


INDIA'S SMART POWER STRATEGIES IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
2018



Date: 20. 07.2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled “**India’s Smart Power Strategies In India-China Relations**” submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirement of **Masters of Philosophy** is my own work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree in this or any other university.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this Dissertaion be placed before examiners for evaluation .


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Abbreviations

FY : Financial Year

CSIS : Centre for Strategic & International Studies

FTA : Free Trade Agreement

CCP : Chinese Communist Party

CPPCC : Chines People's Political Consultative Conference

BRIC : Brazil Russia India China

GDP : Gross Domestic Product

SME : Small and Medium Enterprise

SCO : Shanghai Corporation Organization

BJP : Barathya Janatha Party

ASEAN : Association of South East Asian Nations

UPA : United Progressive Alliance

PNE: Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CPC : Communist Party of China

UN : United Nations

UNSC : United Nations Security Council

ROI : Republic of India

MGC : Mekong – Ganga Cooperation

ASEM : Asia Europe Summit

APEC : Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

PRC : People's Republic of China

SAARC : South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation

BIMSTEC : Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Techincal and Economic Cooperation

BRI : Belt & Road Initiative

ICCR : Indian Council for Cultural Relations

Chapter 1

Introduction

The use of smart power strategy started gaining prominence in US Foreign policy in 2011 with Hillary Clinton stressed on the use of these strategies. Smart power invited an amplified and much needed academic attention when Clinton mentioned the of Smart Power tactics in her tenure as US state secretary. She expressed that the United States, in order to solve the most “pressing problems” of the interdependent world, needs to make use of “Smart Power tools” in its Foreign policies tactics (Nye, 2009: 160). James Traub (2015) elaborates as to how Hillary’s smart power strategy from 2009-2011 and gave a strong outline to a “Hillary Clinton Doctrine”. Joseph Nye writes that he coined the term in 2003 in order to point out the flaws in the general assumption that Soft Power is sufficient for an adequate foreign policy (Nye, 2009:160)

India is reckoned as a rising power in on the global rankings and evidently it has become increasingly interested in it. In just about a few decades India's expansion of economic ties, its liberalization policies and has greatly enhanced its influence in global economic affairs. World Bank reports in January 2018 projected that India’s growth of economy to reach 7.5% in FY 2019-2020 (Poonam Gupta, 2018:47).

Similarly, India has also made a remarkable impression as a strong military power, pertaining to its nuclearized status. Observers have also reckoned India’s potential as a rising soft power with it’s due to its cultural legacy as a remarkable strong bone. Joseph Nye revealed in an interview that he believes liberal democratic regime in India has advantages over China when it comes to the competition between the two Asian giants for gaining attractiveness and worldwide influence (Pranay Sharma, 2015)

Conceptualizing Smart Power

International relations has for long been synonymous with the conventional use of hard power. But is today, identified with sovereign equality as a central-legal norm. The world is now tied in a “Global Covenant” which respects the ideals of both individual and International freedom and sovereignty. And thus, a hard-headed reliance on only Hard Power cannot be put to use by states for gaining dominance in today’s times. As Joseph Nye (2008) notes hierarchy is being eliminated and there is stress of networking. Thus, a very mellow

and feminine conduct of International affairs is beginning to gain its prominence to balance the conventional stoic usage of power. And so forth, the role and importance of Soft Power are being gradually realized. Soft power and hard power as tools for conducting foreign affairs have attracted a substantial amount academic acclamation and interest. The conventional use of military and economics may not always help maintain the relations cordial between the states in a globalized world. Unlike pre-world-war era the states recognize non- intervention, non-violation and mutual respect for values of independence irrespective of size and development of states.

The world today is intermeshed with economic overlaps in the globalized world. In policymaking, use of Smart Power strategies is widely realised after Hillary Clinton's speech on emphasis on Smart power in 2013. It has an amplified visibility and a number of policymakers' and leaders are talking about it. Smart power seems to have increased preferences and interest and is being practiced too. Policymakers can be said to have taken a positive shift to use contemporary strategies. Nations are developing their Soft Power doctrines for better implementation of their influence. But surprisingly, smart power strategy has fallen short lack of academic interest. India has always been a subject to observation and analysis when it comes to soft power. India has always maintained a respectable reputation as a pioneer of peace, as a torchbearer of the non-aligned movement (NAM). India has enjoyed a status and image of a peace-loving state with icons like Mahatma Gandhi, B.R. Ambedkar that are iconic for the country's peaceful freedom struggle. It enjoys the status of being the largest democracy of the world and has its image of a non-offensive state right from the historical times of Buddha.

This positive image of India has favoured it in its International affairs. Indian diaspora across the globe has played a very central role in taking India's soft power beyond its geographical boundaries. Indian diaspora has introduced and maintained Indian traditions and culture outside the geographical confines of India to a great extent. Indian scholars make up for a large number of scholars abroad. There are tools of soft power such as Indian music, movies, spiritual and religious movements, arts and aesthetics and even cuisine, which has given recognition to India's image. Authors have widely analyzed India's soft power and how its image on the global scale favour it since the ancient times. A lot has been written of China and India, about their soft power tools and potentials. Both the countries have a legacy of traditional values and cultures which are recognized and have shown to have a positive impact on people elsewhere due to their respective diaspora throughout the globe. Both the

states enjoy a respectable image in terms of their contribution to world economics. China undoubtedly seems to have an upper-hand in terms of its economic contribution. However, India's is trying to cope up with any obstacles in its way to become an effective power in the South Asian region. China is emerging as an economic hub with its Industrial setups and Manufacturing industries, whereas India provides a skilled manpower in terms of IT. But unlike India, China has developed a Soft Power doctrine and making huge investments to realise an amplified global influence both regionally and globally. India seems to lack at this. In terms of military, both the states seem to make a number of military exercises to maintain the essential deterrence. However with increasing interdependence in terms of trade and economics, there are attempts of engagements for enhanced strategic interests. There seems to be a gradual attempt in practicing soft power strategies by both the states that point to a contemporary change from an existential conventional notion of the conduct of Foreign policy.

Soft power received much criticism for its inability to become a substitute to hard power in its entirety. Soft power has faced criticism that it cannot really completely influence the decisions of the other party in negotiations the way hard power strategy does by making use of Coercion and incentivisation. China's political setup and its image of a secretive, hawkish and aggressive state has affected its spread of influence. China has tried practicing its soft power strategies through the power of its tradition, cuisine, scholars exchange, mushrooming Confucius institutions throughout the world.

Diagnosis of Smart power suggests it as a strategy which relies more on influencing the counterpart by incentivising it, while maintaining an upper hand, or an invisible, yet obvious manipulator control. India seems to be adapting to changes under the new leadership and trying to mend ties with China.

As this research involves a number of concepts that work in close conjunction with each other, it is important to first analyse them in detail, pertaining to their intricate interdependence on each other. As we try and track the changes in India's slight shift to Smart power strategies, it is firstly important to take a look at the various tools that are essential for conducting this research. It is important to develop a better understanding of the process and the underlying points of contention and engagements in India-China Relations. Further it is important to understand the concept of Smart power, Soft power and its applications.

Relations between India-China

India and China are largely a play of balance of power in the region. Chong(2016) points to both the countries maintaining an internal balance of Power in terms of military and externally by strengthening ties with bordering neighbours and multilateral ties. However, there also is a prolonged uneasiness between the two in maintenance of state of affairs due to longstanding historical disputes. Chong explains India- China relations over the years, analysing the underlying issues from Realist, Liberal and Constructivist lenses, establishing why the two countries are opposite poles with their ideas. He assesses from a history of enmity in relationships between the two on territorial disputes and the problems over Dalai Lama and lays facts about their perception of each other. Menon (2014) points to frequent Chinese incursions as one of the flaring issues between India and China. Much discussed border disputes and frequent episodes of military incursions has plagued the peaceful relations. Chinese troops frequently breach the line of control (LOC) in the Aksai Chin, offering reminders that it remains a potential source of war. Aksai Chin means a lot to China due to it being a way into the Xinjiang province and Tibet, also it is the region where anti-Han nationalism is increasing.

India asserts that China has occupied around forty three thousand sq. kilometres of Indian territory in the western and eastern region. China holds claim to 90,000 square kilometres of landmass in the Indian state of arunachal pradesh in India and marks it as Southern Tibet. This also varies because of the values and conduct of the two, mainly due to differences in their conduct of Foreign policies. Singh (2010) notes that India's multilateral engagements are more 'norms' based in comparison to China whose engagements on multilateral engagements are more about power. This is also the reason why China's military incursions in the Aksai Chin, and recently Doklam, has been a major irritant for India.

Chong (2016) points to a sustenance of mutual suspicion and distrust which has been expanding the rift and adding to more instability in relations. There seems a kind of 'action-reaction dynamics' between the two as India has shown a greater inclination to work with the US which has also fumed a balance of threat in the region as opposed to balance of power.

Perspectives from both sides and scope of engagement

India is in constant process of replenishing its trade relations with China. Singh (2010) points out how the India's potential in trade with China is asymmetrical and is underutilized. There is a wide scope of improvement. Strengthening ties with China is not a new phenomenon and the previous governments too have done substantial efforts to engage with China which the current leadership is carrying forward. Manmohan Singh visited China in October 2013, made significant efforts at establishing protocols to avoid any miscalculations at the border. Keeping that in mind, and how the two countries share similar views on climate change issue and devaluation of Nuclear weapons. On his perceptions of how China views India, Tharoor (2013) says that an emergence of a Stronger US-India engagement, especially in regard to the military exercises with US, Japan, Australia has made China view India as an object to containment. India is trying to square the circle in increasing its influence and strengthening its bilateral ties in the neighbourhood and elsewhere. The concept of extended neighbourhood has become an important aspect of India's policy for China, which extends to all sides oft-quoted as Omni-directional (Scott, 2009).

Both the countries have different views on a variety of issues that are points of contentions which they need to tackle with the inevitability of increasing dependence on trade. Scott (2009) points to India's notion of an expanded neighbourhood involves a desire of muscle projection by India; may it be in terms of military or economic prowess or its culture backed, soft and idealism. The antagonism still remains between the two, especially for India, one of the greatest reasons is that China has a better balance of power in comparison to India. China Menon(2014) writes about that Beijing enjoys a better Balance of power in terms of Economics. He mentions India's defence budget standing to be around seventeen percent of china and that of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 37 percent.

Gojree(2013) mentions that the two are likely to converge on issues where the two states have shared interests and avoid any open and overt conflict. He mentions some of the fields of convergence of interests such as Energy security, maritime security and their Views on the issues of Human rights.

Menon (2014) lays out a comprehensive comparison with infrastructure of the two countries. In terms of economics, he stresses on the inflow of foreign investments. The markers of social standards, such as standards of living, the rate of education, advancement and use of latest technology, or the defence might, China leads by a wide margin. There is also a desire

of engagement by China towards India. Besides its realization of India being an important trade partner, China also wants to keep a check on India's pursuits. India seems to be on China's priority list. Selina Ho (2014) Li – Keqiang chose to enhance relations with India on his maiden trip abroad, right after assuming the office to power, with an aim to multiply Indian exports to China and establishing Investment parks to balance the unidirectional flow of investments in India – china trade relations.

China extended its hand in a friendly gesture to India, by offering it to join The Maritime Silk Road Initiative. It was earlier targeting ASEAN states. It planned a four countries corridor which was to include Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and China itself. With such intricate and complex interdependence it is foolish on part of both the countries to pose confrontational towards each other is not a good idea. It is also important on part of India to reduce tensions with China in order to overcome the problems in the North east. There is wide scope of improvement in relations between the two and both the states are willing maintain better trade relations. However, it is important to maintain a clarity of messages in order to maintain the relations. Both the countries maintain an internal and external balance of power which also breeds ambiguity in their conduct of relations. India has often been accused and criticised for its inaction and silence when it comes to giving political signals. China is also accused to maintain a Hawkish personality when it comes to its Foreign policy, especially in its spheres of influence in East Asia (Malone,2011).

Thus there is a need to maintain a balancing posture. Pratibha (2017) writes how it is essential for India to avoid conflicting and ad-hoc signals by India in its diplomatic practices to give for changing the image of how china views India. There is a need for Smart Power strategies to do the tightrope walk of balancing act. An institutionalised use of Soft power and Smart power strategies might benefit India. Insistence to come up with an institutionalised use of Smart power strategies is not new. There have been allegations over neglect over skirmishes with China from one government to the other amidst Indian policymakers. Tharoor(2013) writes that India under the rule of the congress has invited much criticism from the opposition (BJP) for not being concerned about the skirmishes with China over border issues. He says, India has no choice in that matter as it cannot undermine its long established democratic principles and suppress the voice of the Tibetans, nor can India afford to ignore China, which is its largest trading partner and a growing Superpower. He calls that India will continue a tightrope walk over the issue of Tibet. This resonates in the present day India turmoils in India's its domestic politics, which needs a planned move.

Menon (2014) traces down the fact India's attempts to engage with China are not new and completely owed to the new change in leadership. Manmohan Singh his predecessor, made a visit to China, and got a Border Defence Cooperation Treaty signed. The attempts to engagement weren't one sided. Menon writes about Li- Keqiang's choice of as his prime choice a good omen for the budding ties. Chong(2016) highlights that both China and India have an avid interest in strengthening ties in terms of trade and economics. This is visible through their participation in CBMs on International level despite the long-standing territorial issues. India is the largest exporter of Raw materials and Iron to China's industrial sector.

Selina Ho(2014) writes about China's changing perceptions towards India in the light of Xi-Xinping's visit to India and how the Sino- India relations seems to move in a positive direction. Ho points out that China holds out two views of India, on one hand, it analyses India from a historical viewpoint, and the other in terms of India's growing rapprochement with the US. She talks of a perceptual dilemma on part of China in case of India in the way that how it should proceed with India. She remarks China doesn't knows if it has to deal with India as a backward country or as an irritant in the East Asia, where India seems to barge in with its "Look East Policy", irking China to cross its self-proclaimed territories of influence.

Lu (2017) explains India- China relations from Social constructivist lens and analyses how national identity and national Interest play in India China relations. Lu tracks down how the National identity and National interest create misunderstandings and internal and external threats between the two. Chong (2014) lays down facts to analyse that India views its Relations with china from a Liberal Perspective whereas China maintains a realist temperament in its balancing strategy with India. This is where the ambiguity and misunderstandings erupts in the conduct of both the countries.

Theorists argue that pertaining to its insufficiency to completely replace hard power, Soft power is all about investing now to reap the benefits in the long run. The present Indian Foreign policy witnessed several trips and signing of treaties around the world to strengthen bilateral ties and make an investment with India's soft power tools. Tandon (2016) talks about the Modi's doctrine making use of Soft power for both regionally and globally. She believes him to be a champion of commerce and his strategy of engaging with countries capable of providing it raw materials and resources in the long run. Academics argue that Modi has taken smart power to India's economic realm and has taken India's Foreign policy on a fast – track relationship building process. She however, criticizes that Modi's vision of

use of Soft Power is very thinly spread as it is all about quantity over quality when it comes to visiting central Asian states. Soft power's payoffs only emerge in the long run. Jacob (2017) says that China is no longer an ideologically revolutionary actor the way it was Maoist era. Today, China is in the position of remarkable importance in the world and has a tendency towards protecting its gains especially in the regional contexts. It also does not want to be drawn into a conflict with a power, whether the United States or India, China understands how it can impose prohibitive costs and punitive damage. Thus there are signs of building steps to new era of enhanced cooperation and a need for a careful tightrope walk in maintaining the relations. Thus, smart power strategies might prove to be useful in conduct of balanced policies towards each other.

Discourses on Smart Power

It is crucial to first know about smart power in depth. Getting to the depth of the concept is of utmost importance. As there is not a variety of theoretical inputs to it, especially policy analysis from a developing world, it is important to get a grasp on the concept. The concept of Smart power has been introduced by Joseph Nye and has an extensive contribution in conjunction to that of Soft Power and hard power alike. According to Joshua Kurlantzick (2007) whatever acts of show of power that are external to the spheres of military and security canopy is soft power. He says that soft power doesn't only means the most obvious visible forms, such as in diplomacy, but it might also be practiced by the use of elements like the economic handles with an element of coercion or investing in organizations that have a multilateral expanse. India sure takes strides up its multilateral engagements right from the Nehruvian times. Chong (2014) points to a relationship of restrained balancing and engagement by China in its policy towards India which forces India to follow a two pronged strategy of balancing with China and engaging with the Neighbourhood in hopes that its relationships with the China becomes friendly Nye(2008). Smart power as a theoretical concept makes use of the power of attracting, incentivising and also maintaining the image of a roughneck underneath. He makes a point as to how smart power has always existed, but seldom identified and improved and policymakers did not make the best use of it. Nye introduced the concept of Smart Power with US as the key actor, defining it as an amalgamation of hard power and soft power. Nye (2009) lays down emphasis on the three kinds of power which can be used to affect or manipulate the behaviour of other actors. It is interesting to figure out how hard and soft power, being completely counterparts in their basic nature, cannot be a substitute to each other in practice and thus there's a need to

combine the two with smart strategies which includes the usage of tools and tactics of both hard power and soft power. This balance can be achieved through ‘Contextual Intelligence’ which he describes as an intuitive skill for diagnosing smart strategies. This study minutely addresses the answers to the question of what is Smart Power and how a country like US must complement the military and economic might with soft power. Soft power is subject to contextual understanding. It is not necessary that Indian movies or its aesthetics will be appreciated in China to make a deep impact on its policies. Contextual intelligence will aim at eliminating any ambiguities when it comes to communicating a clear message. Both the countries are known to conduct their policies marred by ambiguities. India’s China policy is marred by silence and unclear signals.

Pratibha (2017) writes in the backdrop of Counter-terrorism initiatives and India China relations. She says that it is important for the two states to move beyond a historical enmity and how the tensions have actually drawn China to deepen its ties with Pakistan and views the issues of terrorism through the eyes of Pakistani interlocutors. She writes that despite the contradictions in conduct of diplomatic activities in India- China relations there is some scope of improvement due to increasing economic cooperation between the two. She says India must communicate clear policy messages to China to obliterate any ambiguity and strategic dialogues. This study gives an insight on how India has been engaging in talks with China and how China views India. She gives a broad overview as to how India may engage with China by playing its card better on negotiations table.

Smart power and Soft Power in India –China relations

Pattanayak (2007) tries to engage in comprehensive analysis of India’s status as an emerging power both in the immediate and extended neighbourhood. He gives an overall picture of India’s engagements vis-à-vis different regions. It tries to give an overall holistic overview as to how India has engaged in terms of economics with various powerful states in the world including the great powers. It gives an overview of India’s potential as the next big player in world politics with its soaring stats in economic and military power development. Singh (2010) writes extensively on how India and China’s economies are on a rapid ascension despite recession in the World economy and how the two players are maintaining their economic growth. He gives an overview of India- china relations in light of the individual GDP growth and their takes on Climatic and nuclear issues. Nye(2008) gives an insights on how to identify and hone effective leadership and underscores how the nations with

leadership that combines an appropriate mix of both hard and soft power can be more attractive and also persuasive. This text establishes an elaborate understanding of smart power and makes a dent with the use of variety of soft and hard power tools. It points that use of Smart power may also increase the chances of a leader to come across as a more successful leader. This is also the case with the new Prime Minister who enjoys an image of a ‘Shrewd Bargainer’ in its negotiations with China. Effective leadership makes use of inspirational soft power skills, which makes use of emotional intelligence, visionary ideas to involve people, and persuasive communication. Academics speculate a new shift in Indian foreign policy under the with PM Modi with his claim to power in India.

Jacob (2015) gives an insight on how India-China relations in the post- world war times have taken a different turn in both India and China. He contrasts Narendra Modi and Jawaharlal Nehru with the times and situations, as how the relations in times of Nehru were woven more around India’s multilateral treaties and representation in terms of peace treaties and initiatives. In Nehruvian times, the concentration was not solely on making India emerge as a superpower but to be a representative of the developing world. Singh (2010) notes the on the they faced in their times and makes a point that present flow of relations are mostly economic in nature and are focussing on development rather than the diplomatic practices of multilateral alignments in the past it is more about multilateral engagement, rather economic in the present times.

However, India’s pursuits on making efforts in improving the relations with China is not a new phenomenon and was also carried forward by the predecessor governments. Modi remained an extrovert about his motivation and determination for country’s economic triumph. Rajiv menon points out that from 2001 to 2014 while he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi took trip to China four times and encouraged business relations and got better returns to Gujarat in comparision to any other Indian state. (Menon,2014).

Heng (2016) talks about how Modi has endorsed the India’s soft power to strengthen the economic ties. She tries to highlight the tools of soft power used by Narendra Modi in his diplomatic visits to highlight India’s economic potential and strengthen the ties with other states. She analyses in detail how Modi has put to use, the modern day social media tools for generating the positive attention and branding India as a soft power while making diplomatic ties. Heng points to Modi’s usage of unconventional tactics such as selfies with world leaders and his switching up to people through web media to penetrate and influence the foreign

peoples has favoured him. She mentions how Modi joined the Chinese social media website “Weibo” to bond with Chinese populations.

Nye classifies effective leadership to employ tools of Hard Power one of which he classifies as organizational skills that are important to maintain the information and Institutional systems. Nye talks of Machiavellian political skills as another tool which lets the leadership create and manage winning coalitions and maintain an upper hand in bullying, bargaining and buying power with respect to other states. Chong (2016) points to a security dilemma, pointing that both the sides have maintained a restraint in strategic – military sphere. It is important to assess the yardsticks acquired to assess a country’s offensive. Nye points out that Smart power combines the two resources to broad political skills (contextual intelligence) by capitalizing on trends and understanding the dynamics of changing times and needs, according to the style that suits and addresses the needs of the followers or the general public. The new Indian leadership seems to have caught the needs of the time. Jacob (2015) writes that India had an immense presence during the times of Nehru and now with Modi’s play into power the situation is differing in terms of times and trends both for China and India. He says during the times of Nehru India had an International presence in terms of leadership on multilateral forums as Nehru held dominated India’s decision making policy. But Modi’s times are different in terms of a new wave of strengthening the economy as well as a diverse cabinet which decides for India’s foreign policy. Hall (2015) speculates and analyses an emergence of a ‘Modi Doctrine’. Hall point’s to the Modi Government pacing up India’s military- modernisation and fostering strategic friendships.

Soft power will play a central role in this research as we track down the convergence in strategies. Importance of Soft power is increasingly being realised Analysing the trends in India’s Smart Power strategies will require an in-depth knowledge of India’s Soft power skills. Patryk Kugiel (2012) writes, had the term soft power been in usage in the Cold war era. India would have been a leader, pertaining to the richness of the culture despite economic backwardness. About India’s image, Kugiel(2012) points to a rise in the acceptance Of India also on terms of its spirituality and wellness industry. India enjoys a history of being a nation backing its breakthrough peace initiatives such as NAM. Kugiel says that India being the pioneer of NAM and its strong heritage of principles of non-violence, strong criticism to arms race; has always maintained the image of a value-based nation, which helped it in maintaining a goodwill and sympathy especially in the developing states. Kugiel explains how India’s use of Soft power is yet not institutionalised, in the way China has, but has

undergone a visible change with the help of its culture, political values and highlights factual points as to how various researches point to a positive attitudes to Indian culture and traditions, thus calling it a “toolbox of Soft power instruments and policies” in its neighbourhood. Tharoor (2013) traces how India’s soft power prospects has thrived naturally throughout the ages and without any encouragement of administrative policies, which are instead hampering the proper exploitation of its soft power resources as sue to their rigidity and turn a blind eye to potentialities of the soft power resources of India on world front.

Malone (2011) tracks evolution of India’s soft power in south-east and broader Asia. India’s efforts at planning its influence throughout remained unplanned. He says how India has not being practicing its Soft power well in East Asia where the people share affinity with Buddhism and a widespread diaspora been India side-lined establishing cultural ties in the East Asia in the past. He highlights and contrasts how such engagements can be fruitful for India for a global influence. Thussu (2013) tries to trace India’s global influence from a historical, cultural and political backdrop, and tries to trace the existence and evolution of India’s Soft power from its very inception. He gives an insight as to how the Indian Diaspora abroad, in terms of Scholars and IT professionals abroad.

Dr. Shashi Tharoor has vividly patronized spoken about India’s soft power potential. According to Tharoor any nation’s “brand influence can be configured by the soft power basics it projects” (Tharoor, 2014). He further says that this is based on the projection the country’s global consciousness, which can either be deliberate or by exchange of cultural elements. This can also be intricately annealed at the levels of people. It includes foreign people and cultural propaganda and this surfaces “unwittingly” through methods by which it is professed as an outcome of “news stories in global war media.” (Tharoor , 2014) However, there’s a growing realization about the transition of India to make use of its soft power strategies lately. Balachandran (2016) quotes Modi about how he runs India’s foreign policy in his own words. He tracks down how Modi has met almost all the big leaders including Xi Jinping several times on diplomatic visits. He quotes Modi saying that In interconnected world, it’s all about making connections with everyone. Modi said, even if two countries are opposing each other, they will have to be friends in the changing times. Balachandran quotes on China’s attitude in the backdrop of stonewalling India in its attempt to enter Nuclear Suppliers Group to which he responds that there’s a whole lot of pending problems with China which can only be resolved through negotiations, irrespective of contradictory views between the two. About India’s potential of smart power, Amitabh Mattoo (2014) writes

about how the present Indian leadership under Prime Minister Narendra Modi hinting en route for a gradual use of smart power strategies in policymaking. Even though smart power is not a new phenomenon, the new leadership under Modi is speculated to ensure optimum use of soft power tools. Mattoo says, Modi's foreign policy doctrine has a strategies to brandish India as a Smart Power. He tries and point out to possibilities and a variation in India's existing foreign policy with Modi's doctrine as portrayed through his speeches and party manifestos. He intricately tracks down unfolding events from Modi's ascension to power, and is tries to demystify Modi's foreign policy doctrine and concludes his reliance on the strategies use of smart power strategy and an amplified use of soft power tools. He has very analysed Modi's foreign policy to comprise of 5 key elements highlighting his reliance on 'enlightened national interest' which gives a morality perspective in policy-making.

He talks of Modi's growing interest in strengthening ties in the neighbourhood and use of soft power tools for influence with what he classifies as 5 Ts (talent, tourism, trade, tradition and technology) to amplify the India's power through attractiveness. Modi's policies seem to carry out an action plan of predecessor governments and his idea of embracing china seems to dominate the idea of his foreign policy that lay grounds on a possibility of making use of Smart power strategies. Menon (2014) points out to the popular image of PM Narendra Modi as an ardent nationalist, who has painted the picture that its India's destiny to emerge as a prodigious power and has reproached previous Indian governments for rested attitude towards China. His policy is potentially trying to make use of soft power as a glove to strengthen India's hard power muscle in its relations with China.

This study aims to study a transition in India's tactics in its relations with China. Use of Soft power tools has been widely written and talked about. However, Smart power is one such concept which has not enjoyed a wide interest and support of the academics most probably due to limited theoretical definitions to the concept. The concept has remained understudied, and most of the research has been done along the lines of the historical relations or the military capabilities and other related hard power issues. Soft power and the comparative on India and China has been widely analysed, however Smart power seems to be something new to deal with. With India's visible engagements to boost its economy and the position among the top world players is being recognized now. Especially with China, India is one of the greatest Trade partners and both the economies are largely interdependent on each other now. But then there are feelings of antagonism underneath that compel India to do a tightrope walk in its relations with China. Historically, India- China relations have experienced friction and

both the countries have been expressive of it time and again. In the present times India is trying to engage more with Modi's Doctrine of making friendly relations with neighbours. It points to the possibilities of using new tools of smart power strategy.

The research also add on to analyse and view a contemporary view of analysing the India-China relations, other than the stereotypical views of just analysing the military or hard power aspects, or analysing the soft power alone. This research will try to bind both the extremes to figure out any underlining changes in the India's attitude and actions towards China. This will be an attempt to contribute to the academic world with a contemporary newness in viewing India's China Policy. With a visible shift in reliance on soft power tools, India seems to have treaded on ambivalent balancing strategy to survive in a hostile neighbourhood. Even as Nye argues, that there was Smart power embedded in US strategy behind the fall of the Berlin Wall as they deterred the USSR with hard power and undercut communism behind Iron curtain. People who lost faith in Communism destroyed the Berlin wall and not the military forces. In case of India, both the states have strong soft power potential and both are trying to establish a stronger global influence. This study will try and find a missing link between two streams of widely analysed hard and soft power strategies in affairs between India-China.

It will try to analyse how far India has gone in its attempt to compete with China when it comes to Smart power strategy. The current leadership in India is trying to encircle and compete with China by strengthening its ties in the neighbourhood. For instance, India seems to be making friendly alliances in East Asia where China has established an image of an aggressive player, India's proactive engagement to establish its image of a responsible power in places where China is practicing its influence, seems to have sparked a fire in India- China relations. The relations between the two have displayed friction over decades with regard to pending issues. The current Indian leadership has initiated dialogues and engagements with China. This research will also look into the scope and transition in India's China policy and explore India's reliance on Smart power strategies. This will also cover in detail, the explanation and elaboration on the concept of 'Contextual Intelligence, which is a touchstone in the identification of smart power. It will also analyse what other writers have to say about smart power and what are the varied aspects, to smart power. This will also try and touch Smart power is effective in dealing multilaterally and its use and importance in effective Foreign policy multilaterally. These may be analysed it in the wake of gender stereotypes as well like how Smart Power is a balanced assortment of Masculine and Feminine behaviour in

Foreign policy. Competitiveness, assertiveness, authoritative and commanding behaviour of subject nations that resonates masculine aspects, in contrast to the emerging 'feminine' aspects of co-optive, integrative and participatory acts. This will try and concentrate more on lines of involvement of strategic use of diplomacy, persuasiveness, state's capacity-building potential and its projection of image as a powerful and influential actor. He further says that it needs to have gainful elements of political and social rightfulness, principally, the engagement of both military and other varieties of diplomacy.

The tragedy with Smart power is also the fact that Hard Power has always kept the academics intrigued with dominating charm. It has been a subject to academic analysis and strategic and defence studies has always experienced an inclination to academic research. Lately, Soft power too has become a subject of fascination with academics as policymakers across the states are increasingly awakening to the importance of soft power in diplomatic practices. However, it is surprising how Smart power as a concept has failed prove itself attractive enough, despite its visible practical applications. Theoretically too, it doesn't enjoys much attention and inputs. This research may as well prove to be a cornerstone for further research on theoretical aspects of Smart Power as it might as well bring out its implications from a developing world perspective. This will further help us decipher a direction of political interactions in India- China relations. It might as well help us in assessing India's on-going China Policy in comparison to what tricks and trends that were followed in the past. The two states are nuclear superpowers trying to establish their influence at both regional and global level and are thus also trying to win over the neighbours resulting in head-on skirmishes. Both India and China realise the negative consequences of an all-out war, thus it leads to scope of negotiations, but that doesn't overrules the aspirations of power for them. This research may thus be capable of answering the questions about some of the complexities in India- china relations in a completely different perspective with a completely different strategy. This study will also try and de-Americanise the concept of Smart power which is largely centered around in all the previous academic writings. This might prove to give an interesting direction from a developing world perspective and might forecast a change in power dynamics in international politics.

This research will first attempt at analysing the notion of soft power and its application in the India- China context. It will thus, firstly rely on finding facts out of descriptive, theoretical literature which is available. It will secondly try and draw its premises from the on-going tactics and strategies in terms of use of Soft power strategies by India in terms of its

engagements with China. Thus, this study will primarily make use of qualitative data for analysis. It will make use of comparative methods to measure the changes against the existential relations in the past and changes that are manifesting in the India's China Policy. This study will try and analyse how India, whether in a planned or unconscious manner, making use of smart power strategies, involving the use of soft power tools and making use of economic incentives and brandishing and strengthening its military abilities simultaneously in its Foreign policy conduct with China. This study will also make use of empirical evidences.

This research will try and draw premises on various ex-post facto researches relevant for to the diagnosis of India's shift to a Smart power strategy. It will make comparative analyses of the conduct that were being followed in the past and any other advancement that are currently taking place. Thus, this study will largely draw on secondary sources of information for analysis. The research will make use of descriptive, analytical and comparative methods of research. The sources will involve a constant lookup for relevant happenings through online news websites, newspapers, research articles and policy briefs that are published in relation to the various facets of the research and will collate the essential facts and evidences. This research will try and draw new findings from descriptive of Smart Power which is largely Americanized in its perception. This research will try and demystify the concept's application to the India- China relations through rigorous analysis from past and unfolding attempts at engagements by India in its China policy.

In order to obtain a synthesis and a direction, there will be several questions which will arise as we proceed with this research. These are some of the research questions, which will be crucial as markers to this research.

- Is India's Foreign Policy experiencing/adopting a shift to Smart power strategy to emerge as a powerful actor in International Politics?
- Is India relying more on Soft Power to emerge as a dominant power in World Affairs?
- Is India making efforts at rewiring its relations with China by the use of strategies consciously or unconsciously?
- Is India concentrating on a balancing act in flexing its hard power muscle especially in a hostile neighbourhood under the gloves of soft power?
- Is India really in a transition phase to emerge as a prominent Smart Power?

- Is India coming up with its own model of Smart Power?
- Can India become a model for Smart power strategy for Third World / Developing world?
- Does Smart power strategy play a catalytic role in improving India- China relations?
- Is Smart Power policy capable of replacing the dominance that hard power has in International politics?

This study will examine aforementioned research questions to testify the hypothesis as mentioned below:

With the change in leadership India is emerging as a Smart Power by making use of Smart Power strategies to compete with China.

Thus, the research will try and concentrate on the trajectory and personal growth of the two countries and their domestic reliance on Smart strategies by use of soft power tools and maintaining their self-spiced hard power goals simmering underneath. It will also try to analyse the growing fondness or elements of estrangements between the two countries.

Chapter 2

Smart Power- Theory and Practice

Introduction

Smart power is comparable to a subtle continuance of Soft Power, which includes a balanced use of hard power. The use of Smart power strategy started gaining its prominence in the US Foreign policy after 2011 when Hillary Clinton stressed the importance and need for the US to become a 'Smart Power' in its Foreign policies tactics. Both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama explicitly endorsed the use of Smart Power strategy solutions for a more optimal Foreign policy as it was gradually being realized that strong and sole reliance on Soft power a crucial idea for comprising of distorted power spaces. The trajectory is backed in the gradual changes like Guilliano Gallarotti explains "National power has become transformed in ways that have made it far more difficult to gauge and consequently manage and this necessitates to new approaches in studying power and its changes in world politics"(Gallarotti, 2015).

The use and Nye argue that Smart power adds more dynamism to soft power as soft power alone is not capable to bring about any radical changes over a short period of time. Moreover, an assessment of Soft Power's effectiveness is questionable and spells unpredictability as its results are only visible in the long run. Nye, in his initial writings, familiarized the thought of smart power with US as the key player, defining it as a unification of hard and soft power. The phrase is now extensively established. Academics argue that the existence of the concept has remained pervasive, but unearthed throughout the history. The notion of soft and hard power was present even in the ideas of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton (Gelb, 2009).

To begin with the theoretical expanse and implications makes it imperative to recognise the countless components of Smart Power. With the emergence of a new world with economic overlaps, it is practically impossible for nations to declare a war over other countries. In fact, such an act by any dominant or powerful actor leads to condemnation of an actor by the larger world society concludes that the Smart power is all about obtaining a balance can be achieved through 'Contextual Intelligence' which he describes as an intuitive skill for diagnosing smart strategies. (Nye,2009: 88)

Components of Smart Power

Grander consideration to soft and smart power itself reveals budding of a transformational landscape in the International Relations discipline. They have constantly been integral “sources of national influence, fluctuations in contemporary world policymaking have added to its efficacy” (Nye, 2008). Undeniably the era may be sprouting gradually in the direction of an accommodative, laxer and shrewder world. But the shift has a probable room for hard and soft power manoeuvres that pose a task to leaders in their pursuits for optimization of national influence. In this transformed international system, soft and resultant smart power is important paraphernalia for influence. Global political affairs are now less amenable to implements of hard power like force and threats, and more amenable to actors that are sensitized to the limitations of hard power and the opportunities of soft power created by this new global environment. In fact, it is only through the application of diverse soft and hard power strategies that leaders will be able to reap the profits of exploiting domestic influence in this changed sphere. An assortment of alterations in world politics position itself in this regard. Indeed, governments have an amplified desire to chalk out a significant balance with defence and non-defence aspects of power.

The costs involved in handling threat to others or actually using force (power of coercion) among nuclear powers have literally hit the roof. Evolution of nuclear technology has indeed been contributory as the bricks for new world order with deterrence against each other, creating a world in which war between major powers is almost unthinkable because the war budgets are no longer affordable. Furthermore, if analysed the introduction of contemporary military mechanisms and technologies may also render the expenses of even a conventional war unaffordable. Thus, efficacy of soft power resources will increase exponentially to the utilitarian values of hard power resources as apparatuses of government for ensuring enhanced sustainability for future purposes.

The growth of democracy in the world system has played an instrumental role. Even the Arab Spring of 2011 poses a good example of the success of democratic ideals. Democratic ideals have shown the disadvantages of coercion and use of force where the actors who are bearing the burden of coercion and force i.e, the people are also the ones who have political power over policymakers. They are capable of generating strong impediments to the coercive and forcible methods. In this respect, the process of peace in democracies has altered power equations with other states. Beyond an effect of enfranchisement, presence of democratic

values also take the leaders towards liberal principles of Soft Power. Therefore, national leaders are working carefully within a constrained and a softer form of foreign policy making which limits the conventional utility of hard power. In essence, it is about a contemporary essence of power in play where the conventional emphasis on Hard power is being taken away. Outcomes are now being planned through policies that are in tune with democratic legitimacy. Moreover, modernization and the socio-economic and political interdependence further diminish the utility and strong reliance on hard power. Globalization amplifies the process of social and economic intertwining more than ever before. These links make intermeshes all national and trans-national actors. In the new era, the preference to coercion has drastically dropped down as it might rupture the attempts of these nations to practice and build a socio economic influence.

This makes populations far less enamoured of a war as an option. But what's more elusive to the quest for constraining repercussions of coercion in such a relatively new environment is, the quest to impregnate specific and calculated outcomes in other actors' behaviour. In an interlinked world, the actors that are the points of target, may find many alternatives to escape. National and transnational actors may escape compulsion because of the hugeness international political economy and their unbound access to it. Escape in the new web of economy is way easy, with new safe havens for them. In this way, there's a type of new age economic feudalism that has come to existence through interdependence, which is shifting the axis of power to transnational networks, which was initially limited to state. Such forces diminish, both the chances of political disturbances and issues and shift in epicentre of competition, away from force and threat. With rise of sensitivity and an ever increasing entanglements of states in it, nearly diminishes, the requirement of coercion, which is risky for themselves now.

With the spread of democracy and a changed orientation towards welfare, various leaderships are now relying on an "economic imperative and less by foreign adventurism as a source of political survival" (Gallarotti, 2000). This society which is getting prosperous with democratic values as a driving force has witnessed a shift to foreign policies orientation too, which was initially limited to domestic realm. The notion of economic welfare has resulted in cooperation which is capable of delivering and growth. It has provided a paradigm shift from hard power backed politics that might disrupt the achievement of this growth. The post-world war era has witnessed growth of international organizations and enhanced cooperation. Thus

nations are operating in a mesh of norms and laws, where “unilateral actions that disregard these institutions become far more costly” (Gallarotti ,2015) existence of these institutions have effectively encouraged lawfulness and compliance. Thus matters of human interest, appropriate civil conduct has gained importance and consequently, there is a significant impact with soft power strategies. And as coercion is not a viable in this loop of cooperative world, incentivising techniques of smart power comes gives better returns.

Understanding Smart Power

The role of Smart Power in a "Hazy Power Space" has been under-analysed. Apart from the role of coercion, as highlighted by realist thinkers there is a shift to maintain and adhere to a “positive image in world affairs to maintain attractiveness to other nations” (Gallarotti, 2015). Usage of Smart Power strategies is largely due to the change in international society and a need to maintain a healthy competition and attractiveness to reap the maximum benefits out of the dynamic world society. After Obama and Hillary Clinton's usage of the term, Smart Power in American decision making seems to be a result of the changing nature of society and changing dynamics of power. International world politics is experiencing a change which explains the individual at the axis. Smart power is about making decision making more accommodative and more inclusive with every state. Thus the brutishness or hard power ideals in politics is not the smartest way to conduct the policymaking.

The main difference between hard and soft power primarily is that hard power applies coercion for compliance. principally it achieves this through its backing with tangible power resources that are more straight and short methods, either through their real or figurative uses. “Soft power cultivates it through policies, qualities, and actions that make nations attractive to other nations – more indirect and non-coercive methods. In this respect, hard power exhibits a greater conflict of interests relative to soft power.” (Kiliptari,2015:88) Hard power contemplates nations coercing other nations to do what the latter would ordinarily otherwise not do. “Soft power, on the other hand, conditions target nations to voluntarily do what soft power nations would like them to do, hence a greater harmony of interests.” (Gallarotti, 2015) Thus an emphasis on the use of Soft power is important than to rely on the traditional mode of flexing the hard power muscle.

Attractiveness

Attractiveness plays a key role in maintaining a positive image of a nation. Naturally, if a state maintains a strong headed stance, it will not be able to manipulate other states for economic expansion and growth. In order to maintain and promote the image of the state as a selfless, friendly actor states usually employ tactics like the promotion with .In order to understand the theoretical aspects of Smart power, it is important to understand the various components that are involved in the strategy. We will try and analyse all the components of Smart Power in detail.

(i)Soft Power

In contrast to coercive power, soft power is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants. It was first coined and introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990, and expanded in his later works, soft power has become a central analytic term in foreign policy discussions. Nye defined it “the ability to get what one wants through persuasion or attraction rather than coercion” (Nye, 1990: 78). Soft power was accepted and used by academia, media, and policy-making establishments and included in foreign policy strategies not only in the US but also in the European Union (EU), Japan, Australia, and China. In opposition to neo-realists, who emphasize military and economic might, proponents of soft power argue that this form of power has become equally important in the increasingly interdependent post-Cold War world transformed by the globalization process, popularization of communication technologies and the emergence of new non-state actors. “Soft or co-option power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of the others to do what you want rather than coerce them (sticks) or influence them (carrots) to do what you want” (Nye, 2004: 2).

Soft power does not refer to the tangible such as dropping a nuclear bomb, but rather is something that might change your mind about wanting to drop anything in the first place. Soft power is constituted on the basis of the power-wielding country’s culture, political values, and foreign policy and often times contains considerations for economic policies as well. Soft power in its broad understanding contributes to legitimizing power with the use of culture. Culture involves masses, and culture is a binding value which forms a society, peoples and a nation. Therefore, it plays a central role in asserting the use of power. Soft Power includes the combination of three characteristics: political, social and intellectual. Sheng Lijun (2001: 53). This implies, that the state needs to maintain a careful balance of the three aspects of the successful use of soft power strategies.

A careful combination of the three makes it highly cohesive instruments for these three aspects, whose capacity to act can be seen in the international arena which is usually unstable. Balancing the three is likely to demonstrate a resilience and survival accompanied by a skilful political-economic strategic performance, but results might appear in the long run.

According to Nye, “a country’s soft power stems from three sources: ‘its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority’” (Nye, 2004: 11). Soft power is then understood as different from both military power and economic power. Soft power, though its embraced by ethically- bent scholars and policy makers , is also susceptible to misuse. He says, like any other form of power, even soft power can be misused. Leaders such as Stalin, Mao, Hitler, Osama bin Laden had immense potential of Soft power in the eyes of their accolades/believers, but they didn’t put this to a good use. (Nye, 2006)

As the soft power concept has changed over time, it has become larger in scope. In an extended definition proposed by Joshua Kurlantzick, soft power means “anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers, like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations” (Kurlantzick, 2007) In this sense, it could also include, for instance, “development cooperation” (foreign aid), which rests on the “economic capabilities” of the country but is often used as a tool for “creation of goodwill and long-term relationships in friendly countries.” (Kugiel,2012 :355) To sum up, when a country has considerable soft power, its foreign actions would be seen as more legitimate and others would be more willing to comply with its objectives.

It builds attraction and encompasses nearly everything other than economic and military power Soft power today refers to a resource of power that does not utilize military force or coercion but instead seeks to achieve goals through non-forceful persuasion, economic actions, humanitarian actions, and other non-military actions. The concentration of neorealist approaches tend to have their empahasis on hard power, especially states potential of hard power . While liberal institutionalist scholars, emphasize soft power as “an essential resource of statecraft (along with the power to write the rules of the game, a curiously missing element in contemporary conversations of hard and soft power.”(Wagner, 2005)

Classification of Soft Power:

Nye classifies soft power in three categories.

He says that a country can be a soft power if it has a rich culture which is attractive to people in other places. Secondly, a country's political values if they are projected as they are, both home and abroad are also lucrative. Thirdly, the country's foreign policies if they have a legitimacy and authority embedded and are morally acceptable. The tools of soft power are diplomacy, diaspora, cultural resources, education, political values of democracy, pluralism and spiritual resources. There is a difference between soft power resources, can a vast diverse plural country with a very old civilization has multiple resources which give us the potential of soft power. It is the task of political leadership to transform capacity or potential resources into capability. Nye further says that Soft power, as opposed to raw power politics has been well embraced by scholars with ethics-oriented scholars and policymakers. (Nye, 2006). With rampant corruption on the domestic level, India has a lot to do. It involves domestic political debate and politics to convert soft power capacity into capability and a strategy further how to use it as means to achieve foreign policy goals. India has not done much in this regard and its soft power is mainly for image building rather as a foreign policy effective strategy capable to influence the foreign policy behaviour of adversaries.

In India, a political debate is on regarding its cultural heritage. Its policy is vertically divided on the matter of its plural religious diversity, on treatment and status of its minorities and a growing sense of constructed insecurity among its majority. Breakdown of national consensus on such a core issue is the weakest link of any foreign policy project of using its cultural resources as a foreign policy soft power strategy. The more the policy is divided the greater urge for the demonstration of hard power and its use for electoral purposes. The rise of aggressive nationalism with majoritarian hegemony has found its ally in rising militarism whose symptoms can be found in Street glorification of armed forces soldiers.

The posturing of hard power is being used as domestic political means and its echo is seen on borders also. Previous regimes had adopted hard power whenever possible but were shy of demonstrating it and often sought justification of the use of force in moral normative considerations. India justified military intervention in Bangladesh in the name of humanitarian intervention and not nationalism. India has reasonable military and economic clout to defend itself. What it requires is intelligent use of a combination of hard and soft power. In the absence of national consensus on core domestic issues its potential to transform its soft power capacity into capability and a foreign Policy effective strategy may not be

realizable. A United nation with cohesive social fabric with rich cultural plural heritage can convert its soft power cultural and economic resources into national capability and use it as foreign policy strategy if it can preserve its liberal egalitarian values and plural democracy. Soft power has more prospects in the era of globalization and India can seize the opportunity provided its policy shows inclusiveness and as the most powerful country in South Asia it wins the goodwill of its neighbours by shedding their fears of hegemony. Hard power may not defeat terrorism. It can be defeated by its soft power without undermining democratic rights and liberties of its people.

(ii) *Beyond Soft Power*

There are elements of simplification in Nye's conception of the concept of Soft Power. First, Nye too easily assumes that we are attracted to those who resemble us. In fact, opposites can also attract. Indeed, national identity depends on intense interactions with a key comparison other: we cannot fulfil the basic human drive of knowing who we are except by identifying who we are not. Nye too easily assumes that attractiveness produces soft power. In fact, it can also produce soft vulnerability causing others to do precisely what you don't want them to. (Hymans, 2009: 242) .Soft vulnerability is an especially common fate of key comparison others, colonized India was no exception. Its attractiveness tightened its bondage. Nye too easily assumes that unattractiveness produces vulnerability. In fact, it can also produce power, as the skunk well understands. British were attracted to a certain idea of India, because this idea allowed them to bolster their own self-conception. By refusing to indulge them, Gandhi succeeded in cancelling India's magnetic hold on Britain – and thereby freed them both. Nye claims that liberal policies are capable to attract. But, there is a gap between the liberal values loudly proclaimed by the US and UK, and the conservative policies they and the other great powers have often respected more in practice.

Moreover, taking a longer-term perspective, the fact is that all empires eventually die. Therefore, instead of seeking soft power through conformity with the hegemonic ideology of the day, states can also seek it by embracing an alternative conception of the good. As this article will argue, India pursued just such a revolutionary soft power strategy under Gandhi and Nehru, until turning away from it under Indira Gandhi, and then definitively abandoning it under Atal Behari Vajpayee. It remains to be seen whether or not this abandonment will prove to have been realistic, or short-sighted. Soft power is real power in international relations, but its sources and workings are widely misunderstood.

(iii) *Hard Power*

Over the decades, India has pursued different strategies to deal with its troubled neighborhood and ascertain its special role. One of the most common approaches was the use of hard power in terms of military build-up, interventions (for example, in the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 and Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict during 1983–1990) and economic pressure (for instance, the blockade imposed on Nepal in 1989). In the post-Cold War period, India has tried to overcome its regional limitations by engaging more at the Asian and global level without really solving persisting problems in South Asia (Basrur, 2010). In the last two decades, India has also used more soft power strategies towards its neighbours to extract cooperation by increasing its own attractiveness and credibility. Nations including India have always proclaimed to pursue certain moral and normative goals and tried to define their foreign policy in the moral and normative vocabulary. But in reality, most of the nation's most of the times have followed realize notions of national Interest in which they often had to face the criticisms of doublespeak and were charged with deviations from ideological and normative principles. This contradiction between moral idealist and realist national interest has been sought to be removed by introducing the concepts of hard and soft power. Nations should feel free and capable to use hard or soft Instruments as per their capability and its effectiveness in changing situations.

India has demonstrated tremendous resilience in using hard and soft power in different situations. States' reliance on the hard power Instruments is not going to disappear as the very structure of international relations leaves the job of their security on themselves through the international community has evolved regimes and institutions for the regulation and control of the use of force by states. When states resort to using international laws and institutions they are invoking their soft power and when they show their military muscle by use or threat of use of force they are using their hard power. Over-reliance on Hard power proved self-defeating for American foreign policy in promoting administrations' three major goals: Limiting terrorism, promoting democracy abroad and reducing the threat of WMDs (Gallarotti, 2015). Bush doctrine concentrated more on the hard power tactics in their policies.

Again India while sincerely trying to strengthen international institutions and conventions has not shied away from using force or threatening the use of force whenever it has found convenient to do so and fulfil its objectives. Regarding much talked about Nehru's aversion to hard power and his over-reliance on soft power Instruments like moral normative norms,

laws, and institutions like the United Nations it is to be noted about deeper realize awareness of Nehru about India's military weakness and his priority of building a modern democratic post-colonial nation. Non-alignment policy through a soft power strategy had deeper security angle by non-military means. Soft Power has its own sets of issues which is one reason why it is considered better only as an aide to hard power strategies. Both hard power and soft power is not capable to completely replace each other or be institutionalized. Hard power will only lead to creating complications in foreign relations, whereas Soft Power might not make a complete change in the outcome. Moreover, Soft Power is also criticised for having a weak theoretical backing. There is no strong theory to support Soft Power, or a 'soft theory', therefore, despite attracting attention from scholars, not much has been done in regard to any strong theoretical developments in Soft Power theory.

Conceptual Challenges

Nye says, In international politics," having power is having the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. Hard power is the capacity to coerce them to do so." (Nye, 2008: 85) Hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests. Earnest J Wilson explains:

"The relationship between the two components of smart power, hard and soft power, is complicated, complex and interactive: the two are neither perfect substitutes nor are they perfect complements, although they do often reinforce one another. hard power vs. soft power debate in IR theory"
(Wilson, 2008:111)

"It is believed that in this particular debate realism stands for the hard power concept "the one comprised of military and economic power" and that realist thinkers advocate that "this type of power is the ultimate goal aspired by all states." (Wilson, 2008:113) Neorealists, on the other hand, would assume that power is used as an instrument to attain certain goals, rather than the goal itself. In other words, the better off a state is guns and money (wise, the greater the chances that it will survive the competition and foster its existence in an anarchic system.

On the soft power side of the debate, most prominently stands Joseph S. Nye, who indeed was the one to coin the term "soft power." It is not that Nye excludes the importance of hard power elements; rather he argues that this type of soft power is of co-optive nature (unlike the coercive hard power). Interestingly, Nye also discusses the possibility of co-optiveness of

hard power elements; e.g. he argues that military posture and the image of “invincibility of a certain state might be also attractive to others and command power may sometimes be used to establish”.(Nye,2008:55) To draw a greater distinction between soft and hard power, it is useful to understand that soft power seeks to align preferences between states by allowing target states to accept the preferences for themselves, whereas hard power seeks to align preferences through force, regardless of the interests of the target state.

A strong positive image can garner many more security commitments, which in turn can bolster a nation’s hard defenses. In applying soft, hard, and smart power into the end of history and return to history narratives, it is clear that soft power goes hand in hand with the end of history. Appeal to interests as opposed to the implementation of military force is in-line with conceptions of global cooperation and cessation of military conflict between large states. Soft power seeks to influence much like the end of history seeks to promote cooperation. Alternatively, hard power appeals to the use of military force, a strategy in-line with conceptions of a return to history and a return to an era characterized by conflict and power struggle. And of course, force in the form of wars of liberation (humanitarian intervention) will certainly garner a better image for the protector state. The possession of hard power itself “can make a nation a role model in a variety of ways; large military arsenals and successful military strategies can generate significant soft power by enhancing respect and Admiration” (Gallarotti,2015). But hard power cannot be used in ways that undermine that respect and admiration. In other words, they cannot be used in ways that deviate from the fundamental principles undergirding soft power. The employment of force can only generate soft power if it is used in the service of goals widely perceived as consistent with such principles, such as protecting nations against aggression, peacekeeping, or liberation.

At the same time, however, it is also the case that the misguided use of one kind of power may undermine the other. Hard power carries obvious disadvantages for image if it is manifest in an aggressive unilateralist style: threats, invasion, or imperialism. But actions that enhance soft power can be equally costly in terms of sacrificing hard power. Moreover, the distinction between hard and soft power can be somewhat arbitrary and imperfect categorically. Giving international aid for example may enhance a nation’s image, but this liquidity can be used to purchase donor exports or to pay back debts to banks in donor nations. Here, a single instrument generates both hard and soft power. Similarly, the use of aggressive military force can generate a positive image with nations who are benefiting from such an initiative: for example, liberating Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia during the Gulf

War (another dual effect in the use of a single power resource). Additionally, the exercise of either soft or hard power alone has complex consequences within its own specific context.

The use of hard power resources can in fact diminish the hard power position of a nation in various ways. For example, military atrocities may stiffen resistance in a manner that weakens an aggressor nation if the victims either grow to hate the aggressor or sense that such atrocities can be withstood. Also, the use of threats that are never carried out may over time diminish the influence of the nation issuing such threats. Similarly, the use of soft power resources may also adversely affect a nation's image no matter how innocuous the actions. A clear example is the contempt that many hold for international development organizations (IMF, World Bank) because they see such institutions as promoting neo-imperialistic economic relations between North and South. In a related example, while many embrace the values of Western culture, others see them as a source of cultural imperialism and contamination. Another interesting interaction effect among the two kinds of power is that the use of one set of resources may either economize on or enhance the need for another set of resources.

A positive image may create outcomes within such favourable boundaries for a nation that it actually reduces its need to use hard resources in order to gain compliance on important issues. For example, a reputation for loyalty may attract more allies whose own loyalty can vitiate the need to expend hard resources in order to achieve one's foreign policy goals. Moreover, accepting restraints on one's unilateral actions through ratifying a treaty may not adversely affect relative hard-power positions if such an action fosters similar restraints by other nations, as would be the case with arms reduction treaties. Hence, a reduction of hard power can be compensated by a soft power effect. However, intransigence to multilateralism may in fact reduce one's hard power position even though it frees that nation from restraint. Such would occur if reactions to such intransigence resulted in a more antagonistic international system. In such cases, the intransigent nation would have to compensate in other ways (both hard and soft) to restore its former position of influence. Although there is a tendency to equate hard power with tangible resources and soft power with intangible resources, their principal distinction does not depend on tangibility.

Even for Nye, tangibility is not a strict source of differentiation among the two categories: there can be intangible applications of hard power. For example, a threat is intangible, but a threat is a highly coercive act. Furthermore, a large military force can generate attraction effects through "perceptions of invincibility". (Nye, 2013) In views of Nye, Nations may show deference, even admiration, because they want to be associated with a winner. He says

that soft power can be enhanced through the use of tangible resources, as tangible resources may be necessary to institute the policies and actions that deliver soft power. (Nye, 2013) But ultimately, as interconnected as the two sources of power are and thus share many qualities; the real differentiation of power is in the context of its use. In order to achieve soft power, the context of actions (whether tangible or intangible) must be a manifestation of particular principles. Hard power itself can be used in a manner that engenders the respect and admiration of other nations if it manifests itself in actions consistent with these principles. Hard power is not inherently pernicious. Hard power, of course, will fail or be counterproductive in enhancing influence when it is used inconsistently with these principles. Ultimately, tangible resources can deliver both hard and soft power. But tangible resources are merely instruments and are no better or worse than the manner in which they are used.

Early Signs of use of Smart Power by India

India's foreign policy towards China under the Modi government has moved from normal and non-alignment to a harder, outspoken bilateral diplomacy. India's foreign policy towards China has one been one of simultaneous co-operation with defection, diplomatic engagement with China at various summits and at the same time engagement with other nations such as the US, Vietnam, Japan and Australia. India has been looking ahead at its role to act as a deterrent to China's growing influence. This means increasing ties with the US, Japan and other smaller Asian nations. Indian PM Narendra Modi is hailed to maintain a balance in India- China relations. Which seem to be running in parallel discord all throughout. After Modi's election as PM, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Delhi in June 2014. Modi reciprocated with complimentary words about China. President XI came to India in September to attend a summit that was held on the sideline of a military incursion and conflict between Indian and Chinese troops in Chumur, Ladakh, to which the summit was slated a week ahead. Months after the summit, Modi visited nations that are generally wary of China's ambitions - Vietnam, Australia, and the US.

In PM Modi's 2015 visit to China, US \$22 billion deal was concluded along with a series of agreements. There have been similar instances of discord and cooperation. Even earlier this year, Modi and Xi Jinping attended a BRICS summit on the sidelines of a dangerous standoff at Doklam. India's foreign policy vis-a-vis China thus seems to be focussed on improving economic ties and boosting bilateral trade, but not giving a sign to China that it is submissive to China's ambitions. The Modi government has not been shy opposing China and was

capable of spreading a similar vibe in the country by promoting Indian industries and goods and discouraging Chinese goods. A recent ban on Chinese goods and firecrackers on the speech before Diwali particularly signaled and encouraged the general public to buy Indian goods is clandestinely a sign to avert people from buying Chinese goods. India has taken a strong stance on various issues from China- Pakistan Economic corridor to the South China Sea and most recently at Doklam standoff. This cycle of cooperation and discord is run only by one principle of development from a personal standpoint for both the countries.

China's strong signs with Smart Power

Historically, the Chinese have a steady hold on putting Soft power to use. China's basic aim is to put both hard and soft power in collated use. Its vision of Soft power policy hasn't worked without a vision of incorporation of hard power. China has already drilled billions of Dollars for institutionalizing its soft power, however a recent report, published by National Endowment for Democracy presented that there is a strong requirement to re-think soft power. As the conceptual vocabulary that has remained in use since the times of Cold war, it seems, are no longer adequate to the contemporary times. The report described, the rise of authoritarian being felt around the world as sharp power. Thus showing the trajectory of world affairs, making clandestine moves towards the adoption of Smart power strategies . Hu Jintao, former Chinese president told the 17th Party Congress in 2017 that China needs to work on enhancing its soft power. He further said that if a country's hard power is on the rise, it increases the chance of frightening the neighbours. But if a state works on increasing its soft power simultaneously, the hostile states are less likely to make coalitions against the state in practice. This clearly aims at a planned smart power policy from the times of the former Chinese government. According to Raya Koreh, Chinese government runs their international affairs with a pragmatism and stability with the use of Confucian values reassuring them international partners. (Koreh.2015).

This is indicative of a strong presence of use of soft power. China also has a longstanding conflict over possession of oil fields and claims to ownership to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. This recently led Chinese to take a strong stance on Japan incentivizing the act of putting its hard power muscle to use in East China Sea. To explain this, an obvious underlying cause of the skirmishes is a shift in economic power i.e Meteoric rise of China and economic stagnation of Japan (Koreh,2015). China's well-grown and strong and diverse economy intimidates the island nation of Japan. Meanwhile, Japan's retaliative stance also threatens

China. According to Koreh, China's aggression is a direct indication of the country's desire to make use of its economic primacy with hard power to take control of the islands. Japan in contrast, aims being a victim to China's offensive policy over the islands (Koreh,2015). China, on several occasions was accused of threatening Japanese vessels, displaying its sovereignty in the desired swathe of waters. An obvious truth is that Japan is backed by the U.S., and the stretch of its nuclear umbrella, but this doesn't led China to budge from displaying its offensive stance. China openly marched for securing its dominance in East Asian region, indirectly challenging the U.S. allies in its quest for hegemony in the region. The skirmishes were of great importance to the domestic politics of Japan for the conservative Prime minister Shinzo Abe. The Post war Constitution does not Allow Japan to build up its military power due to the post world war clauses in the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty. However, Japan was capable of nuclearization in one year after letting go off the U.S. security alliance.

However, both the parties did not let the matter to escalate marked by a historic handshake in 2014 between both the head of the states. Both the leaders discussed and rejuvenated the bilateral agreements that were stalled and discussed other matters of great importance in 2014. Both the nations came up with a new Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century, with a provision for "crisis aversion in the East China Sea" (Koreh, 2015). China further de-escalated the situation by withdrawing the consequences of violating the Chinese Air Defence identification zones. China shares a similar cultural affinity with the countries of East Asia , which is why its attempts to de-escalate the tensions on this matter was a clear case of use of Smart Power. Initially, the country tried stunning japan and 'bullied' other island countries with its economic prowess and later, showed a strong use of Soft power to done the matter and tempering its image in the positive way.

For the first time, Xi Jinping is changing the equations with the world with the most pressing concerns in the world. The convention on climate change in November 2015 diverges directed that global warming-related directives which seeks to reduce peak emissions by 2030, requires a deviation from the present policy of Chinese government. The climate change policies implemented by Chinese usually only promises the provisions of reductions of emmissions which are non- interfering with their domestic production. Like every other deal involved, the 21 Conference of parties was also blocked by members with their appeasements and domestic concerns. Rather, Xi Jinping is allowing a leeway for the international efforts to make an impact on its domestic policies on climate and related

progress. Moreover, most deals are unilaterally indicating Chinese independence from foreign influence, whereas the recent agreement was announced jointly. This is largely noticeable that the signing of the COP 21 climate deal signalled a significant shift to the use of Smart power. China has merged a manufacturing hub for most of the capitalist companies globally and its mellowed behaviour in respect to the climate change treaty can well be seen as an attempt for an image make-over. China as the manufacturing chamber for most of the global capitalist entities is capable of incentivising other economies.

This is smart power of where it decided to embrace the opportunity to come across as an international actor which is one of the pioneers for the issue of climate concern for global welfare. Xi's deviation from a traditional hawkish, nationalistic policy, which is not widely accepted domestically in Japan can be explained well through John G. Ikenberry's concept of maturing power. According to this, a state expresses its readiness for accepting the responsibilities for global good which actually acts as what is called a "strategic restraint" for it. (Ikenberry, 2001). China ended its show of power with Japan, and in turn accrued to put a constraint on returns to power from any other country in East Asia. China set itself as an exemplary by being a precedent for practicing restraint instead of control and dominance to achieve stability.(Koreh, 2015) It is clear that with such an act of lowering its widely recognized temperament, China has left only a miniscule incentive for any other East Asian country to put across its power projection against China.

Presence of a mature power can be an important factor in changing the traditional values of a country when it comes to a greater good. The change in Chinese way of policy practice is also a result of presence of US which is a mature power. US has been showing a steady restraint, which China wishes to achieve. US too avoids any direct conflict with China. America-China interaction has been around military advancement and territory. This explains China's pivotal shift to for venturing in a collective emissions reduction and display a stark shift to smart power strategies in contrast to its signature hard power strategies. China has come across like a growing entity, and its rise is dependent on channelling its vigour towards a healthy growth and development and avoiding any possible diversions of energy. For channelizing the establishment of an efficient strategy for smart power, China needs to overcome three factors that inhibit its rise namely executive stance of Xi Jinping's and domestic party cohesion, the traditional vision and thinking, and finally, establishing an international credibility, equivalent to the United States.

The initial signs to a significant shift to smart power and the growing power of Chinese is due to Xi Jinping's acting executive actions that are not the "the first among equals, but simply first" anymore. (Koreh,2015). His foreign policy previously dominating and reactionary to domestic concerns and no importance was given to polish China a an actor which withstands the issues of global welfare. Also, Xi came to throne when communist party wasn't efficient enough and corruption ruled it's working. They also failed to help countries like, Syria, Libya or South Korean crises. However, Xi accepted the fact that goals in the long run are dependent on forgoing the conciliation in every sector of the Chinese society, "drowning out domestic outcry with the promise of a visionary, brighter future."(Koreh,2015)

China has lauded insightful views in the long-term, that are also based on the outlines formulated by Deng Xiaoping, which also included avoidance of limelight and not being a leader per se. Xi Jinping's foreign policy style more military bent and assertive in opposition to Deng Xiaoping's humble ways. But its surprising to see Xi's trajectory of maintaining of a conciliatory "Smart" stance in the case of East China Sea shows that he hasn't diverged completely from Deng Xiaoping's policies. Thirdly, China's foreign policy methods with other stated are in a no-strings-attached fashion. Such interactions are reliable. When countries develop a preference for a more dependable Chinese soft power, it can even challenge the US leadership. Essentially, the efficacy of smart power is not what a country has, but the influence it is capable of achieving. Nye mentions that no country alone can seek to dominate the world and this view holds true in accepting smart power. China must cooperate with other nations, beyond the United States and the G2, in order to seek the outcomes they desire. According to Parama Sinha Palit, China recognizes that the US stands as a pioneer in higher education. US provides a number of scholarships for students globally making it one of the most preferred destinations for studying abroad. China realises the great influence US is able to spread around the world through this.

Leadership in Smart Power

While any kind of power, may it be hard is a medium for sustainable power projections, smart and fast power can help nations, big and small, find their way through or adapt to complex and rapidly changing strategic environments. Sanjaya Baru writes, India's growing reliance on Smart Power can "fasten". Modi government can claim it has more than neutralized, in a short period of time, the negative impact of its predecessor's months of inaction. While critics and cynics may dismiss this action as nothing more than photo-ops and

collecting flying miles, like Hillary Clinton (the most traveled foreign minister in history), the Ministry of External Affairs'(MEA) document for "fast-track diplomacy" shows clarity of purpose in all this speedy activism. Indian foreign policy has tread on a fast track engagement with the document released by MEA, highlighting Modi's 'fast-track diplomacy'. According to Baru the document catches attention to 'four different categories of diplomatic engagement by Modi and Swaraj: first, with South Asian neighbours, second, with East and West Asian "neighbours", third, with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P-5) and, finally, India's most important economic and strategic partners, led now by Japan and including Australia, Brazil, South Africa and Singapore. Within its first 100 days in office, the Modi government has engaged all". (Baru, 2014)

India's Smart Power

India's interest in shifting to Smart power strategy is obviously to maintain a good trade and political relationship, China is an fast-emerging power and its muscle show at Indo China border is not a new phenomenon. The recent being the tussle at the "Chicken's neck" region in Doklam. India has always avoided war and this time it is necessary to just intimidate than to retaliate and not to declare full on war with the neighbour. For the sake of national development, and to make China realize that they alone cannot dominate Asia , India respects every country's individuality. Due to historic reasons, Indians have a problem trusting China with historical reasons such as indo-china war right after panchsheel pact. India is among the first handful of Nations that recognized communist China. As a Sovereign and independent countries and expressed the desire to cooperate with it. Thus an emphasis on Smart Power strategies is more or less necessary. Smart power is strategically important because all states, even small states, can wield smart power. Smart power is not dependent on the size of militaries, but on a state's ability to effectively shape power resources, be it soft or hard, into strategies that produce the outcomes they seek. The Human rights around the world hold a great importance in the world relations and an educated workforce and a free flow of information is important in today's times. This is applicable to policymaking as well. Nye quotes a Silicon Valley Executive, who expressed that if employees are not treated with respect and involved in decision making, they will walk down the streets to some start-up, which has an interesting story. (Nye, 2007) Military insurgents and counterinsurgents require soldiers to win hearts and minds and not just breaking bodies

(i) Leadership

Leadership is exercised through relationships. Leaders need to influence themselves and others to take Vision-directed and Values-based action. There are three types of power available for influencing action in relationships: hard, soft and smart. The purpose of this tool is to assist leaders to develop the most suitable balance of hard and soft power for a specific leadership situation, i.e., smart power. The smart power tools are used anytime leadership needs to understand how to act most effectively to influence positive change. It is best used collaboratively with the LS. Complete a new analysis of each situation. Start by reviewing the current conditions. Complete the Smart Power analysis, implement decisions, review and reflect to make improvements. Theorists working on the concept of leadership identify it in two categories. One being Shared leadership and the other being Distributive Leadership. Leaders are taken at the centre of the system and not on the top of hierarchy. Leadership plays an important role in Smart power. Many leadership contexts are far more fluid, whether they are political groups, street gangs, universities, or online communities. Leading inside an institution is different from leading a movement without institutions. A prophetic style fits well with a loosely organized social movement, whereas, managerial competitiveness is important in an organization.

Concentration on fast track diplomacy also holds an important position in India's foreign policy. All of these developments point towards the increasing shift towards the use of Smart power strategies in the Indian Foreign policy, vis-a-vis China. Joseph Nye points out to the fact that people today are less deferential to authority in Organizations. He points out that Hierarchies are becoming flattered and embedded in fluid Networks of contacts. Similar is the case with the democratic government system in India which claims to be more people friendly and more people-centric in its approach. PM Modi, is stressing on the more people-centric and all-inclusive country and expanding the ties with the leaders of the countries around the world.

India's position as the largest democracy in the World has always played a positive role in it. Being the o largest democracy, India has its share and support and affinity in terms of democratic ideals from other nations at least. Sidney hook talks about eventful and event making leaders. Event making leaders are transformational leaders. Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair weren't universally liked as PM in Great Britain however, both enjoyed the credit of changing the political conditions in Great Britain. Some leadership will increasingly be a woman's world. Gender stereotypes also play a significant role. In terms of Gender stereotypes, the masculine leadership is assertive,

competitive, authoritative and focussed on commanding the behavior of the others. Feminine style is collaborative, participatory, integrative and aimed at co-opting the behavior of followers.

(ii) Contextual Intelligence

In terms of psychology, Contextual intelligence consists part of cognitive analytical capabilities and part of tacit knowledge accumulated in form of experience. Tacit knowledge tends to be implicit and articulate. Such as in novel situations, judgment is more important than experience. Contextual intelligence i.e. combining both individual positions of power, through one's role in an organization, and through socially-granted contexts, is key to understanding how agents establish their role as leaders in participatory processes. This differs slightly from other concepts that deal with the importance of contexts, such as wisdom – a three-dimensional personality characteristic that involves an understanding of life and a desire to know the truth, a perception of phenomena and events from multiple perspectives and sympathy and compassion for others

Emotional intelligence is one of the most important aspects of contextual intelligence. Without the sensitivity and, ability to understand the needs of the masses, cognitive analysis and experience might not be able to fulfill the needs to put contextual intelligence to use. While theorists point out that soft and hard power may often undercut one another, finding the balance and using the appropriate resource is critical, but also the smart strategy. The probability of outcome, favourable or non-favourable, actually depends upon the context (Nye, 2006) This is not exclusive to just soft power, but also applies to Hard Power. “Having a larger tank army may produce military victory if a battle is fought in the desert, but not if it is fought in a swamp” (Nye, 2006). Nye proposes that in order to combine the strategies, it is important to blend both hard power and soft power. This is possible through contextual intelligence. Contextual Intelligence in foreign policy matters is the diagnostic skill which is based on intuitive response to a situation which enables policymakers to carve new objectives for smart strategies according to the situation. It implies both a capability as well as adaptability. Capability to discern trends while adaptability while trying to shape the events.

Leaders with contextual intelligence have the judgment to adjust to the political landscape and it also allows them to adjust their style and situation according to the followers' needs. It enables the leaders to create a flow of information t the followers in whatever way suitable

and helpful for them. Contextual intelligence also involves the use of political skills along with respecting a standpoint from the position or strength of any big factor, like individual stakeholders. To arrive at decisions, it's just not limited to group politics and the decisions thus arrived at, are made through transactional or inspirational skill of the leader. In unstructured situations, it is often "more difficult to ask the right questions, than to ask right answers" (Nye, 2009). According to him, Leaders that are skilled at contextual intelligence are capable of providing the roadmap, by defining a problem that a group confronts. The best leaders are able to transfer their skills across contexts. Many leaders have a fixed set of skills, which limits and conditions their responses to new situations. A leader who is a successful orator may not essentially be a good implementer. Leaders need to develop a broader understanding avoiding gender stereotypes to adapt to the needs of the followers using contextual intelligence.

Hillary Clinton, while U.S. Secretary of State, used Smart Power to highlight the need for the United States to pull all the levers of power and influence, including its military, diplomatic, cultural, humanitarian, legal, and technological dimensions. "She invoked Smart Power as the idea that an effective foreign policy must place principal reliance on a tailored synthesis of Hard and Soft Power adapted to specific circumstances." (Jehan, 2014: 5). Thinking about U.S. constraints on power may not come naturally to policymakers for whom the United States and superpower have long been synonymous. In the aftermath of September 11, the ambition driving President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq was grand. It was nothing less than the remaking of the entire Middle East. The doubling of the U.S. defense budget within a decade reflected a sense of limitless resources and bespoke of unwavering faith in what could be achieved through their investment from turning Iraq into a friendly democracy to transforming Afghanistan. Aude Jehan explains, "Secretary Clinton used Smart Power to push for increasing resources for diplomacy, more civilian shoes on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, enhanced non-military expeditionary capabilities, and more public diplomacy"(Jehan, 2014: 5) And she successfully enlisted the Department of Defence to chime in with her, supporting these arguments on the grounds that U.S. foreign policy needs to operate more like a jack-knife than a hammer. By explaining why it was smart policy to match military capacity with stronger civilian and diplomatic counterparts, she could argue for the restructuring of American power without being seen as weak on defense (one of the traditional main arguments against additional resources for diplomacy and civilian capacity). Then, part of Smart Power's appeal certainly laid in its expansiveness: the idea of doing more.

Enhanced utility of Smart Power

David Cross has written about enhancement of the utility of Smart Power. Within the contemporary setting it is important for the concept to maintain the dynamism according to the situations. Cross says, “A simple step in enhancing the utility of the concept of Smart Power is to take effectiveness out of the definition” (Davis Cross, 2011: 11). Smart Power can be assessed as the tactical and instantaneous use of coercion and co-option. “Another step in enhancing the utility of Smart Power is to recognize the diverse ways in which Hard and Soft Power can be combined, which builds upon the above analysis of the tools of power. Smart power can create for possibilities prospective investigation agendas for contemplation of “both forms of power in tandem, rather than separately” (David Cross, 2011:11). For example, Smart Power might entail “long-term attraction alongside the short-term use of coercion when necessary”.(David Cross, 2011: 11) Soft power in long run is capable of involving cultivation of legitimate and resourceful domestic establishments, sustaining a swift response military force on reserve, or prominent elements of home culture that have general appeal. It may also come about through consistent outreach to foreign audiences through public diplomacy efforts, such as support for cultural programs or science diplomacy.

Even with the coterminous rise in the scholarly attention towards the Smart Power strategy as a concept, a theoretical analysis is belittled, hampering the development of the concept to its fullest. Under the international sources to create a positive image, nations demonstrate adherence to International Norms, laws and institutions. Nations avoid alienation from the bigger world society to avoid bearing the brunt of consequential marginalization. Slowing economic growth in China also holds a reason for its attempts to expand its influence beyond its own boundaries. China feels left out from the clout of G7, an informal group of developed democratic countries, including EU as an observer member, with a collective GDP of about 50% of world’s GDP. Japan with which China has been experiencing a tussle over a few islands in the South China Sea is a member of G7.

Conclusion

Both hard power and soft power have their own advantage and disadvantages. The application of both depends on tangible and intangible resources. The concept of Smart Power is furtherance of soft power., with inputs from hard power in the form of

incentivization. Theoretical expanse of Smart power includes a number of soft power tools, including a country's cultural and historical background.

The impracticality of war has led to inclusion and acceptance of smart power in the policies, however, in the globalised times and resultant in intermeshed economies and uncertainties of outcomes for smart power, its important for the countries to have a diplomatic stance on their course of action with other countries , therefore, Smart power's importance has gradually been realised by the nations globally in the changing landscape of world politics, importance of Soft power is largely being realised. The world has emerged as less amenable to coercion and that is due to the costs of wars involved. The shift to a kind of modern day federalism has now shifted to transnational networks, unlike states, which was a case before. Utility of hard power has decreased,

Political debates in India revolve around cultural heritage and plural religious diversity and constructed insecurity among individuals. The policy diversion is more in the case, which leads to greater domestic disturbances, and urges for the use of hard power. The rise of militarial nationalism and majoritarian hegemony has marked a significant presence and this is visible by growing glorification of the armed forces which has surfaced on several occasions and most recently in Doklam, which involved a show of force from China at the "chicken's neck" territory. Attractiveness, as opposed to Joseph Nye's its beliefs, isn't limited to only countries with democratic ideals, countries with an authoritative structure may also possess smart power strategies through a "global welfare" stance. China has a hawkish image, but it has imbibed a Smart power doctrine, more or less institutionalised, which is changing China's perception with global people gradually. The process has fastened under Xi Jinping's government.

Chapter 3

Smart Power and India's Foreign Policy

Evidences of India's Smart power connections with India's extended neighbourhood across Asia as also in its post- Independence globalist narratives, are evident in the strategies of Jawaharlal Nehru which were centred at a ensuing focus at South Asian countries. A similar legacy was carried-forward by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During post-independence years, India's foreign policy was galvanized by the morals and visualization of the iconic leaders who empowered its protracted independence movement. Notable front-runners like that of Mahatma Gandhi, Subhash Chandra Bose, Jawaharlal Nehru and numerous others were mainly the ones behind the philosophical and grounds for India's strategies and path to India's foreign policy. A number of its chief canons were enunciated by India's 1st prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, at the Asian relations conference which took place in March 1947. Foreign policy of India had analytically collective national interests and comprehensive objectives to construct a unprejudiced and balanced world order. It absolutely was sincerely secured with the epitomes of truth, passive resistance, tolerance and the awareness of worldwide governance and hence the world as one community of kinfolk.

India attempted to mark international presence in global decisions well beyond its material capabilities with Nehru's ideational policy Lal Bahadur Shastri, succeeded Indira Gandhi and deviated from Nehru's policy, nevertheless partially, and progressed en route for a more pragmatic tactic. Sumit Ganguly specified that throughout Nehru's epoch, underdevelopment of India's political establishments had very restricted contribution on the foreign policy of India in that time. He mentioned, "Mrs. Indira Gandhi, nevertheless, eliminated institutional restrictions with centralized authority and her predispositions and a team of experts for managing the foreign relations of the country." (Ganguly 2015: 2)

Kate Sullivan expresses that factor similar to "moral leadership", "internationalism", "respect for autonomy and equity" were the central principles and norms which were regarded as aspirations for a universally prominent role in the early years of independence are evidently visible in India's foreign policy discourses even now. (Sullivan, 2015:31) The

conception was driven with a certain vigour during Atal Bihari Vajpayee's tenure. From 1998–2004, during BJP's tenure, the Government quickly announced that India's "concerns" and "Interactions" move beyond South Asia, comprising of the countries to be classified as "extended neighbourhood" (Sullivan, 2015:24). David Scott notices, addition of the term "Extended Neighbourhood" absent in Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) brochures before the start of the decade. This marked as an epoch, for introduction of this policy. The word Ministry of external affairs document mentioned the word extended neighbourhood in the annual report for year 2000-2001, referred to as the regions as the one an extension India's neighbourhood as "Something to be distinguished from India's immediate neighbourhood" (David Scott, 2016: 14)

India and its image as an ambivalent power

India has often been criticised internationally as an ambivalent power. It is criticized to be delusive when it comes to its image and its temperament. There is a prolonged argument of India as a provocative power in Asia with its rising importance backed by its nuclear power arsenal , or the one which is normative, in conjunction to its past. India has been identified with maintaining an ambivalent stance when it comes to world affairs. It has an image which is largely being questioned in terms of classification as being a responsible self-sufficient power, or as one which is developing. (Ollapally, 2011) mentions the identity crisis and ambivalence in India's global image as one oscillating in between two extremes - the one in need and the one powerful enough to bring about remarkable changes in the region. Matching to the notion of a character for India as the "conscience keeper of mankind" (Ollapally, 2011). India presents a self- prognosis of itself as a role-model through knowledge leadership. The discourse yet again functions as to foreground ideas in India's external projections, other than hard power. According to an article published in The Hindu newspaper on January 2011, PM Manmohan Singh expressed, "The strength of a nation is no longer determined by the might of its army" (cited in *The Hindu*, 2011). He said that it is an outcome of the quality of knowledge as a collective, the productivity contributed by working people, dedication of its professionals and creativity of entrepreneurs. (Cited in *The Hindu*, 2011)

Deepa Ollapally classifies India as a flexible actor in the world power structure. She classifies India as a "bridging power" which is fortifying its engagements in multiple regions and people whilst making use of its time-tested normative values , and a mature power, non-

provocative power. India has historically come across a non-cooperative power in contrast of being a provocative power. India's identity, like individuals, identities of the state do not remain static and are likely to undergo a modification, pertaining to its interactions with other state and non-state actors as well as emanating from the domestic, socio-economic and cultural factors. This points out to the fact that a state's identity is largely relational. empirical analysis of foreign policy involves the application of interpretative methods, analysing norms and values, that are not empirically measurable. Ollapally mentions factors that have contributed for constructing of India's foreign policy. She says it includes a great legacy inherited from the British in the form of, "civilizational exceptionalism, Post-colonial nationalism, partition trauma"(Ollapally,2011,:213) .The concepts of "pluralism" and "tolerance" and it's well known "Secular-democratic tradition" is an inheritance from the British raj, imparting roots to develop the country's foundations and the conception to power (Ollapally,2011:213).

India: An Exemplary power

The initial years of India's sovereign history under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was fuelled by his idea of stressing the spread of "Indian Values" (Sullivan, 2014). Those who agreed to Nehru's ambitions were sure about India's need to disseminate its natural aspects. Nehru endorsed a need to publicize the "Indian values peaceful coexistence and non-violent conflict resolution" outside the Indian boundaries (Sullivan, 2014). He realised the fact that these values were required to be expected, and not forced as other leaders were functioning within the restraints of a national treatise on Gandhian ideals, which adamantly dissociated itself from methods of coercion. Sullivan says that conceptions of wielding power inappropriately for obtaining supremacy is relevant on world stage. However, it doesn't suggest an absence of hawkish discourses. She says that it's not necessary that they were yet not "featured conspicuously" due to the consequences of definitive procedures of "decision-making and their rhetorical legitimization". (Sullivan, 2014)

The notion of India's character as a influential clout in the global domain is centred around the idea of being a didactic power, fuelled by notions of being an exemplary, divergent to the practice of coercive power. This notion is associated to Joseph Nye (2004) explains as conception of "soft power", which describes it as the competency to "entice or co-opting as a means to realize other ends", and certainly The Indian foreign policy elites recurrently invoke the use of the term. Shashi Tharoor served as a distinguished Minister of State of external

affairs. In 2007 he labelled India's soft power as those "aspects and products of society" which are enticing to the world (Tharoor, 2007). Joseph Nye's conception, however, views soft and hard forms of power, working in tandem. For India, being a moralistic power is all the more, under risky circumstances, largely envisaged like an alternative for the coercive use of power. Furthermore, the anticipated quests by other states and communities which follow Indian norms are envisaged as the end in itself. Here the key purpose of the discourse on didactic status is to delineate suitable social relations amidst India and its subservient states.

This is reflected much clearly in India's development co-operation. The image of India is recognized as one with normative stance in post-independence era, when it comes to its foreign policy. Ollapally says that it is only after the CTBT, power politics came onto surface in Indian political practice. Prior to it, there was an absence of a strong sense of power politics which can be analysed from the point of view of realist or non-realist lenses. Dominance of Nehruvian secular democratic thought had outshined, despite the socio-cultural differences within the country.

India's Soft Power assets

For many people, the word evokes a strong imagery of a nation with soft and mellow attributes. It has produced a number of leaders who have become a brand to its soft power assets. Debiddatta Aurobindo Mahapatra points to how India has from time immemorial housed a number of factors and/or people who have proven to be an addition to the soft power potential. Mahatma Gandhi, with a soft manner and a saint-like politician, taking India towards liberation from British rule has been an exemplary. India's historically noted spiritual depth and cultural diversity, its vast stretch, is capable of numbing rational mind. The epics written in India have often been compared to the most celebrated epics worldwide. Indian epic Ramayana and the Mahabharata have been compared to Iliad and Odyssey. Sanskrit playwright Kalidasa's work has found a profound comparison with the works of William Shakespeare. In the field of politics and diplomacy, Chanakya's Arthashastra has found a comparison with Machiavelli's Prince. Emperor Ashoka, who ruled a vast stretch of India and was also a disciple of Chanakya, was known to abide by the rule of sword, and his aggressive foreign policy. But he later abandoned the atrocious policies and embraced Buddhism, which is another tool of Indian soft power, making its presence felt globally.

Multiple synonyms used to refer to India likewise disclose its historical soft power metaphors. The very derivation of India's name emerges from the name of the river Indus which was lifeline to the Indus valley civilization, which is also one of the oldest known civilizations. There are other names in native languages like "Bharatavarsha", "Aryavarta" and "Hindustan" that have intrinsic religious and spiritual implications. Mahapatra enlightens as to how the term Hindu is derived from Persian traders' pronunciation as Sindhu for the locals of Indus i.e, as Hindus. Hindi name, Bharat roots back to Vedic interpretation of Bha which means knowledge, and Rat which implies engagement, implying peoples or a "race engaged in knowledge". (Mahapatra, 2016)

India is a confluence of faiths, philological and ethnic diversity. Her language Sanskrit has played a central part in defining the uniqueness of India globally, has been symbolic of its soft power potential. According to Hart, discovery of nearly 160,000 manuscripts by Indian scholars in Sanskrit demonstrates the domination of the language and remained an integral part of its background for a substantial portion of its presence. Other dialects and languages which coexisted, as well as, successive religions gradually developed as inseparable components to the philosophy and custom of India. (Hart, 1984: viii). It is noted, that India is also a hub of origin to three of world's chief religions, namely, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism. There are accounts of that Christianity arriving to India as early as first century AD. India culture, spirituality and mentions of culture legacies in vedas well reflects the diversity of India. India's National emblem Satyameva Jayate, borrowed from Mundaka Upanishad "Let truth alone triumph". Indian tradition endorses world as one family. N. Lakshman notices PM Modi's endorsement of "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" in UN assembly in September 2014 (Lakshman, 2014). The Sanskrit word grasps the explanation that the world is one big family, was used and explained, by Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the UN assembly on September 2014 and stated this message from the ancient Vedanta and contended that it summarises India's culture.

Traditional depiction of Hinduism is pluralistic and tolerant religion. This image has been a conduit to India's portrayal of itself as a tolerant and peaceful state. Even the US nationals of Indian origin have helped spread this image of India. Balachandran quotes US Congress member, Tulsi Gabbard saying that the very core of Hinduism that she performs is 'karma yoga & bhakti yoga'. These explains loving divinity and all of his offsprings, irrespective of their religion, race etc. and for dedicating her life for welfare of all (Balachandran, 2016). Niall Ferguson's arguments recognized religion's importance in determining politics is

important. However, ethics and religion is capable of yielding more power than hard power. He argues, belief cannot move mountains, but it capable of moving people, in the sense, that it can transform people's mind-set (Ferguson, 2003).

In an interview to DNA, Dalai Lama presented an argument, according to him India has sustained an extensive practice of religious open-mindedness can be an ideal archetypal for rest of the world" (DNA, 2008). He believes India has housed a number of religions, coexisting in one place, and it serves as an excellent model for the world. Tharoor (2012: 40) presented a fitting example of Indian multiplicity and nonviolent cohabitation; he pointed to India as a bouquet of diversity with leaders from diverse religions. He noticed, that India is a Hindu majoritarian state, with about eighty-one percent of the population as ardent followers of Hinduism but is still having beautiful examples of diversity. He says :

“the sight in May 2004, after the world's then-largest democratic exercise, of a victorious leader of Roman Catholic background and Italian heritage (Sonia Gandhi) making way for a Sikh (Manmohan Singh) to be sworn in as Prime Minister by a Muslim (President Abdul Kalam), in a country 81 per cent Hindu, caught the world's imagination and won its admiration. This had nothing to do with external messaging: it was simply India being itself” (Tharoor, 2012: 40)

Such a statement portrayed a great symbolism for an India's picture which respects the diversity of faiths. Such symbolism is backed in India's secular ideals which are great resource of India's natural soft power. He further writes that such diverse amalgamation of people had “won world's imagination and won its admiration” (Tharoor, 2012:40). It will be inappropriate to say India's soft power is strengthened by Hindu religion in particular. The majoritarian conviction and culture , has played a role in modelling it, but “other religions and cultures have contributed to its evolution” (Mahapatra, 2016). Indian political and spiritual leaders regularly accentuated on a balanced fusion of Indian values for India's progress. Nehru's concept “unity in diversity” conceptualizes this synthetic character of India's soft power. Swami Vivekananda advocated that for a better India, it's necessary that India becomes unit at all aspects that is, “Hinduism and Islam—Vedanta Brain and Islam Body—is the only hope” (Mehta, 2012).

India is the homeland of prodigal mathematicians and scientists, which has attracted acclamation and admiration from the west, thus summing India's soft power to immense heights. In the Indian conception of science and spiritualism, the line of demarcation is thin. The 2015 Hollywood movie “The Man Who Knew Infinity”, based on the life of the famous Indian mathematician, Srinivasa Ramanujan, displays the connection between science and

religion, a characteristic trait of Indian culture and identity. Mahapatra makes a mention of how even the Mughals, who have been referred to as outsiders, have lent their contribution in adding to India's smart power arsenal. He points to 16th century India, ruled by Akbar, who was the brainchild of a new religious practice "Din-i-Elahi" which stands for the belief of divinity. The practice blended teachings of most faiths. There were saints whose mentions were found in both Hindu and Islamic scriptures, but they had different names in both religions. Mahapatra exemplifies saints like Kabir who is known in both the religions. He also demonstrates how "Nund Rishi which is a Hindu name, and Noor-ud-Din, which is Islamic were two names of one Kashmiri saint" (Mahapatra, 2016) Similarly, there were Saints like Kabir who had both Hindu and Muslim disciples. Not only in spiritual, religious or cultural field, India's soft power assets also encapsulated the fields of science. Aryabhata, Bhāskara I, Brahmagupta, Varāhamihira contributed to mathematics and astronomy in the ancient period. Swami Vivekananda has proved to be a great icon of India's smart power and is oft-quoted by academics for his powerful speeches abroad. Swami, though young, captivated a plethora of people irrespective of their religions. Another such influential personality was Sri Aurobindo. He anticipated five dreams for the rising motherland, out of which the fourth was the boon of Indian spirituality to the world to follow as a new way of living. Indian spiritual practices are being increasingly accepted and analysed. In a radio message subjected to Indians, he was quoted "movement will grow; amid the disasters of the time more and more eyes are turning towards her with hope and there is even an increasing resort not only to her teachings, but to her psychic and spiritual practice"(Mohanty, 2012: 197).

Modi reckoned the soft power potential hidden in the policies of Aurobindo and did not fail to make a mention of Aurobindo's philosophy to Indians on his first speech ever on Independence day in 2014. He said, "Today, on 15th August, we also have the birth anniversary of Maharishi Aurobindo, with regard to the destiny of India, he remarked, "I have a faith that the divine power and spiritual heritage of India will play an important role towards the welfare of the world, I strongly believe in the words of legends" (as cited in the Indian Express, 2014). Mahatma Gandhi is specially reckoned as one of the leaders, who are pioneers of soft power of India. His ideologies of truth and non-violent resistance has served as an example and also given out a message of India as a peace loving country. A lot of freedom struggles got inspired through his ideals. Asian Relations Conference in April 1947, witnessed his explanation of the idea of third world and Indian self-sufficiency when he said,

“The message of the East, the message of Asia, is not to be learnt through European spectacles, through the Western spectacles. If you want to give a message again to the West, it must be a message of “Love”, it must be a message of “Truth”.

Martin Luther King Jr. entitled Mahatma Gandhi as “the guiding light”. Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of non- violence inspired King Jr. in his movement. He termed him the beacon of techniques of societal transformation through non-violence (King Jr, 2005: paper V, 231). On India visit , on a radio address, he mentioned “In a real sense, Mahatma Gandhi embodied in his life certain universal principles that are inherent in the moral structure of the universe, and these principles are as inescapable as the law of gravitation”.(King Jr., 2005: paper V,136) Yoga is the most significant of all the soft power tools of today’s times. UN acknowledged 21 June and mounting admiration of spiritual fitness worldwide in 2014. According to Aurobindo, “In the right view both of life and of Yoga all life is either consciously or subconsciously a yoga”. Yoga, as conventionally understood, is practice of certain exercises that help the practitioner to control the movements of body and mind towards leading a healthy life. UN definition to Yoga on their official website declares:

“Yoga is an ancient physical, mental and spiritual practice that originated in India. The word yoga derives from Sanskrit and means to join or to unite, symbolizing the union of body and consciousness. International yoga day aims to raise awareness worldwide of the many benefits of practicing yoga” (UN, 2016).

While presenting a proposal to celebrate yoga as an international event at the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Modi stated, “yoga is an invaluable gift from our ancient tradition. yoga embodies unity of mind and body, thought and action a holistic approach [that] is valuable to our health and our well-being” (UN, 2016) The definition that the UN has “ yoga is an ancient physical, mental and spiritual practice that originated in India” (UN, 2016). One of the major recognitions of India’s soft power was the United Nations’ approval of 21 June as International Yoga Day. Internationally about 125 million people practice yoga. In 2016, on the yoga day at Dubai, led by Indian yoga guru, Baba Ramdev, 100,000 people participated, creating Guinness Book record. In recent days, there have also been attempts to explore the utility of yoga in bringing peace in conflict situations. Yoga can play a positive role in bringing peace to conflict situations (Mahapatra, 2013). Ayurveda is an ancient medicine practice, which has gained popularity across the world, it being one of the safest treatments without and ill-effect. Ayurveda serves as a strong soft power tool as its benefits are being reckoned “Ayurveda is one of the branches of the

Vedas” (Sharma 1981: v). Charaka, whose Charaka Samhita is considered one of the major texts on Ayurveda, was, according to some accounts, belonged to second century AD, though some accounts place him to an earlier date (Sharma, 1981: viii–x). Ayurveda has become increasingly popular in the developed world, and it is seen in conjunction with yoga. At present, there are about 2000 Ayurvedic Retreat centers around the world, and out of which about 100 centers are based in the United States. Association of Ayurvedic Professionals of North America (AAPNA) (2016) aims to bring “the healing science of Ayurveda and its modalities to the forefront of integrative medicine in the West”. In November 2014, Indian government upgraded the Department of Ayurveda, yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy, founded in November 2003, into a full-fledged ministry.

India’s film industry, Bollywood, is the producer of highest number of films in the world and is popular in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, South East Asia and in many other parts of the world. Tharoor accounts how during the peak of violence in Afghanistan in 1990s, people never failed to watch Indian soap opera, *Kyun Ki Sass Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi*. He cites another example, in Syria during the regime of Hafez al-Assad, the life size portrait of then Bollywood superstar, Amitabh Bachchan, was as big as of al-Assad (Tharoor, 2008b). While walking in the Batavia area of Jakarta in October 2008, Indonesia, a local started conversation with the author and knowing that the author is from India, he mentioned the names of Indian film stars Mithun Chakraborty and Amitabh Bachchan, of whom he was a fan. During the cold war era, film stars like Raj Kapoor worked as bridge between India and other countries. Kapoor and his films like *Awara* and *Mera Naam Joker* were immensely popular in Soviet Union. In the Middle East, Indian films run for days, and the diaspora plays an active role in popularizing the films. In countries such as the United States, Hindi films are increasing playing in multiplexes to satisfy demands of increasing Indian diaspora. Along with Bollywood, Indian music and cultural elements such as dance and drama too have played a role in boosting India’s image as a soft power. For instance, the USA-based Bollywood America, annually organizes dance and other cultural events. The aim of the organization is “to celebrate and spread interest in the diversity and tradition of South Asian culture” in the world (Bollywood America, 2016). The popular memory treasure the friendship of the Beatles with the Indian sitar maestro Ravi Shankar and Yogi Bhanu Bhawanji. And, to add, many Indian actors are becoming part of Hollywood movies as well as television shows. For instance, Bollywood actor Priyanka Chopra played a leading role in TV serial

Quantico, and is confirmed to play a role in Baywatch. Similarly, Deepika Padukone, another Bollywood actor, is playing a major role in The Return of Xander Cage.

Indian food, another element of the soft power, has become increasingly popular in various parts of the world. One can easily find an Indian restaurant in most places. It is noteworthy that many restaurant owners of other South Asian countries name their eateries Indian. Indian spices too have crept in several non-Indian households all over the globe. Samosa, chaat, chicken tikka masala, masala dosa, curries and many such Indian dishes have made inroads across the globe.

Indian spices have captured the popular imagination by featuring in films like Mistress of Spices and Today's Special and a whole host of television shows like Outsourced and The Big Bang Theory for example.

“Indian food including kebabs, chicken tikka masala, biryani, curries, masala dosa and even the humble naan are immensely popular and available in places like UK, Canada, the Middle East, US and even China. This reflects the soft-power that India has abroad through its food. When singer Katy Perry was in the country two years ago to perform at the T20 opening ceremony in Chennai, she insisted that she wanted to try out all the staple kebabs and curries. From street stalls to subway cafeterias to Michelin-starred restaurants, Indian food and ingredients have made inroads at every level on the larger gastronomical map” (Suresh and Nooran, 2014)

According to a report of 2003, there are about 9000 Indian curry houses in the United Kingdom, employing about 70,000 staff. The Indian food industry in the United Kingdom is worth £3.2 billion and accounts for two-thirds of all eating out. In London, there are more Indian restaurants than in Mumbai and Delhi, and Indian restaurants in Britain serve about 2.5 million customers every week (The National Archives, 2003). Then British Secretary of State, Cook (2001), had said, “Chicken Tikka Massala is now a true British national dish, not only because it is the most popular, but because it is a perfect illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external influences. Chicken Tikka is an Indian dish”. According to a report of 2007, more than 1,200 Indian food products were introduced in the United States since 2000, out of which 300 were introduced in 2006 (Bhide, 2007). According to an Indian-American, “After first moving to Washington in 1992, I would travel to India to bring suitcases full of spices, spice mixes, pickles, lentil wafers and even curry leaves, because

local availability was limited. Today, ingredients are easily available at Indian markets, at Korean stores and at chains such as Giant, Whole Foods, Costco and Wegmans. Moreover, food manufacturers and even local grocers are now tempting people to cook easy Indian—a concept that once was oxymoronic—through the use of time-saving products” (Ibid.). Though the entrance of Indian food to the West is relatively of recent origin, its spread to countries of developing world including South East Asia, Middle East, Central Asia, Caribbean Islands could be traced to at least few centuries. In the ancient and medieval periods, India had a strong naval trade with eastern coast of Africa through the Arabian Sea, and with the countries of South East Asia through the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean, and land route trade with China, Central Asia and Persia through the Silk Road, through which not only spices but a whole lot of goods, ideas, knowledge and skills were transported.

Indian democracy has remained an attraction throughout the post-cold war world, in which more nation-states are turning democratic. Despite being a developing economy, with significant level of poverty and other nation building travails, India is known as the largest democracy in the world, while its neighbours have witnessed coups. Except a brief period, from 1975 to 1977, India has regular elections. During the 2014 nation-wide elections, there were about 814 million eligible voters, 100 million more than the last elections in 2009, and there were 930,000 polling stations to exercise their basic political right (BBC, 2014a). Even for those who know nothing about India, this really looks to be one of the most fascinating political events this year, and not just because of its scale. The election is taking place in an increasingly important tech-savvy country, with vital issues of economic problems and nationalism at stake ... It’s a fascinating moment in democracy, and one that shouldn’t be ignored (Taylor and Kaphle, 2014).

Modi’s projection of India as a smart power

Modi visited 46 countries in 20 years as a part of his foreign policy, which drew serious criticism at home. His critics claimed the prime minister was vacationing abroad while domestic problems continued to explode exponentially every day. India, which remained non-aligned for much of its independent history and struggled with its position regionally, has been reluctant to accept the ambitious goals of its newest statesman leader. A foreign trip provides ample opportunity to scrutinize a leader’s foreign policy goals and directions. Speeches abroad are not aimed for the consumption of the domestic audience, but are primarily targeted at an international audience. Naturally, there is a lot of posturing,

pretending and photo-ops involved; Narendra's Modi's selfie photograph with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was hailed as the most powerful selfie on the planet. Modi has acquired 'rockstar' status among politicians; Modi's Twitter following is second only to the US President Barrack Obama. Scholars and foreign policy pundits are passionately debating whether Modi has instituted a new doctrine that will guide India's foreign policy during its rise. The term doctrine has been used to describe the perspective or ideology of leaders rather than a strict path adopted by a state that guides all its foreign policy behaviour. Whether or not we use the label doctrine, it is worth considering the focus and scope of Modi's approach to foreign policy. Modi has used a surprising element in his foreign policy approach: leveraging India's abundance of soft power regionally as well as globally.

Modi's visits points out to his attempts of global engagement. Being the astute politician and champion of commerce that he is, Modi realizes that India can advance only by selectively engaging foreign powers that hold the key to its future. Rising to power on a mandate of economic growth and development, he understands that India cannot grow without acquiring requisite raw materials and energy resources that remain in limited supply but high demand by other fast growing economies, such as neighbouring China as well as other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies. His foreign trips are as much about securing access to crucial sources of energy and raw materials as about cementing India's long-ignored diplomatic and political ties within the region and beyond. If India hopes to be treated as a major power, then its outlook cannot be inward looking; it must embrace the responsibilities of its role as a major power state. Belonging to the Bharatiya Janata Party and holding the image of a Hindu nationalist hardliner, Modi was expected to be *realpolitik* in his approach to international relations. Instead, he is using smart power, which is a blend of hard and soft powers, to pursue India's foreign policy goals. Much to the surprise of his supporters and the chagrin of his critics, Modi has taken a mixed approach to handling India's international business. The word business is purposeful and key in the preceding sentence, for above all Modi is an astute businessman turned politician. He hopes to revive India's economy and return it to a double-digit growth rate, thus alleviating poverty, unemployment and other social evils that plague the country.

The iconography generated by terms in the title is fitting (Chaulia, 2011). The elephant, though unbound, is hardly as scary and threatening as the Hulk can be (especially when infuriated). However, in spite of his vices, the Hulk remains a lovable character worldwide. As India starts to amass unprecedented military strength and power, it is this image of the

lovable icon that its leaders must continue to preserve. Failing to do so would invite counterbalancing strategies by threatened neighbours and major powers alike. Modi's several international visits help to reassure friendly states and economic partners of India's intentions to rise peacefully. India is trying to challenge the status quo, by using smart power strategies incrementally, without disrupting the existing international order.

Conclusion

India has emerged as a provocative power with its rising importance, which is also due to its nuclear power arsenal, but has largely shown ambivalent tendencies when it comes to world affairs due to a doubt on its clarification as a developing or a developed power. India projects itself as a forerunner in leadership and matters of cooperation in world affairs. India's Smart power connections with India's neighbourhood and its post-independence global narratives were visible in the foreign policies

These qualities of global welfare were a part of Indian diplomacy right from the times of Jawaharlal Nehru. Even Dr. Manmohan Singh, during his tenure as the PM said that the nations' strength cannot solely depend on its army, but also collective knowledge and contribution of working people, adding to its productivity by professionals. India has started to stress on its soft power ideals to dominate the world politics. Analysts are terming Modi's foreign policy as his foreign policy doctrine and also terming it a transition in India's foreign policy. India has a plethora of Soft power icons in form of influential leaders, which make its Soft power arsenal strong. Its has a historical cultural and traditional legacy, and an epic of Freedom struggle. Its foreign policy has an ideational historical element to it which gives the Foreign policy of India a soft attribute. The present government and the predecessors have ensured that the Indian diaspora abroad is also taken care of, and through the speeches abroad, both diaspora and international audiences can be influenced.

Chapter 4

India- China relations and Smart power strategies

Several factors account for the advancement of China's image and rise of its influence in Asia. The foremost achievement is its fast economic growth. A bit less obvious, however equally vital, is China's regional policy. China has been exhibiting an amendment in its perspective toward Asia since the mid-1990s. It regards Asia as a core strategic region and has actively enforced regional policies toward the continent, which had not been the case within the past. As an example, China has begun propagating numerous diplomatic ideas like "responsible power," "new security concept," "peaceful rise and development," and "harmonious world," and has enforced a "good neighbour policy" to support these notions (Cho and Jeong, 2008). These efforts have eased the considerations of neighbouring countries and guaranteed China's rise as a regional power. Soft power is planned as the concept that others can align themselves to state and its policy preferences as a result of their interest in its political and social values and policies. Ironically given all that has been written and said about China's soft power, it is here that most assessments of broadly defined 'soft power' appear to agree that China seems to have least purchase vis-à-vis other states and systems. Therefore, there is definitely a strong case for saying that China's system repels rather than attracts. (Breslin, 2011).

India's interest in china

Reports from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2009 with Bates Gill (2009) as a member, confirmed a significant rise in curiosity by Indian academics and policymakers in the analysis and affairs of China. CSIS surveyed the "strategic elite" in the US and eight Asian countries (including Japan and India) regarding their expectations for the Asian region in the next 10 years.

"China was the country most expected both to possess the strongest overall national power and to pose the most likely threat in 10 years (among all respondents in the survey, 65.5% expected China to possess the strongest overall national power and 38% expected China to

pose the most likely threat” (Horimoto, 2017). “However, a breakdown of the results shows that the US and Indian respondents had the greatest expectation for China to become the strongest power, while Japanese and Indian respondents had the greatest expectation for China to pose the most likely threat” (Gill , 2009)

In other words, Indian experts seem to be even more highly focused on China than do their peers in other countries, seeing it not only as a major power but also as a threat.

Due to its size and placement, India was a naturally emerged as one of the prime trading country in the South Asian region. India and its neighbouring country Nepal are on friendly relations since decades, and share an open border. India’s 1st free trade agreement (FTA) was signed with Sri Lanka. India and Bhutan share “mutually beneficial economic inter-linkages” and India has been a serious economic partner to Bangladesh since its independence in 1971 (Anderson and Ayers, 2015). China’s extensive economic extensions with Pakistan and its growing influence in South Asia is comparatively recent development. The China-Pakistan axis stands as a special and separate case, one that reflects a novel strategic logic incomparable with other South Asia countries. According to Ashlyn Anderson and Alyssa Ayers, China’s recent economic commitment to Pakistan a declared package of \$46 billion in infrastructure development and assistance thus represents an intensification of, however not a strategic modification, a longstanding relationship going back five decades. Their current two-way trade volume surpasses \$16 billion. (Anderson and Ayers, 2015)

China has emerged as a prime exporter of goods to the region in the new millenia, it surpassed India over a decade ago, alongwith India, seeping its way into South Asian markets with its signature export-led development strategy. India’s neighbor Bangladesh provides one starkest example to this strategy. China overturned India as Bangladesh’s prime trading partner in 2005. China displaced several Indian goods in Bangladesh, which as an economy based on garment industry. China provided Bangladesh cheaper Chinese materials (especially cotton and other materials vital to the garment industry. The perquisites include trade without visa, customs and transportation obstacles which has restricted trade between India and Bangladesh. Modi on his visit to Bangladesh in 2015, signed the Land Boundary Agreement along with 22 other agreements. Land and boundary agreement gave identity to more than 50000 homeless people. This move resolved a longstanding issue and

also signed an important agreement giving India an access to use the Chittagong and Mongla ports in Bangladesh (Bagchi,2015). India has tried to penetrate the Bangladesh waters for better trade practices with this agreement

China's multiplied involvement in South Asia poses a challenge to India primarily due to China's regional economic dominance and diplomatic heavyweight. Nonetheless, this is not an simplified case of regional competition between the two. Despite much of the headlines throughout which proclaim India's eclipse by China, there are multiple threads of economic relations still linking India with China. China hasn't shadowed India all across South Asia, however it's catching up in its investment and trade, and in some cases, its economic diplomacy has been in the middle of enlarged strategic cooperation with India's neighbors. (Anderson and Ayers, 2015) As China steps up its engagement with the region and promotes Asian fellowship of Asian countries, mostly through its much talked of trade route "belt and road initiative" vision, it can marshal intensive resources on initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which might probably surpass alternative monetary sources. Keeping a watch on India's regional standing, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has doubled up on his trips across South Asia, stressing on development of infrastructure, connectivity of people, and deeper relations approach to assist India's neighbors gain from its own rise.

Soft power no longer remains a distant and alien concept to top Chinese political leaders. The political report dating back to the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002, as an example, points out: "In today's world, culture intertwines with economics and politics, demonstrating a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national power." The main focus of the 13th collective study session of the commission of the 16th CCP Central Committee on May 28, 2004 was a way to develop China's philosophy and social sciences. The session passed off 2 months since the CCP Centre had publicized the document entitled "Suggestions of the CCP Centre on any Developing and Boosting Philosophy and Social Sciences". It emerged that the study session signifies the leadership's will to accelerate the growth of China's soft power from a strategic height. Party chief and President Hu Jintao created this clear at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership cluster meeting on January 4, 2006: "The increase in our nation's international status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defense, as well as in soft power such as culture." Other leaders increasingly often refer to soft power. Li Mingjiang gives insightful information on the same , Jia Qinglin, CPPCC

Chairman and member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, delivered a speech in March 2007 at the fifth session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 10th National Committee in which he elaborated on China's soft power. The CPPCC National Committee held a session in the calendar month of July 2007 on 'cultural construction as the main approach for national soft power building' during which Jia Qinglin urged Chinese officers to "deeply perceive the importance of national soft power with cultural construction because the main task", to satisfy domestic demands and enhance China's aggressiveness within the international arena (Mingjiang,2008: 289). India and China and the world's largest countries in terms of both population and area. They both have long histories and are the only two countries in the world that have managed to maintain their distinctive civilizations even as modern states. Moreover, the combined GDPs and populations of the two countries accounted for half of the global total in the 1820s. Both India and China started over as new nations following World War II and are now feted as emerging economic powers along with the other BRIC countries (Horimoto, 2014 :63). However, China is seen as second only to the US as a world power, and its GDP and military spending are roughly quadruple those of India. Furthermore and perhaps of greatest importance is the fact that for the great South Asian power India, China, the great East Asian power, is a neighbour (Horimoto, 2014:63) . It is possibly then only expected that India highly attracted to China as both have historic legacy and both endeavour to inaugurate themselves as absolute powers.

Positive and Negative influencers of China-India Relations

The prospect of any revolutions in India-China relations during the Cold War was highly unlikely due to three controlling factors: bilateral matters which consist of boundary clashes, Its close ties to Pakistan, making up for its regional political structure and it's international political issues. End of cold war witnessed instances of harmonization in the economic policies India-China but experiences simultaneous tensions due to closeness to Pakistan and changing equations dawning in the China-US ties. the relationship continues to be impacted by bilateral issues, China's closeness with Pakistan, and US-China relations.

Trade relations continue to grow fourfold. The heads of state of India and China have elevated their aggregate trade goals with every official visit. In a joint statement in 2005, on rPrime Minister Wen Jiabao's, a joint release expressed new trade targets , that are a cumulative of total imports and exports. They set a mark of US\$20 billion by 2008, which

was already achieved in 2006. Later, in 2006 following the visit of Hu Jintao, the oaths for increasing trade practices had a new figure and a timeline of reaching US\$40 billion figure in summative trade by 2010. Hu Jintao was also appreciated for his remarks that India –China’s growing ties may one day lead to Asia’s domination in 21st century. On Prime minister Manmohan Singh’s visit, the target was set at USD 60 billion in a time-frame of 2010. With Li-Keqiang’s visit, it the target figures were set up as US\$100 billion by 2014. A steep surge in trade relations between the two is a doubtful question. There are several quarters which demand and recommend a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries; however, most Indian investors are not in favour of this proposal for their limited export prospects. India is a big importer of Chinese merchandises. Fiscal year 2012- 13, showed massive net exports from China to India of US\$37.81 billion. This showed an alarming deficit, which stood at 20% (approx.) of India’s total trade deficit. In January 2007, India’s Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) released a report entitled “Granting Market Economy Status to China”.

The report argued that China should not be granted market economy status and that India should not enter any FTAs with China because its industrial sector enjoyed unfair advantages, including significant government subsidies for domestic companies, tax exemptions, and the unreasonably low value of the yuan.³ The Indian government is likewise not actively seeking an FTA with China as it is concerned about potential damage to the domestic small-and-medium-enterprise (SME) sector from a massive influx of cheap Chinese products. India entered an FTA with Singapore that took effect in 2005 and has since actively negotiated to conclude similar agreements with other countries, so its reluctance to follow a similar route with China is notable. Joining forces on energy & global warming India and China have also joined forces on the energy front. They signed a basic agreement on energy cooperation in January 2006. Both countries are attempting to increase their petroleum imports, but India frequently comes in behind China in the two’s race to secure energy resources. This agreement was apparently envisioned as a counterbalance to that dynamic.⁴ In December 2006, the two countries also signed the Memorandum for Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Oil and Natural Gas. As of 2012, China and India ranked as the world’s second and fourth greatest petroleum importers. India and China’s support for multi-polarity. Examples of Sino-Indian cooperation can also be seen in multilateral contexts. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) accepted India as an observer in 2005. The SCO’s advocates the transition from a unipolar international system to a multipolar one, and India has no objection

to this. That said, India has not shown an interest in fully engaging with the SCO. At SCO summits, it has been represented only by such officials as its minister for the environment rather than by the prime minister. It attributes this not only to its reservations about becoming a full member, but also to the fact that it is not an official member. This is likely primarily out of deference to the US, with which it has entered into an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation in addition to forging other ties.

This noncommittal stance on the SCO seems to epitomize the essence of Indian foreign policy. A SCO summit held in Russia in 2009 marked the first time an Indian prime minister took part, but Prime Minister Singh's attendance was apparently orchestrated by Russia. If the SCO's goal is primarily to develop a multipolar global political system, its counterpart on the economic front is the BRICS Summit. The first BRIC Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009, with Brazil, Russia, India, and China attending as member nations. South Africa joined as of the third meeting (2011), with the name being changed to the BRICS Summit. The GDP of the five countries totals US\$21.18 trillion (World Bank, 2012), accounting for 20% of the global total, and their populations account for approximately 40% of all the people in the world. If on one side of its foreign policy coin India finds China, on the other it finds the US. Given that Indian foreign policy seems to demonstrate an ingrained desire for strategic autonomy and that the country has suffered the fallout of its own overreliance on a major power (namely the Soviet Union), it seems unlikely that it will grow any closer with the US much less forge an alliance with China. As is the case with China, India's desire for strategic autonomy likely derives from the "largeness" of the land it occupies, its population, and its traditional thought, all of which have undergone very little change. In other words, this desire likely stems from India's own nature as a great power.

India is involved in multiple strategic global partnerships—primarily with major nations—thanks to the omni-directional diplomacy it engaged in following the Cold War. However, it currently has no ally on which it can rely in the way it could, for example, on the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. India is in the process of forging international ties based on the principles of both bilateralism and multilateralism, but the way in which it has combined the two approaches has been far from efficient. India does appear to be a partner country in which Japan. Some take a stern view of India's foreign policy, including one Indian expert who writes, "While focusing on strengthening itself economically and militarily, India will also have to work proactively to achieve greater strategic balance in the region over the next few years if it wants to preserve and enhance its own interests. As of now, it is not clear if the

Indian policymakers have found a way to do this.” While nothing is certain, the road ahead for Indian foreign affairs— including its relations with China—looks likely to be a bumpy one. In India the new government, BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) government, headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi comes on stage as a result of the 16th General Election held between April and May 2014. Since BJP has made a history by winning more than half of the seats of the lower house of the parliament for the first time in the past a quarter of the century, its government is expected to be stable and decisive unlike the successive coalition governments.

India-China Economic ties

Economic engagement has been the greatest driver of improvement in bilateral relations. Economic ties between the two countries cooled during the Cold War but are now on a solid upswing. David Shambaugh reckones a Chinese professor once reckoned China’s insufficiency in Soft Power strategies when he told David Shambaugh , the China has Kung-Fu and it has Pandas, but it could not create the movie “Kung- Fu Panda.” (Shambaugh, 2015: 98). Although China lacked the creativeness to supply a soft power hit just like the well-liked movie maker motion-picture show, it looks to own the vision to form one thing bigger: the “One Belt, One Road” initiative – the supreme mixture of sappy and arduous power, one thing almost like Joseph Nye’s plan of good power. (Shambaugh, 2015: 99). The ideas of arduous, soft and good power are developed and enforced to variable extents within the West. And Western students and analysts have tried to grasp China through the lenses of Western paradigms. However, once it involves good power, there's not an abundant amount of a discussion on the difficulty and even less to what Chinese conceptualization of smart power is.

China’s Self-Conceptualization Theory of IR was never studied or instructed in China in classical Western terms till the late Nineteen Eighties. As some students argue, even today, despite the reforms, Chinese academe is much more policy oriented and lacks discussion and educational work on IR theory per se. It ought to be of explicit interest to appear at a number of the speeches by Zheng Bijian’s, who is supposed to be an outstanding ideologist behind today’s China and therefore the author of “peaceful rise,” later remodeled into “peaceful development” (Mingjiang, 2008:305) Bijian believes that on the international scene China’s top priority should be proper relations with major powers. However, he conjointly stresses the importance of cooperation with developing countries, wherever China has what may well

be labeled as a missionary vision and a sort of sentimental philosophical system. It seems as a modernizer and a rule setter however with the exception of economic means that it also conjointly acts through soft power channels (political, diplomatic and cultural). “cooperation with these countries in the international economic sphere will help establish a new international economic order and speed up the industrialization process” (Kiliptari, 2013 :82) China’s exchanges in the economic, political, cultural, and diplomatic fields will be expanded and deepened. Bijian portrays China as a peaceful late arrival with sensible intentions; but, he doesn't miss any chance to praise its individuals for the good attainments and to precise pride: “No latecomer to development in the contemporary world has been able to achieve this during its rise.” (Kiliptari,2013:83)

The phrase seems within the text many pack the notions of arduous, soft, and times and alludes to what Kenneth Waltz stated while discussing the states’ attitudes towards the need of changing into superpowers. Pride knows no nationality On the opposite hand, despite the achieved progress, China realizes its own shortcomings and still considers itself as a developing nation. within the words of this President Xi Jinping, China “remains the world's largest developing country and it faces many difficulties and challenges.. We need to make relentless efforts in the years ahead to deliver a better life to all our people ” On the international scene, China presents itself as an associate of multilateral diplomacy, favoring cooperation and reciprocity over isolation that behaves “like an accountable power.” Globalization, although delivery challenges, still offers huge opportunities, as China acts in honesty on the international scene, together with its encompassing region, wherever it “had maintained sound relations of cooperation with close countries and frequently self-addressed “border issues”. “Multilateral diplomacy is the main channel for China’s expansion. (Kiliptri,2008:83)

Modern China is “an image for economic cooperation”, not seeking world form of government, rather lowering its head, operating towards excellence to “ensure the right to subsistence and therefore the right to development of over one billion Chinese individuals. This accomplishment, in itself, is going to be a large contribution by China toward world development and human progress.” it's a proactive power taking trust in cooperation and reciprocity to “achieve win-win and all-win outcomes.” On the opposite hand, due note is taken of the importance of rationalism once pertaining to terms like “soberly assess” or “soberly take into consideration the international and domestic things, bear in mind the risks and uncertainties” or “maximize advantages and minimize risks. 21st century China is

experiencing “the nice renaissance” through peaceful rise that conceptualizes the harmony among material, political, spiritual, social and ecological civilizations, that on their own square measure stock-still within the ethical qualities of general Chinese public and therefore the nature of relations within and outside the nation.

China’s rise takes “a peaceful, civilized, and open pathway” and its outcome in Mao’s words are going to be “a massive, powerful, nonetheless approachable country.” Bijian uses self-other classification let’s say that, in its essence, China could be a distinctive power. He attracts on the past examples from history and while comparing China to European nation like Germany and Japan within the half of the 20th century, states that “it is completely different from the trail undertaken by any power in modern history and in the history of socialism, for instance, the policies by the previous U.S.S.R. throughout the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, that wanted dominance on the strength of military axis and race. China’s individuation and therefore the new mode of rise square measure unconditional within the strategic selection created in favor of economic power and soft ways.” (Zhang, 2008: 313)

Hard power, like military strengths and armed forces are less valuable. “Armed forces cannot make peace and power politics cannot ensure security. “an aggressive path of war and expansion is doomed to failure.” (Kiliptari,2015:89) . From this perspective of international relations cooperation is not only possible, but is rather necessary. In addition, there is a certain level of skepticism towards the overall impact of systemic factors in shaping modern China. Rather it’s declared that today’s China is that the product of the reforms undertaken by Chinese authorities and not of the modalities that have taken place with the tip of the bipolar system. In alternative words, the driving force or variable is China’s internal transformation and not the general modification. Significantly, the Chinese read of the international system is twofold: China strives to stick to its strategy of gap up and integration within the globalized world, underlying that its rise is peaceful and cooperative, however at an equivalent time, reiterates the need of stability and security within the world to ensure its prosperity and development. It’s a reformer and a democratizing force in international relations: “It advocates a replacement road toward a replacement international political and economic order .India’s extended neighborhood concept has become part of a new national consensus in foreign policy, shared between the BJP and Congress parties/governments. (Kiliptari,2015:89)

The language and concept remains loaded on this; for K. R. Singh it has been a question of replacing “a subcontinental mindset that had virtually confined it to a small portion of the Afro-Asian region, so-called South Asia” a mindset that had “denied India its rightful place in the extended neighbourhood. Structurally, then, the concept of extended neighborhood serves to bridge the gap between India's established role as a local power in its immediate neighborhood region of South Asia, and its hoped for role as a global power. There is the possibility that India may be over-extending itself with regard to its extended neighborhood concept. It would be overdoing it to say that India sees itself as a Great Power that should have Great Power sphere-of-influence paramountcy in its extended neighborhood.

The presence of other strong states in those extended areas makes that an unrealistic scenario. Instead, whilst India perhaps seeks some preeminence – or perhaps even a degree of unipolar hegemony – in its immediate neighborhood, India seeks to deny such a situation to other powers in its extended neighborhood, especially to China. Within this strategic denial setting, India's easterly and southerly projections into the extended neighborhood of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean have been most substantive, with a degree of pre-eminence being sought in the Indian Ocean for India, as India continues its economics-driven rise. Within that hard power economic thrust, rising energy needs (to fuel India's burgeoning economic rise) is a factor that will in all likelihood increase in importance for India, and which will pull India still deeper into involvement with its extended neighborhood, especially north, west and east. Other factors magnify India's concerns with its extended neighborhood. Islamist *jihadi* groups operate in all four quadrants of India's extended neighborhood, and as such increase India's preventative concerns. Last, but by no means least, India's encounters with China are taking place around much of India's extended neighborhood. There is something of a Great Game between these two giants and India's extended neighborhood is a scene for much of it.

Conclusion

China has displayed a dramatic change towards its neighbours after the South China sea affair. India has an avid interest in rising China and its increasing positive influence in Asia. India has an interest in China's replenishing regional policy with its diplomatic ideas of being a responsible power with its new security concept and its peaceful development which it has been showering on several domestic and international forums. A similar piked interest is visible from China's side as well, signs of which came to surface with wen Jiabao's 2005

visit to India, which focussed agreements from both the countries, to fasten up the trade and investment goals, which were meted out earlier than expected. India has a higher import rate from China in comparison to exports, which hampers its economic growth. Domestic dissatisfaction also surfaced when economic lobby groups in India objected to the India's grant to China of a market economy status. China and India have jointly come out as supportive to global issues around the world, which apparently China is concentrating on. China realises India's strength with soft power, but is undeterred with its institutionalised processes.

Both the nations, are coming across as allies with the smaller countries in the region, by coming in solidarity on pressing global issues such as Climate change, which the smaller nations are largely incapable of affording. Smaller nations look up to support from the bigger players and China is trying hard to come across as the reliable big power regionally by the use of its cultural diplomacy and soft power ideals. It is also keeping the idea of its strong, authoritative image intact, such as in the case of Japan in South china sea, so that the smaller nations can fear an offensive with the country. In this manner, China is carefully maintaining a tightrope walk, and India is trying to follow the same suit , in its attempts to maintain better relations with China, As India deems it necessary to strengthen itself in terms of economics and military for keeping up with a strategic balance, and not to come across as offensive to China.

Chapter 5

Efficacy of Smart Power Strategies

With the velocity of his foreign policy decisions PM Modi earned recognition of being more emphatic than the predecessor governments. As soon as he took the office as Prime minister he was on the go to the immediate and extended neighbourhood for official visits. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's put the seeds of a variety of foreign policy promises for the East Asian countries but critics argue that the sufficiency of the same remained doubtful. Academics have a notion that PM Manmohan Singh's strategies were on the correct track, but it never met the promises it made. Especially for ASEAN countries, critics say that Manmohan government was "unable to deliver on those promises" (Chong, 2016).

The role of the states in shaping the foreign policy is also likely to be very different. Mr Modi is likely to see the states as partners in his foreign policy, as opposed to Dr Singh, who represented a very Delhi-centric traditional view with respect to the country's foreign policy. However, at the same time, it is unlikely that Mr Modi will allow certain state governments to stall India's relations with neighbouring countries as was the case with the previous government. Although the UPA was in a key position to draft a roadmap philosophical system for India's policy, it didn't do so. A serious gap within the policy was the dearth of leadership or split leadership with regional leaders in Chennai and Kolkata acting as roadblocks to major vital foreign policy selections. This clearly reflected "a politically weak centre which was concerned with other things, rather than foreign policy" (Jabin, 2015). The failure to maintain good relations with Sri Lanka cost India significant strategic opportunities in the Indian Ocean. He urged that the focus of the foreign policy should be towards neighbouring countries, followed by the surrounding region and the broader international community. He noted that "Indian Subcontinent has the most regional organisations, but in the past decade they have received very little focus" (Masud, 2017).

(India's world image transformed after its nuclearization in 1998. Government under Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) consciously used the tests, as well as its subsequent

demonstrations of military force, “to try to dispel India's global image of timorousness” (Sood, 2007) The leaders in different times also showed a different temperament to the the explosions. PM Indira Gandhi endorsed her 1974 tests as “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). Whereas, under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, with his BJP associates, bragged India’s achievements in a celebratory way. He proclaimed “we have a big bomb now” (Kanwal, 2008). While it endorsed under the PNE umbrella, it was certain the explosion wasn’t meant for peaceful use. The message and the excitement, showed a different temperament, which received a worldwide criticism. Even with the decisions to go Nuclear, India received strong condemnation from US, which was then headed by Clinton government. According to D’ Hooge “the truth was that most American policymakers simply could not understand why the Indians had hesitated so long in the first place” (D’Hooghe, 2005).

Both India and China are pushing their soft power to use, with their arduous stance on the back foot, overlaps in their engagements with among themselves and other states. For example, a survey conducted by the BBC in 2005 shows that 48 percent of people polled in 22 countries said China 's role was mainly positive —more than the case of the United States and Russia —and only 30 percent saw it as mainly negative (BBC News, 2005).

China as a brand in Indian’s perspective of China

The Sino- Indian border dispute has remained a topic of debate among the Indian strategic community since the humiliating defeat of the Indian armed forces in the 1962 war. While the Chinese were accused of being the aggressors, it proved the delinquency of India’s advancing strategy. The 4500 (approx.) kilometres long Indo-Chinese border remains disputed to this day. Negotiations on settling the dispute have always been raised by India and the clauses put forth by china have always been assertive and claiming over Indian territories. Chinese quid pro quo offered to India at a point was turned down by India. An explosive atmosphere flooded Sino-Indian relations. After India’s nuclear trials, Pokhran II, the volatility of affairs lessened and been swapped by a transformed importance to stabilization and cooperative stance. The engagements between the two states over years has initiated to little improvements in relations (Kanwal 2008).

Rajiv Gandhi's maiden visit to China in 1998, helped ease the tensions. This visit was a stepping stone and "one of a kind" in 34 years (Horimoto, 2017). Then in 1991, the then Prime minister of China, Li Peng visited India in 1991, to revert to the gestures. Continuing with this, an official visit after the end of cold war era in 1993, by Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao motivated the ratification of the agreement on the "Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility" along the "Line of Actual Control(LAC)" among the nations (Horimoto,2017).

This framework carried on to assist as the foundation for the improvement in bilateral affairs amongst the states. In November 1996, the "Agreement on Confidence-building Measures" (CBMs) in defence domain added to improvement of relations (D'Hooghe 2005). However, the break point in the relations came with the nuclear tests but a visit by Indian President K.R. Narayanan visit to China, which were the point of reset for the ties. It triggered frequent official visits from both sides. April 2005 saw a moment of fruition for the relations and India – China ended up in a strategic relationship at a final point. (Horimoto, 2017)

The border clash has yet to be resolved, and rarely intensified rhetoric is heard from bureaucrats from both sides. Just a day before Hu Jintao's visit to country in December 2006, a top Chinese diplomat uttered to everyone's that surprise "whole lot of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China" (Kanwal, 2008).

China has endeavoured to soften somewhat India's fears of a Sino-Pakistani nexus by attempting to stabilize its treatise on South Asian policy, snubbing its open backing to Pakistan's entitlements over Kashmir besides maintaining its silence on Kargil Conflict. Some scope Chinese disillusionment with Pakistan's discretion and incompetence in their dealings with Uyghur dissenters has also begun to show up.

In words of John Garver, China has proved itself strangely resilient in a few decades. There are signs that regardless of the progress with its ties with India, China hasn't displayed enough warmth with Pakistan too.

China has been engaging in creating with the economic corridor which signifies to a clandestine strengthening of the bond between the two. China has substituted the US as India's number one trading partner, but India is a secondary source of commerce for China when compared with the United States, Taiwan or Japan. (Garver, 2006)

Unbalance Trade equations between the two countries always calls for domestic pressure in India, due to heavy trade deficits for Indian traders. Year 2008 recorded huge deficits of

about USD\$ 10 million for Indian exports. (Kanwal, 2008). Chinese are buyers of raw materials from India most of which is tonnes of iron ores for support of Chinese Industries. Inversely, Indian Markets have surplus of manufactured goods from Chinese exporters. Such Economic inequalities can create inequalities in working relationships of the countries. Just like Breslin believes:

“whereas liberals believe that economic ties can dampen the desire for war, realists consider economic interdependence to be a sign of mutual dependence, and thus vulnerability, which can act as a source of antagonism” (Breslin, 2011).

Such economic imbalance also affects overall relationships between India and China. A realist reassessment of trade configurations between India and China would might even lead to conflicts and embitterment of improving ties.

China’s Domestic use of Soft Power

China’s emergence as an alternative economic partner seems to be the major source of attraction for other developing states, though it remains difficult to separate hard material factors from softer attraction to values and world-views (Breslin 2011).

The CPC, from the day of its founding, modelled its communication after the Soviet propaganda system, which featured rigid, highly controlled top-down mass dissemination of information to educate, indoctrinate and agitate the masses (Kanwal 2008). The system became less rigid after the late 1970s when China started its economic reforms. In 1989, journalists, who are supposed to be propagandists, participated in demonstrations calling for more freedom of the press (Zhang, 2008) As a result of the crackdown triggered by the demonstrations, the liberal tendency stalled and the traditional indoctrination role for the media re-emerged. (Zhang, 2008).

China’s public diplomacy has monitored an array moving away from “one-way Soviet-style propaganda to one-way public information”, concluding in the present assorted cause model, or a combination of “one-way and two way asymmetric and symmetric communication models” (D’Hooghe, 2005). In addition, there have been significant changes to China’s public diplomacy messages in terms of strategies, intended audience effects, symbolic nature of language, motivation and strategic consideration throughout the past few decades. (D’Hooghe, 2005). There could be many factors leading to the changes. Based on observation of the timing of these changes, however, the driving forces appear to be China ’ s increasing

integration into the global economy, its increased interactions and frictions with world audiences, and the revolution in information technology. When ideology is replaced by pragmatism, once additional external audiences have stakes during the process of a country's development, and once information technology and global media measure powerful enough to form world belief and even government policies, the old school information and unidirectional data dissemination quieten down. The only way forward is to try some relationship-building and two-way communication approaches to engage in dialogue and to resolve conflicts. Grunig(1998) applied the excellence theory in the study of Slovenian organizations and found that the change in Slovenia's political system from communism to democracy and its economic change to the privatization of business organizations resulted in practicing the generic principles of communication in public relations. Although China is not a democracy, its economy is certainly moving toward privatization and globalization. Such transformation dictates more practices of two-way communications. Another driving force is the maturation of the public relations industry and education in China. After about 20 years of development, China's public relations industry has its accreditation programs, and several dozens of colleges now offer public relations programs.

In 2003, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiaobao took state power. The new leadership repeatedly stresses the use of soft power to show the world that China would seek to boost its influence through peaceful means such as the spread of culture instead of military force. (Zhang, 2008) The official news agency Xinhua also reported how the need "to develop China's soft power has emerged as a hot topic at the annual sessions of China's parliament and top political advisory body"(Mingjiang, 2008). Together with the 'peaceful rise' heijie jueqi doctrine is the 'harmonious world' doctrine (hexie shijie , multilateralism with strong role of the UN; prosperity for all through mutually beneficial cooperation; collective security mechanisms; and the tolerance and enhancement of dialogue among civilisations (D' Hooghe, 2007).

The new administration declared its new foreign policy doctrine of 'peaceful rise' to reassure the world that a rising China is not a threat and that China does not intend to challenge the existing world order dominated by the United States. The doctrine was widely interpreted as

meaning that the Chinese government no longer adhered to Deng 's dictum of ' bide our time and build up our capabilities'. Instead, it sought to show the world its influence. The shift of foreign policy doctrines calls for changes of public diplomacy. Li Changchun, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, verbalized that:

“There should be breakthrough and innovations with international publicity, including using modern communication technologies such as the internet, expanding international cultural exchanges and integrating them into international publicity, adopting a strategy of reach out, invite in by trying all means to deliver our publicity materials to foreigners and effectively handling international media relations” (Li Changchung in Zhang, 2008).

With the soft power doctrine and the official demand for ' breakthrough and innovations ' for international publicity, the Chinese government has adopted a number of strategies that represent significant expansions in models of public diplomacy practice. there have been significant changes to China ' s public diplomacy messages in terms of strategies, intended audience effects, symbolic nature of language, motivation and strategic consideration throughout the past few decades (Kanwal 2008). That is, China ' s public diplomacy has shifted from merely stressing dissemination of information to a mixed-motive model that blends public information, one-way asymmetrical communication, two-way symmetrical communication, the personal influence model. and elements of old-fashioned propaganda. The dominant component of the mixed-motive model is, however, still public information dissemination. As CPC Politburo member Li Changchun stated, the Publicity Department should ' continue to objectively introduce all facts about China to the world and actively engage in the struggle for world public opinions the word ' struggle ' reveals a trace of Soviet-style propaganda. What follows is an analysis of the strategies that bear characteristics of two-way asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical communications (Zhang,2008).

China 's public diplomacy has followed a pattern moving from one-way Soviet-style propaganda to one-way public information, culminating in the current mixed motive model, or a blend of one-way and two-way asymmetric and symmetric communication models. The driving forces appear to be China's increasing integration into the global economy, its increased interactions and frictions with world audiences, and the revolution in information technology. When ideology is replaced by pragmatism, when more and more external audiences have stakes in a country's development, and when information technology and

global media are powerful enough to shape global public opinion and even government policies, the old-fashioned propaganda and one-way information dissemination become less effective (D'Hooghe, 2005). Another driving force is the maturation of the public relations industry and education in China. After about 20 years of development, China's public relations industry has its accreditation programs, and several dozens of colleges now offer public relations programs.

China's Rise and its Implications for India

China has maintained a continuing support from Pakistan. This can be regarded as a slice of a loftier Chinese tactic aiming to block India's escalation. China accepts that its strong opposition is the United States. China's covert ambitions to take over the United States' status of superpower are not hidden. Achieving this pushy objective implies that it will not bear any toleration to the development of a contender, particularly in the Asian region. According to Breslin, China is on the bright side with its "economic head start on India" (Breslin 2011). China opened their economy under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s in contrast to India which initiated liberalization after decades in 1991 after the financial crisis. China sports a urbane atomic and missile arsenal and the military manpower. And not to forget, China enjoys membership in the United Nations, a status which India has been trying to acquire since long.

According to most analysts, the end of the cold war serves as the break point in India-China relations. China has been going out of its way to minimize India's regional and global standing. China has sought to interrupt entry for India to any South Asian regional groupings. India has seen oppositions from China from any pan-Asian organizations. It maintains close ties with East Asian and central Asian countries and always attempts to block India's attempts to enter these coalitions or just blocks its membership down to observer status. India's status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is restricted to that of an observer nation with the ambition of cooperating in the struggle against Islamic terrorism. India would like to play a greater role in the organization in order to establish a stronger political presence in Central Asia, gain easier access to Central Asian hydrocarbon reserves and keep an eye on Islamist movements in the area.

Russia, along with some Central Asian Republics like Tajikistan, has urged India to become a member, however sensing the strength of Chinese opposition (China vulnerable to ask Pakistan into the organization if India joined) the Republic of India (ROI) has renounced temporarily, a proper demand for membership. In June 2006, the Chinese adopted a seemingly more conciliatory position, inviting India to join the SCO. Nevertheless, it left its invitation open to Pakistan as well and so far India has declined to take the Chinese up on their offer (D'Hooghe, 2005). Chinese skill at side-lining India from regional organizations was just as apparent during the first inaugural meeting of the East Asian Summit which took place in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. During much of 2005, Chinese diplomats had visited Southeast Asian countries lobbying (in vain) to prevent India from joining the EAS. Most ASEAN countries, seeing the use of having India as a counterweight to China in the organization, refused and China had to grudgingly make do with India's presence in the organization. Powerless to prevent India from attending the summit, China decided to take steps to ensure that whatever role India played would be a marginal one.

The Sino-Indian rivalry is discernible not only in regional organizations but also in the existence of competing projects for regional cooperation, which mutually exclude or diminish each other's presence, such as the Kunming Initiative or the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation Project. The Kunming Initiative is a Chinese project aiming to develop the Mekong River area and to include Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as India's beleaguered north-eastern provinces in its sphere of cooperation (Breslin, 2011).

Determined not to let China become the sole promoter of multilateralism in the region, India unveiled its own project for Mekong–Ganga Cooperation or MGC in 2000, which included India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China. Involving exactly the same states as the Kunming Initiative, the MGC had simply replaced China by India at the head of the project, in a symbolic gesture of defiance that did not go unnoticed by the Chinese (D'Hooghe 2005). On a global level, whereas Jawaharlal Nehru once actively campaigned for China's permanent seat at the UN, the Chinese have refused to reciprocate the gesture 50 years later by openly supporting India's bid. Beijing has not formally voiced its rejection of India's claims, but neither has it come out in India's support, despite constant Indian urgings to do so. Instead, China has endeavored to mollify Indian concerns by playing with semantics, claiming that it would be happy to see India play

a greater role at the UN may not be actively lobbying against India's bid, as it is doing vis-à-vis Japan's, but it is clear that it has no desire to see a change in the status quo. For the time being, China is the only voice at the UNSC for Asia and the developing world and it has no inclination whatsoever to see its influence “diluted” in any way by the integration of another Asian state, and, what is more, by a state with which it has often had conflictual relations in the past (Breslin 2011).

As one analyst has aptly put it, quoting an old Chinese saying, "One mountain cannot accommodate two tigers. For the time being, the US, unlike Great Britain, France or Russia, has been reluctant to support India's claims and has lobbied in favor of Japan, a historically more reliable American partner than India. China has been quite content so far to brush the issue under the carpet with a smile and ride behind American ambivalence. Things would drastically change, however, if, for example, Indo-American relations continued their upwards surge and the US changed its mind, deciding to come out in support of India. Such a development, which is by no means implausible, would force China to re-evaluate its position, compelling it to clearly voice its rejection of India's bid and putting the whole process of Sino-Indian normalization into jeopardy.

The UN is not the only global organization that China has attempted to bar India from. Indeed, China has also shown in the past a staunch opposition to India joining the ASEM (Asia-Europe Summit) or the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) (D’Hooghe 2005). These organizations, unlike the UNSC, would not provide India with more clout in world affairs or with more diplomatic autonomy. They would, however, do much to enhance India's image as a major “soft power” in Asia. The ASEM is an informal organization which promotes dialogue and cooperation between the member states of the European Union, the European Commission and ten Asian countries (Breslin 2011). Summit-level meetings are held every second year, and ministerial-level meetings every year. In 2006, India was invited to join future ASEM meetings. India's joining of the APEC is currently up for review but has not yet been confirmed by the state members.

Regional fora and economic organizations become not only theaters of discussion but also areas of rivalry, where states such as India and China continue to behave as if they care more about a "positional" than an "atomistic" mindset (Kanwal 2008).

China has also been extending its influence in South Asia, which India considers its “backyard” or sphere of influence (Sood 2007). The PRC has not confined its presence in South Asia to Pakistan but has also been stepping up its courtship of other South Asian countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. Beijing's relationship with the ruling junta in Myanmar is of particular concern to Indian strategists, who fear being surrounded by Chinese proxies, not only on the Western Front but also along India's troubled north-eastern border. China has three separate reasons for intensifying its engagement of India's South Asian and Southeast Asian neighbors: to develop trade and economic integration with neighboring countries, to contain India in the South Asian subcontinent, and to attend to its energy security needs by establishing a substantial naval presence along vital maritime chokepoints (Breslin 2011).

China has 3 separate reasons for strengthening its engagement of India's South Asian and Southeast Asian neighbors: to develop trade and economic integration with neighboring countries, to contain India within the South Asian subcontinent, and to attend to its energy security desires by establishing a considerable and fortified naval presence on very important maritime chokepoints. Pakistan, all nations which have maritime access to major shipping lanes (D’Hooghe, 2005). The development of the port of Gwadar had been planned for since 1971 by the Pakistanis. In the course of that year, the Indian Navy successfully raided the port of Karachi, prompting the desire amongst the Pakistani security establishment to put an end to its over-reliance on a single major port. China's string of pearls strategy and India's correlated security concerns seem to validate the previously discussed trade expectations theory. China's uncertainty in its capability to guarantee the reliability of its energy supplies in a conflict-prone environment has led it to engage in pre-emptive military deployments which may undermine peace in the region rather than contributing to sustaining it. Chinese attempts to encircle India aren't just maritime. SAARC members have shown a tendency to look up to China for trade and investment, but this is solely not due their preference for China. Other SAARC nations try to counter balance the strategic domination of China with India.

Vikram Sood describes the atmosphere in south Asia as “a collection of unhappy neighbors – unhappy with each other and unhappy among themselves.”(Sood, 2007) And indeed, India has not always been on the best of terms with its smaller neighbors over the years, some of

whom have accused the ROI of being a regional bully. Chinese exploitation of these feelings of frustration is nothing new. In the past, China charged India with “hegemonism” within the South Asian continent, particularly throughout the 1960s and 1970s once Sino-Indian relations were at their lowest level. Chinese leaders visit Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh on a regular basis to reaffirm Beijing's “friendship,” and China is all of those countries' main arms supplier.

As one can see, China has deftly managed to prevent India from playing any significant role outside South Asia.

Furthermore, China has not been content only with keeping India out of East or Central Asia but has simultaneously been working to marginalize India's influence in South Asia itself by increasing its own “invisible” influence in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation or SAARC (Kanwal 2008). The extent of Chinese influence in South Asia was made crystal clear in November 2005, during the 13th SAARC summit held in Dhaka, when India, after refusing to grant China observer status in the organization, had to back down and give the PRC what it wanted. This was due to pressure from the pro-China bloc of SAARC members, composed of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, which all came out with a statement welcoming China as a friend (D’Hooghe, 2005).

India’s response to China’s rising influence

Since the late 1990s, India has radically changed the nature of its relationship with the United States, entering into a strategic partnership founded on a common scepticism regarding the supposedly ‘peaceful’ nature of China's rise. In order to reduce China's influence in Asia, India has not only engaged the United States but has also pursued a Look East Policy which has gradually become increasingly strategic in nature; intensifying ties with certain ASEAN member states and with China's main East Asian rival, Japan (Masud 2017),.

The "strategic triangle" of China–India–US relations have undergone major changes over the past ten years (Malik,2007). In the spring of 1998, the US was vehemently criticizing the Vajpayee government for its decision to go nuclear, menacing it with a series of crippling economic sanctions and siding with China, it's newly proclaimed “strategic partner” in denouncing the destabilizing effect of India's actions in the region. Less than ten years later, India and the US are finalizing a nuclear cooperation deal which has necessitated “the

amending of American domestic law as well as the norms of the global nuclear order,” Parallel to its strategic alignment with the US, India has been engaging ASEAN states as well as Australia and Japan. Adhering to the age-old precept of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. India has been stepping up its military ties with countries traditionally wary of China's power in the region, such as Vietnam, and, looking even further afield, to Mongolia (Sood 2007). In the 1980s, India's massive naval build-up and erection of naval installations on the Nicobar and Andaman islands raised concerns in Southeast Asia that India was becoming a destabilizing force in the region, and that it would provide the Soviet Union with unrestrained access to vital sea lanes such as the Malacca Straits. Atal Behari Vajpayee had come to power in India with the firm intention of “speeding up” the Look East Policy. Many members of the BJP government such as Defence Minister George Fernandez and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh upheld visions of a newly assertive India, whose influence reached far beyond the traditional confines of the South Asian theatre. In April 2004, the Indian Navy's maritime doctrine underwent a major shift in its approach, declaring the entire Indian Ocean region, from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca to be its “legitimate area of interest,” whereas before it had solely focused on the defence of India's coastline.

New Delhi has additionally figured out how to make, following a time of careful foundation, a sub-territorial association, BIMSTEC, or the “Bangladesh– Sri Lanka– Thailand Economic Cooperation”, which viably interfaces South Asia to Southeast Asia. BIMSTEC recognized six territories of sub-provincial participation: in exchange and venture, innovation, transport and correspondence, vitality, tourism, and fisheries. In 2004 Bhutan and Nepal joined the gathering, which was then renamed the “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation” (Sood, 2007). “Albeit so far BIMSTEC has not generated astonishing returns, exchange comes about, its hidden “raison d'être” is more political than monetary, Indian policymakers trusting that the association will go about as a springboard and furnish India with a more grounded key nearness in the area” (Rehman, 2009). Malik mentions, “China for now appreciates a few focal points over India: it is a piece of the ASEAN+3, while India is just an individual from the ASEAN territorial gathering, and in sheer volume of exchange with ASEAN, China far surpasses India” (Malik, 2007). In 2004, China's FDI in ASEAN achieved 225.9 million dollars while that of India just added up to 46.3 million around the same time.) Both nations have consented to Free Trade Arrangements (FTA) with ASEAN, which will completely go into application in 2010 on account of China and in 2011 in that of India.

Although Beijing holds substantial economic and institutional advantages over India in the region, the latter does not provoke as much fear and resentment as the former. India has no territorial disputes with ASEAN states, which are nearly all embroiled in territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea (Sood, 2007). With the exception perhaps of Malaysia, which has much closer ties with China than with India, all the states in Southeast Asia are keen not only to profit economically from Sino-Indian rivalry in infrastructure projects, trade, and energy acquisition, but also to encourage the presence of a potentially counterbalancing power to China in the region.

Nations such as Singapore and the Philippines, which have always maintained close ties with the United States, are particularly mindful of the need to have an Indian counterweight in the region if ever their American allies should decide to sizably reduce their military presence in the area.

The Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar reiterated his nation's belief in the solidity of the balance of power theory in 2000 when he declared: "What we can be certain of is the fact that India will play an important role in the new equilibrium that will emerge. India's strategic importance, therefore, cannot be overemphasized" (D'Hooghe, 2005).

The potential future sources of conflict with China for many association states being primarily maritime in nature, the actual fact that Singapore and Vietnam have oftentimes conducted joint military service exercises with the Indian Navy within the South China Ocean is hardly synchronous. The Indian Navy is recognized as one of the most capable in the world, and perhaps the only one in the region capable of effectively deterring China's submarine fleet. Conducting joint naval exercises provides Singapore and Vietnam with a degree of reassurance while giving India the opportunity to penetrate the South China Sea in a "tit-for-tat" for China's forays into the India Ocean (Malik ,2007)

China, meanwhile, has been regarding the formation of this "quadripartite alliance" or "Arc of Democracy," comprised of India, Japan, Australia, and the US with mounting apprehension. In May 2007, days before an official-level security consultation between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India in Manila, China issued formal diplomatic demarches to each of the participants demanding the purpose behind their meeting (D'Hooghe, 2005). All four participants chose to downplay the significance of the quadrilateral meeting in response to China's edginess, India pointing out that it already participated frequently in trilateral talks with China and Russia, and Australian Foreign

Minister Alexander Downer assuring that the four countries were “not building some sort of security arrangement” (Malik,2007).

it would seem that a detailed analysis of Sino-Indian relations indicates that the end of the Cold War has not lessened the validity of realism. With the collapse of the bipolar system, regional heavyweights such as India and China seek to attain regional hegemony, gradually expanding their "areas of interest" until they overlap, bringing about a conflict. Sino-Indian relations provide a textbook example of the potentially negative consequences of this "overlap effect" (Sood 2007). China no longer views its sphere of influence as being solely comprised of the Asian continent's eastern periphery and seeks to assert its dominance over the entire continent, including India's South Asian backyard. China has thus increasingly displayed what John Mearsheimer termed offensive realism. in its quest for superpower status, containing India in South Asia and side-lining it from global and pan-Asian organizations, while propping up Pakistan's military capabilities.

Relations between India and the countries of Southeast Asia were very friendly during the 1950s, India supported many in their struggle for independence and, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, signed treaties of friendship with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar. As the Cold War progressed, however, relations between India and Southeast Asia took a turn for the worse, particularly after the signing of the India–Soviet Peace and Friendship Cooperation Treaty in 1971.

India’s “Neighbourhood first” policy

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India enjoys a better standing in global politics than any time in the recent past. But the euphoria that greeted his historic electoral victory in 2014 has worn off. And it is equally true that Chinese President Xi Jinping has also been having a fantastic time at home and abroad. When the Chinese Communist Party's Congress concluded in October, President Xi's position strengthened considerably, ensuring his global ambitions for China will continue (Chong 2016). Besides consolidating his hold on power, Xi has been instrumental in implementing. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is set to extend its reach and influence well beyond its borders, including in South Asia. Many analysts believe that it can leave India isolated regionally because it opens up the likelihood of China dominating India's immediate neighbourhood (Jabin 2015).

"Neighbours first" is the striking feature of India's diplomatic approach since 2014. If India does not resolve its differences with its small neighbors, it will only pave the way for China to enjoy a growing influence in the region. Prime Minister Modi often projects himself as an innovative and decisive leader who could make things happen. Since 2017 has not been an entirely promising year for India's "neighborhood first" policy, the Modi government should prove that it is not merely a political rhetoric but a strategic necessity (Jabin 2015). By focusing larger energy on the neighborhood, the Modi government will demonstrate that India has the potential to market regional peace and economic unity by uniting all the governments within the specified region.

China is focussing increasingly on infrastructure development projects, especially the Belt and Road initiative BRI, which is likely to leave India isolated regionally and encircled by Chinese allies. There are serious apprehensions over growing ties between China and Pakistan, which are potentially compromising for India's national security. "There is widespread concern in India's policymaking circles of Beijing's expanding presence in Pakistan and Nepal and now in Maldives. China's relentless attempts to establish formal engagement with Bhutan has also highlighted Beijing's aggressive posturing." (Kaura, 2018)

China has ability to work much faster on its foreign policy decisions, in comparison to India, also due to its authoritarian one-party governing structure which gives President Xi Jinping the decision-making power far beyond what Modi is able to command" (Kaura, 2008).

Joseph Nye, who coined the term, argues that the key is to make yourself attractive to others. "At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction. In a relationship or a wedding, power doesn't essentially reside with the larger partner, however within the mysterious chemistry of attraction. Simply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power." Nye goes on to argue that in general, the surest path to attractiveness is to both preach and practice cultural "universality" – that is, to adopt an attitude of international openness, respect for rules, and a preference for absolute gains, instead of national isolationism, hypocrisy, and a preference for relative gains. We can easily recognize this as a description of the ideal liberal state. If a country embraces this menu of liberal policies, Nye writes, it will likely reap rewards far beyond those that it could hope to

secure through threats and inducements alone Nye deserves great credit for pointing us to the reality of soft power. His powerful case for soft power as a semi-autonomous element of total national power, not just a semi superstructure stemming from military or economic might, needs to be heeded more by international relations scholars all over the world. However, the equations that Nye posits between power and attractiveness and between attractiveness and liberal “universality” only begin to describe the workings of this complex phenomenon.

Following the surprising FTA deal between Maldives and China, India's foreign ministry issued a statement saying it is India's "expectation that as a close and friendly neighbor, Maldives will be sensitive to our concerns, in keeping with its 'India First' policy." Rather than addressing India's concerns, the Maldivian government suspended three local councilors for an "unauthorized" meeting with the Indian ambassador (Masud 2017). India's economic or diplomatic options for compelling Male to back down are not promising. A pro-government paper has also published an anti-India editorial which describes India to be the biggest enemy nation while praising China, the "new best friend" of Maldives. It also accused New Delhi of plotting a coup against the Abdulla Yameen government. Unfortunately, India's non-coercive options for compelling Male for course correction do not seem promising. This must set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi (Chong, 2016).

New Delhi has always resisted international intervention in the dispute. The current level of tensions creates the possibility of an occurrence of a conflict that might begin not through calculation however through a level of miscalculation. Most importantly, the manner in which Modi, during a recent election campaign in Gujarat, cast aspersions on a private dinner hosted by the Congress leader Mani Shankar Aiyar and attended by former prime minister Manmohan Singh, former vice-president Hamid Ansari along with retired Indian diplomats for visiting former Pakistan foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, many responsible Indians feared the worst over the damage it would do to the government's Pakistan policy (Masud 2017).

Modi's accusation was also dangerous because of the worldview it represented. If even the prime minister can openly share this disturbing worldview, what might be next? It is a worldview that, if allowed to grow, will plunge India into greater conflict internally as well as in the neighborhood than we can imagine today.

China will continue to extend support to the sympathetic politicians and groups in India's surrounding neighborhood. Already, there is a widespread concern in India's policymaking

circles of Beijing's expanding presence in Pakistan and Nepal and now in the Maldives. China's relentless attempts to establish a formal engagement with Bhutan have highlighted Beijing's aggressive posturing. If there is a common thread running through events in 2017, it was that they tested South Asia's confidence in India's leadership (Jabin 2015).

Smaller countries in South Asia will be watching very closely to see whether, and how, India fights China's effort to make itself the regional hegemonic power. Foreign capitals are also watching. As China has deeply entrenched its economic and strategic footprints in South Asia, the Modi government faces a difficult, long and jolting road ahead if it desires to negate China's relentless march in South Asian Region. However, as India plans for the uncertain future, the most common approach is to engage in conventional thinking and extend its successful strategies. Unfortunately, using a traditional lens coupled with incremental thinking to plan for a new world is not only limiting but ultimately futile. A paradigm shift needs to be accompanied by a mind-set shift in neighbourhood policy. It is a tricky tightrope walk, and it remains to be seen how well Modi keeps India's balance

Conclusion

India's foreign policy has shown a more assertive temperament, in comparison to the predecessor governments. The past governments displayed a Delhi centric approach with a traditional view of Foreign policy. There of course was a doctrine, which lay the outlines, but the engagements set forward by the present government makes use a lot of soft power tools. Modi makes use of a very friendly demeanour with his signature handshakes, which are also seen as a break from Diplomatic protocols, or not seen appropriate by many critics. However, by stirring up the neighbourhood with his fast track diplomacy, Modi caught the attention of China and even made attempts at getting in talks with China through informal talks at regional forums. BIMSTEC is one such forum through which India tried to penetrate the member states. This attempt, instead of stirring ties with China, can also be seen as a step in improving engagements with it. China, with its stir at Doklam, later practiced an image of the welfare state, and got on tables with India to discuss prospects.

The recent talks at Wuhan, was termed a reset in India –China relationship, point to a significant smart strategy from both sides. After testing waters for each side, both the countries are trying to mend the broken ties. From India's perspective, the Doklam stir gave

India a chance to also display its military might, which primarily triggered the Chinese aggression. Modi invited the heads of ASEAN leaders to join the Republic day parade, showcased India's military strength. Successful resolution of the Doklam matter helped both countries outshine at their use of Smart power strategies. For China, it first displayed its Hard power by incursions in Ladakh and Doklam and then with the resolution, it extended an image as a nation "ready to come to the table for talks, for global welfare." For India, the matter highlighted the growing Hard power under the soft attributes that India possesses, to show a kind-of self-sufficiency and a superpower potential.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The seeds of India's use of soft power were reflected by various leaders on their visits abroad. Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned India to play a significant and beneficial part in the affairs of the world. Starting from the 1920s, he had developed a fervour for diplomacy that was not backed by much needed military and economic hard power. The Nehruvian idealism flaunted India's natural power which was carried forward by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with a similar vigour. India's post-independent years saw heavy engagement in multilateral agreements and certainly proclaimed itself as the pioneer in representing itself as a perfect example of a third world country on a course of development after being ravaged by the British rule. Prime Minister Nehru as a leader made a statement with his ideals of Peace. Not to miss, Mahatma Gandhi's image through his philosophies has already lent enough evidences of India's natural power. That being analysed, India was never short on influential leaders which defined the dimensions of India's foreign policy. India has always remained inflexible on relying on coercive measures for influence, yet it has always kept itself ready to face the hostile neighbourhood. With change in leaderships, changing equations with neighbours, it was necessary for India to tread on to the contemporary policies, by exploiting its brand image as a peace-mongering, welfare-centric and ambitious nation which has immense faith in diplomacy over Military power.

But with growing hostility of neighbours and undeterred determination for development, India has always kept its military arsenal intact, and made its presence felt internationally right after it acquired the atomic bomb. Thus, this ambivalence of a natural character of India has always remained in question, but it turns out this very ambivalence has been its smart power, where India tries to "contextually" handle any criticisms and situations.

All the leaders from Nehru to Narendra Modi, have concentrated on maintaining a charisma of their own and keeping up with their signature foreign policies, it looks like the present leadership is taking lessons from history. The only difference is the use of new mediums, and growing awareness and tactics for exploitation the soft power elements. India's ambitions to

emerge as a regional power compelled it to make allies in the near and extended regions, which in a way has consciously spiralled China. India is also making attempts for multilateral engagements to increase its global rankings, which is stealing China's thunder internationally.

China with its history as an aggressive nation, has made conscious attempts to practice its influence through its soft power tactics.

It is evident that India has emerged as a regional power with its impressive growth rates, despite the burgeoning poverty and domestic problems. Nehruvian times saw Nehru supporting industrialisation, accelerating the economic handles to generate wealth and improving the infrastructure and even peaceful use of atomic power for public utilization. However, he concluded that for industrialization to be feasible it required a corroborative agricultural system and a small industrial base (Das , 2011). However, given Nehru's firm commitment not to use force and to non-interference in internal affairs in other states, India's neighbours do not feel threatened by it. . The 1998–2004 BJP-led NDA had inculcated significant developments under the guidance of Indian foreign policy, most conspicuously the substantial deepening of India's relationship with the United States, as well as with China, primarily through the 1998 nuclear tests that propelled India back into the international mainstream.

Then Prime Minister Vajpayee also emboldened India's gradual embrace of liberal economics and an appreciation of some of the virtues of globalization, particularly as the means by which to strengthen and legitimize India's status within the international system. Though Nehruvian India stumbled to accomplish its glorious objective of applying the soft power to modify the tendency of global politics, it nearly reached to success in this attempt than many realized. Mahatma Gandhi was successful in changing Indian soft weakness into soft power in regard to the British, and with that festinated their evacuation from the subcontinent. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's speeches and proclamation for India's economic development has earned him accolades vastly in India. Modi's foreign policy initiatives are motivated as much by his government's domestic political power as by India's growing fear over expeditious development of China's economic clout and military strength in Asia. Positioning India within the upper most tiers of the global hierarchy as one of a handful of the world's great powers has been the first major strategic aim of the new

NDA. Continuing the approach of his predecessors, Modi is unabashed about India's great power aspiration in his speeches and exchanges.

India's rise is exponentially happening along with China's dramatic rise. China's has had a history of being assertive, and sometimes aggressive. China's behaviour is assumed to be an enormous challenge for India. This is probably due to China dominating India's immediate neighbourhood. By putting immense efforts in the neighbourhood, it is clear that Modi government is demonstrating India's potential to brandish itself as a pioneer of regional peace and economic power. Instead of just steepening its external influence, India developed a territorial plan of action which will support India's geographical assets, Cultural affinities with the region, economic complementarities and preeminent strategic position.

Leadership has played an important role in putting India on a more impressive and influential footing. Prime Minister Narendra Modi frequently portrays himself as an innovative and conclusive leader who can make things work. And he has even proved to live up to this image at both at domestic and international level. True to his style, he began his journey as prime minister with a conciliatory first by welcoming the leaders from the South Asian subcontinent to be present at his commencement in May 2014. Trying to influence and grab attention of China while trying to influence its Strings of Pearls. In his initial two years at office, Modi travelled to almost all of the South and South East Asian nations, with a vision to influence them and strengthen the strategic relations. These overt visits also underlined the covert ambitions of engaging in deepening India's roots in these countries for Trade and welfare, to mark India's broadening horizons as a dominant power in South Asia.

His successful visits to South Asian capitals reckoned him a status as a national leader for whom the neighborhood first policy was a serious affair and not mere political rhetoric. Modi's portrayal of neighbourhood policy was of a strategic necessity. The "neighborhood first" policy is the astonishing feature of Modi government's diplomatic approach. With the present government, the topmost strategy is to strike out any differences with the smaller neighbouring countries, leaving them unresolved, will only make it easier for China to apply its clout in the area.

Kaura explains, "Besides the fact that Indian economy is only a fifth of China's in size, India suffers key institutional constraints, including a notoriously slow and cumbersome bureaucracy."(Kaura,2018). It is thus not surprising that it has been a challenge for India to compete with China in different regions, as a number of nations are now economically

dependent or intermeshed with China. Despite this, Modi's accomplishments in South Asia are significant.

There have been little failures too, but neighbourhood first policy has observed great commitments with neighboururest that are having relations on the edge with that of India. With India and China, making attempts at straightening out complex strategic policies, there is an evident use of Soft Power and people to people connect. While during the Nehruvian era, India's soft power was a substitute for its absence of military strength, India's soft power clout is more powerful now, as it has gained the hard power to back it up with. Yet India has been secretive in this accomplishment and preceding governments have not consciously utilized the country's soft power by following policies that enhance the same to better in achievein political ends.

India suffers from an unplanned Policy on Soft power, but is making use of soft power tactics, while also glorifying its military might. As Kaura notices, "India's soft power outreach has been largely unplanned and automatic, and institutions like the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) that was started in the 1950s to publicise Indian culture worldwide have lacked adequate investment and resources." (Kaura, 2018) In contrast to India, China's successful institutionalization of Smart power, and more recently, what it calls the Sharp power, has been benefitting it more.

From accentuating India's egalitarian credentials throughout his official visits to Australia, Bhutan, Fiji, Japan, Myanmar and Nepal or for United Nations' acknowledgment of International Yoga Day and an effective commitment to the Indian countries abroad, Prime Minister Modi is wiring the concept of smart power in India's foreign policy discourse. Given to what Nye says, "In the information age, it is often the side which has the better story that wins. To continue its generally positive story, India must tackle its domestic challenges" (Nye, 2015).

With the new Government's utilization of India's soft power in the international arena, its standing will advance its gigantic growth if it is tailed by significant socio-economic variations which will improve the deliverance of comprehensive national progress that enhance the standard of life of the population living in utter poverty. Modi government need to be prudent and prolong its soft power by guaranteeing that India preserves its traditions of secularism which led to successful reconciliation of its multiplicity of cultures and populations and not compelled by polarisation . Soft power is similar to merchandise

branding. It might instantaneously conjure up images and associations, but these continue to be effective as long as the brand achieves.

India's foreign policy never highlighting use of out-rightly flexing its power muscle and has deliberately and strategically exploited its natural soft power with its means and strategically engaging these as valuable implements to supplement its foreign policy objectives in the globalization era. India displayed calm yet firm stand during the Dodo-la crisis and stood up firmly to Xi-Jinping's attempts to make India accept the Chinese hegemony. Indian government broke the longstanding superstition by inviting the Tibetan executives in exile Standoff in Ladakh in September 2014 coinciding with President Xi Jinping's first visit to India observed a unique display of India's new approach of not break down to Imperious China.

India has many weaknesses in its defence management which has a number of issues. It sports weak procurement systems, and has a slow pace at military modernization. India's military power is capable of only holding off Chinese incursions, but it is not ready for initiating an offensive. But India's defiance to give in to Chinese bullying and Modi's meeting with Xi, points to a strong use Smart power techniques where hard power has actually helped India and China to sit across tables and discuss in talks and engagements for resolutions of issues. It can well be called to play a catalytic role in relations with China. The recent informal between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi at the end of April 2018, experienced a reset in the tone of the two countries' bilateral relations, with significant progress on discussions and resolutions of their border problems and some opening towards opportunities for increased economic cooperation.

He recent meeting between Modi is largely being termed as a reset in relations after a stormy military standoff, paving way for bilateral talks on better cooperation, steering the way clear for an absence of war between the two. It is evident that both the countries are now concentrating on use of diplomatic tools for engagement. China has invested a lot both domestically and worldwide which is also its policy for making china as brand. Any wrong move in a world comprising of a hazy power spaces will backfire China's plans on breaking out of the hegemonic image.

It seems that China and India have found a convergence in bilateral dialogues as China attracted criticism for aggression at Doklam standoff. India's move to invite ASEAN shows

the Indian desire to come at par with China as an influential power in the neighbourhood and in world affairs.

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