RIGHT-WING POLITICS IN EUROPE: A CASE STUDY OF AUSTRIA AND ITALY (1990-2010)

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ANKITA DUTTA

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
2017

Centre for European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067, India

Tel.: (O) 2670 4148, Fax: 91-11-2674 2592, 2674 1586
Email: cessjnu@gmail.com

Date: 5 July 2017

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "RIGHT-WING POLITICS IN EUROPE: A CASE STUDY OF AUSTRIA AND ITALY (1990-2010)" submitted by me for the award of the Degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University, is my own work. This thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of any degree of this University or any other university.

Ankita

ANKITA DUTTA

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Bhaswati Sarkar

Prof. Bhaswati Sarkar
(Chairperson)

Prof Bhaswati Sarkar
Chairperson
Centre for European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067, India

Bhaswati Sarkar

Prof. Bhaswati Sarkar
(Supervisor)

Professor
Centre for European Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067

For

Latika and Lakshay

(for all our struggles and laughter)

"So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past."

F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Great Gatsby*

Acknowledgments

I knew from the beginning that pursuing doctoral study was a difficult and challenging task. Losing two very important people in my life, my father Satish Dutta, who was really looking forward to this day, and my nani, Sarla Sharma, my source of strength and inspiration, made it much more daunting and an emotional challenge.However, throughout this long journey, I have gained a lot by learning to persevere despite hardship and there have been many people who have unflinchingly stood by me through this difficult time. As Rumi once said *"Wear gratitude like a cloak and it will feed every corner of your life"*. Keeping this in my mind, I would like to express my gratitude and thanks to all the people without whom this thesis would not have been possible. First, my supervisor, Prof. Bhaswati Sarkar, you have always been there for me, kept me in check and over the years have become a friend. You are the best Supervisor one could hope for and I am really lucky and privileged to call you as mine. Your mix of straightforward criticism combined with heart-warming support have given me great confidence as a researcher, and at the same time made me realise that I am only a beginner in this exciting profession. Our discussions were always lively and although generally longer than planned, always ended too soon.

This thesis is also the result of the guidance that I received from Prof. Satish Kumar. I feel honoured to have known him over the years. You created the invaluable space for me to develop myself as a researcher in the best possible way. I greatly appreciate the freedom you have given me to find my own path and the guidance and support you offered when needed. I have immensely benefitted from your academic guidance and your critical inputs from time to time.

The completion of this study would not have been possible without the support of my friends, Sonam and Jayadev, your constant support and help for making me stay focused on my study is truly appreciated. Special thanks to Anubha, whom I met at the time when I had lost hope, I greatly value our friendship and I deeply appreciate your belief in me and making me realise that every ending has a new beginning. Thank you.

Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without the patience of my family, my mother Kanchan Dutta and my siblings Latika Dutta and Lakshay Dutta. The countless times they have helped me through this journey, your encouragement when times got rough are very much appreciated. It was a great comfort and relief to know that you were willing to provide everything you could even though I know you have struggled a lot. You three have been a constant source of love, concern, support and strength all these years. I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude to you all. Thank you.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AN - Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)

BZÖ - Bundnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria)

CdL - Casa delle Liberta (House of Freedom)

CISNAL - Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Nazionali dei Lavoratori (Italian Confederation for National Unions for Workers)

DC - Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party)

DF - Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party)

DNSAP - Deutsche National SozialistischeArbeiterpartei (Austrian National Socialists Party)

DS - Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left)

DVU – Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union)

EPP - European Popular Party

EU - European Union

FdG - Fronte della Gioventu (Youth Front)

FI - Forza Italia

FLI - Futuro e Libertà per l'Italia (Future and Freedom for Italy)

FN - Front National

FP - Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party, Denmark)

FrP – Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party, Norway)

FPK - Die Freiheitlichen in Karnten (Freedom Party Carinthia)

FPÖ - Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)

FUAN - Fronte Universitariodel'AzioneNazionale (University Front of National Action)

KZ - Kronen Zeitung

LN - Lega Nord (Northern League)

LPF - Lijst Pym Fortuyn

M5S - Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement)

MSI - Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement)

MSI-FT - Movimento Sociale - Fiamme Tricolore (Social Movement – Tricolor Flame)

NF - NationalFront

NPD - NationalDemokratischePartei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)

NSDAP - Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' Party)

ÖVP - Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's Party)

PdL - Il Popolo della Libertà (The People of Freedom)

PCI - Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)

PDS - Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left)

PNF - Partito Nationale Fascista (National Fascist Party)

PRI - Partito Repubblicano Italiano (Italian Republican Party)

REP – Republiknar Party

RPR - Rally for the Republic

SPÖ- Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria)

SRP - Socialist Reich Party

SS - Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad)

SVP - Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party)

TTIP - Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UdC - Union of the Centre

UDF - Union for French Democracy

VB - Vlaams Blok

VdU - Verband der Unabhängigen, (League of Independents)

List of Tables, Figures and Maps

Tables

Figures

Maps

Chapter 1
Understanding Right-Wing Politics

This introductory chapter situates the study and is divided into two sections. Section I of the chapter introduces the study along with the questions, hypotheses and chapterisation of the study. This is followed by an overview of literature on right-wing politics that this study draws upon. Section II deals with the background analyses of the right-wing politics and parties in the pre-Second World War Europe. The understanding of rise of extremist movements is crucial to the understanding of resurgence of the right post 1945. These concepts of Fascism and Nazism are inescapable part of Austrian and Italian history and lot of right-wing parties' trace their roots from these movements [namely FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs (FPÖ, Freedom Party of Austria) and Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement, MSI)].

Section I

In 2000, the chair of the European Union announced that it was about to impose a number of sanctions on one of its own member, Austria. Amongst the most significant measures taken against the Republic was the indefinite suspension of the bilateral relations with Austria, reduction of contacts with Austrian ambassadors and withdrawal of the support for Austrian candidates for the international posts. These measures were taken to show the displeasure of the Union for the inclusion of several ministers of the Freedom Party of Austria into the newly formed government in Vienna. The core of the issue depicted the unacceptability of the EU members for the inclusion of the party that the observers considered as the right-wing extremist and therefore out of acceptable political spectrum. Given all the commotion following the election of the Austrian ÖsterreichischeVolkspartei (Austrian People's Party, ÖVP) – FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ) government, it is almost forgotten that the first post-war government in Europe that included right-wing parties, namely Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and Lega Nord in Silvio Berlusconi's short lived government, was constituted in Italy in 1994. The question then rises is, why was there no outrage pertaining to the formation of the right-wing government in Italy; why was FPÖ considered an extremist party, while parties in Italy, especially the neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement, MSI), were overlooked.

The present study analyses the rise of the right-wing in Europe.It takes up two countries where the right-wing has been active as case study one Austria and the other Italy. The time frame is 1990-2010. The revival of the right-wing politics largely contradicted with the prevailing claims about the end of the ideology with the advent of the post-industrial society and the expansion of post-materialistic values. Although the percentage of the total vote share for parties of the right-wing in national European elections since 1980 has typically been small, these parties have undeniably been far more successful at generating electoral support than many observers had anticipated. Their resurgence has indeed attracted considerable attention, because the combination of xenophobia and populist anti-system sentiments embodies a challenge to norms of tolerance in liberal democratic societies. It also raised the spectre of direct neo-fascist participation in government, after the March 1994 Italian general elections.

Austria and Italy form logical case studies in several respects - culturally, historically, and politically. The research also helps usidentify the particularities of each case. They share long historical parallels, most disastrously during the Nazi period in Germany, the "willing" annexation of Austria by Hitler's Third Reich in 1938 and the rise of the Fascist regime in Italy. In the post-war period, these countries embarked on a process of revitalising their political system, where - even though many formerly prominent right-wing leaders remained in important political roles as converted democrats - each country's public, official ideological credentials were explicitly anti-fascist.In both countries, the crux of the post-war democratic legitimising principle was an *elite consensus* among the major parties, as well as leading political, economic, cultural, and military figures, not to cooperate with or even to tolerate extreme-right parties and movements. In both Austria and Italy, even though small right-wing parties existed from the early post-war period, they were systematically isolated and excluded and they remained marginal in the political party systems. At stake for the leaders from both the centre-left and the centre-right was the very survival of democracy and the integration of their countries into the western group of nations.

The revival of right-wing politics also had significant, indirect and direct, effects on the behaviour of larger, more established parties. By the early 1990s, right-wing parties,

namely, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Lega Nord; Italian Social Movement (MSI)/Alleanza Nazionale (AN); Forza Italia in Italy were established features of their respective political systems. These parties went on to become the most electorally successful right-wing parties in Europe and entered national coalitions, however, the fortune of all these parties have not been consistent. The difference in success were direct result of the different strategies that other political parties, media and civil groups in the two states adopted toward the right wing.

In analysing the transformation of politics and the resurgence of right-wing parties in Austria and Italy, the study tries to answer a number of questions like, how can the support for the right-wing parties are explained? What are the reasons that lead to the rise of right-wing politics? What are the consequences of its rise for political competition in Austria and Italy particularly vis-a-vis mainstream parties? In addition, questions have been raised regarding the political style of these leaders and the related issue of importance of communication and personal image. These parties provide excellent examples of the role of leadership in politics, increasing personalisation of politics and tendency towards leadership centralisation in parties. This work also studies how the right-wing politics have challenged pre-existing socio-structural and ideological divisions in Austrian and Italian politics, and how it brings to the fore important new political innovations. The present study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, as stated earlier, gives an introduction to the study. Chapter 2 deals with Rise of Right-Wing Politics in Post-Cold War Period. This chapter analyses the re-emergence of right-wing politics in Europe with the focus on the situations and the conditions facilitating the emergence of the right-wing politics and the issues raised by the right-wing parties.Chapter 3 is primarily concerned with the Right-Wing Politics in Austria, where focus is largely on the rise, issues and impact of the right-wing politics. Chapter 4 focuses on Right-Wing Politics in Italy where the emphasis is on the understanding of the rise of right-wing politics in Italy. The focus of the chapter would also be on how the right-wing politics has manifested itself in the Italian political sphere and how it has impacted the workings of the government. Chapter 5 is theConclusion which would include the summary of the findings of the study and the verification of the hypothesis. Apart from this, the study tests three hypotheses: One, the rise of right-wing parties in the post-Cold

War era is a result of rise in migration. Two,charismatic leadership has been critical in determining the right-wing parties fortunes. And three, the widespread appeal of right-wing parties in both Italy and Austria has not translated to a uniform rise in their vote.

[1.1] Overview of Available Literature

The emergence of right wing parties constitutes one of the most significant developments in the European political systems during the last few decades. This overview of literature is thematically divided in three sections. The first section gives a general overview of the literature pertaining to the right-wing in Europe. These parties have impacted strongly on the dynamics of the national political competition, their rise has also sparked an intense debate pertaining to the unsettled questions regarding how to properly define, classify and label these parties. The second and the third themedraw upon some of the literature pertaining to the rise of right-wing politics in Austria and Italy.The emergence of the new right wing parties and the radicalisation of the older ones have led to rise of new debates and issues pertaining to what entail this new right-wing.

Right-Wing in Europe

Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (1997), PieroIgnazi (2003), Paul Hainsworth (2008),discusses the key themes and developments in the emergence of extreme right wing political parties and movements. The major discussion centres around the differences in the political and social settings of contemporary and pre-1945 right wing extremism- also their very different international environments- emphasising on the role of immigration, education and the gender issues in the make-up of the current movements and its parallels in different societies. The focus is upon those right-wing parties that have opted for electoralism and for working within the parameters of liberal-democratic political institutions and systems, even though they may not fully subscribe to the values of liberal democracy. Hence, the emphasis is on the examination of the ‘highs’ and ‘lows’ of contemporary right wing- notably the instances where right wing have achieved significant levels of electoral support, but also upon the occasions and the contexts where they have failed to do so. The 1980s represent a watershed in the history of the post was extreme right, until then; the right wing was represented by MSI of Italy. Due to the

massive political and social changes in the mid-1980s led to the rise of new actors for example, FPÖ in Austria; The Republikaner in Germany etc. These parties appealed against the welfare state, democratic institutions, against establishment, traditional parties and politicians. These new parties rejected any reference to socialism and accepted neo-liberal tendency that emerged at the end of 1980s. However, these parties placed special emphasis on traditional moral values, respect for hierarchy, patriotism and so on: issues that are related to post-modern politics. In short, these parties offered a new agenda for a new era.

Elisabeth Carter (2005) examines the dramatic rise in the electoral support for the right wing extremist parties in many West European democracies since the late 1970s. While many of these parties had started to play a crucial role in many countries, however it was not until the 1990s that these parties acquired significant strength to become relevant players in the formation of the governmental majorities. The study is based on a broad set of political, supply side explanations for the disparity in electoral fortunes - which includes the types of ideology embraced by various parties; forms of party organisation and leadership; different types of party competition in each party system in which these parties function; and different institutional environments present in each of the countries in which the parties compete. The demand side explanation for the rise of right-wing includes rise of immigration, the growth of voter's dissatisfaction with the political parties and the democratic system, the breakdown of social ties and the feeling insecurity, the calls for the return to more traditional and paternalistic modes of social organisations, and rise of social deprivation and exclusion.

DiethelmProwe (1994) compares and contrasts the 'Classic' Fascism and the 'New' Radical Right in Western Europe. The fascist movements were born out of the experience of the First World War. The fascist intellectuals and ideologues were built on the profound fears of a generation disturbed by the rapid changes due to industrialisation and by disorienting modernist paradigms in science, philosophy and the arts. Nationalist resentments from the war and intermittent economic crises led to an atmosphere of class struggle and clashes among ethnic and political groups, which ultimately resulted in mass unemployment, fear and street violence during Great Depression, providing an expanded

arena of fear and hatred, in which the fascist gospel of authoritarian law and order, power and narrow national supremacy found wide appeal. In contrast, the radical right groups of Western Europe today emanated from a long period of peace. They were socialised in a society marked by material prosperity and solid, largely unchallenged democratic institutions, and an emerging multi-cultural society. All these conditions have unquestionably created frustrations, tensions and difficult adjustments- the confrontation with the new, still unblended multi-cultural mini societies. But the nature of these conflicts and tensions, as well as the context of the political culture, are different and have thus created notably different patterns in today's radical right from the fascists of the interwar years.LaurenzEnnser (2012) analyses that the common concepts for the classification of the parties into families (origins, transnational links, ideology, name) suggest that the radical right should be less homogeneous than most other party families in Western Europe due to their lack of stable transnational cooperation, disputed ideological core features, as well as their diverse origins. As the concept of a party family implies a certain degree of shared political viewpoints among party family members, Ennser examines whether the parties commonly labelled right-wing radical are more or less diverse than those of other party families (Greens, social democrats, liberals and conservative/Christian democrats). Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert (1996) examine the conditions favouring the parties of the extreme right in Western Europe. The rise of these parties contradicted well-known scholarly claims about the end of ideology, the advent of post-industrial society, and the growth of post-materialist values. Although the percentage of the total vote cast for these parties in the national and European elections since 1980 has typically been little, these parties have been far more successful at generating electoral support than many observers had anticipated. Their resurgence has indeed attracted considerable attention, because the combination of xenophobia and populist anti-system sentiments embodies a challenge to norms of tolerance in liberal democratic societies.

Andreas Schedler (1996)postulates that the understanding of certain aspects of the right wing politics remains elusive in spite of the variety of literature available. One of the aspects is the anti-political nature of these parties. Political scientists have tried to explain this aspect under labels like protest, populist or extremist parties. Yet the 'anti-political'

ideology which is central for many of these parties has not received the systematic attention it deserves. This study tries to fill this gap. It proceeds to describe their position in between normal and anti-democratic opposition, sketches the possible career paths of anti-political-establishment parties, and concludes with some notes on available counter-strategies. The anti-political-establishment parties' associate with the political elite they fight: the image of a political class as incompetent, amoral and insincere, and the image of a dominant class, repressive and exploitative. These are some of the symbolic strategies anti-political-establishment parties employ in order to present themselves as different from all other parties, as immaculate outsiders who inspire hope and confidence: their presumptive novelty, their confrontational policy style, their self-projection as victims of political oppression, their combination of populism with over-promising charisma, and their pretension to bridge the dividing line between left and right.

Antonio Costa Pinto, Roger Eatwell and Stein Ugelvik Larsen (2007)analyses the Weberian concept of Charismatic leadership. The concept of charisma has evolved to such an extent in the study of fascism, that works on the national variations of fascism have introduced new nuances to Weber's original typology and its theoretical inspiration. This has become relevant in the study of the fascist movements and particularly in the analyses of how dictators exercised their powers during the interwar period. The emphasis is laid on those leaders who were in power, and who created and led dictatorships that have been associated with fascism, this serves to illustrate on the 'charismatisation' of the leaders, which serves to demonstrate the huge influence that fascism has on right-wing dictatorship. The power of political leaders does not solely depends upon their being legitimised by traditional, legal and charismatic means, but that the ideological platform to which they make the systemic appeals is every bit as important , whether it be based on the national, religious, ethnic or left-right ideology. The 'content' of the leaders 'message' adds a great deal to the persuasive manners of his 'charisma'. Ami Pedahzur and AvrahamBrichta (2002**)** explain the continuous success of the far right-wing parties in Europe. Instead of using social and political factors (especially in times of long-lasting peace and economic prosperity) for the success of the extreme right, the authors try to explain this phenomenon by using micro-organizational factors by arguing, that factors such as charismatic leadership and cohesive party

organization contribute to the process of party institutionalisation and demonstrate the success of extreme right-wing parties, taking examples of France's Front National and Austria's The Freedom Party.

Austria

The right-wing politics in Austria has emerged as a powerful challenger to the consociational politics of Austria. Paul Hockenos (1995) traces the rise of Jörg Haider in the Austrian political scenario since he assumed the helm of the FPÖ in 1986. In the 1990 parliamentary elections, the FPÖ broke into double digits nationwide for the first time, gaining 17 percent of the national vote. Its simple strategy was a combination of social demagoguery, xenophobia, and anti-political populism. In the 1994 general elections, the FPÖ captured a 23 percent of the national vote, challenging Austria's post-war political consensus [Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs(SPÖ, Social Democratic Party of Austria) and Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP, Austrian People's Party)] for the first time. The bulk of his support comes not from the economically dispossessed or the unemployed but from those among the middle class who fear the loss of their social standing or their jobs. He appeals to the growing number of voters who are frustrated with politics. The central idea of the FPÖ is that of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, or ethnic community, a concept that was also at the heart of Nazi ideology.

Anthony J. McGann and Herbert Kitschelt (2005)analyse the evolution and success of FPÖ in Austria. In October 1999, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) won 26.9 percent of the vote in the Austrian legislative elections of that year, a few hundred votes ahead of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) for the first time. It conform to the 'winning formula' for 'new radical-right' parties, combining xenophobic appeals with free-market economics and socio-cultural conservatism, resulting in an electorate in which small business owners, farmers, retirees and blue-collar workers are over-represented. The FPÖ have been more successful for two reasons. Firstly, FPÖ had a strong 'anti-statist populist' appeal, critical of clientelism and politicised bureaucracy. This has allowed it to appeal to white-collar voters more effectively than any other 'new radical right' parties. The FPÖ went from being a moderate liberal party in the mid-1980s to an 'anti-statist

populist' party, defined mainly in terms of opposition to the Austrian system of party government. Although JörgHaider had a long history of inflammatory statements, it was only in the 1990s that xenophobic appeals and opposition to immigration became central to the party's appeal, and it became the most popular party in Austria among blue-collar voters.Oliver Marchart (2001) on the other hand, analyses the result of inclusion of FPÖ in the coalition government of Austria in 2000. In early February 2000, Austria's conservative People's Party (ÖVP) announced that it would form a coalition with the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ). Undoubtedly, this constituted a historic event in the European political landscape. For the first time a party of the extreme xenophobic Right was allowed to enter government and as a result, for the first time in their history, the member states of the European Union decided to put Austria under diplomatic quarantine and to reduce bi-lateral relations to a technical level. The boycott proved to be the political decision taken by the EU: not the usual bureaucratic compromise solution but a decision over political principles by which a line of demarcation was drawn vis-à-vis ultra-right populism.

David Art (2007)explains the variation in the electoral success of far-right parties in Germany and Austria over the past several decades. He argues that the reaction of existing political parties, the tabloid press and civil society to right-wing populism has been different in the two states, and that these differences help explain the divergent development of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the German Republikaner Party (REP). The reactions of the print media and civil society to the far right are important factors in determining the far right's trajectory. By 'combating' right-wing populist parties soon after they appear, mainstream political elites, civic activists and the media undermine the far right's electoral appeal, its ability to recruit capable party members, and weaken its political organization. Conversely, when mainstream political forces either cooperate with or are disinterested toward the far right, right-wing populist parties gain electoral strength, legitimacy and political entrepreneurs that can transform them into permanent forces in the party system. In the mid to late 1980s, right-wing populist parties emerged in each state: the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria and the Republikaner party in Germany. While the FPÖ went on to become one of the most electorally successful far-right parties in Europe and entered a national coalition with the

conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) in 2000, the REPs disintegrated over the course of the 1990s, never capturing more than 2.5 percent in national elections. The collapse of the REPs and the rise of the FPÖ were the direct results of the dramatically different strategies that other political parties, the media and civil groups in the two states adopted toward the far right: German actors combated the REPs, while their Austrian counterparts sought to cooperate with the FPÖ.

Italy

The right-wing parties have come to play a very crucial role in Italian politics. Samuel H. Barnes (1972) examines the legacy of Fascism.Fascism not only sought to dominate but to remodel the large population, as an innovative form of modern dictatorship, Fascism experimented with the techniques of totalitarian control that sought to go beyond the then traditional methods of coercion and to set new approaches to re-socialisation and cultural changes. It devoted great resources towards the creation of a society and polity that would reflect the image that the regime had projected. They established a single-party dictatorship that penetrated deeply into the state machinery, and they made party membership pre-requisitive for the advancement in the most areas of public life. By devoting special attention to youth, the party recruited its future elites at a very young age. However, long standing feuds with church over education policy resulted in stand-off that reflected the limitation of the regime's power to control the socialisation of the young. The poor economic performance likewise demonstrated the lack of Fascist's control over events. Hence, Fascism did not make a great impact on the attitudes and behaviour of the mass of Italians, however the major impact was on the elites, given the differential involvement of the elites and non-elites in the cultural life of Italy.

Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella (2009)analyse the Italian political scenario post-Cold War emphasising on the rise of the right wing politics. As the opportunity to carve out a new political space appeared after the collapse of the Democrazia Cristiana (DC, Christian Democratic Party) and its allies, and the adoption of the new set of rules to govern the electoral space, lead to the rise of new actors and coalition. The new politics that emerged was a combination of the important role of leadership in politics, the increasing

personalisation of the politics, tendency towards the leadership centralisation in parties and an ever-increasing relationship between media and politics. Lega Nord, MSI/AlleanzaNazionale, and Forza Italia were able to use the political vacuum to its maximum when they came to power in 1994, however short-lived the coalition was, these parties have remained the crucial players of the right wing in Italy, returning to government in 2001 and again in 2008. The history of the post war Italian republic in which government executives were marked by fragilities, the maintenance of this alliance was remarkable despite irreconcilability of the key issues relating to the shape of Italian political culture, to the north-south divide, secular-catholic division in politics and the conflicting interpretation regarding the role of the state and the free market. The political success of the right wing in Italy has come with a seeming refusal to acknowledge its political character- the leaders have presented themselves as political outsiders, rejecting political class and taking up the cause of the common man.Mario Sznajder (1995)examines factors and developments during the March 1994 general election in Italy which brought a right-wing coalition to power in the country for the first time since the Second World War. The political positions and ideological principles of Forza Italia, the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale shows that the right wing of Italian politics is far more internally contradictory than coherent, fostering instability within the *Polo delleliberta*-the victorious political coalition. Yet despite the contradictions and difficulties, Berlusconi was able to form a governing coalition. This coalition was confronted with the problem of legitimacy, and much international criticism, as a result of the inclusion of AN/MSI, the party of the neo- fascists, and the need to reconcile both personal antagonisms between the leaders of the main parties and, in some cases, their contradictory political positions and programmes. Against this background, the after-effects of the *Mani Pulite*(Clean Hands) and *Tangentopoli*(Bribe Town) affairs, the problem of economic adjustment and its political repercussions created very difficult and precarious political context in which this coalition had to operate, until its collapse post withdrawal of Lega Nord.

Paul Statham (1996)analyse the rise of two political actors in Italy- Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia and Gianfranco Fini's Alleanza Nazionale. Media control and access to resources of political communication help explain the success of these two actors in

consolidating their authority within the opportunities that were presented by the collapse of the First Republic and the establishment of a new political system. The media and publicity resources were used to construct the pseudo-national consensus of the populist appeal, which helped these two parties to attain office. These two parties proposed a broad idea of vaguely defined political claims that were loosely joined in a nationalistic sentiment. They advocated and to a certain extent represented a break with the traditions of the politics of the past.

The literature so far has concentrated on the understanding and the characterisation of the right-wing politics and the variations of the electoral voting. This case study of Austria and Italy would help in the understanding of the peculiarities of the right-wing politics in these countries. This study would help in the understanding of how these parties have challenged the pre-existing socio-political structures of the Austrian and Italian politics, hence adding to the present literature.

Section II

This section analyses the rise of extremist movements in inter-war Europe. The study of inter-war period is important to understand the factors that led to the resurgence of right-wing in the post-Second World War period. The concepts of Fascism and Nazism are intrinsic part of Austrian and Italian history and the rise of right-wing parties in these countries cannot be analysed without a historical background as certain parties' trace their roots to these movements (FPÖ and MSI/AN). This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first section deals with the basic understanding of concepts of Fascism and Nazism and the second deals with the marginalisation following the defeat of Fascist and Nazist parties.

[1.2] Extremist Movement in Inter-War Period

The Paris Peace Settlements of 1919–1920 brought an end to the divisions and endless conflict of World War I. European countries were devastated with massive loses, leading to many of the European governments to retreat into isolationism, neutrality, or pacifism. The Paris agreements, including the crucial Versailles Treaty, established national and

democratic states in Germany, as well as the new states of Eastern Europe, and created the League of Nations to protect the peace and ward off future wars. However, the situation reversed in the first post-war years, with economic distress and inflation, irredentist discontent with the Versailles Treaty (especially in Germany), and the unsettling presence of a new communist state in Russia. By the 1930s, a worldwide economic depression weakened governments everywhere[1].

Adolf Hitler emerged from this environment, but he was not the first or the only right-wing dictator to rise to power in interwar Europe. He was preceded, most importantly, by Benito Mussolini (1883–1945), who seized power in Italy in 1922 and established the first fascist dictatorship in Europe in a country that had maintained parliamentary government since unification in 1861.On 23 March 1919, Benito Mussolini, in a rally in Milan, officially launched 'Fascism'. The 'revolutionary', 'anti-capitalist', based on radical nationalist discourse, 'the militarised party', 'anti-communism' and the radical critique of liberal democracy; the electoral tactics and the political violence- all of these became regular features of fascism, irrespective of its national variations. At the beginning of 1930s, Mussolini created his new state from his position of authority, and at the same time, National Socialism in Germany was being transformed into a movement with large electoral support. Almost all European countries had parties of their own broadly similar to these, though the factors that conditioned their emergence and the degree of their success varied from case to case, they were all easily identified by the common citizen as 'fascist'[2].

BerntHagtvet[3] explains the reasons behind the rise of fascist movements and their attainment of political power in Italy and Germany from 1920-1940: first, fascist movements struck deepest roots in nation-states weakened and humiliated by defeat in war. Low national self-esteem was exacerbated by a deep cultural crisis. A damaged

[1]Mason, David (2011), *A Concise History of Modern Europe: Liberty, Equality, Solidarity*, (United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), pp.131.
[2]Pinto, Antonio Costa (2009), *Fascism: a 'Revolutionary Right' in Inter-War Europe*, in Atkin, Nicholas and Biddiss, Michael (ed.) (2009), *Themes in Modern European History, 1890-1945*, (New York: Routledge), pp.215.
[3]Hagtvet, Bernt (1994), Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, *Journal of Peace Research*, 31(3), pp. 241-246.

nation, a wounded collective pride and an unclear national identity provided great fuel for the mobilisation of nationalist and fascist groups. Second, extreme right-wing parties obtained the greatest influence and power in countries which had undergone a period of rapid modernisation and experienced a quick transformation of their social structures or the rise of new social classes. The fear of communism was in all cases a factor which attended the rapid rise of fascism in interwar Europe. Third, fascist movements stood a greater chance of success in countries where the liberal centre occupied a weak position in national politics, i.e. in countries where middle-class parties were fragmented and the extant political elite weakened, as in Italy and Germany before the arrival of Mussolini and Hitler. Both cases lacked a confident democratic culture as well as a leading governing class. Finally, fascist movements had their most rapid rise during economic crises which boosted unemployment and confused the power relations among the major social classes.

[1.2] (a) Rise of Fascism

Italy did not experience the trauma of dramatic and sudden political change that happened elsewhere in Europe at the end of the First World War; however, it did go through a process of political transition in the early 1920s.In the four years between the end of the war and Mussolini's appointment as prime minister there were no less than six short-lived, unstable coalition governments, each less able than the previous one to deal with Italy's serious problems. Italy suffered from severe economic problems, like high unemployment rate resulting from the rapid demobilisation of millions of troops and the slowness to return to a peacetime economy, and high inflation rate, which primarily hit the middle class. The failure of the government to resolve these issues undermined the faith of the Italian population in the political parties and in democracy itself. Even worse, many Italians believed that they had been cheated by their Allies - Britain, France and the USA - of just territorial gains, especially from the German and Turkish empires, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919[4]. This situation in Italy led to the rise of twentieth century's most used concept, Fascism.

[4]Pollard, John (2004), The many problems and failures of Liberal Italy led the establishment to turn to Mussolini, *New Perspectives,* 9(3), pp. 28-31.

According to Michael Mann[5], there were four crises that led to the growth of Fascism: the consequences of a devastating "world," but in fact largely European; war between mass citizen armies; severe class conflict exacerbated by the Great Depression; and a political crisis arising from an attempted rapid transition by many countries toward a democratic nation-state, and a cultural sense of civilisational contradiction and decay. Fascism itself recognised the importance of all four sources of social power (ideological, economic, military, and political) by explicitly claiming to offer solutions to all four crises. And all four played a more specific role in weakening the capacity of elites to continue ruling in old ways. Fascists emerged as a response to a crisis of mass mobilisation warfare. Italy was marginal in the Great Power system and Italians were divided by the war. It divided the political parties and created space for new ones. A few hundred fascists then became a mass movement as further crises of post-war Italian society exacerbated the class struggles of capitalism and energised a paramilitary youth movement.

On 23 March 1919, Benito Mussolini officially launched Fascism in Milan. The scholar, Antonio Costa Pinto emphasises that what was to become a fascist programme – with its radical nationalism, the antidemocratic stance, its communitarian and corporatist alternative, its anti-social third way – were all present in the European cultural milieu from the beginning of the century. Hence it is crucial to recognise that fascism cannot be separated from a new type of political formation that appeared in the wake of 1914-18 conflict. Adopting the rhetoric of 'neither right nor left', the fascists relied on an innovative brand of organisation that was characteristic of the era of mass movements and of post-war European democratisation. Italian Fascism presented itself as an anti-party with its own progressive social agenda, with nationalism as a driving force for its political actions. Mussolini, in a very short span, was able to win over many supporters through a more nationalist programme; at the end of 1920, the movement had more than 20,000 members. In May 1921, it possessed 35 parliamentary deputies, but by July its membership was approximately 200,000.[6]

[5]Mann, Michael (2004), *Fascists*, (UK: Cambridge University Press), pp.23.
[6]Pinto, n.2, pp. 219

Mussolini's takeover of power from the liberal politicians asserts to the fact that for the first time in the European history, liberal democracies and parliamentary process was entrusted to the leader of militia party who repudiated the values of liberal democracy and proclaimed the revolutionary intention of transforming the state in an anti-democratic direction.

Understanding Fascism

The concept of Fascism is in itself elaborate and complex, with the wide varieties of definitions and explanations provided by scholars over the years. Roger Eatwell[7] argues that the academic literature is so vast that one leading authority on Nazism confesses 'even experts have difficulty in coping'. According to Eatwell, one interpretation holds that fascism lacked any clear ideological basis, other than a commitment to nihilistic violence. More commonly, it is claimed that 'fascisms' were so varied in practice, except perhaps in their opportunism, that it is impossible to construct any generic concept. In part fascism's theoretical weakness stemmed from the fact that it preached activism, and was often anti-intellectual. In particular it stressed aggressive male values. Following from this, some psychological approaches have argued that fascism attracted activities and supporters who were characterised by an 'authoritarian personality'.

Michael Mann[8] in his definition of fascism identifies three fundamentals: 'key values, actions and power organisations' in 'pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through para-militarism'. Understanding these attributes as: firstly, Nationalism as the deep and 'populist commitment' to an 'organic' and 'integral' nation. Second Statism, as the goals and organisational form, that was involved when the organic conception imposes an authoritarian state 'embodying a singular, cohesive will [as] expressed by a party elite adhering to the "leadership principle"'. Third, transcending the conventional structures, such as 'left' or 'right'.It can be understood in terms of fascist 'third way'. Fourth, Cleansing, most fascism entwined both ethnic and political cleansing,

[7]Eatwell, Roger (1992), Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4(2), pp. 161-194.
[8]Pinto, n.2, pp. 216

though to different degrees. Lastly, Para-militarism as a key element both in values and in oganisational form.

On the other hand, Robert Paxton[9] described fascism in term of power and action. For him a usable definition of fascism must find a way to avoid treating fascism in isolation, cut off from its environment and its accomplices. Fascism in power is a compound, a powerful amalgam of different but marriageable conservative, national-socialist and radical Right ingredients, bonded together by common enemies and common passions for a regenerated, energised, and purified nation at whatever cost to free institutions and the rule of law. The precise proportions of the mixture are the result of processes: choices, alliances, compromises, rivalries. Fascism in action looks much more like a network of relationships than a fixed essence.

However, Roger Griffin[10] argues that fascism is a product of the modern age. It is identified with a whole range of forces, like totalitarianism; brainwashing; state terror; social engineering; fanaticism; orchestrated violence; and blind obedience. For him, there is a chronic lack of consensus on how to define fascism and what constitutes a 'fascist minimum', that is the lowest common denominator of defining features to be found in all manifestations of fascism. For him, the fascist minimum can be identified in terms not of a common ideological component but of a common mythic core. The mythic core that forms the basis of the ideal type of generic fascism is the vision of the (perceived) crisis of the nation leading towards a new order. The idea that a 'nation' is an entity which can decay and be regenerated implies something diametrically opposed to what liberals understand by it. It connotes an organism with its own life-cycle, collective psyche, and communal destiny, embracing in principle the whole people, and in practise all those who ethnically or culturally are 'natural' members of it, and are not contaminated by forces hostile to nationhood. In this way of conceiving the nation – sometimes referred as 'integral nationalism', 'hyper-nationalism' or 'illiberal nationalism' – it becomes higher reality transcending the individual's life, which only acquires meaning and value in so far as it contributes directly to the whole organism's well-being. The core mentality of

[9] Paxton, Robert (2004), *Anatomy of Fascism,* (New York: Random House Publications), pp.207.
[10]Griffin, Roger (ed.) (1995), *Fascism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.1.

Fascism then appears to be devoting, if necessary sacrificing, individual existence to the struggle against the forces of degeneration which had seemingly brought the nation low, and of helping re-launch it towards greatness and glory. Hence the fascist obsession with the 'national rebirth' and the rise of the 'new man'. Therefore, Roger Griffins defines fascism as a *genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of ultra-nationalism*.

Similarly, Roger Eatwell elaborates that Fascism "strives to forge social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical third way." He adds that in practice, fascism has tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed program, and to engage in a "Manichean demonisation of its enemies". He amplifies this by elaborating four key characteristics: nationalism, holism (i.e., collectivism), radicalism, and "the third way." The third way lies between capital and labour, right and left, drawing from the best of both of them. Since this means that fascism has something practical to offer modern society, he sees fascism not as anti-modern but as an alternative vision of modernity.[11]

Fascist Italy

After declaring for neutrality in 1914, the Italian government joined the Entente in 1915, which promised territories that were to be won from the Habsburg Empire. However, there was serious conflict over entry into the war. The years 1915 and 1916 saw mass demonstrations, rioting, and street-fighting between pro and anti-war factions. Divisions over the war weakened the state and split all the main parties, including the ruling liberal and conservative parties. This led socialists that included Benito Mussolini – to break with the party and join with radical nationalists to create the fascist movement. Many Italians distinguished sharply between the Italian nation and the Italian state. There was a strong popular sense that the Italian state had been created in the 1860s by diplomatic manoeuvres among the upper class and foreign governments, in the course of which Garibaldi's popular redshirt movement had been side-lined. Italy was "the last (or the weakest) of the Great Powers," the only one "deprived of Empire."[12]Nationalists tried to rekindle this populist national fervour, emphasising the leftist view of the state as a sham,

[11]Mann, n.5, pp. 11
[12]Ibid., pp. 94

its conservative and liberal parliamentarians representing only the rich. Since the Catholic Church was also hostile to this secularising state and stood aside from politics, the state lacked sacred authority on the right. The contemporary terms were that the "legal" was not the same as the "real" Italy, that is, that the state did not represent the nation.[13]

Mussolini and 190 others founded the *fasci di combattimento*(groups of combatants) in 1919 in Milan. Renamed as the *PartitoNationaleFascista* (PNF, National Fascist Party), the movement had 20,000 members by late 1920, almost 100,000 by April 1921, and 320,000 by November 1921[14], leading Mussolini to take over power. Though Mussolini has come to power with the help of PNF, the dismantling of the democratic regime was slow; hence he had to accept the compromises with the monarchy and the Catholic Church. Mussolini progressively abolished the formal limits to his powers and by 1926; PNF became the de facto Italy's sole party. This marked the peak of the fascist political system, a fusion of party and state affected in a manner that did not subordinate the former to the latter. By the eve of the world war, Italian fascism has evolved from the phase of being an 'authoritarian' state to that of 'totalitarian'. This was evident in the alliance with Nazi Germany, introduction of anti-Semitic legislation- in an attempt to permeate Italian Society with the fascist values, and in the regimes expansionist agenda. The decision to enter in alliance with Germany was taken against the opinion of the most conservative sections of the Church. The military disasters experienced in 1942 led to the expulsion of Mussolini by the Fascist Grand Council and restoring to power King Victor Emmanuel. This new regime was driven with conflicts between anti-fascist partisans and 'fascist republicans' and never amounted to anything more than a puppet of Nazi Reich.[15]

[1.2](b) Nazist Germany

Germany was reconstituted as a democratic republic, but it was also forced to accept the terms of the Versailles Treaty, despite vigorous and sustained protests from every band of the political spectrum inside the country. The treaty not only assigned Germany responsibility for World War I and imposed reparation payments on the new government

[13]Mann, n.5, pp. 94
[14]Ibid., pp. 95
[15]Pinto, n.2, pp. 227

but also reduced the size of the country by restoring an independent Austria, returning Alsace-Lorraine to France, placing the Saar territory and the Rhineland under French or Allied occupation, ceding most of West Prussia to Poland, and establishing the port city of Danzig as a free city under the auspices of the League of Nations. In addition, the treaty placed German colonies (e.g., in Africa) under League of Nations control as mandates and limited the German army and armaments.[16]

Nazism in Germany consolidated itself much slowly as compared to Italian fascism; however it arrived in power with greater political and electoral strength. In 1921, Adolf Hitler presented himself as a leader of the small and relatively new extremist party National Socialist German Workers' Party. The party underwent many fundamental changes, especially in terms of its discourse and organisation. Hitler used to humiliation caused by the Treaty of Versailles, together with Jewish and Marxist conspiracies to create a stronghold for the party. Majority structural shifts included concentration of leadership in one person, increased discipline in within the party's paramilitary formation and the creation of the Protection Squadron called *Schutzstaffel* (SS).[17] In November 1923, Hitler tried to take advantage of the crisis facing the Weimar government by instigating a revolution in Munich, following which Nazi party was banned and Hitler was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

The unstable new Weimar Republic and economic crisis was reflected in the electoral polarisation that favoured Hitler. Between 1928 and 1930, the Nazi party's support increased from 2.6 to18.3 percent. Under conditions of mass unemployment, increasingly authoritarian measures and political violence, NSDAP won the biggest vote shares of 37.3 percent in the elections of 1932.[18] Hitler came to power in Germany purely by constitutional means, occupying the Reich Chancellery at the invitation of President Hidenburg.

NSDAP's agenda after coming to power was similar to the party program of 1920, which stated that, the "union of all Germans in a Greater Germany," revocation of the peace

[16]Mason, n.1, pp. 132.
[17]Pinto, n.2, pp. 220
[18]Ibid., pp. 220

treaties, and "land and territories (colonies) to feed our people and to settle our surplus population." "Only those of German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. Accordingly, no Jew may be a member of the nation."[19]In October 1933, he pulled Germany out of the League of Nations and denounced the disarmament negotiations that were then under way. By 1935, he began rearming Germany, contrary to the provisions of Versailles, and had introduced compulsory military service. The League censured Germany but took no other action. In 1936, Hitler moved German troops into the Rhineland (on Germany's western border), an area that had been permanently demilitarized by the Versailles Treaty. The same year, Hitler signed mutual defence and assistance treaties with both Mussolini's Italy (the Rome - Berlin axis) and with the military government in Japan. And during the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, when government forces were pitted against Francisco Franco's rebel fascists, Hitler and Mussolini cooperated in assisting Franco, providing a testing ground for their troops and weapons.[20]

The emergence of three distinct centres of powers within Germany: the state party monopoly, the centralised government dictatorship and the absolutism of the Fuhrer; undermined the unity of the government and the monopoly of government by Reich cabinet, making Hitler the most powerful dictator in Europe by 1938. The conservative constraints on his authority were removed by systematic elimination of the opposition and the territorial expansion of Germany had begun through Anchluss with Austria. Hitler's expansionist strategy that led to the Second World War continued even further than 1939 as a form of new imperialism, whose ideological and ethnic violence became particularly obvious. The anti-Semitism and racial nationalism had been central themes for the NSDAP's political program from the beginning; however it was in the context of war, and especially the invasion of the Soviet Union, that an ad-hoc means of annihilation became superseded by the systematically organised Holocaust.[21]

[19]Mann, n.5, pp.142
[20]Mason, n.1, pp.136
[21]Pinto, n.2, pp. 230

Anchluss

By 1938, Hitler was prepared to press his demands to bring all Germansinto the greater German Reich. In March, he marched Germantroops into Austria, announced the *Anschluss* (merger) of Austria withGermany. Even after this, neither theLeague nor the Western powers responded, in part due to a growing sentimentthat there was some justification to Germany's nationalist claims.The annexation of Austria had added about six million Germans to theReich.[22] The 12 March 1938 was not only the beginning of Nazi rule in Austria; it was also the end of a six-year struggle by a significant minority of Austrians to maintain Austrian independence against very considerable odds.

Up till 1918, Austria had been a part of larger Austro-Hungarian Empire, the division of territories after the World War I created a smaller and ethnically German Austria leading to what was viewed as an identity crisis amongst the majority of the population. The question of 'what type of nation-state would Austrian-Germans have' seemed to increase the existential crisis of Austria. There were two possible solutions: Austria itself – a second *Kleindeutsch*state – or *Anschluss*, union with neighboring Germany (the *Grossdeutsch*solution).

Austrians knew they could not restore empire themselves. Either Germans under the leadership of Germany could restore lost territories and dominion or they could recriminate against those "traitors" who had lost them. This movement called "Austro-fascism"wavered around the option of an independent but recriminating Austria. Austro-fascism emergedout of paramilitaries formed in the aftermath of World War I, then consolidatedinto the *Heimwehr*("Homeguard") rightist paramilitary of thelate 1920s and early 1930s, and out of the conservative Christian SocialParty, which won around 40 percent of the national vote in inter-warelections and headed all the elected governments. The new Republic of Austria had been reduced down to theEmpire's Catholic heartland, distinctively conservative, attached to hierarchyand order. Yet old regime conservatism was now widely consideredinsufficient. Fascism seemed to offer a more modern alternative.[23]

[22]Mason, n.1, pp. 136
[23]Mann, n.5, pp. 204

Vienna erupted into anti-Semitic violence after the Nazi take-over. Austria might seem the most fascist country in the interwar world, since it had two fascist movements (Austro-Fascism and Nazism), each with mass support, each able to seize power and to govern the country. Yet some of their success was due to Austria's position as a lesser Germanic power. The successes of Hitler were especially admired and emulated in Austria. Yet Austrians then contributed substantially to the German war effort and especially to the Final Solution, whose perpetrators were disproportionately Austrian. Austrian anti-Semitism was particularly brutal than Germans.[24]

During the first decade after 1945, the Moscow Declaration had a profound impact on Austria's post-war evolution. With a few short phrases, the 1943 Declaration committed the grand alliance to securing the re-establishment of a free and independent Austria. It described Hitler's 1938 annexation of Austria as an 'occupation' and named Austria as Hitler's 'first victim'. However the Allies also added that Austria would have to shoulder its share of responsibility for its participation in the war alongside Hitler's Germany.[25]

[1.2](c) Matrix of Extremist Ideology

Anti-Liberal

Fascists rejected conservative notions that the existing social order is essentially harmonious. They rejected liberal and social democratic notions that the conflict of interest groups is a normal feature of society. And they rejected leftist notions that harmony could be attained only by overthrowing capitalism. Fascists originated from the political right, centre, and left alike and drew support from all classes. They attacked capital and labour as well as the liberal democratic institutions supposedly exacerbating their strife. Fascist nation-statism would be able to "transcend" social conflict, first repressing those who fomented strife by "knocking both their heads together" and then incorporating classes and other interest groups into state corporatist institutions.[26]

[24]Ibid., pp. 207
[25]Pick, Hella (2000), *Guilty Victim: Austria from the Holocaust to Haider*, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd.), pp.17
[26]Mann, n.5, pp. 14

Fascism called for the regeneration of the national community through a heroic struggle against its alleged enemies and the forces undermining it involved the radical rejection of liberalism in all its aspects: pluralism, tolerance, individualism, gradualism, pacifism, parliamentary democracy, the separation of powers, the doctrine of 'natural rights', egalitarianism, the rectilinear theory of progress, the open society, cosmopolitanism, etc.[27]

Totalitarian/Authoritarian

This involved both goal and organisational form. Fascists worshiped state power. The authoritarian corporate state could supposedly solve crises and bring about social, economic, and moral development. Since the state represented a nation that was viewed as being essentially organic, it needed to be authoritarian, embodying a singular, cohesive will expressed by a party elite adhering to the "leadership principle."[28]

The concept of totalitarianism (or total political power) was first developed by Giovanni Amendola in 1923. He was a political opponent of Mussolini's Fascist Party and came to the conclusion that the Fascist regime was qualitatively different from other dictatorships. In fact, Mussolini took over Amendola's term in 1925, claiming that fascism was based on a 'fierce totalitarian will' and that all aspects of the state – its politics as well as its cultural and spiritual life – were now fully politicised. He stated that everything should be 'fascistised' in order to create a situation which could be described as 'Everything within the State. Nothing outside the State.Nothing against the State.'Since then, several historians have attempted to define 'totalitarianism' by identifying certain characteristics that are not usually features of authoritarian dictatorships. Overall, there are five main aspects which are said to be central to any totalitarian regime. These are as follows[29]:

i. A distinctive, 'utopian', all-embracing ideology which both dominates and attempts to restructure all aspects of society;

[27]Griffin, n.10, pp.4
[28]Ibid., pp. 14
[29]Todd, Alan (2002), The European Dictatorships: Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, (UK: Cambridge University Press), pp.13

ii. A political system headed by an all-powerful leader, around whom a deliberate cult of personality is created, and in which party, parliament and the state are under the control of the leader;

iii. The deliberate use of censorship and propaganda aimed at controlling all aspects of culture and at indoctrinating (and at times mobilising) all sections of society, especially the young;

iv. A systematic use of coercion and terror to ensure total compliance on the part of the people, with all decisions made by the leader and the regime;

v. The establishment of absolute state control and co-ordination of the economy, which is subordinated to the political objectives of the political regime.

Ultra-Nationalism

Fascists had a deep and populist commitment to an "organic" or "integral" nation, and this involved an unusually strong sense of its "enemies," both abroad and (especially) at home. Fascists had a very low tolerance of ethnic or cultural diversity, since this would subvert the organic, integral unity of the nation. Aggression against enemies supposedly threatening that organic unity is the original source of fascism's extremism. Racially tinged nationalism proved even more extreme, since race is an ascribed characteristic. We are born with it, and only our death or removal can eliminate it. Thus Nazi racial nationalism proved more obsessed with "purity" and proved more deadly than Italian cultural nationalism, which generally allowed those who showed the right values and conduct to join the nation.[30]

Fascism and Nazism resorted to every possible form of social engineering to weld the population into a homogeneous national community, the dedicated paramilitary forces and SS represented the totalitarian nationalism. This concept of nationalism was very much evident in Hitler's statement; 'For us the State is nothing but a form. Its substance or content is the essential thing. And that is the nation, the *Volk.* It is clear therefore that every other interest must be subordinated to the supreme interests of the nation'. In practise this meant that any alleged source of the decay to the German culture was to be

[30]Mann, n.5, pp.13

eliminated, initially through the denial of civil rights, and eventually through the systematic extermination of those deemed unfit or inferior. This came to be applied to Jews, Communists, Homosexuals, and all other enemies of German rebirth.[31]

Charismatic Leadership

The term 'charisma' was used by St. Paul to define the gift of divine grace which manifests themselves in forms such as prophecy and healing. Since the 20th century, this term has been used largely with reference to Max Weber. He used the term to focus on the emergence of exceptional and radical leaders in time of crisis. The charismatic personality refers to namely specific traits associated with exceptional leaders, and the causes of what can be termed as 'charismatic bond', i.e. the relationship between leader and followers which can be described as; 'compulsive, inexplicable emotional tie linking a group of followers together in adulation of their leader'.[32]

Leaders like Hitler and Mussolini have often been portrayed as charismatic leaders by a lot of scholars. Roger Eatwell points to the fact that the concept of charisma relates more to policy during the fascist regime. By the late 1920s, Italian Fascist intellectuals were specifically citing Weber in their attempt to bestow special powers upon Mussolini. There also developed in the inter-war period significant cults of personality around dynamic personalities like Hitler and Mussolini. The emergence of an intensely emotional bond with a leader plays part in explaining mass support for European 'fascist' movement of regimes during 1919-45. These leader were able to attract hard-core supporters, both in inner-court and locally, who held the belief that the leader was driven by a special mission/ or the leader was vested with special powers. This accorded these leaders with considerable power and loyalty that ultimately led to the personalisation of politics and hence to the personification of the party and the regime.[33]

[31]Eatwell, Roger and Wright, Anthony (eds) (1994), *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, (London: Pinter Publishers), pp.181
[32]Eatwell Roger, 'The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership', in Pinto, Antonio Costa, Eatwell, Roger and Larsen, Stein Ugelvik (eds.) (2007), *Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe,* (London: Routledge), pp.4.
[33]Ibid., pp. 5

[1.3] Marginalisation

The full extent of Nazi policy to exterminate the Jews became public and clear when the allied forces liberated Nazi controlled areas and stumbled upon concentration camps of Dachau and Buchenwald and gas-chambers in death camps in Auschwitz. The anti-Semitism of Hitler and the Nazi was perfectly clear from the beginning and was vividly displayed in *Mein Kampf*, in which he systematically demeans Jews and refers to them as un-German and subhuman. At first, though, the policy of Hitler's Nazi government was to encourage or intimidate Germany's six hundred thousand Jews to leave the country, rather than to kill them. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws identified Jews as subjects but not citizens, banned them from the professions, and placed restrictions on intermarriage and sexual relations between Jews and non-Jews. Official anti-Semitism became violent in November 1938, with *Kristallnacht*(the night of broken glass), when Nazi storm troopers looted and smashed Jewish shops and synagogues, and rounded up tens of thousands to be sent to concentration camps. After this, a campaign of threats and intimidation was carried out to force Jewish emigration. The actual slaughter of the Jews, what was later to become known as the Holocaust, began with the mass killings of Jews in German-occupied Soviet territory in 1941. About the same time, Nazi leadership decided that the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" was to take the form of annihilation.[34] Over the next three years, some six million Jews were killed in these camps, including almost all of Poland's three million Jews and perhaps two-thirds of all the Jews in Europe.

The losses of World War II were far worse: in Europe alone, there were probably fifteen million military casualties and almost twice that many civilian deaths. The numbers were so huge in part because this was the first war in which civilians were deliberately and systematically targeted - from the German aerial attacks on London and Coventry, to the Allied firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo, to the Nazis' systematic "liquidation" of Warsaw in 1944, to the nuclear incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With the war years, much of Europe seemed to have reversed course from the steady evolution that had begun at the end of the eighteenth century. The totalitarian regimes of Hitler, Stalin, and

[34]Mason, n.1, pp. 140

Mussolini rejected the notions of individualism, natural rights, and common humanity that had derived from the Enlightenment. But with the deaths of Hitler and Mussolini in 1945, and of Stalin in 1953, totalitarianism was no longer a force in Europe. At the Allied trials of Nazi leaders held at Nuremberg after the war, the policy of genocide was defined as a "crime against humanity," thus re-establishing a sense of common values and morality. The end of the war represented a major geopolitical shift in both Europe and the world, with the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant powers. As a result of the end-of-war military operations, the Soviet Union ended up occupying eastern Germany and most of Eastern Europe. U.S. forces, having moved toward Germany from the south (North Africa, then Italy) and the west (Normandy) controlled western Germany and most of Western Europe. This division of Germany along with the rest of Europe signalled the beginning of the Cold War and the marginalisation of the right-wing politics in Europe.

In the post-World War II period, support for the right-wing parties was marginal. Even if these parties existed within the countries, they were totally delegitimised and out of political arena. Despite being marginalised they manifested themselves in 1980s in a pattern that the study and the research on the study of right-wing parties received attention. The re-emergence of right-wing parties in Europe led to growing concerns over their long-term impact on the established political systems, as these parties had not only gained electoral support or political representation but rather through this had systematically gained political legitimisation that had been denied to them since the end of the Great War.

[1.4] Conclusion

The rise of German National Socialism and Italian fascism were the most significant developments in the European history of 1930s. However, the successes of Mussolini and Hitler were not easily replicated in rest of the continent. The fascist movement were crucial actors in the democratic crises of the inter-war period, even though many movements failed to have lasting effects. Some transitions to authoritarianism involved ruptures with democracy that were violent (Salazar in Portugal), while others featured a

more legitimate assumption of power (Hitler in Germany or Mussolini in Italy).Italian Fascism and German National Socialism represented attempts to create a new set of political and para-state institutions, along with charismatic leadership and a 'totalitarian tension' that were in one form or another present in other dictatorships of the period. After taking power, both the National Socialist and Fascist Party became powerful instruments of a new order, agents of a 'parallel administration': transformed into single parties they flourished as breeding-grounds for a new political elite and as agents for a new mediation between the state and civil society, creating tensions between the single party, the government and the state apparatus in the process. These tensions were also a consequence of the emergence of new centres of political decision-making that transferred power from the government and the ministerial elite and concentrated it into the hands of Mussolini and Hitler.[35]

However, despite these two regimes seems to be the most important developments of the twentieth century, there are certain inherent differences between Fascism and Nazism. Fascism, unlike Nazism was not premised on biological racism; the role of political parties was less important in Fascism; though highly statist, Fascist Italy exerted less 'totalitarian' social control as compared to Nazism. Many scholars view fascism as more revolutionary than reactionary. Scholars like Zeev Sternhell[36], viewed Fascism as a product of synthesis of radical socialism and nationalism in order to achieve renewal and the birth of a new world. The idea of rebirth was also elaborated by Roger Griffins[37], for him fascism represented 'palingenetic' (reborn) form of populist ultra-nationalism.

The closure of World War constituted a watershed moment which decided the fortunes of the right-wing in Western Europe. After 1945, with the defeat of fascism and the victory of the liberal democracy, increasingly stable political structures and electoral systems developed across Western Europe. In emerging post-war order, right-wing parties did not totally disappear, but the broad picture was one of marginalisation. Anti-fascist victory,

[35]Pinto, Antonio Costa (2011), *Ruling Elites, Political Institutions and Decision-Making in Fascist-Era Dictatorships: Comparative Perspectives*, in Antonio Costa Pinto (ed.), *Rethinking of Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspective*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan), pp.199.
[36]Sternhell, Zeev, Sznajder, Mario And Asheri, Maia (Translated By David Maisel) (1994), *The Birth Of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion To Political Revolution*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), pp.4
[37]Griffin, n.10, pp.4

economic growth, lower unemployment rates and the discrediting of pseudo-scientific racism all mitigated against the emergence and success of right-wing parties. The neo-fascist parties were weak all over Europe; it found very limited audience and were relegated to the status of marginal fringe. The exclusion from mainstream politics and the limited, and even declining electoral and organisational strength offered a very gloomy picture for the right-wing parties.[38]

[38]Ignazi, Piero(2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,* (USA: Oxford University Press), pp.1.

Chapter 2
Rise of Right-Wing Politics in Post-Cold War Period in Europe

For much of the 20th Century, history was characterised by the clash of great ideologies, internal violence and major wars. Two World Wars and a series of conflicts led to countless horrors. For a long period Western Democracy seemed in danger of being eclipsed by a series of radical forces, most notably the fascist and the communist. However, the main manifestation of fascism went down following a catastrophic defeat in the Second World War. Thereafter overtly neo-fascist parties were marginalised by the omnipresent images of brutality and genocide. They exerted little appeal outside a fringe of ageing nostalgics and alienated youths. By the 1990s, liberal democracy appeared destined to become the universal norm. Soviet communism had collapsed, to be replaced in most successor states by multi-party electoral politics.[1]

However, the most significant development of past two decades in European politics has been the transformation of right-wing parties from the margins to the mainstream. In Western Europe, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland have strong right-wing parties that not only influenced their national governments by forming governing coalitions, but even when they were not, these parties directly or indirectly reshaped their countries' foreign and national policies. Right-wing parties across Europe are enjoying success at the polls due to a crisis of confidence in how contemporary politics is being shaped by the establishment. Across most European countries, citizens are facing insecurities from terrorism, organised crime, uncontrolled immigration, European integration and economic fears about globalisation. Supporters of Western European right-wing parties feel that the current governments in place are not doing enough to counter these perceived threats.

The diversity of these countries, their relative affluence and political stability, suggests that re-emergence of right-wing politics is a complex phenomenon; hence, it cannot be easily reduced to a simple resurgence of the Fascist or Nazi tendencies of the past. This is a new phenomenon, arising out of a new context in a reaction to the prevailing fears. With the global integration rushing forward, their strident nationalism stands in opposition to the prevailing world economy and supranational bodies like the EU. It is

[1]Eatwell, Roger and Mudde, Cas (eds.) (2004), *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge*, (Oxon: Routledge), pp.1.

prompted as much by fear of change and a fear of the future as by relative economic disadvantage. Its populism often finds a traditional scapegoat in immigrants, and in many cases its anti-immigrant message covers an underlying anti-Semitism drawing upon age old prejudices[2].

Since the early 1980s, new kind of right-wing parties with an anti-establishment stance, an agenda of protest and a charismatic leader have been able to attain electoral success at a national level. Despite their widespread appeal, right-wing parties rarely succeed in coming into government, and even if they actually manage it, they predominantly function only as junior partners or, as supporters of a minority government. Therefore, this chapter tries to understand the re-emergence of right-wing parties in Europe focusing on questions like: how are the contemporary right-wing parties different from pre-Second World War parties? How is right-wing politics defined? What were the reasons that led to the re-emergence of right-wing politics? What are the key issues raised by these parties? To answer these questions the chapter is divided into three broad sections which deal with re-emergence of right-wing politics. In the first section various aspects of understanding of right-wing like defining and classification of right-wing parties, party ideologies etc. are analysed. The second section deals with the explanation of various reasons for the rise of right-wing parties in Europe. The third section deals with the electoral politics and issues raised by these parties.

[2.1] Re-Emergence of Right-Wing Politics

Since the late 1980s, a growing number of European democracies have witnessed the re-emergence of right-wing parties and movements. Although many of these parties have not been able to assume a position of importance, there are some parties which have been able to provide competition to the mainstream parties. Hence, it becomes important to understand, firstly, how these parties are different from the inter-war period parties. Second, how they have defined and classifies themselves, have they used the rhetoric of past or have created new identities for themselves. Third, what ideology these parties have adhered to.

[2]Marcus, Jonathan (2000), Exorcising Europe's Demons: A Far-Right Resurgence?,*The Washington Quarterly*, 23(4), pp. 31-40.

[2.1](a) Distinguishing Present from the Past

Since the end of Second World War to the rise of the contemporary right-wing parties, the comparison and contrasting of the past phenomenon to the present have been done by many scholars. In the 1940s and 1950s, any party with inclination towards nationalism or extreme nationalists groups was termed as neo-fascist/neo-nazist, whether they owed their allegiance to the past or not. Even today, news of violent acts or electoral successes of radical right organisations in Europe raise the spectre of fascism in the minds of observers[3].

Several characteristics distinguish these parties and movements from the more traditional parties: reliance on charismatic leadership, and centralised and hierarchical party structure; the scrupulous pursuit of a populist strategy of political marketing; and, perhaps most importantly, a style of political mobilisation that appeals primarily to popular anxieties, prejudices and resentments, particularly against the political establishment. Ideologically, these parties and movements espouse a political doctrine of exclusionary populism. Their principal characteristic is a restrictive notion of citizenship, which holds that genuine democracy is based on a culturally, if not ethnically, homogeneous community; that only long-standing citizens are full members of civil society; and that society's benefits should accrue only to those members of society who, either as citizens, or at least as taxpayers, have made a substantial contribution to society. The spirit of this doctrine is reflected in the notion of "their own people first" and the call for "national preference", which are core demands of right-wing populist parties in the current debate on immigration in Western Europe. In recent years, exclusionary populism has gone beyond xenophobia, turning into a new form of cultural nativism, which seeks to distance itself from and disavow traditional forms of racism. The new populist cultural nativism, rather than promoting notions of ethno-cultural superiority, aims at protecting its own "indigenous" society, culture and way of life against what is seen as alien intrusion,

[3]Prowe, Diethelm (1994), 'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts, *Contemporary European History*, 3(3), Theme Issue: Race and Violence in Germany- and Europe, pp. 289-313.

contamination and subversion, whether under the guise of American popular culture or Islamic religious practices and religiously inspired lifestyle[4].

The contemporary right-wing, unlike the parties of post-war period, is no longer a fringe movement. It is true that some of the parties have not been able to leave a mark on the national and European politics but then there are those that have assumed the position of significance at the local, national and European levels much to the chagrin of the mainstream parties.

[2.1](b) Defining and ClassifyingRight-Wing

During the 1980s and 1990s in countries across the Europe, new protest movements and radical political organisations emerged to challenge traditional parties, ruling elites, and professional politicians, and even long-standing social norms. The end of the Cold War, particularly in Europe, witnessed a surge of popular movements and political parties opposed to what the discontented perceived as the corruption and deceitfulness of the political classesand their corporate patrons. Some protest movements promoted more democracy, pluralism, and economic opportunity; some expressed intolerance, bigotry, and xenophobic nationalism.

Since the late 1980s, with the rise of right-wing parties in France, Italy, Austria, and other European countries, a flood of books, anthologies, and journal articles has raised an alarm regarding the dangers posed by right-wing populism. In these works, "the radical right," "the extreme right," "the populist right" and "the far right" are all regarded as popular archetypes. Since most of these right-wing parties direct resentment not only against established parties and business elites but also against an influx of new immigrants and refugees, many scholars are quick to label them racist.[5]

By the way of understanding, it is useful to say that the variety of names have been adopted for the right-wing politics. What exactly constitutes the right-wing is rather

[4]Betz, Hans-Georg (2004), *Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe in the 1990s and Beyond: A Threat to Democracy and Civil Right?*, Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper No. 9, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
[5]Formisano, Ronald (2005), Interpreting Right-Wing or Reactionary Neo-Populism: A Critique, *Journal of Policy History*, 17(2), pp. 241-255.

difficult to pin down. According to Hainsworth[6]- although the term "right-wing extremism" is today quite current in the social and political jargon, there is no unequivocal definition. Others have pointed to the overlap between the extreme right and right-wing as a potential source of confusion. To some extent, this overlap has been accentuated by the evolution of the extreme right in recent years and the formation in Europe of coalition governments that includes extreme right parties. Others have pointed to the non-parliamentary forces and, at times, violent movements as constituting a specific case of extreme rightism. When there is overlap on the far right between electoral-focused organisation and violent, non-parliamentary movements, again there is a scope of confusion.

Fascism-Nazism/Neo-Fascism-Neo-Nazism

One approach is to place the most recent emergence of right-wing parties within the historical context of fascism insofar as social scientists contend that new right parties represent a reincarnation of the old fascist parties. The first self-styled fascist movement was set up by Benito Mussolini in 1919, the term deriving from the Italian word, '*fasci*', meaning leagues or unions in political context. Fascist and Nazi are the common epithet among the journalists for parties displaying authoritarian behaviour. Some academics on the left, are also willing to identify widespread forms of contemporary fascism as a form of 'capitalist' politics that deludes ordinary people about their true interests, and/or which appeals particularly to the 'petit bourgeoisie' which lacks a broad class and party home.[7]

Fascism has been identified with the quest for the rebirth of 'ultra-nationalism' after a period of decadence[8], or the quest to forge a 'holistic nation' and pursue a 'third way' (neither capitalist nor socialist) political economy[9]. Most political scientists use terms 'fascism' in contemporary context within a rigid inter-war template. Sometimes the point of contact is essentially stylistic- for example, the wearing of fascist style uniforms or insignia. Common ideological parallels include current groups that more or less openly

[6]Hainsworth, Paul (2008), The Extreme Right in Western Europe, (Oxon: Routledge), pp.8.
[7]Joes, Anthony James, (1974) Fascism: The Past and the Future, *Comparative Political Studies,* 7(1), pp. 107-133.
[8] Griffin, Roger (ed.) (1995), *Fascism,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.4.
[9]Eatwell, Roger (1992), Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism, *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 4(2), pp. 161-194.

support violence, which are critical of liberal democracy, and which advocate statist economics. On the other hand, Nazism is used for the groups that overtly link themselves with the German model and are highly anti-Semitic.[10]The terms Fascism and Nazism and then 'neo-Fascism' and 'neo-Nazism', were the language of political and historical researchers until 1960s. As PieroIgnazi[11]observes 'Until the 1980s the term right-wing was synonymous with that of neo-fascism'.

The 1980s was the watershed decade for right-wing as new parties emerged, older ones innovated themselves in their appeals and ideas. Treating the parties' like- the *Freedom Party*, *National Front*, the *SchweizerischeVolkspartei*, the *Republikaner*, the *Danish People's Party* and the *Lega Nord* as neo-fascist parties is problematic on several accounts. From a structural perspective, fascism arose within a specific economic, political, social and institutional context. Although there is still considerable debate over fascism, it is important to emphasise several determining factors: fascism emerged within societies that were either moving from agrarian to industrialised economies (Italy) or within newly industrialised economies (Germany). Socio-economic tensions resulting from divisions caused by large-scale mass production created the structural context from which fascism emerged; in pre-Second World War Europe, liberal democratic parliamentary institutions were not fully institutionalised; this was a period of economic crisis; there were intense political, social and ideological tensions between political parties and political movements (communists, socialists, anarchists, conservatives, monarchists, Catholics and liberals); and Europe had just emerged from a devastating war.[12] Furthermore, fascist movements shared certain common ideological and organisational traits. First, they opposed parliamentary democracy, the liberal democratic state, liberalism, socialism and cosmopolitanism. Second, there was a search for national unity and the construction and protection of an authentic and pure national culture. This was achieved through mobilization of the state to fight against internal and external enemies and through the use of empire or national expansion. Third, fascist political parties supported a state-regulated economy, whether capitalist or socialist. Fourth, the

[10]Eatwelland Mudde, n.1, pp. 6
[11]Ignazi, Piero, (2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, (USA: Oxford University Press), pp.1.
[12]Zaslove, Andrej (2004), The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right, *Journal of European Integration*, 26(1), pp. 61-81.

fascist political party was constructed around a -charismatic leader, mass organisations, close alliances with paramilitary organisations, and violence against political opponents[13].

Unlike fascist parties, the contemporary right-wing does not contend that a corporatist state should protect national and local culture through state-sponsored programmes. Instead, the nationalism of the current right-wing parties is based upon the notion that the 'authentic civil society' must free itself from the bureaucratic state, from the hegemony of American culture, and from the invasion of immigrants and the construction of a multicultural society. Unlike the corporatist ideology of the fascist parties, these new right-wing political parties support free-market economies. There is no question that this support of a market-based economy is tempered by a populist attack on globalisation and the need to use the state to protect the identity, the economy and the social well-being of the native and local citizens. But centralisation of state power is generally frowned upon.

However, the question still remains on the nature of fascism and how far this rhetoric is seen in the present day right wing parties. Parties like Italian Social Movement (MSI) and Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) are viewed as neo-fascist and neo-nazist parties respectively. Both of the parties have exhibited the nostalgia for past, and have developed from a band of former fascists and Nazis, to liberal centre party to being the part of the government coalition. These parties have re-invented themselves and adopted winning formulas based on populist and economic arguments against the presence of immigrants. These parties might have attained acceptability, support and reference to their fascist and nazist past is sometimes more pronounced, but they do not seek to revive the palingenetic myth of fascism[14], but they strive to respond to the needs and demands of post-industrial society.

Hence, it could be concluded that fascism and present day right-wing politics occur in different political, economic and cultural circumstances. Consequently, and perhaps most importantly, the ideology and actions of these two political movements also vary.

[13]Karapin, Roger (1998), Radical-Right and Neo-Fascist Political Parties in Western Europe, *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), pp. 213-234.
[14]Griffin, n.8, pp.2, Hainsworth, n.6, pp.16

Extreme Right

BerntHagtvet[15]explains thatthe extreme right-wing movements in contemporary European politics share several traits with the fascist movements which appeared in Italy and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. First, these movements reject existing forms of representative government and the liberal, democratic values which inform them. Right-wing movements attack the extant division of power of government. They ridicule liberal freedoms. They reject minority rights and due process of law. These movements display attitudes which deny egalitarian values and which oppose political and cultural pluralism. Second, they are populist in the sense that they criticise the activities of elites - economic, political or cultural - while emphasising ordinary people's untrammelled right to determine the content of politics. Third, right-wing politics are nationalist. Right-wing groups tend to perceive nations as unequal; they rank nations by worth, placing their own on top. They insist on the excellence of their own nation; they emphasise its history as particularly glorious; they include allusions to its past in their political discourse. Today's right-wing movements display several parallels to the fascist movements which appeared in Italy and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. All the groups are populist and patriotic[16] in nature. All the movements are authoritarian and violent in their practice. They all advocate the pre-eminence of their own nation, and the repression of weaker actors.

[15]Hagtvet, Bernt (1994), Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, *Journal of Peace Research*, 31(3), pp. 241-246.
[16]**Nationalism versus Patriotism Debate**: Discussions of both patriotism and nationalism are often marred by lack of clarity due to the failure to distinguish between the two. Most of the times these terms have been used interchangeably. George Orwell contrasted the two in terms of aggressive vs. defensive attitudes. Nationalism is about power: its adherent wants to acquire as much power and prestige as possible for his nation, in which he submerges his individuality. While nationalism is accordingly aggressive, patriotism is defensive: it is a devotion to a particular place and a way of life one thinks best, but has no wish to impose on others. Both patriotism and nationalism involve love of, identification with, and special concern for a certain entity. In the case of patriotism, that entity is one's *patria*, one's country; in the case of nationalism, that entity is one's *natio*, one's nation (in the ethnic/cultural sense of the term). Thus patriotism and nationalism are understood as the same type of set of beliefs and attitudes, and distinguished in terms of their objects, rather than the strength of those beliefs and attitudes. Patriotism and nationalism are distinguished in terms of the strength of the love and special concern one feels for it, the degree of one's identification with it. When these are exhibited in a reasonable degree and without ill thoughts about others and hostile actions towards them, that is patriotism; when they become unbridled and cause one to think ill of others and act badly towards them, that is nationalism. (George Orwell: Notes on Nationalism, http://orwell.ru/library/essays/nationalism/english/e_nat; Patriotism, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/patriotism/)

The emergence and re-emergence of extreme right parties in Europe raised the question in collective memory and its role in history, its meaning in current society and its possible manipulation in politics. The distinctiveness of extreme right parties is based not just on the intensity of their neoconservative approach. They are distinct because they endanger the legitimacy of the system. The adoption of a more radical version of neo-conservative values by these parties is intended to undermine the foundation of the system by delegitimising the parties and the party system, the parliamentary procedure, the principle of equality, and, sometimes, even the rule of law.Parties that are successful today represent a new breed of right-wing extremism, inthe sense that they have little if no affiliation to inter-war Nazism and fascism.The successful parties of this family are the ones thathave been able to modernise and offer a mix of ultra-liberalism, xenophobia,authoritarianism, a social affairs' discourse, and the acceptance of democracy[17].

Hainsworth[18]also argues that today's extreme right is verymuch the product of contemporary developments, and not a return to a fascist andNazi past. Ignazi[19] considers far-right parties' emergence to be a response tothe post-industrial area and the new postmodern values it has created. This 'newbreed' of right-wing extremism has some particular attributes as well as amodernised discourse. It is characterised by a constantly changing, issue-orientedpolitical strategy "that combines verbal radicalism and symbolic politics with thetools of contemporary political marketing to disseminate their ideas among theelectorate".

The classification and descriptive complexity also derives from the dynamic natureof political parties. Parties are not static: they develop and may discard issues (e.g.the centrality of immigration policies) in favour of others, as a result of thechanging social base of their electorate. To deal with this, theextreme right is defined as a *political family*, whose members share commoncharacteristics but also feature differences that classify them into subtypes, such as'modern', and 'post-industrial' extreme right parties, or 'old'

[17]Mudde, Cas (2000), *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*, (UK: Manchester University Press), pp.5.
[18]Hainsworth, n.6, pp.25
[19]Ignazi, Piero (1996), The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties, *Party Politics*, 2(4), pp. 549-566.

and 'traditional'parties[20]. This broad qualification acknowledgesthe specific and particular nature of the different political parties within thebroader extreme right-wing movement.

Radical Right/Populist/Neo-Populist

CasMudde defines this group of parties as sharing a core ideology that includes a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. By nativism, it meant a xenophobic form of nationalism in which a mono-cultural nation-state is the ideal and all non-natives are perceived as a threat to the nation. Authoritarianism entails a strict belief in order and its stringent enforcement within society through discipline, law and order-based policies.Finally, populism is defined as a thin ideology that considers society to be essentially divided between two antagonistic and homogeneous groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and wants politics to reflect the general will of the people. The combination of all three of these features defines the populist radical right party family.[21]

These parties derived much of their appeal from their ability to market themselves as the advocate of the common people. They are considered more successful because they have portrayed themselves as trustworthy representatives of their nation and people, as a better alternative to the corrupt; power-clinging elites; and out-of-touch mainstream political parties. At least three developments[22] account for the rapid diffusion and increasing acceptance of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. Western Europe is in the midst of a political revolution, which appears to have caught the established political parties largely unprepared. Having provoked voter disenchantment in large part themselves, the established political parties have lost much of the public's confidence in their capability and willingness to execute genuine reforms. This voter disenchantment stems from the established parties' inability to respond to the consequences of the profound socio-economic and socio-cultural transformation inWestern Europe. This transformation is perhaps best characterised as a transition from industrial welfare

[20]Mudde, n.17, pp. 15
[21]Mudde, Cas (2014), Fighting the system? Populist radical right parties and party system change, 20(2), pp. 217-226.
[22]Betz, Hans-Georg (1993), The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, *The Review of Politics*, 55(4), pp. 663-685.

capitalism to post-industrial individualised capitalism. The ensuing acceleration of individualisation and social fragmentation has provoked a wave of individual, regional, and national egoism, reflected in the political discourse of radical right-wing populist parties.

Radical right-wing populist parties are radical in their rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system and their advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state. They are right-wing in their rejection of individual and social equality, in their opposition to the social integration of marginalised groups, and in their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism. They are populist in their instrumentalisation of sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense. In short, they tend to combine a classic liberal position on the individual and the economy with the socio-political agenda of the extreme and intellectual new right, and they deliver this amalgam to those disenchanted with their individual life chances and the political system.[23]

Taking advantage of a socio-political climate of anxiety and resentment, these parties present themselves as "catch-all parties of protest." However, their political programs show marked differences both in terms of political objectives and demands, whereas some parties pursue a predominantly neo-liberal strategy, others pursue a primarily nationalist-authoritarian one. A radical right-wing populist party's choice of strategy depends crucially on which social groups it is able to attract. That, in turn, depends in large part on the response of the established parties to the challenge posed by the transition to individualised post-industrial capitalism.

The new populist interpretation argues, that the fragmentation of classes and pressures on the welfare state open up space for new populist parties to mobilise voters who are dissatisfied with economic and political developments. New populist parties are able to create coalitions between blue-collar workers and small business and medium-sized business owners around anti-tax, neo-liberal productivist, anti-welfare, anti-immigrant,

[23]Ibid.,pp. 663-685.

and law-and-order issues. The populist approach argues that new populist parties' success comes from the parties' organisational structures and their style of politics. Charismatic leaders employ populist themes to mobilise voters around political, economic, cultural and social issues that they claim represent the common sense of the silent majority. These leaders speak out against corruption, entrenched political parties, bureaucracies and corporate economic interests. Essential for the success of these parties is their ability to form broad coalitions on a variety of issues. Successful new populist parties are able to emphasise seemingly contradictory policies, to represent complex problems in common-sense language, and to change issues when necessary. The top-down hierarchical structure of these parties gives almost total control to the charismatic leader[24].

In recent years radical right-wing populist parties have made significant political gains in Scandinavia (the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties and the Swedish New Democracy party), Austria (the Freedom party), Germany (the Republikaner), and Switzerland (the Automobile party and the Tessin League), in Belgium (the Flemish Block) and France (the National Front), as well as in Italy (the Lombard /Northern League). Radical right-wing populist parties tend to distinguish themselves by their radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system, their pronounced advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and drastic restrictions of the role of the state; their rejection of individual and social equality, their opposition to the social integration of marginalised groups and the extension of democratic rights to them, and their promotion of xenophobia, if not overt racism; their populist instrumentalisation of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety, envy, resentment, and disenchantment, and their appeal to the allegedly superior common sense of the common people against the dominant cultural and political consensus.[25]

The ideology and platforms of parties such as the Freedom Party, the National Front, the Progress parties, the Danish People's Party and the *Lega Nord* unify these political parties under a common roof. Their political ideology addresses common economic, social and political themes. They support free-market economic reforms while opposing

[24]Zaslove, n.12, pp. 61-81
[25]Betz, n.22, pp. 663-685

globalisation. They attack the bureaucratic state and the European Union while they argue for the defence of local, regional and national cultures. Populism is another crucial element of the current radical right. It makes no sense to merely refer to the Freedom Party and the *Lega* as 'populist' and to French National Front as 'radical right' given that the French National Front, the Freedom Party and the *Lega Nord,*as well as the *SchweizerischeVolkspartei*, the Progress parties, *Lijst Fortuyn*, the *RepublikanerParty* and the Danish People's Party, all possess populist characteristics: charismatic leaders, a populist discourse, populist mobilisation tactics and similar populist hierarchical party organisations[26].

A diverse picture emerges when one tries to label or define parties under the label of 'right-wing'. The historical roots ofthese parties are by all means manifold, there is hardly a uniform account of the social and organizational re-emergenceof the right-wing: some parties, for example the Danish Progress Party or theDeutsche Volksunion (German People Union, DVU) in Germany, were distinct foundations, others – most notably the FPÖ and the SVP - transformed themselves into this party type. Some right-wing parties originated from party splitsfrom other radical right or conservative parties, namely the FPÖ andBundnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ); DanskeFolkeparti (Denmark), whereas others arethe result of party mergers, for example VB or LN. Also, the wider ideological backgrounds of the parties in question are far from similar:The SVP, for instance, was (and in some cantons still is) a national-conservative partywith an agrarian background. The Austrian FPÖ moved 'away fromliberalism' into the radical right spectrum, thus shifting its voter basefrom anti-clerical and German-nationalist civil servants and professionals to young blue-collar workers. In Italy, the MSI (later AN) had its roots inthe country's fascist heritage, while the Northern League started out as a regionalistmovement and only later adopted radical right-wing stances.[27]

Hence, it can be pointed out that there are no set yardsticks to define the right-wing parties as there are always problems involved in using terms such as "extreme right", "populist" or "radical", because it raises issues concerning to what extent can they be

[26]Zaslove, n. 12, pp. 61-81
[27]Ennser, Laurenz (2012), The homogeneity of West European party families: The radical right in comparative perspective, *Party Politics*, 18(2), pp. 151–171.

applied to the contemporary movements. It is true that there are certain right-wing movements that are unquestionably extreme. However, most do not espouse violence and many do not seek to over throw any kind of liberal democracy. Moreover, it is important to note that some of the questions raised by these groups relate to the problems within the liberal democracy. These parties may often be defined in the terms of opposition to, or at least fundamentally critical of, liberal democracy, it is important to remember that existing democracies are in many ways flawed. Even in its own terms, liberal democracies has many problems – including growing powers of multinational corporations, of mass media, of national and international bureaucracies[28]. These parties have presented themselves as an alternative to everything that is wrong with the contemporary democracies.

The reason of the rise of right-wing politics is multi-faceted, the emergence of new unaccounted issues to the crisis of representation, from the emergence of the charismatic leaderships to growing personalisation of politics, from increasing political and societal alienation and the dissatisfaction for traditional features of political system and for politics as such. The right-wing parties of the 1980s, in fact, are no longer neo-fascist parties. On the other hand, they are perceived as the extreme-right parties because they occupy they occupy the right-most position in the political spectrum. It is true, that these parties are anti-system, anti-political establishment as they undermine the system's legitimacy through their discourses and actions. They are opposed to the ideas of parliamentary representation and partisan conflicts, hence they argue for the corporatist or direct and personalistic mechanism of representation. They are against the idea of pluralism because it endangers societal harmony; they are against the universal idea of equality as rights should be allotted on the basis of race, language, and ethnicity. Finally, they are to an extent, authoritarian because they conceive supra-individual and collective authority of State, Nation and Community, as more important than individual[29]. All these elements basically put these parties in conflict with the basic principles of contemporary liberal democracy.Many of these parties stand out from the mainstream party system in

[28]Eatwell and Mudde, n.1, pp.14
[29]Ignazi, n.11, pp.2

terms of their discourse and the manner in which deal with issues, such as immigration, identity, security, culture and nation that helps to locate the right-wing.

Due to plethora of terms and definition for the right-wing parties and politics, understanding what exactly constitutes right-wing parties becomes difficult. However, the understanding in this study would be based on CasMudde's[30] delineation of five common features or the basic traits for all the right-wing parties- nationalism; racism; xenophobia; anti-democracy; and a strong state. Also, for the sake of generalisation in this study, these parties would be referred as the "Right-Wing Parties" because there is no definite yardstick for pinpointing extreme-right or populist right.

[2.1] (c) Party Ideology

Over the past two decades, numerous countries in Europe have witnessed the rise of political movements and parties that can be placed under the broad rubric of 'the new extreme right.' This phenomenon aroused the interest of researchers, who aimed to ascertain both its characteristics and the underlying causes. In fact, during the 1990s, several scholars tried to define the new extreme right and its ideological boundaries. At the same time, others were trying to formulate theoretical frameworks and models that could predict the conditions enabling the rise of movements, and particularly parties, which represent this ideology[31].

The classic approaches to right-wing parties have analysed the question of their relationship to European democratic political systems in four ways[32]- by considering them as a danger to democracy; second, by examining the response of the democratic regimes to the challenge posed by the right-wing parties; third, by evaluating the impact of these parties on political system; and fourth, by interpreting the phenomena's emergence in Europe as a consequence of factors such as transformation or the crisis of

[30]Mudde, n.17, pp.11

[31]Pedahzur, Ami and Canetti-Nisim, Dapna (2004), Support for Right-Wing Extremist Ideology: Socio-Economic Indicators and Socio-Psychological Mechanisms of Social Identification, *Comparative Sociology,* 3(1), pp.1-36.

[32]Deze, Alexandre (2004), Between adaptation, differentiation and distinction: Extreme right-wing parties and democratic political systems in Roger Eatwell, and Cas Mudde (eds.), *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge,* (Oxon: Routledge), pp.19.

West European party system. Some of these parties are now considered to be legitimate part of the political arena, this especially holds true for Belgium, Italy, Austria and France. Although based on ideology whose roots are in contradiction to the essential liberal democratic principles, such parties have nonetheless tried to win power through proper constitutional means.

The question of ideology for the right-wing party is closely related to the question of what one means by the term right-wing. Almost every scholar in the field has pointed to the lack of a generally accepted definition, hence lack of general ideology. Even though the term right-wing itself is accepted by a majority of the scholars, there is no consensus on the exact definition of the term. A variety of authors have defined it in a variety of ways.

Notwithstanding these political disputes, there is a rather broad consensus in the field that the term right-wing politics describes primarily an ideology in one form or another. What this ideology holds, again, is a matter of extensive scholarly debate. Some scholars define right-wing extremism on the basis of only one single feature, for example, some use right-wing politics as a collective term for all 'progress-hostile forces'. There are some major objections to this restricted though at the same time broad usage. The most important objection is that it portrays right-wing parties falsely as (primarily) single-issue movements, thereby obscuring other (sometimes more) important features of their ideologies[33]. Most of the authors involved, define right-wing politics as a political ideology that is constituted of a combination of several different features. The number of features mentioned in the various definitions varies from one or two to more than ten. Examples of short definitions are from Macridis[34], who defines right-wing extremism as an 'ideology [that] revolves around the same old staples: racism, xenophobia, and nationalism'. The absence of an agreed-upon definition of right-wing means that scholars continue to disagree over which attributes a party should possess to be called right-wing party. As Hainsworth[35] argues, 'essentialists categorisations of the extreme right [are]

[33]Mudde, Cas (1999), The single-issue party thesis: extreme right parties and the immigration issue, *West European Politics*, 22(3), pp.182–97.
[34]Mudde, n.18, pp.10
[35]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 23

fraught with problems' and it is thus, 'not easy to provide neat, self-contained and irrefutable models of extremism which might successfully accommodate or disqualify each concrete example or candidate deemed to belong to this party family'. Despite the problems of typology and definition, a consensus does emerge that right-wing refers to a particular form of ideology. Many scholars have pointed to a certain type of political style, behaviour, strategy or organisation, or a certain electoral base as constituting facets of right-wing[36]. These must be considered additional or secondary dimensions of the concept rather than defining features, and also part of the defining ideology.

In twenty-six definitions of right-wing extremism that can be derived from the literature no less than fifty-eight different features are mentioned at least once. Only five features are mentioned, in one form or another, by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state. However, it would be highly misleading to consider them as the only dimensional course of understanding or the foundation of an accepted definition of right-wing politics. This is because the all of these features do not occupy the same level in the ladder of abstraction. This in the level of abstraction of these five features is problematic because it means that possible (or even sufficient) features of right-wing are mixed with its necessary features. Nationalism, xenophobia, racism and call for strong state are all possible and even sometime even sufficient, but they may not always the necessary ones[37].

Political ideologies are bodies of inter-connected ideas and systems of thought and constitute a basis for political action, reflection and debate. They are constructed in order to promote a view of the world, to criticise or to promote changes within. They can change or vary over time and circumstances. Political ideologies are generally associated with the social groupings such as classes, nation, social movements or adherents of certain body of ideas, and they provide for them a description and assessment of society and a vision of the future. This is precisely what the right-wing parties seek to provide- a sense of solidarity and belonging, that binds supporters to their vision of the nation and society. Ideologies are born of crisis and feed on conflict. People need help to

[36]Carter, Elisabeth (2005), *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?*,(Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp.14.
[37]Ibid., pp.15

comprehend and cope with turbulent times and confusing circumstances, and ideologies provide this help.[38] The ideological basis of right-wing politics then seems to be, saving the endangered nation and the people from migrants, decadent and anti-national influences.

Right-wing parties are to some extent 'masters of their own success'[39], this is regardless of the political environment they operate in. Their electoral success depends, in part, on the ideology they promote and the policies they put forward, and on the way in which they are organised and led. Rather than there being a uniform right-wing ideology, the ideas and policies of the different parties vary considerably, with some of these being more popular with the electorate than others.

The main idea behind the most studies of right-wing is to illustrate the diversity that exists within these parties. Since these parties have developed in distinct time-periods, ideology has developed along with them. As the parties in the current study have emerged in the 'third-wave' of the post-war right-wing parties, they are in most part distinct from the parties that embrace certain historical baggage.

The 'third wave' of post-war right-wing politics is without a doubt the most successful period in both the electoral and ideological sense for such parties in almost every West European country. Even though they are still regarded as pariahs in most countries, some right-wing parties have established themselves, at the least, as politically important pariahs, as, for instance, the French *Front National* (National Front, FN) and the Belgian *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Block, VB). In Italy the *Alleanza Nazionale*(National Alliance, AN) was the first West European right-wing party of the post-war period to make it into government. The right-wing has become a relevant factor in West European politics both within the party system and outside of it.[40]

The right-wing parties, in whichever form they appear on the political stage reflects the political movement and the ideological characteristics of the particular time. Since the appearance of fascism, to the post-war neo-fascism up until the today's form of populism,

[38]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 67
[39]Carter, n. 36, pp. 13
[40]Mudde, n.18, pp.6

the extreme and populist right wing parties have undergone tremendous changes. That is why; there cannot be one definition or one ideology to describe these parties.

These parties present a mixed bag ideologically. Some of them are inspired directly by fascist intellectuals from the 1930s and speak of the fall of Western civilisation, whereas other such parties have no sympathy at all for the fascist past. Some have a programme that promotes a free market economy, whereas other such parties have objected against free market arrangements, particularly when it comes to international trade. However, the main thing these parties have in common is their fierce opposition against immigration, apart from promoting strong right-wing nationalism, anti-EU sentiments, as well as anti-Semitism and hate against other ethnic groups for the fear of the erosion of the national culture.[41]

Common ideological strains, political platforms and intellectual influences demonstrate that there are common roots, whether implicit or explicit, that structure right-wing politics. Right-wing parties demonstrate support for liberal free-market economics, they argue that the overly bureaucratic state must be reformed, and they generally oppose the centralised and elite nature of the European Union in the name of the authentic silent majority and the common person. Furthermore, these parties oppose globalisation and multiculturalism. They argue that globalisation destroys the fabric of the domestic economy, places too much economic power in the hands of economic and political elites and imports American capitalism. Multiculturalism is opposed since it uproots European identity, local cultures and Western civilisation through policies that encourage immigration. Thus, right-wing parties are also exclusionists. They argue, based on the principle of 'the right to difference,' that cultures, including European cultures, have the right to defend themselves from immigration, especially if this immigration threatens the security, identity and well-being of society[42].

[41]Brug, Wouter Van Der and Fennema, Meindert (2009), The Support Base of Radical Right Parties in the Enlarged European Union, *Journal of European Integration*, 31(5), pp. 589-608.
[42]Zaslove, n.12, pp. 61-81

[2.2] Explaining the Rise

In the past few decades, one of the most crucial theme and development in the Western European politics has been the rise of right-wing political parties and movements. The last century witnessed a great upheaval and suffering in Europe as forces came to power, or aspired to do so, bent on ideologies, policies and practices incorporating intolerance, xenophobia, ethnic cleansing, racism, chauvinism, and anti-Semitism, resulting into a most destructive world war. The inter-war and war time Europe conditioned debate after 1945, as post-war politics and society in Western Europe sought badly to turn page on the past and to look forward towards a more tolerant and open future.[43]

However, the political situation changed in many countries in 1980s, new parties emerged; older ones radically innovated themselves gaining unprecedented consent. These new movements and parties of right-wing emerged in a socio-political and historical environment absolutely different from the pre-war era. Liberal and capitalist democracy had become more embedded, international climate had evolved from cold war to thaw, to the fall of Berlin wall, retreat from communism, accelerated globalisation, European integration, migrationary flows and multiculturalism emerged as noteworthy developments that resulted in a critical response from the parties on the right-wing.The number of right-wing parties which had entered the national or European parliament had passed from 6 at the beginning of 1980s to 10 by the end of 1980s to 15 by the mid-1990s, with their vote sharing doubling; rising from 4.75 per cent in the decade 1980-90 to 9.73 in 1990-99.[44] In 1990s, right-wing made its breakthrough in six major countries of Europe- Front National in France, Haider's Freedom Party of Austria; Vlaams Bloc and National Front in Belgium; Germany, with the coming of the third wave of extremism[45];

[43]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 1
[44]Ignazi, n.11, pp. 198
[45]The third wave dates from the mid-1980s and has seen much higher and more durable levels of support for right-wing parties. The rise of parties such as the Austrian FPÖ, French FN and Flemish Bloc/Interest (VB) in Belgium followed a new phase of immigration into Europe as either workers or their dependent. The first began after the end of the war and was comprised of openly fascist and neo-Nazi parties that remained overtly committed to political ideas that had flourished in the interwar years. While some such as the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) in Germany were banned, others found that their openly racist, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic message garnered only fringe support. The second wave that rose in the 1970s included the Progress Parties in Scandinavia that were mainly anti-tax populist movements and parties such as the National Front (NF) in Britain, which attracted only isolated and ephemeral pockets of support.The

the Netherlands, with the series of appearances and exits of Centre Democrats; Switzerland, whose right-wing proliferated into various parties. Following are the main reasons for the re-emergence of right-wing politics.

[2.2] (a) Political Disillusionment

Western Europe not only went through significant economic change in the 1980s and 1990s but also experienced important political changes. Most of these changes were related to the furthering of European integration, which was seen by public as an elite-driven project marred by democratic deficit and corruption. Alongside the deepening and widening of EU, governments engaged in more international cooperation, which to some citizens appeared to remove political power away from the national arena and democratic accountability. In addition, several Western European countries - like Italy, Britain, Belgium, and Germany - experienced large political corruption scandals in the 1990s, which further undermined the public's faith in their politicians. These political changes and events, some suggest, have created a grievance against contemporary politicians, which benefits some or all outsider parties such as the right-wing. The vote for the them is, in this line of reasoning, cast at least in part because people want to express their disillusionment with politics and not necessarily their agreement with the populist right's policies.[46]

The strategic and programmatic shift of these parties has not only solidified their existence but has helped in attaining a presence within the large political spectrum. Even those parties who were traditionally more ideologically oriented have modified their strategies in order to attract larger or specific strata of the population.This has been successful because the electorate has been affected by these structural changes leading to breakdown of voter loyalties, and greater electoral unpredictability which has led right-wing to succeed in mobilising disillusioned voters.

---

third wave of right–wing is not simply the extension of conservatism towards the extreme end of the political spectrum; instead, it is the product of a restructuring of that spectrum and a regrouping of political actors and alliances. It is distinguished from the old right by its softening of anti-democratic rhetoric and willingness to play according to the rules of the game, as well as by its advocacy of ethnocentrism rather than classic biological racism.

[46]Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth (2008), What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases, *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(1), pp. 3-23.

The success of right-wing parties stems from what Hans-Georg Betz refers to as the 'politics of resentment'[47]. The right wing's attack on economic elites, politicians and intellectuals attracts supporters who feel as if politicians no longer address pressing economic and political issues. Voters turn to right-wing common-sense solutions to complex problems as they lose confidence in post-war technocratic solutions to growth, unemployment, inflation and recessions and as they become disenchanted with postwar ideologies[48].The assumption that the radical right gain support among those voters who are characterised by political cynicism and are discontent with mainstream parties is usually referred to as the protest voting model and represents one of the key theories applied to explain the successes of the radical right[49]. Radical right parties attract dissatisfied voters because the former criticise the conventional political system and established parties, use anti-elite rhetoric, and claim that they protect the interests of the 'common people'.[50]

It is impossible to discuss their electoral success with only reference to the strategic shifts and political disillusionment; there are certain issues that have been invaluable in the right-wing electoral breakthrough. Immigration is often presumed to be the single most important cause of the right-wing's electoral breakthrough. Some authors even label these parties 'anti-immigrant' in order to emphasize the importance of the immigration topic in radical right electoral strategy, whereas others argue that an anti-immigrant position was merely a manifestation of a wider nationalist or 'nativist' ideology of the right-wing[51]. It can be deduced that anti-immigrant rhetoric is something that unites all successful right-wing parties in Europe and also that this issue represent a crucial motives for radical right voting throughout West European countries. Anti-immigrant attitudes are generally seen as an instance of xenophobia and intolerance related to a wider authoritarian syndrome.

47Betz, Hans-Georg(1994), Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe,(New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. xi

[48]Zaslove, n.12, pp. 61-81

[49]Eatwell R (2003), Ten theories of the extreme right, in Merkl P and Weinberg L (eds.),*Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Frank Cas Publishers), pp.45–70

[50]Zhirkov, Kirill (2014), Nativist but not Alienated: A Comparative Perspective on the Radical Right vote in Western Europe, *Party Politics*, 20, pp. 286-296.

[51]Mudde, n.33, pp.182–97

Alternatively, an anti-immigrant position can be motivated by rational interests and the intention to limit immigration by voting for a party which backs restrictive policies[52].

[2.2] (b) Economic Uncertainties

Economic issues have a long tradition of being considered the most important voting reason. The unique selling point of right-wing parties is their anti-immigrant or anti-immigration standpoint. It is argued that these unfavorable attitudes are induced by experiences of threats from immigrants, both economically and culturally. These two threats are often highly correlated and, consequently, are mostly used as a single factor[53]. Radical right voters – manual workers and small business owners – are united by anti-immigrant and anti-elite attitudes whereas they are deeply divided with regard to economic interests. The strategy of successful radical right parties is based on a combination of anti-immigrant rhetoric with a pro-market economic program. This model is sometimes referred to as the 'winning formula'[54].

Immigration, anti-system, economic stagnation, political corruption, breakdown of cultural homogeneity has been some of the issues that have helped right-wing parties to establish themselves in the past two-decades. The right-wing parties which were on the margins and fringes of the political system post-second world war have been buoyed by favorable electoral results which have helped them to come into mainstream and emerge as significant players in their respective political systems.

Unemployment levels have risen in most Western European countries in the 1980s and 1990s, with highs reaching 12per cent at the national level in France and Germany. Despite discontinuing the importation of labor in the early 1970s, the number of non–European Union (EU) immigrants has continued to grow due to family reunifications, the demand for illegal labor, and refugee movements. Several scholars like PieroIgnazi, Hans

[52]Rydgren, Jens (2008), Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists?Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six Western European Countries, *European Journal of Political Research*, 47, pp. 737-765
[53]Lucasen, Geertje and Lubbers, Marcel (2012), Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats, *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(5), pp. 547–574
[54]De Lange, Sarah (2007), A New Winning Formula? : The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right, *Party Politics*, 13(4), pp. 411-435

Betz, etc point to these factors as putative causes of the increase in votes for radical right parties. For example, the leader of the French National Front (FN), Jean-Marie Le Pen, hasconsistently linked the number of immigrants in France to the number ofunemployed. His plans to repatriate immigrants and give French citizenspreference in the job market were designed to strike a chord with working class French voters. Likewise in Austria, the FPÖ's"Austria First" petition drive was an attempt to push the great coalition government to toughen immigration control. The Freedom Party's leader, Jörg Haider, connected the number of immigrants to the number of unemployed in Austria, and the party has called for a reduction in the number of immigrants in Austria until full employment of Austrians has been reached.[55]

[2.2](c) Charismatic Leadership

One of the reasons that right-wing parties have stood out in the whole political party spectrum is the way in which they have been led. The visibility of these parties and the electoral support they have received has been to a very large extent dependent on the leadership, which has been called "charismatic" by various scholars. Wouter van der Brug and Anthony Mughan[56] observed thatright-wing party support was argued to have two distinctive characteristics that combine to give it an ephemeral quality. The first was that it is a 'protest vote' motivated more by what the established parties fail to offer voters and less by what the newcomers on the right-wing offer them. Right-wing party voters, in this view, were seen as having 'abandoned their traditional parties just to send a message of protest against inefficiency, incompetence and incumbents in general'. The second distinctive characteristic of these same voters was that, in common with their predecessors in Europe's fascist past, they are held to be swayed by the appeal of 'charismatic' leaders. 'Both fascist and right-wing parties share in common the prevalence of charismatic leadership and the relative absence of formal–rational bureaucratic internal party structure'.

[55]Givens, Terri (2005), *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 69.
[56]Brug, Wouter van der and Mugha, Anthony (2007), Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties, Party Politics, 13(29), pp. 29-51.

According to Max Weber, "The term 'charisma' will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary." As conceived by Weber, charisma is not an attribute of leaders themselves, but is a quality that inheres in the relationship between a leader and his followers. This relationship is not one of routine exchange where, for example, individuals are attracted to a candidate simply because he is the representative of the party with which they identify and think of as being best for them. Rather, the charismatic leader 'is obeyed not by virtue of a custom or a law, but by virtue of the faith he inspires. The follower "gives way" to the charisma of the prophet, the warrior, the demagogue, on account of their personal, exceptional merits'. At its base, therefore, charisma is an influence term and this influence can take a number of forms. In the short term, it is 'a very rare virtue, power or talent which endows its holder with various capacities, most notably one for eliciting passionate popular support for a mission or for the holder's guidance in human affairs'. More durably, it can 'give birth to a new tradition, it can become institutionalized in structures and practices which, without its initial impulse, would not have seen the light of day'[57].

Charismatic leaders can be defined as those who have a high self-confidence, a clear vision, engage in unconventional behaviour, and act as a change agent, while remaining realistic about environmental constraints. Charismatic leaders are believed to possess particular personality traits and abilities while displaying unique behavioural model[58]. The charismatic leader claims to speak for the 'people.' Contending that they represent the grassroots and the true interests of the people, right-wing party leaders argue that the leaders of the established political parties have abandoned civil society. They claim that the professionalisation of politics, the bureaucratisation of the state and the entwining of

[57]Ibid., pp. 29-51
[58]McLaurin, James Reagan and Al Amri, Mohammed Bushanain (2008), Developing an Understanding of Charismatic and Transformational Leadership, *Proceedings of the Allied Academies,* 15(2), pp. 333-337.

the parties with the state encourage politicians and political parties to view civil society as merely a resource to maintain political power[59].

Having charismatic party leadership has proven to be an added advantage during the radical right-wing party renewal process. Time and again, leaders such as Gianfranco Fini of the Italian NationalAlliance and Jean-Marie LePen of the French National Front have demonstrated their ability to capture the attention of audiences through their speeches and use of the media. Meanwhile, a new class of charismatic leaders emerged in Austria, with JörgHaider of the Freedom Party, and Belgium, with FilipDewinter of the Vlaams Blok. Patrick Hossay and Aristide Zolberg comment on the importance of this new leadership that "Haider's charm and professional polish transformed the Freedom Party from a group of political misfits, waffling on the margins of politics, to a governing partner", concise the argument on the importance of charismatic leadership. The revamped right-wing parties of the 1980-90s used the media to spread their message. They held demonstrations and marches, gave speeches, published leaflets and brochures, used the Internet, and generally created interest around themselves by tapping into public frustrations. Initially frustrations included distrust in government, unemployment, uncertainty regarding the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, then German reunification, and the immigration wave that accompanied the end of Soviet communism. Using immigration as a funnel or omnibus issue, the radical right wing traced virtually all other social problems back to immigrants. This scape-goating became their new strategy.[60]

Charismatic leadership is crucial for the right-wing parties as these parties are more prone to infighting and factionalism, a strong leader is capable of uniting the various factions and hence is invaluable for the party organisation. In many cases, party is so dependent on the leaders that if the leader were to leave, the party would simply fade into oblivion. In addition, a strong leadership and well-structured organisation enable the party to be more flexible in terms of its programmatic strategy[61]. In terms of electoral success, right-

[59]Zaslove, n.12, pp. 61-81
[60]Williams, Michelle Hale (2006), *The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp.59.
[61]Carter, n.36, pp. 65

wing parties with stronger leadership and a well organised party structure will automatically would record higher result at the polls due to greater programmatic and electoral coherence would bring greater credibility and hence higher levels of electoral success than parties with uncharismatic leader and weak organisational structure. For example, the French National exhibits an exquisite illustration of charismatic leadership. Jean-Marie Le Pen founded it in 1972 as a heterogeneous federation, bringing together those who were nostalgic for Vichy, anti-Gaullist, Poujadists, Neo-Fascists, intellectuals and others. It was not Le Pen's first political experience. Under the leadership of Le Pen the FN has managed to fight every legislative election since 1973 though not in all constituencies. Over the years, Le Pen led his party and kept control over all its branches. Parliament members who showed signs of independence were expelled. He also led organisational reform that was aimed at centralising the power in the party and enabled him to coordinate and arbitrate[62].

Similar is the Lega Nord, its organisation is tightly structured and organised which is in turn divided into twelve national sections that are in turn divided into provincial, district and local sections. The most important position is held by Umberto Bossi since the foundation of Lega Nord. For him, 'tight control over the party was necessary to prevent the establishment of internal factions that would have weakened the movement in its struggle against the established parties'. Along with his secretariat he decides how the ideas are generated within the party are put into practice, and if there is any disagreement within the federal political secretariat, it is Bossi that takes the final decision. The party's structure is pyramidal so that much of the power and decision-making centres around Bossi. Although this has reduced dissent in the party, however there hasn't been complete absence of internal disagreement. In the wake of 1994 election, there were considerable defections and resignations so much so that the party lost Milan mayorship in 1997 followed by poor result in 1998 administrative election and 1999 European election[63]. However, Bossi's charismatic and authoritarian leadership has acted as a unifying force

[62]Pedahzur, Ami and Brichta, Avraham (2002), The Institutionalisation of Extreme Right-Wing Charismatic Parties: A Paradox?,*Party Politics*, 8(1), pp. 31–49.
[63]Carter, n.36, pp. 90

for the party. He continued to dominate the party entirely, and was able to impose his will on the party organisation[64].

JörgHaider indeed was the right man at the right moment, when he became the leader of the FPÖ in 1986, the party, which over the years had moved toward the centre, was at a point of near extinction. Under his leadership the FPÖ went through a new identification stage and steadily increased its electoral hold until it became the second largest party in the Austrian parliament. After his election in 1986 Haider led the FPÖ to an achievement of 9.7 percent of the vote. Analysis of the FPÖ electorate in 1986 established that Haider's charismatic personality was the greatest single factor in the party's appeal. His authority was demonstrated by his ruthless personal leadership of the party. Following his election as party leader, internal discipline was rigidly enforced and, one by one, all rivals were driven to the margins. As the party grew in membership and electoral power, Haider's skills as creative leader were exhibited. He started to build party organs in order to strengthen party ties with the membership and render it more cohesive. The information centre of the party, formed to collect data and cultivate contacts with members and supporters, was established 'to ensure smooth coordination between the parliamentary party, the provincial parties, and members and sympathizers'.[65]

These leaders and their parties have not just funneled the anger and feelings of alienation from the political system, the welfare state and the party system. They also critique the internal party structures of the established post-war. These leaders speak to those segments of the population which feel that party bureaucracy excludes the common person from participating in the everyday functioning of the party. They claim that the hardworking citizen has been removed from the party while intellectuals and party bureaucrats colonise the decision-making processes. These leaders often use the common vernacular and dialect to appeal to the notion of common sense. In the process, they oversimplify complex issues, calling for seemingly common-sense solutions to difficult and complex problems. The charismatic populist leader claims to practice politics differently. This persona of the leader is quite often reinforced by a leader who comes

[64]Ignazi, n.11, pp.58
[65]Pedahzur and Avraham, n.62, pp. 31–49

from "outside the political mainstream during a time of declining public confidence in political institutions."[66] Although these parties contend that they are more democratic and participatory than other parties, in fact they are highly centralised. The charismatic leader and a few close allies formulate the party policy and strategy. The centralised party structure allows the charismatic leader to change position on issues as he sees fit. This flexibility allows right-wing parties to emphasise specific issues depending on the context, while it also permits them to form broad coalitions as they evolve from protest parties into parties with established constituencies[67]. For example, Lega Nordbegan as an anti-tax, liberal free-market party that blamed the less developed South and the centralised state for Italy's economic and political problems. However, the party radicalised its platform against immigration, articulated a stronger stance on law and order and, most recently, proclaimed support for the traditional family and for religion. Haider's initial success was also based upon protest votes against the Austrian state, the partysystem. Subsequently, the Freedom Party emphasized on issues surrounding immigration and law and order.Initially, right-wing parties were able to attract disillusioned voters. However, the activities of protest voters without strong party affiliations cannot explain the continued success of these new right populist parties. Instead, successful right-wing parties and their leaders were able to politicise core followers by establishing roots within civil society.

[2.3] Electoral Politics

> I would never have imagined that demons long believed to have been banished would return. But simple-minded populism is once again gaining ground.
>
> *Martin Schulz*[68]

In the post-Second World War decade, the remnants of the right-wing existed at the fringe of party politics in established European democracies. The most significant parliamentary party which could trace its origins to Europe's fascist past was the

[66]Zaslove, n.12, pp. 61-81
[67]Ibid., pp. 61-81
[68]Martin Schulz, A Diversified Europe United against Right-wing Extremismand Right-Wing Populism, in Melzer, Ralf and Serafin, Sebastian (ed) (2013), *Right-Wing Extremism: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies, Labour Markets and Exit-Strategies*, (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), although in post-war German politics the NationalDemokratischeParteiDeutschlands (NPD)remained active at the margins. The most dramatic rise, which shocked established party systems, arose in France, where the Poujadists registered short-lived gains during the 1956 general election. By the early 1970s, however, initial signs suggested that the European party politics was starting to change. In 1972, Mogens Glistrup established the Danish Fremskridtspartiet (FP, Progress Party, Denmark). In just a year this party became the second largest party in the Danish Folketing, gaining 16per centof the vote on a radical anti-tax program. Other leaders sought to emulate their success for instance in Britain (with the National Front, founded in 1967), France (Le Pen's Front National, FN, founded in 1972), and Norway (Fremskrittspartiet, or FrP, created in 1973).[69]

By the 1980s, right-wing parties managed to establish a strong presence at local, regional and national levels in the democratic systems across Europe. These parties have used every available opportunity and issue, as explained in the chapter, to further their aim and propaganda. They have used cultural protectionism, triggered as a backlash directed against the growth of the 'borderless' European Union, surges in population migration, 'guest-workers', political refugees, and asylum seekers and growing multiculturalism to highlight the problem that their countries suffer from.

In the period 1990-2010, which is the timeline of the present study, right-wing parties have become more popular in almost every country of Europe, although the number of seats won in successive elections has varied. As the following Table 2.1 shows right-wing parties across Europe over the last thirty years have steadily increased their vote share. The average national vote share for these parties has risen by nearly ten points. Moreover, even though right-wing parties remain relatively small in many countries, one can see that their vote share in 2000s is greater than their share in the 1980s. In a relatively short span of time, right-wing parties have gone from being non-existent in Europe to having double digit vote shares in five countries.

[69]Norris, Pippa (2005), Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.6.

Table 2.1:Election Results of Right-Wing Parties (Per Cent) in Selected EU Member Countries, National Parliamentary Elections (Averages) and Election to European Parliament, 2009

	1980–1984	1985–1989	1990–1994	1995–1999	2000–2004	2005–2009	EP 2009
Belgium (B)	1.1	1.7	6.6	1999	13.8	14.0	10.1
Denmark (DK)	6.4	6.9	6.4	9.8	12.6	13.9	14.8
Germany Federal Republic (D)	0.2	0.6	2.3	3.3	1.0	2.1	1.7
France (F)	0.4	9.9	12.7	14.9	12.4	4.7	6.3
Great Britain (GB)	-.-	0.6	0.9	-.-	0.2	0.7	8.3
Italy (I)	6.8	5.9	17.8	15.7	4.3**	8.3**	10,2**
Norway (N)	4.5	8.4	6.0	15.3	14.7	22.5	--
Austria (A)	5.0	9.7	19.6	24.4	10.0	28.2	17.8
Sweden (S)	-.-	-.-	4.0	-.-	1.5	3.0	3.3
Switzerland (CH)	3.8	6.3	10.9	9.3	1.3	30.0	--
Average (Ø)	**2.8**	**5.0**	**8.7**	**10.4**	**7.2**	**12.7**	

The following parties were included in the calculations:
Belgium: *Vlaams Blok, Front National;* Denmark: *Fremskridtsparti, Dansk Folkeparti;* Germany: *Republikaner, DVU, NPD;* France: *Front National, Mouvement National Républicain;* UK: *British National Party, National Front;* Italy: *Movimento Sociale Italiano, Alleanza Nazionale, Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore, Lega Nord;* Netherlands: *Centrumpartij, Centrumdemocraten, List Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders PVV;* Austria: *FPÖ, BZÖ;* Sweden: *Ny Demokrati, Sverigedemokraterna, Nationaldemokraterna;*

Source: Langenbacher, Nora (2011), Is Europe On The "Right" Path? Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism In Europe, Berlin:Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forum Berlin, pp.44

Diverse patterns of right-wing support in Europe are to be expected, since each party is a product of its own specific political culture, circumstances, opportunities and party system, and is influenced by these variables. Also, broader developments such as globalisation, de-industrialisation, migration and European integration need to be taken into account.They impact on different countries and on different political parties in both

general and specific ways. Moreover, a central theme running through discussions on the right-wing is that significant socio-economic, political, cultural and structural changes have created favourable circumstances in which these political parties have been able to campaign. In this context, right-wing parties have offered ready remedies to the problems (real or imaginary) thrown up by change and development (Map 2.i depicts the right-wing parties in national Parliaments across Europe in 2010). As Paul Hainsworth observes, 'voter identification with and loyalty to political parties has become weakened and, as a result, voting for political parties has become more volatile, whilst membership too has fluctuated. Moreover, old cleavages such as class and religion have lost much of their traditional significance as modes of belonging and indicators of voting behaviour… the protracted breaking down of these older forms of solidarity has left individuals more atomised and individualised, more de-aligned socially and politically, and 'available' for recruitment to new forms of belonging and identity that extreme right and other forces might provide'.[70]

[70]Hainsworth, n.6, pp.26

Map 2.i: Right-Wing Parties in National Parliaments (2010)



Source: The Rise of Europe's Right-Wing Populists, *Spiegel Online*, 28 September 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/bild-719842-136031.html, Accessed on 9 January 2015.

The culmination of this de-alignment from the mainstream parties was observed in the beginning of the 21st century, when in many European countries right-wing parties were able to leave a lasting impact (Table 2.2). In Belgium, in October 2000, the Vlaams Blok, or VB (led by FrankVanhecke), became the biggest party on Antwerp City Council, winning twenty out of fifty seats. In the 2001 Danish general election, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF), headed by PiaKjaersgaarg, got 12 per centof the vote. In Norway that very same year, Carl Ivar Hagen's Fremskrittspartiet won 14.7 per cent of the vote, becoming the third largest party in the Storting. On 21 April 2002, the defeat of the Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the first round of the French presidential elections, sent shock waves throughout Europe. The result galvanized massive anti-Front National demonstrations by millions of protestors all over France. One

of the best-known leaders on the right, Le Pen dismissed the Holocaust as a 'detail of history,' and he continued to voice anti-Semitic, racist views. These events were rapidly followed in the Netherlands by the assassination on 6 May 2002 of Pym Fortuyn, a controversial figure, leading to a sudden surge of support for his party in the general election. The anti-immigrant Lijst Pym Fortuyn (LPF), formed just three months before the election, suddenly became the second largest party in the Dutch Parliament and part of the governing coalition. During the June 2004 European elections, Vlaams Blok won the second largest share of the Belgian vote. In Switzerland, the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) consolidated gains in the October 2003elections with 26.6 per cent of the vote, becoming the largest party in the Swiss Parliament, with 55 out of the 200 seats in the *Nationalrat*, gaining an additional seat in the executive Federal Council. This by no means suggests that these parties were able to maintain their vote share in subsequent elections nevertheless each temporary surge administered a shock to mainstream parties.[71]

[71]Norris, Pippa (2005), Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.3.

Table 2.2: Countries with Right-Wing Parties and their electoral results since the mid-1980s

Country	Party/Parties (with founding year)	Electoral results, in per cent of votes cast (year of election in brackets)								Best position*
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ, 1956)	9.7 (1986)	16.6 (1990)	22.5 (1994)	21.9 (1995)	26.9 (1999)	10.0 (2002)	11.0 (2006)	17.5 (2008)	J (2000–5)
	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ, 2005)	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.1 (2006)	10.7 2008)	J (2005–7)
Belgium	Flemish Interest** (VB, 2004)	1.9 (1987)	6.6 (1991)	7.8 (1995)	… …	9.9 (1999)	11.6 (2003)	12.0 (2007)	7.7 (2010)	
Denmark	Progress Party (FRP, 1973)	9.0 (1988)	6.4 (1990)	6.4 (1994)	-	-	-	-	-	
	Danish People's Party (DF, 1995)	-	-	-	7.4 (1998)	12.0 (2001)	13.0 (2005)	13.9 (2007)	12.3 (2011)	T (2001–11)
Finland	The (True) Finns*** (PS, 1995)	6.3 (1987)	4.8 (1991)	1.3 (1995)	1.0 (1999)	…	1.6 (2003)	4.1 (2007)	19.0 (2011)	
France	National Front (FN, 1972)	9.9 (1986)	9.8 (1988)	12.4 (1993)	14.9 (1997)	…	11.3 (2002)	4.3 (2007)	13.9 (2012)	Second round of presidential election (2002)
Italy****	Northern League (LN, 1989)	-	8.7 (1992)	8.4 (1994)	10.1 (1996)	…	3.9 (2001)	4.6 (2006)	8.3 (2008)	J (2000–11)
Lithuania	Order and Justice (TT, 2002)	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.7 (2008)	7.3 (2012)	J
The Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF, 2002)	-	-	-	-	17.0 (2002)	5.7 (2003)	-	-	
	Party for Freedom (PVV, 2004)	-	-	-	-	-	5.9 (2006)	15.5 (2010)	10.1 (2012)	T
Norway	Progress Party (FrP, 1973)	13.0 (1989)	6.3 (1993)		15.3 (1997)	14.6 (2001)	22.1 (2005)	22.9 (2009)		
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS, 2001)	-	-	-		9.5 (2001)	27.0 (2005)	32.1 (2007)	29.9 (2011)	S (2006–10)
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS, 1990)	13.9 (1990)	7.9 (1992)	5.4 (1994)	9.1 (1998)	…	…	11.7 (2006)	5.1 (2010)	
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD, 1988)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.7 (2010)	
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP, 1991)	11.0 (1987)	11.9 (1991)	14.9 (1995)	22.5 (1999)	…	26.6 (2003)	29.0 (2007)	26.6 (2011)	G, 2 seats (2003–8)

Source: KarstonGrabow and Florian Hartleb (eds.) (2013), *Exposing the Demagogues: Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*.

The rise of the right wing is nothing short of a puzzle and understanding this phenomenon is important for several reasons. Pippa Norris highlights two factors as to why understanding this rise of right-wing is crucial. First, these parties are becoming increasingly powerful political actors in the countries where they have gained seats in local councils, the European Parliament, or national parliaments. Elected representatives can influence public policy process directly, through legislative debates and motions, as well as indirectly, through shaping the policies adopted by either their coalition partners or the mainstream parties. Even in countries where right-wing parties remain excluded from government office, any basic shift in the party system can have significant consequences for the workings of representative democracy and the public policy process. Under electoral pressure, political leaders in mainstream parties such as the British Conservatives and German Christian Social Union have co-opted the language of the right-wing on issues such as crime, immigration, and welfare abuse. The centre-right parties in France, the Rally for the Republic (RPR) and union for French Democracy (UDF), adopted the Front National anti-immigrant rhetoric after 1986, in the attempt to pre-empt their support. Second, it calls to question as to whether public support for right-wing parties represents 'politics as usual', or whether it does reflect deeply undemocratic tendencies, intolerance of minorities, and racist sentiments, as many fear, which may have serious consequences for representative democracy. There are anxieties that the sudden rise of these parties may make it more difficult to establish durable coalition governments, exemplified by the collapse of the Dutch government coalition and the calling of new elections in January 2003, just seven months after LijstPim Fortuyn's first breakthrough.[72]

[2.3](b) Issues Raised

Migration

Since the 1960s migration to Western Europe has increased substantially, despite the fact that by the early 1970s various countries adopted restrictive legislation with regard to the entry of foreigners in the country. These obstacles have not been able to prevent an ever

[72]Norris, Pippa (2004), The Rise of the Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition in Postindustrial Societies, (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp.2.

increasing number of persons to settle in Western Europe, either in the form of economic or labour migrants, political asylum seekers or in the form of various procedures with regard to family reunification. The years and decades of migration have challenged the European states in multiple ways, most importantly eroding the cohesive and mono-ethnic societies and economic crisis within the European Union has led to low or negative growth and substantially high levels of unemployment, especially among the youth (Map 2.ii depicts the migration patterns into Western Europe in the 1990s).[73] And that, in turn, has led to very unpopular austerity measures. The combination of these social and economic stresses has gone a long way to delegitimise the European establishment[74]. This situation has led to discontent, insecurity and fear among the masses the benefit of which has been reaped by the right-wing parties, who have not only challenged the establishment and what it stands for, but also have become a pole of attraction.

[73]Throughout 1990s, EU15 experienced an average rate of unemployment of about 10 per cent, an almost five-fold increase from the average for the 15 states in 1960s (when rate was in the range of 2 to 3 per cent). At the beginning of 2000, above 20.5 million persons were unemployed in the EU-28, corresponding to 9.2 per cent of the total labour force. The youth unemployment rate in the EU-28 sharply declined between 2005 and 2007, reaching its minimum value (15.1 per cent) in the first quarter 2008. The economic crisis severely hit the young. From the second quarter of 2008, the youth unemployment rate has taken an upward trend peaking in 23.9 per cent in the first quarter 2013, before receding to 19.7 per cent at the end of 2015, which was still relatively high. (*Unemployment Statistics*, Eurostat Statistics Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics, Accessed on 21 May 2017)

[74]Kaplan, Robert (2014), Europe's Deep Right-Wing Logic, Forbes, 6 April 2014, URl: http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2014/06/04/europes-deep-right-wing-logic/, Accessed on 20/12/2014

Map 2.ii: Migration into Western Europe in the 1990s

Source: http://www.roebuckclasses.com/maps/placemap/europe/europemigration.JPG, Accessed on 22 December 2014

The political dimension of immigration emerged as a growing spectre of right-wing anti-immigration movements made many mainstream parties to address the issue. The politicisation of the immigration issue was particularly visible with respect to the changes within the political spectrum. Before the 1970s, immigration issue had witnessed a

convergence of mainstream parties. In order to defuse immigration and race politics, discussions remained largely behind closed doors, and the issue was bureaucratically contained. In the 1980s, however, immigration entered into the rhetoric of electoral campaigns and social movements. The political nature of immigration manifested itself in a paradoxical fashion by the turn of the twenty-first century. "New security" issues like ethnic conflict, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and drug and human traffickingreplaced the Cold War ideological conflict, and linked migration to crime, smuggling, terrorism, and other policing issues of law and order.[75]

This discrimination and mistrust fueled the aspirations of the right-wing parties, whose anti-immigrant attitude has been justified on the basis of the declining fortunes of European citizens. Right-wing parties claimed to protect the interests of the social groups under threat (i.e., socio-economically weak) and made this issue a central tenet of their political campaigns by linking unemployment statistics and joblessness to the number of labour migrants and asylum-seekers in the country. These parties have been able to reorient the political agenda on the immigration issue and to create a political–ideological climate more conducive to hostility and antagonism toward migrants.

For example, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the French National Front (FN), has consistently linked the number of immigrants in France to the number of unemployed. His plans to repatriate immigrants and give French citizens preference in the job market were designed to strike a chord with working class French voters. Likewise in Austria, the Freedom Party's "Austria First" petition drive was an attempt to push the great coalition government to toughen immigration control. The Freedom Party's leader, Jörg Haider, has connected the number of immigrants to the number of unemployed in Austria, and the party had called for a reduction in the number of immigrants in Austria until full employment of Austrians was achieved[76]. "Save the welfare state: expel false refugees! Eliminate unemployment: stop immigration! Fight against crime: deport foreign criminals!" These slogans promoted by the German Republikaner party reflect and express growing concern that the unrestricted influx of Eastern European and especially

[75]Lahav, Gallya (2004), *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp.31.
[76]Givens, n.55, pp. 69

non-European political and economic refugees is adding to an already overburdened welfare state, creating unemployment, and augmenting crime rates[77].

All of these groups, migrants; asylum seekers; refugees are viewed by the right-wing as unwanted and alien representing a threat to the larger society. Way back in 1968 English Conservative leader Enoch Powell predicted that 'rivers of blood'[78] would flow in Europe if the third world immigration was not reversed. This discourse gave the emerging right-wing a substance and an argument to legitimise their position on immigration. The right-wing has been accused of racism, xenophobia, exclusion and intolerance, the settlement of migrants and their families have been viewed as the process that fosters multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism – forces that allegedly threaten (an imagined and exclusively defined) national identity, culture and cohesion. The right-wing has capitalised on this situation and has exploited this issue, by identifying themselves in the minds of the voters as the parties for immigration control. Their stance on this issue has often been used as the benchmark for the other parties to respond to[79].

In the last three decades, prejudice, fear and resentment towards immigrants and refugees have been growing within western societies. The large influx of refugees from Eastern Europe and Africa in the 1990s gave rise to talk of an "invasion of the poor" and expressions such as the "storming of Europe". Over time, a number of economic, social, political and cultural arguments have been developed to justify a negative attitude towards immigrants. These range from downward pressure that migrants push on wages and rising unemployment among the native population, to their comparatively high birth rates with potential detrimental implications for the existing welfare system, demographic developments and national identity.[80] Immigration and insecurity are presented as an inseparable issue in the right-wing discourse. It is this linking that has been most potent combination for the success of the right-wing. The issue of immigration and a common perception of linking foreigners with rising crimes levels have ensured it to become the

[77]Betz, n.22, pp. 663-685
[78]Enoch Powell (1968), 'Rivers of Blood', Address to the General Meeting of the West Midland Area Conservative Political Centre, United Kingdom.
[79]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 76
[80]Guibernau, Montserrat (2010), *Migration and the Rise of the Radical Right: Social Malaise and the Failure of Mainstream Politics*, Policy Network Paper, London, pp.10.

focal point of right-wing discourse. Crime is portrayed as the consequence of immigration and the presence of foreigners as the cause.

It needs to be understood that immigration has become the most used and abused issue ever to be raised by the right-wing parties. The centrality of immigration as the core theme has encouraged many observers to portray these parties as anti-immigration parties as opposed to right-wing. The importance of this issue to right-wing parties is not in question. However, it needs to be understood that it is one of the many issues that right-wing parties have used to rally their forces. Increasing numbers of immigrants belonging to various cultural, ethnic, and religious identities have led to the increasing heterogeneity within the European culture. The substantial influx of refugees and asylum seekers recorded in the last fifteen years or so contributed to an enhanced perception of diversity in Western Europe where, in many instances, indigenous cultures are being challenged, rejected, and confronted by those of the newcomers. Moreover, some sectors of the indigenous population display a growing mistrust and even hostility towards aspects of the newcomers' cultures and values which are perceived as "alien" and posing a threat to national cohesion, national culture and a national "way of life."[81] Many scholars, like PieroIgnazi, Hans Betz etc, believe that anti-immigration attitudes are important factors in explaining the electoral achievements of the right-wing, however, for CasMudde immigration is at the core of the right-wing parties' political programmes and dominated the images voters have of these parties but anti-immigration nexus is only a part of wider web of issues[82].

Economic Issues

In the decades following the Second World War, the liberal democracies of Western Europe enjoyed a remarkable degree of social and political stability. Sustained economic growth, growing individual affluence, and the expansion of the welfare state each contributed to a social and political climate conducive to political stability while eroding support for extremist factors within the political sphere. The massive integration of markets since 1960s facilitated by reduction in transaction costs through technological

[81]Ibid., pp.6
[82]Rydgren, n.52, pp. 737-765

changes, new institutions, rise in annual trade in goods and services lead to a considerable rise in the GDPs of the European states. Many countries during this period experienced dramatic expansion of capital openness and intensive financial market integration at the European and international levels. The lowering of boundaries between nation-states accelerated the process of economic modernisation. The "losers" of modernisation werelower-skilled individuals who either had increasing difficulty in competing in the labour market, or who faced a relative decline in real income, depending on a country's politico-economic system. Many governments justified unpopular measures in economic and social policy making with the structural imperatives of globalisation and EUintegration, an example being the obligation to fulfill the Maastricht requirements in order to participate in the European Monetary Union[83].

Furthermore, concerning the sections most affected by economic modernisation, persistently high levels of unemployment as indicated earlier or declining standards of living led to a loss of credibility of mainstream parties' promises to solve these myriads problems.A similar conflict was embodied in disputes over European integration because the delegation of competences to the EU to a certain extent undermined an autonomous economic and social policy at the national level; hence, there was both a cultural, political, as well as an economic rationale for opposing European integration.In addition, significant immigration from developing and under-developed countries rose to 5 per cent in 1980s and to 7 per cent by 1999 despite significant restrictions. This resulted in roughly 6.5 per cent of European labour force to be made up by the foreigners by the end of 1990s[84], leading to heightened insecurities among the large population.

In this sense, the right-wing profited from the processes of globalisation, European integration and immigration in a direct way by exploiting these issues, by attacking the gradual process of de-nationalisation that was bought forward.Therefore, voting for right-wing parties then becomes a feasible option. Hans-Georg Betz pointed out that these parties arose "as a protest against the fact that the established parties had not only

[83]Bornschier, Simon (2008), The Extreme Right Populist Challenge and Transformation of Political Space in Western Europe, Paper Prepared for NCCR Workshop on Populism, Aarau, 6-7 June 2008.
[84]Swank, Duane and Betz, Hans Georg (2003), Globalisation, the Welfare State and the Rise of Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, *Socio-Economic Review*, 1, pp. 215-245

misruled the country, but managed to deceive the population about their misrule and were generally out of step concerning the rapid development of society."[85]

The right-wing parties hold a relatively positive view of the market within the nation-state, but it regards the European and global markets with great suspicion. In the words of the FN, "globalization leads to company relocations, thus to unemployment, and Maastricht brings about the deregulation of public services, thus insecurity"[86]. This suspicion also applies to the welfare state, which is supported in principle, but should be provided only to needy members of the nation. Many parties call for the protection of the welfare state at its present or previous high levels, including the increase of some social benefits (notably pensions)[87] and the introduction of new provisions. Support for right-wing parties comes from those citizens who feel threatened by rapid changes in post-industrial societies. Blue-collar workers with low education feel insecure because of globalization and immigration. They compete with immigrant groups for scarce resources. These 'losers of modernity' feel threatened by rapid social change and tend to support radical right-wing parties out of resentment against immigrants and against politicians in general, who are held responsible for their uncertainty[88].

For example, in Austria Jörg Haider pointed out that Austria might have to protect itself against unfair competition by introducing 'selective protectionist measures', moreover, Haider'sBZÖ, has among its key focal points theguarantee of the social market economy. Despite the change in terminology, however, the BZÖ's "social market economy" is not much different from the FPÖ's "fair market economy": a combination of a basicfree market with low taxes and various protectionist measures for smallbusinesses, shopkeepers, and farmers. Similarly, Le Pen has stated that the FN supports "Rhenish capitalism[89] which tries to reconcile a certainlevel of economic performance with an

[85]Zaslove, n.12,pp. 61-81
[86]CasMudde (2007), *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp.125.
[87]Ibid., pp. 125
[88]Brug and Meindert, n.41, pp. 589-608
[89]Rhenish Capitalism: A system of capitalism characterised by non-market patterns of coordination by economic actors and extensive state-regulation of market outcomes. Rhenish capitalism is associated with Northern European economies—most centrally Germany but also the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. Non-market coordination refers to the engagement by firms, unions, and other social actors of a variety of associational bodies used to develop and renew economic institutions. Examples include collective wage

acceptable level of social wellbeing". In Italy, the leaders of LN have combined with anti-globalisation rhetoric with criticism of centralised government, taxation, southern Italians and foreigners.[90]

Issues ofNationalism/Identity

PieroIgnazi[91] defined right-wing parties as extreme right-wing parties which can be identified and classified by reviewing both their political ideology and attitude toward the political system as reflected in party manifestos. Extreme right-wing parties constitute a distinct party family, for they are anti-system parties that aim at undermining the legitimacy of the democratic regime. They, either openly or in more subtle ways, advocate beliefs and procedures diametrical to the established political culture and system. More specifically, they endorse an authoritarian and hierarchical governmental structureand aggressive nationalism. Further, they frequently adopt an ethno-centrist or racist outlook.

Successful parties pursue a 'post-modern' strategy that consciously appeals to widespread anxieties, prejudices, and resentments for political gain. Politically, these parties have derived legitimacy for its ideas directly from voter sentiments and public opinion, e.g., on immigrants, foreigners, and refugees, rather than a well-defined body of ideas. The politics of contemporary right-wing has often been seen as primarily issue-driven and opportunistic. There has been a tendency to define it in terms of the major issue associated with it. However, a closer look at the programmatic propositions and statements of contemporary right-wing radical parties and their leading proponents challenges this view. It suggests, as Roger Eatwell[92] has argued, that the radical right does have a 'common core doctrine', a distinct ideological platform, which distinguishes it from other political parties and movements in contemporary liberal capitalist

---

bargaining, vocational training systems, technology transfer initiatives, and credit-based financial systems with 'stakeholder' patterns of corporate governance. State regulation supports non-market coordination through accepting many associational agreements as legally binding and through granting statutory bargaining rights to traditionally weak social actors, such as unions within collective bargaining law or employees within 'codetermination' or workplace representation law.

[90]Brugand Meindert, n.41, pp. 589-608.

[91]Iganzi, n.11, pp.5

[92]Eatwell, Roger (2000), The Rebirth of the 'Extreme Right' in Western Europe?,*Parliamentary Affairs*, 53, p. 412.

democracies. The core of this ideological platform has variously been described as 'reactionary tribalism', 'ethnocratic liberalism', 'holistic nationalism', 'exclusionary welfarism', or 'exclusionary populism'. Its main characteristic is a restrictive notion of citizenship, which holds that genuine democracy is based on a culturally, if not ethnically, homogeneous community; that only long-standing citizens count as full members of civil society; and that society's benefits should be restricted to those members of society who, either as citizens or taxpayers, have made a substantial contribution to society[93].

The right-wing's formulation of the concept of "ethno-pluralism" demarcated its thinking from old-fashioned ideas of biological racism and white superiority. Directly appropriating the political left's concept of the right to be different, the right-wingemphasised the incompatibility of cultures and ethnicities and advocated the legitimacy of European resistance to cultural mixing. Ethno-pluralism is a politically enforced segregation of cultures and ethnicities according to geographical criteria – essentially, a sort of global apartheid – and the right-wing's counter-model to multiculturalism, one that functions as a modernised strategy against immigration and integration. It precedes and merges into, the xenophobic messages promulgated by mainstream politicians. At the level of political party discourse, ethno-pluralism gives rise to defensive ultra-nationalism. None of the new right-wing parties advocates a return to pre-democratic, dictatorial political orders; all stress theirsupport for republican principles and democratic constitutions. Also, the traditional radical right's search for a "third way" between Western capitalism and Eastern communism has been replaced largely by a principled but not unrestrained support for the capitalist order.[94]

Right-wing political marketing has deftly reduced the argument to a single slogan – 'Our own people first' – and a single demand – 'national preference' – which, taken together, have had considerable electoral appeal. They has increasingly gone beyond exclusionary populism to adopt a new form of cultural nativism, which, rather than promoting

[93]Betz, Hans-Georg (2003), Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe, *Socialist Register*, pp. 193-210

[94]Melzer, Ralf and Serafin, Sebastian (ed.) (2013), *Right-Wing Extremism: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies, Labour Markets and Exit-Strategies*, (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), pp.20.

traditional right-wing extremist notions of ethnic and ethno-cultural superiority, aims at the protection of the indigenous culture, customs and way of life. In the process, the right-wing has increasingly shifted its focus to questions of national and cultural identity, and as a result their politics has become identity politics. Right-wing parties have derived much of their electoral appeal from their ability to market themselves as the advocates of the common people, as spokespersons of the unarticulated opinions and sentiments of large parts of the population, who dared to say out loud what the 'silent majority' only dared to think, and who, to quote Jean-Marie Le Pen, in this way managed to 'return the word to the people' (*rendre la parole au peuple*).[95]

For right-wing, issues of immigration, refugees and asylum seeking are related to questions of nation, nationalism and national identity. For them, the nation is idealised and popularised as a homogeneous entity and a core value for a designated people, more or less fixed entities whose cultural attributes and essence is not open to dilution from other cultures. The nationalism of the right-wing parties tends to be narrow, exclusive and ethnocentric, resident outsiders and others are seen as threats to the integrity of the nation and its people[96].

The first party to adopt the doctrine of differentialismwas Jean-Marie Le Pen's *Front National*. The party was quick to maintain that its French-nationalist position should not be construed as reflecting 'disdain for other people'. On the contrary, the goal was to protect French identity and 'to defend the fundamental values of our civilization'. For this, the party proposed to accord absolute priority to a 'cultural politics designed to defend our roots'. As early as 1988, Le Pen warned that the peoples of Europe were faced with a real danger of extinction. 'And we think that everything has to be done to try to save them'. At the same time, the *Front National* addressed the question of racism, which it defined as a 'doctrine that denies the right of the peoples to be themselves', and which it declared to be among the main threats to the survival of the French people and the peoples of Europe in general. The *Front National* made it a point to charge the established political parties and the whole political class with having actively promoted

[95]Betz, n.92, pp. 193-210
[96]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 78

the emergence and establishment of a 'multiracial and multicultural society' in France. This had been 'justified in the name of abstract, universal human rights and based on a formalistic, juridical definition of French nationality in place of the bond of real, living community formed by shared historical legacies and shared memory of past'. Multiculturalism was part of a larger ideology, which the *FrontNational* called '*mondialisme*' (globalism).[97]

The nationalist myth is characterised by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalising ethnic, religious, cultural and political criteria of exclusion and to condense the idea of the nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity (Map 2.iii shows growing number of xenophobic parties in Europe). For example, according to right-wing parties, public funds and benefits of the national economy should be first and foremost be allocated to "their own people", not to immigrants. This policy of national preference is a constant feature of right-wing discourse especially in terms of immigration. This discourse on nationalism and immigration has opened up these parties to the charges of racism and apartheid, which has been stigmatized due to the experiences and outcome of the Second World War. Therefore to escape the marginalisation, the contemporary right-wing parties have adopted a new outlook of combined ethno-nationalistic xenophobia, based on ethno-pluralist doctrine, with anti-establishment populism[98].

[97]Betz, n.92, pp. 193-210
[98]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 79

Map 2.iii: Growing Number of Xenophobic Parties in Europe



Source: http://geocurrents.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/far-right-map.jpg

The nationalism of right-wing parties is based upon the notion that the 'authentic civil society' must free itself from the bureaucratic state, from the hegemony of American culture, and from the invasion of immigrants and the construction of a multicultural society[99]. These parties have used the issue of immigration to gain increasing support and influence, linking immigration to unemployment and characterising calls for multiculturalism as dangerous to national unity.For example, to garner more votes FPÖ moved away from pan-Germanic nationalism towards imagining an Austrian nationalism that is based on Euroscepticism, ethno-centricism and anti-immigrants.

[99]Zaslove, n.12, pp. 61-81

In short, Right-wing'snationalism is exclusionary. It tries to form an identity barrier between 'us', that is, the ordinary native people of the 'heartland', and 'them', where the 'them' can be both the political establishment and strangers - especially (Muslim) immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities. Right-wing leaders need such groups as the concept of an enemy to mobilise either latent prejudices or real concerns among their potential followers. These enemies are accused of undermining the cultural identity of the nations and of exploiting the domestic welfare state ('social parasites') without any intention of taking care of themselves or 'of integrating' into the host society[100]. According to right-wing parties, the national economy should serve the nation and welfare state measures should be preserved primarily for native citizens who work hard but are, in the populist's language, 'left behind' by the failedoverall immigration policies of either politically correct or remote governments.[101]

Euro-scepticism

Europeanisation represents a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon.After the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, there has been a notable decline in public support for European unification. The accelerated process of European integration has further produced increased levels of opposition. The deepening of European integration combined with the increased salience of the issue in party competition constituted the main factors structuring the post-Maastricht Eurosceptic agenda of the right-wing.

Right-wing parties tend to view European integration as an encroaching, bureaucratic and elitist phenomenon. Accordingly it serves to undermine constructs and values, such as the nation-state, national identity, state sovereignty, deeply embedded roots and national belongings. Right-wing parties have been critical of the top-down nature of the European integrative process[102]. But the fact still remains that many of the right-wing started out as euro-positive and some became euro-positive to gain favors. For example, since its foundation in 1956, the FPÖconstituted the mostfervent supporter of Austria's European

[100]Grabow, Karston and Hartleb, Florian (eds.) (2013), *Exposing the Demagogues: Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*, Centre for European Studies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Berlin, pp.18.
[101]Mudde, n.86, pp.125
[102]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 82

Community accession. The FPÖ's populist shift did not haveany immediate consequences for the party's pro-EC stance as the FPÖ continued tofavouraccession. However, as the prospect of membershipbecame a reality, the FPÖ's European policy changed: on the eve of the 1994Referendum on EU accession, the FPÖ reversed its European policy with themajority of the party's MPs voting against the constitutional amendment on EUaccession. Although the national party did not officially campaign for a No vote,59 per cent of the party's supporters voted against accession. As a coalition partner of the Austrian People's Party between 2000 and 2005, theFPÖ was forced to tone down its Euroscepticism by agreeing to commit to a pro-integrationistagenda. The FPÖ's return toopposition in 2005 after the creation of the *BundnisZukunftÖsterreich* (Alliance forthe Future of Austria) from a secessionist faction led by Haider fostered a renewedcourse of opposition to the EU[103]. On the other hand, Lega Nord in Italy changed its stance on Europe in order to fit in with its strategic goal of joining the nationalistic right-wing coalition of Silvio Berlusconi in 2001. After a fractious coalition experience with Berlusconi first time round in 1994, the LN was keen thereafter to build bridges and demonstrate its willingness to compromise on Europe. Doing a U-turn on Europe therefore was for the LN a means to help achieve its political goals. This puts the LN at odds with its other partner, National Alliance which has been a Euro-positive party since the beginning[104].

The enlargement of the EU towards the Eastern region in the 21st century has also emerged to be an important issue for the right-wing parties. This has manifested in various ways in various countries, for example, right-wing parties in central and eastern Europe has been wary of the loss of the sovereignty to the EU or many western European countries are apprehensive of Turkish accession into EU which has resulted in massive opposition across European Union countries with many members, like Austria, calling for referendums regarding the Turkish membership. However, the mainstream parties have largely been supportive of the EU, along with its integration policies, giving perfect

[103]Almeida, Dimitri (2010), Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(3), pp. 237-253
[104]Hainsworth, n.6, pp. 82

ammunition to the right-wing parties to voice the popular dissent and protest against the developments that are considered to be anti-national.

[2.4] Conclusion

Right-wing parties have become firmly established as relevant and serious political players, who exercise significant political influence, both on their country's politics and at the European level. What is remarkable is that the right-wing parties have recalibrated their propaganda,moving away from xenophobia to some extent and towards pronounced Euroscepticism, and that this recalibration has turned out to be quite successful.

The right-wing success reflects popular disillusionment and lack of trust with the mainstream parties and institutions. In the post-materialistic and rapidly changing socio-economic scenario, right-wing parties' discourse reflects the popular opinion of the society and electorates at large – for example security, identity etc. In their discourse, these parties have not only discussed the failures of the ruling elites but have projected themselves as the possible solution to the problems of the society and of the nation. These parties have been able to exploit the opportunity available to them because the voters have been able to identify with them, and their programs and agendas, this in turn have provided them with legitimacy that has eluded them for a long time.

Chapter 3
Right-Wing Politics in Austria

"Today, Austria is at the same time small and great. It is independent and forms part of a greater whole… After multiple detours and sacrifices we Austrians have finally found back to our European vocation."
Thomas Klestil[1]

Austria, since 1945, has defied every odd to survive in global geopolitics. It found itself stuck in the fault-lines between east and west during the Cold War, with great powers jostling and trying to give a new meaning to neutrality which became a cornerstone of its political and foreign policy. With the establishment of consociational politics and the grand alliances, Austria tried to achieve a semblance of normalcy while keeping the extremist elements at bay.

In this larger picture, the right-wing elements in Austria did not disappear but were largely marginalised. It was in 1949 that*Verband der Unabhängigen*(League of Independents, VdU), constituting of former *Deutsche National SozialistischeArbeiterpartei* (Austrian National Socialists Party, DNSAP) members purged by the de-nazification process, was established to oppose the hegemonic duopoly of *SozialdemokratischeParteiÖsterreichs* (Social Democratic Party of Austria, SPÖ) and *ÖsterreichischeVolkspartei*(People's Party of Austria, ÖVP) as established under the Proporz system. Since then, right-wing politics has come a long way in leaving its mark on Austrian society and politics. The right-wing in Austria represented by *FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs*(Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ) has become a well-established feature of the political system since the mid-1980s. Their inclusion in government, especially in 2000, created a furore in Europe with many leading scholars declaring that a "dark sceptre haunts Europe" and European Union declaring diplomatic and economic sanctions on Austria. These events have not daunted the right-wing parties in Austria who claim to be fighting for the essence of 'Austrian Nationalism and Identity' to save politics and society from the disillusioned politics practiced by the mainstream parties. Moreover, the inter-party rivalry in FPÖ led to the rise of new right-wing party in

[1]Speech by Federal President Thomas Klestil on 1 July 1998, Vienna. Quoted from Thomas Angerer, *Regionalisation and Globalisation in Austrian Foreign Policy Since 1918*, in Bischof, Gunter, Penlika, Anton and Michael Gehler (eds.) (2002), *Austria in the European Union*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers).

Austria, namely Bundnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ), which included many members of FPÖ. Although this party is not as powerful or successful as FPÖ, it is nonetheless important as it divided the loyalties of the voters.

It is this phenomenon of FPÖ becoming a crucial player of the Austrian politics that is analysed in this chapter. The rise of right-wing politics in Austria has raised a lot of questions like, how can the support for the right-wing parties be explained? What are the reasons that led to the rise of right-wing politics? And what are the consequences of its rise for political competition in Austria. In addition, the questions have been raised regarding the relationship between the media and politics and the potential conflict of interest. The political style of these leaders has raised the issue of importance of communication and personal image.

In order to answer these questions the chapter is divided into sections and sub-sections. To contextualise the rise of the right-wing parties the first part of the chapter traces the development of the Austrian political system, how it developed from a mighty empire to a democratically elected Second Republic. The rise of VdU and how the mainstream parties reacted to it are discussed. The chapter then discusses the transformation of VdU into FPÖ focussing on the phases of development from 1955-1986. During this period, FPÖ was trying to find a foothold in the political system of Austria. Although marginalised, FPÖ tried to project itself as a credible player. Under the leadership of Norbert Steger, it was able get a semblance of acceptability by giving up some of its radical ideals. This is followed by a section on Freedom Party of Austria under the leadership of Jörg Haider. The emphasis has been laid on the rise and impact of Haider's leadership and how the electoral politics has panned.Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, FPÖ projected itself to be the only party that could seriously challenge the duopoly of ÖVP and SPÖ.

Freedom Party represents a perfect example of right-wing party moving from the margins to the mainstream. The party not only succeeded in garnering enough votes to enter national politics but its inclusion in the coalition government created an international controversy. An analysis has been done of the impact of FPÖ joining the government that

led EU to put diplomatic and political sanctions. The chapter seeks to understand how it has influenced the policy making in the country, what issues they have raised and how far have they been successful in pushing forward their agendas.

[3.1] Austrian Political System

Austria is a by-product of the dissolution of Habsburg monarchy and the ensuing peace treaties after the First World War. Its borders, established by the State Treaty of St Germain in 1919, mark the territory that remained after national states like the Czechoslovakian Republic, Hungary, Yugoslavia and others broke away and Italy's territorial demands were met. The new constitution created bi-cameral legislature with upper house *Bundesrat*formed by representatives from federal Lands and lower house '*Nationalrat'*, where deputies were elected in universal elections. The Federal President was elected for a four year term in a full session of both houses, while Chancellor was elected by the *Nationalrat*. As no political party gained parliamentary majority, Austria was governed by coalitions of conservative Christian Social Party and right-wing Greater German People's Party or *Landbund*which were more conservative that the first government of Social Democrat Karl Renner of 1919-20, that had established a number of progressive socio-economic and labour legislations.After 1920, Austria's government was dominated by the anti-Anschluss Christian Social Party which retained close ties to the Roman Catholic Church.

During the inter-war period, Greater German People's Party represented the right-wing and supported German nationalism and anti-clericalism. This party stood mainly for making Austria and the Austrian Germans a part of Germany. The Austrian nationalists' anti-clericalism was based on the assumption that the close link between the Habsburg's dynasty and Catholic Church had been an obstacle to the ultimate nationalist aim: unification with Germany.The support of Austro-fascism has been attributed largely to this pan-Germanism, nationalism, anti-Clericalism and anti-Habsburg feelings. These events paved the way for the ascendency to power of the Nazis and the long awaited Anschluss with Germany in 1938. The support for Anschluss was overwhelming and even more was the support for Nazi organisations, which flourished better in Austria than

in any country. The recruitment to the Nazi party and later to the *Wehrmacht* (Armed Forces), the *SS* and the *Waffen SS* was unprecedented. The identification of the large population with the *Reich* and the enthusiastic support for Hitler's policies was reflected in the harsh resistance until the end of the war.

For most of the post-war period, Austrian politics appeared unique in many respects. Between 1945 and 1966, the country was ruled by the grand coalition of the two major parties, the ÖVP and SPÖ.The allied powers licensed only two parties in 1945, the mainstream left Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and Christian Democrats later renamed People's Party (ÖVP). The experience of the Anschluss and Nazi rule deepened the commitment of the ÖVP and SPÖ to parliamentary democracy and Austrian statehood. De-Nazification of the country represented a critical challenge for the newly appointed unity government of SPÖ and ÖVP. Favourable Allied treatment of Austria was based in part on the premise that it was a liberated victim of Nazi aggression and not a Nazi ally. Thus, the government wanted to avoid any suggestion of collective guilt while at the same time prosecuting individual Nazis. The DNSAP and its affiliates were banned and ex-members were required to register. Approximately 536,000 did so by September 1946. The government attempted to draw a distinction between committed Nazis and those who had joined because of economic, social, or personal coercion. Both the SPÖ and the ÖVP actively solicited the electoral support of ex-Nazis, but this new bloc of voters also enabled the formation of a successor party to the pre-war parties in the nationalist-liberal camp.

The right-wing during this period was represented by various veterans' association that framed and voiced the views of ex-members of the DNSAP, small extremist groups; various association like patriotic associations that were closely associated with the past regime etc. In addition to these, some truly neo-Nazi organisations were founded secretly after the war.[2] However, in 1949, the Allies licensed a third party called *Verband der Unabhängigen* (VdU, League of Independents), which represented a voice, for the

[2]Ignazi, Piero, (2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, (USA: Oxford University Press), pp.108.

general opposition of national-liberal interests.[3]The SPÖ encouraged the formation of the new party expecting that it would split the antisocialist vote and thus weaken the ÖVP.

In the October 1949 parliamentary election, however, the SPÖ lost nine seats, compared with the eight lost by the ÖVP. The VdU, with nearly 12 per cent of the vote, won sixteen of these seventeen seats. The ÖVP and the SPÖ formed another coalition government continuing what came to be known as the "grand coalition". To limit internal conflict, the coalition partners devised a system to divide not only cabinet ministries but also the entire range of political patronage jobs in the government and nationalised industries based upon each party's electoral strength. This proportional division of jobs, called the "Proporz" system, became an enduring feature of coalition governments.[4]

This arrangement appealed to Austria's politicians and people mainly because it symbolised the reconciliation between social groups that had fought a brief civil war before the Anschluss by Nazi Germany in 1938. The duopoly of the ÖVP and SPÖ led to the systematic dividing of political offices and civil service posts. Also benefiting from this arrangement were key economic and professional organisations that were aligned with the two major parties. This provided for a pervasive institutionalised consensus and guaranteed that radical parties could not come to power.[5] This systemic feature not only ensuring their control over the country's political institutions, the bureaucracy, labour market associations and public enterprises, but also extending to all areas of public life.[6] This system of *Proporz* reinforced hegemony of the two parties and exclusion of other political networks.

Despite the monopoly of the two parties, VdU's success was immediate: first, in the 1949 elections, it received 11.7 per cent; secondly, in the 1951 presidential elections the VdU candidate got 15.4 per cent of the vote. These initial performances show that the third

[3]Williams, Michelle Hale (2006), *The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp.156.
[4]Solsten, Eric and McClave, David E. (eds.) (1993), Austria: A Country Study, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress), pp.xxviii
[5] Hale, n.3, pp.155
[6]Heinisch, Reinhard, 'Austria: The Structure and Agency of Austrian Populism', in Albertazzi, Daniele and Mcdonnell, Duncan (eds) (2008), *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy,* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan), pp.68.

Lager gained a conspicuous number of votes from 'de-Nazified' people.[7] However, SPÖ and ÖVP launched recruitment policies among the ex-Nazis so as to integrate them into the system and to remove a potentially dangerous monopoly of this constituency's representation from the VdU. This strategy was particularly effective and the VdU, already divided between an anti-socialist and an anti-clerical faction, was somewhat deprived of its own electoral constituency.[8] Through the State Treaty and the Declaration of Permanent Neutrality in1955, Austria regained its independence and declared its neutrality.The downfall of VdU came from the 1955 peace treaty that removed its raison *d'être: National Identity of Austria*. The *Anschluss* for a brief period had accomplished the nationalists' aim of a single German nation. The return to the borders of the first republic in 1945 implied the abandonment of the idea of political unity as well as that of German cultural unity, the '*Kulturnation*'.[9]

[3.1] (a) Transition from Verband der Unabhängigen toFreiheitliche Partei Österreichs (1955-86)

In 1955, VdU transformed itself into the FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ). FPÖ not only became the political successor to the VdU, but also to Austria's so-called 'third camp' (*Dritte Lager*).FPÖ underwent several stages of development, from being a party of ex-Nazis to liberal centrists to a nationalist and Populist Party. Austrian political scientist Karl Richard Luther[10] divides these stages into three: *Firstly,* from 1956 to approximately 1965, Luther calls the FPÖ a "*Ghetto*" party. Whereas its predecessor party the VdU had achieved nearly 12 per cent of the vote in its first year as a party, the FPÖ started with 8 per cent and found itself completely contained by the two-party government. Since, the party promoted pan-Germanism and stood against all that the mainstream consensus parties represented, the party lacked support as the spirit of opposition did not exist in Austria. The *Second* stage of FPÖ development from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s has been classified as the "*normalisation*" period. Luther argues that votes for the party achieved constancy at around 5.5 per cent and a

[7]Ignazi, n.2, pp.110.
[8] Ibid., pp.110
[9] Ibid., pp.110
[10]Luther, Kurt Richard (2000), Austria: A Democracy Under Threat from the Freedom Party?,*Parliamentary Affairs,* 53, pp. 426-442.

loyal core of supporters emerged. Yet the party continued to lack influence, as its numbers were miniscule and its lacked representation. It was during this period that the party transitioned toward more liberal-centrist politics. It began to move away from its German nationalist ideals and broadened its platform to include liberal economic free markets and centrist politics. However, the mainstream parties were comfortable in their positions of unchallenged power and had no incentives to seek junior coalition partners. Also, the legitimacy of this new liberal-centrist orientation remained questionable given its National Socialist origins.

During the *Third* stage from1970s-1986, the consensus government of the ÖVP and SPÖ remained popular and in control of the political party system. From the late 1970s until 1986 FPÖ experienced an "*acceptance*" stage in its political development. The party joined the Liberal International group of liberal parties in 1979 building its political credentials. By the early 1980s, its good behaviour as a liberal-centrist party convinced the other *Lager* that it could make an attractive junior partner for the governing coalition.In 1983, SPÖ leader Bruno Kreisky invited FPÖ to enter his coalition government making Steger the Vice-Chancellor of Austria. Despite achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the other political parties, the FPÖ however continued to lose its constituency. The party's electoral fortunes dropped to under 5 per cent of popular support in 1983. In its *Fourth* stage from1986-1999, support for and membership in the party continued to decline. This stage has been identified as the period of "*Populist Protest*" by Karl Luther. This stage begins with the internal party-leadership conflict in 1986 that resulted in Vice-Chancellor Steger's replacement by JörgHaider. Haider represented the nationalist roots of the party and expressed the dissatisfaction of many of its core members.

The party's nationalist wing had grown disgruntled with the decision of Steger to move the party to the liberal centre of the political spectrum. Haider's accession to the party helm caused the SPÖ to dissolve its coalition arrangement on the grounds that the party position had shifted dramatically with the replacement of Steger. Through the late 1980s, Haider moved the party increasingly further to the right of the political spectrum. He put forward a nationalist agenda including first pan-Germanism and later Austrian

nationalism and renewal. He took advantage of a changing climate in the 1980s when the public proved more receptive to opposition against the consensus politics of mainstream left and right parties than it had in earlier periods. The population was growing increasingly dissatisfied with grand coalitions and consensus and searching for a voice of opposition by the mid-1980s.

[3.2] Jörg Haider'sFreiheitlichePartei Österreichs (FPÖ)

From the late 1960s onward, Austria experienced what came to be called a period of de-alignment due to the consensus and bi-partisan attitudes of the main parties, as well as to the pro-liberalideological turn of the FPÖ under Steger's leadership. The de-alignment of the Austrian electorate brought together disenchantment,distrust, and anger vis-à-vis the parties themselves, as well as the political classand the political system. Therefore, dissatisfaction over the malfunctioning of thesystem and *Proporz*, over the unaccountability of politicians, and over mismanagementby the parties had been growing since the late 1970s. The anti-party andanti-political sentiments moved up from a minimum of 6 per cent points to amaximum of 13 points, according to different indicators, between 1974 and 1996.[11]

From 1980 to 1990, confidence inthe political institutions decreased substantially. All these indicators depicted a context of de-alignment from previous, old loyalties, inducing change and protestfor mounting dissatisfaction towards the system andpolitics.In the 1980s, protest against the consociationalism and *Proporz*and mistrusttoward politicians merged with the resurgence of right-wing sentiments such asanti-Semitism, xenophobia, and historical revisionism. The Waldheim[12] case andthe anniversary of the *Anschluss* revealed both widespread uneasiness inconfronting the problem of the Nazi past and creeping anti-Semitism.

[11]Ignazi, n.2, pp.116

[12]Kurt Josef Waldheim was an Austrian diplomat and politician. He was the fourth Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972 to 1981, and the ninth President of Austria from 1986 to 1992. While he was running for president in Austria in 1985, the revelation of his service in Salonica as an intelligence officer in the Wehrmacht during World War II raised international controversy which came to be known as Waldheim Affair.

As far as the new issues of crime and immigration were concerned, the rapid andsteep increase in the total number of foreigners after the collapse of the Berlinwallraised a wave ofxenophobic resentment. The level of xenophobia in Austria scored the highestin all of Europe in 1990: 77 per cent of Austrians agreed with the statement that'nationals should have priority in receiving jobs' whereas Italy was at 74 per cent,France at 63 per cent, Germany at 62 per cent, Norway at 57 per cent, andDenmark at 52 per cent.[13]

At times, Austria's political system seemed impervious to change, but by the middle of the 1980s, it had become clear that far-reaching social and economic trends were beginning to affect the country's politics. The dominance of the ÖVP and SPÖ was challenged by the re-emergence of the FPÖ, led by JörgHaider. After FPÖ's short-lived coalition with SPÖ between 1983 and 1986, it continued to attract increasing numbers of voters. In the national election of 1990, the FPÖ won 16.6 per cent of the vote, establishing itself as a new power centre. In early 1993, however, some members of the FPÖ withdrew from it and formed their own party, *The Liberal Forum* (Das Liberale Forum).

The societal and political changes that occurred in the 1980s like the decline of the party'sencroachment on society, higher voter volatility etc., prepared the way for newpolitical actors. In addition, the decline of confidence in the system fuelled bythe wave of scandals and corruption, the distrust toward the traditional elite, therise of new issues such as immigration and crime, plus the resiliency of oldthemes such as the question of nationalism, modified the political agenda. The image of FPÖ's image proved successful in presenting the partyas a new anti-establishment political choice with a charismatic leader at helm.

Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, FPÖ projected itself to be the only party that could seriously challenge the duopoly of ÖVP and SPÖ. The party not only succeeded in garnering enough votes to enter national politics but its inclusion in the coalition government. The democratic deligitimisation of FPÖ post EU-14 sanctions was largely rooted in the Austria's Nazist past than in the structure and issues of the party. The entry

[13]Ignazi, n.2, pp.118

into government for FPÖ had come after a period of extensive populist protest from 1986-1999, and its success had put its core values to question. In this period, FPÖ found itself in a position where it needed to rethink and restructure its position with the changing Austrian electoral space, in terms of its internal organisation and its major policy positions. This period represented the transition of Freedom Party of Austria from just being a protest party to a partner in government to become Austria's second strongest electoral force.

[3.2] (a) Organisational Changes of FPÖ

Under Haider's leadership, FPÖ underwent an extraordinary transformation. For decades, it was considered as a small opposition party, receiving between 5.4 and 7.7 per cent of the vote. It centred on anti-clerical libertarians, academics and entrepreneurs favouring greater flexibility and liberalisation. The party also included a significant segment of pan-German nationalists, some with right-wing extremist and neo-Nazi sympathies.

Following Haider's election as chairman, ReinhardHeinisch[14] identifies three phases of adaptation to changes in the political context of FPÖ. These three stages were: *firstly,* 'the Political Rebel Phase' (1986-91) - in its 'rebel phase', the party's goal was to convince the public that Austrians were sustaining a corrupt and wasteful system that catered exclusively to the special interests of political insiders. *Secondly,* 'the Social Populist Phase' (1991-96) - FPÖ's shift to social populism reflected the party's adaptation to the political conditions that emerged as a consequence of the post-1989 geopolitical changes. Economic liberalisation challenged Austria's organised market economy, causing a fundamental crisis of the Austrian model and triggering a surge of new fears and anxieties. The FPÖ during this period launched some of its most virulently xenophobic and racist campaigns, as reflected in for example, Haider's plan of reducing unemployment payments for people seen as "freeloaders", or complementing the economic policies of Third Reich. This tactic proved so successful that, in the 1991 elections to the Vienna state legislature, FPÖ gained 162,000 votes, increasing their share from 9.7 per cent to 22.5 per cent. The party was particularly effective in attracting

[14]Heinisch, n.6, pp.78

former SPÖ voters who had become disillusioned. *Thirdly*, 'the Anti-Internationalist Phase' (1996-2000), during this period FPÖ increasingly advocated a new Austrian patriotism. Departing from its pan-Germanic tradition, the Freedom Party began championing Austria's specific cultural heritage. In doing so, the FPÖ tapped into a traditionalist resurgence in which a desire to 'return to the roots' and 'back to nature' promised an escape from the accelerated process of modernisation. Accordingly, immigrants were no longer seen mainly as potential criminals and economic competitors, but more broadly as a threat to the fabric of Austrian society. Freedom Party campaigns contrasted the concept of multiculturalism with that of '*Überfremdung*' (over-foreignisation). In 1997, a new party programme explicitly endorsing '*Österreich Patriotismus*' (Austrian Patriotism)[15] was unveiled. The new programmatic approach focused on the Christian character of Europe and was intended to mobilise demands based on identity. Summing up, the approach adopted by the Freedom Party was designed to maintain political momentum and the sense of permanent campaigning.

The most important structural feature was the party's exclusive orientation towards its leader and it adapted itself organisationally to maximise his power. Organisational reforms in 1992 and 1995 diminished the power of party institutions and strengthened the top leadership around Haider. Specifically, representation in the party's (formally) highest decision-making body was replaced by a system rewarding electoral success instead of regional party membership. This process diluted the power of the traditional party apparatus and shifted the priorities away from programmatic development and membership-building to short-term strategies, popular campaigns and fighting elections. Furthermore, by depending on Haider's tireless campaigning for their electoral success, regional FPÖ functionaries usually acquiesced whenever he pushed the party in particular directions.[16]

Haider's vision was that the FPÖ should become a party wielding its power directly from a position inside the national government. To this end, Haider worked to shape the party preparing it for ascendancy. Beginning in 1986 when he assumed party leadership, the

[15] Freedom Party of Austria, 1997 Party Programme, Vienna, pp.6
[16] Hale, n.3, pp.173

party became increasingly centralized, developed an efficient party machine at all levels, recruited elites and notables, strengthened connections with think-tanks and intellectuals of the *New Right*, and utilized publications and other media to disseminate its message. Overall, the party established its credibility as a legitimate party of government through this calculated process of professionalizing its organization over the last fifteen years. The FPÖ has been labelled a *Führerpartei*(leader party), suggesting its authoritarian organizational tendencies. Its organisational structure has reflected a pyramidal design with party leader Haider at the top directing its activities. Local party offices had some power in terms of choosing their campaign issues which were supplemental to those coming down from the main party office under Haider's management. In 1992, the leader's office was formally created by changes in the party statutes that increased Haider's power and control.[17] Throughout the 1990s, he intervened more and more directly in the affairs of local level party offices, especially in the process of candidate selection. Haider also asserted his influence in the process of political recruitments.

Other organisational changes affected the FPÖ's 13-member Presidium, which was responsible for the day-to-day affairs and was de facto the most powerful party institution. The authoritarian nature of Haider's leadership was underscored by sweeping 'purges' of party officials at all levels and of varying political philosophies. These measures ranged from more or less voluntary departures after people had been humiliated and demoted to outright expulsions following disciplinary action. In this way, he rid himself of the leading exponent of pan-Germanic nationalism, KrimhildTrattnig and the main figure on the party's libertarian wing, HeideSchmid, who subsequently formed a new party, the Liberal Forum. Haider also flexed his muscles by indicating that displays of allegiance could result in forgiveness for officials who had fallen out of favour. The cult of obedience reached its peak in 1998 with the pledge of loyalty dubbed the 'Contract of Democracy', which he demanded all party officials sign.[18] When Haider recruited party officials, therefore, he was interested in loyalty to him personally and in already well-known people such as athletes and entertainers. He especially sought those who appeared young and flamboyant like himself. Subsequent *ad hoc* appointments and

[17] Luther, n.10, pp. 426-442
[18] Hale, n.3, pp.175

quick promotions created conflicts in local branches, but reinforced the image of permanent revolution. Summing up, the organizational changes thus paralleled the FPÖ's repositioning as an increasingly centralized populist party.[19]

The spectacular growth in support, which saw the FPÖ rise from 5 per cent in 1983 to 26.9 per cent in 1999, solidified Haider's unassailable position at the head of the party. Its entry into a coalition government with the ÖVP in 2000 heralded the beginning of a distinct fourth period in Freedom Party evolution, marked by Haider's formal withdrawal from the national leadership after international criticism.

[3.2] (b) Haiderisation of Party: *Analysing Charismatic Leadership*

This study began with a hypothesis that charismatic leadership has been critical in determining the right-wing parties' fortunes. As discussed in the previous chapter, charisma as defined by Weber is a quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. Charisma is not an attribute of leaders themselves, but is a quality that inheres in the relationship between a leader and his followers. Jörg Haider represented one such individual with the capacity of making the masses follow him. Throughout his career, Haider projected a brilliant, cultivated and dynamic image of himself. His rhetoric merged and alternated between modernising, pro-market, entrepreneurial and *Volkgemeinshaft*(People's Community) references, commitment to individual freedom and complacency regarding Austria's Nazi past, loyalty to constitutional rule and demand for radical change, and a direct appeal to the people.

The concept of charisma is about audiencereceptivity as well as leadership traits. Here the focus turns to why leadership appeal to voters. Votersare attracted to appealing leaders because they offer an easy way ofunderstanding political message. Leader-oriented parties are also appealing ifthis means that dissent, which could cause dissonance, is minimised. Theextensive focus on Haider in parts of the Austrian media and his control of theparty before splits began to emerge during 2000–2002, almost certainly played its

[19]Heinisch, n.6, pp.79

partin the rise of the FPÖ. Charismatic appeal can further be related to argumentsabout rapid socio-economic change and/or economic crises. Such developmentscan produce a sense of powerlessness, which may lead to non-voting. Thecharismatic leader increases voter effectiveness because they can create the belief that the leadercan change things, and by encouraging the belief that the leader is partof the people, he can be influenced by the people.[20]

The breakthrough in the elections of 1986 resulted in FPÖ outgrowing its minority status to become a credible player in the Austrian political scene. The party became more and more Haider's party and he used various methods to secure absolute control over the party. Under his leadership, FPÖ made significant changes in its internal dynamics and party structures so as to give manoeuvring space to its leader and direct contact with the public. The excessive centralisation of the party resulted in the leader and his staff being answerable only to the National Congress and the party executive was deprived of any relevance. Moreover by eliminating his opposition, through pushing out neo-Nazi components and pro-liberal factions, Haider secured absolute control over the party. The gaining of full control was also represented by the cadres' turnover through the appointment of newcomers and of independents to medium-to-high levels of the party's hierarchy, overruling the traditional inner *cursushonorum*(course of office). At the same time, the party apparatus was reduced to some 150 officials by 1990, and the party membership was kept at a very low level, maintaining the traditionally small dimension of the party organisation: the 36,683 members in 1986 increased to just 44,541 in 1996 implying a decrease in the voters/members ratio from 7.8 to 4.2.[21]

Haider, by the early 1990s, accomplished an immense turnaround within the FPÖ, which granted him absolute dominance.By the mid-1990s, Haider dissociated himself from the establishment and started a campaign against the Second Republic of Austria. The strategy was to end the two-party consociational politics. FPÖ campaigned for a transformative new Third Republic. Haider presented himself as the patron of hard

[20] Peter Merkl, Ten Theories of Extremist Right, in Merkl, Peter H. and Weinberg, Leonard (eds.) (2003), *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century,* (London: Frank Cass Publishers), pp.63.
[21]Ignazi, n.2, pp.116

working Austrian citizens stuck in a corrupt corporatist state.[22] The party wanted to inaugurate a Third Republic based on real party competition without the patronage and corruption that had accompanied consensus government throughout the post-war period. The FPÖ became the first party to voice its frustration with the patronage and corruption of the two party consociationalgovernment.[23] The opportunity to oppose an institutional arrangement that had become increasingly corrupt and archaic provided Haider with a unique context, as the rise of the FPÖ was made possible by the end of consensus government and the failure of established parties. In his 1995 book, Haider explained the party's position on inaugurating a new system of government saying, "Our call is for a 'Third Republic' a new era free from party patronage and nepotism. The coalition parties denounce this as 'dangerous' and for them it is. The Third Republic would put an end to their hitherto unquestioned rule. These old parties have everything to fear from more competition and openness.[24]

Protest against the consociationalism and *Proporz*and disillusionment with politicians merged with the resurgence of right-wing sentiments such as anti-Semitism, xenophobia. In a 1990 survey carried out by FESSEL-GfKInstitut, Vienna, 21 per cent of the Austrian population was classified as strongly xenophobic. The party developed on a basis of a populist style revolved around the party leader, which, in turn, pushed the party towards the *Führerprinzip*, weakening internal democracy and forcing out dissidents. The post-1986 FPÖ was shaped by the image of its own leader: young, dynamic, and endowed with great rhetorical and communicative ability. The personalisation of FPÖ politics was one of the party's best assets, even when his declarations appeared outrageous to the conventional political discourse, they did not adversely affect the 'protest' anti-political FPÖ constituency. The party radicalised along neo-liberal and authoritarian lines and trivialising the country's Nazi past. On many occasions, Haider has expressed sympathetic sentiments toward the past. The most resounding attempt at fostering a Nazi reconsideration - his admiration for the Third Reich's labour policy - forced Haider to resign from the presidency of Carinthia in 1991 (Map 3.i places Carinthia within the

[22]Pedahzur, Ami and Brichta, Avraham (2002), The Institutionalisation of Extreme Right-Wing Charismatic Parties: A Paradox?,*Party Politics*, 8(1), pp. 31–49.
[23] Hale, n.3, pp.168
[24] Ibid., pp.168

Republic of Austria, it is here that Haider had concentrated his political career), but he continued along the same lines, later praising Waffen-SS veterans as an 'example for the youth'. Even if the references to the Nazi regime are not always so explicit, Haider normally used terminology taken from the Nazi repertoire like, 'the final solution', using it in completely different contexts, for example: 'the final solution to the problem of agriculture.' It needs to be understood that the verbal slips or pro-Nazi rhetoric (for example, when during a Parliamentary debate, he described World War II concentration camps as "punishment camps") of Haider depicted that he was 'willing to challenge taboos and offend Austrian "partocracy" that was united in its condemnation of racism and anti-Semitism. In a subtle way, racist signals may have here contributed to the Freedom Party's anti-establishment message which, many argue, is clearly the most important driving force of its electoral success'.[25]

Map 3.i: Map of Republic of Austria

Source: www.planetware.com

[25]Ignazi, n.2, pp.121

In the case of Haider, it was the attribution of Volksnähe (populism, closeness to 'common' people), that acquired specific and ideological connotations such as 'representative of the true will of the people' in questions concerning immigration and authoritarian approaches to law enforcement. After Haider's death, even former political opponents praised his charisma as an 'outstanding politician' and 'exceptional political talent', thereby unwittingly reaffirming parts of this imagery that Haider had propagated about himself. Haider cleverly and quickly adapted the FPÖ's position to popular trends in changing situations, connecting the upcoming new issues with his core political themes: immigration, the EU and public security. Unexpected moves, often introduced by deliberately provocative messages and personal attacks on his critics, were an important and powerful part of his strategy. He consciously polarised public opinion, frequently representing opinions that promised to bear the biggest potential. His aim was to portray himself as the only politician who would not stand for the 'foul compromises' of mainstream parties. The recurring pattern of such enactments was to introduce his political initiatives under the general framework that the FPÖ was the only party that cared for the Austrian people. This, he argued, stood in contrast to what he dubbed the 'left-liberal power block', which allegedly cared more about foreigners or about maintaining their own power position. To depict FPÖ and its followers as the 'true Austrians', he categorised everybody else in the political arena as part of the 'left-liberalpower block', which also included the conservatives, and the Green Party.[26]

Under Haider's leadership, the party was transformed into a formationtightly controlled by a quasi-authoritarian leader. This was accomplished through strategic intra-party alliances and asystem of deputies devoted to Haider personally. Party tribunals, loyaltypledges, gag orders and the party leader's power of sanction over allmembers led to a concentration of political control in the hands of the topleadership beyond what would be normally acceptable in other democraticorganisations. Thus, the concerns of the party apparatusshifted away from longer-term goals and programmatic and institutionaldevelopment to shorter-term strategies, popular campaigns and fightingelections. At the zenith of his power, Haider could practically refashion theparty

[26]Gotsbachner, Emo, 'Talking about Jörg Haider: Enactment of Volksnähe', in Vivian Ibrahim and Margit Wunsch (eds.) (2012), *Political Leadership, Nations and Charisma*, (London; Routledge), pp.148.

at will. Frequent rotations of officials and periodic shake-ups of thecomposition of decision-making bodies added a dimension of 'permanentrevolution' to Haider's FPÖ. FPÖ became to be characterised by an exclusive orientation towards Haider, who wouldfrequently announce important changes in direction via the media.[27]

Charismatic leaders are important for the rise of right-wing political movements and Haider had successfully created a 'popular' persona for himself. Haider with his charisma oversaw the extraordinary rise of the FPÖ between 1986 and 1999. However, as political figures, they seem to be replaceable by persons imitating their tactics and style. This holds true for his successor, Heinz Christian Strache. Although, Strache enjoys a degree of popularity[28] and acts like his erstwhile mentor, the new FPÖ leader is much more beholden to the organisational reality of the party. He does not enjoy the same power and standing within the party apparatus and cannot act with as much impunity as Haider did.

[3.2] (c) Electoral Politics

The right-wing in Austria has had its share of ups and downs in terms of vote share and electoral politics. Varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties, greater scrutiny of policy making, breaking down of older forms of solidarity etc. led the voters to turn away from traditional parties to right-wing parties. Moreover, from the 1960s, emphasis on themes like environmentalism, globalisation, multiculturalism, drew voters away from the traditional politics, making anti-migrant, authoritarian, ethnocentric right-wing parties the favoured ones. Space opened up for the new parties to emerge and forces such as right-wing, Greens etc. have tried to fill in gaps. In this process of change, certain themes, like Euro-scepticism, immigration, territory etc., have assumed greater relevance. In this scenario, right-wing parties have projected themselves as the agent of change and influence.

VdU was established in 1949 largely to accommodate the ex-Nazi leaders and members. The party gathered momentum over the few years but was a picture of marginalisation

[27]ReinhardHeinisch, Austrian Right-wing Populism: A Surprising Comeback under a New Leader', in Grabow, Karston and Hartleb, Florian (eds.) (2013), *Exposing the Demagogues: Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*, Centre for European Studies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Berlin, pp.65.
[28]Gotsbachner, n.26, pp.156

due to its ideological leanings towards pan-germanic positions. In the 1949 legislative election the VdU obtained 11.7 per cent of the vote and won 16 seats in the National Council, with both the SPÖ and the ÖVP losing equally to the VdU. The party drew most of its support in areas where in pre-war times the rural *Landbund* (agricultural league) had been rooted and in cities with a high percentage of former Nazis. At the 1953 legislative election, its share of the vote fell slightly to 10.9 per cent and 14 seats in the National Council. The party during this period saw the start of internal strife between the adherents of liberal approach and the German nationalist faction centring on the former Luftwaffe General Gordon Gollob. This led to the collapse of the party, which was absorbed by the newly founded Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) of Anton Reinthaller in 1956.[29]

The FPÖ entered the Austrian party system, replacing the defunct VdU in representing the third *Lager*. Up to the end of the 1970s, the FPÖ remained marginal because of its ties with the past. The party represented the vote bank of traditional 'third *Lager*': middle class (self-employed and white-collar), pan-German, anti-clerical, hyper-conservative, and nostalgic. However, since the late-1960s the party had been relaxing its references to the past, affording a modernisation of its programme emphasising in particular free market and economic liberalism. During the 1970s, the FPÖ worked within consociational institutional constraints, expecting that its only opportunity to change its marginal status was through forging alliances with one or the other mainstream parties, since they held the monopoly on power. During the 1970s, the FPÖ began to foster a relationship with the Socialists rather than maintaining its weak position of opposition to the grand coalition.[30]Under the leadership of Norbert Steger, who replaced Friedrich Peter in 1980, the party moved along the path of gradually accepting the ideological features of liberalism. This process was propelled by acceptance of the FPÖ into the Liberal International in 1979 and found its final confirmation in the 1985 Salzburg programme. This ideological and programmatic revolution was completed by a more cooperative relationship with the Social democrats that set the conditions for the SPÖ-

[29]Federation of Independents explained, http://everything.explained.today/Federation_of_Independents/, Accessed on 21 April 2015
[30] Hale, n.3, pp.168

FPÖ government coalition in 1983-86. For the first time the FPÖ attained governmental responsibility and democratic legitimacy.[31]

The rising dissent due to ideological reorientation of the party paved the way for Jörg Haider to emerge as the new leader. The party under the leadership of Haider radically changed its programme and bought forth its nationalistic, pan-Germanic position and the politics of opposition to consociational government. The consequence of Haider's victory was that the government coalition collapsed and the socialists called for elections. The FPÖ had a resounding success in the early general elections of 1986, with a doubling of the votes from 5.0 to 9.7 per cent. The exit from the government reinforced the anti-system feelings of the traditional third *Lager* electorate that Haider revitalized with his populist rhetoric, which expanded to include new themes like wastage of welfare schemes, dishonest politicians to the defence of national integrity.

The first FPÖ electoral breakthrough occurred in Carinthia in 1989, when the party scored 29.0 per cent in the regional elections, gaining 13 percentage points compared to the previous elections. This victory gave the presidency of a region to an FPÖ member for the first time and, simultaneously, set the stage for the outcome of the 1990 general election. The FPÖ attained 16.6 per cent, polling its best result up to then. Its anti-establishment, law-and-order, anti-immigration campaign attracted votes from everywhere: 16.2 per cent of the FPÖ electorate switched over from the SPÖ and 27.6 per cent from the ÖVP. The working class emerged to be the largest occupational group within the party (25 per cent), followed by the traditional backbone of the national-liberal *Lager*, the self-employed professionals (21 per cent). In the following local and regional elections (1991) in Vienna, the FPÖ more than doubled its votes: in the municipal election it jumped from 9.7 per cent to 22.5 per cent. The party campaigned against the consociational and patronage-like style of government of the two mainstream parties, against political and administrative corruption, against the waste of social provisions, and, above all, it was successful in targeting immigrants as the main reason for crime and unemployment. Since 40 per cent of Vienna's population perceived immigration to be the most important problem, the FPÖ's steady propaganda against foreigners and

[31]Ignazi, n.2, pp.112

multiculturalism contributed highly to its success. The working class massively supported the party: 26 per cent of blue-collar workers (and 35 per cent of skilled workers) voted FPÖ. The FPÖ's breakthrough in 'red Vienna', where the SPÖ for the first time went below 50 per cent and ÖVP was overcome by the FPÖ, represented a watershed in the party's history. After that the party outgrew its minority status and has since competed on the equal as the other parties.[32]

As analysed in the following table (Table 3.1) in the following decade, Haider instituted transformative changes. Pursuing an aggressive vote-seeking strategy, the 'new' FPÖ under Jörg Haider increased its electoral share from 5 per cent to 26.9 per cent in 1999 and the party's share of seats in parliament from 5 to 52, forming government in coalition with ÖVP. The ÖVP renewed its coalition with the FPÖ after the 2002 general elections in which the Christian Democrats achieved an impressive victory: 42.3 per cent of the votes, 15.4 per cent more than in previous elections. As discussed later in the chapter, by joining the government the FPÖ became part of the establishment, essentially undermining its own anti-establishment appeal and the 'sanctions' of the Austrian government by the EU also had a counterproductive effect. This led the FPÖ to experience a catastrophic defeat by falling from 26.9 per cent to 10 per cent of the electoral votes. This outcome prevented the FPÖ from regrouping and reasserting itself in opposition. In 2005 the FPÖ, already weakened by internal dissent and disagreement, split following a grassroots rebellion against the leadership in government. This caused many of the party moderates to leave the FPÖ, under Haider's leadership, and form the BZÖ. Recognising that the latter group would exact a smaller price and be easier to control than the alternatives, ÖVP continued in government by forming a coalition with the BZÖ. After elections in 2006, Austria reverted to the format of grand coalitions when the Social Democrats defeated the Christian Democrats in a campaign fought over social policy reforms. Neither after 2006 or 2008 elections was the FPÖ invited into any serious coalition negotiations.[33]

[32]Ignazi, n.2, pp.115
[33]Heinisch, n.27, pp.52

Table 3.1: Elections to the National Parliament (Lower House, *Nationalrat*)

	Political parties*					
Year of election**	Greens	Social Democrats (SPÖ)	People's Party (ÖVP)	**Freedom Party (FPÖ)**	Alliance (BZÖ)	Liberals
1983		47.7	43.2	**5.0**		
1986	4.8	43.1	41.3	**9.7**		
1990	4.8	42.8	32.1	**16.1**		
1994	7.3	34.9	27.7	**22.5**		6.0
1995	4.8	38.1	28.3	**21.9**		5.5
1999	7.4	33.2	26.9	**26.9**		
2002	9.5	36.5	42.3	**10.0****		
2006	11.1	35.3	34.3	**11.0**	4.1	
2008	10.4	29.3	26.0	**17.5**	10.7	

Source: Heinisch, n.27, pp.51

Who Votes for Freedom Party of Austria and Why

To characterise the party as right-wing, it is important to look at who votes for the said party and why. Since the eighties, Austria's political parties had to face an electorate that was increasingly critical, with increasing political disenchantment and fluctuating groups of protest voters. The FPÖ during this period underwent radical change. Behind the electoral success of FPÖ were not only pent-up criticism and the discontent of weary voters, but also conflicts between those who benefited from modernisation and those who lost, as well as conflicts between those who belonged to the sheltered, public sector and those who found themselves in the unsheltered, private sector. Problems resulting from increasing economic rationalisation and competitive pressure in the nineties only intensified these conflicts. The elections of 1999 represented a watershed moment in the history of Austrian voting. The marked decline in the traditional party affiliation and competition resulting from the rise of new issues and situation resulted in the fading away

of traditional spheres of influence. This created space for other parties to take advantage of the broken alliance and realign the electoral arena with them at the centre.

Within this scenario, Freedom Party of Austria represented a typical case of the right-wing populist protest parties that emerged in Europe towards the end of the last century. Central to the FPÖ's populist belief system has been the constant reference to a vaguely defined concept of a single people with unified interests and preferences. Along with a common-man ethos and the 'centrality of the purported popular will', the populism of the FPÖ is also characterised by opportunistic and frequently inconsistent programmatic positions as well as by a strong preference for plebiscitary politics, direct appeals to the population, and the reduction of political issues, choices and groups to dichotomous categories such as yes/no, good/bad and us/them. In parties such as the FPÖ, populist orientations merge with radical right-wing elements. Like all right-wing groups, the FPÖ represents a rejection of the European enlightenment tradition in the form of political liberalism, universalism and humanism. Unlike its politically extremist right-wing forebears (VdU) who alleged the biological and genetic superiority of their own ethnos to justify intellectual and cultural hegemony, the new right, such as the FPÖ, uses these concepts to advocate cultural and ethnic autonomy. The racism, xenophobia and cultural relativism of the old right have been resuscitated by the new right to justify extreme measures in the name of protecting the sanctity of one's own ethnos.[34]

FPÖ represents a case where through a long series of 'incidents' and misunderstandings, there has been a constant de-legitimising of representative democratic institutions through the cult of the leader and the myth of the popular will. The disdain for liberal democratic procedures and the continuous appeal to the *Völk*are are crucial indicators of populist leaning. Moreover, distrust for the idea of equality of man expressed by overt xenophobia and differential racism, the populist rhetoric (the common man and the 'powerless' against the establishment and the 'powerful'), the appeal to natural community and

[34]Heinisch, n.27, pp.50

ethnicity (the *Völkgemeinschaft*) against citizens' rights, all expressed by Haider's FPÖ, place the party much closer to right extremism rather than liberal-conservatism.[35]

According to a study done by Plasser and Ulram[36], FPÖ is by far the most successful right-wing party in Western Europe. Its rise has been consolidated by three long-term trends in Austrian voting behaviour: *firstly*, a blue-collar realignment: since 1999 FPÖ has been the strongest party among blue-collar workers. *Secondly*, a generation-based realignment: FPÖ is also the strongest party among voters under 30 years of age. *Thirdly*, gender realignment: FPÖ is the strongest party among male voters.

[35]Ignazi, n.2, pp.122
[36]Plasser, Fritz and Ulram Peter A (2000), *The Changing Austrian Voter*, (Vienna: Signum), pp. 18

Table 3.2: FPÖ's Votes within Social Groups

	1986	*1999*	*Change*
Overall	10	27	+17
Men	12	32	+20
employed	13	33	+20
unemployed	11	34	+23
pensioners		28	
Women	7	21	+14
employed	7	22	+15
unemployed	8	22	+14
pensioners	5	19	+14
Age			
18–29	12	35	+23
30–44	11	29	+18
45–59	6	21	+15
60–69	8	21	+13
70+	9	25	+16
Occupation			
self-employed/professionals	15	33	+18
farmers	5	10	+5
civil servants/public service	9	20	+11
white-collar	13	22	+9
blue-collar skilled	11	48	+37
blue-collar un/semi-skilled	8	45	+37
housewives	8	25	+17
pensioners	7	24	+17
in adult education	9	23	+14

Source: Kurt Richard Luther, The FPÖ: From Populist Protest to Incumbency inMerkl, Peter H. and Weinberg, Leonard (eds.)(2003), *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers) pp. 189.

As the political landscape in Austria changed, immigration and its consequences for the labour market, education and the housing situation in urban areas, economic restructuring

and resulting unemployment, the costs and distributive effects of welfare policies, and questions of national independence versus European integration made their way onto the public agenda. Particularly among the lower social and educational groups of the population, these changes were often met with diffuse fears of worsening social conditions and economic prospects, as well as with preoccupations about a loss of traditional socio-cultural identities. The FPÖ redirected its oppositional impetus from political renewal to *"politics of resentment"*[37], mixing up fears and preoccupations with an ever more aggressive attack against the political class. The dominant issues are immigration and law-and-order politics, the rejection of Austria's accession to the European Union and the failure of the governing coalition to meet these new challenges. Much more than in the case of other parties, the electoral success of the FPÖ depend on its media presence and performance which is explained later in the chapter. The success of the FPÖ is inseparably linked to the political communication skills, the populist impression management and the strong rhetoric of its leadership. As the electorate is in a state of flux, FPÖ has found itself under constant pressure for mobilisation. The electoral success has largely depended upon its ability to pursue proactive issue-management, sharpen criticism, mobilise latent resentment and polarize the electorate.

Plasser and Ulram[38] identified the following factors that have resulted in the electoral success of the Freedom Party: *first*, 13 years of a Grand Coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP resulted in an "oversized coalition", an oppositional vacuum that was successfully filled by the FPÖ. *Second*, the erosion of traditional party loyalties as a result of increasing party weariness, anti-party sentiment and anti-establishment.*Third*, the "colonisation" of the public sector and the state-owned industries by the two governing parties, a system of "Proporz", and patronage.*Fourth*, new cleavages between the public and private sector – unskilled blue-collar workers in particular felt under threat from economic and technological changes. *Fifth*, an increase in resentment towards foreigners in spite of a restrictive immigration policy, the fear of increasing crime, and, in some cases, worries about Austria's traditional cultural identity. *Sixth*, entry of Austria into the European

[37] Betz, Hans-Georg(1993), The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe, *Comparative Politics*, 25(4), pp. 413-427.
[38]Plasser and Ulram, n.36, pp.43

Union and the planned enlargement of EU were viewed with extreme scepticism by large sections of the Austrian electorate. *Seventh,* the image of Jörg Haider, his professional "impression management" and his ability to mobilise protest votes by stirring up deeply rooted resentment and prejudice. *Eighth,* growing desire for a general change in Austrian politics, which has been fulfilled by the SPÖ and ÖVP to only a very small degree.

Haider adapted the FPÖ's position to popular trends in changing situations, connecting the upcoming new issues with his core political themes: immigration, the EU and public security. Unexpected moves, often introduced by deliberately provocative messages and personal attacks on his critics, were an important and powerful part of his strategy. His aim was to portray himself as the only politician who would not stand for the 'foul compromises' of mainstream parties. As analysed in Table 3.3, in 1999 it achieved a record share of 26.9 per cent of the vote. Its vote share dropped substantially in 2002 after its first participation in government, but in 2008 it was again able to obtain 17.5 per cent of the vote share.[39]

Table 3.3: Election Results for the National Council in Austria, 1983-2008

Election	SPÖ	ÖVP	FPÖ	Greens	Lib	BZÖ	Other
1983	47.7	43.2	5.0				4.2
1986	43.1	41.3	9.7	4.8			1.0
1990	42.8	32.1	16.6	4.8			3.7
1994	34.9	27.7	22.5	7.3	6.0		1.6
1995	38.1	28.3	21.9	4.8	5.5		1.4
1999	33.2	26.9	26.9	7.4	3.7		2.0
2002	36.5	42.3	10.0	9.5	1.0		0.7
2006	35.3	34.3	11.0	11.1		4.1	4.1
2008	29.3	26.0	17.5	10.4	2.1	10.7	4.0

Source: Sylvia Kritzinger, New political conflict and the radical right in Austria, Policy Network, 24 May 2013, http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4408&title=New-political-conflict-and-the, Accessed on 25 April 2015

[39]Sylvia Kritzinger, New political conflict and the radical right in Austria, Policy Network, 24 May 2013, http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4408&title=New-political-conflict-and-the, Accessed on 25 April 2015

It seemed that the FPÖ's success was unstoppable until 2005 when intra-party rivalries flared up, leading to Jörg Haider's decision to leave the FPÖ to organise his own party, the BZÖ. The split had less to do with policy, and more to do with personal rivalries inside the party. Voters also punished the FPÖ for their failure to carry forward their agenda (i.e. the FPÖ voted in favor of the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005). The party's share of the vote took a nose-dive to 15 per cent in 2006. Still, FPÖ's quick recovery under the leadership of Heinz-Christian 'Strache, and its return to a more radical xenophobic, populist rhetoric with slogans like 'Vienna must not become Istanbul', and the BZÖ's rapid rise brought the extreme right to new heights in the 2008 parliamentary elections, as the two parties won a combined and unprecedented 28.24 per cent of the vote (Figure 3.a). The death of the BZÖ's charismatic leader, Jörg Haider in 2008 proved detrimental for the party which experienced an ideological split over economic policy. The Carinthian support-base of the BZÖ was absorbed by the Die Freiheitlichen in Karnten (Freedom Party Carinthia, FPK), a party ideologically proximate to, and supportive of, the FPÖ.[40]

[40]Stockemer, Daniel and Lamontagne, Bernadette (2010) , Pushed to the Edge: Determinants of Popular Support for Right Wing Extremism in Austria, SSRN Electronic Journal · September 2010, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228237879, Accessed on 17 June 2016

Figure 3.a: Combined Electoral Support for FPÖand BZÖ in Parliamentary Elections.



Source: BMI (Bundesministerium Fur Inneres 2009).

Throughout its changing fortune, the reactions of the national media and civil society have emerged to be a crucial aspect. Three specific forms of media influence have received particular attention. First, the *agenda setting* effect of the media, whereby 'those problems that receive prominent attention on the national news become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation's most important'. Second, by elevating some issues over others the media *prime* citizens by influencing their evaluative standards for judging political actors. Third, the media package news in a *frame*, which is often defined as 'a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them'. The central point is that the media influence political attitudes and, as a result, vote choice.[41] The reactions of civil society, in addition of the press, to the appearance of right-wing populism are also important. Large and frequent protests about right-wing populist parties not only demonstrate that a significant

[41]Art, David (2006),*The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*, (UK: Cambridge University Press), pp.30.

proportion of the population considers them politically illegitimate, but sustained protest can also create significant organizational and recruitment problems.

The political might of the largest tabloid newspaper in Austria is even greater than its counterpart in Germany. Over 40 per cent of Austrians read the *Kronen Zeitung* (KZ) daily, giving it the highest circulation rate per capita in Western Europe. In the words of one former Austrian Chancellor, 'it is impossible to govern without the support of the *Krone*'. During the national parliamentary election campaigns in the fall of 1986, *Krone* gave Haider, the head of a party that had polled less than 3 per cent in public opinion polls that summer, twice as much coverage as any other Austrian newspaper. From 1986 until February 2000, *Krone* stuck to a pro-Haider line.[42]

Krone's most widely read columnist, Richard Nimmerichter, referred to Haider as 'an unfaltering representative of the truth and indispensable ally of the average man'. Apart from giving Haider favourable coverage and lauding him in editorials, *Krone* proved to be a critical ally when the FPÖ suffered political setbacks. During a debate in the Carinthian parliament on 13 June 1991, Haider castigated the national government's employment policies and lauded those of the Third Reich. This statement provoked an outcry from the SPÖ, who convinced ÖVP that was already looking to get rid of Haider to vote for a motion of no-confidence in the Governor. Haider was dismissed several weeks later, and many considered his political career over.[43]

But *Krone* came to Haider's defence. The editorial staff defended Haider's statement, argued that the Nazis had indeed created jobs and printed a barrage of editorial and readers' letters portraying the young politician as the victim of the machinations of the two major parties. Nimmerichter noted that Haider's statement had a 'certain justification in the facts', since Hitler had virtually eliminated unemployment in Austria within six months after the *Anschluss*. While Haider would have been wise to qualify his statement, Nimmerichter continued that Haider's statement became 'a state affair' when the SPÖ, ÖVP and the Greens 'saw their chance to finally get rid of their annoying competitor

[42]Art, David (2007), Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria, *Party Politics,* 13(3), pp. 331-349
[43]Ibid., pp. 331-349

Haider'. The massive campaigning launched by *Krone* resulted in a positive vote during the 1991 state elections in Vienna. The FPÖ won 22.5 per cent of the vote, more than doubling its total from 1987 and robbing the SPÖ of the absolute majority it had enjoyed since 1954. Throughout the rest of the decade, *Krone* continued to support Haider and defend him against charges of right-wing extremism and Nazi apologia.[44]

Austrian civil society did not react to the FPÖ with the same vigour as in many European countries. When the FPÖ captured nearly 10 per cent in national elections, there were no protests in Austria. Haider faced little protest from Austrian civil society until he was winning over 20 per cent of the vote in national elections, and even then these protests were sporadic and largely confined to Vienna. In contrast to many European countries, the Austrian right-wing benefited from the actions of elite political actors. The FPÖ was not precluded from holding power, and indeed ruled in local and state coalitions before joining the national government in 2000. By the 1990s, the FPÖ was a highly organized and wealthy political party, and one that was viewed as politically legitimate by the majority of Austrians.

[3.2] (d) FPÖ in Government

In 1983, for the first time in the FPÖ's history as already mentioned, it came to power in a 'small coalition' together with the SPÖ. Far from being the beginning of some sort of political normalisation, FPÖ's participation in government created a new series of internal tensions. The lack of electoral backing for the liberalization of the party, the loss of FPÖ's protest vote, were all factors that contributed to creating a favourable breeding ground for the internal revolt led by Jörg Haider. Reacting to this sudden radicalisation, Chancellor Vranitzky broke up the governmental coalition and called for new elections, putting a temporary end to the FPÖ's integration efforts.[45]

On 3 October 1999, FPÖ finally broke the hold the two major parties had maintained on Austrian politics. The SPÖ remained the strongest party, with 33 per cent of the national vote and sixty-five seats in the lower house of parliament (*Nationalrat*). The FPÖ and

[44] Ibid., pp. 331-349
[45]Eatwell, Roger and Mudde, Cass (eds.) (2004), *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge*, (Oxon: Routledge), pp.31.

ÖVP tied for second with approximately 27 per cent, giving both parties fifty-two seats. For the FPÖ, this was an increase of eleven seats.After extensive negotiations, the SPÖ and the ÖVP were unable to form a coalition excluding FPÖ.[46] Shortly thereafter, Wolfgang Schussel, leader of the ÖVP, announced that his party had come to a power-sharing agreement with the FPÖ that would split the twelve cabinet ministries equally. Despite the fact that they had finished a few hundred votes behind the FPÖ, the ÖVP secured the chancellorship as well as the ministries of foreign affairs and interior. The FPÖ was awarded the only other position of significance, the finance ministry. Haider agreed to stay out of government entirely, opting to remain head of the southern province of Carinthia.

Anticipating the formation of a new government that included the FPÖ, Austria's fourteen EU partners pressed the European Council Presidency, to announce three steps that would be taken by the EU. The Portuguese Council Presidency issued a statement "on behalf of 14 Member States". It announced that "*the governments of the fourteen Member States will not promote or accept any official bilateral contacts at political level with an Austrian government integrating the FPÖ; there will be no support for Austrian candidates seeking positions in international organizations; Austrian Ambassadors in EU capitals will only be received at a technical level*." By issuing diplomatic sanctions against Austria before the swearing-in of the new government, the EU Members had hoped to prevent its formation; however, this effort failed.[47]

The FPÖ-ÖVP coalition tried to reassure Europe by issuing "Responsibility for Austria-A Future in the Heart of Europe." This document was the preamble that - at the insistence of Federal President Thomas Klestil - the two coalition partners officially signed and made part of their agreement. In this declaration, the government "condemns and actively combats any form of discrimination, intolerance, and demagoguery in all areas...The Federal Government works for an Austria in which xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism have no place...The Federal Government supports the Charter of European

[46]Saltiel, David H., (2000) Austria: Crossroad or Roadblock in a New Europe? *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 11(2), pp. 41-58

[47] Freeman, H.B (2002), Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and the European Union Members' Sanctions, *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review,* 25(1), pp.109-124

Political Parties for a Non-Racist Society and commits itself to work for the exemplary realisation of its fundamental principles in Austria".

Although the sanctions were more symbolic than practical in nature, their announcement was debated throughout Europe. Supporters of sanctions declare that Europe is a "community of shared values" (German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer) that must clearly distance itself from the "insulting, anti-foreigner and racist utterances of Jörg Haider" (EU Parliamentary President Nicole Fontaine). The European Union states are concerned with delivering "clear signals, a type of symbolic policy" (EU Foreign Policy Representative Javier Solana). Opponents warn that the EU ban breaks "the fundamental right of each democracy to decide freely which parties its citizens can vote for and which of these parties should form the government...A cabal of EU heads of government is determining whether the democratic decisions of the people are valid".[48]

The three "Wise Men", the former Finnish president MarttiAhtisaari, the former Spanish foreign minister MarcelinoOreja and an international lawyer, JochenFrowein of Germany, appointed by the European Union recommended that the diplomatic quarantine of Austria should end. Austria's respect for human rights is "no less than in other EU member states", their report concluded. According to the report, the "wise men" believed that it would be "counter-productive" to continue the sanctions adopted against Austria. "The measures have already generated nationalist sentiments in Austria, above all because they have sometimes been wrongly interpreted as sanctions against the Austrian people," the report added. The "wise men" strongly criticised the Freedom party itself, even though Jörg Haider, infamous for his sympathetic remarks about the Nazi period, has officially resigned as its leader. They said that the party's election campaign created an atmosphere where openly xenophobic demonstrations were a normal event. But in general, violence against foreigners has been less frequent in Austria than in other EU countries, they added.[49]

[48]Peter Schwarz, *The European Union's sanctions against Austria*, World Socialist Website, 22 February 2000, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/02/haid-f22.html, Accessed on 26 April 2016.
[49]Ian Black, *End Snub to Austria, says Three Wise Men*, The Guardian, 9 September 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/austria.ianblack, Accessed on 26 April 2016

The EU sanctions against Austria were a result of concerns amongst EU member states about the racist and fascist undertones of the party and the fear of there being a right-wing radical party in the middle of Europe. The ensuing EU report was also important because of the uniqueness of the EU's reaction: never before had the EU so swiftly reached consensus. The sanctions were unable to produce the desired result of discouraging right-wing extremist tendencies among the Austrian electorate. According to a poll published by the Austrian *SozialwissenschaftlicheStudiengesellschaft*about 66 per cent of the Austrian population claimed to beoutraged by the sanctions. Even among voters of the Green Party, normally stern critics of anything relating to the FPÖ, 40 per cent claimed to be outraged. The figures for the FPÖ voters and the ÖVP voters were almost identical - 84 per cent and 82 per cent respectively.[50]

The sanctions were both success and failure because the reason behind these - Jörg Haider -resigned on 1 May 2000, and was succeeded by Susanne Riess-Passer, who was generally seen as a more moderate force in the party. Also there was considerable decline in the vote share of FPÖ, where in 1999 they had received almost 27 per cent of votes, it declined to only 10 per cent by 2002 elections. However, certain questions were raised on the imposition of the sanctions as the coalition government was established in Austria after a free and fair election and that why did EU not had made no similar demands when other countries (specifically Italy where right-wing government was elected in 1994) in the Union had included in their governments communists and post-fascists.

Once the sanctions had ended in 2000, there was rising internal dissent within the party. The FPÖ struggled with its shift from an anti-establishment party to being part of the government, which led to decreasing internal stability and electoral support. As the party was no longer able to criticize the government and instead was held responsible in introducing certain unpopular cutbacks, it began to lose ground in the regional elections. Its electorate became unhappy with the party's need to support some neo-liberal ÖVP economic reforms; the government's peak in unpopularity occurred when tax reform was postponed. Strife erupted in the party over strategy between party members in

[50]Adamson, Goran (2009), 'The spectre of Austria - Reappraising the rise of the Freedom Party from 1986 to 2000', (Ph.D Thesis; London School of Economics), pp.146

government and Haider, who allied himself with the party's grass roots.[51] Moreover, several prominent FPÖ government ministers resigned in the 2002 "Knittelfeld Putsch"[52] which led to new elections being called.

In the subsequent election campaign, the party was deeply divided and unable to organise an effective political strategy. It changed leaders five times in less than two months, and in the 2002 general election decreased its share of the vote to 10.2 per cent, almost two-thirds less than its previous share. Most of its voters sided with the ÖVP, which became the largest party in Austria with 43 per cent of the vote. Nevertheless, the coalition government of the ÖVP and FPÖ was revived after the election, with FPÖ having less leverage over the government policies.[53]

Split in FPÖ: Rise of BZÖ

After losses in state and local elections, a section of party under Heinz-Christian Strache of the FPÖ's Vienna branch threatened to force a change in the party's direction. On 4 April 2005 Haider formed thebreakaway Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bundnis Zukunft Österreich, or BZÖ), which included most of the representatives in parliament apart from the national party leader, the vice chancellor and several prominent member.

As a consequence, the old FPÖ was split at all levels, resulting in bitter infighting over party resources and identity. While the BZÖ under Haider continued the coalition with the ÖVP, thus retaining the resources of a party in government, however, it lacked electoral legitimacy and clear programmatic direction. Only in Carinthia, where Haider pressured nearly the entire local FPÖ branch into joining the BZÖ, did the new party have a real organization. In turn, Heinz-Christian Strache was elected chairman of the Freedom Party. In the first election in which FPÖ and BZÖ competed against each other

[51]Meret, Susi (2009), 'The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support', (Ph.D Thesis, 2009, Aalborg University), pp.187.
[52]Knittelfeld Putsch refers to a conference of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) which took place on 7 September 2002 in the small Austrian town of Knittelfeld, Styria, called due to political differences within the party leadership. It was followed by, Vice Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer, Minister of Finance Karl-Heinz Grasser and the chairman of the FPÖ parliamentary club, Peter Westenthaler, announcing their resignation, as did some other functionaries. Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel then renounced the coalition pact, which led to early elections being called.
[53]Heinisch, n.6, pp.81

− in Styria − the former lost all its seats in the regional legislature, but still obtained a far larger share of the vote (4.6 per cent) than Haider's BZÖ (1.7 per cent). The real test for Strache came in the Vienna election on 23 October 2005. Following a xenophobic and racist campaign, the FPÖ succeeded in defying low expectations and polled almost 15 per cent − far more than the BZÖ's 1.2 per cent. Using the same strategy for the federal elections on 1 October 2006, the party managed to increase its vote nationally, securing 11 per cent. No longer under Haider's leadership, the BZÖ barely crossed the 4per cent threshold. Even this modest success was almost entirely due to Haider's strength in Carinthia from where the BZÖ drew nearly half its support.[54]

The strategy of the FPÖ's leadership under Heinz Christian Strache has been to counter its collapse to 6 per cent in the opinion polls by reverting to aggressive right-wing populist vote maximization. It targeted blue-collar voters alienated by the neo-liberal discourse and policies of an ÖVP-dominated government accused of 'social coldness'. The BZÖ had initially stuck to its strategy of retaining office by stressing responsibility and policies favouring small business and a limited state, but its campaigns have largely reverted to right-wing populist discourse. The election was thus contested by two parties claiming to embody the 1986-99 period of successful populist mobilization.With the BZÖ just crossing the 4 per cent electoral threshold, Austria's parliament now contained two mutually-hostile populist parties. Continuing to defend the monolithically-conceived Austrian nation against the corrupt national and European elite (as well as against undeserving 'others'), the FPÖ remained firmly right-wing on the socio-cultural dimension and committed to moving leftwards on the socio-economic dimension. Using techniques copied from Haider, Strache soon succeeded in becoming its new personification.[55]

Initially, the BZÖ might have appeared as a popular alternative to the FPÖ, but it lost much of its support to the FPÖ since Haider's death just days after the 2008 election. The weakening of the BZÖ was furthered when Haider's former followers in Carinthia renewed their alliance with the FPÖ in 2010. An opinion poll indicated that the FPÖ is

[54]Ibid., pp.82
[55]Heinisch, n.6, pp.83

again reaching high levels of support under its current leader, Heinz-Christian Strache. Meanwhile, its radical-right rival, the BZÖ, appears now to have become a minor party in electoral terms.[56]

To sum up, the BZÖ's emergence has led to a kind of bifurcation of right-wing within the Austrian electoral space. Austrian voters could thus choose between two populist parties, whose combined vote would have exceeded the number of votes ever obtained by FPÖ. Yet these parties appear to be incapable of working together and have appealed to rather different constituencies. FPÖ, for its part, remained a right-wing Populist Party, focused exclusively on responsiveness, whilst the BZÖ set itself the challenging task of tempering the responsiveness of its middle-class populism with responsibility.[57]

[3.3] Issues Raised by Freedom Party of Austria

In the past few decades, FPÖ has become a well-establishedfeature of Austrian party system. Two perspectives dominate the effort to understand support for the right-wing and its repercussions for other political parties and for party competitionmore generally. First, how the success of the right-wing reshapes party competition and thus threatens established political parties.Second, the ideological and attitudinal drivers ofright-wing support are examined. Here it has been shown that the political views thatunderlie right-wing support are related to newly emerging values andconflicts over issues such as immigration and European integration.Like every other right-wing party in Europe, FPO has used various issues to further their agenda and enhance their electoral base. They have portrayed themselves as the protectors of a welfare state under attack from liberal immigration policies. Immigration, in turn, gives them an opening to capitalise on the rising fear of voters. Moreover, as nationalists who want to protect the strong welfare systems their citizens currently enjoy, they frequently express their criticism of migrants in terms of economic pragmatism, explaining that there is simply not enough money and jobs to go around.

[56]Aichholzer, Julian; Kritzinger, Sylvia; Wagner, Markus and Zeglovits, Eva (2014), How has Radical Right Support Transformed Established Political Conflicts? The Case of Austria, *West European Politics*, 37(1), 113-137

[57] Luther, Kurt Richards (2014), *AustrianPopulism and the Not-So-Great Recession: The Primacy of Politics*, Working Paper 38, Keele European Parties Research Unit, Keele University.

Haider pursued an uncompromising vote-seeking strategy as soon as he took over FPÖ.This implied a high degree of ideological flexibility and political opportunism in the pursuit of popular or politically expedient positions, even if they contradicted programmatic fixtures of the FPÖ. Thus, he shifted from apro-European to a sharply anti-European stance and, departing from theparty's libertarian roots, began criticising economic liberalisation as socialdumping. Moreover, Haider moved the FPÖ from pan-Germanic to Austro-patriotic,from anti-clerical to rather traditionalist Catholic, and fromlibertarian to protectionist positions, all within less than a decade. Despite the programmatic changes, the FPÖ was successful in creatingthe appearance of ideological consistency and continuity.[58]

[3.3] (a) Crisis of Identity: *From Pan-Germanism to Austrian Patriotism*

For a right-wing party, the idea of nation, nationalism and national identity represents a homogeneous entity with core values whose essence is not open to dilution from other cultures. As Mikenberg explains, the nationalistic myth is characterised by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalising ethnic, religious, cultural and political criteria of exclusion and to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity.[59]For all of the right-wing parties, the preservation of national identityis paramount. They tend to see themselves as theonly true "patriots" in the country. They claim that unlike the other partiesin the country, they are not ashamed of the country's (wartime) historyand long for a return to a more glorious past. This view can beseen in the way that party leaders in Germany and Austria downplaythe Holocaust and Nazi crimes in World War II.[60]Austria has over the years struggled to create an identity for itself. The problem of Austria's national identity - as an autonomous entity or an appendix of a 'Great Germany'- has periodically emerged in Austrian history.[61]

[58]Heinisch, n.27, pp.64
[59]Hainsworth, Paul (2008), *The Extreme Right In Western Europe,* (London: Routledge) pp.78
[60]Givens, Terri (2005), *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe,* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp.36.
[61]Ignazi, n.2, pp.110

The *Anschluss* for a brief period accomplished aim of a single German nation. The return to the borders of the first republic in 1945 implied the abandonment of the idea of political unity as well as that of German cultural unity. At the same time, this 'return' brought about the need to create a founding myth of the new republic. This myth came from the interpretation of the *Anschluss* as an act of aggression by Hitler's Germany. Given these premises, the second republic was inevitably born with an incomplete identity.[62] Austria was permitted and even encouraged by the Allies to take on the guise of victimisation at the hands of Hitler and Nazi Germany in the Second World War. The country was not forced to make reparations or issue internationally broadcast public apologies after the war. Neither its population nor its officials were made to undergo war tribunals as the Germans were. Instead, the Allies allowed Austria to take on a new identity rather than admit its guilt in the Holocaust, Austria claimed to be Hitler's first victim.[63] The historical narratives of the Nazi past served concrete political goals in Austria. Classifying Austrians as the victims of Hitler helped Austria's founders to disentangle their nation's identity from that of their northern neighbours. The lack of a strong Austrian national identity was viewed as one of the chief weaknesses of the First Austrian Republic (1918-1938), widely known as "the republic no one wanted". The defence that Austrians were, like Jews, victims of Nazism was used to parry claims from Jewish groups for restitution. The victim myth also paved the way for the reintegration of half a million former Nazis into politics and society. The two large parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) openly courted these voters after the general amnesty of 1947, but most of them joined VdU and later FPÖ. Thereafter, the Socialists in particular reached out to former Nazis to gain edge over ÖVP. Unlike in West Germany, there was virtually no public debate in Austria for forty years about the Nazi past.[64]

To ensure Austria's emergence as an independent Western democracy, the elites constructed a 'founding myth of post-war Austria as a nation of victims' and of 'Austrians as *non-Germans*' although, some analysts observed that, 'at least half of the population' did not share this view. Even the idea that most Austrians were part of a

[62] Ibid, pp.118
[63] Hale, n.3, pp.154
[64]Wüstenberg, Jenny and Art, David (2008), Using the Past in the Nazi Successor States from 1945 to the Present, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 617, pp. 72-87.

'non-political [German] *Kulturnation*' based on a common language, history and ethnicity was equated by the political elites with Nazism, and the rejection of the concept of an Austrian nation was regarded as right-wing extremism.[65] This weakness of the Austrian identity was revealed by a 1949 survey in which 49 per cent of the citizens did not consider themselves to be Austrian citizens.[66] This was substantially overcome in 1960s when those who did not recognise an autonomous national Austrian identity fell below 50 per cent: and finally, in 1990, 74 per cent of the people agreed that 'Austria is a nation' compared to 47 per cent in 1964.[67]

The VdU and, afterwards the FPÖ reaffirmed the association of Austria to the German *Kulturnation*, despite the fact that the 'pan-german' faction within the party was fading. In its early years, the FPÖ had opposed the idea of a specific Austrian national identity and acted as the heir to the pan-German tradition, which included the years of Nazi rule in Austria. During the party's liberal period, especially between 1978 and 1986, it played down these roots and pragmatically accepted Austrian patriotism. When Haider became chairman, the party returned to the pan-German tradition. Haider's well-known remark about the Austrian nation being an "ideological monster" (*IdeologischeMissgeburt*) was squarely in the tradition of pan-Germanism, which never accepted that Austria as a country could have a distinct Austrian, non-German character.[68]

However, Haider moved the party away from liberal-centrism toward nationalism in 1990s. He made a key strategic decision to frame his party as the long overdue liberators of post-war Austria, promising to return the country to its roots by bringing the discussion of Austrian identity to the political agenda. Haider recognised that a vacuum existed in the collective national psyche, which had never come to terms with its culpability in the ethnic cleansing of the Second World War.[69] By bridging the gap between an Austrian, non-German orientation and an Austrian, pan-German one, the FPÖ

[65]Heinisch, n.6, pp.71
[66]Katzestein, Peter, The Last Old Nation: Austrian National Consciousness since 1945, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Jan., 1977), pp. 147-171
[67]Ignazi, n.2, pp.111
[68]Pelinka, Anton (2001), The Haider Phenomenon in Austria: Examining the FPO in European Context, *The Journal of the International Institute*, 9(1), http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0009.102/--haider-phenomenon-in-austria-examining-the-FPÖ-in-european?rgn=main;view=fulltext
[69] Hale, n.3, pp.154

was able to muster all the ideological inclusiveness necessary to create a distinct exclusiveness. Two factors were of central importance: the increased tension in the consociational arrangement and the Waldheim Affair in 1986. The first created instability in the consensus government and the second led to the question of the post-war victimisation imaging. The important legacy of this event in terms of its effect on FPÖ was that it broke the taboos created in the process of re-imaging Austria as a victim of Hitler. It brought an end to the post-war Austrian pattern of silence regarding Nazism. It opened the doors to discussions of Austrian identity and nationality and raised the question of what it meant to be an Austrian. One answer had to do with pan-Germanism, but by the early 1990s the FPÖ had shifted this dialogue away from German nationalism toward a uniquely Austrian identity. This new identity included elements of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the rule of the Hapsburgs, and emphasized an ethnic community based on blood succession demarcating the Austrian *Volk* from others.[70]

The party manifestos clearly reflect these nationalisttendencies.The Austrian Freedom Party's preamble to its October 1997 party program was entitled "Austria First."[71] In this documentthe party declared itself to be the only credible guardian of Austrian patriotism:"*The Freedom movement puts Austria, the country and its people, above everything else especially party political interests*." Although the Freedom Party had been known for its German nationalism,the party has placed more emphasis in recent years on Austrian nationalism,while still acknowledging the common German cultural heritage.[72]

Moreover, FPÖ modified some of its traditional positions in order to attract and retain a larger electoral audience. One point concerns the national issue. This sensitive subject, central to party identity, was rapidly revised in connection with the collapse of the old international system following the fall of Berlin wall. The linkage to the German *Kulturnation* and the mistrust of the Austrian nation, repeatedly defined by Haider as 'an

[70] Hale, n.3, pp.159

[71]This was not the first time FPÖ had put forward the idea of "Austria First". As discussed later in the chapter, in 1992, the Freedom Party pursued a petition drive on an initiative that called for a stop to immigration. Entitled "Austria First," this initiative was ultimately unable to gather enough signatures to push the legislature to take any action. In the campaign for the initiative, the Freedom Party linked foreigners to crime and an increase in drug dealing.

[72]Givens, n.60, pp.36

ideological monster', was discarded introducing instead a novel nationalistic *Austrian* sentiment. The 1997 party programme stated the central role of national identity and the necessity to defend it from foreign invasion. Coupled with strong opposition to the European Integration, the FPÖ opposed Austrian accession to the European Union in the 1994 referendum on the basis of the defence of national culture and way of life against globalization and multiculturalism. The people's cultural community (*Volkgemeinschaft*) was raised as a counteracting factor against the disruptive effects of the excessive presence of foreigners and the standardising implications of the supra-national process. The defence of small homogenous communities became a key reference for the party.[73]

The uncertainty of what defines Austrians and their historical accountability entails a collective feeling of vulnerability *vis-à-vis* foreign influences, resulting in surrogate forms of identity. The Austrian way of life or *Lebensart* - referring to an eclectic collection of customs, values, habits and social mores - has taken the place of a national identity founded on a shared historical experience. This cultural ambiguity has created space for populist mobilisation aimed at exploiting latent fears and multi-layered meanings.[74]

[3.3] (b) Immigration and Integration

Although Austria has a long history of immigration, migration is largely associated with "guest worker migration" that started in the early 1960s and the "new immigration" of Eastern European, African and Asian migrants that began in the late 1980s. At the time of 2001 census, Austria had a foreign population of about 711,000 or 8.9 per cent of the total population, and a foreign born population of just over 1,000,000 or 12.5 per cent. Immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia (almost 62.8 percent from these countries), which were the major sources for labour recruitment, formed the majority of immigrants, making up more than two thirds of the total foreign population. However, as a result of the "new immigration" from other European, mostly Eastern European

[73]Ignazi, n.2, pp.119
[74]Heinisch, n.6, pp.72

countries as well as from Africa and Asia (approx. 12 per cent), and, to some extent, Latin America and the Caribbean, the immigrant population diversified.[75]

Despite the increase in the number of migrants in Austria, the official line remains that "*Austria is not a traditional country of immigration*", and its immigration policies reflect this ambivalence. Traditional labour migration and family reunification programs have been severely curtailed in the wake of widespread public discontent over levels of immigration in the early 1990s. Since then, new integration measures have been introduced specially keeping in view that the country's accession to the European Union has brought more open borders and with that thousands of temporary seasonal workers.[76]

Until the early 1990s, Austria designed its migration policy exclusively on the basis of economic considerations. The government left the determination of migration levels largely to the "social-partners", comprising organised labour and institutionalised business interests. The pattern of migration to Austria during this period changed due to the end of Cold War, break-up of Yugoslavia and increase in number of asylum applications from third world countries. The transformation of the Austrian political system and the increasing politicisation of immigration issue, led the government to adopt a major reform of immigration legislation. The objective was to restrict immigration, including annual immigration quota. In 1992, new Aliens Act[77] tightened up regulations on the entry and residence of foreigners. A second law introduced in 1993, the Residence Act, established contingents for different categories of migrants. In contrast to the quota used for the issuing of work permits, the contingents for residence permits defined the

[75]Kraler, Albert, *Immigrant and immigration policy making – A survey of the literature: The Case of Austria*, Paper prepared for the IMISCOE C9 State of the Art Report in view of the First Annual Imiscoe Conference in Coimbra, Portugal, December 2004.

[76]Jandl, Michael and Kraler, Albert, *Austria: A Country of Immigration?*,Migration Policy Institute, 1 March 2003, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/austria-country-immigration, accessed on 10 November 2015.

[77]Austria's post-World War II economic boom led to a growing demand for labour and an important shift in immigration policy. Austria began to forge bilateral agreements with southern and south-eastern European states in the 1960s. These pacts were designed to recruit temporary workers. Agreements with Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966) were quickly followed by the establishment of recruitment offices in these countries. The oil crisis and ensuing recession in 1973 radically reduced the demand for guest workers. As a response to the recession, recruitment was ended, the access of foreigners to employment restricted, and a new law - the Aliens Employment Act - passed in 1975. This law remained one of the primary control mechanisms of foreign employment.

absolute number of permits that would be issued in any single year. By the mid-1990s, still another round of immigration legislation reforms was under way, resulting in the passage of the 1997 Aliens Act. The act merged the 1992 Aliens Act and the 1993 Residence Act into a single law. The stated aim of the reform was to promote the integration of aliens already present in Austria, in the place of new immigration. This concept was called "integration before immigration", and the law became known as the "integration package".[78]

The 1997 reform of the Aliens Act addressed the deficiencies of the previous acts to some degree, by introducing the principle of "consolidation of residence", that is, increasing residential security (protection from expulsion) for long-term third country nationals. Access to the labour market, however, remained decoupled from immigration legislation until the reform of immigration legislation in 2002. The latter introduced the so-called residence certificate which gave unrestricted access to employment for long-term third country nationals. The most important factor introduced by the law was the principle of "successive" consolidation of residence in increments of five, eight, and ten years. An immigrant with fully "consolidated residence," that is, an immigrant continuously residing in Austria for 10 years, would have a legal status (except in terms of political rights) very similar to that of an Austrian citizen. Only convictions for major criminal offences would allow the state to take away the residence right of such a migrant. At the same time, new restrictions were imposed, this was particularly true regarding the employment rights of migrants who had arrived as family members, making them subject to a waiting period of eight years of continuous residence, later lowered to four years, at which point access to employment would be granted.[79]

Finally, a new Naturalization Act was passed in 1998 that retained the core elements of the previous regulations. These include the principle of *jus sanguinis* and a regular waiting period of 10 years for naturalization. The new law shifted the burden of proof on the individual immigrant, who now has to show that he or she is sufficiently integrated into Austrian society (through learning of the language and cultural integration courses).

[78]Jandland Kraler, n.76
[79]Ibid.

Most importantly, the migrant has to prove that he or she was economically self-sufficient, that is, not in need of social assistance. Also, even minor criminal offenses now constitute reasons for denial of citizenship. A migrant may now acquire citizenship after a period of 15 years on grounds of good integration. Still, in the majority of cases, Austrian citizenship is awarded on a discretionary basis, possible after 10 years of continuous residence. Since 1998, largely due to demographic reasons (most migrants who entered Austria in the period of high immigration between 1988 and 1993 were eligible for citizenship on a discretionary basis) the number of naturalizations has continued to increase from 17,786 in 1998 to 31,731 in 2001.[80]

The 2002 reform, however, also massively expanded the scope for temporary labour migration. In contrast to "guest-workers" who were equally regarded as temporary migrants were permanently excluded from "denizenship", i.e. the secure status long-term migrants enjoy, as well as citizenship. In addition, mandatory integration courses were introduced and labour immigration limited to highly skilled migrants.[81] Mainstream parties have reacted only tentatively to the FPÖ's challenge. Particularly as regards immigration and integration policy, where one would expect the extreme right to shape debates, there is ample evidence that the discourse has shifted to the right, while the actual extent of extreme right influence on policy-making remains contested.

Fabio Wolkenstein[82] presents two distinctively different arguments in this regards. The first line of argument suggests that the FPÖ has been instrumental in passing more restrictive immigration policy. In view with the "contagion from the right" thesis, the contention is that the diffusion of the extreme right's ethnocentric and anti-establishment frame has influenced the debates on immigration and Islam in particular. With the growing salience of restrictive immigration and integration policy positions, mainstream parties are expected to adapt accordingly. In October 2001 for example, with the FPÖ in government, the Schüssel I cabinet passed a new integration law, one which obliged

[80]Ibid.
[81]Kraler, n.75
[82]Wolkenstein, Fabio, *Austria*, in Radko, Hokovský and Jiří, Kopal (eds.) (2013), *Politics and Policies of Integration in Austria, Hungary, Czechia, Denmark and at the EU Level*, (Burešova, Czech Republic: Brno &Praha), pp.26.

immigrants to take integration courses. Failure to pass the course could result in the denial of residence and work permit renewal. Despite the objection from FPÖ, the asylum law was not changed, it was decided that asylum seekers would be fingerprinted. Notably, in the aftermath of 9/11, pressure from the FPÖ and Haider himself forced the coalition government to adopt a "harder line" on immigration. Step by step, so the argument proceeds, such a harder line is normalized in everyday politics, reflected in the mainstream right's eventual commitment to 'get tough' on immigration, which also holds true for the ÖVP. The second line of argument contends that the influence of the extreme right on immigration and integration policy should not be overstated. According to Wolkenstein, several studies have shown that, "(…) the direct influence of radical right parties on policy change was rather marginal," which is also connected to the mainstream right's shift. Analogical to the FPÖ's three periods, the highly restrictive stance on immigration and integration could not be maintained in government, as the following examples illustrate. The FPÖ in 1999, when entering government, insisted on an immediate immigration stop, it softened its stance and committed only to a decrease in foreign immigration in 2002 at the dawn of Schüssel II. Similarly, while in 1999 it called for a consistent deportation of foreign criminals, only a more effective use of detention prior to deportation was suggested in 2002. Once voted out of office, the FPÖ readopted the initial restrictive stance.

Similar to Wolkenstein's first argument, Fraser Duncan[83] also argues that right-wing parties are generally acknowledged to have raised the prominence of immigration as an issue, to have framed discourse about it and to have brought about more restrictionist policies. It has been argued that the right-wing has been a major force in constraining and shaping the way immigration policy was developed in many countries in the 1990s. In most cases, however, this influence has been indirect, brought about the dynamics of party competition, rather than directly shaping policy outputs in cabinet, as mainstream parties of right and left responded to this mobilisation by toughening their rhetoric and introducing more restrictive policies. For example, the FPÖ, in opposition throughout the 1990s, mobilised effectively around anti-immigration themes in electoral campaigns and

[83] Duncan, Fraser (2010), Immigration and Integration Policy and the Austrian Radical Right in Office: the FPÖ/BZÖ, 2000–2006, *Contemporary Politics*, 16(4), pp. 337-354.

the 'Austria first' popular initiative. For many analysts, the content of subsequent government legislation on labour migration, migrants' rights, citizenship and asylum reflected many of the radical right's central concerns. Exclusion from office therefore did not seem to prevent the right-wing influencing policy.

In 1992, the Freedom Party pursued a petition drive on an initiative thatcalled for a stop to immigration. Entitled "Austria First," this initiativewas ultimately unable to gather enough signatures to push the legislatureto take any action. In the campaign for the initiative, the Freedom Partylinked foreigners to crime and an increase in drug dealing.Immigrants are seen as a threat to national identity and the homogeneityof the country. In its 1993 party program, the Freedom Party states,"The protection of cultural identity and social peace in Austria requires astop to immigration". The issue of law and order arisesagain with the reference to "social peace." The party's position on immigrationis outlined clearly in the 1994 electoral platform:*We [the Freedom party] stand for the preservation of natural ethnic groups and the protection of their cultural identity. However such protection is not to be extended to new immigrants. Austria is not an immigration country*.[84]

The conclusions that can be drawn from the above argument is two-folds- it would not be wrong to say that the issue and debate over immigration has shifted to the right-spectrum of politics and right-wing parties have influenced the policy-making in this regard. However, the level of influence that these parties have exerted is a matter of debate and it varies from country to country. In terms of Austria, it would be right to say that FPÖ has used the migrant rhetoric to gain popular votes but immigration issue had not been the only issue, it was one of many.

Throughout the lifespan of the two Schussel cabinets, the FPÖ and the BZÖ were eager to claim credit for the various legislative initiatives on immigration, particularly for reforms in asylum and citizenship. They focused on tightening the right to seek asylum, cultural and linguistic integration, and the establishment of immigration quotas. Haider argued, especially after the events of 9/11, that the asylum laws as they stood must be

[84] Givens, n.60, pp.37

altered since these laws were too lenient; they permitted criminals, murderers and terrorists to enter Austria, and they did not adequately protect citizens. The Freedom Party argued that quotas should be lowered and that a seasonal or a guest worker model should be adopted. It called for language and cultural integration courses. Failure to successfully complete the integration course, the Freedom Party demanded, should lead to sanctions, beginning with deductions from social assistance benefits and eventually leading to possible deportation. Heated dialogue ensued between the Freedom Party, the People's Party, the parliamentary opposition and civil society organizations, such as the Catholic organization Caritas. After much internal politicking, the new integration law was passed in October 2001. Although some aspects of the new law were a compromise between the People's Party, pressure from Haider and the Freedom Party forced the coalition to adopt a harder line towards immigration. All immigrants, new and old, who could not demonstrate an adequate level of German would be forced to take integration courses.[85] It was determined that the state would be responsible for only 50 per cent of the cost of the course, resulting in the SPÖ and the Green Party accusing the ÖVP of caving in to the FPÖ.

[3.3] (c) Economic Outlook

> A fair market economy means free competition plus social responsibility.
>
> *FPÖ 1997 Party Programme*[86]

In the 1980s, the ideological appeal of the right-wing consisted of a winning formula that combined a pro-market position on the socialist–capitalist dimension and an authoritarian position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. The winning formula attracted a broad constituency of small-business owners, routine white-collar workers, blue-collar workers and in-actives. In the course of the 1990s, established right-wing parties modified their ideological appeal and moved to a more centrist (albeit still right-wing) economic position. This change was inspired by the simultaneous decline in voters with capitalist–authoritarian preferences and increase in working class voters with socialist–

[85]Andrej Zaslove (2004), Closing the Door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(1), pp.99-118
[86]FPÖ 1997 Party Programme, pp.20

authoritarian attitudes. To expand its vote-share, they had to meet the preferences of the latter group without neglecting those of the first group. Hence, it gradually moved to a more centrist position on the socialist–capitalist dimension, while maintaining its fierce authoritarianism.[87]

The corner-stone of the Austrian polity is the so called 'social partnership', the Austrian form of liberal corporatism. Traditionally, corporatist arrangements have excluded FPÖ, while the SPÖ and ÖVP have been represented both by their intra-party groups which dominate the major interest groups and by their government members. 'Social partnership' is characterised by three features. First, it builds on the granting of privileges to the major interest groups. These privileges have eased the establishment of comprehensive and centralised interest organisations. Second, 'social partnership' means co-operative behaviour of trade unions and business in labour market relations. Third, the major interest groups participate intensely in public policy-making. Indeed, during the heyday of 'social partnership' in the 1960s and 1970s, the government largely delegated real decision-making in some policy areas to the major interest groups. Later, the government assumed a more active role, but the major interest groups remained central players in the social and economic policy areas. 'Social partnership' is consensus democracy *par excellence*: decisions are agreed between labour, business and the government. Yet it is the decision of the parliamentary majority of the day whether and to what extent it allows such arrangements to tie its hands.[88]

The political beginnings of the Freedom Party had its roots in the liberal camp and this was emphasised by indicating individual freedom as one of the cardinal points of the party's ideology and view of the world. Particularly under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the FPÖ was clearly in favour of implementation of what the party considered a 'fair' market economy. The FPÖ supported tax reduction policies and the demand for less state intervention and more privatization and liberalization of the national economy. In 1997

[87] De Lange, Sarah (2007), A New Winning Formula? : The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right, *Party Politics*, 13(4), pp. 411-435

[88] Müller, Wolfgang and Fallend, Franz (2004), Changing Patterns of Party Competition in Austria: From Multipolar to Bipolar System, *West European Politics*, 27(5), pp.801-835

Party Programme, FPÖ supported the complete deregulation of the economic life.[89] According to the party, this would bring economic prosperity and a higher degree of stability to the Austrian economy and labour market. In particular, the party demanded the withdrawal of the political parties from their dominant involvement in the national economy and reduced influence of the interest groups on public life.[90] The party described the public administration as 'the most expensive' and 'protected sector, for which the state spends a continually growing part of its budget[91]. Also the emphasis on Austria not being a country of immigration was been placed. According to FPÖ, the pressure on wages and rising prices in the housing market, which result from uncontrolled immigration, make for a distortion of the labour and housing markets, which endanger social freedom. Enterprises which need labour in certain seasons of the year (*Gastarbeiters*) should have the possibility to take on foreigners for a limited time through the development of a seasonal model.[92]

FPÖ's propaganda has been full of references to "freedom" and "liberty", the economic model that the party supports is not so much a "free" market economy, but rather a "fair" market economy (*Faire Marktwirtschaft*). While the fair market economy was clearly seen as more market-oriented than the current economic model of Austria, which was allegedly perverted by clientelism and socialism, it was also explicitly posited against neo-liberalism.[93] As explained in 1997 party programme[94]:

> The model of a fair market economy requires equality of the productive factors - labour and capital. In accordance with the principle of fairness allowing for appropriate remuneration for labour, men and women should receive the same pay for the same work. A fair market economy is the response to unbridled capitalism which exploits man and nature and to failed socialism which degrades its "workers" to administrative objects. A fair market economy should create an economic climate that encourages independence for those in production and those wanting to start their own firms.

Also the BZÖ has among its key focal points the guarantee of the *social* market economy. Despite the change in terminology, however, the BZÖ's "social market economy" is not

[89]FPÖ, 1997 party programme, pp.20
[90]Ibid., pp.21
[91]Ibid., pp.23
[92]Ibid., pp.23
[93]Mudde, Cas (2007), *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp.123.
[94]FPÖ, 1997 party programme, pp.20

much different from the FPÖ's "fair market economy": a combination of a basic free market with low taxes and various protectionist measures for small businesses, shopkeepers, and farmers.[95]

However, as a part of the government in 2000, FPÖ's position on economic policy shifted to accommodate its coalition partner ÖVP. Towards the end of grand coalition government, the trade unions had been more reluctant to accept proposals to introduce cutbacks in the welfare and pension systems. They were less willing to consider the budgetary consequences of maintaining the policy status quo and to acknowledge the bargaining power of the government. Consequently, some government proposals - already agreed between the SPÖ and ÖVP at the cabinet level - met the resistance from the trade unions. In the end, the ÖVP leaders were not happy with the outcome: policy changes were kept to a minimum and not worth their considerable electoral costs. These considerations, together with the FPÖ's general rejection of corporatism and internal ÖVP rivalries between the leaders of the central party and those of its business wing, accounted for the government's detachment from corporatist policymaking. Therefore, ÖVP-FPÖ government was less willing to negotiate its proposals with interest groups than the grand coalition. One reason for this pushing back of 'social partnership' was that the government was suspicious that the trade unions would use negotiations only for trying to water down and delay reforms.[96]

Post 2000, there has been hardly any change in the economic outlook of FPÖ. Economic liberalism goes along with the emphasis that the FPÖ has started to give to social issues.[97] The FPÖ describes itself as a Heimat and social party. This development has created an ideological combination in which a regulated liberalism that includes privatisation and low taxes is combined with support for the Austrian welfare state. The Austrian welfare state is described as a 'joint and agreeing community that has its duties', consisting primarily in preserving the individual from the risks that emerge or can emerge in the course of life 'with age, handicap, sickness, misfortune of some kind, unemployment and

[95]Mudde, n.91, pp. 124
[96] Wolfgang and Franz, n.86
[97]*Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik, Ein Leitfaden für Führungsf unktionäre und Mandatsträger der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ 2008

ill-fated events to the Austrian citizens'.[98] It emphasises that social rights are to be considered conditional on effective control against social abuse and against privileges. The unemployment among immigrants (almost 10 per cent) is seen as one of the most burdensome costs for the Austrian welfare state, making its existence in the future very precarious, unless more rigorous restrictions are approved by the government. According to the FPÖ, if something is not done, the 'welfare state cannot be financed and the bills of hundred and thousand seniors' pensions in Austria cannot be safe anymore', because 'the doors to the Austrian welfare state are wide open to looting'.[99]

Immigrants have been regarded as welfare state abusers, taking advantage of a relaxed legislation that gives them access to social benefits. According to the party, this makes them subjects living at the expenses of the Austrian state and citizens. The measures suggested by the FPÖ to limit immigration include rigid quotas of immigrant labour based on the effective need of the labour market and harsher rules in the assignment of working and residence permits in general.[100] The entrance of foreign labour, *Gastarbeiters* as the FPÖ should be conditional on the internal demand and exclusively when it is otherwise impossible to employ Austrian citizens.[101] Over the period of time, FPÖ has adjusted its position regarding the welfare structure of Austria but it has not voiced down its criticism of migrants. The party still continues to support privatization with minimal state intervention. In relation to taxes, the FPÖ declares that the party basic principle on economics is to relieve the tax pressure on the citizens considering lower taxes the precondition for a healthy economy'.[102]

[3.3] (d) Anti-Establishment Rhetoric

Robert B. Barr defines anti-establishment politics as a rhetorical appeal used in opposition to the elite. This term is comparable to what some call anti-politics, anti-party politics, etc. In other words, they deal with a specific rhetorical appeal, where political actors attempt to gain support through an 'us versus them' discourse, opposed to the

[98] Ibid.
[99] Meret, n.51, pp. 191
[100] Ibid., pp.191
[101] Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik, FPÖ 2013, pp. 115
[102] Ibid., 148

entire class of individuals wielding power.[103] Often described as populist or extremist, these parties accuse established parties of forming an exclusionary cartel, unresponsive and unaccountable, and they portray public officials as a homogeneous class of lazy, incompetent, self-enriching and power-driven villains.[104]

FPÖ presents a perfect example of anti-establishment party. Since 1980s, Austrian citizens had started to show fatigue with the two ruling parties particularly with the whole idea of corporatism and consociational politics. Under the leadership of Haider, the FPÖ promoted itself as the only political force that could challenge the system. The party demanded and supported radical transformation in Austrian politics. The critique against the power concentrated in the hands of the political elite became one of the central issues debated by the FPÖ during the late 1980s and until the party's entry in government in 2000. The FPÖ described Austria as a country ruled by an undemocratic system, in which corporate elements, privileges and corruption dominated unhindered among the political elite.

In doing so, they appeared as the only authentic anti-establishment force. This constituted a strategic advantage for the FPÖ: even as they were presenting themselves as anti-establishment force and a challenge to the dominant consensus, they could start from the position of a party already established within the political spectrum and not an outsider like most of the right-wing parties because when Haider took hold of the party in 1986, the FPÖ was still in government. Haider's populist discourse directed at 'the people' against the corporatism, the ossified arrangement associated with what he called the 'old parties' (*Altparteien*) SPÖ and ÖVP.[105] Haider actively mobilised the themes of popular sovereignty and liberty of choice in order to articulate the growing resistances to the bureaucratic and authoritarian way in which the country was governed by the consociational elites. At first his campaigns were directed against the federal government accused of corruption, excessive political patronage and presented as being responsible for rising unemployment. He advocated the privatisation of state-owned enterprises,

[103]Barr, Robert R (2009), Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics, *Party Politics*, 15(1) pp. 29–48

[104]Schedler, Andreas (1996), Anti-Political-Establishment Parties, *Party Politics*, 2(3), pp. 291-312

[105]Marchart, Oliver (2001), The 'Fourth Way' of the Ultra-Right: Austria, Europe, and the End of Neo-Corporatism, *Capital & Class* 24(73), pp.7-14.

lower taxes and a reduction of regulation on business and individuals. From the 1990s onwards, starting with the federal parliamentary campaign in Vienna, the theme of immigration began to play a central role and the discourse of the party acquired a clearly populist character. The discursive strategy of Jörg Haider consisted in constructing a frontier between an "us" of all the good Austrians, hard workers and defenders of national values, against a "them" composed of the parties in power, the trade unions bureaucrats, the foreigners, the left-wing artists and intellectuals who were, all in their own way, contributing to the stifling of political debate.[106]

The FPÖ has continuously campaigned against the status quo in Austria. The FPÖ has insisted that these features of Proporz should be abolished and has demanded furthermore that the people be given more possibilities to directly influence the political process, mainly through a more extensive use of plebiscites and referenda. After Jörg Haider took over the leadership of the party in 1986, the FPÖ began to develop more elaborate plans for constitutional change. In the early 1990s the party presented its proposals for a Third Republic. These included abandoning the parliamentary system of government and replacing it with a presidential system, introducing direct elections for most political offices, more direct democracy and doing away with all remaining consociational and corporatist features. All of these proposed changes are intended to reduce the role of political parties in the political process and increase that of the individual citizen). The Freedom Party emphasized its position as an outsider in the Austrian political system during election campaigns and it attacked the "system parties" as basically interchangeable entities that are interested only in maximizing their power at the expense of the broader public.[107]

However, this anti-establishment attitude of FPÖ was put to severe test when it formed the government in coalition with ÖVP. In particular, the party had difficulties sustaining the image of an anti-establishment political force working against the status quo. The tension arising from being in government and at the same time maintaining the critical

[106]Chantal Mouffe, Democracy in Europe: The Challenge of Right-wing Populism, http://www.cccb.org/rcs_gene/mouffe.pdf, Accessed on 27 March 2016
[107]Abedi, Amer (2004), *Anti-Establishment Political Parties: A Comparative Analysis*, (London: Routledge), pp.17.

line against the establishment created serious problems within the party's own ranks and more specifically between the FPÖ cabinet members and its traditional electorate. Disagreement with the reforms decided by the government and endorsed by the FPÖ grew among the rank and file. The 'hard-liners' accused the party members in government of sacrificing FPÖ principles and positions to remain in office. This showed that the political pragmatism and the politics of compromise result from the FPÖ's direct engagement in government activity and decision making processes destabilised the internal balances.[108]

Moreover in 2002, the FPÖ entered the electoral campaign divided and without any clear party strategy. Significantly, the 2002 electoral programme put emphasis on the results achieved in the few years in government and in particular on fields like employment, immigration, asylum policy and law and order. The programme, entitled 'Social and worth living in and possible' (*Sozial und Lebenswert und Leistbar*), attempted to dissociate the party from some of the unpopular reforms implemented by the government. The second ÖVP-FPÖ government showed strong continuity with the reform policies that had characterised the period 2000-2002.[109] The FPÖ tried to exert a stronger pressure on the ÖVP to influence more directly the decisions of the government on a series of relevant policy reforms such as pensions and privatisation of public enterprises. The efforts were more or less in vain, also because the FPÖ had a much weaker electoral backup than in 2000. Moreover, in 2005 all FPÖ cabinet members and most of the parliamentary group left the party to launch the BZÖ, the rest of the FPÖ was suddenly again in opposition. Under the new leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, the FPÖ resolutely returned to vote maximising strategies that again emphasised its anti-establishment positions. This, together with the renewed radicalisation on other issues, seemed to pay back in electoral terms, as the party most recent results at the polls quite clearly indicate.[110]

[108]Meret, n.51, pp.193
[109] Duncan, Fraser (2007),The end of the Wende? The 2006 Austrian parliamentary election, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8(1), pp. 13-30
[110]Meret, n.51, pp.193

[3.3] (e) Euroscepticism

In 1945, Austria was divided into four occupational zones divided among the allies. Given its geopolitical situation, the country occupied a 'front-line' position between the East, defined as the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the West, defined as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). During the Cold War, two of Austria's neighbours belonged to the Warsaw Pact (Czechoslovakia and Hungary) and two to NATO (Germany and Italy). Both Soviet and American troops were stationed on Austria's borders. Therefore, when the State Treaty was signed in 1955, emphasis was laid on the condition of permanent neutrality for the allied powers withdrawal. The idea behind neutrality was that Austria would refrain from getting involved in cooperation with the West, however, it continued to be economically and ideologically inclined towards West.

It was not until 1989 that Austria applied for the membership of European Union and it was in 1993 that the negotiations started. This step was viewed as a result of changing European geopolitics: the East-West conflict was over, Austria was no longer between two blocs in a bipolar European system. The USSR, which had had a strong interest in preventing Austria from joining the community, had ceased to exist. The Maastricht Treaty had established European Union with the aim of deepening and widening its character by introducing European Monetary Union and a Common Foreign and Security Policy. After successful accession negotiations and a positive referendum (66.6 per cent of the Austrian population in favour) Austria became EU member on 1 January 1995.[111] Subsequently, Austria became part of the Schengen territory (the agreement entered into force in 1997 and has been incorporated into the EU treaties) and introduced the Euro as a single common currency in 1999 together with ten other countries.

FPÖ and the Green party were the two political parties that had opposed the accession to European Union. The stand of FPÖ had become skeptical in the beginning 1990s as earlier they were in favour of acceding to EU. Since its foundation in 1956, the FPÖ constituted the most fervent supporters of European Commission (EC) accession. The

[111]The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union, CVCE, University of Luxemburg, http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/ff4dba1b-7691-48a8-b489-51393c82c951, Accessed on 27 May 2016

FPÖ's populist shift did not have any immediate consequences on the party's pro-EC stance as the FPÖ continued to profess EC-membership until the late 1980s. Even in their 1985 party programme they had declared that, the future of Europe lies in a close community of all its countries and peoples. In spite of all the difficulties of unification the goal remains a unified and strong Europe to which there is no reasonable alternative'. However, as the prospect of membership became reality, the FPÖ's European policy witnessed a change. In 1991, the party still maintained a pro-accession line but qualified its position with criticism against the perceived bureaucratic and centralized character of the European polity. On the eve of the 1994 Referendum on EU-accession, the FPÖ finalized its shift towards Euroscepticism as the majority of the party's MPs voted against the constitutional amendment on EU-accession. Although the party did not officially campaign for a 'No vote', 59 per cent of the party's supporters voted against accession[112].

Since then, the FPÖ has consolidated itself as a Eurosceptic party that fundamentally and regularly opposes European integration in terms of principle, institutional setup and project. In the 1997 policy agenda, in Chapter VI on 'Europe - a common destiny' the 'limits' to European integration are more directly defined[113]:

> The term "Europe" cannot be reduced to a mere geographic concept or to the supranational organization of the European Union. Europe is composed of a variety of peoples and ethnic groups, regions, nations and state units which have all grown up historically with shared values… The future destiny of Europe has to be shaped through close cooperation of its peoples. Politically Europe is represented only partly by the European Union. Europe's diversity calls for forms of political cooperation which envisage different confederations on different levels. The independence of states should be restricted only by what is absolutely necessary to reach specific goals… The European Union is just a part of the European reality. The European Union shall not become a European federal state but a confederation.

Moreover, in its electoral campaigns the Freedom Party connected the European issue openly to the issue of over-foreignisation and immigrant criminality. In 1999, the party's campaign focused on control and accountability; the Freedom Party proclaimed to be the only party that would protect Austrian interests, particularly in the face of the prospective enlargement of the EU to include East European countries. When FPÖ was elected as the

[112] Almeida, Dimitri (2010), Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 11(3), pp. 237-253
[113] 1997 Party Programme, pp. 11

coalition member in 1999, the issue of imposition of EU's diplomatic sanctions on the new government as long as the Freedom Party participated in government or did not change its nature, was used to stir up nationalistic feeling against the foreign interference and disrespect to the fundamental democratically legitimate government. The issue of eastward enlargement of EU was particularly well suited for the purposes of the Freedom Party to present itself as the only party that listens to the people and takes their concerns seriously.

However, the issue of enlargement proved to be difficult for the FPÖ leadership. In 2002, Susanne Riess-Passer asked for the party's commitment to the EU enlargement. This was not accepted by Haider and other members of the party, who had reservations regarding the integration process and specifically the effects of enlargement on Austria's labour market. These different positions represented the clash between the fundamental party ideology and short-term, pragmatic approach. The increasing intra-party conflict resulted in prominent government members resigning, forcing Chancellor Schussel to call for elections in 2002. In the campaign, FPÖ adopted a critical position towards EU and enlargement. The party declared to be against the enlargement claiming that it was necessary to wait for the new countries to reach the same levels of social welfare and environmental standards before joining the EU. The Temelin nuclear power plant located in the Czech Republic and close to the Austria border became one of the main issues explaining an Austrian veto against the enlargement. At the 2002 election the FPÖ lost about two-thirds of its electoral support.

By 2005, FPÖ's position on EU became more openly critical. This was facilitated by the fact that the FPÖ was no longer in government, since all members of the party who had been in government had shifted to the BZÖ. At the 2006 parliamentary election, the FPÖ, now under the new leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, emphasised the importance of preserving Austrian sovereignty and its neutrality in a Europe of fatherlands (*Europa der Vaterländer*)[114]. It pointed to the threats to national independence and problems of democratic deficit that are embedded in the European process. In its 2008 party

[114] FPÖ Party Programme, 2006, Vienna pp.10, https://translate.google.co.in/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=http://www.erhoert.at/Wahlprogramm_FP__2006.pdf&prev=search

programme, FPÖ described the Austria's possible exit from the EU as 'not a taboo, but ultima ratio'[115] against the development of the European Union into a central state. They have also opposed Turkish EU membership. Turkey is considered culturally far too different from Europe and therefore not an eligible member.[116] For this reason the party argues that 'the accession negotiations with Turkey must stop and must be followed by the determination of the EU external borders' and in the end 'Turkey's access in the EU has to be followed by the immediate exit of Austria from EU'.[117]

[3.4] Impact of Freedom Party of Austria

To analyse the impact of FPÖ, it can be said that the FPÖ prior to 1986 appeared to be a different party to Haider's FPÖ. Whereas the FPÖ prior to Haider's leadership had tried to develop a coherent world-view while oscillating between more liberal views and more right-wing extremist views, Haider's party gradually shed ideological consistency for the benefit of a more instrumental approach, whereby maximising voter support and breaking the dual elite rule of the ÖVP and SPÖ became the key objective. Another main difference simply had to do with political strength. Prior to 1986, the party was weak, and after 1986 it rapidly became very strong. Haider through his personal style, charisma and populist rhetoric had discovered a new formula for electoral success.

The rise of FPÖ in 1986 represented the breaking of the party system that was developed in the aftermath of Second World War. In response to Haider's success in the 1986 elections, the SPÖ and ÖVP sought to isolate the FPÖ politically. Especially the Social Democratic Party, initially under Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in 1986, committed itself to a *cordon sanitaire* with respect to the FPÖ. The Christian Democrats also declared the FPÖ unfit to govern (*regierungsunfähig*) as long as the party opposed Austria's consensus democracy and social partnership, rejected European integration and distanced itself only half-heartedly from Nazism. In the second half of the 1990s, the dismissive strategy adopted towards the FPÖ was tacitly but increasingly abandoned by the major

[115] FPÖ Party Programme 2008, Vienna, pp.172
https://translate.google.co.in/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=https://neuwal.com/2008/09/23/wahlprogramme-das-wahlprogramm-der-FPÖ/&prev=search
[116]Meret, n.51, pp.206
[117] FPÖ 2008, n.111

parties. The shift to an accommodationist approach was most acute in the areas ofimmigration and, to a lesser extent, law and order. When the ÖVP offered to form a coalition with the FPÖ at national level, it breached the *cordon sanitaire*.

However, FPÖ had to pay a great price to be part of the government in 1999. It not only compromised with its basic ideals but lost a lot of electoral votes. FPÖ might have reached its zenith when it came to its political aspirations but its inclusion in government was much criticised, above all because of partychairman Jörg Haider's radical statements and/or actions, in which he occasionallyalluded to anti-Semitic, racist or xenophobic feelings. This led to the imposition of diplomatic sanctions by the EU 14 which saw this development as a threat to the ideals of liberal Europe. After becoming part of government and of the political establishmentitself, it was to a considerable degree the fate of the FPÖ to 'fuel the misgivings ofan increasing share of the electorate', as the results of the 2002 electionsdemonstrated. The party did not manage to adapt to its new role as governing party,but effectively split into two factions, a 'radical' one standing for its populist rootsand another one that strived to make the party '*staatstragend'* (carrying the state). The two factions increasingly clashed with one another, which finally broughtdown the government, and in the end the voters punished the party for its internal squabbling and 'irresponsible' behaviour.[118] The failure in the government quintessentially represents the internal strife in terms of reconciling with its anti-establishment ethos and working against the established status-quo.

Despite this, the mainstream parties of Austria have found no alternative to the challenges posed by the FPÖ. Dismissive or accommodationist strategies have tended to make the FPÖ stronger while increasing voter apathy. The most effective tool has been to appeal to Austrians' desire for political harmony by pointing to the FPÖ's polarising nature. Trying to coax the populist right into adopting a more moderate political posture may be difficult after its disastrous experience in government. The FPÖ, which tolerates extreme right-wing forces in its ranks, will continue to have an established place in the party system, as shown by the return of the FPÖ under Heinz-Christian Strache - a return which many

[118]Fallend, Franz (2004), Are right-wing populism and government participation incompatible? The case of the freedom party of Austria, *Representation*, 40(2), pp.115-130.

observers had hardly considered possible and which demonstrated major similarities in style and content to the FPÖ under Haider during the 1990s.[119]

[119]Heinisch, n.27, pp.75

Chapter 4
Right-Wing Politics in Italy

Given all the uproar in 1999-2000 regarding the inclusion of Austrian right-wing party FPO in the government, it is often forgotten that the first post-war government in Europe that included right-wing party was constituted in Italy in 1994. It was an intricate mix of old and new parties including newly revamped Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) as Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Lega Nord (LN) and brand new Forza Italia (FI). Though the government did not last long, it did herald the rise of Second Republic of Italy wherein the traditional alliances and coalitions were broken giving rise to a new political scenario. By the end of 1990s, these three parties emerged to lay claim to the political power again and formed the government in 2001. This was significant because this coalition not only completed its term but emerged to be a milestone given the history of post-war Italian politics which had as many as 58 governments from 1945-2001.

Italian political space is not only divided geographically by significant economic and cultural cleavages, its politics has often been understood in spatial terms - the idea of 'southern question' - the North-South gap in economic development - and of fixed regional political cultures as well as typologies of region-based voting processes (patronage votes in the South, party identification and opinion voting in the North) and centre-periphery relationship. The right-wing survived all these cleavages, including north-south divide, secular-catholic division in politics, economic policies etc. and unified the country politically and electorally that transcended local and regional loyalties.[1] These right-wing parties represented a combination of populism and anti-political rhetoric. Even while in the government these parties criticized other political leaders and portrayed themselves as alternative to the mainstream parties. The role of leadership was also central to the rise of right-wing in Italy, with Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia), Gianfranco Fini (MSI/AN) and Umberto Bossi (Lega Nord) taking a lead in shaping and reshaping their parties in line with the opportunity offered to them by the changing political climate.

As in the case of Austria in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to understand the right-wing parties and politics in Italy, how these parties have influenced the policy

[1]Agnew, John (2007) Remaking Italy? Place Configurations and Italian Electoral Politics under the 'Second Republic', *Modern Italy*, 12(1), pp. 17–38.

making in the country, what issues they have raised and how far have they been successful in pushing forward their agendas. The chapter is divided into four sections and a number of sub-sections explaining and analysing the Right-Wing in Italy and its impact on Italian politics. The first section briefly analyses the Italian politics from 1948-1990, i.e. from the establishment of the First Republic to its collapse and the emergence of Second Republic and the presence of right-wing parties during this period. This section is followed by the examination of three major Right-Wing parties, MSI/AN, LN, and FI. The next section analyses the impact of these parties while they were in the government.

[4.1] Analysing Italian Politics: *From First Republic to the Second*

One of the most prominent distinctions persisting in Italy has been related to the discussions centering on Old and New Republic. The First Republic begins in 1948, when the post-war constitution was put into effect, and ends in the early years of the 1990s, with the rise of the Second Republic.

Since the establishment of the First Republic, the *Democrazia Cristiana* (Christian Democratic Party, DC) governed Italy. They were able to maintain in political power until their decline in 1992. As this was the period of the Cold War, the Left, represented by *Partito Comunista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party, PCI), was excluded from the government despite its tremendous presence at the municipal and regional level. It was not until the 1980s that DC, because of their declining electoral support, was forced to form a coalition with four other parties: the Socialist Party, the Liberal Party, the Republican Party, and the Social Democratic Party. This period is referred to as the *Pentapartito*.

From the 1980s onward, Italian politics became unstable because of the failure of political parties' to adapt to the changing realities. The country was plagued with a lot of problems like unbalanced national budget; insufficient modernization of industries, an aging institutional establishment, and an increasingly inefficient welfare structure. The Parliament and the political parties were unable to bring on a reasonable process of

reform, leading to the growing disenchantment of the population.[2] Although, DC received 30 percent of the votes in 1992, it was unable to cope with political change. It strenuously resisted any change in the electoral and institutional rules, despite popular support for such. Hence, it was no longer the key party in a democracy based on consensus and bargaining. While on the other hand, PCI, proved more adaptable. Like the DC, it had become firmly established in post-war Italy, demonstrating its loyalty to republican institutions and the democratic order. From 1989 onwards, under the leadership of Achille Occhetto, the party began the process of revising its ideology and organisational structure, trying to form a position halfway between the Social Democratic tradition and a non-ideological left-wing outlook.[3] However, it failed to make any impact as by 1991 the opposition to the reforms were getting stronger, culminating in the breaking away and the formation of a new party called *Rifondazione Comunista*. On the other hand, the PCI, renamed itself as *Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (PDS).

Italian politics changed significantly in the early 1990s, which was largely overlooked by the ruling coalition of the DC. The rise of the Second Republic was facilitated by the transformation and the revamping of the Italian Political System. The period from 1990-1994 is generally regarded as the period of crisis and transformation. The DC and PCI tried to adopt themselves to the changing scenario and new actors, like Lega Nord and MSI, came up in Italian politics. There are few changes that stand out in the transition of First Republic to Second Republic.

First, there was growing support for e electoral change. The public exasperation with the then political system was reflected in the referendum on minor electoral changes. Mario Segni, a liberal Catholic and minor politician in the DC, embarked on a campaign to transform, through a referendum, Italy's electoral law, replacing a system of proportional representation with one based on a plurality of votes. The referendum movement quickly won popular support. Public opinion came to share the hope that a new electoral formula could restore rationality to Italian politics. The first phase of Segni's campaign took place in 1991, when the electorate was asked to vote on a minor aspect of the electoral law.

[2]Berselli, Edmondo (2001), The Crisis and Transformation of Italian Politics, *Daedalus*, 130(3), pp. 1-24.

[3]Berselli, n.2, pp. 1-24

While the referendum was largely ignored by the ruling parties, citizens regarded it as an opportunity to express their rejection of the status quo. Italians voted overwhelmingly to repeal the current electoral rules. It was a very explicit signal of a popular demand for reforms and transparent behaviour.[4] In 1993, a new referendum was called. The result was a plebiscite for the introduction of a plurality rule. As a consequence of the electoral referendum of 1993, a law predominantly based on the plurality rule was approved (the new law decreed that 75 per cent of the seats in Parliament would be assigned with the first-past-the-post system, while for the remaining 25 per cent the election with the proportional method would be preserved). Multiple factors like the success of the electoral referenda, the rebellion of the northern regions against the centralised state, the onset in 1992 of judicial inquiries into political corruption (which began in Milan and then spread to the other main cities) and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, created conditions for a radical transformation of the Italian post-war party system. Also around this time a number of political corruption and bribery scandals jeopardized the whole Italian political system. What was later defined as the *Tangentopoli* (Bribe Town) affair was a real turning point in Italian post-war politics. The *Mani Pulite* (Clean-Hands) trials that took place in Milan during the 1990s showed that the phenomenon went beyond the worst case scenario. Several prominent Italian politicians, like Mario Chiesa (PSI), Sergio Moroni (PSI) etc., were involved in illicit financing and corruption.

Apart from the disillusionment with the political system, immigration was also proving to be a contentious issue to be dealt with. Due to the consistent rise of the migrant's population during this period, immigration in Italy became a subject of 'great public concern'. Political parties across the political spectrum, however, accepted that Italy needed migrant labour to fill labour shortages in specific areas. Immigration quotas have generally been viewed as inadequate for Italy's economic needs and powerful lobbies such as the employers association had called for larger quotas. In addition, Italy's informal economy which is estimated to represent 25 per cent of total employment has a significant presence of migrant labour. This became evident after Italy's largest immigration amnesty, in 2002, when over 600,000 undocumented migrants were

[4] Ibid., pp. 1-24

regularised. This has encouraged the right-wing parties to focus their anti-immigrant mobilisation on the issue. With the collapse of Italy's established political regime, around 1992-94, and the birth of the 'Second Republic', new parties were created and new political alignments formed[5], giving a brand new dimension to the issue of immigration.

Another major challenge for the mainstream parties was the rise in popularity of Lega Nord. This league united several regional political parties, including the Lega Lombarda, established by Umberto Bossi, a self-made politician who quickly became attuned to public opinion in the North. The LN proposed a federalist structure that verged on secession, expounded anti-welfare attitudes that did not completely hide an anti-southern propensity, and issued vociferous demands to crack down on immigration. As it established itself as a serious political force, the LN capitalised on the weakness of the DC. As the Lega Nord grew, and the DC proved unable to rally its supporters, the old party patronage networks began to fall apart. Lega ensured its financial flows and investments, and managed power by securing the consensus of the Catholic Church, the entrepreneurial organisations, and the economic associations.

The result of the election of 27 March 1994 was the culmination of transition to Second Republic. The great innovation of these elections was the formation of Forza Italia (FI), the movement-party set up by the entrepreneur and television tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. In a very short time, taking advantage of his ready access to the mass media, Berlusconi was able to take advantage of the uncertain nature of the political system of the country. The government, which survived only for a short period of time, represented a complex coalition of LN, Alleanza Nazionale (AN), and the Liberal Catholics.

The changing scenario and the alignments of the party system in Italy gave rise to new dilemma and uncertainties. The stability of the system was put to question and the disillusionment of the people with the democratic system was at the peak. Italy's political system underwent far-reaching changes. The dominant presence of both the centre-left and the centre-right represented a new chapter in the political system of Italy. Both the

[5]Andall, Jacqueline (2007), Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in Government (1996–2001), *Patterns of Prejudice*, 41(2), pp. 131-153

party coalitions, while in power, have brought with them different agendas and proposals to handle the situation effectively.

[4.2] Right-Wing Politics in Italy

The realignment of Italian politics that took place after *Tangentopoli*, created a vacuum in the political scene. There was an urgent need to move on from the crisis in the state, a weak civil society, institutional incompetence and corruption. The collapse of the old parties, the arrival of a new electoral system and the prospect of new alternative governments provided the right-wing parties an opportunity to emerge as credible players in the national political space. The emergence of Forza Italia and strengthening of Lega Nord provided the voters with an alternative to the traditional mainstream parties. However, it was not until the 1990s that right-wing emerged in Italy.

Fascism in Italy was deeply embedded due to large network of fascist associations and sympathy for the regime. Italian fascists developed a model for the state, society, and economy that they sought to export, trumpeting fascism as the only alternative capable of heading off the challenge to Christian civilization posed by Soviet-style communism.[6]Though the fascist regime collapsed in 1943-45 civil war, fought in centre-north between forces loyal to Benito Mussolini and the anti-fascist forces, the fascist political presence in post-war Italy was not regarded as "illegitimate".[7]

Because the Fascism was so deeply embedded in Italy, it played an important part in the construction of the post-war Italian political system. The abolition of the monarchy by popular referendum in 1946 was partly the result of that institution's relationship with Fascism. Other characteristic features of the 1948 Constitution of the Italian Republic testified to the desire to avoid a repetition of Fascism: the creation of a weak executive (that is, presidential and prime ministerial power) and a powerful legislature - parliament;

[6]Roberto Chiarini, *Italy* in Melzer, Ralf and Serafi, Sebastian (eds.) (2013), *Right-Wing In Europe Extremism: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, (Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), pp.103
[7]Ignazi, Piero (2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, (USA: Oxford University Press), pp.35.

the return to the proportional representation voting system; and the introduction of other constitutional checks and balances, such as the constitutional court.[8]

Despite various steps taken by the government to overcome the fascist past, the fascist heritage in Italy managed to withstand the test of time. It was largely because the fascists were able to organise themselves with the establishment of *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement, MSI). The MSI's first '10 points' programme veiled its ideological-political mould, insisting on 'national conciliation', pacification, and economic recovery. But all the symbolic and cultural references were unquestionably linked to fascism. The party depicted itself as a 'veterans' fraternity'. Since both ideology and political personnel characterised the MSI as a nostalgic neo-fascist party, this genetic imprint raised the problem of the party's legitimacy within the democratic *anti-fascist* regime.[9]

Both Gianfranco Baldini[10] and Piero Ignazi[11] draw on the work of Renzo de Felice to understand the ideological character and transformation of MSI through the period 1946-1992. According to them, two factors determine the political identity of the party which is characterised by the alternative presence of one of the two different "faces" of fascism. The party traces its roots in the fascist movement of the Mussolini's era, with its links to the northern Italian Social Republic. In the course of development, the distinction was made with what de Felice called '*Fascism-movement*' and '*Fascism-regime*'. Fascist-movement was revolutionary, anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, non-conformist, utopian, etc. and the 'fascist-regime' was authoritarian, clerical, corporatist, traditionalist, etc. MSI attempted to sell its claim representing a 'third/alternative way'. This division was also prominent given the party itself was divided into two diverging factions that followed the geographical divide. The 'northern' faction, more militant and radical, claimed to be the heir of the socialistic and anti-bourgeois 'republican' fascism of the 1943-45 period, while the southern faction had more in common with the clerical, conservative, authoritarian, bourgeois fascist tendency. Such an ideological cleavage compares

[8]Pollard, John (1998), *The Fascist Experience in Italy*, (New York: Routledge), pp.136
[9]Ignazi, n.7, pp.35
[10]Baldini, Gianfranco (2001), Extreme Right Parties in Italy: An Overview. http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/ereps/download/italy_overview.pdf, Accessed on 23 March 2016
[11]Ignazi, n.7, pp.35

favourably with the geographical one, as the northern fascists reflected the fascist-movement tendency, whereas the southerners represented the fascist-regime.[12]

Another important factor in the development of MSI was its oscillations between different attitudes towards the political system. It moved between positions of opposition to the 'Italian system established after the war' to the 'acceptance' of mainstream political institutions. From the period 1946-1960s, the radical faction expressed hard-line opposition to the democratic system; the moderate faction was inclined to exploit any circumstance in order to be accepted as a 'normal' political partner by the conservative parties. Instead of stressing the anti-system profile of the party, the new leadership attempted *to fit in with the system*.[13] MSI gained some political credibility by assisting DC in their struggle against PCI under the leadership of Augusto De Marsanich. However, the moderate politics did not go unchallenged inside the party. Despite the electoral successes, the radical faction remained militant and tried repeatedly to overthrow the majority until the 1956Congress, where it quit the party, creating the *Ordine Nuovo* (New Order) group. Apart from Pino Rauti's Ordine Nuovo, the *Avanguardia Nazionale* and other extremist groups challenged the MSI's claim of a united Right.[14]

Also, at the national level, DC's manoeuvres of engaging with MSI were viewed as violation of Italy's antifascist consensus, and in the aftermath of Genoa rioting[15], the party adopted a strategy of marginalization toward the far right for the next several decades. The failure of the MSI's integration strategy sparked a decade of inner-party turmoil and a decline in its share of the vote. Extremists abandoned the electoral road to power and embarked on a "strategy of tension" *(strategia della tensione*) that would result in a decade of political violence known as the "years of lead" *(anni di*

[12]Ibid., pp.35
[13]Ibid., pp.37
[14]Carlo Ruzza and Oliver Schmidtke,Towards a modern right: Alleanza Nazionale and the 'Italian Revolution', in Gundle, Stephen and Parker, Simon (eds.) (1996), *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, (UK: Routledge), pp. 147
[15]During the MSI's 1960 national congress in Genoa, militant anti-fascist protests erupted due to leftist concerns over the party's growing role in Italian politics. These protests spread to other Italian cities, resulting in violent and lethal clashes with police, and led the government to ban the MSI's congress from taking place.

piombo).[16]These dissident factions attacked the parliamentary system by all means available. MSI sought to downplay its entanglement with the activities of the terrorist right and to adopt the image of a respectable right-wing party. Nonetheless, the party never explicitly dissociated itself from its fascist heritage.[17] In 1969, Almirante developed a "two-pronged strategy" *(strategia deldoppio binario)* to address this situation. On the one hand, Almirante reached out to other rightist forces and tried to make the party attractive to conservatives to combat the leftist threat. To this end, the MSI merged with the Monarchist Party under the new name *Destra Nazionale* (National Right). On the other hand, Almirante tried to reclaim defectors to the extra-parliamentary right by supporting violent actions against left-wing opponents.[18] The strategy appeared to work in 1972, when the Destra Nazionale captured 8.7 per cent of the vote. But as Ignazi pointed out, *this ideological renewal was more to do with the external image than the principles*.[19]

By 1980s, references to fascism were weakened but the party ideology did not change. Neither did the party undergo any transformation despite it gaining acceptance as a legitimate actor in talks for the formation of the cabinet led by Bettino Craxi in 1983. With the re-election of Gianfranco Fini, MSI moved to more traditional issues of the party including law and order situation, authoritarianism, nationalism etc. In the early 1990s, the party managed to stay afloat after the *tangentopoli* and capitalised on the anti-partitocracy sentiment by representing itself as a newcomer against the corrupt system of the First Republic.[20]

The collapse of DC provided Gianfranco Fini and MSI a way out of the political isolation. The limited involvement of MSI in the corruption scandal enabled the party to distance itself from others mainstream parties. The transition of MSI into Alleanza Nazionale (AN) represents many paradoxes of Italian political culture, foremost being that the right never faded after the defeat of fascism and MSI retained sufficient political

[16]Art, David (2011), *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe,* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp.41.
[17]Ruzza and Schmidtke, n.14, pp.148
[18]Art, n.16, pp.211
[19]Ignazi, n.7, pp.38
[20]Baldini, n.10

influence to attract a fourth of the voters. Especially after the 1994 elections and the establishment of AN in 1995, the party constituted the third strongest faction in the Italian political space.[21] The rise of AN represents a perfect example of a right-wing party escaping political seclusion and marginalisation to become the largest vote gatherer and an influential partner in the government.

The political vacuum not only provided MSI an opportunity to re-organise itself into a new party, but also paved the way for Lega Nord to emerge as a national party and for Silvio Berlusconi to launch his new party Forza Italia, which are discussed in detail in the following sections. These parties represented the rise of Second Republic of Italy wherein they were able to leave a remarkable mark. These parties, like other right-wing parties, revolved around a central and strong leadership, with a definitive organisational structure. Although, the ideology of each party has evolved over the period of time, they have illustrated the ideals and arguments central to the definition of right-wing as discussed in Chapter- 2.

[4.2](a) Alleanza Nazionale

MSI is the only example of a neo-fascist party that has been constantly present in the country's central and peripheral institutions, often holding the reins of power in local jurisdictions.Under the leadership of Fini, MSI grabbed the opportunity provided by the chaos of collapse of First Republic. The legitimacy provided by the invitation to join Berlusconi's government in 1994 proved to be a decisive factor that contributed to the success of the party. Fini went much further in enabling his party to shed the burden of the past and presided over the formal dissolution of MSI within the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in 1995 Fiuggi Conference, bestowing upon AN the status of a formal party organisation which proclaimed itself to be a democratic conservative force committed to liberal values.[22] The leadership insisted that the Mussolini regime emerged in a unique period of history whose circumstances cannot be replicated now. Thus by dismissing the regime, MSI sought to frame its new image as a party of the 'reformed, post-fascist,

[21]Ruzza and Schmidtke, n.14, pp.147
[22]Ruzza, Carlo and Fella, Stefano (eds.) (2009), *Re-inventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and Post Fascism,* (London: Routledge), pp.27.

European movement'.[23] But the real change in the ideological stand of AN came at the Verona Congress of 1998. Despite the centralisation in many of its organisational dynamics, it was during this conference that debate on fascism was dealt in depth than at Fiuggi. Fini expressed a clear condemnation of some of the acts of the fascist regime. A particularly significant was his denunciation of fascist regime's racial laws of 1938 and the collaboration in the holocaust in 1943-54. This led Alessandra Mussolini, the granddaughter of Benito Mussolini, to leave the party and form a new political movement.[24]

Organisational Structure

MSI leadership at the time of establishment adopted a mass-party model which led the party to have by far the largest membership for any far right party in Western Europe. It had local sections *(sezioni)* across the country and a range of auxiliary organizations that helped maintain a political subculture that proved as tenacious as the larger Communist and Catholic ones. What was unique to MSI was that the party elite reached their positions after years of activity within the party making them highly experienced, in addition to being well-educated. Although factional divisions existed, the MSI possessed a high degree of internal coherence. For example, a potential member required the signatures of two current members to fill out the application form, which was then screened first by the secretary of the local section and then by the federation.[25]

Moreover, to give itself an appearance of being entrenched in the civil society, MSI developed a central hierarchal structure with a strong territorial network of sections and a large network of flanking organisations. These organisations served as a fertile recruitment ground. Among most prominent were MSI's university front *Fronte Universitario del'Azione Nazionale* (FUAN, University Front of National Action) and its youth front, *Fronte della Gioventu* (FdG, Youth Front), Gianfranco Fini himself was the leader of FdG from 1977 to 1987. Another important union was *Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Nazionali dei Lavoratori* (CISNAL, Italian Confederation for National Unions for Workers), founded in 1950, which had 300,000 members by 1970s, it was strongly

[23]Ruzza and Schmidtke, n.14, pp.152
[24]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.154
[25]Art, n.16, pp.213

represented among state employees and white collar workers. It also had a network of journals and daily newspaper, *Il Secolo d'Italia*, which had a circulation of around 10,000 rising to around 30,000 with creation of AN.[26]

However, with the establishment of Alleanza Nazionale, Fini included a new statute that altered the traditional 'mass party' structure by introducing a new basic unit parallel to the local branch: the 'environmental circle'. This unit was designed to gather members in the social, cultural and economic spheres who shared a common interest beyond traditional territorial boundaries. This change was conceived with a triple aim: one, to tear down the local power groups, which in many cases were quite nostalgic for the party's neo-fascist tradition, and therefore potentially disloyal to the new course; two, to present to the public the image of a radically renovated party even in its internal structuring in order to reinforce the overall project; and, three, to use this organizational innovation to attract a diversified constituency, especially those who were uneasy in the face of the traditional branch centred party life.[27]

The organisational transition including various collateral organisations and party newspaper was inherited by AN. However, the FdG and FUAN were amalgamated into a new party youth organisation - Azione Giovani created in 1996. CISNAL became part of a union confederation, which was created for reaching out to a wider range of economic actors. According to party data, the transformation of MSI to AN, resulted in the increase of recruits to over 600,000 by 2006, making AN second largest party after DC in Italy. The transition resulted in party moving from a mass-party organisational model to a highly personalised and centralised leadership structure, giving Fini considerable power over the party.[28]

In general, the party's increased centralization led the provincial level to acquire more power vis-à-vis the local one, and the regional level vis-à-vis the provincial one. Also, the regional leaders were no longer elected by the regional assembly but nominated by the

[26]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.149
[27]Ignazi, Piero (2005) Legitimation and Evolution on the Italian Right Wing: Social and Ideological Repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord , *South European Society and Politics*, 10(2), pp. 333-349
[28]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 150

national leader. At the national level, the party leader - named 'party president' - continued to be elected directly by the congress but he was no longer responsible to the national collective bodies. Moreover, he expanded the range of appointments and nominations within the national bodies. However, the most notable difference between MSI and AN was in terms of generation: all the relevant positions in the party's hierarchy were occupied by the younger generation, represented by Fini himself.[29]

However, the new statute adopted in 2006 reflected the need for making leadership more accountable to the party. It provided that the local circles which were organised territorially or sectorally to elect their own presidents, regional co-ordinators were to be elected by regional assemblies composed of various office holders in the specified region. The national leader and the national assembly were to be elected by national congress only. Although, national leader retained few of the discretionary powers, like appoint various officers to party's internal organisations, the statute reflected the response of the party to the internal pressures.[30]

Ideology

MSI was established as a nostalgic neo-fascist party with symbolic and cultural references embedded in Italian fascist history. The party presented itself as the veteran fraternity which brought together the losers of the war. Since the ideological and political characteristics were that of the past, this genetic imprint raised problems of legitimacy within the democratic *anti-fascist* regime.[31] As fascism was condemned to a marginal existence, the MSI leadership soon realised that to survive in an anti-fascist democratic society, the party needed to tone down its rhetoric. This led to the appearance of divisions between the Rautian group, which reflected the radical quasi socialist 'fascism in movement' tradition and the majority grouping which while sharing a nostalgia for fascism was more conservative-authoritarian in character reflecting the 'fascism in power' tradition.[32] For almost fifty years, the MSI remained the only party overtly claiming a right-wing position. However, the collapse of the old party system in 1993-

[29]Ignazi, n.27, pp. 333-349
[30]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.151
[31]Ignazi, n.7, pp.36
[32]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.158

1994 brought to an end the ostracism of 'the right'. The shift occurred for two reasons. Firstly, the new plurality electoral system introduced a majoritarian logic splitting the political landscape into two distinct camps located on the left and the right. Secondly, the transformation of the MSI into the new Alleanza Nazionale (AN, National Alliance) dislodged the previous party's strict lineage from neo-fascism in the eyes of the mass public.[33]

The MSI's response to the political crisis was to re-invent itself into AN. This was politically important, for on the one hand it allowed the party leaders to reassure activists that, since the National Alliance was something different, no ideological and policy sacrifices by the MSI itself were being made, while simultaneously suggesting to voters that the National Alliance represented a fundamental transformation, in a moderate direction, of the MSI.[34]

Piero Ignazi explains that the transition of MSI to AN was relatively easier because the 'new' party availed itself of very favourable media coverage and also, and more significantly, of a generous compliance by the left-wing parties and opinion leaders. The reasons for this accepting attitude, he explains, can be summed up in the desire to overcome, once and for all, the division in Italian politics provoked by the fascist regime. In accepting the heirs of the fascist tradition into the new party system as fully legitimate political actors, the harsh divisions induced by the fascist regime and the 1943–1945 civil war could be relegated to history. The new party ideology highlighted in the document called *'Pensiamo l'Italia',* presented at the 1995 congress, was infused with an anti-liberal and anti-democratic culture. However, the document failed to acquire the status of a historic, path-breaking 'manifesto' of the new party because of both its inconsistency and its persistent non-democratic lineage.[35]

AN-MSI programme attacked 'partycracy' and the model of parliamentarian liberal democracy in which corruption thrived as anachronistic, and advocated the old Fascist model of a mixed parliament stressing corporatism. Besides reaffirming the basic

[33]Ignazi, n.27, pp. 333-349
[34]Newell, James L (2000), Italy: The Extreme Right Comes in from the Cold, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53(3), pp. 469-485.
[35]Ignazi, n.27, pp. 333-349

Catholic values shared by large sections of Italian society, AN-MSI promised to fight against abortion; to help future mothers in distress; to bring genetic engineering under strict control; to help large families; to promote voluntary work; to reward families that keep their old people living with them; and to ensure that strict drug laws are enforced. AN did not oppose free markets and entrepreneurship, but granted the state a tutelary role in order to strengthen the national economy and avoid 'sectoral colonization' by large multinational companies. To encourage national production, and to combat unemployment by creating new workplaces, a tax exemption on reinvested profits is proposed. This developmental approach was reinforced by a reduction of taxation and by cancellation of taxes on first house ownership, while tax would be concentrated on profits rather than profits invested, thus encouraging productivity. They argued that formula to solve the public debt problem was political: less dependency on coalitions of elements that demand a share of the budget in return for their political support, coupled with strong doses of austerity.[36]

The programme also depicted majority support for extending measures of social protection to immigrants, the right of public-sector workers to strike, and Italy's constitutional ban on the death penalty. Moreover, as a party engaged in electoral competition, the National Alliance's goals were not limited to articulating the preferences of its members but also included vote-maximising and office-seeking strategies. In order to fulfil these goals, it was also obliged to de-emphasise, or draw attention away from, its tradition. It is these conflicting goals, that explain the ambiguities and contradictions of the party - for example, such equivocal assertions as Fini's that 'it is time to consign fascism to the serene judgement of history' or the fact that positive evaluations of the Fascist regime can coexist with the adoption of a range of positions (support for European integration, privatisation, opposition to racism and anti-Semitism) far removed from the traditional ideological baggage of the extreme right.[37]

Another phase of ideological development of AN began in 1998 with Verona Congress. The party presented itself as a party of modernisation embracing free market and

[36]Sznajder, Mario (1995), Italy's Right-Wing Government: Legitimacy and Criticism, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 71(1), pp. 83-102
[37] Newell, n.34, pp. 469-485

attempting to shake off its reputation for having old-fashioned statist approach to the management of economy. It called for flexibility in labour market, further privatisation and a general liberalisation of the economic system. The traditional themes as law and order and a strong Italian state were reaffirmed. It went on the further entrench itself when in 2001 it presented itself as a responsible party of government. AN recycled some of its central ideas of MSI adopting them in new national and international context. It focused on law and order, guiding role of state in economy and the exaltation of social bonds in national community. It sought to synthesis the modernising elements with the conservative ideas. It attacked the excesses of economic deregulation that threaten the weaker section of society with exclusion and poverty and the super class of technocrats and finance managers who sought to concentrate the power in their hands. It also called for finding equilibrium to sustain global competition without renouncing values of social and community solidarity of dignity of work and of national identity.[38]

Europe also features prominently in the ideological discourse of AN, though it cannot be called a Eurosceptic party, which most right-wing parties are, it does call for protection of European identity and safeguard of Christian values. Alleanza Nazionale has generally adopted a positive attitude towards Europe. The first definitive stand was taken during the Fiuggi Congress of 1995 whose declaration had a long section on Europe. The section opened with a reference to '*Pan-Europe of Coudenhove Kalergi' and to the 'Europe des Patries of de Gaulle*', which was defined as an 'ideal approach to European integration'. Secondly, it called for the 'development of the EU beyond the purely economic and monetary dimension' as well as the 'strengthening of the European pillar vis-à-vis the US'. It advocated the extension of EU's competencies in several common policies. At the Verona conference in February and March 1998, the final document called for the 'strengthening of the EU by increasing the size of its budget' and enhancing the scope of its budgetary policy. It also proposed the 'reduction of the weight of the national government by increasing the power of the European Parliament'. However, the document criticised 'measures labelled as market opening, but which jeopardise the homogeneity of national products'. A point that is worth making is that the tone used in

[38]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 163

all these documents called for a more assertive stance from the Italian government vis-à-vis the EU.[39]

For AN, the Europe of the future cannot be conceived as a union of banks or a technocracy unable to influence global well-being: it must become an important political player in international relations. This would involve an emphasis on the diversity of Europe's constituent parts on the one hand and, on the other, its relationship with the United States. In order to avoid Europe becoming a 'directory of the few', the Alleanza Nazionale proposed that it be based on the reactivation of the vitality of its member states, on a harmonious sum of identities and 'concentric' sovereignties which produce 'unity in diversity'.[40]

The theme of protecting national identity often comes in AN's statements. Majority of their programmes have focussed on the need to pursue the national interest in the EU and guaranteeing the role of the nation-state within it. This approach was re-emphasised in its 2006 document where it was stressed that there was a need to re-emphasise the common identity, culture and history. This was a reference to the Christian roots of the European continent. The Document said:[41]

> Europe is not just a reality defined in geographical terms, but it is rather a cultural and historical concept… Europe seems to have emptied inside, resigned to a loss of identity… We need to re-propose values to a Europe which no longer loves itself, which flees from its own history and lives, like a shadow, its own identity.

Leadership

As discussed in Chapter - 2, charisma has been defined as an ability of a leader's direct appeal to voters, but it can also be considered in terms of an ability to hold a party together. The social science use of the term 'charisma' stems from Max Weber, who associated it with a leader characterised by a quasi-religious sense of great vision, and

[39]Quaglia, Lucia (2003), *Euroscepticism in Italy and Centre-Right and Right Wing Political Parties*, Sussex European Institute, SEI Working Paper No: 60, pp.14.
[40]Tarchi, Marco (2003) The political culture of the Alleanza Nazionale: an analysis of the party's programmatic documents (1995-2002), *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 8(2), 135-181
[41]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 180

who attracted a body of unquestioning, affective supporters.[42]Giorgio Almirante was undoubtedly the historic leader of the MSI. He was the first secretary from the foundation of the party in 1947 until 1950 when he made way for August De Marsinich. He remained a critic of the flexible and compromise-oriented administration of the subsequent leader Arturo Michelini who was secretary from 1954 to 1969. Almirante returned to the secretaryship in 1969 in the middle of the social crisis (the Student Protests of 1968 comprised a worldwide escalation of social conflicts, predominantly characterized by popular rebellions against military and bureaucratic elites) that hit the country in 1968-9. Under the leadership of Almirante, the MSI redefined its relationship to the state by denouncing the existing institutions as the corrupt organs of the Left. The era of 'political appeasement' when the MSI had participated in the clientelistic system erected by the Christian Democrats had come to an end. During the years of the student revolts, a growing polarisation of political forces spurred the mobilisation of the radical Right. During these years, the MSI tried to reunite the parliamentary Right with the extra-parliamentary groups. Almirante achieved some short-term success by capitalising on lingering feelings of nostalgia for the Fascist order, fear among some members of the social elite of threats to their status raised by the Left, anger among the marginalised sub-proletariat, and fear among some of the petty bourgeoisie of their loss of status through 'proletarianisation'.[43]

Gianfranco Fini had been the anointed successor of the long-standing leader of the MSI, Giorgio Almirante. He had previously chosen Fini as leader of the MSI youth wing in 1977 and made way for him as party leader in 1987. Fini played a central role in capitalising on the transformed political opportunity structure provided by the collapse of the old parties. Fini exploited the new political space created by the implosion of the DC by moving the MSI towards the political centre and re-moulding it - eventually through its submersion into the AN - into a new democratic conservative political force which could attract centre-right voters who had previously supported the DC. Fini launched the

[42]Merkl, Peter H. and Weinberg, Leonard (eds.) (1997), *The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, (Great Britain: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.).
[43]Ruzza and Schmidtke, n.14, pp.150

AN in 1994[44] and his command of the party was aided by his own personal popularity. Opinion polls have continuously suggested he is Italy's most popular party leader. Fini's embodiment of firm leadership would appear to have gone down particularly well with an Italian public tired of the weak and bargained leadership of the post-war Republic. Nevertheless, Fini's leadership has not been of the same charismatic style as that of the other main leaders of the centre-right, Berlusconi and Umberto Bossi. Indeed, his calm, rational and measured presence could be described as the very antithesis of the populist and sometimes demagogic styles of the latter two. He thus provided a reassuring alternative to those Italian centre-right voters put off by Berlusconi and Bossi.[45]

The recasting of the MSI/AN as a modern conservative force illustrated Fini's agility in responding to the opportunities offered by changing external circumstances. From 1996 to 1999 he sought to move the AN further in the direction of the modern European centre-right in embracing the free market, in an attempt to exploit FI's apparent weakness (both in terms of organization and Berlusconi's apparently weakened leadership). Fini sought to distinguish the AN from the populism and neo-liberalism of the LN and FI (and the divisive regionalist identity of the former), presenting the party as the social conscience of the right and (paradoxically, given previous perceptions of the MSI-AN) as the moderate component of a right-wing populist government. The AN's moderate image was enhanced by the measured tone of Fini's public utterances, particularly when compared with the controversial outbursts for which Bossi is notorious and the gaffe-prone populism of Berlusconi.[46]

Electoral Politics

The Italian Social Movement was founded on December 26, 1946, and contested its first election, for Rome's city council, in October 1947. In 1948, the MSI won 2.2 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections. The fact that is very crucial is that that nearly 70 per cent of the party's vote and all of its six parliamentarians came from the south. The main reason for this as explained by David Art was that neither of the two major sub-

[44]Fella, Stefano (2006), From Fiuggi to the Farnesina: Gianfranco Fini's Remarkable Journey, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 14(1), pp. 11-23
[45]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 147
[46] Fella, n.44, pp.11-23

cultures that dominated post-war Italian politics, the Catholic and the Communist, had penetrated southern society, leaving the MSI with political space and that anti-fascism and the partisan struggle had been concentrated in the north. Whereas in the south anti-fascist prejudice was muted and in vast sectors of the electorate it was practically non-existent. This helped MSI's initial strength in the south to allow it to develop clientelistic networks there that would enable it to consolidate itself in politics and society to an extent that was impossible in the north.[47]

The electoral support for the MSI fluctuated around 5 per cent, with its supporting peaking in 1972 at almost 9 per cent. The party's popular support came mostly from the southern underclass and the rural until the 1960s, and later from the urban middle classes, especially in Rome, Naples, Bari, and the other cities of the Centre-South. Its supporters consisted demographically of old fascists, lower-middle-class shopkeepers, and artisans, as well as a number of bureaucrats, police, and military. Reasons to vote for the MSI included protest votes, nostalgia, and support for traditional values, as well as southern resentment of the North. As the old fascist veterans started to fade away, the party in turn gained support from alienated youth groups.[48] Showing that its voting support was concentrated in the South, MSI appeared to do well by exploiting a feeling of social dislocation among certain groups in the face of socio-economic change, appealing to a general desire to restore old certainties and return authority to a changing world.[49] However, since the 1980s, there has been a marked cooling of the ideological leanings. The leadership of the MSI understood that the pre-condition for survival of a neo-fascist party in an anti-fascist democratic regime was strictly to follow the democratic rules to set a distance between itself and any political entity inclined to violence and extra-parliamentarism.[50]

The beginning of the 1990s presented MSI a chance of revival. The change in the MSI's fortunes owed very little to changes in the party itself and far more to the change that

[47]Art, n.16, pp.210
[48]Movimento Sociale Italiano, https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Movimento per cent20Sociale per cent20Italiano&item_type=topic, Accessed on 27 April 2016
[49]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.145
[50]Sznajder, n.36, pp. 83-102

took place in its external environment, namely the transformation of the Italian party system as a whole. This transformation can be explained as the culmination of three broad sets of factors: the spread of corruption and the explosion of the 'Bribe City' (*Tangentopoli*) scandal in 1992, change in voting patterns and in the electoral system itself. Moreover, a chance to end its political isolation was presented by Silvio Berlusconi, who while launching his party Forza Italia announced that he would have no problem in voting for Gianfranco Fini, the MSI's leader and candidate for mayor of the city in the run-off ballot against the Green Party's Francesco Rutelli. The MSI was therefore able to throw-off its isolation essentially because the terms of political competition had changed. In the old party-system with its tri-polar format, the Christian Democrats, as a dominant centre party, had to isolate the far-right. For, having made anti-communism and exclusion from government of the Communists the categorical imperative of its politics, the Christian Democrats had to with-hold legitimacy from the far-right too in order to avoid the risk of the anti-communist appeal allowing the far-right to eat into its own support. In the new party-system, with its predominantly bipolar format, lacking a strong centre party, and with a non-communist left pole, the MSI was given a unique opportunity to assert a claim to joint leadership, together with Forza Italia, of the forces of the right pole.[51]

While the 1994 elections had seen AN build on MSI vote across Italy, it remained particularly skewed towards South. The week leftist traditions, deep-rooted clientelistic systems whose privileged groups feel threatened by the Centre and Left, and economically under-developed areas suffering high unemployment have favoured the extreme right in the past. The southern Catholics were not the only demographic group with which the extreme right increased its appeal.[52] The party voters are clearly and by far the least ethnocentric, xenophobic and authoritarian of all the other European extreme right parties. The AN voters are predominately male (55 per cent) and young adults (50 per cent below 40 years of age).[53]A closer examination of the statistics from the 1994 general election, in which the MSI-AN coalition won a total of 13.4 per cent of the votes,

[51]Newell, n.34, pp. 469-485
[52]Ruzza and Schmidtke, n.14, pp. 155
[53]Ignazi, n.7, pp.52

provides more insight into the nature of the resurgence of the extreme-right. Support for the Right varies considerably over different regions. In the northern regions, Lombardy, Piemonte, Trentino-Alto-Adige, and Veneto, the AN alliance gained between 5 and 9 per cent of the vote. The Right alliance enjoyed better success in the central regions and islands, where it secured between 9 and 15 per cent of the vote, and performed best in the South, where it averaged over 20 per cent of the vote. The Right garnered its highest percentages in Campagnia (20.3), Lazio (24.3), Puglia (26.5), and Rome (26.98). The MSI-AN won more votes than any other party in Rome.[54]

The elections of 2001 saw a decline in AN's vote share to 12 per cent which forced its dependence on its political alliance with FI. While the 1996 election result had signalled progress in making inroads into northern electorates, the 2001 elections reconfirmed the AN as a predominately central-southern based party. Its vote share was particularly rooted in areas with high unemployment and where public sector played a key role in local economy. Thus, its voters strongly identified with support for social protection and state intervention and were sceptic of ideas of decentralisation and devolution. However, the analysis of 2006 elections shows that AN share of votes actually decreased slightly in south where the leading party emerged to be Union of the Centre (UdC) and increased in North at the expense of FI.[55]

Along with a revamped AN, Lega Nord and Forza Italia represented the new parties of Italian politics. These parties became the alternative to the mainstream DC and centre-left PSI. They came to represent the aspirations of the ignored and disillusioned section of the Italian society.

[4.2] (b) Lega Nord

Lega Nord (LN, Northern League) is a combination of various Leagues which were a major source of electoral and political change that emerged in Italy in the post Second World War period. They became a significant player in the Italian political system because of their ability to break with the traditional bases of political identity and

[54]Ruzza and Schmidtke, n.14, pp.155
[55]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.146

representation[56] namely: religion, class and secularism. The League owes its success to variety of factors: from a flexible ideological base to widespread organisation, easy decision making mechanisms that centre on its charismatic leader Umberto Bossi. They have been able to present themselves as a better alternative to the inherent contradictions of Italian political scenario, especially the old party system of DC, contradiction between North and South and between the centre and periphery.

Historical Background

For a large part of its history, LN was not considered as part of right-wing structure but as an ethno-regional party. This demarcation was endorsed by the party because of its demands of regional autonomy from the national government which played a very crucial role in the politics of LN until the end of 1990s. LN still remains a Northern Italian political and geographical phenomenon.

As LN represents the combination of various leagues in the Northern Italy (Map 4.i represents the various regions of Northern Italy), the core is represented by Lega Lombarda. In the early 1980s, the Lega Lombarda[57] was one of many movements striving to represent local sentiment in northern Italy. These movements stood for policies that represented local chauvinism – even cultural xenophobia. The Lega's first manifesto called for public examinations to be held on an 'ethno-regional' basis, for public housing to be reserved for Lombards, to be given preference in private-sector jobs, and for the defence of the 'cultural and linguistic patrimony' of Lombardy in the schools. Its so-called 'definitive programme' called for the 'reaffirmation' of Lombard culture, history and language, and of the territory's 'values and morals'. The appeal for preferences in healthcare, housing, education and jobs was made even more explicit, and the movement demanded that Lombardy be given the same kind of special constitutional status reserved for regions with a substantial non-Italian minority such as Trentino-Alto Adige, the Val

[56]Ilvo Diamanti, The Northern League: From Regional Party to Party of Government, in Gundle, Stephen and Parker, Simon (eds.) (1996), *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, (UK: Routledge), pp.113.

[57]Other parties representing linguistic or cultural minorities in what Italians call the 'Alpine arc' are the Union Valdôtaine, which represented French-speakers in the Val D'Aosta, and the Partito autonomista Trentino Tirolese (Trentino-Tyrol Autonomy Party: PATT), an intensely conservative movement popular in the valleys of the Trentino.

D'Aosta and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The movement declared itself to be against 'any assault on Lombard national identity'.[58]

Map 4.i: Northern Region of Italy

Source: https://www.mapsofworld.com/italy/northern-region.html

The emphasis on ethno-regionalism became the cornerstone of party from 1981 to 1989; this bridged the gap between the historical ethno-nationalism that emphasised on cultural and regional traits and the economic nationalism[59] emerging in the affluent European regions, like Rhone-Alps etc. Economic problems were one of the most crucial issues that were raised by the Lega which translated into traditional north-south problem, industrialised-agricultural divide within Italy. The Lega represented a new awareness of a

[58]Bull, Anna Cento and Gilbert, Mark (2001), *The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Publications), p.10.

[59] Economic nationalism is a body of policies that emphasize domestic control of the economy, labour, and capital formation, even if this requires the imposition of tariffs and other restrictions on the movement of labour, goods and capital.

regional identity and a regeneration of the Italian political system through renewal of political class. The Lombard League was the first political organization that mobilised the electorate on the North and South question. The party did the same with the immigration question, making their anti-immigration position very clear. This later became a central issue on the political agenda. The anti-immigration stand was based on the following premises: the socio-economic costs of immigration and its negative consequences for the regional development and wealth.

The Northern League was launched at the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the experience of different regional leagues. The prospects of the party changed in the 1990s, the *tangentopoli* provided the League with an opportunity to become the spokesperson of the disillusionment that was created with the collapse of the Italian political system.

Phases of Development

Ilvo Diamanti[60] identifies four phases of development of LN from 1983 elections to 1994 elections. The *first* phase called 'Genetic Phase' covers the period from the 1983 parliamentary elections to those of 1987. This phase was characterised by the emergence of the League in the Veneto, where the Veneto League (Liga Veneta) won 4 per cent of the votes in the 1983 parliamentary elections. This success, however, was not repeated in the following elections. The Liga Veneta failed to increase its support, and indeed went into decline in 1989. Nonetheless, the 1987 parliamentary elections were a turning point because the Leagues' support spread beyond their original boundaries. The *second* phase covers the period from 1987 to1990 local government elections. It can be considered a 'developmental' phase. It was characterised by strong growth in the League's electoral support, owing to the success of the Lombard League (Lega Lombarda) whose electoral presence in the region rose rapidly from 3 per cent in 1987 to 8 per cent in the 1989 European elections. A year later in 1990 local government elections, Leagues (Veneto and Lombardy) won almost 18 per cent of the vote. This was also an important milestone as Lombardy became the centre of the League phenomenon. The Lega Lombarda's

[60]Diamanti, n.56, pp.115

success in the 1990 elections in fact gave impetus to the revival of the Leagues in the other regions of the North, where the 'autonomist' vote exceeded 5 per cent.

The *third* phase coincided with the early 1990s and covered the period in which the Leagues enjoyed their maximum expansion, particularly after the creation of the Northern League. The Lega Nord won 23 per cent of the vote in Lombardy (almost all of it by the Lega Lombarda); 25.5 per cent in the Veneto (18 per cent by the Liga Veneta and the rest by other autonomist formations); around 15 per cent in Piedmont, Liguria and Friuli, and around 10 per cent in Emilia and Trento-Alto Adige. The *fourth* phase covered the two parliamentary elections, 1992 and 1994. This phase can be broken down into two sub-periods separated by two series of local elections. The first, in June 1993, saw the Northern League reach its electoral high when it won control of some of the most important northern cities, particularly Milan. This was followed by a period of decline leading towards the elections of 1994. This contraction of electoral votes was a result of the entry of a new political actor that pushed it from centre stage – Forza Italia, the political party formed by Silvio Berlusconi. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, which were a watershed moment of the country's long political crisis, the League's share of the vote was similar in percentage terms to that of 1992 (8.7 per cent), but with different implications. The LN became partner in a Right-Wing coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi's FI. This election established the right-wing parties as a credible political actors and stakeholders in the crisis prone Italian political system.

Apart from these phases of development, one can add two more phases. The *fifth* phase is from 1994-1996 when LN became the part of the government. This marks a new phase because the LN ended its political isolation by becoming part of the governing coalition, comprising of FI and AN. So far it had been able to garner votes at the local level of governance, with the collapse of the old system and the emergence of new, LN was able to take advantage of its ideological roots and emerge as a credible player in a discredited system. However, it was not a smooth run for the party because as a part of the coalition, LN felt that alliance with right-wing was detrimental, leading them to withdrew from coalition within a short span of seven months. After withdrawing from the government, LN underwent ideological changes to present itself differently from the other right-wing

parties. In the 1996 elections, LN contested separately from the right-wing coalition achieving 10.1 per cent of votes but still remained isolated.

The *sixth* phase begins from 1997 to 2008. This period represented the revitalisation of LN. The party toned down its rhetoric by declaring that the epoch of uncompromising separatism was no longer an option, which had been a central demand of LN. The party during this period tried to become a relatively accommodating ally, given its previous experience in the government, to become part of the right-wing coalition government in 2001 and then in 2008.

Organisational Structure

In February 1991, the Lombard League, the Venetian League and four minor regional parties (Lega Emiliano-Romagnola, Alleanza Toscana, Union Ligure and Piemont Autonomista) formed a political party organization called the Northern League. Thus, Lega is organised in 'national sections' – dominant being Lombard and Veneto. Other includes Trentino, South Tyrol, Emilia, Romagna, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Liguria, Marhe, Piedmont, Tuscany, Umbria and Val d'Aosta.

At the first federal congress of the party, Umberto Bossi was elected party secretary. This position allowed the newly constituted Northern League a highly centralized structure and top-steered leadership. The League emerged not only as a centralised party but also as a cultural and social movement. The protest oriented cadres of the social movement co-exist with the institutionalised functionaries and party members. This informal character was reflected in the small number of staff, i.e. 5 in 1989, which grew to 10 in 1992 and then to 100 in 1993.[61] Umberto Bossi introduced a system of tiers of membership, whereby the important positions in the party required the extensive periods of previous membership. It was only later that the internal decision-making emerged but the hierarchical character of the party was kept intact. This gave Bossi and his views an absolute centrality in the policy formation and in the allocation of responsibilities.[62]

[61]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 75
[62]Ibid., pp.75

Although the party lacks internal democracy, in other ways it resembles a traditional mass party far more than its competitors. Unlike mainstream parties in which the difference between supporters and members has been blurred by the introduction of open primaries, online enrolment and the drastic reduction of local branches, in the Lega Nord the situation is very different. The number of party branches steadily increased, while membership of the Lega Nord is something which must be earned and is prized. Members are divided into two hierarchical categories: the '*soci ordinary militanti*' ('ordinary members-activists') and '*sociso stenitori*' ('supporting members'). The latter can only progress to the 'ordinary member-activist' level after having proved their activism over a period of at least six months. This entails regular attendance of weekly meetings, participation in staffing information stalls at markets or in piazzas, putting up posters on walls and similar activities. Despite these requirements, the number of Lega Nord members has increased over the past decade. According to figures made available by its central office in Milan, at the end of 2011, the party had 173,044 members, an increase of almost 40 per cent from 124,130 in 2001.[63]

Lega, like Alleanza Nazionale, has also sought to strengthen its relations with the civil society by creating and managing a set of organisations which addressed variety of issues and therefore becoming relevant in the day-to-day life of its members. These organisations range from recreational organisations to trade unions, support groups etc. By creating these organisations, LN has been able to create a popular base for itself which has resulted in creation of territorially based organisations which has proved to be a crucial electoral strategy and an ideological goal for the league.[64] Over two decades, it has also built up a class of elected representatives at all institutional levels who have gathered a wealth of experience. In January 2012 the party had 374 mayors, 12 provincial presidents and approximately 6,000 elected representatives. Moreover, its new leader Roberto Maroni was consistently the most popular minister in the Berlusconi-led government from 2008 to 2011.[65]

[63]Bartlett, Jamie; Birdwell, Jonathan and McDonnell, Duncan (2012), *Populism In Europe: Lega Nord,* (London: Demos), pp.26.
[64]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.76
[65]Bartlett, Birdwell and McDonnell, n.63, pp.14

Ideology

There seems to be a broad acceptance among scholars that Lega Nord can be considered as a populist right-wing party[66]. Lega Nord conforms to the very basic ideals of populism, like every Populist Party it claims to represent the common, hard-working, everyday citizen of Northern Italy. It portrays lower-middle and working class voters as the backbone of the nation and as the victims of political elites and special interests groups. Also, the populist leader is essential for the success of populist parties and they are often recognized by their leader: Jörg Haider and the Austrian Freedom Party, Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front, Umberto Bossi and the Lega Nord. It is common for the leader to claim that he is one of the people and one who speaks for the people.[67]

However, in certain aspects Lega Nord is different from all other populist parties. Its emphasis on its regionalist character and identity, and fiscal federalism makes it unique example of populist right-wing party. Since its establishment, the core issue in policy making of Lega has been to get greater autonomy for Northern Italy. The degree of autonomy has over the period varied from federalism to independence, to devolution to fiscal federalism.

Lega Nord redefined the economic, historical and political arguments in favour of the North setting it against the backdrop of the Italian State and southern Italy. It constructed a framework of interpretation in which a virtuous and homogeneous 'us' - honest, hard-working and simple-living northern Italians attached to their local traditions - was cast as under siege from 'others' represented by the financial, political and cultural elites and, southerners and immigrants. The solution to this is to introduce measures by which northerners would gain greater control over how their localities are run and their money

[66]Cass Mudde defines populism to be 'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people, in C. Mudde (2004), The Populist Zeitgeist, *Government And Opposition*, 39(4), pp.541–563

[67]Zaslove, Andrej (2008), Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type, *European Review*, 16(3), pp. 319–336

spent. The Lega Nord's offer to northerners can be summed up in the party's key slogan of making the people once more 'masters in their homes'.[68]

By developing their ethno-regional ideology, they combined local trends, secularisation associated with rapid modernisation and disillusionment with centralist policies. LN also propagated the fear that state bureaucracy, massive taxation and the subsidising of failing state enterprises in the undeveloped south would end up ruining the prosperous north. Thus a cluster of socio-economic interests was rationalised through ethnocentric principles that constituted the region as a nation, as the source of cultural and historical identity.Therefore by creating a secessionist strategy and demand of independent 'Padania' on the lines of a Padanian identity implied a shift from a community of economic interests to a community of people belonging to a motherland. The construction of an ethnic commonality - which actually remained largely unfulfilled – provided the reasons for the exclusion of others: and this time the aliens were no longer the Italian southerners but foreign immigrants. The closure to the external world entailed by the construction of the new ethnic (and mythical) community pushed the party towards extremist positions. The constellation of Padania's enemies encompasses a large number of scapegoats which range from foreign immigrants to Brussels Eurocrats, from international capitalism to the Islamic world, especially after the 9/11 - this is a constellation quite similar to that of the other invoked by other right-extremist parties in Europe. Mobilisation along these issues brought a different electoral constituency to the Lega.[69]

To achieve this, Lega radicalised its appeal to demand a transformation of the state along federal lines. This radicalisation was also favoured by the collapse of the old party system because of the corruption scandal unveiled by magistrates' investigations, especially in Milan. In this way the Lega offered itself to the northern 'honest and laborious' people as a sanctuary from the sleaze, corruption and selfishness of the traditional parties and politics. The party leader, Umberto Bossi, employed the typical populist rhetoric of radical antinomies - small vs. big business, establishment vs. the people, the centre vs. the

[68]Bartlett, Birdwell and McDonnell, n.63, pp.24
[69]Ignazi, n.27, pp. 333-349

periphery, northerners vs. southerners and finally us vs. them - to attract a larger electorate.[70]

On the ideological level, ethno-regionalism developed. The two main pillars of the Northern League's political programme are liberalism and federalism: a neo-liberal approach to society, the economy and government, with federalist principles reflected not only in the proposed division of Italy into macro-regions and the application of principles of direct participation in democratic processes, but also, and especially in the fiscal sphere, with the granting of autonomy to local authorities in taxation and expenditure. Thus, a programme of economic devolution would be enforced in which each region administered most of its own finance.[71]Over a period, LN has adjusted its approach on economics, maintaining a moderate neoliberal position demanding less public intervention. But one of the main questions in the party's economic policy remained the reform of the state. Although it is no longer formulated in terms of secessionist demands, it has translated into a demand for a devolution system, giving the regions more decisional and fiscal autonomy in fields such as the school and the healthcare system. The Northern League has maintained direct continuity with the past concerning the neo-liberal orientation on economic matters. The demands for lower taxes, less government involvement in the economy, a more efficient public administration and better conditions for the small and medium entrepreneurs remained on the agenda.[72]

In the late 1990s the Lega reformulated and radicalised most of its themes with a particular emphasis on the anti-immigration issue. The Lega became the only Italian party to openly address a xenophobic discourse. The opposition to multiculturalism and the practice of making foreigners the scapegoats are constant themes of the party propaganda. Although the party officially says it only opposes *illegal* immigration, it seems apparent that it is not comfortable with the presence of non-Western European outsiders in northern communities. This is particularly so in the case of Muslims, which has become an increasingly significant theme for the party over the past decade. One of the main

[70]Ibid., pp. 333-349
[71]Sznajder, n.36, pp. 83-102
[72]Meret, Susi (2009), 'The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support', (Ph.D Thesis, 2009, Aalborg University), pp.162.

ways it did this was by presenting itself as the most vociferous and toughest opponent of Islam and those from Muslim-majority countries present in - or intending to come to - Italy. Muslims and Islam are often characterised by the party as representing a fundamental threat to the values, way of life and cultural integrity of northerners.[73] The Northern League started to give voice to those who were worried about how the Italian society would develop in the future if the number of immigrants with a Muslims background continued to increase.

In terms of Europe, Lega Nord, like FPÖ (as discussed in Chapter-3) started out as a pro-European integration party. It declared itself strongly pro-European and argued that '*The political objective of Europe is fundamental for us... If we look back, the best laws put in place in Italy are the laws based on EU legislation'*. In 1993 the League voted in favour of the ratification of the Treaty of European Union and afterwards it maintained that Italy had to do its utmost to fulfil the convergence criteria in order to join EMU. The support for European integration was also seen as a way to give more power to the regions as Bossi reiterated at Bologna in 1994:'*[the treaty of] Maastricht re-allocates power at different levels and across the territory of each member state and gives new vitality to local autonomies'*. However, from 1998 LN's shifted towards Euroscepticism. In 1998, when Italy officially qualified for EMU membership, there was an increase of criticism of the EU. At the Northern League congress in Brescia in October 1998, Bossi criticised the fact that Italy's joining of EMU had been decided without a referendum. From then on Bossi's criticisms of the EU increased. Bossi repeatedly attacked the EU as 'the Soviet Union of Europe', 'a nest of free masons and Communist bankers'. Furthermore, Bossi argued '*Everybody has seen that the music has changed and that Italy is defending its own interests… We used to just go there and always say 'yes'. Now it's enough'*.[74] LN changed its stance on Europe in order to fit in with its strategic goal of joining the right-wing coalition of Berlusconi in 2001. After their disastrous coalition experience in 1994, LN was keen to build bridges and demonstrate its willingness to compromise on Europe. Doing a u-turn on Europe was, therefore, seen as a means to achieve its political goals.[75]

[73] Bartlett, Birdwell and McDonnell, n.63, pp.14
[74]Quaglia, n.39, pp.17
[75]Hainsworth, Paul (2008), *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*, (London: Routledge), pp.82

Leadership

Umberto Bossi appears to be the embodiment of the Northern League. He is a highly prominent figure who managed to secure a larger proportion of media attention than the League's political influence would seem to merit. It is an image which is largely accurate and one which Bossi himself actively encourages. Bossi owes his primacy in the Northern League not just to his role as founding father and 'charismatic' leader. His organisational skills, his tactical abilities, and his personality and image all play a part in his leadership. However, he is perceived as being the embodiment of the League, largely owing to his personality and image.[76] The Northern League leadership described the party as a popular movement, whose existence had emerged directly from the needs and demands of a popular base that has grown increasingly disenchanted with the political establishment. These feelings were not new to the Italian electorate, but the Northern League was the party that managed most effectively to capitalize them.[77] As Bossi[78] described it:

> "…the League is not an ordinary party. I believe that our movement expresses the desires and hopes of many people of the North and of all those looking for freedom, respect for traditions and justice against the unfairness of the power. Those who join the League must have solid ideals and must be ready for personal sacrifice (…) there is no place for those looking for a position and for personal rewards."

Under the uncontested leadership of Bossi, various Northern Leagues consolidated to emerge as a unified force. The party set aside ethnic-cultural discourse by reframing the territorial questions in terms of economic and anti-political discourse. This was pushed forward with the help of unusual rhetoric skills of its leader who introduced direct, outspoken language which touched the nerves of the audience. Bossi has been responsible for the distinct nature of LN wherein Lega has voiced the uneasiness and dissatisfaction against the 'inefficient' centre through its anti-centralist and anti-statist discourse. The populist appeal to the 'virtue' of the northern people was consistent with the objective of providing it with an identity; and in this process every distinctive element was acceptable, including the authoritarian and xenophobic voters. Notwithstanding the mix of pro-

[76]Barraclough, Richard (1998), Umberto Bossi: Charisma, personality and leadership, *Modern Italy*, 3(2), 263-269
[77]Meret, n.72, pp.150
[78]Ibid., pp.150

market and welfare chauvinism, of federalism and independence, of libertarianism and xenophobia, of anti-fascism and authoritarianism, and, above all, of reference to the 'people' against the establishment, the party leader himself always provided the unitary and uncontested voice.[79]

Throughout his career, Bossi has presented himself as an agitator with his characteristic fiery rhetoric, fighting for the federalist or secessionist 'revolution', who had been able to interpret the hearts and minds of the popular heartland. As a strategist, Bossi realised that it was crucial to maintain the LN's distinct political identity as a social movement, to stress that any accord with the old party was limited and tactical. He has led his party decisively, confronting internal dissent with expulsions and imparting quick changes in policy formations. However, after the 2004 elections, the party underwent a period of uncertainty with in-fighting, splinter groups defections and the direction in which the party was heading. Nonetheless, Bossi was able to reign in, although his leadership image has changed from symbolic representation of a villager of the north to a father-figure of the movement founder. The tone has also changed and his style expanded to include statesman-like interviews.[80]

Electoral Base

Lega Nord's electoral support came from the areas which were dominated by the DC, it gained a following in the peripheral areas of the northern regions, rather than in the large cities. As ethnic-regionalist party, LN had a stronghold in Veneto and Lombardy. As the various Leagues (the Lombard League, the Venetian League and four minor regional parties - Lega Emiliano-Romagnola, Alleanza Toscana, Union Ligure and Piemont Autonomista) were established with the purpose of creation of an autonomist and ethnic Northern region, the secularisation of Italian society triggered important changes in the voters' political consciousness and affiliation, particularly in some areas of the North, where Catholicism had been coupled to the vote for the Christian Democrats. However, this dominant position of DC began to wane in the 1980s and the gaps were filled by the new emerging parties like Venetian League or Lombardy League.

[79]Ignazi, n.7, pp.59
[80]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.74

The Leagues' agenda represented a dichotomy between the periphery/local against the urban interest and the centre of the political power. The revival of this position reloaded a socio-political cleavage of Italian politics and society. This position also emerged in the electoral profile of the Leagues, whose electoral core came from minor urban centres, provincial towns and communities of the Italian Northeast and Northwest (as depicted in Table 4.1). The phenomenon of the Leagues was the product of affluent regions and relatively strong socio-economic realities that in many respects were ready to tackle the consequences and challenges brought about by globalisation and by the increasing internationalisation of the markets.[81]

Table 4.1 - Socio-demographic profile of AN and Northern League Voters (1999)

	AN	League
Man	+11	+13
Woman	−11	−13
18–30 years	+5	+8
30–45	2	2
45–60	−1	0
+60	−3	−11
Elementary (5 years)	−7	−8
Medium–Low (8 years)	−2	+18
Medium–High (13 years)	+7	−6
High (+13)	+2	−4
Entrepreneur/manager	+5	−2
Employee/teacher	3	5
Self-employed	+4	−4
Worker	−3	+15
Housewife	−9	+1
Student	+4	+3
Unemployed	−1	−2
Pensioner	−3	−6

Source: Ignazi, Piero (2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,* (USA: Oxford University Press).

A new phase started with outcome of the 1989 European elections. The various leagues merged together in a single one (Alleanza Nord-Northern Alliance) polling 1.8 per cent; but what made the difference was the performance of the Lombardy League, which got 8.1 per cent in the region, attaining fourth position in the regional party system. This was followed by the 1990 administrative elections where all the various leagues gained

[81]Meret, n.72, pp.147

positive results: 6.1 per cent in Liguria, 5.9 per cent in Venetia, 5.1 per cent in Piedmont, 18.9 per cent in Lombardy. Collectively, the various leagues scored almost 6.0 per cent at national level, a large share of which (4.8 per cent) was due to the Lega Lombarda.[82] Under the leadership of Umberto Bossi, the Lega Lombarda had set aside the ethnic-cultural discourse, reframing the territorial identity in economic terms. The scapegoats of the protest that Bossi pointed to were the lazy, parasitic, inefficient, welfare-scrounger southerners - concentrated in the public sector - contrasted with the hard-working, entrepreneurial Lombardy people. The Lega Lombarda drew a large part of its support from this ample reservoir, whose concerns had never been politicized before, despite the fact that the North/South divide has been an enduring question since Italy's unification.[83]

The Lega Lombarda gradually lessened its ethnic-regionalist references in favour of a populist anti-politics approach. According to the Lombardy League, the responsibility of the draining of resources no longer lay in the hands of the southerners but, above all, in the corrupt and clientelistic party system. The Lega intended to defend the common man against the national political establishment, the parties, the politicians, and the central administration along with an effective Lega slogan: 'Against Rome'.[84] This reshaping of its political rhetoric, moving from one based on identity to one based on interests, proved to be successful in the 1990 local government elections - and it reached its zenith in the 1992 Parliamentary votes, 8.9 per cent of the national electorate, and 81 seats in Parliament. The League gained more than 23 per cent of the vote in Lombardy, 18 per cent in the Veneto; it polled around 15 per cent in Piedmont, Liguria and Friuli, and 10 per cent in Trento and Emilia-Romagna.[85]

The mounting dissatisfaction vis-à-vis politics in the country gave impetus to the anti-politics discourse of LN. Moreover, beginning of the Clean Hands investigation into political corruption in 1992, led to rising anti-politics sentiments thereby increasing leagues' support. The anti-politics discourse, conveyed with unusual rhetorical skills by Umberto Bossi, who introduced direct, outspoken, and even vulgar language, proved to

[82]Ignazi, n.7, pp.53
[83] Ibid, pp.55
[84]Ibid., pp.55
[85]Diamanti, n.56, pp.119

be the winning formula in enlarging the party's audience. The 1992 elections turned out to be a watershed moment for LN. It collected votes from every major party in the region, especially DC and PSI. Its electorate was mainly mobilized by anti-corruption sentiment and by the demand for regional autonomy from Rome. The combination of anti-politics, anti-centralist, and anti-alien positions provided the Lega with success. Moreover, the continuous references made by the party leadership to a 'community' of Northern people, strengthened by common interests, created a solid party constituency. This massive inflow of new voters pushed the Lega to enlarge and differentiate its discourse by de-emphasising the 'protest' appeal, and by presenting itself as a national governing party.[86]

LN's electoral appeal remained high throughout the early to mid-1990s. However, as it was blamed for the fall of right-wing coalition government in 1994-95 followed by its decision to run independently in 1996 elections led to a relative decrease in its vote bank. Although, it did tone down its rhetoric and extreme-right stands, its majority votes were split between FI and AN. It was not until the 2008 that it achieved a substantial success which bought it back to the level of the earlier peak (Figure 4.a). LN reasserted its territorial roots against other right-wing parties which were engaged in the process of introspection and re-invention.

[86]Ignazi, n.7, pp.56

Figure 4.a: Lega Nord's electoral performance (1987-2010) (per cent of vote)



Source: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/02/06/2013-italian-elections-lega-nord-italy-padania-bossi-monti-maroni/

LN remained the only party with strong territorial roots and a distinct radical message. This was reflected in the ability of the party cadres to assert their presence through small protests, use of local media and government for publicity and extensive political symbolism. During this period, LN developed as a party that linked small and medium businesses with the process of regionalisation. In short, since the early period of 1990s, the electorate of LN was represented by the predominately male voters among arrays of manual labours and self-employed. LN voters were less educated, with a higher number of voters interrupting their studies at middle school. However, in 2008, the electorate

broadened and increasingly included workers who had previously voted for Left as well as centre-right.[87]

[4.2](c) Forza Italia

Forza Italia redefined the Italian politics in ways unknown before by introducing new campaign methods, a new leadership style and language, new coalition strategies and ideological contents. According to Stefano Fella and Carl Ruzza, the invention of party from scratch, by Silvio Berlusconi at the beginning of 1994 transformed the political landscape in Italy, offering political scientists a perfect example of electoral-professional model of party organisation and providing a whole new picture for the Italian voters when it came to the manipulation of mass communication and leadership style.[88]

Historical Background

The period since 1994 has been one of rapid and widespread change in Italian politics and society. Not only were the major parties of government, the DC and the Italian Socialist Party, were caught up in the corruption scandal, the PCI had already divided with the collapse of state socialism in the former Soviet Union, and a significant portion of the northern electorate was drifting toward the Northern League and its radically anti-Roman rhetoric.[89] According to Patrick McCarthy[90], Silvio Berlusconi had two advantages: first, as the owner of TV networks and of AC Milan, he could engage in politics as spectacle. Second, Berlusconi depiction of himself as a man of the people was crucial in a country where populism, whether left-wing or right-wing, cultural or political, was endemic. Just like Lega developed in phases, FI's emergence can also be divided over period of time. Francesco Raniolo[91] elaborates on three phases of development of FI as the Foundation Phase from 1994-96, second, Crossing the Desert from 1996-2000 and third as Back in Office from 2001-2006.

---

[87]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.70
[88]Ibid., pp.104
[89]Shin, Michael E. and Agnew, John A. (2008), *Berlusconi's Italy*: *Mapping Contemporary Italian Politics*, (Temple University Press: Philadelphia), pp.5
[90]Patrick McCarthy, Forza Italia: the new politics and old values of a changing Italy, in Gundle, Stephen and Parker, Simon (eds.) (1996), *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, (Routledge: United Kingdom), pp.132
[91]Raniolo, Francesco (2006) Forza Italia: A Leader with a Party, *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), pp. 439-455

The Foundational Phase (1994–96)

On 26 January 1994 Silvio Berlusconi announced his entry into politics to the nation, with the creation of 'the political movement Forza Italia'. In the March elections, after an electoral campaign that had no precedent in the history of Italian politics in terms of the enormous sums of money involved and the role played by television and electoral marketing, FI won 21 per cent of the proportional representation votes and 15.7 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This election was historical because firstly, in the few months of launching a party, Berlusconi was able to build up the consensus of the electorate. Secondly, he was able to build up an exceptional coalition, unlike any that was witnessed in Italy. He bought together Lega Nord and MSI/AN. Its main themes, embodied in FI, the AN and the League were a mixture of reaction to statism and party politics and a dislike for the political regime itself (the First Republic). Thirdly, Berlusconi succeeded in defining and imposing the main points on the agenda for the electoral campaign and the political contest (the welfare crisis, the privatisations, the modernisation of the state, etc.). Although, Berlusconi was successful in putting together a heterogeneous coalition, governance was an entirely different issue. The absence of leaders with political and professional experience, and the inclusion in the government of collaborators or employees financially linked to the premier were all factors of weakness in that first cabinet. Within seven months of being in power, as discussed earlier, the coalition had to resign because LN withdrew from the government. This was followed by a period of institutional tensions, characterized by a conflict with the head of state, and political uncertainty. The competitive advantages gained in 1994 were lost within a year.

Crossing the Desert (1996–2000)

The elections of 1996, the centre-left coalition led by Romano Prodi came to power. Francesco Raniolo suggests three reasons as to why FI lost the elections. Firstly, Berlusconi made a number of serious mistakes when building up the electoral coalition. The League stood for the elections independently and the leaders of the Polo delle Liberta were unable to agree on candidate lists. Secondly, even Berlusconi's image seemed less attractive because of his failure to deliver on its 1994 election campaign promises and

was unable to sway the moderate electorate. Thus, began FI's 'crossing of the desert'. The years that followed witnessed the years of strengthening the party organisation and of establishing it throughout the country. The European and regional elections, in 1999 and 2000 respectively that followed also provided the opportunity for a new alliance with the League. The results of these elections indicated that the balance of power had now again tipped in favour of the centre-right. Lastly, FI and its leader became better known on the European scene with the party's disputed entry into the parliamentary group of the European Popular Party (EPP) in December 1999.

Back in Office (2001–6)

Quoting Gianfranco Pasquino, Francesco Raniolo analyses the elections of 13 May 2001 as 'the first legitimate, peaceful changeover in the Italian political system, decided by the electorate and accepted by the losers'. But the elections were especially important for the 29.4 per cent won by FI, that is, 10,923,146 votes. More than 50 per cent of the votes went to the *Casa delle Liberta* (House of Freedoms), the new name for the centre-right coalition. In parliament, FI won 187 seats in the lower chamber and 83 in the Senate. It thus became the first party in Italy for its nationwide size, 'capable of establishing itself anywhere and everywhere'. In the 2001 elections FI spread and geographically extended the consensus, since it was the first party in 81 provinces and came second. FI was no longer the party movement of 1994. Now it seemed a strong organisation, well rooted throughout the country.

The second Berlusconi cabinet is remembered as the longest in republican Italy. However, a number of internal conflicts took place between the leader and his partners in the cabinet, and between the different components of the cabinet that is, between 'technical' ministers and 'political' ministers and, among the latter, between representatives of the League and those of the other incumbent parties. Comments have been made on Berlusconi's style in the management of internal conflicts, which was 'reactive rather than preventive'. Signs of crisis became more evident after the results of the European (2004) and regional and local (2005) elections. The outcome of this

negative trend was the resignation of the Berlusconi cabinet. Nonetheless, the coalition was again voted into power again in 2008.

Organisational Structure

> 'We had no intention of turning Forza Italia into a real party, we thought it was right to go on being an electoral committee to gather voters at election time . . . We wanted to be free of any form of organization'.
>
> *Silvio Berlusconi*[92]

Silvio Berlusconi launched Forza Italia as a result of the continued failure of the forces of the centre and right to forge an electoral coalition to stop the left. Forza Italia was structured along the lines of the supporters' clubs of the football team AC Milan (owned by Berlusconi); run along business-management lines similar to the entrepreneur's multinational company, Fininvest; staffed by members of his publicity agency, Publitalia; and marketed using sophisticated opinion research techniques and the media magnate's three television channels. It grew, in the space of three months, into the largest political organisation in Italy. The development of its image as an anti-communist, anti-state party which opposed the *ancien regime*, successfully exploited a niche for a modern, right-leaning, pro-business, conservative party in Italy.[93]

FI was created by an external organisation, Berlusconi's firm Fininvest. The head of the external sponsoring organisation not only created the party, but became its head as well. This made the party very cohesive at the top, but also totally dependent on the external sponsoring organisation and its leadership, which provided the party with important financial resources, communication know-how and advertising instruments, allowing it to reach the electorate in a direct way through the media rather than through classic grassroots structures. The new values FI sought to promote were largely derived from the world of business: its ideological model, centred on the private business run by a creative entrepreneur, carrier of a vision and operating in a competitive free market context, was

[92]Quoted from Francesco Raniolo (2006) Forza Italia: A Leader with a Party, *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), pp. 439-455

[93]Bull, Martin J. and James L. Newell (1995), Italy Changes Course? The 1994 Elections and the Victory of the Right, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 48(1), pp.72-99.

presented as alternative and superior to the one represented by the state-controlled, bureaucratically and centrally administered economy.[94]

In development of FI, Berlusconi developed a network of intellectuals and business elites around a political manifesto developed by Giuliano Urbani, a liberal political scientist. The special feature in the development of the party was the launching of the Forza Italia clubs in 1993, which were responsible for the promotion of liberal ideas and creating grassroots activism. These clubs were promoted by Berlusconi's Mediaset TV channels and enabled Berlusconi to present FI as a ready-made mass movement.[95] The business-firm style of the party meant the adoption of the discourse of efficient management found in business firms. It was a lean non-hierarchical structure, with a strong concentration of power at the top. This was a deliberate strategy adopted by Berlusconi to avoid the bureaucratic and heavy structures that characterised the traditional mass parties. Even the term Forza Italia (Come on Italy!) was used to enhance Berlusconi's popular credentials and remind voters of the unprecedented success he has brought as owner and president of AC Milan. Also the term had nationalist connotations, contributing to the image of the new force as one bringing renewal to the whole nation.[96]

Organisational dynamics in the initial phase were dominated by those among Berlusconi's business-firm entourage who trusted him as a person and who opposed any reinforcement of the party that would challenge his power. While the party was in government, this group fiercely opposed those second tier 'First Republic' politicians, who started proposing changes to bring the party's organisation more in line with more traditional mass-representation and bureaucratic party models. The divisions that emerged were overcome through expulsion or the co-optation of the politicians into the dominant coalition's inner circle, and through the creation of a dependable parliamentary group. The justification offered for this – namely, the requirement to give organisational

[94]Paolucci, Caterina (2008) From Democrazia Cristiana to Forza Italia and the Popolo della Libertà: Partisan change in Italy, *Modern Italy*, 13(4), pp. 465-480
[95]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 106
[96]Ibid., pp. 123

privilege to those elected by the people – was in reality aimed at preventing any consolidation of power by the extra-parliamentary party.[97]

After the loss of 1995 elections, the party tried to re-organise itself from a '*partito degli eletti*' (Party of the Elect) into a mass party, with a strong following, party cadres and grassroots sections: what its proponents called the '*partito della gente'* (People's Party). In 1998 party statute was adopted which ratified the distribution of power that had established itself within the party during its initial years of existence. Henceforth the 20 regional coordinators would be chosen personally by Berlusconi and the *Comitato di Presidenza*, a directorate of the party would also be controlled by the leader.

FI's centralisation did not allow for any instruments of factionalism to establish itself - namely the power of leaders outside of Berlusconi's circle to manage party membership cadres. This fundamental task was in the hands of the party in central office. Nor could power groups be consolidated through selection processes and internal votes, as was the case in the DC. The members of most party bodies were nominated entirely or in part from above, and the linkage function between the centre and the periphery was performed by regional coordinators. There was no way, therefore, to form factions, or even just tendencies. And yet contrasting positions as regards party organisation were always present. There were those who strongly supported the idea of the 'partito degli eletti', and those who saw the need for radical changes, especially at the grassroots levels.[98]

Membership of FI grew from about 140,000 in 1997, to 160,000 in 1998, to 190,000 in 1999 and, substantially, to almost 313,000 in 2000 (Table 4.2). According to Gianfranco Pasquino, in 2000 two factors were probably responsible for this increase: first, an accelerated and intense recruitment drive in preparation for the 2001 general election; second, an influx of new members hoping to take advantage of the (highly predictable) forthcoming election victory.[99] However, in the period 2001-2006, because of the decline in popularity of the government, party membership declined from about 313,000 to 190,000. The local structures, the clubs, too lost momentum, declining in the period from

[97]Paolucci, n.94, pp. 465-480
[98]Ibid., pp. 465-480
[99]Pasquino, Gianfranco (2003), A Tale of Two Parties: Forza Italia and the Left Democrats, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 8(2), pp. 197-215

1996 to 2006 from 3500 to 2300, with a virtual membership that fell from 87,500 to 57,500. The national coordination office in 2006 reported that FI had almost 900,000 members since its inception, but only 12,000 of these renewed their party cadres without a break each year.[100]

Table 4.2: Forza Italia Membership and Ratio of Party Members to Party Voters and Total Electorate, 1994–2004

	Forza Italia members	Forza Italia voters	Total electorate	FI members as % of FI voters	FI members as % of electorate
1994	5,200	8,119,287	48,135,041	0.06	0.01
1995	—				
1996	116,000	7,715,342	48,744,846	1.50	0.24
1997	139,546				
1998	161,319				
1999	190,399				
2000	312,863				
2001	271,751	10,923,431	49,256,295	2.48	0.55
2002	222,631				
2003	239,252				
2004	171,273				

Source: Raniolo, Francesco (2006) Forza Italia: A Leader with a Party, *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), 439-455

In sum, the peculiarities of FI were mainly the result of its origin in the designs of a leader who was not the expression of a collective partisan choice, or of the dominance of a faction. He was neither selected nor elected, but, at most, merely confirmed by acclamation. His reputation and public profile preceded the existence of the party, which, as his personal creature, was largely dependent on him. Given his incomparable advantages in terms of resources and skills, no one could have competed with Berlusconi at that moment in time in founding a new movement, or resisted his efforts to control it. Therefore, the new party was tailored around Berlusconi's personality and interests and rapidly became both his property and personal tool. He oversaw its organisational design, financed it, launched it in the political arena, created publicity for it by appearing on television as the sole spokesperson for the new project, chose the top party personnel and parliamentary leadership, and decided the programme and alliance strategies.[101]

[100]Paolucci, n.94, pp. 465-480
[101]Ibid., pp. 465-480

As FI remained a patrimonial (dominated by leader) party in which party recruitment was personalised and 'aimed at consolidating or confirming a personal relationship with Berlusconi specific party offices'. Those who were chosen were legitimised exclusively by this infusion of personal trust. Hence their power was not linked to covering specific party offices, but to oscillations of their personal relationship with Berlusconi.[102]

Ideology

For Lorenzo Brusattin[103], ideology represents a shortcut both for the parties and for the voter. Each citizen develops a verbal image of a good society and the majority, under conditions of uncertainty, makes good use of parties' declared ideologies to distinguish and make their own choice. A party, therefore, adapts its own ideology to the demands of the groups from which the largest number of votes can be harvested.

FI is a new party that came into being as a consequence of the serious crisis the Italian party system went through in the 1990s. Forza Italia was designed to be the centre-right party able to collect the former establishment votes. It took into consideration the impact of the *Tangentopoli* and *Mani Pulite* affairs, and the vacuum created by the resulting collapse of the existing political establishment. At the inception of FI, Giuliano Urbani drew up a document called 'In Search of Good Government', which was later combined with the Forza Italia programme, outlined the principles which guided Berlusconi's action. Italy's ills were listed as corruption and occupation of the state by the parties, but also as remnants of communism. The solutions lay in the market economy, the assertion of civil society and the politics of efficiency.[104]Its messages stressed the traditional Italian middle-class values-private initiative and property, the family, a strong civil society, political freedom, honesty - while at the same time rejecting petty politics, bureaucratisation, corruption, and all the negative qualities associated with the political management of the First Italian Republic under the DC. Forza Italia was designed by its founders to be the political force that would replace Christian Democracy, inheriting the positive features of the leaders of the First Republic, rejecting the negative inheritance

[102]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.125
[103]Brusattin, Lorenzo (2007), Late Anti-Communism as a Shortcut: The Success of Forza Italia in the 1994 Italian Election, *South European Society and Politics*, 12(4), pp. 481-499
[104]McCarthy, n.90, 138

and modernizing the political game, not only by its reliance on media politics but also by enforcing its declared goals to produce a second 'Italian miracle.'[105]

Ever since its formation, it has carried out a double function of systemic integration. On the one hand, it has filled the gap left by the disappearance of governing parties; on the other hand, it has made a decisive contribution to bipolar dynamics in a party system that is still fragmentary and in which there are heterogeneous coalitions. For FI the main sources of change and development have been both internal and external. The changes of internal origin have been connected with the resilience of the original model of a personal party and with the prevalence in the dominating coalition. External sources of change, instead, are concerned with the transformations that affect the institutional and competitive context (system of government, electoral law, party financing, number of parties, ideological distance between them, etc.) in which the party exists.[106]

For Piero Ignazi, Forza Italia represents a puzzling case. If its electoral programmes are considered, FI emerges to be a 'neo-liberal' party with the emphasis on individual freedom and civil rights, the criticism of big government, the entrepreneurial flavour and the strong pro-market stance credit the party with a neo-liberal profile. But Forza Italia cannot be considered neo-conservative as it lacks any reference to traditional-moral values, statecraft or latent nationalism. That said, it should be added that the party has followed a rather different track in its day-to-day politics. The appeal to the people frequently invoked by Berlusconi in the face of the working of the institutions gradually shifted Forza Italia and its leader towards a populist approach. The cult of the personality; the hyper-simplification of the political agenda; the harsh confrontation with the outside world in a dichotomous terms of 'us and them'; opposition to the establishment and big business (despite being mobilized by the richest man in Italy); the conspiracy interpretation of reality and political struggle – all such labels aptly express this approach. As in the case of many populist parties, it tried to avoid any extremist connotation and

[105]Sznajder, n.36, pp. 83-102
[106]Raniolo, n.91, pp. 439-455

claims a middle-of-the-road, centrist standing. And this is the case as far as public perceptions are concerned.[107]

Therefore the question arises, what are the ideological roots of FI. Stefano Fella and Carl Ruzza argue that Berlusconi himself is clearly not a 'mainstream' political actor. His neo-liberal conservative discourse on de-regulatory economic programme signalled a departure from the conservative consensus which favoured a more statist approach. The party programmes has emphasised freedom from state intervention in economy along with a populist view of democracy, in which popular will is reflected in a personalised form. Thus emphasising that the leader be allowed to govern without the burden of the constitutional checks usually found in liberal democracies.[108]

FI's formal statement of values (*Caria dei Valori*) also presents a vague picture, emphasizing non-controversial aims as "rejection of totalitarianism" (*rigetto dei totalitarismi*) and "positive thinking: the morality of getting things done" (*pensiero positivo: la moralità del fare*).[109] Coupled with the anti-political criticism directed by Silvio Berlusconi, from the very moment he entered the political arena, the party's ideological and programmatic vagueness has appeared to be a big advantage when running election campaigns against an incumbent government. Berlusconi's style of leadership, his principal characteristics has remained tied to a non-traditional view of politics. Berlusconi presented himself as a political outsider, determined to fight against what he judged to be the old, inefficient, and corrupt political system. Apart from periodically appealing to anti-communism, the founder of Forza Italia had a favourite target in public speeches: the professional politicians whose ineptitude and factiousness compared so badly with the industry of civil society and the entrepreneurial classes. The anti-political strain of Berlusconi's rhetoric and his thinking is so deep-rooted that he did not even abandon it during the period when he was in government for an entire term. Programmatically, the politics espoused by Forza Italia are formally based on neo-liberalism, exalting free enterprise and the resultant withdrawal of the state from the economy, leading to the 'downsizing' of the role of politics in society. In reality, Forza

[107]Ignazi, n.27, pp. 333-349
[108]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.128
[109]Hopkin, Jonathan (2004), Forza Italia after Ten Years, *Italian Politics*, 20, pp. 83-99

Italia has to face a clear paradox: on the one hand it has an image of itself as a pioneer of innovation and political and social transformation; on the other hand, it had to deal with its voters, who were on average more traditional and moderate compared with other parties.[110]

Emphasizing its pragmatism, FI considers itself non-ideological. With a business mentality prevailing, it is oriented towards problem solving. Thatcherism is often cited in discussions of its policies. It is clear that free market liberalism is a centrepiece of its programme. The reduction of the role of the state in the economy is a major goal. Privatisation, which had started before the FI victory at the polls, was accelerated by the Berlusconi government. The party was committed to reducing taxes and government spending.[111]

Similar to LN, FI started out as a Eurocrat party but over the period of time adopted a mild Eurosceptic position. Until the 1990s, the governing parties generally aligned themselves with the Franco-German initiatives for deepening integration. This changed with the election of the Berlusconi's first government in 1994 with the appointment of Antonio Martino, who presented himself as a Thacherite Eurosceptic[112] and in 2001 with the new Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti. Tremonti, Berluconi and Bossi, to varying degrees, openly blamed the euro membership for Italy's poor economic performance. They pressed for economic reforms and labour market flexibilities, opposing the stress on social guarantees as proposed by France and Germany.[113]

The reason as to why the presence of euroscepticism is important is not because it was present in the right-wing parties but that these parties were in power in 1994, 2001 and 2008. For all these parties, changes in their stances on issues, either towards

[110] Mete, Vittorio (2010), Four Types Of Anti-Politics: Insights From The Italian Case, *Modern Italy*, 15(1), pp. 37-61

[111] Sondra Z. Koff and Stephen P. Koff (2000), *Italy: From the First to the Second Republic*, (Routledge: London), pp.46.

[112]British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher's Bruges speech of 1988 became a template for a new generation of Eurosceptics. It was not given to put the country on course for an exit, but to limit Europe's ambitions. "To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve," Thatcher said. Increasingly, they believed the original vision of a trading area had been supplanted by Franco-German ambitions for political and economic union.

[113]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 134

euroscepticism as in the case with LN and FI, should be considered to be strategic moves rather than actions rooted in ideological base. Since the late 1990s, the public support for European integration and the assessment of benefits derived from the EU has declined. It is not because there is dissatisfaction with the Union, but it is more about Italy's low economic growth since joining single currency and sharp increase in consumer prices. Also it needs to be noted that the contemporary eurosceptic discourse of these parties is different from the past, for it is understood to be more political than economic. Moreover, since the 2001, European integration does not feature as a top agenda for Italian foreign policy. The new priorities of the second and third Berlusconi government were to defend their own 'national interest', to raise Italy's international profile even if it was detrimental to the relationship with the EU. This was evident in Italy siding with US during war in Iraq in 2003, which split EU. In short, euroscepticism in Italy would increase in future, coupled with weak economic growth, reduced purchasing power and sluggish domestic reforms which present these parties ample manoeuvring space and an abundant electoral space to change public opinion.[114]

Figure 4.b: Lack of Trust in the EU



In an ECFR analysis done in 2013, while the statistics showed that trust in the EU has decreased in Italy (Figure 4.b), a majority of Italian respondents still see themselves as

[114]Quaglia, Lucia, *The Ebb and Flow of Euroscepticism in Italy*, in Verney, Susannah (ed.) (2012), *Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A Diachronic Perspective*, (Oxon: Routledge), pp.47.

European citizens and identify with Europe. In the poll, only 1 per cent wanted to leave the EU. Instead, a large majority – especially among the business community – want to move ahead to a real political union that is more democratic and more social than the current EU. The election did not show that Italians want less Europe. Rather, they want a different Europe: one that is more flexible and more symmetrical, less focused on austerity and more focused on investment in the real economy.[115]

Leadership

Silvio Berlusconi was the dominant political force in Italy from 1994-2010. As Gianfranco Pasquino[116] explains, he was obliged by political circumstances to play a variety of roles in Italian politics; and he fully enjoyed s being in the spotlight as a result of his several public faces. It is this charisma of Berlusconi that defines Forza Italia's success. Forza Italia, according to Stefano Fella and Carl Ruzza,[117] has enjoyed the typical attributes of charismatic movements, in which the leader and founder alone selects aim and the social basis of the party and is the only true source and legitimate interpreter of the party's doctrine.

As Caterina Paolucci[118]explains, the crucial characteristic of Forza Italia was its configuration as a *patrimonial organisation*, owned, controlled and directed autocratically by its founder and leader. This characteristic of the party was closely connected to the second and third most important features of the genetic model: the *business firm character*, with the transfer of people, but also structures, ideology, styles and procedures from Berlusconi's firms into the party, and *charismatic leadership*, which played an important legitimising function, by justifying patrimonialism internally and the business firm model externally, thereby guaranteeing the loyalty of the activists and the support of the voters.

---

[115]Torre Blancs, Jose Ignacio and Leonard, Mark, *The Remarkable Rise Of Continental Euroscepticism*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 25 April 2013, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_remarkable_rise_of_continental_euroscepticism36468, accessed on 20 December 2016

[116]Pasquino, Gianfranco (2007), The Five Faces of Silvio Berlusconi: The Knight of Anti-politics, *Modern Italy*, 12(1), pp. 39-54

[117]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.114

[118]Paolucci, Caterina, *A firm masquerading as a party transforms Italy: Berlusconi's Forza Italia*, European Consortium of Political Research, Joint Sessions, Intercollege Nicosia, Cyprus, April 25-30 2006.

Silvio Berlusconi tailored his new party around his own personality and whims. He presented himself as the Milanese businessman, who was a typical successful self-made man who has never severed his links with the middle classes from which he emerged. Despite his enormous fortune, he worked hard to appear as one of the common people.[119] He presented himself, successfully, as the outsider from politics and anti-establishment candidate in fight against the old and corrupt party-order. Berlusconi acted as if he was in sync with his audience, with the aim of appearing as the only sincere and worthy interpreter of what the man in the street thinks. Berlusconi used simple and clear language that the common man viewing television would easily comprehend and connect with. This gave his viewers the satisfaction of being finally able to understand something of the obscure and unsavoury material that politics had been. This strategy was apparent in Berlusconi's praise for the common sense of 'the real Italy, the Italy that works', juxtaposed with the 'chattering Italy'.[120]

This is how; Berlusconi discredited the old regime, which was responsible for the corruption scandal. Its discourse was the 'chatter' of a do-nothing political class, which hid its weakness behind incomprehensible language. However his sharpest criticism was reserved for the Left, which lost itself in 'abstract principles' and 'complicated ideologies'.[121] His political speeches were dominated with referenced to the 'communist' opposition and this often comes as part of a general demonisation of both communism and opposition in general.[122]However, the key protagonist of Berlusconi's discourse remains the entrepreneur. He was clever to invoke the economic miracle when discussing political change, believe in the post-war transformation which they experienced directly. In his speeches Berlusconi ran the gamut of the private sector: from the family firm, where the father is the boss, the mother the bookkeeper and children or relatives provide the labour, to the grand *condottieri* (entrepreneurs), at whose head he placed himself. He

[119]Marco Tarchi, Italy: A Country of Many Populisms, in Albertazzi, Daniele and McDonnell, Duncan (eds.) (2008), *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan), pp.93.
[120]Ibid., pp.94
[121]McCarthy, n.90, pp.134
[122]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.117

promised to re-launch the economy, adding that '*there is no one in Italy who can make this promise with as much credibility as I who am making it before you'*.[123]

Berlusconi's charisma played a legitimising function which diverted attention and criticisms away from the centralised management of the party and its atypical business firm nature. He appeared as a natural leader, invested with a difficult mission.[124] Paternalistic and reassuring, Berlusconi never missed an opportunity to proclaim himself as the interpreter and defender of the popular will. His ideal stage was not the platform of a rally, but the television screens which, as owner of the three most popular private networks, he knew perfectly.[125] The personalisation strategies were the first tools to explain Berlusconi's success; he won because he knew better than his opponents how to self-manage his image, and could apply this communicative strategy to new TV programmes dealing with the election and aired by both his privately owned TV stations and the more traditional public broadcasters. Furthermore, he won because, not only did his opponents not know how to manage their own television images, but also because they mocked the narration Berlusconi was building and the commercials he took advantage of.[126] The effective channelling and modulation of charismatic communication was made easy by the specialisation of Berlusconi's firms, namely advertising, marketing and television programming. And the personal ownership by Forza Italia's leader of three TV channels allowed for the national broadcasting of the leader's image. This genetic feature led Forza Italia to display the typical attributes of charismatic movements, in which the leader and founder alone selected the aims and the social basis of the party. Also in Forza Italia, there was a complete integration between the identity of the party and that of the leader, who wielded control over all relevant organisational spheres.[127]

He interpreted and depicted his job as prime minister as that of the CEO of 'Italy plc', who cannot waste time on the burdensome rituals of parliamentary discussions and was obliged only to report to the company shareholders, or rather that part of the electorate

[123]McCarthy, n.90, pp.136
[124]Paolucci, n.118
[125]Tarchi, n.119, pp.93
[126]Ruggiero, Christian (2012), Forecasting in the Politics of Spectacle, From Berlusconi to Grillo: The Narrative of Impolite Politics, *Bulletin of Italian Politics*, 4(2), pp. 305-322
[127]Paolucci, n.118

which, with their vote, have placed absolute faith in him. From the moment he decided to enter politics, Berlusconi had frequently reiterated that he was only on 'temporary loan' to politics. He has left the professional world, but wishes to return there once he has successfully completed his mission to 'save the country' from the abyss into which it would be led by 'old politics' (especially the parties of the Left). His pride in coming from outside the corrupt and inefficient elite was a key element in his populist repertory.[128]

His presentation of himself as a political outsider, speaking the language of the common man and representing the interests of the latter against the political elite and the values attached to the moral qualities of family and professionalism added another important feature of the populist rhetoric of the Forza Italia leader. This involved the belief that he spoke for the Italian silent majority, which constituted of the average hard-working Italian, who was not very political but anti-communist and holding traditional catholic and conservative values.[129]

Completing the picture of Berlusconi's populism were the concessions in his speeches aimed at the weak, the abandoned, the unemployed and the elderly - that is the most disadvantaged of the 'common people', whom the parties and unions of the Left have abandoned in order to defend the interests of those 'insiders' who are already protected. The 'appeal to the people' has been a constant and essential component of Berlusconi's discourse, both in opposition − when it served to discredit the legitimacy of those opponents who had forced him to resign by a First Republic-style coup − and also in the years after he returned to government. As prime minister, he continued to accuse the old political class of meddling in the affairs of businessmen and all innovative and creative citizens, and praised the simple and linear solutions practised by such 'men of action', contrasting them with the unfathomable alchemies of those who know no job other than politics.[130]

[128]Tarchi, n.119, pp.93
[129]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp. 115
[130]Tarchi, n.119, pp.96

Consistently critical of other politicians, he cultivated an image of an outsider, but someone at ease with the changing global political and technological scenario. With his position as a media entrepreneur, owner of a football club and reputation as a 'show-man', the *cavaliere' (Knight)* brought his audacious business acumen to politics. His personal leadership style has been refined with great care and detail, in presentation of his own image as someone much younger than he actually is and as a successful businessman who can seamlessly extend his own personal success as a salesman to the role of statesman.[131]

Electoral Base

Forza Italia has remained dominant in the electoral scene since its inception. Francesco Raniolo[132] explains that the basis for the mobilization and identification of electors and supporters can be found in a specific set of cleavages. They reflect FI's reference values, that is, it's 'ethos', as well as its programme or 'doctrine'. The position of the party on the first two cleavages, that is, the state vs. market and individualism vs. authoritarianism, places it within the ideological family of neo-conservative parties, in the wake of Reagan and Thatcher, who complemented economic free enterprise, the breaking-up of the state, and market centrality with an authoritarian vision of society. This meant the deregulation of economic behaviour and at the same time the regulation of social behaviour. The third cleavage, that is, the pro/anti-regime cleavage, is typical of a new party with an anti-political culture: 'FI is, first of all, in favour of a new constitution', Berlusconi's position regarding constitutional and electoral reforms has been anything but stable and coherent as discussed later in the chapter. Lastly, with regard to international politics, a pro-American feeling and a Eurosceptic attitude have characterized FI. These positions on cleavage configuration make up the core of FI's set of values which have not undergone much change since 1994.

Forza Italia's success probably owes more to Berlusconi's role as a politician than his role as a media baron. Not only has he been effective as a coalition builder, at the very least politically mobilizing local business elites all over Italy and bringing together

[131]Andrews, Geoff (2005), *Not a Normal Country: Italy after Berlusconi*, (Pluto Press: London), pp.20.
[132]Raniolo, n.91, pp. 439-455

various political forces from the political right.[133] To present itself in sync with the public, FI's candidates were young and well educated (60 per cent under the age of 50 and 70 per cent had BA level education), with the largest group being represented by the entrepreneurs, almost 15 per cent. To increase its popular outreach, sports personalities were well represented. Among the campaign themes, anger at corruption, economic issues etc. were highlighted. FI has been able to maintain its electoral record, never falling below 20 per cent of the vote and has enjoyed a strong support throughout the Italian territory, although it is particularly strong in the more highly developed regions of north, notably in Lombardy, Piedmont and in some parts of south, like Sicily.[134]

The electoral appeal of FI is furthered, as explained by John Agnew, by Berlusconi's control over most television channels, both private and public. Reaching everywhere in Italy, television has replaced grass-roots organisation as the main instrument of political involvement. Thus, 'the new politicians no longer belonged to ''parties'' - they became elites of electoral entrepreneurs who, competing among themselves through advertising, spoke directly to the mass of citizen consumers offering them their symbolic ''products'' through the television medium according to precise marketing strategies'. Television, in general, and Berlusconi's ability to use it to advantage in particular, have undoubtedly had major effects on Italian electoral politics.[135]

Forza Italia drew votes primarily from the old parties of government: 25.8per cent of people who voted DC in 1992 turned to Berlusconi, as did 15.1per cent who voted PSI and 10.2 per cent who voted *Partito Repubblicano Italiano* (Italian Republican Party, PRI).However, FI also picked up protest voters: 18.6 per cent of 1992 Lega voters, 13.8 per cent of MSI voters, 3.3 per cent of Verdi voters. Forza Italia was successful because it appeared to offer the most plausible solution to the two-year crisis of the Italian state, moreover, its future depended on its ability to provide answers to the many questions which that crisis posed. They included not merely economic revival but finding a more

[133]Shin and Agnew, n.89, pp.23
[134]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.112
[135]Shin and Agnew, n.89, pp.21

correct balance between the state and the private sector as between the state and civil society.[136]

FI electorate is represented largely by younger generation, housewives, businessmen, and self-employed as well as those with a low level of education. Forza's anti-political stand was crucial because it attracted the electorate which showed a deep mistrust against the Italian political institutions. These resources helped FI to win its maiden election 1994, in total the coalition won 46.4 per cent of vote with FI single-handedly winning 21 per cent. It emerged to be strongest in the north followed by LN, second largest in central Italy after PDS and the third party in south following MSI/AN and PDS. However, Berlusconi's confidence was severely damaged after the 1996 elections where FI lost 38 per cent of electors it had gained in 1994, losing majority votes in north to LN, which ran against it. This was largely due to the fact that Berlusconi's first victory was built on heterogeneous alliances in different parts of the country. In the North, Berlusconi relied on LN and in the South, on MSI/AN. His dependence on the support of these parties was such that the government he formed lasted only seven months, when the LN's defected creating ground for the Centre-Left to achieve victory in the 1996 elections. The reorganisation that followed in 1998 cemented Berlusconi image as a serious leader, and the campaign that followed presented an excellent showmanship of the leader and the capacity of the party to reach to even the remotest part of Italy. FI won 29.4 per cent of vote in 2001 elections and the party was reaffirmed as the most voted party of Italy.[137]The elections saw the victory of a centre-right alliance called the 'House of Freedoms'(*Casa delle Libertà*, CdL) led by Silvio Berlusconi, over a centre-left coalition called the Olive Tree Alliance (*Ulivo*) which had been in office since the last elections in 1996.

FI's electoral crisis in 2003-5, due to declining government's popularity, was a destabilising factor within CdL coalition. Just as Forza Italia gained most of its votes from the centre, at the beginning of the 1990s, after the scandals, the launch of a new electoral system and the disintegration of the parties that had previously formed the

[136]McCarthy, n.90, pp.144
[137]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.113

governing coalitions; these voters were left without political representation. Forza Italia gave them what they were looking for: an anti-communist discourse and organizational credibility.[138] Similarly, during this period the other partners took advantage of the FI crisis: in 1994-96 the League absorbed the FI's votes and in 2004-5 the centre-right successors to Christian Democracy did the same.[139] In the 2006 elections, FI was the biggest loser, its vote share fell to 23.7 per cent, a drop of 5.8 per cent vote, while the vote share of AN and LN increased marginally and of UdC doubled.[140]

Silvio Berlusconi in 2007 launched a coalition called *Il Popolo Della Liberta* (The People of Freedom, PdL). The formation of a new coalition was declared during a demonstration of the centre-right in Rome against the government of Romano Prodi in 2006. Silvio Berlusconi proposed the foundation of a "Freedom Party", stressing that voters of the different parties were all part of a "people of freedom". At that time, none of Berlusconi's allies seemed keen on joining the new party. Moreover, it was also not yet clear when Forza Italia would be dismantled to merge into the new party.However, Berlusconi was able to forge a new coalition, and along with LN was able to receive almost 47 per cent of the vote in 2008 elections. The PdL, with over 37 per cent votes, secured slightly more than the total votes for FI and AN in 2006. Berlusconi's new party was thus his most electorally successful yet and he was once again Prime Minister.[141] This coalition was later transformed into s party during a party congress on 27-29 March 2009.

[4.3] Impact of Right-Wing Parties in Government

Between 1992 and 1994, the major governing political parties of Italy, especially DC and PSI, were riddled with scandals and corruption cases creating, as noted, an atmosphere of disillusionment and disenchantment among the population. This situation proved to be a fertile ground for Silvio Berlusconi to enter politics with his newly formed Forza Italia. He knitted together after 1994 elections a coalition which was a mixture of new and old parties, AN and LN. Although the coalition of 1994 was short lived, it was extremely

[138]Brusattin, n.103, pp. 481-499
[139]Raniolo, n.91, pp. 439-455
[140]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.113
[141] McDonnell, Duncan (2013), Silvio Berlusconi's Personal Parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo Della Libertà, *Political Studies*, 61(S1), pp. 271-233

important because it was for the first time in the history of post-war Europe that a government was formed which was entirely made up by the right-wing parties.

Despite the setback of 1994, all the three parties returned to a coalition government in 2001 and this time completed a full parliamentary term. The coalition lost to Centre-Left in 2006, they again returned to power in 2008. The success of right-wing coalitions in government is nothing short of an achievement. Italian political system, since the end of Second World War, have been known for unstable governments, the right-wing coalition, despite inherent distinctions, represented a stable and one of the most remarkable feature.

In the 1990s, Italian politics underwent an unprecedented change and upheavals. The ruling parties electorally and organisationally disintegrated, the two main parties of opposition (communists and neo-fascists) transformed themselves into different parties by shedding their ideological identities. The party system underwent a meltdown and transformation, and the electoral system was reformed from a Proportional Representation system to one based on a mix between proportional and majoritarian elements. The elections of 1994 in this context were the most significant in the Italian Republic's history. The election of right-wing alliance under the premiership of Silvio Berlusconi represented the formal end to Italy's First Republic: the culmination of a four and a half year period of crisis and transition, entailing the dismantling of the existing governing parties with their fifty year hold on power.

The election of 1994 was preceded by remarkable events that helped the right-wing parties to emerge successfully. Umberto Bossi, at the Lega's congress in December 1993, decided to end his movement's isolationist stance and enter an anti-left alliance. Gianfranco Fini launched the National Alliance (AN) to convince voters that neo-Fascists were now 'post-Fascists' who were ready to govern with Berlusconi. The right-wing coalition represented the perfect mix of the old and new. Moreover, to overcome the inherent differences among them, Berlusconi stressed values instead of ideologies. He claimed: 'Our program is based on the family, the enterprise, the market, profits; but also on solidarity, the Christian principles of respect and tolerance.' Berlusconi and the *Polo delle Liberta* (Poll of Freedom) had answers to the problems posed by the three cleavages of Italy: right-left; north-south; modernity-traditionalism. They claimed to represent the

interests of large segments of the north (the League), of the centre and south (AN/MSI), and of Italian society in general within a populist framework provided by the personalities led by Berlusconi and a broad political alliance. They could claim to have modern goals and the means to achieve them- 'a second Italian miracle' was one of Berlusconi's favourite campaign slogans-while preserving fundamental social values based in Christianity.[142] The coalition won a resounding victory in the 1994 elections. Forza Italia became the leading party in Italy with 21 per cent of vote, while MSI/AN's vote leapt to 13.5 per cent and LN polled 8.4 per cent of national votes. In May 1994, as soon as the new government was sworn in, the inclusion of neo-fascist party in a democratic system was severely criticised. The inclusion of MSI/AN represented the end of anti-fascist consensus in Italy leading European Parliament passing a motion urging Italy to be 'faithful to the fundamental values that influenced the foundation of the community'.

However, inclusion of LN and AN proved to be a difficult situation for the coalition. LN's outbursts against both Berlusconi and Fini continued despite being in the government. Also the difficulties LN faced in reconciling its populist nature with the demand of being a coalition partner led to its exit from the government merely months after its formation. Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker[143] in their analysis highlight the reasons as to why the 1994 government of right-wing was shortlist. First, the presence in government of members of the MSI/National Alliance was disturbing. Although its leader Gianfranco Fini did much to modernise the appeal of his party its roots were Fascist. Fini was careful to define his revamped party as 'post-fascist', but he refused to embrace Italy's post-war tradition of anti-fascism and even let slip a remark about Mussolini being the country's greatest statesman in the twentieth century. Second, there was concern about the extraordinary concentration of power in Berlusconi's hands. Especially Berlusconi's reluctance to divest himself in any meaningful way of his holdings created a great number of potential conflicts of interest and introduced a grave element of distortion into the functioning of Italian public life. Third was economy. Under Amato

[142]Sznajder, n.36, pp. 83-102
[143]Gundle, Stephen and Parker, Simon (eds.) (1996), *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, (UK: Routledge), pp.11

and Ciampi stern measures were undertaken to tackle the recurring budget deficit and the public sector debt. There were fears that the Berlusconi government would both fail to continue the work of correcting past abuses and that it would penalise the less well-off, giving rise to a new season of social conflict. Fourth was Lega Nord which acted as a catalyst for the collapse of coalition. It was angry to see itself supplanted and a large part of its electorate seduced by Forza Italia. It was also disturbed by the number of recycled Christian Democrats and Liberals that occupied government posts. Its unease was increased when Forza Italia and National Alliance formed a close working alliance and began to implement a struggle for power within the institutions - broadly excluding the League from the share-out of posts.

Between the periods from 1995 till 2001, the right-wing parties underwent a series of re-organisations and re-evaluation. MSI officially underwent the transformation and emerged as Alleanza Nazionale after 1995 Fiuggi Congress. This, however, did not result in a cohesive party rather resulted a group led by Pino Rauti to create a breakaway party – Movimento Sociale – Fiamme Tricolore (Social Movement -Tricolor Flame, MSI-FT). MSI-FT served to reinforce the idea that AN represented, a break with the past. On the other hand, AN chose to consolidate its new found legitimacy and present itself as a modern European party. Lega Nord, which was blamed for the fall of first Berlusconi government, moved towards a more separatist position due to which a substantial number of party members left deeming secession as a controversial slogan with limited support among the leaders and population. Although after internal debates and discussion, the issue of secessionist ideology was dropped but by that time isolation of LN was complete. FI underwent internal reorganisation, as it sought to deepen its institutional and territorial roots with internal elections involving party leaders. Despite this the party remained heavily dominated by its leader.

The elections of 1999 and poor electoral performance by these parties again resulted in extensive introspection by these parties. The leaders of both LN and AN reappraised their strategies, AN went back to its traditional positions, issues like identity, law and order situation and security were emphasised. Gianfranco Fini tried to portray AN as “socially advanced wing of the centre-right” placing a renewed emphasis of the social market

economy.[144] On the other hand, Umberto Bossi opted for a fundamental transformation of LN by declaring that the ideal of secessionism had to be dropped without compromising the issue of greater autonomy for Padania. He declared that the price of coalition with other parties would be the delivery of the devolution reforms to enhance power and status of Italian regions.[145]

The elections of 13 May 2001 resulted in the election of a centre-right alliance called the 'House of Freedoms' (*Casa delle Libertà*) led by Silvio Berlusconi and his party, FI, over a centre-left coalition called the Olive Tree Alliance (*Ulivo*) which had been in office since the last elections in 1996 (forming four separate governments between 1996-2001).One of the most important reforms was referendum of Constitution in 2003, a number of *Ad Personam laws* and Bossi-Fini Law in 2001. Just as with the 1994 government, the question of Berlusconi's conflict of interest was raised again and again. However, by 2001 this had expanded to include his leadership and a number of judicial proceedings against him for corruption and financial irregularities. Given the problems that Berlusconi faced with regard to his office of profit, these laws appeared to be designed primarily to resolve Berlusconi's personal and business problems, including one on international requests for judicial assistance, making evidence obtained this way inadmissible unless the documents were original or authenticated individually. Another example could be taken of the Gasparri Law passed in 2004. The bill was intended to transform Italy's media sector by abolishing restrictions on cross-ownership of national TV channels and newspapers. The law effectively reversed a constitutional court order for Berlusconi's Mediaset Company to divest itself of one of its three terrestrial national TV channel. As it altered laws on general media ownership in a flexible direction, it allowed Mediaset to extend its holdings in other forms of media.[146] Another controversial reform by this government was for judiciary which was spearheaded by LN justice minister, Roberto Castelli. This involved a reform of the selection procedures and career patterns of judges which was eventually adopted in 2005.[147]

[144]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.31
[145]Ibid., pp.31
[146]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.33
[147]Ibid., pp.33

Berlusconi's government also made an attempt to reform the constitution. In 2003, a group of Italian politicians from the governing centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi drafted the so-called 'Great Reform' of the Italian Constitution. This proposed amending 53 of the 139 Articles of the Second Part, the section that deals with the Republic's organisation; both central institutions (Parliament, Government, the Presidency, the Judiciary and the Constitutional Court, referenda) and local ones (regions, provinces and municipalities). There were a number of major changes recommended. Firstly, Parliament should have scrutiny over regional laws that were deemed to conflict with the 'national interest'. Secondly, there was the introduction of the 'Federal Senate', with the consequent abolition of symmetric bicameralism. Thirdly, there was the possibility of giving the regions legislative power on crucial areas such as health, education and security. Fourthly, there was to be a strengthening of the Prime Minister's role, with relevant changes to the parliamentary system. Fifthly, the role of the President of the Republic was modified. Finally, a revision was to be made to the composition of the Constitutional Court. Difficulties in arranging a mediation caused some internal unrest in the Berlusconi government in 2003, but then they were mostly overcome and the law was passed by the Senate in April 2004; it was slightly modified by the Chamber of Deputies in October 2004, and again in October 2005, and finally approved by the Senate on 16 November 2005, with a bare majority. Approval in a referendum is necessary in order to amend the Italian Constitution without a qualified two-thirds parliamentary majority. The referendum was held on 25–26 July 2006 and resulted in the rejection of the constitutional reform, refused by 61.3 per cent of the voters.[148]

The CdL coalition prioritized changing of immigration laws in their agenda. However, there were differences within the coalition on what they perceived to be the most important issue within immigration, the Lega called for the zero immigration, linking immigration with radical Islam and an unwanted multicultural society, Alleanza Nazionale linked immigration to crime and the Christian Democrats demanded an

[148] Wolff, Elisabetta Cassina (2012), *Berlusconi's Attempt to Reform the Italian Constitution: Rehearsal of New (Post-modern) Authoritarian Politics or Same Old Habit*?, Paper prepared for the One-day conference, *Silvio Berlusconi and Post-modern Politics*, University of Birmingham, 14 December 2012

amnesty for the democratic workers at a bare minimum, despite their ultimate goal of greater amnesty.

In February 2002, the new Bossi–Fini law passed through the Senate. This new legislation amended the Turco-Napolitano law. Several important changes were implemented. The new law linked employment with the ability to obtain a work permit or a visa. It was now only possible to receive a work permit if the applicant secures a job, a place of residence, and if the employer can guarantee return passage. Non-European Union citizens were no longer able to qualify for entrance visas in order to come to Italy to seek employment. Sponsoring a person who does not have a job in Italy was also no longer possible. Instead, entry was only possible if an employer, through one of the newly created local immigration centres, puts in a specific request for a specific quantity and a type of worker or for a specific individual. When the work permit expires the immigrant must find a new job, or return home.

The new Bossi–Fini law made family reunification more difficult. The law states that third-generation relatives cannot be sponsored by their families and that parents can only be sponsored if there is proof that they will be financially supported and if they can demonstrate that they are not already supported in their country of origin. Penalties for trafficking immigrants were toughened and calls for the military to block boats attempting to smuggle immigrants into the country were legalized. The Bossi–Fini law also claimed that asylum laws would be streamlined. The law demanded that the processing of asylum claims must be accelerated. But it also demanded that claimants must not be given temporary work permits until it is assured that their claim for asylum is legitimate.

Finally, quotas would be set more rigidly. At the end of the year, depending on demand and levels of unemployment, the quota for the following year will be determined. Since the quota system was selective in nature, the priority was given to the nationals from the states with which Italy had bilateral agreements. Despite the strict laws and regulations introduced by the law, under Bossi-Fini the largest ever regularisation of the undocumented migrants took place, legalizing almost 700,000 migrants.

The law was seen to be much harsher than any law ever passed by the Italian Parliament and did invite a fair share of criticism. The proceedings of the preparatory work on the Bossi-Fini Act led to a divided Parliament and a highly polarised and ideological political atmosphere. Although there was not much opposition within the government coalition, the left, civil society organisations and industry objected to the new law. On several occasions, in cities such as Brescia and Rome, immigrants groups, opposition parties, anti-globalization groups and the unions proclaimed that the Bossi-Fini law was racist.[149] The opposition parties in particular complained of serious doubts as to the constitutional legitimacy of the provisions under discussion, and described the Bill as a manifesto law which had a purely demagogic, propaganda purpose and no operational capacity. All the opposition parties expressed deep suspicion and rejection of the Bill and the political philosophy that inspired it: the *Democratici di Sinistra* (DS), which was now in opposition, called for a radical review of the Bill, which in their opinion was based solely on contingent and particularistic political needs, the Margherita Party, a fairly moderate opposition party described the bill as having a punitive spirit towards immigrants and a dangerous attitude of irritation with the phenomenon of immigration.[150]

Despite the largest regularisation in 2002 and extensive immigration laws, immigration to Italy was on an all-time high, reaching an estimated 5 million in 2006. The Italian political scenario changed yet again in 2006 when the Centre-Left came to power. The Centre-Left, Prodi government that came into power after the elections had a different attitude towards the immigration, and attempted to move from a policy based on a posteriori regularization to an active immigration policy. In particular, a second decree-law on migration flows was passed, which enabled 350,000 immigrants to regular jobs; abolished the transition period limitations on workers from eight of the new EU member countries; implemented the Community directives on family reunion and long-term residents, with more favourable rules than those in force at the time; and proposed one bill to revise the law on acquiring citizenship and another to modify the Bossi-Fini law.

[149]Zaslove, Andrej (2004), Closing the door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy, in Austria and Italy, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(1), pp. 99-118.
[150]Zincone, Giovanna (2006), The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32(3), pp. 347-375.

However, the fall of the Prodi Government at the start of 2008 and the dissolution of Parliament prevented the approval of two measures presented by the executive regarding naturalisation and immigration.

The coalition, despite being able to complete a full-term, was fraught with various problems, primarily the difference of opinion between coalition partners. Although Berlusconi presented himself as arbitrator between conflicting positions of AN and LN in government, he and his party often took similar position to those of LN. This was particularly the case on economic issues, although on issues such as immigration and constitutional reforms, FI position was similar to that of AN.

However, the constitutional reform referendum done by the right-wing coalition backfired leading them to loose marginally to the centre-left led by Romano Prodi. The race was so close that the Centre-Left coalition won the plurality of votes in the Lower House by 49.8 per cent and the Centre-Right winning the plurality of votes in the Senate with 49.9 per cent. The result was contested by Berlusconi who refused to accept the legitimacy of the victory, alleging electoral fraud. The fairness of the election had to be confirmed by the High Court. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, and still in control of the government and of most television channels, Berlusconi kept the situation very unsettled, whilst pressurising the Centre-Left to accept a 'grand coalition' solution to the crisis. The *Unione* refused any possibility of a 'grand coalition' and, when the new Parliament was established at the end of April, succeeded in getting its candidates elected as Speakers in both Houses.[151]

Post the defeat, LN and AN retuned to some of their older tactics. LN reaffirmed its populist stance with hints of the need to return to the secessionist strategy of the 1990s, while its anti-immigration message was reiterated in the wake of the outcry over the rising Romanian criminality in 2007 and their general opposition to the construction of mosques. For its part, AN returned to a more aggressive stand on immigration and their rejection of multiculturalism. The populism of the alliance came at forth by the united

[151] Guerra, Simona and Massetti, Emanuele, (2006), *Election Briefing No.25: The Italian Parliamentary Elections of April 2006*, European Parties Elections and Referendums Network, Sussex European Institute.

opposition of proposals presented by the centre-left government regarding easing of immigration reforms.[152]

Taking everyone by surprise, Silvio Berlusconi on 27 November 2009 announced the creation of a new party, *Il Popolo Della Liberta* (The People of Freedom, PdL), which would incorporate Forza Italia and other representatives and parties that wanted to join. The subsequent election in April 2008delivered an easy victory for the PdL-LN coalition which received almost 47 per cent of the vote compared to the 38 per cent gained by Walter Veltroni's centre-left coalition. Moreover, the PdL, with over 37 per cent, secured slightly more than the total votes for FI and AN in 2006. Berlusconi's new party was thus his most electorally successful yet and he was once again Prime Minister.[153]

The success and failure of this government is largely assessed with reference to its economic performance and changes in immigration laws. The immigration issue became much more negative in the Italian arena and was one of the most salient issues for Italian voters. This was the main area of interest for Berlusconi's centre-right coalition from 2001 to 2006 and then again in 2008 when the right-wing coalition was again voted to power. These parties adopted xenophobic rhetoric mirroring the anti-immigrant sentiments of their respective bases. Immigration was linked, in a contradictory relationship, with the economic issues and as a threat to cultural values and disrupting community cohesion. Roberto Maroni, the newly elected Interior Minister, presented a series of measures concerning immigration and crime, explicitly linking the two phenomena, which resulted in the 'security package', first presented to the Council of Ministers in May 2008, finally approved in July 2009, and introduced in August 2009 as Law 94/2009. The new law was designed explicitly to criminalize clandestine immigration, raising barriers to entry and facilitating the expulsion of illegal immigrant

This law modified some measures, introduced new proposals, and abrogated certain others. The most prominent included the crime of illegal residence, which was introduced to avoid the Returns Directive Requirement that the guilty verdict under the criminal law be required for an immediate expulsion with the accompaniment to the border. This was

[152]Ruzza and Fella, n.22, pp.150
[153] McDonnell, n.141, pp. 271-233

changed from entailing a mooted custodial sentence to a fine that was so high that it was unlikely that any illegal migrant would be able to pay. A regularisation procedure for the foreign housekeepers and care-workers was established after it became clear that many households would suffer from losing their services, hence a total of 294,744 applications for regularisations were granted.

The security package included non-comprehensive list of the measures that were to be adopted, this included the rise of the custodial sentences of between six months and three years for people who lease accommodation to undocumented migrants; criminalisation of the foreigners irregular entry and residence in Italy, to be sanctioned with a substantial fine of between Euro 5,000 - Euro 10,000 and expulsion rather than imprisonment; restrictions in all aspects of migrant‘s relationship with public authorities, including municipal residents register for marriage, for which the foreigners would have to produce documents that certifies the regularity of their stay in Italian territory; in the penal code, illegal presence on the Italian territory of the person found guilty entails an increase in sentencing of up to a third of the given offence, applicable to third country nationals and stateless people, but not to the EU- country nationals; it authorizes and regulates the setting up of the *Ronde* (citizen’s patrols) for surveillance the territory and reporting of the crimes to public security bodies; for the purposes of integration, Italian language tests and an integration agreement were introduced as requirements for obtaining a residence permit.

Other provisions envisaged the enforcement of a series of controls on the status of foreign nationals in Italy, including making it the duty of money transfer agents to check the residence permits of migrants using their services and to report any illegal immigrants to the police (Article 1, paragraph 20). Further articles established that a foreign citizen married to an Italian can acquire Italian citizenship only after two years of legal residence in the country since the marriage took place, or three years in case of residence in another country (Article 1, paragraph 11). Previously a period of only six month’s residence was required. In addition, any request for Italian citizenship was a subject to the payment of Euro 200 (Article 1, paragraph 12), whereas previously this did not incur any cost. The new law made it more difficult for family members to rejoin their relatives in Italy.

Article 1, paragraph 19 (a) stipulated that family reunions would be subject to double certification by competent council offices, testifying to the fitness of housing accommodation both in terms of size and in terms of hygienic conditions. The law also established that foreign nationals can be kept in so-called 'centres of temporary permanence' (referred to by the new law as 'centres for identification and expulsion') for up to 180 days, whereas previously their stay in such centres was restricted to two months (Article 1, paragraph 22l).

Along with passing this new law, the Berlusconi government initiated a new policy of sending migrants caught at sea back to Libya, under a bilateral agreement. Thus, on 6 May 2009, 227 migrants were forcibly returned to Libya by the Italian coast guard. Interior Minister Maroni was reported as saying that this was a historic 'turning point' in the fight against illegal immigration. This action met with numerous criticisms from international bodies, and the United Nations refugee chief intervened on 2 October 2009 asking European countries not to send migrants forcibly back to Libya.[154]

The security package also dealt with the organized crime, drawing a closer link between the punishment for assisting illegal immigration and that meted out for other forms of criminal activity, and for offending public officers who were carrying out their duties. This drew criticism from not only within Italy but also from abroad calling these measures to be largely racist. The government responded angrily to these criticisms, portraying them to be anti-Italian and ill-informed.[155]

Apart from the different approaches to immigration on the part of left and right, over the last few years the economic system has demonstrated its growing need for foreign workers. The extraordinary growth in the numbers of officially registered foreigners in this decade suggests an increasing stabilisation of numerous immigrant communities and the work of various migration networks, but it also demonstrates an increasingly strong demand for foreign labour in Italian factories and homes as a result of specific demographic, economic and social factors. The Italian political system is trying to

[154]Bull, Anna Cento (2010), Addressing contradictory needs: the Lega Nord and Italian immigration policy, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 44(5), pp. 411-431.
[155]Maccanico, Yasha (2009), Italy: The internal and external fronts- security package and returns to Libya, *Statewatch Bulletin,* 19(3), pp.1-6.

mediate between these two positions on immigration. Even when the political scene was dominated by the right wing, the needs of firms and families were considered because they needed an open policy for immigrants. This led to the largest regularisation campaign ever witnessed in Italy. This mediation essentially consisted of the adoption of the quota mechanism for determining the number of new migrant entries. The results have not been completely satisfactory if one considers the large gap between the demand and the supply of regular migrant workers and the lack of an active recruitment policy of high-skilled migrants.

In terms of economy, like FI, PdL in its election manifesto promised to deliver a "Italian miracle" through re-launching economic growth while supporting families which would be accomplished in parts through reduction of the tax burden, and public debt. As for the years 2008-2010, OECD figures shows Italy's overall GDP shrinking from US$ 1,990.5 bn to US$ 1,908.6. Apart from this country's competitiveness and productivity fell by 5 per cent and Italy slipped to 80th position in World Bank's "Doing Business Index", and 48th in the World Economic Forum's competitiveness.[156] Italy's economic performance had been grim for a long time. The country had not benefited from the pre-crisis expansion as other industrialized countries did. Between 1991 and 2000, Italy's GDP increased a mere fifteen per cent: below France (twenty per cent), Germany (seventeen), Spain (twenty-nine), the UK (thirty), and the US (forty). The following decade was even grimmer, with a mere one per cent growth from 2001 to 2010, again the worst among industrialised nations. Also, the economic synergy with Germany, the largest EU economy, seemed broken.

Apart from looming economic crisis, problems quickly emerged between Berlusconi and Fini, with the latter accusing the leader of doing nothing to build up the new party organisation and of stifling internal democracy. The escalation of tensions between the two culminated in a heated argument at a televised party executive meeting in April 2010. This led Fini finding himself increasingly isolated and under attack within the PdL, including from former AN elites. When the expulsion from the party of a number of his key allies in July 2010 made his position untenable, Fini created a breakaway group

[156]Albertazzi, Daniele and McDonnell, Duncan (eds.) (2014), *Populists in Power,* (Oxon: Routledge)

called *Futuro e Libertà per l'Italia* (FLI – Future and Freedom for Italy). This initially provided external support for the coalition, before moving into opposition and aiding an unsuccessful attempt in December 2010 to bring down the government. However, with its numbers reduced, Berlusconi's administration was able to do little more than hang on to power for the first half of 2011. With the financial crisis in Italy in 2011, the government lost the support of a handful of other deputies, the combination of its parliamentary weakness, along with the external pressures from Europe and the markets, resulted in Berlusconi's resignation and his government's replacement by Mario Monti's non-party technocratic executive in November 2011.[157]Also a new and emerging 5-Star Movement, established in 2009, has become one of the most voted-for parties in Italy. Giuseppe Peiro Grillo started the Five Star Movement - or Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) along with web strategist and editor of his blog, Gianroberto Casaleggio to bring people together to campaign on local issues. The five stars standing for the five top issues of the movement since its appearance (public management of water, sustainable mobility, development, connectivity, and environment) can be understood more as a symbol than a real party program. Its policies, like the other right-wing parties, have been a mix of the anti-establishment, environmentalist, anti-globalist and eurosceptic, and its supporters have always come from across the political spectrum.[158] Although the party was established in 2009, its electoral breakthrough happened in 2013. As the rise of M5S is after 2010, it falls outside the purview of this study.

[4.4] Conclusion

Right-wing politics in Italy represents a unique case of success as compared to the right-wing movements elsewhere in Europe. There are several factors ranging from the corruption scandals to the immense disillusionment of the general public with the governmental institutions and political parties that led to the rise of the right. However, what is crucial is to understand that these new and old parties of the Italian right represented a break from the past. The vacuum created by the collapse of first republic,

[157] McDonnell, n.141, pp. 271-233

[158][158]GiorgiaBulli, Here to stay? Populism in Italy and Germany, *Das Progressives Zentrum,* 30 August 2016, http://www.progressives-zentrum.org/here-to-stay-populism-in-italy-and-germany/, Accessed on 21 April 2017

not only helped these parties to emerge a better alternative rather they were the only alternatives left. One party, rooted in Italy's prosperous north-eastern region, wants regional autonomy even to the point of complete independence from the republic. The other party is the heir to Mussolini's Fascists and is nationalistic and statist in approach with much of its support base in South. Whereas FI's appearance and constant presence has refashioned the way coalitions were made. These parties took to centre stage issues of great significance to Italian public, such as immigration, law and order, taxation and they framed strategies and policies that no other government was able to even respond to.

These parties have created a type of populism that has been able to capture the sympathies of different types of public opinions which have responded favourably to the personalities of these leaders, appeals to the people that they have made, the direct communication between the leader and the grass-root supporters, the fervent criticism of the traditional structures of representations and the failures of the previous governments and leaders to address the grievances of the population. The anxieties about immigration, the creation of multi-ethnic society, end of religious and cultural homogeneity, erosion of sovereignty vis-à-vis EU, the consequences of globalisation[159] are all important dynamics of Italian right-wing movement and because of the centralities of these issues, Italy remains a fertile ground for future populist movements.

[159]Tarchi, n.119, pp.99

Chapter 5
Conclusion

> There can be no doubt that for the first time since the end of World War II the radical right has become once again a significant political factor in a growing number of established Western-style democracies.[1]
>
> *Hans-Georg Betz*

Right-Wing politics in Europe has attracted a lot of attention in past few decades. The right-wing of pre and post Second World War is very different and the emotions it evokes in political spectrum and population is worth analysing. Although many of the parties, such as Freedom Party of Austria, MSI/AN in Italy or NSDAP, traces their roots to the Fascist and Nazist history, but they are parties of modern times having shed their overt references to the past and revamping themselves to acclimate to the present situations. Their ability to change, attract and sustain a loyal electoral base has not only surprised the mainstream parties but has also made them realise the need to restructure their own arguments and positions on various issues keeping in touch with the popular polls.

The strategic shift of these parties has not only solidified their existence but has helped in attaining a lasting presence and legitimisation within the large political spectrum. Even those parties which were traditionally more ideologically oriented have modified their strategies in order to attract larger or specific strata of the population. This has been successful because the electorate has been affected by various structural changes leading to breakdown of voter loyalties and greater electoral unpredictability which has led right-wing to succeed in mobilising disillusioned voters.

The journey of right-wing parties from margins to mainstream politics is a remarkable one. The analysis presented in this study proves that the right-wing parties have come a long way in establishing themselves as credible players, directly or indirectly influencing policy making and bringing certain issues to the forefront. The analysis of right-wing's fortunes in Austria and Italy formed a logical case because of several factors. First, they share long historical parallels, during the Nazi period in Germany, the "willing" annexation of Austria by Hitler's Third Reich in 1938, and the rise of the Fascist regime in Italy. Second, in the post-war period, they embarked on a process of revitalising their political system, where - even though many formerly prominent right-wing leaders

[1] Betz,Hans-Georg, The Growing Threat of the Radical Right, in Merkl, Peter H. and Weinberg, Leonard (ed.), *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers), 2003, pp.72.

remained in important political roles as converted democrats - each country's public, official ideological credentials were explicitly antifascist. Third, in both countries, the crux of the post-war democratic legitimising principle was an elite consensus among the major parties, as well as leading political, economic, cultural, and military figures, not to cooperate with or even to tolerate extreme-right parties and movements. In both Austria and Italy, even though small right-wing parties existed from the early post-war period onwards, they were systematically isolated and excluded and they remained marginal in the political party systems. At stake for the leaders from both the centre-left and the centre-right was the very survival of democracy and the integration of their countries into the western group of nations.

This study is not within a comparative framework rather an individual case study of Austria and Italy. However, wherever it has been possible some parallels have been drawn. At the onset of the study certain questions and hypothesis were posed to understand and analyse the rise of right-wing politics in Austria and Italy. The following sections deals with examining those assumptions. The following section deals with the questions that were raised in the study followed by the section on examination of the three hypotheses that were taken. Some observations on right-wing wing politics in Europe post 2010 are also made.

Answering the Questions

The study began with questions which can be divided into two sets. The first set dealt with the understanding of right-wing politics, why the right-wing parties were marginalised post Second World War Europe, what led to the re-emergence of these parties and how they were defined, and what were the problems in classifying these parties?

Europe in the aftermath of Second World War enjoyed a remarkable degree of social and political stability. Sustained economic growth, growing individual affluence, and the expansion and perfection of the welfare state each contributed to a social and political climate conducive to political compromise and consensus while eroding support for extremist solutions on both the Left and the Right.The resurgence of ideological and

political turbulence in the late 1960s, rising social conflicts in the early 1970s, and the spread of mass protest by new social movements and citizen initiatives in the 1980s were symptoms of transformation of West European politics. Its contours were increasingly becoming visible by the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The socio-political climate of the 1980s was characterized by disillusionment of the population with the major social and political institutions and deep distrust in their workings, the weakening and decomposition of electoral alignments, and increased political fragmentation and electoral volatility. Alongside this disenchantment, new political issues emerged - advances in general welfare and education led to demands for social equality; increasing migration; economic stagnation resulted in growing frustration of the people.Within this situation, European democracies came under heavy pressure from a right-wing that in terms of its programmatic challenge and electoral potential represented the potentially most dynamic, and disruptive, political phenomenon of the 1990s. Their massive breakthrough of right-wing parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s in a many West European countries was one of the most significant signals of a fundamental transformation of politics. To quote Hans Betz, by *distancing themselves both from the backward-looking, reactionary politics of the traditional extremist (i.e., neo-fascist and neo-nazi) right as well as its proclivity for violence, these parties posed the most significant challenge to the established structure and politics of West European democracy today.*[2]

One of the key findings of the study is that these parties projected themselves to be different from the right-wing parties of pre-Second World War Europe despite having the historical nostalgia. The main problem one encounters while analysing the right-wing parties is how to define them. As discussed in detail in Chapter - 2, diverse pictures emerge when one tries to define and classify right-wing parties. There are no set yardsticks to define these parties because using terms such as “extreme right”, “populist” or “radical” raises concern to the extent these can be applied to the contemporary movements. It is true that there are certain right-wing movements that are unquestionably

[2] Betz, Hans-Georg (1994), *Radical Right-Wing Populism In Western Europe*, (London: Macmillan Press), pp.3.

extreme. These parties have been called as the extreme-right parties because they occupy the right-most position in the political spectrum. They are also called anti-system and anti-political establishment as they undermine the system's legitimacy through their discourses and actions. However, most do not espouse violence and many do not seek to overthrow any kind of liberal democracy. These parties have presented themselves as an alternate to everything that is wrong with the contemporary democracies. They are often defined in terms of opposition to, or at least fundamentally critical of, liberal democracy. They are opposed to the ideas of parliamentary representation and partisan conflicts, hence they argue for the corporatist or direct and personalistic mechanism of representation. They are against the idea of pluralism because it endangers societal harmony and the universal idea of equality as right on the basis of race, language, and ethnicity. Finally, they are to an extent, authoritarian because they conceive supra-individual and collective authority of State, Nation and Community as more important than individual[3]. Many of these parties stand out from the mainstream party system in terms of their discourse and the manner in which they deal with issues, such as immigration, identity, security, culture and nation that helps to locate the right-wing.

Second key finding is that despite the problem of classification, right-wing parties experienced a dramatic rise in electoral support in many West European democracies. One of the most prominent party, the French Front National (FN), won nearly 10 per cent of the vote in both the 1986 and 1988 national legislative election, and in 1993 and 1997 its share of the ballots grew even further, first to 12.7 per cent and then to 14.9 per cent. Similarly, in Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) recorded close to 10 per cent of the vote in 1986, and then saw its electoral score rise to 16.6 per cent in 1990, 22.5 per cent in 1994 and to a massive 26.9 per cent in 1999. The Vlaams Blok (VB) also performed well at the polls in this time period, recently securing over 16 per cent of the vote in Flanders. Likewise, in Italy, the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Lega Nord (LN) both secured vote shares of over 10 per cent in a number of elections since the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s some of these parties had acquired sufficient electoral strength to become relevant players in the formation of governmental majorities. In Italy, the AN

[3]Ignazi,Piero(2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, (USA: Oxford University Press), pp.3.

and the LN both entered office in 1994, as junior partners in Silvio Berlusconi's first government, and in 2001 they once again formed part of the governing coalition when the alliance with Forza Italia was renewed. In a move that sparked widespread international criticism, the Austrian FPÖ also assumed office when it entered into coalition with the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) in 1999. The party remained in government after the 2002 elections when the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition continued. In Norway and Denmark, right-wing extremist parties similarly played a role in the formation of parliamentary majorities.[4]

As Paul Hainsworth[5] explains, diverse patterns of right-wing support in Western Europe are to be expected, since each party is a product of its own specific political culture, circumstances, opportunities and party system. Also, broader developments such as globalisation, deindustrialisation, migration and European integration, have resulted in the shifting of loyalties of voters with different impact on different countries and their political parties. Also a central theme in understanding the right-wing is that significant socio-economic, political, cultural and structural changes have created favourable circumstances in which these political parties have been able to campaign. In this context, right-wing parties have offered would-be remedies to the problems (real or imaginary) emerging from change and development.

Third key finding of the study is that these parties had a considerable impact on the mainstream parties in the democracies of Western Europe. However, this has varied from country to country depending upon the strengths and circumstances of right-wing penetration. The strength and influence of right-wing parties via voting as exhibited through public opinion mechanisms have enabled them to pressurise other political parties and their policy agendas. In turn, political opponents, faced with extreme right challenges, have adopted measures and strategies to contain and reverse right-wing growth.[6] Tim Bale adds that the mainstream by adopting some of the right's themes, it legitimised them and increased both their salience and the seats it brought into right-wing

[4]Carter, Elisabeth (2005), The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?, (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp.1.
[5] Hainsworth, Paul (2008), The Extreme Right in Western Europe, (Routledge: London), pp.25
[6]Ibid, pp.111

bloc. He contends that the rise and mainstreaming of the right-wing is part of a process by which the parties have achieved their governmental majorities.[7]

The second set of questions largely dealt with the right-wing politics in Austria and Italy. It includes questions like what are the factors that led to the rise of right-wing politics in Austria and Italy?The key issues raised by these parties? Why Austria was put under sanctions by EU for including FPÖ in the government and why Italy was not? How these parties have influenced the policy-making in their countries?

Based on an ideology whose roots are inherently different or are in contradiction to the liberal ideals of Europe, these parties have tried nonetheless to establish themselves as credible players and win power through democratic and constitutional ways. Fourth key finding of the study is that the right-wing parties in Austria and Italy have defied odds to emerge from their marginalisation. One of the most important similarities between the two countries is that history of Nazism and Fascism left a deep void in the consciousness of the ruling elite and the larger population. Due to this, the post-war democratic system tried very hard to exclude and marginalise the remnants of the movements who after the war had organised under the umbrella of various political parties. For Austria, denazification proved to be a critical challenge. To limit the impact of Nazism, avoid any suggestion of collective guilt and to receive favourable allied treatment, the country declared itself to be the first 'victim' of Nazism and not a Nazi ally. To further limit the participation of VdU (formed by ex-Nazi officers in 1949 and a predecessor of FPÖ), the ÖVP and SPÖ formed what came to be known as the 'Grand Coalition'. They divided the spheres of influence to limit the conflict between them. This proportional division became the cornerstone of Austrian political structure known as 'Proporz' system which led to the hegemony of the two parties thereby excluding all the other political structures.

Italy was also not immune to the after-effects of the fascism. The memory of fascism was central to the construction of the post-war Italian political structure. Post-war government took various steps to exclude and limit the participation of MSI. From abolition of monarchy (because of their support of fascism) to creation of a powerful legislature and a

[7] Bale, T. (2003) 'Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems', *West European Politics*, 26, 3, July: 67–90.

weak executive, to introduction of the constitutional checks and balances, the government tried to marginalise the neo-fascist party MSI.

However, what stands out in both countries is that not only these parties survived their persecution but emerged as strong players in their respective political systems. Both these countries underwent a series of structural changes that created a political vacuum giving chance to the right-wing parties to emerge and stake claim to the political power. Austria, from 1960s, experienced a period of distrust and disenchantment with the parties and the system due to the bi-partisan attitude of the mainstream parties. By late 1980s, the confidence in the political institutions had decreased substantially. Coupled with rise in corruption, distrust towards political elite, emergence of old and new issues like resurgent nationalism and migration led to higher voter volatility. During this period, FPÖ under the leadership of Jörg Haider projected themselves as the only party that could challenge the duopoly of SPÖ and ÖVP. In Italy, the outbreak of corruption scandals (*Tangentopoli*) and the following clean-hand investigations (*Mani Pulte*) led to a situation of state in crisis. This resulted in the collapse of the old party system and the arrival of new electoral system which was called the rise of Second Republic. This re-structuring of political system provided the right-wing a perfect opportunity to establish themselves as better alternatives to the mainstream parties. MSI and LN were present for a while but the impetus to the right-wing was provided by the establishment of Forza Italia by Silvio Berlusconi. He unified the scattered right-wing and was able to present his coalition as the only alternative to the crisis-ridden political system.

Fifth key finding in the study is that both the countries elected the right-wing parties as part of the coalition government but the experience of these parties in government is polls apart. The election of FPÖ in the coalition government with ÖVP in 1990-2000 led EU14 to impose diplomatic sanctions on Austria for the inclusion of a xenophobic extreme right-wing party. The EU declared that it was a community of shared values that must distance itself from the 'insulting, xenophobic and racist utterances of Haider'. Amidst the hue and cry of FPÖ becoming part of the government, it is overlooked that Italy elected its first right-wing government in 1994. The question then arises as to why such

distinctions were made. Stefano Fella and Carl Ruzza[8] explains this by emphasising that the coalition in Italy was an odd mix of new and old parties namely Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, Umberto Bossi's Lega Nord and Gianfranco Fini's MSI/AN. The lack of outrage was primarily because of the fact that FI was new and was based on the personality of leader that it was almost impossible to determine what exactly it stood for, other than Berlusconi's self-interest or his corporate interest. LN, on the other hand, was known for the volatile programmatic position of its leader, which included breaking away from the country and establishing an autonomous Northern Italy (*Padania*). MSI/AN during the whole time was trying to redefine itself and was under the process of transition into a yet to be defined new party.

Sixth finding of the study is that while political crisis in each country played a vital role in the re-emergence of right-wing parties, there were also various other factors. The disenchantment of the people was highlighted by the leadership of the parties, which has been called charismatic because of which these parties appealed to large sections of the population. Ideology has also played an important role. These parties adapted themselves with the changing scenario which helped them to connect with people. They have sometimes taken pride in their ideological background and at other times diluted the references as it suited their purpose. These characteristics along with the issues, like immigration; anti-establishment etc., have appealed to the disillusioned electorate making these parties a challenge to the mainstream.

Seventh key finding is that these parties impacted policy-making both directly and indirectly. As discussed in the chapters they used a combination of anti-establishment rhetoric, nationalism, criticism of immigration, traditional values and demands for law and order to formulate public opinion and put pressure on the mainstream parties to give cognizance to issues which they think is of importance. Example can be taken of immigration policies in both the countries, either in government and outside, these parties have taken a tough and 'zero migration' stand linking the issue not only with the dilution of the national identity but also to law and order. They have played direct and indirect

[8] Ruzza, Carlo and Fella, Stefano (2009), *Re-inventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and Post Fascism*, (London: Routledge), pp.1.

role in the formulation of tough and restrictive migration laws. The right-wing parties have been part of the government in both the countries, although there experiences have been very different.

Examining the Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: The rise of right-wing parties in the post-cold war era is a result of rise in migration.

Immigration, since 1990s, has been a central issue of the right-wing parties in Europe. Many scholars have called these parties as 'single-issue parties' because of their hard-line stand against migration. Immigration is viewed by these parties as a threat to the social fabric of the country which emerged from their idea that genuine democracy is based on a culturally, if not ethnically, homogeneous community. The spirit of this doctrine is reflected in the notion of "their own people first" and the call for "national preference", which are core demands of right-wing populist parties in the current debate on immigration in Western Europe. Austrian and Italian right-wing parties have taken incredible strides in pushing forward their anti-immigration stand.

One of the first similarities that stand out between the countries is that both of them have served as the transit points for the migration to the larger Europe. Due to its geopolitical position during the Cold War, Austria was one of the main receiving and transit countries for refugees fleeing communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe between 1945 and 1989. About two million people found temporary shelter in Austria during this period. Although the majority of them travelled on to other Western states, many were granted asylum and subsequently integrated into Austrian society. Similarly, Italy served as a transit point for the migrants moving towards Western Europe till 1980s. With many of the North European countries adopting restrictive measures to control the migration, many immigrants chose to stay back in Italy where a thriving underground economy made it easy for them to blend in.

With the end of the Cold War, immigration became one of the most contested issues in the Austrian and Italian politics with varied opinions, and a very sensitive public and media opinion. This was also aided by the changes in the political structures of the

countries. The rise of these parties raised questions like, whether the politicization of immigration has created an important rift between those who favoured policy that grants immigrants more social and political rights and those who feared that immigration is linked to crime, unemployment, and a risk to national identity.[9]

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, both the countries have approached the issue of migration with great ambivalence. The population in both countries have become much diverse in recent years. According to the 2001 census, of Austria's roughly eight million inhabitants, more than 730,000 (or 9.1 per cent) were foreign residents - with 62.8 per cent of them coming from the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. Between 1985 and 2001, over 254,000 foreigners were naturalized. Austria's proportion of foreign-born residents in 2001 was even higher than that of the United States, reaching a level of 12.5 per cent.[10] Italy, for more than two decade, has experienced a heterogeneous immigration. Up till 1990s the largest proportion of immigrants came from North Africa (up to 20 per cent with the permits to stay), and with the end of the cold war the leading position was taken by Eastern-Europe (up to 25 per cent). The proportion of migrants from Asia increased to 18, whereas that from Central and Southern Africa decreased a little (down to 9per cent), that from South America was per cent quite steady (around 8 per cent). Still the official line remains that Austria and Italy are not traditional country of immigration. Traditional labour migration and family reunification programs have been severely curtailed in the wake of widespread public discontent over levels of immigration in the early 1990s. Since then, new integration measures have been introduced, being part of the European Union (EU) has brought more open borders, and thousands of temporary seasonal workers further increasing the discontent among the population.

With migration becoming visible in Austria by mid-1980s, the general attitude towards the immigrants started turning hostile since the Austrian public, media and political discourse on foreigner policy is strongly related to that on employment. Like in most E.U.

[9] Zaslove,Andrew (2006), The Politics of Immigration - A New Electoral Dilemma for the Right and the Left?,*Review of European and Russian Affairs*, 2(3), pp. 10-36.
[10] Michael Jandl, and Albert Kraler, *Austria: A Country of Immigration?*, Migration Policy Institute, 1 March 2003, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/austria-country-immigration, Accessed on 18 April 2017.

countries, the number of unemployed persons in Austria had increased and for this increase of the unemployment rate, foreigners were held responsible, leading to increasing xenophobia. In a 1996 survey it was established that 50 per cent of the Austrian population displayed negative attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly, the 1998 survey done on 'Migration and Xenophobia' commissioned by Austrian Ministry of Science and Transport, found that while 31 per cent of the population saw foreigners as an 'enrichment of Austrian culture', 40 per cent felt like 'foreigners in their own country.' The rising migration and the constant FPÖ rhetoric of 'Austria First' has created a sensitivity towards 'outsiders', in particular towards those who are regarded as 'too different' (particularly from Turkey and non-EU states). According to 2003 Eurobarometer, 64.37 per cent of Austrians showed resistance to immigrants, standing at the third place after Greece and Hungary.[11]

Italian experience with immigration is also distinctive. Like much of Western Europe, over the last few years Italy has wrestled with how to successfully integrate and assimilate its Muslim minority. Additionally, the recent influx of Romanian immigrants — especially Roma or gypsies from Romania - into Italy has led to new controversies over immigration. The 2007 Pew poll included a number of questions on immigration, and on each of these, Italians held the most negative opinions of any Western public. Nearly two-thirds of Italians (64 per cent) believe immigration is a very big problem for their country. In no other Western nation did a majority of population rate immigration as a very big problem (Spain was the closest at 42 per cent). Similarly, roughly three-in-four Italians (73 per cent) said immigrants were having a bad effect on their country.87 per cent of Italians said there should be tighter restrictions on people coming into their country. Italian attitudes were overwhelmingly negative toward immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as immigrants from Eastern Europe. Two-thirds say immigration from each of these areas is a bad thing.[12]

The right-wing parties took optimum advantage of the rising immigration and tapped into the growing frustrations of the citizens and called for "zero immigration" and have been

[11] Montserrat, Guibernau (2007), *The Identity of Nations*, (Wiley: Cambridge), pp.1992
[12] Anti-Immigration and Pro-Italy, Italia Anthropology Blog, 29 September 2011, http://italianthro.blogspot.in/2011/09/anti-immigration-and-pro-italy.html, Accessed on19 April 2017

successful in playing an important role in introduction of restrictive immigration laws in their respective countries. What is crucial here is that, even the mainstream parties, realising the importance this issue, initiated a series of legislative reforms. These covered all areas related to immigration, including entry, residence, employment, and asylum. For example in Austria, as discussed on Chapter - 3, in 1992, a new Aliens Act tightened up regulations on the entry and residence of foreigners. A second law introduced in 1993, the Residence Act, established contingents for different categories of migrants. Because of the constant pressure from the FPÖ on refining and restricting the immigration laws, by the mid-1990s, another round of immigration legislation reforms was under way, resulting in the passage of the 1997 Aliens Act. The act merged the 1992 Aliens Act and the 1993 Residence Act into a single law. The stated aim of the reform was to promote the integration of aliens already present in Austria, in the place of new immigration. This concept was called "integration before immigration", and the law became known as the "integration package". Finally, a new Naturalization Act was passed in 1998 that retained the core elements of the previous regulations. These include the principle of *jus sanguinis* and a regular waiting period of 10 years for naturalization. The formation of a coalition government in January 2000 between the People's Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party (FPÖ) was seen as a major break with the past, as well as a break with the consensus among mainstream politicians that a coalition with the right-wing FPÖ was out of question. From the beginning, however, it was clear that the FPÖ would try to reform Aliens legislation, as immigration policy has long been one of its central campaign issues. Finally, in July 2002, Parliament adopted major amendments to the Aliens Act and the Asylum Law. The reforms followed the line of earlier legislation, but introduce new regulations in three important areas. *First*, labour immigration was restricted mainly to key personnel, with a minimum wage requirement of around 2,000 per month for prospective migrants. *Second*, the employment of seasonal workers would be greatly facilitated by allowing such labourers in areas outside agriculture and tourism and extending the employment period to up to one year. *Third*, all new immigrants from non-EU third countries (plus those who have been living in Austria since 1998) were required to attend "integration courses" consisting mainly of language instruction and an introduction to fundamental legal, historical, and political aspects of Austria. Non-

participation will lead to sanctions, both financial and legal, e.g., the denial of more secure residence titles. The ultimate fate of non-compliant foreigners could be expulsion from Austria.[13]

This was also the case in Italy where the right-wing parties played a central role in passing of restrictive immigration laws. The collapse of support for the traditional mainstream parties in 1992-93 led to a surge in support for the anti-immigrant right wing parties. They owed much of their electoral win to the anti-immigrant stand and a tough stance on the growing problem of illegal migration. They were able to exploit what has been coined the Italian 'invasion syndrome', fears of uncontrolled migration into Italy, the Right-wing populist parties benefited from the political opportunities created.[14] As discussed in Chapter - 4, the introduction of immigration legislation in 1998 is a case point because it was the first instance when a comprehensive immigration bill was introduced. The Turco-Napolitano adopted a tougher approach in relation to expulsions, entry and residence permits. In order to control clandestine entries, the Law foresaw the possibility of detaining illegal immigrants in special centre of residence and assistance. Detention in special centres can be applied not only to people caught illegally crossing the Italian borders and to people already requested to leave the country, but also to undocumented residents. The introduction of more severe measures towards undocumented people was due to the growing belief that illegal residence and criminal behaviour go 'hand in hand'.[15] The right-wing, disagreeing with the Turco-Napolitano, spearheaded the mobilization against immigration by highlighting what it called as 'Italian-ness'. Lega Nord in its campaign for abrogation of the law pointed out the specific articles in the law, that it argued, privileged the foreigners over Italians; for example, Article 38.3, which established that schools must protect the culture and language of origin of the non-EU migrants, Lega[16] argued that '*It is a pity that similar treatment is not given to our languages, our dialects and our local traditions which are opposed and mocked by the Italian state*.' The

[13]Michael Jandl, and Albert Kraler, n.10

[14] Boswell, Christina (2003), European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, (USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.), pp.22.

[15] Zincone,Giovanna (1998), 'Illegality, Enlightenment and Ambiguity: A Hot Italian Recipe', *South European Society and Politics*, 3(3), pp. 45-82

[16] Andall,Jacqueline (2007), 'Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in Government (1996–2001)', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 41(2), pp. 131-153.

successful election of right-wing coalition in 2001 gave these parties a chance to prioritise their agenda and bring the change in the Italian immigration laws. However, there were differences within the coalition on what they perceived to be the most important issue within immigration, the Lega called for the zero immigration, linking immigration with radical Islam and an unwanted multicultural society, Alleanza Nazionale linked immigration to crime and the Christian Democrats demanded an amnesty for the democratic workers at a bare minimum, despite their ultimate goal of greater amnesty. In February 2002, the new Bossi-Fini law passed through the Senate. This new legislation amended the Turco-Napolitano law which implemented several important changes. The new law linked employment with the ability to obtain a work permit or a visa. It was now only possible to receive a work permit if the applicant secures a job, a place of residence, and if the employer can guarantee return passage once the new arrival is not employed. Non-European Union citizens were no longer able to qualify for entrance visas in order to come to Italy to seek employment. Sponsoring a person who does not have a job in Italy was also no longer possible.

In short, it can be said that anti-immigration is considered the main and often the only ideological issue of relevance of the right-wing parties. As seen in the study, anti-immigration is an important ideological issue and ensures the parties the support of a part of the electorate. Immigration is increasingly considered in terms of a cultural threat and a threat against national security. It was also observed that anti-immigration is a question that the right-wing has continued to develop and elaborate.Anti-immigration has been a central theme for right-wing parties both in Austria and Italy. They have used and misused the issue linking it to criminality, issues of law and order, dilution of what they have defined as their national identity. They have developed their arguments around the themes like the economic and social costs of immigration (housing problems, uncertainties in the labour market, criminality, social benefits and so forth); the need to defend the ethnic and cultural identity against people of non-western origins; and the attack against the political, economic and religious establishment via support to the development of a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. These have not only fuelled the public opinion against the migrants but the rising xenophobia has resulted in pressurising

the mainstream parties to take cognizance of the issue, making it difficult for the migrants to integrate into the respective societies. Although the centrality of immigration in the rhetoric of right-wing cannot be argued, it is not the only issue that has led to the rise of right-wing parties in Europe and certainly not in Austria and Italy. For both the countries, there were multitudes of factors that were crucial and provided the impetus to rise, like the economic-welfare schemes, rising euroscepticism, volatile political scene, etc.

Hypothesis 2: In Italy and Austria charismatic leadership has been critical in determining the right-wing parties' fortunes.

> The most successful right-wing populist parties are led by charismatic figures capable of setting the political and programmatic direction. In addition, most parties display a highly centralized organizational structure, with decisions being made at the top by a relatively circumscribed circle of party activists and transmitted to the bottom.[17]
>
> *Hans-Georg Betz*

As discussed in Chapter - 2, Charismatic leaders can be defined as those who have a high self-confidence, a clear vision, engage in unconventional behaviour, and act as a change agent, while remaining realistic about environmental constraints. Charismatic leaders are believed to possess particular personality traits and abilities while displaying unique behavioural model[18]. The charismatic leader claims to speak for the 'people'. Contending that they represent the grassroots and the true interests of the people, right-wing party leaders argue that the leaders of the established political parties have abandoned civil society. They claim that the professionalisation of politics, the bureaucratisation of the state and the entwining of the parties with the state encourage politicians and political parties to view civil society as merely a resource to maintain political power.[19]

Since the 20th century, the term 'Charisma' is specifically associated with Max Weber, who in anticipating the emerging challenges to the liberal democracy from the evolving forms of political movement and the rise of dictatorial regimes post 1918 era, formulated

[17]Betz, Hans-Georg (1998) 'Introduction', in Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall (eds) *The New Politics of the Right: Neo Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies,* (New York: St. Martin's Press).
[18]McLaurin, James Reagan and Al Amri, Mohammed Bushanain (2008), Developing an Understanding of Charismatic and Transformational Leadership, *Proceedings of the Allied Academies,* 15(2), pp. 333-337.
[19]Zaslove, Andrej, (2004) The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right, *Journal of European Integration*, 26(1), pp. 61-81.

threefold "ideal type" of classification of legitimacy and power. Out of these three,[20] Charisma referred to the emergence of exceptional, radical leader in times of crisis. Weber believed that such charismatics could attract an effective community of supporters, largely unconcerned with rational economic affairs. For Roger Eatwell, the term 'charismatic personality' refers to specific traits associated with exceptional leaders - facets which were sometimes related to psychological explanations concerning the leader's background, such as problems in childhood that supposedly led the afflicted youth to crave attention and achieve spectacular success. More recently, there has been a tendency to concentrate on the nature and causes of what can be termed the 'charismatic bond', namely the relationship between leader and followers, which is often seen in quasi-religious terms. Even where the quasi-religious side is stressed less strongly, the focus remains heavily upon charisma as an affective relationship. Thus political charisma can be defined as a 'compulsive, inexplicable emotional tie linking a group of followers together in adulation of their leader'.[21]

Charismatic leaders represent an intrinsic part of rise of right-wing in Austria and Italy. The leaders of FPÖ, MSI/AN, LN, and FI have played central role in getting their parties from margins to mainstream. As soon as the election of Jörg Haider as national party chairman, he began to develop a new message, which was a point of departure of the party's electoral appeal. Under his leadership, the FPÖ modernized its liberal image, turning it into a so-called 'fundamental liberalism'. His clear message was that, contrary to the corrupt policies of the established parties, he was to introduce integrity and honesty into politics and to mobilize more and more voters against the establishment.[22]

Italy is no stranger to charismatic leadership especially since the advent of Second Republic. Although popular party leaders were already present in the political landscape, Umberto Bossi was to be both the party's founding father and the most charismatic leader. Forza Italia is the most important party of the Italian Second Republic. It was

[20]The first type he termed as "traditional", which he linked with systems such as monarchies. The second type he termed as "bureaucratic", which were associated with institutions such as democracy and political parties.

[21]Pinto, Antonio Costa, Eatwell, Roger and Larsen, Stein Ugelvik (eds.) (2007), Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe, (London: Routledge), pp.4.

[22] Pedahzur, Ami and Brichta, Avraham (2002), The Institutionalisation of Extreme Right-Wing Charismatic Parties: A Paradox?, Party Politics, 8(1), pp. 31–49.

created by Silvio Berlusconi to run the 1994 parliamentary election. From the start it performed as a typical populist party: it had an unexpected electoral victory; a short government was followed by an electoral defeat and the party returned to the opposition. During the second half of the 1990s Forza Italia was able to stabilise itself, to maintain its original mission, that is to say to sustain the political career of its founder and - for fifteen years - its sole leader. Berlusconi has not simply been the leader of Forza Italia; he has also kept the centre-right coalition together. By doing so, he made it easier for the transformation of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano to take place: by the mid-1990s that party abandoned its name to become the Alleanza Nazionale. In contrast to the Lega Nord and Forza Italia, AN is not a new party: it is an old party radically changed to adapt to a new political milieu. As its right-wing partners, however, AN has been led by the same politician since its foundation in 1994. Indeed, Gianfranco Fini has regularly been the most popular 'Second' Republic's politician, largely surpassing even Silvio Berlusconi.[23]

Charismatic leadership has played a central role in the revival of right-wing in Austria and Italy. These parties were tightly wound around their leaders, who were often accused to increasingly personalise politics and their parties' structure. Although these parties contend that they are more democratic and participatory than other parties, in fact they are highly centralised. The charismatic leader and a few close allies formulate the party policy and strategy. The centralised party structure allows the charismatic leader to change position on issues as he sees fit. This flexibility allows right-wing parties to emphasise specific issues depending on the context, while it also permits them to form broad coalitions as they evolve from protest parties into parties with established constituencies[24]. For example, Lega Nordbegan as an anti-tax, liberal free-market party that blamed the less developed South and the centralised state for Italy's economic and political problems. However, the party radicalised its platform against immigration, articulated a stronger stance on law and order and, most recently, proclaimed support for the traditional family and for religion. Haider's initial success was also based upon

[23] Jean Blondel, Jean Louis Thiébault, Katarzyna Czernicka, Takashi Inoguchi, Ukrist Pathmanand and Fulvio Venturino (2010), *Political Leadership, Parties and Citizens: The personalisation of leadership*, (Oxon: Routledge), pp.175.
[24] Zaslove, n.19, pp. 61-81.

protest votes against the Austrian state, the partysystem. Subsequently, the Freedom Party emphasised on issues surrounding immigration and law and order. These leaders and their parties not just channeled the anger and disillusionment of the people towards the political system, but also criticized the internal party structures of the established post-war. They claim that the hardworking citizen has been removed from the party while intellectuals and party bureaucrats dominate the decision-making processes. The charismatic populist leader claims to practice politics differently. This persona of the leader is quite often reinforced by a leader who comes from "outside the political mainstream during a time of declining public confidence in political institutions."[25]

This is something that Silvio Berlusconi used over and over again. He presented himself as the 'people's man' who has emerged from the grassroots and understands the difficulty that people face because of the corrupt government officials. Berlusconi presented himself as a political outsider, determined to fight against what he judges to be the old, inefficient, and corrupt political system. The appeal to the people frequently invoked by Berlusconi in the face of the working of the institutions gradually shifted Forza Italia and its leader towards a populist approach. The cult of the personality; the over-simplification of the political agenda; the harsh confrontation with the outside world in a dichotomous terms of 'us and them'; opposition to the establishment are labels that aptly express this approach.[26]

Another important factor in the charismatic leadership is the organisational structure of the party. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, these parties are an outer reflection of the thoughts and views of its leader; it centres on the leader who gives it direction and takes the final decision in the situations of internal faction. The right-wing parties of Austria and Italy are perfect examples of this arrangement. Lega Nord's organisation, as the study shows, is tightly structured and organised which is in turn divided into twelve national sections that are in turn divided into provincial, district and local sections. The most important position was held by Umberto Bossi since the foundation of Lega Nord. For

[25] Betz, n.2, pp.2

[26]Ignazi, Piero (2005) Legitimation and Evolution on the Italian Right Wing: Social and Ideological Repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord , *South European Society and Politics*, 10(2), 333-349

him, 'tight control over the party was necessary to prevent the establishment of internal factions that would have weakened the movement in its struggle against the established parties'. Along with his secretariat, he decided how the ideas generated within the party were put into practice, and if there was any disagreement within the federal political secretariat, it was Bossi that took the final decision. The party's structure is pyramidal so that much of the power and decision-making centres around Bossi.[27] His charismatic and authoritarian leadership has acted as a unifying force for the party. He continued to dominate the party entirely, and was able to impose his will on the party organisation[28].

Similar in appeal was Jörg Haider. When he became the leader of the FPÖ in 1986, the party, which over the years had moved toward the centre, was at a point of near extinction. Under his leadership the FPÖ went through a new identification stage and steadily increased its electoral hold until it became the second largest party in the Austrian parliament. Analysis of the FPÖ electorate in 1986 established that Haider's charismatic personality was the greatest single factor in the party's appeal. His authority was demonstrated by his ruthless personal leadership of the party. Following his election as party leader, internal discipline was rigidly enforced and, one by one, all rivals were driven to the margins.[29]

In terms of revamping the party and breaking away from the dilemmas of the past, the leadership of FPÖ and AN has played a crucial role. Freedom Party and MSI both trace their roots in Nazism and Fascism. The leadership post-Second World War was aware of the burden of history and adopted stances that helped their party survive, even if that meant taking liberal positions. However, what distinguishes these two parties is that with the election of Jörg Haider, FPÖ went back to its hardline stance and AN, after its transition, diluted its Fascist rhetoric. Haider systematically pushed out neo-Nazi components and pro-liberal factions, thereby securing absolute control over the party. On the other hand, Gianfranco Fini emphasised on drawing attention away from the historical

[27]Carter, n.4, pp.89.
[28]Ignazi, n.3, pp.58.
[29]Pedahzur and Brichta, n.22,pp. 31–49.

roots of MSI with an emphatic statement that *'it is time to consign fascism to the serene judgement of history'*.

Hypothesis 3: The widespread appeal of right-wing parties in both Italy and Austria has not translated to a uniform rise in their vote share.

The formation of coalition government between Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Christian-Democratic Party (ÖVP) in 2000 represented the 'point of no-return' in the understanding of the rising influence of the right-wing in Austria. The new arrangement of the Austrian government was the result of the parliamentary election of October 1999. At this election the Freedom Party gathered 27 per cent of the votes, becoming the second biggest electoral force in Austria after the Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ). At the European level, the formation of the FPÖ and ÖVP government coalition triggered the long threatened official diplomatic sanctions against Austria decided by the other 14 member states. However, not only the institutional Europe mobilized against the political developments in Austria, the 'Thursday Marches' in Vienna became a regular public rally against the newly formed government.

As discussed earlier, if the FPÖ-ÖVP coalition was the watershed moment for Austrian right-wing, with a severe backlash from all side, it is often forgotten that in Italy a right-wing coalition had been sworn in 1994 with parties of Fascist Legacy and vocal anti-immigrant, ethno-regionalist sentiments. The centre-right government coalition of 1994 was led by Silvio Berlusconi along with MSI/AN and LN. But at that time, this right-wing coalition's entrance into office had not provoked significant reactions from the international community. The political situation in Italy in the 1990s was such that the rest of Europe did not seem concerned that the right-wing coalition was in office. It was mainly considered the result of the popular protest against the political establishment that had grown out of the cases of political corruption and briberies that emerged in Italy in the early 1990s and which radically transformed the Italian political party system.

Right-wing parties have experienced a dramatic rise in electoral support in many European democracies. As discussed in Chapter - 3, one of the most prominent such parties, in Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) recorded close to 10 per

cent of the vote in 1986, and then saw its electoral score rise first to 16.6 per cent in 1990, then to 22.5 per cent in 1994, and then to an enormous 26.9 per cent in 1999. Similarly, in Italy, the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Lega Nord (LN) have both secured vote shares of over 10 per cent in a number of elections since the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s some of these parties had acquired sufficient electoral strength to become relevant players in the formation of governmental majorities. In Italy, the AN and the LN both entered office in 1994, as junior partners in Silvio Berlusconi's first government, and in 2001 and 2008 they once again formed part of the governing coalition when the alliance with Forza Italia was renewed. The FPÖ also assumed office when it entered into coalition with the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) in 1999. The party remained in government after the 2002 elections when the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition continued.

This raised certain questions like, what were reasons that led to the rise of these parties; what made these parties appeal to the electorates and why did the people vote for them; why the electoral fortunes of these parties varies? Although, these questions have been dealt with in the respective chapters, it still calls to question as to why are their disparities in various right-wing parties given that they all espouses the same spectrum of political sphere and why despite a widespread appeal, the vote share has not seen a uniform rise. Elizabeth Carter[30] explains this disparity in the electoral fortunes in terms that the parties embrace different types of right-wing ideology, and by the fact that they have different forms of party organization and leadership. For her, there are four sets of political, supply-side explanations for the disparity in the electoral fortunes of the right-wing parties. *First*, ideologies of the different right-wing parties. Regardless of the nature of the institutional and political environments in which the parties find themselves, the electoral fortunes of the parties may depend, to a certain extent, on the nature of the message and policies that they put forward. *Second*, the electoral fortunes of the parties are also likely to be affected by the parties' internal organization and leadership and by the consequences of these internal dynamics. In fact, a general consensus in the literature on right-wing parties suggests that 'one of the most important determinants of success is party organization'. *Thirdly*, in addition to being influenced by party-centric factors, the

[30]Carter, n.4, pp.6.

electoral fortunes of the parties of the right are likely to be affected by party system factors. In particular, they are expected to be influenced by the patterns of party competition in the party system. The dynamics of party competition on the right side of the political spectrum are likely to be important in explaining the variation in the right-wing party vote. *Fourthly*, the electoral fortunes also depend on the positions that these parties choose to adopt for themselves within the political space available to them.

In terms of voting behaviour, Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema[31]classified voting motivations into four categories: idealistic, pragmatic, clientalistic, and protest. Idealistic voters are seen as those whorationally cast a vote on the basis of ideological proximity. Pragmatic voters take accountof ideological proximity plus the size of the party, on the grounds thatit is perfectly rational to vote for a second-choice party which is closeto one's policy positions if this party stands a better chance of gettinginto power. Clientalistic voters rationally cast a ballot for concrete materialbenefits, such as the delivery of individual or public goods.Protest voters are regarded as the default category in the analysis, understoodas those whose objectives are to demonstrate a rejection of all otherparties.

Many scholars (like Betz, Putnam etc.) are of the view that voters are attracted by the right-wing because they seethemselves as ideologically close to their positions on salient issues suchas immigration or taxes, or because they admire the charisma, rhetoric,and leadership of figures such as Umberto Bossi, or Jörg Haider. This could be because right-wing voters may be deeply dissatisfied with the performanceof the government over specific issues, such as unemployment rates,European integration, or immigration policies; or, they may be alienated and socially intolerant citizens lacking interpersonaltrust or alternatively, they could be deeply unhappy with the general workings of thepolitical system and lack confidence in representative democraticinstitutions in their country.[32]

---

[31]Brug,Wouter van der and Fennema, Meindert (2003), Protest or mainstream? How the European anti-immigrant parties developed into two separate groups by 1999, *European Journal of Political Research,* 42, pp. 55–76

[32]Norris,Pippa (2005), *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.152

Applying this to the electoral behaviour in Austria and Italy, it is evident that these parties have utilised every opportunity to expand their vote banks, whether their strategies have been successful or not is an entirely different question. In Austria, the FPÖ for a long time remained marginal because of its ties with the past. The party represented the vote bank of traditional 'third *Lager*': middle class (self-employed and white-collar), pan-German, anti-clerical, hyper-conservative, and nostalgic. The FPÖ worked within consociational institutional constraints, expecting that its only opportunity to change its marginal status was through forging alliances with one or the other mainstream parties, since they held the monopoly on power. This policy of liberalising the ideology of the party received severe backlash from several members and paved the path for the rise of Jörg Haider.

Haider's anti-establishment, law-and-order, anti-immigration campaign attracted votes from everywhere made FPÖ as the sought after party with the total of 29 percent vote in the regional election of Carinthia in 1989, gaining 13 percentage points compared to the previous elections. But the most important breakthrough for the party was in the 1999 legislative elections the FPÖ won 26 per cent of the vote, it's best ever in a nationwide election. This led ÖVP to form a coalition government with the party in 2000. Being a partof government proved to be detrimental for the popular appeal of the party, as it had to compromise on the promises it had made and also to dilute its policy positions. This led to a sharp fall in the vote bank with FPÖ gaining only 10 per cent of the vote in the 2002 elections. Moreover, due to the increasing in-fighting and disagreements within the FPÖ, Jörg Haider and several members of the party left to form BZO, which replaced FPÖ as government partner.

In terms of Austria, whether FPÖ's widespread appeal has not translated to a uniform rise in their vote share, it can be said that the party has seen its fair share of ups and downs in terms of its vote bank. That being said, FPÖ has been one of the most successful right-wing parties in Western Europe. The electoral success of the FPÖ has largely depended on its ability to pursue its proactive issue-management, sharpen criticism, strengthen emotions, mobilise latent resentment and polarize the electorate; all this by demonstrating cool and calculated professionalism. There were times when the electoral volatility had

resulted in FPÖ losing out on its vote share, especially after 2002 elections, but since 2005 and election of Heinz-Christian Strache as the party President, the party has been witnessing an upward trend. Since then, under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, the party revitalised itself to attract its popular support by going back to its strong anti-migrant and 'Austria First;' policies. For example in the 2013 elections FPÖ won almost 21 per cent of vote and in recent times, it has come ahead of traditional mainstream parties, ÖVP and SPÖ, in some of the state elections. Even more recently, in the 2016 presidential elections, FPÖ's Norbert Hofer won the first round by receiving 35.1 per cent of the vote but was defeated by the Green's candidate Alexander Van der Bellen, 53.8 per cent as against 46.2 per cent, in the final run-off, an earlier was declared invalidated.[33]

For Italy as discussed in Chapter - 4, the situation is a bit more complicated because of the presence of multiple right-wing parties. The electoral support for these parties has fluctuated over a period of time. Since the 1990s presented MSI a chance of revival and an opportunity to throw-off its isolation essentially because the terms of political competition had changed. The 1994 general election saw the MSI/AN coalition won a total of 13.4 per cent of the votes and rise to 15.7 per cent in 1996. The elections of 2001 saw a decline in AN's vote share to 12 per cent which forced its dependence on its political alliance with FI. From that moment, the party suffered an electoral decline, but remained the third force of Italian politics. In the 2006 general election, the final election to which the party participated with its own list, AN won 12.3 per cent of the vote, securing 71 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 41 in the Senate.

FI won in its maiden election in 1994 with 21 per cent of votes. It emerged to be strongest in the north followed by LN, second largest in central Italy after Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left, PDS) and the third party in south following MSI/AN and PDS. However, Berlusconi's confidence was severely damaged after the

[33]In the May 2016 elections, Green's candidate Alexander Van der Bellen had defeated FPO's candidate Norbert Hofer by 50.3 percent as against 49.7 percent. This elections result was annulled after the results in 20 out of 117 administrative districts was challenged and the Constitutional Court of Austria confirmed irregularities that had affected a total of 77,926 votes that could have gone to either of the candidate, enough in theory to change the outcome of the election. (Philip Oltermann, 'Austrian Presidential Election Result Overturned and must be Held Again', *The Guardian*, 1 July 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/austrian-presidential-election-result-overturn, Accessed on 21 April 2017)

1996 elections where FI lost 38 per cent of votes, losing majority votes in north to LN, which ran against it. The reorganisation that followed in 1998 cemented Berlusconi image as a serious leader, and the campaign that followed presented an excellent showmanship of the leader and the capacity of the party to reach to even the remotest part of Italy. FI won 29.4 per cent of vote in 2001 elections and the party was reaffirmed as the most voted party of Italy.[34] In the 2006 elections, FI was the biggest loser, its vote share fell to 23.7 per cent, a drop of 5.8 per cent vote.[35] However, Berlusconi was able to forge a new coalition called PdL, of which AN was also a part and in the subsequent election in April 2008 it received almost 47 per cent of the vote. Moreover, the PdL, with over 37 per cent, secured slightly more than the total votes for FI and AN in 2006.

For LN, a new phase started with outcome of the 1989 European elections. The various leagues merged together in a single one (Alleanza Nord - Northern Alliance) polling 1.8 per cent. This was followed by the 1990 administrative elections where all the various leagues gained positive results collectively scoring almost 6.0 per cent at national level.[36] The Lega intended to defend the common man against the national political establishment, the parties, the politicians, and the central administration along with an effective Lega slogan: 'Against Rome'.[37] This reshaping of its political rhetoric, moving from one based on identity to one based on interests, proved to be successful in the 1990 local government elections—and it reached its zenith in the 1992 parliamentary votes, 8.9 per cent of the national electorate. However, the change in leadership changed the fortunes of the party. Lega Nord's founder and former long-standing leader Umberto Bossi was succeeded by Roberto Maroni in 2012, then in December 2013 Matteo Salvini became the new secretary after defeating Bossi in the leadership election.

For Italy, it can be concluded that widespread appeal of right-wing parties in Italy has not translated to a uniform rise in their vote share. It is true that these parties were able to get enough votes to form coalition governments three times, but they have witnessed sharp decline in their vote-share with AN and FI unable to emerge as credible players after their

[34]Ruzza and Fella, n.8, pp.112
[35]Ibid., pp.113
[36]Ignazi, n.3, pp.54.
[37]Ibid., pp.55

failed experiment with PdL. Moreover, after the coalition resigned in 2011, these parties have found it difficult to survive in the current Italian political space, instead, Italy has witnessed the rise of new right-wing party and a resurgent Lega. It was said that when Matteo Salvini took over the leadership of the Northern League at the end of 2013; Italian politicians and the media stated that his job would be to officiate at the party's funeral as it had only received 4 per cent of the votes in 2013, a massive decline in its electoral weightage. However, Salvini was able to sustain the party and in 2015 regional elections Lega Nord was the largest party in Veneto and Lombardy, the second-largest in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, the third-largest in Liguria, Marche and Umbria, the fourth-largest in Piedmont, and the fifth-largest in Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino.Salvini portrayed himself as "new blood" in party politics and eager for publicity, be it talk shows, social media or magazines. According to Mario Tarchi, the secret of the League's new-found success lies in "its competitors' total neglect of issues that are deeply important to a significant proportion of the electorate, especially the less wealthy ones." Its captive vote includes "those who would like to stop the spread of a progressive and cosmopolitan worldview; those who feel uncomfortable with multi-ethnicity and with living with foreigners, as well as homosexual unions".[38]

Lega Nord is given a serious competition by a new and emerging 5-Star Movement which has steadily grown since 2009 to become one of the most voted-for parties in Italy. Giuseppe Peiro Grillo started the Five Star Movement - or Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) along with web strategist and editor of his blog, Gianroberto Casaleggio in 2009 to bring people together to campaign on local issues and then field candidates for elections. The movement has at its heart been a reaction against Italy's self-serving and corrupt politics, with a founding aim to cut parliamentarians' salaries (the highest in Europe) by 80 per cent and to ensure financial accounts of all state bodies are accessible to the public. Its policies have been a mix of the anti-establishment, environmentalist, anti-globalist and eurosceptic, and its supporters have always come from across the political spectrum. At the 2013 general election, the M5s came from nowhere to become the second most voted

[38]Giulia Paravicini, 'Italy's Far-Right Jolts Back from Dead', Politico, 2 March 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/italys-other-matteo-salvini-northern-league-politicians-media-effettosalvini/, Accessed on 21 March 2017

for party. Through ups and downs, its poll ratings have stood at around 30 per cent ever since.[39]

Some Observations

In the twenty-first century, it has become clear that many of right-wing parties are here to stay. They have participated in national governments and won representation in state parliaments and local councils across Europe. However, there are certain characteristics that are specific to this party group which have made them appealing and in part successful. *Firstly,* the electoral volatility in Europe has increased over the past several decades. Party fortunes and individual electoral behaviour have become far less predictable than in the past, and the effective number of parties has increased across advanced industrial societies. Right-wing parties - particularly those that use populist appeals - are uniquely positioned to take advantage of this fluid electoral environment, since skilful use of the media and ideological flexibility has become two of their hallmarks. *Second,* over the past several decades, the personalisation of elections has become a centre-point for these parties. The campaigns are becoming more candidates centred and that parliamentary systems are increasingly taking on some of the key features of presidential systems. Right-wing parties seem to fit particularly well into this literature on the personalisation of politics. Indeed, perhaps the most popular explanation for the rise of right-wing parties is that they are led by charismatic personalities who exert nearly dictatorial control over their organizations. *Thirdly*, the right-wing influences the on-going public debates in European states about immigration, integration, and national identity. Politicians facing strong radical right parties have often tried to co-opt them by integrating elements of their discourse. Also, the right-wing matters for the course of European integration. Although their positions toward the European Union have shifted over time, most of these parties have become deeply skeptical of the integration process. *Fourth*, socio-political ties that had inextricably bound certain social groups to specific political parties has loosened over the years: post-industrialisation and the growth of the

[39] May Bulman, Who is Beppe Grillo and what is Five Star Movement? All you need to know about the biggest threat to Italy's status quo, Independent, 5 December 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/who-is-beppe-grillo-five-star-movement-italy-referendum-party-matteo-renzi-resigns-a7456106.html, Accessed on 21 April 2017

service sector eroded the power of unions and, by extension, the link between workers and Social Democratic parties; secularization cut into the base of Christian Democratic parties; new forms of mass media rendered voters less dependent on all types of political parties for information while simultaneously promoting more candidate-centred political campaigns. The right-wing has been a beneficiary of this electoral dealignment and has at the same time accelerated it.[40]

What happened in Italy in 1994, 2001 and 2008, and Austria in 2000 was in reality only the tip of the iceberg that would fully emerge in the years that followed. Since then other right-wing parties have achieved important results either at the national or regional level, for instance Pim Fortuyn in Holland in 2002, the Vlaams Block in Belgium, the SVP in Switzerland and so forth. However, what stands out in relation to the right-wing studies today is to look at the way these parties have developed over time both ideologically and in relation to their voters. This implies considering how the right-wing has evolved through different phases of the parties' life time: breakthrough, exit from the margins, consolidation and government responsibility. Recent history has shown that the right-wing - as any other party - has been able to evolve, to transform and - whenever necessary - to adapt to new situations and conditions. This has to do not only with a party's organisational strategies, but also with party ideology. Party ideology and party politics are not a fixed 'variable', but can change and be influenced by different conditions, opportunities, as well as internal and external factors.

Although the scope of this study is from 1990 - 2010, however, since 2010 a reordering of the political landscape in Europe is underway. It is true that Europe has not been at peace with itself in recent years. The 2008 financial crash dented its economies, sparking a debt crisis and generating high levels of unemployment. That led to debates within countries about immigrants, foreigners, assimilation, national identity and so on. The European Union's policies of integration have been blamed for the situation, prompting anti-EU, anti-immigration and anti-Muslim platforms to gain ground. Right-wing parties have gained support across the continent, including France, Germany, Austria,

[40] Art,David (2011), *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*, (New York: Cambridge Publication Press), pp.10.

Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary and Italy. Support for xenophobic populism is strongest among those who are older, non-university-educated, working-class, white and male. These voters do not think they benefit much from EU membership, but they certainly felt the effects of the crisis: tax hikes, benefit cuts and unemployment. The right-wing partiesin Austria and Italy blamed austerity measures on untrustworthy Greeks and Spaniards, or on the EU's strict budget-deficit limits, or both. In Italy the migrant crisis has created opportunities for the formerly secessionist Northern League. Under its leader, Matteo Salvini, the once struggling party has transformed itself into an anti-immigrant group, pulling itself back up to 16 per cent in the polls in 2015.[41]

Similarly, in Austria, Norbert Hofer only narrowly lost out to Alexander Van der Bellen, the former Green Party leader, in his country's presidential election. Such a near miss, by a politician who would previously have been dismissed as a fringe candidate, is a sign of the changing times. Across the continent right-wing populists are on the march. Some, like the FPÖ and the National Front in France, have abandoned some of their more obviously extremist positions and project a more professional image. Others, like Jobbik in Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece, are overtly racist. What they all have in common is a focus on national identity and strong leadership. They are Eurosceptic, anti-migrant (albeit in varying degrees) and led by charismatic leaders. For such parties the combination of the eurozone crisis and the surge of refugees into Europe have created the perfect circumstances in which to rail against establishment politicians and other elites. Norbert Hofer's strong showing in Austria is just the latest milestone in their advance.[42]

In terms of economic policies, there are more structural and long-lasting forces underlying the rise of right-wing parties in Austria and Italy which includes a rapidly aging population coupled with a fragmented labour market that makes the absorption of immigrants challenging, pressures on wages from globalization, and structural unemployment as the result of domestic market distortions. All contribute to a loss of

[41] 'The march of Europe's little Trumps', *The Economist,* 10 December 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21679855-xenophobic-parties-have-long-been-ostracised-mainstream-politicians-may-no-longer-be, Accessed on 20 April 2017

[42] 'Playing with fear', *The Economist,* 12 December 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21679792-america-and-europe-right-wing-populist-politicians-are-march-threat, Accessed on 20 April 2017

confidence in the process of European integration and its foundational economic assumptions (including free movement of labour and migration). Failure to reverse these trends has added to a more pessimistic view of the future in Europe that undermines the credibility of mainstream economic policies and the governments that implement them. Right-wing parties have integrated elements of nationalism and euroscepticism to caution that further EU integration threatens national sovereignty and ultimately people's well-being. The majority of these partiesoppose European monetary union and further integration. Some do support free trade, but many oppose the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), as the negotiation is conducted by the European Union rather than national governments. Moreover, most of these parties argue strongly for tighter immigration restrictions on non-EU countries. Although these parties' differences make cooperation at a pan-European level difficult, it creates a hostile environment to further liberalisation and market-oriented reform.[43]

All this said, the reality is that Europe's political fault-line is shifting: from left versus right, to pro-Europeans against anti-Europeans, and right-wing parties have projected themselves to be the only parties that are working for the benefit of Europe by highlighting the problems within their countries. In Austria, FPÖ has come a long way from being the neo-nazist party of 1960s and 70s. When the FPÖ appeared in 1955, it became the political successor to the League of Independents (VdU), a group founded six years earlier which had attracted former Nazi party members and others discontentedwith the existing party choices.But the Freedom Party's seemingly unstoppable rise can only be understood against the background of the peculiar political system created under the Second Austrian Republic after 1945. For the entire post-war era, Austria was always governed by one of the two large parties, the centre-right Christian Democrats or centre-left Socialists - or, often, both at the same time, when they formed a grand coalition, as is the case today. With the rise of Jörg Haider in 1986, FPÖ became a force to be reckoned with. Adopting the slogan "Austria First," Haider initiated a nation-wide petition calling for a constitutional amendment specifying that Austria was not a country of immigration

[43] Robert Kahn, Steven A. Tananbaum, *Global Economics Monthly December 2015: Addressing Economic Populism in Europe*, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2015, http://www.cfr.org/economics/global-economics-monthly-december-2015/p37335, Accessed on 21 April 2017

(the petition failed). Later, he gained international notoriety for praising the successful employment policies of the Third Reich and for calling SS veterans "men of character." Haider achieved his greatest triumph in 1999, when the FPÖ drew 27 percent of the vote and came second in the national elections. The Freedom Party entered a coalition with the Christian Democrats that resulted in imposition of sanctions by EU 14.

However, FPÖ had to pay a great price to be part of the government in 1999. It not only compromised with its basic ideals but lost a lot of electoral votes. FPÖ might have reached its zenith when it came to its political aspirations but its inclusion in government was much criticised, above all because of partychairman Jörg Haider's radical statements and/or actions, in which he occasionallyalluded to anti-Semitic, racist or xenophobic feelings. Despite this, the mainstream parties of Austria have found no alternative to the challenges posed by the FPÖ. Dismissive or accommodationist strategies have tended to make the FPÖ stronger while increasing voter apathy. The most effective tool has been to appeal to Austrians' desire for political harmony by pointing to the FPÖ's polarising nature. Thanks to a broader shift to the right in European politics, the FPÖ has become the most popular party in Austria, with its support growing fastest among voters younger than 30. They have encouraged voters to fear for the loss of what they have called being an Austrian: migrants taking your jobs, Muslims threatening your culture and security, political correctness threatening your ability to speak your mind and entrenched elites selling the citizens out in the service of the wealthy and well-connected. In the case of Austria, the man responsible for harnessing this formula is Heinz-Christian Strache who took over as FPÖ chairman in 2005. Back then, the party's approval ratings were in the single digits, weighed down by claims of anti-Semitism that had dogged its upper ranks for years. But Strache changed the party's image. Support for the state of Israel became part of its platform, and its new leaders renounced the aversion that their predecessors had expressed toward Jews. Instead, Strache focused his party's hostility on a different minority group: Muslims.[44]

[44]Simon Shuster, European Politics Are Swinging to the Right, *Time Magazine*, 22 September 2016 http://time.com/4504010/europe-politics-swing-right/, Accessed on 21 April 2017

What has been happening in Italy over the last two decades, where three right-wing parties accounted for approximatelyhalf of the vote is nothing short of an achievement. There can be little room for doubt about classifying Lega Nord in a racist,ethno-regionalist and openly anti-political party. Nor the credentials of AlleanzaNazionale (AN)be underestimated. Notwithstanding its public declarations of respect for the rules and standards of liberal democracy, the party remains the legitimatepolitical descendant of the post-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). More complex is the case of Forza Italia(FI) tends to leave racist rhetoric to its two abovementionedjunior partners. Nonetheless, in addition to its ambiguous positionon Europe and marked anti-Islamic stance, FI also viscerally opposeswhat it condemns as old, professional politics and is highly intolerant ofliberal democratic principles and rules. These parties represented the trifecta of successful experience of right-wing parties staying in power in a democratic structure. However, the fortunes of right-wing parties in Italy witnessed a down-ward trend since 2011. Despite losing favour, opinionpolls continue to show that the majority of Italians hold very critical viewsof politics and politicians which are similar, if not identical, to those articulatedby the leaders of right-wing movements throughout Europe. Moreover,anxieties about immigration, the creation of a multi-ethnic society, the end of religious and cultural homogeneity, the erosion of the sovereignty of thestate versus the European Union, and the consequences of globalization, areall important dynamics in public opinion. For the right-wing parties, therefore, both those of the present and those which emerged, Italyremains a fertile terrain for populism.[45]

In Italy,new players and old parties under new leadership in the right-wing politics have emerged.The typical right wing anti-élite and xenophobic populism is carried forward by the Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini. The Northern League combines its traditional anti-elite appeal with an evident xenophobic and Anti-Islamic rhetoric. Anti-immigration stances have always represented one of the core issues of the party. Since the change of the party's leadership, they constitute the leading message of the party. The abandonment of the traditional Northern centred request for federalism or secession of the Italian Northern regions has coincided with the call for a homogeneous community

[45]Albertazzi, Daniele and McDonnell, Duncan (eds.) (2008), *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan), pp.99.

and the relevant fight against illegal immigration and the "refugee invasion". However, the Northern League is not the only form of a direct appeal to the people in Italy, as another form of populism has emerged in Italy during the last few years. The unexpected success of the 5 Stars Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) in the 2013 general elections (25 per cent of the votes) points to a rich populist reservoir within the Italian electorate.Created by the famous comedian Beppe Grillo as an internet blog aimed at denouncing political and social scandals, the M5S does not have any problem in presenting itself as the harbour for the disenchanted citizens, dissatisfied with the Italian parties and, more in general, its economic, social and cultural elites.Vis-à-vis policy issues, the M5S offers a less coherent image in comparison to the Northern League. The five stars standing for the five top issues of the movement since its appearance (public management of water, sustainable mobility, development, connectivity, and environment) can be understood more as a symbol than a real party program.Despite the above cited differences, both the Northern League and the Five Star Movement offer a clearly a typical right-wing appeal based on offering easy solutions to complex problems and an opposition to cooperate with traditional parties.[46]

[46]Giorgia Bulli, Here to stay? Populism in Italy and Germany, *Das Progressives Zentrum*, 30 August 2016, http://www.progressives-zentrum.org/here-to-stay-populism-in-italy-and-germany/, Accessed on 21 April 2017

Bibliography

(* Indicates Primary Documents)

Abedi, Amir (2002), Challenges to Established Parties: The Effects of Party System Features on the Electoral Fortunes of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties, *European Journal of Political Research,* 41, pp. 551–583.

---------- (2004), *Anti-Establishment Political Parties: A Comparative Analysis,* (London: Routledge).

Adamson, Goran (2009), 'The Spectre of Austria - Reappraising the Rise of the Freedom Party from 1986 to 2000', (Ph.D Thesis; London School of Economics)

Adamson, Walter L (1980), Gramsci's Interpretation of Fascism, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 41(4), pp. 615-633.

Adamson, Fiona B; Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos; Zolberg, Aristide R (2011), The Limits of the Liberal State: Migration, Identity and Belonging in Europe, Journal *of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37(6), pp. 843-859.

Agnew, John (1995), The Rhetoric of Regionalism: The Northern League in Italian Politics, 1983-94, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 20(2), pp. 156-172.

---------- (2007), Remaking Italy? Place, Configurations and Italian Electoral Politics under the 'Second Republic', *Modern Italy,* 12(1), pp. 17–38.

Aichholzer, Sylvia Kritzinger, Wagner Markus and Zeglovits, Eva (2013), How has Radical Right Support Transformed Established Political Conflicts? The Case of Austria, *West European Politics*, 37(1), pp. 113-137.

Akkerman, Agnes, Mudde, Cas, and Zaslove, Andrej (2014), How Populist Are the People? MeasuringPopulist Attitudes inVoters, *Comparative Political Studies,* 47(9), pp. 1324-1353

Akrami, Nazar and Bo, Ekehammar (2006), Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation: Their Roots in Big-Five Personality Factors and Facets, *Journal of Individual Differences*, 27(3), pp. 1-10.

Albertazzi, Daniele and McDonnell, Duncan (2005), The Lega Nord in the Second Berlusconi Government: In a League of its Own, *West European Politics*, 28(5), pp. 952-972.

---------- (eds.) (2008), *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan).

---------- (2010), The Lega Nord Back in Government, *West European Politics*, 33(6), pp. 1318-1340.

---------- (eds.) (2014), *Populists in Power*, (Routledge: Oxon).

Albertazzi, Daniele (2002), Recent studies of the Lega Nord, *Modern Italy*, 7(2), pp. 209-213.

---------- (2006), 'Back to Our Roots' or Self-Confessed Manipulation? The Uses of the Past in the Lega Nord's Positing of Padania, *National Identities*, 8(1), pp. 21-39.

---------- (2013), Amici Fragili: the Alliance between the Lega Nord and the Popolo della Libertà as Seen by their Representatives and Members, *Modern Italy*, 18(1), pp. 1-18.

Almeida, Dimitri (2010), Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(3), pp. 237-253.

Alonso, Sonia and da Fonseca, Saro Claro (2011), Immigration, left and Right, *Party Politics*, 18(6), pp. 865–884.

Andall, Jacqueline (2007), Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in Government (1996–2001), *Patterns of Prejudice*, 41(2), pp. 131-153

Andrews, Geoff (2005), *Not a Normal Country: Italy after Berlusconi*, (London: Pluto Press).

Anti-Immigration and Pro-Italy, Italia Anthropology Blog, 29 September 2011, http://italianthro.blogspot.in/2011/09/anti-immigration-and-pro-italy.html, Accessed on19 April 2017

Art, David (2006), *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*, (UK: Cambridge University Press)

---------- (2007), Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria, *Party Politics*, 13(3), pp. 331-349.

---------- (2011), *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*, (New York: Cambridge).

Atkin, Nicholas and Biddiss, Michael (eds.) (2009), *Themes in Modern European History: 1890-1945*, (New York: Routledge).

Bailer-Galanda, Brigitte and Neugebauer Wolfgang (1996), Right-Wing Extremism: History, Organisations, Ideology, *in Stiftung Dokumentations archiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (Anti-Defamation League)* (ed.): Brigitte Bailer-Galanda and Wolfgang Neugebauer, *Incorrigibly Right. Right-Wing Extremists, "Revisionists" and Anti-Semites in Austrian Politics Today*, Vienna-New York.

Baldini, Gianfranco (2001), Extreme Right Parties in Italy: An Overview, http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/ereps/download/italy_overview.pdf, Accessed on 23 March 2016

Baldwin, Peter (1990), Social Interpretations of Nazism: Renewing a Tradition, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 25, pp. 5-37.

Bale, Tim (2003), Cinderella and her Ugly Sisters: the Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems, *West European Politics,* 26(3), pp. 67-90.

Bale, Tim; Green-Pedersen, Christoffer; Krouwel, André; Luther, Kurt Richard; Sitter, Nick (2010), If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe, *Political Studies,* 58, pp. 410–426.

Barnes, Samuel H (1972), The Legacy of Fascism: Generational Differences in Italian Political Attitudes and Behavior, *Comparative Political Studies,* 5, pp. 41-57.

Barr, Robert R. (2009), Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics, *Party Politics,* 15(1) pp. 29–48.

Barraclough, Richard (1998), Umberto Bossi: Charisma, Personality and Leadership, *Modern Italy,* 3(2), pp. 263-269

Bartlett, Jamie; Birdwell, Jonathan and McDonnell, Duncan (2012), *Populism in Europe: Lega Nord,* (London: Demos).

Baumeister, Andrea T (2000), *Liberalism and Politics of Difference,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).

Berezin Mabel (2011), *The Normalization of the Right in Post-Security Europe,* in Armin Schaefer and Wolfgang Streeck (edited), *Politics in the Age of Austerity,* (UK: Polity Press).

Berselli, Edmondo (2001), The Crisis and Transformation of Italian Politics, *Daedalus*, 130(3), pp. 1-24.

Betts, Paul (2002), The New Fascination with Fascism: The Case of Nazi Modernism, *Journal of Contemporary History,* 37(4), pp. 541–558.

Betz, Hans-Georg (1993), The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, *The Review of Politics*, 55(4), pp. 663-685.

---------- (1993), The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe, *Comparative Politics*, 25(4), pp. 413-427.

---------- (1994), *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*,(New York: St. Martin's Press)

---------- (2000), The Enigmatic Haider, *SAIS Review*, 20(2), pp. 265-271.

---------- (2003), Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe, *Socialist Register*, pp. 193-210.

---------- (2004), *Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe in the 1990s and Beyond: A Threat to Democracy and Civil Right?*, Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper No. 9, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Bischof, Gunter, Pelinka, Anton and Michael Gehler (eds.) (2002), *Austria in the European Union*, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers).

Black, Ian, *End Snub to Austria, says Three Wise Men*, The Guardian, 9 September 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/austria.ianblack, Accessed on 26 April 2016

Blee, Kathleen (2007), Ethnographies of the Far Right, *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 36(2), pp. 119-128.

Blondel, Jean; Thiébault, Jean Louis; Czernicka, Katarzyna; Inoguchi, Takashi; Pathmanand, Ukrist and Venturino, Fulvio (2010), *Political Leadership, Parties and Citizens: The personalisation of leadership*, (Oxon: Routledge).

Bornschier, Simon (2010), *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right-The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).

---------- (2008), The Extreme Right Populist Challenge and Transformation of Political Space in Western Europe, Paper Prepared for NCCR Workshop on Populism, Aarau, 6-7 June 2008.

Bos, Linda and Brug, Wouter van der (2010), Public images of leaders of anti-immigration parties: Perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness, *Party Politics*, 16(6), pp. 777–799.

Bos, Linda , van der Brug, Wouter and de Vreese, Claes (2011), How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders, *Political Communication*, 28(2), pp.182-206.

Boswell, Christina (2003), *European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*, (USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.).

Borneman, John and Fowler, Nick (1997), Europeanization, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 26, pp. 487-514.

Bracher, Karl Dietrich (1982), *The Age of Ideologies- a History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- Anstalt GmbH).

Brass, Tom (1997), The Agrarian Myth, the 'New' Populism and the 'New' Right, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 32(4), pp. PE27-PE42.

Brug, Wouter Van Der, Fennema, Meindert and Tillie, Jean (2005), Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support, *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(5), pp. 537-573.

Brug, Wouter van der and Mugha, Anthony (2007), Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties, *Party Politics*, 13(29), pp. 29-51.

Brug, Wouter Van Der and Fennema, Meindert, (2003) Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-Immigrant Parties Developed Into Two Separate Groups by 1999, *European Journal of Political Research*, 42, pp. 55–76

---------- (2009), The Support Base of Radical Right Parties in the Enlarged European Union, *Journal of European Integration*, 31(5), pp. 589-608.

Brusattin, Lorenzo (2007), Late Anti-Communism as a Shortcut: The Success of Forza Italia in the 1994 Italian Election, *South European Society and Politics*, 12(4), pp. 481-499

Bulman, May, 'Who is Beppe Grillo and what is Five Star Movement? All you need to know about the biggest threat to Italy's status quo', *Independent*, 5 December 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/who-is-beppe-grillo-five-star-movement-italy-referendum-party-matteo-renzi-resigns-a7456106.html, Accessed on 21 April 2017

Bull, Anna Cento and Gilbert, Mark (2001), *The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics*, (Hampshire: Palgrave Publications).

Bull, Anna Cento (2009) Lega Nord: A Case of Simulative Politics?,*South European Society and Politics*, 14(2), pp.129-146.

---------- (2010), Addressing Contradictory Needs: the Lega Nord and Italian Immigration Policy, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 44(5), pp. 411-431.

Bull, Martin J. and James L. Newell (1995), Italy Changes Course? The 1994 Elections and the Victory of the Right, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 48(1), pp.72-99.

Bull, Martin and Rhodes, Martin (1997) Between Crisis and Transition: Italian Politics in the 1990s, *West European Politics*, 20(1), pp.1-13.

Bulli, Giorgia, Here to Stay? Populism in Italy and Germany, *Das Progressives Zentrum*, 30 August 2016, http://www.progressives-zentrum.org/here-to-stay-populism-in-italy-and-germany/, Accessed on 21 April 2017

Burack, Cynthia and Snyder-Hall, Claire (2012), Introduction: Right-Wing Populism and the Media, *New Political Science*, 34(4), pp. 439-454.

Caiani, Manuela and Porta, Donatella della (2003), *Extreme Right and Populism: A Frame Analysis of Extreme Right Wing Discourses in Italy and Germany*, Political Science Series 121, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.

Caiani, Manuela and Borri, Rossella (2012), *Between Violent and Non-Violent Action Strategies: a Study on Extreme-Right Organizations in Italy and Spain*, Political Science Series 130, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.

Carter, E. L (2002), Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties, *West European Politics*, 25(3), pp.125-146.

Carter, Elisabeth (2005), *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?,*(Manchester: Manchester University Press).

*Charter of Values of Popollo della Liberta, Italy, http://www.pdl.it/notizie/15346/carta-dei-valori, Accessed on 17 July 2013.

Chattopadhyay, Paresh (1996), Fascism, Socialism and the Left, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 31(41/42), pp. 2823-2831.

Chiantera-Stutte, Patricia (2003), The Ambiguous Heritage of Mitteleuropa- The Resurfacing of Mitteleuropa as a Counter-Image to the EU in Austrian Populism, *Law and Critique*, 14, pp.325–353.

Croci, Osvaldo (2001), Language and politics in Italy: from Moro to Berlusconi, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 6(3), pp. 348-370.

Conti, Nicolò (2009), Tied Hands? Italian Political Parties and Europe, *Modern Italy*, 14(2), pp. 203-216.

Diamanti, Ilvo (2007), The Italian Centre-Right and Centre-Left: Between Parties and 'the Party', *West European Politics*, 30(4), pp.733-762.

Diamond, Sara (1996), Right-Wing Politics and the Anti-Immigration Cause, *Social Justice*, 23(3), Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue for the Americas in the 21st Century, pp. 154-168.

Dechezelles, Stéphanie (2008), The Cultural Basis of Youth Involvement in Italian Extreme Right-wing Organisations, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 16(3), pp. 363-375.

De Lange, Sarah (2007), A New Winning Formula? : The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right, *Party Politics*, 13(4), pp. 411-435.

---------- (2012), New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties, *Political Studies*, 60, pp. 899–918.

De Vries, Catherine E. and Edwards Erica E (2009),Taking Europe to its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism, *Party Politics*, 15(1), pp. 5–28.

Di Scala, Spencer (2009), *Italy: From Revolution to Republic: 1700 to the Present*, (Philadelphia: Westview Press).

Dr Matthew Goodwin, Ramalingam, Vidhya, Briggs, Rachel (2012), *The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe*, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Dolezal Martin, Ennser-Jedenastik Laurenz, Müller Wolfgang C. and Winkler Anna Katharina (2012), The Life Cycle of Party Manifestos: The Austrian Case, *West European Politics*, 35(4), pp.869-895.

Duch, Raymond M and Gibson, James L (1992), "Putting Up With" Fascists in Western Europe: A Comparative, Cross-Level Analysis ofPolitical Tolerance, *The Western Political Quarterly*, 45(1), pp.237-273.

Duncan, Fraser (2007), The End of the Wende? The 2006 Austrian Parliamentary Election, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8(1), pp.13-30.

---------- (2010), Immigration and Integration Policy and the Austrian Radical Right in Office: the FPÖ/BZÖ, 2000–2006, *Contemporary Politics*, 16(4), pp.337-354.

Eatwell, Roger and Wright, Anthony (eds.), *Contemporary Political Ideologies,* (London: Pinter Publishers), 1994

Eatwell, Roger (1992), Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism, *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 4(2), pp. 161-194.

---------- (1998), The dynamics of Right-Wing Electoral Breakthrough, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 32(3), pp.3-31.

---------- (ed.) (1997), *European Political Cultures- Conflict or Convergence?*, (London: Routledge).

---------- (1997), Towards a new model of the rise of right-wing extremism, *German Politics*, 6(3), pp. 166-184.

---------- (2000), The Rebirth of the 'Extreme Right' in Western Europe?,*Parliamentary Affairs*, 53, p. 412.

---------- (2006), The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 7(2), pp. 141-156.

Eatwell, Roger and Mudde, Cass (eds.) (2004), *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge,* (Oxon: Routledge).

Ennser, Laurenz (2012), The homogeneity of West European party families: The radical right in comparative perspective, *Party Politics*, 18(2), pp. 151–171.

Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz and Ejnar Hansen, Martin (2013), The Contingent Nature of Local Party System Nationalisation: The Case of Austria 1985–2009, *Local Government Studies*, 39(6), pp.777-791.

Ellinas, Antonis (2007), Phased Out: Far Right Parties in Western Europe, *Comparative Politics*, 39(3), pp.353-371.

Erk, Jan (2004), Austria: A Federation without Federalism, *Publius*, 34(1), pp. 1-20.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (1998), *Report on Italy*.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (1999), *Report on Austria*.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2000), *Second Report on Austria*.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2001), *Second Report on Italy*.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2004), *Third Report on Austria*.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2005), *Third Report on Italy*.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2010), *Report on Austria*.

*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2012), *Report on Italy*.

*European Council (1997), *Regulation (EC) 1035/97- Establishing European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia*, Luxembourg.

*European Commission (2003), *Activities of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Together with Proposals to Recast Council Regulation (EC) 1035/97*, Brussels.

*European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Annual Report 2004/2005*.

*EU Research on Social Sciences and Humanities (2004), *Socio-economic Changes, Individual Reactions and the Appeal of the Extreme Right*, Final report, Funded under the 'Improving the socioeconomic knowledge base, key action of the fifth framework programme, Directorate-General for Research European Commission, Report issued in September 2004.

*European Commission (2008), Sharing Diversity- National Approaches to Intercultural Dialogue in Europe, European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research.

*European Migration Network, *Fact Sheet Austria 2012*, European Commission, 2013.

*European Migration Network, *Fact Sheet Italy 2012*, European Commission, 2013.

*European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *The Racial Equality Directive: application and challenges*, URL- http://europa.eu, [Accessed on 09/04/2012].

*EUROPOL (2012), EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europoltsat.pdf, Accessed on 23 June 2013.

Fallend, Franz (2004), Are Right-Wing Populism and Government Participation Incompatible? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria, *Representation*, 40(2), pp. 115-130.

---------- (2010), Austria, *European Journal of Political Research*, 49, pp.880–898.

Falkner, Gerda (2001), The EU14's "Sanctions" Against Austria: Sense andNonsense, *Journal of the European Union Studies Association*, 14 (1), pp. 14-15.

Federation of Independents explained, http://everything.explained.today/Federation_of_Independents/, Accessed on 21 April 2015

Fekete, Liz (2008), *The Italian General Elections and its Aftermath*, Institute of Race Relations, Bulletin No. 64.

Fella, Stefano (2006), From Fiuggi to the Farnesina: Gianfranco Fini's Remarkable Journey, *Journal ofContemporary European Studies*, 14(1), pp.11-23.

Fella, Stefano and Ruzza, Carlo (2013), Populism and the Fall of the Centre-Right in Italy: The End of the Berlusconi Model or a New Beginning?,*Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21(1), pp. 38-52.

Ferraresi, Franco (1988), The Radical Right in Post-war Italy, *Politics Society*, 16(1), pp. 71-119.

Formisano, Ronald (2005), Interpreting Right-Wing or Reactionary Neo-Populism: A Critique, *Journal of Policy History*, 17(2), pp. 241-255.

*FPÖ Party Programme, 2006, Vienna, https://translate.google.co.in/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=http://www.erhoert.at/Wahlprogramm_FP__2006.pdf&prev=search

*FPÖ Party Programme 2008, Vienna, https://translate.google.co.in/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=https://neuwal.com/2008/09/23/wahlprogramme-das-wahlprogramm-der-FPÖ/&prev=search

Franzmann, Simon and Kaiser, André (2006),Locating Political Parties in Policy Space: A Re-Analysis of Party Manifesto Data, Party Politics, 12(2), pp. 163–188.

*Freedom Party of Austria, Party Programme, 1997, Vienna

Freeman, H.B (2002), Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and theEuropean Union Members' Sanctions, *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 25(1), pp.109-124

Freire, André (2006), Bringing Social Identities Back in: The Social Anchors of Left-Right Orientation in Western Europe, *International Political Science Review*, 27(4), pp. 359-378.

Furlong, Paul (1992), The Extreme Right in Italy: Old Orders and Dangerous Novelties, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 45(3), pp.345-356.

Gilbert, Mark (2009), The Crisis of the Italian State: Then and Now, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 14(1), pp.31-37.

Giordano, Benito (2003), The Continuing Transformation of Italian Politics and the Contradictory Fortunes of the Lega Nord, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 8(2), pp.216-230.

Geddes, Andrew (2008), "Il Rombo Dei Cannoni? Immigration and the Centre-Right in Italy",*Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(3), pp. 349-366.

Gentile, Emilio (1984), The Problem of the Party in Italian Fascism, *Journal of Contemporary History,* 19, pp. 251-274.

Gerring, John (1997), Ideology: A Definitional Analysis, *Political Research Quarterly*, 50(4), pp. 957-994.

Gerwarth, Robert and Riall, Lucy (2009), Fathers of the Nation?Bismarck, Garibaldi and the Cult of Memory in Germany and Italy, *European History Quarterly*, 39(3), pp. 388–413.

Giddens, Anthony (1994), *Beyond Left and Right- the Future of Radical Politics,* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Givens, Terri (2005), *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Goeschel, Christian (2012), Italia docet? The Relationship between Italian Fascism and Nazism Revisited, *European History Quarterly*, 42(3), pp. 480–492.

Golder, Matt (2003), Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, *Comparative Political Studies,* 36(4), pp. 432-466.

Goodwin, Matthew (2011), *Right Response: Understanding and Countering Extremist Populism in Europe*, A Catham House Report, The Royal Institute for International Affairs.

Glenn Gottfried (2014), *Continental Drift: Understanding the Growth of Euroscepticism,* Institute for Public Policy Research, United Kingdoms.

Grabow, Karston and Hartleb, Florian (eds.) (2013), *Exposing the Demagogues: Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*, Centre for European Studies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Berlin.

Griffin, Roger (ed.) (1995), *Fascism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Guerra, Simona and Massetti, Emanuele, (2006), *Election Briefing No.25: The Italian Parliamentary Elections of April 2006*, European Parties Elections and Referendums Network, Sussex European Institute.

Guibernau, Montserrat (2007), The Identity of Nations, (Wiley: Cambridge).

---------- (2010), *Migration and the Rise of the Radical Right: Social Malaise and the Failure of Mainstream Politics*, Policy Network Paper, London.

Gundle, Stephen and Parker, Simon (eds.) (1996), *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, (Routledge: United Kingdom)

Guzzini, Stefano (1995), The 'Long Night of the First Republic': Years of Clientelistic Implosion in Italy, *Review of International Political Economy*, 2(1), pp. 27-61.

Hainsworth, Paul (2008), *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*, (London:Routledge).

Hagtvet, Bernt (1994), Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, *Journal of Peace Research*, 31(3), pp. 241-246.

Halla, Martin, Wagner, Alexander F., Zweimüller (2012), Josef, *Does Immigration into Their Neighbourhoods Incline Voters toward the Extreme Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria*, Discussion Paper No. 6575, Institute for the Study of Labour.

*Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik .Ein Leitfaden für Führungs funktionäre und Mandatsträger der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, FPÖ 2008

* Handbuch freiheitlicher Politik .Ein Leitfaden für Führungs funktionäre und Mandatsträger der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, FPÖ 2013

Hartleb, Florian (2011), *After their Establishment: Rise of Populist Parties in Europe*, Centre for European Studies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin.

Harris, Geoffrey (1990), *The Dark Side of Europe- the Extreme Right Today*, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press).

Heilbrunn, Jacob (2000), A Disdain for the Past JörgHaider's Austria, *World Policy Journal*, 17(1), pp. 71-78.

Heinisch, Reinhard (2003), *"Salvation and Villain"- the Role of Europe in Austrian Politics and The Rise of Right-Wing Populism*, Paper Prepared for EUSA 8th Biennial International Conference on March 27- 29 (2003), Nashville: Tennessee.

Hockenos, Paul (1995), Jörg Haider: Austria's Far Right Wunderkind, *World Policy Journal*, 12(3), pp. 75-80.

Hokovský, Radko and Kopal, Jiří (eds.) (2013), *Politics and Policies of Integration in Austria, Hungary, Czechia, Denmark and at the EU Level*, (Burešova, Czech Republic: Brno and Praha).

Hopkin, Jonathan (2004), Forza Italia after Ten Years, *Italian Politics*, 20, pp. 83-99

Horton, John (1981), The Rise of the Right: A Global View, *Crime and Social Justice*, 15, Law and Order in the 1980's: The Rise of the Right, pp. 7-17.

Howard, Marc Morjé (2000), Can Populism Be Suppressed in a Democracy? Austria, Germany, and the European Union, *East European Politics and Societies*, 14(2), pp. 18–32.

Huysseune, Michel (2010), A Eurosceptic Vision in a Europhile Country: The Case of the Lega Nord, *Modern Italy*, 15(1), pp.63-75.

Hybel, Alex Roberto (2010), *The Power of Ideology- from the Roman Empire to al-Qaeda*, (London: Routledge).

Ibrahim, Vivian and Wunsch, Margit (eds.) (2012), *Political Leadership, Nations and Charisma,* (London; Routledge).

Ignazi, Piero (1996), The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties, *Party Politics,* 2(4), pp. 549-566.

---------- (2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,* (USA: Oxford University Press).

---------- (2005), Legitimation and Evolution on the Italian Right Wing: Social and Ideological Repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord, *South European Society and Politics,* 10(2), pp. 333-349.

Immerzeel, Tim; Lubbers, Marcel and Coffe Hilde (2015), Competing with the radical right: distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics,* pp. 1-15.

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth (2004), Populists in Power: Attitudes towards immigrants after the Austrian Freedom Party entered government, Paper Presented at New Parties in Government Workshop, European Consortium on Political Research Conference, Uppsala, 13-25 April 2004.

---------- (2008), What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases, *Comparative Political Studies,* 41(1), pp. 3-23.

Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder (1987), *News that Matters,* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press).

Jackman, Robert W. and Volpert, Karin (1996), Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, *British Journal of Political Science,* 26(4), pp. 501-521.

Joes, Anthony James, (1974) Fascism: The Past and the Future, *Comparative Political Studies,* 7(1), pp.107-133.

Jones, Jessica Sprague (2011), Extreme Right-Wing Vote and Support for Multiculturalism in Europe, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(4), pp. 535-555.

Kahn, Robert, Tananbaum, Steven A, *Global Economics Monthly December 2015: Addressing Economic Populism in Europe*, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 December 2015,http://www.cfr.org/economics/global-economics-monthly-december-2015/p37335, Accessed on 21 April 2017

Kallis, Aristotle A (2000), The 'Regime-Model' of Fascism: A Typology,*European History Quarterly*, 30(1), pp. 77–104.

Karapin, Roger (1998), Radical-Right and Neo-Fascist Political Parties in Western Europe, *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), pp. 213-234.

Karner, Christian (2005), The 'Habsburg Dilemma' Today: Competing Discourses of National Identity in Contemporary Austria, *National Identities*, 7(4), pp.409-432.

Katzenstein, Peter J (1977), The Last Old Nation: Austrian National Consciousness since 1945, *Comparative Politics*, 9(2), pp. 147-171

Kestilä-Kekkonen, Elina (2009), Anti-party sentiment among young adults: Evidence from fourteen West European countries, *Nordic Journal of Youth Research*, 17(2),pp.145–165.

King, Russell (1992), Italy: from Sick Man to Rich Man of Europe, *Geography*, 77(2), pp. 153-169.

Kitching David (2011), Facing down the Far Right in Europe: A Challenge for Progressive Politics, Foundation for European Progressive Studies.

Knigge, Pia (1998), The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe, *European Journal of Political Research*, 34, pp.249–279.

Knight, R.G. (2000), Contours of Memory in Post-Nazi Austria, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 34(4), pp. 5-11.

Koff, Sondra Z and Stephen P. Koff (2000), *Italy- From the First to the Second Republic*, (London: Routledge).

Kogan, Norman (1969), The Origins of Italian Fascism, *Polity*, 2(1), pp. 100-105.

Kopecek, Lubomír (2007), The Far Right in Europe: A Summary of Attempts to Define the Concept, Analyze its Identity, and Compare the Western European and Central European Far Right, *Central European Political Studies Review* Vol. (IX)(4), pp. 280-293.

Kraler, Albert (2004), *Immigrant and immigration policy making – A survey of the literature: The Case of Austria*, Paper prepared for the IMISCOE C9 State of the Art Report in view of the First Annual Imiscoe Conference in Coimbra, Portugal, December 2004.

Kritzinger, Sylvia, New Political Conflict and the Radical Right in Austria, Policy Network, 24 May 2013,http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4408&title=New-political-conflict-and-the, Accessed on 25 April 2015

Lahav, Gallya (2004), *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*, (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Langenbacher, Nora, Schellenberg, Britta (ed.) (2011), *Is Europe on The "Right" Path? Right-wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Forum, (Bonner Universitäts- Buchdruckerei: Berlin).

Leconte, Cécile (2005), The Fragility of the EU as a 'Community of Values': Lessons from the Haider Affair, *West European Politics*, 28(3), pp. 620-649.

Lederer, Gerda (1988), Young Austrians and the Election of Kurt Waldheim, *Political Psychology*, 9(4), pp. 633-647.

Levy, Carl (1999), Fascism, National Socialism and Conservatives in Europe, 1914-1945: Issues for Comparativists, *Contemporary European History*, 8(1), pp. 97-126.

Lewis, Jill (2000), Austria 1950: Strikes, 'Putsch' and their Political Context, *European History Quarterly*, 30(4), pp.533–552.

Lipset, Seymour M (1959), Social Stratification and Right-Wing Extremism, *British Journal of Sociology*, 10(4), pp. 346-382.

Loughlin, Michael B. (2003), GustaveHervé's Transition from Socialism to National Socialism: Continuity and Ambivalence, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38(4), pp. 515–538.

Lucassen, Geertje and Lubbers, Marcel (2012), Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats, *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(5), pp. 547–574.

Luther, Kurt Richard and Deschouwer, Kris (eds.) (1999), *Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in Consociational Democracy*, (London: Routledge).

Luther, Kurt Richard (2000), Austria: A Democracy Under Threat from the Freedom Party?,*Parliamentary Affairs*, 53, pp. 426-442.

---------- (2007), *Electoral strategies and performance of Austrian right-wing populism 1986-2006*, Working Paper 24, Keele European Parties Research Unit, Keele University, UK.

---------- (2009), *The Revival of the Radical Right: The Austrian Parliamentary Election of 2008*, Working Paper No. 29, Keele European Parties Research Unit, Keele University, UK.

---------- (2011), Of Goals and Own Goals: A Case Study of Right-Wing Populist Party Strategy for and during Incumbency, *Party Politics*, 17(4), pp. 453–470.

---------- (2014), *Austrian Populism and the Not-So-Great Recession: The Primacy of Politics*, Working Paper 38, Keele European Parties Research Unit, Keele University, UK.

Majorities' Attitudes towards Minorities: Key Findings from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, March 2005.

Macdonald, Ian (1975), Some Thoughts on Fascism Today, *Race and Class,* 16(3), pp. 295-304.

Maccanico, Yasha, (2009), Italy: The internal and external fronts- security package and returns to Libya, *Statewatch Bulletin,* 19(3), pp.1-6.

Mann, Michael (2004), *Fascists,* (UK: Cambridge University Press).

Marchart, Oliver (2001), The 'Fourth Way' of the Ultra-Right: Austria, Europe, and the End of Neo-Corporatism, *Capital & Class,* 25, pp. 7-14.

Marcus, Jonathan (2000), Exorcising Europe's Demons: A Far-Right Resurgence?,*The Washington Quarterly,* 23(4), pp.31-40.

Mason, David (2011), *A Concise History of Modern Europe: Liberty, Equality, Solidarity*, (United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers).

McCarthy, Patrick (1997), Italy: A new language for a new politics?,*Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 2(3), pp. 337-357.

McGann, Anthony J. and Kitschelt, Herbert (2005), The Radical Right in The Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ, *Party Politics*, 11(2), pp. 147–171.

McLaurin, James Reagan and Al Amri, Mohammed Bushanain (2008), Developing an Understanding of Charismatic and Transformational Leadership, *Proceedings of the Allied Academies,* 15(2), pp. 333-337.

Mendelssohn, F (2000), The Return of the Repressed: Is Austria a Racist Society?,*Patterns of Prejudice*, 34(4), pp. 13-22.

Melzer, Ralf and Serafin, Sebastian (eds.) (2013), *Right-Wing Extremism: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies, Labour Markets and Exit-Strategies*, (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung).

Meret, Susi (2009), 'The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support', (Ph.D Thesis, Aalborg University).

Merkl, Peter H. and Weinberg, Leonard (eds.) (1997), *The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, (Great Britain: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.).

---------- (eds.) (2003), *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers).

Mete, Vittorio (2010), Four Types of Anti-Politics: Insights From The Italian Case, *Modern Italy*, 15(1), pp. 37-61.

Meyer, Thomas M. and Müller, Wolfgang C (2013), The Issue Agenda, Party Competence and Popularity: An Empirical Analysis of Austria 1989–2004, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*.

Movimento Sociale Italiano, https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Movimento%20Sociale%20Italiano&item_type=topic, Accessed on 27 April 2016.

Jandl, Michael and Kraler, Albert (2003), Austria: A Country of Immigration?, Migration Policy Institute, 1 March 2003, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/austria-country-immigration, Accessed on 18 April 2017.

Minkenberg, Michael and Perrineau, Pascal (2007), The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004, *International Political Science Review*, 28(1), pp. 29-55.

Mills, Melinda, van de Bunt Gerhard G, de Bruijn, Jeanne (2006), Comparative Research- Persistent Problems and Promising Solutions, *International Sociology*, 21(5), pp. 619–631.

Minkenberg, Michael (2013), From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21(1), pp. 5-24.

Mouffe, Chantal, Democracy in Europe: The Challenge of Right-wing Populism, http://www.cccb.org/rcs_gene/mouffe.pdf, Accessed on 27 March 2016

Mudde, Cass (1996), The Paradox of the Anti-Party Party: Insights from the Extreme Right, *Party Politics*, 2, pp. 265-276.

---------- (1996), The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family, *West European Politics*, 19(2), pp.225-248.

---------- (1999), The single-issue party thesis: extreme right parties and the immigration issue, *West European Politics*, 22(3), pp.182–97.

---------- (2000) *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*, (UK: Manchester University Press).

---------- (2004), The Populist Zeitgeist, *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), pp.541–563.

---------- (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press).

---------- (2011), Radical Right Parties in Europe: What, Who Why?,*Participation*, 35(1), pp.12-15.

---------- (2010), The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy, *West European Politics*, 33(6), pp.1167-1186.

---------- (2013), Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So what?,*European Journal of Political Research*, 52, pp.1–19.

---------- (2014), Fighting the system? Populist radical right parties and party system change, *Party Politics*, 20(2), pp.217-226.

Muller- Rommel, Ferdinand (1998), The New Challengers: the Greens and the Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe, *European Review,* 6(2), pp.191-202.

Müller, Wolfgang and Fallend, Franz (2004), Changing Patterns of Party Competition in Austria: From Multipolar to Bipolar System, *West European Politics*, 27(5), pp.801-835

Murphy, Anthony (2004), The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s: A Culturalist Approach, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP)*, 33(3), pp. 297–307.

Musulin, Stella (1968), Climate of Austrian Politics, *The World Today*, 24(11), pp. 483-490.

Nagorski, Andrew (2000), The Politics of Guilt: Austria's Bigot, Europe's Burden, *Foreign Affairs*, 79(3), pp. 18-22.

Newell, James L. (2000), Italy: The Extreme Right Comes in from the Cold, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53 (3), pp.469-485.

Norris, Pippa (2004), *The Rise of the Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition in Postindustrial Societies*, (New York: Cambridge University Press).

---------- (2005), *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

*OSCE (2004), *International Action against Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and Intolerance in the OSCE Region*, http://www.osce.org/odihr/13995, Accessed on 10 December 2013.

*OECD (2000), The Creative Society of the 21st Century, http://www.oecd.org/futures/35391171.pdf, Accessed on 12 December 2013.

*OECD (2010), International Migration Outlook, Public Opinions and Immigration: Individual Attitudes, Interest Groups and the Media, http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/48328734.pdf, Accessed on 12 December 2013.

Oesch, Daniel (2008), Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland, *International Political Science Review*, 29, pp. 349-373.

Onraet, Emma and Van Hiel, Alain (2013), When Threat to Society Becomes a Threat to Oneself: Implications for Right-Wing Attitudes and Ethnic Prejudice, *International Journal of Psychology*, 48(1), pp.25-34.

Orfali, Birgitta (2006), Extreme Right Movements: Why Do They Re-Emerge? Why Are They Accepted?,*Theory Psychology*, 16, pp.715-736.

Orsina, Giovanni (2010), The Republic after Berlusconi: Some reflections on historiography, politics and the political use of history in post-1994 Italy, *Modern Italy*, 15(1), pp. 77-92.

Paolucci, Caterina (2006), *A firm masquerading as a party transforms Italy: Berlusconi's Forza Italia*, European Consortium of Political Research, Joint Sessions, Intercollege Nicosia, Cyprus, April 25-30 2006.

---------- (2008), From Democrazia Cristiana to Forza Italia and the Popolo della Libertà: Partisan change in Italy, *Modern Italy*, 13(4), pp. 465-480

Paravicini, Giulia 'Italy's Far-Right Jolts Back from Dead', *Politico*, 2 March 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/italys-other-matteo-salvini-northern-league-politicians-media-effettosalvini/, Accessed on 21 March 2017

Parekh, Bhikhu (2008), A New Politics of Identity- Political Principles for an Interdependent World, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan).

Parsons, Craig and Smeeding, Timothy (eds.) (2006), *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, (USA: Cambridge University Press).

Pasquino, Gianfranco (2003), A Tale of Two Parties: Forza Italia and the Left Democrats, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 8(2), pp. 197-215

---------- (2005), What Is Right in Italy?,*South European Society and Politics,* 10(2), pp. 177-190.

---------- (2007), The Five Faces of Silvio Berlusconi: The Knight of Anti-politics, *Modern Italy*, 12(1), pp. 39-54.

---------- (2009), Political History in Italy, *Journal of Policy History*, 21(3), pp.282-297.

---------- (2013), Extreme right parties in Western Europe: the case of the Italian Northern League, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 18(1), pp. 53-71.

Pavone, Claudio (1967), Italy: Trends and Problems, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2(1), Historians on the Twentieth Century, pp. 49-77.

Paxton, Robert (2004), *Anatomy of Fascism,* (New York: Random House Publications).

Pedahzur, Ami and Brichta, Avraham (2002), The Institutionalisation of Extreme Right-Wing Charismatic Parties: A Paradox?,*Party Politics,* 8(1), pp. 31–49.

Pedahzur, Ami and Canetti-Nisim, Dapna (2004), Support for Right-Wing Extremist Ideology: Socio-Economic Indicators and Socio-Psychological Mechanisms of Social Identification, *Comparative Sociology,* 3(1), Pp.1-36.

Pelinka, Anton (2001), The Haider Phenomenon in Austria: Examining the FPO in European Context, *The Journal of the International Institute,* 9(1), http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0009.102/--haider-phenomenon-in-austria-examining-the-FPÖ-in-european?rgn=main;view=fulltext

Pelizzo, Riccardo (2010), Party Direction- The Italian Case in Comparative Perspective, *Party Politics,* 16 (1), pp. 51–67.

Pick, Hella (2000), *Guilty Victim: Austria from the Holocaust to Haider,* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd)

---------- (2001), Time of Remember, *Index on Censorship,* 30, pp. 56- 61.

Pinto, Antonio Costa, Eatwell, Roger and Larsen, Stein Ugelvik (eds.) (2007), *Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe*, (London: Routledge).

Pinto, Antonio Costa (ed.) (2011), *Rethinking of Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspective*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan).

Plasser, Fritz and Ulram Peter A (2000), *The Changing Austrian Voter*, (Vienna: Signum).

'Playing with Fear', The Economist, 12 December 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21679792-america-and-europe-right-wing-populist-politicians-are-march-threat, Accessed on 20 April 2017

*Political Manifesto of Lega Nord Padania, URL- http://www.leganordromagna.org/lega-nord/programma-lega-nord.php, [Accessed on 10-10-2013].

Pollard, John (1998), *The Fascist Experience in Italy*, (New York: Routledge).

---------- (2004), 'The Many Problems and Failures of Liberal Italy Led The Establishment to Turn to Mussolini', *New Perspectives*, 9(3), pp. 28-31.

Porter, Glenn (2011), Changing Winds: An Analysis of Right-Wing Political Rhetoric, *Explorations: The UC Davis Undergraduate Research Journal*, 14, pp.1-19.

*Program of the Austrian Freedom Party, as adopted October 30, 1997, www.fpoe.at / fileadmin / ... / Partei program / Partei program _eng.pdf, Accessed on 14 June 2013.

Prowe, Diethelm (1994), 'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts, *Contemporary European History*, 3(3), Theme Issue: Race and Violence in Germany- and Europe, pp. 289-313.

Quaglia, Lucia (2003),*Euroscepticism in Italy and Centre-Right and Right Wing Political Parties*, Sussex European Institute, SEI Working Paper No: 60.

Radaelli, Claudio and Franchino, Fabio (2004), Analysing Political Change in Italy, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(6), pp. 941-953.

Raniolo, Francesco (2006) Forza Italia: A Leader with a Party, *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), 439-455.

Reyneri, E (2007), *Immigration in Italy: Trends and Perspectives*, International Organisation of Migration.

Rieker, Peter, Glaser, Michaela and Schuster, Silke (eds.) (2006), *Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism in European Perspective*, (Deutsches Jugendinstitut: Halle).

Riva, Paolo; Colombo, Monica; and Montali, Lorenzo (2008), Comparing Right and Left-Wing Discourse on Immigration: a lexical Correspondence Analysis of Italian parliamentary Debates,*9es Journées Internationales d'Analyse Statistique des Données Textuelles*, pp. 995-1007.

Rubinson, Claude and Ragin, Charles C (2007), New Methods for Comparative Research?,*Comparative Social Research*, 24, pp. 373-389.

Ruggiero, Christian (2012), Forecasting in the Politics of Spectacle, From Berlusconi to Grillo: The Narrative of Impolite Politics, *Bulletin of Italian Politics*, 4(2), pp. 305-322

Ruzza, Carlo and Fella, Stefano (2009), *Re-inventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and Post Fascism*, (London: Routledge).

Rydgren, Jens (2005), Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family, *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, pp.413–437.

---------- (2008), Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists?Radical Right-Wing Voting in Six Western European Countries, *European Journal of Political Research*, 47, pp. 737-765.

Sagar, D.J. (ed.) (2009), *Political Parties of the World (Seventh Edition)*, (London: John Harper Publishing).

Saltiel, David H., (2000) Austria: Crossroad or Roadblock in a New Europe? *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 11(2), pp. 41-58.

Salucci, Lapo (2009), The FPO and BZO against Migrants in Austrian Cities, Paper prepared for Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association on September 3-6 (2009), Toronto: Canada.

Sapelli, Giulio (1997), The Transformation of the Italian Party System, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 2(2), pp.167-187.

Sauer, Wolfgang (1967), National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?,*The American Historical Review*, 73(2), pp. 404-424.

Schain, Martin, Zolberg, Aristide andHossay, Patrick (eds.) (2002), *Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Schedler, Andreas (1996), Anti-Political-Establishment Parties, *Party Politics*, 2(3), pp. 291-312.

Schwarz, Peter, *The European Union's sanctions against Austria*, World Socialist Website, 22 February 2000, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/02/haid-f22.html, Accessed on 26 April 2016.

Semyonov, Moshe and Raijman, Rebeca (2006), The Rise of Anti-foreigner Sentiment in European Societies, 1988–2000, *American Sociological Review*, 71, pp. 426–449.

Seton-Watson Hugh (1966), Fascism, Right and Left, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1(1), pp. 183-197.

Shin, Michael E. and Agnew, John A. (2008), *Berlusconi's Italy*: *Mapping Contemporary Italian Politics*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).

Shuster, Simon, European Politics Are Swinging to the Right, *Time Magazine*, 22 September 2016 http://time.com/4504010/europe-politics-swing-right/, Accessed on 21 April 2017

Smith, Jason Matthew (2010), Does Crime Pay? Issue Ownership, Political Opportunity, and the Populist Right in Western Europe, *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(11), pp. 1471-1498.

Söderlund, Peter and Kestilä-Kekkonen, Elina (2009), Dark Side of Party Identification? An Empirical Study of Political Trust among Radical Right-Wing Voters, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 19(2), pp.159-181.

Solsten, Eric and McClave, David E. (eds.) (1993), *Austria: A Country Study*, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress).

Spanje, Joost van (2011),The Wrong and the Right: A Comparative Analysis of 'Anti-Immigration' and 'Far Right' Parties, *Government and Opposition*, 46(3), pp. 293–320.

Spektorowski, Alberto (2002), The Intellectual New Right, the European Radical Right and the Ideological Challenge to Liberal Democracy, *International Studies*, 39, pp. 165-182.

Sprague-Jones, Jessica (2011), Extreme Right-Wing Vote and Support for Multiculturalism in Europe, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(4), pp. 535-555.

Startin, Nicholas (2010) Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(4), pp.429-449.

Statham, Paul (1996), Berlusconi, the Media, and the New Right in Italy, *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 1(1), pp. 87-105.

*Statute of Lega Nord Padania, http://www.leganord.org/index.php/il-movimento/lo-statuto-della-lega-nord,Accessed on 12 May 2013.

*Statute of the People of Freedom of PopollodellaLiberta as adopted at National Council - Rome, (July 1, 2011), http://www.pdl.it/notizie/15377/statuto-del-popolo-della-liberta, Accessed on 12 May 2013.

Sternhell, Zeev, Sznajder, Mario and Asheri, Maia (Translated By David Maisel) (1994), *The Birth Of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion To Political Revolution*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).

Stockemer, Daniel and Lamontagne, Bernadette (2010), Pushed to the Edge: Determinants of Popular Support for Right Wing Extremism in Austria, *SSRN Electronic Journal*, September 2010, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228237879, Accessed on 17 June 2016

Swank, Duane and Betz, Hans Georg (2003), Globalisation, the Welfare State and the Rise of Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, *Socio-Economic Review*, 1, pp. 215-245.

Szaz, Zoltan Michael (1963), The Ideological Precursors of National Socialism, *Political Research Quarterly*, 16, pp. 924- 945.

Sznajder, Mario (1995), Italy's Right-Wing Government: Legitimacy and Criticism, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 71(1), pp. 83-102.

Tannenbaum, Edward R. (1969), The Goals of Italian Fascism, *The American Historical Review*, 74(4), pp. 1183-1204.

Tepfenhart, Mariana (2011), Right-wing Extremists in Europe, *Comparative Civilizations Review*, 65, pp. 57-72.

Tarchi, Marco (2003), The Political Culture Of The Alleanza Nazionale: An Analysis Of The Party's Programmatic Documents (1995-2002), *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 8(2), 135-181.

'The march of Europe's little Trumps', The Economist, 10 December 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21679855-xenophobic-parties-have-long-been-ostracised-mainstream-politicians-may-no-longer-be, Accessed on 20 April 2017.

The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union, CVCE, University of Luxemburg, http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/ff4dba1b-7691-48a8-b489-51393c82c951, Accessed on 27 May 2016.

Thompson, Peter (2000), Jorg Haider and the Paradoxical Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe Today, *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 8(1), pp. 9-22.

Thorpe, Julie (2010), Austro-fascism: Revisiting the 'Authoritarian State' 40 Years On, *Journal of Contemporary History,* 45(2), pp. 315–343.

Todd, Alan (2002), *TheEuropean Dictatorships: Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini*, (UK: Cambridge University Press).

Torreblancs, Jose Ignacio and Leonard, Mark, *The Remarkable Rise Of Continental Euroscepticism*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 25 April 2013, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_remarkable_rise_of_continental_euroscepticism36468, accessed on 20 December 2016.

Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law, 20th Century Right Wing Groups in Europe: Prone to extremism or terrorism?, 4 July 2008, Case Study, Work package 3 'Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society, Financed by European Commission under Sixth Framework Plan.

Triandafyllidou, Anna and Gropas, Ruby (2007), *European Immigration: a Source book*, (England: Ashgate).

Turner-Graham, Emily (2008), "Austria First": H.C. Strache, Austrian identity and the current politics of Austria's Freedom Party, *Studies in Language & Capitalism*, 3(4), pp. 181–198.

Vasilopolou, Sofia (2009), Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the EuropeanExtreme Right, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 5(1), pp. 3-23.

Verney, Susannah (ed.) (2012), *Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A Diachronic Perspective,* (Oxon:Routledge).

Vujacæicv, Veljko (2003), From Class to Nation: Left, Right, and the Ideological and Institutional Roots of Post-Communist "National Socialism", *East European Politics and Societies*, 17(3), pp. 359–392.

Wanrooij, Bruno (1987),The Rise and Fall of Italian Fascism as a Generational Revolt, *Journal of Contemporary History,* 22, pp. 401- 418.

Wagner, Ulrich, van Dick, Rolf, Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Christ, Oliver (2003), Ethnic Prejudice in East and West Germany: The Explanatory Power of Intergroup Contact, *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,* 6(1), pp. 22–36.

Werts, Han, Scheepers, Peer and Lubbers, Marcel (2013), Euro-Scepticism and Radical Right-Wing Voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social Cleavages, Socio-Political Attitudes and Contextual Characteristics Determining Voting for the Radical Right, *European Union Politics*, 14, pp. 183-205.

White, Jonathan (2012), Community, Trans-Nationalism, and the Left-Right Metaphor, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 15(2), pp. 197–219.

Widmer, Thomas, Blaser, Cornelia and Falk, Chantal (2007), Evaluating Measures Taken against Right-Wing Extremism, *Evaluation,* 13(2), pp. 221-239.

Wilkes, Rima; Guppy, Neil; and Farris, Lily (2007), Right-Wing Parties and Anti-foreigner Sentiment in Europe**,** *American Sociological Review,* 72, pp.831-840.

*Wilson, Robin and Hainsworth, Paul (2012), *Far Right Parties and Discourse in Europe: challenge to our time,* European Network against Racism, Brussels.

Williams, Michelle Hale (2006), *The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

---------- (2013), Tipping the Balance Scale? Rightward Momentum, Party Agency and Austrian Party Politics, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21(1) (2013), pp.68-86.

Wodak, Ruth and Richardson, John E. (2009), On the Politics of Remembering (or Not), *Critical Discourse Studies*, 6(4), pp.231-235.

Wolff, Elisabetta Cassina (2012), *Berlusconi's Attempt to Reform the Italian Constitution: Rehearsal of New (Post-modern) Authoritarian Politics or Same Old Habit*?, Paper prepared for the One-day conference, *Silvio Berlusconi and Post-modern Politics,* University of Birmingham, 14 December 2012

Wüstenberg, Jenny and Art, David (2008), Using the Past in the Nazi Successor States from 1945 to the Present, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 617, pp. 72-87.

Yilmaz, Ferruh (2012), Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe, *Current Sociology*, 60(3), pp. 368–381.

Zaslove, Andrej (2004), "Closing the Door?" -The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(1), pp. 99-118.

---------- (2004) The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right, *Journal of European Integration*, 26(1), pp. 61-81.

---------- (2006) The Politics of Immigration- a New Electoral Dilemma for the Right and the Left?,*Review of European and Russian Affairs*, 2(3), pp. 10-36.

---------- (2008), Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type, *European Review,* 16(3), pp. 319–336

Zhirkov, Kirill (2014), Nativist but not Alienated: A Comparative Perspective on the Radical Right vote in Western Europe, *Party Politics*, 20, pp. 286-296.

Zincone, Giovanna (2006), The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32(3), pp. 347-375.