

**Nonproliferation and Sanctions:
A Comparative Study of Evolving Indian
and Chinese Discourse**

*Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
for award of the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RISHIKA CHAUHAN



Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi-110067

2018



Date: 5.11.18

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “Nonproliferation and Sanctions: A Comparative Study of Evolving Indian and Chinese Discourse” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

Rishika Chauhan

Rishika Chauhan

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Choodon

**Prof. Yeshi Choedon
(Chairperson, CIPOD)**



Chairperson
Centre for International Politics,
Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Swaran Singh
5.11.18

**Prof. Swaran Singh
(Supervisor)**



Centre for International Politics,
Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Dedicated
to
Ma, Papa and Bhai.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my PhD supervisor, Professor Swaran Singh, who helped me initially in framing and later in refining my research and supported me through the process of thesis writing. Without his guidance and persistent help this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Professor Long Xingchun, from China West Normal University who encouraged me to apply for the Chinese government scholarship and offered me the position of a Visiting Scholar at the Centre for India Studies in the university. The scholarship made it possible for me to stay in China and finish my field work. I would always be grateful for all his help and support throughout my stay in China. I learnt and continue to learn a lot about China from him.

In addition, I would like to thank the various members of the Indian and Chinese academic community who helped me in different stages of framing and writing my thesis. I am indebted to Professor C. Raja Mohan, who helped me in conceptualizing the study. Shen Dingli, Tong Zhao, Li Tao, Lora Ofner and the academics I reached out to at Peking University were very helpful. My Chinese teachers and the administrative staff of CWNU and CIPOD made my work easier. Thank you Ajay sir, Roshni ma'am and Birendra bhaiya for all your help and patience. My friends Wang Li, Sheng Yangyang, Zhang Min (Chaio Min), thank you for helping me during my stay and work in China. Wang Li, I will always be grateful for all your help and support, that you continue to offer. Frank Lee, Vincent, Johnny and Song Sha, thank you for all your encouragement during the hard times. Johnnythan, meant a lot when you checked on me and my work from time to time. Finally a doctor! right. In addition, my friends Shruti, Priti Sinha, Sunil, Junjun, Ai Zhong whose help and faith in me kept me going. Ekta, Malvika and Pooja you have given me strength in my darkest hours. I will always be grateful. Ivy and Zoe, I cannot thank you enough for supporting me through thick and thin. You are my 'home' feeling, I value your friendship and the wonderful times. Ivy, accomplishing this would have been twice as hard if it wasn't for you. Sneha, your unwavering faith in me meant a lot, even when you were not around it was enough to lighten my days.

I want to thank my parents and bhai. I owe them everything I am and aspire to be. Manpreet and Oindrilla, thank you for being my rock, you are my best.

CONTENTS

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. Background	1
1.1 India	2
1.2 China	4
1.2. Contemporary Debates	6
1.2.1 Sanctions Evolution in International Relations Literature	6
1.2.2 Locating Sanctions in Economic Coercion	7
1.2.3 Sanctions: Issue Saliency and Commitment Problem	8
1.2.4 Sanctions and Nonproliferation	9
1.3 India and Sanctions	11
1.4 China and Sanctions	12
1.5 Rationale and Scope of Study	13

Chapter 2

Sanctions in Foreign Policy Discourse	19
2.1 Sanctions and the Non-Western Perception	20
2.2 Sanctions in the Indian Context	23
2.3 Sanctions in Chinese Context	25
2.4 India as a Sanctioner	27
2.5 China as a Sanctioner	33
2.6 Western versus Non-Western Sanctions	41

Chapter 3

Responding to Sanctions on Self	44
3. Nuclear Nonproliferation regime	45

3.1	Problems with the NPT	47
3.1.1	Indian Perspective	47
3.1.2	Pakistani Perspective	51
3.2.	Nuclear Nonproliferation Sanctions	52
3.3	Sanctionees	58
3.3.1	India as a Sanctionee	58
3.3.2	China as a Santionee	66
3.4	Indian and Chinese reactions to sanctions	71
Chapter 4		
	Responding to Sanctions on Third Parties	78
4.1	Indian and Chinese Response to Iran sanctions	79
4.1.1	UNSC sanctions against Iran	80
4.1.2	European Union sanctions against Iran	82
4.1.3	Unilateral Sanctions against Iran	83
4.1.4	India Balancing	86
4.1.5	China Assertive	87
4.1.6	BRICS and RIC Response	89
4.2	Indian and Chinese Response to North Korea sanctions	90
4.2.1	US Sanctions on North Korea	92
4.2.2	India Supportive	93
4.2.3	China Dismissive	95
4.2.4	BRICS and RIC response	96
4.3	Indian and Chinese Response to Iraq Sanctions	97
4.3.1	Supportive India	102
4.3.2	Defying China	103

Chapter 5	
Assessing the Alternative Paradigm	108
5.1 Colonialism in India and China	110
5.1.1 Colonial Experience of India	111
5.1.2 India's Post-Imperial Ideology	114
5.1.3 Colonial Experience of China	115
5.1.4 Post-Imperial Ideology of China	118
5.2 The Indian and Chinese Exceptionalism	119
5.3 Sources of Indian Exceptionalism	124
5.4 Sources of Chinese Exceptionalism	127
Chapter 6	
Conclusion	131
References	148

Tables:

1. Table 2.1	Major sanctions imposed by India	33
2. Table 2.2	Major sanctions imposed by China	41
3. Table 3.1	US Nonproliferation Laws	58
4. Table 3.2	Major Nonproliferation Sanctions against India	65
5. Table 3.3	Selected Chinese Proliferation Activity During the 1990s	70
6. Table 3.4	Major Nonproliferation Sanctions against China	71
7. Table 6.1	Models of political survival and nuclear outcomes	134

Chapter 1: Introduction

The study proposes to analyze the Indian and Chinese discourses on sanctions as instruments of nuclear nonproliferation. To evaluate the contributions of Chinese and Indian discourse on the evolution of sanctions, it approaches the topic at two levels—when sanctions were imposed on India and China; and, subsequently when sanctions were imposed on other states. By delving into the Indian and Chinese responses, the study seeks to engage with the question how India and China perceive this tool of statecraft, especially as a means of checking nuclear proliferation.

The study also evaluates if the Indian and Chinese reactions to sanctions changed on account of the target, examining the cases of Iraq, North Korea and Iran. Although India and China are dissimilar on various counts, with regard to international sanctions their stands have often been congruent as both have been largely uneasy about the increasing use of international sanctions. The two Asian states have also often taken similar stands against sanctions in political groups like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and at the trilateral forum RIC (Russia, India, China). India and China have themselves been the target of several international sanctions. Nevertheless with their increasing economic might and growing external linkages their support has often been imperative to sustain sanction regimes.

Background

Though sanctions have not been mentioned as a means of checking nuclear proliferation in the text of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), they have lent substantive support to the nonproliferation regime, especially since the 1990s. This particular tool of economic coercion has garnered interest and attention as a consequence of nonproliferation regime's dismal performance in curtailing NPT signatories like Iraq and North Korea, from initiating their own nuclear weapon programmes (Paul 1996: 440). However, with regard to sanctions, the world has been geographically divided with the developed 'North' assuming the role of a sanctioner and the 'South' being relegated to the role of a sanctionee with minimal effort to look into the issue beyond the established moulds. While this study asserts that this understanding is incorrect, it confines itself to understanding the Indian and Chinese discourses on nonproliferation sanctions. Several sanctions have been imposed on

India and China to change their nuclear behaviour; however the reasons for initiating the action have starkly differed. While sanctions imposed as a reaction to Indian nuclear tests have been the most directly involved nonproliferation sanctions against India, majority of nonproliferation sanctions imposed on China have been the result of its interactions with the “recalcitrant” entities.

India

As a response to India’s first nuclear test (Pokhran I) conducted in 1974, many Western states and organizations had imposed nuclear equipment and sensitive material embargoes on India. Immediately, after the test, Ottawa announced that it would suspend nuclear cooperation with India, however nuclear ties were not completely severed till 1976 when India refused to accept safeguards on all of its nuclear activities (Spector 1985: 61). Following the test, the UK and Japan also, cut bilateral aid to India. The US voted against loans to India at the International Development Association from 1975 to 1977, however it was overruled every time. After the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was passed in the US, nuclear aid to India was prohibited after March 1980.

With the intent to, “cap, roll back and eventually eliminate,” India’s nuclear and missile capabilities, the US took an assertive policy towards New Delhi in the 1990s (Holum 1994). As a result, India was pressurized to alter its nuclear and missile posture. The US opposed the deployment of the short-range Prithvi missile and development of the medium-range Agni missile (Choudhury 2008:8). That year, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) strengthened its guidelines, by adding a list of dual-use technologies and more stringent measures—prohibiting India from indulging in nuclear commerce with the world (Varadarajan 2008).

When India conducted nuclear tests (Pokhran II) the second time in May 1998, the US again imposed sanctions. The sanctions, included “prohibitions on foreign assistance, weapons sales and licenses, foreign military financing, government credit, guarantees and export of certain controlled goods and technology” and were imposed under section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. “Humanitarian aid, food and agriculture exports, food assistance, private bank loans for purchase of food and agricultural commodities and certain transactions involving intelligence activities”

were excluded from the list(Grimmett 2001: 1).Moreover, non-statutory sanctions, restricted“high level visits and military to military contacts” in accordance with the Clinton’s administration policy (Grimmett 2001: 2). In July 1998, the President used his authority to waive particular sanctions. On October 27, 1999President Clinton waived statutory restrictions. Subsequently, on September 22, 2001 following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, President Bush waived all sanctions imposed under section 102(b) of AECA, and the sections 2(b)(4) of Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (Grimmett 2001:16).

Discussions on sanctions, can be found as early as in 1936, in the Indian foreign policy discourse. Highlighting the broad outline of Indian National Congress’s foreign policy, Ram Manohar Lohia, the first secretary of the party’s foreign affairs department, announced that “India would not hesitate to use economic sanctions against an aggressor to support national, democratic and socialist forces” around the world (Prasad 1960:134). In May 1938, Jawaharlal Nehru, brought up the topic of sanctions, while explaining his party’s position on collective security. He said that “for any system of collective security to be successful it had to be backed by sanctions, stressing that the failure to invoke sanctions would mean allowing complete freedom to the aggressor” (Nehru 1938:4).

India has not articulated its policy on international sanctions since independence. According to a perspective India views sanctions as “a diplomatic tool that does not serve any purpose” (India Today 2010). Nevertheless, India has supportedmany multilateral sanctions regimes especially against terrorist groups (Ministry of External Affairs 2011). Conversely, whenever sanctions have been imposed on India, it has often remained defiant. Reacting to imposed sanctions in 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said:

Every decisive action has its consequences. But if the action is inherently in the national interest—and I believe our decision to conduct the tests is in (the) supreme national interest—then we have to face the consequences and overcome the challenge..Sanctions cannot and will not hurt us. India will not be cowed down by any such threats and punitive step (India Today 1998:4).

As far as sanctions on other entities are concerned Indian reaction has been mixed. India has supported multilateral sanctions initiated by the United Nations (UN) but often been sceptical of unilateral sanctions. India has been equivocal about lending

support to sanctions imposed on its friends, allies and business partners. In the case of Iraq which was the target of the most comprehensive sanctions imposed since World War II, India was initially sceptical as it had its own interests involved. Yet later it supported the sanctions against Iraq. In the North Korean case, India has been endorsing sanctions and supporting multilateral and unilateral initiatives. However in the Iranian case, the Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao had asserted that “India did not wish to see the spread of nuclear weapons in West Asia but at the same time believed that Iran had a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while fulfilling its international obligation as a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT” (The Hindu 2010). Concurrently, some Indian entities have been sanctioned using US laws for being engaged in commercial activities with the Iranian companies (Purushothaman 2012: 110).

China

Though sanctions have been imposed on China as early as in 1946 by the US and CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) and in 1960 by the USSR, it became a target of nonproliferation sanctions later, apropos its nuclear dealings with other states, particularly Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. It was only after the 1990s that nonproliferation sanctions were imposed on China. Nevertheless the US contemplated varied options to check nuclear proliferation since the 1960s taking China as the referent point. The little-known Gilpatric committee* formed in 1964 was one such attempt. President Johnson formed the committee to deliberate policy options and strategies to secure one of the most important goals of US foreign policy namely, nonproliferation. The major task of the Gilpatric Committee was to suggest policy options in response to China’s first nuclear test. In 1996, US contemplated the issue of imposing sanctions on China for technology transfers to Pakistan’s nuclear program, however Beijing soon issued another nuclear nonproliferation pledge (Kan 2015: 3). According to a count, while President George W. Bush was in office, the US imposed sanctions on 23 occasions against 30 plus different Chinese entities.

*Though the major task of the Gilpatric Committee was to suggest policy options in response to China’s first nuclear test, the committee also explored strategies to check nuclear proliferation in Europe, South Asia and West Asia.

During this time, transfer of dual usable materials to Pakistan, Iran, and other states became a reason for the punitive measures (Zhao 2010:270). China sought to change its behaviour post 1991 though the development cannot be wholly attributed to sanctions. In the last decade of the 20th century, China took steps to address US and western concerns and increased its participation in international nonproliferation regimes and started observing guidelines of export control regulations (Kan 2015:6).

As regards Chinese discourse on sanctions, Beijing has often reacted strongly to sanctions imposed on it and overtime developed a discourse against unilateral sanctions, arguing that it does not support one state's domestic law taking precedence over international law. Overtime China's opposition to sanctions, particularly unilateral ones has been "legendry" (Reilly 2008: 121). Regarding Chinese reactions to sanctions on Iraq, Iran and North Korea, much has depended on its relationship and business transactions with the three states. In the case of Iraq, China stressed on the need to continue UN weapons inspections in Iraq. In the early 2000s Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan endorsed sanctions over armed conflict (CNN 2003).

In the North Korean case China was relatively easier on its neighbour till its third test. China continued to engage with North Korea in important sectors like banking and transshipping which are under sanctions. It was only after the third test that China supported Resolution 2094, strengthening sanctions against North Korea. In the Iranian case, China did not lend explicit support especially to unilateral sanctions. A number of Chinese companies operating in Iran or dealing with Iranian entities came under the purview of sanctions. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei insisted that sanctions cannot help to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, but will only further worsen and escalate it, "which will do no good in regional peace and stability" (Xinhua 2012a).

Undoubtedly China has taken tougher stands against sanctions compared to India. The reason for Beijing's stance is the state's continual distrust of international norms and systems developed by the West, particularly the US. The behaviour has been observed since long and became particularly evident during the reign of Mao (Scott 2008: 263). Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that Chinese entities have been sanctioned more frequently than Indian businesses, making Beijing voice its dissent and share its views

on sanctions. With Chinese state-funded as well as private firms expanding and investing all over the world, Beijing has become conscious of any limitations on trade like sanctions. Hence, China's strong stance against sanctions is also an attempt to protect its interests abroad.

The Indian and Chinese reservations to unilateral sanctions are not unnoticed. The sanctioners (in case of nonproliferation often the North) have been attentive to the views of the two states. Overtime India and China have become the authors of an alternative paradigm wherein sanctions are less intrusive, adaptive and accommodating of the interests of other states.

Contemporary Debates:

Overtime sanctions have attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines. Consequently this tool of statecraft has been understood in various ways. The study locates the literature on sanctions in economic coercion. Delving into the debate on imposition of sanctions, it regards issue-salience and commitment problem as major themes in this literature. Further it individually examines the Indian and Chinese discourses on sanctions to explore their contribution in the sustenance and evolution of sanctions regime as an instrument for nuclear nonproliferation.

Sanctions evolution in International Relations Literature

Sanctions are fundamentally coercive measures imposed with a specific purpose. They are understood as a "middle ground between diplomacy and the use of military force"(Speier et al 2001:7). Hufbauer et al use 'economic sanction' and 'economic coercion' interchangeably, defining them as "the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations"(Hufbauer et al. 2012: 3). Essentially, sanctions can be understood as actions initiated by one or more international actors (the 'sanctioner') against one or more entities (the 'sanctionee') in order to punish the sanctionee by depriving them of something that is important to them and/or to make the receivers act in accordance with certain norms the senders consider important. Hence sanctions can be punitive as well as defensive.

Overtime, international sanctions have evolved. The 432 B.C Megarian Decree is believed to be the oldest documented peacetime economic sanction. Since then sanctions have been used by states unilaterally, or multilaterally by international organizations to support their policies. UN's use of sanctions increased significantly in the 1990s, leading to the decade being termed as the "Sanction's Decade". Sanctions have remained a preferred policy instrument for the US. President Woodrow Wilson introduced sanctions in 1919, as he emphasized "apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force" (Wilson 1919 cited in Hufbauer et al. 2008a: 1). Peterson's Institute of International Economics highlights that the US has used unilateral sanctions the highest number of times in the world. According to its count, more than 101 times in the 20th century (Hufbauer et al. 2008a: 3). In 1998, acknowledging his country's predilection for sanctions, President Bill Clinton stressed that the US had become "sanctions happy" (Clinton 1998 cited in Hufbauer 1998d). Hufbauer and others have maintained intensive data on the topic.

Humanitarian concerns arose after the incessant use of comprehensive or "blanket" sanctions, which focused on entire sectors of economic activity. Collateral damage, particularly impact of these sanctions on common people caused grave worry among the policy makers around the world, which led to them introducing "smart" or "targeted" sanctions. Targeted or smart sanctions focus on a particular entity or individual to minimize collateral damage and concentrate the impact on the decision makers themselves, or those closely related to them. With the aim of maximizing, 'the target regime's costs of noncompliance while minimizing the target population's suffering' (Drezner 1999:107).

Locating Sanctions in Economic Coercion

David Baldwin (1985: 145) provides an intensive survey of previous studies on use of economic coercion in International Relations (Drezner 1999:10). The literature on economic statecraft, according to him has been marked by "scarcity" and there is a "tendency to denigrate the utility of such tools" (Baldwin 1985: 50). Johan Galtung (1967), Peter Wallensteen (1968), Robert Gilpin (1980) and Robert Pape (1997) have shared their doubts about economic coercion. Nevertheless the topic continues to attract attention of various scholars who specialise in different disciplines, lending it fascinating perspectives. Economic statecraft is applied as a broad concept that

“subsumes all of the economic means by which foreign policy makers might try to influence other international actors” (Baldwin 1985: 40). These are attempts to weaken another state’s economic potential in order to weaken it militarily or for the purpose of demonstrating resolve, and inflicting punishment. Baldwin believes that such behaviour includes beliefs, attitudes, opinions, emotions and predispositions, which economic coercion seeks to alter. Economic coercion entails much more than sanctions. Robert Pape (1997: 90) distinguishes between economic sanctions and other economic instruments of statecraft like trade wars and economic warfare by taking into account the strategy involved. Arguing that each instrument seeks a different set of goals.

According to Baldwin sanctions are a part of a larger set of policy instruments available to foreign policy makers. In contrast to Pape’s views, Baldwin believes that social scientists should not confine themselves to the study of countable universes. He believes that there should be a broad definition of sanctions emphasising the “peculiar nature of the means” and not a particular goal (Baldwin and Pape 1998:190). However Baldwin overlooks the fact that sanctions can also be imposed by a state to serve its domestic purposes or appease its domestic constituencies. Other definitions of economic sanctions recognise sanctions as, “coercive economic measures taken against one or more countries, to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country’s opinion about other’s policies” (Carter 1988 : 4). Brendon Taylor (2010:12) in an *Adelphi Paper* defines sanctions as economic instruments which are “employed by one or more international actors against another, ostensibly with a view to influencing that entity’s foreign and/or security policy behaviour.”

Sanctions: Issue Salience and Commitment Problem

Under the broad category of sanctions there are many sub-themes that need elucidation. Studies on sanctions have often been obsessed with ascertaining the efficacy and impact of sanctions. However Adrian U-Jin Ang and Dursun Peksen (2007: 135) make amends and elucidate the importance of studying the “perception of issue salience” attached to sanctions by sender as well as the target states. They believe that sanctions should be examined from the domestic as well as the systemic level. Moving away from the domestic and systemic dimensions, some scholars also look at the question: when do sanctions work? (Hovi et al 2005). An interesting

perspective to the sanction debate is brought to the fore as these the scholars inspect, if the threat of sanctions could work more than its imposition. They believe that the effectiveness of sanctions is often misinterpreted as the definition of a successful sanction is only the extraction of political concessions from the targeted state. Euclid Rose (2005) believes that even partial compliance is a success of sanctions and should not be overlooked. The same standard should not be applied while examining all cases, even success is context specific, she stresses.

Han Dorussen and Jongry Mo (2001) have delved into the commitment problem of states. According to them, not all states go beyond the threat and actually impose and keep sanctions imposed on the targeted entity. In this context the bargaining power of the domestic pressure groups that have an interest in the disputed policy is examined. It hints at the cost of imposing and keeping the sanctions imposed. This cost is examined from the sender's perspective. Daniel W. Drezner (2003) while examining the virtues of smart sanctions has aptly explained that the success of sanctions will be determined by the political economy of the target state. In fact, he explains that to ensure that the sender state stays committed to keeping the sanctions imposed, the sender's domestic sectors which are affected by sanctions, need to be compensated. He also points to the possibility of success when sanctions are multilateral instead of unilateral. This aspect of sanction implementation has been discussed by many scholars as they believe that when sanctions are imposed by one state the target has the tendency to tilt towards other partners who are uninterested in such measures (Haggard and Noland 2010).

Sanctions and Nonproliferation

The study of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy has been carried out since long; however their use in nonproliferation remains underexplored. T.V Paul has touched on the issue and discussed ten cases where sanctions have been imposed to check proliferation. He argues that most of them have been unsuccessful in completely stopping nuclear proliferation, though they have succeeded in slowing down the pace of nuclear development and checked states from openly declaring their nuclear activities (Paul 1996). Most of the literature on the use of sanctions for nonproliferation, documents the policies of states, particularly the US. Washington

imposed a record number of sanctions to check nuclear proliferation in the 20th and 21st centuries.

In a report titled, “Nonproliferation Sanctions” published by Rand in 2001, Richard H. Speier, Brian G. Chow and S. Rae Starr discuss sanctions imposed by the US to check nuclear proliferation. They argue that there are four objectives of sanctions:

- (1) Action, to demonstrate that something is being done in response to outrageous foreign behavior;
- (2) deterrence, to dissuade both the sanctionee and onlookers from repeating such behavior;
- (3) constraint, to use economic or technological restrictions to interfere with the continuation of the behavior; and
- (4) coercion, to lead to improved behavior in the future (Speier et al. 2001:8).

They explain that the process of sanctions as established by “law and practice” includes nine elements: Triggering events; Targeting entities; Determination of sanctionability; A certification of nonsanctionability; Waivers; The design of a specific sanction; Implementation; Multilateral Support; and Incentives. Studying 24 instances when sanctions were imposed under the US nonproliferation laws they conclude that, that only seven times the sanctions were able to pressurise the sanctioned party to negotiate. The cause for the low success rate according to them was that the US did not maintain much economic engagement with the targets before imposing the sanctions, which made the sanctions impact weak (Speier et al 2001).

However, Nicholas L. Miller (2014: 1) has a different perspective on the success of nonproliferation sanctions. In an article titled, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions” published in *International Organization*, he builds on the rationalist literature on sanctions, and argues that “economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy” as they deter “states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place”. He further asserts that “vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence” on the sanctioner. Stressing that rational leaders would choose to take into account the risk of sanctions before starting their nuclear weapons program. He explains that only inward-looking regimes decide in favour of building nuclear weapons. Hence, the sanctions often dismissed as unsuccessful have been successful as they have been able to keep states from starting their own nuclear weapons program.

Etel Solingen (2007: 3) in her seminal work, *Nuclear Logic* explains “why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them?”. She examines nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, pointing out the regional patterns which explain the states’ nuclear behavior. Domestic conditions are found to be the reasons in the variance in behaviour of states. The states which are integrated within the global economy are found to be more pliable and conscious of international pressures, hence they often choose to not go nuclear if international action is threatened. Duly, the states who reject international integration often choose to overlook global reactions to their nuclear policies. The work explains the distinct role of democracy and authoritarianism in explaining a state’s nuclear behavior. Since the study explains external pressures and their effects, it is also beneficial in explaining response of states to international sanctions.

India and Sanctions

While providing a detailed account of India’s nuclear history, George Perkovich has dealt with the issue of sanctions. He has elucidated the instances when sanctions were imposed on the state and how it dealt with them (Perkovich 2001). While explaining the episodes when sanctions were imposed on entities to check nuclear proliferation, T. V Paul has also explained the Indian experience with the international sanction regimes arguing that sanctions was a factor that influenced India’s nuclear strategy (Paul 1996). In an article titled, “Half Past India's Bang”, Lewis A. Dunn has explained how sanctions were imposed on India post Pokhran I, claiming that the fear of sanctions kept Indira Gandhi and the subsequent prime ministers from testing another nuclear device (Dunn 1979).

As regards Indian discourse on sanctions, in a detailed article titled, “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Doctrine” Whaheguru Pal Singh Sidhu argues that the Indian programs are designed to reduce the impact of international sanctions (Sidhu 2004). Leonard Spector has also dealt with India’s experience with international sanctions in detail. Peterson’s Institute of International Economics maintains data on economic sanctions imposed on India to check nuclear proliferation. The institute has tabulated the data and even estimated the impact of sanctions in numerical terms and the possible loss of investment during the time when India was under sanctions.

Use of sanctions in the context of other parties was discussed even before India's independence when the foreign policy discourse was beginning to take shape. Ram Manohar Lohia discussed the subject in 1936. After independence, the Indian policy and academic circles also examined the topic in specific contexts when the circumstances demanded. In the case of Iraq, India argued that the "unjust" and "unwise" sanctions should be lifted, yet maintained that Iraq should comply with UN resolutions and "forswear weapons of mass destruction" (Rediff 2003). In 1992 India abstained from voting in the UN when the issue of sanctions on Iraq was brought up. India has supported sanctions against North Korea and when the issue was discussed in Lok Sabha, E. Ahamed the minister of state in the Ministry of External Affairs maintained North Korea should, "refrain from such actions which adversely impact on peace and stability in the region" (Ahamed 2013). Nevertheless, India has emphasized that it is against new sanctions on the country and supports the measures that push North Korea to the negotiating table (The Hindu 2012). With respect to Iran, India has highlighted that it does not support proliferation of nuclear weapons in West Asia however states like Iran possess a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while satisfying its international obligation as a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT (Mathai 2012). India has taken a stand against unilateral sanctions on Iran but assured its West Asian allies and the US that "its interest in Iran will not be in contradiction with the relationship India shares with them" (The Hindu 2010).

China and Sanctions

While Chinese officials have spoken extensively about sanctions, especially after each instance when China was involved, yet academic articles on the topic are numbered. In an article titled, "Sanction experience and sanction behavior: an analysis of Chinese perception and behaviour on economic sanctions", Tong Zhao (263: 2010) lists the sanctions imposed on China. Focusing on China, he explores the interrelationship between its sanction experience, perception, and behaviour. Cases of major economic sanctions against China, as well as cases of Chinese economic sanctions against other states are listed maintaining that sanctions with tactical purposes in mind succeed in changing China's behaviour and for the same reason China uses sanctions as a tactical tool and not as a strategic instrument. James Reilly (2012) examines China's opposition to unilateral sanctions, exploring the instances when China took tough stands against unilateral sanctions. However he argues that gradually China is learning

to use this instrument of coercion itself and as a result softening and accepting unilateral sanctions. In an article, “US Economic Sanctions Against China: A Cultural Explanation of Sanction Effectiveness” Yitan Li (2014) explains that the efficacy of sanctions cannot be solely judged by the norms and standards of the sanctioning entity, understating the norms of the receiver or sanctionee is imperative.

China has often taken strong positions against sanctions—unilateral as well as multilateral, hence several of its official stands are worth examining. In 2008 while vetoing sanctions against Zimbabwe, Guangya Wang, China’s permanent representative to the UN explained that the threat of sanctions was not “conducive” to the attainment of the final goal (Wang 2008). China has also taken the issue salience into account and weighed the pros and cons while deciding on its stance. In the Iraqi case though China was not enthusiastic about sanctions but, “sanctions were preferable to using force” (Yang 2013:156). In the context of North Korea, China has not cooperated with other states and maintained links with its neighbour even in the areas under stringent sanctions. It was only when North Korea conducted its third nuclear test that China took a stronger position against the state, supporting sanctions to contain its nuclear activities. However clarifying this point Yang Jiechi, then Chinese foreign minister said, “We always believe that sanctions are not the end of the Security Council actions, nor are sanctions the fundamental way to resolve the relevant issues” (Reuters 2013). In the Iranian case, China has again taken a stand against sanctions. Since many Chinese companies came under the purview of U.S. initiated secondary sanctions for their interactions with Iran, the government vehemently opposed sanctions. Addressing the U.S. Secretary of State the Chinese foreign minister explained, “...all along we have been opposed to unilateral sanctions. When such sanctions affect other countries and damage other countries’ interests, it is something we cannot accept” (Jiechi 2012).

Rationale and Scope of Study:

Evidently, most of the literature on economic coercion and sanctions has been written from the Northern point of view. The Southern perspective is lacking in theoretical as well as empirical work. To fill in this void this study addresses the topic from the perspective of the South, particularly India and China. Additionally it also attempts to monitor the changes that have taken place in the recent years and how the emergence

of states like India and China have made their support indispensable for the survival of international regimes. So far no in depth study has been conducted on the Indian views on sanctions. While the Chinese case has been relatively better explored, no study has particularly focussed on Iraq, North Korea and Iran to examine the continuity and changes in China's stand on international sanctions. This study seeks to fill in these gaps in the literature.

Indeed, sanctions have seldom been analyzed from the vantage point of the non-western states. Though China's importance has been acknowledged and subsequently some work has been carried out on China's approach towards the issue, the literature, on the Indian side is essentially absent. No database on sanctions imposed on and by India is maintained and attention is only paid to sanctions imposed after its two nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. At the same time it is seldom acknowledged that India has used sanctions in the past and still has the option of using economic coercion in the form of sanctions to forward its foreign policy goals. It is also important to acknowledge that the growing use of sanctions around the world has made it important for emerging economies like India and China to take a stand on sanctions. In fact at times their support has been necessary to sustain international sanctions, as not cooperating with them would lead to the weakening of regimes or a possible collapse.

This study shall examine important instances when sanctions were imposed on India and China evaluating the responses of the two states to ascertain the discourses. Additionally it would also look into how India and China have responded to nonproliferation sanctions imposed on Iraq, North Korea and Iran. Starting with India's response to sanctions imposed after its first nuclear test, the study will examine the country's reactions to nonproliferation sanctions. Apart from 1974, it will particularly explore the instances that occurred in 1981, 1992, and 1998 examining India's stand on efforts to restrict its nuclear activities. Subsequently New Delhi's stand on sanctions imposed on Iraq, North Korea and Iran will be examined to ascertain the nonproliferation and smart sanction discourse in India. The nuclear sanctions imposed on China have mostly been imposed to check its interactions with other states. Taking that into account the study will delve into the 1991, 1993, 1996 and 2001 instances. However it will keep in mind that many of the sanctions against

China are still in force. Additionally the study will also explore Beijing's position on nonproliferation sanctions against Iraq, North Korea and Iran.

In addressing these themes this study seeks to raise as also examine following research questions:

- How do India and China view sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy?
- How have India and China responded to sanctions imposed on them?
- How do India and China respond to sanctions imposed on other states namely- Iraq, Iran and North Korea?
- Has their behaviour changed depending on issue-salience or their relations with it?
- Have India and China influenced the evolution of international sanctions regime?
- Why has China taken tougher stands on international sanctions than India?

The central research puzzle of this study constitutes the following two hypotheses:

- The Indian and Chinese discourses on sanctions have evolved with time and become an important influence in the development of international sanctions.
- In spite of divergences in the Indian and Chinese discourses on sanctions their approach reflects common themes and has come to represent an alternative paradigm wherein sanctions are less intrusive, adaptive and accommodating of the interests of other states.

Following a qualitative methodology, the study shall analyse episodes that contributed in formulating Indian and Chinese discourses on sanctions as instruments of nonproliferation. Employing the rules of process tracing and establishing causal linkages it further engages in elucidating their differences and similarities. The study refers to historical documents, ministerial archives, speeches and involve extensive archival research. For secondary sources various books, journals, articles, magazines, newspapers, etc. are consulted. Both systemic and sub-systemic level are analyzed. The dependent variable remains sanction discourses of India and China. Scientific research adheres to a set of rules of inferences on which its validity depends. The content of science according to King, Keohane and Verba (1996) is primarily the

methods and rules and not the subject matter since the methods can be used to study anything. Thus an earnest attempt is made to carry out a scientific research in King, Keohane and Verba's sense of the term.

Chapterisation

The first chapter attempts to establish the 'what', 'why' and 'how' of the study. Reviewing the International Relations literature it discusses the history and evolution of international sanctions, explaining how comprehensive sanctions have evolved and changed to targeted sanctions over the years. As US is an important case study to understand sanctions, it examines the literature on the US in two ways—first as the state that has imposed the highest number of unilateral sanctions, and second US policies on nonproliferation sanctions, as nuclear nonproliferation remains an important goal for Washington, DC. It briefly discusses the sanctions imposed on India and China, preparing the ground for further elucidation in the subsequent chapters. The main aim of the first chapter is to acquaint the reader of the study with significant discourse and terms associated with sanctions and steering the study towards India and China, the two Asian states whose support is increasingly considered significant to sustain sanctions regimes. These are the states that have also been the targets of sanctions.

Chapter 2: Sanctions in Foreign Policy Discourse

The chapter attempts to understand the Indian and Chinese academic and foreign policy discourse on sanctions. Locating sanctions in the foreign policy discourse of the two states, it discusses the views of Indian and Chinese leaders and academics on sanctions. Bringing out the difference in the Western and non-Western views on sanctions is an important part of the chapter, subsequently referring to the stance of political groups that India and China are a part of, namely—BRICS and RIC. Citing important cases, continuity and change in the sanction discourses is ascertained. It challenges the usual understanding of sanctions in relation to India and China and argues that sanctions have also been imposed by the two Asian states. Listing such instances, it is determined how India and China are themselves using this instrument

of foreign policy. The chapter is summed up by underscoring the difference between the Indian and Chinese use sanctions, from that of Western powers.

Chapter 3: Responding to Sanctions on Self

The chapter concentrates on sanctions imposed to check nuclear proliferation in case of India and China. It examines the nuclear nonproliferation regime, delving into its definition and current understanding. It looks into deficiencies of the regime that has made it weak and allowed states to deviate, discussing the reasons that particular states have forwarded for not abiding by the regime. US nonproliferation policy as well as the use of sanctions is an important part of the chapter. Discussing the sanctions imposed on India and China to check their nuclear activities, Indian and Chinese response to sanctions imposed are also examined.

Chapter 4: Responding to Sanctions on Third Parties

The chapter analyses the Indian and Chinese stance on sanctions imposed on other states. Focusing on cases of Iraq, North Korea and Iran, New Delhi and Beijing's response to the sanctions imposed to check nonproliferation is evaluated. Further the reasons for states to react in this way are examined. Studying the responses of India and China, the chapter attempts to answer the question as to what influences a state's reaction to sanctions imposed on other states?

Chapter 5: Assessing the Alternative Paradigm

India and China have long argued that they are different from the Western powers and those that colonized them. The chapter examines the assertion looking at how India and China understand their exceptional status. Additionally it lists the sources of the Indian and Chinese exceptionalism. It argues that a post-imperial ideology exists in India as well as China which, while remains rooted in their historical moorings and has an impact on its foreign and security policy.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Finally the concluding chapter explains this study's major findings. The Indian and Chinese experience with international sanctions is explained along with an appraisal of how important have the two states been in influencing the evolution of sanctions at the international level. It examines if there have been any attempts to

adapt sanctions taking into account the Indian and Chinese stance which represents an alternative paradigm.

When explaining sanctions, an attempt has to be made to not let the Western perceptions overtake the understanding. Though a definition of sanctions has been established it is important to check if the Western perception of the subject is different from the non-Western. This remains the next step in the process of explaining sanctions from a different point of view. While asserting that Western states are not the only states to use economic coercion in general and sanctions in particular, it also becomes important to check their discourse and ascertain if sanctions have been discussed there.

With regard to India and China, it also has to be examined if the way the two rising states impose sanctions is different from their Western counterparts, whose similar actions have been criticised by the two states. The next chapter addresses these important concerns to take the study of sanctions from a non-Western perspective forward.

Chapter 2: Sanctions in Foreign Policy Discourse

Speaking to the media at the 2012 BRICS summit in New Delhi, Chinese and Indian representatives expressed their disregard for US imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran. Clarifying his state's position, then Chinese trade minister Chen Deming said, "China wants to develop normal trade relationship with all countries including Iran." Subsequently, his Indian counterpart, Anand Sharma added, "Iran has been and continues to be one of our key energy suppliers" (Chen and Sharma cited in Mint 2012). While both the Asian states registered their opposition to new US sanctions, that particularly penalized financial institutions that decided to deal with Iran's central bank, the subject did not find a mention in the joint statement issued by the five BRICS countries. This, in spite of the fact that the Fourth BRICS Summit-Delhi Declaration, highlighted Iran's nuclear issue, stressing:

The situation concerning Iran cannot be allowed to escalate into conflict, the disastrous consequences of which will be in no one's interest...We are concerned about the situation that is emerging around Iran's nuclear issue. We recognize Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.... and support resolution of the issues...in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions(BRICS 2012).

This ambiguity has marked Indian and Chinese stance on sanctions in recent years. Though critical of unilateral sanctions imposed by the Western states, both states have not altogether dismissed the utility of economic tools like sanctions. In fact while China threatened US with sanctions in 2010, in 2012 an Indian official had remarked, "Don't we all use our economic muscle?" (Bloomsberg 2012). However, India and China, both have often spoken about sanctions imposed on them and other states rather than the sanctions imposed by them. At international forums New Delhi and Beijing have explained their aversion to unilateral sanctions, particularly since they have been the victims of Western sanctions. Yet, Indian and Chinese discourse is not unlike that of the Western states. Overtime, many Western great powers have conceptualized and imposed meticulous sanction regimes and overtime also built a legal framework as well as social acceptance towards imposing sanctions. While India and China might not have legal requirement and social acceptability to use sanctions as the Western states, the leaders and scholars of India and China, both have spoken about sanctions and the possible use of them by New Delhi and Beijing. While the fact might not have received attention previously, overtime the acceptance of sanctions and its inclusion in the foreign policy discourse is coming through. Leaders and

scholars in India and China have discussed sanctions, and seem to be open to sanctions use much before they became popular among the Western states and international organizations. Nevertheless the way and means through which states like India and China impose sanctions is different than the Western major powers.

This chapter attempts to study the differences in the approach of Western and non-Western states towards sanctions. It further examines the place of sanctions in the foreign policy discourse of India and China. It tries to assess the importance of sanctions in the policy tool kit of both the states. It is divided into following four sections: The first section discusses the non-Western perception of sanctions and the Indian and Chinese sanctions discourse. Subsequently, the second section lists the sanctions imposed by India and China, highlighting the issues sparking them. The last section explains the difference in the nature of Western sanctions and those imposed by India and China. Finally the chapter is concluded linking the first three sections.

Sanctions and the Non-Western Perception

At a cursory look, it seems the world is geographically divided vis-à-vis sanctions — the developed West is the sanctioner and the Non-West more often than not is relegated to the position of a sanctionee. The effort to understand the response and imposition to sanctions beyond these established moulds is minimal. Nevertheless it is important to look beyond such binaries. Many states including India and China might have criticized sanctions and other forms of economic coercion at international forums, but they have used similar tools of statecraft to achieve their foreign and security objectives. Their use of sanctions, however is different than the Western states, moreover they remain reticent about their sanction use.

Western states and international organizations have used sanctions profusely in the last few decades. While the League of Nations used sanctions, its successor, the UN also continued. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, permits the use of sanctions in the event of any “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.” In the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly stressed that the Security Council:

Ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions (UNSC 2005).

However, Biersteker and Eckert (2006) point out that the final decision to impose sanctions is taken by the UN Security Council. Moreover, the definition of “fair and clear procedures” is unclear and is often not only dependent on legal arguments but also political. In the 1990s there was a noteworthy increase in the number of sanctions imposed by the UN. The decade is called the ‘Sanction’s Decade’. The reason the 1990s are called the sanctions decade is not because there were so many sanctions being applied. It is because the 1990s sanctions were such a contrast to the nature of sanctions in the previous decades. Biersteker (2018) explains: “There were only two UN sanctions regimes applied against Rhodesia and South Africa during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, the UN's collective security system began to function, and there were 8 or 9 sanctions regimes in place, up to 6 or 7 at a time at several points in the decade.”

In the 1990s, citing the case of Iraq humanitarian questions were raised in context of collateral damage caused by sanctions. This is when the idea of ‘smart’ or ‘targeted’ sanctions was introduced. Drezner (1999:107) defines smart sanctions as, “measures that are tailored to maximize the target regime’s costs of noncompliance while minimizing the target population’s suffering.” Besides the UN, European Union (EU) has also applied sanctions to forward its own foreign policy objectives or support international norms. Sanctions, are called “restrictive measures – against third countries, individuals or entities,” by EU and are recognized as significant tool in EU’s policy tool-kit to aid its Common Foreign and Security Policy. Sanctions are applied independently by the EU or by adopting UN Security Council Resolutions (European Union 2016).

India and China and several other developing states have however objected to sanctions, particularly unilateral sanctions. They have also taken collective stands at the UN against unilateral sanctions. In March 2012, India, China and 33 other states, voted in support of a UN Human Rights Council Resolution (A/HRC/19/L.12) concerning human rights and unilateral coercive measures, which stressed:

Unilateral coercive measures in the form of economic sanctions can have far-reaching implications for the human rights of the general population of targeted States, disproportionately affecting the poor and the most vulnerable classes. Long-term unilateral coercive measures may result in social problems and raise humanitarian concerns in the States targeted (UN 2012).

The US and most of the EU members disapproved of the resolution. The ‘extra-terrestrial’ nature of unilateral sanctions leading to contravening sovereignty has also been a cause concern among the developing states (Chenoy 2013). Often commentators as well as leaders of developing states are seen questioning the reason and purpose of Western states imposing sanctions on weaker states—suspecting the tool to be a means of bringing about a regime change.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group of 120 mostly Asian and African developing states formed in 1961, has also often taken a stand against unilateral sanctions. The group has condemned specific unilateral sanctions, usually imposed by the major powers of the world against a member state. On December 22, 2014, when US applied sanctions on Venezuela, the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement issued a Communiqué emphasizing:

The Coordinating Bureau of the Non Aligned Movement categorically rejects the decision of the Government of the United States to impose unilateral coercive measures against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela aimed at undermining its sovereignty, political independence and its right to self determination(NAM Coordinating Bureau 2014).

BRICS, a group comprising of the states, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has also expressed its reservations about unilateral sanctions. Since 2000s, they have especially shared their doubts about applying and expanding unilateral sanctions on Iran and North Korea. Since 2013, their reservations on unilateral sanctions have found a mention in their joint statements every year. The group has often spoken strongly against sanctions imposed on its member states. For instance in 2014, when sanctions were imposed on Russia, BRICS stressed, “... sanctions and counter-sanctions, and force does not contribute to a sustainable and peaceful solution” (BRICS 2014a).

However, it cannot be denied that the issues that invoke sanctions also often determine state response. In the case of sanctions imposed to check proliferation of nuclear weapons, reactions to which is the subject of the study, BRICS states have individually as well as a group taken a stand. Generally, BRICS maintains what is called as a ‘pro-nuclear energy perspective’(Weitz 2014). However, each state has its own interests to protect and often has to consider them while formulating their position and reaction to third-party sanctions. Citing the case of Iran sanctions, Hodde explains BRICS response to unilateral sanctions, emphasizing:

Although the BRICS disapprove the unilateral behaviour of the West and behave assertively in international politics to advocate their multipolar world objective, the BRICS do not fundamentally challenge the unilateral power structures right now. The reason for the ambiguous policy of the BRICS is their political and material dependence of the hegemon (Hodde 2015:31).

Meanwhile, nuclear nonproliferation sanctions are strongly supported by Western states. US is the most prominent proponent of nuclear sanctions. Non-proliferation has remained one of the primary foreign policy objectives of the US. Over the years US has adopted a number of policies to discourage proliferation of nuclear weapons. Sanctions are one of the many instruments of statecraft adopted by the US to check nuclear proliferation. Though, impact of sanctions is often debated and collateral damage frequently discussed, the US has often used sanctions to change the behaviour or policies of states in the South Asian region. Sanctions have been used for various purposes, including showing dissent, for appeasement of domestic constituencies, or economically crippling targets. In contrast to many states, US has a well laid legal framework that supports and backs its policy of imposing sanctions to forward its objective of non-proliferation. Canada, Britain, France, Japan, Norway, and Australia are other states that often support sanctions imposed to check nuclear proliferation activities of other states.

Sanctions in the Indian Context

Sanctions find a regular mention in the Indian foreign policy discourse. In May 1938, Jawaharlal Nehru, mentioned that of all the different types of sanctions, economic sanctions were most effective and had the advantage of being both potent as well as peaceful. Though he recognised that sanctions might not work immediately, the economic instrument had “far-reaching” qualities and could alter the behaviour of the aggressor. Nehru also acknowledged the use of military sanctions (Nehru 1938:4). Moreover, Nehru also examined multilateral sanctions, in context of collective security. He explained that for “any system of collective security to be successful it had to be backed by sanctions, stressing that the failure to invoke sanctions would mean allowing complete freedom to the aggressor”. He said:

To have no sanctions is to allow free play to the aggressor, and ultimately to bow to his will. That cannot be agreed to for that means no collective security. It means the law of the jungle (Nehru 1938:4).

A. Appadorai, hints at India’s adherence to sanctions imposed by the UN as he examines three fundamental ideas of India’s foreign policy. He stresses that “whole-

hearted co-operation with the United Nations and unreserved adherence in both spirit and letter to the Charter governing it” has been the primary element of India's foreign policy (Appadorai 1949: 40). He also emphasises how India had earnestly cooperated with the system of collective security enshrined in the UN charter, suggesting its adherence to sanctions. Indeed, most Indian leaders, like Nehru, had the prudence to appreciate peaceful methods to solve international problems. Many world leaders have also mentioned sanctions while discussing peaceful methods of statecraft, and they include India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. * Jawaharlal Nehru had emphasised:

In a world full of war and preparations for war India stands significantly as a country which has deliberately based its policy on peace and non-violence. How far it is possible to apply these methods in the international sphere today is difficult to say. But it must be remembered that the nonviolence of the Indian struggle is not a weak, passive and ineffective pacifism. It is a dynamic thing with sanctions behind it and if the world is to progress in culture and civilization, it will have to adopt peaceful methods of solving its problems (Nehru 1938: 4).

On July 26, 1955, when the issue of integrating Goa, then a Portuguese colony, into the Indian union came up, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru insisted that the means should be ‘peaceful’. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said:

There is no one in this House who requires any argument in justification of India's claim to Goa. It is obvious. There is hardly any question that has come before this House which had such unanimous approval or agreement. The only questions that have arisen are as to the steps that might be taken to give effect to India's claim. Even there, so far as I can understand, it is by and large the opinion of this House that the methods should be peaceful (Nehru 1955: 111).

Subsequently a trade embargo was imposed on Goan territories controlled by the Portuguese and the Indian consulate in Panjim was closed (See table 2.1).

After independence, India has not lucidly spoken about its policy towards international sanctions. In recent years, the topic has only come up when discussing India's stand on sanctions imposed on other states. Some commentators have long argued that, traditionally, India sees sanctions as a diplomatic tool that “does not serve any purpose” (Chaudhury 2010). This assertion stands in contrast to the fact that India supports several multilateral sanctions regimes, many of which have been imposed against terrorist groups (Ministry of External Affairs 2011).

*Woodrow Wilson and Mao had also advocated the use of sanctions.

The few studies available on Indian sanctions usually focus on evaluating the impact of sanctions imposed on India. Since India seldom accepts imposing sanctions, scholars often choose to not work on the topic. However, there are some studies, which have examined the sanction efficacy of some of the sanctions imposed by India. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al (1998) have done so while listing some of the sanctions imposed by India. According to them, India is among the states that pursue an active foreign policy and use sanctions as part of it. India also imposes sanctions to resolve neighbourhood fights (Hufbauer et al 1998: 5). Among other reasons, “restoring democracy”, “protecting minority rights”, checking a neighbouring state’s bent towards China and assimilating provinces into the Indian union, are reasons sparking sanctions from the Indian side (Hufbauer et al 1998: 28). While some sanctions have worked, India has not always achieved its goals by means of this instrument of statecraft.

Sanctions in Chinese Context

Chinese leaders and scholars have expressed their views on sanctions—its use and utility especially in recent years. However, the historical baggage of being a sanctioned state, has not allowed the policy makers to fully embrace sanctions as an instrument of statecraft. Nevertheless a study of Chinese scholarship reveals Beijing’s predilection to avoid a military conflict, studies often focus on how China should avoid getting into conflict. Offering a “cultural explanation of sanction effectiveness”, Yitan Li (2014: 311), explains that, conflict avoidance over confrontation is consistent with Taoism and Confucian philosophy. Scholars believe that in Chinese culture, “the military virtues have ranked far less eminently than in European traditions” (Clarke 1999: 263 as quoted in Yitan Li 2014). The belief held is that violence produces more violence and “never achieves the end intended”; therefore, to “impose order by force only results in disorder” (Clarke 1999: 263 as quoted in Yitan Li 2014). Since historically, war and conflict is shunned, leaders seek other instruments of statecraft.

Many Chinese scholars have discussed Beijing’s distaste for military conflict. Studying their work on the topic also explains, though implicitly, why China resorts to sanctions. In a comprehensive study titled ‘China’s National Interest’, Professor Yan Xuetong lucidly explains:

China's most important strategic goal is to become a modern state. One of the important conditions for achieving this goal is that the economy not be destroyed or disturbed by war (Yan 2002:100).

Yan further stresses how China has been engaged in military clashes six times since its formation in 1949. The six conflicts being—the Korean War (1950-1953), bombing Jinmen and Mazu islands (1958), war on the Sino-India border (1962), military clashes on the Sino-Soviet border (1969), war in the South China Sea (1974) and the Sino-Vietnamese Border War (1979). In the thirty years post its formation, China found itself tangled in an armed conflict every five years— in the process gravely hampering its economic development. Economic progress accelerated only post 1980s when China kept its distance from armed conflicts.

Considering China's aspiration to become a 'modern state' and its realisation that to attain the end a peaceful environment is required, it seems likely that Beijing would not employ military force but seek other means to achieve its policy goals. Hence, it seems that China's sensibilities are not different from US President Woodrow Wilson and in these circumstances sanctions become an instrument of statecraft. China has imposed economic sanctions a number of times. Often employing sanctions as well as the threat of their use to support its core interests of 'territorial integrity and sovereignty' by lending support to its policy line on Taiwan and Tibet. China therefore, has used sanctions to support its 'core policies'. Unlike US and several other Western states, China does not have domestic laws on sanctions explaining procedures to impose or axe them. The emerging power is often discreet about its sanctions use—providing it the ease to impose sanctions and terminate them without much clarifications or media attention. According to James Reilly:

Beijing prefers to use vague threats, variation in leadership visits, selective purchases (or non-purchases), and other informal measures. Such informal measures enhance the leadership's flexibility, since they can be removed without an embarrassing policy reversal. They also provide Chinese leaders with credible deniability, thus minimizing diplomatic fallout (Reilly 2012: 123).

It has also been stressed that since the introduction of 'smart sanctions' that target the decision makers, Beijing has opened up to the idea of using sanctions. In fact there have been discussions about introducing a domestic law on sanctions. A Chinese study on sanctions states:

Given our nation's increasing economic power, we should prudently use economic sanctions against those countries that damage world peace and damage our country's national interests (Liu and Liu 2009, cited in Reilly 2012: 123).

Moreover, the recent developments affirm that sanctions are becoming an important means through which China is increasingly pursuing its interests, whether core or peripheral. This marks a change from China's strong positions against economic sanctions—unilateral as well as multilateral. The country is known for criticizing sanctions and occasionally vetoing them at the UN. Myanmar (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and Syria (2011 and 2012) are some significant examples. Chinese officials have spoken extensively about sanctions, especially after each instance when China was involved. It has often termed sanctions as 'immoral' and 'illegal'. In the last decade, China has opposed unilateral sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia.

Unlike the Indian case, much work has been done on China's use of sanctions. In a study analysing China's economic statecraft, Clayton Bradley Doss III (2012) argues that economic inducements are preferred more by China compared to coercion. Moreover, economic coercion is reactionary with limited political objectives such as signaling resolve, official protest or short-term shifts in a target state's behavior. According to James Reilly (2012: 122) increasing Chinese economic sanctions are "more bark than bite, which is unlikely to deter Washington but will have certain impact on US allies."

India as a Sanctioner

India's sanction use has often been symbolic — to convey its posture and take a stand than meaning a perceptible economic harm to the sanctioned state. To protest Japanese aggression towards China in the 1930s, Indian National Congress (INC), the political party that led India's freedom struggle and after independence formed the government, took a strong stand against Japan. The party called upon the Indian people to boycott Japanese goods throughout the country to protest Japan's invasion of China (Dube 1988 : 225). It was more of a gesture, showing its concern towards China and resentment for Japan's incursion. Moreover the stand was also a move to assert that it was INC and not British authorities that was representing the Indian people at the international level. It stressed that INC did not support the British government's

policy on the issue and would make its own foreign policy decisions (Dixit 1992:539). In September 1934 through a press statement, Jawaharlal Nehru said:

We must create the psychological atmosphere for such a boycott and each one of us, who feels hurt at the suffering and the sorrow of China under Japanese aggression must avoid purchasing Japanese goods.... Mere sympathy is not enough let us do this much more at least to help the people of China in the hour of their trial and distress (Nehru as quoted in B.R Deepak 2001: 116).

With eminent Indian leaders like Gandhi, maintaining their aversion to Zionism, it was not surprising that India supported Arab-boycott of Israel (Pinto 2013). Moreover, being dependent on the Gulf countries to meet its energy requirements, India chose to shun not only economic but also diplomatic interactions with Israel. Shortly after independence, India opposed a Jewish homeland in Palestine and also voted against the UN partition plan. It was during Jawaharlal Nehru's tenure as the prime minister and foreign minister (1947-1964)* that India voted against the partition plan and also backed Israel's exclusion from the Non-aligned movement. New Delhi officially recognized Israel in late 1950. However, it established formal relations only in 1992.

P. R Kumaraswamy notes:

India's policy toward Israel is primarily a study of nonrelations or the absence of normalization. For over four decades, the changing international political situations, the Eurocentric cold war, compulsions of interests, and domestic electoral calculations meant that the absence of normalization was prominent in the India's Israel policy.... India soon emerged as the principal non-Arab and non-Islamic country to castigate Israel for its policies and practices (Kumaraswamy 2010:183).

India used sanctions to secure the interests and well being of the Indian diaspora in South Africa (1946 onwards) and in Fiji (1987). Sanctions against South Africa are one of the most discussed sanctions imposed by India. According to the Indian High Commission in South Africa, India "was the first country to sever trade relations with the apartheid Government (in 1946) and subsequently imposed a complete embargo on South Africa." However, according to Vineet Thakur (2017) the sanctions started way before, in 1944. What makes the sanctions distinct is also the fact that, they were placed by British India at the behest of the Indian people. Sheer hard work of the Indians in the administrative services and consistent pressure of the people made it possible to impose the sanctions. To protest the government policies, which discriminated against the Indian diaspora in South Africa or were damaging to their interests, economic and political restrictions were placed on South Africa by terminating a trade agreement and withdrawing the Indian high commissioner from

*Nehru served as the foreign minister during the seventeen years that he was prime minister of India.

South Africa.

Dr Narayan Bhaskar Khare, who was at the time, the Viceroy's executive council member played an important part in initiating the action against South Africa (Llyod 1991: 709). Primarily, the sanctions were placed to protest to the segregatory Areas Reservation and Immigration and Registration Bill of 1925, which was further 'pegged' by the Trading and Occupation of Land Restriction Act of April 1943 (Llyod 1991:709). In this case an economic cost for India was also involved.

In 1987, another instance when India imposed sanctions to protect the rights of its diaspora came to light, this time in Fiji. A coup d'état installed Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, as the head of the country on September 25, 1987. Subsequently, the Constitution was annulled. The developments were understood as detrimental to the interests of the Indo-Fijian population of Fiji and also a means to check Indo-Fijians from gaining political power (Fogleman 2008: 18). Responding to the situation, New Delhi imposed trade sanctions on Fiji and also limited its diplomatic ties with the state. As India did in the South African case, it called out to other states in the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations to impose sanctions against Fiji. Another coup occurred in 2000, and the sanctions continued till 2001. However, when in 2006 a third coup took place, India decided against imposing sanctions on Fiji. Ajay Singh, the Indian High Commissioner in Fiji, explained that India believed in "engagement rather than isolation" (Singh2007).

New Delhi has used sanctions to attain various objectives, including integration of provinces within the Indian union. To make the Nizam of Hyderabad relent, when he expressed his intention to stay independent, New Delhi decided to coerce the princely state through a various financial and trade sanctions on Hyderabad starting in July 1948 (Guruswami, 2008). On August 20, 1948, the Nizam of Hyderabad sent a cablegram to the UN Security Council. Addressing the President of the UNSC, the cablegram stated:

The Government of Hyderabad, in reliance on Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, requests you to bring to the attention of the Security Council the grave dispute which has arisen between Hyderabad and India, and which, unless settled in accordance with international law and justice, is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Hyderabad has been exposed in recent months to violent intimidation, to threats of invasion, and to crippling economic blockade which has inflicted cruel hard-ship upon the

people of Hyderabad and which is intended to coerce it into a renunciation of its independence (UN1948).

The sanctions were lifted on September 16, 1948, as New Delhi decided to use military force and the Indian Army moved in to occupy Hyderabad. The Nizam signed the Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union in November 1949. The need and effectiveness of the sanctions has been elaborately discussed in the case of Hyderabad. Robert A. Pape overlooks the role of economic coercion in the case and regards it as a “military conquest” (Pape, 1997:111). Arguably, New Delhi wanted to unify the province without the use of military force and resorted economic coercion before turning to military options.

It was the first time when New Delhi used sanctions for political unification. However, it again resorted to sanctions to achieve the same objective in 1954—to integrate Goa, a colony of the Portuguese since 1505. When protests and unrest started increasing in Goa, the Indian government applied a trade embargo against the Goan territories controlled by the Portuguese and shut down its consulate in Panjim, which had been operational since 1947. The Indian leaders clarified that sanctions were being placed to integrate Goa peacefully in the Indian Union. However, in this case again the military was called in to resolve the situation, as it occupied Goa in 1961, subsequently Goa was integrated into the Indian territory.

Sanctions have also been placed to resolve disputes and disagreements with neighbours. Pakistan and Nepal are two of India’s South Asian neighbours who have dealt with Indian sanctions. Though India granted Pakistan the status of a ‘Most Favored Nation’, in 2006, New Delhi has also imposed sanctions on its neighbour. In 1949 India initiated a trade embargo on Pakistan when it declined to devalue its currency with respect to the US dollar. An economic decision, however it caused a grave decline in imports from Pakistan. In 1948-49, before the sanctions were imposed around 70 per cent of Pakistan’s trading transactions were with India, while Pakistan was the beneficiary of 63 percent of Indian exports. According to economists the sanctions made Pakistan look for new and distant markets in Japan and the US. It has been termed a “transformational experience” for Pakistan, as after the episode, it intently attempted to acquire an industrial base (Burki 2011:1).

As a response to Pakistan's delay in acting against two militant groups blamed for a suicide attack on the Indian Parliament, India imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 2001. The groups—Jaish-e- Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba were believed to be operating out of Pakistan, as India found clinching evidence of the terrorists from the two groups being involved in the attack. A report published by the Public Diplomacy Division of the Ministry of External Affairs states that, the Indian High Commission was called back from Islamabad, the number of the mission was cut, and overhead-flights were prohibited. Moreover, the Lahore-New Delhi bus and train services were also stopped. On December 27, 2001, announcing the sanctions in a statement, Jaswant in 1989 (see table 2.1), then the External Affairs Minister, explained:

Regrettably India's serious concerns about all the ramifications of the 13thDecember attack on our Parliament have not been fully grasped in Pakistan. The depth of concern in India, the totality of rejection by the entire cross-section of our country's opinion of Pakistan's continued sponsorship of cross-border terrorism, and its promotion of terrorism as an instrument of state policy has also not been sufficiently appreciated. That is why it is doubly regrettable that attempts to dupe the international community with cosmetic half measures, non-measures, or even fictitious incidents are still being made. This is not acceptable. Terrorism can simply not be justified on any grounds, or under any name. It must be eradicated fully. The Government of India therefore has no option but to take the following further steps (Singh 2001).

Pakistan in turn placed similar sanctions on India (Space Daily 2001). Subsequently, Islamabad banned Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba in January 2002 (BBC 2013).

In 2008, India again imposed sanctions on Pakistan, however this episode was different than the previous case (see table 2.1). Unlike the last time, India neither declared nor accepted using sanctions against Pakistan. However, overtime it became clear that sanctions had been placed by New Delhi. Post terror attacks on Mumbai in November 2008; a *de facto* ban had been imposed on Pakistani cricketers from playing in the Indian Premier League (IPL) in India. Though Pakistani players had been a part of the matches held earlier, 2008 onwards there was no participation from the neighbouring state. While officially India did not accept having placed the sanctions, former Pakistani players made requests to the Indian Board for Control of Cricket to allow Pakistani participation in the IPL (Press Trust India 2013).

Nepal is another Indian neighbour that faced New Delhi's sanctions. Shortly after Nepal purchased anti-aircraft guns from China, India partially closed its borders to

Nepal for thirteen months. It was believed that, India placed trade sanctions on Nepal to control its deepening relations with China. Meanwhile, India clarified its stand and stated that if Nepal wanted economic privileges from India it had to acknowledge a special security relationship as well (Garver 1991:958). On the issue, the Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesperson stated:

India has always valued the special relationship with Nepal as embodied in the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship.... For the last four decades India has done everything possible to live up to the letter and spirit of the treaty. Good neighbourliness implies a degree of mutual sensitivity and concern for the interests of both countries. This is particularly necessary if the special relationship between India and Nepal is to be maintained (India News no. 7/89 as cited in Garver, 1991:958).

Later, a report of the United States General Accounting Office (1992), stated, that the sanctions had succeeded in changing Nepal's behaviour, and had made the leaders change their mind about purchasing arms from China. Sanctions had caused unrest among the people and increased their resentment towards the King. In 1990, tensions grew, as there were strikes and unrest in the country, subsequently leading to the collapse of the monarchy. Thirteen months after India placed sanctions on Nepal, a pro-democracy government was formed as King Birendra stepped down. Subsequently on July 1, 1990 the sanctions were lifted (Crossette 1990). India was again given an important say in deciding Nepal's security issues as the new government agreed to consult India while deciding on defence issues. Many academics believe that Nepal's monarchy collapsed under the pressure of Indian sanctions. This case is considered as an example of effective economic statecraft (Mukherjee 2004: 367).

In 2015 a similar case involving India and China came to light. Disapproving of the new constitution adopted by then President Ram Baran Yadav, an ethnic minority called Madhesis, initiated a blockade. The blockade lasted for five months and was lifted only when the protestors' demands were addressed. Though Indian leaders denied imposing the blockade, which created shortages of essential supplies in Nepal, India's support to Madhesis was largely acknowledged. As the Madhesi protestors blocked the border, New Delhi backed the tactic (Jha 2016). Reports suggest that during the time, the Indian Border Security Force were given orders to thoroughly search trucks heading to Nepal (Najar 2015). The searches significantly slowed down the traffic, cutting essential fuel supplies, which lead to a fuel crisis in the landlocked

country (see table 2.1). Since the Indian population in the provinces of Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh is ethnically and culturally close to Nepali Madhesis, New Delhi's involvement was expected. However, India did not make explicit declarations or acknowledge aiding the sanctions.

Table 2.1. Major sanctions imposed by India

Sl.No.	Target	Issue	Year
1.	Japan (sanctioned by Indian National Congress)	China invasion	1939
2.	South Africa (sanctioned by the Government of India)	Discrimination against Indians	1946
3.	Israel	Pro-Arab/Palestine	1947
4.	Hyderabad*	Integration into Indian Union	1948
5.	Pakistan	Currency devaluation	1949, 2001, 2011
6.	Portuguese Goa*	Integration into Indian Union	1954
7.	Rhodesia	Against minority white rule	1965
8.	Fiji	Restore democracy and modify Constitution	1987
9.	Nepal	China proximity	1989, 2015
10.	Pakistan	Action against militants	2001

Source: Rishika Chauhan

*When the sanctions were imposed, both Hyderabad and Goa were not a part of the Indian Union.

China as a Sanctioner

China has used sanctions as well as the threat of sanctions use to achieve a number of goals. While in some cases sanction use has been symbolic, others have caused noticeable economic harm to the sanctioned entity and have managed to successfully coerce the sanctionee. China has often used sanctions to secure its core interests. Unlike India, China clearly defines its core interests; hence it can be related to sanction use. It can be seen that China is increasingly using sanctions to secure its expanding core interests. China has used sanctions to resolve a number of issues ranging from Taiwan and Tibet to maritime disputes. The threat of the use of sanctions has also aided Beijing in coercing other states in Asia. States like Vietnam and Philippines, have especially dealt with the threat of use of sanctions by China.

One of the earliest sanctions imposed by China were against Vietnam. In 1975-78, Beijing imposed economic sanctions against Vietnam to penalize the state for its anti-

China attitude and growing tilt towards Moscow. The intention was also to seek territorial concessions in the boundary dispute and also pressurize Hanoi to end persecution of ethnic Chinese population residing in Vietnam (Path 2012). In 1978, to coerce Vietnam to withdrawal troops from Cambodia, Beijing again imposed economic sanctions on the state (Hufbauer et al 2007: 273). Beijing, reduced and later ended economic and military aids to Vietnam. The sanctions continued till 1988 and have been termed as the only, “strategic sanction that China ever used against other countries” (Zhao 2010: 268).

China began cutting its aid to Albania in the 1970s. According to Zhao (2010:273), China was unable to meet the growing demand of aid by Albania. Zhao clarifies, “there was no or very limited political objective behind China’s economic sanction against Albania. Beijing’s decision of cutting-off aid was primarily driven by the desire to reduce its own economic burden and to facilitate domestic economic reform (Zhao Tong 2010: 273). However Hufbauer, et al (2008:25) argue that the aid cut was a type of sanction, “retaliation for anti-Chinese rhetoric”.

Another important concern that has made Beijing target French businesses and consider imposing sanctions on the US, is their defence sales to Taiwan (Republic of China). In the 1990s, when Beijing felt that France’s defence sales to Taiwan “seriously damaged China's sovereignty and national security,” it took action against Paris. France is said to have sold six frigates and 60 "Mirage 2000" fighters to Taiwan (China Daily, 2013). Beijing demanded that, “the French government close its consulate in Guangzhou within a month and revoked large-scale projects under negotiations, such as the Guangzhou Metro and the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station. China strictly controlled the exchanges on the vice ministerial level and took the non-engagement policy against the companies that sold the arms to Taiwan” (China Daily 2013).

In 2010, China threatened to impose sanctions on the US, when US President Obama decided to go forward with a \$6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Beijing said that it would suspend military exchanges with Washington and also impose sanctions on the US firms involved in the arms sales to Taiwan (Browne and Solomon 2010). However, ZhaoTong points out that the economic sanctions were, “more rhetorical

than substantive.” According to him, “This was the first case in which China explicitly threatened economic sanctions, ...China did not take specific steps to implement the sanction and bring the threat into reality” (Zhao, 2010: 274).

Taiwanese firms have also faced sanctions on their refusal to comply with Beijing’s policies. On many occasions the refusal of Taiwan based commercial entities to adhere to mainland China’s policies on Taiwan, has made Beijing individually target them and at times “moderately sanction”(Tung 2005:25). The economic relationship between Taiwan and China began its ascent in early 1980s. While there was no contact before, by late 2001, China overtook the US to become Taiwan’s most favoured market for exports. The economic proximity provides China an opportunity to exploit the “asymmetrical interdependence” (Tanner 2007: 135). It has employed sanctions as well as threats of the same to coerce the business leaders into reaffirming their support to mainland China’s claim of Taiwan. According to Tanner,

Beijing has, in fact, either committed or publicly contemplated many forms of economic pressure against Taiwan at various times within the past two decades. Beijing has openly proclaimed that its key goals for expanding economic relations with Taiwan include encouraging ‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘using business to pressure politicians.’ Over the years, Chinese leaders and analysts have often argued that cultivating economic ties with Taiwan might contribute to reunification in many ways, from the magnetic to the highly coercive (Tanner 2007: 14).

China has used sanctions to penalize states that support the freedom of Tibet or host the Dalai Lama. While the Dalai Lama is considered as a spiritual leader in many states worldwide, Beijing believes that he is a separatist, leading a campaign for the independence of Tibet, which according to China is one of its “core interest” and an “integral part” of the state. Since 1959, when the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India, Beijing has been campaigning for a diplomatic boycott of the Dalai Lama.

In 2008, the French government faced Chinese sanctions for inviting and hosting the Dalai Lama. French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to meet with Dalai Lama in Poland, made Beijing decline to attend the 11th annual European Union-China summit in Paris (Day 2008). Beijing also cancelled an order of 150 French made Airbus planes. Moreover, Chinese trade delegations also maintained their distance from France while they continued to invest in other European countries (Reilly 2016:189). In 2009 while commenting on his upcoming European tour, Premier Wen Jiabao

stated, “I looked at a map of Europe on the plane. My trip goes around France ... We all know why” (Wen Jiabao as quoted in Reilly 2016:189).

Beijing’s hostility tempered and trade engagement resumed to its pre-2008 frequency only in April 2009, after France-China Joint Communiqué was issued jointly by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the G20 summit in London. The statement stated:

France fully appreciates the importance and sensitivity of the Tibet issue and reaffirms her adherence to the One China Policy and her position that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory... With this in mind and with due regard for the principle of non-interference, France objects to all support for Tibet’s independence in any form whatsoever. (G20 2009).

In a October 2009 article in *China Daily*, Ding Qingfen explained:

After skipping over France twice this year on purchasing delegations, China will shop in the Western European nation late next month, a move that analysts said signals a return to their economic relationship. The delegation will arrive in France on Nov 26, nine months after China passed France over on its first business delegation of Europe this year (China Daily 2009).

In December 2016, there were reports about China’s “transport obstruction” in Mongolia. Mongolia insisted that China had closed an important crossing at the border, a week after the Dalai Lama’s visit to the state. According to Ulaanbaatar, Beijing was penalizing them for inviting the spiritual leader (Al Jazeera 2016).

Speaking in India, Gonchig Ganbold, the Mongolian Ambassador to India, said that following the Dalai Lama’s visit, China significantly increased tariffs on Mongolian trucks passing through Chinese territory. Moreover, Inner Mongolia, a province in China had imposed a provincial tariff on trucks carrying minerals. He stressed, “With winter temperature already around minus-20 degrees, transport obstruction by China is likely to create a humanitarian crisis in Mongolia as these measures will hurt the flow of essential commodities” (The Hindu, 2016). He further said:

India should come out with clear support against the difficulties that have been imposed on Mongolia by China, which is an overreaction to the religious visit by His Holiness Dalai Lama. We have not changed our ‘One China’ policy, so Beijing’s response to Mongolia hosting the spiritual leader is really not justifiable (The Hindu 2016).

A journalist, Adrian Brown argued that, “In a sense, Mongolia is paying a very heavy economic price for putting religious freedom ahead of economic necessity” (Aljazeera 2016) 2016). While Chinese foreign ministry chose to neither confirm or deny the “countermeasures or their connections with the Dalai Lama’s visit”, spokesperson

Geng Shuang did keep precondition for resuming Sino-Mongolian relations stressing, Mongolia should "adopt effective measures to eliminate the negative effects of the Dalai Lama's visit" (Global Times 2016).

A similar instance occurred in 2017, however this time it was the threat of Chinese sanctions, rather than their imposition. According to news reports, the Dalai Lama was invited to address a human rights conference in Botswana's capital Gaborone on August 17 and was also scheduled to meet the state's president during his trip (Reuters 2017). Responding to the news Beijing first conveyed its objections to the Dalai Lama's visit, however China soon adopted a hard stance to change the mind of the African state with which it then had several economic partnerships and significant investments (Shanghaist 2017). In a statement, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang opposed the Dalai Lama visit, stressing:

We hope the relevant country can clearly recognise the essence of which the Dalai Lama is, earnestly respect China's core concerns, and make the correct decision on this issue (Shuang quoted in Reuters 2017).

However, news reports later said that Botswana's President Ian Khama did not give in to Chinese pressure even after the local Chinese Embassy officials tried to persuade him to withdraw the invitation to the Dalai Lama. Speaking to the media about Dalai Lama, International Affairs and Cooperation minister of Botswana, Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi said:

Our view is that he is a man of peace and we have done our security checks through Interpol. He does not pose any threat. Our immigration laws, as supported by our citizens, allow for anyone who does not pose a threat to come in. This country belongs to Botswana and we are not going to allow favours from other countries to dictate who comes here and who does not (Mmegionline 2017).

Failing to change Gaborone's mind, Beijing adopted a stronger stance and the next day on July 26, during a press conference, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's said,

I must stress that Xizang-related issues concern China's sovereignty and territory integrity. We demand that the relevant country shall earnestly respect China's core interests and make the correct political decision on this matter. China will not interfere in other countries' internal affairs, but will not accept another country doing anything that harms China's core interests (Kang 2017).

Subsequently, on August 11, four days before the Dalai Lama was to visit, the trip was cancelled with physical "exhaustion" being cited as the reason on the Dalai Lama's official website (Tibet Sun 2017). While many experts believed that Botswana finally

gave in to the Chinese pressure and decided to not host the spiritual leader. An article published in *Global Times* shortly after the cancellation of the visit, titled, “More countries shun Dalai Lama as China’s economic impact grows”, quoted Lian Xiangmin, an expert at the China Tibetology Research Center, explaining, "I don't know the actual circumstances, but I would say it's very probable that Botswana is taking into account its relations with China. After all, compared with China, the Dalai Lama is trivial." Suggesting the threat of sanctions, he further said, "As China started to take countermeasures to the countries that accepted his visit, not many countries today truly welcome his visit." The author, Zhang Yu cited a 2013 Heidelberg University's research paper which said that from 2002 to 2008, “meeting between a head of state and the Dalai Lama lead to a reduction of exports to China by 16.9 per cent on average; the Dalai Lama meeting with a government member decreased exports to China by 12.5 per cent on average”(Global Times 2017). Making it clear that there could be a threat of use of sanctions involved (See: table 2.2).

China has been using sanctions to secure its core interests. As maritime issues have started gaining prominence and being considered as core interests, simultaneously it is being observed that Beijing is also using sanctions to secure its maritime interests. In this regard, the Japanese case is significant. China has not only threatened Japan with sanctions, but also imposed them (Pu 2007). In 2010, during a standoff on Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a disputed territory within the East Asian Sea, China imposed sanctions on Japan. China particularly blocked the sale of rare earth, a mineral that it has monopoly on (Bradsher 2010). Laden with fisheries and energy resources, the islands are important to and claimed by both the Asian states (Tisdall 2012).

The dispute started on September 7, 2010, when the Chinese fishing trawler *Minjinyu* 5179 crashed with Japanese coast guard vessels near the disputed islands. Following the crash, the Japanese navy promptly arrested the trawler’s captain, initiating legal action against him. Reacting to the episode, China argued that Japan had violated the status-quo procedure of turning over the captain and crew to the Chinese, which was being followed since the previous 15 years (Dundon 2014: 15).

However, US' pressure, given Japan's security alliances with the former is also believed to have made China wary of using military means to solve the dispute (Dundon 2014: 20). Hence sanctions seemed a viable option. China proscribed all intergovernmental meetings and negotiations, official and unofficial exchanges, including talks on joint exploration of the Chunxiao gas fields, and also significantly checked Chinese tourism to Japan. However the most drastic step that China took was that of banning the sale of rare earth material to Japan from September 23 to November 19, 2010. Though China's Ministry of Commerce denied coercing Japan by means of sanctions to concede, it was widely acknowledged that 'export quotas of rare-earth metals to Japan' were drastically reduced at the time (Bradsher 2010). In October, speaking at the 6th China-EU Business Summit Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao stressed:

We haven't imposed, and will not, impose an embargo on the industry. We are pursuing a sustainable development of the rare earth industry, not only to meet the demand of our own country, but also to cater to the needs of the whole world...China is not using rare earth as a bargaining chip (Wen 2010).

The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry stated that several trade companies had informed the authorities about an embargo on the export of Chinese rare earth materials to Japan. While eight months before the rare earth sanctions, Japan's rare earth imports from China averaged around 1,780 metric tons per month. In October and November of 2010, the number dropped to 200-300 metric tons a month, resuming to its former level only in December (Morrison and Tang 2012: 32) when China and Japan reached an agreement. Japan consequently considered contingency plans, including importing rare earth materials from India and setting up joint production units (Mohan and Chauhan 2015:189). It was only in November 2010, after Zhang Ping, China's director of the Development and Reform Commission, met with Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Akihiro Ohata on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Japan, that the sanctions were lifted. The Chinese captain was subsequently released in November 2010 (BBC 2010). And rare earth imports were restored to normal levels by December, after nearly two months of the rare earth sanctions (Smith 2015: 192).

Likewise, the Scarborough Shoal standoff with the Philippines made China impose trade sanctions against the state—blocking agricultural produce, particularly a number of banana consignments. Scarborough Shoal islands, called Panatag Shoal or Bajo de

Masinloc by Philippines, and Huangyan Island by Chinese, are situated off of the Philippines coast in the South China Sea. Though not capable of sustaining human life, these maritime features are significant for their strategic use as they not only have resources but are also close to an important shipping lane.

China-Philippines standoff lasted about ten weeks starting in April 2012. Arrest of Chinese fishermen by the Philippines authorities became the cause of discord between the two. A Navy surveillance plane of the Philippines, first detected eight Chinese fishing vessels near Scarborough Reef in April 2012 (Thayer 2012). According to reports, the ships contained illegal and endangered giant clams, corals and live sharks, which Philippines understood as a violation of its law. The Philippines used a BRP Gregorio del Pilar, a decommissioned US Coast Guard cutter, to arrest the fishermen. The Chinese found this objectionable as according to them a military vessel should not have been employed for law-enforcement activities. Accusing Manila of militarizing the dispute Beijing sent its maritime-surveillance vessels in the area to prevent the Philippines from detaining the fishermen. Beijing demanded that the Philippines immediately withdraw, and also intensified the dispute by first matching and subsequently outnumbering the Philippine vessels that had arrived to relieve its frigate (See table: 2.2).

Shortly after the arrests of the Chinese fishermen, the foreign secretary of the Philippines Albert del Rosario, took a strong stand, stressing, “we have sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Scarborough Shoal and finally I mentioned that if the Philippines is challenged, we are prepared to secure our sovereignty” (Rosario 2012 cited in Tan and Legaspi 2012). While the Chinese embassy in Manila released a statement urging the Philippine side, ‘to stop immediately their illegal activities and leave the area.’ (Xinhua 2012b). It further stressed:

The Chinese Embassy hereby reiterates that Huangyan Island is an integral part of the Chinese territory and the waters around it is the traditional fishing area for the Chinese fishermen, for which China has abundant historical and jurisprudence backings (Xinhua 2012b).

China again found its core interests threatened, and it emphasised that Philippines action was a departure from the status quo in a territory, and that these islands were a part of China. Subsequently, China imposed trade sanctions on the Philippines by enforcing new import and travel restrictions. In this case, China used economic

sanctions as part of a twofold strategy. It displayed force by sending civilian surveillance vessels and imposed sanctions on the democratic Filipino government to demonstrate its might. However, the significance of sanctions should not be overlooked in this case. Since the Philippines export a substantial part of its agricultural produce to China, the sanctions proved to be a heavy blow to the state's economy (Higgins 2012). The Chinese sanctions worked as the Philippines conceded and withdrew its vessels from the contested Scarborough Reef.

Table 2.2 Major sanctions imposed by China

Sl.No	Target	Issue	Year
1	Vietnam	To penalize the state for its anti-China attitude and growing tilt towards Moscow; Withdrawal troops from Cambodia	1975-78;1978
2	Albania	Retaliation for anti-Chinese rhetoric	1978
3	Taiwan	To encourage 'peaceful reunification' and 'using business to pressure politicians.'	1997-2017
4	France	1990- Taiwan air planes supply 2008–2009- Inviting Dalai Lama to Paris	1990s; 2008-2009
5	Japan	Over Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute	2010
6	Philippines	Over Scarborough Shoal islands dispute	2012
7	Mongolia	For hosting Dalai Lama	2016
8	Botswana	For inviting Dalai Lama	2017

Source: Rishika Chauhan

Western versus Non-Western Sanctions

India and China have used sanctions in the past as well in recent years. However, the way in which New Delhi and Beijing use sanctions is different than how the Western states like the US do. There are specific characteristics of the Indian and Chinese sanctions that can be listed. China and India have not authorized economic sanctions through acts or explicit regulations and statements as the US and the European Union (EU) have. For instance, Section 102 of US' Arms Export Control Act deals with economic and military sanctions to be placed on states engaged in transfer of nuclear reprocessing equipment and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The president of the US has also been given the power under several statutes to use sanctions for national security and foreign policy purposes. Some of the statutes under which the president can proscribe trade and financial transactions with other states and entities include, The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), the Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA), and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977

(IEEPA). The 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), is another example. Signed into law by President Trump on August 2, 2017, CAATSA involves imposing new sanctions of Iran, Russia, and North Korea. The law includes, Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 and Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act. The purpose of CAATSA is: "To provide congressional review and to counter aggression by the Governments of Iran, the Russian Federation, and North Korea.. "(CAATSA 2017).

The US constitution has also authorised other means through which the executive can impose *de facto* sanctions, if not *de jure*. According to Hufbauer et al (2008: 126) the president has "several options", that include:

For example, the executive branch can suspend or delay aid disbursements under the authority of Section 621 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which gives the president the authority to administer foreign aid programs. Similarly, Section 2(b)(1) of the Export-Import Act of 1945, as amended (1986), allows the president to deny Export-Import Bank credits for noncommercial reasons if the president determines that denial is in the national interest of the United States (Hufbauer et al 2008a: 126).

EU's official statements recognize sanctions as an "essential EU foreign policy tool that it uses to pursue objectives in accordance with the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy" (EU 2017).

China and India on the other hand are discreet about the use of sanctions. Unlike the US the two do not have an overt policy of democracy promotion or checking proliferation of nuclear and other sensitive materials, which requires the Western state to often resort to sanctions. However, not unlike the US, New Delhi and Beijing typically use sanctions to promote their interests, which not always have humanitarian purpose. The nature of the sanctions used by the two Asian states and the West is though different. Having been formalised through laws and explicit statements, Western sanctions are often automatic. In the case of nuclear tests, for example, the US laws demand that sanctions be imposed automatically, giving the leadership little choice. Indian and Chinese sanctions, on the other hand, are flexible. The leaders find ways and procedures depending on the case in point and their own suitability and ease. Accordingly sanctions are imposed or axed.

Conclusion

India and China portend all the attributes to be economic super powers. Currently, the two are among the world's largest economies and have large capital surplus, along with coveted domestic markets. In spite of ups and downs, their currencies RMB and INR are growing in appeal in the region, allowing their leaders a range of economic tools to achieve foreign policy objectives. However, India and China value their economic prosperity. Especially Beijing's political structures have been appropriately chosen or shaped to aid steadfast economic development, often at the cost of social freedoms. Hence it seems unlikely that China would use its economic might recklessly. Meanwhile, India often adopts a moralistic tone while speaking about its foreign policy preferences at international forums, making it averse to being referred to as a state that uses economic coercion to achieve its domestic or foreign policy objectives.

On the flip side, Indian and Chinese economies are growing, as are their interests abroad, concurrently making them vulnerable to economic coercion. Beijing and New Delhi might be in a position to exploit smaller economies like that of the Philippines and Nepal. However the two are certainly conscious of their economic interests in states with stronger and bigger economies. As the study shows, India and China have used sanctions to secure their interests, however it cannot be overlooked that promoting economic and social development are some of their chief interests, which could conflict with the former. Hence, it seems that the Indian and Chinese leadership would not be irresponsible when using sanctions. Nevertheless, since India and China abhor military use, it is likely that sanctions would feature prominently in the policy tool-kit of the two states, as they become more assertive in world politics.

Chapter 3: Responding to Sanctions on Self

In 1989 in a meeting with former US president Richard Nixon, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping is reported having said, “America is strong and China is weak, and China is victimized... The Chinese people will not beg for the cancellation of sanctions, even if they last 100 years” (Deng as quoted in Yan 2002:12). Nearly a decade later in 1998, responding to a question on the consequences of conducting a nuclear test, then Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was likewise reported saying, “I believe our decision to conduct the tests is in supreme national interest—then we have to face the consequence and overcome the challenge.... Sanctions cannot and will not hurt us. India will not be cowed down by any such threats and punitive steps” (India Today 1998).

Indian and Chinese understanding of sanctions on self has been dictated by a sense of victimization, while their reaction is often verbalized keeping in mind national pride rather than calculations of economic harm. Meanwhile, for both the states, US has been the common sender of sanctions given Washington’s foreign policy goal of checking proliferation of nuclear weapons through sanctions. The US has been occupied with checking the Indian and Chinese nuclear activities and has passed special laws to sanction both the states in order to take either restrictive or punitive action against the them. While the reaction of the two states to sanctions has been similar and can be linked, to some extent to their sensibilities arising from being former colonies of Western states, the reasons that have sparked sanctions against India and China have been different.

China is recognized as a nuclear weapon state by the international nonproliferation regime, India on the other hand is not a *de jure* nuclear power. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) — the most significant treaty conceptualized and implemented to check nuclear proliferation recognises only the states, which tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 as nuclear weapon states. Hence as China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, is recognized as a nuclear weapon state while India, which first tested in 1974, is not. Since one state is accepted in the regime while the other has been traditionally considered as an outlier, the reasons sparking sanctions have also

differed. While for India the reason for sanctions has been checking its own nuclear weapons ability or to take punitive action against New Delhi for testing nuclear weapons, in China's case sanctions have been imposed to discourage Beijing from exporting sensitive material to other states. In the case of nuclear exports, the understanding of the Indian and Chinese leaders has also been different as India has been careful about exporting sensitive material to other states and entities but China has often considered its economic and strategic interests while exporting nuclear materials and technology instead of the common objectives of international security. Moreover, some of the states identified as threats by Western states and their nuclear proliferation termed as dangerous for international security, are close allies of Beijing. Beijing for example, has not been averse to exporting sensitive technology to Syria, Iran, Pakistan and North Korea. China's acceptance into the nuclear nonproliferation regime has also made sure that it is allowed to engage in nuclear commerce unlike India, which is still not a member of the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG). In the situation, sanctions on China have often been imposed when it has exceeded the quantity and nature of the exports allowed under the regimes that it is a member of. However, it has to be noted that the US laws and norms on nuclear nonproliferation are stricter than those of many international nonproliferation regimes. Sanctions likewise have been American leaders' favoured instrument of statecraft especially since the end of the Cold War. Hence both India and China have often been sanctioned by the US.

This chapter examines the international nonproliferation regime and the sanctions imposed on India and China. It has four sections, the first section discusses the international nonproliferation regime, focusing on the definition and weaknesses of the regime and it explains how sanctions are used to check nuclear proliferation, particularly the unilateral sanctions imposed by the US. The second section lists the sanctions imposed on India and China to check their nuclear activities and/or change their nuclear behaviour. The last section then briefly elucidates New Delhi and Beijing's reaction to sanctions imposed on them.

Nuclear Nonproliferation regime

An array of treaties, agreements and laws together form the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, which aims to check horizontal and vertical nuclear weapons

proliferation by states. The nonproliferation regime also intends to preclude non-state actors from procuring nuclear weapons or materials.

Joseph Nye (1981:16) defines international regimes as, “sets of rules, norms, and procedures that regulate behavior and control its effects in international affairs.” He further explains, the norms and practices of the nonproliferation regime are espoused in “the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its regional counterparts like the Treaty of Tlatelolco; the safeguards, rules and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as in various UN resolutions” (Nye 1981:16). Adding to the list, Paul Lettow (2010:6) stresses that the international nuclear nonproliferation regime comprises of:

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system; export control arrangements, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group; UN Security Council resolutions; multilateral and bilateral initiatives, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between supplier and purchaser states.” And is further, “supported by a broad range of alliances and security assurances (Lettow 2010:6).

Signed on July 1, 1968 and effective from March 5, 1970, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is considered as the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. Behrens (2006:3) notes that the NPT, “provides the legal and institutional basis for international nonproliferation policy.” In the opinion of most Western academics, despite detractors, the treaty is a success (Thakur et al 2008:4). Although India, Israel, and Pakistan have refused to sign the treaty and North Korea withdrew from it in 2003, its membership is the widest of any arms control treaty. With 190 signatories, the participation to the NPT is widespread however the two South Asian nuclear states—India and Pakistan— have decided to not sign the treaty, which was indefinitely extended in 1995. The treaty has provisions for nuclear as well as the non-nuclear states, making the regime beneficial to both parties. The treaty forbids the five declared nuclear weapons states —the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China—to assist a non-nuclear-weapon state in acquiring nuclear weapons (Article I); the non-nuclear weapon states from receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article II). While the NPT grants the non-nuclear weapons states access to peaceful nuclear technology, it also requires them to not develop nuclear weapons and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect their nuclear facilities and materials (Article III and IV). Assuring that peaceful nuclear technology is not diverted to military purposes is an important objective of the NPT.

The NPT also mentions reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals in Article VI asking the nuclear weapon states to, “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (NPT, 1967). Key successes of the nonproliferation regime include South Africa’s historic decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the treaty, and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine’s transfer of nuclear weapons back to Russia after they seceded from the Soviet Union. However, like most regimes, the NPT is not fool proof and is susceptible to foul play—a fact that has been underlined by many scholars and practitioners.

Problems with the NPT

Especially since the end of the Cold War, deficiencies in the non-proliferation regime have repeatedly been noticed. The 1990s, saw NPT signatories, such as Iraq and North Korea launching their own nuclear weapons program, causing concern over the efficacy of the nonproliferation regime and making the West seek options to restrict and penalize defectors—to make the regime more effective. However, before the efforts to enhance nonproliferation regime’s effectiveness are studied, it is important to learn about its flaws, which have occasionally been the reasons for defections by various signatories to the treaty.

At the very outset, in spite of being the principal treaty of the nonproliferation regime, the NPT has not been able to secure a universal membership. Two *de facto* nuclear weapon states—India and Pakistan have remained out of the purview of the treaty as they have refused to sign it, pointing to its structural flaws. Examining the Indian and Pakistani problems with the NPT also clarifies the reason for NPT’s limited success.

Indian Perspective

India and seven other nations had moved a resolution on “a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons”, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 1382nd plenary meeting on November 19, 1965. The resolution had explicitly stated that the treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based on principles, backing similar nonproliferation rules for nuclear as well as non-nuclear

weapons states creating “acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations” for all parties and complete disarmament (Jayaprakash 2000:525). An eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which included India was convened in Italy in July 1965 to begin negotiating the NPT. The eight non-aligned countries in the ENDC stated that they would support an NPT only if it sought to build “tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce, and eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery” (Weiss 2010:256). However the final draft ignored most of the principles and demands put forward by India. By forwarding the proposal, New Delhi sought to keep the international community from relegating it to an inferior status. India did not want to relinquish its option to weaponise in the future. Not surprisingly, India did not support the final NPT, that it saw as discriminatory.

India saw the NPT as structurally discriminatory. After independence, India’s leadership was sympathetic to global arms control and disarmament. But given India’s experience of colonialism, its leadership was also very sensitive towards any discrimination that disfavoured developing and least developed countries that constituted NAM. As early as in 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru had proposed that nuclear testing should be permanently stopped. Speaking in the Indian parliament he said:

Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, the government would consider, some sort of what may be called ‘standstill agreement’ in respect, at least, of these actual explosions, even if agreements about the discontinuance of production and stock-piling must await more substantial agreements amongst those principally concerned” (Nehru 1951, as quoted in Ghose 1997: 241)*

In 1963, India also signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). However, India’s aversion to the NPT stemmed from the fact that while awarding the ‘nuclear weapon state’ status, the treaty made a clear distinction between the states that had exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967 and the ones that had not. The clause presented India’s neighbour, China the status of a ‘nuclear weapon state’ while making it clear that the treaty would never give India the same status. According to T. V Paul (1998:2) New Delhi often explains its:

Challenge to the nonproliferation regime in normative and idealistic terms, such as the sovereign equality of states and the need for global disarmament. However, these rationales mask the real Indian concern: namely, the nonproliferation regime privileges the five declared nuclear weapon

*Many believe that Nehru’s “standstill agreement” sowed the seeds of the CTBT. However, India disapproved of the final provisions of the treaty and decided to not sign or ratify CTBT.

states (NWS) and perpetuates their dominance, while keeping India as an underdog in the global power hierarchy (Paul 1998:2).

The Articles IV, V, and VI have been added in the treaty particularly to attract and later benefit the non-nuclear weapon states. Article IV recognizes a non nuclear weapon state's "inalienable right" to research and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in "conformity with Articles I and II of this treaty"; Article V allows non-nuclear weapon states access to the research and benefits of explosions that the nuclear weapon states conduct for peaceful purposes;* and Article VI disallows a non-nuclear state from developing nuclear weapons, while asking the nuclear weapon states to "disarm". Despite the inclusion of these articles, the treaty has failed to appeal to India. In 1968, when the topic of signing the NPT came up in the parliament, the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi said:

India's refusal to sign the NPT was based on enlightened self-interest and the considerations of national security... nuclear weapon powers insist on their right to continue to manufacture more nuclear weapons. This is a situation that cannot be viewed with equanimity by non-nuclear countries, especially as they are called upon to undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons for their own defence (Gandhi 1968 as quoted in Ghose 1997: 242).

However while she emphasized that India had no intention of building nuclear weapons, she did not touch on the topic of peaceful nuclear explosions.† India continues to maintain the same stance on the NPT. Following its nuclear tests in May 1998 then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, clarified India's position and relationship with the international nonproliferation regime. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in September 1998, Vajpayee, said that India had "participated actively and constructively in the negotiations" of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which was adopted in 1996 and aimed to ban military as well as civilian nuclear explosions in all environments. He explained, that owing to India's "security environment" it had then refused to sign the treaty. However the tests did not "signal a dilution of India's commitment to the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, after concluding this limited testing programme, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions"(Vajpayee 1998:5). He declared, "in announcing a moratorium (on further nuclear tests), India has

* Now article V of the NPT is considered obsolete as over time states realized that there was no utility of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. And the CTBT, to which the five nuclear states are signatories, restricts explosions.

† In 1974, India carried out a "peaceful nuclear explosion" about which a scientist Raja Ramanna later said, "An explosion is an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground... I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful" (PTI 1997).

already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT. In 1996, India could not have accepted the obligation, as such a restraint would have eroded our capability and compromised our national security” (Vaipayee 1998:5). However he did not mention NPT in his speech. But stated:

As a responsible state committed to non-proliferation, India has undertaken that it shall not transfer these weapons or related knowhow to other countries. We have an effective system of export controls and shall make it more stringent where necessary, including by expanding control lists of equipment and technology to make them more contemporary and effective in the context of a nuclear India...At the same time, as a developing country, we are conscious that nuclear technology has a number of peaceful applications and we shall continue to cooperate actively with other countries in this regard, in keeping with our international responsibilities (Vajpayee 1998:6).

In years after 1998, India continued to maintain its stand on NPT. In 2007, Pranab Mukherjee, then the External Affairs Minister of India said:

If India did not sign the Non Proliferation Treaty, it is not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we consider Non Proliferation Treaty as a flawed treaty and it did not recognise the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and treatment (Times of India 2007).

In 2017, more than fourdecades after the NPT came into force, Amandeep Singh Gill, India’s Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament told the UN General Assembly that, while India was:

As a responsible nuclear power, India has a policy of credible minimum deterrence based on a No First Use posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. We remain committed to maintaining a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing..Since there was a reference to India and the NPT by a grouping yesterday, let me say that India’s position on the NPT is well-known and should require no reiteration. The question of India joining the NPT as NNWS does not arise (Ministry of External Affairs 2017a: 1).

Nevertheless, the India-US nuclear agreement did give New Delhi the rights and obligations that were previously limited to those recognized as the nuclear weapons states by the NPT. The deal became a latent acknowledgement of India’s status as a nuclear weapon state. In 2008, India was granted a waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) allowing export of nuclear equipment and materials to India to help develop its civil nuclear power industry. While, India is still not recognized as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, Leonard Weiss (2010: 256-57) points out that India’s, “relationship to the treaty is, therefore, still a subject of international dialogue and discussion, and the outcome of such discussions can have a profound effect on the international non-proliferation regime, especially as the regime is considered to be in some degree of trouble.”

Pakistani Perspective

Pakistan's nuclear program as well as refusal to sign the NPT, is believed to be a response to India's actions. In an interview with the *Manchester Guardian* in 1965, when then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was asked how would Pakistan respond if India built a nuclear bomb, he said, "we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own" (Bhutto 1965 as quoted in Khan 2012:2). Historically, Pakistan has maintained that it would sign the NPT as well as the CTBT as a non-nuclear weapons state if India agrees to do the same. It has argued that it would be happy to follow suit, when New Delhi decides to take the step first. Essentially, Pakistan sees nuclear weapons as a "leveller against the overwhelming Indian superiority in conventional weapons" (Nayyar 2008:2).

Additionally, Pakistan has also found problems with the NPT. Previously, the state had cited its reluctance owing to little progress in nuclear weapon states' executing Article VI of the treaty, which calls for disarmament of the five nuclear weapon states. Moreover Pakistan has argued that the coercive actions exist to make the non-nuclear states conform to the various articles of the treaty while the nuclear states violations have not engendered the same level of action or criticism (Nayyar 2008:7). Since 2010 an important shift in the nuclear policy of Pakistan has occurred, owing to India's nuclear deal with the US and the subsequent 2008 NSG waiver (Sastry 2010:2).

Speaking to the media in 2010, Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman, Abdul Basit revealed that, Pakistan had decided to change its historic position about joining the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state if India decided to do the same. The new term of Pakistan joining the NPT was that it be acknowledged as a nuclear weapon state. South Asian security environment and Pakistan's increasing dependence on nuclear weapons for its safety and security were other reasons for the stance change (Sastry 2010:1).

Apart from its provisions being interpreted as biased and discriminatory by the developing world, there are another inherent lacunae in the NPT, which impedes non-proliferation. According to Ruzicka and Wheeler, the NPT acknowledges that the "treaty's original bargain embodies a trusting relationship." The treaty highlights three

sets of relationships: First, the relationship between the five recognized nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS); second, the relationships among the NWS; and third, the relationship between the signatories to the NPT and those states that remain outside the treaty (Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010: 75).

While trust is important in all relationships, including in relations between states, there have been times when the signatories have been deceived by diversion of nuclear material to pursue military goals. Behrens (2006:3) explains, that not unlike all international agreements, the NPT, “depends for its success on the good will of its participants”, moreover it does not warrant that states would not violate their commitments. In this situation to redress and check proliferation, various measures have been followed. One of the measures is sanctions, imposed either unilaterally by states or multilaterally by international organizations.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Sanctions

Most aspiring as well as now de-facto nuclear states have faced economic coercion of some form or the other in various stages of their nuclear weapon development. Israel, Egypt, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, India and Pakistan are some of the states. To check nuclear proliferation, states and international organizations have resorted to various tools — sanctions is one of them. The term ‘nuclear sanction’ has often been used to address sanctions imposed on states to curtail their nuclear related activities. While the NPT does not mention sanctions as a means of preventing or limiting horizontal or vertical nuclear proliferation, other proposals recommending the use of sanctions to check the spread of nuclear weapons, have been made.

One of the first mentions to sanctions as a means to check nuclear proliferation was found in 1946, in the Baruch Plan. Presented at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), by US representative, Bernard Baruch, the proposal contained a suggestion to create an international atomic development authority to supervise and inspect the development and use of atomic energy in the world. Moreover, Baruch plan proposed that the atomic development authority would only be answerable to the Security Council, which would have the right to penalize the states if they violated the terms of the plan by imposing sanctions. Additionally Baruch reasoned that in regard

to sanctions, the veto power of the members of the United Nations Security Council should be suspended, so that the violators could be penalized promptly. In turn the permanent members of the UNSC could also be punished if they do not cooperate with the nuclear nonproliferation norms. He argued, “if I read the signs right, the peoples want a program not composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions — an international law with teeth in it” (Baruch 1946:2). Explaining the utility of sanctions and the failure of arms control he claimed:

Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars...There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed (Baruch 1946:1).

Even without NPT’s endorsement, sanctions are a preferred option for the nuclear nonproliferation regime to make proliferators comply with its norms. They have been initiated at the bilateral as well as multilateral levels. Since the 1970s states involved in supplying nuclear material have used sanctions on other states that divert the material or technology towards military ends or violate the non-proliferation norms (Paul 1996: 441). At the multilateral level, the UNSC can impose sanctions on states if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finds violations of safeguard agreements, which is entrusted with the responsibility of conducting inspections at the nuclear facilities of states and report any violations of the safeguards agreements. The safeguards are based on the agreements signed by the non-nuclear weapon states, allowing the IAEA to conduct routine inspections of their nuclear facilities. The IAEA aims to deter covert nuclear activities by conducting inspections and reporting violations and clandestine activities to the UN. While the IAEA’s role is to conduct inspections, the function of enforcement lies with the UNSC, which can deter, restrict or punish the concerned state with sanctions. Export control mechanisms like the London Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM); also have provisions of using sanctions against violators of non-proliferation norms.

The US has remained a proponent of the non-proliferation norms. With increase in both power and prestige post-Cold War, Washington has not only followed the agenda itself but also promoted it through the means of international organizations like the UN and the IAEA. In 1993 a former US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, not

only listed ways in which US could combat nuclear proliferation but also said that the UNSC, “could play a central role in stopping the further proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them”(McNamara 1993:2). He stressed that the council should, “agree to prohibit the development, production and purchase of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles by countries that do not have them.”Further emphasizing, “countries violating this ban would be subject to strict economic sanctions” (McNamara 1993:2).

However, he believed that the US had a particular stake and responsibility in supporting and promoting the nuclear non-proliferation regime, arguing, “Progress on this difficult agenda would be accelerated if the U.S re-examined its own long-term strategic nuclear aims. We need to ask ourselves: What would be the rationale for having 3,500 nuclear weapons 10 years from now?” (McNamara 1993:2).

US Unilateral Sanctions

The understanding and implications of the international non-proliferation regime have often varied depending on which side of the globe is the observer based. US has been the proponent of nuclear nonproliferation, and has amended its own domestic laws to lend support to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In 1998, Strobe Talbott,^{*} then the US Undersecretary of State explained why the US imposed sanctions. While referring to the Indian and Pakistani case, he said:

The sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan were necessary for several reasons. First, it's the law. Second, sanctions create a disincentive for other states to exercise the nuclear option if they are contemplating it. And third, sanctions are part of our effort to keep faith with the much larger number of nations that have renounced nuclear weapons despite their capacity to develop them” (Talbott 1998:4).

It is widely believed that India's 1974 tests and the secret nuclear deals signed by France and Germany with South Korea, as well as Pakistan and Brazil, prompted the US and other states to resort to economic coercion (Lellouche 1979:337) for the first time as an instrument for nuclear nonproliferation. In fact post-tests the Indian case was often discussed in the US Congress, contemplating what could have stopped India from testing the nuclear weapon.

^{*}Strobe Talbott was appointed as the chief US interlocutor with India and Pakistan following their nuclear tests in 1998.

Speier et al (2001:vii) argue that US' first nonproliferation sanctions law was enacted in 1974, "targeted at India for its peaceful nuclear explosion." While "more general nuclear nonproliferation sanctions" were enacted from 1976 through 1978. They explain that nonproliferation sanctions laws did not change for the next 12 years. In early 1990, US Congress took a strong position and passed various sanctions laws against the proliferation of Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles. US could not, however, maintain the same momentum and by the mid-1990s, many of the laws requiring US unilateral economic sanctions were being criticized. Various groups were trying to draw the attention of the government on the counterproductive effects that sanctions were having on the US' foreign and security policy objectives.

Advocating the use of sanctions post India's first nuclear test, Senator Charles H. Percy called for sanctions backed controls on US exports brought by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. He said that India would have not been able to test a nuclear device "without any concern that they would have any sanctions imposed against them... But if we had just had a clear-cut policy from the outset that (an explosion) would be an action so contrary to our policy that we would sever our supply if technologies and materials were used for explosives, then I do not think they would have taken the action" (Percy as quoted in Perkovich, 2000: 207).

However there is evidence that suggests that even before the sanctions laws were passed, the US had contemplated varied options to check nuclear proliferation through various means. The little-known Gilpatric committee* formed in 1964 was one such attempt. President Johnson formed this committee to deliberate policy options and strategies to fructify one of the most important goals of US foreign policy namely, nuclear nonproliferation. Speculations about economic coercion influencing Japan's decision to not build a nuclear weapon after China's first nuclear test have also surfaced. There are reports suggesting that economic coercion was used as early as 1961 to curtail Israel's nuclear ambitions. Though, it is largely believed that US attempts were half hearted in this case.

*Though the major task of the Gilpatric Committee was to suggest policy options in response to China's first nuclear test, the committee also explored strategies to check nuclear proliferation in Europe, South Asia and West Asia.

The US' nonproliferation laws are nuanced and so sentient that sometimes "credible information" is sufficient to impose sanctions on states as in the case of Iran Nonproliferation Act (1999). The laws allow a range of sanctions, often involving supplementary economic restrictions, commonly known as secondary sanctions, designed to penalise non-US citizens or companies for doing business with the primary target. Completely segregating the target, secondary sanctions expand the scope of sanctions. Moreover, Washington has also sometimes considered whether unilateral sanctions should be imposed according to existing laws or new laws requiring sanctions should be made to make the impact more effective on the target, like it has been in the case of China (Kan 2001: 12). US commitment can be seen from the fact that sometimes state actions do not violate international treaties however sanctions are required by the US laws if it deems a state or entities actions against the norms of the nonproliferation regime. It has also linked international agreements and regimes to its laws. For example the sanctions listed as Category II in the MTCR, makes US cancel licenses to transfer missile equipment or technology to the violating state.

Currently, US has a set of export control and licensing laws and regulations which deal with transfers of nuclear technology or materials, and dual-use technology. Additionally US laws also call for automatic sanctions on non-nuclear weapon states that acquire or test nuclear weapons and violators of nonproliferation commitments. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was one of the early attempts of US to regulate and manage nuclear technology beyond its own borders. The Nuclear proliferation-Foreign Assistance Act of 1961-1977, amended by the International Security Assistance Act (Section 669, Symington amendment) prohibits military or economic assistance to any country that "delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country," unless the transaction follows specified international safeguards requirements. The act has been used to control the nuclear activities of states like Pakistan.

Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is significant. Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act is sometimes called 'nuclear sanctions', as it elucidates the need for the President to impose sanctions on any country that he

has declared as a ‘non-nuclear-weapon state’ and has received or detonated a ‘nuclear explosive device.’ The Congressional Research Service Report entitled, ‘Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan’, updated on 5th October, 2001 is the first official document of the US to have used the term, ‘nuclear sanctions’ for this section of the act.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 is widely accepted as a fine attempt of the US to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and set up criteria for governing US export controls. It deals with limiting and controlling nuclear technology. Moreover the act prohibits exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and sensitive technology to nonnuclear weapon state, which has been found by the president to have exploded a nuclear weapon or ended or violated an IAEA safeguard or agreement. It also bans defense items, nuclear material, and other sensitive materials and technology to other nuclear weapon states if the president finds the state has violated a cooperation agreement with the US or assisted or encouraged proliferation to nonnuclear weapons state. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 gives the President the right to impose sanctions if it “(A) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state a nuclear explosive device, (B) is a non-nuclear weapon state and either (i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or (ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device” (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Prevention Act 1994).”

There are laws focused on particular states like Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 or Russia, North Korea and Iran focused Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017. Iran Nonproliferation Act (2000) authorizes the US President to take punitive action against state or entity if it provides material aid to weapons of mass destruction programs in Iran. While the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 1996 requires the president to impose at least two out of a menu of six sanctions on foreign companies (entities, persons) that make an “investment” of more than “\$20 million (\$40 million for Libya) in one year in Iran’s energy sector.”

Legislations like the Export- Import bank financing to Iraq and Iran are also meant to check nuclear proliferation. Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 authorizes sanctions against any foreign government or person who contributes “knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran and Iraq (or any agency or instrumentality of either

such country)□to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons”(Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992). While Section 826 of the Glenn amendment calls for sanctions on non-nuclear states that conduct nuclear tests. Sanctions involve “restrictions on financial assistance except for humanitarian purposes, a ban on Trade and Development Agency, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Export-Import Bank financing, restrictions on US exports of high-technology products, and opposition to loans from international financial institutions” (Arms Export Control Act1976).

Table 3.1: US Nonproliferation Laws

S. No	Law	Use
1	Atomic Energy Act of 1946	To regulate and manage nuclear technology beyond its own borders.
2	Nuclear proliferation-Foreign Assistance Act of 1961-1977	Prohibits military or economic assistance to any country that delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country.
3	Arms Export Control Act 1976	Stresses need for the President to impose sanctions on any country that he has declared as a ‘non-nuclear-weapon state’ and has received or detonated a ‘nuclear explosive device.’
4	Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978	Prohibits the export of sensitive material and technology to a non-nuclear weapon state if found to have exploded a nuclear weapon. Ban exports of defence and other sensitive material and technology to a nuclear weapon state if found to be encouraging proliferation or/and going against the US nonproliferation norms.
5	Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation 1992	Particularly aims at the proliferation activities of Iran and Iraq
6	Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1994 Prevention Act	Gives the President the right to impose sanctions.
7	Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000	Particularly aims at the proliferation activities of Iran.
8	Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 1996	Particularly aims at the proliferation activities of Iran and Libya

Source: Gary Clyde Hufbauer, et al (2008: 151-54) revised and updated by author

Sanctionees

India as Sanctionee

India conducted nuclear weapon tests in May 1974 and then again in May 1998. Over the years India has become capable of manufacturing highly enriched uranium-based nuclear weapons and has significantly developed its ability to make plutonium. While India has signed neither the NPT nor the CTBT, it regards itself as a responsible

nuclear power and has not carried out proliferation activities. In 2016, 2017 and 2018 India received the membership of — Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, as well as Australia Group, the three international regimes that had previously refused to warm up to India.

After conducting its first nuclear test (Pokhran I) in May 1974, India became a ‘discriminatee’— a status the developing state had to deal with until the 2000s (Vardharajan 2017: 482). However, according to Leonard S. Spectre, besides a partial nuclear trade embargo, the developed Western states did not “inverve” and “try to prevent this major expansion of Indian nuclear capabilities” (Spectre 1985: 60). Following the nuclear test several Western states and groups imposed nuclear equipment and material embargoes on India. Yet, many of the sanctions were not placed immediately after the test and were imposed subsequently when India failed to reach an agreement on safeguards with supplier-states, particularly Canada and the US.

India-Canada nuclear cooperation started in the 1950s, under the aegis of the Colombo Plan. The two states signed the agreement to establish CIRUS nuclear reactor in 1956. The Canadian government also helped in setting the Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant (RAPP) with a CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) type reactor.* The heavy water for the reactor was, however supplied by the US as Canada’s heavy water industry was then in its infancy. The borrowed heavy water was later returned to the US. During the time Canada had not stressed the need for strict safeguards on the reactors aided by them. The agreement insisted that the heavy water would only be used for research and would not be resold or distributed. In the absence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or any similar organization that could regulate nuclear materials and technology, India’s word to put the nuclear aid to peaceful uses was then considered sufficient (Kamath 1999:749).

*Since necessary fuel and heavy water for the project came from Canada, India particularly had trouble running this reactor after Canada cut off nuclear aid to India. CANDU type reactors were also used for RAPP II and later, also for the Madras Atomic Power Plant (MAPP).

Subsequently, after India tested the nuclear device, the Canadian leaders were alarmed and reacted sharply. Ottawa felt a sense of betrayal as India had used plutonium produced in the Canada-supplied CIRUS reactor (Perkovich 2000: 186). Earlier, the Indian government had assured Canada that they did not have any intention to conduct a nuclear test. The Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi had been warned by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau that on the occasion of India conducting a nuclear test, Canada would not only stop nuclear aid but also economic aid to the developing state (Kamath 1999: 753). Trudeau had told Indira Gandhi:

The use of Canadian supplied material, equipment and facilities...at CIRUS, at Rajasthan, or fissile material from these reactors, for the development of a nuclear explosive device would inevitably call on our part for a reassessment of our nuclear cooperation arrangements with India (Trudeau cited in Kamath 1999: 753).

Consequently, following Pokhran I, Canada froze all assistance to India for the Rajasthan II reactor and the Kota heavy-water plant, which was then under construction. Canada made further nuclear assistance conditional on India's acceptance of the IAEA safeguards for all its nuclear activities, not only the Rajasthan I reactor and Tarapur reactor which was supplied by the US. However it was on May 18, 1976, exactly two years after Pokhran I, that Canada formally terminated nuclear cooperation with India (Spector 1985: 61). After the test, India and Canada had been negotiating on establishing stricter safeguards, however they were unable to reach a conclusion, as India did not agree to safeguards on all its nuclear facilities and sanctions continued.

The US' reaction to the test was "conflicted" (Perkovich 2000: 183). While the bureaucracy sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a harshly worded draft criticising India for undermining international non-proliferation efforts, the final statement was tempered (Perkovich 2000: 183). The US continued to deal with India the same way for at least sometime, in fact as previously agreed, it shipped an instalment of uranium fuel for India's reactor in Tarapur in June 1974. The US administration found that the Indian test had not violated any agreement, hence Washington had to abide by the 1963 nuclear cooperation agreement and the related 1966 contract to sell enriched uranium to India for its Tarapur reactor. Nevertheless a sanction— though rather soft and unfocused— was imposed by the US in August 1974. Then the Congress amended the International Development Assistance Act directing the US

representatives on the board of the World Bank to “vote against any loan for the benefit of any country which develops any nuclear explosive device unless that country becomes a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” However, the US did not “rigorously uphold the spirit of this sanction” (Perkovich 2000: 184). While it frequently voted against loans to India in the World Bank, however did not ask the other lenders to do the same. As a consequence from 1975 to 1977 the US allowed itself to be “overruled” in every case at the International Development Association involving loans to India (Spectre 1985: 60).

Meanwhile, the US strengthened its non-proliferation efforts as the cause started to find prominence in the national ethos. In 1975 the State Department attempted to restart the nuclear dialogue with Indira Gandhi, when Kissinger visited India in October 1974. Though there was American pressure, as they feared that India might engage in nuclear exports, however the pressure became pronounced only in 1977-1978. In June 1976, the US enacted the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (1961)* prohibiting US economic or military assistance to any state importing enrichment or reprocessing technology unless it accepted to follow IAEA regulations, allowing inspections and safeguards on its facilities.

Subsequently while President Carter wanted to maintain good relations with India, the US nonproliferation efforts got in the way. On March 10, 1978 US Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), believed to have been prompted by the 1974 Indian nuclear tests. According to NNPA, the US would no longer export, “source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities and sensitive nuclear technology” to any country that does not maintain IAEA safeguards on “all peaceful nuclear activities” within its jurisdiction. Forbidding manufacture or detonation of “nuclear explosive devices and reprocessing US-originated spent fuel without prior American approval (Perkovich 2000: 206). What NNPA did was it imposed “sanctions-backed” controls on US exports with the objective of compelling states like India to give up on the attempts to acquire nuclear weapons in the future.

* This provision, as amended, is now in Section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

Under the provisions of 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, US announced the prohibition of nuclear aid to India after March 1980. The NNPA made India's Tarapur reactor a problem between India and the US as the act demanded that India accept full scope safeguards to eliminate its nuclear explosives capability, or it would terminate its supply to the Tarapur reactor on which Maharashtra, one of the most populated province of India depended for electricity (Perkovich 2000: 209). However, in 1980, President Jimmy Carter used his right to waive sanctions and allowed a fuel shipment for two reactors at Tarapur. However, when US intelligence reports suggested that New Delhi might conduct another nuclear test, the second shipment was suspended. New Delhi, at this time emphasized that the US could not terminate fuel supply as it had agreed to the 1963 Indo-American nuclear trade agreement. The Regan administration stopped fuel supply to India in 1982, when France filled in (Spector: 1985 60).

While Pokhran I, prompted the US to tighten its non-proliferation policy, it subsequently prodded leading Western states to establish a strict non-proliferation regime. In June 1974, the Zangger committee with its twenty member states met to discuss and implement tougher supply conditions of sensitive materials. On August 22, 1974, memorandum was filed with the IAEA to regulate exports of a "trigger list" items in order to deny states sensitive materials if they did not accept the IAEA safeguards on their facilities availing the materials. By 1975, the US came to lead the efforts to tighten the nonproliferation regime. While it pursued the Zangger committee's August 1974 agreement to determine a "trigger list" and ban the export of those materials to non-nuclear states, Kissinger pressed for a multilateral approach. In, April 1975 Kissinger convened a secret meeting in London, which later became the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an effective non-proliferation cartel with the aim of "plugging the loopholes that had allowed India to produce a 'peaceful' nuclear explosive" (Perkovich, 2000: 191).

In June 1985 an episode of technological denial occurred that amounted to sanctions. The Indian Meteorological Department wanted to import Cray supercomputer, model XMP-24 from the US. In spite of President Reagan's willingness, India could not procure the computer as many in the US bureaucracy were apprehensive as the computer had security applications including its use for designing nuclear warheads

and ballistic missiles. In 1987 US agreed to export the supercomputer however it sold a less powerful version, a Cray XMP-14 model (Perkovich 2000: 269).

In the 1990s US adopted an aggressive policy towards India under President Bill Clinton, with the intention to, “cap, roll back and eventually eliminate,” Indian nuclear and missile programmes (Holum 1994). India was pressurised to alter its nuclear and missile posture. The US also took a strong stand against the deployment of the short-range Prithvi missile as well as the development of the medium-range Agni missile (Choudhury 2008:8). On May 5, 1992 India tested short range Prithvi missile that miffed the US. The Bush administration imposed sanctions on the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) on May 11 for two years (Perkovich 2000: 327).^{*} The same year in April, Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) prohibited India from getting involved in nuclear commerce (Varadarajan 2008). The NSG decision came after the group tightened its guidelines, and added a list of dual-use technologies and enforced other strong measures. The group identified sixty-five classes of dual-use technology that it would control the export of to states like India that were outside the nonproliferation regime (Chellaney 1993:195). However in October 1992, observing the geopolitical changes and its growing complementarity of interests and values with India, the US decided to soften its stance and eased the ISRO sanctions and agreed to ship supplies that had been previously held (Perkovich 2000: 329).

The US, applied sanctions after India conducted its second nuclear tests (Pokhran II) in May 1998. As India announced that it had detonated five nuclear devices, including a hydrogen bomb, the US imposed sanctions on India. Primarily there were three types of sanctions — first direct aid payments were terminated; second credits and loan guarantees from the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corp were blocked; third US banks were proscribed from lending money to state-owned Indian enterprises and technology exports worth millions of dollars was banned (Lukas 1998:2).

As required by the Glenn Amendment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1994, sanctions were announced, and imposed under section 102(b) of the Arms Export

^{*} The US also imposed sanctions on Glavkosmos, the Russian space research organization which had proposed to sell India three cryogenic rocket engines and technology.

Control Act (AECA) of 1976. On May 13, 1998, the US President declared “that India, a non-nuclear-weapon state, detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 11, 1998. The relevant agencies and instrumentalities of the United States Government are hereby directed to take the necessary actions to impose the sanctions described in section 102(b)(2)” (US Congress 2010: 572).

Following the President’s determination, the Department of State issued Public Notice 2825 on May 15, 1998, to revoke all “licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles and defense services from the United States to India, or transfer U.S. origin defense articles and defense services from a foreign destination to India, or temporarily import defense articles from India pursuant to Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act” (Department of State 1998).

The sanctions included “prohibitions on foreign assistance, weapons sales and licenses, foreign military financing, government credit, guarantees and export of certain controlled goods and technology. Humanitarian aid, food and agriculture exports, food assistance, private bank loans for purchase of food and agricultural commodities and certain transactions involving intelligence activities were excluded from the list” (Grimmett 2001: 1). Moreover, non-statutory sanctions, restricted “high level visits and military to military contacts” in accordance with the Clinton’s administration policy (Spector 2012: 54).

In July 1998, the President used his power to waive particular sanctions. On October 27, 1999 President Clinton waived statutory restrictions. Subsequently, on September 22, 2001 following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, President Bush waived sanctions imposed under section 102(b) of AECA, and the sections 2(b)(4) of Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (Grimmett 2001:16).

Besides the US, other states had also imposed sanctions on India. Japan was one of the first states to show displeasure after India conducted its 1998 nuclear tests and it cut bilateral aid to New Delhi. Tokyo also decided against hosting the scheduled meeting of the World Bank Coordinated Aid India Consortium, planned in Tokyo for June 1998. Germany, Sweden and □ Denmark also suspended their official foreign aid to India and abstained from making future commitments (Wadhva 1998: 1604).

However, Group of Eight (G-8), could not build a consensus on sanctioning India collectively as a group, as Britain, France and Russia particularly raised doubts (Wadhva 1998: 1604).

India did feel the pinch of suspension of Japanese aid. Japan, then was the single largest donor of the Official Development Assistance to India with an annual aid commitment (Morrow and Carriere 1999: 5). However, US unilateral sanctions did not have much impact, inflicting only moderate economic punishment. German aid of about US\$ 300 million; and Sweden and Denmark's combined US\$ 200 million were also suspended (Wadhva 1998: 1604). Canada, Australia imposed sanctions as well. According to Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere (1999: 2) the sanctions on India had a "modest but measurable adverse effect on India's economy."

Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al. (2008) of the Peterson Institute of International Economics estimates that before all the US sanctions on India were waived, the initial costs of economic sanctions were about \$554 million annually. Speier et al (2001) note that:

The effect of the US sanctions was substantial. On May 14, the rupee dropped to a record low. By the next day, however, some business executives were warning that the sanctions could have a broader effect on American interests in India than on the Indian economy itself. And there were limits to the multilateral support that the United States could organize (Speier et al 2001: 37).

While the US could not block World Bank loans to India, it did manage to delay them.

Table 3.2: Major Nonproliferation Sanctions against India

Sl. No	Sender/Sanctioner	Reason for sanction	Year of imposition
1	Canada	Nuclear test (Pokhran I)	1976 formally (1974 May, informally)
2	US	Nuclear test (Pokhran I)	1974 (August)
3	Japan, Britain	Nuclear test (Pokhran I)	1974
4	US	To check proliferation	1981 , 1978
5	US	Missile test (sanctions on ISRO)	1992

6	Nuclear Supplier Group	To check proliferation	1992
7	US, Japan, Germany, Denmark and Sweden	Nuclear tests (Pokhran II)	1998

Source: Peterson Institute of International Economics data, Perkovich (2000), Grimmett (2001), Spector (1985)

China as a Santione

China is recognized as a nuclear weapon state by the nonproliferation regime. It is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA. Beijing acceded to the NPT in 1992 and signed though not ratified, the CTBT. It has a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. China has been accused of proliferating nuclear and sensitive dual-use material and technology by the US several times in the last few years. Beijing is known to have made several pledges and consented to many important nonproliferation treaties and arms control regimes to evade US sanctions. However, Chinese entities have not always agreed with the US on the nonproliferation norms and often understood the transfers as usual commerce and revenue generating ventures than a threat to global security. Some experts even cite China's ambition to be the largest supplier of nuclear technology as the reason for growing proliferation (Joshi 2015:1).

In the 1980s a special certification criteria was established in the US while transacting with China. A 1985 Joint Resolution mandated the US President to certify that while engaging in nuclear cooperation with China, Beijing "has provided clear and unequivocal assurances to (United States) that it is not assisting and will not assist any (Non-Nuclear Weapon State), either directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosives or their materials or components" (Speier et al 2001: 36).

In January 1992, the US Department of State issued a demarche to China raising concerns over Beijing's sale of a 300 MW reactor to Pakistan, a state the US considered as a "country of proliferation concern" (Department of State 1992:1). Further, Washington urged Beijing to adopt a full-scope safeguard nuclear export policy. China attempted to dispel Washington's concerns by arguing that, the reactor deal with Pakistan was "one that was open, public...China as a long time ally and

friend of Pakistan, wanted to help Pakistan's economic development and that the reactor deal would benefit both countries" (Department of State 1992:1).

A Congressional Research Service report by Shirley A. Kan (2015:2) discusses China's missile technology transfers and the consequent US sanctions. Suspected of transferring M-11 short-range ballistic missiles or related equipment beyond the permissible limit of Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, the US imposed sanctions on China under Section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act and Section 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act. The sanctions, first imposed for transferring M-11 technology to Pakistan impeded export of supercomputers, satellites, and missile technology to China. Subsequently, the sanctions were waived on March 23, 1992. On August 24, 1993, the Clinton administration again found China to be transferring M-11 equipment to Pakistan and imposed new sanctions that affected exports of satellites. The sanctions were waived on November 1, 1994, after China vowed to not export missiles capable of delivering 500-kilogram warheads to a distance of 300 kilometers (Kan 2001: 4).

In 1996, US contemplated the issue of imposing sanctions on China for technology transfers to Pakistan's nuclear program. However Beijing soon issued another nuclear nonproliferation pledge (2014: 3). In a June 1997, in a report on "The Director of Central Intelligence Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventions/Munitions July - December 1996", the Director of Central Intelligence identified China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign countries, explaining:

During the last half of 1996, China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign countries. The Chinese provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran's and Pakistan's ballistic missile programs. China also was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan, and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting period. Iran also obtained considerable CW-related assistance from China in the form of production equipment and technology (Director of Central Intelligence 1997).

According to a count, while President George W. Bush was in office from 2001 to 2009, the US imposed sanctions on 23 occasions against 30 plus different Chinese entities. Though China remained reticent about its nuclear cooperation with states like Pakistan, in 2015, during a press conference in Beijing Wang Xiaotao, the Vice-Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission said that China "has

assisted in building six nuclear reactors in Pakistan with a total installed capacity of 3.4 million kilowatts,” hoping to continue the cooperation further (China Daily 2015).

The nuclear role of Beijing’s missile transfers was often discussed in Washington, as suspicions of more trade of sensitive technology between China and Pakistan rose. As evidence of individuals and companies being involved in the transfers surfaced, Chinese entities were sanctioned. In early 2000s reports of China transferring sensitive technology came up. In a 2001 article titled, “Beijing arms Pakistan”, *Washington Times* reported that a Chinese state run company, China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corp. had supplied missile components to Pakistan which had aided its Shaheen-1 Short Range Ballistic Missile and Shaheen-2 Medium Range Ballistic Missile programs. On September 1, 2001, the US State Department imposed sanctions on the China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation (CMEC) for proliferation of missile technology (Washington Times 2001) .

In a 2015 book, titled, ‘The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics’, Andrew Small asserts that China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation was beneficial for both the states. Explaining, while Moscow decided to curtail its assistance to China's strategic weapons programme due to ideological tensions between Mao and Khrushchev, China promptly became the fifth country in the world to test a nuclear bomb, suggesting that Beijing benefited from the A.Q. Khan network by gaining access to Western technology through it. The cooperation took place, in spite of China promising India that it was not in its interest to sell weapons to its neighbours (Small 2015:49). While weakening India’s nuclear threat was on China’s mind when helping China secure nuclear weapons, Beijing was against Islamabad’s nuclear adventurism, which could risk war with India(Small 2015:72).

Besides transfers of dual usable materials and technology to Pakistan, similar trade with Iran, Syria and North Korea also made US take punitive measures against Beijing (Zhao 2010:270). In 2001, a Chinese company —Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation was sanctioned by the George W. Bush administration under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 for export of chemical weapons-related materials or technology to Iran. The sanctions stayed for two years.

Concerns about proliferation were raised several times in the US during the 1990s. China sought to change its behaviour post 1991 though the development cannot be wholly attributed to sanctions. In the last decade of the 20th century, China took steps to address US and western concerns and increased its participation in international nonproliferation regimes and started observing guidelines of export control regulations (Kan 2015: 43). In 2000, the US state department made sanctions waiver and resumption of processing licenses to export satellites along with extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, conditional on, Beijing's promise to not proliferate missiles material and technology. However, an agreement could not be reached and reports of proliferation by Beijing again made the US consider sanctions on China.

With respect to China, US has often had to deliberate whether its security interests precede economic or foreign policy interests. There are specific laws that have been passed by the Congress to control and proscribe China's proliferation activities. In 1999, the 106th Congress passed the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act that required a report on China's obedience to the MTCR. China has also come under the purview of the Iran Nonproliferation Act in context of its proliferation activities linked to Iran. In May 2000, US Congress passed the China Nonproliferation Act, that directed the President to:

Report annually to specified congressional committees on every person with respect to whom there is credible information indicating that such person, on or after January 1, 2000, transferred, retransferred, sold, misused, or diverted from, or within, the People's Republic of China to a foreign person or Chinese national involved in the development or acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or ballistic or cruise missiles any goods, services, or technology: (1) listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (both published by the International Atomic Energy Agency), the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, the lists of items and substances relating to biological and chemical weapons the export of which is controlled by the Australia Group, the Schedules of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, or the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996; or (2) not identified on any of these lists, but would be if they were U.S. goods, services, or technology prohibited or controlled for export to China (or any tier IV countries as defined by the Bureau of Export Administration of the Department of Commerce), and have the potential to contribute to the development, improvement, or production of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems, or advanced conventional weapons or munitions (China Nonproliferation Act 2000).

Table 3.3: Selected Chinese Proliferation Activity During the 1990s

Recipient	Type Trade/Cooperation	Implication
Iran	Chemical precursor production technology and equipment	Promotes Iran's effort to achieve a self-sufficient chemical warfare program.
Iran, North Korea, Libya, Pakistan	Missile-related items, raw materials, technical assistance.	Enhances recipient states' missile production efforts.
Iran	Small nuclear research reactor, zirconium production facility. Halted sale of uranium conversion facility.	Enhances Iran's knowledge of the nuclear fuel cycle. Slowed proliferation concerns.
Pakistan	Previous assistance with plutonium production reactor.	Assists Pakistan with effort to produce plutonium.
Pakistan	Supplied M-11 missiles.	Enhanced Pakistan's missile capabilities.

Source: *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2001:18

China has also come under the purview of US secondary sanctions for its dealings with other states or entities under primary US sanctions. In 2017 the US imposed sanctions on 13 Chinese and North Korean organizations. In this Washington blacklisted three Chinese companies—Dandong Kehua Economy & Trade Co., Dandong Xianghe Trading Co., and Dandong Hongda Trade Co., accusing China of helping evade nuclear restrictions against Pyongyang and supporting the country through trade of commodities like coal (Reuters 2017).

Table 3.4: Major Nonproliferation Sanctions against China

Sl. No	Sender/Sanctioner	Reason for sanction	Year of imposition
1	US	Missile technology transfer to Pakistan.	1992
2	US	Missile technology transfer to Pakistan	1993-1996
3	US	Transfer of missile technology and nuclear material (more than 30 Chinese entities sanctioned).	2001 to 2009
4	US	Sanctions on China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation (CMEC) for missile technology supply to Pakistan.	2001
5	US	Sanctions on Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation for sensitive material and technology supply to Iran	2001
6	US	On Chinese companies for their transactions with North Korea.	2007

Source: Based on Peterson Institute of International Economics data, Shuey and (1995), Zhao (2010) and Kan (2015).

Indian and Chinese response to sanctions

Seemingly India and China have been defiant to sanctions. However the two have not completely overlooked the cost of sanctions and tried to mitigate the loss caused by them. Nevertheless, the two Asian states have often attempted to build a domestic discourse wherein they stand as victims and promise to not capitulate.

India

India's first nuclear test in 1974, that surprised its suppliers Canada and the US was different from the second in 1998. New Delhi termed Pokhran I as a "peaceful nuclear explosion", as a result it did not accept any criticism or the suggestion to join NPT and did not have to accept safeguards (Kamath 1999:749). In fact by describing the test as "peaceful", Indira Gandhi set the tone and the theme for the succeeding policy statements, that are still followed fervently even today (Burns 1998:4).

India's Atomic Energy Commission had insisted that it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons. Following the test, then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi said, "there's nothing to get excited about. This is our normal research study. But we are firmly

committed to only peaceful uses of atomic energy” (Washington Post 1974). While insisting that India was a “nuclear-country” and not a ‘nuclear-weapon country’, she invoked the anti-colonial sentiment, arguing that the new technology and know-how will contribute to India’s development even if the advanced states disapproved. The media too was ecstatic about the news, and Indira Gandhi gained political capital, overnight. When the US started making the nonproliferation regime stricter and the NSG came up with stricter export controls, India felt that the US-led nonproliferation regime proved “intellectual colonialism” (Chellaney 1993: 64). Speaking in the Parliament, about the international reaction to the test, then prime minister, Indira Gandhi said:

It was emphasized that activities in the field of peaceful nuclear explosion are essentially research and development programmes. Against this background, the government of India fails to understand why India is being criticized on the ground that the technology necessary for the peaceful nuclear explosion is no different from that necessary for weapons programme. No technology is evil in itself: it is the use that nations make of technology, which determines its character. India does not accept the principle of apartheid in any matter and technology is no exception (India Today 2013).

Later, when the NNPA was implemented and the US wanted to renegotiate the contract to fuel supply for the Tarapur reactor, New Delhi was upset. They again felt that it was Western colonialism that was impeding India’s development. However, according to some accounts, India’s next Prime Minister, Morarji Desai lamented sanctions and regretted the tests. He said:

It is Pokhran which created all this trouble, and without our gaining anything. If it had gained us something, I would have been very happy. That is why they (the US) are asking now for safeguards. They believe that it is only for weapons and nothing else (Desai 1978 as quoted in Perkovich 2001: 214).

However, many analysts attribute Desai’s reaction and regret to his personal aversion to nuclear tests.

In 1990s when sanctions were imposed on India due to its missile tests and development, Indian authorities argued that the technological development was merely for civilian purposes. India was developing the technology for its space program, to launch communications satellites (Perkovich 2001: 328). In 1995 when reports of India preparing for another nuclear test came out and the US took a strong stance, many Indian scholars reacted differently. While the scientists and the BJP leaders spent time and energy clarifying, claiming that the allegations were a lie and an American ‘ploy’ to make India sign the test ban treaties, other scholars had a

different take. In an article for a daily, C. Raja Mohan stressed that it was time to end the “domestic nuclear debate” and exercise nuclear option. His idea was to conduct small number of tests that would allow India to lend credibility to its “minimum deterrent posture” (Mohan 1995:12).

In 1998, after testing the nuclear weapons , the Indian Prime Minister clarified its stance and reaction to sanctions. When the interviewer, Prabhu Chawla inquired about the “price India has to pay in facing the international community”, Vajpayee said:

Every decisive action has its consequences. But if the action is inherently in the national interest—and I believe our decision to conduct the tests is in supreme national interest—then we have to face the consequences and overcome the challenge. There is simply no other alternative. No price is high enough when it comes to securing national interests. We must be ready to face any eventuality (India Today 1998:4).

He was positive about India’s potential to rise up to the challenge that the sanctions posed. He explained that despite the fact that the tests entailed a price, there was no reason to worry since India was an “immense reservoir of resources and inner strength. If we tap this reservoir, the benefit will be a hundred times more than any price that we may have to pay in the short term”(India Today 1998:4).

However, the leaders pragmatically reasoned and did understand the cost that sanctions entailed. Particularly addressing the topic of sanctions that could be imposed he said that,

My Government will present India's case before the international community—both bilaterally and in multilateral bodies. I am confident our argument will be appreciated by more and more people. Already, countries like Russia, England and France have shown a commendable sense of realism in their response (India Today 1998:4).

Unlike India’s 1974 tests, this time its leaders did not insist that the test was “peaceful”. Burns (1998) argues that it was a signal that “the days of artful ambiguity about India's plans” had ended and the Hindu nationalists political party —the Bharatiya Janata Party, led by Vajpayee, wanted India to take a “more assertive role in its dealings with the world, one that the nationalists believe is more appropriate for a nation with a 5,000-year history and a population, now nearing 980 million, that means nearly one in every five human beings is an Indian” (Burns 1998).

However, Vajpayee did give a hint of an anti-colonial sentiment and Eastern aversion of West built nuclear proliferation regime, when he said:

The talk of sanctions does not stand the scrutiny of logic or fairness. Besides, it sounds hypocritical. Some of the countries which have talked of sanctions, or have otherwise criticised our action, have themselves not only conducted far more nuclear tests than we have done, but they have also built huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Many of them are enjoying the shade provided by somebody else's nuclear umbrella (India Today 1998:4).

Vajpayee further underlined how, “sanctions cannot and will not hurt us. India will not be cowed down by any such threats and punitive steps. India has the sanction of her own past glory and future vision to become strong-in every sense of the term” (India Today 1998:5).

In spite of the reactions, which were tinted by the colonial experience, large number of scholars believe that India’s nuclear policy was pragmatic. Yogesh Joshi (2018:1073) insists:

In this struggle between India’s principles and its necessities, India’s nuclear behavior was guided much more by pragmatism rather than by its normative preferences. Yet, even when India made major compromises on its nuclear principles in private, in public India stuck to the rhetoric of its principled opposition to the NPT regime (Joshi 2018:1073).

China

Similar to New Delhi’s public statements, Beijing also brought up the question of unfair West-lead world order when responding to sanctions. Yet while addressing the public, the leaders promised to fight back conveying their pride as a nation. According to Tong Zhao, Beijing has reacted differently to different types of sanctions—depending on how it has perceived the sanctions imposed on it. While strategic sanctions have been seen as a means of challenging the Communist rule, tactical sanctions on the other hand have worked in making Beijing comply. Zhao argues that the sanctions imposed to check China’s nuclear-related activities have been tactical and Beijing has complied. While in the case of strategic sanctions, the government commands a “remarkable societal mobilization capacity” making strategic sanctions unsuccessful (Tong Zhao 2010: 266).

However, unlike the Indian case, many sanctions have been imposed on China and it has changed its policies to evade sanctions. For instance, when China realized that its sensitive material exports to West Asian states would invite sanctions, it changed its policies. On realizing that the US was getting anxious about the security and stability of the region as well as its own security, because of Beijing’s actions, China ceased

exporting sensitive military material to US' adversary states, especially those in West Asia (Haass 1998 :10).

China has at some point also made pledges to change US' mind about imposing sanctions on it. Beijing has also made domestic legislations to conform to international nonproliferation norms (Bertsch 2008). According to Zhao (2010) to improve law enforcement and international cooperation in the field of nonproliferation, Beijing has decide to cooperate with foreign governments and institutes and train Chinese officials and company to be more sentient towards export control practice. He stresses:

The cooperative attitudes of Beijing on non-proliferation have led to very positive results in this area. Chinese domestic legislation relating to non-proliferation is much more comprehensive and specific than it was a decade ago. The regulatory capacity of the government over the companies that export military or dual usable products has significantly improved. The interaction between China and the USA on non-proliferation has turned out to be a positive one (Zhao 2010: 271).

Further leaders in Beijing asserted how Chinese proliferation is no longer America's concern as it was "becoming a constructive partner of the USA in preventing and countering proliferations world-wide, and has been playing a positive role in dealing with proliferation problems such as hosting the Six Party Talks" (Zhao 2010: 271).

With investments growing across the globe and sectors, many Chinese companies have come under the purview of US sanctions. The intensity and frequency of the sanctions has made Beijing respond to the sanctions. While at one level Beijing has been accommodative of international concerns, it has also been conscious of its own economic interests and has not relented. In 2017, when the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 16 Chinese and Russian companies and individuals for, "business ties with the missile and nuclear weapons program in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", Beijing was quick to respond. The Chinese embassy in Washington issued a statement stressing, "China opposes unilateral sanctions out of the UN Security Council framework, especially the 'long-arm jurisdiction' over Chinese entities and individuals exercised by any country in accordance with its domestic laws"(Chen 2017).

However, underscoring China's commitment to UN sanctions, the statement emphasized, " If there are any Chinese companies or individuals suspected of

violating Security Council resolutions, they will be investigated and treated in accordance with China's domestic laws and regulations..We strongly urge the US to immediately correct its mistake, so as not to impact bilateral cooperation on relevant issues" (Chen 2017).

Conclusion

India and China have emerged from sanctioned states to states whose cooperation is essential to sustain Western sanction regimes. Many sanctions regimes had been conceptualized keeping in mind the Indian and Chinese proliferation activities, however now the two have been accommodated in the regimes. Attaching a sense of national pride to nuclear weapons, both India and China have at some point encouraged a domestic discourse wherein both see themselves victims of the Western pressure and unfair policies. Leaders in both the Asian states have built a discourse of former national glory being lost, while provoking a desire to reclaim the former position and enhancing its pride and prestige. In the domestic discourse, sanctions have been understood as an impediment in achieving national development. Leaders in both India and China, have often justified the suffering and inconveniences caused by sanctions as a minor hurdle that has to be overcome by the general public for their nations development and prestige.

While explaining sanctionee-reactions to sanctions, Speier et al (2001: 32) say that sanctions process is not 'static'. Often sanctionee's response may also determine the sanctioner's next step. Considering possible impacts, sanctionees sometimes try to evade sanctions, or reach out to other actors that have not isolated the sanctionee, to compensate the damage caused. Sometimes they may also attempt to acquire the support of domestic groups in the US to help them evade sanctions or hope for a waiver by mending their ways or showing commitment to changing their concerned action. This has been noticed in the Indian and Chinese cases as well. However Speier et al (2001:55) claim that it can become important for sanctioners like the US to not change their position and retain sanctions especially with respect to nonproliferation policy, so that a deterrent effect is achieved as to set an example for potential proliferators. Though Indian and Chinese discourse is defiant, they have been rational in analysing the cost of sanctions and making amends. However at no point they have ignored the fact that they are significantly big economies and sanctioning them would

involve an opportunity cost for the sanctioner as well. The realisation has certainly made the two states relentless in their reactions and dismissive of the Western coercive measures like sanctions.

Chapter 4: Responding to Sanctions on Third Parties

The first four BRICS summit declarations did not mention sanctions, however the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth did.* From 2013, when the fifth BRICS Summit took place in Durban, to the ninth summit held in Xiamen China in 2017, the BRICS declarations included the following lines:

We condemn unilateral military interventions, economic sanctions and arbitrary use of unilateral coercive measures in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international relations. We emphasize that no country should enhance its security at the expense of the security of others.

Through 2013 to 2018 as sanctions, especially unilateral, were profusely used by Western states and organizations on the BRICS states themselves and their close allies or trade partners, the group felt the need to explain their combined stance on sanctions. Individually, the BRICS states especially Russia, and two biggest and fastest growing economies—India and China, have voiced their position on sanctions imposed on other states and entities. Often the BRICS states have also come within the purview of secondary sanctions as a consequence of their dealing with target states.

China's response to sanctions is significant, as it is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), however India's stance on sanctions regimes is also noticeable. With India's ever expanding economy and foreign relations it has become a pertinent actor in the arena of economic statecraft as well. While India and China's experience as sanctionees might have made them softer towards sanctions imposed on other states and entities, there are other considerations that have determined their response. Supporting the sanctions placed on states and entities with which New Delhi or Beijing share good relations or commercial interests have not been easy for the two Asian powers. Over the years, India and China have been dabbling with interests and obligations especially with respect to sanctions imposed on its neighbours or partners. While analysing India and China's response to sanctions, it is important to throw light on episodes wherein India had interests in or good relations with the target states.

*The 10th BRICS summit declaration released in 2018 did not mention sanctions, however it did mention that the group is against 'unilateral coercive measures'.

Likewise, recording sanction-reactions of political groups of which India and China are members of is significant. BRICS is an important group in this context. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are the member states of BRICS, which held its first formal foreign ministers meet in 2006 in New York. Then it was BRIC; South Africa joined the group in 2010. BRICS states are touted to be the biggest and strongest economies of the world in the coming decades—a fact the members have become notably conscious of. Consequently, they have felt the need to share their worldview, which has often been different from the Western major powers—calling for a more democratic international system and multilateral diplomacy. With the opening of the New Development Bank, formerly called the BRICS Development bank in 2015, the member states have attained more economic leverage. In groupings like the BRICS, India and China have also often taken similar positions on unilateral sanctions and owing to the importance of their reactions, it is important to examine the reactions of BRICS states to imposed sanctions. Since BRICS came into existence in 2006, its reactions to Iraq sanctions cannot be studied, however their response to sanctions placed on Iran and North Korea are imperative.

This chapter attempts to study the Indian and Chinese responses to sanctions imposed on Iran, North Korea and Iraq to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It particularly examines if these responses were different from that of Western states and how. Additionally it looks into the variance in Indian and Chinese responses. It is divided into two sections. The first section explains sanctions imposed on Iran, North Korea and Iraq and the Indian and Chinese reactions to them. Additionally, since India and China are both part of BRICS, the reactions of the political group to sanctions are also studied in the case of Iran and North Korea.* It concludes by delves into the factors that possibly influence state reactions and discusses the variance in the Indian and Chinese reactions to sanctions.

Indian and Chinese Response to Iran sanctions

Issues concerning Iran's contentious nuclear development, which had become a problem for several Western states for years, was resolved in 2016 with the signing of

*The sanctions on Iran under study were imposed in early 1990s while the BRICS came into being only in 2008, hence the reaction of the group will only be explained in the case of Iran and North Korea.

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Subsequently, many sanctions previously imposed on Iran were lifted. However, besides Iran, sanctions also had an impact on Indian and Chinese entities making New Delhi and Beijing react to sanctions on Iran, especially the ones imposed between 2006 and 2012. Consequently, India and China were also among the states that had to deal with the sanctions for their interactions with Iran. With President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from JCPOA in May 2018 and resumption of sanctions (White House 2018), India and China are again concerned about coming under the purview of secondary sanctions.

UNSC sanctions against Iran

Iran has been suspected of harbouring nuclear weapons ambition especially by the Western world. While states in its neighbourhood have voiced their position on Iran's nuclear policies, many Western states and international organization have also taken action against Iran. The UNSC Resolution 1696, which was adopted on July 31, 2006 by a 14-1 vote*, stressed that the IAEA had been unable to assure the UN about Iran's undeclared nuclear material and activities after "more than three years". Giving a specific deadline they warned that if Iran did not halt uranium enrichment, it would face economic and diplomatic sanctions. It said:

The Security Council, seriously concerned that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was still unable to provide assurances about Iran's undeclared nuclear material and activities after more than three years, today demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and gave it one month to do so or face the possibility of economic and diplomatic sanctions to give effect to its decision (UNSCR 1696 2006 para.1).

Shortly after, through UNSC resolution 1737 adopted on December 27, 2006, sanctions were imposed on Iran, under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, forbidding the supply of nuclear-related materials and technology. It highlighted that the UN Security Council :

Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems..(UNSCR 2006: 2 para. 4).

Through the next two years, sanctions were tightened several times through Resolution 1747, 1803 and 1835, aiming particularly at Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. In 2010 after failed negotiations with Tehran, UNSC

* Qatar was the only state that voted against the resolution.

passed Resolution 1929 on June 9, 2010, that adopted more stringent steps to check Iran's activities. While most states supported the resolution, Brazil, and Turkey, voted against the resolution, as Lebanon abstained from voting. It was the fourth round of sanctions on Iran as the measures:

..directed against 41 new named entities and individuals, including one scientist and enterprises linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the defence industry, as well as banks and the national shipping line... the Council decided that Iran should not acquire interests in any commercial activity relating to uranium enrichment and other nuclear materials or technology in other States, and that all States should prevent the transfer to Iran of any tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, or missiles and related systems or parts. It also called upon all States to report to the relevant Sanctions Committee, within 60 days, on the steps they had taken to implement the necessary measures (UNSC 2010a para 2).

The resolution further said:

The Council affirmed that it would suspend the sanctions if, and so long as, Iran suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to allow for good-faith negotiations. It also affirmed its determination to apply further measures if Iran continued to defy the just-adopted text as well as previous resolutions (UNSC 2010a para 5).

Resolution 1984, passed on June 9, 2011, extended the mandate of the Iran Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts for one year.

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007), resolution 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1887 (2009), and 1929 (2010), as well as the state ges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other intereste parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007), resolution 1803 (2008), and resolution 1929 (2010) (UNSC 2011 para. 1).

Subsequently, Resolution 2049, passed on June 7, 2012, renewed the same mandate for thirteen months, highlighting:

The Security Council this morning decided to extend until 9 July 2013 the mandate of the Panel of Experts of its Committee to monitor the implementation of the sanctions regime against Iran, imposed in relation to the country's nuclear programmes (UNSC 2012 para.1).

Later, in April 2015, after Iran-P5+1 (US, China, Britain, France, Russia and Germany) talks in Lausanne, Switzerland, the UNSC decided to ease the sanctions. In the meeting, a provisional agreement was negotiated which discussed lifting of sanctions in exchange of Iran accepting limits on its nuclear program for at least the next decade. Subsequently on July 14, 2015 a nuclear deal or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was concluded in Vienna between the P5+1 and Iran on the lines of an interim agreement called Joint Plan of Action signed by the parties in November 2013. Finally, most of the UN sanctions were lifted on January 16, 2016.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in Vienna, on July 14, 2015, between the E3/EU+3 and Iran stressed: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” Adding, “This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy” (JCPOA Preamble and General Provisions paras. iii and v.).

The July 2015 UNSC Resolution 2231 set a meticulous schedule for lifting the UN sanctions, also calling for a “rigorous monitoring mechanism and timetable for implementation, while paving the way for the lifting of United Nations sanctions against that country.”

Unanimously adopting resolution 2231 (2015), the 15-nation body endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in Vienna by the five permanent members of the Council, plus Germany, the European Union and Iran (UNSC 2015 para. 2).

European Union sanctions against Iran

Sanctions, or ‘restrictive measures’ against Iran were also imposed by the European Union, in addition to “pressure and engagement” to coax Iran to comply with the nonproliferation agenda. E3/EU+3 (France, UK, Germany and the EU+ the USA, Russia and China) also held independent diplomatic discussions with Iran, which finally aided and led to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015. The EU was involved “throughout the implementation process of this plan, including the progressive lifting of nuclear-related sanctions” (EU 2017 para.2).

To make Iran comply with its international obligations, the EU not only followed the UN sanctions, but also initiated separate sanctions of its own. The economic and financial sanctions included “restrictions” on trade in several goods:

Restrictions were also placed on trade in several goods: prohibition to export to Iran arms, dual-use goods and goods which could be used in enrichment-related activities; prohibition to import crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical and petroleum products; prohibition to sell or supply key equipment used in the energy sector, gold, other precious metals and diamonds, certain naval equipment, certain software, etc (EU 2017 para. 4).

Measures in the transport sector were also included:

Preventing access to EU airports of Iranian Since January 2014, some of these sanctions have been suspended. This was done as part of the implementation of the interim agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action, agreed by Iran and the E3/EU+3 in November 2013. After the agreement on the JCPOA, this suspension was further extended by the Council until 28 January 2016, to allow for the necessary time to make arrangements and preparations for the implementation of the JCPOA (EU 2017 para 4).

The EU had imposed travel restrictions and asset freezes against specific persons and entities. After the conclusion of the interim agreement or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the E3/EU+3, EU had even suspended some sanctions. Subsequently on January 16, 2016 the Council lifted almost “all nuclear-related economic and financial EU sanctions against Iran” (EU 2017 para. 5). While the US withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and decided to reinstate sanctions, the EU has not taken similar action. In fact, in August 2018, EU decided to, “allow European companies hit by new US sanctions on Iran to sue the American government amid concerns Brussels cannot provide adequate protection for companies operating in Tehran” (Financial Times 2018).EU’s decision elucidates their difference of opinion and their lack of trust in President Trump’s worldview.

Unilateral Sanctions against Iran

Unilateral sanctions by individual states were also imposed on Iran, along with multilateral. The US imposed majority of such sanctions and its sanction regime against Iran is said to be one of the most rigid in the world (O’Sullivan 2010:7). While US history of using sanctions against Iran dates back to the 1979 hostage crisis, the issues for imposing sanctions have changed as the measures have been renewed and expanded. While in the 1980s and 1990s, the aim of US sanctions was to cut state-support to terrorism and also to “limit Iran’s strategic power in the Middle East more generally” (Katzman 2018:1). Since the mid 2000s, however ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program is confined to civilian purposes is the objective. Since 2010, the US has led the international sanctions regime against Iran at the UN as well as outside it.

Washington has used executive orders and passed specific acts to impose sanctions on Iran. The US-led sanctions regime is meticulous and it involves secondary provisions or sanctions, which are accompanying economic restrictions to discourage non-US citizens and companies from doing business with Iran, the primary target of US

sanctions—thereby significantly expanding the scope of sanctions. Dianne E. Rennack (2016:5) explain Iran sanctions and the processes involved in executing them as:

In the collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the US economic sanctions regime on Iran, the President retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and relax restrictions. However, if an agreement is reached, congressional review requirements added to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 impose additional requirements on the executive branch before the President may ease or lift sanctions (Rennack 2016: 5).

Additionally from time to time, the US authorities have issued papers explaining the sanctions imposed so that the meticulous sanctions regime against Iran could be implemented smoothly. For instance on November 13, 2012, a document called “Policy Guidance” was published in the Federal Register, which explained implementation of many sanctions, and also defined what products and chemicals that constitute “petroleum,” “petroleum products,” and “petrochemical products” as the words have been referred to in the laws and executive orders passed in connection to Iran (Katzman 2018:2).

While the acts and executive orders to change Iran’s nuclear policy were passed in the 2000s, after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, specific acts granted the President the power to end the sanctions previously imposed on Iran. In 2016 Congressional Research Service report, titled “Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions”, Dianne E. Rennack lists a number of acts and executive orders passed to place sanctions on Iran, some of these deserve mention. The President, for instance gets the authority to impose sanctions through the provisions of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). While the “implementation and administration” of the sanctions rests in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury, who delegates the responsibility to Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. However, sometimes the Congress places restrictions on the President’s authority by putting specific conditions for lifting sanctions.

Section 1343(b) of the Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 2002 (INPPA) required the US representative to the IAEA to oppose programs that are “inconsistent with nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals of the United States” (INPPA 2002). The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, bans import of Iranian origin goods into the US. Many sections of the act discuss assets

freezes of individual, or their family member, acting on their behalf. Sanctions through identifying individuals as ineligible to get US visas are also discussed. The President gets the right to lift sanctions on Iran through the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 and Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act of 2012. However the sanctions can only be lifted if the President certifies that the government of Iran has “ceased its engagement in the two critical areas of terrorism and weapons, as set forth in Section 401 of CISADA”. Additionally the act also, “prohibits a US person from exporting most U.S.-origin goods, services, or technology to Iran”(INPPA 2002). For details, see Annexure A.

The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA), allows the President to impose IEEPA-based sanctions on “any person he determines has engaged in transactions relating to providing a vessel or insuring a shipping service that materially contributes to the government of Iran’s proliferation activities.” Moreover it required the President to, “certify that the Central Bank of Iran is not engaging in activities related to WMD or terrorism before he lifts IEEPA-based sanctions..” and extends, “IEEPA-based sanctions imposed on parent companies to their foreign subsidiaries, to prohibit transactions with the government of Iran” (ITRSHRA 2012). The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA), designates entities that operate Iran’s ports, and entities in energy, shipping, and shipbuilding, and their affiliates, as “entities of proliferation concern,” requiring, the President to “block transactions and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction of such entities. It requires the President to impose ISA-based sanctions on any person who knowingly engages in trade related to energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran” (ITRSHRA 2012).

After the implantation of the JCPOA, many sanctions have been lifted, however there are unsettled claims that are still being settled. Katzman (2018:2) listed some of them:

Iranian assets are blocked under several provisions, including Executive Order 13599 of February 2010. About \$2.1 billion in blocked Iranian assets are bonds belonging to Iran’s Central Bank, and have been frozen in a Citibank account in New York since 2008. Another approximately \$1.6 billion in Iranian assets are being blocked in Luxembourg in connection with U.S. assertions that Clearstream, a Luxembourg-based securities intermediary, had improperly allowed those funds to access the U.S. financial system. About \$50 million of Iran’s frozen assets consists of Iranian diplomatic property and accounts, including proceeds from rents received on the former Iranian embassy in Washington, DC, and 10 other properties in several states, along with related bank accounts (Katzman 2018:2).

US passed CAATSA in August 2017 which further imposed sanctions on Iran and also includes provisions for secondary sanctions on states and entities which interact with the primary target of sanctions, Iran. With US withdrawal from JCPOA and its decision to re-impose sanctions, it remains unclear how the US-Iran ties would progress in the future. States like India and China, meanwhile have become conscious of secondary sanctions and have shared their concerns with the US.

India Balancing

While India has acknowledged Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program, it has disapproved of a nuclear weapon program. Overtime India has shared its stance on sanctions imposed on Iran as well. At the IAEA, on September 24, 2005, India had voted against Iran, affirming Tehran was in "non-compliance" of its NPT safeguard obligations. In February 2006, when a resolution was proposed to refer Iran to the UNSC India supported it and on November 27, 2009 sided with the US, on a resolution criticizing Iran's nuclear programme and pressing on the need to terminate uranium enrichment. Shortly after in 2012, India came out with a clear position on the issue. The then Foreign Secretary, Ranjan Mathai, said,

India did not wish to see the spread of nuclear weapons in West Asia, but at the same time believed that Iran had a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while fulfilling its international obligation as a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT. India maintained that IAEA provides the best framework to resolve the issue (Mathai 2012).

However India opposed unilateral sanctions on Iran individually, as well as in multilateral forums like BRICS. In 2010, Nirupama Rao, then Foreign Secretary of India said:

We are justifiably concerned that the extra-territorial nature of certain unilateral sanctions recently imposed by individual countries, with their restrictions on investment by third countries in Iran's energy sector, can have a direct and adverse impact on Indian companies and more importantly, on our energy security and our attempts to meet the development needs of our people (The Hindu 2010).

After the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal, India's nuclear isolation ended and the responsibility to speak against nuclear proliferation also increased. Consequently, New Delhi's decisions regarding Iran's suspected nuclear program involved more considerations than before. The 'transformation' and new recognition brought with it the need to defend the existing international order, even if it was "unjust from India's own past criteria" (Mohan 2010: 141). US' secondary sanctions made Indian investors wary of engaging with Iran. Reportedly, the Indian state, individuals and companies

were affected by US secondary sanctions against Iran and the government reduced oil purchase from Iran (The Financial Express 2013). Following President Trump's decision to re-impose sanctions on Iran, New Delhi has become anxious about the effect of secondary sanctions on India. It is believed that the topic was broached at US-India defence and foreign minister level, 2+2 talks in September, 2018 (The Financial Express 2018). CAATSA has been a major concern for India. Nevertheless, while a few reports stress that Iran's oil sale to India will continue, despite US sanctions (The Economic Times 2018), other are sceptical and expect a major drop in light of imposition of old and new sanctions (NDTV 2018).

China Assertive

Though China has supported most of the UN resolutions against Iran, it has taken a stand against unilateral sanctions. On many occasions, even as the US has taken a position against Iran's uranium enrichment, China has supported Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program and hence allowed uranium enrichment (Hodde 2015: 18). In April 2013, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said, "As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran possesses the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while following relevant international obligations" (Xinhua 2013).

There have been times when Beijing did not support the stance of other UN members. For instance, China refused to term Iran's launch of Shahab missiles a violation of the implemented sanctions, thus blocking the UN from placing new sanctions against Iran (Chumley 2013). China's hostility towards unilateral sanctions against Iran has been unwavering, even when the US tried to convince China to support the US-led sanctions regime (Simpson 2010: 63). In 2009, Jiang Yu the spokesperson of Chinese foreign ministry said, "We believe that sanctions and exerting pressure are not the way to solve problems and are not conducive for the current diplomatic efforts on the Iran nuclear issue" (Borger 2009).

Hong Lei, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, maintained that sanctions cannot help to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, but will only further worsen and escalate it, "which will do no good in regional peace and stability" (Xinhua 2012a). As Chinese companies came under the purview of US initiated secondary sanctions for their interactions with Iran, the government vehemently opposed sanctions. US'

commitment came to the fore when the case of a Chinese national aiding Iran with its missile program came to light, Ian J. Stewart and Daniel B. Salisbury explain:

In late April 2014, the US government announced a \$5 million bounty for information leading to the arrest of a Chinese national and resident, Li Fangwei. Known more prominently in the U.S. as Karl Lee, an accompanying indictment described him as a “principal contributor” to the Iranian ballistic missile program. The reward is unprecedented in the U.S. government’s efforts to end the activities of an individual in supplying prohibited WMD programs (Stewart and Salisbury 2014).

Addressing the U.S. Secretary of State, Yang Jiechi the then Chinese foreign minister said:“...all along we have been opposed to unilateral sanctions. When such sanctions affect other countries and damage other countries’ interests, it is something we cannot accept” (Jiechi 2014). Like India, China has also been concerned about secondary sanctions through acts like CAATSA (2017). However, unlike India it has opposed such acts and sanctions vehemently and also taken action against the US, for sanctioning Chinese agencies for their interaction with the primary target of sanctions (The Diplomat 2018).

BRICS and RIC Response

In the last few years, the BRICS has expanded its agenda to deliberate on various issues of international importance, Iran sanctions is one of them. Each BRICS state has its own relations and partnerships with Iran and has declared their individual stand on the case. However Geethanjali Nataraj and Garima Sahdev insist that along with serving as “the counterbalance to the rising protectionism and anti-globalisation tendencies across the world,” BRICS has also, “presented a united resistance to unilateral sanctions on Iran” (Nataraj and Sahdev 2018: 112).Hodde (2015:18) explains that despite different nuclear policies, the BRICS states came together on the issue of Iran and took a common stand. He further argues that the group has managed to challenge the “unipolar world order and test their independence of the West” by condemning the unilateral sanctions and emphasizing that Iran had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In 2012, during the BRICS summit in New Delhi, the representatives of the BRICS stressed that their state will not cut ties with Iran. Speaking to the media, the Indian trade minister Anand Sharma clarified, “All BRICS members are members of the UNSC. We respect UN resolutions...at the same time the resolution does not forbid

countries to engage in trade in essential commodities and what is required for human good”(NDTV 2012).However, despite taking a similar and strong stand against unilateral sanctions, the BRICS states did factor in their own dependence on the Western states. While many BRICS states have raised objections about the sanctions, they finally gave up and complied. Barring Brazil, the BRICS countries have supported UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran. Gradually, both India and China, which are one of Iran’s biggest oil importers, reduced their oil import from Iran. The two rising states, however, have maintained their ties with Iran, eventually they did ignore some of the sanctions (Cole 2013), even as they grew conscious and followed many of the imposed measures. Therefore, in spite of being called an expressive political group, BRICS have proved to be ambiguous in case on Iran. Since all BRICS states depended on the US, it became obvious that the US led regime will often carry enormous influence.

In another multilateral forum called Russia-India-China strategic triangle (RIC), India and China have again taken a similar position on the Iranin issue. In meetings the representatives of the three states often shared their “serious concern” over Iran's nuclear programme, while acknowledging its right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and calling for a “exclusively peaceful resolution of the problem on the basis of the available decisions of the IAEA and the Security Council” discouraging sanction use (The Hindu 2012). Like BRICS, the opposition of this multilateral forum to unilateral sanctions has been consistent (The Economic Times 2017). The Joint Communiqué of the the 13th, 14th and 15th meetings of the foreign ministers of Russia, India and China mentioned unilateral sanctions in different contexts. The 13th meeting communiqué, released on February 2, 2015 said, “they opposed forced regime change in any country from the outside, or imposition of unilateral sanctions based on domestic laws” (RIC 2015 para.4). Subsequently, the next year’s meeting communiqué released on April 18, 2016, emphasized:

The Ministers agreed that the imposition of unilateral sanctions, which exceed the ones agreed by the United Nations Security Council, is inconsistent with principles of international law, undermines the prerogatives of the United Nations Security Council as set forth in the UN Charter, reduces effectiveness of its sanctions regimes, disproportionately affects States against which they are imposed, as well as, when applied extra-territorially, has a negative impact upon third States and international trade and economic relations at large (RIC 2016 para.6).

The communiqué of the 15th meeting contained the same words, though did not mention the application of unilateral sanctions as “extra-territorial” (RIC 2016 para.33).

Indian and Chinese Response to North Korea sanctions

North Korea’s policies, especially in context to its nuclear weapons program have time and again drawn the attention of the UN. The UN has employed two types of tools while dealing with North Korea— president’s statements and resolutions (Lee and Choi 2009: 27). In April 1993, UNSC issued its first statement when IAEA brought North Korea’s resistance to inspections to UN’s notice. On May 11, 1993 the UN passed the first resolution dealing with North Korea. UN Security Council Resolution 825 called upon North Korea to reassess its decision to withdraw from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to inspect its nuclear waste sites. The resolution was passed with thirteen votes, in spite of China and Pakistan abstaining from voting.

On July 15, 2006 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1695. This resolution was primarily a reaction to North Korea’s July 4, 2006 missile tests. Submitted by Japan and sponsored by the US, the resolution was controversial as China and Russia did not agree with some of its provisions. The two did not favour the use of harsh words and invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter.* The final resolution was a balance between Japan, the sponsor’s draft and China’s recommendations (Lee and Choi, 2009:39). Nevertheless, the resolution barred all UN member states from selling material, technology for missiles or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea and/or from receiving missiles, banned weapons or technology from the state. The resolution asked North Korea to rejoin the six-party talks and refrain from testing missiles and nuclear weapons.

Close on the heels of the former resolution, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 was passed unanimously on October 14, 2006. These were the first round of nuclear sanctions placed on North Korea. This was international

*Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council authority to determine the existence of a threat to, or breach of peace and to call upon member states to apply economic or diplomatic sanctions on countries in order to restore international peace and security

community's reaction to North Korea's October 9, 2006 nuclear test. The resolution, adopted under Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, placed a number of economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea. It called on North Korea to, "Not conduct any further nuclear test or launch a ballistic missile, suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner" (UNSC 2006 para.10).

This resolution asked North Korea to also return immediately to the six-party talks without precondition. Responding to North Korea's second nuclear test, United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1874 unanimously on 12 June 2009. This was an attempt to tighten the sanction regime by further imposing economic and financial sanctions.

On June 10, 2011, the UN Security Council recalled earlier UN resolutions 825 (1993), 1540 (2004), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 1887 (2009), 1928 (2010) that dealt with North Korea and nuclear weapons, and adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1985 unanimously. On January 22, 2013 UNSC adopted resolution 2087 condemning North Korea's December 22, 2012 rocket launch further tightening the existing sanctions. Within a day of the resolution being passed, North Korea announced its third nuclear test plan. It claimed that the test would be aimed at the US. Undeterred by previous sanctions, North Korea tested again on February 12, 2013 which drove the UN to impose another round of sanctions on North Korea. Passed unanimously on March 7, 2013, resolution 2094 was backed by China. In 2014 and 2015 the mandate of the panel of experts was extended.

In 2016, when North Korea conducted nuclear and missile tests, sanctions were again imposed. On March 2, 2016 UNSC resolution 2270 was passed, that called for inspections of cargo, banned weapons trade and instated restrictions on imports of luxury goods. It also called for expulsion of diplomats suspected of undertaking illegal activities, emphasizing:

...if a Member State determines that a DPRK diplomat, governmental representative, or other DPRK national acting in a governmental capacity, is working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, or of an individual or entities assisting in the evasion of

sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions...then the Member State shall expel the individual from its territory..(UNSC 2016 para. 13).

In 2016 and 2017 the sanction regime against North Korea was further strengthened in response to nuclear and missile tests, through resolutions UNSC 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017). Finally in UNSC resolution 2407 (2018) extended the mandate of UNSC resolution 1718 till April 24, 2019.

US Sanctions on North Korea

The US has put in place an articulate policy on international sanctions. Primary sanctions that directly aim the target and secondary sanctions, which are enforced on third parties that do not conform to established sanction regimes. Both types of sanctions are enacted through US domestic laws or presidential executive orders. Apart from initiating UN sanctions on North Korea, US has systematically put in place a detailed sanction regime, consisting of direct and secondary sanctions. Currently, North Korea is among the most severely sanctioned states in the world. The US has maintained comprehensive economic sanctions on North Korea since the Korean War. In 2000, President Clinton had eased many trade and travel sanctions in response to North Korea's 1999 voluntary moratorium on missile testing. However, the George W. Bush administration followed a hard-line approach towards North Korea. Though, no economic sanctions were re-imposed during President Bush's first term, two North Korean companies were later singled out for indulging in activities related with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation (Rennack 2006: 4).

With respect to nuclear and missile proliferation, US has laid down a number of laws. North Korea has been accused of violating section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 11B of the Export Administration Act and sections 2 and 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-proliferation Act of 2000 (US Department of State 2007:19). As per the law, if a state or entity is found guilty of violating US non-proliferation laws, imposition of sanctions is mandatory. However the President has the authority to waive them if he finds it contrary to US national security.

After North Korea's October 8, 2006 nuclear weapon test, President George W. Bush cut off all foreign aid to North Korea. On December 7, 2006, President Bush asserted

that North Korea, a non-nuclear-weapon state, had detonated a nuclear explosive device, hence US would curtail sales or transfers of defence items, restrict export licenses, check foreign military financing and credit, withhold US support in the international financial institutions, and deny export licenses for dual-use items and Export-Import Bank support (Rennack 2011:7). Besides laws executive orders have also been passed to strengthen the sanctions regime against North Korea. Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005, blocked the property of persons engaged in proliferation activities and their support networks. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) was given the responsibility to administer the blocking program, which initially applied to eight organizations in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Under the new authority provided by this executive order, Treasury, together with the Department of State, was authorized to designate additional WMD proliferators and their supporters(US Department of State 2007:5).

Through Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008, President George W. Bush declared that the “current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the US” (Executive Order 13466 2008). Soon enough, President Obama issued Executive Order 13551 on August 30, 2010, in accordance to IEEPA and the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA). This order not only expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466, but added new restrictions.

The Obama administration did not elucidate its sanctions policy towards North Korea initially, but soon enough it authorized sanctions against three North Korean firms under the Arms Export Control Act and a series of nonproliferation executive orders. When Hillary Clinton was appointed the Secretary of state she reiterated President Barack Obama campaign rhetoric connecting sanctions removal to the “complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,” and warning that “If the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we should move quickly to re-impose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions going forward” (Lee and Choi 2009:26).

India Supportive

Unlike China, India has mostly supported sanctions against North Korea. However New Delhi has maintained that it does not support completely severing of diplomatic ties with Pyongyang. Also, despite not being a member of the NPT, New Delhi did not support North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty. New Delhi has issued a statements after North Korea's nuclear tests expressing concern. As a reaction to North Korea's 2009 nuclear tests, the Indian officials stated that the tests were a part of a "dangerous trend" and that India is "against" nuclear proliferation. In a "Press Statement on Nuclear Test conducted by DPRK" in 2017, New Delhi explained:

India deplores the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK this morning. It is a matter of deep concern that DPRK has once again acted in violation of its international commitments which goes against the objective of the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which has been endorsed by DPRK itself. We call upon DPRK to refrain from such actions which adversely impact peace and stability in the region and beyond. India also remains concerned about the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies which has adversely impacted India's national security (Ministry of External Affairs 2017).

The issue has regional implications for India. North Korean and Pakistani nuclear programs share common backgrounds, and have been termed as "too nuclear to fail" (Cohen 2011: 47). While the nature of both the nuclear programs is reactionary, there have been talks of clandestine nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea and even China, especially through the A.Q Khan network in the early 1990s. Some believe that North Korea gained the know-how to uranium enrichment from Pakistan as it provided Pakistan ballistic missile technology in return (Tenet 2007: 294). According to the former director of CIA, George Tenet, the A. Q Khan network sold nuclear designs and blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium. These concerns have made India wary of nuclear cooperation between its adversaries, making it support efforts to make North Korea adhere to the international nonproliferation regime.

When the issue was discussed in Lok Sabha, E. Ahamed the minister of state in the Ministry of External Affairs maintained North Korea should, "refrain from such actions which adversely impact on peace and stability in the region" (Ahamed 2013). However, India has emphasized that it is against new sanctions on the country and supports the measures that push North Korea to the negotiating table (The Hindu 2012). Moreover, New Delhi has always resisted the efforts of other Western states; especially the US to overtly cut it ties with the East-Asian state. When in 2017, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson pressed for a diplomatic boycott of North Korea, India's foreign minister did not agree, and argued in favour of India's diplomatic

presence in and open lines of communication with Pyongyang though India has banned most of its trade with North Korea, except for food and medicine (Reuters 2017).

During talks with US Secretary of State, she said:

As far as the question of embassy goes, our embassy there is very small, but there is in fact an embassy. I told Secretary Tillerson that some of their friendly countries should maintain embassies there so that some channels of communication are kept open (Reuters 2017).

Hence, in the North Korean case India did show support to UN sanctions regime against North Korea, however it was not enthusiastic about the use of unilateral sanctions. It can be said that India's role in the North Korean case has been tertiary. While it has security concerns, owing to Pyongyang's nuclear relations with Pakistan and China, there is no immediate threat. Since North Korea maintains only limited economic relations, commercial interests are also not at stake, making New Delhi more of a by-standee supporting resolution of the issue.

China Dismissive

In the context of North Korea, China has not supported sanctions against the state keenly. Though several states all over the world have criticized North Korea for conducting nuclear tests and not following its NPT guidelines, China went relatively easier on the state and the punitive steps have been "restrained" (Albert 2018:2). China chose to take a bold stand and also support sanctions after the third test, China's disregard towards sanctions has been evident for years. Banking and trans-shipping sectors of North Korea have particularly benefited from Beijing's disregard for sanctions. It was only when North Korea conducted its third nuclear test that China took a stronger position against the state, supporting sanctions to contain its nuclear activities. However clarifying, Yang Jiechi the Chinese foreign minister said, "We always believe that sanctions are not the end of the Security Council actions, nor are sanctions the fundamental way to resolve the relevant issues" (Reuters 2013). In 2016, when North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, Beijing felt the pressure to again clarify its position of the issue. On September 10, 2016, in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, Beijing shared the details of a meeting between Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui and North Korea's ambassador to China, Yesui Ji Jae Ryong, informing:

Zhang Yesui expressed that realizing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region and solving issues through dialogues and negotiations are China's firm and consistent stance on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. The

DPRK's insistence on the development of nuclear weapons and continuous nuclear tests goes against the expectations of the international community, which will escalate tension on the peninsula and is not conducive to peace and stability on the peninsula. China urges the DPRK to refrain from any actions that may aggravate the tension and return to the right direction of denuclearization as soon as possible (People's Republic of China 2016).

The issue of action against North Korea, as well as China's support to such effort have often been brought up in UNSC debates and Beijing has been asked to clarify its stand. At a press conference, addressed by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang on April 13, 2017, he said:

...China had stopped importing coal from the DPRK since February 18 this year, a resolute measure introduced with a notice jointly issued by the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs, which is part of our implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. As for the rise and fall of the trade volume between China and the DPRK within a certain period of time, as you know, China and the DPRK are neighbors with traditional friendly ties, including normal trade activities. As long as it is in line with the requirement of UN Security Council resolutions, normal relations, including trade relations, between China and the DPRK are not to be blamed (Kang 2017).

On September 3, 2017, when Pyongyang allegedly conducted a nuclear test, China's Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning North Korea's action, saying:

Today, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, despite universal opposition from the international community, conducted another nuclear test. The Chinese government expresses firm opposition to and strong condemnation of the test. We strongly urge the DPRK (North Korea) to face the strong will of denuclearisation from the international community, earnestly abide by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, stop taking mistaken actions which worsen the situation and are also not in line with its own interests, and effectively return to the track of solving the problem through dialogueit (Xinhua 2017).

For Beijing, the North Korean case is of great importance. Being a neighbour, it has immediate security concerns arising from the domestic situation in North Korea. Unlike the US and several Western states, it is also a supporter of the Kim Jong-Un regime. While Beijing realizes its international obligations especially as a permanent member of the UNSC, it also has to accommodate and at times appease Pyongyang. Hence, China is often observed attempting to maintain a precarious balance in this case.

BRICS and RIC response

Leaders of BRICS and RIC multilateral forums have again disapproved of North Korean nuclear tests. 2017 BRICS leaders Xiamen declaration said:

We strongly deplore the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK. We express deep concern over the ongoing tension and prolonged nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and emphasize that it should only be settled through peaceful means and direct dialogue of all the parties concerned (BRICS 2017 para.44).

However, anticipating tightening of sanctions the document condemned the practice of unilateral military interventions and economic sanctions, emphasizing that, “no country should enhance its security at the expense of the security of others,” the declaration said, “We condemn unilateral military interventions, economic sanctions and arbitrary use of unilateral coercive measures in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international relations” (BRICS 2017 para. 38). BRICS countries have especially taken a stand against North Korea as and when it has tested nuclear weapons. However, they have often opposed unilateral sanctions on North Korea and their enhancement.

Similarly, in groupings like Russia, India and China, strategic triangle RIC, the topic has been discussed. When in 2012, Pyongyang conducted a rocket test ahead of a RIC foreign ministers meeting, the event did find a mention in the representatives’ discussions. Speaking for Russia, India and China (RIC) Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov insisted, “We do not believe in new sanctions — they will not help in any way to resolve the situation. We are convinced it is necessary to respond to the challenges at hand exclusively through political and diplomatic means” (The Hindu 2012). The Foreign Ministers of the three states, registered their “regret” over North Korea’s rocket launch. However they opposed sanctions vehemently and called for restraint from neighbouring countries and the UNSC. The Russian minister even shared his reservations about the UNSC sanctions, stressing, “the UN Security Council should take a stand on the violation by North Korea of earlier sanctions, but its reaction must be calibrated and serve the main goal — a resumption of the six-party talks” (The Hindu 2012). The position in the trilateral has continued to be against unilateral sanctions. Through 2015 to 2017 the joint communiqué of the RIC has opposed unilateral sanctions, though not always mentioned North Korea.

Indian and Chinese Response to Iraq Sanctions

Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait invited condemnation as well as widespread sanctions. However, the UN as well as the US have imposed sanctions on Iraq not only for starting the Gulf War, but as a response to Iraq’s alleged attempts to procure material for its nuclear weapons programme. Like many Asian states, Iraq’s nuclear program was also aided by the US’ Atoms for Peace project in the 1950s. Its initial cooperation in the field of nuclear technology was with Soviet Union, which had supplied a 2

Megawatt research reactor IRT-5000 in 1962 (Solingen 2007: 143). Though the initial plan was to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, Baghdad launched a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s; this despite signing and later ratifying the NPT. In the following years, Iraq imported reactors from both France and Italy and engaged in nuclear commerce with firms in West Germany. While Iraq enhanced its nuclear weapon program, unrest grew in Israel (Times of Israel 2016). On June 7, 1981 Israel attacked a France bought, Osirak nuclear reactor, 17 kilometres from the capital, claiming that the reactor, “was designed to make nuclear weapons to destroy Israel” (BBC 1981). However, a Harvard University scientist Richard Wilson, who had visited the facility claimed that, “the Osirak reactor that was bombed by Israel in June 1981 was explicitly designed by the French engineer Yves Girard to be unsuitable for making bombs. That was obvious to me on my 1982 visit” (The Atlantic 2005).

In the early 1990s, Iraq pulled its resources to start a fast-track program called Project 601 to acquire fissile material. The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (1999) explains:

Iraq intended to illegally divert to bomb-making a quantity of highly enriched uranium that was being inspected by the IAEA. The HEU was contained in the fuel of Iraq’s two research reactors at Tuwaitha. Iraq had at its disposal some 41 kg of U-235 in its supply of research reactor fuel from Russia and France. The effort to divert that fuel, known as Project 601, started shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. By December 1990, a chemical processing plant had been installed in the LAMA building at Tuwaitha which Iraq hoped would make available 26 kg of HEU within 2-3 months.. (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control 1999:5).

IAEA report titled, “Twenty-Eighth IAEA on-site Inspection in Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687” (1991), stresses that if the program had succeeded then, “Iraq would have been able to extract around 25 kg of HEU, which could have resulted in the availability by the end of 1991 of a quantity of HEU sufficient to manufacture a single low-yield nuclear device.” However, the coalition bombing destroyed the facility.

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait accusing Kuwait of extracting oil from a pool under the border of the two states. Iraq also claimed that Kuwait had saturated the petrol market with sizeable supplies of oil, therefore, making oil's spot market price low. Iraq’s act made the US invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which led to the US freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, banning all trade and financial relations with Iraq. US Congress also passed a legislation denying “benefits of agricultural

promotion programs to countries that violate human rights, acquire weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, or refuse to abide by the 1925 gas warfare treaty” (Hufbauer et al.2008b).

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, starting the Gulf War, the UN passed resolution 660 on August 2, 1990 condemning the invasion and pressing for return to positions prior to the invasion. Resolution 661 adopted on August 6, 1990 noted that Iraq had refused to comply to resolution 660 and hence decided to impose sanctions, under chapter VII of the UN Charter. Explaining:

Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of the present resolution; (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait, and any dealings by their nationals on their flag vessels or their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of present resolution...(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait... (UNSC 1990:1)

It was decided that the sanctions would be reviewed every 60 days, so that the medical sector would not be affected by these. UNSC Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, 678 passed through 1990 and 686 in April 1991, dealt with the conditions of settling the Gulf War and also lifting of sanctions. Moreover, UNSCR 687 passed by 12 votes as Cuba voted against while Ecuador and Yemen abstained, among other subjects dealt with Iraq’s proliferation activities. The UNSC resolution 687 stressed that the UNSC was:

Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member states that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968... Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons. Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region (UNSC 1991:2).

Further the resolution said, that it:

Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities.. To submit to the Secretary General and the Director General of the International Atomic Emergency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items..(UNSC 1991:3).

Most importantly it mentioned:

Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General .. to carry out immediate on-site inspection of the Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declaration and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission;..(UNSC 1991:4).

In April 1991, when Iraq accepted the UNSCR 687, the UN went on to setting up of a Special Commission to carry out inspections. The resolutions, particularly UNSCR 687 were also significant as the US cited them while taking action against Iraq in 1996, 1998 and 2003, stressing that Iraq's actions and policies were not conducive to peace and stability of the region. The IAEA carried out 30 inspections from May 1991 to October 1997 (El Baradei 2011: 31). The UN's 1997, Fourth Consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, insisted that the "destruction, removal, and rendering harmless" of Iraq's nuclear facilities and materials had been accomplished (1997: 13).

However, the IAEA inspections continued till 1998, despite the Iraqi government's reluctance. However, tensions rose when later that year, Saddam Hussain raised objections to inspections and showed his hostility towards the UN. Subsequently the US and Britain together initiated Operation Desert Fox and bombed specific sites in Iraq, after the withdrawal of the UN and IAEA inspectors. For the next four years, Saddam Hussain did not allow the UN and IAEA officials to inspect its nuclear installations. The situation turned tense when in 2001, a US Defense Department report, titled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, estimated that "Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon," and the time period could be "substantially shortened" if Iraq obtained fissile material from a foreign source. Facing the possibility of US invasion, Iraq allowed the IAEA to inspect its facilities and agreed to resume verifications. On March 7, 2003 IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei submitted a detailed report to UNSC, titled "The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update" that explained the IAEA inspections conducted over a period of three months in Iraq, concluding:

In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear weapons... (a) There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites; (b) There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990; (c) There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the

aluminium tubes in question; (d) Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme (El-Baradei 2003:5)

Further adding:

After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities.. (El-Baradei 2003:6).

Saddam Hussain lost power after in Second Gulf War in April 2003, following which many of the UN sanctions were lifted. The US Central Intelligence Agency reports subsequently found no evidence of Iraq having a Weapons of Mass Destruction program. While the topic became contentious and was debated by several US intelligence agencies in the following years, the UN finally lifted all the sanctions on Iraq in 2010. The sanctions that particularly aimed to pressurize Iraq to give up its nuclear program, even for civilian uses, were lifted in 2010. The UN decision was a signal that the state had resumed its former standing in international affairs, which it had been relegated from after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Hence the sanctions that prohibited Iraq from acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and long-range missiles, were lifted. The December 15, 2010 UNSC statement titled, Security Council Takes Action to End Iraq Sanctions, Terminate Oil-For-Food Programme as Members Recognize 'Major Changes' Since 1990, stressed:

Recognizing that major changes had occurred in Iraq since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council today returned control of mineral exports to that country's Government, ended the oil-for-food programme and lifted restrictions on programmes for the development of nuclear energy... he Council lifted restrictions relating to weapons of mass destruction and civilian nuclear activities in recognition of Iraq's progress in supporting the international non-proliferation regime and other international instruments, its commitment to take further such steps and its provisional application of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pending its ratification (UNSC 2010b para 1).

It further maintained:

Adopted unanimously, resolution 1957 (2010) terminated measures imposed under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), by which Iraq was requested to destroy all weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, and not to acquire any nuclear weapons (UNSC 2010b para. 4).

Iraq's then Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari reacted positively to the development, terming it "a historic session" as it ended the international embargo since Saddam's regime. Zebari had previously called the lifting of the sanctions "the biggest political accomplishment for Iraq." Emphasizing, "I can say that the session today is the beginning of the end. Today Iraq will be liberated from all sanctions caused by wars

and misdeeds of the former regime" (Telegraph 2010). In 2011, the UN voted to give back the Iraqi government, control over its oil and natural gas revenue. Iraq sanctions case is significant for many reasons, besides the evidently long duration of the sanctions, this case is also important because it drew attention towards collateral damage. Sanctions on Iraq made the US propose "smart sanctions" which focused on particular entities and lessened civilian inconveniences. Hence, targeting sanctions only on "limiting Iraq's strategic capabilities, and not on its civilian economy" (Katzman and Blanchard 2005:9). Later the concept of smart sanctions was followed while designing the sanction regimes against various states, including Iran and North Korea.

Supportive India

In the case of Iraq, India argued that the "unjust" and "unwise" sanctions should be lifted, yet maintained that Iraq should comply with UN resolutions and "forswear weapons of mass destruction" (Rediff 2002). In 1992 India abstained from voting in the UN when the issue of sanctions on Iraq was brought up. New Delhi opposed the use of force against Iraq in 1991 and condemned UN sanctions on Saddam Hussein's regime. Traditionally India-Iraq relations have been friendly, as Saddam Hussain backed India on the issue of Kashmir and also supported New Delhi's 1998 nuclear tests. India and Iraq have engaged in different sectors. India remains one the largest importer of crude oil from Iraq; it has also helped Iraq in training security personnel and other officials in Iraqi oil companies and made significant contribution to the UN for programs on reconstruction of Iraq. Despite US' pressure, India maintained that it would not send troops to Iraq and did not lend an overt support to the Bush administration's attempts of democracy promotion in Iraq. When Saddam Hussain's death sentence was announced, New Delhi called it "unfortunate" (The Times of India 2006).

However, India and Iraq have been unsuccessful to maintain the same momentum since 2004—following US invasion of Iraq and the consequent security tensions, the government decided to call back its ambassador to Iraq. While India did not support sanctions and in the absence of a meticulous sanctions regime, like in the case of Iran, New Delhi was not particularly deterred from investing or engaging with Iran, though a westward leaning was discernable. Security of Indian nationals in Iraq became a

major concern for Indians, as instances of deteriorating security situation came up. In 2005, reports about Indian truck drivers being kidnapped in Iraq came up, making many investors refrain from investing in Iraq.

In 2011, seven years after withdrawing its diplomat from Baghdad, New Delhi named an envoy to Iraq. Subsequently in 2012, Iraq became, India's the second largest oil supplier (Abhyankar 2013 para 3). In 2013, India's then Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid visited Baghdad. Despite US pressure and India's growing predilection for West, New Delhi has not been mindful of sanctions and has argued that India does not support unilateral sanctions. However as a member of the UN it implemented sanctions imposed by the UNSC. India's decision to engage with Iraq as well as its stand on sanctions were also result of domestic pressures rather than international influence. New Delhi has been more mindful of its domestic Muslim population. To appease the constituency, Delhi has often taken a milder stand on US' policies against the West Asian state (Pant 2011b: 1).

India's relative lack of engagement in Iraq has also been attributed to bureaucratic indolence, rather than international sanctions. However, through the years India's trade with Iraq has increased, with Baghdad taking special interest in reviving the ties. While India exported goods worth \$200 million to Iraq in 2006-2007, the figure rose to \$1.3 billion in 2013. In 2012-2013, Iraq are able to meet 13 per cent of India's oil needs, as Iran came under UN sanctions (Firstpost 2014). According to India's Ministry of External Affairs, "In 2016, Iraq supplied 37.81 Million Metric Tonnes (MMT) crude to India worth US\$ 11.63 billion. It was the largest supplier of crude to India in the first half of 2017" (Ministry of External Affairs 2017:3). Nevertheless, India's engagement with Iraq has not been as intense and diverse as that of China, post sanctions.

Defying China

Though China was not enthusiastic about sanctions but, in Iraq's case "sanctions were preferable to using force" (Yang 2013:156). China stressed on the need to continue UN weapons inspections in Iraq. In the early 2000s Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan endorsed sanctions over armed conflict (CNN 2003). Meanwhile, China viewed sanctions on Iraq as an opportunity to invest and generate revenue abroad

rather than an impediment in the way of enhancing cooperation. Especially since the lifting of the UN sanctions in early 2010s, China stormed in and invested heavily. By 2009 China was importing more than four million barrels of oil per day from Iraq, as experts predicted that the amount will only increase (Pepe 2009:2). Through the years, Chinese firms also signed contracts with Iraq's oil ministry. Beijing cancelled debt that Iraq owed and also signed trade deals amounting to over \$3.8 billion from 2010 to 2012 (Pant 2011b:3).

Since the 2003 war to topple Saddam Hussein, Chinese oil companies have been eager to help develop Iraq's oil reserves with the state-owned Chinese oil firm China National Petroleum Company clinching some of the biggest deals in the Iraqi oil sector. According to Harsh Pant:

It is also helping to restore production at al-Ahdab field. Sinopec, another Chinese oil group, has a strong position in northern Iraq, after its \$7.9 billion acquisition of the London-listed Addax Petroleum, which has been exploring for oil in the autonomous Kurdish region. Not surprisingly, BP and its partner CNPC will be the first companies to be paid back by the Iraqi government for developing Iraq's super-giant Rumaila oil field as part of the terms of the service contracts Iraq signed with the firms. Baghdad has to start paying back costs of developing these fields and remuneration fees when they achieve a 10 per cent increase in production (Pant 2011b:2).

Currently, Iraq ranks fourth among China's crude oil suppliers, after Russia, Saudi Arabia and Angola, accounting for 9% of the imports. Additionally, companies like Zhenhua Oil, affiliated with Chinese government, are helping Iraq to develop its oil fields (Tabeta 2018). Over the years Beijing has sought to import oil from states other than the ones in the West Asian region, however China remains one of the "top three importers from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran" (Kliman et al 2018:1). Hence China's commercial interest as well as intent bureaucracy and private investors have tampered the effect of sanctions. Trade restrictions owing to international sanctions have only had a marginal effect on China's engagement with Iraq.

Similarities and Variance in the Indian and Chinese Approach

In the cases of Iran, North Korea as well as Iraq, Indian and Chinese reaction to sanctions was influenced by their interdependence on them. While the target state had to evaluate the harm that sanctions would cause on noncompliance, New Delhi and Beijing had to check the cost of complying to international sanctions against the three states. Both, India and China lost opportunities to invest and trade with the sanctioned

states by complying with sanctions. In the three case studies, though India and China at times agreed with the reasons for imposing sanctions, they were critical of unilateral sanctions and did not themselves initiate them on the states. In context of unilateral sanctions both India and China displayed autonomy by either supporting or opposing them. New Delhi and Beijing's economic as well as political interests played a role in determining their reactions to sanctions. However, apart from the concerns directly related to the target, there were also international obligations to look into. Nuclear proliferation is an important issue. While both India and China have nuclear weapons—the former a *de facto* state while the latter *de jure*, they are conscious of their international responsibility and obligations. Nevertheless, for China commercial interests have also been significant. Beijing has followed different norms, often choosing engagement rather than isolation of the sanctioned states. India, on the other hand has been staunchly against proliferation of nuclear weapons and has taken a stronger stand against the issue.

Having experienced denial and isolation, empathy could be a significant factor in explaining Indian and Chinese stand on unilateral sanctions. However, it would not be the sole factor, since both the rising states have learnt to look ahead and with time the vengeful feelings towards the West have dissipated. Though muscular anti-West rhetoric is often used by the leaders in both the states to please and appeal to their domestic audience. Meanwhile, the major powers in the West have also become attentive to the demands and interests of India and China and have even attempted to alter their own policies to accommodate the Asian interests. It can be noticed that while India and China have themselves used sanctions to promote their foreign or security policies, their sanction use is different than that of the Western states. Since they do not term or even understand some of their own actions as sanctions, they often react to the sanctions imposed by Western states with disdain. They often suggest measures other than sanctions to achieve the objectives. Their criticism of sanctions imposed on them also makes it obligatory for the two states to stand against unilateral sanctions placed on other states, to appease their domestic audience.

China, however is much more assertive on the issue of sanctions than India. Often taking a strong stand against unilateral sanctions at world forums, it has also threatened or used sanctions against states that have imposed sanctions against

Beijing. Chinese sanctions on US, for instance. China has realised, that its economic strength is providing the state immense leverage in political affairs. China, is thus slowly using its economic might to enhance its status in world politics, shifting its earlier strategy when Beijing sought the help of other policy instruments to enhance its economic strength. India, is expected to follow similar strategy in the coming decades. However, New Delhi's economic strength has not reached a similar level currently.

Conclusion

Over the years India and China's position regarding sanctions have also changed. From being states under sanctions, the two have become emerging powers whose support is necessary to make international sanction regimes sustain and impact. Hence it is important to review Indian and Chinese stand on sanctions imposed on other states and entities. In case of India, no significant change has been observed on New Delhi's stand on international sanctions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised to "reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process" in Bharatiya Janata Party's 2014 election manifesto (BJP 2014: 39). However, National Democratic Alliance's (NDA) official stand on sanctions remains the same as that of its predecessor United Progressive Alliance. New Delhi has maintained that while it supports UNSC sanctions, it is against unilateral sanctions. However, often geopolitical changes have been important and India has had to adapt to them and adhere to its international obligations. Especially since 2008, when India and US signed the nuclear deal, India has had to take a more responsible and stronger posture against nuclear proliferation. Overtime India has also become apart of the structure that once was conceptualized to punish its own policies and actions.

China for its part has also been conscious of its international obligations, especially since it is a permanent member of the UNSC. Like in the case of North Korea, its own security concerns as well as norms have made Beijing support Pyongyang while many Western states and organizations have criticised China for its stand. However, especially after Pyongyang third nuclear test , Beijing had to take a relatively tougher stand against North Korea. In the Chinese case, commercial interest has also played an important role. With a fast growing economy flooded with products, China is continuously looking for markets for its products and new investment opportunities.

Besides economic interests, political interests have also led China to seek new spheres of influence, hence detesting limitations to trade and engagement that come with sanctions. Nevertheless, explaining Indian and Chinese approach to sanctions imposed on other states is not easy. Since many domestic, strategic, commercial and geopolitical factors come into play. Consequently, New Delhi and Beijing are left to constantly devise innovative strategies for balancing their international obligations and domestic interests.

Chapter 5: Assessing the Alternative Paradigm

On August 15, 2014, shortly after assuming the office of Prime Minister, Narendra Modi delivered his first Independence Day speech. Invoking Indian spiritual leader Swami Vivekananda, he shared his thoughts on India's potential to become a world teacher. He said:

Swami Vivekananda called India as a '*jagat guru*' (world teacher)..He had said – “I can see before my eyes Mother India awakening once again. My Mother India would be seated as the World Guru..This legacy of India would be useful for the welfare of the world”..it is incumbent upon us to realize that dream. This capable country, blessed with natural bounty, this country of youth can do much for the world in the coming days (Modi 2014a:17).

Similarly, Beijing has also articulated its views on China being distinct from the West with its own specific features. Addressing the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017, President Xi Jinping said:

Remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national (Xi 2017:1).

India and China have long argued that the two are different from the Western states. With civilizations dating back to millennia, these two civilizational states have often spoken about their past glory and also shared their aspiration for restoring it. Their experience as colonies, however has shaped their worldview significantly. While the extent to which India was colonized was different from China, their experience of subjugation has left an indelible mark on the psyche of the leaders of both the states. Besides, a composite culture developed in India and China post independence, which still influences state-decisions at the international level. A common trauma is associated with the colonial experience. Colonialism is understood as extractive in both the states, which according to them ruined their former structures and slowed down the economic growth and development. Besides, colonization humiliated the morally conscious Asian states. With a high sense of self and their own past, New Delhi and Beijing have found it hard to explain as well as accept their own subjugation by their colonizers. The realization makes the two states seek recognition, which can be in the form of a higher status or appreciation and acknowledgement of

their own development perspectives that are at variance from the West. In turn, it also influences Indian and Chinese reactions to international sanctions.

Moreover, both India and China believe that their status in international politics is 'exceptional'. Though the sources of their 'exceptionalism' are different, however the result is a similar understanding of the West, where both believe that the West is deficient in many ways, especially in morality. A moral assessment of their own actions and future aspirations makes them accord themselves a higher status than Western powers. Ancient traditions as well as history become a driving force behind their exceptional status and higher moral values. They attribute themselves certain national uniqueness and specific characteristics, different from the West, which they believe makes them take moral and egalitarian decisions in world affairs. Both India and China aspire to gain more power in world affairs and hope to bring their 'exceptionalism' with them when they are at the helm of international affairs.

The morality and the sense of being an exceptional states influences how they see themselves in the international system. New Delhi and Beijing believe that they have a special place in world affairs owing to their exceptional character. India and China have also found the West dominated international order lacking—often criticising and diverging from the Western worldviews as well calling for reforms in international institutions. The two Asian states believe that their uniqueness has earned them a special place in the world order, which they deserve but have not acquired yet. This affects how they view themselves as well as the West when it comes to discourse on sanctions.

While the Indian economy is still developing, China has achieved a high economic growth, which has given the state confidence to take strong stands on several issues at the international level. China has voiced its diverging views in many international forums, including the UN. With the growth and ever expanding external relationships, Beijing realised that sanctions against China also involve a cost to the sanctioner. Beijing has begun to lose its inhibitions and not only make direct threats but also taken action against major Western powers, including the reigning superpower—the US. While the US has used sanctions against China on several occasions, in the last

few years, tables have turned to some extent. Beijing is also known to have threatened Washington with sanctions.

This chapter discusses the colonial experience of India and China, particularly highlighting how it led to the construction of their post-colonial ideology—which shapes New Delhi and Beijing’s sense of self as well as their worldview, and finally their reactions to sanctions. The second section elucidates why the two Asian states consider themselves exceptional and what accords them the exceptional status. Finally, it sums up by examining if the colonial experience as well as the Indian and Chinese understanding of being different from the Western powers, influences their foreign and security policy decisions including their views on sanctions.

Colonialism in India and China

In Marxist literature colonialism and imperialism have been examined in great detail. According to Lenin (1917: 265) imperialism is the highest and a “special” stage of capitalism. Colonialism is often understood to culminate in imperialism when the control becomes complete. Colonialism is considered to be a subset of imperialism (Said 1993:8). “Imperialism means the practice and theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; colonialism, which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory” (Said 1993:8). While in colonialism the control is not complete, in imperialism the control is often at all levels—economic and political. Marxists like Lenin and Hobson have explained that with surplus capital, exporting capital to foreign markets becomes an important aspect of imperialism—often making them seek new colonies for their finished products. Imperialism often uses, politics and ideologies as justifications to cloak economic motives (Hodgart 1977). Anti-Marxists, like Joseph A. Schumpeter, however argue that imperialism is more to do with national affinity to expand without any particular objective in mind. He argues that imperialism originates at a pre-capitalist stage and is a consequence of atavistic tendencies of ruling elites and the remaining pre-capitalist social structures. Though imperialisms can appear in capitalistic societies, “we must evidently see imperialistic tendencies only as alien elements carried into the world of capitalism from the outside, supported by non-capitalistic factors in modern life” (Schumpeter 1918:194).

India and China were both colonized by imperial powers and went through a phase of economic plunder, which crippled them significantly. While their colonizers exploited them economically, there was also widespread racism and social subjugation. In both the states, the colonizing Western states established a racial superiority through their actions as well as policies—leaving an impact on the cultures of both India and China, which still lingers. The colonialism in both India and China was essentially extractive. Manjari Chatterjee Miller (2013:9) explains:

Under extractive colonialism the colonizing power established an ‘extractive state’ whose purpose was to shift the resources of the colony to the colonizer, often with few to no protections for the native populace against abuse by the colonial authority. Extractive colonialism came in different forms in different societies, but elements of these institutions had a striking resonance for all countries that experienced them: external political dominance, economic exploitation, denial of rights, and suppression of cultural and ethnic pride (Miller 2013:9).

The colonial experience of these two states led them to developing a post-colonial ideology, which still determines the international behavior of both India and China.

Miller (2013: 2) terms it post-imperial ideology (PII), as she expounds:

Post-imperial ideology comprises a sense of victimization that brings with it the dominant goal to be recognized and empathized with as a victim by others in the international system. I refer to this as the goal of victimhood, which is simultaneously a desire to be recognized as a victim and also to ensure that one will not be victimized again the future. This dominant goal drives two subordinated goals: maximizing territorial sovereignty and maximizing status. These three goals are inherent in PII, and their pursuit shapes foreign policy in states that hold such beliefs (Miller 2013: 2).

A specific behavior is associated with states that follow a post-imperial ideology. They understand their own position as that of a victim, invoking discourse of oppression and subjugation. Further, having experienced territorial control, they are conscious of maintaining the sanctity of their territory and also aim to recover any territory lost to colonizers or other states. Status—gain as well as maintenance becomes significant for them and they shape their policies and actions to achieve that end (Miller 2013: 25) Before elucidating the development of Indian and Chinese post-imperial ideology, it is important to briefly discuss the course of colonization in both the states.

Colonial Experience of India

Colonialism started in India in the 17th century and continued till the year 1947 when India gained freedom from the British. India was primarily a British colony. However the French and Portuguese who initially came to trade through their companies had

also colonized some parts. Vasco da Gama, a Portuguese explorer is believed to be the first European trader to reach India in 1498. The Portuguese and French often fought with the British over colonies in India, however they were defeated each time and managed to establish only small colonies in Goa; Pondichéry, Karikal and Yanaon.

At the time when the Europeans entered India, the Mughal dynasty was ruling. Though the Mughals were not the natives of India, they had assimilated and adapted to the culture, while influencing natives in the process. Mughals have not been regarded as colonizers as unlike the British that followed them, they made no distinction between the natives and the ruled (Miller 2014:10). It was the British East India Company that entered India in the 17th century to trade that eventually colonized it. In 1619, the East India Company started trading after Emperor Jahangir's approval. The Mughal Empire, soon fell following the death of Aurangzeb, and the East India Company which was previously engaged economically, eventually started taking political control. The transition happened in mid-19th century and led to the political and economic consolidation of India—starting a colonial rule that would last hundred years.

In India, the East India Company initiated the process of colonizing. The commercial enterprise, particularly known to trade tea, opium, porcelain and spices was intensely invested in the Eastern part of the world and later also sought political control of significant parts of China. During its time in India, the East India Company also had private military to secure its economic interests. Initially the British government did not have a direct control over the activities of the company, however later the East India Company was brought under government control through various acts (Key 1994: 130). The political control and consolidation was not immediate. It started with East India Company's interference in internal matters of small rulers. After the British won the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the road to future expansion was cleared. As the British started collecting taxes in some of the biggest provinces of India, namely—Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, its grip tightened over India. East India Company first gained power over the Indian market, by strategically gaining allies as well as gaining control on the trade routes to India. The fall of the Mughal Empire aided their cause, as they sought allies in many local and small rulers. With the development of military technology in Britain through industrial revolution, the company gained in military

power and as the Indian manufacturing crippled, their economic power increased further. Consequently, disparity in resources increased and Indian revolts were crushed severely. The expansion of the British Empire in India led to the “deinstitutionalization of India’s governance” (Taroor 2016: 53).

Eventually, the political control was complete, as the Company controlled colony came under the purview of the British government. India became one of the most significant colony of the British crown. Nicholas B. Dirks (1996:21) explains the process of colonialism in India. “If colonialism can be seen as a cultural formation, so also culture is a colonial formation.” He stresses that the “cultural technologies of rule” which entailed strategies like census taking and border making also helped sustain colonialism in India (Dirks 1996). He explains:

Colonial conquest was not just the result of the power of superior arms, military organization, political power, or economic wealth—as important as these things were. Colonialism was made possible, and then sustained and strengthened, as much by cultural technologies of rule as it was by the more obvious and brutal modes of conquest that first established power on foreign shores(Dirks 1996:21).

The period under the British rule is regarded as a phase of colonial plunder, as with political control, the British found it easier to gain complete economic control. India became a source of raw materials, as the colonizers built railways, they found it easier to transport raw materials from India. The railways helped in extracting from even remote parts. Later the markets were flooded with British made finished products, which were the only products available, hence completing the process of extraction. This form of colonialism came to be called extractive colonialism. Besides the constant extraction of raw materials to support its own industries there were other extractions that the British made, some had great symbolic value for the Indians. Indians still lament colonialism because some commodities that the British took as they signified India’s rich heritage and prosperous past (Taroor 2016: 13). The British took many precious Indian artefacts back to England. Kohinoor diamond, said to be one of the biggest diamonds in the world is a part of the British Queen’s crown. While the British have insisted that the diamond was not stolen and was a gift to the queen, many Indians maintain that it has been wrongfully taken and want it to be returned (The Telegraph 2016).

Shashi Taroor in his book, *An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India* explains that how India became poor and the British Empire, rich through colonization. As a colony, India was impoverished, as famines, epidemics, communal riots were caused due to acts of “commission and omission” by the British (Taroor 2016). He argues:

At the beginning of the eighteenth century...India’s share of the world economy was 23 per cent, as large as all of Europe put together. By the time the British departed India, it had dropped to just over 3 per cent. The reason was simple: India was governed for the benefit of Britain. Britain’s rise for 200 years was financed by its depredations in India (Taroor 2016: 4).

Taroor, explains various themes associated by many Indian scholars and a significant part of the public with British colonialism, which are inherently negative. Through the book he narrates “looting of India”, and argues against arguments that the British were responsible for bringing political unity, or democracy to India (Taroor 2016).

India’s Post-Imperial Ideology

Indian nationalism was a product of the oppression faced during its years as a British colony. Coercion was used by the British to suppress dissent. The time is etched in the Indian memory as that of suffering and discrimination, leading to a sense of gratitude and reverence for the freedom fighters for freeing India from the British rule. Nehru explains that the British in India maintained, “social exclusiveness..based on racialism and on a ruling class always exhibiting its superiority and unapproachability” (Nehru 1946 :293-294). In fact the sense of gratitude was so heartfelt that the Indian National Congress, the party that led the freedom struggle was voted in power consecutively for numerous terms after independence. Jawaharlal Nehru, the most prominent leader of the party was elected as the Prime Minister consecutively for four terms (17 years) post-independence.

The speeches and actions of Nehru, who also took over the mantle of the foreign minister after independence, were laced in a post-imperial ideology. He was one of the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM)—a group of newly independent and developing Asian and African states that sought to stay detached from any major blocs of the Cold War. There was a fear of being colonized again, through neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism. In 1961, speaking at the first NAM, said, “The power of nations assembled here is not military power or economic power, nevertheless it is power. Call it moral force” (Ministry of External Affairs 2009:1).The leaders of NAM emphasized that colonialism was not dead but could manifest itself in

a different way. Nehru often made seeking equality the subject of his discourse as well as policies. The pursuit of technological development and recognition were also products of the post-imperial ideology.

For India status became important as it took a stand against any international treaty or organization that failed to recognise New Delhi's unique position or presented it with an unequal status. Nonproliferation treaties became a reason for India to tell off the West. India became critical of treaties like the NPT, which presented many states especially in the West, a higher status and left no room for India to reach the same position. India refused to sign the NPT, "on grounds that it is a biased legal instrument that divided the world into 'nuclear haves' and 'nuclear have-nots'" (Sarkar and Ganguly 2018:1). India used terms like 'discrimination' to define the provisions of the treaties, unrelentingly taking a strong position against such treaties and leaving no space for negotiations. It is for the same reason that India has pursued and been pleased to receive the membership of international technology control groups like Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. Gaining membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group is still important to India because it views the denial of the membership as a blow to its status. Besides its interest in developing its nuclear-energy program, India also seeks "greater international political status" through NSG membership (Hibbs 2017:275). Though New Delhi has secured a waiver from the NSG, it seems it will continue to pursue its membership as it attaches it with a sense of pride and worth directly affecting its status in the world.

Colonial Experience of China

China was not colonized in its entirety. In the 1840s colonialism reached a few parts of China, mostly ports, as the colonizers formalized their rule through treaties with the then ruling Chinese Qing dynasty. Gradually colonialism was expanded and lasted about a century till 1945. Unlike India, China was not only colonized by Western states but also its neighbour Japan, which was an imperial power commanding many colonies in Asia. The French also came to control some territories around the state, including a part of Shanghai.

British colonialism started in China after the Qing dynasty lost the first Opium war (1839-42). In the 16th century as the demand for Chinese products increased in Britain, trade imbalance grew. In 1760, the British decided to export opium grown in India to China, with the aim of correcting trade imbalance. However, resistance against the use of opium grew, as the Chinese society became more dependent on it and the addictions started to cause social problems. In 1839 Emperor Daoguang of Qing dynasty took a stance against selling and consumption of opium. Several raids were conducted and thousands of tones of British supplied opium was confiscated without offering compensation. The Chinese burned a significant amount of opium during the time as a protest. As the threat of a blockade of foreign trade at Canton port loomed large, the British decided to send the Royal Navy to China(Fay 1998: 237). Using naval and gun power the British succeeded in defeating China. It was the first time in history that steam-driven ships were used as part of the main force (Wahed 2016:25). In 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed between the Qing dynasty and the British. The treaty, which the Chinese term unfair, gave opened Chinese ports to foreigners and gave the British the island of Hong Kong.

The colonial rule could not be restrained, and after the first war, the British sought more from the Chinese government. They wanted opium trade to be legalized, permission to British merchants to trade across China, and exemption from foreign imports from internal transit duties. British also wanted to be favoured in trade with China. The treaty of Nanking had proved insufficient to satisfy the British demands and in 1856, the second opium war commenced, that went on till 1860. In this war, the United Kingdom and France fought together against the Qing dynasty.

The war started when suspecting of piracy, Chinese marines seized a ship called the Arrow in Canton, which though deregistered formerly, belonged to Britain and still had the insignia of the British Empire. The removal of the British flag from the ship became a grave issue, as the Chinese were asked for an apology for insulting the Union Jack and the release of the ship crew. On Chinese refusal to release all the crew, the British bombarded the city of Canton and the Chinese retaliated. The French, who had also have problems with the Chinese government also joined forces with the British during the war. The city was successfully taken over by the forces together. There were intervals during the war as negotiations took place, however the

war lasted till 1857 when the British went back to Hong Kong. The United States and Russia are also known to have lent support to the British during this time, though the former did not send military help (Wong 1974: 303-320).

Subsequently, two new treaties were signed —Treaties of Tianjin and the Treaty of Aigun. Britain, France, Russia, and the US were parties to the first treaty that was signed in 1858 and allowed Western trade in 11 more Chinese ports. The four states also got the right to have diplomatic representations in Peking. The Chinese were also asked to pay indemnity to the British. Initially the Chinese leaders did not agree to the treaties. In May, 1858, the Treaty of Aigun was signed between Russia and China to settle boundary disputes. The treaties finally granted Britain control over major parts of coastal China, including the right to fix and collect tariffs. The Western powers got the opportunity to extend their rule inside China through the treaties (Wahed 2016:25).

In 1931, the Japanese forces invaded the Chinese city of Manchuria and subsequently established their government there. The Japanese expanded their rule and in 1937 took over Shanghai. One of intense display of the Japanese might in China was when the Japanese military invaded the city of Nanjing and within the period of six-week in December 1937 and to January 1938, caused grave destruction. Japanese brutal actions during the time have been harshly criticized as thousands of episodes of rape, looting, and arson were reported. Reportedly, the population of Nanjing dropped from 350,000 to less than 500 (Chang: 1997:37). More than 142,000 deaths are believed to have been taken place in the duration. With the help of the US, and the combined strength of the bickering Chinese blocs— Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were defeated in 1945. Subsequently, following a civil war between the CCP and Kuomintang in 1946, the CCP won and Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan by 1949. In 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the mainland China (Chang: 1997:37-70).

The major aim of the powers that colonized China in the 19th century was economic exploitation. China possessed materials that the West wanted along with access to the Chinese markets for their own products. Japan however, wanted to increase its political control and influence in the region.

Post-Imperial Ideology of China

The Chinese understand their colonial past as a traumatic period. In fact, from 1839 to 1949, the hundred years when the Western states and Japan colonized China are recognised as the “century of humiliation” in Chinese history (Kaufman 2010 :1). The Chinese pride was affected by the fact that they had to endure social, economic and also violent atrocities by their colonizers during the time. The subject is regarded as sensitive in China. The Chinese feel that during the time their pride was eroded by the dishonour they had to endure. They lost several wars to the colonizers, particularly the Opium wars and signed unfair treaties that made them give away their land to the colonizers, in addition to indemnity. As China lost territory, their defeat challenged their sense of sovereignty. Like in the Indian case, the Kohinoor diamond had symbolic value, the Chinese found many actions of the colonizers more traumatic because of the symbolism associated with them. The looting of Qing dynasty’s Imperial palace during the Second Opium War in 1860-62 was one such instance. A beckon of China’s past glory and history, the Chinese found the act more hurtful for what the palace symbolized than the monetary loss. This time period has become a significant part of “modern China’s founding narrative” (Yoho 2018:1).

During the colonial period, the Chinese faced social discrimination. Like the Indian case, their race was considered lower than that of the Western colonizers, which made them, face discrimination of various kinds in their social life in the colonial times. Mao Zedong also understood nuclear weapons as a reason for Western hegemony, hence he believed that attaining nuclear weapon would mean neutralizing American nuclear threat (Mao 1977 :168). When China tested a nuclear weapon, they believed an entire race had come to represent power. Moreover, the colonial rule was violent and led to loss of life and property. Notably in the Tianjin incident in 1870, the French killed many Chinese and later during the Boxer revolution from 1899 to 1901 when anti-foreign rule protests had taken place, the colonizers used force against the native Chinese people. The use of violence during the colonial times shaped Chinese post-imperial ideology in which they were the victims of humiliation during the period when the Western powers and Japan ruled China. Consequently, “Chinese elites today draw on the Century of Humiliation as a starting point for their views on how China should interact with other nations” (Kaufman 2010 :1).

According to Yan Xuetong (2002:164) in history, while withdrawing from their colonies, the British attempt to incite conflicts to later gain favour in their former colonies. In a similar vein, in 1982, Deng Xiaoping anticipated initiation of conflict in Hong Kong as the British were withdrawing. He explained, if achieving back sovereignty would mean “disaster”, then “we need to bravely deal with the disaster...as long as we have a suitable policy, the capital that flowed out would come back” (Deng 1982 :14).

Wang Jisi (2003:7) is critical of the way the Western powers like US have risen and are perpetuating their hegemony. While he understands China as a state that does not like to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states, the US is seen as a hegemonic power that does not mind its own business. He argues that the US’ unified value system, for which freedom is critical provides an, “ideological basis for its hegemonic behaviour in the world” (Wang 2003:7). Alison Adcock Kaufman (2010 :1) explains that while the post colonial ideology was influenced by the colonial experience, China also follows the ideologies of its old dynasties. He emphasizes:

Arguments about the nature of international competition, about the reasons that nations succeed or fail in the international arena, and about the prospects for long-term global peace and cooperation draw not just on China’s experiences during that period, but on the vocabulary and debates that Qing and republican era intellectuals developed to understand the modern international system (Kaufman 2010 :1)

Ted S. Yoho (2018:1) believes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), aims to redress the injustices suffered during the century of humiliation by achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” President Xi Jinping has promoted the “Chinese Dream” of achieving rejuvenation, where China conquers the humiliating impediments of colonial history, and gain strength to make sure that the state does not fall prey to similar fate again.

The Indian and Chinese Exceptionalism

Especially owing to their colonial experience, India and China believe that they are different from their colonizers—hence the way they conduct themselves and make their policies on international issues will be distinct from their colonizers. Writing before India’s independence, in the book ‘Discovery of India’, Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized on India’s uniqueness and past heritage despite technological

backwardness. He said that India, “fell behind in the march of technique, and Europe, which had long been backward in many matters, took the lead in technical progress.” However, he believed that “India was not lacking in mental alertness and technical skill in earlier times”(Nehru 1946 :54). Moreover, he believed that India had a unique strength, explaining, “I feel that anything that had the power to mould hundreds of generations, without a break, must have drawn its enduring vitality from some deep well of strength, and have had the capacity to renew that vitality from age to age (Nehru 1946 :55). Many scholars have also pointed at the distinct nature of India’s freedom struggle that shunned violence. According to Jawaharlal Nehru:

She has always honoured thought and the men of thought, the highbrows, and has refused to consider the men of the sword or the possessors of money as superior to them. Even in her days of degradation, she has clung to thought and found some comfort in it (Nehru 1946 :152)

In a similar vein, M. N Roy explained the unprecedented nature of Indian freedom struggle. In his seminal work, *India in Transition*, he said:

The Indian people are engaged in a social struggle of historic and to a certain extent of unprecedented character. There must be a socio-political philosophy behind this great movement. This much-needed ideological background of our struggle is not to be invented from the imagination of great men; it will be evolved out of the material forces making the birth, growth and success of such a struggle possible. (Roy 1922 :14)

Later scholars like Rabindranath Tagore gave a spiritual meaning and direction to India’s freedom struggle, not limiting it to its political implications (Ramachandran 2011). The new political leaders have built on the ideas of Indian exceptionalism that the former leaders and scholars have forwarded.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 15, 2014, stressed that India could be a “*jagat guru*” or world teacher, he was hinting at the higher status of India in relation to the West. Despite being technologically inferior and on the path of development, India could teach the West in significant ways (Modi 2014a: 17). Likewise Indian leaders have often hinted at that “India’s destiny was to make a moral-spiritual contribution to world history” (Sullivan 2014: 643). In the context, Partha Chatterjee (1993: 51) explains that it becomes about competing as well as emulating the culture of their colonizers, who are understandably ahead of India in sectors like science, technology and material well being, but there exists a “cultural-domain” wherein the East is much more advanced.

The discourse has also permeated domestically where it is also finding references that might be articulated at international level. For instance when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited his election constituency, Varanasi, a city famous for its temples and spiritual connections, he stressed the importance of the city at the world stage. He said, “..till Varanasi does not become the ‘*Rashtra Guru*’ (national teacher), India cannot become the Jagat Guru (world teacher)” (Modi 2017:1). Encouraging residents to involve themselves in issues like cleanliness Through the statements, the current prime minister has acknowledged India’s uniqueness owing to its culture that the West does not possess. The statements also stress that India’s spiritual standing.

Indian leaders have attempted to share their state’s uniqueness with the West by pointing at its ancient traditions. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed the idea of having an International Yoga Day in the UN on 27 September 2014, he wanted to endorse more than the physical and spiritual exercise regime called Yoga which originated in India. Informing the UN about the benefits of Yoga, he also attempted to promote Indian traditions in the UN. Speaking in the UN General Assembly, he said:

Yoga is an invaluable gift of India's ancient tradition. It embodies unity of mind and body; thought and action; restraint and fulfillment; harmony between man and nature; a holistic approach to health and well-being. It is not about exercise but to discover the sense of oneness with yourself, the world and the nature. By changing our lifestyle and creating consciousness, it can help in well being. Let us work towards adopting an International Yoga Day (Modi 2014b:1).

Subsequently the proposal was accepted by the UN and since 2015, June 21 is celebrated every year as the International Day of Yoga or Yoga Day. A higher sense of spirituality has been an important distinction in the minds of Indians. Chatterjee points out that India seeks a “truly non-European modernity” wherein they want to combine “the superior material qualities of Western cultures with the spiritual greatness of the East” (Chatterjee 1993:51). Swami Vivekanand’s address at the Parliament of the World's Religions in 1893 in Chicago is still quoted widely by leaders as many believe that the spiritual leader was successful in establishing the superiority of Hinduism at the world stage. Representing India and Hinduism at the parliament of religions, he drew attention of the world towards Hinduism, particularly the Advaita Vedanta, an ancient branch of Hinduism. On September 11, 1893, responding to the welcome address Swami Vivekanand emphasized:

I thank you in the name of the most ancient order of monks in the world; I thank you in the name of the mother of religions, and I thank you in the name of millions and millions of Hindu people of all classes and sects (Vivekanand 1893:1).

Swami Vivekanand, many believe was successful in positioning himself as “the spiritual leader of mankind” (Mehta 2008:16). Along with establishing the superiority of Hinduism among all religions—in the process forwarding India’s culture as well as uniqueness. He is also credited with making the West curious about the Indian civilization, and its potential to teach the world. Thus making India progress in the direction of reclaiming its rightful place in the world order, much higher than the one assigned to it by the Western powers.

Similarly, Beijing has also been preoccupied with its uniqueness and explained its cultural superiority—sometimes directly while other times obliquely. The Chinese leaders have often maintained that their policies have specific ‘characteristics’ to emphasize the distinction. Through the statements, Chinese leaders have consciously argued that their state preaches an alternative paradigm that has special features which are not practised by the Western super and major powers. Speaking about Chinese values, Yan Xuetong (2002:156.) points at the difference between Western and Chinese values:

It is in China’s present cultural interest to promote the right values of Chinese culture and to avoid repeating the errors and mistakes of western modernization. Modernization in western countries has generated numerous social problems (Yan Xuetong 2002: 156).

Hence, by highlighting its own distinctiveness it has tried to gain more support for its actions and policies at international forums, especially of the small developing South Asian and African states. For instance, addressing the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017, President Xi Jinping said:

Remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics...strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation (Xi 2017: i).

While the West has accused China of violating human rights and looked down on its ‘anti-democratic’ political structures, Beijing has stressed that the American values do not align with its own cultural and national identity (Ho 2015: 169). Acknowledging the difference, China has also highlighted its own special features and its source of direction. In 2013, raising concern over social problems like corruption, President Xi

Jinping said that he hoped China's "traditional cultures" or "faiths— Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism - will help fill a void that has allowed corruption to flourish" (Reuters 2013). The statement shows that China reaches out and delves into its own strength at the time of need.

The Chinese 'traditional cultures' or faiths press for morality. Confucianism lays out not only social practices but also principles for those who govern. Leaders are taken as statesmen who would not indulge in amoral acts. Morality is taken as a significant part of their public as well as private life. Ho explains that, Lucian Pye highlights the "Confucian tradition of rule by men and not by law and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the preciousness of the Party, when combined...have produced a heightened glorification of the concept of the infallible leader, the indispensable figure" (Ho 2015: 169). Hence, it becomes easy for the leaders to justify their actions using the concept of morality.

Meanwhile Confucianism also preaches a sense of community. Family is considered an important unit of the society for the progress of which sacrifices and accommodations are encouraged among the family members. Further, the nation-state is also understood as a big family, therefore advocating a similar sentiment and commitment towards the wellbeing of all the countrymen. The Chinese hence, consider their own culture different than their former colonizers. Even when abroad, they are encouraged to follow the spirit of community and support the actions of the leaders and the culture back home.

Another distinction that China makes from the West is its benign intentions when there is talk of the state emerging as the next super power. Beijing has hinted at its own 'peaceful' aspirations, stressing that it seeks to 'rise peacefully' as well as seek 'peaceful development', signaling that it does not intent to be the hegemonic power like the US. William Callahan explains:

Beijing often says that the PRC will be a moral power, as opposed to a hegemonic one like the United States. Yet, when Chinese leaders and citizen intellectuals insist that the PRC will never be hegemonic, they are not saying that China will not dominate; they are merely saying that the PRC will never see itself as immoral, which, as experience shows, few countries do (Callahan 2013: 158).

It has been argued that formerly China used to choose to respond and react instead of

initiating action against actors in international politics. However, last decade has witnessed, China's increasingly assertive behavior being noticed. Over the years, China has also become very conscious of its image abroad. With global aspirations it seeks to only share the information that paints it in a positive light and emphasizes its uniqueness and superlative morality. While the world is still divided about China's grand strategy and academic wonder out loud "what kind of power would China be?" (Manning 2016) Beijing highlights its own exceptionalism. Meanwhile debates about China abandoning their exceptionalism and seeking the same goals as the West have also been doing the rounds.

Sources of Indian Exceptionalism

While India and China consider themselves exceptional there are certain explanations for their belief that they often present in their domestic discourses and on occasions at international forums. For both the states the awareness and conviction of being exceptional comes from their own history and ancient ideas that can be listed and discussed for better understanding.

Ancient Philosophy and Spirituality

India has reaped in its reputation of being an ancient civilization and the coffer of ancient philosophy and texts. Indians often insist that their land is the birthplace of many religions including —Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism. Many Indians believe that Hinduism is the oldest religion in the world and is responsible for creating the concepts of ancient science and traditions—Yoga, Ayurveda, Vastu Shashtra, Astrology (Jyotish), Vedanta, circle of rebirth (Karma), concept of reincarnation of soul (Atman). Sanskrit, one of the living ancient languages in the world is also said to have originated in India and some of the oldest texts have been written in the language. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) a Right-wing Hindu organization that often gains traction when Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) gains political power in India, has long preached about the Hindu distinctiveness and superiority.

Kate Sullivan (2014:6) quotes M.S. Golwalkar, the second 'Sarsanghchalak' or supreme leader of RSS after it was founded in 1925, propounding Hindu superiority. He believed, says Kate Sullivan that Hinduism had a special capacity, on the basis of the "generosity, toleration, truth, sacrifice and love for all life of the common Hindu

mind, to lead the world spiritually. Indeed, the ‘illustrious’ Hindu religion was ‘the only Religion in the world worthy of being so denominated’” (Golwalkar 1939). Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi led BJP came to power in 2014, RSS has again attempted to gain a foothold in the domestic discourse. RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat has highlighted the superiority and greatness of the Hindu religion (Singh 2017). He has also highlighted the indispensability of Hinduism and people living in India, claiming, “Anybody living in India is a Hindu” and “The Muslims in India are also Hindus” (Times of India 2017). However despite his political motives, Bhagwat has attempted to turn the attention to India’s potential of being a ‘*jagat guru*’ or world teacher. Invoking spiritual leaders and India’s rich heritage he has stressed.” While Modi has made similar attempts, in 1893, at the Parliament of the World's Religions in Chicago, Swami Vivekanand had similarly stressed, citing text from the Indian religious book, Gita:

The present convention, which is one of the most august assemblies ever held, is in itself a vindication, a declaration to the world of the wonderful doctrine preached in the Gita: ‘Whosoever comes to Me, through whatsoever form, I reach him; all men are struggling through paths which in the end lead to me’ (Vivekanand 1893:1).

Freedom Struggle and Nationalism

A long history of freedom struggle and construction of an inclusive national identity with a strong sense of nationalism also became reasons that strengthened the belief of Indians that they are exceptional. Moreover, the nature of the freedom struggle especially the non-violent methods, made India distinct and enhanced its moral capital in the world. According to Kate Sullivan (2014:644), three “prominent discourses of Indian nationalism emerged and circulated in the early twentieth century.” The first was Mohandas Karahchand Gandhi’s (1869-1948) idea of India, which focused on forming a territory which was inclusive and ensured equality for all religious communities. The second, Jawaharlal Nehru’s (1889-1964) concept, was more of a modern, and explained the construction of a liberal order that promoted secular individualism, embedded in a glorious heritage and Vedic traditions. The third was that of the Hindu Nationalists like V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966) and M.S. Golwalkar (1906-73).

The father of the nation, Mohandas Karahchand Gandhi categorically rejected the use of force to secure freedom. He associated ‘*swaraj*’ or self-rule as more than a change of government and sought human upliftment, which could not be achieved through

violence. He emphasized that India was a holy land and he did not want arms to be used, making a clear distinction between the European colonizers strategy and that of Indians (Gandhi 1921:49). Moreover, concepts like '*satyagraha*' — a non-violent attempt to change the hearts of opponents through self-suffering, '*swadesh*' use of indigenous products and promotion of khadi, a handspun cloth, made the Indian freedom struggle unique and not only got India international recognition but domestically a higher sense of self.

In Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* (1938:49) meaning home rule, he explained that certain "irreligiousness" had crept in India under the rule of the British, clarifying that he wasn't referring to any particular religion but to Indians turning away from the path of God. By claiming so, Gandhi was making a distinction between the British and Indians wherein he considered the former morally depleted. In the same work Gandhi argues that the British claim that India was not a 'nation' before they colonized is spurious. Emphasizing India's plurality he explained that India was a nation even before the Mughals came as its identity was not dependent on a particular religion but was inclusive. The sages and spiritual teachers laid the foundation of India long back. He says:

If the Hindus believe that India should be peopled only by Hindus, they are living in dreamland. Hindus, Mohammedans, Parsees and Christians who have made India their country are fellow countrymen and they will have to live in unity if only for their own interests. In no part of the world are one nationality and one-religion synonymous terms nor has it ever been in India (Gandhi 1921:49)

Jawaharlal Nehru's version of nationalism by contrast sought Western recognition. It was liberal and sought parity with the Western nations by progressing and investing in technology. Nehru (1946: 52-53) said, "nationalism was and is inevitable in the India of my day; it is a natural and healthy growth... the intellectual strata of the middle classes were gradually moving away from nationalism." He sought morality with modernity, and wanted India to lead especially the developing world. After independence Nehru was personally invested in projects that sought to recognize the East and its contributions. He was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group that advocated and supported newly independent and developing Asian and African states to be able to maintain their own foreign and security policy without aligning with any of the major power blocs of the time.

Savarkar associated India's national identity with the religion of Hinduism. He also discussed integration and assimilation of non-Hindus into the religion. In a 1928 pamphlet titled, "Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?", he said "Hindu is someone who regards India as both a fatherland and a holy land" (The Economist 2014:2). While, Golwalkar was critical of territorial nationalism, he believed that India's special feature came from the caste system. He said,

We know as a matter of history..that our north-western and north-eastern areas, where the influence of Buddhism had disrupted the caste system, fell an easy prey to the onslaught of Muslims.... But the areas of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, which were considered to be very orthodox and rigid in caste restrictions, remained predominantly Hindu even after remaining the very citadels of Muslim power and fanaticism (The Mint 2017:3)

Though criticized by liberals, he had staunch views about India's identity and nationalism deriving from the caste system and cow-love. RSS still abides by many of the principles he preached.

Sources of Chinese Exceptionalism

China has underlined its exceptionalism at the international forums much more than India in the last few decades. Since it argues that there are certain Chinese 'characteristics' in its policies and aspirations, it has become important for academics as well as the state to explain and define China's exceptionalism. The sense of self and past achievements make the Chinese more aware of their exceptional status.

Ancient history and heavenly authority

The Chinese perception of their own greatness comes from how they view history and their own position in it. The Chinese view themselves as being the focus of the world. The general discourse in China is that their land has been "chosen by Heaven." China or '*Zhongguo*' translates to the 'middle kingdom' or 'the central state' which is the "center of the known world and superior to other polities culturally, morally, and materially" (Zhang 2011:308). While some argue that when China calls itself as the master of the middle kingdom it is referring to being the legal ruler of the entire world. The middle kingdom being in the middle, with the sky above and the underworld below, being the other two kingdoms of the universe.

While Zhang (2011: 305) acknowledges that there could be a significant extent of 'myth making' in the 'sino-centric conception', however through persistence of the

leaders and state-institutions the discourse has been established. In fact, Benjamin Ho (2011: 166) argues that according to Chiang Kai-shek, “the name Central Kingdom was not just a geographical and cultural concept but was also loaded with political meaning. It was said that whoever controlled Zhongguo, the Central Kingdom, would be the legitimate ruler over *tianxia*.” Heaven, the domestic discourse believes, grants the Chinese rulers the mandate to rule, as they are the ‘Sons of Heaven’.

Confucianism in diplomacy and foreign policy

Confucianism presents the most potent source of moral authority and, to some extent, administrative control to the rulers. Statecraft based on Confucianism is often understood as based on ethics and morals, unlike the Western version driven by the *realpolitik* pressures. Echoing Confucius ideals the Chinese leaders have called for pacifism and harmony. Zhang Feng (2011: 305) explains that many Chinese scholars believe that the foreign and security policy of several emperors including those from the Ming dynasty was to “share the fortune of peace”. Confucianism also calls for principles like “*tianxia weigong*”, meaning the whole world as one community (Schell 2008:5). While, contemporary leaders like Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and even Xi Jinping have invoked Confucianism in their speeches, Mao Zedong was critical of Confucianism. During the Maoist era, a wave of anti-Confucianism was noticeable, which finally culminated in Cultural Revolution. However, when Deng Xiaoping began the reforms, Confucianism regained popularity among the leaders as well as the public (Hu 2007:139). According to some scholars it cannot be said that Mao Zedong’s completely dismissed Confucianism (Boer 2015:37). However, Deng Xiaoping reinstated it, and even reintroduced traditional Confucian concepts like the civil service examination (Hu 2007:142).

In Hu Jintao's report at the 18th Party Congress he emphasized that China diplomatic objective was to continue to “promote the noble cause of peace and development of mankind” (Hu 2012:20). In a 2011 book titled, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, an eminent Chinese intellectual, Yan Xuetong argued that the moral authority is essential for improving the standing of a state through its foreign policy. Since assuming power, Xi Jinping has introduced a foreign policy with his own principles, popularly called, “Chinese Foreign Policy With Xi Jinping Characteristics.” Xie Tao argues:

No Chinese leader, ancient or contemporary, has attracted so many foreign leaders to the Middle Kingdom. Over the course of just five years, Xi hosted five major summits....What's more, no Chinese leader has done more globe-trotting within such a short time...Xi introduced four new concepts into Chinese foreign policy:...No Chinese leader has been more successful in keeping foreign observers busy analyzing the meaning and implications of these concepts. (Xie 2017:1)

However, Xi Jinping who has been hailed for his distinct and unprecedented diplomacy has also invoked Confucius in the conduct of his diplomacy and foreign policy. In a speech titled, "Exploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy With Chinese Characteristics" in 2013, Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained foreign policy with Chinese or Xi Jinping's characteristics. Though he listed many new additions to the foreign policy of China under Xi Jinping who assumed office in 2012, he also invoked Confucius to elucidate the government's stand, he said:

Over 2,000 years ago, China's great philosopher Confucius said, "the virtue of the sage will last long and the cause of the sage will thrive". To promote peace and development of mankind is just such a lofty and everlasting cause. We will actively explore major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, make joint efforts with people of other countries and work for the establishment of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity (Wang 2013:4).

The examples clarify that China has grounded its discourse in its years old history, traditions and practices. This makes it different from the West, lending it a sense of its exceptional achievements as well as sense of self.

Conclusion

In the last few decades when China meteoric rise has become notable, the topic has been widely discussed. Compared to India, the literature on China is more prolific in the field of International Relations. Owing to its different political structures, Beijing often finds itself explaining its own special features. With institutional control over media, universities and academic platforms, backed by significant investment in promoting its aspiration of rise, it has been able to make international audience aware of its exceptionalism, more than India has. In fact, for India sometimes strength also comes from having similar political organizations like democracy and value-system as the West. Hence, India's exceptionalism is more about emerging as a world teacher, with a moral conscience superior to the West.

The belief of one's own exceptionalism is not confined to Eastern states. In a similar vein, the US in the 19th century claimed that it had a 'manifest destiny' and was ordained by God to expand through the continent and spread democracy and

capitalism. However, the Eastern exceptionalism is grounded in centuries of history that has been repeated by leaders so often that it has become a significant part of their domestic discourse. Often the pride of being some of the oldest civilizations is tied with the sense of being special and lamenting that the deserving status has not yet been allotted to them by the international society. The Indian and Chinese reactions denouncing sanctions on self are also the result of hurt pride. Sanctions are seen as coercion used by strong powers on weaker ones, hence the domestic discourses on sanctions in both the states challenge the relegated position that being a sanctionee brings them.

Indian and Chinese leaders and scholars also explain their own exceptionalism in relative terms. They establish their special status by comparing their history, philosophy or actions to that of the West. In the process they gradually infer that they are superior to the Western powers. Concurrently the argument is supported by their experience of colonialism, which was oppressive and extractive, establishing their own moral and ethical superiority when compared to their colonizers. In the situation, sanctions become a new means to practice imperialism, through which the former colonizers are able to not only consign a low status to the former colonies but also harm them again by either punishing them or denying them of something of value. Hence, sanctions become another means for the Western imperial powers to assert their power on the Asian states.

There is also a measure of myth making involved in each state's discourse on its own exceptionalism. New Delhi and Beijing might be invoking their past experiences and heritage to cite that their approach is embedded in pacifism or their rise would be peaceful, however their practical policies could be similar to that of their colonizers. For instance Chapter two discussed that even though India and China do not always acknowledge, nevertheless they have imposed sanctions on other states to achieve their foreign and security policy ends. Moreover, as China is rising and attaining a stronger position in international politics it is also becoming assertive and securing its own interests through sanctions. Beijing's 2012 veto on action against the Syrian government is an important example. India's is not as powerful as China in global politics, however its approach could also be similar in the coming decades.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Hans J. Morgenthau, in his seminal work, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, explained the fifth principle of Realism:

All nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another ... On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them (Morgenthau 1978:13).

Morgenthau's fifth principle aptly explains the Indian and Chinese cases. While both the states have been guided by their post-imperial ideology, which has often been noticed in their muscular state-discourse, they have not completely dismissed other inclinations. Unlike the US, Indian and Chinese foreign and security policies are not clearly defined which leaves them more room to manoeuvre. However, the two rising Asian states often gain from asserting especially domestically, that their policy is different than that of their colonizers. Nevertheless, pragmatism has not been completely dismissed by their leaders and often becomes the most pressing reason for making a particular decision.

Acknowledging the above assertion, this chapter concludes the study by garnering the significant points examined. It begins by discussing the major debates concerning sanctions in International Relations literature today. Particularly examining sanctions use for the purpose of changing nuclear behaviour of states. It makes an allusion to the liberal school literature, which is applicable to sanctions as many scholars explain sanctions response as a factor of their connectivity and assimilation in the world economy. It provides a brief outline of the themes discussed in each chapters and outlines and tests the hypotheses, forwarded at the beginning of the study. The chapter concludes the study by discussing the problems faced while conducting research on the topic and identifying future avenues of research related to the topic.

Understanding Sanctions and Nuclear Behaviour: Current Debates

Over the years, states and international organizations have profusely used sanctions as their preferred tool in the conduct of international relations. Before examining sanctions use to change nuclear behaviour, it is important to recapitulate important

debates concerning sanctions. The reasons to impose sanctions have ranged from merely signalling displeasure, appeasing domestic constituencies to causing definite monetary harm to the target state. Of late the implementation of sanctions has also become an issue of debate. It is increasingly being accepted that multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral ones. However, the subject is more complex than it seems. Many studies have inferred that the impact of sanctions is greater if imposed by a state or an entity with close political or economic relations with the target—with pre-sanctions trade between sanctioner and sanctionee determining the “terms-of-trade effects of the sanctions” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007:872). Thus more the connectedness more the impact of sanctions.

At the beginning of the study, sanctions were defined as coercive measures imposed by one state, or coalition of states, against another state, its government or individual entities to bring about a change in behaviour or policies. The definition laid emphasis on a “change in behavior” which would be brought about when sanctions have an impact. However the argument is not necessarily valid. Ensuring compliance entails much more than impact. Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter is to build on the previous chapters and evaluate the Indian and Chinese discourse on sanctions. While explaining sanctions, Cortright and Lopez for instance, have put forward three questions to determine the level of their success:

Firstly, did sanctions help to convince the targeted regime to comply at least partially with the senders’ demands? Secondly, did sanctions contribute to an enduring, successful bargaining process leading to a negotiated settlement? Lastly, did sanctions help to isolate or weaken the military power of an abusive regime? (Cortright and Lopez 2002:7)

While answering the three questions would help in understanding the success or failure of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, determining the answers to the questions would be a complex process. With interest groups and diaspora spread around the world, states face different pressures while formulating their foreign policies. Sometimes, sanctions are also a way to demonstrate action and the motive could be appeasement of domestic constituencies rather than an impact on the target. To use sanctions as a potent policy tool it is important to understand them; their functioning, implementation and finally impact that can bring about compliance.

The liberal theory implies that interdependent states are likely to make concessions and bow down to an international boycott and pressure, and therefore sanctions (Keohane and Nye 1989:10). Many International Relations thinkers from the Liberal school of thought have delved into the subject of economic interdependence and compliance. In the book, *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, Helen V. Milner and Robert Keohane argue, “domestic politics should show signs of the impact of the world economy” (Milner and Keohane 1996:13). According to them, internationalization^{*}, has an “effect on opportunities, constraints and policy preferences of social and economic actors”. Constraints as well as opportunities arise for governments as their sensitivity and vulnerability to external changes alter. The incentive structure changes with the change in the level of openness. Institutions are also modified to suit the change. India is one such case. After opening the economy, there were noticeable changes in the institutions as well as social and economic choices of actors in India. Some liberals also explain that an “exogenous easing of trade increases the impact of the international economy on national politics” (Frieden and Rogowski 1996:46). Change is expected and associated with an increase in the domestic political salience of international economic issues.

Another widely discussed topic in liberal theory of International Relations is interdependence and dependence, which also has implications in the study of sanctions. In economics the concept of dependence is understood in terms of the “opportunity costs of foregoing trade” (Baldwin 1980:479). However, International Relations scholars have discussed dependence and interdependence with reference to self-sufficiency and the vulnerability of a state to alterations in certain kinds of international relationships, especially trade. In fact, according to William E. Rappard (1930:261) during World War I, the costs of breaking off trade were so high that two states on opposing sides engaged in trade. Today there is a distinction between “sensitivity interdependence,” defined in terms of mutual “effects,” and “vulnerability interdependence,” explained in terms of the opportunity costs of disrupting the relationship (Baldwin 1980: 490).

^{*}In the study internationalization refers to the “processes generated by underlying shifts in transaction costs that produce observable flows of goods, services, and capita.”

Etel Solingan in her book, *Nuclear Logics* examines the same topic, perhaps with a different approach. She argues that “globalization, international institutions, norms, and democratization” have deepened our understanding of different logics that can explain nuclear choices of a state (Solingan 2007: ix). Nuclear choices cannot be understood and explained by only considering international power. The relationship between “regime and state security, or internal and external political survival” is significant while analysing nuclear choices, and therefore sanctions response. Solingen squarely underscores, “domestic models of political survival and their orientations to the global political-economy have implications for nuclear trajectories.” Governments that advocate economic integration in the global economy have “incentives to avoid the costs of nuclearization” as it damages domestic reform that favours internationalization. While for inward-looking governments and regimes which do not depend on international markets, investments, technology and institutions, the cost of nuclearization is not as high. They use their nuclear programs at nationalist platforms and base their political survival on them (Solingen 2007:17). Political survival models provide valuable insights on the evolution of nuclear trajectories (Solingan 2007:19). See table 6.1.

Solingen, has given four scenarios or rather models of political survival and nuclear outcomes, which have implications for sanctions reactions.

Table 6.1 Models of political survival and nuclear outcomes

	Internationalizing	Inward –looking
Denuclearization	1 Compatible	2 Anomaly
Nuclearization	3. Anomaly	4 Compatible

Source: Etel Solingan (2007), *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East*. *Nuclear Logics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.p. 287

When there is internationalization, the possibility of denuclearization increases, making the first scenario compatible. However, the second situation wherein an inward-looking regime has a bent towards denuclearization is an anomaly, as economic

connectivity is still deciding the policy preferences. The third scenario in which an internationalized state chooses to nuclearize also goes beyond the understanding of the liberal tenets making it another anomaly. The fourth scenario when an inward-looking regime decides to nuclearize is understandable, for they have an incentive and no opportunity cost of nuclearization (Solingen 2007:287).

Their response to sanctions could also be determined similarly, “if states expect that sanctions are likely and too costly to endure, they may abstain from nuclear proliferation in the first place” (Miller 2014:4). In a similar vein Drezner notes, “It is quite likely that potential targets try to comply with US demands before the articulation of a threat...There may...be instances in which a target refrains from acting against the sender’s preferences because of the anticipation of sanctions” (Drezner 2003:653). The insight goes to show that the policy on sanctions cannot be governed by the understanding—one-size fits all. Understanding states with nuclear aspirations as similar actors could lead to policy failure.

Sanctions and Coercion

While coercion continues to be a significant tool of statecraft, economic connectedness has considerably altered its form. Economic coercion—often in the form of sanctions, has become a noteworthy tool of foreign policy. Ironically, this form of coercion does not only enjoy efficacy in the present world order, but also legitimacy, which its former variants lacked. Economic interconnectedness among states has enhanced the effectiveness of sanctions and simultaneously made the states vulnerable to it. Of all the instruments of economic coercion, sanctions are the most popular. State and non-state actors are increasingly using sanctions to change the nuclear policies or behaviour of the sanctionees.

Multilateral and unilateral sanctions have also been discussed widely. However after examining the studies it seems obvious that it is not about how many entities impose sanctions but who are the entities that have imposed sanctions—sanctions would work more on a friend than an enemy. Making a friend comply would be easier as the target would be more interconnected, hence more vulnerable. There would be an incentive to cooperate while a disincentive to break ties with the friend. In case of an enemy, the

interactions would already be negligible, hence an enemy's boycott would not hurt or make it comply.

In recent times, emphasis has been laid on making the 'sanctions bite'. However the main aim of sanctions is to alter the policy of the target. Impact cannot always persuade an actor to change its actions, but many other factors which concern the nature and type of the target have a role to play. Usually general rules are followed to sanction states. Once a domestic law is passed it is applied on all the targets alike. However states are different, with different sensibilities and orientations. What has an effect on one state is not an antidote for all. To make sanctions potent and enhance their efficacy it is important to understand and then prescribe. There is a need to mould sanctions and sanction regimes to suit particular target and plug loopholes. Immense collateral damage has been cited in North Korea and Iran owing to careless imposition of sanctions. Talks of making the sanctions smart have also gained limelight, however to secure the desired result it is not only important to get a number of actors on board, but make the actors and states that matter the most to the target to support and abide by sanction regimes.

While learning the general debates on sanctions is important, the purpose of this study is to examine nonproliferation sanctions from the perspective of India and China. Before further analysis is made it is important to look into significant events that changed India's position in the nonproliferation regime. The signing of the India-US nuclear deal in 2008 and the subsequent NSG waiver were the turning point.

Indian Acceptance in Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

India has been considered as an outlier in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. However its status has changed after it signed the India-US nuclear deal in 2008 and thereafter received the NSG waiver. Indeed it was on July 18, 2005 that India was declared a 'responsible state with advanced nuclear technology'. Since the release of Manmohan Singh-George Bush joint statement on July 18, 2005, the world seemed to be deeply engaged and interested in knowing the proceedings and outcome of Indo-US nuclear negotiations. The prospect of two established democracies navigating their domestic political processes and international institutions to adjust more than three-decade-old nuclear order was indeed intriguing. For the US, geopolitical

considerations with respect to China were on mind besides the prospect of engaging with the biggest democracy with an influential and well-placed diaspora (Perkovich 2010:22).

For India the deal was a middle path between a “virtually autarkic nuclear programme, and a programme, which totally surrendered to the discriminatory nuclear order” (Mattoo 2005: 3815). India’s post Pokhran I nuclear isolation had impeded its nuclear development. NSG guidelines had not only placed limitations of technology and fuel but also relegated a proud nation to a position where the international community viewed it with suspicion and concern. India gained from the deal in many ways, some of which include the following:

As discussed previously, the aftermath of Pokhran I and II were sanctions, which made it hard for India to secure latest civil nuclear technology, available in the international market. India had set a target of 20,000 Megawatts (MW) of nuclear power by 2020, but in the absence of access to international markets, it was unachievable. Mattoo (2005) termed it the “regime of denial” which had to be “circumvented”. M R Srinivasan, former chairman and later a member of the Atomic Energy Commission explained in an article in *the Hindu*:

India could have gone on with the present situation of nuclear power making steady but slow growth based on Indian pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR), followed by the development of the fast breeder reactor and the eventual use of thorium. This path would mean a relatively small contribution of nuclear power, perhaps increasing from the present 3 per cent to a figure below 10 percent, after two or three more decades (Srinivasan 2015).

Subjectively speaking, India gained international recognition and reputation through the deal. The 2005 Joint Statement declared it a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”. India had always portrayed itself as a morally conscious state. It believed that it was different. Gandhi had termed the nuclear weapons “evil” and Nehru had followed suit after India’s independence and advocated disarmament. Amitabh Mattoo confidently announced in 1996 that India will not test nuclear weapons, giving several arguments ranging from economic costs and benefits to diplomatic gains of being a non-nuclear-weapon state. He also acknowledged the moral reason for India’s abstinence (Mattoo 1996:42-57). Arundhati Ghose, the ambassador and permanent representative of India to the UN, while negotiating CTBT had reasoned, that India’s stand on nuclear issues was a product of its “unique

historical experiences”. That India’s promotion of the goal of total nuclear disarmament predated the nuclearization of China (Ghose 1997:2). In the years following independence, India’s leaders followed an ethical approach to foreign policy in general and nuclear issues in particular.

Since India established its place despite the disapprovals and later signed nuclear-agreement with other states, proves that it is no longer the nuclear outlier that it started out as. The former ‘sanctionee’ had now been accepted in the sanction regime that had been initially conceptualized to punish and deny it. This study has attempted to discuss the same in the context of both India and China and underlined salient themes through the chapters.

Salient themes in Indian and Chinese discourses on Sanctions

Though this study deals with India and China, it realises that the existing literature on sanctions is more for the latter. It also calls for more study on the Indian perspective on sanctions, as the topic is important. Explaining the concept of sanctions from an *Indian and Chinese perspective is challenging*. As India and China rise and gain more power at international forums, it becomes important to analyse how the two states understand international issues. Nuclear proliferation and the use of sanctions to achieve the end are some of them. There have been no incisive study on the topic and no empirical work that can spearhead further research, keeping it in mind the study attempted to list the instances, which concern India, China and sanctions. The study found that looking at India and China comparatively is significant. Both the states have different political structures, yet their economies are growing fast and making them vital actors in international politics. Their response to unilateral sanctions have been similar, as both favour-unrestricted trade. The study also attempted to follow a different approach of explaining the topic— beginning each chapter by narrating an instance; it seeks to bring out the argument in an intelligible way.

The study took an approach different from the existing literature and dominant perspectives on sanctions. It discussed many themes that have been previously overlooked. Firstly it establishes that *India and China are also sanctioners*. The understanding that —West is the sanctioner and India and China the sanctioned states, is incorrect. Though the nature of sanctions placed by India and China are different

than the West, sanctions have been and are a part of their policy-tool-kit. Listing and individually discussing the episodes when Beijing and New Delhi imposed sanctions, the argument is substantiated. Hufbauer et al (2008), have previously prepared intensive data, providing details of as many as 170 sanctions cases. However, for India and China the list is insufficient, as the two states often do not acknowledge having imposed sanctions. An attempt is made to compensate and update the data by compiling major instances that have been reported since the 1940s. India's sanction use has also often been symbolic with an aim to convey its stand rather than harming the target state. For example in the 1930s, Indian National Congress (INC), called for sanctions on Japan, to protest its invasion of China.

The study *recounted various episodes concerning sanctions*, for instance a case in 2012, when during a BRICS summit the representatives of both India and China expressed their disregard for unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran, however the same sentiment did not find a mention in the BRICS statement. Hence the ambiguity that exists in the Indian and Chinese stance on sanctions is also acknowledged, throughout the study. Further, there exists a vagueness in the Indian and Chinese stance on sanctions as both New Delhi and Beijing have to factor in their own interests. They are aware of the fact that sanctions are an important tool of statecraft and they might have opposed sanctions-use of Western states, however the tool has utility. The realisation exists, even in the absence of public acceptance of using or having used sanctions. Hence not surprisingly Indian minister Salman Khurshid in 2012 remarked: "Don't we all use economic muscle?"

When asserting that India and China have imposed sanctions it also becomes clear that the way they apply sanctions is different from the Western powers. Hence the study argues that *Western sanctions are different from the Non-Western*. It discussed how Western states and international organizations often have laws and clear procedures to sanction states and other entities, but New Delhi and Beijing do not. In fact, the two states often do not acknowledge when they impose sanctions, even though their actions qualify as sanctions. However, there have been times when the two states were not reticent about their sanctions use. This has happened when the issues sparking sanctions have been of concern to domestic constituencies. For instance when India imposed sanctions on South Africa, and Fiji, it was to lend support to its diaspora—a

cause that stuck a chord with the domestic public. Hence the Indian government announced the sanctions. Domestic constituencies in China, on the other hand have supported a muscular policy, often making it easy for Beijing to justify its actions. As the list showed China is increasingly using sanctions to secure its national interests, which are often in the form of settling territorial disputes. Hence, it is using sanctions to secure them—Taiwan, Tibet and now maritime disputes are examples. In the situation, with a newfound assertive nature, it has become easier for China to justify the sanctions that it has placed.

It can be noticed that New Delhi and China *seldom accept when they impose sanctions* on states. In the context of India and China, another point that should be noted is that *Western states have imposed sanctions on them*. Beijing and New Delhi, have for decades called out to the West for its discriminatory policies, talking from a moral and ethical standpoint. Hence, proclaiming that they have imposed sanctions, especially the ones used to pursue their own interests would not be acceptable to the public. Moreover, sanctions often bring collateral damage, and many of the sanctions imposed by India and China have caused tremendous civilian inconveniences, particularly in the case of Indian sanctions against Nepal; and Chinese sanctions on Philippines. Though by declaring sanctions, or formalizing them through laws, New Delhi and Beijing might be able secure a deterrent effect—potential targets could change their behaviour owing to the threat of sanctions. Nevertheless, that would entail accepting having imposed sanctions, which would be detrimental to the image that India and China aspire to present internationally. It would relegate them to the position of their own sanctioners and erode their own moral capital.

The study provides a comprehensive description of sanctions conceptualization and their use for the purpose of checking nuclear proliferation. It has attempted to *explain the Nonproliferation regime*, arguing that it has its flaws, which has made states defect or dismiss the NPT. However, since the case studies are India and China, it has been noted that they have had different experience with the nonproliferation regime. China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, while India first tested in 1974—making the former a nuclear weapons state according to the NPT provisions, yet denying the same status to the latter since it tested post 1968. India is also not a member of the NSG, while China is. This becomes a stark difference between the two Asian states,

influencing their nuclear decisions as well as the response of Western states to their nuclear activities.

Moreover, the Indian and Chinese *understanding of nuclear weapons and other materials is also different*. Indian leaders like Gandhi and Nehru considered nuclear weapons “evil”. Their psyche had an impact on a generation of Indian leaders, who were conscious of exporting nuclear material and supporting nuclear proliferation in any way. However, China did not have many inhibitions in dealing with nuclear materials and technology and saw it as another economic opportunity. Their sensibilities to nuclear matters also reflect in the sanctions that have been imposed on the two states. While India has generally been sanctioned for building its own nuclear facilities, China has invited Western sanctions for its dealings with other states and entities. Another aspect that should be looked into is that the states, which have been the beneficiaries of China’s nuclear trade, have been its friends or allies. For the US, however they have often been enemies, hence it has condemned China’s actions vehemently and often by using sanctions on it.

The study narrated the instances when sanctions were imposed on India and China. While compiling a detailed list was one of the reasons to add this section, bringing out and discussing obscure instances, which are not well known, was also an objective. For instance, the US denial of a super computer of a high power to India in 1992 has been a hurtful episode for the Indian scientific community and left an indelible impact on the psyche of Indian officials, particularly working in the science and technology sectors. However not many outside the circle know about the case. Also the study provides a list of the laws used by the US to sanction China. In the Indian case not many laws have been used to apply sanctions on India, though the first law was conceptualized following India’s nuclear test.

In spite of different reasons sparking nonproliferation sanctions against India and China, their *reactions have been similar*. For instance both Vajpayee and Mao in 1989 and 1998, while taking a strong stance against sanctions imposed on them said that their countries would not relent and would fight back. While China has seen nuclear technology in a pragmatic way, India has been inhibited. During the first nuclear test, India added the epithet “peaceful” to the nuclear explosion to gain social acceptability

for the test among the domestic audience as well as not cause concern internationally. Nevertheless, in the Indian case a change has been noticed in its response to sanctions. When New Delhi tested again in 1998, it did not feel the need to term it “peaceful” again and stuck to a pragmatic policy. Meanwhile, China has also at times decided to understand the US security concerns and made attempts to evade sanctions by changing its policies and offering pledges. However, the Chinese leaders have often felt the need to maintain a muscular rhetoric in the public discourse, often making strong statements asking the US to change its policies and going as far as to say that the US is making a “mistake” by sanctioning Chinese entities.

The *muscular rhetoric is a similarity* to some extent, in the response of both the states. India and China have not cowed down by sanctions in the domestic discourse. They have viewed their actions from a moral standpoint. Their post-imperial ideology, discussed in chapter 5 has influenced their response to sanctions. Sanctions have also been termed as “intellectual colonialism” (Chellaney 1993: 64) by some Indian scholars.

Another difference that can be observed and needs to be stressed through this study is that unlike in the Indian case, *a number of sanctions have been imposed on China*. Hence Beijing has dealt with the issue since a long time and devised a set of reactions to sanctions, which are often predictable and critical of the West. As India increases its economic engagement with the world it might share its opinion on sanctions more often. Its involvement on comparatively lesser number of cases has made it possible for India to remain reticent—a luxury that it might have to abandon in the coming decades.

However the study elucidates that Indian and Chinese *reactions to sanctions imposed on other states* are different, compared to their response to sanctions that have been imposed on them. While promoting nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is not an overt foreign policy goal of either Beijing or New Delhi, they have not completely dismissed the use of sanctions to change nuclear behavior of states. Both New Delhi and Beijing have denounced nuclear proliferation at international forums, however the two have not opposed the development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. While the issue is significant for both the states, it has served merely as one of the factors

that influence their decision. The two states while responding to sanctions imposed on Iran, North Korea and Iraq, have been concerned about their own relations with the states. Whether economic interests or political, both have figured in New Delhi and Beijing's calculus while drafting their responses, though often the two states have acknowledged their own dislike towards unilateral sanctions.

Geopolitical changes have also had an effect on the reactions as has their own security concerns. New Delhi and Beijing have not been able to take a stand on sanctions in isolation. International obligations have also found a place, as both the states are aspirational and wish for a higher status in the arena of international politics. In the case of nuclear proliferation, they do not want to be dismissive of its risks to world peace. It is often argued that China supports North Korea and engages with the state in spite of the sanctions imposed on it. However, it cannot be denied that while deciding to cooperate or not cooperate with sanctions regime against North Korea, China has to factor in its own security concerns. The stability of North Korean government also has an effect on China's security. Beijing is aware that, instability in North Korea could spillover into China. Hence crippling Pyongyang through sanctions is not in China's interest. At the same time, rapid nuclear proliferation cannot go unnoticed—the situation poses a dilemma for Beijing as it attempts to balance its own interests and obligations regarding North Korea.

Having been in the shoes of a sanctionee, it would appear that empathy might have a role to play when sanctions on other states are concerned. However, though the rhetoric has often been sympathetic to the target state's situation, both New Delhi and Beijing have had other concerns while reacting to sanctions on other states. New Delhi and Beijing have also devised ways to *evade sanctions*. With US' meticulous sanction regimes like in the case of Iran, sanctions are pervasive. However the two states managed to find ways to engage with Iran without coming under the purview of US laws. Though some of the Chinese and Indian companies were sanctioned by the US, Beijing and New Delhi did not completely end engagement with Iran. Their support to sustain the sanction regime was acknowledged by the US, and it granted them sanction waivers.

India and China are part of the group BRICS. As the BRICS members are emerging powers with fastest growing economies, the group's voice has become important in international affairs. Realizing the same, since 2013 sanctions have been mentioned every year in its annual statements. Leaders have also felt the need to individually articulate their stand on sanctions, as sometimes sanctions are also imposed against the group's own members. BRICS has maintained that it supports the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and not for weapons. Hence it took a stand against unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran. However there is ambiguity involved in BRICS stands as each member realizes its own dependence on the US—the state that led the international sanctions regime against Iran. Each state did attempt to evade secondary sanctions and cooperated to some extent. Hence even though BRICS took a stand together against unilateral sanctions, it was unable to follow it in full measure, as individual interests dictated each state.

As elucidated in the study is a specific behavior associated with colonial states as they frequently acquire a *post-imperial ideology (IIP)*. They understand their own position as that of a victim, invoking discourse of oppression and subjugation. Further, having experienced territorial control, they are conscious of maintaining the sanctity of their territory and also often aim to recover any territory lost to colonizers. Status—gain as well as maintenance becomes significant for them and they shape their policies and actions to achieve the end (Miller 2013: 25). Examining the sanctions reactions of India and China elucidated in chapter 3, it seems likely that their PII is influencing their response to sanctions imposed on them.

When reacting to unilateral sanctions New Delhi and Beijing have often pointed at their “*extra-territoriality*.” Having experienced colonialism they have become sensitive to their sovereignty, which is observable from their reactions to sanctions. As Miller (2013: 4) points out, “maximizing territorial sovereignty and maximizing status” is an objective of a state with a post –imperial ideology. In 1989 when Deng Xiaoping said, “China is victimized... The Chinese people will not beg for the cancellation of sanctions, even if they last 100 years” (Deng as quoted in Yan 2002:12), a “sense of victimization” that Miller (2013) mentions was also observable. Similarly India's post-imperial ideology was discernable, when in 1998, Vajpayee said, “..We have to face the consequence and overcome the challenge.... Sanctions

cannot and will not hurt us. India will not be cowed down by any such threats and punitive step” (India Today 1998). Additionally as pointed in chapter 3, India and China have both challenged the fairness of sanctions and in the process defied the world order.

While PII has been successful in explaining the reactions of India and China to sanctions, what cannot be denied is that those were the reactions to sanctions and the state rhetoric. *‘Response’ is different than ‘reaction’* as the former is based on logic and analysis not always shared immediately. *‘Reaction’* on the other hand is not well thought out and is promptly shared. Both India and China have not been irrational while responding to sanctions. While the two have reacted strongly against sanctions imposed on them, the discourse has often been for domestic consumption. China for instance, many times gave assurances to the US to change its policy of exporting nuclear material to Pakistan and North Korea in order to evade the US sanctions. Similarly, post India’s second nuclear test Vajpayee reacted, “There is simply no other alternative. No price is high enough when it comes to securing national interests. We must be ready to face any eventuality” (India Today 1998). However he later reasoned and responded, “My Government will present India's case before the international community-both bilaterally and in multilateral bodies. I am confident our argument will be appreciated by more and more people” (India Today 1998).

Alternative paradigm?

The study attempts to answer some questions outlined in the introduction chapter. While doing so it also touched on various topics central to the study of sanctions as well as the discourses in India and China. The first hypotheses, that “Indian and Chinese discourse on sanctions have evolved with time and become an important influence in the development of international sanctions”, has been proved valid. As the study earlier noted, Indian and Chinese leaders and scholars have discussed sanctions extensively for many decades. While debates on sanctions have come up with sanctions imposed on India and China, they have also been addressed in other contexts. Leaders have even contemplated sanctions use and also understood well the potential of sanctions as an instrument of statecraft. The leaders however, maintain a post-imperial ideology, which often surfaces in their reaction to sanctions, nevertheless there is a reticent approval.

The assertion that sanctions discourse has evolved also becomes apparent as India and China are using sanctions to support their foreign and security policy goals more than before, especially China. In the Chinese context, Yan Xuetong (2002: 186) said “rationality means finding a balance between rights and obligations or responsibilities. For example, since developed countries assert a right to impose sanctions against other countries for their human rights violations, they should provide capital to these countries to help improve the human rights situation and also their prison facilities and conditions.” However, sanctions of different types have become a quick recourse for Beijing of late. In the last few years Beijing has placed diplomatic sanctions on celebrity singers like Katy Perry and famous international models Gigi Hadid, Adriana Lima, Kate Grigorieva , Julia Belyakova, and Irina Sharipova for hurting the sentiments of the Chinese people (BBC 2017b). The action contradicts Beijing’s alleged stand on sanctions, however proves the first hypothesis of the study. Similarly, India has imposed sanctions on Nepal to support a minority group in the state, by aiding a blockade initiated by them. In the case of Sri Lanka as well, South Indian officials, political parties as well as the public have called on the central government to use sanctions against the Sri Lankan government to protest against its behaviour towards a minority group that has ethnic ties with southern India.

The second hypothesis, i.e “In spite of divergences in the Indian and Chinese discourses on sanctions their approach reflects common themes and has come to represent an alternative paradigm wherein sanctions are less intrusive, adaptive and accommodating of the interests of other states” has also been proved valid. The study enumerated important instances when the West accommodated India and China in the present world order. In the nuclear context, the study discussed several examples. Special laws have been enacted by the US to place sanctions on India and China however, both the states have managed to find a way to mitigate the situation. China’s assurances have been taken seriously by the US and it has many times evaded sanctions. Washington has also become conscious of Beijing’s power as China has also threatened sanctions on the US, while imposed many on states like France. India has been accommodated in the nonproliferation regime through the India-US nuclear deal and the NSG waiver. Despite the criticism, India has been given its due and a *de facto* recognition has been allowed to India in the last decade.

The two have also received several sanction waivers from the US. A Rand study defines waivers as, “instruments with which sanctions can be avoided by means of a Presidential assertion that the national interests override nonproliferation concerns” (Speier et al 2001: ix). Having realised the importance of both India and China in the US national interest, it seems rational for the US to adapt the stand. Hence, the situation and position of the two states have made the Western states accept them in the regimes that were earlier created to penalise or deny India and China. The interests of the two states are also being acknowledged to garner their support to the established regimes. Hence an alternative paradigm is being accepted which is different from the previous one created to punish India and China. Now the regimes are being adopted or created to accommodate the Indian and Chinese stance as their refusal to support the sanctions regime could jeopardize its survival as well as success.

Finally, the study has attempted to answer the question—how do India and China see sanctions as a means of checking nonproliferation? Each chapter deals with a specific issue to help answer this question. It highlights the ambiguities on their stance, as well as the tangible changes that have occurred in the last few decades making India and China more relevant and important than before to international sanction regimes. Given India and China’s history of dealing with sanctions imposed by the West, its need to maintain muscular domestic rhetoric against Western sanctions, attempt to constantly balance their ever growing interests and international obligations while taking stand on sanctions imposed on other states, as well as the empathy that creeps in while drafting the official stance of the state on sanctions—it becomes hard to take a clear stand and provide a definite answer to the question about the perspective of the two states on sanctions. The study concludes that though India and China are guided by various ideologies and inclinations especially its post-imperial ideology, the leaders of the two emerging states deal with sanctions pragmatically.

REFERENCES

(*indicates a primary source)

Abhyankar, Rajendra M (2013), “Maliki’s visit lays ambitious goals”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [Online: web] Accessed 30 July 2014, URL: <https://mea.gov.in/articles -in-in dian-medi a.ht m?d tl/22 137/M alikis+ visit+la ys+a mbitious+goals>

Abraham, Itty (1997) “Science and the making of Postcolonial State”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, August 16-23, 1997. 32 (33): 2136-46

_____ (1999), *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State*, Orient Blackswan, New Delhi.

Adler, Emmanuel (2005), “Constructivism and International Politics” in Carlsnaes Walter ed. *Handbook of International Relations*, Sage Publications; London.

Agrawal, Subhash (2011), “India and the United States: A New Partnership”, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 46 (2): 57-73.

Ahamed, E. (2013), “Nuclear Tests by North Korea”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 13 March 2013: New Delhi [Online: web] Accessed 30 July 2014, URL: <http://www.mea.gov.in/loksab ha.htm?dtl/21 348/Q+2624+N UCLEAR +TE T+BY+NORTH+KOREA>.

Albert, Eleanor (2018), “The China–North Korea Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations, March 28, 2018 [Online: web] Accessed 18 December 2017, URL: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship>

Albright, A David (2005) “India's Military Plutonium Inventory”, End 2004” Institute for Science and International Security, May 7, 2005, Washington, D.C. [Online: web] Accessed 18 December 2017, URL: http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/india_military_plutonium.pdf

Aljazeera (2016) “China 'blocks' Mongolia border after Dalai Lama visit” 10 Dec 2016, [Online: web] Accessed 18 December 2017, URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/china-blocks-mongolia-border-dalai-lama-visit-161210060313417.html>

Anderson, John and Kamran Khan (1998), “Pakistan sets off nuclear blasts”, *The Washington Post*, 29 May 1998, [Online: web] accessed on 29 February 2012, URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/southasia/stories/pakistan052998.htm>

Appadorai, A (1949), “India's Foreign Policy”, *International Affairs*, 25(1): 37-46.

Arms Export Control Act (1976), US Department of State, [Online: web] accessed on

29 February 2012, URL: <https://fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/aeca00.pdf>

Askari, Hossein G. et al. (2003), *Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy*, Praeger Publishers, United States.

Baldwin, David (1985), *Economic Statecraft*, Princeton University Press, 1985, Princeton.

_____ and Pape, Robert A. (1998), “Evaluating Economic Sanctions,” *International Security*, 23 (2), pp. 189–198.

*Baruch, Bernard (1946), “The Baruch Plan”, Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, Atomic Archive [Online: web] Accessed 1 November 2018, URL: <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml>

BBC (1981) “1981: Israel bombs Baghdad nuclear reactor” [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/date stories/june/7/newsid_3014000/3014623.stm

_____ (2010) China resumes rare earth exports to Japan, 24 November, 2010 [Online: web] Accessed 22 July 2015, URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-11826870>

_____ (2017a) India Profile: chronology, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12641776>

_____ (2017b), “Why Katy Perry and Gigi Hadid were missing from Shanghai’s Victoria’s Secret” Grace Tsoi, November 20, 2017.

Behrens, Carl E. (2006), “Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues” CRS report for Congress. Updated January 20, 2006 [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IB10091.pdf>

Bertsch, G.K. (2008) Challenge and change in Chinese export controls and industry compliance. China Centre, 2008: Volume 7, Number 2 Dec 17, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: https://www.chinacenter.net/2008/china_currents/7-2/international-relations-challenge-and-change-in-chinese-export-controls-and-industry-compliance/

Bhagwat, Mohan (2017) as quoted in the *Times of India*, “Anybody living in India is a Hindu: RSS chief”, Dec 17, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/anybody-living-in-india-is-hindu-rss-chief/articleshow/62107639.cms>

Biersteker, Thomas (2014), “Sanctions,” in Joel Krieger, ed. *Oxford Companion to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____ and Eckert, Sue E. (2006), “Strengthening Targeted Sanctions through Fair and Clear Procedures,” Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf (accessed on July 12, 2016).

BJP (2014), Election Manifesto 2014, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL:http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf

Boer, Roland (2015), *Confucius and Chairman Mao: Towards a Study of Religion and Chinese Marxism*. Crisis and Critique 2.1: 36-55.

Bon-Hak Koo.(1992), *Political Economy of Self-Reliance: Juche and Economic Development in North Korea: 1961-1990*. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea.

Borger, Julian (2009), “China Maintains Opposition to Iran Sanctions Ahead of Crucial Meeting,” *The Guardian*, September 24, 2009.

Bradsher, Keith, (2010) “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan” *The New York Times*, September 22, 2010 [Online: web] Accessed 27 August 2016,URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>

_____ (2010), “China to Tighten Limits on Rare Earth Exports”, *The New York Times*, December 28, 2010 [Online: web] Accessed 2 December 2016,URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/29/business/global/29rare.html?_r=0

B.R, Deepak (2001), *India-China Relations in the First Half of the 21st Century*, A.P.H Publishing Corporation, 2001, New Delhi.

BRIC (2009), “Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders”, Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 16, 2009, - [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://brics2016.gov.in/upload/files/document/57566ee059e181stdec.pdf>

BRICS (2010), “Third Summit - Joint Statement”, April 16, 2010, Brasilia- [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:<http://brics2016.gov.in/upload/files/document/5763e23d75e512nd.pdf>

_____ (2011), “Sanya Declaration, 2011”, Sanya, China, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://brics2016.gov.in/upload/files/document/57566e28a911e3rd.pdf>

_____ (2012), “Fourth BRICS Summit - Delhi Declaration” New Delhi, March 29, 2012, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:<http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/19158/Fourth+BRICS+Summit++Delhi+Declaration>

_____ (2013), “Fifth Summit: BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation” Durban, 27 March 2013, [Online: web] Accessed 3

December, 2017, URL:
<http://brics2016.gov.in/upload/files/document/5763be1c4da6e5th1.pdf>

_____ (2014) "Chairperson's Statement on the BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting held on 24 March 2014 in The Hague, Netherlands" March 24, 2014

_____ (2014a), "Sixth BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration, Brazil, 2014, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:<http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/press-releases/214-sixths-summit-fortaleza-declaration>,

_____ (2014b), Chairperson's Statement on the BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting held on 24 March 2014 in The Hague, Netherlands, Department of International Relation, Government of South Africa.

_____ (2015), "VII BRICS Summit Ufa Declaration, Ufa, the Russian, 9 July 2015, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:<http://brics2016.gov.in/upload/files/document/5763c20a72f2d7thDeclarationeng.pdf>

_____ (2016), "Goa Declaration at 8th BRICS Summit" 26 January, Goa, India, October 16, 2016, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:<http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/27491/Goa+Declaration+at+8th+BRICS+Summit>

_____ (2017), BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, Xiamen, China, 4 September 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:https://brics2017.org/English/Documents/Summit/201709/t20170908_2021.html

_____ (2014), "Chairperson's Statement on the BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting held on 24 March 2014 in The Hague, Netherlands" March 24

Brooks, Risa A, (2002), "Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?", *Security Studies*, 11:4, 1-50.

Browne, Andrew and Jay Solomon (2010), "China Threatens U.S. Sanctions Over Arms Sale to Taiwan", *Wall Street Journal*, 31 January 2010 [Online: web] Accessed 22 November 2017, URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703389004575034240303883892>

Bureau of Economic Analysis (2012), International Economic Accounts Pakistan [Online Web] Accessed on 11 September 2012, URL: <http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm>.

Burki, Shahid Javed (2011), "Pakistan-India Trade", ISAS Brief, National University of Singapore, Singapore: 211.

Burns, John F (1998), "India Sets 3 Nuclear Blasts, Defying a World Wide Ban; Tests Bring Sharp Outcry" *The New York Times*, 12, 1998, - [Online: web] Accessed 3

December, 2017, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/12/world/india-sets-3-nuclear-blasts-defying-a-worldwide-ban-tests-bring-a-sharp-outcry.html>

Callahan, William (2013), *China Dreams*, Oxford University Press, 06 June 2013 New York: Oxford University Press.

CAATSA (2017), US Department of Treasury, Government of the United State, [Online: web] Accessed 12 September, 2017 URL:<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/caatsa.aspx>

Carter, Bany E. (1988), *International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Chang , Iris (1997) *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*. New York, NY: Basic Books

Chanlett-Avery, Emma and Taylor, Mi Ae (2010), “*North Korea: U.S. relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*” CRS report for Congress. Updated. May 26, 2010.

Charnysh, Volha (2000) “ Pakistan’s Nuclear Program “, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, September 3, 2009,[Online:Web] , Assessed on May 12, 2013 URL http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear_weapons/issu_es/proliferation/pakistan/charnys_h_pakistan_analysis.pdf

Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (2010), “US wants India to act on Iran sanctions”, *Mail Today*, 15, July 2010, [Online: web] Accessed 30 July 2013, URL: available at: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/us-wants-india-to-act-on-iran-sanctions/1/105461.html>

Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (2010), “US wants India to act on Iran sanctions”, *Mail Today*, 15 July 15, 2010, [Online: web] Accessed 2 February 2018, URL: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/us-wants-india-to-act-on-iran-sanctions/1/105461.html>

Chauhan, Rishika. 2016. ‘China and India aren’t afraid to use money as a weapon’ *The National Interest*, [Online: web] Accessed 8 July 2017, December 14, 2016, URL: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-india-arent-afraid-use-money-weapon-18741?page=show>

Chellaney, Brahma (1993), *Nuclear Proliferation: U.S.-Indian Conflict*, New Delhi: Sangam Books.

_____ Personal Blog, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL:available at source:<http://bchellaney.wordpress.com/2007/09/09/future-of-indo-u-s-nuclear-deal>

Chen, Weihua (2017), “China urges US to correct secondary sanctions 'mistake'”, *China Daily*, August 23, 2017

Chenoy, Anuradha (2013) "India and the issue of sanctions", *New Indian Express*, Chennai , 15 April, 2013.

China Daily (2012), "China to boost railway and nuclear exports" February 7, 2015, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: http://www.china.org.cn/business/2015-02/07/content_34762057.htm

_____ (2013), "China-French Relations", 19, September 2013, Beijing, [Online: web] Accessed 22 May 2016, URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/201311/19/content_17364601.htm

_____ (2014), "China Opposes Fresh Sanctions on Russia," April 28, 2014. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2014-04/28/content_15132692.html

_____ (2014), "China Opposes Fresh Sanctions on Russia," April 28, 2014. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2014-04/28/content_15132692.html

_____ (2015), "West sanctions will not hurt Sino-Russia ties: PBOC", January 23, 2015 [Online: web] Accessed 30 January 2015, URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-01/23/content_19390013.htm.

_____ (2017), Washington, 23 August 2017 [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL : http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-08/23/content_30984808.htm

*CIA Factbook (2012), East and South East Asia: North Korea [Online Web] Accessed on 20 August 2012, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/rss-updates/WFB-april-13-2012.html>.

*Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (2017), US Department of the Treasury, [Online Web] Accessed on 11 September 2012, URL :https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/hr3364_pl115-44.pdf

China Nonproliferation Act, 2000, H.R.4829 - China Nonproliferation Act, [Online: web] Accessed 13 December, 2017, URL: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4829>

Choi, E. Kwan et al. (2003), *North Korea in World Economy*, Routledge Curzon, London.

Choudhury, Upendra (2008) "The Indo-US Nuclear Deal and its Impact on India's Ballistic Missile Programme", South Asian Strategic Stability Institute Research Report 17, June 2008.

Chumley, Cheryl K. (2013), "Russia, China Faulted for Blocking New U.N. Sanctions on Iran," *The Washington Times*, July 16, 2013 [Online: web] Accessed 12 February

2017 URL: <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/16/russia-china-faulted-blocking-new-un-sanctions-ira/>

CNN (2003), “More Inspections Enjoy Broad U.N. Support,” *CNN*, February 14, 2003. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/14/sprj.irq.un.world.reax/>

Cohen, Stephen (1976), “US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis”, *Pacific Affairs*, 49(1): 49-69.

_____ (2004), *The Idea of Pakistan, Washington*, Washington D.C:Brookings Institution Press.

_____ (2011), *The Future of Pakistan, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.* [Online: web] Accessed 12 February 2017 URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/01_pakistan_cohen.pdf

Cole, Juan (2013),” India and China Ignore US Sanctions Against Iran” Oil Price, August 14, 2013, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/India-and-China-Ignore-US-Sanctions-Against-Iran.html>

Cortright, David and Amitabh Mattoo (1997). “Carrots and Cooperation: Incentives for Conflict Prevention in South Asia” in David Cortright (eds.) *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (2017), Department of Treasury, Government of US.

Crossette, Barbara (1990) “India to Lift Nepal Embargo and Discuss Rift”, *New York Times*, 2 July, 1990. Accessed on 12 December 2012 [Online: web] <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/12/world/india-to-lift-nepal-embargo-and-discuss-rift.html>

*Department of State (1992), “Demarche: China’s Nuclear Deal With Pakistan”, January, 1992, Beijing, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-21.pdf>

*Department of State (2017), Public Notice 2825 on May 15, 1998, The Arms Export Control Act, Federation of American Scientists, 1998, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/aeca00.pdf>

D’Anieri, Paul (2012), *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*, Cengage Learning: Boston.

Day Matthew (2010), “Defiant Nicolas Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama despite China's trade threat”, *The Telegraph*, Warsaw, 6 December, 2010 [Online: web] Accessed 22

November 2017, URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/3629865/Defiant-Nicolas-Sarkozy-meets-Dalai-Lama-despite-Chinas-trade-threat.html>

Declan Walsh (2012), "Militants attack Pakistani Air Force Base," *The New York Times*, 16 August 2012,[online Web], Assessed on January 15, 2013. URL http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/world/asia/pakistani-air-force-base-with-nuclear-ties-is-attacked.html?_r=0

*Deng, Xiaoping (1982), *Selected Works (1975-1982)*, Foreign Languages Press; Second edition

Desai, Jatin (2000), *Nuclear Diplomacy: The Art of the Deal*, New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers.

Dillon, Garry B. (2002)"The IAEA Iraq Action Team Record: Activities and Findings," in *Iraq: A New Approach*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002.

Ding Qing Fen, "France goes back on China's shopping list", *China Daily*, 29 October 2009, [Online: web] Accessed 20 November 2017, URL: available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-10/29/content_8864372.htm.

Dixit, Sandeep (2010), "Unilateral Sanctions on Iran Will Hurt India: Nirupama Rao," *The Hindu*, July 6,

Dong-Joon, Jo and Erik Gartzke (2007), "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51 (1): 167-194.

Dorussen, Han and Mo Jongryn (2001), "Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(4): 395-326.

Doss, Bradley (2012), "Coercive Levels in Chinese Economic Statecraft: Attributed across Earth, Rarely Apparent", A thesis of Naval Postgraduate School, June, 2012.

Doxey, Margaret P. (1987), *International Sanctions in contemporary Perspective*, Macmillan Press, Hong Kong.

Drezner, Daniel W. (1999), *The Sanctions Paradox*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

_____ (2003), "How Smart are Smart Sanctions?" *International Studies Review*, 5(1) :107-110.

_____ and George A. Lopez (2002), *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Dube, Rajendra Prasad (1988), *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Study in Ideology and Social Change*, Mittal Publications, Delhi, India
- Dundon, Jeffrey R, (2014) *Triggers of Chinese economic coercion*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
- Dunn, Lewis A. (1979), “Half Past India’s Bang”, *Foreign Policy*, 39: 71-89
- Eagleton, Clyde (1950) “The Case of Hyderabad Before the Security Council”, *The American Journal of International Law*, 44 (2):220-232.
- El-Baradei, Mohamed (2003), “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update”, United Nations Security Council-IAEA, March 7 2003,). [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei-7mar03.pdf>
- _____ (2011) *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times*, New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Elliott, Kimberly Ann (2009), “Assessing UN sanctions after the Cold War: New and evolving standards of measurement”, *International Journal*, 65(1):90-110.
- Escobar, Pepe (2009) “Iraq's oil auction hits the jackpot” *Asia Times*, Dec 16, 2009 [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KL16Ak02.html
- EU (2017), European Union Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force (2016). [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf
- Executive Order 13466 (2006) U.S. Government Publishing Office, June 26, 2008,. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2009-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2009-title3-vol1-eo13466.pdf>
- Fay, Peter Ward. (1998) *The Opium War: 1840-1842*, Chapel Hill. The University of North Carolina Press. 1
- Federation of American Scientists (2017), *US Proliferation: Threat and Response*, Office of the Secretary of Defence, January 2001 [Online: web] Accessed 4 January, 2017, URL: <https://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf>
- Feiler, Gil (2012), “India's Economic Relations with Israel and the Arabs”, *Mideast Security and Policy Studies* No. 96, The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, [Online: web] Accessed 4 December, 2012, URL: <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/MSPS96.pdf>
- Financial Times (2018), “EU launches counter-measures against US sanctions on Iran” Mehreen Khan, August 6, 2018 [Online: web] Accessed 2 October, 2018 URL:

<https://www.ft.com/content/be32d010-9973-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d>

Firstpost (2014), "Iraq and India: A forgotten love story World" Ajaz Ashraf, June 21, 2014, [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2018, URL: <https://www.firstpost.com/world/iraq-and-india-a-forgotten-love-story-1581885.html>

Fogleman, Julia (2008) "Fiji ' s Relationship with India: The Answer to or the Source of Fiji's Problems?", Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, Paper 581, 2008, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/581□

Ford, Glyn and Kwon Soyoung (2008), *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival*, Pluto Press, London.Friday 7 March 2003, Vienna Austria, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/status-nuclear-inspections-iraq-update>

Frieden, Jeffery and Ronald Rogowski (1996), "The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview," in Keohane and Milner (eds), *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Fuqua, Jacques L (2007), *Nuclear Endgame: The Need for Engagement with North Korea*, Praeger Security International, United States.

*GAO (US General Accounting Office). 1998. *Nuclear Nonproliferation: Difficulties in Accomplishing IAEA's Activities in North Korea*. GAO/RCED-98-210,

Galtung, Johan (1967), "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia" *World Politics*, 19(3):378-416.

Gandhi, Indira (1959) cited in A. Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament", *Journal of International Affairs*, 51(1), Summer 1997.

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1938), *Hind Swaraj: Or, Indian home rule*. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Pub. House.

Gangualy, Sumit and Manjeet Pardesi, (2009) "Explaining Sixty Years of Indian Foreign Policy", *India Review*, 8 (5):4-19.

Garver, John W. (1991), " China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales", *Asian Survey*, 31(10):): 958-959. □

George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, (Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), p.294

George, Alexander, Andrew Bennett (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, MIT Press.

Ghose, Arundhati (1997), “Negotiating The CTBT; India’s security concerns and nuclear disarmament”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1997

Global Times (2016), Wen Dao, “Mongolia should soul-search on hosting separatist figure”, 8, December 2016, [Online: web] Accessed 2 November 2017, URL: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1022715.shtml>

_____ (2017), “More countries shun Dalai Lama as China’s economic impact grows” June 6, 2017 [Online: web] Accessed 12 November 2017, URL: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1061653.shtml>

*Global Fissile Material Report 2007, International Panel on Fissile Materials [Online: web] Accessed 2 May, 2012. URL: http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf.

Golwalkar, M.S. (1939) *We or Our Nationhood Define*, Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1939 Gonchig Ganbold as quoted in the Hindu, 2016)

Grimmett, Jeanne J. (2001) “Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan”, Congressional Report Service, October 5, 2001.

Grover, Verinder (1992), *Political Thinkers of Modern India: Rammanohar Lohia*: Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications

Guruswami, Mohan (2017) “There Once was a Hyderabad!” Hyderabad On the Net

Haass, Richard N. (1997), “Sanctioning Madness,” *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (6),74–85.

Haass, Richard N. (1998). *Economic sanctions and American diplomacy*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Haggard, Stephan and Marcus Noland (2007), “North Korea in 2007: Shuffling in from the Cold”, *Asian Survey*, 48: 1.

Haggard, Stephan and Marcus Noland (2010), “Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation”, *Asian Survey*, 50(3):177-199

Haggard, Stephan and Marcus Noland (2010), “Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation”, *Asian Survey*, 50:3,177-199.

Hans J. Morgenthau, in his seminal work, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15

Harrington de Santana, Anne (2011) “The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an Incredible Pledge to Disarm”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 40(1)

Hedley Bull (1976), “Arms Control and World Order”, *International Security*, 1(1)

Hibbs, Mark (2017), “Eyes on the prize: India’s pursuit of membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group”, Volume 24 (3-4), 2017.

Higgins, Andrew (2012), ‘Philippines, banana growers feel effect of South China Sea dispute’, *The Washington Post*, June 10, [Online: web] Accessed 28 July 2017, URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-philippines-banana-growers-feel-effect-of-south-china-sea-dispute/2012/06/10/gJQA47WVTV_story.html?utm_term=.c83ac3c0f06f

Ho, Benjamin (2015) , “Understanding Chinese Exceptionalism China’s Rise, Its Goodness, and Greatness”, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 2014,39(3):164-176□

Hodde, Anouk (2015) *Assertive BRICS & Iran’s Nuclear Issue*, Ph.D Thesis, Leiden: Leiden University

Hodgart, Alan (1977). *The Economics of European Imperialism*. New York. W.W. Norton & Company Inc.

Holum, John D (2013), "A revitalized ACDA in the post-cold war world : joint hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs", House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, June 23, 1994, [Online: web] Accessed 4 July, 2015, URL: <https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/sanctions-happy-usa>

Hovi, Jon et al. (2005), “When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?”, *World Politics*, 57(4): 479-499.

Hu, Jintao (2012), Report at 18th Party Congress, People’s Republic of China, November 27, 2012 [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: http://www.chinaembassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm

Hu, Shaohua (2007), “Confucianism and Contemporary Chinese Politics”, *Politics & Policy*, 35 (1):136-153

Hufbauer, Gary and Elliott, Kimberly (1988), “Financial Sanctions and Foreign Policy: Qualified Success,” *Harvard International Review*, 10 (5)

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffery J., and Elliot, Kimberly Ann (2008a), *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Peterson Institute Press: Peterson Institute for International Economics*.

_____ (2008b) , “US vs India 1998- : Nuclear Weapons Proliferation” Peterson Institute of International Economics, May 1, 2008, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/case-98-1>

_____ (2008c), “US and UN v. Iraq (1990–: Invasion of Kuwait, Impairment of military capability, destabilization) See also Case 80-2 US v. Iraq (1980–2003: Terrorism; Chemical and Nuclear Weapons)” Peterson Institute of International Economics, May 1, 2008, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/case-90-1>

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde (1998d), “Sanctions-Happy USA”, Peterson Institute of International Economics, Policy Brief : 98-4, July 1998 [Online: web] Accessed 27 July, 2016, URL: <https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/sanctions-happy-usa>

IAEA, "Report on the Twenty-Eighth IAEA on-site Inspection in Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)," S/1995/1003, 1 December 1995, www.iaea.org;

IAEA, "The Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq," Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 (GC(40)/1), 12 August 1996, www.iaea.org.

IAEA, Communication of 17 October 2011 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the Agency concerning the Export Control Policies of the Government of Pakistan and a Statutory Regulatory Order," INFCIRC/832. Updated November 30, 2011,*Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act (1992), US government, [Online: web], Accessed 3 February 2015 URL: http://www.parstimes.com/history/iran_iraq_nonproliferation.html

India Pakistan Relations 1947-2007, Vol -I-X, Public Diplomacy Division, Ministry of External Affairs. CLXXVI. □

India Today (1998) “India is now a nuclear weapons state”16 May, 1998 [Online: web] Accessed on 12 December, 2015, URL: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/we-live-in-a-world-where-india-is-surrounded-by-nuclear-weaponry-atal-bihari-vajpayee/1/266168.html>.

India Today (2010),“US wants India to act on Iran sanctions”, Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, July 15, 2010, [Online:web] Accessed on 30 July, 2013, URL: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/us-wants-india-to-act-on-iran-sanctions/1/105461.html>.

India Today, (2013) “WikiLeaks: Indira had offered to share N-tech with Pakistan in 1974”,April 10, 2013

Indian High Commission (2016), “India-South Africa Relations”, South Africa , June 2016 [Online: web] Accessed 2 July 2017, URL : <http://www.Hcisouthafrica.in/hc.Php?id=India-SA>

Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act (1992), US Department of State, June 18, 1992 [Online: web] Accessed 2 July 2017, URL : <https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-bill/5434/text>

Jha, Prashant (2016), “A renewed test for India’s diplomacy as Prachanda becomes Nepal’s premier”, *The Hindustan Times*, 3 August, 2016 [Online: web] Accessed 5 December 2017, URL: <http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/a-renewed-test-for-india-s-diplomacy-as-prachanda-becomes-nepal-s-premier/story-ln7Hu8uZk>

Jiang, Lifeng (2010) “Some advice for Japan”, *China Daily*, November 11, 2010, [Online: web] Accessed 12 August 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-11/04/content_21269982.htm (accessed on 12 August 2016).

Jiang, Yu, (2009) addressing ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign affairs, People’s Republic of China, 24 ‘September 24, 2009 [Online: web] Accessed 28 July 2017, URL: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cep/1/pol/xnyfgk/t617251.htm>

Jiechi, Yang (2012), ‘Remarks With Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi ‘,U.S. Department of State, 5, September 2012 [Online: web] Accessed 20 May 2016, URL: <https://www.state.gov/secretary/2009201clinton/rm/2012/09/197343.htm>

Joel Watson, Strategy (2004); *An Introduction to Game Theory*, University of California, San Diego, 2004, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, July 14, 2015.

Nye, Joseph S. (1981), “Maintaining a nonproliferation regime”, *International Organization*, 35,1, Winter 1981.

Joshi, Rohan, (2015), “China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation”, *the Diplomat*, February 16, 2015.

Joshi, Yogesh (2018), “Between Principles and Pragmatism: India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in the Post-PNE Era, 1974–1980”, *The International History Review*, 02 January 2018, 1073-1093.

Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg (2007), “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions”, in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, in Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (eds.), Elsevier:North Holland.

Kallol Bhattacharjee, 7 , December 2016 [Online: web] Accessed 2 November 2017, URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Mongolia-seeks-support-against-China%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98blockade%E2%80%99/article16769678.ece>

Kamath, P.M (1999) “Indian Nuclear Tests, Then and Now: An Analysis of US and Canadian Responses”, *Strategic Analysis* , 23:1999, 749-762, [Online: web] Accessed 13 June, 2017, URL: <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug9-4.html>

Kan, Shirley A. (2001), “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report, Updated October 30, 2001. [Online: web] Accessed 12 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477880.pdf>

_____ (2015), “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report, Updated January 5, 2017. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf>

*Khan, Ashfaque H. and Kim Yun-Hwan Kim (1999), “Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: Policy Issues and Operational Implications”, *EDRC Report Series* no. 66

Karen DeYoung (2011), “New Estimates Put Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal at More Than 100,” *Washington Post*.

Katzenstein, Peter (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and identity in world Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Katzman, Kenneth (2013) “Iran Sanctions”, Congress Research Service Report, 10 January , 2013.

Katzman, Kenneth and Christopher M. Blanchard (2005), CRS, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations Updated June 14, 2005, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL30472.pdf>

Kaufman, Alison Adcock (2010), “The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order” *Pacific Focus*, XXV(1):1-33.

Keay, John (1994) *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company*. New York, Scribner Press.

Kennedy, Andrew B (2011), “India’s Nuclear Odyssey; Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb”, *International Security*, 36(2)

Keohane, Robert (1988), “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (4): 390-391.

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye (1989), *Power and Interdependence*, London, Harper Collins.

Kerr, Paul (2012) U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, May & 2012 [Online: Web] Accessed 5 April, 2012. URL <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf>

Khan, A. Muhammad and Sujaat Ali Khan (2011), “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Pakistan: A Sectoral Analysis, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Working Paper 2011:67, Islamabad.

Khan, Feroz Hassan(2012) , *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press

Khurshid, Salman (2012), interview conducted by Bloomsberr, “Vietnam says China must avoid trade weapon in maritime”, 12 February, 2012, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-02/vietnam-says-china-must-avoid-trade-weapon-in-maritime-disputes.html>

Kimball Daryl G. & Fred McGoldrick (2007), U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement: A Bad Deal Gets Worse, 3 August 2007, [Online: web] Accessed on 3 January 2012, URL: http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20070803_IndiaUS

King, Gary et al (1996), *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kliman, Daniel and Abigail Grace (2018), “China Smells Opportunity in the Middle East’s Crisis”, *Foreign Policy*, June 14, 2018

Koithara, Verghese (2012), *Managing India’s Nuclear Forces*, Washington D.C: Brooking Institutions Press.

Krasner, Stephen (1983) ed., *International Regimes*, Cornell University Press: New York

Kroenig, Matthew (2009), “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance”, *The American Political Science Review*, 103,(1) : 113

Kummaraswamy, P. R (2010), India's Israel Policy, Columbia University Press (30 July 2010) 378

Lee, Karen and Julia Choi (2009), “North Korea: Economic Sanctions and U.S. Department of Treasury Actions 1955-September 2009.” Washington: National Committee on North Korea. [Online Web] Accessed on 20 August 2012, URL: <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/09035LeeChoi.pdf>

Lellouche, Pierre (1979), “International Nuclear Politics”, *Foreign Affairs*, 58:2, 336-350.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1917), *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers. [Online Web] Accessed on 20 August 2017, URL: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/>

Leonard Weiss (2010), “India and the NPT”, *Strategic Analysis*, 34 (2), 255-271.

Lettow, Paul (2010) *Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*, Council Special Report No. 54 April 2010.

Llyod, Lorna (1991), “‘A Family Quarrel’ The Development of the Dispute over Indians in South Africa”, *The Historical Journal* , 34(3),703-725.

Lohia, Rammanoha (1938) *Indian Foreign Policy*, Allahabad: Congress Political and Economic Studies

Lukas, Aaron, (1998) “Two Cheers for India Sanctions”, CATO Institute, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/two-cheers-india-sanctions>

*Mathai, Ranjan (2012), “Building on Convergence: Deepening India US Strategic Partnership”, Speech delivered on 6 February, 2012 at CSIS: Washington D.C.

*Ministry of External Affairs (2017c), “India-Iraq Bilateral Sanctions”, Government of India, August 2017 [Online: web] Accessed 15 December 2017, URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Brief_iraq.pdf

*Ministry of External Affairs (2011), “India’s Explanation of Vote after the adoption of the two resolutions succeeding 1267 Sanctions Regime”, Government of India, June 18, 2011. [Online:web] Accessed 12 January 2014 URL: <http://www.mea.gov.in/SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/372/Indias+Explanation+of+Vote+after+the+>

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015), “Wang Yi: Finish the Last Kilometer of the Marathon of Negotiation on the Iranian Nuclear Issue” Government of People’s Republic of China, February 16, 2015. [Online:web] Accessed 4 March 2015 URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/t1238815.shtml

Macaskill, Andrew and Jennifer M. Freedman (2012), “UN Rights Council Backs U.S. Demand for New Sri Lanka War Probe”, Bloomsberg news,[Online: web] Accessed 22 March, 2012, URL:<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-22/un-rights-council-backs-u-dot-s-dot-demand-for-new-sri-lanka-war-probe>,

Major, Solomon (2012), “Timing Is Everything: Economic Sanctions, Regime Type, and Domestic Instability, *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, 38:1, 79-110.

Malik, Mohan J (2000),“China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* , 22(3):445-478.

Manning, Robert (2016),“What Type of Great Power Does China Want to Be? *Foreign Policy*, January 5, 2016, Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/05/what-type-of-great-power-does-china-want-to-be/>

Manyin, Mark E and Ryun Jun, (2006) “*U.S. Assistance to North Korea*”, CRS Report for Congress, Updated October 12, 2006.

Manyin, Marl (2010), “North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?” CRS Report for Congress, Updated June 29, 2010.

Mao, Zedong (1977) “Speeches at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China,” in Mao Tsetung, Selected Works, Vol. 5, n. 4, p. 168. . [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2018,

URL:https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfMaoTsetungVol.V/MaoSW5_djvu.txt

Mathai, Ranjan (2012), “Building on Convergence: Deepening the India–U.S. Strategic Partnership,” Washington, D.C., F2012, February 6, 2012. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2016, http://csis.org/files/attachments/120206_india_transcript.pdf

Mattoo, Amitabh (1996) “India’s Nuclear Status Quo”, *Survival*, Autumn 1996: 42-57

_____ (2005) “Striking a Balance” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40:35

McNamara, Robert S, “Nobody Needs Nukes”, *The New York Times*, February 23, 1993,[Online: web] Accessed 13 June, 2017,

Mehta, V.R. (2008), *Foundations of Indian Political Thought*, New Delhi: Manohar

Merom, Jill (2001), “Democracy, Dependency, And Destabilization: The Shaking of Alende's Regime”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 105: 2001 □

Miller, Manjari Chatterjee (2013), *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press

Miller, Nicholas (2014), “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions”, *International Organization*, 68(4): 913-944.

Milner, Helen and Robert Keohane (1996), *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press

Ministry of External Affairs (2017b), “Press Statement on Nuclear Test conducted by DPRK”, September 03, 2017, MEA, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL:

http://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/28911/Press_Statement_on_Nuclear_Test_conducted_by_DPRK

Ministry of External Affairs (2009), Statement by the Prime Minister at the XV Summit of the Non Aligned Movement July 15, 2009, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2018,

URL:<https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/1111/Statement+by+the+Prime+Minister+at+the+XV+Summit+of+the+Non+Aligned+Movement>

Ministry of External Affairs (2017a), Statement by Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons 72nd First Committee, 12 October 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 1 November 2018, URL: <http://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/?6452?000>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2017), as quoted in Xinhua "China firmly opposes and strongly condemns DPRK nuclear test", September 3, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/03/c_136579629.htm

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2016), "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's Regular Press Conference on April 13, 2017," April 13, 2017. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1453551.shtml

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2017), Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's Regular Press Conference on July 26, 2017, People's Republic of China, [Online: web] Accessed 2 November 2017, URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1480270.shtml

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peoples Republic of China (2009), France-China, "Joint Communique Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China" Paris, 1 April 2009, [Online: web] Accessed 2 November 2017, URL: <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/France-statement.pdf>

Mint, 2012, "BRICS say will follow UN, not US sanctions against Iran", Mar 29 2012. [Online: web] Accessed 2 February 2018, URL: <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/HaWDoaLRPU9UMpvSBYWO6K/BRICS-say-will-follow-UN-not-US-sanctions-against-Iran.html>

Mmegi online (2017), "Dalai Dilemma: Khama unmoved after two-hour plea", July 25, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 22 November 2017, URL: www.mmegi.com/index.php?aid=70470&dir=2017%2Fjuly%2F25

Modi, Narendra (2014a), Prime Minister Narendra Modi's speech on 68th Independence Day, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/full-text-prime-minister-narendra-modis-speech-on-68th-independence-day/>

Modi, Narendra (2014b), Speech in UN General Assembly , "UN General Assembly to hold informal consultations on International Day of Yoga, October 10, 2014, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: [//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/44770027.cms?intenttarget=no&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst](http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/44770027.cms?intenttarget=no&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst)

Modi, Narendra (2017), Modi's speech in Varanasi, May 17, 2014, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://www.narendramodi.in/maa-ganga-has-made-me-yours-i-thank-you-for-your-affection-narendra-modi-in-varanasi-6217>

Mohan, C. Raja (2003) *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Viking/Penguin Books India, 2003

Mohan, Raja C. (1995), 'India's Nuclear Options', *The Hindu*, 20 December 1995: 12

Mohan, Raja C. (2010), "Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 33: 3), 133–148. □

Mohan, Raja C. (2012) "India's New Foreign Policy", Lecture delivered on September 24 2012 at the Elcano Royal Institute" Madrid [Online: web] Accessed on 22 December, 2012, URL: GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari65-2012_india_foreign_policy#_ftnref1.

Mohan, Raja C. and Rishika Chauhan, (2016) 'India–Japan Strategic Partnership: Steady Advance amidst Enduring Constraints', in *Poised for Partnership: Deepening the Japan-India Partnership*, Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki (Eds.), Oxford University Press, India, 188-189

Morrison, Wayne M. and Rachel Tang (2012) 'China's Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States', CRS Report R42510, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 32.

Morrow, Daniel and Carriere, Michael (1999), "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," *The Nonproliferation Review* 4(3).

Mukherji, Rahul (2004), "Economic sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool", in Kanti Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu (eds.) *International Relations in India: Bringing Theory Back Home*, New Delhi: Orient Longman.

*Noland, Marcus (1995), "The North Korean Economy", *APEC Working Paper Series*, Number 95-5. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

*"North Korean Threat", (1999), US House of Representative. 1999. Congressional Report. House North Korean Advisory Group Report. Washington.

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1938) Forward in Rammanohar Lohia, *Indian Foreign Policy*, Allahabad: Congress Political and Economic Studies.

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1961) Reply to a debate on Goa in Lok Sabha, on July 26, 1955 in *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India:111-112 □

N. D. Jayaprakash (2000) “Nuclear Disarmament and India”, *Economic and Political Weekly*,35(7).

Najar, Nida (2015), “Border Havoc as Nepalis Accuse India of Payback”, *New York Times*, 30, September, 2015, [Online: web] Accessed 9 May 2016, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/asia/border-havoc-as-nepalis-accuse-india-of-payback.html?_r=0

NAM Coordinating Bureau (2014), “Communiqué on the Decision by the Government of the United States of America to Impose Unilateral Coercive Measures against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” December 22, 2014. <http://namiran.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/19.-Communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-NAM-CoB-on-the-Decision-by-the-US-Government-to-Impose-Unilateral-Coercive-Measures-against-the-Bolivarian-Republic-of-Venezuela-22-Dec-2014.pdf>. (accessed on January 12, 2017).

Nataraj, Geethanjali and Garima Sahdev (2018), *Confronting BRICS: The Indian Dilemma*, in *India: The Modi Factor*, Edited by Ugo Tramballi and Nicola Missaglia, Ledizioni LediPublishing Via Alamanni, 11 – 20141 Milano – ItalyIndia. The Modi Factor Edited by Ugo Tramballi and Nicola Missaglia First edition: February 2018

Nato, Dick et al (2008), “China-North Korea Relations”. CRS Report for Congress, Updated October 22, 2008.

Nayyar, A. H (2008), “A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation”, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Pakistani Perspective FES Briefing Paper* 9 August 2008

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1946), *The Discovery of India*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1938) Forward in Rammanohar Lohia, *Indian Foreign Policy*, Congress Political and Economic Studies, no 12, Allahabad, 1938, p. 4 □

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1966), *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April1966*, The Publications Division,Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government ofIndia.of Foreign Policy”, 19 February, 1992.

Nicholas B. Dirks (1996), Forward in *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: In British India* in Bernard S. Cohn (1996) , Princeton University Press, New Jersey

Niksch, Larry A. (2002) “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program”. CRS report for Congress. Updated. October 21, 2002.

Niksch, Larry A. (2010), “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons *Development and Diplomacy*”. CRS report for Congress. Updated. January 5, 2010.

- Nye, Joseph (1985), "NPT: The Logic of Inequality", *Foreign Policy*, 59:123-131.
- O 'Hanlog, Michael et al (2003) *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula*, The Brookings Institution.
- O'Sullivan, Meghan L. (2010), "Iran and the Great Sanctions Debate," *The Washington Quarterly*, 33(4),7-21.
- Ono, Kyoko. 1999. Turning Sticks to Carrots: US Economic Sanctions Against North Korea. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Leeds, School of International, Development and European Studies (August).
- Oye, Kenneth (1985), "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies", *World Politics*, 38:1,1-24.
- Paul, T.V. (1998) "The Systemic Bases of India's Challenge To The Global Nuclear Order", *The Nonproliferation Review*, Fall 1998
- Path, Kosal (2012), "China's Economic Sanctions against Vietnam, 1975-1978", *China Quarterly*, 212: 1040-1058.
- *Panel of Experts. 2010. *Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)*, [Online Web]. Assessed on May 12, 2013. URL <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/SCR1874.pdf>.
- Purushothaman, Uma (2012), "American Shadow over India-Iran Relations", *Strategic Analysis*, 36(6):99-110.
- Pant, Harsh (2011a) "India finally makes an entry in Iraq", Rediff, March 14, 2011, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/column/india-finally-makes-an-entry-in-iraq/20110314.htm>
- Pant, Harsh (2011b), *The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pape, Robert A (1997), "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work", *International Security*, 22 (2): 90-136.
- Pape, Robert (1998) "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work" *International Security*, 23, Summer 1998, 66-77
- Partha Chatterjee (2014), *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, London: Zed Books
- Paul, T. V (1996), "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions" *International Journal*, 51(3) : 440-465.

_____. and Mahesh Shankar (2007), “Why the US-India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal”, *Survival*, 49:4, 111-122.

_____. (2003), “China-Pakistan Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power”, *The Nonproliferation Review*.

_____. (2007), The U.S-India Nuclear Accord, *The International Journal*, Autumn 2007

Peksen, Dursun and Adrian U-Jin Ang (2007), “When Do Economic Sanctions Work? Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes”, *Political Research Quarterly*, 60(1): 135-145.

Perkovich, George (2002), *India's Nuclear Bomb The Impact on Global Proliferation*, California: University of California Press.

Perkovich, George (2010) “Global implications of the U.S. –India deal” *Daedalus* Winter 2010,

Perry, William. 1999. Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations. Unclassified Report. Washington, October 12, 1999.

Peter Wonacott (2007), "Inside Pakistan's Drive to Guard It's A-Bombs," *Wall Street Journal*, 29 November 2007.[Online: web], Assessed on January 2013, Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119629674095207239.html>

People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016), “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui: DPRK's Nuclear Test is not Conducive to Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula” , September, 2, 2016, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: http://ww.w.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1397137.shtml

Pinto, Cliff (2013), “The India-Israel Alliance – Part I: The Arab World’s Betrayal (from pre-independence to 1992), 5, February 2013, [Online: web] Accessed 22 July 2013, URL: <http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-india-israel-alliance-part-1-the-arab-world/>

Prasad, Bimal (1960), *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947*, Calcutta: Bookland

Prasad, Bimal (1960), *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947*, , Calcutta: Bookland□

PTI, (1997) Raja Ramanna interview with PTI on October 19, 1997, [Online: web] Accessed 22 May 2018, URL: <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html>

PTI, (2013) “Wasim Akram requests BCCI to allow Pakistani players in IPL” PTI | Times of India, [Online: web] Accessed 22 May 2017, URL:

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Wasim-Akram-requests-BCCI-to-allow-Pakistani-players-in-IPL/articleshow/19412866.cms>

Pu, Xiaoyu, (2007) 'Interdependent Rivals: China's Economic Statecraft towards Japan', in Mingjiang Li and Natalie Yan Hong eds. *China's Economic Statecraft: Co-optation, Cooperation, and Coercion*, Singapore: World Scientific, 2016.

Purushothaman, Uma (2012), "American Shadow over India-Iran Relations", *Strategic Analysis*, 36(6): 99-110.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh(2008), "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: An Indian Perspective", (October 2008) Briefing Paper 10, FES New Delhi,

Ramachandran, Nandini (2011), "Tagore's vision of Independent India, spiritual not political", *Firstpost*, Aug 16, 2011

Rediff (2002), "Why India must oppose war with Iraq," Ramananda Sengupta, *Rediff*, New Delhi, □December 26, 2002 [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/dec/26ram.htm>

_____ (2003), "Who'll clean up the mess?", New Delhi, 25 March , 2003. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/25ram.htm>

Reilly, James (2012), "China's Unilateral Sanctions", *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall, 2012: 121-133.

_____ (2016), "China: Turning Money Into Power" in *Connectivity Wars: Why Migration, Finance and Trade Are The Geo-Economic Battlegrounds of the Future*, The European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2016:189

Rennack, Dianne E. and Shuey, Robert D. (1998), "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law," Congressional Research Service. [Online: web] Accessed 22 January, 2017, URL: https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6971/m1/1/high_res_d/97-949_1999Nov01.pdf

Rennack, Dianne E. (2001) "India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions", CRS Report for Congress, Updated October 12, 2001, [Online Web] Accessed on 12 September 2012, URL:<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6202.pdf>

_____ (2006), *North Korea: Economic Sanctions*, Congressional Research Service, Updated October 17, 2006 , [Online: web] Accessed 22 January, 2017, URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31696.pdf>

_____ (2010), *Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law*, , Congressional Research Service, Updated: November 30, 2010[Online: web] Accessed 2 January, 2017 URL:

<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31502.pdf>

_____ (2016), “Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions Foreign Policy Legislation January 22, 2016.

Reuters (2013), “Sanctions not fundamental to resolving North Korea problem: China” March 8, 2013. [Online: web] Accessed 5 March 2015. URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/09/us-korea-north-china-idUSBRE92803E20130309>.

Reuters (2017) “U.S. sanctions 13 Chinese and North Korean organizations,” Joel Schectman, David Brunnstrom, 22, November 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa/u-s-sanctions-13-chinese-and-north-korean-organizations-idUSKBN1DL2G6>

Reuters, (2017), “China cautions Botswana over Dalai Lama visit”, Beijing, July 14, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 2 November 2017, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-botswana-dalailama/china-cautions-botswana-over-dalai-lama-visit-idUSKBN19Z0XE>

Reuters, (2017), “India defends ties with North Korea in talks with Tillerson” Jonathan Landay, Aditya Kalra, October 25, 2017

RIC (2015), “Joint Communiqué of the 13th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China”, Russia-India-China trilateral, February 2, 2015. [Online: web] Accessed 7 February 2017, URL: <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24751/>

_____ (2016), “Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China”, Russia-India-China trilateral, April 18, 2016. [Online: web] Accessed 7 February 2017, URL: <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26628/Joint+Communiq+u+of+the+14th+Meeting+of+the+Foreign+Ministers+of+the+Russian+Federation+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China>

_____ (2017), “Joint Communiqué of the 15th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China”, Russia-India-China trilateral, December 11, 2017. [Online: web] Accessed 2 February 2018, URL: <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29171/Join+t+Com+muniqu+of+the+15th+Meeting+of+the+Foreign+Ministers+of+the+Russian+Federation+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China>

Rose, Euclid A (2005), “From a Punitive to a Bargaining Model of Sanctions: Lessons from Iraq”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 49:3, 459-580.

Rozman, Gilbert (2007), *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and United States*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Roy, M. N (1922), *India in Transition*, Geneva: J.B. TargetSagan, Scott (1997), “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? : Three Models in Search of a Bomb”, *International Security*, 21(3):54-86.

Said, Edward (1993) , *Culture and Imperialism*, New York : Knopf, Random House

Sanger, David E. and Eric Schmitt (2011), “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy”, *New York Times*.

Sarkar, Jayita and Sumit Ganguly(2018), “India and the NPT After 50 Years” *The Diplomat*, June 22, 2018 [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2018, URL:<https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/india-and-the-npt-after-50-years/>

Sastry, Viyyanna (2010), “Pakistan against signing the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state”, IDSA Commentary, March 08, 2010, [Online: web] Accessed 7 February 2017, URL: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/PakistanagainstsigningtheNPTasanonnuclearweaponsstate_cvsastry_080310

Schell, Orville (2008) “China’s Quest for Moral Authority,” *The Nation*, 2008

Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1918). “The Sociology of Imperialism” in *The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Scott, David (2008), *China and the International System, 1840-1949: Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation*, New York: State University of New York Press.

Security Council Takes Action to End Iraq Sanctions, Terminate Oil-For-Food Programme as Members Recognize ‘Major Changes’ Since 1990, Security Council

Shanghaiist, (2017), “China warns Botswana that it really shouldn't welcome the Dalai Lama for a visit next month”, 27 July, 27, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 2 November 2017, URL: <http://shanghaiist.com/2017/07/27/dalai-lama-botswana-warning.php>

Sharma, Anand (2012) quoted in NDTV 2012, “BRICS not "obliged" to follow US sanctions on Iran”, NDTV, March 29, 2012, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL <https://www.ndtv.com/business/brics-not-obliged-to-follow-us-sanctions-on-iran-300806>

Squassoni, Sharon (1999), "Weapons of Mass Destruction:Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan", CRS Report for Congress, updated March 11, 2004 .Unclassified Report to Congress, January - June 1999,

Shen, Simon (2016), "10 Characteristics of Chinese Diplomacy in the Xi Jinping Era" Foreign Policy Association, April 19th, 2016 , [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/04/19/10-characteristics-of-chinese-diplomacy-in-the-xi-jinping-era/>

Shuey, Robert and Shirley A. Kan (1995), "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service Report, 16 January, 1995.

Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh (2004), "Evolution of India's Nuclear Doctrine", CPR Occasional Paper No.9.

Sigal, Leon V (1998). "Averting a Train Wreck with North Korea," *Arms Control Today* [Online:Web] Assessed on March 29, 2013. URL : www.armscontrol.org/ACT/novdec98/sigal98.htm.

Sigal, Leon V (1998). *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Simpson, Jr., George L. (2010), "Russian and Chinese Support for Tehran Iranian Reform and Stagnation," *Middle East Quarterly*, 17(2), 63–72. □

Singer, Clifford E. et al. (1998) "Feasible Deals with India and Pakistan after the Nuclear Tests: The Glenn Sanctions and U.S. Negotiations", *Asian Survey*, 38:12, 1161-1178.

Singh, Jaswant (2001), Text of the Statement made by the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, December 27, 2001, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL:http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/6024/Text_of_the_Statement_made_by_the_External_Affairs_Minister_Shri_Jaswant_Singh

Singh, Swaran (2004), "The Efficacy of Sanctions Regimes: Experience from Asia" in Greg Mills and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.) *New Tools for Reform and Stability: Sanctions, Conditionalities and Conflict Resolution*, Johannesburg: The South Asian Institute of International Affairs.

Singh, Ajay (2007) quoted in Radio New Zealand on April 2, 2007, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=31238>

Singh, Ajay (2017), "Mohan Bhagwat's views on Hinduism not new: that's old RSS position His message: No need to look at the Sangh Parivar through the prism of secular narrative", *Governance Now*, September 15, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <http://www.governancenow.com/views/columns/mohan-bhagwats-views-on-hinduism-not-new-thats-old-rss-position>

Singh, Puri Hardeep(2013), statement in New York on July 17, 2011, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 July 2011 [Online: web] Accessed 22 July 2013, URL: available at: <http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements?dtl/372/Indias+Explanation+of+Vote+after+the+adoption+of+the+two+resolutions+succeeding+1267+Sanctions+Regime>

Small, Andrew, (2015), *The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics*, Washington: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Sheila A. (2015) *Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Solingen, Etel (2007), *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East*, Princeton N.J, Princeton University Press.

Space Daily (2001) “India, Pakistan Trade Sanctions, Both Say Ready For War”, , December 27, 2001, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.spacedaily.com/news/nuclear-india-pakistan-01b.html>

Spector, Leonard S. (1985), “Silent Spread”, *Foreign Policy*, 58:53-78.

_____ (2001), “Status of U.S. Sanctions Imposed on India and Pakistan”, CNS archive, August 11, 2001. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://cns.miis.edu/archive/wtc01/pakind.htm>, accessed on 3 December, 2012.

Speier, Richard H, Brian G. Chow, S. Rae Starr, (2001), *Nonproliferation Sanctions* California: RAND.

Srinivasan, M R (2005) “New Opportunities for Nuclear Energy”, *The Hindu*, August 2. 2005.

*State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2003), “China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures”, White Papers of the Government: Information Office, People’s Republic of China, December 2003. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2012, URL:<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20031202/3.htm>

Stephen Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan*, (Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

Stewart Ian J. , and Daniel B. Salisbury (2014), “Wanted: Karl Lee”, *The Diplomat*, May 22, 2014. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/wanted-karl-lee/>

Sullivan, Kate (2014) Exceptionalism in Indian Diplomacy: The Origins of India's Moral Leadership Aspirations, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 37:4,

Swaine, Michael D. (2011) ‘China's Assertive Behavior: Part One—On “Core Interests,”’ *China Leadership Monitor* 34, Washington: Hoover Institute, February, 2011, [Online: web] Accessed 28 July 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/clm34ms_final.pdf

Tabeta, Shunsuke, "China looks to Iraq to secure oil supply", *Nikkei Asian Review*, June 15, 2018 , URL: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/China-looks-to-Iraq-to-secure-oil-supply>

Talbott, Strobe , (1998) "US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report," Remarks given at the Brookings Institution , Washington, DC, November 12, 1998.

Tan, Kim and Anita O. Legaspi (2012). "PHL Says It Will 'Secure Sovereignty' if Challenged by China," *GMA News Online*, April 11, 2012

Tanner, Murray Scot (2007), *Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use*. Rand Corporation: US.

Taroor, Shashi (2016) *An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India*, Aleph Book Company: Mumbai.

Taylor, Brendan (2009) "Sanctions as Grand Strategy" *Adelphi Series*, 49 (411).

Thakur, Ramesh, Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss (2008), "Can the NPT Regime be fixed or should it be abandoned?" *Dialogue on Globalization*, Occasional Paper, October 2008, India's Nuclear Debate: Indo-U.S Cooperation Agreement, World Focus Series one.

Thakur, Vineet (2017), The "hardy annual": A history of India's first UN resolution, *India Review*, 16:4, 401-429.

Thayer, Carlyle (2012), "The China-Philippines Face Off at Scarborough Shoal: Back to Square One?", *E-International Relations*, April 26, 2012, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/25/turkey-today-a-leviathan-or-a-law-seeker/>

The Atlantic (2005), Richard Wilson quoted in Letters to the Editor", 2005, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/03/letters-to-the-editor/303727/>

The Diplomat (2018), "China Postpones Military-to-Military Talks With US After CAATSA Sanctions Image Credit: Chinese Internet China Postpones Military-to-Military Talks With US After CAATSA Sanctions", September 23, 2018 [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2018, URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/china-postpones-military-to-military-talks-with-us-after-caatsa-sanctions/>

The Director of Central Intelligence, "The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventions/ Munitions July - December 1996", Federation of American Scientists [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/wmd.htm>

The Economist (2014), "What Hindu nationalism means", May 19th 2014 [Online: web] Accessed 1 November 2018, URL:<https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/05/18/what-hindu-nationalism-means>

The Economic Times (2017), "Doesn't reduce frictions, but RIC positive on ICT, N-pact with Iran", December 13, 2017.[Online: web] Accessed 12 June, 2017, URL: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/view-doesnt-reduce-frictions-but-ric-positive-on-ict-n-pact-with-iran-/articleshow/62044586.cms>

The Economic Times (2018), "Oil sales to India will continue despite US sanctions: Iran", The Economic Times, September 30, 2018.

The Financial Express(2013), "Iran Oil Sanctions: US Exempts India, China," November 30, 2013. [Online: web] Accessed 12 June, 2017, URL: www.financialexpress.com/archive/iran-oil-sanctions-us-exempts-india-china/1201601/

The Financial Express (2018), "India-US 2+2 talks: Iran sanctions, trade to top agenda" Huma Siddiqui, September 6, 2018, [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2018, URL: <https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/india-us-22-talks-iran-sanctions-trade-to-top-agenda/1304026/>

TheHindu (2010), "Unilateral sanctions on Iran will hurt India: Nirupama Rao", New Delhi, 6 July, 2010

The Hindu (2011), "French nuclear chief bats for EPR technology", November 29 2011.

The Hindu (2012) "BRICS on North Korea", 23 March, 2012[Online:web] Accessed 3 December, 2012 [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/ric-opposes-new-sanctions-on-north-korea/article3311008.ece>.

The Hindu (2014), "U.S., Allies Ask Russia to Change Course", March 26, 2014. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: www.thehindu.com/profile/author/Vladimir-Radyuhin/

The Hindu (2016), "Mongolia seeks support against China's 'blockade'", December 7, 2016

The Hindu, (2010), "Unilateral Sanctions on Iran Will Hurt India: Nirupama Rao," Sandeep, Dixit, July 6, 2010.

The Hindu, (2012) "RIC opposes new sanctions on North Korea", Vladimir Radyuhin, April 13, 2012, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/ric-opposes-new-sanctions-on-north-korea/article3311008.ece>

The Hindu, (2017), “India rules out joining NPT as non-nuclear weapon state”, October 13, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 28 July 2017, URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-rules-out-joining-npt-as-non-nuclear-weapon-state/article19855611.ece>

The Indian Express (2014), “India Not to Support Western Sanctions against Russia,” March 19, 2014. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-not-to-support-western-sanctions-against-russia/>

The Indian Express (2016), “British reduced India to one of the poorest countries: Shashi Tharoor” December 21, 2016

The Mint (2017), “Decoding RSS ideologue M.S. Golwalkar’s nationalism”, Manu S Pillai, July 15 2017.

The Reuters (2015). “India skips Iran oil imports in March under U.S. pressure”, Reuters , March 31, 2015, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://in.reuters.com/article/india-iran-imports/india-skips-iran-oil-imports-in-march-under-u-s-pressure-idINKBN0MR0WT20150331>

The Reuters (2017) “India defends ties with North Korea in talks with Tillerson” Reuters , Jonathan Landay, Aditya Kalra, October 25, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://in.reuters.com/article/tillerson-asia-india-northkorea/india-defends-ties-with-north-korea-in-talks-with-tillerson-idINKBN1CU0XZ>

The Telegraph (2010), “UN lifts Iraq nuclear weapons sanctions” *The Telegraph*, 15 Dec 2010, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/8204606/UN-lifts-Iraq-nuclear-weapons-sanctions.html>

The Telegraph (2016), “India insists it still wants back crown jewel Kohinoor diamond”, April 19, 2016 , [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/19/india-insists-it-still-wants-back-crown-jewel-koh-i-noor-diamond/>

The Times of India (2006), “India disappointed at Saddam Hussein's hanging” December 30, 2006 [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India-disappointed-at-Saddam-Husseins-hanging/articleshow/995833.cms>

The Times of India (2007), "India Dismisses NPT as 'Flawed' Treaty," March 23, 2007 [Online: web] Accessed 1 November 2018, URL: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/India-dismisses-NPT-as-flawed-treaty/articleshow/1799434.cms?referral=PM>

_____ (2013), “India Must Impose Sanctions on Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu Governor Says,” February 1, 2013. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: www.weeklytimesofindia.com/india-news/india-must-impose-sanctions-on-sri-lanka-tamil-nadu-governor-says/ (accessed on June 22, 2017). □

Tibet Sun Newsroom (2017), “Dalai Lama cancels Botswana visit citing exhaustion”, McLEOD GANJ, India, 12 August 2017

Times of Israel (2017) “5 years on, IAF pilots recall daring mission to bomb Saddam’s nuke reactor” [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/35-years-on-iaf-pilots-recall-daring-mission-to-bomb-saddams-nuke-reactor/>

Tisdall, Simon (2012), “China and Japan: a dangerous standoff over the Senkaku islands”, *The Guardian* September 17, 2012 [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/17/china-japan-dangerous-standoff>

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency, 22 April 1970 [Online: web] Accessed 28 July 2017, URL: <http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf>

Tung, Chen-Yuan (2005), “The Evolution of Cross-Strait Economic Relations in the First Chen Shui-bian Administration”, Prepared for the Conference on the First Chen Shui-bian Administration, sponsored by the Harvard University and the University of London, Annapolis, Maryland, USA, May 5-8, 2005. □

*The Peterson Institute for International Economics (2012), Report on India: US assistance (1984-2001), [Online: Web] Accessed on 18 September 2014, URL: <http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/india3.cfm>.

*The Peterson Institute for International Economics Report on: Pakistan: US assistance (1984-2001), [Online Web] Accessed on 18 September 2012, URL: <http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/pakistan3.cfm>

*UN (1948) Doc. S/986, Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, Supp., September, 1948,, available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL4/809/86/PDF/NL480986.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on December 12, 2013).

*UN (2005), World Summit, Outcome (2005), paragraph 109, September 20, 2005, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/511/30/PDF/N0551130.pdf?OpenElement>

*UN (2006), Resolution 1737, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on 23 December 2006, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1737%282006%29

*UN (2009). Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) [Online Web] Accessed on 16 August 2012, URL: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/422.

*UN (2011a), Resolution 1984 (2011), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6552nd meeting, on 9 June 2011, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1984>

*UN (2011b), Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report [Online Web] Accessed on 17 October 2012, URL: <http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf>.

*UN (2012), Human rights and unilateral coercive measures draft resolution, (2012), March 15 2012. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/LTD/G12/120/71/PDF/G1212071.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on July 12, 2013). □

*UN (2006), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 (2006), July 31, 2006. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8792.doc.htm

*UNSC (1991) Resolution 687, 1991, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf>

*UNSC (1997), *Fourth Consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996)*, S/1997/779, 8 October 1997

*UNSC (2006a), “Nonproliferation” United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 [Online: web],]Accessed 3 February 2015 URL: <http://www.un.org/ga/search>

*UNSC (2006b), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 [Online: web] Accessed 8 June, 2013 , URL: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1696%282006%29 UNSC (2010), SC/10118, 15 DECEMBER 2010, SECURITY COUNCIL

*UNSC (2010a), “Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favour to 2 against, with 1 Abstention] 9 JUNE 2010, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9948.doc.htm>

*UNSC (2010b), “Security Council Takes Action to End Iraq Sanctions, Terminate Oil-For-Food Programme as Members Recognize ‘Major Changes’ Since 1990” [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10118.doc.htm>

*UNSC (1990), Resolution 661, August 2, 1990, Online: [web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL:[https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RE SOLUTION N/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR 057511.pdf?OpenElement](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RE%20SOLUTION%20N%20GEN%20NR%20575%2F11%2FIMG%2FNR%2057511.pdf?OpenElement)

*UNSC (2016), Resolution 2270 Adopted by the Security Council at its 7638th meeting, March 2, 2016, [Online Web] Accessed on 16 August 2012, URL: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2270\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2270(2016))

United States General Accounting Office Report (1992), “Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy”, Government of United States, February 19, 1992: 25. □

US Department of Defense (2001), "Proliferation: Threat and Response," January 2001, p. 40; Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenal: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2005), pp. 273-275.

US Department of State (2007), “Sanctions: Imposition and Implementation of Sanctions” November 27, 2007, Online: [web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153988.pdf>

Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, (1998), UNGA Address in UN General Assembly, 53rd Session, 24th Sept 1998, September 24, 1998, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://pminewyork.org/pdf/theme/1998.pdf>

Van Evera, Stephen (1997), *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Varadarajan, Siddharth, (2008), “NSG lifts sanctions on India,” *The Hindu*, New Delhi, September 7, 2008. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/NSG-lifts-sanctions-on-India/article15298224.ece

_____ (2017), “The Roles and Dimensions of Science and Technology in India’s Foreign Policy”, *Defence Science Journal*, 67(4):481-482

Verinder Grover (1992), *Political Thinkers of Modern India: Rammanohar Lohia: Volume 9*, Deep and Deep Publications, 54.

Vivekanand, Swami (1893), Address at the Parliament of Religions, Chicago, USA , Response to Welcome, Chicago, September 11, 1893, , [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://www.ramakrishna.org/chcgfull.htm>

_____ (2010), “India and the NPT”, *Strategic Analysis*, 3:2, March 2010, 255–271.

*Wertz, Daniel and Vaez Ali (2012), “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative analysis” Federation of American Scientists Issue Brief,

[Online Web] Accessed on 12 October 2012, URL:http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/IssueBrief-Sanctions.pdf.

*World Bank (2012), Data on Foreign Direct Investment [Online Web] Accessed on 12 November 2012, URL: http://data.worldbank.org/Indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD/view_doc.asp?symbol=SD/RES/1737%282006%296450th Meeting, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10118.doc.htm> <http://www.hyderabad.co.uk/policeaction.htm>(accessed on March 22, 2013) □

Voice of America News, (2012), “China Criticizes ‘Unilateral’ U.S. Sanctions Against Iran” January 4, 2012.

Wadan Narsey (2013), “China and India in the Fiji equation”, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for Public Policy, January 16, 2013, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/01/16/China-and-India-in-the-Fiji-equation.aspx>

Wadhva, Charan D. (1998), “Costs of Economic Sanctions: Aftermath of Pokhran”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33 (26): 1604- 1607.

Wahed, M. S. (2016). The Impact of Colonialism on 19th and Early 20th Century China. *Cambridge Journal of China Studies*, 11 (2).

Wang, Jisi, “The Logic of American Hegemony,” *American Studies Quarterly*, 17 (3):7-29.

Wang Yi (2013), “Remarks by Foreign Minister At the Luncheon of the Second World Peace Forum” MOFA, PRC, 27 June 2013, *Exploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy With Chinese Characteristics*, People’s Republic of China, 27 June 2013, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t1053908.htm>

Wang, Guangya (2008), “Security Council fails to adopt sanctions against Zimbabwe leadership as two permanent members cast negative votes”, *United Nations Security Council Press Release*, July 11, 2008. [Online: web] Accessed on 22 December, 2015, URL: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9396.doc.htm>.

Washington Post (1974), , “India Explodes A-Device, Cites 'Peaceful Use',” Lewis M. Simons, *Washington Post*, May 19, 1974

Washington Times (2001), “Beijing arms Pakistan”, August 6, 2001. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2012, URL: <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/aug/6/20010806-024754-6513>, *Washington Times*, July 16, 2013.

Watson, Joel (2004), *Strategy; An Introduction to Game Theory*, University of California, San Diego, 2004

Weiss, Leonard (2007), “US-India Nuclear Cooperation Better Later than Sooner”,

Nonproliferation Review,14 (3): 429-457.

Weitz, R. (2014) “How BRICS can advance global non-proliferation agenda. *Russian Direct*. 2014, August 13, Retrieved May 18, 2015, [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/how-brics-can-advance-global-nonproliferation-agenda>

Wheeler, Nicholas and Jan Ruzicka (2010), “The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, *International Affairs*, 86: 1

White House (2018), “President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal”, May 8, 2018 [Online: web] Accessed 3 July, 2018 URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/>

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (1999), “Iraq’s Nuclear Weapon Program Profile”, January 1, 1999. [Online: web] Accessed 3 December, 2017, URL: <https://www.wisconsinproject.org/iraqs-nuclear-weapon-program-profile/>

Wong, J. Y.(1974) “Harry Parkes and the 'Arrow' War in China” *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 9(3): 303-320.

Xi, Jinping (2017), “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China October 18, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf

Xie, Tao (2017), “Chinese Foreign Policy With Xi Jinping Characteristics”, Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy,November 20, 2017, [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017 URL: <http://carnegietsinghua.org/2017/11/20/chinese-foreign-policy-with-xi-jinping-characteristics-pub-74765>

Xinhua, (2010) “Premier Wen’s Speech at Sixth China-EU Business Summit.”, October. 6, 2010, [Online: web] Accessed 12 July 2015, URL: http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-10/08/content_13919237.htm

_____ (2012a), “China Opposes Sanctions on Iran,” Beijing, January 26, 2012. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-09/26/content_15785742.htm

_____ (2012b) “Chinese Embassy Urges Philippines to Stop Illegal Activities in China’s Territory,” April 11, 2012 [Online: web] Accessed 2 July 2015, URL: <http://en.people.cn/90883/7797368.html>

_____ (2012), “China opposes sanctions on Iran”, Beijing, January 26, 2012

_____ (2013), Xuequan, M. (2013, April 10). China urges conditions for resolving Iran nuclear issue. English News.cn. Retrieved June 7, 2015, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/10/c_124564922.htm

_____ (2014) “Chinese envoy calls for prudent, responsible attitude toward sanctions”, Beijing, November 25, 2014.

_____ (2015), “China calls for caution following new U.S. sanctions on DPRK”, Beijing, January 5, 2015.

Xinyu, Mei (2012), “Options and Rules of Economic Sanctions against Japan,” China.org.cn, September 24, 2012. www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/24/content_26613446_2.htm

Yan Xuetong (2002), *Analysis of China’s National Interests*, James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, CNS: US.

Yang Jiechi (2012), U.S. China Conference, Institute of Peace, Washington D.C. [Online: web] Accessed 12 January, 2017, URL: www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/185318.htm

Yang, Suzanne Xiao (2014), *China in UN Security Council Decision-Making on Iraq: Conflicting Understandings, Competing Preferences*, London: Routledge.

Yang, Suzanne Xiao (2014), *China in UN Security Council Decision-Making on Iraq: Conflicting Understandings, Competing Preferences*, London: Routledge.

Yitan Li, (2014), US Economic Sanctions Against China: A Cultural Explanation of Sanction Effectiveness, *Asian Perspective* 38 (2014), 311-335.

Yoho, Ted S.(2018) “China’s second century of humiliation”, Japan Times, June 27, 2018. [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2018, URL:<https://www.japan-times.co.jp/opinion/2018/06/27/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-second-century-humiliation/#.W8uS4mIzaCR>

Yunling, Zhang (1999), “Whither World Order?”, Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Science, 22 December 1999 [Online: web] Accessed 15 January 2015, URL:<http://yataisuo.cass.cn/english/articles/showcontent.asp?id=384&key=sanctions>.

Zhang, Feng (2011), “ The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations” *European Journal of International Relations* 19(2) 305–328

Zhao, Tong (2010), “Sanction Experience and Sanction Behaviour: An analysis of Chinese Perception and Behavior on Economic Sanctions,” *Contemporary Politics*, 16(3): 263-278.