

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled,
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P R E F A C E

The nuclear ambitions of Pakistan can no longer be doubted. So much so, that the query - is Pakistan going nuclear or not has lost value. The questions that are now being asked are - What are the considerations that have motivated Pakistan to embark on the nuclear path? Can Pakistan's nuclear policy be diplomatically viable for the pursuit of its foreign policy? Is Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy thus expected to exercise a lot of leverage in the international area? Or Pakistan simply cannot afford to be left behind in the race of going nuclear among the nations? The study has been undertaken to explore these and many other related questions for an indepth study of the subject - Pakistan's Nuclear Diplomacy.

The first chapter examines the evolution of nuclear policy of Pakistan. It goes into the recent political history of Pakistan, beginning from the time when Pakistan's interest in the field was first aroused. An attempt has been made to examine Pakistan's nuclear policy as a part of the technological and scientific revolution taking place throughout the world. Pakistan's nuclear pursuit may be regarded as a natural solution to the nation's energy requirements. In fact the energy needs of the third world leave no ground for depriving them of the nuclear option.

In the latter part of the chapter, the military purpose of Pakistan's nuclear programme has been highlighted. This has been supported by an analysis of Pakistan's stand towards major arms control measures. Thus towards the end, this chapter brings out the declared and the undeclared or actual objective of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy.

In the second and the third chapter Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy has been examined in the regional context. The subject has been approached from two angles - Why cannot Pakistan remain non-nuclear, and Why must Pakistan go nuclear? In South Asia, in the context of a nuclear India, Pakistan views its nuclear pursuit as one of paramount importance. Assuming that India has already acquired the nuclear status, Pakistan feels that it has no alternative other than that of going nuclear.

Moreover, Pakistan perceives that by going nuclear, there are enormous gains in store from the oil rich nations of South West Asia. Pakistan is regarded as a 'Child of Islam' by the countries of the region. It's nuclear programme also entails the least opposition from Israel. The nuclear endeavours of the South West Asian nations are being obstructed by Israel. Pakistan thus with the Islamic bomb visualizes for herself the role of being the leader of the Muslim world.

The fourth chapter has dealt with the failure of the international agreements on non-proliferation, and the approach of the Super Powers (particularly U.S.) towards the

Islamic bomb visualizes for herself the role of being the leader of the Muslim World.

The fourth chapter has dealt with the failure of the international agreements on non-proliferation, and the approach of the Super Powers (particularly U.S.) towards the nuclear policy of Pakistan. Pakistan has continued to receive military assistance from U.S.A. The nuclear diplomacy of Pakistan vis-a-vis U.S.A., has been examined in this chapter.

The failure of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to fulfil the commitments undertaken by them under the NPT has led to a situation, where the third world countries refuse to be taken in by assurances, safeguards and guarantees contained in the non-proliferation treaty. A nuclear policy holds a lot of importance for the developing countries to fulfil their energy requirements from both the civil and military angle. Diplomatically, in the context of national interest thus embarking on the nuclear path is unavoidable for Pakistan. Economically, the nuclear pursuits cannot be regarded as a burden, as on their completion great returns are foreseen.

The last chapter gives a summary and the conclusion.

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Finally, I alone am responsible for the shortcomings in this paper.

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Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Diplomacy :

The nuclear programme of Pakistan can be divided into four main periods. These are (i) 1953-60, when Pakistan's nuclear programme was entirely peaceful, though it lacked a technical knowhow. (2) 1960-61, when the programme was still peaceful although there was a minority view in the Pakistan Government - the Foreign Office and Bhutto - in the mid 1960s in favour of a nuclear weapons option by Pakistan. In this period, the programme had a technical focus. The research reactor and the power reactor was emphasised but the programme lacked substantial significance. (3) December, 1971-77, when the plutonium bomb and the reprocessing to a weapons programme was adopted. There was also the start-up of the enrichment route to a weapons programme in 1974-75, and (4) 1974 to date, when the emphasis was on enrichment work, and the reprocessing activity was suspended but it was not scrapped.¹

The two sharp lines marking Pakistan's nuclear development may be said to be as follows. One that

1. Ashok Kapoor, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (Croom Helm, London, 1987) P.19.

marks the initiation of Pakistan on to the nuclear path. The second is the one that marks the beginning of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. In the study of the intentions of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy, it is essential to consider the background of the development of Pakistan's nuclear energy programme.

Broadly the background can be divided into the role of the external and the internal factors.

The first basic requirement for any kind of development of a third world developing country is to possess scientific technical infrastructure. The help for the training of the Pakistan Scientists came from the western countries Canada, U.S.A. and the European Countries.

The first phase of Pakistan's nuclear development was directed towards civilian ends. The western countries played the part of being the 'Supplier nations' for the technology, talent and the equipment required for the purpose. Pakistan's intention into the nuclear path was thus encouraged by the incentives coming forth from the Western powers.

Pakistan's entry on the nuclear scene with civilian motives ~~path~~ was regarded as an essential step on the following grounds - Economic and Status. Economically, the nuclear energy was expected to increase the energy

production manifold. This feature was expected to be very beneficial in diverting the oil money of South West Asia to Pakistan.

Status-wise the stepping on to the nuclear path was regarded as one of important diplomatic nature, because Pakistan did not want to be left behind the few third world countries that has also embarked on the nuclear path. This factor made the idea of becoming nuclear important for Pakistan in the global as well as regional context. In the regional context, Pakistan did ^{not} want to be left out of the nuclear race, with India its neighbour, allegedly a nuclear power. This is a major factor that decided Pakistan's approach towards non-proliferation. Given the psychology of the peoples of India and Pakistan, Pakistan's behaviour is understandable. The only argument put forth by Pakistan for not signing the NPT was that India has not signed it."

the security question ... the motivating factor for Pakistan to go nuclear (in natural response to its perception of India having acquired nuclear status after the Pokharan Test in 1974).."²

2. Brij Mohan Kaushik and Melhōtra, Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb (Sopan, N. Delhi 1980), p.11.

This naturally lends some more credence to the point, that whenever any feature of Pakistan's foreign policy arouses controversy, the first aspect that is picked up for justification is the "India factor".

It is this factor that has been played upon by Pakistan to quell the domestic criticism of the Government. Bhutto in the seventies, at the height of the political crisis, when Pakistan was left ~~with~~ ^{her} left half of original sizes, used this very diplomatic instrument to quieten the unrest at home. Similarly, at present the repeated postponement of the 'free and fair' elections by President Zia is explained by laying blame at the 'India factor'.

In the same manner, the domestic attention is sought to be diverted from the political and economic problems, by turning them towards the nuclear development of Pakistan. The diplomatically strategic permanent instrument of any leadership (elected or otherwise) is that of making promises and arousing expectations of public. This serves to rouse their morale too. Pakistan's nuclear adventure is diplomatically' playing this role also.

At this juncture, briefly the usage by the Pakistani Government of the diplomatic strategy of going nuclear may also be noted.

During the fifties the nuclear programme and nuclear diplomacy did not have much importance for the Pakistani Government. In this period there were no imperative external (diplomatic and strategic) factors to lead the Pakistani diplomatic and military elites to give importance to Pakistan's nuclear development³. The absence of an external imperative was re-inforced by the absence of an internal technical and scientific base. In the latter case, the Pakistani political leadership and bureaucracy had no appreciation of the importance of a nuclear programme for the nation. Perhaps, because they did not even think on the line as the Pakistani scientists did not possess the technical capability. In this case the ineptitude of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) during the 1950s was partly responsible for the indifference of the Pakistani civilian and military organisations to the nuclear factor."⁴

From the mid 1960s 'the economic and technological compulsions on Pakistan were such that it would have been naive on its part to think in terms of nuclear weapons'.⁵

Brutto's association with the nuclear policy of

3. n.1, p.42.

4. Kausik and Mehrotra, n.2, p.80.

5. n.1, p.53.

Pakistan began from 1958. In his opinion Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission was no more than a signboard when he took charge of the department. When he assumed charge of the Atomic energy department, Pakistan was nearly twenty years behind India in its nuclear programme.

Pakistan's nuclear power programme could 'get off the ground'⁶ only in the 1960s. This was the high point in the development of nuclear energy in Pakistan. The main motivation behind this lies in the 'granite determination' with which Bhutto took over the programme. He put his entire vitality behind the task of acquiring nuclear capability for Pakistan⁷. A second factor responsible for this is that the bureaucratic problems which Dr. Nazir Ahmad had earlier encountered because of his incorrect technical approach and his poor scientific background were successfully overcome by his successor 'Dr. Usmani'⁸.

Usmani has been called the architect of Pakistan's nuclear energy developments during the 1960s.⁹ It has been opined that during the 1960s Pakistan did not seek a nuclear weapons option, because its political, military, scientific and foreign officials invariably took decisions which retrospectively speaking, distorted the physical developments of a nuclear infrastructure that is required

6. n.2, p.38.

7. n.2, p.38

8. n.1, p.53

9. ibid., p.86.

to develop a nuclear weapons option¹⁰. When Bhutto became serious about the nuclear weapons option, Usmani left the Ministry. Had Bhutto adopted this approach right from the beginning this would not have happened. Initially Bhutto was serious about developing a nuclear capability but had not concentrated on the 'Weapon option'.

A change in his policy came during the mid 60s. The Bhutto era is important from 1972 - 77, because it represents a turning point in the Pakistan's nuclear history. It transferred the scope and character of Pakistan's nuclear activities - its nuclear policy, its nuclear posture and its arms control activities as compared to the scope and direction of various aspects of Pakistan's nuclear activities in the 1950s and 1960s. The Bhutto era represented a break from the past. It was a turning point in many ways. The innocence of Pakistan's nuclear past was lost. Bhutto's approach distorted Pakistani Planning for nuclear energy in the future. Though Bhutto failed to acquire a Pakistani bomb in the name of Islam during his lifetime, it is to his everlasting credit that he laid the foundations of Pakistan's nuclear and industrial development. Zia ul-Haq, the present President of Pakistan build on

10. ibid., p.137

Bhutto's accomplishment in these areas.¹¹

Bhutto personally dominated over the nuclear decision making process. The chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was made personally responsible to Bhutto. Munir Ahmad Khan was made the Chairman of PAEC.

In 1977, Bhutto was ousted from power by General Zia-ul-Haq. The nuclear decision making process under him is different from the one that existed under Bhutto. With Zia's coming, military men moved into nearly every department of the Government. Unlike Bhutto who had kept the nuclear programme in his own hands, "General Zia is not thought by most analysts to wield untrammelled power"¹². The aim is take decisions with a careful consideration of the relevant factors, including both the perceived need for deterrance and prestige, as well as ensuring the supply of external arms for conventional defence.

General Zia is as ambitious about the nuclear policy as Bhutto was although his manner of operations is slightly different. "The nuclear programme was accelerated under military auspices (aspirations) and taken to its

11. ibid., p.137

12. Richard P. Cronin, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, The Middle East Journal Autumn, Vol.37, pp.594 - 616.

logical conclusions. Zia moved to build the bomb without a formal declaration and without an expression or demonstration. That is, he simultaneously sought Pakistani bomb development and a move away from a decision to explode it. Zia also implemented Bhutto's NPT policy or posture¹³

In 1979, Pakistan's nuclear policy led to a difficult period for Zia. The revelations about Pakistan's clandestine nuclear operations led to a diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, the enforcement of Symington and Glenn amendments in Pakistan and thus an increase in military and diplomatic insecurity of Pakistan. Zia however, even under pressure from U.S. did not abandon Pakistan's nuclear quest.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served as a turning point in Pakistan's fortunes. The Afghanistan event gave Pakistan an opportunity to develop its nuclear option in a friendly international climate, and to develop the Zia/Regan^a approach which was to treat the nuclear issue as a regional problem which required significant India concessions to Pakistan and the U.S.A. Thus the Afghanistan event^t created opportunities for Pakistani diplomacy in general and Pakistani nuclear diplomacy in particular which did not exist before 1979¹⁴.

13. n.11, p.137

14.^s ibid., p.191

Irrespective of who the head of the State is - civilian or military, Bhutto or Zia¹⁵; the nuclear department has always had great significance for the Pakistani Government. The question that arises is - what are the factors that have made going nuclear unavoidable for the Pakistani Government? This can be viewed from two angles - external and internal, implying how advantageous can be nuclear status for Pakistan from within and outside.

At the very outset, it may be rightly said, that considering the rate at which technological and scientific revolutions are taking place throughout the world, Pakistan's nuclear policy should be viewed as a part of this process. Perhaps or rather the fact is that because Pakistan - a small nation belonging to the third world has chosen to pursue the nuclear policy, even before the world is prepared to accept it as such, the subject has invited so much of attention. Or in other words, in the understanding of the greater part of the world, Pakistan has unnecessarily joined the nuclear race reserved for the 'select few' generating unprecedented controversy.

Pakistan has openly stated that she needs nuclear power as a solution to her energy needs since the country

15. Even Ayub Khan, according to Bhutto was prepared to buy the "bomb of the shelf".

totally lacks any fossil resources. She has contended that if the advanced industrialized countries are concerned with the energy crisis which affects their prosperity, the developing countries which are more seriously affected, have every reason for developing nuclear technology for power purposes.¹⁶

The Pakistani Ambassador to the United Nations has stated that it would be 'ironic' if the developing countries ~~are~~ and deprived of the benefits of advanced technology without which their economic backwardness will be perpetuated and their progress paralyzed.¹⁷ The nuclear technology is significant for Pakistan for the provision of power and for reducing water shortage in her desert areas by powering desalination projects along the Makran coast which is adjacent to the barren areas of Sind.

In the later part of 1979, a Pakistani Government Publication entitled - Nuclear Energy in Pakistan was released. According to this, the country needs 27,000MW of installed hydro, thermal and nuclear generating capacity

16. T.C. Bose " Nuclear Proliferation: A Case Study of Pakistan " Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol. 7, No.1, January-June 1983, pp.34-48.

17. The Economist, (London), 15 September, 1979, p.62.

by 2000 A.D., in order to achieve a modest electricity consumption rate of 800 KWH per capita compared with an estimated world average consumption rate by that time of 3,000 KWH.

The hydro, coal, oil and gas resources of the country in combination cannot contribute to a total non-nuclear capacity of more than 11,000 MW. The remaining 16,000 MW, according to the publication, will have to come from nuclear power. Pakistan's nuclear development is thus an economic necessity.

The publication also states that the oil imports will become an unbearable strain on the country's economy if they are directed toward power generation. Pakistan's bill for imports had increased from \$70,000,00 to \$950,000,000 during the period 1974 - 79. Consequently, the development of nuclear energy is imperative for Pakistan economically.¹⁸

The impression given by the publication is that Pakistan's nuclear programme is intended to augment the nation's energy supply. The nuclear power plants have been set up thus to meet the energy requirements of the country.

It may be noted, that the emphasis laid on the economic necessity could be used as a camouflage for Pakistan's nuclear military programme. President Zia, while insisting that the programme was entirely directed to obtaining nuclear source of energy, refused to rule out the possibility of the country setting off an atomic explosion to join the nuclear club. ~~This~~ he emphasised would be sought if its need was felt as a part of the country's search for peaceful power.¹⁹

Now, it needs to be analysed as to in what manner can Pakistan's pursuit for nuclear power be regarded as a part of its pursuit for achieving a nuclear weapon capability? The inevitable by product of nuclear power production has to be huge quantities of plutonium. This produced every year, through reprocessing can be used for the production of nuclear weapon. It is this link between the so called peaceful nuclear technology and nuclear weapon manufacture that is the key issue in the Proliferation in Pakistan.

Plutonium 239 and Uranium 235 are the fissile

materials generally required for making nuclear explosives.

It was attempted by the Pakistan Government to acquire the spent fuel of both heavy reactors and light water reactors containing Plutonium. The Plutonium needs to be separated from other elements and the spent ^{fuel} ~~fuel~~ has to be reprocessed. It was for the purpose of acquiring a reprocessing plant that Pakistan had negotiated an agreement with the French company Saint Gobain Techniques Nouvelles. Under an agreement the French company was to set up a reprocessing plant at Chasma.²⁰

Pakistan's choice of the Plutonium route was thus publicly calculated to throw the western powers off the scent and protect the secrecy of what Pakistan was actually upto. Pakistan was conscious of the fact that on the successful ^{fu} ~~su~~ explosion of a nuclear device, she would be the first Muslim nation to do ^{so} ~~so~~. It would also have a profound effect in Asia and elsewhere. It was with this in mind that soon after the Indian explosion in 1974, Bhutto set out to spin a web of deception around Pakistan's efforts to become a nuclear power.

In this manner, consequently, Pakistan's progress

20. Immediately after the Indian nuclear explosion Bhutto initiated a nuclear weapon programme. He planned to divert the nuclear explosive material from the reprocessing plant at Chasma.

with its Plutonium reprocessing plants was monitored. To the French company, contract safeguards were given in writing to ensure against the 'misuse' of the refined Plutonium. The Vienna, the International Atomic Energy Agency, was insisting on rigorous control procedures, at the time when Pakistan opting for the Uranium path was going ahead with her nuclear programme. The Uranium was being enriched by the centrifuge process. Astonishingly enough, Pakistan had started buying technology she needed from the very countries which had been trying to stop her from becoming a nuclear power. The material needed for the centrifuge Uranium enrichment facility which Pakistan acquired for weapons grade Uranium for obtaining weapons Uranium for nuclear explosives, was purchased covertly to avoid public attention.

With this purpose in mind, Pakistan set up a number of front or dummy organizations around the world for centrifuge plant components. These ranged from electrical equipments, invertors to corrosion resistant tubing. 'Team Industries' and 'Weargate', a West German and Dutch firm respectively were used among others to buy invertors and marten site steel from a number of countries including Great Britain, Netherlands, West Germany, United States and Switzerland.

The components required for the centrifuge enrichment

facility, have other legitimate civilian uses also. While purchasing these items through dummy organizations, Pakistan gave the impression that they were being made for a textile mill and were intended for civilian uses.

Ostensibly Pakistan did not embark on the part of going nuclear for military purposes. And in the garb of civilian pursuits thus purchased material required for the purpose from the very powers that were dead against any such designs of Pakistan. Pakistan's intentions did come under suspicion, when a member of British Labour Party, Frank Allaun, made a statement in the British Parliament in the last quarter of 1978. He referred to the export of 'invertors' to Pakistan by Emerson Electric, an English concern. ²¹

Pakistan had purchased thirty invertors or high speed motor drives from Emerson Electric in 1977 through a West German firm and was seeking to purchase hundred more through a Dutch intermediary called 'Weargate'. The British authorities intervened. The invertors were of the kind employed by the British Atomic Energy Commission. Nucleonics Week, October, 1978 reported that the British Government feared the use of the

equipment in a gas centrifuge plant. The same view was held by Emerson Electric. Emerson also stated that eighteen months ago the British Government had been informed of such a possibility. After the intervention of the British Government Emerson halted the production of the second investor and stopped the sale.


There are several other similar cases of Pakistan's attempts to acquire the material required for the nuclear projects in the garb of civilian pursuits. On suspicion that at Chasma a nuclear power project (CHASNUPP) is being worked upon, the promised Canadian aid to the project was stopped. According to the Pakistani version, this did not halt the work, at Chasma Plant as their own engineers continued it.



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The most controversial and significant of the nuclear projects in Pakistan are the reprocessing and the uranium enrichment project. "In his statement of 16 August 1977 made before newsmen, General Zia said that he would implement the agreement with France for the supply of the reprocessing Plant".²² Informed sources reported in September, 1977 that Pakistan had already stated receiving necessary blue prints related to the

22. P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Pakistan - Atomic threat to South Asia, (Vision Books, 1980), p.46.

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project from France and some part payment had been made,²³
On being pressed by U.S.A. France, in the beginning of
1978 suggested renegotiations to modify the deal by
supplying a 'co-processing' instead of the reprocessing
plant. A co-processing plant produces a mixture of
Uranium and Plutonium oxides - usable in reactors, but
does not separate Plutonium which can be used for
weapons purposes. This suggestion of France was rejected
by Pakistan.²⁴ The French company, despite the French
President's declaration, surprisingly continued to help
Pakistan. The last of the French advisors ultimately
withdrew from the project in June, 1979. An effective
end to the French co-operation in the project was thus
brought by the time, when Pakistan possessed the details
of the plant but lacked the vital or the sensitive
equipment.

Despite the French vocal abrogation of the agreements,
there remains no doubt that Pakistan continued to go
ahead with the reprocessing plant. It is difficult to
say with certainty that she continued on her own or with
assistance from other powers.

23. DAMI, September 6, 1977.

24. n.20, p.47

Thus the controversy about Pakistan's nuclear pursuits hovers over whether they are aimed towards civilian needs or military. Or rather, in view of certain clandestine efforts of Pakistan having come to light, it would be fitting to say, that her nuclear intentions are increasingly suspected to being oriented towards not merely civilian power.

According to secret U.S. documents, allegedly seized by the Iranian students from the U.S. Embassy, Tehran in November 1979, Pakistan's nuclear programme is for military purposes. The two volume of documents contain a confidential telegram sent on 22 October, 1979 by the US Envoy in Paris to Mr. Arthur Himmal, the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan. It said that Mr. Adnurd, Islamabad's Ambassador to France had told him that Pakistan had every intention of finishing the reprocessing plant on its own after France cancelled its contract to set up the plant in Islamabad.²⁵

In the second week of December 1985, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace brought out a report, which described the nuclear developments in India and Pakistan as of particular concern. The report has been written by Mr. Leonard S. Spector, a Senior-Associate at

Carnegie. The report stated that Pakistan had continued its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and was on the threshold of becoming a nuclear weapon state.²⁶

Pakistan's nuclear programme generated more controversy, when on 15 September 1986, a nuclear energy co-operation agreement was signed with China, despite the fact that both the countries agreed to the inspection of any point project by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and maintained that the agreement covered only peaceful uses. On 4 November, the Washington Post published an article claiming that Pakistan was able to enrich Uranium to 93.5%. This is well in excess of the 5% level required for domestic purposes, and is the amount needed for weapons. It also reported that between September 18 and 21, Pakistan had detonated a high explosive device as a part of a programme to develop a 'implosion' type of nuclear weapon. Indian nuclear officials, while also claiming that Pakistan had attained the ability to enrich Uranium to 93.5%, said that US reports had incorrectly identified an earthquake in September as a nuclear test.²⁷

The UK newspaper 'Observer' published on 1 March 1987

26. Asian Recorder 1987, p.19901.

27. ibid., 1986, p.18736.

a front page story about the production of weapons grade enriched Uranium at the Khan Laboratories some 30 km East of Islamabad. Dr. Abdul Qader Khan was quoted to have confirmed the speculation of Pakistan having assembled a nuclear bomb.²⁸

Two Soviet scholars I.B. Radko and N.B. Shastokolsky have affirmed that Pakistan's regime is trying to build a thermo-nuclear bomb.²⁹

It would be appropriate to say that Pakistan's nuclear pursuits clearly suggest a strategy to develop a nuclear explosive capability in advance of a balanced civil nuclear programme. This is primarily a reflection of the first and topmost priority being given to security considerations. The military intentions of Pakistan's nuclear pursuits thus can no longer be held in doubt.

Although the nuclear capability of Pakistan is almost certain, President Zia seems to have mastered the diplomatic strategy of being ambiguous on the issue. President Zia in his March 1987 interview to the 'Time'

28. ^{Contemporary} Kessinger's Archives March 1987, p.34996.

29. Reported in Link (525) (52), 7 August 1983, pp.17-21.

magazine said:

" what is difficult about a bomb? Once you have acquired the technology, which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you like".³⁰

Subsequently in April he said that "Pakistan has not made a bomb, is not working on it, nor has any intention to build it".³¹

The father of the Pakistani enrichment project Aul Qader Khan, said in an interview to Kuldip Nayar, an Indian Journalist : "... they told us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but now they know, we have done it."³²

Later Khan denied giving the interview and said that the article which appeared in Observer was "false ... to and an attempt to malign Pakistan".³³

It would not be incorrect to pinpoint that such statements coming from responsible people in the Pakistan

30. Rodney Jones (ed), Small Nuclear Forces and US Security Policy, the centre for strategic and International studies, USA, 1984. From Ravi Sastri, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon Programme and US Policy, Strategic Analysis. January 1988, p.1221.

31. Nuclearics Week, April 12, 1987.

32. The Observer (London), March 1, 1987 from n p.1222.

33. The Muslim, March 2, 1987 from n p.1222.

government have been deliberately given. The calculated strategy is to create a posture of diplomatic ambiguity.

Pakistan's attempt to go nuclear clandestinely and maintain an ambiguity about its nuclear capability, indicates that it is not in a position to follow an overt nuclear weapons programme. If it goes nuclear openly, it would invite the following probable consequences; a cut-off of American aid, an arms race with India in which Pakistan would be the loser, and if Pakistan attempted to test and stockpile nuclear weapons, Israel would be tempted to carry out a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan nuclear facilities.³⁴

Concluding, it may be opined that although Pakistan's nuclear capability is certain,³⁵ it prefers to maintain a posture of diplomatic ambiguity because of advantages inherent in this policy.

34. Ravi Sastri : Pakistan's Nuclear weapon Programme and US Policy, Strategic Analysis, January, 1988, p.1222

35. See Appendix I & II.

The India Factor

The study of Pakistan's Nuclear Diplomacy in the context of the India factor¹ limits the subject to a regional perspective. To gain a deeper insight and broader outlook into the subject the nuclear policy of both India and Pakistan needs to ^{be} studied as a part of the global proliferation with special reference to the third world countries.

Global proliferation exists at two levels - horizontal and vertical. The select few members of the nuclear club do not want more countries to attain the nuclear capability. It is this factor tht has led to the drafting of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The key factor in the development of the NPT may be regarded as follows. With the spread of nuclear technology, the future role predicted for nuclear power continued to expand, and a growing number of nations developed the ability to engage in a wide range of nuclear activities. It became increasingly clear that verified promises of peaceful use applying only to imported nuclear supplies could not provide enough assurance that ostensibly peaceful nuclear programmes would not serve military ends also. This recognition was the key factor

1. See the Table (pp 49-52).

in the development of NPT.

The treaty, in this context, can be regarded as the culmination of efforts to implement an international co-operative regime for the controlled development of nuclear energy. The NPT accords unequal status to the (nuclear) weapon and non-weapon states. The negotiations which led to the drafting of the NPT and the subsequent acceptance or rejection of the treaty by different states, reinforces the image of an international system organized hierarchically in terms of power but given over in some strategic measure to the political demands of a particular category of its constituents. The reality of the NPT as it stands today is that those states most able in varying degrees to embark upon national nuclear weapons programme either have not signed, have signed but not ratified (which is the same as being a non-signatory) or may be suspected of "unsigning the treaty". Among these States are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan. Perhaps these regarded the choice between being and not being a signatory to NPT similar to that between whether to bell cats or to catch the mice.²

2. Marwah, Onkar and Schulz ~~Am~~, Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries, (Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Mass 1975), p.1.

In the approach of the non-nuclear weapons to the NPT debate in 1968, the relationship of vertical to horizontal Proliferation was a central issue. India found the NPT as it stood, did not give a real genuine and credible guarantee to non-nuclear countries against a nuclear attack.³ A General Assembly Resolution pointing to the absence of such guarantees was offered by Ethiopia and supported by Ceylon, Japan, Kenya, Nepal and Pakistan. The NPT was rejected by South Africa also. Algeria pointed with scepticism to the Treaty's supposition that its three co-sponsors would never be aggressors. Thailand found that the treaty offered no security against potential Chinese Communist aggression. Pakistan stated that its position would depend on its own enlightened national interest and national security in the geographical context of the region in which Pakistan is situated.⁴

The Indian view expressed was that even after the conclusion of the NPT the nuclear threat will continue to exist until such time as the nuclear menace has been eliminated further. The rejection of the NPT thus determined India's stand on the issue. Subsequently even the states such as Iran, which signed the Treaty pointed to the

3. The Hindu, 21 June 1968.

4. Dawn, 2 May 1968.

weakness of the Resolution. The majority of the non-nuclear third world countries felt the same. The NPT was not signed by the States with peaceful nuclear aspirations, because it was regarded as discriminatory. The obligations in the NPT were pointed as asymmetrical by Brazil and India. The nuclear 'haves' could retain weapons, were not subject to the safeguard system and could develop peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). This, then was not wrongly regarded as a new form of dependence, and this in no way could be regarded as beneficial to their national interest by the nuclear 'have not' states.

Irrespective of the fact, whether party to treaty or not, equal right to nuclear technology has been a common theme of the non-nuclear states.

In the preceding paragraphs stress has been laid on various nations' approach towards NPT. Pakistan's nuclear policy can be studied as a part of the general trend towards proliferation.

India, Brazil and Argentina, the more developed of the third world nations also form a part of this trend. These countries have made considerable economic progress. They are the leading countries in the non-aligned movement, the champions of a new international economic order, and the non-signatories to the NPT (being its

most trenchant critics). The regimes in these countries, while striving their best to end all internal pressures for a just social order, use radical rhetoric against imperialism, and clamour for a just world order and a new North-South equation. In essence they are seeking a redistribution of world order to their own advantage. The nuclear technology has tremendous value as a symbol of modernity, technological development and potentially independent growth. This explains their quest for the nuclear status.

Pakistan's proliferation is explained in the West as a part of a 'chain theory'. The 'Chain theory' entails that just like the whole of Latin America would go nuclear, if Brazil does so; Pakistan will, similarly take cue from India, followed by Iran and the entire Middle East.

It has also been opined that the third world nations do not want to be left behind in the age of nuclear revolution, as they were at the onset of the industrial revolution.

Leave alone Pakistan, the question of why is any country going nuclear cannot be accorded a simple answer.

The trend is not limited to Pakistan, South Asia or the third world, but may be regarded as a global characteristic. The complexity of the issue of proliferation, perhaps also justifies the failure of the NPT and the nuclear-free zones proposals.

From time to time, to check proliferation, proposals for a nuclear weapon free zone have also been made in various areas of the world. These include the Romanian proposal for a Balkan nuclear weapon free zone, the Soviet proposal for a mediterranean zone, the Finnish proposal for a Nordic zone, the Chinese proposal for an Asia Pacific zone, the Polish proposal for a Central European Zone, the African proposal for a Middle East Zone, the Pakistan proposal for a South Asia Zone and the Latin American proposal. So far only the last mentioned has been formally ^(not actually) constituted as a nuclear weapon free zone under the Treaty of Tlateloco, the others being still in the stage of proposals.

Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone, according to India should include all the significant nations of Asia. In other words, there cannot be a South Asia nuclear weapon free zone without China being brought into it. The cardinal principle of the nuclear weapon

free zone, according to US and the Western powers is that it should not upset the existing military balance.⁵ Since China has Soviet divisions armed with nuclear weapons parked on its boarder, it cannot participate in the proposed nuclear weapon free zone's implementation in Asia. China, being blocked on the north and west by the Soviet Union is in a position to exercise its big power role only in the South and South East Asia. A nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, without China, would tilt the military balance overwhelmingly in favour of China, which is undoubtedly an unacceptable proposition for India.

The Pakistani proposal for a South Asian Nuclear free zone should not be understood as its advocacy for non-proliferation.⁶ A Pakistani scholar had pointed out that this proposal of Pakistan is actually a cover for its going nuclear.

"Pakistan will continue its efforts to embarrass India in international forums by demanding that South Asia be made a 'nuclear free zone of peace', that India should open its nuclear installations to inter-

5. Maj. D. K. Palit and P. K. S. Nambhodi, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb, (Vikas, New Delhi, 1979),

6. See the Table and Appendix 2.

national inspection and that India should never undertake the production of nuclear weapons. By making these demands, some of which are unacceptable to hope, Pakistan hopes to gain international support for its position and provide an excuse for going nuclear itself at a later date.⁷ Pakistan has opted for nuclear proliferation because India has. This is the most general and popular explanation of Pakistan's decision to go nuclear. There seems to be a lot of weight in this statement. It cannot be denied that there is no aspect of Pakistan's foreign policy which can be studied without taking into account the India factor. In the nuclear development too, this factor can not be ignored.

This factor may be called the most popular instrument used by the Pakistani leadership to justify its actions and quell the restless opinion at home. Whatever may be the economic burden of the pursuit of such a policy be Pakistan cannot but continue it because of India's nuclear status. Similarly, Pakistan cannot ignore its security concerns and thus in the face of India being a nuclear power, has no other course open before it other than that of going nuclear. True, whenever Pakistan has sought justification for its nuclear pursuits, it has diplomatically, put forward the

7. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Pakistan: The Making of Nuclear Power". Asian Survey, June 1976, Vol. XVI, p.590.

India-factor as the prime motivator. This diplomatic instrument has been made use of by Pakistan time and again.

Will what extent can this be held true that Pakistan's decision to go nuclear has really been motivated by that of India's nuclear status. The 'link-chain' theory supports this point. India joined the club as a response to China's entry into the nuclear club and to the Indo-China war. Similarly, it may be held that Pakistan's decision to go nuclear was provoked by India going nuclear.

Pakistan's search for a certain level for parity with India, can never perhaps be satisfied on the nuclear issue. Still, the nuclear arms for Pakistan are the only way it can create a major deterrent to counter balance the Indian superiority in conventional forces. Its nuclear programme is thus driven by the "classic deterrence" objectives.

It has also expressed, that India in the long run wishes to obtain a great power status. Pakistan's entry into the nuclear club may thus disturb 'Status Quo' - the regional importance of India. Diplomatically, it has been opined, that India will find hard to swallow this fact. The reverse is true for Pakistan. Perhaps,

because it also wants to maintain preeminent position with nuclear power and prestige, it has opted for proliferation.

Pakistan, thus diplomatically does not want to be left too far behind India in the nuclear race. It is perhaps this reasoning, that has made Pakistan a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Similarly, Pakistan's stand on the issue of the South Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone can be explained. The 'link-chain theory' can be applied here also. India feels that Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone should include all the significant nations of Asia. In other words, there cannot be a South Asia nuclear weapon free zone without China being brought into it. China being blocked on the north and west by the Soviet Union is in a position to exercise its big power role only in South and South East Asia. A nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, would tilt the military balance overwhelmingly in favour of China, which is undoubtedly an unacceptable proposition for India.

Pakistan too is willing to support the proposal of South Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone, only if India also becomes a party to it. This may be also regarded as a diplomatic play of Pakistan, Pakistan

paints the picture of being interested in non-proliferation, and in favour of South Asia as a nuclear weapon free zone; but is rendered helpless in supporting these issues, in the face of a nuclear power like India not willing to be a party to these proposals. It may even be suggested that Pakistan herself does not favour such proposals and these are presented to serve as a cover for its going nuclear.⁸

Pakistan will continue its efforts to embarrass India in International forums by demanding that South Asia be made a 'nuclear free zone of peace', that India should open its nuclear installations to international inspection and that India should never undertake the production of nuclear weapons. By making these demands, some of which are unacceptable to hope, Pakistan hopes to gain international support for its position and provide an excuse for going nuclear itself at a later date.

8. Ibid.,

been.
Thus so far it has observed that Pakistan has made use of the 'India-factor' in its nuclear policy, as a diplomatic instrument, diplomatic ploy and also a diplomatic cover. From these angles, this "India-factor" has played an important role in the nuclear pursuits of Pakistan. No doubt, that Pakistan has made diplomatic usage of India's nuclear status, to itself go nuclear. But the question still remains - has Pakistan really gone nuclear because India has.

Ashok Kapur has outlined Pakistan's nuclear development from a different angle. In his opinion - 'the truth is not to be found in the simplistic and deterministic notion of 'Indian threat/Pakistani nuclear response' as has been frequently stated by Western specialists."⁹

In Ashok Kapur's opinion "the India factor was not the driving force in Pakistani nuclear activities". In 1972 Bhutto was seeking accommodation, not confront-

9. Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (Croomhelm, Great Britain, 1987), p.158.

-tation with India by his signature of the Simla Agreement". However, Ashok Kapur in the book does not specifically take one stand of either totally accepting or rejecting the India factor as a driving force in Pakistan's nuclear policy.

He writes " The compulsion to challenge India in the nuclear field must not have been strong; or if it was, then the Simla agreement represented a policy of calculated a deception, a part of the peace of offensive to buy time - until time was ripe to confront India by military and nuclear means"¹⁰.

It would not be wrong to say that Pakistan has always maintained a web of deception around its actual nuclear policy. As a result of this, Pakistan's nuclear policy has always appeared to be complex and ambiguous. It is these ambiguities which have made it difficult to precisely determine the extent to which India factor can be said to have precisely influenced the nuclear activities of Pakistan. For instance, Bhutto said after India's 1974 test:-

10. Ibid., Ashok Kapur, p.162.

" ... We are not going ahead with a nuclear programme for the explosion of a nuclear device which whatever India might say really means a nuclear device for military purposes. But our nuclear programme for peaceful purposes has undoubtedly been accelerated ... and ultimately, if our backs are to the wall and we have absolutely no option, in that event, this decision about going nuclear will have to be taken." 11

The 'India focus' is revealed here as the nuclear programme of Pakistan for peaceful purposes was accelerated.

This then makes us once again take the position, that 'India factor' cannot be eliminated from the study of this subject. Bhutto had said :

"If India goes nuclear, even we will, even if we have to eat leaves, grass or go hungry." 12

Similarly, speaking at the Tokyo Press Club on July 20, 1983, General Zia had declared :

"Pakistan will not sign a nuclear non-proliferation treaty as long as it is treated discriminately. There are many countries which have refused to sign the treaty, and one of these

11. Ibid., p.162.

12. Ibid., p.107, Bhutto just said this in 1965 when Pakistan did not have the technology, manpower or resources to do the job. With time the 'leaves and grass statement' became his favourite. -----

countries is the neighbour of Pakistan to the east. If that neighbour cannot be forced to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, it would be very unfair for Pakistan to have to sign the treaty." 13

In the context of India being a nuclear power, thus Pakistan perceives that it cannot afford to remain non-nuclear. Pakistan, with a nuclear India at its border, views its nuclear pursuit as one of the paramount importance. India's nuclear status leaves Pakistan with no alternative other than that of going nuclear. Nuclear proliferation, for Pakistan is essential from point of security perceptions. Considering the nature of India-Pakistan relations, Pakistan would regard the option to remain non-nuclear as an error of the foreign policy. From the Pakistani viewpoint thus nuclear proliferation is an essential.

Wherein the 'India factor' is concerned, the nuclear pursuits do not have economic advantages. The advantage perceived is the defence potential of the nuclear weapons expected to act as a deterring force. Whatever may be nature of opinions expressed on Pakistan's nuclear pursuit, it cannot be denied that from the Pakistani

13. Link 25 (52), August 7, 1983, pp. 17 - 21.

viewpoint it is naturally an inevitable part of its foreign policy.

The 'India factor' has thus played an important part in not only providing a diplomatic justification for Pakistan's nuclear pursuit, but has also served to propel Pakistan onto the nuclear path.

However, important the India-factor be, it is not only the factor responsible for the proliferation drive of Pakistan. In the context of South West Asia, Pakistan perceives its nuclear policy to be of great economic advantages. If wherein South Asia is concerned, Pakistan (in light of the India-factor) cannot afford to remain non-nuclear, in the context of South West Asia Pakistan perceives enormous gains in store for it economically. This aspect shall be focussed upon in the next chapter.

From an Indian viewpoint, in the light of the Indian nuclear pursuits being for peaceful purposes, Pakistan's embarking on the nuclear path may be regarded as a fallacious blunder.

Pakistan's nuclear policy in the context of the India-factor may thus be viewed from the two angles - from the Pakistan's perception, it may be regarded as an essential feature. Pakistan cannot afford to remain non-nuclear. Pakistan has no course open before it, other than of going nuclear. The Indian analysts may regard the same as an economic waste, an error in decision-making, a wrong policy option and so on.

Whatever the analysts opinions be, the situation as it stands is as follows - Pakistan has embarked on the nuclear path. One of the major factors that has propelled Pakistan onto this path is the 'India factor'. The India factor however cannot be regarded as the one and the only motivating forces responsible for Pakistan's nuclear pursuit. However, it cannot be denied that it is a major factor. With India as a nuclear power, Pakistan from the view point of security cannot afford to remain non-nuclear. Further by going nuclear, Pakistan hopes to gain parity with India on the enhancement of its status and prestige also.

One is led, thus, to accept the fact that perhaps nuclear proliferation would not have been deemed to be

of paramount importance for Pakistan if India had remained non-nuclear. It must be noted that all academicians have agreed that in fifties and sixties Pakistan's nuclear drive was for peaceful purposes. The ambiguity about Pakistan's actual intentions grew when Bhutto came to power in the seventies after the May 1974 nuclear test. Opinions may be accepted or rejected, but this order of happenings cannot be changed.

Before concluding the role of India-factor in the nuclear policy of Pakistan may be analysed. Bhutto had played his role of giving the nuclear development of Pakistan an anti-India orientation, However, under Bhutto, Pakistan was always going nuclear but was never able, even when he possessed full executive powers, to cross the threshold to that executive decision.¹⁴

This leads to the assumption that India-factor has been a determinant of Pakistan's nuclear policy posture, but cannot be classified as a 'primary determinant' of Pakistan's nuclear policy activities.¹⁵

This hypothesis can be extended further to give the following argument. True, that India-factor cannot

14. n, 12, p 172

15. Ibid.

be hailed as a primary determinant where the nuclear activities of Pakistan are concerned, but the role of the same factor in the nuclear diplomacy of Pakistan is irreplaceable. Reiterating it is the India-factor that has been played upon to give diplomatic justification and explanation of its nuclear activities by Pakistan. Ashok Kapoor writes :-

"... India factor was not strong enough to take the plutonium bomb project and the enrichment project to its logical conclusion in Bhutto's lifetime. The reasons for hesitation were numerous, domestic, bureaucratic, as well as technical, industrial, external nuclear supply constraints, as well as diplomatic and strategic considerations. The India factor was not strong enough to overcome the impact of countervailing considerations or compulsions." 16

Going by this assumption one is led to believe that India factor does not have a very major role to play in the nuclear development of Pakistan. Yet the Western analysts have opined that Pakistan has embarked upon the nuclear path because of India.

One is thus forced to debate as to which view should be accepted, to explain the role of the India factor wherein Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy is concerned. Ashok Kapoor has minimised the importance of the India-

factor by saying that it did not play a primary role in the nuclear development of Pakistan. Debating upon this point one is forced to state, be it primary or secondary India's role in this subject cannot be minimised from any angle. Pakistan's diplomatic posture right from the beginning has been such that it has taken the crucial decision to go nuclear because of the suspected nuclear status of India.¹⁷ One cannot deny that the origins of Pakistan's nuclear development can be traced to the India factor. The famous leaves and grass statement was oft repeated to strengthen this very stand of Pakistan.

Ashok Kapoor's stand that several other factors (domestic, bureaucratic, etc ...) were too strong because of which India factor did not play a role of any significance for the nuclear fulfilment of Pakistan, can also be criticized. It has already been expressed that Pakistan always tried to win over the factors at home by playing upon the India-factor.

Concluding, thus the role of the India - factor in Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy can from no angle be

17. See the table Appendix 2.

minimised. Pakistan has never ceased to play upon this factor, to diplomatically justify its nuclear policy. It is this diplomatic usage of the term that leads one to classify India - factor as one of the major diplomatic instruments of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy.

Table:-

THE INDIAN FACTOR AND PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

Period	Diplomatic strategy and posture	Non-Proliferation diplomacy	Assumption
1960s	India's nuclear threat is advertised repeatedly	Signs PTB, 1963 but declines to ratify it	India is a nuclear threat
	Non-proliferation is encouraged to curb India's nuclear ambitions	Favours the principle of NPT, but declines to join NPT citing many reasons.	India's nuclear status threatens the Indo-Pak balance.
	Development of Pakistan's nuclear option isolate India diplomatically in S.A., in Asia vis-a-vis China in particular.		

Contd /.....

Period	Diplomatic strategy and posture	Non-Proliferation diplomacy	Assumptions
1970s to present	<p>January 1972 takes the decision to develop the bomb</p> <p>Seeks India's denuclearization.</p> <p>Pakistan's initiatives about S. Asia nuclear peace diplomatically embarrass India.</p> <p>Encourage the development of Western pressure against unsafeguarded Indian activities</p> <p>Keep India guessing about Pakistan's nuclear intentions and its nuclear weapons capability</p>	<p>"We cannot accept international agreements because India is seeking nuclear armament . There should be a South Asian NWFZ."</p> <p>Does not sign NPT, PTB</p> <p>Repeated declarations that Pakistan is willing to accept any reasonable proposal to de-nuclearize S. Asia.</p> <p>As above.</p>	<p>Indian nuclear intentions are suspected</p> <p>India's nuclear activities are suspected.</p> <p>As above.</p>

This has been made on the basis of the material gathered during the course of the research work, in addition to the tables given by Ashok Kapoor in his book (Pakistan's Nuclear Development Groom Helm 1987).

DIPLMACY OF THE "ISLAMIC BOMB"

The term 'Islamic Bomb' was coined by the late Prime Minister of Pakistan Bhutto. The very term embodies the idea of a nuclear bomb for all the Muslim nations of South West Asia. Considering the nature and extent of intra - regional rivalry prevalent in South West Asia, one is left wondering at the thought of the entire region being united by a bomb the 'Islamic bomb'. Perhaps, it would not be wrong to say, that the very idea, in view of the real state of politics in the region, seems a bit far - fetched. What then is reality of the true picture behind the Islamic bomb of Pakistan. In other words what diplomatic tactic explains the idea and the usage of the term Islamic bomb?

Bhutto strongly felt the necessity of an Islamic bomb. He wrote :-

"We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization is without it, but that position is about to change."¹

1. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 'If I am assassinated' (New Delhi, Vikas, 1979) p.138.

Hutto, thus assumed the responsibility of giving the entire Islamic civilization nuclear capability. This may also be described as a diplomatic measure to justify the nuclear policy of Pakistan. Diplomatic justification, thus is sought by the explanation that Pakistan's nuclear capability is essential for the entire 'Islamic Civilization.' Hutto thus also introduced a new 'Supra-national' concept by suggesting a common term 'Islamic Bomb'.² Bomb that can be used by any or all of the Muslim Countries.

True the term 'Islamic bomb' does diplomatically justify the need of nuclear capability by the Muslim countries. One, however, is forced to question the religious value of a bomb for the entire region. The one and only factor of solidarity existing among the Muslim nations of the regions is that they perceive Israel as a common enemy. This fact can on no account be doubted. Nor can the point be negated, that Israel does not want any country within its reach to attain the nuclear ^{ca}pability.

In Israel's view it cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon. For us it is not a question of

2. Shaikh P. Ali 'Pakistan's Islamic Bomb Reconsidered,' Middle East Review, Vol. 17, No.3 Spring 1985, pp.52-58.

survival," it therefore has to "prevent such a threat at its inception".³

This very principle of Israel has been put into practise through a number of incidents which have disturbed the Iraqi nuclear programme. Iraq's nuclear Programme has been stalled by many unprecedented and unaccountable sabotage operations and assassinations. The most significant of these has been :

"On the afternoon of June 7, 1981, two formations of U.S. - built aircraft left Etzion Air base near Eilat, Israel for a preemptive strike on the Osiraq nuclear reactor. Eight F-16 Falcon aircraft escorted by six F-15 eagles dropped a total of sixteen 2000 pound iron bombs on the reactor facility. According to the account the pilots had been training for this mission since October 1981."⁴

The incident brought out two ^{facts} very clearly. Israel was determined not to allow any nation within its geographical proximity attain the nuclear capability. The other nations realised that till they too acquired access to nuclear weapons, Israel would remain invulnerable as (they believe it has already built nuclear weapons. With material secretly obtained from United States. The Arab nations states thus became determined to either buy or build the weapons.⁵

3. George H. Quester - "Nuclear Weapons and Israel" Autumn, The Middle East Journal Vol. XXXVII, 1983, pp.547-564, Ariel Sharon the Israeli Defence Minister had said this in December, 1981.
4. Ibid.,
5. n.2.

The Muslim nations of the region had become aware of an urgent need to develop and implement a new and comprehensive defence strategy to make the Muslim world capable of defending itself a couple of years before the Osiraq bombing. In 1979, in London^w the first international conference of its kind on 'Defence of the Muslim World', all the Muslim nations were appealed, to pool their resources and share them for their economic and security interests. An Islamic bank of strategic materials was also established subsequently.⁶

Now before analysing on how important can the 'Islamic bomb' be for the region, it would be pertinent to consider the importance of the Islamic bloc for Pakistan. Specifically it would be appropriate to look into the diplomatic advantages of the Islamic military-economic collaboration for Pakistan.

Pakistan's importance in the region was first realised during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Pakistani civilian technicians and military personnel were found throughout the Arab world. Before this war, Pakistan had received hardly any financial assistance also from the Muslim countries of the region.

6. Ibid.,

But ever since the war, the services of Pakistanis - military, civilian and technical, have been much in demand (and have been provided) all over the region.

In brief the services can be listed as following⁷ -

Pakistanis have played important roles in commercial and military operations of Libya, Kuwait and several Persian Gulf Emirates. Pakistan - run training missions have been conspicuous in the front-line states, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's troops have also been furnished to help the Arabs. Large contingents of armed personnel have been deployed throughout the Arab countries. Pakistan maintains military advisors and service personnel in many Arab countries and offers training programmes at home.

The airforce of Abu Dhabi is commanded and maintained by Pakistan air force personnel. In Saudi Arabia alone, there are about 9, 000 Pakistani troops. Many members of the Libyan air force are also Pakistanis.

7. Ibid.

The economic collaboration between Arab countries and Pakistan includes the following areas ⁸ :-

- (i) Joint industrial projects from Pakistan;
- (ii) extended deposits by Arab Countries in Pakistani banks;
- (iii) increased export of cultural commodities and industrial products from Pakistan;
- (iv) Subsidized delivery of oil to Pakistan;
- (v) absorption of Pakistan's surplus labour by Arab countries; and
- (vi) Preferential treatment for Pakistani firms for contracts in the Arab Countries.

Pakistan's diplomacy in the region has brought the country enormous economic returns. The 3,00,000 civilian Pakistanis employed send home every year \$ 3b. as foreign remittances. By mid 1976, Pakistan had received from five Arab countries and Iran, grants and loans worth \$ 1 b. General purpose aid from Iran rose by mid 1977 to 730m, loans and investments from UAE totalled 192 m, from Libya \$ 133 m, and from Kuwait \$ 50 m. ⁹

The above given facts are substantial enough to support the view that there exists close economic and military collaboration between Pakistan and many of the Arab countries. Thus it cannot be nullified that

8. Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Nambodri
"Pakistan's Islamic Bomb" (Vikas, New Delhi, 1979)

Pakistan's nuclear process is being looked forward to by these countries, with almost as many expectations as Pakistan itself has.

These nations need the nuclear weapons primarily to use them as a deterrent against Israel. This factor may be regarded as a permanent one, Pakistan's intentions appear to be to exploit this very sentiment to the maximum extent. Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy in the region is thus not patterned on the religious sentiments of Islam. Rather Pakistan via its nuclear power, hopes to gain diplomatically as much as it can. The religion is being used as a factor to satiate the domestic opinion about the nuclear exploits of the Pakistani government, and to cash upon the value of the religion in the region.

Thus by making as much noise as possible about the Islamic bomb, Pakistan hopes to draw upon the wealth of the oil rich nations to develop itself. In 1973, Bhutto had called an Islamic summit in Pakistan in which he reminded the wealthy Muslim nations of the Middle East of their responsibility towards other Muslim nations. Col. Qaddafi, in the same spirit had

remarked, "our strength is your strength our resources
are your resources." ¹⁰

Pakistan's diplomatic intention to cash upon
its nuclear policy is aided by the following factors :-

Technologically, it is ahead of the nations
of the region. The nuclear capability can naturally
be expected to strengthen this further.

Similarly the nature of economic and military
collaboration has brought out following facts to the
surface, Pakistan has the most skilled man-power; ~~the~~^{its}
industrial infra-structure is more advanced and Pakistan
has assumed a military leadership among the Arab
Countries. The nuclear-capability of Pakistan will
accelerate its lead further in all these areas.

The most skilled manpower in nuclear techno-
logy among all the Muslim nations is found in Pakistan.
And Pakistan by diplomatically giving rise to and
playing upon the idea of an 'Islamic Bomb' has made
the countries of the region look upon it as a developer
of nuclear weapons for all of Islam. This very fact

10. Ibid.,

can be regarded as a diplomatic feat of Pakistan. For, true a common religion does bind these countries. But it would not be incorrect to say, that it binds them in name only. So rampant and frequent is the nature of intra-regional rivalry among these very co-religionists that it would not be incorrect to make the following assumption. Even if the Israel factor does not raise its head again, these very countries would not tolerate the attainment of nuclear capability by their own rivals.

Pakistan has thus been diplomatically very careful about not taking any sides in the intra-regional rivalries. It has a bilateral understanding with almost all the countries but has been cautious about entering into bilateral pacts with them. This aspect of Pakistan's exercise of diplomacy in the region has also contributed to it being looked forward to as a developer of nuclear weapons by the Muslim nations of the entire region.

The exercise of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy, does not end here. The most obvious diplomatic advantage perceived by Pakistan is that with the possession of the

nuclear weapons it hopes to become a leader of the Muslim world.

Pakistan, with the Islamic bomb, hopes to not only obtain the petro-dollars from the Arab-countries, but also expects to receive financial support for its economic and military programme.

The criticism of the anti-proliferation proponents, about Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme would thus be diffused by the support of the Muslim nations.

It thus is not wrong to say that the advantages accruing out of the exercise of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy are manifold. Thus it is no wonder that diplomat Zia calls himself a "Soldier of Islam", to exploit the Islamic connection of his administration, and to seek political and economic gains of the Muslim world.

The 'Islamic bomb' it has been felt may have
11
the following consequences also.

11. Ibid.,

The most obvious and natural effect of an Islamic bomb would be that Islamic solidarity will be strengthened. With the Islamic solidarity strengthened Israel would naturally be deterred from invading and occupying the Arab Countries. Even if Islamic solidarity is not strengthened, Israel will be deterred from going to war with any country in ^{possession of} ~~possession of~~ nuclear weapons. Armed with nuclear weapons, the Muslim nations would thus be better able to withstand external threats and pressures.

It is also possible that the threat of terrorist organizations gaining access to the Islamic nuclear weapons might create security problems in the world. In a civil war situation, which is more probable in Pakistan than in any other nation, contending sides might attempt to seize the weapons and use them either inside or outside the country.

Once Pakistan decides to, it may also seek to capitalize its nuclear strength from as many avenues as possible. It may even one day, export highly enriched uranium to other nations ready to pay for it and those who might wish to make their own bombs.

In the event of such happenings the international efforts to stop or slow down the spread of nuclear weapons would suffer a great set back. It is therefore not impossible to expect that human kind would be one step closer to a world in which a long list of nations could threaten their enemies with nuclear weapons.

Broadly, two facts form the basic parameters of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy. One is that Pakistan is the only Muslim country which is expected to be successful in achieving nuclear capability. The second factor is that the Muslim nations are extremely determined, almost fanatic to possess nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussains had once commented upon the value of an economic boycott of any nation that continues to maintain an embassy in Jerusalem.¹²

"Some people may ask if this decision is the best than can be taken. No. a better decision would be to destroy Tel Aviv with bombs".¹³

Within the parameters of these two factors it may be said that in view of Pakistan's nuclear technology and fanaticism of the countries to possess nuclear weapons,

12. In August 1980, during a debate over whether the Arab world should consider an economic boycott of any nation that ^{continues} countries to maintain an embassy at Jerusalem.

13. n. 3.

the term 'Islamic bomb' has no real political value. In its place any other term would have been equally effective. Any nation can take up banner of promising to produce an Islamic bomb. In real politics it is not the making of promises that counts. What counts is the extent to which these can be kept. Pakistan floated the idea of an Islamic bomb. The idea gained ground and become popular not because of the usage of the name of religion, but because Pakistan has the capability to produce a bomb.

The success of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy is thus dependent not only on verbal diplomacy, but more on the exercise of its nuclear diplomacy. It is due to this factor that in this chapter the words 'exercise of nuclear diplomacy' have been used.

This then brings us to the crux of the dissertation. In South West Asia, the most successful nation in its nuclear pursuits has been Pakistan. And till now such pursuits of Pakistan have in no way been hampered with by outside interference militarily.

The issue at this point boils down to the diplomatic advantages foreseen for Pakistan as a nuclear

power in the region. In the preceding chapter, when reference was being made to Pakistan's nuclear pursuits in the context of similar Indian pursuits, stress was laid on the diplomatic disadvantages that Pakistan may have to face by adhering to non-proliferation. Or in other words, in South Asia keeping in view the nature of Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan has no diplomatic course open to it, other than that of going nuclear. It views its nuclear pursuit thus as an essential feature of its strategic calculations and defence policy.

However, when the region of South West Asia is glanced at, the diplomatic calculations are formed otherwise. This is here that the decision of going nuclear is not^a must. But in the context of the minimal chances open before other Muslim countries of the area in going nuclear, Pakistan is the one with the maximum advantage in pursuing such a policy. And the diplomatic gains perceived by the pursuit of such a policy are of no mean consequence either. Without being a nuclear power, Pakistan's economy gains such a lot from the oil money of the region. Naturally when Pakistan goes nuclear, the economic advantages would increase manifold.

Apart from the economic advantages, Pakistan would as a matter of course also have a stronger say in the intra - regional affairs. Pakistan with the Islamic bomb, may automatically also adopt the role of being the chief representative of the Islamic bloc.

The acquisition of even a few nuclear weapons can provide Pakistan with considerable counter-value capability. It is also likely to make other countries more cautious in threatening Pakistan. The international prestige of Pakistan, especially among the Middle Eastern Countries would increase. Once a member of the nuclear club, Pakistan can also provide nuclear assistance to other nations, including some Arab countries. The Arab Countries, especially, Libya, Iran and Syria have for some time assumed that Israel possess nuclear weapons. The Israeli nuclear capability is equivalent to a threat to their security. Libya in recent years has been seeking a nuclear capability of its own. Reportedly she has attempted to purchase a nuclear device from China and reportedly has also financed Pakistan's efforts to acquire a reprocessing plant and an enrichment facility. If this is true once Pakistan acquires

nuclear weapons herself, she may also provide Libya
with bombs.¹⁴

Thus nuclear Pakistan perceives diplomatic gains
not on one but on many fronts - economic and militarily
along with a stronger voice in international affairs
and enhancement of its prestige.

14. Zalmay Khalilzad, Survival 'Pakistan and the Bomb'
Vol. 21, No.6, Nov. Dev. 1979, pp.244-50.

UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN PAKISTAN

The Pakistani attempts at nuclear proliferation have never been approved by the super powers U.S. and U.S.S.R. China, however has adopted a different posture towards the nuclear ambitions of Pakistan.

Specific allegations have been made regarding China having given the weapon design of their fourth test to Pakistan. Leslie Gelb, who held a responsible post in the Carter administration and who had extensive contacts, within the U.S. administration and intelligence agencies, has reported the above effect. U.S. intelligence agencies have also uncovered some evidence of Chinese collaboration with Pakistan on nuclear weapon development. It was because of this that the U.S. administration withheld for several months sending down to the Senate for its approval the nuclear agreement signed during President Reagan's visit to China in early 1984.¹

The significance of the weapon design of the fourth bomb test allegedly made available to Pakistan

1. Sreedhar, Pakistan's Bomb - A Documentary Study (ABC, Delhi, 1986), page. vii (Introduction by K. Subrahmanan)

by China is that the warhead weighed less than a ton and could be carried by an aircraft like Mirage III/V or F-16 or by a missile like SS-4 which may be transferred by China. If the Chinese could withstand the approbrium of transferring nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan, there is no reason why they should not transfer missiles too to that country. Chinese scientists, according to the report of the U.S. intelligence sources have been seen in the Pakistani nuclear facilities. It is also believed that China is trading its experience as a nuclear weapon state against the advanced technical knowledge acquired by Pakistan from URENCO.²

Unless contrary evidence is discovered, it cannot be doubted that there has been some kind of Chinese support and help for Pakistan's ~~pursuit~~ of its nuclear policy. On September 15, 1986 a nuclear energy co-operation agreement was signed between China and Pakistan. Though it is maintained by both that the agreement covers strictly peaceful uses, this stand is found to be weak in the light of what has been given in the preceding para.

2. Financial Times, 17 July, 1984.

Pakistan's relation with China thus on the nuclear front have been advantageous for both. Pakistan as a small power can not afford to remain hostile towards China. Further, in keeping with their diplomatic perceptions and foreign policy nuances both do not have a friendly posture towards India. China in its ambitious drive for a super power status, feels perhaps bigger with a small power like Pakistan being included in its foreign policy stances. This is also advantageous strategically, if it even needs to strike against India. Thus diplomatically both China and Pakistan have perceived several advantages, by coming closer on the nuclear front.

Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy, thus wherein a major power like China is concerned has been very beneficial. Had China not approved of Pakistan's nuclear intentions, the success of the same would have been very uncertain. However, China, as evidence points out not only, did not obstructer but also helped, and supported Pakistan in its drive to go nuclear.

Unlike China, Soviet Union and United States do not approve of Pakistan's nuclear intentions. In the

opinion of two Soviet Scholars, I.B. Radko and N.E. Shastokolski,³ Pakistan's bomb project is fully in accord with Washington plans for setting up an alliance in which Pakistan will be cast in the role of a policeman, while Saudi Arabia and some reactionary Gulf regimes will be treasurers footing military bills. This ~~view~~ may be regarded as Soviet Unions ^{stand on} ~~advocating~~ ^{in Pakistan} non-proliferation ~~among the other nations~~.

Horizontal proliferation is not at all welcomed both by U.S.A. and Soviet Union and that is why they have sponsored the non-proliferation treaty ^(NPT). The reasons offered for the NPT by the co-sponsors have already been given in the previous Chapter.

U.S.'s non-proliferation policy is legislatively enshrined in the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act and Sections 669 and 670 (Springston and Glenn amendments) of the Foreign assistance Act, as modified by Public Law 97-113. Section 669 prohibits U.S.'s aid to countries acquiring unsafeguarded uranium enrichment technology, while section 670 requires an aid termination in the event that a non-weapon state has acquired unsafeguarded

3. Link 25 (52), August 7, 1983, p.17-21-

reprocessing technology, transfers or acquired a nuclear weapon or explodes a nuclear device. In 1981 Congress provided a waiver to section 669 in Pakistan's case under certain conditions until September 30, 1987 thus permitting the restoration of U.S.'s Security assistance. At the same time Congress expanded the scope of Section 670 to include the transfer or receipt of a nuclear device and restricted the President's waiver authority in the case of a nuclear detonation by Pakistan or any other non-weapons State.⁴

United States has never ceased to champion the significance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite this Pakistan has successfully embarked onto the nuclear path. The question that thus arises is what role has been played by America in ^{the} proliferation in Pakistan. Has it encouraged it or offered disincentives.

It has been opined that "the credit for initiating Pakistan to the nuclear path goes to the United States of America. Ironically, it was the United States itself which first drew the attention of Pakistanis to its nuclear programmes. The American exhibition 'Atoms

4. Richard P. Gromin, 'Prospects for Nuclear proliferation in South Asia' The Middle East Journal, Autumn, Vol. VII, 1983, pp.594 - 616.

for Peace' toured Pakistan in 1954 and attracted a large number of Pakistanis in big cities ... Soon thereafter, Pakistan took the first step on the part of nuclear development.⁵

The U.S. played a significant role in the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses. For the pursuit of nuclear research and energy programme specially trained scientists, engineers and technicians were required. Arrangements for the required training of the Pakistani scientists were made in U.S., Britain, France and Canada.

Pakistan signed an agreement with the Government of the U.S.A., before 1957,⁶ which provided for co-operation between two countries in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The U.S.A. besides sending consultants to Pakistan to discuss overall plans of the PAEC, presented a technical Library comprising of 70, 000 pamphlets, reports, journals, micro cards, etc.⁷

5. P.B. Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, Nuclear Atomic threat to South Asia, (Vision Books, New Delhi, 1980), p. 29.

6. Ibid., p.31.

7. Ibid., p.31.

The famous American architect Edward Stone⁸ was allegedly commissioned to build the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PIN STECH) at Nallore near Islamabad. U.S. also supplied "swimming-pool" type reactor set up in PIN STECH in 1963 under IAEA safeguards. It was critical in December, 1965. The Institute is the country's leading centre for advanced study and research in nuclear technology.⁹

American help and help from other western powers was forthcoming in setting up Karachi Nuclear Power Project (KANUPP) and the Chasma Nuclear Power Project (CHASNUPP).

Pakistan's nuclear development became controversial, when news started leaking out about its reprocessing plant and uranium enrichment project. Pakistan was thus heading towards its programme of building its own nuclear reprocessing plant in the country. The blue prints related to the project were supplied by France. U.S.A. pressed France to supply a co-processing and not a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. A co-processing plant does not separate plutonium which can be used for military purposes. Reportedly, despite French President's declaration, the French

9. Ibid., p.33

company continued to help the Pakistanis build the reprocessing plant.

Later from August 1978, the details of the gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment plant which Pakistan had been setting up at Kahuta came to light. U.S.A. suspecting Pakistan's "Intention to develop, produce and test nuclear weapons" as a warning withheld approval of a licence to export plutonium to Pakistan. As a second warning in August 1978, the U.S. Government announced the stoppage of new development aid to Pakistan. It still tried to persuade Pakistan to desist from setting up an uranium enrichment plant. Having failed to do so, ultimately the Carter Administration in April 1979, cut off U.S. economic aid to Pakistan worth \$ 40 million for 1978 - 79 and \$ 45 million for 1979 - 80.

A decade ago, United States thus had been firm about its stand on proliferation in Pakistan. This stand has however been of no help in preventing proliferation in Pakistan. The point to be noted is that where development of atomic energy for civilian purposes is concerned, it has been expressed that Pakistan was initiated onto the path by United States. In the opinion of Ashok Kapoor also, the first phase of atomic development

in Pakistan was not directed towards military ends.

This did not give rise to any diplomatic controversies and accusations about Pakistan's nuclear policy.

Pakistan, landed itself in a diplomatic mess, when news about its actual (military) nuclear intentions started leaking out to the world. U.S., which had till this point acted as an important supplier nation, disapproved of this strongly by the cuts in aid to Pakistan. U.S., also sought to limit Pakistan's access to nuclear technology. These two steps of U.S. may be described as a result of diplomatic calculation based on the following. Firstly, this gives the impression that Pakistan is not being permitted to carry out a nuclear weapons programme under an American security umbrella. Secondly, Israel and the Jewish lobby in the Congress disapproved of the nuclear intentions of Pakistan. The United States from mid 70's tried to divert Pakistan from the nuclear path.¹⁰ Henry Kissinger threatened Bhutto with dire consequences if he continued down the forbidden path.¹¹

Pakistan's proliferation drive has, however, not come to a halt because of the U.S. stand. Clades-

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10. Ravi Sastri : Pakistan's Nuclear weapon Programme and U.S. Policy. Strategic Analysis, Vol. XI number June 10, 1988, p.1216
11. S. Weissman and H. Krossney, "The Islamic Bomb" (Time, London, 1981), p.163.

tinely, illegally or by fraud, Pakistan has undoubtedly continued its nuclear drive.

A U.S. Embassy assessment of General Zia-ul-Haq's two years in power on July 11, 1979 mentioned, among his minor points, that he "recklessly pursued an independent nuclear weapons option at the cost of his relationship with what is still Pakistan's most important patron, U.S.A." ¹²

However, Pakistan's most important patron has not been able to thwart the nuclear aims of Pakistan. "The American aid cut-off was first one of series of steps which signalled a deterioration of relations between Pakistan and U.S. During 1979, Pakistan joined Iran in pulling out of CENCO, and subsequently joined NAM and attended the NAM Conference in Havana. The incident with the greatest Islamic content and perhaps the greatest symbolic expression of anti-Americanism that Pakistan has witnessed was the burning of the American Embassy in Islamabad and attacks on other American facilities on 21 November 1979. Apparently, the violence was sparked by false rumours that the U.S. and Israel had been involved in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca earlier that day." ¹³

12. Asian Recorder 5 - 11 November, p.19163.

13. Mohd. Ayoub : "The Politics of Islamic Resurgence" from W.L. Hatcher (ed), Pakistan (Vikas, 1982), p. 158.

The Carter administration took Non-Proliferation very seriously. Carter attempted to establish stringest controls on the spread of plutonium reprocessing. He even suggested that U.S. take back spent fuel for storage in U.S.¹⁴

The deterioration in the U.S. - Pak relations did not last long. The Soviet build up in Afghanistan and the consequent perceived threat on its north west frontiers were enough to reverse¹⁵ the deterioration. Another factor that also contributed to this is that with the fall of the Shah of Iran, the U.S. Policeman Policy for the Gulf collapsed. The Gulf sheikhdom all of a sudden looked vulnerable to the fundamentalist threat. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan overshadowed these events. This led to a reformulation and renewed interest of U.S. policy makers in South Asia. Thus there began a readjustment in the U.S. - Pak relations. In 1981 because of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a Presidential waiver was provided.¹⁵

Now Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S. global security pattern. Regan did not take Non-Proliferation seriously. By closely aligning itself

14. n.10, p.1216.

15. n.13, p.158.

16. n.10, p.1217.

of supplies to upgrade its military equaton vis-a-vis
India.

The \$ 3.2 billion military and economic aid package was sanctioned by the Regan administration as a part and parcel of a plan to bolster Pakistan against Soviets in Afghanistan. This package was to be spread over 5 years, and this ^{was} in addition to R 16s that were ^{being} paid for in cash by Saudis. Amidst objections raised in Congress, the President had to certify that President Zia had given reasonable assurances to the effect that no nuclear device would be detonated. An aid 'cut off' clause stipulated that all aid would cease when Pakistan detonated the device. However, the clause failed to account for the contingency that Pakistan may stockpile by way of enriched uranium of weapon grade quality and choose not to detonate. For all practical purposes therefore Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state with bombs in the basement. ¹⁷

The U.S. aid to Pakistan waivering the Symington amendment has been strongly criticised. On January 5, 1988 TASS ¹⁸ criticised the U.S. military and aid to Pakistan

17. R.R. Sbramanian, 'U.S. Nuclear Guarantee for Pakistan' Strategic Analysis, November 1984, Vol. VIII,

No.8, p. 708.

18. Asian Recorder
March 11 - 17, 1988, p.1921 - 22.

saying the militarization of the region proved U.S. assurances about the wish to establish peace and tranquility in the area to be baseless ... the extension of Symington waiver in the case of Pakistan ... would lead to further aggravation of the situation in the area. The Symington Amendment stipulating bar on the U.S. aid to any country developing nuclear weapons had been discarded due to amassed pressure by the U.S. administration compelling the Congressmen and Senators to overlook the military nature of Islamabad's nuclear programmes. The analysis further said that protests by Senators like John Grant ^{were} of no avail. Violating its own legislative acts the U.S. administration had accepted Islamabad's un-substantiated assurances of the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme, and on this flimsy ground appropriated hundreds of millions of dollars worth aid to Pakistan.

A decade ago, on a mere suspicion of Pakistan's nuclear programme U.S. had effected a cut in its aid to Pakistan. Now, when there is no doubt about Pakistan's nuclear intentions, oppsite is the happening. Why?

U.S. spokesmen have frequently referred to the linkage between an implicit no test, no-weapon Pakistan - U.S. military economic supply relationship.

This statement looses weight when it is realized, the proliferation drive of Pakistan has not been stalled. It is clear that for U.S. in relation to Pakistan "non - Proliferation " is a "lost cause" now. 19

The non-proliferation objective of U.S. Government thus is of no avail in Pakistan. The Springington amendment, Senator Alan Cranston's stand on U.S. aid cut to Pakistan etc., thus now form a weak premise, in the case of Pakistan. Ashok Kapur thus sums up the present U.S. diplomatic calculation with reference to proliferation in Pakistan as follows:-

" The Pakistan's nuclear case indicates that when strategic and foreign policy considerations require a strengthening of a bilateral relationship, then proliferation concerns take a back seat in the U.S. agenda". 20

It has thus become all the more difficult to convince oneself of the intentions of the sponsors of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the nuclear weapon free zones. The main point deduced is that certain powers advocate these propositions out of sheer interest of enhancing their gains. And without any ideological basis. Had there been even a shadow of the ideals and

19. Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, (Groomhelm, Great Britain), 1987, p.12.

20. Ibid., p.13.

perceptions of security, vertical proliferation would not have been indulged in and the world including the Central Europe would have been a nuclear weapon free zone.

Thus whether it be Pakistan or any other country earnest in the pursuit of a nuclear policy, the super powers quest for non-proliferation seems to be more or less unfulfilled.

Firstly, there is every indication that atomic energy will play a major role in the future energy production of the world. It will obviously be unacceptable in the non-nuclear states not to have the same possibilities in the field as the nuclear states.

The legitimate security interests of the non-nuclear states must be taken into account. It should be given the guarantee that its security position will on no ground be enhanced by acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. And this is a difficult if not impossible condition to be fulfilled.

A non-nuclear state which agrees to follow the path of non-proliferation must also be assured, that it will not risk facing a situation in which its potential adversary having also promised to go in for non-proliferation suddenly becomes a nuclear power.

It may also be said that both the propositions of non-proliferation and nuclear free zones, on one hand legitimizes the nuclear intentions of the nuclear haves, on the other creates an unequal relationship of protector and protected among the nations of the world. Thus in the seeking of the guarantees by the nuclear have-nots, and becoming and signatory to NPT is implied the acceptance of the hegemonic status of the nuclear weapon powers.

It is because of the awareness of this reality that despite ~~of~~ the stress being laid on nuclear non-proliferation by the nuclear haves, it is difficult if not impossible to curb the nuclear pursuits of certain countries. The second Post - 1974 phase of the non-proliferation has been as ineffective as the first one, and the failure is being proved by the nuclear pursuits in Isreal, South Africa and Pakistan.

When will the Pakistani bomb^{bc} born is not certain.²¹
What is certain is that Pakistan and some other countries have been able to procure nuclear components in the pursuit of developing bombs. The countries who have helped it knowing or unknowingly are the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland

21. Indian Express : March 6, 1988 - "U.S. Reports ... it has been produced weighing 400 pounds."

all of whom are members of the London Group.²²

It has been revealed that in the case of Britain and Switzerland, the consignments concealed were cleared because they did violate the existing export regulations of those countries. This is possible only if the London Group Governments have not been following their own guidelines in regard to the deals in which they have enormous commercial stakes or if the components brought by Pakistan were all multipurpose and the supplier governments did not know that they could be put to nuclear uses. This leads one to conclude that the nuclear technology has become so common place that in spite of the sanctions sought to be placed on its spreading, it is difficult to contain proliferation of nuclear technology by means of 'technological fixes'. The following facts explicitly come to the fore. The non-proliferation ~~and~~ ~~endeavours~~ of the major powers have not at all proved to be effective. Verified ~~and~~ horizontal proliferation have not been brought to a halt. The major nuclear powers have not been able to win the confidence of the nuclear have nots through their assurances, safeguards and guarantees.

22. NPT lobby using the strategy of improving the treaty's provisions by disguising them under labels such as "full scope safeguards", the 'principle of pursuit', London Group guidelines and the U.S. Non-proliferation Act.

The nuclear have nots do not wish to enter into another trap of dependency with the nuclear hegemony of a few. The Non-proliferation efforts are being sponsored by the nuclear haves, basically to perpetuate the dependency of the have nots upon the haves. It is the commercial interests which they have at stake, that decides where, when and how should nuclear proliferation, non-proliferation or disarmament be promoted or discharged.

It is difficult if not impossible to curb the nuclear pursuits of certain countries. When the sponsors of non-proliferation offer disincentives, the nuclear programme of these countries can at best be delayed. This is not reason enough for them to abandon their nuclear programme. Once having embarked upon it there is no turning back on the path.

The opposite holds for the attempts of the non-nuclear and the nuclear threshold powers going nuclear. The important issues for them is not non-proliferation but the gap between their being nuclear-threshold and the nuclear power. Horizontal proliferation is the significant issue for them. If India goes nuclear, so must Pakistan. If Brazil goes nuclear, so must Latin America. The major nuclear powers want to prevent this, to maintain their hegemony by vertical proliferation.

The above given is the crucial motivating factor behind the drive of the nuclear powers for non-proliferation. In defiance to it, the few countries who have embarked onto the path are not going to be affected by this drive. This is not the only factor, but a major one responsible for proliferation among the third world countries.

U.S.A. has not been able to dissuade Pakistan from its nuclear drive. In April, 1982, the then U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, had Mr. Ronald Spiers pinpointed that the nuclear issue if not handled wisely, could become problematic for Pakistan - U.S. relations.²³ At the present, this issue is from no angle serving as an irritant factor in the U.S. - Pakistan relationship. It has been earlier stated, that ever since Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, U.S. stand on non-proliferation vis-a-vis Pakistan has lost its significance.

At Lahore in May 1984, Vice-President George Bush said that there was no question of Washington losing interest in Pakistan in the event of any settle-

23. Rais. A. Khan, Pakistan - United States Relations An Approval American Studies International, April 9, 1985, (The George Washington University, 1985) p. 96.

ment of the Afghan issue.

The U.S. and Pakistan seem^d to have reached some sort of working compromise on the latter's quest for nuclear power. Reagan has soft pedalled the issue and Zia has publicly promised not to detonate a nuclear device even for peaceful purposes.²⁴ Pakistan's nuclear policy, thus provides a glaring example of the lack of credibility in the American non-proliferation policy.²⁵

24. Ibid., p.100.

25. Ibid., p.99.

EVALUATION

Pakistan's nuclear efforts show no signs of being stalled. It has also become explicit that non-proliferation efforts of the major powers also have been more or less a failure. They have failed because of the intentions behind them are not the same as the assurances and guarantees contained in them.¹

Thus in the light of this, were Pakistan to remain non-nuclear, its foreign policy would suffer. It has been opined that had Hiroshima and Nagasaki possessed even crude bombs, the disaster could have been averted. Similarly whatsoever may be the technological lags and international constraints, even rudimentary success of Pakistan's nuclear policy should be hailed as a great diplomatic achievement.

Just as Pakistan's conventional military build up can be no match for that of India's, Pakistan on the nuclear front also can be no match for India. The acquisition of even a few nuclear weapons could provide Pakistan with considerable counter-value capability.

1. The practice of vertical proliferation by the co-sponsors of NPT, itself leaves no room for horizontal non-proliferation to gain support.

And wherever two nuclear powers share a border, the best hope would lie in the normalization of relations, and keeping the nuclear weapons genie in the bottle.²

However, in India, U.S.A. and Israel there are those who would not shrink from the possibility of eliminating the Pakistani nuclear capability through military action along the lines of the Israeli attack on Iraqi installations. All of Pakistan's sensitive facilities are located in the vicinity of Islamabad, just fifty miles from the Indian border. Although Pakistani reprisals against the nuclear facilities would be possible, no comparable 'knock out' is feasible. For India to attack Pakistan's facilities it would also have to be confident of success, which would by no means be guaranteed, and of military victory in the war that would likely follow.³

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2. The Times of India, 4 July, 1988. "... according to western intelligence sources quoted in 'Newsweek' Magazine ... the CIA and the U.S. defence department officials "are convinced that Pakistan has made a complete bomb".
3. Ravi Ekkye, The Fourth Round : Indo-Pak War, 1984 (New Delhi : ABC Publishing House, 1982), from Richard Cronin prospects for Nuclear proliferation in South Asia "The Middle East Journal, Vol. XXXVII, 1983, p.614

India would also have to gamble that Pakistan would not retaliate against its nuclear facilities in the Bombay area, which include BARC, the Tarapur atomic Power plant, and the Tarapur reprocessing facility. With the use of United States F - 16s by Pakistan, Bombay would be within fairly easy reach of the Pakistan bases.⁴ The potential damage, in terms of radiation contamination, could be catastrophic under conditions.

Therefore, however little the nuclear strength of Pakistan be its tremendous significance lies in its value of being a deterrent to the Indian attacks. Thus, it serves to be effective in the avoidance of a possible Ind-Pak confrontation. This can never be achieved by any amount of conventional military build up. It is on this ground that Pakistan's nuclear endeavour has been hailed as a diplomatic victory.

It is a diplomatic victory from other angles also, which shall be subsequently dealt with. The very fact that Pakistan, though be it illegally, clandestinely and by fraud has reportedly succeeded in nuclear pursuits is another diplomatic achievement. Diplomacy is a tool

4. Times of India 4 July, 1988 ... "Pakistan has developed four complete atomic bombs which can be delivered by its U.S. supplied F - 16 fighter bombers ... "

of any nation's foreign policy. And Pakistan in the national interest, perceived going nuclear to be an essential attribute of its foreign policy. It has been successful in achieving this.

Different opinions have been expressed on the role of United States in Pakistan's achieving the nuclear capability. There is an opinion that without U.S. support Pakistan may not have been successful. A contradictory opinion is that United States has tried to offer as many disincentives as possible to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear. Yet another opinion expressed is that United States has looked the other way or turned a blind eye to the nuclear pursuits of Pakistan.

Whatever be the perception of United States' approach to the Pakistani nuclear pursuits, the following facts cannot be denied. The vocal expressions of United States disapproval of Pakistan's going nuclear have been a plenty. Yet, despite the U.S. pressure against Pakistani reprocessing since 1975, work on the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons option continued.

The development process was significantly advanced

by the external circumstances. Pakistan took advantage of the institutionalized and legal cracks in Western nuclear export policies and in internationally agreed trigger lists. Furthermore, it benefitted by the tolerant attitude and assistance of the western powers and Peoples Republic of China⁵ to Pakistani acquisition of sensitive nuclear technologies, equipment and materials, even though U.S. legislation forbade any kind of assistance to a non-nuclear weapon state (as does Article - 1 of NPT). The Pakistani nuclear story demonstrates that formal national and international arrangements are of dubious value in preventing or stopping nuclear proliferation. Such regulations work the best where they are needed the least.⁶

There is no doubt that Pakistan has embarked upon the nuclear path. In such a case shouldn't the U.S. military aid to Pakistan should be cut because of the primacy of the non-proliferation objective to which the U.S. Government is committed as a matter of formal public policy and national law. This approach

5. Times of India, 4 July, 1988, " ... Pakistan had received the blue - print for its bomb, from China, based on proven design ... "

6. Kapur Ashok, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, (Croom Helm, London, 1987), p.227.

exists for several reasons : (1) Israel is concerned about Pakistan - Middle Eastern Arab nuclear links; (2) The controversy about suspected Sino-Pakistani nuclear co-operation delayed U.S. approval of the Sino-U.S. nuclear accord (1984); (3) The super powers need to maintain a posture against nuclear proliferation; (4) The U.S. has on its statute book the law against nuclear proliferation.

This approach however has been a weak one.

One of the reasons for this is stated to be due to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, U.S. has not been able to effect any substantial cut.⁷ With Soviet troops withdrawal will this be possible, is for the future to say. The current sceneries is as follows:-

On April 6, in New Delhi, the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Frank Carlucci, justified the U.S. military aid to Pakistan. The "long standing and durable" security relationship with Pakistan was intended to promote political stability in that country. He declined to commit himself to a reduction in the arms supply to

7. Times of India, 4 July, 1988, " ... Regan administration had pressurised a reluctant Congress to clear a massive aid to Islamabad so that Pakistan's support for the Afghan Mujahideen is not endangered. "

Pakistan in the wake of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Pakistan. In reply to a question on Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, he talked of nuclear non-proliferation and the need for restraint in the regional context.

This then brings^{and} to the actual crux of the situation. United States cannot be held to be directly or indirectly responsible for Pakistan's nuclear pursuits. However, what Pakistan has been clandestinely able to achieve has not been hampered by U.S. Aversions for Pakistan's going nuclear have been vocally expressed, yet the failure of American non-proliferation strategy in Pakistan has not changed the context or nature of U.S. - Pak relations. Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy, thus, from this angle also should be said to be successful.

The other diplomatic angles of Pakistan's nuclear policy have yet to be considered. In a way Pakistan's nuclear posture is based on diplomatic bluff, " We will sign the NPT if India does ". The NPT is not a viable option for India. Nuclear arms may be strategically necessary in the future. India may commit a fallacious

error by giving up its right to have them. Zia's various proposals to denuclearize the sub-continent may thus be regarded as non-starters.

Bhutto and Zia's nuclear posture has been that Pakistan's nuclear programme is only for peaceful purposes. It is a partly correct to say that as long as the Pakistani leadership does not make a formal declaration about its nuclear weapon status, its programme is not overtly and officially of a military character. On the other hand, since 1980 Pakistan's nuclear activities have led to a nuclear explosive capability without a formal declaration. Pakistan's posture that its programme is only for peaceful purposes is thus a 'diplomatic half-truth'.⁸

In the same vein Pakistan's proposal for a South Asian nuclear free zone (as mentioned in the previous chapter) may be regarded as a diplomatic cover for its own nuclear pursuits. It is a cover without any sincere motivation of Pakistan. The same can be said about Zia government's plea to the super powers to move towards nuclear disarmament.⁹

8. n. 6, p.227

9. Ibid.,

What is not possible is being proposed, so as to give the impression of Pakistan's concern about non-proliferation, and that in the face of the continuing nuclear race it has been left with no alternative and so has also joined the race.

Pakistan has not hesitated to exploit the religious sentiments in its nuclear quest. The Muslim civilization is without nuclear power and Pakistan as a harbinger of this, will produce an Islamic bomb. The question is, whether Islam is the motivator, legitimator or simply gives diplomatic justification for Pakistan's nuclear policy. Or has it been only used to mobilize support.

Islam has an important societal and national value. It was to cash on this value and win over the support of people at home and abroad that Bhutto coined the term 'Islamic bomb'. This move may be called a clever diplomatic device. It should be clearly understood that it is not Islam which has been used, but the societal value of the religion has been cashed upon.

Pakistan has to this day been ambiguous about its nuclear intentions. Till it became a suspect in the eyes of the world, it denied its interest in such pursuit. The motive behind this denial was that after such an acceptance, the clandestine operations it was making use of to go nuclear would also come into being questioned before the completion of its objective.

Once the world got a wind of these operations, Pakistan was forced to admitting its nuclear interests. However, Pakistan maintained a posture of diplomatic ambiguity on the issue. So Pakistan remains a nuclear - threshold or a nuclear suspect power. ¹⁰ Lack of any realistic enunciation by Pakistan on its nuclear policy, makes one wonder how long will it take to become a nuclear power.

Nuclear power is the strength ~~of~~ which one can elucidate more elaborately only in terms of its value. This is because even a primitive bomb can cause havoc and destruction beyond one's imagination. Thereby, where even a nuclear threshold state is concerned, its nuclear policy acts as a deterrent in the outcome of

10. Technically, Islamabad does not have a nuclear weapon as it still is "one screw turn away" Times of India, 4 July, 1983, U.S. Officials have made this claim in justifying aid to Pakistan".

a conflict. Reiterating it has been felt that had Hiroshima and Nagasaki possessed even rudimentary bombs the disaster could have been avoided.

Consequently, as a nuclear suspect power also, Pakistan's policy on the issue has been successful.

Pakistan's ambivalence as regards its nuclear pursuits should be regarded as an essential diplomatic requirement of Pakistan's foreign policy. It has been deduced that through declarations and the so-called safeguards the nuclear powers have promoted non-proliferation among the nuclear have nots states. If the clandestine efforts of the latter, have been shown a blind eye that is a different matter. Firstly with its endeavours in the pursuit being clandestine, Pakistan's efforts could not be openly declared. Secondly, had such declarations been made there was the risk of losing the opportunity through the clandestine efforts to achieve the nuclear status. This is because open approval of proliferation efforts of Pakistan appears to be impossible.

11

In the final analysis this picture emerges.

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11. U.S. is aware of Pakistan's nuclear pursuits. Yet vocally it disapproves of the same, partly because of the Israel factor.

Pakistan has been a non-signatory to the non-proliferation proposals of nuclear powers. Despite the disincentives of United States, Pakistan has not turned its back to the nuclear path. Whether by fraud, clandestinely or in the garb of civil power, Pakistan has successfully embarked onto this road. It has been helped and supported by China and clandestinely (knowingly or unknowingly) by certain western powers also.

Pakistan's nuclear policy should be described as an essential fact of its, not only foreign policy but the domestic policy also. The energy output will be multiplied manifold in this endeavour. The publicity given to the idea of Muslim unity and an Islamic bomb satiates the masses at home.

The prestige gained by Pakistan as a nuclear threshold power has also been a factor responsible for the political stability of the government. Consolidation of Zia's stay in power, may be partly due to this factor of prestige.

The nuclear-value is enhanced more, when for domestic consumption India-factor is played upon as a

motivator for Pakistan's nuclear pursuits.

India factor is not the only one, but undoubtedly it is a major factor. One significant diplomatic achievement of the nuclear policy of Pakistan is its role as a deterrent factor, in other words its value lies in the avoidance of war. When its value as a deterrent factor is more or less certain, the two powers cannot afford to go in for a confrontation and for each the nuclear development of the other can only serve as an irritant factor.

Thus in the face of the Indian nuclear pursuits, Pakistan cannot afford not to go nuclear. Going nuclear is of course a very expensive move, but not going nuclear when India is, can be many times costlier for Pakistan and the Pakistani leadership. Bhutto after all did not simply pout hollow words when he said that Pakistanis will go nuclear even if they have to eat grass or go hungry. Or for that matter, again it is not for nothing that Zia is continuing to propel Pakistan onto the same nuclear path, that was taken by his adversary Bhutto.

Consequently the Pakistani logic of going nuclear because of the India factor is based on the perception of the fear of losing a lot. This is just one side of the

story. From another angle, Pakistan perceives that it has immense gains in store by going nuclear. This is from its friends beyond its western border.

Rumours are afloat that Libya has financed Pakistan's efforts to acquire a reprocessing plant and an enrichment facility. Loans, aids and investments from these countries to help Pakistan's economy. They have the oil money, but do not have the skilled manpower and technology which Pakistan has. Secondly, the June, 7 Israeli bombing of Osiraq has made it certain that the Zionist regime will not within its striking reach let any nuclear power come up.

The success of Pakistan's nuclear policy among the Muslim nations of the region, thus is the most imminent. Pakistan, looked upon as a 'Child of Islam', is also not a suspect in their eyes. In the course of the paper it has been pointed out that there is very close economic and military collaboration between Pakistan and many of the Arab countries. Pakistan's nuclear process is being looked forward to with many expectations.

The nuclear bomb, consequently is desired by Pakistan for two major reasons. One as a strategic

equaliser to off-set its military weakness vis-a-vis India. Two, to gain technological superiority in the Muslim world in order to draw upon the Arab wealth to develop itself. It is in the context of the latter advantages that the term, 'Islamic bomb' has been coined by Bhutto.

In the regional context, as regards South Asia and South West Asia, thus ^{the} nuclear pursuit of Pakistan is a significant posture of its foreign policy.

As a developing country belonging to the third world, can the nuclear policy of Pakistan be regarded as equally essential. The advantages Pakistan perceives for itself, as already mentioned, outweigh the expenses which it has to entail in such pursuits.

Moreover, as outlined in the third chapter, Pakistan has nothing to gain by becoming an active participant in the campaign for non-proliferation. The safeguards and the guarantees in the Non-proliferation treaty do not sufficiently assure the third world nations of their security.

The NPT is motivated towards preventing horizontal proliferation but not vertical proliferation. This then implies that the co-sponsors of the NPT wish to maintain their nuclear hegemony in the world. The failure of

the NPT, thereby, is not an astonishing fact.

Similarly, the same can be said of the failure of the proposals for nuclear free zones. The only region that has been declared as such is Latin America.¹²

In practice this has also been contravened by the nuclear policies of Brazil and Argentina. Central Europe, has not been declared as such, ^{because} ~~because~~ the Western powers have their commercial interests at stake.

The NPT and the proposal of nuclear free zones, are given such importance by the nuclear-haves, to let the nuclear have-nots remain as such. However, certain countries have refused to put their interests at stake. These have (may be with defiance) taken to the path of the proliferation. Another reason is ~~that~~ they also do not want to be left too far behind in the nuclear race, as they were in the period of industrial revolution.

Pakistan in the similar fashion, has therefore not ~~hesitated~~ in joining the nuclear race.

It has subsequently been delved upon how the major powers have encouraged or discouraged Pakistan

12. Now, South Pacific has also been declared as Nuclear Free Zone.

in its nuclear endeavours. China has helped and supported Pakistan. Specific allegations have been made about China having given the weapon design of their fourth bomb to Pakistan. The two entered into an energy co-operation agreement on September 15, 1986. It has been noted that coming together on the nuclear front is expected to be advantageous both for China and Pakistan in their foreign policy stances. The plan of China, helping Pakistan may be a part of her design to attain Super Power Status, or a ploy against India. The major significance for Pakistan is to have obtained support and help of a major power like China, in its nuclear policy.

Unlike China, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. have disapproved of Pakistan's nuclear policy. U.S.A. has from time to time made declarations against Pakistan's nuclear policy. These declarations may be considered essential, to satisfy the Zionist factor. As a co-sponsor of NPT, these can be regarded as a part of the Non-proliferation drive of U.S.A. In actual practice, if Pakistan's nuclear drive has not been helped by U.S.A. it has also not been obstructed.

All this day, U.S.A. has declined to commit itself to any cuts in the U.S. military aid to Pakistan

in lieu of the latter's nuclear drive. One is thus forced to accept that the United States has turned a blind eye to the proliferation in Pakistan.

Pakistan, thus making the maximum use of loopholes and safeguards in the treaty agreements, with or without the knowledge of the western powers, in the garb of civil power, has been clandestinely pursuing her nuclear interests.

In the last part of the dissertation, an attempt has been made to apply the diplomatic terminology to Pakistan's nuclear policy. The following points have been considered. The angles from which Pakistan's diplomatic ambivalence is justified. The reasons behind policy enunciations being called diplomatic half-truths.

How diplomatically shrewd Pakistan has been in (even though) clandestinely gaining access to nuclear technology. The coining of the term "Islamic Bomb" by Bhutto has also been described as a diplomatic device. Pakistan's proposals for South Asia nuclear disarmament have been made because they have no practical significance at all. And this is the diplomatic cover for Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear policy.

Concluding, Pakistan's nuclear drive is motivated by the quest for security (India factor) prestige, status (internally in the third world and in the Muslim countries) and wealth (from oil rich countries). Pakistan is still on the nuclear threshold. On going nuclear, these gains may be taken to be guaranteed by Pakistan.

Consequently, if Pakistan does not go nuclear that would be regarded as a blunder. This blunder may prove to be very expensive at home and abroad.

Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy is an essential part of its foreign policy and it plays a significant role internally also. It is on this account, that Pakistan's nuclear drive (be it clandestinely, illegally or by fraud) is hailed as a diplomatic achievement.

*
APPENDIX - I

Developing Countries' Nuclear Programme

Country	Nuclear Reactors Operating		Under construction	Growth Estimates	
	Total net capacity in Megawatts	% of National electricity generation	Total net capacity megawatts	1985	1990
Argentina	335	5.3	60	935	--
Bangladesh	--	--	--	300	--
Brazil	--	--	2,051	3,296	--
Egypt	2	--	622	--	622
India	804	0.9	880	1,684	6,000
Indonesia	1	--	600	--	600
Iran	--	--	2,400	--	--
Iraq	2	--	70	--	1,000
Libya	2	--	--	200	--
Mexico	--	--	1,308	1,308	--
Pakistan	137	5.4	600	737 (73.7)	1,337
Philippines	-	-	620	620	-
South Korea	564	9.0	3,034	3,034	-
Taiwan	604	10.3	4,320	4,320	-
Turkey	2	-	600	1,040	2,000

* Source : S. Irfan Ali Yusuf "Nuclear Energy in the Muslim World", 'Pakistan Horizon', Vol. XXXIV, No. 1 1981, p 63

(Cont. --- 106)

A P P E N D I X - 2

Pakistan's Nuclear Programme

Power Reactors/Operating or Under Construction :

KANUPP, Karachi (heavy-water/natural-uranium, 125 MWe)

- * Supplier : Canadian General Electric (Canada)
- * Start up : 1972
- * Fuel source : Canada , also Pakistan after 1980
- * Heavy water : United States
- * Safeguards : Yes

Uranium Resources / Active Mining Sites / Uranium Mills :

- * reasonably assured reserves : Sufficient for Kahuta enrichment plant
- * Currently active site : Dera Ghazi Khan
- * Mills in Operation : Lahore

UF₆ Conversion :

- * Capacity : Max. 218 metric tons of hexafluoride per year
- * Supplier : CES Kalthof G.m.b.H. of Freiburg (West Germany)
- * Start up : 1980
- * Safeguards : no

Heavy Water :

MULTAN

- * Capacity : 13 metric tons
- * Supplier : Belgomuclear (Belgium) (?)
- * Start up : 1980 (?)
- * safeguards : No

Karachi :-

- * Capacity : Upgradation unit to serve KANUPP, quantity unknown
- * Supplier : Canada (?)
- * Start up : 1976
- * Safeguards : (?)

Enrichment :-

KAHUTA

- * Type : Ultracentrifuge
- * Capacity : Currently 1, 000 centrifuges; planned 2,000 - 3,000 (45 kg. highly enriched uranium) ..; some highly enriched uranium possibly produced.
- * Supplier : Vakuum apparat Technik (Switzerland), CORA Engineering (Switzerland), Emerson Electric (Britain), Van Doorne Transmissie (Netherlands), Leybold Heraeus (West Germany), Aluminum Walzwerke (West Germany); items also obtained from U.S. and Canada; plans illegally obtained from URENCO. 1984 (partial)
- * Start up : 1984 (partial)
- * Safeguards : no

Shala :-

- * Type : Ultracentrifuge
- * Capacity : Experimental Scale
- * Supplier : Same as Kahuta (presumed)
- * Start up : Prior to 1984 (presumed)
- * Safeguards : no

Uranium Purification (UO₂) :-

- * Capacity : Sufficient to supply KANUPP reactor (presumed)
- * Supplier : ? (possibly associated with UF₆ plant)
- * Start up : 1980
- * Safeguards : No

Fuel Fabrication :-

CHASHMA

- * Capacity : Sufficient fuel for KANUPP (currently, probably less).
- * Supplier : Pakistan, plans from Canada
- * Start up : 1980
- * Safeguards : No

Reprocessing :-

CHASHMA

- * Capacity : 100 metric tons of spent fuel; 100 to 200 kg. of plutonium per year
- * Supplier : SGN (France)
- * Start up : France terminated this project in 1978; construction may be continuing.
- * Safeguards : uncertain; agreement between Pakistan, France and IAEA provides for safeguards, but these provisions not yet in force.

New Labs, Rawalpindi :-

- * Capacity : Capable of extracting 10 to 20 kg. of plutonium per year
- * Supplier : SGN (France), Belgomucleaire (Belgium)
- * Start up : Cold tests 1982; start up after 1984 (presumed)
- * Safeguards : No (but might be subject to safeguards as a "replicated" plant under Pakistan-France-IAEA agreement covering Chashma, if safeguards under this agreement are implemented).

Pinstech, Rawalpindi :-

- * Capacity : Experimental scale
- * Supplier : Pakistan (?); plans from Great Britain
- * Start up : ?
- * Safeguards : No

Research Reactor :-

PARR, Rawalpindi (light-water / highly enriched uranium, 5 MWt)

- * Supplier : United states (through the IAEA)
- * Start Up : 1965
- * Fuel Source : United States
- * Safeguards : Yes

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