Workers' representatives was held on the initiative of the London Trades Council (there was not yet a Trade Union Congress), and a committee was assigned to draw up an address to the French workers proposing the holding of an international workers' congress. The reply of the French workers was brought and read out by their delegation to the St. Martin's Hall meeting on September 28, 1864. A plan for the formation of an international workers' organisation by establishing a central commission in London, with representatives from the workers of all countries and with sub-commissions in the capital cities of Europe, to draw up the constitution and rules and to arrange for an International

Congress in the following year was extended by the French representatives and the resolution was passed unanimously and adopted by the meeting.” (Dutt 1964: 46-47)

Soviet scholar Ponomarev claimed that “the founding International Working Men's Association was a clear expression of different frames of mind of the masses of the workers and their desire to unite. It was essential to convert this feeling into an organisation. The structure of the association, which had been laid down in its very first documents drawn up by Marx, was highly flexible. On the one hand, it was conceived of as a network of sections operating as bases for propaganda and organisational works in the different localities, linked with the General Council either directly or through regional or national federations. In addition to that system, which was built on individual members of each workers Marx had also introduced another principle into the Provisional Rules, viz, the joining as affiliated members of already existing organisations of the proletariat.” (Ponomarev 1980: 559)

The International was a very inclusive setup of representatives of any ideological trend, but it was essential for them to realise and recognise that the emancipation of the working class will be brought about by the working class itself, and hence they adopted the slogan “Workers’ of the World, Unite!” “For Marx, the task of pulling and involving the masses of the workers into the movement was of prime importance seeing in that the road to uniting scientific theory with the working-class movement.” (Ponomarev 1980: 560) In this regard, “a Russian Section of the First International was founded in Geneva, in March 1870. Karl Marx was nominated as their representative by the members of the Russian section of the International on the General Council and at the same time sent Marx their programme and rule for approval. Marx wrote to his dear friend, Engels with great amusement in 1870 that he had become ‘the representative of Young Russia’.” (Dutt 1964: 83)

The most serious incident that was characteristic of the First International was the rise and fall of Paris commune in 1871. It was for the first time in the history of the world communist movement that the working class had aspired to seize power in France. However, Karl Marx’s assessment was phenomenal that he believed “the proletariat class was not strong enough to endure its rule permanently in France” moreover he was not very desirous about acquiring power. In the minutes of the General Council of First International, 1870-71, Marx predicted, in his second address on the Franco-

Prussian war and advised the French section of the International “to utilise the republican freedom for robustly constructing the proletarian organisation and warned them against the early action.” (Zagdalin 1981: 125) It proved to be totally correct as Paris Commune faced a suppression just after two months of its occurrence. Subsequently, it was found that “the truth that, by the 1870s capitalist development had not reached a sufficiently high level not only in France but the world as a whole, was the prime reason for the defeat of the Paris Commune.” (Engels 1973: 178-189)

Afterwards, the fact that the Paris Commune was heavily crushed created a very negative impact on the survival of the First International. The aftermath of the Paris Commune saw the suppression of workers giving rise to many folds due to which its headquarters was eventually shifted to the United States of America in 1872, where it finally ceased to exist in 1876. For the next thirteen years, the International working-class movement was left clueless and aimless due to the absence of some strong guidance. Engels and his associates worked strenuously in strengthening the movement following which the International Socialist Congress of working men was held at Paris on July 14, 1889, where the Congress was attended by about 390 delegates from 20 various countries which even comprised of three delegates from Russia. The Russian delegates were Georgi Plekhanov, V.I. Zasulich and P. V. Axelrod who were the founders of the renowned organisation ‘the Emancipation of Labour Group’ in Russia. (Zagdalin 1981: 266-67)

In the beginning, the death of Karl Marx was a sudden turning point and one of the major reasons for the Second International not seeming to gain the same level of popularity. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, it gradually took shape with an increase in pace and started to play a critical role in the international working-class movement. It was the same period when sizeable changes took place in Russia with the foundation of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) which was formed in March 1898. At this crucial juncture, Lenin was undoubtedly emerging as a larger than life image of the Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution of 1905 made the Tsarist Empire tremble in Russia, amidst this moment of revolutionary upsurge, the Seventh Congress of the Second International was also held at Stuttgart in August 1907. This was the first time that Lenin participated in any congress of the Second International. It was also the first time that the issue of the colonial question

was discussed in-depth and was subsequently added to the agenda of the Stuttgart Congress. (Lenz 1986: 85)

In a resolution on colonial policy, the Stuttgart Congress (1907) decided and declared that “the capitalist colonial policy by virtue of its nature will lead to enslavement, forced labour or extermination and exploitation of the indigenous population of colonial territories.” It also stated that “civilisation process termed by the capitalist society was only pretexted to fulfil its inner desires for conquest and ill-treatment and only a communist society will create an atmosphere in which all the humans will receive the equal opportunity to develop their culture completely. On the contrary capitalist colonial policy, instead of opting to increase the inclusive policies, is keen in destroying and driving away from the indigenous crowd through enslavement, impoverishment murderous, devastating wars, the natural riches of the territories into which it transplants its methods. Thereby, it brings a menace to the development of trade and the consumption of the industrial products of the civilised states.” (Gankin and Fisher 1960: 52-53) The Congress outrightly denounced “the atrocious methods and manipulations of the capitalist colonisation and demanded, in the interests of the upliftment of productive forces, a policy which would allow a peaceful, cultural development and which would place at the service of the progress of all humankind and the natural riches of the soil.” (Gankin and Fisher 1960: 52-53)

Igor Krivoguz, a Soviet specialist on Second International, articulates “The Stuttgart Congress confirmed the crucial role of the revolutionary socialists and the pervasiveness of Marxism in the international working-class movement irrespective of the adamant resistance of the opportunists and also made a significant step forward. It adopted the rules and resolutions in order to strengthen the cooperation of Socialist Parties and the trade unions.” (Krivoguz 1986: 255) According to Lenin, “the Stuttgart Congress marked the final consolidation of the Second International.” (Lenin 1946: 93)

The last phase of the Second International was staged from 1908 to 1914 which seemed to be a tough task as the international working-class movement was gaining proper momentum which in turn was a reason for the fast-occurring rift in the Second International. The resolutions passed in the International’s congresses and its other documents had analysed the character of the impending world war long before

August 1914 even happened and the causes that would lead to its occurrence, of, instead of acting accordingly, its leaders, primarily the social democrats supported the war efforts made by their imperialist Governments, it thereby led to the collapse of the Second international not long after World War I commenced in August 1914.

Lenin came up with a thesis on the war on Sept. 5th, 1914, predicting that “the European and World War has the sharp and definite nature of a class conscious, imperialist, and dynastic war.” (Gankin and Fisher 1960: 140) He added that “the struggle for markets and the flavour to plunder countries, the intention to deceive, disunite, dismantle and kill off the proletarians of all countries, by instigating the hired slaves of one nation against the hired slaves of the other for the benefit of the bourgeoisie was the only real purpose of the war.” (Gankin and Fisher 1960: 140) Evaluating the prevailing circumstances he goes on to say that “the betrayal of socialism by the majority of the leaders of the Second International (1889-1914) marks nothing but the ideological vacuum of that International. The primary factor for this collapse is the actual predominance of petty-bourgeois opportunism inside the International. The bourgeois nature and danger was a longtime grievance of the best representatives of the proletariat of all countries. Opportunists have long been waiting for the fall of the Second International by which they could renounce the Socialist revolution and replace it with the irrational bourgeois reformism for it; by renouncing class struggle, with its transformation into civil war, which is agreeable at certain moments but by propagating bourgeois chauvinism under the image of patriotism and defense of the fatherland and by ignoring the aspects of socialism, which is mentioned, according to the Communist Manifesto, that workers don’t have any fatherland.” (Gankin and Fisher 1960: 141)

In 1890, Plekhanov and Axelrod published the Russian socialist organ Social democrat in which Engles wrote in Geneva in an article titled “The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism”, where he mentioned “how capable is the Russian revolution to get away with the danger of a world war but also stresses on the fact that if there is a delay in change in Russia, Europe will slip down with ever-increasing speed into the abyss of a world war of unexampled violence and universality.” (Dutt 1964: 127)

With respect to this, R. Palme Dutt identifies that “Marxism was the ground on which the Basle resolution of 1912 of the Socialist International was based on, while

continuing to validate the resolutions of Stuttgart and Copenhagen, which by the course of this functioning system had defined with very precise accuracy the character of the approaching European war, the opposing alliances, the secret treaties, the criminal aims of all the capitalist powers, and even specifying the prospective immediate occasion of the war in 'The Austro-Serbian dispute'. The resolution thus assuredly established the fact that the war which broke out in 1914 was essentially in no aspect different from that which had been anticipated and about which all the parties had unanimously pleaded themselves to pursue a policy of uncompromising opposition." (Dutt 1964: 129) According to the Basle resolution, as far as the proletarians were concerned, for them, they considered it "a crime to fire at each other for the benefit of the capitalists' profits, the ambitions of dynasties or the greater glory of secret diplomatic treaties." (Dutt 1964: 129)

As previously explained, during World War I many Social Democratic Parties backed their Governments to indulge in the war for their own survival, which included, the British Labor Party, the French Socialist Party, the German Social-Democratic Party, the Austrian Social Democratic Party, the Belgian Labor Party and the Australian and South African Labor Parties, as mentioned by R. Palme Dutt. The British, French and Belgian leaders, were part of the capitalist war coalition Governments. The Labor Government of Australia fully supported the war, whereas the Russian Bolshevik Party and the Serbian Social Democratic Party and the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party, which firmly believed in the principles of the International, daringly voiced their opinions against the war which later led to the conduction of revolutionary agitation. On the other hand, the Mensheviks in Russia, after their members had initially joined with the Bolshevik deputies in voting against the war credits, moved over to embrace the slogan of "national defence". By then the Socialist Revolutionaries were themselves fragmented and also the Mensheviks located themselves between the "Internationalists" and "defencists". (Dutt 1964: 129)

To quote a statement by French Socialist leaders, Lazitch and Drachkovitch as they clearly stated that "the war has devastated socialism as it has devastated the world" and with a clear understanding, he rightly critiqued that "the guns of August 1914 did nothing except disintegrating, not only the unity of the International Socialist movement but also the order and file of camps and the claims of internationalist

proletarian class struggle with these absurd ideas of patriotic fervour, national defence and national solidarity quickly spreading amongst the majority of socialist leaders. In the Entente countries, the leaders justified their actions and positions in the name of upholding the principle of legitimate national defence.” (Lezitch and Drachkovitch 1972: 3). They were also heard exclaiming as how the war created ever-greater divisions in Russian Social Democratic émigré circle and particularly among the Russian Socialist émigrés and in the countries of the Entente, the vast majority stood under the impact of the idea of ‘Defence of the Fatherland’. The founder of the Russian Marxist Georgie Plekhanov turned into a dedicated supporter of the “defence” and the movement and readily came forward to serve in the French Army. Famous Bolsheviks such as N. V. Kuznetsov (Sapozhkov), secretary of the Bolshevik centre in Paris, and former Bolshevik such as G.A. Aleksinsky, deputy to the second state Duma, went after the same patriotic trend, whereas the leading Mensheviks abroad, like Y. Martov and P. B. Axelrod opposed the war as internationalists and understood the importance of building peace as the narrative of the workers’ struggle. (Lezitch and Drachkovitch 1972: 5)

The first international conference of Socialists in the aggressive countries for the fight against the war was called by the International Socialist Women’s Bureau of the Second International, with Clara Zetkin as the secretary, and was held at Bern in March 1915. This was a historically remarkable conference attended among others by Krupskaya in the Bolshevik delegation, being a first international conference of socialist representatives from the aggressive countries opposing the war. In the ensuing month, International Socialist Youth Conference, held in Berne, was convened by the secretary of the International Socialist Youth Bureau of the Second International, Willi Munzenberg. (Dutt 1964: 134)

Initially, the war created much uncertainty among the proletariats; even though they defended it which they gradually overcame by obtaining a clear revolutionary understanding of the events. Having taken shape ideologically and structurally in the autumn of 1915 at the International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald (Switzerland) which was later known as Zimmerwald movement, the anti-war movement among the workers can be comprehended as a remarkable manifestation of

this profound left-ward shift of the masses. (Sobolev 1971: 28-29) The Zimmerwald movement created a space for the emergence of the Communist International.

The Zimmerwald conference in which 37 delegates from Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden took part, happened between 5th to 8th September 1915. From a political perspective, the conference was evidently heterogeneous in nature, only eight delegates from 7 countries had a stance which embodied revolutionary internationalism, and these delegates instituted the Left Zimmerwald group. This group got ideologically shaped when it moved its draft resolution and manifesto and then headed by Lenin it organisationally elected its bureau. (Sobolev 1971: 29) The other two members who constituted the Bureau were Zinoviev of Russia and Karl Radek of Poland.

Known as the Zimmerwald majority, the other 29 delegates constituted the right-wing of the conference. The primary focus of the Zimmerwald was the proletariat's call for action for peace. The Zimmerwald Left, in their documents, drew attention to their only purported way to bring the imperialist war to a close. It was by straight out leading the masses of the proletariats to a revolutionary struggle against the capitalist governments to attain political power for society's socialist re-organisation. (Sobolev 1971: 28-29)

Espoused by the French and German delegates at Zimmerwald, a joint declaration allowed the exchange of fraternal messages between the French and German factions of the First International in the middle of the Franco-German war. Not just this, a general manifesto was also adopted along with it, it declared international working-class solidarity against imperialism. Signed and agreed upon by all the delegates, the agenda included Leeboard and Hoffman for the Germans, Merrheim and Bourderon for the French, Lazzari and Modigliani for the Italians, and Lenin, Axelrod and Bobrov for the Russians. Zimmerwald witnessed the institution of a permanent "International Socialist Commission" which coordinated with the parties concerned in an unofficial bloc and got completely new affiliates. Furthermore, this commission organised various conferences at Kienthal in April 1916 and at Stockholm in Sept. 1917. Concludingly, the basis of the new International had started to emerge and evolve. (Dutt 1964: 135)

According to Lazith and Drachkovitch, during the summer of 1915, Lenin and Zinoviev wrote a pamphlet entitled 'Socialism and War' and Lenin communicated with his comrades living outside Russia to send their trustworthy comrades to attend the conference and if they couldn't make it, he proposed them to send some comrades on behalf of them. The pamphlet itself translated into both French and English contained some very precise ideas which drew close attention. The first chapter was focussed on the issue of 'Social chauvinism' or Socialist 'defencism', which they claimed as the betrayal of Socialism and the text and spirit of the revolutions of the congresses of the Second International. (Lezitch and Drachkovitch 1972: 10)

The Zimmerwald conference presented Lenin with his first chance to project his leadership qualities in an almost non-comprehensible political battle, which he ardently encountered with three clear objectives that he had consciously thought of: to form a coherent international nucleus of like-minded revolutionaries; to influence the other participants whose likelihood of subscribing to his political line was slim to none as much as possible, and to augment the rift between the internationalists in attendance and the absent "defencist" socialist. The heterogeneity of the conference made Lenin's task comparatively easier. Out of 38 delegates, to back his claim, Lenin could garner the support of only eight members. They were, Ian Berzin (Winter), representing the leftist social democrats; Karl Radek, representing the left-wing of the Polish Socialist Party; Zeth Hoglund and Ture Nerman, representing the Social Democratic Youth organizations of Sweden and Norway; Fritz Platten, a Swiss Social Democrat; and Julian Borchardt from Berlin, editor of the left-socialist magazine *Lichtstrahlen* and himself and Zinoviev: (Lezitch and Drachkovitch 1972: 11-12) By a majority of 19 to 12, the Zimmerwald conference repudiated the principled resolution put forth by the left and declared for a manifesto which didn't succeed in concretizing the tasks and methods of the struggle. The conference also saw the adoption of a declaration of solidarity with the victims of the war appealing socialists to take note of the example of the Bolshevik deputies in the Duma, the example of Liebknecht and other revolutionary fighters for peace and socialism. The conference elected a governing body, the International Socialist Commission-comprising of Robert Grimm, Charles Naine, Oddino Morgari, and Angelica Balabanova. Focusing on the significance of the Zimmerwald decision for the Left-wing of international Social-

Democracy, Lenin stated that the conference was the “first step to the Third International.” (Sobolev 1971: 30)

Post First Zimmerwald Conference period Lenin continued to wage an ideological offence against the Social chauvinists. That is why, analysing their character as “Socialist in words and chauvinist in deeds”, he termed them to be “class enemies who have gone over to the bourgeoisie.” (Lenin 1946: 4) Lenin further elaborated; “Everyone knows that on the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the war the socialists all over the world, in all countries, belligerent as well as neutral, split into two large main division. Some took the side of their Governments, of their bourgeoisie. These we call Social-chauvinist. A chauvinist is one who concealed the defence of the predatory interest of his ruling classes with the concept ‘defence of the fatherland.’” (Lenin 1946: 14)

Zinoviev referred the second conference as another step forward for the Zimmerwald Left, which was held in Berne and Kienthal (24th- 30th April 1916). (Lezitch and Drachkovitch 1972: 15) Citing multiple references, S. W. Page explained in his theses of April 1917, that Lenin demanded his Russian comrades (Bolsheviks) to split with the Zimmerwald bloc and they could proclaim the Third International. However, the Bolsheviks sent delegates to the Third Zimmerward conference, held in Stockholm, on Sept. 1917, by gently brushing aside the demands that Lenin raised. Early in 1918, with the help of delegates from Soviet Russia, Lenin once again tried to do so. He went on to pass on the vigour of the Bolshevik revolution to Europe by and large. Howbeit, the task of arranging contacts preliminary to a conference of left-wingers assigned to missionaries by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet regime could not succeed to get through the blockade. The end of January 1918 witnessed the materialisation of a meeting in Petrograd of the so-called “representatives of left socialist parties” (attended only by revolutionaries then residing in Russia), and they elected an International Bureau. (Stanley 1959: 122)

He further points out that “from the preceding note, two things are obvious. First, Lenin tried at every possible opportunity to bring the Third International into existence, and second, he made his attempts without any reference whatsoever to the wishes of the European proletariat. From this, it may be deduced that Lenin had a strong personal interest in fathering the new International. Why this was so is not

difficult to imagine. While in Switzerland in 1915- 1917, he had decided to take the lead in what he considered the coming European revolution.” (Stanley 15: 123)

Meanwhile, the triumph of the Soviet Revolution 1917 heavily altered the contemporary revolutionary processes. The task became really urgent with the formation of the German Communist Party which had its origin from the former Spartacus league in December 1918. However, great obstructions of the communique on account of the imperialist block emerged. The invitation to the Foundation Congress was sent out in the name of six Communist Parties (Russia, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Latvia and Finland), the Balkan Revolutionary Social Democratic Federation and an individual representative of the Socialist Labor Party of the United States on January 24.

The invitation was written with the sole purpose of structurally summarising the intended basis and principles of the new International which was addressed almost to thirty-nine organisations or groups, including all Communist Parties, five socialist or Social Democrat Parties ranging with the left, nineteen left minorities within socialist parties or militant industrial grouping. This was pitched with the urgent notion which was increased by the fact that the discredited leaders of the old Second International were planning to meet at Berne in February 1919, in order to rebuild the old Second International. This leadership did not have to face many difficulties as it was supported by the Governments in coming together which the still-developing revolutionary section of the working-class movement had to face given the conditions of the beginning of 1919. (Dutt 1964: 156)

The new International proposal was regarded as being increasingly significant in order to revitalise the international revolutionary solidarity of the national deputations of the working class which was ravaged by the war and the spasm of jingoism and chauvinism. It was even pivotal to organise the struggle of those involved in the spontaneous revolutionary upheaval, the effect of which was seen in several countries in varying degrees. The Communist International had to do its bit to apprise and to consolidate the erstwhile infirm communist parties and other left revolutionary groups and organisations. It also had to provide the necessary conditions for collective formulation and the subsequent working out of revolutionary strategy and tactics. (Zagdalin 1984: 264)

To make these agendas come to fruition, Lenin formulated a conclusive plan to arrange the International Socialist Conference to establish the Third International. In a note, G.V. Chicherin, twice accentuated that “it must be convened ‘urgently’, ‘very soon’... Lenin opined that the Third International should go on to not just comprise of the already founded communist parties but should further incorporate those parties and groups that were drawing near to Bolshevism, which included existing groups within social democratic parties.” (Zagdalin 1984: 165) Concurrently, while outlining this circle, he suggested “inviting to the constituent Congress those who resolutely stood for the break with the social-patriots who were for a socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat...who were in principle for ‘Soviet power’ and against the limitation of bourgeois parliamentarism, against subordination to it and who recognized the fact that the Soviet type of Government was higher and closer to socialism.” (Lenin 1964)

Keeping the aforementioned theoretical framework under consideration, the first international meeting for the preparation of the Communist International was held in Petrograd in January 1918. The Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-revolutionaries and the left social-democrats of Sweden, Norway, Britain, USA, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia etc were in attendance. According to Pravda of 30th January 1918, “the meeting decided to call a conference of the left on the following conditions:

1. Approval of parties and organisations to engage in the revolutionary struggle against their governments for immediate peace;
2. Support of the October Revolution and Soviet Government.”

This decision was distributed among the left parties and organisations that became the cornerstone of uniting various countries’ internationalist forces into the Communist International. The primary challenge at the moment was to unite the Communist movement organisationally because of the chauvinistic stance of the European Social Democrats, who had started to construct a “reformist global organization” in an effort to re-establish it. Following this progress, the Bolshevik Party prepared an urgent call to unite in the Third International to the Communists of other nations. (Sobolev 1971: 50)

In January 1919, Moscow held another global conference which unitedly accepted the suggestion by Lenin to convene an inaugural Congress to create the Communist International shortly. Eight sides signed an appeal and released in Pravda on 24 January 1919, which provided the ideological and political platform for the suggested international. (Zagdalin 1984: 226)

Citing an American scholar from various sources, James W. Hulse writes: “Communist International’s organisational history starts with a riddle. On January 24, 1919, the Soviet government’s radio station directed broadcasting to revolutionary groups around the world, inviting them to send representatives to a Congress to create a new Communist International. The invitation claimed that it was urgently necessary to establish a revolutionary International, but it did not specify a time or place for delegates to meet. The Bolsheviks did not repeat the invitation, and the meeting began on March 2nd. No further attempts were produced to draw attention to their scheme. When the meeting opened in the Moscow Kremlin, its initial session was encircled by a veil of secrecy, although earlier stressed the messianic nature of the suggested organisation. Never properly described these conditions.” (Hulse 1964: 1)

He adds that “there is an eyewitness account of the meeting that probably chose to summon the Moscow Congress. J. Fineberg, an Englishman who had attached himself to the cause of the Bolsheviks, wrote a description of the meeting ten years after the event, but his statement contains some internal evidence that he had trouble remembering details.” According to Fineberg, “the meeting took place in the Kremlin, one evening in January, in the room that had been the bedchamber of Nicholas II; Lenin presented the draft invitation to be sent to parties opposed to the Second International calling them to the Third International’s inaugural meeting. Fineberg said the invitation and a ‘manifesto’ were broadcasted a day or two later.” (Hulse 1964: 14-15).

On March 2, According to Hulse, giving another fascinating account from Russian sources; “the Bolsheviks had accomplished the organisational structure they had attempted. The fresh agency form was described not only in the invitation of January 24 but also in a declaration taken on Congress’ opening day. Zinoviev released an article in Pravda predicting that the Russian Communist Party’s program would be acceptable to the parties participating in the Third International’s founding congress.

The paper did not show that the conference was convened that very day; it was not a news account of an ongoing case, but a propaganda declaration aimed at winning assistance for the Bolshevik scheme. It may have been aimed at the meeting participants as well as public reading. Zinoviev was explicit on the issue of organisational form and management. The Third International's organisational form must be determined at the Communist Parties' First Congress. A powerful centre of guidance must be created that can guide the movement in all nations in thoughts and organisation." (Hulse 1964: 20-21).

Under Lenin's chairmanship, a precursive meeting was held on March 1, 1919, to deliberate about the agenda of the forthcoming Congress; howbeit, due to the relentless opposition received from Hugo Eberlein of the German Communist Party, the issue concerning the establishment of the Communist International remained unresolved. His party had given Eberlein a mandate to contend with the hurried formation of the Comintern, which thereby resulted in the decision being taken to go directly to the session of the International Communist Conference held in Kremlin on 2 March 1919.

Inaugurated at the Kremlin on the evening of 2 March 1919, the International Communist Conference was chaired by a three-member committee made up of Lenin, Hugo Eberlein (Germany) and Platten of Sweden. A total of 52 delegates from 35 organisations from 21 nations in Europe, America and Asia attended the meeting. Of these organisations, 19 had voting privileges, while 16 had no voting rights. The delegates represented Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the Communist and Left Socialist parties. A distinct delegation from Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Estonia, Armenia, Germans from the Volga region, Turkestan, Georgia and Azerbaijan were present. The conference was also attended by officials from Iran, China, Korea, and Turkey. (1971 Sobolev: 51)

Once Lenin proclaimed the International Conference open, his first act was to call on the participants to rise in honour of the memory of the Third International's most exceptional representatives, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. After paying tribute to them, Lenin said that "faced with the growing revolutionary movement of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie is angry with fear. This will be understandable if we consider the fact that the advancement of events since the imperialist war inevitably

facilitates the proletariat's revolutionary movement at the start of the International World Revolution.” (Lenin 1964: 26)

After two days of intense discussion on a broad range of problems, including whether or not to set up the Communist International, the International Communist Conference eventually decided to set up the Comintern. When this problem was put before the Conference, all delegates voted in favour, with the exception of Hugo Eberlein of the abstaining German Communist Party. The resolution concerning the Comintern's foundation indicated that “all parties, organisations and groups maintain the right to declare their adherence to the Third International within eight months.” (Lenin 1919: 57) After the polling, Hugo Eberlein ensured the Conference that he “would do all he could to persuade his party to enter the Comintern after returning to Germany.” It is the historical fact that one of the first groups to join the Comintern was the Communist Party of Germany.

Following this process, the International Communist Conference developed into the Communist International's First March 4 Congress, which finished on March 6, 1919. This is how on March 4, 1919, the Communist International came into being. The Congress supported the renowned “Communist International Manifesto to World Workers” and “Appeal to All Countries' Workers and Soldiers.” G.Zinoviev together with Angelica Balabanova and J. Berzin was the first Chairman of the Communist International with both of them as the secretaries.

In his closing speech, Lenin pronounced that, “Let the world's bourgeoisie continue to rage, let it deport, imprison and even kill the Spartacists and Bolsheviks - this won't assist it anymore, and it will only serve to enlighten the masses, free them from the ancient bourgeois-democratic prejudices, and harden them in the fight. The worldwide victory of the proletarian revolution is ensured. The International Soviet Republic's basis is imminent.” (Lenin 1919: 28) Writing on April 15, 1919, about the historical place of the Third International (Communist International), Lenin said that “the First International (1864-72) laid the foundation for the proletarian, international struggle for socialism. The Second International (1889-1914) marked the time when the ground was prepared in a number of countries for a broad, massive, widespread movement and that the Third International collected the fruits of the Second International's work, purged it of its opportunist, social-chauvinist, bourgeois and

petty-bourgeois dress, and began to influence the proletariat's regime." (Lenin 1964: 31).

The creation of the Communist International further reinforced the World Communist movement as well as the anti-colonial national freedom movements as they started to emerge all over the world. In a year before the Second Congress of the Comintern was convened in 1920, several new Communist Parties were also established. Especially in the Eastern colonies, this erected a revolutionary wave.

According to Melograni(1989), the following specific long-term, as well as short-term reasons, motivated Lenin to act towards the formation of the Comintern.

"Firstly, the war was reconstituted over the Second International of Social Democratic Parties. From 3 to 10 February 1919, a conference was held. Lenin would surely have liked to take some prestige away from the Social Democrats while at the same moment showing that the organisation of Communist Internationalism could be found. If he did not, the Communist movement would look like it would disintegrate into the globe. The resolution adopted on 4 March that founded the Comintern included the admission:

If the conference convened in Moscow, the Third International would not be created; it could offer the feeling that there was disagreement between the communist parties. This would discredit our stance and boost the scepticism among those components of the proletariat that in all nations are vacillating." (1989 Melograni: 57)

It was also fascinating to note that the Russian Communist Party was invited to join the aforementioned Social-Democratic Conference. On 24 December 1918, in response to their invitation, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party sent a telegram, reported next day in Pravda, calling on all the revolutionary and internationalist elements of the European Socialist movement to boycott this conference of enemies of the working class disguised as Socialists, while pointing out that "the Third International, in charge of the revolutionary world already prevails. In such a situation, Lenin had no option but to establish the Comintern instantly. Lenin could not be anticipated to sit calmly and do nothing while the Second International, whose "Corpse" he had so often declared dead since 1914 and whose leaders, in his sight, were packed with traitors, outlined his new International, which he had been the

first to promote back in 1914 and which he deemed to have existed since the revolution in Russia. (Lazitch and Drachkovitch 1972: 52)

“Secondly, the then unbalanced global scenario and the Soviet’s lack of confidence in the League of Nations were the direct factors behind the Comintern’s creation. The ‘Appeal for the formation of the Communist International’ declared that it was in reply to the capitalist alliance under the banners of the ‘League of Nations’ that will strangle this revolution, that it became increasingly essential to convene the Communist International to advance the revolution and encourage the formation of an alliance between the revolutionary proletariat and the country that had carried out a socialist revolution. The Comintern’s objective was thus clearly acknowledged to be revolutionary and to safeguard the socialist revolution, which in this case meant protecting the Soviet State first of all.” (1989 Melograni: 57)

“Thirdly, the extraordinary triumph of the October Revolution and the Bolshevik ideology had given a prodigious boost to the aspirations of the toiling and exploited people in Europe as well as in Asia. The Bolsheviks were honestly convinced that they were working for the World Revolution and pictured it as a part of their revolution. Meanwhile, they would not desire to forget the edge that Socialist organisations provide them with in spreading their faith worldwide, as per which Soviet Russia seemed to realise its ambitions. Furthermore, upon arguing about it, since the Bolsheviks were direly seeking external assistance, they could not have missed the possibilities provided by this faith. They hoped to institute a centralized network of communist parties capable of what Lenin deemed subordinating the movement’s interest in each nation to the revolution’s common interests on a global scale.” (Melograni 1989: 57)

As Lenin explicitly put it, “the other parties of the Comintern would be subordinated to the Russians and that the leadership in the revolutionary proletarian International has passed for a short time, it goes without saying to the Russians, just as it was in the hands of the British, then of the French, and then of the Germans at various times of the nineteenth century.” (Lenin 1964: 277) Therefore, there could be no scepticism whatsoever as to where its governance as the newly established International stood. The Russians seemed gargantuan, even like giants dwarfing the small groups that had

joined them. Moscow turned into the International's seat, and its chairman was Gregory Zinoviev.

“Fourthly, to allow Russia to overcome its political isolation and create an economic recovery, the key was a powerful section among the Bolsheviks that viewed revolution on a worldwide scale. Some of them occasionally indulged in their wildest dream as mostly cut off from the remainder of the globe, the Russians saw events as they wished to see them, and as their own country's revolutionary atmosphere proposed. Trotsky, in his armoured train's Gazette, wrote an essay in which, after defeating the whites, he claimed to see the Red Army conquer Europe and attack America. Zinoviev in number I of The Communist International, prophecies that not only would all of Europe be the Soviet Republic in a year's time, but he would already forget that a struggle for it had ever taken place. (Lazitch and Drachkovitch 1972: 165) The Comintern meant a distinct significance to such revolutionaries. Comintern's presence would offer the impression to these Bolsheviks that something was moving in the correct direction.”

“Fifthly, Lenin obviously saw that the Comintern would serve him as a platform that would enable him to achieve his goals of international politics. The “coexistence” policy he advocated with the West did not indicate any kind of ‘ideological disarmament’ that was immediate. In several messages sent to the Allies, only after a peace settlement had been signed, Chicherin and Litvinov guaranteed to stop revolutionary propaganda. The fact that the Third International existed reinforced the diplomatic stance of the Bolsheviks until peace was ended.”

Finally, it was the huge colonised world of Asia and Africa, which was the focal point of the Bolsheviks' attention. The “weakest link of imperialism” was located in Asia. The liberation of colonies was crucial for the ultimate defeat of imperialism. It was, therefore, necessary to ally with revolutionary Russia, the Western Proletarian movement and the colonial national liberation movement to make imperialism its ultimate defeat.

The end of imperialism and the strengthening of the national liberation movement was regarded as one of the most potent tenants in the creation of the Comintern through whose instrumentalities these different revolutionary trends would be coordinated and

driven. Therefore, the colonial aspect of the policy of the Comintern becomes a significant topic of inquiry. The Third International's Foundational Congress laid the cornerstone of its eventually pursued strategy towards colonialism and national liberation movement.

The CPSU Anti-Colonial Policy and the Communist Movement in India

The CPSU policy towards the communist movement in India was driven primarily by Lenin's standpoint towards the Eastern national freedom movement. Most Asian countries were subjugated under Western colonial rule at the moment of the October Revolution. Soviet policy towards these nations came to be known as 'eastern' or 'oriental' policy. Lenin studied with tremendous concern and attention to the evolution of National freedom movements in the East. According to him, these movements expanded under the direct influence of the First Russian Revolution of 1905; as he mentions that the revolution in Russia was followed by revolutions in Turkey, Iran, China and an uprising of the struggle for national liberation in India. Linking the struggle of the peoples of the East with the tasks of social revolutions, Lenin stressed that "the struggle for the liberation of the peoples of awakened Asia is a key component of the struggles of the proletarians against imperialism." He dutifully noted that "Asia's awakening and the start of the advanced proletariat of Europe's struggle for power were a symbol of a new phase in world history that began in the early part of this century." (Lenin 1969)

Lenin chartered the primary elements of communist strategy and tactics about the East's colonial, semi-colonial and dependent nations. These colonies were either enslaved or governed by imperialism, and Lenin designed to cover the whole historical transition period to socialism on a global scale. (Ulyanovsky, 1978) Through two consecutive stages, he developed his strategy on the national and colonial question as part of the colonial world-the stage of democratic, national liberation revolution and the stage of socialist revolution. Countries such as India came into the first phase category, i.e., the revolution of national liberation.

The communist movement's history in India is almost as ancient as the Revolution of October. Under the immediate impact of the Soviet Revolution, the communist movement in India started to take shape. The communist movement in India also

played a significant role in the national liberation movement and was therefore aimed at abolishing the British colonial rule in India and at the same time working for the national democratic revolution. The famous “Decree on Peace” of Lenin played an encouraging role in the movement of the working class in the colonies in this regard. The “decree on peace” was the first Soviet foreign policy resolution adopted on November 8, 1917, just one day after the October Revolution, which called on all progressive peoples and their government to begin immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace. Lenin said about this decree that “The struggles for peace is on. It will be an uphill fight. International imperialism is mobilising all its forces against us.” (Lenin, 1969)

The “peace offensive” thus became one of the Soviet foreign policy’s most grand strategy. At first, the Soviet policy toward the communist movement and its foreign policy appeared to be converged with each other.

Given the Soviet Union’s anti-colonial attitude, it became natural to engage in the Indian communist movement. While in the early years of its history, the October Revolution brought isolation to the Bolsheviks, instantly after its achievement, the then colonial and imperialist powers intended to ruin the first socialist state. Instead, Soviet Russia discovered its natural ally: the workers and communist revolutionaries of other nations, especially the nations under colonial rule. Most Asian nations were under colonial rule at the beginning of the October Revolution owing to which the state to state relations was almost impossible between the Soviet Union and these nations. Under these conditions, Soviet Russia had embraced new tactics to assist these countries’ national-revolutionary and communist movements. This policy had, in effect, a dual significance. For example, while its primary objective was to augment the ideological influence in these countries, concurrently, it was concerned with ending the colonial rules to debilitate their footing throughout the world, so that the Soviet Union could coherently defend itself from the colonial powers.

India was a perfect example of such an experimental ground for the Soviet policy while it was under British rule. This policy had proved lucrative for Soviet Russia as it had received growing backing from the revolutionaries fighting against colonial rules. Later on, the Soviet Union developed a well-structured policy against colonialism in Asia, shaped by the Communist International’s Second Congress

(Comintern) in 1920. Prior to the establishment of Comintern in March 1919, a significant basis for influencing Soviet policy towards the world communist movement was set.

However, the intermittent interest of Lenin in India was more than philosophical. He criticised the British as “civilised capitalists for their exploitation of India and indicated that in India, the native slaves of the ‘civilised’ British capitalists had caused much unpleasant concern to their parents in exactly this latest era. There is no end to violence and plunder, which goes under the name of the British system of government in India.” (Lenin 1957: 100-101)

Commenting on Lokmanya Tilak's sentence, Lenin stated:

“But popular India is beginning to stand up in defence of her writers and political leaders. The infamous sentence pronounced by the British jackals on the Indian democrat Tilak - he was sentenced to a long term of exile; a question in the British House of Commons the other day revealed that the Indian jurors had declared for acquittal and that the verdict had been passed by the vote of the British jurors! - this reprisal against the democrat by the lackeys of the money bags evoked street demonstrations and a strike in Bombay.” (Lenin 1957: 100-101)

He condemned the behaviour of the English officers in India and the British administration of justice in an article written by Lenin entitled “Cultured Europeans and Savage Asians.” (Lenin 1957: 159-60) He also mocked the English socialists for their attempts to reconcile colonial and socialist policies. Commenting on the British Social Democratic Party’s deliberations, he stated that “the British Socialists were absurd in supporting the fat naval ‘domestic defence’ budget, as the ‘Empire’ was what their navy defended and protected.” (Lenin 1957: 120)

The Indian issue for Lenin was “more or less comparable to that of Russia.” In answer to questions posed by an American correspondent, he said: “The activity of our Soviet Republic in Afghanistan, India and other Muslim countries outside Russia is the same as our activity among the numerous Muslim and other non-Russian nationalities within Russia itself.” (Lenin 1957: 220) “Russia has supported people of distinct nationalities to set up their republics within the Soviet Union and has also urged Afghanistan and India to set up their National republics. When some Indian

revolutionaries sent Lenin a message of felicitation on the establishment of the socialist state, Lenin reciprocated their feelings by saying that “toiling masses of Russia follow the awakening of the Indian worker and peasant with unabating attention.” (Lenin 1957:248)

Moreover, the colonial issue and the CPSU policy created disagreement among the Bolsheviks and other countries’ revolutionaries, especially in Asia. Although there was no Indian representative in establishing the Communist International Congress, the Indian revolutionaries had been greatly affected. The Communist International’s second session held in 1920, however, became a turning point in the development of the Indian communists. However, this Congress was represented by India as a Mexican delegate, namely, M.N. Roy. The Comintern’s Second Congress advanced the concrete program for national liberation and communist movements. However, on National and colonial issues, a fierce dispute emerged between M.N Roy and Lenin.

Lenin emphasised that “the Communist International must extend their hands to the bourgeois-democratic national movements in colonial and backward countries only on the condition that the elements of future proletarian parties existing in all backward countries, which are not merely Communist in name, shall be grouped and trained to appreciate their special tasks, viz., the tasks of fighting the bourgeois-democratic movements within their nations and that the Communist International must enter into a provisional partnership with bourgeois democracy in colonial and backward nations, but not combine with it, and must maintain the independence of the proletarian movement unconditionally, even in its most basic type.” (Lenin, 1969)

M.N.Roy, however, resisted the concept of Lenin. Roy was standing on this principle that both the fight against colonialism and the national bourgeoisie must go on simultaneously. Although the concepts of Lenin reigned in Congress, M.N. Roy lifted the contentious point. Roy began to be a contentious problem, especially in the communist movements of Asia in the coming years. Recalling Lenin's renowned debate, M.N.Roy says in his Memoirs, that he pointed out that “the bourgeoisie, as a category, was not economically and socially distinguished from the feud even in the most developed colonial nations such as India. Therefore, the nationalist movement was ideologically reactionary in the sense that the bourgeois-democratic revolution would not necessarily have triumphed.” Gandhi’s character was the key difference

point as Lenin thought that he was revolutionary as the inspirer and leader of a mass movement to which M.N.Roy argued that “he was bound to be socially reactionary as a spiritual and cultural revivalist, however revolutionary he might appear politically.” (Roy, 1964)

M.N. Roy also claims that “the approach of Lenin was very kind and sympathetic. At first, he seemed to be amused by a novice’s naiveté as he was struck by my statements before long, however, and was unable to contest the validity of the reality I quoted. It may have been my life's most precious experience until then. I had the special honour of being considered equally by a wonderful person who, by doing so, demonstrated his greatness. He might deny spending his precious time talking to a non-important youthful person. I would not have an opportunity at the International Congress to make myself known.” (Roy, 1964)

Regarding his parallel thesis, Roy states that “Lenin lastly surprised me by suggesting that his thesis, as well as mine, be suggested for implementation by Congress after a particular debate in the committee set up to examine the issue. Then I chose to formulate my critical findings and useful ideas in a document which, I insisted, should be presented as an additional thesis, not as an alternative. Lenin agreed with the remark that we discovered new soil and should withdraw final judgment pending practical understanding. I agreed, too, but with a reservation of mind. For me, it was not new ground. I was quite certain of my stand, and the open-minded approach of Lenin gave me the correct belief. He lastly tells about reasoning and counter-argument that Lenin submitted the debate in the Commission to a Congress plenary session and suggested that both theses be adopted.” (Roy, 1964).

This Lenin-M.N.Roy controversy, benefitted the upcoming communist movement, While India had emerged as one of the most significant centres of this debate, the minds of Indian communists were not getting any respite, since it was constituted in 1925, the Communist Party of India had been involved in innumerable relentless disputations over this dissension on numerous instances particularly during the freedom struggle anterior to 1947. It did not stop even after India had achieved freedom and independence; it rather intensified. It was one of the most heavily debated and talked about issues that evoked controversial opinions in the Indian communist movement. Furthermore, it even laid the basis of multiple splits within the

communists in this country that were to follow. In such a setting, the Soviet policy towards the communist movement in India became a sensitive point in history. At several instances, it caused a stir and also generated controversies between Soviet and Indian communists. It has been noted that despite having officially accepted a Soviet position on the colonial question and the national bourgeoisie, the Communist Party of India, time and again deviated from its position to M.N. Roy's position. All these factors were enough to compel the Soviet Union to get increasingly involved in the affairs of Indian communists. Contrary to what it should have been, this involvement has not always proved to be beneficial to the Indian communists. This has been detrimental, too at times. Had it not been for this, the Indian Communist movement would have never split in 1964 and onwards.

Because of its huge geographical region and population in the Indian Ocean, India has always attracted the attention of world powers. At the same moment, it is made a prime ally by its geographical closeness to Soviet Central Asia. Under these circumstances, an all-around success for the Soviet Union in today's different world would be the possibility of a successful revolution in India. That is why, not only the Indian communists were given assistance and guidance from the Soviet Union, but India as a state also played a significant role in the Soviet strategy towards Asia. The existence of many Indian revolutionaries in Soviet Russia just after the October Revolution was one of the most significant variables in shaping Soviet policy towards India and the Indian communist movement.

The Migrant Indian Revolutionary and the Support of the Soviet Union

It is also a historical fact that seven revolutionaries led by M.N. Roy set up an organisation called the Communist Party of India in Tashkent on October 17, 1920. It demonstrates the level of collaboration between Soviet and Indian Communists long before the actual Communist Party was established in India in 1925. The migrant Indian revolutionaries played a significant part in bridging the gulf between Soviet and Indian communists despite the lack of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and British India.

The presence of millions of migrant workers from various Asian nations was a common sight during the time when the October Revolution caused upheavals across

the world. Despite that no migrant worker crossed the borders from India to Russia, some of the Indian freedom fighters who somehow managed to reach Russia after the October Revolution, played a pivotal role in spreading the Indian revolutionary message. Imbued by the October Revolution, between 1918 and 1920, several Indian revolutionaries immigrated to Soviet Russia. The key objective that the Indian revolutionaries had in mind was to secure Lenin's material assistance to further their quest to liberate India from the subjugative colonial clutches. As per the Soviet sources, to look for ways to bring an end to British colonial rule and gain their domestic political freedom, several hundreds of Indians crossed into Soviet Russia. (Persits, 1983) Anterior to when the Indian revolutionaries first ventured out on Soviet soil, the first Indian Communist group was constituted by emigrants in Soviet Central Asia; the Indian revolutionary emigrants had spent years working in various countries in Western Europe, America and Asia. (Persits, 1983)

In the history of Indian emigrants' revolutionary activities, the formation of the Ghadar Party in the United States in 1913 under Lala Hardayal's leadership was a milestone in India's fight for freedom. The party's primary objective was to organise and unite the dispersed Indian revolutionaries in the United States and Canada. Bhagwan Singh and Mohammad Burktullah, the two prominent leaders of the Soviet-based immigrant group, took charge of the party after Hardayal's detention in 1914. Prominent Ghadar Party representatives and other Indian emigrant organisations met in Berlin in 1914. Some of them later came to Soviet Russia to organise a revolutionary Indian centre. They were Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, Bhupendranath Dutta, Mohammad Barkatullah, Mahendra Pratap, Abdur Rabb Barq and Pandurang Khankojee, Revolutionaries of India in Soviet Russia. (Persits, 1983) These emigrant revolutionaries obtained as much assistance as possible from the Bolsheviks. Unity between these revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks has thus proved to have an overarching effect on the development of the Indian communist movement. "Four different trends can be observed when one looks at the official documents of the Communist Party of India, which among the Indian revolutionaries in India's liberation movement during the first world war and the upcoming years where individuals and groups were in their search for a new path for the struggle for independence, drifted to scientific socialism and communism under the impact of the Great October Revolution of Russia on November 7, 1917." (Adhikari, 1971)

These four trends are as follows

1. “Indian national revolutionaries worked overseas at the time of the first world war and after that from Germany, the USA, Turkey and Afghanistan, who earlier functioned through the Berlin committee and the provisional government of independent India or amongst whom we have excellent personalities such as V. Chattopadhyaya, M. Burktullah, M.P.B.T. Acharya, M.N.Roy and Abani Mukherjee.
2. National revolutionaries from Pan-Islamic Khilafat movement, who went abroad in the war period (1914-16) and those from the great Hijrat movement of the post-war period. Moreover, who similarly later came under the influence of the October Revolution among whom we have such names as Mohammad Ali Sepassi, Rahmat Ali Khan, Ferazuddin Mansoor, Abdul Majid and Shaukat Usmani.
3. National revolutionaries of the Ghadar Party organised among the Sikh and Punjabi emigrant labourers (USA) before the first world war, who staged an unsuccessful revolution in 1915 at the time when Kamagata Maru arrived in India. We are not here concerned with the first period of the Ghadar Party but the second, post-war period when it was organised and arrived by Rattan Singh and Santokh Singh, with the latter as the general secretary, and who is in 1922 took the initiative to establish contact with the Communist International.
4. The fourth and the most important trend was of the national revolutionaries in India itself - from the left-wing of the National Congress, the terrorist organisations, and parties, the Khilafat movement, the Akali movement (especially) it is Babbar Akali leftwing which was linked with the Ghadar Party). Individuals and groups from this trend- when disillusioned with Gandhiji's ideology of nonviolent resistance after the debacle of the movement in 1921-22 or those who never accepted the same turned to scientific socialism and the class organisation of workers and peasants under the impact of October Revolution and later became the founders of the early communist groups in different parts of the country, e.g., Dange in Bombay,

Singaravelu in Madras, Muzaffar Ahmad in Calcutta and the Inquilab group in Lahore.” (Adhikari, 1971)

Anterior to when the four organisations mentioned above, led by Dange, Singaravelu, Muzaffar Ahmad and Inquilab group, were able to come in unison and form a working-class party, the world communist movement witnessed some noteworthy developments. These developments included the establishment of the Communist International, whose primary objective was to organise and guide the worldwide communist movement. Before it was formed, the Bolshevik Party earnestly urged the Communists of all the countries to unite under the banner of the Communist International given the international revolutionary situation on December 24, 1918. The end of February 1919 saw Sobolev and others beginning to reach Moscow by delegates from all over the globe. (Sobolev 1971: 76),

The International Communist Conference began in the Kremlin on the evening of 2 March 1919; it was attended by 52 delegates from 35 organisations from 21 European, American and Asian countries.

Following the conclusion of the Comintern’s second congress, the Eastern People’s Congress was organised in Baku in September 1920, attended by many Indians. This Congress is also regarded as the Eastern Muslims’ Congress. These two successive conferences together have greatly influenced Asia’s national liberation and communist movement. Some of the Indian revolutionaries came to Tashkent after the completion of these two sessions and established a group with the title of Communist Party of India on October 17, 1920. Seven Indian revolutionaries including M.N.Roy, his spouse Evelyn Trent (Roy), Abani Mukherji, Ros Fitingof, Mohammad Ali (Ahamed Hussain), Mohammad Shafiq Siddiqui and M.P.B.T. Acharya were involved in the creation of the Indian revolutionary. Mohammad Shafiq was appointed as the party chairman. Some other Indians also entered the Tashkent party later. In this respect, Dr Devendra Kaushik found an exciting paper in the Uzbek Communist Party Archives in Tashkent. The paper relates to a conference that took place on 15 December 1920 which read and committed to the following,

“Admitted to the applicant membership of Abdul Qadir Sehrai, Masud Ali, Shah Kazi and Akbar Shah, the Executive Committee of Roy, Shafiq and Acharya shall be appointed” (Adhikari, 1971).

Referring to Tashkent, a Soviet scholar I.S. Sobolov, reproduced a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India from the Turkestan Bureau of Communist International saying, “Be it known to all that the Indian Communist Party organised here by the Third International Principles.” (Adhikari, 1971)

The papers listed above obviously show that there was a strong amount of close collaboration between the Soviet and the early Indian Communists. It also provides us with hints about an early Indian communist movement’s Soviet perception. Regarding the revolutionaries’ issues, M.N. Roy said “the party has been created. What should his exercise be, though? Among the masses, a communist party must operate. India was far from here. It was impossible to reach the Indian masses from where we were.” He pointed out, however, that “we had a cross-section of the Indian masses in the emigrant band. The groundbreaking communists would have to face the masses’ political backwardness, general ignorance, and religious fanaticism upon their return to India. So, by trying to affect the cross-section of the Indian masses within our grasp, they had better perform their apprenticeship. They agreed, and it was decided to attempt to convince the remainder of the emigrants to join a sequence of overall political duties in preparation for their entry to the suggested army colleges.” (Roy, 1964)

Later, to train the revolutionaries, the military school was established. M.N.Roy tells about this college, “Still in Tashkent was the band of Russian policemen who had followed me from Moscow. The school organisation was assigned to them. John, the American Wobbly, was named the school’s commander. He was going to take care of the discipline. Looking over his wards, he commented sarcastically that “we would not train a revolutionary military, but an army of God.” (Roy, 1964)

In the context of Indian revolutionaries, the foundation of the **Indian military school in Tashkent** was conceived as a momentous event. However, because of the circumstances generated by the British government at the moment, it could not survive for a more extended period. M.N. Roy (1964) defines the formal basis of

military school as a ceremonial event hosted by a Turkestan Republic high official and the representatives of the Communist Party of Turkestan. He retains an intriguing reality about the school's lack of Russians. He suggests that, according to an arrangement, Russians stayed back, considering that diplomatic talks were taking place between the Soviet government and Britain just at that moment to resume trade ties that would put an end to the Soviet Republic's lengthy economic blockade.

Roy adds that "Therefore, eager to bring an end to the economic blockade, the Soviet government was unwilling to do anything that could detract from the pitch of diplomatic talks to resume trade with Britain. A pathological suspicion, however, could not be easily allayed. The Soviet government got a blistering notice from the British Foreign Secretary before the year was out, referring to the Tashkent Indian Military School as proof of aggressive Soviet policy against the British Empire. The Indian Military School at Tashkent had to be dissolved as a break in the freshly formed financial ties with Britain would bias the painful method of Russian rebuilding." (Roy, 1964)

The Communist Party of India's formal report, however, rejected the view of M.N. Roy on the dissolving of Indian Military School in Tashkent. Citing an article (New Times, No. 14, 1967) drafted by N.I. Favrovsky, a deputy member of revolutionary Military council of the Turkestan Front and a veteran Communist Party member since July 1917, tells that "at one of the council meetings, Roy, requested for the entire group, the supply of food, military equipment and assistance in organizing military training, of course, we knew what this entailed. When Roy left the conference after placing his case, there were comments like adventurism, wonderful, etc.. That was the first response, and it was accompanied by more severe scrutiny. It was chosen to offer all feasible assistance to Indian comrades without being engaged in their scheme, however that was Moscow's stance as far as he understood that the Indians were awarded a Chirchik highway shooting range close to Tashkent and started their army training." (Adhikari, 1971)

Also, the article says: "The Muhajirs were very passionate, but it was not long before the entire scheme was cancelled. The state of Afghanistan categorically denied authorisation on the way to India to enter Afghanistan. Roy's constant and persistent requests to Tashkent's Afghan embassy were in vain. Military exercise ended in

spring 1921. Some of the Indians chose to move to India unlawfully; others remained in Tashkent, several accompanied the Red Army, and 22 moved to Moscow to study at the 'Communist University of the Toilers of the East'." (Adhikari, 1971)

Communist University of the Toilers of the East was another important milestone in the arena of Indian Emigrants' political education. M.A. Persits, a renowned Soviet scholar, writes that "the news of the establishment of the 'Communist University of the Toilers of the East' quickly reached and made many of its nationalist revolutionaries eager to study in Moscow." (Persits, 1983) He further shows that "they could never recognise one Indian Communist, who had left the Soviet capital in August 1921, entered Bombay on December 15, wrote to the Indian Communist Party Secretary to inform him about his nearly seven-month journeys throughout the country until June 2, 1922." (Persits, 1983)

The first group of eight Indians to finish training at the Communist University, sent thanks to the Third International Executive Committee and the Russian Communist Party (B) on November 20, 1921, in its first letter to the Comintern, they said: "We, the Indian Section of the Communist University for Eastern Peoples Nations greet the Executive Committee of the Third International after completing our study of social science. We want to express our commitment to the philosophy of Communism we have received through our contact with the Comintern." (Persits, 1983)

As for the key objective of the University, the famous article entitled "Russia's University of Oriental Communism" by A.C. Freeman, appeared in Soviet Russia Pictorial of April 1923, published in New York. Citing the University Director, he explained that the main purpose of the University was to spread the ideology of Soviet Russia among the people of the East. According to the Director, "This purpose finds expression in two ways. We are not imperialist. We do not believe in taking up the White man's burden, in Kipling's sense of the phrase. Moreover, so we do not attempt to train Russians to govern the Oriental peoples who live within the frontiers of the Republic. We believe that these peoples govern themselves, and so we encourage their young men to come to this University, where they can get both practical and theoretical education and to make themselves fit to become leaders in their communities." (Adhikari, 1971)

In the beginning, the Indian Military School in Tashkent and the Communist University of the Toilers of the East proved to be the seedbed for the ideological framework of the Indian revolutionaries. In fact, under the leadership of the 'Third International', the Tashkent and later Moscow based CPI played a crucial role in the formation of the original Communist Party of India in 1925.

Meanwhile, it was the era of the emergence of small organisations in India, of some devoted communists, like S.A. Dange who led India's ever-first communist group, which arose in Bombay. In April 1921, his famous book 'Gandhi vs Lenin' was published. The novel was highly acknowledged in the circle of both the Indian and the Communist International. In the first section of the book, Dange says, "On March 15, 1917, the world was proclaimed as the achievement of the first Russian revolution by the surrender of the Czar, the tyrant of all Russia." (Dange, 1974)

The British politicians and the entire world welcomed it as a step towards recognising this world's democracy. But when the Kerensky government was toppled by the Second Russian Revolution of 7 November, and the Russian policies of the Bolsheviks in the Soviet government were replaced by peace with the central powers, and when Russia withdrew from the war as if by magic the British started to see the ugly monster of despotism and threat to the entire globe in the location where they were willing, not long old, discovering the very heaven of democracy. They began to shout "Traacherous" to the Bolsheviks and Russia, then declined to have a relationship with their government, and began to spread the news about all the alleged cruel atrocities by the Bolsheviks. (Dange, 1974)

Meanwhile, Muzaffar Ahmad founded a communist group in Calcutta. A third similar group was established in Madras by Singaravelu Chettiar, and the fourth communist group was set up in Lahore by Gulam. Muzaffar Ahmad remembering these incidents says:

"At different moments, previously and subsequently, tries to construct the Communist Party started in India at four locations. These efforts were not the result of any collective decision of joint meeting by those who initially handled these missions; they began at separate locations separately of each other; one did not even recognise the other and that, India is a huge nation. The first four of these locations are isolated

from each other by a range of more than a thousand miles from Calcutta, Bombay, Lahore, and Madras. We embarked on the mission of constructing an all-India party far apart from each other as we were. We could do that because communism was an international movement. The nucleus was the Communist International for all of us; its headquarters in Moscow were thousands of miles away. However, with each of these four locations, the Communist International developed autonomous relations. In some instances, the Communist International led us together (as Dange did to me)” (Ahmad, 1978)

The above-mentioned communist organisations surfaced during the mass unrest against the British colonial rule. At the same moment, there was a lot of peasant uprising across the nation. During this period, the 36th session of the Indian National Congress was held in Ahmadabad in 1921. In the name of the Communist Party of India, a Manifesto under the signature of M.N.Roy and Abani Mukherjee was addressed to this session. The Manifesto put forward a full-fledged programme of the anti-imperialist democratic revolution with particular stress on the demands of the workers and peasants to steer them full-fledged into the freedom struggle. It is through this Manifesto that Maulana Hasrat Mohani at the Ahmadabad meeting passed a motion for full autonomy – a resolution that was defeated only because of Mahatma Gandhi’s spirited resistance. (Adhikari 1971)

The Communist International’s third, fourth, and fifth congresses performed a significant part in acting as a remarkable basis for establishing an association with developing communist organisations in India. Nalini Gupta, a revolutionary emigrant, performed a significant role in India in this respect. After leaving Moscow in 1921, late in December, he entered Calcutta and remained in India for more than two months. He succeeded in collecting information about the communist movement in India and in helping to establish links between its groups, which at the time existed in isolation, and also between the Comintern and M.N. Roy’s centre abroad. (Persits, 1983)

Activities linked to communist revolutionaries increased significantly between 1922 and 1924. This could be proven by at least two significant instances of conspiracy framed by the Britishers against communist revolutionaries. These cases were the conspiracy case of Peshawar in 1922-23 and the conspiracy case of Kanpur in 1924.

Nearly all the top communist revolutionaries had been involved in these conspiracy cases. The leaders like S.A. Dange, especially in the event of conspiracy in Kanpur. They detained Dange, Muzaffar Ahmad, Nalini Gupta, Shaukat Usmani, etc. In the event, 13 people were initially mentioned, including M.N. Roy, who had been overseas. On May 22, 1921, the session judge handed down the verdict and sentenced the four accused to four years' imprisonment each. The appeal in the case was rejected. While Muzaffar Ahmad and Nalini Gupta were released earlier, Dange and Shaukat Usmani served their complete term.

In the Kanpur situation, the two primary accusations against the accused were:

- 1) The Communist International tried to establish a branch in India through these conspirators;
- 2) The accused tried to establish a Workers and Peasants Party.

The above instance received enormous hype in India and overseas that helped spread the impact of the communist revolutionaries in this country. After these events, on December 26, 1925, the creation of the Communist Party of India was finally announced. Satya Bhakta, who was not a member of any of the recognised communist groups operating in India, convened the first Indian communist conference. This meeting took place from 26 December to 28 December 1925 in Kanpur. (Adhikari, 1971) The first Kanpur Communist Conference chose Singaravelu as President, and Ghate as one of the secretaries, M. Yoglacar, R.C. Nimkar and Muzaffar Ahmad were among the members of the first Comintern. The Communist actions started to gain popularity throughout the nation, especially among the workers and farmers, after the creation of the Communist Party of India.

Before the party was formed in Kanpur, the Fifth Congress of the Comintern held in Moscow in June 1924 had already placed forward the motto "Popular Revolutionary", "People's, Workers' and Peasants' Parties" and encouraged the Eastern Communists to operate hard and constantly within those Parties-to maintain their own political independence in order to transform them into political or peasant parties to fight against the imperialism. According to this Comintern resolution, the Communists in India established workers and peasants' groups in many locations. This step reinforced the position of Communists' in the country. The Communist Party of

India's formal report points out that "to summarise, the workers' and peasants' groups in four regions (Bengal, Bombay, Punjab, and U.P.) succeeded in carrying out a breakthrough and unleashing mass activity, constructing aggressive red-flag unions, holding protests and meetings under the red-flags." (Adhikari 1971)

Within the All India Trade Union Congress, the workers unitedly formed a left-wing and also a nucleus in the Indian National Congress. In the early months of 1928, this encouraged the Communists to decide to hold an All-India Conference of Workers' and Peasants' Parties and form an All-India Workers and Peasants Party. The left-wing was powerful enough to get 'Ghate' appointed as assistant secretary of the All India Trade Union Congress when the eighth meeting of the All India Trade Union Congress convened in Kanpur in November 1927.

At the same time, the Sixth Congress of the Communist International was also held in Moscow in 1928 with the formation of the Communist Party of India and the subsequent revolutionary development. In the world communist movement, this served as a historical juncture.

The Congress embraced the program of the Communist International, evaluating the power of imperialism and the power of revolution, analysing the global crisis of capitalism in depth and concluding that the demise of capitalism and the defeat of the world socialist revolution were unstoppable. The Comintern's Sixth Congress also formulated the theoretical and political position of war and various types of war and set the practical tasks of fighting the threat of war before the sections.

This Congress once again gained prominence in the debate over the position of the national bourgeoisie. Like the Comintern's second parliament, it had dragged India back into conflict. Concerning the implementation of transitional contracts with the national bourgeoisie by the Sixth Congress, the Indian representatives attending the Congress raised their voice against it. One of the representatives from India, Narayan said that he believes that "this wording is fundamentally incorrect. It is elevated moment now, after our experience in India in 1922, when the bourgeoisie abandoned the great mass movement that shook India from one edge to the other, to formulate it more obviously to demonstrate that the bourgeoisie can never really fight against imperialism, and even a political alliance with the bourgeoisie implies the surrender

of the agrarian revolution motto, which implies the virtual suppression of revolutionary fight in the colonial nations, particularly in such a predominantly agricultural nation as India.” (Schram, 1969)

The communist party in India had to face many political and ideological issues after the Comintern’s Sixth Congress, with thirty-one top party politicians being imprisoned in relation to the 1929 Meerut conspiracy incident. At the same moment, the group was moving slowly but eventually towards sectarianism, as a result of which it started to experience separation from the national stream. That is why the British, Chinese and German Communist Party central committees sent an open letter to the Indian Communists in 1932. They observed that India’s communist party had fallen into isolation and were even facing a crisis. The letter articulated the opinion that “Indian Communists’ approach towards bourgeois-democratic movement should not be limited to revealing domestic reformism alone, that criticism should be coupled with involvement in the national movement and work in reformist organisations.”

In the International Communist Movement, a new tactical line was starting to take form and aspects of subjectivism and left-sectarianism were removed. This was the era when forming the united anti-imperialist front was the primary issue before the Communists. In India, the Communist International was deeply concerned about this issue. Therefore, at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International held in 1935, the experience of the communist movement in India was criticised. This criticism appeared in Georgi Dimitrov’s report and in Wang Ming’s leading report on the colonial question, which stated that “there were leftist errors in the preceding activities of the Communist Party of India and noted that Indian Communists’ work was an example of how the tactics of the united national front could not be carried out. Moreover, while preserving their political and organisational independence, they must carry on active work within the organisations participating in the Indian National Congress, enabling the process of crystallising among them a domestic revolutionary wing to further develop the Indian people’s national liberation movement against British imperialism.” (Ulyanovsky, 1978)

The scenario started to enhance favourably by the Comintern's condemnation of Indian communists. Meanwhile, in July 1934, India’s Communist Party had already been proclaimed illegal. However, under the Indian National Congress, many leaders

of the Indian Communist Party entered the Congress Socialist Party in 1936, which helped communists spread their impact in the nation. Thus, the Communist Party of India pursued the united front policy from 1935 to 1939 against the background of the opposition of leftist elements who tried to restore the policy of the party, typical of the communist movement before the Comintern's Seventh Congress.

Meanwhile, the start of World War II in 1939 altered the whole communist policy discourse. Contradictions became more and more intense within the party. In October 1939, the CPI ratified a bill calling that the military crisis must be used in the interests of the fight for independence. The strategy was to transform Satyagraha into a revolt against Britishers. The decree criticised the Congress Party's conciliatory position. In CPI, sectarianism reigned strongly during this era. In 1940, the group broke all relationships with the Indian National Congress. It introduced a political manifesto called the "proletarian path" which suggested the use of the army crisis in the interests of the revolution in two stages: First, a general strike and a reluctance to pay rent and taxes; second, an armed insurrection.

The Manifesto was proclaimed extremely controversial, bringing the British colonisers severe repression. In the global scenario, on June 22, 1941, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, after which Communist International put forward the worldwide slogan of "people's war". At the same time, anti-fascist united fronts against Hitler started to appear globally. The Communist Party of India also introduced the People's War slogan and said that for the fight against fascism, India's fight for independence had to be incorporated with the world front. The slogan of "Quit India" was also developed by the Indian National Congress in August 1942, along with the "do or die" slogan of Gandhi which generated tremendous mass upsurge across the nation. While implementing the slogan of the people's war against fascism correctly, the Communist Party of India failed to link the people's war with the Indian liberation movement, thereby severely cutting the party off from the national mainstream. This blunder had a long-term effect on the Indian Communist movement.

In this respect, Dr G. Adhikari, a prominent communist ideologue, stated that "this shift in the domestic environment emerged from our dogmatic knowledge of working-class internationalism and sectarian behaviour towards the national bourgeoisie."

In 1946, the Indian communists began an armed uprising to liberate the entire territory in Telangana. It was such a vital era in Indian history that the communists were unable to correctly assess their power because of which they had to endure greatly. The most significant development was India's freedom on August 15, 1947, securing the overthrow of British colonial rule, which was two hundred years old. The Communist Party of India, however, resumed its armed struggle in Telangana, calling India's Independence as 'fake freedom'. It had a shared understanding of this great event, because of which the group still regarded India under British rule even after 1947.

However, the Soviet and Indian communist distinction of view persisted. While the Soviet Union regarded India's independence as an anti-imperialist revolution, a large segment of Indian communists believed India was still under colonial rule. It took Indian communists nearly a decade to recognise that in 1947, India had become a free nation. Amid these controversies, the CPSU's 20th Congress in 1956 created more problems for the International Communist Movement in general and India in particular. Revolutionary approaches and tactics and the emergence of Maoism in China in the late 1950s and early 1960s triggered massive controversy in India. The Soviet Union came out against Maoist thinking publicly. There were severe disagreements between Indian communists on this issue, however, which led to a split in the Indian Communist Party in 1964. A faction of the Communist Party of India opposed the Soviet Union and split the party under the Maoist impact.

To conclude, without considering the events taking place in the Soviet Union, the historical background of the Communist movement in India cannot be dealt with in isolation. In other words, we can conclude from the historical facts illustrated in detail in the chapter above that it was the Soviet Union that created the historical background needed for the communist movement to materialise in India.

CHAPTER-III

Post-World War CPSU and CPI, (1947-1953)

The aftermath of the second world war saw the International Communist movement gain huge momentum with the vanquishment of International Fascism. The world was swept over by two extraordinary developments. On the one hand, while the communist movements broadened in Europe and China; on the other hand, this period saw the nationalist forces cornering the colonialist powers and liberating themselves from their exploitative clutches, particularly in Asia and Africa. India happened to fall in the latter. To begin with, the communist movement had to confront an ideological plight in the colonial countries like India. Communism had to stand toe to toe against colonialism and domestic capitalism. Since the prime leadership of anti-colonial struggle in the colonies like India comprised of the national bourgeoisie, it was an extraordinarily strenuous task to fend both these forces off. Thus, the communists, owing to their ideological quandaries, were left behind and it was national bourgeoisie that had come across as the principal force against colonialism. This specific predicament caused the communists to endure a bitter crisis in the country, which led them to commit a series of blunders even after India got liberated from colonial rule in 1947.

The success of communist parties in Europe had sparked changes in the attitude of the European colonial powers towards colonies and therewith withdrew from there. This phenomenon was rife in India as well in the form of the Mountbatten Plan to secure independence for India. Against this backdrop, the Attlee led Labour government, pronounced its new policy towards India on February 20, 1947, in which it was mentioned that the British would pull out of India before July 1948. For this purpose, Mountbatten, as new viceroy of India, devised a plan.

The Mountbatten plan was as follows: “

i) The subcontinent would see two dominions being constituted: The Indian Union and Pakistan;

- ii) The quandary as to whether the partition of Punjab and Bengal on religious grounds was to be **determined** by separate votes cast by deputies from those parts of the provinces concerned where there was an existing majority of Hindus or Moslems;
- iii) A referendum was to take place in the North-West Frontier Province and the Silhat district of Assam, majorly populated by Moslems;
- iv) Sind's future was to be resolved by a vote to be taken into consideration in a voting session in the provincial legislature;
- v) The inclusion of the princely states into one of the dominions would be an issue for their rulers to adjudicate, and
- vi) The constituent assembly would comprise of two assemblies, one for each dominion; they would dictate the future footing of the two states.” (Antonova and Katovasky 1979: 247-248).

As the Independence of India Act was enacted on August 15, 1947, the British House of Commons sanctioned the Mountbatten Plan. It led to the partition of 'United' India, and Pakistan sprang into existence. As reported in the World News and Views Weekly (1947), the Communist Party of Great Britain condemned the proposal of the partition of India outlined in the Mountbatten plan and supported full Independence for United India. The CPGB believed the Mountbatten plan could not provide any final solution for the country's problem and acknowledged that the Indian subcontinent is a place with multiple national groups diverse languages and cultural traditions and believed that only self-determination of these nationalities would bring long-lasting and actual Unity of people in India.

The proposed partition of India into Hindu and Muslim States with artificial boundaries of princely states had no common ground with the National Independence. This proposal would obstruct the progressive development and create economic instability in the country. It separates the agricultural area from the Industrial Area and irrigation system from Railways. This would make India open and vulnerable to imperialist exploits by turning one section against the other. The Communist Party of Great Britain also expressed that the government of Britain projected Indian leaders to be responsible for the partition when the partition was the outcome of 200 years of

divide and rule policy of Britain. The party affirmed that it was also the result of Reluctant approach of the British government during the negotiation after the world war and its refusal to hand over the power to the elected constituent assembly and majority leadership of Indian people. Instead, it handed it over to a small minority. Communist Party believed that all the efforts would be needed to overcome the difficulties presented after partition and form an all India Union based on the free participation of the diverse nationalities present in the subcontinent. (World News and Views Weekly 1947: 265)

The communist of Great Britain also asserted that “it was Britain’s responsibility as a country to see that the transfer of power should be genuine and effective at this crucial time when India is moving forward towards its freedom.” (World News and Views Weekly 1947: 266)

It insinuates that the aforesaid statement of the British communist party was espoused as a guideline for the Indian communists. This is one of the reasons as to why a majority of Indian communists deemed India’s independence as a farce from the very outset. Beginning with the resolution of December 1947, the central committee of B.T. Ranadive led Communist Party of India comprehensively enunciated in the political thesis of the second party congress (Calcutta, 28th February – 6th March 1948) and other documents, which was perjured as it found its way in the Polit-Bureau documents to come later. The aftermath of the three-month session of Polit-Bureau saw a full-fledged left-sectarian, dogmatist and left adventurist line being worked out and followed unremittingly. Expatiating on it in “famous” documents such as “Struggle against Revisionism Today in the Light of Lenin’s Teaching”, “On People’s Democracy”, “On the Agrarian Question” (published in January- February 1949) and “Struggle for People’s Democracy and Socialism - Some Questions of Strategy and Tactics” (Published in June-July 1949) were the following noteworthy points of the line:

1) India’s Independence in 1947 was called ‘farce’ on the name of independence. The political proposition says that “the Mountbatten plan did not manifest the withdrawal of imperialism, but it was a devious counter-offensive against the rising power of Indian people. Hence the freedom given by the Mountbatten plan was not real. It did not end Britain’s control over the country; just the form has been changed. The Indian

bourgeoisie which was not part of the State Power for so long as it was opposing the British rule, was then given a part of it to disrupt and viciously draw the national democratic revolution.”

2) The national capitalist class's double role was discarded, and they were viewed as the leader of the counter-revolution.

The premise in Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India (1974) also states that “the notable truth of power politics in India is that the Indian bourgeoisie or the Congress party which led them has now left their job as opposition and has become an alliance partner hence a reactionary force.” (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India, 1974: 76-77)

In the tactical line document, the Polit-Bureau formulated, that “the bourgeoisie and its government did not just ally and settle with the ruler but also became the leader of Counter-Revolutionary forces thus becoming the lone force since they have influence among the masses to defend the capitalist structure And create disturbance in the masses and organize terror.” (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India, 1974: 76-77)

In the same Polit-Bureau document, it was stated, that “the working class must achieve the People's democratic revolution by collaborating with agricultural workers and poor peasants eventually with middle peasants so that they can alienate the bourgeoisie and quash their resistance with force.” (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 78) Consequently, while imperialism and feudalism were completely neglected by the party, the Indian bourgeoisie was regarded as the primary foe.

If the Soviet assessment of India's independence is put into perspective, it will be entirely conspicuous that the Soviet Union recognised India's freedom from British colonialism diplomatically months ahead of the actual day of India's Independence was put to paper. To some extent, the Soviet Union regarded India's independence under the framework of their long-established policies towards national liberation movements. Howbeit, for a longer period following the independence in 1947, there was no satisfactory explicitness in comprehending either the Soviet policy towards India or its communist movement. Since it was Stalin's epoch which had been

hegemonizing actions of the Indian communist movement, certain deductions can be drawn from some early writings of Soviet scholars, published in their journals during 1948-49.

Commenting about “Partitioned India” A.Dyakov in 1948 said that “after the implementation of the Mountbatten plan, the changes in the arrangement class forces in India and Pakistan need special attention.” (Dyakov 1948: 06) He believed that as compared to united India, Hindustan has become an overly Industrial and capitalist country. The pressure and influence of the feudal forces have declined in Hindustan even when the native States personifies it. The bastions of native capital industries, including tea plantations, were all part of Hindustan and therefore, the industrial and plantation workforce along with the major part of railwaymen came with Hindustan.” (Dyakov 1948: 06) So, he deduced that the reasonable importance of native bourgeoisie and the working class in this power structure, as a result, had been increased. (Dyakov 1948: 06)

The adoption of the Mountbatten plan for Indian independence by the pioneers of the Indian National Congress as a consequence of a trade-off arrangement between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism. The arrangement depends on compromise made by the two sides. The British government reported that it was ready to allow India have the dominion status_while quoting Communist Party of India, Dyakov expressed that “it (CPI) had portrayed the Mountbatten plan as new British colonial attack against the democratic movement of people for national freedom.” (Dyakov 1948: 07)

After a year, A. Dyakov again drafted an article on India, entitled, “Indian National Congress in Power.” Examining comprehensively the aspects of Congress Party during that period, he wrote that “rule of terror is being executed against the worker and peasants’ movement all over India. The Communist Party of India was banned in a number of provinces whereas its publication in the languages of the respective provinces was basically prohibited everywhere. The distribution of the People’s Age, Central Organ of the CPI, was forbidden in many areas. The British and American imperialism was exploiting India’s economic dependence to put political pressure on the Indian government and interfere in its internal affairs.” (Dyakov January 12, 1949: 10-11)

He further mentioned a press conference by US Ambassador Henderson in Delhi on December 22, 1948, where the letter states clearly that “America’s “aid” to India would be directly dependent upon her future constitution and economic policy.” (Dyakov January 12, 1949: 10-11)

Concerning India’s external affairs, he wrote that “India was increasingly tilting into the circle of the Anglo-American front in terms of foreign policy. At the Conference of the premiers of British Dominion held in October 1948 Indian representatives committed to getting the constituent assembly to rule in favour of India staying within British Empire stated by the Indian and British media then.” (Dyakov January 12, 1949: 11) He affirmed that “the people of the British labour party and the Indian Congress were immersed in finding a new legal way or a new name to define the British empire and its control over India, but the truth remained that India was politically reliant on Britain. it was clear in the vaguely written official communication, filled with the chatter of Universal peace and coalition of East and West, it stated that country (i.e. non-European) under the British Empire should be informed the coordination among the countries of Western Europe (i.e. western bloc.)” (Dyakov January 12, 1949: 11)

Dyakov (1949) Blamed India for its arrangement with British Empire, the United States and Western Europe of monetary and military affairs; he stated that the reactionary domestic strategy of Congress was in complete alignment with its international strategy. Congress headed India was increasingly more drawn into the war intrigues of the Anglo-American alliance. (Dyakov January 12, 1949: 12)

As has been witnessed before, the left sectarian comprehension of the Communist Party of India immediately posts the Indian independence, and the Soviet understanding of India was more or less the same, which the aforementioned writings of Dyakov substantiate as well.

As far as the communist movement in India is concerned, the first four years posterior to independence were particularly pivotal. It was a phase when the party was employing a multitude of strategies and tactics experimenting ways to bring about a revolution adhering to an absolutely dogmatic line as was the case, to begin with, an experiment to replicate the Russian model of revolution under the hegemony of the

working class was acted out as well. When it did not materialize the way it had been expected, the party switched over to the path of a revolutionary path that the Chinese had espoused, it failed to yield the desired result, and ultimately the party decided to espouse and embark on the democratic path under the Indian Constitution.

About the left-sectarianism, the CPI documents mention that “CPI after understanding of the circumstances, with new line of technique and strategies it believed in departing itself with the traditional act of pushing the revolution of the Russian way and pursuing the progressive battle against the capitalist on all levels, turning over every protest into a conflict with the police, giving a radical shape to all battles and all conflicts, to turn the jails also into the revolutionary fronts along with series of conflicts there as well, and the party proceeded with the call of general strike on railway on March 9, 1949, which turned out to be unsuccessful and it demolished party’s railways branch rather than garnering the anticipated support and leading it to a mass mobilisation.

‘Petty- bourgeois elements’ being indecisive and reformist cowards in front of suppression and fascist attack of the bourgeoisie was party’s formulated reply to any criticism of its adventurist stance. Another argument given was that the masses will re-emerge as of now they are temporarily held back due to repression. Ranadive did not think twice before publicly accusing the whole communist movement of being reformist and revisionist (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 81)

The phase that B.T. Ranadive came to be at the helm of the Communist Party of India, i.e. during the period after the second congress of the party was convened in 1948 saw a conspicuous deviation in the Indian communist movement from a correct understanding of the Indian reality to an erroneous one. It caused the party to confront a substantial crisis of lack of proper leadership. Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that the Andhra faction of the CPI challenged Ranadive’s leadership. They brought out an extensive report called “Report on Left Deviation Inside the CPI” (Rao 1976: 745-944) which demurred B.T. Ranadive's tactical line.

After this, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India convened its meeting in May 1950 and ousted B.T. Ranadive from the party leadership, and

subsequently, C. Rajeshwara Rao became the new General Secretary. Under his leadership, the party members came to a consensus to go about leading armed guerilla warfare on the Telangana pattern and along the line of the Chinese revolution. (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 83) This was another humongous miscalculation on the part of the party. Arguing that India was then a semi-colony like China the Andhra Document drew a mechanical parallel with China, suggesting that any revolution in India would be along the Chinese line, i.e. peasant's partisan warfare evolving into an armed guerilla resistance and emancipating areas and eventually armed forces emancipating the towns.

The May 1950 central committee meeting endorsing this line stated that "you cannot demonstrate any elective battling line but to wholeheartedly acknowledge the Chinese way, for example, the way of equipped armed faction fighting combined with agrarian upheaval to make free bases and free armed forces while building a people's fair front to vanquish the foe and set up rule of the proletariat." (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 84)

A Soviet scholar Kotovsky (1979) commented that "the condition of the communist movement across the nation, in general, was spoiled due to left-factional divergence in the understanding of architects of CPI. At certain places, the party deteriorated at the grassroots level, and certain factions of politically informed sections of the society stopped supporting it." (Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky 1979: 261)

He further states that "the left-sectarian deviation along with the oppression by the formal fronts of the power corridors immensely impacted the growth of the communist struggles and damaged communist influence among the masses. By the start of 1951 membership of the CPI had fallen by more than 66% and totalled just twenty-five thousand." (Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky 1979: 268-69)

Nevertheless, old left-sectarian lines under Ranadive and Rajeshwara Rao were met with strong criticism by a fraction of the prominent CPI leadership. In this regard, "A Note on the Present Situation in our Party" widely referred to as three P's document played a crucial role. Formulated by three eminent communist leaders - Ajoy Ghosh, S.A. Dange and S.V. Ghate, the three P's document was published by their fake

names - Probodh Chandra, Prabhakar, and Purushottam which is why it came to be known as three P's document.

Meanwhile, after the past left-sectarian lines turned out to be sheer jolts, a high-powered CPI delegation went to Moscow to confer with CPSU and Stalin, in which case it should be noted that the CPI could rectify its left-sectarian comprehension on the friendly counsel of CPSU and Stalin. This sorry state of affairs can be seen in Ajoy Ghosh's remark in which he said, "today no one in the Indian party can resolve this emergency. It was the international comrades who called attention to our fallacies. Since we do not concur on the inference, no one but they can support us." (Gupta 1978: 29)

Regarding this phenomenon, Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky (1979) said, "...determined, sound people inside the party battled hard to put a stop to the Left-Sectarian deviation. As early as May 1950 a plenary session of the CPI's Central Committee was held, and another, temporary Central Committee was chosen. The new Polit Bureau of the Central Committee chartered and distributed in April 1951 a draft party plan requiring the formation of the largely anti-feudal and anti-imperialist front, grasping the national bourgeoisie, however, driven by the proletariat and its organisation. This draft program directed the organisational exercises towards the execution of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist radical changes. In May 1951, a whole session of the CPI's Central panel endorsed the program and the 'statement of Policy'. These two records proclaimed an unequivocal defining moment in the approach of the Indian Communists. At the party's All-India Conference in October of that year, the program was received with a couple of minor alterations. Another Central Committee and Polit Bureau headed by General Secretary, Ajoy Ghosh, whose name is connected with the annihilation of the left deviation in the Party, were chosen." (Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky 1979: 269)

Concurrently, the communist party decided to participate in the first general elections held in 1952, thereby relinquishing the line of armed struggle through a negotiated settlement with the Indian government. Despite the grave mistakes the CPI committed in the past, the performance of the Communist Party was more than stellar. It had the second-largest mandate after the Congress in the parliament and as well as in a number of state Assemblies.

Once the first general elections ended, the theoretical debate questioning the role of Nehru and the national bourgeoisie aggravated all over again. Against this backdrop, the Communist Party of India was still clamouring for counsel from Stalin, who was regarded to be the unequivocal authority on Marxism-Leninism around that time. This can be validated from a resolution of the Communist Party of India on the demise of Stalin, which says, “V. Stalin’s, ‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’ came out in the first week of October 1952, a work which equipped the world proletariat movement with a reasonable comprehension of the international condition of the founding laws working in socialist and capitalist social orders, of the responsibilities ahead and of the manner in which these responsibilities are to be undertaken. Incidents that have occurred from that time have splendidly affirmed the observation made in this work and the documents of the USSR guided by and dependent on this work” (Sen 1970: 211)

The statement further said that “The solidarity of the socialist world has been more strengthening, its power has been expanded and more progress has been made on the way of socialism in the USSR. The grieving all over the world on the event of the tragic demise of Stalin who was a splendid upholder of the works of Marx-Engels and Lenin and leaders of enlightened mankind, was also most noteworthy show of the solidarity of the socialist and populist based powers, their resolve to reinforce the fight for socialism, democracy and harmony, their resolution to carry forward the commands of their late leader.” (Sen 1970)

Around this time, the CPI convened its third congress which took place in Madurai from December 27, 1953, to January 4, 1954. This congress was taking place during a period in a scenario where the party was still struck with befuddlement. The CPI document says, that “The Madurai Congress, in any case, did not roll out any improvement in the essential plans of the program. Nonetheless, it did alter a portion of the definitions in connection with the foreign policy of the administration. The international strategy moves of the legislature were portrayed as “factors helping the cause for peace”. It did turn out as a sharp cautioning against the US movement’s in Pakistan as being coordinated against India’s security. It affirmed that “all actions of the administration which help the maintaining peace ought to be strongly upheld, insistence should be made to work for a stable strategy to maintain peace and there

was no chance of extending overall help to the legislature. The Congress did not clarify, in any case, how this was conceivable if India was as yet a semi-colony and the government was itself a sell-out.” (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 94)

In the meantime, after the death of Stalin, some new stances were evolving in Soviet foreign policy towards the Indian Communist Movement. It was a time when American imperialism replaced the offensive role of British imperialism. An eminent CPI leader P. Ramamurthy, an exponent of forging a greater united front even with the national bourgeoisie to fend off the plight of American imperialism, formulated a thesis on this basis which elucidated how American imperialism presented a serious threat to India's independence. However, this thesis was conspicuously repudiated.

A little later, Rajni Palme Dutt, a pre-eminent British communist leader, wrote a piece in Cominform's Journal, “For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy” criticising the Indian communists, which appeared on October 8, 1954. This article comprehensively appraised the developments ensuing in the aftermath of the second world war and characterised the offensive role of American imperialism. It seemed more like guidance to Indian communists to rectify their line. The then General Secretary of the party, Ajoy Ghosh, was in Moscow around this time for his treatment and stayed there for six months until December 1954. He decided to make the most out of his stay in Moscow; he had thorough and long hours deliberations with leaders of the CPSU on a theoretical problem which “was being faced by the CPI”. His return to India at the outset of December 1954 saw the change in CPI policy become quite palpable.

With respect to this incident, Victor M.Fic (1969) writes that “As soon as Ghosh came back from Moscow towards the start of December 1954, the first contradiction, the clash between the goals of Kremlin and CPI and emerging out of the developing Indo-Soviet solidarity was resolved. Also, the way was open for the arrangement of the second logical inconsistency, the inconsistency emerging out of the contention between the radical external and reactionary internal strategies of the government, when he later took a leftward turn even on the domestic level by intending to build up the communist example of a society in India.” (Victor 1969: 133-34)

During these twists and turns, in June 1955, while being in the middle of a haphazard sort of a predicament, the central committee espoused a significant resolution and decided to layout an open forum for inner-party discussion as an overture to the party congress. In the resolution, it was clearly stated that “it was a factor of extreme importance at that time globally that India developed as a sovereign and autonomous republic, strengthening the reason for harmony and freedom. It announced that India’s international strategy firstly contradicts the imperialist push for war and further the case for Asian solidarity and by and large resist imperialism. It would construct cordial relations with the Soviet Union, China and other states desiring peace. It was an international strategy which evoked true national pride and in the development of which the individual inconsistency of Pandit Nehru was perceived. The CPI invited and supported this direction with dry will aimed to build it further.” (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 79)

In an unprecedented move, the Communist Party of India officially acknowledged India as a sovereign and independent state for the first time and thus the years old erroneous comprehension of India’s freedom came to an end in mid-1955, and the Indian communists tried their fair at mainstream politics. After this development, towards the end of 1955, i.e. November - December 1955 two topmost Soviet leaders, N. Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India on a long tour of the country. It was a monumental tour and a watershed moment in the relation between the two countries. That is why, CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, referring to the Soviet leaders visit, wrote that “The couple of days that they have spent here would locate a significant spot in our history, and there will be much discussion about this. In this life, we have marched forward, closer to our objective and to the advancement of our nation, the welfare of our people, encouraging the common man, friendship, and harmony on the planet.” (Sen 1977: 481)

He further wrote about it that “their visit would be recollected for quite some time in India. He then expressed his contentment by writing that they may take whatever they like to take from this nation, but they must take an immensely precious thing that is the message of love from the people of this country to the populace of the Soviet Union.” (Sen 1977: 481)

By analysing of the developments taking place during the second half of 1955, it appears that there must have been comprehensive and frantic discussions between the Indian Communist Party and its Soviet counterpart on a multitude of issues particularly before the final visit of Soviet leaders to India towards the end of 1956. This visit validates strengthening of ties between CPI and CPSU as it proves that the prevailing differences must have been if not completely solved, at least alleviated.

India secured independence on 15 August 1947, but her diplomatic relations with major powers were established by the Interim Government, which had been about a year ago. By the middle of April 1947, Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations were established. A press dispatch issued in New Delhi on 13 April 1947 expressed that “the Governments of India and the USSR had consented to trade diplomatic missions at the Ambassador’s level.” (The Hindu; April 16, 1947: 07)

The veritable appointment of the Indian ambassador to the Soviet Union, howbeit, materialised on 25 June 1947. The Vice-President and Minister of External Affairs of the Interim Government, Nehru declared that his government would try to forge good relations with the Soviet Union and the United States of America as part of his policy. His very first speech gave a rough idea of free India’s foreign policy; avowing that he would strive to keep India “away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to disasters...”(The Statesman; September 8, 1946: 05) He averred that it was his government’s policy to stay in the British Commonwealth of Nations and institute friendly relations with the USA and the Soviet Union.

While sending regards to the Soviet Union, he mentioned that “the Soviet Union was an extraordinary country in the contemporary world, which also bears the huge burden of sculpting world affairs.” (The Statesman; September 8, 1946: 05) He further affirms the countries being neighbours in Asia; hence, they will have to carry many familiar endeavours together and have a lot to do with one another. (The Statesman; September 8, 1946: 05)

The time of formation of the Interim Government clashed with some parts of India is deeply affected by famine conditions, and the first major task of the government was to dispense food to famine-stricken areas. To obtain food aid from the Soviet Union

and institute diplomatic relations with her, Nehru enjoined V.K. Krishna Menon to meet the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, M. Molotov, who was in Paris regarding the post-war peace conference and substantiate talks with him related to these issues. Menon met Molotov on 28 September 1946. Reuter's dispatch on Menon-Molotov talks said that "Molotov gave a most cordial hearing to the subject of a future trade of envoys, however on the sustenance issue, he communicated his failure to supply huge amounts of food from the Soviet Union to India, as Russia herself was dealing food deficiency." He said that "the only reason Russia does not send food is simply that they cannot. After his discussions with Molotov, Menon disclosed to Reuters reporter that his discussions with M. Molotov were done in a most well-disposed manner and from everybody at the Russian Embassy he was met with compassion and comprehension for India." (The Statesman; September 30, 1946: 06)

It was not clear whether Russia had extra available wheat and rice to give India in 1946. Reports from the Soviet Union talked about surplus sustenance in the nation during that time., however, the later examinations announced that the nourishment circumstance in Russia in 1946 was a long way from agreeable. (Venkatramani 1946)

Therewithal other factors, what determined Soviet demeanour during the post-war time was the bizarre circumstances prevalent then. The intricacy of the post-war troubles and the recurrent confrontations with the war-time allies involved Russia increasingly in European situations and India, in view of the preceding, was a far-flung land to draw her particular attention. The end of the war saw the end of the war-time inter-allied co-operation and there grew fraught relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The West resisted the communisation of Eastern Europe with all its might. Similar to the rest of Eastern Europe, Stalin ventured to place Greece under Communist rule. But this plan failed to materialise as he envisioned it due to the presence of British troops, which were kept to fight against the Greek National Liberation Front. Against this backdrop, in his famous Fulton Jo speech, delivered on 6 March 1946, Churchill gave expression to his anti-Soviet feelings, in which he supplicated for the joint Anglo-American alliance to fend off the Soviet threat. In an interview with the Pravda journalist, Stalin called Churchill's articulation as "warmongering" and cautioned the West of the "outcome of such a

strategy.” (Pravda March 14, 1946) while reacting upon this articulation, a Soviet memoir expressed that “the freed nations of Europe did not face any sort of barriers however Indonesia, India, Greece and different spots where the British colonialists are practising influence and trampling upon the fundamental rights of the peoples did.” (New Times 1946: 2) By the middle of 1947, the Soviet Government took a stand in opposition to the “Marshall Aid”, and Pravda was brimming with analysis of the American strategies of subjugating Western Europe.” (New Times October 10, 1947)

In one of its cartoons, Marshall and Dulles were demonstrated trimming the UN tree; (Pravda October 17, 1947) in another the leaders of Cuba, Australia, England, Turkey, Holland, and Canada was sitting in seats with their hands bound together by strings of American dollars. (Pravda October 13, 1947) The London Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers took place towards the end of 1947. It turned out to be a debacle as far as the issues of the German Peace Treaty, and the German condemnation is concerned. In an announcement issued to the Soviet press, Molotov expressed that “the disappointment was because of the reluctance of the western forces to maintain the agreements formulated at Potsdam and Yalta.” (New Times 1947)

Amidst such an atmosphere, Stalin resuscitated the formerly dissolved Communist International under the name the Communist International Information Bureau. Even though this organisation was particularly tasked with formulating policies for the European Communist parties, it began undertaking the role of governing all the Communist Parties, with India being no exception, the official pronouncement of which came shortly after that. Towards the end of September 1947, in one of his speeches delivered in Poland in front of some Polish Communist Party officers which was later published in Pravda in a month, the Soviet Communist Party Secretary, Andre Zhdanov, furthered his theory of the division of the world into two camps. He drew attention to the new position espoused by the post-war political forces and the establishment of two camps - imperialistic and anti-democratic camp on the one hand, and the anti-imperialistic and democratic camp on the other.

In this epoch-making speech, which constituted two full Pages of Pravda, Zhdanov thrashed American intentions to oppress Europe and talked about organisational teachings on the solidarity of the liberal, anti-fascist, peace-loving factions in the

battle against new schemes of war and hostility. However, very rarely did he concern himself with the colonial question or with countries such as India, which had just then emancipated themselves from colonial subjugation. In a way, this, by and large, indicated the European pre-occupation of the Soviet Union in post-war days, and also the lack of Soviet policies towards India on the eve of her independence. Zhdanov, in one of his ancillary references to India, lambasted the Anglo-American policies, maintaining that even after India secured independence, it was kept in “obedience and enslavement” of these powers. As expressed how Churchill’s approaches were “the vilest and imperialistic”. He grew quickly to make preventive wars against USSR happen and also ordered to use atomic powers under American control against the Soviet people. They were showing the offensive image of the U.S.S.R. as the conceivable assailant and introducing themselves as companions of China and India, as “rescuers” from the socialist peril and as “aides”. In such a way, China and India are kept in compliance and under control. (Pravda October 22, 1947: 02)

CPSU Apathetic approach towards India after Independence

In a way, the speech mentioned above of Zhdanov had all the attributes of Stalin’s policy towards independent India. It was nonchalant about, hostile towards, and barely paid any attention as to whether or not India had secured independence from British colonisers. When, however, he deemed it necessary to take note of the changed situation, he barely let his policy, which set out to tackle a world divided into two camps only, to be affected by it. Furthermore, this sheer unconcern, coupled with inimical posture, was exhibited in the Soviet publicity organs which did not at all care to note the announcement of India’s freedom from Britain. It might come across as utterly outrageous that none of the Soviet papers of considerable prestige including the Pravda carried the news of Indian independence. In a society which, as claimed by its rulers, was instituted for freeing colonies, the emergence of independent statehood of a ginormous neighbouring country went unremarked. This is a deplorable observation of the circumstances under Stalin in which post-war Russia had come to, and also on a people whose national policy made them stray farther away from the developments taking place abroad.

It was not only the emergence of independent countries, that went unnoticed by the Soviet rulers but even their writers who bothered to take note of it could not find the new situation as any different from that which existed in the past.

A Soviet journal published a statement that an Indian delegate made at the Trade Union Congress held in 1949, it explained how the “most recent eighteen months since the change was made give the running of government to Indian hands has made it very clear that the national bourgeoisie leaders of the Congress acquired the control of power by making a deceptive arrangement with British colonisers.” (New Times 1949: 29) He believed that the compliant giant capitalists with their convenient relationships with British and American counterparts and their Congress supporters sold India’s independence for an arrangement with British colonialism to spare their exploitative benefits from the growing powers of progressive bodies in the country.” (New Times 1949: 29)

This stance to regard India still as an Anglo-American colony found its expression in other terms too. The existence of foreign capital in India, India’s decision to stay in the British Commonwealth of Nations, etc., were regarded as a validation of her status as a dependent country. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in one of his addresses in March 1950, opined that whereas Asian countries such as India, Ceylon, Burma, etc., had secured freedom, but he believed that the struggles of the people had not accomplished the same in China. K. Zhukov, another Soviet authority on the East, mocked Acheson’s opinion of India being free and China still not being independent. He was shocked to see that India, which did not have any heavy industries of her own, for the lone reason that it is not coveted by the Anglo-American monopolists, as it would alleviate India’s colonial dependence on the imperialist powers, was deemed free. (Pravda March 23, 1950: 4) India’s choice to be part of the Commonwealth was viewed as a characteristic of her provincial status. Remarking upon the Indian Constituent Assembly’s choice, in this regard a Pravda editorialist said that “India’s choice to proceed in the Commonwealth of Nations signifies that India was still a part of the British Empire.” (Pravda December 2, 1948: 4)

Izvestia put out an article on “The colonial policy of the British Labourites”. The author contended that “the British move to accord independence to India did little to ameliorate India’s status in the British Empire. In 1947 India was separated into two

states who started to relish uniform rights together, and they were incorporated into the British Commonwealth of Nations as the dominion of India and Pakistan. In January 1950 under the supervision of their chosen President, Government of India declared itself to be a Republic. This republic, be that as it may, remained a part of the British Empire and acknowledged the authority of the ruler of England. Have these official adjustments made any difference in the situation of the controlled nations? Not the slightest bit at all. The overwhelming controlling position of the English capital stayed unblemished in every single English state presently called “autonomous”. The English capitalists are the actual masters in the dominion state’s economy.” (Izvestia September 10, 1950: 21)

Stalin’s outlook was the textbook definition of a typical communist slant. As a result, his policy towards newly freed Asian countries suffered due to exiguous interest as well as from expressed pugnaciousness. The indifferent Soviet attitude was not just a defining feature of the CPSU, but that of the communist parties of several other countries as well, with India being no exception to it either. The Second Congress of the CPI was held in February 1948; it brought about a significant transformation in its composition changing its old rightist leadership and the much-criticised policy of co-operation. The Party now espoused a policy which ventured to oust the Congress governments at the Centre and in the states by belligerent means. Numerous strikes were organised across the country in large cities where the Party-controlled some trade union organisations and in a few remote rural areas, such as in Telangana in the then undivided state of Hyderabad, where peasants strived to unseat the Congress regime. With the Indian National Congress backed into a corner, the only way it felt it could tackle with such a situation was by banning the Communist Party, large scale arrests of CPI leaders took place. During 1948-50 Pravda’s section related to India used to brim with such arrests and strikes with reports reading “massive arrests of democratic workers in India” or “the movement of protest against the government’s anti-democratic activities”, just to mention a couple. Another report was about a group of Allahabad University professors having excoriated the government’s repressive policies. (Pravda April 8, 1948: 4) Another Tass dispatch said that “the continuous attack and hostile nature of the administration towards communist exercises are motivated with the end goal of making a path to secure the nation financially and politically for the U.S.A control.” (Pravda February 27, 1949: 4) In

fact, during 1948 and 1949, more than one-third of Pravda's news on India was about the arrests and repressions of the Indian communists. A Tass dispatch from Delhi said that from 1947 up to the first quarter of 1948 there were about 1,811 strikes in India in which about 1,840,780 workers participated. (Pravda July 7, 1948: 4)

In a prominent article in Pravda, it was purported that

“the suppression of national freedom and popular mass movements was not just prosecuted by Indian capitalist; it seemed like a global phenomenon because every urban street wanted to make India an important ground for Anglo-American capitalists in the East.” (Pravda November 25, 1949: 3)

Furthermore, the author affirms that the Indian soldiers were by then accustomed to suppress the people's movements as was evident in Malaya, the Indian government had also made a pact with the Burmese government to aid in suppressing mass movements there. Considering the government's stance in concern with Hyderabad, he contended that the action of the government of India's police in Hyderabad was prompted by the desire to restrict the growing popularity of “Telangana revolt and the peasant unrest” in other parts of the country. (New Times 1949: 11) “Also, how were the communists treated in the prisons? The treatment is given to them lengths about horrible events of dread and police oppression in India. Concentration camps and prisons were filled with thousands of innocent people. The conditions of these camps can only be equated with that of the more notorious Hitler's prisons.” (New Times 1949: 30)

Indian Government, CPI and Stalin's Policy:

Stalin's antagonism towards the non-communist world reached its apex in the aftermath of the Berlin blockade and the beginning of the Korean War. When the Berlin blockade was about to come to an end, and Stalin realised the disastrous debacle that his policy was, he condemned “the aggressive policies of Anglo-American ruling circles” on Berlin and warned that the aggressive policies of the current leaders of the U.S.A and Britain were only going to lead towards new war. (Pravda October 29, 1948) By mid-1949, he set out to confront the “Tito clique”. By the end of October, German policy of the West and the Soviet Union reached its rubicon since both the German states had come to exist as independent, sovereign,

states. To add to that, the Soviet Union had now turned into a full-fledged atomic power. Augmenting Stalin's sense of mightiness was the fact that China joined the socialist camp in an impressive fashion, as a result of which Stalin was now in a position to pursue the most onerous and hostile policies as far as the non-communist countries were concerned, and by his increased strength and the ensuing sense of security, the quest for such a policy became attainable.

What is more significant in this regard is that it was during this period that the Soviet Union came to adopt a more antagonistic approach towards India. The Indian government was now deemed merely as a puppet government in the hands of the big bourgeoisie. As mentioned by one Soviet commentator:

“Sardar Patel, who was, for the most part, perceived as the pioneer of the Congress conservative, Minister of Home Affairs in Nehru Government, and the man who is viewed as the moving soul in that administration had a solid open association with the Birla's. There are various certainties which demonstrate that the almighty Minister for Home Affairs, whom many see as India's future tyrant, owes his profession to the immense support of the firm of Birla Brothers, Ltd.

The Tata family is one of the mainstays of the Indian National Congress... Dr John Mathai, one of the executives of Tata Sons, Ltd. during the war, he was a top government official in the Indian administration, and today Dr Mathai is Minister of Transport and Railways in the Nehru Cabinet”. (New Times 1948: 10)

It was further alleged that the incumbent Indian government was intentionally conforming to anti-Soviet policies. A Tass dispatch declared that “the exhibition of Soviet films had been banned by the Bombay government, along the same lines, other Indian states soon followed the example. The banning of Soviet films, it was stated was guided by deceptive intentions of not enabling the Indian people to know the life of the exceptional Soviet people, how rapidly and effectively they are tackling their human issue.” (Pravda July 26, 1948: 10) The alleged denial of the Indian Government to issue visas for fifteen Russians associated with the anti-fascist organisations to take part in a conference organised by the All-India Students Federation did not sit well with them. (Pravda September 9, 1949: 4) Similarly, the ban imposed on the Conference of “Progressive writers” by the Indian Government on

the eve of its inauguration in May 1949 (in which the delegates of the Soviet Writers Association were to participate) infuriated the Soviet Government. A Pravda news said that “the Prohibition on the gathering of progressive authors and refusal to allow the Soviet journalists to come to India had instigated the justified resentment among the liberal Social section in India.” (Pravda May 28, 1949: 4) The government of India, according to a Soviet weekly, “allowed the reactionary American publications to be sold on Indian railway stalls but not the Soviet magazines, the sale of which, it was alleged, was previously allowed but now banned for ‘political reasons’.” (New Times 1952: 17-18)

On top of that, the Indian Constitution was seen merely as a contrivance of keeping power in the hands of the Indian bourgeoisie. At the point when the Indian Constituent Assembly was talking about its draft, a Pravda editorial said that “the aim of the Constitution was to reinforce the interests of the bourgeoisie and business class.” (Pravda December 2, 1948: 4) It was alleged that “the Indian Constitution had embodied the characteristics of all bourgeois constitutions i.e. the private possession for land, jungles, manufacturing plants, factories and different methods for production; the oppression of man by man and the presence of oppressor and oppressed; vulnerability of the working masses and extravagance for the inert yet protected minority, and so forth.” (New Times 1950: 3)

This period saw a very wretched image of the Indian economy being painted. The Indian economy was exhibited as being under the sheer ascendancy of Anglo-American monopolists who were fighting amongst themselves to establish their sway over it. In an article on Americans in India, Pravda’s special correspondent reported:

“India was ripped in battles among American and British bourgeoisie in those days. American capitalists were contending with British, who have since quite a while ago settled their hold and were happy to lose it. Clearly, as India kept on being a part of the British Empire, it was in the British side of the alliance, and the same went for the colonial defence mechanism. Manufacturing and banking problems were controlled by English fiscal capital. 66% of the international wealth in India was British. The English chief naval officers and Marshalls were ordering the Indian armed forces, and aviation-based armed forces and Indian commanders get their training in the British military institution.” (Pravda March 29, 1952: 3)

When the First Five Year Plan was launched a news item stated that “it was simply the imperialistic agenda of Mountbatten. This arrangement does not go for industrialising India, nor does it desire to free India in far off future from its reliance on colonisers in agrarian issues.” (Pravda June 21, 1951: 4)

During these days the Soviet stance towards the Indian press was equally rancorous as it was alleged to be on an American payroll. It was reported that an American Information Service officer had approached Calcutta paper editors and canvassed issues such as making the Indian readers cognizant of American foreign and organising a pejorative and derogatory campaign against the Soviet Union and China. (Pravda February 4, 1953: 4) A Tass dispatch claimed that “a US government-appointed team was pouring dollars for planting specialists in India and that a few media-houses had gotten cash for managing American indoctrination.” (Pravda January 8, 1951: 4) The Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh were accounted for getting a tremendous amount of money from the Americans. (Pravda January 8, 1951: 4)

The picture portrayed of an average Indian was also very desolate. A series of travel notes by a Soviet professor who had attended the Indian Science Congress in 1951 was published by Komsomolskaya Pravda. It brimmed with references of the author stumbling across half-naked, bare-footed women workers in mines, sick, helpless children carrying out laborious manual work and of students with a grim and insecure future. (Komsomolskaya Pravda 1951) Giving his record of the year 1950 in India, a Tass reporter said that “Indians saw just cynicism and dejection in future. 1950 was a time of disarray and vulnerability After living through the old year and in welcome the new, the man in the road says defencelessly: to what extent will this go on?” (Pravda January 1, 1951)

This attitude was more conspicuously conveyed in the account of the Soviet and western aid of food grains to India. In 1951 India faced an acute dearth of food, and there were conditions of famine in a number of areas. Howbeit, the Soviet reports gave an overtly overstated rendition of “large-scale starvation deaths and food-riots.” A Tass dispatch said:

“The problem of Severe lack of food was escalating in Kanpur, Guwahati and other towns of Assam. People suffering from hunger came out on streets to protest for food in Guwahati. A senior official of Bihar Government in an official communication accepted that there was a large number of deaths due to hunger in Bihar. The official communique mentioned that out of total population 3/4 was suffering from starvation.” (Pravda April 1, 1951: 4)

The span of two years between 1951 and 1952 saw the Soviet newspapers being continuously flooded with news about “starvation.” One of Pravda’s special correspondents went to Bihar and wrote a voluminous article titled "who is responsible for starvation in India"? He alleged that “American imperialists and the anti-people Indian rulers were equally responsible for the innumerable starvation deaths in India.” (Pravda October 15, 1951: 4)

In another news excerpt of 12 sentences, the term “starving population” appeared seven times. (Pravda September 13, 1952: 3) The Pravda correspondent’s report on Bihar famine was broadcasted on Moscow radio home service on 12 October 1951. It portrayed “Bihar as a place that is known for sickening destitution. Bihar today looks like a massive concentration camp where the greater part of the number of inhabitants in 40,000,000 is destined to gradual extermination by starvation.” (Summary of World Broadcasts 1951: 21-23) Moreover, if, under such conditions, an Indian financial expert contended of over-populace in India he was reproached as an “Indian Malthusian”. (New Times 1951: 17)

By way of a trade agreement that was materialised in the latter half of 1949, the Soviet Government-furnished India with a little less than a quarter-million tons of wheat in 1951-52. Be that as it may, when the Soviet wheat was dispatched to India, it was reported as an “aid from Soviet trade unions to the starving population of Madras”. Opposite to the unmotivated Soviet help, it was maintained that the American help was designed and even futile. A Pravda report averred that “50 per cent of the American wheat provided to India on layaway was spoiled and futile and the rest contained a lot of dirt.” (Pravda September 13, 1952: 4) It wasn’t just that America was allegedly furnishing useless wheat but was said to be demanding a hefty price too. An article in Pravda declared that “the US wheat was sold to India at 105 dollars a ton which was estimated at 73.95 dollars a ton in the domestic market.”

(Pravda January 28, 1953: 4) A Tass dispatch kept up that “the US help of wheat to India was dependent upon the Indian supply of crude materials which were tactical most important to the United States, for example, manganese, chrome metal, beryllium, potassium cyanide, and so forth.” (Pravda September 13, 1952: 4)

Despite the fact that the Soviet leaders never keep out of view the policy of aiding and facilitating the spread of communist movement abroad with the help of major assistance from national communist parties, the Soviet press policy barely reflects this policy with the exception of cases in which the official Soviet stance is castigatory of the government concerned. Stalin lambasted the Indian government on several accounts, the Soviet press denounced the non-communist parties of India and portrayed the Communist Party of India as the only party that had taken up the cudgels for the cause of the destitute and downtrodden. Nevertheless, when under Khrushchev the official Soviet policy towards India changed, as will be seen as we proceed further, such remarks about the Indian scene were refrained from. Sen, a special correspondent of Pravda, came to India in 1952 on the eve of the first general election to cover the elections. A significant feature of his reports was opprobrium of the main non-communist Parties. While the election campaign was going on, it was predicted that the CPI and its leftist fronts would emerge victoriously. But when the results of the election turned out to be in odds with this prediction, Soviet reports started to claim that voters were bribed and election results fabricated. The Indian National Congress was depicted as a capitalist-class organisation; the non-communist leftists were stigmatized as opportunists; the Hindu communal parties were deemed reactionary and fascist. A Pravda report presented this attitude enough. The report mentions how “The Indian press affirmed the way that the Congress candidates could keep up most of the votes because of disruptive, dividing strategies of the chiefs of the Indian Socialist Party who were funded by the US... Congress could garner most of the votes by using the British and American Skills to manipulate elections along with false Assurance, warning, incentive. The agenda plan and election pronouncement of the Indian Communist Party were believed to be an eye-opener for the citizens of India. It was reported that the common masses of India are increasingly more persuaded by the fact that just under the leadership of the Communist Party would they be able to accomplish national and social freedom.” (Pravda February 3, 1952: 3)

Another report of Pravda said that “the governing party had not strived to do social reforms and to improve the Indian common masses’ way of life as it was firmly associated with the feudal forces and bourgeoisie. This was offered as a clarification for the Congress loss in Madras, Travancore Cochin, Orissa and Rajasthan where it was challenged by the People's Democratic Front, headed by the Communists.” (Pravda February 22, 1952)

Internal rivalries for leadership in the Indian National Congress were at times published in the press and broadcasted on radio. Remarking upon Purushottam Das Tandon’s resignation as Congress President, Moscow radio told its South-east Asian listeners that “regardless of whether Tandon’s abdication had ended the tussle for chairmanship briefly but the causes were profoundly deeper, and they were to be looked for in the Congress strategy of oppression of the press and the common masses.” (Summary of World Broadcasts 1951: 23)

During this phase, the Soviet press had a lot to comment on the activities of the Indian Communist Party. Pravda published the CPI’s statements of programme and election manifesto in full and that too on at least three occasions, Pravda dedicated over half of the total space to report the news concerned with the Indian Communist Party, a sort of immoderation which was never done again after the demise of Stalin.

So, for an impartial comprehension of Soviet policy as far as India is concerned, it is necessary to scrutinize the Soviet perception of India’s foreign policy and internal developments.

Conclusion

So, during these years, the Soviet policy towards communist movement in India both anterior to and posterior to India's independence has been significantly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The ideological factor never ceases to provide the way for aptly comprehending the Soviet perceptions of the outside world. The Soviets organise and appraise their acuity in ideological substructure also used for elucidating and validating their demeanour in the international sphere. However, Marxist-Leninist ideology does not provide them with a readymade blueprint for their foreign policy; it merely serves the Soviets only as a compass.

As far as political developments in India are concerned the stance adopted by the Soviets has been primarily dictated by the Leninist ideological modus operandi of alliance of the proletariat striving to bring about a socialist order and the forces of National liberation fighting against imperialism with all its might in the ci-devant colonies under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie. This line instituted in the second congress of the Comintern convened in 1920 was nevertheless garbled by the sectarian tinge contained in the suggestions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928. It was years later after the Seventh Congress of 1935 when this distortion was discarded.

The period starting with World war II coming to a close to at least April 1947 when diplomatic relations between India and the Soviet Union were instituted, Moscow had espoused a roughly positive perception of the national movement led by the Indian National Congress with Gandhi at the helm of it. Soviet Indologists regarded the national struggle as a multi-class movement.

They delineated the Indian National Congress as striving to accomplish the goal of complete independence, and its socio-economic programme was deemed "progressive-democrat", and Gandhi's deeds were declared to be "progressive".

Howbeit, Soviet appraisal of the Indian political scenario, inchmeal began to take a negative turn largely under the international environment devastated by the cold war. It is not just inadvertent that the Soviet perceptions of the Congress-led nationalist indurated in May-June, 1947 when the cold war was at its apex in the aftermath of Trueman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union also started becoming

increasingly agitated of the military implications of a modus vivendi between the big colonial bourgeoisie exercising ascendancy over the nationalist leadership and British imperialism for its (Soviet) security. Soviet writers were perturbed over Field Marshall Montgomery's visit to India and over deliberations at the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi on a report by the transport department of India having recommendations for the amelioration of strategic roads to meet the so-called expansionist menace from the North-west. It was in such a setting of mistrust and misapprehension that the Soviet orientalist Zhukov deemed Nehru a 'millionaire' and Gandhi 'the apostle of India's backwardness'.

The triumph of people's democracy in East Europe and materialisation of the Chinese revolution supervened in a propensity towards the role of the proletariat and its vanguard, the communist party, as also the path of armed struggle. The pro-west proclivity of the ruling bourgeoisie leadership of India during the early phases posterior to independence also bolstered up the negative Soviet slant. Despite that, the Soviet slant was marked by great vigilance. Some Cominform article which extolled the path of armed struggle in other Asian countries, but India was not mentioned among these countries.

The new foreign policy stance of non-aligned espoused by Nehru led Indian government which became particularly conspicuous during the Korean War, along with the Soviet need to secure aid from the nationalist bourgeoisie for a broad anti-imperialist struggle for peace forced Moscow to reanalyse Indian political developments. All this caused the Soviets to look at Nehru's India as a likely ally in the encounter against imperialism. The buildout of benevolent Soviet relations with India caused the supersession of the espousal of a Chinese model by projecting the Indian model for forging and further developing a cooperative relationship between the socialist state and newly independent countries governed by different social systems. This model held out by the Soviet publicists as actualisation in practice of Lenin's idea of an alliance of socialism with bourgeoisie nationalism in a united front across the world against imperialism.

This new Soviet appraisal of the Indian scene which rectified the short-lived sectarian miscalculation and brought precocity and realism to the Soviet stance also manifested

a particular gleeful propensity towards over expectation about the socialist orientation of the bourgeoisie leadership in India.

Yet if the entire picture is put into perspective, the Soviet slant towards Communist movement in achieving the right balance between its ideological motivations and the realpolitik goals seems extraordinary. Being a world power with a revolutionary moniker to uphold, the interests of national security of the Soviet Union are best served only by being proponents of social change and not certainly not through the endorsement of social status-quo. The Soviet approach of cooperation with the bourgeoisie nationalist regimes in the erstwhile colonies has in the general run of things debilitated imperialism and aided in building the objective preconditions for their headways made towards socialism. Putting into perspective in the long run of things, the Soviet approach to India is odds on to bolster up the forces of social transformation and progress in the country. However, this does not rule out short term losses at times to the national revolutionary forces on account of an exhibition of what may be deemed “Comradeship” of the Soviets. The impediment that the electoral fortunes of the communist party of India in Andhra had to bear during the 1955 elections due to the publication of an editorial in Pravda in January 1955 speaking remarkably about Nehru government’s foreign and domestic policies is exemplary.

It is, however, not necessary for our purpose to dive into the particulars of this debate. It is sufficient here to draw attention to the unequivocal fact that ideology has been a significant element of the Soviet view of international politics and foreign policy.

Chapter-IV

De-Stalinization, Great Debate and Split in Indian Communist Movement, (1953-67)

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held from February 14 to 25, 1956 was a watershed not only in the history of the Soviet Union but also in the international communist movement. Having insinuated a myriad of critical theoretical problems, perhaps for the first time after the death of Lenin in 1924, it was a different Congress in that sense. Posterior to the famous second congress of the Communist International held in 1920, the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was the first occasion which brought forth a multitude of debates on theoretical issues throughout the world. It had fascinated not only the thinking of the communist parties of the world but also the leaders of different social systems which had wide-ranging ideological affiliations.

When Nikita Khrushchev shoved the Soviet Union into the Third World, two of the countries he chose to pay a visit to during his well-publicised 1955 trip to the Third World were Afghanistan and India. Personalities were of paramount significance in the early years of relations, partly due to the fact that embassies and diplomatic channels were relatively new and not very well developed, but more importantly to the high degree of personal control of foreign policy in the leaders of both the USSR (i.e., Khrushchev), and the South Asian countries (e.g., Nehru and Krishna Menon in India; Senanayake in Ceylon; Zafrullah, Mirza, and Ikramullah in Pakistan). In a debate with the Chinese over the nature of the new Indian regime, Khrushchev observed in his memoirs that [Nehru] might have been a bourgeois politician, but according to him, he was the most progressive leader in India outside the Communist Party. His politics have been resolutely neutralist and anti-imperialist. He advocated against the overthrowing of Nehru as he was convinced that if it were materialized more reactionary forces would take power. Therefore, he believed, it was futile to alienate Nehru or in debilitate his position in his own country.

Khrushchev's appraisal of Nehru, which was quite different from Stalin's essentially suspicious assessment of the Indian leader, reflected not only the Soviet estimation of India's prospects for progress towards socialism but also Khrushchev's personal

opinion of Nehru as a man of conscience, as a great leader of the independence movement in the Third World. This evaluation was helped by the fact that Jawaharlal Nehru had a somewhat positive view of the USSR and socialism.

Nehru had visited the Soviet Union in 1927, commenting on the accomplishments of socialism there and its potential worldwide. Despite the initially chilly reception given Nehru's doctrine of neutralism, the USSR began to rely on Nehru for his nationalistic and often anti-Western outlook. Like his Soviet counterparts, Nehru was very concerned in keeping Western influence within bounds in South Asia. With the Avadi Resolution of 1955, Nehru urged Indian state planners to develop a "socialist pattern of society." Moscow and Khrushchev, in particular, reacted favourably, yet cautiously, to Nehru's proclamation, recognising that while the Indian leadership probably did not have in mind a Soviet-style workers' state, it was moving away from the capitalist West. In Soviet eyes, the Indian leadership, and particularly Nehru himself, had exemplified "progressive" propensities, giving way to a more rapid evolution of the relationship that might have been likely had Nehru been less favourably inclined towards "socialism."

Against this background, it is pertinent to mention the then Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's statement in the Indian parliament on March 20, 1956. Nehru, referring to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which had met recently in Moscow, stated that he would like to bring to the notice of the House a very important event in recent weeks. He stated that "there could not be any doubt that that Congress had adopted a new line and a new policy. New in both political thinking and practical policy, the new line seemed to be based upon a more realistic appreciation of the present world situation and represented a significant process of adaptation and adjustment." According to their principle, he said, they neither interfered in the internal affairs of other countries nor did they welcome any interference of others in the matters of their own country. Any significantly important development in any country which appeared to be a step towards the creation of conditions favourable to the pursuit of a policy of peaceful co-existence, he opined, was important for them as well as the others. Convinced that the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were likely to have profoundly wide-ranging and far-reaching effects, he furthermore

hoped that the aforementioned development would lead to a further relaxation of tension in the world. (Nehru 1971: 578)

Pandit Nehru's foregoing reaction to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU is a testament to the Soviet desire of maintaining peace in the world. That is why Khrushchev (1956) while presenting the report at the Twentieth Congress, enunciated that "the Soviet Union had kept their nose to the grindstone to ease international tension and strengthen peace completely steadfast to the Leninist principles of peaceful foreign policy and had scored great successes." (Khrushchev 1956: 28-19) He recalled "the most important directions in which the Soviet Union initiative for peace developed. **First**, a substantial amelioration in relations between the great powers. **Second**, the obliteration of the breeding grounds of war that existed in the East and the prevention of the development of new seedbeds of war and conflict in Europe and Asia. **Third**, the adjustment of relations with several countries in order to mitigate tension in Europe (normalisation of relations with fraternal Yugoslavia), the conclusion of the state Treaty with Austria, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the German Federal Republic, etc.. **Fourth**, new strategies to settle conundrums such as the establishment of a collective security system in Europe, disarmament, the prohibition of atomic weapons, the German problem, etc being probed. **Fifth**, resolute rapprochement with all countries desiring to preserve peace. **Sixth**, the expansion in every way of international contacts; personal contacts between Soviet statesmen and those of other countries; contacts between representatives of our Party and Workers' parties of other countries and between Trade Unions; delegations; the development of trade and other economic ties, and the expansion of tourist travel and increased student exchange." (Khrushchev 1956: 28-19)

However, "the principal theoretical direction of the Twentieth Congress was concerned with peaceful co-existence and competition between two antithetical systems (namely capitalist and socialist) and strife free transition to socialism." (Khrushchev 1956: 37-47) The Twentieth Congress report was especially divided into three parts - the international position of the Soviet Union, the internal situation of the USSR and the Party. Be that as it may, J.V. Stalin's criticism and the cult of personality were the most burning issue at the Twentieth Congress was. Criticism to Stalin's reign of terror had not been brought up much until then, but Khrushchev's

thorough criticism of Stalin's terror during his long rule spread over 28 years was the first time that he inveighed against him. Now it has become a well-known fact that Stalin had liquidated thousands of innocent people, including hundreds of top party leaders, many of whom were close associates of Lenin. The normal functioning of the party had ceased to exist during Stalin's period. Even, after the Eighteenth Congress held in 1939, it took 13 years for the commencement of the Nineteenth Congress in 1952. Under these circumstances, the criticism of Stalin and his personality cult created a shock wave throughout the world, particularly in the international communist movement.

The fourth Congress of the CPI held at Palghat soon after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU paid special attention to the Khrushchev's report and revelations about Stalin. In a special resolution, cognizant of the Report of the General Secretary, the party Congress resolved that "taking into consideration the fact that the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was an event of the greatest importance and took decisions which every Communist Party in the world needs to study seriously, and called upon all Party Committees and members to analytically study the documents and marshal discussion with the help of the General secretary's Report." (Communist Party Publication 1956: 1)

The antecedent statement certifies the high quality of CPI's understanding of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, which also proved to be a guiding force for the CPI in the ensuing years. At the Palghat Congress, CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh came out with a lengthy report entitled, "on the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU". In his report, Ajoy Ghosh dealt with all major issues raised by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. His stance on the peaceful transition to socialism was that "it was a big weapon in their hands, which facilitated them in strengthening the socialist movement that was debilitated by the split in it. Furthermore, he averred that "it enabled them to forge working relationships with socialists who sincerely desired socialism but abhorred civil war, in addition to that the propaganda of the bourgeoisie would be dealt with." He further believed that "it enabled them to bring to the forefront the enormous significance of the struggle for democracy." (Communist Party Publication 1956: 17)

Through the document of the CPI, it seems evident that the party completely agreed with the theoretical formulations of the Twentieth Congress, especially related to amicable co-existence and peaceful transition to socialism. However, the criticism of Stalin did create some contradictions within CPI. Even a leader like Ajoy Ghosh expressed some doubts and apprehensions about the report on Stalin. He affirmed that “several questions had come to everybody’s mind in the wake of the 20th Congress. What about Comrade Stalin’s outstanding contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism? What about his exceptional contribution in building socialism and fighting against right and left-wing deviations? He also wanted to figure out as to why there was no reference to it in the 20th Congress? There were a few other questions that he sought answers to as well. Secondly, what were the other leaders doing all these days? What role did they play in fostering or combating the cult of the individual? Thirdly, what made it possible for such things to continue for such a long time?” (Communist Party Publication 1956: 18) He further said that “there could be no dispute about the tremendous positive role of comrade Stalin in enriching Marxism, in building socialism in the USSR, in fighting against right and left deviations, in guiding the international communist movement.” (Communist Party Publication 1956) He was of the opinion that “if the 20th Congress Report itself had made a statement about the positive achievements of Stalin, then much of the confusion that has arisen would have been avoided.” (Communist Party Publication 1956)

About the second and third questions raised above, Ajoy Ghosh accepted that he could not be satisfied with answers given at the 20th Congress. Lamenting on the sorry state of affairs, Ajoy Ghosh, referring to themselves, said that “they should comprehend that what was being criticised as not merely comrade Stalin, what was being criticised was the whole method of leadership that had evolved in the CPSU over a certain period. Comrade Stalin’s special mention, he stated, was because he was the leader of the Central Committee of the CPSU and that if they looked at it as a mud-slinging business, then they would not be able to see any further.” (Communist Party Publication 1956: 19)

Paying tribute to Stalin's remarkable role, Ajoy Ghosh said that “the CPSU had been the party which had acted as a model for international communist movements and

comrade Stalin was the undeniable international leader of the communist movement. Having reminded of the background of victories that the whole thing had to be viewed in which had no parallel in history, he questioned as to where the international communist movement was thirty years ago and where it was then, they knew that that was a tribute to Comrade Stalin and the leaders of the international movement as well.” (Communist Party Publication 1956: 20) However, Ajoy Ghosh conceded that “the leadership of the CPSU had rendered excellent service to the Soviet people, to the People’s Democracies and the entire international communist movement by boldly declaring ideological war against the cult of personality and by laying the damage it had done. Alluding to themselves, he said that they might criticise the specific manner in which this was done, the fact was that the job had to be undertaken. Despite any temporary confusion it might have created, it would be of great help to all Communist Parties in the long run.” (Communist Party Publication 1956: 26)

It is fairly evident that the upcoming events and developments within CPI after the 20th Congress of the CPSU indicate that the party was divided into two factions on the ideological ground, whether to support or oppose Stalin. The future developments also proved that the controversy which arose out of Stalin’s criticism became the cause of the split in the international communist movement.

So as far as the peaceful transition to socialism is concerned, its first impression could be seen in the 1957 Kerala Assembly elections where the Communist Party of India was voted to power. It was unprecedented as it was for the first time in the history of a communist movement that an elected communist government came in power. Despite securing a popular mandate, the E.M.S. Namboodiripad led communist government was dismissed by the Central government on July 31, 1959. The dismissal of an elected communist government posed several questions that needed to be addressed with utmost and equal importance, but among them, one problem that took prominence was the vexed question as to whether the much talked about the peaceful transition was possible or not.

During that period, the Soviet Union had developed exceptional diplomatic relations with the then Indian government led by Nehru. So, no overtly palpable opposition could come from the Soviet Union to the Kerala government being annulled even though certain Soviet mass media did come out with some news of journalistic nature.

Perhaps the Soviet Union did not find it prudent to displease the Nehru government on a domestic issue like the dismissal of the communist government in Kerala. At the same time, it is undeniable that any such criticism by the Soviet Union would have created strife in the relation between the two countries.

Some Soviet authors like Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky, around one and a half-decade later came out with minimal criticism of the aforementioned events of yesteryear. For example, Soviet author Kotovsky puts forth that “the opposition which was led by local, national Congress organisation did not confine itself merely to anti-government agitation. In a bid to convulse the state, muddle the day to day functioning in the communist territory and creating pretexts for intervention by the central authorities, it organised numerous rallies, demonstrations and protest strikes, etc between 1957 and 1959. With assistance from local reactionary forces as well as those in the centre a united opposition headed by the National Congress fanned unrest and partially disrupted the normal functioning of the state administration in the summer of 1959. In July 1959 under the pretence of restoring ‘law and order’, dissolution of the legislature, the negation of the elected government from the office, and the subsequent imposition of President's rule transpired.” (Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky 1978: 302)

During this phase, the world communist movement witnessed another substantial development. Due to augmenting difference of opinions in the international communist movement, the first meeting of the communist and workers’ parties of the socialist countries, held in Moscow in 1957, had become the need of the hour. That is why, the Moscow meeting of 1957, in its declaration stated that “being cognizant of the present situation, the meeting considered that the strengthening of the unity and fraternal cooperation of the socialist countries, the communist and workers’ parties and the solidarity of the international working-class, national liberation and democratic movements acquired special significance.” (Basic Documents of the Moscow Meeting of the Communist & Workers’ Parties 1957)

The declaration further said “the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was of gargantuan significance not only to the CPSU but they also opened a new stage in the world communist movement and pushed ahead of its further development along Marxist-Leninist lines. The results of the congresses of the Communist parties of China,

France, Italy and other countries in recent times have clearly demonstrated the unity and solidarity of the party ranks and their loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. This meeting of the representatives of communist and Workers' Parties testified to the international of the communist movement.” (Basic Documents of the Moscow Meeting of the Communist & Workers’ Parties 1957: 15-16)

After the first meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties of the socialist countries, the fifth (extraordinary) Congress of the CPI, held in Amritsar in April 1958, was very pivotal as it adopted a new constitution of the party and declared to achieve full democracy and socialism by peaceful means. The constitution was based on the proposition of converting the CPI into a mass communist party with broad-based leadership at all levels into which new comrades should be drawn through working out a three-tier system of leadership Council, Executive and Secretariat.

The Congress emphasised on overcoming the deep-rooted sectarianism about boldly recruiting members for the party from the lakhs of militants who had for so long worked loyally for it and fearlessly participated in its struggles. (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 105-06)

In a separate resolution, the 1957 Moscow declaration was met with a tremendous response as having heralded a new stage in the unity of the international working-class movement and given it a priceless weapon for forging ahead with still greater strides. Despite being this resolution was unanimously adopted, it became increasingly evident later that not everybody was proponents of the understanding embodied in that document. Moreover, not carrying out any inner-party ideological campaign or struggle based on it remained a weakness of the party. (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 106)

According to Soviet scholars like Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky about the Congress that “the resolutions adopted by the 5th Congress of the CPI were supremely influenced by the resolution adopted earlier by the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the Moscow meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers’ Parties of the socialist countries.” The CPI was now planning to concentrate much of its work on setting up a united democratic front soon. However, it was pointed out only much

later that reformist, as well as party organisations, had manifested themselves in the work of the party organisations. (Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky 1978: 303)

After the extraordinary congress held in Amritsar in 1958, the Communist Party of India lost its footing a little in the wake of some unfortunate events that transpired in India. On the one hand, while the communist government in Kerala was dismissed in 1959, on the other hand, the border dispute between India and China began to blow up and cause strife in the relations between the two Asian juggernauts. Especially, the perilous anti-China revolt in Tibet exacerbated the already tensed state of affairs. The situation turned from bad to worse when Dalai Lama, the spiritual leaders of the anti-China revolt, escaped to India and got asylum there in 1959. Dalai Lama's presence in India became the biggest cause of deteriorating relations between India and China. When Dalai Lama was aided to escape to India where his statement denouncing China was distributed by a representative of the Indian government, the CPI came out publicly exposing the Indian reactionaries, criticising Nehru, upholding India-China friendship and demanding that the anti-China campaign should cease. (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 112)

In the meantime, the dispute between India and China began to take the form of fierce controversy between the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of China. Since it was crystal clear by this time that differences in the international communist movement had cropped up, calling a meeting of World Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow in November 1960 was a great attempt to bridge the differences in communist movements across the globe.

Despite any direct reference having been made to the Communist Party of China, there was some unwritten understanding among the world leaders about the sectarian development within the Communist Party of China. However, a direct attack was dished out on Yugoslav Communist Party in the declaration of the international meeting of 1960 wherein all the communist parties unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist "theories" in concentrated form. Terming it absolute and turning their back on Marxism-Leninism, the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia disapproved of their anti-Leninist revisionist programme to the Declaration of 1957; they set the LCY at odds with the international communist movement as a whole,

severed their country from the socialist camp, jeopardising the Yugoslav people of losing the revolutionary triumphs achieved through an indomitable spirit and constant struggle against extraordinary odds of getting completely trounced by the imperialist capitalist order throughout the course of it by making it dependent on so-called “aid” from the US and other imperialist forces around the globe. The Yugoslav revisionists continued with their subversive work against the socialist camp and the communist movement challenging the corporate plunder at the time. Under the pretext of an extra-bloc policy, they engaged in activities which prejudiced the unity of all peace-loving forces and countries. Further disclosure of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionist faction and active struggle to safeguard the communist movement and the working-class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists remained an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist parties. (Basic Documents of the Moscow Meeting of the Communist & Workers’ Parties 1957: 56-57)

As far as the development of sectarianism in many parties is concerned, without naming them the above declaration asseverated in clear terms that if “dogmatism” and sectarianism in theory and practice were not combated unrelentingly, they could also become the main danger at some stage or the other of development of individual parties. They swindle revolutionary parties of the ability to develop a Marxist-Leninist party structure through scientific analysis and apply it creatively according to the specific conditions, thereby secluding communists from the broad masses of the working people, doom them to passive expectation or leftist, adventurist actions in the revolutionary struggle, prevent them from making a felicitous and correct estimate of the changing situation and of new experience, using all to bring about the subsequent triumph of the working class and all democratic forces in the discernible struggle against imperialism, reaction and war danger, and thereby prevent the peoples from achieving victory in their just struggle. (Basic Documents of the Moscow Meeting of the Communist & Workers’ Parties 1957: 57)

Ajoy Ghosh, S.A. Dange, Bhupesh Gupta, E.M.S. Namboodiripad and P. Ramamurthy, eminent members of the CPI were part of the delegation that CPI sent to the international meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties which convened in 1960. The differences in party lines between Indian and Chinese communist parties could not come up openly in the meeting. However, posterior to the aforementioned

international meeting of 1960, these differences became multi-dimensional and so very acute and egregious that it became extremely detrimental to the Indian communist movement in subsequent years.

According to CPI documents, concurrently it was in light of the mounting offensive of the leadership of the Communist Party of China from outside the country and the left-sectarian dogmatists from within the party against the line that the CPI had taken that the sixth Vijayawada Party Congress was congregated from 7 to 16 April 1961. (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 119)

Furthermore, the document enunciates that after heated discussions, voting, walkout and all manners of obstructionist and disruptive method used by the “left” sectarian-dogmatists, the Congress amended and adopted the speech made by Ajay Ghosh and authorised him to amend the political resolution against this backdrop. In his speech, Ajoy Ghosh absolutely extolled the 1960 Moscow statement and made an exhaustive analysis of the world and Indian situation. (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974)

However, the most monumental conundrum that the CPI was faced with at the Vijayawada Congress was the left-sectarian challenge from some eminent CPI leaders who would, later on, lay the foundations of the first substantial split in CPI which gave rise to the Communist Party of India (Marxist). According to Soviet sources, the Sixth Congress at Vijayawada intricately expatiated on the policy for the creation of united democratic front, a front though headed by the working class and its 'vanguard party', but which would incorporate all the main class forces, including that section of the national bourgeoisie that did not collaborate with the imperialist. In this regard, it was posited that the CPI should liaise with the democratic wing of the National Congress in a united front. However, implementation of this policy agreed upon in the 6th Congress was complicated both by the anti-communist stand adopted by the National Congress and socialist parties' leadership and by the growing differences within the communist party itself. (Antonova, Levin and Kotovsky 1978: 305)

There was a rancorous inner-party disputation at the Vijayawada Congress on several official formulations of the CPI. The principal problem surfaced as the result of the official characterisation of Congress Party and the national bourgeoisie. The

Vijayawada Congress came out with more lucidity about the role of Congress and the national bourgeoisie. The political resolution of Vijayawada Congress opined that “the Congress had been and was an extremely important factor in India's political life. It was hardly stupefying given the role it had played in spearheading the national freedom struggle and in taking measures to consolidate independence under Nehru’s leadership. The influence of the Congress, though to a lesser degree than it was during the time of the freedom struggle, was still vast and extensive as it extended to all classes, including big sections of the working class, the peasantry, the artisans, the intellectuals and others. Nehru’s influence was ever wider.” It was averred that “the national democratic front could not be built by ignoring this big reality of the Indian situation.” (Communist Party Publication 1961: 28)

The resolution further went on to defend the Congress by drawing an evident dissimilitude between the Congress and parties of right reaction calling it a huge mistake to equate either with the other. Congress declared several policies and some of the measures are, in today’s context, progressive foreign policy, public sector, secularism, and so on. (Communist Party Publication 1961: 29)

These formulations were met with strong opposition by the left-sectarian leaders of the CPI. Concomitantly, neither could these sectarian leaders conceal their disapproval of the formulations of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. In some measure, the left-sectarian challenge to the CPI programme was not just that; it was an unmediated challenge to the CPSU. Following these developments at the Vijayawada Congress, the CPI had to encounter another enormous challenge from China and the Chinese Communist Party. There was a substantial armed build upon India’s borders facing China. Synchronously, the Communist Party of China launched an organised campaign of criticisms against CPI. Ultimately, as 1961 drew to a close the CPI too had to come out to reply to the Chinese allegations, which led to fierce struggles between the two communist parties. This struggle was not a merely one-sided affair between two parties in the corner of the world; it was also a war of ideas which were prevailing during the time in the international communist movement. To state an undeniable fact, the CPI was fighting a proxy war on behalf of the CPSU against the Communist Party of China.

CPSU And The Rupture In Communist Movement In India, (1962-64)

The period between 1962 and 1964 has been the most determining phase in the history of the communist movement in India. It was a juncture replete with turmoil with national and international problems. Two overtly significant events occurred during this period, which shuddered the fundamental core of the communist movement in India. The first incident was the Chinese aggression against India in October 1962, and the second was the rift in the party in 1964. In the meanwhile, the third general elections were held in 1962, and at the same time, the Communist Party of India had to reconcile to a tremendous loss in early 1962 when the party's General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh met his untimely demise during the election campaign. After his death, the party constitution was amended in order to constitute the new post of Chairmanship of the party along with General Secretary, a result of the growing factionalism by the sectarian leaders of the party. To maintain a balance in the party, S.A.Dange was elected Chairman and E.M.S. Namoodiripad General Secretary of the party. The threat of left sectarianism in the party, as mentioned previously, kept on augmenting as it continued to consolidate its position in subsequent years. Therefore, the organisational adjustment, as mentioned above, could not do away with the ideological differences in the party.

The CPI has documented the relentless efforts of left-sectarian dogmatists to either take over the party or split it. To carry forth such a split within their ranks, they were directly incentivised and encouraged by the leadership of the CPC. (Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India 1974: 128) As established in foregoing chapters, the left-sectarianism during this period burgeoned faster due to the decisions taken in the 20th (1956), the 21st(1959) and the 22nd(1961) Congresses of the CPSU, as well as due to the declaration of communist and workers' parties of socialist countries (1957) and the statement of a meeting of representatives of the world communist and workers parties (1960). The underlying theme of all these congresses and international meetings was to justify the theory of peaceful coexistence and the proposition of peaceful transition to socialism.

Amid these conundrums that the communist parties of the two neighbouring Asian juggernauts that had caused them to turn antagonistic towards each other, China's belligerent fit of pique and aggressive mood against India created a perilous situation

within the CPI. On the one hand, while China claimed thousands of square miles area on the Indian territory, on the other hand, the Communist Party of China put forward many dogmatic and sectarian ideological formulations for the international communist movement to ruminate over. The significant differences grew out of the peaceful transition to socialism and the central contradictions in the present-day world. The statement that the meeting of World Communist and Workers' parties in 1960 brought out comprehensively mentioned that "time, whose content was the transition from a capitalist order to a socialist one that was ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution, was an epoch of struggle between the two social systems in direct contention with each other, a time of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions, a time of the breakdown of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale." (Communist Party Publication 1972: 18)

However, Communist Party of China further went on to state that "if the general line of the international communist movement were one-sidedly reduced to 'peaceful coexistence', 'peaceful competition' and 'peaceful transition' it would repudiate the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 statement and abjure the historical mission of proletarian world revolution, and to depart from the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism." (Great Debate 1964: 4)

It was also contended that "the revolutionary struggles of the people could not be replaced with peaceful coexistence. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country, it said, could only be brought about through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country. The application of the policy of peaceful coexistence, they believed, was fundamentally flawed, a struggle between the socialist and imperialist countries is unavoidable in the political, economic and ideological spheres, and it is absolutely impossible to have all-around cooperation between the two diametrically opposite ideological poles." (Great Debate 1964: 28)

Thus, we see that the ideological differences and the borders disputes with China ran in conjunction and not in isolation. Before a full-fledged Chinese attack was unleashed in October 1962, many clashes ranging from nugatory to substantially big had been already taken place between the two countries since 1959. These small and

big skirmishes had given rise not just anti-China but anti-CPI atmosphere in India as well. It was the cardinal reason for the communist government in Kerala to be dismissed in 1959. The CPI, however, fired on all cylinders to ameliorate the situation by fraternal talks with the Communist Party of China, but the desired result was not achieved. Despite the encounters of 1959, the then General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh led a delegation to China on the 10th commemoration of the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

A series of correspondence between the two parties also proved futile as it did not yield any positive result. Ultimately Chinese forces attacked India on October 20, 1962. After the ambush on the part of the Chinese, the national council of the Communist Party of India decided to hold a meeting in New Delhi which commenced on October 31 and concluded on November 2, 1962, to discuss the critical situation. The National Council of the Communist Party of India, meeting in New Delhi in the present grave period of national emergency, in its resolution, appealed to all sections of the Indian people to come in unison to defend the motherland against Chinese aggression. The Communist Party, the resolution assured, “would stand through the critical situation of foreign threat that the nation was facing with all other patriotic people who stood firmly behind the Prime Minister's riveting and stimulating appeal for national unity in defence of the country during such an extreme and appalling situation.” The National Council paid its most humble homage and encomium to the unparalleled heroism and valour of our soldiers undeterred by seemingly insurmountable odds. The National Council also acknowledged and saluted “the memory of those Indian sons who went on to bite the dust on the battlefield, losing their priceless lives defending our borders from Chinese intruders.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 64)

“The National Council also extended its unconditional support to the stance taken by Prime Minister Nehru regarding the conditions he laid down for the initiation of negotiations for the settlement of the borders dispute.” The National Council further urged Communist Party Units, their members and sympathisers everywhere: “

- To actively take part in the functioning of the popular committees being set up in support of the defence efforts;
- to spare no effort to build up the National Defence Fund;
- to work their fingers to the bone for an increase in production for defence and people's needs
- to galvanise public opinion against price rises, black marketing and profiteering and other anti-social activities taking a toll on the working people and the nation;
- to campaign arduously against those groups, parties and social elements seeking fiddling political expediency out of the nation-wide plight;
- to oppose constant attempts to persuade India to capitulate her foreign policy of non-alignment and peace and thereby put her at the clemency of the imperialist camp and heave India to a prolonged full-scale war; and
- to stand firmly with all the steps taken by the Government of India to bring about a peaceful settlement, consistent with the honour and dignity of the country.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 69-70)

Ulteriorly with the signatures of six secretariat members of the party- S.A. Dange(Chairman) E.M.S. Namboodiripad (General Secretary), Bhupesh Gupta, Z.A. Ahmad, M.N. Govindan Nair and Yogendra Sharma (all secretaries), all fraternal Communist Parties were sent a comprehensive letter on November 20, 1962. This letter laid down all the information and developments that led to the Indo-China war. The November 2 resolution of the national council was also attached to this letter. The leaders gave a detailed account of the events; they opined that “ruminating over the fountainhead of the disastrous mistakes and deviation of the Chinese leadership about India would not be completely futile, but would not solve the conundrum either.” They believed that “it was evident to everybody that the Chinese leadership's cognizant consciousness and its line of action had nothing in common with either the common understanding and objectives of the international communist movement or with the Marxist-Leninist principles. What the Chinese leadership propounded with

regard to India and what its actions showed were oppugnant to each other, conspicuously brass necked in conforming to the Marxist-Leninist positions and principles of proletarian internationalism.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 87)

The six leaders concluded by appealing to the fraternal parties “to intervene not only in the interests of the Indian people but, if we dare say, in the interests of the Chinese people as well and of the worldwide struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism most desperately demanded such an intervention before it was too tardy.” They were resolute that they “would leave no stone unturned to face the strenuous situation but they naturally expected the fraternal Communist and Workers’ Parties to give their deepest thoughts to these developments in general and the attitude and policy of the Chinese leadership in particular and wield their influence on the latter so that it redressed its harrowing blunders and returned to the common positions of the international communist movement in the context of this matter.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 88)

In another noteworthy development, the Central Executive Committee of the CPI, in a meeting held in New Delhi from November 29 to December 1, 1962, passed a resolution in its meeting, which emphasised on the sheer need for a new world conference of the Communist and Worker’s Parties. It was stated that “differences had conspicuously cropped up all over again and on the initiative of the Chinese Communist Party in all international mass organisations such as the Peace Council, Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, youth, women and trade union organisations. These contradictions were brought out in the open when the CPSU broke with the Albanian Party of Labour, and the Chinese Party stood by the Albanians by repeatedly asserting that all the Albanian Party of Labour was doing was upholding the purity of Marxist-Leninist principle and their endorsement of the positions of the leadership of the Albanians Party of Labour accentuated these differences.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 95)

At the end of this resolution it was stated, "Hence the Central Executive Committee resolves that the world communist movement, which took the initiative to call the 1960 conference, to consult the world parties and call another conference in the immediate future before the situation worsens further". (Communist Party Publication 1963: 96)

Meanwhile, the border confrontations ceased, the dispute between CPI and CPC continued to exacerbate, the reflection was evident within the CPI leadership itself. The inner-party struggle turned more intense, one of the most notable developments was the circulation of a document entitled “The Threatening Disruption and Split of the Party - How to Avert the Disaster”. Under the leadership of M. Basavapunniah, this document was signed by 17 members of the National Council and was submitted to the National Council meeting of the party, held in New Delhi from October 14 to 19, 1963, in the context of ideological differences the document stated that “all students of Marxism-Leninism could conspicuously comprehend that the incisive differences in the world communist movement dated back to the 20th Congress of the CPSU and were unequivocally not of recent origin. Its deliberations and decisions had introduced certain fundamental and wide-ranging departures in some of the fundamental propositions concerning war and peace, forms of transition to socialism, assessment of the role of Stalin and cult of personality, etc. This resulted in great scepticism and a form of dubiety in the ranks of the communists all over the world.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 7)

The document cited Sino-Indian border conflict as the second biggest question, which was gravely causing dissension within the party. However, the document attributed liability to the party of not conforming to the correct path. The document raised many political and ideological issues and recommended the review and revision of organisational measures taken during the last one year by the National Council amidst a dire inner-party crisis to restore confidence and promote the cause of inner-party unity. It had to be undertaken by all the state district and other local committees which should amend disciplinary actions, if any, which had arisen because of political, ideological differences.

a) “The appointed provincial Organising Committee should be dissolved, and the state council in West Bengal should be restored;

b) In Punjab, large-scale arrests of most of the leading comrades following the declaration of emergency in 1962 made it absolutely requisite for an extraordinarily hurried Provincial Conference to be convened. It elected a new state council. Irrespective of the merit issue the newly elected council should immediately give

place to the one duly elected by the regular Punjab Party Conference once the majority of the detained leaders are released from prison.

c) All moves for constituting enquiries into the (mis)conduct of leaders like Comrade Gopalan and Sundaraiyya should be withdrawn, and the Central Control Commission should be directed to cease further activities relating to the aforementioned.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 15)

The document further laid down :

a) “That since it was accepted by all unquestionably, the membership rolls based upon which the Vijayawada Congress was held should form the basis for the next Party Congress too.

b) That all Party members should be given full opportunity to renew their cards within a certain period. Time could be extended where repression is not relaxed.

c) That it was necessary for new membership recruitments to be scrutinised by agreed sub-committees that were to be set up at the state and national level to carry out the proposed task and recommend their genuineness to the concerned bodies as to whether they should be accepted as full members for the purpose of participating as delegates in the conferences and the Congress. Regardless of anything, this issue should be allowed to escalate to viciously violent differences and disagreement.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 16)

The document prepared by 17 National Council members laid the foundation of a parallel centre in the party. On behalf of the Central Secretariat of the CPI, its Chairman S.A. Dange responded to the document by asking as to whether the seventeen comrades had any concrete proposals in order to ameliorate the situation and save the party from a disastrous split and what were they if they did? They were of the opinion that “it was the most important part of the statement as the proposals that the comrades made, they opined, were extremely far-reaching in character and that after much consideration, they were of the firm belief that if they accepted the recommendations, instead of truncating dissension uniting the party, it would eventually lead to a complete paralysis of the Party, prevent all mass work and lead to

total disruption of whatever progress had been made thus far by legalising two or three Party Centres at the same time.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 24)

Concluding the reply, Dange concisely questioned as to “whether there was an ulterior motive behind such proposals, he asked as to whether they actually wished to unite the party or only were only concocting covert plans under the guise of unity proposals.” However, they assured that “they had cogitated that the statement of the seventeen was actuated by a desire to prevent a split”, but at the same time, he was convinced that “the measures proposed by their actual effect would lead to precisely the opposite effect.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 30)

Earlier the National Council of the Communist Party of India in two of its resolutions adopted in its meeting of June 26 to July 2, 1963, directed the Central Control Commission to :

- i) “look into the activities of the parallel centre and recommend disciplinary actions against those members and units responsible for its existence and functioning.
- ii) report on the charges and the counter-charges made in papers referred to the National Council at its meeting of June 26 to July 2, 1963.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 32)

By another resolution adopted at its meeting of October 14 to 19, 1963, the National Council asked the Control Commission to further probe into the reports of Sundaraiya’s speeches at the general party meetings at Katur and other places being mindful of any other speeches whose reports Rajashekhar Reddy and P. Sundaraiyya might like to file. On Control Commission's behalf S.V.Ghate (Chairman), Hajara Begum and P. Narayanan Nair compiled and submitted a report in April 1964. The over 40-page long report dealt with diverse aspects of parallel activities carried out by the left-sectarian leaders. The members of control commission toured Madras, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Bombay West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh between August and December 1963 to probe into the matter. About 450 party members were interviewed, and many others sent written statements.

The control commission gave an exhaustive account of activities by the parallel centre and reported that the situation was assessed by the parallel centre without any delay

after the meeting of the CEC in Delhi from April 13 to 16, 1963. In the review, it was stated that “wherever they were in a position to unleash activity by themselves they should do it without any delay whatsoever and where the situation didn't favour them as much and where they could mobilise party ranks to coerce the leadership to persuade them to take things forward with such campaigns as should be their job to do so... They knew that even though the campaign was launched by the then leadership, it should be they who should be working their fingers to the bone and be the most active participants in the campaign to rally more and more of the party ranks to ride their bandwagon and side towards them and consequently isolate the then leaders.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 41)

Following the directives from the parallel centre, A.K. Gopalan went on extensive tours to the states of Bengal, Andhra, Madras and Kerala. It was during this epoch that four language weeklies began to be published in different states as organs of the parallel centre namely Janasakti Telugu weekly published from Vijayawada from June 1963; Teekkadir - Tamil weekly, from Madras, started in June 1963; Chinta - Malayalam weekly, from Kozhikode, started in August 1963, and Desh Hitaishi - Bengali weekly from Calcutta, from August 1963. (Communist Party Publication 1963: 41-42)

The control commission thoroughly scrutinised the everyday pursuits of the leading figures of the parallel centre and concluded its report by saying that under normal circumstances party members found guilty of such misconduct warrant expulsion from the party. But since an emergency National Council meeting was being convened to take necessary decisions about the (mis)conduct of the comrades concerned, it was left to the National Council to consider the entire situation and take firm and necessary decisions that were in conformity with the integrity and prestige of the party and which keeping in mind the wide political and ideological issues that had surfaced then which would ultimately lead to restoring the solidarity and the unity of the CPI. (Communist Party Publication 1963: 72-73)

Posterior to the submission of the Control Commission report, the Central Executive Committee of the Party brought out a resolution on April 9, 1964. The resolution stated that “the leaders of the dogmatist faction in the CEC, M. Basavapunniah, P. Sundaraiyya, P. Ramamurthy, A.K. Gopalan, Harekrishna Konar, Pramode Das Gupta

and Harkishan Singh Surajit had convened an all India gathering of supporters of their political and organizational line including members of state and district council from various states which took place in Delhi in the first week of April 1964. Their alternative programme was talked about in length and adopted at this conference. The leaders of this conference authorised press briefings and interviews almost on a daily basis.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 13)

The resolution further mentioned that “no Communist Party had ever condoned the organisation of such a conference with the intention of adopting a rival programme. Ultimately M. Basavapunnaih, P. Sundaraiyya, P. Ramamurthy, A.K. Gopalan, Harekrishna Konar, Promode Das Gupta and Harkishan Singh Surjeet were charged by the National Council of being the main culprits of this unprecedented disruption within the party and for spearheading the formation of a rival party. Therefore, the National Council decided to expel them from the party membership for these unpardonably outrageous offences.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 14)

The expulsion of the aforementioned leaders caused the already exacerbating situation to turn extremely explosive and fervent in the party. Thirty-two members of the National Council who walked out of the April 11, 1964 meeting, came out with a deleteriously distressing statement in which they said the members of the National Council who walked out of the meeting of April 11, after exchanging their views on ways to move forth with the struggle against the anti-party factional activities being carried on by the Secretariat headed by S.A. Dange, it divulged the fact that they were on the same page not only against the factionalism and anti-party organisational methods resorted to by them but also against their political line of tread on the heels of the bourgeoisie through general united front with the Indian National Congress. (Communist Party Publication 1963: 79)

This statement was primarily against S.A.Dange, the 32 members of the National Council even demanded a probe into “Dange’s letter” (Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party of India (National Book Agency, Calcutta, 1970), PP.384-91) that they alleged was penned down by him to British authorities offering his services to them. The CPI, however, said that “those so-called letters procured from the National Archives of India were forged.” At last the 32 members disclosed in their statement that they had “decided to convene a meeting of the representatives of party

members from across the country after two months to access their activities during that period and chalk out further programmes.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 86)

The above statement by the 32 members of the National Council seemed to be the final nail in the coffin to the proposition of unity of the party, and ultimately the party was split. After this statement, the National Council of the Communist Party of India espoused the historic “Resolution on Splitters” in its meeting on April 15, 1964 which led to all the 32 members being purged from “all positions in the party organisation which they were holding and during the period of their suspension, they would not have the right to be a part of any party meetings or exercise any authority on party's behalf.” The National Council further directed them to “show cause by the next meeting of the National Council as to why more severe disciplinary action should not be taken against them.” The Resolution also stated that “the Communist Party of India was facing the most acute crisis in its history, a crisis which was the clear reflection of the international conspiracy of disruption and direct creation of a group of hardened dogmatic, ‘Left sectarian and adventurist leaders’ within their party.” It said, “History would never absolve them for their dereliction of splitting the party which tens of thousands of heroic revolutionaries and selfless workers had forged at the cost of their lives and untold sacrifices, a party which the toiling millions of India had pinned their hopes.” (Communist Party Publication 1963: 9)

This is how the split in the party was formalised. The group comprising of 32 that split from the CPI organised an all India Communist Convention at Tenali from July 7 to 11, 1964, in which they resolved to hold the Seventh Party Congress in Calcutta. They held their seventh Congress from October 31 to November 2, 1964, in Calcutta. Thus a new parallel Communist Party called Communist Party of India (Marxist) made its presence on the Indian political arena. On the other hand, at this pivotal point in time, the Communist Party of India organised its Seventh Party Congress in Bombay from 13 to 23 December 1964. The Communist Party of India adopted its historical party programme emanating from the general line of the international communist movement at the Bombay Congress.

CONCLUSION

Thus, the Soviet policy during British rule in India was to bolster the communists to the degree that they could take over the country after the defeat of British colonialism. However, the communist movement could not become as strong as the Soviet hoped to be able to rule the country after the British withdrawal. Against this backdrop, the Soviet Union underlined the cooperation of the communists with that of the national bourgeoisie in a broad united front. This policy, since its inception, travelled a zig-zag path in India. The Indian communists always followed this policy theoretically during and after the British rule in India, but the biggest problem before the communist movement in India was that they could never fully bring it into practice. The Soviet Union has always been unswerving in its policy of supporting broad united front comprising of communists and the national bourgeoisie. However, the Indian Communists at one time followed this policy, and at the very next moment, they opposed it. It happened so because there had never been consensus on one line in the party. Not only this, the disunity could be seen in many other significant issues. To put things into perspective, under the pressure of a section of the party the Communist Party of India characterised India's freedom as fake freedom in 1947, only accepting India as a free country much later in 1955.

Thus, the communist movement entered free India with an opposite understanding of anti-British colonial revolution, which led the Indian communists from one mistake to another. However, in most of the cases, the Soviet understanding was completely different from the Indian communists, but the Soviet Union theoretically helped Indian communists on numerous instances to drag them out of trust. For example, Telangana armed struggle and so on. However, it is quite peculiar that the biggest ever split in Indian Communist movement took place due to Soviet's theoretical positions in the international communist movement after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which put forward a position related to peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition between two opposite systems (Socialist and Capitalist) and peaceful transition to socialism. It is ironical that the split in the Indian Communist movement was the conclusion of Soviet theoretical positions.

Chapter-V

Reconsiderations and Realignment, (1968-1985)

CPSU Policy in Brezhnev Epoch (1964-82)

During the Brezhnev era, the Soviet commitment to promoting national liberation movements and communist movement in the world remained resolute. He was a proponent of the need for the unity of the world communist movement and against the imperialist forces. He held forth in the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981 that the cosmic uniting proposition, a powerful aspect further leading to the coherence and augmentation in the esteem of the world communist movement, is the communists' relentless struggle to attain peace, against the belligerent policy of imperialism and the arms race that bears with it the threat of a nuclear cataclysm. (Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress: Documents and Resolutions; Information Department of USSR Embassy, 1981: 17) However, the essence of this address appears to contradict his new theory 'Brezhnev Doctrine' drawn up for handling the Soviet relations with the other socialist states. This doctrine states that the sovereignty of each socialist country is kept within bounds by the unambiguously wider interests of the "World Socialist System". It proposed that in case a member of the Socialist Commonwealth was browbeaten or coerced, the socialist internationalism, i.e., for all practical purposes, regardless of whether it was invited or not the Soviet Union has the right to intervene. The first time the Soviets used this tenet was to vindicate the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Socialist internationalism of a centralised variety was the central point of the Brezhnev doctrine. Several Communist Parties resolutely repudiated the Brezhnev doctrine, and this conduced much to the furtherance in the collapse of the world communist movement.

Several important parties, including the Chinese, North Vietnamese, North Korean, Albanian and Yugoslav parties, did not register their presence at the world conference in 1969. The CPSU could neither dispel the doubts of the remaining parties and convince them to support its prime holy grail, i.e., a collective denunciation of the Chinese party nor could it avert mention of the intercession in Czechoslovakia, with all its implications of the relations of communist states and parties. First broached in

1981, Soviet plans for a fourth world conference were met with immense resistance from various parties.

This period saw more autonomist propensities in the world communist movement, whether it be Maoism in China, Castroism in Latin America, development of national communism in Eastern Europe or Euro-communism in West Europe, to name a few.

When Brezhnev redeveloped the ideological status of the Third World in the seventies, the meaning and limits of proletarian internationalism became more enigmatic. Brezhnev made efforts to elaborate on the concept of proletarian internationalism to include a new class of parties, which he called “revolutionary-democratic”. He contended that the surfacing of parties and states in the Third World with a “socialist orientation” obtruded a proletarian internationalist onus on the socialist states to aid them, despite not being either proletarian or communist. The USSR also secured the aid of non-ruling communist parties in the Soviet centred communist movement without questioning their right to operate as independent national forces within their respective countries.

The non-existence of a permanent political organisation or regular general meetings of communist parties persuaded the USSR to rely on scanty membership, functionally based institutions, bilateral contacts and Soviet party agencies to assert leadership and further unity. The two most crucial Soviet-sponsored functional organisations were the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Bilateral contacts were bolstered up essentially through yearly visits by the General Secretaries of the Soviet bloc states to the USSR and vice versa.

The retiring of British troops from east of Suez, the documented debacle of American policy in Vietnam, the coups in Somalia, Ethiopia etc. and the Portuguese pronouncement to quit Africa had engendered the establishment of new ‘countries of socialist orientation’ in the Middle East, Indo-China, and Africa. As the decade of the Seventies came to a head, Afghanistan, Grenada and Nicaragua became a part of the group. (Stern 1996: 239)

Despite that Brezhnev’s proposed actions and steps could inveigle a number of parties and also some states which had dissimilitude of ideas concerning socialism and internationalism, the lack of an ideological centre of singular intent as regards

proletarian internationalism, tendency of 'autonomy' and 'polycentrism' made strides and reacted against Soviet endeavours to revamp the former idea of 'proletarian internationalism'. The plummeting communist movement has to be analysed against this backdrop.

Posterior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet in 1979 and the clampdown in Poland in 1981, the PCI (Italian Communist Party or 'Partito Comunista Italiano') headed by Enrico Berlinguer decamped from the Soviet ambit relinquishing its privileged relations with the CPSU.

The decline of the world communist movement in its typically structured Moscovite form caught pace during the Brezhnev era. The divergent and autonomist proclivities aroused incertitude about the existence of a 'world communist movement' in its political sense.

Under Brezhnev, there was a reversion back to neo-Stalinism as USSR ventured to keep pace with the west militarily even if it meant paying a huge cost, the cost of economic developments at home. The Brezhnev years showed great emphasis being laid on the ideological purity both in domestic and foreign policy areas. The notion of 'developed socialism' further deferring the goal of communism, was also used to cross over the contradiction within the socialist society.

On the foreign policy front, USSR slowly but quite suddenly strengthened its military might, achieving a military power equivalent to that of the US and then sought to ensure detente in East-West relations. The Brezhnev tenet steered the relation with the socialist countries and the anti-imperialist potential of the national liberation movements was sought to be exploited.

As the Soviet Union started greatly influencing the world affairs, it became increasingly interested in even the most minuscule developments taking place anywhere in the world, which thereby led to further development of Soviet theses of international relations which had a bearing on USSR's foreign policy conduct.

Brezhnev Policy of “Communist Construction”

Underemphasising the Khrushchevian idea of reaching communism in 20 years, Brezhnev reposed on the concept of “communist construction” by creating the “material and technical basis of communism” for “guaranteeing a higher standard of living, ameliorating social relations and educating the Soviet people in the ethos of majestic communist consciousness”. (Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 23rd Party Congress, Moscow, 1966: 7)

The 23rd Party Congress alluded to particularly the 20th, 21st and 22nd Congresses as well as the 1965 economic reforms and emphasised on economic and social advancement in USSR and its importance in the international realm. During the early Brezhnev years, the emphasis was on economic development. The foreign policy task was to foster international conditions to expedite the “Communist Construction” in USSR. The report that the CPSU presented to the 24th Congress (1971) affirmed that the developed socialist society which Lenin referred to in 1918 had been formed by the selfless labour of the Soviet people. (Report of the CC, CPSU to the 24th Party Congress, Moscow, 1971: 46)

The CC report to the 25th Congress examined the most crucial economic tasks in the stage of a developed socialist society as also the party in the conditions of ‘Developed socialism’. (Report of the CC, CPSU to the 25th Party Congress, Moscow, 1976: 74) The newly adopted Soviet Constitution (1977) proclaimed the Soviet society to be a society of mature socialist social relations and held a ‘developed socialist society’ as ‘an objectively necessary stage on the road to communism.’ (Kessings’ Contemporary Archives, 1977: 28701-28709) Furthermore, the constitution incorporated the Khrushchevian proposition of the Soviet state as the state of the whole people.

Brezhnev never conspicuously mentioned as to how long the road to communism would be. Instead, in an article written in December 1977, he alluded to Engel’s views that the question of the stages of transition to communist society was the most strenuous of any that existed. (Brezhnev, 1980: 205)

The premise of a ‘mature socialist society’ was ‘highly developed productive forces’ and its attributes were majestic material and spiritual life for the people, socialisation of industry, constant drawing together of state and collective forms of socialist

property, coming closer of collective farm peasantry to working class, the development of a historically new social and international community - the Soviet people, and the forming of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a socialist state of all the people. (Brezhnev,1980: 206-208)

Brezhnev propounded that the people were now predominantly and deliberately taking an active part in the administration of life in the country. The 'socialist democracy' had been instituted in the USSR as a consequence of it having embarked on attaining the stage of developed socialism. Brezhnev went on to write that in the further development of 'socialist statehood and socialist democracy', "the vital role belonged to the Communist Party". (Brezhnev,1980: 216) The CPSU was not to take the place of the Soviets; its job was to "strictly limit the responsibilities of the party and the state organs and follow its line essentially through the Communists working in them. (Brezhnev,1980: 216) Therefore, under the circumstances of 'Developed Socialism', the party's capacity as it had always been, remained as that of the vanguard. The significant thing that came out of the modification was that the party had become the 'party of the whole people's and did not just remain that of the communists. Article 6 of the constitution conferred on the CPSU the monopoly on power as it stated that the CPSU was the prominent guiding force of the Soviet society and the centre of its political system, of all state and public organisations. The CPSU existed for people and always did their bit for the people. This was exceptional and distinct in the Soviet constitutional history.

Appraising the period since the adoption of new Constitution in the USSR, the 26th CPSU Congress demonstrated that the notion of 'the period of developed socialism' was the "restructuring of all social relations along the collectivist lines". (Document and Resolution of the 26th Party Congress,1981: 74) The social policy of the Party comprised ameliorating the 'socialist way of life' and obliterating all impediments from the way of "moulding of the new man" (Document and Resolution of the 26th Party Congress,1981: 82)

By putting forward 'developed socialism' as a historically essential stage on the road to communism, Brezhnev instituted a form of incertitude in the transition to communism and tried to lay the groundwork for the people to be prepared for a prolonged period of struggle for communism. However, completely cognizant of the

sheer reality that peoples' living standards needed amelioration, he introduced a few economic reforms in 1965 and in 1979, which did not exactly set the Thames on fire. There was an undisputed up-gradation in the living standards but at a high economic, social, political and environmental cost. However, on the political front, the adoption of the new Constitution did not yield any grass-root socialist democracy. 'The party's role and the bureaucracy's strength, augmented after the adoption of the Constitution, which portended 'developed socialism' and the 'state of the whole people'. The economy languished ineptly, and despite claims to the contrary, the nationality question remained unsettled.

CPSU Analysis of the World Situation during the Brezhnev Era:

The chief propensities which in the Soviet view impacted the Soviet view of international relations were: the snowballing of the general plight of capitalism (23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th congress), the 'historic' contention between socialism and capitalism and the struggle between the belligerent imperialism line and the tranquil socialist line (24th, 25th, 26th Congresses), the soaring role of the ever-strengthening world socialist system is impeding the bellicose imperialist plans, the change of correlation of forces in approbation of the world socialist system, the sharpening of class-struggle in the capitalist countries (24th Congress), the slackening of the sphere of imperialist domination (26th Congress), further disintegration of imperialist colonial empires (25th Congress), the growing role of the newly emancipated countries (25th, 26th Congresses), the Soviet Union's concerted endeavours to preserve and maintain peace and, consolidation of the principle of peaceful coexistence (25th Congress). It would thus seem that the Brezhnevian analysis of the world situation as done in the conceptual framework developed by Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence, avoidance of the war and promotion of peace, strengthening of world socialist system, cooperation with the national liberation movements and growing reliance on the strength and might of the USSR. The emphasis laid at any time on a specific facet of the analysis varied according to the existing situation. Numerous crucial doctrines like the 'correlation of forces' and the 'Brezhnev doctrine' were evolved to cope up with different situations.

Joint Anti-Imperialist Struggle Policy

Going ahead with the premise of imperialism being our ‘class enemy’, Brezhnev emphasized on the necessity for tackling “bourgeois ideology, revisionism, dogmatism and reformism”. The ideological work of the Party had an undeviating bearing on “the moulding of the new man” ideological work which was to be closely concerned with the tasks in hand, e.g. communist construction, moulding of new man, development of individual etc. - Lest it should degrade into mere ‘phrase-mongering’. Ideological work could not be forsaken as grave challenges were posed to the socialist unity (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Poland) during the Brezhnev years. In the 1969 International Conference of Communists and Workers' Parties held in Moscow, the significance of ideology as a weapon in the struggle to fend off the forces of imperialism was accentuated. The Conference espoused a rigid stance on the ideological question by supporting the line taken by the Communist parties in 1957 and 1960. The document adopted at the conference affirmed:

“That the proposed action of joint anti-imperialist struggle needed that the ideological and Political role of the parties abiding by Marxist-Leninist principles in the world revolutionary process be strengthened and amplified and the Communists would strive to go on waging an unforgiving struggle against bourgeois ideology.” (Brezhnev, 1969)

The conference adopted the line of the 24th Party Congress of the CPSU, held after the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, in which Brezhnev had said that they should never make any compromise in ideological matters.

Brezhnev Analysis of Imperialism

All through the course of the Brezhnev era, there was an acute emphasis on the analysis of imperialism, the ‘class enemy’. Despite the fact that the general analysis was in the framework of the aggravating capitalist crisis and exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions as well as deepening of struggle between the two ideas in direct contention with each other, imperialism and socialism, a multitude of ideas were also rough-hewed during these years: imperialism debilitates socialism by suppressing national liberation movements and the Working people in capitalist

countries; it employs armed struggle against socialism, anti-communist proclivities have become a guiding principle of the state policy of the imperialist countries.

By making use of military-political blocs and bases on foreign territory, economic pressures and trade blockades, and through armed intercessions imperialism creates a situation of sheer chaos in several areas across the world; fires on all cylinders to sabotage the unity of the world socialist system; it creates catastrophes and jars the world to a thermonuclear war; incapable of reversing the developments in the world today owing to the strength of the socialist world, imperialism deploys the “positions of strength” policy to deal with socialism.

The Soviet theory displayed cognisance of imperialist strengths, which could not be disregarded. The headways made in the western countries in the economic and scientific-technical fields were explicated by the sheer reality that imperialism had displayed the proficiency of acclimatising itself to the new conditions. Brezhnev, in his speech at the 1969 conference of the Communist and workers’ parties, touched on the strengths of imperialism, which could not be flat out disregarded. He averred that imperialism had an extremely developed powerful production mechanism; it fused monopolies with state apparatus, it could programme and forecast production; state financing or scientific research helped monopolies, there had been an improvement in the effectiveness of social production. (Myron Rush,1970: 331-332) The ascendancy of imperialism meant that it was a policy that would turn out to be even more ‘reactionary aggressive’. An evident outcome of this was financial and political imperialist support to the “openly terrorist regimes of the fascist types”. (Myron Hush,1970: 333)

During the Brezhnev years, the anti-imperialist struggle was considered one of the paramount principles as far as the Soviet foreign policy was concerned.

Revised Policy of ‘Proletarian Internationalism’

In the anti-imperialist struggles waged by world socialism, the unity and cohesion of the world socialist system and relations with the socialist countries were extremely significant. It was avowed that the experience of the socialist world since 1947, its accomplishments and mishaps laid bare the principles which would dictate the socialist relations. ‘Proletarian Internationalism’, when applied to relations between

socialist states, gave way to the idea of 'socialist internationalism', which successively subsumed the idea of 'socialist integration'. During the Brezhnev years, several forms and methods of relations between socialist countries were developed not just in theory and but in practice as well. WTO, CMEA and regular meetings between the leaders of the socialist countries bore great significance. The coordination of foreign policies cropped up as a recurrent theme in the Soviet proclamations on relations with the socialist countries. 'Brezhnev Doctrine' (a western term) and the 'theory of limited sovereignty' (another western term) were developed. The increasing role of international cooperation in attaining national goals was emphasized. 'Nationalism', on the other hand, was christened as narrow mindedness.

A number of 'objective laws' regulating the economic cooperation of socialist states were brought to light. Case in point, one such 'law', applicable to all the countries was about the intensification of the international division of labour and a historic propensity of further increasing the role and share of international economic relations in extending national reproduction of each socialist country. Yet another such deduction was that better organisation of external economic ties became an ever more significant function in the planning activities of the socialist state. (Senin,1966: 14) To put it a little differently, cooperation amongst socialist states became an equitable law dictating relations amongst the socialist states. The international and external factors of production were proclaimed to be in 'dialectical unity'. All this needed special standards and rules guaranteeing national and international interests. (Senin,1966: 12) It was acknowledged that the operation of these laws, *i.e.* conditions for objectively determined mutual assistance and presupposed stable inter-state relations based on 'division of labour' which could be accomplished only by "ameliorating the system of treaty-based concerted plans". (Senin,1966: 17)

On the political side, 'socialist internationalism' dictated relations between the socialist states. Socialist internationalism, envisioning 'economic integration' and 'international socialist division of labour' was laid down in Article 30 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution. (Soviet Constitution,1977: 28703)

The events taking place in Czechoslovakia in 1968 elucidated the 'principles' governing the relations between the socialist states. An authoritative Tass statement of August 21, 1968, made it evident that the military aid provided to Czechoslovakia

was at the plea made by the party and state leaders of Czechoslovakia. (This formula of intervention at 'request' was used later on in Afghanistan also). According to the Pravda editorial, the reason for this 'appeal' made by the Czech leaders, was to combat the counter-revolutionaries in Czechoslovakia. (Pravda,1968) The editorial described the 'disturbing' situation prevailing in Czechoslovakia before the military intervention as a progressive debilitation of the party, growth of the imperialist and bourgeois propaganda perilous to socialism and the "offensive against Marxist-Leninist ideology", whipping up of nationalistic passion and derogation of Soviet-Czechoslovakia friendship and cooperation, particularly the economic cooperation; strides made to re-formulate Czechoslovakia's political and economic policies towards the west. Such a situation was perceived as a menace not only to socialism but also "the foundation of peace in Europe". (Pravda,1968)

The military intercession in Czechoslovakia brought forth a number of questions related to the sovereignty of the socialist states. The primary task at hand, as maintained by Pravda, was the correlation and interdependence of the national interest of the socialist countries and their international responsibilities. (Kovalyov,1968: 1) The article above further went on to state that the military intervention in Czechoslovakia did not "run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the right to self-determination". It reprobated the "abstract, non-class approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination". (Kovalyov,1968: 1) The article castigated the standard of bourgeois law and 'formally juridical reasonings' on the question of sovereignty of nations and averred that 'in a class society' laws and legal measures were contingent on "the laws of class struggle, the laws of the social development". So, the sovereignty of the socialist state held a completely different denotation than perceived in the bourgeois international law. Therefore, military intervention was fully 'legal' and in congruence with 'laws' dictating the development of a socialist state.

The article also touched upon the norms governing the relations between the socialist states, which were dubbed as 'Brezhnev Doctrine' in the western media. The Pravda article mentioned that:

- (i) a Communist Party was certainly accountable to its own people but not only to them but also to every socialist country in the world, to the entire communist movement
- (ii) Marxist dialectics demanded that ...one or another state, staying in a system of other states constituting the socialist community could not be free from the common interests of that community.
- (iii) The sovereignty of each socialist country could not be in contention with the interests of world socialism, of the world revolutionary movement.

The intervention in Hungary in 1956 and that in Czechoslovakia were vindicated in connection with claims of “counter-revolution” in these countries, thereby menacing socialism. In 1956, the Soviets initially acknowledged that the working class in Hungary had unfeigned grievances. The aftermath of events in Czechoslovakia witnessed emphatic methods and forms of inter-socialist state relations being developed. The other factors stressed posterior to the Czechoslovak episode was the shortcoming of sovereignty and the threat to Europe’s security. The Czechoslovak chapter reasserted the viability of the ‘new’ sort of international relations that had emerged since the dawn of the world socialist system and its historic contention with the capitalist system.

Howbeit, it is conspicuous that despite how it was vindicated theoretically, the main reason of the intervention was the question of security in case Czechoslovakia drifted away from the socialist community and joined the ‘imperialist’ bloc.

The incidents that took place in Hungary and Poland in the fifties, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as complications with China concluding with military clashes, brought the question of conflicts and antagonisms within the socialist countries and methods to deal with them to the forefront.

The 1969 statement of the Communist Parties had discerned the likelihood of divergence within the socialist states owing to the difference in the level of economic development, in social structure, national distinctions etc. These differences could be settled if dealt with on the basis of ‘proletarian internationalism, through comradely discussions and voluntary fraternal cooperation” (Light, 1988: 197)

The Soviet authors believed that this grave inequality could be eliminated by applying the “principle of equality under socialism”. (Tsapanov 1972: 24). Such differences could lead to ‘non-antagonistic’ conflicts, which only served to augment mutual understanding. The non-antagonistic strifes could be done away with by ‘comradely discussion’ or by the method of ‘criticism and self-criticism’ - up to the extent that did not undermine socialism.

A concern to prove that the principles of socialist internationalism should be given due recognition in international law could be seen in the Soviet writings. If truth be told, Soviet authors have time and again stated that ‘socialist internationalism’ had already become a substantial principle of contemporary international law. All bilateral treaties between socialist states, the CMEA, the WTO etc. were predicated on ‘socialist Internationalism’. (Sanakoyev 1974: 77) It was further averred that the proletarian internationalism or its application to relations between socialist Internationalism enhanced the general international law. For case in point, the principle of equality in general in the International law as it includes ‘the demand for actual equality and in some cases, ...inequality...in favour of less developed countries’. (Usenko 1973: 51)

Likewise, it was held that under socialist internationalism, the respect for state sovereignty went far out with the principle of sovereignty in general international law. The whole of the socialist community stood guard over independence and territorial integrity of the socialist countries which aided in bolstering the sovereignty of each. (Usenko 1973: 51)

It can be argued that the Brezhnev years witnessed a bid to place relations amongst the socialist countries contingent on ‘socialist internationalism’. This required accordance with special meanings to the traditional concepts of international law governing inter-state relations.

Détente and Association with Capitalist Countries

The emergence of detente between the socialist and the capitalist countries in the seventies did not require any new ideological innovations. The phenomenon of détente could very easily be explained by the stress on peaceful coexistence between

different social systems. However, what requires scrutiny is the Soviet view of the factors which made détente possible.

Soviet theoreticians opine that the emergence of world socialist system and its augmentation which might lead to “changing the balance of forces between the two socialist systems”, proved to be the conclusive factor in the ‘fundamental restructuring of international relations’ which détente implied. (Lebedev,1976: 2) In his speech of June 14, 1975, Brezhnev propounded this idea, when he said that after appraising the overall balance of forces in the world, they had deduced that there was a real possibility of bringing about a basic change in the international situation a few years ago. This fundamental restructuring of the international situation meant the exclusion of war from the practice of universal life and the attainment of a just and lasting peace. It might be evidently observed that the basis of détente was based on the augmenting strength of USSR and “military-strategic parity” with the USA. If this parity were disturbed, détente would also be disturbed.

The basic restructuring of the international relations, in palpable terms, inferred that the development of bilateral relations with capitalist countries, unyielding repulses to any act of pugnacity and arbitrariness in international relations, disarmament, multilateral cooperation amongst a state in a diverse area. However, what this restructuring of the relations did not imply was the abandonment of class-struggle. In fact the Soviet theorists opined that the restructuring of international relations would carry forward “amidst mounted class struggle”. (Lebedev,1976: 13) Thus the actual political meaning of détente and the restructuring of international relations was the acknowledgement of the significance of the socialist world and its natural stakes in the world affairs and military parallelism with the west.

The détente also implied cooperation between the East and the west, but little did it mean the mitigation on the ideological struggle front. Brezhnev stressed that the alleviation of International tensions did not mean averting the struggle of ideas at all. This was referred to as an objective fact. (Pravda,1975)

The Soviets reckon the Final Act at Helsinki (1975) as a significant stage of détente. The principle of interstate relations to which the Soviets agreed in Helsinki Final Act was:

“Sovereign equality, the non-use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, equal rights and the right of peoples to be their own masters, cooperations between states and the conscientious fulfilment of obligations”. (Valentinov,1976: 24)

However, they also heeded that in a number of countries like the USA there were forces which kept on being hostile to détente which was demonstrated in the steep soar in military expenditure in the USA and continued disaccord on the strategic forces of the two countries. The USA was equally held accountable for having squandered opportunities for promoting détente in having repudiated the Soviet disarmament proposals in 1977 and 1978. (Abarenkov, 1979: 6) By 1980, particularly after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, a fresh round of cold war had replaced the détente. In his report to the 26th party Congress in 1981, Brezhnev rarely mentioned détente and completely pinned the blame on the USA for infringement of the principle of détente. He inculpated the west of “line of disrupting detente, escalating arms race”. The primary reason for the downswing of détente, as put forward by the Soviet theorists, was the frenzied effort by the USA to unsettle the ‘military-strategic’ parity between the socialist and the capitalist camp and ‘the re-embarkation by the US on “the inefficacious course of establishing ‘military superiority’ over the USSR”. (Shurdeyev,1981: 40) The Soviet Mezhdunardoniki denounced the ‘anti-détente’ sentiment in the western countries as manifest in such western notions of the day as ‘limited nuclear war’, ‘complimentary armament’, ‘collapse of détente’ etc.

‘Correlation of Forces’ vs ‘Balance of Power’

It is noteworthy that the Soviets have been adamant in their opinion that detente became feasible because the ‘balance of forces’ inclined towards socialism and it withered because the west ventured to achieve ‘military superiority’ over the USSR and in the process denied it ‘equal and equitable security’. The Soviet theorists have universally castigated the Western concept of ‘balance of power’ and instead put forward the concept of ‘correlation of forces’ which they considered one of the leading factors in structuring international relations. The balance of power concept, basic to the western school of political-realism founded by Hans Morgenthau, was heavily lambasted citing the unequivocal fact that this approach completely brushed

aside ‘the class essence’ of the international relations and the ‘class character of a state foreign policy’. (Sergiyev,1975: 100) Even the more refined bourgeois concept of “political equilibrium” implying that a state sought by its foreign policy to ‘stabilise’ the system of international relations was castigated by the Soviet theorists for the reason that, by means of Marxism-Leninism, the international relations at any particular moment were characterised by ‘a definite correlation of the struggling classes and political forces’. (Sergiyev,1975: 102)

The concept of ‘correlation of forces’ was a corollary to the Soviet world view of the struggle between the two camps, the emergence of world socialist system and the effect this had on the international relations and the foreign policy of individual states. In its struggle with capitalism, socialism banked on the military as well as economic strengths and capabilities and also on all diverse political, social, economic forces and opportunities which seemed to bolster the anti-imperialist struggle. It was registered that the historical struggle between the two socio-economic systems carried on not just at the state level but also other, non-state, non-governmental forums. Fundamentally, the struggle against imperialism was a class struggle of which relations between states was only one integrant. Once the class struggle was recognized as the fundamental driving force of international relations, the “correlation of force”, i.e. “the correlation of class forces in the worldwide system of international relations” surfaced as a natural conclusion.

How did the phenomenon of ‘correlation of forces’ work in practice? Foreign policies of states were nothing more than just mechanisms to achieve the class interests. “Diverse classes and political forces... emerge in the world scene fully endowed with powerful and intricate means of foreign policy influence” (Sergiyev,1975: 102) A multitude of states, parties and political forces ‘come together and form definite groups, systems of states, or political, economic or military coalitions forged upon common class and state interests.” (Sergiyev,1975: 103) This meant that the unity, cooperation among socialist countries emerged as a crucial integrant in the correlation of forces on a worldwide scale. So WTO and CMEA, and ‘socialist internationalism’ had a first-hand bearing on the ‘correlation of force’. Similar to national liberation force, the significant force in international relations ended up being “natural allies” of the world socialist system.

Another significant consequence of this concept was the relations at non-state levels, which the Soviet Union retained with the diverse political groupings, parties, personalities in the numerous countries around the globe. This overt characteristic of the Soviet foreign policy played no less part in the west to project the 'Soviet threat' and the Soviet expansionism often in an overemphasised manner. The concept of 'correlation of force' vindicated and bolstered up the 'new type' international relations which the Soviets stressed after the emergence of the world socialist system.

Brezhnev Policy and Freedom Movement of Third World

Under Khrushchev, the Soviet took up an active role in extending solidarity to the third world countries, but 'peaceful coexistence' and relations with the capitalist countries as well as the development of inter-socialist state relations remained the prime occupation of the Soviet foreign policy theory and conduct. The Brezhnev years saw a significant amount of theoretical work being done in the Soviet Union on the National Liberation movements, and it was during these years that the Soviet registered some of the most remarkable success in the third world. The avid Soviet interests in the national liberation movements across the globe stemmed from the theoretical premise that national liberation movements, the unwavering corollary of decolonisation and the evident conclusion of inner contradictions of imperialism, were built in allies of the world socialist system in its anti-imperialist struggle. For the Soviets, even though the principal contradiction in the world was between socialism and capitalism (unlike for the Chinese who regarded imperialism vs national liberation movements as the primary contradiction) the enormous revolutionary potential of the national liberation movements could be made use of in alleviating imperialism.

The Soviet theories on national liberation movements and the recently liberated countries dealt not only with the internal processes but also the foreign policies espoused by these countries.

A very crucial concept that evolved in the Soviet theory was that of 'National Democracy'. It had been brought up in the 1960 statement of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties.

Those states which followed an economic programme of agrarian reforms creating a state sector in the economy following democratic policies internally, and, whose foreign policy favoured the socialist bloc especially the Soviet Union were 'National Democratic' states. (Saivetz and Woodby,1985: 9) In 1963, a novel concept Non-Capitalist Path of Development (NCP) was stressed, which demonstrated a more 'methodical strategy' to solve the problems of the Third World. NCP was defined as that juncture of social (and) economic headways in which essential prerequisites for the progression of the construction of socialism were created by non-capitalist means. (Ulyanovski,1963: 10)

The Brezhnev years witnessed the concept of NCP become more developed, and subsidiary conceptions of the "state of socialist orientation" and "mnogoukladnost society" (multilayered society) were evolved. The NCP put forward to underdeveloped countries a means to make a transition over to 'socialist construction' by bypassing certain historical stages of development. It was realized that in most poor countries the capital would not develop on the classical lines and, therefore, NCP was the sole answer. The NCP also put forward the question of substance and nature of state power in countries walking the non-capitalist path. This, however, depended upon the character of the ruling groups. Some Soviet academics approved of the notion of 'revolution from above' when they posited that in these countries the socialist basis was structured with the most active intercession from above. (Solodovnikov,1970: 13) The specific national characteristics also bore immense significance in relation to a non-capitalist way. Existence of the state sector was of paramount importance when it came to a country taking the non-capitalist way.

No final view on these questions was evolved. While some eminent researchers were prone to flat out dismiss the NCP, others regarded NCP as identical to socialism and thereby admitted the likelihood of socialist upheaval without the dictatorship of the proletariat. These were some who beset the NCP with too many reservations and restrictions. (Tyaguneneko,1970: 14) Some theorists mooted the question of consciousness that was being shaped in complex, multi-layered societies in these countries. Other questions considered by the Soviet theoreticians were concerned with the accurate identification of classes in the developing countries, and inter-class relations with notable citation of the mantle of the working class, peasantry,

bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. In the general run of things, it was discerned due to the pittance in the level of development in these countries, a significantly substantial working-class or a revolutionary bourgeois did not exist. As a matter of fact, the petty bourgeoisie was the most numerous class. The petty bourgeoisie had been deemed anti-revolutionary in European countries, but as far as the developing countries were concerned, it could play a completely different role. The petty bourgeoisie led by the intelligentsia evolved under the patronage of the state and thus could play an increasingly progressive role in the non-capitalist path of development

The concepts of ‘promezhutochny’ or ‘sredny sloi’³ (“intermediate” or “transitional” section or stratum) were developed to elucidate class alignments in society adept of playing a progressive role. These intermediate levels were the coalescence of the petty-bourgeois, non-proletarian semi-proletarian elements along with the civil and military intelligentsia, civil servants, small traders, artisans etc.

These sophistications were imperative to report as to how the transition to socialism could transpire in these countries sans an authentic working class. In their considerations, the Soviet authors also examined the role of armies in third world countries. It was maintained that the armies and the military regimes could also play a progressive role in the same way as petty bourgeoisie has been assigned a progressive role.

While the internal processes in the developing countries exhibited several theoretical dilemmas to the Soviet academics, the question of the foreign policy adopted by the newly emancipated countries equally engrossed the Soviets.

The most substantial facet of their foreign policies was regarded as their attitude towards socialism. Brezhnev had made a note of the ‘diverse’ crowd that these countries presented at the 26th Party Congress. The Soviet theoretician identified a number of primary guidelines and directions. However, the revolutionary process posed a crucial conundrum, the question of the ability of a particular national

³ “Combination of petty bourgeois, semi-proletarian elements, together Defined as a nonproletarian and with the civilian and military intelligentsia, civil servants, small traders, artisans and handicraftsmen, the most radical section of this large group formed the revolutionary democrats” (Mirsky, 1976, p. 42)

liberation movement to combine in a flexible manner national and international factor. (Kim,1971: 71)

The onset of detente, the increasing might of the socialist camp and the perception that it would alleviate chances of war, and general amelioration of international climate were regarded as the factors to have exerted propitious influence on the course of national liberation movements. The Soviet Union was regarded as the “key economic, political, ideological and military factor in the national liberation movements” (Kim,1971: 72-74) Thus it can be conferred that the Soviet theoretician built a ‘natural cause for pro-Soviet orientation in the foreign policies of these countries. The theme of socialist countries and the national liberation movements being the ‘natural allies’ was built up systematically, and specifically posterior to the Havana summit of the Non-Alignment countries in 1979 under the Chairmanship of Cuba.

Interim Period After Brezhnev (1982-85):

As far as the policy matters related to international communist movement are concerned the period between 1982 and 1985, between Brezhnev and Gorbachev, carried no importance. If appraised politically, the epoch can be pertinently deemed part of the Brezhnev era owing to the absence of any significant shift from the earlier policies. Concurrently, it was a preface phase for Gorbachev.

Yuri Andropov (1982-84) was a reformer but in a limited sense. He was basically for economic reforms, and his anti-corruption and anti-alcohol drives drew applause. His approach to economic reforms was weakened by his appeal to strict discipline, making the reform a technical problem without any political implications. At the same time, he could psychologically break the Brezhnev tradition of ‘stability of cadres’ and advance the career of younger members, especially, that of Gorbachev.

For all intents and purposes, Konstantin Chernenko (1984-85) was fundamentally an interim stop-gap arrangement before the long-overdue inexorable plummet into a new era. Chernenko was undoubtedly a conservative, and the public rehabilitation and remittance to the Party of Molotov, a survivor of the Stalin era, was symbolically a crucial step taken by him. Even then, Gorbachev was informally becoming the heir-apparent as he was often officially described as the Deputy General Secretary and at

times being deputised at Politburo meetings in the absence of Chernenko. (Crouch 1990: 61) Chernenko's demise in 1985 and his impressing at least some of the old guards led Gorbachev being chosen the General Secretary of a Party still run over by the conservatives.

Brezhnev's policy to pursue détente along with expansionism in the Third World could not become successful in the long-run. Because of his policies, the Soviet Union was persuaded to support self-declared Marxist-Leninist regimes by the time the Brezhnev era drew to a close. Apart from Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos and Cambodia, Soviet Union was supporting regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Benin, the People's Republic of Congo, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Grenada. Substantial military and economic aid to support these regimes, that too without success and reliability, caused the Soviet experts to ruminate over the validity of "socialism by proclamation" Many of the regimes referred above had ruling parties who proclaimed themselves as "Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties. (Crouch 1990: 289-90)

Andropov, however, was sceptical about the validity of supporting such groups. He averred at a Central Committee meeting in June 1983 that proclaiming socialism as one's sole aim and building it is two completely different things altogether. In order to attain this, a certain level of productive forces consciousness is required. (Crouch 1990: 300)

Andropov's statement indicates the origination of a policy of 'disengagement' which went on to become an active one later during the Gorbachev era. Moreover, it seemed as though Andropov was a little too engrossed with the East-West relations for him to pay heed to the Third World. (Gupta 1993: 185) During Chernenko's brief incumbency, ideas and stances could be seen influenced by the re-emergence of Brezhnevian orthodoxy, though not substantially significant thing materialised. To adduce an instance, in 1984 there was a resurgence in academic circles of concepts such as a revolutionary democracy which was once castigated in the Sixties. (Gupta 1993: 185-86)

CPSU Policy in Brezhnev Era and Debates between CPI, CPI(M) and CPI (ML):

CPSU Policy had severe implications for the Indian Communist movement during the Brezhnev era as the world was divided into two camps. Due to the division of the whole world into two fronts, it had an impact on the Indian communist movement. There was a difference of opinion among the three communist parties about the policies of Brezhnev. Where the CPI continued to support the policies of Brezhnev, CPM opposed imperialism and still adopted 'equidistance policy' from CPSU and CPC. The third party of the left CPI(ML) called the Soviet Union as 'Social Imperialist' and supported the alternative thesis of CPC, according to which, the whole world was not split into 'Two Camps', but in 'Three Worlds.' CPI(ML) believed that the USSR was also following its expansionist policy. It is therefore that, it did not support the attack of USSR in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

However, the debates among the three communist parties in India helped to develop its revised understanding but the movements in the country suffered at the crucial junctures.

Differences on Détente Policy

In the Tenth Congress of CPI, held in 1975, CPI took the position to support the Détente Policy of USSR fully. CPI believed that under the leadership of the soviet union, the Détente peace process was gaining success internationally and the propagators of the cold war were pushed back by them. The U.S. under international pressure was conscious of its actions though it did not really abandon its imperialist agenda altogether. But still, the party thought that overall winning of peacekeeping sides internationally was a good sign for the socialist movement. CPI believed that if they propagate their agendas of peace internationally against the imperialists and the reactionaries, merging these with peoples movement of liberation and class struggle, peace and stability will be achieved at the global level. The CPI explains it further ...

“So the situation demands not any letup in the struggle but on the contrary, its intensification and extension. The pivotal international task today for the anti-imperialist and all peace forces is to deepen and extend detente and make it an

irreversible process. This is in the interest not only of peace and international co-operation but of national liberation democracy social progress and socialism.

Moreover, the struggle shows as it heats more and more clear, that the future of mankind is bound up with the consolidation of détente and its culmination in the establishment of a durable peace on our planet, international set utility and promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation among nations. For the imperialists and other enemies of detente, however, this welcome change signifies not only a retreat on their part but also the gloomy prospects of new and yet greater and decisive victories against them by the anti-imperialist force. Detente shows that the chieftain of imperialism-the USA-has been forced to move in the direction of peaceful coexistence as a result of the struggles of the peace forces, particularly the initiatives of the Soviet Union through the peace Programme of the 24th CPSU congress. However, US imperialism has not yet reconciled to the new growing trend in international life. Imperialism's duplicity is seen, not only in its aggressive actions in Indo-china, West Asia, Indian Ocean, Latin America and other parts of the world but also in Europe itself. The events in Cyprus and the attempts to create tension in, the east Mediterranean by Nato circles and their military preparations are a proof.

Nevertheless, the outstanding fact remains that the advocates of the cold war have suffered a serious defeat, and those of peaceful coexistence are winning. It is no wonder that the struggle for peaceful coexistence merges with the struggle for national liberation and also with the class battles against monopoly capital and reaction and for social progress in the capitalist countries. All these struggles today are components of the world revolutionary process. The overthrow of fascist rule in Portugal, for instance, embodies the merging of be three main trends of our time : the world socialist system which was directly helping the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in their struggle for liberation, the national-liberation movements of these colonies and the working class and democratic movement within, Portugal itself.” (Documents of the Tenth Congress of the CPI, 1975: 32-33)

As we know, the differences between the CPSU and CPC, running from the time of Khrushchev, turned into a gulf in the time of Brezhnev. The impact of this debate at the international level also influenced the Indian Left Movement. Where CPI, while blindly following CPSU, had criticised the CPC, calling it an agent of American

imperialism, CPI had lambasted the foreign policy of CPC, which declared Détente as a ‘temporary and superfluous phenomenon. According to the CPI, while CPSU was trying to prevent a nuclear war situation in the world, the CPC opposed USSR when it took an initiative to ban nuclear weapons in a UN meeting. It was visible in its moves against the anti-war initiatives taken by the CPSU. The CPI mentions this in its 10th party congress documents...

“The Maoist policy is unscrupulously directed against the relaxation of international tension and detente, hence against peaceful coexistence and peace. In the UN the Maoist leadership vehemently opposed the Soviet proposals for a ban on nuclear weapons test and prohibition of nuclear weapons. It also opposed the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference and a 10 per cent cut of the military budgets of the permanent members of the security council. Peking thus stands for the arms race. “Detente is a temporary and superfluous phenomenon”, said Chou En-Lai in his report to the tenth congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However, the Maoist stand is not just confined to that absurd characterisation. The Maoist policy is, in fact, one of active support to everything that is against detente, everything that helps the aggressive moves and designs of imperialism and the cold-warriors.” (Documents of the Tenth Congress of the CPI, 1975: 57-58)

The relationship between CPSU and CPI can be measured from the letter below, which shows mutual respect and faith for each other. It also confirms that the CPI had direct party-to-party contact with the CPSU. Comrade Dange and Rajeswara Rao were even awarded the Order of Lenin, the highest order in the Soviet Union.

“It is noted with satisfaction in the Soviet Union that in this matter we have complete understanding on the part of broad sections of the Indian public, the government, and the prime minister of India Smt Indira Gandhi. Convincing evidence of mutual understanding and of the desire on both sides for the further development of friendship and cooperation was provided by the meetings, talks and documents signed during the official friendly visit to India by the general secretary of the central committee of our party Comrade Leonid Brezhnev in November 1973. The communists and the entire people of the Soviet Union know well and highly appreciate the immense role played by the members of your party and its leadership in strengthening and developing Soviet-Indian friendship and cooperation. As you know

the praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR last year conferred the Order of Lenin, the highest order in the Soviet Union, on Comrades Dange and Rajeswara Rao. This award is the recognition of their great services to the world Communist, working-class and national- liberation movement, and of their outstanding contribution to strengthening Soviet-Indian friendship. (Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Alternate Member of the Polit Bureau and first secretary of Uzbekistan CP, head of a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union speech at Tenth Congress of CPI, 1975: 314-15)

However, the statement in the Tenth party Congress of CPI by Sharaf Rashidovich also shows that the policy of the CPSU was that the Left parties here would support the Congress which strengthened the hands of the Soviet camp instead of promoting free Left movement.

“As is evident from your congress documents, the fraternal Communist Party of India has achieved substantial successes in its activities. The party’s membership has increased considerably. Its influence in the trade-union, Kisan, youth, and women’s movement has been strengthened. We know of the great response evoked in broad sections of the Indian population by the mass campaigns of the CPI for progressive socio-economic changes in defence of the Indian people’s democratic gain and against right-wing reaction. This is the fifth year that a government of the united front consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of India, the Indian National Congress, and other democratic parties, and headed by Comrade Achutha Menon, a prominent figure in your party has been working successfully in the state of Kerala, and it has been able to carry out a number of important changes in the state and to effect a progressive agrarian reform.” (Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Alternate Member of the Polit Bureau and first secretary of Uzbekistan CP, head of a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union speech at Tenth Congress of CPI, 1975: 316)

The Message of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the Tenth Congress of CPI in 1975 clearly affirms that CPSU had the full support of CPI and also indicates that CPSU’s policy was that the CPI would work together with the Congress.

“Now the Communist Party of India has become an influential force on the political scene in India and rightly enjoys high prestige among wide sections of the Indian working people and above all among the working class and working peasantry. The Communist Party of India has rendered very valuable service in the cause of uniting and consolidating the left and democratic and national-patriotic forces of the country in the struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and reaction, for the implementation of progressive social and economic changes in the interests of the common people. The task put forward by your party of the unification of all left and democratic forces in the country, including such forces in the ruling Indian National Congress party, assumes important significance in the present period. Such unity is an essential prerequisite of a successful rebuff to the pressure of the reactionary forces and an important condition for a continuous advance of your country along the path of progress. Your congress is taking place in an atmosphere of further ideological, political and organisational strengthening and consolidation of the ranks of your party. In the recent years, the Communist Party of India has achieved important successes in leading mass actions of working people for their rights and vital interests, for the implementation of progressive social and economic changes, against the forces of reaction and imperialism.” (CPI Tenth Congress Document, 1975: 318)

However, CPM clearly stated that from 1963-64 it took a different ideological line from CPSU And CPSU never shared a direct party-to-party connection with CPM, and on the other hand, it was against the left-adventurist and terrorist line supported by CPC, which was also called Naxalism.

“It is no secret that the CPI (M) was having serious differences and disagreements with the political-ideological line projected and practised by the CPSU since 1963-64. The CPI (M) was having no fraternal, party-to-party relations with the CPSU. The CPSU continued its fraternal relations with the CPI and was fully supporting its right-reformist and revisionist, political line. Similarly, it was no secret that the CPI (M) had to come into head-on conflict with the political-ideological line of the Communist Party of China which began lending open support to the left-adventurist and terrorist line of the so-called Naxalites after 1966-67.” (Eleventh Party congress CPM, 1982: 12)

E.A. Shevardnadze, alternate member of the PB, CC, CPSU at the 12th Party Congress of CPI, 1982, while defending the intervention by the USSR, said that in Afghanistan, the anti-feudal national-democratic revolution had been carried out by the Afghan people. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was not a party from outside of the country; it was a party of the people of Afghanistan. Shevardnadze also lauded the CPI and the Indian government for supporting the action of the Soviet Union on the issue of Afghanistan.

“Imperialists and their accomplices continue to whip up the ballyhoo around Afghanistan. Misinterpreting real facts, they are trying to put the blame for the developments in Afghanistan on the Soviet Union; they stubbornly do not want to see that the antifeudal national-democratic revolution was carried out by the Afghan people themselves. The long struggle against the monarchist feudal regime was conducted by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan that has emerged from the masses of Afghan people. This party is not imposed from outside. It is the flesh of the flesh blood of the blood of sons and daughters of Afghan people. It represents and defends their interests. The national conference of the PDPA that took place recently in Kabul has shown that this party which is leading the country on the road of social progress, strengthening of its sovereignty and national independence, enjoys the confidence of wide circles of people, i.e., workers, craftsmen, peasants, intelligentsia and others. The PDP A strictly observes the principle of respect for religious feelings and customs and traditions of the Afghan people. With every passing day ever greater number of people in countries, both close to and distant from Afghanistan, become convinced that imperialism strives to push Afghanistan back to feudal past and place it under its diktat. In this connection, I would like to say that the realistic approach of the government of India towards events around Afghanistan as well as the position of the CPI and all progressive and democratic forces of your country on this issue are highly appreciated in the Soviet Union. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its position is clear. We stand for discontinuation of any interference into internal affairs of Afghanistan and that the Afghan people should be provided with an opportunity to solve their problems the way they like.” (CPI Twelfth Party Congress Document: 1982: 30)

However, coming to the Tenth Congress (1978), the CPM's stance became harsh for USSR. USSR's policies were termed revisionist, but China's principle of "Three Worlds" was equally considered as dangerous. According to CPM, it was a big mistake on part of the CPC to call the Soviet Union a 'social-imperialist' power. It is worth mentioning here that CPI-ML, the third party of left in India, also called the USSR a 'social-imperialist'. CPM believed that:

"NATO as a defensive alliance and the Warsaw Pact as an aggressive one, supporting ASEAN and the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, opposing the national liberation struggle in Angola, defending the position of alliance with western imperialism and so on. These positions are totally untenable and have nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism." (Tenth Party congress CPM,1978: 12-13)

CPM felt that the imperialist forces were taking advantage of these differences in the socialist camp, that is why CPM adopted equidistant policy from both the socialist countries.

"The sharp divergence between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been and are being utilised by the imperialists. The combined military and economic strength of the two would have been the biggest deterrent to imperialist powers and would have been instrumental in bringing about radical changes in the world situation." (Tenth Party congress CPM,1978: 12-13)

CPM, in its Tenth party congress, made an allegation against the USSR and China that the selfish understanding of these two nations of the international situation reduced the pace of socialist mass movements all over the world. Even after the failure of their understanding, these countries continued with their stance harming developing nations. But the party also asserted the fact that the economic stability and development in the communist nations were still attracting the people and nations towards the Marxist-Leninist socialist agenda. Moreover, it also reaffirmed the need for international unity to fight imperialist powers. The Document states-

"The policy pursued by these two ruling parties of subordinating the development of the revolutionary forces in underdeveloped countries to the opportunist needs of their governments' foreign policy has greatly harmed the democratic struggle of the people

in newly liberated countries. Despite the setbacks in a number of countries as a result of these policies, these parties have not learnt the lesson and pursue the same opportunist course.

Nonetheless, the economic advance of the socialist countries, the great strides they have made in rearing a new society free from unemployment and other evils of capitalism continue to attract new millions to the banner of socialism. Notwithstanding the many mistakes and deviations, the socialist system is acquiring new prestige.

Under these conditions, the fight for principled unity of the international communist movement-unity based on the imperishable principles of Marxism-Leninism is the imperative duty of all adherents of Marxism-Leninism.

While complacency and rosy pictures about a peaceful end to imperialism have to be avoided, the fact cannot be forgotten that all the developing progressive forces have penned their judgement on imperialism, that nations and peoples are trying in a big way to end the epoch of imperialism, exploitation, war and economic misery. The developments of the last five years' show, do whatever it could, U.S. imperialism and its allies are unable to regain the initiative that they lost at the end of the Second World War." (Tenth Party congress CPM,1978: 12-13)

However, CPI made an allegation about CPM's position of playing for both teams (USSR and US) and not taking a firm stand against U.S. imperialists plotting against USSR. Despite being a supporter of the government, CPI said that it was the bourgeois class character of the Congress Party which was responsible for the "vacillation, inconsistencies and weaknesses in the foreign policy."

"A trend is, however, now becoming manifest, to take up an opportunist position of "equidistance" from both the USA and the USSR. There are repeated references to "superpower conflict and rivalry" as the cause of the present aggravation of the international situation-posing the issue as if both the USA and the USSR are equally responsible for it. The specious theory is often put out that the world is no longer "bipolar", but has become "multipolar" and that, therefore, in such a world a "third block position", as distinct from both the USA and the USSR would best serve India's interests and the interests of peace. The "superpower" theory, equating the imperialist

USA and the socialist USSR, equating the camp of war with the “Camp of peace, screens US imperialist war moves in various parts of the world, including our own region. It leads to a balance between friend and foe and helps India’s foe to Cover up its designs. It brings grist to the mill of the anti-Soviet, pro-US lobby in this country. India’s national interests and the interests of world peace demand that we fully support all peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and expose the war conspiracies of US imperialism. Vacillations, inconsistencies and weaknesses arise in the foreign policy of the government due to its bourgeois class character. These vacillations and weaknesses are liable to increase because of the heavier dependence of our economy on the western world and western financial agencies. Rising mass discontent among the people, arising out of ‘the government’s retrograde economic policies, creates a weak and unstable rear at a time when the defence of the country's national sovereignty and integrity urgently calls for a maximum rousing and mobilising of the working people.” (Twelfth Party Congress Document of CPI,1982: 53-54)

It also gave a task to its members to mobilise masses for a peace founding foreign policy. It says

“It is the urgent task of our party to rouse and mobilise masses on the widest scale around the nationally accepted foreign policy of nonalignment, anti-imperialism, peace friendship with the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and progressive regimes. It must fight back attacks from the BJP and other reactionaries, pro-imperialist circles on such policies pursued by the government. At the same time, the party must combat the weakness and vacillation manifested in the foreign policy of the government. The party should mobilise the widest unity of all anti-imperialist and patriotic forces in defence of the country’s national sovereignty and integrity. It is equally urgent and important that friendship and cooperation of India with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries be strengthened, extended and deepened since this is a reliable and tested shield for defence of our national interests, as well as the interests of defence of our nation, as well as the interests of world peace. We should make special efforts to take the left forces and left parties along with us in this effort. Mass mobilisation in defence of peace, against the imperialist warmongers and on foreign policy issues, in general, acquires special importance in the coming period.

The mass organisations have to play an increasingly important role in this respect.”
(Twelfth Party Congress Document of CPI,1982: 53-54)

However, contrary to these two parties, CPI-ML believed that the Communist Movement of India should support peace instead of the war in the US and the Soviet Union's imperialist movement. It is a pity that the CPI was blindly following USSR, and CPM was doing nothing and had adopted an equidistance policy from both parties instead of exposing the expansionist policy.

Because the CPI-ML believed that when the world was standing at the brink of another world war, taking no position at that time was a betrayal of communist principles, instead, India's left movement should mobilise a front of the common masses against the war.

“As a whole, in the present-day world situation, the two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, continue to pose the greatest danger to peace. It is true that at present they are more engaged in proxy wars and local-level wars, with a stalemate going on in their balance of forces. However, the danger of a new world war is still there, and it may become a reality with any major change in the balance of forces. Out of the two, just now, the Soviet Union is waiting for a new turn of events to make a further drive, and the American imperialism is adopting an offensive posture.” (CPI-ML-Liberation Third party Congress, 1982: 20)

While CPM did not subscribe to ideas of any ‘camp’ of the international communist movement, it did recognise the contributions of Warsaw Pact countries during wars and battles happening in other countries against imperialism and for forming a socialist state. While supporting the countries of Warsaw Pact, CPM said that these socialist countries had made a strong commitment against nuclear warmongering countries.

This also eventually led to establishing formal relations of the international communist parties with CPI(M). The party in its Twelfth party congress stated...

“The struggle for peace waged by the Warsaw Pact countries, with the support of the people of the world, together with the military preparedness of the Soviet Union

which is determined to see that the existing military parity is not upset in favour of imperialism, has so far acted as a strong deterrent against the nuclear warmongers.

The Soviet Union has been extending unstinted help to Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. This help and the fraternal role played by Vietnam in Kampuchea and Laos, have helped to frustrate the imperialist designs in Indo-China.

Socialist help, primarily from the Soviet Union and Cuba, to the fighting people of Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique; Afghanistan and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the support of all Socialist countries to the cause of Palestinian liberation, their firm opposition to the Israeli aggressors, have strengthened the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-racist forces everywhere.

The support of the Soviet Union and all Socialist countries, some of whom are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, has given immeasurable strength to this movement which stands for peace and comes out against imperialist war machinations. (CPM Twelfth Party Congress, 1985: 8-9)

But on the other hand, the CPI(ML) believed that the character of the country was semi-colonial and feudal in nature. It still had economic dependence on countries like the U.S and Soviet Russia, which eventually affected its policy at different levels, whether its cornering China or its unending support to revisionist USSR.

According to CPI-ML, India was entirely in the trap of American imperialism and social-imperialism of the Soviet Union. The aggressive approach of the Prime Minister of India towards the socialist country China and the attempt to suppress the movement within India was a clear example of this. At the same time, India's internal support to Soviet Russia in the matter of Czechoslovakia, and support of the American attack against Vietnam's independence movement was proof that India was in full clutch of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism.

“The political, economic, cultural and military grip of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism on the Indian state, the dovetailing of its foreign policy with the US-Soviet global strategy of encircling Socialist China and suppressing the national liberation struggles, the recent tours of Latin America and South-east Asia by the Indian Prime Minister to further the interests of this counter-revolutionary strategy,

the total support given by the Indian Government to the Soviet armed provocation against China, the tacit approval of Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia and its active collaboration with the US imperialists against the national liberation struggle of Vietnam clearly shows that the Indian Government is a lackey of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism.” . (CPI-ML-Liberation Third party Congress, 1982: 14)

However, CPM maintained equal distance from both the sides at the global level, but it also underlined the successful achievements of the Chinese revolution and advised Indian communist parties to learn from it. CPM said that if one looked at the development of China, it was so unexpected that one socialist nation lasted in the most difficult and adverse times. While having a sharp criticism of the U.S. imperialism and Soviet Union’s attack on China and its attempt to isolate PRC in the communist world, CPM had endlessly praised China’s economic development with socialist ways in the party congress. The party says:

“Equally, breath-taking has been the progress of the People's Republic of China, and it is all the more spectacular since this progress is being registered under unusually difficult and tiring circumstances. Despite inheriting an economy even more backward than that of pre-independence India, with one-fourth of the world population to feed, clothe and house, with the imperialist trade boycott and the Soviet revisionist betrayal of promised fraternal assistance, People’s China has forged ahead, built her socialist industry, her agriculture and science in an amazingly short period. Even its avowed enemies admit that its steel production has reached around 20 million tons, coal output 220-225 million tons, oil 10 million tons and foodgrains 190 million tons. (Political Resolution, Eighth Party congress CPM, 1968: 11-12)

But at the same time, CPM vehemently opposed China when it called USSR a supporter of the imperialist lobby. CPM believed that calling USSR an imperialist nation was not only against the Marxist principle but also broke the unity of the communist movement at the global level. CPI, on the other hand, had a different opinion and relation with the international communist parties. After the change in leadership of the CPC, CPI believed that the CPC was in alliance with the right-wing and reactionary forces. CPI had sharp criticism of the CPC on working against the USSR and also collaborating with the US and forming a united front to attack the countries which were fighting against imperialism and for a socialist dream. The CPI

in its Twelfth party congress (1982) said that the policy which was adopted by Mao against USSR (the party of peace, progress and socialism) was now being adopted by right-wing China leadership like Deng Xiaoping. CPI called CPC a threat to world peace.

However, on the contrary, CPI was openly supporting USSR's policies and was calling PRC a partner of U.S. imperialist front. Unlike CPI(M), CPI had all praises for the CPSU and acclaimed its initiatives which were taken up for the world peace and for being a formative partner of Geneva talks where USSR leaders offered to destroy some of its medium missiles to build trust among the members and to make sure that the world remained away from nuclear war. CPI showed complete support to CPSU and in its 12th Congress clearly states that :

“The process of alliance with US imperialism and other - reactionary forces against the forces of peace, progress and socialism-a process that had been carried far already in the last days of Mao Zedong's leadership has become still more marked after his death under the rightwing Deng Xiaoping leadership. The June 1981 plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of China marked a new stage in the degeneration of its present leaders. From being first an accomplice of international imperialism, they have now entered into relations of open collaboration, actively working together to promote common efforts to bring into existence a reactionary united front of struggle against the peace, national-liberation and socialist movements in general and against the USSR in particular. Beijing is openly collaborating with Washington in the undeclared wars against the Afghan and Kampuchean revolutions and in continued aggression against Vietnam. Taking into account the fact that the Chinese leaders have in no way broken with the aggressive, hegemonist and great-power chauvinist policies that led them to attack India, Vietnam and Kampuchea in the past and to support aggression and imperialist intervention against Afghanistan and other states, the collaboration of the imperialism and China's great-power chauvinism is a serious threat to world peace in general and in particular to all states and peoples in Asia who want to follow independent national policies and will not submit to the dictation of US imperialism and Beijing hegemonism.” (Twelfth Party Congress Document of CPI,1982: 39-40)

CPI was so busy in unreasonably following CPSU's anti-China policy that it even saw with suspicion the proposal to normalise relations with China by the Bourgeois Party like Congress. CPI, while addressing India's relations with the Chinese government, did not want India to go blindly behind CPC but asked people to realise whether it would be beneficial for the people of both the nations. CPI said that normalisation of relations between the two countries was possible only if the CPC abandoned its expansionist policy and abandoned the US and returned to the semantics of Panchsheel. While directly accusing the CPC, the CPI said that the Chinese proposal to normalise relations with India was a clever attempt to divide the Indo-Soviet Union's friendship. On the name of "regional security" and "good neighbourly relations" it would be fatal to ignore this trick. CPI called CPC directly as 'Beijing rulers'. CPI agreed with CPI(M)'s understanding here that China was aligning with US imperialism and Chinese attempts for the betterment of Indo-China relations were part of a mere strategy to ruin India's support and relations with USSR. The party in its Twelfth congress explains

"The Indian people firmly and ardently stand for normalisation of relations between India and China. But such normalisation, if it is to be a genuine one serving the real interests of both our peoples as well as the interests of world peace, can come only if the Beijing rulers abandon their present line of expansionism and total collaboration with US imperialism to forge a common front against the Soviet Union and against all national-liberation movement and return to the path of Panch Sheel. The Beijing rulers have also been sticking rigidly to their hegemonistic stand on such issues as the border dispute, Sikkim and Kashmir. The present moves of Beijing to normalise relations with India are nothing but a clever tactic to undermine and weaken Indo-Soviet friendship, to blunt our vigilance against the global Washington-Beijing conspiracies and to inveigle India into acquiescence in these. As a result of all the above developments, the threat to India's national sovereignty and integrity has sharply increased. This threat, it must be re-emphasised, is closely linked up with the global war offensive launched by US imperialism with the collaboration of the Beijing rulers. It would be fatal to delink the two and entertain illusions about "regional security" and "good-neighbourly relations", isolated from the struggle against the global threat." (Twelfth Party Congress Document of CPI, 1982: 44)

While CPI and CPM considered CPSU a socialist country, the CPI-ML said that the USSR was also giving financial aid to India under its expansionist policy. Both the countries were making newly independent countries like India financially dependent in order to increase their influence area. Because while looking at trade agreements between India and these countries, it was clear that these agreements were based on very biased conditions. Dependence over foods like PL 480 proved that India was still living in a semi-colonial phase.

“The abject dependence of Indian economy on ‘aid’ from imperialist countries, chiefly from US imperialism and Soviet revisionism, the thousands of collaboration agreements, imperialist plunder of our country through unequal trade and ‘aid’, the utter dependence for food on PL 480, etc., go to prove the semi-colonial character of our society. (CPI-ML-Liberation First party Congress, 1970: 1)

Differences on the issue of USSR’s intervention in Czechoslovakia

During the Brezhnev period, all three communist parties in India had many differences regarding Czechoslovakian distress. On one hand where CPI openly supported Soviet Union’s interference in Czechoslovakia, stating it to be an important intervention to crush the counter-revolutionaries and also the agenda of U.S. imperialism and also said that Indian communist parties that were opposing this move were doing so under the influence Chinese policy of dominance.

In CPI’s Tenth Congress, 1975, CPSU’s CC clarified its position on the Czechoslovakia crisis, saying that reactionary forces wanted to erase all the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia. Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was captured by revisionists, right reformists and anti-socialist forces, and imperialist powers took advantage of this division and were helping counter-revolutionary forces. Hence the army of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, the GDR and Bulgaria did not let their plans succeed. This intervention of the socialist camp ensured the survival of the thousands of lives which would be lost in the war.

“In this period, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic underwent a most serious crisis. The effort to correct the dogmatic and bureaucratic distortions of the past period of the Novotny leadership was utilised by the revisionists, the right reformists and the anti-socialist forces to denigrate all the achievements of the past, to challenge all the

fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, especially regarding working-class leadership of and in the socialist state, the leading role of the Communist Party and international proletarian solidarity. Chauvinism and anti-Sovietism were propagated, and petty-bourgeois anarchism held sway. The mass media and various strategic links of state power passed under the control of the revisionists, right reformists and anti-socialist forces. The dominant rightist leadership of the Communist Party headed by Dubcek and others paralysed the functioning of the party leadership and all fine and consistent communists. Imperialist powers began to penetrate and interfere in this crisis situation. The whole situation was getting dangerously out of control and counter-revolution was clearly on the brink of taking over Czechoslovakia, of destroying her socialist system and liquidating her sovereignty. At such a moment, the entry of the troops of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, the GDR and Bulgaria thwarted and smashed the plans of counter-revolution. Even so, the same thing repeated in the Communist Party's plenary meeting in Czechoslovakia in which this action was stated in the interest of Czechoslovakia and Inter-National Working Class.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in December 1970 stated in this connection: 'Objective assessment and clarification of the issues and interrelations of the deep crisis in which the CPCz and our entire society found themselves in 1968 give irrefutable proof that the internal forces, paralysed by the rightist representatives in the party leadership were unable to mobilise themselves and to halt the frontal assault of the counterrevolution deciding whether to wait up to the time when the counterrevolution provokes a fratricidal fight in which thousands of people will die and grant internationalist assistance only afterwards, or whether to come in time and prevent a bloody tragedy even at the cost of initial lack of understanding at home and abroad. The entry of the allied troops into Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 prevented such bloodshed and was, therefore, the requisite and only correct solution. The entry of the allied troops of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia was an act of internationalist solidarity which corresponded both to the common interests of Czechoslovak working people and of the international working class, the socialist community and the class interests of the world communist movement. This internationalist action saved the lives of thousands of people, ensured internal and external conditions for their peaceful and calm work, strengthened the western border of the socialist camp and thwarted the hopes of

imperialist circles for a revision of the results of the second world war.’ This assessment has been endorsed by the recently concluded 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Congress has also recorded the overcoming of the crisis conditions, the economic upturn and normalisation of the situation, which enables the Czechoslovak working class and toiling people to resume their advance all along the front. Having overcome grave trials with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, the CPCz and the working class of Czechoslovakia will undoubtedly make great contributions to our common cause as they have done in the past glorious fifty years of work, sacrifice and success since the foundation of the CPCz.” (Documents of the Ninth Party Congress of the CPI,1971: 49-50)

On the other hand, ML openly criticised Soviet Union’s move in Czechoslovakia and stated it to be a ‘social imperialist’ move under which the Soviet Union was fulfilling its desire of imperialism and to increase its area of influence. Whereas CPM expressed its concern regarding the impact of these ideological differences among communists on the international communist movement, it also said that the difference between China and the Soviet Union were benefitting the U.S. imperialist forces. It would have been better if the two nations which believed in socialist ideas were fighting the imperialist forces together.

The impact of these differences among the communist parties in India affected the communist movement in the country. CPI’s blind support towards the Soviet Union degraded the growth of an independent communist movement in the country.

CPM also expressed its concern that the lack of unity among the socialist countries did not only impact the economic development but also the countries fighting for their independence were not getting any help. “The disunity of the socialist camp is impairing its rate of economic advance, emboldening the imperialist enemies for different aggressive wars and activities, and preventing the forces struggling for national liberation, democracy and socialism from fully utilising the opportunities opened up by the New Epoch. The disunity and division in the socialist camp and the world communist movement are also in a big way responsible for some of the serious reverses to the anti-imperialist forces in the recent period.” (Political Resolution, Eighth Party congress CPM, 1968: 12-14)

CPM believed that it was the result of the fractured unity of international communist front that the U.S. and its imperialist minions could do a massacre in Vietnam, 5 lac people who believed in the communist ideology were openly killed, and in Ghana, they overturned the Nkrumah government.

“Apart from the audacity with which the U.S. imperialists are conducting the aerial bombardment and war on socialist North Vietnam over the last three years, they, together with their reactionary stooges, have succeeded in toppling Dr Sukarno's Government in Indonesia and in carrying out mass-scale butchery of five lakh communists and their supporters; they organised a reactionary coup in Ghana and overthrew the Nkrumah Government; they egged on and backed Israel to launch a surprise military attack on the Arab states and are deliberately encouraging it to refuse to vacate the aggression.

“The present disunity and division in the world socialist camp, if it is not overcome and a principled struggle to achieve it is not consciously conducted by all the Communist Parties and socialist states, a great danger faces the forces of peace, democracy and socialism. It becomes imperative that all the socialist states, despite the existing serious ideological-political differences, devise ways and means of achieving unity in action against imperialist aggressors, which alone can facilitate the process of ideological-political unity of the camp.” (Political Resolution, Eighth Party congress CPM, 1968: 12-14)

Moreover, CPM felt that because of this war-mongering, the imperialist nation wanted to put the load of the capitalist crisis in countries like India. USSR and PRC, two of the biggest socialist countries need to have an unbreakable unity against these imperialist attempts. But on the other hand, CPI was openly supporting USSR policies and was calling PRC a partner of U.S. imperialist front.

“It is again in this background of world capitalist crisis and the desperate drive of the U.S. imperialists to shift the burdens of the crisis to the shoulders of other weaker countries and peoples, that the economic-political developments in India, and the dangers of neo-colonialism, the threat to the national independence of our country, etc., have to be examined.” (Political Resolution, Eighth Party congress CPM, 1968: 12-14)

This was absolutely true that due to the lack of unity of large socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, the US was successful in the matter of how to deliver more and more weapons to these countries to promote counter-revolution in these countries. Vietnam was a vivid example of this. According to CPM, Vietnam was a country in the socialist camp where the United States helped to foster counter-revolutionary forces due to which the common people had to suffer. The Soviet Union and China did not actively help Vietnam, they only sent the weapons in a mere gesture of tokenism, if the two countries would have opposed this American imperialist attack the damage and the killing of the common people of Vietnam would not have happened.

CPM, in its Ninth party congress, also asserted the need to fight against the fascist imperialist forces by coming together and advised the CPC and the Soviet Union; it said:

“The fact remains that the disunity and differences between the Soviet Union and China have created a situation where, when armed counter-revolution on a massive scale has been exported by U.S. imperialism into the countries of Indo-China when U.S. imperialism has mounted massive attacks of aggression on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, a member of the Socialist camp, the peoples of these countries have to bear the brunt of the attack single-handed. Particularly the Soviet Union and China do not join in a mighty effort to take effective steps immediately to put an end to the naval and aerial aggression, but only assist the fighting. People by the supply of arms.” (Document of Ninth Part Congress of CPM, 1972: 23)

When CPI was siding with the CPSU and CPM was just criticising without taking a feasible stand, CPI(ML) said that the communist party of different countries were capable enough to understand the situation at their national level, so the phenomena of the global party was not needed and the ideological understanding with mutual respect and support would be enough for all.

“First of all, with the development of communist parties and they are getting matured in understanding their national peculiarities, it was felt that an organisation like the International was no more required as a guiding centre because the practice had proved that this acted as a hurdle in the development of communist parties. Moreover,

with the strengthened resolve-after repudiating Trotsky and the development of socialism in the Soviet Union- that socialism can be built up in one country, it was decided to dissolve the Third International. A common bond of Marxism-Leninism, acceptance of a general line in fighting against imperialism and mutual help and support were decided to be enough. (CPI-ML-Liberation Third party Congress, 1982: 18)

However, the CPI raised many questions on CPM repeatedly on its position regarding the unity of the international communist movement. The CPI said that while CPI activists were engaged in the struggle for implementation of the International Communist Movement according to the concrete conditions of India, in West Bengal, CPM's "action squads" were killing CPI activists. In such a situation, it was ridiculous of the CPM to talk about unity and the 'unity in action' in the communist movement. At the same time, people of Maoist factions like CPI-ML and CPI-M launched a war against the guidelines of the International Communist Movement.

"India has been a major centre of this struggle and our party has had to fight at every step the CPI(M) leadership which, having basically accepted the ideological position of the Maoist leadership as enunciated in the CC, CPC letter of 13 June 1963 to the CC CPSU, has been virtually at war with the general line of the international communist movement. The CPI(M) line today is characterised by both rightwing and leftwing opportunism, and splittism remains as ever its banner.

Further, the ideological degeneration of the CPI(M) is to be seen particularly in the methods of murder and political terrorism against the CPI and other left and democratic parties which the CPM is employing in West Bengal. In applying the line of the international communist movement to the concrete situation in our country, our comrades in West Bengal have had to face murderous attacks by the CPM's "action squads", and some of our valued comrades have been killed by these murder gangs. In a number of other countries, the fraternal parties loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of the unity of the international communist movement have had to face difficulties from the right and "left" revisionists, but they have fought them resolutely. Everywhere these elements and their splitting activities have suffered telling rebuffs. The success in the struggle for the cohesion and unity of the

international communist movement was demonstrated by the meeting of the 75 communist and workers' parties held in Moscow in June 1969. To the success of this meeting our party, we are happy to recall, made a noteworthy contribution. We sent our party delegations to the Soviet Union and the GDR for bilateral talks with the fraternal parties on the latter's invitations. It can now be legitimately claimed that the unity of the international communist movement is today stronger and more consolidated than at the time of our eighth party congress. This is an important positive achievement in the interests of the worldwide successes too have been achieved in defending the struggle against imperialism and for social progress—a struggle which is more and more influenced by the revolutionary ideas of the international working-class movement.” (Documents of the Ninth Party Congress of the CPI, 1971: 96-98)

It is worth mentioning that CPI-ML in its third-party Congress (1982) said that on the one hand, the Soviet Union was also trying to set fire to the countries in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Poland against the United States with the help of its people. On the other hand, America was also pushing the chaos to its peak with the help of proxy war. That is why to prevent such wars, the party should go with a clear opinion to the common people, and they must mobilise for peace.

“The Soviet Union is awaiting- and trying its best through its political agents in all countries to effect- a turn in the mass indignation against it generated because of Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Poland, towards the U.S A. before taking a new military offensive. It is wooing up Iran and trying to cling to India. While resolutely opposing the U.S. offensive, we should keep our vigilance against the Soviet Union and while opposing the Soviet Union, we should keep up our vigilance against American imperialism taking the Soviet Union as the main danger does not mean any united front with the U.S.A. or its forces in India. Such a policy can only prove suicidal. In the event of a war between two belligerent sides, we should strongly oppose war and stand for peace and should take measures appropriate in the then prevailing situation. At present, this is the only correct stand to remain with the anti-imperialist struggles of the world people and develop people's forces as a counter to the possibility of war. The theory of dividing the world into three parts in deciding the strategy and tactics of the international proletariat and the socialist countries, as formulated by Mao Tse-

tung, still holds good as the only correct theory.” (CPI-ML-Liberation Third party Congress, 1982: 16)

While CPI(M) split on the difference of many questions, at the home front, the party had differences in the understanding of state and class. CPI(M)'s relations with the international communist movement was not always smooth; rather, the party had huge differences with the two biggest international communist organisation, CPSU and CPC. Both these organisations did not support the CPM after it broke itself away from CPI whereas the latter continued to have friendly relation with the CPSU. Moreover, the Naxalite movement broke out of CPM; the party said that the support of the CPC was towards the left adventurist who started the Naxalite movement.

CPI(M) in its Eleventh party congress (1982) said that their differences with the international communist organisation did not push it not to acknowledge the struggles led by these parties and achievements attained by them on the path of revolution. CPI(M) rejected the idea of European based communism and Leninism being a Russian formula. CPM rejected the analysis of CPI regarding the Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960 by 81 Communist and Workers' Parties and said CPM stood with the real essence of both these declarations. CPI(M) in its 11th party congress defined its relation and understanding of international communist movement. It said:

“The CPI (M) had to assert itself as a Marxist-Leninist party in the teeth of fierce opposition from both the CPSU and the CPC. But in so conducting the struggle in defence of its political-ideological line, the CPI (M) had refused to slip into either anti-CPSU or anti-CPC stances. It consistently upheld the cause of socialism in these two socialist states, and the two big Communist Parties, notwithstanding numerous differences with both.

The standing that the CPI (M) has acquired in the working class of India and other toiling sections of the people in the country on the one hand, and the proletarian internationalist stand that our Party had adopted on world developments such as the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, the Soviet armed assistance to the Afghan People's Republic, Vietnamese armed assistance to Kampuchea in defence of the revolutionary gains of both Vietnam and Kampuchea, on the Polish crisis of 1980-81, and above all,

the unstinted defence of the Soviet Union and People's China and all other socialist states-all have enabled us to stand up as a Marxist-Leninist Party, no matter whether one or the other Communist Party in the world is willing to forge formal, fraternal relations with our Party or not.

Our Party, learning from life and experience, and guided by the existing realities in the world communist movement, has adopted a proletarian internationalist line towards all the Communist Parties in the world despite our serious political, ideological differences with one or the other of these parties. Accordingly, it is intent upon treating all the Communist Parties of different countries as fraternal Communist Parties and is willing to establish formal, fraternal relations with every one of them if they so desire.

It considers Leninism as the creative application of Marxism to the era of imperialism and socialist revolution, and does not agree with those who have come to consider Leninism as a mere "Russian phenomenon". The CPI(M) does not subscribe to the concept of the so-called Euro-communism and its various propositions, and the Party's views on it were made public long ago." (Document of Eleventh Party Congress of CPM 1982: 15-19)

The communist parties of India have always been in touch with the international communist movement, especially with USSR and CPC after their successful revolutions and establishment of the rule of the proletariat. Communist parties all over the world expressed solidarity with each other and took advice regarding ideological and other conflicts. Mohit Sen (2003), a veteran CPI leader in his autobiography 'The Road and Traveller' continuously mentions the dependence of CPI leaders on CPSU while understanding the different situations related to the internal national situation and international situation. Mohit Sen also mentions how CPSU helped changed the understanding of the united communist party of India in regards to Congress government and vice-versa due to which later conflicts arose in the party as well as on the line taken by the communist party of China. CPI(M) after splitting with CPI states that :

"The protracted inner-Party struggle in the CPI during the years 1955-62 for a correct political-ideological line had ended in the Party split and the formation of the CPI (M)

in the year 1963-64. The differences that sharply divided the two relate to several questions-political, ideological, national and international. In the national sphere, both the parties clashed on the assessment of the class character of the new Indian state and Government, and the tasks that flow from it for the proletariat in the revolution. If the CPI (M) defined the class character of the state as bourgeois-landlord, led by the big bourgeoisie collaborating with foreign finance capital, the CPI holds the view that it is a bourgeois state, led by the big and non-big bourgeoisie as a whole. In reality, the contention was that the state and Government were headed by the non-big national bourgeoisie.” (Document of Eleventh Party Congress of CPM, 1982: 15)

Differences on ‘National Democracy and Non-Capitalist path of Development’

While criticising CPI for accepting USSR’s policy of national democracy and non-capitalist path of development, CPM in its Ninth Congress conducted in 1972 said that those who had right-wing deviations and believed in the doctrine of “national democracy” and “non-capitalist path of development”, today their doctrine had failed. The newly independent states even then were under the bourgeois-landlord class rule. Thus, CPM termed “non-capitalist path and national democracy” as an entirely opportunistic policy. On the other hand, CPI fully supported Brezhnev's policy and supported all the policies of the Congress, which was the ruling party, which was called a non-capitalist path of development in the context of India.

“Thus, the period under review has thoroughly exposed the concept of the so-called “non-capitalist path and national democracy” conjured up for the newly liberated countries under the capitalist rule as nothing but an utter opportunist hoax. Such is the singular lesson that stands out on the issue.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM, 1972: 14)

On the other hand, while calling CPI-ML left opportunist, and adventurist CPM said that they ignored the objective situation of countries like India while blindly following the policies of CPC. Hence Naxalites only gave a reason to the ruling class to create terror and suppress mass movements. However, CPI-ML, keeping a completely different stand from CPI-CPM, said that if a great rebellion of farmers were emerging

against the feudal system in India, then it was clear that the direct fight in India was between these two.

“The rising tide of the peasant struggles in various parts of our country is further confirmation of our stand that the principal contradiction in our country at the present phase is between feudalism and the masses of our peasantry” (Documents of CPI-ML-Liberation First party Congress, 1970: 2)

Communist parties had differences among themselves on the understanding of class struggle and class collaboration. The impact of these differences among the communist party's in India affected the communist movement in the country. CPI's blind support towards the Soviet Union degraded the growth of an independent communist movement in the country.

“According to CPI-ML, the difference between the three parties in India can be understood from their betrayal to the class struggle. At the same time, it can also be understood by their story of becoming unreasonable followers of bourgeois party. According to ML, these two parties, who are called the official Marxist parties continuously, have been running continuously from the struggle of the people and have been playing the squads of the ruling party. More importantly, these two parties have been entirely inefficient in conducting a reliable analysis of Indian society because theoretical weakness makes the ground struggle directionless.” (CPI-ML-Liberation First party Congress, 1970: 4)

While CPM was preaching unity at the international level against the fascists and also reminding China and the Soviet Union of their undemocratic ways. In the home front, the unapologetic instead justifying of its mistakes of betraying the mass struggle against the capitalists was also visible. It did not recognise the unrest among the masses, which led them to oppose the capitalists with state headed by CPM at the time rather called it adventurist position by some left elements. it said in its party congress that

“If the Right-opportunist thesis of the so-called “national democracy” and “non-capitalist” path of development for several newly independent countries still under bourgeois-landlord class rule was blown up as a Right-revisionist myth, the Left-opportunist and adventurist thesis of armed insurrections and wars of people's

liberation as a slogan of action irrespective of the objective situation for most of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, advocated by the CPC, fared no better and ended in fiasco. Naxalism and its disastrous results in India are a standing example as to how this ultra-Left adventurist line has only helped the ruling classes to unleash terror against the mass struggles' to disrupt them. It also shows how the petty-bourgeois adventurists become easy tools in the hands of the ruling classes to attack the mass movements and especially our Party, the CPI (M).” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 14)

The CPI fully supported the decisions taken by the CPSU's 26th Congress, which also spoke of peaceful coexistence with other social systems. Along with disarmament, détente's policy was said to be acknowledged by USSR throughout the '80s. CPI believed that the USSR, which had been continuously saying that reducing the missiles and building a nuclear-free zone, was very important for establishing world peace. That is why the Indian Left movement should strongly support it.

“At the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Union came out with a comprehensive and realistic peace plan for the 80s, embodying a policy of disarmament, détente and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Since then the USSR has come forward with one act initiative after another-moratorium on deployment of new missiles in East and West Europe, a Soviet-US treaty pledging not to be the first to fire a nuclear weapon and to declare a nuclear first strike as a crime against humanity, creation of nuclear-free zones and guarantees that the Soviet Union will not attack states that do not manufacture, stockpile or deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. The Soviet Union fully supports the stand of India on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Leonid Brezhnev, during his visit to India, put forward specific proposals for ensuring the security of the Gulf region. During the recent visit to Bonn, Leonid Brezhnev put forward new far-reaching proposals which serve the aim of reaching a mutually-acceptable agreement during the Geneva talks, of delivering the world from the danger of a nuclear conflagration. He made an offer to “unilaterally dismantle” some of the medium-range Soviet missiles in the European part of Russia, to pledge with the USA not to deploy any more missiles in East as well as in West Europe during the entire period of the Geneva talks and readiness to reduce “hundreds of missiles” if the USA agreed to a moratorium on Pershing II and Cruise missiles

deployment. Since then a series of initiatives have been taken by the Soviet Union. In the light of these developments, it is urgently necessary to step up the campaign inside India against the US imperialist threat of nuclear war, against its policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union and military provocations and threats in Asia, Africa and Latin America, with the collaboration of China. It is necessary for the course of this campaign to expose the deception and lies of the Reagan administration and to mobilise the widest support for the Soviet Union's peace initiatives." (Twelfth Party Congress Document of CPI, 1982: 41-42)

The debate over foreign policy and domestic policy of Government of India vis-à-vis CPSU and CPC

Foreign policy has been an important part of the communist party's agenda after independence. Communist Party of India played a crucial role in forming India's relation with the Soviet Union after getting its freedom. This changed with an understanding of communists parties and ideological debates and differences over the period. For example, CPM has always considered the Indian state playing between the powerful camps but never really took a stand against or for anybody. CPM's understanding of this foreign policy of the nation in Tenth party congress explains this. The party also stated that the Indian state succumbed under the pressure of imperialists, which is visible in its trade relations with other countries.

While evaluating Congress foreign policy in this period, the CPI (M) said that the Congress party always keeps its class interests in the name of non-alignment and neutrality between the two camps. This is the reason why Congress did not open its mouth against the American attack on Vietnam unless the pressure of the general public of India increased because it was completely submerged in the US debt. The entire trade relationship with Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam has ended. In CPM's Ninth Congress, this concern was also expressed that under the American pressure, the Congress is pursuing its foreign policy against China, which has resulted in tension in both countries and the defence budget is increasing. By all these selfish manoeuvres, they simply imperilled the nation's safety and imposed on it a burden of Rs. One thousand two hundred crores per year for military defence which has risen to Rs. 1,400 crores in 1972-73. However, Congress has now been forced to negotiate with China again and is compelled to normalise its relations due to the emergence of

the economic power of China and the US policy of submission to China. That is why the situation of India has become like a snake-bitten by both sides. (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 15-16)

CPM, in its Tenth party Congress underscored many mistakes in the foreign policies of ruling Communist Parties. It also reiterated that these two big socialist countries were denying the fact that the newly independent countries where there were bourgeoisie governments, were mostly of anti-communist attitude. Because of the relationship of two socialist countries with these bourgeoisie governments, the revolutionary mass movement was being harmed.

“The CPI(M) had to comment on the weaknesses in the foreign policy outlook of many ruling Communist Parties in its political resolution of the Tenth Party Congress. The same has again been pointed out in the draft political resolution of the Eleventh Party Congress. The criticism has been that they are “ignoring the interests of the revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped countries and placing reliance on the friendly Governments of these countries. The rulers of some of the underdeveloped countries who adopt reactionary policies at home and oppress their people are excessively praised in the press of the socialist countries, news about the oppression of the working class and the people in these countries hardly figure in it, the working class of the socialist countries is kept in the dark about the struggle carried on by the people of these countries against their Governments, and no solidarity in the spirit of proletarian internationalism is expressed with these struggles of the people against their Governments for democracy and legitimate economic demands.” (Eleventh Party congress CPM,1982: 12-13)

At the same time, due to the crisis of capitalism, India had to ask USSR for financial assistance.

Further, the party believed that due to rising crisis of the business world, the help from the U.S. kept reducing, and pressure to support mass movements at the international level increased on the government which led it to speak in favour of the countries fighting against the imperialists. Moreover, the increasing economic crisis in the country also made India to amend its relationship with China, a growing economy.

“As the crisis of the capitalist system deepened, and U.S. aid became less and less available, the Government had to turn more towards the Socialist countries for trade and aid. Under pressure of public opinion in the country, the Government of India began condemning the bombing of North Vietnam and demanded the withdrawal of American forces and invited Madame Binh to India. With the emergence of China as an industrial-military Power, with the fiasco of the American policy of containment of China, and under the stress of the economic crisis and mass pressure, they began talking of normalising relations with China. They also opened consular relations with the GDR and raised the diplomatic representation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to ambassadorial level.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM, 1972: 16)

CPM in its further observation of the times mentioned due to Indian support to the Bangladesh war U.S. pressure increased on the country which led to its new political ties with USSR and further with the help received from USSR its political stands also changed with the time. Its stand on Vietnam and its improved relations with China were examples of it.

According to CPM, “Today, while Congress itself is talking about Indo-China friendship, the same thing was termed as anti-national when done by CPM. That is why the socialist countries like USSR and CPC should reconsider its policy about this double attitude India's Ruling Class.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM, 1972: 17) Pointing to the CPI, the CPM clearly stated that only “the revisionist traitors are sad when India-China relations are normal, and their anti-China slanders are continuing.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM, 1972: 17)

The policy of Brezhnev was a policy of cooperation with the Government of India. Many economic benefits were proposed to lure India in its camp. In return, India's foreign policy inclined towards USSR. While cooperating with this policy of Brezhnev, the CPI also continued to support the Indian government's foreign policy. CPI believed that India's foreign policy was important for maintaining world peace. Its foreign policy and its position at the world level was actually affected by radical changes made by the people's movement at home front. But the party also recognised the rightward shift of the economic policy and regular pressure by the capitalist and reactionary forces. So, CPI believed that the party and country could not serve its

purpose in maintaining world peace without dealing with these forces. Hence the party wrote...

“Moreover, India's international role as a peace-loving, the anti-imperialist nation is increasingly getting interconnected with the struggle of people at home for the rights and interests of the working people and for radical social change. India's foreign policy of peace and nonalignment is not only making valuable contributions to the cause of world peace and national liberation; it is at the same time strengthening the democratic forces within our country and broadening the basis for their unity for anti-imperialist and other democratic actions. The present international situation as tells our national interest demand that the policy of peace and nonalignment, particularly its anti-imperialist aspect, be strengthened and get rid of all vacillations, inconsistencies and other weaknesses. One can cite such instances as the hesitation in recognising the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam, the unprincipled overtures to make up with the USA and confusing the Soviet and US positions in world affairs by equating them as “superpowers” and by the use of such phrases as “great-power rivalries”. The government’s shift to the right in the economic policies adds to the retarding and negative factors. One cannot but take serious note of the constant pressure both from the reactionary circles within the country and from the imperialists to weaken and emasculate India's foreign policy, particularly its anti-imperialist aspects. Foreign monopolies and multinational corporations which have close links with Indian monopolists and certain sections in the government and top bureaucracy are being used for this purpose without exposing and fighting them we cannot play our due role in world affairs, nor can we use the detente and the opportunities arising out of the favourable change in the international situation to the best advantage of our country and our people.” (Documents Of the Tenth Congress of the CPI, 1975: 68-69)

After the end of the cold war, new relations were forming among the countries. One such example was India and USSR when Brezhnev visited India new economic possibilities were opened up, and India’s reliability on the capitalists class was reduced which CPI believed gave new avenues to defeat the right-wing forces as the international situation of peace also defeated their reactionary agendas. It said in its party congress regarding these new opportunities...

“The historic Brezhnev visit which took place in November 1973 led to wide-ranging political and economic agreements. In the view of the December 1973 session of the national council, while this opened up vast new vistas for building up India's economic strength and accelerating its economic growth and national self-reliance, for expanding and strengthening our state sector, for expanding our employment potential and raising the living standards of our people, for helping India to disentangle itself from dependence on the crisis-ridden world capitalist economy, the internal policies being pursued by the India government on the economic front, policies of drift and retreat before the offensive of the vested interests, are resulting in aggravation of inflation, price-rise and unemployment. The national council stated that “a sharp struggle against these policies and for a shift to the left is needed in order to realise the new possibilities that have been opened up by the Indo- Soviet agreements ... “The climate of international detente and the Indo-Soviet agreements recently concluded have created favourable new conditions for the defeat of right-reaction and the rapid advance of left and democratic forces in India. They have created more favourable conditions for widening anti-imperialist unity and for shifting anti-imperialist and centrist sections to left positions through their own experience.” (Documents of the Tenth Congress of the CPI, 1975: 108-09)

The new government of the Janata party was changing the relationship formed internationally among the countries as well as the party. CPI felt that it was taking the worst of Congress and implementing it. On the one hand, the new party's rule was defining new economic policies which were directed from the World Bank to expand the U.S. imperialist agenda, on the other hand, this Janata party was spoiling India's relation with USSR and all the other socialist states. The then government emphasised on building ideological relations with the imperialists to benefit the big business. The party documents also mention how in the time of crisis as well the CPI(M) kept a so-called neutral stand where it kept criticising the CPSU and did not say anything against the CPC agenda against USSR. The CPI felt that CPI(M)'s strategy of keeping the distance from both parties was an opportunist position on its behalf. Even with the differences emerging at the strategic level regarding international relations, both parties were coming on the same platforms, especially trade unions against the policies of the Janata Party. Regarding this changed scenario at the international and domestic front, CPI wrote....

“In the name of correcting the alleged earlier ‘tilt’ in our policy of nonalignment and making it “genuine nonalignment”, a tilt towards the imperialist powers is being skilfully and insidiously introduced. Anti-imperialism is being more and more ignored in Janata Party policy statements and declarations on international issues, and ‘ideological affinities’ with the western powers are being more and more stressed. (Political Resolution adopted by Eleventh Party Congress of the CPI, 1978: 12)

“On the international plane, the CPI(M) leadership continues its old bankrupt line of denouncing the CPSU and the other fraternal communist parties of the world communist movement as ‘revisionist’. The present line of the CPI(M) leadership is in basic contradiction with the needs of objective reality, with the compulsions of Indian class struggle and of the world anti-imperialist struggle, with the urgent need to build up left and national democratic alternative to which the CPI(M) leaders pay lip service itself and the anti-democratic, anti-people policies of the Janata Party governments are fast exposing the theories of the CPI(M) leadership and are bringing about joint action between the CPI and CPI(M) on some mass issues and on some mass fronts, particularly the TU front. This trend is bound to grow stronger and stronger in the coming period. The CPI(M) leaderships attempt to justify its alliance with the Janata Party is just a ‘tactical move’ to fight against ‘Congress authoritarianism .. is a totally invalid argument.” (Political Resolution adopted by Eleventh Party Congress of the CPI, 1978: 19-20)

On the other hand, CPM was of the opinion that both the countries (USSR and China) ignored that in the newly independent countries, new social contradictions had arisen after independence. Both these countries, instead of supporting democratic movements in these countries were aligning with their government, which were themselves exploitative in nature. To fulfil their short term foreign policy requirements, both these countries were taking the load of the communist party due to which these parties were becoming followers of the ruling class. CPI was a clear example of this.

“Both the USSR and China ignore the fact that in the former colonial countries after independence, social contradictions develop between the ruling upper classes and the common people. Instead of relying on and encouraging the growing democratic

movement of the exploited peoples, they rely on and essentially support the Governments run by the exploiting classes.

In pursuance of the short-term needs of their foreign policies, they seek to impose upon the Communist and Workers' Parties in these countries such policies as lead to their liquidation, and merger with the parties sponsored by the ruling regime or virtually make them obedient adjuncts." (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 11)

"It is tragic to witness that the leadership of the CPSU is selling this as the 'non-capitalist' path and 'National Democratic State'. Parties following them in these countries unashamedly collaborate with these bourgeois Governments giving them the endearing titles of 'revolutionary national democracies' and 'transitional Government to usher in the Socialist millennium'." (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 13)

While the CPI considered the fight against imperialism as its priority and CPM chose the middle path while keeping an equal distance from both the powers. In all this CPI-ML kept clear the view that imperialism could only be fought while fighting against feudalism in India because the root cause of the real problem lied in the oppression of the farmer by the feudal lords. The comprador-bureaucrat-capitalism was responsible for the survival of the feudal system.

"The Indian revolution at this stage is the democratic revolution of the new type - the People's Democratic Revolution - the main content of which is the agrarian revolution, the abolition of feudalism in the countryside. To destroy feudalism, one of the two main props (comprador-bureaucrat capitalism being the other) of imperialism in our country, the Indian people will have to wage a bitter, protracted struggle against the US and Soviet imperialism too. By liberating themselves from the yoke of feudalism, the Indian people will liberate themselves also from the yoke of imperialism and comprador-bureaucrat capital, because the struggle against feudalism is also a struggle against the other two enemies." (CPI-ML-Liberation First party Congress, 1970: 2)

CPM believed even if the newly independent states were sometimes taking a pro-socialist position and anti-capitalist ones, it was convenient in those times to benefit

the business class. So eventually these so-called independent democracies were exposed by their opportunist positions with time. It says that

“If the leaders of the big Socialist States imagine that they have been shrewd in extending them aid and utilising them in the struggle against imperialism and its war machinations, the capitalist regimes of these newly liberated countries have every reason to gloat over the fact that they have been able to successfully bargain between the opposing camps of Socialism and imperialism in furtherance of their path of capitalist development and simultaneously suppress the democratic movement at home with impunity.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM, 1972: 14)

The CPI-ML had said that the root cause of the real problem in India was American imperialism, Soviet Social-imperialism, feudalism and the Comprador bureaucrat capital. This line was entirely different in the three streams of the left.

“Everywhere in India, the people are rising in bitter struggles to remove the four mountains that weigh upon them heavily. These mountains are US imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism, feudalism and comprador-bureaucrat capital.” (CPI-ML-Liberation First party Congress, 1970: 3)

Further, the CPM held the view that CPC and CPSU were equally responsible for losing the momentum of the world communist movement and also ignoring the immense repression on the communist movements all over the world, especially in India wherein West Bengal they were part of the united front which formed the government and Kerala where CPI was heading the government with CPM in the opposition.

Underlining this clearly CPM said that both the Soviet Union and China needed to rethink their policy to cooperate with the ruling class parties of these newly-independent countries because they had an anti-communist attitude more than their anti-imperialist character. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Indonesia, India, Ceylon, Pakistan and many other countries offer standing examples. Governments of these countries had openly massacred peasants and workers there, but it did not even get mentioned in the Soviet and Chinese press. In many of these countries, the ruling class had overthrown the earlier state power, but still, the Soviet Union and China were leaving no stone unturned to help these new governments.

CPI(M) while again criticising the international communist parties for their foreign policy in its 11th party congress. It asserted its point that the relation of the communist-ruled states was only with the state governments of the other states rather than the communist party's presence in the new independent progressing nations in favour of the revolutionary movement. CPM also criticised the coverage of the media in the socialist state which hardly took into account the repression on the people in these countries or mass movements happening against the imperialist forces. (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 11-12)

The fraction and sectarian opportunist characteristics of communist parties were visible in those times. Everyone had kept their benefits rather than building a strong anti-fascist imperialist movement at the international level from CPM to CPC. There seemed to be no mutual understanding of the situation. CPM further criticised the Chinese stand on Bangladesh and accused it of favouring the oppressor Pakistan. It said:

“A regular genocide was organised by Yahya Khan's military regime to suppress the freedom struggle of the people of Bangladesh. Yet the Chinese government continued to support the military junta of Pakistan and termed the struggle of the people of Bangladesh as a 'secessionist struggle.' The solicitude shown by the Chinese Government in the Chou-Nixon communique to the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir is in strange contrast to its attitude to the freedom struggle of the people of Bangladesh.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 12-13)

Even the reality of movement of independence in Bangladesh was ignored, and both these countries had the same attitude towards the issue of Kashmir in India

“Its refusal to see the reality of Bangladesh even after it emerged victorious in the struggle and its harping on the question of Kashmir do not help the cause of peace and democracy in the Indian sub-continent.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 12-13)

However, CPM appreciated the help of the USSR in its Ninth Party Congress (1972) for the independence movement of Bangladesh and said that despite the American pressure, with the backing of USSR, India's help was a much-appreciated step in the restoration of democracy.

This simple step of India not only inclined bourgeois media against US imperialist policies but the biggest enemy of the working class of the whole world. America had been established as an enemy of the common masses of India. But this did not happen by the goodwill of the Congress, but by the pressure of common people of India.

CPM also believed that India's relations with the U.S. were soured as the U.S. continuously supported Pakistan and asked India to take a load of 10 million refugees. The party appealed to the Indian government to outrightly fight the imperialists to uplift the people of India. It said in its 9th Party Congress

“The Government of India backed by the Soviet Union supported the Bangladesh struggle despite American threats, faced the Pakistani aggressors and brought about the surrender of the Pakistani forces in co-operation with the liberation forces of Bangladesh, which ushered in the emergence of Swadhin Bangladesh and prepared to meet further blackmail.

It is true that in all this, it was not relying only on the support of the Soviet Union. It had the sympathy of both France and Britain and also Nixon's Democratic Party opponents.

But it was a sharp conflict of interests with the U.S. Government, protecting the military junta of Pakistan, arming it and asking India to bear the burden of ten million refugees permanently.

As a result, the entire bourgeois Press turned its broadsides against American imperialism and its threatening policies, exposing to the common man its hostility to the Indian people and the cause of democracy in Bangladesh. The enemy of the international working class is now identified as the national enemy of the Indian people, a consummation for which we have been working.

Even now, despite talk of self-reliance, the Government of India has not given up its efforts at rapprochement with this confirmed enemy of the Indian people.

It is for the Party to unite the people against the U. S. conspiracies, create strong public opinion against its blackmail so that the Government does not succumb to U.S. pressures and blandishments.

Our Party has already demanded a moratorium on all debt payments to the USA, confiscation of U.S. concerns beginning with the oil companies and stopping of all future loans from the USA.” (Political Resolution of Ninth Congress CPM,1972: 18)

However, CPI remained a faithful supporter of the CPSU as did its leaders whom all had immense faith on the leadership of CPSU, even after the fall of Stalin, CPI leaders went to USSR to understand the new line and came back with an agreement with the CPSU. CPI played a pivotal role with the Indian government while getting aid from USSR in time of need, Mohit Sen, in his autobiography the traveller and the road, goes on in length to explain how CPI had its voice in the corridors of powers. CPI leaders showed more than required faith on certain people or parties, which later became the reasons for their split and further deterioration.

The party congress documents explain this close relationship and appreciation of USSR's deeds constantly. It says

“An important positive feature on the economic front has been the significant expansion of scientific and economic cooperation of India with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp. The agreements signed at the time of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to India in 1980 signify an important landmark in raising Indo-Soviet cooperation to a higher level. The Soviet Union is extending massive help to India to build up self-reliance in vital fields like steel, fuel, oil and power. It is providing finance for several projects left out of the sixth plan for lack of resources. The agreements worked out with the Soviet Union provide for a big expansion of employment opportunities. Soviet aid has also been forthcoming to a significant extent for strengthening India's defence capacity and potential. It has to be realised that aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries helps to strengthen our self-reliance and the public sector. Its essence is antimonopoly and anti-multinational, and it helps to build an independent economy in our country.” (Twelfth Party Congress Document of CPI, 1982: 49)

The relationship between the two superpowers in the world defined many policies for other countries as well. So after the cold war, which was primarily based on establishing oneself at the highest power, drew to a close, it paved the way for these two countries to come together and co-exist peacefully. That made it possible for the

world to avoid a nuclear war and the use of dangerous weaponry. Like CPSU, CPI also believed that this peace pact was possible due to the initiative of the international social movements. The party further explains...

“The summit meetings which have taken place between CPSU general secretary Brezhnev and the US president and the improvement in Soviet-American relations have a great significance in the struggle for detente and world peace. These summit meetings have resulted in some important treaties and agreements on basic principles of mutual relations between the USSR and USA on the prevention of nuclear war as well as on the question of the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. These great steps are contributing to the struggle for halting the arms race and also to further relaxation of international tension. Needless to say such concrete, practical steps side by side with other measures to normalise Soviet-American relations through mutually beneficial commercial and economic cooperation meet the interest of world peace as they help deepen and expand international detente and generally influence the world trends in this direction. The latest summit talks between Brezhnev and US President Gerald Ford at Vladivostok (23 and 24 November 1974) has been a reassuring continuation of the process that began in 1972 with the USSR-US summit in Moscow. The cause of world peace and international security has undoubtedly a high stake on the steady improvement of relations between the two greatest powers belonging to opposite world social systems. This welcome development is the result of the untiring initiatives by the Soviet government, the CPSU and its central committee headed by Brezhnev, to implement the programme of the 24th CPSU Congress as well as the purposeful and coordinated policy of the socialist community and these initiatives, as we all know, have coincided with and in fact reflected the worldwide struggles of the peace forces both at the government and public levels. ‘Improvement in Soviet-American relations...’, said Brezhnev in the CC CPSU report to the 24th Congress’, would be in the interest of the Soviet-American peoples, interests of stronger peace: The correctness of the statement is now for all to see. The danger of world war is less today than ever before, though, the threat is still not eliminated. Moreover, détente spells the collapse, of the ‘positions of strength on which cold war policy was based. It is proving a deterrent to military and other aggressive potentialities of US imperialism. This is no small gain for the forces, including those in the third world fighting imperialism and neocolonialism, which need peace as well as a new basis of

international relations for their development. At an electoral meeting on 14 June 1974, Brezhnev declared: The favourable changes in the world situation are primarily the result of the influence on the course of events exerted by the socialist world, its success. its power, of example.’ This was in accordance with the Leninist prediction that the countries of victorious socialism would influence the development of world revolution chiefly by their economic achievements. The prediction stands connected in life by the great achievements of the Soviet Union and the socialist community. The peaceful competition between the two world systems is not only aggravating the crisis of capitalism and imperialism but attracting, as a result of the achievements of the socialist countries. Millions and millions of people to the ideas of socialism.” (Documents of the Tenth Congress of the CPI, 1975: 40-41)

Conclusion

Khrushchev’s disbarment from power and Brezhnev’s accession to it in October 1964 led to a reorientation of Soviet stances to the Third World regional conflicts. It goes without saying that a weak-kneed and diffident line was adopted towards these conflicts. While making a fervid call to aid the newly decolonised countries in general and their liberation movements in particular ,Brezhnev himself, referring to the CPSU, averred that their “party as well as the Soviet state would keep on: supporting the peoples’ struggle for their emancipation and striving for the expeditious granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples; promoting full co-operation with countries having secured national independence from colonialists and assisting them in developing their economy, training national cadres and standing in clear opposition to neo-colonialism; bolstering the fraternal links of the CPSU with the Communist Parties and revolutionary-democratic organisations in Asian, African and Latin American countries.” (L.I. Brezhnev, Report to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, 29 March 1966: 40).

As is discernible from Brezhnev’s statement, the policy towards the Third World saw two primary doctrinal adjustments over his predecessor. First, a remarkable role in aiding the regional conflicts; second, a renewed stress on the role of Vanguard parties. While the first one was conditioned by the coups against Ben-Bella, Sukarno and Nkrumah regimes during 1965-1966; the second one was because of frailty and unpredictability of the national bourgeoisie in third world regimes. The policy of

“working in tandem” with the bourgeoisie was no longer espoused by the local communists. Instead, maintaining closer ties with communist regimes, for example, Cuba, was emphasised. Remodelling the Communist parties of the Third World on Soviet model was given priority to stabilise the state power and alleviate the risk of reversibility.

A whole structure of foreign policy theory and international relations theory, based upon the two-camp premise envisaging peaceful competition and co-existence, was erected in the post-war years. The theoretical concepts which had wide-ranging implications for the foreign policy conduct- socialist internationalism, proletarian internationalism, détente, national liberation movements etc.- were evolved through the lens of Marxism-Leninism and its ‘creative’ development, ‘Theory’ and practice interacted closely and mutually influenced each other. The likelihood of foreign policy without ideology was dismissed. The link between ideology and foreign policy was stressed upon time and again in the statements of Soviet leaders as in the writings of Soviet theoreticians. Even though cooperation with the ideological adversaries was not wholly ruled out, ideological struggle remained a chief element in the Soviet foreign policy doctrines.

Concerned with achieving military rather than economic parity with the west, Brezhnev used ideology to segregate USSR from the mainstream developments in the world in a multitude of areas. This caused decadence in the internal development of the Soviet in the late seventies and early eighties. Foreign policy, in the Soviet Union, had always been considered as a means to an end set by the party. Thus, foreign policy had had an overtly close and discernible link with the domestic policy which was conspicuously demonstrated when foreign policy and diplomacy had been employed to accomplish the goals determined by such priorities, i.e. ‘building of Communism’ under Khrushchev and developed Socialism under Brezhnev.

Furthermore, foreign policy had been deployed in attaining the goal of the ‘anti-imperialist’ struggle of which struggle against bourgeoisie ideology was an integrant. Likewise, upon the realization that war would majorly sabotage socialist construction, foreign policy and diplomacy were used to attain ‘peace’ and elude war. Foreign policy was not self-standing as it extracted itself from the general ideology of the Soviet state, which represented class interests.

In the USSR, ideology was also used to combat ideology. To put it into perspective, it was averred that anti-Sovietism was a plank of imperialist ideology and hence of the foreign policies of the imperialist countries. Great emphasis was laid on tackling the challenge of bourgeois ideology by keeping intact the purity of the socialist ideology but in a 'non-dogmatic', 'non-sectarian' way in Soviet literature.

Under Marxist-Leninist principles, substantial importance was laid upon the appraisal of the contemporary world. Such an analysis provided the premise for the formulation of the foreign policy of USSR. Shifts in international relations led to new doctrines being evolved. Thus, never was either the ideology or the foreign policy ever treated as being static. To elucidate shifts in policies or contradictions and departures from the buttoned-down guidelines an integral part of Marxism-Leninism, the dialectical method was used.

The Soviet foreign policy was deemed 'scientific' and 'law-based' and therefore superior to the 'bourgeoisie nations' foreign policy which was lambasted for not giving due recognition to the 'class' premise of international relations.

Several policies of the Soviet can be vindicated only in terms of the ascendancy of the superstructure over the base. This basic theoretical revision under Stalin gave the State and the Party paramount importance even though the foreign policy had also been gravely affected by this.

Changes, developments and new foreign policy doctrines were always vindicated in terms of Marxism-Leninism. Constant practice in the Soviet Union was to show just cause for policy shifts by referring to Lenin, the extrapolation of whom has been very common to the contemporary situation. Marxism -Leninism acted as the legitimiser of sorts of the policy of the day.

The Communist Movement of India was also divided based on Brezhnev's policies. Where CPI continued to support Brezhnev's policies, CPM stuck on the 'equidistance policy' from both the socialist countries, i.e. USSR and PRC. Both CPI and CPI-ML criticised the CPM's 'equidistance policy' and termed it an 'opportunistic and bankrupt' policy while CPI-ML described both USSR and US as imperialistic and

expansionist. Although CPI-ML had long been displaying unnecessary fetishism of the Communist Party of China, later on, it changed its policy towards CPC and made several criticisms against it. Thus, the attitude of India's communist movement towards Brezhnev's policies was not one-sided; instead, they have undergone several twists and turns and intense debates among themselves.

Chapter-VI

CPSU Policy in the Gorbachev Era and Debates among the Indian Left Parties, (1985-91):

Mikhail Gorbachev who became the General Secretary of USSR in 1985, spearheaded a period of change, humanitarian, democratic political and economic reform in an attempt to re-energise the party doctrine and fix the flagging economy, by introducing the philosophy of Perestroika. Inferable from Gorbachev's Perestroika, Glasnost and 'new political thinking', the period after Leonid Brezhnev, particularly since April 1985 was of important significance for the USSR as well as for the world at large. The very foundation of the Socialist system laid in October 1917 in USSR had debilitated, and doubts over the state's stability rose, despite efforts to initiate political and economic pluralism. This resulted in the radical alteration of the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies, bringing in a comprehensive de-ideologization of the Soviet society, its policies and politics. Despite being in the early stages of development, there was an assertion of the renewal of socialist ideology and pragmatism, after the Brezhnev period, which had earlier dressed itself in ideological categories. Conditions in the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, had steadily declined, with the economy increasingly stalling and eventually falling into a decline.

This 'new political thinking' of Gorbachev significantly influenced the global arena. The West, after the end of the Cold War, did not see socialism as a danger and were encouraged by the surrender of the socialist positions one after the other. In fact, the West declared the 'end of history', emphasising on the triumph of the western ideas over socialist ideology. The Soviet Union too were looking for a harmonious tie-up with their former opponents.

The change in the political thinking of the USSR had its effects worldwide, despite the relaxation of tensions between the East and the West, there seem to have been a resurgence of revanchist, fundamentalist, anti-Semitic ideologies, which has resulted in the intense dangers created by sub-nationalisms to the security of the states and international relations. One of its international repercussions, greatly felt by the States, which thought that Soviet help was permanent, was left bereft and alone.

While USSR and its policies gave way to problems, it did not present the solutions, including the replacement of the socialist ideology, with a viable ideology and system.

Perestroika and New Concept of Socialism

Gorbachev's new concept of 'socialism' consolidated the concept of a multi-party system, private property putting the very concept of 'socialism' under renewal, and spinning one of the most 'creative' understandings of Marxism-Leninism. This new idea, which was purported to be more 'humane, democratic socialism', took it outside the limits of the conventional understanding of Marxism-Leninism. Gorbachev (1987), himself named the sweeping changes as 'Perestroika'- a revolution, which saw the dismantling of the socio-political and economic system, set up after the October revolution in 1917. This Perestroika unfurled itself in three-wide and interconnected directions- the democratisation of masses, the establishment of a controlled market economy dependent on various types of property and Glasnost. In the field of International relations, Perestroika broadened the idea of 'New Political Thinking' which implied outright dismissal of the peaceful-coexistence as a "particular type of class battle" and sought for a collaborative association with the west through unilateral concessions when required.

While examining the ideological premise of Perestroika, it should be recognised that the theoretical basis of "restructuring" had been developing over the period of 1985-90 and what started as an objective of further improvement resulted in the reinterpretation of the meaning of 'communist' alternative, thereby discarding the principles of communist theory as developed in USSR in 1917, thus becoming the ideological basis of Perestroika.

Revival of Socialism

Gorbachev had introduced the philosophy of Perestroika, which was driven by his humanitarian sentiment which is apparent in his book on Perestroika (1987), where he explained that the stagnating socio-economic conditions of the country compelled him to introduce the policy of Perestroika. Stalin deviated from the Marxist-Leninist principles in the thirties. Thus, modernisation of socialism was the need of the hour. Gorbachev proclaimed that this did not imply that 'communism' was in crisis. He

believed that the stagnation had been the consequence of the deviations from the principles of socialism. It was the mission of Perestroika to put socialism 'back on its tracks', rebuild socialism, the last value of humanism, and actualise its tremendous socio-economic potential. Gorbachev (1987) advocated categorically that Perestroika did not mean that the Soviet Union was rejecting the socialist-path and approaching the 'other camp'.

In the January 1987 plenum of the CPSU, Gorbachev gave the comprehensive definition of Perestroika, despite the media talking about it during 1986. The fundamental components of Perestroika were regarded as conquering the negative propensities and hindrances which began in the stagnation period, further development of democracy, strengthening of discipline, widening of glasnost, intensive development of the Soviet economy, abandonment of command and administrative method of management, full cost-accounting in all spheres of the economy, basing practice on science, priority for the development of social sphere, deliverance of the society from the distortions of socialist moral, reinstatement of the principles of socialist justice, reinforcement of the unity of word and deed, rights and duties, overcoming the equalising and levelling tendencies etc. The final goal, of Perestroika, was defined as "deep renewal of all sides of the life of the country, giving to socialism the most modern forms of Soviet organisation, the complete opening up of the humanistic character of our system in its most important aspects - economic, socio-political and moral." (Gorbachev 1987) These were necessary goals; in order to accomplish them, an extensive reform idea was essential. In the theoretical plane what was desired was a theory of new political-economy to justify the current economic reforms, a new political theory to expedite the political reforms, an evaluation and rejuvenation of all the social sciences, the theoretical rationalisations for socialism's previous history of attainments and failures, a theory for the 'renewal of socialism' and particularly of the concept of "humane-democratic socialism", and ideology for the future.

After the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, the ideological work for the implementation of Perestroika began. Under the Chairmanship of Vadim Medvedev, who was the member of the Polit Bureau and the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, a commission of ideology was set up to analyse the work relating to the

renewal of ideology. In an interview to 'Komunist', Vadim Medvedev emphasised the urgency for a modern idea of socialism which could prove suitable for the 21st century too. (Medvedev 1988)

Medvedev stated that the Brezhnevian concept of 'developed socialism', was a mere façade to hide the real problems and it would further create illusions of advancing movement in the ideological-theoretical field. He further discarded "the idea of stage-wise development of Socialism and stated that socialism was a living process, and it needs to be constantly renewed" (Medvedev 1988). Medvedev defined the important characteristics of the new idea of socialism as follows:

- "It was focussed to uncover the humane essence of socialism, by resolutely combining ideology and theory with practice and it was by no means degenerate from the basic principles of Marx and Lenin, it took into account Lenin's idea that complete socialism could be achieved only as a result of a series of efforts each of which was necessary of one-sided character; it took full account of the role and place of culture of all the people in the world, it fully studied the experience of the other model systems (i.e. Capitalism etc.) and adopted a non-nihilist positive approach to relations with capitalism." (Medvedev 1988)
- "In the economic sphere, the new concept of socialism entailed: the introduction of 'lease' ('arenda' in Russian) system at all levels of the economy, development of theory and practice of cooperatives; introduction of 'economic pluralism' in the economy; urgent review of old biases regarding commodity-money relations under socialism and between the plan and the market, a redefinition of the role and sphere of the 'centralisation' in the economy, individual initiative and incentives etc." (Medvedev 1988: 14-17)
- "The new concept of socialism sought to take a thorough and 'realistic' view of capitalism; It was now recognised that capitalism had been able to adapt itself to the new situation, had even ushered in a new scientific-technological revolution and had left behind socialism in this regard. Capitalist countries had even evolved an effective system of democracy, which guaranteed human rights and freedoms. Capitalism had also come out with effective methods of

organisation of power and management of society and the state. Socialism could and should learn from capitalism in these areas.” (Medvedev 1988: 11)

- “In the new concept of socialism, the old stereotypes of Socialism Vs. Capitalism equation would have to be discarded. It was realised that capitalism and socialism were part of the same human civilisations. The universal values affecting the mankind as a whole had to take precedence over the class-based priorities. The notions about the ‘limitations of the bourgeois democracy’ would have to be reconsidered.” (Medvedev 1988: 12)

Medvedev (1988) argued that these efforts were still in their nascent form and further stated that Lenin’s work, particularly his last works, would be substantially constructive in defining the new concept of socialism.

After the 19th CPSU Party Conference in June 1988, the issue of whether Perestroika was a ‘socialist idea’, became intense. Gorbachev through the pioneering article titled “The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika” Gorbachev reassured that ‘communist alternative’ was never in question in itself. However, there was a need for a new vision of socialism. This renewed form of socialism would be judged by criteria such as freedom within the reinterpreted parameter of collectivism, labour efficiency and productivity, primary of universally accepted human values and bringing the “vector of class principles” in line with the “progress of civilisation towards freedom and peace.” In the same article, Gorbachev (1990) continues to stress the “need for keeping a one-party system”.

The February 90th plenum of the CC, CPSU was a landmark in the advancement of Perestroika when the party came out with a tentative agenda for the 28th CPSU Congress. The Party decided to abandon its vanguard role in society and further accepted private property and other forms of ownership. The ideological positions which the Soviet Union held on to so dearly, just a few months back were reversed in the February plenum. Thus, the ‘humane, democratic form of socialism’ was to be founded on a multi-party political system and on the economic system that permitted the personal property. The merging of socialism with reformed capitalism was brought nearer. (Pravda 1990).

The 28th CPSU Congress (July 1990) approved the idea of ‘humane, democratic, socialism’ but did not come out with a theoretical elaboration of the concept, also there was a need of a detailed programme of the party. The procedure of renewal of the ideological work of the party had started as it is recognised that it is necessary to redefine the socialist ideology as a whole and restructure the CPSU’s ideological work. (Pravda July 11, 1990) For this purpose, Congress established a commission so that it can be discussed in the “regular party congress in 1991”.(Pravda 1990) In his report to the Congress on the discussion in the working group on ideology, set up at the 28th congress, I.T. Frolov said that most members of the working group had realised that there was an ideological crisis in the party and that various theoretical issues like the correlation between the concept of “humane, democratic socialism” and the party’s “Communist perspective” had not been proved. There was also no distinct knowledge of the concepts like ‘socialism’, ‘market’ and “social-democracy”. This had made the party’s ideological work complicated. The understanding of the Congress was that “the theory of perestroika, the ideology of renewal” needed to be worked out more comprehensively. (Pravda July 9, 1990) Marx, Engels and Lenin were defended, but the emphasis was laid on their reinterpretation.

The February (1990) party CC plenum paved the way for a radical change in the party’s character. The party in a historic decision accepted to drop its constitutionally guaranteed monopoly on power, undertook to discard several ideological notions like “simplified class approach which opposes national and universal human values”, “state hegemony in public” “primitive view of socialist ownership” ,negative attitude towards “commodity-money” relations and accepted perestroika’s ideological principles like interdependence of states, primary of its human values. It also agreed to place “man in the focus of party policy”. (CPSU Plenum 1990) It also rejected the earlier policy of idealising its past.

After the February (1990) CC, CPSU plenum, the party began the process of getting rid itself of the ideology which legitimised the continuance of party-state structure in USSR. This pattern was affirmed at the 28th Party Congress (July 1990).

Even before the February plenum, Gorbachev, through a process of political reforms proposed in the nineteenth party conference (1988) had been able to achieve a considerable degree of separation of the CPSU from the state structure. Thus, the

Constitution of the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies (2250 delegates elected through secret ballot, multi-candidate elections in March 1989) conducted its two sessions in 1989, established a Supreme Soviet and other organs of 'power thereby reducing party's role in every-day decision making in the USSR.

Restructuring of Party

It was obvious that the Soviet's state and society's political, economic and social reorganisation could not be possible without restructuring the party and its ideological foundations. Gorbachev in his Report to the 27th CPSU Congress held in 1986, advised the party members that there was no such thing as the communists' vanguard role in general and it could only be championed in practice. It was to be understood that the party's leading role in the masses would rely on its attitude towards Perestroika.

The reorganisation of the party occurred in three ways:

- (1) Re-evaluation of the party's functions and impact on the society,
- (2) Democratisation within Party,
- (3) Re-interpretation of Leninist principles which would educate the party in the perestroika.

In the early stages of Perestroika, it is clear from the party documents that the party leadership emphasised the role of the CPSU as the political vanguard; it was explicitly indicated that the new political structure is unthinkable without the active involvement of the Party (Gorbachev 1989). Gorbachev abandoned the multi-party system in the USSR in late December 1989,

The second front of the Party's rebuilding was developing the internal party democracy, party reforms and, diluting the *nomenklatura's*⁴ privileges and authority. Thus, the 28th Party Congress took significant decisions in this respect, endorsing new party rules and reorganising the party structures which were expected to encourage more democratic functioning within the CPSU. The main objective of the

⁴ The system in USSR whereby influential posts in government and industry were filled by CPSU appointees.

party restructuring at the Congress was to turn the party into a 'Vanguard of the Society' but without the State power. It was apparent that the CPSU in its restructured form would be completely distinct from the Leninist concept of the party as it evolved in the USSR, thereby paving the way the path for the decline of the Party's decline. (Pravda July 5th,1990)

The distinction between society and State

Lenin believed in the state, transforming itself into social self-rule. Stalin overturned this policy and in the name of establishing 'socialism in one country', removal of antagonistic classes and the capitalist invasion and occupation advocated in favour of empowering the state assertion (January 1933) that the 'withering away of the state' would not occur by weakening the state. (Arbatov 1989: 37) The maximum concentration of power in the hands of the Party-state structure ensured the failure of political and economic reforms initiated by Khrushchev. Brezhnev's idea of 'Developed Socialism' and the 'real socialism' did not invalidate the theory of the 'withering away of the state' but only delayed it to a distant future. At the same time, the party-state apparatus continued to grow to lead to stagnation and negative tendencies in society and distortion from the principles of socialism.

The trends started in the '20s about subordinating society to a 'totalitarian state-apparatus' continued unabated right up to the mid-eighties, some attempts at reforms in the fifties and sixties notwithstanding. (Batalov 1989: 37) One of the objectives of the USSR was considered to be to rectify this trend and ensure democracy.

The advocacy of withering away of state would be nothing short of a "pure and simple utopia." (Arbatov 1989: 42) What was held to be the purpose of the reforms in the USSR was to make a transition from the hyper state, in the form of powerful mechanism retarding Perestroika, to a 'half state' (a term used by Lenin). The essential idea is to replace the control exerted by the 'apparatus' by the control to be asserted by the society. A clear distinction between society and state is sought to be made. The strengthening of the state does not necessarily mean a strengthening of society. It is maintained.(Arbatov 1989: 43)

Seen in this general context, the outline of reforms in the Soviet Union were easily discernible: it garnered the involvement of the masses in the process of governance,

self-governance, self-regulation, development of individual and collective initiative, free development of every nation and nationality, social legality, laws to abolish misuse of power, provision and protection of citizens' rights and freedoms, strict demarcation of the functions of Party and state bodies, guarantees for the irreversibility of Perestroika. (Gorbachev 1988: 40)

There was an emphasis not only on the rights and freedoms but also on the dismantling of yesterday's debilitating controls. It equally realised that there are forces which would use glasnost, democracy and other methods to sabotage perestroika. Hence, equal emphasis needed to be paved on rights and duties, conscious discipline, recognition of responsibilities etc. The need to form a political consciousness and political culture was also stressed. (Arbatov 1989: 45)

What was complicated about the formation of a new state structure was the growing influence of nationalist tendencies, ethnic conflicts, isolationism among republics, history, deteriorating economic condition and ideological confusion. However, the new state structure incorporated some western liberal ideas. Thus multi-party system, accountability to parliament, separation of the party from the state, strengthening of local bodies, a new treaty between the republics and the centre, the codification of the right of cessation, a presidential form of the system were some of the concepts underlying the new model of the state in USSR.

New Approach for Ethnic and Social Contradiction

The Soviet theory took a renewed look at the contradictions and antagonism within the Soviet society, given the ethnic and social contradictions which plagued the USSR in those years. Stalin's arbitrary methods of tackling antagonism and contradictions were one of the prime reasons for the deepening crisis. There were many who believed that these contradictions could be removed through progressive methods and primacy to human values. Arbatov was of the notion that contradictions and antagonisms in socialism were no longer considered to be dirty words, as they spout off from the human interest, which ultimately pushed towards society's development. (Arbatov 1989: 48-55). This new thinking was used to rationalise reforms. However, it must be included that the interpretation of contradictions in socialism only serves as an apologia for socialism.

Individual as a Centre of Social Development

Grekov (1988) stated that economic and technical progress could not be achieved unless the individual's stakes in the latest revolutionary technology were created. Perestroika sought to make the individual as the centre of social development, in an attempt to remove his alienation from the state and the means of production. The interest in the role of the individual saw its peak after the 20th Party Congress but died down in the Brezhnev Period (Grekov,1998:50).

In the socio-political fields, the interest of the individual was being regarded through greater attention to people's political rights and suitable guarantees for the same. Freedom of expression (i.e. glasnost), freedom of conscience, legal guarantees for personal rights of citizens, human rights etc were constituent features of new political thinking. Visnevski (1989) noted that there were many theoretical consequences of placing the individual at the centre of all affairs. In particular, it affected the egalitarianism of the old socialist theory, which was now labelled as crude wage levelling. Further, it ultimately would result in the privatisation of the economy, which in turn would affect the politics of the country. The Marxist principle that production relations in society derive their character from the existing productive forces is being regarded as too restrictive, as it ignores the role of the individual (Visnevski, 1989: 23).

“One of the standard Western criticisms of the Marxist economics is that the productive forces in society are given too much of importance over a man who actually creates them. The current trend in Soviet economic thinking seems to be to accept this criticism. The net result of this lies in suggestions that their material incentive to worker, to raise the prices of subsidised goods, or to introduce conscious differentiation of wages or to have a fresh look at the existing system of 'social use fund' which compensates the citizens for low wages by subsidizing housing, food, transport, education, health facilities etc.” (Vishnevskii 1987: 105)

De-ideologisation of Socialist Economic Theory

The economic reforms saw an intense discussion in the USSR on the theory and praxis. There was a major shift from the Stalinist type of economy to a more regulated

market economy based on diverse forms of property. While the reforms began in April 1985 Plenum, it was in the June 1987 plenum that Gorbachev further elaborated on the reforms. At that moment the underlying premise of the economic reforms' theory, in the words of Vadim Medvedev, the Head of the CC, CPSU's Ideological Commission, was that the "economic basis of socialism are all in need of serious renewal and deepening". The entire economic management practice, based on the ideas of the '30s, needed to be changed. The essence of the economic reforms was "the transition from administrative to economic methods of economic management, reinforcement of economic stimuli of growth of production, qualitative improvement of productivity based on the acceleration of the scientific-technical progress at all levels and in all the links of the economy." (Medvedev 1987: 15). The essential elements of the economic reform as perceived thus included: "Social reorientation of economic growth towards the fulfilment of the needs of masses, changes in planning, management, pricing mechanisms, finance and another instrument of the economy." Self-financing, self-reliance, cooperatives, the introduction of leasing and contract systems, material incentives for individuals etc. were the essential components of the economic reforms in 1987-89. The Law of State Enterprises sought to bring in total self-accounting in all ventures, and the laws on cooperatives were the courageous steps taken to reform the economic mechanism. The old generalisation of commodity-money relations, socialist market, decentralisation, the autonomy of decision making was gradually disposed of.

These reforms packages were really an extension and further elaboration of the earlier economic reforms attempts in the fifties, sixties and the seventies. Even in the late 1950s, the Party had realised that the centralised economy, after developing an industrialised base, was facing difficulties. In 1958 Khrushchev dismantled a host of centralised ministries and created 'Sovnarkhozes'⁵ (Council of National Economy) with dispersed regional operations. In the early sixties, Liberman first mooted the idea of profit as a basis of operation for the Socialist economy. During Khrushchev's time, the 'general slogan was economic freedom for the enterprises, thus putting profit motive at the centre of planning and management. This led to economic reforms in 1964-65 in both industry and agriculture. These reforms envisaged right of the

⁵ Sovnarkhozes were initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in May 1957 trying to fight the centralization and departmentalism of ministries. USSR was at first segregated in 105 commercial zones, with sovnarkhozes being operational the number was later decreased to 47.

enterprise to use part of its profits for capital investment, for investment in the social sphere and bonuses for the workers. However, these reforms were not all-embracing, nor were the political will to see them through to their logical end. Therefore they failed. (Galbraith 1988: 36-37)

As these reforms unfolded, a heated debate began in the Soviet Union on the need to discard the old theoretical concepts and bringing in the new ones. At the heart of the reforms lay the limitations of the socialist view of ownership, the law of value, the importance of human factor, harmonisation of market and plan, and the need for price reforms, tolerance of unemployment etc. Several leading economists participated in this debate and over time took positions that reforms could not succeed unless a full-fledged market based on diverse forms of ownership were introduced in the USSR. (Abalkin 1987 30-39)

The idea of multiple ownership relations including private possession and the market were finally acknowledged when in March 1990 the “USSR Law on Ownership in the USSR” and the “Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Land” were adopted. (Pravda 1990) Finally, the Soviet government introduced in the USSR Supreme Soviet in May 1990 the economic programme of transition to the regulated market economy. This programme envisaged drastic price hikes and the introduction of market forces in USSR. The government was asked to modify the programme in order to build the infrastructure required for the effective introduction of the market. (Ryzhkov 1990)

The process of economic reforms resulted in the de-ideologisation of the socialist economic theory. There is little doubt that ‘socialism’ is redefined as “anything that is good for the individual...”, the elements of the capitalist economy get accepted in the USSR. (Yakovlev 1990: 24) A completely new political economy would be required to understand, explain and implement the transition from ‘state socialism’ to ‘humane, democratic socialism’.

Gorbachev(1990) laid out the features of such a new economic model at the 28th Congress of CPSU: “a multi-layered economy with various types of property relations, a controlled market which guarantees right to work, tolerance of property differentiation in accordance with the ‘principles of socialism’, price reforms but with

assurances of protection for the weaker sections of the society, economic sovereignty for the republics but without upsetting ‘the unity and Integrity’ of the national economy, integration with the world economy. A fine harmony between contrasting forces is called for to build such an economy.”

Policy on National Question

The integrity of the USSR was threatened as the national question, which the 1986 CPSU programme had claimed that had been resolved, resurfaced under the impact of glasnost and Perestroika.

Gorbachev’s policy on national question shows that even at the 27th party Congress, he, like Brezhnev before him, lauded the previous nationalities policy but showed greater sensitivity to the accumulated problems like his predecessors, “.... nationalism and chauvinism, no matter what the guise maybe”, Gorbachev (1990) suggested development of an “integrated national economic complex, promotion of inter-republic cooperation...” to resolve the nationalities question. Events in Nagorno-Karabakh which led to civil-war kind of situation in some Azerbaijan and Armenian districts led Gorbachev to speak out “the greatest possible accommodation about the interests of each nationality and nation and emphasise the need for the ‘internationalisation of the economy and the entire social fabric’.” He also spoke of USSR as ‘our common home’. However, he held the “existing state structure” of USSR as inviolable. (Gorbachev 1992: 62-63) As the ethnic situation worsened in the country, Gorbachev, according to a well-established pattern, blamed Stalin and Brezhnev policies for the ethnic troubles and began to suggest broader political, economic and cultural autonomy for the republics. (Gorbachev May 30th, 1989: 33-36)

With the dangers of economic and political isolation on account of autonomy and disintegration of the USSR being expressed, the debate over economic and political sovereignty for the republics and its impact on the federal structure of the union became sharp in 1989. (Chesko 1989: 97-105)

The nationality question was the central theme in the plenum of the CC, CPSU in September 1989, which occurred around the Baltic secessionism. For the first time, the party spoke about the new nationality policy accepting the need for transforming

the Soviet federation as earlier under the command system of administration several minorities suffered. It also discarded the earlier official claims that the nationalities issue had been settled once and for all. The party spoke in favour of “restoration of Lenin's principle of ethnic self-determination in its actual form...” through appropriate democratic assurance. On the ideological aspects of renewal of USSR, the theoretical premise of the earlier policy considered legitimate, but it was underlined that harmonisation of nationalism and the principle of internationalism should be done without dismantling the national uniqueness. The party document stressed the need to modify the implementation methods rather than revise the Leninist basis of the nationalities policy. It underscored that the class-substance of Leninist internationalism could be balanced with the developing role of universal human interests and values. (Pravda 1989)

It appears that the party's new nationalities policy came too late and made little amends with the separatists in the Baltics. Despite Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania, the Lithuanian Communist Party dissociated from the Soviet Union in December 1990. This was followed by the armed revolt in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such happenings, especially the declaration of independence by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and internationalisation of this issue, threatened the East-West detente. As a result, Gorbachev was forced to have a law on secession, which was passed in April (Pravda April 7th, 1990). With Boris Yeltsin being elected as the president of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and the assertion of the Sovereignty by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies compelled Gorbachev to talk about revamping the state structure of USSR based on the new treaties between the sovereign republics and the Centre. The pressure of events made the nationalities question quite insignificant despite Gorbachev's claims in the 28th party Congress of a “better understanding than ever before of the essence of Lenin's views on the nature and aspects of the Union as a voluntary unification of peoples linked by prevailing economic and political interests, and by history itself”, the theory of Perestroika was incomplete without a theory of self-determination.

Reappraisal of the Socialist-Past

Under the Perestroika, the reassessment of the past had been a significant component of the ideology and strategy. The past had been reevaluated to establish the need for a change and also to implement new ideas. The 20th CPSU Congress, through limited disclosures about the nature of Stalinism, began the de-Stalinisation process in the Soviet Union. However, with the re-examination of the Leninist legacy, sympathetic assessment of Social Democrats and scepticism about the very concept of 'socialism, led to the questioning of the 'Socialist choice'.

The Socialist alternative, as well as collectivisation and industrialisation policies of Stalin, including the Nazi- Hitler pact, was upheld, while the Stalinist purges were underplayed in the report in 1987 at the 70th Anniversary Celebrations of the October revolution (Pravda November 3rd, 1987). In the initial period of Perestroika exceptional prominence was laid on Lenin's writing and the NEP, it was said that the Perestroika was imparting a 'second wind' to the socialism, in fact, polit bureau member J. Yakovlev equated the Perestroika with the 1920s NEP (New Economic Policy). (Pravda April 11, 1987).

As Perestroika advanced and divisions in the society became acute, the debate over past also sharpened. The question of whether Stalinism had its roots in Leninism became unavoidable and particularly painful as it involved passing judgment on life, works and sacrifices of several generations. At the 28th Congress, the party self critically assessed the mistakes of the past but added that the achievements and sacrifices of the people could not be negated. The CPSU Central Committee has authorised a group of authors to re-examine the party's history and paint an honest picture in this work titled 'Historical Studies of the CPSU'. (Yakovlev 1990: 22)

Breaking Mechanism: Threat to Perestroika

The theory and practice of perestroika also included the analyses of forces impeding perestroika which were referred to as the 'breaking mechanism'. The term covered all tendencies which tended to perpetuate Stalinism and neo-Stalinism in USSR. The state-owned property was held to be the cause of the breaking mechanism. In the political arena, the struggle between the breaking mechanism and the pro-perestroika

forces was said to be bringing about in USSR a new “correlation of social forces.” (Gorbachev 1988: 40) Thus, ‘breaking mechanism’ concept was truly utilised against the conservatives who were viewed as a danger to perestroika till about the end of 1989. It is intriguing that in April 1990, a party document identified the radicals and not the conservatives as the main threat. The ‘breaking mechanism’ concept seems to be falling in discuss till now just as the official interpretation of threat to perestroika has changed now and then (e.g. the threat came from the radicals (1987: Yeltsin’s Ouster), from the Conservatives (1988: the 19th CPSU Conference), the radicals again (CPSU letter of 11 April 1990) and the ‘Conservatives’ again (the CP, RSFSR Congress, June 1990)

Perestroika was fundamentally a pragmatic approach intended to dismantle the State socialism model in USSR and to replace it with “humane, democratic socialism”. Increasingly, in the media, the term “humane, democratic society” was often preferred as the term “socialism” is dropped. Due to its pragmatic nature, the idea of perestroika was not a rigid concept. Consequently, the ideological premise of perestroika advanced gradually (Gupta, 1990). Perestroika was an ideology of de-ideologisation as it served as a guide to action and used to combat the ‘state Socialism’ ideology. There was much socialist revisionist thought of the late 19th and early 20th century which had a direct significance to perestroika. Thus, many of Eduard Bernstein's ideas like parliamentarianism, cooperative federalism, local autonomy, trade unionism and Rosa Luxemburg’s anti-war, anti-militarism, anti-centralisation ideas and Antonio Gramsci's ideas about fusing together of diverse social forces to achieve progressive aim became particularly relevant. (Labeledz 1962) Thus the theory of perestroika was refined by an antagonistic variety of thoughts emanating in the West.

Impact of ‘New Political Thinking’ on USSR Foreign Policy

In the domain of global affairs, the ‘new political thinking’, a direct off-shoot of domestic Perestroika, affected some new International strategy approaches. In fact, ‘new political thinking’, advocating de-ideologisation of the international relation, was the first declaration of the ideology of de-ideologisation which Perestroika symbolised. The foreign policy initiatives of Gorbachev justified as the manifestations of the ‘new political thinking’, ushered in several essential changes in crucial areas such as East-West relations, arms control, Euro, Asia- Pacific and regional conflicts

etc. The 'new political thinking' has pulled out the Soviet foreign policy from its earlier straitjackets and has confronted the western world with a challenge to respond constructively. Gorbachev was forced to make a retreat on many international issues on account of his urgent requirement of attending to the grave socio-economic crisis at home, which made it difficult to maintain the Soviet military super-power status. The western response "to the 'new political thinking' varied from negative to cautiously optimistic. The success or failure of the domestic reforms could affect the western response to the 'New Political thinking'.

The 'new political thinking' as it unfolded at the 27th CPSU Congress was a mixture of the old and the new. The elements of continuity included reliance on the traditional Marxist-Leninist theory to analyse the world, emphasis on link between peace and socialism, belief that war was not fatalistically inevitable and should be avoided at all basis, along with the assertion that imperialism engenders war, the belief in the historic destiny when all the exploiting classes (i.e. imperialism) would disappear, the unavoidable competition between socialism and capitalism, the emergence of world socialist system and its role in bringing about fundamental changes in the alignment of forces in the international arena etc. All these were mentioned in the Party programme adopted by the 27th Party Congress in February 1987. (Documents and Resolutions of the 27th Party Congress, 1986: 246-258) Similarly the 1986 party programme retained the provision of international conditions favourable to the perfection of socialist society and the advance to communism, progress of world socialist system, peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, equal and friendly relations with newly free countries, solidarity with communist and revolutionary parties, the international working-class movement, as goals of CPSU's international policy. Regarding fundamental ideas and theory, these elements of the Party programme provided the elements of continuity.

The newness in the Soviet Union's foreign policy consisted of filling these elements of continuity with substantially new content. In the process, several new ideas, e.g. the primacy of common human interests of mankind over the class interests and consequent 'de-ideologisation' of the international relations were introduced. These new ideas were declared to align with the traditional class-based Marxist-Leninist approach as applied to conditions of the modern time.

New Vision of Interdependent and Integral World

The new world view consisted of fundamental changes in the world, which included scientific-technical progress- to counter problems of global nature such as stockpiles of nuclear weapons which threatened the existence of humankind itself. In such a volatile world, there was no place for policies which led to confrontation and war. Both capitalism and socialism were realities and had no option but to co-exist peacefully, and not just that but also work together in order to bring solutions to problems facing humanity. The nucleus of the new thinking was the recognition of “the priority of common human values, more accurately, the survival of mankind.” (Gorbachev 1987: 149) This was a significantly new and bold formulation of the worldview. It imparted a new content to the idea of peaceful coexistence. Indeed, Khrushchev had realised that peaceful coexistence between capitalism and socialism was a must. However, he regarded peaceful coexistence as a ‘specific form of class struggle.’ What Gorbachev has done is to take the peaceful coexistence out of the narrow domain of class-struggle and has placed it even higher, as a universal value embodying the very survival of humanity. Gorbachev took this further, putting this on a higher philosophical footing, making it the cornerstone of USSR’s foreign policy. The 1986 CPSU Party programme declared “A world without wars and weapons is the ideal of socialism.” This formulation of ‘war’ was a further advancement on the Khrushchevian view that was not “fatalistically inevitable.”

Even during Khrushchev’s time, it was realised that atomic weapon knew no class barriers. Indeed the Soviet historian Obichkin had mentioned in January 1955; the Soviet leadership had highlighted the problem of the survival of humanity faced with the existence of nuclear missiles on both sides. However, the view which prevailed at that time was that the world had evolved according to the objective laws, and therefore it could not be destroyed by accident. (Obichkin 1988:13)

The focal point of Gorbachev’s perspective was the idea of ‘interdependent and integral world’ explained at the 27th Party Congress and in his book on Perestroika. The idea of the “integral and interdependent world” has had sweeping ramifications for the theory and practice of the Soviet International strategy. The fundamental conceptual ideas of ‘New Political Thinking’ are elaborated below:

Diversity: Diversity of interdependent, interconnected world was not to be scoffed at but something which ought to be appreciated. Earlier, the Soviet theory regarded diversity as ‘a source of discord and difference’. Now it was regarded as something which could be of benefit to any civilisation, especially to socialist civilisation. (Zagdalin 1988: 28)

Contradictions: Contradictions do not merely sow conflicts and wars. They can even be a ‘source of movement and development.’ Contradictions need not be resolved by war. Even antagonistic contradictions ‘can be resolved dialectically and not necessarily by way of war.’ War is held to be ‘the most undialectical method of resolving contradictions’. (Zagdalin 1988: 31) In the Soviet theory now contradictions of the interdependent world were nothing to be frightened of.

Cooperation and Development: The interrelationship of the world opens up new prospects for progress and collaboration in the world. Earlier, a mere trace of the interdependent world was considered by the Soviet theory as ‘proxy war of the class enemy’. (Zagdalin 1988)

Set Formulas: The earlier formulations ignore the global interdependence, which was not good at this time. Foreign affairs theory and international diplomacy should, therefore, be thoroughly revised.

Place of Class-Struggle: There would have to be a complete revision of the earlier class approach to international relations. In an interconnected world, it is the universal values of humankind which have to accord the highest priority. Any approach which gives priority to the values of the one-class over the universal values is wrong. Since the world is now regarded as objectively to be a single whole, common interests prevail over class-division. Class-antagonism is dangerous for everyone. Does this mean that the class-divisions and class-approach do not exist? No, the Soviet theoretician answered, they do exist. However, a simplified view of class-approach is wrong. The priority of universal values over class-values should itself be incorporated into the class-approach. “Today, even for the working class, the struggle for universal human interests is the struggle for its class interests.” (Zagdalin 1988: 34)

Gorbachev formulated other ideas like supplementing the 'integral, interdependence, world' as well as 'universal values' concepts as those of 'balance of interests', 'global problems', 'freedom of choice', and nonviolent, nuclear-free world.

Global Problems: The notion of the interdependent, integral world are strongly linked to the concept of the existence of International problems. Problems that are considered as global issues that determine the destiny of humanity were environmental issues, problems of developing countries, the nuclear destruction of humankind etc. No country could solve these issues alone. Global collaboration is needed for its alternative. Global collaboration, therefore, arises as a requirement rather than as a discretionary act by a country.

Balance of Interests

The only logical way of conducting International relations in varied, interdependent countries surrounded by a range of global issues is recognising the aspirations of each nation and balancing those interests. It is harmful to the people if any method seeks to give priority to the concerns of one nation or another to the aspirations of one social structure or the other. There is no such harmony of interests that exists as believed by Gorbachev (Gorbachev 1987)

The main objective of the policy of the 'balance of interests' appears to be to develop trust in the other side that the USSR does not like to pursue its interests at the cost of others' interests including the capitalist countries. This has a direct impact on the security aspects and related issues.

Freedom of Choice

Freedom of choice, in the words of Gorbachev, means "recognition of the right of each people to choose its own path of social development... inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for others together with an objective, self-critical view of one's society'. (Gorbachev 1990: 146) Whether someone espouses capitalism or socialism, it is their absolute right. It is essential to free "political positions from ideological impatience." (Pravda 1988)

Believing in this concept has resulted into a completely new perspective of values such as 'socialist-internationalism' and the 'unity and cohesion' of the proletariat movement and the overhauling of relations between the USSR and its developing world allies.

Ideology Not as a Factor in Inter-State Relations

De-ideologization of international relations meant that the ideological differences should not be allowed to come in the way of lessening of tensions and strengthening of cooperation. This, together with the new interpretation of class-approach to international relations, meant discarding the earlier principle of ideological struggle as an integral component of the struggle against imperialism. The ideological struggle was now held to be incompatible with 'New Political Thinking.' Gorbachev, in his address to the UN General Assembly in November 1988, said, "the new stage (in the world) demands that international relations be freed from ideology". Otherwise, he continued, such imperative objectives as mutually beneficial cooperation between states, breakthroughs in science and technology, protection of the environment, end of poverty, elimination of nuclear threat and militarism could not be realised. (Pravda 1988)

In the field of ideology, de-ideologization of global affairs is meant to be a confidence-building measure which even led to the de-ideologization of inter-state affairs, as was visible in relations between the USSR and the USSR-East Europe at that time.

Peaceful World without Nuclear Threat

"A non-nuclear world has been proposed by the Soviets ever since the beginning. However, the necessity of a non-violent world in a nuclear-world is a relatively new doctrine. The Delhi Declaration signed jointly by Gorbachev and the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in November 1986, and the Indo-Soviet Statement signed in Moscow by Gorbachev, and then Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh in July 1990 have become a reference point for the Soviet theoreticians." (The Hindu July 24th, 1990) The world would be more secure and a more just world that was the underlying idea behind a non-nuclear non-violent world.

The new foreign policy doctrines which had come into being under the 'influence of new political thinking' are examined below.

CPSU 27th Party Congress and Renewal of the Soviet Foreign Policy

Gorbachev, in his report to the 27th Party Congress, described the "struggle against the nuclear threat, against the arms race, for the preservation and strengthening of universal peace" as the main direction of the Party's line on international affairs. (Documents and Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, 1986: 82)

While analysing the world situation, he used the traditional Marxist-Leninist theory of contradictions and pointed out the emergence of a new set of contradictions in addition to the old ones. These were described as being 'between transnational corporations and the nation-state form of society's political organisation', (Documents and Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, 1986: 19) '...between imperialism, on the one hand, and the developing countries and peoples, on the other' (Documents and Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, 1986: 20) and contradictions on "global scale, affecting the very foundations of the existence of civilisation". (Documents and Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, 1986: 23) The last group of contradictions referred to 'global problems' like impending ecological disasters etc.

Keeping with tradition, there was the usual condemnation of imperialism and the characterisation of the 'USA, its military-industrial machine' as 'the locomotive of militarism'. (Documents and Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, 1986: 83)

Thus, as for Gorbachev the world situation, with the severe contradictions and ongoing presence of US militarism remained bleak. What was, however, new was Gorbachev's suggestions regarding the escape from this scenario not through conflict but through collaboration which could be made long-lasting only by abandoning the class approach to international relations. The 'new political thinking' was conceived to provide the philosophical underpinnings to the de-ideologization of international relations. This was the most significant ideological change in the ideology determining the USSR international policy.

At the 27th Party Congress Gorbachev outlined the framework of the Soviet foreign policy as consisting of the following components: the security, the European

direction, the Asia-pacific direction, the relations with the socialist world, relations with the international communist movements and the social-democratic movement. At the 28th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev further denigrated the developing nations and the International Communist Movement. (Gorbachev 1986)

Security

Security issues stemmed from the foundations of USSR relations with the US and also in Europe. The concept of universal, comprehensive security was kept in the 27th party congress. The fresh ideas presented in this area were:

Parity and Comprehensive Security

There was a rejection of the idea that military superiority could bring any political gains. Although the concept of military-parity, which underlined the Brezhnevian detente, had not been altogether dropped, it nevertheless mentioned that if the arms race continued, “even parity will cease to be a factor of military-political deterrence”. Proceeding from this premise, it is being stressed that “equal genuine security is guaranteed not by the highest possible, but by the lowest possible level of strategic parity, from which nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction must be totally excluded.” (Gorbachev 1986)

It is also asserted that a comprehensive system of security should not just consider the military and political factors alone but also the economic condition and human factors as well. Just the dependence on military-political components is no assurance of security.

Another characteristic of the comprehensive security concept is that security must be universal, and in the case of the USA and USSR, reciprocal. The comprehensive, universal security, which incorporates the ideas of ‘collective security’, is considered to be a new and higher philosophy of world politics which gives primacy to universal values. (Vladimirsky 1987: 12)

Theory of ‘Reasonable Sufficiency’

A direct outcome of the comprehensive security aspect is that of defensive military doctrine and the principle of ‘reasonable sufficiency’. As mentioned in the 27th Party

Congress report, the military security, in the changed world situation, should be based on the recognition that nuclear war was unwinnable and should not be fought, preventing arms race in outer space, ending all testing of nuclear weapons and fully eliminating them by the end of the century, banning and destroying chemical weapons, the dissolution of military alliances and, as a step to it, the renunciation of their extension and of the formation of new ones, a proportional and commensurate reduction of military budgets and lowering of the military capabilities of countries to reduce them to the level of “reasonable efficiency.” These are the elements on which the WTO military doctrine brought out in May 1987 was based. This doctrine was evolved by “the Marxist-Leninist teaching (that)... it is possible to avert war and save humanity from nuclear catastrophe. This is the historic mission of socialism...” (Yazov 1987: 5)

The principle of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ led to a fundamental restructuring of the Soviet armed force, unilateral defence cut and the beginning of cardinal military reforms in the country- This was a break from the past when expansion in armaments and numerical parity at a high level were the norms.

The even more important consequence of the new understanding of concepts like parity at a low level and ‘reasonable sufficiency’ was to extricate USSR from a crippling arms race in the unfavourable economic situation at home. The calculation of “reasonable sufficiency in armaments has proved to be a highly complex task as it related to the concept of ‘parity’. Soviet Union’s priority task was to remain in “reliable deterrence to probable nuclear aggression through maintenance of strategic equilibrium” (Arbatov 1988: 82), till the Nuclear Weapons were eliminated from the world. Thus the actual implementation of the concept of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ despite unilateral defence cuts depended to a large extent upon its acceptance by other parties too. The USSR by unilaterally cutting down its armaments in East Europe, Asia had taken initial steps towards the ‘reasonable sufficiency’ goal.

Policy towards Third World

Before the end of the cold war and the revamping of Soviet policies and outlook, the importance of the third world countries for the Soviet Union lay in their stance against the imperialistic forces, and were seen as natural allies. However, with the new

political thinking, the USSR's outlook towards the third world nations turned towards the principles of 'freedom of choice', the poverty in the third world nations as a global problem and it was to be resolved jointly by all countries, irrespective of their political affiliations and differences. Gorbachev identified the crisis of the international debt that the third world countries were reeling under (1988). It made consistent attempts with interested countries like France to assuage the problem.

As far as regional conflicts are concerned, there was understanding in Moscow that these conflicts should be settled quickly as they hinder East-West normalisation. Their resolution also accelerated the normalisation of the Soviet Union's relations with some leading western countries, ASEAN and China etc. At the 28th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev called for a restructuring of USSR's relations with the Third world.

The Asia-Pacific direction of the Soviet foreign policy received a great deal of attention from Gorbachev. Some new initiatives had been taken to normalise relations with the countries of this region to utilise the potential of their region for the achievement of the Soviet-foreign policy aims. (Gorbachev 1986)

Conceptually, Gorbachev had stressed that USSR was an Asian power just as it was a European power. At Vladivostok in July 1986, he stressed the "balance of interests" in the context of Asia-Pacific region and declared that USSR did not claim "privileges and special positions" and was against the concept of security which strengthened some nations (e.g. USSR) at the expense of others. (Gorbachev 1986) He also recommended a Helsinki kind of process of detente for the Asia-Pacific. It was the concept of Asia-Pacific security, which was an integral component of the comprehensive international security that Gorbachev propounded. The critical components of this plan were identified by Gorbachev as settlement of Afghanistan and Kampuchean problems, stopping further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the area (this included declaration of the southern part of the Pacific as well as Korean peninsula as 'nuclear-free zones.', turning the Indian ocean into a peace zone, reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia to levels of 'reasonable sufficiency', confidence-building measures and misuse of force in the region etc. (Gorbachev 1986)

At Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev called for negotiations among the USA, USSR and China (leaving out India) on Asian security. In Washington (1990), he proposed discussion with India, Indonesia, China and Japan on Asia-pacific (Wireless file Washington Summit Special June 4th,1990). It should be noted that it was Brezhnev in 1982, who begun work to improve Soviet- Chinese relations; however, it was Gorbachev who took the bold steps of withdrawing troops from Mongolia, flexibility on the Kampuchean issue, concessions on the Chinese border issue and normalisation of relations with several countries. While many of Gorbachev's steps were new, the Asian- Pacific security programme was a mix of old and new strategies.

Policy towards Socialist Countries

Gorbachev's 'new political thinking', particularly the concept of "freedom of choice" which in turn meant non-interference in other countries affairs led to a breakdown of Brezhnev doctrine and the collapse of that part of the Soviet foreign policy ideology which treated world socialist system as a distinct form of international system with its specific laws.

Further, it may be stated that Gorbachev's statements on relations with the Socialist countries during mid1985 to 1989 gave the impression that Gorbachev was focussing on the radical overhaul of the USSR-East European relations, including the restructuring of WTO (World Trade Organisation) and CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), with the framework of socialism. However, as Brezhnev doctrine disappeared and opposition to communist regimes began to emerge, the Soviet policy towards East Europe also evolved. This change coincided with de-ideologisation of USSR's internal policies, which in turn encouraged anti-socialist forces in East Europe to challenge the established communist regimes.

The collapse of established regimes in East Europe at once exerted a positive influence on USSR's relations with US and East European countries. An end to the cold war was signalled. For the USSR, a historic opportunity arose to gain from cooperation with the technologically and economically superior West.

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the problem of reshaping Europe had risen. The Soviet endeavour was to safeguard its interests -security, political, economic, cultural etc. - in new Europe. The normalisation of USSR's relations with China in May 1989

was a historic event. However, its importance was overshadowed by the Tiananmen Square incidents in June 1989 and the shift of focus to Europe after the collapse of the Berlin wall in November 1989. The Chinese were not enthusiastic about the rapid de-ideologisation in USSR as they feared instability in China on account of Perestroika in USSR. However, the normalisation with China was attributed to the new political thinking'. The Soviet concessions to China on the border and territorial dispute, military withdrawal from Mongolia and Afghanistan, flexibility on Cambodian issue have facilitated the normalisation (Gorbachev 1989: 20-41).

Policy towards the World Communist Movement

With Gorbachev's address at the 27th Party Congress, there were signs of the weakening of the global international communist movement; he failed to address the struggle against the imperialist forces as a goal or as a unifier, which had till Brezhnev's report in the 27th Party Congress been an indispensable part. This had acted as a grand unifying principle with the world communist movement. (Documents and Resolutions of the 27th Party Congress: 74) For Brezhnev, the differences in the movement were permissible provided they do not smack of 'reformism'. Gorbachev, on the other hand, declared "Unity has nothing in common with uniformity." Gorbachev suggested that the world communist movement should take "a bold, creative approach to the new realities based on the immortal theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin." This was a signal for the reinterpretation of the 'theory' of the world communist movement actions. Gorbachev further highlighted the importance of "non-communist movements and organisations, including religious organisations" that were against the war. Gorbachev, unlike Brezhnev, omitted to mention the 'political vanguard' role of the communist and workers parties. Gorbachev was signalling a new approach on the part of the communist movement to the question of war and peace, on the issues of cooperation with the communist movements, on the matters about tactics. The underlying philosophy of this approach was to be the 'new political thinking' and the consequent "de-ideologisation" of international relations.

Gorbachev's treatment on the social democratic movement has also been more conciliatory to that of Brezhnev's. While Brezhnev accused some of the social democratic parties of having been affected with "the virus of anti-communism", Gorbachev favoured "an unbiased look" at the differences between the Social

democratic movements on the one hand and the CPSU on the other so that "the struggle for peace and international security" could be strengthened. Over the years the relations between the CPSU and the social-democratic movements have improved considerably, while uncertainties have arisen in the minds of some of the communist parties as in CPI(M) in India over the policies of the CPSU. The downgrading of the world communist movement was significant in Gorbachev's report to the 28th CPSU Congress, where the movement was not mentioned at all. (Gorbachev 1990: 1-20)

Critical Evaluation of Past and Major Shift in USSR International Policy

An essential characteristic of the Perestroika had been the critical examination of the past. The USSR foreign policy was also decayed due to exclusion from self-criticism. The reason for the revelation of past mistakes and calculations was to legitimise and develop new approaches as done in the USSR Foreign Ministry in 1988 after the 19th Party Conference. E. Shevardnadze's speech at the foreign ministry conference is regarded as a seminal document in this regard.

Shevardnadze's proposition was that each departure from the 'Leninist principles' in the domestic policy had an alarming and negative affect on the country's foreign policy. Thus, the subjugation of the late 1930s reduced the efficacy of the USSR foreign policy stands and initiatives and "blackened the image of the Soviet state and our foreign policy with it." The problem was further compounded by the "distortion of the principles of internationalism." Similarly, there was "incorrect appraisal of the roles and possibilities of world progressives" (i.e. the 'world progressives' were overestimated). The erroneous evaluation of European Social Democracy as a collaborator of Hitler undermined the anti-Hitler front.

In the post-war period, the USSR suffered both internally and externally due to administrative commands methods, due to "disregard of special, professional knowledge, and an undemocratic secretive willful style of taking decisions ... the priority of military over political means of countering imperialism, and the inability to see through the manoeuvring to draw us into an arms race fraught with economic attrition for the USSR." As a consequence, this resulted in a wrong vision of world realities and of interstate relations. There was also the tendency to disregard

professional advice concerning the nation's security interests. The USSR's "image of the enemy" emerged largely as a result of these mistakes.

The foreign policy also suffered because the decision making was concentrated in the hands of a few. There was no legal, constitutional mechanism to supervise the decision-making process and enforce accountability.

Shevardnadze felt that in the name of the country's security and prestige, the past decisions regarding building up of the stockpiles of chemical weapons cost the country dearly in political and economic terms. He denounced the past approach of decision making, which did not pay heed to the costs at which the country's security was being built. The burden of Shevardnadze's argument was that the country's security would have been better protected by political means instead of military means. Inherent in Shevardnadze's assessment was the thought that there were double standards in the Soviet foreign policy- on the one hand, it advanced initiatives for disarmament etc., on the other it continued to build stockpiles of weapons under the mistaken belief that this could strengthen country's security.

As the specific directions for the foreign policy and diplomacy in future, Shevardnadze prescribed an undogmatic, open foreign policy and diplomacy imbibing the latest scientific and technical discoveries. He called for setting up of a scientific coordinating centre to coordinate with scientific institutions in the country and abroad in fields like ecology, energy, interspace etc. and maintaining ties with science on a contractual basis.

His other proposals were: building an interrelationship between international and domestic legislation, forming an effective link between culture and democracy, a well-considered cultural policy as a component of Soviet foreign policy efforts to enhance the role of UN in world affairs, and to create a mechanism linking public opinion with the formulation and conduct of foreign policy and the deepening of the USSR's involvement in international organisations.

This short detailing of the new directions of the Soviet diplomacy and foreign policy shows that the impact of the 'New Political Thinking' on the Soviet diplomacy was intended to be to make it more cooperative, thoroughly rooted and also more autonomous in terms of decision making. Shevardnadze laid a particularly strong

emphasis on the image-building of USSR in the west. There was also an indication of acknowledgement of responsibility for developments like cold war and need of progress on disarmament.

Responses of Indian Communist Movement to Gorbachev's Policy:

The communist movement of India did not remain unaffected by Gorbachev's Policy of 'New Political Thinking', 'Glasnost and Perestroika'. This idea of Gorbachev stirred a multitude of debates among the three streams of communism in India, namely the CPI, the CPM and the CPI-ML and there remained tremendous ideological differences among them. The CPI completely supported the Perestroika and mentioned several positive impacts. Even though the CPM after critically analysing this policy level transformation in CPSU, regarded it as a deviation from the fundamental principles of communism, at the same time, CPI-ML always recognised this revisionism as something heralded by Khrushchev. The party congresses convened by these parties witnessed intense debates over Khrushchev's policies of Glasnost and Perestroika.

The CPI had a very positive assessment of Perestroika. It stated that due to the policy, the distortions were being resolved in building socialism. It firmly believed that the reforms were correct and were rooted in a Marxist understanding of the situation and that it would also be a model for the rest of the communist movement as a way of creative thinking. However, it also added a caveat that it need not support all the steps that were being taken by the Soviet Union in the name of perestroika.

“Perestroika in the Soviet Union has given a new perspective and a new optimism to all the progressive and democratic forces of the world. The distortions that had taken place during the years of construction of socialism are being removed. A realistic and scientific approach has been adopted with bold and innovative economic reforms. These new measures, along with the development of democracy, have opened up new prospects for the speedier growth of socialism in the Soviet Union.

Our party is convinced that the main direction of these reforms is correct and we support it. The new restructuring of the economy with democratic content will make socialism more dynamic and attractive. And the new thinking will give an opportunity

to the world communist movement to adopt a bold and imaginative approach for the solution of problems in a creative way.

It does not, however, mean that everything that is being written and spoken by various journals and individuals in the name of perestroika and glasnost and every step was taken in the Soviet Union or other Socialist countries need be endorsed by us.” (CPI-Fourteenth Party Congress Document, 1989: 14)

However, when Gorbachev announced the policies of perestroika and glasnost, the CPM supported the policies because it felt that reforms both at the political and economic front were needed for the advancement of socialism. Economic reforms meant overhauling the production process and introducing new methods of management and technology. In the political sphere, reforms meant increasing the participation of citizens in the functioning of the state and in strengthening collective ownership of enterprises. This would also mean limiting and reducing the bureaucratic control over the polity and the economy in the Soviet Union, which had hindered the development of socialist consciousness. However, in the subsequent Congress of the CPSU, there was a marked departure from Marxist-Leninist principles in thinking about the reforms. The CPM said that the impact of Perestroika would be felt in international relations with the corrections of distortions in socialism. But what the 28th Congress of the CPSU sought to do was not a correction of distortions but the distortion of Marxism-Leninism itself. (Resolution adopted by the Central Committee CPM in its Meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 92)

However, CPM also critiqued the concept of perestroika as put forward by Gorbachev. The CPM’s resolution of May 1990 argued that this new concept of Perestroika was presented as a renouncement of the socialist past. According to CPM the history of socialism was filled with significant landmarks like defeating fascism, fighting imperialism, hence the history of socialism had to be evaluated in the light of the history of achievements made by socialism across the globe and not merely a negation of that very history. Corrections and enrichment of socialist content were necessary but not its complete negation.

“The goal of perestroika is stated to be a “humane and democratic” socialism. This is posed as a qualitatively new concept of socialism which renounces the achievements

of the socialist past. Seven decades which saw the working class endeavours in building socialism in the first socialist state, facing civil war and imperialist intervention; the defeat of fascism with enormous sacrifices; socialism built out of backward conditions which guaranteed the right to work, education, housing, health and cultural development. This history of socialism has to be evaluated within the historical developments of that period. Instead, what is projected is that a transformation is being made from inhuman to humane socialism. Correction of distortion accumulated from the past, innovations to further enrich the humanistic and democratic content of socialism are necessary, but this cannot be done by the negation of all that is valuable and socialist in the past.” (Resolution adopted by the Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 94)

Regarding the concept of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ CPM believed that it was creating a false contradiction between universal human values and class values. The document of the Central Committee meeting held on May 28th, 1990 argued that in Marxism, universal human values could be achieved only when class was abolished with the elimination of exploitation of men by men. The real division of values in society lied along class lines, and until that was abolished, universal human values could not be achieved. Ignoring class values meant ignoring the unequal global order and imperialism.

“One of the important components of the ‘New Thinking’ is the assertion in Soviet writings of the “priority of universal human values over class values”. Universal human values are supposed to have precedence over class interests due to the threat of nuclear war, the consequent annihilation of the human race and the ecological disaster which would destroy the entire planet.

Due importance has to be accorded to finding common ground to avert the threat of nuclear war, for the elimination of nuclear weapons and to preserve ecology. There are increasing possibilities to jointly act, in the interests of humanity, on these vital matters. But it will be wrong to deduce from this common universal human values attributable to imperialism. The Marxist world view holds that the class struggle to eliminate exploitation of man by man for the abolition of classes in society is an inseparable and integral part of the realisation of universal human values. It sees both human values and proletarian class interests as an integral whole. Therefore, it is

misleading and incorrect to counterpose universal human values to class values. Only by abolishing classes in society can the fulfilment of human values on a universal scale be ensured. By elevating universal human values over class values on the basis of a so-called law of an 'integral world', the role of class struggle, the class-based view of human society-historical materialism, is being given the go-by. This leads to spreading illusions about the nature of present-day imperialism and the world capitalist system." (Resolution adopted by the Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 94-95)

The CPM further criticised the 'New Thinking' in Soviet documents which quoted Lenin to justify its new position. The CPM denounced Gorbachev by claiming that the use of Lenin in the Soviet documents had been done in a manner which quoted Lenin completely out of context. It then quoted the full text of Lenin from which the line was taken to argue that Lenin was arguing in a completely different context which was not relevant in the contemporary context. The CPM explained what Lenin meant in his document that to overthrow the autocratic rule of the Czar, all social forces oppressed by the Czarist system had to be mobilised. The overthrow of the Czar in Russia was something which was in the interest of not only the proletariat but the overall development of the entire Russian society. The Gorbachev document completely missed this point and quoted Lenin out of context. The New Thinking in the Soviet Union also completely ignored the anti-imperialist, anti-racist battles that had been fought for democracy and social emancipation and was utterly silent on the internationalist nature of socialism.

"One of the key quotations used to substantiate New Thinking and the priority of universal human values over class interests are cited from Lenin. He is quoted to state: 'From the standpoint of the basic ideas of Marxism, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat'. This sentence taken out of context is from Lenin's Draft Programme, written in 1889.

Lenin's article must be seen in the historical background it was written in, and the full quotation must be studied. Lenin wrote this article while in exile about the draft programme of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and what it should contain. The article deals with the specific situation in Russia, which must be addressed by the programme of the Party. The full extract reads as follows:

‘It is especially necessary to recognise the struggle for political liberties against the autocracy as the first political task of the working class party, this task should in our opinion be explained by an exposition of the class nature of the present-day Russian autocracy and the need to overthrow it, not only in the interests of the working class but also in the interests of social development as a whole. Such a description is essential in regard to both theory and practice, in theory, because from the standpoint of the basic ideas of Marxism, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat interests of the working-class movement as a whole are higher than the interests of a separate section of the workers or of separate phases of the movement; and in practice, this elucidation is essential because of the need to characterize the focal point to which the whole variety of Social Democratic activity propaganda, agitation. and organisation must be directed, and round which it must be concentrated’.” (Adopted By the Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 95)

In criticising the formulation by Gorbachev of the nature of the state, CPM said that “in Marxist terms, the state will be the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the new thinking in the Soviet Union is stating that the State will not be a dictatorship of any class or by any bureaucracy.” (Adopted By the Central Committee of CPM in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 97-98)

The CPM document believed that it was a misinterpretation of the Leninist formulation of the state where the dictatorship of the proletariat did not mean the dictatorship of the working class over other classes but rather that the proletariat would be at the forefront of the building of socialism.

“The dictatorship of the proletariat in the period of transition from socialism to communism, as Lenin pointed out, can ‘yield great abundance and variety of political forms’. The forms of proletarian statehood will vary and pass through various phases from defending and consolidating the socialist revolution to the complicated process of building socialism. It is essential to remember that the State under socialism whatever its form has as its essence proletarian class character. In the name of correcting the distortions of the past, the class character of the state is being abandoned. Giving up the class nature of the State means giving up the revolution itself. The Draft Platform declares: The rule-of-law State of the whole people has no

room for dictatorship by any class and even less so for the power of a management bureaucracy. It is misleadingly portrayed as if the dictatorship of the proletariat under socialism represents dictatorship of the working class over the other sections of the people. Whereas the proletarian state power is meant to represent the overwhelming majority of the people against the class enemies, both internal and external. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx had said that the State in the entire period from socialism to communism could only be the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin, further elaborating this said that the dictatorship of the proletariat embodies the leading role of the proletariat in building socialism, so long as there are sections, among people with different levels of consciousness born out of the socialist property.” (Adopted By the Central Committee of CPM in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 97-98)

CPM also took a position against Gorbachev’s changing formulations about the role of the party in the Soviet documents. According to CPM “wherever distortions have crept into the system they need to be resolved, but the role of the Party as the leading force of the revolution cannot be diluted by abandoning its class nature itself. A multi-party system will represent the different classes in society, but it is only the communist party which can be the vanguard of the revolution, the concept of the multiparty will throw up forces which will undermine the socialist project. It argues instead that the State power should be more widely distributed and pluralism of views within socialist frameworks be encouraged. However, the party cannot replace the working class as the leader of the revolution. The distortions have emerged because they have been substituted for each other.” (Adopted By the Central Committee of CPM in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 97-98)

The CPM strongly disagreed with the report Gorbachev presented at the 70th anniversary of the Russian Revolution where he sought to negate the role of imperialism and argued for a modified understanding of contradictions with imperialism. The CPM delegation which visited Moscow also disagreed with the formulation of Gorbachev.

“In 1987, Gorbachev presented his report on the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution. Dealing with the present-day world contradictions, he deviated from the Leninist understanding. In the name of the changed situation, he advocated the theory

of modification of contradictions where the role of imperialism with its inherent contradictions, was sought to be negated. Our Party is proud of being one of the first to point out to the CPSU about our disagreement. Within two weeks our delegation was invited for a discussion on this subject, and there too we disagreed, and finally, our Central Committee came out with a detailed elaboration of our stand making a critique of the positions of Gorbachev in its resolution of May 1988.” (CPM CC Resolution adopted in its meeting on Aug. 28-31, 1991, On Current Developments in the Soviet Union)

While critically analysing the ‘Glasnost, and Socialist Democracy’ concept of Gorbachev, CPM said that “it is the socialist system which can create democracy in its most substantial form. In the bourgeois system, democracy is only nominal because it establishes the rule of a few. The centralised nature of the socialist state is a remnant of the time when the socialist revolution was in its infancy and had to fight against external intervention and counter-revolutionary forces. Lenin clearly said that the centralised nature is a transitional stage, and it needs to keep evolving. Lenin in this connection had pertinently observed ‘The socialist revolution can only be lasting when this new class learns from the political work of government. Only when it enlists the vast mass of working people for this work when it elaborates forms which will enable all working people to adapt themselves easily to the work of governing the state and establishing law and order. Only on this condition is the socialist revolution bound to be lasting’.” (CPM CC Resolution adopted in its meeting on Aug. 28-31, 1991, On Current Developments in the Soviet Union)

CPM also believed that steps were necessary for further deepening socialist democracy like safeguarding the rights of individual citizens and their right to criticise. It was in favour of reforms but reforms for deepening democracy in a socialist framework; it also recognised that these reforms were necessary for the development of socialism.

On the other side, by placing the message of the CPSU to the CPI’s Fourteenth Congress, the CPI basically endorsed the stand of the CPSU about how glasnost and perestroika reforms were being carried out in the CPSU. This, we should note, is in sharp contrast to the position of the CPM who are staunch critiques of the reforms in the Soviet Union and term them anti-Marxist.

“The message of Greeting from CPSU at CPI-Fourteenth party congress in March 1989.”

“Our party has launched a large-scale effort to reconstruct Soviet society, with the purpose of qualitatively renovating socialism and opening up its potential to the maximum. Far-reaching political and economic reforms are underway to this end. It is served by democratisation and glasnost. The earnest of success in perestroika lies in the resolute support that it is given by the entire Soviet people. The CPSU and the CPI have long-standing and enduring bonds of friendship. We in the Soviet Union appreciate the selfless struggle of the CPI for the vital interests of the working people, and peace and disarmament. We value its contribution to Soviet-Indian cooperation. May, the fraternal ties between the CPSU and the Communist Party of India and the friendship of the Soviet and Indian peoples, go from strength to strength!” (CPI-Fourteenth party congress document, 6-12 March 1989 Calcutta: 346)

The CPM was highly critical of the manner in which glasnost was being practised to condemn the socialist past. It observed that writings in the Soviet had taken to wilfully denigrate and belittle the achievements of the past of socialism and taken to the glorification of bourgeois democracy. It also pointed out that in its own CC in 1988, CPSU had observed and criticised this trend in the Soviet Union. It also stressed that it was the responsibility of the Party to defend socialism and not allow such writings to flourish.

“However, the way glasnost has been practised in the Soviet Union has negative features. In the name of widening democracy and political reforms, many deep-rooted trends have developed to condemn the socialist past, undermine the leading role of the Communist Party and glorification of bourgeois democracy. The past has to be critically reviewed to learn correct lessons. However, in the name of glasnost, what is taking place in Soviet writings is an outright denigration of the achievements of the socialist revolution in the past seven decades. The August 1988 C.C. (Central Committee) resolution correctly stated: ‘An outlook which, while criticising the deformities, deviations and distortions of the past ignores these achievements, prejudices the future and delinks the new democratic reforms from past proletarian history. Such a negative attitude towards the past while discussing the shortcomings, deviations and deformities of the earlier period may distort the prospects.’ Doing so

would be to separate the working class and the forces of socialism from its historical experience and to curb its future revolutionary advance.

Further under glasnost, anti-socialist and anti-Marxist propaganda flourishes, but one is unable to see propaganda on the Marxist-Leninist basis to effectively rebut such views amongst the people. Surely the leading role of the Party does not mean only ensuring freedom of expression for all, but also the intervention by the Party to defend scientific socialism and its propagation among the people.” (Adopted By the CPM Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 100-101)

The CPI attacked CPM’s position on the glasnost and perestroika reforms that were taking place in the Soviet Union. It denounced that the CPM had always had a wrong position about the role of the Soviet Union in the international communist movement and even though they had changed their position about the Soviet Union their position on the reforms are wrong. It also said, unlike the CPM, that the reforms were based on the principles of Marxism- Leninism. The CPI supported the policy of glasnost and perestroika, saying that these policies made socialism attractive throughout the world. The National Report 1986 of the CPI also endorsed the reform but also stated that the CPI did not have to subscribe to everything that was being done and written in the name of perestroika. It stood with the general direction of the reforms.

“As has been stated earlier, the CPI(M) has been changing its wrong international positions since 1979, enabling our two parties to act together on some important issues. However, they were making these changes without any self-introspection of their wrong international political understanding as such. Hence they would claim that they were right all through when they were supporting Maoism and also later when they were breaking away from it.

In this connection, it must be remembered that they not only called the 20th Congress of the CPSU a fountainhead of revisionism but also said that CPSU has given up the concept of ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and a new type of capitalist relations were developing in the Soviet Union. It took them about 25 years to accept that nuclear war could be prevented. However, now they are quiet about these things and try to pose that they were right although.

The CPI(M) has failed to appreciate the ideas of Perestroika and Glasnost fully and have taken a negative stand on new thinking about the world situation and new initiative of Soviet leadership.

As far as our party is concerned, we support the general direction of Perestroika and New Thinking was based upon the sound principles of Marxism-Leninism and making socialism more attractive throughout the world.

October 1986 National Council report says about CPSU implementing Perestroika: 'The CPSU leadership is presently engaged in follow-up action to implement the specific resolutions adopted by the 19th Conference held in Moscow at the of last June.

The CPSU leadership has unleashed processes, democratic reforms and new political ideas which are making and will further make socialism more attractive throughout the world. Acceleration of the development of the forces of production, both quantitatively and qualitatively, is based on sound Marxist-Leninist principles of attaining new heights in the construction of socialism and breaking shackles of stagnation.'

We, therefore, welcome the main direction of Perestroika. It does not mean that we must subscribe to everything that is being written and spoken by various journals and individuals in the name of criticism and self-criticism." (CPI- Fourteenth Party Congress Document, 6-12 March 1989 Calcutta: 93)

The CPSU Draft Platform document advocated the merging of the split of the socialist movement into social democracy and the communist. The CPM was completely opposed to this as this would lead to an end for the ideology of the working class and scientific socialism, and therefore, it stated that social democratic parties could not be equated with communist parties.

However, CPM agreed with the idea that there was a problem in the manner in which ethnic minorities and nationalities had been dealt with. Though immediately after the revolution, the Soviet state created a framework for democratic nationalities since then many problems had arisen which had not been addressed. As a result, they had accumulated over time; these had been caused due to over bureaucratisation, over-

centralisation and violations of the language policy. The CPSU document of September 1989 recognised the above problems, but it failed to factor the fact that imperialist forces were trying to take advantage of the ethnic violence and nationality problem happening in the various republics. It asserted that communists all over the world would support the resolution of the nationalist through the application of Leninist principles.

The CPM also acknowledged the observation of the CPSU in their 27th Congress saying that the socialist economy needed reforms and that as time progressed, the socialist system would have to update itself. This was an urgent need, especially in the light of the economic stagnation that was plaguing the Soviet Union. It noted that the resultant debate in the Soviet Union had revealed diverse trends.

On the other hand, the CPI responded to certain steps being taken by Rajiv Gandhi like cutting costs and reducing the workforce and justified those steps by saying that they were exactly the ones being undertaken in the Soviet Union as part of the perestroika reforms. It stated that the Indian government was making a misleading comparison between India and the Soviet Union, as both of them had very different economic systems. In the process of this polemic, it reiterated its support for perestroika and also stated that the reforms in the Soviet Union were not a dilution of socialist principles and would not usher in capitalism. This position here was very different from that of CPM's, who believed that the reforms in the Soviet Union would lead to a capitalist economy.

“In this context, we must resolutely rebuff the motivated propaganda which seeks to justify the Rajiv Gandhi government's advocacy of increasing productivity by cutting labour costs, shedding 'surplus' staff, inducting new technology from foreign sources, closing down 'uneconomic' plants, promoting Joint ventures, privatising public sector operations, encouraging the contract system, etc, etc, on the plea that these are after all measures similar to the perestroika reforms now underway in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Such a superficial and misleading comparison deliberately hides the fundamental differences between a socialist planned economy and a market one geared primarily to capitalism. Soviet perestroika is not diluting socialist economic principles in order to

usher in capitalism. It is introducing some market mechanisms, forms and processes of production and economic instruments in order to strengthen the progress of the socialist economy and to remove its earlier imbalances and stagnation by improving productivity through economic incentives.” (CPI- Fourteenth party congress document, 6-12 March 1989 Calcutta: 21)

The CPM expressed concern over the abandoning of a planned economy and the adoption of a market economy in the Soviet Union. It argued that a planned economy allowed for a way in which the productive forces could be socialised. The process of planning should regulate the market and the economy. It also acknowledged that in the present juncture, it was necessary to increase the efficiency of the planned economy as well as to decentralise certain aspects to encourage efficiency and innovation. At the same time, it pointed out that the Soviet Document titled ‘For Effective Plan Market Economy’ envisaged the complete reversal of the planned economy. The CPM document argued that the adoption of a market economy would lead to an increase in income inequalities and a complete erosion of socialism.

“There are justified grounds to be alarmed about the direction of reforms undertaken in the Soviet Union. The Draft Platform under the section entitled ‘For Effective Plan Market Economy’ recognises that “one of the most difficult aspects of economic reforms is finding an organic combination of plan and market methods to regulate economic activity.” (Adopted By the Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 104-105)

“But, subsequently, however, the Draft Platform proceeded to state that ‘The creation of a full-fledged market economy requires the formation of markets of consumer goods, capital goods, securities investment, currencies and research and development, and an early reform of the financial, monetary and credit system’. The Platform envisages the market, instead of planning, regulating the economy. It states: ‘The restructuring of the price formation is a sine qua non-condition for the market to start regulating the economy’.

In the name of a full-fledged market economy, the main emphasis on the market economy and talk of its regulating the economy undermines the vital role of central planning. Market relations and commodity-money relations unless integrated into a

single economic mechanism under planning will lead to increasing income differentiation and erosion of social priorities under Socialism. It will lead to unbalanced development with the profit motive becoming dominant.” (Adopted By the Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 104-105)

The CPM strongly criticised the move by the Soviet Union to move towards only individual and market forms of property ownership. It argued that under socialism, social ownership of property and means of production was the basis of a socialist economy and abolishing them would mean an end of the socialist economy. It called the approach of the Soviet Union towards reforming ownership patterns as un-Marxist and bourgeois. It criticised the transition program of the Soviet Union which set out that by 1992 the Soviet Union would transition towards a ‘regulated’ market economy. The CPM believed that this sort of transition and de-emphasis on collective ownership would lead to disastrous consequences and would further deepen the crisis of the Soviet Union instead of solving it.

The CPM document very clearly stated that what was happening in the name of reform in the Soviet Union was basically an undermining of the socialist system. It cited the example of Hungary and Poland to argue that mere opening up of the economy was going to create many problems. It argued that reforms in socialist countries needed to be undertaken, but they had to be done within the socialist framework and not by accepting the market. It said that the correlation between free market and democracy was bourgeois propaganda and must be decisively rejected.

“The whole gamut of economic reforms in the Soviet Union plans, and market restructuring forms of property, price reforms, unrestrained opening to the world capitalist market and integrating with its mechanisms are all questions where there are genuine fears that these lead to adverse consequences for the socialist system. The lessons of the history of economic reforms in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and Hungary, must be drawn. In both these countries faced with the deadlock created by the mechanical adoption of the Soviet model, timely corrections were not made. Instead, the economies of these countries were opened to the play of market forces, western credits and heavy capital imports resulting in hyperinflation and unemployment. The consequent mass discontent resulted in the erosion of the socialist system. Economics, as Lenin pointed out, ultimately is a matter of politics.

The need for reform of the socialist economies is a vital and urgent task. Steps are to be taken to work out an effective policy to benefit from the scientific and technological revolution; socialist cost accounting systems and new management procedures and to improve the socialist commodity economy and market under centralised planning. The bourgeois propaganda blitz about the supremacy of the market and its correlation with free choice and democracy must be decisively rejected. The socialist system and the planned economy provide the basis for creative innovations to enhance the productive forces, labour productivity and the emergence of appropriate relations of production.” (Adopted By the Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 106-107)

In the light of the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union, the CPM CC reiterated its position that capitalism could never be the alternative in response to the crisis that the Soviet Union was undergoing. It quoted Lenin to state that the path of a socialist system would not always be straight forward or in a forward direction rather it would be a complex process, lessons had to be drawn from setbacks, and those must be applied to take the socialist project forward. The CC called for upholding of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and the legacy of the International Communist Movement.

“Marxism-Leninism is the source for developing and perfecting socialism. It is this inexhaustible spring that can nourish socialism’s new thrust forward overcoming the present problems and correcting distortions, not the historically obsolete system of capitalism. The exploitation of man by man and crisis are inherent in capitalist production. Exploitation occurs not because the workers are cheated or because of unfair exchange in the market. Exploitation takes place because there exists under capitalism; a commodity-labour power-whose use itself creates a value larger than what it can command on the market. Surplus value generation, profit, the motive force and exploitation take place in the capitalist production process itself. Class exploitation is inherent in the dynamics of capitalist production, notwithstanding any amount of social welfare measures. Emancipation from this exploitation means directly the overthrow of this system. It is not only a moral question. It is a historic necessity based on scientific realities. Capitalism, therefore, can in no way be the

alternative in solving the problems arising out of the process of building and consolidating socialism.

The greatness, validity and continued relevance of Marxism-Leninism, lies in the fact that it shows the historical inevitability of the overthrow of capitalism and the triumph of socialism on the basis of scientific analysis. The process of humanity's transition to socialism is a process or continuous struggle for ending the exploitation of man by man and of the nation by the nation on the world scale. But this process as we have seen is a complex one marked by a continuous struggle between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution. As Lenin said: "It is undialectical unscientific and theoretically wrong to regard the course of world history as a smooth and always in a forward direction without occasional gigantic leaps back". Such reverses and setbacks must be properly understood and correct lessons drawn in order to strengthen the forces of socialism against its enemies during this period of transition. The main trends of world development in this century, however, testify the correctness of the content of the present epoch since 1917 as that of transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) upholding the banner of Marxism-Leninism against deviations and distortions, calls upon its ranks to face the challenges posed by the recent developments by firmly adhering to revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism. It calls upon the ranks to steadfastly struggle against the onslaught of imperialism and counter-revolutionary forces which are today mounting a fierce attack against Marxism-Leninism and the international communist movement." (Adopted By the Central Committee in its meeting of May 28-31, 1990: 107-108)

However, the CPI had an optimistic view of the world situation; it seemed to think that the Cold War was easing out and the treaty between Gorbachev and Reagan to reduce their arsenals materialised. It thought that the 'New Thinking' that had emerged in the Soviet Union would have a positive impact worldwide.

"The struggle for peace and disarmament waged by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is getting wide support throughout the world. The NAM and the intercontinental group of six are playing a very vital role in the question of peace and

development. Several social democratic parties in Europe are supporting the demand for nuclear-free zones and the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons.” (CPI-Fourteenth Party Congress document, 6-12 March 1989 Calcutta: 11)

On the other hand, The CPI-M was concerned about the lack of unity in the Socialist camp, especially the ideological fall out between the two biggest socialist countries- China and the Soviet Union. It expressed concern that in the contemporary situation where imperialist countries were strengthening themselves, it was imperative that there must be a normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations. CPM expressed its desire for the restoration of the unity of the Socialist camp. This lack of unity was affecting socialist unity on the question of peace and war, and because of this, the communists were unable to speak in one voice and clearly identify the imperialist powers as many socialist countries were not taking the threat posed by the Reagan administration seriously.

“All Communist parties sincerely desire peace and are opposed to war, and yet the Communist movement is unable to speak with one voice pinpointing U.S. imperialism as the chief culprit of the armaments race. Some of them do not take seriously the dangerous utterances of imperialist leaders like Reagan who call for a war against Marxism-Leninism and declares the destruction of the USSR as its objective.” (CPI-M Twelfth Party Congress document, 25-30 December 1985 Calcutta: 27)

The CPI always praised the initiatives taken by the Soviet Union under Gorbachev like withdrawal of armed forces from Eastern European countries and calling for a moratorium on foreign debts. It believed that the Indian Govt. was playing an essential role within the NAM and other forums.

“The struggle for peace and disarmament waged by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is getting wide support throughout the world. The NAM and the intercontinental group of six are playing a very vital role in the question of peace and development. Several social democratic parties in Europe are supporting the demand for nuclear-free zones and the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. (CPI-Fourteenth party congress document, 6-12 March 1989 Calcutta: 11)

The CPI document of the Fourteenth party congress was also in appreciation of the various agreements signed between Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi and believed that

India continued to strengthen Indo- Soviet friendship. Unlike the CPM it believed that India followed an independent foreign policy which was an irritant to imperialist forces.

“Against this background, the proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev in his UN address on December 7, 1988, for a moratorium on foreign debts of developing countries have been widely supported. Further, his declaration that the USSR has decided unilaterally to cut its conventional armed forces by half a million men, and to withdraw several tank divisions and arms from Eastern Europe, will greatly strengthen the cause of peace and disarmament.

India has been following a policy of anti-imperialism, nonalignment and peace. It supports the national liberation movements against the aggressive moves of imperialism. It has taken important initiatives in NAM for mobilising world opinion against the arms race and for development. It is playing a positive role in international economic forums like UNCTAD, GATT, etc, as a member of the Group of 77.

It gives consistent support to the peace policies and initiatives of the Soviet Union and is pursuing a policy of close friendship and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries. The Delhi Declaration signed by Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev for a nuclear-free and non-violent world has given a global dimension to Indo-Soviet friendship.

The independent foreign policy of India is detected by the imperialists, particularly the USA, and they try to pressurise India to change its course.” (CPI- Fourteenth party congress document, 6-12 March 1989 Calcutta: 13)

While CPI termed the foreign policy of the Indian Govt. as anti-imperialist and supporting non-alignment but on the other hand, CPM felt that the ruling class of India wanted to undermine the policy of Non-Alignment and the Congress party did not want to own up to the anti-Imperialist legacy of the anti-colonial struggle. The opposition parties which were mostly pro-Western would be more than happy to dump the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, the new economic policies which were being pursued by the Govt. would inevitably push the country closer to the United States. In its Twelfth Party Congress in December 1985 CPM stated it clearly in point number 8 and 9 of International situation Resolution :

“8. The non-aligned foreign policy of the country cannot be taken for granted. At present, it is almost exclusively dependent on the will of the ruling party. Inside the Congress(I) all are not closely committed to it. The pro-West influence is not negligible. Many do not share the hatred of imperialism born out of the freedom struggle. The bourgeois Opposition parties are mostly opposed to the present policy of non-alignment and would prefer a tilt in the western direction. The masses are virtually disarmed in relation to the question of foreign policy. The new economic policy must inevitably pressurise the Government. In the direction of the West and one big safeguard against imperialist influence and penetration may be endangered.

9. The conflict between the ruling party and the Left is sharpening, and the Left Front Governments are under constant attack.” (CPI-M-12th party congress document, 25-30 December 1985 Calcutta: 30)

The CPI-M believed that the foreign policy of the country reflected the character of the bourgeoisie in India, which was dual in nature; it was in opposition as well as in compromise with imperialism. However, the desire of the Indian ruling class to compromise with Western powers on economic policies was making this dual character harder to sustain. Concessions on the economic front would mean greater pressure in maintaining India’s non aligned position as well as friendship with the Soviet Union in the foreign policy front. The CPM had always been in favour of non-alignment and against vacillations and hesitations in foreign policy

“The Party Programme observes: “The foreign policy of the Govt. of India naturally reflects the dual character of our bourgeoisie, of opposition as well as compromise and collaboration with imperialism... The Indian bourgeoisie, for its very development, needs world peace and is opposed to world war.” (CPI-M-Twelfth party congress document, 25-30 December 1985 Calcutta: 43)

However, the CPI while expressing apprehensions about Rajiv Gandhi’s changing economic policies was also enthusiastic about the various agreements he had signed with Gorbachev, which it saw as a symbol of deepening and strengthening of Indo-Soviet relations. It also stated that “Soviet aid has been crucial for India in maintaining its trade balance and saving it from MNC domination.” However, it also stated that “though Indo Soviet relations are important, they cannot be a substitute for

overcoming capitalist development.” It also stated that there were entrenched interests in the bureaucracy which wanted India to move closer to the United States and away from the socialist world.

The CPM believed that the US was actively preparing for war and an ideological offensive against the Soviet Union and socialism. The document observed a shift in the position of the imperialists towards war and even nuclear war. To strengthen this point, the document pointed to Reagan’s speeches and to the statement of the Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger who had given his approval for preparations for nuclear War in 1982 itself. This shift in policy would mean that the US would actively seek to make war both military and economical with the Soviet Union.

“The war drive has been planned systematically since 1980. In 1981 the U.S. National Security Council prepared. A plan of ideological subversion against the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. But this was not enough. In June 1982, addressing the British Parliament, Reagan virtually proclaimed a holy war against Communism. He called on the West to fight back Marxism -Leninism. But the real aim was not confined to an ideological battle. It was a call to the West to roll back by force and subversion the achievements of Socialism, a call to form a war alliance of the imperialist powers.

The shift of the U.S. imperialists towards an active policy of war preparations against the Soviet Union could be discerned as early as in 1982. In April of that year, Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger gave his approval for the ‘guidance’ of preparations for a nuclear war. The U.S. Press itself called it a blueprint for turning the uneasy U.S.-USSR relations into an unrelenting war to the death. A month later, in May, President Reagan approved a classified document aimed at making the USSR change its system and undermining the Socialist community and in June, Reagan openly announced his crusade against Communism, first: in the speech to the British Parliament and then at the United Nations. On the 18th of the same month, the U.S. Administration decided to launch economic warfare against the USSR.” (CPI-M Twelfth party congress document, 25-30 December 1985, Calcutta: 20)

However, in the Third Congress of the CPI-ML in 1982, the party’s position seemed to be to oppose both the US and the USSR as they were superpowers and were eager

to go to war with each other. Both were making moves which would bring them to the brink of war. The CPI-ML's position was to oppose both US imperialism and the Soviet Union. It also said that opposing the Soviet Union did not mean an alliance with the US. At that point in history, CPI-ML's stand seemed to be opposing both the US and the USSR and standing along with Mao's 'three world policy'.

“As a whole, in the present-day world situation, the two superpowers—the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union—continue to pose the greatest danger to peace. It is true that at present they are more engaged in proxy wars and local-level wars, with a stalemate going on in their balance of forces. However, the danger of a new world war is still there, and it may become a reality with any major change in the balance of forces. Out of the two, just now, the Soviet Union is waiting for a new turn of events to make a further drive, and the American imperialism is adopting an offensive posture. The Soviet Union is awaiting- and trying its best through its political agents in all countries to effect- a turn in the mass indignation against it generated because of Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Poland, towards the U.S.A. before taking a new military offensive. It is wooing up Iran and trying to cling to India.

While resolutely opposing the U.S. offensive, we should keep our vigilance against the Soviet Union and while opposing the Soviet Union, we should keep up our vigilance against American imperialism. We are taking the Soviet Union as the main danger does not mean the united front with the U.S.A. or its forces in India. Such a policy can only prove suicidal. In the event of a war between two warring sides, we should vehemently oppose war and stand for peace and should take measure appropriate in the then prevailing situation. At present, this is the only correct stand to remain with the anti-imperialist struggles of the world people and develop people's forces a counter to the possibility of war. The theory of dividing the world into three parts in deciding the strategy and tactics of the international proletariat and the socialist countries, as formulated by Mao Tsetung still holds good as the only correct theory.” [Documents of the Third All India Congress, CPI(ML-Liberation), 1982: 26]

On the other hand, the CPI-M party document passed in the 12th Party Congress in 1985 believed that it was the combined strength of the Warsaw Pact countries and the military strength of the Soviet Union which had acted as a check against imperialism and nuclear war race. It was in full support of the role the Soviet Union had played in

aiding countries of Asia and Africa in rebuffing imperialist moves in the above continents. It further indicated that it was due to the efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that world peace had been ensured in the face of Zionists, racist and imperialist interests across the globe.

“The struggle for peace waged by the Warsaw Pact countries, with the support of the people of the world, together with the military preparedness of the Soviet Union which is determined to see that the existing military parity is not upset in favour of imperialism, has so far acted as a strong deterrent against the nuclear warmongers.” (CPI-M Twelfth party congress document, 25-30 December 1985 Calcutta: 8)

“The Soviet Union has been extending unstinted help to Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. This help and the fraternal role played by Vietnam in Kampuchea and Laos, have helped to frustrate the imperialist designs in Indo-China. Socialist help, primarily from the Soviet Union and Cuba, to the fighting people of Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique; Afghanistan and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the support of all Socialist countries to the cause of Palestinian liberation, their firm opposition to the Israeli aggressors, have strengthened the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-racist forces everywhere. The support of the Soviet Union and all Socialist countries, some of whom are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, has given immeasurable strength to this movement which stands for peace and comes out against imperialist war machinations.” (CPI-M Twelfth party congress document, 25-30 December 1985 Calcutta: 9)

Moreover, the CPI believed that easing out of relations between India, China and the USSR would be of great benefit to India and Asia as a whole, but for this, it was imperative that the relationship between the USSR and China needed to be normalised and it supported such normalisation.

“The process of normalisation of relations between India and China, USSR and China, will lead to the relaxation of tensions in India's neighbourhood and Asia as a whole. The three countries will now be able to play their historical role of contributing to a peaceful independent and democratic Asia in a much-relaxed atmosphere. The normalisation of relations between USSR and China is of decisive

importance.” (CPI Fourteenth party congress document, 6-12 March 1989 Calcutta: 14)

The CPI-M document stated that the presence of the Socialist camp was the biggest obstacle in the way of world domination of the capitalist bloc. The reason for the failure of the US intervention in Afghanistan and Cambodia was because these countries knew that they were not alone in the fight against the imperialist forces. The CPI-M was clearly in favour of a counter-intervention by the Soviet Union against US intervention. It also clearly stated its position vis-à-vis the refusal of Reagan to sign treaties, which would relax the arms race between the two camps. It also criticised the move by the Reagan administration to place missiles in Europe which would be in striking range of the heart of the Soviet Union and further warmongering. (CPI-M Twelfth party congress document, 25-30 December 1985 Calcutta: 19)

The CPI(M) had been recognised by the Soviet party, and bilateral relations were established between the two parties in 1985. The CPI(M) not only reversed its earlier ‘equidistant’ attitude towards the Soviet Union but also recognised the leading role played by the USSR in support of national liberation struggles in the world. It was for the first time that the CPI(M) did not criticise the Soviet Union in its party congress in December 1985. On the eve of the CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to India, the ground was prepared for the consolidation of the CPSU-CPI(M) ties. While the Soviets felt that there had been a change in the CPI(M)’s perception regarding the importance of the CPSU in the international Communist movement, the CPI(M) asserted that the Soviets had finally conceded that there were two communist parties in India. (Telegraph, November 26, 1986: 8) When Gorbachev visited India in November 1986, leaders of the two parties (CPI and CPI(M)) met him separately and exchanged views regarding bilateral relations apart from others.

It is along these lines that the CPC-CPI relations were sought to be repaired. It can be recalled that in the wake of the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962, The CPI-CPC relations were snapped. As there prevailed a conducive atmosphere leading to the Sino-Soviet normalisation, the CPC showed interest in re-establishing ties with the CPI in the same fashion as the CPSU had done with the CPI(M). However, interestingly, the CPI continued to harp on its differences with the CPC on the border

issue, even while attempts at the CPI-CPC unity were being made. (**New Age, June 1, 1986: 5**)

However, the changed relationship between the CPSU and the CPC noted above contributed to a renewal of CPC-CPI relations. It was at this juncture that the AITUC delegation paid a visit to China on the invitation of CPC's Trade Union Front. A CPI leader viewed the visit as an effort by the two estranged Communist parties viz., CPI and CPC to come closer. He said that despite the serious and wide-ranging political differences between the CPI and the CPC, both the parties seemed eager to repair the ties "as both of us believe in Communist principles".(The Statesman, July 16, 1985: 11)

Accordingly, both these parties had exchanged views on several issues, mainly on the bilateral relationship, during the course of their visits. This was a positive development which in turn brought about some progress in the field of CPI-CPI(M) relations. It is in this background that an analysis of the debate between the parties through their party organs becomes meaningful. The CPI in its organ New Age initiated the debate. It published a series of articles written by its national leaders, covering ideological, political and tactical issues apart from differences on day-to-day activities. In one of his articles, the CPI leader Jagannath Sarkar concluded:

"So long as differences in the ideological positions persist the CPI-CPI(M) relations will be marked by jerks and jolts. But by holding joint actions on as many issues as possible and by soberly evaluating the experiences it will be possible to bring the two parties closer on an increasing scale" (New Age, July 28, 1986: 11).

On the other hand, CPI leader N. Rajesekhar Reddy was very candid when he admitted that both the parties had changed the positions they took earlier, to quote him, he said: "The fact that the CPI(M) had begun to acknowledge the revolutionary role of the CPSU and had accepted many ideas of the world communist movement which it had earlier dubbed as revisionist and the fact that it had begun to critically re-evaluate the policies and practices of the CPC; and the fact that it chose to break with the Janata Party government headed by Morarji Desai..." (Communist party publication, 1985: 1-2)

At some other occasion, he had underlined the need to promote a greater degree of united actions. To achieve unity between the two parties, it was the areas of agreement that should be stressed that the other way round. (New Age, August 4, 1985: 9)

By contrast, the CPI(M) PB member, Harikishan Singh Surjit had written extensively on the question of CPI-CPI(M) differences in the People's Democracy. (Surjit, 1985: 35) He laboured a lot to expose the “class-collaborationist” nature of the CPI, and of course, advised the CPI to change its programmatic understanding so that the cooperation was possible between the left parties. The CPI(M)’s approach to this question of unity amounted to ‘status-quo’. This was perhaps because the CPI(M) had some reservations on this score. For one, the ideological differences still remained unsolved and second, the left unity per se might not bring about much change in the correlation of ‘class forces’.

However, CPI-ML expressed worry about the CPM’s growing relationship with the CPC. It stated that support for the CPM by the CPC would cause great harm to the cause of the Indian Revolution because according to it, the CPM and the CPI have been revisionists. It clearly did not favour closer relationships between the CPC and the CPM.

“We hope that the Chinese people under the leadership of the CPC will come out of these problems with flying colours and strengthen the enthusiasm of the people of the world for the socialist system—the enthusiasm which due to various developments, has been somewhat subdued. The Indian people cherish a profound love for Socialist China and have always got inspiration in their revolution from the Chinese revolution. Any normalisation of the CPC’s relations with the CPI(M) will definitely be harmful for Indian revolution because the CPI(M) is more capable and shrewd in implementing the CPI’s policies in our conditions; still we are confident of overcoming any such eventuality relying on our own strength by exposing and isolating the CPI(M) neo-revisionists.” [Documents of the Third All India Congress, CPI(ML-Liberation),1982: 17]

Conclusions

With the advent of Gorbachev to power in 1985, the trend towards de-ideologisation and pragmatism gradually became more important resulting over time in curtailment of the traditional relationship between the Soviet Union and the developing countries including India. In fact, this trend had emerged during the last days of Brezhnev towards the end of the 1970s and early 1980s and could see a new orientation in the Soviet writings, a new look towards the World War was in the offing. The old basic premises-the socialist orientation, the non-capitalist path of development, etc., began to be questioned in the writings of leading Soviet scholars like Brutents, Ulyanovsky, Mirsky, Primakov, Sakhnazarov and a host of others. Thus, one comes across various sceptical writings in the last days of Brezhnev. During the Gorbachev period, this trend was further consolidated.

It can be argued that Perestroika may be regarded as a distinct ideology which was initially aimed to 'renew' socialism but it too gradually stepped outside the overall framework of Leninism through promotion of "humane, democratic socialism" which had not been fully developed and like the 'Communist Perspective' of the CPSU had not been demonstrated.

Perestroika as an ideology that evolved as it tended to incorporate some of the elements of 'western political and economic system. Perestroika could have been termed as an ideology of the de-ideologisation of socialism. The 'new political thinking', a direct offshoot of Perestroika, imbibed the western ideas of the interconnected world and universal values more openly. 'New political thinking' was essentially peaceful-coexistence sans class-struggle. Once the Soviets, for their internal reasons, decided to turn confrontation with capitalism into cooperation, the entire view about capitalism and imperialism had to be changed. The new political thinking' did precisely that.

The 'new political thinking' was also a language that appealed to Western liberal thought. However, Gorbachev had used the 'new political thinking' to attach the concepts of nuclear deterrence which had been the mainstay of the western strategy in the cold-war years. The 'new political thinking' extended the concept of interdependence from the realm of nuclear weapons to other 'global problems' too.

Thus, a theoretical basis for “globalism” and a strong case for cooperation with the former adversaries was made out.

The ‘new political thinking’ would not have cut much ice with the west had it not been for the de-ideologisation of the USSR’s internal political and economic system and concrete concessions by the USSR in several fields. This, in turn, created pressure on the west to soften its own ideological, confrontationist stance vis-a-vis USSR.

The ‘non-class’ character of the ‘new political thinking’ did generate controversy within the Soviet Politburo in 1988, when CPSU CC Politburo member Yegor Ligachev argued that International relations did have a class character and that primacy of general human problems did not mean that social and national struggles were less important or that class contradictions and antagonisms could be ignored. (Pravda July 26th, 1988) However, with rapid de-ideologisation of Soviet internal policies, Ligachev’s dissent became merely a historical fact.

The Soviet foreign policy was governed to a great extent by the course of Perestroika. Addressing the West, Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders had repeatedly said that international politics would be greatly affected by the success or failure of Perestroika. This was evident as Baltic republics worked towards secession from USSR and the unrest in Central Asia affected the other Muslim nations or as the Soviet state moved towards a loose confederation. Even as the Soviet policies got de-ideologised, the link between the Soviet foreign policy and the ideology of Perestroika remained tangible.

Gorbachev attempted to turn socialism-capitalism contradictions into cooperation between the two. The events of the Gorbachev years had clearly demonstrated the strong link between the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet foreign policy conducted right up to 1985. A whole theory of de-ideologisation, which was sought to be justified in the name of ‘humane’ and democratic facets of Marxism-Leninism, was being built to undo the ideology- foreign policy link built in past decades. The ‘new political thinking’ provided the philosophical undertakings of this immense de-ideologisation effort in USSR. The initial consequence of this effort had been that the former adversaries formally declared the end of the cold war and the heralding of the post-cold war phase in international relations.

There have been several ideological debates between the three Left parties of India regarding Gorbachev's policies. The CPM, which had adopted the 'equidistant' policy from both CPSU and CPC till the time of Brezhnev, began to criticize his policies openly during Gorbachev's era, they even considered the policies of Gorbachev in sharp contrast to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism.

But CPI still continued to support CPSU policies. According to the CPI, Gorbachev's Glasnost and 'Perestroika and New Political Thinking' would make the synergy of Marxism more attractive and popular. Although the CPM, on the basis of the 27th Congress of CPSU which declared Gorbachev's Policy, had supported it, the CPM believed that it was necessary to bring such policies to reform the old economy and governance, but the explanation given by Glasnost and Perestroika and New Political Thinking in the 28th Congress of CPSU was completely against the theories of Lenin. Universal Human Value is actually part of the same liberal philosophy that does not consider the class question at all. Opening the market in the name of improving the economy of the country is to authorize the same capitalist system.

However, in contrast to these two parties, the CPI-ML believed that by blaming everything on Gorbachev's policy, CPSU's policies would not be evaluated properly. In fact, CPSU's deviation from Marxism-Leninism began to come from Khrushchev's time when talk of peaceful coexistence and peaceful cooperation with class enemy started. The class question was sidelined from the time of Gorbachev, and the Soviet Union had been involved in the same blind race of imperial expansion.

However, in 1985, CPSU had recognised the two communist parties in India, CPI-CPM. This was the reason that after 1985 there was some relaxation in CPM's criticism towards CPSU. But after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the CPM again boiled on Gorbachev to break the USSR. Thus, we see that during the time of Gorbachev, there were different opinions among India's Communist parties towards CPSU policies

Chapter-VII

Conclusion

The Communist movement in India has been a fallout of the October Revolution. Had there been no October Revolution, perhaps the communist movement would have never been born in India. It is quite evident that Soviet Russia and the Bolshevik leaders made every effort to assist Indian revolutionaries in setting up a Communist Party in India.

When October Revolution triumphed in 1917, most of the Asian countries were under the colonial yoke, specifically under British domination. The colonial oppression provided a remarkable opportunity to Soviet Russia to enunciate solidarity with the oppressed people with all means and matters. Behind this background, the Soviet perception of the communist movement embarked on a dual path. On the one hand, the Soviets tried to build an anti-colonial front in the colonies; on the other hand, they aided communist revolutionaries in launching a proletarian movement. Keeping a broader perspective of the international communist movement in mind, Lenin laid the foundation of Communist International in 1919.

Posterior to the establishment of the Communist International, proper contact was established with early Indian Communists, and they received not only material help but also ideological advice now and then. To begin with, Soviet Russia was boycotted by all major Western powers, as a result of which, Soviet Russia had to encounter isolation in the international realm. A peculiar situation developed to a large extent in the colonies where the native populations had no right to determine their fate because their real masters were the colonial powers. Under these circumstances, Soviet Russia tried to isolate the colonial powers from the people of their colonies. India was one such country where Soviet Russia tried this policy. It made remarkable headway in its goal because the Soviet Union was supported not only by the Communist Party of India but also by the bourgeois nationalist forces both during and after the British rule in India.

Even though the policies of the CPSU were majorly influenced by individual leaders like Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev, but minute examination

makes it clear that they did not espouse the Marxist ideology in a static form. In order to justify their policies, they stressed the purported significance of existing material conditions and the need to adapt to it. The evaluation of the policies adopted by these leaders (except Lenin) towards the Indian communist movement brings to the forefront the unequivocal reality that under the guise of ideological motives, they pursued pragmatist policies as per Soviet national interest. An evident reflection of this was Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Soviet-supported coup in Czechoslovakia.

As far as CPSU's internationalist vision was concerned, it clamoured for the October Revolution to act as a stepping stone for the establishment of a revolutionary world order marked by a communist upheaval across the globe. The untimely demise of Lenin was a watershed moment that turned out to be a major setback for these aspirations of the CPSU, and by the time Khrushchev assumed power, it had almost ceased aiding the communist movements going on in other countries or shaping their policies that it once purported to do.

Contrary to Lenin's internationalist approach, the global scenario had turned completely hostile towards the Soviet-led communist bloc and compelled Stalin to espouse the policy of promoting the spread of "socialism in one country". This stance caused a stir within the international communist movement as it was heavily debated by its detractors and proponents alike. Citing the ideological reason that the objective conditions of each country were different from the others, the CPSU refrained from intervening in their internal affairs. It opined that shaping the policies of other countries sitting afar without being fully cognizant of the existing material conditions might inhibit the spread of an independent and autonomous communist movement. One of the leading factors of such a position of non-interference was that the world, to a great extent, was divided into two blocs fundamentally opposed to each other in their ideological affiliations. The Soviet Union, being no different, was dragged into a vicious cycle of hostile ideological warfare. So as far as India, a former British colony that had recently gained independence, was concerned, the CPSU did not care to aid communist movement in India as much as it cared about how staunchly the Indian government would support the CPSU in gaining traction and influence against the

backdrop of an ideologically cleaved world. This led to several disputations among members of the Indian communist parties.

The CPI that had direct contact with CPSU blindly supported the CPSU's policies without any scrutiny whatsoever. It would not be an exaggeration to aver that blind adoption of the CPSU's policies and playing second fiddle to it had become the sole strategy and tactic that the CPI could think of. At the same time, the CPM was convinced that a newly independent country like India, where the bourgeoisie had assumed state power posterior to its independence, was inherently anti-communist and its domestic policies incarcerated the peasant and worker leaders and activists and suppressed movements critical of the regime at large. The CPSU turned a blind eye to this state-sponsored suppression. Contemporaneously, the third communist party in India, namely the CPI-ML, backed CPC's view that the CPSU, for all its slogan of international communism, had an expansionist approach not very different than that of the US.

However, upon realizing that a fertile ground for international communism that had been anticipated was not on the cards, Stalin proffered the concept of "socialism in one country", which facilitated the consolidation of socialism in a vast country without any support. One consequence USSR started behaving like other nation-states when it came to international issues. This led to a transformation in its old attitude of providing assistance to revolutionary and national freedom movements in other countries. This had a significant impact on the communist movement in India, as well. The epoch of Stalin witnessed the line between the party and the state getting blurred, as a result of which, the policies of the CPSU became more practical. One of the prime exemplars of this was the Nazi-Soviet pact⁶. Henceforth the CPSU adopted the same pragmatic approach towards the communist movement in India. While it established diplomatic relations with the newly decolonised India and recognised it as an independent country, the CPI dragged itself into a quagmire that alienated it from the common folk with relentless debates over the oft-raised slogan "yeh aazadi jhuthi hai (the independence is a farce)" within its ranks. The CPGB and Rajni Palme Dutt

⁶ This is also called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This pact between USSR and Nazi Germany came into being on 23 August 1939. According to it, neither of them would either befriend an enemy nation, nor would it aid and abet it. This pact was automatically called off on 22 June 1941 when Germany attacked the Soviet Union.

played a significant role in initiating this debate. The most important phenomenon that this period witnessed was that several third-world countries like India freed themselves from exploitative colonialist clutches. At the same time, the majority of the nations in Africa and Asia that attained independence were now ruled by the bourgeoisie. This was a contradiction. This meant that the communists in these countries had to encounter a two-fold challenge, on one front were the imperialist forces, on the other was the nationalist bourgeoisie. The communist movement in India espoused a completely lop-sided approach instead of resolving this ideological challenge.

As has been mentioned before, the slogans of “yeh aazadi jhuthi hai” did little to rally the common people towards the CPI, in fact, it further alienated them. Even though the CPI led the Telangana movement and the massive Railway strike of 1949, but as it advanced, it triggered a debate over the mode of struggle within the party. The militant mode of struggle met with severe criticism as well. To resolve these ideological debates emanating in the CPI and to figure out the correct line to be espoused, the then CPI General Secretary, Ajoy Ghosh, even paid a visit to Moscow. Endorsing the guidelines given by the CPSU to the CPI, it was in 1955 that the CPI first acknowledged India as a sovereign nation. The second significant point is that the “two camps” theory formulated by the CPSU General Secretary Zhdanov had a stranglehold in the contemporary world. As per this doctrine, the CPSU desired the newly independent countries like India to remain associated with the Socialist bloc. This was one of the reasons as to why the CPSU directed the Indian communist parties to co-operate with the Indian National Congress, which the CPI followed.

With the advent of Khrushchev’s era, the slogan of peaceful co-existence was brought to the forefront to vindicate the aforementioned policy, a policy that repudiated class-based approach, not giving it due significance in the international forum. The “two camps” theory given by Zhdanov was revised. The espousal of the policy of peaceful co-existence in the nuclear age made it conspicuous that the CPSU had adopted a realist approach in the international forum. The stress on competition and the liberalisation of the market in the domestic field pointed towards the undeniable shift in the policies of the CPSU towards third world countries like India. Lenin’s policy of supporting communist movements in third world countries and that of an international

communist upheaval remained a thing of the past. To make the policy of peaceful coexistence come to fruition, the CPSU established a myriad of think tanks. Later these think tanks also played a pivotal role in furthering the “new political thinking” during the Gorbachev period. However, these policies initiated by Khrushchev created tumult in the communist movements across the world, India was no exception.

After relentless debates over the party line and the course of action to be undertaken, this period saw the Indian communist movement getting debilitated by sectarianism and splits. The CPC brought a new stream of the Indian communist movement to the fore; it gave rise to the Naxalite movement. Even though there were dissensions in the Naxalite stream as well for a while, but ultimately, the third stream of the communist movement, which was influenced by the CPC, was established in the form of CPI-ML(Liberation).

The CPSU deemed Nehru the “Most Progressive Leader”. Reciprocating this in the Indian Parliament on 20 March 1956, Nehru extolled and sang praises of the policy of “Peaceful Coexistence and Peaceful Competition” that was conceptualised by Khrushchev. The stance of the CPI was more or less the same as it welcomed the policy by declaring that it would revamp and reinvigorate the communist movement.

Although the CPI raised many questions about CPSU’s criticism of Stalin, with time, it became a forgotten affair. However, during this period, when a democratically elected CPI government came to power in Kerala in 1957 and was dissolved by the INC after merely two years, the CPSU distanced itself from such a development in the subcontinent by turning a deaf ear to it. Not even a single word was uttered by the CPSU against this undemocratic dissolution, neither did the Soviet press publish anything concerning the aforementioned development.

On the contrary, the CPSU bolstered its diplomatic ties with the Indian government during this period. CPI’s blind adherence to the CPSU stirred many debates within the party. Several voices of dissent emerged out of the CPI over the relation of the Indian communist movement with the INC: whether the Soviet or the Chinese path should be followed, among others. These ideological debates later led to the split in the CPI.

Meanwhile, during the Brezhnev period when the Cold War was at its peak, CPSU’s policy of developed socialism took centre stage, it stressed principles of proletarian

and socialist internationalism. Around this time, the ideological struggle began to be thought of as a form of class struggle. 'Correlations of forces' and 'limited sovereignty' were given significance in the ideological struggle. Although the arms race with the Western countries had a severe impact on the Soviet economy, Brezhnev's policies generated intense debates and differences among the Indian communist parties.

The chaotic situation in Czechoslovakia and the coup in Afghanistan led to dissensions among the three major communist parties in India after several rounds of disputation. The CPI continued to blindly conform to and support all the policies of the CPSU, the CPM adopted a policy of distancing itself from both the CPSU and the CPC, but the CPI-ML condemned both the US and the Soviet Union for their expansionist aspirations and called them imperialists. CPI-ML deemed the USSR "social-imperialists" and keeping both of them at bay, adopted the policy of organising the Indian communist movement towards the path of peace. For a long time, the CPI-ML followed the guidelines of the CPC, but later on, it abandoned the policies of the CPC as well, but both the CPI and the CPM regarded the CPI-ML to be left adventurist and said that held the CPC accountable for diverting the communist movement in India. For a long time, neither of the two parties recognised the CPI-ML; nor did they show any intention of positive engagement. With the transformation of Indian politics, they changed their stance towards CPI-ML. Not just that, the release of Naxalite prisoners became an important issue in the West Bengal Assembly polls. The stance of the CPC and CPI-ML towards CPSU as social-imperialist did not sit well with the CPM as it was convinced that it was a "mistake" and declared that the dissension in the communist movement at the international level would benefit imperialist forces like the US. It further opined that this dissension was the reason America was blatantly and brazenly bombing Vietnam. The CPC and the CPSU, despite being socialist forces, did not take any position. Simultaneously, the CPI regarded the policy of remaining equidistant as an opportunist move and called them out for being afraid to take a stand. The CPI was fully convinced that the CPC was openly supporting the America-led imperialist bloc and under such circumstances, not siding with a socialist country like USSR would be a betrayal of communist principles. However, the position taken by the CPI-ML was completely different from the other two communist parties. It said that the CPSU did not have anything to do

with the communist movement anymore as it had engrossed itself in a battle for supremacy in a world divided into two blocs affiliated to two fundamentally opposed ideological poles. So, it proposed a front that promoted peace and did not hover anywhere near war.

Although Andropov's time was a transitional phase, however, his era saw a proposition of critical policies being brought to the fore concerning few socialist principles. Even though ideological purity was not only being talked about, the materialisation of this conceptual purity was emphasized upon as well, as he sought to move from words to action on the ground. To ensure the full-fledged success of socialism, the need to turn it into a material reality was stressed upon. As tensions escalated in Afghanistan and with the stationing of middle-range missiles by both sides in Europe, tumultuous conditions gripped the world, Andropov acted very cautiously and tried to ease tensions with China.

Gorbachev era witnessed a sea change in the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The proposition of a more humane democratic socialism was promoted, a proposition that was different from the conventional principles. Even though the policy of de-ideologisation that the CPSU adopted did not mean a complete abandonment of ideology, this re-structuralisation was not done in a vacuum. CPSU began to make bold claims that the humane values that perestroika displayed were based on the Marxist theory of alienation. During this time, several aspects of Marxism-Leninism were sidelined; even Leninist principles did not escape this criticism. Humane values were regarded as more important than class values. Emphasising on the futility of class war, discussion about the need to incorporate democratic and humane values in international relations started. The US perceived these debates and discussions as a signal that the USSR was moving in a different direction with the espousal of a distinct ideological understanding. It seemed like the harbinger of a significant fundamental transformation in the ideology of the Cold War. Inter-nation cooperation had replaced the ideological war between socialism and capitalism. Under the guise of humane values of Marxism, individual-centric liberal ideology had taken root, which was a point of departure from the previously followed policies of the CPSU. It distanced itself from the east including 'world socialist system', 'unity and cohesion' of the socialist world, the 'socialist integration', the 'Brezhnev doctrine'. It marked

the end of the long-followed policy of aiding and abetting the communist movements of the world. The ideas of proletarian and socialist internationalism were not given much importance. Based on the policy of “common European home”, the Soviet Union spoke of establishing relations with all the socialist countries that had traditionally been friends to them. CPSU’s concept of de-ideologisation undoubtedly restructured it at the policy level.

The policy of supporting newly independent third world countries that were fundamentally anti-imperialist was also given up. Third world countries were considered the breeding ground of conflicts and their problems were regarded as a menace to global stability. These issues of the third world were not the sole responsibility of the socialist bloc; it was now deemed to be the collective responsibility of all countries, including the US.

Concerning CPSU, the three parties took a different approach during the Gorbachev period. While the CPM openly deemed Gorbachev’s policy of ‘new political thinking’ as a conspicuous deviation from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, the CPI, as per their track record, kept on blindly following the CPSU. What was even more flabbergasting was that instead of taking a stand against it, the CPI referred to Perestroika and glasnost as historic steps towards further establishing socialism. According to CPI, the democratic and humane aspects of Glasnost and Perestroika would bring about a revolutionary change in the distortion that had become increasingly evident in the implementation of socialism up until then. That is why it said that it should be implemented as per Indian realities. The CPI-ML had a completely different stance as compared to the other two communist parties. It was of the opinion that Gorbachev should not be held accountable for all the shortcomings of the CPSU since it was during Khrushchev’s time that deviations in the party line became the new norm when talks of peaceful coexistence and peaceful cooperation with capitalism were championed. In fact, maintaining peace with class enemies meant running away from the actual struggle.

Even though the CPM had supported the policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, to begin with, but later on when there were talks of the repudiation of the entire history of the USSR, the CPM changed its stance and openly opposed it. It opined that through this policy, it seemed as though Gorbachev wanted to show that up until then,

an inhuman structure had been prevalent. It needed to adopt a humane way of functioning. As far as the CPM is concerned, it believed that the materialisation of fallacious contradiction between universal human values and class values was, in fact, a clear exemplar of deviation from socialist principles because it was necessary to look for class value in the essence of other values.

If we take a closer look at all the ups and downs that took place during this 44 year-long period, it will be evident that neither have the policies of the CPSU been unidimensional towards the Indian communist movement nor has the communist movement in India been homogenous towards the CPSU. It is true that the 1917 Soviet revolution substantially influenced and bolstered the spirit of the Indian communist movement, but posterior to 1947, the Indian communist movement while undergoing several policy changes kept on introspecting. This was the prime reason that there were comprehensive debates within the Indian communist movement related to organising it according to the existing ground realities. A consequence of these disputations was the dissension and the subsequent split into the communist parties here. For all the adverse effects of these splits, a positive one was that it led to the formulation of independent tactics and strategy to move towards 'correct' direction. At the global level, the ideological struggle between CPC and CPSU had a significant impact on the communist movement, which at different times adopted different directions.

There was a striking similarity in the reason given by all the Soviet leaders during this time. When policy changes were brought forth in the CPSU by these influential Soviet leaders, namely Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev, the reason cited for it was that it was necessary to bring about constructive transformation in the principles as per the ground reality. However, if we objectively assess the transformations that came forth, we will notice that despite ideology being the main driving force, national interest played a pivotal role. The USSR was engrossed in a quest to establish global dominance, and this quest did not bother the Indian communist movement much. The CPI, on the other hand, could not comprehend this contradiction as it kept on blindly supporting every policy brought forth by the CPSU. Barring the first few years, the CPI more often than not made minimal effort to create favourable condition for an independent communist movement to flourish according to the conditions in India.

However, the CPM had different stances at different times when it came to the CPSU, but not having a clear position at such a crucial juncture meant chaos and directionlessness in the Indian communist movement. The CPI-ML nevertheless tried to take an autonomous stand different to that of the CPI and the CPM, but for a long time, it stayed under the obsession of the CPC, ultimately swayed by it. For a substantial time, CPI and CPM kept on discarding and disregarding the CPI-ML or initiating a dialogue with it, but as time went by, with clear support of the CPC for the CPI-ML and with changing situations, there began a new round of debates and dialogues.

Thus, it would be erroneous to affirm that the policies of the CPSU were merely guided by ideology. One could see major influence of individual personalities in shaping the policies of the CPSU and the communist movement in India carried forward with debates and disputations about guiding their movement based on their day to day experiences.

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