

**MESSIANISM: A STUDY IN DIALECTICS AND
DECONSTRUCTION**

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
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
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DECLARATION

I, Gaichuimeilu Palmei, declare that the thesis entitled "MESSIANISM: A STUDY IN DIALECTICS AND DECONSTRUCTION," submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work and has not been submitted by me in part or in full for any other degree or diploma of this University or any other university.

Gaichuimeilu Palmei
Gaichuimeilu Palmei

Dedicated
to
my Family

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PREFACE

The present study is an attempt to critically analyze the concept of messianism, comprising of messianic principles in the Bible from two different philosophical perspectives; viz., the dialectics of G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831) and the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). According to the monotheistic religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam, messianism is a belief in *Messiah* who will come to release His people from their bondages. The adherents of these religions have been waiting for the coming of *Messiah* for innumerable years. For the Christian, based on the Bible, *Messiah* has already come to save His people through crucifixion, death and resurrection from their sins but He will come again physically at the end of the Age to bring back His Kingdom on earth and releases His people from their sufferings to reign with them. Whereas in Judaism, as written in *Tanakh*, they are still waiting for *Messiah* to come who will liberate His people from their oppression.

Philosophically, for Jacques Derrida, G.W.F Hegel and Karl Marx (1818-1883) are considered to be involved in messianism because of the teleological feature in their philosophical discourses which are to attain the absolute and to achieve communism. There is the aspect of waiting in the engagement in messianism, which Derrida deconstructs claiming that history is composed of ruptures and mutations without finality. For him, everything can be observed as an openness horizontally which cannot succumb to an end. The study will compare and contrast Hegel's dialectic and Derrida's deconstruction on messianism.

I am thankful to the authors/ co-authors whose works have directly or indirectly helped me. I have always tried to supply exact quotations and full references to original works, and in the footnotes, I have also furnished suggestions for further reading. In referring to the *Bible; Old Testament* and *New Testament* and the works Kant, Hegel, Marx and Derrida, I have used the most accurate available English translation. I am also thankful to the translations of the text.

Introduction

The present work is to critically analyze the messianism comprising of messianic principles in the *Bible* from two different philosophical perspectives; namely, i) dialectics of Hegel and, ii) deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. Messianism is a belief in *messiah* which prevails in the three monotheistic religions namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In this study I'll discuss messianism in Judaism and Christianity. *Messiah* (*mashiach* in Hebrew) is "the anointed one" appointed by God. The anointed one will come to release His people from repression and the appearing of *messiah* has been the sustaining hope of the Jewish people for generations. According to the Jewish tradition, King *Messiah* is the instrument by whom God's kingdom is to be established in Israel and in the world.¹ Lee pointed out that, "Christ is God's Anointed, the One appointed by God to accomplish God's purpose, God's eternal plan."² The Christian notion of messianism in the *Bible* specifically the *New Testament* has engrossed with the concept of Trinity, Paradise, Fall/Sin, Redemption and the Judgment day.

I will discuss messianism from two philosophical perspectives: namely dialectics and deconstruction. Messianism can both be viewed in a philosophical or religious manner and can be studied under dialectics and deconstruction in which, apart from the monotheistic religions, in the perspectives of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831) and Karl Marx (1818-1883) are considered to be involved. According to Derrida, the involvement in messianism is absolutistic in nature that it engages in the waiting for the finality, which he critiques and deconstructs insisting that there can be no eschatology since history is episodic in nature and it is repetitive without end.

Meanwhile, Hegel and Marx as well as Judaism and Christianity actively participated in arriving at the finality which in one way or the other makes them engrossed in messianism and they seem to be incessantly striving for the final goal. In my thesis, I intend to compare and contrast the differences and similarities that evolve out of messianism in Judaism and Christianity in order to bring out Derrida's deconstruction by which he critiques logocentrism that was prevailing in western

¹ http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Names_of_G-d/Messiah/messiah.html Accessed on 24/11/13.

² Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible. John 1:41*.

philosophy especially in the grand narratives of Hegel's dialectics for achieving the absolute and Marx's struggles for communism.

Hegel and Derrida have given a critical analysis on messianism. As a matter of fact, Hegel being a Lutheran preferred Christian theology over all other theologies and regarded Christianity to be the absolute religion.³ As any Lutheran, he was a critic of the oldest, most conservative Christian institution, the Roman Catholic.⁴ He has derived the principles of dialectics from the Trinity in Christianity and the teleology or finality or totality from the Day of the Judgment from the messianic principles. Hegel's definition of Christianity stands or falls entirely within the question of messianism. He distinguishes messianism from the *messiah* in the sense that he admits the impending finality in messianism but he does not endorse *messiah*.

The teachings of Jesus, according to Hegel, is individualistic in nature, that it is more suitable to a sect rather than the whole community since it is easier to love a fellow brethren and hard to love those who do not belong to it.⁵ His dialectical process of attaining the absolute is holistic in nature that the gospels of Jesus are constricted in his view and are not applicable to the Christian community. The Trinitarian concept of Christianity indeed has a profound influence on the philosophical insight of Hegel but he does not give credence to the notion of *messiah*. For Hegel, it is the Notion, the *Absoluter Geist* or *begriff* that lies at the center of messianism and not of *messiah*.

Derrida with his method of deconstruction has leveled three charges on messianism. Firstly, Derrida propounded the concept of messianism as ubiquitous in the context of waiting for something that is yet to happen which either can be secular or religious. For him, the messianic structure of existence is universal. Secondly, the Christian tradition of sacrifice being the assurance of redemption for the consummation of messianism is adjourned by Derrida. His interpretation of messianic notion is without religion that does not necessitate sacrifice. He states "awaiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer."⁶ Finally, the idiosyncratic features, which are supposedly assumed to be possessed by

³ Stace, W.T. *The Philosophy of Hegel, A Systematic Exposition*. p.509.

⁴ For details, please see Hegel, G.W.F. *On Christianity, Early Theological writings*. Trans. T.M. Knox, pp.1-67.

⁵ Beiser, Frederick. *Hegel*, p. 121.

⁶ Derrida, Jacques. *Specters of Marx*, p. 81.

messiah as revealed in the Bible is absent in Derrida's messianic structure. His concept of messianic form does not have any determinate character since he describes it as "messianism without religion."⁷ He says, "The *messianic* structure of existence is open to the coming of an entirely ungraspable and unknown other, but the concrete, historical *messianisms* are open to the coming of a specific other of known characteristics."⁸

Derrida questions the finality both in Hegel and Marx. In Hegel it is the absolute spirit and in Marx it is the emergence of communist society. Marx treats alienation as the product of capitalism and his inclination is to eradicate it by attaining communism.⁹ According to Derrida, Marx's finality which is yet to come is socialism and he circumscribes Marx's ideology to messianism without *messiah*. Derrida's criticism of messianic principles emerges out of his respective philosophical account of logocentrism, western metaphysics in general, writing, language and the world.

Derrida attempts to deconstruct the absolutistic status of western metaphysics derived from logocentrism. He also questions 'writing' as something which cannot have a specific end. Writing, for him, requires more writing and more and still more, but there is no final writing. According to him, the relation between language and the world is not confined to one to one relationship rather it is open with its different contexts. In short, the relationship between language and the world is openness without any finality. Derrida is opposed to all sorts of finalities including that of Marx's final struggle. Thus 'deconstruction' questions the grand narratives of Hegel's dialectic of Spirit and the proletarian emancipation in Marx along with the metadiscourse on messianism and *messiah*.

The present thesis acknowledges the antithetical nature of the philosophical perspectives of Hegel and Derrida on messianism. The objective of the thesis is to re-examine this dichotomy, and to allow these philosophical perspectives to mutually inform and reinforce each other for the possible re-evaluation of messianism. For Derrida, the job of philosophy is not to account for messianism, but to deconstruct it. In deconstructing the messianism, Derrida proposes that reality follows diverse

⁷ Ibid., p.74.

⁸ Singh, R.P. "Jacques Derrida's Deconstruction of the Messianism/Messianic Notion", p. 79.

⁹For details, please see Marx, Karl, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp.112-149.

models which are rich in conflict and rejects totality or finality of any kind – messianic or Hegelian or Marxist. History, for Derrida, is episodic in nature with ruptures and mutations. The eschatological relation reveals a relation to finality, to ending, but without allowing us to think that the Second Coming or Last Judgment will ever occur. Such a wait would be without end. Derrida has an intense distrust in messianism/ messianic principles including all sorts of metaphysical notions and grand narratives.

I'll be adopting a method which is comparative and critical. It is comparative in the sense that I'll be comparing and contrasting the antithetical nature of the perspectives on messianism, and the distinct nature of dialectics as a grand narrative in Hegel and Derrida's critique of all grand narratives including that of Hegel. The philosophical approach on messianism that Derrida espouses is pluralistic and anti-essentialist whereas Hegel is dialectical, critical and absolutist. Derrida's pluralistic perspective is deeply rooted in his attempt to reject finality in writing, in language and on world. Though Hegel and Derrida have different approaches so far as teleological impact of messianism is concerned, they both acknowledge the horizontal impact of messianism. I'll attempt to compare and contrast Hegel's dialectics and Derrida's deconstruction and to allow these perspectives to mutually inform and reinforce each other for the possible re-evaluation of messianism.

To have a general idea of the thesis, chapter 1 will be on "Messianism and the *Messiah*" that will explicate messianism as contested concept by emphasizing on the notion of *messiah* according to Judaism and Christianity. In order to substantiate the view on *messiah*, this chapter will highlight the concepts of fall, sin and redemption and examine the known characteristics of *messiah* in order to fit it in the framework of messianism. Firstly, I will discuss some features of messianic principle in Judaism and Christianity in order to bring out messianism as a contested doctrine. The basic question is – what consequence does messianism have on the adherence of *messiah*? Is waiting still continuing or is it over with the coming of Jesus? As a matter of fact, Judaism fundamentally bases its belief in the *Old Testament* of the *Bible* while Christianity considers the *Old Testament* as prefigure of the *New Testament* and hold their belief basically in the *New Testament*.

According to the Jews, *messiah* will be the descendent of King David who will one day appear to restore the Kingdom of Israel and usher in the era of peace, prosperity and the knowledge of God. The Jewish community is still waiting for *messiah* to come. The Christians, on the other hand, believe that *messiah* is Jesus Christ who is both human and divine by passing through the processes of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension is dispensing Himself into man. The *messiah* in the second coming will restore and manifest His kingdom. I will bring out the biblical concepts of fall, redemption, the final Day of Judgment which in due course gave rise to the notion of messianism.

The second chapter entitled “Messianism without *Messiah*: A Dialectical Approach” will develop the trinity in Christianity in order to formulate the dialectical perspective of Hegel on messianism. It will explore the involvement of Hegel’s dialectic in messianism without *messiah*. It will also observe the notion of finality or Day of Judgment. I will also attempt to bring out Marx’s view on messianism without *messiah*. In the second chapter, I will take up the dialectical approach of Hegel on messianism and include Marx. The questions arise- is it possible to accept messianism without *messiah*? What are the horizontal and teleological implications of it?

Both Hegel and Marx, in one way or another, have advocated messianism without *messiah*. In Hegel’s dialectic there is a triadic movement which he develops from the Christian trinity and it is both horizontal and teleological. Horizontally, for Hegel, everything is in a dialectical process and teleologically it is of becoming the absolute. Hegel is waiting for the absolute to arrive. The waiting aspect of Hegel’s dialectic is an involvement on messianism. Though he was influenced by the Christian theology on trinity, he does not accept the teachings of Jesus since it refers primarily to an individual rather than the whole community. Therefore, Hegel’s messianism is without *messiah*. Marx alleges that alienation is the product of capitalism. So he, like Hegel, is waiting for socialist society that will eliminate alienation suffered by the struggling classes. Both the thinkers are waiting for the emancipation without *messiah*’s intervention. I’ll attempt to give a critical analysis of dialectic of Hegel and Marx in order to examine the concept of messianism without *messiah*.

The third chapter entitled, “Deconstructing Messianism” will be a critical analysis of Derrida’s deconstruction. I will take into account the eschatology on the one hand and Derrida’s position on writing, language and the world in relation to his approach on messianism. This chapter will discuss Derrida’s deconstruction of messianism. Derrida deconstructs the messianic eschatology that exists in the messianism of Hegel and Marx. Though Derrida accepts the horizontal feature of Hegelian- Marxian dialectic, he attempts to repudiate the teleological feature. For Derrida, both Marx and Hegel, in one way or another participated in the messianic structure in the context of waiting.

According to Derrida, waiting is openness to the future without knowing when the expected thing/one would arrive. He critiques the messianism of Hegel and Marx who are still waiting for the finality to arrive. He claimed that it may be a ghost that they wait which has been repeatedly expected and he even called it the impossibility. Derrida attempts to deconstruct the absolute spirit in Hegel that is derived from logocentrism. He attempts to repudiate the finality or totality in writing. Writing always leads to more writing and more and still more, but there is no final writing. Derrida proposes that reality follows diverse models which are rich in conflict and language has to reflect that richness. Therefore, the relation of language and the world can never succumb to finality. In my study, I will attempt to scrutinize Derrida’s critique of eschatology on messianism and analyze deconstruction on writing, language and the world.

Finally, the fourth chapter will be on “Reading the Antithetical: Dialectics and Deconstruction” which will compare and contrast the philosophical approach of Hegel’s dialectic and deconstruction of Derrida. In the writings of both the thinkers, there is the horizontal aspect of the ‘waiting’ in messianism. The dialectic of Hegel has a teleological feature whereas in Derrida’s deconstruction there is no finality. Derrida attempts to deconstruct messianism with his logic of *différance*. In the fourth chapter, I will attempt to re-examine Derrida’s charges on Hegel’s dialectic and his semiology. Hegel’s dialectic can be compared and contrasted with Derrida’s deconstruction. Whereas Hegel’s dialectic has its characteristic features of contradiction and sublation, Derrida’s deconstruction has *différance* meaning ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’.

Further Hegel's theory of speech and writing can be seen in his theory of sign, which is located in the movement of subjective spirit. Derrida's critique of Hegel's idealism lies in 'originary subject.'¹⁰ For Hegel, two opposite terms can be sublimated into higher unity – identity is identical within differences - in which there is unity in differences. But for Derrida's *différance* did not resolve the differences rather it exposes the ambivalent and obscurity of logocentrism in which Hegel is involved. What is central to Derrida's reading of Hegel's doctrine of spirit, dialectic and the sign is that Derrida tries to retain the horizontal character of Hegel's dialectic without its teleology. I'll attempt to evaluate Hegel's finality in writing against Derridean plurality.

Messianism is a doctrine that can be contested because of the discrepancies arising out of the three monotheistic religions i.e. Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Each religion has its own legitimate interpretation of *messiah* which sets insurmountable interlocution and poses remarkable questions on messianism. What is messianism? What effect does it have on the adherence of *messiah*? Is there a difference between messianism and *messiah* and how different is the difference? What is the horizontal and teleological impact of messianism? There are innumerable answers to these questions from divergent perspectives on the philosophical spectrum. In the present study, I will address the following problematic issues concerning messianism.

The term messianism is predominantly endorsed by Judaism and Christianity as a religious believe in the coming of *messiah*. In my study I will elucidate the significant role of messianism in both the religion in order to bring out the philosophical perspective of Hegel's and Derrida's account on dialectic and deconstruction. *Messiah*, in Hebrew is "mashiach" is "the anointed one" and in Greek translation it is Christ which also mean the anointed one. The biblical references of the coming of *messiah* are, to release His people, restore peace, to bring in prosperity and establish the Kingdom. As interpreted from the article "Hebrew Names of God" the *Messiah* in rabbinical Judaism, does not have divinity although bestowed with

¹⁰ Derrida, Jacques, *Positions*, p. 43.

divine powers and attributes.¹¹ It further pointed out that, “he functions as Israel’s Savior who would be empowered by God to:

1. Restore the Kingdom of David (Jer. 23:5; 30:9, Ezek. 34:23).
2. Restore the Temple in Zion (Isa. 2:2, Micah 4:1, Zech. 6:13, Ezek. 37:26-28)
3. Regather the exiles (Isa. 11:12, 43:5-6, 51:11)
4. Offer the New Covenant to Israel (Jer. 31:31-34)
5. Usher in world peace and the knowledge of the true God (Isa. 2:4; 11:9). This will include the entire world speaking Hebrew (Zeph. 3:9).
6. ‘Swallow up’ death and disease (Isa. 25:8)
7. Raise the dead to new life (Isa. 26:19)
8. Spread Torah knowledge of the God of Israel, which will unite humanity as one. As it says: ‘God will be King over all the world -- on that day, God will be One and His Name will be One’ (Zech. 14:9).”¹²

In Christianity, the following functions of *messiah* are also accepted as prophesized in the *Old Testament* but the *messiah* is Jesus who came to indwelt in the believer as portrayed in the *New Testament* of the *Bible*. The *messiah* has already come to redeem man from the Fall. First of all, man’s fall causes him to transgress against God’s commandment (*Rom.5:14*). Secondly, man fall under God’s condemnation (*Rom.5:16*). Thirdly, man became alienated from God (*Eph.8:18*). Fourthly, man’s sin ruined him from fulfilling God’s purpose (*Gen.1:26*). According to God’s righteous requirement, Redemption can only resolve man’s sins (*Heb. 9:12*) and it was accomplished on the cross (*Eph.1:7*). There was the need of mediation since man and God had incommensurable difference due to man’s sin. But through redemption man can return back to God who has become the processed triune God in order to dispense Himself into man (*2Cor. 13:14*). Though *messiah* has come to dwell in man, the triune God, the Father, the Son and the Spirit, the three in one God operate as one in transforming and conforming man into His image (*Gen.1:26; Mat.28:19*). So that Christ as the *Messiah* will come again to restore the earth, gather His called ones and usher in the kingdom of God and thus accomplish God’s goal (*Heb.10:37*).

¹¹ http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Names_of_G-d/Messiah/messiah.html. Accessed on 24/11/13.

¹² Ibid.

In Judaism as well as in Christianity there is the feature of waiting which encompasses them to be in the concept of messianism. The waiting aspect of *messiah* in messianism plays significant governing role in the life of both the Jews and the Christians. The teleological feature in both the Jewish and Christian is that the end will come for which they have been preparing themselves and expecting for the better future. The first chapter will emphasize messianism with *Messiah* and brings out the distinction between Jewish and Christian in their religious belief while waiting for *Messiah*.

Hegel, on the contrary, does not believe in *messiah* as the emancipator though he preferred Christian theology over all the other theology. Messianism in Hegel's dialectic does not necessarily comprise *messiah* itself. He indeed gets his dialectical idea from the Christian notion of trinity. According to Hegel, "Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient, and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite by which the finite, as that which is itself is other than itself, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite."¹³ For him, everything is amalgamated in a dialectical process of becoming. The dialectical process of Hegel comprises of moments of contradiction and these contradictions are overcome in sublation. He asserts that in sublation, differences are mutually interdependent on each other by identifying each other in their differences.

In his application of dialectic method there is a triadic movement which comes from his engagement with the theological concept of trinity. This implies that he was profoundly influenced by Christian theology. But adversely he criticizes the gospels of Jesus as private in nature confining to sect rather than the whole community. For Hegel, "In contrast to the religions of the Greeks and Romans which always address themselves to the entire people, Christianity refers primarily to the individual and to his salvation, the redemption of his soul."¹⁴ Hegel considered the teachings of Jesus as authoritarian and is an enslavement of men who were being deprived of their freedom.

¹³Hegel. *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, p. 150.

¹⁴ Lukacs. *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*, p. 61.

Hegel, on the other hand, advocates the finality of his philosophical discourse like the monotheistic religion. The essential element of his dialectical process is the waiting of the absolute to arrive. He maintains that, “The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially, result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is, and that precisely in this consists its nature.”¹⁵ The arrival of the absolute has been Hegel’s aspiration in developing his dialectics. Hegel’s dialectic on messianism is without *messiah*. Like the messianic religion, he is expecting finality that is when the absolute is attained there will be no more contradictions or differences or injustice.

Marx, in complementary to Hegel’s dialectic on messianism, is hoping for the emancipation of the struggling classes. Alienation emerges out of capitalism who own private property in which the workers labor to earn wages for their survival. Marx’s goal is to abolish private property and bring in communist society where everyone is no longer alienated. In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, he describes four types of alienation namely, alienation from the product, alienation from the activity, alienation from himself and alienation from other. When the labor class works under the capitalist, they do not own their production and their activities is not for themselves which makes them alienated from their essence. And moreover they do not have a social relationship with their co workers since they sole aim is to earn wages. This alienation causes men to suffer just like “the fall” in Christian theology that makes men miserable. There is a need for liberation from capitalism which in a Christian sense is from Satan who causes men to be alienated from God.

According to Marx, as cited by Gajo in his article, “communism as a society means the positive suppression of all alienation and the return of man from religion, the family, the state, etc., to his human, i.e., social life (existence).”¹⁶ Thus, his goal is to attain a communist society. In Marx as well as in Hegel, there is messianic principle of waiting which is seen in Judaism and Christianity. But the messianic structure of existence in Marx and Hegel is secular and does not involve any *messiah*. In short, Hegelian and Marxist messianic principle is messianism without *messiah*.

¹⁵Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p.11.

¹⁶ Petrovic, Gajo. “Marx’s Theory of Alienation,” p.424.

Marx's writing suggests that by abolishing the capitalist society alienation can be surmounted. He anticipates that the day will finally arrive to completely depose the capitalist society. In that day, the communists will own all the private properties and the people will not work like slaves to their masters. There will be equality among the people and they will be free to work according to their potentialities. Like Hegel, Marx is waiting for the finality to arrive. Both Hegel and Marx have a teleological aspect in their philosophy by which dialectic is implemented as a method. Hegel used dialectical method to arrive at the absolute and Marx sees dialectic in his protest for communist society. There is a striking similarity in their aspiration for the emancipation which makes them engage in messianism without *messiah's* interference.

Derrida on the contrary question the concept of finality on messianism in the dialectic of Hegel and Marx's socialism. In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida says,

one does not know if the expectation prepares the coming of the future-to-come, or if it recalls the repetition of the same thing as ghost...Is there not a messianic extremity, an *eskhaton* whose ultimate event (immediate rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of the infinite surprise, heterogeneity without accomplishment) can exceed, *at each moment*, the final term of a *phusis*, such as work, the production, and the *telos* of any history? The question is indeed "whither?" Not only whence comes the ghost but first of all is it going to come back? Is it not already beginning to arrive and where is it going? What of the future? The future can only be for the ghosts. And the past....¹⁷

Derrida deconstructs the believe prospect that one has in waiting for the future. He even declares that this coming event can never arrive, in fact he called it as the impossibility which possibility will never occur. This waiting has been repeatedly done from generations and yet it still does not appear. Derrida applies the waiting and believing element to the messianic principle in which everyone lives in the hope. His messianic interpretation does not succumb to any particular religion. With regards to the waiting aspect in messianism, Singh states that, "the messianic refers predominantly to a structure of our existence that involves waiting- waiting even in activity- and a ceaseless openness towards a future that can never be circumscribed by

¹⁷ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 44-5.

the horizons of significance that we inevitably bring to bear upon that possible future.”¹⁸

Derrida deconstructs the grand narratives of Hegel and Marx that waiting of the finality will never come to an end, it is a waiting that does not have the surety of arrival. He quoted Fukuyama definition of Hegelian and Marxist finality which says, “Both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human society was not open-ended, but would end when mankind had achieved a form of society that satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings. Both thinkers thus posited an “end of history”: for Hegel this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a communist society.”¹⁹ Derrida hold that there will never be the end of history since he deconstructs the idea of finality that Hegel and Marx have in mind. According to Derrida, history has no continuity; it is sporadic in nature with alteration. For him, the messianic structure of waiting is “...strange concept of messianism without content, of the messianic without messianism, that guide us here like the blind.”²⁰ In Derrida’s philosophical perspective, notion of waiting in messianism is unavailing.

Derrida question the trend of western metaphysic wherein he places Hegel and Marx. And in relative to this he also alleges that there is no finality in writing, language and the world. He deconstructs writing by asserting that “The idea of the book is the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier. This totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified pre-exists it, in its ideality. The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing...If I distinguish the text from the book, I shall say that the destruction of the book as it is now underway in all domains, denudes the surface of the text.”²¹ According to Derrida, there is no totality in writing which means there is no end in writing. Writing does not have a final goal since writing always refer to further writing and it goes on and on.

Derrida contends that the exertion of philosophy is not about arriving at the fullness or completion rather it should seek to understand the world in an untold ways and apprehends different meaning attaching to it. Derrida engages himself in

¹⁸ Singh, R.P. “Jacques Derrida’s Deconstruction of the Messianism/Messianic Notion”, p.81.

¹⁹ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, p.83.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.82.

²¹ Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, pp. 17-18.

philosophical discourse as “essential unrest”²² that he persistently move forward to many unexpected and unpredictability that he does not intend to achieve the truth which Hegel and Marx is thriving for. There is no waiting for the eschatology in his philosophical discourse which is why he deconstructs messianism in religion in Hegel and in Marx. It can be concluded that according to Derrida, “The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement One wishes to go back *from the supplement to the source*; one must recognize that there is “a supplement at the source”²³ In *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts* it is mentioned that, “Language, text and writing are constituted by supplementarily, by a network of traces and referents, references to other references, a general referability without simple origin, presence or destination.”²⁴

Concerning language and the world, the relationship can be observed in different context with different meaning. The relation is indeterminate since words used in language have pluralistic meaning in the world with reference to diverse circumstances. The relationship between language and the world is open like the waiting that Derrida submit it to messianism which is ‘awaiting’ without an end. There is no teleology entailed in the relation of language and the world which is why Derrida critique the grand narratives or the metaphysical notions of Hegel’s dialectic and Marx’s communism that involve finality.

To sum up, in Judaism and Christianity there is *messiah* in messianism whereas in Hegel and Marx philosophy there is messianism without *messiah*. According to Derrida, the messianic factor of waiting is seen in monotheistic religions as well in Hegel and Marx. For him, the expecting activity that engages in messianism makes one involve in fundamentalism. His interpretation of messianism is pluralistic in nature and it does not pin down to any religious framework. In my thesis, I propose to bring out all the biblical evidences in emphasizing messianism in Judaism and Christianity in order to highlight the contestation regarding the concept of *Messiah* involving in these monotheistic religions.

²² Edited by Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*, p.188.

²³ Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, p. 304.

²⁴ Edited by Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*, p.107.

I will compare and contrast the notion of messianism with the objective of divulging what Derrida wishes to deconstruct in his philosophy. Derrida seems to place Hegel and Marx in the same platform as those engrossed in Judaism and Christianity in relation to their participation for the teleological aspect which he believes to be actively present in the concept of messianism. It seems that eschatology is the main concern for Derrida in critiquing messianism in Hegel and Marx as well as in Jewish and Christian belief. I will attempt to base my study on the primary writings of Hegel, Marx and Derrida in order to give a critical analysis on the issues concern and to provide a comparative study on Hegel and Derrida.

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Chapter 1

Messianism and the *Messiah*

In order to bring out messianism as a contested concept, this chapter highlights some features of messianic principle in Judaism and Christianity. According to the Jews, *messiah* will be the descendent of King David who will one day appear to restore the Kingdom of Israel and usher in the era of peace, prosperity and the knowledge of God. The Jewish are still waiting for *messiah* to come. The Christians, on the other hand, believe that *messiah* is Jesus Christ who is both human and divine by passing through the process of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension is dispensing Himself in to man. This *messiah will* come again for the restoration and manifestation of His kingdom. Judaism fundamentally base their beliefs in the *Old Testament* of the Bible while Christianity considers the *Old Testament* as prefigure of the *New Testament* and hold their belief basically in the *New Testament*. I will bring out the biblical concepts of Fall, Redemption, the final day of Judgment which in due course gave rise to the notion of messianism. This chapter consists of three sections; namely, A) *Messiah*: An exposition which is divided into i) Concept of Sin/ Fall, ii) Doctrine of Redemption, B) Contestation on Messianism and *Messiah*: Judaism and Christianity, C) Eschatology / the Day of Judgment.

This chapter explicates messianism as contested concept by emphasizing on the notion of *Messiah* according to Judaism and Christianity. In order to substantiate the view on *Messiah*, this chapter highlights the concepts of fall/sin and redemption and defines the known characteristics of *Messiah* in order to fit it into the framework of messianism. Messianism is a belief in *Messiah which* prevails in the three monotheistic religions namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This chapter discusses messianism in Judaism and Christianity. *Messiah* (*mashiach* in Hebrew) is “the anointed one” appointed by God. The anointed one will come to release His people from repression and the appearing of *Messiah* has been the sustaining hope of the Jewish people for generations. According to the Jewish tradition, King *Messiah* is the instrument by whom God’s kingdom is to be established in Israel and in the

world.²⁵ For Christians, “Christ is God’s Anointed, the One appointed by God to accomplish God’s purpose, God’s eternal plan.”²⁶ The Christian notion of messianism in the *Bible* basically the *New Testament* has been engrossed with the concept of Trinity, Paradise, Fall/ Sin, Redemption and the Judgment day.

Messianism is a doctrine that can be contested because of the discrepancies arising out of the three monotheistic religions i.e. Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Each religion has its own legitimate interpretation of *Messiah* which set insurmountable interlocution and pose remarkable questions on messianism. What is messianism? What effect does it have on the adherence of *Messiah*? Is there a difference between messianism and *Messiah* and how different is the differences? What is the horizontal and teleological impact of messianism? Is waiting still continuing or is it over with the coming of Jesus? There are innumerable answers to these questions from divergent perspectives on the philosophical spectrum. This chapter addresses the different perspectives of messianism according to Judaism and Christianity in order to bring out messianism as a contested doctrine.

As a matter of fact, Judaism fundamentally bases its belief in the *Old Testament* of the *Bible* while Christianity considers the *Old Testament* as prefigure of the *New Testament* and hold their belief basically in the *New Testament*. According to the Jews, *Messiah* will be the descendent of King David who will one day appear to restore the Kingdom of Israel and usher in the era of peace, prosperity and the knowledge of God. “According to the rabbinical Judaism, this *Messiah* figure is not divine though he certainly has divine powers and attributes. Indeed, he functions as Israel’s Savior who would be empowered by God.”²⁷ The Jewish community is still waiting for *Messiah* to come. The Christians, on the other hand, believes that Jesus Christ is the *Messiah*, born of human and descendent of King David who possesses divine nature.²⁸ This Jesus who is both human and divine is believed to be the only begotten Son of God and the second of the divine trinity.²⁹ And by passing through the processes of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension, He is dispensing Himself into man.

²⁵ http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Names_of_G-d/Messiah/Messiah.html. Accessed on 24/10/13.

²⁶ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, John 1:41.

²⁷ http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Names_of_G-d/Messiah/Messiah.html. Accessed on 24/10/13

²⁸ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, Mathew 1: 1-25.

²⁹ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, John 3:16; 5:43; 14: 9-10.

The *Messiah* who is within the believer subjectively will come again in His glory for the restoration and manifestation of His kingdom. This chapter highlights the *biblical* concepts of fall, redemption, the final Day of Judgment which in due course gave rise to the notion of messianism. In Judaism as well as in Christianity there is the feature of waiting which encompasses them to be in the concept of messianism. The eschatological aspect of *Messiah* in messianism plays significant governing role in the life of both the Jews and the Christians.

The term messianism is predominantly endorsed by Judaism and Christianity as a religious belief in the coming of *Messiah*. This chapter elucidates the significant role of messianism in both the religions in order to bring out the philosophical perspective of Hegel's and Derrida's account on dialectic and deconstruction respectively, which will be discussed in the succeeding chapters. As mentioned earlier, *Messiah* in Hebrew is "*mashiach*" which is "the anointed one" and in Greek translation it is Christ which also means the anointed one. The *biblical* references of the coming *Messiah* are to release His people, restore peace, to bring in prosperity and establish the Kingdom. But Judaism and Christianity hold different views on *Messiah* especially regarding His becoming and nature.

Section- A

Messiah: An Exposition

Looking into the aspects of *Messiah*, there arise many questions; as to why *Messiah* plays a very imperative role in both Judaism and Christianity? Who is this *Messiah*? What are the supposedly central themes that *Messiah* holds in these monotheistic religions? What are the similarities and dissimilarities between Judaism and Christianity concerning the concept of *Messiah*? As mentioned earlier, the common view that is held regarding *Messiah* is that, in Hebrew *Messiah* is "*mashiach*" which means "the anointed one" appointed by God. According to the interpretation of Daniel, the term originally described anyone anointed ceremonially for consecrated task, such as a king or a priest. He explained that when the Babylonian exiled, they looked forward to their return to Judea, some had talked of their future as organized around one of God's anointed, and had endowed this king or priest with flattering virtues.

He further stated that the expectation which the people had on the *Messiah* as the appointed one has added various miraculous potencies to his person and thus his role in the eschatological drama became a more supernatural one.³⁰ As a matter of fact, Judaism accepts *Messiah* as purely human by denying his divine aspect which Christianity imbibes it in their faith. George in his article ‘Weber on the Eschatology of the Talmud II’ mentioned that though *Messiah* was exalted in position above all ancient prophets and priests, the Jewish theology advocate *Messiah* not to be more than human. In Psalms 110:1, it is written that He shall sit at God’s right hand and Abraham, sitting on the left, shall say: “Lord, the son of my son (David) sits at thy right hand and I at thy left,” but the Lord will comfort him by the answer, “The son of thy son does sit at my right hand and I sit at thy right hand.”³¹ For the Jewish, *Messiah*, the anointed one other than being human does not have a supernatural power. He was sent by God to rescue His people from bondages and bring them back to the Promised Land. In order to carry out God’s predestination for His people, *Messiah* was anointed by God through the priest or prophet, so the idea of him having divine nature completely rule out in Judaism.

“The term “*Messiah*” is not used to refer to “anointed” objects that were designated and consecrated for specific cultic purposes but to persons only. Persons who were anointed had been elected, designated, appointed, given authority, qualified, and equipped for specific offices and tasks related to these.”³² In the *Bible*, the significance of the divine anointing are listed below:

1. Consecration for God’s service as authorized by God.
2. The anointed one is God’s inviolable choice (*1 Sam. 24:8*).
3. The anointing is accompanied in God’s special enablement (*1Sam. 10:6; 16:13*).
4. Being anointed is the engagement in the coming promised deliverance of Israel (*Isa. 11:1-5; 61:1*).³³

Messiah as the ‘anointed one’ has the given attributes that qualifies Him to be the man who can rescue the people from their sufferings. He is chosen by God to

³⁰ Silver, Daniel Jeremy, *A History of Judaism Volume I From Abraham to Maimonides*, pp. 248-9.

³¹ Stevens, George B., “Weber on the Eschatology of the Talmud. II,” p. 46.

³² <http://www.biblestudytools.com/dictionary/Messiah/> . Accessed on 24/10/13.

³³ http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Names_of_G-d/Messiah/Messiah.html. Accessed on 24/10/13.

accomplish His purpose for creating men. According to the *Bible*, as perceived by the Christians, the subject and the content of the *Bible* is Jesus Christ, the *Messiah* who has passed through incarnation, human living, death, crucifixion and resurrection in order that He can dispenses Himself into man. Jesus being the Son of God is the anointed one who was send by God the Father in order to bring salvation to mankind so that God and men can have a relationship. God loves men to such an extent that He send His only begotten Son (*John 3:16*) on earth to save them from their oppression and impart His divine life and nature into them.

For the Christians, God became the processed triune God that is the Father, the Son and the Spirit so that Jesus the *Messiah* can reconciles men and God to have a union in life. It is only when Jesus as the Son came can human participate in the life of God and be save from their sufferings which was due to sins. Men can partake of the divine life and nature of God because God in His trinity is dispensing Himself into men through the processed and consummated Spirit. In the *Bible*, the concept of trinity is for the dispensation of God's life into men that men can become like God in life and in nature but not in the Godhead. *Messiah* in Christian's view is Jesus Christ who has come in His humanity to give life to mankind by becoming the Spirit through death and resurrection so that they can be free from sin and be the expression of God.

In Christianity, *Messiah* is both human and divine who can set His people free from all kinds of slavery. Whereas in Judaism, *Messiah* has not come for many years and they are still waiting for Him to come and save them. Judaism does not accept Jesus Christ as the *Messiah* because they think that if Jesus is the *Messiah*, he would have gathered all the lost tribes of Israelites who were in exile. Since many Jewish are still in exile even after Jesus came, they did not consider Jesus as the *Messiah*.

The Jews basically based their religious belief on the law and ordinances depicted only in the *Old Testament* that they rejected Jesus as the *Messiah* in the *New Testament* of the *Bible*. They are relentlessly anticipating *Messiah* who will eventually bring back all the lost tribes of Israel who were scattered all over the earth and will deliver His chosen race from their slavery.

Both Judaism and Christianity differ in their belief in *Messiah* which will be cover in the later part of this chapter. The similarity between these religions is that, for the

Jews, like in Christianity, *Messiah* being the anointed one is the only who is qualified to release His people. Both expect *Messiah* to come but the difference is that Christians are waiting for the second coming of *Messiah* and based their belief in both the *Old* and *New Testament*.

i) Concept of Sin/ Fall

On analyzing how *Messiah* being the anointed one can execute God's plan in creating man, it is seen that both Judaism and Christianity maintained that *Messiah* is the anointed one as prescribed in the *Bible*. The reason why *Messiah* plays a pivotal character in both the religion is that both consider that human beings are under the bondage of suffering which comes from Sin. Both Jewish and Christian believe that sin originated from Adam who disobeyed the divine commandment which is not to partake of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.³⁴ The cause of suffering is sin and thus one can see the need for emancipation from affliction.

Sin, for the Jews can be either towards God or towards national/ individual which issues in suffering. According to the Jewish theocracy there are three types of sins namely - 1) Fault or misstep or shortcoming (*hettat*) is the lightest sin of all that is committed out of ignorance of the meaning or existence of commandment. 2) Iniquity (*awon*) is committed knowingly the existence of commandment because of the lust of the flesh or emotion. 3) Transgression (*pasha*) is done intentionally by rebelling against God in not keeping the law or commandment which is considered to be the most serious sin.³⁵ In correspondence to the given sins, the Psalms 4:6 in the *Bible* says "...we have sinned...we have committed iniquity, we have done wickedly." Only the anointed one, appointed by God can only lead them to salvation from suffering.

The suffering that the Jewish nation undergoes is a kind of subjugation for them since their Promised Land has been taken away and they cannot dwell in their own land. Shailer in his article, 'The Permanent elements in the Faith in a *Messiah*' pointed out that the Jewish nations look forward to be released from suppression and the failures in their persistent attempt to be delivered always lead them back to God

³⁴ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, Genesis 3:22-3.

³⁵ <http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/13761-sin>. Accessed on 20/11/14.

whom they believed to be the only savior. And Jehovah might use human who is endowed with His spirit and power to be the deliverer. This undying hope for the godly liberation necessitates messianism.³⁶

Judaism, like Christianity, upholds that suffering which derived from sin, is also part of God's plan in chastising His people to make them His expression. In a way, God is using man's suffering to mould them in to His image and likeness. "The great and worthwhile gifts- the Torah, the Promised Land, and the world to come- are gained only through suffering. Suffering exists so that a good man is purged here and now for minor sins, that he may enter immediately into paradise. Suffering hastens *Messiah*."³⁷ The given lines clearly depicts that the suffering that men endure will make them realize their need for *Messiah* who could actually emancipate them. For the Jewish, to live in exile is a suffering which gives rise to inevitable *Messiah* that can bring them back to their homeland. They never give up their hope for the appearing of *Messiah*. It is ironic that the more the anticipated *Messiah* delayed His coming the stronger their hope is and they are by no means tired of waiting. Therefore, *Messiah* plays a prominent role in Judaism.

To examine the importance of *Messiah* in Christianity, it is appropriate to stress on the concept of Sin. Just as in Judaism, there is the need for the anointed one who can release His people from suffering, so is the need for Christian's *Messiah*. Though there are differences between Christianity and Judaism regarding *Messiah*, one cannot really separate them since both based their faith in the scriptures which is the *Bible*. The scripture of Jewish tradition is *Tanakh* which is the *Old Testament* of the *Bible* and the Christian scriptures consist of both the *Old Testament* and the *New Testament* of the *Bible*. Donald asserts that Christianity is indebted to the Jewish scriptures because the *Old Testament* is shared largely with Judaism. "Its methods of interpretation, its guiding symbols, institutional structures, forms of piety, and many theological motifs are drawn from and can be understood only in the light of Jewish history and Jewish faith. These are not peripheral motifs, either: Christian notions of God, of creation, of salvation history, of covenant, of the moral life, our theology of history-to name a few. It should be noted that this dependence on a Jewish context for

³⁶Mathews, Shailer, "The Permanent Message of Messianism: I. The Permanent Elements in the Faith in a *Messiah*, The Biblical World," pp. 268-9.

³⁷Silver, Daniel Jeremy, *A History of Judaism Volume I, From Abraham to Maimonides*, p. 308.

comprehending Christianity is not simply a fact from the past but an ongoing reality.”³⁸ When one discussed about suffering which comes from sin one cannot completely detach Christianity from Judaism.

In understanding the significance of *Messiah*, it is imperative to highlight the concept of Sin. The concept of Sin in Christianity is mostly intertwined with Judaism since the *Tanakh* contributes the *Old Testament* of the *Bible*. How does Sin come into being? Can man be free from Sin? Judaism believe that when God created man, He gave man a free will and that he is responsible for his sin because human being are not created with an inclination to do evil. But then again, it is also said that “For the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth (Gen.8:21).” Therefore, God allows His people to repent and be forgiven.

According to the *Bible*, God created man in His own image and likeness with the intention of working Himself into man as life so that man can express Him and exercise His dominion over all things. “And God said, let us make man in our image according to our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of heaven and over the cattle and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth” (*Gen. 1:26*). In this verse, God’s image refers to God’s inner being which is for the expression of the inward essence of God’s attributes.³⁹ The most prominent attributes are love (*1John 4:8*), light (*1John 1:5*), holiness (*Rev. 4:8*), and righteousness (*Jer. 23:6*).⁴⁰ God’s likeness on the other hand refer to God’s form (*Phil. 2:6*) is the expression of essence and nature of God’s person.⁴¹ Man’s inward virtues which are created in man’s spirit are copies of God’s attributes and are the means for man to express God’s attributes. And man’s outward form, created as man’s body, is the copy of God’s form.

Thus, God created man to be a duplication of Himself that he may have the capacity to contain God and express Him. All other living things were created “according to their kind” (*Gen. 1: 11-12, 21, 24-25*) but man was created according to God’s race as given in the *Bible*, it says, “... For we are also His race. Being then the race of God...” (*Acts 17:28-29*). Since God and man are of the same kind, it is

³⁸ Senior, Donald C.P.C, “Understanding the Divide between Judaism and Christianity,” pp. 67-8.

³⁹ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, Footnotes *Gen. 1:26*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

⁴¹ *Ibid*.

possible for man to be joined to God and to live together with Him in an organic union (*Rom.6:5; 11:17-24*). In *1 Cor. 6:17* it is given that, “But he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit”. From the given verses, one can see that man can be united with God and be one with Him.

The objective of God giving dominion to man is first of all to subdue God’s enemy, Satan who rebelled against God; secondly, to recover the earth, which was usurped by Satan; and finally, to exercise God’s authority over the earth in order that the kingdom of God may come to the earth, the will of God may be done on the earth, and the glory of God may be manifested on the earth.⁴² In *Genesis 2*, God place Adam in front of the tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil allowing him to have free choice - “ And Jehovah God commanded the man saying, Of every tree of the garden you may eat freely” (*Gen.2:16*).

At the same time God also commanded Adam by saying, “But of the fruit of the tree which of the knowledge of good and evil, of it you shall not eat; for in the day you eat of it you shall surely die” (*Gen. 2:17*). Despite of the solemn warning from God, they partook of the wrong tree which signifies Satan and thus sin entered into them. Man failed to fulfill God’s purpose in creating them and their choice cut them off from the tree of life (*Gen.3:22-24*). As a result, man became alienated from God by being sinful and corrupted. Because of this corrupting element, God was barred by His glory, holiness, and righteousness from contacting fallen man. Thus, man is estranged from God and can no longer express Him in His image and represent Him to rule over all created things.

In Judaism and Christianity, after the Fall of Adam, the concept of sin came into being which portrays the need for a savior who can set man free from sin. The fall of man is the beginning of suffering since they became independent from God as their source and life supply. In order to expound the need for *Messiah*, let us study the outcome of man’s alienation from God (which is because of their sin). First of all, man’s fall causes him to transgress against God’s commandments. In the *Bible* there are many places where one can find instances of man’s transgression. This verse, “But death reign from Adam until Moses, even over those who have not sinned after the likeness of Adam’s transgression, who is a type of him who was to come” (*Romans*

⁴² Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, *Matt. 6:10, 13*.

5:14) highlights the fact that through *Adam's transgression*, everyone who is born of sin.

The concept of sin originated from Adam who transgressed against God's commandment by forsaking the tree of life, which denote God as life. Instead of taking the tree of life, Adam pursues the tree of knowledge signifying Satan as the source of death (*Gen.2: 8-9, 17; 3:1-7*) and thereby transgressed God's commandments. As stated earlier, in Judaism we also see transgression as rebellion against God's commandment and that cause enmity between God and man. Transgression is an intentional offense which is considered to be the serious sin in Judaism.

Secondly, Adam's one offense caused man to fall under God's condemnation. "So then was it through one offense unto condemnation to all men..." (*Rom.5:18*). The above verse indicates that the fall of the first man, Adam which is an offense to God is condemned by God. Not only did man transgress against God's commandments but also fell under God's condemnation. To be under God's condemnation in Judaism and Christianity is to die that is "For if, by the offense of the one, death reign through the one..." (*Rom. 5:17*). Man is condemned to death for his sin therefore there is a need for the atonement of sin.

Thirdly, man became alienated from God by partaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. *Genesis 3:8* stated that man hid himself from God's presence right after his fall. This means that man was estranged from God and *Eph.4:18* tell us that man in his fallen state is "Being hardened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of ignorance which is in them, because of the hardness of their heart." Man lost the right to take pleasure in God as his everything and therefore become alienated from God. Since then, man started creating his own entertainment for his enjoyment. Thus, man started indulging in his lust which Judaism terms it as iniquity. Man being alienated from God lives according to his lustful desires which is against God's holy nature.

Fourthly, man's sin ruined him from fulfilling God's purpose which is to express God in His image and represent God with His dominion (*Gen.1:26*). Due to man's fall, satanic nature has entered into him, hindering him from the fulfillment of

God's purpose. Man can no longer represent God and fail to exercise the dominion on behalf of God. Though man is not created with an evil nature, he inherited sin in his being and does things according to evil nature which is far from accomplishing God's will. Thus, man became an expression of Satan rather than an expression of God.

Through his fall, man received Satan's evil thoughts, feeling and will into the inward parts of his soul and his spirit became deadened and his body corrupted. "And the serpent said to the woman, You shall not surely die! For God knows that in that day you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will become like God, knowing good and evil" (*Gen. 3:4*). In *Gen.3:1, 4* and *5*, it is seen that Satan's thoughts were injected into man's mind, his feeling was injected into man's emotion, and his will injected into man's will. This means that man's soul was taken over by Satan. Not only was his soul affected but also the member of his body was contaminated.

From then on, man's body was being transmuted into flesh and it was corrupted with full of lust which is why in *Rom.7:18-20*, Paul mentioned that, "For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, nothing good dwells; for to will is present with me, but to work out the good is not. For I do not do the good which I will; but he evil which I do not will, this I practice. But if what I do not will, this I do, *it is* no longer I *that* work it out but sin that dwells in me". Satan became the very sin within man controlling his soul and directing it to do evil with evil mind. Though man has a good intention of doing good work, he fails to do so because of sin dwelling inside of him. *Rom.7:8, 11, 17, 20* indicates sin as a person, the embodiment of Satan that stays inside man and that whenever man desires to do good he is incapable of doing it. In short, sin is the personification of Satan that lives in man and through his fall, he became one with Satan. As a result, man became deadened in his spirit (*Eph. 2: 1, 5*) and the function of the spirit is damage.

The spirit was created to contact and contain God but due to sin it cannot function as it should. Man who was created with three parts consisting of spirit, soul and body "...may your spirit and soul and body be preserved..." (*1 Thes. 5:23*). The spirit of man is an organ to connect with God where there is intuition, conscience and fellowship. Man can contact God through his spirit since God Himself is Spirit. "God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truthfulness" (*John 4:24*). This verse proves that importance of human spirit in order to remain in touch

with God. The soul has three parts namely, mind, will and emotion. The mind was to know God but sin enter into it so it knows many things other than God. The will originally was to choose God but it chooses not to contact God and instead it chooses many things apart from God. The emotion was created to love God but it loves every other thing except God and man is incapable of loving God. To love God is the greatest commandment from God but man love the world and its lust because of his sinful nature.

The significance of man's fall is that Satan was taken into man which means sin entered into man, and man became a victim of death (*Rom.5: 12,14a; 1 Cor. 15: 22*). "Therefore just as through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin, death; and thus death passed on to all men because all have sinned" (*Rom.5: 12*). This verse points out that death passed on to all man through sin and that everyone who is born in sin is destined to die. Thus, death is the ultimate consequence of man's fall. *Romans 5: 14a* says that from Adam to Moses, death reigned as a king in a way that no one can escape death. "For just as in Adam all die..." (*1 Cor. 15: 22*) meaning that in Adam all die and that from Adam's fall man is destine to die because of sin.

Thus, mankind became a victim of death and suffers death. Both Judaism and Christianity held that only blood can cleanse the sin of man. In the *Old Testament*, there are lots of offering done for the atonement of sin like sin offering and trespass offering where there are animal sacrifices. We can see that there is the need for redemption which reconciles God and man. And this redemption can only be carried out by God send one that is the *Messiah*. The reason why only *Messiah* can perform redemption is that a sinful man cannot save a sinful person. So only who is in the likeness of flesh but does not sin can do this. And the rightful person who can perform this according to the Christian is the *Messiah*, Jesus Christ.

Regarding the concept of sin, both Judaism and Christianity held that sin entered into men through the fall of Adam and since then men has been the victim of sins which cause them to be under the bondage of sufferings. Both religions strongly believe that only *Messiah* can liberate them from their sufferings and they have been waiting for the *Messiah* to come. Though both of these religions have been hoping for the *Messiah* to appear, the striking difference between Jews and Christians is that for the Christians *Messiah* is Jesus Christ who came on earth as human to save the people

from their sins in order to impart His divine life and nature to the receivers through His death and resurrection. So, for the Christians, Jesus Christ is the *Messiah* who has come to dwell inside the believers so that they all can grow in the life of God. But this *Messiah* will come again physically at the end of this age, just like in Judaism, to release His people from their afflictions and establishes His Kingdom.

ii) Doctrine of Redemption

It is pertinent to discuss further the notion of redemption which is the next step to sin and illustrate how redemption and the need for the coming of *Messiah* can be related. Here comes the diverging point between Judaism and Christianity. For the Jewish, God alone is qualified to forgive the sins of man and they did not accept that *Messiah* can forgive man's sin. Unlike Christianity, *Messiah* for them is a human being and has no supernatural potentialities to redeemed man. They hope for a divine deliverance to come from God but they do not acknowledge Jesus as the *Messiah*. Donald in his article 'Understanding the Judaism-Christianity Divide' pointed out the fact that "the *New Testament* affirms that God's plan of salvation is fulfilled in Jesus Christ obviously puts Christianity in serious disagreement with Judaism. Thus, paradoxically, the *New Testament* both affirms its attachment to the *Old Testament* revelation and its disagreement with the synagogue."⁴³

Thus, one cannot deny that fact that Judaism and Christianity are related to each other and that one cannot divide it in a precise manner. While stating the similarities between the two, Donald used a metaphor of a relationship where he describes that Christianity and Judaism cannot be divorce since both share a common spiritual DNA that did not cease to exist even when one tries to segregate them. For this reason, one can say that there is a unity in their differences. "Christianity cannot be defined or understood without Judaism. And Judaism, even if it were to wish otherwise, has to reckon with Christianity as a religious movement born in Judaism and bearing its vital signs. And, too, the relationship is not symmetrical.

Christianity emerged from *biblical* Judaism-*biblical* Judaism did not emerge from Christianity. If we must use metaphors to try to understand our relationship then I think familial metaphors of blood relationship are truer to the mark: Christianity and

⁴³ Senior, Donald C.P.C, "Understanding the Divide between Judaism and Christianity," p.69.

Judaism are siblings, even if estranged. And Judaism is the elder brother.”⁴⁴ There are innumerable occasions in the *Bible* that proves the similarities and differences between Judaism and Christianity which will be discuss later. To begin with, let us observe the concept of redemption in Christianity which cannot be fragmented from Judaism since the idea of redemption begins form the *Old Testament*.

Christians regards Jesus Christ as the redeemer who has to come to redeem man back to God because of sin in order to fulfill God’s original purpose in creating man, which is making man like Him in life and in nature for His expression. Man being sinful is condemned under law and cannot redeem himself. “The universe is not without an owner. It is ruled by God, who controls the universe with His rules. God’s rules are God’s laws. God’s law is righteous therefore He cannot regard a sinful man as sinner. Man has sin and is condemned under the law. Therefore, sinful man needs redemption. A price must be paid to fulfill the demand of the law and to redeem man from the condemnation of the law.”⁴⁵

The verse “And not through the blood of goats and calves but through His own blood, entered once for all into the *Holy of Holies*, obtaining an eternal redemption” (*Hebrew 9:12*) reveals that according to God’s righteous requirement, Redemption resolves man’s sins. Because in God’s righteousness, sinful man must die, so in order to redeem man, there must be another death. Only another death can satisfy the requirement of God’s righteousness and only such a death can redeem man from their sins. “In the *Old Testament*, the redemption of Christ was not yet accomplished. Therefore, it was typified by the propitiation accompanied through the animal sacrifices. Under this propitiation, God was legally free to contact man, and man was repositioned to enjoy the right to take God as life (*Psalms 36: 8-9*).”⁴⁶ Redemption was typified by the offering of goats and bulls in the *Old Testament*. Animals were killed and blood was shed for sin offering to God in order to accomplished atonement for man’s sins. “But the death and shedding of the blood of goats and bulls was only a

⁴⁴ Ibid. p.70.

⁴⁵ Lee, Witness, *Gospel Outlines*, p. 69.

⁴⁶ Lee, Witness, *The Triune God to Be Life to the Tripartite Man*, p.13.

shadow, not the reality; while it made atonements for sin, it could not redeem man from their sins.”⁴⁷

The first step of God’s accomplishment of redemption in reality was the incarnation of Jesus (the Son of God). In the *Old Testament*, God did not enter into man but in the *New Testament*, God entered into man in His incarnation to become a man. In *Matthew 1:21* it is prophesied that “and she will bear a son, and you shall call His name Jesus, for *it is* He *who* will save His people from their sins.” The incarnation of Jesus was already foretold that he will be born as a human in the womb of Mary and He will be the salvation for all sinners. It was also told to Joseph that “... Joseph, son of David, do not be afraid to take Mary your wife, for that which has been begotten in her is of the Holy Spirit” (*Mat. 1:20*). This verse also discloses that Jesus incarnation was conceived of the Holy Spirit. To further suggest the coming of Jesus at the human level it is predicted that “Behold the virgin shall be with a child and shall bear a son and they shall call His name Emmanuel” (which is translated, God with us) (*Mat.1: 23*). He does not come only as a man but He became a flesh as given in (*John 1: 14*) “And the Word became flesh and tabernacle among us” and He was sent by God in the likeness of the flesh of sin “...God, sending His own Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin...” (*Rom.8: 3*). Jesus was in the likeness of the flesh of sin though there was no sin in His flesh. He was sent in such a way that He could take away the sins of the world. “According to *2 Cor.5: 21*, Paul says that Christ did not know sin, yet this one who did not know sin was made sin on behalf of man which was also portrayed in the *Old Testament* as the brass serpent in *Numbers 21*.”⁴⁸ When the children of Israel sinned against God, they were bitten by a fiery serpent and were dying.

Moses pleaded to God for them and “Then Jehovah said to Moses, make a fiery serpent, and set it on a pole; and everyone who is bitten, when he see, it shall live” (v. 8). And in (v. 9) “And Moses made a bronze serpent and set it on a pole; and if a serpent had bitten any man, when he looked at the bronze serpent, he lived.” This clearly indicates that the bronze serpent bears only the appearance, the likeness, of a serpent, but not its poisonous nature. This corresponds to Paul’s word, “in the likeness

⁴⁷Lee, Witness, *Gospel Outlines*, p. 317.

⁴⁸Lee, Witness, *The Basic Revelation of the Holy Scriptures*, p. 21.

of the flesh of sin”, which means the bronze serpent signifies Jesus who did not have sinful nature but was made sin on behalf of mankind and was hung on the cross to die for sinners. Not only was He the bronze serpent, He was also the lamb of God who was obedient unto death. Lamb in the *Bible* signifies meek, lowly, humble and obedient. “He was oppressed, and it was He who afflicted, yet he did not open His mouth; Like a lamb that is led to the slaughter and like a sheep that is dumb before its shearers, so He did not open His mouth” (*Isa. 53:7*).

The Lord Jesus like the lamb was always under God’s ruling while He was living on this earth and by obeying the Father’s command; He suffered on behalf of all fallen man. In *John 1: 29*, “The next day he was Jesus coming to him and said, Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world!” The Lamb of God was Jesus who was sent on this earth to wash the sin of the world that and that man may be saved in His life. When Jesus died on the cross, He was not only a lamb in the eyes of God but also a serpent. And in *John 3: 14* we see that Jesus was typified by the bronze serpent- “And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up”. From the given verses it is seen that Jesus was in the likeness of the bronze serpent as well as the Lamb of God just like He comes as a human in the likeness of the flesh of sin to save man from his sin.⁴⁹

By His incarnation for the accomplishment of redemption, He took the form of man to be one with man, having blood and flesh. *Heb.2: 15* tell us, “Since therefore the children have partaken of blood and flesh, He also Himself in like manner shared in the same”. In the *Bible*, it is said that, there is no forgiveness of sin without the shedding of blood, “And almost all things are purified by blood according to the law, and without shedding of blood there is no forgiveness” (*Hebrew 9: 22*). The blood of Jesus Christ can redeem man from under the law that the law could no longer confine man under condemnation. Since the blood of Christ redeems man from the condemnation of law, it breaks down the barrier between God and man. Thus, man who was alienated from God because of sin was brought back to God.

Redemption was accomplished on the cross and it brings man back to God. “For Christ also has suffered for once for sins, the Righteous on behalf of the unrighteous, that He might bring you to God, and on the one hand being put to death

⁴⁹Ibid., p.22.

in the flesh, but on the other, made alive in the Spirit” (*1 Pet. 3:18*). The suffering which sinners are presumed to suffer was suffered by Jesus through redemption so that sinners can be made alive. “The Lord Jesus bore man’s sin on the cross and suffered punishment for sins (*1 Pet.2:24, 1 Cor.15: 3, Heb.9:28*). Also according to *Isaiah 53: 6*, when Christ was on the cross, God took all sins and put them upon the Lamb of God.”⁵⁰ Sin was condemned and judged on the cross since Christ bore the sins and was judged by God once and for all. In His crucifixion, all the believers are also crucified with Him (*Gal.2: 20*). *Rom.6: 6* say, “Our old man has been crucified with Him.” The old man here is the sinful man who has become old because of sin and the old creation is all the creation before Christ (the Son) redemption. When He was crucified, the old man and the old creation had been crucified with Him.

“Abolishing in His flesh the law of the commandments in ordinances, that he creates the two in himself into one new man, so making peace, and might reconcile both in one Body to God through the cross, having slain the enmity by it” (*Eph. 2: 15*). The given verse reveals that Jesus on the cross has reconciled God and man who was once enemy because of sin. Not only old man and old creation were crucified on Christ’s crucifixion, “He also abolished the law of commandments in ordinance through His death (*Eph. 2: 15*). In the *Old Testament*, among many ordinances, the main thing was the circumcision of Jews which divided them from the gentiles. The Lord came to abolish this on the cross (*Colossians 2: 10, 14*).”⁵¹ Through Christ’s redemption, the difference between the Jews and the gentiles were terminated and in the eyes of God they are one.

Other ordinances were concerning the Jewish regulation on diet. In *Acts 10: 9* and *6*, Peter was told by God to eat unclean and common animals which signifies that Christ already abolished this dietary regulation so there is no more unclean and common food; all are sanctified in Christ. Christ’ complete redemption has taken away sins, crucifies the old man and terminated the old creation, and also abolished the differences between races. Now in Him there are no sins. All the believers have become the member of the Body of Christ which is the Church- “For even as the body is one and has many members, yet all the members of the body, being many, are one

⁵⁰Ibid., p.45.

⁵¹Ibid.

body, so also is the Christ” (*1 Cor. 12: 12*). The redemption has not only redeemed man back to God but it also unites all the believers of God as one.

Another aspect of His death on the cross was that, He also destroys the devil “Since therefore the children shared in blood and flesh, He also Himself in like manner partook of the same, that through death He might destroy him who has the might of death, that is, the devil” (*Heb. 2: 14*). Apart from destroying the devil, He also cast out Satan who is the instigator of sin and in *John 12: 31* Jesus cast out the ruler of this world that is Satan. He says, “Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the ruler of this world be cast out.” The Son of God through His redemption abolished death and destroyed Satan who has the might of death (*2 Tim.1: 10b; Heb.2:14*). Now, Satan is defeated and his power can no longer reign over man. Through His redemption, by the shedding of His blood on the cross, the enemies of God were reconciled to God. *Rom.5: 10* say, “For if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of His son”. The death of Christ redeemed man back to God and laid a foundation upon which God could justify the sinners. *Rom.5: 1-9* depicts of the condition of man being reconciled to God, after redemption the believers are standing on His grace, walking in peace and enjoying His life in tribulation.

By His redemption, crucifixion and death, He was resurrected on the third day and became the life giving spirit (*2 Cor.15: 45*). Now God can enter into man and man can be brought back to God in order to fulfill God’s original intention that is to express God. Man can now receive God into his spirit and be transformed by the sanctifying works of the Spirit. Thus, Christ as a redeemer made God available to man through the Spirit. So that, man can fulfill God’s purpose that is to be like Him in life and in nature but not in the God-head to be His expression.

It is elucidated that the real significance of redemption was to pave the way back to God. Redemption on one hand can be taken as mediation that bridges the gap between man and God. There was the need of mediation since man and God had incommensurable difference due to man’s sin. But through redemption man can return back to God and be one with Him according to what He has planned and willed in creating him before sin enters into him. “Being justified freely by His grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus; whom God set forth as a propitiation place

through faith in His blood, for demonstrating of His righteousness, in that in His forbearance God passed over the sins that had previously occurred” (*Rom. 8:24-5*). As we can see that this redemption was carried out by Jesus whom the Christian considered as *Messiah*. From the preceding paragraphs one can unmistakably perceives the importance of *Messiah* in Christianity as well as in Judaism.

To summarize, first of all it is seen that the *biblical* narrative of God’s plan in creating man and man’s fall by partaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Due to man’s fall, God has to become the processed triune God so that He can bring man back to Himself for His expression. God came down at a human level as the *Messiah* and passed through the process of human living, death and resurrection. Through the Son’s redemption, man’s sins are forgiven and he is reconciled back to God. Redemption tore down the enmity that exists between God and man. Thus, redemption open the way for reconciliation.

For redemption, Jewish, on the other hand, does not believe in Jesus Christ as the *Messiah* who can redeem sinners. Instead, they uphold sin offering, trespass offering, and burn offering by sacrificing animals or birds for redemption. As seen in the *New Testament*, only the shedding of blood can wash away man’s sin which is why the Jewish practice all types of offering for atonement. These offerings were performed by the God ordained Priest for penance. The reality of these offerings as practiced in the *Old Testament* according to Christians is Jesus Christ who came to die for the sin of the world. Thus, there are differences in the adherence of *Messiah* in Judaism and Christianity.

Section- B

Contestations on Messianism and *Messiah*: Judaism and Christianity

On illustrating the involvement of *Messiah* in Messianism, it is necessary to elaborate further about the differences that exist between Judaism and Christianity. As mentioned earlier, one cannot abruptly rule out the lineage that Judaism and Christianity had, since the Christians shared a large part of the scriptures with the Jewish *Tanakh* that is the *Old Testament*. The discrepancy in their faith is mainly related to their vision on *Messiah* as the Jewish denounce Jesus as the *Messiah*. For the Jewish, *Messiah*, unlike the Christian perspective, does not have divinity and

cannot forgive the sins of men. Morais argued that “the *biblical* use of titles associated with the *Messiah* cannot be construed as indicating that the *Messiah* will be a unique, theo-human being, endowed with powers properly attributable to God alone, such as atonement of Sin.”⁵² He further asserts that the Israelites only approved God as their sole redeemer since He is the creator of the heaven and the earth. There is none above God who has the authority to forgive repent sinners as it is instructed by the prophets in their writings. Isaiah who was petitioning for the restoration of the Jews nationality, exclaims, “Thou, O Lord, art our Father, thy name is our Redeemer, from everlasting.” And Hosea who was under the inspiration of God said, “I will deliver them from the power of destruction, I will redeem them from death” (*Hos. 13:1*).

For the Israelites it was not the Christian’s *Messiah* that can save them from their affliction but it is their *Messiah* who is divinely instructed to set them free from the power of destruction. The wish of the Jewish as quoted by Morais is that, “Let therefore no shadow of doubt ever be harbored in a Jewish mind as to the true author of human salvation. Let the oft-repeated lesson of our concerns be ever remembered.”⁵³ Judaism denied Jesus as the savior because in *Hosea 13:4* it is declared that “But I have been Jehovah your God since the land of Egypt; and you were to know no god except Me, for there is no savior besides Me.”

According to the Jewish tradition God is the only savior as it is put forward in *Isaiah 43: 11* “I, even I, am Jehovah; and there is no savior besides Me.” According to Morais, even the expectation of *Messiah* is to be renounced since the Jewish are taught to look upon God for their only redemption and that to wait upon *Messiah* would be a disobedience of God’s word.⁵⁴ For the Jewish, it is strongly held that nothing can be added nor taken out from scriptures. They maintained that even if *Messiah* who is well versed, coming from David’s descendent, respecting the written and oral exposition and who is victorious in leading Israel nation cannot be accepted as *Messiah* if he fail to rebuild the temple and restore back the Promised Land to Israel.⁵⁵ In the judgment of Jews, Jesus cannot be the *Messiah* because the Israelites

⁵² Morais, “Sermon on the “Mission of the *Messiah*,” p. 182.

⁵³ Ibid., pp.183-4.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.186.

are still living in exile and the temple of God is yet to be reconstructed. This is the reason why Judaism does not except Jesus to be the *Messiah* and they continue to wait for *Messiah*.

The Christians on the other hand regarded Jesus as the *Messiah* because He has come as a human who is a descendent of King David, as depicted in the *Old Testament*. In addition to this, He came as a Savior to save men from their sufferings and redeemed them to be God's children. According to the *Bible*, though Jesus was born of a human parents, He is the Son of God and this can be substantiated by quoting a verse here- "And a voice came out of heaven: You are My Son, the Beloved; in You I have found My delight" (*Luke 3:22*).

Concerning Jewish believes on God as the Sole redeemer, a Christian would say God and Jesus Christ are one as they believe in the processed Triune God. The concept of trinity does not exist in Judaism since they strongly denied the notion of God becoming man by sending His only begotten Son, Jesus who was never separated from God and is one with God all the time. There are many instances in the *Old Testament* as well as the *New Testament* which distinctly elucidate the existence of the trinity that is the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit. The first occurrence of the Triune God is in *Genesis 1:26* which say, "And God said, let us make man in our image according to our likeness..." It was not merely God who created man but it is the Triune God – the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The used of plural pronouns 'us' and 'our' specify that the divine trinity is involved in man's creation. When we examine this verse it seems that before God came to create man, the Triune God - the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit were having a sort of "*Godhead conference* among the Trinity, to make decision concerning how man is to be created in His image and after His likeness."⁵⁶ The fact that Jehovah God inspiring the prophets to instruct the Israelites to believed in God as the only savior proves Jesus as the redeemer because God and His Son (Jesus) co-exist concurrently and their oneness is the very substantiation that they coexist at the same time.

In the *New Testament*, *Matthew 3: 16-17* demonstrate the Father, Son and Spirit exist concomitantly. This portion of the *Bible* portrayed the divine trinity in which the Son (Jesus) after being baptized went up from the water; at the same time

⁵⁶ Lee, Witness, *Basic Lessons on Life*, p. 8.

the dove which signifies the Spirit descended upon Him. And alongside the dove (the Spirit), the Father from heaven declares concerning the Son. It is very apparent from these lines that the three coexist simultaneously. *John 14:10* says, “I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me”. This confirms that the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son. And the Father did not come with the son in an objective way; rather, He comes in the Son. Hence, the Son can testify saying, “He who has seen Me has seen the Father” (*John 14:9*). As a result, to see the Son is to see the Father and when the Son speaks, it is indubitably the Father who is working in the Son. The two co inhere in one another.

According to the Christians, Jesus is the savior as well as the *Messiah* because He was never separated from God which qualifies Him to accomplish redemption for sinners and forgive them of their offenses. There many verses in the *Bible* that reveals Jesus as the *Messiah*. *Acts 2:36*: says, “Therefore let all the house of Israel know for sure that God has made that same Jesus whom you have crucified both Lord and Christ (*Messiah*).” The preceding verse tells that God has made His Son, the *Messiah* who is able deliver His people from their miseries. “To put the whole matter then very briefly, the permanent values of Christian belief in Jesus as the *Messiah* are: the that God has entered the world personally as a Savior, that Jesus is the one in and through whom God has revealed the way of salvation.”⁵⁷

Providing the many instances in the *Bible*, Christian undoubtedly believe that Jesus is the *Messiah*. Severino also say, “Jesus fulfills everything that was foretold about the prophet (*Luke 4:21*), the Son of Man (*18:31*), the *Messiah* (*24:26, 44-48; Acts 3:18*), or “these days” (*Acts 3:24*). But above all, Jesus develops a multiple prophetic function for him- self: (1) in the tradition of the great prophets; (2) as Elijah I (prophet and healer); (3) being killed, just like the prophets; and (4) as eschatological prophet-teacher, interpreter of the Scriptures.”⁵⁸ The given attributes of Jesus are all the requirements predicted in Judaism to be the qualities that are to be possessed by *Messiah*. The verses given in *Hosea* and *Isaiah* that speaks of God as the savior which the Jewish recognized as a prove for the repudiation of Jesus as the

⁵⁷Mathews, Shailer, “The Permanent Message of Messianism: I. The Permanent Elements in the Faith in a *Messiah*,The Biblical World,” p.274.

⁵⁸ Croatto, J. Severino, “Jesus, Prophet like Elijah, and Prophet-Teacher like Moses in Luke-Acts,” p. 465.

Messiah is the very verses that affirms Jesus as the *Messiah* since He was one with God and was never independent from God. Thus, one notices the discrepancies that arise concerning the perspectives of *Messiah* in Judaism and Christianity.

Nonetheless, one can unquestionably assume that both the religions are similar in their anticipation for *Messiah*. Although in Christianity Jesus the anointed one as the *Messiah* has already come and dwell among men, at the same time they are also waiting for the second coming of *Messiah*. On the other hand, Jewish nations was and is waiting for *Messiah* and they do not accept Jesus as the *Messiah* since they cannot see any expected change that *Messiah* would bring with the coming of Jesus. However, as long as both the religions are engaging in messianic expectation, it can be presupposed that *Messiah* possessed the following known characteristics which vindicated Him to be the One that is always hope for.

There are innumerable qualities that God has which both the religions has agreed and disagreed upon. I will discuss only fifteen attributes of Him, they are- eternity, holiness, immanence, immutability, omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, transcendence, righteousness, mercy, love, peace, grace, light and life. These qualities, according to the Christians, can be identified as the qualities of *Messiah* because *Messiah* being the Son of God can never be separated with the Father. God the Father is in God the Son and they have one living (*John 14:10, 11, 20; 17: 21*). All that the Father is and has is in the Son. Judaism repudiates the idea of Jesus being the Son which implies that *Messiah* is the son of man and does not have the divine life and nature of God. For them, *Messiah* and God can never be one; they think that God is uniquely divine. They do not accredit any divinity with *Messiah* though he is the send one from God. While expounding the traits of God, the similarities and differences that Judaism and Christianity had concerning the qualities of *Messiah* will be highlighted.

First of all, the first three features namely, Eternality, Holiness and Immanence will be discussed. There are many verses in the *Bible* that mentioned about God's eternity but I would like to use particularly *Psalms 102:12* as a reference. It says "But You, O Jehovah, abide forever" that means God live from eternity past to eternity future. The word 'forever' in the verse designate infinity in God's existence which correspond with *Hebrew 13:8* that say "Jesus Christ is the

same yesterday and today, *yes*, even forever.” The fact that Jesus Christ is the same always indicates His eternity. Since God the Father and the Son are one, eternity is the character of *Messiah* in Christianity.

On the other hand, in Judaism, there is the concept of the pre-existence of *Messiah* in the mind of God before he will actually arrive. The pre-conceive notions of the coming of *Messiah* is seen in the prophecies of the prophets in the Scriptures. But then again, they do not believe that *Messiah* will live forever because as a human he is bound to die. Eternality can be attributed to God alone. Thus, there is difference of credence in the eternity of *Messiah*. Holiness cannot be of any mortal being because it is written in the Scriptures that “There is none like holy like Jehovah, for there is none besides You...” (*1 Sam.2:2*). After Adam’s fall, he is thrown out of the garden because God’s holiness cannot stand sin.

For the Jews, God alone is holy that He alone can forgive the sins of men. *Messiah*, being a mortal man he is not worthy to forgive the iniquity of men. On the contrary, Christian held that *Messiah* came to die for the sinners because He is God’s Son who was made in the likeness of man without sin. Therefore, *Messiah* is holy and can absolve the sin of man. God is Immanent meaning that He is actively involved in His creation especially man that He made man in His race. “Am I a God who is near, declares Jehovah, and not a God who is far off? Can a man hide himself in secret places, so that I will not see him? declares Jehovah. Do I not fill the heavens and the earth? Declares Jehovah” (*Jer.23:23-4*). God’s quality of immanency is what Judaism and Christianity agreed upon. In a sense that *Messiah* is the one in which the deliverance will come, this proves that *Messiah* is not objective to man in Judaism. In the same way, Christianity also apprehended that *Messiah* is living and working in them which will prepared them to meet Him in His second coming. Thus, there is the concept of *Messiah*’s immanence in both the religions.

Secondly, let us examined the next three natures; immutability, omnipotence and omnipresence. Immutability is one of the inherent natures of God. The law of nature is change but God remains unchanged. “For I, Jehovah do not change...” (*Mal.3:6*). As I have already pointed out, for Christians, God and *Messiah* are one which undoubtedly connotes that *Messiah* never change despite the fact that He has passed through the processes of incarnation, human living, crucifixion and

resurrection. He is constantly the same for all His believers. Judaism, on the contrary held that *Messiah* is not eternal since God alone is eternal, He cannot be identified with *Messiah* who is purely human. Being a human, he is not excluded in the law of change. Moreover, *Messiah* is not omnipotent; he is limited by time and space. For them only God has the power to create the heaven and the earth. “Ah, Lord Jehovah! It is You who have made the heavens and the earth by Your great power and by Your outstretched arm. Nothing is too wonderful for You” (*Jer. 32:17*).

Unlike Judaism, the Christian strongly maintain the three-in-one God which unmistakably lead them to believe that *Messiah* is omnipotent. While Jesus was living on the earth, He was able to heal the sick and bring back the life of a death person. Even in the creation of God, He was with the Father which proves that *Messiah* is omnipotent. Through resurrection, Jesus is omnipresent that He could contact His disciples at all time in all places. After the Pentecost He went inside the room with a close door where all his followers gather. In fact, He lives within man which also implies that He is omnipresent. “O Lord, You have been our dwelling place in all generations. Before the mountains were brought forth, and *before* You gave birth to the earth and the world, indeed from eternity to eternity, You are God” (*Psalms 90:1-2*). These verses for the Christian are applied to Jesus as well since God and His Son are one. Judaism will disagree to the idea of *Messiah* being omnipresent because no human being can be omnipresent unless he has some supernatural powers. For them, *Messiah* is an ordinary man sent by God to deliver His people. Therefore, they disregard *Messiah* as omnipresent.

Further on, let us reflect on *Messiah* in His being omniscience, transcendence and righteousness. “Great is our Lord, and mighty in power; His understanding is infinite” (*Psalms 147:5*). According to this verse, there is nothing that the Lord did not know. For Judaism, the understanding aspect is there in *Messiah* which is why he will come as a deliverer. In way, he can be considered as omniscient as it has already been prophesied that he will release his people from distress. Generally, in order for a person to help those who are in captive, he needs to know their condition. So this makes *Messiah* infinite in his understanding that he will come to set his people free from all kinds of bondages.

Similarly, Christian's *Messiah* is omniscient as we can see that He was able to know the minds of the Scribes and Pharisee while they were plotting His death. He even knows who is going to betray Him among the disciples before He was actually betrayed. The element of *Messiah's* transcendence is seen in both Judaism and Christianity (*Isa. 55:8-9; John 8:23*). In Judaism, when *Messiah* comes, he will transcend all the human entanglement of the world and will serve God in an absolute manner. Though he is a human, all the cares and worries of the world will not frustrate him from serving God. The same concept of *Messiah's* transcendence is seen in Christianity. For instance, after He was baptized, He was in the wilderness fasting and at that point Satan came to tempt Him with food but He rebuked Satan telling him that man shall not live on bread alone but by the word of God (*Mat. 4:4*).

In both the religions, one can see that the *Messiah* transcended human affairs by serving God and man selflessly. Not only is *Messiah* transcendence, he is also righteous in every way. To be righteous is to be right with God and with men. From the written Scriptures of Judaism, one can observe that *Messiah* is righteous which qualifies him to be the send one from God to release His people from their sufferings. God cannot use unrighteous person to restore His kingdom. "Jehovah is righteous in all His ways, and faithfully kind in all His doings" (*Psalms 145:17*). Similarly, in Christianity, one sees that *Messiah* was righteous in His living because He was the only begotten Son of God laying down His life for sinners. Only a righteous person can save men from his unrighteousness. Thus, *Messiah* is righteous in all aspects of His life.

Here, let us emphasize on the characteristic of mercy, love and peace. According to Judaism, the virtue of mercy in *Messiah* is not apparent but it can be seen in his service to people. He was anointed by God to be the *Messiah* so he is merciful when it comes to saving people from their affliction. His mission on earth as given in the *Tanakh* was to restore the Kingdom of God by bringing back all those who are in exile to Israel. "Return, O Jehovah; deliver my soul; save me for Your loving-kindness' sake" (*Psalms 6:4*). The returning of Jehovah to save His people is through *Messiah*.

Thus, in his work of salvation, *Messiah* is merciful by giving priority to the need of the nations over his own self. Like Judaism, the mercy of *Messiah* which is

far reaching than grace in Christianity is also seen. “Not out of works in righteousness which we did but according to His mercy, He saved us...” (*Titus 3:5*). This verse pointed out that lost sinners are saved not because of their good work but rather they are saved because of *Messiah*’s mercy. The mercy of *Messiah* can be seen in both the religions. Love on the other hand is one of the outstanding natures of *Messiah* which can be seen in both Judaism and Christianity. Without love, the service to God and man is incomplete. “It was not because you were more numerous than all peoples that Jehovah has set His affection on you and has chosen you ...rather, because Jehovah loved you... Jehovah has brought you out with the mighty hand and ransomed you from the slaves’ house, from the hand of Pharaoh, the king of Egypt” (*Deuteronomy 7:7-8*).

The love of Jehovah towards His children is perceivable through *Messiah*. *Messiah*’s responsibility to save his people from slavery cannot be achieved without love. Love is unconditional and selfless for which *Messiah* will be putting the nations’ interest before his. Through love he will be able to emancipate his people. Similarly, the love of Jesus for His people can be seen when He came to die for sinners in order to set them free from their sufferings of sin. Therefore, the love of *Messiah* is seen in both Judaism and Christianity. Peace is also one of the personalities of *Messiah*. “Peace be upon Israel” (*Psalms 128:6*) is one of the songs of the Psalmist which will be fulfilled with the coming of *Messiah*. The children of Israel are never at rest because they are yearning to return to their homeland. Rest and peace will come with the advent of *Messiah*. In the same way, for Christianity, peace comes with the coming of *Messiah*. “Now the Lord of peace Himself give you peace continually in every way” (*2 Thes. 3:16*). *Messiah* is the Lord of peace that whoever believes into Him receives peace incessantly within them. For example, when a man commits sin, he feels guilty and his mind is unrest. But when this sinner repents and believes in the Lord, He is cleansed from his sin and is at peace with God inwardly. Thus, *Messiah*’s temperament of peace is found in Judaism and Christianity.

Finally, let us discuss the remaining three characters of *Messiah*; grace, light and life. In Judaism, the grace of *Messiah* is seen in his altruistic mission in delivering the children of Israel. When *Messiah* comes he will save the nations irrespective of their transgressions. So this proves that he is full of grace in saving his people from

their miseries. “You are fairer than the sons of men; grace is pour upon Your lips; therefore, God has blessed You forever” (*Psalms 45:2*). Christianity, like Judaism, also talks about the grace of *Messiah*. The grace of God is being express in the Son, Jesus Christ, can be seen when Jesus was obedient unto death in order that man may obtain salvation from sin. This grace paves the way for man and God to have one living. “The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy spirit be with you all” (*2 Cor. 13:14*).

Grace as the character of *Messiah* is realized in both the religions. The aspect of light is also present in both of them. It can be assumed that the Jewish are in darkness as long as they have not seen the *Messiah* because with the coming of *Messiah* they will be brought out of their slavery which in a way can be presume as darkness. Light comes with the coming of *Messiah* which will liberates them from their bondages. Likewise, in Christianity, the coming of *Messiah* is the shining of light because “Jesus spoke to them saying, I am the light of the world; he who follows Me shall by no means walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life” (*John 8:12*). The given verse reveals that Jesus is the light and those who believe in to Him will not walk in darkness. To walk in darkness means to be in sin. When Jesus, the *Messiah* comes He disperse all darkness’s which is to set people free from their sins. In Judaism and Christianity, light is seen as the quality of *Messiah*. The aspect which both of the religions agreed upon is life as the nature of *Messiah*.

For Judaism, there will be a new life for the Jewish nations when *Messiah* appears. Even those who have died will be brought back to life as it is written in *Isaiah 26:19* “...your death will live...” There will be a new life and new living in that day. The same concept is notice in Christianity when Jesus spoke in *John 10:10* “I have come that they may have life and may have *it* abundantly.”

According to the *Bible*, those who live in sin do not have the eternal life of God. Sin causes men to be death in its function towards God so when Jesus comes as the life He gave His very life so that sinners may live because of Him. Life signifies God and death signifies Satan. When Jesus passes through the processes of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension, He became the life-giving Spirit (*1 Cor. 15:45*). Hence, in Judaism and Christianity, *Messiah* can perceive as life to His people. Here, it is important to note that I have attributed those

features of *Messiah* for both Christianity and Judaism given that Christianity shared the same scriptures with Judaism.

But the *Tanakh* does not include the later writings of the apostles which are the *New Testament* of the *Bible*. Despite of all the given qualities of *Messiah*, one should bear in mind that Judaism does not recognize any divinity credited to *Messiah* in view of the fact that he the son of man. Whereas for the Christian, *Messiah* expresses His divine attributes in His human virtues and infuses Himself into the believers so that they can be the duplication of Christ. For them, Jesus Christ, the anointed is the *Messiah*. In *biblical* context, anointing being an act of consecration is a symbolic expression of the pouring out of God's Spirit onto someone appointed by Him (*Isa. 61:1; Acts 10: 38*). *Messiah* being the anointed is a Hebrew word and in Greek translation it is Christ. "Christ is God's Anointed, the One appointed by God to accomplish God's purpose, God's eternal plan."⁵⁹

It is recorded in the *Bible* that the seed of woman (*Gen.3:15*) would come to bruise the head of the serpent who seduced man into the fall. The seed of the woman is Christ; the Son of God in His incarnation became a flesh (*John1:14; Rom.8:3*) by being born of a virgin (*Mat.1:16; Gal.4:4*), that He might destroy the devil in man's flesh through His death in the flesh on the cross.⁶⁰ In resurrection, Christ became the life giving Spirit (*1Cor.15:45*), imparting His divine life and nature into the believers. Even though man fail to accomplish God's desire, He did not give up on man and He became the process triune God to fulfill His original plan by becoming the Spirit. The triune God, the Father, the Son and the Spirit, the three in one God (*Gen.1:26; Mat.28:19*) functions as one in transforming and conforming man into His image. Christ as the *Messiah* will return to restore the earth, gather His called ones and usher in the kingdom of God and thus accomplish God's goal.

In Christianity, it is strongly believed that the dispensation of the Triune God into man is the means for God to bring back His kingdom and recover the whole earth. Christ as the *Messiah* redeemed man in order that man can be the representative of God. Day by day He is carrying out His heavenly ministry by being the Spirit, transfusing Himself into the believers and making them the constituent of Christ so

⁵⁹ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, Footnotes *John 1:41*.

⁶⁰ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, *Heb.2:14*.

that the Body of Christ can be build up and Christ can come back to gather His remnant. At the second coming of Christ, the *Messiah*, He will rule over the earth and defeat His enemy and then there will be no more sufferings from sins.

Section- C

Eschatology /The Day of Judgment

The eschatology of Judaism and Christianity was the resemblance that subsists in their messianic expectation. Steven suggests “that the Christ of Christianity and the *Messiah* of Judaism remain where they have always been: waiting until we have proved ourselves worthy of their arrival. The *Messiah* of the Jews is a "*Messiah* in potential"; the Christ of Christianity, equally so.”⁶¹ In both religions, there is constantly an expectation of *Messiah* which keep them in the same ground of waiting. Duncan alleges in *The Gospel of Israel* that before the world was created, in God’s mind the birth of King *Messiah* was already envisage. And the Most High conceals the ‘Son of Man’⁶² in the presence of His power and reveals Him only to His chosen ones.⁶³ The above lines go align with the Christian notion of God preconception of His Son even before the creation. In John 17:24 Jesus spoke “Father, concerning that which You have given Me, I desire that they also may be with me where I am, that they may behold My glory, which You have given Me, for You loved Me before the foundation of the world. ” It was predestinated by God that *Messiah* will come to rescue His people from desolation by establishing His Kingdom where His people will live in His presence.

Serverino interpreted that based on the promise of *Deut. 18:15, 18*, the expectation of an eschatological prophet was generated in later rereading. There are two forms of the promise in Moses' speech in *Deuteronomy*: “Yahweh your God will raise up for you a prophet like me from among you, from your brethren: him you shall heed (*18:15*). I will raise up for them a prophet like you from among their brethren; and I will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I command

⁶¹ Jacobs, Steven, Leonard, “Two Takes on Christianity: Furthering the Dialogue,” p. 516.

⁶² Hebrew *bar nasa*, used first as a simple periphrasis for ‘I’, and only very late a bye-name of the *Messiah*; Jewish Encyclopedia says: “Among the Jews the term ‘son of man’ was not used as the specific title of the *Messiah*.” It does in *1Enoch* stress *Messiah* is a human being, not a Divine Logos, as the Christians taught later.

⁶³ Greenlees, Duncan, *The gospel of Israel*, p. 287.

him”(18:18).⁶⁴ These verses for the Jewish was not yet fulfill since *Messiah* who is also a prophet is still to come whereas for the Christians these verses have been fulfilled through Jesus whom God raised from among men. He was filled with the wisdom of God and preaches the word of God wherever He goes. After His death on the cross on behalf of all mankind, He was resurrected as the Spirit to dwell in man. Subjectively, He is within all the believers but His objective coming with all His glory is what the Christians are waiting. We can observe in both Judaism and Christianity the messianic expectation which has been delayed but it never wears them out. In fact, the longer it is postponed, the stronger their faith is in hoping to see the appearing of *Messiah*.

According to the book *Judaism*, there are two countertendencies in the Jewish vision of *Messiah*. The first vision is the prophetic view, which in their poem tend to imply that the coming of *Messiah* would happen as the outcome of catastrophe and supernatural phenomenon. The second concept is more of a *biblical* context which identifies the *Messiah* with real political events, like the restoration of the Jews from Babylonian captivity. Hertzberg advocates that these notions of *Messiah* continue while other rabbis held to the ecstatic view ⁶⁵-

“And it shall come to pass in the end days
Then the mountain of the Lord’s house
Shall be established as the top of the mountains,
And it shall be exalted above the hills,
And all the nations shall flow unto it.
And many people shall go, and say:
“Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord,
To the house of the God of Jacob,
And He will teach us His ways,
And we will walk in His paths.”
For the law shall come forth from Zion,
And the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.
And He shall judge the nations,

⁶⁴ Croatto, J. Severino, “Jesus, Prophet like Elijah, and Prophet-Teacher like Moses in Luke-Acts,” p. 454.

⁶⁵ Hertzberg, Arthur, *Judaism*, pp. 215-16.

And shall decide for many peoples;
And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares
And their spears into pruning-hooks.
Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
Neither shall they learn war anymore” (Isa. 2:2-4).

In short, Jewish messianism, as construed by Gersonides, has two redeemers figures- one is *Messiah*, son of Joseph who can be ascribed as the prophet that will be assassinated. And after that the second *Messiah* will appear in glory as a king who would be the Son of King David. “*Messiah* son of David will bring about the resurrection of the dead, and as a result of the stupendous miracle all the peoples of the earth will acknowledge the God of Israel and accept Judaism as their faith. The “days of the *Messiah*” will not be characterized by a completely new world order. Human beings will still be moral, but the earth will be “full of the knowledge of God” and men will use their God-given freedom for the moral purposes.”⁶⁶ There are two viewpoints on *Messiah* in Judaism where one of them will come as a prophet and the other will as a king. While in Christianity *Messiah* came as a Prophet “And the crowds said, this is the prophet Jesus from Nazareth of Galilee” (*Mat. 21:11*). As a Priest, He persistently prays for His children and brings them in the presence of God, “Having therefore a great High Priest who has passed through the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, let us hold fast the confession” (*Heb.4:14*). And He also comes as a King Savior in Mathew and Rev. 19:16 say “And He has on His garment and on His thigh a name written, KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS.” As such, the life of Jesus is the fulfillment of *Messiah* in all the three aspects is now dwelling in man who will return when His chosen ones are ready.

The *Tanakh / Old Testament* divulge the coming of *Messiah* in many places that motivated the adherence of *Messiah* to prepare to meet Him. In Jeremiah, the coming of *Messiah* is predicted as, “Indeed, the days are coming, Declares Jehovah, when I will raise up for David a righteous Shoot; and He will reign as King and act prudently and will execute justice and righteousness in the land. In His days Judah will be saved, and Israel will dwell securely; and this is His name by which He will be called, Jehovah our righteousness” (*Jer. 23:5-6*).

⁶⁶ Martin, Bernard, *A History of Judaism Volume II Europe and the New World*, pp.11-2.

Jonge in his article asserts that “The king expected in *Ps. 17:22,24,26, 28-30* is a national figure using political means and even military power. Yet the main emphasis is laid upon the spiritual aspects of his reign.⁶⁷ The description of these culminates in *v. 43* which reads: “His words will be more refined than the choicest costly gold. In the assemblies he will judge the tribes of the sanctified people, His words will be like the words of the holy ones (i.e., the angels) in the midst of sanctified peoples.”⁶⁸ There are many places in the *New Testament* where one can perceive the second coming of Jesus. “Because He has set a day in which He is to judge the world in righteousness by the man whom He has designated, having furnished proof to all by raising Him from the death” (*Acts 17:31*). God has set an appointed time for *Messiah* to come back to rule in righteousness by resurrecting Him and raising Him in ascension. “For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the coming glory to be revealed upon us. For the anxious watching of the creation eagerly awaits the revelation of the sons of God” (*Rom. 8:18-9*). The given verses refer to the Christians who are encourage not to be perturb by the worldly troubles because those sufferings will mean nothing in comparison to the coming glory of *Messiah*. All the creations are also yearning to be set free from the bondage of this present world and that they are waiting for the second coming of *Messiah*.

The coming of *Messiah* has been eagerly awaited that it requires a preparation. Bernard, holding a view of Judaism proposed that the advent of *Messiah* depends on God’s appointed time but man must prepare themselves by purifying his soul which was entrenched in the sphere of uncleanness. He also insists that there is a need for correction by practicing all kinds of ascetic exercises including regular fasting, midnight vigils, mortification of the flesh, and ablutions, in addition be accompanied by the recitation of mystical formulas of concentration that were elaborated in his circle.⁶⁹ In addition to this, he must obey the law and does good work that is to serve God and men. As for the Christians, the first prerequisite is, to believe into the Lord

⁶⁷ Especially in the last part of the Psalm, vv. 30-45. See G. SEVENSTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-76. On the intimate nexus between religion and politics, also in connection with future expectations, see T. W. MANSON'S excellent exposition in *The Servant Messiah*, Cambridge, 1953, pp. 8-10.

⁶⁸ Jonge, M. De, “The Use of the Word "Anointed" in the Time of Jesus,” p.136.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 46.

Jesus and learns to live by His life by walking according to the spirit. They need to spend time to pray and read the word of God daily.

This way, they can be filled with the divine life of God and minister the life of God to others. By doing this he will be transform day by day meeting with the other believers and be mature in the life of God. George states that *Messiah* is an essential part of God's plan which pre- exists before He created the world. Israel's faith, hope and unceasing prayer are the coming of *Messiah* whose condition for appearing is faith and good works. Until these conditions are met, *Messiah* will not come.⁷⁰ The striking resemblance that one can identify in Judaism and Christianity, as pointed by Hugh, is the teaching of both center in the messianic hope and the gospels in the *New Testament*, is the fulfillment of the Law and Prophet in the *Old Testament*.⁷¹ As a matter of fact, he advocates that the development and fulfillment of Judaism is Jesus and His gospels. He uses a metaphor where he claims that the fulfillment is Jesus like the butterfly is of the caterpillar in which the development is describe by contrasting rather than comparing, for the one has wing and finds its way above the earth and is spiritual while the other creeps upon the ground and rest everywhere upon what is national and material.⁷²

As discussed earlier, Judaism and Christianity share the same eschatology which can also be assumed as the Day of Judgment since Christians *Bible* is largely based on the *Old Testament* that is *Tanakh*, the Jewish scriptures. It can be construe that for the Christian, the *New Testament* is the fulfillment of the prophecy of the advent of *Messiah* given in the form of types and figures in the *Old Testament*. Both the religions have a common characteristic of unremitting hope for the advent of *Messiah*. According to the Jewish traditions, the coming King *Messiah* is the instrument by whom God's kingdom is to be established in Israel and in the world.⁷³ Like the Jews, Christians also believe that *Messiah*, the coming King will bring restoration on the earth. According to the rabbinical Judaism, *Messiah* would be empowered by God to be Israel's savior. The expected functions of *Messiah* as given

⁷⁰ Stevens , George B., "Weber on the Eschatology of the Talmud. II,The *Old Testament* Student," p. 45.

⁷¹ Scott, Hugh M., "The Teachings of Jesus and the Teachings of the Jews in the Time of Christ Respecting the *Messiah* and His Kingdom, The Biblical World," p. 408.

⁷² Ibid. p.409.

⁷³ Ibid.

in the *Tanakh* are to restore the Kingdom of David and the temple of Zion, re-gather the exiles, offer the new covenant of Israel, usher in world peace and knowledge of God, “swallow up” death and disease, raise the death to new life and spread Torah knowledge of the God of Israel.⁷⁴

It is also important to illustrate the functions of *Messiah* to determine messianism in *Messiah*. The main function of *Messiah* is to restore the Kingdom of David (*Jer. 23:5; 30:9, Ezek. 34:23*). If we refer to the *Hebrew* Scriptures, the Kingdom of David is Israel which currently is occupied mostly by the non Jewish people. Israel is the Promised Land for the Jewish but many Jewish are in exile. The Jewish are anticipating for the coming of *Messiah* who will be sent by God to restore their homeland. “But they will serve Jehovah their God and David their King, whom I raise up from them” (*Jer. 30:9*). The above verse shows that King David is Jesus who will be raised from His people. Jesus being born of a human will be raise up to bring in God’s Kingdom. According to the Christians, the restoration of David’s Kingdom implies the restoration of God’s Kingdom which started to occur when Jesus came in His incarnation. He came to prepare the way for the Kingdom of God when He proclaimed, “Repent, for the kingdom of the heavens has drawn near” (*Mat. 4:17*). This verse proves that Jesus is the *Messiah* who came to restore God’s Kingdom.

The advent of *Messiah* is not only to restore the Kingdom but also to rebuild the temple in mount Zion (*Ezek. 37:26-28, Isa. 2:2, Micah 4:1*). According to the Holy Scriptures, God’s desire is to have a dwelling place on earth which is why there are many references in the Scriptures where God spoke to His anointed ones to build His house. For Judaism, this restoration of the Temple will happen only when *Messiah* comes. But in *New Testament*, Jesus coming is for building the temple of God which is Church as the Body of Christ. Jesus as the anointed one is dispensing Himself into believers so that they can be built together as dwelling place of God (*Eph. 2:21; 4:12*). The dwelling place of God on earth is the Church today. In a way, God cannot come back unless His temple is build up which means until all the believers are built up as the one Body of Christ. When *Messiah* comes His dwelling place will be restored.

⁷⁴ http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Names_of_G-d/Messiah/Messiah.html. Accessed on 24/10/13.

Messiah will bring back His people from exiles (*Isa. 51:1; 11:12; 43:5-3*). God has promise that He will re-gather His children for all over the earth. This promise will be fulfilled when *Messiah* comes which is why the Israelites are engrossed in waiting. In a way, the chosen race has lost their land because of their rebellion against God. The *Bible* reveals that Jesus came to bring back the lost one. Jesus said that, "...I was not sent except to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (*Mat. 15:23*). The words 'the lost sheep' refers to the Jews. This verse shows that Jesus is the *Messiah* since He said that He was sent for the Jews. But when the Jews rejected Him He turn to the gentiles who accepted Him and thus they also become the chosen race. The real land for the believers according to the *Bible* is God Himself whom they lost through Adam's fall. When Jesus comes He assembles His people together from wandering in the wilderness.

The other aspect which *Messiah* will do is to offer the New Covenant to Israel. "Indeed, days are coming, declares Jehovah, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with house of Judah... this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares Jehovah; I will put My law in their inward parts and write it upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they will be My people...I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin I will remember no more" (*Jer. 31:31-34*). From these verses, it is seen that God will give the Israelites a new agreement when *Messiah* comes. The promise of God is to give them a law of life in their heart and He will forgive and forget all their wrong doings.

In the *Bible*, this prophesies were fulfilled in Jesus that is when He came, He forgives the sins of man and gave them His life in their spirit where He has written His law. "For the law of the Spirit of life has freed me in Christ Jesus from the law of sin and of death" (*Rom. 8:2*). This law of the Spirit of life is the divine life of God. God wants His children to live according to the divine life by depending on Him as their source. The New-Covenant that will be offer to Israel when *Messiah* comes will be the forgiving of the iniquity of His people and they will depend on God as their source.

When *Messiah* comes, there will be peace and everyone will be having the knowledge of God (*Isa. 2:4, 11:9*). In Judaism, peace is yet to come and people are still ignorant of God's word. "For then I will change the language of the peoples into

a pure language that they may called upon the name of Jehovah, to serve Him with one accord” (*Zeph. 3:9*). The above lines indicate that God’s nations will be in one heart and one mind to serve God by speaking the same language. In that day, God will unite His people by changing their culture, for their culture is wrapped up with language and differences cause division that lead to unrest. There will no longer be differences among them since everyone will be filled with the knowledge of God. Although there will be the second coming in Christianity, Jesus as the *Messiah* ’s coming already usher peace to those who receives Him (*Col. 3:15*).

When Jesus died on the cross He has torn down all the differences that everyone who believes in to Him are made one in Christ (*Gal. 3:28*). The prophecies in the *Old Testament* have partly been fulfilled in Jesus but the full manifestation of men filled with the full knowledge of God is yet to come. The other spectacular thing which will happen when *Messiah* will come is the swallowing up of death and disease. “He will swallow up death forever; and the Lord Jehovah will wipe away the tears from all faces; and the reproach of His people will be remove from all the earth; for Jehovah has spoken” (*Isa. 25:8*). When *Messiah* comes there will be no more sufferings from sorrow and death. God will be the satisfaction, peace, joy and rest for His nations. In the *Bible*, whoever believe into Jesus receives eternal life (*John 3:16*) so the physical death is like sleeping for the Lord. Death and disease comes from sin.

The life of Jesus Christ can swallow up death and heal the sick ones because death cannot hold the resurrection life of Jesus. When He returns in His glory there will be no more death and disease since everyone will eat of the tree of life and drink of the river of water of life (*Rev. 22:12*). In that day, the death ones will be raise and will be given a new life. “Your death will live; my corpses will rise. Awake and give a ringing shout, you who dwell in dust, for your dew is like the dew of the dawn...” (*Isa. 26:19*). The new life I suppose will be the divine life of God. Each one will have a new living where they will be filled with the life. There will also be the new heaven and new earth (*Rev: 21:1-8*). *Messiah* in the *Bible* gave life to those who are death in sin and gave them a new life by making them a new creation. “So then if anyone is in Christ, he is anew creation. The old things have passed; behold, they have become new” (*2 Cor. 5:17*).

Subjectively, Jesus Christ has already come to fulfill the function of raising the dead and giving new life. In the second coming, there will be the full manifestation of it. Finally, the earth will be filled with the knowledge of God and there will be no more disaccord. "God will be King over all the world -- on that day, God will be One and His Name will be One" (*Zech. 14:9*). There will be no more division among the people and there will be only one God whose name will be exalted on high. Everyone will have one expression that is they all will express God. On that day, God's purpose in creating man will be fulfilled (*Gen. 1:26*). Man will be in the image and likeness of God but not in the God-head. They will be filled with knowledge of God. For Christians, spiritually, when man receives God, he will be daily transformed in the life of God in his soul and finally his body will be transfigured (*2 Cor.4: 16-18*). Eventually, the believers will be filled with the divine life and nature of God.

To conclude, Jews has anticipation that one day *Messiah* will come to end all their sufferings and miseries. They believe that God will establish new heaven and earth where there is joy and happiness. The Jewish today are religiously following the commandments with the hope of being set free when *Messiah* come. They also believe that there will be a Day of Judgment where everyone will reap what they sowed. Therefore, Jewish has a strong sense of moral obligation that will later decide their reward which can either be good or bad. Christians, on the other hand, do expect Jesus the *Messiah* to come back but on the pretext of believing that He will make them the same as He is. Like the Jews, they consider that the Day of Judgment will be the day of receiving reward.

But Christian being the adherents of *Messiah* does not follow the outward law instead they turn to their human spirit which corresponds to God's inward feelings. Thus, by believing in the Lord Jesus they obey the inward law of life. The main difference between Jewish and Christians belief system is that *Messiah* is yet to come for Jews whereas for Christians, *Messiah* has already come as Jesus Christ and that He will come again to administer His kingdom on earth. Though Jewish and Christians cannot be completely separated in a water tight compartment, one cannot deny the fact that Christians and Jewish are related to each other in terms of their faith in the Holy Scriptures. Jewish basically follow the *Old Testament* while the Christians

advocate both the *Old* and *New Testament*. Some even says that Judaism is the parent of Christianity.

In both the monotheistic religions, there is the waiting aspect for the final day which makes them involves in messianism. The teleological feature in both the Jewish and Christian is that the end will come for which they have been preparing themselves and expecting for the better future. This chapter thus emphasized messianism with *Messiah* and brings out the distinction between Jewish and Christian in their religious belief while waiting for *Messiah*.

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Chapter 2

Messianism without *Messiah*: A Dialectical Approach

In this Chapter, I will take up the dialectical approach of Hegel on messianism and include Marx to develop the concept of messianism without *messiah*. In Hegel's dialectic there is a triadic movement which he develops from the Christian trinity. For Hegel, everything is in a dialectical process of becoming the absolute. Hegel, like the adherence of *messiah*, is waiting for the absolute to arrive. The waiting aspect of Hegel's dialectic is an involvement on messianism. Though he was influenced by the Christian theology on trinity, he does not accept the teachings of Jesus since it refers primarily to an individual rather than the whole community. Therefore, Hegel's messianism is without *messiah*. Marx alleges that alienation is the product of capitalism. So he, like Hegel, is waiting for socialist society that will eliminate alienation suffered by the struggling classes. Both the thinkers are waiting for the emancipation without *messiah* intervention. I'll attempt to give a critical analysis of dialectic of Hegel and Marx in order to examine the concept of messianism without *messiah*.

The present chapter is a dialectical approach on messianism without *messiah* which enumerates Hegel and Marx philosophical discourses on messianism. The participation on messianism does not necessarily curtail to the adherence in *messiah* rather it embraces all those who, in some way or the other, are living with anticipation for things which are yet to happen. The possible questions that one cannot help but think are – what does it mean by messianism without *messiah*? Is messianism possible without *messiah*? What are the horizontal and teleological implications of it? According to Derrida, messianism without *messiah* means that anyone whether religious or secular person who engrosses in any kind of expectation for things that are yet to come are involve in messianism. He states “awaiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer.”⁷⁵

As pointed out earlier, taking part in messianism has nothing to do with religious believe in *Messiah*. Derrida's interpretation of messianism unlike Judaic belief does not have any distinct character ascribe to it, everyone who live with hope

⁷⁵ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, p. 81.

for the better future are in the messianic structure. For him it is “messianism without religion.”⁷⁶ Both Hegel and Marx, in one way or another, have advocated messianism without *messiah*. In Hegel’s dialectic there is a triadic movement which he develops from the Christian trinity and it is both horizontal and teleological. Horizontally, for Hegel, everything is in a dialectical process and teleologically it is of becoming the absolute. Hegel is waiting for the absolute to arrive. This chapter attempts to give a critical analysis of dialectic of Hegel and Marx in order to examine the concept of messianism without *messiah* and it is divided into three sections. The first section is ‘Trinity and Dialectics’ which will have two sub headings, viz., Concept of Trinity in Christianity and Dialectics: An Exposition. The second section, ‘Notion of Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s philosophy’ and the third, Status of Communism in Marx’s philosophy.

Section-A

Trinity and Dialectics

i) Concept of Trinity in Christianity

Hegel being a Lutheran preferred Christian theology over all other theologies and regarded Christianity to be the absolute religion.⁷⁷ As any Lutheran, he was a critic of the oldest, most conservative Christian institution, the Roman Catholic.⁷⁸ He has derived the principles of dialectics from the Trinity in Christianity and the teleology or finality or totality from the Day of the Judgment from the messianic principles. Hegel's definition of Christianity stands or falls entirely with the question of messianism. He distinguishes messianism from the *messiah* in the sense that he admits the impending finality in messianism but he does not endorse *messiah*.

The teachings of Jesus, according to Hegel, is individualistic in nature, that it is more suitable to a sect rather than the whole community since it is easier to love a fellow brethren and hard to love those who do not belong to it.⁷⁹ His dialectical process of attaining the absolute is holistic in nature that the gospels of Jesus are constricted in his view and are not applicable to the non Christian community. The Trinitarian concept of Christianity indeed has a profound influence on the

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.74.

⁷⁷ Stace, W.T., *The Philosophy of Hegel, A Systematic Exposition*, p.509.

⁷⁸ For details, please see, Hegel, G.W.F, *Early Theological Writings*, pp.1-67.

⁷⁹ Beiser, Frederick, *Hegel*, p.121.

philosophical insight of Hegel but he does not give credence to the notion of *messiah*. For Hegel, it is the Notion, the *Absoluter Geist* or *begriff* that lies at the center of messianism and not of *messiah*.

In order to explicate Hegel's dialectic, it is important to highlight the concept of trinity in Christianity which has philosophical impact on his dialectic. The concept of trinity is one of the major themes in the *Bible* that elaborate how it enables a believer to have a union with God. The God in Christianity is the three-in-one God who has passed through the processes of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension. The triune God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; they are three yet one, that is, in substance three in essence all are one. They are inseparable from each other and cannot be divided in any way. When the Father sent the Son to be human, He came with the Son and have communion with the Son. Even when the Son becomes the Spirit in resurrection, He is still one with the Father. In a way, where the Spirit is, there the Father and the Son is. The Spirit is the consummation of the processed triune God.

The oneness of the Father, Son and the Spirit can be seen in the following verses which states that, "And might reconcile both in one Body to God through the cross, having slain the enmity by it. And coming, He announced peace as the gospel to you who were far off, and peace to those who were near, for through Him [Christ] we both have access in one Spirit unto the Father." *Eph. 2:16-18*." The trinity of the Godhead is implied in the given verses. It shows that God the Son is the means and accomplisher of what God the Father has planned and purposed and God the Spirit is the executer and application so that the believer can have access unto God the Father, who is the originator and the source. First, the Father came to the earth in the Son, and then the Son came into the believer as the Spirit. Now through the Son the believer have access in the Spirit unto the Father so that they can draw near to Him and experience Him.⁸⁰ The context of these verses further indicates that the redemption of Christ has merged the differences that exist among the believers and facilitates entrance to the Father through God the Spirit.

In *John 14:6* it is shown that no one can approach the Father except through Jesus since He came down in humanity as the Son sent by the Father, who is one with

⁸⁰ Lee, Witness, *Truth Lesson- Level Two*, Vol. 4, pp. 85-6.

the Son. It is given as, “Jesus said to him, I am the way and the reality and the life; no one comes to the Father except through Me.” Here it is seen that the Son who is one with the Father can be received by man as life after He became the Spirit (*1 Cor. 15:45*). The dispensing of the trinity is carried out through the Spirit’s transmission of what have been attained, obtained, and accomplished by the Father and the Son. They can never be detached from each other since they are the three-in-one God. The Father is in the Son, the Son is in the Father, and the Father and the Son are one in the Spirit. The Son came in the Father’s name, He says, “I have come in the name of the Father” (*John 5:43*). Not only He came in the Father’s name, He came with the Father in view of the fact that He was sent by the Father as ascertain in *John 8:29* “And He who has sent Me is with Me; He has not left Me alone...”⁸¹ The coming of the Spirit to the believer is also with the Father “...the Spirit of reality who proceeds from the Father...” (*John 15:26*).

The Spirit proceeding from the Father means that the Father is with the Spirit when the Spirit came. And the Spirit came in the Son’s name “But the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name...” (*John 14:26*). The given verse indicates that the Spirit was sent in the Son’s name. These words were spoken by Jesus before He was crucified which testifies that when the Spirit will come, it will come in His name after His death. ‘Therefore when Jesus the Son came to preach the gospel, the Spirit also comes. When a man receives the Son in His preaching, he receives the Spirit. The Spirit then brings him back to the Father through the Son.’⁸² This is the dispensing of the Triune God in the *Bible* which clearly demonstrates that the concept of trinity is for the believers to be united and mingled with God.

The triune God is one God having three aspects- the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. God came down as man by sending His Son who has a human life and nature in the flesh. As the Son, Jesus says, “I and the Father are one” in *John 10:30*” which confirms that He was in the Father even when He came to die to redeem sinners. ‘This does not mean that while the Son was dying, the Father and the Spirit were not there. The *Bible* undoubtedly points out that the Father and the Spirit were both passing through death (*Acts 20:28; Heb. 9:14*) when the Son was dying on the Cross.’⁸³ The

⁸¹ Lee, Witness, *The conclusion of the New Testament*, pp. 1014-15.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Lee, Witness, *The Four Crucial Elements of the Bible- Christ, the Spirit, Life, and the Church*, p.94.

triune God accomplished redemption but it was achieved by the Son in the triune God. Thus, through the efficiency of the Son's redemption in the triune God, man is qualified to come before God just as he is.

One has to be mindful that with the redemption of the Son, the inspiration of the Spirit is required in order for man to enter into God. So, to come to God the Father, there is the need of the Spirit and the Son. Man cannot receive the holy and righteous God directly into his being due to his sinful nature. God, before becoming the processed triune God, in His divinity cannot have a relationship with man which is why the Son has to come in His humanity to be one with man. The Son has to be crucified on the cross for the redemption of sinners so that by becoming the Spirit, He can be received by man. 'Man can come into the Father through the Son as the channel and in the Spirit as the sphere. Thus, the believers entered into God through the triune entrance whereby, the Son is the channel, the Spirit is the sphere, and the Father is the very destination.'⁸⁴ It is again pointed out here that the concept of trinity in Christianity is for the purpose of the divine dispensing of the triune God into the believers.

There are many instances in the *Bible* which lucidly portrays the trinity of the Godhead. *1 Cor. 13:14* says, "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all." The three-in-one God is seen in this verse which depicts the flowing of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit as one entity into the believers. The grace of the Lord is for man to take pleasure in the life of God the Son, the source of grace is the Father in His love who flows through the Son, and the fellowship of the Spirit is the infusion of the grace of the Son and the love of God for the believer's participation in the triune God. "These are not three separate matters but three aspects of one thing, just as the Lord, God, and the Holy Spirit are not three separate Gods but three "hypostases... of the one same undivided and indivisible" God (Philip Schaff). The Greek word for the *hypostasis* (used in *Heb. 11:1*), the singular form of *hypostases*, refers to a support under, a support beneath, that is, something underneath that supports, a supporting substance. The Father, the Son, and

⁸⁴ Lee, Witness, *God's New Testament Economy*, pp. 359-61.

the Spirit are the hypostases, the supporting substances that compose the one Godhead.”⁸⁵

The trinity in *the Bible* is reveal in regard to the relationship of God with His creatures, particularly with man, who was created by Him in His own image and likeness, and more specifically with His chosen and redeemed people. “The first divine title used in the divine revelation, *Elohim* in Hebrew, a title used in relation to God’s creation, is plural in number (*Gen. 1:1*), implying that God, as the creator of the heavens and the earth for man, is triune. Concerning His creation of man in His own image, after His own likeness, He used the plural pronoun *Us* and *Our*, referring to His trinity (*Gen.1:26*) and implying that He would be one with man and express Himself through man in His trinity. Later, in *Genesis 3:22* and *11:7* and *Isaiah 6:8*, He referred to Himself again and again as *Us* in regard to His relationship with man and with His chosen people.”⁸⁶ The Lord Jesus as the Son has prophesied before He died that the believers will know that He is the Father and that the believers are in Him which will be feasible in the Spirit after He died in resurrection. The Son says, “Yet a little while and the world beholds Me no longer, but you behold Me; because I live, you also shall live. In that day you will know that I am in My Father, and you in Me and I in you” (*John 14:19-20*). The coming of the Son undeniably verifies that He comes with the Father in the Spirit into those who receives Him.

Furthermore, it is affirmed in the *Bible* that the Father is not the only God but the Son and the Spirit are also God. But then again, this does not mean that there are three individual Gods; all of them are equally God who exists as one. There are no concepts of more amount of God in the Father or less measure of God in the Son or in the Spirit. The Father, the Son and the Spirit are the three-in-one God. They can never be assumed as three distinct Gods since they never subsisted as an independent God, that is, when the Son lives on the earth, He lives in the Father and with the Father, and by resurrection He becomes the Spirit. The Spirit’s coming is also the Father’s and the Son’s coming. They are all Gods but continue living as one God. *Ephesians 4:6* says, “One God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all.” This verse confirms that the Father is God who is the source of life. “But of the Son, “Your

⁸⁵ Lee, Witness, *The Holy Bible*, Foot notes on *1Corinthian 13:14*.

⁸⁶ Lee, Witnes, *The Focus of the Lord’s Recovery*, p. 31.

throne O God, is forever and ever...” *Hebrews 1:8*. The given lines from the *Bible* illustrate that the Son is God who has come in and with the Father and that His coming is the Father’s coming. *Acts 5:3-4* mentions the Spirit is God in the following line- “...why have Satan filled your heart to deceive the Holy Spirit.... you have not lied to men but to God.” The Spirit is also God since it is one with the Father and the Son and they cannot be divided from each other. If the Father is God so also is the Son and the Spirit.

The triune God is eternal and its triune existence is from eternity past to the eternity future which implies that if the Father is eternal, the Son and the Spirit are eternal. The Father is the eternal Father as written in *Isaiah 9:6* that says “...Mighty God, Eternal Father...” God the Father exist before the foundation of the world and He created the heavens and the earth with all the things that subsist. In *Hebrews 1:12* it is written that “... You are the same, and Your years will not fail.” Here ‘You’ refers to the Son who remains the same irrespective of time and space. The ever moving years have no effect on the Son’s being eternal. Logically, if the Father, the Son and the Spirit are one, the eternalness of the Father and the Son unquestionably entails the Spirit’s eternity. “How much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal spirit offered Himself without blemish to God...” *Hebrews 9:14*. This verse says that the Spirit is the eternal Spirit and that the Spirit lives forever with the Father and the Son. From all the evidences given in the *Bible*, one can observe that all the three the Father, the Son and the Spirit- coexist simultaneously without succession from eternity to eternity.⁸⁷

The *Bible* also reveals that, the Father, the Son and the Spirit co-inhere and are inseparable. Jesus says, “Believe Me that I am in the Father and the Father is Me...” *John 14:11*. The Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son which means that they co-inhere in one another. The Father sent the Spirit in the Son “...the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name...” *John 14:26*. ‘When *John 6:46* and *John 15:26* are put together, it can be realized that the Father, the Son and the Spirit all come together. Apparently when the Lord Jesus came to the earth, He was only the Son of God who became flesh, but actually, the Father was in Him and the Spirit was also in Him. He came in the name of the Father, and the Spirit also came in His name.

⁸⁷ Lee, Witness, *Full Knowledge of the Word of God*, pp. 69-71.

Simply speaking, when He came, all three- the Father, the Son and the Spirit came. Because He is the Triune God, the three are inseparable.’⁸⁸

The concept of trinity is clearly described in the *Bible*. The Father was always with the Son and has never left Him alone. “Furthermore, the Son became flesh through the conceiving of the Spirit, and the Son was filled with the Spirit in His living and moving in the flesh (*Luke 1:35; Matt. 1:18, 20*). All that the Father has belongs to the Son and all that the Son possesses is received by the Spirit (*John 16:14-15*). Finally, the Son is called the Father and also became the Spirit (*Isa. 9:6; 1 Cor. 15:45; 2 Cor. 3:17*). Eventually, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit all consummate in the Spirit. The Spirit is the ultimate consummation for the Triune God.”⁸⁹ The Father, the Son, and the Spirit co –exist simultaneously but they are not identical to each other since they are three persons working as one. For example, when a person takes the role of a man, he can be a father to his children, a son to his parents, a husband to his wife, a brother to his siblings and an uncle to his nieces and nephews so on and so forth.

One can notice from the cited example that a person can take different role in his lifetime but that does not mean that each different role makes him a different person. Though he might have different roles in different occasions, he is still one person. His various roles do not change his person; he still remains the same person with diverse roles. Similarly, in the concept of trinity one can examines that the Father, the Son and the Spirit are having different functions but they concurrently live and moves as one entity. Their distinct function does not make them three separates God. In a way, there is unity in their differences and their distinctive nature is retained in their identity. The Father functions as the originator, the Son functions as the executor of what the Father had planned, and the Spirit functions as the transmitter of what the Father and the Son have attained and obtained. The triune God in Christianity is for God to have a dispensational relationship with man so that man and God can live together as one.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

ii) Dialectics: An Exposition

The function of the trinity in the Bible has tremendous impact on Hegel's philosophical insight of dialectic. There are traces of triune influences in his dialectical method. Hegel opines that the process of human mind and those of nature are the same. In both he found the termed a 'dialectic process' operating'.⁹⁰ When one studies the mind one cannot help discovering in the mind that it is full of contradictions, disagreement, of opposites. But a careful analysis will reveal that there is a process in the mind that these very contradictions, disagreements, of the pair of opposites reconcile in a synthesis but this happens at a higher level.

First there is a thesis or affirmation, then later one notices antithesis to this thesis and at a higher form of thought is the reconciliation of both in a synthesis which uplift thinking one step higher than before. For Hegel, thought is not static; it is always dynamic in nature, unfolding and progressing. He was convinced that thinking moves from the simple to the complex not by discreet jumps but by a gradual development into synthesis. In dialectic, the movement that takes place from thesis to antithesis and then to synthesis is in triadic movement which Hegel got it from the concept of trinity in Christianity.

Furthermore, Hegel has benefitted a lot from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* wherein he develops his dialectic and resolve Kant's dualism between phenomenon and noumena. In opposition to Kant's dialectic of reason which cannot resolve dualism, Frederick Besier said, "the chief result for the dialectic is that reason is not only a form of mechanical explanation, which shows how one finite thing depends upon another, but also a form of holistic explanation which shows how all finite things are parts of a wider whole."⁹¹

For Hegel, dialectic of reason gives a common meeting ground for each contradicted antinomies to meet. Understanding in Hegel's view shows contradictions in things but reason in dialectic serves as a consensus for two opposite concepts or ideas to become one entity. In short, reason identifies the differences but bring unity in these differences. Singh put forth that, "according to Hegel's notion of dialectic,

⁹⁰Frost, S.E., *Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers: A Survey of their Basic Ideas*, p. 258.

⁹¹Beiser, Frederick, *Hegel*, p. 164.

there are two operative terms that are, contradiction and sublation. Sublation, in Hegel's dialectic means to resolve into a higher unity or to bring into the wholeness that which is fragmentary."⁹² As mentioned before, Kant's dialectic of reason can only show contradictions which are valid in their respective way and there is no mutual agreement in the disagreement in antinomies. But in Hegel's dialectic we see agreement in the disagreement. In other words, there is unity in differences. Hegel says,

The true solution can only be this, that two determinations, being contradictory, and yet necessary to the same concept, cannot be valid each of itself, in its one sidedness, but have their truth only in their transcendence, in the unity of their concept.⁹³

So Hegel uses the term *sublation* for the reconciliation of two contradictory concepts. As Federich Beiser said, in Hegel's dialectic differences or contradictions are not eliminated in order to form one non contradictory concept but rather brings identity in differences. And this identity forms a wholistic view in which no differences or contradiction are winnowed out but sublated to form higher part of the whole. In Hegel's view, contradictions or differences are not to be considered as irrelevant mistakes. It is the part that constituted the whole that is higher than a mere concept which has no contradictory nature. Everything that exists has contradicted nature and in this contradictory nature there is sublation in which there is reconciliation between the two opposite concept. For Hegel, the growth or development of things are not linear but circular which means whenever sublation takes place between two contradictions, this very sublation which form unity in differences again become a part which has contradiction. And again this contradiction is sublated and form higher truth which in turn become contradiction again and this goes on and on but in a progressive manner. The higher it becomes the more absolute it is. So Hegel's concept of dialectic is holistic in nature in which nothing is extirpated, everything serves as part to constitute the whole.

Hegel writes in the sub heading 81 of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* that,

Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable

⁹²Singh, R.P., "From Dialogue to Dialectics: Socrates, Kant, Hegel and Marx," p. 265.

⁹³Hegel, G.W.F., *Science of Logic*, pp. 205-6.

and transient, and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite by which the finite, as that which is itself is other than itself, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite.⁹⁴

As mentioned earlier, in the dialectic process, Hegel use two operative terms – contradiction and sublation. Hegel believes that two contradictory viewpoints can be reconcile and culminate for the higher truth. In fact, these are not two separate terms but they are mutually interdependent to each other and under certain circumstances they pass into each other. Hegel says that there cannot be pure contradiction; each contradiction at some point unites to form higher level of knowledge so contradiction has to be there every moment. Sublation here means that the capacity to overcome the contradiction and elevate the stage of knowledge.

In short it is the progression in knowledge that takes place when two contradictory concepts unite. What Hegel means by understanding is that, it has the tendency to reflect the distinction of identity from differences. The understanding, however, restrict itself to the finite, and its thinking is always finite thinking. Hegel often calls it *finite reason*.⁹⁵ By reason, Hegel means that, when the unity of opposites takes, reason operate not as combining or connecting agent; but it functions as the one who transforms the opposites so that they cease to exist as separate entities and become more real form of being at a higher level. In the process of unifying the opposites, reason negates the finite and its negation, and sublates them together in mutual dependence, so that they revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole.⁹⁶

Unlike Kant notion of reason, Hegel's uses reason as the unifying agent to complete a whole which were scattered as contradictions in understanding. Kant stresses too much on contradictions in the dialectic of reason whereas Hegel's dialectic of reason resolve this contradiction by sublating them into higher form of absolute. Micheal George points out, "it was Hegel's purpose in his philosophical system to demonstrate both the method by which and the extent to which, Reason, understood dialectically could be just such a corrective."⁹⁷

⁹⁴Hegel, G.W.F., *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, p. 150.

⁹⁵Singh,R.P., "Kant and Hegel on Categories and Consciousness," pp. 11-12.

⁹⁶Ibid., p.12.

⁹⁷George, Micheal, *Marx's Hegelianism: An Exposition from Hegel and Modern Philosophy*, pp. 118-87.

Hegel acknowledges the logical implication of contradiction in everything that is given to us. He did not just overlook the contradiction and end there but he sublimate contradiction by elevating them into higher stage where each identity is retained yet seen as one whole. One can say that this is the significance of Hegel's dialectic of reason which is similar to Socrates dialogue where there is consensus in the two opposite parties. "Despite such similarities, there are certain fundamental differences between Socrates' dialogue and Hegel's dialectic. The amount of consensus in Socrates's dialogue is not and cannot be, the same as sublation (*aufheben*) in Hegel's dialectic. Sublation, in Hegel's dialectic means to resolve into a higher unity or to bring into the wholeness that which is fragmentary."⁹⁸ Hegel pointed out in *Phenomenology of Spirit* that,

The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially, result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is, and that precisely in this consists its nature.⁹⁹

The given quotation designates that everything in existence is given in its completeness which means things are given not as fragmentary. They are given with its contradictory nature that has to be united into a whole and this whole is the true because this whole contains contradictions that did not annihilate each other but constitute as one whole. The whole is the conglomeration of contradictions which at some point complement each other and transform into higher level of absolute. So every concept of contradiction has been transform into higher absolute where there is unity in differences. And this complete series which constitute the whole become again a starting point for developing more absolute truth and this moves on until it reaches the ultimate absolute. For Hegel, the development of absolute is in a circular form where nothing is eradicated but everything is included in this whole. Every stage is the stage of development from the earlier stage and this series continue till it reaches the absolute.

According to Hegel, the notion of contradiction has sheds light to the conceptualization of dialectic. In *Science of Logic*, he says,

⁹⁸Singh, R.P., "From Dialogue to Dialectic: Socrates, Kant, Hegel and Marx," p. 265.

⁹⁹Hegel, G.W.F., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 11.

...everything is inherently contradictory and in the sense that this law in contrast to other expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things...Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.¹⁰⁰

The above lines evidently indicated that, contradiction in Hegel's concept is bound to exist in one's mind otherwise everything will exist as one where the notion of identity will be irrelevant. To talk about identity in a realm of non contradiction will be absurd and there will be no progressive movement or activity. The movement of things or activity of things happened only when there is contradictory nature. As Hegel puts forth, the essential nature of things is contradiction; it exists everywhere and without it everything will be moribund. In Hegel's view, the law of nature is change and change takes place only when there is contradiction.

Every change that takes place always moves towards the direction of higher state. There is a movement from lower to higher state in which contradiction plays a significance role for being the cause of this movement. When one thinks logically, there cannot be any motion when everything is stagnant, something has to be there to cause motion and one can say that changes happen only in the presence of contradiction. For Hegel, contradiction is the root of all activity and the cause of development. The nature of things is contradiction and nothing subsists without contradiction.

To substantiate the notion of contradiction, Hegel asserts,

... internal self-movement proper, instinctive urge in general...is nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and deficient, the negative or itself. Abstract self-identity is not as yet negativity, goes outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it and moreover in this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it.¹⁰¹

For Hegel contradiction is the very intrinsic nature of each term but in Socrates dialogue one can see that in the process of dialogue contradiction is obviated when thoughts develop. According to Hegel, in every term there is contradiction whether in thought or reality, one cannot conceive things without its contradiction. Eradicating contradiction does not assist the mind to be more close to truth instead it leads to misapprehension of things. It can be assumed that Hegel seems to hold that

¹⁰⁰Hegel, G.W.F., *Science of Logic*, p. 439.

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 439-40.

any form of activity always takes place when there is contradiction and this activity is always in the process of elevation.

Contradiction as a term by Hegel is an instinctive urge which is integral in things or in concepts and it pioneer motion that tend to progress from lower to higher mode. Not only that, thing is in the process of becoming more absolute by undergoing alteration which are cause by contradiction. When things contradict, identity is being questioned and Hegel use reason to conciliate differences and thus melioration takes place. Therefore, Hegel says that contradiction make something alive to persist in order to move towards elevated state. For him, everything is in the process of becoming more and more absolute. In align to the concepts of contradiction, Hegel says,

Nothing exist, as just brutally given and simply possessing one or two fully positive characteristics. Nothing exists that is first and primary and on which other things depend without mutual relation....what appears at first simple and immediate is actually complex and mediated.¹⁰²

According to the given qoutation, one can presuppose that things are given with its distinctive opposite nature. And that a thing is not to be taken in its singleness without its opposites which means one should not view things as one simple thing that is free from contradiction. Things does not possess only one distinctive nature but it always come along with its opposite nature. “Close to the end of the logic, Hegel reasons out that there is nothing, whether in actuality or in thought, that is as simple and abstract as is commonly imagined.”¹⁰³ From the above discussion one can see that, Hegel did not regard contradiction as something which is to be extinguish but rather it is something that one has to hold on in order to perceive thing in line of movement.

From this line of thought, one can notice that Hegel's dialectic differs from Socrates dialogues that advocate the elimination of contradiction with the development of thought. In short, in spite of some similarities in terms of consensus, the differences between Hegel's dialectic and Socrates dialogue is that Hegel merged logic and dialectic and therefore use contradiction and sublation as two operative terms to bring identity in differences. Hegel philosophy also prevails over the

¹⁰²Kolb, David, *The Critique of Pure Morality-Hegel, Heidegger, and after*, p. 46.

¹⁰³Singh, R.P., “From Dialogue to Dialectic: Socrates, Kant, Hegel and Marx,” p. 267.

conventional belief that the annihilation of contradiction take place with the gradual development of thought which Kant also seems to suggest. In Kant, one observes that he does not integrated logic in his notion of dialectic which Hegel essentially refutes. Singh advocated that, “he applies in the science of logic to the gradual explication and development of not only of the *separation* but also of the connectedness between one category and another.”¹⁰⁴

According to Frederick, “indeed the point of the dialectic will be to remove contradictions by showing how contradictory predicates that seem true of the same thing are really only true of different parts or aspects of the same thing.”¹⁰⁵ To illustrate Hegel's dialectic by using his two operative terms namely contradiction and sublation, one bring in the notion of thesis, antithesis and synthesis though he himself did not use these terms. These terms correspond to his idea of Being, Nothing and Becoming. Regarding the concept Pure Being Hegel says,

Being, Pure Being- without any further determination. In its determinate immediacy it is similar to itself alone, and also it has no differentiation either within itself or relatively to anything external: nor it would remain fixed in its purity, were there any determination or content which could be distinguished within it, or whereby it could be posited as distinct from another. It is pure determinateness and vacuity.¹⁰⁶

Being as the thesis is a concept which has the capacity to become something and yet when examine carefully it is void and does not have something solid as its content. It has no form, no shape, no color, no size etc. It cannot be given any definite form as Hegel has said, it is total vacuity. Pure Being is something which can take any form of existent. Being in itself is self sufficient to become something but it is still in an abstract form without any particular name, quality, quantity, measure etc. Therefore, Hegel says it is pure determinateness and vacuity. Pure Nothing according to Hegel is,

Nothing, Pure Nothing: it is simple equality itself, complete emptiness; without determination or content: undifferentiatedness in itself ...Nothing, therefore, is the same determination (or rather lack of determination), and thus altogether the same thing as pure Being.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p.268.

¹⁰⁵Beiser, Frederick, *Hegel*, p. 162.

¹⁰⁶Hegel, G.W.F., *Science of Logic*, p. 94.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

Nothing on the other hand can be taken as antithesis which by itself is empty and is incapable of becoming something. On the other hand, nothing is similar to Being since both implies void or empty. Nothing can also be identified with negation. Nothing by itself negates what it is in itself and thus implies emptiness since it has no content at all.

Hegel defines Becoming as

Pure Being and Pure Nothing are then, the same: the truth is not either Being or Nothing but that Being – not passes- but has passes over into Nothing, and Nothing into Being. But equally the truth is not their lack of distinction, but that they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet unseparated and inseparable, each disappearing immediately into its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement, this immediate disappearance of the one into the other, in a word, Becoming: a movement wherein both are distinct, but in virtue of a distinction which has equally immediately dissolved itself.¹⁰⁸

The idea of synthesis can be identified with Becoming which merges Being and Nothing. Becoming sublates the two contradictory ideas that is, Being and Nothing by negating yet retaining their distinctive nature. In the concept of Becoming one can see that Being which has the tendency to become something has been integrated with Nothing by sublation and thus it turns into Becoming. Becoming can now be the form of something more concrete. Since Becoming is in a very abstract form it can be considered as a starting point for the process of dialectic system where Becoming is taken as the thesis which will in turn has antithesis and then eventually synthesis operating. The whole process goes on and on in a spiral manner until it reaches the absolute. In Hegel's dialectic process one see three distinct ideas but they mutually co exist in one another, in short they are three yet one. George Michael interpret Hegel dialectic process as,

First, it has the moment of 'transcendence' in which it goes beyond a 'limit' or 'boundary'. Secondly, it is 'negation' of the first negation; this 'limit', in which it is the moment of 'preservation; in which what has been 'gone beyond' or transcended is brought again into a new relation.¹⁰⁹

From the above discussion, one can see the identity of the three moments (Being, Nothing and Becoming) and yet their differences is still maintained. One can see their unity in their differences or to put in other words, there is identity in their

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁰⁹George, Micheal, *Marx's Hegelianism: An Exposition from Hegel and Modern Philosophy*, p. 123.

differences. One cannot exist without the other, they coincide in one another. In the dialectic process of Hegel, sublation serve as an elevating agent which negates yet preserves the different nature of Being (thesis) and Nothing (antithesis). They are inter-related in spite of their differences and not only that they also are dependent on one another because the absent of one cannot complete the series of dialectical process. They mutually work together to culminate into a more develop form. Since, the result of synthesis in turn becomes thesis again and this thesis is again bound to have anti thesis and eventually synthesis takes place. And again this synthesis becomes thesis and this whole process goes on and on until it reaches the consummating point which Hegel calls the absolute.

To proceed further with the view of expounding Hegel's concept of dialectic with the assistance of his two operative terms I want to highlight some lines of W.T. Stace, who states that,

The fact that it is an identity of differences means that the differences are merged. The fact that it is an identity of differences means that they are preserved. We have not mere identity, ie simple abolition of differences. Nor have we a mere opposition ie simple preservation of differences. What we have is an identity of opposites. Simple abolition would mean that we have identity, but no opposites. Simple preservation would mean that we have opposites, but no identity. Becoming is the unity of Being and Nothing. And their difference is absorbed. Yet being and nothing are still there, present in becoming, and may get out of it by analysis. They have ceased to exist as separate entities, as opposite abstractions. In this sense, they are abolished. But they now exist in combination, as factors of concrete unity. They exist in absorption and not lost. And when the synthesis becomes the thesis of a new triad, it will in its turn be merged but yet preserved along with its opposite, in a further synthesis.¹¹⁰

From the above lines one can observes that, in the dialectic process nothing is eliminated. Each process in every stage absorbs what was given before and continued to proceed in an ascending manner in the following process. This process is a never ending process which moves with view of reaching a final destination. It can be deduced from Hegel's dialectic that, everything is in the process of becoming and that human history is the history of development which is still process of consummating in an ascending order. For him, everything that is in thought or in reality is in the system of dialectic; in short he sees dialectic everywhere.

¹¹⁰Stace, W.T., *The Philosophy of Hegel*, pp. 106-7.

Another point which is essential to add in order to endorse dialectical method in Hegel philosophy is his three principles of dialectic. These principles were presumed by Frederick Engels as – i) Law of the interpenetration of opposites, ii) Law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, iii) Law of the negation of the negation.¹¹¹ According to Hegel, knowledge is a growing phenomenon and always in the process of becoming the absolute truth. Hegel explicates three basic principles of dialectics. i) Unity and struggle of opposites. This principle can be explicated out of his formulation of the categories of Being, Nothing and Becoming. When one tries to extract Being from all its attributed qualities, one is left with nothing which is like empty vacuum.

For instance, when one wants to define chair, one defines it by taking out all of its properties of being a chair like its solidness, its hardness, and its stability etc, finally one is left with nothing but the concept of chair. So Hegel finds that Pure Being, though absolutely indeterminate, it contains in itself its own opposite. The mediation is hidden within itself and that the opposite can be deduce from it and made to function. Pure Being in a sense is the same as Pure Nothing. Being, therefore, is the same as Nothing. Pure Being is contain in the Pure Nothing. And this indicates that Nothing comes out of Being and this Nothing is in the process of Becoming. The opposition between Being and Nothing has an aspect of unity that is Becoming. In this principle one perceives the unity and the struggles of the opposite. Hegel calls this the category of Becoming.

ii) Transition from quantity to quality and vice-versa. Whenever any changes take place, it takes place quantitatively at first and then quantitative changes lead to qualitative change. And qualitative changes again lead to quantitative changes. This principle is a constant process which has no end. For instance, uses of internet, earlier only emails and chatting can take place one to one irrespective of space and time at different places but now people can see each other through web-cam and hold conferences with many people at the same time. Same principle applies in thinking in which one can find new concepts in the mind and it changes later in a develop manner. “The combination of quality and quantity is found in what Hegel call as measure. Measure is defined by Hegel as the dependence of quality upon quantity, or

¹¹¹Engels, Frederick, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 62.

as quantity upon which quality depends. Quality, for Hegel, is the internal self-determination which is identical with the being which it determines. Quality, when fully developed as repulsion and attraction, passes into quantity and *vice-versa*. It is the unity of quantity and quality.”¹¹²

iii) Negation of negation. This is the principle of development in which the earlier lower stage is not negated but elevated into a higher stage. The unity of the opposite is possible because they did not exclude each other but pass on to each other. Becoming is actually present in Being and Being is potentially present in Becoming. Lower stage is not rejected but assimilated into a higher stage. For example, agriculture has developed into industry and industry to technology and so on. The earlier stage is not excluded but integrated together to form a higher stage. This kind of development takes place in thinking process as well. The contradiction and opposites at some point complement each other to form a higher level of thinking. He suggests that everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. Hegel demonstrated that the laws of dialectic does not only operate subjectively in thought but can also take place in the objective reality. So the dialectic has dual function to perform: viz. to show that dialectic is operating in thought, and, that, simultaneously it is operating in the objective reality. As an absolute idealist, Hegel regards dialectic of thought as primary and dialectic of nature as secondary, being an externalization of the dialectic of thought.¹¹³

Section-B

The notion of Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s philosophy

Hegel concept of spirit has evolved from two fundamental sources, namely, from Judeo-Christian tradition on the one hand and the philosophical tradition of the German Idealism on the other. From Judeo-Christian tradition Hegel’s regards that philosophy is itself religion and it is profoundly a study of God. And the justification of God takes place only with the concept of subjective spirit. This position has evolved out of the notion of Holy Spirit in the Christian tradition. Just as in Judeo-Christian tradition there are three features, Father, Son and the Holy Spirit. For Hegel there are objective spirit, subjective spirit and the Absolute Spirit. There is distinction

¹¹²Singh, R.P., *Dialectic of Reason: A Comparative study of Kant and Hegel*, p. 90.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

and relation between Father, Son and the Holy Spirit as already discuss in the previous section of the chapter. Similarly, Hegel also proposes objective, subjective and Absolute Spirit in terms of philosophical concepts of contradiction and sublation. Just as Holy Spirit is the relationship between Father and Son similarly Hegel's *Giest* or Absolute Spirit is the relationship between subjective spirit and objective spirit.

Hegel's notion of the absolute spirit is attained after passing through a long and arduous development in the dialectical method. Absolute spirit has been the goal of his philosophical development. Waiting for the absolute to arrive makes him engross in messianism but without *messiah* since he does not believe in *messiah* itself. In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel remarks,

The hopes and expectation of the world up till now had pressed forward solely to this revelation, to behold what absolute Being is, and in it to find itself. The joy of beholding itself in absolute Being enters self consciousness and seizes the whole world; for it is Spirit, it is the simple movement of those pure moments, which expresses just this: that only when absolute Being is beheld as an immediate self-consciousness it is known as Spirit.¹¹⁴

To attain the absolute spirit has been Hegel's aspiration in developing his dialectic. His hope for the finality was believed to be an influence of his theological background. Christian's concept of trinity which has a profound impression on Hegel was also for the purpose of the coming of *messiah* to liberate His people from their suffering so that God and man can be united. He also aspires for the absolute spirit which transforms and brings identity in opposites. Hegel being a Lutheran, he was highly influence by theological doctrine of trinity which has finality; his dialectic is a method to arrive at the absolute.

There is a teleological feature in his philosophy which makes him engaged in messianism. He anticipates the absolute spirit which will evolve out of his dialectical processes. As cited before, everything for him is in the process of becoming since contradiction is the inherent nature of things. These contradictions are sublated into a higher unity by passing on to each other. Concerning the idea of Absolute Spirit Hegel states that,

This image of the absolute may have a more or less present vitality and certainty for the religious and devout mind and be a present source of pleasure; or it may be represented as something longed and hoped for, far off, and in the future. Still it

¹¹⁴ Hegel, G.W.F., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 461.

always remains a certainty, and its rays stream as something divine into this present temporal life, giving the consciousness of the active presence truth, even amidst the anxieties which torment the soul here in this region of time.¹¹⁵

The idea of waiting for the absolute to arrive has given assurance and security that even when one is caught up in vicious circle of life, the thought of rewarding end makes life tolerable till the end. For Hegel, there is a goal towards which all things move in dialectic. The movements of things in subjective as well as objective realities are directed to reaching the absolute. In his dialectics, it is observed that things are conceive as a whole where contradictions which can be equalize to the past are not eliminated but preserve in the present by sublation in order to consummate in the future. In the process of consummating in the absolute spirit, there are constant contradictions and sublation which Hegel considers it as development in history that moves from less to more perfect.

There has been unity in differences in every phases of human history that will finally culminate to the absolute. For him, thought and reality cannot be separated but both go hand in hand in producing the perfect world where there will be freedom. For Hegel, the operation of dialectics is that “the historical past of individuals, peoples, even epochs is, according to him, a continuous process of canceling out or annulling that past and yet at the same time preserving its essentials in a higher synthesis, which is a blend of the old and new, past and the present.”¹¹⁶ Since Hegel assists that the true is the whole and his dialectical processes is all pervasive that it can capture momentary and trifling forms. But the main outcomes are present in the absolute spirit.¹¹⁷ The realm of absolute spirit is important in view of the fact that it is where the subjective and objective realm are sublated by integrating the dissimilarity while preserving what is essential. In way, the absolute spirit can be referred to reason which sublates consciousness (objective spirit) and understanding (subjective spirit).

For Hegel, thought is represented as idea and objective reality can be represented as nature. “Hegel’s spirit is a doctrine about the relationship between thought and objective reality.”¹¹⁸ Idea, according to Hegel, is “the categories and the notion which are also known as the truth in the most absolute and objective form. And

¹¹⁵ Hegel, G.W.F., *On Art, Philosophy and Religion*, p.130.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹¹⁸ Singh, R.P., *Consciousness Indian and Western Perspectives*, p. 288.

nature is the sphere of external existence of which the truth is about. In short, the term *idea* Hegel designates it to the absolute truth and nature refers to the truth as we find it in the world which has outward existence.”¹¹⁹ According to Hegel, spirit is the mediation between idea and nature which resembles the Christian notion of the Holy Spirit that bridges the gap between the Father and the Son. For Hegel, idea and nature are dialectical opposites, there is a difference between them but the spirit unites them. The spirit maintains the relationship between idea and nature by uniting them in spite of their differences. Idea and nature does not become the same in the process of unison but their differences are maintained with their distinctive element.

He believes that between idea and nature, there is something that is identical but this notion of being identical is not with the sphere of thought and also not with the objects of thought. He advocated that it is the spirit that imparts intelligible form of both this sphere. Basically, it is the spirit that creates the relationship between idea and nature irrespective of their differences. In fact, the spirit forms the concept of identity in differences. Hegel gets this notion of spirit from Christianity. In Christianity, it is also the Holy Spirit that unites the Father and the Son as one, by uniting; their distinctive nature is not eliminated but maintained. It is the function of Spirit in Christian tradition, which brings the Father and the Son as one, in spite of their respective nature, so is Hegel’s concept of spirit, which brings unity in differences.

The perceptible differences between Hegel’s spirit and the Holy spirit is that Hegel’s notion of spirit is purely for epistemological quest, where as in Christianity, the Holy Spirit is wholly for the believer’s experiences of the triune God, in reality. By epistemological quest, it does not mean that it is purely in thought, that it has no connection with the external world. In fact, Hegel applies this dialectical method of spirit in everything he sees. For him, the two operative terms contradiction and sublation is always present everywhere, whether in thought or in reality. For Hegel, spirit serves as sublation where contradiction between idea and nature are overcome by transforming them into higher unity in which their distinctive aspect is retain, yet they are being put together as one. There is always a movement of thought in an ascending order which means whenever there is contradiction, there is sublation too.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

And this sublation always move towards more absolute since the concept of absolute is the highest point which is yet to be attain. So, everything is in the process of becoming absolute.

Hegel's epistemological position shows his application of religious concept to his philosophy. Basically, epistemology deals with consciousness of object that gives knowledge. For Hegel, "spirit is the active synthesis of our consciousness of the world, and what we are conscious of."¹²⁰As it is pointed out earlier, spirit is the mediation between idea and nature. This idea can be referred to the consciousness of the world and nature can be referred to what one is conscious of. The object of consciousness which gives knowledge does not show the distinction between what exist and what exist in itself.

He believes that things exist because one is conscious of it. And his prime concern is not to show the distinction between what is available and what is not available in the consciousness. He believes that things are given in its entirety and rejects Kantian distinction between phenomena and thing in itself. There is no such thing as phenomena and noumena. "Hegel's main concern is how in consciousness we are related to our object and when object is our own consciousness, it is clear that there is no danger that our consciousness should have an existence in itself which is in principle hidden from us and separates from the consciousness as it exists for us."¹²¹From the above lines, it is apparent that Hegel pays attention to consciousness which relates object to consciousness. He is not bothered whether consciousness captures things as they are or not. His concern lies in consciousness that makes objects exist because one is conscious of it. And what is given as the object of consciousness is what that matters. There is nothing that is knowable and unknowable object. The point that matters is what ignites consciousness that produce knowledge from less perfect to more perfect.

According to Hegel, understanding shows contradiction in the mind and it is reason that resolves this contradiction. He asserts that there are two aspects of spirit. One is the spirit that enumerates the distinction of subject and object. And the other aspect is the spirit that overcomes the distinction between the subject and object. In

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid., p.289.

Hegel's concept of spirit, there is a distinction between subject and object and there is overcoming of the distinction which means there is unity in the spirit. According to Hegel, "the first aspect of spirit is the moment of estrangement and the second is its transcendent or its enlargement. Spirit is thus the locus of God estrangement and enlargement."¹²² Hegel conceives this idea of spirit being two aspects from Kant's doctrine of consciousness which asserts that consciousness is always two-sided that is understanding and reasoning. And it is in reasoning that two contradictory poles exist together. Hegel approves Kant's reasoning that proposes two contradictory terms and that consciousness is possible only when the subject is conscious of the object. In other words, Charles Taylor says, "Kant rational awareness requires separation. Consciousness is only possible when the subject is not set over against an object."¹²³

Hegel, in the *Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences-A* outline, divided his philosophical system into three parts:-

- 1) Logic: the science of idea in and for itself.
- 2) The philosophy of nature; the science of idea in its otherness.
- 3) The philosophy of spirit; the science of the idea comes back to itself out of the otherness¹²⁴(Section 18).

He identifies logic with anthropology, philosophy of nature with phenomenology and philosophy of spirit with psychology. The philosophy of spirit is followed by logic and philosophy of nature. Philosophy of spirit as given in the outline above is, "to show that and how spirit' frees itself from nature, from its otherness. All three moments of this *movement*-anthropology, phenomenology and psychology are concerned with this *notion of freeing itself*."¹²⁵ For Hegel, only the moment of movement that takes place in psychology shows the reality of reason. According to Hegel, the moment of psychology can be identified to the Absolute Spirit where reason unites contradictory poles and there is identity in differences which takes place in reason. The phenomenological moment which he termed as *Objective spirit*, shows that, "reason is to be the goal of consciousness."¹²⁶ This means

¹²²Singh, R.P., *Consciousness Indian and Western Perspectives*, p. 289.

¹²³Taylor, Charles, *Hegel and Modern Society*, p.26.

¹²⁴For details, please see, Hegel, G.W.F., *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, pp. 103-208.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p.91.

¹²⁶Singh, R.P., *Consciousness Indian and Western Perspective*, p. 290.

that consciousness is at the fundamental level that it can show the object of consciousness and that reason has not yet evolved out of it. Here in this moment, there is consciousness because object is given to the senses but its consciousness is unorganized and it is given in its bare form. The anthropological moment on the other hand is also called the subjective spirit. And in this moment, “reason is to be the goal of nature.”¹²⁷

Since reason is operating in the Absolute Spirit, reason is the goal of nature. In nature things are given as they are and nature creates consciousness to the mind. It shows things in the mind in its primal form. Psychological moment as it is mentioned earlier, referred to the Absolute Spirit. The goal of psychological investigation of spirit is to show that reason is the element of subjective spirit, that reason is the active power of spirit. In the philosophy of spirit which Hegel called it as Absolute Spirit, reason is the main factor of uniting subjective and objective spirit. It is in this psychological moment that contradictory term like anthropology and phenomenology can come together, i.e. they are sublated by reason. Here, the differences between them are not eradicated but overcome into higher unity, i.e. the Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit where knowledge is perfect since, it is not given in its one sidedness. It is given in its contradictory nature and this contradictory nature is not annihilated but overcome on a higher level.

According to Marcuse in *Reason and Revolution*, Hegel terms ‘the Absolute’ as the final reality in which antagonisms are resolved. It is in the absolute that reality apprehended by common sense and understanding are negated to the extent that absolute reality has no resemblance to the finite world.¹²⁸ He says common sense and understanding perceives individual things that stands opposed to one other and reason does the identity of the opposites which is done not by simply uniting and combining but by transforming them so that they cease to be opposites. In doing so, their content is being preserve at a higher level. Marcuse explains that, the process of unifying opposites touches every part of reality and comes to an end only when reason has ‘organized’ the whole so that ‘every part exists only in relation to the whole,’ and

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸ Marcuse, Herbert, *Reason and Revolution*, p.47.

‘every individual entity has meaning and significance only in its relation to the totality.’¹²⁹

Stace, in the *Philosophy of Hegel*, claims that, Hegel’s concept of absolute spirit comes to man by undergoing a strenuous dialectical development and that the absolute spirit was form from a low stage and progressively arrives at its complete self-fulfillment. He says, the task of philosophy of spirit is to dig out the gradual development stage by stage with the help of dialectical method.¹³⁰ “The sphere of absolute spirit ends the Hegelian system. It appears as the final result of all development. In accordance, however, with Hegelian principles, it is also the absolute foundation, the beginning. Thus the end of philosophy is also the beginning.”¹³¹ As one observe in dialectics that everything that is given have it is own contradictory nature that whenever sublation/ synthesis takes place, there is an inevitable contradiction. And then there is anti thesis for thesis which issues after synthesizing and this cycle goes on until it arrives at the absolute which is why Stace mentions that the end is the beginning in dialectics.

Section-C

Status of Communism in Marx’s philosophy

Marx is anticipating for communism to arrive where all the laboring classes will be emancipated from their struggling under the ruling of the capitalist society. He relentlessly protests for the liberation of the labor classes who were suffering to make ends meet under the bondage of capitalism. Like Hegel, he is waiting for the day of emancipation where all man will live freely without being tormented by the bourgeoisie. The concept of finality is there in Marx’s writing as much as in Hegel’s philosophy. There has been a persistent struggle that strive towards communism which makes Marx entail in messianism without *messiah*.

In Marx’s philosophy there is no so-called God who will come down to release the people from their affliction but there is a constant struggle that fights for the liberation of the working classes. The fact that there is waiting aspect in Marxist theory makes him engage in messianism. The idea of arriving at the finality is the

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Stace, W.T., *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 332.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 517.

feature that makes one shares in messianism. “Like Hegel, Marx argues that immanent contradictions lead ultimately to an emancipator terminus. However, Marx attempted to ground his standard of emancipation in concrete history, rather than in presuppositions about ‘Spirit.’ The emancipatory teleos, according to Marx, derives from the struggle against natural necessity.”¹³² According to Marx, the instinctive urge to survive is the main factor in driving humanity towards emancipation. The idea of communism naturally originates from the laboring classes in reaction to their being exploited by the dominant capitalist classes. Thus, there is a teleological aspect in Marx’s theory of communism.

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels wrote that the bourgeoisie, has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors,” and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into ex-change value...¹³³ The value of man has come down to the level of commodities due the selfish money loving private property owner.

Wealth is all that matters to the capitalist classes which makes them atrocious men who dehumanize their fellow human beings and make the laborer feel less valuable than the product of their work. Thus, man became alienated from his very self and live an automated life. ‘Alienation’, then, is used by Marx to refer to any state of human existence which is ‘away from’ or ‘less than’ unalienation, though, admittedly, he generally reserves this reproach for the more extreme instances. It is in this sense and on this scale, however, that Marx refers to alienation as ‘mistake, a defect, which ought not to be.’¹³⁴ The essence of man is drain out from his intrinsic being when he lives to cope up the exploitation he face from his employer. He cannot cherish his work because he is bound to work in order for him to survive and thus he does not have time for his own well-being.

¹³² Antonio, Robert J., “Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx and Contemporary,” p. 334.

¹³³ *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels* Vol. I, p. 113.

¹³⁴ Ollman, Bertell, *Alienation*, p.132.

In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, Marx describes four types of alienation namely, alienation from the product, alienation from the activity, alienation from species and alienation from other. They are –

1) Alienation from the product:

Regarding man's relation to his product Marx says,

... the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself- his inner world- becomes, the less belong to him as his own. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker put his life into the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the more the worker lacks objects. Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he himself.¹³⁵

The laborer works to earn wages so the product of his labor does not belong to him. The more products he produces, the more it benefits his owner. His fruit of labor is not the product itself but it is the money that keeps him alive. The product remains insignificant to him because his sole purpose is to earn. With the increases of products, the employer profits more which in turn lead to estrangement of the worker and he does not have a relation to his own product. Thus, he is alienated from his own product.

2) Alienation from the activity:

The relationship of man and his productive activity is express by Marx as,

First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirms himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy, but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of the need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.¹³⁶

Here Marx's implies that the materialistic needs insist man to work so he feels disconnected with his activity. It makes him unhappy to work because he cannot do what he wants to do and cannot even do what he is good at. When he labor, he labor for a stranger who hired him for money so his productive activity is outside of his

¹³⁵ Marx, Karl, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, p.68.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.71.

own self. This kind of work exploits him mentally and physically. Therefore, he is alienated from his activity.

3) Alienation from himself:

Concerning man's relationship to his species Marx alleges,

In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species –life, his real objectivity as a member of the species, and transform his advantage over animal into disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him. Similarly, in degrading spontaneous, free activity to a means, estranged labor makes man's species-life a means to his physical existence.¹³⁷

Marx argues that man becomes edgy in his struggle for survival that he could not manage to have leisure time to indulge on his self. He is continually striving to earn money that his humanity gradually shrinks and he become the same as an animal that lives according to basic instincts. The more he earns the more he becomes insatiable. He loses his own identity of being human where he does not bother to improve his self. Due to the pressure of earning his bread, he eventually lost his self in the midst of hungry capitalist whose sole purpose is to gain more profit. The gaining attitude of the private property owner turns the working classes into machine for profit earning. The laborers produce product that does not belongs to them and they become indifferent towards their activity, product, and to his own species. Their human nature becomes diminish since they have to work whether they like it or not to survive. So, he became alienated in his relation to his species.

4) Alienation from other:

Marx has given elaborate lines to depict man in his relation to fellow men. He states,

Thus through estrange labor man not only creates his relationship to the object and the act of production as to powers that are alien and hostile to him; he also crates the relationship in which other men stand to his production and to his product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. Just as he creates his own production as the loss of his reality, as his punishment; his own product as a loss, as a product not belonging to him; so he creates the domination of the person who does not produce over production and over the product. Just as he estranges his own activity form himself, so he confers upon the stranger an activity which is not his own.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 76.

Marx's seems to suggest that man's relation to his fellow men was effected by the fact that he works to earn. The work given to him creates an environment where each individual will be paid according to his product. The more he produces, the better he will earn. Each person in his work place views the other person as his competitor and tries his best to compete with him. In his struggling to earn to be the best, he does not develop any feeling of social well-being for his fellow men. Hence, he is estranged from his fellow men. In relation to estrange labor, Marx says,

The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things. Labor produces not only commodities: it produces itself and worker as commodity- and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general.¹³⁹

The condition of the workers becomes so deteriorating in capitalist society that the worker becomes poorer the more he produces. Even the extra product that he produces, he cannot take the advantage of it, it all goes to the owner of production. He becomes poorer with the increases in his production since he is less valued than a commodity. In the eyes of the employer, he is nothing more than a means to gaining profit. Elizabeth in her article 'Capitalism vs. Marx's Communism' has explain that the worker- alienation in Marx's theory is caused by the capitalist division of labor and the social relations of production which are constitutive of it. She alleges that "Marx therefore anticipates that the abolition of capitalism will eliminate alienated labor.

The defining manifestations of alienated labor are the workers' experience of themselves as dominated by the commodities they produce. Workers have no control over what is produced or how it is produced, nor do they have any title to the things they make. They perceive the organization and concrete character of their labor as imposed by the technical requirements of production and by the necessity of earning a wage so that they can redeem the products of their labor. Commodities hold them in thrall because they cannot otherwise live than by this process of production and wage-

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 67.

redemption. It is not merely the case that commodities appear to dominate people in this fashion.”¹⁴⁰

Sayers, in *Marx and Alienation* has mentions that, for Marx, the primary cause of estrangement, is the capitalist system in which ownership of the means of production is concentrated in a few private hands, and the direct producers have been dispossessed of everything but their power to labor, which they are thus forced to sell wages to the owner of capital. As a result, workers have lost control of their work and its products; the whole process is owned and controlled by capital. In Marx’s words, workers are thus alienated both from the ‘object’ and the ‘activity’ of labor. ¹⁴¹

As previously mentioned, Marx wants to abolish the class differences existing in the capitalist society so that all may have equal privileges. Capitalist division of labor is the root cause of alienation and Marx hope to eradicate it. Marx’s communism is to eliminate all private property so that the working class can labor according to their capabilities and each individual will be a producer of his product. Richard in his article ‘Marx and Utopia: A Critique of the "Orthodox" View’ said that, for Marx class differences, such as those between the privileged bourgeoisie and the insecure, ill-paid workers, are parts of the exploitative nature of class society and thus should obviously be eliminated. And in developed communism, when all can develop themselves to their full potential, “the antithesis between mental and physical labor” will have vanished. All will have skilled and creative tasks, and the physical labor tasks will supposedly then be shared out amongst all the producers.¹⁴²

Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* discussed about communism as positive transcendence:

Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being—a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the

¹⁴⁰ Rapaport, Elizabeth, “Capitalism vs. Marx’s Communism,” pp. 82-83.

¹⁴¹ Sayers, Sean, *Marx and Alienation*, p. 165. Please also see Marx’s *Early Writings* 1975e, pp. 323-7.

¹⁴² Nordahl, Richard, “Marx and Utopia: A Critique of the "Orthodox" View,” p. 767.

species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.¹⁴³

Marx asserts that communism is ‘the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being- return become conscious, and accomplished with the entire wealth of previous development.’ It is like a home coming for the struggling classes since they have been away from their own essence on the pretext of earning for a long time. The mindsets of earning to survive have made them inhuman that is, they have come out of their self and have become a stranger to themselves. They have been working whether they like it or not, it is like they live to earn and not earn to live. They have been caught up in the mind of earning in order to survive since they were subjugated by the capitalists. They do not work according to their own capacities so their freedom and privileges have been taken away from them. Thus, in the process of struggling to survive, they lost themselves and became alienated. Communism will bring them back from where they have originally come from. It is a return to his human nature. It is ‘the positive transcendence of all estrangement – that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e. social mode of existence.’¹⁴⁴

Sayers alleges that, communism is of values because it will create the conditions for human development. It will lead to: “The absolute working- out of [man’s] creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on predetermined yardstick .”¹⁴⁵ In a communist society, all the private owners will be abolished that each worker will be a producer of his product and he will work according to his talent. He will no longer feel burdensome to work since he will be working on what he can and wants to do. There will be division of labor under the socialist society so each person is free to work on what he likes. The entire product will belong to the communist society which means that they will not be under the suppression of work load. In short, they will not be a means but an end in itself. Marx declares,

¹⁴³ Marx, Karl, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp.96-97.

¹⁴⁴ Ollman, Bertell, *Alienation*, p. 132.

¹⁴⁵ Sayers, Sean, *Marx and Alienation*, p. 164. Please also see Marx’s *Grundrisse: Foundations of Critique of Political Economy* 1973a, p. 488.

For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is force upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whilst in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in very branch he wishes society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.¹⁴⁶

According to Marx, in communist society, each man can have multiple works; he can be a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, and a critic. He will work voluntarily without having to work under obligation. There will not be work pressure that they will not see each other as an opponent which they have defeat in order to survive. He will have time for himself and for the welfare of his society. Each man will develop his skills since he will be working on what he is good at. All the product of his work will be commonly shared and no one will be deprived of his right to live. There will be unity in their differences. In relation to communism, Elizabeth says, “everyone in Communist Society will engage in some activities both in the course of socially necessary work and in other pursuits which employ these higher faculties as well as activities that do not employ these faculties. This is what is to be understood by the Marxist thesis that the division of labor is to be abolished: It is not the thesis that everyone will do everything, much less that everyone will do everything equally well. In Communist society everyone will be able to develop latent or potential capacities which in the capitalist division of labor can only become available as effective powers to a minority.”¹⁴⁷

In order to overcome alienation, Marx wants to abolish the capitalist society. He anticipates that the day will finally arrive to completely depose the capitalist society. In that day, the communist will own all the private properties and the people will not work like slaves to the masters. There will be equality among the people and they will be free to work according to their potentialities. Like Hegel, Marx is waiting for the finality to arrive. Both Hegel and Marx have a teleological aspect in their philosophy by which dialectic is implemented as a method. Hegel used dialectical method to arrive at the absolute and Marx sees dialectic in his protest for communist

¹⁴⁶ *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels* Vol. 1., pp. 35-6.

¹⁴⁷ Rapaport, Elizabeth, “Capitalism vs. Marx's Communism,” p. 84.

society. There is a striking similarity in their aspiration for the emancipation which makes them engage in messianism without *messiah*'s interference.

In conclusion, the concept of trinity in Christianity is for the purpose of God to have a relationship with man in order to make them the same as He is. So that, man can return to God from his sufferings and wait for *messiah* to come to deliver him from the worldly bondages. Christians are expecting to meet *messiah* on the final day to be released from their miseries and live joyful life with God. God has to become the processed triune God so that He can transform man to His image and likeness and finally bring them back to Him. Christians are waiting for *messiah* to come for the goal of ending their afflictions. They continue to live perpetually with the hope of meeting *messiah* in their daily mundane life.

Hegel, on the contrary, does not believe in *messiah* as the emancipator though he preferred Christian theology over all the other theology. Messianism in Hegel's dialectic does not necessarily comprise *messiah* itself. He indeed gets his dialectical idea from the Christian notion of trinity. According to Hegel, "Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient, and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite by which the finite, as that which is itself is other than itself, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite."¹⁴⁸ For him, everything is amalgamated in a dialectical process of becoming. The dialectical process of Hegel comprises of moments of contradiction and these contradictions are overcome in sublation. He asserts that in sublation, differences mutually interdependent on each other by identifying each other in their differences.

In his application of dialectic method there is a triadic movement which comes from his engagement with the theological concept of trinity. This implies that he was profoundly influenced by Christian theology. But adversely he criticizes the gospels of Jesus as private in nature confining to sect rather than the whole community. For Hegel, "In contrast to the religions of the Greeks and Romans which always address themselves to the entire people, Christianity refers primarily to the individual and to

¹⁴⁸Hegel, G.W.F., *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, p. 150.

his salvation, the redemption of his soul.”¹⁴⁹ Hegel considered the teachings of Jesus as authoritarian and is an enslavement of men being deprived of their freedom.

Hegel advocates the finality of his philosophical discourse like the monotheistic religion. The essential element of his dialectical process is the waiting of the absolute to arrive. He maintains that, “The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially, result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is, and that precisely in this consists its nature.”¹⁵⁰ The arrival of the absolute has been Hegel’s aspiration in developing his dialectics. Hegel’s dialectic on messianism is without *messiah*. Like the messianic religion, he is expecting the end to come that is when the absolute is being attained where there will be no more contradictions or differences or injustice.

Marx, in complementary to Hegel’s dialectic on messianism, is hoping for the emancipation of the struggling classes. Alienation emerges out of capitalism who own private property in which the workers labor to earn wages for their survival. Marx’s goal is to abolish private property and bring in communist society where everyone is not being alienated anymore. In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* he describes four types of alienation namely, alienation from the product, alienation from the activity, alienation from himself and alienation from other. When the labor class works under the capitalist, they do not own their production and their activities are not for themselves which makes them alienated from their essence. And moreover they do not have a social relationship with their co-workers since their sole aim is to earn wages. This alienation causes men to suffer just like the fall in Christian theology that makes men miserable. There is a need for liberation from capitalism which in a Christian sense is from Satan who causes men to be alienated from God.

According to Marx, as cited by Gajo in his article, “communism as a society means the positive suppression of all alienation and the return of man from religion, the family, the state, etc., to his human, i.e., social life (existence).”¹⁵¹ Thus, his goal is to attain a communist society. In Marx as well as in Hegel, there is messianic

¹⁴⁹ Lukacs, *The Young Hegel*, p. 61.

¹⁵⁰ Hegel, G.W.F., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p.11.

¹⁵¹ Petrovic, Gajo, “Marx theory of Alienation,” p.424.

principle of waiting which is seen in Judaism and Christianity. But the messianic structure of existence in Marx and Hegel is secular and does not involve any *messiah*. In short, Hegelian and Marxist messianic principle is messianism without *messiah*.

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Chapter 3

An Analysis of Deconstructing Messianism

This chapter will discuss Derrida's deconstruction on messianism. Derrida deconstructs the messianic eschatology that exists in the messianism of Hegel and Marx. Though Derrida accepts the horizontal feature of Hegelian- Marxian dialectic, he attempts to repudiate the teleological feature. For Derrida, both Marx and Hegel, in the context of waiting, in one way or another, participated in the messianic structure. According to Derrida, waiting is openness to the future without knowing when the expected thing / one would arrive. He critiques the messianism of Hegel and Marx who are still waiting for the finality to arrive. He claimed that it may be a ghost that they wait which has been repeatedly expected and he even called it the impossibility.

Derrida attempts to deconstruct the absolute spirit in Hegel that is derived from logocentrism. He attempts to repudiate the finality or totality in writing. Writing always leads to more writing and more and still more, but there is no final writing. Derrida proposes that reality follows diverse models which are rich in conflict and language has to reflect that richness. Therefore, the relation of language and the world can never succumb to finality. Attempt will be made to scrutinize Derrida's critique of eschatology on messianism and analyze deconstruction on writing, language and the world.

This chapter will be a critical analysis of Derrida's deconstruction. It will take into account the eschatology on the one hand and on the other hand Derrida's position on writing, language and the world in relation to his approach on messianism. The present chapter will comprise of three sections namely- A) Deconstruction: A critique of Messianism, B) Critique of Eschatology on Messianism, C) Deconstructing Messianism on Writing, Language and the World.

Derrida with his method of deconstruction has leveled three charges on messianism. Firstly, Derrida propounded the concept of messianism as ubiquitous in the context of waiting for something that is yet to happen which either can be secular or religious. For him, the messianic structure of existence is universal. Derrida says,

If the messianic appeal belongs properly to a universal structure, to that irreducible movement of the historical opening to the future, therefore to experience itself and to its language (expectation, promise, commitment to the event of what is coming, imminence, urgency, demand for salvation and for justice beyond law, pledge given to the other inasmuch as he or she is not present, presently present or living, and so forth), how is one to *think it with* the figures of Abrahamic messianism?¹⁵²

The given lines clearly indicate that messianism is universal structure that can be applied to any expectation which is untenable at the moment. It has the possibility of coming true later but not with an affirmative surety. Secondly, the Christian tradition of sacrifice being the assurance of redemption for the consummation of messianism is adjourned by Derrida. His interpretation of messianic notion is without religion that does not necessitate sacrifice. He states “awaiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer.”¹⁵³

Finally, the idiosyncratic features, which are supposedly assumed to be possessed by *messiah* as revealed in the Bible is absent in Derrida’s messianic structure. His concept of messianic form does not have any determinate character since he describes it as “messianism without religion.”¹⁵⁴ He says, “The *messianic* structure of existence is open to the coming of an entirely ungraspable and unknown other, but the concrete, historical *messianisms* are open to the coming of a specific other of known characteristics.”¹⁵⁵

Derrida also questions the finality both in Hegel and Marx. In Hegel it is the absolute spirit and in Marx it is the emergence of communist society. Marx treats alienation as the product of capitalism and his inclination is to eradicate it by attaining communism.¹⁵⁶ According to Derrida, Marx’s finality which is yet to come is socialism and he circumscribes Marx’s ideology to messianism without *messiah*. Derrida’s criticism of messianic principles emerges out of his respective philosophical account of logocentrism, western metaphysics in general, writing, language and the world. Derrida attempts to deconstruct the absolutistic status of western metaphysics that derived from logocentrism. He also questions ‘writing’ as something which cannot have a specific end. Writing, for him, requires more writing and more and still

¹⁵² Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, p. 210.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.74.

¹⁵⁵ Singh, R.P., “Jacques Derrida’s Deconstruction of the Messianism/Messianic Notion.” p.79.

¹⁵⁶ For details, please see Marx, Karl, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp.112-149.

more, but there is no final writing. According to him, the relation between language and the world is not confined to one to one relationship rather it is open with its different contexts. In short, the relationship between language and the world is openness without any finality. Derrida is opposed to all sorts of finalities including that of Marx's final struggle. Thus 'deconstruction' questions the grand narratives of Hegel's dialectic of Spirit and the proletarian emancipation in Marx along with the metadiscourse on messianism and *messiah*.

Derrida questions the concept of finality on messianism in the dialectic of Hegel and Marx's socialism. In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida says,

one does not know if the expectation prepares the coming of the future-to-come, or if it recalls the repetition of the same thing as ghost...Is there not a messianic extremity, an *eskhaton* whose ultimate event (immediate rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of the infinite surprise, heterogeneity without accomplishment) can exceed, *at each moment*, the final term of a *phusis*, such as work, the production, and the *telos* of any history? The question is indeed "whither?" Not only whence comes the ghost but first of all is it going to come back? Is it not already beginning to arrive and where is it going? What of the future? The future can only be for the ghosts. And the past...¹⁵⁷

Derrida deconstructs the aspect of believe that one have in waiting for the future. He even declares that this coming event can never arrive, in fact he called it as the impossibility which possibility will never occur. He argues that the future to come is alien to the dimension of time in a sense that it is not time bound since the expectation have been going on limitlessly. This waiting has been repeatedly done for generations and yet it still does not appear. So, Derrida propounds it as the waiting for the ghost whose physical appearance is not at all possible. The moment of arrival cannot be apprehended since the moment of the future is not there since no one can catch hold of a single moment. The moment when one tries to capture time, it slips out of one's hand that one cannot finally arrive at the ultimate moment.

Derrida advocates that one is not even sure whether that moment is beginning to arrive or where is it actually leaving which is why he said the future is only for the ghost whose coming is not predictable. The unpredictability of the future is what keeps one open to waiting regardless of the dimension of time. Derrida applies the waiting and believing element to the messianic principle in which everyone lives in

¹⁵⁷ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 44-45.

the hope. His messianic interpretation does not succumb to any particular religion. “The messianic refers predominantly to a structure of our existence that involves waiting- waiting even in activity- and a ceaseless openness towards a future that can never be circumscribed by the horizons of significance that we inevitably bring to bear upon that possible future.”¹⁵⁸

Derrida deconstructs the grand narratives of Hegel and Marx that waiting of the finality will never come to an end, it is a waiting that does not have the surety of arrival. He quoted Fukuyama definition of Hegelian and Marxist finality which says, “Both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human society was not open-ended, but would end when mankind had achieved a form of society that satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings.

Both thinkers thus posited an “end of history”: for Hegel this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a communist society.”¹⁵⁹ Derrida hold that there will never be the end of history since he deconstructs the idea of finality that Hegel and Marx have in mind. According to Derrida, history has no continuity; it is sporadic in nature with alteration. For him, the messianic structure of waiting is “...strange concept of messianism without content, of the messianic without messianism, that guide us here like the blind.”¹⁶⁰ In Derrida’s philosophical perspective, notion of waiting in messianism is unavailing.

Derrida questions the trend of western metaphysic wherein he place Hegel and Marx. And in relative to this he also alleges that there is no finality in writing, language and the world. He deconstructs writing by asserting that “The idea of the book is the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier. This totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified pre-exists it, in its ideality. The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing...If I distinguish the text from the book, I shall say that the destruction of the book as it is now underway in all domains, denudes the surface of the text.”¹⁶¹ According to Derrida, there is no totality in writing

¹⁵⁸ Singh, R.P., “Jacques Derrida’s Deconstruction of the Messianism/Messianic Notion.” p. 81.

¹⁵⁹ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, p.83.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.82.

¹⁶¹ Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, pp. 17-18.

which means there is no end in writing. Writing does not have a final goal since writing always refer to further writing and it goes on and on.

Concerning language and the world, the relationship can be observed in different contexts with different meanings. The relation is indeterminate since words used in language have pluralistic meaning in the world with reference to diverse contexts. The relationship between language and the world is open like the waiting that Derrida submit it to messianism which is 'awaiting' without an end. There is no teleology entail in the relation of language and the world which is why Derrida critique the grand narratives or the metaphysical notions of Hegel's dialectic and Marx's communism that involves finality. In order to comprehend Derrida's critique on messianism it would be appropriate to discuss his concept of deconstruction.

Section- A

Deconstruction: A Critique of Messianism

What is deconstruction? How does Derrida apply deconstruction against messianism? It is considered that Derrida's deconstruction gives the ground for multiple possibilities of interpreting concepts or ideas. By deconstructing the many centuries old dogmatic thinking, he brings out the variable ways of thinking that can lead to many questions and answers. Derrida is critical about logocentrism which was pervading in western philosophy and he deconstruct it by exposing how preconceived thinking inclined to identify the truth with logos especially the monotheistic religion whose sole faith is on the logos or written word (the Bible) spoken by God. He argues that presence of logos is metaphysical and that the idea of discovering more than what is written or adding to what is already given is not encourage and thereby the mind tends to limit itself to what is given.

Simon, in his book *The Ethics of Deconstruction* mentions that a deconstruction reading shows the dependent of the text upon the presuppositions of metaphysics of presence or logocentrism whereby any text identifies the truth with the logos or presence which comes through a voice and it debase writing that the text might attempt to feign and inquires the metaphysics that it presupposes, in so doing enters into self-contradictory and indicates the way towards thinking other than

logocentrism.¹⁶² Simon claimed that instead of raising a question as to what is deconstruction, it would be better to pose a question on what is not deconstruction.

In relation to Derrida's notion of Deconstruction, Simon pointed out that, "according to Derrida, it is not something negative; it is not a process of demolition (which does not automatically entail that it is positive. Furthermore, deconstruction needs to be sharply distinguished from analysis, which presupposes a reduction of entities to their simple or essential, elements, elements which themselves would stand in need of deconstruction. Crucially, deconstruction is not critique, either in the general or the Kantian sense, Derrida writes; 'the instance of the *Krinein* or of *Krisis* (decision, choice, judgments, discernment) is itself, as in moreover like entire apparatus of transcendental critique, one of the essential "themes" or "objects" of deconstruction'.

Similarly, deconstruction is not a method or way that can be utilized in the activity of interpretation. This is also to say that deconstruction cannot be reduced to a methodology (among competing methodologies) in the human or natural sciences or a technical procedure assimilable by academics and capable of being taught in educational institutions.¹⁶³ Further, deconstruction is not an *act* produced and controlled institution. Derrida concludes the 'Letter' characteristically by writing, 'what deconstruction is not, but everything! What is deconstruction? But nothing!'¹⁶⁴

Derrida's deconstruction is described by Harr as, "by means of double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice a reversal of the classical opposition *and* a general *displacement* of the system".¹⁶⁵ Therefore, according to Derrida, deconstruction is not a method or technique used for describing a withdrawn concept rather it open up ways of looking at things which does not conform to mostly held beliefs. As noted above, deconstruction divulges the narrowness of looking at things especially the typical notion of reaching the final truth which Derrida regarded as involving in the messianic structure of existence. He seems to suggest that there is diverse reality of things that were suppressed by the commonly held notion. Looking

¹⁶² Critchey, Simon, *The Ethics of Deconstruction Derrida and Levinas*, (*Psyché: inventions de l'autre* , p.390). pp. 20-21.

¹⁶³ Ibid. Please also see *Psyché: inventions de l'autre* , pp.390-1.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., pp.21-22.

¹⁶⁵ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 329.

through deconstruction, one can say that everything that is believed to be moving towards a particular goal in one direction can be taken as not to be going only in one way but rather participating in different way without actually reaching the goal which seems to be not even there.

For him, every metaphysical opposition like reality and appearance, good and bad, etc is not merely two terms put together but it is ‘a hierarchy and an order of subordination.’¹⁶⁶ It is the subjugation of one thing over the other and one chooses to prefer one over the other. According to Derrida, the idea of preferring one over the other (metaphysical oppositions) has to be deconstructed so that one can look at things in innumerable ways. And by deconstruction the conventional view of order of things are disassemble and it explores the unexplored area. Michel Harr infers that to deconstruct means to reverse a hierarchical order, the order of that which commands (the principle, the *arche*) and of that which obeys (the consequence) which basically means to show who the true master of the game is.¹⁶⁷ He says that language itself is the master. One can observe that deconstruction exposes the limitations of the hierarchical order and shows pluralities of things which saves one from being an essentialist. According to Michel, “*Of Grammatology* provides a more precise, more nuance statement of what deconstruction could venture;¹⁶⁸

within the closure, by an oblique and always perilous movement, constantly risking falling back within what is being deconstructed, it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and thorough discourse, to mark the conditions, the medium and the limits of their effectiveness, to designate rigorously their relationship *appartenance* to the machine whose deconstruction they permit; and, by the same stroke, designate the crevice through which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be glimpsed.¹⁶⁹

As pointed out earlier, Derrida critiques all forms of grand narratives by using deconstruction. He deconstructs the conventional concept of striving towards the goal or arriving at the much awaited future which is supposedly believe to be better than the present. He negates that there is no coming of the promise one or there is no achieving of the final goal. For him, there is no end as such, in a sense that history repeats itself and that there is no finality. He states that the idea of history coming into

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Harr, Michel, *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, p.61.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 124.

¹⁶⁹ Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, p. 25.

an end has been repeatedly told without really reaching to it. He questions all sorts of finalities in Hegel as well as in Marx. There is no final end, things will keep going irrespective of what one believes or hold to be the truth. He deconstructs messianism in Judeo-Christianity which strongly believes that *messiah* will come one day to liberate His people and end all their struggling and strives.

Derrida's notion of deconstruction is to topple the strong hope that is to arrive at the so called society which ends all sufferings or to arrive at the absolute. According to Derrida, as quoted in the book *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*,¹⁷⁰ "the right to deconstruction as an unconditional right to ask critical question not only about the history of the concept of man but about the history even of the notion of critique, about the form and the authority of the question, about the interrogation form of thought"¹⁷¹ He questions the essential truths that has been passed down for many centuries on which no one takes the effort to question. And by doing that he unravels the many hidden meanings which lies unattended so far.

It is given in *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts* that by deconstruction, Derrida is able to bring out certain logical complications which also have much to tell us concerning the real (as distinct from the mythic or idealized) conditions of emergence for language and society.¹⁷² In a way, Derrida's deconstruction opens up the pluralities of realities which no one would even think of the possibilities of questioning. He unveils the many sided notions and discloses its innumerable ways of looking at it and at the same time he deconstructs the idealized way of believing at it. Thus, he deconstructs messianism that involves Hegel and Marx who hold on to their ideal goals.

Derrida questions logocentricism which has been prevailing in the western traditions that conforms to the trend of thinking and disintegrates any dogmatic beliefs in the so called expected future which is assumes to be better than the present. Caputi rightly puts it in '*The Other Heading*' that, the trick in deconstruction, if it is a trick, is

¹⁷⁰ *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*. Edited by Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., p.14.

¹⁷¹ Derrida, Jacques, *Without Alibi*, p.204.

¹⁷² *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*. Edited by Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., p. 72.

to keep your head without having a heading.¹⁷³ The given statement seems to suggest that one cannot ascribe oneself under a single form of thought. It shows openness to the other by deconstructing the oneness in the form of thought and induces one to unload what has been installed in the system of thinking. Dooley and Liam pointed out that, “what this suggests is that Derrida’s philosophy, commonly known as deconstruction, strives to show that any construct-philosophical, theological, scientific-claiming to have pure access to our beginnings is mistaken.

Deconstruction, in other words, is an assault on the notion of purity.”¹⁷⁴ There is no beginning of pure philosophy, theology or scientific theory, since by accepting something as pure one negates the existence of the other. Everything that has come so far is constructed with time and has history which has been handed down from before. So when one takes some theories or beliefs as the only true or pure form of thought, one is not open to the plurality of things and thus one restricts oneself to being a fundamentalist. Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction is pluralistic in nature therefore he is open to all possibilities of thinking. He appears to imply that by opting one thing over the other one excludes what is not included in our option and thus limit thinking to a specific area only.

In the *The Philosophy of Derrida*, it is written that deconstruction is an affirmation to alterity which calls, summons or motivates response for the other, other than self.¹⁷⁵ It acknowledges the other by negating the self which excludes the existence of the other. Deconstruction tries to bring out the latent feature which philosophical discourses neglects since each philosopher has a different area of interest for instance, Hegel is caught up in arriving at the absolute or Marxist theories are for achieving communist society. By giving importance to a specific field, one does not give heed to the other fields and it can be considered that this is what deconstruction does to highlight the other as well.

In deconstruction, Derrida uses *Différance* as an operative term to deconstruct logocentrism and the other grand narratives. The term *Différance*, for Derrida, contains a number of different meanings in *Margins of Philosophy*. Derrida says,

¹⁷³ Ibid., p.121.

¹⁷⁴ Dooley, Mark and Kavanagh, Liam, *The Philosophy of Derrida*, p. VIII.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 108.

“First of all it means difference in the what sense of ‘French is different from English’. It also means the French verb *differer* which means both to differ and to defer. *Différance* also contains within it the present participle *differant*, which means the condition of differing or of diferring (as in “the differing opinions” or “the deferring decision”). Finally, *Différance* account for the *activity* of differing and deferring.”¹⁷⁶ When *Différance* is pronounced, the letter ‘a’ is not heard, ‘a’ is silent. One can know the difference only when it is spelled or written down. It can be seen that his used of *Différance* has significance with regard to phonocentrism which in a way indicates that he opposes the supremacy of speech over writing. In his essay “*Différance*” Derrida says that

This in itself-the silence that functions within only a so-called phonetic writing--quite opportunely conveys or reminds us that, contrary to a very widespread prejudice, there is no phonetic writing. . . . And an examination of the structure and necessity of these non phonetic signs quickly reveals that they can barely tolerate the concept of the sign itself. Better, the play of difference, which, as Saussure reminded us, is the condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign, is in itself a silent play. Inaudible is the difference between two phonemes which alone permits them to be and to operate as such. . . . If there is no purely phonetic writing, it is that there is no purely phonetic *phōne*. The difference which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in and of itself inaudible, in every sense of the word.¹⁷⁷

Derrida’s application of deconstruction is seen in *Différance*, it shows the difference and it also means deferring or postponement or suspension. It seems that when thoughts are scanned under the surveillance of deconstruction one can know the shortage of one’s thought that one realizes the probability of other thoughts which was not there previously and thus one enlarges one’s thinking or view or opinion. Carl Olson in his article advocates the ambiguity of the verb “to differ” which in some instances connote non-identity or the sameness of things. For Derrida it can also refer “to a present distinction or a delay, an interval of space and time.”¹⁷⁸

Carl Olson deduces that Derrida wants to capture the sense of “differing” as spacing and temporalizing and to indicate the sameness that is non-identical. He says, Derrida uses the term *Différance* to point to a necessarily finite movement that precedes and structures all opposition. The *ance* ending of *Différance*, marked by a

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

¹⁷⁷ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷⁸ Olson, Carl, “The “*Différance*” that makes all the Difference: A Comparison of Derrida and Śankara,” p. 248.

silent “a” suggests that it is not simply a word or a concept; it is neither existence nor essence, and is neither active nor passive because the perceiving subject is similarly constituted.¹⁷⁹ *Différance*, as put forth by Olson, being a necessarily finite movement, is what precedes and structures all opposition.

In other words, he further says, it originates before all differences, and represents the play of differences. It is impossible for it to be exposed because it cannot reveal itself in the present moment and never produces presence itself, whose structure is constituted by difference and deferment.¹⁸⁰ According to Derrida, as assumed by Carl Olson, *Différance* is the structure of the psyche or mind that unlike Hegel’s dialectics, it would be impossible to sublimate anything in one’s consciousness.

Carl Olson further explicates that Derrida’s *Différance* never presents itself as present because it does not have an ontological existence and the idea of presence which is habitually a determination and an effect in the philosophical system does not have a place in Derrida’s philosophy. The operation of difference is not to show the present; rather, it is to defer meaning by showing different possible meanings without uniting their differences.

In the *Ethics of Deconstruction* Simon states the aim of deconstruction by quoting Derrida’s writing where he writes,

We wanted to attain the point of a certain exteriority with respect to the totality of the logocentric epoch. From this point of exteriority a certain deconstruction of this totality (...) could be broached. It is from such a point of exteriority that deconstruction could cut into or penetrate the totality, thereby displacing it. The goal of deconstruction, therefore, is to locate a point of otherness within philosophical or logocentric conceptuality and then to deconstruct this conceptuality from the position of alterity.¹⁸¹

According to Derrida, a deconstruction reading shows that the logocentric tradition in philosophy dissimulates an otherness. In deconstructing philosophical text, one can have double reading which pursues alterities within a text. The otherness of the text that was deferred or suspended was revealed in deconstruction. In one of the interviews Derrida remarks “Deconstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness, but an

¹⁷⁹ Derrida, Jacques, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, pp. 130, 134.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁸¹ Critchey, Simon, *The Ethics of Deconstruction Derrida and Levinas*, p. 26.

openness towards the other.”¹⁸² This openness was not there before Derrida’s deconstruction that one tends to look at things in only one direction without having the slightest idea of what one is missing in doing so.

Simon construes that as Derrida is in opposition to logocentrism, deconstruction can be understood as the desire to keep open to the dimension of alterity which cannot be reduced or comprehended even in thought by philosophy. Simon mentioned that, “to say that the goal of Derridian deconstruction is not simply the *unthought* of the tradition, but rather that- which- cannot-be-thought, is to engage in neither sophisticated rhetoric nor negative theology. It is rather to point towards that which philosophy is unable to say.”¹⁸³ The above lines depicts that deconstruction indeed unwrapped the clandestine nature of thought which remains vague until deconstruction happen.

From this it can be observed that Derrida is against the narrowness of logocentrism that he attempts to expose the limitation of it. It may be regarded that even the messianism that Hegel and Marx engrossed in, also constricted them in their views since they are moving towards one path which for Derrida is not confine to one way but open to many ways. The reason, one can assume, for Derrida to oppose against messianism is that, there is an openness to the future without really having the ultimate goal for each movement of thoughts. For him, there is no teleological aspect that he is open to all possibilities without finality. Eleanor claims deconstructive thinking belongs to the movement of thinking that is open to all sorts of future. For Eleanor, deconstruction is a kind of critique that, “this critique belongs to the movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is confided, exposed, given up to its waiting for the other and for the event”¹⁸⁴

For Derrida, messianism in Hegel and Marx does not entail *messiah* but its teleology keeps them anticipating for the finality. And for him, it may seem like they are groping for things which are not there in the first place. The much awaited emancipation that Hegel and Marx was striving, for Derrida, is never to arrive since

¹⁸² Kearney, Richard, *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinker*, p. 124.

¹⁸³ Critcheey, Simon, *The Ethics of Deconstruction Derrida and Levinas*, p. 29.

¹⁸⁴ Macdonald, Eleanor, “Deconstruction's Promise: Derrida's Rethinking of Marxism,” p.148. Please also see Derrida, *Specter of Marx* p.90.

the hope has been propagated repeatedly from before that it can never come. Even if it is to come, it would have come by now and since it has not arrived, Derrida assumed that it will never reach the so called liberation.

Dickens in his article “Deconstruction and Marxist Inquiry” asserts that deconstruction practiced by Derrida is a two-step process of reversal and displacement. He says, “As the deconstruction of Saussure illustrates, the first aspect is one of opposition: In a traditional philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful coexistence of facing terms but a violent hierarchy. One of the terms dominates the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), occupies the commanding position. To deconstruct the opposition is above all, at a particular moment, to reverse the hierarchy.”¹⁸⁵

Deconstruction deposes the traditional logocentrism which maintains the hierarchy of dichotomy and favors one term over the other- for example, reality and appearance, good and evil. One term is presumed to be higher as one is face with only two terms which are oppose to each other. Derrida proposes that there can be more than two opposite terms and that deconstruction shows the differences in each term that one cannot ascribes one term to be higher than the other. And it can be presupposed that because of deconstruction, one can identify the differences in each term. The differences in each term prove that there is not only dichotomy but many different terms.

Derrida’s quotation clearly confirms that deconstruction disintegrates the conformist way of contention by exposing the differences in many terms and unlike Hegel he does not unite the differences but shows the richness in differences. As stated earlier, Dickens affirms that deconstruction is a two-step process which further proves that, deconstruction must complete the process “through a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, put into practice a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is on that conditional one that

¹⁸⁵ Dickens, David R., “Deconstruction and Marxist Inquiry,”p.150. Please also see Derrida’s *Positions*, p. 41.

deconstruction will provide the means of intervening in the field of opposition it criticizes and which is also a field of non-discursive forces.”¹⁸⁶

Derrida definitely knows how to disembark from the traditional way of analyzing things and that is why he considers deconstruction as a process by which displacement takes place in the system of thought. A deconstructive reading opens up the uncommon way of perceiving things and unravels the unthinkable. It is seen from the given paragraph that deconstruction disrupts and critiques the typical way of posing classical opposition. There can be various ways of opening up the coming event but not in the sense of arriving at the end. Deconstruction reveals that by holding on to one particular belief, one is neglecting the other beliefs which were excluded in one’s belief. And that the concept of teleology is deconstructed since it prohibits one to get involve in messianism and in that one is waiting for the impossible.

In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida writes,

For, let us speak as “good Marxists,” the deconstruction of Marxist ontology does not go after only a theoretico-speculative layer of the Marxist corpus but everything that articulates this corpus with the most concrete history of the apparatuses and strategies of the worldwide labor movement. And this deconstruction is not, in the last analysis, a methodical or theoretical procedure. In its possibility as in the experience of the impossible that will always have constituted it, it is never a stranger to the event, that is, very simply, to the coming of that which happens.¹⁸⁷

One can notice that Derrida’s deconstruction does not deconstruct only Marxist theories; it embraces the history of all the events that causes Marx to develop his theories of abolishing capitalist society. But this does not imply that deconstruction is an analysis or a method or theoretical procedure that deconstructs the history out of which Marxist theory is born. It is rather questioning the waiting of the event which is yet to happen with the possibilities of not even coming close to it. Derrida deconstructs Marxist messianism whose main objective is to accomplish a society which is free of capitalism and its impact on the society. Derrida advocates that one can never reach Marx’s goal in struggling for communist society. It can be compared to a specter that never seems to really exist. Deconstruction demonstrates that the impossibilities of finality that is seen in Marx which means that there is no

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. Please also see Derrida’s “Signature, Event, Context.” p. 195.

¹⁸⁷ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, p. 111.

end to human history; it keeps on repeating itself and therefore there is no attaining of the communist society.

In *Of Grammatology* “Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself become a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.”¹⁸⁸ The preceding lines noticeably approves that deconstruction aspire to seize the text through mastery that it wants to disclose what the text fail to apprehends. This means that the interpretation of a certain text does not fully provide the extensive meaning of a text. There are limitations to the understanding of a text and therefore Derrida wants to reveal what was not included in the reading of text through deconstruction. He intends to unveil the varieties of meaning that can be observed from a text and thus shows the limitations of grand narratives or logocentrism.

According to Derrida, “The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality-by thus “placing in the abyss” (*mettre en abime*), as the French expression would literally have it-it woos us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.”¹⁸⁹ The above lines depicts that deconstruction unfold the ever growing phenomenon of knowledge that it does not restricts knowledge to one conclusion. It paves a limitless way of comprehending that it can be compared to an abyss which is bottomless. Derrida says, “thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless.”¹⁹⁰

Furthermore, in *Of Grammatology*, it is given that ‘deconstruction never fully deconstructed text. The critic conditionally gathers the metaphysical resources of criticism and executes what declares itself to be *one* (unitary) act of deconstruction. It is said that deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is

¹⁸⁸ Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, p. 1xxvi-vii.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

inhabited by *Différance*.¹⁹¹ Deconstruction deconstructs itself in a sense that deconstruction does not have teleology like Hegel's dialectics. It is not a method or technique that tries to find the most accurate form of truth. For him, there is no concept of the ultimate truth since it is a perpetual movement of self deconstructing that it never really builds a foundation for itself.

Ken Jackson's article, "One Wish" or the Possibility of the Impossible" gave an account on the faith of Christianity as prescribe by Nietzsche and Derrida. Nietzsche disposes the hypocrisy of Christianity while Derrida critiques against the idea of the eschatology in Christianity.¹⁹² Ken Jackson cited John Caputo writings which says, "... it is so important to see that Derrida is not saying that *The Genealogy of Morals* is the final word on faith or Christianity....Deconstruction, if there is such a thing, means to show that there is never a final word."¹⁹³ It is evident from Derrida's point of view that he deconstructs the finality that is prevailing in Christianity which is messianism. For him, there is no final word or the ultimate promise that will be fulfilled in the future which is why he critiques Hegel as well as Marx for their involvement in messianism that both of them approve of teleology in their philosophical discourses.

Gert Biesta affirms that although Derrida's philosophy indisputably is unique with regard to the object of its critique and with respect to its "method", one cannot deny the fact that Derrida's deconstruction is firmly rooted in the tradition of western philosophy.¹⁹⁴ Gert Biesta quoted Derrida's line that goes as, "Deconstruction always aims at the trust confided in the critical, criticotheoretical agency, that is, the deciding agency," for which reason he concludes that "deconstruction is deconstruction of critical dogmatism".¹⁹⁵ According to the above lines, Gert Biesta says that deconstruction aim at critical philosophy and question philosophy that appear to itself as other than itself in order to reflect and interrogate itself in an original manner. Gert asserts that deconstruction tries to open up the system in the name of that which cannot be thought of in terms of the system (and yet makes the system possible).

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.1xxviii.

¹⁹² Jackson, Ken, "One Wish" or the Possibility of the Impossible: Derrida, the Gift, and God in "Timon of Athens," p. 45.

¹⁹³ Caputo, John, *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, p. 218.

¹⁹⁴ Biesta, Gert, "From Critique to Deconstruction: Derrida as a Critical Philosopher," p. 89.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. Please also see Derrida's *Points... Interviews*, 1997-1994, p.54.

Deconstructive affirmation did not merely affirm what is excluded in the system. Instead it is an affirmation of what is not visible from the present that is, an affirmation of the other in the other. He says, “it is an affirmation of an otherness that is always to come, as an event that “as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations.”¹⁹⁶ Deconstruction is an openness towards the unforeseeable incoming (l'invention; invention) of the other.”¹⁹⁷ Gert Biesta consent that deconstruction is the “right” to deconstruct and to be critical with the intention of disclosing that is for the concern of the other is invisible from the present. It tries to reveal the others which are not included in the visible present and thus open up the pluralities of other.

Deconstruction thus tries to open up the system in the name of that which cannot be thought of in terms of the system (and yet makes the system possible). This reveals that the deconstructive affirmation is not simply an affirmation of what is known to be excluded by the system. Deconstruction is an affirmation of what is wholly other, of what is unforeseeable from the present. It is an affirmation of an otherness that is always to come, an event that “... exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations.”¹⁹⁸ Deconstruction is an openness towards the unforeseeable incoming (l'invention; invention) of the other.¹⁹⁹ It is from this concern for what is totally other, that deconstruction derives its “right” to be critical, its “right” to deconstruct - or, to be more precise, its right to reveal or witness deconstruction.

In the article, “From Critique to Deconstruction: Derrida as a Critical Philosopher” Gert Biesta mentions that the resources of critique which are supposedly assumed to be pure and self-sufficient are not so as suggested by deconstruction since the critical work of deconstruction is to divulge the impurity of critical criteria that they are not self-sufficient but need something other than themselves to become possible. The critical work of deconstruction, as depicted by Gert Biesta, consist in “the relentless pursuit of the impossible, which means, of things whose possibility is sustained by their impossibility, of things which, instead of being wiped out by their impossibility, are actually nourished and fed by it.”²⁰⁰ Deconstruction critiques the possibility of the impossible which can be related to messianism that arriving of the

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. Please also see Derrida's *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, p.27.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p.91. Please also see Caputo's *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, p.47.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. Please also see Derrida's *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, p.27.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. Please also see Caputo's *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, p.47.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p.93. Please also see Caputo's *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, p.32.

goal is impossible but the very fact of its impossibilities encourages the idea of possibility. Gert Biesta says if at all there is the aim of deconstruction, then its aim is not to annihilate the impossible but to affirm the impossible of which one cannot predict as possibility. Therefore, the critical work of deconstruction in a way, places Derrida among the critical stream of Western philosophy.²⁰¹

Ronald Schleifer's article, "Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis" contends that Derrida in his work has highlighted that deconstruction is not neutralization. Derrida says in *Positions*, "What... I am attempting to pursue, is a kind of *general strategy of deconstruction*. The latter is to avoid both simply *neutralizing* the binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply *residing* within the closed field of these oppositions, thereby confirming it."²⁰² Derrida opines on deconstruction is not merely to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics but to depose the hierarchy not in the form of sublatung into third term, rather to leave it open to diversify into many terms. Ronald Scheifer argues that Derrida defines that deconstruction proceeds by the reversal or "overturning" of classical binary oppositions, in which "one of the two terms governs the other" in a "violent hierarchy" the hierarchy of what I am calling unmarked and marked semantic terms.²⁰³ Deconstruction in the form of displacing the difference seems to suggest it as a kind of neutralization but it is not neutralization, as a matter of fact it negates neutralization.

For Derrida, deconstructing is "resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics."²⁰⁴ Ronald Schleifer affirms that deconstruction does not "rest" in its "neutralizing" term. Hence it is not "neutralizing"; rather, it is transformational, inextricably bound to a particular semiotic field, "explosive": "the force and form of its disruption," Derrida says, "explode the semantic horizon."²⁰⁵ According to Ronald, probably the most unequivocal articulation in Derrida writings (as opposed to the spoken interview of *Positions*) can be traced on the last page of *Margins of Philosophy*,

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Schleifer, Ronald, "Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis," p. 388. Please also see Derrida's *Position*, p. 10.

²⁰³ Ibid. Please also see Derrida's *Positions*, p.41.

²⁰⁴ Ibid. Please also see Derrida's *Positions*, p.43.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. Please also see Derrida's *Positions*, p.45.

Very schematically: an opposition of metaphysical concepts (for example, speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of subordination. Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a neutralization; it must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an *overturning* of the classical opposition *and* a general *displacement* of the system.²⁰⁶

It can thus be seen that deconstruction is not to neutralize the metaphysical opposition. It does not reveal a mediation ground rather it discloses the many possibilities which are being ignored in the classical opposition. Derrida's deconstruction is open horizontally to possibilities which does not have teleological end.

Section- B

Critique of Eschatology on Messianism

Derrida's philosophical discourses does not have an eschatology which is why he critiques messianism in the monotheistic religions, in Hegel and as well as in Marx. It was already stated before that, according to Derrida, anyone who is engross in the waiting aspect whether in religion or secular, can be categories under messianism. Messianism, in Derrida's writing, has an eschatology which means everyone who engages in it has a goal and to arrive at it is the end of all their endeavors that can either be secular or religious. In his writings, one cannot find a trace of finality since he endorses plurality in all things or events. He even said that history can never end because it is episodic in nature, that there are ruptures and mutations and he repeatedly pointed out that there is no finality in history.

Unlike the other philosophical theories, there is no teleological aspect in Derrida's philosophy. He instead, pointed out the shortcomings in having a teleology which for him, is narrowing down one's perspective by selecting one over the other as the right means to achieving the goal. When one chooses one thing over the other one excludes the other and by doing that one is annihilating the possibilities of the other which can turn out to have better options. The idea of opting for the best way is what Derrida deconstruct because for him there are innumerable ways of looking at things that one is limited in his understanding when one has an expectation for the finality

²⁰⁶ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, pp. 329-30.

and that one only chose one way to arrive at it. For him, there is no eschatology as such events and things keep happening without really arriving at the end.

It has been predicted way before that there will be eschatology especially in Christianity and Judaism and that the adherence of these religions has been preparing themselves to meet their *messiah* who will end their struggles and afflictions and bring in the new age in which there will be no more sufferings. The notion of meeting the promised one (*messiah*) has been their sustaining hope in facing all their earthly difficulties. The coming of the *messiah*, for Derrida, has been preached for many centuries and according to him, if at all there is *Messiah*, He would have come by now. For him, the waiting of the *Messiah* is like waiting for the impossible; it is like a ghost who can never really appear.

The idea of this ghost, that is the *messiah*, has been haunting the lives of the people that they keep hoping for it but again, the very fact of it not coming until now makes them wait in vain. That is why Derrida deconstructs messianism that have eschatological event which will never happen despite the expectation. Not only does he deconstructs messianism in monotheistic religion, he also deconstructs messianism in Hegel and Marx who are also the victims of eschatology. As mentioned earlier, messianism in Hegel is his waiting for the absolute to arrive through his dialectical approach and in Marx is his hope for the communist society which he tries to achieve it by demolishing the capitalist society who oppresses the struggling class. Derrida in *Specters of Marx*, regarding the eschatology writes:

We do not know if expectation prepares the coming of the to-come or if it recalls the repetition of the same, of the thing itself as ghost... This non-knowledge is not a lacuna. No progress of knowledge could saturate an opening which must have nothing to do with knowledge. And therefore not with ignorance either. This opening must preserve this heterogeneity as the only chance of a future affirmed or rather re-affirmed. It is the future itself, it comes from the future. The future is its memory. In the experience of the end, in its insistent, instant coming, always imminently eschatological, at the extremity of the extreme today would be announced in this way the future of what is coming.²⁰⁷

To further elaborates his critique of Eschatology, he asserts,

More than ever, for the to-come can only be announced as such and in its purity from a past *end*: beyond, *if it is possible*, the last extremity. If it is possible, if there is such a reserve without concluding in advance, without reducing in advance both the future

²⁰⁷ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 44-45.

and its chance? Without totalizing in advance? We must here discern between eschatology and teleology, even if the stake of such a difference constantly risks being erased in the most fragile or the slightest inconsistency-and will in some sense always and necessarily be deprived of an assurance against this risk. Is there not a messianic extremity, an *eskhaton* whose ultimate event (immediate rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of infinite surprise, heterogeneity without accomplishment) can exceed, at each moment, the final term of a *physis*, and the labour, production and *telos* of any history?²⁰⁸

The waiting aspect for the coming event or *messiah* does not justify its fulfillment. Derrida seems to suggest that to-come can only be declared in the now but it eventually becomes the past while waiting. And this waiting has been prolonging from the past that its arriving in the future is doubtful to the extent that it reassures of not coming at all. For Derrida, the future is openness to the heterogeneity that cannot succumb to one particular end, to put in other way, there cannot be eschatology. The term eschatology can be inferred as having a specific teleology which does not encourage diversity. In fact, Derrida deconstructs totality which affirms to messianism. He admits to the infiniteness of the future that one cannot attribute it to a definite end.

According to Geoffrey Bennington in *Interrupting Derrida*, the assertion of out-of-jointness of time, untimeliness of infinite surprise entail of the eschatological affirmation against its teleological recovery. And he said that “this is a refined distinction in view of a more general ‘post-structural’ (and indeed earlier Derridean) tendency to identify the eschatological and the teleological, or at least to treat them as in some way equivalent metaphysical closures.”²⁰⁹ Geoffrey Bennington claims that the eschatological affirmation in Derrida’s writing is ‘messianic without *messiah*’ or a *formal* messianicity which cannot project any content or specificity whatsoever into the advent or coming it nonetheless affirms.²¹⁰

For Derrida, eschatology refers to a metaphysical closure which one can never be sure of. Apart from the coming event, it does not have content with a surety of its appearing since his concept of messianism does not have any distinguishable characters or features like in Christianity or Judaism. To be precise, Derrida’s messianic structure is without the *messiah* and that the delay of the eschatology in fact fortifies the hope of

²⁰⁸ Ibid. p.45.

²⁰⁹ Bennington, Geoffrey, *Interrupting Derrida*, p.136.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

expecting. Derrida's deconstructing of eschatology indicates his openness to the future which yields to plurality rather than totality. There is no totality in his philosophy and he criticizes the idea of totality in Hegel and Marx, not to mention the other monotheistic religions. Totality implies finality which means there can never be a completion of history, writing, language and the world and Derrida has been deconstructing it to open a way for diverse form of thinking.

To affirm further, Geoffrey Bennington states that the event of the coming which can be seen in *Specters of Marx* is eschatological that it is radically indeterminable which is why one cannot assign messianism to *messiah* whose coming is promised. He asserts that Derrida's version of the messianic will be unacceptable to messianism since it does not involve *messiah* in his messianism, and that it deprive of any essential point.²¹¹ Nevertheless, Geoffrey describe Derrida's messianism as going beyond the fundamental messianic theme that point towards teleological schema which is prominent in Holy Scriptures and in Hegel's dialectic. He says that the moment one is aware of the arriving on time, one eventually wind up the essentially unsettling thought of the event as capricious arrival of the other, for which one cannot be certain of the preparation, irrespective of the given amount of time. Geoffrey seems to propose that the thought of the future for which one has been preparing can be subscribes to the teleological structure that summit to maturity which one can never really know and that is the reason why one indulges in waiting. He said the idea of the here and now in which one thinks of the otherness for its arrival, one is accustomed to think in the now as present but that does not vindicate the purpose of one's waiting that Geoffrey ascribes to it as *eskhaton* without salvation or redemption.²¹²

Derrida, in *Specters of Marx* seems to suggest that the eschatological themes like the 'end of history', 'end of philosophy', 'end of man' or the 'end of Marx' has been persistently put into the heart of many that it has become like a daily bread of apocalypse which one has been feeding on for the last four decades that one get habituated to the idea of not really coming to meet the ends.²¹³ In the same book, he argues that the end which one has been obsessively thinking about is not really an

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 137.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, p. 16.

end; it can be the end of a certain trend of thought. The concept of teleology has been interrelated with eschatology and the end which is supposedly presumed to come when a purpose of certain theories are fulfilled, for instances, Hegel's absolute, Marxist communist society or the coming of *Messiah*. So for Derrida, there is no end in language, thought and the world which basically means his philosophy is openness towards all sorts of possibilities but one has to be mindful that when he talks about openness to possibilities he does not refer it to the possibility of finality.

He further argues that one can never be late for the end of history since the coming of the final day is unpredictable to such an extent that one is like waiting for the impossible. One cannot be sure of being absolutely ready for the coming of the expected eschatology because the preparation has been continuing for the past many years to those who endorse finality. So Derrida says, "How can one be late to the end of history? A question for today. It is serious because it obliges one to reflect again, as we have been doing since Hegel, on what happens and deserves the name of event, after history: it obliges one to wonder if the end of history is but the end of a certain concept of history."²¹⁴ In Derrida's opinion, the end, which he reluctantly approve of it if at all, could be the end of certain concept of history, it does not summit to the so called eschatology.

According to Derrida in *Specters of Marx*, the messianism does not necessarily involve *messiah*, his messianism is without *messiah*. He tags messianism to anyone who lives with anticipation for arriving of something better than the present. The scheme of messianism is hope for whatever one believes it to be coming and that is what Derrida is deconstructing. Deconstruction does not leave room for the schema of hope for which one can never be ascertain of. It seems that Derrida is not concern of what will happen in the future or the future to come; his deconstruction is to keep open to the other possibilities which are excluded in the line of eschatology. The concept of eschatology constricts one to think only in a certain way that one misses the other possibilities which are not parts of teleological aspects. Derrida critiques messianism which is always attached to the idea of waiting of which one cannot know when the waiting will get over. According to him, it is

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

... desert-like messianism (without content and without identifiable *messiah*), of this also *abyssal* desert, “desert in the desert,” one desert signaling toward the other, abyssal and *chaotic* desert, if chaos describes first of all the immensity, excessiveness, disproportion in the gaping hole of the open mouth-in the waiting or calling for what we nickname here without knowing the messianic: the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the *arrivant as justice*. We believe that this messianic remains an *ineffaceable* mark-a mark one neither can nor should efface-of Marx’s legacy, and doubtless of *inheriting*, of the experience of inheritance in general.²¹⁵

Though one is not certain when the preparation for the coming of the other will get over, yet one becomes accustomed to the waiting in messianism. Derrida said that the messianic remain is indelible mark just like Marx’s legacy. For him, Marx struggles to eliminate the capitalist society with the idea of arriving at the communist society is an engagement in messianism. There is a sense of hope in Marxism that Derrida deconstructs by pointing out the impossibility of actually reaching the end of history. Derrida writes:

In saying that, we will not claim that this messianic eschatology common both to the religions it criticizes and to the Marxist critique must be simply deconstructed. While it is common to both of them, with the exception of the content [but none of them can accept, of course, this *epokhe* of the content, whereas we hold it here to be essential to the messianic in general, as thinking of the other and of the event to come], it is also the case that its formal structure of promise exceeds them or precedes them. Well, what remains irreducible as the possibility struction, what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps a certain experience of the emancipator promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism, an idea of justice-which we distinguish from law or right and even from human rights-and an idea of democracy-which we distinguish from its current concept and from its determined predicates today [permit me to refer here to “Force of La” and the *Other Heading*].²¹⁶

The above passage unquestionably designates that Marx’s idea of achieving communist society is the same as religious messianic structure but without the intrusion of *messiah*. Both have the phase of expecting for the final arrival of which none of them know when it will arrive. For the religious monotheistic Christian as well as the Jewish the eschatology will be when *Messiah*, the promised one, comes to release His people from the shackles of sufferings. And Derrida has mentioned in the above passage that Marxists have also waited for the promised emancipator to deliver the people from the hands of the oppressors. Marxist messianism is without religion and he further pointed out that it is messianic without messianism. The similarities

²¹⁵ Ibid., p.33.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

that Derrida pointed out in religion and Marxism is the horizontal characteristic of expecting and waiting without any given time frame. The eschatological aspect is more or less the same in both the cases except that in Marxism there is no spiritual figure who will come and end all struggling. Derrida is really skeptical about the about the promised one or the end of capitalist society because he himself has been a bystander of unfulfilled promise for about four decades. The waiting has been delayed for many consecutive years yet the upholder continues to keep their hopes despite the failure to arrive at the finality. Derrida describes it as

A waiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of the *arrivant* from whom or from which one will not ask anything in return and who or which will not be asked to commit to the domestic contracts of any welcoming power (family, State, nation, territory, native soil or blood, language, culture in general, even humanity), *just* opening which renounces any right to property, any right in general, messianic opening to what is coming, that is, to the event that cannot be awaited *as such*, or recognized in advance therefore, to the event as the foreigner itself, to her or to him for whom one must leave an empty place, always, in memory of the hope-and this is the very place of spectrality.²¹⁷

Derrida further substantiates his criticism on messianic eschatology as,

It would be easy, too easy, to show that such a hospitality without reserve, which is nevertheless the condition of the event and thus of history (nothing and no one would arrive otherwise, a hypothesis that one can never exclude, of course), is the impossible itself, and that this *condition of possibility* of the event is also its *condition of impossibility*, like this strange concept of messianism, that guides us here like the blind. But it would be just as easy to show that without this experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on both justice and the event. That would be still more just or more honest. One might as well give up also on whatever good conscience one still claims to preserve. One might as well confess the economic calculation and declare all the checkpoints that ethics, hospitality, or the various messianisms would still install at the borders of the event in order to screen the *arrivant*.²¹⁸

According to Derrida, the waiting for the eschatology which is the arrival of the expected one has been enduring without any margin and that one has been leaving a vacant spot to be filled by the promised one who incessantly fails to appear. Regardless of the hope being thwarted time and again one still manages to reserve an empty place for the coming; Derrida called it “always in the memory of hope and this is the very place of spectrality.” The waiting can be compared to waiting for ghost whose appearing cannot be guarantee and the idea of ghost is a myth for many that

²¹⁷ Ibid., pp.81-82.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

one does not really believe that it exists. And Derrida pointed out that the waiting is always in the memory of hope which means it is not real but a memory.

Apart from waiting, one's character is presided over by the coming one that the openness to the other is restricted to only the hope of finally arriving at the eschatology. The last three lines of the above passage seems to suggest though Derrida is criticizing the waiting aspect he somehow thinks the idea of hope that one preserve makes one not to give up on things which one cannot foresee. And that is the reason why he says "this *condition of possibility* of the event is also its *condition of impossibility*." Derrida says it guided a person blindly without any clue to what will happen next and that it is openness to the impossibility. He fittingly put forth as, "What is happening is happening to age itself, it strikes a blow at the teleological order of history. What is coming, in which the untimely appears, is happening to time but it does not happen in time."²¹⁹

The incongruous belief, for Derrida in *Specters of Marx*, is the biblical messianic hope for the observance is accompanied with being attune in the prescribe laws which must be followed upon in preparing to meet the *Messiah*. In eschatology, not only is the coming of *Messiah* important, it is also important to be approve of getting reward for every conduct that one committed while existing on the earth. Derrida writes,

Ascesis strips the messianic hope of all biblical forms, and even all determinable figures of the wait or expectation; it thus denudes itself in view of responding to that which must, be absolute hospitality, the "yes" to the *arrivant(e)*, the "come" to the future that cannot be anticipated-which must not be the "anything whatsoever" that harbors behind it those too familiar ghost, the very ones we must practice recognizing. Open, waiting for the event as *justice*, this hospitality is absolute only if its keeps watch over its own universality. The messianic, including its revolutionary forms (and the messianic is always revolutionary, it has to be), would be urgency, imminence but, irreducible paradox, a waiting without horizon of expectation.²²⁰

He proceeds on to criticize messianism by claiming that,

One may always take the quasi-atheistic dryness of the messianic to be the condition of the religions of the Book, a desert that was not even theirs (but the earth is always borrowed, on loan from God, it is never possessed by the occupier, says precisely [*justement*] the *Old Testament* whose injunction one would also have to hear); one may always recognize there the arid soil in which grew, and passed away, the living

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 96.

²²⁰ Ibid., p.211.

figures of all the *messiahs*, whether they were announced, recognized, or still awaited. One may also consider this compulsive growth, and the furtiveness of this passage, to be the only events on the basis of which we approach and first of all the messianic in general, that other ghost which we cannot and ought not do without.²²¹

He further enunciates his critique against eschatology on messianism in the following passage:

One may deem strange, strangely familiar and inhospitable at the same time (*unheimlich*, uncanny), this figure of absolute hospitality whose promise one would choose to entrust to an experience that is so impossible, so unsure in its indigence, to a quasi-“messianism” that also has such an obstinate interest in a materialism without substance: a materialism of the *khora* for a despairing “messianism.” But without this latter despair and if one could *count* on what is coming, hope would be but the calculation of a program. One would have the prospect but one would not longer wait for anything or anyone. Law without justice. One would no longer invite, either body or soul, no longer receive any visits, no longer even think to see. To see coming. Some, and I do not exclude myself, will find this despairing “messianism” has a curious taste, a taste of death. It is true that this taste is above all a taste, a foretaste, and in essence it is curious. Curious of the very thing that it conjures-and that leaves something to be desired.²²²

Derrida’s criticism can be seen in the above passages when he equated the impossibility of the coming as a ghost who never really has a physical existence. The scheme of hope has been imbibed in the heart of many that one live to die each day. In other words, one does not really live when one continually hopes for the future; one’s ultimate wish is to meet the end soon in order to reach the promised one. Derrida says the messianic hope is a kind of curiosity for the taste of death because without hope one would no longer wait to see. There would be no desire to wait if one is not promised of the future. In a way, when one is motivated for the future, one forgets to live in the moment and when one is living in the present he is already in the past and he continues to live for the future.

Again, the hope for the future has come along with a baggage of history for which one has been prepared and is preparing to meet the coming. The future is not promised to man that he keeps hoping for the best to happen even in times of trial. For Derrida, messianism is an involvement in optimism where one has been habituated to think of the eschatology. Christopher Wise in his article, “Deconstruction and Zionism: Jacques Derrida’s “Specters of Marx”, claims that “Derrida defines “messianicity” as a fundamental aspect of the human experience: “As soon as you

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid., p. 211.

address the other, as soon as you are open to the future,...[to] waiting for someone to come: that is the opening of experience.”²²³

Derrida deconstructs messianism because it negates the significance of others who are not part of the messianic mission. The concept of messianism necessarily involves eschatology which he deconstructs since the finality in a way is a close system which is not open to the other. Derrida does agree that in the horizontal waiting, there is openness to the possibilities but the possibilities which he have in mind is not the coming of the promised one. His idea of openness to possibilities is without eschatology, it is about opening to the other various ways which eschatology excludes. Deconstruction as mentioned in the first section is to deconstruct all the hierarchy in traditional philosophies where some oppositional terms are given more importance than the other which for Derrida, there can be more than two opposite terms.

Through deconstruction he shows the differences in various ways and intends to keep open to diversity without bringing unity in differences. It seems that the reason he deconstructs messianism is its specific way of looking at things that will eventually lead to eschatology. There is no openness to diversity in eschatology since each upholder has their own distinctive way of approaching to their goal. It can be assumed that when one has teleology in mind, one has the tendency to do things in a particular way in order to reach it and by doing that one does not see the possibilities of other possibilities. Derrida critiques messianism with *messiah* and without *messiah*. The eschatology of Messianism with *messiah* can be seen in Judaism and Christianity because each of these religions has teleological feature of waiting which will be fulfilled when *messiah* comes as the promised one to release His people from all kinds of bondages, and rewards them according to their conduct while living on earth. Messianism without *messiah* as prescribes by Derrida can be seen in Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy where the eschatological aspect for Hegel is the reaching of the absolute and for Marx is the acquiring of the communist society. Because of eschatology, each of these philosophers think in a specific way to obtain their goals and that makes them close to openness for other possibilities. In Derrida’s

²²³ Wise, Christopher, “Deconstruction and Zionism: Jacques Derrida's “Specters of Marx,” p. 58. Please also see Caputo’s *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, p.22.

deconstruction there is openness horizontally but this openness does not finally yield to teleology. He deconstructs eschatology which seems to be a close system to him and does not open to all other possibilities. Derrida deconstructs messianism because there is eschatology in messianism which has a restricted system of thought directed specifically towards a goal.

Section- C

Deconstructing messianism on Writing, Language and the World

Derrida's deconstruction, as mentioned earlier, deconstructs logocentrism and phonocentrism which has been prevailing in the traditional western philosophy. It is one of the most celebrated themes that gave importance to speech over writing. Derrida deconstructs the conventional way of thinking that has been handed down for centuries that spoken words are believed to be more primitive or genuine before writing actually comes into being. There was always an order of speech being prior to writing which Derrida wants to reverse the order and maintain that writing is as important as speech. As one can see, even in the monotheistic religions, words were spoken by God which later were written down by the revealed one. These words which are also referred to as 'logos' that are deemed to be the ultimate words which are written down and compiled together as the Holy Scriptures. It is held that no one has the authority to add or alter the words of God that it is supposed to be accepted as it is and obeyed faithfully until the promised one comes.

Derrida deconstructs the metaphysical authoritative spoken words and propounds that there is no ultimate writing as such because for him writing comprises of more writings that it can never end. He claims that writing leads to more writings which can never lead to final writing. Writing is open like the horizontal aspect of experiences and its relation to language and the world cannot be derived at a one-to-one relationship. Writing, language and the world are interconnected that one cannot assign them to only one meaning in a sense that writing is miscellaneous in itself that its context can change in reference to its meaning when used in different languages in relation to the world. It cannot be tied down to a one-to-one relationship.

For instance, the word 'internet' does not mean anything before the invention of internet and as technologies progress 'internet' is used in innumerable ways with

different context that it becomes more meaningful and useful as time goes by. When one look back to how internet used to be and how it became important, with an account of time, one realizes that words that are used before in different context can have meaning much more than it used to be. Derrida critiques the logocentrism in religions and in western philosophy. For him, writing leads to more and more writing that the language used in it increases in references to time and its context in the world. In the ever escalating writing, there are many new words in languages which have new meanings in the world. With time, new words are invented to describe different contexts in the world which were not there earlier.

The critics of Derrida, as read by Brown, seems to suggest that the world for Derrida is a text and not real, while Derrida's defenders says that it is impossible to get outside a text as it means to create another text.²²⁴ Examining Derrida's work, Brown asserts that in order to describe a fact, one needs to use another fact which in other words means that humans are trapped in language to understand the world. Derrida in *Of Grammatology* claims that, "The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement. If one wishes to go back *from the supplement to the source*; one must recognize that there is "a supplement at the source."²²⁵ The given lines commend that one cannot really use an originary term alone because when one uses certain term to describe something one has the tendency to borrow other term in explanting things which is why Derrida says, "The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement." In *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*, it is given that, "...Language, text and writing are constituted by supplementarily, by a network of traces and referents, references to other references, a general referability without simple origin, presence or destination."²²⁶

To put down one's thought or form of thinking which I am doing at the moment, I use borrowed words from language to think and write it down and when I do that I did not use my own original words but words I picked up from others. It seems that there can be no genuine or primitive words since whatever sentences that one makes, one takes it from other and that other also got it from others and likewise it goes on and on. In writing, while using words from language to give meaning, one

²²⁴ Edited by Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino, *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*, p. 97.

²²⁵ Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, p. 304.

²²⁶ Royle, Nicolas, *After Derrida*, pp. 21-22.

cannot give a definite answer to the origin of words and one cannot have a final writing. Writing refers to more and more writing that it is open horizontally without any finality. Derrida says in *Margins of Philosophy*,

Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the non conceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated. For example, writing, as a classical concept, carries with it predicates which have been subordinated, excluded, or held in reserve by forces and according to necessities to be analyzed. It is these predicates (I have mentioned some) whose force of generality, generalization, and generativity find themselves liberated, grafted onto a “new” concept of writing which also corresponds to whatever always has *resisted* the former organization of forces, which always has constituted the *remainder* irreducible to the dominant force which organized the- to say it quickly—logocentric hierarchy. To leave this new concept the old name of writing is to maintain the structure of the graft, the transition and indispensable adherence to an effective *intervention* in the constituted historic field. And it is also to give their chance and their force, their power of *communication*, to everything played out in the operations of deconstruction.²²⁷

Michel Harr asserts that to deconstruct is to reverse the classical opposition and Derrida states that it is a general displacement of the system.²²⁸ By deconstruction he revokes the importance of speech over writing and reverses the system of hierarchy in the classical opposition. He lays out all the variety of differences in each term and does not intend to show the best or the worse. As a matter of fact, deconstruction reveals the paucity of classical opposition and shows a different way of exploring the richness of terms without classifying them into ascending categories. In the book, *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, Michel Harr quoted the following lines, “Writing constitutes the medium in which opposites are opposed...”²²⁹ contradictions and pairs of opposites are lifted from the bottom of this diacritical reserve of *Différance*.²³⁰

Derrida seems to imply that writing opens up the way to preserve the richness of language which will gradually elapse if it is not written down. It is a medium where the opulence of contradictions and opposite pairs are reflected and conserved for a long time even in the absence of the writer. Unlike voice, writing annihilates the presence or absence of the writer and conveys what it meant to relay. Though there are probabilities of misconstruing in reading a written text, one cannot altogether dismiss the significance of writing. In this regard, Harr noted that, “Plato presents

²²⁷ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, pp. 329-30.

²²⁸ Harr, Michel, *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, p. 61.

²²⁹ Derrida, Jacques, *La Dissemination*, p. 127.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

writing as a remedial poison, a pseudo-remedy against forgetting, a poison because it distances us from the presence of the idea or of the thing itself.”²³¹ Plato implies that writing can replace the function of memory since one can depend on the written words instead of remembering it. But unlike speaking, writing is not time bound; it can be written and read anytime without the risk of being forgotten.

In *The Philosophy of Derrida*, it is written that, “Historical memory, the desire to recollect and preserves the past, is only possible by means of texts and documents, monuments and archives, all of which are forms of what Derrida means by *writing*.”²³² The given statement seems to maintain that writing shield the vulnerability of memory and history, in other words, writing retains history and memory. But writing is composed of manifold traces and has the tendency to be partial and incomplete since memory is inseparable from writing and it is fragmentary; it can always represent an original event or “presence”.²³³ Mark and Liam, in *The Philosophy of Derrida* allege that Derrida is critical of the traditional philosophy which attempts to eliminate the necessity of writing from identity and historical memory with the intention of thinking identity in terms of a teleology of memory. The teleology here means, according to Derrida, an effort to recuperate and recollect the determinate end (telos). The concept of ‘end’ is the assurance that ultimately one will be able to recollect everything that even the past can be assemble into one harmonious whole.²³⁴ And the idea of wholeness or say unity in diversity is exactly what Derrida deconstructed since deconstruction reveals differences that can never be united. Dooley and Liam pointed out that, “Derrida argues that the attempts to recollect the past are always structured by language and writing, absence and loss; the *telos* of full recollection is destined to fail.”²³⁵

David R. Dickens in *Deconstruction and Marxist Inquiry*, contended that for Derrida the privileging of speech over writing is call “phonocentrism” and he argues that western philosophy has been obsessively occupied in searching for the absolute truth that there always has been a devaluing of written language in contrast to self-present speech. It is written that -

²³¹Harr, Michel, *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, p. 61.

²³²Dooley, Mark and Kavanagh, Liam, *The Philosophy of Derrida*, p. 21.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

The priority of spoken language over written or silent language stems from the fact that when words are spoken the speaker and the listeners are supposed to be simultaneously present to one another.... Writing, on the other hand, is considered subversive in so far as it creates a spatial and temporal distance between the author and audience; writing presupposes the absence of the author and so we can never be sure exactly what is meant by a written text; it can have many different meanings as opposed to a single unifying one.²³⁶

The given passage clearly indicates the priority of speech over written language in which writing is considered to be undervalued because of the absence of the author. In contrast to writing, speech has the benefit of being present one to one and that the author can rightly convey what he/she wanted to say. Writing on the other hand, lacks the notion of self present that it can be apprehended in whichever way the reader wants in order to suit his/her taste. One can notice that in the last line of the given passage, written text can have different meanings which are in opposition to a single unifying meaning. It can be assumed that Derrida's idea of writing in a way, is to show that written text can have different meanings without ever submitting to one unified conclusion. Writing basically means openness to the richness of language that it cannot end in one definite way. "Writing, according to Derrida, turns out to provide the best illustration of the nature of language: "speech is to be understood as a form of writing, an instance of the basic linguistic mechanism manifested in writing."²³⁷

Marian Hobson alleges that Derrida's history of 'writing' suggest that it was from the Greek that the distinction between intelligible and sensible came, this distinction can be place as the distinction between sound and writing which became a part of the whole philosophical distinction.²³⁸ Marian Hobson states that superiority of speech to writing was the way of conceding spirit as higher to matter. In *Jacques Derrida: Opening lines*, Marian says, " 'Writing' allows the ideas of selecting and preserving information through time to be thought without implying intention or purpose, and without separating writer and written-on, or agent and acted-on."²³⁹

²³⁶ Dickens, David R., "Deconstruction and Marxist Inquiry," p.149. please also see Derrida, in Kearney's *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinker*, pp.115-116.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 150. Please also see Culler's *On Deconstruction*, p.101.

²³⁸ Hobson, Marian, *Jacques Derrida: Opening lines*, p. 11.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

Writing, in Marian words, cannot function in the conventional way of thinking that pair up a relation of active to passive, cause and effect, or the creator or created.

The preceding lines suggest that writing is not necessarily in a chronological order rather it can be in arbitrary manner. Writing, as mentioned earlier, is capable of selecting and preserving memory of the past, it does not have a teleological facet of having a definite ending. It does not stick to the usual way of presenting thing in an orderly manner since it function in accordance with memory and memory remember things in a paradoxical way. Writing has the privileges to conserve or obliterate memories in a selective way and it does not succumb to finality. Since writing operates arbitrarily that it cannot have a determinate end. Therefore, writing need more writings. It is connected to memory that just like one cannot have the absolute remembrance of everything; writing too cannot have a final completion.

Derrida in *Writing and Difference* states,

Perhaps through major writings: “I write in order to annihilate the play of subordinate operations within myself (which is, after all, superfluous)” (*Method*). Only perhaps, and this is “after all, superfluous,” for this writing must assure us of nothing, must give us no certitude, no result, no profit. It is absolutely adventurous, is a chance and not a technique.²⁴⁰

Derrida seems to claim that he writes in order to eradicate the system of prioritizing that has been within himself which he considers it as redundant. It is superfluous because writing does not give assurance or certainty that it could not produce result or profit. He argues that writing is not a technique but it is completely adventurous, and is random without any systematic order. Derrida says “Writing is itself written, but also ruined, made into an abyss, in its own representation. Thus, within this book, which infinitely reflects itself and which develops as a painful questioning of its own possibility, the form of the book represents itself.”²⁴¹ Writing does not flow in a single direction because it comprises of various components that cannot be united. Writing in itself is open to richness which Derrida deduces it to ruin, to make into an abyss in its own representation. The form of book is not self-sufficient in itself that it cannot avoid to question the possibility of itself. It seems that Derrida deconstruct the idea of book which cannot have a determinate content since writing cannot be inclusive.

²⁴⁰ Derrida, Jacques, *Writing and Difference*, p. 346.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

In *Of Grammatology* Derrida writes:

Writing will appear to us more and more as another name for this structure, of supplementarity. If one takes into account that, according to Rousseau himself, articulation makes possible both speech and writing (a language is necessarily articulated and the more articulated it is, the more it lends itself to writing) one should be assured of what Saussure hesitated to say in what we know of the Anagrams, namely, that there are no phonemes before the grapheme. That is, before that which operates as a principle of death within speech.²⁴²

According to Derrida, writing involves an infinite regress that there is no completion in writing in order to explain certain writings it is inevitable to use writing and one explanation lead to another explanation which makes writing entailed to more writing. He also pointed out that Rousseau proposes language as the outcome of articulation which makes speech and writing possible and the more language is articulated, the more it leads to writing. Derrida asserts that the Saussure seems to reluctantly suggest that in the rearrangement of letter in forming words or phrases there can be no speech prior to writing. Derrida's deconstruction is to deconstruct the stereotyping way of favoring speech prior to writing and by doing this he is neither supporting nor denying writing over speech.

He is advocating that writing always involves an infinite auxiliary writing in a way that there is no absolute writing which does not necessitate more writing. He argues that writing must continue hand in hand in the context of its usage in the world which he believes it to be without eschatology. In writing, language and the world there is no messianism involved that there can be no finality. He seems to imply that the writing and language is an ever growing phenomenon in its relation to the world because some words which appear to be meaningless at the moment may be meaningful with the advancement in the world or say, there are words which make sense now that it was meaningless formerly. What does not make sense right now can be make useful later in context to the world. So, Derrida deconstruct the messianic way of writing which have absolute writing or final writing. Writing being inseparable from language and the world is openness to possibilities that has no eschatology.

²⁴² Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, p. 245.

Writing, for Derrida, unlike messianism has no teleology that it is horizontally open to possibilities. He deconstructs the traditional philosophy which has the system of hierarchy where speech has more credit than writing. There is no certainty in writing that Derrida remarks,

What writing itself, in its nonphonetic moment, betrays, is life. It menaces at once the breath, the spirit, and history as the spirit's relationship with itself. It is their end, their finitude, their paralysis. Cutting breath short, sterilizing or immobilizing spiritual creation in the repetition of the letter, in the commentary or the *exegesis*, confined in a narrow space, reserved for a minority, it is the principle of death and of difference in the becoming of being.²⁴³

Writing as stated above deceives life in a sense that it outgrows life in its limitation. Life, as perceived by men is limited in time and space that it will come to an end while writing on the other hand remains in the absence of the author that it betrays life for its infinity. According to Derrida, Writing, in its relation to language and the world will be perpetual since he deconstructs the concept of eschatology. With the passing of time, writing requires more writing that it will always be in the state of continuity and it defy life in all its limitations.

As long as the world continues, there will always be language for the people in it to communicate and this communication is possible through writing because writing remains in the absence of the author and it can reach to all who read. Derrida's lines show that writing is in the principle of death and of difference in the becoming of beings. It can be supposedly assume that writing is infinite that like the principle of death it is clueless of its finality and moreover it shows possibilities in all forms of writing that it can be compared to the principle of difference which does not unite differences as one whole. Becoming of beings is as abstract as writing in the sense that it cannot not flow in a definite direction which requires more and more writing. The idea of writing, in Derrida's philosophy is in perpetual state that needs more and more writing in its relation to language and the world. There is no finality in language as well as in the world that writing unlike the biblical writing cannot be absolute and it cannot comply with eschatology.

Derrida's deconstruction of messianism can be implemented in his concept of writing, language and the world as well. There is no teleological aspect in writing,

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 25.

language and the world that there is no anticipation for the finality. Life, being temporal and spatial bound, will disappear in a moment of flux but writing, language and the world will persist. Derrida writes,

Writing in the common sense is the dead letter, it is the carrier of death. It exhausts life. On the other hand, on the other face of the same proposition, writing in the metaphoric sense, natural, divine, and living writing, is venerated; it is equal in dignity to the origin of value, to the voice of conscience as divine law to the heart, to sentiment, and so forth.²⁴⁴

Writing which is interconnected to language and the world outruns life that it carries death in its perpetual state. Writing in its intrinsic essence is eternal that it exhausts life therefore Derrida in a metaphorical sense, compares writing to natural, divine and living. For Derrida, writing is like the idea of natural that it is not superficial in its continuity; it is divine in the sense that it cannot be diminished by human technique and finally it is living as it continues to live even in the absence of the writer and can be perceived without limitation by space and time. Just as one cannot refute the presence of virtues and voice of conscience, one cannot obliterate writing which is interrelated to language and the world. Unlike messianism, in the concept of writing, language and the world, there is no waiting for the eschatology to arrive. Regarding writing Derrida further asserts,

There is therefore a good and a bad writing: the good and natural is the divine inscription in the heart and the soul; the perverse and artful is technique, exiled in the exteriority of the body. A modification well within the Platonic diagram: writing of the soul and of the body, writing of the interior and of the exterior, writing of conscience and of the passions, as there is a voice of the soul and voice of the body. "Conscience is the voice of the soul, the passions are the voice of the body" [p.249]. One must constantly go back toward the "voice of nature," the "holy voice of nature," that merges with the divine inscription and prescription; one must encounter oneself within it, enter into a dialogue within its signs, speak and respond to oneself in its pages.²⁴⁵

Writing, in Derrida's words, has richness in its articulation that one can attribute it under different categories such as good or bad writing that it can be written from the heart and soul or from passion or from conscience or from the body or it can be from subjective or objective perspectives. Through writing one can have a conversation within oneself since one constantly engages in listening and hearing from within which Derrida calls it "voice of nature," "the holy voice of nature." There

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

is no concept of only one way of writing which means writing can be laid out in multiple ways that it has no ultimate way of writing like the Bible.

The above passages put forth the diverse kind of writings that can never succumb to only one kind of writing. There are different modes of writing that unlike the religious scriptures it can be written in whichever way the author wants to express. Writing, being inseparable from language and the world can have various expressions which show openness to possibilities but the possibilities mention here is not to be misapprehended as finally ending in one way. There is no ending in writing, language and the world, it moves in innumerable ways that it does not have a final destination. As matter of fact, there can never be sufficient writing in its connection to language and the world because there is no end to progression; it keeps growing more that it led writing to have more writings. Derrida also highlighted his disagreement to the notion of totality in writing in the following passage,

The good writing has therefore always been *comprehended*. Comprehended as that which had to be comprehended: within a nature or a natural law, created or not, but first thought within an eternal presence. Comprehended, therefore, within a totality, and enveloped in a volume or a book. The idea of the book is the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier; this totality of the signifier preexists it, supervise its inscriptions and its signs, and is independent of it in its ideality. The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing.²⁴⁶

The good writing has always been understood as it is supposed to be that it seems to be thought of within, in Derrida words, a nature or a natural law which can either be created or uncreated and within an eternal presence. This kind of writing being in totality can be understood and can be formed into a volume or book. Writing, as mentioned earlier, cannot be totalized since writing lead to more writings with the advancement and development of the world. Derrida seems to suggest that writing can never be fully comprehended since it can never be completed whether it good or bad writing. It seems that in Derrida's philosophy there is no such thing as good writing because he deconstructs the whole idea of totality which has a definite end. There is no end to writing, language and the world since they are evolving with time.

Here, the idea of book submits to totality which in Derrida's opinion, is alien to writing because writing in a sense is a growing phenomenon that plurality is in its nature. The reason Derrida deconstructs idea of book is that it points to totality and

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

writing for him can never be totalize since writing requires more writing which he calls supplementary writing that will need another supplementary in order to explain the former supplementary writing and this process goes on and on. He critiques any form of totality because it means there is conclusiveness and for him there is no finality since he is open to the otherness of possibilities that does not withdraw to one goal. He deconstructs messianism because even in messianism there is totality which has eschatology. Derrida comes to depose the conventional way of thinking which subdues the possibilities of other. His deconstruction opens all differences without uniting them and shows the richness of diversity that cannot have eschatology. In complimentary to the deconstruction of messianism, he also deconstructs totality in writings which is interrelated to language and the world.

According to Derrida, writing is adventurous that it does not follow a particular pattern and the writer itself is oblivious of its unpredictability. In *Writing and Difference* Derrida pointed out the arbitrariness in writing,

Merleau-Ponty wrote, "...The writer's thought does not control his language from without; the writer is himself a kind of new idiom, constructing itself. My own words take me by surprise and teach me what I think," he said elsewhere. It is because writing is *inaugural*, in the fresh sense of the word, that it is dangerous and anguishing. It does not know where it is going, no knowledge can keep it from the essential precipitation toward the meaning that it constitutes and that is, primarily, its future. However, it is capricious only through cowardice. There is thus no insurance against the risk of writing. Writing is an initial and graceless recourse for the writer, even if he is not an atheist but, rather, a writer.²⁴⁷

Derrida quoted Merleau-Ponty in his description of writing that have a propensity to discover the unexplored areas of thought which the writer himself is unaware. The speaker articulations of words are put across in unexpected ways. Derrida claims that writing is inaugural in its enunciation and it does not have a determinate destination. There is always the risk of falling back and forth in its articulation or to put in other words it can be repetitive and tedious but that does not impede the course of writing from being audacious. Writing can be presumptuous to the writer in its act of utterance that the writer is taken by surprise in its expression.

From Derrida's writing it is apparent that the concept of writing takes into account the otherness of other and thereby it unravels any constriction in its moment

²⁴⁷ Derrida, Jacques, *Writing and Difference*, p. 11.

of writing. The unruliness of writing points to the impossibility of having eschatology in writing. Language makes writing possible in its relations to the world. The world becomes significant when there is a right utterance from language to describe it and this description is made possible in writing.

The relationship between writing, language and the world is diverse in its nature that cannot be ascribed to a definite teleology and therefore it cannot have eschatological ending. It is an open relationship which is open to all differences that it is all-encompassing to possibilities without having finality. Derrida deconstructs the eschatological characteristic in logocentrism that has been prevailing in western philosophy. His deconstruction, in fact, reveals the exclusion of other by choosing one over other and it also open up the richness of possibilities when one does not embrace one particular way of thinking. It is evident from his writing that there is no eschatology which results in deconstructing messianism, the pioneer of teleology.

Corresponding to Derrida's concept of writing, William Den says, "The analysis of writing is the analysis of a pluridimensional and diachronic series of significations; it is accomplished by showing how each instance of writing derives from other instances of writing, which in turn derive from other instances of writing. This analysis demonstrates that every writing supplements that about which it writes, which in turn has supplemented that about which it has written, and on and on."²⁴⁸ It is perceptible from the given lines that writing needs more writing and it can never be in completion. Each writing are ancillary in a sense that if one writes, one's writing is supplementary of another supplemented writing and that supplemented writing is from other supplementary writing, this circle of writing goes on and on that one can never really arrive at the source of it.

The other perspective of writing as is seen in Carl Olson article is that writing is a risky endeavor that it is almost death. In his article he cites Derrida's outlook of writing from *Dissemination* which says "Writing is not an independent order of signification; it is weakened speech, something not completely dead: a living-dead, a reprieved corpse, a deferred life, a semblance of breath."²⁴⁹ In comparison to speech,

²⁴⁸ Dean, William, "Deconstruction and Process Theology,"p.3.

²⁴⁹ Olson, Carl, "The "Différance" that makes all the Difference: A Comparison of Derrida and Śankara," p. 247.

writing is not as lively and present as speaking is and it can be misapprehended in the absence of the writer. It is not fervent and vivid as speech but it is not entirely dead so Derrida term it as “living-dead, a deferred life.” There is a postponement of meaning in writing which does not occur in speaking. Writing has pros and cons of its own but in terms of its presence it can be either dead or living. Carl Olson mentions in his article that Derrida in *Dissemination* refers writing as a pharmakon, a drug that can be either medicine to heal or a poison to kill because it goes or leads astray.²⁵⁰ For Derrida, as construed by Carl Olson, writing can be risky, violent, living-dead drug that can give life or take away that it is an activity that possesses no positive or negative value or essence of its own because it simply plays in an unreal semblance.²⁵¹ Derrida is not trying to defend writing as superior to speech; instead he according to his deconstruction shows the different characteristics of writing that can be effective in various ways.

In contrast to the traditional philosopher he does not concerns himself in teleology and that makes him pluralistic in his view which means that the truth for him is not only one but many. So, in writing there is no arriving at one ultimate truth, there are many truths which can be approach in untold ways. Derrida writes, as quoted by Carl Olson in his article, “There is therefore no one truth as such, and besides, even for me, even about me, truth is plural.”²⁵² According to Carl’s understanding, in writing Derrida is not looking for the definite purpose of writing, it can be written in innumerable ways that he does not emphasis the value of writing in terms of negative or positive value.

For Derrida, as mentioned by Carl, writing has no essence that it does not have indispensable justification that it lacks definable value and it means anything in itself apart from particular contexts or nothing.²⁵³ Carl suggest that Derrida is not interested is attaining certainty in writing instead he wants to expose presuppositions, limitations, and illogic of thought and interpretations.²⁵⁴ It is apparent that Derrida’s

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Derrida, Jacques, “The Question of Style,” in *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*, p. 187.

²⁵³ Olson, Carl, “The “Différance” that makes all the Difference: A Comparison of Derrida and Śankara,” p. 254.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

deconstruction discloses the dogmatic contemplation in traditional philosophy and proposes that there is no legitimate truth which one can hope for. In writing, there is an assortment of past and presence that it is impossible to sort out the most accurate truth. Derrida deconstructs every grand narrative which upholds only one point of view and deny the rest that does not conforms to their way of thinking. His philosophical discourse is pluralistic in nature that it does not have a necessary truth like in messianism which one can anticipate for.

Derrida describes 'writing' as below,

Writing is the moment of the desert as the moment of separation. As their names indicates- in Aramaic- the Pharisees, those misunderstood men of literality, were also "separated ones." God no longer speak to us; he has interrupted himself: we must take words upon ourselves. We must be separated from life and communities, and must entrust ourselves to traces, must become men of vision because we have cease hearing the voice from within the immediate proximity of the garden. "*Sarah, Sarah with what does the world begin? - With speech? - With Vision?*" Writing is displaced on the broken line between lost and promised speech. The difference between speech and writing is sin, the anger of God emerging from itself, lost immediacy, work outside in the garden. "*The garden is speech, the desert is writing. In each grain of sand a sign surprises.*"²⁵⁵

According to Derrida, writing can be compared to desert being separated from everything else. In writing, like a lost person wandering in the land of desert not knowing what he will pass through, the writer is lost in articulation without heading to any particular direction. In order to elucidate the randomness in writing, Derrida says that even God's speaking is absence that the writer has to take the responsibility of writing upon him. And the writer must be a man of vision since he is separated from the community life that he has no voice to listen.

Derrida further advocates the position of writing as tentative that one does not know the place of writing which is being displace on the broken line between lost and promise speech. For him, speech and writing are different in such a way that he compares it to sin because of which God distant Himself out of anger and work outside the predetermine garden. Derrida considers speech as garden which man has to leave because of sin and he compare writing to a desert where there seems to be no definite end. And he also wittily places the sand in the desert as the sign which keeps on astonishing the author. In *Writing and Difference*, as mentions by Patricia S.

²⁵⁵ Derrida, Jacques, *Writing and Differnce*, p. 83.

Yaeger in her article, Derrida suggests that in writing the writer is anxious about isolating meanings since the mind is filled with excessive plurality. Patricia further explains that the anguish which the writer experience, as implied by Derrida, is the responsibility of “the necessarily restricted passageway of speech against which all possible meanings push each other, preventing, but calling upon each other, provoking each other, in a kind of autonomous overassemblage of meanings, a power of pure equivocality that makes the creativity of the classical God appear all too poor.”²⁵⁶

Patricia asserts that to choose one word among the many other which might serve better than the one that we choose is to neglect many thousands words. The writer has to choose one word at a time which makes him responsible for the words that he prefers and thus he experiences the anguish of responsibilities. When one opted for a word in writing, one risks choosing which can either be meaningful or useless. So there is always a responsibility for the writer in writing and that one can never be certain of the right words. Derrida also says, “For the work, the writer is at once everything and nothing. Like God.”²⁵⁷ It is the writer who relates writing in context with the world by using language. Language, writing and the world are inseparable from each other because in the absence of language one cannot write and the world is as significant as language since there will be nothing to write about if there is no world outside. Derrida’s definition of the writer is true at this point which is surmised under a specific goal.

Sandra Luft in her articles deduces that Derrida understands speech as the language of presence and that he proposes writing to be prior to speech. For Derrida, writing is the derivative, repeatable language of exile, an originary language which can “write the whole.”²⁵⁸ Speech being the language of presence limits its validity because without the presence of the speaker there can be no speech but in writing there is no limitation since it can still be read even if the author is not present. In contrary to speech, writing surpasses time and space that it continues to subsist. Lionel Abel asserts that for Derrida, “Writing is the very space and possibility of

²⁵⁶ Yaeger, Patricia S., *Coleridge, Derrida, and the Anguish of Writing*, *SubStance*, p. 89.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

²⁵⁸ Luft, Sandra, “Derrida, Vico, Genesis, and the Originary Power of Language,” p. 77.

repetition in general.”²⁵⁹ It can be observed that the repetitiveness in writing in relation to language and the world causes writing to be an activity without finality. Derrida critiques the notion of reaching the final course in grand narratives like Hegel and Marx philosophical dialectics which makes philosophy probing for attaining the truth that will put an end to writing. Richard Rorty suggest that “for Derrida, writing always leads to more writing, and more, and still more- just as history does not lead to Absolute Knowledge or the Final Struggle, but to more history, and more, and still more.”²⁶⁰

One can see from the preceeding statement that there is no end to writing that Derrida is horizontally open to possibilities like in messianism but without integrating teleology in to it. Harold G. Coward has stated in his article that, “Western thought, says Derrida, has always been structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities: good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, presence vs. absence, truth vs. error, identity vs. difference, mind vs. matter, man vs. woman, soul vs. body, life vs. death, nature vs. culture, speech vs. writing.”²⁶¹ Derrida deconstructs all types of dichotomies that exist in the western philosophical system. Derrida through deconstruction, dismantles the concept of valuing one thing over the other by deconstruction because when one indulges in privileging one over other, one admits the inequality that exists in dichotomy.

One can see that Derrida's critiquing is not aimed at reversing this value system or at showing writing to be superior to speech. Rather, he attempts to dissect the whole system of metaphysical opposition upon which the speech versus writing debate is grounded.²⁶² Derrida’s deconstruction shows the richness of differences in writing, language and the world that one tends to be apprehensive on choosing words for which the writer is accountable. However, deconstruction opens a way for plurality that one did not get caught up with a fundamental thought. He also wants to maintain that the mind being filled with plurality that when one speaks, one constantly

²⁵⁹ Abel, Lionel, “Jacques Derrida: His “Difference” With Metaphysics,” p. 10.

²⁶⁰ Rorty, Richard, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida, *New Literary History*,” p.105.

²⁶¹ Coward, Harold G., “Speech versus Writing” in *Derrida and Bhartṛhari*,” pp. 142-3.

²⁶² Ibid.

faces the risk of using the inadequate or inappropriate words. Therefore Derrida says, “Speaking frightens me because, by never saying enough, I also say too much.”²⁶³

According to Derrida, as inferred by Patricia S. Yaeger, “language is the rupture with the totality itself. The fragment is neither a determined style nor a failure, but the form of that which is written.”²⁶⁴ She insists that when one writes one becomes fragmented and acknowledges fragmentation in order to produce only fragments of that which one said.²⁶⁵ As pointed out by Patricia, in Derrida’s theory of writing, one can see writing as fragmentation in which one has to make choices among multitude of possible meanings in order to attempt to reproduce the perfect speaking of the words. There is always a tension of jeopardizing the meaning of words in writing which fails to articulate what it supposed to write. The excessive availability of words in language keeps the writer in a constant risk which is why Derrida called writing as adventurous with no end to it. To risk in writing is to have no assurance of anything that there are multiple possibilities that the writer has. Patricia in her article mentions that for Derrida, “to write is to have lost the theological certainty of seeing every page bind itself into the unique text of the truth.”²⁶⁶ She construes from Derrida’s writing that to write is an act of opening to unanticipated randomness and also to insignificance meaning.

Derrida contends that the task of philosophy is not about arriving at the fullness or completion rather it should seek to understand the world in untold ways and apprehends different meanings attaching to it. Derrida engages himself in philosophical discourse as “essential unrest”²⁶⁷ that he persistently move forward to many unexpected and unpredictability and that he does not intend to achieve the truth which Hegel and Marx is thriving for. There is no waiting for the eschatology in his philosophical discourse which is why he deconstructs messianism in religion in Hegel and in Marx. It can be concluded that for Derrida “The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement One wishes to go back *from the supplement to the*

²⁶³ Derrida, Jacques, *Writing and Difference*, p. 9.

²⁶⁴ Yaeger, Patricia S., “Coleridge, Derrida, and the Anguish of Writing,” p. 92.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*, Edited by Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., p. 188.

source; one must recognize that there is “a supplement at the source”²⁶⁸ In *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*, it is given that language, text and writing are constituted by supplementarily, by a network of traces and referents, references to other references, a general referability without simple origin, presence or destination.”²⁶⁹

To bring the chapter to a close, I have discussed Derrida’s deconstruction of messianism in the present chapter by dividing it into three sections that comprises of Deconstruction, Eschatology and finally on Writing, Language and the World. In my attempt to analyze Derrida’s deconstruction, it is evident that he deconstructs the tradition of logocentrism which tends to have teleology that includes eschatology. Through deconstruction he reveals the richness of differences by critiquing the hierarchical opposition where there is the system of privileging one term over the other that prevails in Western Philosophy. For him, there can be more than two opposite terms that one cannot derive teleology from these countless terms and unlike Hegel, he advocates differences without uniting them. In deconstruction,

Derrida uses an operative term called *Différance* which can either be to defer or differ and that opens possibilities horizontally without succumbing to a specific goal. There are no eschatological features in his philosophy which is why he deconstructs messianism that upholds finality. According to him, there can be no end to history because history is filled with ruptures and mutations that it cannot be heading to definite purpose. That is the reason why he critiques the messianism of Hegel and Marx that is to arrive at the absolute and to attain communist society. Messianism, for him, is an involvement in waiting and anticipating for the eschatology to happen which can be of religious or secular hope. As he opposes the concept of finality, deconstruction shows the impossibility of teleology since there are infinite ways of looking at things that does not conform to a particular end. By deconstruction, Derrida unravels the richness in differences that can be seen in writing, language and the world.

²⁶⁸ Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, p. 304.

²⁶⁹ *Derrida and the Future of the Liberal Arts*, Edited by Mary Caputi and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr., p. 107.

Writing, which is possible because of language, cannot be complete in its context with the world therefore writing requires more writing. From Derrida's deconstruction I have come to observe that writing is always supplementary in its nature and it cannot have a determinate end. Writing is interconnected with language and the world; as long as the world exist writing cannot submit to an end. Derrida also deconstructs the concept of phonocentrism which prioritize speech over writing. For him, though speech carries the presence of the speaker who can rightly deliver what he intends to, at the same time, it cannot convey message in the absence of the speaker.

Writing, on the other hand, can be read anytime even in the absence of the author and it is not limited to time and space. Writing needs more and more writing that it cannot have an absolute end. In Derrida's deconstruction, writing, language and the world does not engross in messianism that there is no eschatological aspects of it. Writing being interrelated to language and the world is open to all possibilities which are infinite. In opposition to messianism in Hegel and Marx, there is no eschatological aspect in Derrida's philosophy. His deconstruction is openness to possibilities without finality which implies plurality in his philosophical discourses. Thus, he deconstructs messianism in monotheistic religions, in Hegel and in Marx which indulges in teleology as well as in finality.

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Chapter 4

Reading the Antithetical: Dialectics and Deconstruction

This chapter compares and contrasts the philosophical approach of Hegel's dialectic and deconstruction of Derrida. In the writings of both the thinkers, there is the horizontal aspect of the 'waiting' in messianism. The dialectic of Hegel has a teleological feature whereas in Derrida's deconstruction there is no finality. Derrida attempts to deconstruct messianism with his logic of *différance*. I will attempt to re-examine Derrida's charges on Hegel's dialectic and his semiology. Hegel's dialectic can be compared and contrasted with Derrida's deconstruction. Whereas Hegel's dialectic has its characteristic features of contradiction and sublation, Derrida's deconstruction has *différance* meaning 'to differ' and 'to defer'.

Further Hegel's theory of speech and writing can be seen in his theory of sign, which is located in the movement of subjective spirit. Derrida's critique of Hegel's idealism lies in 'originary subject.'²⁷⁰ For Hegel, two opposite terms can be sublimated into higher unity – identity is identical within differences - in which there is unity in differences. But for Derrida's *différance* did not resolve the differences rather it exposes the ambivalent and obscurity of logocentrism in which Hegel is involved. What is central to Derrida's reading of Hegel's doctrine of spirit, dialectic and the sign is that Derrida tries to retain the horizontal character of Hegel's dialectic without its teleology. I'll attempt to evaluate Hegel's finality in writing against Derridean plurality. In order to elaborate the antithetical reading in dialectics and deconstruction, this chapter will be divided into three sections namely, A) Contradiction, Sublimation and Beyond, B) Difference and *Différance*, and C) Totality and Plurality.

Hegel's dialectics is profoundly influenced by the Christian notion of trinity in which the Father, the Son and the Spirit are one and that they are not three separate God but the three-in-one God. Hegel does not believe in *Messiah*/Jesus itself whose teachings, according to him, primarily can be implemented only to the individual Christian rather than to the people who are not within the Christian community. But

²⁷⁰ Derrida, Jacques, "Positions" an interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta in *Positions*, p. 43.

one cannot deny the fact that he was fascinated with the concept of the triune God which gives philosophical insight in developing his concept of dialectics.

The other apparent influences of Christianity that can be seen in Hegel's philosophy are the teleological aspect in which one can observe the reaching of the finality that is yet to happen. Like in Christianity, in Hegel's writings one can trace a conspicuous eschatological aspect of hope that there is an element of waiting. While Hegel's philosophy is in the process of arriving at the finality, he engages knowingly or unknowingly in messianism. The dialectics of Hegel has two operative terms namely 1) contradiction and 2) sublation, by which he intends to arrive at the absolute spirit that require numerous processes of transforming differences and uniting them in their differences while preserving their distinct identities. The term 'sublation' is used for the reconciliation of two contradictory concepts. In Hegel's dialectics differences or contradictions are sublated in a progressive manner in order to eventually disembark at the absolute. The idea of totality is unambiguously present in Hegel's writings which Derrida opposed.

Derrida deconstructs the idea of wholeness or totality that can be seen in Hegel's writing. According to Derrida, reality follows diverse models which are rich in differences and contradictions that he questions the notion of finality that involves in messianism. For him, there is no eschatology which has hoping and waiting factor. Derrida opines that in reality there can be no homogeneity since history is episodic in nature that ruptures unpredictably without actually reaching an end. He even compares the teleological aspect of anticipation in messianism to a ghost who never really exists but one blindly waits for it to appear any moment. The prolonged hoping in messianism somehow leads to wholeness that will finally be complete in the future which Derrida robustly opposed. Derrida with his method of deconstruction has leveled three charges on messianism.

Firstly, Derrida propounded the concept of messianism as ubiquitous in the context of waiting for something that is yet to happen which either can be secular or religious. For him, the messianic structure of existence is universal. Secondly, the Christian tradition of sacrifice being the assurance of redemption for the consummation of messianism is adjourned by Derrida. His interpretation of messianic notion is without religion that does not necessitate sacrifice. He states "awaiting

without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer.”²⁷¹ Finally, the idiosyncratic features, which are supposedly assumed to be possessed by *messiah* as revealed in the Bible is absent in Derrida’s messianic structure. His concept of messianic form does not have any determinate character since he describes it as “messianism without religion.”²⁷² He says, “The *messianic* structure of existence is open to the coming of an entirely ungraspable and unknown other, but the concrete, historical *messianisms* are open to the coming of a specific other of known characteristics.”²⁷³

The present chapter will compare and contrast Hegel and Derrida. Regarding contradictions, in both philosophers, one can see similarities horizontally in which both of them emphasize differences/ contradictions as inherent in nature that it highlights the opulence of reality. Hegel uses Contradiction and sublation in his dialectical movement in order to reach the absolute whereas Derrida uses *Différance* to show the diverseness of reality without having to arrive at a specific goal. Derrida wants to deconstruct the conventional view of eschatology which can be seen in Hegel’s dialectic. Their sharp contention can be indisputably examined in their opinion on finality. In Hegel’s writings there is intimation of ultimately reaching the absolute while Derrida deconstructs the concept of finality, he strongly affirms that things happen in an erratic nature that there can be no end to it. According to him, one cannot succumb to finality which is not the case in Hegel’s philosophy.

Section-A

Contradiction, Sublimation and Beyond

To analyze Hegel’s and Derrida’s view on the concept of contradiction, sublimation and beyond, it would be appropriate to first expound Hegel’s dialectics. Contradiction, in Hegel’s dialectics, is inherent in nature that without it there is no activity or movement. The notion of contradiction, for Hegel, have sheds light to the conceptualization of dialectic. In *Science of Logic*, he says,

....everything is inherently contradictory and in the sense that this law in contrast to other expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things...Contradiction is

²⁷¹ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, p. 81.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p.74.

²⁷³ Singh, R.P., “Jacques Derrida’s Deconstruction of the Messianism/Messianic Notion.” p.79.

the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.²⁷⁴

According to Hegel, changes take place in all things because of its intrinsic nature of contradiction which causes change perpetually. But with each change things are moving towards higher form. For Hegel, things are given as complete whole that it has its two determinate natures of oppositions which form a basis for change that sets everything in motion. To substantiate the concept of contradiction, Hegel says,

Nothing exist, as just brutally given and simply possessing one or two fully positive characteristics. Nothing exists that is first and primary and on which other things depend without mutual relation....what appears at first simple and immediate is actually complex and mediated.²⁷⁵

There is a reciprocal affiliation between two oppositions which creates identity in differences and with identification of identities there are differences that make each identifying possible. Hegel seems to suggest that the process of human mind and of nature are the same in the sense that in both he found the term a 'dialectic process' operating'.²⁷⁶ The mind is full of contradiction and disagreement of opposites that a careful examination reveals that there is a process in the mind that reconciles opposition in synthesis. At first there is an affirmation or thesis then there is anti-thesis for this thesis and there is synthesis in the mind which has the capacity to overcome both disagreements.

For Hegel, thoughts are dynamic that it is always in the process of unfolding and progressing until it reaches the absolute spirit. Cadieux, in his article says, "What was initially interpreted as an absolute contradiction now appears as a relation, a series of mutually conditioning states. Thus, questions of contradiction become, for Hegel, questions of process, specific moments in the development of the will."²⁷⁷ Everything is dialectical in nature that it operates with the help of contradiction and sublation which always moves towards higher unity. Sublation, in Hegel's dialectics overcomes contradiction by bringing it at an elevated level without diminishing their distinct identity. For Hegel, identity is retained in contradiction in the sense that it is

²⁷⁴ Hegel, G.W.F, *Science of Logic*, p. 439.

²⁷⁵ Kolb, David, *The Critique of Pure Morality: Hegel, Heidegger, and After*, p. 46.

²⁷⁶ Frost, S.E., "Basic teachings of the great philosophers: A Survey of their Basic Ideas," p. 258.

²⁷⁷ Cadieux, R.D., "Dialectics and the Economy of *Differance*, *Dialectical Anthropology*," p. 323.

because of identity that one can differentiate between two different things. Hegel writes in the sub heading 81 of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* that,

Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient, and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite by which the finite, as that which is itself is other than itself, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite.²⁷⁸

As stated above, everything, in Hegel's perspective, entail dialectical order in which there are contradictions and sublation. Each thing has its own opposite nature which are transform by overcoming each contradictions through sublation and form into a higher unity where each uniqueness are retain. With each identity, there are differences which need to be elevated to a higher level until it reaches the absolute. In correspond to dialectics, Sayers states that existing things are fundamentally changeable by nature that things are inevitably in relations to other things and in order to have accurate comprehension of the characteristics of things it is indispensable to recognize their contradictory nature and use their distinctive forms to describe them.²⁷⁹ The idea of contradiction in a way assists unity in diversity. Everything being in a dialectical order is in incessant processes of becoming more and more absolute. According to Hegel, there is a mutual dependency between contradictions since sublation reconciles differences and thus brings unity in diversities while retaining their identities. For him, everything is in the process of becoming more and more absolute.

It seems that the concept of contradiction in Hegel's philosophy necessitates finality which is yet to be achieved. For Hegel, as put forth by Sayers, there is the historical development in which there is the unity of the actual and the rational²⁸⁰ and this implies that the operation of dialectic always summit in an ascending mode from lower to higher each time it functions. Sayers asserts that Hegel's considerations of history as the "realization of reason" is the result of rational purpose and sees the process of history as progressive which is the outcome of conflicts and contradictions

²⁷⁸Hegel, G.W.F., *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, p. 150.

²⁷⁹Sayers, Sean, "Contradiction and Dialectic, *Science & Society*,"p.86.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 90.

where reason is increasingly developed and realized in human practical and social life.²⁸¹

In Hegel's philosophy, contradiction plays a very significant role as it not only shows identity is identical with differences it also reveals that sublimation takes place which moves further to the beyond that will one day be achievable. One can observe in Hegel's dialectics that contradiction, sublimation and beyond happens concurrently because whenever contradiction takes place, it is resolve as sublimation at a higher level than the previous one that it goes beyond the present state. When there is sublimation, there is also an anti thesis or opposition that will yet again necessitates overcoming of contradiction and when transformation takes place it will always be at an elevated phase which moves beyond the preceding stage. Thus, the dialectics in Hegel has contradiction, sublimation and the beyond as it essential nature that constantly engrosses in finality which will consummate in the future. It can be construed that Hegel's notion of dialectic being influenced by Christian theology that it has inseparable lineage to teleology which always moves beyond the present to the future and is inexorably yield to eschatology.

From Hegel's dialectics, one can perceive his participation in messianism as he intends to arrive at the absolute spirit which is still in the process of becoming. The teleological aspect of waiting can be notice in his conceptualization of contradiction in his dialectical process of synthesizing thesis and anti thesis which at each level becomes more and more perfect. On the contrary, Derrida's deconstruction, as interpreted by Nuyen, emphasizes the conflict between possible meanings or between certain predicates or concepts.²⁸² For Derrida, deconstruction shows differences, contradictions, disagreement, and oppositions as part of the richness of language without unifying them into one entity. He wants to deconstruct the dichotomy of prioritizing one thing over or against the other which is prevailing in logocentrism. Derrida says in *Margins of Philosophy*,

Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the non conceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated. For example, writing, as a classical concept, carries with it predicates which have been subordinated, excluded, or held in

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Nuyen, A.T., "Derrida's Deconstruction: Wholeness and *Différance*,"p. 27.

reserve by forces and according to necessities to be analyzed. It is these predicates (I have mentioned some) whose force of generality, generalization, and generativity find themselves liberated, grafted onto a “new” concept of writing which also corresponds to whatever always has *resisted* the former organization of forces, which always has constituted the *remainder* irreducible to the dominant force which organized the- to say it quickly—logocentric hierarchy. To leave this new concept the old name of writing is to maintain the structure of the graft, the transition and indispensable adherence to an effective *intervention* in the constituted historic field. And it is also to give their chance and their force, their power of *communication*, to everything played out in the operations of deconstruction.²⁸³

Unlike Hegel’s dialectic, Derrida’s deconstruction does not resolve contradictions; instead it displays numerous possible conflicts to disassemble the conventional way of perceiving things. It shows reality in its diversities that does not succumb to finality. Hegel uses the notion of contradiction in his dialectic in order to arrive at the absolute but in Derrida’s deconstruction there is no teleology. In *Derrida: A Critical Reader* Michel Harr quoted Derrida’s description of deconstruction,²⁸⁴ it goes as- Deconstruction... must, by means of double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice a reversal of the classical opposition *and* a general *displacement* of the system.²⁸⁵

According to Derrida, deconstruction is not a method or technique for attaining a specific end rather it opens new perspective by deconstructing the traditional way of perceiving things. It divulges new horizon of reality that it deconstructs the idea of reaching the ultimate truth which he regarded as engaging in messianic structure. Through deconstruction, Derrida unravel the latent heterogeneous disposition of things which was neglected when one is fixated in waiting for the future event. For him, the two determinate nature of opposite remains in opposition to each other that they can never be reconcile like in Hegel’s dialectics. In fact, nothing in a way is identical to each other, each being or things are different from each other that they can never be amalgamated. Derrida brings out the beauty of differences horizontally without having to reach the absolute.

Regarding contradiction, one can illustrate the similarities between Derrida and Hegel that they both horizontally expound the notion of differences in reality which throws light to multiplicities of things in the rational and actual world. They

²⁸³ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, pp. 329-30.

²⁸⁴ Harr, Michel, *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, p.61.

²⁸⁵ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 329.

both elucidate the sumptuousness of all things in its nature. But their contention lies in their concept of eschatology which for Hegel is the absolute whereas Derrida repudiates the idea of finality in messianism. For Derrida, history repeats itself through mutations and rupture that it can never come to an end. He critiques Hegel's dialectic of unifying differences that conceive everything to be in the process of becoming perfect. According to Derrida, no contradiction can ever be put together as one since each possesses their own distinctive identities that differentiate them from being identical with other.

Robert asserts that, "to put it simply, deconstruction is an operation that involves a *reversal and displacement* of the hierarchy in a conceptual opposition (for example the opposition between speech and writing). The reversal is supposed to show that the minor, suppressed terms is in fact essential for the identity or meaning of the minor, suppressed term is in fact essential for the identity or meaning of the major, primary term (writing is not just a transcription of speech; rather as the possibility of repeatable traces or marks, it makes possible the transmission of speech)."²⁸⁶

For Derrida, there is no lower or higher order of things, everything is equally significant that deconstruction shows innumerability of reality in which one cannot prioritize. Therefore, he deconstructs the concept of eschatology in messianic structure. In Hegel's dialectics, one observes a continual motion of change from lower to higher phase each time when contradiction and sublation takes place. There is hierarchical movement in dialectics that is directed towards the goal and Derrida deconstructs hierarchy in logocentrism where there are oppositions like good and bad, reality and appearance and so on. According to Derrida, Hegel's participation in messianism is also within the sphere of hierarchy where contradictions are sublimated each time from lower to higher.

There is no dichotomy of lower or higher form of truth, minor or major term, every term or meaning is essential that it can view in more than two ways and deconstruction invalidates the traditional way of choosing one thing over the other to be superior or inferior. By preferring one thing instead of the other that usually is the case in messianism, one neglects the possibilities of the others which remain

²⁸⁶ Sinnerbrink, Robert, *Understanding Hegelianism*, p. 190.

concealed due to the traditional hierarchical order of things. When one persistently strives towards the goal, one indulges in choosing sides which will aid in achieving the so-called objective. Derrida is against Hegel's messianism since it has a teleological aspect where there is the option of wanting one thing over the other while trying to reach the finality and this make one close-minded in looking at things unwilling to see things in a different way.

Ronald Schleifer in "Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis" argues that Derrida did not consider deconstruction as neutralization. Derrida says in *Positions*, "What... I am attempting to pursue, is a kind of *general strategy of deconstruction*. The latter is to avoid both simply *neutralizing* the binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply *residing* within the closed field of these oppositions, thereby confirming it."²⁸⁷ Unlike Hegel's Dialectics, Derrida's deconstruction is not merely to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics but to depose the hierarchy not in the form of subsuming into third term rather to leave it open to diversify into many terms.

In contrast to Hegel, Derrida does not identify unity in contradictions and he deconstructs the idea of two determinate oppositions. For there can be more than two contradictory terms that one can never mediate differences which is why his deconstruction is not neutralization. Ronald Scheifer maintain that Derrida's deconstruction proceeds by the reversal or "overturning" of classical binary oppositions, in which "one of the two terms governs the other" in a "violent hierarchy" the hierarchy of what I am calling unmarked and marked semantic terms.²⁸⁸ Deconstruction in the form of displacing the difference seems to suggest it as a kind of neutralization but it is not neutralization, as a matter of fact it negates neutralization. In deconstruction, contradictions are not neutralized and sublimated like in dialectics, disagreements cannot be reconciled otherwise everything will exist homogeneously. It can be presupposed that Derrida does not regard deconstruction as Neutralization because it will destroy the uniqueness of differences which is the very thing he tries to preserve. For Derrida, contradiction can never be sublimated and there is nothing beyond the present situation; rational or actual world exist as it is without having to aspire for the future.

²⁸⁷ Schleifer, Ronald, "Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis," p. 388. Please also see Derrida's *Position*, p. 10.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. Please also see Derrida's *Positions*, p.41.

For Derrida, deconstructing is “resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics.”²⁸⁹ In contrast to Hegel’s dialectics, Derrida does not acknowledge that contradiction can be sublated at an elevated level where thesis and anti-thesis are synthesis and united as one that no two different things can have a common nature that they can be put together as one. He disassembled Hegel’s dialectic in such a way that he did not leave any ground for transforming two different things, in fact he exposes the narrowness of dialectic where there is movement in only one direction that is towards finality.

For Derrida, things cannot be univocal and contradictory simultaneously, there is no middle ground where two different things can be united. Ronald Schleifer insists that deconstruction does not “rest” in its “neutralizing” term. Hence it is not “neutralizing”; rather, it is transformational, inextricably bound to a particular semiotic field, “explosive”: “the force and form of its disruption,” Derrida says, “explode the semantic horizon.”²⁹⁰ According to Ronald Schleifer, probably the most unequivocal articulation in Derrida writings (as opposed to the spoken interview of *Positions*) can be trace on the last page of *Margins of Philosophy*,

Very schematically: an opposition of metaphysical concepts (for example, speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of subordination. Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to a neutralization; it must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an *overturning* of the classical opposition *and* a general *displacement* of the system.²⁹¹

It can be seen that deconstruction is not to neutralize the metaphysical opposition. It does not reveal a mediation ground rather it discloses the many possibilities which are being ignored in the classical opposition. Derrida’s deconstruction is open horizontally to possibilities which does not have teleological end. He exposes the heterogeneity of things that one cannot be preoccupied with the idea of fixating since each thing is crucial in their differences.

The very fact that he opposes dualism is that there are more than two determinations which is the reason why he tries to displace and overturn the binary

²⁸⁹ Ibid. Please also see Derrida’s *Positions*, p.43.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. Please also see Derrida’s *Positions*, p.45.

²⁹¹ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, pp. 329-30.

system in logocentrism. In contrast to Hegel, for him, contradiction cannot be sublimated and that there is no element of waiting for the future event. He is more concerned with the here and now that there is nothing beyond the present and things persist to exist as they are, devoid of conclusiveness.

In Hegelian dialectics, as mentioned in “Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis”, Derrida writes, “...be spoken of, nor has it ever been except in this fabric of meaning. Now, the sovereign operation, the point of non reserve, is neither positive nor negative. It cannot be inscribed in discourse, except by crossing out predicates or by practicing a contradictory super impression that then exceeds the logic of philosophy.”²⁹² Derrida deconstructs the Hegelian idea of retaining identities and unifying differences because logically two different identities cannot be identical and different at the same time; all things have their distinctive nature that makes them distinguishable from one another. Thus, Derrida disorganizes Hegel’s concept of contradiction, sublimation and beyond and maintain multiplicity which overturn the binary system of thought.

Section-B

Difference and *Différance*

As mentioned in the previous section, the concept of difference, according to Hegel’s dialectic, can be located as contradiction that initiated activity or change in thought and in reality. Everything is dialectical in nature that things undergo transformation through change and the concept of difference makes it possible for things to change. For Hegel, contradiction generates vitality of change and that transition takes place from lower to higher in a progressive manner. Hegel uses two terms that is, contradiction and sublation, in the operation of dialectics by which he mediate and preserve differences.

To illustrate the functions of dialectics, he uses the notion of Being, Nothing and Becoming. Being can be equated with thesis, Nothing with anti thesis and Becoming with synthesis. Being in a sense is pure nothing, void of content or form but has the proficiency to become something solid whereas Nothing is pure void

²⁹² Schleifer, Ronald, “Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis,” p. 390.

without any capacity to become anything. Being is contradictory or different form Nothing but they both can be united through Becoming. So in Becoming, one can see both Being and Nothing are united as one and yet their Beingness and Nothingness is retained. Becoming have the capability to change into something concrete which have form, content, name etc, but unless it becomes something determinate, it still remains vague. And therefore there is anti thesis for Becoming and then there will be synthesis. This cycle of becoming goes on and on but always in a developing manner each time synthesis happens. The whole process goes on and on in a spiral manner until it reaches the absolute. In Hegel's dialectic process one see three distinct ideas but they mutually co exist in one another, in short they are three yet one. George Michael interpret Hegel dialectic process as,

First, it has the moment of 'transcendence' in which it goes beyond a 'limit' or 'boundary'. Secondly, it is 'negation' of the first negation; this 'limit', in which it is the moment of 'preservation; in which what has been 'gone beyond' or transcended is brought again into a new relation.²⁹³

Hegel uses the term *sublation* for the reconciliation of two contradictory concepts. As Federich Beiser said, in Hegel's dialectic differences or contradictions are not eliminated in order to form one non contradictory concept but rather brings identity in differences. And this identity forms a holistic view in which differences or contradiction are not abolish but sublated to form higher part of the whole. It can be maintained that contradictions or differences constituted the part of the whole and changes from lower to higher with sublation. Everything that exists in thought or in reality has contradictory nature and along with there is sublation in which there is reconciliation between the two opposite concept.

According to Hegel, the growth or development of things is not linear but spiral that goes on until it reaches the absolute. Whenever sublation takes place between two contradictions there in unity in differences, this very sublation became thesis which also has anti thesis or contradiction. And again this contradiction is sublated and form higher truth which in turn become contradiction again and this keep going but in a progressive manner. The higher it becomes the more absolute it is. So Hegel's concept of dialectic is holistic in nature in which nothing is extirpated, everything serves as part to constitute the whole. In Hegel's dialectic of contradiction,

²⁹³George, Micheal, *Marx's Hegelianism: An Exposition from Hegel and Modern Philosophy*, p. 123.

there is agreement in the disagreement or in other words, there is unity in diversity.

Hegel says,

The true solution can only be this, that two determinations, being contradictory, and yet necessary to the same concept, cannot be valid each of itself, in its one sidedness, but have their truth only in their transcendence, in the unity of their concept.²⁹⁴

The concept of difference, as define in *Hegel's Logic*, is immediate difference that is Diversity of Variety in which individually each are different in what they are and remain unaffected by the relation they stand to each other.²⁹⁵ It produces distinction for each individual thing that it separates one from another. The uniqueness of things is identifiable when they stand in relation to each other. In way, Hegel's idea of unity in diversity in dialectic constructs a platform for distinguishing one thing from another in their unity which implies that things are in some way or the other are related one another that they are interdependent. Through the perception of difference, one has the ability to know and recognize one thing from another. R.D. Cadieux, in "Dialectics and the Economy of *Différance*," stated that "the distinctive difference of anything is the boundary, the limit of the subject,"²⁹⁶ he writes, "It is the point where the matter stops, or it is what the matter is not."²⁹⁷

In deconstruction, Derrida uses *Différance* as an operative term to deconstruct messianism in Hegel's philosophy. The term *Différance*, for Derrida, pertains to various different meanings in *Margins of Philosophy*. "First of all it means difference in the sense of "French is different from English". It also means the French verb *differer* which means both to differ and to defer. *Différance* also contains within it the present participle *differant*, which means the condition of differing or of diferring (as in "the differing opinions" or "the deferring decision"). Finally, *Différance* account for the *activity* of differing and deferring."²⁹⁸ *Différance*, unlike the notion of difference in Hegel, does not only denote distinction but also refers to postponement of meaning.

²⁹⁴Hegel, G.W.F., *Science of Logic*, pp. 205-6.

²⁹⁵Findlay, J.N., *Hegel's Logic, Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of The Philosophical Sciences* (1830), p. 169

²⁹⁶ Cadieux, R.D., "Dialectics and the Economy of *Différance*," p.322

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Dooley, Mark and Kavanagh, Liam, *The Philosophy of Derrida*, p.p. 29-30.

Derrida's *Différance*, like in Hegel, shows peculiarities of things in its relation to the other but he did not use as a medium for combining two different things together. He rejects Hegel's notion of difference where there is sublation of contradiction, difference can never be reconciled as suggested by Hegel. *Différance* in Derrida also implies to defer or to postpone meaning which can later be useful when used in different context. He reveals the diversity of language which rupture arbitrarily that it is not in align with messianism of Hegel which consistently move only in one direction of reaching the absolute. The concept of Difference and *Différance* can be compare in the sense that both divulge distinction of things in its relation to other. But in contrast to *Différance*, Hegel's difference gave rise to sublation that brings identity in differences.

The irony of *Différance* is that when it is pronounced, the letter 'a' is not heard, 'a' is silent. One can know the difference only when it is spelled or written down. It can be seen that his used of *Différance* has significance with regard to phonocentrism which in a way indicates that he opposes the supremacy of speech over writing. In logocentrism, spoken words are considered more accurate and closer to truth than writing. Derrida deconstructs phonocentrism and maintain that writing can be as accurate as speech that one should not be engrossing in judging with a preconceive assumptions. In his essay "*Différance*" Derrida says that

this in itself-the silence that functions within only a so-called phonetic writing-- quite opportunely conveys or reminds us that, contrary to a very widespread prejudice, there is no phonetic writing. . . . And an examination of the structure and necessity of these non phonetic signs quickly reveals that they can barely tolerate the concept of the sign itself. Better, the play of difference, which, as Saussure reminded us, is the condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign, is in itself a silent play. Inaudible is the difference between two phonemes which alone permits them to be and to operate as such. If there is no purely phonetic writing, it is that there is no purely phonetic *phōne*. The difference which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in and of itself inaudible, in every sense of the word.²⁹⁹

Derrida's application of deconstruction is seen in *Différance*, it shows the difference and it also means deferring or postponement or suspension. *Différance*, as mentioned earlier operates in two ways, one is to differentiate things and the other is to defer or postpone meaning that can be used later in different context. Derrida overthrow the preconceive assumption of giving importance to speech over writing.

²⁹⁹ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, pp. 4-5.

Carl Olson in his article asserts the ambiguity of the verb “to differ” which in some instances connote non-identity or the sameness of things. For Derrida it can also refer to a present distinction or a delay, an interval of space and time.³⁰⁰

As put forth by Carl Olson, Derrida intends to capture the sense of “differing” as spacing and temporalizing. He also attempts to show sameness that is non-identical. Carl Olson interpreted that Derrida uses the term *Différance* in order to point to a necessarily finite movement that precedes and structures all opposition. The *ance* ending of *Différance*, marked by a silent “a” implies that it is not simply a word or a concept; it is neither existence nor essence, and is neither active nor passive because the perceiving subject is similarly constituted.³⁰¹ *Différance*, as read by Carl Olson, being a necessarily finite movement, is what precedes and structures all opposition. In other words, *Différance* originates before all differences, and represents the play of differences. It is impossible for it to be unveiled because it cannot reveal itself in the present moment that it is incapable of generating presence itself, and its structure is constituted by difference and deferment.³⁰²

According to Derrida, as depicted by Carl Olson, *Différance* is the structure of the psyche or mind that unlike Hegel’s dialectics, it could not mediate differences in consciousness. He further explains that Derrida’s *Différance* does not have an ontological existence that it is not present in the presence. Derrida considers the notion of presence as metaphysical and argues that the notion of presence is a creation of a habituated philosophical system in the Western traditions. According to Derrida, the operation of *Différance* is not to show the present rather it is to defer meaning by showing different possible meanings without uniting their differences.

Cadieux states that, “Derrida points to the non-totalizable movement of *différance*: the differential process of differing/deferring between marks or traces that makes signification possible, as well as “impossible”-unavoidable prone to slippage of meaning, disruption of sense, infinite recontextualization and so on.”³⁰³ The given

³⁰⁰ Olson, Carl, “The “Différance” that makes all the Difference: A Comparison of Derrida and Śankara,” p. 248.

³⁰¹ Derrida, Jacques, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, pp. 130, 134.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³⁰³ Sinnerbrink, Robert, *Understanding Hegelianism*, p. 190.

lines seem to portray that Derrida's *différance* is a process in which he deconstructs the idea of wholeness that submit to Hegelian sublation of unity in diversity. Derrida did concur to Hegel's idea of contradiction horizontally but he does not succumb to the teleological aspect of it. For him, differences or contradiction can be reveal in various ways that he deconstructs the dualistic division of things by showing that distinction in differences takes place in variable ways. And he destroys the conformist approach to thought and reality where everything seems to move in a linear course.

By using *différance*, Derrida exposes the infinite way of perceiving meaning in rational and actual world and shows that things cannot surrender to a finite end. In contrast to Hegel's messianism, his theory of deconstruction does not acquire waiting or hope element. In other words, his deconstruction endorses plurality, diversity and multiplicity. It is openness to possibilities and not restricted in any sense.

Cadieux, in his article "Dialectic and the Economy of *Différance*" states that signification is possible,³⁰⁴ and this in conformity with Derrida's position given below:

... only if each so called present element is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the relation to the future element, this trace, being related no less to what is called the future than what is called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what is not: what it absolutely is not, not even past and future as a modified present. An interval must separate the present from what it is not, in order for the present to be itself.³⁰⁵

Différance as observe earlier, mean differing and deferring. In *Différance* there is trace which can neither be refer to the past nor to the future. It defers the present in it relations to the past and concomitantly it is cannot be subscribe to the future as it supposedly takes place at present. *Différance* form a base for trace which is distinct from history and is suspended from the future but it is distinguishable from the present. Derrida usages of trace in *différance* give meaning to the signified and the signifier.

Whereas in Hegel's difference the past and the future are mutually dependent on one another since everything is given in wholeness that neither the past nor the

³⁰⁴ Cadieux, R.D, "Dialectic and the Economy of *Différance*," p. 344.

³⁰⁵ Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 13.

future can be eliminated from the present. What constitute the present are the past and the future and in Hegel one notices the process of becoming is always proceeding to the course of finality. Derrida's *différance* function in opposition to the logocentric philosophy proves the openness of Derrida to possibilities. Deconstruction opens up possibilities of various meaning which differ from other and also highlight the function of deferring which can give meaning in different context opposing to the present interpretation. Derrida, unlike Hegel, deposes the typical grand narratives in Western philosophy.

According to Nuyen, *différance*, says Derrida, is the vigor that operates on the whole, the text and which has an ontological priority over everything and it is responsible for everything in our experience.³⁰⁶ Nuyen further states that, "*différance* could be said to designate the productive and primordial constituting causality, the process of scission and division whose differings and differences would be the constituted products or effects."³⁰⁷ For Derrida, it is *différance* that "introduces into self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively excluded from it," allowing the living present to spring forth "out of its non-identity with itself."³⁰⁸

The aim of deconstruction is define by Simon in the *Ethics of Deconstruction* by quoting Derrida's writing which says,

We wanted to attain the point of a certain exteriority with respect to the totality of the logocentric epoch. From this point of exteriority a certain deconstruction of this totality (...) could be broached. It is from such a point of exteriority that deconstruction could cut into or penetrate the totality, thereby displacing it. The goal of deconstruction, therefore, is to locate a point of otherness within philosophical or logocentric conceptuality and then to deconstruct this conceptuality from the position of alterity.³⁰⁹

A logocentric reading is primarily restricted to their fundamental principle that it is not open to alternative reading so Derrida implement deconstruction in order to throw light to the otherness. Deconstruction shows that text can have double reading which does not conform to the traditional way of reading. It unveils the otherness of text that it can have many possible reading. Derrida comments 'Deconstruction is not

³⁰⁶ Nuyen, A.T., "Derrida's Deconstruction: Wholeness and *Différance*." p.30.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 137.

³⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 85.

³⁰⁹ Critchey, Simon, *The Ethics of Deconstruction Derrida and Levinas*, p. 26.

an enclosure in nothingness, but openness towards the other.³¹⁰ The logocentric traditions were not open to a different perception that they neglect the affluences of meaning. Derrida deconstruct the logocentric by revealing the probability of other which they fail to give heed.

Simon rightly asserts that deconstruction attempt to open the dimension of alterity which traditional philosophy fails to notice. Simon asserts that, “to say that the goal of Derridian deconstruction is not simply the *unthought* of the tradition, but rather that- which- cannot-be-thought, is to engage in neither sophisticated rhetoric nor negative theology. It is rather to point towards that which philosophy is unable to say.”³¹¹ Derrida exposes the limitation and failure of logocentrism in looking at the possibilities of other. For him, even Hegel’s involvement in messianism constricted him from seeing the prospect of other. Both in Derrida and Hegel there is openness but Derrida’s openness differs from Hegel. Unlike Hegel, Derrida’s openness is not to the future event but to alterity.

According to Ronald in “Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis”, the scandal work of deconstruction is its non synthesizing contradiction and its difficulty in discursive functioning.³¹² In *Margins of Philosophy*, Derrida asks “how to interpret?

the strange and unique property of a discourse that organizes the economy of its representation, the law of its proper weave, such that its outside is never its out- side, never surprises it, such that the logic of its heteronomy still reasons from within the vault of its autism? . . . Can one then pass this singular limit which is not a limit, which no more separates the inside from the outside than it assures their permeable and transparent continuity? What form could this play of limit/passage have, this logos which posits and negates itself in permitting its own voice to well up?³¹³

According to Derrida, language is rich in its nature that there can be no hierarchical order or binary opposition. If one chooses one word over many others, there is always the risk of not choosing the right one which can be much more meaningful than what one chooses. For him, language is so immense that one cannot pass judgment over the supremacy or inferiority of words or meaning that is why he critiques the logocentric hierarchy. Derrida emphasizes the heterogeneity of language

³¹⁰ Kearney, Richard, *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinker*, p. 124.

³¹¹ Critchee, Simon, *The Ethics of Deconstruction Derrida and Levinas*, p. 29.

³¹² Schleifer, Ronald, “Deconstruction and Linguistic Analysis,” p.394.

³¹³ Ibid. Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, p. xvi.

that each words or meanings are individually unique that they can never be synthesis or united.

Derrida uses *différance* to show the variability of language that cannot complete as a whole. In logocentrism as well as in messianism, language is used as a medium for attaining finality which causes totalization of language. Especially in Hegel's philosophy, language is used as means for the spirit or idea in order to find itself. He uses sign for expressing the movement of spirit that will consummate in the absolute spirit. Sign and language are means for him to communicate thought. Smith in his article, "U-Topian Hegel: Dialectic and Its Other in Poststructuralism," pointed out that Derrida examine that if the unfolding of Spirit takes place in discourse, the Spirit needs sign in order to express itself.

According to Hegel's philosophy, the Spirit move outside of itself in search of finding itself. Simon advocated that, "Derrida "literalizes" the semiological interpretation of Hegel even further by considering the materiality of signs created by the Spirit for its self-expression-the letter corresponding to the spirit, the signifier of the signified. Derrida's reading takes an apparently minor image in Hegel literally in order to show how any general semiology, including Hegel's, falters. Hegel refers, namely, to the material aspect of signification (signifier) as a "pyramid," an arbitrary structure within which meaning is housed."³¹⁴

Smith interpreted that, Hegel establish dialectic as the motor of Spirit's unfolding itself and the Spirit confront with Other while moving out of itself. The Spirit gradually recognize that the presumed Other is merely a different appearance of the Spirit itself. In Hegel's dialectic there is no complete otherness so true dialogue cannot happen. Smith says that, "Hegel thereby reduces all supposedly oppositional knowledge of some other to a form of reflection or self-knowledge from a higher (third) position of Spirit.

His epistemological utopia is thus a universalized Ithaka, a grounding of all individual difference in the point of the Spirit's return to itself."³¹⁵ According to

³¹⁴Smith, John, H., "U-Topian Hegel: Dialectic and Its Other in Poststructuralism," p. 241.

³¹⁵ Ibid. p. 242. 7 Hegel himself uses the metaphors of wandering and return in his History of Philosophy when he remarks that with Descartes' discovery of the self-reflecting subject, philosophy

Smith, in his article, Hegel understands language, as read by Hyppolite, as externalization and alienation which make the confrontation of otherness possible and it the medium for self-reflection in which the self reproduce and creates universal Spirit out of itself.³¹⁶ For Hegel, as mentioned by Smith, language is for the self/Spirit to differentiate itself. On the contrary, for Derrida language is diverse in nature that it cannot be just for reaching the presuppose goal and it can never be totalize for arriving at the finality.

Section-C

Totality and Plurality

This section will examine the lineage of totality in Hegel and plurality in Derrida. Hegel's dialectic can be ascribe under totalization since everything is given in nature as a whole that it comes with its opposite nature that will be combine and transform in dialectic. Sublation, in Hegel's dialectic means to resolve into a higher unity or to bring into the wholeness that which is fragmentary.³¹⁷ Hegel pointed out in *Phenomenology of Spirit* that,

The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially, result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is, and that precisely in this consists its nature.³¹⁸

Hegel's notion of the absolute spirit is attain through his dialectical method. In Hegel's dialectic, everything is in the process of becoming perfect. Things whether in the rational or actual world are given as whole in the sense that there is always a contradictory or disagreement for each given thing. In differences or contradictions, dialectic operates in order to mediate the differences by using sublation. Things are in one way or the other mutually dependent on one another for developing to higher stage. For Hegel, the otherness of things is given so that there can the realization of oneself which means there can only be identity when there is difference. It is in differences that one can have distinction in relation to the other.

finally found itself: Quoted in Heidegger, "Hegel und die Griechen," *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p. 257.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Singh, R.P., "From Dialogue to Dialectic: Socrates, Kant, Hegel and Marx," p. 265.

³¹⁸ Hegel, G.W.F., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 11.

According to Hegel, everything is transient in nature that it passes from one form to another but always developing. In dialectics, contradictions are reconciled and when sublation takes place it is constantly in a progressive manner and for Hegel this processes of contradictions and sublations persevere until it arrives at the absolute. Absolute spirit has been the goal of his philosophical development. Waiting for the absolute makes him engross in messianism but without *messiah* since he does not believe in *messiah* itself. In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel remarks,

The hopes and expectation of the world up till now had pressed forward solely to this revelation, to behold what absolute Being is, and in it to find itself. The joy of beholding itself in absolute Being enters self consciousness and seizes the whole world; for it is Spirit, it is the simple movement of those pure moments, which expresses just this: that only when absolute Being is beheld as an immediate self-consciousness it is known as Spirit.³¹⁹

Hegel's objective in developing his dialectic is to finally achieve the absolute. It is believed that his theological background has a great impact in developing his dialectic. The Christian notion of trinity, which gave a philosophical insight to Hegel, is for the purpose of the second coming of *Messiah* to release His people from their bondages so that God and man can have one living regardless of their differences. Hegel also is hoping for the absolute spirit to arrive where there can be transformation of differences to bring unity in opposites. It can be seen that Hegel's aspiration for the absolute comes from the theological doctrine of triune God which have the Day of Judgment as finality.

In Hegel's dialectic, there is a teleological feature of waiting that makes him succumb to messianism. He believes that the absolute is in the process of becoming that it will arrive one day. As cited earlier, contradiction being the inherent nature of things causes activity in the dialectical processes. For Hegel, these contradiction passes on to each other by sublating in a higher unity and there is identity in diversity. These processes of becoming perfect have been embedded in Hegel's philosophy that there is indisputably finality entail. Hegel, *On Art, Religion, and Philosophy* says,

This image of the absolute may have a more or less present vitality and certainty for the religious and devout mind and be a present source of pleasure; or it may be represented as something longed and hoped for, far off, and in the future. Still it always remains a certainty, and its rays stream as something divine into this present

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 461.

temporal life, giving the consciousness of the active presence truth, even amidst the anxieties which torment the soul here in this region of time.³²⁰

The element of waiting has been part of Hegel's philosophy and it gives aspiration till it reaches the preordained goal. As stated above, the idea of absolute gives the adherent a ray of hope that it never wears them out no matter how much it has been delayed. In fact the more it is delayed, the more it gives hope for the aspirant. Hegel said that in the midst of temporality of difficulties in things, there is an eternal hope that encourages one to keep looking forward for the final day. Since there is a goal all things in dialectical process move towards it. Hegel's dialectic seems to imply that the movement of things whether in thought or in reality are all in the direction of attaining the absolute.

As stated before, for Hegel everything is given as true whole where contradiction can be compared to the past which cannot be eradicated and preserved in the present by sublation so that it will be consummated in the future. The ongoing processes of retaining identity yet uniting differences constitute the process of consummating in the absolute spirit. Hegel upholds these constant processes of contradiction and sublation as the development of human history that is always in an ascending order. Nothing is eliminated in these processes of developing since it moves as a whole. In every phase of human history, there is always the amalgamation of differences which can be regarded as past that will culminate to the absolute.

For Hegel, the rational and the actual world are inseparable that both significantly manage to produce the perfect world. For Hegel, the operation of dialectics is that "the historical past of individuals, peoples, even epochs is, according to him, a continuous process of canceling out or annulling that past and yet at the same time preserving its essentials in a higher synthesis, which is a blend of the old and new, past and the present."³²¹ Since Hegel asserts that the true is the whole and his dialectical processes are all pervasive that it can capture momentary and trifling forms. But the main outcomes are present in the absolute spirit.³²² It is in the realm of absolute spirit that the subjective as well as the objective are integrated by sublating dissimilarities while preserving identity.

³²⁰ Hegel, G.W.F., *On Art, Religion, Philosophy*, p.130.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

The notion of the absolute in Hegel's dialectic is the finality that unites contradictions and inevitably places Hegel's philosophy as totalization. It is seen that in Hegel's philosophy there has been a uniform course throughout his writing that is to finally arrive at the absolute which makes him a totalitarian. The concept of finality which runs all through messianism according to Derrida is totality because other than their goal, it not open to an alternative interpretation. He maintained pluralities of reality that his deconstruction capsizes totalization in messianism. According to him, reality is diverse in nature that it can never be circumscribe to homogeneity like in messianism. Derrida questions the concept of finality in messianism in the dialectics of Hegel. In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida says,

One does not know if the expectation prepares the coming of the future-to-come, or if it recalls the repetition of the same thing as ghost...Is there not a messianic extremity, an *eskhaton* whose ultimate event (immediate rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of the infinite surprise, heterogeneity without accomplishment) can exceed, *at each moment*, the final term of a *phusis*, such as work, the production, and the *telos* of any history? The question is indeed "whither?" Not only whence comes the ghost but first of all is it going to come back? Is it not already beginning to arrive and where is it going? What of the future? The future can only be for the ghosts. And the past....³²³

Messianism, for Derrida, refers to anyone secular or religious who have hope for the future and believe in the end of all things. In *Specters of Marx*, he describes that in waiting there is an expectation for the future which can be compare to a ghost whose existence is questionable. No one has actually seen ghost but one assume that it does exist likewise the finality or the coming of *messiah* is an assumption which one cannot actually prove its coming with assurance. Derrida questions when will the expected finality or *messiah* arrive and he sarcastically said that may be it has begin to arrive that one does not know where it will be going.

The expectancy in hoping is as futile as, Derrida puts forth, the concept of ghost and he says the future is for the ghost. The future does sound as empty as ghost that one does not know when that future will actually appear and one is not even sure whether the future has already arrive. According to Derrida, the hope which sustains the believer in messiansm, can also be likened to the past that have no actual existence but the concept of it keeps deceiving people and making them unwilling to open to the

³²³ Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx*, pp. 44-5.

other possibilities which is other than their goal. And thus their objective makes them totalitarian in their perspectives.

Deconstruction leaves no room for blind hope and pragmatically it is inclining to the present than to the future. Derrida's deconstruction deconstructs the traditional way of looking at things and open a new way of looking at things. It is a horizon of openness to possibilities, possibilities not of the future but more of alternative or otherness. His philosophical insight is pluralistic in nature that there can be no eschatological reading in his writings. According to him, the engagement in messianism is

... desert-like messianism (without content and without identifiable *messiah*), of this also *abyssal* desert, "desert in the desert," one desert signaling toward the other, abyssal and *chaotic* desert, if chaos describes first of all the immensity, excessiveness, disproportion in the gaping hole of the open mouth-in the waiting or calling for what we nickname here without knowing the messianic: the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the *arrivant as justice*. We believe that this messianic remains an *ineffaceable* mark-a mark one neither can nor should efface-of Marx's legacy, and doubtless of *inheriting*, of the experience of inheritance in general.³²⁴

Derrida compares messianism to desert which covers vast expansion of sand without end. He even says messianism is like a 'desert in the desert' which implies that one cannot hope for anything better to happen in the future if it does not happen now. And one can never be sure of the arrival of the future which is why it is like a desert that seems to have no end. The waiting aspect in messianism as describe by Derrida, is like a bottomless pit, an abyss. Messianism, for Derrida, is like a desert without content which basically means that it is meaningless to keep waiting for the future that may or may not arrive. And more importantly the concept of future is indefinable that nothing can be categorized under the theme of future.

Derrida seems to argue that, how could one even know whether one is in the future or not. What matters to him is the present, the future is vague and ambiguous for him which is the reason why he said messianism is like a desert that looks like there is no end to it. When one is engrosses in hoping for the better future, one tends to perceive everything in view to the goal and thus one becomes a totalitarian. . Derrida deconstructs the Hegelian notion of messianism which has an element of

³²⁴ Ibid., p.33.

teleology. The absolute in Hegel's dialectic is still in the process of becoming that Hegel until now is waiting for it to arrive. The hoping aspect, Derrida considers it as void and pure nonsense. There is a line of totality entail in Hegel's messianism since he uses dialectic as means to proceed to the finality.

According to Derrida, the hope for the eschatology has been continuing though the waiting has been delayed for many consecutive years. Derrida describes waiting as

A waiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in advance to the absolute surprise of the *arrivant* from whom or from which one will not ask anything in return and who or which will not be asked to commit to the domestic contracts of any welcoming power (family, State, nation, territory, native soil or blood, language, culture in general, even humanity), *just* opening which renounces any right to property, any right in general, messianic opening to what is coming, that is, to the event that cannot be awaited *as such*, or recognized in advance therefore, to the event as the foreigner itself, to her or to him for whom one must leave an empty place, always, in memory of the hope-and this is the very place of spectrality.³²⁵

The above quotation seems to imply that waiting has become without end that one keeps waiting to such an extent that one does not know what to expect from waiting anymore. Derrida asserts that waiting is like giving hospitality to stranger unconditionally without any favor in return. The unconditional hospitality is humanly impossible similarly waiting is like hoping for the impossible to happen. The delay in coming of the *messiah* causes the believer to wait without expectation like a host who cannot expect anything from the guest. The relationship between the host and guest can be likened to the waiting and expecting. In the guest- host relationship, the host is to be unreservedly hospitable to the guest or stranger and absolutely expecting nothing from the guest for his generosity.

Like the host, waiting has to be maintained unconditionally without expecting the goal anytime soon. On the other hand, the stranger who has been accommodated is deprive of his rights to anything since he is a guest in someone house. He does not have the freedom to do what he likes and is expected to please his host. Likewise in waiting there is the aspect of hope in which one is restricted not to see things other than the finality itself and that one loses the right to open to otherness. The relation between waiting and expecting is similar to the relationship between the host and

³²⁵ Ibid., pp.81-82.

guest. In messianism, waiting is to be carried on unconditionally which means there cannot be expectation from waiting yet while waiting hope constantly sustain the prolong waiting. When one is ensnare in waiting, one is open to the future of possibilities but at the same time one is confine only to the goal that one is deprive of exploring the other. Waiting in a way is waiting for the impossible that is ghost or specter where one cannot expect anything but to wait unconditionally. So, for Derrida, waiting is an involvement in totality.

Reality, according to Derrida is diverse in nature that one cannot totalize it like Hegel did in his dialectics. For Derrida, differences and contradiction can never be united as one; there are differences so that one sees distinction. If differences are unified there will be sameness or non-identity among things and that will eliminate the richness in diversity. Derrida's deconstruction is pluralistic in nature that it is openness to alterity and overturns hierarchical order or binary opposition in logocentrism. Hegel, on the contrary, advocates that difference and contradiction can be amalgamated while preserving their identities and that there can be unity in differences. He states that contradictions are given for the identification of differences that is for self- identification.

For Hegel, contradictions are inherent in nature and that they are mutually related to one another when sublation takes place. Things in their opposite nature are dependent on each other in dialectical process that they can be united as one without losing their distinctive identity. The unity of opposite happen in sublation which take place at an elevated level and this process keeps going on until it reaches the absolute. Hegel's dialectic is a movement towards the absolute that his philosophy can be view as totality. Derrida's deconstruction operates in plurality whereas Hegel's dialectics function as totality.

To conclude, this chapter compares and contrast Hegel's dialectic and Derrida's deconstruction. It shows that in regard to contradiction, sublimation and beyond Hegel united contradiction through sublation and sublimated them for becoming the absolute that can be consider as beyond. In contrast to Hegel, Derrida deconstruct the idea of unity in differences and show the multiplicity of things in reality. They both use the concept of difference for identifying distinction in relation to other. Derrida use *différance* as an operative term to deconstruct messianism in

Hegel. Hegel on the other hand used contradiction and sublation in dialectics for arriving at the absolute. Derrida's deconstruction is pluralistic in nature that explore the diversity of reality whereas Hegel is a totalitarian in his dialectic that it is a movement to reach finality. Both are similar in their openness to possibilities but Derrida's possibility unlike Hegel is without teleology.

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Conclusion

The messianic principles of messianism are widely seen in both religious and philosophical perspectives. In fact, Messianism is a contested concept that vitally participated in reaching finality in which there is the aspect of waiting or hoping. The concept of messianism is assumed to have been derived from the three monotheistic religions namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These religions have been embedded with anticipation for the coming of *Messiah* which makes them engrossed in messianism. It is held that *Messiah* “the anointed one” will come to liberate His people from sufferings and gather His people on earth. In a religious approach on messianism, the study compared and contrasted Judaism and Christianity belief on *Messiah*. While examining the philosophical approach on messianism in the dialectics of Hegel and communism of Marx, the criticism of Derrida on the messianic structure in messianism is also highlighted based on its engagement in finality. For Derrida, history is repetitive in nature that it can never have eschatological aspect.

Hegel and Derrida both played pivotal roles in contributing philosophical discourses to the history of western philosophy. Hegel, in his dialectical method has come up with the concept of contradiction which is present everywhere whether in thought or in reality. In dialectic, he used two operative terms; they are i) contradiction and ii) sublation. For him, things are given as a whole in the sense that each thing in its wholeness has contradictory nature which he amalgamated by using dialectics. His concept of contradiction can be identified as thesis and anti thesis that are synthesized in such a way that there is unity in differences.

According to Hegel, everything is in the dialectical process of becoming and sublation takes place wherever there is contradiction. In sublation of contradiction, the distinct nature of each are retained at a higher level while at the same time they are united as one entity. After unity is maintain in differences, there is another corresponding contradiction which results from sublation and each time sublation take places there is also contradiction, this process moves on until it arrive at the absolute. Hegel’s dialectic has a goal that is to finally arrive at the absolute which is why Derrida charged him to be involved in messianism.

Derrida's deconstruction on the other hand, criticized the notion of finality involved in messianism. For him, there is no finality as such and things whether in the ideal or the real world are not moving toward the end. Everything happens horizontally in an episodic manner that it cannot succumb to one final goal. According to Derrida, reality is diverse in nature that it cannot be subsumed under eschatology. He deconstructed the idea of arriving at the absolute in Hegel's dialectic. He, like Hegel, admitted the richness of nature where there are infinite differences but unlike Hegel, he did not attempt to unite contradictions. The fact that Hegel intended to unite differences is to ultimately arrive at the absolute that things will become more and more perfect until it reach the absolute and that is the reason Derrida accused Hegel's dialectic to be involved in messianism.

The philosophical method employed in the study is mostly based on a comparative and critical method. The study acknowledged the antithetical nature of the philosophical perspectives of Hegel and Derrida on messianism and analyzed the dichotomy. An effort is made on a comparative study where both the philosopher mutually informed and reinforce each other in the re-appraisal of messianism. Derrida's method of deconstruction is pluralistic in nature that he does not approve the teleological aspect in messianism. He rejected the idea of waiting for the finality since it implicates totality. His deconstruction is open to all possibilities without succumbing to the final goal.

Unlike Derrida, Hegel's dialectic has finality that there is eschatological lineage in his philosophical work. In his dialectics, he sublated contradictions with the view of arriving at the absolute spirit. Similar to the messianic traditions in religion, there is the waiting aspect which he believed it to be reached one day. Both Hegel and Derrida are opened horizontally to possibilities but unlike Hegel, Derrida denied the idea of finality. Hegel's dialectic is absolutistic in nature whereas the nature of Derrida's deconstruction is pluralistic. The study is divided into four main chapters: 1) Messianism and *Messiah*, 2) Messianism without *Messiah*: A Dialectical Approach, 3) An Analysis of Deconstructing Messianism and 4) Reading the Antithetical: Dialectics and Deconstruction.

In the context of Messianism and *Messiah*, It can be pointed out that messianism is a contested concept in Judaism and Christianity with different features

of messianic principle. Though it is commonly held in both religions that *Messiah* (in Hebrew *mashiach*) is “the anointed one” preordained by God to bring salvation to His people; Jewish and Christians have contended views on *Messiah* since the previous one is solely based on *Old Testament* and the later one on both the *Old* and *New Testament*. *Messiah*, according to the Jews, is to come from the descendent of King David in human form and that he is to come to restore the Kingdom of Israel and usher in the era of peace, prosperity and the knowledge of God. It is seen that the Jewish are still waiting for *messiah* to come.

The Christians, on the other hand, believed that *messiah* is Jesus Christ who has come on the earth, possessing both human and divine nature by passing through the process of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension is dispensing Himself in to man. This *messiah* is to come again for the restoration and manifestation of God’s kingdom. The biblical concepts of Fall/Redemption, the final Day of Judgment that gave rise to the notion of messianism are also highlighted in this chapter. In enunciating the contestation of messianism, this chapter is divided it into three sections; namely, Section A) is on *Messiah: An exposition* which is further divided into i) Concept of Sin/ Fall, ii) Doctrine of Redemption, section B) on Contestation on Messianism and *Messiah: Judaism and Christianity*, and section C) on Eschatology / the Day of Judgment.

In giving an exposition on *Messiah* which has sub-divisions on concept of Sin/ Fall and doctrine of Redemption, the description and importance of *Messiah* is brought to light. Regarding the concept of *Messiah*, there are similarities and differences between Judaism and Christianity. Unlike the Christians, the Jewish does not accept Jesus as the *Messiah* and they only based their faith in the *Old Testament* of the *Bible* which is also called *Tanakh*. For the Jews, *Messiah* is to be born of human like prophets and priests that he will not have divine nature and is incapable of performing miracles like Jesus. They do not consider Jesus to be the *Messiah* mainly because they are still in exile even after Jesus came. They strongly hold that when *Messiah* comes, he will gather all the children of Israel who are scattered all over the world and he will release them from their bondages.

Based on the *New Testament*, the Christians considered Jesus to be the *Messiah* who is both divine and human that He brings people to salvation from their

sins and imparts Himself as life to the believers. They regarded *Old Testament* to be the prefigured of the *New Testament* that their faith is inseparable from the Jewish. In both Judaism and Christianity, there is waiting aspect except that the Christians are waiting for the second coming of *Messiah*.

Concerning the concept of Sin/ fall both Judaism and Christianity considers sin to be root cause of suffering. Sin entered into man from the fall of Adam who partook of the wrong tree that is the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Since then man became the slave of sins and was under the bondage of sufferings. According to the *Bible*, man was created in the image and likeness of God that he is to have dominion over all the things on the earth and expressed God. But he failed to have dominion on the earth and expressed God because of his sinful nature.

There are four main reasons that necessitated the coming of *Messiah*. Sin, first of all, causes man to transgress against God's commandments and they became disobedient to God. Secondly, sin caused man to fall under God's condemnation that he is subjected to death. Thirdly, he became alienated from God that he needed a mediator to be reconciled to God. Fourthly, sin ruined man from fulfilling God's purpose and failed to be the expression of God. Due to sin, both Judaism and Christianity needed *Messiah* to set them free from the subjugation of afflictions.

When I examined the concept of sin in Judaism as well as in Christianity it is found that the concept of sin necessarily entailed the notion of redemption. Both religions held that only the shedding of blood can redeem man. So Judaism practiced offerings of animal sacrifices for the reparation of sin that they can be reconciled to God whereas in Christianity only the blood of Jesus can cleanse man from their sins. Judaism being based on the *Old Testament*, there are evidences of animal and bird sacrifice for sin offerings, trespass offerings and burn offerings which requires the shedding of blood for redemption.

In view of the fact that the *Old Testament* is the foreshadow of the *New Testament* for the Christians, Jesus Christ as the *Messiah* is the only qualified man who can redeemed man by shedding His blood on the cross. He is qualified for the redemption of man because He is the begotten Son of God who became human yet without sin. Being God yet man possessing both divine life and human nature makes

Him eligible to save men from their sins. Redemption brings in reconciliation between man and God and thus man can have a relationship with God again. On the contrary, for the Jews, *Messiah* is human being so he cannot redeem men that only God can save men which is why they do not considered Jesus as the *Messiah*. They do not regard Jesus as God and rejected the idea of redemption being carried out on the cross.

From the study, one cannot deny that fact that Judaism and Christianity are inseparable though they have contestation on messianism and *Messiah*. Most of the doctrines in Christianity derived from Judaism since Christianity used the *Holy Bible* which consist of both the *Old* and *New Testament*. Christians held that the coming of Jesus as the *Messiah* has already been predicted in the *Old Testament* and they believed that Jesus is the Son of God who was sent on this earth in order to deliver sinners from their sins and be saved in God's life. For them, Jesus is no less than God that He passed through the processed of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, death and resurrection. After His death for the redemption of sinners, He died and was resurrected to become the life-giving Spirit.

The doctrine of Trinity in Christianity is what Judaism does not have. For Christians, God became the processed Triune God that is the three -in -one God, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Through this processes of Jesus becoming the Spirit, *Messiah* for them can dwell within men and thus men and God can unite and mingle together. *Messiah*, according to Christianity, is actively dispensing Himself into men in order to make men the same as He is in life and in nature but not in the Godhead. The objective of God becoming the Spirit through Jesus death and resurrection is for men to fulfilled God's purpose that is to be the expression of God through the Body of Christ (the Church).

The concept of trinity in Christianity pave the way for men to participate in God's life and until men is transformed and conformed into the image of God to build up His Body, He will not come back. In contrast to the Christians notion of trinity, Jewish does not have the concept of God's dispensation into men. They hold that *Messiah* is a human who like the priest and prophet will come in order to help his people from their bondages and bring them into the promise land. Jewish and Christian complement each other in relation to the human virtues of *Messiah* like,

love, peace, mercy, righteous, kind, patience and so on. Both religions indubitably are similar in their hope of waiting for the final day that they both strived toward meeting the *Messiah*.

On the concept of eschatology in messianism as depicted in Judaism and Christianity, it can be apprehended that in both religions there is lineage of teleology which encouraged them to continue to pursue *Messiah* even if he fails to come for many centuries. In fact, the more *Messiah* delayed, the stronger their faith is, in waiting for Him. Jewish have been preparing to meet *Messiah* by trying their best to follow the commandments and laws with their efforts. On the contrary, Christian tries to live out the laws and commandments by depending on the divine life of God which was imparted into them through Jesus becoming the Spirit.

Both of these religions have expectation for final Day of Judgment which will arrive with the coming of *Messiah*. They both agreed upon each other in concerning the anticipated functions of *Messiah* which he will execute during the time of his coming. The eschatological features that will happen at the final Day which will be the functions of the savior are, to restore the kingdom of David, to restore the Temple of Zion, to re-gather the exiles, to offer new covenant to Israel, to usher in world peace and the knowledge of God, to swallow up death and disease, and spread Torah that will unite humanity as one. In messianism there is a strong evidence of hoping or waiting for the future which is observed in Judaism as well as in Christianity and in both the religions there is the concept of messianism with *Messiah*.

I have observed that the dialectical approach of Hegel and Marx engagement in messianism is without *Messiah*. According to Derrida's interpretation of the concept messianism, it is an engagement in waiting or hoping, whether secular or religious, for the future which one cannot be ascertained of. Derrida charged Hegel and Marx to be involved in messianism since their philosophical discourses have a teleology for which both the philosophers have been anticipating to arrive at absolute for Hegel and for Marx to achieve communist society.

Hegel's dialectics have definitely been influenced by the Christian theology that he developed his dialectic from the concept of trinity. Though influenced by Christianity, he does not believe in *Messiah* because he thinks the teaching of Jesus to

be individualistic in nature that it is exclusive only to Christian community. However, his dialectical processes like in Christianity have a specific goal to attain. Likewise, Marx has been hoping to accomplish communist society through the elimination of capitalist society without *messiah's* intervention. Thus, their philosophical writings clearly indicated their involvement in messianism without *messiah*. In order to give a critical analysis of the dialectical approach on messianism I have divided chapter two into three sections namely, section A on Trinity and Dialectics which have two sub-sections, i) concept of Trinity in Christianity and ii) an exposition on Dialectics, section B on notion of Absolute spirit in Hegel's philosophy, and section C on status of Communism on Marx's philosophy.

As I have analyzed the dialectical approach of Hegel on messianism without *Messiah*, I have come to figure out that the messianism in Hegel's dialectics have a theological lineage which comes from concept of trinity in Christianity and a detail exposition on Dialectics. According to the *Bible*, Trinity is the concept in which God the Father, God the Son and God the Spirit functions as one. They are the three-in-one God where the God the Father is the creator and originator by sending His Son on earth to save sinners. God the Son is the executer of what the Father had planned for men by passing through the processes of incarnation, human living, crucifixion, death, resurrection and ascension so that men can have redemption through His death on the cross. And whatever the Father and the Son have, God the Spirit transmitted it to the believers. The triune God, the Father, the Son and the Spirit lives, moves and works as one, they are inseparable from each other that they co-exist simultaneously.

Likewise, in Hegel's dialectics there is a triadic movement in which there is thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For Hegel, everything is dialectical in nature that there is contradiction everywhere. He used contradiction and sublation in his dialectics method that is sublation combines contradictory nature without diminishing their distinct nature, in short, sublation operates to bring identity in differences. Sublation unites contradictions but retains identity. Similar to the concept of trinity, dialectics is illustrated as a process in which Being, Nothing and Becoming moves as one. Being is pure without determinate form that it has the potentiality to become actual; the opposite nature of Being is Nothing which is empty/void and is incapable of becoming actual. Becoming sublates Being and Nothing that their unity lies in their

nature of emptiness and their distinctness is seen their ability to become something actual.

There are three principles of Hegel's dialectics namely, unity and struggle of the opposites, transition from quantity to quality and vice-versa and negation of negation. He used these principles in his dialectical method since everything is in the process of becoming whether in thought or in reality. There is unity in differences in dialectics just like in trinity the Father, the Son and the Spirit are three persons with one essence that is triune God.

I have comprehended that the notion of the absolute spirit highlights the teleological aspect in Hegel's philosophy. According to Hegel, contradiction is the inbuilt nature of things that it caused activities and progressions which eventually leads to the consummation of the absolute spirit. There is the process of thesis, anti thesis and synthesis which continuously is directed toward reaching the absolute. The goal of Hegel's dialectic is to arrive at the absolute which passes through arduous development. In dialectics, there is the horizontal characteristic of waiting just like the monotheistic religions which make him involved in messianism. He does not believe in *Messiah* itself for the reason that he considered the teaching of *Messiah* not applicable to other community but there is the mannerism of finality in his writings which is also customary in Judaism and Christianity. Thus, Hegel's dialectics succumb to messianism without *messiah*.

In studying messianism in the dialectics of Hegel, I have come to identified that Derrida's charging of Marx's communism to be engrossing in messianism is also without the intervention of *messiah* like in Hegel. Marx is anticipating for the struggling class or the laboring class to be emancipated from the captivity of capitalist society who owns all the private properties. He described laborer's alienation in four ways; they are alienation from product, from activity, from himself and from other. The laboring class suffered from alienations under the subjugation of bourgeois society.

Marx wanted to depose the so-called capitalism so that he can bring in communist society where there will be no struggles of different classes and in which there will be no slaves or master. In socialism, there will be equality among each

citizen that each will serve according to their capabilities. Like Hegel, Marx is also waiting for communist society to arrive one day which makes him engaged in messianism without submitting to *messiah*. In complementary to Judaism and Christianity, Hegel's dialectics and Marx's communism have horizontal teleology which makes them involved in messianism without *messiah*.

In giving an analysis on deconstructing messianism by bringing in Derrida's method of deconstruction, I have located that his critiquing of the messianic principle in messianism is basically in three ways. Firstly, he stated that the context of waiting in messianism is ubiquitous that it cannot be restricted to religion alone. With his method of deconstruction, he asserted that the messianic nature in the concept of messianism is universal. Secondly, his notion of messianism is without *messiah* so he criticized the monotheistic traditions of offering sacrifices for redemption or atonement of sins.

Finally, his concept of messianism is outside religion so he deconstructed all the supposedly assumed to be the attributes of *messiah* as depicted in the Holy Scriptures. As he deconstructed all the possible features of *messiah* in messianism he also repudiated the idea of waiting which he claimed to be waiting for the unknown and whose coming cannot be assured of. In fact, he suggested that hope or expectation in messianism is futile and that there is no final end as the religionist anticipated. He questioned the finality involved in messianism. Derrida deconstructs the grand narratives of Hegel and Marx on messianism that there can be no eschatology. For him, thought or reality are rich in nature that there it cannot be restricted to the conventional way of arriving at the goal. He also deconstructs the concept of messianism entailed in writing, language and the world.

They are interrelated to one another and that finality cannot be applied to writing, language and the world. Writing is diverse and rich language that is used in writing cannot end to final writing which means in writing, language gives meaning to the world and each time the meaning differs with each different contexts. For Derrida, writing, language and the world have indeterminate relationships which have diverse meaning in the world with references to different context that there can be no teleology. With his method of deconstruction, he questions the concept of finality in messianism.

For analyzing the deconstructing of Messianism, I realized that it is necessary to divided it into three sections, section A) deconstruction: a critique of messianism, section B) critique of eschatology on messianism and section C) deconstructing messianism on writing, language and the world. As I have examined Derrida's critique of messianism, I have found out that he deconstructs the usual dichotomy that messianism always have. He deconstructed traditional logocentrism that maintain the order of hierarchy where one thing is assumed to be superior over the other.

According to Derrida, diversity is the nature of things that it cannot be terminated at one ending by preferring one thing over the other. His deconstruction is open to all possibilities without compliance to teleology. To substantiate pluralities in reality or in thought, Derrida used the term *Différance* to show differences and it also means deferring or postponement or suspension. *Différance* operates either as to defer that is to postpone or suspend its meaning in relations to the context or to differ that is to show differences in order to reveal the richness of things. Through the method of deconstruction, Derrida, unlike messianism, rejected the concept of totality and he deconstructed the traditional metaphysical opposition seen in logocentrism. Deconstruction showed diversity which is openness to all possibilities without any finality.

In discussing Derrida's critique of eschatology on messianism I have apprehended that Derrida is against the whole idea of totality that can be seen in the messianism of Hegel and Marx on the secular side and Judaism and Christianity on the religious side. He mainly criticized messianism because of its engagement in waiting for the final day. For him, history or events happened in an episodic nature that it is composed of ruptures and mutations and that it can never consummate at one specific goal.

According to him, hoping for the eschatology is in vain as waiting does not assured the arriving of the expected one. He critiqued that waiting in messianism is likened to waiting for ghost whose existence itself is questionable. He questioned the fulfillment of expectation and argued that waiting does not justified the arrival of eschatology. Derrida has critiqued the eschatological aspect seen in messianism of Hegel and Marx as well as in Judaism and Christianity in view of the fact that there is

no openness to differences that blinded the upholder to see otherness of possibilities that is not in ally with the finality.

As I have examined that Derrida deconstructed the messianism on writing, language and the world, I have found out that he questioned all kind of finalities that for him, writing cannot have one definite end since writing requires more and more writing. Writing can never be completed because writing cannot be free from supplementary writing. Derrida also criticized the dichotomy of prioritizing speech over writing where speech is assumed to be superior over writing. Writing, in fact, cannot have absolute writing in its relation to language and the world. Writing in its richness of articulating is indebted to language that gives meaning to different context in the world and it cannot have a teleological aspect.

Writing, language and the world cannot participate in messianism since there cannot be eschatology. Unlike messianism, deconstruction revealed the horizontal openness in writing, language and the world that can never have teleology and that writing, language and the world are infinitely related to one another. In deconstructing messianism, Derrida lucidly exhibited openness to possibilities that does not comply with finality.

Lastly, in conferring the antithetical reading of dialectics and deconstruction, I have come to realized that Hegel and Derrida can be compared in the aspect of waiting which is the horizontal openness to possibilities. But their sharp contention lies in the features of eschatology where Hegel endorsed it that is to arrive at the absolute and Derrida rejected the concept of finality. Hegel's dialectics have two operative that is contradiction and sublation by which he resolves contradiction while retaining the identity. In dialectics, there is identity in differences which Hegel did it by using sublation in which differences are maintain and at the same time they are united as one.

On the contrary, in deconstruction, Derrida used *Différance* as an operative term to show the differences or contradictions without resolving it. And he exposed the totalitarian nature of thinking that is seen in Hegel's dialectics. In contrast to Hegel's dialectics, Derrida's deconstruction is pluralistically open to possibilities without yielding to finality. Chapter four comprises of three sections, section A)

contradiction, and sublimation and beyond, section B) difference and *Différance* and Section C) totality and plurality.

Having discussed the concept of contradiction, sublimation and beyond according to Hegel and Derrida's philosophical approach, it became apparent to me that Hegel saw everything as instances of dialectics that contradictions are inherent nature of things because of which there is activity or movement in dialectical process. In contradiction, two opposite nature mutually depend on each other that it makes identification possible and sublation overcomes differences at an elevated level without diminishing identity and bring identity in differences. And with each contradiction, there is sublation at the same time and this process is always moving in a descending manner until it reaches the absolute.

Hegel's dialectics have the characteristics of waiting which he hoped to arrive at one day. Derrida's deconstruction, on the other hand, does not unite contradictions and deconstruct the notion of finality. His deconstruction instead showed the multiplicity in reality or thought that cannot have customary goal. Reality for him, like Hegel, is full of contradictions which unlock all sorts of possibilities that cannot have one final end and there is nothing to expect beyond contradictions. Unlike deconstruction, Hegel's dialectics have the concept of sublimation which is seen when contradiction are resolved as one and are moved to higher level until it reached the absolute that is identified as beyond since it hasn't arrived yet. The absolute for Derrida is beyond the sphere of the objective reality that his deconstruction does not have sublimation in contradiction.

In the course of explaining the concept of difference in Hegel's dialectics and *Différance* in Derrida's deconstruction, I have perceived that Derrida used *Différance* to reveal the richness of differences either by deferring the different meanings with regards to different context or by showing differences as it is. With his method of deconstruction, Derrida showed the diversity in nature that one cannot make the mistake of choosing or picking one thing to be better than the other. He gave the importance of the otherness of things which is seen in hierarchical order of things. For him, everything is equally significant that one is always at the risk of preferring the wrong choice of things or idea.

Hegel's dialectics, on the contrary, is engrained in hierarchy that there is always a development from lower to higher. For Hegel, differences or contradictions caused activity that moves in a descending order where sublation takes place by overcoming the differences and uniting differences. There is unity in differences in Hegel's dialectics whereas differences are not resolved in deconstruction of Derrida.

In conclusion, I have identified Hegel's philosophy to totality and Derrida's philosophy to plurality. Since Hegel's dialectics engaged in messianism like the monotheistic religions, there is an undeniably totality involved in it. Each movement in his dialectics is goal oriented that there is a whole ascending line of arriving at the absolute. In dialectics, every development whether in ideal or objective world follow a pattern of reaching the finality and that everything is in the process of becoming the absolute. Thus, Hegel's dialectics succumbed to totality which is apparently evident in the messianism of waiting. Derrida's deconstruction, on the other hand is pluralistic in nature since he deconstructed the very notion of eschatology. He argued that the nature of things whether in thought or in reality is diversity that it cannot submit to finality. History or events according to him happened in an episodic manner that it never arrives at one final day. Both the philosophers are open to possibilities but Derrida deconstruct the idea of finality in messianism. So, Derrida's deconstruction can be identified with plurality where as totality can be identified with Hegel's dialectics.

On the whole, based on the two different philosophical perspectives of Hegel's dialectics and Jacques Derrida's deconstruction, the study highlighted the religious perspective on messianism with *Messiah* according to Judaism and Christianity and pointed out their similarities and differences in relation to their belief in *Messiah*. One can thus conferred a dialectical approach on messianism without *messiah* by examining the concept of absolute spirit in Hegel's dialectics and Marxist struggles for socialist society. Derrida's criticism on eschatology and his critiques of messianism in writing, language and the world is also brought to light while analyzing Derrida's deconstruction on messianism. Finally, in the process of comparing and contrasting Hegel's dialectics and Derrida's deconstruction, one can conclude that Hegel's dialectics conformed to finality and that Derrida's deconstruction is opened to the diversity of nature.

Glossary

- Absolute Spirit** According to Hegel, absolute spirit is the psychological moment which he also called the philosophy of spirit that is to show how spirit' frees itself from nature, from its otherness. In the absolute spirit, reason is the goal of nature and the main factor of uniting subjective and objective spirit. The absolute spirit is the final goal of Hegel's dialectics.
- Alienation** Alienation in Marxist philosophy is to be detached or to be estranged from self, activity, product and the other was suffered by the struggling class who were working under the bourgeois society so that they can earn their living in order to survive.
- Anointed** Anointed one is appointed or designated by God to carry out His purpose which in Judaism and Christianity is to emancipate the children of God from their sufferings.
- Becoming** According to Hegel, the idea of synthesis can be identified with Becoming which merges Being and Nothing. Becoming sublates the two contradictory ideas that is, Being and Nothing by negating yet retaining their distinctive nature. In the concept of Becoming one can see that Being which has the tendency to become something has been integrated with Nothing by sublation and thus it turns into Becoming. Becoming can now be the form of something more concrete. Since Becoming is in a very abstract form it can be considered as a starting point for the process of dialectic system where Becoming is taken as the thesis which will in turn has antithesis and then eventually synthesis operating.
- Being** According to Hegel, Being as the thesis is a concept, which has the capacity to become something and yet when examine carefully, it is void and does not have something solid as its content. It has no form, no shape, no color, no

size etc. It cannot be given any definite form as Hegel has said, it is total vacuity. Pure Being is something which can take any form of existent. Being in itself is self sufficient to become something but it is still in an abstract form without any particular name, quality, quantity, measure etc.

Concept of Fall/Sin

The concept of Sin in Judaism and Christianity came into being due to disobedience to God's commandment that is, when Adam partook of the wrong tree that is the tree of knowledge of good and evil and thus sin became the root cause of suffering.

Contradiction

Contradiction is one of the operative terms used by Hegel in his dialectical processes, which can be considered as opposition or disagreement of concepts that causes activity in thought for the progressing of knowledge until it leads to the absolute.

Crucifixion

crucifixion according to the Christians is the death of Jesus on the cross in order to fulfill God's righteous requirement that is to bear the sins of men so that God can forgive men for their sins and have a relationship with God.

Day of Judgement

The day of judgment is the final day for Judaism and Christianity in which they are either rewarded or punished for their deeds while they live on the earth. So the Jewish and Christians live with hope to finally arrive at the final day which will be brought in with the coming of *Messiah* and that caused them to be involved in messianism.

Deconstruction

Derrida used deconstruction to oppose or criticized the grand narratives of Hegel and Marx who waits for the absolute or communist society to arrive and which makes them engaged in messianism. According to him, deconstruction is a practice of a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. As such, deconstruction is not a method or technique used for describing a withdrawn concept rather it open up ways of

looking at things which does not conform to mostly held beliefs.

Dialectics

Hegel's dialectic is a logical reasoning where contradictions are united yet their distinctiveness are retain. Dialectic brings unity in differences. Everything for Hegel is an instance of dialectic, always moving towards the absolute.

Différance

Derrida used *Différance* as an operative term that is to differ or defer that it means difference and it also means deferring, postponement or suspension. When *Différance* is pronounced, the letter 'a' is not heard, 'a' is silent. One can know the difference only when it is spelled or written down. It can be seen that his used of *Différance* has significance with regard to phonocentrism which in a way indicates that he opposes the supremacy of speech over writing.

Eschatology

eschatology is the study of final or end of time that prevails in the monotheistic religions as well as in Hegel and Marx's philosophical discourses. For the Jewish and Christian, it is the coming of *Messiah* and for Hegel and Marx it is to reach the absolute and communist society.

Holy Spirit

Holy Spirit is the consummation of the Triune God that it is the dispensation of the Father and the Son. It is in the Holy Spirit that the Father and the Son are united as one.

Incarnation

Incarnation is coming of God as a man with the birth of Jesus so that God and man can have a relationship. He took the form of man to be one with man, having blood and flesh.

Mark's communism

In Mark's communism, there will be an abolishment of all private owners and that each worker will be a producer of his product, he will work according to his capability, and he will no longer be under the enslavement of capitalist society.

Messiah	Messiah is the chosen one from God to emancipate the Israelites from the bondage of sufferings. Messiah in Christianity is Jesus Christ who will come again to release His people from enslavement of the world and ushered them into the New Kingdom.
Messianism	Messianism is an involvement in expectation for future. It is a participation in waiting for something that is yet to happen which can be either secular or religious.
Nothing	According to Hegel, nothing can be taken as antithesis which by itself is empty and is incapable of becoming something. Nothing in a way is similar to Being since both implies void or empty. Nothing can also be identified with negation. Nothing by itself negates what it is in itself and thus implies emptiness since it has no content at all.
<i>New Testament</i>	It is the second part of the Holy Bible, which starts with the birth of Jesus. It emphasised on the life, work and person of Jesus with His attainment and achievement.
Objective Spirit	According to Hegel, objective spirit is the science of idea in and for itself. It is also the phenomenological moment, which shows that reason is to be the goal of consciousness. This means that consciousness is at the fundamental level that it can show the object of consciousness and that reason has not yet evolved out of it.
<i>Old Testament</i>	It is the first part of the Holy Bible for the Christians which predicted the coming of Jesus as the Messiah. For Jewish it is also called <i>Tanakh</i> , which gives a historical account of the Israelites and a prophesying of Messiah's coming. It also contains the laws and commandments given to them by God.
Plurality	Plurality is the notion of multiplicity or diversity in which Derrida is involved by using deconstruction that deconstructs the idea of Messianism and reveal the many possibilities without confining to one uniform thoughts or ideas.

Redemption	It is the shedding of blood by Jesus on the cross for sinners, so that they can be reconciled to God. it is the mediation between God and man, in order that man can come to God and God to man. In short, it is for the uniting of God and man.
Resurrection	Resurrection is the raising up of Jesus from death, in order that He can become the life giving Spirit to enter into man. So that God and man can have a mutual abode.
Subjective Spirit	According to Hegel, subjective spirit can be called the philosophy of nature, which is the science of ideas in its otherness. Reason is the element of subjective spirit and that reason is the active power of spirit.
Sublation	Sublation is one the operative term in Hegel's dialectic, which is to unite opposition, or contradiction wherein differences are mutually interdependent on each other by identifying each other in their differences. Sublation, in Hegel's dialectic, means to resolve into a higher unity or to bring into the wholeness that which is fragmentary.
Teleology	Teleology is an attempt to study everything in relation to purpose. In Messianism, teleology is engagement in arriving at the goal by which one is govern by it.
Trinity	It is the christian's doctrine of the unity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Trinity is the Father, the Son and the Spirit who coexist simultaneously. The Christian notion of trinity is for the purpose of the second coming of <i>Messiah</i> to release His people from their bondages so that God and man can have one living regardless of their differences.
Writing	According to Derrida, writing is something which cannot have a specific end. It requires more writing and more and still more, but there is no final writing.

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