

The Janata Party in Bihar : An Assessment

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DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled "The Janata Party in Bihar: An assessment, submitted by Ravi Ranjan is for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University and is his own work. We recommend that his dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

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INTRODUCTION

The working of Indian political system shows that it is gross oversimplification to say that politics offers choice between alternative sets of policies and personnel. Politics is not always reducible to who gets what, when and how.

The working and failure in providing an alternative to the dominant party, ideology proves that still India can be characterised as one party dominant system. The victory of Janta at Bihar level has significance for national scale. It was the state which saw the revolutionary upsurge started by Jay Prakash Narayan who gave the slogan of "Total revolution" and shift from "Rajniti to Lokniti". The very rejection of this ideology proved that general masses are not concerned with idealism rather they are very pragmatic.

The emergence of Janta Party in Bihar was not due to the capability of opposition unity but rather to the weakness of Congress party. Moreover the plurality of interest were not reconciled and Janta Party couldn't provide an alternative to the Congress party. This was the most auspicious occasion on which it should have consolidated its power.

Janta party in Bihar was torn as under into many groups. It was reputed by Satyendra Narayan Singh for upper caste Rajputs, Ram Sunder Das and Karpori Thakur.

While Karpori Thakur took drastic step for reservation in govt. jobs who constitute nearly 52 percent of the state population, it was dominated by upper backwards. However much was carried the governmental jobs created in Bihar per year came out to mere 9000¹.

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1. Mishra, D.D (1978) - Anatomy of Anti-reservation Agitation in Bihar and UP : A survey of current agitation : mimeo, Institute of Development Studies, University of Mysore.

The real decline of upper caste in Janta party's reign was only of Brahmins because people thought Congress to be of Brahmin's party and the marked gain was only of Upper backward classes like Yadavas, Kurmis etc.

The emergence of Janta Party was a sudden euphoric effort which was bound to failure. It was an organisation of antagonistic groups and interests which was not easy to reconcile. It could have been possible if a leader like J.P. did not want to participate in State politics.

It was a grouping of Secular party like Janta and markedly communal party of India RSS . In Bihar Chhatra Sangharsh Samiti (BCSS) and local Chhatra Sangharsh Samities (CSS) were compelled by the youth wing of the various parties. The Jan Sangh, Congress (O), Socialist party, Samyukta Socialist party, and their front organisation, the ABVP, SYS, TSS and the Sarvodaya Mandal, were the confident partners of the movement. Some organisations like RSS and Anand Marg

supported or worked for the movement without wearing their particular labels.

Ghanshyam Shah writes "of the three, the Jan Sangh was the most organised party working in the movement. It's members planned their strategies and followed their strategy. The party co-ordinated with its two sister organisations, the ABVP and RSS".²

Janta party has a framework of policies around Gandhism, decentralization of power and values of Democracy. Kothari, Joshi, Desai and Das Gupta have argued that the Janta party has an element of cohesion, and it has provided some new policy directives in Indian politics.

The actual performance of the Janta party has not revealed any new directives in any critical sectors of national life."³ Various parties

2. Ghanshyam Shah : protest movements in two Indian States : A study of the Gujarat and Bihar movements, New Delhi.

3. Ibid - p - 131.

were opposed on merger issues. While Jan Sangh was opposed to any merger issue of political parties, the BLD was in favour of a merger of non-communist and anti-congress opposition parties. This created more and more heterogeneity rather than homogeneity.

The policies and programmes of Janta Party also reflected a left-of-the-centre image and like the Congress party it had supporters of free enterprise co-existing with socialism. Despite rhetoric of Gandhism and economic decentralisation of economic power, the Janta did not adopt any policy regarding industry and rich peasantry which was fundamentally different from that of congress. The Janta talked of rural development without undertaking agrarian reforms.

The crisis of the Indian political system has emerged because of the breakdown of the notion coalition of the bourgeoisie and the landlords and rich peasants. The rural rich

is demanding more than an equality with capitalist classes in the governance of the country.

Since the merger of opposition parties in Bihar was not based on any ideological coherence rather on the struggle against domination of one party and its excesses so the merger of different parties was shortlived. Since the JP movement was basically a revolt of urban middle classes, the Jan Sagh Cardre which is concentrated in the urban centres was very actively involved in this movement.

In the first chapter I will examine the theories of different political parties expounded by Sartori, Duverger, Michels and Lenin. Sartori's configurations of party system is detailed. In view of Sartori, the single-party-system is one where political competition between different political parties is either non-existent or is not very effective. Here configuration is namely:-

- (1) Monopolistic - with its subvarieties (i) Totalitarian (ii) Authoritarian (iii) and pragmatic.
- (2) Another party of the single party system is its hegemonic position. Here we find that while the

existence of other parties is allowed, only one party counts more than all. Other parties are permitted as licenced parties, for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis. It has two subvarieties - ideological and pragmatic.

3. Finally,, sartori refers to the case of predominant party system as another variety of single party system. Here we find a power configuration in which one party governs above without being subjected to alternation as long as it continues to win absolute majority in the elections. In this model, one party out-distances all other, for it is significantly stronger than all of them even put together. The case of India comes in this division.

In the second chapter I will discuss the emergence of Janata Party in Bihar which needs no introduction.

The Third chapter deals with the real issue of Janata party in Bihar that is Reservation issue which was the much talked about issue in Bihar. We find that the Reservation didn't have any structural impact. This was not the integral policy of Janata party rather it was the political expediency of Karpoori Thakur to rally around him backward castes.

In the fourth chapter I will mention the performance of Janata Party. Although Janata party professed the ideology of rural development, poverty alleviation and backwards classes but it achieved little in comparison to congress.

Exemption of landholding was given to uneconomic holding and distribution of land to poor and landless labourers was undertaken during Janata party regime. Bhoodhan movement was a futile exercise, Antyodaya programme was consolidated.

The Industrial policy of the Janata Govt. must be creating maximum employment opportunities. As J.A Naik said "what we need is not the survival of classical Gandhian economy but the creation of a neo-Gandhian model which is realistic and idealistic in the same measure".⁴

The small units need to be integrated with the large-scale units in the production process itself and this will help in solving the marketing problem.

4. Naik, J.A- "From total revolution to total failure"
National publishing Delhi- 1979 -
Page - 29.

IRDP was originally visualised in the Draft Sixth Plan (1978-83) as a block level resource based total development with specific beneficially - oriented schemes of poverty alleviation integrated into it.

The fifth and last chapter is based on leadership & Ideology. Diversity of leaders background and interest weakened the party and finally it disintegrated.

The emergence of Janata party marked a sea change at state level. Karpoori Thakur and Ram Sunder Das both the chief ministers were from backward castes. But the condition of entire backwards didn't improve only Upper backwards were substantial beneficiaries. No political party is true to its proclaimed ideas, and ideology. Political parties work purely on pragmatic consideration and political expediency.

CHAPTER-III

In this chapter I am going to discuss briefly the theories of political parties and its referance to Indian political system.

THEORIES OF PARTIES

Maurice Dwyerger has taken the view that a political party "is not a community but a collection of communities, a union of small groups, dispersed through out the country (branches, callcuses, rural associations, etc.) and linked by co-ordinate institutions.¹ He includes every organisation operating through a party by terming it an 'indirect party' the examples of which can be found in numerous groups, associations, unions, corporations, professional societies etc.

The empirical examination of the organisation and working of a political party shows the role of several 'inner circles' that may be termed caucuses, cells, branches, milities etc. Moreover, it is their meaningful role that enables us to distinguish between democratic, fascist and communist variations of a political party.

1. Duverger, M. Political parties, Methen - 1956 P. 117

Keeping this in view, Duveyer suggests the following basic elements of a party's organisation.

1. Caucus : It is limited in character. It consists of a small number of members, and seeks no expansion. It does not indulge in any propaganda with a view to extending its recruitment. It plays a very important part in the decision-making process.

They belong to the first category (as in the French Radical Socialists) where they are composed of 'notabilities' choosing for their individual qualities and personal influence, they belong to the second one where (as in the case of Republican and Democratic parties of the United States) they are composed of the 'experts' in the art of fighting elections.

2. Branch : In itself the term 'Branch' designates a basic element which is less centralised than the caucus, a branch is only part of the whole, and its separate existence is inconceivable. On the one hand the word caucus evokes an autonomous reality, capable of living on its own.

The branch appeals to the masses. Finally the permanence of the branch confronts with the semi-permanence of the caucus.

The branch is a socialist invention. The socialist Parties which because organised on a purely political basis and direct structure naturally. Chose it as the fundamental unit in their activities.

3. Cell : It is an invention of the Fascist and Communist parties where the 'occupational' units of the ruling party are scattered every nook and corner of the country and every cell has a much greater hold on its member than the caucus or a branch. The party solidarity is every strong Above all the cells have an ideological orientation and they are a source of every clandestine action.
4. Militia : The Fascist Party of Mussolini in Italy and the Nazi Party of Hitler in Germany (and so communist Party of China under Mao) made another experiment by taking militia as the basis of their party's organisation.

No political party has been exclusively formed on the basis of the militia. There were in the German National Socialist Party, side by side with the storm Troopers, work place cells by and branches of the classical type. For instance, the membership of a democratic party is quite different in nature when it is compared with a

a totalitarian party, whether of the right or of the left. Keeping in view Duverger suggests two types of parties.

1. Cadre Party : It is a grouping of notabilities who constitute the structure of a political party. It believes in the principle of 'selection'. The notable figures take a very important part in the formulation of its policies and programmes, nomination of candidates for elections, collection of funds for the party and the like. Here quality is the most important factor.

Not only this, such people prepare a sort of cadre for the party whose support for it at the time of elections is a foregone conclusion. Reference in this direction may be made to the communist parties that have a cadre of their own in the influential figures of labour and peasant organisations.

2. Mass Party : The growth of franchise is responsible for converting cadre parties into mass parties to a very great extent. Different from a cadre party, a mass party

is one that believes in the principle of 'election' so as to win the title of popular legitimacy. It tries to enrol more and more measures and act with their confidence and consultation.

Duverger makes a division of party system into "internally" or "externally" created party keeping in view the emergence and development of political parties in various countries of the world.

The case of the internally created party system represents its emergence and development in response to the growth of the trends of democratization in the countries of the Western World in particular.

~~Howe~~ However, externally created parties are those which came into being and made their development to realise some revolutionary objective, to safeguard some interest religious, communal, economic or the light for the achievement of national liberation.

Duverger says of the externally created parties that they tend to be more centralised than that one internally created, more ideologically coherent and disciplined, less subject to influence from the legislative contingents of the parties, and generally less

willing to ascribe major importance to or be deferential toward parliament.

Duverger finds three lines of distinction between internally and externally created parties. First, while the former develop from 'in' to 'out' the latter show the reverse tendency, in the case of the former, local units widen themselves to become a national organisation, in the latter case, wide units move towards the trend of centralisation.

Second, for similar reasons parties arising outside the cycle are generally more coherent and more disciplined than parties of electoral and parliamentary origin. The former have at their disposal an organisation already in existence which binds together all the cells at their base, the latter have all these bonds to create with not starting point than the co-existence of a few representatives within the one parliament.

GIOVANNI SARTORI

A more neat taxonomic illustration of party system has been given by Giovanni Sartori in his latest study on the subject. The notable feature of his classificatory illust-

ration is that he has discovered several sub-varieties within the one party system and then differentiated the two party and multi-party system on the basis of "pluralism" and "Atomism". The basic touchstone of his classification is the fact of real participation in power what he terms 'competition'. If so, only two broad categories can be earmarked with the designation of 'competitive' and 'non-competitive' models. While the case of one party system falls into the former category, the cases of two and multi-party systems belong to the later.

In the view of Sartori, the single-party system is one where political competition between different political parties is either non-existent or is not very effective. The single party model may be said to have three main varieties. It is monopolistic when political power welded by one party and no other party is permitted to exist at all. A deeper study of such a party system shows that it has three sub varieties. It is totalitarian and has the rubric of 'dictatorship' where the degree of coercion is very high, policies adopted by it are highly destructive to the opponents, only official ideology is sacrosanct, no autonomy to other group is sanctioned and the elements of arbitrariness is unbounded and unpredictable. It is authoritarian when

the criteria of ideology is weak and non-totalistic, degree of coercion is medium, source autonomy is available to different groups, and the element of arbitrariness is within predictable units, Last, it is pragmatic it is nothing but a state of low affect, of low temperature of ideologism, or it can be challenged by rotating the perspective that is by announcing that we speak of pragmatism.

One can equally say that totalitarianism and authoritarianism appear as different points of an ideological scale whose lowest point is called pragmatism.

Another variety of the single party system is its hegemonic position. Here we find that while the existence of other parties is allowed, only one party counts more than all. Other parties are permitted licenced parties, for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis. The case of hegemonic party has two sub-varieties -ideological and pragmatic.

Finally, we may refer to the case of predominant party system as another variety of the single party system. Here we find a power configuration in which one party governs above without being subjected to alternation as long as

it continues to win absolute majority in the elections. In this model, one party out-distances all others, for it is significantly stronger than all of them even put together. The cases of India, Japan, Turkey and Uruguay fall in this category.

A degree of difference between the hegemonic and predominant party models can be traced in the fact that while the latter remains submissive to the conditions that make for a responsible Govt., no real sanction commits the former to responsibility whatever its policy is domination can't be challenged.

Despite the fact that 'Polarised pluralism' is the common feature of bi-party and multi-party systems, a line of distinction between the two may be drawn. A bi-party system is one where the existence of third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone and, therefore ^a coalitions are unnecessary. It involves these important conditions:

- (i) Two parties are in a position to compete for the absolute majority of seats,
- (ii) One of the two parties actually succeed in winning

- (iii) This party is willing to govern alone, and
- (iv) alternation or rotation in power remains a credible expectation.

Finally, we come to the point of extreme polarism that is the hall-mark of an 'atomised' party system. A multi-party system having a highly fragmented character leads to the existence of highly fluid party politics. Here we find that no party is in a position to cast noticeable effect on the other. An atomized party is fragmented leader by leader, with very small groups revolving around each leader.

It is pointed out that the 'democratic model' allows a elements of 'opposition' leading to the existence of a big or multi-party system while the 'totalitarian model' signifies the existence and leading role of a single political party.

As verney remarks: "political parties as the term is commonly understood, can, therefore, flourish only in liberal societies where there is general agreement on

fundamentals, the acceptance of the integrity and good faith of one's opponents".²

Apter observes : "In Western practice a political party is a creation of a longer system in which it Operates, that is, it is a servant of the constitutional framework. Totalitarian parties are different, and to understanding their role, it is necessary to examine totalitarian party coterminous with the state itself".³

As Durverger points out" multi-partism is often confused with absence of parties. A country in which opinion is divided amongst several groups that are unstable, fluid and short lived does not provide an example of multi partism. In the proper sense of the term, it is still in the pre-historic era of parties, it is to be situated in that phase of general development at which the distinction between bi-partyism and multi-partyism is not yet applicable because there are not yet true parties"⁴.

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2. Vernuy: An analysis of political system P. 125 Quoted in Badm powers, origion and growth of Village,
 3. Apter - David - Intro to Political Analysis Massachusetts, Winthrot Pub - 1977- P. 7
 4. Maurice -Duxerger - Political parties, Methur - 1956

LEADERSHIP AND ITS AUTOMATIC TENDENCY
MICHEL'S IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY

"It is organisation which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators, who say organisation, say oligarchy". These words first published in 1911, some up michels famous 'iron law of oligarchy'.



The issue of leadership has a relevance of its own in a study of the organisation and structure of a political party. Every party works under the leadership of a person who can ~~entuse~~ ^{entuse} influence, inspire and control other persons, in such a manner that he can guide or direct the thoughts, feelings and actions of the persons he leads".⁵

For michels argues that the malfunctioning of existing democracy, in particular the domination by the leadership over the society and position organisation, was not primarily a phenomenon which resulted from a low level of social and economic development, inadequate education or capitalist control of the opinion forming media and other power' resources, but rather was character of any complex

5. Sumna, Chitnis - "The Nature of leadership: A sociological point of view" in J.W. Airan (ed) The Nature of leadership: A practical app. (Bombay: Lalwani, 1963). P.3

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social system, oligarchy the control of a society or an organisation by these at the top, in an intrinsic part of bureaucracy or large scale organisation,

MICHEL' THEORY OF ORGANISATION

The leaders possess many resources which give them an almost unsurmountable advantage over members who try to change policies. Among their account can be counted.

- (a) Superior Knowledge, e.g. they are privy to much information which can be used to secure assent for their programme.
- (b) Control over the formal means of communication.
- (c) Skill in the art of politiking eg. they are far more adept in such professions in making speeches, writing articles, and organising group activities.

These occupational skill which inhere in the leader's role are power about which are further strengthened by what Michel's called the "incompetence of the masses".

That is to say, the leaders of the masses are themselves part of the 'power elite'.

Criticism:- OVER-DETERMINISTIC ASPECTS OF THEORY.

Michels has been criticised for being over deterministic ofr seeing only the restrictive side of bureacracy and failing to see it also as a means through which group may achieve desired objectives.

Meurice Duverger, sigmend Newmann and Robert Macquire among others, have shown that Michels has been over deterministic in his anaylisis of party behaviours.

Gaetano Mosca deemed that no highly developed social order is possible without a "political class".

Vilfredo pareto has even recommended socialism as a means favourable for the creation of a new working class elite.

The most sinister dimension of leadership may, however, be seen in its 'personalised' variety. Not only

in a totalitarian system but also in a system committed to a democratic model, the fail^{ure} of personalised leadership may be said to have its indelible impression in most of the cases. It is all the most striking in the politics of the third world countries where a single person identifies himself with the party, in other words the party is condensed in him.

Three factors may be said to play an important part in this connection. First, a leader risen from the people develops a sort of autocratic tendency, because he seeks to capitalise on the myth of 'hero-worship', that supplies sustaining force in a backward country. Second, The element of efficiency also enthuses a leader to tread the path of authoritarianism. The leaders renders certain useful services to the people and there by obliges them to obey this dictates. Last, the element of 'charisma' has its own role in the countries of the Third world where the people are swayed by the exception qualities of a leader by which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with super natural, super-human, at least superficial exceptional power".⁶

6. Weber M " Class, Status and party" in Gerth HH and Mills (Trans. and Eds.) From Maxweber, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1948 P-328

Lenin's theory of Party

The Marxist view of a political party and its role is quite different from one we have seen above. Here the liberal emphasis on party as a 'doctrine' has been replaced by the idea of a party as a 'class' that will fight for inaugurating a new era culminating in the phase of 'communism'.

Developing the idea of Marx in the name of making it up to date Lenin says that proletariat "has no weapon in the struggle for power except organisation. Constantly pushed down to the depths of complete poverty, the proletariat can and will inevitably become an unconquerable force only as a result of this : that its ideological which by means of the principles of Marxism is strengthened by the material union of an organisation, ~~holding~~ holding together millions of toilers in the among of the working class⁷.

According to Lenin, under Russian conditions in the early twentieth century, the Russian working class would not spontaneously develop into a revolutionary body. Many workers, not seeing their long-term interest would concentrate on short-term trade union 'economistic' constantly confined to marginal improvement, in ways and conditions.

7. Lenin's one step forward, Two step backward. ,

cited in G. H. Sabine. A History of political Theory 1 P-724 (1904)

These convinced of the need for revolutionary elections should be organised in a revolutionary party, with disciplined and dedicated leaders and member.

The need for firm leadership and the desirability of democratic participation were to be received in the doctrine of 'democratic centralism'. Resolute action against the proletariat's class enemies called for a party based on absolute 'centralism' and the strictest discipline to provide decisive political leadership the party had to be monolithic : that is, unified and centralised in its organisational structure, its members bound by strict discipline, its pronouncements being distriinctively respecting, in theory if not in practice, the unanimous voice of the party.

Lenin's form of party organisation, therefore was specifically devised to promote the intersts of the working class under autocratic conditions. As Lenin put it : "Only our incoyrrigible utopian would have a broad organisation of workers, with elections, respects universal suffrage etc. under the autocracy"⁸.

8. Lenin - in-David Lanes - politics & Society in the USSR, New York, Free Press - 1971 P - 113

Though central control of day-to-day policy and strict discipline were important, democratic party was also an ingredient in the party organisational form.

Lenin's justification for the hegemony of one party over the working class was based on Marx's sociological, theory of class, or rather his own interpretation of it. The working class, being unified socially and having a homogeneous political instrument in the abolition of the capitalists, needed a single united party devoted to the promotion of revolution.

A politically fragmented working class organised in separate trade unions and numerous socialist parties, (often based on nationalist sentiment could only weaken our might even thwart revolutionary potential. Therefore, one party composed of worker from all trades and nationalities was essential, though membership of course, had to be restricted to ardent Marxist revolutionaries.

Lenin distinguished between the social composition of a party and its political goals. The fact that a party is organised of, and led by workers does not ensure its Marxist nature.

Hence Lenin was opposing the more orthodox social, democratic parties of Western Europe, based on wide trade union objectives.

The main additions to Marxism made by Lenin's theory of party organisation may be summarised as follows. First, that ideas had to be brought to the proletariat by the intelligentsia. Second, that a political party should be formed to lead the proletariat to revolution. Third, that the party should be based on an organisational pattern of "democratic centralism".

Some Marxist critics of such views have argued that if the workers by themselves would not develop a resulting consciousness, then Marx's analysis of class is undermined and that Lenin's theory of the party, therefore, contradicts, Marx's theory of class.

But it is not so, Leninism is compatible with Marxism in that it stresses the revolutionary role of the proletariat and the revolutionary nature of social and political change. On the other hand, Marx had much more faith in the spontaneous growth of the proletariat's class consciousness.

When Lenin spoke of the 'unity' of the working class, he referred to what the working class would be if it were imbued with Marxist philosophy and aware of its objective class position. He assumed that there was such a thing as "objective class consciousness" which only the party could properly articulate. Lenin fully realised that, in fact the subjective feelings of the workers did not coincide with their objective class position and, as we have seen, led to non-Marxist

political leanings which his form of organisation sought to remember.

Criticism

Lenin however, left himself open to the criticism of self-interest. The centralisation of decision making in the party and the absence of adequate control over the leadership, left effective power with the central committee of the party and particularly with the leaders.

Lenin it was argued by his adversaries, was concerned with maximising his, own personal power, therefore, he was ruthlessly revolutionary and 'centralised' to suit his own interests.

Rosa Luxemborge

She raised this point just after what is to be done, was published. She wrote : "The ultra-centralism asked by Lenin is full of the sterile spirit of the overseer. It is not a positive and creative spirit. Lenin's concern is not so much to make the activity of the party more fruitful as to control the party- to narrow the movement rather than to develop it, to bind rather than to unify it"⁹.

Parties in third world

The study of party system reveals more astonishing features when attention is paid to the cases of under-

developed or developing countries of the African and Asian regions. While European political parties emerged as 'internally' created phenomenon in response to the growth of democratic trends like the extension of franchises and parliamentary system, the political parties in a subject country came into being and developed as 'externally' created institutions. That is, parties came into existence not for the sake of running the government but for the purpose of fighting for national liberation. They had an anti-foreign character.

The emergence of party system in a colonial country witnessed the coming up of such anti-nationalist organisation as well to counteract the growing force of a nationalist party. This happened either due to the policy of 'divide and rule' pursued by the colonial power or due to resentment of certain ambitious leaders against the entrenched leadership of the elite of the nationalist organisation. As Joseph La Palombara and Weiner observe. "The expansion of the league into a mass movement was clearly associated with an integrationist crisis that ultimately resulted in the partition of the Sub-countries. Elsewhere in Asia 7 religious, linguistic and tribal minorities have often organised political parties in opposition to the nationalist movement and advocated special protection within the framework of an accepted colonial rule, or else favoured the creation of several nation-states where there had previously been none"¹⁰

10. Joseph La Palombara and Weiner - Political parties and political development, New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1966 PP - 34-36

1. In the pre-independence period there existed in many parts of the subcontinent powerful local elites who can be said to have had a virtual monopoly over both political activity and local maharajas, zamindars, watandars, jagirdars and other little purohits.
2. A second type of political elite includes the urban professional classes - the journalists, lawyers, academics, and administrators. These were among the earliest supporters of the nationalist movement and indeed could be described as the initial organizers of the movement. As the nationalist movement under Gandhi's leadership grew in mass characters and reached into the countryside, the influence of the urban elite upon the movement and subsequently upon govt, has declined.
3. By the mid-1930s the small landholding small gentry in the countryside and the merchants in the town, became increasingly active in the nationalist movement. Thus, neither the numerically large, poor lower castes, nor the small, wealthy, upper castes are now as important as the large and moderately prosperous middle castes.
4. The best type of political activities can appropriately be described as traditionally non-actors at any levels of politics. Here we have in mind the lowest caste, the landless labourers, the tenant farmers, the unskilled factory labourers, the sweepers and other in the city performing menial jobs.

One more characteristic feature of the party system in a subject country of Asia and Africa is that a nationalist party came into being as a small body of men determined to oppose their colonial masters or serve them in a way of their own choosing as far as possible.

In case of India, though the congress easily dominated the national parliament, there is a far more comparative stray, situation in some of the state. Within the Congress Party also there has been much internal conflict.

The task of nation-building and social reconstruction could not be fully achieved partly due to one party dominance and partly due to internal factionalism. As we know lower the level of political participation, higher the levels of power concentration.

Next, Congress, has been always in power in Centre except for some time.

In rural India there exist in India a ruling elite or ruling class usually the terms "dominant caste" is used "meaning that those who have the greatest access to wealth, status and power come from a single social group"¹².

Four major social groups whose pattern of political activity has changed in recent years¹³.

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12. ~~M.M.~~ SRINIVAS, CASTE IN MODERN INDIA Orient Longman N. Delhi - 19
PP-63-69
13. Weiner (Myron) - Politics of Scarcity, Chicago, University
of Chicago Press - 1962 PP - 120 - 25

When the so-called lower-classes enter politics, they often do so not by moving into the local political arena but by leap forgoing directly into state politics.

In the field of modernization Indian state's performance is abysmally poor.

"A modern society is not just a complex of modern institutions. It is a mode of interpretation of the whole society. It is a mode of relationship between the centre and the periphery of the society. Modern society entails the inclusion of the mass of the population into the society in the sense that both elite and mass regards themselves as members of the ministry"¹⁴.

The reduction of primordial sentiments to civil order is rendered more difficult, however, by the fact that political modernization tends initially not to quate such sentiments but to quicken them.

This it is the very process of the formation of a sovereign civil state that, among other things, stimulates sentiments of parochalism, communalism, racialism, and so on.

The integrative revolution does not do away with ethnocentricism, it merely modernizes it.

14. Clifford Geertz (Old Societies and new states) Newyork Free Press - 1971 p. 125

Character of State Power

As the state arises, "underlines Engels," from the need to hold class antagonism in check, but it arise, at the same time, in the midst of conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and this acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed classes"- Engels¹⁵. To conclude, the state in India is essentially the organ of power of the Indian monopoly bourgeoisie and the rural bourgeoisies led by the big bourgeoisie.

The characters of the state describes the character of poverty because the poverty which is essentially in the power naturally represents the ruling classes.

Whether it is Janata Party or Congress, class characters is more or less the same.

The capitalist development of India required a restructuring of the agrarian social relations so that a national capitalist market develops in a unity between agriculture and industry. Agrarian transportation was undertaken by the Indian state with a view to change land ownership pattern and to develop new productive forces for raising agricultural output.

It must be stated here that the legal power of the state was used to change ownership pattern, but the social aspects of

15. Engels, origine of the Family, Private property and state.
(Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol III, Moscow, 1973-
PP - 324-5

agrarian system which was linked with local ownership like caste, ethnicity and religiousity of the rural society remained out of the reach of state inter-vention in agrarian class.

In the process of establishing hegemony, the capitalist classes may be challenged by other members of the exploiting classes for control over the state power. The Akali Dal which represents the landlords and rich peasantry of Punjab created condition where elected majority of the Congress party could not administer the Punjab state.

The army intervention in Punjab and many other states reveals serious weakness of the Indian state which is apparently very sound but in actual practice, it has suffered serious assaults on its stability and in the process its state apparatus has emerged fractioned and divided on caste, communal and regional basis.

During the last years the movements in Assam Punjab and Gujarat, have clearly revealed regionalisation, communalizations and easteism of the Indian state apparatuses and all these movements led to social violence, bloodshed and deaths and the state used its reserved power i.e. the Army.

The conflicts in rural areas have reached a stage where landlords have established their own private armies for social oppression. As segment of the ruling class, i.e. the landlords have lost faith in the capacity of their own state to punish the power and for this private armies have emerged on rural India.

SECOND CHAPTEREMERGENCE OF JANATA PARTY : AN ALTERNATIVE

India rejected one-party authoritarian system and opted for two-party system and with a clear verdict of the masses of Indian in form of Democracy.

This emergence can be traced back to the JP movement and dissolution of assemblies in Gujarat in 1974 and in Bihar in 1975.

March 18 proved a red letter day in the history of Bihar on the one hand, violence was let loose students on a large scale including lathicharge, tear-gas attack and police firing on the other hand ordinary security arrangements in the other part of the city were completely neglected by the Govt.

The next day there was widespread protest against the firing on unarmed students throughout Bihar.

Earlier Shri Jayaprakash Narayan was not in favour of the demand for the dissolution of the assembly and resignation by the opposition and the Congress MLAs.

The Socialist party was inevitably involved in this mass movement. Socialist party suggested that the challenges emanates from the centre, and not only from the Bihar Congress, and Bihar Govt, the Centre's policies have to be attacked on a nationwide basis.

Bihar adopted the strategy of people's candidate, strategy of people's candidate, people's programme and a common symbol.

J.P. MOVEMENT

Janataparty's emergence during the Gujarat and Bihar movement had attracted the attention of the opposition political parties for gaining support during the dissatisfied masses, and in this process extended area of influence under the instruction provided by the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan.

The Congress (O), the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and the Socialists extended their full support to the JP movement. Since the JP movement was basically a revolt of the urban, middle classes, the Jan Sangh Cadre which

is concentrated in urban centres of India was very actively involved in this movement.

"Most of those who flocked to his banner, seeking the advantage of having a father - figure to provide certain interests, were believers neither in Gandhism nor in socialism nor in revolution total or partial."¹

In his perceptive study of these movements, Ghanshyam Shah has reported that both in Gujarat and Bihar some of the opposition parties had actively supported the movement.

Bihar Chhatra Sangharsh Samiti (BCSS) and local Chhatra Sangharsh Samities (LSS) were compelled by the Youth wings of the various parties in the movement. He writes :

"Political parties are their front organisation were in the forefront of the Bihar movement. The Jan Sangh Congress (O), Socialist party, Samyukta Socialist party and their front organisations, the ABVP, SYS, ISS and the Sarvodaya Mandal were the constituent partner of

1. C.N. Chitta Rajam - Main Stream , Oct 20, 1979
"Revolutionary or Escapist".

the movement. Some other organisations such as the RSS and Anand Marg supported or worked for the movement without wearing their particular labels. They received formal or informal instruction from their organisation as to the attitude they should adopt. They were identified by the other activists as the members of possible organisation."²

Shah further writes : "of the three, the Jan Sangh was the most organised party working in the movement. Its members, planned their strategies and followed their strategy. The party coordinated its work with its two sister organisations, the ABVB and RSS".³

The Jan Sangh leaders publicly emphasised their active support to the JP movement.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Jan Sangh leader, was keen to resign his Lok Sabha seat to work wholeheartedly for the movement.

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2. Ghansyham Shah : Protest movements in two Indian States : A Study of the Gujarat and Bihar Movements, New Delhi, Ajanta-Publication (India), 1977, pp-72.
 3. Ibid. - p. 131

"Janata party has a framework of policies around Gandhism^a decentralisation of power and values of Democracy Kothari, Joshi, Desai and Das Gupta have argued that the Janata party was element of cohesion, and it has provided some new policy directions in Indian politics. The actual performance of The Janata party has not revealed any new direction in any critical sectors of national life"⁴

PRE-EMERGENCY RESPONSE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
TO MERGER OF PARTIES

The genesis of the birth of the Janata party may be discussed in a chronological manner.

An attempt at 'unifying' The opposition parties to fight elections against the congress party had been made many a time after the independence of the country. The electoral debacle of the congress party in many states of India in 1967 in the "Grand split" of 1967 in the congress accelerated the process of United Front of the opposite parties the movement' led by Jaya Prakash Narayan provided a shared explanation to different political parties which

4. C.P. Bhambri - The Janata Party - A Profile -Preface

were opposed to one another, and the movement also brought into sharp focus different perspective of parties towards merger during 1974 and 1975. The Jan Saugh, The BLD, Lok Dal The Socialists and the congress (o), which merged into The Janata Party in 1977 had revealed sharp difference of opinion on the merger issue during 1974 and 1977.

MERGER ISSUE

The Jan Saugh participated actively in Bihar movement for the dissolution of the State assemblies, and it also appealed to other opposition parties, which were participating in the JP movement, to sink their differences and form a "Joint electoral front" to force the electoral challenge posed by the congress party.

The political strategy of the Jan Saugh was that the opposition parties should be a "Joint Bloc" in parliament, and fight elections on the same of an agreed minimum programme and common Janata candidates"⁵

5. TIMES OF INDIA - Delhi Feb. 13, 1975

A few days before the proclamation of Emergency, the central working committee of the Jan Saugh in a meeting at Mt. Abu held on June 16, 1975 endorsed the concept of a federal party comprising all parties involved in the JP movement.

While the Jan Saugh was opposed to any merger of political parties The Bharatiya Lok Dal was in favour of a 'merger' of non-communist and anti-congress opposition parties"⁶

The idea of a loose federation of parties did not appeal to the Bharatiya Lok Dal leadership who pursued vigorously for the merger of parties. The Bharatiya Lok itself had come into existence on Aug, 1974 by a merger of The Bharatiya Kranti Dal, a faction of the Sanyukta Socialist party, The Utkal Congress.

In its 'policies and programme', The Bharatiya Lok Dal criticised The Five Year Plans for accelerating rural and urban disparities in income. The party was

6. TOL - Delhi - Jan 25, 1975

growing role of The state in regulating The Indian economy and it advocated decentralization of State power in India.

In its economic priorities the BLD states that it would give 'first priority to the development of agriculture in India the BLD's emphasis was on the reorientation of economic policies in favour of the farmer and rural development."⁷

The BLD was mobilizing middle caste, present proprietors in Bihar under the leadership of Karpoori Thakur, the BLD leadership made further attempts" at the consolidation and merger of political parties which were opposed to the congress party.

The BLD extended its support to the JP movement in Bihar and elsewhere. It however, didn't subscribe to the view of those political groups which believed that a strong national alternative would emerge only out of such a movement.

7.

BLD : Policy and Programme, New Delhi - BLD Publication.

Charan Singh - India's Economic Policy - The Gandhian Blueprint - Delhi - Vikas - 1978

To sum up, in spite of The JP movement, the political parties had different perspective on merger or United Front politics and such differences were sharply expressed by The BLD and The Jan Saugh. Both The BLD and The Jan Saugh participated in the JP movement, and they appreciated The Janata Morcha' strategy of election to the Gujarat assembly in June 1975, both differed on the degree of their involvement in the JP movement and also on the issue of merger of parties.

The difference as the issue of merger of parties were not confined to The BLD and The Jan Saugh, the congress (O), a breakway group of the congress party was also reluctant to merger with other parties the congress (O), had fully supported the JP movement in Gujarat and Bihar, but it expressed serious misgivings on the merger of parties.

Aseka Mehta, a former president of the congress (O), was for a federal party, to fight against the anti-democratic' politics of the congress party the congress(O), came into existence after the grant split' of the congress party in 1967 the leadership of The congress arrangement among parties to fight Mrs Indira Gandhi, who was responsible for the split.

Socialist party has serious reservation on the question of merger of parties & like, these of the Jan Saugh. Like The Jan Saugh, the socialists party under the chairmanship of congress Fernandes, was very active in the JP movement in Bihar but the socialists, wanted the formation of ' a viable alternative of left progressive forces to the congress".⁸

The socialists firmly believed that a 'Credible left democrativ alternative would be a serious challenge to the continuing domination of the congress party the leaders of the socialists party held discussions for the formation of an "alliance with other leftist parties like the CPI (M), Forward Block, Revolutionary socialist party, socialist Unity Centre, and the peasants and workers party".⁹

The socialists had persenal loyalty for JP because of his socialist antecedents, and they believe that the

8. HINDUSTAN TIMES - Delhi - Nov ,8 1974

9. HINDUSTAN TIMES - Delhi - Dec , 31 1974

JP movement had a great potential for future alignment of political forces in the country : Madhu Limaye expressed the opinion that "The viable radical alternative envisaged by the party would emerge only out of the struggle going on in Bihar".¹⁰

George Fernandes also eulogised the JP movement, and said "Bihar had created a situation which was bound to hasten the process of creating the viable alternative".¹¹

The political parties had serious differences on the merger or alliance:

- (i) The BLD wanted merger of 'non-communist parties'
- (ii) The socialists believed in an alliance of the leftist parties, and
- (iii) The congress(O) president Asoka Mehta was against the Jan Saugh and the ~~CPI~~ (M) in any future arrangement of political alliance.

10. TIMES OF INDIA - Delhi - Jan, 1 1975

11. INDIAN EXPRESS - Delhi - Jan, 3 1975

EMERGENCY AND PARTY - POLITICS IN INDIA

The proclamation of Emergency by Mrs. Indira Gandhi on the midnight of June 25, 1975 and the detention of all "non-communist opposition party" leaders opened a new chapter on party politics in the country. It was the culmination of authoritarianism of Mrs. Gandhi. Mrs Gandhi crushed political dissent by imposing censorship on the press. During the Emergency, the non-communist opposition parties were paralysed because their leaders had been arrested and detained in prison without trial.

Mrs Gandhi's alibi to impose the Emergency on the country was that the opposition political parties were disrupting peace and they were oping inviting lawlessness in the country. In reality democratic rights of political parties were crushed because they were prosing inconvenicnt to Mrs Gandhi by organising popular movement of protest and disseent.

'On January 18, 1977 Mrs Gandhi announeed the elections to the Lok Sabha that it would be held in March. This announcement regarding the merger of parties, and no January 20, 1977 the four 'non-communist parties' - i.e. the

congress (O), the Jan Saugh, the Bharatiya Lok Dal and the socialists agreed to work as party' forth coming elections'.

Jaya Prakash Narayan blessed the formation of the Janata party He said:

"The main aim of the Janata party would be to decentralize power, so that people even in the remotest villages could participate in the making of decision and plans that came them. And, of course the party will revive, the strength of independent institutions like the judiciary and the press that act as a check against authoritarian rule rule" ¹²

To conclude, the repression of Emergency, the detention of leaders, and the effects of Jaya Prakash Narayan contributed to the idea of merger of parties, but they didn't proved adequate to the idea of merger of parties.

12. STATSMAN - Delhi - Jan 24, 19

The sudden announcement of the Lok Sabha elections actually, acted as catalyts for the emergence of the Janata party. The election of 1977 accelerated the process of formation of the party, and electoral results decided that the Janata party had emerged on political scene of India.

The election of 1977 were full of great significance for the Indian democracy because a new experiment in the form of Janata party on trial. The success or failure of representative democracy and one party system which to use Sartori's definition, had been "frozen and fragmented".

Morarji Desai, who had been nominated president of the newly formed Janata party stated in his election campaigns that the fight was against 'dictatorship'. He promised " If the Janata party was voted to power it would bring suitable legislation to prevent anyone at the apex of the government from assuming "dictatorial powers" or acting arbitrarily against the wishes of the people.

The Janata party's main election plank was to project its, determination to remain unified inspite of its heterogeneity. In a hurriedly drafted Election Manifesto, the Janata party preferred its commitment to Gandhism,

decentralised democracy and rural development. The political charter of the party manifesto was directed against curtailment of freedom of individuals during the Emergency and the Janata pledged to restore independence of judicial supremacy of law and freedom of the press.

The Janata Party formed alliance and coalitions for contesting The Lok Sabha elections. The Janata nominated its candidates for 394 seats. The party agreed to leave 52 Lok Sabha seats for candidates of the congress for Democracy, and 134 seats for candidates of its electoral allies like the DMK, CPI(M) and Akali Dal. The strategy of elections was based on a united opposition to the congress so that democratic forces were not divided in their opposition to authoritarianism, of the congress party.

The Jaya Prakash Narayan who was projecting himself as the real inspiration behind the idea of forming the Janata party, appealed to the nation that the "Janata was not a hotchpotch" and the voters should return it to power to end the tyranny of nineteen months of the Emergency."¹³

13. INDIAN EXPRESS - Delhi - March 15 1977

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE : A STEP FORWARD
FOR THE JANATA PARTY

The Janata party brought to an end the thirty years of uninterrupted rule of the congress by winning a clear majority in the Lok Sabha elections of 1977. The Janata party with its ally, CFD, got 298 seats, and the congress party was reduced to minority status by winning only 153 seats. All other smaller party's trailed badly behind the Janata.

The winning of an absolute majority of the Lok Sabha seats by the Janata party acted as a catalyst for its unity and survival. The electoral victory acted as a cementing force for the survival of the Janata party.

FORMAL BIRTH OF THE JANATA PARTY

The electoral victory preceded the formal birth of the Janata party. The leadership of the Janata party and its various groups were compelled to consolidate their unity if they wanted to shoulder the responsibility of governance of the country. The immediate task before the victorious party was to elect a leader who should become the PM. Differences among the constituent groups

of the party emerged in public, but they were clearly resolved by Jaya Prakash Narayan and Acharya Kripalani who declared that the majority in the Janata would vote Morarji Desai as their leader.

After assuming responsibilities for the governance of the country the Janata party leaders laid down a programme for the merger of the party, and its formal inaugurations on May 1, 1977. The congress (O), The Jan Saugh, the BLD and the socialists organised meetings of their separate parties, and their merger in the Janata party. The CFD showed some initial reservation for joining the Janata but, finally, it agreed and thus the Janata was formed.

CHAPTER - IIISTRUCTURAL CHANGE : CASTE & RESERVATION

The point has been made a number of times that the Indian poor tend to secure fewer benefits from Development Programmes than do the better-off segments of the population because the poor are relatively unorganized and unaware of their potential for national political influence.

At the state and local level, however, organization of the poor has often been along caste and community lines rather than one a purely voluntary or economic basis.

To a certain extent, "caste and class have always been intertwined".¹

The backward classes movement began in the later half of the 19th century where it was found that only members of these high castes that had a tradition of education were acquiring English education and moving into politics, in the administrative service. Not surprisingly, the movement began in the South, where a

1. Andre Beteille, Caste, class and power (Bombay : Oxford University Press, 1966).

single caste, the Brahmans, enjoyed an overwhelming preponderance in higher education, the professions, and government enterprises and where the gulf between the Brahmans and non-Brahmans was ensured.²

Indeed, while the Nationalist elite and local village Brahmans have been in favour of applying some discrimination on a non-caste basis, i.e. to individual with low incomes or little or no property, with no reference at all to caste - local non-Brahmans in the village have favoured the granting of concessions to lower caste members regardless of income or property. Members of the highest castes and secular nationalists in Delhi argue that the use of caste as the sole or major criterion for granting reservation direct benefit has simply produced a non-Brahmin elite without distributing benefits throughout the non-Brahmin communities. Non-Brahmin leaders argue that the use of economic criterion alone would result in a situation where poor Brahmans would gain all or most of the benefits from reverse discrimination legislation.³

2. M.N. Srinivas : Social Change in Modern India (Bombay, Allied Publishers - 1966), pp. 166 Pf.

3. Hetukar Jha, "Caste Conflict in Bihar : Competitive Elites, Times of India, May 5, 1978.

The decision to grant concessions to backward classes on the basis of caste was recommended by the Backward Classes Commission that met from 1953 to 1955 under the chairmanship of Kaka Kalelkar.⁴

The Janata Party election manifesto did not mention the backward classes, but it did promise " a new deal for SCs and STs, with special machinery to guarantee their rights and interests."⁵

With 50% of all got jobs now reserved for the backward classes and backward castes and tribes. Bihar is the first state in India to reach the maximum limit set by the Supreme Court, which has ruled that no state can reserve more than half of its jobs or seats in schools to particular section of society.

Attempts by the Janata party to favour the backward classes is viewed by Indian political observers merely as a means to consolidate and extend the party political base, which is firmly rooted among these "backward" castes that have prospered in.

The Janata period in Bihar has been plagued with instability and violence in the state's political life,

4. Report of the Backward Classes Commission, Chairman Kaka Kalelkar, New Delhi, Govt. of India-1955, pp. 11.

5. The Hindu (Madras, April 21, 1978).

its universities and its bureaucracy. In the minds of many observers, the disruption and its immediate cause, the Karpoori Thakur Ministry's reservation policy, are indicative of a sea change in the structure of Bihar's political economy.

Thakur in his chief-ministership showed himself determined to pursue his reservation policy. Thakur's successor and chief minister, Ram Sunder Das, has also promised to implement the policy.⁶

Promised in 1977 and finally promulgated in the autumn of 1978, the reservation policy amused that in addition to the quotas in govt employment already reserved for Harijan and Adivasis (24% if taken together), henceforth 20% of new government posts would be reserved for the 'backward classes'.

More precisely these backward known as being 'Annexure I' would be allotted 12% of the posts, these known as being Annexure II would be allocated 8%, 3% would go to women and 3% to "economically backward".

The history of the annexures is tangled one, and the question of how many people they include is even more confusing. The story goes at least as far back as to

6. See Hindustan Times - 1979 : Bihar C.M. Consolidating Position, Aug. 5.

1951, where the Bihar government, composed two lists of backward classes comprising Hindus and Muslims castes groups that were not Harijans or Adivasis, but were nonetheless determined to be economically and socially backward, and in need of special assistance.

Annexure I ('The more backward') included some 78 Hindu and Muslims castes, some well known (e.g. Dhaukus, Harijans, Kahar and Malkhi) others considerably less.

The Annexure II (less backward) included 30 castes altogether, many of them were communities that in terms of social and economic backwards were difficult to distinguish from these in Annexure I, such as Bhuminyas, Kahars and Kumhars (as well as some momius and Payeels) but the rest consisted primarily of the more advanced communities in the Vaishya and Shudra varnas that in Banias, Koiris, Kurmis and Yadavas".⁷

The backward classes commission (BCC) set up at the central level and chairman Kaka Kalelkar. made use of these data in composing its own lists of backward classes for the various states in its support published in 1955. For Bihar some 127 castes (again both Hindu

7. Marc Galanter - Who are the other backward class?
An introduction to a constitutional puzzle -
Economic and Political Weekly, Oct. 23, 1978.

and Muslims) are left with a total population of 15.3% Muslims or 38.1% of the state's total population in 1951."⁸

The 1955 enumeration was not a complete one, however, for such important castes as Koiri, Mallah and Tatwa were included in the history as backward, but has not been counted in 1955 Commission.

To compound the confusion the Chairman of the BCC refuted the whole idea of backwards castes."⁹

The Patna High Court declared the 1951 list to be unconstitutional as it was composed on the basis of caste rather than education and social backwardness.¹⁰

Eventually, the Government of Bihar responded to this legal rejection by appointing the December 1971 a new Commission on the matter, headed by Munjere Lal. The Commission was not empowered to take any census of castes.

Here we see that a part of the Muslim community has been included in all the listings of SC's, but we will exclude them for three reasons. First, the census, while it does count Muslims, does not distinguish between

9. Ibid, Vol I, IXXXIII, also 1978, p. 18).

10. AIR (1969)

muslim castes, so it is impossible to say which Muslims are backwards and which are not. Second, Muslims are generally think of in Bihar simply as Muslims, rather than belonging to caste groups within their religion. Third, it is relatively to easy to keep track of Muslims as a single group in the analysis.

Substracting Muslims, then, we are left with 0.6% Baniyas and 18.7% 'upper Shudras' (that is, the term backward Shudras communities) or a total of 19.3% that we may call 'upper backward'.

Altogether, there is a total backward community of 51.3% of the state's population, of which about one-third 19.3% are upper backward and about two-thirds are lower backwards.

How accurate is such a listing based as it is primarily on data from 1931? Hence we find that despite some urbanisation over the years, perhaps some upward caste mobility¹¹ and promoting a tendency for weller (and higher castes) facilities to be larger than poorer and lower caste families.¹² These caste groups have retained essentially the same proportion of total population over quite a long time.

10. "Caste and the British Census in Bihar: Using old date to study contemporary political behaviour in N. Gerald Barrier (ed) "The Census of British India, Manohar, Delhi 1979.

11. On the relationship, see Blair (1979, "Voting, Caste, Community, Society, Young Asia, Delhi). P- 5

Reservation as Symbol

Somewhere in the vicinity of half the population of Bihar, then, has been designated as officially backward, and are eligible for 20% of the new position open in the state bureaucracy, with an additional 3% reserved for women of any caste and 3% reserved for economically salaried groups.

But how much of a victory was it? An estimate of all the governmental posts created in Bihar per year came out to a mere 9000.¹³

The widespread violence that has bedevilled and disrupted the state over the job reservation issue clearly could not have arisen solely from less than 2,000 jobs that were at stake.

The whole struggle is not really over the 2,000 jobs, however, rather, the reservation policy is a symbolic issue that has gripped the imagination of virtually everyone in Bihar who has even the slightest disgress of political awareness. Though the reservation issue, Karpoori Thakur asserted that the backward has displaced the forewards as the dominant race in Bihar politics, that the old days

13. Mishra, D.P. (1978) - "Anatomy of Anti-Reservation Agitation in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh : A Survey of Current Agitation, *(1978)*, Institute of Development ~~Skills~~, University of Mysore.

Studies

of dominance in public affairs from village to vidhan sabha by the 'twice-born' were gone forever and that new government would be one based on the support of the backwards.

At the student level, the forwards showed their distress and anger in bus burning, many derailings and vandalism upon government buildings.

Many of these castes especially the Yadavas, Kurmis, Kahar and Jats have gained economically during the past three decades at the expense of the traditional upper castes, for a variety of reasons like the European bourgeoisie in relations to feudal classes the cultivating "backward" castes have also been successful because of their dynamic, thrift, hardwork and their abilities to ensure investments in development through their political activities. As A.J. Abraham points out "with success has come confidence, aggressiveness and political ambition, having one shared up the upper castes, they now want to take their place".¹⁴

It should be pointed out that there are considerable differences between untouchable castes, with some of them being generally better off than others. In Bihar and UP, the Chamars, Dusadh and Dhobi and all untouchables - have

14. A.S. Abraham, "Roots of Current Violence : Pressure of Caste Conflict." TOI, May 15, 1978.

garnered the lion's share of opportunities reserved for the scheduled castes in education, government employment and representation in legislature.¹⁵

At the other extreme, the Pasi and Musahar castes also untouchable, have claimed very few benefits.

In the view of most untouchable elite leaders, what they must do is to "establish an image of being benefactors to their own communities, but at the same time, they have to "so to it that they are acceptable to the rest of the Hindu electorate as being not too radical".¹⁶

In an atmosphere where land is so crucial to alterations in economic and political power, most observers see the debate on reservation of seats in schools and jobs in government as a diversion from structural change. The most that one could expect from a well-implemented reservation policy would be gradual accrual of benefits to the elite leadership of the backward classes and SC, STs, but this has in the past only produced greater and greater degrees of conflict between the better off BCs and worse of SCs.

Caste in the State Assembly

In a state where caste and politics have been mixed in such a stray and offer explosive combination for so

15. Sachchidanand, The Harijan Elite (XI Delhi Thomson Press, 1977). DP - 164 - 167

16. Ibid, pp. 172-173.

long, the Vidhan Sabha is a natural place to look for evidence of a change from forward to Backward, primarily Table 3 gives a caste breakdown of the general seats in the Bihar Legislative Assembly over the 1962-77 period. Here we find the familiar stronghold of upper caste domination in the early years, where well over half of the MLAs from non-reserved seats belong to the twice-born caste. The pattern maintained itself through the 1967 and 1969 elections, and even down to the period of the Emergency, where fully 54.8% of the MLAs from general seats were towards as against under 16.5% of the non-scheduled population.

The 1977 election meant a noticeable decline in the forwards representation to 48.6%, though a look at the figures for the individual caste groups shows that all that decline was born by the Brahmans who dropped from 18.3% of the general sit in 1975 to only 7.6% in 1977, or in numerical times from 36 MLAs to 19.

The other three castes among the forwards even gained a bit, in fact their collective share went up from 36.5% to 40.9%. Why should it have been only the Brahmans that were played by the votes? Perhaps they sufficed from their caste connection with Indira Gandhi and the Emergency period. Chief Minister of Bihar, Jagannath Mishra, perhaps the votes in some sense held Brahmans guilty for the "excesses" committed under the Emergency leadership of Brahmin PM and CM.

TABLE - 1CASTE COMPOSITION OF GENERAL SEATS IN BIHAR VIDHAN SABHA

	1962	1967	1969	1975	1977	General population
Brahman	17.2	13.2	12.3	18.3	7.6	6.0
Bhumihar	12.6	14.8	14.8	14.7	14.8	3.6
Rajput	23.8	22.2	23.5	19.8	21.7	5.3
Kayastha	5.4	4.9	3.3	2.0	4.4	1.6
Forwards	59.0	55.1	53.9	54.8	48.6	16.5
Bania	3.3	5.3	3.2	4.6	3.2	0.0
Yadav	11.7	15.2	18.5	11.7	20.5	13.8
Kurmi	7.1	5.3	3.3	5.6	4.8	4.5
Koiri	0.7	5.8	4.1	5.6	6.4	5.2
Upper	(28.8)	(31.6)	(32.1)	(27.5)	(34.9)	(24.3)
Lower	(1.7)	(2.9)	(2.5)	(2.01)	(3.6)	(40.3)
<u>Total Backwards</u>	30.5	34.5	34.6	29.5	38.5	64.6
Muslims	8.8	7.4	7.8	13.2	10.0	15.8
Bengalis	1.7	2.9	3.7	2.5	2.8	3.1
<u>Grand total</u>	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0

Interviews with MLAs in various years, quoted in Blair, H.Harey,W.

"Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social Changes in late 70s." EPW, Vol-15, No.2, 1980.

As the forwards declined in strength, the backwards grew, but just as the forwards, less was really the drop of just one caste groups so the advance of Backwards was actually the progress of only one community the Yadavas, who by 1977 had become the single largest group in the Assembly next only to the Rajputs. For the other upper Backwards representation has been essentially stationary over the period.

Among the Backwards the Upper Backwards have been consistently overreputed.

Caste in Ruling Parties

A better share of the ^{representative} strength of the different caste at the state level can be had from total membership in the ruling party, for after all, it is the governing party that makes policy in parliamentary system, not the legislative bodies as a whole. Table 2 presents a breakdown of the major ruling parties and coalitions since 1962. Here we again see evidence of a steadily fall in the population of the Forwards, from 47.8% of Bindan and Jha's Congress Party in 1962 to 39.21% of the 1977 Janata legislature party.

Again also, it is the Brahmans who have lost most heavily, perhaps been of their intimate connection with the Congress, the Brahmans were not a majority element in the Janata party in 1977. But as the Brahmans were

down, other castes among the Forwards came up, with the Rajputs, Bhumihaar and Kayasthas all improving their representation under the Janata significantly.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Backwards, through the caprice of the Janata strategy in Bihar were no better represented in the Janata Legislature Party than in any of the precessing. Indeed the total backward group were said in 1977 as it has been in 1962 with the four upper backward communities membership of the Assembly throughout the entire period.

Rather than the Backwards replacing the Brahmins, it was the Scheduled Tribes that increased their participation as members of the ruling parties and coalition.

Caste at Ministry Level

Only with the Janata Ministry did the Backwards formed something approaching a majority. Of course, by 'backward' we in fact mean Upper Backwards, for they had 38% of the posts, while the lower Backwards have only 4% or one Minister (though, he was a very potent one, the C.M. himself). As elsewhere, then, the advance of the Backwards meant the advance of the Upper Backwards with Ram Sunder Dass the older pattern ^{reasserted} ~~to~~ itself, exactly half the ministers were Forwards, and Backwards were reduced to the level that they had been relegated in earlier times.

Table - 2Caste Composition of parties and coalition in power in Bihar
Vidhan Sabha

(figures in percentage)

	1962	1967	1969	1975	1977	State population
Brahmin	14.1	8.6	11.8	16.0	2.8	4.6
Bhumihar	13.6	11.1	10.5	9.3	12.0	2.8
Rajput	14.1	24.1	19.1	14.4	19.4	4.1
Kayastha	6.0	3.1	2.6	1.5	5.1	1.2
Forwards	47.8	46.9	44.0	41.2	39.3	12.7
Bania	2.7	3.1	3.3	4.1	2.8	0.6
Yadav	8.2	14.8	15.1	9.3	14.3	16.7
Kurmi	6.5	1.2	3.3	4.1	2.8	0.6
Koiri	6.5	6.8	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.0
(Upper Backward)	(23.9)	(25.9)	(25.6)	(22.1)	(23.5)	(18.8)
(Lower Backward)	(0.5)	(3.1)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(2.3)	(31.2)
Total Backward	24.4	29.0	26.9	23.6	25.8	50.0
Muslims	8.2	4.9	8.6	10.3	6.5	12.2
Bengalis	1.1	3.1	0.0	0.5	2.3	2.4
SC	17.4	11.7	12.5	15.5	18.0	13.8
ST	1.1	4.3	7.9	8.8	8.3	8.9
Grand Total	100.0	99.9	99.9	99.9	100.2	100.0
N	184	162	199	199	210	

Sources : As per Table-1

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TABLE III

Caste composition of major Cabinet Ministries
1969-79

Full Ministers only, Figures are in percentage

Category	B.N. Jha	K.B. Sahaj	M.Pd Sinha	D.Pd Rai	Kedar Pandey	Abdul Ghafoor	Jagan Nath Mishra	K. Thakur	Ran Sunder Das	State People
	1962	1963	1967	1969	1972	1973	1975	1977	1979	
Forwards	68	40	67	33	38	38	40	29	50	13
Upper	8	20	20	20	23	23	20	38	20	19
Lower	0	0	7	0	0	5	0	4	0	31
Muslims										
Bengali	8	20	7	13	15	10	13	13	15	15
SCs and STs	25	20	0	33	23	24	27	17	15	28
Total	99	100	101	99	99	101	100	100	100	100
N	12	10	15	15	13	25	15	24	20	
Number of Ministers in Office	32	41	11	10	15	21	25	22	30	

Blair, H Harey W. " Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar :
Social Changes in late 70s, EPW, Vol-15, No. 2, 1980.

During the 22 months that the Karpoori Thakur Ministry was in power. The Forwards, with about 40% of the Janata MLAs (Table-2) had only 3.9% of the ministerships, while the Upper Backwards (about 24% of Janata MLAs) had fully 38% of these posts. On the other hand, the Ram Sunder Das Ministry, whatever its other faults, much better reflected the makeup of its party than did Karpoori's govt, as a comparison of Table 2 and 1 will show.

Political economy in Rural Bihar

In short, the Upper Backwards simply outnumber the Forwards in most places. In the past this numerical inferiority didn't hurt the forwards, for they were the major landowning castes under the British zamindari system, they were the zamindars and the intermediaries in the structure of subinfeudation that built up over the years.

After the zamindari abolition of the 1950s, the picture became a bit more slurred, as large numbers of zamindars 'reserved' cultivation of their lands and became ryots, but the basic division remained. Now the Forwards ~~being~~ the larger cultivator often with holdings greatly in excess of the land ceiling imposed by the Congress government, holdings which they were able to retain through a combination of benami transfers, badly

maintained land records corruption. The Upper Backwards became the small cultivators, and the Harijans stayed where they were as landless labourers.

Even where the Forwards became what would have to be called small farmers on the basis of landholding size they have tendered to behave like big farmers, for in one of these interesting instances where culturalness reinforces class differences, there is a traditional taboo against Upper Caste men actually handling the plough or physically working in the fields.

"The object of all these control, it should be rejected, has not been primarily profit maximising or even pre-capitalised accumulation, but rather maintenance of position, for the larger farmers are motivated more than anything else by fear of losing control, of being seduced under by the huge landowners in the country side."¹⁷

17. Prasad, Pradhan, H. (1979) - 'Caste and class in Bihar' EPW, Annual Number, February.

CHAPTER - IVPERFORMANCE OF JANATA PARTY

Indian politics has never been politics of ideology, priveleges and commitment, party splits, defection and counterdefection within the bourgeois parties have always been guided by party personal selfish motive. The personal politics of the Congress parties could not provide any initiation for ideological polarisation. It turned out finally to be authoritarian rule. The post- emergency period saw the installation of a conglomeration of political parties which had little in common ideologically. They were found to disintegrate and revive their past weakness.

The fast changing alliance limit but confuse the electorates. when all parties make identical claims and appear in the same dress, how one can distinguish the genuine from false?

We will have to make an attempt to analyse the support structure of these political parties or groups of individuals and to verify the respective claims of these who aspire to rule in the Centre"¹

1. Crisis of Upper Class Politics : Moin Shakir,
December, 8, 1979, Mainstream, Vol XVIII, No. 15. p. 31

The major difference between the mass upsurge in Gujarat and Bihar lie in this that the farmers could never gather enough momentum to reach the take off point and the other difference between the two major mass-actions during the Indira regime is without doubt due to the quality of this leadership perhaps the intensity of the Gujarat upsurge was greater than that of Bihar govt it remained confined to a few urban centres and failed to find out penetrate the rural regions from the beginning to the end it continued to be agitation of the elite.

We will discuss the policy and performance of Janata Party broadly under heading namely - Agrarian policy, Industrial policy, Community Development Programmes and Anti-poverty Programmes.

The state has been ^{predominantly} agrarian in economy. Only 10% of its population is urban. Its industries were mostly capital intensive. The development of small-scale industry was restricted. The employment in the factory sector was only 3.02 lakhs in 1974-75 against a total population of 36.7 lakhs as 1971 census.

One of the disappointing feature of the economy of the state was that the per capita plan investment was almost the lowest in the country during the whole of

congress regime"². This perhaps is the main factor keeping Bihar at the lowest in economic performance.

REMOVAL OF CORRUPTION

The emergence of Janata Govt in the wake of the emergency, resulted abruptly a wave of civil liberty creating a law and order situation in the state. The tragedies at Belchi, Pathardih and Bishrampur and the violent incidents in panchayat elections indicate the situations.

Secondly 'The declaration of the Govt of Bihar, reserving jobs to Backwards classes was another factor creating widespread tension in the state. The Janata Govt had, for a socio-economic transformation in caste-ridden society to reserve 26% of the jobs for them who constitute 97% of the population.

The opponents, however blame Shri Karpoori Thakur that he has done so to ensure his stability in power by reducing "less dependance for survival upon Rajputs

2. JANATA - October - 29, 1979 -Janata performance in Bihar

Bhumihars, and Brahmins, who have shown closed their rules to meet the situation created by the cabinets, decision on reservation.

- Harijans to be given land and to be protected against cruelty.

- Land reforms and to be implemented, Distribution of land to landless.

- Public Grievances Redressal

- Minimum wage of agricultural labourers.

- Employment Scheme³

Thirdly The vested interests and opposition parties have been making all possible efforts to disturb and defame the Janata Govt. The law and order is being created to achieve political gains even with regard to these issues which should have been kept above party politics.

"Despite ~~its~~ proclaimed policy of being pro-people and ~~promise~~ of land-reform Bihar govt's performance was abysmally low. For the failure not only the Janata is wholly responsible but we have to go for retrospective study of land reform history in Bihar.

Land reforms movement officially and gramdan and Bhoodan movement unofficially.⁴

4. Arvind, N. Das, Agrarian Unrest and Socio-Economic change in Bihar op. cit, P-184.

The continued and great peasant uprising in different parts of Bihar compelled the state govt to take agrarian reform measures.

The communists in 1930, the socialists in 1934⁵ and Kisan Sabha⁶ had pressed for the zamindari abolition. In 1937 the Congress, in its election manifesto, advocated moderate reforms in the system of land tenure and rent. But after election the Congress, an instrument of land-holding conservatives, did not pursue any meaningful agrarian reforms⁷ instead negotiated an agreement with the zamindars. The Bihar tenancy amendment act of 1937 and the Bihar restoration of Bakasht lands and arrears of rent act, 1938 were legislated on the basis of compromise with the Zamindars under the guidance of Rajendra Prasad⁸.

The peasantry was not satisfied with remedial legislation like the Bakasht act.

The Government of Bihar made its first post independent legislative attempt with the help of K.B. Sahay to

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5. Jannuji, Ft. Agrarian Crisis in India, The case of Bihar, Pune, 1974 P-5
 6. Arvind N. Das. Op Cit P- 155
 7. Jannuji, F.t. op cit - 155
 8. Rakesh Gupta- Peasant Struggle: A case study of Bihar Ph.D. Thesis JNU, N.Delhi-1978. -- 88

abolish the Zamindari System by passing the Bihar abolition act in 1947. It was then amended and published as the Bihar abolition of Zamindari Act 1948 only to be repeated and replaced by the Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950, the validity of which was finally upheld by the Supreme Court only in 1952⁹. The Zamindar opposed the act while some of them succeeded in acquiring tacit support from important Congress leaders like Rajendra Prasad and most conservative among them joined the Janata Party launched by the Maharaja of Ramgarh who later rejoined the Congress.

In a predominantly agricultural country like India where exists both the extreme form of poverty and institutionalised social inequality, land reform does not imply only the principle of economic development but of social change as well. Guided by this twin objective, land reforms in India was initially approved to be one of the most revolutionary steps towards bridging the enormous gap between the 'Haves' and 'have not' and also giving an impetus to the tempo of economic development.

BRITISH LAND POLICY

The agrarian system under the colonial period was not production oriented but a tax-oriented one in the sense

9. Jannaji, Ft. Cp. Cit pp-12-13.

that the peasantry was forced to meet the needs and demands of the ruling class, the Army and the landed aristocracy.

MORELAND says that the tax was paid by the peasantry for maintaining both the ruling sovereign and the army¹⁰.

Marx rightly said that "in Pre-Colonial India there were only three departments of the Govt, viz, the plunder of the interior (i.e. finance), the plunder of the exterior (i.e. army) and finally the department of Public works (namely for agricultural purposes)¹¹.

The main objective of the settlement was to gear up the economy in the interest of imperialist bourgeoisie and to create¹² a class of collaborators i.e. the Indian Landlords to squeeze maximum surplus out from agriculture¹³.

The exploitation of peasantry was continued by the British in alliance with its natural ~~ally~~, the Indian Landlords in the form of eviction of excessive rent. The situation marked by absence of legal limits on levy imposed upon peasantry caused immense misery for them. The destruction of traditional industries further increased the pressure on cultivable land with the result that there

10. MORELAND, W.H. Agrarian System of Muslim India, Delhi-1968, P.11
11. MARX'S ARTICLE "The British Rule in India", New York Daily Tribune 1953 quoted in Dhanagare, DN. Peasant Movement in India 1920-1950 Delhi, Oxford University Press 1981
12. BHAWANI, SEN, Frontier of Agrarian structures in India, N. Delhi PPH, Pub. 1962 P.63
13. MANOSHI, MITRA, Agrarian Social Structures: Continuity and Change in Bihar 1786 - 1820, N. Delhi - 1985 P.14

was no dearth of tenants willing till the soil on any
The landless could change tenants at will because there was not
adequate provision for safeguarding the interests of cultivators¹⁴.

In short, the whole structure shaped the feudal agrarian economy
of Bihar¹⁵.

Between 1950-51 and 1960-61, the land Reforms Act of 1950,
the Tenancy Act of 1885 the consolidation of Holding Act, the fix-
-ation of land ceiling act and transfer of surplus Act, 1961 and
the Bihar privileged persons homestead Act of 1948 was passed by the
Bihar Govt¹⁶.

The land reform Act of 1952 came into force after eight years
owing to the long legal battle fought by the Zamindars. In the first
phase of implementation of the Act 1952, only 155 Zamindars were
affected. To eliminate in 1954 and 1959 the Act was amended to
facilitate, speedy implementation of 5, 6 and 7 of the Bihar land
Reforms Act, 1950 specifically provided for the retention by the
intermediaries of certain interests. But these sections have not
been altered in amendment acts of 1954 and 1959.

In between the time of enactment and enforcement, the Zamindars
took advantage of delays to put through partitions of joint family
property and in the process they tampered with the village records
for personal gains.

14. Ray SC.(Comp) Land Revenue Administration in India, Calcutta
1115, PP. 38-39

15. Das, A. N., Op.Cit-PP - 22 - 23

16. G, Ojha, Land problems and Land reforms - A study with special
Reference to Bihar, S.Chand & Sons, N.Delhi

The Implementation of the act was slow and ineffective. The act only regulated the relationship between an outgoing proprietor and the state Govt and not the proprietor and the third party. The outgoing Zamindars were permitted their 'Sir' and 'Khudakhasht' land that prevented the process of breaking up land concentration in the agricultural sections.¹⁷

G.Ojha, in his study, have pointed out the utter ineffectiveness of land reform legislation in Bihar till 1972-73. Further he says "that legislations appear to have been enacted in haste, without creating proper admosphere, without studying the likely impact of future ~~implication~~ and the manner in which the laws could be evaded. However, the Bihar land Reforms Act 1950 failed to bring any change in socio-economic political set up of the village."¹⁸ Various evaluation reports, plan projects and documents have enumerated that the lack of political will have been key factors behind ineffective implementation. This resulted in agrarian tension of various districts of Bihar.

The performance of the Janata Govt in Bihar in agriculture may be assessed through its achievements on three main points.

- (i) Increase in the production of agricultural goods
- (ii) Actions taken for land reforms, and
- (iii) Provision of irrigation, fertilisers and other things employed.

AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS:

Agriculture production has been better in 1977-78 in comparison to 1976-77. The production of foodgrains during 1977-78 was 102 lakhs

17. G.Ojha, OP.CIT P - 284

18. G.Ojha, OP.CIT P - 285

tonnes as against the 94 lakh tonnes in 1976-77. In the major crops of paddy and wheat the production increased from 47 lakh tonnes and 24.85 lakh tonnes in 1976-77 to 50.10 lakh tonnes and 28.50 lakh tonnes, respectively in 1977-78.

Exemption of landholders was given to uneconomic holding and distribution of land to poor and landless labourers undertaken during the year under the Janata rule. All land tenures upto three hectares in the plateau of Chota Nagpur and Santhal Parganas.

The Bihar Govt has been able to distribute 13,526 acres of Bhoodan land and some 2000 acres of ceiling ~~to landless~~ and people of weaker section during 1977-78.¹⁹

BHOODAN MOVEMENT

In 1946-51, adopting a Maoist revolutionary strategy CPI launched peasant movement based on guerilla warfare in Telegana regions within the former princely states of Hyderabad (Now in AP). Vinoba Bhave launched the Bhoodan movement by demonstrating that lands might be re-distributed peacefully without resort to class conflict²⁰. According to Vinoba Bhave, Bhoodan Yagna is an all comprehensive movement designed to the reform in all walks of life. Bhave suggested that the problem of landlessness can be solved not by violence, legislation and by means of Govt schemes, but through the spirit of Bhoodan.²¹

According to J.P.Narayan, the Bhoodan and the Sampattidan movement based on the theory of ethical transformation of the heart of those who own land and wealth are important factor to bring an egalitarian society.

19. Janata performance in Bihar - Janata Oct-1978-79

20. JANNUJI, FT, Op Ct, PP - 93-94

21. Quoted in JANNUJI, FT, Op Cit P-99

Through this, propertied classes would voluntarily relinquish a substantial portion of their possession for the benefit of the poverty stricken section of the population.²²

Bhoodan movement during the reign of Janata was also a futile exercise, unable to carry the Gandhian legacy.

Some scholars have suggested that extreme poverty restricts the meaning of Sarvodaya or any movement in this area. They further say that 92.5% donees felt grateful for this dan. The landowners are openly admitting that donations of land, under the garb of generosity, is a device which helps them to maintain control over their retained labourers.

Antyodaya programme was undertaken in 1/3 of villages or state consisting of at least 5 family each to be alleviated above poverty line.²³

INDUSTRIAL POLICY

The Industrial Policy of the Janata Govt must be guided by the objective of creating maximum employment opportunities in the industrial sector and encouraging small scale industries from the point of view. It must also aim at curbing the black money and checking the inflation.

The cottage industries have been there in our economy since ancient times. They thrived during British rule on their own, in the Congress days with political and economic patronage. Cottage industries can't survive without subsidy and the people employed in these units may somehow manage to survive under poverty, as they have been doing since Independence.

22. Quoted in C.C, Shah "Sampattidan and Bhoodan movement" in (ed) A.R.DESAI, Op CIT P-656

23. Governor's Add-Bihar Legislative Council, Directory 1978

What we need is not the survival of classical Gandhian economy but the creation of a neo-Gandhian model which is **realistic** and idealistic in the same measure.²⁴

The small scale units needs to be integrated with the large scale units in the production process itself and this will help them to solve their marketing problem. No large scale unit should be allowed to function under it lines upto production pattern with the small scale.

In a predominantly agricultural country like India ironically the least developed industries have been agro-industries. There are hardly any food processing and milk product in the country at present.

ANTI - POVERTY PROGRAMMES

Janata party was committed to alleviate poverty from country. So keeping in view IRDP was originally visualised in the Draft Sixth plan (1978-83) as a block level resource based total development plan with specific beneficiary-oriented schemes of poverty alleviation, integrated into it. The operational strategy for the programme was to be the formulation of a five year development profile for each district disaggregated into blocks, based on practicable possibilities of development in agriculture and allied sectors.

Describing the situation at the beginning of sixties, Dandekar and Rath conclude "In spite of these rather old and fragmented data, it is clear that the rural poor consists predominantly of agricultural households and small landholder with cultivated land holdings of less than 5.6 acres and particularly less than 2.5 acres. The two things would also include village artisans progressively thrown out of their

24. J.A.NAIK - From total revolution to total failure, National

Traditional employment. The urban poor are only an overflow of the rural poor into the urban area. Fundamentally they belong to the same class as the rural poor."²⁵

SFDA AND DPAP

For the benefit of weaker section of society, JanataGovt. created Small Farmers development Agency and Drought Prone Areas programme under which minor irrigation schemes were given subsidy. For small farmers this subsidy was 25% and for marginal Farmers it was 33%.

Commenting on the unsatisfactory performance of IRDP Rath, Rao said, "the percentage of beneficiaries whose income had risen above the poverty line of Rs.3500 was 47% of all eligible beneficiaries with considerable regional variation."²⁶

V.K.RV.Rao has pointed out "In my opinion the missing link in the programme of alleviation of poverty is now sought to be removed."²⁷ Rath also feels that the very strategy of helping the rural poor to get over poverty with the help of asset transfer is largely misconceived.²⁸

The Janata party which was committed to poverty removal has failed. It had to bear the criticisms of different opposition leaders. Jagannath Mishra compared "it to the regime of Ian Smith. CPI leader Chaturanan Mishra was vocal in condemning it".²⁹

25. Dandekar, V.M. and Rath N. Poverty in India, Bombay 1971, Indian School of Political Economy PP - 16-17

26. Cited in Rath N " Garibihatao, can IRDP Do it?, Op.Cit.

27. V.K.RV.,Rao, " Alleviating Rural Poverty, And how? Kurukshetra, Vol XXXII, No.1 Annual No.1983

28. Rath N. " Garibihatao! - Can IRDP Do It Op. Cit.

29. Indian Nation, Patna, 13 Oct. 1979

ATTITUDE TOWARDS BACKWARDS AND WEAKER SECTION

Except providing reservation Govt did nothing for the weaker section. Chief Minister claimed that whenever there had been any case of atrocities on Harijans, Adivasis and weaker sections in Bihar his Govt had been very prompt in taking action and providing the relief to the victims which had never been done during the congress regime.

-Harijans to be given land and to be prevented against atrocities and cruelties. The Govt. assured minimum wage to workers.

-Improvement in education-

-alongwith Hindi, lingua-franca to be used

-Ration card to be issued

-Free education upto Matric

-upto 31 March 1978 two lakh illiterates to be made literate.

-Separate cell in Home department for Tribes and Harijans

-Govt believes in Decentralisation of authority, District Planning to be organised.

-Drug addiction to be banned

-Legal aid - for Harijans, Tribals, landless labourers

If we make a comparison with the system which the Janata party initiated, its achievement has not been inconsiderable. It has been able to free the country from the terror under which it has lived under the Emergency.

A system has always to be judged by the end-product that emerges. The Janata party has shown a degree of responsiveness to public opinion which is something to be welcomed.

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CHAPTER - 5

LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGYS ISSUES

If we compare Janata rule in term of caste represenatation in Bihar Vidhan Sabha we find that compared to 1975 in 1977 Brahmin strength declined sharply from 18.3 to 7.6 percent in Janata period while the total population of Brahmin is 6 percent.

During Janata period they declined but even then they were not weeded out completely.

Bhumihars a gained a little bit 1975 (14.7) to 1977 (14.8). While the total population is 3.6 percent.

Rajputs gained from 19.8 (1975) to 21.7 (1977). They also gained while the total population is only 5.7 percent. They have entrenched themselves disproportionately depriving backward castes from political berefits.

Forward as a whole constitute 48.6 percent (1977) compared to 54.8 (1978). While the total population is only 16.5 percent. It means almost three times more than their numercial strength.

This shows that even in Bihar Janata party can't change the caste structure, though the changes were marginal. In 1977, Upper Backward 34.9 percent (Total population 24.37), lower Backward 3.6 percent (Total population 40.3 percent). While we see that upper Backwards have interpreted lower backward also. But in comparison to their state population their representation was negligible.¹

To sum up, this brief profile of the Janata party leadership at the top and middle levels reveals their diversity of backwards and socio-economic political perspective. The cleavages in the party can be particularly explained by the diversity of social background of the leaders party leaders, can act as a mirror to look into the realities of internal politics of political parties.²

CONFLICTS ON PARTY ORGANISATION

The battle between the BLD and the Jan Sangh were drawn, and these two constituent groups of the Janata came into an open clash on enrolment of members and elections

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1. Interviews with MLAs in various years quoted Blair, Harry W. " Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social changes in late 70s, EPW. VOL 15, No.2 - 1980.
 2. B. Sartori - Democratic Theory - 1967
Also see sigmund Neumann (ed) Modern Political parties. University of Chicago Press-1956

in the party. The Jan Sangh leadership openly challenged the BLD leaders as disruptionists of the party unity. The BLD leaders decided that the Jan Sangh members of parliament should sever their links with the RSS. It was argued by Raj Narain and Madhu Limaye that members of the Janata party could not be members of another organisation like the RSS.³

The BLD wanted to counter the strategy and alliance of other factions of mobilising farmers in the Bihar. The Kisan Rally had immediate impact and Charan Singh won back his seat in the cabinet. But beyond this, the Kisan rally could not have achieved anything.⁴

The various factions operating in the Janata party, and the continuous bargaining for concessions and advantages created serious strains in party-government relationship. The party activists have themselves suggested that the lobby of rich peasant and middle castes was represented by the BLD, the Jan Sangh represented the interests of shopkeepers and urban trades and the erstwhile Swatantra and Congress (O)

3. TIMES OF INDIA - Jan 29 - 1979 - Delhi
Also States man, Jan 29 1979

4. Brij Khandelwal - "The Janata's anxious movements" - Janata
Delhi- Vol XXX III, No. 49- Jan 14, 1979
P. 4

leaders were safeguarding interest of the capitalist classes in the country such a lobbying is an essential feature of any democratic party. Parties promote and defend sectional interest and they compete and bargain for their party members. The Janata party failed to harmonise and regulate the conflicting interest of various lobbies and groups, and this led to the disintegration of the Janta party.

If we came to the personality of leaders we find that in Bihar too Janta party leaders Karpoori Thakur has some soft-corner of Backward castes in Bihar. He has antagonised a vast section of forwards by advocating the case of reservation

Karpoori Thakur has 29 percent minister from Forwards while Ram Sunder Das has 50 percent even more than previous. Jagannath Mishra's Ministry, who has only 40 percent. Out of total forwards, population which is 13 percent.

In Karpoori Thakur time Upper backwards has 30 percent compared to 20 percent of Ram Sunder Das Ministry while the state population is 19 percent.

Lower Backwards representation in Karpoori Thakur Ministry was 4 percent, while Ram Sunder Das's era the representation

is zero. State population is 31%.

This shows the trend that while during Ram Sunder Das's regime forwards have upper hand, in Karpoori Thakur's Ministry upper backwards have higher hand. Lower Backwards were only 4 percent which is better to Ram Sunder Da.

Despite Ram Sunder Das being a lower backward: his ministry failed to represent his caste. He gave more seats to forward.

SC's and ST's during Karpoori and Ram Sunder Das's regime were 17 percent 18 percent respectively while in Jagannath Mishra's cabinet it was 27 percent compared to 22 percent of total population of SC and ST.

In Jagannath Mishra's rejime Scheduled Caste and Tribes were better represented than Ram Sunder Das and Karpoori Thakur. This shows that even the caste-identity is not well establised.

Karpoori Thakur were somewhat better than Ram Sunder Das. But if we compare him with previous congress Ministries then was decline in SC, ST Ministers. Despite his proclaimed rhetoric of resevation and all on the one had he was messiah of Backwards, on the other SC, ST have lost.

Ram Sunder Das by caste a SC never bothered about them why ? This can be explained in terms of complexities of caste politics.

Dynamics of any party can be judged by the context of its programme and its performance and membership and followers, its policy of operations. For this we must understand the difference between the leadership of Janata party and congress. Difference in terms of congress.

We see after analysing that members of upper caste has declined slightly but this decline is retained by upper backwards like yadava, Kurmis, Lower backwards are yet deprived. The paradox is that both the chief Ministers during Janata party- were from backward castes.

When we analyse the background of different members we find that their background is same the large majority of people are agricultural.

The Janata party has a negligible base in the rural areas and is articulating rural interest in its economic policy.

In nomination of the members of party casteism was rampant. The duel continued between Satyendra Narayan Sinha

and Karpoori Thakur.⁵

Karpoori Thakur declared that no further realisation of rent would be done.⁶

During the regime of Karpoori Thakur Belchchi incident took place congress MP's staged dharna, walk out in Rajya Sabha.

In fact Satyendra Narayan Sinha and Karpoori Thakur represented two group. S.N. Sinha was the leader of Rajputs known as 'Chote Sahab' even today. Karpoori represented backward, dalits. This way it is not only a conflict of upper caste various backward castes but it can be interpreted by way of conflict between upper class various backward caste.

Janata party stressed need for positive unity to light against problems of poverty, unemployment, inequality- and illiteraly.⁷

Chief Minster claimed that when there had been any case of atrocity on Harijan, Adivasi and weaker sections in Bihar, his government had been very prompt the taking action and providing refuge to the victions which had never been

5. INDIAN NATION - May 9, 1977

6. INDIAN NATION - July 9, 1977

7. INDIAN NATION - 13 July 1977 Patna

done during the congress regime.⁸

No political party in India is true to its proclaimed ideals. None of them practices the ideology it preaches. All of them are being organised and monopolised by the members of the English educated middle class. Therefore, none of the present political parties in India is capable of doing any good to the people. It is better not to accept there as political parties but as organised groups of the ruling class with the sole purpose of exploiting the masses for the advantage of their member and their families. Each of them is thriving on the ignorance of the people.

All put together are managed by a few thousand professional political families who have engaged themselves in the game of power-politics shared the spoils according to one's capacity or power fought or accommodated each other on the basis of expediency, managed to keep the area of power politics limited only to themselves as monopoly capitalists do in trade and industry and successfully elained power and leadership even on hereditary basis. For there political and economic ideology or honest programmatic difference are no motivation but, in fact, are simple cloaks to cover their real motivation which are basicly of self interest and power oriented.⁹

8. INDIAN NATION - 13 October - 1977

9. L.P.Sharma - The Indian Ruling class - P. 72 - Harman
publication ; Delhi

B.B.Mishra comments "In the course of hardly five years after 1937, however the pattern of political behavior in India underwent a radical change. The Indian engaged in a race for foreign power, where each tried to outmanoeuvre. The others in order to gain a position of advantage".¹⁰

Whether it be Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Swatantra party congress(O), LBD and the recently framed combination of them is, Janata party are all Rights parties largely depending on vested political and economic instrument though of course, cleaving otherwise".¹¹

None of them is capable of looking forward and each of them owes its existence and continue existence to the personalities of the leaders or taking advantage of the mistakes of the issues rather than the political ideologies.

"Jaya Prakash Narayan, father of the new India taught the nation a lesson on which the Indian people may not always remember but which they shall never forget"¹² A call for

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10. B.B. Mishra - "The Indian political parties"(Delhi OUP)1976
 11. L.P.Sharma - Indian Ruling Class, Harnam Publication
 Delhi - P. 174
 12. Sharad Paul- 1977 Elections in Indian - 1982 New Delhi

total revolution against corruption in the Bihar state govt. was made in 1974 and the way arrived in June 1975. It was not merely a question of change in the Ministry or administration or change in the leadership, but will have to bring about a new society. In the part, he said, the Government was based on 'Rajniti' and 'Raj Shakti' (politics and state power) but this must toady be replaced by 'Lok niti' and "Lok Shakti" (The policy of the people and the power of the people). In building a new India then would be two - the power of the state and the power of the people.

Another leader from Bihar was Jagjivan Ram president of congress for Democracy (CFD). After all Jagjivan Ram was a growing force in the country. He represented a large section of the people namely Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes because he himself was a Chamar by caste people respected him and he was popularly known as Babuji. He is also a seasoned politician and is the leader of the Harijan when Janata party came power Jagjivan Ram got defence.

Another prominent leader in Bihar Janata party was Karpoori Thakur. He introduced some radical changes like reservation for Backwards Matriculation without English etc. But it is incontrovertible that was above caste politics.

By reservation and other type of alignment he mauled his immediate personality. This led to antagonism with upper caste people. There was a great deal of tension in Bihar on the issue of Reservation.

Another leader was S.N.Sinha (Janata) who was by caste Rajput. This Backward forward group laid a wide rift in Janata party on the issue of reservation, Karppori Thakur was notoriously known for his anti forward rhetoric.

The establishment of Universal adult suffrage, the extension of political rights and privileges to people, and more generally the expansion of government activities in social and economic life have been accompanied by a rise by organized interests in Indian political life.

FIRST: Political parties have both to organized interests and gain control of them. Trade Indians, Students organization, peasant organization and many cultural groups, welfare association, and refuge organization are dominated by political parties. Business organization are the only major type of association apart from ethnic groups which is free from party control.

SECOND: ' ethnic idntification play an inereasingly emportant part in the development of organized interests.

THIRDLY: ' Though organized interests have an impact on the formation of public policy in India, to a large extent the influence has been a negative one that is, it has been directed towards preventing govt. from pursuing some course of action.

FOURTH: ' Organized groups largely influence the administration rather than the formulation of policy. Since the ideological framework of Indian politics, does not support may of the goals of the business community or of rural but often powerful agrarian interests. These groups find it difficult to affect the main outlines of public policy.

FIFTH: ' The growth of organized interests at the state level is an important factor in the development of conflicts between the state govts, and centre and between several state govt.¹³

The weaknees in Nanata party was that it was predmi- nantly a north Indian party.

13. Myron, Weiner - The politics of Scarcity - Asia Publishing House P.P. 232 - 234.

Secondly, the Janata constellation included a powerful party called Jan Sangh which strongly believed in introducing Hindi as the national language all over the country.

In Bihar instead of trying to set the house in order and to attend to the pressing problems of the people, the Chief Minister chose in early 1978 to introduce a controversial measure for reservation of Govt jobs for the backward castes. It was a highly emotive issue at a time of widespread unemployment among the educated youth. This measure was undertaken without any concern to see that jobs opportunities also expanded. In Bihar where 26 percent posts were sought to be reserved were and above the 24 percent posts reserved for the SC's and ST's feelings ran high as was expected.

In Bihar Mr. Karpoori Thakur proved to be extremely incompetent Chief Minister. He has tried to depend on the support of two or three backward castes alone. In the process they have antagonised all the other sections of the population. Since they have lost the grip on the administration, there has been an upsurge of mass agitation of various kinds in these two states. The bureaucracy and the police, on which alone they rely, have gone, out of control, with the latter becoming trigger happy. In Bihar

between June 1977 and May 1978 there were police firings nearly at a dozen places.

Apart from a clash of personalities, the situation in the Janata Party is largely confusing. The constituents still showed their old habits and prejudices but abandoned if they ever had, any coherent ideology perhaps even the Jana Sangh, which seems to insist on. The real reason behind the reservation issue was precisely a decision to create caste riots and caste conflicts so that there should be a polarisation between the so-called forward castes and could find a solid base of support among them. So the caste-riots in the State were viewed with profound satisfaction in circles close to Mr. Thakur as that worked exactly according to their scheme. They hoped that the deeper caste cleavage, the more permanent will be their influence among certain castes. However they failed to see that this kind of polarisation would leave the middle caste, on whose support they sought to build, isolated from all the other castes and connections. This policy could not stabilise the Janata, but was rather likely to sweep it clear off entire North India¹⁴.

Difference within a democratic party are natural. Even personal ambition is not alien to politics. But there must be a sense of proposition and a minimum of consensus if a party has to survive at all. But the Janata party seems to lack both. There seems to be no limit to personal ambitions. There is no sense of a common direction in evidence. It is a virtually free for all with a view to obtaining places of power and profit that the party may offer. No one is bothered about building up an organised party.

TABLE I-CASTE COMPOSITION OF MAJOR CABINET MINISTERS 1969-79. FIGURES IN PERCENTAGE

CASTE	KEDAR PANDEY	ABDUL GHAFOOR	MISHRA	KARPURI THAKUR	RAM SUNDER	POPULATION
	1972	1973	1975	1977	1979	
Forward	38	38	40	29	50	13
Upper Backwards	28	28	20	38	20	19
Lower Backwards	0	5	0	4	0	31
MUslims and Bengalis	15	10	13	13	15	15
SC & ST	23	24	27	17	15	28
Total	99	100	101	100	100	100
N	13	25	15	24	20	
No. of Ministers in Office	15	21	25	22	30	

Source - Blair, H Harey, W. " Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social Changes in late 70s." EPW, Vol-15, No.2, 1980.

TABLE - II CASTE COMPOSITION DURING JANATA PERIOD IN 1977

<u>CASTE</u>	<u>CASTE IN JANATA PARTY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
Brahmin	7.6	6.0
Bhumihar	14.8	3.6
Rajput	21.7	5.7
Kayastha	4.4.	1.6
Forwards	48.6	16.5
<hr/>		
Bania	3.2	0.8
Yadava	20.5	13.8
Kurmi	4.8	4.5.
Koiri	6.4	5.2
Upper Backwards	(34.9)	(24.3)
Lower Backwards	(3.6)	(40.3)
<u>Total Backwards</u>	<u>38.5</u>	<u>64.6</u>
Muslims	10.0	15.8
Bengalis	2.8	3.1
<hr/>		
Total	99.9	100
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>		

Source - Blair, H Harey, W. " Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social Changes in late 70s," EPW, Vol-15, No.2, 1980.

CONCLUSION

If we make a comparison with the system which the Janata Party inherited, its achievement is not inconsiderable. It has been able to force the country from the terror under which it had lived under the Emergency press freedom has been restored. Institutional changes have been made to ensure diversity of news resources and competitions among the news agencies to keep up the standard of news coverage.

There are welcome moves to ensure that fundamental rights will not be tampered with without the consent of the majority of the population through a referendum. The independence and dignity of the judiciary have been restored. Thus we see that Indian political system is as usual. It has not broken the myth of one-party dominant system and it proves that opposition in India gains where congress loses. Janata's arrival was due to the failure. But it was not only that because of the ideological and interest differences also it declined. The Janata Party has shown a degree of responsiveness to public opinion which is something to be welcomed.

The behaviour of the police towards political demonstrators has been as brutal as ever. The pampering of public has resulted in a spurt in crimes to check which alone there is any necessity of the police force.

On the whole, the stagnation that has gripped the nation for the past few years continues. There is no sense of direction. The economy is not picking up fast enough to make any impact on our most pressing problem, Unemployment. To say that the economic

situation is marginally better than what it had been before is not very reasonable. It was the stagnation of the economy under Mrs. Gandhi which led to widespread public discontentment which, in turn, was sought to be met by imposing a brutal police state on the people.¹

But the crisis of the Janata Party is not a temporary one. The divergence within the party on economic issues is so wide that there is little likelihood of any coherent and dynamic policy emerging. There is nothing surprising about this. The truth is that the Janata party was never really out to play a constructive role in the economy. It had been hastily put together to fight against a dictatorship. That was its real mandate and that has been nearly accomplished.

The Janata party's real problem is to establish its identity. Even where it conjures up some policy on paper, in practice nothing materialises. Not only diverse groups, which theoretically do not exist and in practice are the only reality, put in different direction, but even personal rivalries are such as to defy all bounds of party discipline. Contradictory pronouncements by its readers do not allow it to develop a comprehensible image. The absence of some sustaining myth makes it largely loose around disjointed politics.

The Janata Party's tragedy is that, being a combination

1. Sachchidanand Sinha "The Permanent Crisis in India - P-64-68

of opposite elements i.e., those who stand for traditional values and status quo and those who profess basic changes in society, it lacks the ethos of either. The parties merging to form it have inherited different traditions and values. Individual member may still hold fast to those previous belief. Hence as a members of a common party their beliefs must be at odds.

The result is that the workers of the Janata Party lack any perception of their role in society. People outside remain confused as to what to expect from it.

The dynamics of party can be understood by pressing attention on the inside power structure and leadership. The emergence splits and disintegration of political trend can be explained by relating the internal factor of parties with the totality of external factors of the polity.

Sartori is correct in maintaining that "party system mould the political society" but it is equally correct to state that political system exercises significant influence on the functioning of parties.

It has been suggested that various lobbies operated in the Janata party, and their continuous bargaining for concessions and advantages, created serious strain in party - Govt-relationship.

"The lobby of rich peasant and middle castes were represented by the BID, the Jan Sangh represented the interests of shopkeepers and urban traders and the erstwhile swatantrites and Congress (O) leaders were safeguarding interests of the capitalist classes in the country. Such a lobbying is an essential feature of any

democratic party!² Parties promote and defend sectional interests, and they permit competitive lobbies to bargain with each other. The Janata party failed to evolve any mechanism to regulate and harmonise the conflicting interests of various lobbies and groups, and this created party Govt-tensions which led to the eventual disintegration of the Janata experiment.

The growing disintegration processes in the party system may be explained by the crisis of capitalist development in India. In spite of major thrust on industrialisation of the country, the Indian economy is still predominantly agricultural, and about half of the country's national income is derived from agricultural and allied activities which absorbs nearly three tenths of its working force³.

It may be suggested here that Congress and Janata party are the two faces of the same political system. The crisis within the Janata party in Bihar can be understood in terms of inter-class and intra-class conflict, conflict between the upper class lobby Vis-a-vis- lower class caste lobby which was emerging at that time as a threat to upper class (caste). Bihar has witnessed large-scale violence due to the issue of reservation. The struggle was not merely anti-reservationist but it was a symbolic protest for the maintenance of status quo. Because the elite\$, of Bihar do not wanted to lose their hold from economic and political system.

2. C.P. Bhambri - The Janata Party - A Profile, National Publishing House, N. Delhi. - 114

3. Ibid PPP - 115 - 117

The Janata also projected a left-of-centre image and like the Congress party it had supporters of free enterprise co-existing with fire brand socialist. Irrespective of rhetoric of Gandhism and economic decentralisation of economic power, the Janata did not adopt any policy regarding industry and rich peasantry which was fundamentally different from the Congress. The Janata's slogan of rural development was essential for the development of Indian capital.

But if we look at the entire political scenario we find that the so-called pro-backward leader Karpuri Thakur in reality, never re-presented backward caste. The number of Backward ministers in his regime increased but it was confined only to upper class backward.

For the first time in the history of Indian Politics "one-party dominance" was threatened so seriously and this too was due to Congress's weaknesses and excesses. For the first time rural, down trodden people found some avenues for the articulation of their demand.

The emergence of Janata party in Bihar was the resultant of a revolutionary campaign of Jay Prakash Narayan's "Total Revolution" and shift from "Rajniṭi" to "Lok niti".

The phase of Janata party represents the crisis when the old class alliance is under strain, and the new coalition has not emerged. This is the crisis of our political system which has long term consequences.

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