


INDIA'S SUMMIT DIPLOMACY VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN, 1998-2004

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University for award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2018



Date
20/07/2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**India’s Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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For my Parents

My (late) Father, who taught me to Dream

My Mother, who gave life to that Dream

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CONTENTS

Contents

Declaration and Certificate

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

CHAPTERS

Page No.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1-20

1.1 Overview of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1998

1.2 Background of India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004

1.3 Review of Literature

1.4 Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study

1.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses

1.6 Research Methodology

1.7 Overview of the Chapters

Chapter 2: Summit Diplomacy in International Relations

21-52

2.1 Meaning and Definition

2.2 Origins and History

2.3 Key Elements of Summit Diplomacy

2.4 Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis other Diplomatic Tools

2.5 The Future of Summit Diplomacy

Chapter 3: India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Nawaz Sharif Government

53- 90

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Situating the India-Pakistan Conflict Relation

3.3 Why Summit Diplomacy?

3.4 Objectives and Motivations for the adoption of Summit Diplomacy
(Agenda to the Summit)

3.5 The Lahore Summit

- 3.5.1 Actors
- 3.5.2 Processes
- 3.5.3 Issues
- 3.5.4 Agenda
- 3.5.5 Assessment of the Lahore Summit
- 3.6 Conclusions

Chapter 4: India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Pervez Musharraf Government

91-137

- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Contextualizing the India-Pakistan conflict relations: Lahore to Agra
- 4.3 The Agra Summit
 - 4.3.1 Actors
 - 4.3.2 Agenda
 - 4.3.3 Processes
 - 4.3.4 Issues
 - 4.3.5 Assessment
- 4.4 The Islamabad Summit
 - 4.4.1 Change in Behavior: From Operation Parakram to Islamabad Summit
 - 4.4.2 Objectives, Motivations and Agenda
 - 4.4.3 Actors, Processes and Issues at Islamabad summit
 - 4.4.4 Assessment of the Islamabad summit
- 4.5 Conclusions

Chapter 5: Assessments and Findings

138-157

- 5.1 Summit Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool
- 5.2 India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004
- 5.3 Crisis Management versus Conflict Resolution
- 5.4 Agenda, Personality and Regime
- 5.5 Conclusions

Chapter 6: Conclusions	158- 164
References	165-174
List of Appendices	175- 189
1. Text of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1172 on International Peace and Security, S/RES/1172 (1998), adopted on 6 June 1998.	
2. Text of India-Pakistan Joint Statement, 23 September 1998	
3. Text of The Lahore Declaration, Joint Statement, Memorandum of Understanding	
4. Text of Statement issued by External Affairs and Defence Minister Shri Jaswant Singh at the Ministry of External Affairs Press Conference, July 17, 2001	
5. Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Lok Sabha on his two day visit to Jammu & Kashmir, April 22, 2003	
6. Text of India-Pakistan Joint Press Statement, Islamabad, January 06, 2004	

Abbreviations

List of abbreviations used in the thesis

AIADMK	All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CBT	Cross Border Terrorism
CCS	Cabinet Committee on Security
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CGS	Chief of General Staff
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSBMs	Confidence and Security Building Measures
FAR	Foreign Affairs Record
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JeI	Jamat-e-Islami
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC	Line of Control
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NCBMs	Nuclear Confidence Building Measures
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NFU	No-First-Use
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Advisor
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

VHP

Vishwa Hindu Parishad

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1998

India-Pakistan relations have been defined by conflict and enmity ever since the birth of the two states in 1947 at the end of the British colonialism in the Indian sub-continent as a result nationalist movements in the country and the changed scenario in international relations after the end of the World War II. The two nations (states) came about as a result of the inability of the freedom fighters to reconcile along religious lines: the Hindus and the Muslims and the resultant creation of the two states; India for the Hindus and Pakistan for the Muslims of the subcontinent. As such, the relation between the two states has been defined by conflict, rivalry, and enmity.

The two neighbours have already fought three wars (1947-48, 1965 and 1971), one limited war (Kargil 1999) and endless skirmishes along the border and cross-border terrorism. Conflicts and tensions between the two states have been a constant with the occasional respite from time to time. The introduction of the nuclear weapons in the region with the nuclear tests first by India and followed by Pakistan added a new dimension to the conflict dynamic of South Asia. The nuclear tests raised the stakes of the India-Pakistan conflict and added an element of imminent doom in the event of a war between the two countries. This also created a sense of urgency for the leaders of both countries to meet and negotiate and made the international community to put pressure on the two countries to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries.

Foreign policy doctrines are largely defined by continuity rather than change and India's foreign policy doctrine and decision-making is no exception although the packaging and approaches adopted to achieve defined foreign policy objectives can vary. Most foreign policy doctrines have been defined and shaped by the early years of India's independence and Nehru's vision and influence weigh heavily on India's foreign policy-making even now although other political parties and regimes claims otherwise. Having said that, we can see a very slow and gradual change in India's foreign in general and India's Pakistan

policy. Most of the changes in India's foreign policy have been injected by the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

India's foreign policy soon after the independence and into the Cold War was defined by the need for preserving India's autonomy in its foreign policy decision-making with occasional issue-based alignment and effectively remaining out of the two power blocs. With the end of the Cold War, India has gone through significant foreign policy orientations which have become the bedrock of important foreign policy outputs that we see today. Important policy re-orientations post-Cold War includes the liberalization of the economy and opening up of markets, re-defining relations with China by getting China to legally commit on the status quo of the Indo-China border and thus ensuring stable relations with China while the two countries try to resolve the border on incremental basis; the successful courting with the United States of America culminating in the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal; and most importantly broadening India's foreign policy objectives and options beyond the region (South Asia). Such a shift and re-orientation in foreign policy necessitated by the end of the Cold War was designed and implemented by some of India's finest leaders of the time including Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, Finance Minister (and later Prime Minister) Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh, India's Foreign Minister at a very crucial time. Shivshankar Menon in his book *Choices Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy* argued that these leaders "brought abundant intellectual capital to the tasks of remaking India's policies to fit the changed situation" (Menon 2016:4).

An important aspect of the broadening foreign policy objectives and options beyond the region includes India developing a Pakistan-proof policy. This means the moving away from a Pakistan-centric policy and as a result a declining influence of Pakistan on India's foreign policymaking. As former Prime Minister Vajpayee succinctly pointed out in his speech at the dawn of the new millennium that terrorism (emphasis on Pakistan sponsored terrorism) is just one issue that a strong India has to deal. This shows a great maturity of India's foreign policy.

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government came to power at the centre in 1998 with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the helm and A.B. Vajpayee as its Prime

Minister. The NDA rule was very eventful and important policy decision making which would continue to shape India's foreign policy in the long term took place during the period. The NDA witnessed India's overt nuclearization (1998 nuclear tests), a limited war fought under the shadow of nuclear weapons (Kargil War), the largest military mobilization post-1971 War (Operation Parakram) and the increasing level of cross-border terrorism (CBT) both in number and degree.

The endless conflict and tussle between the two states have been defined by experts in different ways: conflict unending, enduring conflict, sibling rivalry, and so on. This shows the interest of scholars and academicians on the study of conflict and rivalry in the region. This study is an attempt at understanding the process of India's negotiation with Pakistan during the NDA I regime (1998-2004) through the lens of summit diplomacy (negotiation at the highest political level)

1.2 Background of India's Summit Diplomacy vis-a-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004

The study looks at India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan during the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments, 1998-2004. The study is an attempt to investigate whether the NDA government adopted summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan as a crisis management tool or conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. It also analyzed whether the success or failure of India's summit diplomacy was determined by the presence or absence of a substantive agenda to the summit or regime type and the personality of the leader. The study is a diplomatic history project and traces the process of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan during the NDA governments, 1998-2004. It, in particular, examine the factors and motivations that led the NDA governments to adopt summit diplomacy as a principal tool of engagement vis-à-vis Pakistan and the reasons and factors that contributed to the failure and success of India's summit diplomacy during the period.

Summit diplomacy has been an important tool of carrying out interstate (between empires in olden times) relations and has predated the existence of regular diplomatic channels and exchanges where princes/political leaders met on different occasions (weddings,

funerals, coronations and sometimes meetings specially arranged for leaders) to discuss and decide matters concerning their states/empires (Roetter 1965). The emergence of resident commissioners and other regular diplomatic channels in the fifteenth century led to the decline of summit diplomacy. However, summit diplomacy as a tool for conducting foreign policy gained ground in the twentieth century. Summit diplomacy has become a very important tool in conducting foreign policy in the present world and “it is safe to assume that summitry will continue to transform in the twenty-first century” (Melissen 2004). Summit diplomacy, as important as it is, is strangely a neglected field of study (Reynolds 2007). It has come under scrutiny from all quarters and yet it has not only managed to survive the onslaught but have become an integral part of the larger diplomatic processes and is likely to increase in the future (Feilleux 2010). This calls for an in-depth and systematic study of summit diplomacy as one of the principal tools of diplomatic relations.

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government which was headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its use and practice of summit diplomacy in its relations with Pakistan provides a very interesting point of the study. The BJP as a political party put a lot of emphasis on ‘Hindu Nationalism’ and its ideology revolves around the notion of a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ and the Islamic state of Pakistan was perceived as its natural adversary. As such, the BJP constantly seeking to engage with Pakistan is intriguing. The study will attempt to find out the reasons as to why summit diplomacy was adopted as a principal tool of diplomatic engagement by the NDA government in its relations with Pakistan. The bold initiatives taken by the NDA government (Lahore Process) was derailed by the Pakistani intrusion into the Kargil sector and the resultant Kargil War (1999) did not prevent the NDA government from initiating such moves later (Agra Summit 2001, Islamabad 2004 between Vajpayee and Musharraf at the sidelines of SAARC Summit). The study does not in any way seek to argue that other governments did/have not make effort to engage or normalize ties with Pakistan but to find out what were the reasons that drive the NDA government to consistently engage with Pakistan. It seeks to understand factors that motivate the NDA government to pick up the threads after periods of crisis/conflict with Pakistan.

There were two bilateral summits specifically arranged to discuss or negotiate between the leaders of the two countries (Lahore 1999 and Agra 2001); three meetings at the sidelines of SAARC Summit (Colombo SAARC Summit 1998, Kathmandu SAARC Summit 2002 and Islamabad SAARC Summit 2004); and one UN General Assembly (New York 1998). There could be many reasons that motivated or compelled the NDA government to take this road of constantly seeking ways to engage with Pakistan despite many failures and setbacks. Was the use of summit diplomacy by the NDA government a conscious strategy or was it imposed upon by factors beyond its control? These moves and initiatives could be a result of international pressures, domestic compulsions or beliefs/ideology of the party or the leaders in rule. The study is an attempt to understand the factors that motivated and shaped the NDA government to adopt and practice summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan.

The study is an analysis of how effectively and successfully summit diplomacy as a diplomatic tool was used by the NDA government in its relationship with Pakistan. What are the factors that contributed to or hindered the success of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan during the NDA years (1998-2004) and how these factors came about? It is interesting to note that out of the six summits that India and Pakistan hold from 1998-2004, three summits were held between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (democratically elected civilian leader) and three were held between Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (a military chief who ousted the civilian PM through a coup in late 1999). Some of these summits were considered successful (meeting between Vajpayee and Sharif at the sideline of UN General Assembly in New York 1998, Lahore summit, Islamabad Summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf at the sidelines of SAARC summit 2004) while others did not bear any clear result (1998 Colombo meeting between Vajpayee and Sharif at the sidelines of SAARC Summit, Agra Summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf 2001, and Kathmandu summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf at the sidelines of SAARC summit).

1.3 Review of Literature

The review of literature will begin by looking at the concepts and practice of summit diplomacy in international relations. The second part will examine the literature that deals with the history and practice of India's summit diplomacy. The third part will look at the literature on India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan during the NDA governments, 1998-2004. The last part will identify and analyze the literature on the causes and factors for the success or failure of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004.

1.3.1 Concept and Practice of Summit Diplomacy in International Relations

Summit diplomacy has been defined and interpreted differently by different people. It has been defined by David H. Dunn as “the meeting of political leaders for official purposes, an activity which constitutes diplomacy at the highest level” (Dunn 1996: 20). Another definition is that of Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. who defined summit diplomacy as “meetings held, for the real or nominal purpose of negotiation, between heads of governments rather than their subordinates” (Fairbanks 1988: 69). The significance or the distinguishing feature that makes summit diplomacy unique from other diplomatic tools is attached to the fact that since the “main actors are heads of state, summits become dramatic and unusually public diplomatic events” and because of “this high level character summits also offer the possibility of resolving problems that only top-level leaders have the authority to decide” (Fairbanks 1988: 71). He further argued that for a summit to be successful, it must have “a specific purpose”. He argued that “if one side has a definite purpose and the other brings no agenda, simply hoping to emerge from the meeting as advantageously as possible, the side with a clear purpose will have an enormous advantage” (Fairbanks 1988: 81).

Jean Robert Leaguey-Feilleux (2010: 05) argued that summit interactions usually serve as diplomatic means to put together a negotiated treaty (negotiated at the lower level). Top leaders do not have time to negotiate the minute details and therefore when an agreement is reached between two parties, the chief executives usually meet to “formalize this accomplishment and sign the document”. In reality, it is just a symbolic and ceremonial function (Feilleux 2010: 305). Heads of states visiting each other have always been a part

of statecraft “plotting together, negotiating alliances and otherwise trying to find support from other potentates” although these acts and practices may not be perceived as diplomacy” (Feilleux 2010: 293).

Charles Roetter traces the origin of the history and practice of summit diplomacy and argued that summit meetings between leaders at the highest levels predate the establishment of resident embassies which started in the fifteenth century. He further added that the meeting of leaders takes place during weddings, funerals and sometimes specially arranged (Roetter 1965: 199). As such; summitry is not new and has been there as early as and even before the establishment of the regular diplomatic establishment. Summit diplomacy has always been an important diplomatic tool; it is important too, however, note that the frequency of summits and the virtual takeover of “established and traditional mode of diplomatic discourse” is a modern phenomenon (Eban 1983: 359). The resentment and opposition for summit diplomacy have been as old as the very idea and practice and have been warned of amateurism by professionals in the field (Eban 1983: 358).

David Dunn argued that the development of summit diplomacy in the twentieth century as an institution was a very significant influence on the dialogue and relations between different states (Dunn 1996: xv). Summits also provide “opportunity for bold acts of international leadership capable of producing results which could not be accomplished at lower levels” (Dunn 1996: 251). Summits are successful when it has the “willingness of political leaders to exercise executive authority in an attempt to make a radical breakthrough on a particular issue area” like the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November 1986 (Dunn 1996: 251). Françoise de Callières writing in the eighteenth century argued that the “passion of princes and of their ministers often overrule their interests” (cited in Dunn 1996: 4).

David Reynolds (2007) categorized summit meetings into three types: 1) Personal Summits- in “which the main object was to forge a relationship between the two leaders” like the Chamberlain-Hitler (1938) meeting and Kennedy-Khrushchev 1961 meeting (Reynolds 2007: 7). Plenary Summit is one where “the dynamics of personal encounter are balanced and complemented by the presence of specialist advisors and there is also a

concerted effort to resolve substantive problems” like the Yalta 1945 and the Camp David 1978 meetings (Reynolds 2007: 7). 3) Progressive Summit which involves “personal and plenary elements but in addition the single meeting became part of a series, both between leaders and also among lower-level specialists” (Reynolds 2007:8). Summitry, though varied, usually involves three stages “preparation, negotiation and implementation” (Reynolds 2007: 10). The preparation stage would consist of sorting out “how leaders get to the summit and what baggage they take with them” (Reynolds 2007: 10). Negotiation would mean the process of engaging “with each other and how well they withstand the rigors of high altitude personal diplomacy” (Reynolds 2007: 10). Implementation would mean “how well the parties carry forward their agreed terms and how well the agreements/achievements are received by sceptical, sometimes hostile, audiences at home and among allies” (Reynolds 2007: 10).

1.3.2 History of India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan

Stephen P. Cohen argued that the relations between India and Pakistan are "far from static" and fluctuates “generating new aspects and complications giving rise to cautious optimism, but also feeding uncertainty” (Cohen 2013: 1). The addition of nuclear weapons, he argued, to the conflict dynamics of India and Pakistan “raised the stakes but reduced the chances of a new conflict” (Cohen 2013:1). The reason according to him for the endurance of conflict or the inability to resolve the Kashmir (which is both the cause and effect of India-Pakistan conflict) between India and Pakistan is contributed by the “fact that stalemate is more attractive to each side than some solutions that have been put forward” (Cohen 2002: 56). For instance, when talks began between the two countries at the Foreign Secretary-level in July 1990, “the Indian preconditions for normalization were to be Pakistani statements dissociating the country from subversive activities in Kashmir, extraditing fugitives, and ceasing funding for separatist' activities in Kashmir” and of course, “Pakistan replied that discussions on Kashmir were its own preconditions” (Cohen 2013: 26). The inability of both sides to bend and compromise positions made negotiation and conflict resolution between the two countries extremely difficult.

Though the India-Pakistan relations have been dominated by conflict and tension it is not all. Accordingly, Manju Parikh argues that “it is all too easy to assume that the relations

between India and Pakistan are impeccably hostile” (Parikh 2005) and we often fail to see that India and Pakistan also have negotiated agreements and areas of cooperation. He further argued that the “lack of trust” between India and Pakistan “is based on each side’s perceptions of its own vulnerability and the other’s lack of good faith” (Parikh 2005).

Dennis Kux argued that if there is any lesson to be learned from history about normalizing India-Pakistan relation is that “vigorous, innovative, and sustained leadership will be required of both India and Pakistan to achieve tangible, across-the-board improvement in bilateral relations” (Kux 2006: ix). He studied the major negotiation initiatives between India and Pakistan and categorised the major India-Pakistan Negotiation (summits) into three groups. He accordingly argued that the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and 1962 attempt to solve the Kashmir problem as “problem-solving Negotiation”, the 1966 Tashkent Declaration and 1972 Shimla Agreement as “Post-Conflict Negotiation” while the 1999 Lahore and 2001 Agra Summits as “Talk About Talks” (Kux 2006:x).

The core issue surrounding India’s summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan has changed and evolved over time. For instance, the Tashkent Declaration which brought an end to the 1965 India- Pakistan War placed a lot of emphasis on peaceful and good neighbourly relationship between the two countries. The Shimla summit focused on the repatriation and exchange of prisoners of war. The engagement between India and Pakistan are a result of “fear rather than opportunity” (Cohen 2013: 148) and this explains the lack of motivation and political will to bring about a solution to the enduring India-Pakistan conflict. Time and again the leadership of India and Pakistan have tried their hands at solving the crisis. It was one of those attempts when Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif tried to end the conflict through the Lahore Process. After the Lahore process was derailed by the Pakistani intrusion into the Line of Control (LOC) and the ensuing Kargil War 1999, India-Pakistan relations deteriorated and it took three long years to start the dialogue.

1.3.3 India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004

In the context of the changes and continuity in India's foreign policy under the National Democratic Alliance governments Kanti Bajpai argued that "the Indian government under the BJP led NDA has adopted a foreign policy approach which emphasises decisiveness and departures (from established patterns and styles), then finds itself under criticism or is underprepared in dealing with the consequences of its decisions, and finally begins to lose momentum or to develop self-doubts along the way, leaving the country without a firm sense of what it is trying to achieve and why" (Bajpai 2002:1).

Mubeen Adnan is of the view that summit diplomacy between India and Pakistan are usually used as tools to normalize ties after "periods of tensions" (Adnan 2013: 179) and are many times the result of external pressure to normalize ties. For example, the Lahore Summit was a result of the meeting US Ambassador Frank G. Wisner and Nawaz Sharif in 1996 where Wisner in some way pressurised Sharif to negotiate with India (Adnan 2013: 181). This was then carried forward when Indian Prime Minister Inder Gujral and Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met in Male in 1997 and agreed upon forming Joint Working Group on all outstanding issues including a separate one on Kashmir (Adnan 2013: 182). After the change in government in India, the pace slowed down by some degree as nothing came out of the first meeting between Vajpayee and Sharif in Colombo 1998 at the sidelines of the SAARC Summit. After the nuclear explosions, both India and Pakistan were keen to normalise ties both because of the mounting international pressure and also the strong conviction of the Prime Ministers in peace initiatives to stabilise ties. Many argued that the first major summit (Lahore, major because it was specially arranged for this) between Vajpayee and Sharif was a result of the strong conviction of the two leaders for better relations between India and Pakistan.

Jaswant Singh, the then India's Minister of External Affairs, recorded vividly in his memoir *A Call to Honor in the Service of India* the process leading up to the Lahore Summit. During a meeting between Vajpayee and Sharif in New York in 1998 at the sideline of the UN General Assembly, the Delhi- Lahore Bus project was proposed. The

idea was very well taken by the two prime ministers and thus was “born the Lahore bus project” (Singh 2006: 191). Soon after the meeting, the Pakistani government issued a press statement describing the meeting as “very friendly and cordial” (Singh 2006: 191). The Lahore Summit came to a close with the conclusion of three documents: The Lahore Declaration, a Joint Statement of the two Prime Ministers, and a Memorandum of Understanding between the two Foreign Secretaries (Singh 2006: 197). The Lahore process was derailed by the Kargil crisis over Pakistani intrusion into the Indian side of the Line-of-Control (LoC) and the subsequent overthrow of the civilian government in Pakistan when General Pervez Musharraf replaced Nawaz Sharif in a coup in October 1999. From the Kargil crisis till the Agra summit there was a period of diplomatic stalemate as there were no official efforts taken to normalise ties between the two countries.

Another significant summit between India and Pakistan during the NDA tenure was the much-hyped two days Agra summit held from 15-16 July 2001 at Agra. The Vajpayee's government inviting Musharraf for talks “marked a significant shift in its Pakistan's policy” (Yadav 2005: 98) especially after its openly declared stand to not engage with a military regime which ousted a democratically elected government. The summit was described by many as a total fiasco as the two countries couldn't agree on a joint declaration or a joint press statement. But a large section of analysts and commentators argued that the Agra Summit was successful in its own way and merit appreciation. It ended a long period of diplomatic stalemate. This argument found resonance in J.K. Baral's article titled “The Agra Summit”. He analysed the Agra summit and argued that “although the summit failed in terms of achieving a breakthrough, it succeeded in bringing the two adversaries to the negotiating table” (Baral 2002: 289). It created “goodwill after the Kargil War which had frozen their relations” (Adnan 2013, Singh 2006).

Kanti Bajpai argued that one of the major learnings for India from the Agra Summit is that “there must be an agenda for India Pakistan summits, and pre-negotiations between senior officials and leaders (perhaps a special envoy) should help define that agenda. We cannot negotiate with the Pakistanis without doing a lot of homework. In particular, we

must know how far we are prepared to go “it is not clear that the Prime Minister and his team had done enough on this score in the lead up to Agra” (Bajpai 2002:6).

1.3.4 Causes and Factors for the success or failure of India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004

The major thrusts of conflict between India Pakistan during the period were based on Cross-Border Terrorism (CBT) and the unresolved Kashmir issue. It can be accordingly argued that the success or failure of India's summit diplomacy depended on how these two issues were handled and managed by the two countries. The first summit level between India and Pakistan during the NDA government took place at the sidelines of the Colombo SAARC Summit in 1998 between Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. Harinder Baweja and Zahid Hussain argued that the meeting did not bear any result because of the inflexible positions held by both sides. While India stood for a broad-based composite dialogue, Pakistan wanted the resolution of the Kashmir issue as a starting point for dialogue and normalizing ties with India (Baweja and Hussain 1998). It was, as such, no wonder that the talks terribly failed. The next meeting between the two leaders took place at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (September 1998). It was here that the two leaders agreed to hold the Lahore Summit and necessary preparations were made by the Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of the two countries.

Talat Farooq and Nicholas J. Wheeler argued that the India-Pakistan negotiations have been stalled for months because of “Pakistan's determination to link the progress in the bilateral relationship to concessions on Kashmir” (Farooq and Wheeler 2015). During the Lahore summit, Nawaz Sharif “took the courageous step of breaking this linkage and his government signed the Lahore Declaration” and this explains the success of the Lahore summit, the “most comprehensive set of nuclear confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) between the two countries” (Farooq and Wheeler 2015). Sharif's willingness to take this risk, according to Wheeler and Farooq, was contributed by the trust he and Vajpayee had developed over the months and based on the promises made by

Vajpayee during their meeting in New York “to deliver progress on Kashmir” (Farooq and Wheeler 2015).

Kanchan Yadav in “India-Pakistan Negotiation on Kashmir since the Simla Agreement (1972)” argued that the most significant aspect about the Lahore Declaration is that “it was formulated keeping in mind the realities of domestic politics of both the countries” (Yadav 2005: 89) and thus led to the success of the summit. Kashmir was highlighted as one of the outstanding issues to accommodate Pakistan’s domestic compulsions and accordingly, India's concern on Cross-Border Terrorism was addressed very significantly though very lightly. It reads as “the two countries shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs” (Yadav 2005: 90).

According to C. Raja Mohan, Kargil occurred because India underestimated “the impact of the Indian peace initiative on the internal political dynamics of Pakistan” as “many ideological and militarist elements in the Pakistani establishment are frightened by the thought of peace with India and what it could do to their dominance of politics and society in that nation” (Mohan 2010). This fear aggravated during Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore and “they struck back in no time to produce the Kargil confrontation” (Mohan 2000).

According to J.N. Dixit, Prime Minister Vajpayee was “not keen on a bilateral summit with Musharraf in India” and wanted to “recommence such contacts at the margins of the SAARC summit and the UN General Assembly session, then scheduled in December and September respectively” (Dixit 2002: 401). The Agra summit was brought upon by L. K. Advani and other cabinet members to show something “bold and dramatic in a bilateral framework so that India and Pakistan could break out of the logjam since the Kargil War of 1999” (Dixit 2002: 402). Vajpayee wanted to portray India as a country “committed to peaceful means, even when its unity and territorial integrity stood threatened by the continuing adversarial attitude of Pakistan” while Musharraf wanted to use the summit to legitimise himself as the “political and institutional” head of Pakistan (Dixit 2002: 409). This dichotomy of objectives effectively led to the inconclusive nature of the Agra Summit.

J.K. Baral argued that Musharraf before coming to India for the Agra summit has made it very clear that it has to be Kashmir that has to be settled before any meaningful engagements between India and Pakistan found resonance across the different sections of the society (Baral 2002: 292, Adnan 2013: 190). Knowingly India went ahead with the summit which was bound to fail. Jaswant Singh in his memoir *A Call to Honor in the Service of India* argued that an agreement couldn't be reached because the Pakistani team refused to include terrorism as a major issue which needs to be resolved (Singh 2006: 259). Some American experts on South Asian affairs argued that the Agra Summit was "pre-emptive diplomatic strike" on the part of the Indian government (cited in Cohen 2001: 48, Baral 2002: 292) to ward off possible external intervention.

The second meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf took place in Kathmandu on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit (3-6 January 2002). Both the parties were not ready to change their Agra positions. In fact, the Indian stand on Cross-Border Terrorism became the central issue after the December Parliament terror attack. As a result, no agreements could be reached between the two. The last such meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf before the NDA government lost the 2004 election took place in Islamabad at the sideline of the SAARC Summit (4-6 January 2004). The two leaders welcomed the recent trends of normalisation of relations between the two countries and issued a Joint Press Statement. Vajpayee emphasised that hostility, violence, and terrorism should be prevented for a sustained dialogue while Musharraf assured that such acts will not be permitted. The two leaders also agreed to commence the composite dialogue (MEA Annual Report 2003-04). Many strategists and analysts see the Islamabad Statement as a great success for India more important than the Lahore Declaration itself as Musharraf publicly agreed not to allow Pakistan to be used for terrorist purposes (Bidwai 2004). It may be argued that the success of Islamabad was in many ways made possible by the domestic scene in Pakistan.

There has been so much work done on India-Pakistan relations especially in the field of conflicts and nuclear security. Strangely there is a dearth of literature in the field of summit diplomacy (negotiation) which is the key to resolve conflicts and security issues. The scarcely available literature only looks at the objective results and how it impacts the

conflict dynamics without going into detail the process involved or the factors that condition in reaching such result or conclusion. This study seeks to understand the complexities involved in summit diplomacy and trace the processes that summit diplomacy goes through to emerge as one in the India-Pakistan context.

1.4 Definition, Rationale, and Scope of the Study

Summit diplomacy is the meeting between leaders at the highest level to discuss and decide on matters that concern their states. Summit diplomacy has been defined and interpreted differently by different people. For the purpose of this study, two definitions are particularly relevant. The first is the one given by David H. Dunn as “the meeting of political leaders for official purposes, an activity which constitutes diplomacy at the highest level” (Dunn 1996: 20). The second is that of Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. who defined summit diplomacy as “meetings held, for the real or nominal purpose of negotiation, between heads of governments rather than their subordinates” (Fairbanks 1988: 69).

The NDA, a coalition under the leadership of the BJP, came to power in 1998 general election but was forced to face another election when one of its constituent allies (AIADMK) walked out of the coalition. The NDA won the 1999 elections with more seats and ruled the country till the next election in 2004 and became the first non-Congress government to complete a full five-year term. The NDA, while trying to maintain an image of a strong posture (1998 nuclear tests, Operation Parakram) continually sought to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table through summit diplomacy (Lahore, Agra, Islamabad, etc.). The history and credibility of the BJP as a party made the study more interesting. The BJP was seen by many as a ‘realist alternative’ to the ‘idealist’ (Nehruvian) previous governments at the centre. The BJP with its Hindutva credibility and its engagement with Pakistan is an interesting point of the study. Whether the adoption of summit diplomacy by the NDA governments in its relations with Pakistan was contributed by the personality of the leaders? Whether summit diplomacy remains

the only suitable choice available to the government at that time or was it preferred over other diplomatic tools? The study intends to find answers to such questions.

There has been so much work done on the politics of the world both at the domestic and international level but “there has been surprisingly little attention devoted to the institution of the summit meeting” (Dunn 1996: xii). In particular, there is virtually no work done on the practice and pursuit of summit diplomacy by India. Summit diplomacy is “an important subject that has been strangely neglected by scholars and pundits” (Reynolds 2007: 10). Summit diplomacy has become an important and a common diplomatic tool of the “larger diplomatic processes” and is likely to increase in the future (Feilleux 2010: 312). As rightly pointed out by Jan Melissen “summitry is unlikely to disappear and it is safe to assume that summitry will continue to transform in the twenty-first century” (Melissen 2004: 195). Summit diplomacy has become a regular phenomenon in the Indian diplomatic discourse and it is important that systematic works on the dynamics and processes governing summit diplomacy be undertaken.

The use of summit diplomacy by the National Democratic Alliance governments as a major diplomatic tool vis-à-vis Pakistan presents a very interesting point of the study. It is surprising that when India and Pakistan constitute nearly 20 percent of humanity and both are nuclear weapon states and yet no sustained or systematic work has been done on their negotiating experience which is the key to bring stability in the region or normalize ties between the two countries while so much work being done on Kashmir dispute and nuclear weapons (Kux 2006: ix).

The scope will be limited to the study of India’s summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan under the National Democratic Alliance governments, 1998-2004. In many cases, the “the diplomatic work done at the ministerial level is comparable to summit diplomacy” as Ministers of different departments are chief executive in their respective departments or fields “although their actual powers will vary with the political system” (Feilleux 2010: 293). For the purpose of this study, only the interactions or meetings at the highest political level, that is the head of state (between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif before the 1999 coup in Pakistan and between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf after the 1999 coup in Pakistan) will be studied. There were six summit level

meetings between India and Pakistan from 1998 to 2004. Three of which were held between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif namely the Colombo July 1998 (at the sidelines of the Tenth SAARC Summit), New York September 1998 (at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly), and the Lahore Summit February 1999. Three meetings were held between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf namely Kathmandu January 2002 (at the sidelines of the Eleventh SAARC Summit), Agra Summit July 2001, and Islamabad January 2004 (at the sidelines of the Twelfth SAARC Summit).

The study has focussed only on three summits: Lahore, Agra, and Islamabad. This is not to say that the other meetings were not important but have been considered as part of the process leading up to the major summits. As such, Colombo meeting at the sidelines of SAARC summit and New York meeting at the sidelines of UNGA has been regarded as a part of the Lahore Summit while the Kathmandu meeting is considered as part of a failed attempt and re-engaging.

1.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses

1.5.1 Research Questions

In order to understand India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan from 1998 to 2004, the following research questions have been raised in the study.

1. How did summit diplomacy shape India-Pakistan relations during the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments' era, 1998-2004?
2. Was the use of summit diplomacy by the NDA governments (1998-2004), a conscious strategy or was it compelled to do so?
3. Why did the NDA governments (1998-2004) prefer to use summit diplomacy as an important tool in its relations with Pakistan?
4. Why did the use of summit diplomacy by the NDA governments (1998-2004) fail to resolve India-Pakistan conflict?
5. Does the regime type or the agenda of the summit influence the outcomes of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan during the NDA (1998-2004) era?

1.5.2 Hypotheses

At the beginning of the study, the following hypotheses have been proposed in the context of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004.

1. NDA's choice for summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan was largely dictated by the need for crisis management rather than conflict resolution.
2. Lack of substantive agenda rather than the personality or regime type determines the process and outcome of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan under the NDA governments, 1998-2004.

1.6 Research Methodology

The thesis has been written by employing a qualitative method to understand the use of summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan as a foreign policy tool by the National Democratic Alliance governments from 1998 to 2004. The study uses the concepts and practice of summit diplomacy in international politics and uses them to explain India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan.

The study investigated the outcome process of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan by employing process tracing method. It traces the process of how summit diplomacy as a diplomatic tool is conceived and put into practice and what are the processes involved and the factors that govern the dynamics of the outcome. The use of Process Tracing method enabled the study to trace the causal mechanism of the adoption of summit diplomacy by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government and the resultant outcome. The use of process tracing method also shed light on important yet unnoticed areas and factors that conditioned or influenced the outcome.

The study uses both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources consist of government documents like declarations, interview transcripts, memoirs, press release,

joint statements, memoirs, reports, and so on. Secondary sources include books, journals, articles in the newspapers, magazines, papers presented at conferences, scholarly debates, etc on the subject.

Personal interviews were conducted in the process of the study with diplomats and experts who were actually involved in the process of India's summit diplomacy vis-s-vis Pakistan from 1998 to 2004. The information and opinions gathered from the interview were then used in verifying the existing literature and more importantly to reflect the finer details which did not come out at the time or in existing literature. This was then carefully analysed and used to interpret the process and outcome of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan during the National Democratic Alliance government, 1998-2004.

1.7 Chapterization

The thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter One introduces the study and set the framework of the study. It begins with an overview of India's foreign policy since the independence up till the NDA era and laid out the background under the NDA government adopted summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool in its relations with Pakistan. The chapter then gives an overview of the existing literature and the literature gap on the subject. It also highlighted the research questions and the proposed hypotheses at the beginning of the study. The chapter ends with a note on the research methodology adopted in conducting this study.

The following chapter that is Chapter two look at summit diplomacy in international relations. The chapter begins by examining the meaning and definition to understand the concept of summit diplomacy. It then looks at the origins and history of summit diplomacy by looking at its use as a tool for conducting inter-state relations and the factors that contributed to its demise and the regaining of significance in international relations. The next section looks at the key elements of summit diplomacy and the conditions that constitute summit diplomacy. It then moves on to examine the strengths and weaknesses of summit diplomacy as a diplomatic tool and the debates surrounding

the institution of summit diplomacy. The next section raised the question on the future of summit diplomacy as a diplomatic tool and end with concluding remarks.

Chapter three is titled India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Nawaz Sharif government. As the name suggests this chapter looks at the summit meetings that took place between PM Vajpayee and PM Nawaz Sharif. It starts by analysing the conflict relations between India and Pakistan and situating the dynamics at the time under which the NDA came to power and adopted summit diplomacy in its relations with Pakistan. It then moves on to examine the actors, issues, process, agenda/objectives and assessment of summit meetings between Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif.

Chapter Four looks at India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis Musharraf government. As such, the chapter looks at the summit meetings between PM Vajpayee and President Musharraf by examining the actors, process, and agenda of the summits. This chapter also reflects the change in the issues and agendas to the summit with the change in the government in Pakistan and the changed international scenario especially in the global narrative on terrorism post 9/11.

Chapter five is titled Assessment and Findings. This chapter brings out the assessment and findings gathered during the course of the study. It also reflects the changes in position/argument in the study from the proposed study.

Chapter six is the concluding chapter. It brings out the conclusions and observations of the study.

CHAPTER 2: SUMMIT DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This chapter will look into the concepts and practice of summit diplomacy in international relations. It will examine the origin and usage, and the important components of summit diplomacy. The chapter will be broadly divided into five sections based on themes of summit diplomacy. The first section will look at the meaning and definition of summit diplomacy. This section will give a brief overview of the idea and meaning of summit diplomacy. It will analyze the different understandings of summit diplomacy. The second section will examine the origin and history of summit diplomacy. This section will look into the origin of summit diplomacy and also examine important or defining events in history where summit diplomacy was practiced. It will also examine the factors that contributed to the growth of summit diplomacy in international relations. The third section will look at the key elements of summit diplomacy. It will examine the categorizations of summit diplomacy based on purpose, themes, etc. This section will also examine the process or stages of summit diplomacy. Important stages in summit diplomacy include setting the agenda, planning the actual meeting, the meeting, the implementation, and follow up. The fourth section will examine and compare summit diplomacy vis-à-vis other diplomatic tools. It will analyze the uniqueness, strengths, and weaknesses of summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. The executive participation which is *diplomacy at the highest* level and the person to person contact of chief negotiators where the personality and background come into play will be studied here. This section will also underline the impact of summit diplomacy to the larger discourse of diplomacy and how well it fared in comparison to other diplomatic tools. It will try to bring out the debate or tension between the proponents and opponents of summit diplomacy. The fifth section will try to attempt a study on the future of summits; to look at the future prospects of summit diplomacy, about its survivability or gaining dominance as a diplomatic tool.

2.1 Meaning and Definition

There is a new trend of diplomacy in the world today which takes place between leaders and decision-makers who are not part of the traditional definition of diplomats or professional diplomats (Leguey-Feilleux 2010). This is changing the pattern and boundary of the conduct of diplomacy in international relations. This diplomatic interaction at the level of decision-makers has been called by David Dunn (1996) as “summit diplomacy”; that is *diplomacy at the highest level*. It is a common phenomenon for heads of states or rulers to visit each other often negotiating or plotting. This type of interaction at the highest level existed in history but was not seen as diplomacy (Leguey-Feilleux 2010: 293). In fact, such summit interactions predated the growth and establishment of regular diplomatic channels in the form of resident commissioners in the fifteenth century.

Summit diplomacy has been defined and interpreted differently by different people. Because of the varied nature of summits, it is difficult to give a universal definition of summit diplomacy and draw “meaningful generalizations” (Melissen 2003: 4). In modern international relations, summits have become so frequent that it began to be seen as an ordinary diplomatic tool in modern international relations (Weilemann 2000). The frequent resort to summit diplomacy, as opposed to a diplomatic tool which is employed when other diplomatic tools have failed, makes it difficult to distinguish “between summits and other kinds of high-level meetings” (Melissen 2003: 4).

The definitions given by David H. Dunn and Charles H. Fair come nearest to a near-universal definition of summit diplomacy. David H. Dunn defined summit diplomacy as “the meeting of political leaders for official purposes, an activity which constitutes diplomacy at the highest level” (Dunn 1996: 20). Here, the emphasis is placed on the meetings at the highest political level which generally would mean the head of states (Prime Minister or President depending on the nature of the political system in the state). Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. defined summit diplomacy as “meetings held, for the real or nominal purpose of negotiation, between heads of governments rather than their subordinates” (Fairbanks 1988: 69).

Summit diplomacy as such is the meetings between the political heads of states at the highest level and other meetings held in the run-up to the summit including those of the meetings between foreign ministers do not constitute summit diplomacy even though they are crucial to the summit. From the above definitions, we can argue that summit meeting can both mean substantive negotiations between the leaders or/also remain nominal or ceremonial too.

Present day summits are largely nominal/ceremonial rather substantive negotiation between the head of states at the summit. Jean Robert Leaguey-Feilleux (2010) argued that summit interactions usually serve as diplomatic means to put together a negotiated treaty (negotiated at the lower level). Top leaders do not have time to negotiate the minute details and therefore when an agreement is reached between two parties, the chief executives usually meet to “formalize this accomplishment and sign the document” (Leaguey-Feilleux 2010: 305) and thus, in reality, have a symbolic and ceremonial function. In short, summits are usually used as starting point, to accelerate and/or put a cap to negotiations that will be carried out or to negotiations that have been conducted at lower levels.

The idea of summit diplomacy as an event is problematic but this has been followed mostly on the analytical ground. Jan Melissen explains this necessity succinctly when he argued that “limiting the definition of summitry to time that the two or more political leaders spend together, as is the case in most of the literature, seems to make sense on the analytical ground” (Melissen 2003: 7). While remembering that summit cannot be an isolated or stand-alone event, the need for the analytical purpose has to be understood too. Here the argument put forward by Hans J. Morgenthau in his famous book *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* best explains it. He argued that summits should be seen

“as instruments for the negotiated settlement of outstanding issues, summit meetings are a supplement to ordinary diplomatic procedures- they are functionally connected with those procedures. They follow ordinary diplomatic negotiations as they are followed by them, each laying the groundwork for the other” (Morgenthau 1985: 122).

From the above statement, we can argue that summit diplomacy is a part of the larger diplomatic process and not a separate thing and the groundwork for summit diplomacy are laid down by normal diplomatic processes just as summit diplomacy is employed to settle outstanding issues. Thus, summit diplomacy is used to supplement ordinary diplomatic process, usually when there is a deadlock or the necessity for something drastic and radical is felt.

Just as summit diplomacy has been defined in different ways, it is also seen and understood in different ways. In olden times, summits were part of the normal affairs of states and empires where rulers meet on occasions such as marriage, coronation, funeral, etc. and sometimes at specifically arranged meetings between rulers to plot wars, forge alliances and negotiate settlements. The decline of the summit as an often used diplomatic method came about with the establishment of the regular diplomatic channel through resident commissioners first and later in the form of ambassadors. However, summit diplomacy picked up significance during the War era. Summit diplomacy was employed as a last resort during the War period. Leaders met on several occasions to discuss and negotiate on important issues which required immediate attention and importance.

The association of summit diplomacy with 'high politics' continued during the Cold War (at the beginning and especially so when the Cold War was at its peak) but this changed towards the end of the Cold War and the agenda to the summit was widened to include low politics issues such as economic and environment. This Melissen argues is due to the "growing interdependence, issues of domestic and foreign policy were increasingly seen as interrelated and started to receive attention at the highest level" (Melissen 2003: 8). As the world progressed into the Cold War, leaders and statesmen realized the importance of new issues (earlier considered low politics) and its influence on people. As a result, issues which were earlier considered as low politics and were delegated to a lower level of negotiations began to be discussed and deliberated at the highest political level.

2.2 Origins and History

Summit diplomacy as a diplomatic tool has been used even before the establishment of the terminology of diplomacy which came after a much later and advanced stage. Records of summit diplomacy in the past can be found in the meetings and consultations between kings and princes during the medieval and early modern times, concerts and congresses, and the meetings between great powers (Goldstein 1996: 23). Summits are not a modern day invention and have been used and are as old as the human history itself. We have records in history where kings/princes/chiefs came together both in bilateral level and at the sidelines of other multilateral events which usually are royal coronations, marriages and funerals “to settle disputes or make peace” (Weilemann 2000). Heads of states visiting each other have always been a part of statecraft while “plotting together, negotiating alliances and otherwise trying to find support from other potentates” although these acts and practices may not be perceived as diplomacy” (Leguey-Feilleux 2010: 293).

Charles Roetter traces the origin of the history and practice of summit diplomacy and argued that summit meetings between leaders at the highest levels predate the establishment of resident embassies which started in the fifteenth century. Summit diplomacy has been an important tool of carrying out interstate (between empires in olden times) relations and has predated the existence of regular diplomatic channels and exchanges where princes/political leaders met on different occasions (weddings, funerals, coronations and sometimes meetings specially arranged for leaders) to discuss and decide matters concerning their states/empires (Roetter 1965: 199). The emergence of resident commissioners and other regular diplomatic channels in the fifteenth century led to the decline of summit diplomacy. However, summit diplomacy as a tool for conducting foreign policy gained ground in the twentieth century.

Leaders and heads of states in modern times meet frequently at multilateral events like the United Nations General Assembly sessions and sometimes specifically arranged bilateral summits. Even the so-called private meetings between rulers were common as they were “linked through marriage and other familial bonds” (Weilemann 2000).

One of the major obstacles to summit diplomacy in the olden times was the issue of venue in the event of a summit. The general understanding was that if a ruler or a leader visits the court of another ruler, it made him look like a subordinate to that ruler. This stems from the tradition that a weaker ruler or a conquered ruler is forced to pay homage at the court of his/her superior. David Reynolds gave a classic example of Emperor Henry IV who was compelled to visit the papal castle in Canossa in 1077 and pay homage to Pope Gregory VII as homage (Reynolds 2013). Thus the issue of the venue of the meeting is extremely delicate and often became the biggest and the first hurdle for summit diplomacy in the old world.

The second difficulty of equal importance and maybe greater consequence for summit diplomacy in the old world was that of security. There are records from history that show that a leader travelling for a summit meeting with counterparts in the past has to take great risks. There were instances where rulers were killed in the process of conducting summit diplomacy. One example is that of the meeting between two feuding barons of France, Dauphine and Duke John who met on a bridge on a wicket bridge. Duke John was stabbed by Dauphine's entourage¹ (Reynolds 2013). Apart from the threat their personal life; leaders also have to go through the very arduous task of travelling for days on end and sometimes even weeks. This made travel extremely difficult. Despite these difficulties, summit diplomacy was continued as preferred mode of conducting important inter-state relations and this shows how important it was as a diplomatic tool.

Though summit diplomacy has always been an important tool in the conduct of foreign policy it is important too, however, note that the frequency of summits and the virtual takeover of the established norm of diplomacy by summit diplomacy is a modern phenomenon (Eban 1983: 359). The above discussion shows that summit diplomacy has been practiced long before the present diplomatic channels were established in the form of resident commissioners in the fifteenth century. But the term 'summit diplomacy' assumed significance only in 1950 when Winston Churchill used the term 'summit' to

¹ This event is a classic example of difficulties in summit diplomacy in the old showing both the factor of venue and security. The fact that the two leaders met on the bridge and that one was killed by the other's entourage shows the complications and risks involved in summit diplomacy.

denote highest level negotiation or engagement between the Cold War powers at a speech in Edinburg (Berridge 2010: 161).

The Cold War era, marked the establishment of summits as the “preferred medium, even though few of them could be labelled as a diplomatic success” (Mellisen 2003: 1-2). This is because during the Cold War many important issues including the nuclear weapons came up. Many leaders believed such issues were too important to be left to professional diplomats to discussed and negotiate. Also, because the Cold War conflict went on for so long that many leaders tried to used personal touch to diplomacy to get to know the other leader to build trust or to influence in future negotiation. Three decades earlier, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George stated that “if you want to settle a thing, you see your opponent and talk it over with him. The last thing to do is write him a letter” (cited in Craig 1952: 46). This clearly shows how summit diplomacy was regularly used when certain issues cannot be resolved through other channels of communication and the need for leaders to meet and discuss at the highest level. Summit diplomacy has been practiced in the past by rulers in different ways such as royal meetings, coronation, funerals, weddings, etc.

The following paragraph will briefly examine few events that had shaped our understanding and the significance of summit diplomacy as an important tool of foreign policy in the past.

Royal Meetings: There were recorded instances where kings and princes met to discuss important matters relating to their state. Such meetings were limited by the fact that the logistics and security arrangements for such travel were extremely difficult then. This is exemplified in the case when four Anglo-Saxon kings travelled to Rome and only one survived the journey and the three kings died there (Whitelock 1996). At the meeting between the King of England, Edward IV and the King of France, Louis XI in 1475 at Picquigny, extreme care was taken to ensure security. The meeting took place on a bridge on the Somme specially built for the occasion. Louis made his diplomat Philippe de Commines wore the same attire so as to prevent any possible assassination bid. In the writings of Commines, it is recorded that “in the midst of the bridge there was contrived

a strong wooden lattice” wherein the two kings carefully embraced through the holes which were no wider than thrive a man’s arm (cited in Rogers 1955).

Another very important example of a summit meeting was the visit of King Canute to Rome in 1027 on the occasion of the coronation of King Conrad and where he conducted very important diplomatic roles. The occasion provided a big opportunity for Canute to resolve important and difficult issues facing his empire as the gathering had many important and powerful figures (Goldstein 1996: 23). This is akin to a modern meeting at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly or other multilateral forums.

Early International Congresses: Around the seventeenth century, a new form of practice, that can be seen as a precursor to modern summit diplomacy developed. These were the congress convened by the Church concerning both issues of spiritual and political consequences. There were ten such recorded congresses before the French Revolution (Goldstein 1996). These congresses were held to end wars but were also used to “settle other matters or to determine general issues of principle” (Goldstein 1996: 26). The first such congresses were held at Munster and Osnabruck that led to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Concert of Europe: The Concert of Europe was one of the earliest examples of systematic adoption of a summit for conflict resolution at the highest political level between Austria Prussia, Russia and United Kingdom (Hurst 1972). The concert of Europe did not have any written rules or secretariat and any of the members could propose to convene a conference at the time of crisis. Important meetings or conferences include Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Carlsbad (1819), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), Verona (1822), London (1832) and Berlin (1878). The end of the concert has been explained by the mistrust that developed between Russia and the United Kingdom among other factors.

Funeral summits: Funeral summits or working funerals have become one of the most important variants of ad-hoc summit diplomacy in recent times. This is partly because “the shortness of notice available to the mourners” it allows heads of states a good excuse or reason to “break existing schedules in order to have urgent discussions on current problems without arousing public expectations” (Berridge 2010: 173). Even if the summit

did not bear result, there will be no embarrassment as the working funeral would cover up the meeting and is more likely to go smoothly as there will be no time for mobilizing domestic opposition (Berridge 2010). An example of modern day funeral summit or working summit could be best illustrated during the funeral of Singapore's founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew which was attended by several leaders (including the Indian Prime Minister) and this served as a platform for many leaders to meet with other leaders and exchange courtesy calls.

The fizzling out of summit-level interaction in the fifteenth century was not purely because of the establishment of the resident commissioner. It was contributed by different factors. Rulers were not always good at diplomacy, they became an easy target of assassination and ransom and more importantly the old notion of the state as private estates of the rulers and therefore their obligation to safeguard its welfare was been constantly challenged by the notion of modern state. The occasional congresses and Concert of Europe injected sporadic life into summit diplomacy but it was not until the twentieth century and the outbreak of the World Wars that substantially brought back summit diplomacy. The 1919 Paris Peace Conference announced the return of summit diplomacy (Berridge 2010: 162). Ceremonial visits and state visits still hold diplomatic significance and are in fact used for "non-verbal communication or diplomatic signalling" (Goldstein 1997: 27). The summit between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler in 1939 in which Chamberlain attempted personal diplomacy (Berridge 2010) consolidated the return of summit diplomacy in all its substance and force. From then on, we see a spiralling of summit diplomacy to the extent that it became too common and frequent that at times made it difficult to draw a line between summits and other meetings.

2.3. Factors that contributed to the Growth of Summit Diplomacy

The practice of summit diplomacy gained prominence within a short time after the Second World War. This was largely contributed by the very volatile condition of the Cold War and the fear of possible hot war and the notion that diplomacy, in the nuclear

age was too “important to be left to the diplomatists” (Dunn 1996:5). The multilateralization of ‘post-war politics’ was “an important incentive for the rise of multilateral summits” (Melissen 2003:9). Some important factors that contributed to the growth of summit diplomacy in modern times have been discussed in the following paragraphs.

Crisis Diplomacy: The establishment and conduct of regular diplomacy through resident diplomats or ambassadors has led to the decline of summit diplomacy. The War era and the onset of the Cold War soon after showed the re-emergence and the growing popularity and importance of summit diplomacy. Summit meetings became a preferred medium of conducting diplomacy both due to the urgency and importance of the issues to be settled. Summit diplomacy became prominent during the war period as a result of the crisis “where the speedy conclusion of a grave international question was at a premium” (Dunn, 1996: 5). As rightly pointed out by Abba Eban about the Big Three during the war that “only the emergency of war could have impelled those elderly men and their associates to accept such frequent toil and risk” (Eban 1983: 361). One of the factors that stimulated the growth in frequency and significance of summit is the “risk that the Cold War could lead to hot war between the superpowers” and that “diplomacy in the nuclear age was too important to be left to the diplomats” (Dunn 1996: 5).

Technological Developments: The sudden and explosive growth of summit diplomacy was facilitated by different factors and one such as the “dramatic progress in civil aviation after the War” (Melissen 2003: 9) which made travel very easy and comfortable and short. Now leaders do not have to spend days aboard a ship or carriage and could reach a destination in a matter of hours and therefore they could travel and meet their counterparts as and when the need to. Earlier it would take weeks or months to get a respond or instruction from the home country or ruler and the situations or circumstance for which the instruction was sought would change by the time an emissary gets to hear from its home government. With the advent of air travels in the twentieth century “politicians seek to present their argument first-hand, especially in matters of high politics where an atmosphere of crisis prevails” (Dunn 1996: 6). Another significant aspect of the influence of technology on summit diplomacy is the advancement in the communication system which enabled leaders and heads of governments to communicate

(telephone, internet, etc.) and this increased “both the contacts between political principals and their involvement in foreign policy matters” (Dunn 1996: 6). The improved communication also made the work of actually arranging a summit much easier and at a short notice without significant disruptions on the usual business and thus became extremely sought after.

Politician’s Ambition and Mistrust of Diplomats: Politicians’ love for foreign policy has made foreign policy the topmost agenda of every political leader. Prime Ministers or Presidents are so attached with foreign policy decision making that it is impossible to find any country in which foreign policy is left in the hands of the Foreign Minister (Melissen 2003: 1). This is also a result of the increasing centralization in foreign policy decision-making ensuring that political leaders have a final say in every important foreign policy issue. Another reason for the frequent resort to summit meetings by heads of states is that political leaders at times, consider themselves as the “only ones capable of rising above the particulars with the authority to integrate the complex array of political and economic issues” (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980).

This is true to some extent as political leaders have the power to cross-over certain bureaucratic issues and procedures which professional diplomats cannot but the question as to whether the political leaders can “grasp complex interrelationships and to devise creative but balanced compromises” (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980) remains. The introduction of media and public opinion in international affairs also encouraged political leaders to engage in summit diplomacy in greater frequency than required as conducting diplomacy in the public eye gives them visibility and popularity. However the downside to this was and still remains, is that the “intrusion of media into every phase and level of the negotiation process changes the whole spirit and nature of diplomacy” (Melissen 2003: 13). At the same time, the political leaders are also faced with another task of handling the media and assuaging the public which, if not planned meticulously, often became the biggest hurdle in modern summitry.

With the deepening of the Cold War, a consensus grew among the politicians that “diplomacy in the nuclear age was too important to be left to the diplomats” (Dunn 1996: 5) thus popularizing summit diplomacy. A large number of politicians believed that

personal contact adds an advantage in conducting diplomacy with foreign peers (Melissen 2003: 2). Politicians felt that certain issues are too important to be left with diplomats and top leaders believed it is only them who can take a call on matters of high politics, e.g. nuclear issues. While it is true that certain issues need to be addressed by political leaders at the highest level, it is important to remember that summits are part of the larger diplomatic process and not a different or isolated from the normal diplomacy. It becomes problematic when political leaders get involved in summit without realizing the repercussions on the larger diplomatic process. A summit might come out very victorious with agreements and documents but its success can only be measured by the impact on the larger diplomatic process or its implement-ability.

Cold War and the new Alliance system: The breakdown of the pre-War alliance system and the need to forged new alliances in the emerging 'bi-polar' system coupled with the absence of regular diplomatic channels between the new superpowers necessitated the use of summit diplomacy. The platform leaders get through summit diplomacy has “a magnificent propaganda instrument” during the Cold War ensured that summit diplomacy was here to stay (Melissen 2003: 10). At the same time, the onset of the Cold War and the emergence of the bloc system necessitated many meetings between heads of states and governments and thus contributed to the explosion in the number and frequency of summit diplomacy.

Decolonization and the birth of New Nations: The World Wars contributed significantly to the modern summit. The post-War era also shows the birth of many new nations and “the concomitant rise of regional diplomacy has resulted in the multiplication of summit meetings” as a result of the “the expansion of the international society in the aftermath of decolonization” (Melissen 2003: 11). The decolonization of Africa and Asia also contributed to the growth of summit diplomacy as a popular form of conducting diplomacy as many of these newly independent countries did not have to necessary skilled staffs or professional diplomats to carry out the diplomatic works (Berridge 2010: 162) and it was upon the leaders of such countries to carry out diplomatic works which could be otherwise done by professional diplomats.

In short, one can safely argue that the frequency and popularity of summit diplomacy in the modern world is made possible by technology in the form of transport and communication. Air travel has made summit meetings between leaders extremely easy and convenient unlike in the old world where leaders have to travel for days or weeks to meet and negotiate with their counterparts. The convenience and possibility of a frequent summit are facilitated and complemented by the development in communication systems as the venues, date and time can be easily arranged and fixed now without subordinates travelling for the arrangements thanks to the telephone and the internet. Summit diplomacy or diplomacy at the highest level is made necessary by the nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, especially during the Cold War. It became popular in common everyday parlance as a result of mass media. Media persons are now an essential part of the summit entourage and minute details of the meetings are telecasted on real-time basis making the news available and accessible to everyone.

2.4 Key Elements of Summit Diplomacy

2.4.1 Categorisation of Summit Diplomacy

There are different kinds of summits and the type of summits adopted should be based on the need or purpose of the negotiation. But the functionality of summits that they are “driving forward the policy process” (Melissen 2003: 4) should be the basis for all summits. Because the varied nature of the summit and uniqueness of individual summits, it is very difficult to categorize or group summits but a broad categorization can be made according to their formal criteria. Summits can be categorized into bilateral (between two countries) or multilateral (between three or more countries); regional (summit between countries of the same region, region can also mean a grouping based on the stages of development, for instance, global south) or worldwide (between countries across regions); and finally summit can also be categorized based on their goals (Weilemann 2000). Different scholars and practitioners have categorized summits in different ways. In the following, we shall look at the some of the major categorization of summits.

G.R. Berridge in his book 'Diplomacy: Theory and Practice' has distinguished summit into three major categories: serial summits, ad-hoc summits and high-level exchange (Berridge 2010: 167). Serial summits constitute a part of a series of other summits; ad-hoc summits are a specific issue based and designed to solve that specific issue or problem; high-level exchanges are less ambitious by nature and more likely to be a one-time summit although some can lead to a series of summits. Because of its very nature, ad-hoc summits are usually employed for symbolic value and are suitable for nations attempting to promote friendly relations. A high-level exchange is usually ad-hoc in nature and is also more likely to be bilateral than multilateral. They are mostly used and successful when it is employed to push forward a stranded talk/negotiation or end a deadlock (Berridge 2010: 172). Serial summits are suitable for long-term negotiation and are usually employed when there is a need for a systematic step-by-step negotiation.

David Reynolds (2007: 7) categorized summit meetings into three types: personal summits, plenary summits, and progressive summits. Personal summits are used to build relationship between two leaders. Important examples in history where personal summits were used to build relationships include the meeting between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and German leader Adolf Hitler (1938) before the outbreak of the World War II, the meeting between American President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Statesman Nikita Khrushchev (1961) during the early part of the Cold War. In a plenary summit, the personality of the leaders and the skills and knowledge of experts are combined to complement each other. Important examples of plenary summit from history include the Yalta conference between President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin of United States, United Kingdom, and Russia respectively in February 1945 to decide on the future course of action in a post-war Europe; Camp David meetings between the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin facilitated by the American President Jimmy Carter in 1978, a precursor to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. A progressive summit is one which uses the attributes of both personal and plenary summits but differs from both as progressive summits are part of a series and are also both between political leaders and specialist/experts (Reynolds 2007: 8).

There are varied types of summits held for varied reasons and objectives. There are peace summits held to end conflicts, others are held to bring about change in the existing order or called for a new one, while there are still others that would serve as “instruments to give new orientations or to reassure the participants of their common political goals or values” (Weilemann 2000). Some summits are used for pre-negotiation purpose while others have been used to increase the momentum of an already initiated negotiation and to put a time-frame or re-focus. Some summits have resulted in important breakthroughs while others merely used as a rubber stamp for symbolic purpose of the deal already negotiated at the lower levels (Melissen 2003: 3). Thus, summits come in different shapes and sizes. A certain type of summit may be well suited in a certain situation and disastrous for other situation. Therefore, it is not a one-size-fits-all and every individual summit is unique and has to be planned and designed according to the need of the situation.

2.4.2 Process or Stages of Summit Diplomacy

As pointed out above in the discussion on the categorizations of summit diplomacy, summits come in different shapes and sizes and yet there is an underlying principle that summits drive the policy forward. In the same way, although summits are varied and diverse, summitry largely involves three stages: “preparation, negotiation and implementation” (Reynolds 2007: 10). In the following, we shall examine briefly the three stages of summit diplomacy.

Preparation/Setting the Agenda: The preparation stage of the summit constitutes the starting point of summit diplomacy. Here, the professional diplomats known as sherpas set the stage for the summit before the actual event took place. The preparation by sherpas and other experts is very important. It is in this stage that the fundamental issues are discussed and how to go about to resolve these issues and yet it is, in the words of Jan Melissen, to underline that “it is not a sufficient condition of success” (Melissen 2003: 4). It is in this stage that the agendas are set. The setting of agenda to a summit constitutes one of the most important and the most political part in a summit. This is so because of the agenda shapes “the outcome of such a meeting and determines its specific outlook or character” (Weilemann 2000). The preparatory stage also decides and design

“how leaders get to the summit and what baggage they take with them” (Reynolds 2007: 10) and to some extent decides the outcome of the summit.

It is very important to set the agenda of the summit well in advance to meet the objectives of the summit as summits can vary greatly. Every possible benefit and drawbacks of summits must be made “against the background of the specific purpose of such meetings and the tasks they are meant to accomplish” (Weileman 2000: 18). There should be elaborate and detailed planning on the “choreography of the summit” (visits, speeches, motorcade, press conference, etc). It is equally important to remember that for a summit to be successful it should not arouse high expectations (Berridge 2010: 176).

The Summit/Negotiation: The summit/negotiation here denotes the actual meeting of the leaders in person. It is about “how well they withstand the rigors of high altitude personal diplomacy” (Reynolds 2007: 10) when the chief negotiators come face to face. Here the atmosphere is extremely delicate as the meetings or negotiations at the highest political level are keenly observed and scrutinized both by the public and the media. Every single acts and gesture are measured and calculated and as such, it makes preparations all the more important. At the summit, the personality of the leaders and their power of persuasion come to play although much of the preparation as to what they will discuss and negotiate has been planned and decided in advance.

Implementation: Summits are not stand-alone events. Meticulous preparation takes place before the summit and the bigger and more important function of a summit, which is implementation, comes after the summit. The real worth of the summit depends on “how well the parties carry forward their agreed terms and how well the agreements/achievements are received by sceptical, sometimes hostile, audiences at home and among allies” (Reynolds 2007: 10). The success or failure of the summit can only be determined from the implementation of the agreed terms. Here the logic of two-level games as outlined by Robert Putnam will be very helpful in elaborating. According to this logic, Putnam argues that when chief negotiators negotiate a deal with his/her counterparts from other countries, the negotiator has to constantly remember how the negotiated deals will be received in his/her home constituency. The negotiator has to play a two-level game of diplomacy whereby s/he will try to get the best outcome of the

negotiation for his/her country and at the same time, ensure that this negotiated terms will be well received in his/her constituency and will, therefore, be ratified/implemented (Putnam 1988).

2.4.3 Key Factors for a Successful Summit

Meticulous Preparation: The most important factor and the key to success in summit diplomacy is the meticulous preparation of professionals who are also known as sherpas. In cases of summits which involved the meeting of rival leaders, extreme care is taken to ensure that the meetings do not backfire. Because summit diplomacy is usually designed for its symbolic and propaganda value “the conventional wisdom is that the preparation should be meticulous- to the point of leaving the summiters with little more than to sign the agreement in front of the cameras” (Berridge 2010: 175). The pre-summit preparation or “the pre-cooking of agreement” is especially important in cases of delicate summits and the agreement to issue declaration after the summit “should be prepared well in advance” while also agreeing on “what might and might not be said to the media” for the summit to be successful (Berridge 2010: 175).

While it is important to ensure that all the procedures and protocols are prepared in advance, as part of the preparation for the summit, well researched and informed opinion should be formed. This concern should be taken seriously by the chief negotiator and his team. Attention should be given to ensure that leaders have a fair knowledge of “a larger sense of process beyond the normal short-termism of what they are thinking about” (Reynolds 2013). This will ensure that the leaders will be able to situate themselves at the summit as a part of the larger diplomatic and historical process. This will go a long way in ensuring that short-term gains will not hamper larger policy directions. This, when carefully undertaken, can also prevent the friction between professional diplomats and political leaders. This is so because professional diplomats who are well acquainted with the diplomatic process will have a pivotal role to play and the political leaders can have the immediate gains they need for political reasons and at the same time ensures that the larger policy objectives and directives are not compromised.

Clarity of Agenda: Apart from the meticulous preparation, for a summit to be successful, the parties to the summit should have a very clear understanding of what they want out of the summit. The clarity in the agenda gives strength and motivation for successful negotiation and at the same enables each party to assess the expectations of the other party and the possible compromises that each need is willing to make. During a summit, if one party has a very clear agenda and the party has no clarity in the agenda it is likely that “the side with a clear purpose will have an enormous advantage” (Fairbanks 1988: 81).

Another aspect related to clarity of agenda to think in terms of policies. Political leaders meeting at summits should remember that they are meeting to discuss on a particular agenda or policies and therefore the talks should be limited to the agenda. The objectives, therefore, should be clear and defined and not broad and vague. At the same time, parties to the summit have a clear understanding of what the other party wants and the compromises they may be willing to do and bargain accordingly. Knowing your opponent is equally important as knowing yourself. Unless such clarity is established there can be no substantive negotiation.

Political Will/Commitment: Despite meticulous preparations by the sherpas and the clarity of agendas, if there is no political will/commitment summit can become a deadlock. If the political leadership are not willing to make adjustment and accommodation, there will be no meaning or rhyme in holding a summit. This is so because summits are usually used by political leaders to discuss and decide on complicated issues that cannot be resolved at lower levels or issues that needed a political push. Summits are successful when it has the “willingness of political leaders to exercise executive authority in an attempt to make a radical breakthrough on a particular issue area” like the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November 1986 (Dunn 1996: 251).

As a part of the political commitment, there should be co-ordination. Successful summits in history have always been characterised by team works. For a summit to be successful there should be clarity of what a party wants between the chief negotiator and his team. The often cited example of a successful summit with great teamwork is that of the Reykjavik 1986 summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev and their

foreign ministers George Schultz and Eduard Shevardnadze. It is important that the chief negotiators and their advisors are clear about what they want out of the summit and at the same time, a clear understanding between the chief negotiators and the advisors. This will ensure that there is no misunderstanding in the term of agreements.

One important mistake leaders involved in summit diplomacy often make is that of quick fixes (Reynolds 2013). Most leaders often look for a tangible outcome from summit meetings as political gains to be displayed in their own constituency. This often runs the risk of belittling or hampering long-term policy objectives and therefore care should be taken to ensure that long-term policy is not hurt in the process of short-term gains. A safe way to conduct summit diplomacy is “to play it long” (Reynolds 2013). Real success or the real changes in policy takes time and sometimes even years and therefore the immediate success in the form of tangible outcome from the summit can be misleading.

2.5 Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis other Diplomatic Tools

Summit diplomacy has been invoked at crucial junctures in the history of the world. Significant summits in modern history include Big Four meeting between the leaders of Britain, United States, France and Italy (David Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, George Clemenceau and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando respectively) in 1919 and the Hitler-Chamberlain (1938) in the inter-war period. The meeting between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev (1962), Richard Nixon- Zhou Enlai meeting (1972), Camp David between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin (1978), Ronald Reagan-Mikhail Gorbachev (1986) were important during the Cold War era. The latest in the list of summits that changed the face of history includes the Kim-Moon (Kim Jong-un, Moon Jae-in) and the summit between American President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held recently. There are many diplomatic tools employed at different times and occasions based on the practicality and suitability and summit diplomacy is just one of them. In the following, I will briefly discuss the uniqueness, strengths and weaknesses, and the debate for and against summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool.

2.5.1. Uniqueness/Distinguishing factor of summit diplomacy/Executive Participation/Person to Person Contact (Personality of the Chief Negotiators)

David Dunn argued that the development of summit diplomacy in the twentieth century as an institution was a very significant influence on the dialogue and relations between different states. Summits also provide opportunities for bold and radical acts to leaders to produce results of international significance which would otherwise not happen at the lower levels (Dunn 1996: 251). The significance or the distinguishing feature that makes summit diplomacy unique from other diplomatic tools is attached to the fact that since the “main actors are heads of state, summits become dramatic and unusually public diplomatic events” and because of “this high level character summits also offer the possibility of resolving problems that only top-level leaders have the authority to decide” (Fairbanks 1988: 71).

It is important to distinguish summit from other forms of personal or direct contact between leaders. A starting point for a summit is the agreement on the time and location of the meeting, and extreme care was taken that the summit venue is uncontroversial or a matter of routine between the parties for practical and symbolic reasons. In olden days, the decision on the venue of the summit is of high significance as it involves a lot of security considerations and the importance accorded to the venue of the summit. For most of the 20th century, the first obstacle to overcome was to agree on the venue as the understanding was that a weaker ruler always pays homage to a stronger ruler and this explains the obstacles in deciding the venue of the summit. Historical records show that many summits were held on the bridges or riverbanks so as to overcome the problem of the location.²

In the post-Cold War era, the concept of venue has taken a different dimension from the traditional understanding of the venue. In the olden days, the significance and obstacles attached to the venue emanated from the potential security dangers on the person of the

² The finest example of this is the meeting between King Edward IV (England) and King Louis XI (France) in 1475 which was held on a bridge specially made for the occasion at Picquigny near Amiens. The two kings negotiated on the bridge with a wooden grill-barrier on each side and carefully embraced.

kings³ and the loss of face to travel to a rival territory. However in the present day; the obstacle of the venue selection “emanates from the potential dangers posed to the summit by non-participants, inter alia a variety of protest movements or even terrorists” (Melissen 2003: 6-7).

What makes summit unique is the executive participation, which is diplomacy at the highest level and is different from other forms of personal contacts and characterized by the meeting of the leaders in person. It is also this participation at the highest level that makes summit “more difficult and usually involves a ceremonial dimension that represents a greater commitment of time energy, and political risk” (Weileman, 2000) than other forms of personal contacts like telephonic conversation or correspondence over the mail.

Journalists and commentators tend to use the term summit so generously and so freely that at times the concept of summit gets blurred. Political scientists have deduced two broad criteria to prevent the indiscriminate use of the term. The first and the key element of a meeting to be considered a summit is the “executive participation, diplomacy at the highest possible level” (Weilemann 2000: 17). The second element of a summit meeting is “distinguished by the form of personal contact, meaning that participants communicate face-to-face” (Weilemann 2000: 17). This is important because “it is more difficult and usually involves a ceremonial dimension that represents a greater commitment of time, energy, and political risk that is present in, say, a telephone call” (Weilemann 2000: 17). Another element characteristic of summit meetings is that most summit meetings do not have formal decision-making structures and are more informal and personal. Summits are best suited for “private consultation, bypassing multiple bureaucratic layers, and they may take place at any stage of international relations” (Berridge 2002).

2.5.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of Summit Diplomacy

The success or the impact of summit diplomacy may be difficult to measure in tangible terms but we cannot deny the distinct diplomatic functions such as meetings held and the

³ Phillipe de Commynes recorded in his memoir that King Louis made his diplomat Philippe de Commines wore the same attire so as to prevent any possible assassination bid.

flexibility with which summit diplomacy operates. Although negotiation is supposed to be the most important aspect of summit diplomacy, most of the time there is hardly any substantial negotiation and are usually symbolic and as such the credibility of summits have been continually questioned. Since most of the summits are of orientation nature, they produce no clear results. As a result of this, the public and the critics see summits as something very expensive bearing few tangible results (Berridge 2010).

In the past, summits are usually used for high politics concerning national interest but are now been transformed continually to include a wide range of issues “directly related to the interests of citizens” (Melissen 2003: 20). As such, the problems and difficulties associated with summit diplomacy have changed. Earlier when summit diplomacy was employed for high politics, the major concern would be about “the relationship between politics at the highest and the lowest levels of international society” which has now transformed into a concern “between political leaders and large sections of the general public” (Melissen 2003: 20). Summit diplomacy is constantly been transformed with the inclusion of “wide-ranging, multifaceted agenda of contemporary summitry, which increasingly deals with issues that are much closer to the people’s perception of the international environment” (Melisen 2003: 19) as part of its agenda. In the following, we shall briefly examine the strengths and weaknesses of summit diplomacy in the light of the arguments put forward by the proponents and opponents of summit diplomacy.

2.5.2.1 The Case against Summit Diplomacy

The resentment and opposition for summit diplomacy have been as old as the very idea and practice and have been warned of amateurism by professionals in the field (Eban 1983: 358). The frequent use of summit as a diplomatic tool “cultivates the dangerous notion that there is a quick fix for such complex problems as energy supply and demand, protectionism, and international credit” (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980). Despite the growing popularity of summit diplomacy in international politics, it has its own price. The most important one of this is the burden on the leaders whose priorities and responsibilities are constantly increasing and re-oriented. The other price for the escalatory nature of the practice of summit diplomacy is the pressure on diplomatic resources. The price of summit diplomacy in economic terms has “skyrocketed and has

become a subject of much adverse reporting in leading international newspapers” and it has been argued that “many contemporary summits offer little value for money” (Melissen 2003: 17-18). Writing on the usefulness of summit diplomacy, Berridge argued that summits are “unlikely to be so useful for negotiation during the meetings themselves” as they tend to generate more expectations and publicity because of its ad-hoc nature and the sudden meeting of head of states (Berridge 2010: 171). The problems of diplomacy at the top are diverse and it has proved difficult for the quality of summit talks to keep in step with their quantity. As a result, “presentation often triumphs over substance” (Melissen 2003: 18).

Three prominent figures expressed their reservation for diplomacy at the highest level in a very strong way. In the fifteenth century, Philippe de Commynes advised: “that princes refrain from meeting with their counterparts and leave the art of international negotiation to skilled and well-prepared envoys” (Commynes cited in Melissen 2003: 9). Francoise de Callieres, the foremost author on diplomacy under the Ancient Regime, wrote in 1716 that “it is an important task to ensure that the passion of their political masters do not prevail over their interest” (Callieres cited in Melissen 2003: 9). Two centuries later, Harold Nicolson complained that “the art of diplomacy as that of water-colors has suffered much from the fascination it exercises upon the amateur” (Nicolson 1939: 52). From this, we can clearly argue that statesmen and diplomats in history are not very fond of summit diplomacy.

The major case against summit diplomacy was based on the belief that the head of states or government were not established, negotiators, do not appreciate details as they do not have the time, indulged in publicity, “prone to cultural misunderstandings and too readily swayed by personal likes and dislikes towards fellow leaders” (Berridge 2010: 164). One of the most frequently cited supposed advantage of summit diplomacy, that is personal contacts between leaders, has often been the most criticized attributes. Critics of summit diplomacy argue that “personal acquaintance and group therapy, excessive intimacy holds special risks” (Schaetzal and Malmgren, 1980). As such, “diplomacy conducted at the summit is not only likely to lead to more mistakes, but also to mistakes that are irrevocable” (Berridge 2010: 164).

There are many instances where professional negotiators agreed that the meeting between leaders at the highest level “adds to the interlocutor’s credibility, and there is indeed sufficient evidence to suggest that a favourable personal chemistry can be decisive in complex or difficult negotiations” (Melissen 2003: 2). But the danger of personal contact, as aptly described by Jan Melissen is that “it may result in the in the illusion of familiarity and mutual understanding” (Melissen 2003: 2). This danger that many scholars and diplomats wrote about can be best illustrated by the writings of Sir Harold Nicolson about the Congress of Vienna,

“Nobody who has not actually watched statesmen dealing with each other can have any real idea of the immense part played in human affairs by such unavowable and often unrecognizable causes as lassitude, affability, personal affection or dislike, misunderstanding, deafness or incomplete command of a foreign language, vanity, social engagements, interruptions and momentary states of health” (Nicolson 1939: 52).

Many argued that, summitry as a diplomatic tool, instead of maturing and becoming more sophisticated is degrading and that the original attributes of summit diplomacy have been lost. Summits were considered useful and handy because of its informal nature and such a gathering allows free and frank exchange of views at the highest level without protocol or bureaucratic constraints and free from any pressure to make decisions" but are today characterized by hype and ceremony “leaving very little room” for free discussion and usually increasingly complicating the issues (Weilemann 2000).

The practicality and feasibility of summit meetings have been challenged continually. During the Cold War, one of the most pertinent questions raised frequently in regard to summit diplomacy was the feasibility and practicality of leaders from different ideological bloc to be meeting in person and negotiating. This is because the Cold War was built on ideological differences and therefore some speculations arise as to whether leaders should negotiate if the principles and values they propagate are so diverse and contradictory. What good could come out at all by engaging with someone you have no shared values or interests? The question that was put up was “How can the head of a democratic country deal successfully with the leader of a totalitarian system or

dictatorship?” (Weilemann 2000). Another very strong argument against the presumed advantage of summit diplomacy is that the actors (heads of states) are from different cultures and it is suggested that engagements based on wrong understanding or little understanding could only end up aggravating differences in the future.

George Ball in his book ‘Diplomacy for a Crowded World’ condemned summit in the following way; “when leaders have disparate backgrounds, customs, and languages, and in many cases, ethical attitudes and ideologies, summitry is more likely to produce mistaken and misleading impressions than a clear meeting of minds” (Ball 1976: 32). In the same line, because the actors (heads of states) are from different cultures and it is suggested that “such encounters can only lead to superficial understandings that in the long term could actually aggravate differences” (Weilemann 2000). Jan Melissen argued that “the typical summit communiqué is a masterpiece in the art of compromise, with a degree of ambiguity so as to leave room for maneuver for follow-up talks or the leaders' confrontation with their domestic constituency” (Melissen 2003). This is very important and there are many instances in which the cultural difference have led to different understanding and interpretation.⁴

Another often cited complaint against the unrestrained use of summit diplomacy, and in fact very sensible one, is that since political leaders and heads of states are not experts in negotiation and do not have the diplomatic skills or the art of negotiation they are “often ill-prepared for these debates” (Weilemann 2000). As a result of this, political leaders are often seen as making compromises under pressure and coming up with the wrong solutions. But this is not a problem that cannot be remedied. When enough preparations and arrangements are done, the political leaders can be acquainted with the issues and at the same time be made aware of what to say and what not to say. Thus enough preparations with clarity in the objective can successfully prevent such a situation.

⁴ In a very interesting study on the negotiating styles of the Americans and the Japanese, titled “Business Negotiations between the Americans and the Japanese”, Yumi Adachi argued pointed out that the main difference between the Americans and Japanese lies in the fact that “Americans recognize that a deal is a deal and consider it a firm commitment, the Japanese see a deal more as an intention within the context of a long-term relationship, where the relationship takes precedence over the terms of the deal” (Adachi, 2010).

Many professional diplomats considered summit diplomacy as “an insult to their competence, and at least a limited threat to their careers” (Berridge 2010: 162). Francoise de Callieres writing in the eighteenth century argued that the “passion of princes and of their ministers often overrule their interests” (cited in Dunn 1996: 4). This is mostly because heads of states are often not equipped with necessary training which professional diplomats have and also because summits operate in an environment where diplomatic decorum are not observed. Heads of states at summit often addressed issues in a very informal way as compared to professional diplomats and often try to come to understanding through personal rapport or trust. It is interesting to note that the personal aspect of summit diplomacy is considered as a strength or advantage by the negotiators while it is also a favourite area of criticism from the professional diplomats.

Opponents to summit diplomacy have given many examples to prove that summit diplomacy is more damaging than good to diplomacy. Dean Acheson argued that President Truman in an informal conversation with the British Prime Minister Atlee casually commented that the United States would not use nuclear weapons without consulting Britain. Acheson argued that the President “unwittingly altered American policy in the in a most sensitive area” by that act (Acheson 1969: 140). In the same way Lyndon Johnson and Harold Wilson in the 1960s “impaired the Anglo-American relations because the two men simply do not like each other” and the “discussion dogged with misunderstanding” (Berridge 2010: 165). Another flipside of summit diplomacy is that head of states who indulges too much in summit diplomacy with other leaders may end up giving insufficient time to domestic affairs and consequently cost them of their job (Berridge 2010: 166). As such, summit meeting must not be made to become the problem solver for technical issues the bureaucrats have failed to agree on. Agendas should be streamlined and more focused—a case of less is more. In the modern days, “summitry belongs to the dramaturgy of globalism which in turn belongs to the future of world politics” (Weileman 2000: 20). It is also important to remember that “summits are by nature episodic, for its agenda highlights the crisis of the moment and it deals with issues by declaration” (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980) and the regular diplomatic channel should not be wrecked up.

Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office during the World War II was to write about political leaders and their meetings in the following way

“It is always the same with these conferences: the great men do not know what they are talking about and have to be educated.”
That is the diplomat’s view of all this. The prima donnas again to strut their act on the stage, while the diplomats, the people who really know how to handle these things, have to sort out the mess that they create” (cited in Reynolds 2013).

It is true that head of governments can settle certain issues left unresolved by officials or diplomats below them but again this is no guarantee that the decisions/agreements reached the summit will be implemented and without which there is no worth. This is so because political leaders because of the executive power/authority they possessed they can cut across boundaries and issues have the power to make decisions, unlike the professional diplomats who are allowed to negotiate with strictly defined boundaries and how much they can give in. Professional diplomats have to always defer the decision when new issues and agendas came up at the summit itself which political leaders by being the chief executive don't have to go through.

However, the question of how much a political leader can grasp and understand the issue was and still continues to haunt summit diplomacy. This apprehension has led to another argument that even if political leaders can cut across boundaries and issues, their acts and decisions are only about ‘short-circuiting’ the system. But the positive aspect of this is that such ‘short-circuiting’ can serve as effective pre-empts for official responsibilities at lower levels. We also need to remember that political leaders are usually in office for a short time, except in dictatorship or authoritarian regime, while to effectively change policies and doctrines takes a long time. Thus, the negotiation and other changes in policy should be situated in historical context and the larger diplomatic process.

Political leaders involved in frequent summit diplomacy have been branded as lonely captains. Frequent summit meetings have been viewed with suspicion and many see summits between the head of states as an effort of the head of states trying to revive their

own spirit rather than substantive negotiation. Leaders might often find themselves in the company and comfort of counterparts who might be going through a cycle of boredom and frustrations where summits have been used to re-inflate their own egos with the inevitable pomp and grandeur surrounding summit meetings (Schaezsal and Malmgren 1980). Thus we can argue that summit diplomacy has a rather chequered history and is not blameless.

2.5.2.2 The Case for Summit Diplomacy

Summit diplomacy or summitry existed before the ‘modern times’ but the establishment and expansion of modern diplomacy in the form of resident ambassador replaced the conduct of summit diplomacy or the direct meeting of rulers by their delegated representatives. Despite the introduction of the regular diplomatic channel through the resident commissioner, “meetings at the highest level did continue to be attractive” and “summitry avant la letire was never short of professional critics” (Melissen 2003: 8-9).

Summit diplomacy has been anathematized at first glance without properly analyzing it and yet summit diplomacy has remained so common and significant. This calls for a serious investigation. The main reason for this, according to G. R. Berridge, is the fact that summit diplomacy has an enormous symbolic and propaganda value. He argued that the summit has been employed as an art during the Cold War as the conflict was essentially fought through propaganda during the Cold War (Berridge 2010: 166).

One of the most often cited argument in favor of summit meeting is that the ‘lonely captains’ get to know each other better when they meet face-to-face during the summit and therefore makes it easier in subsequent negotiation. A corollary to this argument is the supposed practical benefit from summits that in the anticipation and preparation for an upcoming summit officials are motivated to work harder and achieve goals which might otherwise not achieved and this promotes fresh motivations and directions (Weilemann 2000).

In democratic countries, summit diplomacy is an important tool for political leaders as engaging in summit diplomacy can be a means of demonstrating to the public or voters “that they are personally doing something about a current problem, and are important

actors on the world stage” (Berridge 2010: 167). Thus engaging in summit diplomacy can elevate the prospect of getting re-elected or increase the popularity of the leaders. But it is important to remember that summit diplomacy as a tool should be employed judiciously and with proper preparation. The participation of leaders in summit diplomacy can also “can open up new avenues in domestic political debate and provide fresh opportunities to overcome deadlocked situations” (Weilemann 2000).

Despite the low success rates of summits, it provides the opportunity to leaders to meet in person and bring an end to the crisis by bringing new elements into the negotiation and conflict resolution through persuasion and bargaining. Many leaders believed that they are the only one capable of “rising above the particulars with the authority” to bypass certain unnecessary structures and processes in the bureaucracy (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980). An extended argument of the advantage of personal contacts or face to face meetings of heads of states is that the personality and the power of intellect of the leaders get factored in during such meetings through the way he/she argues and puts forward arguments “with the chance to redress imbalances in favour of the weaker side and to produce results shared and accepted as legitimate by all” (Weilemann 2000).

Political leaders are looking for ways and means to be able to negotiate with their counterpart directly away from the gaze of bureaucratic procedures “casually and without a plan” and often result in creating “quasi-international institution” (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980). Such informal way of negotiation may give the much-needed flexibility and space but it is important to remember that summits should not be made to “become the problem solver for technical issues the bureaucrats have failed to agree on” and proper streamlining of agendas and careful preparation should be emphasized.

2.6 The Future of Summit Diplomacy

History books and books on diplomacy and diplomatic history depicts events in which rulers come together both in bilateral meetings and multilateral meetings to settle differences or forge peace (Weileman 2000) and summits as such are not a modern day invention but have been found from the earliest times of recorded history of kingdoms,

empires or states. However, the terminology and analysis came much later. Summit meetings have become so frequent that it began to be seen as an ordinary diplomatic tool in modern international relations instead of a diplomatic tool which is employed as a solution when other diplomatic tools have failed. This in a way is diluting the significance and uniqueness attached to summit diplomacy by making it very common and ordinary.

The gaining of the prominence of summit diplomacy in the present time can also be attributed to the rise of globalization and the constraints imposed upon the state's room to manoeuvre (Mourlon-Druol 2012: 686). This led to the search for new ways and tools in negotiation and bargaining in international relations by political leaders in their effort to negotiate with their counterpart directly away from the maze of bureaucratic procedures (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980). Leaders continue to meet during funerals and at the sidelines of multilateral events (like UN General Assembly). Even in olden times when travelling itself involves great risk and danger to their own lives, princes apart from the time involved, princes and rulers have taken out time and energy to meet and converse directly with each other (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980). Such importance to the device of the summit as a diplomatic tool goes a long way to prove its usefulness. In modern times, summit diplomacy is used as a tool for dealing with the paradox of the contemporary world politics with the growing interdependence and the increasing vulnerability amongst nations (Schaetzal and Malmgren 1980).

The private meetings of leading politicians today were common in the past as rulers of different kingdoms/empires/states were linked to each other by marriages which were the most common aligning principle in the past. Important summits that influenced and shaped the face of history and international relations in modern times include the Munich summit between British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and German leader Adolf Hitler in 1938, the Yalta Summit/Conference between Franklin D. Roosevelt (United States of America), Winston Churchill (United Kingdom) and Joseph Stalin (Soviet Union) at Yalta in 1945, the Vienna Summit 1962 between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, the 1972 Summit between US President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, the Reykjavik Summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail

Gorbachev 1986, etc. The summits between the leaders of North Korea and South Korea Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in held on 26 April and 26 May 2018 on South Korean side of the Joint Security Area⁵ can be seen as the latest addition to the list of summits that changed the world. Technological advances and progress in transport and communication are making summit diplomacy more appealing and convenient.

Summit diplomacy does not seem to be going away and it is safe to argue that summit diplomacy “will continue to transform in the twenty-first century” (Melissen 2003: 9). It has come under scrutiny from all quarters and yet it has not only managed to survive the onslaught but have become an integral part of the larger diplomatic processes and is likely to increase in the future (Feilleux 2010: 312). Summit diplomacy is here to stay.

2.7. Conclusions

Summit diplomacy has been used as a tool for carrying inter-state relations even before the introduction of regular diplomatic channels and before the term assumed significance. There is no strict definition of what summit diplomacy is as it has been used in different ways for different purposes. There are instances where elaborate summit meetings which bore no results while some low key summit has borne significant results. Some summits have been used to signal a change in the foreign policy behaviour, others to put end to conflicts or to start a dialogue while there are still others which are used to put a cap to a negotiated deal.

It is also a very difficult task to define the success or failure of summit diplomacy as there is no one way to do so. Some summit might very significant and symbolic when it comes to political commitment and achieving breakthroughs at the time of the summit but if such commitments and breakthroughs are not implemented, it cannot be called a success. While there are instances where summits have been seen as a total failure because they failed to produce documents or breakthroughs or the political leadership

⁵ This summit is significant both in symbolic value and substance because this is the first time a North Korean leader steps into the territory of South Korea and the considerable restraint exercised by South Korea in terms of keeping the agenda limited is in the spirit of summit diplomacy.

could not agree to commit to issues that were discussed or negotiated and yet significant changes to relationships between states. As such, only time will decide the success or failure of a summit. However, we can definitely agree on the factors that make the summit successful. Among others, the meticulous preparation, clarity in the agenda/objective and the political commitment go a long way in determining the outcome of summit diplomacy.

As regard to the debate on the usefulness of summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, it is safe to argue that summit diplomacy, when used judiciously can be very useful to settle complex political issues. It is important to remember that summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool should be used judiciously to prevent the tool from becoming a “hobby” of politicians. Summit diplomacy, when planned and orchestrated carefully can successfully solve complex political issues but technical issues should be left to the professional diplomats. There is a general misunderstanding that professionals diplomats are against the use of summit diplomats as it threatens their profession and also gives them more trouble because politicians who are not adequately trained for diplomacy ends up muddying the water instead clearing it. This is not true. Certain areas are best left and handled by professionals and certain areas are best handled by political leaders. The important thing is to remember and respect this difference. Else professional diplomats have no particular dislikes for summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool.

Summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool has been used before the establishment of regular diplomatic channels and despite occasional highs and lows, it is still one of the preferred channels for conducting important diplomatic tasks. Summit diplomacy as a tool stand out from other tools/channels of conducting diplomacy for its uniqueness in terms of actors at the highest political level and the vulnerability associated with that, symbolic significance, ability to make or unmake important diplomatic moments, etc. Summit diplomacy, as such, will continue to be an important tool as long as diplomacy and inter-state relations continue to exist. The changes in how it is applied and carried out, should not doubt, be expected as all other human activities with the change in time and space.

CHAPTER 3: INDIA'S SUMMIT DIPLOMACY VIS-A-VIS NAWAZ SHARIF GOVERNMENT

This chapter will examine the conduct of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan from 1998 to 1999; when Pakistan was under the civilian government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. As such, the chapter will examine the summits between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. The two Prime Ministers met on three occasions: Colombo 1998 at the sidelines of the SAARC summit, New York 1998, at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, and Lahore Summit in 1999 was exclusively arranged for the summit. The meetings between Vajpayee and Sharif at Colombo and New York were important and instrumental in creating an enabling environment for the ultimate summit at Lahore. As such the chapter will examine the processes, actors, and issues at Lahore in detail while Colombo and New York summits will be examined as a process of the Lahore Summit.

As summits are not stand-alone events, the chapter will attempt to contextualise the India-Pakistan conflict relations before getting into summit diplomacy in details. This will set the background and context under which summit diplomacy was adopted as a foreign policy tool by the NDA government in its relations with Pakistan. A fair knowledge of the background and context would also enable us to understand the factors that contributed or influenced the adoption of summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool and the objectives and motivations behind the adoption of summit diplomacy. The chapter will then move on to analyse the actors, process, and issues at the Lahore summit.

The chapter will be broadly divided into four sections. The first section will contextualise the India-Pakistan conflict relations. This section will bring the major issues of conflict and the reasons for the endurance of such conflicts and the impact thereof on India-Pakistan relations. The second section will then examine the issues in India-Pakistan relations at the time and evaluate the reasons for the adoption of summit diplomacy as a strategy. This section will explore the possible reasons as to why the NDA chose to adopt summit diplomacy as an important tool in its relations with Pakistan. It will analyse the

changes and continuity in India's foreign policy in general and particularly in India's Pakistan policy. The section will examine the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the repercussions of the tests and its impact on India-Pakistan relations. The third section will examine the objectives and motivations for the adoption of summit diplomacy. It will examine detail the objectives that the NDA government seeks to achieve by the adoption of summit diplomacy; in short, agenda to the summit; and the motivations for the same. The fourth section will examine the actors, processes, and issues involved in the Lahore summit. The chapter will end with a brief assessment or conclusion on India's summit vis-à-vis Nawaz Sharif government.

3.1 Situating the India-Pakistan Conflict Relation

India-Pakistan relations have been defined and characterised by conflict and rivalry ever since the two nations came into being. The reason for conflict and rivalry has been studied and analysed differences. The unending conflict between India and Pakistan has been fuelled and sustained by the distrust making it extremely difficult for leaders on both sides to compromise. Leaders on both sides are extremely careful not to make any concessions as “doing so might confirm one's own weakness and invite further demands” and also the belief that “as the stronger side they can bend the other party to its will” (Cohen 2002: 33) has led to the persistence of the conflict. The lack of trust between the two countries largely stems from each country's perception of its vulnerability and the lack of good faith on the other (Parikh 2005). As such, negotiating under the constant shadow of mistrust, there can hardly be any progress in building better relations between India and Pakistan. Leaders also secretly hope for the moment “when they can achieve some special advantage or when the other side will collapse” (Cohen 2002: 34). This can be seen as the reason for the lack of political will to the resolution of differences between India and Pakistan. This also explains why the negotiating experience between India and Pakistan is more about one party getting an edge over the other rather than resolving the differences between the two countries.

The root of the conflict between India and Pakistan can be attributed to “competing projects of nation-building” (Ganguly 2006: 46). The India-Pakistan conflict is a complicated one and there is no easy answer. Both India and Pakistan have their own reason for holding on to Kashmir despite the tremendous cost each country pays in terms of both material resources and the loss of lives. India cannot afford to make any territorial concessions for “fear of encouraging other secessionist movements elsewhere in the country” (Ganguly 2003: 46) and to “demonstrate that the province could thrive in a secular state” (Ganguly 2006: 46). Pakistan believes Kashmir to be an unfinished work of the partition which was supposed to create a homeland for the Muslims and therefore Kashmir by default of being a Muslim majority state should be a part of Pakistan.

Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah while writing about Kashmir in his memoir ‘Aitsh-e-Chinar’ rightly pointed out that

“Unless India and Pakistan come close, the Kashmir problem will remain. It is imperative that these neighbourly countries learn to trust one another. That is the only way to safeguard their interests as well as the interests of Kashmir” (Abdullah cited in Dulat 2015: xx1).

While it is logical for Pakistan to feel threatened and encircled by India due to history and experience; India is five times larger than Pakistan in the territory and seven more populous than Pakistan and had defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war. There are no such factors or reason for India to explain why Pakistan “remained deeply embedded in Indian thinking” (Cohen 2002: 34). Sartaj Aziz former Pakistan’s foreign minister argued that Pakistan's foreign policy has been influenced, shaped and dominated by its relations with India as a result of being the “constant threat to its security from a much larger and hostile neighbour” (Aziz 2009: 216).

There are multiple factors that contributed to the everlasting hate and distrust between India and Pakistan. History, strategy, ideology and domestic political compulsions played their own role. It is important to note here that politicians and leaders from both sides have selectively drawn conflicting traditions for narrow political gains to prove that the

“other intends to conquer and dominate” (Cohen 2002: 36). Pakistan uses the “Arthashashtra⁶ as ‘proof’ of an Indian/Hindu approach to statecraft that emphasizes subversion, espionage, and deceit”; Indians and especially from the Hindu nationalist, argue that “Islamic teachings that portray a world divided between believers and unbelievers, and set forth the obligation of the former to convert the latter” (Cohen 2002 36). As such, the major source of conflict between India and Pakistan is hardly about rational and logical arguments which can be validated or enhanced by proofs and evidence but a lot more to do with culture and ideology.

Nuclear proliferation by the two nations has further destabilized the region as against the claim of proliferation optimists who argued that the overt nuclearization would prevent the outbreak of conflicts in the region as any war could prove to be “catastrophically costly” and would “rendered conflicts in South Asia especially unlikely” (Kapur 2007: 8). Soon after the nuclear tests, Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif who had been heralded as ‘bomb-heroes’ came under massive international pressures to “abandon the policy of the arms race in the volatile region of South Asia” (Chandio 2016: 186) and were compelled to negotiate. In this background of tension, the Lahore summit was held to assuage the international community that India and Pakistan responsible nuclear powers. The Lahore summit was significant because it was the first such high-level document between India and Pakistan post the nuclear tests and also because the leaders were now “offering an olive branch to each other” with nuclear bombs in their jackets (Chandio 2016 188). Soon after the Lahore summit, India and Pakistan fought a limited war over Pakistani intrusion at Kargil into the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC). Kargil is a testament that the introduction of nuclear weapons in the region, as expected by the nuclear optimists, could not deter the outbreak of conventional conflict. Close analysis shows that “nuclear proliferation encouraged the outbreak of the very crises upon which nuclear weapons later had some stabilizing effects” (Kapur 2007: 9). The failure of the nuclear weapons in preventing the outbreak of conflict between India and Pakistan and also the reason why the war remained a limited has been explained by the ‘stability-instability paradox’.

⁶ Arthashashtra or the science of politics is an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic policy, and military strategy. The section on statecraft deals extensively on war-making and state-making.

The 'stability-instability paradox' posits that two nuclear-armed rivals will ensure that they don't cross each other's nuclear thresholds as a nuclear exchange will be fatal to both sides. But the fact that each side will not cross the other's threshold for fear of a catastrophic outcome, one or both sides may consider this "as an insurance policy, since an adversary's reluctance to cross this threshold could provide a license for mischief-making below it" (Nayak and Krepon 2006). In this case, Pakistan used the 'stability-instability paradox' as an insurance policy against India during the Kargil War. This is mainly because "proliferation has created strong incentives for conventional aggression by Pakistan because Pakistan is conventionally weak compared to India and is dissatisfied with the territorial status quo in Kashmir, the key issue of Indo-Pakistan contention" (Kapur 2007: 2). Pakistan tried to revive the Kashmir issue during the Kargil War but India showed great strategic restraint (Ganguly and Pardesai 2009). Pakistan believed that the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe would prevent India from launching an all-out conventional war against Pakistan. Thus contrary to the proliferation optimists' argument that nuclear proliferation in South Asia would stabilize the region, nuclear weapons "have actually made such conflicts more likely" (Kapur 2007: 2).

3.2 Why Summit Diplomacy

The electoral victory of the BJP-led NDA, a Hindutva party, created a new chapter in the India-Pakistan relations. The BJP and its larger Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) have propagated the idea of Akhand Bharat and as such have not reconciled with the fact certain areas of Kashmir under Pakistani administration and considered that as an assault on India itself. The BJP was the only political party in India which can make a significant change to this effect and thus the electoral victory of the BJP led NDA coalition was been watched closely both from India and abroad and especially by Pakistan with many speculations.

At the BJP national executive meeting in April 1998 soon after the electoral victory, the BJP adopted a resolution which stated "the BJP wholeheartedly thanks the voters for bestowing upon it the privilege of serving this great nation. This is both the end of an era

and the dawn of a new one” (BJP 1998). The nuclear tests conducted by the NDA government soon after assuming government was described by L.K. Advani as “walk our talk” (Advani 2008: 541) and described it as the Vajpayee’s government greatest achievement by “instilling a sense of pride, confidence, and hope in Indians both within and outside India” (Advani 2008: 541). The BJP as a political party has always propagated for a strong India and was seen by many as a realist alternative to the idealist Nehruvian Congress government. The consequent detonation of five nuclear devices marked the beginning of the BJP rule in India. The electoral victory and the successful nuclear testing was heralded as with euphoria and triumphalism in the domestic political sphere and scepticism at the international level with many Pakistanis fearing that “a nightmare was upon them” (Raghavan 2017: 227).

The BJP as a political party has always supported the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons and so it was not a surprise that soon after it came to power, the NDA government successfully conducted a series of nuclear tests known as ‘Operation Shakti’ (Operation Power) on 11 and 13 May 1998 in the desert of Rajasthan. Pakistan lost no time and responded with its own series of six tests. India and Pakistan have been “locked in a bitter enmity that has characterised their relationship since the partition” and this has led to three wars between the two neighbours and endless skirmishes and low-intensity conflicts (Wheeler 2010: 319). It has been the norm in India-Pakistan relations to counter and retaliate against each other but the enmity and suspicion between the two countries increased when the two countries crossed the nuclear threshold in 1998. As the international community came down heavily on India and Pakistan in the form of condemnation and sanctions; opinions about the possible consequence of the tests remain divided among the security specialists and observers.

As Pakistan responded with its own nuclear tests on 28 May; a ‘war of words’ between India and Pakistan ensued while the “world looked on appalled and no amount of pressure or threat of consequences had, in fact, deterred either country” (Raghavan 2017: 227). The international caution and coercion seemed to have no effect on Pakistan in the aftermath of the Indian tests to prevent Pakistan from conducting its own tests. This only show how intricately linked the history and future of India and Pakistan to the Indian

tests mandated Pakistani tests. Both India and Pakistan seemed to have a good reason for the detonation and were engaged in “frenzy rhetoric” and the 1998 tests seemed to have encapsulated “a half-century of India-Pakistan history” (Raghavan 2017: 227).

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan made South Asia extremely volatile in the event of a crisis. The fact that a confrontation between the two nuclear-armed states can be catastrophic, compelled policymakers of both states to “stabilize the Indo-Pakistani security relationship at both the strategic and the tactical levels, thus minimizing the danger of nuclear war while reducing the likelihood of lower-level violence” (Kapur 2005: 127). The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan was met with strong reactions and condemnation from the international community which resulted in a series of bilateral and multilateral sanctions stemmed from two reasons as “they expressed grave concerns about the impact of these tests on the global non-proliferation regime” and secondly, “they argued that the tests would further destabilize an already fraught security environment in South Asia” (Ganguly 2008: 45).

The first concern of the international community on the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan was the impact on the global non-proliferation regime. This was a very legitimate concern as the tests by India and Pakistan would mean a blatant challenge to the non-proliferation regime. Technically the test cannot be considered as a violation of the non-proliferation regime as India and Pakistan were not signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan could set a dangerous precedent for other countries in the future to challenge the non-proliferation regime both from within and outside the regime. As such the international community felt the need to react strongly against India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. The second concern expressed by the international community after 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan was that the tests would “further destabilize an already fraught security environment in South Asia” (Ganguly 2008: 45).

South Asia’s security environment has been eternally mired by India-Pakistan conflict and the addition of nuclear weapons into this already troubled water posed a dangerous situation. The security condition in South Asia became extremely volatile and thus the region became vulnerable to external intervention. Against this background of “deep-

rooted fear and suspicion”, India made an effort “to overcome the psychology of mutual distrust by undertaking a dramatic conciliatory move” when the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari undertook what Nicholas J. Wheeler called a “leap of trust” by travelling to Lahore to meet his Pakistani counterpart (Wheeler, 2010). The visit was symbolic as Vajpayee was the second Indian Prime Minister to visit Lahore Nehru’s 1960 visit and the first Indian Prime Minister to visit the Minar-e-Pakistan.

Alarmed by the rising conflicts between the two nations and addition of nuclear weapons into the conflict dynamics, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on 6 June (UNSC Resolution 1172, 1998) which “Recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and

“Demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

Urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation;

Urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir” (UNSC Resolution 1172, 1998, Para 3-5).

In the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, proliferation optimists argued that “proliferation would have a highly stabilizing impact on the subcontinent” as overt nuclear capability would “any war catastrophically costly” and therefore “nuclear

weapons rendered conflicts in South Asia especially unlikely” (Kapur 2007: 8). This argument was drawn largely from the Cold War experience and the fact that United and Soviet Union during the Cold War never entered into direct confrontation, which the proliferation optimist argued was brought about by the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. While it is possible that the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe in the region will bring about stability in the region; it can also be argued that the promise of a nuclear catastrophe in the event of crisis outbreak in the region also acted as a motivating factor towards the need for negotiation and the adoption summit diplomacy as a strategy? Can this be considered as a contributing factor to negotiate?

While there are others who argued that “nuclear proliferation encouraged the outbreak of the very crises upon which nuclear weapons later had some stabilizing effects” (Kapur 2007: 9). This is so because Pakistan, a militarily weaker state in the conventional sense of the term is also a revisionist state in regard to the status quo in Kashmir; which is the source of fundamental dispute between the two nations. Thus the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a “weak, revisionist Pakistan creates strong incentives for limited conventional Pakistani aggression” (Kapur 2007: 9). The fact that a full-fledged war can escalate to a nuclear, which will be catastrophic and that India will not resort to such a war gives Pakistan the edge to conduct a limited war. The Kargil War and the increasing level of militant activities along the border can be considered as supporting this line of argument.

It can thus be argued that both lines of argument have some truth. While Cohen and others are partially right in arguing that the addition of nuclear weapons into the conflict dynamics of South Asia “raised the stakes” (Cohen 2013: 1) and the continued and consistent effort on the part of India to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table despite repeated violation of trust explains the fact that the stakes have been raised in the South Asian conflict dynamics. The raised stakes also played a significant role in making the peace efforts between India and Pakistan possible in different ways. The possibility of a nuclear catastrophe mainly for India as Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy and also the fact that it openly declared that it would resort to nuclear weapons if its territorial integrity is at stake made India consciously open to negotiation with Pakistan. The other

factor is the lack of a proper command and control (CandC) in place and after the military coup in 1999 accompanied by a rogue military regime. This made many Indian leaders felt that the chances of Pakistan pressing the nuclear button highly probable although the Indian leadership tried to brush this fear aside as clearly evidenced from Jaswant Singh's memoir where he argued that the nuclear fear was a construct of the west and there was no point in it (Singh 2006).

The presence of nuclear weapon emboldened Pakistan in carrying out low-intensity conflict as they already knew that India will not retaliate on large scale or wage a full-fledged war for fear of a nuclear exchange. The Kargil conflict and other terror attacks in India can be associated to this reasoning and they stemmed from the assumption that India will not resort to a full-fledged war. However, when India did respond strongly both during the Kargil intrusion and in the aftermath of the Parliament attack, it became obvious that it is the fear of nuclear misadventure that the conflicts were kept under control. For India, it was about not crossing the LoC during the Kargil crisis and not declaring a full-scale war during 'Operation Parakram' despite the massive mobilisation and stationing of troops along the border. For Pakistan it is more to do with international pressure on both occasion and this international pressure was conditioned by the fear of a possible nuclear exchange in South Asia in the event of a war. So in short, the introduction of nuclear weapons played a dual role of encouraging low-intensity conflict and also prevented these conflicts from getting out of hand.

Many feared a real 'nuclear Armageddon' as India and Pakistan declared to the world successful testing of nuclear weapons. As pressures were mounting and sanctions began raining down on the two poor nuclear weapons states, Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif declared that "a forthcoming SAARC summit in Colombo would provide a venue for meeting and both evidently had made up their minds to prove the doomsayers wrong" (Raghavan 2017: 228). To complement this, statements came from both foreign offices that indicated a "changed context of both being nuclear powers and the corresponding need to build trust, reduce conflict and set aside the bitter legacy of the past" (Raghavan 2017: 228). This clearly shows that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was instrumental in pushing India and Pakistan towards the negotiating table. Thus the nuclear tests of

1998 did not only change the conflict dynamics of South Asia but also added a peace quotient to the region. Despite the international repercussions in the forms of sanctions and statements of condemnation from all possible and important quarters of the diplomatic world, the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan was significant not only in changing the dynamics of world politics but also in strengthening peace channels between India and Pakistan. The event provided a push for the two nations “an important opportunity for talks on all the outstanding issues including Kashmir between the two countries at the highest political level” (Maggsi 2013: 1840).

The leaders of India and Pakistan have never given up on the idea of peace even when there were enough reasons to do so. This clarity for the need to have peace or at least a dialogue going was exemplified by the former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee during the NDA years who time and again pick up the thread and start a dialogue process. Vajpayee had just returned from the Lahore summit when reports of Pakistani intrusion into the Indian side of the LoC at Kargil sector was discovered resulting in a limited War between India and Pakistan. The Kargil War was followed by the coup which overthrew the civilian democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif and was replaced by General Pervez Musharraf believed to be the architect of the Kargil War. After the Kargil War, Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf met at Agra for a summit in 2001 but ended inconclusively. Later that year, terrorist organisations based in Pakistan attacked the Indian Parliament leading to one of the biggest military mobilisations in the history of the two nations after the 1971 war. Even after this, India under the leadership of Prime Minister Vajpayee continued to engage with Pakistan which culminated in the 2004 Islamabad Joint Statement. To India’s advantage, the “Kargil turned the international community against Pakistan, while Operation Parakram in 2001–2002 brought demoralization and a huge financial setback” (Basrur 2009: 339).

Recounting his entry into the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Dulat wrote that Brajesh Mishra “more than anyone else understood the importance of engaging with the Kashmiris, and Vajpayee was clear that we needed to move forward and end our permanent confrontation with Pakistan” (Dulat 2015: xxiv). This clearly shows that NDA government and Prime Minister Vajpayee along with his National Security Advisor

(NSA) Brajesh Mishra the first NSA were very clear that there was no other way but to engage in a dialogue with Pakistan and in effect with Kashmiris.

Although India has been following a hedging strategy with Pakistan, leaders and strategists of late realized that India's interest will be better served by engaging with Pakistan. The argument follows that "a weak, military-dominated, and insecure Pakistan is not in India's interest, and instead India should support democracy and democratization in Pakistan" and by doing so hoped "to prepare adequately for defense, trust in treaties and international laws, and wean Pakistan away from the influence of external powers" (Mukherjee 2009: 408). Despite the enduring conflicts between the two neighbour ever since the two nations got independence, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the already troubled waters made the conflicts more intense and dangerous (Matinuddin 2002). As expected international pressures rained heavily on the two South Asian neighbours and it became imperative that for the leaders of both nations to make peace endeavours which resulted in the Lahore summit of 1999. In the history of India-Pakistan relations, each major conflict is usually followed by attempts at negotiation. For instance, the 1965 War was followed by Tashkent Declaration, the 1971 War followed by the Shimla Agreement with no concrete measures adopted to resolve the conflicts and each event become a page in the history of India-Pakistan conflict

3.3 Objectives and Motivations for the adoption of Summit Diplomacy (Agenda to the Summit)

As a result of the nuclear tests in 1998, India and Pakistan were isolated diplomatically and the Lahore summit was undertaken to send a message to the international community that India and Pakistan were "responsible" nuclear weapons and that the South Asian nuclearization would not fall victim to the strategic miscalculation (Effendi 2006). For India, more importantly, the Lahore summit also served as an indication to the world that India was capable of initiating bilateral measures with Pakistan on its own and (Effendi 2006) and effectively keeping out external players in the region.

The Lahore summit provided an opportunity for India and Pakistan to discuss “on all the outstanding issues including Kashmir between the two countries at the highest political level” and the fact that this happened at the highest political level is the “real worth of the Lahore Declaration” because this shows that “a strong political commitment was made to normalize the strained relationship” (Maggsi 2013: 184). The Lahore summit was aimed at breaking down “bilateral problems in discrete baskets including Kashmir and to address these in separate but parallel talks” and not to “try to solve differences in one comprehensive negotiation” (Kux 2006: 40).

Advani argued that the 1998 nuclear tests raised the stature of the Prime Minister and the popularity of the NDA government. Having demonstrated that that “he was a worshipper of Shakti (power), he now set out to prove that he was equally, a votary of Shanti (peace)” by undertaking the famous “bus yatra to Lahore” (Advani 2008: 550). As the foreign minister under the Morarji Desai government, Vajpayee had played an important role in advocating for a friendly relation between India and Pakistan. This shows that Atal Bihari Vajpayee has an inclination to peace with Pakistan even before assuming the role of Prime Minister. It might be interesting to note that the Lahore bus yatra to restart the India-Pakistan peace had the blessing of the RSS Chief, Professor Rajendra Singh (Advani 2008: 551). And as such, the Lahore process happened with the full support of the RSS and this shows how intricately linked the policies of the NDA government and the RSS.

Despite all the differences and distrust, Indian and Pakistani leaders have made several attempts at changing the perception and building friendly relations. To their credit, “leaders on both sides never stopped talking to each other even when there was a deep sense of betrayal” as the one felt by Prime Minister Vajpayee over Kargil intrusion soon after the Lahore summit (Basrur 2009). India and Pakistan have been involved in numerous negotiations over issues ranging from minor issues like railway crossings and timetables at the border to “highly contentious political questions of vital national security interests, such as nuclear confidence-building measures and the Kashmir disputes” (Kux 2006: 19). Both countries have a “strongholds of the status quo and

opponents to policy of change” demonstrated by the past sixty years of “of nearly unbroken bilateral hostility” (Kux 2006: 22).

Another contributing factor to India consistently engaging with Pakistan is the fact that India’s leaders and its strategic community have realized that “unless India and Pakistan can resolve their differences and end their seemingly intractable dispute, India’s influence will remain mostly confined to South Asia and its immediate environs” (Ganguly 2003: 46). This is because all the energy and attention will be focussed on Pakistan and therefore there is a pertinent need to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table. When India does not have to worry about Pakistan, it can focus elsewhere. Thus the NDA consistently picking up the thread of dialogue and negotiation even after blatant violations and betrayals is a part of the larger process of moving away from a Pakistan centric policy. As clearly pointed out by Vajpayee in his writings on the eve of the millennium that Pakistan and terrorism are just one of the many issues that a rising India have to handle (Vajpayee 2000).

In an effort to show the world that India is a responsible nuclear power and to prove to the international community that India and Pakistan are working towards effectively reducing the tensions, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee took to ‘political symbolism’, in a way that have “never attempted so far in the India-Pakistan diplomatic terrain” (Raghavan 2017: 229). This was highly appreciated both by the domestic constituencies (in India and to some extent in Pakistan) and the US in particular and the international community at large. This in a way raised expectation in the sense that this new government with its leadership is up for business and in a way that has never before been attempted.

The Lahore summit was a classic example of bringing “political theatre and sentiment into the existing mould of distrust and suspicion” (Raghavan 2017: 230) was a watershed in the history of India-Pakistan relations. Vajpayee crossed the India-Pakistan border at Wagah on a bus and breaking away from the traditional way of conducting diplomacy through official meetings and statements. The people in the bus comprised of actors, sportspersons, activists, and artists and this symbolic gesture can be seen as an open invitation to other stakeholders into the diplomatic processes. Thus Vajpayee opened up

the diplomatic arena to a larger audience, a clear break from tradition and the signalling of the need to resolve India-Pakistan conflict in a radical way. It changed the face of diplomacy and opened the space for other actors to contribute towards peace in the region which used to be strictly carried by politicians and diplomats until that time.

One of the major reasons for India to adopt summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan is the nuclear factor. The possibility of a nuclear devastation made India “realised the urgency for creating peaceful relations to face the challenges” of the new regional order (Bokhari 2005). India and Pakistan time and again resorted to peace initiatives is because as they are “under constant international scrutiny-not least from Washington-about behaving ‘responsibly’; and ‘responsibility’ would be demonstrated in an overt search for a peace process” (Croft 2005). Nuclear pragmatism also made India take measures to mend ways with Pakistan and an effort to resolve outstanding issues with Pakistan was undertaken to contain the nuclear danger in the region. As such, the adoption of summit diplomacy as a strategy by India in its relations with Pakistan and the compliance by Pakistan “clearly reflects that the two countries were conscious of the inherent dangers of continuous confrontations and appear to be determined to deal with it rather constructively” (Bokhari 2005: 147). Despite all the rhetoric and especially from the Pakistani side, both countries and its leadership have fully realised that there is no winner in a nuclear catastrophe and the Lahore summit clearly reflected the desire of both countries to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in a curious way helped to improve bilateral ties between the two neighbours as they both are “clubbed together in the realm of international criticism and sanctions, and there was a common interest to show the outside world that the two were responsible nuclear powers” (Koithara 2004: 44). Thus the nuclear tests in a way made the Lahore summit possible as this put the two nations in a situation which they both need to get out and it is not every day that India and Pakistan find a common ground or common interest to work together despite the fact that both their history and peace are tied together. The addition of nuclear weapons into the South Asian dynamics “threatens to make regional conflict catastrophically costly” and this compelled policymakers to “stabilize the Indo-Pakistani security relationship at both the

strategic and the tactical levels, thus minimizing the danger of nuclear war while reducing the likelihood of lower-level violence” (Kapur 2005: 127). This was one of the most important motives for the adoption of summit diplomacy after the 1998 nuclear tests.

The reason why Vajpayee time and again undertook summit diplomacy is that he, like his immediate predecessor and successor Inder Kumar Gujral and Manmohan Singh, respectively realised the need to transform relations with Pakistan by transcending the traditional diplomatic boundaries and conventional wisdom. All the three leaders believed that “by engaging Pakistan on its core concern-the question of Jammu and Kashmir- India could find a way to get Islamabad to end cross-border terrorism and normalize the bilateral relationship” (Mohan 2011: 6). Again this shows continuity in policy and how these leaders have carried forward the policy initiated by their predecessors.

3.4 The Lahore Summit

This section will examine the summits that took place between Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. As such, it will examine the three summits that took place between the two leaders; at the sideline of the SAARC Summit (Colombo, 1998), at the sideline of the UN General Assembly (New York 1998) and the Lahore Summit (1999). As mentioned earlier, the focus will be on the Lahore summit as the other two summits (Colombo and New York), are considered as preparatory meetings for the ultimate meeting, i.e. the Lahore summit. The section will go in the following manner. It will first look at the actors involved in the summit; both in terms of negotiators and the stakeholders in and from the summit. It will also examine the personality and regime of the leaders negotiating and see if the regime and their personality have any weight in the way they negotiate. Then it will move on to examine the processes of the summit. Here the main focus will be to examine if enough pre-summit preparations have been done and if the basic tenets of summit diplomacy have been followed while preparing for the summit. This will also help us in determining whether the parties to the summit genuinely believed in the summit. Then we will move on to examine the issues at the summit. What

are the principal issues that were negotiated at the summit? What are the issues that contributed to or influenced the outcome of the summits?

3.4.1 Actors

The Lahore summit was held between Vajpayee and Sharif and in which both happen to be from a right-wing party in their own nations. Sharif not only belongs to Pakistan Muslim League, a right to Centre party which also harboured anti-India sentiments throughout its history” but also belonged to Punjab province in which the “anti-Indian sentiments were rifer than other parts of the country” (Maggsi 2013: 185). Likewise in India when the BJP led NDA government came to power, speculations that the peace process would be caught in deadlock were raised. The BJP was free of much of the historical baggage and associations carried by the Congress. Coupled with their general Hindutva credentials, according to a journalist, the BJP's projected image as the party of national security could also give legitimacy to any peace efforts in a way unimaginable for the Congress (Ogden 2014: 102).

Sartaj Aziz, former Pakistan foreign affairs Minister, writing about the Lahore process and Nawaz Sharif’s approach to the India-Pakistan relations recorded that Nawaz Sharif when he was the leader of opposition in 1996 ask him if nothing can be done to improve India-Pakistan relations and if India and Pakistan are going to continue with the confrontation while neglecting the well-being and welfare of the people on both sides of the border. Sartaz Aziz, according to his book, responded that nothing can be done to change the scenario if both sides stick to their maximum position. As a response to this, Nawaz Sharif later commented, if he gets back to power he would do something about and show flexibility. He added that no one would doubt his intention and he could be more flexible when it comes to negotiating with India (Aziz 2009). This confidence in Nawaz Sharif came about with his background, being from Punjab where nationalist feelings run higher than most other regions; and his political affiliation (being from Pakistan Muslim League (PML) a political party that embodies the very essence of Pakistan as a separate entity.

Nawaz Sharif accordingly made a lot of rhetoric during his election campaign to improve relations with India and this received overwhelming support from the public (Maggsi 2013). A month later during the election campaign, Nawaz Sharif reiterated this view and declared that one of his priority would be to have serious negotiations with India on the Kashmir issue in order to improve ties. According to Sartaj Aziz, Sharif declared this openly in the campaign so as to prevent any misunderstanding or objection later. In his own words, “Sartaj Sahib, mai oh gal kardetiye (I said that thing) so that tomorrow people cannot object to negotiations with India. This is now part of my election platform” (Aziz, 2009). To India and Vajpayee, Nawaz Sharif “had given an impression of being constructive and rational” (Maggsi, 2013) and this was clearly indicated in his dealings with Vajpayee's predecessors like Chandra Shekhar, Narsimaha Rao, and I. K. Gujral. Vajpayee, thus, believed that a nuclearized South Asia could make use of a radical peace initiative and this rapport between the two leaders made the Lahore summit possible.

As the BJP, a rightwing political party ascended to power in India there was a mixed feeling. Many feared that the BJP led NDA government would exacerbate the risk of conflict with Pakistan (Ogden, 2014). Other believed that the BJP’s understanding of Pakistan in relation to Kashmir that “only a hawkish attitude and international pressure will compel Pakistan to end its interference” (Basrur 2002: 54) could be enough reason to settle scores with Pakistan. While the BJP is known to be the most vocal anti-Pakistan national political party in India while Pakistan Muslim League (PML) clearly has anti-India elements within its fold. Nawaz Sharif belonged to Punjab where the anti-India sentiments were stronger compared to other regions of Pakistan and he also belonged to the Muslim League. Interestingly, the presence of the rightwing parties in both countries facilitated the India-Pakistan engagements at the highest political level. Their background enabled the leaders to take forward the relations to another level as the “political leadership of both the countries found a space to move forward on the path to normalization of relations” (Maggsi 2013: 192). This is so because of the historical credit that each of these parties would not betray the nations as they were hard-bent on the other nations in their own way and not sell out in the event of negotiation.

Vajpayee's decision to travel to Lahore for talks with Nawaz Sharif was heralded both at the domestic level and international level. The visit was elevated and compared to historical events of international significance with the likes of Nixon's 1971 China visit and Gorbachev's 1989 Berlin Wall visit. Nicholas Wheeler called Vajpayee's decision as "Leap of Trust" in the history of India and Pakistan (Wheeler 2010). The successful conduct of Lahore should, irrespective of whether the agreements were implemented, be attributed to the flexibility shown by both leaders. There was a tacit understanding and both leaders had avoided propaganda against each other through state-controlled media. While Vajpayee exercised restraint by not declaring Kashmir as "an integral part of India", Nawaz Sharif gave hope by moving beyond Pakistan's "stated position"⁷ (Maggsi 2013: 193).

At the Lahore summit (and even at the Islamabad summit), the parties were careful not to engage in rhetoric and information to the press were regulated and carefully phrased and this created, especially at Lahore, a favourable public opinion in both countries and the moral legitimacy of the agreements and deals arrived were acceptable. This shows what an important role media play in diplomacy and more so summit diplomacy where the chief negotiators consisted of political leaders at the highest level as the public expectation and scrutiny also takes place at the highest level when such events take place.

The Lahore summit stands out as an example of "the exhibition of a political will by the political leaders, for a peaceful relationship and it had melted the ice between the two countries" (Maggsi 2013:198-199). The political symbolism adopted by Vajpayee suggest that "an inflection point had been reached in South Asia" and this successfully brought down the rhetoric of the impending doom in South Asia as a result of the nuclearization (Raghavan 2017: 230). Vajpayee's decision to visit the Minar-i-Pakistan⁸ was significant because this act was "a reiteration- if one was needed- that India accepted the reality of Pakistan" (Raghavan 2017: 230). The Lahore summit is an example of "the

⁷ Pakistan's stated position has been that there can be no improvement/negotiation between India and Pakistan until such time the Kashmir dispute is resolved.

⁸ Minar-i-Pakistan was a symbol for the birth of Pakistan as a separate political identity. It is here that the Lahore Resolution, the resolution for the creation of Pakistan, was passed on 24th March 1940 by the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League.

exhibition of a political will by the political leaders, for a peaceful relationship and it had melted the ice between the two countries” (Maggsi, 2013).

The Lahore visit by Vajpayee created much excitement among the public in Pakistan but certain sections were not happy with the Lahore spirit. The Jamat-e-Islami (JeI), an Islamic organization declared 20th February, the day of Lahore summit a “black day” and carried out a massive protest in Lahore. This was understood as a sign that certain groups were against the idea of a peace process with India.

Indian initiatives and overtures for peace seemed perfectly well but the mistake was in not realising the impact of peace initiative can have on the domestic political dynamics of Pakistan. This is so because there are many militarist and ideological sections within the Pakistani society that will see peace initiatives with India as a threat to their influence and dominance (Mohan 2000). This was actually visible even during Vajpayee’s visit in the protest demonstrations that were carried out across the cities. India failed to see this as a sign and was not prepared for an eventuality and they quickly reacted which resulted in the form of the Kargil intrusion (Mohan 2000).

3.4.2 Processes

When Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister H.D. Gowde wrote a letter congratulating him and expressing his desire for better relations between India and Pakistan. At the suggestion of Sartaj Aziz, Nawaz Sharif wrote to Gowda stating “I share your desire for improved relations but that requires serious negotiations and I suggest that we begin these negotiations at the Foreign Secretary’s level, if possible before the end of March 1997” (Aziz 2009: 220). A positive reply came and the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan (Salman Haider and Shamshad Ahmad) met in New Delhi from 28-31 March 1997. The next foreign secretary-level meeting took place in Islamabad from 19-23 June 1997 which achieved something of a breakthrough and the foreign secretaries came up with a Joint Statement. In the Joint Statement, the foreign secretaries, with the objective of promoting friendly and harmonious relationship agreed to “address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides” which was divided into eight categories or baskets and “to set up a mechanism, including working groups at

appropriate levels, to address all these issues in an integrated manner” (India-Pakistan Joint Statement, Islamabad, June 23, 1997). Unfortunately, the Gujral government in India fell in November and the negotiations came to a halt. However, the pieces were picked up in 1998 after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

When the NDA came to power and India and Pakistan conducted the nuclear tests, it created imperatives for the two countries to come to the negotiating table. Although the nuclear factor and the resultant summit diplomacy cannot be seen as a parallel to the case of US and USSR during the Cold War, there are similarities. One of such similarities can be found in the urgency created by the nuclear weapons for initiating attempts or measures for peaceful relations in the face of the new environment (Bokhari 2005). The positive developments in the aftermath of the nuclear tests in the form of peace initiatives clearly show that “the two countries are conscious of the inherent dangers of continuous confrontations and appear to be determined to deal with it rather constructively” (Cheema cited in Bokhari 2005).

The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan became a blessing in disguise as the event catapulted the two neighbours into a common situation where both have to face the international criticism and sanctions. This common circumstance helps the two arch-rivals to find common interests to demonstrate it to the world as responsible nuclear powers by negotiating with each other. This along with the progress in the diplomatic process made in Colombo (SAARC Summit), Durban (NAM Summit) and New York (UN General Assembly) enabled the Lahore summit (Koithara 2004: 44). This shows that extensive groundwork had been done to make the summit possible and this is an indication that the summit is part of the larger diplomatic process and will succeed when diplomatic decorum and protocols observed.

The meeting between Vajpayee and Sharif at Colombo took place at the sidelines of the tenth SAARC summit held from 29-31 July 1998. The meeting in Colombo is the first between the two leaders and also the first high-level meeting after the two neighbours crossed the nuclear threshold, served as a platform for the two leaders to set the stage for future meetings. The two leaders used this platform to express their own intentions and the distance each were willing to take and at the same time they also successfully

expressed areas which cannot be compromised. Thus the Colombo meeting was used by both parties as an assessing field to understand and calculate the other. The meeting also served as a cooling point as pressures were mounting on the two countries after the nuclear tests. The coming together of the two leaders of the most dangerous region of the world was an attempt to allay the fear of a potential nuclear crisis in the region as was the fear. This was important to show the international community that India is a responsible nuclear power and also to thwart any possible external intervention in the region.

Going by the statement given by the Prime Minister of India on 02 August 1998, the meeting could be described as an exploration of new ways to establish friendly relations between the two countries. In his statement, the Prime Minister of India categorically stated that “we recognized the importance of building mutual trust and confidence and of establishing stable and friendly ties” (FAR 1998, 1). The Colombo meeting between the two Prime Ministers also signalled the resumption of the dialogue already started by Nawaz Sharif and Gujral and which was stalled by the change of government in India. The statement thus reads as “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and I have agreed that the dialogue process should be resumed and we have directed our Foreign Secretaries to meet today and tomorrow to work out the modalities of the resumption of the dialogue” (FAR 1998, 1). As pressures and condemnation were building, tests, the Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs called on the Indian Prime Minister in Durban at the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in August 1998. It was agreed here that the structure/framework for dialogue as evolved by the foreign secretaries in June 1997 would but the official announcement be declared at the meeting of the two Prime Ministers scheduled to be held at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September (Aziz 2009: 221).

As planned, the next meeting between the two leaders was held at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. It was a step further to the blossoming relationship between India and Pakistan under the leadership of Vajpayee and Sharif. The New York meeting serves to strengthen the relationship between the two countries also consolidated the efforts and after this meeting, India and Pakistan had something concrete to work on. It was at this meeting that the Pakistani Prime Minister invited his Indian counterpart to visit Pakistan.

The two leaders also agreed to resume the Delhi-Lahore bus service as a goodwill gesture and strengthen the people-people connection between the two countries. The meeting also came out with a Joint Statement on 23rd September 1998. Three important points were noted in the joint statement:

“They reaffirmed their common belief that an environment of durable peace and security was in the supreme interest of both India and Pakistan and the region as a whole.

The two leaders reiterated their commitment to creating conditions which would enable both countries to fully devote their resources, both human and material, to improving the lives of their people, particularly the poorest among them.

The Two prime ministers noted with satisfaction the agreement reached between the foreign secretaries on operationalizing the mechanism of the composite dialogue” (India-Pakistan Joint Statement, 23 September 1998).

As a follow up this, the foreign secretaries met again in Islamabad from 15-18 October (1998) while other officials met in New Delhi in November. One of the decisions taken at the September meeting between the two leaders was to start at bus service running from New Delhi to Lahore to improve people’s movement.

The Lahore summit was a result of the preparation and the steps taken at the two previous summits namely Colombo and New York. The efforts/initiatives at the two previous summits were essential for the momentum at Lahore. The Lahore summit was one of the most elaborate and conclusive diplomacy at the highest level in the history of the two countries. This is because of the fact that it constituted as one of the most successful diplomatic strikes on the part of India. The summit was aimed at sending a message to the international community that India is a responsible nuclear power and is both willing and capable of managing its own and its surrounding affairs. This systematically served to prevent external intervention in the region, which was prominent at the time because of nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan. The success of the Lahore summit was reaped

when, soon after the summit, the United States of America dropped the sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan in the wake of the nuclear tests. The Lahore summit was also aimed at putting in place a systematic and achievable term to seriously engage with Pakistan and the leaders were successful in this aspect too (Singh 2006).

While the Colombo meeting was about finding a common interest in peaceful relationship between the two countries under the leadership of Vajpayee and Sharif, the New York meeting can be considered as a step ahead as the two leaders agreed on “the peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir” (FAR 1998,2). This shows that the two leaders were concretizing on the process already started at the Colombo meeting. If we look at the outcome of the New York meeting, it can also be considered as a major success for Pakistan in the sense that a clear mention of Jammu and Kashmir; as Pakistan has been insisting on Kashmir issue as the mother of all other problems in India-Pakistan relations. While the Indians have no clear win here but if explored and manipulated here properly, India can strategically win big because terms like “all outstanding issues” can be used include many issues including the issue on cross-border terrorism. It is here that the two leaders agreed to famous bus service across the border and the inauguration of the same by Vajpayee and the consequent Lahore Summit.

It can be argued here that both the Colombo meeting and New York meeting between Vajpayee and Sharif are steps to a bigger and more significant meeting or rather a summit; the Lahore Summit. The Lahore summit took place from 20-21 February 1999. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to Pakistan on the inaugural Delhi-Lahore bus service who was welcomed by his Pakistani counterpart at the Wagah border. The two leaders held discussions on wide-ranging issues including “bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern” (FAR 1999, 1). As a sign of their vision for peace and commitment to improving ties between the two countries, the two leaders signed the Lahore Declaration “embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples” (FAR 1999: 1).

The Lahore Declaration is significant both in a symbolic and substantial sense. The Lahore Declaration is the first Nuclear Confidence Building Measure (NCBM) between India and Pakistan as it recognized the “nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries” (FAR 1999: 2). Carrying it further, the declaration stated that the two countries “shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict” (FAR 1999: 2). Jammu and Kashmir were reiterated as an important issue that needs to be resolved to ensure an environment of peace and security. The declaration also emphasized the determination of maintaining peaceful co-existence and “implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit” (FAR 1999: 2). The Lahore Declaration also came as a major breakthrough for India and provided ample space to manoeuvre over the issue of cross-border terrorism. The declaration agreed that the two countries “shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs” (FAR 1999: 2) and this clause can prove instrumental in making a case against cross-border terrorism used by Pakistan as an instrument of policy against India.

3.4.3 Issues

The core issue surrounding India’s summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan has changed and evolved over time. For instance, the Tashkent Declaration which brought an end to the 1965 India- Pakistan War placed a lot of emphasis on peaceful and good neighbourly relationship between the two countries. The Shimla summit focused on the repatriation and exchange of prisoners of war. Dennis Kux studied the major negotiation initiatives between India and Pakistan and categorised the major India-Pakistan Negotiation (summits) into three groups. He accordingly argued that the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and 1962 attempt to solve the Kashmir problem as “problem-solving Negotiation”, the 1966 Tashkent Declaration and 1972 Shimla Agreement as “Post-Conflict Negotiation” while the 1999 Lahore and 2001 Agra Summits as *Talk About Talks* (Kux 2006: x).

The major thrusts of conflict between India Pakistan during the period were based on Cross-Border Terrorism (CBT) and the unresolved Kashmir issue. It can be accordingly

argued that the success or failure of India's summit diplomacy depended on how these two issues were handled and managed by the two countries. The first summit level between India and Pakistan during the NDA government took place at the sidelines of the Colombo SAARC Summit in 1998 between Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. Unfortunately, the meeting did not bear any result because of the inflexible positions held by both sides. While India stood for a broad-based composite dialogue, Pakistan wanted the resolution of the Kashmir issue as a starting point for dialogue and normalizing ties with India (Baweja and Hussain 1998). It was, as such, no wonder that the talks terribly failed. It became very clear post-Colombo meeting that for Pakistan, it was mandatory that Kashmir issue is included as an important and starting point for any future dialogue and negotiation between India and Pakistan. While India wants to go beyond Kashmir issue and include other issues. The most pressing concern for India at that time was to bring cross-border terrorism to the negotiating table. Thus we can conclude that the agenda of both the parties were well communicated.

The next meeting between the two leaders took place at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (September 1998). It was here that the two leaders agreed to hold the Lahore Summit and necessary preparations were made by the Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of the two countries.

Talat Farooq and Nicholas J. Wheeler argued that the India-Pakistan negotiations have been stalled for months because of "Pakistan's determination to link the progress in the bilateral relationship to concessions on Kashmir" (Farooq and Wheeler 2015). During the Lahore summit, Nawaz Sharif took a courageous step "of breaking this linkage" and signed the Lahore Declaration without attaching the resolution of the Kashmir issue to improve ties with India. Vajpayee and Sharif in a big way contributed to the success of the summit by not using the usual rhetoric and exercising significant restraint. The fact that the Lahore agreement was reached in amidst nuclear tensions and opprobrium made it significant and this became one of the most comprehensive nuclear confidence-building measures (NCBMs) between India and Pakistan. The conducive environment at Lahore was made possible because of the trust and comfort that developed between the two leaders over the months as a result of the previous two meetings (Colombo and New

York) and the unilateral steps and measures taken by each country to assure the other party and the world that a genuine effort is being made to broker peace in South Asia in the aftermath of the nuclear tests.

The uniqueness of the Lahore summit was that it was conducted and the declaration formulated in a way that will benefit both the countries and also that will cater to the sensitivities of both countries by “keeping in mind the realities of domestic politics of both the countries” (Yadav 2005: 89). In the process of the negotiation, Kashmir was discussed as one of the outstanding issues among many others between India and Pakistan. At the same time, the declaration agreed that the “two countries shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs” (Lahore Declaration, 1999). In this way, the Kashmir issue which was of the utmost importance to Pakistan was included while the issue of cross-border-terrorism (CBT) one of India’s biggest concerns was made a part of the Lahore Declaration.

3.4.5 Agenda

Nawaz Sharif speaking at the banquet he held in honor of Vajpayee stated that “there can be no greater legacy that we can leave behind than to do away with mistrust, to abjure and eliminate conflict, to erect an edifice of durable peace, amity, harmony and cooperation” (Advani 2008: 551). Vajpayee while addressing the gathering said “we welcome the opportunity for meaningful negotiation on all pending issues including Kashmir. In the interest of the future generations, we have to bury our differences and restore trust between the two countries” (Aziz 2009: 223).

While visiting the Minar-e-Pakistan, the monument where the historic resolution for a separate entity of Pakistan was passed, Vajpayee wrote in the visitor's book “A stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest. Let no one in Pakistan be in doubt. India sincerely wished Pakistan well” (Advani 2008: 552). Vajpayee’s historic visit to the Minar-e-Pakistan has been seen by many as a message to Pakistan to dispel the skepticism that the BJP as a party has not reconciled with the creation of the Pakistani nation (Wheeler 2010, Bidwai 2005). Later that day he urged the people of India and Pakistan in a passionate speech at the citizens' reception that "we have suffered enmity

for so long. Now is the time for friendship” (Aziz 2009: 224). If we dissect each of these speeches and statements one by one, we can see that the leaders of both countries at the time were concerned to portray an image of a peace-loving and cordial neighbourly attitude. This to a large extent was conditioned by the international pressures and condemnation of the two countries as a result of going overtly nuclear.

A closer look at the summit revealed that India had multiple agenda to the Lahore summit. Three major agendas figure out prominently. The first one was that the summit was successful as a crisis management tool by the Indian leadership. It was used as a way to communicate in clear terms that the Indian leadership can and is willing to keep the area stable and therefore there is no reason or excuse for outside powers to intervene in the region. The second agenda was to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table without having to compromise on issues that concern India. Thus one of the most important aspects of the Lahore declaration was the clause on non-interference in each other's internal affairs which in effect meant that Pakistan implicitly agrees to cross-border terrorism as a policy against India. The third agenda was to show the Indian public that the leadership meant business and Lahore summit was heralded (at the time) as one of the most defining moments in the effort of normalizing India-Pakistan relations mired with constant conflicts and tensions.

It is interesting to note that the factors influencing Pakistan to adopt or at least subscribing to the Indian initiatives of peace also stemmed from domestic politics. One of the most important is the realisation that Pakistanis are growing weary of the Kashmir policy of bleeding India. More importantly, it becomes clear in Pakistan that India has not only successfully absorbed the Pakistani assault but won a good deal of sympathy from the international community, especially the US” (Parikh 2005). There was a growing realization among the public that the support for jihadi group was proving seriously damaging to Pakistan's image at home and abroad. As such the domestic environments in India and Pakistan is changing for good and this is reflected in the attitude of leaders that even when the talks have failed to reach an agreement, officials in both countries are quick to re-affirm that their commitments to peace process would continue.

3.5 Assessment of India's Summit Diplomacy vis-à-vis the Nawaz Sharif government

The Lahore summit concluded successfully and came out with three documents: Lahore Declaration, Memorandum of Understanding and Joint Statement. The Lahore Declaration, a document sharing the “vision of peace and stability” between the two countries under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. Important components include the following:

“Identify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir;

Identify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda;

Take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons” (Lahore Declaration 1999).

Opinions about the substance of the Lahore summit differ. For instance, there are people who argue that the Lahore declaration stripped of its rhetorical commitments to peace and stability, was “a little more than a transparency measure and the goal was to assuage the international community that having tested their nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan would behave as ‘responsible’ nuclear weapons states” (Mian et.al 2004: 3221). While others argue that the Lahore summit for all its symbolic value was also not without substance. One of the most symbolic aspects of the Lahore Declaration is that both India and Pakistan agreed to “intensify the composite dialogue process and efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir” (Raghavan 2017: 230).

The Lahore Declaration was also one of the most comprehensive (NCBMs) and the two parties agreed to have “consultations on each other’s nuclear postures and doctrines and to inform each other in advance of ballistic missile tests and upgrade communication links between military commanders” (Lahore Declaration 1999). One of the lesser known outcomes of the Lahore summit was the agreement between the two Prime Ministers to delegate a trusted representative “meet quietly and discussed what could be the way for Jammu and Kashmir” (Raghavan 2017: 220-221). R.K. Mishra (India) and Niaz Naik

(Pakistan) were appointed and the duo had many discreet meetings away from the public scrutiny and media glare and thus paving the way for what we have now 'back-channel negotiation'.

Vajpayee's Lahore visit in 1999 was equally significant as it was the first since Rajiv Gandhi's visit in 1989. Riding the bus across the border, he was "more imaginative than any Prime Minister could ever dare to be, and it kindled a lot of hope – at least for a few months" (Dulat 2015:15). In the same way, Vajpayee's visit to Minar-e-Pakistan, a monument that was created to commemorate the Muslim League Resolution for the creation of Pakistan, a homeland for the Muslims (13 March 1940) was a symbolic gesture to allay any existential fear that Pakistan may have. To assure the people of Pakistan that India fully recognizes as a separate entity as evident in his words "Pakistan does not need anyone's endorsement" (cited in Dulat 2015: 18).

The Lahore summit was also significant for the fact that it was the first meeting between India and Pakistan after Shimla Agreement and the bilateral summit between the two nations after South Asian nuclearization. History and experience has shown that "settlements of protracted conflicts are very difficult to achieve if negotiations are limited to formal channels" and as such states resort to "formal official channels, informal official channels known as back channels, and Track II channels" (Koithara 2004: 260) to bring solution to protracted conflicts.

All of these channels have their own advantage and disadvantages. For instance, the formal official channels "while essential in developing purpose and communicating commitment, have the handicap of being burdened by public positions and public expectations" and makes it extremely difficult in exploring options as this can be seen as succumbing to the pressure of the other party. Despite the fact that India and Pakistan had conflicted relations since the beginning, it took a more dangerous turn when the two neighbours went nuclear and the Lahore summit can be seen as a peace endeavour (Matinuddin 2002), an escape route after the nuclear tests.

Soon after Vajpayee returned to India after the success of Lahore, his government fell as one of the parties (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) left the coalition and the

NDA could not pass the ‘vote of confidence’ in the house. Even as the government was in shambles, reports of Pakistani intrusion across the LoC surfaced. Despite the Pakistani government claiming ignorance and blaming the infiltration to “mujahideen activity by alienated and insurgent Kashmiris were all too familiar to carry the credibility” (Raghavan 2017: 232). Jaswant Singh was to write about the Kargil crisis in his memoir in the following way:

“What on earth is happening? What was Pakistan attempting to do by this forced aggression in the Kargil sector, particularly so soon after the Lahore bus journey? I could not fathom why those hopes, generated by Lahore, had to be abandoned, why should the promise of peace be choked so soon after?” (Singh 2006: 202).

The Kargil War was, in a way, beneficial to the political life of the NDA. The President requested Vajpayee and his government to continue as a ‘caretaker government’ (as a result of the Kargil War) until such time, the country to go to election again, as the immediate need of the hour was to safeguard the nation against external aggression.

If one looked closely at Jaswant Singh’s comment on the Kargil intrusion in his memoir; one can’t help but speculate what he meant by the phrase “the promise of peace is choked so soon”? Is he already aware that peace was not going to last but was only surprised that it ended too soon? Has he expected it last it for longer? Or did he genuinely believe that peace could be reached between India and Pakistan? Can one say that the Indian government and Jaswant Singh already know that the peace arrived at Lahore will not last but nevertheless went for it? Was this part of the crisis management policy adopted by the NDA government? Did the NDA government genuinely believe in conflict resolution?

This is unlikely because the conflict was beneficial for both India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan use the conflict for scoring political mileage to mobilize the public and especially so during an election. The Lahore spirit was nip from the bud and was not given a chance to mature and develop on its own “left to itself, thus has to remain one of the great counterfactuals or ‘what ifs’ of recent South Asian history” (Raghavan 2017:

232). Had the Lahore spirit left to take its own course (undisturbed by the Kargil conflict) and the NDA government losing the 'confidence vote' in the house, will the NDA still continue with the Lahore spirit?

In the Lahore Declaration, India and Pakistan "reiterated their pledge to resolve the Kashmir issue through peaceful measures" but not long after, the Kargil war took place and diplomatic channels were cut off (Effendi 2006: 197). The Kargil episode proved to be the "demise of Lahore Declaration" (Kamal Matinuddin 2002). The Kargil crisis cannot be brushed off as the attack by the Mujahidin at the behest of the Pakistani military establishment or even the direct hand of the establishment. Nevertheless, the Lahore Declaration "provided a comprehensive code of CBMs for future relations" for India and Pakistan (Effendi 2006: 197).

According to C. Raja Mohan, Kargil occurred because India underestimated "the impact of the Indian peace initiative on the internal political dynamics of Pakistan" as many ideological and militant elements in Pakistan are "frightened by the thought of peace with India and what it could do to their dominance of politics and society in that nation" (Mohan 2001). This fear was planted by Vajpayee's visit to Lahore bringing peace on the horizon and "they struck back in no time to produce the Kargil confrontation" (Mohan 2001).

When the Indian government found out about the intrusion into the Kargil sector, India realized that the only way to respond was through force. And yet even as the Indian forces pushed back the Pakistani intruders peak-after-peak; the Indian government decided against launching a full-scale war and exercised great restraint. This can be explained as an attempt to put the weight of international pressure on Pakistan can well be a reason for India limiting its operations in the Kargil war; it cannot be the only reason. As much as the Indian (in the government) refused to admit, this can only be a subsidiary factor and not a primary one. The truth is; Pakistani troops infiltrated into the Indian side of the LoC; therefore the Indian response in any form would still be a response to an act of aggression on its territory.

There is no denying that the international community will dissuade or even put pressure not to launch a full-scale war or crossed the LoC, yet this is not enough reason to hold back India. The best explanation for this restraint behavior of the Indian government could be the effect of nuclear deterrence. As Pakistan has by that time acquired nuclear weapons and does not have a no-first-use policy, this could have deterred the Indian leadership from taking a more aggressive path. This can be the explanation for not crossing the LoC during the Kargil crisis.

When the Kargil crisis ended after India successfully forced out the intruders “there was a grudging respect for India for securing its military and political aims without expanding the conflict and risking a nuclear confrontation” and Pakistan’s idea of internationalizing the Kashmir issue ended in exasperation (Raghavan 2017: 235). The Kargil crisis in a strange way thus became a scoring point for India against Pakistan in the international parlance.

Sartaj Aziz in his book *Between Dreams and Realities* argued that the Kargil crisis “prepared the ground for a prolonged military takeover in Pakistan in October 1999” and also cause “irreparable damage to Pakista’s principled and legitimate stand on Kashmir in the international arena” (Aziz 2009: 249). Thus the Kargil was as bad for Pakistan's domestic politics as it is for India-Pakistan relations. He also argued that no one was willing to take responsibility for the Kargil War as it failed terribly implying that had Kargil had a different outcome, the narrative and counter-narratives surrounding the Kargil might have been different. Shirin Mazari argued that the planners of the Kargil operation considered it as retaliation to the Indian’s continued activity in the Neelum valley from 1994-96. It was “a limited tactical defensive operation which incrementally escalated as a result of India raising the military, political and diplomatic ante” (Mazari 1999: 25). In Pakistan’s defense for this action, Aziz argued that India has been getting away with several violations of the agreed terms and the planners of Kargil operation assumed that they could do the same just for some tactical advantage without much international reaction in the guise of Kashmiri freedom fighters (Aziz 2009: 252).

While Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif feigned ignorance about the Kargil operation; Army Chief Pervez Musharraf claimed that the Kargil operation was “a limited military

operation intended to retain focus on Kashmir and by bringing about relatively small realignments in the Line of Control to improve Pakistan's negotiating position with India" (Raghavan 2017, Basrur 2009). Sartaz Aziz argued that the Kargil crisis went out of hand mainly because India overacted for political gains. The Vajpayee government failed to secure the confidence motion and fell soon after the Lahore summit and India was in the election fray again. As such, the Kargil issue was drummed up as an election issue and the NDA won the hearts of the people by declaring that they would that not an inch of Indian Territory would be left undefended. The international reaction to the crisis was strong because of the fear of nuclear disaster (Aziz, 2009) and not because of the extent of the crisis.

The civilian-military relations and domestic factors greatly determine and shapes Pakistan foreign policy and especially so when it comes to India and Kashmir. The outbreak of conflict "soon after peace efforts were undertaken by the leadership of both countries raised fingers over the authority and credibility of political leadership in foreign policy domain" (Chandio 2016: 190) and it would not be an exaggeration to argue to argue that summit diplomacy failed and that the civilian establishment in Pakistan do not have power over the military establishment. The fact that Aziz was not consulted before such operations were undertaken by virtue of being the foreign minister shows the sad picture of the civilian-military relationship and that "in the face of prolonged periods of military rule, such major decisions are still being taken by the army leadership without adequate consultations with the political leadership and the civilian bureaucracy" (Aziz 2009: 258).

Even after the Lahore process was decapitated by the Kargil War, and the subsequent military coup in Pakistan and the ever growing in infiltration and terror attacks on India the Vajpayee government still continued to seek to engage with Pakistan through summit diplomacy. C. Raja Mohan explained this effort as a strategy of the Indian government to downplay the Pakistan factor in India's foreign policy. He argued that "calling for retribution and preparing to show Islamabad that New Delhi can hit back vigorously at its provocations will undermine India's own long-term strategic interests" and push India "back towards a Pakistan-centred foreign policy that it has sought to overcome" (Mohan

2000). This explains why India continued to use summit diplomacy and negotiating with Pakistan despite repeated attack and betrayal by Pakistan. He argued that Vajpayee did the right thing by holding the Lahore summit with Nawaz Sharif and visiting the Minar-e-Pakistan as this sent the right message of India's interest in a "stable and prosperous Pakistan" (Mohan 2000).

It was necessary to resolve the conflict between the two nations especially so in the wake of the nuclear tests and the Lahore process was a part of the confidence-building measures to avoid nuclear catastrophe in the region. But India could have done better if it had a better understanding of "the impact of the Indian peace initiative on the internal political dynamics of Pakistan" as many "ideological and militarist elements in the Pakistani establishment are frightened by the thought of peace with India and what it could do to their dominance of politics and society in that nation" (Mohan 2000) and Kargil was a result of this unease.

By not engaging with Pakistan even in the aftermath of betrayals, India can end up supporting those elements it seeks to destroy and prolong the resolution of India-Pakistan conflict. Some commentators argued that one of the major factors that motivated the two leaders to negotiate was for "the economic and political pressure from the United States, its allies, and the multilateral lending agencies among the main reasons" (Chandio 2016: 192). The consequence of economic sanctions was not stringent for India as it was for Pakistan and Pakistan could have been motivated to some extent for negotiation but this cannot be the case for India.

It is a fact that "India looms large over Pakistan and may have more power than it believes it has in shaping the evolution of its neighbour" and it is important that New Delhi "find a way to pursue those aims, with the benefit of lessons learned" (Mohan 2000). India must engage with Pakistan without emotions but with strategy and must be willing to make short-term compromises for the realization of its long-term interest. By engaging with Pakistan, Indian leaders hoped that it would keep away great powers from the Indian subcontinent and in a way implies that (Mukherjee 2009). This is one factor for the continual resort to summit diplomacy by the Vajpayee government (1998-2004) to engage with Pakistan.

After the Lahore Declaration, the Kargil war took place and the military coup in Pakistan and the continual rise in infiltration and terror acts on Indian soil, there was a call for retribution from the Indian public and the hawkish elements within the military and security establishments to show Islamabad what India can do and cause substantial damage to Pakistan. India chose not to do so and fought its way through a limited war without widening the war theatre as doing so to preserve its long-term strategic edge over Pakistan. The Indian military action during the Kargil War was a testament to India's strategic learnings.

This explains why India continued to use summit diplomacy and negotiating with Pakistan despite repeated attack and betrayal by Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee did the right thing by going to Lahore and his symbolic visit to 'Minar-e-Pakistan' and thus successfully and effectively proclaiming India's interest in a stable and prosperous Pakistan. While signalling India's peaceful intentions and desire for cooperative relations with Pakistan, he also hammered out a framework with Mr. Nawaz Sharif for resolving the current problems between the two nations.

3.6 Conclusions

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government came to power in 1998. Soon after the electoral victory, the NDA government successfully conducted a series of five nuclear tests and declared that India is now a nuclear weapons state. Pakistan followed suit and conducted its own series of tests. International pressures in the form of sanctions and condemnation for the tests. As pressures were reining in on India and Pakistan, the NDA government under the leadership of Prime Minister Vajpayee took to summit diplomacy with Pakistan to diffuse the situation. The previous governments under Prime Ministers Gujral and Narasimha Rao have initiated measures for a structured dialogue with Pakistan. The NDA government peck up this thread and steps were taken to engage with Pakistan at the highest political level.

The first summit-level meeting under the NDA government was held at Colombo at the sidelines of the SAARC summit (1998). Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif met

under the shadow of the nuclear tests knowing very well that they need to talk to each other. As such, nothing substantial happens at the Colombo summit but it certainly was a step towards creating a more suitable environment for future talks. The Colombo summit ensured that the two Prime Ministers get to know more about each other and also effectively served as a platform for the two leaders to communicate their own positions which enabled better understanding and help in ensuring the success of future summits.

The two leaders met for the second time at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York (1998). At this summit, the leaders agreed to re-start the Delhi-Lahore bus service as a gesture of goodwill and also to hold the Lahore Summit (1999). Prime Minister Vajpayee very successfully employed symbolism through summit diplomacy and introduced theatre into India's diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan by riding on the inaugural bus service and was received by his counterpart at the Wagah border. The people travelling in the bus with him were composed of personalities from diverse backgrounds consisting of activists, sportspersons, and film stars, among others. This was a signalling of widening the gate of India-Pakistan relations from the usual business conducted by diplomats.

Vajpayee's Lahore visit and the Lahore summit has been compared to historic events such as Nixon's visit to China and Gorbachev's visit to the Berlin Wall which changed history forever. The visit was also rendered more significant when Vajpayee visited the Minar-e-Pakistan; where the resolution for a separate state for Muslims was adopted. Vajpayee wrote in the visitor's book that "a strong and stable Pakistan is in India's interest". Many commentators and analysts argue that this was a step taken to assure that India fully recognize and accepts Pakistan as a political entity and to dispel, if any, that the BJP as a political party was un-reconciled to the idea of Pakistan. The Lahore summit came out with three documents: the Lahore Declaration, Memorandum of Understanding and Joint Statement. The Lahore summit was considered as a huge success as it brought the two countries together to the negotiating table and this was important because the two countries had become nuclear weapons states and the international community was concerned over the possibility of a nuclear misadventure. India and Pakistan had always been in conflict with each other but this conflicting relation was made more dangerous

with the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict dynamic. The Lahore summit also came up with comprehensive measures for nuclear risks reduction and also elaborate plans for structured dialogues were agreed upon.

Unfortunately, the Kargil War took place soon after the Lahore summit and this made it difficult to determine whether the Lahore summit was a success or a failure. At the time of the summit, the coming out with documents would have sufficed as a tremendous success but the outbreak of the Kargil War proved otherwise that the relations or ties built at Lahore was not enough to prevent the outbreak of a war between the two neighbours. However, the significance of the summit cannot be denied. Irrespective of what happened after the summit, the Lahore process enabled India and Pakistan to come together for a brief period to work together. The experience and process of the Lahore summit would go a long way as a source of motivation and hope that, the two neighbours can work together when there are common interest and political will.

CHAPTER 4: INDIA'S SUMMIT DIPLOMACY VIS-A-VIS MUSHARRAF GOVERNMENT

This chapter will examine the summits held between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf. The two leaders met three times: Agra summit 2001 and at the sidelines of the SAARC summit at Kathmandu (2002) and Islamabad (2004). The Lahore Peace process was derailed by the Kargil crisis and India-Pakistan relations was back to its 'normal' of crisis-negotiation-crisis cycle. Then in November 2000, the Indian government unilaterally declared cease-fire coinciding the holy month of Ramzaan. This created goodwill and when the cease-fire which extended for six months came to an end, the Indian government took another bold initiative and invited Musharraf for talks at Agra. The Agra summit, which has been described by many as the 'most dramatic and disappointing summit' was soon followed by terrorist attacks on the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir in October and the Parliament in December.

The Parliament attack resulted in Operation Parakram, one of the largest military mobilizations in the history of India and Pakistan along the border which resulted in a diplomatic stalemate and the suspension of all diplomatic channels. After ten long months of mobilizations Operation Parakam which was initiated in the wake of the Parliament attack along the India-Pakistan border was withdrawn. There was no consensus on whether India has gained or lost by the massive operation that cost dearly in material terms and yet it cannot be altogether called a failure too. In a moving speech on 19 April 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke movingly on the plight of the Kashmiris and indicated his desire to once again engage with Pakistan which famously came to known as the 'hand of friendship' speech. In this speech, he declared that "we are again extending a hand of friendship" to live together in peace. But he also added that this can happen only if both sides are determined to live together in peace as it is brotherhood and not guns that can resolve issues between the two sides.

The gesture sent by the 'hand of friendship' speech was received with great excitement in Pakistan and within a span of three-four months; the stage was ready for the next summit

between Vajpayee and Musharraf in January 2004 at Islamabad along the sidelines of the SAARC summit which resulted in the India-Pakistan Joint Statement 2004.

The chapter will be broadly divided into three sections for analytical convenience. The first section will contextualize the changed India-Pakistan relations after the breakdown of the Lahore process as a result of the Kargil crisis. This section will also analyze the change in Indian government's stand of not engaging with Pakistan to re-engage with Pakistan at the highest political level. The second and third section will examine the Agra summit and Islamabad summit respectively. The section will, in particular, examine the factors/conditions that contributed to the summit, the objectives, and motivations, the actors, processes, and issues at the summit. Each section will conclude with an assessment of the summits. The chapter will conclude with a short assessment/conclusion of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan under the Musharraf government.

4.1 Contextualizing the India-Pakistan conflict relations: Lahore to Agra

Time and again the leadership of India and Pakistan have tried their hands at solving a crisis. It was one of those attempts when Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif tried to end the conflict through the Lahore Process. The “hopes for trust briefly glimpsed at Lahore quickly evaporated” when Pakistani troops infiltrated into Kargil sector of the Indian side of Kashmir. The infiltration at Kargil “threatened to escalate into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan” and in the nuclear background after the 1998 tests by both countries, the crisis sent shiver over the possibility of a nuclear exchange (Wheeler, 2010: 319-320). The inability of India to deal with the rise of terrorism and militant activity in Kashmir might, to some extent/ have emboldened the militant and radical elements in Pakistan for a more adventurous and daring act. The Kargil episode was an attempt to increase its strategic vantage point by using the Pakistan Army in the shadow of the so-called ‘freedom fighters’ (Basrur 2009).

After the Lahore process was derailed by the Pakistani intrusion into the Line of Control (LOC) and the ensuing Kargil War 1999, India-Pakistan relations deteriorated and it took three long years to start the dialogue. According to L.K. Advani, the then Home Minister;

between October 1999 (coup in Pakistan) and early 2001 (before Agra summit), the Indian government adopted a three-pronged approach; the intensification of the war against terrorism, declared that India will not have peace talks with Pakistan unless it stops helping terrorist organization and stop cross-border terrorism, and widened diplomatic offensive and campaign with the international community against Pakistan's support to terror groups (Advani 2008:696).

So much had happened since the breakdown of the Lahore process when Pakistan crossed into the Indian side of the border at Kargil sector and a limited war broke out between the two neighbours. Pakistan went through another military coup on 12 October 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf toppled the Nawaz Sharif government and imprisoned Nawaz Sharif. The military coup in Pakistan took place on 12th October 1999 under General Pervez Musharraf while the second NDA government was sworn into office on 13th October 1999 (after the first NDA government fell when the AIDMK walk out of the coalition). General Pervez Musharraf who was considered as the architect of the Kargil War and who assumed power in Pakistan through a military coup and this “evoked a more-than-normal cold and cynical response in the political and societal circles in India” (Advani 2008: 695).

On December 24, 1999, an Indian Airlines aircraft from Kathmandu to Delhi was hijacked and the hijackers “demanded the release of a large number of terrorists and infiltrators from Pakistan in Indian jails in exchange for the 160-odd passengers and crew” (Raghavan 2017:237). As the agony of the traumatized hostages increased, the Indian government decided to take a difficult decision to exchange the lives of the hostages with those of three terrorists. In the words of Jaswant Singh, the then foreign minister, who took the terrorist to Kandahar for the exchange, as “a searing experience” as he was faced “between two moral rights: saving the lives of the innocents and a fight against terrorism” (Singh 2006:232-234). T.C.A. Raghavan paid rich tribute to Jaswant Singh for taking the fall in the following way, “In doing so, and to his everlasting credit, he took the bullet on behalf of the government” (Raghavan 2017: 238). Jaswant Singh explained that “somebody had to go” and by virtue of his being the Foreign Minister, felt that it was his responsibility (Singh 2006:235). Raghavan explained that this act cannot

be explained and argued that it was derived from “deeply ingrained notions of what constitutes responsibility and leadership” (Raghavan 2017: 238).

After the Lahore process was derailed by the Kargil War and the IC-814 Kandahar hijack, things seemed so bleak for India-Pakistan relations. The peace process that has been initiated and the personal relations that have been built between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif destroyed when Musharraf ousted Sharif with the coup. The little achievements or break-through in India-Pakistan relations were all thrown to the drain saddened Vajpayee. With one misfortune after another starting with the derailment of the Lahore process by the Kargil conflict, followed by the military takeover in Pakistan and the hijacking of the of the Indian aircraft by terrorist groups based in Pakistan and which many Indians believed Musharraf had a hand; the prospect of an Indo-Pak peace process seemed bleak. It so happened that a much-needed breath of air came when George Tenet, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after his visit to Pakistan in June 2000 came to India. He told Dulat that “Musharraf was there to stay” and that the Americans felt “they could do business with the General” but added a caveat that “You guys should check him out yourself” (Dulat 2015: 22).

The new millennium brought the much needed “mix of pragmatism and creative thinking” (Basrur 2009) which enabled the Indian and Pakistani leaders to look for more innovative and non-traditional way of negotiating on the Kashmir issue. This was done through the ‘Composite Dialogue’ wherein both India and Pakistan agreed that outstanding issues between the two countries can only be solved in a gradual step-by-step process tacitly agreeing that there is no quick fix to the problem. A. S. Dulat wrote that “It helped that the CIA chief came and shared his opinion with us that Musharraf was someone people could do business with (Dulat 2015: 34). This must have, in some way, motivated the Indian leaders to pick up the peace initiative with Pakistan after the bitter experience of the Lahore process which was nip at the bud and not allowed to mature.

Prime Minister Vajpayee while addressing the nation at the dawn of the millennium declared that “the battle against terrorism can be won” but stressed that “terrorism is only one of the challenges we have to overcome” (Raghavan 2017: 238). There was an emerging perspective in India and this perspective was gaining ground on how to ‘look

beyond Pakistan' or moving away from a Pakistan centric policy. This explains the continual engagement of India with Pakistan despite Pakistan's persistent attempt to polarize the relations in the form of terrorist attacks. This act of the Indian government was very important and it set precedent for future implications.

Kuldip Nayar explained Vajpayee's continual approach to seeking to engage with Pakistan as a strategy for survival and status of importance in world political scenario. He argued that "anti-Pakistan feeling was strong within the BJP and Vajpayee was an exception because he realized that without an equation with Islamabad he would not receive the attention he sought from world leaders" (Nayar 2012: 361). This is blunt and yet we cannot debunk his argument altogether and this found resonance in Vajpayee's own writings;

"Our country is facing many problems that are a legacy of our history. I wish to share my views on two of them. One is the long-standing problem with Pakistan over Jammu & Kashmir and the other is the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute at Ayodhya.

A self-confident and resilient nation does not postpone the inconvenient issues of yesterday to a distant tomorrow. Rather, it strives to decisively overcome the problems of the past so that it can pursue its developmental agenda for the future with single-minded determination. I have heard many of my countrymen tell me that, now that we have entered a new century and a new millennium, it is time we found lasting solutions to these two problems, one of which is a legacy of the last century and the other a legacy of the last millennium. I agree with them" (Vajpayee 2001).

The pragmatism and maturity in Indian strategic thinking can be contributed to the significant level of stability which was facilitated by nuclear weapons and as such there was a strong felt need on both sides for some kind of equilibrium. The process of engagement and negotiation was a result of this and this was a "comprehensive effort to

transcend their ideational differences” although uncertainties abound (Basrur 2009). It is a fact that Pakistan been a weaker power in relation to Kashmir vis-a-vis India will naturally be dissatisfied and emerge as the revisionist power. This also means there will certain sections and elements that will not be happy with status quo or any peace initiatives with India and this has been reflected in the reactions and uproar in almost all major peace initiatives between India and Pakistan. As India is growing militarily, economically and in terms of strategic connections and influence and the Indian interest and concerns with Pakistan is significantly reduced, Pakistan’s “primary interest lies in de-stabilizing the subcontinent” (Basrur 2009).

4.2 The Agra Summit

Another significant summit between India and Pakistan during the NDA tenure was the much-hyped two days Agra summit held from 15-16 July 2001 at Agra. The Lahore process was derailed by the Kargil crisis over Pakistani intrusion into the Indian side of the Line-of-Control (LoC) and the subsequent overthrow of the civilian government in Pakistan when General Pervez Musharraf replaced Nawaz Sharif in a coup in October 1999. From the Kargil crisis till the Agra summit there was a period of diplomatic stalemate as there were no official efforts taken to normalise ties between the two countries. The Vajpayee’s government inviting Musharraf for talks “marked a significant shift in its Pakistan’s policy” (Yadav 2005: 98) especially after its openly declared stand to not engage with a military regime which ousted a democratically elected government.

The Agra Summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf was “perhaps the most dramatic, but ultimately most disappointing India-Pakistan Summit” (Kux 2006: 44). This can be attributed mainly to the fact that “fairly extensive consultations among senior officials had preceded the previous parleys, but not in the case of Agra” (Kux 2006: 44) and hence the fiasco was not a surprise. While the Indian public statement before the Agra summit “indicated Delhi’s interest in resuming the Lahore summit dialogue, and in obtaining Islamabad’s agreement to phase out its support for Kashmir insurgency” Pakistan clearly “focused on the importance of tackling the Kashmir issue” (Kux 2006: 44) and more

importantly; this view put forth by the Pakistani government was in sync with the view held by the Pakistani army, the establishment which has a huge bearing when it comes to Pakistan's India policy. Though the Agra summit failed terribly, it "underlined the Indian leadership's persistent search for a normalization of relations with Pakistan" (Mohan 2011: 13).

4.2.1 Actors

Lal Krishna Advani in his memoir recorded that "although it was a summit between the Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President, Atalji had taken the well-considered decision to have all his ministerial colleagues in the CCS in Agra" (Advani 2008: 700). It is interesting that Vajpayee was accompanied by all the ministers who were part of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security). Was this imposed on Vajpayee by others within the BJP high command to ensure that he did give in to Musharraf, the moderate that he was within the party? Or was Vajpayee aware that the summit might result in a deadlock and therefore took all the Ministers in CCS to make sure that he will not have to take the responsibility solely on the failure? These are important questions that need to be dealt with in details.

At the Agra summit, the leaders of India and Pakistan negotiated under tremendous pressure conditioned by "different set of domestic, regional and international factors" (Singh 2011: 23). Both parties had a clear picture of what constitutes core issue and because of the clear divergent idea of the core issue, the Agra summit like many other summits between India and Pakistan failed as both countries rigidly held on its core issue without any space for accommodation.

Although the Agra summit was held between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf, a number of varied actors were involved all through the process. The Indian Prime Minister was surrounded by his close confidants including Lal Krishna Advani, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister; Jaswant Singh, the Foreign Minister; India's Interlocutor on Kashmir, K.C Pant; Brajesh Mishra, the first National Security Advisor, and Vivek Katju, Joint-Secretary In-charge of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran division (Mohan, 2001). President Musharraf was assisted and

accompanied largely by a military team including Director General ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, the Chief of General Staff (CGS); Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar; and Tariq Aziz National Security Advisor of Pakistan, (Raman 2001). As such the chief negotiators at Agra summit were not functioning in a vacuum and were pushed and restrained by multiple factors and this was reflected in the competing affiliations and backgrounds of the principal actors at Agra.

Pakistan was represented by a military man and also known in India as the architect of the Kargil War (Kapila 2001) attuned to corporate decision making in consultation with military personnel as against India's consensus building process of a democratic political culture. Moreover, Musharraf was faced with a very strong military and religious lobby which greatly impinged on his approach to the Agra summit. He needed to consolidate his position and therefore took the Agra summit as an opportunity to demonstrate to Pakistani public and major stakeholders in the decision making that he is determined to show that Kashmir lay at the centre of all talks between India and Pakistan to ensure that he gets the necessary support and legitimacy. He thus made it very clear and openly declared before coming to Agra that the Pakistani position on Kashmir remains the same and there will be no compromise whatsoever (Reddy 2001). Yet both leaders agreed to meet. This can only be explained by the fact that Vajpayee wanted to make history and leave a legacy behind for his role in bringing peace in the region while Musharraf needed to consolidate his position at the domestic level and improve his image at both regional and international level. Apart from the contradicting personality of the leaders, the Agra summit took place under the shadow of a divergent regime which also meant that the decision-making process would be different as reflected in the outcome of the summit.

When Vajpayee invited Musharraf for the Agra summit, Musharraf shrewd as he was responded in affirmative adding that he wants a "sincere and candid" discussion with Vajpayee to resolve outstanding differences between India and Pakistan (Reddy 2001) after carefully assessing the domestic compulsions he was in. Before coming to India for the talk, Musharraf held consultations with major stakeholders in the Pakistani establishment including mainstream political parties and Islamic parties to ensure that he secure the support from these groups and also to send a message that he was for a

political process (Raman 2000). However, his team to Agra mostly consisted of important persons from the military and his own confidants and marked a total absence of people from commerce and industry which gives the impression that Musharraf was interested only on the Kashmir issue and not on other issues which are also on the agenda.

The foreign policy establishment in India at the time of Agra summit was closely knitted and played a significant role in the run-up of the summit. Important personalities include Brajesh Mishra and Jaswant Singh. Brajesh Mishra was Vajpayee's pick for the role of National Security Advisor (NSA) and he is credited for giving "a new dimension to India's foreign policy at the turn of the 20th century" (Singh 2011: 26) and a close confidant of Vajpayee during the Agra summit. He was initially against the idea of a summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf at the time and revealed later that the Agra summit was more of a political decision and he had been effectively kept out of this decision making (Mishra 2011). This can be explained by the fact that the BJP hardliners were not very happy with the way Mishra had been influencing the bureaucracy in issues relating to Pakistan. Another very prominent personality in the foreign policy establishment at the time was Jaswant Singh, the then India's Foreign Minister. Jaswant Singh, along with Vajpayee and the deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani took the decision to invite Musharraf for a talk at a meeting May 23, 2001 (Singh 2006).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MEA) wanted a more bureaucratic approach to the Agra summit rather than a "political engagements between the two leaders" (Singh 2011: 27). While Brajesh Mishra attempted for a non-conventional approach of dealing the Kashmir issue with Pakistan by bringing in Pakistani Americans at some backdoor meetings (Singh 2011). This shows that the NDA government was exploring for different and radical ways of dealing with the Kashmir issue. Jaswant Singh despite his strong position on the Kashmir issue has always made it clear that there is no alternative to talking or engaging with Pakistan. This, he argued, is the only hope for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences (Singh 2006).

Another important personality at the Agra summit was L.K. Advani, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister. Advani was hopeful of coming up with something radical and to reap the benefit of making BJP the only party capable of delivering the

country when it comes to Pakistan. This the bank on the fact that he was representing the Hindutva forces (Noorani 2005) as the BJP with its credentials will never be accused of selling out to Pakistan.

Advani and others advised Vajpayee that irrespective of what happened to the Lahore peace process, India needs to continue with peace efforts without softening on the issue of cross-border terrorism. Advani had also given an indication, even before the summit took place; that India will maintain a tough posture on the issue of cross-border terrorism. It later emerged Advani was in touch with a senior Pakistani diplomat through the intermediary of Karan Thapar, a noted journalist. According to this communication, Advani gathered that “General Musharraf, who had then assumed the tag of President from CEO, in June 2001, was keen on ending his country’s isolation. For this purpose, he too was keen on resuming talks with India” (Advani 2008: 696).

At the summit, the difference in negotiating strategies and constraints on each leader became obvious. While President Musharraf sought to negotiate hard with Prime Minister Vajpayee using the media as a tool and also the unflinching support of the domestic stakeholders in Pakistan to put up a rigid and non-negotiable stand on Kashmir, he had his own sets of restraints. A little digression from the portraying Kashmir as the centre of the talk would put him in a difficult situation back home. He was aware that he needed to put up a tough stand to win the support of the military establishment and the fundamental groups at home. As such, any move or steps with the slightest indication of softening of Kashmir would put the survival of his regime at risk. Under such circumstance, it is noteworthy that Musharraf had tactfully managed the situation and came out unscathed.

Likewise, Prime Minister Vajpayee and the Indian delegation were also faced with their own constraints although the type of constraints on each party was absolutely different and unrelated. The Indian leadership hoped to use the Agra summit as a diplomatic strike (Cohen 2001) to ward off possible external interventions in the region and as such, was already aware that the summit may not bear any radical solutions. The very act of holding the summit itself was radical and therefore the summit has served its purpose. Having said that, Vajpayee and his team which comprised of Jaswant Singh, Brajesh Mishra, and Lal Krishna Advani were also faced with constraints. President Musharraf, despite the

fact that he wanted a mostly one-to-one discussion with Prime Minister Vajpayee hoping he would be able to persuade the peace-loving (as it was generally believed) man in his advanced age; Musharraf had no other choices. India being a democratic country with elaborate institutional mechanisms, Vajpayee couldn't take decisions on his own and any suggestions and a possible agreement were constantly subjected to approval by the cabinet. This was not the case with Musharraf although he did not seem to have any plan to make any drastic decisions at the summit assuming that India will never accept his stance on Kashmir. The draft of Joint Statement prepared by Jaswant Singh and his counterpart Abdul Sattar was shot down by the cabinet committee on security (Sattar 2013).

4.2.2 Agenda/s

Many in India felt that this was the right time to bring Pakistan to the negotiation table as Pakistan has been diplomatically isolated as a result of the Kargil War and its economy was spiralling downward and this should provide an opportunity for India to press its points; and the Pakistani government because of its present scenario was expected to be more reasonable and accommodating (Raghavan 2017: 248). The information that Advani got in his communication was that Musharraf was keen on starting a dialogue and that Pakistan is getting exhausted from the isolation in the wake of the Kargil crisis and the military coup. This is a possible reason for India (and particularly Advani, because he suggested the summit to Vajpayee and in some way brought it on him) that Musharraf would give in to the Indian demands at the summit.

India's invitation to President Musharraf came along with the decision to end the cease-fire along the border. India's Foreign Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh explained the decision arguing that the government hopes and believes that various terrorist groups and organization should be able to see the rationale and imperative to peace to adopt cooperation and dialogue and shun violence. In his letter to Musharraf, Prime Minister Vajpayee invited President Musharraf to walk together on the "High Road to Peace" and "picking up the threads" (Cherian 2001); the thread of Lahore that has been broken by the Kargil War. Vajpayee's letter to Musharraf was quickly corroborated by a press statement by the external affairs minister Jaswant Singh. The sudden change in India's

stand on Pakistan of inviting Musharraf for talk breaking India's declaratory policy of not engaging with Pakistan (after the Kargil episode) came as a surprise both to the region and to the international community.

Observers commented that the summit invitation was extended to President Musharraf after a BJP high command meeting and therefore indicates that the BJP was recalibrating India-Pakistan relations and that India and Pakistan need to redefine the rules of engagement. The BJP came under scrutiny from a number of scandals including the Tehelka investigative journalism exposing a senior BJP leader for arms dealing and the poor performance of the BJP party in legislative assemblies. As such, the BJP was on the look-out to score at the India-Pakistan peace process (Singh 2011) and sent a message that it is seriously attempting resolving differences with its immediate neighbour and arch-rival Pakistan. Thus the Agra summit seemed to have a substantial domestic agenda than about resolving the India-Pakistan conflict. Since the political fortunes for the BJP seemed to be running out at the domestic level, the Agra summit was designed in such a hurry to fill the gap by doing something radical on the foreign policy front.

Pervez Musharraf in his memoir "In the Line of Fire" placed the Palestinian issue and the Kashmir issue in this category. This shows his position on the Kashmir issue and he argued that the resolution of the Kashmir issue is urgent "if there is to be permanent peace in South Asia" (Musharraf 2006: 296). This argument can be further extended to indicate that he sees the resolution of the Kashmir as the starting for peace in South Asia and that unless the Kashmir issue is resolved, there can be no other efforts at peace in the region.

In his effort to resolve the Kashmir, he openly declared that as part of his diplomatic efforts, he urged the "world's power to exert the maximum pressure" to resolve the Kashmir issue (Musharraf 2006: 296). This shows that Pakistan under Musharraf was clearly attempting to get international powers in the Kashmir issue while India has always been constant in arguing that Kashmir issue is a bilateral issue and it should be resolved bilaterally between India and Pakistan. The point of convergence between India and Pakistan when it comes to Kashmir (the main bone of contention between the two

countries) is almost absent except the fact that both countries claim Kashmir to be a part of their own.

The Indian government intended to use media as a major tool in the Agra. L.K. Advani, the then Home Minister argues that there were no structured or pre-summit agreed agendas at the Agra summit as wanted by Pervez Musharraf. He also continued that India agreed to that as he and others felt that “in their first ever interaction, it was important for the two leaders to get to know each other’s mind in an informal atmosphere and then chart a roadmap for future dialogue” (Advani, 2008). This argument looks more like a defense in retrospect. Had the Indian leadership really expected the Agra summit to be just a meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf to get to know each other, they would not have prepared an elaborate summit and would do so at the sidelines of other multilateral meetings like the SAARC summit or UN General Assembly.

Also if the Indian leadership, as Advani claimed, had expected the Agra summit to be build relationship between Vajpayee and Musharraf, nothing explains the presence of the whole Cabinet Committee on Security at the summit. While discounting allegations about the possible rift between Vajpayee and Advani at Agra on the issue of cross-border terrorism leading to the summit ending in a flux, Advani argued that the reason why India refused the draft of Joint Statement was the absence of cross-border terrorism and reference to Shimla Agreement and Lahore Declaration. He also argued that Musharraf was allergic to such pacts “as they were associated with his political rivals” and that he “probably wanted to send a signal to his people back home that he wanted to start Indo-Pak engagement on a clean slate, all on his own terms and bearing his exclusive imprint” (Advani 2008: 702).

4.2.3 Processes

In November 2000, India unilaterally declared ceasefire in honor of Ramzaan- “the Islamic month of prayer and fasting” which extended for another six months and was hoped that it would bring calm in Kashmir and also “create a reprieve for civilians caught between the pressure of the militant groups and the counter-insurgency efforts of the security forces” (Raghavan 2017: 248). The cease-fire went on until May 2001 and both

countries seemed quite satisfied that the leaders felt the time for a meaningful dialogue has come. The situation now looks like the two countries are only waiting for a trigger to start a dialogue with each other after the cutting off of diplomatic channels after the Kargil War. The 2001 Gujarat earthquake proved to be a blessing in disguise as the calamity allowed the two countries to come together to work together for relief work. Communication channels were once again opened and a high-level Indian delegation including military officers visited Islamabad.

As the cease-fire came to an end, Prime Minister Vajpayee was keen to initiate something new and thus the Prime Minister invited two of his most trusted friends/confidants; L.K. Advani, Deputy Prime Minister and Jaswant Singh, Foreign Minister to discuss over lunch. At this lunch discussion, L.K. Advani suggested to Vajpayee to invite Musharraf for a talk. In his own words,

“Atalji, why don't you invite the General to come to India for talks? It does not matter if your Lahore initiative failed. It was highly appreciated both at home and abroad. Similarly, your invitation to him will be welcomed as an act of statesmanship both within India and internationally” (Advani 2008: 697).

It was then that Prime Minister Vajpayee decided to take the leap again for the second time to boost the India-Pakistan re-kindled delicate relation and invited President Musharraf to come to India for a summit-level talk, which was soon accepted by President Musharraf and thus the stage for the Agra summit was finally set.

The extending of an invitation to Musharraf to come to India for talks and the cessation of the cease-fire were announce simultaneously and this created a strong wave of debate and criticism within India. But this act of re-engaging with Pakistan meant that India realized that “it is better to be taking and retaining the initiative rather than being reactive” (Raghavan 2017: 249). The invitation to President Musharraf to come to India to come for talks reflects on the larger idea of ‘going beyond Pakistan’, that India cannot be bogged down by the actions or policies of Pakistan. It was an effort to score over Pakistan that India, as an emerging great power is capable of dealing with different issues

including the issue of terrorism and terrorism, is just one issue like many others facing the country.

The fact that the Kargil crisis had been brought upon by Pakistan and yet India extended a hand at re-engaging with Pakistan also shows that India's Pakistan policy has ceased to be 'reactive' and that India was prepared to take the lead. The Agra summit took place without necessary preparations and J.N. Dixit argued that Vajpayee wanted to restart the India-Pakistan peace process at the sidelines of other multilateral meetings (SAARC and UNGA scheduled for December and September respectively) but was advised otherwise by his cabinet (Dixit 2002) and confidants for a bilateral summit (Agra).

Initially Goa was considered for the venue for the talks between Vajpayee and Musharraf but finally, Agra was chosen for its historic and symbolic values. The city housed the TajMahal, and it is a very symbolic location as the Taj Mahal was a symbol of love, built by Shah Jahan, a Mughal (Muslim) Emperor for his wife Mumtaz Mahal. The symbolic value of Agra as a symbol of shared history between India and Pakistan was a good choice for the venue. The announcement of a summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf generated much excitement and hope among the people. The government claimed after the summit that it considered the Agra summit as a part of the process towards improving India-Pakistan relations but never expected overnight results for a problem so complicated and that has spanned over the decades.

As to the invitation extended to Musharraf, a much-denigrated figure in India for masterminding the Kargil operations and possible involvement in the Kandahar hijack case, Indian leadership felt that Pakistan has been chastised after the Kargil conflict and the isolation caused by the coup d'etat. This they believed would make Musharraf reasonable in the negotiations. India by exercising political and strategic restraint during the Kargil conflict had successfully shifted the focus in Kashmir from being an Indo-Pak conflict to cross-border-terrorism. This made the Indian leaders open up for talks with Pakistan despite its stated position that it will not talk with a regime that had ousted a civilian democratically elected government. The invitation extended to Musharraf for talks was also used as an opportunity by the Indian government to show the world that

India is committed to resolving “outstanding issues with Pakistan through dialogue and peaceful means” (Advani 2008: 698).

Before the summit, Prime Minister Vajpayee met with various former leaders and listened to their experiences in dealing with Pakistan. While most of the former leaders were supportive of the summit, former Prime Minister H.D. Gowda was apprehensive of the summit and expressed his apprehensions that the summit between the two leaders will in any way bring about a resolution in the India-Pakistan conflict (Tribune 2001). I.K. Gujral was very supportive of the summit and appreciated the fact that Indian leaders irrespective of their political leanings were determined to resolve the contentious issues between India and Pakistan (Gujral 2001). He also expressed his curiosity as to the perception that General Musharraf might have in regard to India as compared to his predecessor.

As a part of the preparation for the Agra summit, President Musharraf advised the Islamic clergy to refrain from making unpalatable comments against India. This was perceived by South Block in New Delhi as a positive sign and Deputy PM Advani commented that everything was in place for the summit (Cherian 2001). India also released some prisoners as a sign of peace and hinted at opening bus link between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar. This gesture was intended to make people-to-people accessible and was responded by Pakistan when Musharraf stated that he is coming to the summit with an open mind and hopeful about the summit and the need for both sides not to spoil the atmosphere in any way (Singh 2011).

4.2.4 Issues

It was widely held that both India and Pakistan were in some way compelled to come to talks by the United States. The United States was particularly concerned that any conflict between India and Pakistan could turn disastrous as they are both nuclear armed and a lot of US diplomatic activities were focused on the region (Cohen 2001). The United States believed that some kind of nuclear confidence could emerge from a talk between the two nations. The United States through Secretary of State Colin Powell and the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice urged India to look beyond Kargil and resume talks

with Pakistan. The Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Prime Minister Vajpayee in May 2001 where he urged the two leaders to resume dialogue with Pakistan (Dixit 2005). Similarly, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet while visiting Islamabad stated to Musharraf that Pakistan should open dialogue with India at the earliest (Cherian 2001).

Terrorism and militancy in the Kashmir valley reached an all-time high and the number of such activities from August 1999 to August 2000 was higher than the corresponding period of the last five years (Mattoo 2001). Political rhetoric attacking each other, propaganda against each other has become the norm (Mattoo 2001). The Agra summit took place in this tense environment and each side brought with list issues which they felt need to be discussed for normalization of ties between the two neighbors. The significance of the Agra summit lies in the fact that it served as a precursor to future talks despite the failure to come up with something concrete on the spot. Ever since the partition of the country into two, Kashmir had remained a central hurdle to cordial relations between India and Pakistan.

There was an internal rift within the BJP in the run-up of the Agra summit. L.K. Advani and other hardliners within the BJP and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) did not like the idea of ceasefire as the previous cease-fire had not borne any positive result. They were of the view that talks with Pakistan can be held simultaneously with military operations (Swami 2001) and that a cease-fire is not mandatory to have talks with Pakistan. The NDA government from 1998-2004 was in fact very interesting. The BJP, the most vocal hardliner political party based on Hindutva ideology at the national level cannot survive without the support of various regional parties and therefore this exigency of coalition politics made BJP moderate its tone and ideology (Hasan 2002). And the invitation that was extended to Musharraf to come to India for talks can be seen as a part of this project.

The shadow of the Hindu nationalist loomed large over the Agra summit. The RSS, in particular, were averse to the idea of a summit with Pakistan at that time and openly declared that nothing would come out of the summit (Singh 2011). The hardliners were against any conciliatory position on Pakistan and Kashmir and accused Vajpayee of being too soft on Kashmir.

The Agra summit was the first-ever summit between India and Pakistan when the media played a significant role. The media attention could be explained largely because the Agra summit was a major shift in India's Pakistan policy especially from the no-talks stand after the Kargil war. The Agra summit was significant for the fact that Musharraf who replaced Nawaz Sharif after the military coup of October 1999 was meeting the Indian leadership for the first time and that too at the highest political level. The hype surrounding the Agra summit was largely made by the media attention and this generated expectations among the public. It is important to note that both India and Pakistan used the media for their own advantage. It is a different thing how successful it was. The media attention and public glare at Agra summit also made it more difficult on the leaders. It was estimated that the summit has been covered by around 500 media personnel (Hussain 2009) and as such created sensationalism.

Amid all these gestures of peace and goodwill, some untoward events took place creating bitterness between the two countries when Pakistan insisted on meeting the Hurriyat leaders at Delhi which was opposed by India in obvious terms. The Indian government communicated these concerns and Pakistan Foreign Office came out with a statement accusing New Delhi of repression and those international humanitarian laws have been violated in Kashmir. India went on to release a statement of its own of violence being fomented in Kashmir from beyond the border. The issue was somehow put to an end when Advani when indirectly made reference saying that foreign dignitaries should have the decency to respect the sentiments of host country but nevertheless the damage was done and the Agra summit was held under this tense environment (Malhotra 2001). Nevertheless, the summit took place as the Indian leadership did not assume that the summit is a "one-shot event" and considered it to be a process (Mohan 2001). It was hoped that the Agra summit would serve as a modest beginning for a sustained long-term process to eventually resolve all outstanding issues between the two countries. Vajpayee also hoped that the Agra summit would serve as a way of engaging with other sections of the Pakistani community apart from the military establishment (Singh 2011).

Upon arrival, President Musharraf stated that India and Pakistan should aim to resolve all outstanding issues for the sake of development and its people. While it was not certain if

a political breakthrough will happen at Agra, the first day of the summit appeared meaningful and prospects for a productive discussion was raised by the end of the day (Mohan 2001). On the second day of the summit, both “India and Pakistan put on the negotiation table most of the bilateral and fundamental subjects that have divided the two nations for over half a century” including Kashmir and cross-border terrorism (Singh 2011). During a delegation-level talk, the issues of Kashmir and cross-border terrorism was taken up. While Pakistan insisted that India should at least in principle show a fundamental commitment to resolve the Kashmir issue as parallel discussions were being held at the ministerial level between Jaswant Singh and Abdul Sattar and at official level (Reddy 2001).

By the evening of the second, a draft was expected but the three rounds of talks went by between the leaders and nothing conclusive came about. The major source of roadblock came from the fact that Pakistani wanted Kashmir to be clearly stated in the statement as the central issue of discussion while India was not willing to let that happen and moreover the Indian side wanted the problem of cross-border terrorism to be reflected as the core issue discussed at Agra. Thus at the end of the second day at Agra, the two interlocutors were faced with the challenge of breaking this deadlock before they can finally work towards a breakthrough in India-Pakistan bilateral relations (Mohan 2001). Unless this deadlock is broken, the historic Agra summit may yet be elusive and it would not be the first joint other events where “a fundamental change in bilateral relations appeared so tantalizingly near but remained impossible to grasp” (Mohan 2011). The irony about the Agra summit is that both sides came prepared to sign a declaration or agreement but the idea of declaration they both have been too divergent that they could not agree or find a middle ground. This could have been easily avoided if necessary pre-summit preparations were done.

Later that evening, Indian Minister for Information and Broadcasting Ms. Sushma Swaraj briefed the media people stating that the core issues of discussion consisted on cross-border terrorism, NCBMs, trade, and economic cooperation among others without mentioning Kashmir. Pakistan protested strongly and the newspapers the next morning carried reports of Musharraf publicly criticising the Minister. The Minister, however,

clarified later that she meant to “emphasised on the positive course the dialogue was taking” (Singh 2011) and not meant to hurt the sentiment of the Pakistani delegates. Thus the Agra summit was conducted under the constant scrutiny of the media and this could very well be one of the reasons why the talks collapsed. President Musharraf himself took to the media the next morning and held a breakfast conference with senior editors of major newspaper and channels. The very last straw of hope for the success of the summit was cut when the press conference was telecasted (Singh 2011).

The press conference by President Musharraf over breakfast could be understood as a last attempt to impress upon the Indian public. In the course of the conference, President Musharraf clearly stated that there can be no progress in bilateral relations unless the Kashmir issue was addressed as it was the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan and as such any attempt at other initiatives for peace would prove futile. He also argued that India been the bigger country, it is upon India to uphold and respect the dignity and honour of the smaller country that is Pakistan (Parthasarathy 2001). The Indian leadership felt the press conference by President as a grandstanding in an effort to out-march the Indians. Also after the press conference, it became very obvious that everything was not all right in the on-going dialogue and this according to Jaswant Singh made further negotiations on the delicate draft more difficult.

Not that the Indian side is blameless in derailing the summit (Ms.Swaraj took to media before Musharraf); but it is definitely true that Musharraf’s press conference with senior editors over breakfast did effectively eliminate all possibility of reaching an agreement as he was the chief negotiator of Pakistan and his actions cannot be brushed aside unlike Ms. Swaraj’s acts which could be done so or even feign misinformation and thus removed all opportunity to the Indian leadership to rectify or even apologize.

The leaders were engrossed in discussion and deliberation for five hours but nothing came out as the two sides could not agree on the text of the draft even as the foreign ministers worked overnight. The Indian leaders indirectly hinted the situation was made more difficult by Musharraf’s inclination towards a military way of conducting business (Singh 2006). The major problem at arriving a joint statement was on India's insistence to put the word cross-border terrorism and Pakistan's insistence to include Kashmir as the

fundamental issue. Meanwhile, both refuse to accommodate the other's demand in the draft.

4.2.5 Assessment

Musharraf expresses his dissatisfaction with the summit but claimed that it was the beginning of a process to Digvijay Singh on his way from the hotel to the airport (Sudarshan 2001). The external affairs minister Jaswant Singh gave a very matured and calculated statement at the end of the summit. While accepting the failure of the summit he explained that the peace process initiated has not been destroyed and that the Indian government did not expect to solve 53 years old issues to be settled in such a brief period of time. He, however, attributed that the failure of the summit to Musharraf's press conference with senior editors, insistence on Kashmir as the central issue and the refusal of admitting the cross-border terrorism (Noorani 2005).

It is interesting to note that both India and Pakistan refused to call the Agra summit a failure. This shows maturity on both sides and the process that was started at Agra was hoped to be picked up at the UNGA and SAARC summit in September and December that year. While Pakistan foreign minister described the Agra summit as inconclusive, India's foreign minister called it "a step in our march towards peace" (Mattoo 2001). Taking stock of the environment between India and Pakistan before the Agra summit, the holding of the summit itself was itself not a small feat. It also emerged later from there a "framework to discuss Kashmir, terrorism and peace and security matters in an integrated manner" (Sudarshan 2001).

The Agra summit ended in failure and "the mutual accusations and recriminations about it continue to this day" and "drama associated with the summit, in fact, overshadows its ultimate failure" (Raghavan 2017: 250). The Agra summit was the first summit covered 'life'. As such, there was a huge media contingent from both sides and every minute detail was covered and it is but natural that there will be a different India story and Pakistan story. One of the most controversial issues at the Agra summit was the holding of press breakfast by President Musharraf. Musharraf had invited editors for an interaction over breakfast which was telecasted on the same day. Many argued that

Musharraf broke diplomatic decorum by doing so while the Pakistani side also accused India of the same when Minister for Information and Broadcasting Sushma Swaraj addressed the media the previous evening and said that Kashmir was not on the top of the agenda.

Matters went downhill after this interaction and the joint statement which was being negotiated and drafted between Jaswant Singh and Abdul Sattar did not see the light of day. The Pakistani Foreign Minister argued that the media interaction by Musharraf was intended at demonstrating “his persuasive views on the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute to a spellbound audience in both countries” (Sattar 2013: 252). The Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh argued that this act of the President is belligerent and that “a grandstanding had induced General Musharraf into a great deal of unrestrained comment” (Raghavan 2017: 250).

The failure to reach an agreement was principally contributed by the fact that for Musharraf there was no common understanding of what the parties want out of the summit. For Pakistan (Musharraf) a resumption or picking up the threads of Lahore was not appealing as Musharraf and the military establishment at the time of the Lahore summit was not happy the Lahore process. While the primacy on the Kashmir issue by Pakistan was a no-no for Indians especially so after the Kargil episode and with the increasing tide of cross-border- terrorism in the region. The absence of a common ground or mutual interest in the success of the summit proved costly. There was absolutely no meeting ground and the “divergence in the respective positions made any squaring of the circle difficult because perceptions of the summit itself were fundamentally different” (Raghavan 2017: 250).

Many in Pakistan and Musharraf himself perhaps believed that India initiated the Agra talk as a result of the untenable situation in Kashmir and that India was looking for a way out of this mess. While in India, the invitation for talks was seen as a favour done to the military regime in Pakistan which was being isolated. From these perceptions, we can argue that each side expected the other side to make huge concessions in the negotiations as each sees the other in a disadvantaged position and hopes to play the role of a saviour to the other side. For Pakistan, it was about catching at its lowest point as India,

according to Pakistan, has run out of measures to be employed in Kashmir and was extending its hand for a truce. While in India, the feeling was that it was extending a hand to a beleaguered Pakistan after the Kargil episode and the military coup. In doing so, India expected to gain international applause as a responsible nuclear power, a peace-loving neighbor, and a potential benevolent great power.

Despite all the misperceptions and lack of common ground, both parties attempted to reach an agreement at the summit but “found themselves confronting the basic fallacy of their fundamental assumption- that the other was in a position of weakness” and this created “all the drama and some amount of confusion, which seemed to encapsulate this India-Pakistan summit” (Raghvan 2017: 250-251). This shows that India and Pakistan and especially India because it initiated the summit, have not followed the basic tenets of summit diplomacy at multiple levels. Firstly, there was no clarity in the agenda as the driving force for the summit was motivated by other political reasons and not the reaching of an agreement between the two parties. Strangely, for Pakistan and Musharraf, there was clarity as to what their stand in the summit despite the fact that it was flawed. Flawed because the aim was not to reach an agreement but to pin on the resolution of the Kashmir issue as a starting point for talks between the two countries. As such, because of this clarity, Pakistan seemed to emerge victorious to the public eye, even though there was nothing victorious about it as it did not gain anything from the summit, as it did not bend on its stated objective of the resolution of the Kashmir issue as a starting point for talks.

Secondly, there was no common ground or common interest on which both the parties are willing to negotiate and bargain. A common interest or common ground to negotiate and bargain would also mean that both parties would be willing to make some concessions or compromise because it was in their common interest to reach an agreement. It is interesting to note here that both India and Pakistan agreed for a summit, India in extending the invitation and Pakistan in accepting the invitation, without having any common ground to the summit. This, in a way, reflects the desperation of both the parties in their own situation. India was desperate for a greater role in the world stage and thus considered constant efforts at engaging with Pakistan would create a favorable image for

India in the world arena. Musharraf was desperate for legitimizing his regime both at domestic and international level. The invitation for Agra summit came as a blessing in disguise for Musharraf. He tactfully manipulated the event. While sticking his ground on the resolution of Kashmir issue as a starting point for normalizing ties between Pakistan and India, he succeeded in gaining the trust and confidence of his domestic constituency and especially the conservative fundamental groups. The act of negotiating at a summit with India as head of state gave him the opportunity to improve his image internationally and just before the summit, he changed his designation from being the chief executive officer to President.

Thirdly and most importantly, there was no or too little preparations made before the summit. Had there been enough preparations, the two mistakes of lack of clarity in the agenda and the absence of common grounds could have been prevented. Summit diplomacy involves massive preparation that at times it has been described as a rubber stamp to legitimize the negotiations done at lower levels. In a well-planned summit, heads of states are left with no or little to negotiate as most agreements have been reached in the course of preparation and the summit itself are often held for symbolic purposes. Had such care been taken before the Agra summit, the two parties could have come to an understanding of the other party's agenda, objective, and position. All these steps should have been taken before the official announcement of the summit and even if the announcement had been made the parties to the summit could take the last resort of calling off the summit or declared it as a process in a joint statement even if the two parties cannot agree on the terms of the process. The fact that India and Pakistan held the Agra summit without taking into considerations the basic tenets of summit diplomacy is a misuse of the tool of summit diplomacy. Prime Minister Vajpayee while addressing the parliament on 24 July 2001 categorically stated that "Pakistan was reluctant to acknowledge and address cross-border terrorism. My cabinet colleagues and I were unanimous of the view that our basic principles cannot be sacrificed for the sake of a joint document" (Advani 2008: 705).

The failure of the summit was loud and clear and yet the fact that the Agra summit took place indicates that the dust of the Kargil War and the hijacking case had settled and the

door to other meetings and engagements had been opened. This was clearly reflected in the way the Foreign Ministers of both countries responded about the Agra summit. They resonated in the same tone. Jaswant Singh declared, “we will pick up the thread” indicating that the two countries have not ruled out other meetings (Raghavan 2017: 251) while Abdul Sattar said that he was a “natamam, not nakam” (inconclusive not a failure) (Sattar 2013: 251). But this did not bear fruit as the world was embroiled in a war against terrorism in general. The attack of the Legislative Assembly in Srinagar and the Parliament by terrorist groups based in Pakistan changed the whole dynamic of whatever little seeds were sown to re-ignite India Pakistan relations at Agra. It thus became clear that “whatever balance was going to be found between India and Pakistan on the issues of terrorism and Kashmir would have to be a new one and in an environment in which equations were rapidly changing” (Raghavan 2017: 252).

Brahma Chellaney argued that India committed a blunder by inviting Musharraf for a talk and “ended up, through its own initiative, reinforcing its international pairing with Pakistan, renewing global attention on the Kashmir issue, and helping Musharraf to build legitimacy for his military regime” (Chellaney 2001). Part of his argument is logical in the sense that the invitation for Agra summit gave Musharraf the much-needed platform to legitimize his position as the head of the state at the international level. Since the Agra summit was a bilateral talk at the highest political level; India though unintentionally, was in a way recognising him as the rightful leader to represent Pakistan by engaging with him at this level. The part of the argument on “renewing global attention on the Kashmir issue” does not hold much ground as the very reason why India and Pakistan could not agree was that of Kashmir issue (Kargil war). His argument stemmed from the logic that the rigidity of Musharraf made the agreement on a joint statement at Agra impossible as he wanted a joint statement or a declaration on his own terms. This probably was contributed by his fear of meeting the same fate as Pakistani leaders in the past met their end by signing agreements/declarations with India as in the case of Tashkent, Shimla, and Lahore.

According to Varghese Koithara, the Agra summit failed miserably because the negotiation or summit at Agra was held more under pressure and resistance and not based on mutual interest which did “not only stall” the peace process but “end up worsening the relations” (Koithara 2004: 259). For negotiations to be successful, either through compromise or creative solutions, parties should be able to manoeuvre without been seen as succumbing to the pressure or giving in to the demands of the other party. A summit must be well prepared and a situation involving loss of face should be avoided at all costs because. Brahma Chellaney argued that “Agra is a testament to how abrupt; personality driven changes in foreign policy that catch even the establishment professionals by surprise can backfire” (Chellaney 2001). P.R. Chari writing about the Agra summit noted that it was “the commencement of a journey and the beginning of a process” as the foreign ministers of both the countries commented that the summit was “inconclusive and not a failure” (Chari 2001). This tacit understanding and agreement in terming the summit also raise hopes of possible future engagements.

If there is anything the commentators and observers agree about the Agra summit was that it broke the ice or stalemate after the Kargil War but there is no consensus on the failure of the summit. It could be argued that the failure or inconclusiveness as government officials would like to call it, was because of the “aura of mistrust of following years but could not help the two countries to sign an agreement” (Effendi and Choudhary 2016: 191). Again the ease that was somehow restored was derailed by the attack on Indian Parliament in December of that year for which India accused Pakistan of having a hand. As such it took a gap of two years for India and Pakistan to muster the strength to start the process of normalization after the Islamabad summit (2004).

The mood in India at the time of Agra was that “Musharraf chastened by his Kargil experience and burdened by a failing Pakistani economy, was ready to explore a historic peace deal” and this turned out to be a massive miscalculation on the part of the Indians (Chellaney 2001). This false assumption from the Indian strategic community blinded the environment and as a result “India did not take too seriously the signals he conveyed before coming to New Delhi, particularly his insistence for progress on the Kashmir issue

on his terms” and “misjudged the risk-taking commando turning a new leaf” (Chellaney 2001).

While there are others who are more optimistic and argued that although the Agra summit failed terribly, it “underlined the Indian leadership’s persistent search for a normalization of relations with Pakistan” (Mohan 2011: 3). He emphasized India's experience of the summit from the period was beneficial for long term. Whatever the outcome at Agra, the NDA government had successfully crafted out a broad framework for engaging with Pakistan and this was significant for long-term diplomatic conduct.

The Agra summit also signified a form of détente indicating a change of mindset and broke the ice after the Kargil episode and the military takeover in Pakistan. While Vajpayee’s Lahore visit have been perceived by many as been coerced into by external pressures, the decision to invite Musharraf for talks came immediately after “a BJP high command meeting that deliberated the party's performance in recent state elections – indicating a wish to profile itself as a peace-seeking party” (Singh 2011). This shows that domestic politics and foreign policy are highly interdependent although the question as to which comes first remains. But the conduct of each has bearings on the other and at the same time, each can be used to further the other.

At the end of the summit, the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan characterized the summit as “inconclusive and not a failure” and extend that the summit was the “commencement of a journey and the beginning of a process” (Singh 2011). Speculating on the Agra summit, P R Chari wrote that there were two very unique aspects. The first aspect was the “lack of enthusiasm for the Summit and pessimism about its outcome is pervasive in both countries” which he attributed to past experience as “Indo-Pak Summits and meetings that either yielded no results or led to agreements that were only honoured in their breach” (Chari 2001). There was a glaring absence of agenda or mutually agreed issue to be discussed or negotiated at the summit. The best take away from the summit would be the “back channel contacts must exist to inch the two protagonists’ forwards” and that the two leaders “develop a personal chemistry between themselves, and the bureaucrats could then hammer out their decisions into agreements” (Chari 2001).

The Agra summit “broke the ice after Kargil crisis, 1999 and tried to mend the aura of mistrust of following years but could not help the two countries to sign an agreement” (Effendi 2006, Adnan 2013, Singh 2006). It was a landmark achievement as it ended the “two years of stalemate and brought higher hopes to the region” (Amir 2001). Despite the failure in coming out with a document and “remained inconclusive devoid of finalization of any agreement or pact”, the two leaders discussed at length on “issues such as CBMs, resumption of dialogue, Kashmir, economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence” (Amir 2001).

The Agra Summit serves as breathing a new life into the deadlock in India-Pakistan relations although in technical terms the summit did not bear any results like producing peace documents which the expected results of such summits. The breaking of ice was a much-needed action at the time and the Agra summit could not have served a better purpose even if it was considered a total fiasco by many. In the words of J.K. Baral, “although the summit failed in terms of achieving a breakthrough, it succeeded in bringing the two adversaries to the negotiating table” (Baral 2002: 289).

4.3 Islamabad Summit, 2004

Not long after the Agra summit, militants based and operating in Pakistan attacked the Legislative Assembly of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in October and the Indian Parliament complex in December 2001. The attack led to one of the largest military mobilization in the history of the two nations and caused massive condemnation and alerts both in the regional and international community. The fear of a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia was constantly in the air and even when the mobilization was called off in October 2002, the low-level conflicts in the form of infiltration and militant attacks were on the rise. This necessitated the need to engage with Pakistan and peace initiatives were offered by the Indian government in late 2003 and this made the Islamabad summit possible. The Islamabad summit (Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting at the sidelines of the SAARC summit, 2004) was the last attempt at summit diplomacy by Prime Minister Vajpayee and which became one of the most significant in terms of achievement.

The Islamabad summit between the two leaders was very successful and this success can clearly be attributed to the proper planning and clarity in the agenda from both sides. Michael Krepon, an expert on South Asia wrote that “the script was carefully prepared in advance” (Krepon 2004) during the Islamabad summit unlike the unscripted Agra Summit held in 2001 between the two leaders. The conducive environment at the Islamabad summit was also contributed by the fact that “Pakistan’s political options are running out” (Basrur 2009). Its strategy of using stability-instability paradox seemed to be dwindling and this is reflected in Pakistan’s growing unease in the deepening India-US ties and the demonstrated willingness to negotiate on the Kashmir issue.

The Islamabad Declaration concluded that “both leaders were confident of reaching a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Kashmir” (Islamabad Joint Statement 2004). The most significant aspect of the Islamabad summit was Musharraf’s pledge “to prevent the use of territory under Pakistan’s control to support terrorism in any manner, the first direct commitment of this kind since Pakistan backed insurgency in Kashmir began in 1989” (Krepon 2004).

In the following, we shall examine the Islamabad summit in details. The first part will briefly examine the change in the attitude/behavior of leaders from a no engagement with Pakistan in embarking on a new phase of engagement with Pakistan. The section will then move on to examine the objectives and motivations, actors, processes and issues respectively and end with an assessment of the summit.

4.3.1 Change in Behaviour: From Operation Parakram to Islamabad Summit

Just a day after the Parliament attack, the Indian government linked the attackers to groups operating in Pakistan and contended that it was done at the behest of the Pakistani government (Ganguly and Kraig 2005: 298). The Parliament attack resulted in the adjournment of the winter session indefinitely. The Indian government had very few choices available to respond to the parliament attack. India and Pakistan have very low levels of trade and economic sanctions would have, if any, only symbolic value and would not put any costs on Pakistan and will not, in any way, compelled that Pakistani government to give in to the Indian demands. Similarly, severance of transport and

communication links would affect only a fraction of Pakistani population and therefore would not put any pressure on the Pakistani government to comply with Indian demands (Kalyanaraman 2002: 483).

Soon after the attack, the Cabinet Committee on Security met to discuss the ongoing situation and discuss a future plan of action. The Committee agreed that Pakistan should be dealt strongly as the ongoing pattern of attack on Indian cities demonstrates the Pakistani government support and patronage. To send a strong message, the Cabinet Committee agreed that the threat of military action should be held up and the option for war open for consideration. The Committee, however, did not discuss or deliberate any details as to how exactly this should be done (Raghavan 2009: 245).

The Indian Armed Forces were mobilized and demands were made of Pakistan. The ten-month-long mobilisations were given the name 'Operation Parakram' (Operation Valour) and troops were deployed along the border with Pakistan to end proxy war and terrorism. Thus "India mobilized its army, moved key military formations to forward deployments, and permitted its air force to carry out repeated sorties near the border" (Ganguly and Kraig 2005: 299). It was hope that this mobilisation would back diplomacy and therefore "the entire exercise was an attempt at coercive diplomacy" and based on the assumption that the US would give unconditional support in the effort to end Cross Border Terrorism (Mehta, 2003). The Indian exercise of coercive diplomacy occurred in this background. It was "aimed at compelling Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism and renounce it as an instrument of policy against India" (Kalyanaraman, 2002). India responded to these events by mobilising its armed forces along the border with Pakistan and threatened that it would impose a heavy cost on Pakistan if it did not comply with the Indian demand. The stand-off between India and Pakistan lasted for ten long months until India pull back its forces in October 2002 (Raghavan 2009: 254).

The Indian government made the following demands for Pakistan to comply or face heavy costs:

"To ban the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Lashkar-i-Taiba; the extradition of twenty individuals accused of involving terrorist

attacks on India; and to put an end to the infiltration of insurgents into Kashmir” (Mehta 2003).

According to Ashok Mehta (2003), the operation has the following ingredients: a) Application of military pressure for meeting political ends; b) Backing coercive diplomacy with regular diplomacy; c) Asserting the importance of war as an instrument of last resort; d) Reiterating the primacy of political will.

The orchestration and communications of the coercer state's intent are very important for the success or failure of the whole exercise. Patrick Bratton is of the view that the Indian had not clearly sent the message of the seriousness and motivation of India and therefore had not created a sense of urgency in the minds of the Pakistani leadership. There was no specific time frame or time limit for Pakistan to comply or face the consequence. Moreover the Indian effort of communicating to multiple audiences: the Pakistani leadership, the domestic population, and the United States; was a major problem for successful communication (Bratton 2010: 603).

The result of the Indian exercise of coercive diplomacy is very ambiguous and does not bear any clear result. It can neither be called a success nor a failure. After ten long months of massive troop mobilisation, the government cannot call it a failure and claims that the objectives of the operation have been achieved. While the Indian government claimed that the exercise of coercive diplomacy was successful in that “some of the terrorist organizations in Pakistan were banned, some terrorist camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir were closed, their accounts frozen and leaders arrested” and that cross-border infiltration had considerably come down and put Pakistan in the spotlight which made the international community see Pakistan's complicity with terror outfits (Raghavan 2009: 254). Ganguly and Kraig argued that the Indian exercise of coercive diplomacy at best has a Pyrrhic victory and a possible path to peace. The massive military mobilization cost India dearly but failed to achieve any concrete objectives and instead largely “undermined the morale of the armed forces” (Ganguly and Kraig 2005: 320). Pakistan failed to comply with India’s demand to hand over the terrorists and terrorist's infiltration into India continued unabated. The only success derived from the exercise of coercive diplomacy by India was “to draw the United States into the fray as a significant

player to try and curb Pakistan's continuing support to the insurgency and to acts of terror" (Ganguly and Kraig 2005: 320-321).

The Indian exercise of coercive diplomacy was only "successful in compelling Pakistan to comply with its initial set of demands, i.e., action against the LeT and the JeM. But out of the four subsequent demands, Pakistan formally complied with only one: the public undertaking not to permit terrorism in the name of Kashmir from within its territory" (Kalyanaraman 2002: 487). There are different reasons and arguments as to why the Indian attempt at coercing Pakistan failed. Indian leaders were continuously involved in a dual-track policy. While trying to intimidate Pakistan, the Indian leadership was at the same time, trying to use the United States to coerce Pakistan. The US has two objectives: to put pressure on Pakistan to comply with the Indian demands, and to stop the Indian attack on Pakistan. In order to keep the Americans onboard, the Indian government has to take actions which were detrimental to its attempted compellence. It became "very difficult to balance attempts to credibly threaten Musharraf with war with trying to convince the US that it was not going to rush into a war with Pakistan" (Bratton 2010: 605). Both India and Pakistan have high stakes in Kashmir for which Pakistan has been engaging in proxy war and cross-border terrorism. Thus "New Delhi had a strong interest in defeating Pakistani attempts to wrest Kashmir by the use of terrorism" while "Islamabad, too, had a strong interest in undermining Indian control of Kashmir" (Raghavan 2009: 247, Kalyanaraman 2002: 487). It is but obvious that no side will give up easily. Islamabad's conviction that "neither India nor the international community could generate sufficient pressure to force it to compromise on Kashmir" and India do not have the option to go war with Pakistan as Pakistan was strategically located intricately needed in the global war on terror and the international community would not allow India to attack Pakistan (Kalyanaraman 2002: 486).

The biggest flaws with the Indian exercise of coercive diplomacy were the lack of political will which was responsible for the inability to wage war against Pakistan and therefore Pakistan ignoring the threat; and lack of an exit strategy for both the target which is Pakistan as well as the coercer which is India (Sood 2003). The mobilization

lasted for ten long months and “it was simply too much to ask of any government to keep up this level of orchestration for 10 months” (Bratton 2010: 605).

Apart from these reasons that stemmed from India's failure to effectively implement the strategy of coercive diplomacy, there are several other reasons that contributed to the failure of India's coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Some of these reasons are systemic- factors beyond the control of India and Pakistan, regional- coming from regional security complex and complicated by the presence of nuclear weapons in the region, and the domestic political economy of Pakistan (target state). These factors strengthened Pakistan's resolve not comply with the Indian demands during the exercise of coercive diplomacy by India. Nuclear weapons effectively neutralised the outbreak of a full-scale war between the two neighbours. The second factor is the global war on terror (GWOT) of which Pakistan formed a strategic position because of its location and the venue of the war that had to be fought. This gave Pakistan an added advantage over India for the fact that the US would go to great length to keep Pakistan in the war and therefore prevent India from attacking Pakistan. The other very important factor was the domestic political economy of Pakistan at the time which was very volatile. The Pakistani society was highly charged with radical fundamental elements, which were, in fact, waiting for a chance to overthrow the government, and a little wrong step by the government could be disastrous to the ruling regime. This is more so because it had to do with India, the perceived threat to its existence and nothing could be left to chances.

Thus after ten long months of mobilizations (Operation Parakam), there was no consensus on whether India has gained or lost by the massive operation that cost dearly in material terms and yet it cannot be altogether called a failure too. The exercise of coercive diplomacy can at best be considered to have borne mixed results. In the words of T.C.A. Raghavan, “the gains from Operation Parakram seemed intangible and the threats of terror attacks had not receded” but the Prime Minister and National Security Advisor (NSA) at the time “seemed clear that enough had been extracted and that a new phase had to be embarked upon” (Raghavan 2017: 263). The Prime Minister and his NSA felt that the time has come to engage Pakistan and bring it to a negotiating table as the high level of tension along the border are helping neither India nor Pakistan. It was just natural

that this changed attitude and energy would “take some months more before the outlines policy became clear, even to those in the government or close to Vajpayee” (Raghavan 2017: 263) and especially after such a major tiff between the two countries in the aftermath of the terror attack on the Indian Parliament.

The United States in its effort to secure that the war on terror goes undisturbed “launched a frantic diplomatic campaign to defuse the India–Pakistan crisis”. The Deputy of States Richard Armitage visited both New Delhi and Islamabad in June 2002 and eventually, India and Pakistan pull back its forces from the border. The US role here in diffusing the crisis is important but it is important to also remember that this was done to secure its own interests. This is so because, in the event of a war or crisis outbreak between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani forces stationed on the western front (bordering Afghanistan) would be pulled out and transferred to the border with India.

Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center argued that the India-Pakistan 2001-2002 crisis was a result of the stability-instability paradox (Nayak and Krepon 2006). The stability-instability paradox is a situation in which two nuclear-armed competitors are trying to maintain a safe distance for fear of a nuclear catastrophe. This lead to a situation when one of the power abuse the situation and follow revisionist policy knowing full well that the other party will not cross its nuclear threshold for fear of a nuclear exchange and thus become an insurance policy for low-level conflicts. In this case, Pakistan has time and again used the stability-instability paradox for conducting low-level conflicts. Pakistan’s ability to effectively use the stability-instability paradox vis-a-vis India is complemented by not having a no-first-use (NFU) policy. The 2001-2002 crisis occurred when the Indian Parliament was attacked by Islamic terrorists which led to a ten-month-long mobilisation with the Indian and Pakistani forces stationed along the border in a ready-to-fight mode.

On 3rd April 2003, Vajpayee while addressing a public meeting in Kashmir spoke movingly on the plight of the Kashmiris and in the same breath extended the hand of friendship. Taking advantage of this, the Pakistani Prime Minister Jamali called Vajpayee on 28 April and thus the diplomatic stalemate broke and soon “the two prime ministers discussed way of improving bilateral ties, both sides announced the return of diplomats to

each other's capitals, and also agreed to re-establish communication and sporting links" (Hussain 2006). Now both parties realized the futility of war and conflict to resolve the differences and the credit goes to Vajpayee for taking the first step toward this rapprochement.

Change in mood towards a new approach was brewing and this was reflected in the actions of Prime Minister Vajpayee addressing both Pakistan and the domestic constituency simultaneously. In a passionate speech during a public meeting, Vajpayee spoke movingly on the plight of the Kashmiris as he declared that the Kashmiris have been through pains and difficult times and "the doors of our hearts will always remain open for you" (Times of India 19 April 2003: 1). In the same breath he offered peace and friendship to Pakistan and declared that 'we are again extending a hand of friendship but hands should be extended from both sides' but this time, he emphasized that "both sides should decide to live together" as "not with guns but brotherhood alone can resolve issues" (The Times of India 19 April 2003, Raghavan 2017: 263-264).

Fortunately this time, the "hand of friendship" speech of Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 18 April 2003 was well received and reciprocated by Pakistan and thus began a new chapter in India-Pakistan peace process. Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali wrote to PM Vajpayee inviting him to visit Pakistan to which Vajpayee responded the same day and expressed his interest to visit Pakistan. In a span of 3-4 months, India-Pakistan peace had become the most popular and important topic of discussion and speculation both in India and Pakistan. Both countries were in a hurry of announcing varied confidence-building measures (CBMs) which included the release of prisoners, scholarships, travel links, easier visa processes, etc.

Michael Krepon argued that such a sea change in the attitude in two countries was also made possible because of the fact that "Musharraf and Vajpayee are both temperamentally inclined to be in a hurry on Indo-Pak relations" (Krepon 2003). This is so because both leaders have the necessary domestic political economy to make substantial policy changes without having to worry about the survivability of their regime. Vajpayee had established himself as a visionary and peacemaker both domestically and internationally and his credibility is strong enough to take few stones

being thrown at. Musharraf had demonstrated to his domestic constituency through Agra summit that he will not compromise Pakistan's interests and had consolidated his position within the ranks of the establishment.

It is important to remember that despite all the similarities, PM Vajpayee and President Musharraf were the oddest possible pair after Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Vajpayee writes poetry and Musharraf was a trained commando. Does their personality contribute to the success or the failure of the summit? The answer to this question can be found by examining the experiences of Agra Summit and Islamabad Summit respectively. And it should not come as a surprise that at Agra summit when the two leaders had an unscripted meeting that the ending came out the way it was. The leaders seemed to have learnt the lesson and there were enough indications to show that care has been taken to ensure that such a mistake will not be repeated at Islamabad Summit.

4.3.2 Objectives, Motivations and Agenda

Despite the ever-lasting conflict between the two siblings, India-Pakistan relations reached an all-time low in the aftermath of the 13 December 2001 Parliament attack. New Delhi strongly reacted and initiated a full-scale mobilization and Pakistan returned the courtesy by its own mobilization. The atmosphere along the LoC was so tensed that by May 2002, the war between India and Pakistan seemed imminent. As war rhetoric and sloganeering took center-stage with the possibility of a nuclear nightmare and devastating impact on the US GWOT, and the United States put pressure on both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint. With the Indian threats building up and pressures from the US, President Musharraf had earlier taken certain radical steps in January 2002 to “condemning the radical Islamists who had unequivocally set up a ‘state within a state’” and “his determination to rid Pakistani society of their pernicious influence” (Hussain 2006).

The Islamabad meetings between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf was the first meeting at the highest political level between India and Pakistan after the September 11 and Iraq War which have significantly changed the international security environment as well as the relations between Pakistan and the United States. The

Islamabad summit was preceded by quite back channels negotiations spreading over seven months including a meeting between India's National Security Advisor (Brajesh Mishra) and Tariq Aziz (Pakistan's National Security Council Secretary). The United States and to some extent Britain played a facilitating role by putting pressure on Musharraf "to stop supporting jihadi operations in India, in particular, Jammu and Kashmir, and make peace moves to reciprocate Vajpayee's April 18 offer of the 'hand of friendship'" (Bidwai 2004).

Shivshankar Menon argued that the "primary cause of present standstill in formal India-Pakistan processes was domestic developments in Pakistan..... The practical problem for India and the world is how to deal with Pakistan's multiple centres of power and whom to talk to" (Menon 2009). He went on to argue that "the paradox is that while there is no alternative to dialogue, it is not and cannot be the entire answer to India's dilemma" (Menon 2009). Jaswant Singh too unequivocally argued that there is no alternative to dialogue with Pakistan (Singh 2006). It has become clear within India's policy-making circles now that the only way to deal with Pakistan was to engage with it irrespective of the failures and discouragement in the process. This is best expressed by C. Raja Mohan when he argued that "strategic patience, engagement without high expectation, and the political will to seize fleeting moments of opportunity when the present themselves must be the elements of India's renewed engagement with Pakistan" (Mohan 2011: 11).

Today, the negotiator has to engage in both convincing the public and bringing them along apart from bargaining with the other party. As such, "creating public support for negotiating flexibility has become critical" as the media scrutinize every move and diplomacy has become "a public spectacle" (Koithara 2004). States "find themselves transacting business simultaneously with their opponents as well as with their own public" and "sheltering negotiations from hard-line domestic constituencies" has become the most gruelling work for negotiators (Koithara 2004: 262). While parties try to "spin the media to help their hand in negotiations", they are also confronted with the problem of multiple signalling to the opponent, to domestic opinion and to international watchers" (Koithara 2004: 261). If India wants to make any progress in negotiation with Pakistan, it

should be “a structured, step by step framework, with a summit meeting being offered as a reward for flexibility and joint work at lower levels” (Chellaney 2001).

The Indian leadership also has learnt from experience that the best way to deal with Pakistan is to continually engage with it and meanwhile come up with an innovative and radical way of doing so. Also, there was a growing consensus within India that India's Pakistan policy should not be determined by what Pakistan do to ensure an image of India that is not defined by Pakistan. Thus the objective/agenda behind the re-engagement with Pakistan this is about moving beyond Pakistan. While the cross-border terrorism is an important issue, it is just one issue and that India as an emerging power has many other issues to deal with.

Indian Prime Minister, at a foundation laying ceremony of the Indian High Commission, stated that “Pakistan and India should continue talking to each other to take the present process forward” (Dawn, January 6, 2004). This shows that Vajpayee was being careful enough not to raise expectations and this can be considered a lesson learned from Agra summit, 2001. This statement also shows that Vajpayee while being careful was also hopeful that thing will move forward.

In an interview to India Today Group, Vajpayee commented that “until they change their perception about Jammu & Kashmir – that because it is a Muslim majority state, it should be a part of Pakistan – no meaningful discussions can take place on this matter” (MEA, 12 January 2004). This implies that Vajpayee see the Kashmir issue, not in the light of the two nation theory and therefore the solution of this issue should not be based on the two nation theory but out of the heed to have cordial relations which would benefit both the nations. When asked if “problems between India and Pakistan remain as long as Kashmir is an issue” Vajpayee responded that “It does not have to be so” (MEA, 12 January 2004). This shows that Vajpayee is aware that resolving the Kashmir issue is not possible at the moment but was hopeful that the India-Pakistan relations can be improved despite the Kashmir issue and he is looking for other possible ways to bring down tensions between India and Pakistan. Thus the continuous effort at summit diplomacy with Pakistan by the NDA government under the leadership of Vajpayee was an attempt to explore other ways to improve the relations between the two nations.

4.3.3 Actors, Processes and Issues at Islamabad summit

The timing of the cease-fire which came into effect on 26 November 2003 which was also an Eid couldn't have been better and was wholeheartedly greeted by the people on both sides of the border. For the first time in twenty years, "guns fell totally silent, across the entire India-Pakistan interface" even as "infiltration levels started coming down dramatically as did reports that terrorist groups and extremist leaders in Pakistan were being more tightly muzzled than ever before" (Raghavan 2017: 265-266). Michael Krepon, a South Asian expert who observes the India-Pakistan relations keenly wrote that "something refreshingly different is happening in South Asia" and that India and Pakistan are "beginning to stitch together ties that were severed two years ago when Islamic extremists linked to groups based in Pakistan shot up the parliament building in New Delhi" (Krepon 2003).

The series of agreements and confidence-building measures which was "accompanied by a sea change in public atmospherics was, in fact, focused on the big ticket item- a visit by PM Vajpayee to Pakistan" (Raghavan 2017: 266). Coincidentally, the attempts on Musharraf's life also contributed to/with the "recent warming trend toward India" and the timing of Vajpayee's scheduled visit to Islamabad could not have been better (Krepon 2003). As such, the trip should be "used to gird Indo-Pak relations against the shocks to come and if it is not used to further accelerate the process of normalization, it will be a wasted opportunity" (Krepon 2003). The upcoming SAARC summit provided the easy platform for this visit. The SAARC summit was instrumental towards contributing for the success of Vajpayee-Musharraf meet in 2004. It made things easier. Even if the meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf did not bear fruit, there is always the SAARC summit. The Prime Minister went to attend the SAARC summit and the failure of the meeting could be sidelined and the two leaders do not have to face the heat both in their own domestic constituents and at the international level. In that sense, the two leaders did not have to pay the price should the meeting became unsuccessful.

The goodwill gestures extended and reciprocated by both the countries shows that India and Pakistan are both willing and ready for a new chapter and the atmosphere in both countries shows that leaders were convinced and confident for a changed India-Pakistan

relation. But for a substantive and meaningful dialogue, both India and Pakistan have to show commitment and willingness. For this Musharraf needs “a resumption of dialogue with India on Kashmir and other subjects” and “Vajpayee needs sustained efforts by the Pakistani military and intelligence services to stop facilitating infiltration across the Kashmir divide” (Krepon 2003).

In India, the idea of having peace talks with Pakistan took just 3-4 months to build the momentum while in Pakistan; the initiative was viewed with scepticism and suspicion. This is because “the initiative had challenged a firmly held assumption that the tensions of 2002 would be maintained by the ‘Hindu nationalist’ BJP till the next general elections as animosity with Pakistan was a vote winner in India” (Raghavan 2017: 266). The major source of apprehensions to the newfound India-Pakistan peace initiative was that such an initiative was taken up at a time when the timing was favourable to India. The growth in Indian economy, India's improved image in the international arena and at a time when Pakistan was been cornered with terrorism as an instrument against India.

The summit meeting held between Vajpayee and Musharraf at the sidelines of the SAARC summit discussed various issues. The eight issues/baskets as it was called in the Composite Dialogue which includes “Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project; Sir Creek; Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; Economic and Commercial Cooperation; Peace and Security; and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields” (Mishra 2004) were discussed.

Despite all the apprehensions and amidst the clamour for peace in the region, the SAARC summit took place and Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf met on the sidelines of the summit on 4th January 2004. After the highly scripted meeting at Islamabad on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit, the two leaders released a Joint Statement. This itself is a progress from the Agra Summit where the two sides could not agree on a Joint Statement or a Press Release. In the statement, Prime Minister Vajpayee emphasized that “in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility, and terrorism must be prevented” (Joint Statement, Islamabad, January 6, 2004). To this President Musharraf “reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit

any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner” (Joint Statement, Islamabad, January 6, 2004).

At a news briefing soon after the meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf, Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha expressed that “both leaders welcomed recent steps taken towards normalization of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the process would continue” (Dawn 2004). He added that the “fact that the Prime Minister of India came to Islamabad for the SAARC summit, the fact that the prime minister of India has met the prime minister of Pakistan and the president of Pakistan, that I have met my counterpart and the foreign secretaries have met, is progress” (Dawn, 2004). His statement showed that definitely progress had been made at the meeting between the two leaders. But what is more important is the fact that his answers and responses were very calculated and toned. This shows that “some understanding had been reached between the two sides not to divulge its contents to the media” and when pressed for details about the meeting and the progress on bilateral relations, he commented “we are dealing with a very sensitive issue; don’t put words in my mouth” (Dawn 2004).

All these shows that so much progress had been made in the conduct of summit diplomacy since the Agra debacle. He also added that “If anyone at this stage says anything more is not doing justice to the cause” (Dawn 2004). This shows that enough care had been taken by both sides that the misadventure with the media at Agra will not be repeated. As when elaborate preparations are put in before the D-day, the perimeters have already been drawn and thus make it easier for the top leaders to agree and to deliver. Yashwant Sinha also pointed out that the agenda of the summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf at Islamabad was “the furtherance of the process Prime Minister Vajpayee started on April 18” (Dawn), that is the “the hand of friendship” speech to work together for peace and stability in the region.

The major takeaway for India was that Pakistan having recognized the change international environment after 9/11 assured India that it will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity. For Pakistan, India’s commitment to start a dialogue on Kashmir and an end to the high level of tensions with India. The joint statement released

at the end of Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting stated that “President Musharraf assured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he would not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner” (India-Pakistan Joint Statement, 4 January 2004). The Indians found the Islamabad meeting extremely satisfactory and fruitful as this “illustrated the new environment that Pakistan faced and was as explicit an acknowledgment as possible that many ground realities had changed” (Raghavan 2017: 267). Prime Minister Vajpayee was lauded on the ground that he had achieved at Islamabad what he could not at Agra summit. More importantly, the agreements reached Islamabad initiated a process for India-Pakistan negotiations in the long-term.

The external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha was calculated and careful in his choice of words so as not raise the expectations and yet ensure that things were moving. While stating that the delegation level meeting as a courtesy call he also indicated that “resumption of bilateral talks had been given the green light from the highest level but the two sides did not want to make public the modus operandi” Dawn, January 6, 2004). In his statement he said that “both leaders welcomed recent steps taken towards normalization of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the process would continue” and added that “the fact that the prime minister of India came to Islamabad for the SAARC Summit, the fact that the prime minister of India has met the prime minister of Pakistan and the president of Pakistan, that I have met my counterpart and the foreign secretaries have met, is progress”. His short opening statement and calculated answers to pointed questions on the Monday morning meeting hinted that some understanding had been reached between the two sides not to divulge its contents to the media (Dawn, January 6, 2004).

Speaking about the meeting with Vajpayee, Musharraf commented that “I would like to give total credit to his vision, to his statesmanship, which contributed so significantly towards settlement, for coming to this joint statement” (Jang, January 6, 2004). The generous praise and credit given to Vajpayee by Musharraf show that he was determined on improving ties with India. He also emphasized that flexibility was the basis for successful and meaningful negotiation. In his own words, “I would like to commend the flexibility of the negotiators on both sides” (Jang, January 6, 2004). Musharraf laid out

the three major components of the joint statement as “the continuation of normalisation moves, commencement of dialogue that includes Kashmir, and Pakistan's commitment to prevent the use of its territory by terrorist groups” (Jang, January 6, 2004).

4.3.4 Assessment of the Islamabad summit

The success of negotiations between India and Pakistan is conditioned by various factors including the leadership and the political scenario of the time from within and outside the region. At the outset, for a successful negotiation, the two parties there should be some common grounds or conflict of interest in which both the parties want to settle or a mutual desire to resolve the issue. The Islamabad summit has been described by Michael Krepon as “a model of high-minded diplomacy” as “divisive words were not spoken, substantive private sessions were held and common purpose was evident throughout” (Krepon 2004). The Islamabad summit showed a huge progress in the India-Pakistan negotiation experience and as the two parties agreed to discuss the fundamental issues concerning the two neighbours namely Kashmir issue and cross-border terrorism.

The Islamabad summit between the two leaders was very successful and this success can clearly be attributed to the proper planning and clarity in the agenda from both sides. At the Islamabad summit, every minute detail was planned and all actions scripted well in advance unlike the unscripted Agra Summit held in 2001 between the two leaders. The most significant aspect of the Islamabad summit was Musharraf’s pledge “to prevent the use of territory under Pakistan's control to support terrorism in any manner, the first direct commitment of this kind since Pakistan backed insurgency in Kashmir began in 1989” (Krepon 2004). The Islamabad Declaration concluded that “both leaders were confident of reaching a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Kashmir” (Islamabad Joint Statement 2004).

The fact that the Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra was in Pakistan ahead of the Prime Minister’s visit and his meeting with the Inter-Services Intelligence chief Lt Gen Ishanul Haque (Razdan, 2004) also speaks volume. This time, the two parties are making sure that no stones are left untouched and every care is taken to ensure that the

meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President will be fruitful, unlike the Agra summit. Shivshankar Menon, the Indian High Commissioner to Islamabad at the time, in a conversation with the author revealed that Vajpayee wanted to make sure that everything was on track before he comes to Islamabad and that his visit was not made public until the last moment (Menon 2018). When this was asked, TCA Raghavan, the then Deputy High Commissioner, had a slightly different opinion. He argued that Vajpayee's visit had been planned long before and added that "maybe what Menon meant was that Vajpayee wanted to make sure that cross-border terrorism was a part of the discussion on the joint statement if there were to be any" (Raghavan 2018). From this discussion, one thing we can conclude is that there was no disagreement on the fact that every possible preparation had been done for the Islamabad summit.

It is noteworthy that both sides are extremely careful with the conduct and preparation in the run-up of the Islamabad summit could be attributed to the very precarious situation both sides are in. the situation in Kashmir, for New Delhi, was very volatile "with an umbrella group of separatist leaders splitting into moderate and pro-Pakistan factions" and the seriousness of the situation can be seen by the fact that "New Delhi has finally agreed to send a political heavyweight, the hawkish Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, to talk directly to the moderate faction". History has shown that "political assassinations have accompanied hopeful developments in Kashmir" (Krepon 2003). As such, "both Musharraf and Vajpayee need something more tangible from each other if a peace process can gain traction" (Krepon 2003).

The normalization process leading up to the Islamabad summit was different from other/previous attempts at normalizing ties between India and Pakistan. Musharraf too took extra steps to make this normalization possible in his determination of going beyond Pakistan's stated position that unless Kashmir issue is resolved there can be no negotiation on other aspects of the India-Pakistan conflict. By moving away from the stated "demand for a UN-mandated plebiscite over divided Kashmir" and by means of the Joint Statement at Islamabad in 2004 that "Islamabad would not encourage violent activity in Indian-held Kashmir, President Musharraf has helped create much-needed political space for New Delhi to substantively engage itself with Islamabad" (Hussain

2006). These bold acts of Vajpayee taking initiatives to engage with Pakistan after repeated failures and Musharraf radical break from Pakistan's long-stated stand were instrumental in taking the peace process forward to finding a mutually acceptable solution on the Kashmir dispute.

The agreement reached Islamabad was carried forward by holding the first round of talks between officials of the two countries in Islamabad from 16-18 February which came up with a Joint statement to restart the composite dialogue and the next round of talks was planned for August to assess the progress made in the composite dialogue. Unfortunately, the NDA did not come to power in the Indian general elections of April 2004. But the fact that the composite dialogue was carried forward by the UPA government only proves that the Islamabad summit was successful in laying the ground-works for a structured dialogue between India and Pakistan.

Apart from the politics and agendas of the summit, what was significant about the Islamabad summit was the substantial environment of goodwill that the summit created. The event also witnessed massive congregations of a local and foreign journalist. It was reported that “the sense of exhilaration that the Islamabad summit represented a tipping point in India-Pakistan history and the future would be different from the past” (Raghavan 2017: 268). As the region was overwhelmed by the spirit of India-Pakistan peace and all dissident voices were silenced for the time-being, Vajpayee himself hinted that difficulties are bound to come up. Vajpayee during the ceremony hoped that foundation he laid would gradually develop into a building which would be strong enough to face the storms in future and secure its inhabitants.

4.4 Conclusions

The Lahore peace process was not destined to last and mature on its own. Many events took place. Soon after Vajpayee returned from the Lahore summit, his government fell when the All India Anna DravidaMunnetraKazhagam (AIADMK), one of the constituting parties of the NDA left the coalition. Even as the government was in shambles, Pakistani intrusion into Kargil sector on the Indian side of the Kashmir

surfaced. The President of India requested Mr. Vajpayee to continue as the caretaker government until the intrusions were successfully flushed out. It emerged that Pakistan had successfully occupied certain outposts and a hard but limited war was fought between India and Pakistan. The Indian forces slowly forced the intruding forces out of its territory. The general election was announced and held in India by September 1999 to elect a new government at the centre. The NDA emerged with the clear majority this time and was sworn into government on 13 October 1999 while the fourth military coup took place in Pakistan on 12 October 1999. General Pervez Musharraf, the Army Chief ousted the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif.

Since the breakdown of the Lahore process as a result of the Kargil War and the military coup in Pakistan, India, and Pakistan did not have any dialogue at the official level. In 2001, the NDA government took another bold initiative of inviting General Musharraf for a talk at Agra in July. The Agra summit generated much heat and was keenly observed. The Agra summit was also one of the first summits in the history of India and Pakistan where diplomacy was conducted in public. It has been described as the most dramatic and disappointing summit. This is partly true and partly wrong. The summit was held without necessary preparations and failed terribly in terms of coming to an agreement. But politicians, diplomats, and academics agree that the Agra summit was a very significant step towards normalizing India-Pakistan relations as it broke the ice after the Kargil war.

Soon after the Agra summit, the Legislative Assembly of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Parliament were attacked by terrorist groups based in Pakistan. The Indian government resorted to coercive diplomacy to compel Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism as an instrument against India and to crack down on terrorist camps. This resulted in one of the largest military mobilization as the Indian mobilization was responded with a Pakistani mobilization. The mobilization lasted for ten long months and was finally withdrawn in October 2002. In April 2003, Vajpayee took a final dig at peace and in a passionate speech while addressing a public meeting declared that India was once again extending a hand of friendship which was picked up quickly by Pakistan. Thus began the new peace process which was to culminate at the Islamabad summit 2004.

The Islamabad summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf took place at the sidelines of the SAARC summit. The Islamabad process was different from previous peace process as Pakistan deviated from its long-held position of resolving the Kashmir issue as a starting point for India-Pakistan dialogue. The Islamabad summit was also very significant as Musharraf publicly for the first time committed to prevent terrorist activity within the territory of Pakistan. This change in Pakistan behavior has been attributed to the change in the international environment as a result of the 9/11 and the shift in global centres of power.

CHAPTER 5: ASSESSMENTS AND FINDINGS

This chapter will assess the Indian practice of summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan under the National Democratic Alliance government (1998-2004). The chapter will be broadly divided into three sections. The first section will examine summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool in general. It will bring out opinions and observations of diplomats collected in the interaction during the course of this study. It will also highlight the differences in opinion, if any, between the professional diplomats and also between the existing literature. The second section will examine the Indian practice of summit diplomacy in its relations with Pakistan from 1998-2004 in the light of the two hypotheses proposed at the beginning of this study. This section will, in particular, analyze if the NDA government (1998-2004) adoption of summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool in its relations with Pakistan was dictated by the need for crisis management and to prevent external intervention in the region or conflict resolution. The second part of this section will analyze the second hypothesis of whether the agenda or the regime and personality of the leaders explain the success or failure of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan under the NDA governments, 1998-2004. The third section will bring out a comparative analysis of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis the Nawaz Sharif government and Musharraf government. This section will bring out the differences, if any, in India's conduct of summit diplomacy vis-à-vis the Nawaz Sharif government and the Musharraf government. Here we will not only assess the differences in the two regimes in Pakistan but also the Indian behaviour and if there are any differences in the way Indian leadership approach summit diplomacy with the different regimes in Pakistan. This will enable us to draw conclusions if personality and regime affect the way summit diplomacy is conducted.

5.1 Summit Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Tool

Summit diplomacy has been used as a tool in interstate relations from the earliest times of the recorded history of inter-state relations even before the emergence of modern nation-states and the emergence of regular diplomatic channels. Summits have been used by Kings and rulers to negotiate on issues concerning their kingdoms, plot wars and forge alliances in ancient diplomatic history. Summits took different shapes and forms ranging from elaborately designed bilateral meetings between rulers to meetings at the sidelines of other events like a royal coronation, royal marriage, funerals of rulers, etc. In modern times summit, diplomacy takes place in the form of bilateral meetings between the head of states and meetings at the side-lines meetings between the head of states at major international gatherings such as the UN General Assembly and other regional meetings such as SAARC, BRICS, G-8, G-20, etc. to mention a few.

Summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool took a backseat with the emergence and flourishing of the regular diplomatic channel through resident commissioners in the early fifteenth century. The change in attitude in the conduct of diplomacy and the relegating of summit diplomacy to the back seat was also affected by the change from empires and kingdoms to nation-states. The emergence of modern state system changed the way politics and diplomacy were conducted at the states under the state system do not see states as the holding of the rulers as in the ancient days anymore when kingdoms and empires were the properties of the rulers. This also led to the development of more elaborate and systematic methods of conducting diplomacy in the form of an institutionalized system like the early international congresses and Concert of Europe. Summit diplomacy regained its lost glory during the inter-war period when summit diplomacy was invoked for issues that were considered a top priority by the head of states. The adoption of summit diplomacy during the War era was mainly a resort to crisis diplomacy when the normal diplomatic processes or channel could not be relied upon as time was of the essence and certain decisions need to be taken immediately and following the normal diplomatic process cannot be afforded. Summit diplomacy is useful in certain cases but it should be carefully orchestrated. While it is a useful tool, summit diplomacy should make use of other diplomatic tools and institutions for the successful

conduct of summit diplomacy. For instance, the ambassadors and secretaries are instrumental in the making and process of summit diplomacy and therefore summit diplomacy cannot be seen as a different and isolated self; rather it should be seen as complementary to other diplomatic tools and institutions. Extreme care should be taken to ensure that “a meeting between leaders follows a script, it follows an agenda that is established in advance, and you cannot disturb the agenda during the summit” (Rana 2018). This will ensure that unexpected and unwanted hiccups do not happen during the meeting that would leave the parties to the meeting open to media and public scrutiny.

The preference of summit diplomacy for conducting important diplomatic issues continued during the Cold War era. In the early stage of the Cold War, summit diplomacy was used for conducting high-politics; matters relating to security and especially nuclear issues which were considered too important to be left to professional diplomats. But before the Cold War ended, the use of summit diplomacy was expanded issues of low-politics including environmental negotiations and trade negotiations. The end of the Cold War also signalled the explosion of summit diplomacy as the world was again left with no alliance system and countries and regions were on the constant lookout for avenues to further its interests and make a place for itself.

Professional diplomats have often been branded as anti-summit diplomacy on the grounds that professional diplomats find summit diplomacy as an indirect threat to their profession and also because politicians’ indulgence in summit diplomacy makes the life of professional diplomats difficult. This stem from the fact that politicians are not well equipped with the art and often end up muddying the relations built over a long period of time. While the second argument may hold some ground, the first argument does not seem to have any logical basis. Shivshankar Menon in an interview argued that summit diplomacy is a very important foreign policy tool. He, however, argued maintained that it is important to remember summit is “a means to an end and not an end in itself” (Menon 2018). TCA Raghavan argued that summit diplomacy is a very useful instrument because “it shows high-level commitment and optically very powerful and able to focus minds in both the governments so that political decisions to override the differences can be taken” (Raghavan 2018). Summit diplomacy “engages those in the government who makes the

decision so there are issues that can be resolved which is not possible at the lower levels if both sides are willing to do, narrow down the differences” (Menon 2018) meaning the willingness to make certain concessions and compromises. However, not all issues should be left to political leadership and summit diplomacy should be used judiciously to resolve complicated issues where the professional diplomats cannot take the decision. Even then, professional diplomats have to play an active role in clarifying all the complexities and also bring out the differences which exist between the two sides to “narrow the differences to a point where a political decision can be taken” (Raghavan 2018). Just as political leaders are not equipped with minute details of the issues, the professional diplomats are not armed to take certain decisions. As such, the roles are complementary and not opposing.

As to the effectiveness or success of summit diplomacy, professional diplomats and academics share the consensus that preparation is the key to success with other factors such as political intent, clarity in agenda and objectives. There has to be a lot of initial preparations and the ground-rules of summit have to be understood by both sides, that is to say “before the leaders meet, it must be properly planned what is the agenda, what will they talk about, what is the expectations from the meeting” (Rana 2018). Leaders don’t like to be surprised and when there is an element of surprise in a summit, it leads to very unproductive, confusing or false results especially parties with conflict history (Rana 2018). The outcome of the summit is largely conditioned on “preparations, a good appreciation of the situation, a clear picture of your objective and the other party” (Menon 2018). As such eighty-ninety percent of the works are usually done before and “summit is at the end of a diplomatic process and the better prepared the summit is in laying out the ground-works the more chances for the success of a summit” (Raghavan 2018). Having said that, it is also important to note that some summits are used as a starting point for a diplomatic process and this applies to India-Pakistan summits after periods of diplomatic stalemate. But even in such cases too, a lot of preparation and planning goes are done before the political leaders actually meet and therefore it will be no exaggeration to say that preparation is the key to all successful summits.

Apart from preparation, political intent and commitments from both sides are instrumental aspects of summit diplomacy (Raghavan 2018). Political intent and commitment entail to the seriousness of the parties to the issues at hand. If the parties to the summit are genuinely concerned, they would make an earnest effort in resolving the issue and also be willing to make concessions and compromises in the process for the larger good of resolving the conflict/issue. Unless the two parties are committed to 'give and take'; after a careful appreciation of the issue (Menon 2018) a meaningful summit cannot take place.

Another very subtle and important for determining the outcome of a summit is the strength and reputation of the government/regime. The ability to take decision and agreement of a government/regime is greatly influenced by how strong the government is in its domestic setting. A strong government with large majority/support in its domestic constituency can take unconventional and difficult decisions when it comes to negotiating with foreign powers without the fear of losing power at home. The reputation of the government both at home and abroad can also play a determinable role in the success of summit diplomacy. At home, the intentions, policies, and ideologies of the government (party in power) will determine how its efforts and engagements abroad are judged by its domestic constituency. There can be a public uproar if the public feels a possible 'sell-out' by the party in power and this will be based on the image/reputation of the government. Abroad, the reputation/image will be determined by 'ability to deliver' on the agreements/promises on the part of the government and its domestic performance in the implementation stage. The personality and ideology of the leader and the ruling party also contribute to the strength and reputation of the government.

It is important that "a meeting between leaders follows a script, it follows an agenda that is established in advance, and you cannot disturb the agenda during the summit". Unless all these factors are taken care, summit diplomacy cannot be employed as a successful tool of foreign policy (Menon 2018). The Agra summit is a classic example of how not to organize a summit meeting between two countries that have a lot of problems to solve. But it can be different for other meetings when the two countries are not in conflicting relationships and have a framework of cooperation (Rana 2018).

There is no universal definition that pertains to the success or failure of summit diplomacy because every summit is different and unique. Each summit has its own unique agendas, objectives, actors, and issues and therefore to generalize it would be an injustice. However, for analytical purposes, certain frameworks and parameters can be drawn. Generally, a successful summit would have two aspects: 1) a statement of political intent, 2) the implementation of this political intent (Raghavan 2018). Although in reality, the success of a summit can only be determined based on whether the roadmap of that political intent is actually implemented or not. Many times, summits are considered a grand success but the statements or agreements are not implemented. So it is very difficult to determine the success or failure of a summit and only time will tell. But the important thing is the process that the summit generates.

From the above discussion, we can conclude that the professional diplomats do not dislike summit diplomacy as it has been shown in the literature. Their concern is that certain decorum of diplomatic processes is respected and maintained. As much as they support summit diplomacy as a very useful tool of foreign policy, it cannot be used indiscriminately and as Menon pointed out “preparations, a good appreciation of the situation, a clear picture of your objective and the other party” are a must for effectively conducting summit diplomacy. Reservations about indiscriminate use of summit diplomacy are not only justifiable but also important for maintaining the sanctity and soul of summit diplomacy from turning it into a club for socialization and hobby of political leaders.

5.2 India’s summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004

Talat Farooq and Nicholas J. Wheeler argued that the India-Pakistan negotiations have been stalled for months because of “Pakistan’s determination to link the progress in the bilateral relationship to concessions on Kashmir” (Farooq and Wheeler 2015). The Indian leadership has always sought to engage with Pakistan at the highest political level. Gujral and Narasimha Rao before Vajpayee have always sought to engage with Pakistan but because of the domestic instability in Pakistan, it was not as effective as it was during the

Vajpayee years. Whoever becomes PM of India realizes the need to engage with Pakistan but how he does it when he does it may differ but we cannot deny that Vajpayee has a very clear understanding of the importance and the need to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table (Raghavan 2018).

The practicality or feasibility of summit diplomacy depends on whom you're dealing with Pakistan was particularly useful because Pakistan is a highly centralized polity and the adoption of summit diplomacy by the NDA government in its relations with especially during the NDA years as a result of the military coup. All foreign policy decisions are taken at the top unlike “normal democratic system of distribution of powers and decisions where different bits of power are scattered” (Menon 2018). The BJP does not have a stand on Pakistan that is built on cement and brick and it's more or less the same with the Congress although the "packaging may be different at the core of it, there are much stronger continuities than discontinuity” (Raghavan 2018). Since Pakistan has always been a highly centralized polity “it makes sense to deal directly with the person who had power rather than to talk to people who couldn't take a decision or cannot implement what they promised” (Menon 2018). The adoption of summit diplomacy by the NDA government in its relations with Pakistan can also be explained as a part of a larger scheme. Vajpayee wanted to change the situation whether it was Pakistan or China where he felt we were been hamstrung and do not have the diplomatic freedom. He and Jaswant Singh (and Yashwant Sinha) opening up of relationship with the US and other countries to increase our options while maintaining a strategic link with Russia and repeated attempts to improve relations with Pakistan. It was part of a broader policy and summit were useful devices to do this and to signal to our people and their people that “there is leadership commitment to take relations forward and that it's time to move on” (Menon 2018).

The repeated attempt at engaging with Pakistan by the Vajpayee government despite bitter experience was remarkable. Vajpayee has always insisted that we have to deal with Pakistan and argued that “you can choose your friends but you cannot choose your neighbours” and we have to live with them. He has demonstrated this clarity even as the Foreign Minister and made a strong impression among the Pakistani population when he

visited Lahore way back in 1978. He had “a very clear sense that it was in India’s interest to break out of this cycle of negative relations with Pakistan and he was right as it would not make difference only in the sub-continent but in our access to Central Asia and it would also make things easier at home” (Menon, 2018). It was the gut sense that “if you want to be taken seriously in the world, you have to attend to your neighbourhood” and without attending to your neighbourhood you cannot expect a clear role and respect from the world community (Raghavan 2018). So it was a part of the larger project of building India’s image and moving towards a great power and therefore conditioned by strategic interest.

There were three major summits between India and Pakistan under the NDA governments (1998-2004). When we examined carefully these three summits have their own distinct features which determined the outcome of each. There could be many reasons that motivated or compelled the NDA government to take this road of constantly seeking ways to engage with Pakistan despite many failures and setbacks. Was the use of summit diplomacy by the NDA government a conscious strategy or was it imposed upon by factors beyond its control? These moves and initiatives could be a result of international pressures, domestic compulsions or beliefs/ideology of the party or the leaders in power. Mubeen Adnan is of the view that summit diplomacy between India and Pakistan are usually used as tools to normalize ties after “periods of tensions” (Adnan 2013: 179) and are many times the result of external pressure to normalize ties. After the nuclear explosions, both India and Pakistan were keen to normalize ties both because of the mounting international pressure and also the strong conviction of the Prime Ministers in peace initiatives to stabilize ties.

The major thrusts of conflict between India Pakistan during the period were based on Cross-Border Terrorism (CBT) and the unresolved Kashmir issue. It can be accordingly argued that the success or failure of India's summit diplomacy depended on how these two issues were handled and managed by the two countries. The first summit level between India and Pakistan during the NDA government took place at the sidelines of the Colombo SAARC Summit in 1998 between Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. It has been argued that the meeting did not bear any result because of the

inflexible positions held by both sides. While India stood for a broad-based composite dialogue, Pakistan wanted the resolution of the Kashmir issue as a starting point for dialogue and normalizing ties with India (Baweja and Hussain 1998). It was, as such, no wonder that the talks terribly failed. The next meeting between the two leaders took place at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (September 1998). It was here that the two leaders agreed to hold the Lahore Summit and necessary preparations were made by the Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of the two countries.

The two leaders met for the third time at Lahore. At the Lahore summit, Nawaz Sharif “took the courageous step of breaking this linkage and his government signed the Lahore Declaration” and this explains the success of the Lahore summit, the “most comprehensive set of nuclear confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) between the two countries” (Farooq and Wheeler 2015). Sharif’s willingness to take this risk, according to Wheeler and Farooq, was contributed by the trust he and Vajpayee had developed over the months and based on the promises made by Vajpayee during their meeting in New York “to deliver progress on Kashmir” (Farooq and Wheeler 2015). Kanchan Yadav argued that the most significant aspect about the Lahore Declaration is that “it was formulated keeping in mind the realities of domestic politics of both the countries” (Yadav 2005) and thus led to the success of the summit. Kashmir was highlighted as one of the outstanding issues to accommodate Pakistan’s domestic compulsions and accordingly, India’s concern on Cross-Border Terrorism was addressed very significantly though very lightly. It reads as “the two countries shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs” (Lahore Declaration 1999).

Unfortunately, not long after the Lahore Declaration, India discovered Pakistani intrusion into the Kargil sector and the Kargil War took place and with this, the Lahore process has come to an end. The Lahore Declaration could not sustain the peace process and the Kargil War took place because certain section/stakeholders Pakistan (the military establishment, fundamental groups) were not brought along (Menon 2018). According to C. Raja Mohan, Kargil occurred because India underestimated “the impact of the Indian peace initiative on the internal political dynamics of Pakistan” as “many ideological and militarist elements in the Pakistani establishment are frightened by the thought of peace

with India and what it could do to their dominance of politics and society in that nation” (Mohan 2001). This fear aggravated during Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore and “they struck back in no time to produce the Kargil confrontation” (Mohan 2001). The Kargil War was followed by general elections in India and the NDA government came back to power with a clearer majority and the fourth military coup took place in Pakistan in which Musharraf ousted the Nawaz Sharif government and installed himself as the Chief Executive Officer. Another period of diplomatic stalemate ensued and it was not until late 2000 the Vajpayee government took another initiative at restoring relation with Pakistan.

In November 2000, the Indian government unilaterally declared cease-fire coinciding the holy month of Ramzaan. This created goodwill and when the cease-fire which extended for six months came to an end, the Indian government took another bold initiative and invited Musharraf for talks at Agra. The Agra summit, which has been described by many as the ‘most dramatic and disappointing summit’ was soon followed by terrorist attacks on the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir in October and the Parliament in December. The Parliament attack resulted in Operation Parakram, one of the largest military mobilizations in the history of India and Pakistan along the border which resulted in the suspension of all diplomatic channels. After ten long months of mobilizations Operation Parakram was withdrawn. There was no consensus on whether India has gained or lost by the massive operation that cost dearly in material terms and yet it cannot be altogether called a failure too.

The core idea about Agra was that we have to open up a line with Musharraf and “bring down the temperature with Pakistan” (Raghavan 2018). The NDA government was aware of the need to take initiatives and start a process and not to have a formal summit and have a declaration and therefore the core idea succeeded (although people think that Agra was a failure) and the opening has been made and if the 9/11 did not happen, there would have been a meeting at the UN and some other efforts would have been made now that the process has begun (Raghavan 2018). But in the process of four/five months, many things got added. Originally the plan was to have an informal summit but then Musharraf declared himself a head of state so it became a state level visit and expectations build up that some positive outcome should come and Musharraf used that sense of expectations

in India to press for things which were not given to him in any case. The failure of the Indian government at Agra was not in producing documents but “in anticipating how much high the expectations were but the core idea was a sensible one that we have to end this freeze and that they succeeded” (Raghavan 2018).

The second meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf took place in Kathmandu on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit (3-6 January 2002). Both the parties were not ready to change their Agra positions. In fact, the Indian stand on Cross-Border Terrorism became the central issue after the December Parliament terror attack. As a result, no agreements could be reached between the two. The last such meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf before the NDA government lost the 2004 election took place in Islamabad at the side-line of the SAARC Summit (4-6 January 2004). This meeting was a result of a long process started in 2003. In a moving speech in April 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke movingly on the plight of the Kashmiris and indicated his desire to once again engage with Pakistan which famously came to known as the “hand of friendship” speech. In this speech, he declared that “we are again extending a hand of friendship” to live together in peace. But he also added that this can happen only if both sides are willing and determined to live together in peace as it is brotherhood and not guns that can resolve issues between the two sides. The gesture sent by the “hand of friendship” speech was received in the great spirit in Pakistan and within a span of three-four months; the stage was ready for the next summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf in January 2004 at Islamabad along the sidelines of the SAARC summit which resulted in the India-Pakistan Joint Statement 2004.

The Islamabad summit was about starting something new and the SAARC summit made it easier. Vajpayee could go and come back without having to worry about the outcome of the meeting between him and Musharraf. Nearer at the time of the summit, the Pakistanis were very keen on some kind of bilateral documents emerging to show that the process with India had begun and that all issues including Kashmir were back on the table. It was then that India asked Pakistan to give a commitment on terrorism which they had so far not agreed (Raghavan 2018). The changed international scenario as a result of the 9/11 became very useful. While welcoming the recent trends of normalization of

relations between the two countries, Vajpayee emphasized that hostility, violence, and terrorism should be prevented for a sustained dialogue; Musharraf assured that such acts will not be permitted. The two leaders also agreed to commence the composite dialogue (MEA Annual Report 2003-04). Many strategists and analysts see the Islamabad Statement as a great success for India more important than the Lahore Declaration itself as Musharraf publicly agreed not to allow Pakistan to be used for terrorist purposes (Bidwai 2004). It may be argued that the success of Islamabad was in many ways made possible by the domestic scene in Pakistan.

At Islamabad, “both parties needed some kind of adjustment and which is why the ceasefire/thaw in the relationships lasted a few years and terrorist activities went down considerably” and this lasted as long as Musharraf was in power, once he started losing power in 2007, then many of these things started unraveling (Menon 2018). The Islamabad summit was also facilitated by Musharraf’s own internal difficulties (attempts on life) at home and this partly contributed to the success of Islamabad while at Agra or Lahore there was no agreement between the two parties and at the same time, there was no clarity of what each party wants (Menon 2018). At the same time it was becoming difficult for Musharraf by the time of the Islamabad summit to “sustain the fiction that Pakistan is not involved in the cross-border terrorism proceeding in Kashmir” and also convinced the Americans that “Pakistan would act decisively against the domestic Islamic fundamentalist groups that have proliferated across the country but do little to uproot them or stop their support to global terrorism, but especially in Kashmir” (Chari 2004). All these issues need to be addressed if Musharraf has to “promote his image in the country and abroad” and therefore the imperative to deliver something and hence the concession at Islamabad.

Not only were the two parties unable to reach an agreement at Agra, the Indian side was clearly divided on what it wants at Agra. For Musharraf, the difference between Agra and Islamabad was that at Islamabad “he realized that what he was doing was unsustainable” in terms of running terrorism and trying to pressurize India into not hitting back and that realization took him a while because he was new to government and the fact that Agra gave him that legitimacy both at home and abroad and that India recognized him as the

leader of Pakistan was important to him and he was not faced with this in 2004 (Menon 2018). The key difference was the 9/11 and the global narrative on terrorism has changed and Musharraf could not take the position at Islamabad he had taken at Lahore or Agra and everyone in the decision making in India understood that and although the Pakistanis could not say so, they also implicitly understood so (Raghavan 2018).

In the following, we will examine India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, 1998-2004 in the light of the hypotheses posed at the beginning of this study.

1. NDA's choice for summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan was largely dictated by the need for crisis management rather than conflict resolution.
2. Lack of substantive agenda rather than personality or the regime type explains the success or failure of India's summit diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan under the NDA governments, 1998-2004.

5.2.1 Crisis Management or Conflict Resolution

Foreign policy decisions are far from abstract and there is always a large measure of pragmatism and political positioning. Vajpayee's government engagement with Pakistan was no exception and there was more of continuity than a radical break from the previous government's Pakistan policy. It is true there was political positioning in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests to reassure the international community. It also meant that the political initiative remains with India. At the core of all these is the understanding that we have to move on with Pakistan and we cannot remain stuck in the past (Raghavan 2018). But apart from that, there was nothing radical as previous governments and Prime Ministers like I.K. Gujral and Narasimha Rao have earnestly sought to engage with Pakistan.

The 1998 nuclear tests was a shock to US intelligence that they were completely in the dark, the almost certainty that Pakistan would follow with its own tests and the international pressure took the form of pressure in the form of displeasure (Menon 2018). The sanction was a form of intervention but apart from that United States and others

know that when it comes to dealing with countries like India and Pakistan, there are certain limits in the means of putting pressure (Raghavan 2018).

The Lahore Declaration was signed in an environment when the two nations were “isolated diplomatically, both countries faced greater pressure from the international community that envisaged the region as a high-risk conflict zone, moving towards a nuclear holocaust” (Effendi and Ahmad 2016: 197). As such, the signing of the Declaration was aimed at reassuring the international community that India and Pakistan were responsible nations that “South Asian nuclearisation would never fall victim to any strategic miscalculation in future” (Effendi and Ahmad 2016: 197). The Agra summit despite its failure was “a landmark achievement after two years of stalemate and brought higher hopes to the region” and the two leaders discussed several issues ranging from “CBMs, resumption of dialogue, Kashmir, economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence” (Effendi and Ahmad 2016).

After the nuclear explosions, both India and Pakistan were keen to normalise ties both because of the mounting international pressure and the fear of a possible external intervention in the region. Hence the adoption of summit diplomacy by the NDA government can be considered as a diplomatic strike to prevent an impending intervention in the region. By adopting a peaceful method to engage with its nuclear-armed neighbour, India hoped to send a message to the international community that India is a responsible nuclear power and thus effectively removing all possibilities of external intervention in the region. As such, it can be argued that the adoption of summit diplomacy by India under the NDA government was aimed at crisis management rather than conflict resolution. The fact that the BJP (the leader of the NDA) is a right-wing political party and represented one of the most conservative section when it comes to India’s relation with Pakistan also strengthen the argument that the adoption of summit by the NDA government was aimed at crisis management and not conflict resolution.

Musharraf before coming to India for the Agra summit has made it very clear that it has to be Kashmir that has to be settled before any meaningful engagements between India and Pakistan found resonance across the different sections of the society (Baral 2002: 292, Adnan 2013: 190). Knowingly India went ahead with the summit which was bound

to fail. Experts and commentators on South Asia argued that the Agra Summit was “pre-emptive diplomatic strike” on the part of the Indian government (Cohen cited in Ali 2001: 48, Baral 2002: 292) and this can only be seen as a management of conflict if not crisis.

Raja Mohan argued that India did not believe that engagement with Pakistan will produce substantive results and “New Delhi is not in a position to either coerce Pakistan into giving up its support to ‘anti-India’ militant groups or entice Islamabad into normalizing relations, by offering an early resolution of the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir” as this was eliminated by the acquisition of nuclear weapons which put an end to “India's ability to use its superior conventional military power to compel Islamabad to stop supporting cross-border terrorism” (Mohan 2011: 5). As such, Delhi has “no option but to demonstrate strategic patience in managing its complex relationship with Islamabad, while India awaits structural changes in Pakistan” (Mohan 2011:1). This shows that the attempt at resolving conflict through summit diplomacy was more about managing the crisis rather than resolving it all together. The Lahore summit took place post-nuclearization and “settled the dust while the international community was taken by suspicions that India and Pakistan may opt for nuclear misadventure” while the Agra Summit “served as a bulwark in India-Pakistan relations after Kargil” (Effendi and Ahmad, 2016). Both these cases show that the summits were conditioned by the need to control the situation and keep it under control to prevent it from getting out of hand.

The fact that Lahore summit and Agra summit “were agreed to after declaring that no dialogue with Pakistan was possible unless cross-border terrorism ceased, and some 20 wanted criminals, provided asylum in Pakistan, were repatriated” and those meetings been held “despite these conditions not being met” (Chari 2004) only shows that Vajpayee and the NDA government also desperately needed to manage the situation.

5.2.2 Agenda, Personality, and Regime

J.N. Dixit argued that Prime Minister Vajpayee was “not keen on a bilateral summit with Musharraf in India” and wanted to “recommence such contacts at the margins of the

SAARC summit and the UN General Assembly session, then scheduled in December and September respectively” (Dixit 2002: 401). The Agra summit was brought upon by L. K. Advani and other cabinet members to show something “bold and dramatic in a bilateral framework so that India and Pakistan could break out of the logjam since the Kargil War of 1999” (Dixit 2002: 402). This clearly shows that there was no clarity even within the inner circle of the cabinet as to what India wanted out of the summit. The success and failure for each side in summit diplomacy are driven by the clarity in agenda and political will and as such the two major bilateral summits between India and Pakistan (1998 and 2001) clearly prove this point. At Agra summit “the Indian side was clearly divided on what to offer and accept in terms of preliminaries” just the same as Pakistan “did not have an internal consensus” at Lahore summit (Koithara, 2004:51). While India wanted to portray India as a country “committed to peaceful means, even when its unity and territorial integrity stood threatened by the continuing adversarial attitude of Pakistan”; Musharraf wanted to use the summit to legitimise himself as the “political and institutional” head of Pakistan (Dixit 2002: 409). This dichotomy of objectives effectively led to the inconclusive nature of the Agra Summit.

Talking about the personality and regime and its impact on summit outcome between India and Pakistan it can be argued that “Musharraf’s predicament arises from his imperative to balance the basic anomalies in Pakistani polity, some inherited, and some he created himself” (Chari 2004).

Shivshankar Menon argued that Vajpayee has never been given enough credit. While everyone considered him to be a great parliamentarian, people don’t give him enough credit for the tremendous change in the way we conducted foreign policy. Vajpayee was “big enough to carry everyone with him and there were very few controversies regarding foreign policy” even though many terrible things happened like Kandahar, Kargil, etc. and these events didn’t lead to any domestic turmoil and this is a fine example of political management (Menon 2018). The conversations of a broader Indo-US relationship was first initiated by Narasimha Rao with the Clinton government but it was broken after the 1998 tests; the process was then taken up by Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh and they covered some of the areas but the US policy at that time was cap, freeze and roll back (of

India's nuclear program) which India did not accept. The significance of the Talbott-Singh process was that Jaswant got them to think of alternatives and having opened the door the Vajpayee government made the broader relationship between India and US possible and thus making the next step with the Bush administration possible which culminated in the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal (Menon 2018).

The personality and background of Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif put together made a big difference. Their internal politics also made a big difference because Vajpayee coming from a rightwing party gave him a little more flexibility, Nawaz Sharif, after a long time in Pakistan, appears that the civilian political leadership in Pakistan has more power and stability (sacked the Chief Justice and changed the Army Chief, got rid of the President) compared to his predecessors (Raghavan 2018). Vajpayee already had a bonafide in Pakistan as a result of his historic visit to Pakistan in 1978 as India's Foreign Minister and gave a passionate speech at Minar-e-Pakistan. This was in a way perceived as accepting the existence of Pakistan as a separate state and to do it as the FM of India. In this way, his personality was an asset, and this helps (Menon 2018) but it will not be right to say that the Vajpayee's government's engagement with Pakistan was a result of his personality.

The NDA's consistently trying to engage with Pakistan can be attributed both to strategy and the personality of the leadership at the time (Vajpayee). It clearly has "a strategic underpinning because it is so consistent as behaviour", even as Foreign Minister because for him "the conviction of what was in India's interest was very important not only with Pakistan but across" (Menon 2018). This was also expressed by A.S. Dulat when he writes "I watched Prime Minister Vajpayee, one of India's most experienced and respected politicians, evolve a grand plan with an enlightened strategy on cutting the Gordian Knot" (Dulat 2015:3) that Kashmir is. Vajpayee was a confident statesman with a clear objective and it is these attributes with which Vajpayee re-establish diplomatic relation with China in 1979 after the 1962 Sino-India War and broke the ice with Pakistan by travelling to Lahore in 1978 after the 1971 War as the Foreign Minister. Vajpayee being a member of the BJP (formerly known as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, BJS); known for its hard-line position on security and foreign policy and especially on

Pakistan. This, according to Dulat, “gave Vajpayee the confidence to take these initiatives at the time----there was nobody to his political right to taunt him” (Dulat 2015: 14).

Different regime types also complicate the possibility of having peaceful relations between India and Pakistan as rightly described by Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay and Julian Schofield as either “[the] military using democratic means to legitimize itself or popularly elected governments functioning under the threat of military intervention,” (Tremblay and Schofield 2005). This follows that Pakistan “either escalated conflicts (under a civilian administration) or have actually provided opportunities for progress towards peace (under military rule)” and this has been exemplified by the fact that “the Kargil war was launched under the democratic government of Nawaz Sharif, while General Pervez Musharraf, as President, made the most far-reaching proposals with regard to the Kashmir dispute” (Mukherjee 2009: 421). Thus the India Pakistan case provides a very insightful study when it comes to negotiation and regime type. As against the conventional understanding that it will be comparatively easier to negotiate with a civilian government as compared with a military regime, the India-Pakistan case shows that it is otherwise.

The above discussion shows that it is not possible to talk about regime and agenda independently because the regime types influenced the agenda. It also affects the ability to deliver certainly on the Pakistani side but for India because of its institutional set up, the ability to deliver is more or less the same irrespective of which party in power which is why when Manmohan Singh took over most of the policies were carried forward but in Pakistan when Musharraf go, the policy changed and actual Pakistani behaviour changed. While all factors are important in determining the outcome of the summit, the agenda is critical. At the same time, we have to remember that the agenda is influenced by the regime, by the personality and in Pakistan’s case variation is much greater compared to India (Menon 2018).

The Hindutva credibility helps them a little when it comes to Pakistan than a centrist or left of centre party. The hardliners on Pakistan are everywhere and not only in the BJP party and therefore a lot depends on the quality and determination of the leadership. The

NDA also enjoys more flexibility in dealing with Pakistan was because of a large number of the military officer who had joined the BJP and I think Jaswant Singh played a big role in bringing them into the BJP and the retired military officers feel more at ease with him (Raghavan 2018). Musharraf as chief of Army staff had the certain delivery capability which others like Zardari didn't have. So whether regime affects or not is different for India and for Pakistan because India is a settled polity and Pakistan is not (Menon 2018).

When the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the elections in March 1998, everyone thought that the peace initiatives started by the two former Prime Ministers Morarji Desai and I. K. Gujral have come to an end. But contrary to this expectations “during six years of BJP rule (1998-2004), relations between India and Pakistan did not turn out to be hopelessly hostile” (Parikh 2005). Vajpayee actively and continually sought to engage in peacemaking process despite opposition and commentators argued that Vajpayee was seeking for himself a legacy. Another factor that motivated Vajpayee's decision of continually seeking the peace track is “India's ambition to be recognized as a regional leader and gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India cannot do so if it cannot ensure stability in its region and demonstrate good relations with neighbours” (Parikh 2005). The influence of domestic politics for peace process can never be ignored altogether. Many BJP leaders believed that "peace attracted great public support; BJP leaders calculated that Vajpayee's rapprochement with Pakistan would translate into more votes in the parliamentary elections in 2004” (Parikh 2005).

The BJP was free of much of the historical baggage and associations carried by the Congress. Coupled with their general Hindutva credentials, according to a journalist, the BJP's projected image as the party of national security could also give legitimacy to any peace efforts in a way unimaginable for the Congress (Ogden 2014). Taking these factors into account, if the BJP led NDA wanted to resolve outstanding issues with Pakistan, there were high chances. With the changing political landscape in India “the desire to hold onto Kashmir [had become] less a result of moral principle and more an imperative of statecraft (Ganguly 1996). Many also feared that for this reason the BJP led NDA government would exacerbate the risk of conflict with Pakistan (Ogden 2014: 102) or

else the BJP's understanding of Pakistan in relation to Kashmir that "only a hawkish attitude and international pressure will compel Pakistan to end its interference" (Basrur 2002) could be enough reason to settle scores with Pakistan.

Vajpayee was also faced with a difficult task of balancing between his party's Hindutva credibility and the need to appear 'moderate' and "represent the voice of reason before the international community" (Chari 2004). This is so because he cannot "afford to displease the Hindu fundamentalists within the Sangh Parivar, particularly the RSS, which provides the manpower to fight the elections and is fast penetrating the BJP leadership" (Chari 2004) at one level. At the second level he "needs to secure the Muslim vote, but not alienate the Hindu vote" and as rightly pointed out by P. R. Chari "this balancing act is, no doubt, difficult after Gujarat, but the need to keep juggling several balls in the air illumines his policy compulsions and choices" (Chari 2004).

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the agenda, personality, and regimes all play a very important role in summit diplomacy and influence the process and outcome of the summit. Yet all these variables are very intricately linked and it will not be right to single out one or the other because the nature of agendas that are pursued by leaders will be influenced by the regime type. At the same time, the personality of the leaders both depends on the regime type and is also determined by the regime type.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

Summit diplomacy has been used as a tool for carrying inter-state relations even before the introduction of regular diplomatic channels and before the term assumed significance. There is no strict definition of what summit diplomacy is as it has been used in different ways for different purposes. There are instances where elaborate summit meetings which bore no results while some low key summit has borne significant results. Some summits have been used to signal a change in the foreign policy behaviour, others to put end to conflicts or to start a dialogue while there are still others which are used to put a cap to a negotiated deal.

It is also very difficult to define the success or failure of summit diplomacy as there is no one way to do so. Some summit might have very significant and symbolic values when it comes to political commitment and achieving breakthroughs at the time of the summit but if such commitments and breakthroughs are not implemented, it cannot be called a success. While there are instances where summits have been seen as a total failure because they failed to produce documents or breakthroughs or the political leadership could not agree to commit to issues that were discussed or negotiated and yet contributed to significant changes in relationships between states. As such, only time will decide the success or failure of a summit. However, we can definitely agree on the factors that make the summit successful. Among others, the meticulous preparation, clarity in the agenda/objective and the political commitment go a long way in determining the outcome of summit diplomacy.

As regard to the debate on the usefulness of summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, it is safe to argue that summit diplomacy, when used judiciously can be very useful to settle complex political issues. It is important to remember that summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool should be used judiciously to prevent the tool from becoming a “hobby” of politicians. Summit diplomacy, when planned and orchestrated carefully can successfully solve complex political issues but technical issues should be left to the professional diplomats. There is a general misunderstanding that professionals diplomats are against

the use of summit diplomats as it threatens their profession and also gives them more trouble because politicians who are not adequately trained for diplomacy ends up muddying the water instead of clearing it. This is not true. Certain areas are best left and handled by professionals and certain areas are best handled by political leaders. The important thing is to remember and respect this difference. Else professional diplomats have no particular dislikes for summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool.

Summit diplomacy as a foreign policy tool has been used before the establishment of regular diplomatic channels and despite occasional highs and lows, it is still one of the preferred channels for conducting important diplomatic tasks. Summit diplomacy as a tool stands out from other tools/channels of conducting diplomacy for its uniqueness in terms of actors at the highest political level and the vulnerability associated with that, symbolic significance, ability to make or unmake important diplomatic moments, etc. Summit diplomacy, as such, will continue to be an important tool as long as diplomacy and inter-state relations continue to exist. The changes in how it is applied and carried out, should not doubt, be expected as all other human activities with the change in time and space.

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government came to power in 1998. Soon after the electoral victory, the NDA government successfully conducted a series of five nuclear tests and declared that India is now a nuclear weapons state. Pakistan followed suit and conducted its own series of tests. Massive international pressures came in the form of sanctions and condemnation for the tests. As pressures were reining in on India and Pakistan, the NDA government under the leadership of Prime Minister Vajpayee took to summit diplomacy with Pakistan to diffuse the situation. The previous governments under Prime Ministers Gujral and Narasimha Rao have initiated measures for a structured dialogue with Pakistan too. The NDA government pick up this thread and steps were taken to engage with Pakistan at the highest political level.

The first summit-level meeting under the NDA government was held at Colombo at the sidelines of the SAARC summit (1998). Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif met under the shadow of the nuclear tests knowing very well that they need to talk to each other. Nothing substantial happened at the Colombo summit but it certainly was a step

towards creating a more suitable environment for future talks. The Colombo summit ensured that the two Prime Ministers get to know more about each other and also effectively served as a platform for the two leaders to communicate their own positions which enabled better understanding and help in ensuring the success of future summits.

The two leaders met for the second time at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York (1998). At this summit, the leaders agreed to re-start the Delhi-Lahore bus service as a gesture of goodwill and also to hold the Lahore Summit (1999). Prime Minister Vajpayee very successfully employed symbolism through summit diplomacy and introduced political theatre into India's diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan by riding on the inaugural bus service and was received by his counterpart at the Wagah border. The people travelling in the bus with him were composed of personalities from diverse backgrounds consisting of activists, sportspersons, and film stars, among others. This was a signalling of widening the gate of India-Pakistan relations from the usual business conducted by diplomats and politicians.

Vajpayee's Lahore visit and the Lahore summit has been compared to historic events such as Nixon's visit to China and Gorbachev's visit to the Berlin Wall which changed history forever. The visit was also rendered more significant when Vajpayee visited the Minar-e-Pakistan; where the resolution for a separate state for Muslims was adopted. Vajpayee wrote in the visitor's book that "a strong and stable Pakistan is in India's interest". Many commentators and analysts argue that this was a step taken to assure that India fully recognizes and accepts Pakistan as a political entity and to dispel, if any, that the BJP as a political party was un-reconciled to the idea of Pakistan. The Lahore summit came out with three documents: the Lahore Declaration, Memorandum of Understanding and Joint Statement.

The Lahore summit was considered as a huge success as it brought the two countries together to the negotiating table and this was important because the two countries had become nuclear weapons states and the international community was concerned over the possibility of a nuclear misadventure. India and Pakistan had always been in conflict with each other but this conflicting relation was made more dangerous with the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict dynamic. The Lahore summit also came up with

comprehensive measures for nuclear risks reduction and also elaborate plans for structured dialogues were agreed upon.

Unfortunately, the Kargil War took place soon after the Lahore summit and this made it difficult to determine whether the Lahore summit was a success or a failure. At the time of the summit, the coming out with documents would have sufficed as a tremendous success but the outbreak of the Kargil War proved otherwise that the relations or ties built at Lahore was not enough to prevent the outbreak of a war between the two neighbours. However, the significance of the summit cannot be denied. Irrespective of what happened after the summit, the Lahore process enabled India and Pakistan to come together for a brief period to work together. The experience and process of the Lahore summit would go a long way as a source of motivation and hope that, the two neighbours can work together when there are common interest and political will.

The Lahore peace process was not destined to last and mature on its own. Many events took place. Soon after Vajpayee returned from the Lahore summit, his government fell when the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), one of the constituting parties of the NDA left the coalition. Even as the government was in shambles, Pakistani intrusion into Kargil sector on the Indian side of the Kashmir surfaced. The President of India requested Mr. Vajpayee to continue as the caretaker government until the intrusions were successfully flushed out. It emerged that Pakistan had successfully occupied certain outposts and a hard but limited war was fought between India and Pakistan. The Indian forces slowly forced the intruding forces out of its territory. The general election was announced and held in India by September 1999 to elect a new government at the centre. The NDA emerged with the clear majority this time and was sworn into government on 13 October 1999 while the military coup took place in Pakistan on 12 October 1999. General Pervez Musharraf, the Army Chief ousted the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif.

Since the breakdown of the Lahore process as a result of the Kargil War and the military coup in Pakistan, India, and Pakistan did not have any dialogue at the official level. In 2001, the NDA government took another bold initiative of inviting General Musharraf for a talk at Agra in July. The Agra summit generated much heat and was keenly observed.

The Agra summit was also one of the first summits in the history of India and Pakistan where diplomacy was conducted in public. It has been described as the most dramatic and disappointing summit. This is partly true and partly wrong. The summit was held without necessary preparations and failed terribly in terms of coming to an agreement. But politicians, diplomats, and academics agree that the Agra summit was a very significant step towards normalizing India-Pakistan relations as it broke the ice after the Kargil war. The similarity in the hopeful tone of the Foreign Ministers of both countries at the end of the summit was significant. Jaswant Singh, India's Foreign Minister stated that "we will pick up the threads"; his Pakistani counterpart Abdul Sattar called the summit inconclusive but refused to call the summit a failure. This shows maturity and statesmanship from both the Ministers.

Soon after the Agra summit, the Legislative Assembly of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Parliament were attacked by terrorist groups based in Pakistan. The Indian government resorted to coercive diplomacy to compel Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism as an instrument against India and to crack down on terrorist camps. This resulted in one of the largest military mobilization as the Indian mobilization was responded with a Pakistani mobilization. The mobilization lasted for ten long months and was finally withdrawn in October 2002. In April 2003, Vajpayee took a final dig at peace and in a passionate speech while addressing a public meeting declared that India was once again extending a hand of friendship which was picked up quickly by Pakistan. Thus began the new peace process which was to culminate at the Islamabad summit 2004.

The Islamabad summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf took place at the sidelines of the Twelfth SAARC Summit. The Islamabad process was different from previous peace process as Pakistan deviated from its long-held position of resolving the Kashmir issue as a starting point for India-Pakistan dialogue. The Islamabad Summit was also very significant as Musharraf publicly for the first time committed to prevent terrorist activity within the territory of Pakistan. This change in Pakistan behaviour has been attributed to the change in the international environment as a result of the 9/11 and the shift in global centres of power.

In regard to the proposed hypotheses made at the beginning of the study, the study makes three major arguments. The first argument pertains to the practice of summit diplomacy in general. There is a common misperception that professional diplomats are against the use of summit diplomacy as a diplomatic tool as it is seen as a threat to their profession and also complicates the diplomatic processes. The complication on the diplomatic processes stems from the logic that since political leaders are not trained negotiators, they end up making the process more complicated. This is wrong. This study argues that professional diplomats consider summit diplomacy as a very important diplomatic tool as summit diplomacy indicates political commitment at the highest level. However, one has to draw a line between technical issues which are best left to professional diplomats and political issues which are best left to political leaders. The other aspect of summit diplomacy complicating the diplomatic process can effectively be averted if proper preparations are done for summit diplomacy. It is true political leaders are not experts in multifaceted diplomatic issues but a thorough preparation would ensure that leaders are prepared on the issue, and be briefed about other diplomatic processes well in advance.

The second argument relates to the adoption of summit diplomacy by the NDA government as a strategy of engagement with Pakistan. The adoption of summit diplomacy by the NDA government was motivated by the need for crisis management and therefore the first hypothesis is confirmed. But there is another aspect to it. It was a part of the larger policy of enhancing India's image globally. The NDA government realized that unless India's neighbourhood is taken care, India will not be taken seriously by other powers. Vajpayee was very clear about this and commented that unless this is done, there was no meaning in meeting leaders from other countries as such meetings would end up discussing India Pakistan conflict.

An important aspect of enhancing India's image globally and taking India's foreign policy objectives and options beyond South Asia was the initiation of a strategic relationship with the US. Vajpayee through his Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh opened and broaden the horizon of Indo-US relations. He used his power of persuasion in making the idea of flourishing Indo-US relations acceptable in India. The Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott

dialogue was instrumental for the strategic Indo-US relations and the eventual Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal (2005).

The third major arguments concern the process and outcome of India's summit diplomacy vis-a-vis Pakistan from 1998 to 2004. The study examined the role of agenda, personality, and regime to see which of this influence the outcome of summit diplomacy. The study posited at the beginning that it is the agenda and not personality or regime that determines the outcome of summits. The study, however, found that agenda, personality, and regime are interrelated and are not independent of each other. The study thus argues that while the clarity in the agenda is crucial for successful summit diplomacy the agenda pursued is influenced by the regime just as the regime and personality influence each other.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1172 on International Peace and Security, S/RES/1172 (1998),

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3890th meeting, on 6 June 1998.

The Security Council, Reaffirming the statements of its President of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/12) and of 29 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/17), Reiterating the statement of its President of 31 January 1992 (S/23500), which stated, inter alia, that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan constitute to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also gravely concerned at the danger to peace and stability in the region,

Deeply concerned at the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and determined to prevent such a race,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty for global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the successful outcome of that Conference,

Affirming the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

and welcoming the determination of the five nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of that Treaty.

Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998;
2. Endorses the Joint Communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at their meeting in Geneva on 4 June 1998 (S/1998/473);
3. Demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context calls upon all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
4. Urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation;
5. Urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir;
6. Welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage India and Pakistan to enter into dialogue;
7. Calls upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles

capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard;

8. Encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect;
9. Expresses its grave concern at the negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond;
10. Reaffirms its full commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
11. Expresses its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and consolidated and recalls that in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State;
12. Recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament;
13. Urges India and Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions;
14. Urges India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, with a view to reaching early agreement;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution;
16. Expresses its readiness to consider further how best to ensure the implementation of the present resolution;
17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Appendix 2

September 23, 1998 New York India - Pakistan Joint Statement

The Prime Minister of India and Pakistan held a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of UN General Assembly in New York on 23rd September, 1998. Their discussions covered the whole range of bilateral relations. The two Prime Ministers also carried out a detailed review of new developments in the region during the past few months. They reaffirmed their common belief that an environment of durable peace and security was in the supreme interest of both India and Pakistan, and of the region as a whole. They expressed their determination to renew and reinvigorate efforts to secure such an environment. They agreed that the peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, was essential for this purpose. The two leaders reiterated their commitment to create conditions which would enable both countries to fully devote their resources, both human and material, to improving the lives of their people, particularly the poorest among them. The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the agreement reached between the Foreign Secretaries on operationalizing the mechanism to address all items in the agreed agenda of 23rd June, 1997 in a purposeful and composite manner. They directed the Foreign Secretaries, accordingly, to resume the dialogue on the agreed dates.

Appendix 3

The Lahore Declaration, Joint Statement and Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 21st February 1999

The Lahore Declaration

The following is the text of the Lahore Declaration:

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:
Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their peoples;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co- existence

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective Governments:

- shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
- shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.
- shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
- shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.
- reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.
- reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.
- shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999.

Atal Behari Vajpayee - Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif - Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Joint statement

The following is the text of the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee's visit to Lahore:

1. In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.
2. The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e- Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.
3. The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:
 - The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.
 - The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.
 - The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.
 - The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime.
 - The two sides shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.

4. They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.

5. Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.

6. The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.

7. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.

8. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.

Lahore,

February 21, 1999.

Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in Lahore on Sunday:

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:-

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two side shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.
4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.

5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.
6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.
7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors- General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.
8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements. Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K. Raghunath)

Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India

(Shamshad Ahmad)

Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Appendix 4

Statement issued by External Affairs and Defence Minister Shri Jaswant Singh at the Ministry of External Affairs Press Conference

July 17, 2001, Agra

1. At the invitation of Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the President of Pakistan H.E. General Pervez Musharraf visited India on 14-16 July, 2001.
2. In keeping with his abiding vision of good Neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan, the Prime Minister had invited President General Pervez Musharraf to walk the high road of Peace and reconciliation. Our commitment to that noble objective, upon the attainment of which, rests the welfare of many, is not transitory. It is that commitment, which was demonstrated at Simla, in Lahore and recently during President General Pervez Musharraf's visit.
3. Significant CBMs that were announced prior to President Musharraf's visit would be fully implemented on our part. It is our conviction that, when put in place, they will make an important contribution to our relations.
4. During his visit, the President of Pakistan had extensive discussions with our entire leadership. These included three rounds of one-on-one meetings with the Prime Minister and an hour-long farewell call prior to his departure yesterday night. There were also detailed discussions during delegation level talks. All these meetings were marked by cordiality and candour. They provided an invaluable opportunity to both sides to understand each others' view points, concerns and compulsions.
5. Our negotiations for an agreed text of a document were seriously pursued. There were long hours of discussions at official and political levels. During these negotiations India did not shy away from any issue. In keeping with the confidentiality, which is necessary for these negotiations, and the maintenance of which is essential for the future of bilateral relations themselves, it would not be proper to go into details. However, it needs asserting that during the negotiating process, India fully respected all established international norms. As a mature and

responsible democracy, we negotiate to improve bilateral relations with our neighbours, not to indulge in public relations.

6. We are of course, disappointed that the two sides could not arrive at an agreed text. It will not be a breach of confidentiality to clarify that this was on an account of the difficulty in reconciling our basic approaches to bilateral relations. India is convinced that narrow, segmented or unifocal approaches, will simply not work. Our focus has to remain on the totality of relationship, our endeavour to build trust and confidence, and a mutually beneficial relationship even as we address and move forward on all outstanding issues, including Jammu & Kashmir: building upon the existing compacts of Simla and Lahore.
7. It was also made abundantly clear to the Pakistan side during the visit, that the promotion of cross-border terrorism and violence are unacceptable and must cease. Let there be no illusions on this score: India has the will and resolve to defeat all such challenges.
8. We will pick up the threads from the visit of the President of Pakistan. We will unceasingly endeavour to realise our vision of a relationship of peace, friendship and cooperation with Pakistan.

Appendix 5

Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Lok Sabha on his two day visit to Jammu & Kashmir, April 22, 2003

Following is the text of the Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's statement in the Lok Sabha on his two day visit to Jammu & Kashmir:

"I went to Jammu & Kashmir on a two-day visit on April 18-19, 2003.

I had five programmes in Srinagar. The first had to do with the Foundation Stone laying ceremony for modernization of Srinagar Airport. This project would double the capacity of the airport. We would like international air services to start from Srinagar.

The second programme related to the National Highway Development Project. Under this, work on a four-lane highway from Srinagar to Kanyakumari was launched. The newly elected Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, Shri Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, had been insisting that work on this project in the Kashmir Valley should start as early as possible.

In my public rally, I congratulated the people of Kashmir on participating in the Assembly elections in large numbers. They exercised their franchise defying the threat of bullets. I assured them, "We have come here to share your pain and suffering. Whatever complaints you have, try to address them collectively. Knock on the doors of Delhi. Delhi will never close its doors for you. The doors of our heart will also remain open for you".

I assured the people of Jammu & Kashmir that we wish to resolve all issues – both domestic and external – through talks. I stressed that the gun can solve no problem; brotherhood can. Issues can be resolved if we move forward guided by the three principles of Insaniyat (Humanism), Jamhooriyat (Democracy) and Kashmiriyat (Kashmir's age-old legacy of Hindu-Muslim amity).

In my speech, I spoke of extending our hand of friendship to Pakistan. At the same time, I also said that this hand of friendship should be extended by both sides. Both countries should resolve that we need to live together in peace.

My last programme was about the start of work on the construction of Udhampur-Srinagar- Baramulla railway line. It is our resolve to ensure that train services start in Kashmir Valley before August 15, 2007.

Unemployment is the greatest problem facing the youth of Jammu & Kashmir. We have decided to facilitate creation of one lakh opportunities for employment and self-employment over the next two years. For this, a special Task Force would be set up with representatives from the Central Government, State Government industry, commerce, banking and financial institutions. The Task Force will present its report by June 30 and implementation would commence from August 15 this year.

At a press conference before returning to Delhi, I expressed the hope that a new beginning can take place between India and Pakistan. I said that we have extended our hand of friendship. Let us see how Pakistan responds to this. Stopping cross-border infiltration and destruction of terrorist infrastructure can open the doors for talks. Talks can take place on all issues, including that of Jammu & Kashmir.

Thank You

Appendix 6

India-Pakistan Joint Press Statement, Islamabad

January 06, 2004

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met during the SAARC summit in Islamabad.

The Indian Prime Minister while expressing satisfaction over the successful conclusion of the SAARC summit appreciated the excellent arrangements made by the host country.

Both leaders welcomed the recent steps towards normalisation of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the positive trends set by the CBMs would be consolidated.

Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. President Musharraf emphasised that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results.

To carry the process of normalisation forward, the president of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February

2004. The two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.

The two leaders agreed that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for our peoples and for future generations.

Islamabad

January 6, 2004