LIVING PARTITION: INDIA AND KOREA, 1945-65

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Declaration

I, Youngsoo Kong, hereby declare that this thesis entitled 'Living Partition: India and Korea, 1945-65' submitted to the Centre for Historical Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, has been previously submitted for any other degree of this university or of any university and is my original work.

Youngsoo Kong

Certificate

We recommend that this thesis may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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This work is a result of the continuation of my research interest since the M. Phil dissertation titled, 'Partition and Christians in Punjab' at Centre for Historical Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, in 2012. My personal life journey helped me persistently opt for partition history. I myself am a second generation of the North Korean refugee family who had migrated to South Korea during the Korean War. My primary socialization in upbringing was highly affected by my own family who experientially kept anti-communism as an invincible and inviolable norm. It was the period of unknowingly trained anti-communism in my youth. My grandfather, Moonwhan Kong, was in the battlefield during the Korean War with the South Korean army against the communist North. My father was a just five-year old boy when the war broke out on 25 June 1950. He joined the Vietnam War in 1969 when he was in his 20s. Although I didn't personally experience any type of war, I experienced the severe reality of partition during the two years of my military service (1997-1999) at the border, so-called, the demilitarized zone (DMZ). My family history is not unique among common Koreans in terms of anti-communism tendency and war experiences. This family history always lingered in my mind whenever I wrote something about partition and anti-communism. This further stimulated me to study another history of partition in India. Furthermore, my religious affiliation to Christianity also encouraged me to examine religious factors of the two countries' partition. Consequently, I decided to compare both India and Korea in light of the partitions and their related wars.

Throughout my research, many of my colleagues, friends, and family members helped me generously in various ways. First and foremost, my thank goes to Professor

Aditya Mukherjee, my supervisor, who was a well-balanced scholar with an open-minded heart. He sharpened my research skills from the M. Phil course until I finished this work. He has been patient with my slow speed of the work as well. I do also express gratitude to Professor Sucheta Mahajan, Professor Bhagwan Josh, and Professor the late MSS Pandian for their valuable lectures and suggestions. During my research trips, I was indebted to some scholars who had helped me enhance the quality of the work. In Korea, Professor Lee, Manyeol, Professor Kim, Heungsoo, and Professor Yoon, Kyungro provided me valuable insights for a relation between Christianity and the modern Korean nationalism. In the United States, Dr. Sachi Dastidar at the partition seminar in New York commented on part of my work. Courtney, Sneha and Chingri read the whole manuscript and commented me with valuable suggestions. Librarians, archivists, and officers in some institutions which I had visited both in India and abroad would never lose their shares of getting my gratitude. In India, I am particularly grateful to librarians of Jawaharlal Nehru Central Library, New Delhi, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, United Theological College, Bangalore, Delhi Brotherhood Society Library, New Delhi. In Korea, I am indebted to librarians of National Central Library, Seoul, particularly in North Korean section. Officers in the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, Seoul helped me collect research materials with a joy. In the United States, archivists of the Presbyterian Church Archives, Philadelphia and the United Methodist Church Archives, Drew University, Madison assisted me graciously. My special thanks go to all interviewees in my field work both in India and abroad. Without their testimonials, my works wouldn't be completed. I also thank my personal friends such as Christopher Joe, Stacy Chou's, and Rev. Park who accommodated me during my research trip in the United States. Last, but not the least, Sungeun, my

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Youngsoo Kong

05 July 2017

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Table 1.1. Damage of the Presbyterian Church in Korea during the March First Movement in 1919

Table 5.1. Persons in Need of relief during the Korean War

Abbreviations

AICC	The All-India Congress Committee
BJP	The Bharatiya Janata Party
CWMG	The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi
CWPK	The Collected Works of Paikbum Kim Koo
CWS	The Church World Service
ICCC	The International Council of Christian Churches
NCC	The National Christian Council of India, Burma, and Ceylon
NCCR	The National Christian Council of India, Burma, and Ceylon Review
PCK	The Presbyterian Church of Korea
POW	The Prisoner of War
RSS	The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SGPC	The Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee
USAMGK	The United States Army Military Government in Korea
UN	The United Nations
UNCACK	The United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea
UNCOK	The United Nations Commission On Korea
UNKRA	The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
UNTCOK	The United Nations Temporary Commission On Korea
WCC	The World Christian Council
YMCA	Young Men’s Christian Association
YWCA	Young Women’s Christian Association

Introduction

In the mid twentieth century, India and Korea not only achieved independence from colonialism, but simultaneously experienced partition as well. Both Indians and Koreans had to live under the influence of partition reality comparable to one another. In the two countries the politicized religions played a critical role in shaping "the partition system", a system in which post-partition India and Korea operated in social, political, economic, and cultural arenas.

Although India and Korea equally experienced partition along with independence, causes and processes of the two partitions differ greatly. In India the cleavage between communalism and secularism played an important role in partitioning both the land and the people, whereas in Korea the Cold War and differences of political ideologies (communism versus liberalism) were the predominant driving forces. Partition, however, impacted reshaping overarching socio-politics and daily lives of people in the two countries. Partition was not a one-time event, but a continual process with on-going long-term repercussions. Both partitions took place when no one was ready to manage their impact on the life of countries. Thus, there were unresolved issues of partition which involved not only damages to the infrastructure and heavy casualties, but also mental, emotional and spiritual distortions of the people in the course of building new nations in both countries.

The two capital cities in both countries provide typical examples of the effects of partition. Many partition refugees in India and war-time migrants in South Korea were able to find shelters in the two capitals, Delhi and Seoul and their vicinities. Thrown out of ancestral lands by neighbours whose faiths or ideologies were different from their own, they experienced loss and grief during partition and war–time violence which heightened enmity against the Muslim in India and against the communist in South Korea while they struggled for resettlement. Strong anti-Muslim sentiments arose among those who took refuge in India, and similarly anti-communist sentiments arose among northern Korean refugees in South Korea. In such an atmosphere their roles in local politics of the capitals and at the national

level were vivid enough to reshape the socio-political geography of the countries.

The *Hindutva* phenomenon imposed by Hindu communal institutions in India and the 'Red Scare' Syndrome spearheaded by right-wing political and social institutions in South Korea played pivotal roles in enhancing 'the partition system' during and after the respective partitions. They were institutions of day-to-day lives of people in the society. Once they were closely linked with political parties and local or national governments, they gradually became more influential in socio-politics of the countries.

Then, why are India and South Korea compared? Why not Pakistan (or Bangladesh) and North Korea? It is because both India and South Korea are comparable in terms of a national commitment to secular democracy in their post-independence politics and further the two countries comparably witnessed a critical role of religions in partition politics and its aftermath whereas the roads taken by Pakistan and North Korea differ greatly from one another. However, both India and South Korea had to undergo huge internal and cross-border struggles in order to achieve what they are today overcoming the system that led to partition.

The Historiography of Partition

Thanks to the new historiography of Partition, contributed recently by various social science disciplines, writing on Partition went beyond just the 'high politics' of Partition history. There have been a series of attempts in the Partition narratives to include perspectives of state, community, gender, religion, nationalism, communalism, region, legacies and minority experience with the multi-disciplinary contribution. The new millennium editions of two volumes, *Pangs of Partition (2002)* edited by S. Settar and Indira B. Gupta under the sponsorship of the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR) include both traditional and new history writings of Partition.[1]

In addition to high politics of partition history Ayesha Jalal's revisionist

[1] S. Settar and Indira B. Gupta (ed.), *Pangs of Partition vol. I, II* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002). Volume 1 deals with high politics of Partition with the help of official documents including the updated analysis while volume 2 examines human dimension of Partition by looking at people's history with new sources of testimonials and oral narratives allowing interdisciplinary analysis.

interpretation on relations between the Muslim League and the Congress in the prelude to partition provides old topics of partition history revived as new debates.[2] Political history of partition still attracts scholars as a new analysis of old debates is ongoing. Ian Talbot's locally-based Partition history writing and comparative studies examine different local experiences and distinguishes one from another.[3] Ilyas Chattha also furthered locally-based history of Partition in *Partition and Locality* while examining violence, migration, and development in Gujranwala and Sialkot in West Punjab.[4] However, Jasbir has opined, because the Bengal region has different partition stories from that of Punjab, so it is not accurate to generalize multi-geographical aspects of partition history based on a single region.[5]

Looking at the multidimensional aspects of Partition history, small narratives of, for instance, women, children and minority communities in their Partition experience are also taken into consideration in the new history writing.[6] What is quite significant is that such a 'history from below' perspective allows the marginalized whose lives were not previously visible and voices were not heard to be at the forefront of the stories of Partition. Majority communities, males, and the high or middle classes had been dominating the narratives. However, due to

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[2] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Mushirul Hasan upholds the need for an all India level understanding of Partition narratives while cautioning the danger of putting the event local or micro level in *Partition Omnibus* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). Sucheta Mahajan urges to look at Partition in the context of Independence in *Independence and Partition* (New Delhi: Sage, 2000) and 'Genealogies of the colonial and anti-secular: Historical debates on the Independence and Partition of India', Presidential Address, Section 3: Modern India, Indian History Congress 77th Session, University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, 28-30 December, 2016.

[3] Ian Talbot, *Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006); Ian Talbot & Gurharpal Singh (eds.), *Region in Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999). And in the area of politics it came down to local level analysis in revised versions, for example, Joya Chatterji in her *Bengal Divided* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995) argues that Hindu middle classes were also responsible for Partition of Bengal while Neeti Nair in her *Changing Homelands* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2011) carefully examines the role of the Hindu affluent for the division of Punjab in local politics.

[4] Ilyas Chattha, *Partition and Locality* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[5] Jasbir Jain, *Reading Partition/ Living Partition* (Jaipur: Rawat, 2007), p. 2.

[6] Ritu Menon & Kamla Bhasin, *Borders & Boundaries: Women in India's Partition* (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998); Urvashi Butalia, , *The Other Side of Silence* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998); S. Setter and Indira B. Gupta (ed.), *Pangs of Partition vol. II* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002); two articles of Urvashi Butalia, 'An Archive with a difference: Partition Letters' and Ramnarayan S. Rawat, 'Partition Politics and Achhut Identity: A Study of the Scheduled Castes Federation and Dalit Politics in UP, 1946-48' in Suvir Kaul, (ed.), *The Partitions of Memory* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001).

interdisciplinary study and use of interviews, unwritten records, the unspoken voices of the minority communities, women, and the poor have now begun to be recorded and studied. Little attention was paid to non-migrant residents who also had gone through drastic changes with the inflows and outflows of people during the turbulence followed by restructuring of socio-economic and political relations of the region. Gaynendra Pandey's *Remembering Partition* and Zamindar's *The Long Partition* deal with Muslim residents and refugees of Delhi during partition and how their experiences of partition were somewhat different from non-Muslim refugees who came from West Pakistan and settled in Delhi.[7] Perhaps Ilyas Chattha's *Partition and Locality* is one of the few exceptions in West Pakistan side. For example, he points out the need for studying the under-researched residential minority of Christians in Punjab, examining the impact of partition on both residents and migrants in Gujranwala and Sialkot districts.[8]

The time period of partition history is another concern for the study. The history of post-partition and its impact on the two new nations is gradually getting serious attention[9] while the main focus of traditional history writings was related to the period of prior to and during partition. Refugees, migration and rehabilitation in post-partition India and Pakistan are now also included for study. Here oral history has been used in enhancing the understanding of the pains, traumas, and emotional lives of refugees, as well as, the impact on the generations following partition.[10]

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[7] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Vazira F.Y. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008).

[8] Ilyas Chattha, *Partition and Locality*, p. 171.

[9] Suvir Kaul, (ed.), *The Partitions of Memory* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001); Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Tai Yong Tan & Gyanesh Kudaisya (eds.), *Partition and Post-Colonial South Asia, vol. I, II, III* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Tai Yong Tan & Gynesh Kudaisya (ed.), *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asi*a (New York: Routledge, 2000); Ravinder Kaur, *Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007); Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007); Vazira F.Y. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008).

[10] Alok Bhalla in his book, *Partition Dialogues* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) interviewed six prominent novelists of Partition literatures. In literatures, memory of Partition was reorganized and oral history was well observed. See also Ian Talbot, *Epicentre of Violence: Partition Voices and Memories from Amritsar* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006); Anam Zakaria, *The Footprints of Partition: Narratives of Four Generations of Pakistanis and Indians* (New Delhi: HaperCollins, 2015).

Furthermore, the link between the events of partition and current communalism was taken into consideration as a long-term impact of partition. Jassal and Ben-Ari's analysis of the impact of partition and its use in contemporary conflicts is an attempt to relate the current issues back to those of the partition period at a trans-national level.[11] It provides anthropological insights on the use of the partition motif in current conflicts showing the long-term impact of partition on society. Communal violence and conflicts in the post-partition India reflected the event of partition.[12]

In Korean partition historiography, there are two distinct phases after independence: one is the pre-war period (1945-1950) and the other is the war period (1950-1953). Many histories of the Korean partition argue about why and how the Korean peninsula was divided, who is to blame, and what the social and political changes were in light of the Cold War's power struggles in the 1940s.[13] Cumings and Park emphasized the pre-conditions of the Korean War in order to understand the characteristics of the war while six volumes of *Haebang Junhoosaui Insik* [Thinking of the History of Liberation Periods] analyzed the social, political, economic, and cultural developments of Korean peninsula in the period between liberation and the Korean War. Furthermore, the history of the Korean War mainly focuses on documentation of its battles, explaining the troop movements and military strategies while others theorize about why the war started.[14] However, a new way of history writing has emerged to understand the true impact of the

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[11] S.T. Jassal & Eyal Ben-Ari, The *Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts* (New Delhi: Sage, 2007).

[12] Paul Brass, *Form of Collective Violence: Riots, Pogroms, and Genocide in Modern India* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 17; Urvashi Butalia, , *The Other Side of Silence* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), p. 6.

[13] For pre-war conditions and its origins, see Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, vol. I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, vol. II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Keonho Song, Mankil Kang, Kiwan Baek & Others (ed.), *Haebang Junhoosaui Insik*, vols. 1-6 [Thinking of the History of Liberation Periods, vol. 1-6] (Seoul: Hankilsa,1979-1989); Myunglim Park, *Hankook Junjaeui Balbalkwa Kiwon*, vol. II [The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, vol. II: The Origins and Causes of the Conflict] (Seoul: Nanam, 1996).

[14] For the Korean War's details of battles, movements and strategies as a war history, see Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of the Military History, 1961); Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988). For visual pictures of the war, see John Rich, *Korean War in Color: A Correspondent's Retrospective on a Forgotten War* (Seoul: Seoul Selection, 2010).

partition and the war on South Korea's people and society.[15] Dongchoon Kim examined social history of the war, focusing on how the Korean people experienced the war in relations with the state and civil society. In terms of partition and the war's impact in Korea, structural peculiarity was looked upon. Kang and Seo analyzed social, political, economic and cultural development in divided Korea.[16] Kang calls it, 'the Division System', a system which drives South Korean society, politics, economy and culture.[17] According to him, partition is not a one-time event, but an existing structure with long-term effects.

Comparative analysis across the nations would enable us to see partition as 'a phenomenon of modernity as well as a set of organizing principles'[18]. Such comparisons are helpful to understand partition not only as unique event in particular historical contexts, but also as a broader process of national divisions and nation-making. Partition impact on both India and South Korea holds some similarities although some aspects are not directly comparable; for example, in terms of causes, processes and local contexts. However, 'despite the differences, the memories are equally painful and the loss equally irreparable.'[19] Both countries maintained 'the partition system'[20] which influenced their entire politics and societies with enmification[21] (the process of enemy making) being practiced among political or social elites and transmitted to the masses through education and media

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[15] See some examples. Dong-Choon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A Social History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000); Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War* (New York: Modern Library, 2010).

[16] Mangil Kang, *A History of Contemporary Korea* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005); Joongseok Seo (Translated by Dohyun Han and Pankaj Mohan), *Korean Nationalism Betrayed* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007).

[17] Mangil Kang, *Bundansidaeui Yeoksainsik* [Understanding History in Divided Period] (Seoul: Changbi, 1978). For further debates on the division [partition] system of Korea, read Mankil Kang and Kunho Song (ed.), *Hankook Minjokjoouiron II* [Korean Nationalism I] (Seoul: Changbi, 1983); Nakchung Paik, *Bundancheje Byunhyukui Kongbookil* [The Division System and the Transformative Way of Study] (Seoul: Changbi, 1994).

[18] S.T. Jassal & Eyal Ben-Ari, The *Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts* (New Delh: Sage, 2007), p. 47.

[19] Jasbir Jain (ed.), *Reading Partition/ Living Partition* (Jaipur: Rawat, 2007), p. 2.

[20] It is generally termed 'the division system' also as it was suggested by Kang, Mangil examining post-partition Korean history. However, as we look at both India and Korea comparatively, the word 'partition' shall be a more inclusive term to both histories for an analysis.

[21] Alan C. Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved: A Critical assessment of Conflict Resolution* (London: Pinter Press, 1998), p. 126.

The Partition System and Religion

Partition violence and its related wars played a great part in hardening antagonism against each other among the partitioned nations and people. It left tangible, unforgettable scars on the lives of people who had experienced the painful loss of loved ones in traumatic incidents of killings, destructions, and unwanted migrations to unknown places. Partition violence and wars led to the creation of stereotypes about each other and the concept of the enemy.

In India, a violent civil war occurred in Delhi, Punjab, Bengal and Bihar, generally in major towns and occasionally in rural areas, during partition. Approximately more than 10 million were thought to be partition migrants and 1 million died in India. Some 75,000 women were victimized through rapes, abductions and forced pregnancy by men of the other communities. Refugee camps were common scenes in many North Indian towns. Looting and destruction of properties of other communities were prevalent. Partition violence marked wounds in the lives of people in both Pakistan and India physically and psychologically. In many areas in both the countries, Muslims and non-Muslims (Hindus and Sikhs) no longer stayed together as neighbours anymore as they did in the past, after the mass migration. Some Muslim residents who had decided to remain in India had to live in ghettoized Muslim colonies for their own security. Separation, division, segregation took place according to religious lines. It created a space for new socio-political relationships within each religious community. It gradually developed as a system which provided operating principles, and social and political structure in the partitioned country. Further, the partition-affected system in India was hardened through the 1948 war, the 1965 war and the 1971 war. The 1965 war was especially a war in which the system was reassured politically, socially and economically.[22] It

[22] It was a turning point in terms of the openness of the countries to each other. Indian films and songs were banned in Pakistan, borders were closed, train, ferry services were discontinued, visas were suspended. Musharias (poetry recital) disappeared. Books, magazines and newspapers from the other country were removed from shelves. However, the war heroes were celebrated. The budget for defense increased in the next year at the expense of other sections. See more details in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (ed.), *Bridging Partition: People's Initiatives for Peace between India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2010).

was an event of enmification of the other across the border. It affected social and political relations of the people along communal lines within India.

In Korea, there were two phases to divide: first is pre-war period (1945-1950), second is war period (1950-1953). In both phases, violence and migrations took place to a great extent though during the war period violence and migration occurred on a much larger scale. In the first phase, we see the left wing versus the right wing confrontation which caused violence (riots, killings, assassinations, massacres, etc.). The infusion of the Cold War ideology entered the minds of Korean people both in the North and the South which gradually sidelined the composite nationalism which transcended ideological differences. It was the beginning stage of 'the partition system' which the Korean War was decisive in developing. Three years of the Korean War ended without any solution in the Korean peninsula except the strengthening of the partition system.[23] It was a tragedy because the war solved nothing but tensions and problems continued to linger in the course of socio-political development in the country –existing even today.

The war caused 2.5 million deaths in both South and North Korea combined. It created 200,000 war widows, 100,000 orphans, and 10 million were displaced during the war. As Koko and Koko opined, the Korea War "inflicted at least as much death, destruction and misery on a civilian population as any war against a single nation in modern history".[24] The North and the South continue to have military tension over the borders, 10 million families remain divided, and stories about what happened during the war still cannot be told. The States and the people practiced anti-communism through the bitter and painful war experience in South Korea. The worst part that resulted from the Korean War was that it underwent two processes: internalization and institutionalization of its causes and consquences. Thus, the partition system was fully established. Kang's comment is summarizing here:

> The division of the Korean nation, arising from the establishment of separate

[23] Mangil Kang, *A History of Contemporary Korea*, p. 177.

[24] Joyce Koko and Gabriel Koko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 614-616.

> regimes and hardened by the Korean War, developed into the division system within the context of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. The division system saw both regimes promoting different political, economic, social and cultural changes in ways that enabled them to build their own power bases. The two regimes strengthened their power bases through confrontation and competition with each other. All thought and action that sought to overcome the division system and to recover national homogeneity were continuously suppressed as Korea fell deeper into the morass of national division.[25]

At the height of the Cold War after the Korean War, Korea became a focal point of World rivalry between the Communist wing and the Capitalist wing. Internalization and institutionalization of the Cold War ideology in the form of anti-communism was upheld by religious groups, mainly, Christians. They successfully provided a spiritual and psychological justification for anti-communistic policies of the South Korean government. Furthermore, they were able to take advantage of social hegemony by implementing such a cultural atmosphere, that they secured themselves as the social protectors or spiritual leaders in society. Some scholars analyzed the Korean War keeping in minds of the religious factors.[26] American foreign policy during the terms of two Presidents, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower (1945-1960) was especially influenced by religious ideology supported by Protestant and Catholic clergymen and lay leaders. In Korea, Rhee Syngman, the first President of the Republic of Korea (1948-1960), was similarly affected by Christian ideology which he combined with anti-communism and further used the Church network for his political gains, and thus politicized the Church in South Korea. Kai Yin Allison Haga examined religious factors prior to and during the Korean War in several aspects. Her analysis helps us look at the Korean War beyond simply

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[25] Mangil Kang, *A History of Contemporary Korea*, p. 177.

[26] Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokyohoewa Kookka Siminsahoe, 1945-1960* [The Korean Christianity, the State and Civil Society, 1945-1960] (Seoul: The Institute of Korean Church History, 1996); Heungsoo Kim, *Hankook Junjaengkwa Kiboksinang Hwaksan Yeongoo* [A Study of The Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches] (Seoul: The Institute of Korean Church History, 1999); Incheol Kang, *Junjaengkwa Jongkyo* [War and Religion] (Seoul: Hanshin University Press, 2003); Jungran Yoon, *Hankook Junjaengkwa Kidokkyo* [The Korean War and Protestantism] (Seoul: Hanwool Academy, 2015).

labeling it as a part of the Cold War. It excavates moral and inner motivations of U.S. foreign policy as well as South Korean government national policy. Anti-communism was not simply a political campaign but also anti-atheism religious campaign against atheistic communism. However, her focus was more on U.S. foreign policy and its relations with American missionaries in Korea and the churches in the U.S. Thus, she failed to place autonomous roles of Korean Christian elites during and after partition and the Korean War in relation to the solidification of anti-communism and the partition system.

The Sources and Methodology

Works of Political and Religious Leaders: In order to investigate the influence of religious and political leaders on the masses, the papers of the leaders like the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG), Nehru's selected works, Azad's memoir, Jinnah's collected works, Golwalkar's works, Savarkar's works and so on in India and those of Korean leaders such as Kim Koo, Rhee Syngman and Han Kyungchik have been consulted. Particularly, chapter 3 heavily relied on these sources.

Newspapers & Magazines: Newspapers and magazines are valuable sources of events (before, during and after) and reactions of societies (or communities) on various partition-related issues. They contain both objective information and subjective views on it at the same time. Also, changing views on issues before and after partition are well chronicled in this source. Some helpful resources in India were the major newspapers like *the Times of India*, *Hindustan Times*, *the Statesman*, and *the Tribune*. In Korea, major papers and magazines such as *Donga Ilbo*, *Kyunghyang Shinmoon*, *Chosun Ilbo*, *Hangyore Shinmoon*, *Hangyore 21*, and the like were consulted.

Governments and Institutional Records: Some of the sources that have been examined are the Punjab Governor's fortnightly reports, Nathuram Godse's court hearings for Gandhi's murder case, An Doohee's court hearings for Kim Koo's murder case and so on.

Documents of UN and Other International Organizations: Since the two

partitions and wars in both countries had international links, UN documents and US Government Documents are good sources of looking at international dimensions.

Documents of Religious Institutions and Political Parties: Close examinations of religious and political institutions' records are critical parts of understanding main players of partition politics and its influence. Major political parties and organizations in both countries have critical resolutions and discussions in their meetings and activities. Thus, those records are worth consulting. Christian missionary records (reports, letters, minutes, magazines, etc.) and church records in Korea were a very important for factual information and looking at the ideological formulations, while records of the RSS, the SGPC, the Arya Smaj, and the Christian organizations in India were also consulted for communal elements of partition politics.

Literatures: Both India and South Korea have a large volume of partition literature, i.e. novels, poems, movies, non-fictions, and so on. They enrich the understanding of real experiences of the common people during the event and its aftermath. As suggested by Jasbir Jain, 'It is writing about what cannot be written about; the pain, the anguish, the collective unconscious, the unperceived truths, the hidden hurts, the long hold of events on human life, the constant filtering of the past into our present challenging all stable or external formulations and the constant and constantly shifting human factor.'[27]

Interviews: Oral history is a good tool for connecting the reality of an event and its prolonged repercussions on the lives of the society.[28] Interviews were held in both India and South Korea with people of various backgrounds who actually experienced the partitions and wars. Furthermore, the generations after partitions were also interviewed to search for aspects of the continual impact of the partitions down the generations.

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[27] Jasbir Jain (ed.), *Reading Partition/ Living Partition*, p. 6.

[28] For details about the use of oral sources for a history writing, see R.J. Grele, 'On Using Oral History Collections: An Introduction', *Journal of American History*, vol. 74, no. 2 (September 1987), pp. 570-78; A. Thomson, 'Fifty Years On: An International Perspective on Oral History', *Journal of American History*, vol. 85, no. 2 (September 1998), pp. 581-95.

Structure

What is discussed in this work is how far the partition reality in both India and South Korea impacted the post-partition politics and daily life of the people through comparative studies. Furthermore it is examined how far religion, particularly as a political ideology played a role in the partition system in the two countries. It is divided into three parts: (1) historical background of partition and independence of India and Korea; (2) impact of partition violence and wars on both countries and two murder cases, M.K. Gandhi and Kim Koo, as a microcosm of partition politics; (3) partition impact on socio-politics in relations to special roles of refugees and religious elites in both countries while dealing with reconstruction of national capitals.

In Part 1, first and foremost step taken is to examine the historical contexts of partition and independence of both countries. It attempts to show how India and Korea went through different historical developments of the late-colonial period and how significantly both countries underwent immediate partition along with independence.

Chapter 1 deals with Indian partition and independence. A separation of the Muslim-dominated country, Pakistan, from independent India is a main topic of analysis based on religious aspects and regional specificity. This chapter holds main areas of examination as follows. How did 'two nation theory' and debates from various voices on future India affect furthering the division of the people? How were factional aspects of two religious communities (the Hindu and the Muslim) developed? And how far were religious narratives successful in imposing communalism into the common masses? Thus, this chapter intends to see how communalism went along with nationalism and finally distorted the latter and led into partition.

The chapter also deals with Korean peculiarity on partition under the two issues, the Cold War and nationalism. The Korean peninsula was divided into North and South by the 38th parallel line. South of the 38th parallel, the U.S. set up an occupational regime that later became South Korea. The area north of this line went under the Soviets and later became North Korea. It was a tragedy for the future of

the Korean people because it was not decided and implemented by Koreans, but by the Cold War super powers, The Soviet Union and The United States of America. It was intended for a temporary period only during the trusteeship of both superpowers. However, the 38th parallel line unexpectedly later became a permanent symbol of the divided Korean peninsula. The chapter also focuses on how internal division of Korean nationalism contributed to its inability to resist division of the peninsula while dealing with the Cold War world politics.

Part 2 examines how wars and violence during and after partition influenced both countries. A focus area of analysis is how partition-related violence including wars generated a concept of enemies, further stereotypically demonized 'Otherness' and hardened the partition system. A close examination of the murder cases of M. K. Gandhi and Kim Koo are also a part of looking at ideological tensions of partition politics during violent conflicts.

Chapter 2 analyzes partition violence of India and the two Indo-Pak wars of 1947-8 and 1965. It also analyzes the Korean War and its immediate effects in light of partition impact. Traumatic events during partition riots and wars increased antagonism against each other. Experiences of loss, deaths, killings, hatred, agony, abductions, and migrations were all parts of hardening the process of enemy-making. In India, violence took place during partition. It was, in fact, 'undeclared war' between antagonistic communities (Muslim versus non-Muslim). The 1965 war was a landmark for solidifying the reality of partition in India. In Korea, the Korean War was a shattering blow to mark unforgettable and unforgivable scars on both lives of North and South Korea in continuation of pre-war period (1945-50) violence. The major research questions raised here are: To what extent did violence and wars play a role in structuring and hardening the partition system both in India and South Korea? Furthermore what were the peculiarities of the violence in each country?

Chapter 3 introduces case studies of political murders. Two prominent nationalist leaders, M. K. Gandhi in India and Kim Koo in Korea, were assassinated by post-partition factionalists. Both Gandhi and Kim Koo were strong upholders of national unity; in Gandhi's case, it was unity beyond religious boundaries, and for Kim Koo, the unity was based beyond the Cold War ideologies. However there was no room

for them to sustain their political idealism for national unity while they were suspected or accused as non- loyalists to their respective countries in the course of nation-building. The research questions raised here were: What does the case study of two assassinations tell us about divisive nature of partition politics? How did ideological confrontation between the assassinated and the assassins explain larger national ideological tensions on partition as a microcosm?

Part 3 deals with post-partition socio-politics of India and South Korea. By analyzing roles of refugees and religious elites in the formation of local and national politics and society, it tries to look at how characteristics of societies and politics are defined and redefined in both partitioned countries and further influenced the hardening of the partition system. In India, *Sangh Parivar* generated the idea of '*Hindutva*' which enabled communal mobilization and at the same time provoked communal tensions between the Hindu and the Muslim.

In Punjab, Sikh communalism was actively encouraged in post-partition politics by the Punjabi Suba or the Punjabi-speaking state demand. The communal tensions between the Sikh and the Hindu in the region in 1950s and 60s were major political challenges to the commitment of the Government of India to secular democracy.

In South Korea, North Korean Refugees and conservative protestant churches played decisive roles to promote anti-communistic ideology. It created a certain ways of social and political behaviours of people within the country. During and after the Korean War the solidification of the partition system in South Korean politics and society was enhanced in this circumstance.

Two respective capital cities, Delhi in India and Seoul in Korea, were highlighted for analyzing partition violence and the aftermaths in terms of demographic changes, the role of migrants and religious institutions. Refugee rehabilitation areas in the cities were taken into zoom-up considerations for an analysis.

Chapter 4 evaluates how far postcolonial democracy was hampered by communalism under the influence of partition. India's secularism was badly affected by such sentiments. It also brings issues of partition's impact on society by analyzing the influence of *Sangh Parivar* and '*Hindutva*' on the common mass on the one hand and the Sikh communalism on the other hand, particularly in Delhi and Punjab. How the regions of Delhi and Punjab were reshaped after the influx of

the partition refugees were another concern for the study. With the demographic change due to incoming refugees, significant alterations in cultural, economic and political profiles in two cities occurred. In Delhi, about 10,000 Muslims were massacred. Muslim neighbourhoods particularly in the walled city suffered a great deal of violence and about 44,000 houses occupied by Muslims in these neighbourhoods were abandoned or forcibly evacuated. Almost two-third of Muslim inhabitants abandoned the city (an estimated 329,000 Muslims left Delhi following partition) and in 1951, the city had just 99,000 Muslim residents. Delhi's Muslim population had declined from 33.22 percent in 1941 to 5.71 percent by 1951.[29] About 496,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province and Sind came to Delhi.[30] In light of this information, research questions looked at were: What kinds of changes took place in Delhi and Punjab during and after partition? What significant roles did partition migrants play in the socio-politics of the cities and also of the country? How did common people undergo traumas by partition violence and wars, and further pass on them to next generations? What kinds of roles did *Sangh Parivar* play in the process of enemy making? How strongly did the partition reality act on stereotyping others on the basis of religion? How much did communal sentiments act against the making of secular democracy?

Chapter 5 examines anti-communistic sentiments in South Korean politics and social life by examining 'Red Scare[31]' syndrome and the roles of right-wing agencies, notably North Korean refugees and Christians in the country. It analyzes the impact of the term, '*Ppalgaengi* (a Korean version of *Commie)*', developed in the periods from 1945 to 1965 and how it was used and misused for the making of the 'Other' or 'enemy'. Seoul as the capital of Korea at the time of partition and after was examined in light of the growth of anti-communism. Seoul became a hotbed for ideological rivalries as well as for the activities of refugees and Christians while experiencing social and political changes drastically, making it

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[29] Tai Yong Tan & Gyanesh Kudaisya (eds.), *Partition and Post-Colonial South Asia, Vol. III* (New York, 2008), pp. 257-258.

[30] *Hindustan Times* (19, October, 2011).

[31] The term **Red Scare** denotes the promotion of fear of a potential rise of communism or radical leftism, used by anti-leftist proponents.

interesting case for examination. During the Korean War, at least 191,000 buildings, 55,000 houses, and 1,000 factories belonging to Seoul lay in ruins. In addition, a flood of refugees swelled the population of Seoul and its metropolitan area to around 2.5 million, more than half of them homeless. Non-government forces, particularly Christian institutions were active participants in promoting strong anti-communism sentiments in the South Korean society. They interpreted communists in religious terms as satanic forces which had to be removed. This religious interpretation of anti-communism eventually affected mass congregations of the Christian community and therefore the Korean masses, as the Christian elites held influential social and political positions. With this information given some research questions made were: What kinds of changes took place in Seoul during and after partition? What significant roles did North Korean migrants play in the socio-political developments in the cities and also in the country as a whole? How did common people undergo traumas by partition violence and wars, and further pass them on to next generations? How did the anti-communistic policy of South Korean government influence lifestyles of common citizens? Why were Christian institutions so against communism in post-partition Korea? To what extent was the Christian minority able to influence the socio-political scenario of South Korea? What was the degree to which North Korean refugees and Christians could be held responsible for hardening the partition system?

Part I

Partition with Independence: Historical Contexts

Chapter 1

Nationalism and Religion Prior to Partition: India and Korea

Introduction

India and Korea had a dynamic and prolonged history of nationalist resistance against colonialism particularly with regard to religion and its complex position in modern nation states in the late nineteenth and the first half of twentieth century. There were multi-dimensional inner struggles and competitions among nationalist groups while fighting against colonial regimes. With the introduction of mass politics and modern nation-states, role of religion in politics grew rapidly. Both countries witnessed peculiar roles of religion in their nationalism. Two important roles religion played were that it nurtured political mobilization for nationalist cause and provided nationalist ideologies. There were different ideologies and approaches among various religious groups as to how to achieve national independence from the colonial powers, who would seize political powers, and what would be the guiding principles or ideologies in the future independent country. Answers to them were not same from one leader to another or from one community to another. However, India, in contrast to Korea, could proceed to negotiate with the colonial power for her independence and partition in the course of nationalism while Korea was not given any bargaining position for her national freedom. Nevertheless, ideological struggle with the reference to religion played a pivotal role throughout nationalist movements in both countries.

This chapter juxtaposes and compares two different experiences of religious leaders and institutions in India and Korea which were critical to formulate nationalist ideas and execute them to independence movements in both countries. The aim of this chapter is to understand the pre-conditions of the partitions by analyzing relations between nationalism and religions. First, Indian nationalism and religious factors are examined by comparing two contrasting ideological stands,

secularism and communalism, while analyzing major nationalist developments in the early twentieth century India. Second, the role of religion in Korean nationalism and the freedom struggle against Japanese colonial rule is examined particularly with reference to the Christianity. Finally, the historical context of colonialism and its effects on the Christian community's stand on Korean nationalism as it experienced gradual changes of its nationalist principles, strategies, and concepts will be discussed.

1. National Movement and Religious Factors in India Before 1947

India had been historically multi-religious, multi-racial, multi-lingual from her ancient times. The competing tendency among diverse religious groups was especially enhanced under the historical context of the British colonial rule. In the late 19th and early 20th century, modernization proceeded along with religious reforms in each Indian religion, competing initially with Christian missionaries, then with other Indian religions.[32] As Chandra remarks, religion was the dominant ideology of the times so that it was impossible to undertake any social action without religion.[33] Religious mobilization and its appeals were frequently seen in social and political realms after introduction of mass politics and modern nation-states.[34] When the colonial government introduced the census and Indian

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[32] For religious discourse between Christianity and Indian religions in modernity during the colonial period, see Antony Copley, *Religions in Conflict* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gauri Viswanathan, *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1989); Gauri Viswanathan, *Outside Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); Nandini Chartterjee, *The Making of Indian Secularism: Empire, Law and Christianity, 1830-1960* (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). For religious (or communal) consciousness in religious reforms in each religion, see Harjot Oberoi, *The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997); Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim in South Asia* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000); Kenneth Jones, *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth Century Punjab* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976).

[33] Bipan Chandra & others, *India's Struggle for Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 83.

[34] For details of a relation between politics and religion in India, see Donald Smith (ed.), *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Ian Copland & others (ed.), *A History of State and Religion in India* (London: Routledge, 2012). For theoretical analysis of modern nation-state and religion, see Talal Asad's two books, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) and *Genealogies of*

representation in politics through a series of political reforms (the Government of India Act of 1909, 1919, and 1935), religion was made into a political basis and therefore increasingly influential in providing the sources for mass mobilization and ideology-making.[35] Each religion used its own religious symbols, rituals, and processions for its political gains, both from the colonial regime and from other community.[36] Under this situation, communal competition gradually increased simultaneously in the nationalist movement gaining more strength.[37]

When the Indian nationalist mass movement was launched by M.K. Gandhi in 1920s, it was critical to integrate various Indian communities and individuals with a united force against the British Raj. Particularly, two competing religious communities, the Hindus and the Muslims were clearly at a tension when it came to a political representation and mobilization in the early twentieth century though they had been living side by side for almost one thousand years together. Therefore, for Indian nationalists, bringing all different communities together for one common cause, the freedom of India, was a key task to achieve before they could overthrow the British colonial rule. It meant that there was a need of a common, overarching ideology which could embrace various religious groups for the cause. It was an Indian version of secularism. Secularism in India never discarded or underestimated

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Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

35 For a view on communalism as a colonial construct, see B. S. Cohn, 'The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia', in *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 224-55; Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).

36 For a relation between communalism and religious symbols, rituals, conversions, and processions, see Sandria B. Freitag, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Peter Van Der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996); Marzia Casolari, 'Role of Benares in constructing Hindu Identity', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 37, no. 15 (13 April 2002), pp. 1413-1420; Pradap K. Datta, *Carving Blocs: Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth-century Bengal* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Christopher R. King, *One Language, two scripts: The Hindi movement in nineteenth- century Northern India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994); Geoffrey A. Oddie (ed.), *Religion in South Asia: religious conversions and revival movements in South Asia in medieval and modern times* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1977); Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993).

37 For nationalism and modern nation-state, see Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (ed.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983).

the importance of religion, but rather advocated equal status of minority religions and majority religions so that Indian solidarity beyond religious affiliations would be enhanced. Donald Smith pointed out that Indian secularism was understood as a state which aided all religions equally rather than a state which was separate from religion.[38]

This would be decisively critical in achieving a democracy, which ensured equal rights of every individual. With such commitment, the Indian National Congress (the Congress, hereafter) adopted secular democracy as a guiding principle for its political agenda under the leadership of M.K. Gandhi in 1920s onwards. Therefore, Gandhian nationalism was primarily based on the principle of secularism. In this regard, an analysis of the political ideologies and activities of Gandhi and his fellow Congress Muslim leader, Maulana A.K. Azad provides a clear representative view of Indian secularism in pre-independence period.

However, communalism, an opposite trend to secularism during the Indian nationalist movement gradually became very powerful - influencing Indian people, both leaders and the mass. It was developed in two directions. One, developed as Hindu majoritarianism, which segregated Muslims and Christians particularly on the grounds that they were derived from foreign religions without sharing the "holy or sacred" tradition and land with other Indian religions. This ideology became militant and divisive. The other was developed as a Muslim separatism which claimed a separate Muslim country according to the so-called, "two nation theory". In this communal trend of Indian politics, Hindu communalism with a reference to the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha, and Muslim communalism with a reference to the Muslim League would be analyzed while ideologues of both communal trends would be dealt with side by side.

1) Secularism and National Movement Before 1947

Secularism was a basic guiding principle of the Indian nationalist movement throughout the anti-colonial struggles. The Hindu-Muslim unity in particular was

[38] Donald Smith, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 100-134.

highly emphasized though it failed to prevent the division of religious communities which finally led to the partition. Communalism was a strong obstacle toward achieving the nationalist goal of a unified free India and it further continued to hamper the national unity of post-partition India socially, economically, politically, and psychologically. Secularism was adopted under a modern democratic framework derived from Western Christian experience. Relations between the state and the church were defined with non-interference so that both entities would function in their own realms. However, secularism in Indian nationalism added one more critical principle, a principle of equality among religions so that anyone with any religious affiliation should not be subject to discrimination but treated equally. Therefore, while one religious individual or community enjoyed their spiritual privileges, other religious groups, even a smaller minority, might also freely do the same with religion and politics not interfering with one another. Secular nationalism, as Vanaik argues, could be legitimized not by history or the past but by its promise, and not by origins but by its desirable effects.[39] He goes on to say that "a social order which is to be progressively humanist and democratic cannot simultaneously be Hindu nationalist or communally founded".[40]

Gandhian Nationalism and Mass Mobilization

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was a champion of the Indian nationalist mass movement. His entry into Indian nationalism was a turning point in energizing anti-British fervor from all sections of Indian society across class, communities, regions, genders. Gandhi had many significant contributions in terms of strategies of Indian nationalist struggles against the British Raj. First, his guiding principles of *Ahimsa* (or non-violence) and *Satyagraha*, though outwardly weak, became powerful weapons to effectively expose the brutality and inhumane characteristics of the British rule of India. The Moral force of Indian nationalism effectively

[39] Achin Vanaik, *The Furies of Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity, and Secularization* (London: Verso, 1997), p. 39.

[40] Achin Vanaik, *The Furies of Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity, and Secularization* (London: Verso, 1997), p. 39.

delegitimized the colonial government. Second, Gandhi brought all sections of people together for the common cause, that of India's independence. Indian nationalism before Gandhi was more or less an elites movement whereas after Gandhi the nationalist movement became pan-Indian and a mass movement. Third, he encouraged unity of communities by adopting secularism as a principle in the course of the movement. The Indian National Congress was to pursue secular democracy.

Gandhi was strongly of the opinion that "nationalism is greater than sectarianism".[41] He argued that "when a Hindu or a Musalman does evil, it is evil done by an Indian to an Indian", therefore, each individual Indian had to share the blame and try to remove the evil together. He firmly believed that people in India were to be identified as Indians first, then Hindus, Musalmans, Parsis or Christians later. And yet, being a devout Hindu Gandhi considered his religion a guiding force of his every political activity, even the tiniest.[42] For him, strengthening one's religious identity would foster a stronger morality which would bind communalized religious communities and individuals together. Moral ethics would be a solution to communal problem. However, his way of understanding Hindu faith - ethical, composite, seeking harmony, and secular ethos, and the like - was one of many ways in which Hinduism was perceived. His nationalism was, as Veer remarks, based on the imagination of "a common ethnic culture of India in terms of religious pluralism."[43] Therefore, Hindu communalists' version of understanding Hinduism and religion was far different from his. For example, the *Bhagavad Gita* was a sacred Hindu scripture from which Gandhi had drawn the idea of his composite nationalism and *Ahimsa* or non-violence whereas the Hindu communalists viewed it as a textbook for the militant *Hindutva* ideology.[44] The early debates on the

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[41] P.K. Dutt, *Gandhi's Approach to Communal Problem* (New Delhi: Bookleaf Publishers, 2013), p. 183.

[42] 'Religion and Irreligion in Politics, 30 May 1932', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 125.

[43] Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 23.

[44] 'Letter to Gulzarilal Nanda, 28 May 1927', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 172. ; 'Note on Tilak's Letter, 28 January 1920', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi:

interpretation of the *Gita* between Gandhi and Tilak are worthwhile to examine to know the difference of two opposite ideological thoughts within the Indian nationalist leaders.[45] For it later led to divide the Hindus into two groups throughout the freedom struggles in the British colonial period as well as the post-independence period and stimulated the Muslim separatism as well. However, despite his personal and life-long commitment to Hindu-Muslim unity, Gandhi failed to meet his goal of seeing a unified India due to the partition of Indian subcontinent. His anti-communalism efforts at the end were heavily dependent upon his own personal, moral, and physical characteristics.[46]

Jawaharlal Nehru was a political heir of Gandhi's nationalism in terms of secular democracy. However, unlike Gandhi he was more political than religious. Nehru in his writings treated religion as a vehicle of culture, not as an object of spiritual seeking.[47] His understanding of religion was quite negative, saying that "religion seems to me to lead to emotion and sentimentality and they are still more unreliable guides."[48] He confessed that "religion is not familiar ground for me, and as I have grown older I have definitely drifted away from it."[49] He felt hostile to religion:

> I am becoming more and more hostile to the religious idea. Exceptions apart (and some of them are big exception), it seems to me the negation of real spirituality and only a begetter of confusion and sentimentality. I should like to keep myself away, as far as possible, from all religious rites and ceremonials, all the hallmarks of religion-indeed to be wholly non-religious.[50]

Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 113.

[45] Christophe Jaffrelot, 'Opposing Gandhi: Hindu Nationalism and Political Violence', Denis Vidal, Gilles Tarabout &Eric Meyer (ed.), *Violence/Non-Violence: Some Hindu Perspectives* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), pp. 301-303.

[46] Bipan Chandra, *The Writings of Bipan Chandra: The Making of Modern India From Marx to Gandhi* (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2012), p.196.

[47] B.R. Nanda, *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 100.

[48] 'A Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to M.K. Gandhi, 5 May 1933', Uma Iyengar & Lalitha Zackariah (ed.), *Together We Fought: Gandhi-Nehru Correspondence, 1921-1948* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 182.

[49] 'A Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to M.K. Gandhi, 5 May 1933', Uma Iyengar & Lalitha Zackariah (ed.), *Together We Fought: Gandhi-Nehru Correspondence, 1921-1948* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 181.

[50] 'A Letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to M.K. Gandhi, 25 July 1933', Uma Iyengar & Lalitha

His views on religion were perhaps affected by contemporary Hindu and Muslim communalism in his own experience of political and social life. Communal problem was, according to his analysis, the political creation of the upper classes in various communities. It had nothing to do with the basic needs of the masses.[51] He saw the instrumentalist aspect of communalism that the upper strata of society tried to maintain their hegemony through communal exploitation.[52] For him, religion was "an irrelevant factor in national politics".[53]Thus, his denunciation of communal politics, whether it might be Hindu majoritarianism, Sikh or Muslim minority communalism, was consistently maintained throughout his political career. Therefore, even after independence and partition, Nehru as the Prime Minister of India continued to maintain secular democratic vision of India though his policies severely met reactionary challenges from communalists. However, his failure to maintain the united India against partition was due to his and co-nationalists' limitation to prevent communalism in national politics. Chandra points out the lack of political strategy Nehru and other Gandhian nationalists had against communal politics. It caused them to heavily rely on negotiations with the communal leaders, thus enabled them to emerge in the public domain and failed to evolve a viable and effective long-term strategy to combat communalism at the political, ideological and cultural levels.[54]

Zackariah (ed.), *Together We Fought: Gandhi-Nehru Correspondence, 1921-1948* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 186.

[51] B.R. Nanda, *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 102-103.

[52] For the analysis of communalism, Brenschot explaines an "instrumentalist approach" which shows the upper classes of the regions took control of the masses for their political gains and for the defense of their hegemony, deviating the real issues of castes, economics, and etc. to communalism. Ward Brenschot, *Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim Violence and the Indian State* (New Delhi: Rainlight, 2011), pp. 26-29.

[53] B.R. Nanda, *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 103.

[54] Bipan Chandra, *The Writings of Bipan Chandra:The Making of Modern India, From Marx to Gandhi* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2012), pp. 196-197.

Secularism from a Muslim Nationalist Perspective: Maulana A.K. Azad

A prominent Muslim leader of the Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, was president during a critical period of Indian nationalist movement in 1940. He was strongly against the partition which he thought would lead to 'no solution of the problem of minorities' while he denounced Jinnah's 'two-nation theory':

> The demand for Pakistan loses all forces. As a Muslim, I for one am not prepared for a moment to give up my right to treat the whole of India as my domain and to share in the shaping of its political and economic life. To me it seems a sure sign of cowardice to give up what is my patrimony and content myself with a mere fragment of it. As is well known, Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan scheme is based on his two-nation theory. His thesis is that India contains many nationalities based on religious differences. Of them the two major nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, must as separate nations have separate states… Two nations according to Jinnah confront one another in every hamlet, village and town, and he, therefore, desires that they should be separated into two states…Two states confronting one another, offer no solution of the problem of one another's minorities, but only lead to retribution and reprisals by introducing a system of mutual hostages.[55]

His commitment to secular democracy had many adherents among Indian Muslims while Jinnah's Muslim League was also gaining a larger support base after the Lahore Resolution in 1940. Azad's views on issues of future India were clearly not religious ones, stating that "differences will no doubt persist, but they will be economic, not communal" and "opposition among political parties will continue, but it will be based, not on religion but on economic and political issues."[56] He and his Muslim nationalist leaders worked "within the framework of India's unity with a sovereign constitution". The Azad Muslim Conference held in 1940 was an attempt for India's unity at national level by clearly opposing the demand of the Muslim League. How was it different from communalist Muslims? It would be beneficial to quote some of discussions and resolutions of the conference. Maulana

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[55] Maulana A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (complete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), pp. 150-151.

[56] Maulana A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom (complete version)* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 152.

Hifzurrahman said "the partition scheme, he feared, would retain British rule and might create a buffer state for the benefit of Great Britain."[57] It was a real concern for the conference that the division of India would only benefit British imperialism. According to the resolutions of the conference, "any scheme which divides India into Hindu India and Muslim India is impracticable and harmful to the country's interests generally and those of Muslims in particular" and it was further argued that "the inevitable result of such a scheme will be that obstacles will be created in the path of Indian freedom and British Imperialism will exploit it for its own purpose."[58]

K.B. Allah Baksh, then Premier of Sind and the president of the Azad Muslim Conference addressed at the Conference rally that "Indian Muslims were proud to be Indian nationals and equally proud that their spiritual level and creedal realm was Islam."[59] His word reflected a basic concept of Maulana Azad's secularism without sacrificing religious identity of the community. However, his voice different from the Pakistan demand did not sustain long due to his assassination on 14 May 1943 as the Muslim League firmly strived to establish itself as "sole speaker" of the whole Indian Muslim community at the time.[60]

2) Hindu Communalism and National Movement

Hindutva Ideology and Exclusive Nationalism

From 1920s, Hindu political organizations, notably the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha, played a crucial role in mobilizing Hindu masses with Hindutva ideology which went against the Congress nationalist policy. They sought to establish exclusively Hindu nation in India. Two prominent ideologues, V.D. Savarkar of the Hindu Mahasabha and Golwalkar of the RSS at the time, were catalysts of Hindu communalism. Savarkar elaborated the concept of Hindutva that

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[57] *The Times of India*, 30 April 1940.

[58] *The Times of India*, 30 April 1940.

[59] Rizwan Qaiser, *Resisting Colonialism and Communal Politics: Maulana Azad and the Making of the Indian Nation* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 230.

[60] *The Times of India*, 15 May 1943.

suited Hindu communal ideology. He said that:

> These are the essentials of Hindutva-a common nation (Rashtra), a common race (Jati) and a common civilization (Sanskriti). All these essentials could be best summed up by stating in brief that he is a Hindu to whom Sindhusthan is not only a *Pitribhu* but also a *Punyabhu*. For the first two essentials of Hindutva-nation and Jati- are clearly denoted and connoted by the word *Pitribhu* while the third essential of Sanskriti is pre-eminently implied by the word *Punyabhu*, as it is precisely *Sanskriti* including *Sanskaras*, i.e., rites and rituals, ceremonies and sacraments, that makes a land a Holyland.[61]

Territorial ownership of Indian subcontinent was an essential part of Hindutva assertion that:

> The land which extends from the Indus to the Southern Seas is Hindusthan - the land of the Hindus and we Hindus are the Nation that owns it. If you call it an Indian nation it is merely an English synonym for the Hindu nation. To us Hindus, Hindusthan and India mean one and the same thing.[62]

Golwalkar similarly asserted that "Hindusthan is the land of the Hindus and is the *terra firma* for the Hindu Nation alone to flourish upon."[63] Hindutva ideology further developed a divisive notion on the non-Hindu population in India that:

> The non-Hindu people of Hindustan must either adopt Hindu culture and language, must learn and respect and hold in reverence the Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but of those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture ... In a word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment—not even citizens' rights.[64]

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[61] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* (fifth edition) (Mumbai: Veer Savarkar Prakashan , 1969), p. 116.
[62] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), pp. 63-64.
[63] M.S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1947), p. 53.
[64] M.S. Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thought* (Bangalore: Vikram Prakashan, 1966), p. 52.

Hindutva's Two Nation Theory and Anti-Muslim Stance

Savarkar was a person who asserted a 'two nation theory' like Jinnah. He was of the opinion that there were two antagonistic nations: the Hindus and the Muslims, living side by side in India.[65] As far as his two-nation theory was concerned, "India cannot be assumed today to be a Unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main; the Hindus and the Muslims, in India."[66] In 1937, the Hindu Mahasabha officially passed it as a resolution when he was its President, three years earlier than the Muslim League's. In 1940, when the Muslim League declared its two-nation theory in Lahore, Savarkar said he agreed with Muhammad Ali Jinnah. How he differentiated the Indian Muslims from the Hindus was based on his *Hindutva* criteria for nationhood. He asserted that "their [Muslims'] love towards India as their motherland is but a handmaid to their love for their Holyland outside India. Their faces are ever turned towards Mecca and Medina. But to Hindus Hindusthan being their Fatherland as well as their Holyland, the love they bear to Hindusthan is undivided and absolute."[67] Savarkar went on to say that Indian Muslims who often cherished extraterritorial allegiance with other Islamic countries was proven to be less national than the Hindus because they had their fatherland outside India.[68] The characters of Muslims' extraterritorial link with other non-Indian Muslims were also used to create "a fear psychosis" among Hindus.[69] Once the British power was gone, Indian Muslims with the help of other non-Indian Muslims would overpower the political sovereignty of India and re-establish a Muslim empire again.[70] According to Mukherjee and Mahajan, "a major

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[65] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 13.

[66] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 14.

[67] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 8.

[68] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 8.

[69] Aditya Mukherjee, Mridula Mukherjee and Sucheta Mahajan, *RSS, School Texts and the Murder of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Sage, 2008), p. 86.

[70] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 62.

problem for the Hindu communalists was how the majority was to be made to fear the minority, because without fear communal feelings do not grow."[71] For Savakar, India was "the home of our Hindu Race, the land which has been the cradle of our prophets and heroes and gods and godmen", therefore, mere geographical independence of India did not mean the independence of Hindu Nation.[72] He defined the independence of India that it meant "the political independence of the Hindus, the freedom which would enable them to grow to their full height."[73]

Fascist and Nazi connections with the *Hindutva* movement

Some aspects of the *Hindutva* movement contain certain similarities with fascist and Nazi ideologies. Hindu communal ideologues like B. S. Moonje, V.D. Savarkar, and G.S. Golwalkar found that the fascist and Nazi features of the leadership principle, the militarism, the doctrine of racial-cultural superiority, ultra-nationalism infused with religious idealism, the use of symbols of past greatness, the emphasis on national solidarity, the exclusion of religious or ethnic minorities from the nation-concept were highly relevant in its movement.

Nazi Germany became the main point of reference for the Hindu communalist leaders. Germany's policies regarding race, i.e., the anti-Jewish campaign were taken as the model to be adopted to solve the 'Muslim problem' in India. Golwalkar said that it would be "a good lesson for use in Hindusthan to learn and profit by".[74] Marzia summarized that Hindu communal organizations adopted two main political tasks in the period between 1920 and 1940: 1) racial supremacy of the Hindu, 2) militarization of the Hindu community. For them, Muslims were the main target rather than the British colonizers.[75]

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[71] Aditya Mukherjee, Mridula Mukherjee and Sucheta Mahajan, *RSS, School Texts and the Murder of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Sage, 2008), p. 86.

[72] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 9.

[73] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 9.

[74] M.S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1947), p. 43.

[75] Marzia Casolari, '*Hindutva*'s foreign tie-up in the 1930s; Archival Evidence', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 35, No. 4 (22 January 2000), p. 227.

Marzia has argued that *Hindutva* ideology was not purely an outcome of Hindu traditional belief system and practice, but also its amalgamation with Italian fascism and German Nazism. She argues that fascism influenced *Hindutva* movement in the areas of militarizing Hindu society and creating militant mentality among the Hindus. Ideologically, she further says, fascism helped *Hindutva* movement to identify 'its own concept of diversity, transforming diverse people into enemies'.[76] *Hindutva* was politically defined movement rather than religious. It was a "political Hinduism" within the frame of power struggles against competing communities; a prelude to the independence and partition of India. Similar to fascism in Italy, *Hindutva* became "political religion" of Hindu communalists.[77]

Parallel to Secular Nationalists for Nationalist Struggles

Savarkar and his associates were critical of the Congress and its leaders like Gandhi, blaming them as "the pseudo-nationalists".[78] The Congress was condemned because it "so thoroughly prejudiced anything against that was connected with *Hindutva* that they militiated against the very word Hindu as something superstitious, out-of-date unworthy of a progressive patriot to own."[79] The Congress was, according to *Hindutva* adherents, not only anti-Hindu, but also pro-Muslim and therefore anti-national.[80] Unlike secular nationalists' Hindu-Muslim unity as its nationalist agenda, *Hindutva* advocates asserted that Indian nationalism would be equal to Hindu nationalism as Hindu nation was equal to

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[76] Marzia Casolari, '*Hindutva*'s foreign tie-up in the 1930s; Archival Evidence', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 35, No. 4 (22 January 2000), p. 227.

[77] Emilio Gentile, 'Fascism as Political Religion', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 25, no. 2/2 (May-June 1990), pp. 229-251. Here Gentile argues that there was religious aspect of mass political movements in fascism in modern Italy, in which 'sacralization of politics' was one of its kinds.

[78] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 42.

[79] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 42.

[80] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 82.

Indian Nation according to their justification.[81] They also justified this with the reason that Muslims were not nationalistic in India, but more loyal to their own foreign Muslim neighbours. However, as Savarkar claimed, to a Hindu "India was all in all of his National being" and "the trusted champion of Her cause."[82] Therefore, Indian nationalism should be legitimately Hindu nationalism.

Savarkar went against Gandhi's non-violent Satyagraha on both practical and moral grounds, saying that "if the first extreme remedy of an armed rising on a National scale is ruled out on grounds of practical politics, this other extreme of absolute non-violence condemning all armed resistance even to an incorrigible aggression must be ruled out not only on practical grounds alone but even on moral grounds."[83] And he further explained the reasons that:

> Without going into deep waters for want of space and time to ascertain what constitutes the criterion of a moral action, whether morality derives its saction from Intuition or Revelation or Exigency, the most practical factor and one which ought to be common to all of these schools of moral thought and which alone can practically serve to distinguish a moral act from an immoral one, a virtue from a vice, the good from the bad is the utilitarian principle that everything that contributes under a given set of circumstances to human good is moral, a virtue and the opposite is immoral, a vice under those given circumstances; that all morality is essentially human. Judged from this most practical and yet fundamental test, the principle of absolute non-violence condemning all armed resistance even to incorrigible aggression cannot but be ruled out as absolutely impracticable antihuman and therefore positively immoral.[84]

One example of distrust against Gandhi's politics by the Hindu Mahasabha was a controversial issue of the Communal Award accepted by Gandhi in November 1939. The Bengal Hindu Mahasabha blamed the imposition of the Communal Award that "it is a revelation which is really distressing at this crisis - at least for Bengal and

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[81] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 82.

[82] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 8.

[83] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 83.

[84] V.D. Savarkar, *Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches* (Bombay: Laxman Ganesh Khare, 1949), p. 83.

the Punjab, where the Hindus have been most unfairly treated by the so-called Award."[85] It was condemned as "not only anti-Hindu, but also anti-national and anti-democratic, and which, in its practical working, has proved inimical to the growth of nationalism in India, and has fomented communalism and widened the cleavage between the communities all over India".[86]

As a result of their understanding of Gandhi and the Indian Nationalist Congress, the Hindu communalists' engagement with nationalist movement often contrasted to that of secular nationalists. For instance, they completely neglected the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 and the Quit India Movement of 1942 against the British Raj. During the Quit India movement what was particularly shocking to the secular nationalists was that Hindu communalists wanted to reserve their strength for what they considered more urgent and critical fighting; that being fighting against the Indian Muslims rather than the British.[87]

3) Muslim Communalism and National Movement

Mohammad Ali Jinnah and The Muslim League

The 1937 elections in India was perhaps a turning point for Mohammad Ali Jinnah in pursuit of an extreme form of Muslim separatism after the Muslim League failed to gain popular support from the Muslims. He used pernicious communal sentiments like Muslims in danger of being absorbed by Hindu majority and hatred against Hindu exploitation for his political mobilization. At the presidential address of the All-India Muslim League in April 1938, Jinnah accused the Congress of being determined to crush all other minorities to establish a Hindu Raj.[88] In November 1939, Jinnah in reply to Gandhi's article on Hindu-Muslim unity, regarded the Congress as a Hindu body, saying that "it is the same coin with a

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[85] *The Times of India*, 9 November 1939.

[86] *The Times of India*, 9 November 1939.

[87] Aditya Mukherjee, Mridula Mukherjee and Sucheta Mahajan, *RSS, School Texts and the Murder of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Sage, 2008), p. 92.

[88] Jamuuddin Ahad (ed.), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore: Sh. Muhamma Ashraf Kashmiri Bazar, 1942), p. 69.

stamp on one side of the The Hindu Mahasabha and on the other that of the Congress, and what one speaks out openly the other practices."[89] He further went on to argue that adoptions of *Bande Mataram* as a national song, Indian national flag's Hindu symbols, and Hindi-Hindustani language scheme for education were clear examples of "Hinduizing" efforts of the Congress supported by M.K. Gandhi. These efforts meant degeneration of the Muslim community.[90]

Two Nation Theory and Muslim Communalism

When in March 1940 Jinnah declared the Lahore Resolution for the formation of Pakistan as a separate country, communal distinction of the Muslims as a result of his "two nation theory" was officially established. According to Lahore Resolution, "the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".[91] Jinnah advocated a separate nationhood of the Muslims:

> It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to

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89 *The Statesman*, 6 November 1939.

90 *The Statesman*, 6 November 1939.

91 'Resolution of the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League, 23 March 1940', quoted in Kirpal Singh (revised ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab- 1947, India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: National Book Shop, 2006), p. 1.

> growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state… Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their State.[92]

Jinnah further elaborated his two nation theory at his presidential address in the Muslim League at Madras in April 1941, stating that if democracy meant majority rule, majority rule by a single nation in a single society would be natural. However, it could not work when there were two or more than two nations like in India.[93] Therefore, following the logic of Jinnah, in order to achieve true democracy the Hindu and the Muslim, and other minorities had to be given separate national autonomy. His understanding of democracy was fully based on communal affiliation of people in society whereas secular nationalists interpreted democracy differently, keeping the state distant from religion and neutrality among religions. Jinnah's strong stance on communalism was not directly affected by a vision of establishing Islamic theocratic state, but rather by the daily reality of ill-treatment by the Hindu majority. His Pakistan demand was more socio-political and economic than theological.

The 1946 Elections and Religious Leaders in Punjab

During the 1946 election campaigns, the Muslim League's propaganda was based on communal appeals linking the Pakistan scheme with other socio-economic issues of the regions in highly a communalized region like Punjab. For example, "The Muslims are told that if they do not vote [the] League, they are kaffirs" and further emotional slogans like, "to vote [the] League is to go to paradise; to vote against the League is to invite hell." [94] According to B.S. Grewal, then the deputy Commissioner of Ambala,'s report, "one very objectionable type of propaganda indulged in by the Muslim League is to threaten Muslim voters with ex-

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[92] 'An Extract from the Presidential Address of M.A. Jinnah- Lahore, March 1940', quoted in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 56-7.

[93] Jamuuddin Ahad (ed.), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Kashmiri Bazar, 1942), p. 240.

[94] *The Times of India*, 16 February 1946.

communication." The report added that another threat was "including a refusal to allow their dead to be buried in Muslim graveyards and to debar them from joining in mass Muslim prayers in the event of their voting against the League".[95] A prominent Unionist Party leader complained that "we are not fighting an election; this is no political fight, no fair game. There is a religious fire raging and you know the Muslim."[96] In reply to him, Rana Wali Mohmed, Secretary of the Muslim League's Provincial Parliamentary Board answered that "in a sense, it is true. What we have been saying and what we will continue to say is that this is our crusade."[97] He clarified the issue that it was a question between Muslims and the Government on the one hand, and between Muslims and Hindus on the other hand. He went on to say that "we feel it is a matter of life and death for us. We say, 'If you want to safeguard your religion come forward and support the League, otherwise Islam is gone."[98] His views were summarized with the statement: "we have always used religion. To us religion and politics are indistinguishable."[99]

However, communal appeals of the Muslim League in Punjab had unique features where the rural-based religious social orders were fully used for their election tactics, which would later define the successful creation of the new Muslim nation-state, Pakistan.[100] When the Punjab became the Muslim League's political power base soon after the victory of the 1946 elections, the rural-based *pirs* of the region emerged as powerful religious leaders, becoming strong supporters of Pakistan cause. It was because a political body like the Muslim League's communal appeal matched what they wanted, to expand and secure their Islamic foundations within their traditional religious order. As Gilmartin argues, with the emergence of the Muslim League, the *pirs* of rural West Punjab "saw the opportunity to put rural

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[95] 'Glancy to Wavell, Secret No. 584, 16 January 1946', Cited in Lionel Carter (compiled ed.), *Punjab Politics, 1 January - 3 March 1947: Governors' Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 167.

[96] *The Times of India*, 16 February 1946.

[97] *The Times of India*, 16 February 1946.

[98] *The Times of India*, 16 February 1946.

[99] *The Times of India*, 16 February 1946.

[100] Ian Talbot, 'The Growth of the Muslim League' in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 257.

politics on a more solid religious foundation."[101] For them, the concept of Pakistan was seen as "the establishment of a religious state, ruled by the traditional leaders of rural society."[102] There was also a reactionary gesture against the secular-based Unionist Party. With the help of local-based traditional leaders like rural *pirs* and landlords, the Muslim League was able to secure popular support during the 1946 elections and after. Many Sufi shrines issued *fatwas* on the Muslim League's behalf, affecting all rural followers of *pirs*. Such Sufi network became "most important channel for mobilizing"[103] the rural masses. Even if two nation theory and the Pakistan cause were not powerfully propagated during the elections, traditional religious and social leaders' ability to mobilize rural masses was a key to their success. According to Talbot's analysis on the Punjab Muslim League's success in the 1946 elections, it emphasized "how much more important 'traditional' social and religious networks may be in mobilizing political support than has been recognized by existing theories."[104] With the victory of the 1946 elections, the Muslim League could firmly establish a bargaining power with the British and the Congress for the partition of India while it exploited communal sentiments of the regions.

4) Sikh Politics and National Movement

Sikh as a Religious-Political Minority Community

In 1920s there was a strong revivalist movement among the Sikhs in Punjab. Firstly, there was a gurdwara reform. Those who had resented the management of their gurdwaras by Mahants, non-Sikh gurdwara managers, asked for a change. In November 1920 the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (hereafter, SGPC)

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[101] David Gilmartin, 'Religious Leadership and The Pakistan' in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 231.

[102] David Gilmartin, 'Religious Leadership and The Pakistan' in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 232.

[103] Ian Talbot, 'The Growth of the Muslim League' in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 255.

[104] Ian Talbot, 'The Growth of the Muslim League' in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 257.

was established at Amritsar in order to safeguard a Sikhs' right of gurdwara management. Under the Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925, the right of the Sikhs to control their own gurdwaras was recognized, subject to various provisions for the grant of compensation to persons who had been managing them. Since the Committees collectively controlled substantial funds, the elections to them were politically important than before. Within the Sikh community the party which won the gurdwara elections was likely also to win most of the Sikh seats in any election to the Legislative Assembly.

Secondly, there was a formation of a new political Sikh body. Sikh *Jathas* (bands or companies) had been formed independently in many districts of Punjab as a "military wing" of the SGPC.[105] In order to control them the Sikhs established a second body known as the Shiromani Akali Dal (hereafter, Akali Dal). It soon became a political body to represent the Sikhs' interests. There was a strong connection between two organizations for the Sikh politics at the height of nationalist struggles and communal politics before partition. Thus, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and the Shromani Akali Dal became the main organizations of the Sikhs in 1920s onwards. Jenkins, the last British Governor of the unified Punjab, observed in April 1947 that "the existence of a network of elected committees based on the Sikh Gurdwaras throughout the Punjab gives the Sikhs a communal cohesion which the other communities lack."[106]

The Sikh Predicament for Partition of Punjab, 1940-1947

When in March 1940 the Lahore Resolution was declared by the Muslim League, it culminated in a minority fear for the Sikhs that the Punjab would turn into an Islamic State. It would mean that the Sikhs would become a helpless minority, living at the mercy of the Muslim majority. Being a religious-political community, the Sikhs had a unique geopolitical stand in the Punjab considering that almost the

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[105] 'Note by Jenkins for Mountbatten, 1 April 1947', in Lionel Carter (compiled ed.), *Punjab Politics, 3 March – 31 May 1947 At the Abyss: Governors' Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), p. 110.

[106] 'Note by Jenkins for Mountbatten, 1 April 1947', in Lionel Carter (compiled ed.), *Punjab Politics, 3 March – 31 May 1947 At the Abyss: Governors' Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), p. 110.

entire community was concentrated in the Punjab; an area which they called their "homeland". Punjab was a "holy land" for the Sikhs and the birthplace of their founder, Guru Nanak. In such a political and religious crisis in 1940s, the Sikhs had sought to secure for themselves the best possible safeguards for their rights and interests as a community. From 1940 until the independence and the partition of Punjab in 1947, a series of attempts was made by the Sikh leaders, mainly those of the Shiromani Akali Dal, to maximize their religious-political interests. As it was observed, Sikh leaders had a difficulty in choosing one position to another in political decision-making unlike the Muslim League's assertion on Pakistan.

In February 1946, in the midst of uncertainty of safeguarding the interests of the Sikhs, Sikh leaders demanded "a separate autonomous Sikh State". Desperate in political situation where they had fallen to the place of a secondary voice at the bargaining table, the Sikhs strongly felt that they had "no safeguards and guarantees of a constitutional nature, no weightage or protection, promised to the Sikhs and ensure their free and unhindered growth as a nationality with a distinct religious, ideological, cultural and political character."[107] The Sikh leaders designed a Sikh state as a "buffer state" between Pakistan and Hindustan so that Sikhs would "hold the scales between the two."[108]

Master Tara Singh said that in view of the communal position prevailing in India the Sikhs would be bound to be under either the Muslims or the Hindus if there were two states. The Muslims and Hindus were not united and would remain antagonistic for some time. In that situation the Sikhs in a united India would have some bargaining power but if there were division of India they would be under the majority of one community or the other. In that case he wanted a separate independent state with the right to federate or not federate with either Hindustan or Pakistan. The only safeguard in his view was some form of autonomous Sikh state. Similar to Tara Singh, Sardar Giani Kartar said that the Sikhs would feel unsafe in both cases of a united India in one hand and of Pakistan on the other hand. Their

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[107] Gurbachan Singh and Lal Singh Giani, *The Idea of Sikh State* (Lahore: Lahore Bookshop, 1946), p. 1-3.

[108] 'Notes of a conversation between Sir Stafford Cripps, Major Short and Major Wyatt, 20 March 1946', quoted in Kirpal Singh (revised ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab- 1947, India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: National Book Shop, 2006), p. 719.

ideal was a province where the Sikhs were in a dominant or almost dominant position.[109]

However, their demands were not realistic as they required negotiations with and approval from other interested parties, such as the British, the Muslims and the Hindus. Nevertheless such a demand by the Sikh leaders indicated the measure of their frustrations. By calling for a separate Sikh State, as "an incredible demand",[110] the Sikh leaders also might have expected to draw certain attention to the Sikh causes from within the community and outside so that their maximum interests would be secured in independent government within the Punjab.

According to the resolution adopted on 16 April 1947 by the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal in Amritsar, Sikhs agreed to the partition of the Punjab on the ground that "recent barbarities of the Pakistani Muslims on the Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab have left no other solution of the communal tangle except the partition of the Punjab".[111] Furthermore, Akali Dal leaders demanded several conditions for how boundaries should be set up that "terms of reference whereof should be to demarcate the Provincial boundaries keeping in view: (a) Population, (b) landed property, (c) land Revenue, and (d) historical places and traditions of the various communities." It also demanded that "facilities be provided for exchange of population and property and that special arrangements be made for the protection, honour, integrity and sanctity of the historically religious places."[112] Subsequently such demands were put forward to Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of the British India, and the Punjab Boundary Commission. However, it was not accepted by the Boundary Commission since a demographic factor was solely agreed upon by the Muslims. The disappointment of the Sikh leaders was greater than two major antagonistic communities because they believed that at least both the Muslims and

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[109] 'Record of a Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell and Representatives of the Sikh Community on Friday, 5 April 1946', Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), *The Transfer of Power 1942-1947, vol. VII* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1977), pp. 136-7.

[110] Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 112.

[111] Quoted in Kirpal Singh (revised ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab- 1947, India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: National Book Shop, 2006), p. 42.

[112] Quoted in Kirpal Singh (revised ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab- 1947, India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: National Book Shop, 2006), p. 43.

the Hindus were able to secure their own majority regions in the Punjab whereas only the Sikhs did not. It later would result in the Sikh majority state movement or the Punjabi Suba movement in 1950s and 60s in post-independent Indian Punjab.

2. Nationalist Movement and Religious Factors in Korea before 1945

The Emergence of Christianity and the National Crisis of Korea before 1910

The acceptance of Christianity in Korea was initiated by a group of Korean officials at the royal court of Chosun Dynasty, who had visited China for official envoy trips and happened to read Christian books written by Roman Catholic priests, resulting in them accepting the Christian faith sometime in the eighteenth century. These people began spreading Christian teachings initially among Confucian scholars and their families after they came back to Korea. It was unique that without Western missionaries' direct contact or efforts, native Koreans' academic and religious curiosity brought Christianity to the Korean peninsula.[113] However, for more than one century till the late nineteenth century, the Christianity - the Roman Catholicism at the time - was banned and its followers were accused as heretics by the royal court. Conservative Confucian Korean society saw a refusal of ancestor worships and other Confucian rituals by Roman Catholic followers as a threat to the traditional order of Korean society. Even after a series of severe persecutions (1801, 1839, 1866-73) including the execution of some Western clergymen in these periods, Christianity grew gradually, indicating an increasing grassroots eagerness for social and political changes in conservative Confucian society of Chosun Kingdom.[114]

Much after the Roman Catholics, in the late nineteenth century Protestant churches were also started indigenously by Koreans with a similar way as the Roman

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[113] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* I [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 1] (Seoul: the Christian Literature, 1989), p. 56.

[114] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* I [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 1] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1989), pp. 87-121.

Catholics in Northwest region of Korea.[115] Under the circumstance of this indigenous zeal and eagerness for the new religion and new thoughts, Western missionaries, mainly Americans, came to Korea and ushered in further growth of Christianity. In the 1880s, American missionaries like H.N. Allen (1884), H.G. Underwood (1885) and H.G. Appenzeller (1885) arrived in Korea; American Protestant missions then started their full-fledged campaigns. Politically, it was at the height of imperial Japan to overpower other rivals, notably China and Russia, and to get hold of Korean peninsula in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The Chosun court was losing its strength under foreign pressures and internal political instability. A series of top-to-bottom government-initiated innovations failed to strengthen the nation. Political instability was accompanied by economic bereavement of the people, which affected the Koreans psychologically. New religious movements emerged as remedies to their socio-economic bereavement, notably Chondokyo from within Korea and the Christianity from outside.

There were several factors that contributed to creating a new wave of religious movements, particularly Christianity, which simultaneously nurtured nationalist movements. First, social and political instability paved the way for Christianity to be adopted by the Korean people as a new way of living through a new belief. In 1894, the Donghak[116] Peasantry War broke out. The Political and economic bereavement of peasants in Korea and the growing influence of imperial powers on the Korean peninsula stimulated peasants in Southwest region of Korea to rebel against the Chosun dynasty. This rebellion grew quickly, threatening the authority of the royal court.[117] It was followed by China's entry to Korea upon Chosun king's request to subdue the peasants' revolt, stimulating Japan to send their troops. It turned out to be a Sino-Japanese War and Japan won it. As a result, China had to retreat from the Korean peninsula and allow Japan to take power of Korean affairs. In 1904, a Russo-Japanese War broke out in Korea and again Japan was victorious.

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[115] Samuel H. Moffett, *The Christians of Korea* (New York: Friendship Press, 1962), pp. 35-36.

[116] Donghak literally means "East Learning". It was founded by Choi Jaewoo and got a popular support from rural peasants. It later became Chondokyo.

[117] The Donghak Peasantry War in 1894 led to the opening of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5 in Korea.

Now, Japan exclusively had the strongest power holding over Korea. Finally, in 1910 Korea officially became a colony under imperial Japan. During wartime both in 1894 and 1904, insecurity and uncertainty increased among people in the Northwest region as both wars were held here. Wartime refugees and migrants found shelter and help from churches and Western missions. Religious comfort acted as a palliative to their bereavement. Furthermore, some early Christian refugee migrants from Pyongyang who had moved to Jaeryong in Hwanghae Province started new churches there. Due to the wars, there was a new opening for Christianity in the Jaeryong region. In fact, both the wars stimulated the expansion of Christianity in unexpected and unplanned ways. Furthermore, the availability of churches for locals in their distress was well exposed and recognized positively by the people of the region since the missions and churches acted as protectors of the bereaved which the local government had failed to do. A good image of patron-client relationship was established between the church and the bereaved Koreans.[118]

Second, Christian teachings of equality and freedom in a highly hierarchical Confucian society in Korea attracted *Sangmin* [commoners] and *Chonmin* [outcastes], and thus opened their hearts to accept the new religion. They were the first major converts to the Christian faith. They had little to lose in Confucian society, but much to gain from Christianity. As an example, at the turn of the twentieth century, a group of butchers in Seoul converted together. This incident showed, argues Cummings, that "the hierarchy of Korean society pushed commoners toward the egalitarian ideal of everyone the same before God".[119] Such a move became instrumental in spreading social freedom to the Korean society.

Third, many nationalist leaders who had held traditional ideologies like Confucianism, found themselves powerless to resist Japanese aggression adopted the new ideology of Christianity with Western thoughts. It was accepted as a powerful and effective ideological weapon to fight against the foreign power. Under these circumstances, the churches in the period of 1885 and 1910 produced not only

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[118] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* I [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 1] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1989), pp. 255-256.

[119] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), pp. 157-158.

spiritual leaders, but also reformers and educators.[120] Some converts were from social upper strata, or *Yangban*, a Korean aristocracy, who sought solutions from the new religion for social and political unrest and aggressive foreign intervention, particularly Japanese in Korea. Thus, many nationalist leaders were nurtured by Christian institutions with Western and Christian ideas. Syngman Rhee, who would later become the first President of the Republic of Korea, was one of the typical examples. He was a young *Yangban* class reformer of the Chosun court. He was educated in Paijae mission school, Seoul and learned Christian thoughts and Western ideology. This influenced him to join *Dongnip Hyophoe* [Independence Society] in which he advocated political reforms like the pro-republic movement. However, it triggered threats to the sovereignty of the royal court at the time. In 1899, he and his reformist colleagues were arrested and imprisoned. In prison, he began to profess Christian faith for the first time in his life and his Christian stand soon impacted other fellow political prisoners.[121] From that time on, Christianity gained support both from the bottom and the top of the Korean society.

Fourth, it is considerably important to note that Christianity was not a religion of imperial Japan. Thus, Korean nationalists and masses could accept it without prejudices. Unlike India, Korea had a unique discourse with imperial powers in that a non-Western and non-Christian country, Japan, colonized the Korean peninsula. Adopting Christianity as a new religion and ideology didn't contradict nationalist consciousness.[122] Rather it helped Koreans shape the modern nationalist ideas based on its teachings whereas in India Christianity was often portrayed as a colonial religion.[123]

Fifth, a series of genuine evangelical meetings were organized between 1905 and

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[120] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* I [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 1] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1989), pp. 260-266.

[121] Youngik Ryu, 'Rhee Syngmankwa Hankookui Kidokkyo [Rhee Syngman and Christianity in Korea]',in *Sungkyul Kyohoewa Sinhak* [Sungkyul Church and Theology], vol. 13 (Spring, 2005), pp. 13-15.

[122] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokkyoui Yeoksa I* [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 1] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1989), p. 333.

[123] See more details of a relation between Christianity and colonialism, Gauri Viswanathan, *Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1989).

1907 in Northwest region. In 1907, Pyongyang saw the massive conversion movement, called, 'the Great Revival of 1907'. It had such a huge impact on the growth of the Christianity that the numbers of Christians had doubled one year after the meeting according to the missions' reports.[124] This momentum for Christian faiths became spiritually rooted in the hearts of Korean people. Pyongyang emerged as a centre of Christianity, where one-third of the city population followed the church in 1910.[125] 53 percent of all Presbyterian churches in the Korean peninsula concentrated in the North-west region at the time. Christianity became highly urbanized religion. Furthermore, demographically the youth and the educated in particular were major recipients of Christian faiths.[126]

The growth of the Churches and Nationalist Movements

Although it was a great disaster to the history and the people of Korea, Japan's annexation and rule of Korea in the period from 1910 to 1945 ignited and sustained Korean nationalism. Japan was portrayed as a unanimous national enemy for Korean nationals.[127] Anti-Japanese activities were, thus, equal to nationalist movements. By the time Japan officially annexed Korea in 1910, Christianity was ideologically, politically, socially and religiously developed as a force that would challenge Japan's colonial rule of Korea.[128] The churches at the turn of the twentieth century "filled the psychological and political need for a community where Koreans could gather to share their frustration, a sense of crisis, and a feeling

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[124] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* I [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 1] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1989), p. 275.

[125] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 83.

[126] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 83.

[127] Chongsik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 275.

[128] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 72.

of solidarity, and to discuss the future of their country."[129] The Japanese colonial government had prohibited Koreans from participating in any organizations and activities except for religious ones so that many nationalists chose religious communities to find their own political answer. As the traditional religions like Confucianism and Buddhism lost the confidence of nationalist Koreans, Christianity became an attractive option for them. The churches in Korea at the time were able to provide for their needs - new Western thoughts and modern education - which would equip them to fight against the Japanese colonialism. Under this historical circumstance, many Koreans accepted Christianity. Thus, ironically and unexpectedly the annexation of Korea by Japan, a non-Western and non- Christian nation, encouraged many Koreans to join the new traditionally Western religion, Christianity. This was unique in the modern history of Christianity. Modern church growth and expansion were carried out through the expansion of Western Christian nations' imperialism. For example, in India except the early St. Thomas church tradition in Kerala, modern Christian churches grew alongside of the British colonialism. Although the colonial authorities did not intentionally encourage Western missionaries' works, Indian society generally condemned both western Christianity and colonialism as "cut from the same cloth" and "alien imports" that spoiled Indian culture.[130]

In 1910, Christians in Korea numbered two hundred thousand, composed of two main denominations - the Presbyterians and the Methodists. Furthermore, along with churches were mission schools and publications which also had a significant impact. For example, there were 755 mission schools and 20,131 Western-educated students in 1910.[131] In the first two decades of Japanese rule in Korea (1910-1930), Christianity gained significant numbers and extended its influence in the area of nationalist movements in various forms.[132]

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[129] Chungshin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 32.

[130] Robert F. Frykenberg, *Christianity in India: From Beginnings to the Present* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 483.

[131] Chungshin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 33.

[132] For details of a relation between Christianity and Korean nationalism, see the two books of Manyeol Lee, *Hanguk Kidokkyowa Minjokuisik* [Korean Christianity and National Consciousness]

In fact, most of the missionaries and Korean clergymen sought to keep the churches removed from all political movements. Obedience to the powers that be was preached from every pulpit.[133] However, as Chungshin Park argues, "although the church's organization, programs, and teachings were not structured particularly for anti-Japanese Korean political activism, Koreans joined the religious community under the particular circumstance of colonialism and reshaped it for their own uses."[134] In other words, Korean Christians' strong association with nationalist movements in the colonial period "was established unintentionally, not by the church, but by Christian individuals who joined the church and colored it politically."[135] Some examples of major Christian involvements of nationalist movements were the Korean Conspiracy Case in 1911-13, the March First Movement in 1919, and the cultural nationalism.

The Korean Conspiracy Case and the Churches, 1910-1913

The Korean Conspiracy Case,[136] also known as the "105 Incident" was an attempt by the Japanese colonialists to remove or at least reduce the influence of the Christian community in Korea. It was the first of many clashes between Korean Christians and the Japanese colonial government. After the annexation of Korea in 1910, the Japanese desired to control every element within their dominions. However, they saw in "the Korean churches numerous and powerful organizations of their subjects"[137] which they could not fully control due to separate inner management systems and the presence of foreign missionaries. Due to these circumstances, the Japanese police in Korea grew suspicious that "the great

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(Seoul: Jishiksanopsa, 1991) and *Hanguk Kidokkyowa Yeoksauisik* [Korean Christianity and Historical Consciousness] (Seoul: Jishiksanopsa, 1981).

133 Arthur J. Brown, *The Korean Conspiracy Case* (New York: Northfield Press, 1912), p. 6.

134 Chungshin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 35.

135 Chungshin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 35.

136 For more details, see Arthur J. Brown, *The Korean Conspiracy Case* (New York: Northfield Press, 1912) and Kyungro Yoon, *105 In Sagunkwa Shiminhoe Yeongu* [A Study of The Korean Conspiracy Case and Shinminhoe] (Seoul: Iljisa, 1990).

137 Arthur J. Brown, *The Korean Conspiracy Case* (New York: Northfield Press, 1912), p. 7.

organization of Korean church was a hotbed of revolutionary opportunity"[138], and they reacted forcefully. On 28 June 1912, the Japanese government arrested 700 civilians, falsely accusing 123 of them, charging them to have conspired to murder the Japanese Governor General, Count Terauchi, in Korea. 82 out of the 123 accused were Christians, comprising 67 percent.[139] Among the arrested Christians most of them were from the Northwest region where there was high Christian concentration. The brutality of their torture was so great that most of the accused gave in and confessed to the Japanese's false charges. One hundred and five of the men were eventually convicted and sentenced to hard manual labour while six were sentenced to prison.[140] Through the channel of American missionaries, Western media condemned the Japanese's brutality toward the accused and unethical legal proceedings. Even the Japanese media denounced the false court examination. The Jiji Shimpo, a Tokyo-based daily paper at the time, published an article which criticized the trial court:

> It is not much to say that the trial of this case has been attended with most careless examination of the evidence which is a very important factor in determining the truth of offences alleged…. If the confessions of the prisoners made in the course of the police examinations were absolutely authentic, minor failings in the conduct of the public trial might have been passed over: but there was something in these confessions that was very suspicious. The danger of basing judgment solely upon the confessions of the accused is universally acknowledged and yet the Korean Court was exclusively guided by the confessions of the accused in establishing their guilt. According to the opinion of experts their confessions were a mixture of truth and lies, which is probably a correct administration.[141]

Japanese colonial government was well aware of the fact that the Christian community would be a threat to Japan's grip of power on Korea in her early period

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[138] Arthur J. Brown, *The Korean Conspiracy Case* (New York: Northfield Press, 1912), p. 8.

[139] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* I [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 1] (Seoul: the Christian Literature, 1989), pp. 308-313.

[140] Because one hundred five were convicted after the court trials, it was also named as "the 105 Incident".

[141] Quoted in Arthur J. Brown, *The Korean Conspiracy Case* (New York: Northfield Press, 1912), p. 20.

of imperial settlement.[142] Therefore, they plotted to suppress the churches so that the Christian influence on anti-Japanese sentiment among Korean people would be crushed.

The March First Movement and the Churches in 1919

Perhaps the March First Movement of 1919 was one of the most significant Christian nationalist events during Japanese colonial rule as it also marked the momentum for Korean nationalism in the history of anti-Japanese independence movement. Therefore, a more detailed examination of the Christian nationalists' activities needs to be discussed to see relations between Christianity and nationalism in Korea. The churches provided leadership, organizations, networks and strategies for protests cutting across the country during the March First Movement. It was primarily initiated by religious leaders being adherents of Christianity, Chondogyo and Buddhism. In fact, the thirty-three signatories of "Declaration of Independence" on 1 March 1919 were all religious leaders, including 16 Christians, 15 Chondogyo, and 2 Buddhists. Many mission school students participated in the street demonstrations. What made the March First Movement significant was that it became a pan-Korean united independence movement cutting across religious denominations, regions, generations and genders.

The churches were outstanding in their preparation and organization within the movement. The Korean churches already had well-organized networks to connect one region to another, and even had connections abroad through the missionaries. Therefore, the churches effectively distributed copies of the Declaration and national flags, mobilizing the people. The church buildings were used as meeting places for the nationalists. Independence Declaration ceremonies were held at mission schools and church buildings across the whole country.

The principle of non-violence was expounded by the Christian leaders. As American observers described the movement, "no more remarkable "revolution" has taken place in recent history than that which occurred in Korea beginning March 1, 1919. The plan was to secure independence by moral force, without resort

[142] Arthur J. Brown, *The Korean Conspiracy Case* (New York: Northfield Press, 1912), p. 8.

to violence."[143] With the entry of religious groups like Christians, the movement enjoyed several benefits. One of them was maintaining the higher moral ground of non-violence, which attracted international recognitions. What nearly half a million demonstrators did at more than 600 places across the country was to shout "*Taehan Tongnip Manse*" ["Long Live Korean Independence"], waving Korean flags in the streets.

Meanwhile, the story of the movement was widely spread to the entire world by the reports of American missionaries and Western embassies. The international connections of the churches also made communication possible. On 1 March 1919, Korea showed the world that an eagerness for national independence had a popular support across the Korean peninsula, and was not simply the wish of a handful Koreans. Non-violence, the highly valued form of resistance, naturally exposed the brutality the Japanese colonial government, as they mercilessly used violent methods against peaceful demonstrators. A negative image of Japanese militarism was the prevailing and highly condemned portrayal in international media.

However, there was also a great deal of damage done to churches as the result of suppression by the Japanese colonial government. The Japanese brutal attempt at suppression of the movement targeted the churches among religious communities. As one missionary's report on the movement analyzed, "the immediate effect of the present disturbance, a disturbance in which Christians have taken a prominent part, has been to conform and strengthen the suspicion which already existed against Christianity."[144] According to the Japanese military police report, among the arrested, Christians comprised 17.6 percent. Furthermore, 309 out of 471 arrested women were Christians, or 65.6 percent. Considering only 1.5 percent of the population was Christians, it was a huge representation. In fact, the combination of nationalism and Christianity resulted from previous Church activities - teaching of new thoughts including Western ideas of freedom and justice in the churches and the Christian institutions.

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[143] The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *The Korean Situation, vol. 2* (New York: The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1919), p. 3.

[144] The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *The Korean Situation*, vol. 1 (New York: The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1919), p. 88.

The burnings of churches and arrests of many Christian leaders were the clear indications of the Japanese colonialists' wrath against the churches, for the Korean churches were thought to be as prime initiators of the movement. In Seoul, nearly every Christian clergyman was jailed. According to Moffett's report, the first target of suppression was clearly the Christians. "Soldiers stopped passers-by and asked, 'Are you Christian?' If they answered 'yes', they were beaten. If they answered 'No', they were released."[145] In remote area like the countryside, the brutality was even worse.

One of the worst kinds of persecutions was the Cheamni church case. Located in the south of Seoul, on 15 April 1919, Christians were summoned to gather inside the church building by the Japanese police and gendarmes and they were shot to death and burnt. Thirty Christians were killed at the massacre and the entire village was burnt down by Japanese police and gendarmes.[146] The wholesale arrest, beating and even killing of Christians was prevalent across the country.[147] Yet it was undoubtedly evident that Japanese suppression of Christianity was primarily political and not religious:

> It should be clearly recognized that the Korean question is not primarily an issue between paganism and Christianity as some are saying. The Japanese Government General is not seeking "wipe out Christianity in Korea." If the police, gendarmes and other government officials spy upon, arrest and terrorize Christians and invade and violate churches, as they have been doing, it is because they suspect political aims and activities among Christians and in the churches. Christian teaching and the Christian life undoubtedly develop personality and initiative, with the spirit of noble patriotism and with a passion for justice, righteousness and fair play. It has been almost inevitable, therefore, that a Government bent on forced assimilation and humiliating subordination of the Korean people, should find a serious obstacle in the Christian churches. Yet the Government General has repeatedly declared that it seeks to suppress sedition, not Christianity. The Korean

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145 Samuel H. Moffett, *The Christians of Korea* (New York: Friendship Press, 1962), p. 70.

146 The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *The Korean Situation*, vol. 1 (New York: The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1919), p. 77.

147 The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *The Korean Situation*, vol. 1 (New York: The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1919), p. 89.

question is primarily political and not religious.[148]

According to statistical data released at the annual meeting of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Churches held in October 1919, the group's damage in terms of loss of people and property was phenomenal though these figures dealt only with the Presbyterian denomination of the Korean churches.

<Table 1. 1.> Damage of the Presbyterian Church in Korea during the March First Movement in 1919

A kind of damage	No. of persons	A kind of damage	No. of persons
Total number arrested	3,804	Beaten and released	2,162
Pastors and Elders arrested	134	Shot and killed	41
Helpers and leaders arrested	202	Beaten to death	6
Male members arrested	2,125	Still in prison	1,642
Women arrested	531	Churches destroyed	12

Source: The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *The Korean Situation, vol. 2* (New York: The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1920), p. 3.

When total damage, however roughly, was counted, forty-seven churches had been burnt down, hundreds killed, and thousands had been imprisoned and tortured. After the March First Movement, the 22,409 Christians here lost along with 88 churches.[149] As an example, table 1.1. shows the damage of the biggest church denomination, the Presbyterian church.

As it was analyzed, in the post-March First Movement the churches in Korea were accepted as a national religion in Korean society, having fought for national independence. Active involvement of the churches for Independence movement

[148] The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, *The Korean Situation*, vol. 2 (New York: The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1920), p. 25.

[149] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* II [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 2] (Seoul: the Christian Literature, 1990), p. 38.

opened hearts and minds of Korean people which subsequently led to a quick recovery of the church strength.[150] Japan's brutal suppression of Christians spotlighted them as "heroes" and "martyrs" for the country. Thus, "to be a Christian was to be a patriot again."[151] Therefore, despite these trials church membership growth resumed the following year and it continued for next two decades.

Cultural Nationalism and Political Neutrality of the Church in the Post-March First Movement

Christian nationalist movements after the March First Movement took different directions from those in the past. Unity among various nationalist groups including religious communities ceased due to heavy intervention upon nationalist activities by the Japanese colonial government. As a result, most radicals settled abroad (such as Shanghai Korean Provisional Government in 1919 and several militant independence bodies in Manchuria) or worked underground in Korea. Moderates were able to dominate independence activities through "cultural nationalism" inside Korea. This was a gradual resistance to Japanese colonialism. Among cultural nationalists, Christian laymen were the group predominantly initiating gentle, but still powerful nationalism through modern education, village enlightenment activities, literacy campaigns, temperance campaign, evening school activities, publications, women enlightenment activities, and the like. Such cultural nationalism was one end of the spectrum of Korean nationalism while radical militant nationalism mainly by nationalists overseas was the other end during 1920s to 1930s. An American missionary observed that "while many Koreans still demanded immediate independence, some of the most intelligent and far-seeing Koreans are persuaded that there is no hope of speedy independence, and that they must settle down for a long period to build up the Korean people, in physical conditions, in knowledge, in morality, and in the ability to handle government

[150] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* II [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 2] (Seoul: the Christian Literature, 1990), p. 41.

[151] Samuel H. Moffett, *The Christians of Korea* (New York: Friendship Press, 1962), p. 70.

concerns."[152]

Simultaneously, non-nationalistic activities like Christian mysticism initiated by Christian clergymen gained many followers as Japanese rule and persecution of the churches caused a pessimistic sentiment toward their current life and stimulated an eschatological focus, giving them comfort as well as providing religious catharsis. However, the church in Korea as an organized dynamic unit slowly deviated from the church-initiated mass collective nationalist struggles until issues of the Shinto Shrine worship were brought to challenge the very existence of Christian community in the mid 1930s and the early 1940s. This was partly due to the change of Japanese colonial policy in Korea from 1920. The Japanese colonial government adopted *Bunka Seiji* [cultural rule] under the new Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito Makoto, after the brutality of suppression during the March First Movement was widely publicized internationally. According to the new policy, Koreans were allowed to publish their own newspapers and magazines, and to hold meetings, although these privileges were limited. Further, public educations (mostly primary schools) were encouraged while small-scale indigenous industries were permitted. In this cultural rule period, Korean Christians found less persecution and brutality, but they were still tightly under Japanese surveillance. Although cultural rule was imposed, the Japanese government was sensitive to check every church activity in order to prevent the Korean churches from becoming a centre of anti-Japanese sentiment again. In 1930s, such policy became tighter due to Imperial Japan's war preparations in China. Therefore, in the public church meetings clergymen carefully preached purely religious or spiritual topics, distancing their sermons from politics or anti-Japanese nationalist consciousness.[153] The established church meetings were no more used as radical nationalist movements. As sermons were essential elements of Christian discourse, the Korean Christian mass became less radical and more submissive to the Japanese policy. Under this socio-political situation, what the Korean Christian leaders decided was to pursue

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[152] Quoted in Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (updated ed.) (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), p.157.

[153] Quhwan Park, 'Christian Faith and National Consciousness in Protestant Sermons during the Japanese Occupation', *Hankook Kidokkyowa Yeoksa* [Korean Christianity and History], vol. 39 (September 2013), pp. 261-263.

long-term cultural development of the nation to lead to future independence without clashing with the Japanese authorities. Christian cultural nationalists advocated the importance of education and industrial development. Such approaches became common in most Korean churches.[154] However, such a softened approach later paved a way for some to collaborate on Japanese imperial efforts, thus losing support from some nationalist Koreans and radicals such as the communists. Prominent Christian nationalists' collaboration on the Japanese war efforts, like "Imperial Subjects Forming" policy and "the National Total Mobilization System" during the World War II even clearly marked pro-Japanese sentiments within the church leadership.[155]

Nevertheless, throughout the Japanese colonial period, most of the elites were still in the churches, produced from Christian schools and institutions. Therefore, individual Christian nationalists continued to serve in various anti-Japanese independence struggles until the Japanese colonial rule came to an end. Underground nationalist activities were prevalent in this period and most of them took place outside of the church activities, though sometimes with para-church activities. For example, "*Dongwoohoe*" and "*Heungup Gurakboo*" were two major nationalist societies founded and led by Western-educated Christian lay-leaders in this period. The former was led by An Changho while the latter was guided by Rhee Syngman; both were prominent Christian nationalists. Their activities were closely checked by the Japanese police and finally were dissolved with the core leaders being arrested on the grounds that they conducted anti-Japanese activities. According to the Japanese colonial police reports, these two societies were marked for Christian anti-Japanese activities.[156] Another Japanese police report with the same incidents mentioned that the nationalist movement and Christianity were

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[154] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 106.

[155] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* II [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 2] (Seoul: the Christian Literature, 1990), pp. 310-323.

[156] 'Teuksoo Jooyo Sagun (Kidokkyo Kwangae) [Special Major Incidents (in relation to the Christianity)], 1938' quoted in Seungtae Kim (compiled ed.), *Iljaekangjeomki Jongkyojungchaeksa charyojip: Kidokkyopyon, 1910-1945*[The Japanese Colonial Period Religious Policy Documents: Christianity, 1910-1945] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 1996), pp. 219-237.

closely related. Therefore, the issue of Christianity was not purely religious, but fraught with political issues.[157] The report further said that "a relationship between the nationalist movement and the Christianity was still hardened so that it was thought to be difficult to remove it."[158]

Ideological Struggles: the Communists versus the Christians

The churches in Korea had to face anti-Christian challenges from the newly emergent socialists and communists beginning in the 1920s, a struggle lasting even to current times. After the March First Movement failed with the methods of Christian non-violence and appealing to international consensus, there was pessimism growing among nationalist leaders towards keeping such methods for future independence struggles. In this transitional period of the nationalist movement, socialism emerged as an attractive and powerful ideology to adopt, replacing Christian ways of non-violence. As Cumings argues, "if Christian and liberal ideas marked Korean reformers at the turn of the century, socialist ideas spread among young Koreans in the 1920s."[159] A good number of young Christians sided with socialist activities also. They found communist ideas of anti-imperialism and pro-commoners were more powerful than what they had learned from the churches at the time. This eventually led to attacks on Christianity by the new Korean socialists. Being atheistic, the socialists naturally attacked religions, but particularly focused on Christianity. They condemned Christianity on the grounds that Christianity collaborated with Japanese imperialism and accepted exploitative capitalism, and that it also surrendered itself to the reality of colonialism, thus demolishing the independent spirit of Korean people, and further advocating myths

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[157] Hayashi, 'Jinasabyunesoeui Kidokkyo [The Second Sino-Japanese War and the Christianity], 1938' quoted in Seungtae Kim (compiled ed.), *Iljaekangjeomki Jongkyojungchaeksa charyojip: Kidokkyopyon, 1910-1945*[The Japanese Colonial Period Religious Policy Documents: Christianity, 1910-1945] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 1996), p. 276.

[158] Hayashi, 'Jinasabyunesoeui Kidokkyo [The Second Sino-Japanese War and the Christianity], 1938' quoted in Seungtae Kim (compiled ed.), *Iljaekangjeomki Jongkyojungchaeksa charyojip: Kidokkyopyon, 1910-1945*[The Japanese Colonial Period Religious Policy Documents: Christianity, 1910-1945] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 1996), p. 276.

[159] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (updated ed.) (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), p.158.

and lies despite the development of science and technology.[160] As an example, Park Heonyoung, a prominent communist leader, criticized Christianity, saying it was instrumental to protect the interests of capitalists as well as to encourage Korean people to be submissive to the Japanese colonial policy by preaching moral conscience and humility.[161]

The churches in 1920s and 1930s, in fact, remained by and large conservative, which prevented them from absorbing radical ideas like those of communism. Therefore, the church leaders, mostly conservative church clergymen responded to the communists with a counter-attack, criticizing atheistic materialism. Clergymen criticized the evils of the communist materialism from the pulpit, describing followers of materialism as "evil men", "beasts", "anti-Christ", or "the devils".[162] Socialism was renounced as atheism by the church leaders while capitalism was accepted by them. The church leaders in general adopted an anti-communism or anti-socialism line instead of addressing the challenges these groups had posed to the churches and trying to seek solutions within. However, the presence of the Japanese colonial government prevented both parties from further damaging each other as socialist activities were officially banned and persecuted by the colonial authority due to their anti-Japanese sentiments. Yet such theoretical fighting and criticism between the communists and the churches had sown seeds of mutual enmity and this grew until independence preparing the ground for bigger power struggles in divided Korea, both in the North and the South. Such conflict between the churches and the communists was prevalent throughout the Japanese colonial period and continued thereafter.

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[160] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hangook Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* II [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. II] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 1990), p. 48.

[161] Heonyoung Park, 'Yeoksasanguiro Bon Kidokkyoui Naemyun [The Inside of Christianity through History], *Kaebyuk* [The Creation], vol. 63 (November 1925), pp. 66-70.

[162] Quhwan Park, 'Iljesikangjeomki Kaesinkyo Sulkyoe Natanan Kidokkyo Sinangkwa Minjok Kookkauisik [Christian Faith and National Consciousness in Protestant Sermons during the Japanese Occupation], *Hankook Kidokkyowa Yeoksa* [Korean Christianity and History], vol. 39 (September 2013), pp. 264-265.

Issues of the Shinto Shrine Worship and the Churches, 1930s and 1940s

When Japanese imperialism expanded to China in 1930s, colonial policy in Korean peninsula became stricter and Japanization of every aspect of Korean society was heavily imposed on the people of Korea. Ordering the Shinto Shrine worship on every Korean was an attempt to unite all subordinates under the Japanese emperor so that further expansion of the Japanese empire would be secured. However, it faced a strong opposition from the Christian community on the ground that it was against their belief system. Bowing down in front of the Shinto Shrine was considered an act of idol worship which was directly against Christian teaching in the Bible. The struggles between the churches and the Japanese colonial government on the issue of the Shinto Shrine worship marked the most important issue of the Korean churches throughout the decade of the 1930s and the early 1940s. Dr. G. S. McCune, then a principal of Soongsil Boys' Academy in Pyongyang, exchanged several letters with the Japanese Provincial authorities, which would well summarize the whole issue of the Shinto Shrine worship between the Christians and the Japanese imperialists. McCune as a non-conformist was of the opinion that the Shinto Shrine worship was not acceptable in Christian schools. He further highlighted four objectionable points on this issue:

> (1) because these ceremonies held at Shrine dedicated as they are and conducted as they are, seem to me to contain definite religious significance; (2) because large portions of the populace believe that spirits are actually worshipped there; (3) because Christians believe ancestor worship, as distinguished from filial piety, is a sin against God, and (4) because I also believe such to be the act which you have required of me as a school principal.[163]

It was a reply to the order of the statement of the Educational Bureau of the government-General, saying that "the worship of the Imperial Ancestors is the basis of moral virtue of the Japanese Empire and must be inculcated in the minds of all the students. It is to be considered as part of the required curriculum and under no

[163] 'The Final Letter from G.S. McCune to N. Yasutake, 20 January 1936' in Manyol Lee (ed.), *Shinsachambaemoonjae Youngmoon Charyojip* II [The Shinto Shrine Issues English Documents II – Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the USA] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2003), p. 53.

conditions can be omitted."[164] According to the Japanese Educational Bureau, it was clearly asserted that "to make obeisance at the Jinja (one of Shinto Shrine) is no less than the actual practice of reverence and respect for ancestors, which are most important from the point of view of national education as the essentials of our national moral virtue."[165] A local newspaper reported the tension between the Christian schools and the Educational Bureau and stated that the Japanese authorities passed a resolution to adopt "suppressive measures" against non-participation in shrine ceremonies and further described the actual significance and expected results of the shrine ceremonies. Their aim was that the colonial government would control "thoughts" of the Korean people and that the end of "spiritual unity may be established" in Korea.[166] As expected, "when this policy is strictly enforced, a complete change in spiritual training will appear in the province of the country."[167]

There were two ways that the Japanese government approached the Christians on the issue; these are categorized respectively as "carrots and lashes" approaches. The "carrots" approach was that the Shinto Shrine worship was not a religious act, thus not violating Christian faith. It was rather claimed to be an educational and patriotic act so that any religious person could participate in it. The "lashes" approach was the threat that if any dissenter or dissenting groups were found, there would be punishment. Therefore, the "do or be punished" policy of the Japanese colonial government was successfully able to corner the Christian leaders. Many mission schools which had been rejecting the Shinto Shrine worship faced critical cross-roads situation as the choice of whether to continue as an institution or close down depended upon their decision. A number of Christian schools closed down voluntarily while others were forced to.

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[164] 'Statement of the Educational Bureuau of the Government-General, 1935' in Manyol Lee (ed.), *Shinsachambaemoonjae Youngmoon Charyojip* II [The Shinto Shrine Issues English Documents II – Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the USA] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2003), p. 36.

[165] 'A Warning to Dr. G.S. McCune, Principal of the Sujitu School, 6 January 1936' in Manyol Lee (ed.), *Shinsachambaemoonjae Youngmoon Charyojip* I [The Shinto Shrine Issues English Documents I – the US Department of State, Division of Far Eastern Affairs Documents] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2003), p. 142.

[166] Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], 10 December 1935.

[167] Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], 10 December 1935.

Furthermore, all the church denominations were asked to officially agree with the Shinto Shrine worship under the Japanese police's martial pressures. By 1938, the church denomination leaders reluctantly surrendered to the Japanese demand while the dissenters' voices were silenced by Japanese police suppressions. It was then declared by the church leaders that the Shinto Shrine worship was not an act of idol worship against Christian faith, rather a patriotic act to follow. Afterward, many church clergymen participated in the Shinto Shrine worship. It hampered the religious stand of the churches, and further allowed the churches to participate in and even praise the Japanese imperialism, particularly, however reluctantly, supporting Japanese war efforts during the World War II as the Shinto Shrine worship involved the worship of the spirits of fallen Japanese soldiers and the Japanese Emperor. It also led to many Christians to participate in underground nationalist movements.

However, the dissenter group was against this decision and led the anti-Shinto Shrine worship movements nationwide from 1938. Joo Kichul in South Pyongan Province, Lee Kisun in North Pyongan Province, Han Sangdong in South Kyungsang Province, Son Yangwon in South Cholla Province, and Park Huido and Bruce Hunt[168] in Manchuria were prominent dissenters. As a result of the Japanese "lashes" policy, dissenters were arrested and imprisoned, while others were martyred.

Due to deliberate removal of evidence by the Japanese authority, only rough data could tell the horrors of Japan's persecution of Korean Christian dissenters. About three thousand Christians were imprisoned, more than two hundred churches were shut down, and over fifty Christians were martyred.[169]

The anti-Shinto Shrine worship movement could be analyzed in two aspects, religiously as well as politically. In the religious aspect, the movement was an attempt to maintain religious purity of the Korean churches and at the same time it showed a warning sign of the degeneration of the church. Later in post-independence Korea, it provided the reason for church schism in South Korea. In

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[168] Bruce Hunt was an American Presbyterian missionary who was imprisoned for his anti-Shinto Shrine activities. See more details in Bruce F. Hunt, *For a Testimony: the Story of Bruce Hunt Imprisoned for the Gospel* (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1966).

[169] Samuel A. Moffett, *The Christians of Korea* (New York: Friendship Press, 1962), p. 75.

the political aspect, it attempted to fight against the Japanese system and thus advocated anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiment. It was proven that when the Japanese police arrested and sentenced those agitating Christians, they accused them under the charges of the blasphemy of Emperor, violation of the maintenance of public order or national security law. Violators of the Shinto Shrine worship were framed as anti-Japanese political violators, not as religious non-conformists. Furthermore, the Korean church was finally merged with the church of Japanese state cutting across denominational divisions, becoming a subjective religious body under Japanese full control. During World War II, all American and British missionaries were expelled from Korea on the ground that they spied for their countries in Korea. Therefore, after 1938 until independence of 1945, the Korean church underwent serious distortion religiously, administratively, and politically. This led to a stagnation of the church growth in the early 1940s.

As was described, the Christian nationalists played a leading role in independence movements. However, there were two contrasting aspects of Christian roles, including both resistance and collaboration. In India, the communal leaders of the religious communities collaborated with the British Raj. The national movement was able to secure independence from the British using a dual strategy of active and passive resistance to gain complete independence. Unlike India, the day of Korean independence coincided with the Japanese surrender after losing World War II on 15 August1945. Therefore, it was a totally unanticipated independence to Korean people in terms of transfer of power. Naturally the educated elites, both nationalists and collaborators, seized favorable positions to participate in the new-nation building in post-independent Korea. Among these, Christians were the most outstanding group to influence as they used to be.

In India, the religious communal groups received independence without much struggling for it. They in fact were strongly opposed to the secular national movement which achieved India’s independence despite British being on the winning side during World War II.

Conclusion

In the early twentieth century prelude to the partitions, both India and Korea underwent new waves of religion-based activities. In the Korean case it was linked with the nationalist movements against the colonial regimes. In India, in the complexity of the role of religion this chapter mainly focused on two different political movements: one was inclusive nationalism and the other was exclusive communalism. Both gained their strength from their followers' passion. In the course of nationalist struggles against the British colonial government, the former group advocated secularism through the Indian National Congress platform, aiming for national unity solely under their banner whereas religious political bodies like the Muslim League, the Rashtrya Swayamsevak Sangh (the RSS), the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Akhali Dal, sought to maximize their own communal interests, and therefore stimulated communal-based tensions. At a pan-Indian level, the Hindus versus the Muslims were the critical communal problem while in Punjab at the local level, the Sikhs were added to the complexity of communal politics. There were contrasting figures between nationalists and communalists in terms of religious interpretation of Indian nationalism. Hindu secularist leaders, M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, of the Congress were opposite figures of Hindu communalists, V.D. Savarkar of the Hindu Mahasabha and Golwalkar of the RSS. Being Muslims, Maulana Azad of the Congress with a secular mind was in contrast to M.A. Jinnah of the Muslim League with Muslim separatism. It was clear that religion was used as a divisive source to weaken the national movement and led to division of the country and partition.

In Korea, religion and nationalism went hand-in-hand in the course of independence struggles. Newly emerged religions were adopted as new belief systems as well as new ideologies to strengthen national consciousness of the Korean people for fighting against the imperial Japan. Unlike India, traditional religions like Confucianism and Buddhism did not play a crucial role to awaken Koreans for nationalism despite some attempts. Both the commoners and the aristocracy lost hope in the traditional national order's ability to achieve independence of the nation. Therefore, new religions like Chondokyo and

Christianity were welcomed with the hope that these religious ideologies would ensure both personal and national salvations. Chondokyo was well received by rural peasants while Christianity was accepted by urban educated people. However, what was examined here was mostly the role of Christianity, particularly the Protestant due to the fact that they played the most crucial role in shaping Korean nationalism from among the various religious groups.

Part II

The Making of the Partition System (I): Violence and Wars

Chapter 2

Partition Violence and Wars, India and Korea

Introduction

It is essential to examine how the wars and violence during and after partition influenced the societies in both India and Korea in view of the hardening "the partition system". Partition–related violence including wars vividly (re)generated the concept of enemies and further stereotyped 'Others'. Traumatic events during the partition riots and wars increased the antagonism between communities. Experiences of loss, deaths, killings, hatred, agony, abductions, and migrations were all parts of hardening enemy-making.

During partition major communal violence took place in Punjab. It was, in fact, "the war of succession" between antagonistic communities: the Muslims versus the Hindus, including the Sikhs in Punjab. Major violence already took place much before partition day on 15 August 1947. A series of events of political and social unrest enhanced communal hatred among politically competing communities. In the midst of 'live or die' situations during partition, traditional inter-community and inter-personal relationships were communally restructured and redefined. The whole social and political engagement system in partition–affected areas, particularly Punjab was transformed very much along with communal lines. Furthermore, the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1948 and 1965 strengthened the fossilization of the Muslim images as enemies of the Hindu and India.

In Korea, the Korean War was a shattering and scarring blow on the both lives of North and South Korean in continuation of pre-war period (1945-50) violence. One of the most serious results of the Korean War was the hardening of ideological and political lines between the North and the South.[170] This was extended from

[170] Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (revised ed.) (Indianapolis: BasicBooks, 2001), p. 10.

political leaders to the common people who had undergone losses of family and lands, and mental and psychological distortions at the hands of the same Koreans in the other side of the border.

This chapter aims to examine how violence during partition and its related wars impacted common people's psyche and behaviours for fixing the concept of "Others" or enemies while analyzing the process, the strategy and the mobilization of communal violence in India and the Cold War-oriented violence in Korea. Although India and Korea had different causes, processes, and results of the partitions, the reality of partition through its accompanying traumatic experience of violence will be compared in order to identify the common impacts and repercussions of post-partition society.

1. Partition Violence and Wars in India

Communal War during Partition

When Indian partition was realized in the 1940s, communal violence grew systematic in its mobilization, tactics and scale. Punjab was the worst affected region in regards to communal disturbances in this period. Two competing communal organizations – the Muslim League and the RSS – maintained their own "private armies" though they were banned in January 1947 under the Criminal Law Amendment Act in Punjab. A civil war atmosphere grew higher and higher as the date of partition approached. In March 1947, rioting broke out in the city of Lahore and subsequently a series of riots were observed throughout Punjab. Sir Evan Jenkins, the last governor of the undivided British Punjab, analytically termed communal violence in Punjab from the period of 10 May 1947 onwards as "the communal war of succession"[171] after he divided communal disturbances into three main phases according to their scale and characteristics of them: 1) 4 March to 20 March 1947, 2) 21 March to 9 May, 3) 10 May onwards. He described all three

[171] 'Jenkins to Mountbatten, Secret No. 699 [Enclosure: Memorandum], 4 August 1947', cited in Lionel Carter (compiled ed.), *Punjab Politics, 1 June-14 August 1947, Tagedy: Governors' fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), p. 200.

phases:

> The first phase presented many of the features of normal communal disturbances of the past. The urban slaughter was without precedent (in Multan City about 130 non–Muslims were killed in three hours), and the wholesale burnings both urban and rural, and the rural massacres were new. But on the whole, the situation yielded to the usual treatment. The second phase was used by the communities for preparations. It was relatively quiet, but there was much practicing with bombs, and ill–feeling never really died down in Lahore and Amritsar. The third phase showed the real dimensions of the problem. The communities settled down to do the maximum expanse of surface to the troops and police. Mass terrorism of this kind offers no easy answer.... In my opinion not less than 5,000 (and probably not more than 5,200) people have been killed in all, and not more than 3,000 seriously injured.[172]

In April 1947, the increasing number of enlistments for communal volunteer organizations was noticeable in all three major competing communities. The RSS, a leading organization among the Hindu volunteers, closely collaborated with the Sikhs in preparation for communal war against the Muslims while the Muslim National Guards increasingly gained new membership in western and northwestern Punjab.[173] According to Jenkins' report above, it was at the second phase of "preparation" for war. On 15 May 1947, Martha Alter, an American eyewitness in Rawalpindi, reported that systematic violence took place around the city and its vicinity such as Murree. For example, non-Muslim houses were particularly marked by certain assigned people and those marked houses were selectively burnt. Even a certain Christian leader's house was burnt simply because he didn't join the Muslim League.[174]

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[172] 'Jenkins to Mountbatten, Secret No. 699 [Enclosure: Memorandum], 4 August 1947', in Lionel Carter (compiled ed.), *Punjab Politics, 1 June-14 August 1947, Tagedy: Governors' Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), pp. 200–201.

[173] 'Report from Punjab Province, Extract from the Fortnightly Report on Punjab for the Second Half of April 1947, 7 May 1947', Home Poll (I), File No. 18/4/47, NAI. Quoted in Sucheta Mahajan (ed.), *Toward Freedom: Documents on the Movement for Independence in India, 1947*, Part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 1279.

[174] Martha Payne Alter, *Letters from India to America, 1916-1951* (Mussoorie: Vikalp Printers, 2006), p. 539.

Stephenson, then Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore, in his report dated 25 August 1947, said that "the situation has gone far beyond rioting and can only be described as *civil war* [italics added] on a wide and particularly bloodthirsty scale."[175] According to an official report on 21 August 1947, it was observed that for three days prior to the transfer of power, Lahore and Amritsar cities were burnt down by "pre-meditated and well-organized arrangements made by each community".[176] The report continued to say that almost the entire Hindu-Sikh part of the Walled City of Lahore was burnt down whereas in Amritsar most of the Muslim Mohallas were on fire and "this has caused an almost complete exodus of Muslims and Hindus respectively from the two cities," Lahore and Amritsar.[177] It left "with inevitable result that position now shows considerable improvement, there being little property and few individuals of the minority community left to be attacked in each city."[178] In rural areas conditions became worse with a lack of police intervention. During partition such communal war and violence prevailed in Punjab, Bengal and major towns in North India wherever a considerable population of Muslims existed. Punjab was the area worst effected by communal violence while Kolkata and Bengal experienced comparatively less damage due to Gandhi's efforts for "calming things down".[179] While mass migrations took place, mobs of the opposing community often attacked the convoys and trains, killing and abducting people of the other community. It was no doubt an act of inhuman savagery, sparing neither women nor children.

There was also "a very different character" of "a deliberate and organized attempt" by the Sikhs supported by the Hindus that tried to liquidate the entire Muslim population of the districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Ferozepur, Hoshiarpur,

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[175] 'Stephenson to Grafftey-Smith, 25 August 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 90.

[176] 'Shone to Carter, 21 August 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 77.

[177] 'Shone to Carter, 21 August 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 77.

[178] 'Shone to Carter, 21 August 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 77.

[179] 'Shone to Carter, 22 August 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 79.

Jullundar and Ludhiana in the East Punjab by violent bloody methods so that they could bring in the Sikhs of West Punjab to settle in the place of the Muslims.[180] This was deliberately planned "to concentrate the Sikh population in the East Punjab in order to lay claim to the creation of a Sikh State adjoining the Sikh States of Patiala, Faridkot, and others."[181] In September 1947, the Sikhs from West Punjab, as part of their plan, led a march roughly seven hundred thousand strong toward East Punjab:

> Three hundred thousand are collected in a village 6 miles north of Sheikhpura, two hundred thousand at Nankana Sahib, two hundred thousand at Lyallpur and so on. They are not like the miserable refugees from the East. They have their tails up and are largely armed and are waiting to march out leaving all their property which they cannot take out on bullock–carts, mainly their crops and houses, behind on the orders of their leaders.[182]

The "communal war of succession" meant that "it was a war to determine which communities were to occupy the newly defined space and in what proportion."[183] However, unlike the Muslims in West Punjab and the Hindus in East Punjab, the Sikhs had to create their own majority territory by regrouping in East Punjab so that they could finally claim "a homeland of their own".[184] When in March 1947 violence on the Sikhs and the Hindus in Rawalpindi, Attock, and Multan districts took place after the final breakdown of the coalition government in Punjab, it was used by the Muslims to push the Sikh leaders and the Congress to agree to a partition. Violence here was "a principal mechanism for creating the conditions for

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[180] 'Grafftey-Smith to Addison, 12 September 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 195.

[181] 'Grafftey-Smith to Addison, 12 September 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 195.

[182] 'Stephenson to Grafftey-Smith (Extracts), 13 September 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 195.

[183] Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 34.

[184] Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 34.

partition."[185] However, the subsequent violence towards the Muslims by the Sikhs, particularly in East Punjab, was "a principal mechanism of changing the terms of partition"[186] by a deliberate act of regrouping all peoples according to their religious affiliations and majority positions of the regions. As a result, the Sikhs succeeded in "maintaining unity of their community by regrouping its entire population into a more compact area that included several districts where they were now a majority."[187] According to the census of India in 1951, the population of the Muslims in Punjab was a mere 1.8 percent while the Sikhs increased to 35 percent.[188] It was a complete eradication of one community. Communal violence in Punjab among antagonistic communities, especially from majorities against minorities, was an expression of the vested interests of their own communities for control in the regions.[189]

The Demonization of Enemies during Violence

During partition riots, the enmification of the Muslims was often observed through the process of the stereotyping of the Muslims. This involved a progressive "devaluation" up to the point of "dehumanization" of the Muslims.[190] As Tidwell argues, "an enemy is a value-laden, emotionally charged entity, one that is the recipient of specific negative value connotations and meanings".[191] Through communal violence nonhuman characteristics of the enemy was visibly expressed and bitterly experienced. The 1947 partition was the typical kind of such events which fuelled the dehumanizing process among conflicting communities.[192] When

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[185] Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 19.

[186] Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 28.

[187] Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 28.

[188] Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 301.

[189] Ayesha Jalal, 'Nation, Reason and Religion: Punjab's Role in the Partition of India', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XXXIII, no. 32 (8 August 1998), p. 2,188.

[190] Sudhir Kakar, *The Colours of Violence* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1995), p. 55.

[191] Alan C. Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved: A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution* (London: Pinter Press, 1998), p. 127.

[192] For lively captured memories of horrors and hatred during partition violence through literature,

the communal situation was viewed and accepted as a war, it would "provide a cover, an excuse, and a legitimation for a multiplicity of other interests to come into play and to use violent means that would not in normal times be available to them to achieve their goals."[193] War-time logic changed "the 'other' from a human being to the enemy, *a thing* to be destroyed before it destroyed you."[194] This also provided a justification to both conflicting communities to avoid guilt feeling about destroying the enemy during the riots.[195] Therefore, "a demonization of the Muslims" was easily endorsed by the Hindus (or the Sikhs) viewing them as a separate people, a foreign body who were warlike in their religious character.[196] It is important to note on how people remembered and expressed the traumatic event[197], and further transmitted them to others and the next generations. Education from individual or family level, "a collective memory" of the upbringing at home as a part of "primary socialization" shaped the social and religious patterns of life of the individual or his family.[198] Through this socialization process, the demonized image of Muslims ingrained in the minds of family during partition violence was transmitted to the next generations. Furthermore, formal education system, as Krishna Kumar points out, promoted the negative mindset with fixed and limited information about Pakistan. This negativity created a certain distorted behavior towards Pakistan and the Muslims as a whole. The demonized enemy continued to

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movies, and memoirs, see Farzana S. Ali and Mohammad Sabir (ed.), *Partition: The Trauma of Partitioned Lives in Films and Fiction* (Nagpur: Dattsons, 2013); Kamla Patel, *Torn From the Roots: a Partition memoir* (translated by Uma Randeria) (New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2006); K.S. Duggal, *Abducted not and other stories of Partition Holocaust* (New Delhi: UBSPD, 2007): Saros Cowasjee & K.S. Duggal (ed.), *Orphans of the Storm: Stories on the Partition of India* (New Delhi: UBSPD, 1995); Stephen Alter, *Amritsar to Lahore*(New Delhi: Penguin, 2000); Ravikant and Tarun K. Saint (ed.), *Translating Partition* (New Delhi: Katha, 2001); Tarun K. Saint, *Witnessing Partition: Memory, History, Fiction* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2010); Bapsi Sidhwa, *Ice-Candy-Man* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1989); Bapsi Sidhwa (ed.), *City of Sin and Splendour* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2005); Khushwant Singh, *Train to Pakistan* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1956).

193 Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 30.

194 Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices From the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), p. 58.

195 Sudhir Kakar, *The Colours of Violence* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1995), p. 55.

196 Paul R. Brass, *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 35.

197 James E. Young, *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 32.

198 Krishna Kumar, *Prejudice and Pride* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001), pp. 16-17.

be alive in the minds of the people in India. Kumar says that:

> We have inherited a negative mindset towards Pakistan from the history we came to know in our young days and we see no reason to correct this mindset. On the contrary, we nurture it by teaching the young a history of modern India which does not accommodate and rationally account for the history of Pakistan. Moreover, we do little to familiarize ourselves or our children with Pakistan's history since Independence and its current affairs. We thus maintain a memory of trauma and violence as the last record of that country in our mind.[199]

The Making of the Partition System

Approximately more than 10 million people were thought to be migrants and nearly 500,000-1,000,000 died during partition. Some 75,000 women were victimized through rapes, abductions and forced pregnancy by men of other faiths. Refugee camps were common scenes in many North Indian towns. Looting and destruction of properties of other communities were prevalent. Refugee rehabilitation work and the recovery of abducted women were two major missions for nation-building after independence in both the dominions.

The 1947 partition had a negative connotation both to the secularists and the Hindu communalists. From the former's perspective, partition caused damage to the pluralistic and composite culture of India whereas the latter viewed partition as a blow to the continuity and territorial integrity of the Hindu civilization.[200] For the two groups, partition, therefore, created a negative image of Pakistan as she was thought to be responsible for partition. Furthermore, partition violence left wounds physically and psychologically in the lives of people in both Pakistan and India. In many areas in post-partition India, Muslims and non-Muslims (Hindus and Sikhs) were no longer neighbours, particularly in Punjab. Separation, division, and segregation took place according to religious lines. In terms of the scale of migrations and casualties during partition, it was indeed a civilian war, one community against another community without having armed forces involved.

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[199] Krishna Kumar, *Battle for Peace* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), p. 28.

[200] Krishna Kumar, *Prejudice and Pride* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001), p. 54.

Those who lost their lives through communal violence during partition were often taken as martyrs. Incidents of male Sikhs killing their own women or Sikh women jumping into wells were taken as stories of martyrdom in order to preserve their community honour.[201] Such martyrdom stories were repeatedly told and retold by remnants in their religious rituals both in personal and public realms. These memories "do in fact serve the purpose in countless communal riots that have occurred in India since Independence."[202] They were often used to justify the damaging or even up to the killing of Muslims in India, categorizing them as pro-Pakistanis or mini-Pakistanis.[203] The same was done in Pakistan on a larger scale to Hindus from Muslims as well. Partition even led to a "division of hearts" of the people in this regard and, rather than being part of the solution, it became a beginning of more problems.[204]The event of 1947 partition created a space for a new socio-political relationship with each religious community. It gradually developed as a system, a system in the partitioned country (termed 'the partition system' here). Partition was systemized by separate identity making, communal and border conflicts and a series of wars. Maulana Azad, a prominent Muslim secularist and the first Education minister of the Republic of India, after a decade of partition argued, "can anyone deny that the creation of Pakistan has not solved the communal problem but made it more intense and harmful?" and went on to say that:

> The basis of partition was enmity between Hindus and Muslims. The creation of Pakistan gave it a permanent constitutional form and made it much more difficult of solution. The most regrettable feature of this situation is that the sub-continent of India is divided into two states which look at one another with hatred and fear. Pakistan believes that India will not allow her to rest in peace and will destroy her whenever she has an opportunity. Similarly India is afraid that whenever Pakistan gets an opportunity, she will move against

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201 Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices From the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), p. 165.

202 Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence* (New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006), p. 42.

203 S.T. Jassal & Eyal Ben-Ari, The *Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts* (New Delhi: Sage, 2007), p. 26.

204 Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices From the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), p. 58.

India and attack her. This has led both the States to increase their defence expenditure.[205]

As Jasbir says that "every communal riot, every border skirmish, every war takes us back to it [partition]", partition has provided a certain structure for Indian society to think and act upon so that partition remains relevant even in contemporary issues.[206]

Thus, the event of partition created a system that sustained a partitioned society – namely, the partition system[207] – by impacting or even controlling people's relationships and behaviours with other individuals or communities post-partition. Partition in India had resulted in three wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-8, 1965, and 1971. It affected every aspect of people's lives politically, socially, economically, culturally, and religiously. The negative memory of trauma and violence of partition was reinforced by the wars. As Kumar notes, "repeated wars with the same enemy, India has formed, in what we may rightly call its national mind, a frozen image of Pakistan as an aggressive, untrustworthy neighbor." [208] The mass media, particularly cinema and television, and education spread this image across India, capturing the minds of the masses towards the enemy, thus solidifying the partition system. Even though there was no strong communal party as an opponent to the Congress in the 1950s and 60s, as Ghosh argues, there were communal sentiments, i.e. praising India's Hindu past and disfavor of Muslim rule, in school textbooks in North India.[209] Furthermore, national level history textbooks were selectively chosen as the states had autonomous rights for school textbooks. This created the duality of school education having both secular teaching at the national level and communalized teaching at the local level. However, opposite to the secular vision of the Congress government, communal influence at the

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[205] Maulana A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (complete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 247.

[206] Jasbir Jain (ed.), *Reading Partition / Living Partition* (Jaipur: Rwat, 2007), p. 1.

[207] S.T. Jassal & Eyal Ben-Ari , The *Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts* (New Delhi: Sage, 2007), p. 80.

[208] Krishna Kumar, *Battle for Peace* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), p. 28.

[209] Partha S. Ghosh, *BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999), p. 240

individual and local level was strongly present in everyday life of the people in North India. In this situation there was a certain gap between the pluralist intentions and the actual functioning of the Indian state, thus the state often failed to transcend society.[210] This failure of the Indian state was clearly observed when communal riots occurred in post-partition India, for the state was unable to arbitrate between the conflicting communities.[211]

Partition as an organizing system for political mobilization and personal relationships according to communal lines provided a platform for communal struggles in post-partition India while it was admittedly reinterpreted and revitalized into various forms of communal violence and wars with Pakistan. In this system, partition refugees and victims of whatever kind acted as catalysts to harden the communal atmosphere in post-partition society as they continued to remember horrors and the hatred generated by the Muslim enemies. As Butalia observed, long after the actual event of partition, "partitions [were] everywhere, communal tension, religious fundamentalism, continuing divisions on the basis of religion"[212] within Indian society. A series of post-partition communal incidents were visible evidences.[213] Butalia pointed out further that "In each of these instances, Partition stories and memories were used selectively by the aggressors: militant Hindus were mobilized using the one-sided argument that Muslims had killed Hindus at Partition, they had raped Hindu women, and so they must in turn be killed, and their women subjected to rape."[214]

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[210] Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 23.

[211] Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 23.

[212] Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices From the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), p. 6.

[213] For example, the Muslims were killed in Gujarat riots in 1969; the Sikhs were killed by the Hindu mobs in Delhi in 1984; communal killings of Muslims in Bihar in 1989 and Mumbai in 1992; the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya was destroyed by the Hindu mobs in 1992; thousands of Muslim villagers were killed in Gujarat riots in 2002.

[214] Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices From the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), p. 6.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-8 and Its Effects

Partition accompanied the unresolved issue of territory between India and Pakistan, particularly for the Kashmir region. This created conflicts, crises and wars. A series of wars between India and Pakistan was a decisive factor in stimulating enmity and hatred among people of one country towards another. It was tangible, visual, and fearsome, therefore, a threat to the security of the state and individuals. War-time images of invaders throughout media and government propaganda often generated both fear and hatred towards enemies. Partition itself was not a solution to the problems of the Indian subcontinent. The unresolved problems led both India and Pakistan to use force of arms for getting the solution. However, these wars hardened the image of enemies, and further generated negative memories of the "other". War confirmed Pakistan as an enemy nation of India, and vice versa. The continued territorial and military tensions between the two countries kept the partition of the subcontinent alive in everyday life, thus stimulated in the solidification of the partition system.

The first Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-8 began in October 1947 and continued until December 1948, almost thirteen months. War broke out only after only two months of partition because of the territorial issue of Kashmir and it affected all aspects of relations between India and Pakistan, leading to a series of wars. It also affected domestic socio-political relationships among religious communities in a way that still lasts today, despite the fact that it was originally only a regional issue, Kashmir. The repercussions far outweighed the issue itself. The origin of the first war between India and Pakistan would be traced to the final status of Kashmir following the partition of India and Pakistan on 15 August 1947. British policy held that the princely states would have to accede to either Pakistan or India based on geographic location and on demographics. Kashmir was led by a Hindu Maharaja, Hari Singh, with Muslim majority, located between India and Pakistan with geopolitical importance to both the states. The problem was that Hari Singh was unable to decide which state to join until 15 August 1947. Both India and Pakistan were eager to have Kashmir in their own territories. However, Pakistan was more anxious to take action and finally on 20 October 1947, the Pakistan-backed Muslim

tribal forces from the North West Frontier Province entered Kashmir, cut the Rawalpindi-Srinagar road and reached Muzaffarabad. Another armed Muslim bands moved in on Poonch through Jammu-Sialkot area. Pakistani tribes of 1,500-2,000 armed men attacked Kashmir. The distressing stories of Muslim refugees who had fled from Kashmir to North-West Frontier Province apparently provoked the tribesmen to take action against the Kashmir government's savagery towards the Muslims.[215]

By 26 October 1947, the Muslims were about to capture Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. Fearing defeat to Pakistani tribesmen, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, requested military help from India and finally had to sign the Instrument of Accession to India in order to save his own kingdom. It was believed by Lord Mountbatten that "if the [Indian] troops had gone without the Instrument of Accession being signed, Pakistan troops would also have entered Kashmir, and there would again have been every likelihood of war between the two Dominions".[216] At dawn on 27 October the Indian government sent troops by air to Srinagar to assist the Kashmir State Forces against the tribesmen. The fighting between the two military forces started and expanded across almost the entire Kashmir and Pakistan border, exchanging a series of attacks and counter-attacks until a UN mediated ceasefire was put into effect on 1 January 1949. A cease-fire was agreed upon on the conditions that the people of Kashmir would decide their own belonging through a fair plebiscite in the near future under UN supervision.

During the war, 1,500 soldiers died on each side and vast amounts of migrations took place. 375,000 migrated to Pakistan, 150,000 to Azad Kashmir, 45,000 to India, and 18,000 to Kashmir valley.[217] As a result of the war, Pakistan was able to acquire roughly two-fifths of Kashmir which it established as Azad Kashmir, whereas India obtained three-fifths of it. However, India had more than territorial issues on Kashmir. By the Muslim majority state, Kashmir, belonging to India, she

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[215] 'Report by Grafftey-Smith (Extract), 31 October 1947', in Lionel Carter (compiled), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 16 October-31 December 1947, vol. 2* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 593.

[216] 'Appendix 5, Aide–Memoire by Mountbatten, 25 February 1948', in Lionel Carter (compiled), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 16 October-31 December 1947*, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 958.

[217] Kiltae Cho, *Indowa Pakistan* [India and Pakistan] (Seoul: Mineumsa, 2009), p. 279.

could prove that two nation theory of Pakistan would not be valid in Indian nationalism.[218]

In India the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-8 further generated a negative mindset towards Pakistan while the violent and traumatic events during partition still lingered in the minds of people. War-time violence between India and Pakistan which had taken place in 1947-8 for fourteen months culminated in a distrust and hatred between two countries. Unresolved Kashmir issues, despite the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan mediated by UN, continued to evolve as territorial and communal issues between India and Pakistan exist that have still never been resolved. After a cease-fire, the Kashmir issue was taken into the hands of the UN Security Council. But it was "another heavy burden"[219] which India had to bear apart from dealing with Pakistan. What Nehru, the Prime Minister of Indian Government then, worried about the most was the attitude of the great powers in the Security Council because some of them pressurized India in favor of Pakistan on the Kashmir question.[220] The United States and the United Kingdom in particular openly supported Pakistan. Diplomatically, India "reached almost a crisis over the Kashmir issue."[221] Due to disagreeable conditions for a plebiscite suggested by the UN mediator only contributed to the potential crisis. According to the Indian Government, as long as pro-Congress Sheikh Abdullah's Government in Kashmir seized power, "a fair plebiscite" would result in a majority in Kashmir for accession to India. However, there was fear that the UN mediator would impose conditions in favor of Pakistan and that "Pakistan would convert Kashmir into a field for bitter, violent and most bigoted propaganda on the basis of religion,

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[218] Bipan Chandra, Muridula Mukherjee & Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 206.

[219] 'A Letter from Nehru to Chief Ministers, 5 February 1948', in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947–1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 200.

[220] 'A Letter from Nehru to Chief Ministers, 5 February 1948', in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947–1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 200.

[221] 'A Letter from Nehru to Chief Ministers, 20 February 1948', in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947–1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 200.

leading to riots and disorder on a large scale."[222] Prolonged unresolved issues for a fair election in UN further hampered relations between India and Pakistan throughout 1950s and led to psychological effects on both sides as well while situation in Kashmir remained unchanged.[223]

The Indo–Pakistani War of 1965

After Kashmir became a territorial issue between India and Pakistan, Pakistan continued to seek territorial claims on it. In the 1960s, a series of border issues between Sind and Gujarat, especially the Rann of Kutch regions, were precursors of the war of 1965.

The second Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was basically fought over Kashmir. The war began in 5 August 1965 and ended on 22 September 1965. The war was initiated by Pakistan who had perceived that Indian military would be unable to defend the region against a quick military campaign. The judgment was based on the defeat of India by China in 1962 and their passive reaction to the Rann of Kutch issues in early 1965. At the same time, the Pakistani government also believed that there was widespread pro-Pakistan support among Kashmiri people, which would later turn out to be false.

On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August. The initial battles between India and Pakistan were contained within Kashmir involving both infantry and armor units with each country's air force playing major roles. It was not until early September when Pakistani forces attacked Ackhnoor that the Indians escalated the conflict by attacking targets within Pakistan itself, forcing the Pakistani forces to disengage from Ackhnoor to counter

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[222] 'A Letter from Nehru to Chief Ministers, 1 November 1950', in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947–1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 211.

[223] 'A Letter from Nehru to Chief Ministers, 1 November 1950', in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947–1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 211.

Indian attacks. The largest engagement of the war occurred in the Sialkot region where some 400 to 600 tanks squared off. However, this only resulted in a stalemate. On 22 September the UN Security Council called for a cease–fire and called upon "both Governments to issue orders for a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965".[224] The United States and the United Kingdom supported the UN decision by cutting off arms supplies to both sides. Pakistan felt the effects of the ban more keenly since it had a much weaker military in comparison to India. The UN resolution and the halting of arms sales had an immediate impact. India accepted the ceasefire on September 21 and Pakistan on September 22. The ceasefire alone did not resolve the status of Kashmir, and both sides accepted the Soviet Union as a third–party mediator. Negotiations in Tashkent concluded in January 1966, with both sides giving up territorial claims and withdrawing their armies from the disputed territory. Yet although the Tashkent agreement achieved its short–term aims, conflict in South Asia would reignite a few years later.

Militarily speaking, the war was almost a draw. Each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Army casualties on both sides were fairly even, with each side suffering three thousand or above. However, the aftermath was far greater than the actual war. The war brought other repercussions for the security relationships as well. The United States withdrew its military assistance advisory group from Pakistan in July 1967. In response to these events, Pakistan declined the renewal on the lease of the Peshawar military facility, which ended in 1969. The United States–Pakistan relations continued to grow measurably weaker as the United States became more deeply involved in Vietnam and as its broader interest in the security of South Asia waned. Unchanged was the enmity with which India and Pakistan regarded each other over Kashmir.

It was in actual sense a limited war in many ways. It was because East Pakistan remained almost uninvolved and only Northwest regions of Indian territories were involved. The navies of both countries were not really involved in the war. It ended

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[224] 'The UN Security Council's Resolution 211, 20 September 1965' quoted in D.R. Mankekar, *22 Fateful Days: Pakistan cut to Size* (Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 2006), p. 196.

in 22 days.[225] Prasad and Thaphliyal argue that field commanders were not clear about their objectives. He said that "whether it was an all-out general war, a limited war for certain objectives, a war of conquest to annex territories, or a war of attrition to weaken the adversary's striking power – no one had an answer."[226]

The conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965 was portrayed as a conflict of theocracy on one side and secularism on the other by Indian secularist leaders. It was in fact an ideological warfare – secularism versus communalism. As India represented the secular world, denouncing communalism, the Kashmir issue had become a test of her commitment to the cause. Pakistan's demand for Kashmir was based on the "two nation theory", which claimed that since the overwhelming majority of the population in Kashmir was Muslim, it must go to Pakistan, a Muslim country, as India was a Hindu country. However, this was not acceptable at all by the Indian government on the grounds that India had never been a Hindu country but was always cosmopolitan in character since times immemorial and this was the very basis of the freedom movement launched by Gandhi. Therefore, "any compromise on this would destroy the foundation of our democracy; it would be a mockery of all that we have stood for."[227] Thus, from the Indian secularist government's point of view, what must be explained and propagated about the realities of the situation and India's basic approach to the Indo-Pakistan conflict was to stick to the commitment to secular democracy. During the war what encouraged Indian political leaders the most was that, as general secularist historians backed the view, "Indian Muslims had given wholehearted support to the war effort".[228] As far as secularism in India was concerned, it was "its first major test since 1947-8".[229] President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan, said in a broadcast to the people of India from All India Radio that "there is today a oneness of feeling

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[225] S.N. Prasad and U.P. Thapliyal, *The India–Pakistan War of 1965* (Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 2011), P. 312.

[226] S.N. Prasad and U.P. Thapliyal, *The India–Pakistan War of 1965* (Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 2011), P. 312.

[227] *The Times of India*, 1 October 1965.

[228] Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee & Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 279.

[229] Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee & Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 279.

and purpose among our people, especially among the 50 million Muslims who have given a striking testimony of their deep patriotism."[230] "Theocracy versus Secularism" was the undercurrent of the Indian government's ideological basis of war propaganda throughout 14 months of the war including a cease–fire negotiation period. The war was also given the moral justification. The Times of India wrote, "the conflict with Pakistan turned out to be a major moral issue of our time, dictatorship of democracy, a controlled press or a free press, a non-communal State which respects all religions or a theocratic State."[231]

Physical damages and losses throughout the war were immediate and inevitable consequences. According to a neutral source, it was estimated that some 2,000 Indians were killed and 10,000 wounded while Pakistan had 2,500-3,000 killed and 12,000-15,000 wounded during the fighting.[232] 25,000 houses were destroyed in the Akhnoor, Jammu, Naushera, Rajauri, Mendhar, Poonch and Ranbirsinghpura areas during the armed conflict with Pakistan. More than Rs. 1.5 Crores were given as relief to the affected people according to the Rehabilitation Minister's report to the Parliament on 8 Oct 1966.[233]

The 1965 War Effects: the Hardening of the Partition System

The immediate effects of the war were felt in the defence budget in following years. A higher defence budget was unavoidable due to the loss of expensive military equipment as well as enhanced security concerns.[234] So far as the country did not change its basic attitude in defence and foreign policies, it was determined that the budget could not be reduced.[235] However, this very thing was the

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[230] *The Times of India*, 26 September 1965.

[231] *The Times of India*, 26 September 1965.

[232] '# 223. Memorandum from the White House Situation Room to President Johnson, 23 September 1965' in US Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968,* vol. XXV, South Asia (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 425.

[233] *The Times of India* , 9 October 1966.

[234] *The Times of India*, 1 March 1966.

[235] *The Times of India*, 9 June 1967.

government's continuing concern.[236] In the financial year of 1968-9, the proposed defence budget was Rs. 1,115 Crores – an increase of Rs. 45 Crores from the previous year.[237] When India was an undivided country, her denfence budget was just Rs. 100 Crores. However, it was drastically increased after partition up to Rs. 250 Crores despite fact that one fourth of the undivided Army went to Pakistan.[238] Nearly two decades after partition, the defence budget shot up by more than ten times. This led to a diversion of resources from economic development and endangered the Government's Fourth Five Year Plan.[239]

Although partition created geographical and political separation of the Indian subcontinent, the actual separation between the people of India and Pakistan was a slow process that spread over several decades. In this process, as mentioned earlier, a series of violent episodes and wars played pivotal roles in deepening the enmity-driven separation among the people of both countries. The 1965 war, as Kothari and Mian remarks, was "a turning point in terms of the openness of the countries to each other".[240] Political separation did not directly disband the cultural bonds with each other through people to people contacts. At least for two decades after partition, both India and Pakistan allowed people to cross the border by trains and ferries, and cultural exchange programmes like Urdu Musharias. Indian movies and publications were easily available at Pakistan local markets. Pakistan universities and banks were helped by Indian professors and bankers until they could achieve self-functioning status.[241]

However, after the war of 1965, the situation dramatically changed. Borders were closed, train and ferry services were discontinued, and visas became difficult to obtain. Cultural exchange programmes were halted directly. Indian films and songs

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[236] *The Times of India*, 1 March 1968.

[237] *The Times of India*, 1 March 1968.

[238] Maulana A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (complete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 247.

[239] Bipan Chandra, Muridula Mukherjee & Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 281.

[240] Smitu Kothari & Zia Mian (ed.), *Bridging Partition* (New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2010), p. 2.

[241] Smitu Kothari & Zia Mian (ed.), *Bridging Partition* (New Delhi: Orient BalckSwan, 2010), pp. 2–3.

were banned from cinema houses and national radios in Pakistan. The celebrated India-Pakistan *musharias* quickly became extinct. On each side of the border, books, magazines and newspapers from the other country disappeared.[242] The Punjabi common heritage among all different communities through such cultural exchanges gradually disappeared due to separation of cultural bondage across the border between India and Pakistan after the war of 1965. Punjabi culture began to be narrowly defined. Punjabi culture which used to represent the whole undivided Punjab inclusive of the Muslims, the Hindus and the Sikhs, now became associated with only the Sikh culture in India and only the Muslim culture in Pakistan. This was partly due to the creation of Punjabi-speaking Sikh majority state in Punjab in 1966.

In Gujarat, the 1965 war played a critical role in reshaping and strengthening communal politics in the state. Gujarat experienced the war over her border issues with Pakistan. Territorial issues of the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat with Pakistan in the early 1960s and the subsequent war of 1965 helped the Jana Sangh party to communally mobilize sections of middle class. When the plane of Balwantrai Mehta, the chief Minister of Gujarat, was shot down by Pakistan, this added anti-Pakistan sentiments in the region. As Shah observed, "anti-Pakistan sentiments got transformed into hatred against local Muslims. Communal speeches of the RSS and the Jana Sangh leaders added fuel to the prevailing communal tension."[243] Kumar remarks, the existence of Pakistan allowed the Hindu communalists to maintain not only "an object of hatred", but also a source of inspiration for making India a "Hindu Pakistan".[244]

Interestingly, the Sikhs of Punjab in post-partition India which had undergone serious regional disputes in the Punjabi Suba movement in the 1950s and 60s, seized an opportunity to bargain with the Central Government for their decades-long demand for the Punjabi Suba. First, as Punjab became one of the major battlefields during the war, the Indian government was desperately in need of local

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[242] Smitu Kothari & Zia Mian (ed.), *Bridging Partition* (New Delhi: Orient BalckSwan, 2010), p. 2.

[243] Ghanshyam Shah, 'The BJP's Riddle in Gujarat' in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 245.

[244] Krishna Kumar, *Battle for Peace* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), p. 34.

support which eventually loosened the government's strict position against the Punjabi Suba in order to appease the Sikhs.[245] Second, The Sikhs were able to prove their patriotism as citizens of India by fully supporting the war. The Sikh leaders in Punjab participated in mobilizing the masses for the anti-Pakistan war efforts while the Sikh soldiers bravely fought Pakistan raiders so that their demand for Punjabi Suba would not be suspected as a separatist movement. Although the Sikh majority state came into being through the reorganization of Punjab into three states – Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh in 1966 – communal sentiments did not fade away, but continued to impact local politics in subsequent years these areas.[246]

2. Partition Violence and the Korean War

1) Violence between Partition and the Korean War, 1945–50

In Korea, there were two phases of the partition process: first is the pre-war period (1945-1950), second is the war period (1950-1953). In both phases, violence and migrations took place to a great extent, though in the latter at a far bigger scale. In the first phase, we see the left versus the right wing confrontation which caused violence (riots, killings, assassinations, and massacres). The infusion of the Cold War ideology into the minds of Korean people both in the North and the South gradually sidelined nationalist ideas of uniting the whole country.

The first phase could be portrayed as "unpreparedness and chaos" under the influence of the Cold War superpowers. Since Korea achieved her independence when imperial Japan lost World War II on 15 August 1945, she was not seeking political legitimacy of government-making from the Allied powers, except assurance for her independence. This was due to the fact that they, the colonized,

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[245] *The Times of India* (7 September 1965). The Home Minster of Central Government, G.L. Nanda assured the Sikh leaders that the issue of Punjabi Suba would be examined afresh soon after the war while requesting them to co–operate the government's war efforts.

[246] See more detailed discussions about it in chapter 4.

had not defeated Japan, but rather the allied world powers including the United States, the Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union did. Therefore, Japan had nothing to do with Korea's future after she withdrew her colonial government and military from Korea. Korea's future was at the hands of the allied powers. What was sad to the people of Korea was that political decisions for her own future were delegated to non-Koreans even after independence from Japanese colonialism.

Unprepared Independence and Partition

When the Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, announced a total surrender to the Allied Armies in World War II on 15 August 1945, it was an end of the war as well as an end of Japanese colonialism in Korea. On that day, Korea suddenly got independence after thirty-five years of Japanese subjugation. Although the joy of achieving freedom gushed out from every section of the Korean people on Independence day, it was unfortunately a day that merely initiated a different kind of foreign intervention – a intervention of the Cold War world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. When Korea got freedom, all the major Korean nationalist leaders were in exile, mainly in the Korean Provisional Government in China, fighting for freedom against the imperial Japan alongside the Chinese and the allied forces. Therefore, the victory of the allied forces meant also that of the Koreans. However, since Japan signed the surrender pact with the allied powers, not with any Korean political organization, Koreans had no power and right to decide post-World War II resettlements including the issue of her own full independence. After the war, the United States and the Soviet Union rose as two super powers in the Cold War era, the former as a Capitalist and the latter as a communist. The world was divided into two competing realms. Korea was divided into two at the 38th parallel – the North was taken by the Soviet Union while the South was under the United States' control.

After Korea was given freedom from the Japanese rule, many Korean nationalist leaders returned to Korea from China, the USSR and the USA. Rhee Syngman and Kim Koo came to Seoul, South Korea whereas Kim Ilsung and Kim Dubong

arrived in Pyongyang in North Korea. However, the leaders were divided into many factions. Mainly, two groups: the rightists and the leftists were in a struggle to draft the blueprint of Korean Government. In the year of 1945, the political scenes of Korea were not favorable to the Dominion powers. In the North, the rightists were initially stronger in politics while the Soviet-controlled leftists rapidly gained popular support later. In the South, the leftists had a strong domestic grass-root support base while the rightists gradually gained popular support seizing political power under US support. Thus, power struggles between the two groups became inevitable in the following years, which eventually led to violence and further worsened the possibility for a unified Korean independence.

Violence in the North and Migrations to the South

Right after the Japanese colonial government left at the end of World War II, the fate of the Korean peninsula suddenly hung in the hands of the Soviet Union in the North and the United States in the South. In the North, most of Korean leaders were Christians under the leadership of Cho Mansik, a Christian nationalist, until Kim Ilsung's communist group established full political hegemony by the mid of 1946. The first Christian protest was recorded as early as September 1945 in Shinuijoo near China's border. Hundreds of mission school students went to the local police station to complain against mischief of the communist government officers and in return they received gun-fires and became violent causing several casualties. Having been threatened by the communists, Han KyungChik and Yoon Hayoung, as leaders of the protest, had to migrate to the South. Han later played a great role for northern refugees as well as for the anti-communistic national movement during and after the war in the South. According to the report of a Korean church leader at the time, in early March 1946, on the occasion of the March First Movement celebration of the churches in Pyongyang there was a violent clash with the communist authority. More than twenty Christian clergymen, thirty theological seminary students, and more than three hundred students were arrested. This was due to the fact that they organized a separate celebration ceremony apart from the government meeting on the grounds that they disagreed with the communist

authority's order to support "the Three Delegate Council; the Government of Kim Ilsung; to praise Soviet Union; and to propagate for communization of the country."[247] After this incident, many northern Christians, having found no hope in the Communist regime, fled to the South and became a strong anti–communism force there.

Violence between the Right and the Left in South Korea

In December 1945, the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers from three countries (USA, UK, and USSR) discussed the procedures for Korean independence. It was decided that the US and USSR would form a joint committee and place Korea under their trusteeship for up to 5 years. Koreans were vehemently opposed to the idea of trusteeship, for it was interpreted as an extension of colonialism. However, the leftists accepted the decision later on the grounds that it would help Korea establish her own government quickly. The conflict between the rightists and the leftists deepened, and it reached a critical level which became known as the "war without guns".[248] The US-Soviet Joint Commission conference was held in both March 1946 and May 1947 to discuss the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government, but both sessions ended without a resolution. Finally, the US handed the Korean issue over to the United Nations, where the US wielded immense power. In UN, it was decided that people of Korea, both in the North and the South would participate in free elections to form a unified government. In January 1948, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (hereafter, UNTCOK) was established, but the Soviet Union and North Korea refused to acknowledge its authority.[249] Therefore, it was decided to have a

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[247] Minsoo Pai, 'Look what the Russian and Korea Reds are done, 24 March 1946', Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 11, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

[248] The Association of Korean History Teachers, *Korea through the Ages, vol. 2 Modern* (Seoul: the Academy of Korean Studies, 2005), P. 152.

[249] K.P.S. Menon, who was elected as a Chairman of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in November 1947, had in his report to the UN appealed 'to the great powers to let Korea be united', warning that else 'Korea may blow up' but it was to no avail. In Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence (revised ed.)*(New Delhi: Penguin, 2008), p. 94. In his stay in Korea, he was hoping that Korea could form a unified government

separate election wherever possible by UN; Rhee Syngman and his party welcomed the decision. On 10 May 1948, the general election was held only South of the 38th parallel and on 15 August 1948 the Republic of Korea was officially established.

In the course of government-forming in 1948, already enhanced tension between the rightists and the leftists in South Korea finally burst out in the form of violent riots and uprisings. Including the Jeju April Third Incident in April 1948 and the Yosu-Sunchon Incident in October 1948, which were crucial events in defining the character of the newly-established Republic of Korea. On 3 April 1948, a group of Jeju civilians attacked police stations and the rightists' houses. On that day, eleven police stations and five sub-stations were attacked, four policemen were killed and eight men were shot to death.[250] The major reasons for the attack were the misconducts of the local police and the affluent which heightened socio-economic inequality in the region. When the uprising grew bigger in scale, the socialist group also joined and took leadership. The demands they asked for were not ideological like in the communist revolution, but rather practical like the punishment of the corrupt policemen, and the US military government along with nationwide slogans of the anti-separate government and the withdrawal of the US military. Although there was a communist faction during the uprising, it did not in actuality represent the anger of Jeju civilians who participated in the uprising.[251] As the situation escalated beyond the local authority's control, the US military government, and the ultra-rightists, Rhee's Korean Democratic Party dispatched military and the rightist youths like *Sobukchongnyunhoe* [the Northwest Youth Association] to suppress the riot. Both authorities declared that the Jeju rioters were all communist traitors. After the military and the rightist youths took over, a retaliatory massacre began and

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without having partition as his own country, India, experienced a painful partition in August 1947. However, his inability to overcome the will of the Cold War world powers and continuing of Rhee's lobby to him led him to reluctantly suggest a separate election of Korea at the UN report. See more details in Chongko Choi, *Rhee Syngmangwa Menon gurigo Moyoonsook: Daehanminkook Kunkookgwa Hankook Yeoseong* [Rhee Syngman, Menon and Moyoonsook: the Establishment of the Republic of Korea and Korean Women] (Seoul: Guiparang, 2012) and K.P.S. Menon, *Many Worlds Revisited* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1981).

[250] *Donga Ilbo* [Donga Daily], 6 April 1948.

[251] Cumings argued that the primary cause of the South Korean insurgency in Jeju and Yosu–Sunchon was "the ancient curse of average Koreans– the social inequity of land relations and the huge gap between a tiny elite of the rich and the vast majority of the poor." In Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2010), p. 137.

killed not only the accused, but also thousands of innocent civilians. A complete suppression took almost a year. According to a local newspaper's report, some 20,000 were killed and 20,280 houses were burned down mainly by the Military government and the rightists.[252] Merrill had an even larger count, stating that at least 30,000 were killed, about one tenth of the entire Jeju population.[253] It really had "seriously and deeply wounded the hearts of all Jeju people".[254]

On 19 October 1948, in Yosu, the coastal town of the South Cholla Province, an army insurrection broke out from the 14th Regiment which had been dispatched to Jeju to suppress the revolt. One of leaders of the insurrection, Jee Chnagsoo, a communist, declared that "we have to defeat villainous police and the Japanese army before heading to Jeju Island, and furthermore, we are opposed to kill our own fellow Koreans."[255] The insurrection was clearly motivated by the Jeju April Third Incident along with other factors. The left-leaning soldiers joined the insurrection with others soon following – sometimes at the threat of gun point. Local communists also joined them. Likewise, the numbers grew bigger in a few days. Within two days, the insurgents occupied Yosu and Sunchon and were fully equipped with arms. They led these two areas as a small communist zone, establishing people's courts and hoisting the North Korean flag. They began to kill the rightists, government officials, policemen. Many innocent civilians were killed by the insurgents. However, soon the military operation started to suppress the insurrection. On 27 October 1948, the army regained Yosu and chased fleeing insurgents, but retaliation and massacres also began from the rightists towards civilians. As the US military and the Rhee Syngman's new government were firmly committed to completely purge any communist elements, brutal and inhumane suppression was prevalent. Therefore, same as the Jeju Incident case, some six hundreds of *Sobukchongnyunhoe* [the Northwest Youth Association], the rightist

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252 *Yunhap Shinmoon* [Yunhap News], 5 March 1949.

253 John Merrill, 'The Cheju–do Rebellion', *The Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 2 (1980), pp. 194–195.

254 Bokryong Shin, *The Politics of Separation of the Korean Peninsula, 1943–1953* (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2008), p. 514.

255 Quoted in Bokryong Shin, *The Politics of Separation of the Korean Peninsula, 1943–1953* (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2008), p. 522.

youth group, were also sent to assist the military efforts. This led to merciless killings of innocent civilians based merely on loose suspicions.

According to a data report, 5,379 were killed, 3,670 wounded, and 313 went missing while more than 5,000 houses were burned down.[256] What was surprising in the data was that those who were killed by the military and the rightists were much larger than by the insurgents in number.[257]

The Creation of Enemy through Violence

The Jeju and Yosu-Sunchon Incidents played a crucial role in exposing the anti-communistic character of the newly-formed government of the Republic of Korea and that of its hawkishly anti-communist President, Rhee Syngman. What became most clear in the aftermath of these two inter-related incidents was that all of South Korea moved to the right. Several government policies and laws were introduced. For example, a massive purge of the army took place after the Yosu-Sunchon Incident proved their infiltration of the ranks. By July 1949, 4,749 soldiers, which composed five percent of the army population, had been purged.[258] In filling the gap, several hundreds of *Sobukchongnyunhoe* [the Northwest Youth Association] joined the army in December 1948.[259] Politicians were also targeted for the ideology screening through an introduction of the National Security Law in December 1948, which enabled the army to be endowed with police authority. Furthermore, in early 1949 the Education Ministry also expelled some 5,000 teachers from their schools and colleges after investigating their ideological inclinations.[260] Among the students, the Students' Patriotic Corps was organized to promote patriotism through the promotion of anti-communism.[261] In April 1949, *Bodoyeonmaeng* [the League for the Protection and Guidance of the People] was

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256 *Yunhap Shinmoon* [Yunhap News], 18 June 1949.

257 Bokrong Shin, *The Politics of Separation of the Korean Peninsula, 1943–1953* (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2008), pp. 528–529.

258 Deugjoong Kim, *Ppalgaengiui Tansaeng* [The Birth of Ppalgaengi] (Seoul: Sunin, 2009), p. 450.

259 Deugjoong Kim, *Ppalgaengiui Tansaeng* [The Birth of Ppalgaengi] (Seoul: Sunin, 2009), p. 453.

260 *Yunhap Shinmoon* [Yunhap News], 23 January 1949.

261 *Seoul Shinmoon* [Seoul News], 9 March 1949.

organized in order to uncover the hidden communists among the people. According to its pledges, its aim was to support Rhee Syngman's government, to oppose the North Korean regime, and to maintain anti-communism.[262] It seduced the leftists and even the innocents by bribing them with fertilizer coupons and complete citizenship immune from previous pro-communist charges. Thus, many innocent farmers joined just to get free fertilizers without having any ideological leanings or synpathies in line with the group. The organization expanded to the entire country. By June 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, the members of *Bodoyeonmaeng* [the League for the Protection and Guidance of the People] reached some 350,000.[263] As Kim remarks, the members of *Bodoyeonmaeng* [the League for the Protection and Guidance of the People] were "the excluded by inclusion" and "the included by exclusion", treated as middle groups, standing on the line between the communists and the anti-communists.[264] It was a process of enemy-making by separating them from "innocent" citizens of the Republic of Korea. However, their fate was determined during the Korean War that most of them were mercilessly massacred by the South Korean military and police on the grounds of preliminary removal of pro-communist enemies. They were permanently excluded by the state.

As a part of anti-communistic national environment establishing project, even writers, poets, and religious leaders were encouraged by the Rhee's government to contribute the anti-communist campaigns.[265] For example, two sons of Christian clergyman in Yosu were killed by the communist rioters during the Yosu-Sunchon Incident. They were treated as "martyrs" and anti-communistic Christian leaders used this case as evidence of the evil and brutal characteristics of communists.[266] In the end, in June 1949 Rhee Syngman was able to establish a strong anti-

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[262] *Donga Ilbo* [Donga Daily], 23 April 1949; *Kyunghyang Shinmoon* [Kyunghyang News], 22 April 1949.

[263] *Hankyore Shinmoon* [Hankyore News], 24 June 1990.

[264] Deugjoong Kim, *Ppalgaengiui Tansaeng* [The Birth of Ppalgaengi] (Seoul: Sunin, 2009), p. 470.

[265] For more details of religious factors, especially the Christians during partition violence and the Korean War, see chapter 5.

[266] 'To: Second Full Meeting of the CCIA at Chicago University, 1954' quoted in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 394.

communistic government.

A new nation-state emerged, which selectively chose "appropriate" citizens and allowed them to stay in the country with anti-communism as a minimum criterion. A state and a citizen were imagined and legitimized through an act of "inclusion" and "exclusion", incorporating Cold War logic in this process.[267] Further, citizens were legitimized according to anti-communistic orientation through a highly disciplinary regime.[268] The Yosu-Sunchon Incident in October 1948 was a part of the citizen-making process through motivating enemy-making along with the Jeju April Third Incident. From this time onwards, "*Ppalgaengi* (the Commies)" were not citizens of the Republic of Korea despite the common racial and historical inheritance they shared. They were enemies of the country. The partition system was solidified at least at the political, military, jurisdictional and administrative levels in this period through the experience of violence between "the unwanted civilians" and "the state".

2) The Korean War and Its Effect

The Korean War (25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953) saw three years of fratricidal conflict which ended without any resolution in the Korean peninsula except the strengthening of the partition system.[269] The war caused 2.5 million deaths in both the South and the North. It created 200,000 war widows, 100,000 orphans in South Korea. 10 million Koreans were displaced during the war. The North and the South continues to face off over heavily militarized borders, families remain divided, and stories about what happened during the war still cannot be told. Anti-communism was owned and practiced by the authorities and people through bitter, painful war experience in South Korea. Furthermore, anti-communistic sentiments in South Korean socio-politics underwent two processes: internalization and

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[267] "Communities are to be distinguished….by the style in which they are imagined", in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983), p. 6.

[268] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Translated by Alan Sheridan) (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

[269] Mangil Kang, *A History of Contemporary Korea* (Seoul: Global Oriental, 2005) p. 177.

institutionalization. Thus, the partition system was fully established. Kang's comment summarizes the partition system thusly:

> The division of the Korean nation, arising from the establishment of separate regimes and hardened by the Korean War, developed into the division system within the context of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. The division system[270] saw both regimes promoting different political, economic, social and cultural changes in ways that enabled them to build their own power bases. The two regimes strengthened their power bases through confrontation and competition with each other. All thought and action that sought to overcome the division system and to recover national homogeneity were continuously suppressed as Korea fell deeper into the morass of national division.[271]

The Korean War, 1950–1953

The Korean War which broke out on 25 June 1950 took three years and one month to finish with the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953. It had four major stages. Each stage marked its own significance militarily and internationally. With each new stage, the intensity of violence grew up and both militaries and civilians suffered greatly.

1) **The Outbreak of the Korean War (25 June 1950 to 28 September 1950)**: On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded the South by pushing past the 38th parallel line. On 28 June 1950, Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was captured. By the end of September 1950, the North Korean army had pushed toward the southeast tip of the Korean peninsula of which Pusan and Daegu were major cities, conquering most of the South Korean territory. Forceful unification by North Korea seemed almost inevitable in three months of time. However, upon South Korea's request the United States immediately called for a UN Security Council meeting on 27 June

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[270] Kang used the term, "the division system", to explain an overall governing system of the divided Korea after the World War II and the Korean War. However, in comparison to India's partition I prefer to name it, "the partition system" as "partition" would be equally acceptable term to historical events in both countries.

[271] Mangil Kang, *A History of Contemporary Korea* (Seoul: Global Oriental, 2005) p. 177.

1950 and it condemned North Korea[272] and agreed to send the UN forces to back South Korea. 16 nations formed the UN allied forces in which the US army was a major force. From that time onwards, the civil war between North Korea and South Korea turned into an international war.

2) **Incheon Landing and Pushing toward the North (28 September 1950 to 25 October 1950)**: On 15 September 1950, the UN forces succeeded in the Incheon Landing Operation and regained Seoul on 28 September 1950. Afterwards, the tides of war reversed, and on 1 October the South Korean and the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel line and pushed north. On 19 October 1950, they captured Pyongyang, the capital of the North Korea, and reached the Apnok (Yalu) River, a border with China, by the end of October 1950. It appeared that the South Korean and the UN forces were finishing the work of the unification.

3) **Chinese Involvement (25 October 1950 to 10 July 1951)**: On 25 October 1950, Chinese troops joined the Korean War, backing the North Korean army and altering the war situation again. A massive migration took place from the north to the south afterwards and the UN allied forces decided to withdraw from Seoul on 4 January 1951. But, they re-approached the areas near the 38th parallel line in early 1951 and recaptured Seoul on 14 March 1951. From then, fierce battles in the central and eastern regions near the 38th parallel line continued. By July 1951 the frontline situation had become a stalemate.

4) **The Armistice Negotiations (10 July 1950 to 27 July 1953)**: As the war continued, it was realized that it was no longer possible to unify the peninsula by force. On 10 July 1951, upon the Soviet Union's proposal to a cease-fire, the armistice talk started. However, it took two years to come into an agreement, which

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[272] "On the basis of this report and of its knowledge of the general military situation, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been launched across the parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950. The invasion launched by the North Korean forces." Quoted in *Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea*, General Assembly Official Records: Fifth session, Supplement no. 16 (A/1350) , New York, 1950, p. 4.

affected both sides of the armies fiercely fighting for more territories. The US Air Force dropped innumerable bombs and chemicals on major cities in the North in this period. The South Korean government and the people vehemently opposed a ceasefire in fear of permanent division and a continuation of the communists' threat in the future. Finally, on 27 July 1953, the Armistice Agreement was signed by North Korea, China and the UN forces. However, South Korea didn't sign the agreement as Rhee Syngman's government opposed the ceasefire but had to obey it regardless. Now, the border line became the ceasefire line near the 38th parallel line and the Demilitarized Zones (DMZ) between the borders were created. The Korean War came to an end.

War Violence and its Consequences

In the development of the Korean War, all four stages witnessed different kinds of violence not only between armies, but also against civilians, between the civilians of two Koreas. It was a tragedy that many civilians were massacred not by the "enemies", but by their own armies or people. In the first three months (25 June 1950 to 28 September 1950), people in the South were under the North Korean army's control except the southeastern coastal areas. The North Korean army authority quickly wanted to transform the occupied areas into "liberated zones" for communism. The rightists, capitalists, policemen, officials, Christians[273] and their family members were sorted out to be tried at the people's courts, and were executed and tortured, accused as "*Bandongbunja* [political reactionary]". Powerless civilians who could not migrate further south had no option but to cooperate with the communists in order to survive. Fear led them to work under the communist regime.

In the mean time, as the North Korean army pushed southward conquering Seoul in three days, the fleeing South Korean police and army quickly took preliminary actions against the members of *Bodoyeonmaeng* [the League for the Protection and

[273] In Kimjae located in North Cholla Province, for example, twenty–three Christians were killed on the charge of the rightist activity by the North Korean army. In Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2010), p. 202. For Christian activity about anti–communism before and during the Korean War, see chapter 5.

Guidance of the People] and pro-communist political prisoners, and they were killed. According to estimates, up to 300,000[274] people were executed and were simply dumped into trenches and mines, or thrown into the sea.[275] It was the first collective massacre of civilians committed by the South Korean army and police to their own people during the Korean War.[276]

From 26 to 29 July 1950 at Nogunri in the North Choongchung Province, the US force was ordered to kill hundreds of innocent civilian refugees, and at least 200 were massacred.[277] The order was given that they should consider civilians as enemies in their operation area. This tragic story was not exposed to the public until the United States Government disclosed the secret diplomacy papers in 1994, 44 years after the incident happened. It was confirmed by testimonies of the Korean War American veterans who had been there for the operation.[278] It was purposely concealed to defend the moral supremacy of the UN allied forces over the communist attackers. For the same purposes the US, with no delay, reported the "inhumane" and "uncivilized" massacres committed by the North Korean and the Chinese armies during the Korean War at the UN just four months after the war was over.[279] According to the US report there, some 38,000 civilians and soldiers that were brutally massacred not on the battlefields.[280] It was immediately circulated to the South Korea society and it reproduced the logic of the Cold War of the other was, "they" being "evil" and "us" being "good".[281]

In the 1950s, the high pitch of Cold War tensions was exposed in this blame-shift

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[274] It was estimated that there were around 350,000 members in *Bodoyeonmaeng* when the Korean War broke out. Except Seoul and its vicinity due to a lack of time for the operation caused by swift advancement and occupation of the North Korean army in Seoul in the beginning of the war, this massacre took place in the rest of the country. In *Hankyore Shinmoon* [Hankyore News], 24 June 1990.

[275] *Hankyore Shinmoon* [Hankyore News], 24 June 1990.

[276] Till now, excavations of those affected areas are taking place to find out evidences and the hidden truth. Although the Korean War took place 76 years ago, it is still affecting the Korean society. See *Joongboo Ilbo* [Joongboo Daily], 31 March 2016; *Yunhap News*, 06 March 2016.

[277] *Hankyore Shinmoon* [Hankyore News], 13 October 1999.

[278] *Hankyore Shinmoon* [Hankyore News], 13 October 1999.

[279] *Kyunghyang Shinmoon* [Kyunghyang News], 02 December 1953.

[280] *Kyunghyang Shinmoon* [Kyunghyang News], 02 December 1953.

[281] *Kyunghyang Shinmoon* [Kyunghyang News], 02 December 1953.

game with each side defending their own legitimacy through the acts of deliberate "exposition" and "omission". The South Korean government's continued denial of the *Bodoyeonmaeng* Incident committed by the state was similarly in line with the Nogunri Incident as to the Cold War logic. As Kim points out, there were "official experiences" and "denied memories" which bridged the gap between the state's history and the private history about the Korean War.[282] When war and violence are means to a political end, as Kim argues, massacres often "occur when the objective of a war is not just surrender of the enemy but complete elimination of the whole group classified as the enemy and the seizing of political power."[283] Even unidentifiable groups were considered as dangers to remove so as to achieve the objective of a war.

From the second stage until the end of the war, both Koreas witnessed the increase of hatred, confrontation and bloodshed among civilians with the Cold War ideological measures. After Seoul was regained by the UN allied forces on 28 September 1950, the South Korean army and the civilian rightists began to execute those who had collaborated with the communists even involuntarily during the three months of the North Korean occupation. They and their families were labeled as "*Ppalgaengi*", regarded as evil, abhorred, undeserved, inhuman and unwanted, therefore, to be removed from the society. Treatment of the *Ppalgaegi* in war-time South Korea was so severe that anti-communists could kill them without reservation as they were considered unworthy to live.

Similarly, before the North Korean army retreated from Seoul in September 1950, some 9,000 political prisoners, mostly of the South Korean police, army, and rightist youths were taken to the North or massacred. Likewise, in many regions, thousands of corpses slaughtered by fleeing North Korean army were found.[284] The banality of evil in the name of communism and anti-communism was experienced by both sides of Korea where innocent civilians became the worst victims.

From the second stage of the war, the whole Korean peninsula became a battlefield

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[282] Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), p. 16.

[283] Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), p. 181.

[284] Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2010), p. 188.

and many areas were repeatedly gained and lost by the two Koreas. In these war scenes, people did whatever was needed to survive. Whether rule was under South Korea or North Korea in their regions, this was not important for them, only survival. Ideological differences did not impede their longing for life. This was a real tragedy which common Korean people had to bear during the war.

Furthermore, as the war became more complicated and severe after the intervention of the Chinese army in the third stage of the war, both sides of Korea had to bear high military casualties. Simultaneously, civilians had to face high casualties and brutal treatment by both armies. On several occasions, the South Korean and the US army indiscriminately massacred innocent civilians whom they were supposed to protect while the North Korean army did the same.[285]

In the fourth stage, the US air force maximized air bombings in the North regions as the armistice negotiations carried on between the two warring groups. The amount of bombs they used was amazing; they dropped 635,000 tons of bombs plus 32,557 tons of napalm whereas during World War II from 1942 to 1945, 657,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany. Eighteen out of twenty-two major North Korean cities were destroyed more than 50 percent.[286] In this massive killing operation, as Cumings quoted, they "killed civilians, friendly civilians, and bombed their homes; fired whole villages with the occupants – women and children and ten times as many hidden Communist soldiers – under showers of napalm."[287]

Impact of the Korean War in Korean Peninsula

When searching for the Korean War casualty statistical data, there are big discrepancies in the casualty claims by different agencies of different countries. Therefore, some flexible and conservative estimates were maintained to neutrally

[285] Korean Truth Commission on Civilian Massacres was set up in September 2000. This commission investigated massacres of civilians before and during the Korean War. Its work was continued by the Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (KTRC) founded in December 2005. According to their reports, both sides of Korean armies and the US army were involved in civilian massacres.

[286] Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2010), p. 159.

[287] Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2010), p. 160.

view the casualties. Nevertheless, the casualties of both sides, including the UN allied forces and the Chinese army during the war, were strikingly high and the brutality and severity of the war could be well recognized through this data. The South Korean military dead and missing were 217,000 and military wounded were 429,000 while civilian dead and missing were estimated to be from 500,000 to 1,000,000. The North Korean casualties had the biggest range with estimates from 500,000 to 600,000 civilians dead and missing, 294,000 to 406,000 military killed and missing, and from 226,000 to 1,500,000 military wounded.[288] Some estimate that the total number of North Korean casualties reached around 1.5 millions.[289] North Korea was entirely devastated by the war. Constant bombing by the US air forces left North Korea's cities and factories in ruins.[290] More than South Korea, the war left North Korea highly militarized. North Korea has become one of the world military powers, maintaining more than 1 million soldiers, and military has a high share of North Korea's budget. Kim Ilsung became the sole dictator after the war succeeding in removing his political rivals and established his deification. It also resulted in a highly disciplined and controlled society.

South Korea suffered greatly as well. Some 3.2 million Koreans became refugees, another 300,000 fled the country, and about 100,000 children were orphaned while 200,000 were widowed.[291] 10 million are still thought to be separated from family. War-time refugee rehabilitation and economic reconstruction were major tasks for the government. However, as post-war South Korea was portrayed as a "refugee society", "seeking asylum during the Korean War was not a one-time event; together with the war it has been structured as a chronic sociopolitical phenomenon, in the end making all of Korean society into what can be called a "refugee society"."[292]

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[288] *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 22, Macropaedia* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannia, 2007), p. 527.

[289] The Korea Foundation, *The DMZ: Dividing the Two Koreas* (Seoul: Seoul Selection, 2010), p. 41.

[290] Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2010), pp. 158–161.

[291] The Korea Foundation, *The DMZ: Dividing the Two Koreas* (Seoul: Seoul Selection, 2010), p. 42.

[292] Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), p. 40.

Since most of the industrial and transportation infrastructure went in ruins, South Korea depended heavily on US foreign aid as it tried to rebuild from the devastation throughout the 1950s. Therefore, throughout the 1950s South Korea's economy was known as an "aid economy" period. The war and the constant North Korean threat afterwards, necessitated a strong alliance between South Korea and the US as well as a long-term US military commitment that continues to this day. The growth of the military was one of the inevitable consequences. 100,000 before the war the number of soldiers expanded six times reaching 600,000. This was an ideal set up for a military coup in 1961 and 1979, and the establishment of the Junta government for almost three decades. The military service became compulsory for every man in order to meet a demand for maintaining the army. This also served the militarization of the South Korean society.[293]

Beginning in the 1960s, the Korean economy would enter a period of unprecedented economic growth, but the effects of the war continued to be felt as part of the motivation for economic growth was to compete against the communist North. Due to the North Korean threat, the military and anti-communism were facts of South Korea's life. The social and cultural impact of Korea's post-war militarization and anti-communism has continued to linger. Kim was of the opinion that "South Korean politics and society have internalized the war since 1950".[294] He emphasized that the Korean War "has taken root as the principle of politics and social management" and further it exposes "the very nature of South Korean's political ruling order and its capitalism, and the level and meaning of its democracy and freedom".[295] In this post-war environment, the principle that "it is O.K. to kill the Reds" became an acceptable excuse and cause in South Korea's capitalist, judicial, and social order.[296]

Oberdorfer points out the ideological penetration of people's lives, saying that

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[293] Insook Kwon, *Taehanminkookeun Koondaeda* [The Republic of Korea is Military] (Seoul: Chungnyunsa, 2005), p. 211.

[294] Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), p. 221.

[295] Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), p. 221.

[296] Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), p. 221.

"one of the most important consequences of the war was the hardening of ideological and political lines between North and South. The antipathy that had developed between the opposing regimes was deepened into a blood feud among family members, extending from political leaders to the bulk of the ordinary people who had suffered at the hands of the other side".[297] The post-war political terrain was totally rearranged by the terror of war, and anti-communism achieved a hegemonic power over civil society. The state legitimized itself through anti-communism.[298] The war exposed not only a difference in ideology and social systems, but the division or destruction of individuals' lives and the disorganization or destruction of the self.[299] All the national power in both the South and North was almost exhausted because of mutual animosity and destruction created by the war. In Kang's analysis, post-partition Korean politics, society, economy and culture in view of "the division [partition] system" was finally solidified through the tragic fratricidal Korean War. Violence during the war still powerfully affects almost every aspect of life of the people. Kim points out that "most people who point the prevalence of discrimination, suppression, and violence in today's South Korean schools, workplaces, and homes are not aware of how such violence was built into the very structure of society at the macroscopic level during the Korean War."[300] Partition-related violence reproduced other violence in various social, economic and political relations, and it would be justified by the partition logic, for it was the way South Korean society was operated. This was a real tragedy which the Korean War and partition reality had created.

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[297] Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New ed.)* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), p. 10.

[298] Chaehong Lim, 'The National Security Law and Anticommunist Ideology in Korean Society', *Korea Journal*, vol. 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2006), pp. 80-102.

[299] For detailed horrors, traumas, and hatred during the war are often exposed in literature and movies. See Jinki Kim (ed.), *Bankongjoouiwa Hankookmoonhakui Keundaejuk Donghak* I & II [A Study on Modern Dynamics between Anti-Communism and Korean Contemporary Literature, vol. I & II] (Seoul: Hanwool, 2009); Hyangjin Lee, *Contemporary Korean Cinema: Identity, Culture and Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

[300] Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), pp. 221–222.

Impact of the Korean War to the World

The casualties of foreign troops in the Korean War were immediately felt. The Chinese army in particular had a huge loss of military. According to the official Chinese estimates, there were 152,400 military dead and missing, and 238,000 military wounded. The US military dead and missing reached 54,246, more than ninety percent of the total casualties of the UN allied forces.[301] However, the actual figures would be more than the Chinese figures as the US and the South Korean estimates were much larger.[302]

The Korean War changed the United States' foreign policy in East Asia. It doubled the size of the US army and air force in order to check the communist threat while maintaining the containment policy against communist countries. The Korean War could be considered the "real" start of the Cold War.[303] Over all, the US security commitments to Europe and Asia were strengthened, for instance, the NATO alliance in Western Europe and containment in Vietnam. The Korean War was something of a disaster for the Soviet Union; not only did North Korea fail to unify the Korean Peninsula, but the war brought Western Europe, Japan, and the anti-communist states of Asia closer together, countering the Soviet Union.[304] The Korean War prompted China to modernize its military and led to a period of hostility between China and the US. Not only did the arms of the two nations meet in Korea, but the US also moved to put Taiwan under its protection, preventing China from conquering the island.[305]

Japan benefited greatly in her economy during the war. Japanese companies provided war supplies to the UN allied forces and received huge profits, quickly making up the losses from World War II. The US made $ 2.37 billion worth of war

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[301] *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 22, *Macropaedia* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannia, 2007), p. 527.

[302] Michael J. Seth, *A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), p. 112.

[303] The Korea Foundation, *The DMZ: Dividing the Two Koreas* (Seoul: Seoul Selection, 2010), p. 42.

[304] The Korea Foundation, *The DMZ: Dividing the Two Koreas* (Seoul: Seoul Selection, 2010), p. 42.

[305] Michael J. Seth, *A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), p. 112.

procurements in the four years of 1950 to 1954 and it was a "divine aid" for Japan.[306] Japan also politically became a close ally to the US in anti-communism.

The Korean War was a first test for the third world's non-alignment foreign policy.[307]Although the third world countries, apart from the two blocs of the Cold War, had no significant voice to challenge the course of the war, they acted as a channel for the two battling groups. India was at the forefront during and after the Korean War in this role. When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, India supported the UN Security Council, condemning North Korea as an aggressor and calling for a ceasefire. However, India did not agree to send the combat troops. Nonetheless, India sent a non-combat troop of 627 members of a medical team to back the South Koreans.[308] As a third party voice, India's main concern was to prevent the entry of outside powers into the conflict. When the UN allied forces pushed toward the north, crossing the 38th parallel into North Korea, India opposed it. What was critical to communication between China and the US was that India was the only channel in-between. For example, Chou Enlai, the Chinese prime minister, warned the US through the Indian ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar, of retaliation. At the armistice negotiation period, India again played a role to fashion the formula of A Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Some Korean POWs (Prisoners of Wars) who had chosen to go to a third country came to India.[309] Although the Korean War was a civil war in terms of geographical limitation within Korean peninsula, it in fact affected not only the Cold War powers, but also other third world countries like India, particularly in her non-alignment foreign policy to continue with somehow a successful test on the international issue of the Korean War.

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306 Roger Dingman, 'The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan', *The Journal of American–East Asian Relations 2*, no. 1 (Spring 1993), p. 43.

307 Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence* (revised ed.) (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008), p. 94.

308 See a testimony of the Korean War veteran, Lt. General Ashok Banerjee, among Indian medical teams in *Namaste India*, vol. 82 (June 2012), pp. 30-37.

309 See some of testimonials of a POW who had come to India in Donghwa Hyun, *Kyukrangui Sewol Indoae Datulnaerigo* [Dropping Anchor in India during Turbulent Times] (Seoul: Namuwasoop, 2003).

Conclusion

When India and Korea got independence respectively from the United Kingdom on 15 August 1947 and the imperial Japan on 15 August 1945, people once colonized felt the joy of freedom, a freedom of having one's own free independent country. However, the partitions both in India and Korea transformed the joy into fear and hatred. Partitions changed the concept of the enemy from the outsider to the insider, which led to internal divisions, separation and wars. In India, as colonialism drew nearer to an end in the 1940s, communalist leaders and secularist leaders were in severe battles for their political hegemony. Especially, the logic of the "two nation theory" asserted by the Muslim League played a critical role when it accompanied violence between the Muslims, and the Hindus and the Sikhs. The Hindu and the Sikh communal leaders also similarly depended on violent methods to create communal awareness. In this circumstance even before actual partition took place, most of North India witnessed communal violence. Punjab in particularly was the worst affected area during partition period in many respects. Massacres, arsons, lootings and abductions were prevalent. It was almost an instance of ethnic cleansing in Punjab where, in West Punjab, the Muslims killed and purged out the Hindus and the Sikhs while the Sikhs and the Hindus either killed or chased away the Muslim inhabitants in East Punjab. Inhumane brutality was practiced by both sides. Countless refugee migrations added to the bitterness of partition. Attacks and counter-attacks from one community to another community only enhanced fear and hatred against each other. It was a civilian war, a war for the transfer of power. The wars of 1947-8 and 1965 between India and Pakistan created the continued awareness of enemy along communal lines. Such communally charged incidents were often used and misused by communalist leaders for their social, economic and political gains. Partition was an event of the past, but it continued to influence the social and political behavior of the people in India under the partition system.

In Korea, partition was unlike India in which it was prompted not by Koreans, but the Cold War world powers, notably, the United States and the Soviet Union after the Japanese colonial government surrendered to the Allied Forces in World War II.

In South Korea, a series of violent incidents in the period between independence and the Korean War created the division of people according to ideological and political leanings between the right and the left while it insured the establishment of an anti-communistic national system. This was initiated by the state assisted by non-state agencies such as the Church. The Korean War confirmed this system and solidified it while entire people and lands were affected by war violence. The wartime killings clearly scarred on the hearts and bodies of people in the two Koreas. What grieved the Korean people the most after the war was that Korea remained divided. The division of land, people and hearts were serious outcomes along with huge economic losses. From 1950s onwards until very recently, the two Koreas had to live under the partition system. South Korea became a strong advocate of anti-communism while North Korea maintained her own way of communism and dictatorship. Unforgettable and unforgivable Korean War left scars on people's minds in South Korea which could not allow other political alternatives, only anti-communism. Militarization was another by-product of the Korean War, which led to three decades of military rule and the participation in the Vietnam War. Political leaders often misused or otherwise exploited such sentiments as Korea's unique position in Cold War tension did not change much throughout the second half of the twentieth century. It defined the character of South Korean society in every aspect.

In India, the community-initiated violence occurred much more than the state-oriented one whereas in Korea, the state was a main initiator of violence in which religion such as Christianity was an active partaker. Whether violence was imposed by individuals, communities, or the states during partition and its related wars, it challenged secular democracy of the states and served to solidify the partition system in both post-partition India and Korea.

Chapter 3

Two Assassinations and Partition Politics in India and Korea

Introduction

Partition delineated the borders of India and Pakistan in August 1947 while Korean peninsula experienced a similar division of North and South at the 38th parallel line in August 1945. In the partition process, further division took place through a series of extreme violence - killings, massacres and assassinations, solidifying the partition system. Two prominent nationalist leaders, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in India, and Kim Koo in Korea, were assassinated by right-wing extremists in the period of the unsettled post-partition social and political environment in both newly independent but truncated countries. Both Gandhi and Kim Koo were strong upholders of national unity beyond religious and ideological boundaries. However there was no room for them to sustain their political idealism for national unity. Factionalists suspected or accused them of being non-loyalists to their divided new nation in the course of national identity formation. The assassinations were attempts to secure extremists' political influence by removing seemingly significant political obstacles permanently in the divided nation.

It was a highly developed idea, throughout factionalist discourse during the partition, that only a certain category of people would be allowed to become citizens of the new nation after partitions took place. "Otherization" became the process for defining 'who will be appropriate citizens?' and 'what is acceptable ideology for nation-building?' In the midst of partition violence and ideological tensions during and after the partitions, a limited definition of nation and nationhood engendered the growth of a certain tendency towards making others 'enemies'.

This chapter aims first to analyze the characteristics of composite and inclusive nationalism through the work of M.K. Gandhi in India and Kim Koo in Korea. Through a comparative analysis of the contrasting political ideas and activities of the assassinated leaders, M.K. Gandhi and Kim Koo on the one hand, and the assassins and their political proponents on the other hand, it aims to discover the relationship between the assassinations of M.K. Gandhi and Kim Koo and the solidification of the partition system.

1. The Assassination of M.K. Gandhi and the Partition of India

Toward Inclusive Nationalism

Gandhi's nationalism has been analyzed at various angles by social scientists and politicians. One thing most commonly agreed upon among them is that his nationalism was an inclusive and composite nationalism, as opposed to exclusive or separatist nationalism. In his entire public life, Gandhi was a champion of Hindu-Muslim unity in accordance with his religious and political conviction. Being a devoted Hindu himself who practiced his beliefs in every corner of his social and political life daily, Gandhi never disowned his Hindu identity throughout his entire life. However, his commitment to the Hindu faith encouraged him to accelerate the Hindu-Muslim unity, rather than to hold exclusively to his own community's interests. Under the divisive political situation of partition in 1947, Gandhi's prolonged commitment to communal unity and peace played a decisive role in free India's social and political relationships among various communities, especially challenging and healing the divided hearts of the people. His nationalism here will be selectively analyzed in view of his "inclusive" nationalism in terms of his successes and failures.

Gandhi's inclusive nationalism would be found in his conviction to village self-rule tied up with the spiritual values of truth and non-violence. This localized rule, according to his ideology, would ensure the equal status of every religion:

> Independence must begin at the bottom. Thus, every village will be a republic or panchayat having full powers…If there is to be a republic of every village in India, then I

> claim verity for my picture in which the last is equal to the first or, in other words, no one is to be the first and none the last. In this picture every religion has its full and equal place. We are all leaves of a majestic tree whose trunk cannot be shaken off its roots which are deep down in the bowels of the earth.[310]
>
> The new basis has to be built here in the villages where the Hindus and the Muslims have lived and suffered together on the land of their forefathers and must live together in the future. I ask all Hindus and Muslims to devote themselves to the noble task of recognizing village life and in improving their economic condition. Through cottage industries they will find themselves working together in the common task, and unity will spread like a life giving influence over the entire country side.[311]

He dreamt of independent India as a perfectly unified country cutting across religious backgrounds in spite of communal differences:

> Independent India, as conceived by me, will have all Indians belonging to different religions living in perfect friendship. There need to be no millionaires and no paupers; all would belong to the State, for the State belonged to them. I will die in the act of realizing this dream. I would not wish to live to see India torn asunder by civil strife….[312] So my wish is that Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians and Muslims who are in India should continue to live in India and India should become a country where everyone's life and property are safe. Only then will India progress.[313]

Gandhi held religion as a regulator of morality and of law. He believed Allah in the Quran is the same God as Krishna in the Gita and God of the Holy Bible. Therefore, all human beings are children of the same God so that there must be no discrimination among people based on their religious designations. For him, those whom God created as one, man will never be able to divide. The root of all

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310 'Independence and Decentralization, 21 July 1946', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 347-8.

311 Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (compiled.), *Gandhi and Communal Problems* (Mumbai: Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, 1994), p. 67.

312 *The Hindu*, 15 February 1947.

313 'Speech at Prayer Meeting, 13 January 1948', *CWMG*, vol. 98 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 227.

religions, said Gandhi, "is one and it is pure and all of them have sprung from the same source, hence all are equal."[314]

Pursuing Morality as a Remedy to Communal Problem

Gandhi's *Ahimsa* (non-violence) was his lifelong commitment as a seeker as well as a politician. He sought to propagate it as 'the law of life for human beings'.[315] For him, non-violence was not a mere experiment, but it was "both a means and an end". It was "the most distinctive and the largest contribution of Hinduism to India's culture".[316] He considered the *Bhagavad Gita* "the only infallible guide" and "dictionary of reference".[317] He drew the principle of Ahimsa from saying that "the text from the *Bhagavad Gita* shows to me how the principle of conquering hate by love, untruth by truth, can and must be applied."[318] His interpretation was in contrast to that of B.G. Tilak, an extreme Congress leader then, whose reading of Gita was that it legitimized the use of violence.[319] Therefore, as early as the 1920s, two opposite schools of thought were developed, the non-violence of Gandhian ideology on the one hand, and the legitimized violence of Tilak-ite ideology on the other. These two competing ideologies adopted by their respective successors consistently challenged each other throughout British colonialism and post-independent Indian politics. Gandhi in fact clarified his idea of non-violence by refuting Tilak's militant Hinduism. Gandhi further said about *Ahimsa* in linking with *Gita* that:

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[314] 'Letter to Mahadevshastri Divekar, 1 November 1945', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 160.

[315] 'Letter to M. Asaf Ali, 26 June 1933', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 244.

[316] 'Interview with Dr. John Mott, 1 March 1929', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 151.

[317] 'Letter to Gulzarilal Nanda, 28 May 1927', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 172.

[318] 'Note on Tilak's Letter, 28 January 1920', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 113.

[319] Christophe Jaffrelot, 'Opposing Gandhi: Hindu Nationalism and Political Violence', Denis Vidal, Gilles Tarabout &Eric Meyer (ed.), *Violence/Non-Violence: Some Hindu Perspectives* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), p. 301.

> The *Gita* contains the gospel of *karma* or work, the gospel of *bhakti* or devotion and the gospel of *jnana* or knowledge. Life should be a harmonious whole of these three. But the gospel of service is the basis of all, and what can be more necessary for those who want to serve the country than that they begin with the chapter enunciating the gospel of work? But you must approach it with the five necessary equipments, viz., *ahimsa* (non-violence), *satya* (truth), *brahmacharya* (celibacy), *aparingraha* (non-possession), and *asteya* (non-stealing). Then and then only will you be able to reach a correct interpretation of it. And then you will read it to discover in it *ahimsa* and not *himsa*, as so many nowadays try to do.[320]

Therefore, he only grew more convinced that in the complex situation facing India, there was no other way of achieving real freedom, but that of non-violence.[321]

Even when, in March 1940, Jinnah declared the Lahore Resolution which demanded a separate Muslim State, Pakistan, Gandhi called it 'an untruth'.[322] He urged others to see the Hindu-Muslim problem not as a political situation, but rather a religious and a moral situation, which he thought were of greater significance than the political. As far as Gandhi's religious morality was concerned, Jinnah's demand for Pakistan was "poison into the Muslim mind" which rendered the greatest disservice to Islam.[323] Having watched a series of communal violence disputes between the Muslims and non-Muslims during and after the partition, he was of the strong opinion that arms could not preserve the freedom of India as India did not defeat the British with the help of arms. He said that "I fight not with the sword, but with the weapons of truth and non-violence. Those weapons are still with us."[324] To his last moment, he maintained the creed of non-violence despite the pressure of the circumstances to push it aside among a communally antagonistic and divided people. As his power of influence totally depended upon the power of his followers, he realized that his appeal for "sanity amidst insanity" was a lonely battle. He

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320 'Speech to Students, Tiruppur, 23 October 1927', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 69.

321 'Letter to M. Asaf Ali, 26 June 1933', Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 244.

322 'Hindu-Muslin Tangle, 29 April 1949', *CWMG*, vol. 78 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 178.

323 'Hindu-Muslin Tangle, 29 April 1949', *CWMG*, vol. 78 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 178.

324 'Speech at Prayer Meeting, 26 September 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 96 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 434.

nonetheless urged the whole people of India to use the weapons of truth and non-violence and confessed that "it is not within my power alone to use them. I can do nothing without your support." The last two years of his life witnessed an increase of his frustration and despair. Its main causes lay in the communal violence surrounding the partition, which made him feel shame as an advocate of *Ahimsa*. A Hindu refugee, talking with Gandhi, blamed the Congress-led Indian government for their ill-management of refugee affairs while they held emotionally strong anti-Muslim sentiments saying:

> The Congress has already committed one blunder. Now it will commit another. Hindus and Muslims will never be able to stay together. Lakhs of our people are starving and naked. But nothing has been done for them. How many weapons have been surrendered up to now? How can we trust such people? We wish that the houses vacated by the Muslims should be given to us. There is an agreement between the two Governments that they should not make searches. Still the Pakistan Government is taking advantage of this situation. There the people are getting thousands of licenses and arms and here we have been forced to surrender them. We are happy that Muslims can settle in Delhi. But if you come over to Pakistan with us and help us to get back our things, we do not wish to stay in Delhi even for a day. Nothing will be done till you decide to pay them back in their own coin. Today we are without a roof. The condition of women and children is terrible.[325]

Even in this desperately pathetic situation and among angry outbursts from non-Muslim refugees who had fled from West Pakistan Gandhi answered that *Ahimsa* had to be maintained:

> It is a matter of shame for India to think of throwing out four-and-a-half crore Muslims. It is not practical to do so. I cannot say that all the arms have been surrendered to me. But that is not of much importance. Arms can never protect anyone. Try to understand this if you can. You will not hear anything besides this from me. I will only say 'die but do not kill' and I shall die saying this.[326]

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[325] 'Talk with Refugees, 25 September 1947'*CWMG*, vol. 96 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 427.

[326] 'Talk with Refugees, 25 September 1947'*CWMG*, vol. 96 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 427.

On the final implementation of partition, Gandhi found himself helpless in the face of the communalization of the people. There was no question of giving a call for a movement when there was so much violence in the air. He "sadly accepted that the path of *Ahimsa*, however imperfectly practiced, had brought independence but failed miserably to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity."[327] Gandhi himself practiced his last fast as a votary of non-violence, or *Ahimsa*, on 13 January 1948. He clearly declared that his fast was "against no one party, group or individual exclusively and yet it excludes nobody. It is addressed to the conscience of all"[328] and he assured that it would end "when there was a union of hearts of all communities".[329] He viewed that the root of the communal disturbance was a lack of morality and ethics. Therefore, his fast was a fast of "self-purification" which would restore a distorted morality. Therefore, "everyone should purify himself. If not, the situation cannot be saved."[330] After he broke his last fast on 18 January 1948, he repeatedly urged the people of Delhi to work towards communal harmony between the Hindus and the Muslims and disclosed his life purpose by saying that "I do not wish to live for any other purpose. A man lives only to raise humanity."[331]

Gandhi's Assassination and the Extreme Hindu Communalism

After the creation of Pakistan, four millions of Muslims who had decided to remain in India were living with fears of losing their equal rights of Indian citizenship, being frequently threatened by Hindu and Sikh mobs. Gandhi was steady and firm in his commitment for communal unity, especially protecting Muslims during and after the partition. On 22 October 1947, he said to Muslims that "Hindu-Muslim unity has been my lifelong ambition" and went on to say that "you know that today because of you I have become an eyesore to everyone.

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[327] Sucheta Mahajan, *Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India* (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), pp. 390-391.

[328] 'Talk with a Sikh friend, 13 January 1948', *CWMG*, vol. 98 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 223.

[329] 'Speech at Prayer Meeting, 12 January 1948', *CWMG*, vol. 98 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 219.

[330] 'Speech at Prayer Meeting, 13 January 1948', *CWMG*, vol. 98 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 224.

[331] 'Speech at Prayer Meeting, 18 January 1948', *CWMG*, vol. 98 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 260.

Hindus are very much annoyed with me. You should be knowing, if you do not, how furious Hindus are with me. I shall not be surprised if one day I fall a prey to this fury."[332] When there were great massacres against Muslims after partition in the late 1947, Gandhi was strongly of the opinion that communal inclusivity had to be maintained in free India. On 15 November 1947 at the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) he spoke for the cause that:

> When we were fighting for our freedom, we bore a heavy responsibility, but today when we have achieved freedom, our responsibility has grown a hundred-fold. What is happening today? Though it is not true of the whole of India, yet there are many places today where a Muslim cannot live in security. There are miscreants who will kill him or throw him out of a running train for no reason other than that he is a Muslim. There are several such instances. I will not be satisfied with your saying that there was no help for it or that you had no part in it. We cannot absolve ourselves of our responsibility for what has happened. I have to fight against this insanity and find out a cure for it.[333]

Gandhi's last fast was intended for communal unity in New Delhi where there was continuous violence against the Muslims, mainly from the deprived and uprooted Hindu and Sikh refugees who were struggling to settle in New Delhi from West Pakistan. During the fast, he clearly mentioned the meaning of his fast, saying that "our hearts should be cleansed and awakened. In that alone lies the good of all." He went on to say that his fast "should not be considered a political move in any sense of the term", but it was "in obedience to the peremptory call of conscience and duty" which came out of from his heart-felt agony. He agreed to break his fast on 18 January 1948 when he heard that seven points were accepted by all major political groups and religious organizations including the Hindu Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Congress, Delhi Chief Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, and Pakistan's High Commissioner, and the like. A summary of the seven point declarations were: 1) Complete freedom of worship to Muslims at the tomb of Khwaja Qutubud-Din Bakhtiar and non-interference with the celebration of the Urs which was due to be held there within a

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[332] 'Talk with Muslims, 22 October 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 97 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 136.

[333] 'Speech at the AICC, 15 November 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 97 (New Delhi, 1999), pp. 318-319.

week, 2) voluntary evacuation by non-Muslims of all the mosques in the city which were being used for residential purposes or which had been converted into temples, 3) free movement of Muslims in areas where they used to stay before the disturbances, 4) full safety to Muslims while traveling by train, 5) no economic boycott of Muslims, 6) full discretion for Muslims to invite non-Muslims to live in areas occupied by them, 7) freedom to Muslim evacuees to come back to Delhi if they so desired.[334]

However, his last endeavor provoked anger among communally-oriented Hindus and Sikhs. Master Tara Singh openly discussed his resentment towards Gandhi's remarks in favour of the Muslims[335] while Hindu fanatics even conspired to murder him after feeling betrayed by his Muslim-friendly gestures. During his fast, Hindu fanatics organized demonstrations against Gandhi with shouts and slogans, "Death to Gandhi!" He was blamed for the partition and the miseries of the refugees and weakening of the Hindus at the meetings of the Hindu Mahasabha on 17 and 18 January 1948. He finally paid the ultimate price, that of his life for the Hindu-Muslim unity in Delhi. However, as Sarkar remarks, despite total disdain for all conventional forms of political power since 1945, his passionate anti-communalism efforts during partition made his last few months his "finest hour" and it also highly exposed Gandhi's unique personal qualities and true greatness.[336]

On 30 January 1948, a Hindu communal fanatic, Nathuram Godse, assassinated Gandhi. According to evidence and findings, *Hindutva* fanatics had attempted to murder Gandhi at least four times since 1934, which meant his assassination had been well-planned by a group of conspirators.[337] According to Godse's lengthy 93 page statement in court on 8 November 1948, he admitted that he murdered Gandhi on the grounds that Gandhi's "*Ahimsa* Gospel" resulted in a weakening of Hindus and "the emasculation of the Hindu community and thus make the community incapable of resisting the aggression or inroads of other communities, especially the

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[334] See footnote no. 1 in 'Speech at Prayer Meeting, 17 January 1948', *CWMG*, vol. 98 (New Delhi, 1999), pp. 249-250.

[335] *The Tribune*, 25 January 1948.

[336] Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1983), p. 437.

[337] See details in Subhash Gatade, *Godse's Children: Hindutva Terror in India* (New Delhi: Pharos Media, 2011), pp. 45-46.

Muslims."[338] Godse felt that "Indian politics in the absence of Gandhiji would be practical, and would grow powerful with the aid of the armed forces… the nation would be saved from the inroads of Pakistan."[339] There was a fear that the Muslim rule in India and the extinction of the Hindus would be established if, he thought, "the pest of Gandhism" continued.[340] Under this self-reasoning, he concluded that Gandhi was "the greatest enemy, not only of the Hindus, but of the whole nation".[341] Therefore, he was confident that the removal of Gandhi would ensure his wishes for India, "*Akhand Bharat Amar Rehega*" and "*Vande-mataram*" as he shouted at the end of his court statement.[342] His own confessions as to why he had to murder Gandhi reveal how those of the *Hindutva* right-wing were frustrated and later infuriated at the partition of India and the Gandhian government's unchanged favour to the Muslim community in India. He asserted that his act of murdering Gandhi was "wholly and exclusively political" and went on to say that the establishment of Pakistan upset "the tranquility of his mind" and to make things worse, the Indian government didn't take any step to protect the interests of Hindus in Pakistan. It was, by his judgment, a terrible deception of the people.[343] His defense statement expressed sentiments typical to many Hindu communalists. He said that "my study of men and things led me to believe it was my first duty to serve Hindudom and Hindus both as a patriot and a world citizen" and further acknowledged his devotion to "the Hindu Sanatanist ideology and programme", which alone, he firmly believed "could win and preserve the national independence of Hindustan, my Motherland, and enable her to render true service to humanity as

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[338] *The Times of India*, 9 November 1948. For details of Nathuram Godse's court statement and ideological attack on Gandhi, see Gopal Godse, *Gandhi Ji's Murder And After* (Translated by Godbole, S.T.) (New Delhi: Surya Prakashan, 1989); Virendra Mehra (compiled ed.), *Why I assassinated Gandhi* (revised ed.) (New Delhi: Farsight Publisher, 2015).

[339] *The Times of India*, 9 November 1948.

[340] Quoted in *Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1969), p.640.

[341] Quoted in *Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1969), p.640.

[342] *The Times of India*, 9 November 1948.

[343] *The Times of India*, 9 November 1948.

well."[344] He strongly justified the use of force to fight an enemy by his religious conviction based on Hindu mythology:

> In fact, honour, duty, and love of one's own kith and kin and country might often compel us to disregard non-violence and to use force. I could never conceive that an armed resistance to an aggression is either wrong or immoral where one has to fight an enemy who is violent, aggressive or unjust. I would consider it a religious and moral duty to resist and, if possible, to overpower such an enemy by use of force. Shri Ramchandra killed Ravana in a tumultuous fight and relieved Sita. Shri Krishna killed Kansa to end his wickedness. In the *Mahabharata* Arjuna had revered Bhishma. Drona, his preceptor, had to succumb to the arrows of Arjuna. It is my firm belief that in dubbing Krishna and Arjuna as guilty of violence, the Mahatma betrayed a total ignorance of the springs of human action…I believe in Lord Krishna's promise that whenever religion is in danger and contrary forces raise their head, I shall assume incarnation for the re-establishment of the religion. I believe with the poet prophet Jayadeva that in the tenth incarnation the Lord Almighty will act through human beings.[345]

Therefore, Godse assassinated Gandhi justifying his act as that of the warrior heroes in Hindu mythology. It was for him a "sacred duty" dictated by the pure love of the motherland, India.[346] In his communal ideology and mindset, Godse was not able to accept the allegedly deceptive roles Gandhi had played to the Hindu community and to India as a whole. As a patriotic Hindu communalist, his ideological clash with Gandhi finally prompted him to take action to eliminate Gandhi in the name of his God and his nation. Godse defended himself based on the *Bhagavad Gita*, a precedent set by B.G. Tilak and other militant Hindus. Their Hindu militant ideology was deeply rooted in their sacred scriptures of which interpretation and application totally differed from Gandhi's. Therefore, Gandhi's assassination exposed the ideological cleavages between the secularist Hindus and the militant Hindus or the Hindutva advocates.

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[344] Quoted in *Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1969), p.637.

[345] Quoted in *Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1969), p.638.

[346] *Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1969), p.641.

On 27 February 1948, Vallabhbhai Sardar Patel, the deputy Prime Minister, sent a letter containing the following excerpt to Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister: "It was a fanatical wing of the Hindu Mahasabha directly under Savarkar that [hatched] the conspiracy [to kill Gandhi] and saw it through." Savarkar was accused of conspiracy, but was acquitted for lack of corroborative evidence. Sarvarkar upheld his innocence and no connection to Gandhi's murder while Godse also defended his mentor-cum-Guru, Savarkar. However, according to the report of the Kapur Commission for an inquiry of Gandhi's assassination in 1969, it was concluded that all facts and evidence confirmed the conspiracy to murder by Savarkar and his group.[347] This group continued to affect the development of Indian democracy in the post-partition era.

Aftermath of Gandhi's Murder

Gandhi's genuine efforts to appease the Muslims, including his last fast on 13 January, visitations to Muslim refugee camps, and constant appeals directed to the Hindus and the Sikhs for peace along with his murder at the hands of a Hindu fanatic did, in the end, affect the Muslim morale and increase their confidence in a peaceful future for the country.[348] According to Zamindar and based on the official report, between mid March 1948 to mid May 1948 number of Muslims arriving in Delhi was far exceeding the number of Muslims departing Delhi.[349] It was, as Zamindar suggested, due at least partially to Gandhi's fast and death that affected those who had earlier left to Pakistan and made decided to return India.[350] It also influenced political leaders to recommit to the cause of secularism. Nehru's commitment to secularism was reconfirmed and it continued throughout his premiership. Immediate effect on Congress leadership was also apparent in the

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[347] J. L. Kapur, *Report of Commission of Inquiry into Conspiracy to Murder Mahatma Gandhi, Part II*, pp. 355-357.

[348] Maulana A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom (complete version)* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), pp. 238-240.

[349] V.F.Y. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2008), p.88.

[350] V.F.Y. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2008), p.87.

reconciled relations between Nehru and Sadar Patel. Gandhi's murder rang an alarm bell to both to unite in the fighting evil of communal divisions in India. Gandhi's death also led to a 'major setback to the communal forces' in its immediate effects to Indian politics as the RSS was banned by the Government of India for some time in connection with Gandhi's murder case which was followed by Hindu Mahasabha's voluntary disorganization.[351]

The murder of Gandhi had exposed the evil of communalism dramatically. Amidst the high pitch of communal violence between the Muslims and the Hindus in 1948, his murder signified that the Hindu fanatical groups were now becoming more dangerous to the future of India than the Muslim separatists who had already left to Pakistan. In the absence of rival communalists, the Hindu communalist groups began to dominate with extreme politics in post-partition India. It also signified the fact that any obstacle to their political agenda could be eliminated with force of arms even without the consent of the Government as the father of the nation, M. K. Gandhi, so tragically proved. *Hindutva* advocates succeeded in removing the biggest obstacle, M.K. Gandhi, in the absence of the Muslim League in order to establish their own *Hindu Rashtra.* Communal sentiments which had been firmly infused in the minds of people through the brutal experience of partition still played their roles in the social and political developments in post-partition India, particularly in the northern regions along the border between India and Pakistan and the regions which contained a good number of partition refugees. Communal politics soon developed its social and political base in North India. As further discussed in chapter 4, in the 1950s and 60s in Punjab, communal sentiments were ingrained in the linguistic state debates between the Hindus and the Sikhs, which enhanced communal divisions and later ushered in the growth of communalistic political and social bodies in Northwest India. In Delhi, Hindu communal politics was firmly established long before any other state and as early as 1951 when the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (hereafter, BJS) was formed with the help of the Hindu middle classes both from local origins and Punjabi refugees.

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[351] Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence (revised ed.)*(New Delhi: Penguin, 2008), p. 100.

What Made Gandhi Fail to Stop Communalism and Partition?

Gandhi's life-long struggle with communal problems in India turned out to be a half-success in the end. Communalism finally led to the partition alongside religious lines yet Indian democracy continued to retain secularism as a basic principle even after partition. In terms of national unity, the creation of Pakistan clearly indicated failure of Gandhian nationalism. This was due to the fact that Gandhi did not seriously view communalism as an ideology which could replace and destroy other ideologies.[352] Communalism with religious appeals was not religious, but political, which involved non-religious issues like economic, social, and political interests and needs of people. Communalism was used as a guiding principle for communalists as secularism was to Indian nationalists. Communalism was an ideology which controlled the behaviours of people and imposed certain behaviourial norms and values on the psyche of its followers. Therefore, strengthening one's religious identity under communal influence would ensure a stronger communal identity. It was not a stronger morality to lessen communal problems as Gandhi believed it would.[353] Gandhi didn't succeed in solving communal problems with his moral remedy. His emphasis on moral solution neglected ideological aspect of the problem. To fight communalism with success, as Bipan Chandra pointed out, "it was necessary to have a deep comprehension of communalism in all its complexity and opacity - its ideological elements, its sources and social roots, its social base, reasons for its growth and stubbornness in the face of the nationalist attack."[354] Chandra went on to say that "throughout his political career he was baffled by communalism so much so that in the end he could counterpoise to it only his personal, moral and physical courage at Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar or Delhi."[355] In whatever distorted form or manner, communalism

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[352] Bipan Chandra, *The Writings of Bipan Chandra:The Making of Modern India, From Marx to Gandhi* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2012), p. 196.

[353] Achin Vanaik, *The Furies of Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity, and Secularization* (London: Verso, 1997), p.

[354] Bipan Chandra, *The Writings of Bipan Chandra: The Making of Modern India From Marx to Gandhi* (New Delhi: Orient Black Swan, 2012), p.196.

[355] Bipan Chandra, *The Writings of Bipan Chandra: The Making of Modern India From Marx to Gandhi* (New Delhi: Orient Black Swan, 2012), p.196.

was developed as a religion-oriented nationalism at least for its advocates, notably, the Muslim Leaguers and *Hindutva* followers. Gandhi failed to launch an ideological battle against communalism with a long-term political programme. Gandhi's idealistic remedies to communalism like individual awakening, renewing of morality, or communal life in villages weren't realistic at the time of partition violence. It made him more vulnerable and impotent in handling the problem. Gandhi's solution to communal violence was too moral and spiritual to follow for those who had experienced losses of the beloved, properties, and hopes for the future as well as violent massacres, lootings, abductions, forced evacuations, migrations, and forced conversions. For them, Gandhi's remedy to cure their bereavement failed to convince them to take action accordingly. As far as the Hindu and Sikh refugees were concerned, immediate action needed to be taken for their solace, whether that would be receiving proper governmental help for their rehabilitation or taking revenge against enemy community. Gandhi's appeals for communal unity by appeasing Muslims were, in a sense, considered none of their business. Gandhi himself expressed the limitation of his influence to arrest divisive communalism several times, saying, "I wish I could do something, but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is as bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness and in such distress, I cry out to God for light."[356] When evil of communalism finally truncated India according to religious lines, Gandhi could not convince a large number of Muslims that "*swaraj* would not curtail their religious rights and civil liberties."[357]

Secondly, Gandhi was too spiritual and he failed to effectively counterattack communalism as an instrument for political and economic gains in the form of violence. It served the interests of political and local elites. As Brenschot argues, communal sentiments were instruments in the hands of these elites, which they employed to defend their political and economic interests.[358] Arsons, lootings, killings, and abductions in both West and East Punjab were not accidental, but were

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[356] 'A letter to M.A. Jinnah, 24 March 1937', *CWMG*, vol.73 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 29.

[357] Mushirul Hasan, *Faith and Freedom: Gandhi in History* (New Delhi: Niyogi Books, 2013), p. 371.

[358] Ward Brenschot, *Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim Violence and the Indian State* (New Delhi: Rainlight, 2011), p. 26.

more or less deliberate actions to purge the other communities in order to fulfill their political and economic goals. For example, the elections of 1946 in Punjab witnessed full communal mobilizations among the masses by the Muslim League and their counterparts, which culminated in communal cleavage between the Muslims on the one hand and the Hindus and the Sikhs on the other. During partition violence, communal war was highly encouraged by communal leaders of both sides. During communal riots in the regions like Lahore, Amritsar, Multan, Attock and Rawalpindi in Punjab in March 1947, Hindu and Sikh traders and moneylenders were targeted by the Muslim masses. It was for them, an economic liberation movement from the clutches of Hindu and Sikh upper classes as well as a religious movement. Communally mobilized mobs were exploited by political and religious leaders in the name of religion. In this instrumental aspect of communal violence religion had grown to be a far greater factor than any other social mobilization factors like castes, classes, regions, or languages at the time of partition, and it consumed all other factors to serve its purpose just like "a black hole".[359]

However, Gandhi's mere moral appeals for personal repentance could not effectively challenge the multi-purposed communal violence. There was a total absence of thorough investigation of the reasons and motivations behind the interests of the communally-polarized masses perpetuated by the elites, and efforts to find practical solutions to them in Gandhi's anti-communalism. Furthermore, Gandhi did not mobilize any mass movement against communalism in the face of prevailing violence as an upholder of non-violence. He rather religiously condemned himself in saying that his impotence and helplessness for the Hindu-Muslim unity was due to his lack of dependence on God. As Chandra examines, although Gandhi was sure that the communal problem would be solved only

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[359] Brenschot argues that caste and class tensions among the Hindu community was deflected to the Hindu-Muslim tensions by political parties in post-partition India as it was also seen in the partition politics. In Ward Brenschot, *Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim Violence and the Indian State* (New Delhi: Rainlight, 2011), p. 26. And communal riots and violence were used to view any kinds of social and political issues through communal angles. See details in chapter 4 and Paul Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in India (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003) and Amrita Basu, 'Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism' in David Ludden (ed.), *Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 55-80.

through non-violence and *satyagraha*, he did not know how it would happen.[360] He did not have a detailed political strategy as communalist leaders had at the time. Consequently, it resulted in his failure to defeat communalism and the partition. Gandhi did not change his strategy of non-violence toward communal problems which had different aspects of deep-rooted ideological and instrumental interests in the people at the time. He was consistent in his belief and its application until his death. His firm "live or die" commitment to his way of remedy to communalism finally came into reality with his death.

Thirdly, the weakness of his anti-communalism efforts was exposed in the way he worked. Gandhi's moral and idealistic approach to the Hindu-Muslim unity was very much dependent upon his own personal characteristics, influence, popularity, and morality, and he had no other tool when that did not work. He, as commented by his contemporaries and scholars, gradually lost his political influence over the Congress as well as Indian masses throughout 1945-1947. His opinions for any political decision-making made no big impact on Congress any longer. His anguished confession was that "no one listens to me any more. I am a small man. True, there was a time when mine was a big voice. Then everyone obeyed what I said, now neither the Congress nor the Hindus nor the Muslims listen to me."[361] When he became politically impotent, his moral and ethical appeals subsequently declined to draw attention from the people of India, and in this unfavorable situation, surprisingly, he ceased to accept the decision of partition which he had been opposing according to the principle of his composite nationalism and communal unity. He said with lamentation that "I was confident that I had the support of the masses" regarding his anti-partition stance and he admitted that "today the general opinion is not with me, and so I must step aside and stay back."[362] The person greatly revered, but had less influence had no option, but surrendering to the popular decision. On 4 June 1947 right after the partition decision was agreed upon by the Congress, Gandhi said that it was accepted

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[360] Bipan Chandra, *The Writings of Bipan Chandra:The Making of Modern India, From Marx to Gandhi* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2012), p. 195.

[361] 'Speech at the Prayer Meeting, 1 April 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 94 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 216.

[362] 'Speech at the Prayer Meeting, 9 June 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 95 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 245.

because the people wanted it although the Congress never asked for it. The Hindus and the Sikhs desired it while the Muslim League maintained their Pakistan demand.[363] It was, according to Gandhi, "not for fear of violence, but because of the circumstances" Mountbatten and Nehru were obliged to accept the partition.[364] It was, in short, unavoidable. It clearly exposed his limitations in directing the future of India. His frustrations regarding his weakness in political influence and his unrealistic expectations for the future of India after partition were perhaps well written in the following:

> But who would listen to me? You do not listen to me. The Muslims have given me up. Nor can I fully convince the Congress of my point of view. Actually I am a slave of the Congress, because I belong to India. I tried my best to bring the Congress round to accept the proposal of May 16. But now we must accept what is an accomplished fact. The wonderful thing about it is that we can undo it any time we want.[365]

Regarding partition and its aftermath, Gandhi was sacrificed to the cause of communal unity at the hand of a Hindu fanatic. It is wrong to simply underestimate Gandhi's efforts toward communal harmony despite his failure and limitations. He was the greatest individual among his contemporaries who unceasingly fought for communal unity and moral awakening until his last breath. However, Gandhi's failure to bring communal unity was not owing to his limitations, but rather to the strong foundation of the partition system, promoted by the British colonial state. The system strongly infused communal sentiments into the minds of people and political arenas in Indian subcontinent. As Azad rightly argues, "two states confronting one another, offer no solution of the problem of one another's minorities, but only lead to retribution and reprisals by introducing a *system of mutual hostages.*"[366] Partition prevented Gandhi from establishing a firm anti-communalism backing during and after partition. Inspired by Tilak's militant

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[363] 'Speech at the Prayer Meeting, 4 June 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 95 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 205.

[364] 'Speech at the Prayer Meeting, 4 June 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 95 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 205.

[365] 'Speech at the Prayer Meeting, 4 June 1947', *CWMG*, vol. 95 (New Delhi, 1999), p. 206.

[366] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (the compete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 151. Italics are mine.

Hinduism and Godse's self-proclaimed heroic attempts, Hindutva ideologues such as Savarkar and Golwalkar continued to maneuver communal sentiments according to their Hindu communal ideology which stimulated further communal tensions in post-independent India, particularly in Delhi and Punjab under the partition system.

2. Kim Koo on Unification of Korea and his Murder

Kim Koo's Religious Journey in Relation to his Nationalism

Kim Koo was one of many contemporary nationalist leaders who were influenced by modern religious movements in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.[367] He had several diverse religious experiences throughout his life time. Donghak (it was later developed as Chondokyo) he found it as a religion-cum- ideology against *ancien regime* in the 1890s. He participated in the Donghak Peasants War in 1894 and then, left the religion after the failure of the war. It was this first encounter with a new religious ideology that boosted his national consciousness.[368]

His second encounter with religion was Buddhism, a traditional religion of Korea. When he was in the period of an escape from jail, he visited Buddhist temple, then became a monk for one year in order to hide himself from a Japanese police search. Finally, in 1902, when he was 27 years old, he accepted Christianity in his hometown. He became a teacher in the local school as well as a Christian youth activist for the national movement. In 1905, he joined a protest organized by the Seoul Sangdong Church youth association, representing his local church in Changyeon, Hwanghae Province. He was also associated with Christian-initiated nationalist groups such as Sinminhoe before 1910.

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[367] Modernized nationalist leaders such as Seo Jaepil, Yoon Chiho, Rhee Syngman, Ahn Changho, Kim Kyushik, Yeo Unhyung, and so on were influenced by the American Protestant Christianity while Son Byunghee, Choi Rin, and etc. were impacted by Chondokyo. It was a time Korea underwent a series of foreign threats against national sovereignty. In this circumstance, old system of national politics, economy, culture, and religion were seriously challenged by both Korean people and outsiders, which led to many nationalist leaders to adopt new thoughts and ideologies through new religions, mainly Christianity and Chondokyo.

[368] Kim Koo, *Paikbumilji* [Kim Koo's Diary] (Seoul: Kooksawon, 1947), pp. 28-46.

His association with Christianity was partly due to his familial and regional affiliation with Christianity. His mother, Kwak Nakyeon, was a devout Christian who influenced him in his upbringing with her Christian faith. Furthermore, Kim Koo's hometown was one of early Christian inhabitation in the Hwanghae Province, and there he got a chance to meet many nationalist Christians such as Ahn Changho. As Choi argues, Christianity was the main background for Kim Koo to participate in the larger mainstream national movement.[369] People associated with him were mainly from Sinminhoe or other Christian backgrounds throughout his political career. They were critical human resources for him in the time of the Provisional Government in China (1919-1945). Particularly, the last four years (1945-1949) of his political career witnessed more Christianity-inclined attitudes and policies than previous ones.

For example, in his Easter message in 1946, he confessed that as a Christian he wished to become like a mustard seed which produces many fruits after it has fallen to the earth. He encouraged fellow Christians to "let us make Korea God's country with tears and bloods". Kim Shin, a son of Kim Koo, recalled the day of Kim Koo's assassination. In the morning on 26 June 1949, Kim Koo with his family, and attendants participated in Sunday worship service at his residence just a few hours before he would be shot to death by Ahn Doohee.[370] To his death he remained a Christian.

However, he was not dogmatic in his Christian faith, but rather religiously tolerant and pluralistic. This was different from Rhee Syngman and Kim Kyushik who were both more staunchly Christian politicians than Kim Koo. Rhee Syngman was a quite dogmatic and Americanized Protestant believer subscribing to anti-communism, a contemporary American conservative political stand, while Kim Kyushik maintained what might be considered an inclusive nationalism based on Christian norms in his political ideology with less influence from the contemporary American Christian political stand. However, Kim Koo's religious affiliation was so loose and wide that he did not stick to one religion in his political stand, though he

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[369] Kiyoung Choi, 'Kim Koowa Kidokkyo [Kim Koo and Christianity]', *Hankook Kidokkyowa Yeoksa* [Korean Christianity and History], vol. 37 (September 2012), pp. 121-154.

[370] Interview with Kim Shin in *Kidokkyo Times* [Christianity Times], 17 September 2008.

was known as a Christian until the end. For him, religion was not too different from nation. Nevertheless, his emphasis on morality, peace, and national unity in his unification and independence movement derived from his religious ideas.

Kim Koo's 'Nation First and Ideology Second'

Kim Koo was President of the preliminary government of Korea in China when Korea got independence on 15 August 1945. He had a popular support from the Korean people. However, his position in liberated Korea was somewhat complicated due to unexpected international and domestic political power struggles. Being an idealistic nationalist, Kim Koo had to face the reality of nationalism which contained the divisive natures of Cold War ideologies and colonial legacies. However, he was continually of the opinion that nation should always remain the first priority. His ideas of nationalism are perhaps best-addressed in his autobiography. Though it was written much earlier in 1929 and 1932, *Paikbum Ilji* [Kim Koo's Diaries] was published in December 1947 when there was a high pitch of the left and the right division within the country. Kim Koo's strong-willed, emotional and passinate desire for the complete independence of Korea was addressed in his autobiography:

> If God asked me what my wish was, I would reply unhesitatingly, "Korean independence." If He asked me what my next wish was, I would again answer, "Our nation's independence." If He asked me the same question for the third time, I would reply in an even louder voice, "My wish is our Great Korean Nation's Complete Independence." My dear compatriots! I, Kim Koo, have but this one wish. I lived the past 70 years of my life because of this one wish, and even now I am living my present life for this one wish. In the future, I will also live in order to fulfill this one wish. As a man belonging to a nation that has lost its independence, I lived the seventy years of my life in much shame, sorrow, and trouble. The best thing that can happen to me in this world, therefore, is to die after having experienced a life as a citizen of a nation that has achieved its complete independence.[371]

[371] Kim Koo, *Paikbum Ilji* [Kim Koo's Diaries] (with Jinsoon Doh's annotation) (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2002), p. 423.

Kim Koo's idea of nationalism was based on a "nation-state" principle. He advocated that one ethnic group could form one independent nation. His nationalism encompassed all philosophies, political thoughts, economic theories and religions. Though he was a right-wing leader who was not in favour of communist methods of unification, he was not dogmatic in his political stand because he knew that it would last temporally only. He was open to differences of political opinion in the name of national unity. Therefore, his nationalism sought to bind the whole Korea together as a single unit regardless of internal divisions:

> Nations of people who share the same blood and the same history do clearly exist in this world. Just as my body cannot become another's body, one people cannot become another people, in the same way that even brothers sharing the same blood find it difficult to live together in the same house…. Throughout history, there has never been a nation that has not experienced internal divisions and bloodshed because of conflicts arising from religious, ideological, economic or political differences. However, after the passage of time, all these conflicts are but temporary phenomena just like wind that blows and passes away. But, a people sharing the same blood is like the grass and trees that, after the wind calms down, still remain in their place and form a single forest with their roots and branches linked to one another. We should not forget that what we today call the so-called right and left are but temporary waves and tempests that arise in the eternal sea of common blood lineage. So, all ideologies and religions change. Only the people of the same blood lineage exist on this earth as a body and a community bound eternally by the same shared destiny of collective rise and decline.[372]

Anti-Trusteeship and Sovereign Independence

Soon after Japan lost World War II on 15 August 1945, Kim Koo, as president of the preliminary government of Korea, proposed necessary policies for establishing new government before he arrived in Korea from China. With 14 articles he outlined the blueprint of a future independent Korea. In summary, he called for 1) close co-operations with the UN and Allied powers, 2) leaders of all political, social, religious and regional organizations to collaborate in nation-building, 3) adopting new governing principles: self-ruling state, democratic government and equal

[372] Kim Koo, *Paikbum Ilji* [Kim Koo's Diaries] (with Jinsoon Doh's annotation) (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2002), pp. 423-425.

society, and 4) removal of Japanese laws, regulations, and anti-nationalists like Japanese collaborators.[373] In these articles, he stressed the importance of unity among Korean people and co-operation with allied powers.[374] Therefore, he met various political groups for this cause, both the leftists and the rightists. In his initial two years he tried to co-operate with the USAMGK also. However, his arrival to Korea was not welcomed by the USAMGK on the grounds that functioning government in South Korea was claimed to be only US military government, therefore, Kim Koo and his preliminary government group entered Korea not as representatives of the government, but as individuals. His arrival was not immediately broadcast by the USAMGK in order to minimize his influence on the Korean people. It was feared that he would become a threat to the sovereignty of the current US military government with popular support from the Korean people. His nation-building ideas had to be also checked by the USAMGK according to US foreign policy measures. Thus, contrary to his wishes, his proposals remained as simply wishes which had no guarantee for implementation. Rather, Japanese collaborators and Japanese governing structures and systems were maintained in the name of bringing law and order by the USAMGK against his proposals. It was, therefore, not surprising that after one year of his arrival to Korea, he poured out his disinterest towards the advancement of Japanese collaborators under the protection of the USAMGK. He said that "It is worse than Japanese colonialism".[375]

When trusteeship of Korea was decided and announced in Korea on 28 December 1945, Kim Koo opposed it. It was a resolution by the Interim Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and The Soviet Union held in Moscow, 16-26 December 1945.[376] Because of his anti-trusteeship stand,

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[373] Kim Koo, 'An Address to Korean People Domestic and Abroad' 3 September 1945 quoted in Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), pp. 29-31.

[374] *Donga Ilbo* [Donga Daily], 19 December 1945.

[375] *Seoul Shinmoon* [Seoul Daily], 26 November, 1946.

[376] For further details, followings are full four articles of resolutions on Korea issues based on Report of the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom**:**

the USAMGK distanced him more from mainline Korean politics. At the same time, the leftists who had welcomed trusteeship criticized Kim Koo as a 'beastlike separatist'.[377] In response, he defended that all his work was for a unified Korea with complete independence, therefore he opposed trusteeship. In fact, trusteeship was considered as another kind of colonialism in Korea. However, Kim Koo urged the leftists and the rightists to unite for the same cause.[378]

Unified Korea is a Priority

Kim Koo was confident that 'no independence can be achieved without unification' and 'no existence worth maintaining can be acquired without full independence'.[379] After the trusteeship decision was called off and the United States and the Soviet Union couldn't succeed in agreement on Korean issues, a new

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1. "With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people. 2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view- to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission. 3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government and the establishment- of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years. 4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.", quoted in http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade19.asp (Accessed on 19 February, 2016).

377 *Donga Ilbo* [Donga Daily], 7 July, 1946.

378 *Donga Ilbo* [Donga Daily], 7 July, 1946.

379 Kim Koo, 'A Letter to Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary of General, the United Nations', 15 September 1948 quoted in Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), p. 424.

international environment developed that passed the issues to the hands of UN. UNCOK became the sole decision maker of Korea issues. However, UNCOK also failed to meet consensus for the unified elections. Then the UN chose an alternative option: a separate election in whichever areas was possible, forming a government accordingly. It was as critical to the future destiny of the Korean peninsula as it was to the political parties of South Korea. Rhee Syngman fully supported the UN resolution as he had been advocating and lobbied for it. However, Kim Koo couldn't accept it because, for him, "Korea is first, then Korean people, after that there will be democracy, communism or other kinds of organizations".[380] Because of his opposition to a separate election under the supervision of UN, Rhee Syngman's *Hankuk Minjudang* [Korea Democratic Party] fiercely condemned him and called him as a 'believer of Kremlin Palace'.[381] Kim Koo's wish to have a united Korea was perhaps well summarized in his speech on 10 February 1948 after separate elections for the South were decided:

> Regarding the current situation, my only wish is to have thirty million fellow countrymen, hand in hand, campaign in a mutual struggle for a reunified fatherland. If the fatherland requires a sacrifice, I will immediately throw my body onto an altar. I would rather die on the 38th parallel in an attempt to establish a unified fatherland, than to cooperate in establishing a half government for mere comfort of my body.[382]

Kim Koo tried to attract the UN for unification cause for he knew that no solution would be secured without world powers' co-operations:

> We earnestly believe that the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly being held at Paris will carry out the mission of the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on Nov. 14, 1947 and we, at the same time, ask you to remember that no Korean, if given opportunity to express his own opinion freely, will call such a government as has been established in either half part of his fatherland the central

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380 *Chosun Ilbo* [Chosun Daily], 12 Febrary 1946.

381 Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), p. 175.

382 *Seoul Shinmoon* [Seoul News], 13 February 1948.

government of his nation and admit that this separate government will give him happiness, security and equitable opportunity.[383]

He also noted that roles of the US and the Soviet Union would be critical for Korea's unification:

> Unless the Soviet Union and North Korea agree on the principle that the question of Korean unification should be solved through the United Nations, the mission of the UN Commission should first exert its efforts to accelerate cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union for the solution of the Korean problem. In the present situation it would be difficult to attain Korean unification without compromise between the US and the Soviet Union.[384]

He was disappointed with both the North and South governments for their unification efforts after separate governments were established. On 31 May 1949, in his statement to UNCOK, he complained that the South Korean government didn't make sincere efforts for unification:

> It seems that so far nothing has been made public of the measures that the government of the Republic of Korea has thus far taken up for accelerating the unification of Korea. However, if the policy of the Republican administration is for the attainment of a peaceful national unification, the interference of the government with political parties and social organizations, and also with the press, in their lawful activities should, above all, be mitigated.[385]

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[383] Kim Koo, 'A Letter to Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary of General, the United Nations', 15 September 1948 quoted in Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), p. 425.

[384] 'Kim Koo's Statement to UNCOK on 31 May 1949', Enclosure No. 1 to dispatch No. 327 dated 6 June, 1949 from the American Embassy, Seoul, Korea quoted in Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), p. 428.

[385] 'Kim Koo's Statement to UNCOK on 31 May 1949', Enclosure No. 1 to dispatch No. 327 dated 6 June, 1949 from the American Embassy, Seoul, Korea, quoted in Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), p. 431.

He also criticized the unification proposal from the communist North, for it aimed to unify Korea only through and for the communist regime.[386]

Toward Peaceful Unification

Kim Koo was very much worried about possible civil war after the South and the North established their own governments respectively in August and September in 1948, shielding and gunning against each other at the border of the 38th parallel line. When the Jeju Incident in 3 April 1948 and the subsequent Yosu-Suncon Incident in October 1948 broke out, killings between the leftists and the rightists became real among Korean people. There were innumerable innocent victims during these incidents. Kim Koo addressed on the Yosu-Sunchon Incident on 31 October 1948. He condemned the violence - killings, arsons, and riots. He pleaded for an end to the killing. What he worried about the most was that it would only encourage consistent deaths of fellow Koreans, and would pave a way for foreign troops to continue to station themselves in Korea. It would truly be an act of gnawing at the sovereign independence of Korea.[387] His analysis and remedy for the Yosu-Sunchon Incident was far different from Rhee's. Rhee, as a newly-elected President of the Republic of Korea, saw it as the communists' threat to sovereignty of the state. Thus, communists were considered as anti-national, and not acceptable to the new country. Communist elements, including reluctant collaborators by fear, had to be removed at the root. Anyone suspicious would be sorted out and discarded so that an anti-communistic republic would be established. Extreme forms of iron-fistedness were allowed in the name of national security, which resulted in further division of society according to intentional ideological coloring of the people. However, Kim Koo consistently maintained the necessity of negotiations and unity between the leftists and the rightists for a higher cause- peaceful unification of Korea. He asserted to politicians in the South that the unification of Korea required

[386] Kim Koo, 'A Way to Peaceful Unification', *Saehan Minbo* [New Korea People's News], mid & late July, 1949.

[387] *Jayoo Shinmoon* [Jayoo News], 31 October, 1948.

negotiations with the North so peaceful unification would be achieved.[388] He opposed the 'black and white' attitude of both governments. He also condemned civil war protagonists who shouted for "March to the South!" or "March to the north!" For him, these plans were unrealistic, and even if they would occur, they would only destroy each other.[389] He was convinced that negotiations for unification would be effective when peace would be acquired only by 'acknowledging each other's rights, rights of equal position and free atmosphere.[390]

Moral Attitude Matters

Although he agreed with certain aspects of communism, i.e., concerning the welfare of people, he didn't accept the methods the communist North chose, namely, violence and dictatorship.[391] He condemned the false methods of the communists as 'infantilism' which was in need of doctor. He praised Rev. Sohn Yangwon who adopted one of the leftist students who had killed his two sons during the Yosu-Sunchon Incident of October 1948. As for Kim Koo, Rev. Sohn was a 'great doctor' to the leftists. Rev. Sohn, he felt, helped the leftists restore 'pure humanity' to the brutality of the leftist methods. Therefore, he was a great doctor who cured infantilism of many leftists. Kim Koo pointed out that politicians should have such characteristics so that they could win over communism and achieve unification.[392] He also praised M.K. Gandhi who had shown his morality when he was murdered at the hand of an assassin. He took one of his killer's hands and placed it on his

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388 Kim Koo, 'A Way to Peaceful Unification', *Saehan Minbo* [New Korea People's News], mid & late July 1949.

389 *Chosun Shinmoon* [Chosun News], 12 February, 1948.

390 Kim Koo, 'A Way to Peaceful Unification', *Saehan Minbo* [New Korea People's News], mid & late July 1949.

391 Kim Koo in his ideological stand was a rightist who didn't agree with communist nationalism, for it denied motherland and allowed a class dictatorship: "Some on the so-called left deny their motherland formed by blood and advocate the so-called motherland founded by common ideology. These ignore their blood compatriots and advocate the so-called comrades of the same ideology and the so-called international class of the proletariat. These people dismiss nationalism as an outmoded idea that has already fallen way out of the realm of truth…. The Soviet-style democracy, what the communists now advocate, is the most rigorous among these types of dictatorship. It exercises in an extreme form all the characteristics of dictatorial rule." In Kim Koo, *Paikbum Ilji* [Kim Koo's Diaries] (with Jinsoon Doh's annotation) (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2002), pp. 423-434.

392 Kim Koo, 'Infantilism and a Great Doctor', *Seoul Shinmoon* [Seoul News], 17 April, 1949.

own forehead as a gesture of forgiveness.[393] True forgiveness and sacrifice he acknowledged from Gandhi's last life.[394] He also wanted to sacrifice for Korea's unification if it is required. Furthermore, he urged that politicians should be concerned about people's welfare. He pleaded that the 38th parallel line of heart had to be destroyed first, then the 38th parallel line of the land would be next. He said that "there is no bigger despair than the dead heart."[395] For him, renewal of hearts was a prerequisite of Korea's complete independence. Moral attitudes such as humility and selflessness were highly required for unification efforts. As a case example, he pointed out the reason that the Kuomindang government was defeated by communist China, arguing that it was because their political leaders were corrupt. They didn't pay attention to needs of the starving and dying people of China. Therefore, as far as moral attitudes for national unification were concerned, Kim Koo stressed the importance of 'selfless service' for the nation. He suggested 'leg competition' against 'head competition'.[396] The former was to use one's legs to serve the grassroots, but the latter to fight to be head of the people. It was his political idea that "whoever wants to have will lose, whoever wants to lose will have."[397] His nationalism upheld a high morality:

> The enterprise of our people which I desire is certainly not that of conquering the world by force or by economic power. What I am proposing is that we do that which will lead to a world in which we ourselves live abundantly and in which humanity as a whole lives in abundance, peace, and happiness. This world will come true only by establishing a culture of love and peace. Do not say that this is a pipe dream because no people in history have ever done something like this in the past. My point is that we should do this precisely because nobody has ever done this in the past. Only when we realize that this great

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393 Kim Koo's information of Gandhi's final moment was a bit different from the actual. It was widely accepted that Gandhi died with his hands folded in prayer as a gesture of forgiveness. In Raghavan Iyer (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 432.

394 *Seoul Shinmoon* [Seoul Daily], 12 February, 1948.

395 *Seoul Shinmoon* [Seoul Daily], 26 November, 1946.

396 Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), pp. 328-331.

397 Jinsoon Doh (compiled), *Paikbum Eorok* [Kim Koo's Speeches and Writings] (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2007), p. 331.

> enterprise has been left undone by Heaven for us to fulfill, can our people recognize their true path and their true tasks.[398]

His desire for future Korea was absolutely based on morality and humanity. He wanted his country to be influential in the areas of a highly-developed culture of which the core values were humanity, justice, compassion and love. He said that:

> I want our nation to become the most beautiful nation in the world. I do not want our nation to become the richest and powerful nation in the world. Because I have felt the pain of being invaded by another nation. I do not want my nation to invade others. It is sufficient that our wealth is such that it makes our lives abundant and our military strength such that it is able to repel others' invasion. The only thing that I desire in infinite quantity is the power of a highly-developed culture. This is because the power of culture both makes ourselves happy and gives happiness to others. What is lacking in humanity of today is neither military force nor economic power. Although the power of natural sciences is infinitely to be desired, the level of scientific progress achieved so far today is already sufficient to enable the entire human race to live comfortably. The root reason for humanity's unhappiness today is that people lack humanity, justice, compassion and love. If the mind of humanity is developed in this positive direction, mankind's present material capacity will be enough to enable all two billion of the world's population to live in comfort. The only thing that can improve the mind of humankind is culture and civilization.[399]

Kim Koo's Assassination

On 26 June 1949, Kim Koo was shot to death by ultra-rightist, An Doohee, an army lieutenant at the time. He was born in Sinuijoo, the North Pyongan Province of Korea. After the communists seized political power in the North, Ahn fled to the South as a refugee in 1947. He became a member of ultra-right wing *Subuk Chongnyunhoe* [Northwest Youth Association] along with many other northern refugee youths. When Kim Koo opposed a separate government formation, thus refusing to join the general elections in May 1948, and further visited North Korea

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[398] Kim Koo, *Paikbum Ilji* [Kim Koo's Diaries] (with Jinsoon Doh's annotation) (Seoul: Dolbaegae, 2002), pp. 423-434.

[399] http://www.kimkoomuseum.org/eng/kimkoo/mydesire03.html (Accessed on 5 March 2016).

for political talks with Kim Ilsung, Ahn was one of many northern refugees who resented Kim's decision, renouncing him as pro-communist and pro-North, thus anti-national. The year of 1948, as mentioned in chapter 2, was a year of hardening irreconcilable relations between the North and the South, socially, politically, and psychologically. Particularly, when Syngman Rhee's politically rigid policy against the North and communist activities in the South was fully established through the formation of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948, South Korean people's political stance was also affected by such political changes.

Ahn's assassination attempt took place in such political environment. The lines for nationalism and anti-nationalism were easily and clearly demarcated according to the Cold War ideological stands as well as the will of the respective states in South and North. Therefore, the state had power to decide who was an "appropriate" citizen, or who was not. If a person was declared unqualified for a citizenship of the Republic of Korea, he had to bear a bitter price, a price even of his life. Who was unqualified? The one who was accused or categorized as a communist by the state authority, which meant he suffered a punishment of excommunication from the communist-free sacred country, the Republic of Korea. The state-initiated anti-communist policy was welcomed by northern refugees and churches. They were a spearhead group among civilian organizations to deeply carve out anti-communist sentiments in people's lives, which would, then affect people's daily relations with one another. In line with the Jeju April 3rd Incident and Yosu-Sunchon Incident, the state exploited its power over the life of citizens with harsh measures whenever necessary. The state attempted to tame the people into following the Cold War ideology so that they would become appropriate citizens. It proactively sought to eliminate dangers for the state authority in the name of national security, which would justify violence against so-called unqualified citizens. In this social and political atmosphere, Kim Koo's death was an act of removing an unqualified citizen. It was done by an ideologically highly motivated individual, Ahn Doohee.

Ahn's defense in court proved such an ideological dimension surrounding Kim's assassination vividly. Thus, it would become as a microcosm of the ideological underpinnings of the ultra right-wingers and Rhee's supporters. In his trial, Ahn falsely accused Kim Koo as being pro-communist, and thus anti-national.

According to four days of court hearings on 6 to 9 August 1949, such self-legitimization was professed by Ahn and, surprisingly, his army lawyers who supported his defense and proclaimed him innocent. In his defense, Ahn said that he was introduced to Kim Koo by *Subuk Chongnyunhoe* [Northwest Youth Association] college as he was its member and later registered as a member of *Hankook Dongnipdang* [Korean Independence Party] of which Kim Koo was head. However, as an army soldier it was prohibited to be a member of any political party. Thus, he was accused for mainly two crime charges: 1) violation of article 43 of National Defense Law which prohibits any soldier to hold any political party membership, and 2) murder of Kim Koo. However, he simply claimed that he admired Kim Koo and he wanted to be closer to him through this party membership. Ahn's defense was a serious contradiction of terms in that even if he maintained the membership of the Korean Independence Party at the time, he condemned the party as hypocritical on the grounds that it opposed the May 10th general elections, existence of US military advisors, and economic aid from the US. He said that these policies were the same as the communists'.[400] Therefore, Kim Koo, the head of the party, must be held most responsible for the anti-national activities of the party and he decided to eliminate him to save the nation. Ahn clearly defended himself on the grounds that it was a righteous act for him to remove Kim Koo because he was an anti-national who collaborated with the communist North and therefore endangered the national security.[401]

This leads to the question, how was Ahn a staunch anti-communist, able to maintain a membership of the party which he furiously accused of anti-national in court? What was more shocking was the lawyer's defense for Ahn. His lawyer defended Ahn's innocence on the basis that his membership to the political party was not intended for his political activity, but only for being closely associated with the one whom he had been admiring, therefore, he was not guilty of killing Kim

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[400] Oh Sobaek,'Paikbum Salinbum Ahn Doohee Kongpanki [Paikbum Muderer Ahn Doohee's Court Hearings]', quoted in Committee for The Complete Works of Paikbum Kim Koo (ed.), *Paikbum Junjip* [The Complete Works of Paikbum Kim Koo] (hereafter, *CWPK*), vol. 12 (Seoul: The Korea Daily News, 1999), p. 472.

[401] http://www.kimkoo.or.kr/01kimkoo/sub.asp?pagecode=m01s04t04 (Accessed on 22 February 2016).

Koo.[402] Secondly, he was guilty for the murder itself, but his intention was pure. As his lawyer argued, Ahn only wanted to remove obstacles of the Republic of Korea, so the government should, as he emphasized, reward him instead of punishing him.[403] Kim Koo, according to the lawyer, opposed the May 10th elections, a separate government formation, and the Republic of Korea. He further said that Kim Koo walked along the unpractical road of "a plausible belief of bloodless unification".[404] Therefore, according to the lawyer, Ahn should receive an offer of bail after two years of probation. However, the prosecutor said that by condemning Ahn's political party membership "in the perspective of stopping terrors and militarism, soldiers must not participate in any political party… otherwise it would threaten the future of the Republic of Korea" while he condemned his murder charge as a most serious offense, and thus Ahn had to be executed.[405] Finally, Ahn was sentenced to life imprisonment by the judge.[406] Less than one year later when the Korean War broke out, he was dramatically released from prison to join the army and to fight the communist North as the South Korean army ran short of experienced army officers. He became completely free from all the legal punishment. The Korean War and anti-communism ironically saved his life.

Aftermath of Kim Koo's Murder: the Hardening of the Extreme Politics of Anti-Communism

Kim Koo's death not only led to shifting the political weights more rightward in South Korea, but also solidified the partition system at various levels. The absence of a powerful political rival empowered Rhee Syngman to accelerate his hawkish anti-communist policies from the second of half of 1949 and throughout his

[402] Oh Sobaek,'Paikbum Salinbum Ahn Doohee Kongpanki [Paikbum Muderer Ahn Doohee's Court Hearings]', quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12 (Seoul: The Korea Daily News, 1999), p. 471.

[403] Oh Sobaek,'Paikbum Salinbum Ahn Doohee Kongpanki [Paikbum Muderer Ahn Doohee's Court Hearings]', quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12 (Seoul: The Korea Daily News, 1999), p. 471.

[404] Oh Sobaek,'Paikbum Salinbum Ahn Doohee Kongpanki [Paikbum Muderer Ahn Doohee's Court Hearings]', quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12 (Seoul: The Korea Daily News, 1999), p. 471.

[405] Oh Sobaek,'Paikbum Salinbum Ahn Doohee Kongpanki [Paikbum Muderer Ahn Doohee's Court Hearings]', quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12 (Seoul: The Korea Daily News, 1999), p. 47o.

[406] Oh Sobaek,'Paikbum Salinbum Ahn Doohee Kongpanki [Paikbum Muderer Ahn Doohee's Court Hearings]', quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12 (Seoul: The Korea Daily News, 1999), p. 473.

presidency. His political decisions indicated how strong his sole power-base was and how powerfully the state-mandated anti-communist elements consumed other important national policies and nullified them. President Rhee had ultra-rightwing supporters including *Hankook Minjoodang* [Korea Democratic Party] who were mostly landlords, pro-Japanese Koreans (both officials and policemen), and northern refugees. When many *Hankook Minjoodang* members were arrested as pro-Japanese collaborators accused by a special legal committee, "the Special Committee of Investigation and Punishment of Anti-national Perpetrators", he obstructed the National Assembly's efforts of indicting them in order to protect his political support group. The committee in the National Assembly was discontinued without completion of its work, but in an odd twist of events those politicians who had been actively involved in the Special Committee in the National Assembly were arrested and harassed by police. Some of them were even accused of being communists or '*Ppalgaengi*'. Rhee used anti-communism as a powerful means for his political justification. It succeeded in securing his political powerhouse, but unfortunately failed to unite the minds of Korean people.

Kim Koo's death also led to the deterioration of peaceful unification efforts. Kim Kyushik, as a political partner of Kim Koo for unification efforts among the rightist leaders, now lost his most powerful and influential supporter.[407] At the same time, the fast-growing, aggressive anti-communism policy of the state restricted his activities more and more as Rhee's unification plan was far different from his, favoring the force of arms to march northward for unification. Therefore, a loss of Kim Koo was not a loss of just one leader, but the loss of alternative path to Korea's future unification.

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[407] Kim Kyushik was the rightist leader who maintained the left-the right unity movement partnering with Yeo Unhyung who was from the left since independence. However, after Yeo was assassinated by a rightist in 1947, his political strength deteriorated until Kim Koo joined him. From January 1948, Kim Koo became his political partner to continue the unification movement his way of left-right unity. Before Rhee Syngman emerged as a sole power, he was politically favored by the US military Government more than Rhee. His political stand was not extreme such Rhee's as well as he was an America-educated Christian, thus, the US military thought, he maintained pro-American character. However, unlike their expectation, Kim was always above the Cold War politics pursuing "nation first than ideology" attitude. Due to his neutral political stand he was gradually pushed out of from the main political scenes in the South as the extreme form of anti-communism gained its powerful hegemony among leaders and masses. See details in Joongseok Seo, *Nambookhyupsang-Kim Kyushikui Kil, Kim Kooui Kil* [South and North Negotiation- a Way of Kim Kyushik and a Way of Kim Koo] (Seoul: Hanwool, 2000).

Ahn's court hearings left many doubts in the minds of the Korean people which suggested that several factors needed further examination. First, to what extent Kim Koo's murder was related to the conspiracy of ruling authority under Rhee's leadership? Second, how much did Ahn's assassination and life reflect the contemporary social and political upheavals in South Korea as a microcosm of the characteristics of right-wing anti-communist groups? Third, what role did Kim Koo's murder play in hardening of the partition system? It would be critical to know the bigger political players behind Kim Koo's murder before finding answers for these questions. The National Assembly's report, 'The Truth Searching Commission on the Assassination of Kim Koo' would be perhaps officially the most authentic report in answering the questions. Since it was tried as a personal murder case, Kim's death was left unresolved for decades though several attempts were made to find the truth. In 1995 the National Assembly Commission finally officially examined and declared it as a conspiracy. According to the Commission's report, Ahn tride to kill Kim Koo three times in June 1949[408], indicating his assassination was pre-planned contrary to Ahn's defense based on the claim of accidental murder.

The report pointed out *Subuk Chongnyunhoe*'s connection with Kim Koo's murder case. According to the report, there was a secret group for Kim Koo's assassination formed among *Subuk Chongnyunhoe* which Ahn and his two co-conspirators, Hong Jongmoon and Kim Jiwoong, belonged to. They intentionally took membership of the Independence Party as a part of their plan to kill Kim Koo in the early 1949, which Ahn denied in court. Ahn received his membership card on 14 April 1949.[409] From that time onwards, he was relatively free to visit and meet Kim Koo. However, their actions were controlled by a group far above, the military. Jang Eunsan, a Commanding General of Artillery, was the chief control tower of

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[408] The Department of Law in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 'Paikbum Kim Koo Sunsaeng Amsal Jinsang Bogoseo [Paikbum Kim Koo's Murder Fact-finding Report], 18 December 1995'. quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12, p. 440.

[409] The Department of Law in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 'Paikbum Kim Koo Sunsaeng Amsal Jinsang Bogoseo [Paikbum Kim Koo's Murder Fact-finding Report], 18 December 1995'. quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12, p. 439.

the conspiracy who directly ordered Ahn's group to kill Kim Koo.[410] After the murder, more military high officers were involved in order to manipulate the case into an accidental individual murder case. Chae Byungduk, a Chief Commander General of the Army, and Wonyongduk, a Judge in military court, were mainly responsible for the cover-up.[411] Chae, as a chief commander, pressured the prosecutor Hong Youngki to lessen the charge against Ahn while Won deliberately did not sentence Ahn to execution, but rather life imprisonment.[412] President Rhee's direct involvement was not known, but his reaction to the military investigation and report on Kim Koo's murder case created some suspicion. Without suspecting the occurrence of any false judicial process, he blindly favored the military decision.[413] The Commission report charged Rhee for his moral responsibility in the case because without the consent of the highest authority, Kim Koo's murder case and its trial would not have been treated by the military in this way.[414]

On 30 January 1996, the Commission made the final official statement that "the assassination of Kim Koo was not an accidental crime committed by Ahn Doohee alone, but rather it was a crime of the political regime which was well-planned and systematically roles-assigned. Ahn was merely used as a murderer in these system and roles and all criminals were protected by the political regime."[415] These two facts demonstrate that Kim Koo was a scapegoat for ideologically partitioned South Korean politics and society. His death was akin to a witch-hunt of anti-communists

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410 The Department of Law in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 'Paikbum Kim Koo Sunsaeng Amsal Jinsang Bogoseo [Paikbum Kim Koo's Murder Fact-finding Report], 18 December 1995'. quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12, p. 445.

411 The Department of Law in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 'Paikbum Kim Koo Sunsaeng Amsal Jinsang Bogoseo [Paikbum Kim Koo's Murder Fact-finding Report], 18 December 1995'. quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12, p. 445.

412 Kim Samwoong, 'Amsal Jinsang [The Truth of Kim Koo's Murder].' quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12, p. 26.

413 'A letter from President Syngman Rhee to Dr. Robert T. Oliver, 28 June 1948', quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 9, p. 865.

414 The Department of Law in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 'Paikbum Kim Koo Sunsaeng Amsal Jinsang Bogoseo [Paikbum Kim Koo's Murder Fact-finding Report], 18 December 1995'. quoted in *CWPK*, vol. 12, p. 448.

415 http://www.kimkoo.or.kr/01kimkoo/sub.asp?pagecode=m01s04t10 (Accessed on 22 February 2016).

and extended to even the right-wing political opponents of Rhee's government in the name of maintaining laws and bolstering orders of Rhee's dictatorial rule.

Conclusion

M.K. Gandhi was a champion of secularism as well as a victim of communalism at the height of communal violence during partition of India. In the perspective of his composite nationalism, Gandhi's moral and idealistic aspect of seeking the Hindu-Muslim unity was examined through his last activities, speeches and writings mainly in 1940s. Through this analysis, it was discussed that he was a true seeker of *Ahimsa* according to his Hindu faith and thus, morality was the most essential part of his worldview. At the same time he was a politician and a social reformer because he proactively implemented what he believed in in the political and social arenas. Upon the issue of partition of India, his moral worldview impelled him to cry out for communal unity and maintaining *Ahimsa*. However his failure to stop partition did not stop his life-long commitment to non-violence. For him, India was to be secular because it would best reflect what he believed in. Communal harmony, which he tried to maintain during partition violence in Delhi was wrongly seen as his appeasing the Muslim community, which was not what communally victimized Hindus and Sikhs wanted to see. Therefore, he had to pay a heavy price for it, nothing but his life. The logic of Nathuram Godse, the assassin of Gandhi, in his court statement as to why he killed Gandhi was a model of the extreme Hindu communalism advocated by RSS and Hindu Mahashaba at the time. Godse accused Gandhi and his *Ahimsa* of causing the entire Hindu community to be rendered impotent so that the Hindus were falling into the danger of extinction under the Muslims' aggression. He upheld the use of force of arms to fight Muslim enemies so that the Hindu motherland would be saved. Therefore, in order to achieve his goal, Gandhi, the biggest obstacle to India, had to be removed. He did it as a patriot to India. Gandhi's death symbolized growing tension between secularism and communalism during partition. Simultaneously, it exposed the power of Hindu communal politics despite the immediate withdrawal of RSS and Hindu Mahasabha. Partition refugees, the biggest partition victims, and the

partition-affected Northwest India continued to witness communal tensions and violence throughout 1950s and 60s as various issues conglomerated.

In Korea, Kim Koo was a champion of Korean unification and a complete independence effort amidst ideological disparity, political and territorial division between 1945 and 1949. His nationalism was not based on the Cold War ideology. He transcended the left versus the right division. He rather advocated "nation first, ideology second" campaign. As his entire life was dedicated to the independence movement against Japanese colonialism, he vehemently opposed any from of foreign rule. Accordingly, he was against any trusteeship plan imposed by the Soviet Union and the US, which he thought to be another kind of foreign rule. He also opposed the fratricidal tragedy, Koreans fighting each other according to ideological lines. He claimed it would lead to division of the country and possible recapture of the Korean peninsula by foreign powers. Over all, it would make complete independence of Korea impossible. However, under the Cold War influence his political stand did not find popular support either in the South or in the North. Kim Koo, however, continued to maintain his position until his death beyond the Cold War ideology though he was considered as the rightist. He vehemently opposed the UN's decision to have a separate election in 1948. From that time, he and Kim Kyushik tried to make some breakthroughs by directly holding a meeting with the North leaders, but it was to no avail. Subsequent violence in Jeju in April 1948 and Yosu-Sunchun in October 1948 saddened Kim Koo who foresaw the fratricidal war. On 15 August 1948, the Republic of Korea was established in the South while a month later the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North was founded. Kim Koo did not join any of this process and rather condemned both Rhee and his party and the North for dividing the nation. His political stand cost him his life as anti-communism gained an upper hand with Red-hunting. Ahn Doohee, the assassin of Kim Koo, was a typical character of the anti-communist ultra right-wing at the time. His court defense reflects the political stance of the entire ruling authority under Rhee's government. Kim Koo was portrayed as anti-national by Ahn and therefore he had to be removed for the sake of national security. Anything or anyone opposing the state authority or the state-defined authority could be punished harshly, even to the death penalty. Kim Koo's

corrupt murder trial was further evidence to prove that the attitude of the state and its faithful agency, the military, against any political opposition was controlled by Cold War logic in the name of national security and order. Kim Koo's death further accelerated such a trend and the solidification of partition at the dawn of the Korean War.

One difference with both murder cases is that which in India the state strongly opposed Gandhi's murder and hanged Godse, which weakened the Hindu right wing communalism for many years whereas in Korea the state being the right wing government were able to strengthen the Cold War politics in consecutive period after Kim Koo's murder.

Part III

The Making of the Partition System (II): Refugees and Religious Factors

Chapter 4

Partition Refugees and Communalism in Punjab and Delhi, 1947-1965

Introduction

In the two decades after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, Punjab and Delhi experienced a drastic change of demography, social life, economic and political relationships among their religious communities. A massive migration of Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab to East Punjab and Delhi in particular directly altered religious demography and inter-community relationships. Later in the course of the resettlement of refugees, new kinds of social and political developments arose in 1950s and 60s. In this chapter, post-partition social and political developments are analyzed with a special reference to the influence of partition refugees and Hindu and Sikh religious and political organizations.

In Delhi, the Hindu refugees are a main focus group for examining the growth of communal sentiments during and after partition while this chapter investigates new kinds of changed communal relations among various communities. In Punjab, the Sikh communal solidarity issue and socio-political relations between two communal rivals (the Sikhs and the Hindus) are analyzed with special reference to the Punjabi Suba movement. To what extent did the Punjabi Suba and the Haryana movements have their demands heard by the Congress which had previously opposed such demands? The analysis includes the roles of religious institutions and their leaders who fueled communal sentiments in political movements linked to cultural activities of their own. There was a constant attempt to alter or influence social and political relationships between a majority community and a minority in the Punjab and Delhi.

Simultaneously, the Congress-led Government's secular vision continued to be implemented while major competing communities, Hindus and Sikhs, were communally mobilized to enhance their homogenous solidarity. The state and non-state agencies co-operated with each other for the same cause. This included not only

Sikhs and Hindus, but also various other communities who were involved in the course of redefining their social and political status, affected by the tensions between communal sentiments and secularism present in the social and political movements of the time.

This chapter examines the relationship between partition refugees and the growth of communalism, and takes a further look at the connection of the state and non-state's attempts to halt those communal evils in the areas of refugee relief and rehabilitation, and their limitations as well. Furthermore, it examines the link between the formation of the partition system and the roles of partition refugees and religious elites, which triggered communal sentiments to grow in these regions.

1. Partition Predicament for Refugees in Delhi and East Punjab

Communal violence was mainly responsible for the massive migration of the Muslims from East Punjab to West Punjab and vice-versa of the Hindus and the Sikhs. The events that had happened in Delhi and Punjab during partition were described as "worse than war".[416] These tragic events (including riots, murders, arson and abductions) were perpetrated by neighbors against neighbors.[417] According to the official report, the total number of refugees who migrated from Pakistan was estimated at 7.48 million, while those who migrated from India to Pakistan were 7.15 million. Thus India had nearly 330,000 more refugees to accommodate as a result of partition.[418] Most North Indian towns and cities witnessed huge refugee camps and rehabilitation colonies. Hindus and Sikhs of West Punjab made up a significant portion of the refugees in East Punjab and Delhi as many had been thrown off their ancestral properties by Muslim neighbours. Their experience of loss and grief during partition violence in West Pakistan heightened the enmity against the Muslims in India. They became strong anti-Muslims in India for their political stance. Paul Brass argues that the memory of partition and violence was ingrained in the minds of many Hindus and is kept alive by the constant tension in the relations between India and

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[416] 'Editorial Notes', *NCCR*, vol. LXVII, no. 11, November 1947, p. 531.

[417] 'Editorial Notes', *NCCR*, vol. LXVII, no. 11, November 1947, p. 531.

[418] *The Times of India*, 9 August 1952.

Pakistan.[419] The Hindus' and Sikhs' collective past of experiencing loss, grievances, killings, abductions, and looting in the partition was often transmitted across generations and contributed to communal riots since partition.[420] In the minds of Hindus and Sikhs, this past served to justify the killing of Muslims, considered them to be part of 'mini-Pakistan'[421].

1) Refugees and Reshaping of Communal Relations in Delhi

Muslims in Delhi - Refugees or Residents?

In Delhi, most of the incoming refugees were Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab during partition while the outgoing refugees from Delhi to West Pakistan were all Muslims. On 15 August 1947, India's Independent Day, there was the joy of freedom after 190 years of British colonialism; and yet, in the capital city, Delhi, the only noticeable change was that the Union Jack replaced by the tricolor.[422] However, around the end of August and the early September 1947, the time Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Pakistan began to reach Delhi, the city's outlook changed drastically. By 7 September 1947 three weeks after partition Delhi absorbed two hundred thousand refugees from West Pakistan.[423] Sikh refugees in Delhi found themselves secure in some already existing gurdwaras and Hindus in mandirs or Hindu cultural organizations in the city. Religious institutions were an element of the initial survivals of partition refugees in Delhi along with the Government's facilities. However, these arrangements could not solve the entire problem of the refugees. Angry and anxious Sikh and Hindu refugee mobs started killing the Muslims and looted their properties in Delhi. According to official observations, the violence was almost entirely organized by "roving bands" of refugees with the intention of purging

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[419] Paul R. Brass, *Forms of Collective Violence: Riots, Pogroms, and Genocide in Modern India* (New Delhi, 2006), pp. 35-37.

[420] Ibid., p. 35.

[421] S.T. Jassal & Eyal Ben-Ari, The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts (New Delhi: Sage, 2007), p. 276.

[422] J.A. Lovejoy, 'Delhi To-day', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, p. 6.

[423] *The Times of India*, 8 September 1947.

the Muslim inhabitants from the city.[424] Several days before the organized attacks, the band of Sikhs, as witnessed by local inhabitants, visited the area and enquired where each Muslim lived and how many they were.[425] This led the Muslims to evacuate their houses and flee for their lives first to the residency of the High Commissioner for Pakistan, then to the Purana Qila and Humayun's Tomb. From September until the end of October a massive evacuation of the Muslim population from Delhi to West Pakistan took place due to such disturbances. Under this circumstance, Lord Mountbatten, then the Governor-General, said that it was "a war situation and must be treated as such".[426] Accordingly, the Emergency Committee of Cabinet, and a new department of Relief and Rehabilitation of Refugees were formed to tackle warlike disturbances in the capital and Punjab.[427] On 7 September the Government of India took special measures which allowed magistrates, police, military and air force officers to have power to maintain order and disperse an unlawful assembly by opening fire.[428] However, it was already too late to return the city to as it had existed before. It was reported that angry mobs and rioters even opened fire and used hand grenades and bombs against troops.[429]

On 9 September 1947 Nehru in a radio broadcast declared that "we are dealing with a situation which is analogous to war and we are going to deal with it on war basis."[430] On the same day, Gandhi arrived in Delhi from Calcutta and announced his

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[424] 'Shone to Carter, Telegram no. 718, 9 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 165.

[425] 'Report by Cranston on Events during the Delhi disturbances 8 to 20 September 1947, 23 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), pp. 367-368.

[426] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (the compete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 230.

[427] 'Shone to Carter, Telegram no. 717, 8 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1974*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 157.

[428] 'Shone to Carter, Telegram no. 717, 8 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 158.

[429] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 730, 8 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 179.

[430] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 730, 11 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi:

intention to stay in the capital until peace was restored. The Government of India realized the real seriousness of the situation and feared that "any prolongation of trouble in capital will have most dangerous effects upon other parts of the country."[431] During the communal disturbance some 20,000 Muslims were massacred.[432] Muslim residents particularly in the walled city suffered the most and about 44,000 houses occupied by Muslims in these localities were abandoned or forcibly evacuated. An estimated 329,000 Muslims left Delhi following partition, composing two-thirds of Muslim inhabitants in the city. In 1951, the Muslim population was reduced to just 99,000 in the capital. It was a decline from 33.22 percent in 1941 to 5.71 percent by 1951.[433] Three months after independence, Delhi was totally transformed into a non-Muslim city. Here is a well-captured illustration by a Christian resident in Delhi about the changing scenes of "Delhi today", particularly the absence of the Muslims in November 1947:

> The September communal massacres (riots is too mild a word) have left greater effects than August 15th. For in spite of the crowds one element is conspicuous by its absence. There were Muslims to be seen, plenty of them in most parts of Delhi you turn and have another look if you see the characteristic Muslim face and clothes. You rarely even now see one in New Delhi and the well known Muslim shops in Connaught Place have all gone. So have the Muslim cooks and house servants who formed so large a proportion of this part of the population. Householders do not feel it is safe to keep isolated Muslims in their houses; when they have tried, the other servants have often gone on strike as they fear getting themselves involved in some incident… There were certain trades which were almost a monopoly of the Muslims, in particular the butchers, the bakers, and if there are not many candlestick-makers these days-at least most of the men who do metal work and are ready to mend anything from your cycle to your watch. The East Punjab Railway has had to import engine drivers from as far as Madras as this was another of the Muslim trades. These trades

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Manohar, 2011), p. 179.

[431] 'Shone to Carter, Telegram no. 718, 9 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 165.

[432] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 124. Estimates of Muslim casualties differ from various sources which range from 10,000 to 25,000. Nevertheless, each source proves that is was a massive killing or a massacre.

[433] Tai Yong Tan & Gyanesh Kudaisya (eds.), *Partition and Post-Colonial South Asia*, vol. III (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 257-258.

> are being gradually taken up by non-Muslim refugees; but for weeks we had no meat, etc. and we still miss the Muslims.[434]

Muslims' frustration and uncertainty for the future were exposed in inter-communal relations and daily lives. Zamindar and Pandey captured several such incidents even the Muslims' perspectives in Delhi. They introduced some interviews as well as the official reports in order to understand how Muslim residents and refugees were unfairly treated by both incoming Sikh and Hindu refugees and the Government officers.[435] Almost the entire Muslim population was either forcefully or reluctantly moved to Muslim refugee camps, or encouraged (but often, forced) to shift to so-called safer "Muslim zones" such as Idgah, Jama Masjid and areas in Old Delhi. Zamindar argues that in this hurried evacuation of Muslim residents by Hindu and Sikh refugee mobs and later, in the name of safety, by the Government of India created disputes over housings and properties. It produced "a sense of a partisan state unable to protect them and unwilling to rehabilitate them."[436] The fact that the rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Pakistan were taken as a first priority for the Refugee and Rehabilitation Ministry under N.C. Neogy's ministership without considering re-sheltering the Muslim homeless eventually led to a sense of exclusion from the Government's rehabilitation efforts. Furthermore, Muslim camps at Purana Qila and Humayun's Tomb were badly organized and poorly maintained compared to non-Muslim camps in the city. As Dr. Zakir Hussain, a Muslim nationalist, said at a meeting of an Emergency Committee of Cabinet on 16 September 1947, "camps in Delhi could not properly be called camps but rather areas in which humanity was dumped."[437] And he further said that "these poor men and women had been rescued from sudden death to be buried in a living grave."[438]

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[434] J.A. Lovejoy, 'Delhi To-day', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, pp. 6-7.

[435] Vazira F.Y. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia* (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2008), pp. 19-44; Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 121-151.

[436] Vazira F.Y. Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia* (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2008), p. 33.

[437] 'Shone to Carter, Telegram no. 777, 18 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 239.

[438] Quoted in Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (the complete version) (New Delhi:

General conditions of communal hatred among non-Muslim refugees against Muslims were so great that any Hindu or Sikh would not dare commit to humanitarian work for Muslim refugees at the time. Therefore, communally neutral groups were quickly summoned to serve Muslim refugees along with the Government officers, which included local Christians and foreign nationals. Even in the military, the Gurkha Regiment and Madras Regiment were deployed to maintain order in the capital as they had been considered communally impartial. Christian refugee relief work in particular was highly regarded at the early stage of Muslim refugee relief work at Humayun's Tomb and other camps in September 1947.[439] K. B. Lall, an ICS officer who was in charge of Delhi refugee work, urged Christian leaders to mobilize relief teams for Muslim refugees, saying that "the Muslims are too broken by what has happened to help themselves. The Christians alone can do it."[440]

According to Lovejoy, a staff from St. Stephen Hospital, there was a total absence of Muslim patients in November 1947 and he said that "there is only one Muslim woman in the hospital at present, who was abandoned at the Idgah during the riots and was brought to us by soldiers in a truck."[441] Even Muslim patients experienced frustrated relations with other Hindu and Sikh refugee patients in the hospital, with Lovejoy saying that he said "only two Muslim patients have consulted me privately since the riots ended; one we admitted but she left as soon as possible after her operation."[442] The other came for consultation, but "the atmosphere outside the office while she waited alongside Hindu patients was most tense."[443] Economic constraints were not only parts of refugees' lives, but were also a problem for disfavored Muslim residents in Delhi. For the medical treatment, the Muslim lady mentioned who came to St. Stephen Hospital had a great difficulty obtaining the loan of a car for the purpose.

Muslims in Delhi were in a panic for their identity not only because of the non-Muslim refugees' hostility against them, but also because of the Pakistan

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Orient Longman, 1988), p. 238.

439 Arabindo, 'The Bishops' Letter', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, pp. 4-5.

440 Kenneth Sharp, 'The Camp at Humayun's Tomb', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, p. 9.

441 J.A. Lovejoy, 'Delhi To-day', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, p. 8.

442 J.A. Lovejoy, 'Delhi To-day', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, p. 8.

443 J.A. Lovejoy, 'Delhi To-day', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, p. 8.

Government's unwillingness to receive them anymore. As early as mid September, Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, clearly expressed his opposition to the suggestion that all Muslims in Delhi should be sent to Pakistan.[444] It triggered anger as well as frustration from Muslims, for they found themselves belonging nowhere as they were denied by both India and Pakistan. In this circumstance, the constant efforts of Indian nationalist leaders like Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad to accommodate Muslims within the capital produced a certain relief and hope for them materially and psychologically. Nehru said in his speech on minority issues on 29 September 1947 that "every citizen of India whatever religion had the right to live in this country and call for protection from the State."[445] He confirmed the rights of Muslims in face of opposition from non-Muslim communal demands to expel all Muslims from Delhi, going on to say that "Muslims who really considered India as their own country and did not look to any outside agency for help were welcome to live in the country. Government must and will give full protection to them."[446] However, perhaps the following description of "Anti-Pakistan Day" at Jama Masjid observed by Muslim residents in Delhi showed a sign of their feeling of a "double rejection", which enhanced their bewilderments as a minority in the city:

> It is strange to read now of "Anti-Pakistan Day" being observed in the Jama Masjid, the largest mosque in Delhi. But the general feeling among Muslims in India-as opposed to Pakistan-is that the whole theory that the Muslims were a separate nation, a theory preached so assiduously by Mr. Jinnah, was a tragic error. Their feeling is the stronger because Pakistan is now refusing to take in Muslim refugees from Delhi and from the United Provinces. One cannot wonder at the Pakistan Government's feeling that the millions from the East Punjab are enough for a new state to have to absorb, but it is a consideration that does not appeal to the Muslims of Delhi.[447]

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[444] 'Shone to Carter, Telegram no. 772, 17 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 233.

[445] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 887, 1 October 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 377.

[446] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 887, 1 October 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 377.

[447] J.A. Lovejoy, 'Delhi To-day', *Delhi*, vol. XIX, no. 1, January 1948, pp. 6-7.

Delhi, Becoming a 'Refugee-istan'

About 496,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Sind came to Delhi.[448] According to the 1951 census, out of every thousand persons in Delhi, 450 were refugees.[449] Delhi literally became a "refugee city" or "refugee-istan".[450] It meant the future of the city would be defined by the way refugees would play a role in shaping and transforming the city. Right after partition, Delhi faced shortages of physical, economic, and administrative infrastructure as "there has never been such a population shift in the history" of India in such a short period of time.[451] Despite Government efforts to restore communal harmony through strong measures, majority refugees from West Pakistan still maintained communal grudges against the Muslims. An "eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" mentality among refugees justified their indulgence in riots, lootings, murders and the like in the city. This indulgence was also supported by the anxiety of non-Muslim refugees towards survival in the alien city, Delhi, since they had brought almost nothing from West Pakistan and faced high competition for their livelihood due to a shortage of resources in the city. It prompted them to grab whatever things would be left after they would expel or murder Muslims.

However, generally local Hindus did not harm Muslim neighbours, but rather gave them protection as numerous occasions were admitted by Muslims themselves.[452] Gandhi, from 9 September 1947 until his assassination on 30 January 1948, stayed in

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[448] *Hindustan Times*, 19 October 2011.

[449] Only city comparable to Delhi was perhaps Karachi, a capital of Pakistan at the time of partition, as it had 480 refugees out of every thousand persons in the city at the time. In *The Times of India*,09 August 1952.

[450] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 124. Delhi received not only incoming refugees from West Pakistan, but also produced outgoing refugees of Muslim residents. The latter factor increased image of Delhi as a refugee city.

[451] V. N Datta, 'Panjabi Refugees and the Urban Development of greater Delhi' in R.E. Frykenberg (ed.), *Delhi Through the Ages: Selected Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society* (New Delhi, 1986), p. 289.

[452] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 813, 23 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 285.

Delhi and tried his best to calm down communal sentiments of all communities in the city. His appeals earned many followers. However, strong opposition was equally marked. For example, on 16 September 1947, Gandhi's prayer meeting at a refugee camp in Old Delhi was stopped by angry Sikh demonstrators against his recitation of Quran.[453] On 30 September 1947, Shone, then the British High Commissioner to India, reported that "all observers agree that communal feeling still remains extremely bitter and that there has been no change of heart in spite of Gandhi's efforts to restore good-will."[454] Master Tara Singh, a Sikh leader and himself from West Punjab, issued a statement on 5 October 1947 that Muslims of adjoining parts of United Province and Delhi must vacate their lands and go to Pakistan. Because Hindus and Sikhs had left more land in West Punjab than Muslims in East Punjab had, in order to balance the deficiency more Muslims had to leave their lands and migrate to Pakistan. He went on to say that "Mahatma Gandhi and other leaders must pay attention to this side of question and not ask the Delhi Muslims to [stay]."[455] There was a strong feeling among non-Muslim communal leaders that the Muslim population in Indian side had become an obstacle for the rehabilitation of their communities, and they were therefore considered inconvenient citizens of India since the creation of Pakistan.

In contrast, Nehru as a Prime Minister of the Government of India repeatedly assured the citizens of Delhi that "he and his Government would never agree to the demand for a Hindu Raj which was not only stupid and mediaeval but also Fascist in character."[456] For him, Pakistan was not more dangerous than an internal division of India as he noted "the danger of disorder and discord in the country." He felt that "if

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[453] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 776, 18 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 236.

[454] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 881, 30 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 361.

[455] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 931, 6 October 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 418.

[456] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 908, 2 October 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 392.

this danger persists, we [India] shall not only have to face possible dangers from Pakistan but maybe from other foreign powers as well."[457]

Gandhi's efforts in Delhi received good response from nearly all communities despite some strong opposition from refugees and the communalist groups. Particularly, his fast in January 1948 marked a drastic change of the violence against the Muslims. The seven points of the declaration agreed upon by Gandhi and all major community leaders as a condition of breaking of his fast were implemented by the local authorities.[458] However, it cost a huge price: Gandhi's life. Gandhi's fast, despite its achievement, "made him very unpopular among refugees and the Hindu Mahasabha" and resulted in "processions being taken to Birla House with slogans "*Marta hai to marne do*" (If he wants to die let him die)."[459] To restore communal harmony between Muslims and non-Muslims required more mental and psychological confidence in each other. Gandhi's foremost wish above the seven points was "the need for a change of heart".[460]

It was not a task that would be quick to complete as it involved long processes of reconciliation and recovery from all aspects of communal relations. Among grass-root level government officers, police and military directly engaged with refugee affairs there were high levels of communal leanings in their operations. Azad in his memoir mentioned that there were many complaints received from local Muslims against police and military's inaction and indifference towards the protection of minorities from Hindu and Sikh rioters.[461] Khurshid, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, himself a Muslim, was condemned for his inaction. As Azad suspected, he was under majority community pressures not to favour Muslims. Randhawa, the Deputy Commissioner, known as non-communal figure among Muslims in pre-partition periods though he was a Sikh, was also affected so that he became more inactive in Muslim issues

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[457] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 908, 2 October 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 392.

[458] For more details see chapter 3.

[459] J. L. Kapur, *Report of Commission of Inquiry into Conspiracy to Murder Mahatma Gandhi*, *Part II*, p. 355.

[460] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (the complete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 238.

[461] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (the complete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 231.

"under the stress of the communal tension which was sweeping through the Punjab."[462] Due to communal pressures from the majority community and the complexity of their own communal identity, communal sentiments were not suppressed effectively. Due to the unceasing Sikh and Hindu riots against Muslims and the city authorities' initial failures to arrest communal violence, Delhi itself started transforming Muslim residents into refugees as similar occasions happened with non-Muslims in West Punjab.

Communal sentiments, therefore, did not die though strong police and military measures to restore law and order gained some positive response at the end of September 1947. Nehru strongly suspected that recent communal riots in September 1947 were organized by those who had taken advantage of "the psychological state of affairs".[463] The following failure of the Government's propaganda showed a "hyper-sensitivity" towards communalism among refugees. According to the Governor-General, the psychological situation in Delhi became worse on 26 September due to propaganda which Government of India had put out in Delhi. Patel said that "propaganda vans which had been going round with loud hailers had been nearly mobbed."[464] A line which was taken by speakers was: "Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus, be friends: be one". It "did not appeal to anyone at present and annoyed majority of people."[465] According to a Delhi police report there was definite feeling among people that a return of Muslims to the city would cause trouble.[466]

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[462] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (the complete version) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988), p. 231.

[463] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 863, 28 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 350.

[464] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 863, 28 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 349.

[465] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 863, 28 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 349.

[466] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 863, 28 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 349.

Rehabilitation and Resettlement: Making the Unknown City Home

After Delhi became a "refugee city" in the months following partition, both state and non-state agencies worked closely to rebuild the city. Among the latter, Punjabi refugees were chiefly responsible for its transformation. They worked proactively toward reshaping the city, particularly in the areas of communal relations, political stance, economic developments, and cultural dimensions. In making the capital their own home, they somehow wanted to maintain their previous identity by naming of places in West Pakistan into new schools, parks and institutions in the refugee colonies. For example, Salwan Public School, D.G. Khan Bharati Sabha Higher School in Rajendra Nagar, and Sindhi High Secondary School in Lajpat Nagar, etc. The names of the schools at such, opines Chatterjee, "reveals attempts to mark the landscapes with traces of what was left behind."[467]

Delhi received special assistance from the Government of India more than any other state in the process of rehabilitation. For example, by the end of March 1950, 83 percent of Delhi refugees were allowed to stay in Government-provided shelters as compared to any other state. About 6,000 were given newly constructed houses and tenements and 190,000 were placed in evacuee houses.[468] To speed up the construction of new houses for displaced persons, the Government of India allocated more resources to Delhi than any other state, comprising 40,000 tons of cement, steel and asbestos, cement sheets, and nearly 400,000 feet of pipes.[469] There was a complaint from a refugee association in Bombay that, unlike Delhi, the Bombay Government had done nothing for its refugees.[470] On 15 August 1948 the Times of India released a special report on "how India tackled her refugee problem." This report said that the most important step in the Government of India's scheme for

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[467] Suparna Chatterjee, 'Refugee Rehabilitation and the Politics of Nation Making in India, 1947-62', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002, p. 212. Similar nostalgic marks of naming the previous sites were also commonly observed in South Korea among north Korean resettlement areas. See in Heungsoo Kim, *Hankook Junajaengkwa Kiboksinangyeonku* [A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1999), p. 82.

[468] *The Times of India*, 07 July 1950.

[469] *The Times of India*, 7 July 1950.

[470] *The Times of India*, 4 September 1950.

financial assistance to urban refugees was that the Rehabilitation Finance Administration was set up with a capital of Rs. 10 crores.[471] It was reported that more than 2,450 refugees underwent training in the various crafts taught at the training centre in Delhi and other places.[472] Loans for students and trainees were also made available. In February 1951, the Government of India reported on the three years of official efforts to rehabilitate and resettle refugees, and the report claimed that nine out of every ten urban refugees had been provided for in the housing schemes of the Government and furthermore, 98 percent of the total five million displaced persons from West Pakistan were assisted in "one shape or another" by the Government of India.[473] However, as the Times of India analyzed, "such nebulous claims may rejoice official hearts but are not calculated to soothe refugee feelings" and it concluded that "the truth is that these figures barely touch the fringe of a gigantic problem" despite the fact that the Government of India had achieved considerable progress.[474] Indeed, refugees complained against the Government rehabilitation policies consistently, not because "the Government has not done anything, but that they have not done enough".[475] One interview with Chandrima Roy, a Hindu refugee, shed some light on why they were not satisfied with the Government rehabilitation policy. She said that:

> My family was from the affluent Brahman background in West Punjab before partition, having enough properties and resources. My father was a surgeon in Lahore. But, we came with almost nothing. The Congress Government allocated us a small tiny flat which could not accommodate the family. With no proper facilities and arrangements, it was hastily given to us. We were indignant when it was given to us. Finally, we chose not to stay there, but found another house to stay with our own expenses. The Congress did not do much to us.[476]

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[471] *The Times of India*, 15 August 1948.

[472] *The Times of India*, 15 August 1948.

[473] *The Times of India*, 19 February 1951.

[474] *The Times of India*, 19 February 1951.

[475] *The Times of India*, 19 February 1951.

[476] Interview with Chandrima Roy in Lodhi Colony, New Delhi on 28 February 2016.

The wealth they had enjoyed back in West Punjab before partition became a measuring rod for the Government housing policies. With both material and psychological loss and brokenness, she and her family could not accept the Government rehabilitation policy and found it unfitting with their minimal expectations. For her family, Muslims were not to blame, but rather politicians who were mainly responsible for the vivisection of the country and for poor rehabilitation of the refugees. Refugees themselves formed various refugee organizations like Refugee Teachers Association, Railway Vendors Association, Free India Sikh League, All India Refugee Students' Committee, Delhi Sindhi Association, Dera Ghazi Khan Refugee Society, etc.[477] As Kumari examined, these organizations actively raised their grievances to the Government who later recognized their role in the relief and rehabilitations process.[478] However, various voluntary refugee associations reflected, as Kumari argues, "a consciousness among the refugees about their legitimate rights, the willingness to adopt, and a faith in, a progressive, democratic means to get the demands met."[479] In other words, they worked as "interest groups" to maximize their social and political bargaining powers. For example, the All India Refugee Association negotiated with the Central government for various refugee welfare schemes. This group was founded as early as 7 August 1948 in New Delhi.[480] On 1 August 1950 several refugee leaders in Delhi supported the proposal of raising the levy for refugee rehabilitations at the open session of the All India Refugee Conference while the Ministry of Refugee Rehabilitation already had told Parliament that the capital levy proposal might not be acceptable.[481] However, Parliament received their appeals seriously.

Along with their self-made associations, refugees also actively participated in, or otherwise co-operated with, the existing political bodies – including the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Jana Sangh - in order to have their voices heard in the

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[477] Amita Kumari, 'Delhi as Refuge: Resettlement and Assimilation of Partition Refugees', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XLVIII, no. 44 (2 November 2013), p. 65.

[478] Amita Kumari, 'Delhi as Refuge: Resettlement and Assimilation of Partition Refugees', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XLVIII, no. 44 (2 November 2013), p. 65.

[479] Amita Kumari, 'Delhi as Refuge: Resettlement and Assimilation of Partition Refugees', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XLVIII, no. 44 (2 November 2013), p. 64.

[480] *The Times of India*, 10 August 1948.

[481] *The Times of India*, 2 August 1950.

political sphere. They were not in unison in their political stance as their social, political, and regional backgrounds were heterogeneous. However, what was noticeable was that communal sentiments in Delhi were higher than other states due to its high composition of refugee populations and their communal leanings. This ushered in the growth of Hindu communal politics in 1950s and 60s.

Economic changes of post-partition Delhi were phenomenal in that the slow-paced image of the capital was no longer expected, and the capital was rather transformed into the fast-moving crowded commercial and industrial city it continues to be today. V.N. Datta captured how Delhi was dramatically reshaped by Punjabi refugee traders and industrialists and later became a vibrant economic hub of the country.[482] Since most of the refugees who came to Delhi were engaged in business, the task of fitting the trader, the artisan and the professional worker into the complex economy of metropolitan surroundings distressed them and was beset with many difficulties. Therefore, they depended solely upon their own hard-working spirit. They did not mind sitting in the streets and working at the bazaars to sell whatever they could. They worked longer hours and sold articles with lesser margins to compete with other more established businessmen. One interview with Kalyan Singh shows the typical story of a hard-working Punjabi refugee family. "When I was just one year old, the whole family had to migrate from Lahore to Delhi during partition. My father had to earn money in whatever possible ways in the capital in order to feed the family. Therefore, he went out to streets to sell clothes and various items in Patel Nagar whole day long."[483] Being seventy-one years old, Kalyan Singh still works as an auto-rickshaw driver in the city. He might have inherited this industrious spirit from his parents. Ramesh Bathla was a ten year-old boy when partition took place, and he and his family arrived in Delhi with much difficulty. Upon recalling his experience during that time, he became emotional with tears. He said that "my family had nothing when we came to Delhi. As a just ten year-old boy, I had to work in the streets to earn a living. I sold various kinds of items. Life was tough at that time."[484]

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[482] V. N Datta, 'Panjabi Refugees and the Urban Development of greater Delhi' in R.E. Frykenberg (ed.), *Delhi Through the Ages: Selected Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 289.

[483] Interview with Kalyan Singh in Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi on 19 September 2015.

[484] Interview with Ramesh Bathla in Patel Nagar, New Delhi on 10 March 2015.

After considerable rehabilitation work was done by the Government, in July 1949, Meherchand Khanna, then the Rehabilitation Advisor to the Government of India, mentioned that total rehabilitation of refugees depended more on "psychological factors" than on anything else.[485] It was evident that urban refugees viewed themselves as "victims" of partition and "sacrificial offerings" on the altar of India's freedom.[486] These psychological factors were later exploited by communal politics.

2) Refugees, Relief and Transformation of East Punjab

Self-Preparation for Rehabilitation

After partition took place, Sikhs, unlike Muslims and Hindus were in dilemma as to how they could secure community solidarity as they continued to remain a minority in East Punjab. Sikh leaders under the leadership of Tara Singh, the Akalis leader, decided to create their own space in East Punjab by removing Muslims from the region and bringing in Sikhs from the West. Even against guidelines and policies from the local government, they paved a way to safeguard their interests. Violence, whether retaliations or fresh attacks, was often organized by Sikh Jathas, the vanguards of the Sikh militants. Sikh Jathas were already armed in the pre-partition period for fighting the Muslim League National Guards and protecting their own communities, and they continued violent activities during and after partition in Punjab. Due to such activities large scale clashes between troops and armed Jathas were often reported. For example, one of Major-General Thimayya's reports shows the severity of communal violence and its war-like characters, stating that "a Jatha of 10,000 strong attacking a detachment of 60 soldiers, the Commander of which, himself a Sikh, had been wounded four times." He went on to say that "advantage of troops in having automatic weapons was lost in hand to hand fighting their bayonets were not more than equal in fighting value to kirpans."[487]

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[485] *The Times of India*, 15 July 1949.

[486] *The Times of India*, 19 February 1951.

[487] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 860, 27 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi:

Sikh leaders of the Akalis in Punjab had the upper hands over Congress leaders in influencing the Sikh masses including refugees. Tara Singh was the strongest leader of Sikh community at the time of partition, and his words and even his name held great influence over the Sikh masses. On 5 August 1947 it was reported by a secret agent to Mountbatten and other officials in Punjab that Tara Singh planned to attack certain Muslim leaders. However, the authorities decided not to arrest him on the ground that it would be "more likely to result in a further deterioration than in an amelioration of the situation."[488] On 7 September 1947, Tara Singh at a press conference publicly condemned the Government of West Punjab for being "a party to rioting" and said that the massacres of non-Muslims started only after the Muslim Government had taken charge. After this press release, spontaneous violence took place in Delhi against Muslims by non-Muslim refugees. Another interesting occasion was included in an official report which demonstrates how the strength of the influence held by the local Akalis leaders more than that of the Government. On 25 September 1947 at a special meeting of Ministers and military authorities in Delhi, there was a suggestion given from the Governor-General that since Tara Singh had issued a recent call on Sikhs not to attack Muslim refugees, it was essential to make complete use of him and his co-leaders to stop Sikhs' violence against Muslims.[489] Yet it was reported that Nehru had an unfriendly reception from non-Muslims when he recently visited Amritsar and Lahore a few days after independence due to the resentment against the Government's unsatisfactory handling of affairs.[490]

What was significant in terms of the reorganization of the population in East Punjab after partition was that several Sikh majority districts were created. This was well-planned by the Sikh leaders to create future solidarity for maintaining or increasing their political and communal strengths. Stephenson, the British Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore at the time, reported that "it is difficult to resist the

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Manohar, 2011), p. 344.

[488] Lionel Carter (ed.), *Mountbatten's Report on the Last Viceroyalty, 22 March-15 August 1947* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), pp. 279-280.

[489] 'Shone to Addison, Telegram no. 860, 27 September 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947* , vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 343.

[490] 'Shone to Carter, Telegram no. 642, 21 August 1947', in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August-15 October 1947*, vol. 1(New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 77.

conclusion that there is a Sikh plan to concentrate all Sikh strength in the area of Amritsar, Jullundur, Ludhiana and Ambala and with the aid of the [Punjab] States to set up a Sikh enclave and later State which can be again expanded."[491] Sikh leaders, unlike Muslims and Hindus, were always aware of the fact that their community composed no majority either in India or Pakistan, which would critically trigger issues of Sikh solidarity even after partition. Since the basic arrangement for political decision-making in a democracy was often determined by number politics, the Sikhs' ability to maintain their political strength and solidarity was in danger due to numerical weaknesses even in East Punjab. The partition negotiation itself provided evidence for such a tendency. Fear of disorganization or assimilation into the larger community led Sikh leaders to mobilize their masses in such a way that they would be deliberately concentrated in areas where Sikhs could form themselves as a majority so that later they could claim their own shares without fail. Tara Singh and his co-workers did this systematically, particularly the resettling project of transferring the Sikh population from West Punjab to East Punjab.

The Government of India established many refugee camps providing free shelter, food, clothing, medical and sanitary facilities, soap, matches and until the camps were dissolved. Over 180,000 tents were requisitioned for giving shelters to refugees. Some 2,439,432 acres of lands in East Punjab were allotted for refugees to settle. At the same time, 50 cotton spinning centres were opened in order to boost the industrial economy of the region.[492] However, Government's efforts, though valuable, could not compensate for the losses the refugees had experienced. Sikh refugees in particular, having been the most prosperous community in West Punjab, felt the loss of their wealth greater while settling in East Punjab. Farmers from West Punjab were restricted to hold a maximum of 30 acres of land in East Punjab. The urban Sikhs were even worse hit than the rural farmers. The urban properties left behind by Muslims and given them to move into, was comparatively so minimal to what they had left in Pakistan. Furthermore, the Sikh merchant had to compete both with the

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[491] 'Stephenson to Grafftey-Smith (Extracts), 13 September 1947' in Lionel Carter (ed.), *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia, 14 August- 15 October 1947*, vol. I (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), p. 195.

[492] *The Times of India*, 15 August 1947.

Hindu refugees as well as established Hindu tradesmen.[493] Their growing anger and distrust towards the Government was perhaps a natural consequence of the harsh reality they were facing.

In Kurukshetra, 100 miles north of Delhi, there was a new relief centre for refugees opened by the Ramakrishna Mission, which stimulated the Government of India to also open a relief centre a short while later.[494] It soon became the biggest refugee colony, estimated that at its maximum it held three hundred thousand refugees. Likewise, Hindu and Sikh religious organizations actively participated in relief works, especially for the sake of the refugees of their own communities. According to a volunteer's report, among social service organizations religious groups comprised a good portion of the whole. Some major long-term volunteer organizations included, with the number of persons belonging to the group in brackets: Rama Krishna Mission (25), National Christian Council (22), Hindu Mission (15), Friends' Service Unit (1), Relief and Welfare Ambulance Corps, Calcutta (7), Marwari Relief Society (10), Servants of India Society (5), Indian Red Cross Society (4), Tata Institute of Social Science (35), St. John Ambulance Brigade (24), Congress Seva Dal (5), Kurushetra Seva Dal (1,000).[495] One group, Kurukshetra Seva Dal, was even developed later by refugees themselves within the camp. It was the result of initiatives from already-existing volunteer organizations. Yet, among the volunteer bodies at Kurukshetra camp, religious groups were the most prominent in relief work.

Co-operation between the State and the Non-State Body beyond Communalism

As mentioned above, the efforts of great nationalist leaders like Gandhi, Azad, Nehru and the secular policies of the Congress-led Government of India created a certain progress that drifted away from communal sentiments in Delhi and East Punjab. Along with these high level efforts, grass-root level civilian efforts were also

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[493] Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, vol. II*: 1839-2004* (Second ed.) (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 281-2.

[494] *The Times of India*, 8 September 1947.

[495] John Antony, 'Kurukshetra Today', *NCCR*, May 1948, vol. LXVIII, no. 5, p. 226.

equally noteworthy for mending communal tensions of the regions. Particularly, the communally neutral Christian community found more open opportunities and availabilities than any other volunteer groups involved in relief works. They proved highly effective and productive, even in the eyes of the Government. This was not only because they were communalism-free in their position, but they also had the practical ability to contribute to the relief, in that they had buildings, staffs, and skills developed in mission hospitals and mission schools scattered in strategic places. Various Christian organizations, and both pan-India and foreign networks amongst Christian communities were also available to enhance financial and physical help.

As soon as the Purana Qila Muslim Refugee camp was set up in the early September 1947, two Christian organizations, the YWCA and the YMCA, joined forces in the relief work. The report of the National Christian Council (hereafter, NCC) revealed how communalism-free humanitarian work of volunteers from all three Hindu, Muslim and Christian communities helped build communal harmony and confidence to other communities. The report said that:

> Girls from various YWCA hostels willingly spent half a day or a night during the first two weeks, giving any kind of emergency help that was needed… Later on, when these girls had returned to their ordinary work, there were still some ten or a dozen YWCA workers and students who came every day and worked under the direction, on the women's side, of Dr. Bintul Abbas, herself a refugee living in the camp, and on the men's side under Major Ramzan and Dr. A. Pasha… Nurses and Sisters from many parts of India, who had come to Delhi in response to the National Christian Council's appeal for relief workers, worked in the Infectious Diseases Hospital among the cholera cases, as well as in the camp… Almost every day Dr. Shushila Nayar[496] was there attending to the women patients, constantly trying to find how to provide them with better accommodation and more medical equipment… Miss Jumila Khawaja, also a refugee member of the camp, was quite invaluable in the responsibility she took for the general administration of the improvised women's hospital… It was a perfect example of how Hindus, Muslims and Christians were able to work together in perfect harmony, without any thought of community, because they were all inspired with the same desire to help those who were suffering.[497]

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[496] Sushila Nayar was a Gandhian nationalist. During the partition riots, she worked in refugee camps for relief.

[497] E.C. Bhatty, 'Refugee Relief', *NCCR*, December 1947, vol. LXVII, no. 12, pp. 612-613.

At the dawn of independence and partition, the Christian leaders of India often addressed concern for peace and co-operation. "The supreme task at the moment is to achieve unity of will and purpose for the greater good and glory of India. May this be our goal!"[498] John Matthai, later becoming a Finance minister at Nehru's first cabinet, urged that Christians in India should "regard themselves primarily as servants of the country and so organize their resources as to be a spearhead of national service."[499] During the All India Conference of Indian Christians at Bombay in January 1947, resolution no. 4, 'Communal Harmony' was passed such that: 1) they would offer full support and co-operation with the government in any measures taken to alleviate communal tension and to promote communal harmony, and 2) they would promote goodwill among all communities and afford help to any person injured regardless of caste and creed.[500] Such commitment of pan-India Christian leaders was fully applied in the areas of refugee relief works. The editorial in *NCCR* confirmed that:

> It is the task of the Churches, and other responsible Christian bodies constantly to bring their influence to bear on government and leaders, and to help them to the courageous fulfillment of their duties. It is the special vocation of Christians to foster a spirit of mutual goodwill and trust among the different communities and political parties in both dominions. It calls upon all the Christians of India and Pakistan to pledge their loyalty and devotion to the flags of their respective Dominions.[501]

S. P. Singha saw a positive future role for Christians in the two divided Dominions by saying that "If we are true Christians, we shall naturally be true patriots as well. If we are true Christians, we shall have the character qualification par excellence. Merit cannot be permanently suppressed. Opportunities to serve our country will not be lacking if we are worthy sons of our Motherland."[502] The Guardian, a Christian weekly magazine, urged all Indian Christians to participate in refugee relief work on

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[498] 'Editorial Notes', *NCCR*, May 1947, vo. LXVII, no. 5, p. 1.

[499] John Matthai, 'Opening Session', *Report of the All India Conference of Indian Christians*, Twenty Seventh Session: Bombay, 24-26 January 1947.

[500] 'Resolution no. 4, Communal Harmony', *Report of the All India Conference of Indian Christians*, Twenty Seventh Session: Bombay, 24-26 January 1947.

[501] 'Editorial Notes', *NCCR*, September 1947, vo. LXVII, no. 9, p. 2.

[502] *The Guardian*, 21 August 1947, vol. XXV, no. 32, p. 371.

the ground that it would "serve the Nation in such a way that the communal distinction would wear away in the consciousness of brotherhood."[503]

Although the government of India did not make any direct appeal for help to foreign countries, it was not only willing, but eager to secure help from Church sources abroad through the National Council of Churches of India[504] However, the United States did not aid India immediately after independence because South Asia was on the periphery of the Cold War. The frontline states in Western Europe, apparently menaced by the Soviet Union, received billions of dollars under the Marshall Plan; there was nothing left for India.[505] Thus, civilian activities for drawing US aid, in which Indian churches were acted as a mediator, were the only way to secure foreign help. Through American church relief, invaluable medicines, medical equipments, and funds were flown to India for refugee relief work.[506] In fact, unlike other political upheavals, partition "offered to the Christian Church in India an opportunity to demonstrate its goodwill towards other communities and to perform the ministry of reconciliation between them."[507] The Church in India was greatly impressed by the eagerness of the ministers in the Cabinet and the government officials to avail of the help of the Christian organizations.[508] H.M. Mohite, Brigadier, Commander Headquarter Military Evacuation Organization (India) sent a letter of appreciation to the Chairman of National Council of Churches in India, Burma and Ceylon:

> On behalf of the Military Evacuation Organization in India I wish to express my thanks to you for the excellent work of Medical Relief done by your various Medical Teams in West Punjab. They often had to work long hours under most difficult and trying conditions but I am very glad to say that your boys did wonderful well. I am writing this note to record my appreciation of the Noble work done by your boys for the National cause.[509]

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503 *The Guardian*, 9 October 1947, vol. XXV, no. 39, p. 454.

504 'E.C. Batty, 'Report of the NCCR Relief Committee', *Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Council of Churches of India, Burma and Ceylon* , held at Nagpur, 18-24 November 1947, p. 12.

505 Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 108-109.

506 E.C. Bhatty, 'Refugee Relief', *NCCR*, December 1947, vol. LXVII, no. 12, pp. 612-613.

507 'Punjab Refugee Relief work', *The Guardian,* 23 October 1947, vol. XXV, no. 41, p. 484.

508 'Punjab Refugee Relief work', *The Guardian,* 23 October 1947, vol. XXV, no. 41, p. 484.

509 'Relief work in West Punjab', *The Guardian*, 8 January 1948, vol. XXVI, no. 1, p. 5.

2. Hindu Politics in Delhi and Punjab, 1947-1965

The Growth of Communal Politics in Delhi, 1947-1966

After the influx of refugees in the city, tackling the height of communal violence and the subsequent refugee relief and rehabilitation issues became primary tasks in the eyes of the Government of India. The refugees had two reasons for resentment towards the Government and the nationalist leaders: one was their so-called "appeasement policy to Muslims", and the other was the ill-management of refugee policies. Under these conditions, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS, later with the Jana Sangh took up initiatives for mass mobilizations in the city for the interests of Hindu refugees.

Kaur remarks on the changing identity of Punjabi Hindus in Delhi in the perspective of territorial partition and the post-colonial state formation. They soon began deliberately adopting a wider identity of "Indian" while they kept themselves away from the ethnic identity of "Punjabi". Kaur terms it, "ethnic amnesia".[510] This phenomenon was linked to the post-partition tensed relations between Hindus and Sikhs for the creation of the Punjabi Suba. The Punjabi identity shares cultural, regional and linguistic co-inheritance, which encompasses religious differences. Therefore, linguistic identity as a Punjabi speaker was an essential part of Punjabi-ness, which Hindus and Sikhs could share. Kaur's argument was that Punjabi Hindus changed their mother tongue from Punjabi to Hindi in order to indentify themselves with the Indian state of which the official language was Hindi. The demand for a Punjabi-speaking state by the Sikhs was interpreted as a Sikh separatist demand by the Punjabi Hindus, which was anti-national in character. Kaur went on to say that "Punjabi Hindus whose identification with the Indian nation-state has become inextricably deeper than that among their Sikh counterparts."[511] However, it failed to explain fully why Punjabi Hindus rejected Punjabi and adopted Hindi as their mother

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[510] Ravinder Kaur, *Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 217.

[511] Ravinder Kaur, *Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 217.

tongue. It was not only their desire for close association with the Indian state, but also their longing to belong to wider and more secure groups, not necessarily just the Indian state that played important role in their move to choose Hindi. In other words, for some Punjabi Hindus their identity was not based on nationalist views, but rather on Hindu communalism. They chose to become "exclusively" Hindu more than Punjabi because the former would guarantee security and hegemony to them, which they had been desperately searching for while the latter offered only narrowness and confusion of being linked with the Sikh demand for a separate Punjabi-speaking state.

In an interview with Renuka Khanna (name changed for privacy), she introduced herself as a Delhi-ite until I asked her parents' hometown. Being part of the second generation of a partition refugee family in Delhi, she was brought up as a Hindu, a Delhi walla, and an Indian, but not as a Punjabi.[512]

It was a part of partition's impact on the psyche of Punjabi Hindus whose minority fear in pre-partition Punjab led them to desire membership in majority groups. In post-partition Punjab and Delhi, Hindus became the absolute majority. However, as far as Punjabi Hindus were concerned, unless their membership was in some way tangible, they would remain marginalized as refugees or Punjabis. This led them to renounce Punjabi, and instead choose Hindi. However, there were two options of belonging in front of them – the Congress-led secular nation-state on the one hand and Hindu communalist groups on the other hand. Not only a secular choice but also a communal choice attracted them in pursuit to achieve their goals. The two groups often interchangeably affected them. What has to be kept in mind is that the ethnic rejection of Punjabi Hindus prompted a shift in identity brought on by partition altering structural foundations to the language, religion and territorial issues between the Hindus and the Sikhs in the regions.

Hindi Movement in Delhi and Punjab

After Punjab was partitioned in 1947 with the near elimination of Muslims, there was a hope that partition would bring the communal harmony in the region. The

[512] Interview with Renuka Khanna (name changed for privacy) in East Nizamuddin, New Delhi on 20 November 2013.

following decades showed, however, that the communal tensions still existed. These were found their expression in the Hindu-Sikh rivalry. "Both the Sikh gurdwaras and the Hindu temples were", remarks Dua, "actively involved in politics."[513] She goes on to say that these gurdwaras and temples were used as poltical platforms by politicians and religious sentiments and symbols were also used for political purposes. Dua argues that "just as caste has become an important factor in the political life of some regions, religion has assumed ascendency in the political life of Punjab."[514] The intensity of the political role of religion was also encouraged by the post-partition political changes: an adoption of the democratic constitution based on adult franchise. Under these circumstances, many religious groups were closely associated with various political parties in various ways.[515] The language issue in the regional politics, therefore, became an important religious issue and was quickly communalized.

When the Punjabi Suba movement was launched by the Sikhs in the late 1940s, there was simultaneously a counter-Punjabi Suba movement organized by Arya Samaj. In April 1957, *Hindi Raksha Samiti* was formed for the promotion of Hindi as the local and national language of Punjab and India. Swami Anand Bikshu, a leader of the Punjab *Hindi Raksha Samiti*, even launched "fast-unto-death" as a protest against the government decision of a Regional Formula which had allowed bilingualism- a compulsory teaching of Punjabi in schools within the state of Punjab.[516] Prime Minister Nehru said in response to an open letter sent from the Arya Samaj that he didn't see any major conflict over the language question, rather he saw the demand as a political issue which would lead to communal bitterness and thus be a grave disservice to India.[517] He worried about communal elements of Hindi Raksha Samiti because the Jan Sangh was deeply involved in it. He regretted that the cause for Hindi was not properly addressed, but suffered due to the communalistic ingredients of the

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[513] Veena Dua, 'Arya Samaj and Punjab Politics', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. no. 43 and 44 (24 October 1970), p. 1787.

[514] Veena Dua, 'Arya Samaj and Punjab Politics', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. no. 43 and 44 (24 October 1970), p. 1787.

[515] Veena Dua, 'Arya Samaj and Punjab Politics', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. no. 43 and 44 (24 October 1970), p. 1787.

[516] *The Times of India*, 12 August 1957.

[517] *The Times of India*, 24 June 1957.

movement.[518]

In contrast to the view of Nehru's central government, Swami Atmanand of Hindi Raksha Samiti asserted that it was "neither a communal nor political one", but it was 'definitely' cultural movement in order to preserve "the dignity and status of our national language, which is our religious and cultural language also."[519]

Throughout the post-partition period, the Arya Samj took a more consistent pro-Hindi position on the language issue than any other organization in the Punjab. It insisted that there should be no compulsion upon Hindus, whatever their mother tongue, to be educated through the medium of Punjabi and that Hindus should have the right to choose Hindi in the Devanagari script as the medium of instruction in schools. Therefore, it was the Arya Samaj which was the leading force for the cause of Hindi in the Hindu community in the Punjab and Haryana in organization, resources, and mass support. During the height of the Punjabi Suba movement, the Arya Samaj formed alliances with other Hindu organizations and also spawned inter-organizational fronts to fight for the protection of Hindi in the Punjab. Such united Hindu efforts were again organized in 1961 in order to oppose the Punjab Official Languages Act, passed in October 1960, which declared both Punjabi and Hindi as official languages in their respective regions in the Punjab.

However, there was a certain division among various Hindu organizations and groups, depending upon their cultural, political and regional interests. The interests of the Haryana Hindus and Punjabi Hindus became different in the course of the movement. The former were ready to accept the division of the Punjab which would ensure the creation of a Hindu-dominated, Hindi-speaking Haryana as a solution for their cause while the latter were in opposition to the division which would consequently make them as a minority under a Sikh-dominated, Punjabi-speaking state.

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[518] *The Times of India*, 17 August 1957.

[519] *The Times of India*, 20 August 1957.

3. Sikh Politics in Post-Partition Punjab, 1947-1966

Sikhism as a Religio-Political Community

The Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) was a pillar of the Punjabi-speaking state movement. The SGPC had been crucial in mobilizing the Sikh masses and morally legitimizing certain political activities of the community. Therefore, it ushered in a great part of the Sikh's modern political movements. Tracing back to as early as the 1920s, the SGPC as a Sikh religious body had been used as platforms for Sikh social, political and, of course, spiritual gatherings. The decisive period in the growth of a modern, militant Sikh identity and in the institutionalization of Sikh consciousness came in the early 1920s, during the Gurudwara reform movement. In the period between 1920 and 1925, Sikh leaders launched a series of militant agitations at the sites of important Sikh shrines in order to remove them from the control of the allegedly corrupt and Hinduized *mahants*, who were accused of mismanaging their affairs and funds. The agitations of the 1920s, which culminated in the passage of the Sikh Gurudwara Act of 1925, had profound consequences for the development of Sikh consciousness and Sikh political action. Out of the Gurudwara reform movement emerged the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) to manage the Sikh gurudwaras and the Akali Dal, its agitational and political arm. These two organizations continued to be the primary institutional expressions of Sikh communal political consciousness and identity since 1920s. Both the Gurdwara reform movement and the formation of the SGPC and the Akali Dal also served to sharpen the line of demarcation between Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab.[520] The Akali Dal successes in the SGPC elections (1954, 1960, 1965) subsequently provided the platform for the Punjabi Suba agitations of 1955, 1960-1 and 1965.[521] Close relations between religious bodies and political bodies proved to be the key for success of the Punajbi Suba movement. The Sikhs were unlike the Punjabi Hindus in that they were more homogenous in terms of religious, ethnic,

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[520] Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 283-284.

[521] Gurharpal Singh, *Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 107.

regional and political background. They held the unique ingredient of local Punjabi culture, found nowhere else in other parts of India. The SGPC, closely controlled by the Sikh political bodies, was a typical sign of the Sikhs' theocratic or at least semi-theocratic character. In post-partition Punjab politics, such a nexus between religious bodies and political bodies continued to create communal tensions while competing with local Hindus over the Punjabi Suba issues.

The Punjabi Suba and Communal Issues, 1949-1966

During the Constituent Assembly debates (1946-1950), separate electorates and safeguards in accordance with religion were rejected by a majority decision on the grounds that they would create another division of India. They were condemned as a threat to national unity. The event of partition which had created Pakistan according to communal lines clearly impacted these fears. Therefore, the religious minorities such as the Muslims, the Sikhs, the Christians, and others did not secure constitutional safeguards.[522] According to Article 296 of the Constitution draft, only the Scheduled Castes and Tribes were eligible to retain reservation in the Legislatures as well as in Union and State government services.[523] The Scheduled Castes were particularly categorized as the Hindus so that the Sikh Dalits were excluded against wishes of the Sikh Assembly members until they were included in 1956.[524] Furthermore, the formation of linguistic provinces was rejected at the constitution. This was strongly opposed by Nehru and Patel.[525] In this constitution formation, the Sikhs felt betrayed by the Government due to the neglect of the Sikhs by the Hindu majority after a denial of agreed safeguards. Sardar Hukam Singh, a Sikh member of the Constituent Assembly, expressed minority resentment against the decision:

> Sir, I might be accused of communalism when I sound this discordant note. But I hold

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[522] Granville Austin, *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 403.

[523] *The Times of India*, 27 August 1949.

[524] *The Times of India*, 15 October 1949.

[525] Granville Austin, *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 297.

> that this nationalism is an argument for vested interests. Even the aggressiveness of the majority would pass off as nationalism while the helplessness of the minority might be dubbed as communalism. It is very easy for the majority to preach nationalism to the minorities; but it is very difficult to act up to it.[526]

Both Punjabi Hindu and Sikh refugees looked ahead to same fate, until the cleavage over the Punjabi-speaking state issue took place. However, a widening of the difference between the two communities in the areas of social and political interpretations of 'self-identity' was marked in the course of post-partition national identity making. In this socio-political situation two major non-communal issues were communalized in Punjab after partition: 1) the use of Punjabi language, and 2) the demand of the Punjabi Suba. After the failure of imposing constitutional safeguards for religious minorities, the Sikh leaders, mainly the Akalis began to launch a new movement. As early as October 1949, they openly made the Punjabi Suba a demand. In August 1950, the Akali Dal launched its first mass agitation for the demand. In August 1951, the Akali Dal issued a manifesto on its Punjabi Suba demand, stating that it would be vital to the Sikhs and a question of life or death as well as a necessary security for the community.[527] After the partition of India in 1947, the Congress-led Indian government was in disfavor of any proposal based on religious or communal grounds. Therefore, the Akali Dal emphasized the linguistic basis of the demand, proposing the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state rather than a Sikh-majority state before the States Reorganization Commission in 1953. However, the proposal was not accepted on the grounds that the Punjabi language was not distinct enough from Hindi, and there was no popular support within the Punjabi-speaking Hindu population who had denied Punjabi as their mother tongue.

In an outraged response to the States Reorganization Commission, the Akali Dal launched a Punjabi Suba agitation again in 1955. This agitation was communally met by Hindu counter-campaign of "save Hindi". Communal riots were erupted in various major towns in Punjab. The Hindus put their slogan, "*Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan*" up against the Sihks' "*Dhoti, topi, Jumna par* (men who wear dhotis and topis, meaning

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[526] *The Constituent Assembly Debates*, vol. 10, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2003), p. 233.

[527] Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs,* vol. 2*: 1839-2004* (second ed.) (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 293.

Hindus, will be sent across the Jumna river)". Some 12,000 were arrested for communal shouting and riots. Finally, the Congress in Punjab approached the Akali Dal for negotiations which led to the signing of a "Regional formula" in which separate regional committees according to language were allowed in the state legislature. The Akali Dal agreed to merge with the Congress in contesting the 1957 elections and in the Punjab legislature.

At the Punjab government level, a chief minister, Pratap Singh Kairon, was somewhat reluctant to uphold the formula in practice, which eventually led to the split of the Akali Dal from the Congress and the re-launching of the Punjabi Suba demand by the Akali Dal. In May 1960, massive demonstrations were followed by the arrest of 26,000 people. Nevertheless, Kairon was skeptical of the Punjabi Suba demand as he saw no popular support in Punjabi-speaking areas in his tours in June 1960. After it became clear that the government was not willing to consent to the demand, Sant Fateh Singh launched a fast-unto-death until the demand was met. Then, in January 1961, Sant Fateh Singh met Nehru for a discussion of the Punjabi Suba demand and there Sant emphasized the 'purely' linguistic character of the demand, rather than its communal character.[528] It was a turning point for the Punjabi Suba movement as Sant Fateh Singh clearly deviated from the communal stand and sidelined Master Tara Singh's communal stand. In 1962, Sant Fateh Singh formed a separate Akali Dal, and he succeeded in winning in the SGPC elections over Master Tara Singh.

In the mean time, both the years of 1964 and 1965 marked several political changes regionally and nationally, impacting the path of the Punjabi Suba demand: 1. In Punjab, Pratap Singh Kairon's removal from the office in 1964 and his assassination in 1965, which led to factional splits of the Punjab Congress and a weakening of the anti-Punjabi Suba demand within the Punjab government. 2. Nehru's death in 1964 which paved a way for new leaders to take hold of power, leaders who were more open to regional demands. 3. In September 1965, the second Indo-Pakistan War broke out, which pushed the centre to negotiate with Sant Fateh Sing's group in a light more favorable to the demand for the sake of national security and unity. The Home

[528] The Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, made a statement on 8 January 1961 that "the Punjab itself is, broadly speaking, a Punjabi Suba as it is with Punjabi as the dominant language there. It is true that some parts of the Punjab have Hindi but essentially Punjabi is the dominant language and it should be encouraged in every way." in *The Times of India*, 7 September 1965.

Minister, Mr. G.L. Nanda, said in the Lok Sabha on 6 September that "the country was facing a situation with serious possibilities. The present was not the time for doing anything which might defect the energy of the government and the people from the task of facing the serious threat to our [national] security."[529] He assured Sant Fateh Singh that the whole question could be examined afresh with an open mind.

Finally, in March 1966, the Parliamentary Committee on the Demand for Punjabi Suba submitted a report that "Punjabi region specified in the First Schedule to the Punjab Regional Committee Order of 1957 should form a unilingual Punjabi State".[530] According to the committee's report, the Punjabi-speaking State would have a population of 11.5 million and an area of 20,254 sq. miles. It would comprise Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana, Ferozpur, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Patiala, Bhatinda, Kapurthala and parts of Ambala and Sangrur Districts. Haryana State consisting of Hissar, Rothak, Gurgaon, Karnal, Mahendragarh and parts of Ambala and Sangrur, would have a population of 7.5 million and an area of 16,835 sq. miles. The hill areas of Kangra, Simla, Lahaul and Spiti would be merged with Himachal Pradesh, and it would have a population of 1.2 million and an area of 10,215 sq. miles.[531] This ruling was officially declared for implementation on 1 November 1966.

Sikh political leaders valued Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script as a means for communicating a sense of separateness. However, they could not say that they wanted a Punjabi Suba because of their religious affiliation, thus creating a Sikh-majority state. Rather they had to say that it was for the reason that they were Punjabi-speakers that they wanted to live in Punjabi-speaking state. Similarly, Punjabi-speaking Hindus couldn't oppose the Punjabi Suba on the basis that it would create a Sikh-majority state, but had to say that it was because they were Hindi-speakers that they didn't want to live in a Punjabi-speaking state.[532] It was a new rule in Indian politics after the partition of India that communal sentiments involved in any political arrangements would be discouraged in order to avoid further division of India.

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[529] *The Times of India*, 7 September 1965.

[530] *The Times of India*, 19 March 1966.

[531] *The Parliamentary Committee on the Demand for Punjabi Suba: Report* (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966), pp. 83-87; *The Times of India*, 7 September 1965.

[532] Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 323.

Despite the contrary efforts of secular nationalist leaders, communal disparity between the two communities widened and deepened as issues were discussed and negotiated. The demand for the Punjabi Suba was in fact nothing but a demand for a Sikh majority state.The linguistic issue was used as a thinly-veiled bargaining tool with the central government.[533] *The Economic Weekly,* in an interpretation of the Punjabi Suba demand in May 1961, argued much about its communal sentiments. It argued that "whatever course of action the Akalis choose, the result would be to divide the Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab further" and further went on to say that "with the general elections at hand this prospect cannot but please the Jana Sangh which must surely hope to benefit from anti-Sikh feeling among the Hindus. The cleavage may even lead ultimately to a division of the State, on communal, not linguistic, basis."[534] Punjabi Hindus connected with the Arya Samaj and the Jana Sangh played a critical role for the promotion of the Hindi. They had started a campaign during the 1951 census operations to persuade Punjabi-speaking Hindus to declare their mother tongue to be Hindi. This campaign was reviewed in the 1961 census operations. In an atmosphere of communal polarization and division, the Hindu Punjabi elites chose to identify themselves with the new nation-state of India, sacrificing their regional and cultural identity as Punjabi. The influence of communalized Hindu elites over the Hindu Punjabi population of Punjab and their decision to enumerate themselves as a Hindi-speaking population only helped the Sikh elites in strengthening their case for a separate Punjabi Suba within reorganization of the provinces.[535]

Finally, the state of Punjab and the Punjabi language were strongly associated with the Sikhs, meaning that the Punjabi identity was communally occupied by the Sikhs. However, Punjabi Hindus remained politically closer to Hindi and Indian Hindus, which meant their self-identification with Hindu India was growing stronger than their ethnic identity as Punjabis.[536] In due courses, 'the minority fear' of the Sikhs

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[533] Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs,* vol. 2*: 1839-2004* (second ed.) (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 292.

[534] 'Punjabi Suba Where It was', *The Economic Weekly*, vol. XIII, no. 20, 20 May 1961, p. 777.

[535] Surinder S. Jodhka, 'Sikhs Today: Development, Disparity and Difference', Gurpreet Mahajan & Surinder S. Jodhka (ed.), *Religion, Community and Development: Changing Contours of Politics and Policy in India* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2010), pp. 176-7.

[536] Ravinder Kaur, *Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 242-43.

played a crucial role in their defense of their self-defined Punjabi identity, while Punjabi Hindus, once a minority in colonial Punjab, secured majority status from the larger body of the Indian Hindu community, detaching themselves from ethnic Punjabi identity to national Hindu. In doing so, as Ravinder Kaur remarks, many Punjabi Hindus adopted the new cult of the eight-armed goddess for their religious practice so that their association with larger militant Hindu politics propagated by the RSS was not an unusual phenomenon.[537] This all created a space for further division of people within the country.

Hindus were accused of deserting their Punjabi identity by the Sikhs. Gopal Singh argues that "Hindus themselves are responsible for their alienation, insecurity and frustration" and he further accused Punjabi Hindus, saying that "by disowning Punjabi as their mother tongue, they have become rootless and have alienated themselves from the culture, history and society of Punjab, thus leaving the Sikhs to claim Punjabi culture and Punjabi history as theirs. They 'hang' in Punjab like a tree in the air having no roots in the soil they inhabit."[538]

However, their choice to abandon their previous identity was not an arbitrary one. As a Punjabi Hindu, they used to have a minority fear in their home region prior to partition. Being part of the religious majority in India, yet minority in the region, Punjabi Hindus always wanted to associate themselves with larger body of Indian Hindus. In doing so, they thought they could secure their majority status so that the regional majority, the Muslims, would be kept well in-check. Having half succeeded through partition, the Punjabi Hindus' search for absolute majority led them to continue politics of 'majoritarian communalism' even in post-partition Punjab in the name of national unity. This was definitely driven by competition for political hegemony as well as the psychological impact of partition, which made communal mobilization as it became comparatively secure means of safeguarding one's solidarity in the process of nation-building in Punjab and North India.

India's secularism was badly affected by communalism under the influence of the partition motif. Religious rhetoric was frequently used to mobilize the mass in various

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[537] Ravinder Kaur, *Since 1947: Partition Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 242-43.

[538] Quoted in Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, vol. 2*: 1839-2004* (second ed.) (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 294.

social and political issues. Even the issues of caste, class and gender inequalities were manipulated into communal disputes through riots which led to the deepening of distrust between Hindus and Muslims.[539]

4. Religion as Political Ideology and the Partition System

Reorganization of the Self Identity under the Partition System

Through her interview Zakaria discovered different kinds of loss inherited by the second and third generations of Punjabi refugees as a result of partition of Punjab.[540] They experienced the loss of Punjabi, their mother tongue as well as their land, their soils and their culture back in Pakistan. An interviewee's maternal grandmother, in her memory, spoke exclusively Hindi to her though she often used Punjabi with her age groups. Zakaria found that this was due to the fact that she wanted to maintain her identity as an Indian so that she would not have to fear another division. For the next generation of Punjabi Hindu refugees, language was 'the physical loss of partition',[541] a loss of the cultural inheritance of West Punjab.

My own interview with a Hindu lady at East Nizamuddin, New Delhi revealed similar views relating to her identity as a Hindu. Being a Hindu in itself guarantees her union with a bigger "us" whereas her Punjabi identity tended to group her with the smaller or more dangerous "others", particularly during the Punjabi-speaking state debates. However, Punjabi refugees' assertion on being Hindu did create two kinds of contrasting identity formation: 1) Hindu as a community and 2) Hindu as a nation. The notion of the latter was developed by Hindu communalism while the former was the notion maintained by secular nationalists. There was no sharp distinction, but

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[539] Amrita Basu, 'Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism' in David Ludden (ed.), *Making India Hindu* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 79.

[540] Anam Zakaria, *The Footprints of Partition: Narratives of Four Generations of Pakistanis and Indians* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015), pp. 158-171.

[541] Anam Zakaria, *The Footprints of Partition: Narratives of Four Generations of Pakistanis and Indians* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015), p. 163. In West Punjab, after Pakistan Government declared Urdu as a national language, Punjabi also lost its prestigious position which represented Punjabi culture among Punjabi Muslims while Punjabi Hindus lost their cultural and ethnic identity by rejecting Punjabi language.

rather the identities were often intermingled with one another. Punjabi Hindu refugees and their next generations defined and redefined their identities again and again according to the changing situations surrounding local and national issues. Nevertheless, it was clear that communal sentiments grew more and altered the community relations as well.

Chandrima Roy, another Punjabi Hindu refugee, talked of her father's good relationships with Muslims in Lahore before partition. He was, in fact, helped by his Muslim neighbours during partition riots so that he was able to escape from killings. However, Chandrima's grudge against the Congress leaders whom she thought responsible for partition, along with Jinnah, pushed her to choose communal parties as alternatives. As she said, "what had the Congress done to us [the Hindus]? Nothing! That was why many of Hindu refugees in Delhi voted for the Jana Sangh and later the BJP."[542] Although she couldn't personally remember the partition as she was just 4 years old at the time, life in a refugee family had made her resentful towards the established political orders throughout her life. This resentment eventually prompted her to choose alternative options that focused more exclusively on representation of those like her family, these groups including the *Hindutva* groups or *Sangh Parivar*. Her identity formation was not due to anti-Muslim sentiments, but rather it was mainly due to searching for suitable agencies that held out the hope of solacing her losses and pains. Her choice was affected by the psychological dimensions of horrors and angers she witnessed in her parents who experienced violence and loss during partition, as well as physical dimensions - striving for resettlement, never satisfying effort to make-up the losses during partition.

I interviewed Harbhajan Singh, an elderly Sikh man, who owns a car AC repair shop in central market, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. He remembered how his father and family risked their lives to flee from Lahore. His father was a good businessman running a transportation company and had good relations with Muslim business partners and neighbours. But, he lost everything when he had to hastily flee for his life. His Muslim co-workers and neighbours helped him escape the massacres. Because of this, his father had no grudge against Muslims, but rather missed his past relations with older Muslim friends and neighbours. However, presently the son does

[542] Interview with Chandrima Roy at Lodhi Colony, New Delhi on 28 February 2016.

not mingle with Muslims. He simply believes that "they are different from us. Their eating habits, customs, beliefs and almost everything is different. And they are not genuine in business also. I cannot trust them personally."[543] Therefore, he doesn't want to make friends with Muslims. Unlike his father's life in pre-partition, he and his siblings were totally cut off from any close contact with Muslims in their upbringing. Areas they lived in had no Muslim residents. Such a "primary socialization" in his childhood allowed him to develop cultural separation from the Muslims as far as refugee colonies remained Muslim-free zones.[544] This enhanced his rigidity towards unknown and dangerous others, particularly the Muslims.

Indira Khosla was a small girl at the time of partition. She couldn't remember what had happened exactly during the period. However, she knew that throughout her upbringing her entire family struggled a lot. She felt that Muslims were responsible for partition and its terrors. She still can not mingle with Muslims, treating them equally with her Hindu neighbours though she acknowledges that they are equal citizens of India.[545] Throughout the interview it was noticed that she had a fear of Muslims as a whole. In her mind they were dangerous citizens of India.

K.K. Sharma was born in 1938 in Dera Gazi Khan in West Punjab. As a young boy, he clearly remembered the horrors of partition. He said that "it was a struggle during partition, but now it was gone in the past. No grudge or hatred anymore." When his family settled in Delhi, his relatives were already there to help them. Furthermore, as his family members were learned Brahmans they could find jobs comparatively easy, particularly in Government sectors. He said that in those days, the Government of India recruited many officers from educated Punjabi refugees in Delhi because the city had expanded so drastically within a short period of time, meaning it required more government jobs to cover public works. He himself was a former diplomat. He had no strong opposition to the government since his entire family got job opportunities through the government. However, he was not able to accept Muslims as his genuine neighbours or friends. "Because they are so different from Hindus" said Sharma, "unlike flexible Hinduism Islam teaches only one God, Allah. They

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[543] Interview with Harbhajan Singh at Lajpat Nager, New Delhi on 4 March 2015.

[544] Krishna Kumar, *Prejudice and Pride* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001), p. 38.

[545] Interview with Indira Khosla (name changed) at Saket, New Delhi on 7 January 2014.

don't allow any other form of belief. Muslims are so narrow-minded. I can mingle with any other person as Hindu religion is flexible, but except Muslims." When I met Mr. Sharma, it was the last day of the celebration of Ganpati Chaturthi. He opened his house and distributed free lunches as well as kept a Ganesh idol for visitors' worship inside the house. In answer to a question on why he celebrated Ganpati when it's usually a celebration of the Marathi-speaking people, he answered that "Hinduism is a flexible religion. You can choose your own deity according to your own preference. We, Punjabis, didn't worship Ganpati before. But now we all worship him like this."[546] Throughout the day, his house was full of visitors. As if to prove his point, even a Sikh couple came and worshipped Ganpati. He repeatedly stressed the flexibility of the Hindu religion while he maintained his non-flexible rigidity against Muslims.

In a number of the interviews taken, many Hindu and Sikh refugees of first and second generations held strong feelings against Muslims even though their choices of political parties differed from each other. Hindus had their own redefined identity as Delhi-ite Hindus or Indian Hindus deviated from their Punjabi ethnicity. As most of the interviewees were in their seventies or early eighties, most were small kids at the time of partition, and therefore communal sentiments they developed throughout their lives were only after partition. It was therefore only the partition system as a social, political, economic, and cultural structure egged on by communal ideology of Hindu communal forces that ingrained in them the communal attitudes that were further encouraged and solidified by their personal community's own experience of partition.

Communalism as Political Religion

The *Hindutva*[547] phenomenon imposed by right-wing Hindu organizations like the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha played a pivotal role in enhancing 'the partition system' during and after partition. They were institutions of daily lives of people in the society. Once the organizations developed close links with political bodies, they

[546] Interview with K.K. Sharma at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi on 27 September 2015.

[547] For more details, see M.S. Golwalkar's two books: *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1947) and *Bunch of Thoughts* (Bangalore: Vikram Prakashan, 1966), and V.D. Savarkar, *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* (fifth ed.) (Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan , 1969).

gradually became more influential in the social and political arenas of the country. *Sangh Parivar* generated the idea of '*Hindutva*' which enabled mass mobilization along communal lines. It was more political than religious in character. Therefore, *Hindutva* was simply political ideology that aimed at establishing a Hindu nation in India. Communalism was developed when *Hindutva* ideology upheld Hinduism as the basis of nationhood. As 'religious vision and political agenda united'[548], Hindu communalism was, by nature, anti-Muslim. Nehru was of the opinion that the RSS had "strictest Nazi lines" in its organization.[549] He further linked it with the phenomenon of European fascism.[550]

Sikh communalism was also similarly affected and developed by partition. Their identity as a Sikh community had a strong link between religion and politics. Fearing assimilation into the Hindu majority the Sikhs strived to achieve their solidarity by keeping themselves distant from the Hindu. The Sikh's "*Ham Hindu Nahin Hain* (We are not Hindus)" slogan against the Hindu's assertion that Sikhism was a branch of Hinduism is an example of this. Sikh communalism grew in tandem with communalism of other communities. In pre-partition Punjab, there were three competing rivals - the Muslims, the Hindus, and Christian missionaries - while in post-partition Punjab the Hindu community was the sole but strong rival to confront. The Arya Samaj was a champion of provoking fear and anger in the Sikhs towards the assimilation policy of the Hindu majority. For example, the "Save Hindi" movement was presented as a threat to the Sikh identity as a Punjabi-speaker. A prolonged struggle for the Sikh solidarity led to the demand for a Sikh majority state in the form of the Punjabi Suba in the two decades after the partition of 1947, as an organizing principle and a solution to the problem.[551] However, it was not an end to resolve the issue of solidarity. It rather boosted communal sentiments within the region. In the

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[548] Richard H. Davis, 'The Iconography of Rama's Chariot' in David Ludden (ed.), *Making India Hindu* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 51.

[549] Jawarharlal Nehru, 'A letter to Chief Ministers, 7 December 1947' in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947-1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 33.

[550] Jawarharlal Nehru, 'A letter to Chief Ministers, 6 December 1948' in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947-1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 41.

[551] S.T. Jassal & Eyal Ben-Ari, *The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts* (New Delhi: Sage, 2007), pp. 36-39; 41-47.

1970s and 80s, the *Khalistan* movement, a Sikh militant separatist movement, was produced out of such "partition motif"[552], but to no avail. The partition system which controlled the social and political behaviours of the people as a structure continued to affect post-partition society and politics in Punjab and Delhi. Nehru was of the opinion that the partition reality served communalists with a chance to enhance their political extremism, saying that:

> Whenever the tension with Pakistan increases, these communal organizations take advantage of this to preach their misguided views. As the Muslim League did before the partition, they preach the gospel of hatred and separatism. They go about saying continually that Muslims are not to be trusted and thus creating popular feelings against them.[553]… The fact is that the partition and its consequences, while it largely pushed out Muslim communalism and sent it to Pakistan, where it flourished exceedingly, also resulted in encouraging Hindu and Sikh communalism in India and many other separatist tendencies. These flourished in the name of nationalism and culture. They demanded loudly what they called strong action against Pakistan, which included war, and criticized governmental policy as one of appeasement of Pakistan.[554]

The partition of 1947 didn't occur just one time, but it continued in various forms in post-partition India, a fact, Nehru himself acknowledged. As Azad sadly remarked, partition didn't solve the country's problems, but rather made them worse.[555] Furthermore, partition provided a certain social, political, economic and cultural structure to regulate ways of thinking and behaviours of the people through the machination of communalism. The prolonged impact and consequences of partition were huge according to the various studies focusing on these topics. However, no research has been able to give an easy and direct answer as to why a series of same

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[552] S.T. Jassal & Eyal Ben-Ari, *The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts* (New Delhi: Sage, 2007), pp. 19-51.

[553] Jawarharlal Nehru, 'A letter to Chief Ministers, 1 August 1951' in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947-1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), pp. 53-54.

[554] Jawarharlal Nehru, 'A letter to Chief Ministers, 1 November 1951' in Madhav Khosla (ed.), *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers, 1947-1963* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 54.

[555] Maulana A.K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (complete version) (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2009), p. 247.

consequences throughout the history of post-independent India has been repeated multiple times, i.e., why the partition system could not be overcome.

Conclusion

The tragic event of partition transformed its most-affected areas, Punjab and Delhi, in many aspects. It brought nearly five million refugees from West Pakistan to various regions of North India, mainly East Punjab, Delhi, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Bombay, and Uttar Pradesh, while Punjab and Delhi absorbed a majority of them, particularly the Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs. They themselves and their special position as refugees have changed demography, culture and politics of the regions. As examined, the communal elements of Punjab and Delhi politics during the two decades post-partition grew gradually, particularly through the Hindu majority politics in Delhi and the Sikh minority politics in Punjab.

In Delhi, refugees were mostly merchants or traders of the middle and upper classes as well as politically *Hindutva*-oriented or right-wingers of the Congress. They made the city more economically vibrant in which they boosted commercial activities and small-scale industry, making Delhi as a commercial hub of North India, whereas it had previously been a slow pace, administrative, symbolic capital city. They also changed the culture of Delhi from what was once an Indo-Islamic, Urdu-speaking city to a more Punjabi-influenced city in terms of food, clothing, language, etc. Furthermore, Delhi politically became a hotbed of the Jana Sangh politics which vehemently challenged and later defeated the Congress. Communal organizations like the RSS, the Arya Samaj, and the Jana Sangh actively made efforts to win over refugees by exploiting their communal sentiments and at least half-succeeded in their efforts. Owing to these changes, the communal atmosphere in Delhi was more Hinduized in its character.

In Punjab, the refugee migration changed the religious composition of several regions district-wise. It prompted the Sikhs to demand a separate Sikh-dominated state through the Punjabi Suba movement. Throughout two decades of post-partition Punjab, this remained a main political issue and eventually became communalistic, increasing the tensions between the Hindus and the Sikhs. Whatever efforts the Sikhs

made and eagerness they showed, the Congress-run central and local governments kept their position in opposition to their demand due to its communalistic elements and a lack of consensus from other communities within the regions. However, in 1966 the Punjabi-speaking state was finally formed, splitting from two Hindi-speaking regions, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. Although it was claimed to be a linguistic state, its communal elements continued to affect the local politics. Both Sikh and Hindu refugees in Delhi and Punjab ushered in the heightening of communalism in the regions along with communal organizations, which continually challenged the secularism advocated by the Congress. They even infused communal elements in the local Congress politics as well. In the period after partition, Punjab and Delhi continued to exist under the shadow of communal tensions in which refugees and communal organizations were the prominent catalysts in the further solidification of the “partition system”.

Chapter 5

North Korean Refugees, Christians and Anti-communism in South Korea, 1945-1965

Introduction

The combination of the partition of the Korean peninsula in 1945 and the Korean War (1950-53) transformed almost every aspect of social, political, economic and cultural life of Korea. It enhanced the solidification of the partition system, a product of the Cold War. South Korea functioned according to the ideological rigidity of anti-communism. It was the belligerent anti-communistic social and political environment which prompted certain behaviours of people in the society. Such circumstances provided immense opportunities for certain groups to take advantage of it while the whole society was a victim of the brutality of war and violence. Some of successful beneficiaries were northern refugees and Christian elites. These two groups often synchronized with one another as many northern refugees were Christians, or at least pro-Christian in their religious affiliation after migration to the South. They were at the forefront of anti-communist activities throughout the period between 1945 and 1965. Their activities and influence would be divided into three periods: 1) the pre-war period after partition (August 1945-June 1950), 2) the Korean War period (June 1950-July 1953), and 3) the post-war period (August 1953-end of 1965). Seoul as a capital of Korea is the main focus as a microcosm of national transformation.

This chapter aims to answer several questions. First, to what extent did partition and the wars (the Korean War and the Vietnam War) contribute to northern refugees and Christian elites in South Korea accelerating their hegemony by actively promoting anti-communistic sentiments. Second, which areas did northern refugees and the church influence? Third, it aims to find out to what extent religious factors reflected and influenced characteristics of post-partition society and politics in South Korea. Finally, it examines the hardening process of the partition system in

light of Christian justification of anti-communism based on the dichotomist interpretation, i.e., theism against atheism, and good against evil.

1. Partition Refugees, Christians and Pre-Korean War Politics, 1945-1950

North Korean Refugees, Christians and Changing Scenes of Seoul

Seoul, the capital city of Korea, is a typical example of partition violence and its aftermath. Seoul was completely reshaped by partition violence. The demographic change due to outgoing and incoming refugees brought significant alterations in cultural, economic and political profiles in Seoul. At the time of independence in 1945, Seoul stood at 900,000 people. Some 200,000 Japanese left Seoul after liberation. However, in 1949 the population went up to 1,410,000.[556] This sudden rise is attributed to the influx of overseas Koreans and North Korean refugees. The number of North Korean migrants to Seoul in three years (1945-1948) was around 350,000. By 1948 it was estimated that approximately 100,000 northern refugee Christians settled in the South, of which Seoul sheltered nearly 70 percent or 70,000.[557]

Refugee rehabilitation and resettlement became a social issue after partition as their numbers increasingly shot up. However, due to a lack of planning and the spontaneous influx and settling of refugees, unauthorized shacks were erected in many parts of the capital. At the foot of Namsan Mountain, an unauthorized

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[556] Kisuk Lee, 'Seoul's Urban Growth in the 20th Century: From a Pre-modern City to a Global Metropolis' in Kwangjoong Kim (ed.), *Seoul, Twentieth Century: Growth and Change of the Last 100 Years* (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 2003), pp. 45-46, 88.

[557] 'Petition from the Association of Christians from North Korea, 14 September 1948', Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. Population differs from various sources as official census took place much later. For another source, in the periods of between the end of 1945 and the early 1950 it was estimated that a little less than 80,000 refugees were Christians, which comprised almost 40 percent of the North Korean Christian population as well as more than 30 percent of the entire Korean Christians at the time. In Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, Siminsahoe, 1945-65* [The Korean Christianity, the State and the Civil Society, 1945-65] (Seoul: The Institute of Korean Church History), p. 280.

shantytown formed by North Korean refugees and known as Haebangchon[558] became "a symbol of northern refugee town" within the capital.[559] It was hastily established without planning on a first-come, first-serve basis. It was the ideal location for the refugees in that the Namdaemun market, The Seoul railway station and the US military base were within a walking distance, providing a close proximity for potential future work. They built with their own hands all the dwellings constructed in this area. This phenomenon continued for some time, aggravating the chaotic urban situation. The foothills of Geumhwasan, Naksan, Changshindong, and Geumhodong which surrounded the old city centre, also saw the emergence of an unauthorized shantytown. In 1949, the city expanded its urban area, integrating the four new districts of Eunpyeong, Guro, Sungin, and Ttukdo. Thus, Seoul's urban area increased almost twofold, covering an area of 268.4 km^2.[560] The population in this area rapidly increased from 6,531 people in 1947 to 13,458 people in 1949 with the number of dwellings reaching 1,280. Haebangchon can be seen as Seoul's first illegal squatter area to take shape after liberation. The residents of Haebangchon were particularly industrious in their ability to make a living due to their natural eagerness to survive as refugees. This explains their acceptance of the extremely poor conditions of refugee lives. As Choe remarks, "not only were the social characteristics of the development of Haebangchon unique, but it also became one of the most overcrowded areas in all of Seoul."[561] Haebangchon was the first of such unplanned, large-scale developments to absorb the influx of northern refugees.

In the middle of Haebangchon the northern refugee Christians established the church called, Haebang church, which became a spiritual centre of the refugees. Such scenes were typical of refugees' habitations at the time. It is noteworthy to

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[558] Haebangchon literally means a "liberation village".

[559] Sangchuel Choe, 'Evolution of Modern City Planning in Seoul: 1950-2000', in Kwangjoong Kim (eds.), *Seoul, Twentieth Century: Growth & Change of the Last 100 Years* (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 2003), pp. 491-2.

[560] Sangchuel Choe, 'Evolution of Modern City Planning in Seoul: 1950-2000', in Kwangjoong Kim (eds.), *Seoul, Twentieth Century: Growth & Change of the Last 100 Years* (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 2003), pp. 491-2.

[561] Sangchuel Choe, 'Evolution of Modern City Planning in Seoul: 1950-2000', in Kwangjoong Kim (eds.), *Seoul, Twentieth Century: Growth & Change of the Last 100 Years* (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 2003), pp. 491-2.

mention that refugee churches acted as a spiritual comforter-cum-meeting hub of refugees. The Youngnak Church, founded near Namsan Mountain in 1945, was another refugee church. It soon became the biggest church among refugee churches in South Korea and later it became Korea's biggest church. For example, as early as January 1946, a couple of months after its foundation, the membership reached 1,000.[562] Even non-Christian refugees visited the church to seek help by associating with fellow northern refugees. The church was a meeting place for fleeing Christians as well as "a house of mutual solace for refugees".[563] As a result, The Youngnak Church became a social hub for northern refugees.[564] Simultaneously, new members were added and its numerical strength drastically increased. It was not uncommon to see such a bond between non-Christian refugees and Christian refugees as both shared the same experience and regional backgrounds. One incident that tells us about the increasing influence of the church in Namsan Mountain area surrounding Seoul is that the main Shinto shrine in Korea known as the Meiji Shrine, located on South [Namsan] Mountain was "torn down, on the site this year [1946] and an Easter sunrise service was held."[565]

Those Christian clergymen who fled from the north because of the communist persecutions had become ardent anti-communist activists. On 15 August 1947 some twenty northern clergymen founded *Ibook Sindo Daepyohoe* [the Association of the North Korean Christians] and through this association they expanded their influence in the South. In September 1948, they petitioned to the Presbyterian Church of America for helping the northern Christian refugees in the South and the call was answered. By the end of 1948 the northern Christians established themselves as a powerful political, social, and religious force. Seoul had been the most crucial city in modern Korean history as a capital. Whoever controlled Seoul

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[562] Youngnak Kyohoe, *Youngnak Kyohoe 35nyunsa* [The 35 Year History of The Youngnak Church] (Seoul: Youngnak Press, 1983), p. 62.

[563] Youngnak Kyohoe, *Youngnak Kyohoe 35nyunsa* [The 35 Year History of The Youngnak Church] (Seoul: Youngnak Press, 1983), p. 63.

[564] Interview with Jinho Jang at Seoul, South Korea on 4 July 2014. Jang was in his early twenties when he fled from Wonsan, North Korea in 1946. He was a retired elder of The Youngnak Church at the time of interview.

[565] Harry A. Rhodes, 'A Meeting with Korean Educators, 3 May 1946', Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 11, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

commanded the political direction of the rest of the country. The influx of northern Christians, together with other rightist elements, rapidly transformed the political, social, and religious landscape of Seoul, favoring the cause of the rightists. Haga remarks that "the Christians' platform of religious freedom, strong nationalist integrity, and charismatic leadership boosted the popularity of the rightist camp and gave it a more humane and appealing face."[566] The political and social atmosphere provided opportunities for the northern Christians to be seen in a favourable light.

For example, a report on 8 September 1946 by Dr. Fletcher reveals that the American missionaries in Seoul, with the help of the US military Government in South Korea tried to rescue two groups of Korean people; one group was Christian leaders who had fled from the North and the other was the displaced "comfort women" of the Japanese imperial army during the World War II. Such relief or rescue works in the pre-war period were repeatedly seen during the Korean War as well as a basic pattern of Christian relief activities. Through this the churches in Korea extended their sphere of influence from the Christian world to the non-Christian world. Fletcher's prayerful wish would be reiterated during war time, saying that "our prayer is that this social work may draw the Churches into a more intimate and firmer union and that it may be an arresting demonstration to the non-Christian world of the Christ spirit."[567]

Northern refugees, including many Christians, were the main supporters of rightist youth groups, such as *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* [Northwest Young Men's Association] founded on 30 November 1946 in Seoul by northern refugee youths for the purpose of effective anti-communist activities.[568] The Youngnak Church, one of the early and influential northern refugee churches in Seoul, had many members in *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe.* Rev. Han Kyungchik of The Youngnak Church recalled that many of his church youths joined *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* and participated in anti-

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[566] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 192.

[567] Dr. Fletcher, 'A Letter to Dr. Reischauer, 8 September 1946', Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 10, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

[568] Gisung Sunwoo, *Chongnyonui Eojewa Naeil* [Youth Movement, Yesterday and Today] (Seoul: Hwoetbulsa, 1969), pp. 30-31.

communism causes.[569] Because The Youngnak Church was built by northern refugees and mainly composed of young men and women, it was natural that they were proactively engaged in various political activities, especially those of the rightists. Thus, the north Korean-led churches in the South became the most effective non-state organization to influence the northern refugees.

The Role of Refugees in Anti-Communism in the South

North Korean refugees who fled from north of 38th parallel were strong anti-communists because they were persecuted by the communist authority in the North. Initially the refugees were more or less middle class or landowners targeted by communists. They shared their experiences of horrors and ill-treatment by the North communists. Sunwoo Gisung, a leader of *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe*, mentioned that whenever the leftists' violence occurred, *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* was at the front to fight it.[570] From the day of inauguration on 30 November 1946 until the establishment of the republic of Korea on 15 August 1948, *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* was actively involved in rightist government-making through anti-communistic activities.[571] The US military authority closely observed this organization and had detailed reports on them. A report on June 1947 perhaps well summarized the activities of the group and noted that they were engaged in a "Red Hunt", "energetically lashing out against those persons they suspect of being "anti-Democratic"."[572] They also led some propaganda activities against the communists

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[569] Eunsup Kim (compiled ed.), *Han Kyunchik Moksa Junjip:* Junki [The Collected Works of Rev. Han Kyungchik:The Biography](Seoul: Han Kyunmgchik Moksa Kinyumsaophoe, 2014), pp. 489-490.

[570] Gisung Sunwoo, *Chongnyonui Eojewa Naeil* [Youth Movement, Yesterday and Today] (Seoul: Hwoetbulsa, 1969), p. 26.

[571] After its inception it was expanded to the whole South, forming one more branch in Daejon which soon took in charge of anti-communist activities in the southern regions. *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* continued to play its roles during the Korean War and it was dissolved afterward. However, on 10 October 1963 its former members formed *Chungwoohoe* [Youth Friends Association] in order to continue anti-communist activities. Some of their activities were publications of anti-communist youths' history, the erection of anti-communist youths' movement tablets, petition to the National Assembly for pensions of anti-communist youths' martyrs, etc. In Gisung Sunwoo, *Chongnyonui Eojewa Naeil* [Youth Movement, Yesterday and Today] (Seoul: Hwoetbulsa, 1969), pp. 95-96.

[572] 'Activities of North West Korean Youth Association, 3 June 1947', Enclosure #3 to XXIV Corps

and others:

> One of the most active programs conducted by the South Korean branches, has been the propagandizing of the "true conditions existing in North Korea", and toward this end, they have given lectures throughout South Korea, and have submitted articles for publication in newspapers. These North Korean chapters have been used to furnish up-to-the-minute news, and in addition, many members from Seoul and environs have made frequent trips north of the 38th Parallel to gather news, as well as intelligence information.[573]

In this period, many *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* members lost their lives through leftist-rightist violence. For example, *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* members were dispatched to suppress communist rebels during the April First Incident of 1948 in Jeju, as well as the Yosu-Sunchon Incident in 1948 while a majority of the army officials dispatched were also northern migrants who naturally developed staunch anti-communistic sentiments. Their brutal suppression included the killing of many innocent civilians by false suspicion and accusation during the operations, earning the *Sobuk Chongnyonhoe* and northern Christians a bad reputation.[574]

Having just fled from the north in search of religious freedom, Christian refugees, though eager for unification and the chance to return home, dreaded the prospect of unification under communism. These northerners would not support politicians who sought compromise with either the Communists in the north or leftists in the south. Nor would they tolerate such views within their churches.[575] Their testimonies influenced the churches in the South, causing many church leaders to become

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G-2 WS 90, in the Committee of Jeju 4.3 Incident for Truth Finding and Restoring Victims' Honors, *Jeju 4.3 Sagunjaryojip, 11*[The Collected Works of Jeju 4.3 Incident, vol.11] (Seoul: the Committee of Jeju 4.3 Incident for Truth Finding and Restoring Victims' Honors, 2001), p. 397.

[573] 'Activities of North West Korean Youth Association, 3 June 1947', Enclosure #3 to XXIV Corps G-2 WS 90in the Committee of Jeju 4.3 Incident for Truth Finding and Restoring Victims' Honors, *Jeju 4.3 Sagunjaryojip, 11*[The Collected Works of Jeju 4.3 Incident, vol.11] (Seoul: the Committee of Jeju 4.3 Incident for Truth Finding and Restoring Victims' Honors, 2001), p. 397.

[574] Capt. Fischgrund, 'Tours of Chejudo, 22 November 1949', Enclosure to dispatch no. 749 from American Embassy, Seoul, Korea, in the Committee of Jeju 4.3 Incident for Truth Finding and Restoring Victims' Honors, *Jeju 4.3 Sagunjaryojip, 11*[The Collected Works of Jeju 4.3 Incident, vol.11] (Seoul: the Committee of Jeju 4.3 Incident for Truth Finding and Restoring Victims' Honors, 2001), p. 370.

[575] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 192.

politically more anti-communistic. Interactions with refugees had a critical impact on the Christian opinion of communism, causing many church leaders to shift to the right and become more politically conscious. "It was true that they supported Korean independence and wanted Korea to be united", said Haga, "but they desired more to see the establishment of a free and democratic government based on the American model which would allow full religious freedom."[576] In the periods between 1945 and 1948 the tension between the leftists and rightists in the south had accelerated into a power struggle in which the Christian community played a significant role in the establishment of a rightist regime.[577]

In this period their numbers and power rapidly grew. It was not only through growing numbers of Christians fleeing south, but also through revival meetings and evangelical work among the non-Christian refugees. For example, the churches newly planted by northern refugees in Seoul and the vicinity numbered 19 by October 1948, and 44 by October 1949.[578] They criticized and even physically attacked leftist elements within the church. For example, a Kim Kyushik-led moderate Christian youths' meeting was disturbed by the rightist northern Christian youth through physical attacks. Kim's leadership was even questioned by the Saemoonan Church authority to which he belonged on the ground that he tried to compromise with the communist atheists though he was known as a staunch Christian nationalist leader.[579] The northern Christians' fervor and their harrowing tales of persecution swayed many southern Christians to join their crusade, so that

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[576] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 190.

[577] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 190.

[578] Jungran Yoon, *Hankook Junjaengkwa Kidokkyo* [the Korean War and Protestantism] (Seoul: Hanwool, 2015), pp. 108-109.

[579] Kim Kyushik and his supporting youth organization, Chosun Kidokchongnyun JunkookYeonhaphoe [The Korean Christian Youths National Association] were not in favour of a separate government-making, but in favour of a unified government. It provoked distrust among the rightist Christians against him and his followers. In The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea, *Hankook Kidokkyoui Yeoksa*, III [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. III] (Seoul: the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009), pp. 38-39.

even native southern Christians became anti-communists.[580]

There was another equally important factor in the change of the southern churches' political opinion: the events that they, themselves, experienced while living in the South. As violence against the rightists began to intensify in the South in early 1948, Christians were often targeted by terrorist attacks and communist guerilla uprisings, because of their religious faith. Such unprovoked assaults pushed these unorganized individual Christian families more and more firmly into "the hawkishly anti-Communist camp."[581]

For example, in October 1948 during the Yosu-Sunchon violence initiated by communist guerrillas around one thousand civilians were killed. Twenty-two Christians were also killed in one region because of their zeal not only for Christian leadership, but also for their anti-communism.[582] As it was observed, Christians were targets of the guerrillas due to their unwillingness to cooperate with the communist revolution.[583] Such deaths of Christians were interpreted as 'martyrdom' by Christian community.[584] In Yosu, eighty Christian families became homeless and with no bedding, food, nor business places.[585] They became refugees fleeing to neighbouring cities and big towns as smaller towns and the countryside were the main bases of communist influence. Kwangju, the capital of the South Cholla Province, was overcrowded with refugees from the countryside. These people had experienced the same suffering at communist hands as the northern refugees had.

After the Yosu-Sunchon Incident in 1948, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, ROK)

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[580] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 193.

[581] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 198.

[582] J. Curtis Crane, "Dear Folks" letter, 29 November 1948, *Personal Reports of the Southern Missionaries in Korea*, vol. 1, no. *5*, the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, Seoul.

[583] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 199.

[584] J. Curtis Crane, "Dear Folks" letter, 29 November 1948, *Personal Reports of the Southern Missionaries in Korea*, vol. 1, no. *5*, the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, Seoul.

[585] J. Curtis Crane, "Dear Folks" letter, 29 November 1948, *Personal Reports of the Southern Missionaries in Korea*, vol. 1, no. 5, the Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, Seoul.

army thoroughly investigated the communist cells within the army and purged them on the ground of pro-communist activities declared to be anti-national. By July 1949, 4,749 soldiers were removed under this accusation. At the same time, the need for army recruitment was met by and influx of northern refugee youths to the army. For example, on 20 December 1948, 200 northern refugee members of *SobukChongnyunhoe* enrolled in a Daejon regiment of the ROK army. Other anti-communistic youth associations like *Daedong Chongnyundan* also provided some 4,000 to join the ROK police and guard police in 1949.[586] While anti-communism was strongly established in the Army after a series of incidents in 1948, the influence of northern refugees in the army also rapidly increased.

Christians and New Opportunities in Politics

Korean Christian elites were the few English-educated groups who could work in the US military government and therefore secured special privileges. Rhee Syngman, the first President of South Korea and stout Methodist Christian himself, had received education in the USA. and was a strong upholder of anti-communism and the Christian faith. His political ideas were backed by the US foreign policy at the time. He linked Churches and Christian institutions together as a local network for his political gain.[587] During the early period of his presidency, and with very limited funds, Rhee's publicity team in Washington sought the support of church leaders and Christian journalists to lobby the American government and to publish information about Korea. For example, as part of his efforts to obtain a defense commitment from the US prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, Rhee specifically mobilized the Korean Church to demonstrate and write petitions to the American Christians.[588]

Surging growth of North Korean refugee Churches in the South was guaranteed by

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[586] Deugjoong Kim, *Ppalgaengiui Tansaeng* [The Birth of Ppalgaengi] (Seoul: Sunin, 2009), p. 453.

[587] Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 93.

[588] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 527.

the political situation. In August 1948, after the inauguration of the Republic of Korea, Christians were able to seize political hegemony. 44 out of 208 National Assembly members were Christians while 42.8 percent of the first Cabinet ministers were Christians. Christian elites had succeeded in post-partition politics in South Korea, which is made clear by the fact that less than 5 percents of the population were Christians in South Korea at the time.[589] New refugee churches in Seoul and major cities sprang up rapidly. With the help of the US military government, the refugee Korean church leaders took over "vested properties" which the Japanese had owned before the liberation and built churches there.[590] Amongst them, The Youngnak Church in Seoul was the representative church of the North Korean refugees.

The Korean 'Red Scare'[591] syndrome is illustrated by the use of the term, "*Ppalgaengi* (a Korean version of *Commie*)", popularized after the Yosu-Sunchon Incident in 1948. The term itself would tell how anti-communistic sentiments in post-war South Korea were internalized and fossilized in the minds of the common people. It was used and misused for the making of the 'other' or 'enemy'. In fact, *Ppalgaengi* was used to degrade the communist as an 'inhuman being'. It had negative connotations equal to the ethically despised and the national betrayer who had to be discarded. Deugjoong Kim argues that *Ppalgaengi* was a term which expressed an open aggressiveness towards communists incomparable to any other region in the history of world communism.[592]

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589 Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, SiminSahoe, 1945-1960* [Korean Christianity, the State and the Civil Society, 1945-1960] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1996), pp. 176-177.

590 All those properties Japanese had owned before the liberation were taken by the USAMGIK as "vested properties" for disposition. According to their previous uses, the properties were requisitioned to Koreans. For instance, if one had been a religious property, it will be given a priority to buy or freely given to any religious organization. Since the churches had quickly established the connections with the USAMGIK, their shares were greater than other religious groups. See details in Incheol Kang, *Jongsokkwa Jayoo: Daehanminkookui Hyungsungkwa Jonkyojungchi* [Subordination and Autonomy: the Making of the Republic of Korea and Religious Politics] (Seoul: Hanshin University Press, 2013), pp. 145-219.

591 The term **Red Scare** denotes the promotion of fear of a potential rise of communism or radical leftism, used by anti-leftist proponents.

592 Deugjoong Kim, *Ppalgaengiui Tansaeng* [The Birth of Ppalgaengi] (Seoul: Sunin, 2009), p. 560.

Christian Educators and Education Reform: Anti-Communist Vision

Since the Japanese imperial policies aimed at turning the Korean people into second class subjects of the Empire, it resulted in a restrictive education policy for the Koreans. As a result, at the time of independence only 25 percents of the population received a formal education and only less than 1 percent went on to junior college education. This meant the country had very limited intellectual manpower in quantity and quality at the time.[593] Therefore, the few US-educated Christians became valuable resources during the educational reform. Most of the key positions of the Education Advisory Committee and the Education Department both in the USAMGK and Rhee's Cabinet were occupied by Christians. In the three years of American's temporary occupation of South Korea (1945-1948) the USAMGIK and Korean educators had "a clear vision: to create a peaceful, democratic, and anti-communistic society."[594] Education was a crucial component of this vision. Therefore, educational policies were, said Seth, "central, not peripheral concerns" of the government.[595]

At the start of September 1945, Kim Songsu, Yu Okkyom, O Chonsok, Paek Nakchun and Kim Hwallan formed the Korean Committee on Education. Kim Songsu served as the chairman. Except for Kim, the four others were prominent Christian leaders, with the last three listed being were US-educated English-speaking elites. The occupation authorities transferred full responsibility for educational reform to them. Due to their efforts, the National Committee on Educational Planning was established, which met from November 1945 until the spring of 1946.[596] It consisted of nearly one hundred committee members. Among them two groups were distinct: 1) a traditional, upper class educator group like Kim

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[593] Horace G. Underwood, *Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections of Horace G. Underwood* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), pp. 103-104.

[594] Michael J. Seth, *Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), p. 35.

[595] Michael J. Seth, *Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), p. 35. In North Korea, education policy was also essential part of the government efforts to establish communist utopia. See Hyungchan Kim and Dongkyu Kim, *Human Remolding in North Korea: A Social History of Education* (Lanham, 2005).

[596] Michael J. Seth, *Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea* (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2002), p. 35.

Sungsu, 2) Christian educators of foreign experience and connections.[597] Therefore, Christian educators continued to influence the educational reform in the period. They were comparatively more sensitive to the international political affairs and more receptive to the American education system by nature. They proactively upheld an American type of anti-communistic education policy. For example, O Chonsok, a northern Christian, emphasized the importance of establishing the democratic society in linking with anti-communism.[598] On 11 April 1946 six delegates of the Korean educators visited the United States as Korea Educational Commission with an invitation from the Government of United States. They spent four months there and returned on 16 August 1946.[599] They not only met government officers, but also church mission leaders for furthering educational reforms in Korea.[600] Interestingly, all six delegates were Christians who had graduated from US universities. This suggests that US educational support was sought in order to establish an American style democratic society, which would be anti-communistic and would closely cooperate with the churches in the US through the Korean Christian educators. As a long-term education plan, ten medical doctors from the Severance Hospital, a mission hospital in Seoul, were selected to study in US medical universities through their post-graduate programs, furthering the doctors' medical skills as well as supporting ties between the US churches and Government.[601]

However, this isn't meant to say that the post-colonial South Korean education system was fully Americanized. Rather, elements of the American system were added to the existing system, resulting in a cocktail of the Chosun traditional, Japanese colonial and American system. As Underwood, a third generation

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[597] Kwangho Lee, 'Mikoonjungui Kyoyookjungchaek [The Educational Policy of the US Army Military Government in Korea]', *Haebang Junhoosaui Insik* 2 [Understanding the History around Liberation, vol.2] (Seoul: Hankilsa, 1985), pp. 518-519.

[598] Kwangho Lee, 'Mikoonjungui Kyoyookjungchaek [The Educational Policy of the US Army Military Government in Korea]', *Haebang Junhoosaui Insik* 2 [Understanding the History around Liberation, vol.2] (Seoul: Hankilsa, 1985), pp. 522-523.

[599] *The Donga Ilbo* [the Donga Daily], 16 August 1946.

[600] Harry A. Rhodes, 'A Meeting with Korean Educators, 3 May 1946', Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 11, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

[601] Harry A. Rhodes, 'A Meeting with Korean Educators, 3 May 1946', Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 11, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

missionary educator at the time, argues, "Korea has forged a unique educational system, with obvious elements from Chosun, Japan, and America, but entirely different from any of them and uniquely Korean, designed by and for Koreans."[602]

In 1946 the Christian educators played a crucial role in the establishment of the Seoul National University and its management. These Christian educators were normally anti-communistic and therefore they wished to have the University be a communist-free zone. Underwood, as a Dean of the University, witnessed "a great deal of Communist inspired youth activity", noting that in the winter of 1946-7 saw "the most troublesome problems."[603] He went on to say that "it worked out in the end, and the more constructive and conservative students gained control of the student organization."[604] These "constructive" and "conservative" students were no doubt anti-communists including the northern refugee youths and Christians.

In summary, in pre-war period (1945-1950), it was a time when the northern Christians and refugees rapidly grew in political and ideological influence in South Korea, particularly through their anti-communist activities. This created the pre-condition for the partition system.

2. North Korean Refugees and Christians during the Korean War, 1950-1953

North Korean Refugees, Christians and War-time Efforts

Many of the North Korean youths who had fled the Communist North during the Korean War couldn't find shelter in the south or means to secure their living. However, they were also physically and emotionally wounded by the northern communists. They became a strong force for anti-communism, ready to fight against it. Given their circumstances of seeking shelter and safety, many of them

602 Horace G. Underwood, *Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections of Horace G. Underwood* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), p. 105.

603 Horace G. Underwood, *Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections of Horace G. Underwood* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), p. 107.

604 Horace G. Underwood, *Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections of Horace G. Underwood* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), p. 108.

voluntarily joined the South Korean army with no better alternative existing. In his memoir, Rev. Syngman Rhee mentioned that he and his younger brother as wartime refugees had no one to take care of them since they left family back in the north. In order to secure their living, the army was an attractive option.[605]

An interview with Jang Jinho also supported evidence for such cases. He fled from Wonsan, an East coastal city in the North, to Seoul in pre-war period. He joined the ROK army immediately when the war broke out. He always remained very much proud of his army service for anti-communist and free democracy causes.[606]

Kong Moonwhan, my grandfather, fled from Haejoo in Hwanghae Province of North Korea, and joined the ROK army at the beginning of the war. Among veteran interviewees with North Korean origins, there were some common causes for joining the army: 1) hatred of the communist North who damaged their individual and family lives, 2) hope of reuniting with their split family back home in the North. Such a trend of joining the army was a continuation of the pre-war situations among North Korean youth refugees.

However, there was no North Korean refugee association comparable to the northern refugee churches to collectively organize war supports with the ROK Government. During the Korean War (1950-53), collaborations between the South Korean government and the Church became stronger in fighting against the communist North. This was particularly evident in these two areas: 1) the activities of the military Chaplains corps and 2) Christian relief works. In February 1952, a military Chaplains corps was set up during the war with a request from Korean Church clergymen. The first thirty-nine Korean chaplains were all Christian. They acted as defenders of anti-communism along with the US chaplains. It was beneficial for the government and the US army to boost anti-communistic sentiments in the midst of such ideological warfare.[607] It was also good for the church to propagate the Christian faith in the military. Their activities extended to prisoners of war (POW) camps in March 1951. On 3 July, 1950, Rev. Han

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[605] Syngman Rhee, *Kidosokaeseo Mannaja: Eomeoniwaui Yaksok* [Let us meet in Prayer: A Promise with Mother] (Seoul: Qumran Press, 2012), pp. 56-61.

[606] Interview with Jinho Jang at Seoul on 4 July 2014.

[607] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* III [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 3] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2009), p. 76.

Kyungchik, a founder of The Youngnak Church, formed '*Kidokkyo Kookookhoe* [the Christian National Salvation Assembly]' in Daejon to promote and coordinate relief works and other war efforts amongst Christians. In collaboration with the US based Christian charity organizations, their works spread a positive image of Christianity to the Korean public. Therefore, the Church in 1950s was widely known as a relief organization in South Korean society.[608]

Along with a close cooperation between the Church and the Rhee's government for war efforts, Rhee and the Church leaders worked hand in gloves in national politics as well. In particular, Rhee was fully backed by the Church leaders in his 1952 presidential election campaign. The Church publicly supported Rhee on the grounds that he was a Christian candidate who could successfully bring about not only Korea's unification, but also her Christianization.[609]

When a truce was decided upon as the option to stop the war without unifying the Korean peninsula by UN forces, most South Koreans thought this was unacceptable. President Rhee strongly opposed it. Northern refugees and churches were fiercely in opposition as well. Therefore, Korean Christians organized a meeting in Pusan on 12 July 1951. There they passed resolutions which opposed truce talks and negotiations initiated by the UN: "We firmly resolved our mind to chase Communists out of from a border line and achieve unification and complete independence of Korea in order to protect religious freedom even if any cost may occur."[610] This exemplifies the strength of the church's influence during the war. On 25 June 1953, church leaders organized a mass rally against the truce and sent a petition to D. W. Eisenhower, the President of USA.[611]

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608 The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* III [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 3] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2009), pp. 68-69.

609 *Kidok Kongbo* [The Christian News], 4 August, 1952.

610 Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa] (Seoul: the Presbyterian Church of Korea Education Department, 1956), p. 140.

611 Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa] (Seoul: the Presbyterian Church of Korea Education Department, 1956), pp. 140-142.

Korean Church Elites and Global Christian Response to the War

What the World Council of Churches (hereafter, WCC) did first and foremost was condemn the communist North for their aggression. On 13 July 1950, no longer than three weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Central Committee of WCC made the statement on the Korean Situation and World Order. It accused the North Korean troops of committing "an act of aggression". The committee therefore released a statement saying:

> We therefore commend the United Nations, an instrument of world order, for its prompt decision to meet this aggression and for authorizing a police measure which every member nation should support. At the same time, governments must press individually and through the United Nations for a just settlement by negotiation and conciliation.[612]

Secondly, the WCC decided to send relief help to Korea (materials, funds, and personnel) along with other American Christian organizations. Unlike most of the European countries requiring aid from the US to relieve the hardship of World War II, Korea had no large nationality group in the US to stimulate and support voluntary aid. Therefore, the task fell principally on the church groups, Protestants and Catholics, whose missionaries had for many years been active in Korea.[613] Therefore, the ROK Government tried to contact American churches through official channels as well as Korean Christian individual channels in the area of relief work right after the outbreak of the War. On 26 July 1950, the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the USA., Chang Myun, met the Church World Service[614] (hereafter, CWS) leaders and requested them to organize relief from Christian community in the US, and he secured their promise for relief support.[615]

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[612] The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, 'The Korean Situation and World Order, 13 July 1950', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean church History, 2003), p. 22.

[613] Robert E. Bondy, 'Staff Memorandum on Relief For Korea of National Social Welfare Assembly INC, 10 July 1953', Call #. 2041-3-6:07, United Methodist Church Archives, Drew University, Madison..

[614] Church World Service conducted a relief and rehabilitation programme in Korea ever since the end of World War II. It was nothing new for the agency. And During Partition of India, the same agency was in supply of medical and food supplies to refugees of both Pakistan and India.

[615] Richard M. Fagley, 'Conference with Ambassador Chang of the Republic of Korea, 26 July

Furthermore he corresponded with the CWS leaders for help with the decision which the United Nations made for Korean relief. On 11 October, 1950, the CWS submitted a memorandum on Korea Relief and Rehabilitation to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. In the memorandum it was decided that the CWS and other non-governmental agencies including the American Churches would be a part of the United Nations total relief program. Because of the restrictions necessarily imposed by the army due to the military and logistic situation, these groups found themselves unable to furnish emergency relief along the lines of their usual practices. For such relief as they could provide (goods to go into the UNCACK pool) the army wished to deal with a single agency. Under these circumstances, in November 1950, the Committee on Korea of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service facilitated the unification of a group of ten American voluntary agencies (principally representing religious groups) to form American Relief for Korea (ARK).[616] While the CWS was at the front row of relief work in Korea, other voluntary agencies, such as War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, American Friends Service Committee, CARE, Maryknoll Sisters and the like were also unified in relief and rehabilitation.[617]

Various Korean Christian leaders, both from clergymen and lay-leadership, visited the USA to promote Christian awareness both for relief to the destitute and for support for an anti-communism alliance. People like Shin Yunghong, Kim Hwallan, Han Kyungchik, and Lew Hyungki reported their real experiences of horrors, agony, persecution and different kinds of struggles imposed by communist attacks during the war.[618] They acted as intermediaries to spread the news of what had happened in the Korean War between Korea and the West, particularly in American society. Their testimonies and activities in the war were delivered to American and global

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1950', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 56.

[616] Robert E. Bondy, 'Staff Memorandum on Relief For Korea of National Social Welfare Assembly INC, 10 July 1953', Call #. 2041-3-6:07, United Methodist Church Archives, Drew University, Madison.

[617] The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, 'The Korean Situation and World Order, 13 July 1950', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean church History, 2003), p. 22.

[618] 'Suffering Korea', *The Missionary Chronicles* (December, 1952).

Christians, and transferred to wider groups of American society. In this process, anti-communistic narratives were "selectively" exaggerated to appeal to the American sympathy of relief causes.

Christian Relief Activities (I): Expanding Influence

During the Korean War (1950-53), Christian relief work was an essential part of Church activities and impacted the entire country along with missionary work. The government of Korea and non-governmental organizations were not able to handle the massive needs of relief work as almost fifty percents of the population were refugees and war sufferers.[619] According to the UN Civil Assistance Command's estimates, refugees numbered 2,747,009, war suffers, 3,599,800, and the local destitute were numbered 3,944,965. In total, 10,291,774 persons were in need of relief.[620] The total population of the country was approximately 21,000,000 at the time of survey. By definition, refugees were persons displaced from the province in which they had previously lived. War sufferers were persons who had lost their means of livelihood, e.g. their breadwinner, their business, or their own physical capacity. The local destitute were self-defined with various needs.

<Table 5. 1> Persons in Need of relief during the Korean War

Relief Category	Refugees	War-Sufferers	The Local Destitute	Total
Number of Persons	**2,747,009**	**3,599,800**	**3,944,965**	**10,291,774**

Source: Robert T. Oliver, *Verdict in Korea* (Philadelphia: Bald Eagle Press, 1952), p. 147; Elfan Rees, 'Report from Korea: January – February, 1953', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 334.

619 Robert T. Oliver, *Verdict in Korea* (Philadelphia: Bald Eagle Press, 1952), p. 147; Elfan Rees, 'Report from Korea: January – February, 1953', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 334.

620 Elfan Rees, 'Report from Korea: January – February, 1953', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 334.

Relief was an essential part of fighting the war and was the appointed task of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea (hereafter, UNCACK). However, it had its own limitation in many ways in that:

> UNCACK is charged with the prevention of starvation, epidemic and unrest behind the front. It is organized militarily for these basic tasks and its resources derive from financial appropriations of the US Department of War. Any relief contributions from the member nations are supplementary to basic plans. Though their concern, goodwill and devoted service were impressive, qualifications and skills of the UNCACK officials were not so impressive. Unfortunately, there was more concerned enthusiasm than trained skill.[621]

The United Nations relief effort was supported by voluntary Christian groups in the USA Near two-thirds of non-governmental foreign relief aids were sent by Christian organizations from the USA.[622] For example, the Presbyterian Church of the USA sent as much as $ 2,012,425 in relief and rehabilitation funds in the period from 24 June 1950 to 24 July 1954.[623] Christian foreign relief funds and materials were sent through the UN Command (later its role was taken over by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)) and distributed mainly by Korean churches and Christian leaders.

In June 1950, '*Kidokkyo Kookookhoe* [the Christian National Salvation Assembly]' began to promote and coordinate relief works amongst Christians. Since most relief funds and materials came from overseas Christian philanthropic organizations and many Korean church leaders were members of the few English-speaking elites, the church in Korea was a natural choice for relief and therefore played a higher role in relief controls. Relief teams of Korean Christian pastors were organized for service in the refugee camps throughout the country.

In fact, overseas Christian relief teams readily accepted the Koreanization of relief activities, meaning relief efforts done by Koreans themselves in the middle of the

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621 Elfan Rees, 'Report from Korea: January – February, 1953', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 337.

622 Wongyu Choi, 'Activities of Foreign Voluntary Agencies and their Influences upon Social Work Development in Korea', Unpublished Ph.D thesis: Seoul National University, 1996, p. 59.

623 'Relief/ Rehabilitation Funds: Financial Report for the period, 1950-4, 6 August 1954', Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 42, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

war while maintaining close cooperation with the UN agencies.

> Since government can more readily supply food, the greatest call upon the churches is for clothing. Warm winter garments collected by mid-September cannot be processed, shipped, and distributed in Korea before December. Clothing urgently required. The major food needs the churches can meet are for milk and vitamins. As the prospect of civilian UN relief supervision moves closer and as great opportunities are accorded the voluntary agencies, CORRS will need additional personnel. Increasingly, the Committee on Relief and Reconstruction Services (CORRS) has suggested, it will also wish its work to be associated with Korean NCC.[624]

In collaboration with the US-based Christian charity organizations, their works provided a positive image of Christianity to the Korean public. In the 1950s, Korean churches experienced the most active 'social work era' in the history of Korean church.[625] As a result, the Church in the 1950s was widely recognized as a relief organization in South Korean society.[626] Relief work mainly concentrated on several areas: 1) orphans' welfare, 2) widows' welfare, 3) refugee rehabilitations, 4) food distribution, 5) medical aids, and 6) missionary activities. War orphans were estimated around one hundred thousand.[627] Their situation was one of the worst of social problems among war-ravaged people. Christian Children's Fund, Everett Swanson Evangelistic Association, World Vision and other denominational Church missions took part in orphanage constructions and overseas adoptions for them. War widows were also a serious concern for the relief team. They numbered nearly three hundred thousand and two hundred thousand had children who needed equal attention.[628] The Church World Service (CWS), the Methodists, Oriental

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[624] W. Richey Hogg, 'Memorandum to C.W. Ranson on Re: Relief to Korea from American Protestant Christians, 10 July 1951', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 245.

[625] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* III [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 3] (Seoul: the Society of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009), p. 68.

[626] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* III [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 3] (Seoul: the Society of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009), pp. 68-9.

[627] Robert T. Oliver, *Verdict in Korea* (Philadelphia: Bald Eagle Press, 1952), p. 147.

[628] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* III [A

Missionary Society, Mennonites, World Vision, Maryknoll Sisters, United Church of Canada Mission, YWCA, and several other Korean Christian women's organizations participated in the construction of widows' homes, fundraising, tailoring training, supplying consuming goods, and etc. Widows' homes were established in Seoul, Pusan and the South Kyungsang Province during the war. Refugee rehabilitation was mainly taken care of by the Church World Service and the Salvation Army. North Korean refugees and prisoners of wars were given free food stations. Such facilities were established throughout the country and continued after the war.[629] Christian medical aids were provided by the Church World Service and already existing mission hospitals. Severance hospital in Seoul in particular opened a rehabilitation clinic providing artificial limbs for the disabled during the war in October 1952. Similar centres were set up in Daejun, Daegu and Junjoo later.[630]

Christian Relief Activities (II): Saving Body and Soul

In fact, relief work was not the sole objective of more than half of the Christian relief organizations during the war; one of their multiple objectives included missionary activities.[631] The use of relief fund was intended by the Korean Church and the missionaries "not only to keep body and soul together", said Edward Adams, "but that in doing so the refugee Christian leaders be put to work in constructive ways to spread the Gospel and bring comfort and aid to their suffering countrymen."[632] Rosengrant viewed the strategic position of Korea in the entire Christianity of the Far East, saying that:

History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 3] (Seoul: the Society of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009), p. 67.

[629] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* III [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 3] (Seoul: the Society of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009), p. 68.

[630] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokgyoui Yeoksa* III [A History of Christianity in Korea, vol. 3] (Seoul: the Society of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009), p. 68.

[631] Wongyu Choi, 'Activities of Foreign Voluntary Agencies and their Influences upon Social Work Development in Korea', Unpublished Ph.D thesis: Seoul National University, 1996, pp. 88-94.

[632] Edward Adams, 'The Present Missionary Situation in Korea, 1950, undated', Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 37, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

> Korea is strategic. It may very well be that Korea will become the point where the spiritual weather for the entirety of the Far East will be formed. Winds of new courage and spiritual virility are shaping that may ultimately change the shape of things to come in the Far East.[633]

Korean Church leaders and American missionaries requested help from international Christians to help the Korean Church while reporting the variety of damage to churches. Estimates given in June, 1952 by the WCC indicate how calamity of war had severely destroyed churches, both in terms of property and man power. 267 church buildings were completely destroyed or burnt down while 706 were partially broken down.[634] Of all the schools previously operated by churches and missions, about 50 percents were burned or broken down, and all of the furniture in the schools was lost. The buildings of three major Christian universities in Seoul (Ewha Women's University, Chosun Christian [Yonsei] University, Severance Medical University and Hospital) were destroyed 70 percents or more by fire. 27 high schools and 5 middle schools were reportedly destroyed or partially broken down.[635] Official estimates of the required funds for material reconstruction of churches and institutions were submitted to Elfan Rees, advisor of Refugee Affairs at the WCC's Department of Inter-Church Aid, was 68,137,431 US dollars. It was a huge and overwhelming amount, one which local Korean Christian leaders couldn't bear by themselves. The other significant church loss was the loss of clergymen. Hundreds of clergymen in North Korea were massacred by the communists during the war, especially when the UN allied force entered Pyeongyang in October 1951. According to Rev. Rhee's memoir, some 50 Christian pastors were shot, including his own father, by the fleeing communist army in

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633 John Rosengrant, 'Dear Friends, 20 November 1950', Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 1, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

634 'Church Destruction after Communist Invasion', 20 June, 1952, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 311.

635 'Christian School in Korea', 20 June, 1952, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 311.

Pyeongyang.[636] 737 names of Korean clergymen who were captured by the communists in the two years of 1950 and 1951 rang a big alarm bell to Korean church leaders and missionaries facing future ministry in Korea due to the fact that the clergy were considered to be the backbones of church growth in Korea. Most of the captured or missing clergymen who were killed by the communist North were considered as "martyrs" by Korean and overseas churches.[637] American missionaries were, therefore, desperately proactive in rescuing Korean pastors and their families. For example, when Daegu was near the grasp of the North Korean army, around two thousand pastors and their families were separately and safely evacuated by missionaries to Ulsan, a city further south.[638] Twenty thousand Christians and one thousand clergymen were transferred to the far south islands of Jejudo and Kojedo safely under UN army protection.[639] It was an urgent work for missionaries to protect them because South Korean churches had lost almost half of clergymen already.[640]

Kim Hwallan, a female Christian educator, visited major cities in the US and Canada in order to urge North American Christians to back Korean Christian endeavours during the war. Nearly sixty friends of hers gathered in New York to listen to what was going on in Korea. She said that churches in Korea suffered the most, noting the loss of Christian leaders, institutions and homes.[641] She also shared horrors and the deceit of the communist North while introducing North Korean refugees' testimonials.[642] The myth of communist utopia was highlighted.

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[636] Syngman Rhee, *Kidosokaeseo Mannaja: Eomeoniwaui Yaksok* [Let us meet in Prayer: A Promise with Mother] (Seoul: Qumran Press, 2012), pp. 28, 50-51.

[637] 'The Situation of Calamity of War in Korea as at June 1952', 20 June, 1952, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 309.

[638] Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], p. 80.

[639] Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], p. 80.

[640] Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], p. 81.

[641] Rowland M. Cross, 'Confidential',14 May, 1951, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), pp. 238-241.

[642] Rowland M. Cross, 'Confidential',14 May, 1951, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 239.

Furthermore, she urged her friends to support the reconstruction of Korea. 'Maybe the UN Committee will make a reconstruction plan in connection with our Government, but a group like you should get in. Say that we will put in a church in every town.'[643] She passed on a request from the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea for sending trained men and women in the sciences of all kinds.[644]

In response to such calls, many Christian overseas donors earmarked their relief funds for rebuilding destroyed Christian facilities such as church buildings, mission schools, mission hospitals and seminaries, and helping victimized church leaders and their families.[645] For example, The Church of England sent relief fund of 5,550 pounds which were collected from August, 1950 till January, 1951.[646] Along with general relief funds, the earmarked funds for the reconstruction of church properties and houses for clergy and catechists were sent separately: 5,500 pounds for general relief, and 2,000 pounds for church relief. The dual purpose of Christian relief activities was clear. Korean church pastors and leaders were, therefore, busy with 'purely' church works while continuing general relief works for the war victims continued as well.[647] Furthermore, they were proactively professing the Christian faith among Korean civilians and soldiers, resulting in the construction of new churches and new Christian institutions. The growth of Christian population during the war meant that the influence of anti-communist non-state agencies was strengthened.

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643 Rowland M. Cross, 'Confidential',14 May, 1951, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 240.

644 Rowland M. Cross, 'Confidential',14 May, 1951, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 240.

645 For example, fund from the Church of England was divided into two purposes: 1. £ 5,500 for general relief, 2. £ 2,000 for church relief. The latter focused on immediate reconstruction of church properties and reconstruction of homes of clergymen (Dorothy Morrison, 'Korean Mission Relief Fund', 25 June, 1951, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 242.).

646 Dorothy Morrison, 'Korean Mission Relief Fund, 25 June 1951', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 242.

647 It is one of common concerns of missionaries for relief aid as one American Methodist relief worker mentioned in his letter, "As I see it, our task in the immediate present is to bring relief aid to needy people, especially to Christian workers and their families, and to help with repairs on damaged churches" in Mokwon University Theological Study Institute (ed.), *Letters of Charles D. Stokes* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2004), p. 73.

Introduction of Army Chaplaincy: Christianizing the Army

What was equally significant in the missionary work of the Korean Church during the war was army chaplaincy. Chaplains played a variety of critical roles during the war. With political support from the Government of the Republic of Korea, material help from the US Army and practical training for chaplain-trainees from US chaplains, a military Chaplains Corps was set up in February 1952. An international visitor from the Department of Inter-Church Aid and Service to Refugees, World Council of Churches observed that:

> Recent development, in the armed forces of the R.O.K., of a chaplaincy service, which is doing quite remarkable work, is another notable sign of life. I am told that the greatest single increase in Christians is in the armed forces.[648]

The first thirty-nine Korean chaplains were all Christian clergies – both Protestants and Catholics. It was to the benefit of the church to propagate the Christian faith in the military while it was also beneficial for the South Korean government and the US army to boost anti-communistic sentiments in the midst of ideological warfare.[649] By the end of the Korean War, twenty percents of the Korean army were Christians. The Commander-in-chief of the Korean army highly valued the works of chaplains in the army. He, therefore, urged both army officials and chaplains to cooperate with each other in an attempt to convert the Korean army to Christianity. He firmly believed that it would be beneficial to mentally equip the army with the ideology of sacrificial service of the Christian faith.[650]

Their activities were extended to prisoners of war (POW) camps when one of these was established at Kojedo in March 1951. There were 10 staffs: seven Korean

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[648] Elfan Rees, 'Report from Korea: January – February, 1953', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 334.

[649] The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *Hanguk Kidokkyoui Yeoksa* III [A History of Christianity in Korea, Vol. 3] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2009), p. 76.

[650] Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], p. 139.

pastors, one a POW, and two missionary chaplains. According to the chaplain's report when the camp opened, the Protestant constituency totaled 4,261. This number increased by 15,062 after 13 months.[651] By the time Harold Voelkel and Bruce Cummin, American missionaries, entered the POW camps as chaplains under the United Nations, they found the Christian movement already well under way. Twelve Bible institutes were already organized and operating, manned by POWs.[652] One of the American chaplains at the POW camps expressed the joy of gaining lost souls to the Christ:

> The other day I was giving an examination in the Old Testament Bible Correspondence Course on the section that included Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Samuel and Kings. In a conversation with the fellows I learned that one of them had already finished the whole of the Old Testament work and was prepared to take the entire examination. When I expressed surprise and gratitude he replied, "I'm certainly glad I was captured and became a POW for it was here I found Christ and have had the privilege of this Bible study". I could have shouted for joy.[653]

A war correspondent from an American magazine who had visited the POW Camps, confessed that, "there the war is being won, the real war. The war between freedom and slavery, the war between God and atheism, the war between Christ and Stalin!" after he observed a voluntary dawn prayer meeting that 9,000 prisoners of war attended.[654]

Psychological Warfare and Religious Justification of the War

The Korean War was a war of ideology between Communists and Liberalists which created and emphasized a dualism of 'good' and 'evil'. Goebbelsian

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651 'Chaplain's Report: Kojedo Prisoner of War Camp, March 1951-April 1952, undated ', Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 40, Presbyterian Church Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

652 Arch Campbell, *The Christ of The Korean Heart* (Columbus: Falco Publishers, 1954), p. 41.

653 Harold Voelkel, 'Dear Friends', 29 February, 1952, in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 238.

654 Arch Campbell, *The Christ of The Korean Heart* (Columbus: Falco Publishers, 1954), pp. 41-42.v

propaganda was necessary both to encourage anti-communist sentiments in the South, and to discourage the communists' war spirits.[655] Psychological warfare as a 'bloodless battle' was highly encouraged by the UN forces during the war. Right after US President, Harry Truman, announced a ground war on 28 June 1950, the US Air Force dropped as many as 12 million leaflets on South Korean soldiers and civilians in one day. The first message of the leaflets contained a call for soldiers and civilians to refrain from any action as help from the free world forces was on its way.[656] By the end of the Korean War, UN forces had dropped more than 2.5 billion leaflets on enemy troops and civilians, as if they hoped the leaflets would have buried all enemies.[657] This innumerable amount of leaflets was enough to cover the whole peninsula twenty times.[658]

As early as 16 August 1950, the Department of State in the United States announced the establishment of a national psychological strategy board to carry out the functions assigned to the present organization due to the fact that it was becoming more and more important to have effective psychological warfare in the Korean War. Thus instead of serving simply as policy consultants, the representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence were meeting regularly each week as members of the Board with the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs as chairman. It was decided by the National Security Council in the United States that joint political and military action was required in the psychological warfare field.[659] As a result, in January 1951, with the escalation of the war, the Tokyo-based Eighth

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655 Imha Lee, *Jeokul Ppiraro Muteora* [Bury Enemies with the Leaflets] (Seoul: Cheolsoowa Younghee, 2012), pp. 23-24.

656 Imha Lee, *Jeokul Ppiraro Muteora* [Bury Enemies with the Leaflets] (Seoul: Cheolsoowa Younghee, 2012), p. 21.

657 John Martin Campbell, *Slinging the Bull in Korea: An Adventure in Psychological Warfare* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010), p. 98.

658 Imha Lee, *Jeokul Ppiraro Muteora* [Bury Enemies with the Leaflets] (Seoul: Cheolsoowa Younghee, 2012), p. 11.

659 James E. Webb, 'National Security Council Progress Report by The Under Secretary of State on the implementation of The Foreign Information program and Psychological Warfare Planning (NSC 59/1) , 17 October 1950' in http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-17-2.pdf#zoom=100 (Accessed on 20 October 2015).

Army Psychological War Section was elevated to division status.[660]

Churches in Korea acted as civilian agencies to boost such activities through their religious appeals and networks. '*Kidokkyo Kookookhoe* [the Christian National Salvation Assembly]'[661] also played other important roles apart from relief work. It, firstly, organized placating squads of some six hundred workers. They worked amongst civilians particularly against the communist propaganda, supporting the South Korean Army indirectly placed in thirty-six cities of South Korea. Significantly, one thousand North Korea-born activists of the placating squad were dispatched to North Korea after UN forces were able to push the North Korean army back to the North in October 1950. The group also recruited a Christian volunteer corps which numbered around three thousand. They were directly involved in the battle field. The fight was considered a 'Crusades' against the atheistic communist North.[662] The northern Christian writers played a critical role to promote anti-communism in literature. Their staunch anti-communism derived from their personal experience of the communist regime in the North as well as their desperate search for the concrete social position and status.[663] They spearheaded the creation of anti-communism literature. This served to transmit the anti-communism ideology to the masses, particularly the children during the war.[664]

Religion has often provided spiritual and psychological justification for wars in human history, such as in the cases of the Crusades in medieval Europe, Jihad in Islamic countries, and communalism during partition in India. While the communized North Korean churches during the war condemned the USA as 'an

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[660] John Martin Campbell, *Slinging the Bull in Korea: An Adventure in Psychological Warfare* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010), p. 98.

[661] After its foundation on 3 July, 1950, it's headquarter was moved to Daegu on 17 July 1950, later to Pusan in September as war situation compelled to do so. On 28 September, 1950 again it was moved to Seoul. See in Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], p. 79.

[662] Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], p. 79.

[663] Sungkyu Lim, 'Adong Moonhak Kyoyooke Banyoungdoen Bangongjooui Bipan [A Critical Study on Anti-Communism of Children' Literature Education]', *Kookeo Kyoyookhak Yonkoo* [Korean Language Education Studies], vol. 32 (August 2008), p. 375.

[664] Sungkyu Lim, 'Adong Moonhak Kyoyooke Banyoungdoen Bangongjooui Bipan [A Critical Study on Anti-Communism of Children' Literature Education]', *Kookeo Kyoyookhak Yonkoo* [Korean Language Education Studies], vol. 32 (August 2008), p. 381.

imperialist devil' or 'an Avatar of Judas Iscariot, a betrayer of Jesus Christ, in the Bible', South Korean churches described the communist North as 'Red *Leviathan*'[665], 'Communist devil', 'Satanic force' or 'anti-Christ'. Furthermore, in the South communism was interpreted as a 'Satan unable to persuade' or 'forever not repenting devil', with the belief that 'Church and communism could not exist together.'[666] Atheist communists, therefore, must be discarded. The Korean War was a war against 'atheist tyranny' in order to protect the freedom of Christian belief. Dualism of ethics during the war among Korean Christians created a space for the exemption of sinfulness, guilty feelings or fears toward fighting against or even killing communist enemies by allowing the southerners to categorize communists as 'dehumanized beings' or 'the devil'. Myths of communist devils were collected as main narratives during the war.

The religious justification of the war had several effects. Firstly, it encouraged religious devotees to participate in 'sacred' war and increased motivation in battles. Secondly, it also provided an explanation for the causes and responsibilities of the war. It pointed out who was to blame. Anti-communism in South Korea was not driven by a proper study of communist ideology, rather it stemmed from the experiences that people went through killings, horrors and the loss of properties imposed by communists during the war. Therefore, the intensity of anti-communism sentiments in Korea was much stronger than that in the USA as the latter developed their sentiments second-hand. Such religious rhetoric equipped the Korean Church to become 'a spearhead of psychological warfare'.[667] These Christian activities were, as Haga remarks, attempts to impose 'the relevance of religion as an ideological alternative to the communist utopia'.[668] It was also in tune with the US foreign policy at the time.

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665 Leviathan is often described as a Satanic figure in The Holy Bible.

666 *Kidok Kongbo* [The Christian News], 12 February, 1952.

667 *Kidok Kongbo* [The Christian News], 14 January, 1952

668 Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'An overlooked dimension of the Korean War: The Role of Christianity and American Missionaries in the Rise of Korean Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and Eventual Civil War, 1884~1953', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2007, p. 89.

3. Refugees, Christians and Anti-Communism in the Post-War Korea, 1953-1965

Refugees, Christians and the Post-War Seoul

During the Korean War, at least 191,000 buildings, 55,000 houses, and 1,000 factories in Seoul were reduced in ruins. In addition, refugees swelled the population of Seoul to around 2.5 million, with more than half of them homeless.

Seoul was occupied twice by the North Korean army during the war. The battles to secure the capital, including street fighting, inflicted more damage to Seoul than to any other area in Korea. It was estimated that 30,000 people were killed, and a further 130,000 people were either missing or abducted by the North Korean army. The destruction to Seoul's housing was later estimated to be at 47 percents; the most severe damage occurred at Yongsan where 50 large US bombers hit on 16 July 1950, leaving it in ruins. While two out of all nine ward office buildings in Seoul were burned down, in Yongsan and Mapo, almost all district offices were destroyed. 80 percents of all factories and half of the water supply system were completely destroyed. The water reservoirs in Ttukseom, Gui, Gwangjang, and Noryangjin were filled with the dead bodies of North Korean soldiers and their ammunition. Over 80 percents of electricity and communication facilities were also destroyed.[669]

After Seoul was recaptured from communist forces, shacks were hastily built over residential areas that had been destroyed. Originally the shacks were built by refugees for temporary shelters. However, their numbers greatly increased due to the influx of the large number of war refugees who decided to settle in Seoul.[670] The desperate housing situation in Seoul after the Korean War can be seen in the Presidential Decree promulgated on 24 September 1953 in which the local government seriously tried to arrest illegal temporary house builders. The Decree commanded 1) A number of refugees' return to Seoul should be kept for a minimum time, only until winter is over; 2) Police shall strictly stop the refugees who do not

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669 The City History Compilation Committee of Seoul (compiled.), *Seoul Through Pictures 3: The Launch of Seoul as the Capital of the Republic of Korea (1945-1961)* (Seoul: The City History Compilation Committee of Seoul, 2004), p. 78.

670 Kisuk Lee, *Seoul, Twentieth century*, pp. 48-50.

have a house in Seoul from crossing the Han river; 3) No board-framed house or mud hut is allowed to be built along the road or by the streams; 4) The top-priority government project will be building 1 million houses even if on foreign loans; 5) Police shall be held responsible for supervising the newly-built houses within the planned residential areas in line with the city plan of Seoul.[671] However as nearly a half of the population were refugees who sought to grab any opportunity to survive, the government policy was mere paper work for them. Thus, illegal houses, especially board or mud houses became prevalent in the city throughout the 1950s.

It was equally important to note that religious demography was drastically changed in Seoul after the war. Seoul became a centre for Christian growth and influence throughout the 1950s. According to statistical data, Christianity (including both Catholicism and Protestantism) was the largest religion of Seoul in 1958, which comprised nearly 23 percents whereas at the national level it was only 5 percents.[672] However, Buddhism, a traditional religion of Korea, had only about 12 percents of Seoul. The Christians became the largest religious group. This was mainly due to the influx of Christian refugees during partition and the war as well as new membership among non-Christians.

Partition and War Effects on Korean Church Growth, 1953-1965

It was generally observed that during the first two decades after independence the Korean Church rapidly grew at a rate incomparable to any other religion in Korea. Along with the influx of northern Christians, new membership of previously non-Christian refugees and residents ushered in the rapid growth of the Christian population throughout the 1950s and 60s. How was it possible to achieve such rapid growth of the Christian population in such a short period of time? It can be analyzed with two factors: one was that social, political and economic climate favoured Church growth in the period and the other was a zeal for evangelism within the Church, particularly spearheaded by northern Christians. Korea after

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671 Korea National Housing Corporation, *30 Years of Korea National Housing Corporation Seoul*, (Seoul: Korea National Housing Corporation, 1989), p.83.

672 Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, Siminsahoe* [Korean Christianity, State and Civil Society] (Seoul: the Institute of Korean Church History, 1996), p. 296.

independence was politically unstable and anti-communistic in its development. Economically, total devastation of arable lands, buildings, factories and other manufacturing facilities caused by three-year war made the people of Korea vulnerable.[673] It simultaneously caused social instability. Traditional social networks and values were destroyed and the vacuum of social values and order was yet to be filled. Amongst northern refugees such vulnerability was worse than any other community. Having been strongly anti-communistic and having developed a positive image through social and economic relief, the Church in Korea was readily prepared to receive such challenges more than any other religious group. Seeking religious help was a natural phenomenon under these circumstances.

It is equally important to examine the role of the northern refugee Christians as they acted as a spearhead for the Church growth. They successfully secured their hegemonic power in the South Korean Church despite numerical weaknesses. Right after independence there was the first schism of the Presbyterian Church in the South, a schism due to the issue of pro-Japanese Shinto Shrine worship. Those who had opposed it were mostly imprisoned or persecuted by the Japanese. The returnees from the prisons were a minority and their voice was not heard by the majority, and finally there was a split between the two. They became a scapegoat in Church politics. The Pro-Japanese collaborators were freed from further accusation in the Church.[674] The northern Christians meanwhile progressed into the mainstream of the Church governing body in the South. In April 1947, at the 33rd General meeting of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (hereafter, PCK) hundreds of northern pastors were accepted as official members of the southern Presbyteries since they couldn't technically belong to their previous regional Presbyteries due to territorial division. They became catalysts to make the Church in the South more rightward than in the pre-war time.[675]

In April 1952, at the 37th General Meeting of the PCK an "emergency law" was

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673 Timothy S. Lee, *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010), p. 87.

674 Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, Siminsahoe*[Korean Christianity, State and Civil Society] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1996), p. 281.

675 Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], pp. 53-54.

passed which allowed the northern Presbyteries in exile to join with those in the South. All northern Presbyteries were allowed to retain their own leadership for this reason. Therefore, some four hundred northern pastors secured separate governing bodies. Their numerical strength reached almost 40 percent of the PCK.[676]

According to Kim, from the beginning of the Korean War to August 1956, some 2,050 new churches were established in South Korea. Ninety percent of them were refugee churches.[677] After escaping from the persecution of the communist regime in the North, they were eagerly restoring their faith in the free South. It was, therefore, not only the missionaries' works or foreign church relief aids that enabled Korean churches to grow during the Korea War, but more the zeal of North Korean Christian refugees who enthusiastically spread the Christian faith.[678] As a result, the population of the Korean church rapidly sprang up during and after Korean War. In 1950, there were only 600,000 Christians[679], but in 1960 they became doubled numbering around 1,300,000.[680] Their zeal to plant new churches also created a new pattern as the northern Christians tended to build the northern style churches, i.e., using the same names of northern churches like Sanjunghyun Church, Pyeongbook Church, and the like. This was an act rooted in the northern Christians' nostalgia for their home towns as well as showing an eagerness for carrying on the northern church tradition.[681] A similar tendency was demonstrated by refugees from West Pakistan who settled in Delhi after partition who gave their restaurants like Volga (the same name of restaurant in Lahore in pre-partition), and Pind Balluchi, and their new colonies like Wazirabad and Gujranwala. Through these names they expressed and maintained the nostalgia to their home towns which they could not go back. In post-war Korean society the Church then became one of the

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676 Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], pp. 254-255.

677 Yangsun Kim, *10 Year History of Post-Independence Korean Christianity* [Hankook Kidokkyo Haebang Sipnyonsa], p.

678 Robert T. Oliver, *Verdict in Korea* (Philadelphia: Bald Eagle Press, 1952), p. 170.

679 Robert T. Oliver, *Verdict in Korea* (Philadelphia: Bald Eagle Press, 1952), P. 104.

680 Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, Siminsahoe* [Korean Christianity, State and Civil Society] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1996), p. 297.

681 Heungsoo Kim, *Hankook Junajaengkwa Kiboksinangyeonku* [A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in the Christian Churches] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1999), p. 82.

most powerful civilian bodies to represent the interests of the northern migrants.[682] The Church was a microcosm of the "refugee society"[683] in South Korea in the 1950s and 60s. It continued to retain its rightist or conservative characteristics both in its internal theological orientations and on national political issues.

It is also significant to note that Christianity became the most urbanized religion in Korea after the Korean War. Christianity had high proportions of middle class occupations like merchants, entrepreneurs, professors, civil servants, and army officers.[684] The concentration of certain occupational positions was partly due to the previous occupations that Christian refugees had had in the North, and partly due to the limited job options that they had at the time of resettlement as original residents already occupied agricultural lands. They tended to settle in the cities and pursue careers in non-agricultural sectors.

Anti-communism and the Church, 1953-1965

Anti-communism, after three years of the traumatic war, was deeply embedded in the lives of South Koreans. It also became the sole social and political code of conduct to follow. Anti-communism was practiced in almost every aspect of the social, political, economic and cultural arenas in South Korea. In the literature and education sector, all books, including school textbooks published in the 1950s, had "Our Pledges" printed on the back cover. One of the "pledges" read: "We will unite ourselves like iron and destroy communist invaders."[685] All students were expected to memorize these pledges. The essence of their identity as a Korean national was rooted in anti-communism. Textbooks as institutional media of the Government were the most effective in implanting anti-communism in the minds of children.

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682 Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, Siminsahoe* [Korean Christianity, State and Civil Society] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1996), p. 283.

683 Dongchoon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A History* (Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), p. 40.

684 Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, Siminsahoe*[Korean Christianity, State and Civil Society] (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 1996), pp. 298-301.

685 The City History Compilation Committee of Seoul (compiled.), *Seoul Through Pictures 3: The Launch of Seoul as the Capital of the Republic of Korea (1945-1961)* (Seoul: The City History Compilation Committee of Seoul, 2004), p. 312

The textbooks of Korean languages and ethics in particular had extremely emphatic anti-communist elements in their stories and teachings.[686] All public organizations, including schools, were mobilized for anti-communist activities. One of the most highly favoured topics in student meetings at the time, such as writing contests and speech contests, was fighting against the communists. Semi-military organizations such as the Student National Defense Corps were formed within schools and colleges, and these grew more and more similar to military camps. In the 1950s, participating in government-organized anti-communist rallies was an important part of school life.[687] Literature was also an essential part of the indoctrination, creating myths with anti-communists against the communist aggressions, describing the former as "pure" or "good" against "evil" communists.[688]

On 29 March 1954, *Kidok Kongbo*, the Presbyterian Church news magazine, had a special report on President Rhee and his Christian faith. The title was "President Rhee who ruled through Prayer" and described his Christian commitment throughout his presidency.[689] Such pro-Rhee articles consistently appeared in various Christian magazines throughout his term (1948-1960).

On 15 March 1960 a scandal of widespread systematic corruption of presidential election initiated by the President Rhee's ruling party broke. People in Masan and Pusan came out to the streets for demonstrations against the ruling government. However, it was brutally suppressed by the police. Growing distrust towards Rhee's dictatorial government and its corruption reached a high pitch on 19 April, 1960. It

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[686] For example, the textbook of Ethics in grade 4 in elementary school contains a story of Insoo's family who fled from the North during the Korean War. The Soviet and Communist North were negatively portrayed who deprived of their properties. In *Doduk 4-1*[Ethics 4-1] (Seoul: the Ministry of Education, 1962), pp. 13-19. And grade 4 Korean Language textbook had a role of the UN as good allies to South Korea against "evil" communists. All these stories were tools to implant anti-communism in the minds of the young children. In *Kookeo 4-2* [Korean Language 4-2] (Seoul: the Ministry of Education, 1956), pp. 139-144.

[687] The City History Compilation Committee of Seoul (compiled.), *Seoul Through Pictures 3: The Launch of Seoul as the Capital of the Republic of Korea (1945-1961)* (Seoul: The City History Compilation Committee of Seoul, 2004), p. 312

[688] Wonjin Nam, 'Bankong Nationalism kuriko Daehanminkook Yeosarul Moonhakuiro Bunyeokhaki [Anti-communistic Nationalism and the Translation of Korean History through Literature]', Jinki Kim (ed.), *Bankongjoouiwa Hankookmoonhakui Keundaejuk Donghak II* [A Study on Modern Dynamics between Anti-Communism and Korean Contemporary Literature, vol. II] (Seoul: Hanwool, 2009), p. 61.

[689] *Kidok Kongbo* [The Christian News], 29 March 1954.

was the historic day of the 'People's Revolution' which finally overthrew Rhee's government by the people's power alone. However, the Protestant church leaders remained insensitive to the political desire of people, and rather favored Rhee's government, congratulating his election win. On 21 March 1960, *Kidok Kongbo* [the Christian News] analyzed the 15 March election through an abviously religious lens. For example, it was said that it was 'God's will' that Rhee Syngman was reelected as president. It highlighted why the opposition party had lost the election with purely religious reason. It was because they had competed with God, that they had lost the election. The article implied that God was on Rhee's side. It further specified the denominational attitude that Changmyun, an opposition party candidate, should be unwanted by people of South Korea because he was not a Protestant candidate, but a Catholic.[690]

When on 16 May 1961 General Park Junghee led and won a coup d'état, most church leaders supported it on the grounds that the coup core leaders were strongly committed to anti-communism in their political policy.[691] It seemed that anti-communism, to the Korean Church, covered any kind of political falsehood like a black hole and gave its adherents much political license, i.e., cases like Rhee's corrupt and dictatorial rule and Park's coup. Nakjoon Paek, a Christian educationist from the North, suggested that any policy of South Korean society had to be superior to that of other communist society.[692] The Church even extended their interests to reach out to the marginalized in the cities on the basis of anti-communist attitudes: "If Church doesn't pay attention to the needs of the poor and the neglected, they would fall into communist wing."[693] Small wage earners in the industrial complexes were targeted to be converted partly because they were the most vulnerable to the seduction of communist ideology. Fear of communist intervention in South Korean society prompted the churches in the South to commit

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690 *Kidok Kongbo* [The Christian News], 21 March, 1960.

691 *Kidok Kongbo* [The Christian News], 22 May 1960; Younghak Hyun. '5/16 Hyukmyungkwa Hankook Kyohoeui Kwajae [May 16th Revolution and the Responsibility of the Korean Church], *Kidokkyo Sasang* [The Christian Thoughts], vol. 5, no. 7 (Seoul: Daehan Kidokkyoseohoe, 1961), p. 65.

692 *Kyunghyang Shinmoon* [Kyunghyang Daily], 6 August, 1960.

693 'Competing Faith against Communism', *Christian Shinmoon* [Christian Newspaper], 10 December, 1960.

to proactively participate in evangelism among the downtrodden. The Church, therefore, penetrated industrial areas by establishing a separate urban industrial mission. Interestingly, those who worked for factory labourers often imitated communist tactics, i.e., using small cells for their networks.[694]

Clergymen at the pulpits often preached anti-communism as a part of the Christian faith. For example, Han Kyungchik described communists as '*Anakim*'.[695] They didn't have ethics anymore. In order to get blessing from God in this land, Christians had to slay communists like *Anakim*.[696]

Korean Church leaders were active catalysts for promoting anti-communism at the international level as well. In 1954, at the meeting of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, at Chicago University, USA, they strongly pleaded with churches in the world to not associate with any communist group. Korean church leaders viewed communists as 'the devil' or 'beastlike' characters:

> "If we treat the Communists as we do our enemies, and love them, it is nothing but the same as if we loved the devil and try ourselves in vain, to make it repent. Remember, Jesus stood firm and said to the demon "Depart ye". One of the Korean ministers, Rev. Sohn, Yangwon the saint, had excused and saved the Communists who killed his two sons. But the same Communist, after June 25 [1950], murdered Rev. Sohn, mocking him to whom they owed their lives. Communists are taking the advantage of the grace, love and nonresistant attitude of Christians, and seeking only to meet their beastlike desire of conquest."[697]

The bitter experiences Korean churches had had during the Korean War made them to stand firm against communists, and even to have a willingness for forming

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694 'Competing Faith against Communism', *Christian Shinmoon* [Christian Newspaper], 10 December, 1960.

695 *Anakim* was a race of giants who inhabited in Canaan when the Israelites conquered in the Old Testament, Bible. They were dispossessed by the Israelites at the time of conquest and vanished from the history.

696 Kyungchik Han, 'Samchonri Canaan bokji', *Han Kyungchik Moksa Sulkyojunjip, 2* [The Collected Works of Kyungchik Han's Sermons, vol. 2] (Seoul: the Presbyterian Church of Korea Education Department, 1971), p. 221.

697 'To: Second Full Meeting of the C.C.I.A. at Chicago University, 1954', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 394.

a crusade to wipe communism out of the world.[698]

The biggest Korean Church schism after the Korean War took place among the biggest church denomination, the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK) in 1959. There were several issues behind the division. One of them was the issue of a pro-communism argument on the matter of participating in the World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC allowing churches of communist countries for membership led anti-communist sects of the PCK to condemn the WCC as a pro-communist association. They, therefore, opposed the PCK to take part in WCC membership. In 1959 Carl McIntire, a US Presbyterian pastor and ultra-rightwing anti-communist, visited Seoul and supported the anti-WCC sect of PCK. He was a founder of the International Council of Christian Churches (ICCC) which existed in opposition to the World Council of Churches (WCC) as politically pro-communistic and its theological standing of Ecumenical movement. He was a champion of McCarthyism in the Christian world. Although most of the PCK churches were conservative and anti-communistic as they were influenced by the northern Christian members and the communist horrors during the Korean War, inner division was excused by anti-communism argument. The anti-communistic partition system was well established even in the religious sector.

The Vietnam War and the Korean Church: A Case Study

In October 1965, one year after the United States sent combat troops, South Korean President Park Junghee sent a division-size combat troop to back the South Vietnam Army at the requests of the governments of both South Vietnam and the United States. It was the first ever large-scale troop dispatch of the South Korean government after the Korean War. The dispatch of combat troops to South Vietnam met very little domestic controversy. For most South Koreans who had experienced the horrors of the Korean War, 'anti-communism was a way of life and pro-

[698] 'To: Second Full Meeting of the C.C.I.A. at Chicago University, 1954', in Heungsoo Kim (ed.), *Documents of the WCC Library: The Korean War* (Seoul: the Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), p. 393.

Americanism an instrument for survival'.[699] It was, therefore, an indisputable issue since the dispatch of combat troops would work towards establishing peace in the South-east Asian region by defeating communists, a common enemy of liberal countries.[700] There were several points as to why the South Korean government dispatched battle troops to Vietnam.[701] One was that it was a way to repay allies like the United States for their help during the Korean War. It was also defined as an opportunity to secure capital and export markets for economic modernization projects. The South Korean military was able to gain invaluable combat experience and also to modernize its forces with advanced the US military equipment. Furthermore, it prevented some of the US military stationed in South Korea from relocating to South Vietnam. According to the Brown Memorandum of 4 March 1966, as a result of negotiations between South Korea and the United States, South Korea received one billion US dollars' worth of economic and military aid from the United States between 1965 and 1970.[702] It was estimated that it accounted for almost 8 percents of South Korea's GDP in these periods.[703]

On the afternoon of 18 May 1965, a joint Korea-US communiqué was released simultaneously in Seoul and Washington. This consisted of 14 articles, with key articles stipulating continued US military aid to Korea and maintenance of its troops there under the stipulations of the Korea-US Mutual Security Treaty. The communiqué also outlined continuation of US economic aid to South Korea,

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[699] Joohong Kim, 'The Armed Forces' in Byungkook Kim & Ezra F. Vogel (ed.), *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 173.

[700] Myungshin Chae, *Vietnam Junjaengkwa Na* [The Vietnam War and I] (Seoul: Palbokwon, 2014), p. 133.

[701] There would be several factors to consider why dispatching military to Vietnam was decided by Junghee Park's government. For upgrading South Korean military through battle experience and advanced equipments provided by US military, nullifying US military transfer plan from South Korea to Vietnam, economic benefits through war-time businesses, securing anti-communism regime, etc.

[702] The memorandum had 16 items: ten on military assistance and six on economic assistance to South Korea from the US For details of the memorandum, see Minyong Lee, 'The Vietnam War: South Korea's Search for National Security' in Byungkook Kim & Ezra F. Vogel (ed.), *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 418-419.

[703] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (Updated Edition) (New York: W.W. Norton &Company, 2005), p. 321.

granting 150 million US dollars in long-term development loans.[704] The 4th article says that "President Johnson noted with deep appreciation the contribution of the Republic of Korea towards the defense of Vietnam. The two Presidents reaffirmed their intention to continue to cooperate closely in support of the Republic of Vietnam."[705]

In October 1965, the first combat troop, the Maengho [Tiger] Division was dispatched to Vietnam. In 1966, another division-sized troop, the Baekma [White Horse] Division was added. From the year of 1965 till 1972, the total number of Korean military in the Vietnam War was 324,864.[706] More than 40,000 soldiers were at the battle fields each year were stationed in the battle fields throughout the period. It was a second largest foreign troop dispatched to Vietnam after US military. *Maenghonun Ganda* [Maengho is Going], a theme song of Korean Army Maengho[Tiger] Division, soon became a popular amongst children and adults.[707] During the war, 5,099 soldiers were killed and 10,962 were wounded.[708] The deceased and the wounded became national heroes because they fought and died for the nation by fighting against the communist enemies.[709] Such heroic stories were written in school textbooks and taught in classes. These stories became hugely popular among the people of South Korea nationwide.

Jaehong Kong, my father, was one of the soldiers dispatched at the White Horse Division in 1969-1970. He told heroic stories about his days in the Vietnam War. The youth of Korea including myself idolized those dispatched to Vietnam. South Korea's participation in the Vietnam War further solidified anti-communist ideology for the common citizens of South Korea in the 1960s and 70s. Fossilized

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[704] Ministry of Public Information, Republic of Korea, *Bridge of Friendship and Faith: The State Visit to the United States of President Park* (Seoul: Ministry of Public Information in Republic of Korea, 1965) (Korean Translation by Hyunpyo Lee, 2011), p. 138.

[705] Ministry of Public Information, Republic of Korea, *Bridge of Friendship and Faith: The State Visit to the United States of President Park* (Seoul: Ministry of Public Information in Republic of Korea, 1965) (Korean Translation by Hyunpyo Lee, 2011), p. 141.

[706] www.vvak.kr (accessed on 12 February 2016)

[707] Myungshin Chae, *Vietnam Junjaengkwa Na* [The Vietnam War and I] (Seoul: Palbokwon, 2014), p. 124.

[708] www.vvak.kr (accessed on 12 February 2016)

[709] Myungshin Chae, *Vietnam Junjaengkwa Na* [The Vietnam War and I] (Seoul: Palbokwon, 2014), p. 128.

images of inhumane, beast-like communists were inscribed in the hearts of the people, even from a distance. In fact, the Vietnam War had two particularly salient impacts on South Korea: one was that it greatly boosted the national economy through war-efforts and the other was that President Park was able to secure his political powerhouse in national politics in the name of anti-communism.[710]

Leaders of major Christian denominations and institutions, both clergymen and lay-leaders, fully supported the government's decision to dispatch combat troops to Vietnam. Their perception of the Vietnam War was clearly influenced by the memories of the Korean War. Ryu argues that "the tragic Korean War created a deep-seated hatred of communism within the hearts of South Korean Christians that proved difficult to overcome."[711] Korean churches regarded the Vietnam War as an extension of the Korean War. At a prayer meeting for dispatched soldiers that church leaders like Kim Hwallan praised soldiers, saying that they would repay the debt Korea had towards her allies who had helped during the Korean War.[712]

The aggressive anti-communistic attitudes of Korean churches during the Vietnam War, as Ryu argues, vividly express "the damage that was done to their moral and theological judgment"[713] during the partition and the Korean War. The traumatic experience of the Korean War had made it clear in their minds that neither peace nor the Church could thrive as long as communism existed. Kovel uses the phrase, "the black hole of anti-communism", for explaining American anti-communism in 1950s and he argues that the black hole of anti-communism is different from simple anti-communism (that is, a critique of communism as such) in that it has a "dynamism which surpasses the effects of opportunism or calculated, instrumental rationality."[714] Korean society as a whole was under the effect of that black hole with Korean churches adding moral and spiritual fuel to it. Korean churches viewed

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[710] Sejin Kim, 'South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam and Its Economic and Political Impact', *Asian Survey,* vol. 10., no. 6 (June 1970), pp. 519-532.

[711] Daeyoung Ryu, 'Korean Protestant Churches' Attitude towards War: With a Special Focus on the Vietnam War', *Korea Journal* (Winter, 2004), p. 200.

[712] *Kyohoeyeonhap Sinbo* [The Church Union News] (4 September 1966).

[713] Daeyoung Ryu, 'Korean Protestant Churches' Attitude towards War: With a Special Focus on the Vietnam War', *Korea Journal* (Winter, 2004), p. 218.

[714] Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America* (London: Cassel, 1997), p. 197.

the world and the Vietnam War as a struggle between good and evil, with the anti-communist allies on one side, and the 'evil' communist nations on the other. This fixed dichotomy was easily accepted by the Korean churches.[715]

It was a "righteous" war for these churches on the grounds that the Vietnam War was interpreted as a battle against evil of atheistic communism. The churches soon succeeded in persuading the army to organize the Immanuel Battalion which consisted of only Christians in the White Horse Division. The work of army chaplains throughout the war played the role of consistently recruiting Korean churches to engage with the war as a holy mission from God.[716] It was also interesting that 88 out of 97 Korean military officers stationed in Vietnam in April 1966 were Christians.[717] The fact that a majority of the Korean commanders were Christians caused Korean churches to identify the entire deployment as crusaders for God. It was a Holy war according to their theological perceptions.[718] Chae Myungshin, the first Korean Army Commander General in Vietnam, was a devoted Christian. In his memoir he viewed the sacrifice of many Korean soldiers in a religious aspect, writing that:

> "Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it bears much fruit. Whoever loves his life loses it, and whoever hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life (John 12:24-25)." I'd like to take a historical assessment that each one of soldiers who had died at the time of Vietnamese War became a grain of wheat so that it became a stepping stone to make South Korea an economic power.[719]

He kept on assuring soldiers by his conviction from the Christian faith that life was under God's sovereign hands. Matthew 10:28-29 was his favorite quote to encourage soldiers with on the battlefield as well as to back his own faith. "And do

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[715] Daeyoung Ryu, 'Korean Protestant Churches' Attitude towards War: With a Special Focus on the Vietnam War', *Korea Journal* (Winter, 2004), p. 201.

[716] Daeyoung Ryu, 'Korean Protestant Churches' Attitude towards War: With a Special Focus on the Vietnam War', *Korea Journal* (Winter, 2004), pp. 202-204.

[717] Daeyoung Ryu, 'Korean Protestant Churches' Attitude towards War: With a Special Focus on the Vietnam War', *Korea Journal* (Winter, 2004), p. 202.

[718] *Kidokkongbo* [The Christian News] (20 August 1966).

[719] Myungshin Chae, *Vietnamjungjaengkwa Na* [The Vietnam War and I] (Seoul: Palbokwon, 2014), p. 504.

not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell. Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? And not one of them will fall to the ground apart from your Father."[720]

When US and East Asian church leaders adopted a resolution demanding the US government to stop bombing North Vietnam, and rather join peaceful negotiations under the leadership of the UN in December 1965, Korean churches responded that it would be naive to expect fruitful negotiations with the communists as other international churches had never experienced brutality of communists.[721] Their attitude towards the Vietnam War, said Ryu, "clearly exhibit the damage that was done to their moral and theological judgment during the division, the Korean War, and by their subsequent adoption of Pro-American and anti-communist ideologies."[722]

Anti-Communism as Korean Civil Religion and the Church

Robert Bellah introduces the idea of "American civil religion"[723] by arguing that although the separation of church and state was established and personal matters of religious belief, worship, and association were strictly delegated to the private domain, still the great majority of Americans shared certain common elements of religious orientation. Dianne Kirby argues that religion was a factor in the Cold War, even though it was not the primary factor. She writes that "it was a factor that had immense repercussions for faith communities."[724] That played a crucial role in the American public and political sphere. This public dimension is expressed in a set of

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[720] Myungshin Chae, *Vietnamjungjaengkwa Na* [The Vietnam War and I] (Seoul: Palbokwon, 2014), p. 124.

[721] Daeyoung Ryu, 'Korean Protestant Churches' Attitude towards War: With a Special Focus on the Vietnam War', *Korea Journal* (Winter, 2004), p. 208.

[722] Daeyoung Ryu, 'Korean Protestant Churches' Attitude towards War: With a Special Focus on the Vietnam War', *Korea Journal* (Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2004), p. 218.

[723] Robert N. Bellah, 'Civil Religion in America', *Daedalus* (*Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science*), Winter 1967, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp.1-21.

[724] Dianne Kirby (ed.), 'Preface to the Paperback Edition', *Religion and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. xii.

beliefs, symbols, and rituals that Robert Bellah calls "American civil religion".[725] Similarly, Emilio Gentile argues that "secularization in modern society has not produced a definitive separation between the spheres of religion and politics."[726] With the development of mass politics, said Gentile, "the boundaries between these two spheres have often become confused, and on these occasions politics has assumed its own religious dimension." At the same time as this process of secularization within both the state and the society, there was also "sacralization of politics" with Gentile identifying its height to be the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century.[727]

As Inboden argues that the Cold War was not only an ideological war, but also a religious war. Atheistic communism had to be fought against by adopting anti-communism as a new 'civil religion'.[728] Truman's containment doctrine had a strong religious dimension, implying that religion provided a dichotomy for the fundamental conflicts in the world between "those nations who believed in God and morality, and those who did not." Religion also provided a "valuable instrument" to be used in containing the Soviet communists as it was a "potent tool" to undermine faith in the Soviet system.[729] Dwight D. Eisenhower continued to uphold the role of religion in Cold War foreign policies. Religious faith drew a line between the free world and the communist world. This was also "a powerful device to bolster domestic support for anticommunism while also undermining communist regimes abroad."[730] Likewise, ideology and religion combined one another on to enhance a certain political form or a way of the state or the civil society. While examining the

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[725] Robert N. Bellah, 'Civil Religion in America', *Daedalus* (*Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science*), Winter 1967, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp.1-21.

[726] Emilio Gentile, 'Fascism as Political Religion', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3 (May-June, 1990), p. 229.

[727] Emilio Gentile, 'Fascism as Political Religion', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3 (May-June, 1990), p. 229. See more detail in Emilio Gentile, *Politics as Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[728] William Inboden, *Religion and American foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York, 2008), pp. 1-6.

[729] Kai Yin Allison Haga, 'Rising to the Occasion: The Role of American Missionaries and Korean Pastors in Resisting Communism throughout the Korean War', in Philip Emil Muehlenbeck (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective* (Nashville, 2012), pp. 106-107.

[730] William Inboden, *Religion and American foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York, 2008), pp. 257-258.

characteristics of fascism in Italy in the mid 20th century, Gentile notes how political ideology became civil or political religion. He writes that:

> Civil religion tends to sacralize certain aspects of civic life by means of public rituals and collective ceremonies. In so doing, beliefs and behaviours, acquire a 'religious' dimension. As such, civil religion may be considered a belief system or, a surrogate religion, that expresses the self-identity of a collectivity. Yet, like secular ideologies of different kinds, civil religion may also attempt to force group identity and to legitimize an existing political order, by injecting a transcendental dimension or a religious gloss on the justification. This latter manifestation I call political religion.[731]

After the inauguration of the first Republic on 15 August 1948, a sacralization of the state began in the midst of growing tension and competition for legitimacy between the partitioned North and South. During the Korean War and the Vietnam War, sacralization of the state was strengthened by the two Presidents, Rhee Syngman and Park Junghee. Anti-communism as a Korean civil religion became rooted in the hearts of the people and was widely emphasized by state-initiated ceremonies and policies. For example, stories of thousands of war heroes and martyrs were taught and battle sites were visited. National cemeteries and war memorials were erected. Magnificent military parades were introduced at the national annual ceremony. Two national holydays were added, both directly related to the Korean War: 6 June as Memorial Day and 1 October as National Military Day. These visual exercises of the state promoted anti-communism as a civil religion.[732] Kovel carefully examines the relations between ideology and mythology. The latter, according to him, is a precursor of the former. He goes on to say that various anti-communist stories were "collective narratives known as myth, which reflect as well as shape history, and give a people its life-defining sense of identity."[733] "Ideology has surrounded itself with a mythic universe that has

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[731] Marcela Cristi, *From Civil to Political Religion: The Intersection of Culture, Religion and Politics* (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2001), p. 3.

[732] Incheol Kang, 'Jongkyoka Kookkarul Sangsanghaneun Beop: Jungkyoboonri, Kwaeochungsan, Siminjongkyo [How does Religion Imagine the State? : State-Religion Separation, Transitional Justice, and Civil Religion]', *Jonggyomunhwayeongu* [Religion and Culture Studies], vol. 21 (December 2013), P. 107.

[733] Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America*

obliterated history by presenting it as an eternal struggle between American [anti-communist] goodness and communist badness", writes Kovel while examining American anti-communism.[734]

Anti-communism was a minimum criterion in order to become a citizen of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Yet becoming a Korean citizen was not a one-time event, rather it was a continuous process to be an acceptable citizen. There was an unceasing process of 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' of people in Korea. As a result, a violent citizen was born. Making enemies and defining "others" was a necessary and vital process for defining "us". In other words, making an appropriate citizen was completed through defining who else was not.[735] Gentile argues that "fascism's image of being the 'religion of the nation' allowed the movement to monopolize patriotism."[736] It also destroyed all political adversaries as 'enemies of the nation'. Within the party, it worked as a mechanism to sort out dissenters, labeling them as 'betrayers of the faith', whilst absolute obedience was imposed on other members.[737] In the same manner, all political adversaries in the partition of South Korea were to be destroyed as "enemies of the nation", equal to the Communist North. They were considered as "betrayers of faith of anti-communism" even if their claims were incorrect. However, along with the state's endeavor for hardening anti-communism, non-state agencies and individuals were also active participants of the same cause. Anti-communism as a government policy in the South was almost completely without any opposition by Rhee's ultra-rightist efforts. A series of retaliations against communist uprisings in 1948 and the issuing of the National Security Law in 1949 which was intended to purge the communist elements of the South Korean Society was a sign of it. However, it remained more or less a "willed ideology"[738] which was compelled by the above authority level

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(London: Cassel, 1997), pp. 197-198.

[734] Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America* (London: Cassel, 1997), p. 197.

[735] Deugjoong Kim, *Ppalgaengiui Tansaeng* [The Birth of Ppalgaengi] (Seoul: Sunin, 2009), p. 577.

[736] Emilio Gentile, 'Fascism as Political Religion', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3 (May-June, 1990), pp. 235-236.

[737] Emilio Gentile, 'Fascism as Political Religion', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3 (May-June, 1990), pp. 235-236.

[738] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers,

until it became "organic"[739] through the experience of the Korean War among the grass-root level of society. Thus, it became common to say that "if it is not anti-communism, it is considered to be pro-communism." Gramsci argues that "'ideology' itself must be analyzed historically, in the terms of the philosophy of praxis, as a superstructure."[740] He asserts that one must distinguish between "historically organic ideologies" and "ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or "willed"."[741] He further explains the difference between the two that:

> To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is "psychological"; they "organize" human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only create individual "movements", polemics and so on.[742]

Both partition and the war gave the Church an immense opportunity to maximize her religious influence on South Korean politics and society. At the same time, the Church and the northern refugees were among the few non-state forces to stimulate the enemy making process. The communists were now national enemies and anti-Christ figures in post-war South Korea. Williams opines that:

> Religion shapes the identity, the sense of solidarity, and the moral outrage that are integral to social-movement cultures. Motivated believers are the core of any collective action. At the same time, religious doctrine and theology can offer coherent and elaborated cognitive rationales that diagnose social problems, prescribe possible solutions, and justify the movement's actions.[743]

1971), p. 377.

[739] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 377.

[740] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 376.

[741] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 376-377.

[742] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 377.

[743] Rhys H. Williams, 'Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (Vol. 35, No. 4, December, 1996), p. 377.

Such political motivation as religion provides has a combination of 'the emotional and cognitive elements of action with a universal legitimation'.[744] Churches in South Korea in the 1950s and 60s were christened with anti-communistic political thoughts with both emotional and cognitive elements. The Church spearheaded sacralization of anti-communism, thus making it as a Korean civil religion.[745] This religious interpretation of anti-communism eventually affected mass congregations of the Christian community and the entire society. It was in tune with the political interests of Rhee's government (1948-60) and Park's government (1961-1979) in South Korea. Dualism between 'good' and 'evil' was preached at the pulpit while communism was always described as a satanic force, thus anti-communism should be good and 'appropriate' ideology to adopt as Christians. The Korean War and the Vietnam War were interpreted as 'sacred wars' and 'anti-communist Crusades'.[746]

While demonization of the Muslims was common to Hindu communal politics in India, anti-communism in Korea also had a tendency to demonize communists. Kovel notes, "if remembering is necessary to avoid repetition, then the recollection of that demonology becomes an important task for the present."[747] Whenever the demonized enemy gained an upper hand, "sacred anti-communism" also grew in its influence on society.[748]

Rev. Han Kyungchik was a strong advocate of anti-communism and supported the state controlled national security policy in his time. For him, any potential for social, political or economic instability should be regarded as a threat to national security. His ideas of patriotism were to maintain national security. This was strongly affected by a series of traumatic events he had experienced at the hands of the

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[744] Rhys H. Williams, 'Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 35, no. 4 (December, 1996), p. 374.

[745] *Kidok Kongbo* [The Christian News], February 4th, 1952; Kyungchik Han, *Keonkukkwa Kidokkyo* [Nation-building and Christianity] (Seoul: Borinwon, 1949), pp. 198-212.

[746] Incheol Kang, 'Jongkyoka Kookkarul Sangsanghaneun Beop: Jungkyoboonri, Kwaeochungsan, Siminjongkyo [How does Religion Imagine the State? : State-Religion Separation, Transitional Justice, and Civil Religion]', *Jonggyomunhwayeongu* [Religion and Culture Studies], vol. 21 (December 2013), P. 108.

[747] Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America* (London: Cassel, 1997), p. 197.

[748] Incheol Kang, *Hankook Kidokkyowa Kookka, Siminsahoe* [Korean Christianity, State and Civil Society] (Seoul, 1996), p. 270.

communists during his stay in the North in 1945 and the Korean War (1950-53).[749] He discouraged any kind of activity which would cause social instability though it might be fairly justifiable in terms of raising voices against corrupt governments and opposing dictatorial regimes. Such activities would provide an opportunity for the communist North to invade the South again. This would be more dangerous than allowing dictatorship. His acceptance of a military coup in 1961 was based on his commitment for anti-communism and national security. Social justice was overpowered by an adherence to national security and anti-communism.

When a crime against humanity becomes in some sense "banal", it is because it is committed in systematically and on a regular basis, without being adequately named or opposed. Hannah Arendt's popular phrase, "the banality of evil"[750] was practiced among South Korean masses in the name of anti-communism. When the partition system was established through pre-war and wartime experience after unwanted partition, anti-communistic violence imposed by both the state and civil society became more and more banal and acceptable in South Korea. It was so natural that any kind of so-called, 'pro-communist elements' even if aimed at upholding democracy, would be punished and discarded in the name of national security. Those who were oriented in anti-communism through their own memory of brutal experience in the past would also approve of violence against pro-communistic activists. As a result, a "banality of evil" became a critical part of social and political life in South Korea.

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[749] Incheol Kang, 'Jongkyoka Kookkarul Sangsanghaneun Beop: Jungkyoboonri, Kwaeochungsan, Siminjongkyo [How does Religion Imagine the State? : State-Religion Separation, Transitional Justice, and Civil Religion]', *Jonggyomunhwayeongu* [Religion and Culture Studies], vol. 21 (December 2013), P. 110.

[750] Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin, 1963).

Conclusion

When Korea was divided at the time of independence in 1945, the partition of land and people was an abnormal and unthinkable offense in the minds of the Korean people. Furthermore, the independence of Korea after World War II which accompanied partition created Cold War tensions between the North and the South. Under the physical pressures and ideological disputes with the communists in the North, almost one third of North Korean Christians took refuge in the South along with other non-Christian refugees. They played a critical role in making South Korean society and politics more right-leaning than before the Korean War. The Korean War solidified "black and white" or "good and evil" dichotomy of ideological tensions between the communist North and the capitalist South while refugees and Christians continued to place themselves at the centre stage of such physical and ideological war efforts. Furthermore, post-war Korean society and politics continued to be affected by anti-communism sentiments which northern refugees and Christians unceasingly upheld. Due to the bitter experience of killings and hatred during the Korean War after the partition of Korean peninsula in 1945, the people were divided into two irreconcilable groups: communists versus anti-communists. It became also routine to brand partitioned others as unacceptable citizens or anti-national enemies, firmly establishing the partition system. Violence against the *Ppalgaengi* became banal, as anti-communists were assured and reassured about the justice of their actions by political and religious (mainly, Christian) leaders throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The churches in Korea became particularly powerful players of the solidification of the partition system by providing a religious justification especially when "the ideology turned into a kind of state religion."[751] In 1965, the Korean people's decreased resistance and Korean church leaders' full support for the dispatch of combat troops to the Vietnam War with anti-communist slogans demonstrated a sign of deep-rooted system of partition both in the state and civil society.

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[751] Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America* (London: Cassel, 1997), p. 197.

Conclusion

Religion played a decisive role in the nations' unity as well as their divisions. Both independence and partition in India and Korea impacted the social, political, economic, and cultural aspects of people's lives. In "the partition system", partition itself provided an operating system of society and politics. In light of this historical information, this study has examined the extent to which religion, violence, and migrations during the events of partition played a greater role to shape the partition system. Furthermore, it analyzed how the partition system operated in the two decades (1945-1965) post-partition in the two countries.

Chapter one gave a broad overview of the historical background in the prelude to partition in India and Korea. The two countries had a prolonged history of nationalist resistance against colonialism in the first half of the twentieth century. Both the countries also witnessed tension between religion and ideology in the course of their nationalist movements. However, religion also played the role of nurturing (or hardening) separatism among the people. In India, nationalist movements went two different directions: one was the composite nationalism, and the other was exclusive communalism. The former group advocated by M.K. Gandhi upheld secularism through the Indian National Congress platform, aiming for national unity. Gandhi interpreted Hinduism as being supportive of inclusive nationalism and he promoted non-violence as a method of nationalist struggles. Gandhian nationalists like Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana A.K. Azad in the Congress generally followed Gandhi's inclusive nationalism even if each leader had his own individual differences with Gandhi. Their differences were generally more tactical than ideological. In opposition to the Gandhian nationalism, religion-oriented political bodies like the Muslim League, the Rashtrya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Akhali Dal, sought to maximize their own communal interests which led to exclusive communalism. Hindutva ideology was the best example of Hindu communalism, demonstrating the influence of the fascist characteristic of majoritarianism. The Akalis developed minority solidarity

through pursuing theocratic community, fearing extinction or assimilation by both the Muslims and the Hindus in Punjab. In the meantime, electoral representation stimulated competitions and populism among religious communities, leading to heightened communal sentiments. Many followers of communalism were emotionally affected by the divisive sentiments of political and religious leaders of their respective communities.

In Korea, religions boosted nationalism in the course of independence struggles. Traditional religions like Confucianism and Buddhism in Korea did not play a major role in awakening Koreans to nationalism despite some attempts from them due to losing hope in the traditional national order for achieving independence. In this historical circumstance, newly emerged religions played a critical role in strengthening the national consciousness of the Korean people for fighting against imperial Japan. Chondokyo and Christianity were two distinct modern religions which provided not only new belief systems, but also new national ideologies, both of which promised to ensure both personal and national salvations. The former was well-received by rural peasants while the latter was accepted by urban educated people. However, what we examined here was mostly the role of Christianity, particularly Protestantism. Due to the fact that this played the most crucial role in shaping Korean nationalism among the religions. A series of Christian-initiated national movements like the Korean Conspiracy Case in 1912-3, the March First Movement in 1919, cultural nationalism, and the Shinto Shrine worship boycotts in 1930s-40s explained how Christianity determined the characteristics of Korean nationalism during the Japanese colonial period.

Chapter two examined the extent to which partition-related violence and wars played a role in creating and hardening the partition system in the two countries. Partition-related violence, including the wars, experientially (re)generated the concept of enemies and further stereotyped ‘others’. The violent killings, loss of properties and family, dispersing, abductions, and migrations made the victims enhance the process of enemy-making. Whether violence was committed by individuals, communities, or states during partition and its related wars, it served to solidify the partition system in the two partitioned countries. In India, Punjab and Delhi were the worst affected areas during the partition period in many aspects.

Massacres, arsons, lootings, abductions, and massive migrations took place there at the time. In West Punjab the Hindus and the Sikhs were massacred or purged out to the Indian side of Punjab almost completely while in East Punjab the Muslim inhabitants were treated similarly. Inhuman brutality during the civil war was practiced by both sides. It resulted in nearly over five hundred thousand deaths and created ten million refugees. These figures indicate the bitterness of partition. Partition violence only enhanced fear and hatred among communities.

Furthermore, partition generated the motivation and causes for a series of the Indo-Pakistan Wars (1947-8, 1965, and 1971). It created the continued awareness of "the enemy" along communal lines in India. Such communally charged incidents were often used and misused by communalist leaders for their social, economic and political gains. Partition was an event of the past, but it continued to influence social and political behavior of the people in India under the partition system in which communal violence and wars acted as a stimulus to solidify the system.

In Korea, partition was unlike India in that it was not initiated by Koreans, but by the Cold War world powers, notably, the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. However, it was soon internalized by the Korean political leaders and then the masses. In South Korea, a series of violent incidents in the pre-war period between independence and the Korean War created the division of people according to ideological leanings. In this ideological struggle the rightists successfully established an anti-communistic national system. The Korean War confirmed this system and solidified it while entire people and lands were affected by war violence. Inhuman violence against innocent civilians during the three years of war clearly scarred the hearts and bodies of Korean people. What grieved the Korean people the most after the war was not that Korea didn't achieve unification, rather it was divided and had to live under the partition system. From 1945 to this day, South Korea has become a strongly anti-communist country while North Korea maintained her own way of communism and dictatorship. The existing unforgettable and unforgivable enemies, the communist North, deeply affected South Korean politics in terms of sticking to anti-communism. Heavy militarization was another by-product of the Korean War, leading to the three decades of military rule (1961-92), participation in the Vietnam War, and militarization of social

relations. Political leaders often misused (or exploited) anti-communist sentiments for the security of their power, legitimization of certain political policies, and suppression of the political opponents throughout the second half of the twentieth century. It defined the characteristics of South Korean society in every aspect.

Chapter three critically examined the murder cases of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in India and Kim Koo in Korea by comparing ideological differences between them and their assassins. The two prominent nationalist leaders in each respective country were assassinated by right-wing extremists in the post-partition period due to their political stance of composite nationalism. In India, M.K. Gandhi was a champion of anti-communalism as well as a victim of communalism at the height of partition violence. In line with his composite nationalism, Gandhi sought Hindu-Muslim unity. This was based on his interpretation of the moral and idealistic aspects of the Hindu faith. Throughout his activities, speeches, and writings particularly in the 1940s, it was understood that he was a true seeker of non-violence of which morality was the most essential part. Furthermore, he aimed to establish communal harmony through the communally-neutral political ideology of secularism. Although he proactively implemented what he believed in the political and social arenas in the 1920s and 30s, he became less influential in political decisions in the 1940s. For example, on the issue of partitioning India, he opposed it, but could not stop it. Although he failed to stop partition, he did not stop his life-long commitment to communal harmony and non-violence during communal violence. In September 1947 he arrived in Delhi from Calcutta to put a stop to communal violence through his personal appeals and activities. It was hard to convince the Muslims who had fled to come back to Delhi, and similarly hard to convince victimized Hindu and Sikh refugees from Wet Pakistan to make peace with the Muslims in Delhi. His effort to support the Muslim community was interpreted (or misinterpreted) by the groups of the Hindus and the Sikhs as anti-national. At the height of communal sentiments in Punjab and Delhi, Gandhi's speeches and activities were courageous acts, but liable to provoke reactionary activities. He was finally assassinated by a Hindu fanatic, Nathuram Godse, who considered Gandhi's work anti-national. Godse, in his court statement explained why he killed Gandhi according to Hindutva ideology. He was a model of the

extreme Hindu communalism advocated by RSS and Hindu Mahashaba at the time. Godse condemned Gandhi for his non-violence on the grounds that it caused the entire Hindu community to become impotent, so that the Hindus were falling into danger of extinction under the Muslims' aggression. He upheld the use of force of arms to fight Muslim enemies so that Hindu Motherland would be saved. Therefore, in order to achieve his goal Gandhi, the biggest obstacle to India in his mind, had to be removed. He claimed he did it as a patriot to India. Gandhi's death symbolized growing tensions between secularism and communalism during partition. Simultaneously, it exposed the power of Hindu communal politics.

In Korea, Kim Koo was one of the few nationalist leaders who made a constant effort to achieve Korea's unification and a complete independence amidst ideological and territorial disparity in the period from 1945 to 1949. His nationalism transcended Cold War ideology, and rather advocated a "nation first, ideology second" slogan. He advocated morality and national harmony as a remedy to fratricidal disputes based on the Cold War ideology. Thus, though he was not a strongly religious man, he acknowledged that "it would be better to plant one hundred churches than hundred police stations." He went against the trusteeship plan designed by the Soviet Union and the Unites States, thinking that it would mean another foreign rule. Furthermore, he made an effort to unify the North and the South in 1948, though it was to no avail. He constantly opposed a separate election which would lead to a permanent division of the Korean peninsula. Thus, he boycotted the general election in May 1948 and didn't attend the inauguration ceremony of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Government on 15 August 1948 as well. His political opponent, Rhee Syngman, became the first President of South Korea and he drove and accelerated the anti-communist policies which created the further division of Korean society. After Rhee secured his political powerbase, Kim Koo rapidly became impotent in terms of his political influence. He was portrayed as an anti-national by the ultra-rightists due to his different political stance. Eventually he was assassinated by a young army lieutenant, Ahn Doohee, a North Korean migrant and a member of the rightist youth association, *Sobuk Chongnyunhoe*. Ahn Doohee's defense reflects political sentiments of the entire ruling authority under Rhee's government. Kim Koo was condemned by Ahn as an

anti-national who had to be removed for the sake of national security. For him and groups backing him anything or anyone opposing the state authority or the state-defined authority could be justifiably punished harshly, even to the point of the death penalty. It was a microcosm of the anti-communist rightist ruling party. Kim Koo's murder case trial was evidence to illustrate that the attitude of the state and its faithful agency, the military, against any political opposition was greatly influenced by a justification of retribution and even violence in the name of national security and order. Kim Koo's death further accelerated such a trend and solidified the partition at the dawn of the Korean War.

Chapter four dealt with the roles of partition refugees in Delhi and Punjab as well as those of religion-oriented organizations. In India, the traumatic event of partition transformed the worst affected areas, Punjab and Delhi, drastically. Nearly five million refugees from West Pakistan settled in various regions of North India in which Punjab and Delhi absorbed the majority of them. Due to the influx of refugees, Delhi was changed into a "refugee city". The capital demographically became an absolute Hindu majority city in the absence of two thirds of the former Muslim residents who had fled to West Pakistan. A Punjabi culture in terms of food, music, clothing, and language replaced the former Indo-Islamic Urdu culture. Punjabi merchants and businessmen transformed a slow moving artisan–oriented city into a vibrant industrial and business hub. Furthermore, Delhi became more politically Hinduized. The bereaved and angry non-Muslim refugees killed or purged out the Muslim residents in Delhi and the city soon became a centre of communal violence in 1947 and 1948. Since the early 1950s, the Jana Sangh formed its strong base in Delhi and challenged the Congress. Along with Hindu cultural organizations like RSS, Arya Samaj, the Jana Sangh exploited the needs of refugees who were struggling to resettle in Delhi for their political and communal gains. These activities encouraged communal sentiments of the Hindus further.

In Punjab, the Hindus and the Sikhs from West Pakistan replaced the Muslims who had left to West Pakistan. One big demographic change after partition in the region was that the Sikhs for the first time became a numerical majority in several districts of East Punjab. It encouraged the Sikhs to demand a Sikh-majority state in the two decades after partition. This chapter mainly discusses the *Punjabi Suba* movement.

In the two decades after partition, it became a major political and communal issue in the region. Unlike other linguistic state demands like those of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat, Punjab had a peculiar issue along communal lines. Although Punjabi was a language of the region, unlike the Sikh, the Punjabi Hindus wanted to have Hindi as their main language as it was nationally acknowledged as well as considered the language of the Hindu. However, the Sikhs, sticking to Punjabi as a sole language of education and communication in the region, were motivated by the fact that it was not only their mother tongue, but also the language of the Sikh. The Punjabi Suba movement for the Sikh was, therefore, not just a linguistic state demand, but more a Sikh solidarity movement. Thus, the movement created more communal disputes between the Hindus and the Sikhs in the region. For example, the Hindus in the region organized a "Save Hindi" movement against the *Punjabi Suba* and they campaigned among the Hindu community for choosing Hindi as their mother tongue in the census. Further division of Punjab was, it seemed, inevitable. In 1966, it was decided that Punjab would be divided into Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Punjab became a Sikh-majority state and Punjabi language and culture began to be defined as a Sikh language and culture. Ethnic characteristics of Punjabi became narrowly defined according to communal lines. Likewise, both Delhi and Punjab witnessed drastic changes of self-identities. Even the second generations in the post-partition period carried a burden of communalism, inherited from their parents or experienced themselves.

Chapter five examined the roles of northern refugees and northern Christians in South Korea in the period from 1945 to 1965. In Korea, partition (1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953) were two great events which transformed almost every aspect of Korea. These two events solidified the anti-communist structure called, "the partition system" in South Korea. In the process of making the partition system, North Korean migrants and northern Christians played a greater role than any other civilian or religious groups. These two groups often synchronized with one another, for many northern refugees were Christians or pro-Christian, and both groups were hostile to the communists. Thus, most of the analysis in this chapter focused on northern Christian activities. In Seoul, the influx of refugees between partition and the Korean War changed demography, culture, religion, politics, and economy.

Christianity, owing to the addition of northern Christians and many new memberships from non-Christian refugees and residents, grew more rapidly than any other religion. By 1960, it had become a major religion in Seoul. Furthermore, Christianity became an urban-oriented, middle class, politically conservative religion. During two decades after partition, South Korea was reshaped from a Japanese colony to a frontline of anti-communism. The Church in South Korea provided a spiritual justification of anti-communism by firmly establishing a religiously-free, capitalist "good" versus atheistic, communist "evil" dichotomy. Throughout the Korean War, the Christians maximized their influence through relief works, army chaplaincy, anti-communism propaganda, and evangelistic activities. This was fully supported by US Christian groups for pro-Christian cause and US government for anti-communism cause. After the war the Church in the South became a powerful non-state civilian interest group. As anti-communism gained the status of a nation-wide civil religion similar to that of the United States in the 1950s, the Church continued to act as a spearhead of it. As a case study, a dispatch of combat troops to the Vietnam War in 1965 was interpreted and justified by Christian leaders for being in the "holy" war, or Crusade against the atheistic communists. Such an effort of sacralizing the war served the Government's war efforts, legitimizing the policy of anti-communism. All these Christian involvements demonstrated the fact that the partition system was deeply rooted in the state as well as in civil society in South Korea in the period.

In summary, in light of what has been discussed in this work both India and Korea witnessed the active participation of religious elites and their affiliated social and political organizations for furthering the partition system. Partition and religiously-oriented war-time refugees in the two countries played a great role in (re)shaping social and political relations among various communities and groups. Violence during partition and its related wars solidified a concept of the enemy or "others". In India, communalism altered community relationships and enhanced enmification of others. This was often initiated by the non-state agencies and later they influenced the state by challenging its authority. It further helped establish the partition system. In Korea, it was anti-communism which transformed social and political relations of everyday life of the people and defined the legitimacy of any

social and political behaviours. This was mainly initiated by the state while the non-state agencies such as the church acted as a catalyst. Partition and the Korean War ushered in firmly establishing the partition system in South Korea.

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