# Globalization and Contestation in Asian Cities: A Comparative Study of the Political Geography of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "**Globalization and Contestation in Asian Cities: A Comparative Study of the Political Geography of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

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Chapter One

<u>Introduction</u>

1.1   Background:

Global processes actualise in particular places and within certain formal provisions, mostly positioned in urban areas. Global processes have both fixity and mobility and so global/globalising cities are strategic points for the coordination of the global economy as a unit (Sassen 2000; 2001; 2003). This has led to a restructuring of urban spaces in the North as well as the South. In the South the features of poverty coexist with ever-increasing numbers of enclaves of global consumption, aesthetics and production.

Although other forms have occurred historically, and different manner of globalisation is conceivable for the present, yet it exists in reality today, as "a combination of new technology, increased trade and mobility, increased concentration of economic control, and reduced welfare-oriented regulatory action of nation states" (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000a: 5). This has intersected with an increasingly Asia centric progression of urbanization (UNDP 2014). The central focus of state economic and social intervention has changed from balanced regional development of the national economy to concentrating on the development of cities as competitive spaces within the global economy, with the consequent pre-eminence of the entrepreneurial city (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999). Cities must function as engines of economic growth by continuing to attract investment. This is to be achieved through efficient urban management, decentralization of local governance, deregulation of urban land and housing markets and improving local body finances by recovering costs of infrastructure and services. By maximizing the spatial efficiency of production, cities will automatically deliver equitable and inclusive growth, and alleviate poverty. To keep cities inclusive the World Bank recommends poverty reduction and slum upgradation strategies (World Bank 2009).   However, the problem with such policies is that it seeks development within existing global, national and local power structures, which is both asymmetrical and represses true bottom-up, participatory, inclusive and sustainable development (Mahadevia 2001).

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City governments are often forced to be innovative and take the entrepreneurial approach to promote local growth, as mobility of capital leads to a competition for investment. In developing countries, state policies for reducing inequalities are necessary. Instead state policies in their drive towards rapid global economic integration, deliberately or inadvertently strengthening the process of exclusion and displacement of local populations through discriminatory programs to improve urban liveability or by embarking on a process of privatization. City plans prioritise business and most of the limited resources of urban governments are diverted to that end (Mahadevia 2003). The centrality of urban locations in global processes has led to new transnational economic and political entitlements to urban spaces by different groups. This includes both the transnational capitalist class as well as local poor populations who need cities as a space to live in (UNCHS 2001). The urban space is characterised by segmentation and contestation, an integral component of the contemporary political geography of the cities. In the struggle between competing groups to define space, success depends on the group's access to resources and decision makers.

The disillusionment with both the public and private sector to conduct development schemes in a manner so that they may lead to equitable distribution of wealth; and the increasing exclusion of marginalised groups at the local level from the decision-making processes have led to the emergence of new forms insurgent citizenship (Holston 2008; 2009). The dominant organizational form of anti-corporate globalization movements is of decentralized, flexible local/ global networks often connected to trans-local networks of political solidarity and consciousness (McFarlane 2009; Routledge 2003). Such a form of contestation, associated with globalized of networks of resistance could be the herald of a counter-hegemonic globalisation (Evans 2000).

In order to understand the interplay of the forces of neoliberal globalisation and its contestation in the evolution of urban spatial structures, the political geography of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila are compared following within case analysis. These cases have been selected as they have parallels in their spatial structure, conforming to the findings of other studies of globalising cities of the South (Roy and Ong 2011; Saglio-Yatzimirsky and Landy 2013; Banerjee-Guha 2010; Mahadevia 2008). All three cities selected are national capitals and mega-urban regions with fast growing huge populations. They exhibit similar segmented and polarised social landscapes. Within

the global economy they are all ranked as transitional cities in rising economies (Savitch 2002). At the same time, they exhibit a hybridisation and distinctiveness, an outcome of their unique historical, social, political and economic contexts, which make such a comparative study meaningful.

1.2 Review of literature:

1.2.1 Globalisation.

Two viewpoints draw attention to the fundamental spatio-temporal characteristics of globalisation. David Harvey (1989) conceptualises globalisation as "time space compression", which means that with the acceleration of economic and social processes globally have reduced the spatial dimensions of the earth in human consciousness; as a result, the organisation of human activity is no longer hindered by time and space. Thus, the forces of technological and economic change have collapsed time and space, resulting in the annihilation of space by time or the reorganisation of time in such a way to overcome the barriers of space (Harvey 1989). Anthony Giddens (1990) is more concerned with the spreading out of social interaction transversely across space, which he calls "time space distanciation", which refers to conditions under which time and space are organised to connect presence and absence. For Giddens, globalisation is the intensification of worldwide social relations, thus linking distant localities, such that events occurring miles away shape local happenings and vice versa. Social life consists of firstly frontal contact, when people engage directly with each other as they go about their normal lives in closely circumscribed local spaces. Secondly, it also consists of more distant encounters made possible by transport and communication systems that people participate across space and time. With the advent of modernity, the second type of social interaction has become more significant. It has liberated social relations from local frameworks of interaction and readjusted them across broad extents of time and space. This however does not mean that place or locale has stopped being of significance in daily life. However, as social interactions increase across time and space, localities the world over are becoming less reliant on events of face-to-face interaction and more on exchanges over distances (Giddens 1990). Globalisation can be said to be to be characterised by a speeding up of somewhat regularised (as opposed to haphazard and sporadic) flows of capital, goods, images and ideas across borders, given the

development of worldwide modes of transport and communication. The expansion of social, cultural, political, and economic ties transversely across borders makes possible action at a distance. So that while every one's local lives continue to exist, their phenomenal worlds are rapidly becoming global as distant happenings come to have an effect on local spaces, and local developments have global ramifications, thus it implies an increased entanglement of the global with the local (Held et al. 1999). However, such time space distanciation has not taken place evenly across the world. Places are unequally integrated into global processes. Some are left out altogether while others are thoroughly assimilated within it. Within nation states, some populations like those employed in the financial sector have become deeply embedded within global networks, while others like the urban homeless are completely excluded, though affected by them. Even at the level of the neighbourhood, some households may be much more globalised than others (McGrew 1996).

For many the post - Cold War scenario characterised by growing economic globalization and deterritorialising consequences of information technologies seem to have led to a borderless, deterritorialised world and the end of geography (O'Brien 1991). However in the post – modern condition space has not become irrelevant, but reterritorialised in a way very different from that, which characterised the era of high modernity. Although spatially restricted worlds to a certain extent have broken down, yet the very creation of lived spaces may generate conflict where there are competing visions of a place and 'territoriality is thus reinscribed at just the point it threatens to be erased' (Gupta and Ferguson 2002: 70). Further, the 'production of neighbourhoods (is) inherently colonising' as it requires 'the assertion of socially organised power over places and settings that are viewed as potentially chaotic and rebellious' (Appadurai 2003:53).

The hallmark of transition to a post-Fordist system has been a switch to a flexible model of production, which has led to a decentralisation of production functions, an individualisation of work and flexible labour relations. It is also a changeover to an informational economy with a proliferation of new technologies of information and communication. According to Borja and Castells (1997), in such an economy, increases in productivity do not depend on quantitative increases in the factors of production, but rather on the application of knowledge and information in management, production, distribution of both goods and services. These changes have

made employment insecure, undermined the Welfare State and have made the fate of trade unions uncertain. In developing countries, the pre-existing forms of local overexploitation carry on together with new technology enabled modern production networks, which are primed to global competition. Capital is global, labour is local. Thus, speaking in terms of the spatial political economy, it turns out to be a system in which creation of value and intense consumption is concentrated in places and segments that are connected throughout the world. While for other broad segments of the population, it has simply been a transition from exploitation to structural irrelevance (Borja and Castells 1997).

McGrew (2000) classifies three perspectives on globalisation: neoliberal, radical and transformationalist. For McGrew, *neoliberal* globalists depend disproportionately on economic aspects of globalisation, celebrating the rise of a common global market, hegemony of the dogma of free trade and global competition in the aftermath of the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the rise of a unipolar world order. According to this position, binaries like the North and the South are becoming increasingly immaterial. The *radical* viewpoint adheres to the ideas of the Dependency School that the global economy has constantly been characterised by inequalities and can be divided into the core and the periphery. In this view point North-South inequalities are actually increasing. According to the *transformationalist* opinion there are complex and dynamic configurations within the global hierarchy, and there are qualitatively different global divisions of labour, in which the order is not only global but also increasingly social (McGrew 2000).

Neoliberalism is a vaguely defined catchall term that apart from celebrating free markets and economic globalisation, is characterised by its advocacy of the reduction of state intervention in economic and public affairs, privatization and deregulation, and unfettered access of global capital to domestic markets and domestically produced public services. The removal of institutional impediments to marketization and greater commodification has led to the proliferation of the unorganised sector and weakening of hard-earned rights of workers. Neoliberal globalisation is also characterised by: the destruction of the welfare state and collective responsibility; flexible production, wages and working conditions; and the decline of collective bargaining systems and individualised work contracts. Pensions are reduced, retirement age raised, and private pension funds are imposed upon workers. However, while deregulation and privatisation occur at a great pace,

contradictory to the ideology of neoliberalism, state intervention does not go away, but instead transmogrifies into new forms of governance suited to a market driven globalising economy (Peck et al. 2002; 2009; Banerjee-Guha 2010). The (neoliberal) state creates the legal framework for such flexibility in wages and working times and thereby an enduring condition of unstable wage and living conditions and exploitation of work contracts. The state provides assistance and subsidies for large corporations in an institutionalised manner and tries to encourage entrepreneurial thinking. It tries to facilitate capital investment and technological evolution through research and development via funding and institutional support (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016). Critics of neoliberal policies, articulate that neoliberal policies steer the development of the economy in a way that enables the growth of profits by "minimising the cost of investment, reducing social security, and preaching individualism" With the ascendancy of neoliberal logic, society is increasingly pervaded by "the logic of commodities and accumulating finance capital" (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016).

For Arjun Appadurai (1996) the 'global cultural economy' is a 'complex, overlapping and disjunctive order'. The intricate nature of the global cultural economy could be explained in terms of the disjunctions between the economic, cultural and political aspects, which he terms as 'ethnoscapes', 'mediascapes', 'technoscapes', 'financescapes' and 'ideoscapes'. He extends Benedict Anderson's concept of 'imagined communities' or the 'imagined worlds' or the socially constructed worlds of the different communities and individuals, the building blocks of which are the above-mentioned landscapes. The world we inhabit includes many who live in such imagined worlds and communities and sometimes confront the imaginary worlds of the relevant official view. Ethnoscapes are the landscapes of mobile people within the global system including tourists, emigrants, exiles, refugees, expatriate personnel, all of whom have the potential to influence international relations to a level which was unprecedented up till now. Technoscapes are landscapes of mobile technology, moving at high speed of national boundaries, organised by multinational companies and/or governments. Financescapes are the mysterious landscapes of global capital associated with currency markets, equity markets, commodity markets and property markets. Mediascapes are image-centred landscapes offering narrative accounts of human lives and places within the global system through print and electronic - media. Such narratives blur the real and the fictional in the construction of imaginative and idealised commodities, peoples and

places. Ideoscapes are directly political which may be ideologies of states or counter-ideologies of movements having the aim of capturing state power or a part of it.

1.2.2 *Global cities.*

The impact of World Systems Theory and a political – economy approach in the study of world cities was reflected in John Friedmann's paper in 1986. He noted that essence of world cities lay in their connections to the world economy. Similarly connected cities would have underlying similarities despite differences in history, national policies and culture. They were the global command centres because they were the basing points connecting world production and world markets. These leading cities would necessarily have similar divisions of labour (for e.g. large number of professionals in specialized control functions, such as lawyers, computer programmers, and accountants). They were also primary sites for the concentration and accumulation of world capital. Financial and business service concentrations were the most emphasised criteria in the hierarchy of cities. And so, by definition no primary world city could be located in a country that was a part of the periphery. (Abrahamsson 2004)

Saskia Sassen's (2000; 2001) analysis is not rooted in the World Systems theory perspective and proposes that global processes, especially key organisational, managerial, financial and specialised service sector activities are often strategically located on a worldwide grid, which not only cuts across international borders but also across the developed – developing country categories. It combines global dispersal as well as integration of economic activities, which has contributed to certain major cities playing key roles. The major international business and financial centres of New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sydney and Hong Kong are at the topmost level. However, this expanding global network has also incorporated Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mumbai, Bangkok, Taipei and Mexico City. Economic globalisation contains certain dynamics of both mobility and fixity. Within global cities huge concentrations of material facilities and fixed infrastructures makes hyper mobility and time space compression possible. Global cities have vast capacities for controlling hyper mobile dematerialised financial instruments, yet they also have enormous concentration of localised human and material resources that impart to it such capabilities. The internationally oriented financial markets and enterprises of global cities mediate the relationship between, as well as the

relationship of the nation states with the global economy. The hierarchy of local, national and global is challenged. Cities and urban regions, on account of their infrastructures, become "staging posts" in this continuous throughput of money, information and commodities (Graham and Marvin 2001:8).

Global cities may be Mega cities with very large populations above 10 million such as Tokyo, Sao Paulo, New York, Shanghai, Bombay, Mexico City, London, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Delhi, Jakarta etc. They may belong to urban hierarchies characterised by primacy (e.g. London, Tokyo, Jakarta and Manila) or they may belong to a multi-polar urban system (e.g. New York, Los Angeles, Shanghai and New Delhi). They assume the mantle of the nodal centres of information networks, and thus become concentrations of global power (Castells, 2000, Sassen 2000). Often global cities are the formerly major industrial cities that were able to adapt and reinvent themselves in the post-industrial phase (Abrahamsson, 2004; Savitch, 1996). There is no consensus on the cities which should be labelled global cities and attempts to rank order them have shown that the relative positions are not fixed, with new cities being included in the list and others either losing rank or altogether dropping out of the list. Sassen (2000) suggests that there may be only 40 such cities most of which are located on either side of the Atlantic, whereas the Globalisation and World Cities Research Group (GaWC) led by Peter Taylor has recognised 50 world cities and 67 cities that are on the way to becoming true world cities. The latter is based on a *relational* approach that contends that cities should not be defined as nodes that contained within them certain elements, but as nodes through which flows of finance, commodities and people pass (Friedmann 2005).

Cities are not just centres of global capital, but they were themselves also a process. From 1996 to the beginning of the 2000s, most of the academic output on global cities was qualitative in nature, producing 'grounded theory'. This provided the theoretical base of new conceptualization of global urban structure that is the 'inter-locking', rather than hierarchical as originally envisaged in Friedmann's (1986) scheme (Watson and Beaverstock 2014).

According to Castells (2000) the emergent urban form of the global economy and informational society is that of being linked globally, to specific national groups, through certain networks, although being disconnected, physically and socially to local populations who are either "structurally irrelevant" or viewed as socially disruptive. The physical manifestation in the spatial structure of megacities is

segmentation of land use. The "mega cities functional and spatial hierarchies are spatially blurred and mixed, organised in retrenched encampments, and unevenly patched by unexpected pockets of undesirable uses. Mega cities are discontinuous constellations of spatial fragments, functional pieces and social segments" (Castells, 2000: 436). These empirical manifestations can be theoretically explained as the domination of the "space of flows" over the "space of places". The "space of places" is the space of our everyday lived experiences, rooted in place, history and culture; whereas the "space of flows" consists of networks of information technology and global cities located in within national territories. The latter despite being "places", have logically become absorbed in the network. In developing countries new technologies cause the old forms of local over exploitation to be articulated together within modern productive networks geared to global competition (Castells 2000: 436).

1.2.3 Globalisation and urban spatial transformations.

While cities are gradually acquiring the status of competitively driven territories at the global level, at the same time becoming increasingly segregated economically, socially and spatially. Increasing income inequality is considered a concomitant of global city development in some viewpoints due to the presumed effects of changes in the composition of the labour force. There has been a rapid growth in demand for labour force in the two farthest segments within the service sector, the low end (fast food workers, janitors, security guards, drivers, personal or household services etc.) and the high end (computer programmers, financial analysts, consultants, lawyers, accountants, etc.). There is a growing demand for high end services, which in turn generates demand for low end workers; however, this does not translate into higher wages for the latter as there is an abundant supply of workers in this category (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 2000). The emerging distribution of income as well as spatial form of global cities is in the form of an hourglass, where the bloating classes at the top and bottom are referred to as the "citadel" and "ghetto" respectively (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982 in Abrahamsson 2004). According to Borja and Castells (1997) it is not a simple spatial segregation between the rich and the poor, but the urban social structure itself that is created by a contradictory yet dynamic interaction between the opposite ends of the network society. The latter's

processes of capital accumulation, production organisation, market integration, communication and exercise of decision making at the global level causes segregation of the use of metropolitan space that is shared by different occupations, classes and ethnic groups. Intra-metropolitan dichotomy in mega cities of every country is the most visible manifestation of social exclusion processes at work. Contrasting spaces consisting of both highly valued and declining economic activities; social groups producing information and appropriating wealth and excluded and marginalised populations, co-existing without having any interaction between them, sometimes without even seeing each other. Such urban duality is concomitantly accompanied by: (1) housing and urban services shortage (2) growing social inequalities in large cities (3) poverty of the country in general (4) social exclusion and marginalisation as significant segments of the urban population have become structurally irrelevant (Borja and Castells 1997).

Neoliberal urbanism has increasing inequality in income distribution, and displacement of people from the spaces they formerly occupied in the city or have depriving rights of access in the first place. New social landscapes in urban areas is characterised according to Marcuse (1993) by greater homelessness, the growth of gentrification and the role of dispossession and dislodgment as a device of expansion of the middle classes, the growth of territorial allegiances and skirmishes, the responsibility of the government in promoting gentrification, most of which stem from the nature of modern capitalism. Harvey (2010) terms it as "accumulation through dispossession". For Peck and Tickell (2002), the character of neoliberalism has changed from an earlier period of "roll-back neoliberalism" that involved a particular configuration of "deregulation and dismantlement" of government support in the social sector and environmental protection, to a developing period of "roll-out neo-liberalism". This current phase is one of antagonistic intrusions by governments around issues such as crime, policing, welfare reform and urban surveillance with the purpose of penalising and curbing those marginalized or dispossessed in the period of "roll-back neoliberalism" (Peck and Tickell 2002). Critical analyses have stressed the undeniably political nature of economic globalization and the overarching dominance of neoliberal ideology in the discourses of global organisations. Among the largely agricultural societies of India and South East Asia, the control of urban spaces by neoliberal regimes is bolstered by the urban–rural planning discourse of the Washington consensus.

Theoretical approaches studying the changing urban form and governance of cities in the post-Fordist era have failed to take into proper consideration a relational account of the state neglecting the state's influence in actively shaping the urban and regional structure. The strategic location of global processes in national spaces is with the participation of the states themselves, through provision of legal (by innovating to harmonise national legal systems to the operation global firms, integration with the global economy and multinational organisations) and physical infrastructure, which is often produced as 'national' infrastructure although increasingly shaped by global agendas (McLeod and Goodwin 1999; Brenner, 1998). There are associated transformations inside the state where there is a gradual denationalisation of certain sectors such as the financial sector (Sassen 2003). Brenner (1998) states that nation states have largely abandoned the modern infrastructural ideal and its aim of bringing living conditions on par at a national scale. Instead states are tending to shift to the promotion of urban regions as the most important level of policy implementation and re-scaled their internal institutional hierarchies.

City governments are often forced to be innovative and take the entrepreneurial approach to promote local growth as mobility of capital leads to a competition for investment (Harvey 1989). Entirely new constellations of consulting firms have mushroomed to guide urban governments on how to attract foreign investment. Offering real value to foreign investors usually consists of land and infrastructure grants, tax breaks, seducing global investors by constructing enclaves of luxurious living, chic shopping districts and other similar seductions. Thus, cities attempt to conceal landscapes of poverty from the eyes of foreigners, developing certain quarters according to global tastes and standards (Friedmann 2005). Thus, as Friedmann comments:

> "What marketing gurus overlook……, is that genuine urban development is not a question of seducing capitalists to put their money into "your" rather than your competitors city but to develop the city from within by *caring for and improving its asset base*. This development can be called a form of *endogenous* development" (Friedmann 2005: 217).

Many studies have documented the results of such entrepreneurial urbanism to entice global capital. In developing countries, state policies for reducing inequalities are necessary; instead state policies in their drive towards hurried incorporation into the global economy deliberately or carelessly reinforce the processes that exclude or

displace the local populations (Mahadevia 2003). When governments pursue an agenda that prioritises market driven economic growth, the exchange value of land is prioritised over the use value (Logan and Molotch 1987). The needs of business are prioritised in urban planning and limited resources, especially in developing countries are transferred to that end, although not every city is successful in attracting global investment, as they do not possess the requisite resources. Bilateral and multilateral development agencies (such as the World Bank or ADB) too influence local development policies by advocating privatisation, which not only leads to exclusion and increased debt liability, but also adversely affects the ability of the city to implement sustainable anti-poverty programmes and pursue the equitable distribution of the gains from globalisation (Mahadevia 2003; 2008)

In an analysis of local urban politics, Mollenkpopf (1992) has divided traditional approaches into two camps: the *pluralists* and the *structuralists*. The basic theoretical premise of the pluralists was that the bargaining among a multiplicity of groups defined the urban power structure. In this view coalition building between political leaders and private interests was around specific issues, vary from issue to issue and is short lived (Judge 1997). The structuralist camp consists of *elite theory, regime theory, growth machine theory* and *Marxist and neo- Marxist theories.* Elite theory was first systematically applied to urban studies by Hunter in 1953, who in a seminal study of Atlanta offered evidence the local representative democracy in the US was just a smoke screen for dominant economic interests (Harding 1997). Regime analysts recognise the improbability of the event of any singular group exercising complete control in a multifaceted world. However, in contrast to the pluralists, they reject the assumption that the electoral power of groups automatically translates into having a proportionate role in governance. Instead government are prevailed upon to collaborate with groups who possess the means necessary for reaching policy goals. Regime theory thus emphasizes how the involvement of certain groups in a coalition is structurally advantaged (Stoker 1997). They however did not break away from the pluralists' interplay of interests around decisions. Marxist and neo-Marxist theories stress the systematic subordination of the state and politics to capital accumulation and the private market. They were empirically able to investigate those mechanisms and have shown cases where the systematic and cumulative inequality of political capacity was supported and ideologically reinforced by a superficial pluralism (Mollenkopf 1992).

The growth machine theory attempts to build a political economy of place. Logan and Molotch (1987) contend that the activism of entrepreneurs is the potent energy shaping the urban system. They borrow from classical Marxism, in distinguishing between use and exchange values with respect to property. Rentiers who constantly strive to maximise the value of their holdings by intensifying the use of their property (developing higher use values) lie at the heart of the urban development process. Since their assets are immobile, they need to attract investment by bargaining with outside investors or by generating the sort of business atmosphere that will attract investment. They also find allies among other members of the growth machine, business that profit directly from the development process that are not place bound (for e.g. financiers, construction interests, developers); place bound local media and utility companies who benefit from urban development; and a set of auxiliary members who benefit from some, but not all types of growth. This list of key players approximately defines the business elite that collectively exerts power over the pattern of urban development due to its control over substantial material and ideological resources.

Castells (2000) points out the central role played by the cosmopolitan elites as the social actors in the domination by the "space of flows". He proposes that "the space of flows is made up of personal micro-networks that project their (the cosmopolitan elites) interest in functional macro-networks throughout the global set of interactions in the space of flows". To preserve their social cohesion elites resist becoming flows themselves. This is achieved by establishing a "set of rules and cultural codes" that separates the excluded from those included in their political and cultural communities. Spatially this is established first, by living in expensive real estate enclaves that are self-contained with integrated business, luxury residential, and leisure-oriented areas and second, by creating a lifestyle and architectural designs that unify the figurative milieu of the elite about the world, prevailing over the specificity of history and locale (Castells 2000: 446).

In the social landscapes of "splintering urbanism", geographical barriers, network configuration, software codes, socio-technical assemblies of built spaces and built networks, and the new access control capabilities of electronic technologies are increasingly configured to try and separate the premium networked spaces or "recessionary networked spaces" of wealthy socioeconomic groups who have a tendency to withdraw from the wider citizenry and cityscape, from "spaces of

perceived danger, difference and poverty". Further, the practices of building and infrastructural firms increasingly focus on packaging and promoting patches of closed premium spaces of the metropolitan area, super-imposed upon the relatively open channels of flow and interconnection constructed under the modern infrastructural ideal (Graham and Marvin 2001: 301).

Thus, the central actors in the production of new urban landscapes of disarticulation and exclusion are the *state, bilateral and multilateral development agencies, the globalised elite*, and *building and infrastructural business*. It is however essential to integrate recent theoretical advances that moves away from viewing neoliberalism as an immutable force, and to "actually existing neoliberalisms" which is a result of "contextual embeddedness and path dependency of neoliberal restructuring projects". Analysis of cities as sites where neoliberal projects are enacted must take into account "necessary hybridity", as it is analytically and politically misleading, to conceptualise neoliberalism as an ideal-type, a coherent and homogenous ideology imposed top-down with essentially homogenizing effects on urban form. It does not stand alone, but rather exists "in a kind of parasitical relation to other state and social formations (neoconservatism, authoritarianism, social democracy, etc.). The form and consequences of neoliberalizing strategies of restructuring are shaped precisely in and through these hybrid contexts". Thus, the focus must be on the "process of neoliberalisation" within "distinctive national, regional and local contexts, defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles" (Peck et al. 2009: 49 - 52). According to Shatkin et al. (2014: 24) "cities are not simply acted upon and shaped by social and political processes that play out beyond their boundaries. They also shape those processes in their turn, through agencies that their own growth engenders". Harvey (1989: 5) too emphasizes the necessity of spatially grounding social processes to understand urban change as it is through "a particular configuration of spatial practices" that a "wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact".

1.2.4   Globalisation and contestation:

The processes of neoliberalisation are contested both by the forgotten groups themselves, and by those who take up cudgels on their behalf, thus disrupting the

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sense of naturalness of emerging urban spaces. The displaced communities may engage in community organizing ranging from traditional grass root level organizations to national coalitions of Community Based Organizations. It may also involve professionally managed Non-Governmental Organizations as well as large transnational networks of resistance linking traditional grassroots level organisations, CBOs and NGOs, all of whom can be subsumed under the mantle of "civil society". Thus, globalizing cities are the sites of both hegemonic and counter hegemonic globalizations.

According to Oliver-Smith (2002) uprooting and displacement have been an integral part of modernity. It is often the outcome of the implementation of large-scale developmental schemes by the state, which itself solely possesses the legal right to use force unfettered by other institutions or forms of social control. The state thus has the power to move or relocate people and communities over its territory. Equally, being uprooted and relocated denotes defencelessness, as it embodies a loss of control of a community over its territorial space. The democratic character of certain forms of development is suspect when it is carried out despite the opposition of the populations being adversely affected or if it is formulated without their participation and without keeping their benefits in mind. Democracies are faced with the necessity to apportion resources for consumption, even if it is at the expense of investment for economic development. However, influential lobbies within democracies are often able to subvert the development process to meet their own needs at the expense of larger public interests. While the grandiloquence that large-scale development ventures are characterised by frequently makes allusions to nationalistic ambitions and offers welfare for the general public, the ones who actually pay the price of these schemes are frequently local populations. The price that these communities must pay are often unbearably oppressive and impossible to compensate (Oliver- Smith 2002).

The failures of the state and private capital to take on developmental ventures in a transparent and capable manner, and the ever-increasing exclusion of marginalised groups at the local level from the decision-making processes have led to the emergence of new forms of trans-local political solidarity and consciousness, with partially globalised networks of contestation (Routledge 2003). The discrepancy between development expressed through indices of economic growth, in contrast to progress as indicated through greater social, cultural and political empowerment is the crux of Development Induced Displacement Resistance (DIDR) (Oliver-Smith 2002).

With specific reference to large scale developmental projects (including urban renewal) that cause involuntary dislocation of populations, the organised resistance of the displaced and dispossessed is taken up at the local and international levels takes four major forms: as social movements, grass-roots organizations (GROs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and transnational networks. Such organised activities generally have a comparatively long-term existence, with the objective of meeting a particular goal(s). Social movements are a form of collective action by people, involving interaction with other political actors, possessing an awareness of shared objectives and political goals, that are articulated as entitlements or the addition and enforcement of such rights. As the state is the main authority that can bestow or withdraw rights, social movements are mostly directed at the state. Grass-roots organizations (GROs), also known as "base groups", "people's organizations", and "local organizations" are membership-based organisations that are dedicated to the improvement of the lot of their own members. Often, new grass-roots organizations are created owing to the incapacity of government to deliver life essential amenities. Today a few grass-roots organisations are expanding their mandate to bring within it broader regional and national concerns as well (Oliver-Smith 2002). Grassroots mobilisations have been a fundamental factor in the moulding of the city, as well as the critical component in urban activism against interests of dominant social groups. Referring to a Mumbai based local urban activist movement that has forged global links, Appadurai (2002) state, "these networks provide new horizontal modes articulating the deep democratic politics of locality" (Appadurai 2002: 25).

Since 1980's a great deal has been written about NGO's, when they were frequently heralded as the standard "alternative" to established approaches to development. In the 1950s and 1960s, it may be said that the leading view in development was influenced by modernization theory that viewed development as converting traditional, simple societies in the developing world into modern, complex, and westernized ones. In recent decades, however, a new development paradigm has been enunciated promoting poverty reduction, environmental protection, social justice, and human rights (Courtland – Robinson 2002). Thus conceptualised, development has two related facets, the intrinsic and spontaneous development of capitalism and a conscious intervention in underdeveloped countries emerging in the context of decolonisation and the cold war. In this framework, NGO's either execute

the project at the field level, generate data, or are involved in political activism. They are interventionist, yet they are themselves part of the society and political economy within which they operate. They are essentially offshoots of spatially uneven and contradictory capitalist development and at the same time they try, to mediate in and ameliorate the nature and/or effects of the wider progressions of the former type of development (Mitlin et al. 2007). At theoretical and ideological levels, the category of civil society (within which NGOs are subsumed) has thrived in both neoliberal and post-Marxist/post-structural thinking that believe in a reduced role for the state and stresses the potential of social movements to bring about social transformations. At the theoretical level, associations or civil society organisations constitute this sphere, which is also the sphere for the debate and contest over ideas about the ordering of society. NGO's as civil society actors may be located in a tripartite division of society constituted by the state, market and civil society (Mitlin et al. 2007).

A "transnational civil society", consists mainly of global NGOs and social movements that pursue a wide spectrum of questions ranging from the environment, gender, democracy, human rights, equitable trade, frequently at loggerheads with the government or private capital (Oliver-Smith 2002). The spatiality of social movements is often connoted through the concept of networks. "Transnational advocacy networks are networks of activists distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 1). They have acquired their importance from the global dissemination of certain basic norms regarding human rights and the environment (Evans 2000; Oliver-Smith 2002). The Internet not only provides the technological infrastructure for activist networking; its "reticulate" structure ramifies the structural rationale of transnational linkages (Oliver-Smith 2002: 14; Juris 2005: 197).

The dominant organizational form constituting anti-corporate globalization movements is of decentralized, flexible local/ global networks. The lack of administrative centres within dispersed networks makes them really adaptive, as no node having decision making capacity over the other, allowing activists considerable space to decide policy and action most conducive to their goals. Also, it leads to the creation of "broad umbrella spaces for a variety of organizations, collective movements, and networks and linkages among diverse issues while preserving their autonomy and specificity" (Juris 2005: 199). The importance of the introduction of new digital technologies cannot be understated as it further enables decentralization

and multiple channels based transnational network arrangements, facilitating rapid dissemination of information, and coordination among contemporary movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Juris 2005; Routledge 2003; Evans 2000), thereby fighting isolation which is "the capstone of the powerlessness of the dispossessed" (Evans, 2000: 232). Despite lacking a centralised and pyramidal institutional structure, the network of organisations can successfully maintain a coherent structure. Among other things, these organisations can successfully acquire visibility through the media and create policy pressures for the causes they espouse (Oliver-Smith 2002).

This capacity of local/ global linkages or "translocal assemblages" which are historically and consciously produced amalgams of place based social movements exchanging ideas, knowledge, practices and materials, is a functioning entity rather than just a spatial end product (McFarlane 2009). It connects in a "convergence space" which is the space of coming together of diverse grassroots movements, which facilitates the interaction between the social movements and their politics of association (Routledge 2003: 338), possibly as a "counter-hegemonic globalisation" where transnational networks are viewed as a kind of "globalization from below". It is counter-hegemonic in the sense that "the emphasis is more on challenge than on adaptation". By striving for more equitable rules of economic globalisation, and by constructing ideological understandings that run counter to current representations of the intrinsic worth of neoliberalism, transnational networks fight to curb the growing dominance of the global elite. Simultaneously, use is made of the organisational logic of networks and the spread of certain basic global norms about human rights and the environment to shift the balance of power at the local level in favour of the dispossessed (Evans 2000: 231).

Rapid urbanization has produced glaring inequality in urban spaces within urban areas or "peripheries" of abject poverty and inequality (Holston 2009:245). While cities are increasingly assuming the mantle of ultra-competitive economic spaces in a globalised economy, they are at the same time becoming increasingly segregated economically, socially and spatially. Castells (1992) has identified a "wild city" where urban social movements emerge in negative and reactive ways to resist change, growth and progress as determined by business elites.

Urban space is a both the territory and lived spaces of a multiplicity of radical grassroots movements, social alliances, informal networks, immigrant and ethnic communities and cultural organisations who select both global and local images and

imaginings according to their purposes as they engage in identity politics or a keen struggle over resources (Yeoh 1999). The everyday struggles of poor residents of mega cities for basic housing and services have also engendered "new movements of insurgent citizenship based on their claims to have a right to the city and a right to rights". Hence metropolitan areas today are "a site of collision between forces of exploitation and dispossession and increasingly coherent, yet still fragile and contradictory movements for new kinds of citizen power and social justice" (Holston 2009: 245). According to Holston (2009), such insurgent urban citizenship confronts both entrenched as well as new forms of urban inequality, uprooting and violence. These conflicts are actually aimed at projecting alternative ideas of citizenship and the degraded urban margins are often the places from which new urban innovations emerge.

1.2.5   *The political geography of capital cities:*

For national governments, the edification of the capital city holds forth the prospect of articulating national objectives and goals, to elicit admiration from both citizens and foreigners, and to validate their reign (Holston 1989). Ideologies guiding the architectural elements in capitals have also changed over time to reflect new configurations of power and the relation between the government and citizens in the country concerned. Capital building is often used by regimes to convey its power, and the people's interpretation and response to such spatial transformations have changed historically (Shatkin 2005). In recently independent ex-colonial countries, where national identities are still in a flux and there are many competing visions of it, capitals may be used to delineate national identity (King 1993). Capitals function as platforms for governments to validate their nation building and development strategies, as the capital serves as a beacon of achievement. Modern capitals serve as a model for the whole country to emulate. The physical space of the capital city is so configured that they serve as the suitable venue for national ceremonial purposes, and they become both literally and figuratively, theatres of power (Rappoport 1993). For Shatkin (2005), the erection of public structures, monuments or conveniences, such as museums, parks and squares in capitals serve to provide citizens with reminders of their common national identity as construed by the existing regime. Even the everyday lived spaces of the people of the city are regulated to render the capital an

exemplar of socio-economic and cultural development. Capitals are also important arenas of contestation where the visions or the trajectory of national development are challenged. He cites examples of symbolic spaces like Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the Mall in Washington, D.C., or the Democracy Monument in Bangkok, which have become spaces of collective protest. The persistence of socio-economic problems in capitals themselves highlights the disappointing performance of governments (Shatkin 2005). Hall (1993) mentions political capitals (for example, Canberra and Brasilia), which have been constructed expressly for administrative and political purposes; multi-functional capitals (for example London, Paris, Madrid) that serve a variety of social, economic and political functions; and global capitals (for example London, Tokyo, Seoul) where global economic connections are superimposed on pre-existing important political and cultural functions (Hall 1993). Here construction projects of global capital are the new national monuments and the corresponding world class-built form is used by governments to convince their citizens of the soundness of the state strategies of economic globalization (Shatkin 2005).

1.2.6   Global cities in Asia.

Firman (1999) considers Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Seoul, Taipei, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, to be the global cities of East Asia, since they perform several command and control functions in the Asian global economy at different scales, especially in the flows of information, financial services, and commodities transactions. Further, these cities had experienced urban economic and physical restructuring typical of cities deeply integrated with the global economy. Scholarly attention has been frequently given to Mega Urban Regions (MURs), sometimes called Extended Metropolitan Regions (EMRs) in South East Asia. These studies initially focussed on the growth of megacities in densely populated agricultural areas (McGee 1991). Later studies tried to delineate the spatial patterns of growth within these MURs as different zones that play distinct roles and have different growth trajectories (Jones and Douglass 2008; McGee 2009). Here urban expansion takes place in surrounding rice bowl areas of intensive agriculture, which is also called the peri-urban or the inner fringe and desakota or the outer region (McGee 2009) or simply taken together as the peri-urban region (Webster 2002). The globalization of the economy of the South East Asian countries has stimulated the

flows of capital, commodities, people and information, has led to simultaneously both estrangement of the city core from the national/regional economy as it procures capital from a wider global market; as well greater integration with the extended metropolitan region due to greater demand for goods such as water and food (Firman 1999). Apart from greater integration with the global economy, Jakarta and Manila has undergone functional division between the core and periphery in the city, transforming from a single core to multi-core metropolitan region (Douglass 2005). With sprawling radial expansion of the metropolitan region, there has been a sharp climb in the volume of commuters and rising commute times and distances. Both the central and peripheral areas of the city have experienced land use transformations, and witnessed the construction of extensive physical infrastructure, ICT networks, airports, seaports and highways (Firman 1999).

1.3   Research Questions:

The primary objective of the study is the empirical investigation and interrogation of the emergent urban spatial order in the three globalizing Asian megacities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila in the context of established theoretical foundations. This is guided by salient questions that a comparative study of the political geography of these cities throws up and is enumerated in the following paragraphs.

Despite the neoliberal nature of globalisation signposting the contrary, the survey of literature reveals the continued centrality of the state in determining the trajectory of urban change. First, states have been pursuing institutional rescaling and urban boosterism strategies. Second, a good governance discourse that sees the government as a facilitator rather than provider, and dissemination of ideals of participatory governance is being overseen by multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the ADB. Third, there has also been a neoliberal roll back of state interventions in selective areas and the continued provision of legal and policy infrastructure by the state for supporting the participation of the private sector in urban development. Thus, the *first* task is to evaluate the role of the state by examining and comparing the specific macroeconomic and urban policy contexts of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila.

The right of access to urban space by different socioeconomic groups is being redefined, thereby altering the political geography of the three cities. *Secondly*, such changes need to be empirically investigated and mapped. In other words, how are

urban spaces being restructured normatively, in different national contexts, according to the urban power-holders notions of urban order, or the 'world class city'?

Urban theorists often emphasise only socioeconomic attributes of urban spatial form, ignoring ethnocultural factors. Delhi Jakarta and Manila provide immense variation in terms of ethnocultural dynamics like religion, caste and race. Therefore *third*, comparative studies of these cities entail scrutiny of these factors as well.

As these cities are spaces where different social groups stake conflicting claims, the strategies employed by different social groups in order to influence the emerging urban spatial order in their favour must be explored. *Fourth*, the roles of certain crucial actors such as corporate actors and consultants, and social classes such as the middle class and the transnational elite in driving urban change, under conditions of global capitalism in which global capital flows across borders to fund investment in the built environment as a means of encapsulating its presence and reinforcing its benefits, need to be analysed.

Fifth, is the question whether the everyday struggles of poor residents of mega cities for basic housing and services has also generated new movements of insurgent citizenship? If such movements exist are they significant enough to confront macro forces that determine political power in the city, and therefore able to bring about structural change in power relations? By employing concepts drawn from resistance research and by looking at Delhi, Jakarta and Manila as theatres of mass movements, it may be possible to encapsulate the emergent diverse strands of contestation to the hegemonic model of urbanism.

Finally, *sixth*, the mobility and transferability of concepts and strategies amongst Delhi, Jakarta and Manila need to be considered. This provides for better recognition and understanding of the unequal impacts of global city formation in each individual city. Further, in the context of the growing role of transnational convergence spaces of urban social movements, it allows the sharpening of strategies of contestation by learning from each other's successes and failures.

1.4   Hypothesis:

The principal hypotheses contained in this thesis are as follows:

i.   The evolving spatial structures of the megacities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila are exhibiting parallels due to overarching forces of globalisation.

ii. These temporal and spatial changes in urban morphology are driven by (a) changing planning and governance strategies of state agencies in favour of land monetization; (b) the rising significance of corporate actors; (c) the emergence of a new aspirant middle class and their civil society organisations; (d) ethno cultural insecurities.

iii. Violent neoliberal antipathy towards informality is being contested by the displaced through tenuous and contradictory social movements, or through sympathetic civil society organisations in an increasingly systematised and coordinated manner.

1.5   Research methodology and design:

There has recently been a great deal of interest in arriving at overarching frameworks by comparing urban regions in Brazil, China, India, South Africa are then deploying them to showcase the parallels or deviations from the norm as well as demonstrate the transferability and mobility of concepts and theories. In this particular study three Asian mega cities, namely Delhi, Jakarta and Manila have been selected for comparative study. Such a cross cultural comparison assumes the starting point that interaction between globalizing processes and the historical momentum of local and regional forces make for complex Asian urbanisms (Goh and Bunnell 2013).

1.5.1   Research methodology.

The central methodology followed in this study is the *comparative method*. Three globalising Asian megacities have been chosen for the comparative study of their emerging political geographies. Following Lijphart (1971: 686) the focus is on *'comparable cases'* or focus on cases that are matched on many variables that are not central to the study, thus in affect 'controlling' for these variables but are at variance in terms of key variables that are the focus of analysis, thus allowing a more satisfactory assessment of their influence. Hence the selection of cases acts as a partial substitute for experimental control. Following Skocpol and Somers (1980), such a comparative study has been considered useful for *macro causal analysis*, as a kind of a multivariate analysis to validate causal statements about macro- phenomena for which there are a lot of variables but selecting (or availability as the case may be)

only a few cases. Macro analysis uses both Mill's 'Method of Agreement' as well as "Method of Difference" and even combines the two. In this particular study, the former is used extensively to establish that the three selected cities have in common several phenomena under consideration, as well as hypothesised causal factors. However, the cases vary in other ways that are causally relevant. The goal of the study, following Skocpol and Somers (1980) is the *parallel demonstration of theory*, i.e., showing how a particular model or set of concepts, in this case the concept of global cities and neoliberal urban governance usefully illuminates these cases. A *contrast of contexts* is also attempted within the three cities examined, in order to highlight how different, they are, thus establishing a framework for interpreting how parallel processes of change are played out in different contexts.

1.5.2   Research Design.

Theoretical interlocking and the key drivers of change in globalizing urban spaces are shown in Figure 1.1 below. The theoretical frame of analysis on which such international urban comparisons is based is that neoliberal globalization and governmentality and its main agents of change reconfigure urban spaces differently from the period of modernist and nationalist urban development, but there is also an attendant hybridisation that accompanies such reconfiguration. The formation of exclusionary urban forms is contested both actively and passively by the displaced communities themselves or a through a host of organizations and networks that take up cudgels on their behalf, constituting a possible counter hegemonic globalisation. Although the effectiveness of their strategies in resisting urban spatial changes can be questioned, but the contest itself and its multiple and continuously evolving methods cannot be ignored.

Figure1.1: Theoretical interlocking and key drivers of urban spatial change.

Source: created by the author.

Case selection was based on extensive review of theoretical and empirical literature. The cities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila were found suitable for comparison, as they were similar on many variables, yet differing in other key variables that make such a comparison meaningful. This is followed by intra-case analysis through both qualitative and quantitative means. *Qualitative analysis* is used in:

1) The study of the urban planning and management policies of the respective national and city governments.

2) Analysis of the agenda and actions of the different social groups and their NGOs and CBO's through the contents of their litigation, appeals and partnerships with the city government.

3) Discourse analysis of judicial rulings in the case of Delhi.

4) Analysis of published material like booklets, pamphlets and brochures, and material on websites of NGOs and CBOs.

The main *quantitative* tools used are

1) Descriptive statistics including partition values; and exponential and polynomial trend lines for showing growth rates and time series data.

2) Thematic mapping using GIS software.

Following intra-case analysis, inter-case comparison is done to show parallels, deviations and transferability of findings. The research design is illustrated in Figure 1.2 below.

Figure 1.2: Research design.

1.5.3 *Demarcating the comparative framework: similarities and differences.*

This section attempts to lay out the framework of comparison among the three cities and the detailed analysis follows in the chapters to come. The similarities between the three selected cases for comparative study are as follows:

1. *Settlement type and size*: They are all typical Asian megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants. The total mid-year population (in thousand) of the Delhi, Jakarta and Manila Urban Agglomerations in 2014 were 24953, 10176 and 12674 respectively (WUP 2014) and the density of population in 2016 was 11900, 9700 and 14100 persons per/sq.km respectively (Demographia, 2016).

2. *Morphology and Growth*: They are all urban agglomerations spread across several administrative jurisdictions experiencing rapid growth especially at peripheries. They all have large metropolitan areas. Their spatial form is multi nuclear, having a rapidly expanding, distinctive and large peri-urban zone. They are experiencing

a transfer of population and jobs to the degenerated periphery. The residential pattern also reflects a spatial segregation and the widening disparities among the richer communities who live in well-planned and exclusive residential areas and t and poor communities who live in either 'slum' or unplanned degraded areas in the city, locally known as *jhuggie jhopdie* in Delhi, *kampung* in Jakarta and *iskwater* in Manila.

3. *Origins:* All three cities have ancient and pre-colonial origins, and have experienced later colonial transformations. While Delhi served as the colonial administrative capital, Jakarta and Manila in addition to being administrative capitals, were entrepots and naval bases.

4. *Global linkages:* All three cities are experiencing an upward mobility in the global pyramid of cities; progressively climbing from "transitional cities in rising economies" to "Global City" status (Savitch 2002).

The differences in the key variables between the cities, relevant to the current study are as follows:

1. *Importance in the national urban structure:* Although all three cities are national capitals, yet Delhi ranks second, in the Indian national settlement hierarchy that approximates Rank-Size rule. Whereas Jakarta and Manila are the largest cities in the national settlement hierarchies of Indonesia and Philippines respectively that resemble Primate City hierarchy.

2. *Gross Domestic Product:* The Gross Domestic Product (PPP adjusted) of Manila has been estimated to be the lowest among the three at 182.8 billion dollars, followed by Delhi with 193.6 billion dollars and Jakarta with 321.3 billion dollars has the highest GDP among the three (Brookings Institution 2014). However, the projected GDP 2025 (at 2005 PPP) of Delhi has been found to be the highest at 482 billion dollars, followed by Manila at 325 billion dollars and Jakarta at 231 billion dollars (Price Waterhouse Cooper 2008) is the lowest. Thus, Delhi is clearly placed on a higher growth trajectory than the two South East Asian cities. As far as per capita GDP is concerned, Delhi is the poorest at 3580 dollars per capita, while Manila is the richest at 6160 dollars per capita. Jakarta is in the intermediate position with 5020 dollars per capita (Brookings Institution 2014).

3. *Performance on city prosperity indices:* According to the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN HABITAT), Global Urban Indicators Database,

2012, the 5 Dimension City Prosperity Index is an indicator of prosperity of urban areas measured along the 5 dimensions of productivity, quality of life, infrastructure, environment and equity. The value of both the overall 5 Dimension City Prosperity Index and 4 Dimension City Prosperity Index (excluding Equity Index) for both Jakarta and Manila is between 0.700 and 0. 799 and are categorized as cities with "solid prosperity factors". However, the values of the former and latter indices in the case of Delhi are between 0.600 and 0.699 and it is in the category of cities with "moderate prosperity factors". The Productivity Index represents the total output of goods and services (value added) produced by a city's population during a specific year. While Both Jakarta and Manila scores between 0.600 and 0.699 on this index, Delhi scores lower between 0. 500 and 0.599. The Infrastructure Index combines two sub-indices: one for infrastructure, and another for housing. The infrastructure sub-index includes: connection to services (piped water, sewerage, electricity and ICT), waste management, knowledge infrastructure, health infrastructure, and transport and road infrastructure. The housing sub-index includes building materials and living space. In this index, all three cities score between 0.700 and 0.799. The Quality of Life Index is a combination of four sub-indices: education, health, safety/security, social capital and public space. While Delhi and Manila score between 0.600 and 0.699, Jakarta scores better in this index at 0.733. The equity and social inclusion index combines statistical measures of inequality of income/consumption (Gini coefficient) and social and gender inequality of access to services and infrastructure. There is a wide variation among the three cities in this index. Jakarta is found to be the most inclusive city at 0.885, while Delhi scores 0.712 and Manila scores lowest at 0.669. The environmental sustainability index is made of four sub-indices: air quality (PM10), CO_2 emissions, energy and indoor pollution. It is noteworthy that while the values of this index for Jakarta and Manila is between 0.800 and 0.899, Delhi fares very poorly at 0.448 (UN-Habitat 2013).

4. *Urban planning and governance:* Urban planning in Delhi is still largely a centralized and top down planning exercise. Land management and housing delivery is centralized, with little input from the formal private sector. The delivery of services and mode of governance is techno-managerial with several overlapping jurisdictions. The middle classes and the elite, who favour the

corporate capitalist sector as they see their fortunes tied to this sector, have largely captured recent initiatives of participatory governance. Jakarta too is characterized by centralized top down urban planning and has undergone decentralization reforms since 1999. However, the implications of decentralisation reforms are still not clear in the case of Jakarta, where too there is a clear proclivity on the part of state actors, elite and middle classes for preferring neoliberal approaches to governance. Manila is characterised by the lack of any serious effort at large scale centralised urban planning by state agencies. Urban development here has been almost entirely according to the demands of private sector. In contrast to Delhi and Jakarta however, urban governance in Manila is more participatory and decentralized and CBOs/NGOs play a big part in urban management. It largely models its urban governance on the techno managerial market-based prescriptions of multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.

5. *Globalisation and Liberalisation (Macroeconomic policy):* India's New Economic Policy of 1991 that placed the country on a path of globalization, privatisation and liberalization was precipitated by a crisis in the Balance of Payments situation that brought the country to brink of economic breakdown. In order to repay the IMF for bailout, a part of the deposits of gold held by the Reserve Bank of India were moved to London as security. The devaluation of the rupee and acceptance of the structural adjustment programmes followed. A New Economic Policy was adopted that ended the Industrial Licensing Policy, cut tariffs and rates of interest, ended the monopoly of many public-sector units, and introduced automatic approval of foreign direct investment in many sectors. From its inception the liberalisation policy has essentially had the same thrust. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) - Atal Bihari Vajpayee led administrations gave the reforms another big push ahead, when it was in power for six years, from 1998-99 and from 1999-2004. Near the end of 2011 the Congress Party led UPA 2 coalition government announced the introduction of 51 % FDI in the retail sector, eventually approved in December 2012 (Business Standard 2012). Whereas, in both Indonesia and Philippines, economic liberalisation has been pursued aggressively since the 1980's.

Indonesia's trade regime consisted mainly of import substitution through a range of policy measures such as *ad valorem* import duties (which ranged from

zero to 200 per cent) as well as non-tariff restrictions that covered almost 35 per cent of total imports by value, till the middle of the 1980s. As there was a failure to bring about growth in manufactured exports, Indonesia remained overly dependant on exports of oil and natural gas. Suharto's New Order Regime pursued aggressive deregulation and renewed liberalization in reaction to falling oil-prices, and rapid export-led growth from 1983 to 1996. His reforms covered the monetary and budgetary policies and trade regulations. In May 1996, the government announced a second phase of trade deregulation as a follow up to the first phase. Several non-tariff barriers were brought down or drastically reduced, exporters were offered tax breaks, Export Processing Zones were created and tariff rates were reduced. Throughout the decade of the 1990s trade was liberalised further, with new reform measures being announced annually before the meetings with the donors. The end of the 1990s saw the removal of the rest of the non-tariff barriers and further liberalisation of trade. The effective rate of protection on manufactures fell to 20 per cent by mid-1990 and to 6 per cent by September 1997. Parallel to the trade reforms, financial sector reforms were also carried out. By 1988 the deregulation of the financial sector had commenced. The procedures for obtaining licenses for the setting up of new banks were simplified, new branches were easily opened, requirements for becoming a foreign exchange bank were reduced and foreign banks were now given entry into the domestic financial sector through joint ventures with domestic banks. State owned units lost their monopolies. Reserve requirements on all deposits were reduced to two percent reducing the spread between borrowing and lending rates (Stern 2003).

For more than three decades after World War II, import substitution and a high degree of protectionism characterised the Philippine economy. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Philippine government was prompted by multilateral organizations to undertake policy reforms to infuse competition in the manufacturing sector. The trade regime was finally liberalized by removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers in 1986 in the backdrop of the People Power Revolution (Tecson 1995; Lim and Montes 2002). Reforms were set off not only in the financial sector but also in utilities like telecommunications, power, water, air transport and shipping. In 1981, the first Tariff Reform Programme (TPR 1) was launched that cut both the average token tariff as well as the unfavourable non-tariff barriers that typified the Philippine industrial structure before. TRP 2 or the

next round of tariff reduction was started in 1991, and range of tariffs for most products was fixed between 3 to 30 per cent. The government commenced TRP 3 in 1995, attempting to adopt a uniform five per cent tariff by 2005. The tariff range of industrial goods was now between 3 per cent and 10 per cent and the upper limit of tariff on manufactures was set at 30 per cent. A tariff structure with four slabs was put in place. Raw materials and capital goods that needed to be imported attracted a tariff of 3 per cent, while those which could be procured locally attracted 10 percent. It was 20 per cent for intermediate goods and 30 per cent for finished goods. TRP 4 adopted in 2001 allowed a uniform tariff rate of 5 per cent for all goods, with the exception of some critical agricultural and manufactured items (Aldaba 2013).

Encompassing the entire period of reforms in the three countries, a comparison of the growth of purchasing power parity valuation of GDP's from 1980 to 2016 (IMF 2017) among the India, Indonesia and Philippines, shows that while India's GDP was 381.961 billion dollars in 1980, it has grown exponentially since then. It grew to 986.90 billion dollars in 1990, 2077.84 billion dollars in 2000, 5312.26 billion in 2010, and 8720.51 billion dollars in 2016. In the same time period, Indonesia's GDP was 184.23 billion dollars in 1980, rising to 516.67 billion dollars in 1990, 958.48 billion dollars in 2000, to 2003.96 billion dollars in 2010, and 3027.83 billion dollars in 2016. In the case of Philippines, it was 90.28 billion dollars in 1980, rising to 160.56 billion dollars in 1990, 261.13 billion dollars in 2000, to 513.96 billion dollars in 2010, and 801.90 billion dollars in 2016. Thus, we can see that during the entire time period India's GDP has by far outstripped that of the other two countries, perhaps due to its sheer size. However, the opposite picture emerges when the per capita purchasing power parity valuation of GDP's are compared during the same time period (IMF 2017). Here India falls behind both Philippines and Indonesia. In 1980 the per capita GDP of India, Indonesia and Philippines was 557.05 dollars, 1250.41 dollars and 1883.64 dollars respectively. In 1990, it was 1164.57 dollars, 2880.35 dollars and 2634.77 dollars respectively. Thus, Indonesia experienced robust economic growth during this period and its per capita income surpassed that of Philippines and has remained higher than its South East Asian neighbour since then. In 2000 the per capita GDP of India, Indonesia and Philippines was 2018.92 dollars, 4646.85 dollars and 3400.54 billion dollars respectively. In 2016, these figures were

6658.34 dollars, 11699.41 dollars and 7696.16 dollars. Since 1989, Indonesia has had the highest GDP per capita amongst the three countries. But it is noteworthy that it was also affected the most during the East Asian economic crises of 1997, and both its overall and per capita GDP fell in its aftermath. Both its overall GDP and its per capita GDP recovered in 2001 to 1997 levels and has continued to grow since then. Philippines was affected the least and its GDP recovered by 1999.

The sectoral composition of GDP in the three nations has also changed post liberalisation (World Bank 2015; 2005). In India the share of agriculture has fallen from 31 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2015, while the share of services has risen from 41 percent to 53 percent in the same period. Industry and manufacturing have tended to remain stagnant. In Indonesia, the share of agriculture was already low to begin with; in 1990 (19 per cent) and in 2015 it declined to 14 percent. In Philippines the share of agriculture has declined from 22 percent to 10 percent in the same period. While the share of the service sector grew appreciably in Philippines, like in India growing to 59 percent in 2015 from 44 per cent in 1990, in Indonesia the service sector actually shrank to 38 per cent in 2000 from 41 per cent in 1990, and in 2015 it rose to 43 per cent. Between 1990 and 2000, the share of industry grew from 39 per cent to 49 percent, while both in India and Philippines it declined or remained the same in this time period. In 2015 the share of industry has tended to return back to 1990 levels in all three countries. During the 1980s and 1990s Indonesia has benefitted most under the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) among the South East Asian countries. While India was not a part of the NIDL and hence shows decline in the share of industry and manufacturing in this period, Philippines although a part of the NIDL has been the worst performer among the South East Asian nations in terms of growth of industry and manufacturing.

6. *Main determinants of residence:* The main determinant of residence in Delhi, Jakarta and Manila is class. However, caste and religious identity in Delhi, and religious and ethnic identity in Jakarta are other variables that affect this distribution. Manila is remarkably free of religious and ethnic determinants of urban spatial structure. This will be examined in detail later in this study.

7. *Organising resistance:* In Delhi, organisation of mass movement was seen recently in during anticorruption protests of 2011 -12, protests against crimes

against women during the same period, and in the contestation of slum demolitions through both active and passive means by the displaced and their sympathisers. However civil society in Delhi is the domain where capitalism and corporate logic is hegemonic and is dominated by the elite and middle classes. Jakarta is currently witnessing a burgeoning civil society after a long period of authoritarian military rule in Indonesia, from 1966 to 1997 under President Suharto. Mass movements and civil society played an important role in the democratization and anti-corruption movement of 1997. The nature of development of civil society in Jakarta shows great potential in guiding inclusive urban development. Philippines too has experienced authoritarian rule from 1972 to 1986. In Manila too, mass movements and civil society played an important role in ending the Marcos regime and 1986 and in anticorruption movements in 2001. Since 1986, civil society organisations of the urban poor have mushroomed and there is a strong presence of NGOs and CBOs in urban development and service provisioning.

1.5.4 *Primary sources:*

The main primary sources in this study are:

(a) Urban planning documents

(b) Court judgements

(c) Newspaper articles

(d) Pamphlets, flyers and posters of NGOs and CBOs and the content on their websites

(e) The following sources of data:

1. The World Bank, 2015, *World Development Indicators: Structure of output.*

2. International Monetary Fund, 2016, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016

3. Demographia, 2016, World Urban Areas, 12th Annual Edition.

4. United Nations Human Settlement Programme, 2012, *Global Urban Indicators Database*

5. United Nations Population Division, 2014, *World Urbanisation Prospects. The 2014 Revision*. United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)

6. Brookings Institution, 2014, *Global Metro Monitor*.

7. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009, *UK Economic Outlook*

8. Census of India (various reports): 1991, 2001, 2011

9. Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2014, *Statistical Abstract of Delhi, 2014.*

10. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2006, *Delhi Human Development Report. Partnerships for Progress.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

11. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Planning Department, 2006, *Economic Survey of Delhi, 2005 – 2006.*

12. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Planning Department, 2016, *List of Jhuggie Jhopdi Colonies.*

13. Biro Pusat Statistik (various reports), 2010.

14. Philippines National Statistical Coordination Board (various reports) 2001.

15. Philippine Statistical Authority (various reports): 2010, 2013, 2015

1.6   Structure of the Thesis:

The thesis has been divided into five chapters. Chapter One, or the current chapter titled "*Introduction*", provides the background, review of literature, research questions and hypothesis. It has also illustrated the research method and research design. The comparative framework is laid out and the primary sources used in the thesis are mentioned.

Chapter Two is titled *"The role of the state in the evolution of city space following globalization and economic liberalization"*. This chapter clarifies and compares the definitions of "urban" in the three different national contexts. Then it moves on to the comparisons of the historical and the national macroeconomic contexts that shaped the evolution Delhi, Jakarta and Manila and compares the performance of macroeconomic indicators after liberalisation. The transformation of urban spatial structure in the three cities after globalisation and liberalisation is compared along the following dimensions: (1) The role of urban planning; (2)

housing categories, with special emphasis on informal settlements; and (3) other important and distinctive features depending on its impact on the city, such as the changing governance framework in Delhi, suburbanisation in Jakarta, and the combination of several factors in Manila including urban megaprojects, the skewed pattern of landownership and suburbanisation. However, a common feature of the spatial reconfiguration in the three cities is the neoliberal animosity towards informality and accumulation through dispossession on the part of the propertied and affluent classes.

Chapter Three is titled *"Social contestations: socioeconomic exclusion in Asian cities"*. This chapter attempts to look at urban change through the role of certain classes, actors and aesthetics in the restructuring of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila. It makes an attempt to a more nuanced understanding of the processes of urban change by contextually embedding and tracing the individual pathways gentrification in the three cities. For instance, only in Delhi has the judiciary has played a crucial role in slum demolitions. Two parallels in all three cities is the rise and active role of a new middle class, who are among the set of winners in neoliberalism, in the displacement of informal settlers; and the use of the discourse of environmentalism as weapon against the poor. The narrative then moves on to forms of contestation employed both by the informal settlers as well as their counterparts with security of tenure, in Delhi, Jakarta and Manila. First, these cities are examined as sites of social movements in the post liberalisation era in order to delineate the different traditions of insurgent citizenship. Then the different actors, and the methods they use in enacting resistance are assessed. The achievements and shortcomings of civil society groups in organising efficacious resistance movements of the marginal communities is compared, to look for the emergence of a possible counterhegemonic globalisation. Civil society organisations in Jakarta do a better job in this regard despite a national history of overarching authoritarian rule until 1998. Ironically it is in Delhi, the capital of a proud democratic nation, and in Manila that has the most meaningfully enacted decentralised governance framework, where the affluent have managed to capture or co-opt the space of civil society to extend or retain their power.

Chapter Four is titled *"Ethnocultural exclusion in Asian cities"* and it looks at the exclusionary growth of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila from the point of view of identity politics. It is in this regard that the three cities exhibit a considerable range of marginalising behaviour. In Delhi religion and caste are the primary cultural driving

forces of segregatory behaviour, while in Jakarta religion, race and ethnicity are the main causes of enclave formation. Delhi and Jakarta exhibit differences in the severity of communal conflict. While Jakarta has experienced repeated episodes of genocidal communal violence directed against its ethnic Chinese population throughout its history, such conflicts are comparatively smaller in magnitude and operate more passively to segregate ethnocultural areas in Delhi. In Manila by contrast, ethnocultural factors rarely determine residence, which is mainly determined by income.

Chapter Five is titled *"Conclusion: summing up the comparisons of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila"*. This chapter outlines the main findings and summarises the parallels and departures among the three cities.

Chapter Two

The role of the state in the evolution of city space following globalisation and economic liberalization.

2.1 Introduction.

The dominant feature of urbanisation in the developing countries since the 1950's has been high growth rates of population in the mega cities. In South Asia as well as in South East Asia the manufacturing and service sectors tend to be concentrated in the large metropolitan areas due to the presence physical infrastructure as well as availability of capital, labour and market. In terms of morphology the selected megacities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila exhibit certain similarities. The most notable being they are all Asian megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants. They are also urban agglomeration spread across several administrative jurisdictions. They have large metropolitan areas and experiencing rapidly changing urban spatial structure from single core to multi nuclear. They have rapidly expanding, distinctive and large peri-urban zones and there is a transfer of both population and jobs to the degenerated periphery. Peri-urban areas around Delhi, Jakarta and Manila are characterised by a mixture of rural and urban land uses. Urban expansion has crossed the administrative boundaries of the city. Referring to this process in South East Asia, McGee (1991) labels it *'kotadesasi'* a phrase borrowed from Bahasa Indonesia, implying the socio economic and spatial integration of the urban (*kota*) and rural areas (*desa*) (McGee 1991). The physical segregation of the rich and the middle class who live in formal/legal housing and the poor who live in informal/illegal housing or 'slum' areas (called *jhuggi jhopdi, kampungs* and *iskwater* in Delhi, Jakarta and Manila respectively) is an emerging feature in the spatial structure of these cities. They are also experiencing the entrenchment of neoliberal ideology in urban governance and planning.

Global processes have led to a restructuring of urban spaces in the North as well as the South. In the South features of poverty co-exist with ever-increasing numbers of enclaves of global consumption, production and existence. Globalization encompasses many activities, such as the integration of economic activities over space, the uninhibited motion of capital, migration of people, technological

advancement and inventions, as well as the transfer of cultural values and norms across communities. Although other forms have existed in the past and today alternative forms of globalization are possible, yet globalisation as it exists in reality today, is 'a combination of new technology, increased trade and mobility, increased concentration of economic control, and reduced welfare-oriented regulatory action of nation states' (Marcuse and Kempen 2000: 5). The neo-liberal spearhead of globalisation commends the materialization of a single global market and the principles of free trade and global competition as the aftermath of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (McGrew 2000). It favours trimming of government expenditure, privatization and deregulation, unhindered access of transnational corporations to a wide range of markets (including public services), while shirking from alternative models of development founded upon principles of equitable and shared growth, socialism, economic rights and public investment (Routledge 2003). New social landscapes in urban areas is characterised by greater destitution and dispossession, increase in gentrification and desertion, the expansion of the middle classes underpinned by displacement and dislodgement, the growth of turf allegiances and warfare, the involvement of governments in growing gentrification and the changing form of political division, most of which stem from the nature of modern capitalism (Marcuse 1993). Neoliberalism has undergone a transmogrification from 'roll-back neoliberalism' that involved deregulating and rolling back of government funded welfare programmes, education and health programmes and green safeguards to the current phase of 'roll-out neo- liberalism'. This period is characterised by formidable state interventions in spheres such as crime, policing, monitoring and surveillance with the objective of subduing and restraining those excluded or evicted during the previous phase of 'roll-back neoliberalism' (Peck and Tickell 2002).

In the rest of this chapter comparisons will be made at two levels and along three lines of analysis. It is necessary to first locate the spatial transformation of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila within the broader national urban contexts, before commencing to comparison at the level of the cities. Thus first, a comparison is done of the variations in the national definitions of what constitutes 'urban' and the temporal and spatial patterns of urban growth in the context of changes in national macroeconomic policy.

Second, a comparison is done of planning and governance strategies of the three cities in order to differentiate the 'process(es) of neoliberalism' (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009: 51). A point of conceptual clarity need to be articulated here: the *difference between plans and planning*. While plans are complex, multilayered, and includes the voices of many stakeholders with a liturgy of codes and meanings, as 'optical artifacts' they stand as a formal expression of a connected system that endeavors to establish a 'proper' relationship between people and things. Planning in contrast is a practice and does not unfold in orderly and predictable ways. Rather it is likely to be chaotic and manipulated by multiple actors and have unplanned outcomes (Gururani 2013). It is an excellent example of governmental techno-politics involving people and institutions, an instrument of modern statecraft that simultaneously sets boundaries and secures consent for its exclusions (Roy 2003 in Gururani 2013). Planning is thus a dynamic process and a contested area that generates 'unexpected collaborations and conflicts that can make the plan possible' (Gururani 2013: 120). 'Flexibility in planning, according to (planners), is not only necessary but it is also appropriate. From their perspective, flexible planning appears not as an antithesis of planning, or as bad planning' rather 'such planning recognizes and responds to political pressures, shifting alliances, insurgent interventions, and material and ecological restrictions. More recently, in the context of liberalization, it has presented a strategy of accumulation of capital through which cities can become financially competitive' (Gururani 2013 :124).

Third, a comparison is done of the changes in the morphology of the three cities by mapping demographic changes in the three cities since 1990, in order to compare the spatial manifestations of the 'actually existing neoliberalism(s)' (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009: 51).

2.2 The role of the state and multilateral donor agencies:

With globalisation implying a change in the role of the state, the state's new role is that of a facilitator rather than a provider of services. According to the World Bank (1994) the main problem of infrastructure provision is the lack of profit motive of the providers. Infrastructure provision should be efficiently managed like a business and bureaucratic red tape should be reduced. "The high willingness to pay for most infrastructure services, even by the poor, provides better opportunity for user

charges" (WB, 1994: 2). Infrastructure provision should now abandon the supply orientation and instead try to match effective demand. Service delivery can be improved through commercial management, competition, and stakeholder involvement. To make infrastructure provision financially viable the private sector must be included in management, financing, or ownership. The supply side can be made competitive by liberalizing the entry of private firms into service provision and through Public Private Partnerships. The incentive for private sector financing of new infrastructure should be returns from investment based on the performance of the project and any government guarantees should be carefully considered. The central role of the state is to developing legal and regulatory frameworks that support private sector involvement in service provision (World Bank 1994). The Asian Development Bank policy documents also echo these proposals and emphasise the need to improve urban governance through greater community participation, improve the management of public sector institutions, develop PPP's, and improve urban infrastructural finance through enhanced cost recovery and soliciting private and institutional investment (Stubbs and Clarke 1996).

Cities must be ecologically sustainable and at the same time function as engines of economic growth by continuing to competitively attract investment. This can be achieved through a professional approach to urban management, decentralization of local governance, deregulation of urban land and housing markets, improving local body finances by recovering costs of infrastructure and services, market-based financing, building partnerships between local government and community-based organizations and using information and communication technology (ICT). Cities are gateways for international market forces; hence inner-city areas must be regenerated and tapped for investment and taxes. To keep cities inclusive the World Bank recommends poverty reduction and slum up-gradation strategies (World Bank 2009). The emphasis is thus on maximizing the spatial efficiency of production with an administrative and managerialist interpretation of good governance and cities will almost automatically deliver sustainable, equitable and inclusive growth.

Critical analyses have stressed the indisputably political nature of economic globalization and the hegemonic position of neoliberal ideology in the anthology of discourses of global agencies. Among the largely agricultural societies of India and South East Asia, the transformation of urban spaces by neoliberal regimes is

legitimised through the urban – rural planning discourse of the Washington consensus.

Neil Brenner (1998) states that nation states have largely abandoned the modern infrastructural ideal with its stated aim of bringing living conditions on par at a national scale; instead tending to shift to the promotion of urban regions as the most important level of policy implementation. The strategic location of global processes in national spaces is with the participation of the states themselves, through provision of legal infrastructure or in other through words through legal changes to settle the conflict between national law and operation of foreign actors like firms, markets and multinational organisations; and physical infrastructure, which is often produced as 'national' infrastructure although increasingly shaped by global agendas (Brenner 1998). There are associated transformations inside the state where there is a gradual denationalisation of certain sectors such as the financial sector (Sassen 2003). When governments pursue an agenda that prioritises market driven economic growth, the exchange value of land is prioritised over the use value (Logan and Molotch 1987).

Urban planning gives precedence to business and scarce resources are diverted to that end, although not every city is successful in attracting global investment, as they do not possess the requisite capability. Bilateral and multilateral development agencies (such as the World Bank or ADB) too influence local development policies by advocating privatisation, which not only leads to exclusion and increased debt liability, but it also adversely affects the capability of urban areas to address the issue of sustainable poverty reduction and redistribution of the benefits of globalisation (Mahadevia 2003). According to Kundu (2003) there has occurred a reorganisation of the institutions and structure of government and a cutback in the public financing of infrastructure and services, which used to be an important component in the strategy to combat the urban crisis. The strategy is of freeing the market from the regulatory state overview, facilitation of the investment by the private sector and public - private partnerships in infrastructure and service delivery. The local authorities are also being empowered to make development decisions. In order to mobilise resources for urban development a capital market is being cultivated, subsidies are being reduced or ended for obtaining proper prices for provision of infrastructure or urban amenities. The legal provisions governing land use are being streamlined and being made flexible for enabling land use changes to accommodate global economic activities. (Kundu 2003: 3085).

In the context of neoliberal globalization, much of the global discourse on development by multilateral institutions like the World Bank (1992), which promote a model of good governance that, involves collaboration between state and market interests. The proliferation of non-state actors (non-government organizations, community-based organizations, citizens groups and associations, policy think tanks and private consultants) in various sectors of governance have further complicated the scenario, with each having its own set of agenda, interests, and beneficiaries. Though often thought of as the forerunners of social movements, the presence of multiple players have significant implications for transparency, accountability and inclusivity. Civil society organisations are regarded as important participants in these emerging forms of urban governance such as partnerships. The importance of civil society organisations in the governance processes are captured in the World Bank's argument: "in most societies, democratic or not, citizens seek representation of their interests beyond the ballot, as taxpayers, as users of public services, and increasingly as clients or members of NGO's and voluntary associations" (World Bank 1997). In the context of competing social demands, rising expectations and inconsistent government performance, these demands for participation are on the rise.

Two other factors have had a profound impact on spatial patterns of city growth: firstly, the shooting up of land prices in both the urban core and peripheries across Asia has provided governments with both opportunities and difficulties. It often seduces them to formulate new policies to milk the real estate markets in order to collect more revenues and to acquire greater control over urban spatial change. Second, according to Shatkin (2016) regimes throughout Asia have attempted to 'monetize land' or 'to use government powers of land management to realize substantial increases in land values, in order to extend state power either by directly extracting revenue for government from land development, or by distributing the profits of land development to powerful corporate backers of the state' (Shatkin 2016: 142).

2.3   Growth of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila into megacities.

2.3.1   Defining 'urban' in India, Indonesia and Philippines

In order to place the growth of the megacities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila within the comparative framework, it is first necessary to briefly examine the trends of urbanisation in India, Indonesia and Philippines. Definitions of urban areas vary around the world and among these three countries.

According to the definition adopted by the Census of India, an urban area is: "*a) All places with a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or notified town area committee, etc.; b) A place satisfying the following three criteria simultaneously: i) A minimum population of 5000. ii) At least 75 per cent of male working population engaged in non- agricultural pursuits; and iii) A density of population of at least 400 per sq. km (1,000 per sq. mile)*" (Census of India 2011).

The Indonesian population censuses of 1980, 1990 and 2000 define a locality as 'urban' when it meets the three following requirements *1) having a population density of 5000 people or more per square kilometre; (2) having 25 per cent or less of households working in the agricultural sector; (3) having eight or more kinds of urban facilities.* However, the urban–rural distinction in Indonesia, as in many other Asian countries, is unclear as some rural areas have functional and physical urban characteristics as well. The Central Board of Statistics (CBS) uses a more technical scoring system to categorize a locality as being 'rural' or 'urban'. But these indicators for urban facilities are arbitrarily defined and do not consider the differences in the quality of facilities (Firman 2004; 2007).

In the Philippines, "*a barangay (i.e., the smallest administrative division in the country and the Filipino term for "village") can be classified as urban if it meets any of the following three criteria: (a) if its population has grown to 5,000 inhabitants or more; (b) if it has at least one establishment with a minimum of 100 employees; or (c) if it has five or more establishments with ten to 99 employees and five or more facilities within the two kilometer radius from the barangay hall. Any barangay that does not satisfy any of these criteria is considered a rural barangay. Under the third criteria, "facilities" could mean any of the following: town/city hall or province capitol; church, chapel or mosque with religious service at least once a month; public plaza, park or cemetery; market place or building where trading activities are carried out at least once a week; public building like school (elementary, high school, or college), hospital, puericulture center, health center, or library; landline telephone system, calling station or cellular phone signal; postal service or public fire-*

protection service; community waterworks system or public street sweeper; and seaport that is operational" (Philippine Statistics Authority 2013).

Here country and city comparisons have been made on the basis of data obtained from UN sources as it has been standardized for census years and ideal for comparisons and analysis of temporal trends. India holds it population censuses at decadal intervals (1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011). Indonesia too conducts it at decadal intervals (1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010). Philippines has recently conducted it mainly at five year intervals, barring a seven year interval (1995, 2000, 2007, 2010 and 2015). However, the UN does not have its own definition of "urban" population but follows the definition that is used in each country. Delhi, Jakarta and Manila in UN sources are referred to Delhi, Jakarta and Manila Urban Agglomerations (UA). According to the UN (UNCHS 2015), the term "urban agglomeration" or UA *"refers to the population contained within the contours of a contiguous territory inhabited at urban density levels without regard to administrative boundaries. It usually incorporates the population in a city or town plus that in the suburban areas lying outside of, but being adjacent to, the city boundaries".* Delhi UA includes Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Noida, Gurgaon and Bahadurgarh urban areas apart from the National Capital Territory of Delhi; Jakarta UA refers to Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) Jakarta and Manila UA refers to the National Capital Region of Manila.

The data for the population size of the three urban areas however vary greatly depending on the standard reference sources. The main reason for this is that they cannot agree on the spatial delineations of diverse urban areas as their population data may refer variously to the region's most important city, to its built-up area, to its metropolitan area, or to some other layout (Forstall et. al. 2009). Table 2.1 shows such data variations across common reference sources. As per UN data in terms of sheer size of population at midyear 2014, Delhi UA is the largest at 24.95 million, when compared to the midyear population of 10.18 million and 12.67 million for Jakarta UA and Manila UA respectively. However when using Demographia and World Atlas data, Jakarta turns out to be the largest agglomeration followed by Delhi and Manila.

Another aspect of city size is its areal spread. The land area occupied by Jakarta UA is the highest at 3225 sq. km, while Delhi UA and Manila UA stands at 2163 and 1632 sq. km respectively. In 2016, Manila has the highest density of

population at 14100 persons per sq. km, followed by Delhi at 11900 persons per sq km and Jakarta the lowest at 9700 persons per sq. km (Demographia, 2016).

Table 2.1 Population and constituent urban areas according to standard reference source and year.

Standard reference source and year.	Population and constituent urban areas		
	Delhi	Jakarta	Manila
UN (2014)	24.95 million; includes Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Noida, Gurgaon and Bahadurgarh urban areas and New Delhi.	10.18 million; includes only DKI Jakarta	12.76 million; includes National Capital Region or Metro Manila.
World Atlas (2016)	25 million; Includes Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Noida, Gurgaon and Bahadurgarh urban areas and New Delhi.	30.5 million; includes DKI Jakarta and area of continuous urbanization extending into Tangerang, South Tanerang, Borgor, Bekasi and Karawang.	24.1 million; includes National Capital Region and area of continuous urbanization extending into Cavite, Laguna, Bulucan and Rizal.

Demographia (2016)	25.74 million; Includes Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Noida, Gurgaon and Bahadurgarh urban areas and New Delhi.	31.32 million; includes DKI Jakarta and continuous urbanization extending into Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bogor, Bekasi and Karawang.	22.93 million; includes National Capital Region and area of continuous urbanization extending into Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan and Rizal.
National Censuses India (2011) Indonesia (2010) Philippines (2015)	16.79 million; includes only National Capital Territory of Delhi.	9.61 million; includes only DKI Jakarta which is officially designated Special Capital Region	12.88 million; includes only National Capital Region or Metro Manila.

India is one of the least urbanized countries in the world and in 2010 its proportion of urban population was 30.9 per cent, compared to 49.9 per cent and 45.3 per cent in Indonesia and Philippines respectively. India is also projected to lag behind them in 2050 (Table 1. Appendix, Figure 2.1). Indonesia's urbanization has been the most dramatic, rising from 12.4 per cent in 1950 (which then was the lowest among the three), to 49.9 per cent in 2010 (the highest among the three), an increase of 37.5 per cent. India increased its urban population by only 10.7 per cent in 60 years, whereas Philippines' increased by 18.2 per cent.

Fig. 2.1

Comparison of Percentage of Urban Population, 1950 - 2050: India, Indonesia and Philippines.

Data Source: UN-Habitat (2015); WUP 2014; ESCAP SD table_01 - Urban population, share of total population -1950 - 2050*

* Projections.

2.3.2 *Brief early histories of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila.*

The megacities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila are all old historical capital cities with a fundamental colonial imprint. In this section the antecedent forces guiding the growth of these cities, beginning from the time of their respective national independences till the 1990s, (which corresponds roughly to the onset of the period of consumer retail and financial globalisation) is discussed. It is commonly believed that the site of Delhi has historically been the location of 15 urban settlements of all sizes, including military strongholds, between 3000 B.C. and 1700 A.D. Among these seven cities are notable and includes:

(1) *Indraprashtha* supposedly built by the Pandavas as mentioned in the ancient *Mahabharata.*

(2) *Surajkund, Tomar-Gurjar* city built between 9th -10th century A.D.

(3) *Lalkot*, built 1052 A.D. by the *Tomara* ruler, Anangpal. In 1180 A.D. it was expanded and reinforced by Prithviraj Chauhan to defend against Muslim invaders and it was renowned as *Qila Rai Pithora.*

(4) The above mentioned area is today known as *Mehrauli*, and later on became the seat of the *Mamluk* (slave) dynasty. Allauddin Khilji created

the bastion of *Siri Fort* as defence against Mongol invasions in 1303 A.D. Later rulers of this dynasty such as Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq built *Tughlaqabad* (1320 A.D.) and Feroz Shah Tughlaq built *Ferozabad* (1354 A.D.) the remnants of which is today known as *Feroz Shah Kotla.*

(5) Humayun constructed *Dinpanah* and; Sher Shah Suri built *Shergarh* (1538 - 1545 A.D.)

(6) *Shahjanabad* or the walled city that enclosed the Red Fort and Chandni Chowk, currently called Old Delhi, was built between 1638- 1649 A.D. by Shah Jahan as the Capital of the Mughal Empire. Later on in 1858 A.D. it fell to the legions of the British East India Company after a fiercely fought siege that was a crucial part of the quelling of the Revolt of 1857.

(7) Sir Edwin Lutyens and Sir Herbert Baker were British architects and they were appointed to plan a new city and Lutyens Delhi or New Delhi was built to the south west of *Shahjahanabad*. The Capital of the British territories in India was shifted from Calcutta to (New) Delhi on 12th December 1911. Delhi continued to function as India's national capital after Independence and completed 100 years of playing this role in 2011 (Singh 2006).

Jakarta was founded in the fourth century as *Sunda Kelapa*, the city became a significant entrepot for the Kingdom of *Sunda*. As *Batavia*, it became effectively the capital of the Dutch East Indies. After Indonesia's pronouncement of independence in 1945, the city, then known as *Djakarta*, preserved its standing as capital of Indonesia. Jakarta and Manila both served as entrepots and naval bases.

When Ferdinand Magellan discovered the islands in 1521, it was the site of a thriving Muslim habitation under Rajah Suleman (Ragrario 2003). In 1571, Conquistadors arrived from Mexico across the Pacific ocean and Legaspi founded the modern day Manila at the site of what is today the *Intramuros* district. As the other end of the Acapulco – Manila sea lane that connected Spanish America with Asia, Manila received the moniker "Pearl of the Orient". It became a hub of Spanish activity as it was centrally located on Pacific trade routes. *Intramuros* ('within the walls') was citadel that bustled politics, trade and missionary activity (Connell 1999).

The shift of the capital of Philippines from Cebu to Manila in 1571, marked the beginning of 309 years of Spanish rule. *Intramuros,* defended by Fort Santiago became the seat of both state and the church, and the Spanish missionaries and armies ventured forth into the country from this base (Ragrario 2003). The Spaniards ruled the archipelagic island nation till the Battle of Manila in 1898, where they lost Philippines to the United States. When the United States started its colonial rule, it changed the language of official communication from Spanish to English, restructured the education system, changed legislation, and introduced modern urban planning. At the end of World War II, most of the city was flattened by severe bombing by the US Air Force (Douglass et. al 2007). The US occupation of Philippines lasted from 1898 to 1946, a period during which the population of Manila increased from approximately 2 lakhs to 7 lakhs. Manila was a beachhead of the US presence in Philippines and the Americans received from the Spaniards an erstwhile great city from another epoch, fallen upon difficult times. After the Philippine-American War, which cost over 2 lakh lives, armistice was re-established, and the colonial government embarked on a series of reforms, that included political, health, education civic restructurings that was directed to impress upon Philippines that there was a change for the better with the adoption of American institutions. These measures were also undertaken as part of measures to subdue an on-going independence movement. A government elected though popular vote, with a decentralised administration resembling the that of the United States was established. The years 1902, 1907, 1916 and 1935 were marked by the elections for provincial governor, national assembly, national legislature and for president respectively. By 1911, better sanitation and community awareness had almost eradicated the periodic cholera epidemics that used to leave thousands dead. Smallpox, which was slaying 6000 persons annually in the Manila region was eliminated by administering vaccines and the incidence of malaria was reduced through vector control. These measures effectively reduced Manila's annual death rate from 43 per thousand people in 1899 to only 23 in 1914. Colonial overseers next became interested in architectural concerns and enhancement of transportation. In 1904 the renowned architect Daniel Burnham, arguably the finest architect of the City Beautiful Movement was appointed to create a planned Manila and the mountain resort city of Baguio to the north. He was a leading proponent of the American reformist movement that wanted to renovate decaying inner cities through the construction of monumental neoclassical buildings, broad boulevards and parks.

The goal of the planning Manila then became turning the city into an expression of the future of the Filipino people under American colonial rule, as well to symbolize the efficiency of American Administration in the Philippines (Shatkin 2005)

2.3.3   *Macroeconomic changes and the growth of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila*

In 1950, the population of Delhi UA[1], Jakarta UA[2] and Manila UA[3] and was 1.37 million, 1.45 million and 1.54 million respectively. By 2014, the population of all three urban agglomerations had grown manifold, exceeding 10 million, with Delhi having the highest among the three of 24.95 million, Jakarta having a population of 10.18 million and Manila 12.76 million and (UN-Habitat, 2015). These urban regions are not just capital cities and humongous in terms of population and area; but play central roles in the national economy, in the governance of the countries of which they are capitals, and sets the benchmarks of social life. These have a disproportionate share in the country's GDP, and are a focal point for global linkages.

(A) The growth of Delhi since independence and macroeconomic changes:

With independence in 1941, there was rapid urbanisation in India due to demographic, administrative and economic imperatives. Refugees from the newly formed nation of Pakistan teemed into Punjab from the western boundary and into Bengal from the eastern border. Most of them particularly in the west traveled into urban areas and there was an urgent requirement for new housing. While the national capital of Delhi and towns like Jallandhar, Ludiana, Ambala, and Amritsar in Punjab and Calcutta in the east swelled with creation of new clusters and peripheries to house them, yet 14 new towns needed to be constructed amid 1947 – 1951. After the process of linguistic reorganisation in India in 1956, new states were created which required new capitals and administrative centres. The growth of urban population peaked at 3.94 per cent during 1970 - 1980 for India (Table 2 Appendix, Figure 2.2). Coinciding with the period of high urban growth, till 1971, 112 New Towns had been built, which were not only state capitals like Chandigarh, Bhubaneshwar, and Gandhinagar, but also new towns built at the site of heavy industries and power projects such as

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[1] Includes Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Noida, Gurgaon and Bahadurgarh urban areas and New Delhi.

[2] DKI Jakarta

[3] National Capital Region of Manila

Bhilai, Durg, Bokaro, Durgapur and Rourkela. Some towns like Kalyani in the Kolkata metropolitan area were planned to relieve the pressure of the burgeoning population off the central city. With the exception of a few privately built townships like Jamshedpur and Modinagar, the construction of New Towns were commonly funded by the government (Shaw 2012). A parallel development was the growth of metropolitan cities (cities with more than 1 million population). The numbers rose from 4 (Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi and Chennai) in 1951, to 23 in 1991, 35 in 2001 and 53 in 2011 (Census of India 2011). A striking feature of urbanization in India is the dichotomy of decelerating urban growth at national level but accelerating growth in cities with population greater than 100,000 or Class I cities.

In the decades immediately following independence, a large range of jobs in the manufacturing sector supported an important percentage of the industrial labour in the metropolitan areas. But with the waning of old manufacturing activities like jute production in 1960s and cotton textiles since the 1980s, cities whose wealth were based on these industries have stagnated unless they became export oriented or diverted to new sectors. This development was reflected in a change in the economic structure of large cities where there was a decline in manufacturing activity and a simultaneous increase in service sector jobs. The fall of blue-collar industry in the urban core areas came together with a negative growth of population in these cores as well, but labour retrenchment and depopulation in the core was counterbalanced by an increase in both on the metropolitan peripheries.

Another feature of urbanization in India is the problems of housing and overstretched urban infrastructure. Incapable of affording lawful housing, the poor in the city resorted to squatting on whatever open spaces could be found and built their own improvised shelters. For their livelihoods they resorted to the informal sector. As a result an associated trait of urbanization in India has been the burgeoning of slums and informal settlements in the cities and an expanding informal economy.

The outward sprawling of the cities to accommodate the growing population occurred both through planned developments of suburb and satellite townships as well as an outcome of spontaneous chaotic growth along the peripheries (Shaw 2007). A great many satellite towns have appeared surrounding the metro cities, which during the course of time get assimilated into the urban agglomerations in the course of areal expansion. Outgrowth (OG) settlements are also viewed as being part of the Urban Agglomeration (UA) itself by the Census of India. In addition, the municipal confines

of the Class I cities have also undergone enlargement over time, with the consequential addition in population. The higher than national average growth trend of Million Plus cities is another evidence of unbalanced urban growth (Kundu 2006). While urban population for India grew at 2.31 percent, 3.13 percent, 3.94 percent and 3.24 percent during the 1950's, 60's 70s and 80s, Delhi grew at consistently higher rates of 5.24 percent, 4.46 percent, 4.64 percent and 5.75 percent during the same decades. The size of Delhi UA's population swelled from 1.37 million in 1950 to 9.73 million in 1990. It jumped to 15.73 million in 2000 and 21.93 million in 2010. The size of the mid-year population in 2014 has been estimated to be 24.95 million (Table 3 Appendix, Figure 2.3). India experienced the lowest rate of urbanisation since the 1960s during 2000 - 2010 at 2.6 per cent (Table 2 Appendix, Figure 2.2). Delhi's growth had decelerated in the 1990s as well at 4.93 per cent, however the annual average rate of growth of Delhi fell below 4.00 per cent for the first time during 2000 - 2010 (3.38 per cent) and further projected to slow down to 2.95 per cent in 2010 – 2020, and 2.08 per cent in 2020 - 2030 (Table 4 Appendix, Figure 2.4).

Fig. 2.2

Average Annual Rate of Change of Urban Population, 1950 - 2050: India, Indonesia and Philippines.

Figure 2.3

Comparative Growth of Total Population of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila Urban Agglomerations,1950 - 2030

Figure 2.4

Annual Average Rate of Growth of Population of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila Urban Agglomerations: 1950-1960 to 2020-2030

Data Source: WUP 2014, ESCAP SD table_01 - Urban population, share of total population -1950-2050* Projections. In, The United Nations Human Settlement

Programme (2015), The State of Asian and Pacific Cities. Urban transformations. Shifting from quantity to quality.[4]

As cities are engines of economic growth there has been increasing urban rural disparity in India. However declining urban growth rates signal that the nature of this growth has been exclusive. India's New Economic Policy of 1991, which placed the country on a path of globalization, privatisation and liberalization, was precipitated by a Balance of Payments crisis that landed the country in a situation of almost economic breakdown. In repay for an IMF bailout, gold was transported to London as security, the rupee faced devaluation and India was required to accept economic reforms. The reforms eliminated the Licence Raj, cut tariffs and interest rates and broke several government monopolies, permitting automatic approval of foreign direct investment in many sectors. From 1991, the general emphasis of liberalisation has remained the same. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Atal Bihari Vajpayee government gave the reforms another big push ahead, when it was in power for six years, from 1998-99 and from 1999-2004. Near the close of 2011, the Congress-led UPA-2 Coalition Government began the introduction of 51% FDI in retail segment which was eventually approved in December 2012 (Business Standard 2012).

According to the World Bank and other multilateral development agencies, cities must be ecologically sustainable and at the same time function as engines of economic growth by continuing to attract investment. This can be achieved through efficient urban management, decentralization of local governance, deregulation of urban land and housing markets and improving local body finances by recovering costs of infrastructure and services. By maximizing the spatial efficiency of production, cities will automatically alleviate poverty by delivering equitable and inclusive growth (World Bank 2009). The main drivers of growing Indian cities in the post liberalization period are together local and global.

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[4] The UN does not have its own definition of "urban" population but follows the definition that is used in each country. The definitions are generally those used by national statistical offices in carrying out the latest available census.

During the 1990s, India experienced an all-around drop in the growth of employment, and a decline in the ratio of manufacturing employment in the urban sector. The transformations in the structure of workforce and the changing organization of governance concomitant with macroeconomic reforms have resulted in the process of urbanisation becoming exclusionary in nature (Kundu 2003; 2006). The problem of financing urban infrastructure, and urban basic services had been exacerbated as a substantial decline in the governments' budgetary support for this purpose had occurred following the approach of full cost recovery of urban basic services, and strict financial discipline as envisaged in Eighth and Ninth Plans (Bagchi and Chattopadhyay 2004). There has been a decline in the manufacturing sector employment as growth has taken place in industries with high capital intensity. Further, growing casualization and subcontracting, resulting in the classification of these workers in the tertiary sector, declining absorptive capacity of the unorganized sector and the siting of manufacturing units outside the municipal limits due to elitist preferences for a low density clean micro environment has also contributed to the declining share of manufacturing in urban employment. There have been several drives in cities across in India to push out low valued (to the global city) activities to make space for high valued activities through slum relocation, clearance and removal of hawkers. External financial assistance is available only to those urban agencies that fulfil the conditions of cost recovery, and institutional capacity building. Cut backs in government funding of infrastructure and provisioning of public services has meant that the status of the state has now changed to a facilitator rather than a provider; and consequent encouragement to urban bodies to achieve high credit rating and raise funds through municipal bonds and other innovative credit instruments has meant that only limited big cities with a broad economic base are capable of raising assets for development, excluding small and medium sized towns. This has led to the process of urbanization becoming exclusionary in nature (Kundu 2006).

Apart from manifesting in shifting of the goalposts of urban policies, the urban workforce structure and the system of urban governance, the role of globalisation in the evolution of Indian cities is also seen in other arrangements. It can be seen in the presence of FDI in industries, and the BPO and KPO industries budding in the large cities. Even the built environment of the metro cities, although constructed through locally sourced materials, is imbibing a distinctly global aesthetics and design, such as in high-class residential and commercial properties, IT parks, New Towns and

BPO workspaces. Indian mega cities have through the pursuit of projects focused on command and control functions of global cities, invested in infrastructure, aesthetics, cultural facilities and urban spectacles which encourage gentrification and displacement of the poorer populations. In cities which had significant industrial base centred on textiles and machinery, such as Mumbai and Kolkata, have experienced deindustrialization of the central parts of the city and sale of old industrial property in the open market. Thus private developers are now allowed the chance to develop projects on a scale formerly the preserve of only the government, the well-known example of which is the Mumbai mill plots that altogether occupy more than 608 acres. Such large land parcels that came into supply as manufacturing activity exits from their locations are also becoming available in Kolkata: 262 acres cleared at the site of the Bata plant in Kolkata, 61 acres yielded by the Siemens factory and 31 acres relinquished by Usha Fans. The last site has now been transformed by a syndicate of Kolkata's top seven real estate developers into 'South City Mall', a combined retail and high-income real estate area (Shaw 2012).

Another significant feature of urban expansion after the New Economic Policy is a more finely tuned distinction between urban areas with respect to their suitability as destinations for new investment. The old order of the four mega cities of Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata and Chennai has now been replaced by urban corridors and clusters of fresh activities around smaller metropolitan cities, tending to locate typically in the southern and western segments of India (Shaw 2007).

(B) Macroeconomic changes in South East Asia and the growth of Jakarta and Manila:

Growth and expansion of cities in South East Asia from small cities channelling up cash crops and raw materials in the global circuits of imperial capitalism, to mega-urban regions (MURs) was accelerated by the addition of 'two more layers of global circuits of capital' (Douglass 2005: 2). As in most of the colonial world, in Indonesia and Philippines, from pre-colonial times till the 1960's global economic flows were mostly in the form of goods trading characterised by manufactured products being imported from the North, and export of agricultural goods and raw materials from the South, usually with falling terms of trade for the latter. Jakarta and Manila were their country's major gateway port to the world economy and became primate cities at the expense of inland and other cities that

dominated the pre-colonial settlement system as channels for rural surplus extraction. The national population growth rates experienced a dramatic rise after World War II, and this natural population upsurge bolstered urban population growth (Douglass 2007). However this period of commodity trade saw sluggish rates of urbanisation. Indonesia's urban population grew at 3.69 per cent and Philippines' at 4.67 per cent (Table 2 Appendix, Figure 2.2). The general pattern population increase of mega urban regions of South East Asia can be linked with four key modes of global production (Figure 2.5) (Douglass et. al. 2007).

Figure 2.5. Global impacts and associated growth of Mega Urban Region Population in South East Asia

Source: Douglass (2010).

Each phase shown in the figure represents significantly different eras of global-local linkages: (1) primary commodity production and resource extraction; (2) labour intensive export oriented industrialisation; (3) global retail consumption, and (4) global finance capital. While the last three are associated with accelerated urban transition in South East Asia, they are also responsible for the current urban form and built environment. Massive rural urban migration started after the insertion of a few

Asia Pacific countries into the second chapter of linkage with global capital, known as New International Division of Labour (NIDL). With the imposition of NIDL on a world scale in the late 1960s, there was a deep-rooted deindustrialisation of the Fordist factory system in North America and Europe and an associated reallocation of labour intensive assembly and manufacture of components to a few Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs). This global restructuring induced changes in government attitudes towards foreign investment. The initial cohort NIEs of Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, was followed in the next decade by the second generation of NIEs of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines. In the mid – 1980s, FDI in electronics and other labour intensive manufacturing began penetrating into the Southeast Asian economies of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia and to a lesser extent the Philippines, from Japan, a first generation NIE. This spurt in export oriented manufacturing in these economies occurred since 1985, which was characterised by a sudden two fold increase in the value of the Japanese yen with respect to the US dollar. This made exports of labour intensive manufactures from Japan less viable. In this shift from agrarian to urban industrial economies, the sites for location of the export oriented manufacturing industries were limited to mega urban regions (Douglass et. al. 2007). Whereas the economic rise of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is coupled with state-led industrialization, the subsequent economic take-off of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia started in a later period economic reforms and liberalization.

In terms of urban spatial transformations, there has been a trend of flow of industrial and financial investment into the urban property development sector in this region after the deregulation of the Asian banking sector in the 1980's, which led to short term speculative investment flocking to it from all around the world. There has been areal expansion of Jakarta and Manila with the construction of new towns and shopping districts in the peripheries of mega cities. The outstanding economic growth in the region till the East Asian Economic crises of 1997, led to the growth of a new consumer middle class equipped to purchase from the global marketplace. This attracted global consumption and finance capital that was channelled significantly into the construction sector as huge enclosed districts/blocks were constructed to accommodate global retail chains, and franchises. Such changes in the spatial form of major cities is considered a crucial development for sustaining global wealth accumulation through the particular circuits of capital (trade, production, franchise

consumerism and finance) with each circuit requiring a particular urban form to accommodate, support and increase the efficiency of global capital flows (Douglass et. al. 2007; Ho and Douglass 2008).

The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 was followed by an age of increased intercity competition for global investment. Douglass (2005: 2) calls this 'premeditated world city formation', which involved government support of urban mega-projects as they involved both, symbolic as well as functional elements (Douglass 2005: 2). It is pertinent here to once again note that all three countries as well as their capital cities, selected for this study had been experiencing lower annual average rates of urban population growth since 1990 – 2000, which indicates that in all three cases the post-1990's inserting of the cities within the global circuits of capital has led to exclusionary urbanization. According to UN projections the rate of growth of all three cities are likely to be similar by 2020 -2 030 (Table 4 Appendix, Figure 2.4).

After having discussed the macroeconomic changes and the associated changes in the urban geography of South East Asia in general, the next few paragraphs will look individually at the macroeconomic policy changes in Indonesia and Philippines and its corresponding influences on the growth of Jakarta and Manila. In Indonesia, from positions of non alignment and dislike of transnational capital in the early post - independence years, a changeover occurred to policies in the mid 1980s to attract foreign direct investment, including tax holidays, specific subsidies to certain industries and the creation of Export Processing Zones. Both Indonesia and Philippines experienced peak rates of urbanisation, converging at 5.44 percent and 5.41 percent respectively, during the period of 1980 -1990 (Table 2 Appendix, Figure 2.2). According to Dick (2002) the 'Old -Order' phase from 1945 to 1965 was characterised by political and economic disorientation, but certain economic progress was definitely made during this period. Sukarno, Indonesia's first president was a very vocal opponent of colonialism. However, macroeconomic volatility, scarcity of FDI, and organisational rigidities were tribulations that were closely connected with internal political strife. His efforts to do away with foreign economic dominance were sometimes inimical to the troubled economy of the newly independent state (Touwen 2008). Although the 'Old Order' phase is often described as chaotic by commentators, but it was in this phase that the unitary state was founded, important political issues that were a residue of the colonial past resolved, territorial consolidation was

achieved, and the relevance of the army was inscribed; all of which were critical for the growth of the Indonesian economy (Dick 2002: 190).

Suharto's 'New Order' (Orde Baru) stymied political development and rejected the socialist dogma, establishing a strictly monitored regime that dissuaded intellectual questioning. There was an inflow of foreign investment and foreign aid, population increase was checked through family planning programs, and a primarily agricultural economy was gradually fashioned into an industrialising one (Touwen 2008). Wie (2002) identifies a triad of distinct segments within this period. From 1966 to 1973 it was a phase of stabilization, rehabilitation, some amount of liberalisation and economic upswing. The growth of oil exports, high rates of growth of the economy, and growing administrative intrusion in community life featured during 1974 to 1982 (Wie 2002). Till the culmination of 1970s, most of Jakarta's economic output was in the form of primary sector activities like the extraction of mainly oil and timber from the outer islands of the archipelago. Since the start of the 1980s, a significant change into higher rates of economic growth, export directed industrialization alongside explosive population growth, was experienced in Jakarta. Export oriented industrialisation settled in and around Jakarta and vast government funding was made available for construction of export-processing zones, metropolitan thoroughfares and a new international airport. By the beginning 1990s, banking and financial institutions were opened to foreign investors and massive amounts of capital flowed into the JABOTABEK area. The greater part of this investment was channelled into urban land development ventures (Douglass 2005). From 1983 to 1996 deregulation, reinvigorated liberalization in reaction to falling oil-prices, and rapid export-led growth were the characteristic features. During this last phase, corruption flourished through all rungs of the administration. It was termed later as KKN (*korupsi*, *kolusi*, *nepotisme*) practices (Wie 2002).

Up to the middle of the 1980s Indonesia's trade regime favoured import substitution by means of a policy measures that included *ad valorem* import duties that varied from 0 percent to 200 percent as well as non-tariff barriers that protected nearly 35 per cent of total imports by value. Such a trade regime engendered very little development in exports of manufactured products, making Indonesian economy excessively reliant on oil and natural gas exports. Suharto's New Order Regime pursued aggressive deregulation and bolstered liberalization as a response to falling prices of oil, and brisk growth steered by exports from 1983 to 1996. The reforms

encompassed the budgetary and monetary systems as well as trade rules. In May 1986 the Suharto regime commenced on the second generation of trade deregulation that was an affirmation of this approach to economic growth. Several non-tariff obstacles were done away with or drastically reduced, giving exporters access to a duty drawback facility, creation of the first EPZs in Indonesia and reduction of many taxes. The liberalization of trade progressed, and the succeeding decade saw the announcement of supplementary trade liberalisation measures annually, usually just before the annual donors meetings. Over the following years trade reforms did away with most of the residual non-tariff barriers and further simplified the official procedures. The effective rate of protection on manufactures declined to 20 percent during mid 1990s and further to 6 percent by the last quarter of 1997. Parallel to trade reforms, financial sector reforms were also carried out. In 1988 Suharto embarked on a significant course of deregulation of the financial markets. There were fewer requirements for obtaining licenses by new banks, the procedure for opening of new branches was streamlined, requirements for becoming foreign exchange banks were relaxed and access by foreign banks as joint venture banks was now endorsed. The special facilities and obligations of state-run financial institutions were trimmed. Reserve requirements on all deposits were reduced to 2 percent (Stern 2003).

Since import substitution had been replaced by deregulation, the key drivers of urban and economic growth throughout most of Indonesia have been domestic and foreign direct investment, particularly in the industrial and services sectors, that generally cluster in big cities due to the accessibility of physical infrastructure and markets, and concentration of skilled labour. The advance in transportation and manufacturing technologies is fundamentally responsible for the vertical and horizontal division of industrial manufacturing processes and facilitated the incorporation of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) and other big Indonesian cities as nodes in global economic flows. As the industrial, financial and service sectors grew in the JMA and the other metropolises like Surabaya, Bandung, Medan, Palembang and Semarang, property sector boomed, mainly due to the building of shopping arcades and hotels in the city cores and lavish housing colonies in gated new towns on the urban peripheries (Firman et al. 2007; Firman 1998; 2004a; 2004b; 2009). Between 1950 – 1960, the annual average rate of growth of population for Jakarta was 6.32 per cent. It was at 4.33 per cent during the 1970s, thereafter declining to 3.17 during the 1980s.

By 1997, the East Asian financial crises hit and the economies of the major cities, especially the JMA were badly affected. Main factors responsible for the economic crisis in Indonesia were the partially fixed exchange rate of the rupiah, quickly rising short-term foreign debt and the weak financial system. Its acuteness is ascribed to the accompanying political crises: the monetary crisis (KRISMON) led to a total crisis (KRISTAL) due to the inadequate policy reaction of the Suharto government (Firman 1999). Suharto had been dictator for 32 years and his rule was forcefully centralized, corrupt and was unable manage the emergency in a sound way (Touwen 2008). The economic crisis resulted in a rapidly growing unemployment. A massive economic retrenchment was experienced and numerous workers were forced to return to their native villages on becoming suddenly unemployed in the cities. This crippling economic crisis precipitated the fall of the Suharto's regime. In August 1999 the Indonesian Parliament passed Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 concerning regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation. The twin legislations had to be undertaken as it was expected that Indonesia would break up into several tiny nations. It was envisaged that this would curb the separatist sentiments in the outer provinces of Indonesia and stop manipulation of the provincial and local administrations by the national government. During New Order, the national government took all the decisions, while local governments, which was prevented from determining local policies, had to implement policies conceived at the central level. The new laws were passed with purpose of empowering local communities and to foster government - citizen ties. As per these two laws the district (*Kabupaten*) and municipality (*Kota*) governments had much more say in the manage local economic activities, especially utilization of natural resources, such as oil and timber (Firman 2004a; 2004b; 2009; Firman et al. 2007).

Economic activity, especially in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA), had been hit the hardest. There was a rapid increase in unemployment in the urban areas and many manufacturing units, banking and service firms, including in the real estate sector, which had been the main drivers of urban growth in the 1980s and 1990s, shut shop and carried out retrenchment. In the cities, the formal sector workers sought refuge in the informal sector while making do with reduced incomes and flow of remittances in rural areas was greatly reduced (Firman 2007). Indonesia and Philippines has since experienced a slowdown of urbanisation at 4.85 per cent and 2.15 per cent respectively during 1990 – 2000 and historically low rates of

urbanisation following independence at 3.19 per cent for Indonesia and 1.28 per cent for Philippines in the following decade 2000 – 2010 (Table 2.3. Figure 2.2). Jakarta's growth fell to the lowest of 0.26 per cent in the 90s. Thereafter the growth picked up a little to 1.39 per cent during 2000 - 2010, but it can be still called sluggish. Manila was not as badly affected as Jakarta during the 1997 fiscal crises and grew at 2.25 per cent during the 1990s. Between 2000 -2010 it registered better growth than Jakarta at 1.79 per cent (Table 2.5. Figure 2.4).

In the post-WW II period, the economy of Philippines has had a chequered history. From being counted amongst the richest nations in Asia after Japan, it is now ranked among the poorest. Economic growth rates immediately after WW II was high, but has declined with the years. From 1946 to 1949 was a stage of post-war recovery and growth. As Philippines achieved political independence from the US, it was hoped that speedy economic recovery would occur with special post-war non-military US assistance in the country, through reimbursements for war damages, and through a bilateral trade agreement with the US. The period from 1950s to 1960s was one of import substitution and economic nationalism. The series of presidencies after the first president Manuel Roxas, including Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal would oversee and enhance this period of exclusivist economic nationalism. The 1970s to the mid 1980s saw the imposition of martial law and debt crises. Ferdinand Marcos who rose through the mid 1960s to become president, declared martial law after eight years of rule. This allowed him to keep on reigning as president. He oversaw major socio -economic and political changes (Sicat 2015). For more than three decades after World War II, import substitution and a high degree of protectionism characterised the Philippine economy. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Philippine government was prompted by multilateral organizations to undertake policy reforms to infuse competition in the manufacturing sector. A serious recession led to the contraction of the economy by 10 per cent. In the face of these mounting difficulties in 1983, the Philippine government declared a debt repayment moratorium. In response, international creditors and financial agencies cut off access to external credit. As a response both domestic and international business took massive amounts of capital out of the Philippine economy, prompting the government to seek an IMF stabilization loan. In exchange for that bail-out facility, the government agreed to undertake a wide-reaching program of austerity and liberalization (Raquiza 2013).

The trade regime was finally liberalized by doing away with tariffs and non-tariff barriers in 1986 following the People Power Revolution (Lim and Montes 2002). Reforms were set off not only in the financial sector but also in utilities like telecommunications, power, water, air transport and shipping. The initial tariff reform program (TRP 1) started in 1981 considerably diminished the average nominal tariff and the high non-tariff barriers that typified the Philippine industrial structure before (Aldaba 2013). Since 1987 it has been a phase of rebuilding the political system and of liberalizing the economy. Corazon Aquino returned political institutions to that which prevailed before the imposition of martial law by adoption of the 1987 constitution. But readings of political uncertainty during the Aquino government inhibited economic growth. Nonetheless Mrs Aquino persisted on the reforms in trade and industry, facilitating the opening up the national economy. She was succeeded by Fidel Ramos who continued further economic liberalisation and started privatisation of key government companies (Sicat 2015). The next stage of the tariff reform (TRP II) was begun in 1991 that further lessened the range of tariffs between 3 to 30 per cent. The government commenced on to the next stage of tariff reform (TRP III) in 1995 as initial attempts to adopt a uniform 5 per cent tariff rate by 2005. This further tapered down the tariff range for industrial products to within 3 and 10 per cent range and cut the maximum rate on manufactured goods to 30 per cent while the minimum remained at 3 per cent. It also created a four-tiered tariff structure: 3 percent for raw materials and capital equipment which were not locally available, 10 percent for raw materials and capital equipment that were unavailable locally, 20 percent for intermediate goods, and 30 percent for finished goods (Aldaba 2013). During the presidency of Fidel Ramos, the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997 slowing economic development in the Philippines again, although the effects were less harsh in the Philippines than its neighbours, partially because it had more than $7 billion in annual remittances from overseas Filipino workers. The Estrada, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno Aquino presidencies continued economic liberalisation and further opened up the Philippine economy to global investments and competition (Sicat 2015). In 2001, TRP IV, was approved to regulate the tariff configuration approximating an unvarying tariff level of 5 per cent by the year 2004, excluding a limited number of sensitive agricultural and manufacturing products (Aldaba 2013).

External factors have interacted with the domestic political economy of Philippines to produce according to Bello et al. (2005: 15) "a political economy of

permanent crisis" in which the national economy and polity have not been able to provide a steady base of governance to achieve growth objectives. This permanent crisis has its beginnings in the plantation based economy that was established during Spanish colonisation, which led to the creation of a wealthy and influential class of landowners that was made up of hybrid Philippino and Chinese origin merchants dynasties who had obtained their acreage from Spanish monks. The Americans since 1902 nurtured a changeover to electoral democracy, but did not focus on reducing socio-economic disparities. Affluent landowning folks employed their wherewithal to occupy elected positions in local government and parliament. What resulted was a state of 'booty capitalism', in which an influential business class obtains privileges in the face of an ineffectual administration (Hutchcroft 1998: 20 in Shatkin 2008: 396). Such a state of affairs has continued since the overthrow of Marcos, despite the government enacting reforms to improve political accountability, and citizens resorting to mass demonstrations against corrupt administrations, like that which ousted President Joseph Estrada in 2000. Philippines has been caught in a debt trap, a state of affairs that has continued notwithstanding the greater embeddedness of the national economy within global flows. The beginnings of this debt trap were during the Marcos regime, from 1965 to 1986 as a result of the government's use of loans from external sources for funding public infrastructure projects, vital to sustaining the system of patronages, one of the major arrangements that kept the regime propped.

The economy entered into recession in the late 1980s and the debt crisis deepened. After the toppling of Marcos and the reinstatement of democracy in 1986, the administration of Corazon Aquino was under pressure to decide between surrendering to insistence of creditors and IMF to liberalise the economy and reduce government expenditure, or holding out to these demands in the near future to be able to make necessary investments in the infrastructural and social sectors. It however could not withstand the pressure and went with the first option and from 1987 to 1991, more than 40 percent of Philippine's national budgetary expenditure was on servicing external loans, and the government took on supplementary loans to repay long outstanding loans (Bello et al. 2005). This hampered the administrations capacity to steer economic policy in a precarious phase. According to Bello et al. (2005), the state did not steer the elite and the private sector into more growth oriented directions like in the other Asian Tiger economies, instead it retreated from involvement in planning, production, trade and finance justifying it in the name of market efficiency

and tackling corruption. Simultaneously the already compromised Philippine government agencies were pervaded more deeply by vested interests (Bello et al. 2005).

As a result of being in a state of constant predicament, the Philippines state did not have the administrative muscle to grab the opportunities presented after the near doubling of the value of the yen following the 1985 Plaza Accord that had unleashed a wave of FDI from Japan into South East Asia. When other South East Asian economies were investing in infrastructure and undergoing economic and governance reforms, the Philippines stayed encumbered in debt, with a shaky government, a superficial domestic market, and lagged behind all the South East Asian countries in attracting FDI (Bello 2004). While the hamlets and small fishing towns located in the hinterland of the megacities of South East Asia transformed within a decades time to be counted among the fastest growing urban -industrial regions in the world, economic growth around the Metro Manila region remained comparatively sluggish (Shatkin 2008).

Wherever export oriented industrialisation had taken hold, accelerated urbanisation and spatial disparity became the most dominant feature of the space economy. The rise of Metro Manila as the hub of political power, affluence, commerce and of Spanish, American and Chinese influences has been well recognized (Corpuz 1997). Principal sectors of the Philippine economy include agriculture and industry, particularly food processing, textiles and garments, and electronics and automobile parts. Most of these industries are concentrated in the urban areas around metropolitan Manila. This concentration led to a fast pace of urbanization in the region. By the 1970s, Metro Manila's level of urbanization was already at 100 per cent (Magno-Ballesteros 2000). Manila's population growth peaked in the 1970s at 5.36 per cent, and thereafter there has been a steady decline and it grew at 2.96 per cent in the 1980s (Table 4 Appendix, Figure 2.4).

(C) Comparative growth of GDP and per-capita income after macroeconomic liberalization:

Encompassing the entire period of reforms in the three countries, a comparison of the growth of purchasing power parity valuation of GDP's from 1980 to 2016 (IMF 2017) (Figure 2.6(a); Table 7 Appendix) among the India, Indonesia and Philippines, from 1980 shows that while India's GDP was 381.961 billion dollars

in 1980, it has grown exponentially since then. It grew to 986.90 billion dollars in 1990, 2077.84 billion dollars in 2000, 5312.26 billion in 2010, and 8720.51 billion dollars in 2016. In the same time period, Indonesia's GDP was 184.23 billion dollars in 1980, rising to 516.67 billion dollars in 1990, 958.48 billion dollars in 2000, to 2003.96 billion dollars in 2010, and 3027.83 billion dollars in 2016. In the case of Philippines it was 90.284 billion dollars in 1980, rising to 160.563 billion dollars in 1990, 261.127 billion dollars in 2000, to 513.963 billion dollars in 2010, and 801.902 billion dollars in 2016. Thus we can see that probably due to the sheer size of its economy, during the entire time period India's GDP has by far outstripped that of the other two countries.

Figure: 2.6 (a)

India, Indonesia and Philippines, Gross Domestic Product based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP: 1980 - 2016.

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016

A comparison of the city level GDP of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila (Brookings Institution 2014) in Figure 2.6 (b) shows that in 2013, Jakarta had the highest purchasing power adjusted GDP among the three cities at over 320 billion dollars, whereas Delhi and Manila lagged behind at 190 and 180 billion dollars respectively.

But the projected GDP's (PWC 2009) of the lagging cities is set to overtake Jakarta in 2025, with Delhi projected to grow fastest among the three with a GDP of 482 billion dollars followed by Manila at 325 billion dollars.

Figure: 2.6 (b)

Data Sources:

    (1) The Brookings Institution, 2014.

    (2) Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009 estimates and projections using UN urban agglomerations definitions and population estimates.

However the opposite picture emerges when the per capita purchasing power parity valuation of GDP's are compared during the same time period (IMF 2017) (Figure 2.7(a); Table 7 Appendix). Here India falls behind both Philippines and Indonesia. In 1980 the per capita GDP of India, Indonesia and Philippines was 557.05 dollars, 1250.41 dollars and 1883.64 dollars respectively. In 1990, it was 1164.57 dollars, 2880.35 dollars and 2634.77 dollars respectively. Thus, Indonesia experienced robust economic growth during this period and its per capita income surpassed that of Philippines and has remained higher than its South East Asian neighbour since then. In 2000 the per capita GDP of India, Indonesia and Philippines was 2018.92 dollars, 4646.85 dollars and 3400.54 billion dollars respectively. In

2016, these figures were 6658.34 dollars, 11699.41 dollars and 7696.16 dollars. Since 1989, Indonesia has had the highest GDP per capita amongst the three countries. But it is noteworthy that it was also affected the most during the East Asian economic crises of 1997, and both its overall and per capita GDP fell in its aftermath. Both its overall GDP and its per capita GDP recovered in 2001 to 1997 levels, and has continued to grow since then. Philippines was affected the least and its GDP recovered by 1999.

Figure: 2.7. (a)

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016

The comparative levels of per capita GDP in 2013 at the level of the urban areas of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila (The Brookings Institution 2014) in Figure 2.7 (b) show a different picture from the national levels in the same year. Although Indonesia had the highest per capita GDP in 2013 among the three countries, yet Jakarta its capital city does not. While the per capita GDP of Philippines has seen the slowest growth among the three countries, although still higher than India in 2016, Manila has

the highest per capita GDP at 6160 dollars. This suggests greater inequality of distribution of income in Manila compared to the other two cities. Delhi, consistent with per capita GDP rank at the national levels has the lowest per capita GDP at 3580 dollars.

Figure: 2.7(b)

Data Source: The Brookings Institution, 2014.

The sectoral composition of GDP in the three nations has also changed post liberalisation (World Bank 2015; 2005) (Table 2.2). In India the share of agriculture has fallen from 31 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2015, while the share of services has risen from 41 percent to 53 percent in the same period. Industry and manufacturing have tended to remain stagnant. In Indonesia, the share of agriculture was already low to begin with; in 1990 (19 per cent) and in 2015 it declined to 14 per cent. In Philippines the share of agriculture has declined from 22 percent to 10 percent in the same period. While the share of the service sector grew appreciably in Philippines, like in India growing to 59 percent in 2015 from 44 percent in 1990, in Indonesia the service sector actually shrank to 38 percent in 2000 from 41 percent in 1990, and in 2015 it rose to 43 percent. Between 1990 and 2000, the share of industry

grew from 39 percent to 49 percent Indonesia, while both in India and Philippines it declined or remained the same in this time period. In 2015 the share of industry has tended to return back to 1990 levels in all three countries. During the 1980s and 1990s Indonesia has benefitted most under the NIDL among the South East Asian countries. While India was not a part of the NIDL and hence shows decline in the share of industry and manufacturing in this period, Philippines although a part of the NIDL has been the worst performer among the South East Asian nations in terms of growth of industry and manufacturing.

Table 2.1 Sectoral Composition of GDP (Percentage).

	India			Indonesia			Philippines		
Sector	1990	2000	2015	1990	2000	2015	1990	2000	2015
Agriculture	31	23	17	19	16	14	22	14	10
Industry	28	26	30	39	46	40	34	34	31
Manufacturing	17	15	16	29	28	21	25	24	20
Services	41	51	53	41	38	43	44	52	59

Data Sources:

    (1) The World Bank, 2005, World Development Indicators: Structure of output.

    (2) The World Bank, 2015, World Development Indicators: Structure of output.

2.4 Delhi: Transformation of urban space

2.4.1 *The role of urban planning.*

The evolution of city space of Delhi has been the outcome of both formal planning efforts and private initiatives and responses. In the 1950's Delhi experienced severe shortage of physical infrastructure due to an influx of refugees after partition. The population of Delhi grew between 1941 and 1951 from 0.92 million to 1.74 million, with a decadal growth of 90 percent and an annual exponential growth rate of 6.42 percent. During the decade before the population grew by 44.27 per cent while in the decade following it the population grew by 52.44 per cent (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Growth of Population in Delhi: 1901- 2001

Census year	Total population	Annual growth rate (percent)	Decennial growth rate (percent)
1901	405819		-
1911	413851	0.2	1.98
1921	488452	1.66	18.03
1931	636246	2.64	30.26
1941	917939	3.67	44.27
1951	1744072	6.42	90
1961	2658612	4.22	52.44
1971	4065698	4.25	52.93
1981	6220406	4.25	53
1991	9420644	4.15	51.45
2001	13782976	3.85	47.02
2011	16787941	1.92	21.2

Data Sources:

(1) Economic Survey of Delhi, 2005 – 2006. Planning Department, Government of the N.C.T. of Delhi.

(2) Statistical Abstract of Delhi, 2014. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of N.C.T. of Delhi.

The mushrooming of several refugee colonies, unbridled squatting on public land, illegal subdivision of land, housing shortages, and land speculation were taking place without any regard to the availability of basic services and amenities. It was then that the national leaders decided that the growth of the modern capital of independent India was not be left unplanned. Thus an interventionist policy was

decided upon and made tangible through a Master Plan. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was mandated in 1957, when parliament enacted the Delhi Development Act. According to its founding charter, the DDA was entrusted with the task of creating a master plan for Delhi. In this task it adopted the North American model of urban planning owing to the alliance with a team of Ford Foundation consultants (Ahmad et al. 2013). The DDA had 'the power to acquire, hold, manage, and dispose of land and other property, to carry out building, engineering, mining, and other operations to execute works in connection—with supply of water and electricity, disposal of sewage, and other services and amenities' (Delhi Development Act, Section 6, 1957). The Union Ministry of Urban Development controls the Delhi Development Authority. The exclusive responsibilities of the DDA have been clearly laid down and the development works of all civic agencies in Delhi must be in compliance with the Master Plan. The Master Plan for Delhi -1962 had mandated large scale acquisition and development of land, the most important activity of the DDA has been to acquire land and develop new areas in response to the increasing pressures of urban expansion. New areas are notified as 'development areas' and they remain under the purview of the DDA for permitting and regulating construction activity. The DDA endorses the building plans and enforces building norms. It is only in service delivery (non-development) aspects that jurisdiction is given to the relevant local authority such as the MCD, who must act in conformity with the Master Plan. Eventually, when an area has been fully developed and no further land acquisition is necessary, the development area is de-notified and handed over to the relevant local authority, and the DDA remains only as the lease administering authority (Delhi Human Development Report 2006).

The First Master Plan for Delhi became effective in 1962 and was intended to cover a span of 20 years beginning 1961. Since 1962, the process of planned development was imagined and continued to be a public sector led process with very little private participation in terms of development of both, shelter and infrastructure services till the process of macroeconomic reforms was begun in the early nineties (DDA 2007). The inclusion of American experts was aimed at forming a modernist city of the post-War period, in which the city was transformed into "a single state sponsored homogeneous zone, creating a universally rational city divided into functional sectors" (Caldeira 1996: 317). The Plan envisaged segregated land-use; elaborate zoning and sub-divisional regulations and 20 per cent of the urban area were

planned as extensive organized open space. It intended poly-nodal hierarchical development with District Centres, Community Centres and Local Shopping Centres as parts of the hierarchy and the neighbourhood having a population of 15000 with supporting facilities was taken as the main unit of planning. The Plan introduced the concept of seven neighbouring *ring towns* to absorb population growth to take the population pressure off the core city. It also provided for a green belt on the periphery of the proposed urban area to hinder the overflow of urban population (DDA 1990). Its implementation has led to the transformation of the city space as there has been a slow shift of the economic centre from Old Delhi, which was composed of small markets and businesses, to South Delhi where the embassies and multinational companies are located (Ahmad et al. 2013). In this outlook, the Old City was regarded to be a "slum, congested, filthy, obsolete, functionally lacking in exclusive land use zones, without any green spaces and socially and culturally stagnant" (Jain 1990:79). It was thus planned to shift out approximately 45 per cent of its population in order to decongest and redevelop the old city (Batra 2007). This code of the master plan also laid the foundation for Delhi's present spatial contours, "characterized by a multicentric layout with no clearly identifiable Central Business District (CBD) and urban sprawl via several low-density satellite towns" (Ahmad et al. 2013: 646).

In the 1950s and 1960s Indian planning enshrined a developmentalist and liberal logic of urban planning that facilitated uneven development which was manifest in master plans and five-year plans. It was only towards the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s that urban development became a feature in the Five Year Plans. The Third Five Year Plan (1961–66) took up the issue of urbanization for the first time, and there was a growing consensus on the necessity of balanced regional development and integrated regional development (Chand et al. 1983). Following the recommendation of the Interim General Plan for Greater Delhi (1956), in 1961 a high-powered board was set up under the union minister for home affairs to give major consideration to a planned decentralization to outer areas and even outside the Delhi region, introducing the idea of the capital region for the first time. This was a significant development in the urban planning process of Delhi as the Master Plan 1962 was not just an exercise in city planning, but also in regional planning, and had a direct impact on the neighbouring states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. An area of about 2,072 square kilometres was designated as the Delhi Metropolitan Area. With increasing rural urban migration the population of Delhi rose and there was a shortage

of housing, requiring expansion into the peri-urban areas. The designated metropolitan area covered the entire territory of Delhi as well as the five ring towns in the two neighbouring states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh—Loni and Ghaziabad in Uttar Pradesh and Ballabhgarh, Bahadurgarh, and Gurgaon in Haryana—and one town, Narela, in the Delhi territory (DDA 1962). While it was proposed that two new towns, Ghaziabad and Faridabad, be developed as industrial towns, close to 14 per cent of their total population was engaged in manufacturing in 1981, Gurgaon was considered to have limited capacity for growth due to the shortage of water (DDA1962). Although the plan was at a regional level the administration of the DDA was limited to Delhi and it could only implement the plan in the area that was confined within the union territory of Delhi and not in the belt circling New Delhi. The Master Plan covered a total area of 2072 sq kms, but its legislative power could cover only 1485 square kilometres, leaving the fate of the ring towns, including Gurgaon, unclear (Gururani 2013)

According to Priya (2006: 234) the Master plan was "basically a land-management plan", marking out commercial areas, residential areas, industrial areas and educational areas. Existing areas were earmarked for conservation, rehabilitation or clearance. Despite having three Master Plans with an overarching power vested in DDA much of Delhi has evolved informally. Delhi has always been one of the most economically vibrant cities of India. The city had always been a centre for trade and distribution in North India. The city today is the wholesale centre for nine types of goods, and the wholesale trade originated in the Old City. The public sector also became a major economic force in the city after Independence. Since industries, construction, communication, services was concentrated in the city, it acted as a pull factor for migrants from nearby states. There was a huge growth in small and informal manufacturing especially in the Old City. By the time of commencement of the third Master Plan, the number of manufacturing units increased 16 times, investment 140 times and production 180 times between 1951 and 2001. Small-scale industries and the unorganized sector continue to be more productive than formal organizations and employed the urban poor. The effective tax and tariff rates were much lower in Delhi compared to the other neighbouring states. This combined with better physical infrastructure and skilled labour, have acted as a magnet for the location of industries, trade, services and large numbers of low income migrants (Batra 2007).

Thus the Master Plans and the modernist notions of the city were a mismatch with the economy, polity and society of a postcolonial city. The neat bourgeois city with stringent zonation of various functions was not the natural urban form of a national economic centre in a developing economy. The implementation of the plan was full of failures as the growth of Delhi's population exceeded projections by 1.5 million. Mixed land use in residential areas continued in spite of land use controls and the densities also exceeded the intended limits. As the First Master Plan did not conceive the integration of the informal sector into the planned city, the rapid growth of the former took place without adequate infrastructural facilities. The non-conforming industrial units were also not shifted out (DDA 2016). For Priya (2006) the failure of urban planning in Delhi is directly related to the "anti poor bias" and "anti-citizen arrogance" of planners and administrators in the city who viewed the urban poor and the slum dwellers as evils (Priya, 2006: 235-6).

As the DDA became the sole agency to implement the master plan and came to control most of the land sale and development in Delhi, critics have noted that while the DDA provided scanty housing for the poor, it subsidized the middle and upper classes more than the poor (Gururani, 2013; Jain et al. 2015; Joseph and Goodman 2008; Dupont and Ramanathan 2008). Although the objective of Delhi's large-scale land acquisition and disposal policy was to supply affordable housing to Low Income Group (LIG) and Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), in practice this policy benefitted the High Income Group (HIG) and the Middle Income Group (MIG). The plot allocation was intended to be 50 per cent, 30 per cent and 20 per cent for LIG, MIG, HIG groups respectively, but the actual numbers in 1982 were 20 per cent, 21per cent and 47 per cent (Jain et al. 2015; Joseph and Goodman 2008; Dupont and Ramanathan 2008). As the first Master Plan provided the legal framework for land use, and faith in planning did not necessitate taking into account the growth of new slums in the future, slums became de-facto illegal as it was an informal land use (Batra 2007). Most of the formal housing efforts have benefitted only the higher and middle-income groups and there has been a failure of public housing delivery mechanisms to supply adequate low cost housing to match demand. This has led to the proliferation of informal housing as the poor and lower middle classes who have been priced out of the legal housing market are forced to live in substandard housing conditions (Dupont and Ramanathan 2008; Dupont 2003; 2004; 2005; Joseph and Goodman 2008; Schenk 2003; Sivam 2003; Batra 2007). The Delhi land policy had

barred the private sector from the formal land delivery process to check speculation and profiteering. It administered a land bank wherein sizeable parcels of land was reserved to ensure development in a planned way, with the objective of keeping land prices affordable, and provide housing for the poor. But the slow pace of land development and supply affected the urban poor in the reverse way. The shortfall land supply has sent the land prices soaring, at a much greater rate than income since 1974. The rate of land acquisition was slow and the process cumbersome and expensive. Before 1980, land was acquired based on the 1959 rates fixed by the government. But after 1980, the rates of land acquisition were corrected to be in accordance with market rates. This has made the process expensive for the DDA. Although the land acquisition policy gives power to public authorities to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes, measures mandatory under the present Act frequently lead to legal disputes taking many years to resolve. The Land Acquisition Act entails paying compensation to landowners based on the market rates prevalent for land acquired, at the time when notification of intent happens. However as long delays in the actual acquisition is common, the landowner is compensated at rates lower than current market rates. Owners consider this to be unjust and take recourse to lawsuits (Sivam 2003). In such a context, according to Dupont (2005), the Master Plan has favoured a model of elitist urbanism, at the expenses of the housing needs of the lower income groups not only through the adoption of high standards of development and construction, but also because the time lag between notification and actual acquisition of land combined with the sluggishness and inadequacy of land and housing supply, led to *jhuggie jhopdies* and *unauthorised colonies* developing clandestinely in response to the unmet demand for housing of the lower and middle income groups (Dupont 2005).

After conclusion of the period of the First Master Plan, preparation of the Second Master Plan started in the early 1980s for the year 2001. The second plan is critiqued on account of majority of its suggestions and provisions being mere rectifications and supplements to the first plan, although it comprised proposals on encouragement to low rise and high density urban development, energy-efficient transport modes like a mass transit system and safeguarding of ecological balance in the capital's chief watercourses.

The Third Master Plan of Delhi encompasses the period from 2001 to 2021 and became effective in 2007. "Vision-2021" document of the Master Plan- Delhi

2021 states its aim to be making 'Delhi a global metropolis and a world-class city'. It emphasises for the first time the involvement of the private sector in the assembly and development of land and provision of infrastructure services. It states the objective of decentralised local area planning, public private partnership model of governance, redevelopment and the densification of congested urban areas of Delhi (DDA 2007).

2.4.2 Housing categories

The *planned colonies* or formal housing is constructed in compliance to governmental rules, regulations and controls; they possess a great deal of tenurial security and have a minimum standard of environmental quality and infrastructure. Households living in DDA housing hold leasehold titles, which are often converted into freehold through payment of token amounts (Kundu 2004).

Sivam (2003) categorises the *old city* and rural settlements or *urban villages* as organic settlements, as these settlements are not illegal but are pre-existing settlements that are now extremely congested areas and lacking basic amenities. The Walled City originated in the 17th century, with the construction of Shahjahanabad, but has now been assigned slum status by the Government of Delhi due to the substandard housing conditions. They consist mainly of old neighbourhoods of Delhi, where most of the households have secure land tenure. Delhi has nearly 135 urbanized villages. In 1979–80, the Delhi government introduced a policy to increase the municipal amenities in these urbanized villages. *Urban villages* mostly are areas of secure tenurial status, where majority of the inhabitants have either inherited or purchased land and constructed their houses inside the *lal-dora* or permissible limits, without contravention of the Master Plans. Privately built shops and commercial establishments have however led to overcrowding and stressed the meagre civic services within these settlements. Civic amenities that were low to begin with have been further hindered due to overcrowding (Kundu 2003). As the *urban villages* are ultimately incorporated within the urban limits, because of rapid population growth, the existing civic infrastructures become insufficient (Sivam 2003).

Squatter settlements *(jhuggie jhopdies* or *JJ clusters)* and *unauthorised colonies* make up the informal housing. They both have in common low standards of infrastructure and facilities, but can be differentiated in the methods through which access is gained to land. *Unauthorised colonies* are extremely varied in their socio

economic characters. Most of the households belong to middle and high-income groups who possess legal land titles commonly bought from rural landowners. However these settlements are not deemed legal as they are in violation of the Master Plan, land use restrictions and building standards. Availability of basic services here has a stark variation across settlements, depending upon the socio economic profile of residents and their ability to invest on these. In some of these colonies, people have been able to get the services from the public agencies through political contacts. The housing standards of unauthorised settlements that were regularised in the late 1970s have significantly improved due application of layout plans and the expansion of civic services by government agencies. As theses inhabitants have acquired full tenurial security, they have been motivated to make additional investments at personal as well as community levels thus bettering the quality of the microenvironment (Kundu 2004).

Initially unauthorised colonies appealed to low and lower middle income groups who had savings for the initial investment in the plot and so were better off than those residing in squatter settlements, but not well of enough to invest in the formal land market so they accepted they lack or poor qualities of utilities provided. These settlements also provided relatively cheap rental lodging as compared to the formal housing sector. However, urbanisation at the peripheries of Delhi has seen the proliferation of *farm houses*, especially in the southern fringes of Delhi. As they are located in agricultural areas and were initially farms, the civic authorities continued to apply rules pertaining to farmlands to these zones seeking to limit the built up area in relation to the natural green and agricultural lands. The character of such farms is however not agricultural, instead they are gated estates containing lavish sprawling villas, surrounded by large patches of greenery, with swimming pools (at a time of water scarcity, as farmers don't need to pay for water and get subsidised power for tubewells). The mushrooming of such villas in south Delhi has been described by Dupont (2005) as the unauthorised colonies of the super rich, who enjoyed impunity owing to efficient networking with politicians and bureaucrats. The Union Government made a distinction between these affluent and non-affluent colonies in its submission to the Delhi High Court in its guidelines for the regularisation of unauthorised colonies. The amount of penalty imposed along with and as a percentage of total land cost was 10 per cent for the non-affluent and 50 per cent for the affluent (Dupont, 2005).

Unlike the unauthorised colonies, *Jhuggie jhopdies* which are also informal housing, are built on illegally appropriated land and "they are found through out the capital filling up all the interstices of urban fabric, where ever there is vacant land and where ever surveillance by the authorities is low" (Dupont 2004: 161). They shelter mostly migrant households attracted by the employment opportunities provided by the city. A significant proportion of them varying from squatter to squatter, have stayed at another place in Delhi from where they have often been evicted (Dupont 2003). Not only do they have high insecurity of tenure, squatter settlements also have poor environmental conditions, high residential densities and acute deficiencies of basic services. The availability of civic services here are meagre as public agencies are hesitant to provide amenities to illegal occupants of government lands. The government agencies are also fearful that this may provide squatters the basis for making legal claims (Kundu 2004). Dissatisfaction of the central government with the pace of slum clearance led to the task being transferred from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) which was handling it from 1960, to the DDA for efficient implementation, which did happen very effectively during the period of Emergency in 1975 -77 (Priya 2006). At designated resettlement sites houses or plots on a leasehold basis were given to households. The policy of resettling the JJ cluster households is being implemented since 1961. Initially two room apartments were given to 3560 JJ cluster households. Afterwards, these households were allotted resettlement plots. Plot sizes were cut to 40 sq. metres and later on to 25 sq. metres. During the Emergency of 1975–77, Delhi Development Authority (DDA) commenced on a huge scheme for resettling 197624 JJ cluster households in 26 *Jhuggi-Jhopdi resettlement colonies* in plot sizes of 21 sq. metres at the periphery of the city (Risbud, 2002). The DDA fixed the resettlement plot size to 26 sq. metres in the late 1970s, although it subsequently allotted plots of 10 sq. metre size in transit camps during 1983–86 (Kundu 2004).

Due to massive demolitions and relocations during the Emergency of 1975 – 77, the number of JJ clusters plunged from 1124 to 290 between 1971-81. Figure 2.8 shows the growth of JJ clusters in Delhi from 1951 to 2015. But by 1994, the number of JJ clusters has again risen to 1080 as squatters were encouraged to settle back in the centre of the city as there was a subsequent long period of inactivity towards city squatters mainly due ambiguous and inconsistent policy and the reluctance to impose injudicious emergency style evictions, which caused massive agitation (Schenk 2003).

The sheer yearning for survival on part of the poor, together with the compulsions of electoral democracy created a grey area between legality and illegality of tenure that gave the unauthorized land uses of the poor a degree of security till the mid 1990's (Batra 2004). Notwithstanding the lack of formal security of tenure, slum households invested in improving the quality of their micro-environment did not feel an immediate danger of eviction. Many obtained services through state agencies and felt patronized by the government. Also having papers like affidavits (signed by a notary or even a slum leader as a witness), electricity bills and support from most political parties, contributed to their sense of security (Kundu 2004). Most importantly there was a hiatus on evictions from 1977 till 1997–98 (Batra 2007; Kundu 2004). By 1997 the number of J J clusters had risen again to 1100 (Figure 2.8; Appendix Table 5).

In 1990, the Delhi government adopted a 'three-pronged strategy' for tackling squatter settlements. (1) In situ upgradation of clusters whose encroached land pockets are not required by the concerned land-owning agencies for another 15 to 20 years for project implementation (2) Relocation of J J clusters located on the land required to implement projects in the larger public interest. (3) Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (EIUS) (Dupont and Ramanathan 2008; Batra 2007; Joseph and Goodman 2008). While in situ upgradation is favoured by 80per cent of the residents of the JJ clusters (CDP 2006), it had been implemented in only 3 clusters. Clearance and relocation has been the bulwark of the policy approach towards the squatters and JJ clusters (Joseph and Goodman 2008).

2.4.3   The changing governance framework

From 1990s onwards, the changes in the macroeconomic policy environment have indirectly led to a second surge in evictions following the first one during the Emergency. India's New Economic Policy decided to attract foreign companies to invest in the Indian economy especially in the major cities. Foreign investors were attracted to India's megacities, initially Mumbai, and then Delhi, with company headquarters and expatriate staff establishing themselves in (central) Delhi due to the proximity to various ministries. Local authorities decided that foreign investors be given a world class built environment, at least in the centre of the city and proceeded evict squatter settlements to clean up and beautify the central city because the latter were an unhealthy eye sore, and the many thousands of workshops, informal small scale and service units were deemed polluting and pavement encroachments through

hawking were not to be tolerated any more (Schenk 2003; Batra, 2004). Between 1990–2004, 51,461 squatter households have been relocated: 24 percent were displaced from DDA lands, 15 percent from L&DO and 8 percent from PWD lands. The remainder were squatting on plots owned by MCD, NDMC, MTNL, AIIMS, and other land owning departments like the Police department, Health Department, Delhi University, etc (Delhi Human Development Report, 2006). The relocation of slum dwellers in *resettlement colonies* on less expensive lands at the urban fringes have resulted in ''planned slums'' (Priya 2006: 235) and have worsened the quality of life of the urban poor (Bhan, 2009; Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008; Schenk 2003; Batra 2007; Dupont 2004; Priya, 2006; Kundu 2003). In 2001 the number of J J clusters fell to 728 and has declined further to 675 in 2015 (Figure 2.8; Appendix Table 5). The second phase of evictions can be linked to the switch over to neoliberal governmentality that places the needs of global capital before right of the poor to the city. Such repackaging is an integral part of innovative and entrepreneurial city marketing strategies, in an era of intense inter urban competition at global and national levels to attract public and private investment, as the key functions of global cities are as financial, consumption and entertainment centres (Harvey, 1989). Figure 2.8 (Table 5 Appendix), shows the trend in the growth of JJ clusters from 1951 to 2015. Figure 2.9 (Table 6 Appendix) shows the distribution of housing in Delhi under different tenurial categories. Despite three Master Plans and an overarching jurisdiction conferred to DDA almost 75 per cent of the housing in Delhi has evolved informally.

Figure 2.8

Delhi, Number of JJ Clusters: 1951 -2015

Data Sources:

(1) IL&FS Ecosmart Limited (2006), City Development Plan, Delhi (JNNURM), New Delhi: Department of Urban Development. Government of Delhi.

(2) Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (2015), List of JJ Clusters. Government of Delhi.

Figure 2.9

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO VARIOUS TENURIAL CATEGORIES, DELHI, 1999.

Data Source: DUEIP, 2001.

Map no. 1 (Appendix Table 11) shows the distribution of *Jhuggie Jhopdi* (JJ) households across the districts of Delhi in 2016. The Delhi government decided to re-divide Delhi into 11 revenue districts in 2012, from an earlier number of 9 districts. The highest numbers of JJ households are found in South Delhi, followed by West Delhi. The eastern part of Delhi, (South East district and Shahdara), also has significant number of JJ households. The lowest number of JJ households is found in South West district and North East district. Shahdara, has the highest concentration of the number of JJ household, while South West district the lowest.

Map no. 1

Map prepared by author. Data source: GNCTD 2016.

Decentralization in India was officially formalized through the 73ʳᵈ and 74ᵗʰ Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 pertaining to rural and urban contexts respectively. The 74ᵗʰ Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 conferred constitutional status to the urban local bodies, such as municipalities, which were provided with elected councils, and constituted the third tier of government, the other two being the central and state governments. This Act also allowed for the participation of women and weaker sections of society through reservation of one third of the seats for women and for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their demographic composition in the population of any particular constituency; and transferred to the urban local bodies, the responsibility for urban development, particularly providing of urban infrastructure and services, mobilizing required financial resources through taxes, levying of user costs and attracting national and foreign private investments. As per the 12ᵗʰ Schedule of the 74ᵗʰ Constitutional Amendment Act, eighteen new tasks were added to the functional domain of the urban local bodies, many of which still remain in the domain of the state governments and have not been passed on to the urban local bodies. While the 74th Amendment has mostly not been implemented owing to absence of clarity on the modalities of the process of implementation, and the absence of penalties for non-compliance by state governments. It however granted for the first time constitutional status to urban local bodies, thus providing them the legal mandate to play a larger role (Dupont 2007).

In contemporary India there are many examples of decentralized participatory experiments with the aim of bringing citizens and governments closer and more responsive. Elite citizens groups like the Bangalore Action Task Force (BATF) in Bangalore and Citizens Roundtable in Mumbai have implications in terms of inclusion and accountability (Weinstein et al 2014). The *Bhagidari* Partnership of Delhi is such an example of a decentralised participatory experiment. The Government of Delhi launched the *Bhagidari* scheme in January 2000 to promote an interface between government agencies in the National Capital Territory (NCT) like the *Jal* Board, the *Vidyut* Board, Delhi Police and Municipal Corporation of Delhi; and citizens groups like Resident Welfare Associations, Market Trader Associations in order to work out solutions to common civic problems. The most common areas addressed related to the maintenance of civic infrastructure; security; quality of civic amenities such as water, sanitation and electricity; the collection of house tax, water bills and meter reading; and the maintenance of community parks and halls. The

Bhagidari initiative was a product of political necessity of Mrs Sheila Dikshit, the then Chief Minister of NCT of Delhi, because of her relatively weak base of power (given the fragmented administrative structure of Delhi), to reach out directly to the public and establish an independent base of her own, and to even the keel with a host of legislators like Members of Parliament and Legislative Assembly and municipal councillors. It was the chief minister's office that had crafted a programme that masterfully pursued the empowerment of property-owning residents in urban governance and attempted to create a common agenda for urban redevelopment, despite being in disagreement with local politicians and bureaucrats (Sivaramakrisnan 2006; Ghertner 2014).

The *Bhagidari* Scheme was regularly announced in the press by the government and played a significant role for the RWAs to gain visibility and credence (Lama-Rewal 2007). A system of awards was also instituted for RWAs for their performance that was to be given away by the Chief Minister at an annual *Bhagidari Mela* (GNCTD 2016). However the *Bhagidari* could not cover the slum areas of Delhi and it also failed to get the active participation of municipal councillors. It only empowered the Resident Welfare Associations that were found mostly in the planned colonies and the other high-income areas, not in slum clusters and other poor parts of the city (Harriss 2005). (Ghertner 2014: 167) characterises the Bhagirdari scheme as constitutive of the 'gentrification of state space or of the channels of political participation' and accuses the state government of cutting the "chord linking slum dwellers to the local state and sidelining elected representatives' thereby, 'effectively disenfranchising non-propertied classes of the city'.

After conceiving the idea of forming new official institutions to incorporate residents directly into the process of governance, the service of ACORD (Asian Centre for Organisation, Research and Development) was sought. It was a consultancy organisation with a record of working with industrial firms and local governments to build more efficient organisational structures. A *Bhagirdari* cell was created in the CM's office and three primary stake holders were identified: the Market Traders Associations and industrial associations, the bureaucracy from all levels of government (the municipal, state and central government levels) and Resident Welfare Associations of property owners from formal housing colonies. Thereby the residents of slums and unauthorised colonies were automatically excluded from the participatory framework. The goal of *Bhagidari* was to integrate the citizen's capacity

for self help and activism into governance by training RWA members through workshops, through regular announcements in the press, to view themselves and act as a part of the government (GNCTD 2016). It was also aimed at making civil servants, who otherwise only followed directives of their immediate command, more responsive to citizen's demands. According to Ghertner (2014) *Bhagidari* is a trial in fostering a model of self governance among the middle income group who are likely to demand global standard services from the junior levels of the government, and of imbibing this population with civic consciousness.

The *Bhagidars* have four participatory channels for engaging the government. Firstly, through monthly meetings conducted in all of Delhi's eleven districts, where RWAs, junior government officials as well as a high level official each from the pertinent branches of the administration convene in the chairmanship of the deputy commissioners who is the officer in charge of the district office. The second channel of interaction is direct contact with the *Bhagidari* cell that then forwards the problem to the department concerned. Third, *Bhagidari* thematic workshops that concentrate on a particular topic over the course of a three-day workshop, are also held. Fourth, RWAs may directly contact concerned bureaucrats over telephone or through office visits (Ghertner 2014). Ghertner (2014) who conducted an ethnographic study of the interaction of the RWAs and the state government noted that workshops and monthly meetings were generally conducted in big air-conditioned, bedecked conference halls with lots of round tables seating mixtures of officials and RWA delegates.

Despite politicians from both opposition and ruling parties publicly stating the *Bhagidari* scheme to be elitist and aimed at curtailing their influence, it continues to exclude 69 per cent of the resident populace of Delhi living in *jhuggi jhopdies* and unauthorised colonies continues to empower the collective agencies of the wealthy. It obliges subordinate bureaucrats to straightforwardly tackle the apprehensions of the RWAs under the watchful eye of higher-level bureaucrats and provides a shared platform where RWAs can connect with all the concerned branches of government. Thus a governance space is created to which only a narrow section of residents are given access. Through *Bhagidari*, the RWAs are given a superior position over the everyday citizens and 'placed within the apparatus of the state itself' (Ghertner 2014: 195).

Commenting on the *Bhagidari* scheme Shatkin et al (2014: 22) liken it to a second channel of governance through civil society that attempts to impose neoliberal

models of governance and elite ideals of globalised and commodified urban spaces, as a response to the repeated failures of official policy and reform efforts due to weak institutional structures and fragmentation of governance. This second channel consists of a 'multitude of localized mutations in state–society relations, which have emerged as local actors have looked for opportunities in the fissures of power at the municipal level to gain pockets of urban political influence, and to reshape urban space and infrastructure' (Shatkin and Vidyarthi 2014: 22), effectively restructuring the access to space and power.

Shatkin et al. (2014: 22) describe the national government's post liberalization urban policy agenda as being 'experimental, iterative process that has sought, through trial and error, to encourage the re-scaling of institutional power through the empowerment of metro-level institutions; the commodification of urban space through the empowerment of state and corporate actors in their efforts to gain control of urban land'. It includes the launching of the successive programmes of the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), and the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), which have been described as 'reflexive efforts' to design reforms to overcome the obstacles of well-established street-level politics to market-driven redevelopment.

The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), was considerably influenced by two sources: (a) The Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), an experiment in public–private partnership in governance in Bangalore. Nandan Nilekani, CEO of Infosys, who played a central role in the BATF, again performed a seminal role in creating strategies for the JNNURM arising from his experiences (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). (b) The recommendations of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the mid 1990s which posited a set of policy recommendations for Asian Megacities with the standpoint that urban productivity improves with urban growth due to the presence of capital intensive technologies for manufacturing and location of financial and managerial services (Mahadevia 2008) Initiated in 2005, the According to Mahadevia (2006), the hidden agenda was to influence state governments to realize urban sector reform more with greater earnestness than earlier, as the precursor programmes, the City Challenge Fund (CCF) and Urban Reform Initiative Fund (URIF) had been unsuccessful. The JNNURM has two submissions: (a) Submission for Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG), which was administered by the Ministry of Urban Development, was to receive 65 per

cent of the total funds and (b) Submission for Basic Services to the Urban Poor (BSUP), which was administered by the Ministry of Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation, which accounted for 35 per cent of total funds. Projects on road transport, associated infrastructure, water supply, sanitation and beautification fell under the domain of UIG. Items like slum improvement, rehabilitation of the displaced, access to basic services and housing for the urban poor came under BSUP (Mahadevia 2006, Banerjee-Guha 2010). Under the UIG, The JNNURM infused sizeable funds for infrastructure and capacity development for local governments of cities in India (Mahadevia 2011). Before embarking on the JNNURM, first a city development plan (CDP) demonstrating policies, programmes and strategies, and financing had to be prepared, followed by the formulation of detailed project reports for the projects recognized by urban local bodies and urban development branches (Mahadevia 2006). The CDP was supposed to exist as a vision document for the next twenty-five years. (Banerjee-Guha 2010) and was to be prepared by consultancy firms without any public debate (Mahadevia 2006).

The JNNURM imposed a number of contentious preconditions for accessing central funds. These were categorised as 'mandatory' or 'optional' reforms for the urban local bodies and urban development agencies; and for the state governments there were reforms to be completed during the period of the mission itself (Mahadevia 2006). The highlights of the mission were (a) privatization of basic services through public private partnerships by introducing user fees and possibly bringing the urban poor into its ambit; (b) liberalization of the land and the real estate market through repeal of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA), reform of rent control laws, balancing the interests of landlords and tenants and rationalization of stamp duty to bring it down to no more than 5 per cent, 100 per cent FDI in housing and real estate, easier land use conversion norms; (c) rationalizing and outsourcing; (d) introducing e-governance; (e) greater importance given to of private sector and private credit rating agencies over elected civic bodies; (f) Implementation of decentralisation measures as mandated in 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (g) other stipulations like Right to Information, public disclosure law, citizens participation law etc. (Mahadevia 2006; Banerjee-Guha 2010).

Thus the JNNURM was aimed at strengthening the urban local bodies and providing them fiscal incentives to enact reforms so that infrastructure and real estate development may take place at an accelerated rate. In 2008, the National Land

Records Modernization Program (NLRMP) was introduced in order to systematize land titles through the computerization of land records and the land registration procedure, and by surveying once again the current ownership of land. Thus urban local bodies were empowered by being provided the means to clarify land title, so that the state and local governments are now no longer encumbered by legal and institutional barriers to engage in urban mega schemes (Shatkin and Vidyarthi 2014; Shatkin 2016).

2.4.4 Delhi: spatial transformations

During the 1990s, Delhi experienced an all-around falling-off in the trends of employment, and shrinking in manufacturing employment in the urban sector. The changes in workforce structure and the changing system of governance associated with macroeconomic reforms resulted in the process of urbanisation becoming exclusionary in nature (Kundu 2003; 2006). There has been a decline in the manufacturing sector employment and growing casualisation and subcontracting, has resulted in the classification of these workers in the tertiary sector, declining absorptive capacity of the unorganized sector and site of manufacturing plants beyond municipal boundaries because of highbrow penchants for a low density hygienic living environments has also contributed to the declining share of manufacturing in urban employment. There have been several drives in cities across in India to push out low valued activities to make space for high valued activities through slum relocation, clearance and removal of hawkers and small scale industries. The share of manufacturing in the Gross State Domestic Product of Delhi has fallen steadily from 25.2 per cent in 1993-94 to 11.69 in 2014 -15. The share of services has risen from 70.95 per cent to 87.48 per cent in the same period (Table 2.4)

Table 2.4: Sectoral composition of GSDP of Delhi at current prices in percentage.Table 2

Sector	1993 -94	2000-01	2004 -05	2014 -15
Primary	3.85	1.29	1.09	0.83
Secondary	25.2	21.92	18.45	11.69
Tertiary	70.95	76.79	80.46	87.48

Data Sources:

(1) Delhi: City development Plan, 2006. Department of Urban Development. Government of Delhi.

(2) Delhi: Economic Survey, 2014 -15. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of NCT of Delhi.

Delhi experienced its lowest decadal growth of population since 1921, adding just 30 lakh people during 2001 – 2011 and in every district the growth rate in this decade was less than it was in 1991 - 2001. The decadal growth rate of 2001 -2011 for Delhi as a whole was only 17.50 per cent, compared to 47.02 per cent for the previous decade (Census of India, 2011) (Table 8, Appendix). This can be credited to a amalgamation of two factors: falling fertility and large scale slum demolitions. The actual population of Delhi was 1.68 crore was below than the 1.85 crore projected for 2011 after the 2001 census. However, after including the population of major towns included in the bigger urban agglomeration, i.e. Gurgaon, Faridabad, Noida and Ghaziabad recording sizeable increases, 'greater Delhi' probably grew much faster than the statistics suggested.

The slow pace is ascribed mainly to the decline in fertility rates that Delhi has undergone during a decade of its most sluggish population increase in almost a century. The percentage of population in the 0-6 age group has fallen from 14.56% in 2001 to 11.76% in 2011 (Census of India 2011). However there is slight increase in the North West and South West districts. Such a trend conforms to an overall decline in fertility in most India. Even Delhi's 0-6 age group population has declined by 46,000 in absolute numbers as well (Times of India 2011).

The reconfiguration of Delhi's spatial structure is analysed in this study through maps of population growth/decline and population distribution in Delhi at the level of districts. Map no. 2 (Table 9 Appendix) shows the district-wise population growth and decline of Delhi from 1991 to 2011. As result of exclusionary urbanization since the 1990's the urban core consisting of Central and New Delhi Districts has experienced negative growth of population. During 1991-2001, and 2001- 2011 the Central district experienced population loss at the rate of -1.55 per cent and -11 per cent. New Delhi district has experienced the severest decline of -26.13 per cent during 2001-2011 (Table 8 Appendix). New Delhi and Central Delhi are nonetheless districts that have the lowest population. New Delhi extending from Jhandewalan and Chanakyapuri in the north and south respectively accommodates the

bulk of Delhi's government buildings and has only 1.3 lakh dwellers. Central Delhi stretching between Karol Bagh in the west to the Yamuna and incorporates Old Delhi. The Director of Census Operations ascribed the decline to the destruction of slum clusters and subsequent dislodgment of humbler occupants of the Yamuna-Pushta area, Gautam Nagar and Kalka Mandir as well as from other parts of Delhi during the preparation for the Commonwealth Games. Out of the many lakhs people dispossessed due to related demolitions, only 32,000 households, or 1.5 lakh people, were formally relocated in rehabilitation colonies in the North-West and South districts. This has rendered lakhs of people in a helpless situation. They may have entered slums in other or may have departed from the city (Times of India 2011). While such a fall in New Delhi's population has occurred before during 1971-1981, yet the rate was much slower. Central Delhi has however experienced decreases in population in all intercensal periods starting 1971.

Map no. 2

DELHI, DISTRICT-WISE DECADAL POPULATION GROWTH AND DECLINE
1991 TO 2001

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 1991; 2001; 2011.

While the population in central areas are declining, the periphery is growing, although at a much slower rate in 2001 - 2011, almost at one-third the rate in comparison to the preceding decade. The fastest growing districts were South West Delhi, North East Delhi and North West Delhi, which grew by 61.37 per cent, 62.92 per cent and 60.91 per cent respectively during 1991 -2001; and by 23.46 per cent, 21.13 per cent and 21.76 per cent respectively during 2001 - 2011. South West Delhi abuts Haryana and includes Najafgarh, Dwarka, Dhaula Kuan, R. K. Puram, Vasant

Vihar and Delhi cantonment. The new sub-city of Dwarka is experiencing high growth. A similar phenomenon is also occurring in the area of Najafgarh. Delhi's largest district, North-West Delhi that includes Narela, Alipur, Mangolpuri, Wazirpur and Rohini is the quickest growing district after South West Delhi. Not only is this district is the biggest in size, but its population is also the highest at 36.5 lakh. It includes several relocation colonies of populaces shifted from other parts of the city including industrial estates.

Another factor that has affected population distribution was gentrification. Renewal of residential areas and the transformation of residential areas into commercial ones use up housing stock and the phenomenon is most evident Old Delhi and Karol Bagh. Older residents of these areas are moving to parts of the NCR further away (Times of India 2011).

Map no. 3 shows the decadal change of population between 2001 - 2011 at the level of the subdivisions/tehsils. The highest decadal growth in population (61.5%) has occurred in the periphery in Narela in North West District. Seelampur in North East District and Najafgarh of the South West District have recorded the next highest rates of decadal growth (49.8%). Most of the tehsils in the periphery have experienced a growth in population This is in contrast to Kotwali of North District (-43.3%) and Connaught Place of New Delhi District (-37.3%) that have experienced a decline in population over the last intercensal period. Other tehsils recording a decline in population are also located in the core, the most notable among which are Chanakya Puri (-18.2%), Parliament Street (-11.4%), Daryaganj (-12.1%) and Paharganj (-11.7%). Thus Delhi is experiencing a depopulation of the core, while the periphery is experiencing a rapid population growth.

Map no 3.

N. C. T. OF DELHI

DECADAL CHANGE IN POPULATION (2001 - 2011)

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 2001; 2011.

For the purpose of explaining the spatial redistribution of population, the following districts of Delhi: New Delhi, Central and North Delhi are considered to

comprise the urban *core*, while the remaining six districts are considered part of the urban *periphery*. Maps no. 4 and 5 (Table 9 Appendix) show distribution of population among the districts of Delhi in 1991 and 2011. The classes of distribution have been kept the same for all three census years to enable comparison over time. In 1991 (Map no. 4) there was a more even distribution of population across the districts of Delhi, where no district contained more than 15 to 20 per cent of the population and except the larger districts of North West Delhi, West Delhi and South Delhi. New Delhi, was the only district that had less than 5 per cent of the population. The other districts in the core belonged to the 5 to 10 per cent population distribution class. By 2011 (Maps no. 5) North West district accounted for 20 to 25 per cent of the population, while Central Delhi has less than 5 per cent population. The share of population for New Delhi declined from 1.79 per cent in 1991 to 0.85 per cent in 2011, and Central Delhi's declined from 6.97 per cent to 3.47 per cent in the same period. On the other hand the share of 4 other districts in the periphery, the South, North East and South East districts have gone up in this period.

Map no 4.

DELHI, DISTRICT-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, 1991

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 1991.

Map no. 5.

DELHI, DISTRICT-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, 2011

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 2011.

Urban density mapping also reveals the same trends. The population density distribution has been represented through choropleth maps by 5 classes (Map No. 6, 7, and 8; Table 10 Appendix). Map no. 6 show the distribution of the density of population of Delhi for 1991, at the district level. The area covered by the Central,

North East and East District had the highest concentration of population in the National Capital Territory. Central District had the highest density of population with 28545 person/sq.km. Map no. 7 and Map no.8 show the urban density distribution at the level of subdivisions/tehsils. The 2001 census data revealed the same pattern with Paharganj and Karol Bagh (Central District) and Seelampur and Seemapuri (North East District) being in the highest density class of greater than 45000 persons per/sq.km. In contrast Chanakyapuri and Connaught Place (Less than 5000 persons/sq.km) have very low population densities. Cantonment has a population density just above 5000 persons/sq.km while Parliament Street has a population density of around 8000 persons/sq.km. Similarly the other tehsils of Najafgarh, Narela and Vasant Vihar also belong to the lowest density class. Thus the concentration of population is lowest not only in the administrative and foreign embassy populated central areas of Delhi, but also in the tehsils in the periphery. In the case of the latter, the availability of land had led to rapid urban development and has acted as a magnet to migrants for settlement. The 2011 data reflects this fact. While Chanakya Puri, Connaught Place, Cantonment and Parliament Street has experienced declining population density, Najafgarh, Narela and Vasant Vihar, along with all other districts in the periphery have experienced increased population densities .

When the district wise change in population density is scrutinised over the three census decades, it is evident that while all other districts have experienced varying increases in population density, New Delhi records a decline in population density in 2011, and Central Delhi in 2001. The highest increases in population density have taken place in North East and East districts adjoining Uttar Pradesh (Map No. 9; Table 10 Appendix). Overall, the density of Delhi's population increased from 9,340 persons per sq km in 2001 to 11,320 persons/sq. km in 2011, less than other metropolitan cities like Mumbai, which exceeds 20,000 persons/sq.km (Census of India, 2011).

Map no. 6

N.C.T. OF DELHI
DISTRICT-WISE POPULATION DENSITY DISTRIBUTION, 1991

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 1991.

Map no. 7

N.C. T. OF DELHI

POPULATION DENSITY DISTIBUTION, 2001

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 2001.

Map no. 8

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 2011.

Map no. 9

DELHI, DISTRICT-WISE CHANGE ON POPULATION DENSITY
(PER SQ. KM.), 2011, 2001 & 1991

Map prepared by author

Data source: Census of India 1991; 2001; 2011.

2.5   Jakarta: transformation of urban space.

2.5.1   *The role of urban planning.*

Jakarta is a city that has waged a constant struggle against environmental odds. In 1617 the Dutch chose Jayakarta to build a naval base in Java, building alongside warehouses and the Fort "*Kasteel Batavia*". The Dutch launched into the creation of an "Amsterdam in the tropics". An orderly pattern of roads and waterways christened following cities and provinces in the Netherlands was constructed. Homes, churches, warehouses, a law court and a '*Stadhuis'* or town hall was constructed in an area known now as Kota that contains the colonial neighbourhoods and the Chinese district. As trade in East Indies flourished Batavia enlarged southwards. The canals of the town were routes of transportation, and also the lines of sewerage and waste disposal. For a century (1730–1830) there were recurrent epidemics of malaria, earning Batavia the notoriety of being the ''graveyard of the Orient''. In the 17th and 18th century, the main problems of Batavia were dearth of sanitation, frequent floods rapid population growth. (Steinberg 2007) A second node developed in Jakarta known as the Koningsplein, connected to the old city by a road with houses and governmental buildings alongside of it. Thus a linear settlement pattern was established and the ribbon connecting the two nodes gradually got wider with infilling of *kampungs* and *desas* surrounding it. This "dumbbell-infill pattern" (Ford 1993: 377) of urban morphology characterised Jakarta for more than a century afterwards (Ford 1993). There is a wealth of studies that has studied the urban structure of Indonesian cities and it has given rise to several concepts such as 'desakota' (McGee 1991; 2009) and 'mega-urban region' (McGee and Robinson 2005, Douglass 2005; 2010).

After Indonesian independence in 1949, Jakarta has experienced spectacular areal growth, to the south and into the lowlands plains on the west and east (Ford 1993; Hugo 2005; Steinberg 2007; Cybrisky and Ford 2001). It has since then completely dominated the Indonesian economy, with disproportionate amounts of services, political power, foreign investment, decision-making and linkage to the outside world. The Indonesian system of cities consists of some highly populous cities, especially the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) (**Winarso et al. 2015;** Bunnel and Miller 2010; Firman 2009; Firman et al. 2007).   A four city primacy index for Jakarta from 1890 to 2000, (which represents the primacy of Jakarta, dividing it with the

combined population of next three largest centres (Surabaya, Semarang and Bandung up to 1961, and thereafter Semarang was replaced by Medan as the Fourth largest centre) shows that the level primacy of Jakarta actually increased with time, increasing from 0.39 in 1890 to 3.09 in 2000 (Hugo 2005). Jakarta contains five municipalities within the city proper and one island district known as *Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta* (DKI) or the 'Special Capital Territory of Jakarta". The metropolitan area of Jakarta includes the bordering cities of Bekasi, Bogor, Depok, and Tangerang, and was known by the acronym Jabotabek. Jabotabek continued to grow in area and currently it also includes Depok and Cianjur and is known as Jabodetabek or simply Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) (Bunnel and Miller 2011; Firman 2009).

Jakarta's modernisation was the pet project of Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, who was a civil engineer and architect by training and was influenced by the designs of Le Corbusier and other modernist visions of the city. This modernist remaking of Jakarta was with the aim of presenting to the nation a template of its future possibilities after shaking of the yoke of a 350 year old colonial rule (Kusno 2000). He insisted that it was the national duty to "build Jakarta into the greatest city possible," and this magnificence should be perceptible not only in the skyscrapers and monuments but also in "the little houses of the workers". Jakarta was meant to be "the beacon of the whole of humankind" in the fight against colonialism (quoted in Cybriwsky and Ford 2001:203 - 204). His most emblematic new edifice, as a part of a project of decolonization of the architectural profile of the city was *Monas*, a 132 m tall monument that was raised in the heart of the Old Dutch Koningsplein, rechristened *Medan Merdeka* or "Freedom Square". Jakarta was bestowed with large new administration buildings, departmental stores, shopping squares and hotels, good sports infrastructure at Senayan because of the 1962 Asian Games. It also acquired a new-fangled suburban housing area called Kebayoran Baru. Jalan Thamrin and Jalan Sudirman wide avenues with massive traffic roundabouts, joined these constructions. Suharto's 'New Order' regime that took control of the country in 1967 continued similar construction and inserted it into the emergent global economy (Cybriski and Ford 2001).

There were some big planning programmes for Jakarta's development. However, years of political uncertainty after independence and the launch of the 'New Order' rule hindered the planned expansion of Jakarta despite Sukarno's personal involvement in several projects. The initial 'Outline plan' anticipated a population of

4 million and before long was revised allowing for the inclusion of another 2.5 million people. The Master Plan of Jakarta (1965–1985) introduced in 1966 and projected a Metropolitan region of 7.5 million inhabitants. Regional planners recognizing the existence of an extended urban region as early as 1966 incorporated first the cities of Tangerang, Serpong, Depok and Bekasi as satellite growth-poles for the capital territory. In 1965–1972, through three regional development plans radial rings were planned, and finally in 1973 incorporated also Bogor to form Jabotabek. The consideration behind this was to use the existing radial railway corridors as the Botabek region grew to a population of 7 million, while the population of DKI Jakarta because of swampy ground and flood prone nature would not rise beyond 6 million (Steinberg 2007).

Nonetheless, rapid urbanization resulted in much faster population growth in Jakarta than anticipated and the plan needed reconceptualisation. In 1987, a new Master Plan for the Special Capital Region (DKI) Jakarta (Kompas 2013) was unveiled which was appreciated as an appropriate planning document. This plan tried to use planning as a medium to address urban conflicts, tried to implement the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) and tried to control haphazard development of the rural -urban fringe.

However most of the planned developments of this plan have been overwhelmed by unplanned developments that made this Master Plan a redundant document replete with wonderful ideas. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 – 1998 has played a role in the sharp reduction in governmental expenditure on essential infrastructure, neighbourhood development and housing. In the absence of regulation and direction, the swathes of green areas and green belts have been whittled down, and large areas earmarked for mixed land use in central Jakarta is now dominantly used for commercial purposes. The new City Plan for 2002 – 2010 was basically drafted to legalize the abuses of the Master Plan. It professes to consent to the decrease in green areas (from 40 per cent in 1985 to 9 per cent in 2002) — infringement of local by-laws requiring that green areas occupy at least 13.94 per cent of city area (Steinberg 2007). A Strategic Development Plan had been drawn up for 2002 – 2007 outside the public gaze and without the participation of the urban stakeholders. The reluctance of the Jakarta administration to undertake a participatory planning exercise seems to contradict the decentralization laws that proposed the introduction of a democratized planning process (Steinberg 2007). Even the Jakarta

2010 - 2030 Spatial Master Plan has not been done through a proper participatory process. Critics (Kusumawijaya. and Sutanudja 2010) point out that passive consultative participation where people are as a matter of formality asked their opinions or asked to chose between options (the decisions generally being made by bureaucrats and expert consultants) will not be enough to instil a sense of ownership and popular support for implementation. None of the meaningful participatory methods had been used, for instance, focus group discussions, surveys etc. Such opaque urban planning practices that were the norm under the New Order continue in city planning approaches in Indonesia today even after democratization and decentralisation (Kusumawijaya and Sutanudja 2010).

The chief planning instrument used in the Jabotabek strategy was the government allotment of infrastructure for industrial expansion on route to Tangerang where a fresh international airport was built adjacent to highway from Jakarta supporting many industrial estates. Bekasi was chosen as the growth centre to the east of Jabotabek. Bogor was not included as it was located towards the uplands.
The planning was successful in creating an industrial strip of mega-projects, but as there was no supervisory authority to oversee land-use changes from rural to urban-industrial uses, it failed to stop environmentally unsafe development of mega-projects. "Superblocks" containing residences, shopping arcades, and skyscrapers in a chosen "Golden Triangle" catering to global commercial needs sprang up in Thamrin-Sudirman corridor. The purpose was to thrust the urban frontiers vertically upwards to offset spiralling land costs in important localities and the obtainability of motor cars (Cybriwsky and Ford 2001). This zone mainly contained high-rise mega-blocks integrating international investment. About a hundred shopping malls sprang up in JMA from the late 1980s to mid 2000s (Douglass 2005). There was a lot of regional competition for global city status (Firman 1998). Jakarta was connected to other global cities within a purposeful grid of information and communication infrastructure, transport, services and finance. A row of skyscrapers overlooked the main boulevards, housing the offices of Indonesian and multi-national companies. Firman (1999) stated that aggregate commercial area in Jakarta touched 2.7 million meters square with almost 90 per cent of occupancy rates in in 1997, while in 1978 was only 0.1 million meters square. In all parts of the metropolis, new-fangled shopping malls alongside the outlets of family owned enterprises sprang up.

Concomitantly, mammoth privately owned new towns containing gated populations came up in the suburbs, entailing large-scale conversion of croplands and green areas for urbanisation. The largest new towns were proposed to be self-sufficient habitations for more than a half million residents. Eventually, government oversight was lessened through successive policy initiatives and urban expansion was increasingly left to the private sector (Douglass 2005).

2.5.2 *Kampungs as a source of housing in Jakarta*

A unique feature of Jakarta is *kampungs* or urban villages that are somewhat informal settlements (Steinberg 2007). Historically *kampungs* have functioned as rural support systems in a hungrily expanding urban area and were almost always sequestered and poor (Ford 1993). According to McGee it is the result of urban extrusion into a densely populated and small farmer dominated, rice bowl area (McGee 2009). Ford (1993) defines *kampungs* as 'a mostly unplanned, primarily low income residential area that has been gradually built and serviced' (Ford 1993: 392). Almost 60 per cent of Jakartans are inhabitants of *kampungs*, which show the extent to which housing has evolved in unplanned ways in Jakarta. A few inner city *kampungs* dating back to the colonial era have legal or accepted land titles, but as the city grew the number of informal *kampungs* also grew. These *kampungs* come up both on public and private rural plots that become steadily urbanized and acquiring new owners, (mostly outside formal rules and regulations) over time. Most *kampungs* have a high density of population exceeding 600 persons per hectare (Steinberg 2007).

Several old *kampungs*, which were initially squatter settlements, have obtained tenurial security, and have narrow but paved streets, drainage canals, and utilities and better-quality dwellings made of durable building materials. They often contain schools, neighbourly local commercial streets, community health clinics and other services. Several *kampungs* benefitted from the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), which initially started in Jakarta in 1969 entailing the upgrading of physical infrastructure, but ignored contentious land tenurial concerns. It expanded after 1974 as a number of loans were obtained from the World Bank (Winayanti and Lang 2004; Cybrisky and Ford 2001). This continued into the 1980's and 1990's as part of the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP). The KIP by 1979,

had helped about 3.3 million dwellers of Jakarta's *kampungs*. However the local government of Jakarta has lacked consistency, as the habitations that had been improved under the KIP underwent demolition at a later date to make way for new commercial and business spaces. Since the middle of the 1970s both national and local authorities have attempted to incorporate the ideas of welfare housing by constructing public housing and undertaking urban regeneration works. Apartments without elevators were provided under urban revitalization programs of both the national and city governments, but were improperly targeted and did not improve the access of the poor (Winayanti and Lang 2004). With the economic crisis of 1997 this programme came to an abrupt halt, and the work of three decades was wasted away and many of these *kampungs* urgently need improvement again (Steinberg 2007). Many *kampungs* did not benefit from this sites and services scheme, either because they were of recent origin or because they occupy precarious sites like on the banks of the river Ciliwung.

Market based housing solutions were initiated in the late 1980s as a response to falling oil prices 1986 that led to significant cuts in state spending on housing (Winayanti and Lang 2004). From around the 1980's urban governance viewed inner-city *kampungs* as a mess, not fitting in with the vision of an organised modern city with new highways and high-rises. This changeover coincided with high economic growth and real estate boom in Jakarta during the 1980's. Many *kampungs* were removed, particularly in the central areas of the city. Many of the *kampung* dwellers were relocated to flats built by the government, mainly constructed by the National Urban Development Corporation (*Perumnas),* the latter itself constituting another distinct housing category. This agency was established in 1974 to originally provide living quarters for civil servants, but has since created thousands of housing units in four and eight story blocks for low and middle-income inhabitants. With growing in-migration of the poor from rural areas, the quantity of housing provided by *Perumnas* proved too little to meet demands (Cybrisky and Ford 2001). According to Steinberg (2007), in 20 years between 1984 and 2004, only 17,600 housing units were built by *Perumnas* (Steinberg 2007). Also most of the houses built by *Perumnas* were too expensive for the poorest *kampung* dwellers. Thus, the densities of existing *kampungs* have increased and new *kampungs* have come up especially on marginal urban lands such as the fringe or low quality sites, or low-lying flood prone areas. The poorest squatters build rough shacks in vacant spaces under bridges, beside canals and rail

lines. Another unique housing system of Jakarta is the '*pondok*'. There are many circular migrants pouring into Jakarta, who still depend on a long-established housing arrangement called *pondok* upon their arrival. *Pondoks* are generally situated within a *kampung*, and is a 'rooming house with business', providing both refuge and employment to fresh migrants, typically hailing from the *pondok* owner's native place. (Cybrisky and Ford 2001: 208).

Throughout the 1980 – 1990 decade, both the national and local authorities enabled property developers to obtain special licenses called 'location permits for the acquisition of land for building extensive blocks of real estate. The eastern and western suburbs of Jakarta, Bekasi and Tangerang were the foci of this housing expansion. During this period large land parcels in the peri-urban area of Jakarta were allocated via location permits for extensive housing development and construction of new towns. As per this policy, it was expected that developers would build High income, middle income and low income housing in the ratio of 1:3:6. Since no penalties were applied for non-compliance, most developers violated the rule. The housing units thus constructed were exorbitant for the poor, lacking public transport connectivity, and being distant from areas of their employment. Thus, both self-help and market-based approaches did not solve a burgeoning housing problem. In following decades the role of the central government changed from provider to the facilitator of housing, with the government stating that such an approach sought to transfer the responsibility of housing provision to the citizens and unencumbering the government (Winayanti and Lang 2004).

2.5.3   *Jakarta: spatial transformation and suburbanisation.*

Jakarta experienced rapid growth during the New Order regime due to greater bankrolling of the real estate sector, with growing demand for workplaces, business centres, new town development, high-rise apartments and hospitality. In the Suharto New Order period market-based housing provision and private sector housing construction was emphasised, marking a change from the more socialistic foundations of urban policy of the preceeding Sukarno regime. Firman (1999) considers Jakarta, to be one of the global cities of East Asia as like other global cities as it performs many control functions of the globalised Asian economy at many levels, especially in the flows of information, financial services, and commodities transactions. Further it

has experienced urban economic and physical restructuring that is typical of cities embedded in global economic and cultural flows. Global scale economic operations emanated out of it; there was functional division between the core and periphery in the metropolitan area transforming it from a single core to multi-core metropolitan region; both the central areas and peripheral agricultural land experienced land use changes and conversion; expansion of important urban infrastructure comprising of information and telecommunication systems, airport and seaport, freeways and more. There was also concomitant growth in the volume of commuters to and from Jakarta, as well as rising distance and time involved in commuting (Firman 1999).

In 1997, JMR received the largest proportion of foreign and domestic financial inflows to the country, without taking into account investment in oil and gas, half of which is is located in this region. It was the recipient of US$ 32.5 billion and Rp. 68,500 billion from foreign and domestic investment respectively between January 1967 to March 1998, comprising 11.0 and 15.5 per cent of the total domestic and foreign investment, excluding oil and gas, in Indonesia. The financial sector grew briskly in JMR, and new domestic and foreign banks opened, because of banking sector deregulations since October 1988, allowing foreign investment in the banking sector. The market capitalization of stock exchange in Jakarta had increased rapidly: from Rp 0.48 trillion in 1988 to Rp. 264 trillion in July 1997. Since the banking deregulation took place there was a flow of industrial and finance capital in the land development sector in Indonesia's big cities, especially in Jakarta (Douglass 2005). As investment in the property sector in JMA rose, new towns grew in the peri –urban fringe areas, while the central business district began to be filled with offices and commercial high-rises, residential apartments and luxury hotels. Massive redevelopment projects Like Super Block Sudirman were planned. Bank lending on property related investments amounted to Rp. 72.7 trillion (US $ 9.5 billion) by October 1998, constituting nearly 13 per cent of the total loans provided by Indonesian banks till 1998.

As an affluent consumer middle class hungry for consuming global products formed due the spectacular growth rates of the Indonesian economy, global retail chains like JC Penny and Walmart set up shop, keen on rapidly expanding their outlets. In 1996 on the occasion of its 470th anniversary the Jakarta was positioned as an international destination for shopping and consumption, by starting a promotion called "Jakarta as a Centre of Shopping" in Asia, offering "Jakarta Great Sales", in

the lines of "Great Singapore Sales". A manifestation of the growing embeddedness of JMR in the global economy was the growing international trade through Jakarta and through the dependence on the Tanjung Priok International Jakarta Seaport for more than half of Indonesia's commodity exports. On the other hand Jakarta was also the main entrepot for imports, with the total value of Jakarta's imports exceeding 50 per cent of the value of total national imports in 1989. Japan was the chief exporter of goods to Jakarta followed by the US, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. According to Firman (1999) this was indicative of capital flows between JMA and Japan and other East Asian countries. As a result, trade and services, and both the formal sector and informal sector grew in Jakarta City, as well as in Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi (Firman 1999).

From the middle of the 1990s onwards, urban spatial structure in Indonesia has been characterised by two distinct trends. Firstly, it has been characterised by a spatial reformatting and the changing locations of different types of economic activities: the urban core has transformed, no longer a hub of manufacturing, an activity relocated to the urban periphery, dislodged by the service and finance sector that is growing with increasing entrenchment of Jakarta within such global flows. Secondly, there has been a mushrooming of new housing development over large tracts of land, as well as the construction of entire new towns that grew in converted (often good quality) farmlands, with the attendant rural to urban land use conversion being entirely unregulated. The emerging residential configurations are indicative of a spatial segregation and the growing disparities between the affluent groups living in well planned, exclusive enclaves and the lower middle-income and low income groups who resort to informal or slum housing such as *kampungs* in urban areas (Firman 2007; 2009).

By 1997, the East Asian financial crises badly hit the economies of the large metropolitan regions of the region, especially the Jakarta Metropolitan Area which was worst affected. The main causes of the economic crisis in Indonesia were the partially fixed exchange rate of the Rupiah, quickly rising short-term foreign debt and the weak financial system. Political factors compounded its harshness, which led to the monetary crisis (KRISMON) becoming a total crisis (KRISTAL) as the Suharto regime was unable to respond adequately to the financial disaster. The Suharto regime had been ruling for 32 years and had become heavily centralized and corrupt and could not deal with the crisis satisfactorily (Touwen 2008). Large scale job loss,

massive decline in the economic growth and the reverse migration of multitudes of workers to rural areas, having lost their jobs in the cities occurred. The economic turmoil especially affected poverty migration.

The harshness of the effects of the economic meltdown was one of the main factors that led to the overthrow of President Suharto's dictatorship. In 1999 the Indonesian Parliament mandated regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation through Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 respectively. The legislations were mostly undertaken as the territorial disintegration of Indonesia into many small states was anticipated. It was envisaged that this would curb the separatist sentiments in the outer provinces of Indonesia and stop the manipulation of regional and local governments by the central government. During the New Order, the central government took all decisions, while the local city government, whose decision-making powers on important policy areas were curbed only executed decisions made centrally. The new laws had the objective of empowering local communities and bridging the gap between the citizens and the government. As per these two laws the *Kabupaten* or the district and *Kota* or the municipal authority were endowed with greater powers to administer local economic activities, especially utilization of natural resources, such as oil and timber (Firman 2009; 2007; 2004). Economic activity, especially in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA), had been hit the hardest. The economic growth rate of Jakarta City fell by 27.0 per cent in the financial year 1998 - 99. There was a rapid increase in unemployment in the urban areas and the manufacturing, banking and service, and real estate sector, which had been the main drivers of urban development in the 1980s and 1990s, drastically shrunk and retrenched its workforce. In the cities, the formal sector workers sought refuge in the informal sector while making do with reduced incomes, making flow of remittances in rural areas a bare trickle (Firman 2007).

Until the end of 1990s, Japan and newly industrialized countries, such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, contributed most to the foreign investment in urban regions, and especially in the JMA. The strategy of these countries was to transfer the labour intensive part of the production process to states with lower wage rates and great concentrations of skilled workers, decision makers, entrepreneurs and mass markets (Douglass 1997; Firman 1999). This was the main dynamic through which the big cities of Indonesia got linked to the global economy (Firman 1998; 1999; Douglass 2000).

During the Census decade of 1961 to 1971, the population of the urban areas of Jakarta's urban population had increased from 2.9 million to 4.6 million, growing annually at the rate of 5.8 per cent (Firman 2004). This was the highest urban population growth rate that Jakarta had ever recorded. A resultant spatial restructuring occurred not only in Jakarta but also in the contiguous districts comprising the peri urban areas, as more and more land was demanded for housing the increased population. From the beginning of the 1970s planners realized that the 1965 Master Plan of Jakarta was not feasible any longer and a new idea called the Jabotabek Development Plan, which integrated the development of the surrounding *Kabupatens*, was launched in 1974. The new plan paid attention to the construction of toll roads linking Tangerang to the west, Bekasi to the east and Bogor to the south. The peri urban areas of Jakarta that were at a distance of 10 - 15 km from the city centre during the 1970's, had extended to 20 km from the centre of the city during the 1980s. The total population of Jabotabek area touched 11.9 million in 1980, making Jakarta the largest metropolitan area of Southeast Asia (Firman 2009). Areal extension of Metropolitan limits took place as the peri urban areas of the city experienced a large-scale land use changeover. By the late 1980s and early 1990s the physical outposts of the JMA stretched up to 30 - 45 km from the central areas of the city, because of the privileging of land conversion by big developers during this period. Big private developers contributed to the formal housing stock through the construction of several private new towns in the peri urban areas during this period, and by 1987 exceeded the formal housing stock constructed by the public housing agencies (Firman 2004).

The development of new towns on fringes of JMA during the 1980s and 1990's, was fuelled by risky land development by many big realtors and unrestrained land permits approved by national land agency (BPN) for constructing dwelling units in the area. The land acquisition in JMA fringes is often characterized by conflict between the original land owners on one side and the developers with the government on the other. These conflicts have resulted in the expulsion of older residents. A land development permit is granted only to a single developer and any other party is barred from purchasing and developing of that land plot without the licensee's formal consent (Firman 2004). Firman (2004:355) comments: 'There have been several protests and struggles among land owners for fairer compensation but in most cases they finally found themselves powerless against developers who often directly and indirectly intimidate them. For example, the development of Tigaraksa new town led

to the eviction of about 1400 land-owning agricultural households from the area' (Firman 2004). This resulted in the wholesale transfer of land ownership and thereby destruction of livelihood of mostly small farmers who often received little compensation and was forced to seek other occupations.

Excessive land permits were issued to the developers than was their development capacity or intention and many plots were lying vacant or unfinished, especially after the economic collapse. Even many of the housing remained unsold then or bought by people who were now keen to sell them. Even then a good number of the houses are occupied only on the weekends. The new towns are low-density spaces, composed mainly of single-family houses and exclusive middle and high-income residences with typically western sounding names. Some of the new towns have world-class infrastructure, and facilities such as schools, shopping malls, movie theatres, hospitals and even golf courses. The designs of the new towns have a distinctly western style and aesthetics and are frequently designed by émigré urban planners and architects who are often ignorant about native architectural styles. Indeed the main lure of these dwelling units for the upper classes and the newly emergent aspirant middle class was the promise of a modern, western, segregated and gated life style safeguarded with private security (Firman 2004). According to Douglass (2005) it essentially represents the circumstances of global capitalism where there are unhindered inflows of foreign investment in real estate in order encapsulate its presence and reinforce its benefits.

The majority of the new towns generated little employment, although they were advertised as economically self-supporting townships. They became instead "bedroom suburbs for city-bound commuters" (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001: 305). The main source of employment for the new towns remained the central areas of the city proper, (Firman, 2004) leading to intensified daily exchanges among the central and peripheral areas of the city. This in turn led to crippling traffic congestion in central areas of Jakarta (Rukmana 2014).

In fact the property sector was one of the major culprits leading Indonesia into an economic meltdown. Funds were easily available to developers from both domestic and foreign financial institutions; and several public as well private banks in Indonesia, who had overstretched their capacities in order to provide credit to the developers who had powerful connections with or were themselves linked to the banking institutions. According to Firman (2004) the majority of the property firms

and developers in JMR over-invested through risk-laden short-term loans, intended for acquiring land as well as constructing buildings, with high market interest rates for long-term projects, including offshore loans. Such a state of affairs transpired not only in Jakarta, but also in other megacities of Southeast Asia, including Bangkok and Manila. Firman (2004) found it ironical that 'overinvestment in land and buildings in JMR by a few big national developers has given advantage to only a small group of rich people, but the nation as a whole has had to shoulder the severe impacts of the economic turmoil which has resulted from such overinvestment' (Firman 2004: 357)

Figure 2.10: Jakarta - Private New Towns, 1985-1997

Source: Douglass (2005).

Another dimension of spatial reordering was the shift of manufacturing in JMA from the core to the outer districts, with greater concentration in DKI Jakarta of financial, service and allied firms. In addition to the various new towns, several export oriented industrial districts developed both publicly and privately during the dictatorship of Suharto, were also located in the rapidly expanding peri-urban area (Cybrisky and Ford 2001). By the time the 1997 Asian economic crisis occurred, within the metropolitan limits of Jakarta were included a vast agglomeration called the Jabotabek. Jakarta had already transformed from a single core city, to a multi-centric metropolitan area spreading 5,500 sq. km, spilling onto the contiguous province of

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west Java. The urban core experienced depopulation as the megaprojects housing global business centres, centres of global retail consumption and commercial centres became the dominant economic functions of the core. The fringes experienced rapid population growth as large suburban new towns being built in peri urban areas of the city, and the formerly resident population of the core that moved here became instead commuters. Thus, notwithstanding the uninspiring performance of the economy after the crisis, by the early 2000's, speculation in urban land and the megaproject had made a comeback, ostensibly attracted by the self-aggrandizing elites and burgeoning middle classes who continued to increase their wealth. In the mean while, to Jabotabek was added another nodal urban centre - Depok, thereby becoming Jabodetabek (Douglass 2005).

For the purposes of examining the changes in the spatial distribution of population in Jakarta, JMA has been demarcated in this study into the *core* with population density above 5000 per sq. km., comprising of DKI Jakarta; and the *periphery*, comprising of Bekasi, Bogor, Tangerang and Depok with population density between 1000 and 5000 persons per sq. km (Table 11 Appendix; Map no 10). Thus the latter zone is the remainder of Jabodetabek area which excluding DKI Jakarta comprises the *Kabupatens* of Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi and Depok.

Figure 2.11 shows the inter-censal growth of population from 1961 - 71 to 2000 - 2010. Overall population growth rates in the core areas of the city declined sharply between 1961 - 71 to 1980 - 90, from 36.11 per cent to 10.41 per cent, which coincides with the period of high liberalisation, and thereafter it rises marginally by 2000 – 2010 to 13.12 per cent.

Figure 2.11

Jakarta Metropolitan Area, Inter-censal Growth Rates of Core and Peri-urban Zone: 1971 - 2010

Source: BPS, 2010.

Urban population growth occurs dramatically in the peri-urban zone from 1960's onwards reaching its highest rate of growth in 1980 – 1990 at 39.03 per cent. Thereafter it has declined to 28 per cent in 2000 – 2010 (Map No. 10; Table 12 Appendix). This shows first a spatial restructuring where there is a shift in the locus of urban growth from the central to the peri-urban areas, and then due to redevelopment and development of more business functions in the core and long commute times from the periphery, a recent repopulation of the core has begun.

Map no11. shows the decadal change in population in all the regencies of JMA. South Tangerang, Bogor Regency and Bekasi Regency have experienced a decadal population growth above 60 percent. This rate of increase declines in a gradient towards DKI Jakarta which grew at around 15 percent.

Map no. 10

JAKARTA METROPOLITAN AREA

INTERCENSAL GROWTH OF POPULATION IN URBAN CORE AND PERIPHERERAL AREAS, 1990 - 2010

JAVA SEA

DKI JAKARTA

BODETABEK

31

Graphical Scale with Index

1990 - 2000

2000 - 2010

SCALE

0   5   10   20 Km.

Prepared by: 21stCenturyGIS

Map prepared by author

Data source: Biro Pusat Statistik 2010.

Map no. 11

JAKARTA METROPOLITAN AREA
DECADAL CHANGE IN POPULATION (2000 - 2010)

JAVA SEA

Tangerang Regency

Tangerang

DKI Jakarta

Bekasi Regency

Bekasi

South Tangerang

Depok

Bogor

Bogor Regency

INDEX
Percentage Change
15 to 30
30 to 45
45 to 60
Greater than 60

SCALE
0 4 8 10   20 Km.

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS), 2010, Firman 1997 & Cox, 2011

Map prepared by author

Data source: Biro Pusat Statistik 2010.

The density of population in all the administrative units have experienced an increase in population density in 2010 over 2000. Map no. 12 and 13 show that except for DKI Jakarta, Bogor Regency and Bekasi Regency, all other administrative units

have moved into the next higher density class. It is in Bogor and Bekasi Regencies however that the highest decadal growth rates have been registered and this is because the comparative availability of land in the peri-urban has allowed fresh settlement and housing development. In 2010, DKI Jakarta had the highest population density at 14782 persons/sq. km, while Bogor Regency had the lowest population density at 1635 persons/sq. km.

Map no. 12

Map prepared by author

Data source: Biro Pusat Statistik 2010.

Map no. 13

JAKARTA METROPOLITAN AREA
POPULATION DENSITY DISTRIBUTION, 2010

N

Tangerang Regency

JAVA SEA

Tangerang

DKI Jakarta

Bekasi Regency

Bekasi

South Tangerang

Depok

Bogor

Bogor Regency

INDEX

Persons / Sq. Km.

Less than 2501

2501 - 5000

5001 - 7500

7501 - 10000

Greater than 10000

SCALE

0   4   8   10   20 Km.

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS), 2010, Firman 1997 & Cox, 2011

Map prepared by author

Data source: Biro Pusat Statistik 2010.

2.6 Manila: Transformation of urban space.

2.6.1 The role urban planning:

Shatkin (2005) has divided the planning of modern Metro Manila into three distinct phases. There were at least four attempts since WWII to create master plans for Manila, but nothing significant ever emerged (Connell 1999). Shatkin (2005:581) calls the initial period 'colonial', during which the American colonial administration carried out renewal of traditional Filipino cities exhibiting a Spanish heritage, in order to look like and on par with American cities, so that it would impart an air of fairness to the colonial rulers. In the ensuing 'modernist' period between the middle to the end of the twentieth century where the government of the sovereign state of Philippines attempted to inscribe the ethos of nationalist rule, and recast national identity by way of modernist planning and architecture. He identifies the third and latest period to be 'global', characterised by entrepreneurial strategies of the Philippines Government to build Metro Manila into a global city, capable of luring both investors and tourists, as well as impressing upon Filipinos themselves the fruitfulness of globalist economic policies (Shatkin 2005; 2008).

During the colonial phase, the renowned architect Daniel Burnham's plan for Manila in the early 1900's was typical of the City Beautiful movement and highlights the most scenic attribute of the city, Manila Bay. It focused on the presence of big open spaces in a brand new government office complex, looking westward out towards the sea, housing both the Capitol, as well as some branches of the national administration. This national government complex was also to symbolise the colonial government's power and reach by having roads radiate out of it on the eastern side that would connect it to the entire city. Also by placing it in a public and accessible way, the idea was to contrast it from the walled Spanish governmental complex of the *Intramuros*, to emphasise American democratic values. It also planned to accommodate visual spectacles of grand buildings, monuments and grand boulevards to inspire awe towards the American administration. Manila's main open spaces, Rizal Park and Roxas Boulevard were the main developments under the Burnham plan (Connell 1999). It also focused on decreasing traffic congestion. The world class Manila Hotel as proposed by the plan was opened in 1912 to accommodate international tourists and American expatriates. Although most of Burnham's plan was not implemented, it considerably influenced the layout and structure of the city.

The *Intramuros* remained as a heritage of the Spanish historical era, albeit its walls brought down in places to ease the flow of traffic, and the surrounding moat infilled The plan focuses on aesthetics and traffic and 'interpreted Manila's primary functions in a manner consistent with the desires of the colonial administration - it was to be a forum to express the majesty of public institutions, and an efficient market for commerce' (Shatkin 2005: 584). Community interests and the requirements of the working class were completely overlooked. The shortage of housing, widespread corruption in public life, bureaucracy and law enforcement were overlooked, as were deficiency of public transportation systems. Population growth soon overwhelmed the infrastructural improvements under Burnham's plan (Shatkin 2005). The social inequities exacerbated during the colonial rule of the Americans because of an economically opportunistic alliance among the country's landed elite that had ultimately rendered Manila emblematic instead of all the ills of a colonial administration, inequitable, asymmetrical and elitist. In the 1940s a master plan was prepared for development of a part of the Makati area owned by the Ayala family, one of the richest landed elite families who later on multiplied their fortunes through development businesses in the urban sector. Subsequent plans were inconsequential (Connell 1999). Most of the academic discussion concentrating corporate-led urban development in Manila has tended to correlate its spatial outcomes with the current phase of globalisation, so that the urban space shaped by business corporations seem totally the artefact of modern-day globalization. However, the instance of Makati City contradicts this inference, as it was a corporate master-planned new city in the 1950s rather than the 1990s (Garrido 2013).

The next phase of urban planning was modernist planning during the reign of Marcos, beginning from the time of his declaration of martial law in 1972 and his overthrow in 1986. The artful usage of the rhetoric and imagery of nationalism and, the working of a system of patronage networks and sheer oppression were the pillars of Marcos's reign. To further cement his political base, a group of technocrats put together by him started a several infrastructural development schemes, most importantly the construction of roads in the provinces (Shatkin 2005). During the 1960s and 1970s many largescale infrastructure projects were completed, including the inner urban highway, *Epifanio de los Santos Avenue* (EDSA),and one of Marco's slogans were 'Marcos means more roads'. A multi-million dollar Cultural Centre Complex was built on land that was reclaimed from the Manila Bay, on Roxas

Boulevard. This combination of modern buildings and arterial roads in the landscape of Metro Manila appeared to communicate to the West the progress, and the Philippino national identity, and the assertive state under Marcos' rule (Connell 1999).

In this phase of urban planning, the buildings reflected the contemporary trends of modernist architecture. Several imposing structures such as Cultural Centre of the Philippines, designed by renowned architects were built and international events such as the Miss Universe Pageant in 1976, an annual international film festival and others were hosted. Imelda Marcos, a former beauty queen and the wife of Ferdinand Marcos was made the governor of Metro Manila Commission created in 1975 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016). Unfortunately another focus of the renewal efforts was a war against slums, waged through several eviction drives in the face of improperly planned and grossly inadequate low income housing provision (Shatkin 2008).

In 1976, an agglomeration of four cities (Manila, Pasay, Kalookan, and Quezon City) and thirteen municipalities was officially designated as the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila, by virtue of Presidential Decree 921 issued on March 4 of the same year (Ragrario 2003). Despite strong intentions of the government to express its interpretation of the ambitions and ideals of the nation through urban symbolism, large scale formal city planning was weak and remained largely unimplemented due to shortage of financial and human resources as well as administrative apathy. This state of affairs follows directly from the disproportionate power and influence wielded by old landed aristocracy in the Manila region. These land owning elite families are mostly of Chinese mestizo origin, became wealthy and influential as they acquired vast amounts of land from the Spanish Friars. Later on, they acquired more power and diversified their power base by capitalizing on urban development as large real estate firms, developers, transport and banking. Their penetration of the branches and agencies of government was such that most of the bureaucracy and urban managers were recruited from their ranks and had little motivation or ability to implement planning for public welfare.

With an acknowledgement that urban development needs to be regulated, in 1979 an Urban Land Reform Programme was started by Marcos that stated that all land use had to conform to government laid development plans and that government registration and approval was required for all real estate dealings. These procedures

were vehemently opposed by the coalition of developers, land owners, property owners, contractors, and other allied businesses with the contention that such regulatory zeal would crush entrepreneurship and bring about an economic downfall. Eventually Marcos was pressured into limiting these stipulations to the "depressed areas" dominated by squatter settlements. The elite led urban development consisting of mainly residential complexes throughout Metro Manila continued apace and unregulated. (Shatkin 2008; 2005; Connell 1999: 420).

In 1990 the Metro Manila Authority (MMA) replaced the erstwhile Metro Manila Commission (MMC). As in the case of the MMC, it did not acquire the necessary popular support; instead local politicians at the level of the municipality managed to retain a lot of autonomy and restricted the role of the MMA to delivery and of basic services such as waste disposal and traffic management, leaving very little room for participatory development through the community organisations, NGOs or other associations of the urban poor. Almost all the land in Manila continue to be owned privately, with the result that speculation in land and high prices of land persists, with no attempt at land reforms or imposing ceilings. The circumstances of governance in Philippines has been the chief hindrance to the implementation of public planning in Metro Manila. The contradictory tendencies of "strong centralism" linked to the colonial background, the authoritarian inclinations of national leaders, the domination by a small clique of economic and political elites, and the socio-political acceptance of local government autonomy as a result of American influence, did not allow master planning or integrated governance at the level of the metropolitan region. Plans, whenever they have been executed have been for small segments of metropolitan territory, never wider than the area of a municipality (Connell 1999: 420-21).

Today the National Capital Region or Metro Manila is composed of Manila the capital city of the country, Quezon city the most populous city of the country, the cities of Kalookas, Las Pinas, Malabon, Makati, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Paranaque, Pasay, Pasig, San Juan, Taguig, Valenzuela and the only remaining municipality of Pateros (Philippine Statistical Authority 2015). The development of the metropolitan area of Manila in the contemporary period of globalisation is marked by the relegation of urban and regional planning functions almost entirely to the private sector. This takes the form inequitable urban development as a handful of real estate developers acquire new fangled powers of

planning, conceptualising developments at regional scale, upon which the state retreats still further from urban development, leading to a further deterioration of the urban situation. These developments are mainly integrated urban megaprojects that are situated in tactical locations not only anticipating returns from the nature of physical augmentation of Metro Manila, but also to contour this growth to the benefit of developers themselves. Developers are growingly constructing infrastructure, such as community infrastructure, light rail, regional rail, and toll roads, and linking them on a regional scale. Thus over and above developing real estate and infrastructure, private sector firms are conceptualizing and implementing complete urban assemblies that are superimposed on top of the extant urban structure. Such developments receive governmental support through public- private partnerships and sale of public lands to raise revenue, which in this case makes it conducive for private developers to dominate in all planning developments; from the envisioning of urban policy to the management of the urban spaces thus created.

Shatkin (2008: 384) terms this 'bypass-implant urbanism', which is not simply a style of urban development that is the outcome of the impractical espousal of urban development models that originate in the West. In reality it is emblematic of the enticements, limitations, and prospects offered by economic globalization of the Philippines. While it has occurred with a state of constant financial and political crisis for the government, it has also generated new economic opportunities for the Manila metropolitan region (Shatkin 2008: 384). While this phenomena can be partly explained by globalization associated growing demands of new real estate solutions, the availability global finance, and the growing imprint of foreign architects and planners, yet the explanation for the uniquely strong hold of the private sector in urban planning and regional development in Manila in recent times requires delving into three aspects of the political economy of the Philippines.

Firstly, the political economy of the Philippines is characterised by a great deal of disproportionateness in the in the ownership of land and assets, a trait that has transferred into the city, forming two distinct socio-spatial classes: the rural poor who have migrated to urban centres forming the class of urban landless of the informal settlements and the small class of land/home owning, and enclave inhabiting urban elite. Inequalities between the two urban social classes have increased following Manila's growing global economic linkages as the surpluses have accumulated mainly with a small class. The continuous growth in the numbers of the urban poor

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has contributed to overcrowding, and socioeconomic conflicts have led to the growth of enclaves.

Secondly, the concentration of large holdings of land among a few families during the plantation economy led to development of an oligopolistic real estate sector. As a result of this inequitable distribution of land, developers could easily acquire land plots for large-scale development, and many developers have accumulated sizeable land reserves in Metro Manila and the surrounding provinces (Magno-Ballesteros, 2000)

Third, the system of 'booty capitalism', a legacy of the American colonial rule, where in the early part of the 20th Century electoral democracy was deliberately cultivated in the Philippines in a manner that enabled the rich to maintain their political control over the state. Affluent clans owning large chunks of land effectively used their wealth to get elected to posts in local and national government. The business class too wielded a lot of clout and were able to obtain privileges from a spineless bureaucracy (Shatkin 2008: 396). During the Marcos regime it took the form of urban planning projects that were undertaken in order to financially benefit the cronies of Marcos to keep his rule intact. This system has not been demolished even after the downfall of Marcos, despite the subsequent governments enacting reforms to improve political accountability, and was also fundamental to the privatisation of planning in the current era.

After the overthrow of Marcos, reforms for decentralisation divested the Metro Manila Commission of its powers, and devolution of power to the seventeen cities and municipalities within the metropolitan area took place. The enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) in 1991 introduced the decentralization process in the Philippines. In 1992, the Philippine Congress passed in addition, the Urban Development and Housing Act, which further escalated the decentralisation of governance structures and processes, especially in cities and other urban areas. Compared with decentralisation processes occurring simultaneously in other parts of Asia, the process in the Philippines has been more wide-ranging. Functions and services were devolved to different levels of local governance that included 81 provinces, 136 chartered cities, 1495 municipalities and approximately 40,000 barangays. Decentralisation has been the professed way to devolve power from the centre and prevent an authoritarian regime from re-emerging in the future, such as the imposition of martial law during the Marcos era. However, according to Porio (2012)

a recasting and reinforcing of existing power structures has occurred through decentralisation strategies and discourses (Porio 2012).

2.6.2 *Informal settlements in Metro Manila.*

Metro Manila has a large number of informal settlers. Estimates vary according to the criteria used by the analyst to define informal settlers. According to the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor (PCUP) set up by the Corazon Aquino administration, in the late 1990s, the number of informal settlers in Metro Manila was approximately 37 per cent of the city's population (Shatkin 2007). According to Ragrario (2003: 9) in 2002, an average of 38 per cent of the population of the constituent units of Metro Manila belonged to 'depressed households', varying from 73.4 per cent in Pasay City, to 16.8 per cent in the City of Malabon. According to Ortega (2016) the number of informal households in Metro Manila grew sharply between 1980 and 1990, when a 149 per cent increase in the number of informal settlements occurred. From 1990 to 2000 it grew by 73.7 per cent. But from 2000 to 2010 it grew by only 0.6 per cent, along with a significant drop in the percentage of informal households due to a hostile neoliberal attitude towards informality (Ortega 2016).

In Metro Manila, the availability of housing is shaped by the dialectics of two transformative social forces: 'a civil society sector empowered by its success in overthrowing a dictator and its newfound political influence, and a set of powerful political and economic actors bent on realizing, and profiting from, the globalization of Metro Manila's economy' (Shatkin 2007:21). Four main factors can be delineated that have combined to create a housing crisis in Metro Manila. Firstly, the concentration of urban land ownership, that had its roots in the Spanish era, in the hands of a small number of elite families, thus excluding sizeable parcels of land from the residential market, resulting in a cycle of excessive land prices and speculation (Connell 1999). The existing property tax structure also fuels land speculation as property tax rates generally range from 0.3 to 0.6 per cent of assessed values. Attempts to hike property taxes and increase collection have faced severe resistance from both large landowners and middle class homeowners (Shatkin 2007).
Secondly, rapid growth of population of Manila UA, from 1.54 million in 1950 to 5.96 million in 1980 and to 11.89 million in 2010 (UNHABITAT 2015) along with

poor land supply has shot up land prices (Shatkin 2007) in both the urban core and periphery (Shatkin 2016). In 1998, the cheapest housing at market rates was affordable to only 40 to 50 per cent of the population (Shatkin 2007). The main cause of squatting and housing shortages is the rapidly growing gap between growth rates of income and that of urban land prices. The dearth of affordable land, growing poverty and population densities, the inability of the government to address the housing needs of the poor, have left the poor with little choice except for squatting (Porio et al. 2004).

Thirdly, since 1986, following fiscal austerity measures, government involvement in housing has been that of a facilitator, a strategy backed by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, where the role of government agencies is restricted mainly to providing moderately subsidized finance for housing improvement projects. In this scenario, subsequent to decentralisation (as discussed in the previous section), urban land reform legislation and innovative new housing programs have been carried out. Community Based Organisations (CBOs) have been empowered to carry out much of the project planning and implementation, negotiate land acquisition, organize self-help labour, and assist in cost recovery, primarily through collection of repayment of loans. However, many actors both in government agencies and the private sector have systematically undermined such programmes by using legal obstacles, loopholes, or through non-compliance.

The absence of an effective Metro-level planning body impedes the formulation of metropolitan wide policies to address hosing and environmental problems. There is no entity with the capacity to direct urban growth, or to plan for the efficient location of industrial, commercial, or residential land uses. As legalizing informal settlement would use up land that could be allocated to higher-value use, local governments have little motivation to support the development of low-income housing within their jurisdictions through measures such as in-situ improvement projects or providing land for relocation sites for informal settlements. It could also incentivize in-migration into Metro Manila with others hoping to benefit from such programs. Thus many city and municipal governments have purchased land in provinces surrounding Metro Manila to create relocation sites, thus moving the resettled families far from the sources of their livelihood (Shatkin 2007).

Fourthly, globalization related economic transformations have boosted Manila's importance as the economic hub of the country and as a command and

control centre integrating the country with the global flows of finance, consumption, tourism and labour; and national development plans have recognized the city as a growth engine for globalization-led economic development. As a part of intentional world city formation in the context of fierce intercity competition for attracting FDI (Douglass 2007), the government has been: a) undertaking infrastructure development megaprojects, including multi-lane toll roads and a light rail transit system to ease traffic congestion; b) entering into public private partnerships in integrated real estate megaprojects and; c) undertaking tourism related redevelopment (Shatkin 2006). In such public private partnerships the private sector dominates the partnership in all aspects, from conception to the management of the finished products. These integrated urban megaprojects are developed in strategic locations that is not only geared to trends in the metropolitan area's development but also premeditated to benefit the developer with respect to their other ventures (Shatkin 2008).

From 1965 to 1975, the Marcos administration was characterized by failed eviction and resettlement drives of the informal settlers displaced due to large-scale infrastructure projects to land plots outside Manila. This was because the evictees would return to the original sites as the resettlement sites lacked basic amenities and livelihood opportunities. Although Marcos instituted slum upgradation problems in the face of harsh criticism, it was poorly implemented. In 1975 Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 772, which criminalised squatting on publicly and privately owned lands. This was followed up by regular evictions from several informal settlements. It was the because of the impassioned lobbying by NGOs/CBOs and the Catholic Church, that this law was repealed in 1997. However, eviction and demolition of informal settlements have continued as the Marcos era law criminalizing squatting had not been repealed (Hutchison 2007; Porio et al. 2004).

The most significant government legislation concerning urban housing in the post-Marcos era was the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA), which was approved following strong lobbying by NGOs and CBOs. It unambiguously states that the developers of projects must provide adequate provisions for relocation, before any demolition can occur (Porio et al. 2004). Further developers have to allocate 20 per cent of project costs to develop low-income housing (Shatkin 2007). The bill further stipulates a housing program that following the tone of the decentralization reforms (Porio 2012) emphasizes the responsibilities of local governments and CBOs. Now, Local Government Units (LGUs) were authorized to compile a complete

inventory of land uses, and identify vacant land that might be used for community housing. LGUs are also supposed to register all the dwellers of informal settlements, including those established before the mandating of the Act, as potential beneficiaries of community housing projects (Shatkin 2007). The Community Mortgage Program (CMP), under which CBOs obtain loans from the National Home Mortgage Financing Corporation (NHMFC) to buy land usually from private owners at market prices was to be expanded (Berner 2000). Accordingly communities had to reblock themselves and reassign plots in compliance with subdivision regulations. NGOs, and to a lesser extent local and national government agencies perform crucial roles in organizing community residents, helping in negotiations with local governments and landowners, extending technical assistance in reblocking and housing development, and sharing some responsibility for repayment (Shatkin 2007).

These legislations formulated a policy that tried to circumvent eviction and relocation, and attempted a participatory and decentralised approach to housing provision and urban development, taking into account the needs of informal settlers in urban planning. The distribution of responsibilities among government organisations and the urban poor communities and/or their intercessory groups like NGOs and CBOs had changed in favour of the latter, as did the functionings and interactions of the stakeholders in the housing and land sector (Hutchison 2007; Porio et al 2004). Like government agencies in different Asian megacities, seeking to 'monetize' their lands (Shatkin 2016: 1) the LGUs in Metro Manila, have dragged their feet in the compilation of lists of beneficiaries in their jurisdictions, and in the naming of lands for allocated towards resettlement sites, as the motivation to divert land from potential higher value uses is low. In addition, developers have often paid no heed to the provision for allocating 20 per cent project costs for low-income housing projects (Hutchison 2007). The human rights of informal settlers during eviction have been frequently ignored and relocation is provided at sites distant from sources of employment or schools. The success of the Community Mortgage Programme has been restricted; benefitting only 5 per cent of Philippines informal settlers as high land prices in many parts of the city places a huge burden for loan repayment on the poor. In some cases poorer settlers have lost their homes when they defaulted on loan repayments (Berner 2000).

The distribution of informal households in Metro Manila in this study is shown through GIS based mapping. Map No. 14 (Table 16 Appendix) shows the

distribution of slum households in Manila in 2002. Quezon City had the highest number of slum households, followed by Manila, Kalookan and Pasay. Thus the old urban core zone of Metro Manila contains the highest number of slum households. On the other hand the areal units dominated by corporate master planned communities, particularly Makati CBD and its nearby units contain relatively lower number of slum households. There are significant numbers of slum households in the areal units at the periphery of the metropolitan region such as in Las Pinas, Valenzuela and Muntinlupa.

Map no. 14

Map prepared by author

Data source: Philippines National Statistical Coordination Board 2001.

2.6.3   Manila: spatial transformation.

Spatial transformations within Manila have reflected the ambitions of the government to produce a global economic command and control centre, linking Philippines to the global economy and the recognition of Metro Manila as the globalization related growth engine in the national economy. Five aspects characterize Metro Manila's transformed landscapes of globality.

First, are the mega projects in the real estate sector (which had earlier precedents in the Makati CBD and Ortigas Centre), with the government entering into public – private partnerships to develop large scale real estate projects to create socially regulated and planned spaces that meets the standards of an international business community (Shatkin 2006). Shatkin (2008) notes certain common features of these real estate projects. They are integrated, self-contained features of the urban landscape with arranged residential, commercial, office, and industrial spaces. International standards and best practices were used in planning them and many used the services of international architectural firms. They also use 'a system of development controls (such as floor-area ratios, minimum setbacks, and building codes) and traffic management to prevent the "informalization" of the built environment and to maintain a distinctive planned character. The intent is to differentiate these spaces from those of the "public" city in their aesthetic appeal, in the types of clientele that they attract, in their levels of security, and in the quality of the connecting transportation infrastructure' (Shatkin 2006: 391). Metro Manila is the hub of international business activity in the Philippines within which the Makati central business district (CBD), constructed and run by the Ayala Land Corporation (owned by one of the oligarchic families), encloses 90 per cent of the control centres of the top 1000 corporations in the country, and about 80 per cent of HQs of MNCs. Manila has also become a leading retail hub in the region following the inflow of expatriates, tourists and the growth of a resident consumerist middle class. Labour is the country's biggest export and personal remittances of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) which was $28.5 billion in 2016, accounted for a tenth of the nation's GDP (Blankfeld 2016). Shatkin (2006) cites Tyner (2000) in finding 99 per cent of the Filipino overseas contract workers being registered to agencies in Metro Manila, with 77 per cent of them being concentrated within the cities of Manila and Makati. Most of the demand for new housing and consumer spaces comes from OFWs, an

assortment of workers that includes house-maids, engineers and nurses from places like Hong Kong, Middle East and North America among others (Shatkin 2008).

Second, are the spaces of large-scale infrastructural projects in metro Manila and the adjacent regions, focused especially on easing the severe traffic congestion that is viewed as an impediment to attracting investment and growth. Included within these schemes is the extension of the Mass Railway Transit and the Light Rail Transit lines to connect new areas; the Metro Manila Skyway linking Metro Manila to the expanding metropolitan regions to the south; construction of three more expressways connecting Metro Manila to its contiguous regions; and extensions and upgradation of Ninoy Aquino International Airport (Shatkin 2006). The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) in 2014 adopted the Roadmap for Transport Infrastructure Development for Metro Manila and Its Surrounding Areas, informally known as the "Mega Manila Dream Plan", based on the recommendations of a study conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). It recommends further expansion of existing roads, Mass Railway Transit and Light Railway Transit lines, creation of toll expressways, creation of a new north – south suburban railway line, a Metro Manila subway system, as well as the creation of Gateway seaports and airports (JICA 2014).

Third is the migration of production outside Metro Manila and rapid suburbanisation. Nodes in the transportation network as well land along the roads have attracted large commercial developments, driving up land values. This has led to sprawling radial development (Ortega 2016) and the rapid conversion of agricultural land to urban uses (Connell 1999). Sequentially, first, since the 1950's, the areas surrounding the old urban core of the city of Manila, including Kalookan city and southern Quezon City to the north, Mandaluyong to the west, and Makati and Pasay to the south, changed from urban periphery to densely built-up urban centers (Shatkin 2008). In many in outer municipalities of Metro Manila, a "green belt" of agricultural land which was meant for containing urban growth was gradually filled in from expanding ribbon development along main roads, that increasingly merged to form a diverse periurban areas containing agriculture, industry, and new residential areas, as in other Asian extended metropolitan areas (Connell 1999). It was then followed by the appearance of another ring of rapidly developing cities and municipalities, spurred by a combination of industrialization, the proliferation of informal settlements, and

the development of residential areas for middle class people wishing to escape the noise and pollution of the inner city.

Between 1975 and 2000, the population of Valenzuela more than tripled, Muntinlupa quadrupled, and the populations of Taguig and Las Pinas grew almost six times. The northern parts of Kalookan and Quezon City also grew extremely rapidly (Philippines Statistical Authority 2010). As this process occurred Metro Manila became Mega-Manila, extending especially southwards into Cavite and Laguna provinces. Since the 1990's there has been a noticeable movement of industries and housing estates from Metro Manila to the CALABARZON region, as they could no longer afford the exorbitant land prices following the real estate boom of the 1990s. The CALABARZON region lies to the south of Metro Manila and includes parts of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Quezon and Rizal which have emerged as major industrial centres and bedroom communities for commuters to Metro Manila. Currently it is the CALABARZON region where the most rapid population growth is taken place (Ballesteros 2000).

The process of rapid suburbanization has been accelerated due to the prior accumulation of large tracts of land in the periurban areas and capital investment by a small number of oligarchic elite families, such as the Ayala, Ortigas, and Aranetas families. These new suburbs are characterized by mainly residential functions and dependence on car ownership and thereby within the reach of only the upper and upper middle classes. The larger suburbs include integrated service facilities such as shopping and recreation within them. The distinguishing feature of these new residential areas are that they are always gated, guarded and surveilled complexes. The new suburbs are sometimes further set apart by parkland, seemingly public but actually private, much of which has been landscaped into golf courses (Connell 1999).

The fourth feature of the spatial reconfiguration of the Metro Manila region is gentrification 'characterised by accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2010:17) and a 'neoliberal warfare against informality' (Ortega 2016: 35). Land monetization strategies of local governments (Shatkin 2016) and imperatives to create world class spaces have altered the dialectics between the informal settlers and the local governments, and stripped the urban poor of their rights to the city. This is exemplified by frequent eviction campaigns that have displaced thousands of informal households to make way for large-scale public-private-partnership infrastructure

projects and high value constructions. It is characterized by 'violent encounters with informal communities occurring in expansive radial patterns' (Ortega 2016: 48) mirroring the spatial growth patterns of the city. Neoliberal conquest of the metropolitan space includes both the redevelopment of older metropolitan core, as well as the construction of new town type business districts in the metropolitan peripheries. The associated gentrification deconcentrates the areas of informal households and simultaneously resettles them into socialized housing projects in bleak locations outside the metropolitan area. However, the continued existence of clusters of informal settlements in the urban core may be due to the return of evicted informal households and continued arrival of new migrants to Manila (Ortega 2016).

Fifth, the once glorious sites of national political symbolism have become marginalized within the urban fabric with the passing on of planning functions to the private sector. Located in Manila and Quezon City, both of which are the seats of the government, Many such sites in Manila and Quezon city have become run down, while others have been privatized or are occupied by the marginalized populations (Shatkin 2006). Even the imposing buildings housing the Congress and the Supreme Court in the National Government Centre are surrounded by the largest single concentration of squatters in Southeast Asia, Tondo (Connell 1999).

In this study the population distribution of Metro Manila has been divided between the *core* and the *periphery*. As is revealed by population growth data of the National Statistical Office (Map No. 15 table 14 Appendix), the *core* zone of Metro Manila except Quezon city, including the cities of Manila, Makati, San Juan and Pasay, has seen negative population growth during 1990- 2000. Except for these administrative units the rest of Metro Manila experienced slower decadal population growth rates during 1990 – 2000 when compared to 2000 -2010. This shows the negative impact on urban population growth in the core due to the 1997 - 98 East Asian financial crises. Quezon City, a part of the old urban core, although not registering negative growth, experienced lower growth rates than the periphery. The areal units outside the core have however experienced high growth rates in that same decade, the highest being 59 per cent in city of Las Pinas on the southern periphery and, and 54 per cent in Kalookan city on the northern periphery.

Map no. 15

Map prepared by author.

Data source: (1) Philippines Statistical Authority 2010; 2015.

Map no. 16

METRO MANILA
DECADAL CHANGE IN POPULATION (1990 - 2000)

BULACAN

CALOOCAN

VALENZUELA

NAVOTAS

MALABON

CALOOCAN

QUEZON

MARIKINA

RIZAL

MANILA

SAN JUAN

MANDALUYONG

PASIG

Manila Bay

MAKATI

PATEROS

PASAY

TAGUIG

PARAÑAQUE

Laguna de Bay

LAS PIÑAS

INDEX
Percentage Change

-25 to 0
0 to 25
25 to 50
50 to 75
Greater than 75

CAVITE

MUNTINLUPA

LAGUNA

Source: Phillipines National Statistical Coordination Board,
2001 & Phillipines Statistical Authority, 2010; 2015

Map prepared by author.

Data source: (1) Philippines Statistical Authority 2010; 2015.

Map no. 17

Map prepared by author.

Data source: (1) Philippines Statistical Authority 2010; 2015.

Map no. 18

METRO MANILA
CITY-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, 1990

BULACAN
CALOOCAN
VALENZUELA
NAVOTAS
MALABON
CALOOCAN
QUEZON
MARIKINA
RIZAL
SAN JUAN
MANILA
MANDALUYONG
PASIG
Manila Bay
MAKATI
PATEROS
PASAY
TAGUIG
Laguna de Bay
PARAÑAQUE
INDEX
% of Total Population
0 - 5
5.01 - 10
10.01 - 15
15.01 - 20
20.01 - 25
LAS PIÑAS
CAVITE
MUNTINLUPA
LAGUNA
Prepared by: 21stCenturyGIS

Map prepared by author

Data Source: Philippines Statistics Authority (National Statistics Office) 1990.

Map no. 19

Map prepared by author

Data Source: Philippines Statistical Authority 2015.

The decadal change in population among the different areal units in Metro Manila during 1990 - 2000 and 2000 - 2010 is shown in Map nos. 16 and 17. During 1990 - 2000 parts of the periphery have registered extremely high decadal population growth rates more than 75 percent (Taguig). Kalookan and Pasig also experienced very high growth rates between 75 percent and 50 percent. This is in contrast to most of the old urban core including Manila City, Makati, San Juan and Pasay which have experienced population decline up to negative 25 percent. During 2000 -2010 such marked redistribution of population between core and periphery was weakened. All the areal units of the metropolitan region experienced population growth. However the trend of higher growth rates of the periphery over the core continued. Kalookan, Pasig, Paranaque and Taguig had high growth rates between 75 to 50 percent, While Manila City, Makati, San Juan and Pasay grew at 0 to 25 percent. Only Quezon maintained a steady rates of very high decadal population growth, growing between 75 -50 percent during both intercensal decades.

A comparison of the city-wise distribution of percentage of population contain between from 1990 to 2015 is shown in Map Nos. 18 and 19 (Table No. 15 Appendix). It shows the decreasing share of parts of the old core over time, especially in Manila city and Makati. Whereas the share of population of the administrative units in the peripheries have been increasing especially in Kalookan to the north and also in Pasig, Taguig and Paranaque in the south west periphery of the metropolitan area.

The relative movement of the areal units of Metro Manila in and out of five population density classes is shown in maps no. 20, 21, 22 and 23 (Table no 17, Appendix). Very high population densities (greater than 45000 persons/sq. km) are seen in Navotas since 1990, because Navotas city and Manila city houses some of the largest informal settlements in Asia. Thus parts of the core zone of Manila metropolitan area are still experiencing increasing population, with very high population densities and supports a vibrant inner city economy. Murakami et al (2005) confirms that parts of the urban middle class remains concentrated in the core despite massive expansion of Metro Manila over time. Another trend in the increasing population density of Pasig in the east and Kalookan to the north in 2000 when compared to 1990, and the deconcentration of the Makati area in 2000. Since 2000 however density has increased in all areal units adjacent to Navotas -Makati City area of very high population density (greater than 45000 persons/sq. km. to the west and Pasig on the east. Pasig has emerged as another area of very high population density

exceeding 45000 persons per/sq.Km since 2010. In 2015 Manila City too moved into the very high density class.

San Juan and Mandaluyong has consistent had comparatively low population densities (less than 15000 persons/sq.km) since 1990. However, the other areal units in or adjacent to the core, where the concentration of the middle classes and corporate planned and gated sub-cities is increasing, had experienced densities. Thus by 2010 Makati, Quezon, Malabon, Taguig and Paranaque has moved to the next higher density class of 15001 -25000 persons/sq.km.

If we look at the change in population densities from 1990 to 2015, as shown in map no. 24 (Table no 17, Appendix), it is further sheds light on where the greatest increases in density are actually occurring. It is occurring on the metropolitan periphery in the cities of Pasig, Taguig, Kalookan and Navotas.

Map no. 20

Map prepared by author

Data Source: Philippines Statistics Authority (National Statistics Office) 1990.

Map no. 21

METRO MANILA
POPULATION DENSITY DISTRIBUTION, 2000

N

BULACAN

CALOOCAN

VALENZUELA

NAVOTAS

MALABON

CALOOCAN

QUEZON

MARIKINA

RIZAL

SAN JUAN

MANILA

MANDALUYONG

PASIG

Manila Bay

MAKATI

PATEROS

PASAY

TAGUIG

PARAÑAQUE

Laguna de Bay

LAS PIÑAS

CAVITE

INDEX
Persons / Sq. Km.
Less than 15001
15001 - 25000
25001 - 35000
35001 - 45000
Greater than 45000

MUNTINLUPA

LAGUNA

Source: Phillipines National Statistical Coordination Board,
2001 & Phillipines Statistical Authority, 2010; 2015

Map prepared by author

Data Source: Philippines Statistics Authority (National Statistics Office) 2000.

147

Map no. 22

METRO MANILA
POPULATION DENSITY DISTRIBUTION, 2010

N

BULACAN

CALOOCAN

VALENZUELA

NAVOTAS

MALABON

CALOOCAN

QUEZON

MARIKINA

RIZAL

SAN JUAN

MANILA

MANDALUYONG

PASIG

Manila Bay

MAKATI

PATEROS

PASAY

TAGUIG

PARAÑAQUE

Laguna de Bay

LAS PIÑAS

CAVITE

INDEX
Persons / Sq. Km.

Less than 15001
15001 - 25000
25001 - 35000
35001 - 45000
Greater than 45000

MUNTINLUPA

LAGUNA

Source: Phillipines National Statistical Coordination Board,
2001 & Phillipines Statistical Authority, 2010; 2015

Map prepared by author

Data Source: Philippines Statistics Authority (National Statistics Office) 2010.

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Map no. 23

Map prepared by author

Data Source: Philippines Statistics Authority 2015.

Map no. 24

Map prepared by author

Data Source: Philippines Statistics Authority (National Statistics Office) 1990; 2000; 2010; 2015.

2.7 Conclusion

Table 2.5 and Figure 2.12 compare Delhi, Jakarta and Manila along broad indicators of size, economy, liveability, and equity.

Table 2.5 Comparison of urban indicators

Category	Delhi UA	Jakarta UA	Manila UA
Population, 2014	24953310	10176010	12763750
Total Area, 2016 (sq km)	2163	3225	1632
Density of Population, 2016 (Per sq km)	11900	9700	14100
GDP, 2013 (PPP adjusted GDP, $BN)	193.6	321.3	182.8
GDP/capita, 2013 ($)	3580	5020	6160
Projected GDP 2025 ($bn at 2005 PPP)	482	231	325
Decline of projected 2025 GDP in case of de-globalization	-9.20per cent	-9.20per cent	-9.20per cent
Productivity Index	0.596	0.636	0.676
Quality of Life Index	0.69	0.733	0.647
Infrastructure Index	0.786	0.741	0.775
Environment Index	0.448	0.881	0.868
Equity Index	0.712	0.885	0.669
City Prosperity Index (5 Dimensions)	0.635	0.769	0.723
City Prosperity Index (excluding Equity Index)	0.617	0.743	0.737

Sources:

1. WUP, 2014, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
2. Demographia, World Urban Areas, 12th Annual edition.
3. Global Metro Monitor, 2014. Brookings Institution.

4. PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates and projections using UN urban agglomerations definitions and population estimates.
5. United Nations Human settlement Programme (UN HABITAT), Global Urban Indicators Database, 2012

Figure 2.12

Source: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN HABITAT), Global Urban Indicators Database, 2012

The Five Dimension City Prosperity Index is an indicator of prosperity of urban areas measured along the 5 dimensions of productivity, quality of life, infrastructure, environment and equity (UN HABITAT 2012). Comparing the value of both the overall Five Dimension City Prosperity Index and the Four Dimension City Prosperity Index that excludes the Equity Index, for Jakarta and Manila shows that it is between 0.700 and 0. 799 and are categorized as cities with "solid prosperity factors". However the values of the former and latter indices in the case of Delhi are between 0.600 and 0.699 and it is in the category of cities with "moderate prosperity

factors" (Figure 1.5). The Productivity Index denotes the total production of goods and services (value added) by the inhabitants of a city during any particular year (UN HABITAT 2012). While Both Jakarta and Manila scores between 0.600 and 0.699 on this index, Delhi scores lower between 0.500 and 0.599. The Infrastructure Index combines two sub-indices for infrastructure and housing. The infrastructure sub-index includes: connection to services (piped water, sewerage, electricity and ICT), waste management, knowledge infrastructure, health infrastructure, and transport and road infrastructure. The housing sub-index includes building materials and living space (UN HABITAT 2012). In this index, all three cities score between 0.700 and 0.799. The Quality of Life Index is a combination of four sub-indices: education, health, safety/security, social capital and public space. While Delhi and Manila score between 0.600 and 0.699, Jakarta scores better in this index at 0.733. The equity and social inclusion index combines the Gini coefficient (measuring inequality in income/consumption) and social and gender inequality of access to services and infrastructure. There is a wide variation among the three cities in this index. Jakarta is found to be the most inclusive city at 0.885, while Delhi scores 0.712 and Manila scores lowest at 0.669. The environmental sustainability index is made of four sub-indices: air quality (measured through the presence of PM10), carbon dioxide emissions, energy and indoor pollution (UN HABITAT 2012). It is noteworthy that while the values of this index for Jakarta and Manila is between 0.800 and 0.899, Delhi fares very poorly at 0.448 (UN-Habitat 2012)

The megacities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila exhibit certain convergences. They are all Asian megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants. They are also urban agglomeration spread across several administrative jurisdictions. They all have large metropolitan areas and are experiencing rapid transformations in urban spatial structures from single core to multi nuclear. They all have a rapidly expanding, distinctive and large peri-urban zone and are experiencing a transformation in the spatial structure where there is a transfer of both population and industries to a chaotic urban periphery. Globalization is instrumental in the restructuring of urban spaces in the three chosen megacities, where features of poverty co-exist with ever-increasing numbers of enclaves of global consumption, production and existence. Globalization has also overlapped with greater democratization and decentralization at global scale (Hall 1993), enabling local bodies to recast their governance model in an entrepreneurial format.

The temporal and spatial trends of urban growth is explained through macroeconomic policy changes, planning and governance strategies of the three cities, in order to compare the 'process(es) of neoliberalism'. A comparison has also been done of the changes in the morphology of the three cities by mapping demographic changes in the three cities since 1990, in order to compare the spatial manifestations of the 'actually existing neoliberalism(s)' (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009: 51). In South and South East Asia, the transformation of urban spaces by neoliberal regimes is legitimised through the urban – rural planning discourse of the Washington consensus. The strategic location of global processes in national spaces is with the participation of the states themselves, through provision of legal and physical infrastructure, which is often produced as national infrastructure although increasingly shaped by global agendas. In the context of neoliberal globalization, much of the global discourse on development by multilateral institutions like the World Bank (1992) that promote a model of good governance that involves collaboration between state and market interests. The proliferation of non-state actors (non government organizations, community based organizations, citizens groups and associations, policy think tanks and private consultants) in various sectors of governance have further complicated the scenario, with each having its own set of agenda, interests, and beneficiaries. Though often thought of as the forerunners of social movements, the presence of multiple players have significant implications for transparency, accountability and inclusivity.

Two factors have had a profound impact on spatial patterns of urban growth: first, there has been a pan-Asia boom in urban land prices in both the core and peripheral areas. This presents governments with both prospects and difficulties. It often seduces state actors to formulate schemes to milk the real estate markets in order to garner better revenues and to influence the trajectory of growth of urban spaces. Second, governments throughout Asia have attempted to monetize land (Shatkin 2016)

The evolution of city space of Delhi has been the outcome of both formal planning efforts and private initiatives and responses. In the 1950's, interventionist policy was decided upon and made tangible through three Master Plans. However most of the urban development in Delhi continued to be unplanned and 75 per cent of Delhi's population live in unplanned settlements (DUEIP 2001). From 1990s onwards, following the changes in the macroeconomic policy environment, and

adoption of the JNNURM, the urban local bodies were strengthened and provided fiscal incentives to enact reforms so that infrastructure and real estate development may take place at an accelerated rate. In Delhi there has been second wave of evictions following the first one during the Emergency. In terms of spatial structure, the central parts are shrinking and deconcentrating, while the periphery is expanding, although at a much slower rate in 2001 - 2011. This is because in the build-up to the Commonwealth Games, several lakh people were evicted (TOI 2011) through slum demolitions. Another factor that has affected population distribution was gentrification. Renewal of residential areas and the change of residential zones into commercial ones also reduces housing availability in these areas.

Spectacular transformations in the political geography of Asian cities were sparked off between 1980- 1990, when cities in South East Asia received colossal influxes of foreign investment especially into Metro Manila and Jakarta. Following the signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985, in which the US dollar was devalued relative to the yen in an attempt to increase US exports, there was a period of huge Japanese annual foreign direct investment (FDI) influx into South East Asian countries in the early 1990s. Jakarta and Manila were remarkably important beneficiaries of Japanese aid. It was a phase of rapid industrialization, infrastructural and real estate development. Land values soared, following brisk land development and speculation in the face of growing demands for world standard residential, commercial and office spaces. It was abruptly interrupted by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 - 98.

Indonesia's first president Sukarno who was a civil engineer and architect by training, took a personal interest in the modernisation of Jakarta, and was influenced by the ideas of Le Corbusier and other modernist visions of the city. There were some big planning programmes for Jakarta's development. However, years of political uncertainty after independence and the start of the 'New Order' rule hindered the planned growth of Jakarta. In 1987, a new Master Plan for the Special Capital Region (DKI) of Jakarta (RUTR 1985 - 2005) was unveiled and was a much referred planning document. However most of the planned developments of this plan have been overwhelmed by unplanned developments. Approximately, 60 per cent of Jakarta's urban population is estimated to live in kampungs, which show the extent to which housing has evolved in unplanned ways in Jakarta (Steinberg 2007). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, central and local state agencies in Jakarta dispensed special licenses known as 'location permits' to property developers to acquire land for

house and new town construction. With this development came the advent of big new towns that were in reality exclusive enclaves of high standard housing located in suburban areas. They necessitated the conversion of prime agricultural land and green spaces to urban functions. In addition to the exclusive new towns, many export oriented industrial areas were established by both government and private sector during the New Order regime of President Suharto were also located in the rapidly expanding peri-urban area. In terms of urban spatial structure there has occurred a functional division concerning the urban core and periphery, transforming it from a single core to multi-core metropolitan region. There was first a spatial restructuring comprising a shift in the thrust of urban growth from the central to the peripheral areas, and then due to redevelopment and development of more business functions in the core and long commute times from the periphery, a recent repopulation of the core has begun.

The planning of modern Metro Manila into three distinct phases: the colonial phase which was influenced by American colonial rule; the modernist phase which extended from the declaration of martial law in 1972 and to the overthrow of Marcos in 1986; and global, the contemporary phase. Large scale formal city planning was weak and remained largely unimplemented due to inadequate human and financial resources and lack of political will. It was also one of the consequences of disproportionate power and influence wielded by the few oligarchic traditional landed elite families in the Manila region. Almost all land in Manila continues to be privately owned, and speculation in land has continued to grow and expropriation has seldom been attempted. In fact except for small fragments of Metro Manila such as Makati that was a corporate master planned modernist city since the 1950s plans have never been carried out and implementation of planning at a scale larger than a municipality has never occurred. The development of Metro Manila as a global city has been characterized by the exceptional privatization of urban and regional planning. A few big property developers have taken on new powers of planning and have conceptualised developments at the scale of the metropolitan area as a whole following the withdrawal of the state from urban development. The government has been entering into public – private partnerships to develop mainly integrated urban megaprojects to create socially regulated and planned spaces that meets the standards of an international business community.

Metro Manila has a large number of informal settlers, varying between 37 to 38 per cent of the city's population (Shatkin 2007; Ragrario 2003). The spatial transformation of Metro Manila is characterized by the movement of industries outside Metro Manila and rapid suburbanisation. There has been a sprawling radial development and the rapid conversion of agricultural land to urban uses. Sequentially, first, since the 1950's, the areas surrounding the old urban core of the city of Manila, including Kalookan city and southern Quezon City to the north, Mandaluyong to the west, and Makati and Pasay to the south, changed from urban periphery to densely built-up urban centres. In many in outer municipalities of Metro Manila, a green belt of agricultural land which was meant for containing urban growth was gradually filled in from expanding ribbon development along main roads, that increasingly merged to form diverse peri-urban areas containing agriculture, industry, and new residential areas. It was then followed by the appearance of another ring of rapidly developing cities and municipalities, spurred by a combination of industrialization, the proliferation of informal settlements, and the development of residential areas for the middle class wishing to escape the noise and pollution of the inner-city.

Murakami et al (2005) compared the stage of urbanization and patterns of land use in Jakarta and Manila, found that Jakarta had entered the suburbanization stage, while Manila was at early stage of suburbanization.

Delhi has experimented with decentralized participatory programmes with the aim of bringing citizens and governments closer and more bureaucrats more responsive. The *Bhagidari* scheme has effectively led to gentrification of the channels of political participation, de-links slum dwellers from the government and sidesteps elected representatives. In India as per the 12th Schedule of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, eighteen new tasks were added to the functional domain of the urban local bodies, many of which still remain in the domain of the state governments and have not been passed on to the urban local bodies. Moreover, decentralised participatory schemes like *Bhagidari* involving the new urban middle class associations has acted as a second channel of governance through civil society that attempts to impose neoliberal models of governance and elite ideals of globalised and commodified urban spaces.

After the harsh economic conditions of the economic crisis that precipitated the overthrow of President Suharto's regime, in mid-1999 the Indonesian Parliament enacted Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 authorising regional autonomy and fiscal

decentralisation. These two legislations were mostly undertaken as the disintegration of Indonesia into many small nations was anticipated. It was envisaged that this would curb the separatist sentiments in the outer provinces of Indonesia and prevent manipulation of regional and local governments by the government at the centre. However the impact of such decentralization on the evolution of Jakarta is not yet clear.

After the ending of the Marcos rule, the Metro Manila Commission was divested of its powers through decentralization reforms, and these powers have been devolved to its seventeen cities and municipalities. Enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) in 1991 introduced the decentralization process in the Philippines. In 1992, the Philippine Congress passed in addition, the Urban Development and Housing Act, which further escalated the decentralisation of governance structures and processes, especially in cities and other urban areas. Compared with decentralisation processes occurring simultaneously in other parts of Asia, the process in the Philippines has been more wide-ranging. Functions and services were devolved to different levels of local governance that included 81 provinces, 136 chartered cities, 1495 municipalities and approximately 40,000 barangays. Decentralisation has been the professed way to devolve power from the centre and prevent an authoritarian regime from re-emerging in the future, such as the imposition of martial law during the Marcos era. However, according a recasting and reinforcing of existing power structures has occurred through decentralisation strategies and discourses.

This chapter clarifies and compares the definitions of "urban" in the three different national contexts. Then it moves on to the comparisons of the historical and the national macroeconomic contexts that shaped the evolution Delhi, Jakarta and Manila and compares the performance of macroeconomic indicators after liberalisation. The transformation of urban spatial structure in the three cities after globalisation and liberalisation is compared along the following dimensions: (1) The role of urban planning; (2) housing categories, with special emphasis on informal settlements; and (3) other important and distinctive features depending on its impact on the city, such as the changing governance framework in Delhi, suburbanisation in Jakarta, and the combination of several factors in Manila including urban megaprojects, the skewed pattern of landownership and suburbanisation. However a common feature of the spatial reconfiguration in the three cities is the neoliberal

animosity towards informality and accumulation through dispossession on the part of the propertied and affluent classes. In the next chapter the focus shifts to the actors and interests underlying urban change, and the dialectic between globalizing forces of convergence in urban form and its contestation by the local forces of the urban resistance.

Chapter Three

Social contestations: socioeconomic exclusion in Asian cities

3.1 Introduction:

This chapter aims to examine the processes of production of exclusionary cities, where new social inequities are reinscribed upon existing ones. It is however fundamental to integrate recent theoretical advances that moves away from viewing neoliberalism as an immutable force, and to 'actually existing neoliberalisms' which is a result of 'contextual embeddedness and path dependency of neoliberal restructuring projects'. Analysis of cities as sites where neoliberal projects are enacted must take into account 'necessary hybridity', as it is analytically and politically misleading, to conceptualise neoliberalism as an ideal-type, coherent and homogenous ideology imposed top-down with essentially homogenizing effects on urban form. It does not stand alone, but rather exists 'in a kind of parasitical relation to other state and social formations (neoconservatism, authoritarianism, social democracy, etc.). The form and consequences of neoliberalizing strategies of restructuring are shaped precisely in and through these hybrid contexts'. Thus the focus must be on the 'process of neoliberalisation' within 'distinctive national, regional and local contexts, defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles' (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009: 49 - 52). According to Shatkin et al. (2014: 24) 'cities are not simply acted upon and shaped by social and political processes that play out beyond their boundaries. They also shape those processes in their turn, through agencies that their own growth engenders'. Harvey (1989: 5) too emphasizes the necessity of spatially grounding social processes to understand urban change as it is through 'a particular configuration of spatial practices' that a 'wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact'.

The processes of neoliberalisation are contested both by the forgotten groups themselves, and by those who take up cudgels on their behalf, thus disrupting the sense of naturalness of emerging urban spaces. The displaced communities may engage in community organizing ranging from traditional grass root level organizations to national coalitions of Community Based Organizations. It may also

involve professionally managed Non Governmental Organisations as well as large transnational networks of resistance linking traditional grassroots level organisations, CBOs and NGOs, all of whom can be subsumed under the mantle of 'civil society'. Thus globalizing cities are the sites of both hegemonic and counter hegemonic globalizations. I have taken 'contestation' here to mean the challenges to both post-liberalisation market oriented neoliberal models as well as development oriented, socialist welfare state models of urban development by different social classes and actors in their utilization of urban space.

At both ideological and theoretical levels the concept of civil society hast thrived in the circle the neoliberal school of thought that supports a diminution of the responsibilities of the state and also within post-Marxist/post-structural thinking that underscores the capacity of civil society to bring about revolutionary changes. As a theoretical construct, civil society is usually viewed as the platform on which notions pertaining to the arrangement of social life are deliberated upon. It is viewed empirically in terms of associations or civil society organizations. NGO's as civil society actors may be located in a tripartite division of society constituted by the state, market and civil society (Mitlin et al. 2007). Following Mitlin et al. (2007), a Gramscian understanding of civil society has been adopted as constituting an "arena in which hegemonic ideas concerning the organization of economic and social life are both established and contested" (Mitlin et al. 2007: 1702). According to Mitlin et al. (2007) Gramsci (1971) viewed the state and civil society as mutually constituting each other and not as different and independent units, and as being reciprocally formed in the context of historical and structural dynamisms. His main concern was providing an explanation for the disappointing performance of both liberalism and socialism, and identified the important role of counter-hegemonic movements within civil society in bringing about radical social change. The relationships and power struggles among the actors that comprise society determine the emerging resistances and hegemonies, as well as the parts played by different organisations (Mitlin et al. 2007).

The rise of civil society organisations that seek to make politics more accountable to the consumer citizen has taken place in the backdrop of first, the World Bank's (1992) emphasis on transparency and accountability as indispensable to good governance, and as a precondition for successful economic reforms (Harriss 2007); and second, a general thrust towards decentralisation and devolution of

administrative and financial powers. In fact, in the model of good governance, decentralization and devolution of administrative and financial power and functions are central themes. Decentralisation is often seen as a virtue and advocated by many. Chandhoke (1993), for instance, offers the pluralization of state theory, which posits that pluralisation replaces the bureaucratic, hierarchical and overloaded structures of decision making with a multiplicity of agencies that can respond immediately and efficiently to problems. The decline of the state is accompanied by increasing attention towards civil society institutions through which organized interests seek to influence and engage with state institutions. Good governance facilitates the free play of market forces and enables decentralized institutions of participatory management to be formed.

The role of planning and governance in the restructuring of urban space has already been examined in detail in the previous chapter and this chapter adopts class analytics as well as an actor based approach to examine the interplay of the state, real estate developers, the new middle classes, social movements and civil society in the processes of urban transformation.

3.2   The transnational capitalist class in action:

The capitalist class is defined, as those who own and/or control the major means of production, distribution and exchange, and may not always be the dominant class. The members of the transnationalist capitalist class generally have a globally oriented outlook on several issues rather than closed nationalistic sensitivities. In order to outline the character and importance of this class especially with regard to the urban sector, the theoretical works of Sklair (1997) and Castells (2000) have been largely relied upon.

Sklair (1997) critiques the assumption that the hegemony of the transnationalist capitalist class is established automatically, and posits that the transnational class actually organizes social movements of its own to further its own goals. The power struggles among the ranks of the ruling class structures at every level is marked by the balance of power tilting in the favour of the globalists or the globally oriented neoliberals rather than the inward oriented economic nationalists. It is the former, which is largely responsible for the hegemony of neoliberal dogma within the development pedagogy proffered by international agencies that has shaped the shift

from import substitution to export promotion economic strategies of several countries since the 1980s (Sklair 1997).

The institutional form corresponding to transnational economic practices is the multinational company, the transnational capitalist class represents the economic and political realm, and culture and ideology sphere is symbolized by the culture and ideology of consumerism. The *MNC executives, globally oriented bureaucrats, politicians, professionals, consumerist elites, traders and media*, are segments of the transnational capitalist class, who work in a complementary way. They are united by ethos of global capitalist consumerism as the deep-seated value-system that amalgamates a variety of economic incentives, social, political and cultural dogmas, while at the same time managing to accommodate their short-term conflicts of interest (Sklair 1997).

The *top officials of the biggest MNCs* like the Fortune 500 companies, along with their direct subsidiaries or indirectly related entities, wield so much power that they dictate some segments of the global economy. Geographically speaking, decision-making and implementation by these corporations in the areas where they are active can have profound influences on the lives of the local communities. Transnational corporates integrate themselves by occupying of a range of connected administrative posts within the corporate sector and civil society. For example top corporate executives regularly act on the boards of think tanks, charities, scientific, sports, arts and culture bodies, universities, medical foundations and similar institutions, frequently as chairpersons. They legitimize the philosophy of the global capitalism that societies can be run like businesses and although they are an interest group themselves, succeed in persuading the general public that trade unions and activists are vested interests while corporates are not. *Globalizing bureaucrats* are typically point persons dealing with or even working in city-level or regional growth consortiums propelled by foreign investment, or that part domestic bureaucracy dealing with external economic relations and international organizations, especially the World Bank, IMF, OECD, WTO, regional development banks and some agencies of the UN. *Globalizing professionals*, as a group, owe their emergence to firstly, the growth of the service sector like ITES, consultancy and public relations etc.; and secondly, to the ascendancy of think tanks and epistemic communities within academia (especially those advocating neoliberalism). The corporate *media* elites too politically organise and express themselves through their owned/controlled television

networks, newspapers, magazines and other mass media. *Consumerist elites* too promote the culture-ideology of consumerism (Sklair 1997). The making of world-class cities is actualized not only "through an economic calculus of cost–benefit", but also takes shape through the propagation of a convincing vision of the future, or "a world-class aesthetic" (Ghertner 2011: 281). Sklair (1997) regards the retail sector too, especially the shopping mall with global aesthetics popping up in cities all over the world, to be a part of the mass media, as the superior built environment effectively changes the activity of shopping into a form of amusement and relaxation.

Castells (2000) points out the central role played by the cosmopolitan elites as the social actors in the domination by the 'space of flows'. He proposes that 'the space of flows is made up of personal micro-networks that project their (the cosmopolitan elites) interest in functional macro-networks throughout the global set of interactions in the space of flows'. To preserve their social cohesion elites resist becoming flows themselves. This is achieved by establishing a set of rules and cultural codes that establishes the inclusion in their political and cultural community. Spatially this is established first, by living in luxurious real estate enclaves that are self-contained with integrated commercial, business, and leisure oriented land uses. Second, by promoting an emblematic lifestyle and its associated architectural designs that are identifiable the world over, cosmopolitan elites make their lived environment global and eliminate the situatedness and specificity of the local from their lives (Castells, 2000: 446).

This globalised elite is characterised by similar lifestyles; particular patterns of higher education, especially enrolment in business schools; the consumption of luxury goods and services, like exclusive clubs and restaurants, ultra-expensive resorts in all continents; and use of private instead of mass means of travel and entertainment. They live in global cities in increasingly segregated residential spaces, electronically surveilled and secured by armed private security (Sklair 1997).

Thus an emerging and integral spatial feature of globalising cities is segregation, which refers to the residential separation of social groups within the cities on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or class. The greater the deviation from a uniform dispersal, the greater the degree of segregation (Johnston et al., 1986). For the purpose of this thesis the definition of spatial segregation provided by van Kempen and Ozuckren (1998: 1632) is followed: 'Spatial segregation exists when some areas show an overrepresentation and other areas an underrepresentation of

members of a group'. Such exclusionary peopling of urban spaces exists at the scale of cities, neighbourhoods, or even at the micro-level of the housing community. Segregation at one spatial level does not automatically imply segregation at another spatial level. If an area (neighbourhood) displays an overrepresentation of a certain group (compared to, for example, the share of the group in the city as a whole), we speak of a concentration area for that group. This definition implies that a concentration area may also house many members of other groups (van Kempen and Ozuckren 1998) Spatial differentiation along the lines of race and ethnic origin can be seen in a Global City like New York City, indicating the long-lasting segmentation of the economy and labour force along theses divisions (Logan 2000). As the social hierarchy of groups or individuals is often demonstrated through tastes, lifestyles, housing and its location, spatial segregation is therefore also indicative of social disconnectedness and distance among groups or classes (Bourdieu 1996). Firman (2004) views urban spatial segregation, especially along ethnic and religious cleavages as particularly detrimental as it results in the dehumanisation and a lack of compassion among the residents of different quarters of the city.

According to Borja and Castells (1997) intra-metropolitan dichotomy in mega cities of every country is the most visible manifestation of social exclusion processes at work. Contrasting spaces consisting of both highly valued and declining economic activities, social groups producing information and appropriating wealth as well excluded and marginalised populations, co-exist without having any interaction between them, sometimes without even seeing each other. Such urban duality is characterized by: (1) housing and urban services shortage (2) growing social inequalities in large cities (3) poverty of the country in general (4) social exclusion and marginalisation as significant segments of the urban population have become structurally irrelevant. It is not a simple spatial segregation between the rich and the poor; it is the urban social structure itself that is created by a contradictory yet dynamic interaction between the opposite ends of the network society. The latter's processes of capital accumulation, production organisation, market integration, communication and exercise of decision making at the global level causes segregation of the use of metropolitan space that is shared by different occupations, classes and ethnic groups (Borja and Castells 1997). Altogether, a reordering of urban space is taking place in the big cities of both developed and developing countries, where there

is a sharpening of boundaries across the neighbourhoods of the city through increased fortification and surveillance (UNCHS 2002; Marcuse and van Kempen 2000).

3.3   World city aspirations and the role of the growth machine: Delhi, Jakarta and Manila.

According to Harvey (2008:33) 'the economic transformation of a city nearly always has a class dimension since it is the poor, the underprivileged and those marginalized from political power that suffer first and foremost from the process' (Harvey 2008:33). Urban entrepreneurialism depend the on creation of an attractive imagery by eliciting spectacular displays, fashion and the presentation of self through customised acts of consumption. By allowing a range of people, including the fashionable elite, to participate in the creation of the image of the city through reproduction of their own social space, a social solidarity, civic pride and loyalty to place is created.   Urban re-imaging is an integral part of innovative and entrepreneurial city marketing strategies, in an era of intense inter urban competition at global and national levels, to attract public and private investment; given that the key emerging functions of global cities are as financial, consumption and entertainment centres (Harvey 1989).

Logan and Molotch (1987) contend that the activism of entrepreneurs is the decisive force in the fashioning of the urban structure. They borrow from classical Marxism, in distinguishing between use and exchange values with regard to property. Rentiers who constantly strive to maximise the value of their holdings by intensifying the use of their property (developing higher use values) lie at the heart of the urban development process. Since their assets are immobile, they need to attract investment by bargaining with non-local investors or create the sort of business climate that will attract investment. They also find allies among other members of the growth machine, business that profit directly from the development process that are not place bound (for e.g. financiers, construction interests, developers); place bound local media and utility companies who benefit from urban development; and a set of auxiliary members who benefit from some, but not all types of growth. This consortium of actors approximately defines the business elite that collectively exercise control over the nature of urban development due to its control over substantial financial and

intellectual resources. The growth machine theory thus attempts to build a political economy of place.

3.3.1 The case of Delhi: The role of the 2010 Common Wealth Games, real estate developers, corporate actors and independent consultants.

All across the world, cities intensely compete with each other to host Mega-events or hallmark events, such as the Olympics, World Cups, Commonwealth Games, Asian Games, World Fairs and World Expo's. Mega-events are defined by COHRE (2007: 21) as 'large-scale tourist events of limited duration, designed to generate attention and attract support (often in terms of public funding and private investment) in order to stimulate redevelopment'. These large scale sporting and cultural events or even political and economic summits of global importance are distinguished from routine events by the huge amount of investment and preparation they entail, as well as their enduring legacies (Greene 2003). They provide momentum for urban redevelopment and infrastructure improvement and are thus often integrated into, and an addition to the pertinent governmental urban development policies. Since the last two decades, mega-events have been repeatedly associated with large scale housing impacts such as evictions, displacement, increased housing costs and enhanced gentrification (Olds 1998; Short 2008, COHRE 2007). Mega-events are part of an emerging strategy (since the financial success of the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984) by urban governments to augment economic investment and tourism. They seem to have much-touted prospects of attracting hefty sums of investment and bequeathing substantial infrastructural upgradation. Staging the event, puts the national and international media spotlights on the host city during a mega-event (Short 2008; Greene 2003) and is presumed to help cities of the advanced capitalist world reeling under deindustrialisation, industrial restructuring, fiscal austerity and ascendant neoliberalism, present a new image of themselves in the eyes of both potential investors and tourists. However, the role and impact of urban mega events in cities in developing countries is quite different from that in western, post-industrial cities. In the former case, it is a part of the local government's effort to capture the *foreign* investor's imagination. The hosting of mega-events also serves to signal political and legal readiness in conformity with the policy discourse of multilateral

development agencies, which link economic development to strong legal institutions (Greene 2003).

The most visible face of the Commonwealth Games process in India was Suresh Kalmadi, a former pilot in the Indian Air Force, successful businessman and politician, and also the President of IOA since 1996. A Member of Partliament continuously from 1982, including the 15th Lok Sabha, and an entrepreneur employing over 2500 people, he described himself as thus: *"I am an action-oriented and result-oriented person. I am a doer. My track record proves beyond doubt that I deliver the goods."* More pertinently, his resume also included leadership of several sports associations, tourism development corporations and cultural festivals. Organizing mega events thus came naturally to him**:** *"I have no time or inclination for small events. Anything big and massive immediately calls for my attention. I have always been a natural organizer, so all these roles come easily to me"*. In full entrepreneurial style, he brought the Commonwealth Youth Games 2008 to his constituency Pune, and envisaged Pune as a bid city for 2020 Olympics, likening his role to "*a CEO*" to "*the metropolitan cities--Bangalore, Hyderabad in order to market it at a national and international level"* (Official Website for Suresh Kalmadi 2010).

For the city elite, mega events are opportunities to influence urban development in the direction of improving international linkages and better anchoring the city within the flows of global capital, people and images (Short 2008). To the growth machine and its allies, mega events are primarily tools of economic growth and infrastructural upgradation and a fortuitous moment to change the impression of the city among investors. The promoters and the winners of this process are mainly real estate developers, corporate interests, tourism industry, rentiers, financiers, local media and utility providers. A variegated auxiliary group of actors, including cultural institutions, small retailers, and self employed professionals etc., depending on the particular context, may also support and benefit from the mega events being advocated by the growth coalition (Ward 2000). There has been a dramatic rise in valuation of several large real estate firms since the mid-2000s with many of these companies becoming public limited companies, and becoming some of the the biggest corporations in India by valuation. Businesses in segments as varied as jewellery, clothing, and tobacco have exploited their land assets by joining the real estate sector. Some of the big Indian builders as well as well as international developers have put in

a lot of effort towards the development of national land banks, encouraged the growth of SEZ's, participated in large scale urban development projects, and even tried their hands at affordable housing delivery outside the metro cities (Weinstein et al. 2014). In the case of Delhi, majority of the top ten real estate development companies in operation currently has been established since the 1990s, such as Raheja Developers (1990), Gaursons India Limited (1995), Supertech Limited (1998), Emaar MGF (2005), Amrapali Group (2006) and Parsvnath Developers (2007). Only DLF Ltd. (1945), Ansal API (1967), Unitech Group (1971) and Omaxe Construction Limited (1987) were established before the 1990s (Singh 2016). In areas like Gurgaon and Noida adjacent to Delhi, developers, taking advantage of poor planning regulations, have been the main actors in the creation of entire satellite townships (Weintein et al 2014; Gururani 2013).

Mega-events can marshal huge amounts of capital, from both public and private sources by virtue of the business opportunities they offer and the public-private partnership model is commonly resorted to since urban infrastructure development and redevelopment require massive investments (COHRE 2007). Cochrane, Peck and Tickell (1996: 1331) terms the phenomena a 'grant coalition' which coaxes public resources into the private sector, where the strategy is neither to enable the release of new areas for private sector development, nor to strengthen surviving local firms. Quite the reverse, the deal was to secure massive outlays of public funds for developers for the sake of state subsidised sport. In the groundwork for the holding of the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi, which was to be counted in as a part of policy efforts to convert Delhi into a world class city (DDA 2007), government investment during the 2000s decade was steadily diverted from education, public housing, health care, and food subsidies, towards mammoth eye-catching infrastructure projects (Ghertner 2011). The main categories of infrastructural investment in Delhi linked to CWG 2010 have been the building of new sports arenas and revamp of existing stadiums, construction of the Commonwealth Games Village, beautification, transport infrastructure, water, electricity and sewage treatment (Uppal 2009). Initially in May 2003, when the Government of India permitted the Indian Olympic Association to bid for CWG 2010, an outlay of Rs. 296 crore was shown as the requirement for the renewal of sports infrastructure and conducting the Games, with security costs and the costs for construction of the Games village to be borne by the Government of India and Delhi

Development Authority. By December 2003, merely the operational expenditure was projected to be Rs. 635 crore in the revised bid document. Overall expenses, excepting the expenditure for conducting the Games, was estimated at Rs. 1200 crore, and Government grants were estimated to be Rs. 518 crore. The first budget for the Games approved by the Cabinet in April 2007 estimated the total expenditure of the Games at Rs. 3566 crore ± Rs. 300 crore. In 2009, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India estimated the cost of creating venues and city infrastructure as well as the operational expenses for hosting the games to be Rs. 12,888 crore, excluding the investments by several other agencies on infrastructure and other activities e.g. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), Airports Authority of India (AAI)/ Delhi International Airport Limited (DIAL), India Tourism Development Corporation Ltd (ITDC) etc. Venue development (40 per cent) and city infrastructure development (35 per cent) comprised the bulk of the expenditure (Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2009).

The *total* cost infrastructure development in Delhi for CWG 2010 incurred by different agencies was estimated to be Rs 26,808 crore. The Delhi Government would spend Rs 6,209 crore under its State Plan for the development of infrastructure (The Hindu 2006). Major infrastructural investments made included metro expansions (Rs 8,000 crore), airport modernisation (Rs 5,400 crore) and a power plant at Bawana (Rs 5,000 crore). The state of the art Commonwealth Games Village, including a residential complex, spread over an area of 63.5 hectares (158.4 acres) along the east bank of river Yamuna, near the Akshardham Temple, was built by the Dubai based real estate firm, Emaar in collaboration with an Indian enterprise, MGF. The residential complex developed under the Public Private Partnership model has 14 blocks, 34 towers and 1,168 air-conditioned flats to comfortably accommodate 8,000 athletes and team officials (Sharma 2009). Initially, out of the total of 1168 apartments, Emaar MGF was to sell 768 at market rates to fund the construction, and the rest were to be sold by the DDA at lower prices to middle income groups. Emaar priced the apartments at Rs 12500 per sq. ft. However in the backdrop of the global financial slowdown of 2008, DDA bought an additional 333 apartments from Emaar for Rs 700 crore at Rs 11000 per sq. ft. to bail out the realtor when it was unable to find adequate buyers (Hussein 2009).

The Games Village was planned on 100 acres (40 hectares) on the riverfront and it was to be well connected to the rest of the city by roadways and public

transport. The project was envisaged to be the catalyst for the redevelopment of eastern Delhi to "world class" city standards. In the words of the Chief Minister of Delhi: *"The Games Village will require infrastructure, transportation links and development of the riverfront. East Delhi shall be transformed in the manner south Delhi was during the Asian Games in 1982-83"* (Sethi 2005). Although, one of the reasons why the Commonwealth Evaluation Commission chose to award the 2010 CWG to Delhi was the host city's assurances to use the CWG Village as hostel accommodation for Delhi University students after the conclusion of to the two-week sporting extravaganza (IOA 2003.), Emaar MGF planned to sell its share of the apartments at prices ranging from Rs 1.85 to Rs 4.85 crore in late 2011 (Nevatia and Ravindran 2009). Advertised as 'the benchmark for an incomparable urban life style', embodying 'international living' and 'sense of living in an upscale residence', it caters to the NRI and local elite clientele (InvestInNest 2008). Prices of these apartments were supposed to bring the value of new properties in east Delhi and satellite towns like Noida, Greater Noida and Ghaziabad at par with similar properties in central, west and south Delhi (Thareja 2008).

As mega events bring added media, particularly television interest in host cities, municipal or national governments are often required to project an impressive facade of their city at a very short notice. The emphasis is on hiding visible poverty in areas close to event venues likely to be in the spotlight, without significant attention to long-term solutions to housing problems. The losers in the process of renewal and gentrification linked to mega-events are the marginalised and already vulnerable groups like the poor, informal sector workers, migrants, children, the elderly, the disabled, minorities and those with low tenurial security. Greene (2003: 163) designates these cities as 'staged cities' to underscore the contradiction arising from construction of 'an image of development' by local authorities 'and the actively concealed landscapes of the urban poor'.

National governments and other supporters of mega events such as the Olympics, also try to justify the huge economic and social costs by evoking feelings of nationalism. Practices that worsen the standards of due process, diminished rights, violation of human rights, especially the right to satisfactory housing and other extraordinary measures (such as criminalisation of the homeless) are frequently justified on the grounds of presence of exceptional circumstances and upholding of national prestige. Opposition is difficult as the growth machine usurps the narrative

and sweeps away the inchoate resistance as being unpatriotic and regressive (COHRE 2007; Short 2008).

The site for the Commonwealth Games Village had been the subject of much debate. The largest open spaces remaining in Delhi were the flood plains of the river Yamuna, which is the largest groundwater recharge zone as well. Concomitantly, a need was felt in the Master Plan for Delhi, 2021 for a strategy to conserve and/or develop the Yamuna River Bed in a systematic manner. The awareness of the urban planner of the delicacy of the issue is evident as MPD – 2021 that states, 'this issue is sensitive both in terms of the environment and public perceptions' (DDA 2007: 59). Environmentalists predicted that erection of the CWG village on the Yamuna flood plains would obstruct required groundwater recharge that feeds the renewal of the river following the dry season (Nevatia and Ravindran 2010). With growing pressures on urban land, the hitherto neglected 25 km stretch along the river with 97 sq. km of prime land, 7 per cent of Delhi's total area, inhabited mainly by slum dwellers and vegetable growers became prime land (Uppal 2009). Other locational factors that gained ascendancy, like easy access to the Metropolitan City Centre of Connaught Place, accessibility to certain Central Business Districts (like commercial areas in the Walled City and Karol Bagh), proximity to National Highway 24 and metro rail extensions, increased the value of the land.

In order to prepare the area for redevelopment, unlawful structures in the area had to be done away with. This meant that the slums that have appeared in the area had to be demolished, notwithstanding the fact that low-income housing is practically non-existent in the city and the slum dwellers would get insufficient and incoherent relocation. The riverbank was the site of a *jhuggi*, the Yamuna Pushta, which housed a population of 150,000, mostly from Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and about 70 per cent of the population being Muslim. In February 2004, demolition operations were carried out, aided by 12 columns of Delhi Police to make way for a promenade connecting the Yamuna to national memorials and the Red Fort (Gopalakrishnan 2004). The majority of the former residents were daily wage earners including construction workers, rickshaw pullers, domestic workers and rag pickers or recycle workers. Contractors to construct the necessary infrastructure for the Asian Games in 1982 had transported a substantial part of this migrant population to Delhi. The site originally had been developed by them, gradually filling in the vacant marshy embankment with the unused sand and brick from building projects.

By April 2004 all the hutments in the Pushta were bulldozed to the ground. The demolition of Yamuna Pushta was violent and traumatic, with inadequate resettlement to substandard housing sites. Supervised by the Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary, the violent and forcible demolitions evicted the residents in the heat of the summer of 2004. While news paper reports claimed that 35000 families were in residence, a survey conducted by the DDA before the evictions found only 16000 families to be genuine claimants to the resettlement plots. These plots, priced at Rs 5000 – 7000, were located resettlement colonies on the periphery of the city like Bawana, Holambi Kalan,and Madanpur Kadar (Hazards Centre 2007). A survey conducted by Menon-Sen and Bhan (2009) found that the average living space per family (of 5 members) at Bawana was 10 feet by 12 feet, lacking sanitation facilities, negligible (3.7 per cent) metered electricity connections, and infrequent and erratic piped water supply. Unemployment and underemployment have resulted as the livelihoods available in the earlier residence were lost and expensive long distance commuting was inflicted on workers. Work that was available locally was for much lower wages compared to the previous site. Access to the Public Distribution System declined as only 60.5 per cent households had a valid ration card compared to 88 per cent in the previous location. Enrolment in schools declined for both boys and girls, as did the availability of affordable health care (Menon-Sen and Bhan 2009). Other surveys conducted by NGOs like Hazards Centre have drawn conclusions in the same vein.

Corporates have arisen to the status of increasingly powerful actors in India, as state governments who are locked in a competition soliciting private investment, have catered to their needs in urban development. State governments have also forcefully acquired land to provide space for corporate offices and for industrial needs. This greater proximity between state and business is now a part of official government policy legitimised through public private partnerships or PPPs (Weinstein et al. 2014), and in the case of Delhi is illustrated in the case of the B-O-T (Build Own Transfer) PPP of the Delhi Gurgaon Expressway. In April 2002, the Delhi Gurgaon Expressway project was given to the Special Purpose Vehicle of Jaiprakash Industries Limited and DS Construction Limited to design and construct the toll road according to the requirements specified by the National Highway Authority of India, as a concessionaire for 20 years. The total cost of the project was Rs. 10 billion, and the parties apart from the developers included the Delhi and Haryana state governments,

the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI), and an independent consultant, RITES Corporation. In May 2003, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was constituted called Jaypee-DSC Ventures Limited, where Jaiprakash Industries Limited held 51 per cent share and the rest belonged to DS Construction Limited. Later on Jaypee gradually gave away the majority of its stake to DSC Ventures, paring it to just 1.2 per cent. When the latter finally acquired 98.8 per cent stake in the venture it was rechristened the Delhi Gurgaon Super Connectivity Limited (DGSCL). As concessionaire, DGSCL was permitted to collect toll from consumers for investment recovery during the concession period after the conclusion of which the ownership of the expressway was to be handed over to the government. The government sponsored the land acquisition with complete tax exemption for the first ten years, and capital subsidy up to 40 per cent during the first 20 years to make the project feasible. There was greater access to funding as road building were now announced an industry (Ernst and Young 2014).

The private party had the right to collect the tolls during the concession period. As adjustment and alteration of the toll fees and the period of concession were not proposed, it created possibilities of a large windfall for the private partners, as traffic count was underestimated at 76000 passenger vehicles per day while in reality the figure was close to 96000. Breaking down the upfront costs, he NHAI bore costs of Rs. 131.4 crore, Rs. 61 crore was provided by government grants, while concessionaire spent Rs.555 crore. One of the conditions of the contract was that should total traffic count per day reach 1.3 lakh, then half the toll collected must be given over to the NHAI, half the total revenue would be shared with NHAI, but because of underestimation the private party did not have to share the collected tolls. As toll rates could be revised with the changes in the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), growing inflation would be to the profit of the private party, wherein income would continuously grow while the nature of costs were more one-time and upfront (CIRC 2014). The private party due to incorrect traffic projections could also skim more than desired profits. The project later became mired in litigation in 2012 after the NHAI threatened to terminate the contract due to charges of financial malfeasance by the private party, and excessive congestion at toll booths (Balachandran 2014).

The preparations of the City Development Plan for Delhi under the JNNURM necessitated a greater role for private consultants in state planning functions. For this purpose the government of Delhi used the services of the Infrastructure Leasing &

Financial Services (IL&FS). Later on for the Smart City proposals for the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) the consultancy services are being provided by KPMG (NDMC 2015) an international auditor and consultant firm, headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands and ranked as one of the four largest auditor firms in the world, alongside Deloitte, EY and PwC. Private consultants have provided assistance in several areas including guidance in land management, city plan and design, use of GIS and the involvement of non governmental organisations. Although private consultants are technically proficient, yet they generally have little local knowledge of the various urban population groups or political set-ups and rarely carried out participatory decision-making that required a large public involvement. This lack of sizeable local participation during the formulation of City Development plans was ironically in contradiction with the recent policy emphasis on greater democracy and deliberation at the grass roots level. Another weakness of the CDPs is that it advocated projects that would benefit mostly the private sector and the richer urban populace (Weinstein et al. 2014)

3.3.2 *The case of Jakarta: the role of megaprojects of nationalist urbanism and real estate developers.*

In Jakarta, the expression of the world city aspirations and the role of growth coalition could be seen in the construction of mega projects of nationalist urbanism and in the building of new towns and shopping districts in the peripheries and redevelopment of the central areas of the city through megaprojects and superblocks by real estate developers to cater to the preferences of the elite.

Suharto tried to amalgamate global city aspirations of the elite and nationalist urbanism through this Pantura (North Coast) Jakarta project. He issued a presidential decree (no. 52/1995) to secure a megaproject known today as the waterfront development of Jakarta Bay. Suharto was keenly aware that Indonesia was entering a new era, when aspirations of sections of the citizenry were no longer limited to only the basic goods and services, like food and clothing, but extended to the availability of global goods and services. There was growing pressure from sections of the Indonesian society for even greater private revenue from urban development and business activities. It was argued that the coastal cities had greater potential for economic development compared to the non-coastal cities as the coastal cities had

more access to global flows and their people more cosmopolitanized, and thus more open to globalization. In Suharto's narrative the development of the Jakarta Bay area was thus a strategic response to the era of globalization. The Jakarta Bay project was also intended to be a showcase of the nation to the world. Thus global aspirations were central to the gentrification of the relatively underexploited Jakarta coast, and to give the crisis-ridden city of Jakarta another chance to be a symbol of nationalist development.

The Jakarta Waterfront Development Program was soon formed with the goal to boost the historical waterfront area along with the most important commercial and business district (CBD) in the city and to reinforce Jakarta's place at the top of the national urban hierarchy as the most important commercial and financial centre for Indonesia. The land reclamation of Jakarta Bay started on Independence Day, 1995 and an extra 2700 hectares of land was reclaimed over the 32km-long coastline, including the provinces of West Java, DKI Jakarta, and Banten, for hotels, office buildings, business centres, elite housing estates, condominiums, mega shopping malls, seaports, industrial and transportation infrastructure for an estimated 750,000 to 1.19 million residents. Consistent with the authoritarian rule of Suharto, nobody then dared to oppose the president. Some developers (such as Ciputra – known as the 'maestro of property development' and Henro Gondokusumo of the Dharmala group) had already made huge profits from land reclamation and subsequent conversion of the mangrove forest into opulent housing estates. As was often the case under Suharto, the Jakarta Bay project immediately attracted members of the oligarchic regime, which included the president's children and members of his extended family (Tommy Soeharto, Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih, Indra Lukmana, Sudwikatmono), and close business associates such as Ciputra-Salim Group, as well as big developers such as Samadikun Hartono (of the Modern Group) and Hendro Gondokusumo (of Dharmala Group). These groups, well connected to the circle of power, were early birds and before other proposals came in they had already piled the desk of the municipality's planning department with their design proposals.

In the post-Suharto era, Governor Sutiyoso, who was in office from 1997 to 2007, and a former Lieutenant General of Suharto (1997–2007) and the developers tried to continue to benefit from the inheritance of the Suharto era via the presidential decree issued by Suharto in 1995. In 2003, considering the environmental effects of the Jakarta Bay project, the Ministry of Environment insisted that Megawati Sukarno

Putri, then the president of Indonesia, revoked Suharto's presidential decree. The ministry's action was immediately countered by the city government, and it was argued by Governor Sutiyoso that the reclamation must go through, for it would be illegal, according to the governor, to revoke the previous government's concession. All the developers involved in the reclamation project immediately filed a lawsuit against the state (Kusno 2004; 2011a).

In the post-Suharto era the economy of Indonesia recovered slowly which created a constant flow of rural-urban migration to the big cities especially Jakarta. The retrenchment of workers due to the contraction of the manufacturing sector in the peri-urban areas led them to seek employment in the informal sector in the city proper. The numbers of slums settlements in the city also increased and in response public parks were fenced and barbwire was placed around footpaths to discourage unauthorised hawking. During that phase, the state authorities' responses to informality could be placed on a scale that ranges between large-scale forced evictions to complete acceptance (Kusno 2011b). But since 1999, Sutiyoso, the then Governor of Jakarta embarked on a crusade to rid the streets of the city of the indications and livelihoods of the informal economy, including hawking, homelessness, Pedi cab drivers, prostitution and begging, who were actively evicted from the streets of Jakarta. Governor Sutiyoso, blamed in-migration and squatter settlements for several tribulations afflicting the capital, including illegal forms of housing, joblessness and inundation of the low lying areas. The Governor adopted oppressive tactics such as residential raids targeting migrants who did not possess official job and residential permits. As per a directive declared by the Governor, migrants who had not registered with the Jakarta's official population agency and failed to secure a visitor ID within a fortnight of arrival, a procedure which itself required evidence of permanent work and residence, could be imprisoned upto a maximum period of three months or by fine of Rp. 5,000,000 (US$550) (Human Rights Watch 2016). Often, crews of hoodlums known as *preman* assisted the state troops in executing the expulsions. These groups had been patronized under the New Regime to employ tactics of physical and psychological coercion as a regime maintenance chore. A mutually beneficial relationship also existed between street-level *preman* and the military and political and social elites, wherein *preman* were allowed to carry out their activities, like extortion and hold over certain economic activities in certain boroughs of the city, provided they tendered a part of their

earnings to the bureaucracy, which would gradually find its way to the upper levels. The use of violence and criminal elements for eviction purposes, which was standard practice in the Suharto era (Wilson 2006) continued after him.

The *kampungs* of Jakarta have developed over time adjusting to social, political and economic changes in the city, starting from Dutch rule, past Japanese occupation and into the post independence phases of the Old Order, New Order and finally *Reformasi*. Though several *kampungs* were incorporated as a part of the legal urban set up, significant numbers of them continued to be regarded as unlawful or without legitimate land titles. Silver (2008) estimates approximately 60 per cent of Jakartans to be living in *kampungs*. The dwellers of *kampungs* are generally the urban poor who are driven to live on empty sites such as disputed property, vacant private property and marginal government lands such as landfill and garbage dumps, along rail lines and riverbanks. Sites like these are illegally apportioned into individual plots for living or employment activities. Winayanti and Lang (2004) quotes the State Ministry of Housing as defining *kampungs*, as "slums, as irregular settlements with substandard infrastructure, small plots of land for each housing unit, low quality of building structure and materials, and illegally constructed". A Jakarta city bylaw further pinpoints illegal areas along railway lines, rivers, below flyovers, and in the designated green spaces of the city to be unlawful (Winayanti and Lang 2004).

The city government of Jakarta generally uses three justifications for evictions: the dwellings and occupation of the plot is illegal, the settlement disturbs public order, or the area is needed for construction of development projects for the greater common good (Human Rights Watch 2006). There exists a dualism in Indonesia's land laws; it possesses both Western legal systems introduced during colonial occupation by the Dutch as well as the indigenous traditional legal system known as *adat*. The usage of *adat* law has also migrated to urban settings from the rural areas with the people, creating urban informal land rights. Under this system is the *girik* lands possessing tax receipts, which prove that the occupant regularly pays land revenue and it is the evidence of ownership under customary law. *Girik* landholders enjoy full ownership rights such as under freehold ownership. G*arapan* landholders have a use right founded on handover of settlements to a different person, and possess a less robust entitlement to property than *girik* (Zhu and Simarmata 2015; Winayanti and Lang 2004). Winayanti and Lang (2004) estimates about 60 per cent of the land occupied by housing in Jakarta to be unregistered land without any official

documents indicating entitlement. Such land however may possess customary titles such as *girik* or *garapan*, that are not acknowledged officially by the National Land Board (Winayanti and Lang 2004).

Since the 1950's, the delivery of housing was the job of the private sector to a substantial degree, while the state funded public housing agency known as *Perumnas* provided a small amount. According to estimates only approximately 7000 low cost flats were built from 1985 to 1995 (Silver 2008). During a period of rapid urbanization characterized by a dearth of cheap government provisioned housing and absence of industrial housing, illegal subdivision of land became the primary source of land for self-construction of houses by households (Zhu and Simarmata 2015). The majority of illegal dwelling have steadily over time obtained many fundamentals of legitimacy, such as consistently paying local officials to continue to allow them to live at their current locations, occupying the very plot for decades without being challenged by either government or private parties, enjoying several government provided services, or even paying land tax to the government (Human Rights Watch 2006).

By illegitimating all such individuals or communities, successive Jakarta governments have frequently disregarded the truth that informal ways of housing and illegal housing clusters are actually the result of unsuitable government policies, bad governance, bribery, defunct old-fashioned regulations, imperfect land markets, and a dearth of governmental resolve to find proper responses. Both self help and market based tactics did not keep pace with explosive population growth. It also does not take into account the city's history of discriminatory execution of housing policy and law that disadvantages the poor. The state has often condoned the violation of building codes by the affluent sections of the population of the city such as the changing of residential properties to commercial ones, the construction of arcades, petrol pumps and luxury condominiums along river banks and even in areas safeguarded as green cover. As per housing construction rules in Jakarta, builder developing large projects have to construct three units of middle class housing and six units of low-income housing for every one unit of upper income housing, however this rule is consistently disregarded and penalizations for nonfulfillment are light and seldom imposed (FAKTA 2016; UPC 2016).

The outstanding economic growth in the region till the East Asian Economic crises of 1997, led to the growth of a new consumer middle class ready to buy from

global markets. The urban spatial transformation of Jakarta and Manila started in the 1980's after the deregulation of the Asian banking sector, which led to the influx of industrial and financial capital in this region, into the urban land development sector from all around the world in the form of short term speculative investment. The thus attracted global consumption and financial capital was channelled significantly into the construction sector resulting in the building of huge enclosed shopping malls to accommodate global retail chains and franchises, and building of new towns in the peripheries of the mega city. The new towns were typically low-density spaces, composed mainly of the single household owned dwellings and housing estates of the newly emergent middle class and affluent groups with characteristically western sounding names. Some of the new towns enclosed first-rate infrastructure and amenities, including schools, shopping malls, movie theatres, hospitals and even golf courses. Indeed, the main lure of these dwelling units for the upper classes and the aspirant middle class was the promise of a modern, western, segregated and gated life style with private security (Firman 2004). Initially they were advertised as creating self-contained communities but this was hardly realized, and majority of new towns provided little or no prospects for employment (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). In fact the new towns depended totally on the metropolitan city (Firman, 2004) and this increased the frequency of interaction between the peripheral areas and central areas of Jakarta that aggravated the traffic congestion within Jakarta Metropolitan Area (Rukmana 2014; Kusno 2011). The 'suburb town' form of development that had been the chief form real estate development of the New Order is now increasingly unpopular as the upper middle class now sought to return to the city and wanted to stay close to their areas of work instead of wasting time shuttling and being stuck in traffic jams. The idea of self contained superblocks in the heart of the city, with shaded paths and lush green trees, scenic parks, ponds and where inhabitants need not travel or go outside the block for employment, schooling, retail and/ or entertainment needs, now appealed to middle class who now wanted to return back to the city core from the peri urban areas that they had earlier moved out to (Kusno 2011b). As the plot is acquired after eviction, private uses of the land dominate, that Kusno (2011) describes as private spaces with a public orientation, such as a multipurpose 'superblock' fusing residential uses, infrastructural services, workplaces, retail and entertainment sites. Such publicly positioned private spaces have come to be regarded as the epitome of green living by the upper and middle classes (Kusno 2011b).

Often evictions are carried out in Jakarta for the declared purpose of safeguarding "public order," citing city regulations, that make it unlawful for people to construct houses along river banks, below flyovers and adjacent to rail lines. The homeless or landless individuals constructing houses in these locations for rudimentary shelters could be penalised by way of fines or imprisonment from three to six months (Winayanti and Lang 2004)

Evictions typically take place in highly emotional conditions. Many of these evictions are conducted without any discussion with the concerned communities, and with insufficient notice. Conflicts between the people undergoing eviction and the police and public order officials are frequent. Communities have consistently described disproportionate use of force by the police in response to real or potential uprising. Public order officials sport batons, set alight shacks, or target earthmovers on dwellings also end up depriving the slum dwellers of their scant personal possessions like furniture, household appliances, and clothing. Often, post-eviction, residents also face the risk of theft of their belongings from foragers appearing at the places of evictions to scavenge anything that can be resold (Human Rights Watch 2006).

Members of the Indonesian security apparatus indulge in threatening and employing excessive force against members of advocacy organisations who support the evicted communities. As the activists from the NGOs perform the crucial task of marshalling collaborative public resistance to involuntary removal, they face official persecution, including the indiscriminate arrest and detention of activists or even thrashings (UPC 2006).

Successive Jakarta governments have failed to give satisfactory compensation to the evictees for damage to their possessions. Not only do they lose right to land they have occupied so far, they are further marginalised as the dwelling they have built with their own resources and through self help is destroyed and their meagre belongings stolen or destroyed as well. Such a failure to provide adequate compensation or replacement for areas repossessed and properties destroyed is tantamount to larceny at the expense of the city's poorest. The economic setbacks to the displaced communities also includes the loss of employment due to destruction of businesses operated out of the settlements or due to relocation to far flung areas distant from places of current employment. Compensation packages for land and property are either inadequate or completely absent. The government does not pay

compensation for loss of income. When alternative accommodation is provided, evicted groups complain about the unsuitableness of relocation sites with respect to their existing livelihoods (Human Rights Watch 2006). The *Nilai Jual Obyek Pajak* (NJOP), carries out appraisal on behalf of the government for land tax valuation that calculates the amount of compensation that is to be paid to the evicted communities when land is repossessed for public purposes. However there exists a substantial disparity between NJOP and market values. By depending on NJOP appraisals rather than valuations at actual market rates (or replacement costs), the government methodically deprives the evictees from due compensation (Firman 2004). There is little or no consultation with affected residents and insufficient notice before demolition.

In 2014 the National Development Planning Ministry had stated the aim to make Indonesia "slum-free" by 2019, expressing government ambitions to elevate the quality of life in the poorest and most overcrowded neighbourhoods in the urban areas of the country. President Joko Widodo who was elected in 2014 (popularly known as Jokowi) stands out for his populist style and has made poverty alleviation one of the keystones of his administration. He was earlier the governor of Jakarta from 2012 to 2014. Jokowi and his running mate Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), an ethnic Chinese, tried consistently to connect with the poor during their election campaign. Jokowi built up a pro-poor image through earlier accomplishments of being able to provide better livelihoods to poor communities and being able to achieve clash free relocation. He introduced new schemes such as Indonesia Smart Card, programs providing financial help for students, the Indonesia Healthy Card which was a free basic health care insurance system and granted ID cards to thousands of families that had been denied citizenship for years. When Jokowi was the governor of Jakarta, he had succeeded in renewing many of the pitiable *kampungs* into *kampung deret*s or tiered villages, which were state endowed low rise apartment blocks. These transformed slum areas also boasted of green areas and public lavatories. Before leaving Jakarta for the presidency, Jokowi promised that Jakarta would come to have at least 200 such low cost residential complexes *annually* in his efforts to improve the conditions of life among the urban poor of the city (Jakarta Globe 2014).

However the evictions and the complaints of use of excessive force during evictions continue as the successor governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama supported the harsh adoption of the eviction policy in 2015, and vowed not to provide

any concession to squatters. He justified it saying: *"We are not anti-poor. In fact, we are protecting the poor. We are relocating them to better places with better living conditions. We provide them with newly built and fully furnished rusunawa [low-cost apartments]. And you're telling me this is inhumane?"* Like earlier regimes and governors before him he heaped the blame of Jakarta's floods on the illegal settlements of the poor in the catchment of the rivers, ignoring the illegal settlements of the rich. Compensation would continue to be paid based on the NJOP values to those who were residents for more than 30 years and no compensation would be paid to residents who have been living for less than 30 years. Civil society criticized the administration for having built *rusunawa* for only 200 families when the numbers of families evicted were more than 900. The rest of the families would be left shelterless and even more marginalized (The Jakarta Post 2014). Most of the evicted did not possess Jakarta ID cards and were not eligible for apartments. The approach was also criticized for being non participatory and becoming more swift and forceful later on. The Jakarta Post published a survey of evictions carried out in Jakarta in 2015, where 95 per cent violated international covenants and 72 per cent provided no solutions post eviction. Most of the eviction was carried out without a warning letter as according to Ahok, *"they have occupied state land and so they should have known about the eviction"* (The Jakarta Post 2016).

3.3.3 *The case of Manila: The role of real estate developers and corporate agents.*

The role of the real estate developers and the corporate actors in the evolution of the urban space of Metro Manila is demonstrated through three examples. First, is the case of Ayala Land (a company owned by one of the old oligarchic families) demonstrates how real estate companies have tried to configure the spread of the metropolitan area itself for their own profits. Second, is the case of the development of the Manila Metro Rail Transit Line - 7, a light railway connection, which highlights the privatization of planning through the attempts by a consortium of developers to build an entire urban transit system within Manila. Third, is the case of the development of the Fort Bonifacio Global City, where the government played a key role in the emergent urban form by entering into arrangements with developers to construct a world class integrated megaproject.

From the 1980's the paradigm was the building of integrated mega projects as to the developers profit, the infrastructure developed as a consequence increased the values of their other projects. Also building master planned self contained communities with integrated residential, commercial and leisure districts, segregated from the rest of the overcrowded and infrastructure deficient city was profitable, as it both catered to as well as created the demand for first world standards in third world cities. It was in this period that Ayala Land started to consolidate its reputation as an excellent real estate company after the construction of the first corporate master planned city in Metro Manila, the Makati CBD, in the 1950s. The method evolved by Ayala land is that of conceptualising city development at the regional scale, crafting an appropriate master plan and investing in network infrastructure, and has been widely adopted by other real estate companies in Philippines. The company was also one of the first to foresee the southward spread of Metro Manila developing another megaproject, Ayala Alabang, in this part (Garrido 2013).

The company purchased development rights to hefty pieces of land to the south for the construction of Ayala Westgrove Heights, persisting with its strategy to build in the south. After the South East Asian financial crisis of 1997 stalled the building of Fort Bonifacio Global City, the original consortium of promoters divested its stake to Ayala Land, making it the controlling stakeholder. This was a shot in the arm as the status of Makati CBD as the premium real estate holding was threatened by the rise of alternate cheaper real estate locales. It evolved into a prominent company in the field of construction of industrial parks, and Laguna Technopark constructed by Ayala Land is Philippines' finest industrial park. Ayala Land has also entered infrastructure development because of the realization that the bad quality of government provided network infrastructure was an impediment to enlarging corporate profits in the future. In 1997, it entered the water sector by bagging the Manila Water contract for servicing half the population of the metropolitan population. Also during the latter half of the 1990s it stated to enter the transport sector. It envisaged the construction of a regional railway network (CALABARZON Express), which would effectively connect Ayala Land owned parts of Makati CBD and Fort Bonifacio Global City with its land holdings in the southern part of Metro Manila. However this scheme did not fructify. So then the company proceeded to purchase a stake holding in the MRT-3 light railway connection that ran between the Makati CBD and Fort Bonifacio Global City and enhanced their connectivity to the

population centres to the north and south, in order to safeguard the prices of these major land holdings. Additionally, the contract provisions allowed it to build a large commercial complex at the northern end of the line. In 2008 Ayala Corp. expanded into the energy and power sectors (Shatkin 2008).

The Manila Metro Rail Transit Line – 7 (MRT -7), is a rapid transit line scheduled to be completed in 2018, supposed to run from north to east direction, crossing Quezon City and a part of North Kalookan in Metro Manila and ending in urban centre of San Jose del Monte in the province of Bulacan. It was an unsolicited proposal in 2002, from a consortium that included S.M. Prime, Philippines' largest mall developer, E.E.I corporation, the Tranzen Group, and some foreign associates; and led by Roberto de Ocampo former secretary of finance in the national government, envisioned over and above the Philippine government's infrastructure plans. The main objective of proposing MRT - 7 was not profits from building the railway connection itself, but instead the associated rights to construct a business-cum-residential megaproject on land contiguous to the line in the briskly urbanising southern Bulacan province. The plan was questioned on several grounds, including it was redundant as it overlapped with already laid out government plans for a fourth phase of light railway development (MRT -4) and was an unreliable source of future government revenue, prior light railway lines not having achieved the anticipated ridership and revenue, to justify the huge subsidies to be extended (Shatkin 2008).

As the Philippines government has treated the privatisation of government land as an important source of income, it has consequently played a crucial role in consolidation of land holdings. A well-known instance is that of Fort Bonifacio Global City, which is the anterior site of a fort that was previously a part of the main Philippine Army camp. The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) sold the development rights to 214 hectares portion of this area to a group of developers in 1995 for US $1.6 billion (Garrido 2013; Shatkin 2006).

3.4   The new middle classes and exclusionary visions of the city: Delhi, Jakarta and Manila

3.4.1   *The case of Delhi.*
(A) The role of the middle classes.

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In his book *'The Politics of the Governed'* (2004), Partha Chatterjee elucidating the concept of 'political society', describing it as being composed of the majority of the rural population and the urban poor who have the formal status of citizens and use the power of their votes as means for political bargaining. However they do not associate with the state apparatus in the same way that the middle classes do, and are also not viewed by governmental agencies as proper citizens constitutive of civil society, but as statistical categories towards which developmental policies are to be targeted. Those in political society assert their entitlements to the government and are also accordingly governed, outside of the arrangement of the unwavering rights and laws laid down by the constitution, and rather by way of 'temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements' attained through direct political negotiations (Chatterjee 2008: 57). It is this political society that epitomises the major share of democratic politics in India, and is outside the domain of the ideological guidance of the capitalist class. The government agencies deal with the political society with oversight of their various illegal practices, often treating it as special cases, accepted as one of a kind and particular situations, in a way that does not threaten the framework of the general rules and principles. In the case of urban areas, governmental regulation of the urban poor and those surviving on the margins of legality, such as the informal sector, illegal settlements and hawkers, is through the constant political bargaining that is characteristic of political society which does necessarily yield assured and stable outcomes. Thus, informal settlements are sometimes provided water supply or electricity connections, but on extraordinary grounds, so that they are not put in the same category as normal consumers possessing secure legal title to their properties; or hawkers are permitted to sell their wares by putting them in a different category from regular shops and businesses who are in conformity with laws and pay taxes. However the claims of political society, even when accepted, never translate into rights (Chatterjee 2004; 2008).

Benjamin (2008) portrays this phenomenon in the urban sector as 'occupancy urbanism', where urban development occurs significantly through the extralegal negotiations of political society, and conflicting claims to urban space. Here 'vote bank politics' helps the poor in their extra legal claims to space through the power of their vote and has by and large confounded policy efforts of planned urban transformation.

However Chatterjee (2008) argues, the changes in the macroeconomic policy in India since the 1990s decade have been complemented by a transformation in the configuration of the capitalist class. Previously it was characterized by the dominance of handful large industrial oligopolies arising from the folds of the traditional merchant groups and encouraged by the licence raj and import-substitution economy. In the contemporary scenario there has been an influx of an upwardly mobile new rich into the capitalist class at all levels. Instead of earlier apprehensions regarding foreign competition, Indian capitalists seem much more confident to utilise the prospects presented by globalisation. He cites the example of the Indian IT industry and high rates of growth of the economy between 8 or 9 per cent per annum as examples. The urban middle class who played a critical role 'in leading and operating, both socially and ideologically, the autonomous interventionist activities of the developmental state' (Chatterjee 2008: 57) is now aligned with ideology of the bourgeoisie. Dissatisfaction among the urbanising middle classes with the state dispensation, especially with reference to its perceived populism, graft, and ineptitude has led to greater social acceptance of corporate ethics. Thus it has led to the relative increase in the power of the corporates within the capitalist class in comparison to the landed elites. But instead of being achieved through electoral mobilisation as it was in the case of the landed elites, it was achieved through civil society where corporate capital is hegemonic. Chatterjee (2008: 57) states: 'Civil society in India today, peopled largely by the urban middle classes, is the sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois civil society and represents the domain of capitalist hegemony.'

According to Chatterjee (2008) political society is 'the space of management of non-corporate capital', whereas civil society is 'where corporate capital is hegemonic' (Chatterjee 2008:58). The logic of accumulation is articulated in the contemporary period as the demand for high national economic growth rates and precedence given to the requirements of corporate capital. The socioeconomic aspirations of the contemporary urbanising middle class are now increasingly viewed as being fulfilled through participation in the high growth corporate sector as 'a vague but powerful feeling seems to prevail among the urban middle classes that rapid growth will solve all problems of poverty and unequal opportunities'. They are now characterized by an adamant emphasis on the legal rights of proper citizens in order to establish civic orderliness in public spaces and organizations; and thus tends to be less

accommodative of the 'messy world of the informal sector and political society' (Chatterjee 2008: 58).

According to Fernandes (2004), the new Indian middle class is a 'culturally constructed category', demarcated by practices of consumption associated with newly available consumer goods such as mobile phones, flat screen televisions, washing machines and cars, that act as status markers) in liberalising India (Fernandes 2004:2418). The media has played a crucial ideological role in creating a new imaginary of the 'global Indian middle class' and the altering the public discourse in India. It has been a vociferous appropriator of the notions of 'nation' and 'public' for the classes believing in the credo of liberalization, and it has accomplished this through the discourse of its everyday news and features that valorize neoliberal values and through a sustained disparagement of the ideas of state intervention and assistance (Chaudhuri 2010: 57). Thus the vision of the Indian nation as envisaged by new Indian middle class redefines it outside the protectionist and austere notions of Nehru and Gandhi.

The novelty of this middle class can be attributed to its eager acceptance of global tastes and consumption of commodities whose cultural expressions are explicitly linked with liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy (Fernandes 2000). The new middle class is a social group that exemplifies the cultural economy of globalisation of the Indian economy. Advocates of continued and aggressive opening up of the Indian economy have tried to project this category as the anticipated social outcome and as a standard for other classes to aim for. Although the ideal type of this group as represented in the media and public discourse are the English speaking urban professionals who have benefitted from fresh openings in the service sector and sizeable salary hikes in the corporate sector, the political and social boundaries of this category are continuously shifting. The significance of the idea of the new Indian middle class 'rests on the assumption that other segments of the middle classes and upwardly mobile working classes can aspire to this idealised representation' (Fernandes 2004: 2418).

According to Fernandes (2004), empirical definitions of the middle classes for e.g. based on *income* are difficult, as it would be summative of the middles class in both rural and urban areas, including occupations such as shop-keeping, minor trade and farming. In the context of such a wide range of employment and income, the new Indian middle class is actually a sociocultural entity and often the subject of

emulation by other social groups. This is because the borderlines of this group are permeable and holds the promise of upward mobility to the ones below. The middle class as a category thus points to a 'heavily mediated terrain in which politics, activism, entertainment, and consumption can meld, commensurately widening the frameworks in which political action can be constituted and legitimized' (Khandekar and Reddy 2013: 223).

A review of several contemporary works on the new Indian middle class points out the pivotal role played by this group in the gentrification and sanitisation of major cities. This class began to strengthen and expand the sway of the civil society, and in urban areas organised itself to repossess spaces claimed by the poor (Chatterjee 2008; Fernandes 2004; Ghertner 2011). Fernandes (2004) terms this process as 'the politics of forgetting', referring to the 'political discursive processes in which specific marginalized social groups are rendered invisible within the dominant national political culture. Such dynamics unfolds through a spatial reconfiguration of class inequalities. Both middle class groups and the state engage in a politics of forgetting that displaces the poor and the working class from such spaces' (Fernandes 2004: 2415). Further intellectual innovation has conceptualised the middle class as a class whose character is still forming, as a class-in-practice delineated through its political activity and through its quotidian practices that perpetuate its advantaged station. A small but dominant fraction within this middle class shapes its identity and plays a fundamental role in the 'politics of hegemony'. The purpose of the 'hegemonic politics' is to coordinate the self-interests of the dominant groups and to create cohesion within this heterogeneous crowd. However, instead of 'producing the classical pattern of liberal hegemony (in which the ruling bloc actively elicits the consent of subordinate classes) in India these projects have been marked by middle-class illiberalism, and most notably a distancing from lower classes' (Fernandes and Heller 2006: 495).

Such an ideological position that moves back and forth between sociopolitical illiberalism and market liberalism, is refracted onto the urban terrain as a discursive politics of environmentalism that Baviskar (2004) calls 'bourgeois environmentalism' The politics seemingly arose with the aim of relocating polluting units outside city limits, however, M. C. Mehta a Magsaysay Award winning legal expert, who had taken the legal initiative in this case, stated that his true aim was to check migration into the fragile environment of Delhi and to preserve it for its natural citizens (Kumar

2003). Using Delhi as the point of reference, Baviskar (2004) draws attention to the increasingly powerful bourgeois environmentalist who tries to remove the ugliness of industrial production from the city. However this entails that the poor working class relocate too, despite being the supply of cheap domestic labour and sundry services that allows the bourgeoise to lead comfortable lives. Their informal dwellings seem to 'offend the eyes, ears and noses of the well-to-do'. Vital to enhancing the quality of life for the middle class in Delhi are the neighbourhood green spaces for physical exercise and temples and *ashramas* for worship and spiritual retreat. The sanitisation of urban spaces and their preservation for formal economic activities and housing, and initiatives for the creation of urban green spaces, are all elements in the imagining of cities in ways that disregard the requirements of the urban poor for employment, housing, transport and civic amenities (Baviskar 2004).

Such narrow definitions of urban livability are produced through the mobilisations of citizens as *consumers* of civic amenities, and through the deligitimization of the claims of political society within urban spaces. The adoption of structural adjustment programs since the early 1990s has caused the reconfiguration of the identity of the middle classes as consumers, including the consumption of public space, property, and governance (Khandekar and Reddy 2013). The *Bhagirdari* scheme of Delhi (discussed in the previous chapter) is an example of such a 'reconstitution of democratic civic life through the production of a normative civic culture based on notions of the rights of consumer citizens rather than the rights of workers' (Fernandes 2004: 2428).

The idea behind *Bhagidari* was to bring bureaucrats from the upper echelons and the lower levels together at an interface with civil society of the elite, so that the negotiations of political society through which the master planned city has been time and again misshapen to meet the needs of the poor and the informal sector, become redundant. Elite NGOs and associations often interpret the rights of citizens within the strict definitions of ownership. From this standpoint emanates a very exclusive articulation of the right to the city. Terms such as 'residents', 'citizens', 'law abiding taxpaying citizen', 'encroacher', 'illegal habitants' and 'nuisance' are frequently used in the narrative of RWAs and elite civil society organisations. The increasingly vocal and assertive middle class in Delhi have overseen hundreds of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) filed by the Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) of middle class colonies in different law courts, beseeching the removal of illegal slums in their

vicinities. In some recent judgments the judiciary has interpreted rights in favour of RWAs rather than slum communities and is discussed in the next section.

(B) The Role of the Judiciary:

Whether to demolish a slum or not, used to be the choice of the different land owning agencies in Delhi – mainly the Delhi Development Authority - who in the present scenario no longer determine the legality of the slums. Instead the machinery for slum demolition today stirs into motion when the RWA files a writ petition for the removal of a proximal slum, progresses through the judiciaries granting of the RWA's petition, and fulfils its goal with the land owning agency following by the court's directives. Since the turn of the millennium, courts have come to influence the evolution of urban space in a big way. This is in stark contrast to 1985, when the Supreme Court of India issued a breakthrough verdict on a famous PIL that dealt with the demolition of slums and eviction of pavement dwellers by the Bombay Municipal Corporation in 1981. The matter was taken to court, among others, by Olga Tellis and Praful Bidwai who were journalists, along with two pavement dwellers who were directly affected by the demolitions (Dupont and Ramanathan 2008). The Supreme Court ruled in Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) that: '*the right to livelihood is an important facet of the right to life.*' Thus '*the eviction of the (pavement dwellers) will lead to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to the deprivation of life.*' The urban poor do not '*claim the right to dwell on pavements or in slums for the purpose of pursuing any activity which is illegal, immoral or contrary to public interest. Many of them pursue occupations which are humble but honourable*' (Bhan 2009; Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008; Dupont and Ramanathan 2008; Joseph and Goodman 2008). The court also blamed the state's failure to provide affordable housing for the poor for having created the crisis to begin with, and decreed that relocation must be close to the place of employment. Further there must be a compulsory notice period of one month and the slum dwellers must be given the chance to be heard. The court directed the government to avoid carrying out evictions during the monsoons (Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008). In K. Chandru vs State of Tamil Nadu (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that another place to stay has to be given to the slum dwellers before they are evicted. In its judgements in Shantisthar Builders vs Narayan Khimalal Ghotame and Others (1990), the Supreme Court ruled that housing constituted a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution (the right to life).

The judgements held that the right to housing includes a basic minimum quality of housing (Bhan 2009, Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008).

Then the mood changed abruptly in Almitra Patel vs. the Union of India (2000), where the Supreme Court brusquely observed that: *'Instead of "slum clearance" there is "slum creation" in Delhi. This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land in and around the slums. This can best be controlled at least, in the first instance, by preventing the growth of slums. The authorities must realise that there is a limit to which the population of a city can be increased, without enlarging its size. In other words the density of population per square kilometre cannot be allowed to increase beyond the sustainable limit. Creation of slums resulting in increase in density has to be prevented. It is the garbage and solid waste generated by these slums which require to be dealt with most expeditiously'*. Almitra Patel, a retired engineer and environmentalist, and B.L. Wadhera, an advocate of the Supreme Court, were both PIL petitioners went to court on the issue of solid waste disposal in the city. Neither of them was seeking the demolition of slums; that is an agenda that the court set for itself using the expansive power that had accrued to it in its PIL jurisdiction (Dupont and Ramanathan, 2008). What was about the non installation of waste bins by the MCD, turned into a rant invoking Malthusian fears, calling for preventing the growth of slums, as slums were overpopulating the city and turning into generators of unmanageable waste.

In Hem Raj vs. Commissioner of Police (1999), which led to the demolition of Nagla Machi JJ cluster, the court distinguished between the migrants coming from other states and the true natives of Delhi: "*When you are occupying illegal land, you have no legal right, what of talk of fundamental right, to stay there a minute longer'* and that '*nobody forced you to come to Delhi'* (Ramanathan 2006).

The Court hauled up the authorities for not taking any serious initiative for '*cleaning up the city'* which was the '*showpiece of the country*" (Almitra Patel vs. the Union of India 2000). Thus the slums were not just producing garbage that was out of place but the slums itself were out of place with the visions for Delhi's future as the aesthetic, "world class" pride and joy of the nation, the node of global economic flows finance and retail consumption, and a synapse for global stimuli.

Rather than seeing slums as desperate measures of poor rural migrants for shelter and survival, the court saw them as "*large areas of public land, usurped for private use free of cost*" (Almitra Patel vs. the Union of India 2000). Since the slum

dweller was a usurper, he was now undeserving of resettlement which had been previously obligatory, as *"rewarding an encroacher on public land with an alternative free site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket for stealing."* Throughout the decade, the courts refused to acknowledge the failure of the DDA to provide affordable housing for the poor as one of the causes for giving rise to slums. In Okhla Factory Owners vs. GNATCD (2002), the court again denied the right of the evicted to receive resettlement from the state and directed the state to not *"take up an arbitrary system of providing alternative sites and land to encroachers on public land."* This view was reiterated in Maloy Krishna Dhar vs. GNCTD (2003), which led to demolition of three slums in IP extension, by the Delhi High Court, who while rebuking the DDA for having not acted upon a previous order for removing and relocating certain jhuggies, went on to expiate: *'The land having been acquired, compensation thereof being given by public money contributed by tax payers, it had no business to allow the land to be grabbed by encroachers. It is their statutory obligation to see that nobody should squat upon the land which has been put at their disposal I terms of the DDA Act. The pleas taken by the DDA that in view of some policy of relocation, it cannot remove unauthorized occupation amount giving premium to unscrupulous elements in the society as on one hand an honest citizen has to pay for a piece of land or flat and on the other hand on account of illegal occupation of the Government land an encroacher is given premium by giving him a plot in the name of relocation.'* Thus lived spaces of the urban poor became 'illegal' and its residents were 'criminals', 'encroachers' and 'land grabbers'. Slum residents are called "unscrupulous elements", whereas RWA members are called "citizens" both in the RWAs' petitions and in the order of the bench. It distinguished between the tax paying 'honest citizens' who bear the high costs of housing out of their incomes; and the 'unscrupulous elements' who occupy public lands for free. It thus implicitly accepted the owning of private property and paying of taxes as the determinant of citizenship and rights to the city. The courts' judgement recalibrated a model of the ideal citizen and defined propertied-citizenship as eligibility for accessing the city's resources. The solution to the slum problem is made purely technical (i.e., adherence to the statutorily binding Master Plans), despite its deeply ethical and political nature. Slum residents were "dehumanized" (Ghertner 2008: 65) and thus not deserving of moral consideration. The courts have continued to issue orders for demolitions turning a blind eye to the fact that 70 percent of Delhi is

unauthorized, violating land-use codes or building byelaws in some way or another, as stated in Municipal Corporation of Delhi affidavit filed in 2006 in the Delhi high court in Kalyan Sansthan vs. GNCTD (2003). Ghertner (2011: 285) quotes the former Commissioner of the Slum Wing of the Municipal Corporation telling him "the rich have unauthorizedly grabbed far more land in Delhi than the poor. The total land under squatters and slum-dwellers is far less than the illegal land held by the rich and famous, it's just that nobody sees those violations."

Since most of the squatting takes place on public land all the petitions are made out in "public interest", although it serves to only improve the property values of nearby planned colonies. In the Pitampura Sudhar Samiti vs. Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (1995) the court ruled: '*The welfare of the residents of these [RWAs'] colonies is also in the realm of public interest which cannot be overlooked. After all, these residential colonies were developed first. The slums have been created afterwards which is the cause of nuisance and breeding ground of so many ills. The welfare, health, maintenance of law and order, safety and sanitation of these residents cannot be sacrificed and their right under Article 21 is violated in the name of social justice to the slum dwellers'*. Thus it treats slum dwellers as second class citizens whose social justice is of a concern only after those of the dwellers of the planned colonies were met. Ghertner (2008) examined a few unprecedented writ petitions filed in the Delhi High Court by RWAs leading to the demolition of jhuggies. They portrayed slum dwellers as a nuisance as they were unsanitary and thereby the source of potential epidemics; as criminals and antisocials; as usurpers of other scarce public resources such as water and electricity and of being Bangladeshi. He notes that the discourse of nuisance had been especially efficient in getting rid of slums, especially with the widespread attachment of photographs showing accumulated trash, standing water, stray animals, especially open defecation, as evidence of the slum's nuisance value in the Annexures of the petitions (Ghertner 2008; 2012). Ghertner (2008: 68) likens the courts' decisions regarding Delhi's slums to a 'discursive regime' which was 'enforcing a private property regime' using the discourse of nuisance like never before in the history of Delhi (Ghertner 2008: 66). According to Bhan (2009: 139) the discourse of the court orders 'allow(s) corporate capital's moral–political hegemony to define urban politics'.

Although evictions were carried out in the name of public interest, a great part of this cleared land is allowed to lie vacant, to be subsequently used for the

construction of homes and workplaces of the affluent, or for building shopping malls (Jain et al. 2016). The Delhi high court order of M. C. Mehta vs Union of India (2005) led to the eviction of three intergenerational slum clusters, Indira Nagar, Balbir Nagar and Bhatti Mines in the Bhatti area of the Delhi Ridge (M.C Mehta vs Union of India 2005). The construction of an imposing group of buildings, constituting India's biggest shopping mall complex was underway in Vasant Kunj, within the protected forest area of the Mehrauli or South-Central Delhi Ridge near Jawaharlal Nehru University. It was a land use violation of the Delhi Master Plan. A local environmental group called the Ridge Bachao Andolan petitioned the Supreme Court of India against a syndicate of seven top land developers in India, challenging the construction of the mall complex. The Delhi DDA supported the construction in court and recognised it as planned and lawful on the premise that it involved professional builders and it was an exceptional construction that would elevate the architectural status of Delhi. Exhibiting sophisticated building designs of a retail/recreational complex of global standards, and beautiful artist's representations of the structures being erected, and stressing the cost to the builder (US$300 million), describing, the DDA tried to convince the court of the project's legality. The mall's capital-intensiveness and associated global aesthetics persuaded the court, which permitted the construction to proceed in 2007.

In the past, on every occasion, the courts were confounded by the problems of missing government records, lack of clearly defines tenures, and incomplete surveys and was unable to order action. The nonexistence of thorough and standard surveys in Delhi made the data on slum clusters highly qualitative, rather than quantitative, and this was synopsized and used for administration. So the DDA would simply shelve demolitions for years through postponement of court hearings on the pretext of surveying and reassessing the conditions in the field. In many instances, the land owning agency itself was unclear, thus the courts did not know which agency to issue the order to. Such an insufficiency of spatial information benefitted the dwellers of informal settlements in the past as it checked together the court's as well as the senior officialdom's ability to administer informal settlements. The enactment of court orders and enforcing conformity with planning codes was the junior bureaucracy's task, who operated at the ground level, and with whom the slum residents had been able to successfully engage to their advantage because of sociocultural factors or political pressure. Since the stringent application of the Master Plan had been neglected since

1962, it was admitted by the MCD in the High Court, that the problem of unauthorized constructions and slums could not be dealt with by simply adhering to existing laws or under the provisions of the Master Plan. Enforcement now would make Delhi not only a slum-free city, but also erase several office spaces, malls, and factories, as these were also unauthorised. In response, the courts did away with the due process followed earlier (of mapping and surveying slums and the information then reaching the higher levels of bureaucracy and subsequently the court) by determining legality of structures on the basis of whether it looked planned rather than actually being planned (Ghertner 2011).

The poor were portrayed the poor as polluters (Bhan 2009; Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008; Ghertner 2008) who were destroying the Yamuna riverbed, and the demolition of the Yamuna Pushta squatter settlements was the product of a particular set of decisions of the Delhi High Court, particularly in Okhla Factory Owner's Association vs. GNCTD (1994), Pitampura Sudhar Samiti vs. GNCTD (1995), and Wazirpur Bartan Nirmata Sangh vs. Union of India (2002). These petitions, filed mostly by factory owners and resident welfare associations of neighbourhoods adjacent to the slums, asked for the removal of slum clusters from their particular areas. The petitions ignored that the slum clusters were created to house the labourers working in those industrial areas, as there was no workers' housing provided by the industries. However, the High Court went beyond the ambit of the particular petitions and ruled, in November 2002, that all those who had settled in slums anywhere in the city of Delhi after 1990 should be evicted and not given any "free" land for resettlement (OMCT/HIC-HLRN 2004). The area was eventually used to construct the Commonwealth Games Village that was to be later converted into high-class apartments.

3.4.2   The case of Jakarta:

"We need more trees, so we will cultivate them. We will plant 30,000 trees in Jakarta . . . It will take consistency and sustainable action to make this city greener". Thus spoke the former Governor of Jakarta, Fauzi Bowo (The Jakarta Post 2008), who succeeded Sutiyoso while launching the 'Clean and Green Jakarta' campaign. The aim of the project was planting a thousand saplings in Jakarta's principal green space that also had a significant biodiversity. It obtained the volunteership of three

hundred people and received the support of citizen's and corporates like Jakarta Green Radio and the newspaper *Bisnis Indonesia*, as well as internationally connected Non Governmental Organisations like the Medco Foundation, Monfori Nusantara and the Jakarta Green Monster Organization (Jakarta Post 2009). The citizen's groups who were being strategically engaged by the Jakarta Government were mainly the taxpaying middle-income groups. Although the city government had embraced public-private partnerships since the 1980's to accomplish its urban plans and policies, previous alliances tended to engage big business large business houses instead of the middle class. This change towards growing activism and involvement of citizens has its roots in the entrenching neoliberalism in post – authoritarian Indonesia, with its encouragement of self-responsibilisation and initiative taking at the individual and group level so that they may themselves improve their own living environments. Community-based urban initiatives became the innovative instrument for urban governance. This limits the responsibility of the government to that of facilitating initiatives from the private sector. As in the example of the urban forestry initiative mentioned in the previous paragraph, the government seeks exploits subjects that are well liked among the ascendant and globalising middle-classes, especially environmental themes that are most venerated (Kusno 2011b). Such an initiatives also renders Jakarta a nodal, yet liveable city with global standards of service delivery in the eyes of foreign investors. Like in most other urban regimes, the city government of Jakarta involves a community of environmental technocrats for obtaining credibility in order to mobilise citizen participation and inculcate self-responsibilisation.

In Jakarta greens that once occupied 30 per cent of urban land, had since the 1980's come to occupy less than 10 per cent, built up with new homes and apartments, malls and offices. Several scholars believe that recovery of green cover back to 30 per cent in Jakarta would reduce several environment hazards such as yearly floods, air pollution and water scarcity (Rukmana 2016; Douglass 2010). In order to restore 30 per cent green spaces, the authorities embarked upon demolition of the shacks of more than 15000 informal settlers especially along the river banks and rail lines. However such drives were often simply a ruse on the part of the urban authorities to utilise illegally occupied land resources for raising revenues. The urban authorities efforts to restore Jakarta's greens beget inquiry into the extent of encroachment of green spaces by different actors. According to the NGO Urban Poor

Consortium (UPC), while the poor encroached on 218.2 hectares, it was measly compared to 1960 hectares encroached upon for the construction of shopping complexes, high class residences, and fairways. However these spaces are seldom targeted for eviction, victimising only the squatter dwellers (UPC 2011). According to the Rujak Center for Urban Studies it was prejudice on the part of urban authorities to only target the slums as several other structures and neighbourhoods had also been constructed in the catchment areas of the rivers (Wardhani 2014).

Ironically, the development of such 'green spaces', allows developers to complete 'green properties'. According to Kusno (2011b) the catchword of 'green' has pervaded the urban property market. He quotes a survey conducted in 2009 by an Indonesian property magazine *Bisnis Properti,* where almost all respondents strongly felt that the concept of green will have validity for a long time in the future. Many respondents also felt it was a prerequisite to preventing an environmental disaster. The property business jumped at the opportunity and went green and started branding their real estate projects in JMA with 'green' names such as 'The Green', 'The Forest', 'Eco City', 'Eco Living', 'Green Landscape', 'Green Environment', 'Green Tranquility', 'Green Property', etc. in a process termed by Kusno (2011b) as 'green washing' (Kusno 2011b: 321). This was a change from the branding strategy of the 1990's that highlighted western architectural styles or designs. The themes of green and healthy environments is advocated vociferously by the middle classes who are tired of the tedious commute from the peri-urban suburb and want to relocate to the centre of the city. In a sardonic turn of events, the Ciputra group responsible for several mega projects leading to environmental degradation in Jakarta has managed to use the jargon of "greening" to develop several hundreds of millions of dollars worth property in DKI Jakarta (Official Website of PT Ciputra Property TBK 2016).

3.4.3   The case of Manila:

Philippines experienced a growth and consolidation of the new urban middle class since the 1980s as the service sector grew in comparison to agriculture, industry and manufacturing. As illustrated in the previous chapter it constituted 59 per cent of the country's GDP in 2015, rising from 44 per cent twenty years ago (World Bank 2005; 2015). This class is defined not so much by their central positions in the overall income distribution, as they are in the upper deciles, and would be rather have to be

classified as the 'new rich'. They are more distinguishable in terms of their consumption and lifestyles, such as car and home ownership in gated communities and use of world-class retail spaces such as suburban shopping malls. It is noteworthy that such a middle class has emerged in Philippines even without high rates of economic growth as GDP of Philippines grew the slowest among the South East Asian economies (Raquiza 2013; World Bank 2005; 2015). This according to Connell (1999: 421) is indicative of 'the growing extent of capitalist relations in Filipino society and the rise in consumerism'.

The new middle class is constituted by two distinct groups, a bigger bourgeoisie which also includes a significant number of people not associated with the countries old propertied elite and newer heterogeneous class consisting of educated professionals, technocrats and managers who are increasingly important in the economy and society of Philippines. The middle classes have grown and become more diversified since the overthrow of the Marcos' regime in 1986, growing beyond the state and bureaucracy, due to macroeconomic liberalization and political stability in the nation. After privatization and the deregulation of trade and investment, a new crop of businesspersons and professionals were able to emerge who had previously been disadvantaged by the crony capitalism and patronage machine of the Marcos years. Many of the new capitalists emerged from the early Chinese merchant communities. Professionals, who later turned entrepreneurs also entered the bourgeoisie. Although most of the firms are family owned, they are managed mostly by non family salaried managers and technical experts (Connell 1999).

This growth in the middle class is also reflected in gentrification and the social relations in the new suburbia. Crime is common in Manila, with theft the most common crime. In response to the inability of the police, who are branch of the national government, to control crime gated communities have proliferated, fortified by high walls and gates, latest surveillance equipment and guarded by private security. Living in such exclusive communities is also a statement of status and prestige, and the top three developers, the Ayalas, Filinvest and Sta Lucia Realty, aim mainly for the upper middle class and rich consumers as it assures a higher return on investment. The role of the private developers starts from the very identification of location, to the construction, marketing, selling and maintenance of the homes. They even assist in forming the Home Owners Associations, the body with substantial regulatory and managerial powers within the perimeters; and clarify the ownership of

common properties, either public or private. Gating also prevents penetration by informal land uses. Hence all gated communities whose spectrum includes high end (price higher than 40,000 US dollars), moderate (between 40,000 and 9000 US dollars) and affordable (Below 9000 US dollars), restrict thoroughfare through the roads inside the perimeters, and even the domestic staff require passes to enter (Tanate 2005).

3.5   Displacement, resistance and a counter hegemonic globalization:

Rapid urbanization has produced glaring inequality in urban spaces within urban areas or 'peripheries' of abject poverty and inequality (Holston 2009:245). While cities are increasingly operating as territorial units in a competitive process, they are at the same time becoming increasingly segregated economically, socially and spatially. Increasing income inequality is considered a concomitant of global city development by some analysts due to the presumed effects of changes in the composition of the labour force. There has been a rapid growth in demand for labour force in two farthest segments within the service sector, the low end (fast food workers, janitors, security guards, drivers, personal or household services etc.) and the high end (computer programmers, financial analysts, consultants, lawyers, accountants, etc.). There is a growing demand for high end services, which in turn generates demand for low end workers; however this does not translate into higher wages for the latter as there is an abundant supply of workers in this category (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 2000). The emerging distribution of income as well as spatial form of global cities is in the form of an hourglass, where the distending classes at the top and bottom are referred to as the 'citadel' and 'ghetto' respectively (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982 in Abrahamsson 2004).

The everyday battles of the urban poor in the large metropolises of the south for minimum housing and services have at the same time engendered 'new movements of insurgent citizenship based on their claims to have a right to the city and a right to rights'. Hence the metropolitan area today is 'a site of collision between forces of exploitation and dispossession and increasingly coherent, yet still fragile and contradictory movements for new kinds of citizen power and social justice' (Holston 2009: 245). According to Holston (2009), such insurgent urban citizenship confronts both entrenched as well as new forms of urban inequality, uprooting and violence.

These conflicts are actually aimed at projecting alternative ideas of citizenship and the degraded urban margins are often the places from which new urban innovations emerge (Holston 2009).

Dispossession and displacement has been a recurrent consequence of modernization; and displacement and resettlement due to modernization projects usually indicates the carrying out of ambitious engineering projects by states with its relatively unbridled monopoly on the administration of force (Bauman 1989). At the same time to being uprooted is a stark manifestation of subjugation as it implies lack of jurisdiction over material space. Marginalised populations progressively prefer to oppose displacement when they are faced with it, as they view it a more efficacious strategy than co-operation with the government (Fisher 1999). The cause of the displaced have been taken up by social movements and organizations on the grounds of human rights, environmental safekeeping, protecting aboriginal groups and other conjoined topics and constitute an emerging transnational civil society. Transnational civil society is constituted mainly of global NGOs and transnational social movements that include in its purview a wide range of issues such as democracy, fair trade, human rights, indigenous populations, gender, human security and the environment, frequently in conflict with the state and private investment (Khagram 1999 in Oliver-Smith 2002). Keck and Sikkink (1998: 1) have called them "transnational advocacy networks" or "networks of activists distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation." Their ascendancy can be attributed to the globalisation of a particular set of norms premised on the human rights and environmental protection (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the past two decades, 'civil society' has become an important heuristic in the social sciences, inhabiting the middle ground between the state and family (Edwards 2013). Contemporary civil society is normatively defined as "a set of institutions that perform the functions of inculcating morals and values that facilitate social cohesion", enabling the citizenry to act as "good" and "active" communities aware of their responsibilities as citizens (Etzioni 1995, 1996 in Hodgeson 2004). At the ideological and theoretical level, the concept of civil society has thrived within both neoliberal and post-structural or post-Marxist schools of thought. While the former advocates free markets and minimal state intervention, the latter stresses on the ability of social movements to bring about positive transformations in society (Mitlin et al. 2007).

Emphasising the potential of resistance research, Oliver-Smith (2002:5) states that "resistance research displays and analyses the important perspectives and critiques that are provided by resistance for a reworking of a development agenda that has deep and abiding problems. Resistance brings into high relief the serious defects and shortcomings in policy frameworks, legal options, assessment and evaluation methodologies, and lack of expertise in implementation that plague much of the development effort." Environmental degradation coupled with the fact that often it is the most marginalized populations who are forced to bear a disproportionate amount of the liabilities of development, which constitutes abuse of fundamental human rights, has become the driving force behind resistance research. Defiance includes an entire spectrum of actions, including go-slow, not showing up at formal meetings with authorities, incapacity to fathom official orders and other tactics of the oppressed, to more brawny group protests, civil disobedience, and even insurgence and waging war on the state. An absence of open confrontation may not always mean that the community accepts dislodgment, especially where regimes have committed human rights abuses in the past and used excessive force. In the same way, active resistance too does not in all instances signify an unwillingness to move. In some cases, foot-dragging turns out to be a way of haggling with authorities to augment the amount of reparation (Oliver-Smith 2002). The main forms of contestation at local, national and global levels, at the level of civil society outside of formally constituted government or political parties are: social movements, non governmental organizations (NGOs), grass roots organizations (GROs)/Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and transnational networks.

Lefebvre had conceptualized "the right to the city" or "the right to claim presence in the city, to wrest the use of the city from privileged new masters and democratize its spaces"; and that "to exclude the urban from groups, classes, individuals, is also to exclude them from civilization, if not from society itself. The right to the city legitimizes the refusal to allow oneself to be removed from urban reality by a discriminatory and segregative organization" (Lefebvre 1996: 194–196) Lefebvre argued that struggle for the right to the city is triggered by confrontation among urban agents who wanted to influence development of the city based on their different interests. Urban social movements were examined in 1977 in Manuel Castells seminal work, "The City and The Grassroots" where the focus was mainly on working class populations. He created the concept as a response to the then prevalent

tendencies in urban sociology to see social problems created by the working class and migrants as a danger to social stability, instead of being engendered by structural forces that perpetuate socioeconomic inequities. The presence of urban social movements is not only significant for members of the movement but also important to understand social and spatial structures of urban system, including system of urban planning. He suggests that researchers should look at details of the communities and organizations of urban citizens, so it can be linked to the demands and action they produce. Actions of urban citizens as an actual practice are a central element in Castells' arguments and could generate three conceivable levels of potential urban and political outcomes: from 'participation' (at the lowest level), 'protest' (at the intermediary level), to the highest level of 'urban social movements' (also the most rare). Castells had developed his premise that urban social movements have the potential to express structural contradiction and when they are connected to trade unions and party/political groups and they can help to generate deep-seated changes in political power configurations. Ironically, in his own research experience, after his examination on the Madrid citizen movement of the mid-1970s, Castells renounced his optimism and argued that urban movements are not powerful enough to confront macro forces that determine political power in the city; therefore they no longer possess the power to generate structural change in power relations (Castells 1983). All social movements revolve around issues that require policy or legislative action and this happens only at the level of the government. Social movements are cyclic in two ways. Firstly, they react to the conditions that are variable. The other reason is related with the tendency of any social movement to have life cycles of their own (Shah 2004). Maximum social movements are self-protective rather than radical and verge on transience. However, they are vital, possibly the most significant means of social change for the present and the future (Shah, 2004).

Grass-roots organisations (GROs) or Community based organisations (CBOs) (used here interchangeably) are membership organisations devoted to the enhancement of associated communities. GROs have shared socio cultural ancestry, developing mainly after traditional local organizations. Since the 1970's there has been an explosion in the number of CBOs. Often, different GROs are created because of the failure of governments to deliver minimum necessary services. Vital to the formation of new GROs are the increasing quantities of individuals migrating outside for education and employment, and return to their roots as advisers, or find

employment in GROs. Often called 'Gramscian organic intellectuals,' they are crucial negotiators and provide connections between local groups and external assistance. The increasing accessibility of external backing from national and international NGOs and social movements has also spurred the growth of locally organised associations. The growth of information technology has enabled local groups to interconnect across borders and share their experiences. Thus, displaced and resettled people around the world are now able to exchange experience obtained by being involved in land and resource disputes with regional or federal governments, through the World Wide Web by creating their own websites. The growth of IT and the availability of travel grants have permitted formation of regional alliances of NGOs or CBOs.

According to McFarlane (2009) the concept of 'assemblage' better describes spatiality in social movements and offers an substitute to the use of 'network' for conceptualising the spatiality of social movements (McFarlane 2009). Aided by bandwidth explosion and continuous development in IT, translocal assemblages connecting persons, NGOs, GROs and social movements often smudge the lines demarcating local, national and global levels. Grass roots level movements have also reached out laterally in their efforts to build international networks or coalitions with their counterparts across national boundaries. The Internet enables the formation of linkages, and when these assemblages focus on political issues, politics itself finds a new platform. The World Wide Web, which is an entire 'network of networks' and has become both tool and platform for the activities of non-state actors (Oliver – Smith 2002: 14).

Appadurai (2002) calls (referring to the achievements of the coalition formed by three NGOs in Mumbai dealing with poverty – SPARC, the National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan) these networks 'new horizontal modes (of) articulating the deep democratic politics of locality' (Appadurai, 2002: 25). Evans (2000: 230) likens this to a 'globalization from below', wherein the general public cross borders, and utilise cheap transport and communication technology to sustain different transnational populations. The surprising resistance and adaptability of the masses, whose lives too are now transnational, is insufficient to defy existing global order and rules, and the hegemonic economic philosophy that legitimise them. He perceives these to be efforts to challenge the power of the globalised elite through continual wearing down of the global system of rules and through the creation of new subaltern dogmas. They too use digital technologies and globalised norms like human

rights or environmental protection to protect the marginalised at the local level. Though improbable as it is for them to disrupt the existing global order, they contest the hegemony of neoliberalism, both at the global and local levels and are in this sense a "counter-hegemonic" globalisation (Evans 2000: 232). Juris (2005) examined the use of new digital technologies by anti-corporate globalization activists to establish linkages, synchronize actions, practice media activism, and increase the visibility of their politics. He documents the use of email lists, web pages, open source and open editing software to organize and coordinate actions, exchange information, and create documents, revealing a rapid increase in digital collaborations, through a number of mobilizations in different cities, especially in the cases of resistance against multilateral economic and political institutions. He mentions forums like Indymedia, which has provided an online environment for posting audio, video, and text files. Activists have also created short-term media foci to spread alternate knowledges, try out new fangled technologies, and share their resources and experiences. The horizontal networking logic facilitated by new digital technologies not only makes it amenable to social movement organizing but also represents a broader model for creating alternative forms of social, political, and economic organization. Network-based politics creates all-embracing spaces, where varied organizations, collectives, and networks congregate around common issues while allowing autonomy and the specialized roles of the organizations to remain intact (Juris 2005).

3.6 The spaces of protest: Delhi, Jakarta and Manila as the places of mass movements

3.6.1 Delhi as the space of mass movements:

The emergence of Delhi and the signification of certain locations in it as the spaces of mass movements, in the context of its capital city status and the growing clout of its ascendant middle class, is described through two events of mass protests: the anti-corruption movement of 2011 and the Nirbhaya rape protests of 2012. These protests took place both in the traditional symbolic places of national identity in the national capital such as Jantar Mantar, India Gate, Raisina hill, Rajghat, as well as in more plebian venues such as Ramlila Maidan, all of which were transformed into symbols of an ailing nation. According to Menon and Nigam (2011), the Lokpal Bill

became 'the rallying point for a slowly accumulating mass anger – not just against one party or government (the Congress and the UPA) but against the entire political class itself'. A completely fresh set of actors in the shape of the India Against Corruption and Aam Aadmi Party tapped this anger and came into the national spotlight.

In April, 2011, after a slew of cases regarding extensive corruption became public knowledge, India Against Corruption, a civil society group represented by Kisan Baburao Hazare also known as 'Anna' Hazare, a septuagenarian former soldier and rural development activist, not too well known outside of his own state of Maharashtra until he was awarded the Padmashree in 1992, mobilized popular support for the passing by the Indian Parliament of a convincing Jan Lokpal (Citizen's Ombudsman) Bill. Although the Lokpal Bill had been languishing since 1968, this time it received unprecedented support and mass momentum mainly due to the iconic Hazare who was promptly hailed as a modern Gandhi for his steadfast advocacy of grassroots rural development and social movements (as exemplified in his work in his ancestral village of Ralegan Siddhi, Ahmednagar, Maharasthra) and dedication to *satyagraha*. Besides Hazare, Arvind Kejriwal, a former Indian Revenue Services officer turned activist; Manish Sisodia, Kejriwal's assistant; Kiran Bedi, the first woman Indian Police Service officer; Shanti Bhushan, a one-time Law Minister and judicial reform activist; and Prashant Bhushan, his son were the other prominent faces of India Against Corruption (IAC), dubbed by the media later on as "Team Anna". Bedi, Kejriwal, and Sisodia, were connected through a preceding phase of advocacy on Right to Information. Later on they shifted their goalposts from Right to Information to corruption. They roped in the Bhushan father and son duo at this stage, but they still needed a credible face to lead the movement that they found in Hazare (Kirpal 2011) who because of his reputation as an upright and austere Gandhian, provided the moral compass for the masses. Further he possessed a formidable weapon for mobilising the general public in the form of the fasts, which he had used in the previous decade on a few occasions to demand state action against graft, feeble anticorruption laws, and red tape in executing them. This 'appeared to place Hazare and his movement squarely within a Gandhian lineage' (Khandekar and Reddy 2013: 222).

The crusade got added impetus from 5 April 2011, when Anna initiated a hunger strike to death at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi (Hindustan Times 2011).

These protests were at their greatest intensity between April 2011 to July 2012, with peaks in April, June and August 2011. However, it was not villagers or farmers who were responding in large numbers to the movement for accountability in governance but it was the new Indian middle class. The centres of protest were largely urban and the movement was marked by the absence of public violence like rioting, setting vehicles and private property on fire; *lathi charges*; *bandhs;* and other damages to property that characterises political remonstrations in the Indian context (Menon and Nigam 2011). This was credited to the socio-economic categories of the protestor crowds, a group hitherto considered to be politically indifferent. There was a widespread use of Facebook and Twitter through the course of these show of dissent, #isupportannahazare was a top trending item and protesters were affirming their backing of the movement through lakhs of 'missed calls'. While news reports trumpeted the fact that the middle class was participating, particularly young adults from urban areas comprised notably of highly skilled service sector employees, white collar workers, homemakers and college/university students (Khandekar and Reddy 2013), who constitute the media valorised neoliberally aligned global Indian middle class (Chaudhuri 2010; Menon and Nigam 2011); others (Menon and Nigam 2011; Sitapati 2011) have stressed the much wider boundaries of the middle class with reference to the protester crowds gathering at the venues. According to Menon and Nigam (2011), the 'upper middle class' and 'even just really middle-class people were few and far between, the large majority seemed lower middle class to working class'. Thus not only the middle class but also an upwardly mobile working class aspiring to the media idealized notions of the globalised new Indian middle class powered the Lokpal protests. The class boundaries of the crowds were demarcated by their demands for consumption of goods and services, which included efficient and transparent governance.

According to Khandekar and Reddy (2013) the demands of such consumer citizens for smooth and transparent governance was at loggerheads with the existing disorganized and political state apparatus and aimed at displacing the political public by their civil society counterparts. The program utilized recognizable methods of protest derived from India's anticolonial nationalist movement, especially *satyagraha* to 'displace all other political alternatives put forth, collapsing regional concerns into an overarching national anti-corruption stance premised on the freedom to consume and the promise of a reliable national brand' (Khandekar and Reddy 2013: 225).

Although the post-liberalisation 'Nehruvian middle-class', were the driving force behind the movement, Sitapati (2011: 40) points out to the coalescing of the many intellectual traditions of the middle class around the anti-corruption movement, which also included the 'conservative judiciary', Gandhians and the 'Marxist Left' who opposed the movement. This according to Sitapati (2011) pointed to the heterogeneity of income and values within the new Indian middle class.

Figure 3.1.

Source: Sitapati 2011.

Baba Ramdev, television yoga star, and founder of the Patanjali FMCG group which has a 5000 crore annual turnover (Deccan Chronicle 2016) decided to join Hazare in his fasts, afterwards leading a following round of protests at Ramlila Maidan New Delhi on 4th June 2011. The field was reserved for 40 days for the protests. Arrangements encompassed providing 650 toilets, drinking water and medical facilities, as well as a media centre (Zee News 2011). Almost 32 lakh people hitched on to the movement over the Internet (NDTV 2011). On 5th June, police raids were conducted in Ramlila Maidan in the early hours of the morning, Baba Ramdev was detained and his followers evicted through tear gassing and lathi charges. Fifty-three people were injured in the melee. According to the Delhi Police, Baba Ramdev had permission to hold a yoga camp for 5000 people, not for conducting political protests by 50,000 (The Daily Telegraph 2011).

On 15 August 2011, after visiting Rajghat, Hazare declared he would go on a hunger strike from the next day as the UPA government was bent on passing a diluted toothless version of the Lokpal bill. On 16 August 2011, Section 144, which prohibited the assembly of more than five persons, was imposed at Jayaprakash Narayan Park, Rajghat and Delhi Gate (TOI 2011a). The Delhi Police took into preventive custody 1200 protesters, including Hazare and Team Anna, preventing the former from commencing his hunger strike. He was remanded to Tihar Jail upon refusal to sign a personal bail bond. After a few hours a representative for Hazare informed the media that Hazare had commenced his indefinite fast in jail and would not even drink water. Within hours, a Team Anna spokesperson said that he had begun a hunger protest in custody and was not accepting even water to drink. Such a sequence of events which were denounced by the opposition and some organisations, triggered an outpouring of dissent, forcing adjournment of Parliament for the day (The Hindu 2011). Hazare was released from jail on 19 August 2001(TOI 2011b), and continued his fast for the next nine days, until the government conceded to a voice vote on the debate of the bill with three basic demands of Hazare included in it. Thousands gathered at India gate to celebrate Hazare's triumph (TOI 2011c).

The scrimmage between the IAC and the government continued and Hazare observed a day of protest and fasting in December 2011, March 2012 and June 2012. Another bout of protesting and fasts (this time only for four days) was observed in July-August 2012 (The Economic Times 2012), after which the protests were ended and talks with the government broken off. Following a rift among the members of Team Anna, the Aam Aadmi Party was formed (India Today 2012) which successfully entered the electoral fray in the 2013 Delhi Legislative Assembly election, emerging as the second largest party with victory in 28 of the 70 seats. As no single party had obtained an absolute majority, it formed a minority government with conditional support from the Congress. A crucial component of it agenda, the Jan Lokpal bill was to straightaway introduce the Jan Lokpal bill in the National Capital Territory of Delhi (TOI 2013). After being in government for only 49 days the AAP government resigned as it became clear in the post election scenario that none of the major parties were going to help pass the bill in parliament (The Hindu 2014). In the 2015 Delhi Legislative Assembly election, AAP obtained a majority of 67 out of 70 seats in the assembly and once again formed the government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (TOI 2015).

The rape of a young woman in Delhi on Dec 16, 2012 had also led to huge protests in Delhi. In Delhi the composition of the movement was strikingly similar to that of the anticorruption protests. According to Lukose (2005) citizens exhibit consumer-like behaviour with respect to public goods, demanding quality and consistency. Public citizens also treat safety and security in public spaces as a service that is meant for their consumption (Lukose 2005). Thus the protestors drew disproportionately from the urban middle classes. Public protests occurred in New Delhi on 21 December 2012 at India Gate and near the Parliament and *Rastrapati Bhawan*, the official presidential residence. Thousands of dissenters fought with the police and the Rapid Action Force units were also deployed. Demonstrators were subject to baton charges and repelled by water cannons, tear-gassed and arrested (CNN-IBN 2012; NYT 2012).

3.6.2 *Reformasi and the establishment of Jakarta as the place of mass movements:*

Since the establishment of the JABODETABEK in the mid -1970's and up to the downfall of the Suharto government, there were no significant expressions of political dissent in Jakarta and its peri-urban area despite obvious socio economic and environmental crises. In 1998, a groundswell of demonstrations occurred in Jakarta. After 32 years of Suharto's rule thousands thronged the streets of Jakarta, demanding his resignation. At the forefront of this movement were mainly university students although many Indonesians shared the anger, especially after they were hit by the economic crisis in 1997. Although the regime's corruption was common knowledge for decades, yet a presence of a military dominated government always prompts to crush protests, deterred protesters earlier. A riot ground Jakarta to a halt after five students were killed at a protest at Trisakti University. Protests continued to rock the city in the days after this after Suharto publicly declared on 19th May 1998 that he would not resign. Students overran the parliament buildings complex, even occupying the rooftops. They refused to budge until Suharto tendered his resignation. They cheered jubilantly when Suharto ultimately made a public declaration of his resignation on 21st May 1998. Some students even dived into the pool of the parliament complex in exhilaration. The memory of the Reform Movement of 1998 as it is known remains engraved in the minds of its participants and continues to influence whatever activism they embarked upon later. A lot of activists cut their

teeth through their involvement in this movement, and despite having parted ways after its conclusion, or even joined the new governments that succeeded Suharto's regime,, many still continue with their activist careers.

Social movements in Indonesia were usually framed in terms of state interests during Sukarno's rule, who composed his political statements in nationalist semantics. The most prominent example is that of '*Ganyang Malaysia*' (Down with Malaysia campaign of 1963) where Sukarno called for Indonesians to reject the newly independent state of Malaysia. Social movements in the succeeding Suharto administration were repressed by direct clampdown of the military personnel on protestors who dared to voice their dissent in public. It was a very difficult time for activists as they risked arrest or beatings if they staged protests. Kidnappings of political activists were also commonplace. The abducted activists were often more vocal than others and they usually disappeared without a trace. Thus it was very tough to sustain social movements or resistance at the community level. The first declaration of dissent against the Suharto regime after the momentous economic crises of 1997 was the Voices of Concerned Mothers (*Suara Ibu Peduli*). Fearing their physical safety, the protestors planned two months ahead. Hundred women attended the first preparation meetings, but the number of participants diminished as time passed owing to fear, and only 16 members attended the final protests. This protest by *Suara Ibu Peduli* opened the floodgates, and wave after wave of protests rocked Jakarta, even after he was 're-elected' president in March 1998. The women had demonstrated the possibility of resistance to the military's control over public spaces in the city. The significant coverage of the women's protest event in newspapers, magazines and television prompted student movements to emerge from the underground and from cyberspace, where they already existed, to occupy the streets. The 1998 Reform Movement was the signal moment for the formation of many NGOs and CBOs, which later on became the nuclei of grass roots movements (Padawangi 2011).

Kusno (2010) attributes the establishment of the peri-urban regions of Jabotabek during the Suhato era to the dispossession and depoliticization of peasants. Kusno argues that the peri urban area is the result and strategy of the 'post colonial state's efforts to eliminate the political identity of the peasant and its earlier learnt skills of mass mobilization to form a new subjectivity through multiple occupations and labour mobility' (Kusno 2010: 4). He terms as the 'floating mass' the 'largely

underclass rural–urban migrants who could be turned into productive subjects as long as they refrained from any engagement with politics or political parties' (Kusno 2010: 5). Jakarta faced unprecedented rapid population growth after the establishment of the New Order Regime in 1966 due to rural-urban migration. This was due to both social and political insecurity that was prevalent in the rural areas as well as the lure of jobs in the city. The creation of the Greater Jakarta Region or Jabodetabek, was designed to establish order after the 1965 massacre of people, most of whom were peasants and agricultural labourers who were suspected of having communist ties. In the villages instead of agrarian reform, the Green Revolution and agriculture based industries with the assistance of the government and the private sector had begun to rinse out the communist influences, dismantle the political base of the peasant and prevent any future unrest. This mechanism was enforced in cooperation with the rural elite who was beneficiaries of the process and often kept watch over the countryside in conjunction with the military.

The poor peasants and agricultural labour who had lost the capacity to independently make decisions on their own agricultural base and had been depoliticized could now become what the regime called 'productive labour' for supporting 'national development' wandering between rural and urban areas in search of work   (Kusno 2010:12). Champion and Hugo (2005) calls this peasant's mobility circular migration, where in order to minimize housing costs the drifting peasantry would not build houses in the city and instead move along, sleeping in *kampungs, pondoks*, or in their *becaks* or build temporary shanties. But they were not welcome in town either. Ali Sadikin, the Suharto appointed governor of Jakarta from 1966 to 1977 imposed two measures, firstly the closure of the city to migrants and secondly the state enforced deportation of migrants from the city to the outer islands known as *transmigrasi*. However such measures proved ineffective in stopping rural urban migration, so a "transitional area" or a peri urban between the rural and urban which would serve as a counter-magnet for migrants was planned (Kusno 2010: 18) According to Kusno (2010) it allowed the Governor to retain his control over central Jakarta while allowing the private sector to operate away from the controlled centre. Several World Bank prompted Export Processing Zones (EPZ) were set up in the Botabek area. These were prime locations for the workings of international industrial capitalism, attracted by low labour costs for low-end subcontracted work. This led to the building of industrial clusters surrounding Jakarta that also acted as a sponge for

migrant labour. Over a thousand industries within the city proper were also transferred in 1975 to the peripheries of Jakarta. The peri urban areas of Jakarta thus offered space to exploit incarceral modes of labour control (Kusno 2010). Land acquisition to accommodate large-scale projects also involved 'gangs of thugs' using violence, rape and murder to dislodge lakhs of *kampung* dwellers, tenants and small property-owners (Wilson 2006). In the mid-1980's following the liberalization of the economy that pushed up the growth rate, private investment increased sharply around Jakarta. At the same time Indonesian real estate developers with ties to the ruling families invested heavily in building new towns within the peri-urban area for a growing global and aspirational middle class.

The Asian crises substantially shrank the manufacturing and construction sectors in the Botabek zone resulting in a huge volume of unemployed workers looking for work in the informal service sector in the city proper. Most of the circular migrants who were discharged from their jobs in the periurban factories and the real estate sector, resorted to the informal sector. After *reformasi* they not only displayed their merchandise on the pushcart or under plastic tents like before, they also set up permanent stalls that alternated as their dwellings. According to Kusno (2010) the dispossessed staked their right to the city by taking part in post-Suharto era urban social movements. As there was no more intimidation from a military regime anymore they felt emboldened enough to respond to any threats of eviction from security personnel. However, during the term of Governor Sutiyoso, who was in office from 1997 to 2007, and a former Lieutenant General of Suharto (Bunnel and Miller 2011), 4538 demonstrations of all sizes were staged in Jakarta. The ensuing response was harsh and there were mass evictions taking place during those five years, evicting 78,000 *kampung* dwellers and at least 65000 hawkers (Kusno 2010). He also altered and fenced off Jakarta's national memorials in order to make access to them as symbolic sites of protest more difficult. With the end of dictatorial regimes and greater autonomy being granted to the provinces, a decline in architectural demonstrations of nationalist urbanism (as were characteristic during both the Sukarno and Suharto eras) has occurred. Former public spaces that were markers of Indonesian nationalism have now transformed into spaces for demonstrations to express grievances against the New Order rule. Thus nationalist urban spaces were now the propaganda spaces of Jakarta's revived civil society (Bunnell and Miller 2011).

3.6.3 *Pro-democratization movements and Manila as the space of mass movements:*

Metro Manila has had a distinguished history of political protest and conflict, most prominently the 'People Power 1' and 'People Power 2' demonstrations, and an army mutiny in the heart of Metro Manila in Makati CBD in 2003. By 1983 Marcos's health began to give out, and antagonism towards the regime was on the upswing. As a leadership choice alternate to Marcos and the increasingly powerful New People's Army, Benigno Aquino Jr., returned to Manila on August 21, 1983, but was assassinated as soon as he reached. The murder was widely perceived to be the handiwork of the government and led to enormous anti-government demonstrations (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016) known as the People Power Revolution *(Lakas Ng Bayan)* from 1983 to 1986 (Cruz 2014; Alicea 2011). An independent commission appointed by Marcos concluded in 1984 that high-ranking military officials were responsible for Aquino's assassination. In order to demonstrate the intactness of his popular support, Marcos announced presidential elections to be conducted in 1986. However Corazon Aquino, the widow of Benigno Aquino Jr., the presidential candidate of the opposition emerged a formidable political adversary (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016). Marcos succeeded in defeating Aquino and retaining his office in the elections of February 7, 1986, solely, as was widely reported, through his supporters rigging the elections (Alicea 2011). Marcos' support abroad was already severely undermined, and at home the military now rifted between his and Aquino's supporters. Finally, a tense face-off that between the two sides ended only when Marcos fled the Philippines on February 25, 1986, on the insistence of the U.S. and Corazon Aquino became the President of the Philippines (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016; Cruz 2014). Through the entire turn of events anti-Marcos demonstrations at various symbolic sites of nationalist urbanism in Metro Manila played an important role, such as Rizal Park; along the EDSA ring road girdling the core of Metro Manila, especially between Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame, the two military bases where troops decided to back the anti-Marcos movement and where the protesters gathered to shield them and provide moral support; and Mendiola bridge near the presidential palace. These sites were the sites of fierce and sometimes even deadly brushes between anti – government demonstrators and security forces (Shatkin 2006).

An important category of protestors during the People Power Revolution 1, were the poor and marginal population of Manila, and Corazon Aquino after becoming President tried to bolster her acceptability through the establishment of the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor (PCUP) in 1986 for interaction directly with the office of the President. According to Hutchison (2007: 862) the establishment of the PCUP did 'give proximate, individual representatives of the urban poor a defined, sectoral, position within government that allowed greater access to important departments of social welfare and housing' (Hutchison 2007). The nature of urban poor activism changed according to the context in which they occurred. Once civil society was free to operate without fear of detention and abuse, social movements became less confrontationist towards the government, and more oriented towards bargaining for real gains in housing quality and tenurial security.

Between January 16 and 21 of 2001, a series of protests, popularly referred to as People Power 2, ousted President Joseph Estrada. He rose through political ranks, first becoming the mayor of a Metro Manila municipality, and then becoming a Senator, finally being popularly voted as President in 1998, mainly because of his acceptance among poor voters. However he was viewed with derision particularly by Metro Manila's middle class. People Power 2 was more divisive, with a coalition of the urban middle class, corporates, and a segment of the left, pitted against Estrada's mainly poor and lower middle class following. This motley group staged counter protests that are sometimes referred to as People Power 3 (Hutchison 2007). The hub of these protests was the EDSA shrine, a monument dedicated to the 1986 movement.

In 1993, during the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroya, an army mutiny played out in Makati CBD, during which 296 soldiers of the Philippine Armed Forces occupied a portion of the CBD, accusing the government of corruption and demanding resignations. They also beckoned to the people of Metro Manila to take to the streets as a show of people power might. However the increased use of Makati CBD, as a space for protest and involvement of Makati based urban professionals, signalled that the symbolic urban spaces of globalisation were gaining relevance over the older symbolic urban spaces of national identity and ideals (Shatkin 2006).

3.7 Contestation and the possibilities of counter hegemonic globalizations: Delhi, Jakarta and Manila.

3.7.1 *Civil society and contestation in Delhi:*

The nature of the mobilization against the processes of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2010) in Delhi by the affected populations has been characterised as 'forms of resilience, or sporadic contestation, rather than (well-organized) resistance' (Bautès et al 2013: 390). Such practices range from head-on clashes and street protests to feeble mobilizations propped by civil society organizations. There has also been a concomitant decline in the influence of political society in urban affairs, the domain of non-corporate capital, and an increase in the power of civil society where corporate capital is hegemonic (Chatterjee 2008).

An important observation made by Batra and Mehra (2008) is that prior to the 1990s, slum dwellers received the patronage of most political parties in a bid to nurture their vote banks. The local politicians wanted to be seen leading protests against demolition. However since liberalization, locally elected representatives either remained remote or vanished from public gaze as the demolition comes nearer. Sometimes they may even collude with the authorities or RWAs in the process of demolition. Before the actual demolition, usually a notice is given to the slum *pradhan* (self styled leader or intermediary or informally elected representative) or posted on the walls of the colony, anywhere between two days or two weeks. In some cases the *pradhans* may be summoned by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or DDA to their local office, or even to the local police station, and informed about the impending demolition dates. It is usually accompanied by some kind of cautioning against disruption. The police may take into preventive custody, *pradhans* or other slum leaders to prevent an uprising. In the nights preceding the demolition the police may patrol the area at nights dishing out warnings against resistance (Batra and Mehra 2008; Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008). Even when *pradhans* inform the *jhuggie* dwellers, he may not be taken seriously, as Routray (2013) reports in the case of demolition of Gautam Nagar colony in Delhi in early January 2009. Usually when the squatter residents speak to the *pradhan* to ascertain the legitimacy of the pasted notice, *pradhans* who are often affiliated politically, indicate that they would thwart any demolition attempts. Often threats of eviction were routine attempts on the part of politicians to establish their patronage and power. It was only when final notices were

served and the police asked to vacate the place, that the residents were convinced that the notices were not political gimmicks anymore. The styles of functioning of the pradhans are described as varying between 'patronage', 'solidarity' and at times 'exploitation' (Routray 2013: 2303).

Generally speaking Delhi lacks the presence of efficient grassroots-based organizing among the slum dwellers, to present an effective common response in asserting their basic rights (Kumar 2008; Batra and Mehra 2008; Bautès et al. 2013). It may possibly lead to less inhuman treatment during the eviction and resettlement process at the least or in more forceful communications with bureaucrats (Bautès et al). Kumar's (2008), study of urban social movements in India explains the absence of forceful social movements in cities in terms of the preoccupation of the urban poor in seeking livelihood and resources for sheer survival. Thus they are not able to make time to organise and participate in social movements, even if it is in their direct interest. Further exacerbating the problems of collectivization, according to Milbert (2008), the social relationships inside the slum may be hostile and lacking the solidarity and cohesion characteristic of cities in Latin American countries. Often Delhi slum dwellers happen to be separated by communal divides, between the Muslim and the Hindu communities. They are also divided along the lines of 'the absolute destitute' and 'the relatively well-off' (Milbert 2008: 203). In general the *pradhans*, and the relatively well off residents who may have more than one dwelling to their name may covertly support demolition in the hopes of being allotted more than one plot in the resettlement colonies (Batra and Mehra 2008). Further some families may be completely on their own while others may be connected to social political or economic networks (Milbert 2008). The demolitions are often orchestrated in ways that emphasise lines of division among the slum dwellers. Sometimes divisions are created by way of cut-off dates, or those who may or may not be eligible for resettlement because of their arrival before or after an officially determined cut-off date. It usually the *jhuggies* along main streets, with multiple uses as shops or stalls, who put up the fiercest opposition to being evicted and relocated. Despite their divisions, most *jhuggie* dwellers, with or without the help of CBOs/NGOs attempt to stop/delay demolitions by resorting to litigation, public protests, appealing to politicians and city officials (Batra and Mehra 2008).

Several NGOs are currently active in Delhi slums in the field of child welfare, health, sanitation, education, public awareness and community work. Some of them

are sustained by foreign donors, UN development agencies, a few secular foundations, and sometimes by central or state government or the Municipal Corporation (Milbert 2008). However with regard to slum clearance, policy these NGOs have not made any noteworthy change. There are several reasons for this state of affairs. The attempts to mobilize communities undertaken by NGOs, CBOs or workers' unions in Delhi are random and uncoordinated. There are several NGOs, political organizations or forums of various people's organizations, such as the Lok Raj Sangathan, Sajha Manch, Delhi Shramik Sanghathan, Delhi Janwadi Adhikar Manch, etc. in Delhi. However protests carried out by one organization may not be followed up by others. Despite being organized into coalitions and forums, these are not unified under one umbrella as a synchronized forceful social movement. Even when compared to Mumbai, civil society organizations in Delhi are far less effectual in coordinating resistance by slum dwellers. Thus compared to Delhi, slum dwellers in Mumbai are better organized and better equipped to bargain with public and private actors (Bautès et al 2013).

On the day of demolition the *jhuggies* are cordoned off, and police personnel deployed depending upon the possibilities of violent resistance. However the use of violence of any kind, forcibly trying to stop bulldozers, even stone pelting is very rare in Delhi. Successful aggressive tactics to stop demolitions has been seen only in a handful number of cases. Batra and Mehra (2008) cite the example of a slum in Govindpuri area in South Delhi that stopped demolition twice after 'militant protest' (Batra et al. 2008: 408). It is more customary to see that as the demolition crews arrive early in the morning, residents give in to the inevitability of displacement and salvage as many of their belongings as possible, so that they may be reused at a new site to build their homes. When CBOs and NGOs, and even journalists take up cudgels on behalf of the squatters, they are likely to get being beaten up or detained by the police. The resettlement sites are usually on the fringes of the urban area, at least twenty to forty kilometres away from their original places of livelihood. These sites may be undeveloped rural lands or proposed industrial sites, or near landfills or industrial waste dumps. Therefore these locations have fewer opportunities for work. This situation affects women workers more as they mainly work as domestic labour and the transport costs to reach their place of work would significantly eat into their earnings. As a result many of them drop out of the labour force all together. Thus

apart from shelter, evictions also lead to the loss of earnings and livelihood (Batra and Mehra 2008; Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008; Bhan 2009).

The armoury of NGOs against displacement and inadequate resettlement include protests public meetings, rallies, sit-ins, repelling demolition squads, petitions with the collection of signatures, legal petitions filed in the courts, awareness campaigns (such as the Campaign for the Right to Live with Dignity launched by the Delhi Shramik Sanghathan), empowerment and capacity building among affected people. Although there are some local successes, in most cases the actions of NGOs brought only temporary relief or none at all (Bautès et al 2013). For example the Supreme Court rejected three petitions filed by the Yamuna Pushta evictees with the help of Sajha Manch to stop or at least postpone their eviction in 2004. Other innovative forms of protest such as organizing a rally by 500 school students from Yamuna Pushta facing Rashtrapati Bhavan, beseeching President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam to intercede and postpone their dislodgement till their exams were over, had no effect (Menon-Sen et al. 2008). A survey by Bautès et al. (2013) found the awareness and empowerment campaigns to be only partially successful in their outreach, with the result that many slum dwellers were either not aware of their rights during the eviction or did not get any assistance while going through the formal procedures to get resettlement plots.

To make matters worse, Kumar (2008) reports certain NGOs misappropriating relocation plots when they were engaged by the Slum and *Jhuggie Jhopdi* wing of Delhi Government during the 1990 - 91 "three-pronged strategy" (namely, environmental improvements, *in situ* upgradation and relocation) for dealing with slums, when forty NGOs were identified to participate in the resettlement process. Kumar (2008) also posits that most of the government-partner-NGOs in Delhi behave like external agencies due to their external funding and technical and salaried personnel, thereby failing to locate themselves and the issues within local/national social and political structural context. The NGO sector is also plagued by careerism and increased bureaucratization (Dichter 2003).

However, there are factors that contextualize Delhi as a city that makes contestation more challenging here than in other Indian cities. First, it has the status of a capital city bestowed with statehood, but without the full-fledged powers of the other states. Since there are several agencies with overlapping jurisdictions in Delhi, it makes bargaining with state agencies all the more difficult. Second, in the context of

entrepreneurial urban management strategies and boosterism related to the 2010 Commonwealth Games, housing and livelihood issues of the city's working poor population, as they actually exist and at the level of policy, were displaced to the fringes of the city's socio spatial imaginary. Third, working class movements in the city have lost the support of the middle classes, as the latter increasingly perceive their fortunes tied to that of the corporate sector. The *Bhagidari* programme, the much-vaunted participatory innovation in governance and leitmotif of the government was aimed at rallying the middle class around visions of a 'world class city' and neoliberal models of urban governance. The RWAs on their part have successfully effected slum demolitions by filing PILs in the courts by deploying narratives of pollution, unsanitary conditions, illegality and crime. Fourth, the media, especially the English language media have been instrumental in the construction of the imaginary of the world-class city and in tweaking the public discourse. For example the Times of India ran a twelve week campaign in 2006 termed 'From Walled City to World City' to 'rally Delhiites to make their city world class' by 'creating an emotional bond with the government, corporate sector and leading members of civil society to work jointly towards the goal' (TOI 2006). In 2006, the MCD drive to demolish master plan violating unauthorized constructions and commercial land uses in residential areas by traders (and their accompanying indignation) received extensive and sustained media coverage. But very little was reported about the brutality of the squatter demolitions or the unfairness meted out to the displaced.

3.7.2 *Emerging civil society and contestation in Jakarta:*

By the turn of the new millennium, the last vestiges of the authoritarian regime were gone and Indonesia started to experience a meteoric emergence of civil society that is very vocal and assertive in their demands for an inclusive and environmentally sustainable form of development. The Jakarta Bay Development Project (mentioned earlier in chapter) started to face resistance from issues such as 'social justice' and 'human rights' that was never previously openly articulated. The Jakarta Bay project has not only become a symbol of Jakarta's legacy of authoritarian capitalist development and gentrification in the face of demands of global capital, but it also represents the present-day challenge from its citizens over the distribution of benefits of such development. The reclamation of Pantura was unpopular and

provoked a groundswell of protests, criticisms and litigation. For environmental activists, such as that of the Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Walhi), the project of reclaiming Pantura was antithetical to the well being of the fishing communities in the area. Instead it was for the advantage of the rich who wanted to do business while living there. The environmental and legal activists of Walhi organized protests at the sales office of one of the housing complexes (the Marina Coast Royal Residence) and tried to generate awareness concerning the illegality of the housing complex. They tried to deter potential buyers of the property by informing them that they could be charged for participating in the deterioration of environment and the displacement of fishing communities. During the campaign, the notions of human rights, governance, tradition and environment were set in motion against the megaproject which was accused of breaking laws, causing environmental ruin, displacing communities and destroying livelihoods and furthering exclusivist urban development in an already a deeply unequal city (Kusno 2011a).

The Jakarta Citizens' Forum (Forum Warga Kota Jakarta/FAKTA) was formed in 2000 as a platform for the issues of the urban poor. It states as its objective the - "building of a clean, participatory, and transparent local government in Jakarta". It encourages social justice within the city, attempts to make the welfare of the poor a priority of the authorities, sees to the protection of the human rights of the informal settlers, does capacity building and mobilises the urban poor to assert their right to the city. They project themselves as an "alternative city board" that would serve as a platform for citizens "forgotten" by the lawmakers. The founders of FAKTA were active members of the 1998 Reform movement. Many of the workers at FAKTA were lawyers including the founder, Mr. Azas Tigor Nainggolan. It was instituted in 2000, and the idea behind its formation was to create an "alternative voice" (FAKTA 2011). FAKTA's advocacy consists mainly of helping the poor file lawsuits, providing them organisational support, and information dissemination.

As far as litigational assistance is concerned, FAKTA often provides free legal aid to the poor to fight their court cases. FAKTA helped during filing of lawsuits against Governor Sutiyoso after the floods in 2002 and 2007. Despite the court rulings being against them, which is common in Indonesia as the judicial system often works to protect the rich and powerful, the very act of filing lawsuits against the governor, collective organising, and data collection of the hazards faced by *kampung* dwellers themselves during floods, was an empowering experience. The experiences

served to generate awareness among the poor about the class nature of problems they faced and their right to contest it through litigation (FAKTA 2011).

They try to build partnerships with the media for publicity for themselves and their cause as well as for trying to form a more inclusive media discourse (Padawangi 2011). FAKTA also provides trainings and space for village meetings. They describe their role as providing partnership to hawkers, rag pickers, the differently-abled, marginal communities, pedicab drivers, sex-workers, market workers and street children (FAKTA 2011). They are based in a double storied building in Kalimalang, East Jakarta, and an unidentified benefactor lent this building. They had even started their own community radio in 2007, Suara Warga Jakarta/SWJ (Voices of Jakarta Citizens) that operated out of its headquarters. Its services were however abruptly stopped after frequency appropriation by police radio. The radio operators were from the community itself, trained by FAKTA, often doing it on the side, in their free time after work (Padawangi 2011).

They often try to broaden their support base to include to the middle classes as well. They frame their causes to incorporate the terminology of the popular middle class causes such as Human Rights and have organized protests on Human Rights Day. They also try to bring together on a common platform for several communities who have been at the receiving end of neoliberal urbanization. In cases of protests over human rights abuses, they have often transported the mobilised masses to the DKI Jakarta, where their protest will get greater visibility. It changes the outlook and gives confidence to communities to voice their issues on a national scale and creates active members who provide leadership to their communities on these issues. It empowers them to scrutinize government policy and openly express dissent (Padawangi 2011).

The popularity of urban environmental issues among the middle classes has led to the adoption of a new stratagem of resistance among the poor, of framing their concerns in the language of "participation" and "greening the city". An example of this is the attempts by an NGO, the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), to use the discourse of environmental protection to stall evictions and secure housing rights for the poor in Jakarta. UPC was established on 24 September 1997 in the form of alliance consisting of institutions and individuals, a combination of NGO activists, artists, and professionals such as architects, journalists, anthropologists, and so forth. The diversity of backgrounds is based on an understanding that urban poverty,

which is assumed to be a complex and multi-faceted and is best addressed using a multi-disciplinary approach and the joint team can see things from a different angle, in a holistic unity. The establishment of UPC is a continuation of the activities of the joint work for the poor people in the city of New Jelambar, West Jakarta that it has continued since 1993 when it was organized on a small-scale. In the socio-political context of the first half of the repressive 1990s and the culture of silence and the depoliticization, the organization was small, mainly underground and very cautious. UPC defines itself as a 'non-governmental organization that works with marginalized urban communities with a holistic and participatory approach and put the interests of the people as a top priority. Therefore, urban marginal communities are the main subjects and stakeholders have access to and control over all activities carried out' (UPC 2016).

According to Kusno (2011b: 323) the 'green discourse becomes an accepted form of power, carried out through a system of manipulation and conditioning, that constitutes a productive (rather than a repressive) network for the whole social body'. The UPC deploys the discourse of urban environmentalism to resist eviction by trying the perception of the poor and their dwellings as urban pathologies, and attempts to characterize as deserving residents of the city possessing their own capabilities and effective means of participating in sustainable urbanisation processes. They have also trained urban poor communities in techniques of waste management and landscaping to improve the quality of their micro-environment and for the city as a whole. Such image building of squatters as environmentally sustainable communities is often the preliminary step to preventing eviction. Often these attempts to, and actual adoption of environmentally sustainable practices by the poor in the city receive no support from the administration and their efforts are frequently disregarded. This was the case of a neighbourhood in an informal settlement cluster in Muara Kapuk in North Jakarta. This neighbourhood offered to process fertilizer from the city's waste and supply it to the agency dealing with its parks and gardens. It proposals were however turned down. Thus despite successfully casting their image within the environmental discursive mould and reaching out with proposals to engage in participatory green governance, they were unable to gain the status of legitimate urban citizens. However this example demonstrates the potency of the urban environmentalism, and other pet issues of the middle classes, as discursive tools that could be used by CBOs and NGOs to successfully counter the main antipathies towards slums, as polluters and as

environmental hazards. In this case the UPC went so far as to suggest that the city government change its policy to the advantage of the poor as they were better placed at the ground level to engage in environmental improvement work once adequately trained in waste management and sustainable housing practices (Kusno 2011b). Thus the green discourse can be reworked by the urban poor, with help of experts and activists provided by NGOs, to put forth a new front of contestation against neoliberal urbanism.

After the global economic recession of 2008, known as *krisis global* sparked a wave of 'anti-*neoliberalisme*' discourses in mainstream Indonesian politics. Although the economic crisis of *krisis global* of 2008 may have been smaller when compared to the *krismon*, *neoliberalisme* came to acquire politically negative overtones. During the run up to the presidential elections of 2009, such negative sentiments were tapped into by opponents of the incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whom the opposition criticised as being a 'neoliberal' (Bunnell and Miller 2011).

For Yunianto (2014), the transformation of Jakarta can be attributed not only to the operation of vaguely defined global forces and neo-liberal practices. It is also through the indispensable hybridities consisting not only of local practices of the city government, and developers, (who behave as a syndicate), but also of the slum dwellers whose lives and quotidian activities provide continual passive contestation, as they continue to fight for a foothold in the city in the search for employment and a better quality of life. He calls it the 'politics by ordinary people attempting to interrupt the official mode of ordering the urban space they inhabit' (Yunianto 2014: 117). It draws references from the concept of minoritarian politics of Beyes and Steyaert (2011). While the politics of the rich and middle class actors attempt to sustain existing structural inequalities, the questioning and complaining of the poor and dispossessed is viewed as attempts to change power relations in their favour. The main achievement of their politics is placing dilemmas in front of the formal course of actions, disrupting and questioning the dominant order of official business. 'They contest the dominant narratives of what Jakarta is or ought to be. Alternatives are thereby enacted which have the potential to denaturalize the hegemonic notions that constitute conventional models of assessing and using urban land' (Yunianto 2014: 117).

The evicted in responding to threats to their own survival sometimes resort to physical clashes with the police, public order officials, and the *preman*. Such

confrontation often involves brandishing sticks, knives and brickbats, stone pelting, physically obstructing the pathway to the settlements, and setting fire to tyres. The authorities gear up in helmets, riot shields, and protective vests, and use baton charges, water cannons and tear-gassing. Police and public order officials also wear protective helmets with faceguards and protective padding, and have riot shields for protection (Human Rights Watch 2006). The displaced use their anger, fear and pain, to enact spaces ordered in a counter hegemonic logic, where different ways of organizing a part of the urban world are articulated and practiced. The minor politics of the *kampung* dwellers show how alternative cities are constantly enacted. Although urban redevelopment projects are designed and built as a particular form, its essence continues to be questioned. New spaces for action are continuously created as old ones are blocked. Through their relentless everyday tactics of resistance and claim making to the place, *kampung* dwellers stake their claims to and redefine the places in question. Their refusal to be evicted or displaced from their homes leads to the alternative imaginings and alternate demonstrations of the place. Such expression contests the seemingly natural uses of urban space and multiplies the definitions, uses and functions of urban spaces. Like the urban growth machine they try to insert themselves in the transformation of urban space and thereby shape the trajectories of urban development projects. Ultimately, it leads to a 'complex, overlapping and disjunctive' urban spatial order (Appadurai 2003:53).

3.7.3 *The proliferation of civil society organisations in Manila and its implications:*

The Philippines have a higher number of civil society organizations per capita than any other country in Asia. The ousting of Ferdinand Marcos through the exercise of peaceful civil disturbance is one of the late 20th century's most celebrated instances of political change. However, civil society in Manila (and in Philippines in general) which includes CBOs, NGOs and CBO federations, have had to deal with a new set of challenges presented by political decentralization that was mandated through the passage of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which devolved responsibility for planning and the provision of most basic services to Local Government Units (LGUs). The LGC has important consequences for low-income communities, as it devolves responsibility for land use planning and the

implementation of housing programs to local governments (Shatkin 2007; Porio et al 2004). In keeping with this objective the LGUs had by the late 1990s, an infusion of 70,000 personnel from the national government. They were also allocated 40 per cent of national government revenue, and have also been granted greater powers to raise revenue through taxes, fees, and charges. The LGC instructed the creation of local government councils at the level of the city and municipality, and barangay development councils at the level of the barangay (neighbourhood or village). Local development councils are entrusted with the formulation of socioeconomic development plans and policies, and public investment plans; while barangay development councils are responsible for mobilizing participation by local populations in implementing these plans, and monitoring and evaluating the progress of implementation. According to the LGC, NGOs and POs (Peoples Organisations) must constitute a minimum of 25 percent of both barangay and local development councils (Shatkin 2007). This participatory approach aiming to empower the community is also seen in the establishment of the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), already discussed in Chapter Two.

These reforms were welcomed by a civil society that was receiving an influx of talented individuals as many underground members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), who were previously engaged in waging an insurgent war against the government since the early 1970s, left the movement to engage in development work and political organizing. CBO federations and NGOs are a heterogeneous lot who can be distinguished according to their approaches. Variegation started with a rift that occurred in the mid-1970s between the national democrats and the social democrats. The social democrats had their origins in the mainly church-based efforts at community organizing that began in the early 1970s (Shatkin 2007). Greater engagement of informal settlers with church based organisations and activists started to take place with the Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican putting forward the lived experiences of the poor as an important part of the messages of the gospel within the Catholic Church in 1962 – 1965, thus according greater priority to social justice over charity (Hutchison 2007). The social democrats were trained in Alinsky-style organizing as provided by the Philippine Ecumenical Council on Community Organizing (PECCO). In the Alinsky method, organizers first ask community residents to identify the concerns within the community and then coach them to solve their problems. Residents gradually engage in addressing more critical issues till they

confront the most intractable issues like tenurial security, and the social, economic and political barriers to legal housing. In the process the communities gain greater political awareness and start organising politically at the community level, making them better placed to contest the dominant order. Today, social democratic organizations generally advocate the need for political reforms for equity, democracy, and local autonomy. Their organizing strategy by and large emphasizes participatory democracy and community self-help. In Metro Manila, these organizations have organized communities to participate in the CMP and other community-based improvement projects, to engage in political campaigns for legislative change, and to organize CBO participation in local government (Shatkin 2007). Thus the 1970s marked the initial stages of the success of urban poor mobilization in gaining a response from the state that went beyond personal favours granted by local politicians, at a time when political patronage was becoming more centralized; a trend that strengthened in 1972 with Marcos' declaration of martial law (Hutchison 2007).

During the Marcos era, national democrats generally found ideological affinities with the CPP, and its tactics of Maoist uprising. Since 1986, however, many national democrats have espoused a greater engagement in the mainstream politics, and the movement has split into two main groups, which are popularly known as the 'reaffirmists' and 'rejectionists'. The 'reaffirmists' stress the fundamental importance of the rural insurgency that had fuelled the movement since the early 1970s and stay away from mainstream organizing. The 'rejectionists' on the other hand believe that socialist transition can be accomplished through mainstream, issue-based organizing and participation in political processes (Rocamora 1994, in Shatkin 2007: 43). Shatkin (2007) identifies three levels of community organizing in Metro Manila. At the first level, the community has a set of informal leaders who intermediate between the government and the community in issues such as the delivery of infrastructure and services, and in times of eviction. These local leaders also bring together dwellers to undertake minor community improvements through self-help efforts. These leaders are often people who are perceived to have some degree of political influence, such as local businesspeople, civil servants, or elected officials such as barangay councillors. Barangay and city or municipal elected officials in exchange for government assistance in local improvements or personal favours, may ask the informal leaders to mobilize the vote within the community in their favour. At the next level of organizational development are CBOs with a set of elected leaders and possibly by-

laws to manage the working of the CBO. The 'formalization' of the CBO in this manner usually occurs in response to some looming external threat such as demolition or opportunities presented by new government schemes that incentivize better coordinated and consistent collective action. CBO federations and NGOs may play a key part in nudging the communities to organize more formally by bringing to light the news of imminent demolition and the ways to improve collective action. At the third level of organizational development the CBO is characterized by greater stability and coherence in its activities. The CBO participates in a defined set of improvement projects, holds regular elections and the organization has created linkages with external actors such as government agencies or NGOs who are important sources of funding and technical assistance. Umbrella bodies of CBOs who represent a large number of squatter settlements in their engagements with LGUs or national governments are called 'CBO federations' (Shatkin 2007:47). They vary from NGOs in drawing their membership directly from the communities that they represent and as such have greater credibility in their constituency. NGOs may help in their formation and stabilisation, supplying them with resources, training and direction. Sometimes, NGO advisors for all intents and purposes become the proxy leadership of these organizations (Shatkin 2007).

Philippine NGOs as a sector are 'heterogeneous and have conflicting political and strategic orientations' (Clarke 2006: 97) The NGO community in Philippines can be divided into two types based on whether they are membership organizations or agencies/institutions providing some kind of service which reflects such types globally. Since the end of authoritarian rule, the term 'Peoples Organisations' (POs) has become a broad term including mainly a range of traditional organizational structures such as trade unions, peasants associations or rural cooperatives. NGOs on the other hand are a more recent creation dating back from the 1970s. The role of NGOs in the anti-authoritarian movement and their increased role in social welfare provision after decentralization reforms gave them great legitimacy among Filipinos (Clarke 2006). Hutchison (2007) recognises both their contributions to the urban informal settler's movement, as well as their failures to bring about a meaningful change in the political economy that produces a large volumes of squatters:

'Through extensive mobilizations, committee hearings, and private meetings with legislators and their staff, the urban poor were able to push through legislation that had previously languished in the committee system. This saw the passing of the

Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA), giving squatters' struggles for land some legal protections (and hence legitimacy), but without any real mechanisms for land redistribution or steps to address the tax laws that encourage land hoarding; and, as well, there was no concomitant repeal of an old Marcos-era law that criminalized squatting.' (Hutchison 2007: 864).

However, as they have become key actors in development, politicians have increasingly used such organizations to further their own political ambitions, and businesses have used NGOs for financial gain. Clarke (2006) presents a typology of NGOs as: BONGOs (Business Organised/Oriented NGOs); COME N'GOs (fly by night or paper NGOs); GRINGOs (government run or inspired NGOs); DJANGOs (development, justice, and advocacy NGOs); FUNDANGOs (philanthropic NGOs); MUNGOs (mutant NGOs) and TANGOs (traditional NGOs). However the distinction between POs and NGOs are blurring with NGOs promoting membership and POs employing professional staff, formalizing and also accessing funding directly without NGO involvement (Clarke 2006).

In the context of continuing globalization and privatization of planning, large scale projects often face resistance from a number of sources including formal party political channels and civil society. The NGO sector spans a range between 'apologetic', 'liberal' and 'liberative' (David 2007: 7) and, alliances of between NGOs and CBOs have emerged in many places for ensuring the legal constraints on eviction are not violated and that relocation takes place in a manner that does not compromise the livelihoods and socio-economic progress of the squatters. Such 'right of way' issues have deferred several infrastructure projects, and in some cases investors have retreated as a result (Shatkins 2008: 398)

Such a proliferation of civil society has also been criticised in many studies. Hutchison (2007: 853) characterizes the flourishing of civil society after the reestablishment of democracy in the Philippines as a means of politically coopting the poor and connaturalizing extra-parliamentary oppositions. It effectively formalises the World Bank and ADB strategy of self-help, reduces the entitlements of the poor and fails to give equitable access to state resources or protection. Thus such institutional reform after the restoration of democracy has reinforced neo-liberal approaches to problems like shelter and tenurial security as it proposes market inclusion as the solution (Hutchison 2007). As LGUs have authority over the official recognition of NGOs and POs for participation in local and barangay development councils, and

standards for accreditation are not uniform for all LGUs; some organizations have been denied a participatory role based on their ideological positions, and the process has in many cases favoured organizations with political connections. In Metro Manila, the constituents of local and barangay development councils vary between cities and municipalities where in some places CBOs/NGOs engaging with squatters have obtained seats in the councils, while in others elite organizations such as the Rotarians and the Lions Club have found their way inside the councils (Shatkin 2007).

Following democratization and decentralization, mayors of cities in Philippines who are connected to the any of the elite business and political families have resorted to 'networked government practices' (Porio 2012: 7), which have enabled them to retain their stranglehold on local power structures. According to Porio (2012) a recasting of existing power structures has occurred through decentralisation strategies and discourses. In the changed political context of democratic reforms, elected mayors who are in most cases associated with the traditional elite families, are institutionally enabled to keep the electorate from getting too dissatisfied. The continued influence of their respective political families and the affiliated socio political and economic networks is ensured through: (a) networks of allied CSOs and/or GROs through community organising and activation of community-based groups and NGOs that facilitate participation and support; (b) forming of growth coalitions with partners in the private sector to implement the projects of the mayor and the ruling party and to mobilize the necessary finances; (c) institutionalization of regulatory frameworks, permit systems, fees and taxations and resource mobilisation strategies within; (d) linking allied actor networks (from community, private sector and civil society) with the afore mentioned regulatory practices into a set of decentralised and democratic governance practices like consultations, public hearings, participation and consensus-building in decision-making regarding the implementation of policies and programmes. Thus while decentralization has enabled better delivery of services, which is its professed objective, from the point of view of democratization, it has actually been used to strengthen the traditionally privileged and their allied power bases in civil society and the business sector (Porio 2012). Furthermore, the failure of many local governments to comply with national government regulations concerning the provision of low-income housing and the rights of informal settlers in cases of eviction indicate political resistance to cooperation with CBOs.

Vast shantytowns are found all over Manila, squalid, poverty stricken and with high levels of morbidity. Clustered along railway lines and tottering hazardously over dirty canals or *esteros*, even cemeteries house squatters atop graves. Most evictions are violent (Santolan 2011; The Manila Times 2014; Habitat International Coalition 2007). The resident's violent resistance, lead the police to resort to use truncheons, tear gas and water cannons during evictions. The residents may do stone pelting or throwing Molotov cocktails. The shanties are often scorched down or razed to the ground by bull-dozers. Sometimes the administration has also reported sent snipers to rooftops, their weapons trained on the crowd below. Such evictions have been variously justified as efforts to increase the Philippines food production and to create "farm-treneurs" (Santolan 2011), greening the city and improving sanitation (the Manila Times 2014). The displaced squatters are relocated onto undeveloped lands and told to make a living for themselves.

3.8   Conclusion

Since the 'transnational capitalist class' and 'the growth coalition' is difficult to define as a category and an amorphous class, it is more useful to take an actor centric approach to conclude and summarise the comparison of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila as 'neoliberal forms of creative destruction' (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009: 57). The role of four main actors can be compared in the three cities under consideration: Real estate developers, corporate actors, civil society and an aspiring new middle class.

First, in the post-liberalization period *real estate developers* have emerged as powerful intermediaries of national and local government urban development agendas. In Manila this has been the trend since the 1950's due to the oligarchical nature of land ownership by a few Chinese mestizo aristocratic families. Although this was a legacy of Spanish and American colonial rule, it has gained tremendous momentum since 1986 after democratization, decentralization and further liberalization reforms, and in the quest to attain 'Asian Tiger Economy' status. In Jakarta real estate developers, particularly of ethnic Chinese origin became influential since the 1980's after renewed liberalization, export oriented industrialization and the practice of granting unrestrained granting of land permits to real estate developer was started During the New Order government of Suharto. In India, the waves of

liberalization since 1991 (actually started in the late 1980's under the Rajiv Gandhi government) has seen the spawning of the majority of the top real estate companies currently operating in Delhi – NCR, as well the dramatic rises in value of many big construction companies, with a lot of companies going public since the mid 2000s. Developers have been instrumental in the development of entire new urban landscapes in the periurban belts within the metropolitan area characterised by weak planning regulation, such as in Gurgaon and Noida outside Delhi.

Second, *corporate actors* have emerged as increasingly powerful agents in India, as state governments who are locked in a competition soliciting private investment, have catered to their needs in urban development. State governments have also forcefully acquired land to provide space for corporate offices and for industrial needs. This greater proximity between state and business is now a part of official government policy legitimised through public private partnerships or PPPs (Weinstein et al. 2014), and in the case of Delhi is illustrated in the case of the B-O-T (Build Own Transfer) PPP of the Delhi Gurgaon Expressway. In Jabodetabek the influence of corporate actors is seen in the emergence of mega-projects devoted to global business hubs, malls and commercial services in the core and massive suburban new towns in the periphery of the city. Infrastructure projects were favoured to be BOTs during the New Order Period but many got delayed due to the financial crises and regime change of 1997-98. The public sector and other foreign government firms, in a government-government collaboration rather than government-corporate collaboration, including with the Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA) (Arditya 2012) and Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) (Business Standard 2012), currently undertake large infrastructure projects such as the Jakarta MRT jointly. Other infrastructure projects the Jakarta Bandung High Speed Rail is being implemented with the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited (CRCC) (Yahoo News and AFP 2015). In Metro Manila the real estate developers and the corporate actors are playing a leading role in the evolution of the urban space in the absence of any substantial public planning since the 1950's. Three examples: of Ayala Land, the Manila Metro Rail Transit Line – 7 and Fort Bonifacio Global City demonstrate the developers attempts to define the contours of the entire metropolitan region itself for the sake of corporate profit, the privatization of planning and the key role played by the government in the emergent urban form as it enters into PPP with developers to construct a world class integrated megaproject.

Third, coinciding though not always as a result of decentralization reforms, *civil society* organizations (like CBOs, NGOs and RWAs) have emerged in varying degrees as significant forces in governance. India (under the 74th Constitutional Amendment), Indonesia (under Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999) and Philippines (Local Government Code of 1991) have been experiencing decentralization reforms since 1992, 1999, and 1986 respectively. Decentralization in India and Indonesia is much more of an administrative decentralization rather than a fiscal decentralization. The central government continues to control a vast share of the revenues required for local governance than would be the case under true decentralization. In case of Philippines however decentralization has devolved responsibility for planning and the provision of most basic services to Local Government Units (LGUs). This led to the infusion of both personnel and 40 per cent of national government revenue from the national government to the LGUs. They have also been granted greater powers to raise revenue through taxes, fees, and charges. The LGC 1991 instructed the creation of local government councils at the city, municipality, and barangay levels. Further according to LGC 1991, NGOs and POs (Peoples Organisations) must constitute a minimum of 25 per cent of local development councils

In Delhi RWAs of middle class colonies comprises a large segment of civil society and these associations have facilitated the capture of the governance processes by the privileged, notably through the *Bhagidari* programme aimed at achieving greater public participation in governance. Civil society organisations of the rich and middle classes have also been instrumental in allowing greater judicial intervention in urban affairs. The courts have also emerged as key players as their decisions which are generally in response to public interest litigations (PIL) filed by the civil society organisations of middle and high-income groups, have ordered the relocation of industries, slum demolitions and ruled on the use of CNG as fuel in public transportation among other things. In Jakarta in post–authoritarian Indonesia, community-based urban initiatives have been encouraged in the process of urban governance. In this system, the role of the government is largely limited to enabling and rewarding community-based urban initiatives like the 'Clean and Green Jakarta' campaign. As the last vestiges of the authoritarian regime dissolved, Indonesia has experienced a meteoric rise of a civil society that is very vocal and assertive in their demands for an inclusive and environmentally sustainable form of development. Examples include NGOs like The Jakarta Citizens' Forum (Forum Warga Kota

Jakarta/FAKTA) that puts forth the interests of the poor citizens forgotten by lawmakers and provides free legal aid, moral support, and information. With the emergence of the green discourse, attempts have been made to shape a new style of resistance recast in the language of participation in the greening of the city. Such a strategy is evident in the conscious attempts of the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), an NGO to use the discourse of the environment to stop squatter demolitions and fight for the right to the city of the urban poor. However evictions of squatters continue to occur.

Manila has a very active civil society that is heterogeneous and has conflicting political and strategic orientations. The role of NGOs in the anti-authoritarian movement and their increased role in social welfare provision after decentralization reforms gave them great legitimacy among Filipinos and in Metro Manila. Decentralisation reforms were welcomed by a civil society that was receiving an influx of talented individuals as many underground members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which had waged an insurgent war against the government since the early 1970s, left the movement to engage in development work and political organizing and they comprise the national democrats. The Catholic Church has also been very influential in community organization among the social democrats. The scale of community organizing ranges from an informal community leadership to large CBO federations and professional NGOs. They were able to push through the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) that was previously languishing in the committee system, imparting a measure of legal protection to the housing entitlements of the urban poor. However no real mechanism was put in place for land redistribution or reformation of tax laws that have encouraged land hoarding. There has also not been any repeal of the Marcos-era law that criminalised the building of squatter settlements. Thus evictions have not stopped. However, as they have become key actors in development, politicians have increasingly used such organizations to further their own political ambitions, businesses have used NGOs for financial gain and there has been a recasting of existing power structures through decentralisation strategies and discourses.

Fourth, attempts at enclavisation by the *middle classes* essentially represent the circumstances of global capitalism that supports the unhindered flow of capital across borders to make investments in the built environment in order to encapsulate its presence and reinforce its benefits. The effects of new and growing middle class in

Jakarta was manifested in the mushrooming of low density new towns with western sounding names on fringes of JMA in 1980s and 1990's, which nevertheless continues today but at a slower pace. The main lure of these dwelling units for the upper classes and the emergent aspirant middle class was the promise of a modern, western, segregated and gated life style with private security. Although they were advertised as creating self-contained communities, new towns have ended up becoming bedroom suburbs for city-bound commuters. The presence of the middleclass is also influential in the case of schemes such as the Green Jakarta Movement, where engagement with the 'citizen groups' means mainly with taxpaying middle class communities. The lexicon of green has truly entered the real estate markets that have enabled, in an ironic twist, developers with the worst histories of environmental abuse to 'greenwash' projects and develop 'green properties' (Kusno 2011). In Manila too the growth of the middle class has led to gentrification and segregation in the new suburbia. Gated communities have proliferated, fortified by high walls and gates, latest surveillance equipment and guarded by private security, which not only protects residents from crime but also keeps away informal land uses.

In Delhi, the middle class has largely embraced an ideological position that moves back and forth between sociopolitical illiberalism and market liberalism, and is refracted onto the urban terrain as a discursive politics of environmentalism that Baviskar (2004) calls 'bourgeois environmentalism'. The politics seemingly arose with the aim of relocating polluting units outside city limits, when M. C. Mehta a Magsaysay Award winning legal expert, took initiative in this case. Narrow definitions of urban livability have been moulded by the emergence of a model of consumer-citizenship that attempts to restrict the political claims of marginalised social groups to resources such as jobs and housing within urban spaces. It is a very exclusive articulation of the right to the city. The increasingly vocal and assertive middle class in Delhi have overseen hundreds of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) filed by the Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) of the middle class colonies in different courts requesting the removal of slums from their vicinities. Terms such as 'residents', 'citizens', 'law abiding taxpaying citizen', 'encroacher', 'illegal habitants' and 'nuisance' are frequently used in the narrative of RWAs. Since most of the squatting takes place on public land all the petitions are made out in 'public interest', although it serves to only improve the property values of nearby planned colonies. Most of the land that lies vacated after the demolition of informal settlements lies

unused. The prices of vacated land parcels are higher, and they are then used for the construction of houses for high-income groups or for upscale shopping malls, plush office spaces or new roads. The poor were portrayed as polluters who were destroying the Yamuna riverbed and the Yamuna Pushta forced evictions led to the clearing of the area on which the Commonwealth Games Village was constructed. It was later converted into high-class apartments. Rather than seeing slums as desperate measures of poor rural migrants for shelter and survival, the courts have interpreted them as the usurpation of large areas of public land free of cost. Ironically, although the rich have also unauthorizedly grabbed land in Delhi, which unofficially is said to be far more than that by the poor, it does not invite similar references of illegality, criminality and unsustainability.

Finally we come to the question: are the mega urban regions of Delhi Jakarta and Manila sites of collision between a aggressive neoliberal offensive against informality (Ortega 2016) on the one hand; and 'increasingly coherent, yet still fragile and contradictory movements for new kinds of citizen power and social justice' (Holston 2009: 245) on the other? Have the everyday struggles of poor residents of mega cities for basic housing and services also engendered new movements of insurgent citizenship based on the right to the city? If such movements exist are they significant enough to confront macro forces that determine political power in the city, and therefore able to generate structural change in power relations? Macroeconomic globalization in India, Indonesia and Philippines have also coincided with a slew of decentralization initiatives of the government, which are significantly informed by the good governance discourses of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Such initiatives have also served to legitimize the role of CBOs and NGOs for the development of the cities in an inclusive manner, yet it is worth questioning whether such institutional reform has reinforced neo-liberal approaches to problems like shelter and tenurial security as it proposes market inclusion as the solution

The evolution of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila, as the spaces of insurgent citizenship is traced through the trajectory and the nature of recent mass movements in these cities. Jakarta and Manila have in common the characteristic of the being the most important places where pro-democratization movements against oppressive authoritarian regimes (tacitly supported by the US) took place in 1998 and 1986 respectively. Although Delhi does not share such a history in the post independence period, yet all three cities have parallels in the form of mass mobilizations in the post

decentralization and liberalization period: as eruptions against rampant corruption and poor governance. The growing presence of urban professionals and the uses of newer venues of protest apart from the traditional symbolic spaces of modernist nationalism show that the older symbolic urban spaces of national identity and ideals were declining in relevance in the age of globalisation.

In Delhi, two events of mass protests: the anti-corruption movement of 2011 and the Nirbhaya rape protests of 2012, took place both in the traditional symbolic places of national identity in the national capital such as Jantar Mantar, India Gate, Raisina hill, Rajghat, as well as in more plebeian venues such as Ramlila Maidan. The foot soldiers of this movement were mainly the new Indian middle class. The centres of protest were largely marked by the absence of public violence. This is because largely the urban middle classes today, people civil society in India that tries to affirm to normative models of bourgeoise civil society and is the domain in which capitalist ideals are hegemonic (Chatterjee 2008). The novelty of this middle class can be attributed to its eager acceptance of global tastes and consumption of commodities whose cultural expressions are explicitly linked with liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy. However, the boundaries of the new middle class are open and appear accessible to the urban working class population. Thus the Lokpal protests were powered by not only the middle class but also the working class, aspiring to the media idealized notions of the globalised new Indian middle class. Narrow definitions of urban livability are produced through the mobilisations of citizens as *consumers* of civic amenities, and through the delegitimisation of the claims of political society within urban spaces. The adoption of structural adjustment programs since the early 1990s has caused the reconfiguration of the identity of the middle classes as consumers, including the consumption of public space, property, and governance. Thus the class boundaries of the protestor crowds were better defined by their demands for consumption of goods and services, which included efficient and transparent governance.

In May 1998, a groundswell of demonstrations occurred in Jakarta; where people marched on the streets demanding President Suharto's resignation. During these protests public spaces that were markers of Indonesian nationalism were transformed into spaces for mass protests and now they have become the propaganda spaces of Jakarta's revived civil society. The *Reformasi* was germinal to a budding civil society and many individuals started their careers in advocacy in that phase. It

was followed by the genesis of many NGOs and CBOs representing grass roots level mobilization. By the turn of the new millennium, the last vestiges of the authoritarian regime were gone and Indonesia started to experience a meteoric emergence of civil society that is very vocal and assertive in their demands for an inclusive and environmentally sustainable form of development. The politics of this emergent civil society impedes the official course of actions, and disrupts and questions the dominant order of official business.

Metro Manila has had a distinguished history of political protest and conflict, most prominently the 'People Power 1' and 'People Power 2' demonstrations, and has experienced a minor army mutiny in the heart of Metro Manila in Makati CBD in 2003. An important category of protestors during the People Power Revolution 1, were the poor and marginal population of Manila, and Corazon Aquino after becoming President tried to bolster her acceptability through the establishment of the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor (PCUP) in 1986 for interaction directly with the office of the President. The nature of urban poor activism changed according to the context in which they occurred. Once civil society was free to operate without fear of detention and abuse, social movements became less confrontationist towards the government, and more oriented towards bargaining for real gains in housing quality and tenurial security.

Between January 16 and 21 of 2001, a series of protests, popularly referred to as People Power 2, ousted President Joseph Estrada on charges of corruption and inefficiency. However, People Power 2 was more divisive, with a coalition of the urban middle class, corporates, and a segment of the left, pitted against Estrada's mainly poor and lower middle class following. There were counter protests by the latter that is sometimes referred to as People Power 3. While during People Power 1, the symbolic sites of nationalist urbanism in Metro Manila played an important role, however the increased use of Makati CBD, as a space for protest and involvement of Makati based professionals symbolises the growing influence of the spaces of globalisation in shaping national demands.

The strategies adopted by dwellers of informal settlements and the role of civil society organizations who come to their aid are compared next. The evicted of Jakarta often physically battle the eviction entourage consisting of the police, public order officials, and the *preman*. A common feature of all three cities is the growing influence of civil society organizations and middle class discourses. This includes the

concern regarding the degradation urban environment that Baviskar (2006) calls 'bourgeoise environmentalism' and criminalisation of the urban poor. In response, some leading NGOs in Jakarta have tried to broaden the support base of the urban poor to include to the middle classes as well. Framing their cause to incorporate the terminology of the popular middle class causes such as Human Rights and organizing protests on Human Rights Day attempt this. With the emergence of the green discourse attempts have been made to put up a new front of resistance recast in the semantics of participation in the greening of the city. They have also trained the urban poor communities in environmentally sustainable housing, waste management and landscaping practices, in an effort towards changing the thinking that the poor and their dwellings are an urban pathology and tries to portray them as populations with individual capacities and as co-participants in green governance. NGOs also provide free legal aid to the poor for the filing of court cases when their rights are violated, and the very act of filing lawsuits against the government and of collecting of data of their ordeals, serve as an exercise of empowerment and awareness. Some NGOs also try to build partnerships with the media for publicity for themselves and their cause as well as for trying to form a more inclusive media discourse.

By contrast in Delhi, movements for the right to the city by the poor are better described as strategies of endurance, and intermittent contestation, rather than well-organised resistance. Such practises range from rare instances of physical confrontations and street demonstrations to the feeble mobilisations enabled by civil society organisations. The use of violence of any kind, forcibly trying to stop bulldozers, even stone pelting is very rare in Delhi, although on the day of demolition the *jhuggies* are cordoned off, and police personnel deployed depending upon the possibilities of violent resistance. It is more customary to see that as the demolition crew arrive early in the morning, residents giving in to the inevitability of displacement and salvaging as many of their belongings as possible, so that they may be reused at a new site to build their homes. When CBOs and NGOs, and even journalists take up cudgels on behalf of the squatters, they are likely to get being beaten up or detained by the police. Although some NGOs have helped the displaced communities file petitions in courts yet they have had temporary or no effect in stopping demolitions given the nature of judicial interventions in urban governance since the 1990s. Other innovative forms of protest such as organising a demonstration by school students from Yamuna Pushta in front of Rashtrapati Bhawan, beseeching

the President to postpone the evictions until after their exams have not succeeded. Generally speaking Delhi lacks the presence of efficient community level organising among slum dwellers, thus they are unable to present an effective common response to displacement, despite being citizens of a stable democracy with very few hindrances to such activities. The attempts to mobilise communities undertaken by NGOs or workers unions in Delhi are largely random and uncoordinated. There are several NGOs, community organisations and forums, however others may not follow up resistance work done by some organisation. Despite being organised into coalitions and forums, these are not unified under one umbrella as a powerful single social movement. Even the awareness and empowerment campaigns are only partially successful in their outreach, with the result that many slum dwellers were either not aware of their rights during eviction or left without assistance to negotiate the administrative procedures necessary to obtain a plot in a resettlement colony. The informal settlers of Delhi are not better organized and prepared to negotiate with public and private stakeholders even when compared to other Indian megacities such as Mumbai. Another hurdle to mass resistance is that often Delhi slum dwellers themselves happen to be a divided lot, between the Muslim and the Hindu communities and between the completely impoverished and the relatively better-off households. Although there is an increasing presence of civil society in Delhi, but it is dominated by the elite and middle classes who are turning increasingly intolerant of the urban poor and informality. The rise of civil society has been at the expense of political society, which explains the increasing disempowerment of the urban poor.

After the fall of Marcos, civil society in Manila which includes CBOs, NGOs and CBO federations, have had to deal with a new set of challenges presented by political decentralization that was mandated through the passage of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which devolved responsibility for planning and the provision of most basic services to Local Government Units (LGUs). According to the LGC, NGOs and POs (Peoples Organisations) must constitute a minimum of 25 percent of both barangay and local development councils. This approach has however also been described as the formalization of self-help and of is accused of blocking the urban poor's to access to state resources and protection as a justiciable right. Manila (and Philippines in general) has a very active civil society organized at many levels starting from informal leaders who intermediate between the government and the community in issues such as the delivery of infrastructure and services, and in times

of eviction; to stable and formal CBOs with an elected leadership, often converging in umbrella bodies of CBOs who represent a large number of squatter settlements in their engagements with local governments. There are also aided by professional NGOS who help in community organizing. While decentralization has enabled a better delivery of services in Manila, democratization has often been subverted as the traditional elites and their allied power bases in civil society and the business sector have used decentralisation to strengthen their positions. The flourishing of civil society has not been able to stop illegal evictions. Most evictions in Manila are violent. The resident's violent resistance, lead the police to use baton charges, tear gas shells and water cannons to counter them. The residents throw rocks and Molotov cocktails. The shanties are often burned to the ground and others razed with bulldozers. Sometimes the government has also reportedly posted snipers on nearby rooftops; their rifles trained on the workers, the aged, women and children below. Although the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) was passed, giving squatters' struggles for land some legal protections (and hence legitimacy), but there have been no real mechanisms for land redistribution or steps to address the tax laws that encourage land hoarding. There has also been no concomitant repeal of an old Marcos-era law that criminalized squatting. Evictions often taken place with only a fraction of the household being provided alternative sites, although such provisions are expressly stipulated in the UDHA.

Chapter Four

<u>Ethno-cultural exclusion in Asian cities</u>

4.1   Introduction.

This chapter looks at the role of ethno-cultural factors as it relates to the exclusionary growth of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila. Here within this broad analytical category, the pertinent explanatory factors are religion, caste, regional identities, ethno-linguistic identities and ethno-national identities.   Geographers have had a venerable tradition in examining the causes and consequences of urban ethnic segregation. The bulk of such work is associated with the Chicago School of Human Ecology, which includes the works of Robert Park and others in the early twentieth century. It rose into prominence during the 1960's and 1970's when measures were devised to empirically measure the degrees of residential segregation and ethnic residential patterns were integrated into models of urban land use structure. However this approach faced a decline in the face of criticism that the approach tended to define ethnicity from the point of view of race alone and that the absence of residential segregation did not necessarily indicate the absence of discrimination. According to Varshney (2002), "ethnicity is simply the larger set to which religion, race, language and sect belong" (Varshney 2002: 5). Ethnicity is both the way in which individuals define their personal identity, as well as a type of social stratification that emerges when people form groups based on their real or perceived origins. Members of ethnic groups believe that their ancestry and culture mark them differently from others. Ethnicity is essentially relational, and is a classic example of people making a distinction between "us" and "them". As such ethnic group formation always entails both inclusionary and exclusionary behaviour (Hiebert 2000).

Examining the concept of social exclusion, Amartya Sen (2000) finds that it enriches the understanding of the underlying factors as well as the empirical analysis of poverty and deprivation, since exclusion from the enjoyment of public amenities and assistances that others enjoy may be a an important factor in the fulfilment of human capabilities. Therefore "no concept of poverty can be satisfactory if it does not

take adequate note of the disadvantages that arise from being excluded from shared opportunities enjoyed by others" (Sen 2000: 44). Social exclusion is both 'constitutive' and 'instrumental' in nature. It is constitutive as "being excluded can sometimes be in itself a deprivation and this can be of intrinsic importance on its own". It is instrumental in the sense that "they may not be impoverishing in themselves, but they can lead to impoverishment of human life through their causal consequences" such as through the refusal of social and economic opportunities to individuals or groups. Further, it is possible to distinguish between "active" and "passive" exclusions depending on the presence of deliberate attempts to exclude, or whether it is an outcome of social processes in which there is no premeditated effort (Sen 2000: 14-15). Among the advantages of the social exclusion approach is that: it contextualises the study of poverty and deprivation within social systems and structures; assigns causality and allocates a central role to politics (Hickey and du Toit 2007).

In studying the empirical phenomena of social exclusion, place and context have not become redundant; despite global processes of neoliberalisation and marketization and other drivers of social exclusion as these forces have had a very uneven effect on different countries and localities. The different histories, cultures, institutions and social structures in different places make some dimensions of social exclusion more salient and important than others (Silver 2015). A variation in the thinking on social exclusion is that discrepant (or unfavourable) integration with the state, market or civil society is probably a better way of looking at things rather than conventional notions of social exclusion, as reveals how "localized livelihood strategies are enabled and constrained by economic, social and political relations over both time and space, in that they operate over lengthy periods and within cycles, and at multiple spatial levels, from local to global. These relations are driven by inequalities of power" (Hickey and du Toit 2007: 4).

4.2   Religious and caste based segregation in Delhi.

The main dimensions of ethno cultural exclusion in Delhi are along the lines of religion and caste. Jaffrelot and Gayer (2012) in a volume containing ethnographic case studies from eleven Indian cities, including Delhi, present a picture of decline and marginalization of Muslim communities. Apart from having lower levels of

socio-economic development, Indian Muslims are frequently portrayed as being unsure of their relations with the rest of Indian society, given sluggishness performance of state agencies and general feelings of insecurity among them, causing ghettoization of Muslim communities within Indian cities. This tendency according to Jaffrelot and Gayer (2012) is often reinforced by perceptions among the Muslim community itself. Among the proximate factors leading to such as situation are: the degeneration of the old Muslim aristocracy following the Revolt of 1857; the violence during partition in 1947 and the resentment following it; the majority of the elite Muslim families migrated to Pakistan and; in the post-independence era the frequency of communal clashes and the more recent rise of Hindu nationalism. In terms of communal violence, the share of rural India is very low, while Hindu-Muslim violence is largely an urban phenomenon. In this connection, Varshney (2002) posits the importance of civic engagement as characterised by inter-communal connections. He differentiates between two kinds of civic networks: associational and every day civic engagement. Associational includes business association, professional organizations, reading clubs, film clubs, trade unions and cadre based political parties etc. Everyday civic engagement is constituted through the quotidian interactions of everyday life, such as inter community home visits by Hindu and Muslim families. According to Varshney (2002), these forms of civic engagements promote peace and their absence provides the space for communal violence.

From 2011 to 2015, according the Ministry of Home affairs, India had 3365 communal conflicts where the eight states of Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan & Uttar Pradesh accounted for 85 per cent of all the incidents (Dubbudu 2015). According to the Census of India (2011), in Delhi, Hindus are the largest religious group making up 81.68 per cent of the population, followed by Muslims constituting 12.86 per cent, while Sikhs at 3.4 per cent come in third (Fig 4.1). Although characterized by relatively low intensities of communal conflicts and very few casualties, there is however a palpable air of communal tension in recent months. A review of communal incidents occurring in Delhi in the recent past not only throws up names of localities situated in the fringes of the urban agglomeration within the larger National Capital Region such as Dadri near Greater Noida (Despande 2016) and Ballabhgarh in Faridabad (Ghosal 2015), but also within the National Capital Territory of Delhi itself such as in Trilokpuri

(East Delhi district) (Bahl and Tripathi 2016; DNA 2015; Newsclick 2015), Madanpur Khadar (South Delhi district), Bawana (North West district), Nand Nagri (Shahdara district) and Jorbagh and Rangpur Pahadi (South Delhi district) (DNA 2015; Newsclick 2015) among others, where multiple incidents of communal conflict has occurred since 2014. Some of the conflicts such as in the case Dadri, had national ramifications (Deshpande 2016), while in Ballabhgarh there was a hasty exodus of Muslim families where houses were left unlocked and fans running even a day after the violence (Ghosal 2015).

Figure 4.1.

Major Religious Groups in Delhi, 2011

Data Source: Census of India (2011), District Census Handbook, N.C.T. of Delhi, Series-08, Part XII – A

Studies of areas with Muslim concentrations in Shahdara district (the Trans Yamuna localities of Seelampur, Jafrabad, Gautampuri etc,) and South Delhi (including localities of Okhla, Jamia Nagar, Zakir Nagar) which include a manufacturing hub, report both voluntary and forced segregation (Jamil 2014; Zafar 2016). Studies of spatial manifestations of neoliberal urbanism in Delhi have mostly

missed the fact that the new patterns of segregation of India's urban population was based not only on class, but also on ethno religious lines, as attested by the consolidation of ethnic enclaves and religious ghettos in Delhi (Gayer 2011).

The Trans Yamuna manufacturing cluster of Shahdara district which includes the neighbourhoods of Seelampur, Jafrabad, Gautampuri, Welcome and Loni, have a mixed composition, with the main land uses being: *jhuggies* and slum resettlement colonies of the poor having both Muslim population and lower caste poor Hindu populations; upper middle class Muslim residences, small manufacturing enterprises owned by Muslims with the dwellings of the skilled and unskilled labourers employed by them. However Hindus remain concentrated and live separately on Hindus-only streets. Most of the small manufacturing units are located on the ground floors of the buildings, a space that converts into sleeping areas for the workers at night. The upper floors contain dwellings of the owners and the tenants who are employed locally indifferent businesses. Upper middle-class Muslim residents who are mostly the owners of the manufacturing establishments have been able to afford to separate their residences from the workshops. Many of these residents are also professionals, being the children of the older residents who acquired education and professional training or relatives who have shifted here to be near their relatives. The unique feature of this manufacturing hub is the rediscovery of Muslims in Delhi as a human resource, integrated with circuits of neoliberal accumulation at the level of the city as well as global levels. Although the Muslims families here welcome the jobs and businesses that capitalize on their skills and assets, passive social exclusion has lead to ghettoization and marginalization (Jamil 2014).

Studies of another cluster of Muslim concentrated neighborhoods in the vicinity of the Okhla Industrial area of South Delhi, including Jamia Nagar, Zakir Nagar and Abul Fazal Enclave report the common thread tying all the Muslim residents of these enclaves to be the fear of communal violence directed at them; as well as experiences of discrimination emanating from the stigma attached to their Muslim names. Such experiences include refusal to conduct business, discriminatory business practices, discriminations in the housing market and being profiled as either criminals or terrorists. All these factors perpetuate the concentration of Muslims households in this area. The presence of Jamia Millia Islamia, a central university nearby led to the construction of colonies for housing the teachers, staff and students of the university. The presence of a minority institution also worked as a magnet,

attracting Muslims looking for better and higher educational opportunities. Thus these neighbourhoods also contain a large number of migrants (Zafar 2016; Thorat et al 2015; Jamil 2014; Kirmani 2008).

However, another study of Abul Fazal Enclave in Delhi, attributes perceptions of physical security and residential security leading to self-segregation or enclave formation rather than ghettoization in this area. According to this study, despite most Muslims in the city living in precarious economic conditions, a small but flourishing Muslim middle class exists, consisting mainly of better educated and connected families engaged in trade or entrepreneurship. Here, self- segregation has definitely played an important part in the formation of Muslim enclaves, where both needs for physical security (to be found in numbers) as well as cultural affinities weigh in (Gayer 2012). Galonnier (2014) identifies Muslim high-income housing patterns to be determined by three factors which has lead to the overlapping in Indian cities of three varieties of segregated residential patterns as identified in the American context: the *ghetto, enclave, and the citadel*. The perils of communal riots encourages them to self-segregate in Muslim dominant neighbourhoods that can be categorized as the *ghetto*; the longing for a purity of Islamic social environment at least at the neighbourhood level leads to the formation of *enclaves* and; the Muslim upper-class too indulges in drawing sharp demarcations in physical space from their poorer co-religionists to form the *citadel*. These practices lead to a spatial clustering of Muslim families within the city.

The presence of Muslims are also disproportionately high in relation to their population in slums and resettlement colonies (Dupont 2004). In some cases of slum demolitions and evictions, the local RWA's sought to rid their vicinities of not just the squatters in general but also the Muslim poor in particular. The demolition of the Noor Masjid by the DDA, with the support of the Delhi police, although cloaked in the politically correct language of land ownership rights, was driven by the Jangpura Residents Association (JRA), who in 2006, filed a Public Interest Litigation before the Delhi High Court requesting the removal of all encroachments along the Barapullah *nallah* and on adjacent public land, so that these could be transformed into a green area. The *jhuggi jhopdi* cluster located along the *nallah,* which mostly housed a population of Bengali speaking /Bangladeshi Muslim migrants had been subsequently demolished by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) as a part of grooming the city in preparation for the Commonwealth Games. Even after that the

JRA filed a new application before the high court on 7 July 2008, asking for the demolition of all remaining structures, including the Noor Masjid. This was because in the eyes of the residents of Jangpura's B block, there is no doubt that it was a Bangladeshi mosque and a source of nuisance that continued to attract criminal elements (Gayer 2011). Even in the case of the Yamuna Pushta evictions, 70 per cent of the residents were Muslims, and in the run up to the demolition there was frequent highlighting of the presence of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants by a political party (Bhan 2009; Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008; Batra and Mehra 2008). Among the evicted families who were given resettlement plots, 93 per cent were given so in Bawana (Menon-Sen and Bhan 2008), which has in the last few years been the site of repeated communal disturbances (DNA 2015; Newsclick 2015).

Regardless of the debate whether the formation of Muslim concentrated neighbourhoods is due to ghettoization or self segregation, there is empirical evidence to imply the presence discriminatory practices in the housing market directed towards Muslims and the Scheduled Caste population in the city (Datta and Pathania 2016; Thorat et al. 2015). An audit experiment conducted of real estate and rental websites with regard to house listings in Delhi and its largest suburbs, found that upper caste Hindu callers were not only more likely to receive a call back from the landlords than their Muslim counterparts, but were also likely to be contacted first, in the event the landlord decided to call back both categories of callers. In this experiment although no conclusive evidence was found to imply similar practices directed towards scheduled caste callers, yet the authors largely attributed the latter outcome to the limitations of the exercise (Datta and Pathania 2016). Another study found empirical evidence of discrimination and inequitable outcomes for Dalits and Muslim seeking rental housing in the Delhi rental housing market. The study found the prejudice of landlords to be responsible for denial of rental housing to both Dalit and Muslim populations, with Muslims being worse off. The study also finds Dalits and Muslims who did manage to get rental housing, did so by agreeing to unjust terms and conditions (Thorat et al. 2015).

The population of Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes are disproportionately high in relation to their total population in the informal housing sector that included slums, resettlement colonies and the urban villages. The reverse is true in the case of upper caste Hindus, the latter's presence being much higher in the DDA planned colonies and cooperative group housing societies. The higher

proportions of SC and OBC population in the urban villages of Delhi parallel the caste composition of the original inhabitants of the village, and two major groups, the Gujjars and Jatavs, being classified as Other Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes respectively (Dupont 2004). Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of Scheduled Caste population in each district of Delhi in 2011. It is clear that the SCs as a percentage of total population are highest in the core of the urban area, comprising Central (24.6 per cent) and New Delhi (23.4 per cent) districts. It decreases as one moves away from the core. South West (13.9 per cent) and West (14.8 percent) districts have the lowest proportion of SC population.

Figure 4.2.

Data Source: Census of India (2011), District Census Handbook, N.C.T. of Delhi, Series-08, Part XII – A

4.3 Ethno cultural factors in Jakarta's urban structure.

4.3.1 *Ethno religious composition of Jakarta.*

Indonesia is one of the most ethnically plural societies, containing 1,300 ethnic groups with at least 95 per cent native to the archipelago. Minority migrant groups

constitute the rest, such as Chinese, Arab and Indian. Six largest ethnic groups contribute to more than two thirds of the country's total population: the Javanese, the Sundanese, the Batak, the Sulawesi, the Madurese and the Betawi (BPS 2010). Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of various ethnic groups within the population of Jakarta. The Javanese are the largest population group in Jakarta making up 38 per cent of the population in 2000, while nationally they made up 40 per cent of the population in 2010. Javanese population while found all over Indonesia, is highly concentrated in Java and Bali Islands. Javanese people are mostly Muslim, with a small proportion of Christians, Buddhists and Hindus. The Javanese are followed by the Betawi who make up 30 per cent of the population of Jakarta (BPS 2000) where they are concentrated disproportionate to their proportion in the total population of Indonesia, as they make up only 2.9 per cent of the country's total population. They are regarded to be the original inhabitants of Jakarta, and 'Betawi' is the term to describe the people who lived in Batavia, the Dutch name for Jakarta. The language spoken by the Betawi is a "Malay-based creole that borrows extensive words from Hokkien, Chinese, Arabic, Portuguese and Dutch languages as well as other local language — is still used as slang language in Jakarta" (Yuniarni 2016). They are predominantly Muslims, with a small proportion of Christians. The Javanese and Betawi are followed by the Sundanese who make up 17 per cent of the population of Jakarta (BPS 2000), and constituting 16 per cent of the population nationally. This ethnic group is predominantly Muslim and speak their own language. They traditionally inhabit the provinces of Banten, West Java and Jakarta (Yuniarni 2016).

The fourth largest ethnic group in Jakarta is the one of Chinese-descent. One of the first immigrants to Indonesia, Chinese-Indonesians are now found throughout the country. Chinese-Indonesians are a prosperous community, with most of the ones living Jakarta being engaged in trade, be it at the level of neighbourhood, as grocery shop owners or the national/global level as business tycoons (Ajistyatama 2014). The Chinese make up 6 per cent of the population of Jakarta (BPS 2000) and make up 1-4% of the population of Indonesia. They rarely speak Mandarin nor are they familiar with Chinese letterings (Holmes 2016).

The other major ethnic groups in Jakarta are the Batak (4 per cent), Minangkabau (3 per cent) and the Malays (2 per cent) (BPS 2000). The Batak is the third largest ethnicity nationally, accounting for 3.8 per cent of the total population. They are mainly from North Sumatra, consisting of Batak Simalungun, Angkola,

Karo, Mandailing, Pakpak Dairi, Tapanuli, Dairi, Toba and many more ethnic groups. These ethnic groups are closely related, speaking the same language and also practicing similar customs. The Batak are predominantly Christian and have accepted it as part of their identity since the early 20th century. They are closely associated with Minangkabau ethnic group from West Sumatra who also have a 3 per cent presence in Jakarta. Other ethnic sub-groups of the Batak like the Mandailing and Angkola are predominantly Muslims (Yuniarni 2016). Ethnic groups such as the Sulawesi and the Madurese who make up 3.2 per cent and 3.03 per cent of the population nationally do not have significant presence in Jakarta (BPS 2010).

Figure 4.3.

Data Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, 2000.

In terms of religion, the three largest religions of Jakarta are Islam, Christianity and Buddhism (Figure 4.4) Islam has the largest number of followers in Jakarta, accounting for 85.36 per cent of the population, Christianity for 10.68 per cent, and Buddhism for 3.30 per cent. Apart from this Hinduism (0.21 per cent) and Confucianism (0.06 per cent) have a small number of followers in Jakarta.

Figure 4.4.

Major Religious Groups in Jakarta, 2010.

Christianity, 10.68 %

Buddhism, 3.3 %

Islam, 85.36%

Data Source: Statistics Indonesia, 2010.

4.3.2 *Ethno cultural segregation in Jakarta.*

The spatial structure of Jakarta is characterized by the presence of several ethnic enclaves. The most prominent ones are the ones of Chinese-descent, Betawi, Batak, Indian-descent and Arab-descent. They are discussed in detail below.

(A) Enclaves of Chinese-Indonesians:

In Jakarta, most of the people of Chinese-descent reside in boroughs to the north of the city including Glodok in West Jakarta and Kelapa Gading, Ancol, Pantai Indah Kapuk and Pluit in North Jakarta. These regions are believed to be "Dragon-head" positions, which as per the ancient Chinese architectural philosophy of *feng shui*, are fortuitous to people living or conducting business at these particular sites (Ajistyatama 2014). Hundreds of Chinese artisans, who were settlers along the shores of Batavia of the 17th century initially as trading communities, played an instrumental role in the building of it. In today's Jakarta many urban megaprojects have been built by real estate companies belonging to the Chinese-Indonesian businessmen who descended from these families, and constitute approximately 1 – 4 per cent of the total population of Indonesia (Holmes 2016). They were instrumental in shaping the

morphology Jakarta, far more in proportion to their actual population (Holmes 2016; Kusno et al. 2011; Kusno 2000; Firman2004b; Winarso et. al. 2015).

The prolific economic ascent of this migrant community has been the cause of widespread resentment among other native populations, discrimination and recurrent rioting. The history of discrimination against the migrant Chinese dates back to 1740 when the Dutch ruled Batavia. The Dutch had given some privileges to a few Chinese families living in Djakarta, however most of the Chinese minority population were poverty stricken themselves. A revolt of Chinese sugar mill workers in 1740 resulted in a pogrom in which nearly the entire Chinese populace was killed. The persecution of this minority continued even after Indonesian independence from the Dutch after World War II. New laws identified Chinese -Indonesians as aliens and citizenship was denied to many even though they had lived in Indonesia for many generations. Even the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the 1950s, which had a lot of supporters among the ethnic Chinese, would not allow them to hold leadership positions. Suharto's, attitude towards the Chinese-Indonesians was involuntary assimilation under his New Order government, banning Chinese schools, books and languages (Holmes 2016).

Suharto effectively harnessed Chinese capital for Indonesia's economic development. The ruling elite granted monopolies to their patrons and combined with the help of license restrictions many ethnic Chinese businesses developed and expanded. Under President Suharto several big diversified private conglomerates were allowed to operate alongside the public owned companies, and eventually came to dominate Indonesia's economic development. The deregulation exercise in the second half of the 1980's lead to further expansion of the Chinese owned conglomerates. The top 10 largest business groups in Indonesia in 1992 were all Chinese owned. They were the Salim, Astra, Sinar Mas, Gudang Garam, Djarum, Dharmala, Lippo, Bank Bali, Mantrust and Argo Mannuggal groups. These business conglomerates, locally known as *cucong,* meaning businesses with patronage links to the ruling elite were usually structured around huge ethnic Chinese business families who had rapidly expanded in the post colonial years taking advantages exclusive licenses for the import or manufacture of goods for the domestic economy (Lasserre 1993). This arrangement of awarding monopolies and lucrative trade contracts also served the oligarchic families of the Suharto regime, enabling the dictator's aides and six children to take control of key sectors of the national economy and amass huge

amounts of wealth (Encyclopaedia Brittanica 2016). These conglomerates were highly diversified and their manufactures included a wide range of products including flour milling, cement, automobile, food, chemicals, agribusiness, finance, heavy machinery, office equipment, paper pulp, chemicals, real estate, tobacco, electronic, textiles, dairy products, food processing, and metal products to name a few. The *cucong* included not just the above-mentioned 10 business groups, but the ethnic Chinese owned 18 out of the top 20 Indonesian companies in 1992. Thus although they constituted only 4 per cent of the population, they owned more than 90 per cent of the country's wealth (Lasserre 1993).

Anti–Chinese sentiment has erupted several times in the postcolonial years. The most violent incidents took place in 1965, 1984 and 1998. In 1965, with simmering anti-Chinese sentiments in the background and following Suharto's army-powered overthrow of Sukarno on suspicions of him being a communist, suspicions which were strengthened by his proximity to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and China (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016), Indonesian mobs and the military went on a rampage which decimated the Chinese-Indonesian community by hundreds of thousands. During this three month long rampage approximately 90,000 Chinese-Indonesians fled Indonesia. In 1984 resentment towards the migrant community erupted again in riots in the Chinese controlled areas of Jakarta port. In 1991, President Suharto, mindful of the brewing resentment and in an effort to address growing resentment within the populace, asked that the Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates voluntarily hand over a token number of their shares in their companies to Indonesia's sick state cooperatives. This was abided to promptly. This was typical of the strategies of the wealthy but politically vulnerable Chinese-Indonesian minority, where they protected their own interests by intertwining them with that of the ruling elite. This took the form of joint ventures between Chinese owned conglomerates with state enterprises and through creating links with the oligarchical families, particularly Suharto's family (Lasserre 1993).

As was typical of the Suharto era, no one dared to oppose Suharto's policies (Kusno 2004; 2011a). Finally, in May 1998, when Suharto was dislodged from power, Glodok the historical Chinese quarter of Jakarta was subject to arson and pillage. Over a thousand people were killed and property worth $300 million was damaged. Several Chinese-Indonesian women and girls were also raped (Walden 2016; Holmes 2016; Cochrane 2014). Since then Glodok turned into a fortified

enclave, guarded by huge iron gates and patrolled by community members at night. Since then, after 1998, successive leaders abandoned the assimilation policy and Chinese-Indonesians have been more confident in the expression of their Chinese heritage. The Chinese New Year is now declared a national holiday and Mandarin and other Chinese dialects are spoken openly in Glodok. However it remains guarded by augmented iron fences (Holmes 2016). One of the reasons behind the growth of the massive, private, fortified and surveilled new towns from the 1990's in the outskirts of Jakarta Metropolitan Area, was the fear of violence directed towards the prosperous and frequently Chinese families who owned homes in them (Cybriwsky and Ford 2001).

The Chinese-Indonesian community faces a new challenge. Despite a history of political exclusion, the current Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, is a Chinese-Indonesian also known as Ahok. He ran for Lieutenant Governor of Jakarta alongside Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as his running mate in the 2012 gubernatorial election. During the 2012 campaign, the ultra-conservative Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and supporters of rival candidates regularly targeted him for being a non-Muslim and of Chinese ancestry. Jokowi and Ahok defeated the incumbent Fauzi Bowo. He became the Acting-governor of Jakarta when Jokowi took temporary time off to run for President. After Jokowi was elected President, Ahok succeeded him as Governor in 2014. He put himself in contention for the gubernatorial election in February 2017 (Cochrane 2014; Elyda and Sundaryani 2014). Islamist groups such as FPI held regular protests against Ahok, since he assumed office on the ground that he was unfit for leading a Muslim majority capital because of his religion. The Quran, according to their interpretation, prohibits Muslims from supporting non-Muslim leaders. However, it was only from December 2016 that their efforts have drawn a massive turnout of protesters.

Huge rallies were held on 4 November 2016, 2 December 2016 (Suryana 2016) and 21 February 2017 (Budiari 2017) after Ahok delivered a speech in late September 2016 where he criticized rival politicians whom he claimed to have misused the Quran's *Al Maidah* articles to undermine his re-election bid. Although Ahok clarified that he meant to criticize the use of religion in politics, but some Muslims took his words as an insult to their holy book. His comments managed to offend even moderate Islamic groups who claimed to be neutral in the run up to the 2017 gubernatorial elections. As a result the FPI now also found support from the

Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and the Muhammadiyah, the nation's second-largest Muslim organization in asking for police action against Ahok for blasphemy (La Batu 2016; Walden 2016; Suryana 2016). Spearheaded by the FPI, protests started on 14 October in front of Jakarta's City Hall demanding Ahok's imprisonment for defaming the Quran. He was also the target of protests earlier for not only his double minority status, but also for his style of brash and blunt speaking, and harsh slum eviction policies that alienated him from the poor. Thus the subsequent protests from November 2016 onwards drew mammoth turnouts (Walden 2016; Suryana 2016). Subsequently a small market was attacked in a Chinese Indonesian neighbourhood, almost as a reminder of the traumatic riots in 1998 (Holmes 2016).

Perhaps encouraged by the massive turnout at rallies in Jakarta since 4 November 2016, several attacks and threats were directed against minorities elsewhere in Indonesia. A Buddhist temple was bombed in Singkawang, a mostly Chinese city in West Kalimantan, Borneo whilst in East Java a Catholic church received a bomb threat. Molotov cocktails were thrown at a church in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, injuring four children including a toddler who later died (Walden 2016). In the February 2017 gubernatorial elections, in a three way race, Ahok won but failed to cross the 50 per cent threshold in the elections for Governor of Jakarta, and the final result is set to be decided by a run-off between the remaining two candidates on 19 April 2017, after the third candidate who secured a low percentage of votes has had to drop out of the race (Presse 2017).

(B) Betawi enclaves:

The Betawi people are the product of the intermingling of different races and ethnicities like the Balinese, Malay, Chinese, Arab and Portuguese through out Indonesia's history, first recognised as a distinct ethnicity in the 17th century and were christened "Betawi" by the Dutch. They have traditionally owned a lot of land in Jakarta and were the traditional landlords and trading community. Though recognised as the indigenous people of Jakarta, their share of the population of the city has gradually waned following the inflow of other Indonesian ethnicities. However, Betawi enclaves are still to be found in localities such as Mampang in South Jakarta, Kampung Pulo in East Jakarta, Manggarai in South Jakarta and Condet in East Jakarta alongside Arab Indonesians (Ajistyatama 2014).

(B) Batak enclaves:

The Bataks are mainly Christians from North Sumatra (Yuniarni 2016) and came to Jakarta in the post-independence period seeking livelihood and better quality of life. The Batak now live throughout the city. However there also exist a few Batak enclaves in Jakarta, the most prominent being in Cililitan in East Jakarta, where there are several churches and restaurants belonging to this community. Apart from Cililitan, Bataks are also clustered in Kernolong and Senen in Central Jakarta, Peninggaran in South Jakarta, Pulo Mas, Pramuka and Taman Mini in East Jakarta (Ajistyatama 2014).

(D) Indian-descent enclaves:

The Indian-descent enclaves are located in Pasar Baru area in Central Jakarta. The ambience of Pasar Baru, a commercial area created in the 1730s by the Dutch is quite distinct, mainly owing the presence in large numbers of traders of Indian origin. Out of the approximately hundred shops in Pasar Baru, the Indian community, selling textiles and sports equipment own eighty. Stores bearing sanskritised names, the fragrance of burning incense sticks, vegetarian restaurants, and floral garlands all indicate the presence of Indians. Apart from Pasar Baru, A lot of Indians live Sunter in North Jakarta. Both these localities contain a lot of temples and schools for Indians (Ajistyatama 2014).

(E) Arab-descent enclaves:

People of Arab descent, mainly live in a small area in Condet, East Jakarta, making a living mostly through the sale of homemade perfume and Arabian tobacco, shisha. Several families of Arab lineage migrated into Condet in the 1970s selling perfumes and by the 1990s the area became crowded with perfume kiosks. The Kwitang area of Central Jakarta is also home to a small community of earlier Arab migrants (Ajistyatama 2014).

According to Kusno et al. (2011) the vacuum of political power left in the wake of the collapse of the Suharto regime and the attachment of disrepute to authoritarian rule was somewhat filled by alternative constructions of public morality. Some of these new urban movements are characterized by intolerance, conservatism and violence. The New Order authoritarianism coordinated and subordinated sub-national identities, amalgamating them into a national framework. With the collapse of the regime these sub-national identities have 're-emerged, competing to fill up the morality gap left empty by the collapse of Suharto's official nationalism' (Kusno et al. 2011: 474). The attacks by Front Pembela Islam (FPI) on religious minorities and

places are explained as assertion by ways of life that have been inadequately represented in both national politics and in the capital. Although violence and mobilization of "thugs" were also a part of the arsenal of disciplinary methods of the New Order to invoke terror among the populace, but since 1998, violence by "thugs" in public spaces in Jakarta, signifies the loss of the vice-like grip of the state over the city. The vigilantism mobilized by FPI (often in collaboration with police and city government) in the post-Suharto era takes advantage of the lack of an all powerful central authority to use violence as a means of inserting a new kind of morality in the public sphere. This contestation thus takes place literally in the city, fought on the streets, which becomes the sites 'to claim alternative citizenship beyond the framework provided by the nation-state' (Kusno 2011: 478).

4.4 The influence of ethno cultural factors in the spatial structure of Manila.

The Philippines is home to quite a few ethno-linguistic groups, most of whom belong to the Austronesian language or Malayo-Polynesian language group (Doeppers 1974; Blust 2014). The linguistic diversity of the Philippines can be categorized into eight major linguistic groups with several smaller ones as all the chief languages have a number of locally spoken dialects. Despite all the Philippine languages belonging to the same language family, falling within two major sub-groupings within it, linguistic differences are considerable barriers to communication. Although Filipino, based on Tagalog has been designated the national language yet it has not overcome the problems of linguistic diversity. The relative linguistic diversity of cities increase with their metropolitan character and the size of their migration fields. Thus Metro Manila, which draws in migrants from the entire country, is extremely diverse linguistically (Doeppers 1974). The aboriginal people of the Manila region are the Tagalogs, with later in-migration of other ethnic and tribal groups including the Bicolanos, Visayans, Ilocanos, Kapampangan, Pangasinan, Moros, Bajau and the Igorot. The Chinese had settled as traders in Manila region prior to the Spanish conquest, and today there is a large mestizo population of Chinese and Spanish origin. Due to colonial occupation by the Americans after the Spanish, Manila also had significant number of Americans. There are also people of Indian and Korean origin in Manila who had migrated at different points of time. Metro Manila is ethnically one of the most heterogeneous cities in the world, and truly cosmopolitan. The locally spoken

language is Tagalog, while Filipino and English are used for education, business and formal communications throughout Metro Manila (WPR 2017).

Ethno-linguistic groups like the Tagalog, Bicolano, Cebuano, Visayans, Maranao, Ivatan, Ilocano, Pangasinan, Kapampangan, Subanon, and Zamboanguenos (CIA 2009) have mostly converted to Christianity, especially the groups living in the lowland coastal areas, and have also assimilated foreign elements in their culture. Islam is practised among the indigenous populations of western Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago, otherwise known as the Moro. Some tribal groups who still follow their ancient animistic beliefs and traditions, known as the Lumad, live in the highlands of Mindanao. Some have them have however recently converted to Christianity (WPR 2017). Approximately 93 per cent of residents of Philippines are Christians and most of the Christians are Roman Catholics, constituting 80.58 per cent of the total population. Muslims are the largest religious minority making up nearly 5.57 per cent of the total population (PSA 2015). Most Filipino Muslims belong to different ethnic minority groups. Mindanao and adjacent islands are home to nearly 60 per cent of the Muslim population. Except for a small number of Muslims who live in the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Zambaonga del Sur in Mindanao who are Shia, most are Sunnis. Filipino Muslims are increasingly migrating to the large cities of Manila and Cebu for economic reasons (US Department of State 2012).

The creation of separate quarters for Chinese, Filipinos, and Spaniards was officially declared within a few years of founding of Manila in 1571 by the Spanish conquistador Legaspi. Legaspi built a fortress city - the Spanish walled city *Intramuros* ('within the walls'), which became the foci of political, trading, and religious pursuits. The Intramuros became the residence of the Spanish elite and beyond its walls lived Chinese migrants and a growing numbers of indigenous Filipinos. Binondo, the oldest ethnic Chinese urban enclave in the world was established in 1594 in Manila. Binondo has already been established as a centre of Chinese trading activity prior to Spanish arrival in early 16th century. It was within these quarters that the Spanish allowed the converted *sangleys* or their native Filipino wives along with their mixed race progeny to reside (WPR 2017). Thus historically, Manila's morphology was shaped by segregation of the dwelling quarters of the Spanish, Chinese, and indigenous Filipinos (Connell 1999). Although McGee (1967: 97 - 99) states that "overall ethnic concentration is still responsible for the major divisions of the residential areas" in the larger cities of south East Asia, it is refuted

by Daniel Doeppers in his landmark 1974 study "Ethnic Urbanism and Philippine Cities". According to Doeppers' study entrenched social divisions did not characterize the majority population of Christian Filipinos and neither did it tend to segregate residentially. Even "the former shophouse district clusters of Chinese (were) giving way to a much less segregated pattern. Only Muslims are now found in primarily homogeneous residential groupings, and these are either absent or insignificantly small in all but a few exceptional provincial cities" (Doeppers 1974: 550 - 551). By the middle of the nineteenth century, Spanish colonialism was weakened, and the excluded population living outside the walls that were simmering with discontent gradually overcame the walls. The hub of socioeconomic growth had now moved outside *Intramuros* to Chinatown and new Filipino suburbs. By this time the Filipino landed elite had already gained considerable power. During the phase of American colonial domination, the landed urban indigenous elite reinforced its economic domination in Manila, and owned sizeable tracts of land in and around the city (Connell 1999). Thus, residential divisions in Manila were historically reconfigured in terms of class rather than ethnicity and this has become reinforced through time because of the near absence of planned urban development interventions by the state, the initiatives of powerful business conglomerates and the demand for global spaces for consumption and living.

4.5   Conclusion.

Studies of spatial manifestations of neoliberal urbanism in Delhi have mostly missed the fact that the new patterns of segregation of India's urban population were based not only on class, but also on ethno-religious lines, as attested by the consolidation of Muslim enclaves in Delhi. The fear of communal violence directed at them, experiences of discrimination emanating from the stigma attached to their Muslim names, discriminatory business practices, discriminations in the housing market and being frequently profiled as either criminals or terrorists, have all contributed to self-segregation, self-aggregation and social distancing leading to the formation of long-term enclaves along religious lines. This has been reinforced with the rise of Hindu nationalism and communal violence in the last two decades in urban centres in India in general.

Empirical studies have proven the presence of discriminatory practices in the housing market directed towards Muslims and the Scheduled Caste population in the city. The population of Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes are disproportionately high in relation to their total population in the informal housing sector, which includes slums, resettlement colonies and the urban villages. The reverse is true in the case of upper caste Hindus, the latter's presence being much higher in the DDA planned colonies and cooperative group housing societies. The presence of Muslims is also disproportionately high in relation to their population in slums and resettlement colonies.

The spatial structure of Jakarta is characterized by the presence of several ethnic enclaves. The most prominent ones are the ones of Chinese-descent, Betawi, Batak, Indian-descent and Arab-descent. A few hundred Chinese artisans who had settled as traders along the shore of Batavia, the 17th-century capital city of the Dutch East Indies played an instrumental role in constructing it. In today's Jakarta many urban megaprojects have been built by real estate companies belonging to the descendants of the original merchants and other Chinese who have migrated since then. Chinese-Indonesians, who constitute approximately 1 - 4 per cent of Indonesia's 250 million people, have played a massive role in shaping the morphology Jakarta, far more in proportion to their actual population. The economic success of the group's small elite has led to repeated episodes of resentment, discrimination and even violent assaults. The history of discrimination against the migrant Chinese dates back to 1740 when the Dutch ruled Batavia. After Independence from the Dutch, new laws were framed where Chinese -Indonesians was identified as aliens and citizenship was denied to many even though they had lived in Indonesia for many generations. Suharto effectively harnessed Chinese capital for Indonesia's economic development.

The ruling elite granted monopolies to their patrons and combined with the help of license restrictions many ethnic Chinese businesses developed and expanded. And eventually came to dominate Indonesia's economic development. The deregulation exercise in the second half of the 1980's lead to further expansion of the Chinese owned conglomerates. This arrangement of monopolies and lucrative trade arrangements also served the oligarchic families of the Suharto regime, enabling the dictator's aides and his six children to assume control of key sectors of the economy and amass enormous fortunes. The Chinese at twilight of the Suharto era, constituted only 4 per cent of the population but owned more than 90 per cent of the country's

wealth and were the owners of large business empires manufacturing a wide array of products, delving also into the real estate and finance sector. This elite locally known as the *cucong,* constituted 18 out of the top 20 Indonesian companies.

Anti–Chinese sentiment has erupted several times in the postcolonial years. The most violent incidents took place in 1965, 1984 and 1998. In 1965, with simmering anti-Chinese sentiments in the background and following Suharto's army-powered overthrow of Sukarno, Indonesian mobs and the military went on a rampage that decimated the Chinese-Indonesian community by hundreds of thousands. During this three month long rampage approximately 90,000 Chinese-Indonesians fled Indonesia. Finally, in May 1998, when Suharto was dislodged from power, mobs targeted Glodok, the historic Chinatown of Jakarta, pillaging shops and burning buildings, killing more than a 1,000, raping women and girls. Since then Glodok turned into a fortified enclave, guarded by huge iron gates and patrolled by community members at night.

After 1998, successive leaders abandoned the assimilation policy and the ethnic Chinese have been able to express their heritage more freely. However the Chinese-Indonesian community faces a new challenge as the current Governor of Jakarta, Ahok, who is a member of that community, has been repeatedly at the end of growing racist and communal harassment, and now faces trial for blasphemy charges. The vacuum of political power left in the wake of the collapse of the Suharto regime and the attendant delegitimization of authoritarian rule is increasingly filled by alternative constructions of public morality. Some of these new urban movements are characterized by intolerance, conservatism and violence.

Metro Manila is a social urban conglomerate and one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the world. Though historically, Manila's morphology has been shaped by segregation of the dwelling quarters of the Spanish, Chinese, and indigenous Filipinos, yet in the postcolonial years it has been reconfigured in terms of class rather than ethnicity. This has become reinforced through time because of the near absence of planned urban development interventions by the state, the initiatives of powerful business conglomerates and the demand for global spaces for consumption and living.

Chapter Five

<u>Conclusion: Summing up the comparisons of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila.</u>

5.1 Conclusion:

The megacities of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila exhibit certain convergences. They are all Asian megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants. They are also urban agglomeration spread across several administrative jurisdictions. They all have large metropolitan areas and their spatial structures have experienced rapid change from single core to multi nuclear metropolitan regions. They all have distinctive, large and rapidly expanding peri-urban zones and are experiencing a transformation in the spatial structure where there is a transfer of both population and industries to a chaotic urban periphery. Global processes have significantly guided the restructuring of urban spaces in the three chosen megacities, where features of poverty co-exist with ever-increasing numbers of enclaves of global consumption, production and existence. The wave of neoliberal globalization has also coincided with a wave of democratization and decentralization worldwide; and local governments and groups have consequently gained a greater voice in defining the trajectory urban development.

The enactment of the 'process(es) of neoliberalism' (Peck et al. 2009: 51) in the cities included in the study; or in other words, the temporal and spatial trends of urban change, is explained here as an outcome of (a) macroeconomic policy changes, (b) planning and governance strategies, (c) emergence of new corporate actors, and (d) the emergence of an aspirant middle class and their civil society organisations in the three cities. Such an analysis of cities as sites where neoliberal projects are enacted takes into account the 'necessary hybridity', and does not conceptualise neoliberalism as an ideal-type, as a consistent and standardized system imposed top-down with essentially homogenizing effects on urban form. Rather, it is posited following Peck et al. (2009), as existing in parasitical relations to other state and social formations such as neoconservatism, authoritarianism and social democracy. Concepts like the 'transnational capitalist class' and the 'growth

coalition' explain an amorphous grouping, and is difficult to use empirically. Thus although a class based explanation is hinted at, yet in the course of this study it was it was found more useful to take an actor-based approach.

In India, Indonesia and Philippines, the transformation of urban spaces by neoliberal regimes is legitimised through the urban – rural planning discourse of the Washington consensus. The tactical location of global processes in national spaces is with the involvement of the states themselves, as it provides legal and physical infrastructure, which although increasingly molded by a global schemata, is often termed as 'national' infrastructure. In the context of neoliberal globalization, much of the development discourse of the multilateral institutions like the World Bank have promoted a model of good governance that involves collaboration between state and market interests.

Further the rapid escalation of land prices in both the urban core and peripheries across Asia, have provided the state actors with initiatives to formulate new strategies to exploit the real estate markets in order to garner better revenues and to get greater control over urban spatial change. Thus governments throughout Asia have adopted land monetization strategies (Shatkin 2016), added to which are imperatives to create world-class spaces, which have combined to alter the dialectics between the informal settlers and the local governments, and are stripping the urban poor of their rights to the city.

The evolution of city space of Delhi has been the outcome of both formal planning efforts and private initiatives and responses. Since the 1950's, an interventionist policy approach was decided upon, and actualised through three Master Plans. Despite three Master Plans and an overarching authority given to the DDA much of the urban space of Delhi has evolved informally, and 75 percent of Delhi's population live in unplanned settlements (DUEIP 2001). The First Master Plan for Delhi became effective in 1962, which was designed to cover a 20-year period commencing 1961.

The Delhi land policy had barred the private sector from the formal land delivery process to check speculation and profiteering. It administered a land bank wherein large areas of land was reserved for planned development, in order to keep land prices within reasonable limits and to ensure planned development which provided housing for the poor. But the slow pace of land development and supply in the market has had the opposite effect on the urban poor (Sivam 2000). The shortfall

in the supply of land has sent the land prices soaring, at a much greater rate than income since 1974. The rate of land acquisition was slow and the process cumbersome and expensive. Although the objective of Delhi's large-scale land acquisition and disposal policy was to supply affordable housing to Low Income Group (LIG) and Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), in practice this policy benefitted the High Income Group (HIG) and the Middle Income Group (MIG) disproportionately. The Master Plan has favoured a model of elitist urbanism, at the expenses of the housing needs of the lower income groups; not only through the adoption of high standards of development and construction, but also because the time lag between notification and actual acquisition of land combined with the sluggishness and inadequacy of land and housing supply. This has led to *jhuggie jhopdies* and *unauthorised colonies* developing clandestinely in response to the unmet demand for housing of the lower and middle income groups. Since 1962, the process of planned development was imagined and continued to be a public sector led process with very little private participation in terms of development of both, shelter and infrastructure services till the process of macroeconomic reforms was begun in the early nineties. From 1990s onwards, following the changes in the macroeconomic policy environment, and adoption of the JNNURM, the urban local bodies were strengthened and provided fiscal incentives to enact reforms so that infrastructure and real estate development may take place at an accelerated rate. In Delhi there has been second wave of evictions following the first one during the Emergency of 1975 -77.

A spectacular transformation in the politics of land management in Asian cities was sparked off in the mid-1980s, with the colossal movement of foreign investment into Southeast Asian cities, especially into Metro Manila and Jakarta. Following the signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985, in which the US dollar was devalued relative to the yen in an effort to boost US exports, there was a period of huge Japanese annual foreign direct investment (FDI) influx into South East Asian countries in the early 1990s. Jakarta and Manila were remarkably important recipients of Japanese aid. This was a phase of rapid industrialization, infrastructural and real estate development. Land values soared, as developers and land speculators exploited the high growth in demand for world standard residential, commercial and office spaces. It was abruptly interrupted by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 (Shatkin 2016).

The modernization of Jakarta was a personal project of Indonesia's first president Sukarno who was a civil engineer and architect by training and was influenced by the ideas of Le Corbusier and other modernist visions of the city. There were some big planning programmes for Jakarta's development. However, years of political uncertainty after independence and the establishment of the 'New Order' regime hindered the planned development of Jakarta. In 1987, a new Master Plan for the Special Capital Region (DKI) of Jakarta (RUTR 1985–2005) was unveiled which was respected as a applicable planning document. However most of the planned developments of this plan have been overwhelmed by unplanned developments. Approximately, 60 per cent of Jakarta's urban population is estimated to live in kampungs, which show the extent to which housing has evolved in unplanned ways in Jakarta (Steinberg 2007). During the 1980s and 1990s, the central and local government issued 'location permits' to property developers to obtain land for housing and urban development. With this development came the advent of huge new towns with gated communities in suburban areas that involved large-scale conversation of prime agricultural land and green spaces to urban functions. In addition to the various new towns, many export oriented industrial districts that were developed by both government and private sector during the New Order regime of President Suharto, were located in the rapidly expanding peri-urban area.

The planning of modern Metro Manila was three distinct phases: the colonial phase which was influenced by American colonial rule; the modernist phase which extended from the declaration of martial law in 1972 and to the overthrow of Marcos in 1986; and the contemporary global phase (Shatkin 2007). In Manila, large scale formal city planning has historically been feeble and plans have remained largely unimplemented due to inadequate human and financial resources and lack of political will. It was also a direct outcome of disproportionate power and influence wielded by a few oligarchic traditional landed elite families of the Manila region. Almost all land in Manila continues to be privately owned, and speculation in land has continued to grow and expropriation has seldom been attempted. In fact except for small fragments of Metro Manila such as Makati that was a corporate master planned modernist city since the 1950s (Garrido 2013) plans have never been carried out and implementation of planning at a scale larger than a municipality has never occurred. Urban development in Manila in the global era is characterized by the exceptional privatization of urban and regional planning. A few big property developers have

taken on new powers of planning and have conceptualised developments at the scale of the metropolitan area as a whole following the withdrawal of the state from urban development. The government has been entering into public – private partnerships to develop mainly integrated urban megaprojects to create socially regulated and planned spaces that meets the standards of an international business community (Shatkin2008).

Metro Manila has a large number of informal settlers, varying between 37 to 38 percent of the city's population (Shatkin 2007; Ragrario 2003). The movement of industries outside Metro Manila and rapid suburbanisation characterizes the spatial transformation of Metro Manila. There has been a straggling circular development and the rapid conversion of agricultural land to urban uses. Sequentially, first, since the 1950's, the areas surrounding the old urban core of the city of Manila, including Kalookan city and southern Quezon City to the north, Mandaluyong to the west, and Makati and Pasay to the south, changed from urban periphery to densely built-up urban centers (Shatkin 2008). Then in many outer municipalities of Metro Manila, a the green belt of agricultural land intended to contain urban growth was gradually in-filled by expanding strip development along main roads, that over time coalesced to form a diverse peri-urban areas containing agriculture, industry, and new residential areas.

A comparison has been done of the changes in the morphology of the three cities by mapping changes in population growth, distribution, and densities since 1990. In Delhi, in terms of spatial structure, the core of is shrinking and de-concentrating, the periphery is expanding, albeit at a much slower rate since 2001. This is because in the run-up to the Commonwealth Games, several lakh people were displaced as a result of squatter demolitions. Another factor that has affected population distribution was gentrification. Renewal of residential areas and the conversion of residential areas into commercial ones have kept using up housing stock. In Jakarta, in terms of urban spatial structure there has occurred a functional division between the core and periphery in the city, transforming it from a single core to multi-core metropolitan region. Spatial restructuring as revealed through GIS based mapping has shown a shift in the locus of urban growth from the central to the peri-urban areas. Since the census year 2000, due to redevelopment and development of more business functions in the core and long commute times from the periphery, a recent repopulation of the core has begun. GIS mapping shows the spatial expansion

of Metro Manila to have taken place as successive rings of rapidly developing cities and municipalities radiating outward from the old urban core, spurred by a combination of industrialization, the proliferation of informal settlements, and the development of residential areas for middle class people wishing to escape the congestion, noise and pollution of the inner city.

India (under the 74th Constitutional Amendment), Indonesia (under Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999) and Philippines (Local Government Code of 1991) have been experiencing decentralization reforms since 1992, 1999, and 1986 respectively. Decentralization in India and Indonesia is much more of an administrative decentralization rather than a fiscal decentralization. The central government continues to control a vast share of the revenues required for local governance than would be the case under true decentralization. Delhi has experimented with decentralized participatory programmes with the aim of bringing citizens and governments closer and bureaucrats more responsive. This took the form of the *Bhagidari* scheme, involving the new urban middle class associations, which has acted as a second channel of governance through civil society that attempts to impose neoliberal models of governance and elite ideals of globalised and commoditised urban spaces. It has actually led to the gentrification of the channels of political participation, de-linked slum dwellers from the government and sidestepped elected representatives.

During the period of January 1967-March 1998, Jakarta recieved about 11.0 and 15.5 per cent of the total domestic and foreign investment, excluding oil and gas, in Indonesia. Because of banking sector deregulations since October 1988, finance was another rapidly growing sector in JMR, and new domestic and foreign banks opened, allowing foreign investment in the banking sector. Since the banking deregulation took place there was a flow of industrial and finance capital in the land development sector in Indonesia's big cities, especially Jakarta (Douglass 2005). The severe economic crisis following the South East Asian economic crises of 1997- 98 contributed to the downfall of President Suharto's regime, and in mid-1999 the Indonesian Parliament passed Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 regarding regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation. These two legislations were mostly undertaken as the break-up of Indonesia into several tiny countries was anticipated. It was envisaged that this would curb the separatist sentiments in the outer regions of Indonesia and stop the manipulation of provincial and local government by the central

government (Firman 2004). However the impact of such decentralisation on the evolution of Jakarta, which till now had overarching dominance within the space-economy of Indonesia, is not yet clear.

In contrast, in the case of Philippines however decentralization has devolved responsibility for planning and the provision of most basic services to Local Government Units (LGUs). This led to the infusion of both personnel and 40 per cent of national government revenue from the national government to the LGUs. They have also been granted greater powers to raise revenue through taxes, fees, and charges. The LGC 1991 instructed the creation of local government councils at the city, municipality, and barangay levels. Further according to LGC 1991, NGOs and POs (Peoples Organisations) must constitute a minimum of 25 per cent of local development councils. In the post-Marcos era, the Metro Manila government was stripped of its powers under reforms for decentralization, and these powers have been devolved to its seventeen cities and municipalities. The enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) in 1991 introduced the decentralization process in the Philippines. In 1992, the Philippine Congress passed in addition, the Urban Development and Housing Act, which further escalated the decentralisation of governance structures and processes, especially in cities and other urban areas. Compared with decentralisation processes occurring simultaneously in other parts of Asia, the process in the Philippines has been more wide-ranging. Functions and services were devolved to different levels of local governance that included 81 provinces, 136 chartered cities, 1495 municipalities and approximately 40,000 barangays. Decentralisation has been the professed way to devolve power from the centre and prevent an authoritarian regime from re-emerging in the future, such as the imposition of martial law during the Marcos era. However, a recasting and reinforcing of existing power structures has occurred through decentralisation strategies and discourses.

Since the 'transnational capitalist class' and 'the growth coalition' is a difficult to define category and an amorphous class, it is more useful to take an actor centric approach to summarise the comparison of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila as 'neoliberal forms of creative destruction' (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009: 57). The role of four main actors has been compared in the three cities under consideration: (1) Real estate developers, (2) corporate actors, (3) civil society and (4) an aspiring new middle class.

First, in the post-liberalization period *real estate developers* have emerged as powerful intermediaries of national and local government urban development agendas. In Manila this has been the trend since the 1950's due to the oligarchical nature of land ownership by a few Chinese mestizo aristocratic families. Although this was a legacy of Spanish and American colonial rule, it has gained tremendous momentum since 1986 after democratization, decentralization and further liberalization reforms, and in the quest to attain 'Asian Tiger Economy' status. In Jakarta real estate developers, particularly of ethnic Chinese origin became influential since the 1980's after renewed liberalization, export oriented industrialization and the practice of granting unrestrained granting of land permits to real estate developer was started under the New Order government of Suharto. In India, the waves of liberalization since 1991 (actually started in the late 1980's under the Rajiv Gandhi government) has seen the spawning of the majority of the top real estate companies currently operating in Delhi – NCR, as well the dramatic rises in value of a number of major real estate corporations with a lot of companies going public since the mid 2000s public. Developers have acted as the central players in the wholesale creation of new urban landscapes in peri-urban areas like Gurgaon and Noida outside Delhi, where planning regulation is relatively weak.

Second, *corporate actors* have emerged as increasingly powerful agents in India as state governments are motivated to compete for corporate investment and have sought their advice in urban governance. State governments have also aggressively pursued land acquisition for the development of corporate office space, and have catered to the interests of industry. The increasingly close relationship between state and corporate actors is legitimated and formalized through public–private partnerships (PPPs) (Weinstein et. al. 2013) and in the case of Delhi is illustrated in the case of the B-O-T (Build Own Transfer) PPP of the Delhi Gurgaon Expressway. In JABODETABEK the influence of corporate actors is seen in the emergence of mega-projects devoted to global business hubs, malls and commercial services in the core and massive suburban new towns in the periphery of the city. Infrastructure project were mostly in the B-O-Ts during the New Order Period but many got delayed due to the financial crises and regime change of 1997-98. Currently, the public sector and other foreign government firms, in a government-government collaboration rather than government-corporate collaboration, including the Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA) (Arditya 2012) and Delhi Metro

Rail Corporation (DMRC) (Business Standard 2012), fund large infrastructure projects such as the Jakarta MRT jointly. Other infrastructure projects the Jakarta Bandung High Speed Rail is being implemented with the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited (CRCC) (Yahoo News and AFP 2015). In Metro Manila the real estate developers and the corporate actors have played a leading role in the evolution of the urban space in the absence of any substantial public planning since the 1950's. Three instances of Ayala Land, the Manila Metro Rail Transit Line – 7 and Fort Bonifacio Global City demonstrate the developers' attempts to shape the metro region itself for the sake of corporate profit. It also shows the privatization of planning and the key role of government in the emergent urban form, as it enters into PPP with developers to construct world-class integrated megaprojects that accommodate global business hubs, global retail chains, and global standards of leisure and living, in a planned way, on gated land plots, within the central city.

Third, coinciding though not always as a result of decentralization reforms, *civil society* organizations (like CBOs, NGOs and RWAs) have emerged in varying degrees as significant forces in governance. The proliferation of non-state actors like non government organizations, community based organizations, citizens groups and associations, policy think tanks and private consultants in various sectors of governance, have further transformed the scenario, as each has its own set of agenda, interests, and beneficiaries. Though often thought of as the forerunners of social movements, the presence of multiple players have significant implications for transparency, accountability and inclusivity. In Delhi the majority of civil society groups such as RWAs are comprised of and serve the interests of middle-class groups and these institutions have facilitated take over by the elite, of urban governance processes through the *Bhagidari* (partnership) scheme. The growing role of civil society organizations is also a significant force influencing the growing role of the judicial system as a powerful actor on urban issues. Recent court decisions have had significant impacts on the shape and form of Delhi. Often set in motion by public interest litigations (PIL) filed by civil society organizations (Weinstein et. al 2013) of middle and high-income groups, these decisions have ordered the relocation of industries, slum demolitions and ruled on the use of CNG as fuel in public transportation among other things.

In Jakarta in post – authoritarian Indonesia, community-based urban initiatives became the new means for governing the city. In this system, the role of the

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government is largely limited to enabling and rewarding community-based urban initiatives like the 'Clean and Green Jakarta' campaign (Kusno 2011). As the last vestiges of the authoritarian regime dissolved, Indonesia has experienced a meteoric rise of a civil society that is very vocal and assertive in their demands for an inclusive and environmentally sustainable form of development. Examples include NGOs like The Jakarta Citizens' Forum (Forum Warga Kota Jakarta/FAKTA) that puts forth the interests of the poor citizens forgotten even in democratic Indonesia and provides free legal aid, moral support, and information. The emergence of the green discourse has shaped a new style of resistance cast in the language of participation in the greening of the city. This can be seen in the concerted attempts of the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), an NGO to use the environment as a subject to fight evictions and struggle for the rights of the urban poor to live in the city (Kusno 2011). However evictions of squatters continue to occur.

Manila has a very active civil society that is heterogeneous and has conflicting political and strategic orientations. The role of NGOs in the anti-authoritarian movement and their increased role in social welfare provision after decentralization reforms gave them great legitimacy among Filipinos. Decentralisation reforms were welcomed by a civil society that was receiving an influx of talented individuals, as many underground members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which had waged an insurgent war against the government since the early 1970s, left the movement to engage in development work and political organizing. The Catholic Church has also been very influential in community organization. The scale of community organizing ranges from an informal community leadership to large CBO federations and professional NGOs. They were able to push through the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA), giving squatters' struggles for land some legal protections (and hence legitimacy). But without any real mechanisms for land redistribution, or steps to address the tax laws that encourage land hoarding, and without concomitant repeal of an old Marcos-era law that criminalized squatting they have not been able to stop evictions. However, as they have become key actors in development, politicians have increasingly used such organizations to further their own political ambitions, businesses have used NGOs for financial gain and there has been a recasting of existing power structures through decentralisation strategies and discourses.

Fourth, attempts at enclave formation within cities by the *middle classes* essentially represent the conditions of global capitalism in which transnational capital flows freely to support investment in the built environment as a means of encapsulating its presence and reinforcing its benefits. The effects of new and growing middle class in Jakarta was manifested in the mushrooming of low density new towns with western sounding names on fringes of JMA in 1980s and 1990's, which nevertheless continues today but at a slower pace. The main lure of these dwelling units for the upper classes and the newly emergent aspirant middle class was the promise of a modern, western and gated life style with the presence of private security. Although they were advertised as creating self-contained communities, they have ended up becoming new towns bedroom suburbs for city-bound commuters. The presence of the middleclass is also influential in the case of schemes such as the Green Jakarta Movement where engagement with the 'citizen groups' means mainly with taxpaying middle class communities. The lexicon of green has truly entered the real estate markets, which have enabled, in an ironic twist, developers with the worst histories of environmental abuse to 'greenwash' projects and develop 'green properties' (Kusno 2011). In Manila too the growth of the middle class has led to gentrification and segregation in the new suburbia. Gated communities have proliferated with fortified by high walls and gates, latest surveillance equipment and guarded by private security, which not only protects residents from crime but also keeps away informal land uses.

In Delhi, the middle class has largely embraced an ideological position that moves back and forth between sociopolitical illiberalism and market liberalism, and is refracted onto the urban terrain as a discursive politics of environmentalism that Baviskar (2004) calls 'bourgeois environmentalism'. The politics seemingly arose with the aim of relocating polluting units outside city limits, when M. C. Mehta a Magsaysay Award winning legal expert, took initiative in this case. Narrow definitions of urban livability have been shaped by the emergence of a model of consumer-citizenship that seeks to displace the political claims of marginalised social groups to resources such as jobs and housing within urban spaces. It is a very exclusive articulation of the right to the city. The increasingly vocal and assertive middle class in Delhi have overseen hundreds of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) filed by the Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) of middle class colonies in various courts pleading for eviction of squatter settlements from their vicinities.

Terms such as 'residents', 'citizens', 'law abiding taxpaying citizen', 'encroacher', 'illegal habitants' and 'nuisance' are frequently used in the narrative of RWAs. Since most of the squatting takes place on public land all the petitions are made out in "public interest", although it serves to only improve the property values of nearby planned colonies. Post–eviction, a major portion of the land from which slum dwellers have been evicted on the pretext of public interest lies vacant. The price of the vacated land is higher, thus it is then used to build high-end residential areas, shopping malls, office complexes and/or new roads. The poor were portrayed as polluters who were destroying the Yamuna riverbed and the Yamuna Pushta forced evictions that led to the clearing of the area, led to the construction the Commonwealth Games Village that was to be later converted into high-class apartments. Rather than seeing slums as desperate measures of poor rural migrants for shelter and survival, the courts have interpreted them as the usurpation of large areas of public land free of cost. Ironically, although the rich have also unauthorizedly grabbed land in Delhi, which unofficially is said to be far more than that by the poor, it does not invite similar references of illegality, criminality and unsustainability.

The mega urban regions of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila are compared as sites of confrontation between a militant neoliberal warfare against informality (Ortega 2016) on the one hand, and progressively systematised and coordinated, though still tenuous and contradictory movements (Holston 2009) on the other. It raises the question whether the everyday struggles of poor residents of mega cities for basic housing and services has also generated new movements of insurgent citizenship (Holston 2009)? If such movements exist are they significant enough to confront macro forces that determine political power in the city, and therefore able to bring about structural change in power relations? The evolution of Delhi, Jakarta and Manila, as the spaces of insurgent citizenship is traced through the trajectory and the nature of recent mass movements in these cities. Jakarta and Manila have in common the characteristic of the being the most important places where pro-democratization movements against oppressive authoritarian regimes (tacitly supported by the US) took place in their countries in the post independence period in 1998 and 1986 respectively. Although Delhi does not share such a history in the post independence period, yet all three cities have a common thread running through mass mobilizations in the post decentralization and post liberalization period: that of eruptions against rampant corruption and poor governance. The growing presence of urban professionals and the

uses of newer venues of protest apart from the traditional symbolic spaces of modernist nationalism show that the older symbolic urban spaces of national identity and ideals were declining in relevance in the age of globalisation.

In May 1998, a groundswell of demonstrations occurred in Jakarta; where people took to the streets of Jakarta to demand for, and which ultimately culminated in President Suharto's resignation. This event was germinal to a budding civil society and individuals started their activism during that Reform Movement through various organizations. It was followed by the birth of various non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations that became bases of grassroots movements. By the turn of the new millennium, the last vestiges of the authoritarian regime were gone and Indonesia started to experience a meteoric emergence of civil society that is very vocal and assertive in their demands for an inclusive and environmentally sustainable form of development. The politics of this emergent civil society impedes the official course of actions, and disrupts and questions the dominant order of official business. During these protest public spaces that were markers of Indonesian nationalism were transformed into spaces for mass protests and now they have become the propaganda spaces of Jakarta's revived civil society.

Metro Manila has had a distinguished history of political protest and conflict, most prominently the 'People Power 1' and 'People Power 2' demonstrations, and an army mutiny in the heart of Metro Manila in Makati CBD in 2003. The urban poor were an important group in the anti-Marcos demonstrations in Metro Manila and were an early target of President Aquino's efforts to shore up her personal legitimacy. Once civil society was free to operate without leaders fearing arrest and abuse, the movement became less confrontational towards the government, and more oriented towards getting tangible outcomes in areas of land tenure and secure housing (Hutchison 2007).   Again, in the January of 2001, a series of protests, popularly referred to as People Power 2, ousted President Joseph Estrada of allegations of corruption and inefficiency. People Power 2 was however more divisive, with a coalition of the urban middle class, business, and some sections of the left, pitted against Estrada's mainly poor and lower middle class following. There were counter protests by the latter which sometimes referred to as People Power 3 of poor voters with whose support Estrada came to power. While during People Power 1, the symbolic sites of nationalist urbanism in Metro Manila played an important role, however the increased use of Makati CBD, as a space for protest and involvement of

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Makati based professional symbolises the growing influence of the spaces of globalisation in shaping national demands.

In Delhi, two events of mass protests are examined in this study: the anti-corruption movement of 2011 and the Nirbhaya rape protests of 2012, both of which took place in the traditional symbolic places of national identity in the national capital such as Jantar Mantar, India Gate, Raisina hill, Rajghat, as well as in more plebeian venues such as Ramlila Maidan. These protests were largely devoid of violence and driven by not only the middle class but also the working class. Thus the class frontiers of the protestor crowds were better defined by their demands for consumption of goods and services, which included efficient and transparent governance. This is because the media valorised notions of the globalised new Indian middle class is based on the acceptance of new social standards of taste and commodity consumption, and symptomatic of a new cultural norm that is specifically associated with liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy. This new middle class has open boundaries and appears accessible to the urban working class population. It is also a reflection of the fact that largely the urban middle classes today people the civil society in India, and it is a sphere that represents the influence of capitalist hegemony (Chatterjee 2008).

The strategies adopted by dwellers of informal settlements and the role of civil society organizations who come to their aid in the three cities are also compared. In Delhi, resistance strategies against eviction are better described as strategies of endurance, and intermittent contestation, rather than well-organized social movements. Such practices range from direct confrontations and protests in the streets, to weak mass mobilizations supported by civil society organizations. The use of violence of any kind, forcibly trying to stop bulldozers, even stone pelting is very rare in Delhi and residents giving in to the inevitability of displacement and quietly salvage as many of their belongings as possible, so that they may be reused at a new site to build their homes. When CBOs and NGOs, and even journalists take up cudgels on behalf of the squatters, they are likely to get being beaten up or detained by the police. Although some NGOs have helped the displaced communities file petitions in courts yet they have had temporary or no effect in stopping demolitions given the nature of judicial interventions in urban governance since the 1990s. Generally speaking Delhi lacks the presence of efficient grassroots-based organizing among the slum dwellers, to present an effective common response to displacement,

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despite being placed in the milieu of a stable democracy with very few hindrances in community organizing. The attempts to mobilize communities undertaken by NGOs, CBOs or workers' unions in Delhi are largely random and uncoordinated. Even the awareness and empowerment campaigns to be only partially successful in their outreach, with the result that many slum dwellers were either not aware of their rights during the eviction or left without aid to negotiate the administrative procedures to get a resettlement plot. Another hurdle to mass resistance is that often Delhi slum dwellers themselves happen to be a divided lot, between the Muslim and the Hindu communities and between the completely penurious and the relatively comfortable households. The elite and middle classes in Delhi who are turning increasingly intolerant of the urban poor and informality have sought to replace the political society of the poor with their civil society organisations.

The evicted communities of Jakarta often resist the official efforts through physical resistance to police, public order officials, and neighbourhood gangs under official patronage. This confrontation often takes the form of brandishing sharpened sticks, throwing rocks, physically blocking access to their homes, and setting tyres on fire. The police and public order officials who come to enforce the evictions carry firearms, knives, or baton sticks, and have access to tear gas and water cannons. Police and public order officials also wear protective helmets with faceguards and protective padding, and have riot shields for protection. Some leading NGOs in Jakarta have tried to broaden the support base of the urban poor to include to the middle classes as well. Framing their cause to incorporate the terminology of the popular middle class causes such as Human Rights and organizing protests on Human Rights Day attempt this. With the emergence of the green discourse NGOs have attempted to shape a new style of resistance recast in the language of participation in the greening of the city. They have also trained urban poor communities in ways of greening their homes and their environment through waste management and landscaping as an effort towards changing the thinking that the poor and their dwellings are an urban pathology and tries to characterize them as citizens with individual capacities and as co-participants in green governance. NGOs also provide pro bono lawyers for the poor to file lawsuits when their rights have been breached and the very act of filing lawsuits against the governor and the act of collection of data of their ordeals by the informal settlers themselves, serve as an exercise of empowerment and awareness. Some NGOs also try to build partnerships with the

media for publicity for themselves and their cause as well as for trying to form a more inclusive media discourse.

The role of the civil society that emerged in Manila after the fall of Marcos includes CBOs, NGOs and CBO federations, was mandated by the passage of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which devolved responsibility for planning and the provision of most basic services to Local Government Units (LGUs) and stipulated that barangay and local development councils must be constituted to the proportion of at least 25 per cent by NGOs and POs (Peoples Organisations). This approach has however also been criticised as the formalization of self-help and is accused of blocking the urban poor's to access to state resources and protection as a justiciable right. Manila (and Philippines in general) has an active civil society organized at many levels starting from informal leaders who intermediate between the government and the community, to stable and formal CBOs with an elected leadership, often coalescing in an umbrella body of CBOs. They deal with issues such as the delivery of infrastructure and services, and provide organising in times of eviction. They are also aided by professional NGOs who help in community organising. The flourishing of civil society has not been able to stop illegal evictions. Most evictions in Manila are violent and are also met with violence on the part of state agencies. Although the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) was passed, giving squatters' struggles for land some legal protections (and hence legitimacy), but there is no real mechanisms for land redistribution or steps to address the tax laws that encourage land hoarding. There was no concomitant repeal of an old Marcos-era law that criminalized squatting (Hutchison 2007). Evictions often taken place with only a fraction of the household being provided alternative sites, although such provisions are expressly stipulated in the UDHA.

Finally, the patterns of segregation along ethno-cultural lines in the three cities are compared. Studies of spatial manifestations of neoliberal urbanism have mostly missed the fact that the new patterns of segregation of India's urban population were based not only on class, but also on ethno-religious lines, as attested by the consolidation of Muslim enclaves in Delhi. The fear of communal violence directed at them, experiences of discrimination emanating from the stigma attached to their Muslim names, discriminatory business practices, discriminations in the housing market and being frequently profiled as either criminals or terrorists, have all contributed to self segregation, self-aggregation and social distancing leading to the

formation of long-term enclaves along religious lines. This has been reinforced with the rise of Hindu nationalism and communal violence in the last two decades in urban centres in India in general. Empirical studies have proven the presence of discriminatory practices in the housing market directed towards Muslims and the Scheduled Caste population in the city. The population of Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes are disproportionately high in relation to their total population in the informal housing sector, which included slums, resettlement colonies and the urban villages. The reverse is true in the case of upper caste Hindus, the latter's presence being much higher in the DDA planned colonies and cooperative group housing societies. The presence of Muslims is also disproportionately high in relation to their population in slums and resettlement colonies.

The spatial structure of Jakarta is characterized by the presence of several ethnic enclaves. The most prominent ones are the ones of Chinese-descent, Betawi, Batak, Indian-descent and Arab-descent. A few hundred Chinese artisans who had settled as traders along the shore of Batavia, the 17th-century capital city of the Dutch East Indies played an instrumental role in constructing it. In today's Jakarta many urban megaprojects have been built by real estate companies belonging to the descendants of the original merchants and other Chinese who have migrated since then. Chinese-Indonesians, who constitute approximately 1 - 4 percent of Indonesia's 250 million people, have played a massive role in shaping the morphology Jakarta, far more in proportion to their actual population. The economic success of the group's small elite has led to repeated episodes of resentment, discrimination and even violent assaults. The history of discrimination against the migrant Chinese dates back to 1740 when the Dutch ruled Batavia. After Independence from the Dutch, new laws were framed where Chinese-Indonesian was identified as alien and citizenship was denied to many even though they had lived in Indonesia for many generations. Suharto effectively harnessed the capital of the resident Chinese population for Indonesia's economic development. The practice of the New Order ruling elite of granted monopolies to their patrons, and the presence of license restrictions allowed many ethnic Chinese businesses to develop and expand, and eventually come to dominate Indonesia's economy. This arrangement of monopolies and lucrative trade arrangements helped the oligarchic families of the Suharto regime, enabling the dictator's aides and his six children to assume control of key sectors of the economy and amass enormous fortunes. The deregulation exercise in the second half of the

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1980's lead to further expansion of the Chinese owned conglomerates. Chinese-Indonesians, at twilight of the Suharto era, constituted only 4 per cent of the population but owned more than 90 per cent of the country's wealth and were the owners of large business empires manufacturing a wide array of products, delving into sectors like real estate and finance too after liberalisation.

Resentment against the Chinese has exploded several times in the postcolonial years. The most violent incidents took place in 1965, 1984 and 1998. In 1965, with simmering anti-Chinese sentiments in the background and following Suharto's army-powered overthrow of Sukarno, Indonesian mobs and the military went on a rampage that decimated the Chinese-Indonesian community by hundreds of thousands. During this three month long rampage approximately 90000 Chinese-Indonesians fled Indonesia. In May 1998, when Suharto was dislodged from power, mobs targeted Glodok, the historic Chinatown of Jakarta, pillaging shops and burning buildings, killing more than a thousand and raping women and girls. Since then Glodok has turned into a fortified enclave, guarded by huge iron gates and patrolled by community members at night. After 1998, the ethnic Chinese have been able to express their heritage more freely, as successive leaders abandoned the assimilation policy of the Suharto era. However the community continues to face challenges; as is currently manifested in the continuing racist and communal harassment of the sitting Governor of Jakarta, Ahok, a Chinese-Indonesian, who now must face trial for blasphemy charges. The vacuum of political power left in the wake of the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime, is increasingly filled by alternative constructions of public morality. Some of these new urban movements based on such moralities are characterized by intolerance, conservatism and violence.

Contrasted to Delhi and Jakarta is Manila, a social urban aggregate and one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the world. Though historically, Manila's morphology has been shaped by segregation of the dwelling quarters of the Spanish, Chinese, and indigenous Filipinos, yet in the postcolonial years it has been reconfigured predominantly in terms of class rather than ethnicity.

The methodology adopted in this study the comparative method, wherein three globalising Asian megacities have been chosen for the comparative study of their emerging political geographies. Delhi, Jakarta and Manila have been found to be comparable cases, as matched on many variables but also at variance in terms of key variables that are the focus of analysis, thus allowing a more satisfactory assessment

of their influence. A parallel demonstration of theory is attempted in the three cities, wherein strategies of intentional global city formation by state and non-state actors are examined along with the influence of neoliberal modes of urban governance. A contrast of contexts is also attempted within the three cities examined, in order to highlight the attendant processes of hybridisation and the diverse responses of displaced communities and their organisations to forces that attempt accumulation through dispossession. Within case analysis and inter-case comparisons demonstrate not only the mobility of theoretical constructs but also valuable lessons learnt from other cities with respect to the applicability of certain strategies of urban development and resistance.

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Appendix

Table 1: Percentage of Urban Population

	India	Indonesia	Philippines
1950	17	12.4	27.1
1960	17.9	14.6	30.3
1970	19.8	17.1	33
1980	23.1	22.1	37.5
1990	25.5	30.6	48.6
2000	27.7	42	48
2010	30.9	49.9	45.3
2020*	34.8	57.2	44.3
2030*	39.5	63	46.3
2040*	44.8	67.2	51.1
2050*	50.3	70.9	56.3

*Projected.

Source: WUP 2014, ESCAP SD table_01 - Urban population, share of total population -1950-2050* Projections. In, The United Nations Human Settlement Programme (2015), The State of Asian and Pacific Cities. Urban transformations. Shifting from quantity to quality.[5]

Table 2: Annual Average Rate of Change of Urban Population.

	India	Indonesia	Philippines
1950 -1960	2.31	3.69	4.67
1960 - 1970	3.13	4.17	4.02
1970 -1980	3.94	5.15	4.17
1980 - 1990	3.24	5.44	5.41
1990 - 2000	2.65	4.85	2.15

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5 The UN does not have its own definition of "urban" population but follows the definition that is used in each country. The definitions are generally those used by national statistical offices in carrying out the latest available census.

2000 -2010	2.6	3.19	1.28
2010 – 2020*	2.36	2.52	1.46
2020 – 2030*	2.16	1.84	1.94
2030 – 2040*	1.86	1.24	2.16
2040 – 2050*	1.51	0.86	1.88

*Projected.

Source: WUP 2014, ESCAP SD table_01 - Urban population, share of total population -1950-2050* Projections. In, The United Nations Human Settlement Programme, (2015). The State of Asian and Pacific Cities. Urban transformations. Shifting from quantity to quality.

Table 3: Population of Urban Agglomeration[6] (in thousands)

	Delhi[7]	Jakarta[8]	Manila[9]
1950	1369	1452	1544
1960	2283	2679	2274
1970	3531	3915	3534
1980	5558	5984	5955
1990	9726	8175	7973
2000	15732	8390	9962
2010	21935	9630	11891
2020*	29348	11299	13942
2030*	36060	13812	16756

*Projected.

Source: The United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) (2015) The State of Asian and Pacific Cities. Urban transformations. Shifting from quantity to quality.

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6 The term "urban agglomeration" refers to the population contained within the contours of a contiguous territory inhabited at urban density levels without regard to administrative boundaries. It usually incorporates the population in a city or town plus that in the suburban areas lying outside of, but being adjacent to, the city boundaries.

7 Includes Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Noida, Gurgaon and Bahadurgarh urban areas and New Delhi.

8 DKI Jakarta

9 National Capital Region of Manila.

Table 4: Annual Average Rate of Growth of Population.

	Delhi UA	Jakarta UA	Manila UA
1950 -1960	5.24	6.32	3.95
1960 – 1970	4.46	3.87	4.51
1970 -1980	4.64	4.33	5.36
1980 – 1990	5.75	3.17	2.96
1990 - 2000	4.93	0.26	2.25
2000 -2010	3.38	1.39	1.79
2010 – 2020*	2.95	1.61	1.6
2020 – 2030*	2.08	2.03	1.86

*Projected.

Source: The United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) (2015) The State of Asian and Pacific Cities. Urban transformations. Shifting from quantity to quality.

Table 5: Delhi, Number of Jhuggie Jhopdi Clusters.

Year	1951	1961	1971	1973	1981	1983	1991	1994	1997	2001	2015
No. of JJ Clusters	199	544	1124	1373	290	534	929	1080	1100	728	675

Sources: 1. IL&FS Ecosmart Limited (2006), *City Development Plan, Delhi (JNNURM),* New Delhi: Department of Urban Development. Government of Delhi. 2.Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (2015), *List of JJ Clusters.* Government of Delhi.

Table 6: Distribution of Population by Different Tenurial Categories in Delhi, 1999.

Tenurial Category	No. of Settlements	Population (in lakhs)	Percentage of total population
JJC	1160	20.72	15.67

Resettlement colonies	52	17.76	13.43
Unauthorisedcolonies	1500	25.16	19.03
Urban villages	216	8.88	6.72
Notified slum area	-	26.64	20.15
Shelterless	-	-	0.00
Planned colonies		33.08	25.02
TOTAL	-	132.34	100.00

Sources: Compiled from i) DUEIP, Status Report for Delhi 21, GOI & MoE&F, 2001.

ii) A Peoples Housing Policy. Case Study of Delhi. Sajha Manch, 2003.

Table 7: India, Indonesia and Philippines, GDP: 1980 -2016.

	GDP in PPP Billion dollars (current international dollar)			Per capita GDP in PPP Billion dollars (current international dollar)		
	India	Indonesia	Philippines	India	Indonesia	Philippines
1980	381.961	184.423	90.284	557.048	1,250.41	1,885.64
1981	442.709	216.977	102.094	632.498	1,442.61	2,079.77
1982	486.519	235.616	112.353	679.912	1,536.17	2,232.87
1983	542.586	255.186	118.977	742.252	1,631.51	2,306.38
1984	583.309	284.257	114.177	780.868	1,782.15	2,159.81
1985	633.604	304.81	109.221	830.344	1,873.97	2,016.18
1986	677.253	333.309	115.23	868.83	2,009.46	2,076.59
1987	722.079	364.28	123.266	906.566	2,153.61	2,167.23
1988	819.31	403.345	136.196	1,007.14	2,338.34	2,341.53
1989	901.792	457.097	150.272	1,085.84	2,598.59	2,523.35
1990	986.896	516.674	160.563	1,164.57	2,880.35	2,634.77
1991	1,030.52	581.537	164.948	1,192.39	3,189.06	2,645.09
1992	1,111.80	633.591	169.278	1,260.72	3,417.84	2,652.42
1993	1,192.32	700.271	176.972	1,323.33	3,715.90	2,709.31
1994	1,298.78	769.099	188.669	1,413.26	4,014.56	2,822.70
1995	1,426.30	849.679	201.615	1,522.20	4,362.81	2,947.16
1996	1,561.98	932.826	217.296	1,635.47	4,735.06	3,022.20

1997	1,653.06	993.39	232.477	1,698.17	4,984.91	3,161.67
1998	1,774.34	872.355	233.645	1,788.65	4,327.56	3,108.63
1999	1,953.95	892.713	244.531	1,934.24	4,377.99	3,184.83
2000	2,077.84	958.481	261.127	2,018.92	4,646.85	3,400.54
2001	2,230.28	1,016.04	274.808	2,128.13	4,856.66	3,496.73
2002	2,353.00	1,078.06	289.199	2,211.34	5,080.64	3,607.78
2003	2,590.57	1,152.12	309.627	2,397.56	5,353.32	3,781.47
2004	2,870.73	1,243.36	339.449	2,615.85	5,696.02	4,062.34
2005	3,238.20	1,356.41	367.11	2,906.83	6,126.59	4,305.77
2006	3,646.91	1,475.00	398.229	3,227.36	6,568.55	4,578.93
2007	4,110.92	1,610.33	435.876	3,587.19	7,070.37	4,913.50
2008	4,354.65	1,764.11	462.883	3,747.54	7,636.64	5,116.99
2009	4,759.79	1,861.08	471.754	4,040.57	7,943.14	5,182.97
2010	5,312.26	2,003.96	513.963	4,445.17	8,432.70	5,550.36
2011	5,781.84	2,171.52	543.771	4,749.19	8,973.56	5,734.77
2012	6,219.19	2,344.88	590.802	5,003.37	9,554.34	6,121.66
2013	6,739.17	2,515.16	642.751	5,351.30	10,108.43	6,546.31
2014	7,356.73	2,688.81	694.932	5,765.82	10,662.92	6,938.98
2015	7,998.28	2,848.03	743.898	6,187.23	11,148.54	7,282.27
2016	8,720.51	3,027.83		6,658.34	11,699.41	7,696.16

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016

Table 8: Delhi, District-wise Decadal Population Growth and Decline, 1991 to 2011.

District	Decadal Growth 2001 -2011	Decadal Growth 1991 -2001
North West	21.76	60.91
South	17.02	50.95
West	16.29	48.56
North East	21.13	62.92
South West	23.46	61.37
East	14.38	43.06
North	11.99	13.82

Central	-11.00	-1.55
New Delhi	-26.13	6.19
Total	17.50	47.02

Source: Census of India: 2011, 2001 and 1991.

Table 9: Delhi, District-wise Distribution of Population, 1991 to 2011.

District	Percentage of Total Population , 2011	Percentage of Total Population , 2001	Percentage of Total Population , 1991
North West	21.78	20.65	18.87
South	16.27	16.37	15.94
West	15.15	15.37	15.21
North East	13.35	12.77	11.52
South West	13.66	12.67	11.55
East	10.18	10.57	10.86
North	5.29	5.64	7.29
Central	3.47	4.67	6.97
New Delhi	0.85	1.29	1.79

Source: Census of India: 2011, 2001 and 1991.

Table 10: Delhi, District-wise Population Density Distribution, 1991 to 2011.

	Population Density (per sq km) 1991	Population Density(per sq km) 2001	Population Density (per sq km) 2011
North West	4027	6502	8254
South	6044	9068	11060
West	11066	16503	19563
North East	17791	29468	36155
South West	2583	4169	5446
East	16111	22868	27132
North	11444	13246	14557
Central	28545	25855	27730
New Delhi	4819	5117	4057

Source : Census of India: 2011, 2001 and 1991.

Table 11: Delhi, Number of Jhuggi Jhopri Households, 2016

Central	25826
West	51277
South West	7402
South	53782
New Delhi	25918

North West	26970
North	34734
South East	27938
East	19836
Shahdara	30777
North East	2763

Source: GNCTD, 2016.

Table 12: Jakarta Metropolitan Area, inter-censal growth rates and density of population of core and periphery: 1961 – 2010.

Census year	DKI Jakarta			Bodetabek		
	Population	Inter-censal Growth (per cent)	Density (per sq. km)	Population	Inter-censal Growth (per cent)	Density (per sq. km)
1961	2904533		5070	2794712		436
1971	4546492	36.11	7936	3483537	19.77	543
1980	6503449	30.09	11352	5413271	35.65	844
1990	7259257	10.41	12671	8878256	39.03	1384
2000	8347083	13.03	14570	12842626	30.87	2001
2010	9607787	13.12	16771	17839240	28.01	2780

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, 2010.

Table 13: Jakarta Metropolitan Area, population by areal constituents, 2000 – 2010.

Area	Population (in millions), 2000	Population (in millions), 2010
DKI Jakarta	8.39	9.6
City of Tangerang	1.33	1.8
City of South Tangerang	0.8	1.29
City of Depok	1.14	1.75
City of Bekasi	1.66	2.38
City of Bogor	0.75	0.95
Tangerang Regency	2.02	2.84

Bekasi Regency	1.62	2.63
Bogor Regency	2.92	4.78

Source: Compiled from i) Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS); ii) Firman 1997; iii) Cox 2011.

Table 14: Metro Manila, Decadal Growth – 1990 to 2010.

	Decadal Growth 2010-2000	Decadal Growth 2000-1990
City of Manila	4.50	-1.26
City of Mandaluyong	18.04	12.22
City of Marikina	8.43	26.09
City of Pasig	32.61	27.00
Quezon City	27.04	30.19
City of San Juan	3.19	-7.23
Caloocan City	26.45	54.25
City of Malabon	4.27	21.00
City of Navotas	8.13	22.90
City of Valenzuela	18.52	42.68
City of Las Piñas	16.88	59.13
City of Makati	18.92	-1.83
City of Muntinlupa	21.26	36.24
City of Parañaque	30.75	45.93
Pasay City	10.70	-3.65
Pateros	11.74	11.67
Taguig City	37.89	75.29

Sources:1.Phillipines National Statistical Coordination Board, 2001; 2.Phillipines Statistical Authority, 2010; 2015.

Table 15: National Capital Region of Manila - Population from 1990 -2015

	% of total pop 2015	% of total pop 2010	% of total pop 2007	% of total pop 2000	% of total pop 1995	% of total pop 1990
City of Manila	13.82	13.94	14.36	15.96	17.50	20.15
City of Mandaluyong	3.00	2.77	2.64	2.81	3.03	3.12
City of Marikina	3.50	3.58	3.67	3.95	3.78	3.90
City of Pasig	5.87	5.65	5.42	5.10	4.98	5.00
Quezon City	22.80	23.29	23.17	21.94	21.04	21.01
City of San Juan	0.95	1.02	1.08	1.19	1.31	1.60
Caloocan City	12.30	12.56	11.95	11.89	10.82	9.60
City of	2.84	2.98	3.14	3.42	3.68	3.52

Malabon						
City of Navotas	1.94	2.10	2.12	2.33	2.42	2.36
City of Valenzuela	4.82	4.85	4.92	4.90	4.62	4.28
City of Las Piñas	4.57	4.66	4.60	4.77	4.37	3.74
City of Makati	4.52	4.46	4.91	4.49	5.12	5.70
City of Muntinlupa	3.92	3.88	3.92	3.83	4.23	3.50
City of Parañaque	5.17	4.96	4.78	4.54	4.14	3.88
Pasay City	3.23	3.31	3.48	3.58	4.32	4.63
Pateros	0.50	0.54	0.54	0.58	0.58	0.65
Taguig City	6.25	5.44	5.30	4.72	4.03	3.35

Sources:1. Phillipines National Statistical Coordination Board, 2001; 2. Phillipines Statistical Authority, 2010; 2015.

Table 16: Metro Manila, Distribution of Slum Households, 2002.

	Total number of depressed households, 2002
City of Manila	99,549
City of Mandaluyong	25,383
City of Marikina	28,580
City of Pasig	27,328
Quezon City	169,490
City of San Juan	N.A.
Caloocan City	67,292
City of Malabon	12,461
City of Navotas	19,030
City of Valenzuela	36,404
City of Las Piñas	36,107
City of Makati	27,024
City of Muntinlupa	40,457
City of Parañaque	29,790
Pasay City	57,436
Pateros	3,502
Taguig City	21,931

Source:1. Phillipines National Statistical Coordination Board, 2001.

Table 17: Metro Manila, Density of Population- 1990 to 2015.

	2015	2010	2007	2000	1995	1990
City of Manila	46479	43138	43361	41282	43205	41808

City of Mandaluyong	14857	12642	11753	10711	11033	9544
City of Marikina	11587	10904	10915	10056	9183	7975
City of Pasig	58100	51521	48265	38851	36237	30591
Quezon City	17666	16617	16122	13080	11970	10047
City of San Juan	11748	11676	12052	11315	11941	12198
Caloocan City	28387	26685	24760	21104	18336	13681
City of Malabon	15621	15100	15542	14481	14850	11967
City of Navotas	95947	95820	94363	88617	88092	72107
City of Valenzuela	13200	12242	12105	10328	9301	7239
City of Las Piñas	14190	13315	12827	11392	9954	7159
City of Makati	19485	17694	18975	14878	16193	15156
City of Muntinlupa	10803	9849	9699	8122	8562	5962
City of Parañaque	17384	15356	14430	11744	10217	8048
Pasay City	29966	28264	28997	25533	29396	26501
Pateros	6138	6168	5956	5520	5316	4943
Taguig City	23885	19124	18200	13869	11316	7912

Sources:1. Phillipines National Statistical Coordination Board, 2001; 2. Phillipines Statistical Authority, 2010; 2015.