

Politics of American Arms-Transfers to Pakistan 1980 – 86

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



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Certified that the dissertation entitled "Politics of American Arms Transfers to Pakistan - 1980-86", submitted by Anjana Sinha in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University is her own work and has not been submitted previously in any University for the award of this or any other degree. We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.




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
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I N T R O D U C T I O N

INTRODUCTION

The global balance of power functions essentially at three fundamental planes : firstly, in approximate parity of the strategic nuclear potential between the two super powers - the USA and the USSR. Secondly, in rough equivalence of conventional and nuclear strength between the NATO, the WTO in Europe, and finally, in the rest of the world in primarily regional patterns of force; where the competing super powers operate/act within the accepted sphere of influence to keep manifest frictions and conflicts contained within the specific regional arena. This phenomenon of containing escalation and de-escalation of frictions at one level and the military might/force projection of the competing powers at another for the same purpose of 'control-strategy' entails involving tremendous military, naval and airforce capability of the powers at these regional theatres of prospective wars or conflicts. As international relations would have it, both the super powers cannot on pure discretion exercise this prerogative or function of their foreign policies in any or every part of the globe.

Both the super powers, since the second world war have developed accessibility with various states (countries)

in the world based on their economic, military and political policies towards these countries. Dispersed in the various parts of the globe these nations have been utilised by the super powers to serve their strategic, economic and political interests across the world and in so doing, maintain the equilibrium of power. While some of these states have actually become surrogates of the super powers; some have chosen only to participate in consonance with their super powers' policies and strategic-action plans for various reasons, which remains away from the purview of our study. And this dimension of international politics is as integral to the functioning of Soviet foreign policy as to that of the United States of America.

It is in this context that one of the major dimensions of the foreign policy of the United States of America in the recent years has been its defence policy of transferring by way of donating and selling weapons systems, arms and defence requirements to the countries in various parts of the world especially in the continents of Asia and Africa. Arms transfers as an instrument of maintaining a proportionate influence on the recipient's

political and strategic components of foreign policy
has been an integral aspect of American foreign policy
and diplomacy. In fact, it is axiomatic in the American
 perception of foreign assistance programme and weapons
 transfer that these are necessarily transacted in the
 backdrop of international environment of the East-West
 confrontation; in which the recipients' perspective and
security requirements are peripheral and only ancillary to
the criterion of transaction. However, the interests and
conditionalities of the recipient are not excluded or
adverse from the specific arms and defence deal.

This trend of transferring arms; primarily, to
 the third world has been systematically pursued in the
West Asian and the South Asian region arduously, in lieu
of the vital and multifarious American interests in
the region. American arms have been making their way
 into the region since the 50's when the CENTO and the
SEATO alliances were forged between the United States on
one hand, the countries belonging to the respective
regions on the other.

But this policy has witnessed tumultuous fluctua-
 tions especially in the South Asian region when as way
 back as 1962 and then in 1965, 1970 and then 1977 when
either weapons were supplied to India and other countries

in the region besides Pakistan (a signatory of MDAP) -
(Mutual Defence Agreement Pact 1954) - or an embargo was
placed on the total military supplies to the region
following an intra-regional conflict. Similar dilemmatic
situation was faced by American policy makers and US
policy in 1967 and 1973, when having guaranteed the
sovereignty and security of Israel, the US military
equation (as a fall out of the diplomatic rapport) faced
a low point with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf;
which were recipients of American military and economic
aid as well as hardware. Nevertheless, the South West

Asian states due to their geostrategic viability vis-a-
vis American strategic perspective remained staple military
allies of the United States and the latter ensured the
same in more ways than one.

However, the cataclysmic events of 1978-79 altered
the regional as well as international environment
irrevocably for the United States. Saudi Arabia and Iran
which were considered as 'twin-pillars' of American
strategy after the enunciation of the Guam doctrine of
Richard Nixon in 1969 and were equally developed,
similarly were lost. Their complementary role of preserving
and protecting American and allied interests in the region

as well as '...staving off and containing radical challenges that had emerged in the Gulf, such as those from South Yemen and the Dhofar region of Oman...' ¹ had been disaligned -- a loss irredeemable for the United States. The latter event was closely followed by what is very partisanly either termed the 'aggressive invasion' ² or the 'protective interdiction' ³ of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. To Washington, this event reiterated the growing sense of losing ground, credibility and the increasing threat to its interests and its allies in the region. Further, it was a Soviet challenge to deteriorating American access in the region. Moreover, even the Carter administration had to recognise the fact that at the regional level the Soviet action would raise questions of American credibility and Soviet expansionism ⁴. In January 1980, came the Carter Doctrine announcing that, "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including

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- 1 Mohammed Ayoob, "Perspectives from the Gulf Regime Security or Regional Security", in Donald Hugh Mcmillen, ed., Asian Perspectives in International Security (London, 1984), p.101.
 - 2 Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation (New York), p.5.
 - 3 Ibid.
 - 4 International Herald Tribune (Singapore), 19 April 1980, p.1.

military force."⁵

Inevitably, the advent of the 80's coinciding with that of the Reagan administration has been interspersed with important improvisations in American policy of arms transfers vis-a-vis the South West Asian and South Asian region. That in the 80's the world has witnessed a growing nexus between US, Pakistan and China -- all participating in the containment of the Soviet Union's overtures in Asia specific, and the world at large; is a matter of no controversy. That Pakistan, as the Nixon-Kissinger phase has once again become a lever of American strategy in the region is also apparent. However, what beholds a spectator of international politics is the emergence of an almost independent US-Pak 'mutual influence' linkage emanating more forcefully wherein Pakistan is emerging as an 'accepted ally' of the United States in South Asia.

This development is tangibly synonymous with the beginning of the 80's and of Reagan administration taking

5 President Carter's broadcast on 3-4 January, 1980; the transcript of which was published in the New York Times, 5 January, 1980.

over change in Washington. Pakistan has been integrated into the American 'strategic-security calculus'. However, to analyse the political imperatives and such other variables which have led to the 'arming of Pakistan' will be the endeavour of this research. ✓

Thus, the transfer of weapons and other defense requisites from the United States to Pakistan in the 80's as a major focal shift in the American defence policy which itself has been the result of a shift in the US/American political and strategic perception, will form the problematic of the research. ✓

The primary purpose of this research is to attempt an understanding of the motivations, issues and perceptions involved in the US foreign policy perspective which has led the latter to pursue Pakistan as a 'frontline' ally in the region. The fundamental question will be - why? in what conjunction of international circumstance did the United States embark upon Pakistan and not any other country in and around the region as a 'bulwark' via which it could and would extend its strategic consensus to the South West Asian and South Asian region, which would encompass the Persian Gulf as well as the question of the Indian Ocean simultaneously.

Together with the causation-analysis of the trend of arms transfer as different from the previous years, the research will also entail the various ramifications of such a phenomenon in Pakistan and the political and strategic environment contiguous to it.

The inference analysis will be examined and studied against the historical backdrop of American-Pakistani defence and military relations with special emphasis on the politico-strategic requisites and perceptions of the United States of America vis-a-vis the region. The time duration, strictly followed will be from 1980 to 1986; however, for the purposes of building a coherent historical perspective and discursive strain to the research - 1978-79 will be more than often referred to as a reference for the context of the dissertation.

Chapter - I

ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
US FOREIGN POLICY

Chapter - I

ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY

Acquiring arms was one of man's arduously pursued and valued endeavours even during the times of his most primitive existence. Arms seems to have assured him of his strength and security and also gave him the power and confidence to influence and dominate others. Man's long-spread evolutionary transformation from his primordial existence to a 'modern' and civilised world, however, has not brought any change of fundamentals vis-a-vis his instincts for security, survival and domination, or in the manifestations of such instincts through the endeavours to acquire arms and wield influence and hegemony through the same. However, a new dimension of the same aspect i.e. acquisition of arms -- is the transfer of arms which has acquired similar implications in an unprecedented fashion. Especially since the onset of the cold war. To put in the words of Andrew J. Pierre, "They are now major strands in the warp and woof and of world politics", and are, "...far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationship or an arms control challenge".¹ Arms transfers impinge on foreign policy,

1 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, N.J., 1982), p.23.


national interests and security network, besides the defense policy and the military-industrial complex of the nations involved.

More than any other single factor, apart from the national initiative/interests and aspirations within the nations of the developing world (also referred mostly as the third world), the struggle for power and dominance amongst the super powers and their respective allies has had far-reaching implications in this part of the world in the context of arms transfers vis-a-vis their arms build-up resulting primarily from the acquisition of arms from super power blocs.² The pattern and trend has been on the following model primarily :-

Where the developing country A acquires arms from the super power country S to counter a rival developing country/neighbour B; which to counterveil the threat acquires arms from the other super power R and the interests of the latter and S are to prop up

2 S.D.Muni, Arms Build-Up and Development : Linkages in the Third World (Australia, 1983), pp.33, 35-36.

their allies in the respective region/quadrant to counter each other and maintain their security network and the global balance.



This is of course a very reductionist understanding of the phenomenon. But the underpinnings of the 'moves' are broadly within this model.

Prior to a discussion of politics of American arms transfers to Pakistan between the period 1980-86 it is necessary to define the term - 'Arms transfers'. The term is commonly used in the context of all forms of arms transactions between the supplier and recipient countries respectively, whether they are in form of (a) grant, (b) credit or (c) cash. To quote Prof.S.D. Muni, "Arms transactions take place in the form of grants-in-aid as well as hard commercial sales. Together they constitute arms transfers or arms trade".³ However,

3 Ibid., p.23.

arms transfers are no ordinary commercial operations. This is unique in its characteristic; inasmuch as, that the *raison d'être* for the governments can never be absolutely and simply the maximisation of profits, as is the case of conventional transactions which involves purely economic and commercial incentives on the part of the supplier. This exclusivity of arms transfers lies in the intrinsic potential of weapons which necessitates a broad convergence of interests between parties to the transaction and to the prospective recipient country and its foreign policy *vis-a-vis* the supplier before entering into any sort of an arms deal involving transferring of arms to the country in question. Therefore, any arms transfer entails significant political ramifications. Hence the governments find it imperative in their own national interest to regulate both the quantity and the quality of weapons they sell/grant or lease on credit to the recipient.

Arms transfers, therefore, should be analysed and perceived essentially in political terms.⁴ They are

4 Pierre, n.1, p.3.

as a consequence enmeshed in intensely complex foreign policy and politico-strategic considerations/policies. Mr. Henry Kuss, known as the chief salesman of American weapons in the 1960's asserted that, the arms transfers as a 'tool has become increasingly a major tool of government diplomacy in the area of international security".⁵ For instance, a country A transferring weapons to another country B would not do so (despite economic and commercial viability) if the latter was its adversary if it was an ally of an adversary or again if it could be an apprehended adversary to country C which happened to be an ally of country A. Similarly country A would be obliged to arm as an ally country B if an adversary B was proving imminently aggressive or if an ally country of A was being threatened by its adversary, A would like to transfer arms at least (if not help directly) to its ally pre-empt a probable threat or counter it, if required.

5 "Speech of Henry Kuss at the Foreign Military Sales Pricing Conference", 25-26 May 1966", in John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms (London, 1972), p.9.

There has been a substantial rise of such transactions from great powers to the Third World after the Second World War, though it remained largely unnoticed until the seventies.⁶ To understand this unprecedented trend and the reasons behind it, one will have to delve into the dynamics of and co-relation between 'arms and influence'. The phrase picked up from the title of Thomas Schelling's book, on the same subject needs a brief explanation.

An influence relationship which may not necessarily be a mutual one emerges between the two countries which have been giving/selling and receiving/buying arms respectively. The country which happens to be the giver/supplier of the arms has more often than not, the ascendance in the relationship, whereby the latter has the privilege of exercising influence or 'leverage' over the recipient/buyer nation. Drawing analogy from the economic-sphere -- the whole transaction and equation is a la' the 'seller's market', wherein all the initiative as well as privilege is that of the sellers'. As already

6 Muni, n.2, p.25.

mentioned arms transfers are done not only at the level of hard commercial sales but also in terms of grant-in-aid. Therefore, the supplier/donor is in a position -- of advantage to dictate terms and conditions which can influence the recipient countries' policies and attitudes. However, at all times, the capacity to 'influence' is not a direct fall-out of an arms transfer.

Nevertheless, since the rationale involving arms transfers are manifold and distinctive from that of any other commodity-transfer; it would be enlightening to broadly discuss the same for a better and lucid understanding of the actual discourse on arms transfers.

A major political *raison d'etre* is the possibility and the viability of influence the supplier gains in the dealing with the recipient nation. To quote Andrew J. Pierre, "Arms can be an important symbol of support and friendly relations and thereby create influence".⁷ For instance 'Moscow sold weapons to Peru on a long-term low-interest basis in order to establish a base of influence

7. Pierre, n.1, p.14.

in South America. American arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been justified by the need to maintain a 'special relationship' with that country".⁸

However, the most significant anticipated outcome of the transfer of arms is the 'leverage' the donor/supplier country may exercise over the recipient/buyer country's foreign policy. This is because arms generally provide the means of access to the political and military elite of the buyer/recipient country. In most cases what occurs as a follow-up of the arms deal is that military personnel or defence department officials are sent to the recipient country for the advice and assistance required by the latter and in so doing they very imperceptibly influence the defense or related foreign policy issues. To quote Tariq Ali, to substantiate my statement :

In February 1954, USMAAG (United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group) was set up in the army HQ of Rawalpindi as Pakistan's domestic and external

8 Ibid., p.15.

policies had by then become largely subservient to the US interests, few politicians were now bothered by the fact that there was now a direct link between the army chiefs and the Pentagon.⁹

This, of course, was after the Executive Agreement of 1954 between the US and Pakistan was signed. Yet, there is no set equation of influence and leverage vis-a-vis arms transfers. In fact there have been exceptionally piquant situations where arms transfers have made the supplier hostage to the recipient. A report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1976; noted that American arms sales to Iran had inadvertently led to the US commitment to support 'those' weapons. What had happened was that United States could not abandon its arms support deals and activities at that point of time without invoking a major crisis in US-Iran relations and such a crisis could then have affected the oil supply¹⁰ to the US. The United States was placed in such a circumstance that, "If Iran had become involved in a war then, it would have been difficult to

9 T.Ali, Can Pak Survive: The Death of a State (London, 1983), p.67.

10 Pierre, n.1, p.18.

keep American personnel uninvolved".¹¹ Andrew J. Pierre define this dimension of arms-transfer as 'reverse-leverage' which will be discussed in the context of this particular discourse also.

Another reason for transfer of arms is to provide for security requirements of allies and friends. This explains the arms transfer patterns within the NATO or Warsaw Pacts. In fact during the 1970's within the purview of the Nixon doctrine, transfer of weapons was justified as a replacement for direct presence of American personnel. Similarly, the Soviet Union has been assisting Somalia, Syria, North Vietnam and Cuba with weapons for their alleged security purposes. Mere security of the recipient perse, can very rarely be the complete or the absolute rationale for transferring arms. What goes with it, is the perception of global balance from the perspective of the supplier as the donor. Very often the regional environment of the recipient becomes a very important motivating variable for the arms transfers. Therefore, apart from providing security for

11 Ibid.

the recipient, the arms transfers have the 'security-extension' of the supplier/donor also implicit in its rationale; for the purpose of 'regional balance of power'. ✓
This has been most evident in West Asia where to sustain East-West balance of power the Arab-Israeli conflict and their respective security concerns of the parties to this conflict have been projected as super powers rationale for arms transfers.

The reasons are, of course, many more for arms transactions. But before elaborating further on them, a slight explanation seems apt at this moment. The rationales for arms transfers have two aspects: the first is ostensible rationale and the second is the implicit rationale. The ostensible rationale for the supply of transfer of weapons or arms is what is in the public domain. Then there is the implicit rationale which is not articulated in the public. For instance a supplier/donor nation may be transferring arms with the implicit rationale of creating a military base in the recipient country through professing security concerns of the recipient nation alone. The United States acquired base rights in Ethiopia and Libya and naval facilities in

Spain and Philippines on such an understanding. There have been several cases of the establishment of a military naval base in exchange of arms transfers. In fact, after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Washington promised and supplied arms to Somalia, Oman and Kenya in exchange for access to bases. Another peripheral reason which, however, remains absolutely implicit (and the statement itself is based purely on assumption) is the likelihood of testing the arms and their potential on another soil. ✓


Arms sales are seen as an excellent means to create economies of scale, thereby reducing the per unit costs of arms to be manufactured for the supplier country. They are also ways of spreading out and recouping the expenditure in research and development. They are also to provide substantial employment in the defence industries.¹² But the question of economic motivations and the military industrial complex can be answered partially by arms sales.¹³ This leaves the assistance programme like grants-in-aid, lease or sheer gifting away part of arms transaction out of this explanation.

12 Michael Klare, The American Arms Super Market (Austin, Texas), 1984, p.281.

13 Anthony Sampson, Arms Bazaar : The Companies, The Dealers, the Bribes from Vickers to Lockheed (London, 1977), pp.168, 207.

The rationale which very often are talked about by western critics are a) protection of Human Rights; b) prevention of nuclear proliferation; c) standardisation of weapons capability amongst alliance.¹⁴ These reasons, however, appealing to the justification of transfer of weapons have very scarce statistical data in its support.

What goes without saying, however, is that, arms transfers have simply become one aspect of the accepted means through which the donor and the recipient states their foreign relations. The political orientation of an arms importing country can be approximated from the make of the weaponry it imports. Likewise the 'arms-supply' of an exporter state are likely to be regarded as deductive evidence of its ideological and more often strategic inclinations. The supplier-recipient nexus is mostly set against this background of international politics.



Chapter - II

**US FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS TRANSFERS
- THE HISTORY OF US-PAK NEXUS**

Chapter - II

US FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS TRANSFERS - THE HISTORY OF US-PAK NEXUS

The primary purpose of this chapter will be to review the American foreign policy imperatives and how certain regions and countries are considered vital to American security. The place of arms transfers as instruments within this strategic equation of American foreign policy will be analysed and the US-Pak military nexus will be explored in some detail.

The United States and the Soviet Union carved out their spheres of influence which resulted in a bipolar world. However, military superiority alone was not sufficient for the status of the either super power. Military prowess supplemented by the economic and political strength was the determinant of the same. Market avenues, access to energy resources and raw materials, control over communication linkages around the globe became essential ingredients of the cold war. Ideology played its part in the consolidation of the two blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. In this global struggle military strength in itself became a determinant of power in world politics. The

nuclear arsenal came to be treated as a singular entity of power. But conventional military capability came to acquire an added significance more so, after the western as well as Soviet strategic analysts acknowledged that nuclear capability at best could and ought to be utilised for the purposes of 'deterrence'. Therefore, while the actual use of nuclear weapons was conceptually ruled out, these very strategic analysts had to take account of the possible military confrontation in the future. Thus the demonstration of a conventional war fighting and war winning capacity was to be syncretised with commensurate military arsenal and network - once again at a global level.

Therefore, for the purpose of preserving ^{the}/US interests the world over, an international security network comprising regions in the various quadrants of the globe were to be strategically and militarily 'involved'. At the macro level this security network was to be such as to encompass American security as well as strength across the world - thereby maintaining its hegemony. Through different points across the globe American military and defense capability had to be established and demonstrated so that areas and regions which could be prospective battlefields

or battle oceans be within a strategic consensus and accessible to American strategic control. Therefore, a quadrantal strategical perception of the United States was to be directly co-related to her foreign and defense policy. Within this structural framework regional 'locales' were to be established from where American defence policies at the global as well as the local level could be executed.

For the creation of these regional locales - in the parlance of international relations 'regimes' --- the United States adopted various methods, whereby states in particular regions could provide access to American force projection. Port facilities to the American navy, providing for the use of air-space for reconnaissance and surveillance purpose or the use of land territory for military base; had to be organised. While these are very direct methods of expediting global strategy at regional levels; there are also indirect or rather subtle methods of pursuing the same goal. Military aid happens to be one such viable means through which the donor has the 'gradient'¹ equation in its

1 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan : The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York, 1982), p.86.

~~favour which is a function of American foreign policy.~~

Arms transfers have been used in these ways to increase American influence and leverage. This perception and understanding of American administration has been reaffirmed as recently as in 1981 when the Secretary of Defence - Harold Brown in a report to the Congress described the significance of arms transfer as follows...

'In the present international and political security environment, security assistance serves the American interest by strengthening the ability of our allies and friends...by assisting other nations in meeting their defence needs; we in turn strengthen our own 'security'.²

In the purview of security requirements mentioned earlier in this chapter - arms transfers are foreign policy implements to expedite security levels of the supplier directly or indirectly. Although national security involves a spectrum of issues broader than just weapons transfers the latter goes in significantly towards pursuing security consensus of the United States

2 See Report of the Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown to the Congress 1981, p.221, in George G. Quester, American Foreign Policy : The Lost Consensus (New York, 1982), p.111.

of America. There is no gainsaying that US does have 'vital' economic, political and security interests in the various parts of the world towards maintenance of the equilibrium of power. By means of transferring weapons to different countries situated in the various quadrants of the globe, which figure in the ambit of American security matrix favourably, it ensures its strength, through 'influence'.

This foreign policy tool has been used by the United States of America since 1954-55. In the wake of the Korean war the Mutual Security Act was promulgated. This provided the legislative umbrella under which military assistance was proffered until it was replaced by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.³ Under the latter a provision for MAP (Mutual Assistance Programme) was provided for, through which recipient countries were provided articles, defence services and training.⁴ The Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP) served till the mid 1970's as the principal mechanism and legislative conduit of transferring weapons from the United States to various parts of the world. All assistance was in the form of

3 Quester, n.2, p.119.

4 Ibid.

'grant-in-aid' which required no payments on the part of the recipient.⁵ Obviously, it goes without mentioning, that such 'investments' with no monetary/pecuniary returns could not possibly have been propelled by humanitarian impulses of a super power and such 'assistance' under the MAP was to augment the political and strategic stakes and interests of the United States. Then there was the International military and training programme which was initiated during the Carter Administration - 1976 which provisioned for the probation and training of the military personnel of the recipient countries. And, of course, there was the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which accounted for more than 40 per cent of weapons transfer from the United States. In fact in the fiscal year 1980, the military transaction under the Foreign Military Sales accounted for as much as 88 per cent of the \$ 17.4 billion military transaction of the United States.⁶

5 Andrew J. Pierre, Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982), p.43.

6 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1980-81.

While the piece d' resistance of arms transfer; whether in a sales, grant or whatever means, is to add to the strength of the recipient/allies and therefore enhance the American security nexus, there are certain other fringe benefits accruing peripherally to the United States of America. Much of the equipment which goes out of the ~~United States of America~~ is of such degree of sophistication that the recipient country is not in a position to handle it on its own without the supervision and assistance from the supplier country. This provides enough justification for sending out technical support teams to the recipient nation. These teams or 'task-forces' might by the virtue of their indispensibility, exercise effective control of the combat use to which the weapons are put. Thus the United States indirectly exercises a measure of control through its 'assistance programme'. Moreover these 'technicians' very often alluded to as 'attaches' who invariably follow a shipment of arms provide an indirect means through which the United States exercises considerable control over the military and defence policy of its client. ~~Thus the~~ immediate outcome to the supplier country in transferring arms is that it adds to the military strength of its

friends and minimises the recipient nations' 'adverse' orientation or hostile approach, towards the supplier nation.

Moreover, a substantial number of major arms transfer via aid from the United States are accompanied with training programmes through which the latter endeavours to closely integrate members of its defence personnel with that of the 'key' members of the recipient countries.⁷ The implicit idea behind such programme is to integrate American personnel in the administrative echelons of defence department in a manner whereby these personnel can exercise influence and to an extent as far as possible - control the recipients defence and military postures.

In any case nations, especially the super powers with global commitments and interests are secretive about the details of the quid pro quo involved in any kind of aid. In the instance of arms aid via 'transfers', the quid pro quo may involve and entail base facilities; staging posts facilities, overflying rights or similar

⁷ Pierre, n.5, pp.45-46.

strategic military concessions.⁸ In fact, the United States does provide 'official' indication of the correlation between arms transfers and its foreign base rights - in its financial allocation made under her military assistance programme for 'Basic Rights'. It says that the latter '...shall be provided for...' i.e.⁹ military assistance of all kinds, which will include arms transfers also; will be given to all those countries in which the United States has access to bases and installations essential to optimal deployment of US military strength.¹⁰

The story of American arms transfer to Pakistan began almost four decades ago. Instead of a specific agreement on the subject, there was a beginning of 'military assistance' which in itself was only a small part of 'Technical Assistance'. American assistance to Pakistan had started as way back as in December 1950,¹¹

8 Ingemar Dorfer, "Arms Deals : When, Why and How?" in Stephanie G. Neuman and Rogert E. Harkavy, eds., Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York, 1980), p.202.

9 John Stanley & Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms (London, 1972), p.76.

10 Ibid.

11 Kheli, n.1, p.2.

When President Truman initiated the 'Point Four' technical assistance agreement with Pakistan. The equation was furthered when in February 1952 the United States provided economic assistance to Pakistan as 'defense support'. However, it was not until 1954 (March) when General Hary Meyerss visited Pakistan and the Mutual Defense Agreement was signed between the two countries on 19 May 1954. The latter culminated in the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. A military and strategic nexus between Pakistan and the United States had been established by the end of 1954. Of course, the defence experts, the diplomats and strategic advisors were not humanitarians to have simply proferred the same to Pakistan without any returns. In the wake of the beginning of 'aid' per se, a report of the Committee on Foreign Relations dated 12th March 1957 of Washington laid down in black and white the underpinnings of any and all kinds of aid. ✓

Technical aid is not something to be done as a government enterprise...the US government is not a charitable institution, nor is it an appropriate outlet for the charitable spirit of the American people... ✓

Assistance is only one of a number of instruments available to the US to carry out its foreign policy and to promote its national interests abroad...these tools...include economic aid, military assistance, security treaties...(12)

As a matter of reality, the 'aid' programme at large was embarked upon by the United States of America in a world situation characterised by cold war stalemate in Europe and '...developing colonial revolution in Asia and Africa'.¹³ The refusal of India and Afghanistan to deviate from what Nehru defined as 'nonalignment' and the West as 'hostile neutrality', added to the geopolitical importance of Pakistan in the Asian region. No wonder John Foster Dulles remarked while talking about regional security, that Pakistan was "...a bulwark of freedom in Asia".¹⁴ There was a quid pro quo built into this relationship i.e. arms for Pakistan in return for Pakistani access to US sponsored military alliances. What needs to be additionally mentioned is the fact that Pakistan's consent to join these alliances was based on diverse

12 Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive ? The Death of a State (London, 1983), p.57 (Technical Assistance : Final Report of Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, 12 March 1957).

13 Ibid.

14 John Foster Dulles Papers, Part 9 (Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960).

strategic perceptions.¹⁵ While the distinct understanding of the United States was the containment of communist expansion represented by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as the *raison d'être* of these agreements, Pakistan's rationale was primarily to neutralise Indian military superiority and upgrade its own defence and military capabilities.

At the initial moment of the defence equation 'given the weakness of Pakistani defense establishment, and the country's faltering economy, American preponderance in the partnership was inevitable. In the American scheme of things Pakistan was worth cultivating only because it offered a "centrally positioned landing site", for possible operations against the USSR and China.'¹⁶

Such were the national perceptions of the United States and Pakistan, when the military nexus was first established. However, while immediately after independence, Pakistan perceived the need of beefing up its military

15 M.S.Venkatramani, The United States Role in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1982), p.27.

16 Kheli, n.1, p.4.

and defence capability and actually tried to procure US arms, particularly ammunition which was retained by the British, right from 'infantry anti-tank projectiles stenguns magazines...grenades and signalling material,¹⁷ To smoke cartridges of 35 mm and 75 mm calibre and various types of ammunition and even light tanks (M-24) (F-24),¹⁸ Pakistan lobbied for its transfers with 'national integrity' and 'security' as the reasons for the same. This particular demand could not be met for two reasons. The United States as early as 1947-48 had not yet finalised its assessment of the prospective role of Pakistan (or for that matter India) in its foreign and strategic affairs. In fact at that moment of international juncture India appeared the most plausible 'ally' in the Indian subcontinent. The second reason, being that a probable military confrontation between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir seemed imminent which kept the United States away from acceding to the Pakistani request. The Pakistani request was turned down and the State department declared : 'It was

17 M.S.Venkataramani, n.15, p.49.

18 Ibid., p.81.

obvious from this approach that Pakistan was thinking in terms of the US as a primary source of military strength and since this would involve virtual US military responsibility for the new dominion, our reply to the Pakistani request was negative.¹⁹ Nevertheless, simultaneously the United States was strategically assessing the possibilities of Pakistan as the military and defence ally in the region.

Policy makers and defence analysts in the US were formulating a coherent line of functioning and policy vis-a-vis Pakistan on a diplomatic as well as strategic plane. Various ideas and themes emerged out of the formulation and the most significant were a) a realisation on the part of the US, of having erroneously speculated of clinching a similar equation with India; b) that Pakistan actually was a considerably populous state (the East and the West inclusive) flanked on both sides of India (a very unique international situation) and very notable geostrategically, as far as control and access to

¹⁹ Ibid., p.21.

the Asian mainland was concerned; c) that Pakistan with a population of 70 million happened to be the largest Muslim country in South west and South Asian region of the world, and enjoyed more leverage with the rich Muslim countries purely on ground of religious fraternity and d) Pakistan's proximity and its existence like a bridge between South West Asia and South Asia was a very advantageous geostrategic factor which the United States could use in the pursuit of its global objectives.

These considerations influenced the American initiative to establish a formal security equation with Pakistan. The intensification of the cold war, of course, hurried the basic framework within which the initiative was taken. 1954 was the year, when in May, the Mutual Defence Agreement was signed and in September, the SEATO was established. Thus, the American policy towards South-west and South-Asia concretised in this Pakistani partnership. The first consignment of arms and military equipment was sent to Pakistan. Though the arms supplied within the aegis of SEATO could be used only against a communist aggression persistent pressure by Ayub Khan resulted in the deletion of the particular provision so that American military equipment transferred under the auspices of SEATO

could be used by Pakistan in case of a military conflict with India.²⁰ So 1954 was the beginning of a distinct defence relationship evolving between US and Pakistan. Pakistan's primary objective to neutralise Indian military superiority and to establish a military balance in its own favour in South Asia. ✓

The American security perception was different. Pakistan's geographical location in proximity to the Soviet Union made it vulnerable to the Communist infiltration. It was, therefore, necessary to have Pakistan as the "cordon Sanitare".²¹ MDAP quantitatively realigned the political situation and power equation in the Indian subcontinent. In the wake of this agreement emerged the weapons nexus between the United States and Pakistan. The SEATO made the nexus more substantial. This military alignment of the United States and Pakistan immediately portended a local arms race between India and Pakistan. This the United States was willing to overlook, precisely because this pact served the 'larger' and 'greater' interests and the more basic rationale of the United States in terms of ✓

20 Kheli, n.1, p.4.

21 Ibid., p.7.

military bases which would be used against the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Containment of India was another objective served through the US-Pakistani nexus.

The US arms transaction and military aid was obviously to serve the long term interests of the United States of America, both geo-strategic and politico-economic. The plea that MDAP was to contain communism, was a camouflage. The American motivations behind this military assistance, as in many cases, was to tighten its own security, and establish linkages with the emerging military, political-bureaucratic elites of Pakistan. The fragile democratic polity of Pakistan became a casualty and the Pakistani armed forces emerged as the new rulers for whom the United States supplied military equipments. This became a major instrument for the consolidation of their power. The United States in turn consolidated its hold over the new rulers by pandering to their military demands in return of military facilities and other similar concessions, needed for its geostrategic interests.

Moreover, with the transfer of weapons and military assistance the United States was able to dictate terms and conditions to Pakistan which, if violated could result in the suspension of the US military assistance. This

happened during and immediately after the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965 and 1971. Such suspension had serious consequences in terms of domestic politics of Pakistan. A democratically elected government could withstand such pressure but a military-ruling elite depend on the unimpeded supply of military hardware for its survival. This vulnerability of the Pakistani regime was the gradient of influence which the United States cashed in through the means of transfers of weapons and military aid. (A classic example of supplier-recipient nexus). The US soon acquired an air-base and reconnaissance facility in Peshawar. One cannot accurately account for the quantum of arms acquisition (due to the confidentiality of documents and data) by Pakistan from the US but a certain insight into the type and quality of weapons provided can be assessed from the statement of Senator Chanez's in his report in the Committee on Appropriation :

Pakistan is being furnished equipment and material consisting and not limited to naval ships....jet aircraft, artillery, ammunition, technical publications, electric (including radar) equipment and training aids. The construction programme has improved air-fields and provided supply depots, maintenance ships...which add to the capability of Pakistan's military forces. (22)

In fact from the period 1953-58 --- 36 Vickers Attackers VR-F1, 26 Martin Canberra USA (B-57B), 10 Lockheed T-33A (USA), 120 NAF-86F Sahra (USA) 1 coastal sweeper, 1 Ting, 1 fight cruiser (Aido) Laval vessels were transferred to Pakistan besides artillery and armoured vehicle etc.²³

It goes without saying that the United States having committed and actually transferred arms defence equipments on such a large scale; which amounted to \$ 290 million would not have done so without any bargain commensurate to the 'transfers'.²⁴ In February 1954 the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (US/MAAG) was set up with its headquarters at Rawalpindi. A month later the United States Pakistan signed the Mutual Aid and Security Agreement which provided access to the US personnel into the Pakistani army. In September 1954 the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was founded, whose main aim was to contain Chinese communism. Exactly a year later, Baghdad Pact christened Central Treaty Organization

23 Michael Brzoska & Thomas Ohlson, "Arms Transfers to the Third World", SIPRI -1971-1985 (1981).

24 Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures & Arms Transfers, 1953-1963.

and later CENTO was established. Pakistan's membership of the two military alliances sponsored by the United States made it subservient to US policies in two widely separated regions of Asia. The underlying intention of integrating Pakistan into these 'security' arrangements was to utilise the latter as a viable operating base in the region. Membership of these arrangements facilitated arms transfers to Pakistan. It received approximately \$ 1.5 billion worth of military aid between the period 1954-65. 'According to Leo E. Rose, the US gave from 1954 to 1965 military grant assistance amounting to 650 million, defence support assistance valued at \$ 619 million and cash and commercial basis purchases amounting to approximately \$ 55 million'.²⁵

The peak of American arms transfers was witnessed in the period 1954-62 (just before the Sino-Indian conflict). During this period M-47 (Tanks), M-48 (Tanks) plus the B-57 light bombers (aircrafts) were supplied to Pakistan in considerable numbers. Surely and steadily the American acquired a military base and surveillance centre for themselves near Peshawar in 1959 as a quid pro quo to their arms transfers into Pakistan. With the

²⁵ Abha Dixit, "US-Pak Strategic and Military Collaboration", Strategic Analysis, vol.XI, no.12, March 1988, p.1398.

advent of the Kennedy administration and the outbreak of hostilities between India and China, there was a shift in US policies in South Asia as reflected in US military and diplomatic assistance to India vis-a-vis China; which led to a slackening of US-Pak military nexus. With the onset of Detente, force projection and military preparedness in various theatres of probable confrontation did not require the same urgency as it did during the intense phase of the cold war. The Cuban missile crisis had propelled the need to actualise detente for a while at least. The PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty) of 1963 made detente a historical reality. Moreover the early 1960's also saw the Kennedy administration reviewing its foreign policy and strategy around the world. A vigorously pursued military policy with Pakistan (then perceived only in the context of the South Asian subcontinent) was not required, in the spirit of detente. The 1965 arms embargo, as a 'logical' fall-out of the Indo-Pak conflict, had therefore, deeper reasons than the professed American explanation, that using US arms against India was a breach of US-Pak agreement.

The whole period of 1960's right from the beginning has to be seen in the global perspective. The two super powers had embarked on a substantial easing of

tensions. There was no urgency therefore to arm Pakistan as the 'bulwark of freedom in Asia'. The internal crisis in Pakistan during this period further reduced American involvement in that country. Most of erstwhile US arms and military aid was used in quelling internal disorder. Therefore, to be intimately associated with Pakistan, especially in military and defence issues was not diplomatically and politically very attractive to the United States.

The Sino-Indian conflict in which the United States supplied military and defence equipment to India had repercussions on US-Pakistani relations, too. Consequently, there was a slight chill in the military and political nexus between the United States and Pakistan. In actual terms what had occurred was that the balance of the equation of arms and influence had turned against the United States, where ^{the} latter's security, stability and strength in South Asia was no longer guaranteed by her relationship with Pakistan. That the quid pro quo of the arms transfers had lapsed, reflected tangibly in the US-Pak equations in general. The changing perceptions of South Asian countries against the emerging Detente thus provided additional reasons for downgrading of Pakistan in the American security calculus.

The purpose of discussing the ascent and then the decline in the US-Pak relations in general as a quotient of American perceptions and foreign policy is only to infer how the flow of arms to Pakistan was modified in proportion to American perceptions of Pakistan as 'spoke in the wheel' of its strategic and foreign policy formulations. It can thus be concluded that arms transfers in general and specifically from the United States to Pakistan reflect a) quintessential dimension of American strategic thinking; b) the donor country in this relationship is more often than not ascendant in the gradient of influence; c) a quid pro quo is absolutely a part of any arms deal; and d) if and when the paradigm of priorities shift from the supplier/donor's point of perception, commensurate are the reflections on strategic policies and arms transfers of the latter.

The 1965 embargo on arms supplies resulted from an American assessment that her ties with Pakistan were becoming a liability in its South Asian diplomacy. However, Pakistan again assumed significance in the American security calculus in the 1970's. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 was construed by Pakistan as a counter to the Sino-Pak axis. Moreover, the US 'tilt' towards

Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan conflict and the American efforts to start an opening with China enhanced the importance of Pakistan. The significance of the Sino-US rapprochement' was immense for both the powers vis-a-vis their relations with the Soviet Union, and as a logical follow-up, the role of Pakistan in this nexus became very crucial.²⁶ In fact Nixon's sympathy and affinity for Pakistan stemmed from the fact that the latter would be an invaluable ally in the China connection. His rallying posture for Pakistan in the Congress was also part of the same calculations. So was Nixon's visit to Pakistan in August 1969. In fact until Pakistan's commitment to the Washington-Peking nexus had not been officially confirmed, the Congress did not agree to lift the arms embargo on Pakistan, imposed in 1965. The moment its utility as a 'link' in the American strategic security matrix became established the situation was bound to change. And it did so with the beginning of the Sino-American rapprochement.

In 1972, the arms embargo was officially lifted and implemented in 1975 when 300 armoured personnel

²⁶ Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, 1979), p.879-881.

carriers which were ordered by Pakistan in 1969 were delivered.²⁷ By 1976, military equipment, including weapons worth \$ 3,7 million, was dispatched to Pakistan. The 1973 oil embargo furthered the rationale for renewing military defence linkages with Pakistan, precisely due to its proximity to the oil rich Gulf -- now called South West Asia -- and its Islamic solidarity with the Arab states which were great assets from the American perspective -- despite its 'twin-pillars' namely Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the region. No wonder, the 1970's witnessed a considerable warmth and intimacy in the US-Pak relations. The American policy which assigned a double role to Pakistan in relation to China and West Asia was pursued in an amorphous fashion until the collapse of the twin pillars in West Asia. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 brought about a qualitative change in West Asian politics.

The importance of Pakistan as a frontline state became imperative for the United States to strengthen its mutual defence and improve its force projection.

27 Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation : Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Super Powers (New York, 1982), p.169.

capabilities in the region. United States found it necessary to transfer arms of sophisticated nature to Pakistan commensurate to the requirements of American interests in the region. Iranian revolution entailed the loss of vital strategic installations which the United States had established with the active support of the Shah of Iran. Having difficulties in coping with the revolutionary rhetoric of the Khomeini regime, and its impact on the neighbouring people and region, the states of West Asia found it difficult to publicly accept a pro-US posture -- a role subservient to the United States. Even Saudi Arabia displayed a certain degree of weariness and skepticism about overt US presence in the Gulf, 'largely because it tends to detract from their own legitimacy, particularly in the context of US economic and military support to Israel. Therefore...they prefer the American presence to be an over-the-horizon one'.²⁸ This indifference of the Saudis was perceived as a lacuna in the American low-intensity-conflict strategy. A hypothetical scenario of crisis

28 Mohammed Ayoob, "Perspectives from the Gulf Regime Security or Regional Security?", in Donald Hugh Mcmillen, ed., Asian Perspectives in the International Security (London, 1984), pp.108-109.

where a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was required to be installed in the region could not be strategically and tactically fool-proof, with Iran having been lost as a US defence forte, and the vacillation of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. A link between Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, Masirah in Oman, Ras Banas in Egypt, on the one hand and Diego Garcia and Mauritius on the other, became very important for a successful military and naval operation or even for a credible presence in the region.²⁹ Hence it was obvious that Pakistan had a crucial role in this strategy. Moreover containment of Soviet Union also necessitated a closer US-Pakistan military equation.

The sheer land-mass of the Soviet Union bordering on a number of countries in Europe and Asia creates a whole range of indirect threat perceptions for the United States. It is stated that, "geography provides the Soviet Union with a permanent presence that the West can match only with great difficulty"³⁰ and that too vicariously through allies or military and naval presence. According

29 William J. Taylor Jr., Maaranen, Gong, eds., Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 80's (Massachusetts, 1984), p.223.

30 Ibid., p.238.

to one scholar :

Even before the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union cast a long political shadow over the region. Soviet presence may not lead to direct influence over the foreign and domestic politics that the South West Asian nations pursue; nevertheless, the Soviets' ever present nature and the fact that they can never pack their bags and go home...means that regional nations must shape policies and actions with an eye always over their shoulder toward their northern neighbours. The primary risk or threat from a US perspective is that the region could become politically neutralised or frightened into inaction because of the Soviet Union's proximity ...no US interests and objectives would be served by such an event...(31)

The proximity of the Soviet Union to the South West Asian countries as well as the Indian subcontinent in itself was viewed as a threat to the region. Moreover, having stationed troops, and air-battle and air-surveillance facilities in Afghanistan the Soviet Union was considered by the United States to have posed a major threat to the entire region. The geographic advantage of the Soviet Union had to be matched by a defence build-up in the region by substantial American military presence in the Gulf. Hence a highly equipped avionics, reconnaissance, military and naval weapons systems transfers to Pakistan was warranted to suit the strategic and tactical American imperatives.

Thus the events since 1979 established the hypothesis that the renewal of a concrete and consistent military nexus between the United States and Pakistan was a result of changing international scene. In the rearranging of strategic and foreign relations necessitated by the changing co-relation of forces' in the region, a revival of an arms transfers policy was in the national interest of the United States.

Having substantially elaborated on the variables which have affected the US weapons transfers to Pakistan right from 1954 to the 1980's, it can be stated that the transfers, with all their fluctuations, have been directly proportional to changing perceptions of the United States regarding its interests in the South-West Asian and South Asian arenas. Whenever Pakistan's strategic significance has enhanced or abated in the matrix of the American security-framework, the arms transfers have increased and decreased respectively. What also follows logically from it, is the fact that on straight scales of comparative assessment it is the priorities of the United States' interests which have had more weightage vis-a-vis Pakistan's needs and requirements in deciding on the timing and the volume of the arms transaction. It should not be concluded, however,

that these arms transfers occur at a point of time when there existed only the American need to transfer arms and there was no urgency from the Pakistan point of view to import the same. The requirements existed from both sides simultaneously, but what generally dominated the decision for the arms transactions was more often the American perception of national interests and global security.

Chapter - III

THE LOST CONSENSUS REVIVED

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This chapter is an analysis of the emergence of South Asia as a prominent region in contemporary US foreign policy, and the designation of Pakistan as the bastion of American geostrategy and regional defence in South and South-West Asia. These developments of the 1980s can be understood in the context of the changing world scene and the new strategic environment in the region of South and South-West Asia as perceived by the United States. South Asia will be treated within this broad calculus of American international perspective.

The United States had 'vital' economic and strategic interests in and around Iran and Saudi Arabia and the region. The strategic importance of the oil-producing Gulf states and the overriding necessity of keeping the sea-lanes open for the ready flow of oil to the industrial western countries made it imperative from the American perspective that the political orientation of the regimes in this crucial region was favourable to the United States. Moreover, the Strait of Hormuz in proximity to Saudi Arabia and Iran was the commercial thoroughfare for the United States and its European and

Asian allies, and the United States had no choice but to keep its transit rights secure through hegemonic influence in the region. There were also the petrodollars to be regulated through investments in western banks and a lucrative market in the region which seemed to provide an outlet to all kinds of products from consumer to luxury goods and services. The geographic propinquity of the region with the southern borders of the Soviet Union was an added rationale for securing access, both political and strategic, over the region. The governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran were for mutually beneficial reasons positively disposed towards the United States. The Iranian Revolution, however, knocked off the 'twin pillars' policy which forced the United States to re-examine its priorities in the region. The foreign policy and geopolitical reorientation of the revolutionary regime in Iran resulted in Pakistan and Turkey withdrawing from CENTO.¹ As a consequence of these adverse regional developments, American influence and ability to manoeuvre received a significant setback in this very 'vital' important area.²

1 International Herald Tribune (Singapore), 11 June, 1982.

2 Ibid.

Meanwhile the Iranian hostage crisis occurred in November 1979. Late in the same year, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and set-up a pro-Soviet regime under their aegis. The two happenings heavily underscored the limitations of US ability to project military power in the region. Western commentators perceived the Soviet intervention as the beginning of a forward push toward the Gulf with ominous consequences for the flow of oil to the industrialised west. Some western critics who had direct links with the decision makers of the United States even perceived the alarming scenario of Soviet advance towards the Gulf upsetting the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States.³ They perceived the 'invasion' as purely opportunistic which had placed the Soviet Union in a position to provoke and then exploit the instabilities and vulnerable points of the region, undermining the vital interests, both strategic and economic of the United States.

The strategic scenario since the fall of the Shah and made more threatening by the hostage crisis and the Soviet move in Afghanistan was so grim that a viable alternate strategic framework became indispensable at

³ Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan : 'A Trip Report'", A Rand Note (Santa Monica, 1986), p.26.

all costs. The international circumstances at this juncture seemed so minatory to American geo-strategic capabilities that defence and strategic analysts and policy planners even started anticipating an attack and worked out various permutations and possible American responses.⁴ For instance, in a very widely attended conference hosted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, William O. Staudenmaier, Research Director of Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, presented a paper on the "Formulations of US Strategy in South-West Asia and Guidelines". His presentation began with an illustrative hypothetical scenario of a Soviet occupation of Iran :

The peace of the world was shattered with dramatic suddenness when twentyfive Soviet divisions invaded Iran. The United States had been alerted to the impending invasion by increasingly aggressive Soviet reaction to the domestic turmoil that plunged Iran into chaos following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini... Under the protective cover of frontal aviation, the Soviet divisions began a deliberate advance in the direction of Tabriz, Qazvin and Tehran, Regional Military observers speculated that after seizing these strategic areas and moving frontal aviation units to forward based where they could support ground operations

4 Ibid., p.32.

farther south the attack would resume to seize the Khuzistan oil fields. The Soviets were also amassing ground and air units along the Iran-Afghanistan frontier. Potentially these forces could be used to control the vital Strait of Hormuz... (5)

Thus West Asia which had so far been an effective bastion against the Soviet Union and Communism, had become an 'arc of crisis'. Moreover, despite the enunciation of the Carter doctrine in January 1980 the American policy for the region still had many contradictory elements in it.

Then the assassination of Anwaar Sadaat in 1981 was another setback to American policy in West Asia. The same year also witnessed a domestic change in America -- which was perhaps significantly instrumental in reformulation of policy resulting in greater significance of Pakistan in the American foreign policy in the Gulf theatre.⁶ With the Presidential elections which brought Ronald Reagan to the White House there was the resurgence of "politics of security".⁷ His radically conservative

5 William O. Staudenmaier, "The Formulation of US Strategy in South-West Asia", in William Taylor, Manranen & Gerrit Gong, eds., Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 80's (Toronto, 1984), p.217.

6 Christopher Van Hollen, "Don't Engulf the Gulf", International Security, vol.6, no.3, p.212.

7 Selig S. Harrison, "As he Courts Pakistan, Reagan is Alienating India", International Herald Tribune, 25 July 1981.

approach manifested itself when soon after his taking over, he reiterated the essentials of US policy initially enumerated by Carter and pledged to defend American interests by whatever means in the region.⁸

Thus the events of 1979-1981 in a 'new' policy towards eastern quadrant of the globe. The South Asian region was dragged into the American security framework for South West Asian interests of the United States.⁹ South Asia, so far, had primarily figured in the US security considerations only in the global context. Its distance, cultural contrasts and poverty aggravated by the Malthusian dilemma had been partly responsible to the low priority assigned to it in the American scheme of variables. There was no vital American states in this part of the world. But its geogtrategic proximity to the Soviet Union was pivotal in changing American perceptions in the 1980's. Pakistan became an important factor in the American response to the Soviet expansionism reflected in the intervention of Afghanistan.-- in this context.

8 Shahrum Chubin, "US Security Interests in the Gulf in the 80's", Daedulus, vol.109, no.4, (Fall,1980), pp.47-48.

9 Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Revisited", Asian Survey, vol.XX, no.4 (April 1980), pp.330-332.

Two principal interests controlled the United States policy and in turn strategy in the region. Any Soviet control, over this land bridge of Africa, direct or indirect was unacceptable to the United States. Secondly, the stability of oil flow from the Gulf was a sine quo non in the global competition. The two interests being distinct, converged at the level of strategy.¹⁰ It is in this context that the particular dimension of regional defense enters into the strategic security calculus. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which, in Tallyrand's vocabulary was a 'mistake' in any case, prompted an extraordinary strategic response in the USA. Preoccupation with the oil supplies from the region made the arc of states extending from Pakistan to the Horn of Africa - a focal point of strategic analysis.¹¹ But of greater significance was the underlying strategic choice to fashion a response to the changing scene in the region, which in due course would grow from localised measures to increasingly broadened schemes.¹²

10  Staudenmaier, n.5, p.220.

11 Lawrence Lifschultz, "Ring Around the Gulf", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 December, 1981, pp.36-41.

12 Ibid., p.39.

The American search for facilities to obtain strategic accessibility in the region was only a logical conclusion from the strategic analysis which became imperative in Washington. Another aspect of the increasingly military response was the militarization of the Indian Ocean. Never before had the Indian Ocean and its littoral witnessed such an assemblage of military equipment. Having become an arena of the New Cold War the oceanic theatre got caught in a spiral of military competition. In fact with the advent of 1980-1981 USA continued to ameliorate her under water capability of launching ballistic missile and clearly manifesting a determination to reinforce her presence in the region by the introduction of several advanced weapon-system.¹³

Thus there was an enlargement of United States' role in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. It was no longer purely strategic. To it was added a new component - assuring the uninterrupted supply of oil from the Gulf for itself and its industrial allies. Therefore, Diego Garcia and Mahe were developed into virtual floating fortresses of American financial and

¹³ Stephen P.Cohen, "Perceptions, Influence and Weapons Proliferation in South Asia", Report prepared for Department of State External Research Contract No.1722-920184, August 1979 (Washington, D.C.), p.69.

economic interests.¹⁴ The Subic bay facilities and the Diego Garcia base were developed to enhance the power projection capacity which the United States considered indispensable in the region. The military contingency planning by ^{the} Pentagon ostensibly to counter a putative Soviet military threat, was in reality to threaten the countries in the South Asian region and the adjoining area comprising the Indian Ocean littoral and to bring about even domestic changes non-violently without intervention.

Another prominent feature of US policy execution in the region came to be the containment of India as a regional power. Indo-Soviet friendship was perceived by some policy makers in Washington, not as a convergence of the policies of the two countries but as a relationship in which India played a role subservient to the Soviet interests. The militarization of the Indian Ocean could thus serve the purpose of intimidating India. A militarily strong India was never in concurrence with the US strategic interests in Asia and an American sponsored military build up of Pakistan was to maintain a military balance in South Asia. Thus the United States could indirectly coerce India through arming Pakistan.

14 International Herald Tribune, 2 October, 1982.

However, it was in the north-west quadrant of the region that one finds the most complete and immediate features of the new security architecture. As Joseph E. Pechman has put it,

The barest outline of a long-term design... are discernable... what is suggested by Washington is nothing less than an evolution within a decade of a long-term security regime which takes into account not only the North-West quadrant; but the entire littoral of the Indian Ocean. (15)

However, Washington had to reckon with the fact that the turbulence which lies beneath the surface of Pakistan's domestic politics hardly suited it to sustain a long confrontational posture on the Afghan frontier. Moreover, Islamabad's acceptance of the American perception of a Soviet threat in the Gulf and the South-Asian region was facilitated by America's ever-riding concern to strengthen Pakistan against a 'potentially minatory' Soviet invasion¹⁶ and a powerful India, a fact which complicated relations between Washington and New Delhi.

The American attempt to incorporate Pakistan into its South-West Asian strategy was in contravention with the history of the Indian subcontinent. India and Pakistan

15 Joseph A. Pechman, Setting National Priorities : An Agenda for the 80s (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution), 1982, p.17.

16 Francis Fukuyama, "The Security of Pakistan", A Trip Report', A Rand Report (Santa Monica, 1980).

shared a common history and despite recent conflicts of interests the people of Pakistan have greater affinity with India than the people and the region of West Asia. However, America's attempt at weaning Pakistan from its subcontinental entity and linking it with that of the West Asian geopolitics was primarily guided by its desire to promote its diplomatic and other relations with India and at the same time arm Pakistan for its own defense and security requirement. But given the proximity of India and Pakistan and the tenor of their diplomatic relationship; this was quite improbable.

Hence the Reagan Administration wanted to use Pakistan as a conduit for US aid to Afghan resistance through arming the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Therefore, in one of its most spectacular, open-ended military assistance programme of 1980-81 Reagan announced a package of \$ 3.02 billion in arms, defence and economic support including the controversial transfers of 40 F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan. Thus, at the beginning of 1981 the United States embarked on a massive transfer of arms to Pakistan. The Congressional waiver of the anti-proliferation Symington Amendment lifted the ban on assistance imposed on Pakistan in April 1979 and cleared the ground to move ahead with the first instalment of \$ 3.02 billion economic and

military assistance. The programme dwarfed the Carter offer of \$ 400 million and gave Pakistan access to an array of sophisticated military hardware, and defence equipment.

Thus, Washington policy makers wanted Pakistan to occupy a frontline position in the containment of Soviet power. As an essential anchor for the entire South and South-West Asian theatre, ~~there was, therefore, an urgent~~ need for ground, naval and air force modernization of the country.¹⁷ The Reagan administration agreed that it was indeed reversing Carter's position, but that Pakistan's military modernization would bolster the entire region against Soviet pressures from Afghanistan, and that a 'limited transfer of arms' would not upset the existing military balance between India and Pakistan, Additionally, as a condition of the 'deal', Islamabad, would curtail its nuclear weapons programme if the rehabilitation of conventional forces was undertaken.

~~Reagan's~~ Reagan's leitmotif, if any, was something akin to the 'restoration of realism' in context to the Soviet Union which would entail fundamental global competition a stance which could be used to produce both 'negotiation'

17 Drew Middleton, "Renewed US Stakes in Asia", New York Times, 9 September 1982.

and 'confrontation'.¹⁸ Economic and military aid, therefore, was to enhance the politico-military interests of the United States. And it was in the logic of this South West and South Asian imperative, initiative and interest that Pakistan (and not any other country) was chosen by the United States as its only option.

18 Ibid.

Chapter - IV

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WEAPONS
TRANSFERS 1980-1986**

Chapter -IV

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WEAPONS TRANSFERS : 1980-1986

After having described the international scenario of the period since 1979 and having historically traced the strategic significance of American arms transfers to Pakistan, it is time to quantitatively assess the arms and weapons systems which have been transferred between 1980 and 1986. What is the offense potential of these weapons and weapon systems and what will be their effect within the parameters of American strategy. This can only be understood by understanding the weapons itself apart from statistically enumerating the weapons transfers.

Table 1 gives the data on U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan from the United States for the period between 1981 to 1986. What is striking about this set of arms transfers is the fact that they have involved sophisticated and latest military technology. Secondly, in contradistinct from the arms and weapons equipment transferred during the 1960's and the 1970's the recent transactions appear to have been more towards the establishment of a complete and autonomous military set-up.

Table - 1

US MILITARY SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN: 1980-81-1986

Year	Item ordered by Pakistan	Year of Delivery
1981	24 SEA CAT (SAM/Sh Sh M) to (SAM-S)	1982
	ARM COUNTY-CLASS DESTROYER(S)	
	1 County Class (Destroyer) (s)	1982
	34 F-16A (Fighter/strike) (a/c)	1983-85
	6 F-16B (Fighter/Trainer) (a/c)	1982-84
	12 Model 209 AH-IS (HEL) (helicopter)	1984-85
	DEAL INCLUDED TOW MISSILES, MBTS, ARVS, ANTI-TANK VEHICLES AND HOWITZERS	
	63 M-109-A2 155 mm (SPH)	1983-84
	40 M-110-A2 203 mm (SPH)	1984-85
	75 M-198 155 mm (TH)	1984-86
	100 M-48-A5 (MBT)	1982-83
	35 M-88-AI (ARV)	1984-85
	24 M-901 TOW TD (M)	1984-85
	4 AN/TPQ-37 (TRACKING RADAR)	1982
1982	12 Model 209 AH-IS (HEL)	1986
	35 M-109-A2 (SPH) 155 mm	1984-85
1984	4 G-134 MOHAWK A/c (Battlefield Surveillance)	-
	35 M-48-A5 (MBT)	1985
1985	2 Amazon Class (FRIGATE) (s)	
	88 M-109-A2 155 mm (SPH)	-
	110 M-113-A2 (APC)	-
	4 AN/TPQ-37 (Tracking Radar)	
	2 RGM-84-AL (Sh Sh M Launcher)	1986
	500 AIM-9L (AAM) Sidewinders	1985

Year	Item ordered by Pakistan	Year of Delivery
1985	Pakistan is negotiating for unspecified number of Grumman E-2C Hawkeye (Total requirement believed to be 4 aircraft. Also being negotiated are 4 Grumman OV-10 battle field surveillance aircraft)	Negotiations
	Pentagon is finalising details of letter of offer and acceptance of sale to Pakistan of AIM 9L Sidewinders AAM. The deal is worth 50 million dollars	Confirmed
	Pakistan Navy has awarded \$ 1.6 million contract to Raytheon's Submarine Signal Div. for two solid state transmitters to modernise the electronics of AN/SQS-23 sonar systems aboard its destroyers. This follow on contract brings to four the number of Raytheon solid state transmitters in Pakistan's fleet.	Confirmed
	10 Bell AH-1S Huey Cobra attack helicopters for Pakistan. A second batch of 10 Huey Cobras are scheduled for delivery in May 1986.	Confirmed
	15 Hughes Aircraft AN/TPQ 36 mortar locating to be bought by Pakistan for \$ 65 million	Confirmed
	Pakistan received first shipment of 100 M48A5 tanks for a price of \$ 42.1 million. 20-40 more F-16 (US to Pak)	Confirmed Negotiations
	US Congress has been notified of two letters of offer of Pak worth \$ 100 mm for 88 BMY M109 A2 self propelled howitzers with M2-50 calibre machineguns and 110 M-113A2 armoured personnel carriers with machineguns, spare parts and support.	Negotiations

<u>year</u>	<u>Item Ordered by Pakistan</u>	<u>Year of Delivery</u>
1985	Pak looking at P-3, AEWs, and balloon-borne radars	Negotiations
	US/Pak-negotiations-- for sale of Hughes AT/TPQ-37 Firefinder artillery locating radar plus support (cost \$ 31 m)	Negotiations
	From the US, TOW anti-tank missiles	Negotiations
1986	54 SEAWOLF-I (Sh AM/PDM). To ARM 3 AMAZON-CLASS Frigates 3 RGM-84 AL (Sh Sh M launcher) Talk under way for supply of additional F-16 Fighter, AIM-9L and Harpoon missiles and inflight-refuelling equipment.	Negotiations
	2,030 TOW-1 missiles from US at a cost of \$ 20 mn.	Confirmed
	Chinese F-7 aircraft to be retrofitted with US engines (GE F110, PW/F 100-200, GE-E404 under consideration) and western avionics. Negotiations going on with Boeing & Grumman.	Negotiations
	F-16s being delivered to Pak being equipped with a French Thomson-CSF At/is laser designator Pod with a TV-type tracking system and laser illuminator	Confirmed

Source : Michael Brzoska & Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to Third World - SIPRI - 1971-85 (Oxford University Press, 1987) .pp.

For instance, the defence shipments of the 1960's and the 1970's comprised of light planes, with minimal offense capability like the Bird Dog (light plane) the T-37 (Jet-Trawer) and other surveillance equipment like tracking-radars; and transport aircraft carriage.¹ But the 'package-deals' during the Reagan Administration have a different orientation towards weapons transfers to Pakistan.

A study of the weapons transfers to Pakistan during 1980-1986 reveals drastic changes in the U.S. strategy since the 1980's. Low intensity conflict-escalation and confrontation scenarios have been developed by American strategic analysts and defence experts.² This has resulted in the attempt to build an autonomous defence-infrastructure which has been on the anvil of the Pentagon and the Capitol Hill decision-makers for the region.

This new dimension of American foreign and defence posture is however, part of its global policy. Not only in South and South-west Asian theatre but also in Europe

1 Abha Dixit, "US Strategic and Military Collaboration", Strategic Analysis, vol.XI, No.12, March 1988, p.1398.

2 William J.Taylor, Maaranen, Gong, eds., Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 80's, 1984, p.239.

and Latin America the transfer of weapons have recently been of a highly sophisticated nature. Apart from the immediacy of the regional factors which propelled such an initiative, the other factor which perhaps was responsible for this arms transfers was the pressure from military-industrial-complex on the U.S. policy-making process. Thus a coincidence of domestic pressures and external developments changed the character of arms transfers in South and South-West Asia. Since Pakistan was to be the 'donor's bowl', the repercussions of the same were to be direct vis-a-vis its defence and foreign policy.

Table 1 lists the weapons systems and defence equipment which were transferred from the United States to Pakistan in the specified period between 1980 and 1986. Of these, the most controversial and perhaps even the most 'consequential' has been the fighter aircraft F-16. It is a single-engined, single-seat air superiority fighter.³ It was initially built as a low-cost weapon system to supplement the high costing super-sophisticated Eagle fighters or the F-15 of the US Air Force.⁴ However,

3 Janes, All the World's Aircraft (1983-84), p.723.

4 Ibid.

after being experimented as a highly efficient cost-optimal fighter aircraft, it came to be the most versatile of its kind to be inducted not only in the American Air Force but also in those having American defence patronage and guidance. It later on turned out to be the most popular US fighter-aircraft to be sold to almost every ally of the United States.⁵

From the American point of view, it was the most appropriate weapon system to be transferred to the air force of its allies because it happened to be both cheaper and slightly less sophisticated than the F-15 fighters.⁶ It therefore became the favourite export fighter aircraft gradually acquiring the position of almost a status symbol to the US allies, especially in the developing world.⁷

The United States first offered it to Pakistan in the early 1980's and at the moment Pakistan has about 49 such fighter aircrafts. It has to be noted that F-16 fighter (strike) and (trainer) both, i.e., F-16A and F-16B respectively, can be and are used in a variety of roles right from an air defence fighter, a medium

5 Ibid., p.724.

6 See, Janes, n.3, p.723.

7 Ibid., p.724.

range attack aircraft as well as ground support aircraft and combat trainer aircraft.⁸ The versatility of the F-16 added to its low cost investment has made it a very valuable acquisition of the Pakistani defence infrastructure. Its high penetration and target accuracy is also one which is commensurate to that of the Mirage 2000. It can carry a maximum of 300 lbs of armaments, making it an asset for both the United States and Pakistan Air Forces. It is most suitable aircraft fighter for a conflict escalation from a low intensity conflict at a local level to a medium intensity regional conflict - and American experts have based their South-West and South Asian strategy as well as their strategic consensus in the third world theatre on the possible escalation from the local to the regional level.⁹ The psychological advantage of the F-16 has also been enormous both for American security as well as Pakistan's military strength because it has become a status symbol in international politics.

Another outstanding weapons-system which has been transferred under Reagan's package deal of 1981-87 is the TOW missile. It (Tube-launched optically-tracked and wire-

8 Ibid.

9 "Defence & Disarmament Review : Arms Transfers", Strategic Digest, vol.XVII, no.9, September 1987, p.1788.

guided) is a heavy anti-tank weapon (HAW) which can be launched manually as well as mechanically mounted on vehicles. The missile is guided to its target by an operator who controls its flight through a wire trailed behind by the missile. It's a technically superior missile to its previous kinds in terms of enhanced accuracy and range.¹⁰ Its range is about 2 to 3 kms. The induction of TOW missiles in defence forces was obviously to serve the immediate artillery requirements of Pakistan vis-a-vis its antagonistic neighbour and possibly to be further delivered to the Afghan Mujahedeen's resistance group. ✓

Other weapons systems and equipments which have been transferred from the United States to Pakistan within the purview of the 1981-86 package deal and are conspicuous owing to their advanced technology are the AM-15 Cobras (HEL); G-134 Mohawk (aircraft); Sidewinder; AIM-9L (AAM) (missile); M-113-A2 (APC) the Harpoon missiles; and the Seawolf (Sh AM/PDM) (missile).¹¹ It would be appropriate to go into the characteristics and military potential of these defence equipments to realise their utility in the strategic perspective of the USA as well

10 Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1985-86 (Jane's Publishing Co.Ltd., London, 1986), p.727.

11 Arms Transfers to the Third World, SIPRI 1971-81 (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.

as of Pakistan. The AM-15-Cobra is an anti-tank helicopter; though small in size, it carries heavy calibre rapid firing cannons and anti-tank missiles basically used to destroy enemy tanks.¹² It is fuel-efficient, usually carries the 'Hellfire missile' and is capable of high and low altitude flying.¹³ On the other hand, G-134 Mohawk is a small light aircraft which is used to carry surveillance equipments like radars, infra-red sensors, cameras, etc. to survey battlefields, areas, enemy troops and armoured concentrations and movements. It is used for small to medium range reconnaissance and survey.¹⁴ Its induction in Pakistan's Air Force only strengthens the assumption of the American strategy in the region of possible escalation of low intensity conflict and its use can be made to monitor neighbouring states' military movements and installations. In the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Indian postures towards Pakistan and the Soviet Union this small surveillance aircraft was transferred to Pakistan to interdict Soviet

12 Jane's, n.3, p.322.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p.281.

aircraft and other Soviet avionics on the Pak-Afghan border or for all possible military coercive measures. The aircraft, perhaps, could also be used for routine surveillance of commercial shipping and overall situation in the adjoining waters and territory.¹⁵

However, the most consequential, in terms of its utility and usage, have been the Sidewinder and Harpoon missiles. Sidewinder AIM-9L (AAM), where AIM stands for Air Interception missile and AAM for air-to-air missile is a defensive weapon; known for its accurate interception and targetting. The missile is guided by infra-red sensor (AIM) and is used for arming F-16 fighter jets in the Pakistan Air Force.¹⁶ The missile automatically moves on its release guided by its sensors. It is reported that approximately 500-1000 such missiles have already reached the territory of Pakistan.¹⁷ Experts are of the view that such a large number of Sidewinders, do not appear to be the legitimate requirement for dealing with possible threat from Afghanistan, but would actually be a serious threat to the Indian Air Force.

15 Ibid., p.282.

16 Jane's Weapons System 1983-84, (London, 1984-85), pp.223-24.

17 See, n.9, p.2340.

"Pakistan is hoping to acquire a total of 1,500 such missiles, which would give it a three-to-one ratio in the number of Sidewinders to the total IAF aircraft."¹⁸

Added to this deadly weapon, is the Harpoon anti-submarine-launched missiles, for use against surfaced submarines, patrol craft, destroyers, trawlers and large vessels, the probable use of which could only be in an escalating conflict in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf region owing to the range of the missile which is around 100-150 kms.¹⁹ The acquisition of the Harpoon by Pakistan cannot be justified on the basis of the threat from either Afghanistan or the Soviet Union.

It is in this context that the American Central Command (CENTCOM) strategy becomes relevant. This new command was established by the United States on January 1, 1983. Since then, the *raison d'etre* of arms transfers and military aid to Pakistan have witnessed a shift in the emphasis and so have the nature of weapons systems and equipments too. In 1985 the US gave two Amazon class

18 Ibid.

19 Jane's, n.16, pp.209, 287.

(frigate): i) 88 M-109-AZ, 155 mm (SPH) and ii) 100M-113-A2 (APC) to Pakistan.²⁰ Both destroyer ships are capable of high seas conflict. In 1986, 43 Seawolf I (Sh AM/PAM) were given to Pakistan. These are ship-to-air missile used to safeguard ships from aircrafts and especially anti-ship missiles.²¹ To have a naval task force like the Seventh Fleet in this region was one of the main thrust of the CENTCOM. This naval capability was to be supplemented by air defence and land forces as support systems. And in this defence network of the United States in the region, the role of Pakistan was indispensable, especially in the context of the naval facilities it could provide to the naval fleet and the air space and base facilities as well. It is interesting to mention that the high-range and substantially destructive Harpoon, Sidewinders and Seawolf missiles saw their way into Pakistan only after the CENTCOM was established. And the 'links' in the form of Pakistani ports assumed ineluctable significance as 'being the intermittent linkage' between Indian Ocean on its East quadrant and the Persian Gulf on its west.

20 Jane's Fighting Ships (1985-86), (London, 1986), p.625, 629.

21 Jane's, n.16, p 141.

thus encompassing the Southwest Asian and South Asian theatre almost completely.

Given the feasibility of Pakistan's role in the successful execution of the CENTCOM, the transfer of highly sophisticated air and naval defence equipment seemed a logical step. From Pakistan's point of view also the acquisition of the weapons and defence systems was a net gain and an addition to its projected military strength -- a cause for concern in the neighbouring countries. Therefore, the 'Afghanistan-argument' was obviously not the only rationale for the transfer of such high-potential weapon systems to Pakistan, nor did the overall security of the latter be the possible reason for such sophisticated defence acquisitions -- though the ostensible argument of United States and Pakistan has been it, respectively. That in the overall execution of the CENTCOM, the arming of Pakistan was really relevant towards the new Southwest and South Asian policy was pivotal to the American arms transfers to Pakistan during the stipulated period.

The recent controversy regarding the proposed supply of Air borne Warning and Control system (AWACS) to Pakistan is to be properly understood in the context of Pakistan's role as a frontline state. Basically, two defense systems

with very little fundamental modifications, i.e., the E-2C AEW and the E-3A AWACS, have been the fulcrum of defense transfer controversy between USA and Pakistan. The E-2C AEW, also known as the Hawkyee, is an airborne early warning radar. It is actually a transport aircraft E-2C (Hawkyee fitted with large and multi-functional radar and computers to analyse the data collected by the radar). The essential purpose of the AEW is to locate hostile air activity at distances much larger and wider than what is possible from surface-based radars. Its highly sensitive computer can detect and track hostile air activity, analyse the possible threat and instantly direct the requisite friendly forces to meet such a theatre.²² It was initially built for the US Navy and was based on the aircraft carriers. The other is E-3A AWACS also known as 'Sentry' which is functionally the same warning system but slightly more accurate, efficient and sophisticated.²³ It is installed on a larger aircraft and mostly on a Boeing 707-320B transport plane and is thus capable of assimilating larger computers and sensors required for approximately a 300-350 km. diameter range. It is evidently

22 Jane's, n.16, p.544.

23 See n.9, p.1789.

more capable and powerful but is equally more expensive and technically complicated.²⁴ It had been sold to Saudi Arabia in 1981 and the delivery was almost completed by 1986. In 1987 the Pentagon proposed to transfer the AWACS to Pakistan.²⁵

The AWACS of the E-3A (Sentry) variety which are in use in the USAF can intercept till a circumferential distance of about 470 km. radius.²⁶ In addition to tracking, it then also guide friendly interceptors to either negate enemy's air-warfare or hostile electronic activity or direct friendly weapon systems to get operational and shoot the enemy weapons system/aircraft.²⁷ The latter "...provides the capability to control the air-battle in the envelope it covers".²⁸ ~~It is instructive~~

It is instructive to mention the Pakistani rationale for the acquisition of AWACS. The latter has reasoned out "the need for acquiring the AWACS against air intrusion

24 Jane's, n.16, p.553.

25 Brožka and Ohlson, "Arms Transfers to the Third World", SIPRI (Oxford, 1987), pp.

26 See, n.9, p.1789.

27 Jasjit Singh, "US Arms for Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, vol.xi, no.9 (Dec., 1986), p.1075.

28 Ibid.

from Afghanistan i.e. to intercept and combat air intrusions from Afghanistan". But what fails the exponents of this justification is that given the topography and the contour of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border the AWACS will be minimally effective. It will be able to pick up signals only at distance of about 40-50 km. from the Pakistan border. To intercept, alert and operationalise its war systems or aircraft to combat the approaching enemy ploy would not be feasible given the distance between the nearest airfield in Pakistan and the latter's border with Afghanistan and the minimum time required to reach the point.²⁹ Thus the Pakistani rationale does not seem to be very convincing. However, the transfer of AWACS could have serious consequences for the Indian defence even in peace time. To quote Air Commodore (Jasjit Singh -

Information from the USAF AWACS over Pakistan would be released by the US on selective basis and the recipient country would not even be in a position to assess the extent and authenticity of information being made available. AWACS under these circumstances itself becomes an instrument of foreign policy...for coercive diplomacy.(30)

29 Singh, n.27, p.1076.

30 Ibid., p.1016.

The United States has been expanding its defence and military nexus with all countries in the South West Asian region and will Pakistan in South Asia towards what Caspar Weinberger once defined as 'coalition strategy'.³¹ It has improved its access facilities with Oman, Somalia, Kenya, etc.³² With CENTCOM having jurisdiction over 19 countries which included Pakistan as well, it was but natural that Pakistan would have to be inducted with sophisticated weaponry and defence systems.

The CENTCOM consists of a task force of one to two large deck aircraft carriers with US navy P-36 maritime patrol aircraft which have been using the Karachi air-base since 1983. The CENTCOM further has a strength of 'nearly 40,000 troops including three aircraft battle-groups ten tactical fighter wings and 7 marine/army dimensions assigned to it'.³³ It also consists of an USN/USAF air component of over 720 combat aircraft and about 28 B-52I strategic bombers. In addition, there is a massive airlift capability for troops, defence requisites and transport to the required deployments.³⁴

31 Singh, n.27, p.1073.

32 Albert Wohlstetter, "Meeting the Threat in the Gulf", Asian Survey, XXV, no.2 (Spring, 1980), pp.138-39.

33 Singh, n.27, p.1073.

34 Wohlstetter, n.32, p.143.

With such an elaborate infrastructure sophisticated defense hardware and software, the venues and points of location for its stationing for accurate coordination and efficiency also became very crucial in the planning process. Hence the proposed AWACS facility in Pakistan.

The American force projection capability in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf has thus been considerably augmented and Pakistan has become an integral component of American diplomacy and strategy. Pakistan has strategically used the leverage acquired through its crucial role as a 'frontline state', its nuclear weapons programme has been the main beneficiary of the 'reverse leverage' acquired by the recipient in lieu of the massive supply of military hardware. Thus the quantum and the characteristic of the weapon systems were integrally co-related to the perceptions of both the countries and its requirements vis-a-vis the international strategic climate; however, having an American accent to the requirements and perceptions.

C O N C L U S I O N

CONCLUSION

Having examined some of the dominant aspects of the dynamics involved in the politics of American arms transfers to Pakistan in the period 1980-1986, the task remains to highlight these derivations and coalesce the arguments, broadly a) as to what was the American rationale; b) has the intended imperative of the United States vis-a-vis its regional strategy been achieved; c) what might be and to a fair extent been the repercussions of it on the security environment of the region; and d) that the United States has had to overlook certain major dimensions of Pakistan's foreign and defence policy, adverse to its own interests. What has been the reason behind it?

The South West Asian policy of the United States had developed irrevocable lacunae by the early 1980s. The 'twin pillars' policy had collapsed in the wake of the Iranian Revolution which was followed by dismantling of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Afghanistan ceased to play its traditional role of a buffer between Pakistan and the Soviet Central Asia letting the South West Asian arena absolutely vulnerable to the Soviet overtures.

Thus there was an urgent need for a policy re-appraisal leading to a new strategy to deal with the changing configuration of power-relation in the region. The geo-political location of Pakistan and the orientation of its power elite were to play a significant role in shaping the strategy, which was to supplement the US naval strength in the Gulf with land and air base support systems. In this strategy centering around the Central Command, the Gulf was to be its fulcrum with other focal points around it. The objective was to retain American influence and access potential in the Gulf as well as in Indian Ocean and the subcontinent. It was this syndrome which governed Pakistan's major role in the new American security network.

Pakistan by its sheer existence on the globe as it were was to resolve various aspects of new American strategy in the region. In fact, the main setback to the American position in West Asia was the Iranian Revolution which brought a severe blow to the western strategy extending from South Africa to Israel; the geographical proximity of Iran to the Soviet Union and installation of some of the most sensitive installations in the country crucial to American global strategy and diplomacy had, therefore, ceased to be functional. Thus, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan occurred

as a fortuitous event for the United States to vindicate and augment its need and the actual supply of arms to Pakistan. The instrumental reason for the alternate strategy and hence the arms supply, was actually the abated strength and power projection capabilities of the United States in the South West Asian theatre. The integration of Pakistan into the Central Command Strategy necessitated and accentuated transfer of weapons and weapons systems. Moreover, the principal instrument of the new CENTCOM strategy was the naval component which increased the significance of the southern and eastern coastline of Pakistan for its successful execution.

The internal stability and territorial integrity of Pakistan were equally important for the efficient execution of the CENTCOM. The transferred weapons and defence systems were also to strengthen the internal order and territorial integrity of Pakistan. This served the interest of the ruling elite in the recipient country. Therefore, the US arms package to Pakistan served the mutual requirements of both the countries and a quid pro quo was the basic premise of the military nexus.

Though the security perspectives and the threat perceptions of the United States and Pakistan varied,

the divergence had considerably narrowed down than on earlier occasions. The Soviet intervention had left Pakistan with no option but to recognise the vulnerability of its north western borders. Pakistan perceived its security "sandwiched between Soviet occupied Afghanistan and Soviet ally India..."¹ It was, therefore, logical from American as well as Pakistani point of view to transfer weapons to the latter. The initiative was definitely American but interests were mutual.

In fact the basic postulates were based on an on-the-spot study of the security requirements of the United States in the region by Francis Fukuyama, who visited Pakistan in 1980. His report titled, "The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report", suggested that for a viable strategic consensus to be operative in the region the integration of Pakistan and its security was essential. Fukuyama's findings were these: a) there existed a vital necessity of the Persian oil supply for the political and economic interests and integrity of the United States and the West; b) chronic political instabilities prevailed in the countries of the region

1 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan Perspectives on International Security", in Donald Hugh Mcmillen, ed., Asian Perspectives on International Security (London, 1984), p.145.

and c) the region was geographically contiguous to the USSR and therefore very vulnerable. Hence, there existed major 'choke points' of American security and strategy in the region. He further foresaw a set of emergency situations "of probable Soviet moves" which could jeopardise American power and the global balance in favour of the Soviet Union such as the Soviet control of oil which would proffer the Soviet a "virtual veto" over the growth in the western economies,"² or in the event of the disintegration of Islamic regime in Iran the Soviets might be prompted to intervene. The Soviets could also subdue Pakistan by force, 'to accommodate Moscow' with enormous effects on the region as a whole. To strategically counter the 'Soviet advantage' and these hypothetical contingencies Fukuyama advocated, "various forms of strategic cooperation"³ with Pakistan. Obviously, these forms of strategic cooperation translated into actual terms would entail a military nexus between the two countries. And weapons transfers to Pakistan was a

2 Francis Fukuyama, "Speech at Asia Society New York, 16 June, 1981, Quoted in G.S.Bhargawa, South Asian Security After Afghanistan (New York, 1981), p.166.

3 Francis Fukuyama, The Security of Pakistan : A Trip Report, A Rand Note (Santa Monica, 1980), p.18.

corollary to this military nexus.

Over the years this evolving military nexus has accrued vital advantages for the United States. Due to the close cooperation and defence collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan the United States has had the opportunity to pursue a military relationship with Saudi Arabia, howsoever minimal it has been. Similarly, with the countries of the Gulf Council being positively disposed towards Pakistan, they also have been brought into the American security nexus through the Pakistani linkages. Arms transactions to Pakistan have had the other advantage of utilising air and sea port facilities of the latter for various purposes of American security requirements be it espionage reconnaissance, refuelling, naval and air exercises or military and naval bases. Finally, the United States has made a very tangible attempt at delinking Pakistan from its South Asian context and integrating it to that of South West Asia.

However, the assignation of Pakistan as a front-line state and the massive flow of US arms to Pakistan has had the beneficial effect on Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. While all along United States has been

very consistent on the prevention of horizontal nuclear proliferation, it has either overlooked or failed to check Pakistan's attempts at it. The same Carter Administration which had attempted to exert pressure to stall Pakistan's nuclear ambitions through the Symington-Glenn Amendment (1979) had to perforce revise its policy in 1980. With the advent of the Reagan Administration, a \$ 3.02 billion worth of military assistance and weapons like the F-16s were transferred to Pakistan. Hence, the American non-proliferation concerns were muted by the elevation of Pakistan as a major pillar of U.S. policy in South West and South Asia. The Reagan Administration even used this as a justification of increasing military transfers to that country with the rationale that such transfers may slow down the nuclear weapons programme of Pakistan. A second instalment of \$ 4.02 billion military aid and assistance has been sanctioned once again despite newspaper reports of nuclear components being smuggled to Pakistan.

In actual terms America's own security and its geo-strategic and economic interests around the globe

figure very high in the priorities of American foreign policy postures and stances vis-a-vis the question of nuclear proliferation in the third world, and the policy and programme of the United States reflect this hierarchy of priorities explicitly. Hence even a sensitive issue as the question of nuclear proliferation in Pakistan had to be summarily overlooked in the light of the strategic imperative to transfer arms to Pakistan.

This brings us to the last major impact of arms supplies to Pakistan. The substantial quantity of arms reaching Pakistan have posed a major threat to Indian security. To counter this enhanced threat it has been logical on the part of India to equip herself militarily. This has resulted in the Indian subcontinent becoming a breeding ground for arms and militarisation having disastrous prospects and consequences for the region as a whole. Stanley Wolpert very succinctly puts it, "for South Asia the new arms race had only just begun..."⁴

⁴ Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Super Power (New York, 1982), p.3.

APPENDIX-I

APPENDIX-I

Table-1

ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN FROM THE USA
(From 1954-1970)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1956	10	<u>AIRCRAFT</u> Lockheed T-33A	
1956-58	120	NAF-86F Sabre	
1957	6	Lockheed RT-33A	
1958	6	Martin Canberra RB-57	
1958-62	75	Cessna 0-1 Birddog	
1960-62	15	Sikorsky S-55	
1962	4	Grumman HU-16A Albatross	
1963	4	Lockheed C-1305 Hercules	
1963	25	Cessna T-37 B	
1966-67	2	Lockheed (-130 E) Hercules	
1968	18	Lockheed F-104 Starfighter	After the partial lifting of the embargo
1968	7	Martin Canberra B-57	
		<u>MISSILES</u>	
1964	150	Sidewinder	
1965	500	Cobra	
		<u>NAVAL VESSELS</u>	
1955	1	Coastal Minesweeper	Transferred under MAP
1956	1	" "	"

Table-1) continues

Date	Number	Item	Comments
1957	2	Coastal Minesweeper	Transferred under MAP
1958	2	Destroyer 'Ch' class	
1959	2	Coastal Minesweeper	Transferred under MAP
1959	1	Tug	"
1960	1	Filer	"
1959	1	Water Carrier	built for the MAP
1960	2	Tugs	transferred under MAP
1963	1	Oiler	"
1964	1	Submarine 'Tench' class	
1965	4	Patrol Boat (Town'	
<u>ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES</u>			
1951-54		M-24 Chaffell.	
1954-55	200	M-4 Sherman	
1954-55	50	M-41 Bulldog	
1955-60	460	M-47 & M-48 Patton	
1960-62	50	M-113	
1969	300	APC	After the partial uplifting of the embargo

Source: Arms Trade to the Third World, SIPRI (Humanity Press, Stockholm, 1971).pp.

Table-2

US-MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount in million dollars US</u>
1953-57	(160.4)
1958	(92.9)
1959	(102.7)
1960	(79.1)
1961	(56.7)
1962	(21.2)
1963	(99.8)
1964	(55.8)
1965	(56.0)
1966	(1.4)
1967	-
1968	2.3
1969	0.1
1949-59	356.0
1959-69	372.4

Notes: Brackets are for estimated amounts.

Sources: Arms Trade with the Third World, SIPRI (Almquist and Wilkell, Humanities Press, New York, 1971), pp.146-147.

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