THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST CONFLICT STATES: A CASE STUDY OF LIBERIA

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HEENA MAKHIJA

International Organization

Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament

School of International Studies

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

New Delhi 110067

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "The United Nations and Democratization in Post Conflict States: A Case Study of Liberia" submitted by me for the award of thedegree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

HEENA MAKHIJA

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof Yeshi Cheodon

Chairperson, CIPOD

Prof YeshiChoedon

Supervisor

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List of Abbreviations

ALCOP – All Liberian Coalition Party

ATU – Anti-Terrorist Unit

CPP – Cambodian People's Party

CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CNDD-FDD – The National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG – The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

EU – European Union

FUNCINPEC – Royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Party

HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union

IFCC – Independent Federal Constitutional Commission

IECOM – Independent Election Commission

LURD – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MODEL – Movement for Democracy in Liberia

MINURCA – United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NTC – National Transitional Council

NPFL –National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NPP – National Patriotic Front

ONUSAL – United Nations Observer Mission in El- Salvador

ONUMOZ – United Nations Operation in Mozambique

PRC – People's Redemption Council

RENAMO – The Mozambican National Resistance

RUF – Revolutionary United Front

SDS – Serbian Democratic Party

TFC – Transnational Federal Charter

UN – United Nations

UNOMIL – United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNTAC– United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAG – United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia

UNAVEM II – United Nations Angola Verification Mission II

UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNAMSIL – United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOCI – United Nations Operation in Côte D'Ivoire

UNMIT – United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNEAD – United Nations Electoral Assistance Division

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

ULIMO – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy

US – United States

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/ Soviet Union

UNEF – United Nations Emergency Force

UNTAES - United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia

UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNITA – The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty has been the priority of states. Interstate conflicts over strategic issues and desire for territorial expansion led to wars and aggression throughout history. Initially, security and managing conflicts were the sole responsibility of the states. Under the 'Self- help' mechanism, states depended on their own efforts, resources, and skills to defend their territory. It was followed by adopting the alliance system, which was a formal agreement between two or more nations agreeing to assist the other states by pooling their resources to encounter threats to their security and protect each other in case of an attack. Eventually, the alliance system aimed to achieve parity of power so that no single state or coalition of states could dominate in international politics and paved the way for a 'balance of power' system. Under this system, states act on the assumption that there is always a possibility of war and as a result, states devote their limited resources for consistently enhancing their military capabilities so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others.

In the 20th century, the balance of power system led to the rise of hegemons and a quest for power. The 'Balance of Power' system failed to resolve conflicts and could not establish peace eventually leading to the two world wars. The destruction caused by the World Wars posed an existential threat to the survival of mankind, and this compelled the world leaders to suggest an alternative system for countering the threatening situation. This resulted in a decision to replace the balance of power system with a 'community of states' organized together for attaining common peace. 'Collective Security' system was a coalition-building strategy based on the idea that "an attack against one, is an attack against all" under which a group of nations agreed not to attack each other and to defend each other against acts of aggression. The League of Nations and the United Nations were based on this system, and for the purpose of making collective security work efficiently, these organizations followed the principle of maintaining state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic matters of the states.

However, as the powerful states and their national interest took precedence over collective concern during the Cold War, the United Nations could not operationalize the collective security system. The United Nations developed a new mechanism for managing conflicts in the world, known as the 'Peacekeeping Operations'. Under 'traditional peacekeeping', UN missions were formulated to monitor and report on the

conflict situations, after a resolution passed by the UN Security Council and strictly based on the consent of the states. Towards the end of 1980's, intrastate conflicts and civil wars including acts of genocide witnessed an upsurge. Violence and massacre caused by intrastate conflicts drew attention and concern of the international community. But, UN's involvement to resolve emerging civil wars for maintaining peace was viewed to be in contestation with its traditional policy of non-intervention.

The Post-Cold War era signaled enhanced requirement of the United Nations to respond to increased intra-state conflicts. UN's involvement in dealing with civil wars was viewed to be in contestation with its traditional policy of non-intervention. However, through creative interpretation of the UN Charter, the UN viewed these civil wars as a threat to international peace and security and justified its engagement in the containment of conflict within states. Hence, in the 1990s the United Nations re-interpreted its responsibilities to deal with domestic conflicts and took on robust peacekeeping operations with multidimensional functions to prevent reoccurrence of conflicts and embarked on the rebuilding of post-conflict states.

Among other operational activities, the United Nations adopted democratization of the post-conflict states as one of its main tasks to deter recurrence of the conflict and ensure durable, stable peace. Beginning with United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployment in Namibia in 1989, UN incorporated democratization as one of its major policy objectives in the post-conflict reconstruction by explicitly supporting the promotion of democracy through its missions. Though democratization was considered to be a problematic exercise for the UN as it involved addressing the domestic political arrangements of member states, till date the UN peacekeeping missions have been mandated to carry it out as a way of bringing about stable peace in the conflict areas. Hence, the issue of democratization of post-conflict states by the United Nations generated substantial academic interest. This research focuses on why and how the United Nations carries out democratization in post-conflict states and critically analyses the working of UN's norms, guidelines, and mechanisms in consolidating democracy in post-conflict states.

Review of Literature

The literature related to this topic is reviewed under various themes: Democratization and International Relations; The United Nations and Democratization: Norms,

Guidelines, and Mandates; The United Nations and Democratization: Mechanisms and Operational Activities and Democratization in Liberia.

Democratization and International Relations

Since the end of the Cold War, many of the international organizations have adopted the promotion of democracy as one of their main agendas. Collier (2003) is of the view that democratization has been carried out as an integral part of conflict prevention. Specifically, the United Nations has been carrying out democratization in the post-conflict states as one of the main agendas for the post-conflict reconstruction effort. Doyle (1983, 1986), Russett (1993), Russett and Oneal (2001), and Kegley and Hermann (2002) postulate that 'Democratic Peace Theory' provides the theoretical explanation and rationale for democratization. 'Democratic Peace Theory' suggests that democracies rarely go to war with one another and liberal democratic states would form 'pacific union' that 'maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands.' It traces its origin back to the work of Kant (1795) who suggested that democratic norms are based on shared values and peaceful resolution of political disputes. Doyle (1986) stimulated renewed interest in democratic thesis through his work by identifying that liberalism and democracy are essential principles of freedom. Russett and Oneal (2001) provide a prolific definition of "democratic peace" by highlighting its normative and institutional influence, and ultimately attaching it to triangulated interdependence. According to them, democratic states resolve their conflict without wars as when dealing with other democratic states; it's expected that the other will follow the same norms. Hence, violent conflicts between democracies are not as frequent as the institution of democracy itself through its processes, restraints leaders from entering into conflict. Rasmussen (2003) adds that 'Democratic Peace' rests on the idea that the spread of democracy leads to the probable elimination of war based on the belief that free democratic people will treat each other ethically. Adding on to the theoretical paradigm of 'democratic peace', Bastian and Luckham (2003) contend that democratic structures decrease the likelihood of civil conflicts. Russett (1993) and Ikenberry (1999) highlight that democratization creates stable, peaceful states. Przeworski (2000) correlates democracy with an increased level of development leading to peaceful governance. Critiques of the 'democratic peace theory' point out to its limitation in explaining the correlation between democracy and peace. Layne (1994) and Maoz (1997) conclude

that rather than democracy, it is the structural constraint of fear that avoids or settles conflict and the relevance of 'Democratic Peace Thesis' is limited to the nuclear era. Factors such as military competition act as main determinants of war and peace between states with democracy exercising marginal influence. Rosato (2003) is of the opinion that the logic underpinning the democratic peace theory is flawed and highlights that peace is not caused or guaranteed by the democratic nature of states.

In the post-cold war era, democracy promotion emerged as a major field of interest in the international arena. Schmidt (2015) pointed out that the idea that democracies make the world a safer place as they are inherently peaceful began to influence and shape policymaking. Armey and McNab (2012) pointed out the rise in a number of civil conflicts, the damage caused by long-lasting civil wars and its correlated how democracy promotion can act as a tool for bringing about a peaceful resolution of hostilities. McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas (2011) highlighted that external actors exercised a considerable impact on democratization as they accelerate the process of democratic transition and support building of stable political structures. Hence, international organizations emerged at the forefront of democracy promotion. Lipset (1994), Russett and Oneal (2001), and Vachudova (2005) viewed democracy as an 'international cause' and postulated that International Organizations and democracy were inherently linked. They pointed out that interactional organizations exercise a lasting influence on establishing durable democracy and bringing about domestic political change. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) highlighted that international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations influenced a number of African dictators to agree to multiparty elections and facilitated democratization in the post-cold war era. However, Highley and Burton (1989) Schraeder (2002), and Diamond (2002) counter this argument by pointing out that international organizations have marginal influence on democratization and suggest that democratic transformation should be initiated by domestic actors. They deny any concrete influence international actors exercise on democratization. Carothers (1999) adds to this dimension by emphasizing on ''modestly positive, mostly negligible" effect of democratization and democratic aid in recipient states. Chayes and Chayes (1995), Grigorescu (2003), and Abbott and Snidal (2010) highlight that international organizations have promoted democratization in post-cold war era but haven't able to prevent authoritarian reversals or consolidate peace.

Ottaway (2007) is of the view that as 'democracy' emerged as the suitable political system for post-conflict states, the international organizations engaged in democratization in order to stabilize a divided society and assist post-conflict countries to rebuild stable and durable peace. Paris and Sisk (2007) and Doyle (2007) opine that as liberal internationalism correlated the ideas of liberal state building and the democratic peace thesis, peacebuilding and democratization emerged as a means of transforming war-torn countries and expand the peaceful zone. Hence, democratization in the post-conflict states emerged as a major theme within peacebuilding. Bastian and Luckham (2003) are of the view that the UN and some other international organizations like the European Union decided to carry out democratization in the post-conflict states as they propounded that democratic structures and increased opportunities for participation will encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts and decrease the likelihood of a return to civil war. Hegre and Fjelde (2009) associated democracy with domestic peace and argued that democracy promotion and support is and should be a necessary part of UN's state-building strategy through peacekeeping operations.

However, Scholars such as Mansfield and Snyder (1995) use statistical evidence to counter the rationale behind democratization in post-conflict states by showcasing that democratization makes countries more war-prone. They point out that democratic nations may be more peaceful, however, in post-conflict states, the process of democratization increases the chances of relapse of war. The authors argue that rise of domestic elites and institutional weaknesses due to democratization triggers civil conflict. Ottaway (2007) is of the opinion that coercive external democratization is not a successful approach for rebuilding post-conflict states. According to her, democratization can only be successful only in well-established states and not in conflict-ridden ones. Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), Diamond (2002), and Levitsky and Way (2006) accentuate that transfer from an authoritarian rule through democratization can be a democracy, but it can also adversely result in a liberalized authoritarianism or illiberal democracy or hybrid regimes of competitive authoritarianism.

United Nations and Democratization: Mandates, Norms, and Guidelines

In the UN Charter, the word 'democracy' is not mentioned, nor it is the requirement for a state to be a democracy to apply for the UN membership. In fact, one of the guiding

principles of the UN is non - interference in the internal matters of the member-states. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) mentions democracy as one of the significant ideals of a sovereign state. Farer (2004) states that in the cold war era the United Nations acknowledged the self-determination of states and viewed conflict resolution to be within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. As after the cold war, instances of civil war increased and democratization emerged as an essential tool for building peace, the UN reinterpreted its approach. The agenda for the promotion of democracy and UN's attempt at carrying out democratization in the conflict areas became prevalent in the post-Cold War era. An Agenda for Democratization (Boutros-Boutros Ghali 1996) enlists the norms for carrying out democratization - "The United Nations will not offer or encourage a model of democratization or democracy; it must receive a formal request before it can assist the Member States in their democratization processes; providing technical assistance towards areas relevant to democratization, and promoting a culture of democracy." Parakh (1993) and Newman (2004) point out that in theory, the UN is free from any ideological binding, but its approach to democracy promotion is not entirely value free. They argue that the United Nations promotes a specific liberal form of democracy in post-conflict states.

Guidance Note of the UN Secretary-General on Democracy (UN Document, 2009a) provided a holistic set of norms and guidelines for democracy promotion – "do no harm, uphold local ownership, broaden domestic engagement, provide political facilitation, encourage popular participation, develop democracy building strategies with long-term horizon, accountability, domestic capacity building, and foster inclusive governance." While commenting on the norm of local ownership, Billerbeck (2015) points that UN asserts that local ownership enhances the legitimacy and working of peacebuilding by preserving the principles of self-determination. The author adds that UN's norm of local ownership often comes into conflict with its operational obligations. Duffey (2000), Paris (2002), Jarstad (2008), and Liden (2005), and Richmond (2004) highlight that international actors including the UN at times ignore local perspectives and treat locals as an obstacle to peacebuilding and democratization. Chandler (2006), Hazen (2007), Paris and Sisk (2007) are critical of these norms followed by the UN and highlight its failure in building a bottoms-up approach to democracy in conflict states. Chesterman, Farer, and Sisk (2003) and Farer (2004) are of the opinion that the United Nations is focused on formulating universal norms and are critical of UN's one-size-

fits-all approach. They highlight that institutional and material differences among regions mean that relevant norms applicable in one state might not be suitable for another region. Commenting on the norm of 'long-term strategy formation' and 'exit strategy', Ludwig (2004) points out that UN focuses on the technical and infrastructural assistance for building democracy but lacks in developing develop long-term participative strategies. The author argues that absence of post-election assistance, civic education about democracy, and support to the media creates feeble political institutions.

In Secretary General's Guidance Note (UN Document, 2009b), highlighted the norm of capacity building by highlighting that "the United Nations aims to provide expertise and support in conflict-ridden states through the development of legislative, executive and judicial institutions by building their capacity, resources, and necessary independence to play their respective roles." Highlighting the drawbacks of UN's norm of capacity building, Tommasoli (2010) and Reports of International IDEA (2010, 2011, 2012) point that UN adopts a narrow approach for promoting democracy and does not invest in the effective local capacity building. Liden (2005) and Diamond (2009) point that the manner and norms of implementing democracy through peacebuilding missions appear to follow benign autocracy leading to quasi-democratic arrangements. The Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes (UN Document, 2009) also recognizes that constitution-making is central to democratic transitions. It says that UN assistance in constitution-making should be participatory, inclusive, and National-led, provide legitimacy for transitional governments, lay foundation for public participation and strong democratic structures, and enhance the legitimacy of final constitution. Brandt (2005) points out that UN does not follow the stated guidelines for constitution making and infield processes are often determined by the case to case basis.

Rich (2004) highlights the decisive influence that the permanent members exercise in crafting the shape and text of the Council's state-building and democratization mandates. Heldt (2005, 2011) highlights that democracy promotion mandates and democratization through peacekeeping missions bear a positive impact in conflict zones. Ghali (1996) emphasizes that mandates lay out the structure and are incremental for successful democratization in conflict areas. Hirschmann (2012) points

out that mandates of UN peace operations of the 1990s defined the successful conduct of elections as the benchmark of a completed operation. However, Brahimi Report (2000) highlights the drawbacks of mandates and criticises the inconsistent, vaguely formulated, and under-funded mandates formulated by the UN for hindering democratization efforts in post-conflict states. Wright and Greig (2012) point to the limited focus of the democratization mandates of peacekeeping operations. According to them, peace operations in post-conflict situations are mandated for short periods whereas democratization is a strenuous long-term process. Mason and Mitchell (2016) are of the opinion that the United Nations focuses too much on the formation of formal mandates whereas the manner and way to achieve democratization are not clearly specified in these mandates.

United Nations and Democratization: Mechanisms and Operational Activities

The United Nations carry out a number of tasks for the democratization of the post-conflict states. Highlighting the significance of constitution-making processes, Kumar (1998) and Samuels (2006) point out the facilitative role played by external actors and the United Nations in bringing political transition in post-conflict states. Bastian and Luckham (2003) and Rubin (2004) point to the supportive role of the UN in deciding the process, stakeholders, and drafting procedure of the constitution in post-conflict states. They state that UN provides a platform for representation through participatory constitution making process. Lake and Rothchild (1998), Kumar (1998), and Samuels (2006) are of the opinion that unless carefully designed and implemented, constitutions can ferment conflict in post-conflict societies. As in Liberia and Haiti democratization, they pointed out that without the firm foundation of a constitution these countries could not establish durable democracy. Brandt (2005) highlights that UN might be incremental in the formation of a constitution but, many constitutions remain merely on paper such as many of Cambodia's provisions, several years on, have not been implemented. He suggests that UN should provide advice about constitutional provisions post-adoption, including suggested deadlines for implementing a strong constitution.

Soderberg, Kovacs, and Mimmi (2007), Ottaway (1997), and Kumar (1998) are of the view that one of the ways the UN is carrying out democratization is by the formation of political parties as many of the post-conflict societies never had the experience of

democracy. They highlight that through the transformation of former warring parties into political parties the United Nations in a way attempts to demilitarize the society and plays a facilitative role in stimulating effective power-sharing and party system in post-conflict states. They specify that UN provides training to political stakeholders on how to hold meetings, raise funds, organizing public rallies, and mount election campaigns. Takashi, Newman, Keane (1998) pointed out the chances of the resurgence of conflict if warring parties fail to see any political future by converting their warring factions into political parties. Sokoliv (2001) and Jarstad (2015) pointed out the varying results of converting warring factions into political parties. They stated that the legalization of the warring groups in El Salvador is seen as an important stride towards democratization but, in Bosnia and Herzegovina conversion of armed groups into political parties resulted in establishing an autocratic rule that exists till date. Similarly, in Liberia, the transformation of warring parties into political parties by the UN did not prevent relapse of conflict.

Kumar (1998) and Reilly (2002, 2004, 2006) discuss the UN involvement in conduct and supervision of elections in post-conflict states and regard it as a crucial mechanism for democratization and building electoral infrastructure. Holiday and Stanley (1993) and Ludwig (2004) pointed out the drawbacks of UN's electoral assistance by its failure in enhancing grassroots empowerment. National democratic institute reports (1994,1996) are also critical of UN's disregard of educating voters and development of social acceptability for the electoral process. Bermeo (1997), Kumar (1998), Mansfield and Snyder (1995), and Hoglund and Svensson (2006) raise doubts on the fairness of UN election processes and point that its conduct leads to political violence. Geddes (1996, 2007) and Magaloni (2006) highlight the instability of electoral processes and institutions that enable ex-authoritarians to compete in fair elections. Horowitz (2002) and Reilly (2006) emphasize that 'quick fix' approach to electoral assistance increases the chances of relapse of civil wars and legitimisation of authoritarian leaders. They are of the opinion that rushed implementation of democratization policies by the UN and untimely elections cause weak institutionalization. Pugh (2001,2004) and Newman (2004) point out that ill-timed and early elections by the United Nations in post-conflict situations can exacerbate nationalist tensions through electoral competition as witnessed in the case of Angola and Burundi. Daxecker (2012) highlights that UN involvement and presence of

international observers during elections increases the risk of violence. Reilly (2006) also highlights that in Angola (1992), Cambodia (1993), and Liberia (1997), UN-administered elections despite being declared successful, created unrest, violence, and instability. Ludwig (2004) asserts that UN's experience with conducting elections in conflict states has demonstrated that elections are substantial to democratization, but elections cannot establish a successful democracy without creating effective democratic institutions and processes.

Kumar (1998) and Pugh (2001) have extensively researched and critically analyzed the operations and outcomes of UN democratization activities. Newman and Rich (2004) and Pushkina (2006) criticise the standard and one-dimensional operating procedure of UN adopted for democratic transition under post-conflict peacebuilding. They highlight that rapid hand-over to the newly elected local authorities created weak democratic institutions in post-conflict states. Carothers (1999) and Newman and Rich (2004) point out the institutional limitations faced by the United Nations in conducting democratization. They postulate that due to pressure to end missions quickly, the UN withdraws support from democratization activities. Ludwig (2004) highlights the issue of lack of funding acting as a hindrance in UN's operations as the substantial international funding of one election (such as Cambodia in 1993) fails to establish a permanent structure for future elections. Newman (2004) points out that UN has mostly been involved in less developed post-conflict states in most challenging political situations. Thus it exercises modest impact on building democracy in the absence of local support.

Marten (2004), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), and Fortna (2008) evaluate the overall success of UN and are of the view that UN's experience with democratization in post-conflict states has been complex and failed to build stable democratic structures. Carothers (1999) points out that countries that began their democratic transition with international assistance in the 1990s are mired in 'grey zones'. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) put forth that UN peacekeeping had a limited impact on democracy building and has shown a mixed record. Newman (2004) points out that the cases where the United Nations played a major electoral or democracy assistance role such as in Cambodia, Bosnia, Western Sahara, Angola, El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, Mozambique, Liberia, Kosovo, East Timor – the record is not completely positive. The author is

critical of the extent to which stable institutions were created in these countries as UN did not succeed in establishing an accountable, transparent, and participative democracy. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), Heldt (2001, 2005), are of the opinion that UN multidimensional peace operations were significantly positively correlated with the level of democracy and probable success of democratic transition in target countries. Pickering and Peceny (2006) through their study point that UN presence increased the likelihood of successful democratization in host-states by 6.1% (with all other variables kept constant).

Democratization in Liberia

Marcos, Kolleholon, and Ngovo (2005) trace back the existence of modern-day Liberia to the 12th century. Liberia is one of the oldest independent republics in Africa founded by ex-slave community from the United States in 1847. Rinehart (1985) and Moran (2006) state that though Liberia was never formally colonized, the United States has exercised enormous influence in the matters of governance since its formation. Dennis and Dennis (2008) point that dissatisfaction of the ordinary citizens with the political cult, rivalries between leaders combined with economic problems in the period of 1940s to 1980s sowed the seeds for armed conflict in Liberia. Ellis (1995) is of the opinion that President Tolbert (1944-1980) who belonged to the ex-slave community, exercised totalitarian control over the government structures and created divisions and discontent within Liberian society. Baos and Utas (2014) suggest that history of conflict in Liberia can be traced back to elite politics and ethnic cleavages prevalent since its formation. Ellis (1995), Kieh (2008, 2009), Baos and Dunn (2013), and Boas and Jennings (2005) summarise various causes behind the Liberian civil war using the theories such as - ethnic; elite pathology; institutional pathology; spiritual-religious anarchy; political culture; and crises of underdevelopment.

Ikechi (2003) points out that a coup led by Samuel Doe in 1980 led to deepening of ethnic and regional tensions. They are of the opinion that neighbouring states such as Libya and Cote d'Ivoire were apprehensive of Doe's closeness to the US and supported the rival party, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)'s leader Charles Taylor's claim to forming a government in Liberia. As a result, a civil war involving forces led by Doe and Taylor broke out in 1989. During the first Civil War, Amnesty International (1996) reported that 700,000 citizens had fled the country and

lakhs were killed. As an international response, the United Nations established United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1993 that worked in close collaboration with the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) for bringing an end to the Civil Conflict and was tasked with overseeing and verifying the election results. Jorgel and Utas (2007) and McLaughlin (2012) highlight that the UN mission proved to be incremental in resolving the conflict, establishing democratic structures and was perceived positively by a majority of Liberians.

Paris (2004) and Jarstad (2015) point out that UN was unable to break the pathology of repression and violence through its democratic processes and it created unstable state structures. Samuels (2006), Kovacs (2008), and Harris (2011) highlight that UN-facilitated inclusion of warlords into political competition led to relapse of civil war in Liberia. They pointed that post-UN's exit in 1997, and after elections were declared a success, elected leader Charles Taylor reversed to old style coercion. In former President of Liberia's words, "The state produced turned out to be a criminal state, legitimized by-elections." Eze and Saa (2013) and Baos and Utas (2014) pointed that UN peacekeeping and elections acted as major triggers for renewed violence in Liberia. They further add that the civil wars in Liberia can be viewed as 'Nationalisation of Local Conflicts'. Reilly (2004) points out that rushed elections by the UN in Liberia undermined the legitimacy of the electoral process and created problems for future democracy-building efforts. With the end of the mission in 1997 and election of Charles Taylor, the second civil war broke out when a group of insurgents of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) attacked the elected Taylor government.

Due to the resurgence of Civil War in 2000, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with an explicit democratization mandate began in 2003 for the purpose of overseeing the implementation the Accra Peace Accord (2003). Kieh (2009) argues that the second civil war was 'inevitable' and was caused by the failure of the processes of democratic transition initiated by the international community after the first civil war. Nilsson and Kovacs (2005) highlight that the reintegration of ex-combatants and building of stable democratic institutions by the United Nations has been successful as the democratic process included not only all warring parties to the conflict but representatives from the civil society as well. Sisk (2008) and Tamagnini and Krafft (2010) point out that post-war elections in Liberia were conducted peacefully

because of the widespread deployment of international election observers and support of the United Nations in the electoral process. They are of the opinion that the United Nations Mission in Liberia eventually did succeed in establishing stable democratic structures. Johnson-Sirleaf, elected as President of Liberia in 2005, in her address to UN General Assembly in 2017 proclaimed "Liberia is a post-conflict peace-building and democratic success." Hoglund (2008), however, points out that major violence erupted in Liberia's capital Monrovia in 2004 around the presidential and parliamentary elections, despite heavy United Nations peacekeeping presence. Jarstad (2015) highlights that the UN might have succeeded in establishing peace, but it could not establish stable democratic structures in post-conflict Liberia.

There exists literature on democracy promotion and conflict resolution in post-conflict states. There is also literature on democratization by the United Nations in specific post-conflict states. However, there is no comprehensive work that evaluates the working of UN's norms, guidelines, and mechanisms for democratization in the post-conflict states and how they have expanded and evolved over time. This study attempts to fill up this gap.

Definition, Rationale, and Scope of Study

There are two key concepts used in this research, democratization and post-conflict states. In generic terms, democratization refers to the end of an authoritarian regime and transition to peaceful democracy through competitive electoral processes. Whitehead (1996: 27) states that "Democratization is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics. Democratization occurs when significant political actors accept the inevitability of electoral process for allocating public offices and facilitates active participation of citizens in political processes." (Whitehead, 1996: 27)

Due to the absence of a coherent definition of 'Post Conflict' in the international arena, the academic literature has used varied interpretations for the term. For the purpose of this study, the conceptualization of 'Post Conflict' put forward by Brown, Langer, and Stewart (2011: 4) is used. The authors define 'Post Conflict States' as the countries where armed hostilities (including civil wars) have ceased, and the state is

undergoing a transition process for the establishment of peace (Brown, Langer, and Stewart, 2011: 4).

Since the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts exist as a major threat to international peace and security. Conflict-ridden states have the tendency to become a thriving ground for terrorism which poses a graver threat to international peace and security. The United Nations has been a key player not only to bring the situation under control but also in carrying out peacebuilding activities in an attempt to bring about lasting peace and stability. One of the crucial peacebuilding activities is the attempt to reconstruct the political institutions through democratization. This study is significant as it seeks to problematize and question the outcomes of democratization carried out by the United Nations and critically evaluate how the UN norms and guidelines played out in the field and how the UN mechanisms for democratization actually operated. It seeks to critically analyze the working of the processes and mechanisms of democratization and attempt to identify the factors which contribute and hamper the consolidation of democracy in the post-conflict states. It is also significant because this study attempts to examine how the lessons learned from UN's past experiences of democratization influence the designing and practice of the subsequent democratization activities in post-conflict states.

For an empirical understanding of UN's democratization, Liberia would be taken as a case study. Liberia adequately represents a 'post-conflict' fragile state after facing years of devastating civil war. Even after the initial failure of UN's democratization and relapse of war, Liberia is on the verge of emerging as a competent democracy. United Nations Mission in Liberia which began in 2003 is one of the biggest and longest peacebuilding undertakings of the United Nations, and it had a significant role in the democratic transition of war-torn Liberia. Hence, due to its two-time experience with UN democratization, attempted in two different periods and being one of the latest operations with a mandate for democratization, Liberia seems to be the fit case to critically evaluate how the norms and mechanisms of the UN democratization shape the democratic transition of a post-conflict state.

As the UN involvement in the democratization of post-conflict states began from 1989 onwards, the scope of this research is from 1989 – 2017.

Research Questions

1. Why does the United Nations carry out democratization in post-conflict states?
2. How have UN missions mandate for democratization expanded over the years?
3. How did the various norms and guidelines for democratization in post-conflict states evolve?
4. How does UN facilitate constitution building process in post-conflict states?
5. How does the UN support formation of political parties in post-conflict states?
6. Why do elections under the supervision of the United Nations lead to a resurgence of hostilities in post-conflict states?
7. What are the challenges faced by the United Nations in consolidating democracy in Liberia?

Hypotheses

1. The ineffective building of local capacities for democratization leads to relapse of political instability in post-conflict states.
2. The early exit of the UN missions causes autocratic takeover of the government in post-conflict states.

Research Methods

This study is based on Qualitative research. Single case studies have significant scientific value in the sense that they perform well in dealing with the in-depth investigation to substantiate the larger argument. Hence, for empirical examination of the subject and its related contextual conditions, case study method will be used in this study. Statistical data will be used wherever is necessary to depict the number of UN personnel deployed for missions, the financial cost incurred, a number of candidates or political parties and voting results and so on. UN's norms and mechanisms employed for democratization is treated as an independent variable in this study. Democratic consolidation and building of stable peace in post-conflict states is the outcome or the dependent variable. This study seeks to evaluate the interaction between the two variables critically. The study draws from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources for this study are the UN documents and the UN reports such as An agenda for democratization, An agenda for peace, Reports of the Secretary-General, etc. Secondary literature is drawn from a range of academic books and journals as well as reports of various think-tanks and other reliable internet sources.

Chapterization

This research study has been divided into six chapters. This introductory chapter lays down the overview of the thesis including literature review and research questions. Chapter 2 entitled 'Democratization and International Relations' begins by discussing theoretical underpinnings of 'Democratic Peace' and its relations with the sphere of international relations. It goes on to examine the debate of various authors on the issue. Then it goes on the discussion about how the experiences of the transitional states led to a redefinition of this theoretical aspect. The last section of this chapter devoted to discussion on why the United Nations adopted the agenda of democratization in the post-conflict states. It ends with critically analyze the theoretical debate surrounding the UN project of democratization in the post-conflict states.

The third chapter "The United Nations and Democratization: Mandates, Norms, and Guidelines" highlights the normative basis of UN's involvement in democratization. It seeks to enlist, explain, and analyze the norms and guidelines adopted by the UN that shape its approach to democratization in post-conflict states. It also critically examines how the UN mandates of democratization evolved and expanded over the period of time.

The fourth chapter "The United Nations and Democratization: Mechanisms and Operations" analyzes the tools and mechanisms for the democratization of the United Nations in the operational field of post-conflict states. It critically evaluates the performance of United Nations in carrying out democratization in the post-conflict states.

The fifth chapter "Democratization in Liberia" begins with the historical background of Liberia and then traces the origin of the conflict. It proceeds to analyze the changing mandates of democratization and mechanisms employed by the United Nations for democratization in Liberia. It discusses why and how the initial attempt of democratization failed, leading to relapse of war. It further discusses the elaborative mandate of the second mission. It also discusses how the second attempt of democratization was more successful than the former one. It also critically analyzes the factors that contribute and hamper the consolidation of democracy in Liberia.

The final chapter titled 'Conclusion' provides a summarization of the major findings of the research work. It addresses how the hypotheses have been substantiated, modified, or nullified and research questions have been addressed. It seeks to bring out

the challenges, limitations, and lessons learned from UN's experience in Liberia. It concludes with suggestions of what future research needs to be done on this topic.

CHAPTER 2: DEMOCRATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the contemporary world order, the reach and appeal of 'Democracy' can be established from the fact that more than 100 states of the world today are functioning democracies. The origin of 'Democracy' can be traced back to the Greek city of Athens in 5th Century BC which exists as one of the oldest examples of a democratic society. Even the term democracy has been derived from the Greek word 'demo-kratia' that literally means 'people's-power' (Cartledge 2011: 1). While the Athenian model of direct democracy was a fairly simplistic understanding of the concept, over the years, the definition of democracy has undergone several modifications resulting in the varied forms of democratic governance. In the 18th and 19th century, as the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity questioned the existing autocratic structures, it led to the emergence of several nation-states that followed a democratic model of electing the government. Although democracy took various forms across states, the idea that citizens should be active participants in decision making formed the basis of governance. For instance, after a prolonged civil war, Britain adopted a constitutional monarchy where the monarch was a figurative head and the first parliament was established in 1707, whereas after the American Revolution and formation of a constitution in 1787, the United States adopted a Presidential form of government. Yet, both the nations are democracies based on principles of equality and rule of law where representatives chosen by the people are in-charge of the state of affairs in the country. In other words, legal equality, political freedom, and rule of law emerged as formative characteristics of a democracy (O'Donnell 2005: 3). By the 20th century, democracy is no longer a domestic concern of the states. The scholars started looking at democracy through the lens of international order as well. The rise of 'Democracy' as a concept in international relations and conflict resolution can also be attributed to the rise of a Liberal school of thought. By the turn of 20th century, subsequent wars, economic crisis, people-led revolutions, and decolonization transcended borders and spread across states leading to the evolution of democratic ideas or 'waves' of democracy (Diamond 2015: 141).

In order to understand the historical and theoretical transformation of the concept of democracy, this chapter begins by discussing the origin and context of liberal democracy. It seeks to discuss why democracy was considered as a formidable and desired form of government in comparison to other forms of governance worldwide.

Then it discusses 'Democratic Peace Theory' and critically evaluates the core argument of the theorists that 'democracy builds peace'. It further explores the revival of 'Democratic Peace' paradigm in the 1970s and 1980's. It then focuses on why and how the end of Cold War facilitated the spread of democracy in the world and how the international organizations have taken the project of democratization as one of their main agendas.

Liberal Democracy

The roots of liberal democracy can be traced back to the age of enlightenment in Europe. During the 18th and 19th century, citizens and scholars began questioning the theory of natural rights of the monarchs that provided the rulers an inherited right to govern. Intellectuals, as well as the commoners, supported the idea of the creation of a stable nation-state based on equal rights and political freedom. In 1784 essay "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View", Immanuel Kant problematizes the concept of universal history and the system of monarchy. According to him, history had reached an endpoint and the final purpose of the time should be the realization of human freedom and creation of a society governed by a just civic constitution (Fukuyama 1992: 58). Similarly, in 'The Philosophy of History", Hegel also pointed out the internal contradictions of the existing political systems and postulated that rigid monarchies will be replaced by other governance models based on value for human freedom. According to him, the modern constitutional state or liberal democracy perfectly embodied the needs of political and human freedom (Sibree 2001: 19-20). Given the despotic nature of governance and ensuing misery of the masses, liberalism gained prominence as an alternative political system and Europe witnessed several revolutions and people's movements demanding the abolition of old structures and creation of nation states.

Hence, the seeds of liberalism and democracy were sown in Europe in the 19th century. Industrialization accompanied by the proliferation of liberal, democratic, egalitarian ideologies contributed to rising of nationalism in Europe (Fukuyama 1992: 269). However, 20th century marked a turning point in the history of liberalism as democracy moved towards transforming itself into a 'universal value' (Sen 1999: 4). Early 20th century witnessed the fall of erstwhile empires, two disastrous world wars, the fall of Nazi forces, and a phase of global economic depression, yet the rise of

democracy is seen as one of the major path-breaking developments of this period. The Liberal School of thought based on the ideas of free political institutions, peaceful resolution of disputes, laissez-faire economy, and religious toleration presented a stable model of governance in the post-war era and 'Democracy' emerged as a lynchpin of the Liberal School. Whereas the norm of democracy was not new and existed since decades, the idea of democracy being the "normal", ideal, and universal form of government is a by-product of the 20th century (Sen 1999: 4). Moreover, albeit universal yet democracy has been a contested concept and with its expansion, its characteristics have undergone ramifications and modifications.

On a basic level, democracy was defined as for a system that enabled effective participation of citizens based on free and fair voting (Dahl 2000: 38). Dahl laid out the minimal requirements of a functional democracy – universal adult suffrage; competitive, free, regular, and fair elections; and with the participation of more than one political party (Dahl 1971: 1). A liberal democracy hence was 'a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions' (Owen 1994: 89). But, achieving the requisites for democracy and their implementation has been a slippery slope. As Diamond (2002: 28) points out, that it's difficult to judge or to make sure that elections were free and fair and opposition parties had an uncompromised chance or the armed forces did not constrain the voting and decision-making processes. In the 1950's and 60's, Marxists brought out the scathing drawbacks of democracy and liberalism that according to them converged decision making power in the hands of a section of elites (Morrice 1994: 646). Yet, despite facing several challenges from communism, 'Liberal Democracy' emerged as the desired and reliable model of governance in comparison to other regime types.

Till the 1970's almost 30 percent or 46 countries were electoral democracies based on universal adult suffrage and most of these nations belonged to the developed liberal West with few exceptions such as India. But, in the following decades, democracy witnessed a remarkable global expansion, as the number of democratic countries in the world rose to 114 by the end of 2006 (Diamond 2015: 142). In the absence of an alternative political or economic model with the collapse of Soviet Union, liberal democracy emerged as the model of governing states. Thus, democracy garnered

a universal acceptance by default, on account of the failure of other governing systems (Hobson 2009: 383).

Democratic Peace Theory

As liberal democracy emerged as a formidable form of government by the end of the Cold War, the expansion of democracy throughout the world was attributed to the theoretical belief that democracy had a positive impact on achieving the end goal of a peaceful state. In order to provide an explanation and justification for democratization, scholars often employ the 'Democratic Peace Theory'. The Democratic Peace Theory derives its crux from the ideology of Liberalism. The core premise of the theory is based on a positive correlation between democracy and peace. It combines the liberal ideas of civil liberties, economic independence, and democratic institutions and concludes that democracy is a necessary prerequisite for building international peace as liberal democratic nations rarely engage in warfare. While the rigorous scientific study of the democratic peace theory began in the 1960's, the origin of the idea behind democratic peace can be traced back the writings of Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant in the 1700's.

In 1791 work "The Rights of Man", Paine wrote about the perils of war and conceived that wars preserved the power of the rulers including statesmen, soldiers, and diplomats who build a tyranny over common people (Howard 1978: 31). Drawing inspiration, Immanuel Kant constructed the idea further and through his essay 'On Perpetual Peace' of 1795 provided a thorough analysis of the context of war and means to achieve peace in the states. The core proposition of Kant's work is that 'Perpetual Peace' in states is built by adopting republicanism and principles of liberty which are implemented through constitutions and international laws. While a number of philosophers of that time believed in the existence of a natural state of peace in the world, Kant's work contested the argument and highlighted that states are either unstable or a constant threat of war lurks over them. As quoted in his text -–He states, "The state of peace is not a state of nature, which is rather a state of war, so must the state of peace is established" (Kant, 1991: 5). Kant postulated that in absence of a pre-existing state of peace, it had to be constructed within the nation and republicanism or a federal structure of governance was ideal for that purpose. He further states, "But peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general agreement between the

nations; thus, a particular kind of league, which we might call pacific federation (foedus pacificum), is required." (Kant, 1991: 22).

Kant also highlighted the three principles as being necessary conditions for establishing long-lasting peace. According to Kant, states should follow republicanism based on a civil constitution, the laws of the nations should be based on the federation of free states, and the right of citizenship shall be universal (Kant, 1991: 6). Kant's argument rested on the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis and on peaceful resolution of disputes through long-term treaties based on democratic values. He was also of the view that if citizens had a say in decisions on war and peace, then it would foster peaceful interstate relations (Mello 2016: 3). Kant's essay was one of the foremost literary pieces that discussed the relationship between states, war, and peace while laying out the foundation for analysing the effects of democratic values on a nation's stability.

Though mainstream theorists in international relations neglected Kant's work for decades on account of its raw idealism, yet, the contemporary examples of the following centuries corroborated that the peace might not be perpetual, but peace mostly strives in states with republican constitutions and commercial exchange bounded by international law and institutions (Russett 2006: 254). Kant's ideas witnessed a restoration in the early 20th century through Woodrow Wilson's revival of the Liberal School. Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points" of 1914 that served as a benchmark for post-war conflict resolution and international governance were rooted in Kantian idealism. Wilson's plan of action was based on mutual cooperation between liberal states and respect for international law that led to the formation of the League of Nations which acted as a 'community of states' committed to achieving peace in the world. Thus, Kant's belief in cooperation, republicanism and international law was re-introduced in the international system by Woodrow Wilson. At the end of First World War, the victory and growth of democracies created a consensus that democracy was emerging as the most favorable regime type (Ray 1995: 8). Wilson, who was a firm believer in liberal internationalism favored democratic governance for building international peace and proclaimed that 'a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations' and 'the world must be made safe for democracy' (Chan 1997: 59). However, as Wilson could not get the Treaty of Versailles ratified by the US Congress and the League of Nations failed to prevent the

outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, it brought out the shortcomings of the Kantian liberal idealism (Kane 2012: 5). Kantian emphasis on cooperation and idealism for building peace did not succeed in dealing with the political competition between states.

In the 1950's, realists and neo-realists emerged as a challenge to democracy and Kant's influence in the sphere of international relations by highlighting the drawbacks of the liberal school. Hans Morgenthau in his book Politics Among Nations (1948) brought out the significance of political realism and propounded that the world was under a constant state of anarchy (Morgenthau 1948: 3). Realists believed that in the international realm, states focus on survival and are in constant pursuit of national interest which creates a sense of conflict with other states. Hence, cooperation among states might be possible, but it cannot sustain due to the anarchical nature of the international system (Layne, 1994: 11). Thus, states continuously seek to maximize their power in relation to their rivals and create conditions for war or conflict. Realists challenged the 'Democratic Peace' paradigm by concluding that democracies do not necessarily assure peace as interests of liberal states are inherently contradictory and international order breeds conflict. Throughout the Cold War era, democracy had been used by the Western countries to counter communism. In fact, realism's focus on building national power and state-centric approach held greater influence over international relations during the Cold War period.

However, Kant's ideas and scholarly interest in 'Democratic Peace' witnessed a revival in the 1970s and 1980s in the academia. A study by Small and Singer in 1976 observed an encouraging trend of the absence of war between democratic states that led to a resurgence of an academic debate over the relationship between democracy and peace (Small and Singer 1976: 50). But, it was Michael Doyle's 1986 article 'Liberalism and World Politics' that provided an empirical and theoretical argument in favor of Kant's ideas and led to a renewed emphasis on the possibility of a democratic peace. In his work, Doyle lists all the liberal regimes between 1700-1982 as well as all the major the global wars fought since 1817. According to his data analysis, Liberal democratic states were different and had created a separate peace, corroborating Kant's claim (Doyle 1986: 1157). This stimulated a renewed interest in the study of democratic peace thesis. He emphasized that liberal states have been successful in maintaining

peaceful relations with other liberal states as democracies once established lead to peaceful ties. Democracies rarely go to war with one another and liberal democratic states would form a 'pacific union' that 'maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands'. In other words, the Pacific Union would set up a 'zone of peace' amongst the republics, with an ultimate goal of including new republics. As this zone would rely on political and economic interdependence, the resultant incentives would put constraints on republics not and prevent wars (Doyle 1986: 1158). Democracies under a system of checks and balance exercise democratic caution and respect international law, thus bringing down the prospects of war (Doyle 1986: 1168). Doyle also focuses on the positive correlation between democracy and economic development. Economic interdependence creates pressure groups who oppose war as it imposes costs by disrupting international trade and investment (Doyle 1997: 26). Thus, Doyle concluded that Kant's idea of liberal republicanism based on a constitution and belief in international cooperation should act as the standard for setting up modern-day peaceful democratic regimes.

Building on the arguments of Doyle, the relevance of democratic peace has also been defended on the grounds of its institutional or structural competence. The mechanisms, processes, and division of power within the democratic states put a system of check and prevents prevent democracies from engaging in warfare. Building on Kant's Cost-Benefit analysis as the decision makers are institutionally answerable to the media, legislature, and other interest groups, public opinion puts a substantial check on the level of involvement of democratic states in war situations (Mello 2016: 4). Moreover, the institutional process in democracies entails that a proper procedure is followed even if the military needs to be mobilized for an attack. Democracies are deemed rational as the procedures ensure that no decision about engaging in war is undertaken in haste or without due explanation. Hence, theoretically, the liberal democracy does allow the public to somewhat influence the decision to go to war. Moreover, the transparency argument contends that democracies are based on the open electoral contest and in time of conflict, democratic leaders are open about their political goals and war agendas. Thus, democracies handle the security dilemma that causes major conflicts in international sphere better than other states (Mello 2016: 3). Engaging in war also impacts the re-election prospects of leaders. If the material and physical cost of war negatively impact the population, chances of the future defeat of leaders are

higher in democracies. Therefore, democratic leaders shall only engage in popular wars that have public support and higher chances of success in order to maintain their position (Silverson 1995: 481). Thus, it's rare for a democracy to wage a war against another democracy (Lake 1992: 24).

Doyle's trust in the 'democratic peace' also found support in the work of Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz on "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986". This study provided a quantitative study of the democratic peace thesis. Through a comprehensive study of a number of democracies, they concluded that political constraints and democratic norms exercise considerable influence and provide a plausible explanation for why democracies rarely fight among each other (Maoz and Russett 1993: 636). Democratic peace thesis is based on a strong normative foundation of the internal capability of democracy to prevent war. Even if the democracies accept the realist argument of anarchic nature of international relations, the states hold on to the belief that democracies would follow the cultural ethics and strive for peaceful resolution of disputes rather than engaging in war. The liberal ideas of peace, equality, and freedom that democratic states follow internally would shape and influence their interaction in foreign affairs. Hence, the tenacious grounding of democratic states in norms and ethics prevents them from exaggerating conflicts.

Adding further to the democratic peace paradigm, Russett and Oneal (2001) also used variables to explain the relevance of democracy for peace. In their study, the relationship between 'peace' which is treated as variable 'Y' and three different concepts of democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations which are treated as variable X is studied to explain the interaction between the two variables and how 'X' leads to 'Y'. They also provide a prolific definition of "democratic peace" by highlighting its normative and institutional influence. Democratic states resolve their conflict without warfare when dealing with other democratic states, as it's expected that the other democracy will follow the same ethical norms and strive for a peaceful resolution. As a result, violent confrontations between democracies are not very frequent as democracy through its internal mechanisms puts a system of checking and restraints leaders from exaggerating any conflict situation. The authors argued that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations can successfully build peace (Russett and

Oneal 2001: 651-652). Thus, the authors highlighted the normative and institutional relevance of the theory and hypothesized that peaceful states are based on the triangulated interdependence.

Democratic Peace Theory has also derived empirical support from the academic circles. A section of scholars used statistical evidence to give credence to the correlation between democracy and peace. Statistical analysis has indicated that historically, there have been fewer wars between liberal democracies. Even after controlling for a large number of confounding factors (alliances, economic wealth, political stability), the conflict-reducing effect of democracy remains strong (Bremer 1993: 248). Another study by Bennett (2006) classifies states into "democratic", "autocratic" and "mixed". The study concludes that in comparison with a pair of autocratic states, democratic dyads have 82% lesser chances of going to war and democracies are clearly more efficient in building peace and restraining conflict (Bennett 2006: 313). Democracies also employ discreet diplomacy when dealing with other states and are more capable of forming alliances in comparison to an autocracy. This leads to higher chances of diplomatic resolution of conflicts (Ray 2003: 1). Hence, over the years, the Democratic Peace Theory established itself as an influential paradigm within the realm of international relations. As Jack Levy once proclaimed – "Absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (Levy 1988: 662)

However, Democratic Peace Theory has faced severe criticism on several accounts as well. Firstly, it falls short of providing an adequate explanation for the relationship between democracy and peace or the Causal logic. A considerable section of research on democratic peace has been based on 'theory' and it fails to provide credible evidence that democracy leads to peace. Academia accepts the analogy that democracy is one of the factors that positively effect peace, but serious doubts exist over whether democracy causes peace. Democratic Peace theorists have developed plausible empirical generalizations – Democracies rarely engage in war with one another, but they failed at establishing a causal logic. There might be peace between democracies, but it is not necessarily 'caused' due to their democratic nature (Rosato 2003: 585).

Secondly, scholars are also critical of the normative logic behind democratic peace and assert that democracies do not externalize their domestic concepts of conflict resolution (Rosato 2003: 590). In the international system, the reason for conflict is rooted in territorial ambition in order to gain power over the enemy states. Even if the liberal democracies trust and respect each other, it doesn't provide a guaranteed peaceful resolution of conflict. In an instance of conflict, the parties do not treat each other with ethical norms of conduct and the democratic norms are not usually externalized in the battlefield (Rosato 2003: 591). As Doyle puts states "Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes" but that does not bring down the instances of war between democracies, rather just limits the reasons to engage in one (Doyle 1997: 59). Democracies often wage wars in the name of imperial war or self-defense, but it often takes the form of forceful interventions. For example, most of the wars throughout history have been waged by democracies (US, Britain, France) for imperial and territorial gains. Similarly, during the cold war, US militarily engaged in weaker states in the name of promoting democracy in order to counter communism. But, democratization did not necessarily build peace in the target states.

Similarly, on the institutional front, there is scarce evidence to corroborate that democratic leaders refrain from engaging in the war due to fear of losing support. If public opinion puts a restraint on democratic states on engaging in war, then that argument should hold ground for interaction with all states and not just between democracies (Farber and Gowa 1995: 128). Scholars argue that democracies have equal chances of engaging in wars just as much as non-democracies. Expecting accountable and transparent behavior from democratic leaders is also a slippery slope, as democracies often conceal information during a conflict leading to greater apprehension in other states. Domestic constraints and interests are not capable of placing enormous pressure on democratic leaders and the leaders often don't accept accountability to pacifist public on matters of war (Rosato 2003: 590). Also, rather than slow decision making on matters of war, democracies are albeit quicker in mobilizing resources for war.

The capability of democratic peace theory is also countered on the statistical front as theorists point out that its empirical success cannot be validated beyond the 1970's. While democracies avoided confrontation and did not engage in open conflict

during the cold war era, however, that was mostly to counter the threat of communism rather than an innate tendency of democracy to be peaceful. Thus, the data presented in favor of democratic peace is skewed towards presenting democracies as peaceful as the majority of the research has dealt with the cold war era (Farber and Gowa 1995: 123). Another problem with the democratic peace paradigm is its limited success in transitioning or post-conflict states. Certain critics highlight that the claims of democratic peace are not supported in transitioning states. Under-prepared attempts to democratize weak states such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda hinder the democratic progress in the long run. In these states, in light of weak political institutions, absence of effective state laws, lack of organized parties that compete in fair elections, merely introducing democracy leads to war and conflict in the short run rather than peace (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 2-3) Thus, in the initial stages, democracy might not be the most suitable mechanism to build peace in conflict areas and might lead to resurgence of war.

Critiques from the realist school contend that military capabilities and allocation of material power is the major determinant of peace rather than a democracy (Maoz 1997: 162). Realists question the stability of democracies and point towards the anarchic nature of international relations that makes conflict inevitable. For them, the structural constraint of fear and military build-up leads to peace and democracy exercises a marginal influence over core issues. Realism provides a stronger explanation of why countries do not engage in or pull out of conflict situations. The belief of democratic peace in norm externalization leading to prevention of war does not hold up, as realist factors such as power and military exercise a greater impact on decisions to go to war (Layne 1994: 6). In a nutshell, it could be concluded that Democratic Peace Theory is not a scientific theory with credible empirical evidence validating it.

Another major concern surrounding the theory was defining the key concepts of – democracy and peace. As a result, the majority of research on the democratic peace applies minimalist definitions of these terms, referring to the presence of electoral democracy and the absence of interstate war (Mello 2016: 3). Over the years, research has brought out various versions of the democratic peace, but overall it can be seen through two major lenses – Monadic and Dyadic. Monadic approach to democratic peace claims that democracies are in general more peaceful, and less like to go to war

with any other type of state. Monadic approach to the democratic peace theory studies whether democracies are less prone to war and conflict in general, regardless of the regime type of the enemy state. The monadic proposition focuses on the individual capacity of the state and uses the normative foundation of democracies to conclude that due to the inherent norms propagating peace, democratic states are less likely to use force. In other words, while democracies might be more peaceful in relation to other democracies, it is the internal democratic norms that are determining factors in making democracies inherently more peaceful than other regime types (Quackenbush and Rudy 2009: 268).

While the monadic approach investigates the overall interaction and involvement of democracies as well as non-democracies, it has found limited support in academia. There is little if any, empirical evidence to supplement the monadic approach to democratic peace (Quackenbush and Rudy 2009: 268). Critics point out that there is no substantial evidence to prove that liberal democracies are less likely to go to war with other nondemocratic states. On the contrary, available research disapproves of the monadic proposition that democratic states are less prone to use force (Layne 1994: 13). Moreover, democracies do initiate war and have better chances of a win in comparison to non-democratic states (Reiter and Stam 2002: 10). Countering the monadic claim of inherent peaceful nature of democracies, critics observed that democracies do initiate wars and especially the ones that they are more likely to win. Monadic version of democratic peace was still relevant in the 1960's and 70's, but that line of the argument lost its influence with the rise in the number of autocratic regimes and conflicts in the 1980's.

However, the majority of the work on democratic peace has focused on the Dyadic approach. The dyadic proposition of democratic peace argues that democracies create a separate and joint peace among other democratic states (Elman 1997: 10). It is based on the hypothesis that democracies rarely go to war with other democracies and states are analyzed relative to other states. Most of the theorists support the argument that the democratic peace theory is majorly a dyadic process, specifically, when a democracy is involved in an international conflict, its response depends on the opposition states as when dealing with a democratic state, it believes that its opponent also shares its desire to avoid the use of force (Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, and Huth 1996:

526). Dyadic approach investigates pairs of states (dyads) and analyses their interaction to test the premise that democracies rarely engage in war with each other (Mello 2016: 3). The dyadic approach is widely accepted by democratic peace theorists and asserts that democracies rarely fight each other, but war is equally likely with other non-democracies or democratic states do engage in war with autocratic states. Even in the global domain, the institutional constraints of a liberal democracy make it difficult for nations to retract on decisions taken mutually by competent autonomous political institutions. Hence, a coalition of democratic states is better able to maintain mutual commitments and obligations aimed at achieving peace (Choi 2003: 144). Despite an increase in the number of democratic dyads or states in the international system, there hasn't been any significant war between democracies. According to the supporters of liberal democracy, this observation hints towards a positive trend that the incidence of conflicts or wars should steadily witness a downward spiral if more countries become democracies (Russett and Oneal 2001: 114 -115). The dyadic approach to democratic peace was perceived to be a stabilizing factor for the international system, as democracies would rarely fight other democracies and not upend the international order.

However, critics highlighted the lacunae in the approach by pointing out that absence of war between democracies, as claimed by the dyadic approach, is not a significant and empirically proven pattern in the last 200 years (Spiro 1994: 51). In response to Doyle's claim, that no two liberal democracies have fought a war with one another, critics point out towards the glaring inconsistency in the study on account of laxity in the determining the definition of democracy as well as the tools for statistical analysis (Spiro 1994: 51). While democratic peace is mostly analyzed through the monadic and dyadic lenses, at times a systematic approach is adopted by certain scholars. A systematic approach asserts that as democratic states grow, the international system becomes more peaceful on the whole. It claims that spread of democracy leads to stability in the international arena (Mello 2016: 3). The systematic approach also came under scrutiny as it was argued that on the contrary, the number of wars increased with the spread of democracy. Expansion of democratic regimes did not lead to a peaceful world order.

Democracy Promotion in the Post-Cold War

It is still debatable whether building democracy can prevent war and establish stable peace, but the theory gained currency in the post-Cold War. The fall of Berlin wall and end of communism had severe implications for international relations. The event was regarded as a triumph of the liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992: 303). Post the collapse of the Soviet Union, democracy promotion became particularly significant as there was no alternative foreign policy ideology to follow as was available during the Cold War era. As liberal democracy secured a stable footing in the international realm, the demand for increasing involvement of external actors in promoting democracy gained momentum globally. Thus, the democratic peace thesis also witnessed a renewed interest in the Post-Cold War era.

Democratization and democracy promotion, which was laid on the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace theory, found excessive mention in the foreign policy of major nations, especially, the United States (Chan 1997: 59). It was believed that democratization or promoting democracy around the world would enforce international peace. Majority of the political leaders, such as Bill Clinton and George Bush openly gave statements suggesting that democracy was the best antidote to war and democracies were capable of building international stability as democracies rarely go to war with each other (Chan 1997: 59). Clinton's vision of a Post War international order was based on 'democratic enlargement' and expansion of democratic regimes (Robinson 1996: 332). In his inaugural address, even President Bush stated – "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and every culture, with the goal of ending tyranny around the world" (Bush 2005). The faith in the ability of liberal democracy to build peace was grounded in the assumptions of the democratic peace theory that democracies do not fight other democracies. The period post-Cold War witnessed a renewed influence of the democratic peace theory in international sphere as nations often used the basic premise of the theory that democracies are stable and capable of resolving conflict to justify the expansion of democracy in the world. Hence, transforming states into democracies emerged the cornerstone of the foreign policy of many Western states.

Even the international organizations, specifically those dominated by the Western countries, adopted promotion of democracy as one of their main agendas. During the Cold War, animosity between the Western and the Eastern blocs had put a

restraint on intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations from interfering in or undertaking ideologically charged issues as the promotion of democracy or protection of human rights (Paris 1997: 60). But, with the end of Cold War hostilities, organizations such as NATO began to include expansion and protection of democracies in its policy agenda. Even organizations such as IMF and World Bank included democracy as necessary criteria for providing development aid. Therefore, democracy promotion emerged as a major foreign policy strategy of major regional and international organizations (Pevehouse 2005: 1). Moreover, during the 1990's as civil wars caused tremendous losses to the local population, the widespread massacre of citizens by their own governments compelled the international organizations to step in for resolving conflict and building peace. These organizations actively promoted democracy in conflict-ridden states as democracies were considered to be stable and peaceful regime types. Studies also pointed out that to counter the damage caused by long-lasting civil wars, democracy promotion could act as a tool for incorporating peaceful resolution of hostilities (Armey and McNab 2012: 2). Thus, building on the theoretical belief of the democratic peace, various regional and international organizations postulated that expansion of democracy would positively impact global peace. As a result, with the end of cold war, democracy promotion became a major policy agenda of these organizations as well.

As the end of Cold War opened up the political space, the majority of the global issues were being addressed at the international stage. Based on the confidence in the democratic peace theory, it was widely believed that democracy promotion will usher in an era of political, economic, and social stability in states. As far as the role of external actors in democracy promotion was concerned, it was widely believed that foreign actors, especially the international organizations such as the United Nations exercised considerable influence and were capable of building peace through its policies. International Organizations, in particular, were considered the ethical choice for democracy promotion. As UN's democratic assistance was based on the consent of host nations, it was believed that rather than imposing democracy, international organizations facilitate the consolidation of democracy in states struggling with civil conflicts (Joyner 1999: 341). International norms of democracy propagated by external actor's such as UN, EU, and NATO played a significant role in shaping political

outcomes in host states as they accelerated the process of democratic transition (Rich 2001: 20).

However, the use of democratic peace theory as a justification for democratization is highly problematic as it ends up justifying pro-democratic forceful interventions in many cases. The democratic peace defense often encourages a democratic crusade and is unethically used to justify overt interventions by powerful nations (Boulding 1979: 13). While external actors might display that their major agenda is the conduct of free and fair elections, but in the garb of promoting democracy they often aim at toppling over the existing autocrats (Carothers 2006: 61). As seen in the case of the middle east as well, democratization was not only deployed as cover for regime change operations of the West but also led to the destruction of existing structures in the states. In a sense, democratic peace theory also ends up propagating a value-laden approach that favors a specific Western notion of democracy (Mello 2016: 4). International organizations propagated Western liberal ideology through democracy promotion but, they exacerbated social tensions and led to a renewal of instability rather than building peace. Scholars point out that when international actors promote liberal ideas of democracy and capitalism, it encourages conflict, political violence, and competition within states (Paris 2007: 74).

Moreover, scholars are also apprehensive of the role of international organizations in democracy promotion and highlight that they exercise marginal influence on creating democratic peace in states. While UN and other organizations adopted the theoretical explanation of democratic peace theory and engaged in democratization, it's policies had a limited impact and few accomplishments under its belt. Democracy promotion through international actors did not initiate substantial changes in the domestic conditions of states as they were secondary influences. Democracy promotion does not exercise major impact on the political environment of the recipient countries. Its effects are usually modestly positive, sometimes negligible, and occasionally negative (Carothers 1999: 16, 308). In fact, in certain cases, democracy promotion could actually lead to a revival of conflict. For example, in Angola (1992), political liberalization through UN-monitored elections resulted in renewed violence.

Conclusion

To conclude, democratic peace theory has been primarily used by states and international organizations to provide a theoretical explanation for engaging in democracy promotion. Finding its origin in the work of Kant, a systematic analysis of the theory gained center-stage in the recent decades. However, the existing academic research falls short in terms of explaining the interrelationship between democracy, democratization, peace and the international system (Smith 2000:1). While the democratic peace theory consists of certain strong normative claims that create a positive correlation between democracy promotion and peace, yet the theory definitely lacks a strong statistical and empirical backing. The democratic peace analysis might be able to provide a generic explanation of the reasons that why states and organizations engage in democracy promotion but, it still lags behind in explaining the politics and diplomacy behind democracy promotion. In other words, democratic peace theory does not provide a clear-cut picture of external democracy promotion. The causal mechanisms, positives, and the critiques highlight the internal contradictions existing within the democratic peace analysis. Democratic Peace theory can be used to criticise as well as encourage democracy promotion (Wolff and Wurm 2011: 79).

Thus, while democracy might not be the guaranteed way of building stable peace but, in relation to other regime types and in absence of a better alternative, democracy exercises a great potential to positively influence the creation of peaceful states. Especially in the Post-Cold War era, the democratic peace theory witnessed a revival due to rapid external democratization undertook by western nations as well as international organizations. However, with a growth in the number of intervention cases undertaken by the US in the 21ˢᵗ century often working in collaboration with international organizations, the concept of 'democratic wars' has emerged as a grave threat to world peace and has brought out the dark side of the democratic peace theory (Hobson 2011: 1904). Rampantly changing dynamics within the domestic governing system and setting up of puppet governments through West's democracy promotion is leading to war rather than building peace in certain states. This paradox surrounding the democratic peace has revived a fresh debate over the pros and cons of the democratic peace theory. Yet, despite its drawbacks on the institutional and causal scale, the majority of academic work on democratic peace still aims to delve further to study the normative strength of the theory. Whether building democracy can prevent war and establish stable peace is debatable, but the hypothesis that democracies are less likely

to wage or engage in violent conflict is more or less still a relevant concept of research in the academic circles. As a result, International Organizations, including the United Nations are still actively engaged in democracy promotion in order to build peace in post-conflict states.

CHAPTER 3- THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION: MANDATES, NORMS, AND GUIDELINES

End of the Cold War was perceived as a victory for western liberal democracy and capitalism. As Fukuyama (1989: 1) precisely put forth – "*20th century that began with the triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to returning full circle to where it started: to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. It is evident, first of all, in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberal democratic model.*" The dominant Western countries led by the US were eager to propagate the western liberal ideas which was a difficult task during the Cold War due to the rivalry between the two blocs. As discussed in the previous chapter, the end of the Cold War also led to the revival of the democratic peace theory. The US and other nations propelled that expansion of democracy would create international peace as democracies were considered to be stable states which rarely engaged in warfare. Thus, the reappearance of democratic peace thesis in the mainstream international relations paradigm also paved the way for a more significant role for external actors, states as well as international organizations, in advancing the idea of liberal democracy.

In the absence of countervailing power in the United Nations with the end of the Cold War, the western countries were able to convince the United Nations to adopt democracy promotion as one of its main agendas in the Post-Cold War. Based on positive correlation established between democracy and international peace, democracy promotion became a primary policy goal of international organizations for resolving conflict and building peace in states. While the United Nations has been involved in conflict resolution since its formation in 1945, democratization emerged as a major theme in its programmes since the 1990's. The United Nations came to play a significant role in the promotion of democracy as certain scholars went to the extent of referring to it as the 'International Agent for Democratization' (Joyner 1999: 333). Apart from promoting democracy in states, the United Nations has been actively engaged in the democratization of the post-conflict states as one of the significant parts of the UN peacebuilding activities in the states emerging out from internal conflict.

However, International Organizations are based on certain norms, and major policy programmes are designed based on these set of well- defined guidelines. Similarly, in the area of democratization, while the United Nations did emerge as a

primary actor, it was necessary to lay down the ground rules for determining the manner and extent of UN's involvement in democracy promotion. This chapter consist of two major themes, the issue of Democracy during the Cold War and the Democracy Promotion in the Post-Cold War. It begins with a discussion on why the United Nations could go ahead with the project of promoting democracy during the Cold war. The major part of this chapter is concentrated in discussing why and how the United Nations promoted democracy in the Post-Cold War in general and in Post-Conflict states in particular. This section starts with discussion on promotion of democracy by the UN in general. Then it discusses how and why the United Nations adopted democratization as one of the main programs within its peacebuilding activities in the Post-Conflict states. Next, it discusses in detail how the mandate of democratization of the UN peacekeeping operations changed and expanded over the period of time. As to implement the mandates more effectively, the chapter goes on to critically discuss the norms and guidelines formulated by the UN in the field of democracy promotion.

The Issue of Democracy during the Cold War

If we trace the historical background of 'Democracy' as an ideal within the corridors of the United Nations, it does not find an explicit mention in its Charter. As the United Nations was formed in the aftermath of the disastrous Second World War, the primary purpose of the organizations is to maintain international peace and security. Formation of the United Nations also coincided the beginning of the Cold War, creating two power blocs headed by the United States and USSR respectively. While the international system was divided between the two ideological blocs, scholars were actively debating over the merits and demerits of democracy and communism. To establish itself as a legitimate international body, the United Nations could not side with any of the camps and had to refrain from explicitly propagating any specific ideology or the type of government. Therefore, the United Nations did not take up the task of promoting democracy during the Cold War.

However, the period following the creation of the United Nations also witnessed a wave of decolonization. Maintaining State Sovereignty was one of the primary objectives of the newly independent states after years of colonization by Western powers. As most of the Global South at the end of the Second World War were under colonial rule, one of the purposes of the United Nations is "… *to develop friendly*

relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace …" (UN Document 1945: 5). The Charter of the United Nations imbibed the sentiment and "Self-Determination" was recognized in principle in Article 1 of the UN Charter. During the initial decades, the United Nations actively promoted the goal of 'self-determinism' by building the normative pressure on the Western States against the continued illegal occupation in colonies (Farer 2004: 32). Given the history of imperial exploitation that led to the two World Wars, in the Post-War world order, maintaining territorial sovereignty emerged as a basic pre-requisite for states.

In addition to recognizing the principle of self-determination, the United Nations also adopted the principle of 'Non-Intervention' as a formal norm. Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter explicitly mentions - ''*… Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII ...*" (UN Document 1945: 7). According to the principle of 'Non-Intervention", internal conflicts were considered as the domestic matter of the states, and the United Nations refrained from intervening in resolving disputes arising within the borders of its member's states. While Article 2(7) mentions about punitive action, however, even to invoke Chapter VII, the threat to the host state had to be imminent and count as rarest of the rare case scenario. Though doubts were raised over the scope and implications of such a non- interventionist policy, yet the United Nations did generate consensus over not interfering in the internal matters of the states during the Cold War period (Kinacioglu 2005: 16). Thus, internal conflict, democracy, and governance within states garnered negligible attention and were not the concern of the UN.

Even though the UN did not actively deal with democracy during the Cold War, yet it was a relevant norm of the UN. While the Charter does not mention the word "democracy" the opening of the Charter, "We the Peoples," vaguely reflects that the will of the people is the source of legitimacy for the United Nations. Similarly, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), laid down the concept of democracy by acknowledging "*the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government*."

The declaration has influenced and encouraged active political participation, constitution-making, and democratic values throughout the world. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) also laid down the legal basis and covered various aspects of democracy such as freedom of expression (Article 19), the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives (Article 25), the right to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage (Article 25). Therefore, during the Cold War, though the idea of democracy vaguely existed in the UN official declarations, yet Democracy was considered to be a sensitive issue, and the ideological divide between US and USSR blocked the UN from formally propagating democracy as a policy.

Democracy Promotion in the Post-Cold War

The end of Cold War led to a greater role for the United Nations. During the Cold War, animosity between the West and the Soviets put a restraint on intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations from undertaking ideologically charged issues as the promotion of democracy or protection of human rights (Paris 1997: 60). However, end of confrontations facilitated the United Nations to play a stronger role in democracy promotion. With the absence of opposition from the Soviets, the western liberals exercised major influence in the UN corridors and pushed for propagation of democracy as one of the core ideals of the United Nations. Democracy was positively connected to the UN objective of establishing peace, human rights, and development globally. Thus, during the 1990's through a system of providing assistance to elections, UN introduced a new vision of democracy as a model of good governance (Haack 2011: 69). Moreover, World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began to link democracy with financial assistance as the criteria for furthering loans to states. Thus, activities such as development assistance and electoral support combined together to build a UN agenda for democracy promotion in the post-cold war.

The first indication of a forthcoming official UN democracy agenda was seen in General Assembly's resolution on "*Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections*" issued annually between 1988 to 1994. These documents linked democracy to human rights and democracy was discussed between member states as a potential universal norm (Haack 2011: 32). An Agenda for Peace

(1992) was one of the foremost UN documents that attempted to set the normative groundwork for UN's democratization activities. While stressing on the need for democracy and elaborating on the concept of 'Peacebuilding', it pinned and defined 'Democratic Governance' as an essential task of the United Nations –

"(59.) … *The United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities...*" (UN Document 1992).

In 1996, Boutros Boutros Ghali, the then Secretary-General, to provide a technical and institutional understanding of the concept of democratization formulated "*An Agenda for Democratization*". The document aimed to define and discuss the emerging consensus on democracy and democratization and attempted to lay a foundation for international action and the UN's role in it. It posits "…*Democratization is a process which leads to a more open, more participatory, less authoritarian society. Democracy is a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people…*" (UN Document 1996: 1).

The document also laid down the foundation for a formal role of the United Nations and supported for democratization at the international level. On the same hand, Ghali also specified the basic norms and principles that would act as the base for UN's Democratization policies –

"…*The United Nations is, by design and definition, universal and impartial. While democratization is a new force in world affairs… it is not for the United Nations to offer a model of democratization or democracy or to promote democracy in a specific case… The United Nations possesses a foundation and a responsibility to serve its Member States in democratization, yet it must receive a formal request before it can assist the Member States in their democratization processes…*" (UN Document 1996: 4)

"… *While the United Nations still provides technical assistance in all areas, the wave of economic and political transitions witnessed in the post-cold-war period has led Member States to reorient their requests for technical assistance towards areas more relevant to democratization... The United Nations strengthens the context for support to democratization through information-gathering and awareness-raising and by offering Member States and the wider international community a universally legitimate global forum for dialogue, debate and consensus-building. Through the United Nations, multilateral agreements can be reached — whether embodied in the form of non-binding norms, internationally recognized standards or binding obligations...*" (UN Document 1996: 5)

In other words, the document highlighted the major role to be performed by the United Nations in providing democracy assistance. It clearly set out that with the end of cold war confrontation and a growing momentum for democratization, the United Nations existed as a principal actor in assisting democratization.

Apart from promotion of democracy in through assistance in states, the United Nations has taken up democratization as its key objectives in the peacebuilding efforts in the post-conflict states. In the aftermath of civil wars, as the risk of a return to war run high, the primary responsibility of the United Nations was conflict mitigation through the deployment of a Peace Operation (Diehl 2014: 1). In order to build stability, it was widely accepted that to build peace in the long term, disarmament needs to be accompanied with a democratic form of government. The belief that democratization would break the conflict trap was based on the democratic peace theory. While democracy was seen as an essential element of Peacebuilding, the United Nations was considered as the perfect agent for democratization. Hence, creating or restoring democratic processes became one of the main goals of UN peace operations. Moreover, most of the Post-Conflict states lacked any experience with democratic governance. Thus, the United Nations began including democratization in its mandates. As a result, Democratization or promoting democracy became a major component of UN's Peace Operations in the post-Cold War. Hence, with the coming in of 1990's 'Democratization' was one of the primary agendas of the United Nations. Especially in conflict areas, Peace Missions under the aegis of the United Nations promoted democratic governance as one of its principal objectives for post-war reconstruction.

Civil War in the Post-Cold War

During the Cold War, most of the conflicts were inter-state conflicts which involved disputes over territory and resources. Thus, during this period, UN majorly encountered and intervened in inter-state conflicts. Even in the conflict zones, the United Nations was usually involved through its peacekeeping operations mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Kenkel 2013: 123). The mandate of these operations was limited to facilitating implementation of the peace agreement through its peacekeeping forces. Further, these peacekeeping operations were guided by three principles of the Consent of the host nations, Non-discrimination between conflicting parties, and Non-use of force (Bellamy 2010: 174). For instance, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that was set up in 1956 to intervene in the Suez Canal Crisis was mandated to oversee the withdrawal of foreign troops from the host country's territory (Kenkel 2013: 125). As an attempt to influence the institutions within the states was seen to conflict with UN's principle of non-intervention, hence, during the Cold War, the United Nations intervened in disputes for the sole purpose of overseeing or implementing a ceasefire through the means of traditional peacekeeping.

While the Cold War was myriad by inter-state conflicts, the late 1980s witnessed a new trend towards increasing internal conflicts. In the last few decades, international wars have become rare, and civil wars have emerged as a potent threat to international peace and security. In 2001 all major conflicts in the world were civil wars with a tendency to last longer than international wars at an average of almost seven years and posed a greater threat to peace and security (Collier 2003: 93). In the1990's, reports of Genocide, violation of human rights, political violence, and mass killings surfaced on a massive scale from various regions of the world. Figure 1 depicts the steady increase in the number of civil conflicts in the world after the end of the Cold War. Thus, as the intensity of civil wars expanded, it emerged as one of the significant challenges facing the international community in the post-Cold War era.

Figure 3.1 Global Trends in State-Based Conflicts

Source: Human Security Report (2012), "Sexual Violence, Education, and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative.

Figure 5.1 Global Trends in State-Based Conflicts, 1946–2009

Data Source: UCDP/PRIO.

The number of conflicts declined steadily after the Cold War, then rose from 2004 to 2008. There was a slight decrease in 2009, however this does not appear to mark the start of a downward trend.

During the 1990's as the Civil Wars caused widespread destruction, the United Nations could no longer stick to its traditional approach. In order to deal with civil conflicts, the United Nations not only carries out intrusive peace operation but also rebuilds the state's institutions through peacebuilding activities. International organizations accepted the responsibility for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and authorized limited intrusion in domestic affairs of states for the protection of its citizens from violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779). The UN missions included civilian component in their mandates along with overseeing ceasefire agreements (Bellamy 2010: 194). The UN peacebuilding aimed to resolve the factors that lead to conflict and to create, at times by the use of force, conditions for lasting peace (Richmond 2004: 84). Collapsing states posed a threat to international security and development agendas. In order to manage internal conflicts and assist such states, a new multilateral method involving international actors was required for building peace (Helman and Ratner

1993: 7). In "*An Agenda for Peace*", in light of incidents of Civil War and Genocide, Ghali went beyond the traditional dispute settlement mechanisms of mediation and arbitration. United Nations was to play an active role in to identifying and supporting institutional and political structures that tend to strengthen peace and avoid a relapse into conflict. Thus, the Post-Cold War era witnessed the UN undertaking a proactive role and greater responsibility in not just dealing with civil conflicts, but also in the rebuilding of states, including political institutions through democratization.

Mandates for Democratization

The United Nations faced the uphill task of bringing about democratization in post-conflict states. In these states, in the absence of existing structures, the United Nations had to stabilize the situation and build the political and administrative institutions to foster peace. Thus, democratization became a significant part of UN mandates. UN Mandates for democratization were instrumental in providing a principled structure and set the scope of UN's democratization policies. Structured mandates can prove to be incremental for successful democratization in post-conflict states (Ghali 1992). The mandates not only gave legitimacy to UN's democratization efforts but, the inclusion of democratization with the peacekeeping mandates also had a definite bearing in settling down the conflict (Heldt 2005: 307).

Over the years the language, expanse, and scope of the UN mandates for democratization have undergone significant changes. In examining the UN mandates for democratization, the terminology and language used are of utmost importance. As the source of legitimacy remains the same, the beginning of mandates almost has similar and consistent wording. However, each peacekeeping operation has varied goals. While some mandates focus on monitoring and verification, others require the UN to assist local processes, but the common aim is to draft a mandate that fits the particular post-conflict context that is achievable (Rich 2004: 76). To derive a better understanding and explain the changing nature of the democratization mandate over the years, the following table shows the clause in the mandates relating to the democratisation of the major UN Peacekeeping Operations till date –

Certain trends can be observed from the mandates of the UNPKO's. Firstly, the language and the wording of the democratization mandate has undergone modifications. Whereas, in 1989, the UNTAG mandate simply used the umbrella term of '*Free and*

Fair Elections under the supervision of the United Nations" (UNTAG 1989), the UN missions in the later decades clearly specified its role and job in democracy assistance, such as, MINURCA's democratization mandate in 2000 states "*to provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of the legislative elections.*" (MINURCA 2000). In the initial operations such as in Cambodia and Mozambique, the UN missions were not involved in conflict states for longer durations and accordingly, the mandate for democratization was kept short and worded cautiously without any elaborate details. Hence, there existed scope for misguided interpretations of the terms. The vagueness of the mandate in general and effortless nature of implementation of the democratization mandate to enable the UN mission to exit led to series of reoccurrences of conflict in some countries such as Cambodia and Liberia. The last two decades witnessed the introduction of clear-cut language and elaboration of mandates for democratization.

Secondly, the transformation in the terminology of the mandates rests in the fact that the UN expanded the scope of its democratization activities. From limiting itself to *'verification and monitoring'* of elections in the initial operation of Namibia, steadily the UN undertook a proactive role by conducting the entire electoral process – "*the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections*" in Cambodia in 1993. But, facing backlash for its intrusive and ill-timed mandates, with the end of 1990's, UN mandates incorporated the norm of local engagement. Later mandates acknowledged the primacy and significance of local ownership, and most mandates often highlighted that the UN should provide democratic support and assistance. Though electoral assistance remained the primary objective of UN mandates, recent mandates also talked of institutional support such as election commissions and constitution building. The mandates of the some of the missions in the 2000s, such as in Kosovo and Timor Leste were more expansive in comparison to previous operations reflecting an understanding that UN operations needed to focus more on democratic consolidation and less on their exit strategy (Paris and Sisk 2009: 7).

	UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION/PEACE OPERATION *	DURATION	DEMOCRATIZATION MANDATE
			Table 3.1- Peacekeeping Operations and Democratization Mandates (Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Website, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations
1.	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG)	1989 - 1990	"In accordance with resolution 632 (1989) , to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to *ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations*."
2.	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991 - 1995	"The Security Council, by its resolution 747 (1992), decided to enlarge the mandate of UNAVEM II to include *observation and verification of the presidential and legislative elections in Angola*."
3.	United Nations Observer Mission in El- Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991 - 1995	By resolution 832 (1993) the Security Council decided enlarged ONUSAL's mandate to include – *"observation of the electoral process*."
4.	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	1992 - 1993	Security Council resolution 745 (1992), mandated *"the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections"* to the UN Mission.
5.	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	1992 - 1994	Security Council resolution 797 (1992) mandated the mission to – "*provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process*."
6.	United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	1993 - 1996	The Security Council through its resolutions 940 (1994) and 975 (1995) revised the mandate of the mission as – " UNMIH shall *assist* the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in *establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities*."
7.	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	1993 - 1997	Security Council Resolution 866 (1993) mandated the mission to – "*to observe and verify the election process*, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement."
8.	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	1998 - 2000	Security Council resolution 1159 (1998) mandated – *"to provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of the legislative elections."* Security Council resolution 1201 (1998) expanded the mandate to – *"MINURCA shall include support for the conduct of legislative elections, and in particular, the transport of electoral materials and equipment to selected sites as well as the transport of United Nations electoral observers to and from electoral sites; the conduct of a limited but reliable international observation of the first and second rounds of the legislative elections."* Resolution 1230 (1999) authorized MINURCA – *"to play a supportive role in the conduct of the presidential election."*
9.	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	1999 - 2002	The mission had "overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and was authorised to *exercise all legislative and executive authority,* including *support for capacity-building for self-government*."

10.	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	1999 – 2005		Security Council resolution 1270 (1999) mandated – "To *provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution* of Sierra Leone."
				Security Council resolution 1346 (2001) revised the mandate of the mission as – " The main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remain *to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone* to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and *to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.*"
11.	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	1999 2010	-	By resolution 1565 (2004), the Security Council expanded the initial mandate of the mission to – "to *contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process* stipulated in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, *by assisting in the establishment of a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place.*"
				By its resolution 1797 (2008) ⬇, the Security Council further authorized MONUC
				- *"to assist the Congolese authorities in organizing, preparing and conducting local elections."*
				- "*Provide advice* to s*trengthen democratic institutions and processes* at the national, provincial, regional and local levels."
				- "*Work in close coordination* with *international partners and the United Nations Country Team, provide assistance to the Congolese authorities, including the National Independent Electoral Commission, in the organization, preparation, and conduct of local elections.*"
12.	United Nations Operation in Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI)	2004 2017	-	Security Council by its Resolution 1528 (2004) mandated UNOCI to – "To provide *oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation*, with the assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners, *to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election."*
13.	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	2004 2017	-	By Resolution 1542 (2004), the Security Council mandated the mission –
				- "*to support the constitutional and political process* underway in Haiti, including *through good offices*, and foster principles and democratic governance and institutional development."
				- "to *assist the Transitional Government* in its efforts to *organize, monitor, and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections* at the earliest possible date, in particular through the provision *of technical, logistical, and administrative assistance and continued security, with appropriate support* to an electoral process *with voter participation* that is representative of the national demographics, *including women."*
14.	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	2005 2011	–	The Security Council, by its resolution 1590 (2005) authorised the mission to – "to provide *guidance and technical assistance* to the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation with other international actors, *to support the preparations for and conduct of elections and referenda provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.*"

15.	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	2006 – 2012	Established by Security Council resolution 1704 ⬙ (2006), the mission mandate included – "*support Timor-Leste* in all aspects of the 2007 *presidential and parliamentary electoral process.*" Resolution 1867 (2009) and 1912 (2010) expanded the mandate of the UN mission to – "*extending necessary support, within its current mandate, for local elections planned for 2009*" Security Council resolution 1969 (2011) ⬙ authorised UNMIT *"to support, within its current mandate, the preparation of parliamentary and presidential elections planned for 2012, as requested by Timorese authorities, and encouraged the international community to assist in the process."*

Lastly, as the recent UN peace operations have been employed for longer durations, the UN mandates have been revisited and reframed several times during the mission depending on the changing context in the states. For instance, under the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) that was established in 2006, the mandate for democratization was expanded thrice till the missions exit in 2012. While the initial mandate mentioned - "*support Timor-Leste in all aspects of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary electoral process*", Security Council resolution in 2009 expanded the mandate to include support for local elections. Another resolution in 2011 mandated the UNMIT to extend its democracy support to 2012 presidential elections as well. Hence, instead of a rigid one-time mandate, the UN missions now re-access their policies and reframe their democratization mandate depending on its progress in the states.

To summarize, UN democratization mandates have certainly evolved over the past decades. Learning from its past experiences, recent UN operations have a broadened, well-articulated, and explicitly defined democratization mandates with a scope of revaluation and further expansion. The mandates serve as the base on which the UN peace operations are based as they set out the objectives of the missions and the tasks that are supposed to be performed. However, in the 1990's while most of the UN missions were declared a success and claimed to fulfil its mandate, the relapse of conflict in the states and failure to consolidate democracy raised serious doubts over the efficiency of UN mandates. The 'Brahimi Report', which examines the shortcoming of the UN peacekeeping operations, brought out a scathing critique of the democratization

mandates of the UN missions. The report highlighted that the UN mandates were formulated using vague and inconsistent language. It also emphasized how the mandates were overambitious and underfunded (Brahimi Report 2000: 3). Jacques Paul Klein, Head of United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) while pointing out the shortcomings of UN Mandates stated -

"*…the mandate of UNTAES contained just thirteen sentences that could be distilled into six quantifiable objectives… My point here is twofold: if you start out and don't know where you want to go, you will probably end up somewhere else. And secondly, the mandate is the floor (but not the ceiling) for everything the mission does. If the mandate is vague for whatever reason — including the inability of Security Council members to agree on a political end state — dysfunction will plague the lifespan of the Mission…*" (Nadin 2014: 1)

It was pointed out that the vague and inconsistent mandates for democratization hindered the democratic transition in post-conflict states. While the UN laid enormous emphasis on the procedure and formal wording of the mandate, the method and process to achieve democratization took a backseat in the formulation of mandates. As a result, the democratization mandates were crafted formally, yet it was ill-equipped and inadequate to clearly guide and define UN's way of attaining democratization in post-conflict states (Mason and Mitchell 2016: 32). The process of formulation of UN democratization mandates also faced criticism due to the unchecked influence exercised by the P-5 in the sphere of crafting mandates (Rich 2004: 70). This led to partisan and biased mandates keeping in mind the national interest of the permanent members rather the ground realities of the post-conflict states. The UN mandates for democratization certainly haven't been free from limitations, and its drawbacks often led to counterproductive effects in the recipient states. In the recent decades, the United Nations has attempted to incorporate the suggestions and craft attainable, practical, and comprehensive mandates. Though the success rate and workability of the current mandates of democratization are still under scrutiny in the absence of tangible evidence.

Norms and Guidelines for Democratization

As the United Nations became actively engaged in the democratization of post-conflict states through its peace operations, it is democracy promotion activities expanded in its scope and reach. To implement the mandate for democratization effectively, the United

Nations, from time to time, set norms and guidelines. The UN document titled "*An Agenda for Democratization*" laid down the UN's normative groundwork for democracy promotion. UN's policies were to be based on the norms of mutual consent, no use of force, providing technical assistance, local involvement, and capacity building. With the end of 1990's, as the UN was extensively involved in democratization across continents, it was realized that democratization is an umbrella term and further clarity is needed in defining the guidelines. Over the years, though the basic essence of the norms and guidelines for democratization remains almost similar, the language and scope of UN's guidelines for democratization have significantly expanded. Learning from its past experiences of democratizing post-conflict states, the United Nations attempted to inculcate practical principles and overcome its shortcomings by rekindling its existing approach.

In 2009, the Secretary-General set out to formulate an organization-wide coherent policy document that would clearly state the UN's approach and support to democracy and democratization. The document titled '*Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy'* attempted to build UN's commitment to adopt a principled and consistent approach in support of democracy. The document explicitly lists the guiding principles that should guide the UN's democracy promotion and support efforts. It states "Adopt proactive approaches to threats to democracy; Do no harm; Uphold local ownership; Broaden domestic engagement and participation in democracy-building; Explicitly address the effects of discrimination against women; Develop democracy support strategies with a long-term horizon; and Invest in a comprehensive approach to democratization (UN Document 2009a: 6). The document also mentions the major focus areas of democracy support such as, in providing political facilitation, encouraging popular participation and support for free and fair elections, fostering the development of a culture of democracy, supporting political pluralism, advancing transparency and accountability arrangements, promoting the rule of law, and developing a vibrant civil society (UN Document 2009a: 9).

As the process of democratization and UN's role in it was expanding it was observed that democratization and peacebuilding is an amalgamation of a number of processes including elections, constitution making, the rule of law, among others. Thus, specific documents such as *Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations*

Assistance to Constitution-making Processes (2009) were formulated in order to provide a principled framework for UN's policies with regard to each mechanism. The note identifies the components of constitution-making and sets out the guidelines for UN's assistance for the constitutional process, such as – *Seize the opportunity for peacebuilding; Encourage compliance with international norms and standards; Ensure national ownership; Support inclusivity, participation, and transparency; Mobilize and coordinate a wide range of expertise; and Promote adequate follow-up* (UN Document, 2009b: 8)

As the United Nations is based on the principles of equality and voluntary membership, state sovereignty is accorded priority. Any UN intervention should be based on principle of "consent of the states". Even in the realm of democratization, normally the United Nations gives democracy assistance only when approached by the states. Even during the 1990's as the demand for international intervention in conflicts arose, UN's peacebuilding and democratization policies followed the principle of consent (Chandler 2017: 50). This norm accorded legitimacy and acceptability to the UN missions. However, with regard to the intra-state conflicts and deployment of the UN peace operations under Chapter VII, the principle of consent has been set aside as UN intervention, including democratisation, is justified as a legal right to undertake enforcement measures in light of the threat to international peace (Sejdiu and Onsoy 2014: 39). Through a collective decision, often generated within the framework of the Security Council, democratization is carried out in the post-conflict states through peace operation at times in cooperation with other international organizations. While UN's legal right to engage in democratization through peace operations has been under question and scrutiny, yet the United Nations has been actively promoting democracy in post-conflict states

Even when engaged in democracy promotion, UN has to follow the norm of *Do No Harm or Non-Use of Force*. This guideline is based on the concern that international interventions, through democratization activities and humanitarian aid, can bear positive as well as negative results in post-conflict states. Thus, UN should refrain from employing force for democratization activities as it can lead to disastrous results. The UN missions have faced severe criticism for using forceful methods or undemocratic ways to bring about democratization, in contrast to its norm of doing no

harm. In the rush to witness rapid changes or to exercise power the UN mission staff, who possess the attitude of 'we know the best' often end up destroying the existing structures. For instance, in Bosnia, the high representatives and other international actors employed undemocratic methods such as pressurizing locals and dismissal of officials to reach electoral outcomes which according to them would be suited best to promote the international agenda (Caplan 2014: 55). Thus, in the early 1990's, majority of the UN peacebuilding and democratization missions adopted a 'quick-and-dirty' approach with a limited engagement of the locals. They followed *top-down approach* and as a result, international transitional administrations, specifically in Cambodia, created feeble local political institutions, which crumbled soon after the exit of the UN peace operation (Paris 2004: 8). This top-down approach gave rise to two major concerns – extensive intrusion by the UN in political processes which alienated the locals and created fear of external control. Moreover, without successful handover of control to local actors, missions became extraordinarily costly or ended without substantial outcomes (Narten 2009: 253). Thus, initially, a liberal model of democratization was being enforced from the top rungs without any active involvement of the locals. Though in theory, the United Nations is free from any ideological binding and follows the norm of impartiality, but no norm is 'Value-Free'. The manner in which the United Nations conducts democratization – through electoral processes, free markets, and civil authority, it imposed a specific liberal model of democracy in the post-conflict states (Newman 2004: 200). Failures of this 'top-down' approach of the UN in Angola, Bosnia, and Rwanda where UN democratization exacerbated conflict led to renewed violence (Paris 2004: 163).

As the UN policies did not succeed in creating durable political structures, the beginning of 21st century witnessed the emphasis on norm for local participation and local ownership. Pointing out the pitfalls of UN efforts, critiques started demanding a greater emphasis on '*Local Ownership*'. Barnett (2006:110) was of the view that "*If UN peace-builders are serious about preparing states for self-governance, then local elites must be included in the reconstruction process*". Thus, in recent years, there has been a renewed emphasis on greater participation of national actors in United Nations operations and a stringent commitment to local ownership. Advocates of local ownership norm argue that it legitimizes UN peacebuilding efforts and increases the chances of sustainable democratic governance in post-conflict states (Billerbeck 2012:

322). UN missions implement the norms of local ownership through stages of responsiveness, consultation, participation, accountability, and transferring effective control, and eventually providing them full local sovereignty (Chesterman 2007: 349). Thus, for the United Nations, local ownership contained within itself an element of democracy as it is based on participatory processes. The norm complimented the UN goal of enhancing democratic governance in war-torn states and reduced the chances of violence. However, in the absence of a clear definition of the term 'Local Ownership' or a clear recognition of who local owners are, policy-making has used a vague understanding of the term and UN often ends up engaging only privileged elite rather the masses in the political processes (Chesterman 2007: 7). The UN has also been criticised for failing to formulate policies conducive to local ownership. While the democratization policies involved local actors, the control was in the hands of international actors making the locals dependent on them for security, political development, and the rule of law (Billerbeck 2012: 333).

Another of the major norms of the UN for providing democratic assistance is to foster *Capacity Building and Accountability*. UN's focus on building institutional capacities is necessary for ensuring the long-term sustainability of democracy and eventual local ownership in post-conflict states. Though institution-building and capacity development have been an essential guideline for UN missions, its earliest direct reference can be traced to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999 (Smith 2016: 3). UN prioritizes capacity development and building on existing national political structures. Similarly, the UN follows the principle of accountability for its engagement in post-conflict states as well as assists in the development of commissions and auditors through its democratization policies to maintain the rule of law. However, failure of include and carry out capacity building as a formal norm in its democratization policies has been another drawback of the United Nations Peace Missions. For instance, though UN's democratic processes in Cambodia were largely successful, weak institutionalization and a volatile post-election power-sharing arrangement led to the collapse of the democratic structures in the country (Newman 2004: 204). Hence, it is incremental that UN's democratization activities are designed with a focus on building local capacities and accountable institutions.

Another norm is that the UN's democratization policies should be formulated aiming at *a Long-Term Horizon*. International actors have often neglected the complexity of democratic transition, especially in post-conflict states and as a result expected rapid positive outcomes. The short-term commitment of the UN, followed by a rushed and an ill-timed exit of the mission failed to consolidate democracy in the host states. In the case of post-conflict states, where democratic transition requires considerable external support over longer durations, untimely declaration of the success of the democratization and exit of the UN operation fell in the trap of autocratic rulers. In the former UN missions, such as in Cambodia, the short-term approach and engagement of the UN-led to half-done and controversial transition. Thus, over the recent years, UN peace missions and democratization policies are formulated with the aim of long-term commitment in the state. UN acknowledged the peculiar context of the post-conflict states, and as a result, its programmes for democracy are guided by comprehensive and long-term planning accompanied by a comprehensive exit strategy.

While these are the basic norms and guidelines that shape UN's democratization activities, however, with the changing context of international relations and learning from its past experiences, UN's norms and guidelines for democratization have evolved and expanded over the years. As mentioned in *Guidance Note on Democracy 2009,* issues such as gender, culture, diversity, and human rights have lately emerged as significant normative ideas within the paradigm of democratic assistance. Even within its larger spectrum of a peace operation, the UN is supposed to carry out the democratization tasks such as the drafting of electoral laws, supporting electoral institutions, training election officials and political parties, drafting of the constitution, supporting media and civil society based on the prescribed norms and guidelines. UN is mandated to perform these either by the Security Council resolutions as witnessed in Kosovo and East Timor or by the peace agreements brokered by the international community (Sejdiu and Onsoy 2014: 47). In other words, the UN is not only supposed to support the drafting of a constitution, but it has to ensure that the drafting process in inclusive and engages relevant local actors. Though several doubts exist over the proper inclusion and implementation of the norms and guidelines in the playing field, yet, undoubtedly these norms provide a balance and structure to UN's democratic assistance policies in post-conflict states.

Conclusion

Democracy did not find any explicit mention in the UN charter or the formal discussions in the UN during the cold war. Following the principle of 'Non-intervention,' self-determination and sovereignty of states was respected, and the UN refrained from engaging in affairs of the states. Democracy and governance were majorly the domestic concerns of the states as UN's role was restricted to traditional peacekeeping for resolving international conflicts. However, the relationship between UN and democracy took a leap in the aftermath of the end of cold war hostilities. With the rise of the liberal order and strong grip of the western nations in multilateral institutions, democracy emerged as a widely accepted norm internationally. Not just the UN, but institutions such as the World Bank and UNDP began propagating democracy and linked it as a prerequisite for providing international financial assistance. Largely due to the efforts and reports of the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, democratization and democratic processes were formally recognized as major goals of the UN and treated as effective means to address to a wide range of human concerns (Joyner 1999: 335).

UN's democratic assistance was not just confined to non-democratic states. The beginning of the 1990's witnessed a steep rise in instances of civil conflict. Civil wars posed a threat to international peace. In the Post-Cold War, it was widely believed that political and economic liberalism could be a determining factor in resolving social, political and economic problems in Post Conflict states. This led to the introduction of 'Peacebuilding' for reconstruction of states. Democracy promotion was one of the major tasks that the UN sort to perform for building peace in states. From being a mere peacekeeper, the UN now diversified its role to include civilian tasks and instating democratic governments formed an essential part of it. In light of internal conflict and rise of the Democratic Peace thesis in the 1990's, 'Democracy' emerged the forefront of UN agenda in Post-conflict states as well, as democracy was positively linked to peacebuilding.

Major UN peace missions explicitly mentioned democratization in its mandates. While in the initial years, the mandates of UN missions were vaguely worded and its role was confined to observation or verification of elections, over the years the mandates for democratization have become more exclusive and expansive. UN formulated and followed a series of norms and guidelines for carrying out

democratization, especially in post-conflict states. During the initial operations, UN assistance was based on basic norms such as the consent of states and non-use of force. But, as UN adopted an intrusive and top-down approach, it led to a renewal of war and breakdown of institutions in post-conflict states. This led to the inclusion of the norm of local ownership to provide structure, engagement, and legitimacy to the democratization activities of the UN. Similarly, long-term engagement of the UN missions and capacity building in post conflict states also emerged as a prominent norm that determined UN's activities.

However, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN in democratization faced severe criticism. In hindsight, the efforts at promoting a liberal democratic model of state and the market-oriented economy proved to be difficult and unpredictable for the UN and produced destabilizing side effects in recipient states (Paris 2010: 337). While UN succeeded in generating a structured set of norms, the compliance with those guidelines has been a slippery slope. For instance, exclusion of local groups from policy formulation and early exit of the missions have led to a renewal of political violence in states. Moreover, the UN itself is still far from generating a comprehensive framework that is non-partisan and works effectively in post-conflict states. Thus, the mandate, norms, and guidelines for democratization as formulated by the UN have certainly evolved over the years. UN's role in peacebuilding and democratization activities is significant, but UN's failure to consolidate democracy has led to a redrafting of its approach and guidelines to democracy promotion in the post conflict states.

CHAPTER 4 – THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION: MECHANISMS AND OPERATIONS

As liberal democracy emerged as a favourable system of governance in the post-Cold War, the United Nations began to actively promote democracy through its technical assistance programs. As discussed in the previous chapter, the United Nations was called upon to address the internal conflicts within the states. It not only attempts to manage the conflicts through its peacekeeping operations but, also tries to bring about durable peace through its peacebuilding activities. Democratization has been one of the significant components of the peacebuilding activities of the UN peace operations to bring about peace and stability in the post-conflict states. As mentioned in the previous chapter, as the UN expanded its democracy promotion activities, the mandates of UN peace operations for democratization not only were refined in nature but also became more elaborate. To carry out the mandates for democratization more effectively, the UN formulated a foundation of norms and guidelines, the next significant step for the UN was to figure out the mechanisms to implement democratization. A peaceful democratic transition requires setting up of a functioning government based on the rule of law, will of the people, and representation of all major stakeholders (Jeong 2005: 77). Due to the complex circumstances and peculiar violent tendencies in post-conflict states, it became all the more necessary to adopt effective tools and mechanisms to carry out the democratization of the post-conflict states.

In a post conflict environment, a coordinated strategy that includes a chronological list of activities to be undertaken and well defined democratic processes are crucial for the success of democratization and reconstruction activities. Thus, the chapter discusses the significance of various methods and mechanisms adopted by the United Nations for the democratization of the post-conflict states. The chapter begins by elaborating on the different mechanisms adopted by the UN for democratization. It attempts to explain the working of mechanisms such as constitution making and its evolution over the years. It goes on to critically analyse why and how the UN operationalizes various mechanisms such as constitution-making, the formation of political parties, and other electoral assistance programmes such as planning of election, electoral training, voter registration and conduct of elections. The chapter ends with the

overall assessment of UN operations in the field. It critically accesses the performance of UN peace operations in consolidating democracy in post conflict states by discussing the drawbacks of its democratization policies and subsequent transformation in UN's approach to Democracy Promotion.

Mechanisms for Democratization

While the UN was involved in providing electoral support to states approaching the organization for electoral assistance, beginning in the 1990s, democratization became a major part of UN's peacekeeping mandates in the post-conflict states as well (Rich and Newman 2004: 3). Hence, the UN adopted various tools and mechanisms to carry out democratization through its peace missions. To democratize the post-conflict states, the UN adopted mechanisms such as constitution-making, the formation of political parties, and other electoral support techniques for bringing about democratic transition as these post conflict states lacked even the basic capacity to build democratic structures. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a UN peacekeeping operation in Namibia, was the first UN mission with an explicit mandate of democratization as it clearly stated UN's role of monitoring the elections in the state (Rich and Newman 2004: 3). The mechanisms and methods through which the UN spearheads democratization have evolved over the years. Thus, it is significant to understand the working of these mechanisms and methods to evaluate their performance in promoting democracy.

Constitution Making

The constitution is the basic legal document of a democratic state which acts as the foundation and a source of legitimacy in a nation. It defines the structure of the state, the processes of government, the power of the state and the fundamental rights of the citizens (Bulmer 2017: 2). In any democratic nation, a constitution serves as the bedrock of its political processes and legal system. Until recently, mainstream academia focused on the process of constitutionalism in the context of matured and developed democracies. In the context of Post- Conflict states, the political and institutional transformation requires a solid foundation of law and principles to guide the democratic transition as well as validate it. As a result, it was widely accepted that the constitution building processes following a civil conflict could hugely impact the state's transition to democracy (Samuels 2007: 175). Constitution-making is a vital component of

conflict resolution and national reconciliation. Tietel (1997: 2075) also highlighted that constitutionalism is "*inextricably enmeshed in transformative politics*", in other words, it not only legitimizes and codifies the existing consensus but it also transforms it.

Constitution making provides an opportunity for the post-conflict states to create a common vision for the future. It plays a central role in peace building because constitutions create state institutions, provide a legal framework for the exercise of state power, and establish the relationship between the people and their government. It is also expected to "*drive the transformative process from conflict to peace, seek to transform the society from one that resorts to violence to one that resorts to political means to resolve conflict, and/or shape the governance framework that will regulate access to power and resources …*" (Samuels, 2006: 664). Hence, constitution making emerged as one of the foremost tasks for the democratization of the post-conflict states. The United Nations employed constitution-drafting as a tool for democratization and treated it as a foundation stone for guiding future democratic processes (Turner and Houghton 2015: 119). With the expansion of UN's democratization agenda, as constitution making emerged as one of its primary mechanism for democracy promotion, it was argued that international law and international actors such as the United Nations could immensely and positively influence the constitutional processes (Dann and Ali 2006: 423).

While historically, drafting of constitution and conflict resolution were separate processes, the two processes merged in the context of post-conflict states. Bosnia and Herzegovina, presents a quintessential example of a country where the peace agreement and the drafting of the constitution were combined into one negotiation process. The experience demonstrates that when the negotiations on a peace agreement and the constitution are conflated, constitutional principles may be compromised and a democratic set up based on such a constitution proved to be unstable. Therefore, normally UN tends to separate the two processes and regarded the conclusion of a peace agreement as a precondition, which enabled the negotiations among the interested parties on the drafting of the constitution (Benomar, 2003: 4).

Over the last three decades, more than 30 instances of international constitutional assistance have been witnessed in the post-conflict context (Turner and Houghton 2015: 119). The United Nations specifically mandated its peace operations

to provide constitutional support in 12 states. Its missions provided constitutional assistance through two means – either by assisting in the drafting of a new constitution or by aiding in transforming the already existing constitutions of Post- Conflict states. For instance, it mandated missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia to assist the states in reforming their existing constitutions (Sripati 2012: 93). Table 4.1 enlists the 12 states where the UN provided constitutional assistance through its missions.

TABLE 4: 1- CONSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE THROUGH UN PEACE OPERATIONS

COUNTRY	UN MISSION/PROGRAMME PROVIDING CONSTITUIONAL ASSISTANCE
Namibia	UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), April 1989 to March 1990.
Cambodia	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 15 Mar 1992 to 24 Sept 1993
Rwanda	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993 to March 1996
Somalia	UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), April 1995 to the present
Kosovo	UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), 10 June 1999 to the present.
East Timor	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 25 Oct 1999 to 20 May 2002.
Afghanistan	UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 28 Mar 2002 to the present.
Iraq	UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), 14 Aug 2003 to the present.
Burundi	UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 1 June 2004 to 31 Dec. 2006; UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), 1 Jan. 2007 to 31 Dec. 2010; UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), 1 Jan. 2011 to 11 Dec. 2011.
Sudan	UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 24 Mar 2005 to 9 July 2011
Nepal	UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), 23 Jan. 2007 to 15 Jan. 2011
South Sudan	UN Mission in South Sudan UNMISS (9 July 2011 to 8 July 2012) [current authorization until 2012]; UN Mission in Sudan, UNMIS (24 Mar 2005 to 9 July 2011).

Source: Sripati, Vijayashri (2012), "UN Constitutional Assistance Projects in Comprehensive Peace Missions: An Inventory 1989–2011, *International Peacekeeping*, 19(1): 95

The United Nations provides constitutional and legal experts to post conflict states and also set out guidelines on how to provide assistance for the constitution-making process. The United Nations guidelines identify six major principles for participation in constitution-making processes. These include: (a) seizing the opportunity for peace-building; (b) encouraging compliance with international norms and standards; c) ensuring national ownership; (d) supporting inclusivity, participation and transparency; (e) mobilizing and coordinating a wide range of expertise; and (f) promoting adequate follow-up (UN Document, 2009: 2). The United Nations has been an influential external actor in shaping the constitution-making and the overall process

of democratization in post-conflict states. Its role and engagement in this process has evolved over the years. Although there is no doubt about the normative reasoning for undertaking constitutionalism in order to rebuild post-war states, the manner in which it is carried out raised several concerns. Initially, the United Nations was responsible for determining the legal framework, duration, and representation of parties in the constitution-making processes in the Post Conflict States. Mostly, a prior peace agreement or Security Council resolution defines the principles and mandates for post-conflict constitutional exercises (Brandt 2005: 2). For instance, in Namibia, a well-defined timetable and structure for drafting were adopted. Under the aegis of the UN mission, Constituent Assembly elections were conducted from 7 to 11 November 1989. Prof Paul Szasz, a seasoned UN legal expert, assisted and advised the Constituent Assembly in drafting the constitution, which was unanimously adopted and Namibia declared its independence in 1990 (Szasz 1994: 249). Similarly, the UN Transitional Authority of East Timor (UNTAET) which exercised full legislative and executive authority, assisted the East Timorese in drafting their new constitution by undertaking numerous processes. From creating a legal framework for the constitution-making process to electing a Constituent Assembly and writing the constitution, the UN-assisted in every aspect of constitution formulation in East Timor (Sripati 2012: 103). In both the cases, UN assistance proved to be incremental in time-bound and successful formulation of the constitution from scratch in states domestically lacking technical know-how and emerging out of the protracted conflict.

However, the UN does not necessarily adopt a linear and rigid process of constitutional assistance. In Afghanistan, the UN adopted a skeletal or vague framework for building the constitution rather than stringent guidelines in order to allow flexibility in the ever-changing political context and control ensuing violence (Brandt 2005: 2). Put in place with the consultation of major stakeholders and warring groups, the Bonn Agreement called upon the UN Transitional Administration to create a constitutional commission and finalise the constitutional processes in order to lay the foundation for democratization (Sripati 2012: 102). Similarly, through continuous consultation and meetings between the UN and the transitional government, Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) of the Somali Republic was adopted in 2004 addressing that a new federal constitution should be framed within two-and-a-half years of the formation of an independent federal constitutional commission with assistance

from the UN (Sripati 2012: 99). As a result, the Independent Federal Constitutional Commission (IFCC) was formed in 2006, and the UN played a key role in advising on and publicising the draft constitution within the civil society. Thus, in these cases, UN assistance for constitutional processes spanned across several years and was flexible in nature.

Another significant aspect of the UN's constitutional making processes is the technical assistance provided in the drafting process. It is involved in the training of the political leaders and other stakeholders in the drafting process. For instance, in Afghanistan, the UN coordinated the technical assistance aspect of constitution-making and collaborated with the national actors to ensure that experts in the field are engaged in the process. The UN also facilitated communication between locals and experts by adopting techniques such as – translation of option and input papers in local languages (Dari and Pashtu) to get swift feedback (Brandt 2005: 5). Elaborating on the ways in which the UN technically supports the drafting of the constitution, Dr. Ali Tarhouni, member of the Libyan Constitutional Drafting Assembly remarked "… *The UN, through its Special Support Mission and its agencies, has given support to the CDA (Constitutional Drafting Assembly) by providing expert advisors, coordination, and facilitation of roundtables discussions with local experts, activists, women groups and civil society representatives and by helping make the process more inclusive and participatory. The UN has also taken a leading role in the coordination of the international community's efforts to support the CDA…*" (Tarhouni 2015: 1)

Brandt extensively explained the processes that were used by the UN for constitution building in post conflict states and laid out the roadmap for UN's future engagement in constitution making. According to Brandt, the UN through its constitutional assistance provides temporary legitimacy to the often unelected transitional administration; an alternative to the violent past political voices, a platform for national dialogue among stakeholders to generate a common vision for the nation, technical assistance to carry out the proceedings of the drafting constitution, and lays the foundation for a culture of law and democracy by beginning the constitution drafting process through democratic means (Brandt 2005: 1). In few cases, the UN exercises its influence and pushes for inclusion of universally accepted policies and human rights such as - rights of minorities, equal rights for women, democratic elections, among

others in the final constitution. The UN also engages the locals in the process by spreading awareness about the concept of rights, law, and duties in order to enhance the legitimacy of the constitution. While evaluating UN's experience with constitutional assistance, Brandt also generates a renewed emphasis on nationally led and owned constitutional processes with a supportive role of the UN (Brandt 2005: 5).

However, while constitutional assistance proved to be a significant mechanism used by the UN for the democratization of post-conflict states, its processes have also generated concerns. The UN assistance has been criticised for being exclusionary as it involves and interacts with the 'elites' of the states during the drafting process of the constitution, thus marginalizing the aspirations and demands of the larger population. In a post-conflict setting, if the consultations are not seen to be representative and just, it creates bitterness among the citizens and negatively impacts the legitimacy of the document which can further lead to undermining of the democratic processes or even resurgence of conflict (Samuels 2007: 175). For example, in Cambodia, UNTAC provided constitutional assistance based on the legal framework of a peace agreement and was supposed to conduct the elections for the constituent assembly followed by the drafting and implementation of the constitution. However, the agreement did not explicitly mention any mechanism for ensuring wider public participation. Out of the 120 seats in the constituent assembly, Khmer Rouge, a key faction in the conflict had no representation (Brandt 2005: 10-11). Moreover, the absence of women, youth, and minorities from the drafting process killed the inclusive character of the constitution and turned it into an elite document created under the undue influence of the UN. As a result of an exclusionary process leading to a weak constitution, the political elite in Cambodia turned autocratic and toppled over the democratic ideals after the UN's exit (Brandt 2005: 12).

Moreover, in certain cases, the manner in which constitutional support has been carried out by the UN led to sudden and superficial political change creating weak and unstable states (Samuels 2006: 666). Benomar is of the view that constitution making processes should be separated from conflict resolution as when the two processes are conflated, the constitution becomes a mere document to achieve short-term termination of conflict. Constitutional assistance should be seen as a mechanism of democratization with a long-term approach (Benomar 2003: 2). The UN should also adopt a participatory

model of constitutional assistance focusing on inclusion of all the major national leaders, warring groups, and local actors. Exclusion of dominant groups from the drafting process undermines the legitimacy and reach of the outcome document (Benomar 2003: 2). For instance, in the case of Bosnia, the 1995 Dayton agreements and UN assistance led to the formulation of a constitution that aimed to end armed hostilities swiftly but, excluded the dominant groups from the drafting table. As a result, the constitution was not based on agreement and understanding between the major warring parties. This led to exaggerated tensions and power struggle in the state that dismantled the future political system (Benomar 2003: 4).

Deliberative processes and legal framework aimed at the drafting of a constitution and democratization require substantial time frame. The UN also faced criticism for setting a limited and short timeframe on its constitutional drafting process that often turned out to be counterproductive for post-conflict states (Brandt 2005: 3). For instance, in East Timor, rushed up and tight timelines for the drafting process set by the UN-led to an under-representative and privileged body drafting the constitution without due consultation. Moreover, it was also observed during the 1990's that in the states where the United Nations facilitated a constitutional process, its activities were not limited to technical assistance, but UN actively pushed for particular liberal ideological norms to be included in the constitution of post- conflict states (Easterday 2014: 395). Even the timing and feasibility of UN's constitutional assistance in building peace in post-conflict states has been under question (Turner and Houghton 2015: 18). Certain doubts are raised over the UN's ability to conduct a successful democratic transition and build peace through constitution making in post-conflict states. Constitution drafting, democratization, and peacebuilding are inherently conflicting ideas and merging them give rise to issues of sequencing, timeframe, and participation in the process creating further division in the states (Ludsin 2011: 251). While Constitution-making is a major mechanism for democratization, in few cases, the United Nations used constitutional assistance as a means of ending a conflict or as a part of conflict resolution rather than treating it a participatory process for building democratization (Ludsin 2011: 239). This short-term approach and treating it as means of conflict resolution led to a weak constitutional process that undermines the future course of democratic transition in post-conflict states. As a result, even after the constitutions for post-conflict states are drafted with the support of the UN, they merely

remain symbolic. For instance, in Cambodia, even after two decades, the majority of the provisions in the constitution have not been implemented, and the state has failed to consolidate democracy or implement the non-partisan rule of law which the UN aimed for while drafting the constitution (Brandt 2015: 5). While the UN has actively celebrated its efforts after the successful adoption of the constitutions in post-conflict states, its failure to ensure successful implementation creating long-term institutional concerns for post-conflict states has been a source of major criticism.

In the wake of the criticism levelled against UN's approach to constitution making, the UN bodies have often pointed out the limitations they face in carrying out constitutional assistance. Lack of resources and short duration of the peace operations leaves little scope for drafting and implementation of dynamic constitutions. However, in light of severe criticism and learning from their past failures to successfully draft and implement constitutions in post-conflict states, the recent UN missions have tried to adopt a structured process with the larger involvement of the national stakeholders. For instance, in Somalia, after the 2004 peace agreement, an interim 'Transitional Federal Charter' was treated as the formal constitutional document and a timeline of two and a half years was set for finishing the drafting process and formulating the new constitution of Somalia (Turner and Houghton 2015: 11). In the initial years, the process of constitution making in post-conflict states was largely directly under the auspices of the United Nations, as witnessed in Bosnia, East Timor, Cambodia or Kosovo (Turner and Houghton 2015: 11). However, the increasingly intrusive role of the UN led to the alienation of the locals, and the drafting process faced criticism for losing its character of national ownership and for being non-inclusive. Hence, in recent years, the UN in the latter missions has acted more in the capacity of a facilitator or a mediator to bring all the stakeholders in the process of dialogue and consultation in drafting the constitution. Lately, the UN has also adopted a participatory approach to constitution-making processes by engaging locals to create democratic constitutions through democratic processes (Banks 2007: 138). For instance, in the Central African Republic, a Transitional Constitutional Charter was adopted in 2013, and the National Transition Council (NTC) was entrusted with drafting a new constitution. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was mandated to provide technical support to the NTC, and as part of the

electoral process, UN had to support and conduct a constitutional referendum (Koulibaly 2015: 9).

Therefore, while UN constitutional assistance is a substantial mechanism to lay down the democratic foundation in the Post-Conflict States, but, the processes adopted by the UN over the years are flawed. The United Nations tries to learn lessons from the past experiences and attempts in the later missions to redesign constitutions based on a participatory, long-term, and nationally driven approach.

Development of Political Parties

Almost all democracies rely on political parties as they are essential for directing policymaking and achieving effective governance in states. Genuine democracy requires effective political parties and healthy political competition. Political parties find candidates, put up alternative manifestos for the people to select, and organize political competition in order to win elections. The political parties which garner the majority votes normally win and run the government. The other opposing parties formulate the opposition and exercise the responsibility to pressurise the ruling party to respond to public grievances. They provide structure for political participation as political systems without free political parties can hardly be considered democratic (Bjornlund 2007:111). Political parties are not a part of the formal definition of democracy, neither is the criteria of forming parties explicitly mentioned in the constitutional frameworks, yet they are necessary for engaging in fair electoral competition (Stokes 1999: 245).

While political parties have been a striking feature of democratic states, its relevance in post- conflict states heading towards a democratic transition is even more pertinent. However, the circumstances and process of developing political parties in post-conflict states are quite different from that of the normal states. In general, political parties are survival oriented and goal-oriented organizations that emerge and adjust according to their electoral environment (Manning 2004: 255). But, one peculiar feature in the post-conflict states is that at the end of the civil conflict, the previously warring factions emerge as crucial stakeholders in the political landscape. For these warring factions, democracy is seen as a chance for power sharing, and they often transform into political parties with adequate institutional changes and external support (Manning 2004: 258).

Whereas the political party landscape varies from one post-conflict state to the other, three broad types of post-conflict parties can be distinguished: a) political parties that already existed before the war; b) political parties that emerged out of former warring factions, rebel groups or militias; and c) political parties that were established in the post-conflict era (Hoove and Scholtbach 2008: 18). These different types of parties have different institutional needs. They generally lack resources and experience and struggle with the uneven playing field. The United Nations has been involved in providing assistance to develop all these types of political parties. Turning warring groups into functioning political parties is one of the most challenging tasks of democratization.

Warring groups that turn into political parties are often part of the problem, but they are crucial for conflict resolution as well (Hoove and Scholtbach 2008: 5). In post-conflict states, the external support required for the development of political parties is often provided by the United Nations. Under its larger democratization agenda, the United Nations through its missions engages with the stakeholders by bringing them to the negotiation table and facilitates the development of political parties. While interacting with local political actors is a part of UN's democratization policies, it also gives rise to pertinent questions regarding the extent to which UN exercises influence on political groups. As far as the role played by the UN is concerned, the UN exists as a neutral and legitimate negotiator. In the post-conflict states, as power-hungry factions often come in conflict with each other, the UN serves as the peacemaker and acts as the liaison for the peace negotiations by formally grouping the factions (Miller 2013: 13). Thus, the UN acts as the primary negotiator and gives a head-start to the process of bringing warring factions to the negotiation table and turning them into formal political groups. For instance, in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Cambodia, even after the peace accord was signed, the warring factions were willing and needed to use the United Nations as a facilitator for collaborating themselves into formal political groups (Montgomery 1995: 161). Due to the sheer number of conflicting groups and factions laying claim to power, UN's role as a mediator becomes all the more significant in order to maintain peace and legitimately resolve the conflict.

In certain cases, while the UN supplements the transition of factions into political groups and helps to formulate political parties from scratch, in other cases, it

works to reinvent the already existing political parties. In the first case, in countries which are emerging out of conflict, UN's role in assimilating the warring factions into mainstream negotiations is crucial as failure to do so might lead to a renewal of violence. Acting as a mediator on the negotiation table, the UN staff assesses the motives and interests of all the parties involved. While some warring groups are motivated by economic gains, others seek greater political power. Thus, accordingly UN either provides recognition to the former warring factions as legitimate political actors and in some cases, it finances the transformation of rebel groups into organized political parties (Hoove and Scholtbach 2008: 10). The various warring factions such as RENAMO in Mozambique and CNDD-FDD in Burundi were converted into political parties. The United Nations provided assistance to these former armed rebel groups to undertake considerable internal reforms in order to be able to function effectively as a political party within the democratic multiparty system.

In order to provide an effective incentive to rebel groups to transform rebel groups into political parties, the UN often adopts a model of consociational democracy for effective power-sharing between major political factions in post-conflict states (Jeong 2005: 96). For instance, in Cambodia, after several years of armed conflict, based on the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement and efforts of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Party (FUNCINPEC), with CGDK alliance, and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), with PRK alliance, entered into a power-sharing agreement for forming the Cambodian government (Roberts 2002: 522). Whereas in 1993 about 19 political parties contested elections in Cambodia; in the 1998 elections the number grew to 39 (Peou 2004: 264). According to Kumar and Zeeuw (2008: 274), the international community and the United Nations are significant in the development of political parties in the post conflict states.

UN's assistance for transforming the warring factions into political parties can be divided into four major steps. Firstly, the UN provides technical and financial assistance for disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants to pave the way for their reintegration into the mainstream political spectrum as was observed in Burundi, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique. Secondly, in certain cases, the United Nations along with other international actors provide financial assistance to former

warring groups to assist them to convert into political parties. For instance, in Mozambique, a "RENAMO Trust Fund" worth US$ 17 million was established to assist the development of political parties (Tollenaere 2006: 83). Thirdly, International Organizations such as the UN also provide logistical assistance to the rebel factions such as providing office equipment to opposition parties and rebel groups in East Timor and El Salvador. Finally, the UN makes it a point to ensure participation of all major parties, including the newly formed political parties or former warring factions at the negotiation table and within its assistance programmes (Kumar and Zeeuw 2008: 275). In this light, UN did play an active role in the transition of warring groups into political groups and development of political parties in post conflict states.

On the other hand, certain post-conflict states inhibit an existing structure of political parties. In these states, there is an already existing nexus of political parties and locally active scattered political groups. Thus, in this case, the United Nations assists political parties in post-conflict states by aiding them in activities such as building organizational capacities, promoting internal democracy by recruiting women and minorities, and teaching techniques of effective participation in legislative processes (Kumar 2005: 505). International organizations, especially the UN also provide training and technical aid to the old as well as newly formulated political parties to undertake effective election campaign, candidate identification and selection, platform development, voter outreach, campaign funding and budgeting, and voter mobilization (Kumar 2005: 508). For instance, in Mozambique during the 1990's, the opposition party was at a disadvantage in comparison to the existing dominant parties. Hence, the UN provided assistance and training to recruit candidates, draft election manifestoes, write party rules, and design election campaigns (Tollenaere 2006: 84). Similarly, in Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan played a key role in advising and assisting the interim government in formulating political party laws putting the parties under a series of regulations such as not using force for campaigning and not inciting ethnic or religious violence (Kumar and Zeeuw 2008: 268). UN missions have also been influential in controlling the flow of muscle and money power in the formation of political parties by putting rules for the financing of parties as well.

However, even though the United Nations assisted the development of political parties under its democratization agenda, it led to violent outcomes in certain post conflict states. In states such as Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Kosovo legitimisation of political groups into parties and their entry into formal political order further fragmented the legislature and encouraged ethnic polarization (Reilly 2006: 814). The UN recognized and assisted only the elite factions or dominant warring groups while disregarding the power aspirations of ethnic minorities. The political party landscape may be dominated by elites at the centre, excluding the vast majority of a country left untouched by government and disconnected from the political process for a long time. The problem of elite-capture of the political system is twofold. On the one hand, there is a strong disconnect between leaders and constituents, leading to weak representation and legitimacy. On the other hand, intra-elite tensions and fragmentation is common, which leads to different elite factions mainly occupying themselves with intra-elite competition, rather than seeking the deepening of consensus and a common agenda. As a result, the majority of the political parties that developed due to UN's assistance were seen as initiatives of the elites, not as a result of mass movements and lacked local support (Reilly 2008: 4). This led to a revival of political differences and renewed violence in the Post Conflict States. Moreover, the UN just acted as a vehicle for legitimizing the power of the elites by providing them logistical assistance and showcased partisan behaviour. They actively attempted to use their missions and democratization to diminish the influence of particular political parties who according to them were non -cooperative and responsible for the war and encouraged the emergence of "moderate" alternatives (Manning 2004: 61). The factions that were supportive of the liberal ideas were given prominence, and the UN tried to keep the opposition voices at bay. For instance, The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina faced serious challenges to their authority from the UN and other international institutions tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The high commissioner used discretionary powers to remove elected officials from public offices or from their party functions that reflected the undue interference of the UN and international actors (Manning 2004: 61).

UN's role in the development of political parties was also criticised on the grounds of exercising negligible influence over domestic political parties and non-

implementation of party procedures. For instance, in Afghanistan, the UN Mission could not ensure adherence to party laws, despite the provision banning parties associated with armed groups from participating in elections as several candidates linked to armed militias formed parties and fought elections (Giustozzi 2008: 179). Lack of local ownership as in the absence of strong party systems, the UN intruded in the functional areas of the national party politics was another limitation of the UN assistance (Kumar 2005: 517). Therefore, while the UN provides substantial assistance by acting as a mediator between warring groups and by providing monetary and technical support for the development of political parties, yet due to the dynamic nature of post conflict states, the extent of UN's influence as an external actor is limited.

Electoral Assistance

The institution of elections is one of the major indicators of whether a country is democratic or not. Electoral legitimacy and election outcomes affect the prospects for effective governance in states. Elections in the post-conflict states have served well to resolve long-standing conflicts and to initiate or consolidate transition to democracy. Therefore, elections are crucial for the democratization of the post-conflict states. As post-conflict states often lack the institutions and personnel capacity necessary for organizing elections, the United Nations often undertake a direct role in election administration as seen in Cambodia in 1993. The United Nations has three main objectives for elections in post-conflict states: 1) the transfer of power to a recognized democratic government with national and international legitimacy; 2) the introduction of democratic institutions and processes and the initiation of a longer process of democratization; and 3) to promote reconciliation among the parties to the conflict and to shift their struggle from a violent to a nonviolent forum (Bjornlund 2007:110).

Electoral support and elections form an integral part of UN's peacekeeping missions and democratization agenda. In the post conflict states, the successful conduct of elections is considered as the stepping stone for successful democratization. Elections act as the tool for developing democratic politics, choosing representatives, and forming legitimate governments. As war-torn states lack a formal structure of governance, in order to create stability, installing a legitimately elected democratic government at the earliest is one of the primary objectives of the UN peace missions. Democratic governments created through elections are vital for conflict resolution, democratic

transition, and building peace in post-conflict states. The UN-sponsored Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation also states that democratic elections are "central to the maintenance of peace and stability" (Lappin 2009: 88). For a successful democratic transition and the rule of law in the Post Conflict States, elections act as the primary medium through which citizens elect their representatives. Moreover, elections possess the capability of building stability by transforming a violent conflict into the non-violent political competition as 'ballots take the place of bullets' (Kumar 1998: 7). Though it is often argued that the conduct of elections is the responsibility of the domestic actors, yet UN's electoral assistance is incremental for elections in post-conflict states. States emerging out of conflict are not only vulnerable, but they also lack the adequate experience, finances, manpower, local capacities, and technical know how to organize and conduct full-fledged elections. Hence, the United Nations plays a significant role in the conduct of elections by providing electoral assistance through its peacekeeping missions.

Electoral Assistance in the post conflict states is one of the major tasks carried out by UN Missions under its Democratization agenda. UN's electoral support is an umbrella term that involves a list of processes and functions to be performed for the conduct of elections. According to Krishna Kumar (1998: 6) –

"…*Electoral assistance refers to the set of economic, technical, and political programs financed and often implemented by the international community for governmental institutions, political parties, civil organizations, and other organizations involved in planning and conducting the elections. Electoral assistance may include support for a wide range of activities, from advising in the drafting of the necessary electoral legislation to organizing the tabulation of the votes…*" (Kumar 1998: 6)

While the United Nations assists on a wide range of election-related activities, academics have adopted different criteria's for enlisting the electoral assistance activities. According to Carothers (1999: 125-126), external electoral assistance can be divided into five categories - electoral systems design, voter education, election mediation, election observation and election administration (Carothers 1999: 125-126). Conduct of elections is not an isolated narrow event, as from the deployment of the UN mission till the consolidation of an elected government, a number of electoral activities

need to performed and guided by the UN. Figure 4.1 depicts the electoral cycle in a post-conflict state. From constituting a legal framework and code of conduct for elections, the process of elections in a Post conflict state involves planning of election schedule and implementation, training and education of voters, voter registration, election campaigning, maintenance of security on voting day, verification of results, and post-election consolidation (Darnolf 2011: 372). Institutionally, UN engages in eight kinds of electoral assistance: organization and conduct of elections, certification, technical assistance, expert panels, operational support to international observers, support to creating a conducive environment, electoral observation, and supervision (Halff 2017: 3).

One of the major functions of the UN mission is the organization as well as supervision of elections. The United Nations is responsible for the design of the election system, sequencing the timing of elections, and conduct of the entire electoral process. For instance, in Namibia and Cambodia, the United Nations took control over the organization and management of the elections. Especially in the case of Cambodia, the elections conducted in May 1993 were designed, prepared, organized and administered by the UN with the simultaneous presence of almost 20,000 peacekeeping troops (Jeong 2005: 109). It was one of the first instances where the UN played a proactive role in elections that were not limited to overseeing the electoral process. The international organizations such as the UN not only incurred the costs of elections but planned and conducted the elections. While the locals were involved in the election machinery, UN staff held the major positions and often had veto power over decisions (Darnolf 2011: 366).

While elections are necessary for a political transition in post-conflict states, most nations lacked the resources to conduct them. UN's electoral assistance not only covers the incurring costs but provides the necessary logistical support for elections. UN plays an instrumental role in providing technical assistance, which includes the training of citizens and staff. For instance, in Liberia, national election commission was funded and supported by the UN mission, and as a result of its technical support, the commission was able to register 502,678 electors and 91% of eligible voters (Jeong 2005: 109). Under the UN assistance, the very establishment of autonomous and semiautonomous national election commissions in Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and

Mozambique was a significant step towards establishing democratic structures. Similarly, in Cambodia, more than 50,000 electoral officials were trained by UNTAC with a view of building experts for future elections (Kumar and Ottaway 1998: 221). UN electoral assistance has been quite effective in building electoral infrastructure and providing technical support in post-conflict states.

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Source: Darnolf, Staffan (2011), "International Election Support: Helping or Hindering Democratic Elections?", Representation, 47 (4): 372

The success of elections largely depends on the engagement of civilians and the voter turnout. The United Nations plays a crucial role in educating the voters and ensuring voter participation in the electoral process. UN usually takes up the responsibility of collecting and providing targeted and timely voter information on the issue of registration and other election procedures (Wally 2014: 160). Presence of UN staff and forces also created a sense of security for the citizens enabling free participation in the electoral processes. The post-conflict electoral process undertaken by the UN including voter education was historically the first systematic attempt in Africa and Cambodia to disperse information and expose the civilians to democratic engagement (Kumar 1998: 222). Its positive impact was evident from the observation that in Angola, El Salvador,

Mozambique, and Cambodia the elections conducted by the UN witnessed huge participation by locals with total voter turnout ranging between 86 to 88 per cent (Jeong 2005: 113).

UN also engages in election observation, verification and monitoring that provides a sense of validation and credibility to the elections. In these cases, the UN is not actively involved in planning and conduct of operations but provides international support to the process. For instance, in Mozambique, the mandate of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) included verifying the impartiality of the National Elections Commission, monitoring the level of freedom of the parties to campaign, implementing the local electoral process, and assisting in computing of the results (Turner, Nelson and Clark 1998: 157). In other words, UNOMOZ's role was limited to monitoring of the electoral process. As a neutral international body, it was believed that overseeing of the electoral conduct by the UN decreased the chances of manipulation and eliminated the scope for the use of force for buying votes. For instance, in Mozambique, local police units were attached with international civil monitors to keep a check on any incidents of intimidation or violation of the code of conduct during elections (Jeong 2005: 111). Hence, UN's presence acted a positive influence for elections in Post Conflict states.

However, elections conducted under the leadership of the United Nations have produced worrisome outcomes in the certain Post Conflict States. Flaws in the electoral design implemented by the UN-led to a renewal of hostilities. The ill-conceived timing of elections proved to be a major setback for the UN missions. After a minimal level of infrastructure was put in place and hostilities were under control, the UN ushered in quick elections within a year or two of its involvement in the Post-Conflict state and rapidly transferred power to the elected leaders. For instance, in Angola, the United Nations Angola Verification were mandated to oversee and verify the electoral process. In the haste to conduct elections within a short duration, a poorly drafted electoral law was put in place which called for a presidential run-off between the top two candidates in-case no one gained a majority. Rushed elections, along with the run-off clause eliminated any power-sharing arrangement between former warring groups (Reilly 2004: 114). Thus, when UNITA leader Savimbi figured that winning was unlikely, he refused to abide by the 1992 elections results and the state returned to

war (Reilly 2004: 115). Failure of the UN-assisted elections in Angola led to a resurgence of war in the state. While the UN faced serious challenges in planning the election schedule, its Exit timing was equally flawed and disregarded the domestic needs of the state. Immediate departure of the UN missions after the elections without consolidation of democratic structures led to a renewal of violence as witnessed in the case of revolts in Haiti in 2004 and military coup in Sierra Leone in 1997 (Jeong 2005: 114). Conducting presidential and national elections in a jiffy without the creation of regional political parties created weak institutions (Linz and Stepan 1996: 135). The lacunae of UN's strategy can be observed from the statement of Lakhdar Brahimi, member of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Special Envoy - "We need to organize elections as early as possible, but not earlier than possible" (Brahimi 2004).

Internationally monitored elections in the Post Conflict States are also criticised for fostering political polarization that further encourages the renewal of civil war, or at its worse, sow the seeds of political violence. The sequencing and design of UN's electoral assistance have caused a revival of hostilities in certain post-conflict scenarios. Post-conflict states present unique circumstances and the manner in which elections are conducted tends to distribute power along political lines or to the elites rather than aiming for long-term national reconciliation (Sisk 2007: 198). Hence, the UN's electoral processes are used as a tool to transfer power to elites rather than creating stable democratic mechanisms. Like, in Bosnia- Herzegovina, in the elections of 1996, nationalist parties representing the majority came to power whereas the small multi-ethnic parties could not hold ground (Jeong 2005: 116). In ethnically divided societies, while political compromise is necessary for peaceful settlement, in the absence of proper planning and a long-term approach, elections legitimize the rule of the majority and increase the chances of renewed conflict. Elections in war-torn states often bring the autocratic leaders in power through legitimate means who disregard the democratic order and weaken social institutions. Like Rwanda's Presidential election in 2003, the first after the genocide brought Paul Kagame who had a dubious role in the genocide, back in power with almost 95% of votes cast in his favour (Jeong 2005: 115). These instances highlight the inherent drawbacks of the UN's electoral processes in promoting credible democracy.

Even on the technical front, the United Nations performed a commendable role by introducing technology and democratic practices but, they were not sustainable in a post-conflict environment. Elections run and financed by the UN often introduced electoral technology that could not be sustained or run by the locals post its exit as seen in the case of Cambodia and Mozambique (Reilly 2004: 121). Control of the electoral procedure in the hands of international staff and community led to disregard for the domestic capacity building. In view of the lack of training, the locals were neither able to handle the electoral equipment nor were they able to sustain the democratic practices. After the elections, the United Nations was quick in declaring an operation a success and wrap up its mission. UN missions considered holding of elections as an end goal and trigger for its exit from the conflict area. However, failure to institutionalize the electoral mechanism post the elections and rushed exit without building local capacities led to relapse of violence and collapse of democratic procedures. Cambodia's 1993 elections, organized and administered by UNTAC were declared a success, but it did little to build democracy or transform the status quo (Jeong 2005: 117). Post-UN's exit, Cambodia returned to its authoritarian history following a coup by Hun Sen against the democratically elected party, FUNCINPEC (Reilly 2004: 129). UN's 'quick fix' approach to elections did not generate positive acceptance for the electoral results and failed to consolidate democracy.

However, in the recent years, the UN has tried to incorporate changes in its electoral assistance policies. Recent UN missions actively promote local ownership of elections. For instance, in Afghanistan, a Joint Electoral Management Body chaired by a UN electoral official and consisting of local Afghans leaders and experts administered the first presidential elections in 2004 (Sisk 2007: 212). There has been a conscious effort to adopt a sustainable strategy of electoral support that includes long-term engagement of the UN and building local capacities to avoid a relapse of war post-UN's exit. Sequencing, design, and aim of UN's electoral assistance are determining factors in explaining the ability of UN-led elections in democratizing post-conflict states (Sisk 2007: 196). Hence, UN's capacity to bring about a positive change depends on the manner of designing and implementing its electoral procedures.

Overall UN Performance of Democratization in the Operational Field

Beginning in the 1990s, the United Nations was actively involved in promoting democracy through its peacekeeping missions deployed in several post conflict states. It assisted the states in democratization through mechanisms such as constitutional assistance, development of political parties, and electoral support. UN's involvement in post-conflict states was built on the belief that democratization is positively correlated with peacebuilding. However, UN mechanisms have showcased a mixed record in consolidating democracy in the post conflict states.

UN operations in the 1990s were seen as a path-breaking step towards building peace and democracy in the post conflict states. The successful introduction of democratic practices and conducting elections in worn torn states such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Liberia, that had no history of participatory governance was applauded as an achievement for the UN missions. UN peace missions were regarded to be significant for building local capacities and for the transition of a conflict-ridden state to a participatory democracy (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779). Moreover, it was postulated as the UN as an international organization exercises caution with respect to state sovereignty and has value for democratic principles, in contrast to when independent states engage in democratizing post-conflict states, UN exercised a positive influence on building democracy (Pickering and Peceny 2006: 539). The majority of conflict-ridden states had no prior experience with democratic processes and UN through the free and fair conduct of elections gave them an outlet for choosing a peaceful, stable government. As a result, the newly elected governments were relatively less autocratic than the predecessors and due to the presence of UN, they engaged democratically in the electoral process as seen in the case of Mozambique and El Salvador (Kumar and Ottaway 1998: 217).

However, research towards the beginning of the 21st century highlighted the limited ability of UN missions to impact democratic transitions. UN involvement and mechanisms exercised a negative effect on democratization and led to a renewal of conflict in certain states. Researchers observed that democratization did not improve the democratic structures, rather a steady decline in democracy was seen in the post-conflict states. After a thorough comparison drawn between states that experienced UN intervention and those that did not, with regard to democratic transition in post-conflict states it was observed that states that faced UN intervention fared no better and actually

did worse on account of the building of democracy (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006, 643). Instead of building democracy, UN policies hindered the consolidation of peace and in certain cases, sparked renewed conflict. In Rwanda and Angola, political liberalization through elections and formation of political parties contributed to the resurgence of violence, and in Bosnia, elections created political polarization, reinforcing the ethnic divide rather than facilitating national reconciliation (Paris 1997: 56). One of the serious loopholes in the UN's democratic assistance has been in its failure to consolidate democracy in post-conflict states. It failed to generate a sustainable and long-lasting impact on democracy and post its exit; the state spiralled back into the trap of authoritarian regimes.

Based on the critique levelled against UN's approach to democratization and alarming outcomes observed in recipient states, subsequent missions of the UN tried to modify its policies. The missions recognized the need for local ownership, capacity building, and long-term engagement as UN still remained the primary actor in the field of democracy promotion. Recent empirical research suggested that UN intervention in post-conflict states positively impacted and helped in the democratization of post conflict states as the presence of UN increased the chances of democratization by 6.1% (Pickering and Peceny 2006: 558). While UN missions might have faced limitations in sustaining the democratic transition, but the presence of UN missions overall had a significant positive impact on the democratic transition of post-conflict states (Joshi 2010: 826). Hence, in the contemporary times, the UN is still actively engaged in democracy promotion in war-torn states.

In order to provide a contemporary empirical analysis of UN Missions and democratization policies and to supplement the argument, Table 4.2 enlists the countries where UN Missions carried out democratization and were majorly involved in providing electoral and constitutional assistance. The table uses the data from *'Freedom in the World Report 2018'* formulated by Freedom House, which ranks countries as Free, Partly Free, and Not Free based on the level of freedom, civil, and political rights exercised by the citizens of the country. The level of democracy and freedom in the country was rated on a scale of 1 to 7, whereas one denoted 'most free' and seven denoted 'least free.' The data represented in the table has taken into account the

countries where UN undertook democratization and has wrapped up its mission. Ongoing missions have not been included in the scope of this analysis.

While the level of civic and political liberties might not be the only criteria to judge the strength of a democracy, nevertheless, they are the defining pillars of a stable democracy. If we look at the data, most of the countries where UN missions carried out democratization are either 'Not Free or Partially Free.' Only Namibia, El Salvador, and Timor Leste score high on the scale and exist as stable democracies. Systematic and well-funded democratization mandate of ONUSAL along with elections under the observation of international bodies and a planned UN exit created a strong democratic foundation in El Salvador (Baloyra 1998: 20).

However, as is evident from Table 4.2, the majority of the states that UN intervened in, it did not succeed in consolidating democracy in the long run. With the UN exit from the country, the political structures collapsed, and democracy was compromised. Cambodia is a classic case for analysing the long-term turbulent impact of UN's democratization mechanisms. UNTAC envisaged the role of the administrator and mediator of the electoral process in Cambodia.

However, in order to reach a quick settlement, UN adopted power sharing method between the major warring factions turned political groups – CPP and FUNIPEC. This further alienated the local factions and led to the formation of a weak constitution voicing the opinion of the elites. Even after the conduct of elections, even when the local institution and capacities were inadequately developed, the UN was quick to depart as it viewed the conduct of elections as an exit strategy (Sisk 2007: 206). In the aftermath of the UN Mission, a coup led by Hun Sen eliminated the basic democratic principles and Cambodia refurbished into an authoritarian state. Freedom House report gives Cambodia a ranking of 5.5, that demotes 'Not Free' even after 15 years of UN's exit from the country. Similarly, UN's record in Africa and the Middle East has been equally worrisome with its democratization policies creating more damage and exaggerating the conflict.

Country	UN Mission	Duration	Freedom in the World Report (2018) - Freedom Status	Freedom in the World Report (2018) - Freedom Rating
Namibia	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG)	1989-1990	Free	2
Angola	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991-1995	Not Free	6
El Salvador	United Nations Observer Mission in El- Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991-1995	Free	2.5
Cambodia	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	1992-1993	Not Free	5.5
Mozambique	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	1992-1994	Partly Free	4
Liberia	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	1993-1997	Partly Free	3
Central African Republic	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	1998-2000	Not Free	7
East Timor	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	1999-2002	Partly Free	3.5*
Sierre Leone	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	1999-2005	Partly Free	3
Democratic Republic of Congo	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	1999-2010	Not Free	6.5
Cote D' Ivoire	United Nations Operation in Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI)	2004-2017	Partly Free	4
Haiti	United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)/ United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	1993 -1996/ 2004-2017	Partly Free	5
Sudan	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	2005-2011	Not Free	7
Timor Leste	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	2006-2012	Free	2.5

Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report 2018, Accessed on 9th March 2018, URL: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores

On the other hand, initial operations of the UN such as Namibia, El Salvador, and Mozambique showcase positive trends towards successful democratic consolidation. Even recent rating of states such as Liberia where UN intervened through another operation showcase scope for growth. Fortna (2008: 39) provides a balanced argument to explain the dwindling record of the UN and conclude the role of its mechanisms in

the democratic transition of post-conflict states. According to her, the concept of democratization is inherently conflicted, and UN missions do not exercise a clear positive or negative impact on democratization. She states that since the breakthrough in 1989, democratization emerged as a major agenda of UN's peacekeeping missions including monitoring and running of elections, but, simultaneously maintaining peace and stability and fostering democracy may at times come in direct conflict (Fortna 2008: 40). Hence, while UN's democratization policies are a tool for building peace, their outcomes in certain states have not led to the consolidation of democracy.

Conclusion

The United Nations does play a major role in the process of democratic transition of post-conflict states. As states emerging out of conflict lack the adequate resources, manpower, and capacity to engage in democratic processes, the UN missions prove to be crucial for initial technical and logistical support for building the basic democratic structures. Constitution making, developing political parties, and electoral assistance are the three major areas where the UN has provided incremental support. While UN provided crucial technical support and acted as a mediator between parties in the drafting of the constitution, its constitutional programmes often excluded the local stakeholders and conflated it with conflict resolution leading to the creation of feeble constitutions. Similarly, the UN was a significant actor in bringing the warring groups to the negotiation table and provided adequate logistical support for transforming rebel groups into political parties. Yet, the very inclusion of warring factions into political mainstream led to their legitimisation and renewal of violence in few cases.

Conducting a full-fledged election without any international external support can prove to be tedious for a state emerging out of the conflict. UN through its institutional mechanisms provided the material and institutional support for instituting the electoral design, constructing basic institutions, building norms, voter education, and providing security, infrastructure, and routine of the first post-conflict election (Reilly 2004: 132). UN staff and technical experts were incremental in mediating between major groups, exerted pressure wherever necessary for ensuring fair elections and ensured adherence to the electoral laws (Kumar and Ottaway 1998: 230). However, UN treads on a curvy path in trying to strike a balance between its goal of maintaining security and democratization. While UN intervenes in conflict areas with an ambitious aim of

building democracy, the manner in which its mechanisms are designed and implemented have restrained the democratic transition of post-conflict states. Most of UN's missions in the early 1990's failed to consolidate democratic processes in the post-conflict states. As the discussion has highlighted, UN's way to approach and implement the mechanisms such as early elections, early exit, non-representative constitutional bodies, unsuccessful transition of warring groups into political parties, lack of local ownership, and lack of capacity building led to weak institutionalisation in the states and led to renewal of conflict in certain cases. Democratization is a long-term goal, and limited engagement of the international community gave rise to serious concerns in recipient states.

As the last section highlighted, UN exercises a limited ability to influence the democratic consolidation in states. The fact that UN missions were able to create institutions and political processes in states which were gripped in violent conflict and present difficult domestic circumstances is worth noting (Newman 2004: 199). But, while the ultimate success of democracy is dependent on the states, yet the UN is fairly responsible for the outcomes in the state. The UN mechanisms are expected to establish coherent and robust political institutions, but the UN often engages in social engineering and adopts practices that are not sustainable and lead to further polarization in post-conflict states (Reilly 2004: 132). Hence, the UN missions are significant for democratic transition and peacebuilding. However, the UN needs to re-access and rework on making its mechanisms more inclusive, effective and sustainable. Like recent operations in Liberia and Afghanistan have tried to incorporate the lessons learned from UN's past experiences and have tried to design the constitutional and electoral mechanisms with the aim of long-term engagement and promoting a greater degree of national ownership.

CHAPTER 5: DEMOCRATIZATION IN LIBERIA

Though UN's role and ability in promoting democracy in post-conflict states has been challenged time and again on theoretical, legal, and structural grounds, yet it continues to be engaged in democratization. Its continued relevance in carrying out democratization as means of conflict resolution and continuous attempts to bring about durable, stable peace is evident from the fact till now the United Nations is actively carrying out democratization activities through UN peace operations in nearly 15 countries. In the last three decades, the majority of the conflict-ridden states from the Middle East to Africa have witnessed UN's involvement in the promotion of democracy through its peace operations. The United Nations 'guidelines, norms, mechanisms and tools for democratization in the post-conflict states have evolved over the years. It has learnt lessons from its past experiences and has tried to incorporate elaborate mandates and devise more effective mechanisms in its subsequent operations.

To examine through an empirical case study that how the United Nations carried out democratization in the earlier UN operations and how it tried to make changes in its approach to democratization in following operations based on the lessons learnt from its experience, the case-study of Liberia is taken for this study. The UN peacekeeping mission and democratization activities in Liberia which ended in March 2018 is one of the latest missions of the UN aiming at building democracy in the post-conflict state. The contemporary mainstream narrative tout Liberia as a 'UN peacebuilding success story.' This case-study seems to be the most suitable as it manifests both the earlier and later practice of democratization as the UN was involved in democratization in Liberia twice, first through United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) from 1993 to 1997 and then through United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 to 2018.

Through the case-study of Liberia, this chapter intends to examine how the previous experiences of the UN in the promotion of democracy influenced the subsequent mandate and activities of the UN in Liberia. The Chapter begins by discussing the historical background and the origin of conflict in Liberia. It attempts to explain the circumstances that led to the need for international intervention in Liberian affairs. The following section discusses and evaluates the regional and UN response to the conflict in Liberia. It assesses the working and outcomes of the United Nations

Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) that was established in the 1990s. The chapter further discusses the resurgence of the Civil War in Liberia and the subsequent re-involvement of the UN through the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003. It further explains the working of the democratization mechanisms adopted by the UN. The chapter concludes by critically analysing the performance of UN's democratization activities and accesses the contemporary state of democratic consolidation in Liberia.

Historical Background

Located along the coast of West Africa, Liberia boasts of vibrant history and stands out among the other African Countries. Surrounded by Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea on three sides and the Atlantic Ocean, Liberia has a population of almost 4 million people, consisting of 17 major ethnic groups., who beginning since the 12th century migrated from different parts of Africa. Americo – Liberians who arrived in the 1800's comprising about 5% of the total population (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 9). The United States played a significant role in the formation of Liberia and had exercised excessive influence over Liberian State since its inception. Abolition of slavery in the west and growing number of African Americans on the US soil led to the formation of the American Colonization Society in the 19th Century, funded mainly by the Presbyterian churches and comprising of diverse interest groups determined to resettle African- Americans in Africa (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 9). In 1819, the US Congress passed an act to enable the return of captured African slaves back to the African Continent. As a result, a set of African – American Freeman led by Elijah Johnson set sail in a ship named Elizabeth towards the coast of West Africa (Waugh 2011: 15). In 1822, this first group of explorers with the support of the American Colonization Society raised the American flag on the Providence Island and founded the colony of Liberia or "Land of the Free" as a base for returning freed slaves from the Americas (Dennis 2006: 2). Based on the lines of the US constitution, in 1845 Liberia drafted and adopted its constitution and in 1847, Liberia declared independence from the American Colonization Society and emerged as Africa's first independent republic (Waugh 2011: 19).

Historically, Liberia is often positively referred as the first black independent republic in Africa that was never formally colonized but in reality, the United States

exercised enormous influence, and the migrated Americo-Liberians controlled the state institutions. The migrants, who established Liberia as a nation, were neither mainly black nor did they share common belief systems with the Africans. On the contrary, they brought in lofty ideas of democracy, constitutionalism, and freedom in an economically fragile and immature state (Waugh 2011: 21). In the political sphere, the True Whig Party was established in 1869 consisting of the Americo- Liberian migrants and Christian fundamentalists. Americo -Liberians ruled over Liberia for the next 133 years by setting a single party rule that introduced English as the national language and propagated western political structures (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 9). An elaborate patronage system was introduced in Liberia with the country divided into Western, Eastern, and Central provinces. Liberia was more or less considered to be a stable state under the leadership of Americo- Liberians. Towards the 1920s, the Firestone Tire company occupied 4% of the territory in Liberia for establishing world's largest rubber plantation, which also generated significant cash resources and integrated it with the world markets (Ellis 2007: 44).

Despite its visibly stable institutions, Liberia was an ethnically divided society with inequitable political representation. Americo - Liberians subtly propagated a segregationist policy. Indigenous groups which accounted for almost 95% of the population were denied their political rights, and membership in the government, the membership in True Whig party as well as in the military was restricted to people belonging to the Congo heritage (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 9). Liberia presented a peculiar problem where forty to fifty thousand Americo - Liberians from the United States, occupied and headed a territory which was inherently inhabited by native tribes. These natives were cut off from the elites and had no representation in government or any scope of institutional growth.

In the post- World War era, Liberia under the leadership of President Tubman, who was also descendant of the settler Americo-Liberian community (1944 -1971) witnessed the most prosperous decades (Ellis 2007: 49). With US dollar as its official currency and economic enterprises running swiftly, Liberia presented a different picture from its other African counterparts. However, the domination of the Americo – Liberians in political affairs and exclusion of other ethnic groups from mainstream governance created a deep-seated divide in the Liberian society. In the 1970s, with the death of

President Tubman and owing to general discontent of the public with the repressive state structures, differences manifested themselves in the open and led to unrest in the Liberian society. Tubman's successor Tolbert used violence to suppress the agitation and people's movement. This led to a coup by an army sergeant named Samuel Doe who executed Tolbert and 13 other cabinet members (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 10). In 1980, Doe claimed the presidency of Liberia and put an end to the Americo-Liberian rule in the country.

Figure 5: 1. Geographical Location of Liberia

Source: Magellan Map of Liberia (1997), Accessed 14th May 2018, URL: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/34/076.html

Doe's presidency initially garnered support from the masses as it brought an end to the one-party rule of the Americo- Liberians. However, the relief was short-lived as the government turned into an autocratic military regime and destroyed the existing economy of Liberia (Amos 1992: 296). After the coup, Doe formulated a People's Redemption Council (PRC) that suspended the Constitution and banned other political parties (Dennis 2006: 3). Instead of assimilation, Doe's policies furthered the divide the ethnic groups, as he favoured his own Krahn tribe, leading to violent clashes between military and ethnic communities. Though international pressure led to the national elections of 1985, the elections were rigged, and with the US providing legitimate

recognition to Doe's leadership. Once again, Doe established a one-party rule in Liberia (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 10).

By the end of the 1980s, Doe was increasingly surrounded by Americo-Liberians who virtually were heading the Liberian affairs yet again to the displeasure of the common public. This paved the way for the rise of Charles Taylor as the face of rebellion against Doe's oppressive regime. Taylor was trained in guerrilla warfare and returned to Liberia from the US in 1989 to form the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), an armed group comprising few former members of Doe's administration (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 11). To enhance his appeal, Taylor presented himself as an educated and seasoned leader who had native roots as his mother belonged to the Gola tribe as well as had the experience of Americanisation owning to his years spent in the US and an Americo-Liberian father (Huband 1998: 12). Under the leadership of Taylor, an armed rebellion broke out in Liberia in 1989. Taylor openly announced the attack on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) office and several high-ranking officials and urged the Liberian public to revolt and take up arms against the oppressive government. In retaliation, the Doe regime took aggressive measures to curb the agitation and unleashed brutal violence on the ethnic tribes. The situation worsened in 1990 when one of the rebels and former ally of Taylor, Prince Johnson tortured and killed President Doe while videotaping the execution (Ellis 2007: 10). The killing of President Doe unleashed the violent forces and led to the First Phase of the Liberian Civil War. An atmosphere of fear, lawlessness, unrest, and violence engulfed the state of Liberia.

For the next several years, Liberia continuously faced rebellions and counter rebellions from diverse ethnic groups. While groups such as Krahn and Mandingo formed the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) in 1991, another counter-rebellion known as the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) representing the Sapo tribe emerged in Southeast Liberia (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 11). Led by Amos Sawyer, the interim government was confined to the borders of capital Monrovia, and Taylor exercised control in the rest of Liberia by setting up a parallel government. Thus, in the early 1990s, Liberia was facing a full-fledged civil war with rebellion groups causing unrest, violence, and thousands of civilians were either rendered homeless or were killed. Moreover, Taylor's armed rebellion crossed borders and sowed

the seeds of unrest and violence in neighbouring states of Cote D' Ivoire and Sierre Leone. Thus, the civil war in Liberia transcended borders and became an international concern.

Regional and UN Response to the Liberian Crisis in the 1990s

As the unrest in Liberia was escalating and splitting over to the neighbouring states, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was the first regional respondent to the civil war situation. Established in 1975, ECOWAS was a regional conglomeration of 16 West African states aimed at achieving greater economic cooperation and growth in the region. During the initial years, ECOWAS restricted itself to economic affairs. The civil war in Liberia, escalating refugee crisis in West Africa, and Taylor's support to guerrilla groups in Sierra Leone threatened the peace and stability of the entire region (Adeleke 1995: 569). Due to the threat of civil war looming over the entire West African region, the heads of Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone built pressure on ECOWAS to take action in response to the escalating crisis. As a result, ECOWAS formulated a conflict mediation committee, followed by the signing of an agreement in August 1990 in Banjul, Gambia authorizing the deployment of an ECOWAS intervention force to Liberia (Waugh 2011: 98). ECOWAS Peace plan exercised the support of all major warring factions, Liberian religious groups, but faced vehement opposition from Taylor's NPFL. As ECOWAS failed to negotiate peace through deliberation between warring factions, owing to the rise in violence, a peacekeeping force was dispatched and deployed to supervise the ceasefire in Liberia (Adeleke 1995: 569). In 1990, the ECOWAS formed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peacekeeping operation, to deal with the Liberian crisis. As Taylor's reach through the country was expanding manifold, the interim government in Liberia became depended on the ECOMOG for protection and maintaining peace in Liberia (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011: 11).

For ECOWAS, intervening in the Liberian crisis was not only a divergence from its initial stand of sticking to economic issues, but it was one of the first instances where a regional organization was heading a peace operation rather than the United Nations. However, ECOWAS lacked resources and experience to run a peacekeeping operation successfully. Institutional weakness of ECOWAS, combined with the vested interests and control of the regional hegemon – Nigeria - in planning and decision making

negatively impacted its ability to remain impartial in resolving the conflict (Adeleke 1995: 569). Critiques also point out that though the ECOWAS operation did not have the authorization of the UN Security Council, it was commended and encouraged due to US support (Farer 2004: 44). Towards the end of 1992, as the civil war intensified, ECOMOG's entire focus was on dismantling Taylor's power for which it even facilitated the infiltration by another rebel faction - United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) (Waugh 2011: 158). As a result, ECOMOG's primary aim of conflict resolution, disarmament, and peacebuilding in Liberia took a backseat, and its policies were influenced by regional politics.

The continuous failure of ECOMOG to implement a ceasefire and worsening civil war situation in the region caught the attention of the international community. As the reports of severe atrocities and large-scale civilian deaths surfaced, the UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros Ghali ordered an official investigation (Waugh 2011: 164). Due to its military, political, and diplomatic shortcomings and failure to bring about any progress in resolving the conflict, ECOMOG invited the United Nations to intervene in Liberia. After several UN-sponsored meetings in Geneva, an agreement was reached in Cotonou in 1993 that called for reconciliation between all the warring parties. The Cotonou agreement was signed between the interim government of Liberia (IGNU), National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). It authorized that "*The ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission shall supervise and monitor the implementation of this Agreement*" (UN Document 1993b). The agreement also specified that an interim government should be selected and installed within 30 days from the date of signing the agreement, the executive powers will be exercised by a five-member council which shall consist one representative from each warring parties, and elections will be conducted after seven months (UN Document 1993b). ECOMOG and the United Nations were entrusted with the task of supervising and implementing the provisions of the Peace Agreement (Carter Center Report 1997: 15).

Hence, in order to implement the ceasefire agreement, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established in 1993 as an international response to the escalating civil war crisis in Liberia. Formulation of UNOMIL was an ambitious step as it was for the very first time that the United Nations was undertaking

a peacekeeping operation in collaboration with a regional organization (Adibe 1997: 471). It was an extraordinary instance where the United Nations deployed its military personnel to support an ongoing regional initiative, marking a deflection from UN's long-existing policy of keeping regional organizations at an arms-length (Gberie 2016: 2). Moreover, in the 1990s, as liberals propagated the approach that international organizations are positive influencers and can play a definitive role in resolving civil conflict through peacebuilding and democratization of war-torn states, Liberia emerged as one of the first test cases to evaluate the capability of UN's peacekeeping missions in conflict resolution and democracy promotion.

The initial objective of UNOMIL was to verify and oversee the implementation of the peace agreements, or the Cotonou Accord in collaboration with and parallel to ECOMOG. While UNOMIL focused on monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, democratization was also one of the aspects of the mandate of UNOMIL. Under the mission, 303 military observers and an unspecified number of administrative and support staff were deployed in Liberia (Adibe 1997: 478). Established by Security Council Resolution 866 (1993), the initial mandate of UNOMIL included, –

"…*To observe and verify the election process, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement…*" (UN Document 1993a).

However, Taylor's apprehension of sharing power and his exclusion from the negotiation table led to continued bloodshed in Liberia and failure of the Cotonou peace accord. As far as UNOMIL was concerned, even after the collapse of initial agreements, the UN Security Council had faith in the peace negotiations and continued to renew the mandate of UNOMIL. For instance, the mandate of UNOMIL was adjusted in 1995 by Security Council Resolution 1020 to include–

"…*To observe and verify the election process, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with provisions of the peace agreements…*" (UN Document 1995).

Eventually, after full scale violence and almost 13 failed attempts at peace initiatives, finally the Abuja II Accords were signed in 1996. The Abuja Agreement stated establishment of a transitional government, followed by disarmament, an executive

body consisting of all major groups including Taylor, and conduct of special elections of 1997 (Carter Center Report 1997: 10).

As mandated, UNOMIL, working along with ECOMOG and various other international players was bestowed with the task of verifying and overseeing the implementation of the Abuja Accord and the election process. Beginning with disarmament and demobilisation, the warring factions quickly transformed the militias into political parties in order to contest elections for instance, Taylor transformed NPFL into National Patriotic Party (NPP), and Kromah turned ULIMO-K into All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP) with a total of 13 parties contesting the final elections to be held in July 1997 (Carter Centre Report 1997: 17). UNOMIL deployed medium term electoral observers to Liberia's 13 counties. These observer teams carried out the voter registration process and observed the political campaign. In addition, UN deployed 200 short term international observers who were UN staff members to observe the election itself, including observing the polling and counting of votes. UNOMIL and ECOWAS also established a Joint Coordination mechanism to perform the following tasks: 1) to ensure operational requirements are fulfilled and that electoral process remains on track; 2) to coordinate the deployment, logistics, and security arrangements for international observers; 3) to identify gaps in the electoral process; and 4) jointly certifying whether the election is free and fair (UN Document 1997b). UNOMIL along with UNDP provided technical assistance to the electoral authorities, ranging from logistical and material support to advice on election management, voter registration, polling, and civic education. UNOMIL also provided assistance in setting up and working of Liberia's Independent Election Commission in planning and providing logistical support for elections (UN Document 1997b). Under the supervision of UNOMIL and ECOWAS, the elections were scheduled to be held in July 1997. UN mission played an active role in ensuring that the election process is conducted freely, election laws were put in place, and voter education programmes were conducted to ensure broader participation.

On the day of the election on 19th July 1997, Liberia witnessed almost 85% of voter turnout. Nearly 500 international observers from the UN and other agencies were deployed to oversee the electoral process, and the elections faced limited irregularities, mostly adjudged to be free and fair (Lyons 1998: 231). However, the election results took the world by surprise. Despite his proactive role in encouraging the civil war and

negative propaganda in the media, Charles Taylor was elected as the president and his National Patriotic Party won 49 out of 64 Senate seats and garnered almost 75.3% of the votes (Waugh 2011: 228). It was postulated that people voted for Taylor due to fear of recurrent violence if he failed to form the government, but the electoral process, in general, was free from discrepancies. After meddling in the Liberian affair for almost five years, the United Nations and ECOWAS were eager to end their operations as according to them the mandate of the operation had been achieved successfully. Installation of Taylor as the newly elected President through a fair democratic electoral process marked the success of the UN mission.

As the twenty-fourth report of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) stated –

"… *Liberian peace process has come to a successful conclusion during the reporting period, with the holding of presidential and legislative elections on 19 July, as scheduled, and the installation of the new Government on 2 August. With the establishment of a democratically elected Government in Liberia, UNOMIL's principal objective has now been achieved. The withdrawal of the Mission's personnel was already underway and should be substantially completed by 30th September, leaving a small team to complete the usual liquidation and closing processes…*" (UN Document 1997a).

Thus, after Taylor's election as the president and subsequent promise of disarmament led to the exit of peacekeepers from Liberia. The United Nations viewed UNOMIL and democratization efforts in Liberia in a favorable light and UNOMIL came to a close after achieving its mandate.

Evaluation of Democratization in the 1990s

While UNOMIL and ECOMOG exited from Liberia after fulfilling its mandate and Taylor's election in 1997, yet peace in the country was short-lived as Liberia witnessed a resurgence of civil war. Initially, through a power-sharing arrangement, leaders of opposition groups such as ULIMO were given representation in government offices on the condition of dissolving their rebel factions. However, in just two years of his rule, Taylor's administration was engaged in widespread corruption, repression of dissent, exploitation of ethnic groups, and unleashed a fresh cycle of violence on civilians (Kieh

and Klay 2009: 9). Combined with the abject poverty of common citizens, severe exploitation of ethnic groups by the regime forced the rebel groups to re-arm, and Liberia witnessed a resurgence of civil war in 1999. Taylor's regime was incompetent, corrupt, autocratic, and engaged in violent suppression of other ethnic groups. Taylor formulated specialized security agencies such as Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and Special Security Services (SSS) which were involved in assassinations, loot, brutality, and a crackdown on dissenters on the name of maintaining law and order (Waugh 2011: 251).

Few scholars would argue that the renewal of civil war in Liberia was a result of domestic dynamics, Taylor's abysmal decision making, and ethnic violence. However, the role of the way the peacebuilding and democratization were carried out by the United Nations and other international organizations cannot be ignored. It clearly indicates that it was too hasty to declare the success of the election and preparing for the exit of the UN engagement in Liberia. The resurgence of war even after a full-fledged intervention and elections under the supervision of ECOMOG and UNOMIL showcases the dismal failure of disarmament, democratization, and overall post-conflict peacebuilding project (Kieh and Klay 2009: 7). Firstly, the UN observers adjudged the elections mostly to be free from irregularities. The former US President Jimmy Carter went to the extent of declaring it a "*uniformly excellent election process*" (Waugh 2011: 229). Taylor had used his vast network in the countryside with access to resources, people, and experience not only at leading but, also intimidating and campaigning as well during the election (Waugh 2011: 229). Taylor had access to the formerly state-owned short-wave radio station and indiscriminately used it to propagate his message outside Monrovia. UNOMIL and election observers did place an electoral code of conduct limiting the spending on campaigning but did not have strict enforcement mechanisms. Taylor blatantly used resources and intimidation to impact the voters (Lyons 1998: 232). Hence, the electoral processes were not free from influence and placed Taylor at an undue advantage at winning elections. This apparently is the defect in conducting an election under the supervision of the UN mission.

Moreover, the United Nations usually adopts a proportional representation system for post-conflict elections as it simplifies the innumerable pre-election processes such as demarcation of districts and voter registration (Reilly 2008: 173). However, the implementation of a new system by the UN, without taking into account the existing

mechanisms and demarcation of power, created feeble democratic structures without equitable representation. The civil war in Liberia caused population displacement, and in the absence of accurate data and census, the old system of single-member multiple constituencies was replaced with a proportional system with a single national constituency. As a result, some number of refugees, ethnic groups, and ex-combatants were excluded from the electoral college (Lacy 2004: 1). Thus, many Liberians were disfranchised and could not participate in the election.

Another critique levelled against UNOMIL and other international actors is conducting the electoral process in haste and early elections causing disruptive in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities. Despite several apprehensions from several quarters about the ill-timed elections, UNOMIL and ECOWAS decided to go ahead with the 1997 elections. They lacked resources and struggled to formulate a structured electoral procedure in such a short duration (Lyons 1998: 231). Liberia was underprepared and not ready to undertake elections. The independent election commission (IECOM) recommended postponing the elections as the registration of almost 1.2 million eligible voters was incomplete, and polling stations were not functional in every quarter (Waugh 2011: 239). Apprehensive of losing power, Taylor lobbied with ECOWAS and UNOMIL and succeeded in sticking to the pre-determined election schedule despite serious concerns of international observers over resources and manpower to conduct fair elections. Most of the voters did not elect Taylor by choice, but due to lack of confidence in UN-led democratization measures and the fear that loss in elections might instigate him to restart another brutal cycle of violence. With ineffective democratization, haste elections, weak institutionalization, and statements from ECOWAS and UNOMIL stating its intention to leave quickly after the elections, voters could not have risked electing anyone other than Taylor (Lyons 1998: 233).

The first phase of democratization in Liberia clearly indicates that the mechanisms for democratization were not planned according to the context and led to counterproductive results. Through the hasty democratization process, Taylor could turn his guerrilla group – National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), into the National Patriotic Party (NPP), and legally won a majority in the elections and came to power. After forming the government, Taylor returned to violent and dictatorial measures in governing the country. Thus, instead of putting an end to the civil war, elections under

UN supervision and power-sharing arrangements institutionalized the rule of a warlord through democratic means and legitimized Taylor's position as head of the state (Kovacs 2008: 152).

Another major cause of the ineffective democratization was the dual presence of ECOMOG and UNOMIL which created severe coordination problems. Institutionally and legally, the dynamics of the relationship between ECOMOG and UNOMIL were not specified as they existed as separate parallel bodies without robust coordination. Locals viewed UNOMIL as a subordinate body to ECOMOG exercising minimal influence, and for a substantial time, even UNOMIL did not take proactive steps in formulating policies giving a free hand to the regional organization (Boulden 2013: 203). While UN's partnership with a regional organization in the field of peacebuilding and democratization was seen as an experiment, the resurgence of civil war in Liberia brought out the structural limitations of such an engagement in the process of democratization in the absence of clear-cut division of functions and authority. UNOMIL was relatively a small mission with a limited number of civilian personnel to carry out its democratization mandate. It was dependent on the military support of ECOMOG creating questions about the power of UNOMIL to bring about constructive changes (Kihunah 2005: 126).

Second Phase of Civil War and Democratization

By the late 1990s, it was widely believed that Taylor was supporting and arming the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and instigating the civil war in Sierra Leone (Dennis 2006: 5). Taylor's involvement with the rebel fighters in Sierra Leone, instability in West Africa, and illegal export of diamonds irked the US government and curtailing Taylor's agenda became one of its top priority (Waugh 2011: 261). As a result, despite visible dissent from Russia, France, and China, a US-sponsored resolution was passed by the UN Security Council in 2001 putting sanctions on Liberia. The UN resolution imposed a ban on arms supplies, put an embargo on the export of diamonds from Liberia and a travel ban on Taylor and 130 other officials (Waugh 2011: 264).

Domestically, the second phase of the Civil War that began in 1999 was primarily fought between two major rebel armies - the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) operating from its base in Guinea; and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) operating from Cote d'Ivoire. The constant

confrontation between LURD and the state forces led to the collapse of the security sector in the countryside and by 2002 LURD controlled over 80% of the countryside while Taylor could just retain the control of capital Monrovia (Dennis 2006: 5). The resurgent civil war in Liberia soon engulfed Sierra Leone and parts of Guinea followed by a constitutional crisis in 2002 in Cote d' Ivoire, destabilizing the entire region with rampant incidents of loot and mercenaries openly moving around in the countryside (Waugh 2011: 266). The regional actors found themselves incapable and lacking resources to resolve the escalating armed conflict. Further, the UN sanctions halted Taylor's ability to hit back at the rebels and totally crumpled the Liberian economy causing civilian unrest (Waugh 2011: 267). Even on ethical grounds, the Liberian conflict was emerging as a cause of international concern owing to the brutality carried out by state forces on the civilians. Another striking aspect of the Liberian Conflict was the indiscriminate use of child soldiers by all sides that was not only endemic but an attack on basic human rights (Kelly 2009). Thus, it was when the civil war had transcended borders and took a bloody turn that it became necessary for the UN to undertake effective measures to resolve the conflict and stabilise the region. As Kofi Annan, the Secretary General states:

> "… (in Liberia) *the main aim, to an alarming degree, is the destruction not of armies but of civilians and entire ethnic groups. Preventing such wars is no longer a question of defending states or protecting allies. It is a question of defending humanity itself…*" (Shawcross 2000: 252).

Apart from the sanctions imposed on Liberia, the United Nations-sponsored Special Court for Sierra Leone established in 2002 amassed witnesses and evidence against Taylor and closed in on his indictment by finding him guilty of seventeen counts of war crimes (Waugh 2011: 270). With a warrant against Taylor, the collapse of Liberian economic, and LURD forces breaching the border of capital Monrovia creating a catastrophe. Under severe international pressure, Taylor accepted political asylum in Nigeria and announced to resign from the presidency by handing over the reins to vice president Moses Blah. After peace talks brokered by ECOWAS, Taylor's government signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003 and formally marked the end of Liberian Civil War.

Learning from the limitations of UNOMIL and ECOMOG in establishing peace, the United Nations took over complete control of peacekeeping from ECOWAS and United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established as a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was set up in September 2003 with deployment of 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including 250 military observers, 160 staff officers, and almost 1,115 UN police officers, for maintaining law and order with an initial mission mandate of 12 months. Following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report (2000), UNMIL was the first of UN's multidimensional and complex peace operations with significant democratization and civilian component. Institutional reform, democracy building, election oversight, and economic reconstruction were important policies that UNMIL aimed to undertake for successful peacebuilding (Fortna 2004: 270). The UN Security Council mandated UNMIL –

> "…*to assist the transitional Government, in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners, in re-establishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels… to assist the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions… to assist the transitional government, in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners, in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than the end of 2005…*" (UN Document 2003).

UNMIL had a yearly review of the mandates where the past performance was accessed, and the mandate was extended according to the existing circumstances. For instance, with regard to democratization, Security Council Resolution 1561 (2004) stated that it -

> "… *decides to extend the mandate of UNMIL until 19 September 2005… Calls on all Liberian parties to demonstrate their full commitment to the peace process and to work together to ensure that free, fair and transparent elections take place as planned no later than October 2005… Requests the Secretary-General through his Special Representative to continue to report periodically to the Council on*

UNMIL's progress on the implementation of its mandate…" (UN Document 2004).

Acting on the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, UNMIL was designed based on an 'Integrated Mission Concept' (Finegan 2015: 6). With a pre-mandate commitment and an integrated mission approach, UNMIL was one of the first missions which sought to increase the coordination between military and civilian aspect by actively engaging in building stable democratic institutions (Hull 2008: 6). It was one of the classic cases of multidimensional peace operations where the UN was engaged in multiple activities including disarmament, conflict resolution, security, and democratization among others. Under UNMIL, almost 15,000 troops and 1,100 police were deployed, and hundreds of civilian U.N. employees assisted in Ppost-war reconstruction making it the largest peacekeeping mission in the world (Scharff 2011: 2).

As far as the mechanisms of democratization adopted in Liberia are concerned, one of the significant features of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement as well the UNMIL mandate was that it did not mention a tightly timed schedule for the conduct of elections (Sisk 2009: 215). The UN set a flexible deadline of two years for the conduct of elections that should not be held later than 2005. This can be taken as a lesson learnt from the past experience of hasty election and an early exit. Moreover, neither of the parties to the agreement showcased any desire to bring about drastic changes in the electoral law or the electoral system to be followed. Hence, after a steady preparation, the national and presidential elections were to be held simultaneously for electing a new government without the need for redesigning the existing governance institutions (Sisk 2009: 215). The first presidential elections in Liberia that ended 14 years of gruesome civil war were scheduled to be held in 2005. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement specified the steps to be followed till the conduct of elections including banning the officials of interim government from contesting elections and formulation of a new election commission after the dissolution of any existing electoral bodies (Scharff 2011: 2). With the logistical and institutional support of the UN in formulating an election commission, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Frances Johnson-Morris was elected as the chairwoman of the National Elections Commission of Liberia in 2004. Recruitment for the commission was done through a committee where UNMIL representatives acted in the capacity of an advisory (Scharff 2011: 5). Preparing for

elections in Liberia was a daunting task as after facing civil war for more than a decade, people were apprehensive, the communication, transportation, and voter registration system was in shambles. The biggest contribution of UNMIL in the initial phase was in rebuilding the infrastructure and providing resources for the successful conduct of elections. In a step towards generating an effective public information system to educate the wider population about election schedule and voting rights, UNMIL established its radio station (Scharff 2011: 3). With the training, advice, and support of UNMIL's electoral division, the commission drafted a legal framework for the elections, voter registration, campaign training, a voter education program, and training of polling staff to conduct the elections (The National Democratic Institute Report 2005: 2).

Agencies such as United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical and logistical support to the Liberian election commission and funded more than three-quarters of the total US$18.9 million election budget (Scharff 2011: 5). Few senior UNMIL officials point out that Post War Liberia was in such a broken state that UNMIL's major focus for the first five years was on creating peaceful conditions for the conduct of elections and stabilizing or disarming the rebel force s (Gberie 2016: 2). Hence, UNMIL focused on training the national commission and supervising the electoral process.

After trailing in the first round, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf gained back her edge in the second round by securing 59.4% votes in comparison to opponent George Weah and was elected as Liberia as well as Africa's first female president (Sisk 2009: 216). Under the supervision of international observers and the UNMIL, the elections were conducted peacefully. Liberia showed a positive outcome due to the inclusion of warring parties representing major ethnic groups in electoral competition, and election of popular leader Sirleaf through a fair electoral process was seen as a watershed movement for Liberia (Sisk 2009: 217).

Another striking feature of UNMIL was that even after successful conduct of elections, it did not immediately cease its operations in Liberia. This again is an indication of a lesson learnt from the past experiences of hasty exit leading to negative consequences of the consolidation of democracy. UNMIL followed up with a gradual drawdown of its support and forces from Liberia while providing security and leading

the administration of 2005 as well as of 2011 general and presidential elections (Claes and Borzyskowski 2018). For instance, citing the supportive role of the UNMIL in the forthcoming 2011 presidential and general elections, its mandate was extended for another year by the Security Council in 2011. The United Nations succeeded in controlling the rebel warring factions through stabilization, negotiations, assimilation, and participation in the electorate. This steady virtual disappearance of the rebels and timely elections with a well-planned pre-election strategy proved to be a remarkable aspect of UNMIL that led to positive outcomes in Liberia (Harris 2006: 376-377). The 2011 Report of the Internal Audit Division of United Nations accessing the effectiveness of UNMIL's electoral assistance stated:

> "…*UNMIL's risk management, control and governance processes examined were partially satisfactory to provide reasonable assurance regarding UNMIL's effective implementation of its electoral assistance mandate… UNMIL had established the United Nations system-wide Electoral Task Force and was convening regular meetings. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was using her good offices to consult with major stakeholders in the political process. UNMIL assisted the National Elections Commission (NEC) of Liberia in developing the voter registration logistic plan and security plan for the voter's registration process…*" (UN Document 2011).

However, the UNMIL mandate as well the mechanisms for democratization consisted of several loopholes. The initial mandate of the UNMIL focused excessively on security sector reforms, and the task of rebuilding state institutions was entrusted to the transitional government. The limited engagement of UN gave rise to crippling corruption in newly formed institutions including the UNMIL itself where certain audits highlighted dysfunction from top to bottom and misuse of finances and assets (Gberie 2016: 2).

Another critique pertains to the registration of voters, equitable representation, and representation of internally displaced people. Due to the large-scale migration of people from Liberia during the years of civil war, the voter list excluded almost 150,000 displaced but eligible voters (Harris 2006: 380). While UNMIL has been applauded for providing logistical support to the electoral processes, the 2011 Internal Audit Report points out the implementation gap. According to it, UNMIL failed to establish detail of

its electoral assistance to the Government of Liberia, and therefore the full magnitude of electoral assistance could not be determined. Similarly, the mission established an Election Technical Team and proposed the establishment of a full electoral support capacity but, till April 2011, there was no clear UNMIL plan of action for electoral assistance (UN Document 2011). The lack of planning and implementation led to delay in the rebuilding of structures and mechanisms for democratisation effectively.

Despite repeated UN guidelines emphasising the local ownership, UN followed a top-bottom approach to Democratization that was not conducive to local aspirations. While the government of Liberia is seen as a host and partner of UNMIL but, the mechanisms and decision-making procedures of the international actors are starkly different from that of the domestic political system creating a gap in local ownership (Neumann and Winckler 2013: 620). The mandate of the mission and subsequent statements of the officials have indicated that UNMIL exists in a supportive and subordinate capacity mainly for assisting the national actors. However, even after elections, the informal power of UNMIL and its officials is highly intrusive and significant. It was discovered that UNMIL employees completely took over the domain of their national counterparts and took major administration decisions, advising them to just draft memos (Neumann and Winckler 2013: 620). In other words – "(… In Liberia) *The national government is formally 'in the driver's seat' while the international intervention is quietly 'running the ministries*." (Neumann and Winckler 2013: 621).

UNMIL is also criticised for extending the mission way beyond necessary, leading to the creation of weak local institutions that were dependent on international bodies for the successful conduct of elections. Liberia witnessed underlying ethnic tensions that had the potential to turn into an armed conflict and the UN's democratization policies and following elections have still not succeeded in giving satisfactory representation to ethnic groups. In the wake of Liberia's dependence on the UN, it is feared that UNMIL's exit would give space for the revival of LURD and MODEL rebels and the renewal of the civil conflict.

UNMIL successfully ended its final mandate and shut down its operation on 30th March 2018. Sirleaf, after serving two terms as the President, stepped down peacefully and in the 2017 Presidential elections, George Weah was elected as the new President of Liberia (Wanjiru 2018). The UN considered UNMIL to be a true Peacebuilding

'success' story. Farid Zarif, UNMIL's Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General stated –

> "… *The withdrawal of UNMIL signifies that we are leaving behind a country whose citizens can now enjoy relatively peaceful lives. Liberia has great potential to achieve lasting stability, democracy, and prosperity…*" (UN Document 2018)

Most nations of the world hailed the success of UNMIL in transforming a failed state into a peaceful democratic one. Peaceful conduct of 2005, 2011, and 2017 elections, eventual transfer of power and handing over of the institutions to the national government, and successful containment of the erstwhile rebel factions were the major achievements of UNMIL (Das 2018). Creating conducive conditions for democracy and enhancing political participation of citizens is the crucial objective of UN's democratization activities. In the context of Liberia, even statistical study and collected data suggested that UN's democracy promotion activities had a positive, statistically significant effect on political participation and UN Peacebuilding enhances the prospect of democratic transition in the aftermath of a civil war (Mvukiyehe 2017: 2-3). If we look at the Freedom in the World Report 2018 ranking of Liberia, the country is currently placed under the category of "Partially Free." Liberia showcased enormous strides in the field of electoral processes, political participation, civil liberties, and individual rights. However, Liberia still falls behind, crippling under the burden of corruption, non- implementation of electoral laws, weak state institutions, and lack of the rule of law. Rising level of corruption, land wars and ethnic divide topped with a newly elected government habitual of working under the shadows of UN peace mission presents a challenging picture. Thus, despite major positive outcomes, UNMIL's policies suffered from logistical and policy drawbacks that might negatively impact democratic consolidation in Liberia.

Conclusion

Liberia has a deeply entrenched history of civil war that transcended borders to emerge as an international concern during the 1990s. The United Nations was called upon twice to intervene in order to mitigate conflict and build peace in Liberia. Based on the discussion in the chapter, a comparative analysis between UN's first mission UNOMIL and its second mission UNMIL showcases the latter mission in Liberia did showcase variation in its techniques to democratization and peacebuilding. During UNOMIL, UN

worked in close coordination with ECOWAS and was mainly responsible for overseeing and verification of electoral processes. However, on the contrary, UN mechanisms and electoral planning led to a resurgence of war in Liberia along with the legitimization of a warlord through democratic elections. The early exit, a top down approach, and weak institutionalisation created a feeble political order that collapsed with UN's exit.

However, UNMIL learnt from its prior experience in Liberia and approached democracy promotion differently to avoid a relapse of war. One of the biggest difference between the two operations was the manner and duration of the electoral processes. Initial Post-War electoral processes and elections are crucial for the future of democratization. In Liberia, short-term mentality and lack of a transition driven approach of UNOMIL hindered the building of a viable state structure (Sisk 2009: 217). UNMIL attempted to bridge this gap by carefully planning the election schedule, not rushing through elections, and did not drastically reform the existing electoral laws (Sisk 2009: 216). UNOMIL's focus was conducting elections and immediately departing from the country without any concern for institution building. However, UNMIL adopted a yearly periodic review of its mandate and a gradual withdrawal of its support even after successful conduct of elections. Sustained presence of the UN contributed to the building of local capacities and stable democratic institutions. Involvement of local actors and national ownership of processes as well as institutions was a significant part of UN's approach to democratization.

The actual test of Liberia as a democracy is yet to arrive. After almost 14 years of involvement, UNMIL fulfilled its mandate and departed from Liberia in March 2018. Under the leadership of George Weah, Liberia showcases great potential for emerging as a successful democracy, but if UNMIL was able to consolidate democracy in Liberia is questionable. UNMIL was largely responsible for providing security, technical, and logistical assistance to democratization activities. UN exercised enormous influence for more than a decade, and the departure of the UN forces does not guarantee an equitable, democratic transformation of a deeply divided society. While UNMIL undoubtedly succeeded in building stable democratic structures and processes in Liberia, the survival of democratic structures and success of democratic consolidation in Liberia is yet to be seen.

Hence, Liberia presents a promising picture, with international community applauding the efforts of UNMIL. A newly secure surrounding enabled more than a million internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes. The Government established its authority throughout the country with the help of UN democratization policies, successfully conducted three presidential elections. In the words of George Weah, "In Liberia's Darkest Days, UN stood with them".

CHAPTER 6- CONCLUSION

This research primarily delved into and explained why and how the United Nations carries out democratization in post-conflict states. Through a critical analysis of the role and working of the UN's mandates, norms, guidelines, and mechanisms, this work studies the evolution of these principles over the years and evaluates the overall capability of the UN missions in consolidating democracy in post-conflict states. For a detailed empirical study, Liberia has been taken as the case study.

Unlike the interstate conflict which the United Nation used to address during the Cold War, in the 1990s, as intrastate conflicts emerged as a major threat in the international domain and domestic political systems collapsed. The reconstruction of war-torn states emerged as a major agenda of the United Nations along with conflict resolution. UN has been actively involved in peacebuilding and democracy as a reliable way of building peace in the post-conflict states. The democratic peace theory is often used as the theoretical foundation for democracy promotion in international relations. Chapter 1 elaborates on how the involvement of the UN in democratisation is also based on the theoretical underpinnings of democratic peace theory. The chapter highlights that the rise of liberal democracy, especially after the end of world war led to the expansion of democracy throughout the world. However, the origin of democratic peace can be traced back to the work of Kant who believed in the stability of a pacific union and emphasised that republican states often engage in pacific settlement of disputes. Kant's ideas were furthered by Wilson who propagated that post- war reconstruction should be based on mutual cooperation between liberal states and respect for international law. However, the theory did not find much attention during the cold war, and neither was the democracy a major agenda for the UN.

The second chapter on 'Democratic Peace Theory' highlights a full-fledged revival in the late 1980s and emerged as a major paradigm in the academic discourse. Academics such as Doyle (1986, 1997), Russett and Maoz (1993) through their empirical and qualitative research pointed towards a positive correlation between democracy and peace. The crux of their approach was that democracies rarely fight each other and are often stable in nature due to the inherent strength of democratic norms. The critiques raised genuine concerns over the viability of the democratic peace theory as existing research fell short in creating a direct connection between democracy and peace. In

other words, democracy did not guarantee the creation of peaceful, stable states. Yet, in the post-cold war era, with the triumph of liberal democracy and absence of an alternative, democratic peace theory exercised considerable influence in policy-making despite its shortcomings. This chapter concludes that international organizations, especially the United Nations used democratic peace theory as a theoretical and normative justification for engaging in democracy promotion as democracy was now seen as a significant tool for building peaceful states. Despite its limitations on the institutional and causal front, the hypotheses that democracies are less likely to wage or engage in violent conflict is more or less still a relevant concept. Thus, international organizations, including the United Nations are engaged in democracy promotion in order to build peace in post-conflict states.

The third chapter on "The United Nations and Democratization: Mandates, Norms, and Guidelines" tried to examine how the UN's mandates, norms and guidelines for democratisation have evolved, expanded, and transformed over the years. The chapter firstly points out that the concept of 'democracy' did not find any explicit mention in the UN charter and in the initial decades UN's response to conflicts was based on the principle of 'non-intervention'. UN did not intervene in the domestic matters of the state and accorded high priority to state sovereignty. However, in the post-cold war, due to the rising intensity and number of civil wars in the 1990s, UN was called upon to deal with internal conflicts. Also, with the end of cold war, owning to the influence of western liberal states, the UN actively adopted the ideals of peacebuilding and democracy promotion. Democratization was considered as a significant tool for post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding in post conflict states and UN was considered an adequate actor for democratization. Hence, democracy promotion emerged a major part of its peacebuilding operations, based on the idea that democracy would build peace. Documents such an Agenda for Peace (1992) and An Agenda for Democratization (1996) laid out the normative groundwork for UN's official engagement in democratization.

Democratization featured prominently in UN's peace mandates during the 1990's. However, during a thorough study of UN mandates during the course of this research, it was observed that UN mandates for democratisation, especially missions formulated after the Brahimi Report (2000) have extensive and well-defined mandates for

democratisation in comparison to its earlier operations. During the early 1990s mandates for democratisation were narrow, limited, and vague in language often restricted to verification and observation of elections in a limited time frame. In the recent missions, the mandates for democratisation were observed to be well defined, expansive, with a provision for yearly reconsideration in certain cases such as Liberia and a wide variety of functions to be performed by the UN.

Documents such as the Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on Democracy 2009, defined the various norms and guidelines that shape UN's engagement in the democratisation of post-conflict states. Through studying various UN reports and documents, it was deduced that consent of states, non-use of force, local ownership, and capacity building were few of the major norms that UN adopted for promoting democracy. However, most of the cases in the 1990's showcased a serious limitation in the planning and implementation of these norms by the UN missions. The norm of doing no harm and non-use of force was flouted as in the majority of the states, such as in Cambodia, UN adopted a top-down approach where the UN staff exercised unprecedented power over decision making and political institutions. As Billerback (2012:333) rightly summarises that while the democratization policies involved local actors, the control was in the hands of international actors making the locals dependent on them. This led to political violence and created further divide into the states. Moreover, the earlier UN missions adopted a quick and dirty approach to democratization. In states such as Angola, elections were held quickly without any proper planning for the building of infrastructure or local capacity and UN exited the country quickly post elections that led to a renewal of violence and failure of state machinery. It was also observed that the UN did not invest in building local institutions and was engaged in post- conflict states for a limited duration. The early exit of the UN missions did little to consolidate state apparatus in war- torn states. All in all, the initial UN missions could not implement the norms properly and more so it i's approach was flawed. As a result, the majority of the UN missions in the 1990s failed in consolidating democracy as violence resurfaced in these post- conflict states as soon as UN exited.

However, it is also observed in the chapter that the norms and guidelines of the UN have also evolved over time as the failure of missions in the early 1990s in consolidating democracy led to the redrafting of guidelines for UN missions in recent decades. UN

has shifted its focus to norms such as capacity building, local ownership, and long-term engagement. Learning from its past experiences and subsequent criticism, the later UN missions such as in Liberia and Afghanistan formulated policies in synchronisation with the norms and guidelines for democracy promotion, especially concerning the engagement of locals and national ownership of political processes. Hence, UN's democratization policies in the recent decades are based on local ownership of institutions, adequate capacity building, planned exit strategy, the presence of UN assistance till the time the state is ready to take up ownership of its domestic political institutions, followed by steady with-drawl of logistical support.

The expanding mandates, UN guidelines and norms for democratisation would be ineffective without operationalisation of effective mechanisms and tools to carry out democratisation and knowing the operational challenges in the field. The fourth chapter on "The United Nations and Democratization: Mechanisms and Operations" tries to discuss these matters. It has critically analysis the UN mechanisms for democratization such as constitution- making, development of political parties, and electoral assistance. UN is a primary actor in the field of democracy promotion with the technical know-how and resources that are capable of building democratic structures from scratch in a state emerging out of the conflict. The chapter clarifies that the UN engages in democratization majorly through constitutional assistance, development of political parties, and electoral assistance. On the positive side, the UN performs a significant role in providing technical assistance, forming drafting commissions, training the political staff, and involving all the major stakeholders in the constitution drafting process. It also assists in deciding the design and time frame of the drafting process. Major goals of UN's constitutional assistance pertained to seizing the opportunity for peace-building, encouraging compliance with international norms and standards, ensuring national ownership, supporting inclusivity, participation and transparency, mobilising and coordinating a wide range of experts on the constitution, and adequate follow-up. Table on constitutional assistance in in the chapter brings out that till date UN has provided constitutional assistance in 30 countries. As states emerging out of conflict lacked the resources and know how to formulate the constitutions, hence the UN had a major role to play.

However, it was also observed during the research that initial UN attempts at constitution making created weak outcomes and non-inclusive constitutions, that crumpled after UN's exit such as in the case of Bosnia and Cambodia. UN often imposed its own ideas for defining the basic tenets with no participation from locals, that led to non-compliance with the final document and collapse of the constitution. However, overall, UN's assistance has been significant in the making of constitutions in post-conflict states. Hence, learning from it pitfalls, the recent operations have attempted to adopt an inclusive and nationally owned approach to constitution making. For instance, it was also observed that lately, the UN does not necessarily adopt a rigid and linear process of constitutional assistance. Afghanistan emerged as one of the contemporary examples where the UN adopted a skeletal or vague framework for building the constitution rather than following stringent guidelines to allow flexibility and the process was owned nationally. Thus, the UN now tries to engage in constitution making by ensuring a greater role for national actors and compliance with international norms.

This second section of the chapter discusses the role of the UN in developing political parties in post- conflict states. Research work points out that UN is involved in developing three major kinds of parties in post- conflict states - political parties that already existed before the war, political parties that emerged out of former warring factions, rebel groups or militias, and political parties that were established in the post-conflict era. This chapter extensively discusses the ways UN supports the formation of political parties in post- conflict states. In the case of already existing political parties, UN majorly provides logistical, organisational, and technical support to help them with setting up proper channels. In the case where the political parties need to build from scratch as warring groups transform themselves into political factions, the UN plays a significant role as it acts as the mediator that brings the warring factions to the negotiation table. It provides technical and financial assistance for the disarmament of ex-combatants and paves the way for their reintegration into the mainstream political spectrum as was observed in Burundi, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique. UN also provides financial assistance to former warring groups to assist them in converting into political parties. UN also provides logistical assistance to the rebel factions such as providing office equipment to opposition parties and rebel groups in East Timor and El Salvador. UN makes it a point to ensure participation of all major parties, including the

newly formed political parties or former warring factions at the negotiation table and within its assistance programmes.

However, UN's policies suffer from a major loophole as its attempts at supporting political parties has led to the legitimisation of war lords into tangible political groups. Moreover, in the process it often ignores the major stakeholders that lead to domination and formation of the party by ruling elites who exercise the capability to represent themselves, creating a political divide. UN's shortcoming at being inclusive and putting war lords at the helm of governance in certain post- conflict states has created a negative impact on democratization leading to the setting of dictatorial regimes post its exit.

It is a widely accepted fact that elections are the stepping stone for choosing a democratic government, more so for a post- conflict state looking at democratic transition. Electoral assistance is one of the major tasks performed by the UN under its democratization agenda. As far as the role of the UN in providing electoral support is concerned, it was observed that the UN provides extensive electoral support in post-conflict states covering various aspects of elections. Usually tasked with conduct and organization of elections, UN's electoral assistance includes tasks such as voter education, drawing of voter lists, advising in the drafting of the necessary electoral legislation, organizing the tabulation of the votes, designing the electoral schedule, technical assistance, logistical support, expert panels, operational support to international observers, support to creating a conducive environment, and verification of elections among other things. All in all, the UN often runs the entire electoral machinery in post- conflict states.

However, this chapter concludes that UN-led electoral processes or elections led to instability and renewal of violence in certain post-conflict states. Majorly, flaws in the electoral design implemented by the UN and ill-conceived timing of elections emerged as the striking reasons for the failure of elections and proved to be a major setback for the UN missions. Like all other mechanisms, gaping holes were seen in the planning and implementation of the electoral process. It was observed that mostly during its operations in the 1990s in Liberia, Cambodia, Burundi, and Angola, after a minimal level of demobilisation was achieved and basic infrastructure was put in place, the UN ushered in and conducted quick elections within a year or two of its involvement. Due to the undemocratic nature and ill planning, mostly the ruling elites exercised an

advantage and used elections to form the government legitimately. That aggravated existing hostilities and often led to a renewal of violence, in certain cases like Angola, elections led to fresh political violence. This top-down and liberal approach to elections aggravated the divisions in the post-conflict states and post- UN's exit led to the breakdown of democracy such as in Cambodia. Various cases highlighted in the chapter point towards loopholes in the UN's electoral design and exit strategy that led to weak institutionalisation in post- conflict states. UN- led elections due to their flawed conduct and implementation led to the winning of elections by elites or autocratic rulers. However, the recent missions have attempted to rework on its approach towards elections. Examples showcased that elections are now conducted after setting up of concrete democratic institutions, probably in 2 to 5 years of the start of UN mission, and focus is drawn towards voter education and participation to ensure greater local engagement.

Thus, this chapter in its last section brings out serious concerns over UN's ability in building durable democracy. While the mechanisms are significant in culminating the process of democratic transition, they often end up creating half-baked results. UN has had a mixed record on account of consolidating democracy in post- conflict states. Majority of the states which were supported by UN's democratization policies could not sustain as democracies after it i's exit. The last section of this chapter uses 'Freedom House' rankings to supplement that argument. Using freedom in the world ranking of states where the UN was involved in democratization through its peace missions, it evaluates the performance of UN missions in promoting democracy. Analysis of the data showcased that UN missions are significant for a democratic transition of post-conflict states, but UN mechanisms for democratization have witnessed limited success in consolidating democracy in post- conflict states. Majority of the states where UN intervened rank low on democratic parameters and a breakdown of democratic structures was witnessed with UN's exit with the state spiralling back to violence.

To add an empirical element to this study, the case-study of Liberia has been taken in the fifth chapter on "Democratization in Liberia". Among all the cases, Liberia has been taken because the state has witnessed UN's involvement in democratization two times, in different spans of time, and UN policies have had a significant impact on democracy in Liberia. It exists as an adequate case to observe and study the working and evolution

of UN's approach to democratization over the years. This chapter showcases how the mandates, norms, guidelines, and mechanisms for democratization worked and performed in Liberia. It starts with tracing of the historical background and origin of the civil war in Liberia. It highlights the inherent divide between settlers, the Americo-Liberians, who exercised political control and the native population. During the 1980s, ethnic divide combined with large- scale corruption and economic distress led to the first Liberian civil war causing the massacre of common citizens. UNOMIL was established in 1993 in response to the threat caused by civil war and was the UN's first engagement in Liberia. UNMOIL worked in close coordination with ECOWAS and was tasked with overseeing the implementation of peace accords and conduct of general elections. UNOMIL deployed medium- term electoral observers, and the observer teams carried out the voter registration process and observed the political campaign. UNOMIL provided incremental technical and logistical support for the conduct of elections. UNOMIL was declared a success and it exited from Liberia.

However, the exit of the UN- led to a relapse of conflict in Liberia and the start of the second civil war. It was observed that faults in the electoral design and lacklustre implementation of electoral laws gave an undue advantage to Taylor who turned Liberia into an autocratic state as soon as UN departed. Even though UN adjudged the electoral process to be fair and free from coercion and discrepancies, but the ground realities hinted towards loopholes is the UN's conduct and running of elections. UNOMIL's democratization policies did not build effective and representative democratic structures and its early exit failed to consolidate democracy in Liberia.

With the resurgence of war, UN again intervened in Liberia in 2003 through UNMIL. However, this time around the UN learnt its lessons and adopted a varied form of democratization policies. UN was engaged in Liberia for almost 15 years, with a slow and structured designing of institutions and a well-planned exit strategy. The mandate of the UNMIL was reviewed on a yearly basis marking a change from UN's earlier policy of narrow and rigid mandates. Local ownership and institutional building stretching over a long period of time were the key features of UNMIL's engagement in Liberia. UNMIL focussed on firstly rebuilding the infrastructure and providing resources to enable the successful conduct of elections. First elections were conducted two years after the establishment of UNMIL. An effective public information system

was used to educate the wider population about election schedule and voting rights. With the support of UNMIL's electoral division, a legal framework for the elections, voter registration, campaign training, a voter education program, and training of polling staff to conduct the elections were put in place. Thus, during its second mission UN definitely adopted a more refined and expansive approach with an attempt to work on the drawbacks of its previous missions that had caused the collapse of democracy post elections.

As far as the hypotheses are concerned, the first hypothesis is "The ineffective building of local capacities for democratization leads to relapse of political instability in post-conflict states". This has been substantiated in parts of Chapter 4 dealing with operational aspects and partly while discussing the performance of UNOMIL, during the first phase of the UN involvement in Liberia crisis. Capacity building is one of the most significant norms of the UN democratization in post- conflict states, as the eventual aim of UN is to establish democracy and transfer the power to elected locals, and it requires the building of democratic institutions and capacities. However, lack of adequate capacity building has been one of the major limitations that negatively impacted consolidation of democracy. It has proved that top-down approach to implementing them combined with the hurry to wrap up the UN missions as soon as the elections were conducted is the major factor in lack of capacity building. UN did not pay attention to or invest in building institutions that would sustain even after its exit. Further, locals and national stakeholders were excluded from exercises such as constitution drafting, that led to the creation of weak, unrepresentative, and unstable domestic institutions as seen in the case of Cambodia and Bosnia. In the absence of a capacity building, the local staff was left clueless after the UN's exit as to how to conduct elections or implement the constitution, and that led to the crumpling of political machinery. The recent mission in Liberia, Afghanistan, and Haiti where UN has paid attention and devoted time towards the construction of strong local institutions and training of local staff, they showcase better chances of handling and heading the democratic set up even after the end of UN missions. Hence, the ineffective building of local capacities for democratization does lead to a relapse of political instability in post-conflict states and missions conducted in the 1990s provide a coherent proof of the same.

The second hypotheses – "The early exit of the UN missions causes autocratic takeover of the government in post-conflict states" has also been substantiated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this thesis. Setting up of democratic structures is a long drawn out process. Especially in the case of states emerging out of conflict, the erstwhile war lords and elites often use elections to legitimise their power. The exit of the UN missions after elections before the setting up of concrete structures provides a free hand to the leaders who often do not comply with democratic ideals and turn into dictatorial leaders. Liberia presents a perfect case where Charles Taylor, who was a former war lord gained power through institutional channels. As soon as UN exited after declaring elections a success, Taylor shifted to his old autocratic policies and democracy in the state was compromised. While the counter- argument states that countries such as Mozambique continue to be a democracy even after a very short engagement with the UN mission. However, in the divided post- conflict states with warring factions as part of the political competition, early UN exit creates vulnerable circumstances. All these chapters have also showcased that long-term commitment of the UN missions increases the chances of democratic consolidation. Various cases of the early 1990s, such as Angola, Cambodia, and Liberia proved that haste elections and early exit of the UN missions immediately after the electoral process led to the concentration of power in the hands of an autocratic ruler. In a hurry to conduct elections and exit, the UN flouted the electoral laws, did not invest in building political institutions and elite contenders exercised tremendous influence. This led to the legitimisation of warring factions and posted the UN's exit, autocratic takeover by the leaders defeating the attempt of building a stable democracy. While UN has attempted to include the provisions of long-term commitment and enhanced local ownership in its democratization policies, and the hypothesis might be modified in future research. However, the study of the current and past operations of the UN substantiates both the hypotheses.

Variety of literature exists on democracy promotion, conflict resolution, and assessment of UN operations in various post- conflict states. Studies have analysed UN's intent and performance at promoting democracy in general and in specific cases. However, no comprehensive study has focused on the working of UN norms and mechanisms for democratization. Thus, by analysing the working of UN mandates, norms, guidelines, and mechanisms for democratization and accessing their evolution over the years, this study has attempted to fill the existing literature gap. By tracing the evolution, working,

limitations, and change in norms and mechanisms for democratization over the years, this research work has tried to add to the existing literature. Through a thorough case study of Liberia, the thesis has drawn a comparative analysis of the earlier policies of the UN, lessons learnt, and eventual transformation in its approach in recent missions.

The research questions have also been answered in various chapters. The first research question: Why does the United Nations carry out democratization in post-conflict states? This has been addressed in the second chapter, which explains the reasons behind UN's engagement in democratisation through the theoretical lens of the democratic peace theory. The second research question: How have UN missions mandate for democratization expanded over the years? The third chapter addresses this research question. This chapter seeks to analyse how UN mandates for democratisation evolved over the years. Using data from the UN peacekeeping website, this chapter answers the second research question and traces the evolution of democratization mandates and also give the evolution of mandates as shown in in the Table 3.1. The third research question: How did the various norms and guidelines for democratization in post-conflict states evolve? The third chapter also addresses this research question. It traced the evolution of various norms and guidelines for democratization. The major conclusion drawn was that the UN faced several glitches in adequately implementing the norms and guidelines for democratization that led to an eventual restructuring of norms and guidelines for democratization. The fourth chapter addresses the fourth, fifth, and sixth research questions. They are: Why do elections under the supervision of the United Nations lead to a resurgence of hostilities in post-conflict states? How does the UN support formation of political parties in post-conflict states? What are the challenges faced by the United Nations in consolidating democracy in Liberia? The chapter extensively discusses UN's role in supporting constitution making and development of political parties. It critically discusses how UN in engaged in both. It also answers why UN-led elections led to a resurgence of violence in post-conflict states. Chapter 5 addresses the seventh research question as to the challenges faced by the UN in consolidating democracy in Liberia. The major conclusion drawn from the study is that Liberia has a better chance at emerging as a stable democracy after the conclusion of UN's latest mission in Liberia owning to the changes made in its approach after learning lessons from its past failures.

It could be safely concluded that the United Nations was and continues to be a significant actor in providing democratic assistance to post-conflict states. In the absence of other alternatives, democracy exists as a viable governing system and UN as a suitable actor for democratization in post- conflict states. Based on the argument of democratic peace thesis that talks of a positive correlation between democracy and peace, UN continues to use it a theoretical defence and engages itself in democracy promotion, despite many criticisms. Especially in post- conflict states, democratization continues to exist as a major part of UN mission mandates. Through, learning from its past experiences, the UN mandates, norms, and guidelines have evolved and expanded over the years. Similarly, the UN mechanisms for democratization such as constitution making, development of political parties, and electoral assistance are significant for democratization, but they suffer from ineffective designing of policies and major implementation gaps. Despite a strong focus on the norm of local ownership, UN still is excessively centralised and adopts a top-down approach that imposes liberal ideals and creates weak local institutions in some of the cases.

As observed in the case of Liberia, the UN learnt significant lessons from the experience of democratisation from the experiences of UNOMIL and made significant changes in its approach and programmes, the democratic structures in Liberia still needs to pass the test of surviving after the exit of UN mission in March 2018. While the chances of revival of civil war are less, the political polarisation leaves scope for unrest. Nevertheless, Liberia definitely has a strong shot at emerging as a stable democratic state and the transformed policies employed by the UN in Liberia can serve as a benchmark for future operations.

Thus, the significance of the United Nations in promoting democracy cannot be ignored. Post- conflict states lack even the foundational capacity and resources to formulate a democratic government. UN missions play a major role in laying the foundation of democracy in states emerging out of the war especially in providing technical and logistical support. Few years down the line, like other recent operations of the UN will come to a close, the researchers in the near future can delve further and provide a thorough comparative and performance analysis of the transformed UN's policies aimed at democracy promotion and its ability at consolidating democratic in the post-conflict states. Definitely, the UN as a promoter of democratisation in the post-conflict

states is here to stay in the future as well until a better alternative to stable democratisation is found.

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