

# **UNITED STATES FUNDING OF UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA: DOMESTIC DEBATES**

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**AAKRITI SETHI**



**United States Studies Program,  
Centre for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New-Delhi-11006**

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CENTRE FOR CANADIAN, US AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**  
NEW DELHI - 110067, INDIA

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**United States Funding of United Nations in the Post Cold War Era: Domestic Debates**" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

Aakriti Sethi  
Aakriti Sethi

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Vijayalakshmi  
Prof. K.P Vijayalakshmi  
(Chairperson CCUSLAS)

Vijayalakshmi  
Prof. K.P Vijayalakshmi  
(Supervisor)

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*To Adonis, for her beautiful presence in my life till her very last breath*

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ACABQ	- Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ALEP	- American League to Enforce Peace
BLNS	- British League of Nations Society
BP	- Bureau of Budget and Planning
BRM	- Bureau of Resource Management
CBO	- Congressional Budget Office
CFR	- Council on Foreign Relations
CIF	- Climate Investment Fund
CMP	- Capital Master Plan
CPC	- Committee for Program and Coordination
DPKO	- Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ESF	- Economic Supports Fund
F	- Office of the Foreign Assistance
FAO	- Food and Agriculture Organization
FDR	- Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FMF	- Foreign Military Financing
FY	- Fiscal Year
G18	- Group of 18
GCF	- Green Climate Fund
GEF	- Global Environment Facility
GHS	- Greenhouse Gas Emissions
GNI	- Gross National Income
IAEA	- International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	- International Civil Aviation Organization
ILO	- International Labor Organization
IMET	- International Military Education and Training
IMF	- International Monetary Fund
IMO	- International Maritime Organization
ITC	- International Trade Center
ITU	- International Telecommunication Union
LON	- League of Nations
NATO	- North America Treaty Organization
NGO	- Non Governmental Organization
NIEO	- New International Economic Order
NORC	- National Opinion Research Center
NSC	- National Security Council
NSS	- National Security Strategy
OMB	- Office of Management and Budget



PDD 25	- Presidential Decision Directive 25
PEPFAR	- President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief
PLO	- Palestinian Liberation Organization
PRC	- People's Republic of China
PRD 13	- Presidential Review Directive 13
ROK	- Republic of Korea
S/RPP	- Office of Resources, Plan and Policies
SFOPS	- House and Senate/State Foreign Operations
SG	- Secretary General
TR	- Theodore Roosevelt
UN	- United Nations
UNDEF	- United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	- United Nations Development Program
UNEP	- United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO	- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCC	- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	- United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UN-HABITAT	- United Nations Human Settlements Program
UNHCR	- United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	- United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	- United Task Force
UNODC	- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	- United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	- United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNRWA	- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	- United Nations Security Council
UN-WOMEN	- United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
US	- United States
USAID	- United States Agency for International Development
USSR	- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	- World Food Program
WHO	- World Health Organization
WIPO	- World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	- World Meteorological Organization
WTO	- World Trade Organization

## **PREFACE**

The affect of domestic politics in the international affairs of a nation has always been profound. USA's foreign policy evolution from "isolationism" to "internationalism" has been a process that involved presidential leadership, congressional scrutiny and public perceptions. US-UN relations began with the American dedication towards a new order in the aftermath of the Second World War. Amidst the positive atmosphere, only few Congressmen could realize the possibility of a future irritant between the two i.e. the funding. This issue eventually took the centre stage in the relationship due to the emerging Cold War geopolitics and the rise of the third block in the UN. The growing partisan division in the American society became the driving force for America's legislative stand on the issue of UN funding. The US Presidents in the post Cold War era faced the challenge of molding the future of US foreign policy from the lens of multilateralism and unilateralism. This decision of the Executive became a big factor in the eventual relationship between United Nations and United States, which ultimately influenced the funding narrative. But the most griping impact on this issue has been brought by the Congressmen and Senators on the US Capitol Hill, driven by their partisan interests. Their stand on US funding of UN has been absolute. The US public opinion on the relationship between the two though started with great optimism, has succumbed to the partisan viewpoints. This dissertation searches for the domestic explanations that mold the US-UN relations on funding.

# **CHAPTER I**

## **INTRODUCTION**

America played a central role in the formation of United Nations, yet its approach towards UN has swung between optimism and pessimism. Taking ahead the legacy of League of Nations, the US and other twenty five countries established United Nations under the Atlantic Charter with the aim to maintain peace and stability in the post World War order. The victor states of the Second World War expanded UN's functions and power to mould it into an ambitious body with the responsibility expanding conflict resolution, human rights and socio-economic affairs, throughout the Cold War. Even though the Cold War ended and introduced a brief uni-polar moment for America, various regions' in the world started facing deeper issues like poverty, ethnic clashes, humanitarian crisis, and human rights issues etc. The UN at this time got the rare opportunity to solve these problems and upheld the pledges it took at its inception without being held back by great power politics. But for UN's ambitious tasks to be fulfilled, the organization required vast resources, especially financial resources.

### **Context of the US-UN Relations: The Issue of Funding**

The overall UN budget might be smaller than that of many US states but it has increased consistently over the years. This increase in budget, US domestic factors and dynamic US foreign policy interests have led to growing debates over the funding pattern in the UN since the end of Cold War. The quest for many states to agree upon something crucial as finances, has led to the UN body suffer various financial crises. Moreover, the matter has not entirely been about the big numbers involved, rather it has been a subject to the politics between the states and the organization. The country that has paid the largest amount of budget in all its forms (assessed and voluntary contributions) has been United States since the very beginning of the UN. This unique position has given US the upper hand in any of the financial debates. United States has single handedly influenced the UN financial discourse time and again. In this context, not only the US foreign policy decision making has impacted this issue but also the politics in the US domestic discourse has led to irreversible changes in the funding narrative.

The US presidential and congressional perspective on this matter has been critical in the final decision making of UNGA pertaining funds. Apart from the rising budget of UN, the US criticism prevalent in the UN and corruption scandal involving top

officials of the organization has strengthened the domestic forces in their mission for taking stringent legislative actions. Presidentially, every administration after the end of Cold War has dealt with this matter differently. The preference for collective decision making and multilateral policies over unilateral ones has been the key determinant in an administration's attempt to bolster US-UN relations.

However, the presidential support to the UN has wavered in various instances, irrespective of the administration's pro-UN approach. In such situations, understanding the Congressional attitude towards this matter fills the research gap in the funding narrative. The role of Congress is un-ignorable in the overall changing patterns of funding, occurring since late 1970s and early 1980s. The increasing skepticism of the US Congress over the issue of funding has been primarily due to growing partisan division in the American political discourse, dynamic US foreign policy interests and various geopolitical occurrences. America's attempt for a wholehearted cooperation with United Nations has been frustrated due to the tussle between Republicans and Democrats. The matter of funding many times became a casualty in these political showdowns at the Capitol Hill. Being fully aware of its "power of purse", the Congress has been the final decision maker on the issue of UN funding.

The US public opinion on US-UN relations has traditionally been positive towards the organization since its' birth, but the evolving political climate within the nation deeply impacted their opinions in the long run. The partisan factor has managed to seep into this issue and the division over this matter became more evident after the 9/11 attack.

The early days of close US-UN relations were left far behind due to cold war geopolitics and US foreign policy interests. Apart from being occupied with its larger global responsibilities, United Nations has also increasingly found itself appeasing Washington DC for the smoother functioning of the international body. At times, not just the UN officials and various UN bodies but also important US allies have expressed their displeasure of the deep American interference in the UN affairs. Furthermore, US' reliance on UN as a foreign policy tool has also been a point of friction between the two. The US on the other hand has been torn between its attempts

to reinforce the international cooperation with the multinational body and its divisive domestic politics.

## **Definition, Rationale, Scope of the Study and Research Gaps**

The UN financial system is based on mandatory and voluntary contributions made by its member states. The mandatory contributions are limited to regular budgets and peacekeeping missions; whereas the voluntary funding applies to different UN programs/agencies. United States has been the leading financier of UN budget since its inception; even though the US funding for UN has relatively decreased over the years.

As United States is the major funder of the United Nations, it is germane to examine the key factors that influence the issue. The decision to fund the UN arises out of the foreign policy requirements of the US. The ideological and partisan issues of the US Congress need deeper analysis as they would provide the explanation on the uneven policy regarding funding. The political comeback of the Republican Party in the Congress in 1990s has been an important factor in changing the opinion towards UN. Later, the eventual win of George W Bush strengthened the Republican skepticism about multilateral cooperation. Whereas during President Obama's term, world saw America's attempts at mending its relationship with United Nations.

As these views gained currency in policy, they became an important factor in America's faltering support to UN financially. Therefore, comprehensive and critical analysis of the interplay of domestic factors on the decision on funding to the UN would be studied closely in this dissertation

While most studies on US-UN relations have covered various international and organizational issues, a focused attention on funding from the perspective of policy making has been limited. The lack of assessment about the significant role of the Congress in shaping the larger debate on US funding not only in the US but also in UNGA has been evident. Furthermore, individual examination of various post Cold War presidents and their contribution in shaping the future of US-UN relations with an emphasis to funding has been under studied. This dissertation intends to contribute to the academic discourse by filling these research gaps.

## **Research Methodology**

The research of this dissertation will be qualitative and deductive in nature. Furthermore, it would rely on interpretive assessment of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources would be accessed from the websites of US National Archives and Records Administration, the Center for Legislative Archives, US House of Representatives, US Senate, Library of Congress, US State Department archives, White House Archives, Congressional Hearings at US Government Publishing Office, US Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) and Bureau of International Organizations (BIO). Records of Congressional hearings from the US Government Publishing house would be assessed to understand the partisan divisions on UN funding in the US Congress. Important reports published by Bureau of International Organization and submitted to the US Congress on US Participation in international organizations, especially UN, for each year since the 1990s would be assessed closely. To understand the presidential role in US funding, the archival websites for US State Department and White House from 1993 would be studied.

For understanding the UN budget, especially the regular budget and financial procedure, the UN Documentation website would be used. Furthermore, Secretary General Bulletins would be analyzed to understand the financial regulations and rules of the UN. The General Assembly Official Record website would be used to navigate through various UN Resolutions on UN budget and finances. The Dag Hammarskjold Library would be digitally accessed for UN archival material.

The US foreign policy choices of multilateralism and unilateralism in the post Cold War world have been assessed in this dissertation. The frequent challenge of balancing domestic priorities and international concepts of legitimacy vis-à-vis the US-UN relations has been explored. The two US visions of either being “skeptical” or “supportive” of international cooperation is one of the fundamental issues dealt in this dissertation. The various US administrations since President Bill Clinton and their inclination towards either multilateral or unilateral decision making has been examined for understanding the factors influencing US funding of UN.

## **Research Questions and Hypotheses**

This research will answer the following questions on the issue of US funding to UN:

- How has US multilateral or unilateral approach to foreign policy and various post Cold War challenges impacted the US-UN relations?
- What has been the role of US Presidents, federal bureaucracy and ideological/partisan issues dividing the Congress in determining the US approach to UN funding?
- How has the rise of anti-American sentiments over the years in the UN affected the US funding to UN? and;
- How do the issue of UN Reforms, US debt and US public opinion about UN affect the US-UN relations?

The two hypotheses of this thesis are:

- Despite Congressional constraints, presidential decisions on financial support to the UN depends more on the multilateral-list and unilateralist orientation of US foreign policy.
- US Congressional support for funding the UN is substantially influenced by partisan ideology

## **Content of the Dissertation**

The second chapter of the thesis titled “US-UN Relations: Genesis and Evolution” discusses the origins of the relationship. It maps the beginning of American Internationalism and the domestic debates surrounding it. The clash between the President and the Congress over the US participation in League of Nations is examined as the domestic hesitation over commitments to any international body can be traced from LON. Eventually, the role of President Roosevelt and his administration in architecting United Nations has been elaborately discussed. The American commitment and leadership in the process of defining United Nations, has



been deeper than any other country. But, the seeds of early contentions with UN were visible in the US Congress.

The Cold War era and the changing geopolitics of the world presented fresh challenges for the relationship. This was also the time when many newly decolonized countries joined the UN, creating ripples in the internal politics of the organization. This development changed the future contours of the US-UN relations. Also, the partisan wedges in the American society became sharper, impacting every orifice of the American political discourse. The conservative movement in the US reached its zenith in 1970s-1980s, resulting into major legislative actions on the issue of US-UN funding. This chapter will historically weave the journey US-UN relations took till the end of Cold War with special focus on the issue of funding.

The third chapter of the thesis titled “Institutional and Bureaucratic Framework: US & UN Budget Making and Funding” explains the procedure involved in the UN and US for financial contributions. The budget making process in UN is long and elaborate, involving many committees and officials. The two types of funding for UN; assessed mandatory and voluntary will be studied. Under these two classifications, the UN regular budget, peacekeeping finances and budget for many other agencies is covered by the member states. Even though the whole budget cycle is for five years, the financial contributions are made biennium.

In the US, the funding procedure starts with the President’s Budget, submitted to the Congress. In this budget under the ambit of contributions to international organization, the UN funding is mentioned. In the Congress, the budget is debated and has its own rigorous procedure. Eventually, once the complex procedure is done, the federal budget for the specific year is signed by the President. Various departments of the Executive play a crucial role in formalizing the budget for international organizations. The evolution of structural arrangement present in the UN and the US for the contribution of finances has been introduced in this chapter. Furthermore, these institutional framework and procedure set the boundaries for the internal politics on funding to be played.

“US Foreign Policy and United Nations: Post Cold War Presidents and their Impact on UN Funding” outlines various post cold war presidencies and their unique role in

the US-UN relations. This chapter exclusively focuses on the Executive and its foreign policy endeavor, which ultimately impacted the US-UN relations and the funding of UN for better or worse. The fourth chapter starts from the Clinton presidency and traces the various modulations in its foreign policy orientation. The presidency's special emphasis on assertive multilateralism is looked closely by analyzing the contribution of various members of the administration in developing this foreign policy concept. But this policy was impacted by the US-UN fallout over the failure of Somalia peacekeeping mission. Thereon, the relations trod on a path of bitterness.

From the very onset of the Bush presidency, the US foreign policy took a turn for a unilateral approach to international affairs. But the 9/11 attack on the US, softened the administration's approach towards multilateral cooperation. President Bush hesitantly initiated steps for bettering the relationship but revelation of corruption scandals tainted UN image and strengthened the voices of UN critics in the US. President Barack Obama entered the office with the vast responsibility of repairing the tarnished US image abroad due to Bush's foreign policy misadventures in the Middle East. The Obama presidency fully embraced the route of multilateralism and international cooperation. But the 2007-08 economic crisis and congressional opposition hindered many pro-UN policies of the administration. This chapter underlines the importance and limitations of presidential will in navigating the future course of US-UN relations.

The fifth chapter of the thesis examines the Congressional participation in the UN funding narrative. "US Congress and UN Funding: Issues, Perspectives and Legislative Initiatives" delves into various domestic challenges over the issue of funding. The chapter starts with an explanation of the various financial crises UN has faced since its origin and the role US has played in it. The largest section of the chapter deals with the congressional stance on the matter of funding since the Clinton era. The partisan issues occupying the Republican and Democratic Party in the US Congress pertaining international funds for UN are viewed closely. The congressional insistence on attaching the matter of UN Reforms with the funding narrative is also reviewed. Furthermore, the US dues to UN are explained under the light of important legislative actions taken by the Congress pertaining UN funding.

The connection between public opinion and the partisan politics in the US is detailed in the last section of the chapter. The historically positive opinions about US-UN relations have witnessed various transformations due to the evolving political silhouette of the American society.

The final chapter will lay down the conclusion of the overall thesis. It will systematically review the research findings of every chapter. Additionally, it will also revisit the hypothesis and the research questions of the thesis.

The finances of the UN have always been under public scrutiny. The pressures on the organization to be up float irrespective of the various financial crises have been tremendous. Without these funds, even the minuscule task of the UN cannot be fulfilled. United States being the largest contributor does realize the monetary power it holds in the organization, therefore the relationship has fluctuated from generosity to interest based manipulation. This dissertation intends to understand the domestic factors that lead to this extreme approach of the US towards the UN. As the funding system of the UN mainly rests on the contributions made by the member states, (nongovernmental or corporate funding is practiced by some agencies but the numbers are comparatively small) it is imperative to understand American reservation on this issue while being the country that champions UN initiatives on various platforms. To the onlookers the extreme behavior of the US towards UN might be baffling, but the domestic analysis of the dissertation intends to lay out a politically structured explanation of the funding narrative that eschews from generalizing various decisions US took since the very beginning.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **US-UN RELATIONS: GENESIS AND EVOLUTION**

Amidst the ruins of Second World War, the world driven under the leadership of United States' (US) came together to create an international organization that could help states co-exist peacefully. The US along with the other victors of World War desired to have a global forum that could regulate peace and international laws in a post war world and thus created the United Nations. Understandably, the United Nations (UN) ended up borrowing many of its features from League of Nations (LON), a failed multilateral initiative after World War I. United Nations was envisaged by the founding members as an improvement of LON, which would successfully maintain world peace and security, unlike its predecessor. But developing a platform for multilateral collaboration was far from easy, with a constant altercation between national sovereignty and international cooperation, occurring since its creation to this day.

Even though United States has been the founding member who molded United Nations' core ideas and structural planning; it has time and again clashed with the organization due to its foreign policy endeavors. At the start, in order to create a world body that would be "the primary vehicle for maintaining peace and stability", FDR's main role was to convince different allies, especially Churchill of United Kingdom and Joseph Stalin of Soviet Union, to be part of the new organization so that they can fight Axis Powers in the War.

The aftermath of the War and the beginning of Cold War belied the large expectations from the UN and heralded a tumultuous period in the US-UN relationship.

This chapter begins with a focus on the Woodrow Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge's clash over US participation in League of Nations; role of various individuals (apart from Franklin Delano Roosevelt) and the Department of State in the formation of United Nations; early worries of US Congress and financing of UN; clash between United States and the third block in United Nations; and conservatives and their anti-UN stance.

## **League of Nations and the Origins of American Internationalism**

For hundreds of years, scholars and philosophers across the world argued the possibility of having an international order that could help in stopping anarchy and

maintain peace. LON was the predeceasing body of UN which saw its birth due to the ruins of World War and magnanimous perception of a US President. The fundamental shift in US foreign policy approach from isolationism to internationalism is usually traced back to the Woodrow Wilson presidency (1913-1921). Even though in his first term he did not let America become part of World War I and eventually won the second term with the campaign slogan “he kept us out of the war”; his perception on US participation in the war and its future role in world politics changed for good. Wilson visualized America to have a bigger role in world politics, especially to promote freedom and safeguard democracy, even if it meant to alter America’s traditional foreign policy approach. Imbibing various notions from the idealistic school of thought, Wilson’s enthusiasm for America to be altruistic in its foreign policy was eventually squashed by realists in the US Senate.

The advocates for perpetual peace gathered momentum in the form of various anti-war movements across the world by the end of World War I. Associations like the British League of Nations Society (BLNS) and the American League to Enforce Peace (ALEP) both founded in 1915 campaigned for a new international system for the preservation of peace and justice, if necessary by the use of force (Ginekan 2006). ALEP in particular was unique as for the first time a leading American politician supported the principles of the league. Woodrow Wilson declared that the ideals of the league would be absorbed as one of his principles and eventually executed as his policies. Wilson’s declaration took on a new meaning when the United States entered the war in April 1917 (Ginekan 2006).

Woodrow Wilson won the US presidential elections of 1912 and four years later was re-elected. Initially, Wilson believed that US should stay out of the war primarily arising in Europe. But German submarine attack on American ships in February 1917 reversed the President’s belief which eventually led to his request to the Congress for a Declaration of War. In the chaos of the era and America’s hesitant yet necessary involvement in the war, ALEP further influenced Wilson and his grandiose vision for America’s position in the world. According to President Wilson, secret diplomacy, secret alliances and treaties, imperialism, and militarism—all tools in the hands of the decadent, perverted European Powers—were held responsible for the outbreak of the Great War (Ginekan 2006). Wilson now believed that US had a responsibility and

purpose in the world, which involved making democracy safe and to remedy the inter-state relationship system. Speaking before the US Congress, President Wilson enumerated one of the last Fourteen Points, which called for “general association of nations...formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike” (US Office of the Historian, 1920), the League of Nations. In other part of the speech, he proposed the allies to establish unselfish peace terms, freedom of seas, restoration of territories conquered and so on. President Wilson illustrated that American peace & national security has an inescapable linkage with international stability. The concept of ‘Just Peace’ i.e. peace between equals without any resentment, was also described in his ‘Fourteen Points’. The League, Wilson envisaged to be ‘collective security system’, a mechanism that would aim to replace prewar secret alliance system and balance of power.

Wilson was not the first president to emphasize on America’s participation in a global association. Theodore Roosevelt (TR) stressed in front of the Nobel Committee in 1910, the importance of arbitration treaties and of strengthening The Hague Court. He believed that the “Great Powers should form a league of Peace to keep peace amongst them and prevent it being broken by others” (Henig 2010). But TR insisted that the US military with the help of Britain, back such an association. Wilson on the other hand was not interested in force to be used to support the league. He stated that “A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender...apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force....it is a terrible remedy” (President Wilson Speech, Western Tour, 1918).

Representing America, Woodrow Wilson attended the Versailles Peace Conference in January 1919. Irrespective of his efforts for just peace, the conference did not produce a peace without victory. Germany was put under pressure to take the sole responsibility of First World War and was obligated to pay around \$30 billion dollars for the destruction it caused to other countries. It was also compelled to give up on all its colonies, along with a drastically reduced military power. Even though Wilson felt that the treaty was severely harsh and the territorial issues violated the Fourteen Points, he realized that to readdress this issue the League has to first come into place. The Article X of the Draft Covenant presented by Wilson at Paris, guaranteed the

“political independence and territorial integrity of League members against external aggression, and it required, members to take action, even to the extent of using military force, against violators of this guarantee” (Link 1990). Article X was a daring move, especially by an American president. If approved by the US Senate, it had the ability to overturn America’s long traditional policy of ‘isolationism’ in the international politics. Such a proposal was expected to stir opposition and pave way for Wilson’s crusade to convince his country about America’s role in League of Nations.

After coming back from Paris, Wilson had the mammoth task ahead of him, to present the Versailles Treaty to the US Senate. On June 10, 1919, Wilson spoke in front of the US Senate stating that “Our isolation was ended twenty years ago; and now, fear of us is ended also, our counsel and association sought after and desired...there can be no question of our ceasing to be a world power...the only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept or reject the confidence of the world” (President Wilson Address to Senate, 1919). The Treaty wasn’t ratified by the US Senate and America did not join the League of Nation. A number of issues stood out in the process of Senate declining to sign the treaty. Isolationist senator like William Borah (Rep, Idaho), feared that “American democracy would be contaminated if the United States, through membership in the League, were to tie itself to the militaristic and imperialistic competition of the European nations” (Powaski 2017). He believed that US would serve its own interest as well as promote world peace and democracy by maintaining its complete independence in foreign relations (Powaski 2017).

But not everyone who opposed the treaty was an isolationist. Many internationalists opposed the treaty for multiple reasons like opposition of the US willingly becoming a part of to the collective security system. Also, some didn’t believe that League of Nations would work in the long run as great powers would not accept restrictions on their power and altruistically follow Article X of the covenant, till the time their national interest was not at stake. Furthermore, Senators felt that the people of America would not allow the transfer of its power to an international organization or have a long standing military that follows the command of the League. They also felt



that a commitment to the League could also mean Europe's interference in the Western Hemisphere, which threatened Monroe Doctrine.

Additionally, many Republicans, especially the conservatives who opposed Wilson's Progressive agenda were fearful that ratifying LON would lead to Democrats retaining the White House and lead the country on the path to socialism (Powaski 2017). They particularly had issues with Wilson's attempt to convert "the 1918 Congressional elections into a referendum on the League when he urged the people to elect a Democratic Congress" (Powaski 2017). Eventually the Republicans won the next elections and gained majority in both the houses. The Republicans were further irritated by Wilson's failure to include any Republican senator in the delegation to Versailles for the conference.

But before the treaty was declined by the Senate, Wilson made an attempt to garner public opinion supporting US participation in the League, which according to him would've pressurized the Senate. When Congress vetoed American participation in the peace organization, President Woodrow Wilson embarked on his famous "whistle-stop" tour, across the middle and western United States to talk directly to the masses about LON (Dorsey 1919). Apart from the public many Republicans and pro-treaty democrats were willing to ratify it barring few changes in the provisions. The onus of bringing the divided Republican Party together in opposition to the treaty fell on the Senate majority leader and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge. To overcome the seemingly inevitable victory of Wilson, Lodge strategically concealed his personal opposition to the treaty and instead attached amendments to the treaty, which would've been sufficient to "Republican-ize" the treaty, or at least to be sure that Wilson would not accept these changes and eventually accept his defeat (Powaski 2017). For Lodge's strategy to be a success, he loaded the Foreign Relations Committee with Republican "irreconcilables"<sup>1</sup> and excluded the "mild reservationists"<sup>2</sup>. This move led to six of the ten Republicans on the committee being irreconcilables out of which three were strong reservationists (Powaski 2017).

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<sup>1</sup> Republican Irreconcilables were those senators who were anti LON under any condition, irrespective of any changes in it. It was led by Senator Borah of Idaho.

<sup>2</sup> Mild Reservationists were senators who had less restrictive reservations towards ratifying the treaty in comparison to Senator Lodge.

By the time Wilson returned from Paris, Lodge was sure that for the Senate to ratify the treaty, Wilson would have to accommodate his reservations; which seemed highly unlikely. Understanding Senate's skepticism, Wilson reluctantly revised the Covenant: America's domestic issues were excused from League's purview, the right to withdraw from LON in a given situation, with the intention to shielding the Monroe Doctrine. Regardless of these changes, Lodge and strong reservationists were not satisfied, especially with zero changes in the Article X of the treaty. Also, according to them, the revisions made pertaining to Monroe Doctrine were not ardent enough. Many senators further expressed displeasure of League's authority in interpreting whether a matter fell under the ambit of domestic issues.

Woodrow Wilson believed that joining LON with plethora of reservations would not only taint America's image abroad in the eyes of other countries, but also be dishonorable. Realizing Republican Party's attempt to stall America's participation, Wilson stiffened his pride. On September 10, Lodge showcased his committee's report on the treaty. Out of the fourteen reservations, second reservation was the most difficult for Wilson to agree to. The second reservation stated

*"The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations- whether members of the League or not- under the provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or the naval...."* (Lodge 1925)

Wilson's "whistle stop tour" was his last attempt to save treaty, hoping that by going directly to the people, it might turn the tables for him.

Unfortunately, by the time Wilson started his trip, the public opinion discourse had started shifting against it. Many Americans who came back from the war told horrific stories of their days in Europe, further cementing that US should be wary of its future participation in issues across Atlantic. In November 1919, when he was extremely ill, Wilson had to make a decision whether he will accept the Lodge Reservations and following statement was issued in his name- "In my opinion the resolution in that

form does not provide for ratification but rather for nullification of the treaty...I sincerely hope that friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution” (Built and Freud 1966). The Senate took its “final vote on the treaty on March 19, 1920, 21 Democrats did follow their consciences rather than Wilson’s command. But there were not enough of them to put the treaty across” (Powaski 2017). As a result, “the treaty, with the Lodge reservations attached, failed by a vote of 49 in favor to 35 against, only seven short of the necessary two-thirds majority” (Powaski 2017).

## **Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Birth of United Nations**

Men since history have sat down on table to discuss global propositions, but only few of these meetings have produced results that withstood time. United Nations was the result of one such meeting at San Francisco which changed the future interactions between states and the order they will exist in. League of Nations in the interwar period failed to implement one of its primary purposes, ‘collective security’. Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Italy’s attack on Ethiopia and German capture of Poland; saw no action on League’s part to retaliate against these moves. The treaty asked for states to impose sanctions on countries which initiate aggression. But, the textual weakness of the Covenant did not force states to be absolutely obligated to go on a war with other states that have violated the treaty. Irrespective of the idealistic sentiment behind the formation of League of Nations, the countries were not impelled to follow the principles of the Covenant and had the option to commit to League’s mandates voluntarily.

Apart from these criticisms of League of Nations, there were few lessons learned by its failure: need for a universal body, rule of unanimity to be abandoned, need for wider responsibilities in the economic and social filed, greater authority given to international officials who run such an organization and so on (Luard 1982).

In the early years of World War II, little thought was given by countries to establish a new international organization that would take up League’s responsibilities and much more. The primary focus of the states was on the immediate escalation of war happening in various theatres. Only by the end of the war, states focused their attention on the need for a new organization that would mark the beginning of a new

era and uphold international peace. One of the first countries to throw its attention on such a need was United States. In the year 1937, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) delivered his famous “Quarantine Speech” in Chicago, warning about the erosion of international treaties and the need for peaceful countries to isolate aggressive nations. This speech came around the time when US Congress had passed the Neutrality Acts (1935, 1937, and 1939) with the intention to keep the nation away from the War. FDR stressed-

*“The peace loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignoring of human instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality....There must be a return to a belief in the pledged word, in the value of a signed treaty. There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is as vital as private morality”* (Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech 1937)

He further used the metaphor of an epidemic situation and the society’s action to isolate infected individuals to save the community; similarly nations should adopt a policy to ‘quarantine’ countries that threaten world peace.

FDR’s response on the eruption of World War II, in his “fireside chat” on September 3, 1939 echoed his convictions on America’s greater role in the world and gradual forbiddance of its traditional foreign policy of isolationism.

*“It is easy for you and me to shrug our shoulders and say that conflicts taking place thousands of miles from the continental United States, and, indeed, the whole American hemisphere, do not seriously affect the Americas—and that all the United States has to do is to ignore them and go about our own business. Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought does affect the American future.... This Nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account of facts...Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience”* (Roosevelt’s Address on the Outbreak of World War II 1939)

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, United States eventually got sucked into the war.

In the Annual Message to Congress (State of the Union Address) on January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt addressed the US Congress which famously came to be known as the “Four Freedoms Speech”. The four freedoms included- “freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear” (Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms Speech 1941). The ideas expressed in the Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms were the core ethos that evolved into the “Atlantic Charter declared by Winston Churchill and FDR in August 1941; the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942; President Roosevelt’s vision for an international organization that became the United Nations after his death; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 through the work of Eleanor Roosevelt” (Roosevelt Four Freedom 1941).

Before US formally became part of the War, FDR ordered Secretary of State Cordell Hull to establish a “State Department team of planners for peace”. Roosevelt often spoke of the need for “Four Policemen”- “the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China to order the post war world” (Meisler 2011). The Atlantic Conference held between FDR and Winston Churchill in Newfoundland, August 14, 1941 resulted in the joint declaration of the two countries which later was known as the Atlantic Charter. The Charter had eight clauses which spoke of aims and visions of America and Britain for a postwar world. It spoke to “establish a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries....nations of the world must come to the abandonment of the use of forces....the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential” (Atlantic Charter 1941). Once United States entered the war, on January 1, 1942, twenty six countries along with the big four established the alliance against the Axis powers and came to be known as the Allied powers.

The intensity of discussions on formulating the details of an international organization escalated only in 1943. The US State Department for long had been working on draft ideas for a new international system. Both the heads of states of US and UK kept a personal eye on all the proposals made for the “postwar organization” of the world. But for a very long time Roosevelt and Churchill did not spare any crucial amount of attention to the matter, which according to them was of lesser urgency in relation to the more critical task of winning the ongoing war (Luard 1982). Before Pearl Harbor

attack, Roosevelt was of the thought that US and UK should be the sole countries involved in such a task (Luard 1982). Eventually he changed his mind and decided to include USSR and China; but still stressed on the role of policing to be limited to few exclusive members.

Under the leadership of Cordell Hull (Secretary of State) and Sumner Welles (chief foreign policy advisor of FDR and under Secretary of State 1936-1943), and over the course of “the eighteen months between January 1942 and July 1943”, the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy shaped U.S. policy in numerous areas. The committee was organized by the suggestion of Leo Pasvolsky (assistant of Cordell Hull) and Norman Davis (Council on Foreign Relations). It included Dean Acheson, Esther C. Brunauer, Lauchlin Currie, Myron Taylor, Benjamin V. Cohen to name a few. It included people not only from the administration and Congress, but also from think tanks, namely Council on Foreign Relations. In addition to creating a new international body and drafting a blueprint for international trusteeship for the colonial world, “they investigated and made recommendations for Washington's relations with the exile governments, planned for the postwar reconstruction of Germany, Italy, and Japan, charted the postwar future of China, and attempted to stabilize relations between Moscow and Washington” (O’ Sullivan 2008). The committees argued various possibilities in future that could threaten America’s vital interests and world peace.

The complex geopolitical changes that occurred due to World War politics, cemented the planners’ change in opinion about the future world order. For America to sustain its interests, the possibility of intervening much more deeply in global affairs was inescapable according to American diplomats and leaders. Welles further suggested that the committees should begin to anticipate obstacles to an American-led world order. He and the planners began to grow concerned about the kind of delegates the other nations might send to an initial conclave of the United Nations. He wanted the other nations to select “good men” (O’ Sullivan 2008). The planners also had intentions that surpassed the political realm. Welles sought nothing less than the “creation of a new economic order in the postwar world”, facilitated in part by massive doses of U.S. postwar economic largess (O’ Sullivan 2008).

The United States by this time was keen to have a permanent post war organization that would help maintain a global order and peace. The US and Britain met for the first Quebec Conference in August, 1943 and discussed the possibilities of establishing an international organization which would be embracing all countries for the maintenance of world peace. In Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, the same year in October, included Soviet Union and China; further reinstating steps towards a new international organization –

*“....recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security... purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations”* (Moscow Conference: 1943).

The technicalities of United Nations were discussed at the Tehran Conference in November 1943, between FDR, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. In the conference, FDR put across his understanding of the ‘Four Policemen’ that would be the main countries to take responsibility for the post war world order. He envisaged an assembly that would include all the states and would discuss global issues. Apart from this assembly, he further put forward the idea of having an exclusive body consisting of the ‘Big Four’ that would deal with non-military matters. According to him, in any case of international emergency, the big four will be the first to retaliate against the threat. Stalin opposed many ideas of Churchill. For starters, he objected the concentration of power amidst the four countries as smaller states would voice their concerns over it. He agreed with the proposal of Churchill to have regional bodies that would deal with European (leadership of Britain, America and Soviet Union) and Asian or Far East (China) regional affairs. But President Roosevelt was dubious of such a proposal being accepted by the US Congress as it involved commitment of US troops to Europe for long term (Luard 1982). From December 1943, the US State Department started preparing for the details and technicalities

more seriously so that it could present viable propositions in the Dumberton Oaks Conference.

By 1944, the countries started chalking concrete written documents on the type of postwar organization they would prefer. United States at this time took the lead in forming a definitive vision for United Nations. The eventual result was that whatever discussions were followed, America was the nation leading the way and formulated various proposals to which the other nations responded. The UN Charter was marginally modified from the original draft submitted by the US (Luard 1982). FDR kept a close watch on the detailed plans set by the US State Department and gave preliminary approval. But because he wanted to have a more detailed discussion with Congress leaders and heads of various Congressional committees, based on which the plans would be edited; the three powers only discussed the procedure and agenda for the organization. By this time, the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy had declined in its importance, and was succeeded by the Informal Political Agenda Group led by Pasvolsky, Bowman, Taylor, Davis, Cohen and so on. In the seventy meetings over the next seven months the group considered all the difficult questions of postwar security and formulated detailed plans for an international organization. Its first task was to present a new draft Charter for the secretary to present to FDR; in doing so it clarified some issues and raised others that would bedevil deliberations through the Dumberton Oaks Conference and after (Hilderbrand 1990).

Relations with Congress on the matter of US participation in an international organization, was of utmost importance for FDR, realizing the difficult situation Wilson found himself post World War I. The State Department tapped on its ability for public relations and bridging capabilities with the US Congress, with the successor of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Edward Reilly Stettinius Jr. Thus, the FDR administration backed a resolution drafted by the State Department and representative J. William Fullbright of Arkansas which called for favoring an international organization in the postwar world and America's participation in it, eventually known as the Fullbright Resolution (Fullbright, Britannica, 2017). All these developments delayed the meeting of the four leaders but eventually to have an elaborate discussion on United Nations, they decided to meet at Dumberton Oaks which is near Washington DC in August 1944.



The main participants of the Dumberton Oaks conference were US (Under Secretary of State) Edward Reilly Stettinius Jr, (Soviet Ambassador to the US) Andrei Gromyko, (Chinese Ambassador to UK) Wellington Koo and (British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) Sir Alexander Cadogan. The proposals submitted by US participants were mainly accepted with little to no changes in the comprehensive structure of the organization. The considerations were completed on October 7, 1944, and an outline for the structure of the organization was handed over to all the United Nations governments for the study and discussion of it domestically (Dumberton Oaks and Yalta, UN, 1944-45). The result of the Conference included: “Structure (General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat and International Court of Justice were the four primary bodies of United Nations), Roles and Responsibilities (preventing future war should be conferred upon the Security Council and the UNGA could discuss and make recommendations for promoting international cooperation), Method of Voting (the method of voting in the UNSC was left open at Dumbarton Oaks for future discussion) and Armed Forces in the Service of Peace ( member states were required to let the usage of their armed forces by Security Council in its aim for preventing acts of aggression)” (Dumberton Oaks and Yalta, UN, 1944-45).

The most important point of discussion in the conference was the power of veto available to the major powers. The Big Four unanimously agreed that they should have this privilege (especially because they are the permanent members) so that they could veto any decision unfavorable to them. At this stage, it was assumed by the leaders that whatever issues occurring in the postwar world would be issues between small states that the Big Four will be able to settle or agree upon. But these countries never discussed the possibility of them being involved as a major party in any situation in the postwar world. During such breaches of peace by any big power, the states agreed, would not be a party eligible to vote and therefore cannot utilize its veto benefit.

On the issue of permanent membership at UNSC, United States supported Brazil due to its vast geographical contribution in the western hemisphere. But this proposition was rejected by other countries as such criteria for being eligible for permanent membership might be raised by other countries in various regions. However, entry of France as a permanent member was accepted by all the Big Four countries.

America had originally wished for weighted voting to be used in the General Assembly in matters of finances (similar to the system of voting adopted at World Bank). But this was unacceptable to many (as it would've given huge advantage to the US); and eventually there was a consensus that a simple majority would be applicable for all the major questions in UNGA, with a 2/3<sup>rd</sup> majority required only for "important" questions, including budget affairs (Luard 1982).

All the issues that could not be deliberated deeply at Dumberton Oaks were taken ahead at the Yalta Conference which occurred from February 4 to 11, 1945 at Yalta, Russia. With an exception of procedural matters, the five veto powers had to agree collectively in the UNSC in order for resolution to be adopted. Procedural resolutions especially the ones to which the veto powers agreed needed a seven nation majority out of the eleven in the UNSC. Great Powers agreed required a seven-member majority in the 11-member Council (Baehr and Gordenker 2005). Decisions of the UNSC on every matter were to be made by affirming votes of nine members which should include the votes of the permanent members; provided that, "in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting" (UNSC, Voting System and Records). As for the colonies of the big powers, Churchill was assured at Yalta that no colony would come under the ambit of UN without his consent (Baehr and Gordenker 2005).

The participants at the conference agreed that the new organization should be established as soon as possible, i.e. before the war got over, even at the stake of making it look like a 'big international alliance'. When FDR addressed the US Congress on March 1, 1945 on the Yalta Conference, he stressed that "This time we are not making the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace...this time, as we fight together to win the war finally, we work together to keep it from happening again" (Roosevelt's Address to Congress on Yalta 1945). Within few hours taking office after his predecessor's death, President Harry S Truman made an announcement that the conference for UN will be conducted as envisaged (Luard 1982).

Being one of the most diplomatically prolific events of those days, the San Francisco Conference was initiated on April 25, 1945, and saw fifty countries in attendance. The official participation from US included "(Secretary of State) Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,

(former Secretary of State) Cordell Hull, and (Senators) Tom Connally (D-Texas), Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan) and some other members of the Congress” (US Office of the Historian 1941-45). Conference participants at the time considered a plan for “compulsory jurisdiction for a World Court”, but Edward Stettinius realized that such an outcome could compromise the Senate ratification (US Office of the Historian 1941-45). The delegates eventually agreed that each country should individually determine about World Court membership. The conference did approve the formation of an “Economic and Social Council and a Trusteeship Council to assist in the process of decolonization, and agreed that these councils would have rotating geographic representation” (US Office of the Historian 1941-45). Apart from the US delegation in the conference, the US media too played its important role. Despite abiding sympathy among thousands of the press corps, most correspondents refused to compromise on their reportage. The New York Times under James Reston served as the official “leak central” during the entire affair. Reston reported in an unvarnished tone on the inevitable tussles, the strains left by participants, the clashes between delegations, the struggles between Washington DC and Moscow (Schlesinger 2003).

Irrespective of what the framers had envisaged for the UN Charter to be, it closely resembled the Covenant of League of Nations. The UN charter had its own distinctive features but was nevertheless marred with its predecessor’s foundational features on international politics. One of the big differences between LON and UN was the latter’s ability to halt international aggression with the help of military power. This ability gave United Nations the “political teeth” which LON supposedly lacked. Also the chief position of UN Secretary General was given more independent power under Article 99, way more than his counterpart in LON.

Finally, the Senate accepted the contents of the UN Charter on July 28, 1945, by a “vote of 89 to 2” (US Office of the Historian: 1937-45). The United Nations became a reality on October 24, 1945, “after 29 nations had ratified the Charter” (US Office of the Historian 1937-45).

## **US-UN Relations amidst Cold War and Rise of the Third Block**

When Senator Connally and Vandenberg reported to the Senate after their visit to San Francisco, their welcoming reception signaled to a positive approach of the Congress

towards the new international organization. Even though the Senate ratified the UN Charter, many issues that were raised in the Senate were not completely resolved. One of the issues was the financing of United Nations. US policymakers have been worried about US role in the financing of the organization from its early days. When the Charter was presented to the Senate, Leo Pavlosky did the job to explain the contents of it to the senators (eventually he wrote the final draft of the Charter). The only two senators who actually read the Charter in its entirety before they voted were the two to vote against the US membership in the United Nations. They were Senators William Langer of North Dakota and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota (Snow Sr. 2002). The Senators warned that – “if the United States, as the world’s milk cow, should run dry, not only these novel international experiments would die for lack of nourishment, but so would men’s hopes they should see any such things as the ‘four freedoms’; extended to supply their necessities” (Bongang: 2007). Shipstead further articulated that “...perpetual intervention means perpetual war, we in the New World cannot and will not every twenty years redress the balance of the Old by sending our sons to the War” (Schlesinger 2003). In the hearings before the Subcommittee on Revision of the UN Charter to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the issue of America becoming the “Santa Claus” (Congressional Hearings, James Warburg, 81<sup>st</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, 1950) of the world, and the primary payer of international bills was raised, but eventually the overwhelming pro-UN support in the Senate suppressed such issues.

In years immediately after the war, US-UN relationship was enjoying one its best phase. United States being the moral leader of the organization was in the forefront of setting agendas. Early US ambassadors to UN expressed promising future of the two, especially due to America’s preeminent position in the organization. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, US ambassador to UN for a record of seven and a half years (1953-1960) told the Senate in one of the Congressional hearings-

*“For Americans the United Nations is not only a place to promote peace....it is the greatest single place in which to develop partners who, valuing their own freedom, who will fight to defend it whenever it is attacked...The United Nations is primitive; it is evolutionary; it has not brought- and will not bring- the millennium. But it is useful; its cost is small; it is an intelligent first step; it stands between us and international*

*anarchy. It thus stands between us and World War III or the extinction of human freedom-or both.*” (Congressional Hearings, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., 83<sup>rd</sup> Congress, First Session: 1953)

According to Charles Raith in “The Anti-UN Coalition before the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committee during the years 1945-1955”, the core of the anti-UN sentiments in the US during the first decade since the creation of the UN came from the extreme right of the political spectrum (Bongang 2007). Conservatism then was “the most cohesive element drawing the core-antagonisms into opposition to the UN”. It was based on what, to the conservatives, was an “image of unchanging American superiority, and their rejection of the alleged interdependence of the modern world” (Bongang 2007).

The great power cooperation necessary for the successful functioning of the UN system got obstructed due to the growing ideological impasse between United States and Soviet Union. By 1947 anti-Communist sentiments had replaced the Moscow-Washington DC cooperation as the “touchstone for American policymakers, and the United Nations had become mainly a propaganda platform and a forum for confrontation between two hostile rivals” (Gaddis 1972). Growing mistrust between Washington DC and Moscow and hostility between the super powers challenged the idealistic notions with which it was established. Gradually, the tense world affairs started impacting the functioning of United Nations. “The United Nations” wrote one of Truman’s aides in 1948 “is a God given vehicle through which the United States can build up a community of powers....to resist Soviet aggression and maintain our historic interests” (MacQueen 2013). United Nations became a battleground for Americans and Soviets as both had veto power, giving them the ability to push forward their agendas or thwart the other nation’s agenda in UNSC. Such politics hampered UN’s peacekeeping initiatives like in the case of 1948 Arab-Jew conflict over the creation of the state of Israel. Since both the US and USSR held vetoes, UNSC could not act without their permission.

One of the first major challenges of Cold War came in the form of Korean Crisis (1950-1953). This crisis paved way for deep cold war politics between US and USSR in United Nations, specifically the Security Council. In January 1950, USSR began its boycott of UNSC due to failure of replacing “Republic of China’s seat to the newly

established People's Republic of China (PRC)". When the Korean War began in 1950, Soviet Union was absent in the Security Council, giving America the rare opportunity to introduce two resolutions. The first resolution passed instantly; declared North Korea as the main aggressor; attacked South Korea; and called North Korea to move behind the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. The other resolution was cleared two days later, declaring that North Korea has "refused to stop hostilities" and hasn't withdrawn to the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. The unusual circumstances, under which these deliberations took place, eventually molded the overall approach of UN towards the crisis. The 'Unified Command'<sup>3</sup> which fought under the UN flag, was commanded under the US leadership of General Douglas McArthur. The proxy war of US and USSR in the Korean peninsula between North and South Korea eventually ended with an armistice but no peace treaty was signed and is technically still at war.

Irrespective of the Soviet absence in UNSC, America's decision and opinion on the Korean crisis was critiqued by other states. The non-permanent UNSC members like Ecuador, Norway and Cuba were staunchly supporting the Americans; but countries like India, Yugoslavia and Egypt were skeptical even though they were not supporting Soviet Union. Wordings used by the American representatives in formation of the first draft resolution were challenged by the members. When US delegate Ernest Gross tried to strengthen "cease hostilities" to "cease aggression", he was overruled. These decisions by US reflected the belief that the "information available based on cables from the UN commission stationed in Seoul; the US ambassador to the ROK and; the ROK government remained incomplete to justify the stronger language" (Stueck 2008).

Apart from the Cold War driven geopolitics impacting the US-UN relations, the rise of the new block in United Nations posed new challenges for the relationship. In the beginning of the organization, US assumed the leadership of UN with the hope that it will share the same interests. But during Cold War, decolonization and admission of many new states in the UN changed this notion for America. The new states started asserting themselves in United Nations and challenged the United States. The small states were gradually becoming adept in diminishing the influence of Security Council by increasing the importance of General Assembly. The Article 10 of the UN

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<sup>3</sup> Unified Command was the US lead anti-Communist force in the Korean War (1950-1953).

Charter gave the General Assembly the authority to “discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter...” (exception of Article 12 which gives Security Council some exclusive powers) (UN Charter 1945).

Asian and African countries that were newly independent of colonial powers formed an alternative bloc that would stand for themselves, without any influence of USSR and US. The Bandung Conference of 1955 hosted African and Asian countries which included countries like India, China and the entire African continent. Their “non-aligned” approach to international politics soon seeped into the chambers of General Assembly. Determined to take the principles of Bandung Conference ahead, these countries established Group of 77 and Non Alignment Movement to mold the diplomatic course of United Nations. Outweighed by sheer numbers, resolutions that seemed pro-US were either halted or anti-US resolutions passed in the General Assembly. This fundamental change in the General Assembly impacted the US domestic opinion on United Nations.

The conservative and isolationist fears pertaining US participation in international organizations proved to be right. Unlike Secretary General Trygve Lie who was ignored by Soviet Union on the matter of Korean Crisis as he “sided” with United States; Dag Hammarskjöld was determined to “cut the umbilical cord which linked the UN to old wartime Western alliance, and to align the organization with what he regarded as the new emergent of righteousness in the world: the ‘uncommitted nations’ of Bandung generation” (Heller 2001). In the later years, former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim stated in his memoir “what we now call the third world- that large group of African, Asian and Latin American countries which eschews alignment with any of the major political systems of the world- has long been one of the essential components of the community of nations....(these countries) were getting increasingly impatient with the egocentricity of the West” (Waldheim 1980).

Such anti-US opinion held by top UN officials left the US policymakers baffled. The China membership crisis further deepened the crevices between US and UN. The issue of which China out of the two should be given the seat at UN saw United States and the third bloc on two opposing sides. United States firmly supported Taiwan whereas majority of the third world states supported Beijing and its claim. Being an

important member of Group of 77 and Bandung Conference, China managed to garner support from Asian and African countries. In the 1950s, United States supported Taiwan to represent China in UN, due to its tactics of “manipulation” and “postponement” (Bongang 2007). But by 1960s, with the rising numbers of third world states, US could not continue its pressure on UN. Eventually on October 1971, UNGA passed Resolution 2758 which restored the “lawful rights of People’s Republic of China...recognizing the representatives of PRC are the lawful representatives of China to the UN and that PRC is one of the five permanent members of UNSC” (UN, A/RES/2758(XXVI), 1971). This development was a big setback for United States which was in middle of an intense ideological war against communism.

Since the General Assembly controls the UN budget, many new programs and agencies were introduced with the support of the third bloc, eventually escalating the overall UN expenditure. The purpose of these agencies and programs was to help countries with poor economies. The 1970s became the time when US got involved in open confrontation with many states over the issue of economic development. The global south campaigning for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), called for a range of political and economic actions by the global community to help them in the development of their societies which suffered years of colonialism in the hands of European powers. The publicity surrounding this campaign increased when the level of anti-UN feeling in the US, spreading beyond Washington DC and the diplomatic sphere, taking it from the isolated extremist groups and bringing it into the open mainstream forces of the country (Hanson 2007). Conservative right advocacy groups like John Birch Society popularized slogans like “Get the US out of the UN and get the UN out the US”. By the mid to late 1970s, ‘UN Bashing’ appeared to become a national sport, with many Americans now seeing the organs of UN as ‘hotbeds of socialism, as bastions of Third World-ism, and as ungrateful centers of rampant anti-US sentiment, all of which had to be resisted by a stronger US presence (Hanson 2007).

Both Democrats and Republicans were left appalled with third world states’ ability to challenge US in an organization which mainly ran with its’ funding. Many therefore called the US Congress to deter the UN finances. These were the first calls for the



Congress to exercise its constitutional “power of the purse”- what eventually became the weapon of choice in deteriorating US-UN relations (Bongang 2007). The calls to wield the financial weapon were undisguised: “Let the Communist nations pay in accordance with the number of people they represent”, suggested Representative Ovie C. Fisher, a democrat from Texas (Bongang 2007).

The Republicans more than the Democrats were ardent in their anti-UN stand in the Congress. The leader of the Conservative wave in America, Barry Goldwater stated that-

*“...the UN places an unwarranted financial burden on the American taxpayer...the United States is currently defraying roughly a third of all United Nations expenses...the assessment should drastically be reduced...the UN should not operate as a charity. I fear that our involvement in the United Nations may be leading to an unconstitutional surrender of American sovereignty”* (Goldwater 1988).

President Gerald Ford in 1974 at the UNGA address spoke about the dangers pertaining the “tyranny of the majority” (President Ford’s Address to UNGA 1974), which emphasized on the radical changes occurring in the UN due to rise of the third block. He further stressed that “America will continue to do more than its share, but there are realistic limits to our capabilities” (President Ford’s Address to UNGA 1974), signaling to the US disappointment with the way the UN was functioning and a warning for possible future ramifications.

Confrontation between the developed and developing countries reached zenith when UNGA overwhelmingly adopted resolution 3281 containing the ‘Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States’ on December 12, 1974. US ambassador to UN John A. Scali gave a speech after the adoption of the Charter by the second committee which echoed US temper over the UNGA decision-

*“...last year the United States delegation sought to call attention to a trend to adopt one sided, unrealistic resolutions that cannot be implemented...this trend has not only continued but accelerated. Every majority must recognize that its authority does not extend beyond the point where the minority becomes so outraged that it is no longer willing to maintain the covenant which binds them”* (Meagher 1979).

He pointed out that United States was the principal financial supporter of the United Nations and the 16 countries which withheld their support from the Charter supplied 95 percent of the UN budget (Meagher 1979). He further suggested that that the developing countries' voting power was no substitute for Western financial power (Meagher 1979).

As conservatives in the US won big at Congressional and Presidential levels in 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s, their ideological ideas flourished. In the Congress, fiscal conservatives, anti- communists/socialism, and pro-life conservatives presented their respective opinions on the rising anti-Americanism in the UN. One of the first amendments passed by the US Congress to impact US finances to UN was the Kemp-Moynihan amendment in 1979. This measure reflected Congressional disappointment and prohibited America from making payments of its share for UN funds for liberation movements such as Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Fukushima 2006). In fact, the United States used "threats to withhold contributions" to prevent the UN from behaving "in ways detrimental to US national interests and, in some cases, contrary to American values" (Fukushima 2006).

President Ronald Reagan in 1982 declared that the America would "withhold United States funds from the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission" as "it is not a proper expense of the United Nations within the meaning of its own Charter....these funds are destined to finance the very aspects of the Law of the Sea treaty that are unacceptable to the United States and that have resulted in our decision, as I announced on July 9, 1982, not to sign that treaty" (Statement by US President Reagan 1982). In 1983, Congress decided to withhold 25 percent of US contributions to various UN programs like "Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people, Special Unit on Palestinian Rights", projects that would support "PLO and South West Africa People's Organization" (, 98<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R. 2195, Public Law 98-164, 1983). The same year US Secretary of State George Shultz notified director-general of UNESCO Perez De Cueller of United States' decision to withdraw from UNESCO due to "organization's years of moving away from the original principles of the constitution...that it had served the political purposes of the member states rather than its own international vocation" (UNESO Archives 1984).

US ambassador to UN Jeane Kirkpatrick (1981-1985) played a significant role in influencing the Congress about the future course of US financing of UN. Being inspired by Daniel P. Moynihan (former US ambassador to UN from 1975-1976), Kirkpatrick stood for strong US policy towards the UN. Her tenure in the UN was an ideological change from President Jimmy Carter's idealistic foreign policy. Kirkpatrick recommended to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1985 to adopt discriminatory funding of UN agencies (Bongang 2007). According to her, UN should fund only those agencies that were effectively managed, that worked to achieve the goals of the Charter, and not those that were ineffectively managed, wasteful and in service to negative goals (Bongang 2007).

Finally, in 1985, the US Congress passed the landmark Kassebaum-Solomon amendment, which officially introduced the concept of "conditional funding". According to this amendment, the US Congress was legally able to cut 20 percent of US regular budget to the UN for the year 1987 and the following years until the organization and its specialized agencies grant each member state voting rights proportionate to their contributions to their respective budgets (Zoller 1987). The impact of the Kassebaum amendment on the UN finances was considerable not only because US contributed 25 per cent of the total UN budget, but also because of the additional impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act<sup>4</sup>, which for "fiscal year 1986 mandated a 4.3 percent sequestration of almost all federal appropriations, including those for international organizations" (Bongang 2007).

Also, conservatives from south and extreme right wing think tanks tried to push their agendas in retaliation to the growing "wasteful" expenditures of UN. A 1985 report published by Heritage Foundation titled 'The United Nations at 40; Myth and Reality', presented various "myths" about UN and tried to debunk it. One of the myths the report tried to debunk was 'US and New York City specifically benefit from the presence of UN headquarters in Manhattan'- "the UN provided figure of \$325.5 million dollars for UN Program Budget Expenditures in New York, includes \$229.7 million for salaries and other staff costs....but according to the estimates of US State Department officials, the UN Headquarters personnel send at least 25 percent of their earnings to home countries or spend them outside United

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<sup>4</sup> Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act intended to eliminate the federal budget deficit by setting a maximum deficit amount for federal spending for each year.

States....The overall \$692 million alleged benefit to New York City, is composed of at least \$173 million of US taxpayer money, since the US pays one-quarter of the UN budget...This \$173 million is hardly ‘new’ money benefitting us” (Roger 1985).

Apart from anti-third bloc and anti-communist reasons behind US decision to cut its finance to UN and its agencies, domestic political ideologies also played an important role in influencing such decisions. The pro-life stance of the conservatives in US politics, managed to withhold US finance to UN Population Fund which provides assistance to countries in maternal and child health care. In 1985, the US Congress passed International Security and Development Cooperation Act, sponsored by Rep. Christopher H. Smith, which “permitted the president to deny funds for international population control programs on the basis of the type on voluntary and non-coercive family planning programs carried out under them” (H. Amdt. to H.R. 1555, 99<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1985-86). President Reagan cut off the entire US contribution to United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), then about \$36 million dollars (Cohen 1999). In 1989, US Congress passed a legislation that addressed their concern over increasing “burden” on the US taxpayers for the contributions to United Nations (Congressional Hearings, 101<sup>st</sup> Congress, First Session, 1989).

This chapter addressed the historical evolution of the US-UN relations and the initial stages of frictions over the funding issue between the two. The gradual shift from unflinching cooperation to skepticism between US and UN occurred due to domestic factors, cold war politics and geopolitical triggers. The anti-UN sentiments in America reached full throttle by 1980s. The conservative wave in America led by fiscal and social conservatives dominated the future discourse of US-UN relations. In the hopes to reform the UN, the US Congress used funding as an important tool to be heard by the General Assembly. In this process, not just the US Congress, but even conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation participated in molding the US narrative on UN funding. In the next decade, the relationship between the two complicates further as the world entered in the post-cold war era.

**CHAPTER 3**

**CHANGING PROCEDURES OF BUDGETING  
AND FUNDING AT UN AND US:  
ACTORS, AGENCIES AND COMMITTEES**

Any effort in understanding the procedure of funding UN reveals more about the complex and myriad of systems functioning in the international body. The multiple number of actors, affiliated agencies, committees, sub committees and vast administrative network involved in presenting a budget in front of the General Assembly (UNGA) biennially, is an overlooked examination. Even though the United Nations charter has made certain specifications about the UN budget, the financial system of the organization has undergone vast changes over the years. United States being the biggest contributor to the UN funds has played a distinct role in molding the budget debates in UNGA. The US Congress and White House have been particularly influential in defining the UN budget requirements and have impacted the UN. Furthermore, the bureaucratic procedure followed by the US government in funding UN, directly affects the larger financial decision making at UN. For a better understanding of the biases involved for the UN funding in the coming chapters, it is imperative to analyze the bureaucratic and procedural path existing in the US and UN. Apprehending the mosaic institutional groundwork of UN and US would further help in grasping the dual relationship of collaboration and opposition between the two.

This chapter discusses the basic technicalities involved in UN budget making and funding. It also assesses the procedural changes in the US budget making and the crystallization of the Executive's and Legislative's role in it. Most importantly, it addresses the procedural evolution in the UN and the US.

## **UN Budget: Types and Procedures**

International crises in various corners of the world require global management by United Nations, which is possible because of the necessary funds it holds. But the process to acquire this fund is complicated and political in nature. The UN budget is viewed differently by each member state amidst the issue of “managerial inefficiency” of the UN administration. The UN budget debate revolves around the general equality of sharing the financial burdens between the member states while being independent and protecting their national interests. The debate also leads to the larger narrative of UN Reforms. The UN Financial System encompasses mandatory and voluntary funding by 193 member countries. The Article 17, paragraphs I and II; Article 18, paragraph II; and Article 19 of the UN Charter specifies the financial procedure of UN. Furthermore, the Article 97 of the charter declares the Secretary

General to be the “chief administrative officer” of UN that makes him responsible for the assessment, planning and execution of the UN budget.

In almost all the modern states, the budget procedure is carried out by the executive under the legislative supervision. But in the UN, the above norm isn't particularly practiced as executive-legislative combination; programs and activities of the international body are almost completely initiated and embraced by the member states in UNGA, the Councils and their various sub-sections (Singer 1960). The Secretary General and his Secretariat simply execute the decisions of these states, and therefore might be called the “administration” but never the “executive branch” (Singer 1960). In recent years, “the planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation cycle” of the UN has matured significantly. Some of the recent important General Assembly resolutions that have impacted the process include: 41/213 of December 19, 1986 (101<sup>st</sup> plenary meeting); 42/211 of December 21, 1987 (97<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting); 45/248 of December 21, 1990 (72<sup>nd</sup> plenary meeting), 58/269 of December 23, 2003, (79<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting); and 62/224 of December 22, 2007 (79<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting) (UN Documentation, Regular Budget, UN Dag Hammarskjold Library). The UN program budget cycle takes about five years: preparation begins two years before biennium; the program budget covers two years; and the evaluation concludes after the biennium (UN Documentation, Regular Budget, UN Dag Hammarskjold Library).


In 1986, the General Assembly approved a two-stage budgetary process based largely on the recommendations of the Group of High Level Intergovernmental Experts (“Group of 18”). The new budget process consists of two sequential parts (Hufner 2003). The budget planning is divided into two phases- off budget years and budget years. During the off budget years, the Secretary General prepares a budget outline with reference from past year's budget plan. The budget outline focuses on the possible estimates for the biennial period and budgetary focus on various activities of UN. Next, the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC) holds elaborate discussion on the budget plan and gives a detailed feedback. Then, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (a committee in UNGA) evaluates the budget outline. Its report is guided by the budgetary framework as established by the UNGA and recommendations from the CPC. The ACABQ can formulate its own resource allocation suggestions; most often, these are saving measures (Hufner 2007). In the end, the Fifth Committee of the UNGA discusses the

budget outline produced by the Secretary General. CPC and ACABQ influence these discussions the most. The results of these discussions are then produced in front of the member states of UNGA and proceed to vote on the budget outline.

During budget years, the Secretary General presents a fully planned budget to the CPC, which is also shared with ACABQ. After assessing the budget, both these committees send their recommendations to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. Finally, the General Assembly takes the last decision on the final biennial budget.

The money of the United Nations is primarily spent on six things: “general policy (assembly, commissions, and committees); general administration and services (New York, Geneva, and field service); public information; program operations (Security, Economic and Social, Trusteeship Councils, and legal activities); special conferences; and court” (Singer 1960). While many expenses are constant, most expenditure fluctuates each year, and is therefore arduous to predict precisely. (Singer 1960).

**Figure 3.1: Budgetary Cycle of United Nations**



Source: United Nations, Understanding the United Nations Budgetary Process, Office of Programming Planning, Budget and Accounts, Department of Management, 2008



**Table 3.1: Important Committees and Officials involved in the Budget Making Procedure at UN**

Official/Committees	Role in Budget Making Procedure
1. Secretary General (SG)	According to Chapter 15, Article 17 of the UN Charter gives responsibility of preparing the budget to the Secretary General, as “Chief Administrative Officer” (UN Documentation, Regular Budget UN Dag Hammarskjold Library)
2. Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC)	The CPC is the primary subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social Council and the UNGA for “planning, programming and coordination” (Committee for Program Coordination, UNGA). CPC’s task is to review the strategic framework in the “off budget years” and the “program budget in the budget years” (Committee for Program Coordination, UNGA).
3. `Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)	ACABQ is an additional organ of the UNGA which consists of sixteen members who are appointed by the Assembly. The functions of the advisory committee include: “to examine and report on the budget submitted by the SG to the UNGA; to advise UNGA concerning any administrative and budgetary matters; to examine on behalf of UNGA the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies; and to consider and report to the UNGA on the auditor’s

	report on the accounts of the UN” (ACABQ, UN).
4. Administrative and Budgetary Committee of UNGA (Fifth Committee)	The Fifth Committee of the UNGA has the primary task of managing the administrative and budgetary issues. The assembly approves and considers “financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies and makes recommendations to the agencies concerned” (5 <sup>th</sup> Committee, UNGA).
5. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)	The UN Charter gives the responsibility of approving the final budget to the General Assembly (Chapter 15, Article 97) (UN Documentation, Regular Budget:UN Dag Hammarskjold Library).

Source- UN Dag Hammarskjold Library, Committee for Program Coordination, ACABQ and 5<sup>th</sup> Committee UNGA

The UN financial network and budget can be divided between mandatory and voluntary contributions. The mandatory assessed contributions made by the member states include: the regular budget, the peacekeeping operations, International Tribunals (IT) and Capital Master Plan (CMP). The voluntary contributions are correlated to different UN funds, agencies and programs. Only the “UN specialized agencies have a mixed funding of assessed and voluntary contributions” (Weisser 2009). Each country’s individual capacity to pay is the “basic principle for the assessed contributions”. However, the voluntary funds have no specific rules or regulations (Weisser 2009).

The assessed contributions of regular budget is based on the following criteria: “estimates of gross national income (GNI); average statistical base periods of three and six years; a minimum assessment rate of 0.001 percent; a maximum assessment rate for the least developed countries of 0.01 percent; and a maximum assessment rate

of 22 percent” (Regular Budget and Working Capital Fund, Committee on Contributions: UNGA). The regular budget deals with the expenditures of the organization’s activities, basic infrastructure and expenses of the UN staff. The individual calculated percentage for every member state is determined every three year by the UNGA and the Fifth Committee. The percentage is based on the nation’s “GNI average of the last three to six years” and is calculated “according to particular national debt, per capita income and currency fluctuation” (Weisser 2009).

The peacekeeping budget of UN is based on the respective mission’s mandate specified from the UNSC. Each peacekeeping operation has “its own budget and account which includes operational costs such as transport and logistics and staff costs such as salaries” (Peacekeeping Funding, UN). The peacekeeping budget “cycle runs from July 1<sup>st</sup> to June 30<sup>th</sup>”. This cycle is “rarely aligned with the Security Council mandate; however budgets are prepared for twelve months based on the most current mandate of the operation” (Peacekeeping Funding, UN). Due to no military force of its own, the UN peacekeepers are paid by their respective governments according to their national rankings and salary. Apart from regular budget, peacekeeping budget is also mandatory for member states. The poorest countries have an “effective rate of 0.0001 percent of the budget of the peacekeeping operations” (Weisser 2009). The other developing countries pay “20 percent of their mandatory contributions”. The industrialized countries pay the same contributions rate as they do to the regular budget (Weisser 2009). Only the “five permanent members of the Security Council have an additional burden on top of their normal contribution rate, which underlines their special responsibility as permanent member states of UNSC and compensates for the lower dues from the developing countries” (Weisser, 2009).

The UN assessed and voluntary budget for UN affiliated agencies, programs and funds refer to funding support given to humanitarian and developmental initiatives of the organization. Even though these programs acquire some funds from the allocated regular budget for their administrative expenditure, they are largely funded separately in independent capacity of every member state. But with time, because a large chunk of these funds are voluntary based, they have been drying for the specialized agencies, forcing them to scout for alternatives. From past few years, corporate sector has been playing an important role in funding various programs and UN affiliated agencies.

There are two types of voluntary funds that are programmed under the regular budget-bilateral and multilateral (Banerjee and Sharma 2007). Donors who wish to participate in the implementation of specific UN projects can contribute to the special purpose trust funds. They can contribute to the already existing trust funds or open new ones (Banerjee and Sharma 2007).

**Table 3.2: Funding the UN: Assessed (compulsory) and Voluntary Contributions**

	<b>General Assembly</b>	<b>Secretariat</b>	<b>Economic and Social Council</b>
<b>Assessed Budgets (either entirely or partially)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Environment Program (UNDP)</li> <li>• UN Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT)</li> <li>• UN General Budget</li> <li>• International Trade Center (ITC)</li> <li>• UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</li> <li>• UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-WOMEN)</li> <li>• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</li> <li>• World Trade Organization (WTO)</li> </ul>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International Monetary Fund (IMF)</li> <li>• Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)</li> </ul>
<b>Voluntary</b>	• UN	• Department of	• Food and

<b>Budgets</b>	Development Program (UNDP) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Population Fund (UNFPA)</li> <li>• UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)</li> <li>• World Food Program (WFP)</li> <li>• UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)</li> <li>• UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</li> </ul>	Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</li> </ul>	Agriculture Organization (FAO) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)</li> <li>• International Labor Organization (ILO)</li> <li>• International Maritime Organization (IMO)</li> <li>• International Telecommunication Union (ITU)</li> <li>• UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)</li> <li>• World Health Organization (WHO)</li> <li>• World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)</li> <li>• World Meteorological Organization (WMO)</li> </ul>
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Source- Shendruck, Amanda, Funding the United Nations: What Impact do US contributions have on UN agencies and programs?, Council on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2017,

For the funding of international tribunals on December 1997, the “UNGA decided, beginning from the 1988 budgets, to apportion half of the budgets for the international tribunals among member states in accordance with the scale of assessments applicable to the regular budget of the United Nations and half in accordance with the rates of assessment applicable to peacekeeping operations” (resolution 52/217 and 52/218)

(Tribunals, Committee on Contributions, UNGA). The Capital Master Plan (CMP) is the title given to the plan to renovate the UN headquarters in New York. The cost of CMP is apportioned among member states. A very small share of the regular budget is contributed to international tribunals and CMP. In December 2000, the General Assembly authorized “the Secretary General without prejudice to a final decision by the UNGA on the issue, to protect with the preparation of a comprehensive design plan and detailed cost analysis for the capital master plan and decided to appropriate an amount of 8 million dollars under the regular budget” (Capital Master Plan, Committee on Contributions: UNGA). In 2006, General Assembly approved the “CMP project to be completed from 2006 to 2014 at a total revised project budget not to exceed 1876.7 million dollars” (Capital Master Plan, Committee on Contributions: UNGA).

In the current times, during “both crises and day to day procedures, the member states and the UN Secretariat- and the UN” run financial budgets or accounts of different natures at the same time (McDermott 2000). Since the larger portion of UN funding is voluntary based, every member state is able to influence the funding debate in UN. Apart from voluntary contributions turning into important political leverage at various UN debates, these contributions also tend to fluctuate time and again. Due to lack of strong commitment, the voluntary funding tends to vary decisively. Eventually, the long term and short term planning of various agencies, programs and funds tends to contradict due to financial insecurities. Beyond state’s assessed and voluntary contributions, “the UN is limited in finding ways to finance its activities and programs”. (Mingst and Karns 2017). It has neither “the authority to borrow money nor a history of private fund raising” (Mingst and Karns 2017).

### **US President’s Budget: Various Departments and Process**

The process for developing and reviewing international affairs budget in the US has evolved since the World War II and the Marshall Plan through periodic reorganizations, such as creation of the Agency for International Assistance in 1961 and more recently the Millennium Challenged Cooperation, with its own budget account, and the president’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (Adams, Bent and Peroff 2017). The precise outline of US contributions to various international organizations is explained in the President’s Annual budget, submitted to

the US Congress. Even though “the constitution does not require the president to prepare a budget recommending the revenues and expenditures of the government”, nevertheless, the budget has become an “extremely important Presidential obligation” as well as one of his most” significant policy tools to set legislative and program objectives” since 1921 (Schick 2007). The current budgetary process of United States has its roots in the “Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act” 1974. This act formalized a proper procedure for the US Congress’s expenditures and aimed at limiting the US president’s ability to seize any kinds of funds appropriated by the legislative. This change in the budgeting procedure was brought due to President Richard Nixon’s 1972 impoundment of funds for his various social programs. At this time the Congress had no formal procedure that controlled the overall budget. But even though, the congressional power of budgeting increased since 1970s, the budget procedure every year begins from the Executive. This new process gave the power to the committees of the Congress to decide upon the details of the budget.

The increased role of the State Department in playing a more centralized role in planning the budgetary expenses of the nation’s international affairs has been a gradual process since 1990s. As part of this trend the State department created the Office of Resources, Plans and Policies (S/RPP), which reported to the Secretary to coordinate budget planning for USAID and State and to hold budget hearings for other international affairs agencies to present their budget proposals to Senior State officials (Adams, Bent and Peroff 2017). The government reform of 1998 that incorporated the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the US Information Agency into the State Department tightened the link between USAID and State as well (Adams, Bent and Peroff 2017). During the George W Bush presidency, the State Department established the Bureau of Resource Management (BRM), headed by an assistant secretary of state with the purpose to coordinate budget between USAID and State.

Within the State Department two completely different bureaus are responsible for different aspects of International Affairs budget: Office of the Foreign Assistance and Bureau of Budget and Planning. The improvement in internal coordination of the State Department grew stronger with the birth of the Office of the Foreign Assistance (F) in 2006 which incorporated the planning of budget by State and USAID. Office of

Foreign Assistance, reports to the Secretary of State, prepares the request for foreign assistance programs controlled by the State Department, such as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Economic Supports Funds (ESF), counterterrorism, non-proliferation, counter-narcotics, and non UN international organizations and peacekeeping activities (Adams, Bent and Peroff 2017). Another bureau, the Bureau of Budget and Planning (BBP), reports to the Under Secretary of State for management, prepares the budget for the State Department operations, US assessed payments to the United Nations, and public diplomacy programs (Adams, Bent and Peroff 2017).

In order to execute crucial US foreign funding programs abroad, the “State Department and US Agency for International Development (USAID) must first request funds from Congress as part of the President’s annual budget requests” (Budget Process, US State Department). Congress who holds the “power of the purse”, then “provides funds based on that request to the state department and the USAID” (Budget Process, US State Department). Each year US Foreign Assistance Resource works with the “State Department’s Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP), USAID’s Office of Budget and Resource Management (BRM) and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to forge a budget request that advances US diplomatic, defense and development goals” (Budget Process, US State Department). Once various US embassies and USAID missions send their budget requirements to Washington DC, US Foreign Assistance Resource, BP and BRM analyze and review it. Their budgetary requests are finally submitted to OMB. Under the leadership of White House, OMB defines the final draft of the budget request including requests from all Executive Branch federal agencies and transmits the budget request to the US Congress (Budget Process, US State Department).



**Table 3.3: The Process for International Affairs Budget in US**

<b>Stage</b>	<b>Process</b>
1.	Possible budget requirements for the upcoming year is sent by US embassies and USAID missions around the world to Washington DC.
2.	US Foreign Assistance, BP and BRM review the submitted budget requests and send it to OMB.
3.	OMB plans the final budget which the president submits to the US Congress. Within this budget, international affairs budget, UN Regular budget and UN Peacekeeping budget is also outlined.
4.	The “House Foreign Affairs” and the “Senate Foreign Relations Committee” hold hearings with top officials from the administration, especially Secretary of State to discuss the budget request. At this stage, Congressional appropriators also recommend various suggestions on the budget.
5.	The “House and Senate State/ Foreign Operations (SFOPS) Appropriations Subcommittees” consider and eventually pass their “respective versions of International Affairs funding bill”. Once the Committees report declares the bills, it may go to the congressional floor for consideration.
6.	House representatives and senators negotiate the budget to agree on a compromised version of the budget.
7.	The final bill for the federal budget of next fiscal year is passed which automatically includes funding for international bodies.

Source: US State Department and Better World Campaign

**Table 3.4: Role of Various Departments in International Affairs Budget**

Department	Role of the Department
1. Office of US Foreign Assistance (F)	The Office of US Foreign Assistance was established in 2006 to coordinate US foreign assistance programs. It works closely with BP and BRM before submitting budget to OMB.
2. Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP)	BP undertakes the “principal responsibilities of preparing and submitting the State Department’s budget requests, managing the State Department’s operational resource requirements and ensuring that the operational planning and performance management is synchronized with the Department’s resource requirements” (Bureau of Budget and Planning: US State Department).
3. Budget and Resource Management (BRM)	The Office of Budget and Resource Management (BRM) is the key organization which is responsible for USAID’s “resource planning process and budget capabilities that prioritize investments and are informed by policy priorities and anticipated impacts” (Office of Budget and Resource Management: USAID).
4. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)	The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) primarily attends to the US President in “overseeing the implementation of his vision across the Executive Branch” (Office of Management and Budget: White House). Specifically, OMB’s purpose is to “assist the President in meeting his policy, budget, management and regulatory objectives and to fulfill the agency’s statutory responsibilities” (Office of Management and Budget: White House).

Source- US State Department, Bureau of Budget and Planning, Budget & Resource Management and Office of Management and Budget

Sometimes the “White House intervenes to influence Congress’ revenue and spending decisions”. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 made the “president responsible for the national budget by requiring him to prepare and submit revenue and spending estimates to Congress annually” (Schick 2007). The act led to the establishment of the Bureau of the Budget, now called the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to help in drafting and executing the executive budget. Even though this has been amended some times, this statute is “still the principal legal source of the President’s budget power” (Schick 2007). OMB is the primary department that formulates the budget for the President and coordinates with all the other departments in the administration and processes their budgetary needs before presenting it in front of the Congress.

The OMB is staffed by career civil servants who remain from one administration to the next regardless of the partisanship of the President, and is therefore able to offer advice and assistance that benefits from long-term knowledge and experience rooted in institutional memory of federal governmental activities and programs (Tomkin 1998). Since the 1970s, when the Congressional role in budget process increased, OMB has time and again assumed greater responsibilities in supporting the president in various budgetary negotiations. Due to OMB being run by civil servants without any specific party loyalty, they serve the President with “neutral competence”<sup>5</sup> while giving advices to their political bosses and loyal execution of their orders. One big challenge OMB faces is that the budgeters have to juggle three years of programs simultaneously- the current year, for which they give quarterly disbursements to federal agencies; the coming fiscal year, the president’s budget proposals which are released in early February and then defended in Congress until some action is taken; and the following year, for which they work with agencies to develop the new budget (Stevenson 2013).

When the budget examiners at OMB coordinate with other agencies while developing a budget, their mindset is particularly different and goal oriented. To make sure that they implement the President’s policy guidelines, they tweak the budgetary requests according to the administration’s outlook post agency hearings. As the “elements of the international Affairs budget submissions are received at OMB, they are distributed

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<sup>5</sup> A concept coined by Charles Stevenson and first mentioned in America’s Foreign Policy Toolkit: Key Institutions and Process.

to ten to fifteen budget examiners in the International Affairs Division”, each of whom reviews a particular account or agency budget (Adams, Bent and Peroff 2017). The process includes “hearings or meetings for an hour to a full day with the State Department, USAID and other international affairs program and budget personnel” (Adams, Bent and Peroff 2017). The purpose of agency hearings is to make sure that the budget reflects White House’s policy orientation and not just the respective agency’s preferences. The OMB director reviews the hearings in November and early December. The review process is a closed door affair which doesn’t include officials from White House. On the basis of this internal review, the OMB director sends a letter known as the “pass back”, to the international affairs agencies usually around Thanksgiving (Adams, Bent &Peroff: 2017). The State Department and USAID review the pass back to decide what suggestions to accept. After this stage, the OMB director, senior officials from White House, cabinet level secretaries and the President meet to discuss the budget proposal. Once the president has made any last minute changes to the 2000 plus page document, the budget is prepared for the Congress.

The role of OMB does not limit till the submission of the budget to the Congress. OMB staffers and policy leadership continue to play a significant role in coordinating the administration’s key response to congressional discussions, including participation in interagency meetings, organizing the White House response and communicating the key congressional committees (Adams, Bent and Peroff: 2017). Even though OMB continues to be important at this stage of the budget process, various heads of agencies have the task to defend President’s recommendations and their section of the budget. To get the budget passed, “the president and his staff have to navigate through budget resolutions, reconciliation bills, authorization legislation, annual appropriations, tax legislation and more” (Schick 2007).

In the Congress, the budget is reviewed along three mostly separate tracks- one through the authorizing committees, one through the budget committee and finally through the appropriations committee (Stevenson 2013). Following the “submission of the President’s budget in February each year”, the Budget Committees start formulating Congress’ budget plan. The House Committee on Budget and Senate Committee on Budget chart their respective budget resolutions, which are basically non binding documents passed in the Congress with aim of putting spending limits.

Budget Committees formally solicit the views of the authorizing and appropriations committees (Adams and Williams 2010). These views become an important element of the Budget Committees deliberations where additional analyses and information is included with the help of Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) annual reports on the budget and economic outlook. CBO came into existence in 1975 with the sole purpose to support the congressional budgetary process by producing independent analysis of the economic issues (Introduction to CBO, Congressional Budget Office). The organization is non partisan in nature and conducts impartial examination.

Each chamber's Budget Committee then prepares its draft or markup of the Concurrent Budget Resolution (Congress' Budget Plan) (Adams and Williams 2010). The conference committee which includes the budget committee members from both chambers prepares a Budget Resolution Conference report. Once the "Senate Budget Committee reports the Budget resolution and congress completes its action on it, annual appropriation bills may be considered" at this stage (Heniff Jr. 2008). The House Appropriations Committee reports about the last annual appropriations bill. Once compromise is reached by the Congress, the bill is passed which finally is signed by the President and next year's fund for the federal government is passed.

The Congressional role in budget making process is pivotal as even though the President submits his budget, the Congress has its own procedure and priorities. Earlier, budget resolutions were not difficult to agree upon in the congress, but in recent times with growing partisan division in the country, the Congress has found difficulty in fiscal agreements. But because the president's signature is not needed for the resolutions, they are not the law of the land. The change in the budgetary process brought from the 1974 act has led to an important modern day phenomenon called the "government shutdown". These shutdowns occur when there is lack of approval for the basic federal funds for the next year. The Congress' failure to pass all the important spending bills leads to a shutdown of few federal operations.

This chapter tried to focus on the procedural aspects of budget making in United Nations and the development of international affairs budget in United States. The evolution of budgetary process in the US has also been an important catalyst for strengthening partisan opinion on the US federal budget. Understanding the procedure of budget making and funding in UN and US gives a better insight of the institutional

framework within which various political forces influence the budget debates. The complicating bureaucratic method of budget making in UN with multiple states having the ability to sway the results in UNGA has been foreshadowed by the power and influence of United States time and again. Irrespective of the complex funding framework present in the Executive and the Legislative, the political clout at Washington DC has constructed and deconstructed the budgeting debates at New York since its inception. Therefore, discerning the structural arrangement of budget making and funding of international affairs at UN and US respectively, lays out the institutional parameters within which political forces play out.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **PRESIDENCY AND FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: SHIFT IN POLICY APPROACH TO UN FUNDING**

The role of US Presidents in the funding of UN and their understanding and approach towards the international organization has a direct impact on the process of UN budgeting. In the times after the Cold War era, the US presidents have been dabbling with the issues related to the future of US Foreign policy, either from a unilateralist or a multilateralist perspective. President Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and their administration have added fresh dimensions to the US-UN relations. Their overall foreign policy orientation has impacted their interaction with the international organization and with its funding requirements. The Congressional opinion has been final on the issue of US funding and payment of its dues, but the President has played a role in either being the bridge between New York and Washington; or he has fueled more animosity in the relationship because of his foreign policy outlook and rhetoric.

This chapter aims to assess the engagement of the US Executive in the US-UN relations, especially on the issue of funding. Furthermore, it tries to discern various characteristics of every post cold war presidency; its pursuing of US foreign policy and eventual interaction with the UN. An attempt has been made to examine what presidential factors are influencing the US to pay its dues to UN. This aspect would also explain the level of US engagement and interaction with the UN.

## **Bill Clinton Administration**

### **New Internationalism and Assertive Multilateralism**

The political era between the “Two Bushes” i.e. the years after the Cold War ended and before the War on Terror began, was the time when America searched for its larger place in the international order. Under the leadership of a young president, America hoped to utilize the post Cold War euphoria in establishing a new world order based on the universalization of Western liberal democracy and capitalist market. With the onset of globalization and “dot-com revolution”, the Clinton administration had the task of transitioning the US foreign policy in an era which was not governed by great power politics but by various forms of issues such as - poverty, humanitarian crisis, ecological challenges, ethnic clashes, human rights issues and so on. This was the moment in history when United Nations had the opportunity to put the great power politics in the organization behind and spread its meaningful outreach across continents for reasons it was originally founded for.



Thus the US foreign policy under the Clinton administration had three policy pillars- “1) America’s primary national goal in the mid 90s would be strong economic growth and robust economy; 2) many of the problems neglected during cold war (ecological decay, rapid population growth, political repression etc) must receive international attention and; 3) international institutions such as United Nations and World Bank should play a meaningful role in achieving national goals of countries” (Hook and Spanier 2007). With past experience in domestic politics and minimal foreign policy exposure, President Bill Clinton entered White House amidst the “national debate over the nature and future of American internationalism”. Clinton’s foreign policy agenda of the early years followed President George H.W Bush’s “new world order” and aimed at following liberal internationalism. Although US ambassador to UN Madeline Albright coined the term “Assertive Multilateralism” this philosophy of US and UN leading multilateral engagements or operations abroad was inherited from the previous administration (Saddam-Kuwait Operation). The concept of Assertive Multilateralism has been associated with the characteristics of the president it is followed by. George H. W. Bush was popular for being a team player because of which, he had developed good relations with heads of state and foreign diplomats during his time as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and as Director of Central Intelligence (Boys 2012). He was, therefore, well positioned to lead a multilateral coalition and maximize the historical timing associated with the collapse of the U.S.S.R (Boys 2012).

Clinton on the other hand being a foreign policy novice, relied on his team, (Warren Christopher, Madeline Albright, Anthony Lake, Les Aspin and so on) who crafted a US foreign policy grounded on the moral and idealistic ethos of practicing multilateralism, humanitarian intervention, UN peacekeeping and stronger US role at various international organizations especially UN. Since his campaign days people like Anthony Lake (National Security Advisor) and Richard Gardener (Professor from Columbia University) helped shaping Clinton’s understanding on the future of US multilateralism. The importance of multilateralism in US foreign policy was clearly etched in the early years of the administration. President Bill Clinton stated that-

*“...increasingly in this new era, we will need to work with an array of multinational partners, often in new arrangements....our involvement in multilateral efforts need*

*not be open-ended or ill defined, so that we can go abroad and accomplish some distinct objectives, and then come home again when the mission is accomplished”* (President Clinton’s Welcoming Remarks 1993).

One of the early documents planned by the Clinton administration that would help in the tangible understanding of assertive multilateralism was the Presidential Review Directive 13 or the PRD 13 which outlined America’s participation in international peacekeeping efforts led by the United Nations. According to the early draft of the report the administration:

*“...strongly endorsed the expansion of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and recommended that the United States support multilateral peace operations politically, financially, and militarily. Reflecting PRD-13, the draft PDD endorsed peacekeeping as an essential element of US security policy and suggested that whenever possible the United States commit itself to the multilateral, rather than unilateral, use of force”* (Daalder: 1994)

The Clinton administration also planned to increase the UN staff in UN headquarters in New York, a move seen as US efforts to accept greater UN authority in international affairs, especially in the case of peacekeeping operations. According to a Washington Post story in 1993:

*“U.N. officials acknowledged they sorely need the kind of political and logistical boost the United States is offering....the U.S. plan calls for a reorganization of the U.N. peace-keeping staff, including the creation with U.S. help of a military operations headquarters modeled after the Pentagon's 24-hour command center...the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to take a case-by-case approach and place U.S. troops under U.N. or allied command whenever they find the particular arrangements acceptable.”* (Smith and Preston 1993)

Furthermore, Madeline Albright said that “the United States intends to support U.N. efforts to create a central peace-keeping budget to pay for such operations, including an enlarged contingency fund and a ready pool of military equipment” (Smith and Preston 1993).

The Clinton administration spoke of the UN peacekeeping efforts not only from the lens of US political or military commitment to the operations, but also from logistical and funding perspective. Realizing the size of such UN operations in various parts of the world, the administration supported gradual moves for increasing the UN peacekeeping budget. In the early years of the administration, the policy makers at Washington DC intended on creating a domestic environment that would've let the US Executive to commit bigger funds to the UN. Such intentions were visible not only in the PRD 13 but also in many speeches given by the various member of the Clinton administration. In her speech at Council on Foreign Relations on June 11, 1993 the US Ambassador to UN Madeline Albright reiterated the administration's plan for UN peacekeeping in the form of possible sustained Congressional support for funding UN Peacekeeping Operations, a contingency fund for future missions that gives more authority to the UN Secretary General and US supply of qualified budget experts to UN.

*“...it is also a fact that peace-keeping costs--roughly \$1 billion for us in 1993--must have deep support in Congress and in the public at large if they are going to be sustained. That means we must be extremely clear about how the UN serves U.S. security interests...Peace-keeping costs are billed by the mission, a time-consuming process out of sync with our own and many others' legislative appropriation cycles. One possible solution is to create a unified UN peace-keeping budget accompanied by an enlarged contingency fund for unforeseen missions. While such a fund would have to be adjusted annually, it would give the Secretary-General a better planning basis and reduce the need for member states to keep returning to their legislature for additional finance.”* (Speech by Madeline Albright 1993)

Furthermore Albright added saying that-

*“...as the number and size of peace- keeping missions have grown, so have the United Nations' cash requirements. Yet the UN does not have the resources or skilled staff needed to manage and oversee increasingly complicated peace-keeping budgets. The U.S. and other large donors should support creation of a cadre of highly qualified budget experts for this purpose, as well as the introduction of special budgeting techniques.”* (Speech by Madeline Albright 1993)

In her other statement in front of the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs the ambassador spoke of “improvising” in terms of the budget and financial requirements of UN peacekeeping missions. Empathizing with the logistical constraints of UN at New York and the vast responsibility it has on its shoulders, the ambassador spoke of future plans of the administration to support the increase in its size and effectiveness. Furthermore, she added that solely focusing on domestic agendas could lead to additional financial burden not only for the UN but also for the US.

*“Improvisation is the single word that might best evoke the problems of peace-keeping. And while the potential for fraud and mismanagement exists, as it does in any large organization, the most pressing problems in UN peace-keeping relate to the sheer improvisational character of the system....The millions that are spent on peace-keeping operations--totaling more than \$3 billion in 1993--must be measured against the much higher costs that result if conflicts are left to fester and explode....refusing to recognize the carnage to our left and the distant conflict to our right, eventually the cost of that disengagement, at a minimum, will be an additional financial burden we must bear.”* (US Department of State Dispatch: 1993)

Assertive Multilateralism and New Internationalism helped the Clinton administration in taking ahead the US foreign policy in complex times. With domestic concerns about “over-commitment” of US abroad and domestic economic troubles, the policy makers decided to keep US actively engaged in the world affairs but via the multilateral forums especially United Nations. Splitting the issue of financial and leadership burden sharing with United Nations, the administration decided to balance its domestic and foreign policy requirements accordingly. Even though it knew that US would’ve to support the international organization financially, politically, militarily and logistically, sharing the international responsibility with UN seemed much more feasible than unilateralism.

### **Somalia and US Foreign Policy Reversal**

During the latter term of the George H.W Bush presidency, the US committed itself for the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The socio-political situation in Somalia had

worsened due to the clan system involving rival clans for controlling loyalties and resources. In 1980s, the country witnessed civil war between warlords namely Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed making Mogadishu one of the most dangerous places in the world. Rapid famine, poverty, drought and clan clashes led to death of many people. By early 1990s vast number of people started dying due to hunger related issues amidst Somali Civil War conflict. The increase of death toll led to international community's attention and eventual intervention of the United Nations. In April, 1992, the UNSC passed Resolution 751 which formed the United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) and swiftly ordered the deployment of 50 observers in Mogadishu. Eventually, with the aim to provide "secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid", US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) (Operation Restore Hope) was authorized by Security Council Resolution 794 in December 1992.

The most noteworthy disparity between the US and UN understanding of the UNITAF mandate was the "refusal of the Bush and Clinton Administrations and the military leadership to become embroiled in the disarmament of the various factions, considering it beyond their mandate, and frankly too dangerous for their troops" (Brune 1998). Also, there were fears that "such actions would drag them further into the Somali crisis than they wanted to be, losing the capacity for a clean, quick-exit strategy" (Brune 1998). Whereas, officials at UN felt that the "secure environment" mentioned in the UNSC resolution 794 cannot be acquired without the disarming of the clans or gangs involved. The UNITAF mission led to lull in violent events in Mogadishu. This lull was dependent on the "continued presence of intimidating US marines, ready and most willing to challenge anyone who opposed them" (Ehsa, Pengalase and Mendez 1993). Although violence did flare up again later in its tenure, "it was forced to become more involved with disarming the factions; as Africa Watch noted, UNITAF caused an 'immediate and dramatic improvement' in the lives of most Somalis" (Ehsa, Pengalase and Mendez 1993).

Problems started emerging as the America decided to initiate its plan for its partial withdrawal from Somalia. The UN hoped that "the new US Administration, with its focus on multilateralism and UN peacekeeping, would become more deeply involved in the political aspects of the Somali crisis" (Murray 2007). However, "Clinton

seemed just as keen to pull US troops home, even if his policies were more optimistic and supportive of an enlarged UN role in the country as UNITAF's replacement" (Murray 2007). The American humanitarian intervention plan was still in sync with the "post-Vietnam military lines". But situation in the last days had started dwindling to sporadic violent outbursts leaving US forces more involved. The American perspective on Somalia crisis "either failed to perceive the link between the state of political/governmental vacuum and the famine/humanitarian crisis in the country, or ignored it because they knew recognition of this fact would necessitate a deeper involvement than they wished to commit to" (Murray 2007).

Later in March 1993, UNSC adopted Resolution 814 which established UNISOM II. But things turned for worse when operations of UNISOM II were being implemented on ground. By September, policy makers at Washington DC started reiterating the limits of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention for Americans rather than the moral virtues of it. Finally the irreversible disaster struck on 2-3 October when Aideed's militias shot two Black Hawk helicopters down and clash between the two sides led to the death of 18 American personnel.

The Clinton administration was shaken by the developments in Somalia. Critics attacked the Clinton administration for lack of consistency in its foreign policy and ambiguous understanding of peacekeeping. According to a leading commentator- "It is quite a different matter to introduce peacekeeping forces to compel the parties to a conflict to stop fighting, without any agreement on the terms and conditions for doing so.... To call the latter "peace enforcement" at least acknowledges the problem but still conceals the risks involved" (Wolfowitz 1993). On May 1994, PRD 13 got signed by President Bill Clinton as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (NSC-PDD 25). The report was divided into six sections outlining Clinton administration's policy on reforming multilateral peace operations. The second section of the report spoke of "reducing US costs for UN peace operations". The report claimed:

*"Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the U.S., it would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs to 25% by January 1, 1996, down from the current rate of 31.7%. We will also inform the UN of Congress's likely refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate higher than 25% after Fiscal Year 1995. The*

*Administration remains concerned that the UN has not rectified management inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion, fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue to press for dramatic administrative and management improvements in the UN system.” (PDD 25, US State Department: 1996)*

The department took an overnight U-turn from its earlier policy of “assertive multilateralism” and holistically supporting UN Peacekeeping endeavors abroad. The report spoke of reforming and improving multilateral peacekeeping operations by: “1) Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support -- both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops; 2) Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves; 3) Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations; 4) Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations; 5) Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations and; 6) Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.” (PDD 25, US State Department, 1996)

The UN Peacekeeping disaster in Somalia led to blame game between UN officials and the Clinton administration leading to worsening of US-UN relations. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali started being viewed as “anti-American” in his policy approach at United Nations. In a New York Times op-ed on April 8, 1996, the UN Secretary General stated about the general financial constraints UN faces-

*“The United Nations is on the brink of financial disaster. Americans need to know what's going on, because their country took the lead in creating the organization, and its delinquency in paying arrears is threatening it. My proposed \$2.5 billion budget for 1996-97 is \$98 million less than the previous year's budget. The financial crisis has not been made any easier by the refusal of many to pay dues. Borrowing from the peacekeeping budget to meet regular operating needs cannot continue much longer. Huge sums are owed to states that have provided troops and equipment for peace operations. Besides, while we carry out old mandates new ones keep coming” (Ghali 1996).*

Washington DC decided to put all its efforts in making sure that Ghali doesn't get second term at UN. Madeline Albright, James Rubin, Michael Sheehan and Richard Clarke formed an alliance called the "Operation Orient Express" to stop Ghali's re-election. His perceived arrogance and "disregard for American sensitivities" made him unpopular with people in the United States: among the American public, in Congress and in the White House (Williams 2017). Although not alone in the Security Council in their dislike of Boutros Ghali, the Americans provoked discord by the tactics they employed. France especially resented the American bullying and put up a strong fight, eventually US exercised its veto denying him second term in striking 14-1 in UNSC in November 1996 (Williams 2017).

With all these developments and abandonment of assertive multilateralism by the Clinton administration, the US foreign policy took cautious steps towards multilateralism. The Republican control of the US Congress added domestic pressure on the administration to weigh its support to international organization. The Clinton administration "campaigned for a cut in UN expenses and a cut in the budgets so that for the 1996-97 biennium the regular budget was only \$2.06 billion- in other words, no increase in nominal terms" (McDermott 2002). The General Assembly appropriated \$2.532 billion for 1998-9 (McDermott 2000). But for "the chief contributor to be still owing then one-third of its contributions for 1994 and all of 1995 while, at the same time, asking for cuts in the UN, not surprisingly, evoked strong criticism, not just from Third World countries but also from its closest allies in Europe" (McDermott 2000). Due to economic priorities and domestic politics, the administration pushed for stringent UN reforms especially in the context of funding international organizations.

## **George W Bush Administration**

### **Neo-Conservatism and Moderate Multilateralism**

By the time George W Bush entered the White House, US had already taken the unilateral turn thanks to the Republican majority in the Congress. Being an arch-unilateralist, President Bush was highly skeptical about the benefits of international organizations, treaties and laws for furthering US interests when it can achieve its goals by being "unilateral". His administration included Condoleezza Rice, Dick



Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, to name a few, all sharing Bush's opinion on being unbelieving of multilateralism. The only member of his administration that supported multilateral course of action was Collin Powell, US Secretary of State (2001-2005). According to the Bush administration, multilateral cooperation with other countries on international forums since World War II didn't mold the other countries according to the democratic and capitalist belief of the Americans. Rather by committing to multiple projects and assignments worldwide, these institutions have put extra burden on US and endangered its sovereignty. Therefore, the new administration asserted that it would be selective in international or multilateral engagements.

George Bush became the US president during the national atmosphere of legislative attacks on the multilateral organizations, especially United Nations. Keeping in sync with the political mood of the country, he stood against multilateralism, nation building and further engagement with United Nations (Sanger 2000). The administration made its unilateral intentions clear by opposing to ratify many international treaties like International Criminal Court, Kyoto Protocol, Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Law of Sea of Convention, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In response to US unilateralism, in May 2001, the US was voted out off UN Human Rights panel since its inception. The removal of the "United States from the commission while nations like Sudan and Pakistan were chosen for membership generated further hostility to the United Nations among conservatives in Congress and White House" (Corrssette 2001). The unexpected move, "which came in a secret vote, was apparently supported even by some US allies" (Corrssette 2001). In retaliation to this the Congress withheld the US dues to UN until its membership was not restored in the panel.

George Bush's top aides played a phenomenal role in developing his approach to US foreign policy. According to his foreign policy advisers, United States should exploit its hard won primacy by remaking the world in America's image, by remaking the world in America's image, by force if necessary. Both the "containment and détente policies of the Cold War", and "Bill Clinton's engagement policy in 1990s was dismissed as too passive" by the "neoconservatives" or the "vulcans" as some called them (Mann 2004). The neoconservative part of his administration found a new voice

and influence on the US foreign policy in the aftermath of September 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon. In the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) Report, Bush stated

*“Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States...America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions- as broad as practicable- of states able and willing to promote a balance power that favors freedom...we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against terrorists to prevent them from doing harm to our country...”* (NSS 2002)

Rather than relying under the traditional ambit of NATO or UN, the Bush administration started relying on the temporary case by case basis for the “coalition of the willing”. These coalitions would be defunct once the mission goals have been achieved in the respective regions of the world.

But even though the administration strengthened its unilateral voice post 9/11, its policy swung between unilateralism and multilateralism. In the hopes of garnering international support in its foreign policy endeavors abroad, the administration took many pro-multilateral steps. As discussed in the second chapter, during the Reagan administration, US withdrew its membership from UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on the grounds of corruption and cold war politics. The Bush administration made a surprise announcement of rejoining UNESCO in 2002. This political move by many was viewed as Bush’s readiness for meaningful international cooperation. One of the French officials declared “Brilliant timing”, citing the “U.S. return to the world body as a simple, effective message that the prevailing go-it-alone mood in Washington could be overridden for selected international ventures” (Fitchett 2002). Even though the NSS 2002 document made bold unilateral statements for the future of US foreign policy, it did claim to be if not a stern but a compromised multilateralist- “We are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances”

(NSS 2002). The veering of US Foreign policy between unilateralism and multilateralism was visible throughout the Bush presidency.

The issue of US debt to UN and financial crisis faced by the UN (explained in detail in the next chapter) has been an interlinked matter involving not just the US Executive but also the Congress and top UN offices. The financial crisis faced by UN since 1980s and 1990s amidst stringent US legislative measures on funding United Nations, got somewhat relaxed during the Bush administration. The urge of solving the matter of US dues to UN got new lease under Bush's post 9/11 multilateral-ist initiatives. In a gesture of goodwill towards the international organization and working closely towards terrorists activities abroad, a press briefing after one month of 9/11 "UN Under Secretary General for Management Joseph Connor said that the United States had informed the U.N. that it would receive a total of \$1.666 billion from the United States in 2001" (UN Press Release 2001). This total "included both arrears payments and the assessed contributions for the 2001 period. He further stressed that most of the \$1.666 billion promised by the US is expected after October 2001" (UN Press Release 2001).

Even though in the early months of the administration, the president's approach towards UN was similar to the anti-UN stance by the legislature of the 1990s, "after 9/11, this behavior seemed to shift to a greater emphasis on U.N. participation" (Bond 2003). Analysts suggested that "only yesterday, it seems, the great issue was getting an increasingly disengaged United States to pay its back dues and pay attention; now the problem is keeping an aroused America from sallying off on ... a reckless crusade" (Bond: 2003). President Bush emphasized how important it was for the United Nations to "assume its responsibilities" and "be a successful international body, because the threats that we face now require more cooperation than ever" (Bond 2003). On October 12, 2001, \$625 million dollars reached the UN headquarters which included peacekeeping payments of \$571 million and \$23 million for International Criminal Tribunals (UN Press Release: 2001). Eventually in November, US again paid \$475 million dollars towards its peacekeeping dues (UN Press Release 2001). Similarly the President signed appropriation bill providing \$46 million for the repayment of US arrears to the UN (UN Press Release 2002).

## **Oil for Food Scandal and UN Ambassador John Bolton**

Apart from the Iraq War fiasco and the international criticism of America's unilateral decision making in the UN, the US-UN relations saw some other crucial roadblocks during this time. In 1996, under the jurisdiction of UN Security Council, the Oil for Food Program was established which allowed Iraq to sell their oil in exchange of food as the country faced stringent sanction post the first Gulf war. But according to a 2004 report by Central Investigation Agency, Saddam Hussein exploited the program, earning some \$1.7 billion through kickbacks and surcharges, and \$10.9 billion through illegal oil smuggling (Otterman 2005). The discovery of large scale mismanagement and unethical/corrupt practices by the UN officials made the matters worse. According to the findings by the independent UN Inquiry Committee into Oil for Food Programme, poor financial control by the UN eventually led to the scandal. The final suggestions made by the panel included- UNSC deciding more clearly about various UN operations, their scope and purpose; a Chief Operating Officer should be elected by the UNSC to assist "Secretariat's administrative responsibilities; establishment of an independent Auditing Board that should be responsible for complete UN review and; various UN tasks should be more organized and coordinated between all the inter-UN agencies" (Volcker, Goldstone and Pieth, Inquiry Committee on Oil for Food Program, 2005).

The reaction to Oil for Food scandal was severe in the United States not just by the Congress but also by the administration. Moreover, the time when the news of this scandal broke was when the Bush administration was hoping for troops and financial support from the international organization for its cause in Iraq. Rapprochement between the "United States and the UN had been slow in coming after the Bush administration's decision to go to war without the backing of the body, and given its continued wariness towards multilateralism" (The Economist 2004). In an effort to move towards international cooperation, President Bush announced his initiative United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF) at the 2004 United Nations General Assembly. The aim of the fund was to promote human rights, democracy, and freedom with the help of international cooperation. The United States and India provided the first pledges, giving \$10 million each. In addition, countries including Australia, France, Indonesia, Qatar, Senegal and Sri Lanka also gave, bringing the

total amount available for disbursement to \$50 million. By 2006, the U.S. gave a total of \$18 million to UNDEF (UN Democracy Fund, US Department of State, 2006). But with strong congressional reactions (explained in next chapter) to the oil for food scandal, the Bush administration found itself in a sticky situation amidst its hesitating multilateral foreign policy initiatives.

Furthermore, with President Bush nominating John Bolton as the new US ambassador to the UN, the relationship further strained. Bolton had been famous in the policy making circles for being a vocal critic of the international organization. President Bush “sidestepped the Senate and installed embattled nominee John Bolton as ambassador to the United Nations, after a five-month impasse with Democrats who accused Bolton of abusing subordinates and twisting intelligence to fit his conservative ideology” (Hunt 2005). Bush had “refused to give up on Bolton even though the Senate had voted twice to sustain a filibuster against his nominee. Democrats and some Republicans had raised questions about Bolton’s fitness for the job, particularly in view of his harsh criticism of the United Nations” (Hunt 2005).

In his book “Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad”, the former ambassador expressed the “market test” approach for funding United Nations. He stated-

*“There is simply no doubt that eliminating the “entitlement” mentality caused by relying on assessed contributions would profoundly affect UN officials around the world.” (Bolton: 2007) He further stated that “If member governments providing resources were not satisfied with the outcomes produced by their UN contributions, they could shift their funds elsewhere, thus providing a “market test” for effectiveness...If non-UN programs or agencies proved more effective, the UN would quickly feel the consequences” (Bolton 2007).*

Bolton suggested that US should rely more on voluntary funding to UN so that it can make sure that the funds are used to maximize US national interest. Even though he acknowledged that shifting completely from assessed to voluntary funding would be difficult, he stressed on this issue being thoroughly debated globally which the US Congress and Executive should spearhead. He further went ahead and not only criticized the issue of funding but basic UN principles itself-

*“Most important, it is inherently untenable that America submit to any decision making process in which it is simply one nation with one vote among 192 “equal” nations. There is nothing “equal” about them except the diaphanous idea of “sovereign equality” that no one outside the UN pays the slightest attention to” (Bolton: 2007). He added, “there is no doubt that the one nation- one-vote principle—as fraudulent an analogy to real democracy as has ever been made—completely dominates UN program, budget, and management decision-making, almost entirely to the detriment of the United States” (Bolton 2007)*

To many of his critics, Bolton became the aggressive, unilateralist symbol of the Bush administration. With persistent opposition by Democrats in the Congress, Bolton finally stepped down in 2006. By later half of the Bush administration, Democrats capture of the US congress and the unfolding of the situation in Iraq, Bush’s bold unilateral initiatives and rhetoric came under scrutiny. The pressure for multilateral endeavors was high, but with unilateral misadventures abroad, Bush administration’s attempt at mending bridges with UN or the international community seemed futile and unconvincing.

## **Barack Obama Administration**

### **New Commitment to International Cooperation**

The Bush administration’s foreign policy legacy marred with unilateral interventions, had damaged US leadership and image abroad. The public opinion of Bush was in decline since the Iraq War. The 2008 Presidential Elections led to democrats capturing the White House again after eight years. Barack Obama, former senator from Illinois, became the symbol of change in the nation. He ran on the platform of ending war in Iraq, strengthening US alliances abroad, revitalizing global institutions, combating climate change, and pursuing diplomacy in Middle East. In his 2010 National Security Strategy Report, President Obama stressed-

*“In recent years America’s frustration with international institutions has led us at times to engage the United Nations (U.N.) system on an ad hoc basis. But in a world of transnational challenges, the United States will need to invest in strengthening the international system, working from inside international institutions and frameworks to*

*face their imperfections head on and to mobilize transnational cooperation”* (NSS 2010)

President Obama elected Susan Rice (2009) a former fellow at Brookings Institute with work focused on foreign policy, global poverty and transnational threats, as the new US ambassador to UN. Her pro international cooperation approach was welcomed by United Nations. During her Senate Confirmation hearing she stated

*“To lead from a position of strength, the United States must consistently act as a responsible, fully engaged partner in the U.N. President-elect Obama believes that the United States should pay our dues to the U.N. in full and on time. I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress to ensure that we do so, as well as to pay down our newly mounting arrears and to support legislation to permanently lift the cap on U.S. payments to the United Nations peacekeeping budget”* (Congressional Hearings, 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, 2009).

Obama restored the position of the UN ambassador to cabinet rank, which was last seen in Clinton administration, signaling the importance of US-UN relations. Rice’s close relations with Obama and the White House officials gave the ambassador the opportunity to present UN concerns directly to the president, trespassing bureaucratic chain of procedures.

By the end of Bush administration and the beginning of Obama administration the world saw one of the worst economic recession (late 2000s to early 2010s) which led to many job losses and economic downturn not just in the US but also in various parts of the world especially Europe. The world recession began in the US due to the economic crisis of subprime mortgage sector which eventually led to the crashing of the banking system. The Obama government had to issue massive bail outs to various financial institutions to keep the monetary system of the country and the world afloat. In such a scenario, the Congress and the President showed high sensitivity to the domestic matters. The global recession put pressure on not only budget commitments of US but of all donor countries, plunging the UN in resource crisis. As various UN programs and agencies had started relying on voluntary funds over assessed funds (as they were less in comparison), they started facing budgeting issues. The UN’s “emergency relief co-ordinator John Holmes claimed that he had received less than

half the \$9.5bn sought for humanitarian work in 2009” (Foley 2009). “It is clear that the global recession puts pressure on the aid budgets of all donor governments, but of course it puts immeasurably more pressure on crises-stricken people in poor countries” (Foley 2009).

Irrespective of the financial crisis and congressional clashes, the Obama administration constantly reiterated its seriousness towards international commitments and funding obligations. As of the end of November 2010, “the United States owed \$1.182 billion, accounting for just over a quarter of all the money due the world body” (Reuters 2011). Washington “paid nearly half a billion dollars of what it owed for peacekeeping, the regular U.N. budget and other items.” “The updated situation at the end of 2010 reflects significant payments made by the U.S. at the end of calendar year 2010,” U.N. spokesman Farhan Haq stated (Reuters 2011). “That leaves total outstanding assessed (mandatory) contributions of \$736.2 million,” he added. (Reuters 2011).

The Obama administration’s challenge had been to gather support of Congress to continue full engagement with the United Nations irrespective of many of its flaws. In a term which was dominated by the constant clashes between the White House and Capitol Hill, President Obama faced special difficulties in converting his pro-UN foreign policy in terms of funding. Congressional demands for “UN Reforms” had been consistent since the 1980s, but with Republican control of the UN the issue gained renewed attention, especially on the matter of funding.

Realizing the growing voice for UN reform in the Congress, the administration outlined its broad UN reform agenda. This agenda was a way for the administration to come to a middle path with the Congress on the issue of US participation in the UN. US ambassador to UN Joseph Torsella (2011- 2014) during an event with Council on Foreign Relations explained the administration’s plan-

*“Our first priority is thrift: getting the U.N. to adjust to these tough times...Until very recently, the U.N. budget has been disconnected from global financial realities...Controlling that spending, especially in this time of fiscal challenges, is our obligation. The second task in our reform agenda is to promote greater public accountability at the U.N., as befits what is now a global public institution. Our third*



*reform priority is the U.N.'s reputation and integrity, preventing, where we can, misguided efforts by member states and the self-inflicted wounds that too often make headlines and damage public support for the U.N. the fourth and final pillar of our reform plan is an agenda for excellence. That means, above all, shifting the U.N.'s focus from outputs to outcomes. That means moving much more aggressively to unify service delivery at the country level.” (CFR Event 2012)*

### **Mobilizing International Climate Funds**

With economic woes and domestic pressures, the Obama presidency chose to selectively finance various UN funds based on the administration's priorities. One of Obama's biggest legacies has been his policies towards climate change and environment. In 2013, White House announced the administration's Climate Action Plan which laid national plan of reducing carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) and greenhouse gas emissions (GHS). The plan laid three tier goals: cutting carbon pollution in America, preparing US for future effects of climate change and leading international campaign against climate change. Internationally, United States has been criticized by other countries for thwarting multilateral efforts to deal with climate change. With Bush administration's failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol behind, the Obama administration showed positive commitment towards reducing GHG emissions in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. The Climate Action plan claimed to “fulfill joint developed country commitment from the Copenhagen Accord to provide approximately \$30 billion of climate assistance to developing countries over FY 2010-FY 2012” (President's Climate Action Plan, White House, 2013). According to the plan, “the United States contributed approximately \$7.5 billion to this effort over the three year period” (President's Climate Action Plan, White House: 2013). The “\$30 billion was intended as a publicly funded —fast start toward stimulating financing – both public and private – of \$100 billion annually by 2020” (Legette 2013).

United States during the Obama administration actively financed many international funds working under the framework of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the aim of combating climate change. The United States “spent \$2.6 billion in 2015 to support developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change, representing 0.07 percent of the federal budget” (Thwaites 2017). While most of this “funding is delivered bilaterally, \$422 million –

16 percent – went to multilateral funds” like the “Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF)” (Thwaites: 2017).

The biggest victory of the administration was its proactive role in bringing countries like China and India on board for the signing of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. The administration committed to a \$3 billion pledge to help developing countries fighting climate change. Using the executive powers, Obama paid the first installment of \$500 million dollars to Green Climate Fund in 2016 (Goldenberg 2016). Three days before leaving the White House, “Barack Obama heeded calls to help secure the future of the historic Paris agreement by transferring the second \$500m installment to the Green Climate Fund, just three days before he leaves office” (Slezak 2017). The Republicans bluntly criticized the president for such actions, calling his term as “imperial presidency” especially due to his reliance on executive orders.

The assessments made in this chapter have revolved around the role of the US president and his administration in the funding discourse. The complicating process to fund United Nations is highly political in nature. Even though the Congress gets more control over funding of United Nations, the President is able to either influence the atmosphere domestically towards the funding narrative or is able to contribute in ways Executive actions. Even though the budgeting process begins from the White House, the last word is of the Congress. The President’s leaning towards United Nations can be connected to his foreign policy. Therefore, a president with a unilateral approach towards America’s contribution in the world affairs has been vocal in its criticism of the international organization. But a multilateral approach to foreign policy leads to the administration to be more cooperative with United Nations and its funding requirements. Furthermore, events with vast long term political repercussions can also influence the President in reassessing its policies.

President Bill Clinton started his term with a firm conviction towards the importance of international bodies and peacekeeping in the post cold war world. His special attention towards America’s role in these organizations was visible not only with the way his administration conducted itself but also by heightened communication between New York and Washington DC. But all this momentum reversed with the death of Americans in Somalia, which led to the President being wary of a proactive

multilateral foreign policy. Also, with a Republican Congress, and their highly critical view of United Nations (especially on the issue of the funding), the president was legislatively held back in moving ahead with his pro multilateral plans. Similarly, the 9/11 event reversed Bush's foreign policy approach from unilateralism to moderate multilateralism. But his wavering foreign policy between unilateralism and moderate multilateralism with a skeptical Republican Congress gave mixed results on the funding matter. By the latter half of his term when the democrats held the Congress, he was criticized for his unilateral decisions and was pressured to sustain a multilateral foreign policy.

Barack Obama entered White House voicing his strong views on multilateralism and change in American approach towards international organizations. But with biggest economic recession since the Great Depression and consistent Congressional clashes, the administration could not contribute to UN as much as it would've liked. Nevertheless, the President time and again relied on his Executive powers to fund for selective issues close to him and his administration. Hence, the role of President and his foreign policy orientation plays an important role in US-UN relations.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **US CONGRESS AND UN: ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES**

The funding of UN has been an important issue for the US since the former's inception. The US Congress has strongly influenced the domestic debate on funding at various times in history. The Congressional view on this matter has made a deep impact not only on US contributions to the UN but also on the overall financial workings of the organization. Evidently its role in the UN financial crisis has been significant, either due to the passing of strict legislations on US funding of UN or because of refusal to pay the US debt to the UN. Congressional dealing on the issue of UN funding under the ambit of "UN Reforms" has also been a significant dimension in the funding debate. The US public opinion on US-UN relations has been another factor that contributed to the domestic perspectives, reflecting the political climate of the nation.

In this context this chapter will examine the financial difficulties United Nations faced; the role of US Congress in the UN funding and eventually the public opinion on US-UN relations. It focuses on how UN's financial difficulties led to a major debate on reforming the organization. It would also analyze the causal linkages between US contribution to the UN and Congressional actions. The domestic sensibilities and opinions whether congressional or of the general public would be examined for a better understanding of the funding debate.

## **UN Financial Crisis and US Dues**

United Nations has suffered three major financial crises since its inception. United States being the largest contributor to the organization since the very beginning (even though the percentage of its share has gone down) has managed to impact these moments of financial crisis the most. The first crisis was in the 1960s due to the organization's peacekeeping activities. Even though there was a debate in the Security Council over the funding (Russia and France mainly objected) of the operations to be conducted in Congo and Middle East, the eventual nod came from the General Assembly. At this stage, United States voiced support for UN expenses, especially peacekeeping. However the debate over what expenditures should come under Article 17<sup>6</sup> and how these expenses should be handled by the member states was highly

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<sup>6</sup>Article 17- "The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization."  
"The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

debated. United States played an important role in working with United Nations to solve the matter. Bonds were sold to finance the peace operations and to make up for the budgetary shortfall, and consensus decision making was instituted for the 19<sup>th</sup> General Assembly session in 1964 to avoid a showdown with the Soviet Union and France (Karns and Mingst 2002). In August 1965, faced with consensus that Article 19<sup>7</sup> should not be invoked and that the General Assembly should return to normal voting procedures, the US ambassador to UN, Arthur Goldberg articulated the US view that “the concept of collective financial responsibility is a sound principle” (Karns and Mingst 2002). At the background lurked the problem that the crisis itself was partially caused by the US and some other member countries not meeting their treaty commitment to the UN.

The second financial crisis occurred in 1980s during the Ronald Reagan presidency. This crisis occurred when member states withheld their share of dues for political reasons. Even though the United States was not the only country that withheld its share as other countries including many permanent members to UNSC too refused to make payments; US actions managed to impact the UN the most. Overall US contribution to the UN reduced to 50 percent and being the largest contributor to UN, the effects of it were felt overwhelmingly. The Reagan administration sought advice from Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that believed United Nations to be anti-capitalist, pro-Soviet Union and run by third world radicals. The think tank proposed to hold back funding on the condition of “UN Reforms” or simply refusing funds for objectionable programs (Global Policy Forum: 2005). This school of thought won over the Congress and the Executive which led to passing of three key legislations passed in 1985: the Kassebaum amendment (UN Archives), the Sundquist amendment (Alqaq 2009) and the Gramm-Rudman Hollings Balanced Budget act (Congressional Joint Resolution, 99<sup>th</sup> Congress, Public Law 99-177, 1985).

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The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned”,

<sup>7</sup> Article 19- “A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years.” “The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member”

According to the Kassebaum amendment, the US contributions to the UN were proposed to be reduced to 20% from 25%, unless the UNGA decides for weighted voting system on budgetary matters. This amendment created serious cash flow crisis in UN which led to UN workers being underpaid and piling dues of members. The Sandquist amendment “prohibited a portion of the US payment to the UN because of kickbacks paid from Soviet national’s salaries to their governments” (US General Accounting Office 1999). As the Cold War raged on, due to ideological reasons the US decided to reduce its payment to UN so that the American money does not contribute in the salaries of Soviet origin UN workers. The Gramm-Rudman Hollings Act was a bipartisan bill that was passed to deal with growing deficit and aimed to acquire a balanced budget. One of the important provisions of the act was to threaten stoppage funds that go to many UN programs, as well as the payment for regular UN budget (Alvarez 2005).

The UN responded to this financial crisis by organizing a Group of High Level Intergovernmental Experts, also known as Group of 18 (G18). According to the suggestions of the group, the UN reviewed its budgetary process. The budgetary recommendations were to be reviewed first by “Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC), then Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and then the Fifth Committee of UNGA” (A/RES/41/213, UN, 1986). By dividing the budgetary process, UN gave more authority to countries like US in CPC to intervene and reassess the budgetary requests. This way without amending the UN Charter the G18 compromised with the top funding countries. Furthermore, it was also able to cater to US Congress’ key demands for recommencing UN funds.

The third UN financial crisis and the most serious out of all occurred in 1990s during the Clinton administration. The peacekeeping operations in countries like Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq etc created financial burdens on the UN. The member states owed more than \$2.5 billion dollars to the UN based on their current and past arrears. Only “100 of 185 members had paid in full”(Mingst and Karns 2012). The United States, by far the biggest debtor, owed roughly \$1.6 billion or two-thirds of the total dues”(Mingst and Karns 2012). The Republican Party had a landmark victory in the 1994 US elections, gaining a majority in the Congress. Even though the US paid its

arrears for the 1990s, it still had not cleared its dues from the 80s during the Reagan administration. In 1996, the Congress issued new conditions for its full peacekeeping payments to the UN, which led to a dipping in the UN regular and peacekeeping budget (GA/AB/3091, UN, 1996). These actions occurred despite UN's efforts to meet US demands for consensus based budgeting and zero nominal budget growth (Karns and Mingst 2002). Partially in reaction to this and mainly due to its arrears US lost its seat in ACABQ in 1996 (US General Accounting Office 1998). Only last minute payments in 1998 and 1999 saved US voting rights in UNGA based on article 19 of the UN Charter (Karns and Mingst 2002).

The US pattern of assessment on the voluntary contributions has been highly influenced by the political debate surrounding the matter. In order to influence the debate, the US purposefully delayed making key payments till the very last minute of a year. Withholding specific amount (or assessment caps) of its contribution has occurred with full legislative and at times executive's support. These caps are pushed by the Congress in return for specific demands or reforms to be met by the United Nations. This way, the Congress takes ahead the issue of reforms without activating Article 19 of the Charter, eventually safeguarding its voting rights in the UNGA. The congressional withholdings can occur in three forms: putting caps on US assessed amount; partially withholding amount for various UN activities and; finally, congressional holding off funding due to policy reasons.

**Table 5.1: US Contribution to United Nations Regular Budget (1994-2016)**

Year (Clinton to Obama Administration)	% scale of assessment (from the total UN regular budget)	Actual Payment	Outstanding Amount (unpaid)
1994	25 %	310,800,851	247,851,724 (as of Dec 31, 1994)
1995	25 %	150,130,049	414,423,874 (as of Dec 31, 1995)
1996	25 %	359,040,601	376,775,346 (as of Dec 31, 1996)
1997	25 %	315,585,677	373,239,953 (as of Dec 31, 1997)
1998	25 %	355,262,548	315,704,,661 (as of Dec 31, 1998)



1999	25 %	452,203,605	167,896,611 (as of Dec 31, 1999)
2000	25 %	303,576,746	164,629,456 (as of Dec 31, 2000)
2001	22 %	297,178,107	165,423,794 (as of Dec 31, 2001)
2002	22 %	258,168,464	190,331,651 (as of Dec 31, 2002)
2003	22%	263,845,890	267,960,871 (as of Dec 31, 2003)
2004	22%	390,293,007	240,520,860 (as of Dec 31, 2004)
2005	22 %	428,280,567	251,851,905 (as of Dec 31, 2005)
2006	22%	383,908,137	291,408,623 (as of Dec 31, 2006)
2007	22%	391,901,857	392,673,605 (as of Dec 31, 2007)
2008	22 %	451,527,359	394,484,638 (as of Dec 31, 2008)
2009	22 %	699,042,776	293,733,963 (as of Dec 31, 2009)
2010	22%	532,453,102	278,414,368 (as of Dec 31, 2010)
2011	22 %	582, 678,514	Approx 359,000,000 (as of Dec 31, 2011)
2012	22 %	568,750,776	Approx 295,000,000 (as of Dec 31, 2012)
2013	22 %	618,481,182	Approx 384,000,000 (as of Dec 31, 2013)
2014	22 %	621,203,682	Approx 398,000,000 (as of Dec 31, 2014)
2015	22%	654,778,938	Approx 313,000,000 (as of Dec 31, 2015)

2016	22%	603,941,382	Approx 286,000,000 (as of Dec 31, 2016)
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Source: UNGA, Contributions Status and; UN Tribune, Budget Contributions


**Table 5.2: US Percentage of Total UN Peacekeeping Budget (1994-2016)**

Year (Clinton to Obama Administration)	% of total peacekeeping budget
1994	31.7 %
1995	31.2 %
1996	30.9 %
1997	30.8 %
1998	30.5 %
1999	30.4 %
2000	30.3 %
2001	28.13 %
2002	27.35 %
2003	26.93 %
2004	26.69 %
2005	26.5 %
2006	26.7 %
2007	26.08 %
2008	25.9 %
2009	25.9 %
2010	27.17 %
2011	27. 14 %
2012	27.14 %
2013	28. 38%

2014	28.36 %
2015	28.3 %
2016	28.57 %

Source- UNGA, Financial Contributions; Browne (2011), United nations Peacekeeping Issues for Congress, CRS; UN, Contribution Status and; UN, Budget Contribution

**Graph 5.1: Comparison of Contributions for Peacekeeping by P5 (January 1990 to March 2016)**



Source- IPI Peacekeeping Database Graphs, Providing for Peacekeeping

## **Congress, UN Funding and UN Reforms**

### **Clinton Era and the Conservative Revolution**

When Clinton entered White House in 1993, US-UN relations were enjoying a wave of popularity. With President's vocal support to peacekeeping operations and multilateral humanitarian interventions abroad, funding these ambitious plans got a nod from America. Since 1988 the UN Peacekeeping budget started growing as twenty nine peacekeeping missions were inaugurated. Between 1988 and 1994 the budget for peacekeeping grew exponentially from \$266 million to \$3342 million (Renner 2005). However, with the death of Americans during a mission in Somalia the presidential support for pro-UN initiatives wavered and strict conditions for US participation in the missions got solidified in presidential directive or PDD-25. The biggest impact on the issue of funding came from the domestic depths of the country. The Republican Party led a watershed moment in the American political history by winning a majority in the 1994 US elections.

The Republicans ran for the election on the principles of a document called "Contract with America" released by the party while campaigning for the elections. This document, written by Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey with the significant inputs by the Heritage Foundation, became the guiding text for the conservatives. In a quest for governmental reforms, the document laid down a detailed plan for many policy changes. One of the proposal in the contract mentioned under the "The National Security Restoration Act" expressed lessening US commitments to peacekeeping activities. Emphasizing on US sovereignty and nationalism the act outlined six basic provisions: 1) establishing an advisory commission to assess US military needs; 2) committing US to speed up the development and deployment of missile defense system; 3) restricts deployment of US troops to missions in US national interest; 4) demands US troops be commanded by US commanders and not placed under foreign commanders; 5) reducing the cost to the US of UN peacekeeping missions and; 6) tightening controls and reporting requirements for the sharing of US intelligence information in the UN (104<sup>th</sup> Congress , REC. H1747,1995).

The Department of Defense was prohibited to make any payments for the peacekeeping operations, voluntary or assessed. It also provided that at the beginning of each year, the US would withhold 20% of regular UN budget and 50% of assessed

peacekeeping contributions until President's confirmation (Bongang 2007). The "Conservative Revolution" strengthened the US congress to push forward anti-UN legislatures and reverse the multilateral leanings of the country. Also, the Somalia incident was evidently part of the Republican mindset while crafting the National Security Act. The reliance on unilateralism over multilateralism by the conservative end of the political discourse was gladly embraced by the Congress.

The 1990s saw a rising number of fiscal conservatives and anti-UN advocates in the Congress. This was the time when Republicans were more boldly able to attach their partisan beliefs with the issue of funding and reforms. Under Newt Gingrich, speaker of the House, Republicans like Christopher Smith (N-J) were able to lead agitations against UN programs that supported abortion and associated this issue with withholding of arrears or UN reform. As some UN programs and agencies like United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) funded women across the world with contraceptives and encouraged family planning, the conservatives voiced their disapproval over this provision. The Republicans in Congress were able to combine their ideological belief of being pro-life with the issue of UN reforms and funding. In 1997, Smith achieved success passing an amendment to HR 1757 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 by the vote of 240 to 181 which-

*"...prohibits population planning assistance to any foreign organization until the organization certifies that it will not perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered or in cases of rape or incest; certifies that it will not engage in any activity to alter the laws or policies of any foreign country concerning the circumstances under which abortion is permitted, regulated, or prohibited; and prohibits any funds to the United Nations Population Fund unless the President certifies that it has terminated all activities in the People's Republic of China.." (105<sup>th</sup> Congress, H. Amdt. 156 to HR 1757,1997)*

The conservatives maintained a firm stance on this matter since the Reagan administration. Ronald Reagan's pro-life stance was institutionalized as he promoted this not only domestically but also in abroad. The 1985 Kemp-Kasten Amendment was passed with Reagan's support to disqualify funds for UNFPA as it was determined that it was involved in population control in China. Conservatives not only attacked UN agencies like UNFPA in general, but also their specific programs in

China where they considered abortions to be implemented forcibly especially under the one-child policy of the state. Therefore, they succeeded in combining their ideological agenda with the funding of UN agencies and an international policy issue. As one expert explained,

*“Conservatives also feel that the U.S. doesn’t wield enough influence over budget issues, especially since America is assessed 22 percent of the regular budget and 28.4 percent of the peacekeeping budget. The U.S. is assessed more than 180 other U.N. member states combined and 22,000 times more than the least assessed countries. Yet, under U.N. rules, the 129 member states that contribute 1.5 percent could pass the budget over the objections of the countries paying more than 98 percent”* (Bosco 2013).

The most strident anti-UN voice in the Congress was that of Jesse Helms, (R-NC) who single handedly molded the politics of UN funding. With Joe Biden Jr (D-DEL), the two senators became the sponsors of the S 886 Helm-Biden Act 1999. The act laid out three conditions on the matter of US funding of UN: 1) US assessed contribution to UN regular budget will have a ceiling of 22% (i.e. 3% less than what US had been paying); 2) the US contribution to peacekeeping shall not exceed more than 25% (i.e. 5% less than what US had been paying) and; the UN should formulate an “arrearages account” for amount not credited by the legislature, failure to pay these amount should not activate Article 19 (Karns and Mingst 2002).

Eventually, the US Congress in Dec 2000 agreed for the 22% cap on contributions for the regular budget and finalized on 27% for peacekeeping contributions. These stern funding actions were supported even further by the Congress after witnessing lack of any stern reform moves by the UN under the leadership of Kofi Annan, a DC backed UN Secretary General. Even though Annan proclaimed to start the “Quiet Revolution” (SG/SM/6284/REV.2, UN, 1997) and released “Renewing the United Nations: A Program for Reform” a holistic reform initiative backed by UNGA, US being dissatisfied went ahead with its zero growth in budget plan. With the aim to stop any further growth in US funding share to UN and reduction of its assessed contribution, the act managed to put monetary caps.

Even though the Helms Biden act was a bipartisan bill, the partisan division in the Congress over this was very evident. Biden was one of the few democrats who supported this strong move on the matter of US funding of UN. Clinton and other democrats in the Congress emphasized on the importance of multilateralism and repaying US debt to UN. Republicans on the other hand stressed on the fiscal/economic concerns and pro-life issues. The Democratic Party's argument for paying back the dues was rooted on safeguarding the authenticity of US leadership at the international stage. Whereas republicans saw the withholding of the dues as an opportunity to propel the matter of UN reforms more vigorously. Clinton was especially against the linking of partisan issue of family planning to the US contributions to UN and reversed Kemp Kasten in 1993 to reinstall the funding for UNFPA.

The Congress held an upper hand during this time especially due to the severe financial crisis faced by the UN. With the Helms Biden passed in 1999, the US Congress laid down its conditions for payment of US dues and arrears in the coming fiscal years. The US-UN tensions reached its peak when US for the first time was not included in ACABQ and was on the verge of losing its voting right in UNGA. Finally, in 2000 UNGA produced a reassessed regular budget for 2001-2003, with revised parameters, complying with the US congressional demands. In return US made last minute payments to the UN. During this whole process the Clinton administration had to give in to the congressional pressures. The role of then US ambassador to UN Richard Holbrooke in negotiating with members of Congress, UN officials while representing the Clinton administration was applauded by many.

### **Bush Years and the Strengthening of Republican Agendas**

The Republican influence on this issue sustained beyond the Clinton administration as George W Bush managed to enter the White House and strengthened a unilateral foreign policy. The Bush years were characterized with the strengthening of the neo-conservative and Christian Right (CR) voices in the administration and in the Congress. One of the most significant steps taken by Bush was to successfully stop funding of UNFPA from 2002 to 2008. Before 2002, Bush supported UNFPA initiatives partially in places apart from China, but in 2002 he reversed his policy by continuing the Kemp-Kasten amendment of 1985. Being a born again Christian,

President Bush openly aligned himself with the CR. In February 2001, delegates representing the Bush presidency spoke in the UN, taking a conservative position on child's rights and population policy funding (Buss & Herman: 2003). Using the language of "parental rights" and "the family" the administration voiced its pro-life stance to the world (Buss and Herman, 2003).

US denial to fund UNFPA made it the only country in the world to do so on non-budgetary grounds (POP/836, UN, 2002). The Republicans maintained their control in the Congress till 2006, and openly shared their support for stopping UNFPA funds. The narrative of "hard earned" "tax payer" money being used to coercively conduct abortions on women in various corners of the world (especially China) was the compelling language used by the conservatives.

The most important decision taken during the Bush administration was the passing of H.R 2745 Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005. Before retiring from politics, Henry Hyde, congressman from Illinois and the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee for six year authored this sweeping act with 221 to 184 votes. Some of the reform suggestions of the Act included-

*"...Office of Internal Oversight Services be made as an independent U.N. entity; enforce the 5.6 rule at the United Nations, requiring the Secretariat to identify low-priority activities in the budget proposal; enforce zero nominal growth in all assessed dues to the regular budget of the United Nations and its agencies and programs; ensure the United Nations is annually publishing a list of all subsidiary bodies and their functions, budgets, and staff; ensure that the difference between the scale of assessments for the five permanent Security Council members is not greater than five times that of any other permanent member of the Security Council; a United Nations Office of Ethics as an independent U.N. entity be made, which shall be responsible for establishing and enforcing a code of employee ethics and related training; a position of Chief Operating Officer be made; oppose the creation of any new or expansion of any existing U.N. peacekeeping operation until the Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that specified reforms have been implemented..."* (109<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R 2745,2005)



The act's strongest section was on the "certification and the withholding of contributions". According to the act, the US Congress would withhold 50 percent of UN assessed dues if UN did not fulfill reform demands made by the act in the stipulated time. It stated that at least 32 out of the 40 reform demands need to be met by the UN to stop the withholding of the dues. Out of the 32, the following needed to be met including:

"(1) 20% reductions for Public Information and General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services budgets; (2) annual budget level maintenance; (3) new program sunset provisions; (4) an Independent Oversight Board; (5) a United Nations Office of Ethics; (6) U.N. human rights body ineligibility for a member country failing to uphold the values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or under Security Council sanction or investigation for human rights abuses; (7) barring any U.N. human rights body from having a standing agenda item that relates only to one country or region; (8) Economic and Social Council secret voting abolishment; and (9) Commission on Human Rights membership"( 109<sup>th</sup> Congress ,H.R 2745,;2005)

Apart from the range of reforms stated in the act from a budgetary or administrative point of view, the US Congress was also able to push forward its pro-Israel agenda in the act. The Republican Party's commitment to Israel strengthened even more after the 9/11 attack. America's motivation to work towards a pro-Israel policy was bolstered especially due to the presence of senior figures within the administration that reflected a neoconservative agenda and sharply defined the administration's views on foreign policy (Cavari 2012). The act directed UN to install firm audit and reporting functions of-

"(1) the United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights; (2) the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; (3) the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority; (4) the NGO Network on the Question of Palestine; (5) the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories; and (6) any other entity the Secretary determines results in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues". (109<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R 2745,; 2005)

All these UN reform conditions were viewed by many as a justified reaction especially after the Oil for Food program scandal. The pro-UN reform forces in the Congress were able to put compelling pressure on Kofi Annan to mobilize the reform process. In an “unusual instance of a United Nations official singling out an individual country for criticism”, the UN deputy Secretary General Malloch Brown in 2006 stated-

*“...the prevailing practices of seeking to use the U.N. almost by stealth as a diplomatic tool while failing to stand up for it against its domestic critics is simply not sustainable... In recent years the enormously divisive issue of Iraq and the big stick of financial withholding have come to define an unhappy marriage...”* (Hoge 2005)

The opponents from the Democratic Party stressed that linking of UN reforms with the issue of funding would ultimately weaken America’s influence in the organization. Apart from possible violation of the treaty, the critics spoke of possible diplomatic tensions outside UN with other countries at a time when the world was being skeptical of US actions in Iraq.

Irrespective of the criticism to the America’s harsh insistence for reforms in 2006, many of the reform initiatives were fulfilled by the UN including establishment of “UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Democracy Fund, UN Ethics Office, strengthening financial disclosure requirements and whistleblower protections and Central Emergency Response Fund” (RL33611, CRS, 2013). Furthermore, “the General Assembly held at least 20 meetings of an Informal Plenary on Mandate Review...this review involved 9,000 mandates that are five years or older, with the goal of eliminating or reducing those tasks no longer relevant” (RL33611, CRS: 2013). The basic crux of the UN reform act of 2005 resting on increased supervision and accountability of the UN bureaucracy/ management, thorough review of all programs and various missions and; fiscal discipline was successfully brought in the centre stage of the US-UN relations by the US Congress and the Bush administration (Blanchfield 2008).

### **President Obama’s Clash with the Congress**

President Barack Obama after eight years brought the Democrats in the White House again in 2008 even though the Republicans managed to control the Congress from

2010 till the rest of his term. Under the ambit of reinstating diminished American image abroad by reinforcing multilateral initiatives, the administration set to “re-engage” with UN. Within the early onset of the presidency, Obama administration played a significant role in paying a big amount of US arrears and confirmed participation in the UNHCR. The administration consistently raised issues with combining US contributions to reforms. The administration echoed the Democratic Party’s belief that not paying US dues automatically diminishes its influence and credibility at the international forum.

Even though there wasn’t any act as sweeping as Helms Biden or Henry Hyde UN Reform act passed during the Obama years, the Congress was able to keep a firm grip over financial withholdings of US contribution to UN. For long the fiscal conservatives stressed on relying more on voluntary funding over assessed funding as that led to an environment of competition for the funds between agencies which is guaranteed on timely review of their programs and efficient management. This “a’ la carte” or “pick and pay” perspective resonated with the unilateral beliefs of the Republican Party, criticizing the multilateral “generosity” of the democrats. In 2011, “H.R 2829 United Nations Transparency, Accountability and Reform Act” was passed, sponsored by Congresswoman Ileana RosLetinan (Rep-FL). The act officially urged to make a transition from assessed to voluntary format of funding the whole of UN:

*“...use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, and to make it a priority to build support for such a transformational change among Member States, particularly key United Nations donors”* (112<sup>th</sup> Congress, HR 2829: 2011-12)

Attacking UN in the light of past scandals of wastage of resources and lack of accountability, the act aimed at promoting increased transparency of the organization. The 2011 act especially in the light of funding introduced benchmarks for transparency certification, oversight information and accountability certification (HR 2829, 112<sup>th</sup> Congress: 2011-12). In regard to the act, the Obama administration clashed with the Congress and stated-

*“.... (it had) some constitutional concerns with the bill, contending that numerous provisions ... would interfere with the President’s conduct of diplomacy by purporting to declare ‘policy’ of the United States, or by purporting to direct United State diplomats to use their ‘voice’ or ‘vote’ to advance certain positions, in international negotiations....the Constitution commits to the President the responsibility for formulating the policy of the United States with respect to international bodies (Blanchfield, 2015).”*

On the matter of UNFPA, Obama pledged to resume US funding when he entered his office. Being a pro-choice supporter, the administration resumed its contribution to UNFPA and became the fourth largest contributor to it in 2015 giving around \$75 million dollars (Solomon 2017).

During Obama years there was a renewal of sporadic legislative efforts to get US out of United Nations and completely halting all kinds of funding initiatives for the organization. The frustrations of conservative with UN converted into a failed legislation in 1997 when Congressman Ron Paul from Texas introduced American Sovereignty Restoration Act. It was reintroduced in 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 but without any support from the Congress it was eventually shelved. The bill requested to prohibit:

“(1) the authorization of funds for the U.S. assessed or voluntary contribution to the United Nations; (2) the authorization of funds for any U.S. contribution to any U.N. military operation; and (3) the expenditure of funds to support the participation of U.S. Armed Forces as part of any U.N. military or peacekeeping operation” (111<sup>th</sup> Congress , HR 1146, 2009)

After 2011, Ron Paul retired with the bill being reintroduced in 2013 and 2015 by Paul Broun (Rep-GA) and Mike Rogers (Rep-AL) as HR 1146 and HR 1205 respectively, but met with the similar fate as the original bill. This bill was again introduced by Mike Rogers in 2017 to sever all kinds of ties with the UN.

The current US president, Donald Trump, has been critical of excessive US expenditures for multilateral organizations. Since the onset of his term, he has voiced his contention with other countries (including US allies) over monetarily piggy-backing on US in various international organizations (primarily UN and NATO) and

growing asymmetry in burden sharing. Within few months in office, he was able to convert these opinions into legislative actions and passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018. This act was introduced on the congressional floor as an omnibus bill as it contains various bills for different departments. In terms of UN, the act gave order to stop any kind of fund for the construction or renovation of the UN headquarters in New York under the UN Capital fund. (115<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R. 1625, 2018) The Trump administration made historic cuts of \$285 million dollars (115<sup>th</sup> Congress, H.R. 3362, , 2018) to UN funds for FY2018 and declared to stop funding UN climate change programs apart from reducing funds to UNICEF by 16 percent (Lardieri 2017). President Trump's decision came in the light of his recent recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. According to one of the provisions of the foreign operations act, the department of State is given authority to withhold funds for the UN if it takes any action against US national security interest or allies especially Israel (115<sup>th</sup> Congress; H.R. 3362, 2018). In the budget for FY 2019, the Trump administration continued this trend and signaled restrictions towards overall non military expenditure. Furthermore, president Trump also pulled US out of UNESCO yet again over the Israel-Palestine issue.


## **Public Opinion on US-UN Relations**

In 1941 National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) ran a survey to gauge the public opinion about the post war policies of US. Around 68.1% agreed to "take an active part in an international organization"; 12.7% voiced "entering into no alliance and have as little as possible to with other countries", whereas 7.7% believed that US should "depend only on separate alliances with certain countries" (NORC 1941). In the early decades of the organization, the American public showed firm support to the various possible ways in which America could contribute in the United Nations. In 1945, embracing UN's birth, the majority of public supported the organization to "prevent any member country from starting war of its own against an outside country", "decide what military strength each member nation can have" and range of other diverse responsibilities (Weldon 2015).

In the first decade of the organization, many even supported the idea of making UN a "world government". Even though these opinions were eventually opposed, the general satisfaction with UN remained consistent in the coming years. Throughout

1960s and the 1970s Americans supported UN and resonated that without it, another war could break. Even though the John Birch Society started campaigning in the 1970s to “Get the UN out of US and UN out US”, the larger public clearly disagreed and affirmed US membership in the organization.

**Graph 5.2: US Public Opinion about UN in the Initial Years**



Source: Roper Center, Seventy Years of US Public Opinion of United Nations, 2015


But with the cold war geopolitics being played in various parts of the world, the opinion of UN often suffered in this context. For example, on the “issue of how well the US is doing its job the proportion saying that the U.N. was doing a poor job increased from 1978 to 1980” (Weldon 2015). At that time, more than half the public in a poll said the way the Security Council handled “the Iranian situation” – “the hostage crisis and related issues - made them think less of the U.N. as a peacekeeping organization; only 21% said it made them think more of the U.N. Similarly, 53% said the way the U.N. handled the 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan made them think less of the U.N.’s peacekeeping, while 22% said it made them think more” (Weldon 2015).

In the 1990s, the US public was highly occupied with domestic matters and was tired of more than four decades long cold war, which led to visible signs of inclination

towards an introverted approach to foreign policy. Even though the masses overwhelmingly supported US participation in the UN, it voiced its concern over lack of consistent accomplishments by the organization. On the matter of UN funding, even though the masses seemed against the idea of increased US contributions to UN but they also didn't particularly wanted less money to be spent (Pew Research 1995). Basically, they seemed content with the current contribution rates. On the issue of peacekeeping, the public showed the most restraint in backing for more money to "bring peace to regional conflicts" (Pew Research 1995).

The partisan division over US-UN relations became more sharp after 9/11 attack. By 2004, following the start of the Iraq War in 2003, views of the UN among Republicans had plummeted below 50% and have not recovered, while attitudes among Democrats dropped somewhat – particularly in 2006 and 2007 – but rose through the Obama era (Poushter 2016).

**Figure 5.3: Partisan Division over UN since 1990s**



Source- Pew Research, Favourable Views of the UN prevail in Europe, Asia and US, September 20, 2016

Even though there was a reemergence of positive views about UN during Obama, the win of Republicans in the 2016 Presidential elections saw the reversal of this trend. In 2017, a Gallup poll found that “a majority of Americans (60%) say the international organization is doing a “poor job,” an increase of six percentage points from 2016” (Gallup 2017). The “gap in party ratings has been growing and is now the largest Gallup has recorded since 2001”. While a “majority of Democrats (57%) currently say the U.N. is doing a good job of solving world problems, a paltry 16% of Republicans rate the institution's work positively” (Gallup 2017).

This chapter has focused on the role of congressional decision making and the public opinion in influencing US funds to the UN. The US domestic sensibilities on the issue of funding United Nations or US-UN relations have been governed by the partisan values and beliefs of the Congress and the people. The US Congress has been particular in viewing the matter of funding from the ideological perspective of the majority Party in the Congress in a given time. As the conservatives gained momentum in the American political landscape since the 1980s, so did their partisan beliefs over US contribution to UN. The fiscal conservatives, pro-life supporters and the unilateralists in the Republican Party have played a phenomenal role in molding the narratives of US funding to UN and UN reforms. The multilateralists and pro choice believers of the Democratic Party found themselves at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the issue of UN funding and reforms whenever their numbers have dwindled in the Congress.

The early clashes between the internationalists and the isolationists (Chapter 2) have modified in the current situation of partisan wedging between the Democratic and the Republican Party respectively. The US public support for UN was strong since its inception similar to that of the government and the Congress. But with partisan ideologies gaining strong foothold at the grass root level and with internal evolution of the Republican Party since 1970s, the public opinion started changing as well. The domestic factors have managed to overwhelmingly decide the nature of US-UN relations.

Within the context of complex geopolitical situation (like Cold war politics) or the occurrence of magnified incidents (Somalia crisis, 9/11), the US support for UN or its funding has swayed accordingly. But the partisan opinions in the Executive and



primarily in Legislature have been the deciding factor in shaping the long term interaction between US and UN. The anti-UN voices in the Congress were also heard and somewhat became justified in the eyes of the public when UN shortcomings came out in the form of corruption scandals or poor management of resources.

For a long time since the beginning of the UN, the public opinion has been either overwhelmingly supportive of its initiatives or partially ambivalent due to domestic concerns. But with congress stressing over US “paying more than its share” to the UN or the ballooning of the UN budget since the late 1980s, the public started reassessing its leanings towards the international organization. The domestic ideological struggles over US-UN relations (starting from the onset of rapid increase in third world countries in UNGA in 1970s) have now solidified just as the partisan belief system in the American politics. The Democratic Party has been weaker in pushing their internationalist or multilateral agenda in the Congress due to lack of numbers in the post- cold war election history. Through the US president (Clinton and Obama) they tried for these agendas to be met, but with the Congress realizing its power of purse, these initiatives were not always successful.

The practice of using “US dues or the fact that US is the largest contributor to the UN”, as a tool to push forward for drastic UN reforms has been the formidable approach of the US congress to make UN accept American demands. The Congress has been in the forefront in raising questions over the appropriate levels of UN funds, effective usage of these contributions and ways in which it could use these funds as a leverage for achieving US policies in the UN. These key decisions in the US Congress are made while tightly holding on to the partisan beliefs and therefore, the domestic outlook over UN funding manages to single handedly impact the overall narrative.

## **CHAPTER 6**

## **CONCLUSION**

Visioning an international organization made up of sovereign states in the post World War order, has been one of the biggest contributions of America to the world. The role of American idealism in establishing League of Nations and later United Nations is profound. With the support of the Congress, FDR and his administration namely Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Edward Reilly Stettinius Jr. and so on were able to align US resources in architecting the UN as we know it. But even though US had been the torchbearer of a liberal multilateral order and internationalism, its relationship with UN over the years has been somewhat ironic. Out of the many issues in the US-UN relations, the matter of funding UN sticks out as a sore thumb.

Being the largest contributor to the UN budget to this day (even though the percentage has decreased), the matter of funding since the very beginning was seen cautiously in the Congress. But the optimistic atmosphere of a post war world governed by UN with the help of America's moral leadership sidelined this matter. It was only after the overwhelming emergence of the third block (newly independent countries of Asia and Africa) in the UN which led to open clashes between US and UN. These countries aimed at utilizing the UN as an international stage where they can stand for themselves, practice non-aligned approach and push for programs/agencies that help in the development of poor countries. But because majority of these countries were either centre or left leaning in their political outlook and used their collective vote in opposing pro US resolutions in the UNGA; they were viewed harshly by the American political community.

The growing anti-US sentiments in an organization mainly operating with the help of US funds led to the Democrats and Republicans alike being alarmed. The anti-UN sentiments in the US eventually resulted into various legislative actions during the cold war era namely Kemp Moynihan Amendment of 1979, Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment of 1985 and Kemp-Kasten Amendment of 1985. Out of these legislative actions, the Kassebaum Solomon act was the most significant as it not only introduced the concept of "conditional funding" in the narrative of US contributions to UN, but it also legalized means for US to push forward its agendas in the international forum under the ambit of UN reforms. It is also important to note that if historically there were think tanks like Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) which played an important role in contributing to the early deliberations of establishing UN during the FDR era;

then in sync with the rise of conservatism in the US political spectrum, think tanks like the Heritage Foundation greatly participated in molding the US narrative on funding in the latter half of the century.

The vast institutional and bureaucratic framework of budget making in the UN often got overwhelmed by the politics of funding occurring in Washington DC in the post cold war era. The two ways in which countries contribute to UN i.e. mandatory assessed and voluntary contributions are both part of the US Federal budget each year. But the process of finalizing the US contributions to UN, though meticulous, consistently got entangled in the partisan debates over this issue. The two basic factors which have impacted the UN funding narrative in the US especially in the post cold war era are- unilateral or multilateral influenced foreign policy outlined by various Presidents and; the partisan agendas of the Democratic and the Republican Party in the US Congress.

United States in the immediate aftermath of the end of Cold War found itself probing the future course of its foreign policy. President Bill Clinton saw this uni-polar moment as an opportunity for America to establish a world based on western liberal democracy and capitalist model. The US foreign policy in the early months of his presidency imbibed the assertive multilateralism philosophy which rested on rigorous multilateral interactions led by US and UN. This foreign policy approach was successfully executed by his predecessor George H W Bush during the first Gulf War and was eventually adopted by the Clinton administration. People like Madeline Albright, Anthony Lake and Warren Christopher in Bill Clinton's administration were staunch supporter of humanitarian intervention, stronger US role in UN and greater role of UN peacekeeping forces.

The early drafts of Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13) outlined greater US support for UN multilateral peace operations not just politically or militarily but also financially. Top members of the administration spoke in front of the Congress and in many events about creating enlarged contingency fund for future peacekeeping missions, improvising budget requirements of peacekeeping missions and the financial burden the US must bear in this regard. But this wave of multilateralism was reversed with the deaths of American soldiers during the 1993 peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The shock factor of the incident was further multiplied with the stirring

images broadcasted by the media to the American public. The administration published PRD 13 as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) which showcased the U-turn in the US foreign policy. One of the sections out of the six in the report stressed on the reduction of US contribution to peacekeeping operations by UN. The positive US-UN relations under the Clinton presidency turned sourer with its involvement in stopping UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali getting a second term.

During the Clinton presidency, the Republican Party captured the US Congress by sweeping the 1994 elections. The party ran on the principles of 'Contract with America' which guided the conservatives to pass many important policy changes in the Congress. They passed the National Security Revitalization Act of 1995 which expressed lessening US commitments to UN peacekeeping activities. Under this act the US withheld 20% of the mandatory contributions and 50% of the voluntary contributions till the time President didn't confirm the payments. Furthermore, one of the provisions of the act clearly stated reducing US cost of future UN peacekeeping missions. This act emphasized on US sovereignty and nationalism, signaling to the after effects of the Somalia incident, and showcasing the unilateral shift in the policy discourse spearheaded by the Republicans.

This was also the time when the Republicans were able to attach their partisan agenda of pro-life to the issue of UN funding and reform. This development was institutionalized by the passing of Kemp Kasten Amendment in 1985 which saw stoppage of funds to UNFPA due to its involvement in population control programs in China. Taking ahead the republican leaning on this matter ahead, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1997 was amended to prohibit any kind of population planning assistance to any international organization. But the landmark act passed during this era forever impacting the US funding to UN was the Helms-Biden Act of 1999. Even though the act was introduced as a bipartisan bill, it did not echo the democratic beliefs on the matter of funding. This act created the 22% ceiling on the UN regular budget and 27% for peacekeeping contributions. The act also demanded to create an arrearages account of US dues with the intent to make sure that the failure to pay this account does not lead to the activation of Article 19 of the UN

Charter. This way, the US Congress managed to not only achieve the ceiling percentage on the US contribution but also safeguarded its voting rights in the UNGA.

All these stringent legislative actions since the 1980s taken by the US Congress led to the UN to face its third financial crisis (first during the 1960s and the second in 1980s) throughout 1990s. Due to rapid increase in peacekeeping operations, the budgetary constraints of UN led it to be overburdened as countries failed to make important payments. The largest debt out of all the countries was of US. The 'conditional funding' and ceilings over annual contributions restrained US to clear the overall debt in one go. Moreover, the political will in the US to clear these dues was weak as policy makers saw this debt as an opportunity to take ahead the American demands in the UN. The Helms Biden Act laid down the conditions of US in front of the UN for making debt payments. The tensions between the two reached new heights when US voting rights in ACABQ, an important budgetary committee of UN, were in danger. Only when in 2000 the UNGA revised its budgetary parameters, the US made last minute payments.

During the George W Bush presidency, the US-UN relations were highly impacted by the foreign policy direction taken by Washington DC. The Bush presidency mainly initiated a unilateral approach to US foreign policy but in various phases resorted to moderate multilateral initiatives to further US interests. President Bush started his first term by emphasizing on the unilateral approach of his foreign policy. His administration's opinion of multilateral cooperation was low due to its failure in spreading American beliefs since the end of World War. They further believed that multilateral actions have managed to overburden US with excess funding of international projects and endangered US sovereignty. The Bush administration crystallized its belief of unilateralism by refusing to ratify many important international treaties and demonstrating its support for temporary coalitions over the traditional multilateral coalitions under the UN or NATO umbrella. But this staunch position of the administration softened in the aftermath of 9/11 and the US foreign policy embraced moderate multilateralism. In an attempt to garner international support for US endeavors in the Middle East, President Bush decided to take small steps in improving US-UN relations. As a gesture of goodwill, one month after the 9/11 attacks, US paid a substantial amount of its dues to the UN. Furthermore, the

President made a surprise announcement of joining back UNESCO in 2002 as US had left the organization during the Reagan presidency.

But these attempts to patch the relationship got disrupted due to UN's Oil for Food Scandal of 2004 and Bush's nomination of John Bolton, a fierce critique of UN as the US representative to UN in 2005. The Oil for Food scandal brought out the mismanagement of resources and corrupt practices of the UN officials in open. This program was established in 1996 for Iraq to sell oil in exchange of food. The outrage over this discovery justified the UN skeptics' support for firm legislative actions controlling UN funding. In this political atmosphere, nomination of John Bolton only added more friction in the US-UN relationship as the former ambassador was famous for bitter criticism of UN funding system and coerced multilateral cooperation at the cost of US interests.

The US Congress during the Bush presidency saw itself supporting many of the President's unilateral foreign policy initiatives due to the tense political climate in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, with a born again Christian as the US president, the Christian right forces in the Republican Party strengthened their agenda vis-à-vis the UN funding. The Bush administration and the Congress were able to successfully halt funds for UNFPA from 2002 to 2008 due to its population and family planning programs in various countries especially China. United States at this time became the only country to refuse funding UNFPA on non-budgetary grounds. Before the Democrats captured the US Congress in the 2006 elections, the Republicans managed to pass a landmark bill in the Congress which changed the UN funding narrative in the US for good.

In 2005, the Congress passed the Henry J Hyde UN Reform Act which outlined a list of UN reform suggestions. The most compelling out of all was the suggestion of withholding UN contributions. The act stated that if the UN did not agree to the required number of reforms in the stipulated time, then the US government would withhold some amount of its contributions to the UN. Furthermore, the Republican Party's firm pro-Israel policy was also attached in the Act as a list of committees associated to Palestinian rights was ordered to conduct proper auditing and reporting of their functions. Apart from UN voicing their displeasure towards this act, the Democratic Party stressed that such an act would only weaken US influence in the

international organization. With the possibility of violating the UN Charter, the critics of the act further asserted on the possible diplomatic frictions with the states outside the UN on this matter at a time when the US actions in the Middle East were fanning US criticism in UN. The UN managed to fulfill many of the reform conditions of the act which led to a successful attempt by the conservatives in the Congress to bring the issue of fiscal discipline in the limelight; apart from the issue of bureaucratic accountability and supervision of funds.

President Barack Obama entered White House during the onset of debates on US' relative decline in policy and academic circles. Due to Bush's aggressive unilateral foreign policy misadventures in the Middle East, US image abroad and republican support by people at home suffered. Obama from his campaign days outlined a multilateral US foreign policy approach which rested on strengthening US-UN relations. He nominated Susan Rice as the new US representative to UN and raised this position to cabinet rank, which was last seen during the Clinton era. This change in the administration gave the White House direct access to the affairs in New York without any delays because of middle bureaucracy. In the initial months of the Obama presidency, US witnessed one of the worst economic crises since the great depression. The world recession not only impacted the countries but also UN resources as member states faced domestic financial pressures. Irrespective of glum world financial situation, President Obama stressed on fulfilling US funding obligation to the UN. Obama pushed for clearing as much debt to the UN as possible, resulting to significant payments to the UN in 2010.

The biggest challenge Obama faced in terms of US-UN relations was gathering support of Congress to continue full engagement with the UN irrespective of various shortcomings of the organization. His term was marred with fierce political battles between the White House and the Capital Hill, increasing presidential difficulties vis-à-vis pro UN policies in Washington DC. With an attempt to come on a common ground with the Congress, the president outlined broad UN Reform agenda. The four agendas were namely- controlling excessive expenditures, greater accountability, maintaining UN reputation & integrity and focusing on better outcomes by UN.

President Obama often relied on Executive action for taking ahead his various agendas. In terms of funding, the President used executive action to support selective



priorities of the administration, namely environment and climate change. Concurring with his Climate Action plan of 2013, the president supported joint financial commitment with other developed countries in supporting climatic developments in developing regions across the world. The Climate Action plan stated US financial commitment for a three years time. During his term, US financed billions of dollars to international funds working under the framework of UNFCCC. Under his leadership, the US multilateral initiatives saw a massive victory in the form of Paris Climate Agreement of 2015. Before leaving the office, President Obama for the last time paid few million dollars to Green Climate Fund in 2016. President's reliance on executive powers to fulfill his set policies led to many critics calling his term an imperial presidency.

The Congress from 2010 till the end of Obama's term was dominated by the Republican Party, which led to serious clashes between the executive and the legislative over plethora of issues. Even though during this time there was no sweeping act passed by the Congress like Helms Biden or Henry Hyde act, the financial resistance was showcased by the majority party. In 2011, the UN Transparency, Accountability and Reform Act, sponsored by Republican congresswoman from Florida, Ileana RosLetinan was passed by the Congress. The act made an official urge to make a transition from assessed to voluntary format of funding for all UN activities. This a' la carte perspective of funding United Nations resonated with the unilateral beliefs of the Republican Party which opposed the large compulsory payments done with the aim of sustaining multilateral cooperation. Furthermore, in terms of funding, the act tried to introduce specific transparency benchmarks, ways to oversight information and increasing accountability.

In response to this, the President voiced concern with the act as it could lead to interference in the executive's conduct of diplomacy. Reversing President Bush's policy towards UNFPA, the Obama administration reinstated funds for the organization. In sync with the administration's pro-choice stance, US became fourth largest contributor of UNFPA in 2015.

A small section of US legislators have been for a long time stressing over completely disbanding all kinds of funds to the UN and withdrawal of US membership from UN. American Sovereignty Restoration Act was introduced by Republican Congressman

Ron Paul from Texas in 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 but failed to garner any legislative support. After Ron Paul's retirement, this act was introduced in 2013 and 2015 by Republican Congressman Paul Broun of Georgia and Mike Rogers of Alabama respectively. This bill was again introduced by Mike Rogers in 2017 to sever all kinds of ties with the UN.

In the current times, the new US President Donald Trump has a critical stance towards multilateral initiatives and excessive expenditure of UN. Within few months in office, with the support of large Republican numbers in Congress, the president signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018. The act is an omnibus bill which includes multiple bills for various departments. In terms of UN, the act gave order to stop any kind of fund for the construction or renovation of the UN headquarters in New York under the UN Capital fund. Also, taking ahead the pro-Israel stance of the Republican Party, the President and the Congress in 2017 passed the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act for 2018 financial year. According to one of the provisions of the act the department of State is given authority to withhold funds for the UN if it takes any action against US national security interest or allies especially Israel.

The US public opinion about US-UN relations remained extremely positive since the inception of the organization. The general public satisfaction with UN remained high throughout 1940s, 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s. But with the political outrage over rapidly increasing UN Peacekeeping budget and claims of United States paying more than its share; the public opinion started reassessing its stance towards UN in the 1990s. The most important factor that has impacted the public opinion about US-UN relations has been the development of sharp partisan beliefs in the US political discourse. The partisan division in the US has caused to plummeted opinion of the UN in the US especially after the 9/11 attacks. Even though opinions about UN improved during the Obama presidency, the sharp ideological division between the Republican and Democratic Party over UN has been consistent.

The presidential role has not been as dramatic as that of Congress in the issue of funding, but it has managed to impact the funding debate time and again. President Bill Clinton was unable to take ahead his assertive multilateral plans due to the peacekeeping failure at Somalia and the Republican takeover of the Congress. Not just the funding situation worsened during this time but also the general US-UN relations. The Congress managed to overwhelm the original multilateral vision of the

President. In case of President Bush, his staunch unilateral vision was made clear from the very beginning of his term but 9/11 attacks reversed this approach and forced the administration to adopt moderate multilateral foreign policy. Furthermore, the administration's hesitant multilateral plans of strengthening US-UN relations could not bear fruits due to the Oil for Food Scandal and the nomination of John Bolton as US representative to UN. The Obama presidency was able to take away vast amount of bitterness in the US-UN relations. His positive opinion on clearing US dues led to new breakthrough in the funding narrative. Also, his re-engaging with UN approach resting on firm multilateral cooperation managed to improve US image in the UN.

The issue of funding UN has been a target of partisan politics in the United States. The concern over US dues to UN and America's status as the largest contributor has been used as a tool to push forward US agendas under the ambit of reforms. This has been a significant approach of the majority party in the US Congress to take ahead their policies vis-à-vis funding. In the post Cold War era, the Republican Party has impacted this issue the most due to their large numbers in the Congress. They have successfully attached their unilateral, pro-life, and pro-Israel beliefs to the issue of funding UN. The Democratic Party on the other hand has been weak in congressionally forwarding their belief of multilateral cooperation, pro-choice and internationalism in terms of the UN funding due to unsteady numbers. Through the President, the democrats tried to fulfill these policies. But the Republican dominated Congress managed to influence this issue more often than not.

Thus, the funding to the UN by the US has been shaped by the partisan perceptions in the Congress. Multilateral-ist or unilateralist orientation of the presidents, ideological conventions of key officials and shifting geopolitical narratives (or events) have been fundamental in cementing US funding narrative. The two hypotheses stated at the beginning of the dissertation were:

- Despite Congressional constraints, presidential decisions on financial support to the UN depends more on the multilateral-list and unilateralist orientation of US foreign policy.
- US Congressional support for funding the UN is substantially influenced by partisan ideology

Based on the research findings, the above two assumptions have been found correct and therefore stands validated.

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