

**ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY IN DISASTER RELIEF IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, 2004-2014**

*Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in Partial fulfilment of the Requirements
for the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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NEW DELHI - 110067, INDIA

Date: 24 July, 2017

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**Role of U.S. Military in Disaster Relief in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2004-2014**" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to

My Father Ranjit Singh Engti

My Mother Bimala Tokkipi and

My Sister Birty Engtipi

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Abbreviations

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCC	Combined Coordination Centre
CCIF	Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
CFE-DMHA	Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs
CJTF	Commander of Joint Task Force
CMOC	Civil Military Operation Centre
COC	Command Operation Centre
COCOMs	Combatant Commanders
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSF	Combined Support Force
CSG	Carrier Strike Group
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DAST	U.S. Military Disaster Assessment and Survey Team
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoDD	U.S. Department of Defense Directive
DoE	U.S. Department of Energy
DoS	Department of State
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DRATs	Disaster Relief Assessment Teams
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EDCA	Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
EOC	Emergency Operation Centre
EXORD	Executive Order
FDR	Foreign Disaster Relief

FFP	Food for Peace
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FMF	Foreign Military financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCCs	Geographic Combatant Commanders
GoI	Government of Indonesia
GoJ	Government of Japan
GoP	Government of Philippines
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GoT	Government of Thailand
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDRA	International Disaster Relief Assistance
IGOs	International Governmental Organisations
IMET	International Military Educational and Training
JIPAC	Joint Intelligence Centre Pacific
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
JTF	Joint Task Force
LNO	Liaison Officer
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MBA	Military Base Agreement
MCDA	Military and Civil Defense Assets
MEF	U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit

MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Military Sealift Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	National Research Council
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRCC	National Research Council Commission
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
OUA	Operation Unified Assistance
PACOM	Pacific Command
POW-MIA	Prisoners of War/ Missing in Action
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SoD	Secretary of Defense
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SoS	Secretary of State
TEPCO	Tokyo Electric Power Corporation

TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
U.S.	United States
U.S.C	United States Code
UN	United Nations
UN-CMCoord	United Nations Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Education Fund
UN-OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFJ	U.S. Air Force Japan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAR	Urban Search-and-Rescue
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USNS	United States Naval Ships
USS	United States Ships
UT	Union Territories
VMA	Visiting Forces Agreement
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

Chapter: One

Introduction

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides the guidance for the United States Government (USG) agencies to take up humanitarian assistance abroad. From the start of the 19th century, the U.S. Military played a vital role in assisting the USG's decision in providing humanitarian assistance at home and in foreign lands. The involvement of U.S. military in humanitarian assistance activities came in the form of delivering relief to the people in need, and also providing the government the necessary help in times of disaster caused by nature and man-made (Lancaster 2007). The role of Department of Defense (DoD) in supporting the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is guided by title 10 of the U.S. Code (U.S.C). The U.S.C authorises the DoD to conduct foreign disaster assistance by use of transportation and supply assets. With the DoD's involvement in the foreign assistance activities, the U.S. Military often played the role of first responders to disasters abroad. The military provides relief and basic assistance in certain urgent situations. An attempt has been made to study the role of the U.S military, with the Asia-Pacific region as an area of focus, where the military carried out frequent activities relating to disaster relief.

Background of the Study

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) is a tradition that has been established long before. Records maintain that, soldiers lending a help to the conquered populace predates the period of Napoleon and Alexander the great (Cuny 1989). Extensive help has been provided by the military during the course of the Second World War, particularly in the area of providing relief. The Berlin Airlift (1948-1949), took place at the start of Cold War, when Soviet Union blockaded means of communication in allied occupied Germany. The militaries of the U.S. and United Kingdom together airlifted food and fuel to areas that was under the allied control. During the Azores Islands earthquake of 1980, the American forces stationed at Lajes Field functioned as disaster relief workers, and provided shelter to many affected families.

The U.S. military through its facilities have also assisted in disaster relief activities in the Asia-Pacific region. In Japan's typhoon Ida (1958), the American forces distributed supplies and acted as relief worker, and also in the 1950s Sri Lankan flood, the forces helped to evacuate the victims of flood and support the displaced population.

The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) oversees the operation in the Asia-Pacific region. Due to the military's enormous capabilities, the military has time and again appeared to be first on scene. Some of the major disasters that caught global attention are the tsunamis that took place in the Indian Ocean and in Japan, 2004 and 2011 respectively, and typhoon Haiyan in Philippines, 2013. PACOM conducted its humanitarian military operations through its assets in the form of logistics and also distributed goods for immediate relief.

In December 2004, the U.S. military conducted its humanitarian mission under Operation Unified Assistance as a response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami. The U.S. offered support with the help of its troops stationed in Japan, and also its military assets placed around the Asia-Pacific region. The DoD brought military assets into action to support relief operations in Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Japan in 2011 also suffered massive damaged by the gigantic tsunami, naming it as one of the costliest of all natural disaster. Philippines frequently suffer from typhoons; however, the 2013 typhoon was recorded as the strongest storm that has ever hit on land. In all these cases, the military responded hugely with its assets, that is essentially an apparatus of power.

After the Second World War the U.S. has stationed its military facility across the region, with approximately 375,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel under the Pacific Command. Five out of the Seven U.S. Mutual Defense Treaties are in the region- Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. Approximately, 60% of natural disasters in the world occur in the region, as the region sits on the "pacific ring of fire."

Review of Literature

Increased focus of study has been carried out regarding U.S. military in disaster relief. The Asia-Pacific region more often falls in the interest of scholars while studying the

military's role in disaster management. The Obama's policy of 'pivot' and 'rebalancing' in the Asia-Pacific, highlighted most of the research. However, the research undertaken predates Obama administration, and includes the Bush administration's approach in sending its troops for HA/DR activities.

Some of the academic debate regarding this are put forward in themes in the review of literature. The themes are divided into sections of four based on the existing literature; first section is based on the U.S. military approach to tackling disaster. The focus has been made on literature that discusses the military's role in delivering assistance. The second section on the U.S. response to 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami provides various literatures on the strategic considerations and benefits the USG receives through military assistance. U.S. response to 2011 tsunami in Japan constitutes the third section, which focuses on the impact on their relations as a result of U.S. assistance. The final section on the U.S. and 2013 typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines includes literatures that focus on the impact of U.S. military support and assistance to the victims of typhoon on Philippines.

U.S. Military Approach to Tackling Disaster:

The U.S. military possesses capabilities that civil humanitarian agencies do not possess; most of the recent disasters both natural and man-made require logistical support that most often only the military can provide. First, due to the vast area of operability the military possesses and secondly, due to the military's nature of precision, they tend to be effective in providing immediate relief during the course of event.

According to Elisabeth Fischer (2011), the unanticipated nature of the natural catastrophes, requires for coordination in huge scale on short notice. Though, the principal responsibility for disaster response continues to lay with the civilian agencies, however, the military has the equipments, the training, manpower and also organisational skills to assemble the relief goods and also provide services required during calamitous incident recovery.

The Oslo guidelines (1994), for the procurement of "military and civil defence assets" for relief services in times of disaster, produce a framework that calls for foreign humanitarian aid as "last resort." Last resort implies that military and civil defense assets should be complementing the existing relief mechanism that caters specific

requirements. Further, to fill in “humanitarian gaps” between the needs produce by the disaster that the relief community is being asked to deliver and the availability of resources to meet these needs. In short, the request should be made when there is no civilian alternative to meet the essential humanitarian need.

Charles-Antoine Hofmann and Laura Hudson (2009) addresses the question whether the military response to natural disasters is a ‘last resort or inevitable trend’. As states prepare their military for larger role in disaster response, military participation in both international and national, is expected to be more frequent. The factors driving the emerging interest of military in tackling disasters are: the positive image of the military that can be gained by assistance to the distress populace. The relief activity also provides for training opportunities, which gives the military to diversify their role in times when the militaries faced cuts on their budgets. Finally, with the increase occurrence of large-scale natural disasters, the militaries both national and foreign are expected to play a bigger role.

Humanitarian actors do not support the involvement of military in most cases as it compromises the security of the NGO workers. Brendan Foo (2012), in his article states that in its very nature the militaries are partial. They evaluate the cost and benefits of allying with one group over others, a calculation made by cultural, political, social affiliations and geography. Finally, in his work on Northern military establishment, Nicholas Stockton (1997) negates the arguments given on why the NATO forces have incorporated role in humanitarian assistance. According to him, it is not the change in the doctrine of the military in the Post-Cold War era, which takes on humanitarian mandate. Military always have their core function to perform, that is the offensive and defensive role, military superiority over humanitarian claims, and even when the mission to support the humanitarian needs is called for, only a fraction of the military takes on the role, without compromising the ability to fight wars.

Recent events of U.S. military providing disaster relief have raised lot of questions among the academic community regarding their intentions. According to Fukushima, Ginoza and eds (2014), Military’s HA/DR operations, such as Operation Damayan in the Philippines and Operation Tomadachi in Japan, have portrayed the helplessness of the U.S. military, also softening its image, and justified its presence. Whereas it became a part of rationalization the increase U.S. troop presence in the region.

Simultaneously, the “first and fastest” response of the military to sudden calamities is due to the presence of its military facilities in the region. Second, disaster response missions facilitate military dominance and expansion. Disaster militarism, according to them, is extremely problematic, and increases the cost of assistance. Lack of clarity in military’s role in turmoil areas, whether they may act as a soldier or a relief provider creates fear and confusion. Third, when relief operations are conducted by the military, public distress is a common phenomenon and creates confusion, and also reduces the transparency and accountability of the relief operation. Lastly, the issue of climate change that leads to natural disasters are left out by disaster militarism.

According to Erik Brattberg (2013), disaster relief led by the military does not only have humanitarian aspects to it, but it also serves U.S. foreign goals. Some of the strategic interests are: first, it uplifts the image of the U.S. in the world stage. This involvement is crucial for the U.S. to break through the notion of its losing influence in the Asia-Pacific region to China. Second, it helps contain negative consequences of major disaster from spreading elsewhere. Third, it can provide opportunity to forge into stronger multilateral security relationships with other countries’ militaries by providing military exercises, military to military ties and building trust. They can serve to legitimize US presence in the certain parts of the world where it is currently disputed. Finally, disaster relief reinforces the view of America as an indispensable nation. With the military carrying out large scale disaster like the one seen in Philippines, few are complaining of the role of US as the world’s police in times of real crises.

2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami:

The earthquake and tsunami that occurred on December 26, 2004, with a 9.5 magnitude in the Indian Ocean is most commonly known as the Indian Ocean Tsunami. It occurred off the western coast of Sumatra Island of Indonesia. A total of 225,000 fatalities and missing people and about 1.5 million people are displaced. Indonesia, Thailand, Srilanka, India was hit by the Tsunami and impacted other countries in the African region; the worst affected area was the Banda Aceh province on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia. Bruce A. Elleman (2007), USPACOM instantaneously organise an operations planning team (OPT) at PACOM headquarter

in Honolulu, Hawaii. On December 28, to plan and execute the mission unified assistance a joint task force was created.

Before the 2004, Indian Ocean Tsunami, the United States has engaged itself in fighting Terrorism in all fronts. Southeast Asia, according to the Bush administration is the Second Front. ASEAN states have also committed to support the U.S. and counter terrorism after 9/11. However, the war on Iraq changed the perspective of many states in the region. In Esther Pan (2006), Expert suggests that the war on Iraq led by the U.S. was widely opposed in Southeast Asia. Pan cited Blair King, who states that the Muslim majority states were annoyed by the double standard shown by the U.S, on one hand, promoting the values of human rights and on the other, made an illegal and insensitive invasion of a Muslim country. The abuse of prisoners that came to light at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, the detention centre in the Guantanamo bay and the centre of detention in Cuba and Baghram Air force Base in Afghanistan further hampered the image of the U.S. and pushed the moderate Muslims to provide compassion with the extremists that lead to denouncing the U.S. and the west. However, after the relief effort, particularly in Indonesia which was worst affected, local newspaper which printed anti-US editorial shifted nearly overnight to praise the United States.

Fukushima *et al.*, (2014), reflect the statement made by former Australian diplomat Rory Metcalf that the mobilization of rapid aid assistance by the militaries of Australia, Japan, India and the U.S. after the 2004 tsunami, “set the ball rolling for a four way security dialogue four years later.”

U.S. Military Response to 2011 Tsunami in Japan:

The 2011 Tsunami in Japan is known to be the costliest natural disaster in recent times. The 9.1 magnitude earthquake that took place off the northeast coast of Japan led to the Tsunami in Japan. The estimated damage was \$300billion from the earthquake and tsunami, as reported by the Japanese government.

According to Mizushima Asaho (2012), the tsunami was gigantic and much more devastating than the Hanshin earthquake, with an area that covers from 600km from the north to the south. The U.S. military responded in concurrence with the self defense force of Japan to the disaster. He raised the question on “why did the US

respond so quickly to the disaster in Japan?” According to him, Operation Tomadachi aims to increase military cooperation with Japan by the U.S.

Asaho cited *Mainichi* newspaper from April 22nd which released a special feature on Operation Tomadachi, noted that the deployment of 16,000 soldiers for relief purpose, took a lift in joint operation between the militaries of Japan and the U.S., and also added that the American troops utilisation of civilian airports and as a form of “war simulation.” He also cited *Tokyo Shimbun* newspaper, which published an editorial on May 2nd 2011, which mentioned the aims, that is to justify the presence of U.S. military war headquarters in Japan, the headquarters that used for war emergencies, was utilise as disaster emergency headquarters. To secure the U.S. from nuclear radiation generated from Fukushima explosion, and also to help Japan maintain its status quo as an economic power.

There is a mixed response from the public with the controversy surrounding Okinawa base. In Bruce Klinger (2011), the disaster relief effort of U.S. disaster generated goodwill in Japan, including Okinawa. Yet Okinawan media did not publish articles or photos from Okinawa conducting humanitarian operations in Japan. For example, Ryukyu Shinpo criticized the U.S. marines in humanitarian assistance as “tool for political manipulation and an attempt to gain support of the Japanese people to keep FRF within Okinawa.”

Over all, the US military has received praises for the support given to the SDF forces and the public in the time of disaster. On a Press Conference on U.S. military, Japanese SDF Disaster Assistance Operation (April 15, 2011, Naha), SDF Lt. General Hirata noted that the US military’s relief efforts, called “Operation Tomadachi,” were a success and greatly supported the Japanese self defense forces.

Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines:

The involvement of U.S. military is likely to increase due to climate change, which will further effect the population who rely largely on agriculture and live along extensive coastline and also it has become DoD’s prime strategic region for engagement. The U.S. military’s role in disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific has wide ranging impact.

On 8 November 2013, the Philippines were hit by a Powerful storm known as Typhoon Haiyan, the deadliest typhoon on record. The typhoon devastated thousands of lives, leaving 6,300 people dead and nearly 2000 reported missing. The U.S. and the Philippines has a long history of friendship; with the Typhoon Haiyan disaster in the Philippines, led to the visit of Secretary of State John Kerry. In the following year President Obama visited the Philippines to reaffirms' U.S. commitment to the alliance and to discuss with President Aquino the U.S. strategic vision of bilateral friendship.

According to the White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2013), the U.S. began coordinating potential support to the Philippines before the storm hit the ground. U.S. Marines on the ground was the first to respond, the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group which arrived on November 14, helped enlarge the military's search and rescue operations, provided medical care, and also delivered goods and services with the help of 21 helicopters.

In Lum and Margesson (2014), disaster relief effort by the U.S. military came at a time of increased U.S.-Philippine security cooperation. Col. Miguel Okol, a spokesman for the Philippine Air Force, said that while he is appreciative of the U.S. assistance, there is also an understanding that a military operation though humanitarian, would always have military implication (Eric Talmadge, 2011). He noted that a joint military exercise is conducted by the U.S. troops and the Filipino soldiers, as they operate C-130 transport planes while working on the humanitarian mission. The Philippines with three of their own C-130 transport planes, another 15 was purchased from the U.S. According to him, no country buys these just for humanitarian purpose.

According to Zachary M. Hosford (2013), the U.S. military often demonstrate its capabilities to perform humanitarian missions. However, with Operation Damayan the military showcased their unparalleled ability to execute HA/DR missions. China's inability to respond instantaneously to the devastation, made a huge difference is the two responses. The rebalancing strategy can be reinforce by the U.S., and also show its weight in the region by bringing military assets that can function in HA/DR mission, for example the deployment of a hospital ship.

As U.S. ships delivered food, water and medicines, they also deliver goodwill that could ease the way of U.S. into the Southeast Asia's most strategic countries, and also

to fortify its often contentious military presence (Mogato and Belford 2013). David Capie (2015), the ever increasing areas of cooperation of the military in the Asia-Pacific is in HA/DR. The literatures showed the mixed perceptions of the military involvement in relief efforts in the region.

In Fukushima, Genoa and eds (2014), Washington has used disaster militarism to pursue Philippines to sign a Mutual Defense Agreement, just weeks after Typhoon Haiyan to increased U.S. military presence in Philippines. In Mogato and Belford (2013), the defence cooperation signed by the U.S. and the Philippines, embodies a warming security relations after two decades of reduced presence in the Philippines.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of Study

There are a large number of source materials on the tsunami in the Indian Ocean states, Japan, and also on typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Most debate focuses around, U.S. emphasis on its soft power image, U.S. military related budget cuts and Obama's Asia pivot and rebalancing strategy. However, there is no proper study relating to the application of smart power by the USG in the above cases. This research tries to analyse the application of smart power in disaster relief and brings strategic benefits it could develop. In order to have a better understanding of USG application of smart power in disaster relief effort in the region, a case study of the three large scale natural disaster will shed some light to the response and benefit aspect smart power.

The three cases are chosen because it provides much needed evidence for the study. The 2004 Tsunami took place after 9/11 and the U.S. War against Terrorism, the 2011 Tsunami and Typhoon Haiyan in the midst of Asia-Rebalancing Strategy. Finally, the study will try to compare the findings of each case.

Hypotheses

- The U.S. military response to disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region was not guided by humanitarian considerations alone.
- The involvement of U.S. military personnel in disaster relief was a pretext to increase troop deployment in Asia-Pacific region.

Research questions

1. How is smart power applied in all these cases?
2. What was the level of disaster relief provided by the U.S. military?
3. Did the US military follow the Oslo guidelines in carrying out the relief activities?
4. What were the responses of the affected governments to the help given by the U.S. military in the aftermath of natural disasters?
5. What were the strategic considerations and benefits of the U.S. government?
6. How did the post disaster relief environment shape the U.S. relations with disaster stricken countries in the region?

Research methodology

The research is based on Primary and Secondary Sources. The research tries to examine variables that influence the role of U.S. military in its approach to disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region. For a better understanding a thematic structure is formulated and deductive analysis is used in the research.

The primary sources consist of various U.S. government reports and Congressional sources. The secondary sources consist of books, journals, articles, newspapers and internet sources. Published works of various Organisations like the Rand Corporation, Global Humanitarian Assistance and CRS report for Congress will also be used. Literary works of various military personnel in action, LIASION, and the publication of CFE-DMHA (USPACOM) will provide wide ranging opinions.

Chapter: Two

Tackling Disasters: U.S. Policy Making and Presence

In support of U.S. strategy and goals, the military was regularly required to engage in disaster-relief operations on a large scale. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief have been a hallmark of the U.S. military, especially in terms of engaging in such operations abroad. According to U.S. defence policy, under the larger framework of the Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), the concept of Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) can be applied. FHA as a concept suggests the Department of Defense (DoD) “activities conducted outside the US and its territories, to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.”¹ According to Analyst, the proactive role played by the U.S. military in FDR, is based on the fact that the U.S. military engages in several operations worldwide, and also possesses military bases in various countries in addition to the large amount of resources at its disposal. (Wiharta *et al.*, 2008). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2006) takes an approach that the U.S. military in disaster relief effort was to demonstrate goodwill and compassion of the United States. Further, various scholars propose that this U.S. strategy for combining the hard and soft power concept to form ‘smart power’ was, due to the sudden shift in the concept of security after the end of the Cold War.

This chapter consists of four sections: the first section includes recent debates on the concept of power and “disaster relief” as a policy of smart power, and in addition to that focuses on the changing concept of security and natural disasters as part of human security; the second section provides a brief history of the U.S. military in tackling disasters; the third section includes discussion regarding the role of the U.S. military in disaster response, the various policies in support of foreign disaster relief and the activities carried out by the military; and lastly, the fourth section briefly focuses on the U.S. military’s engagement in disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region.

¹ The Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-29 on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance describes the activities of DoD conducted under the rubric of foreign humanitarian assistance.

The Concept of Power, Security, and Disaster

“Power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get a desired outcome,” (Armitage and Nye 2007). Historically, power is measured in terms of population, size and territory, economic strength, natural resources, social stability and military force. Traditionally, wars are won through vanquishing enemy militarily, however, wars of today are fought against various organisation that “controls no territory, holds few assets, and sprouts new leaders for each one that is killed,” therefore, military strength is often the poor instrument to fight ideas (Armitage and Nye 2007). In 1954, Robert Dahl gave the idea of power which states that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Here, power is defined as relational and have a certain amount of compatibility. In International Relations, Joseph Nye has contributed the idea of the changing face of power.

Nye in the late 80s came with the concept of soft power in relations with other states countering the notion of U.S. decline and saying it is rather a ‘diffusion of power’. Nye (1990) discusses about five trends that have led to this diffusion of power: “economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues.” Soft power, takes the ability to transform power into a much more legitimate force, which makes it more attractive and does not attract negative attention. It can be said that a state’s ideology, culture or even cuisine can be an instrument of channelling soft power. In addition to that, also if the state can support institutions that make other states “wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power” (Nye 1990). Nye argued that he came up with the term ‘smart power’ in 2003,² which he said is “to counter the misconception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (Nye 2009).

In the 2007 CSIS Commission on Smart Power which was chaired by Richard Armitage and Nye, conceptualised Smart power as neither hard nor soft power:

² The origin of the term smart power is contested. Suzanne Nossel in 2004 used the term in her Foreign Affairs article titled “Smart Power: Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism”. Joseph Nye, on the other hand, states that he coined the term smart power in the year 2003.

“It is a skilful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world's interests and values” (Nye and Armitage 2007).

According to Nye, there are three ways to exert power, which involve a coercive tactic, through distribution of freebies and economic support as well as by attracting other states to one's cause. Hard power can be understood as the use of coercive tactics as well as through economic support. Soft Power is the ability to attract other states to one's cause without engaging in coercive tactics. Soft power, as a broad category can consist of culture, which can be pleasing and attractive and can be instrumented in state policies to attract others (Nye 2009).

The decline in U.S. image in the recent polls in Europe, Latin America and particularly the Muslim world can be seen in its policies rather than in its culture and values (Pew Research Centre Global Attitudes and Trends 2007; Nye 2009). It requires hard power to fight against non-state actors like Taliban, but also requires soft power to promote policies like democracy, human rights, etc. Nye (2009), commented that international politics in the present world resemble a three-dimensional chess game; with the military at the zenith, interstate economic relations positioned at the middle and the transnational relations occupying the bottom. The military power at the top is seen as unipolar, where as the interstate economic relations is seen as multipolar, and at the bottom level power is seen to be distributed among various non-state actors.

The concept of security, on the other hand, is a contested one. Traditionally, the association of security is with state security that protects the state against its attacks from other countries; however, it has been expanded to include human security and global security with the coming of the age of globalization. The concept of Human Security evolved in the Human Development Report of 1994, under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994). Security in the report includes environmental, food, economic, personal, health, and community security.

Advocates of Human Security saw that the concept is important to highlight the dangers facing the current societies, of human safety, survival from poverty, disease, human rights abuse and environmental stress.

Human Security creates a linkage between all the areas of security; for example, we can link climate change with diseases, human rights abuse, water crises, and poverty. Reveron (2010) argues that the changing nature of security has expanded the role of the military from traditional war fighting to tackling non-traditional issues. In his book "Exporting Security" he talks about the changing face of the U.S. military; analyses the trend which started from the Clinton administration and through the Bush administration. The involvement of the military in various foreign assistance programs like development, humanitarian, and security assistance can be seen as "adapting to the threat dynamics itself" (Winter 2011).

In the 20th century, the U.S. security concern was from the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, the current situation is different as U.S. faces different security challenges from transnational terrorist organisation to rogue nations with nuclear weapon (Winter 2011). The U.S. strategy itself has changed in the 21st century, especially after the end of the Cold War from 'containment to engagement'. The U.S. strategy of containment used against the Soviet Union is replaced by engagement of adversary states like Iran and China. In Post cold war, the Defense Department has started providing disaster relief to states; and reconstruction in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan after the war.

The QDR of 2006 suggests that the U.S. forces are engage in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in foreign states, to prevent such crises from worsening and also to alleviate sufferings. The National Military Strategy (February 2011) also states, "we must be prepared to support and facilitate the response of the United States Agency for International Development and other USG agencies to Humanitarian Crises." The 2015 National Security Strategy of the United States calls for an active US military that has an edge and readiness in all aspects of national defence which includes mitigation of the effects of a national disaster, both at home and abroad. The document also appeals the U.S. military to be postured globally to "render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of [U.S] partners to join with [the United States] in Meeting Security Challenges."

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction defines disaster as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses or impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its resources.” The National Research Council (U.S.) Committee on International Disaster Assistance, 1978 (NRC) attributes four meanings to the word disaster. The first is the ‘disaster agents’ that is the unfavourable condition created by the environment, like earthquake, volcanoes, fires, etc. The second meaning refers to the physical impact made by the disaster agents, such as the loss of lives and the damages occurred. The third is the social impact created by the physical impact (like loss of lives, damage to infrastructure etc), which leads to disruption of family, community, a region or a nation. The fourth is the evaluation of the physical and social consequences the disaster agents produced.

The disaster agents, as explained by the NRC, produce four types of environment: a) the geophysical environment; b) the biophysical environment; c) the sociotechnical environment and; d) the social system itself. A natural hazard such as an earthquake, tsunami, volcanoes, tornadoes, floods, etc. falls into the first category; these threats change the physical environment itself. The agents that affect the human organism by creating ill health such as diseases, by reducing physiological functioning such as famine produces the second environment (biophysical). The third environment (sociotechnical) is created by those whose impact varies with the level of technology (e.g. oil spills, power blackouts, pollution, and explosion). The fourth category is created from the collective aggression that emerges from situations like civil strife, or war between nations.

Powell (1954) has identified different stages in a disaster which includes the predisaster conditions, warnings, threats, impacts, inventory, rescue, remedy, and recovery. The pre-disaster determines the response to various disaster agents, warnings triggers cautionary activity, and threats prompt the survival action. The impact is the period when disaster strikes, and inventory leads to the diagnosis of the situation e.g. damage assessment and decisions on the immediate action; rescue is spontaneous, local, and usually an unorganised action. Remedy is an organised effort of professional relief consisting of medical care, preventative and security measures. Lastly, recovery is the individual rehabilitation and community restoration.

Further, the NRC has also examined the external factors that determine the definition of disaster. Firstly, those impacts that are sudden and localised are most likely to be determined as a disaster than those that have a slow onset and diffuse impact. Second, those that are within identifiable social and political environment can likely be defined as a disaster than the low-status groups. People on the periphery and others that are away from the mainstream political and social life are most often neglected and can be seen in the cases of the refugees, peripheral groups, and nomadic tribes. Political units at times may try to underestimate the damage caused by disaster agents so that it may not be termed as a disaster. Third, media plays a determining role in defining a disaster. Due to the distance and inaccessibility, national and international community depends on the media for information and evaluation of an event. Fourth, those impacts that occur in societies that have strong political, religious, ethnic and cultural ties with the potential donor country are more likely to be defined as a “disaster.” These ties are created to form a lobby to influence governmental action. They became surrogate members of the impacted society.

The World Confederation for Physical Therapy divides disasters into four main themes such as Pandemic Emergencies, Environmental Emergencies, Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies. Natural Disasters are caused by earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, flood, tsunami and hurricanes, causing widespread damage and loss of lives. Environmental Emergencies are caused by technological, industrial or nuclear accidents, which are man-made and may caused serious damage to both the environment and human health. Complex Emergencies are caused in a situation where there is breakdown of authority, civil strife, etc. Pandemic Emergencies, on the other hand, are led by serious medical emergencies such as an epidemic.

The Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) based on Directive 5100.46, defined a foreign disaster as a threatening situation that takes place naturally, such as storms, earthquake, drought and fires. It may also involve activities induced by humans such as industrial explosions, arson, civil unrest and diseases. Such events, necessitates intervention on an humanitarian ground in order to alleviate the suffering of affected people, and in this context the DoDD Foreign Disaster Relief as an instrument of carrying out disaster relief and rescue operations by providing all possible support and commodities to victims in the overseas.

A Brief History of Role of U.S. Military in Disaster Relief

The first recorded history of the U.S. governmental involvement in disaster relief came after an earthquake in Venezuela in 1812. The Congress authorised the departure of ships and vessels from the port and harbour of the U.S.; simultaneously, an act was passed for the relief of the citizens of Venezuela. This act authorises the President to purchase and provide goods up to \$50,000 to Venezuela in the name of the U.S. government (National Research Council on U.S. International Disaster Assistance 1978). By the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. government started providing relief for humanitarian disasters in countries that was militarily occupied, such as Cuba after the Spanish-American war and later, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, with the help of its military to improve public health, public works, and education (Lancaster 2007).

There was a growing practice of using public aid to provide for disaster relief abroad, when information of disasters became increasingly common. During the Second World War, the military provided food and non-food assistance to the allied nations. With the commencement of the Cold War, the U.S. has increased its presence and influence through Foreign aid. The U.S. military was often called for providing aid for humanitarian relief, for example, the Berlin airlift of 1947 where most of the goods are delivered through the air. The role of the military have also changed during the cold war years from war fighting to peacekeeping; the civilian agencies seek the help of the army to deliver relief goods and logistical support when needed. The changing global scenario required the military to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

In 1954, the USS Saipan operated off the southern coast of Haiti in the aftermath of Hurricane Hazel, extending relief and humanitarian aid (Siegel 1990). On request from the Haitian government, supplies like food, medicines, and clothing were dropped with the help of helicopters from the carrier. The U.S. military also offered services during the 1959 flood in Taiwan, helped to rescue the population from the flooded areas and provide relief. The commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet ordered the giant aircraft carrier, the USS Thetis Bay to move to central Taiwan on mercy

mission dubbed “Operation Hunger” (Taiwan Today 1959; Siegel 1990). The U.S. government has increased its assistance over the years, and simultaneously, the military has become an important part due to its worldwide network of bases and disaster-relevant resources (Lancaster 2007; National Research Council on U.S. Committee on International Disaster Assistance 1978).

The U.S. government program for Foreign Disaster Assistance was formally started in the year 1964 with the creation of the Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (AID/OFDA). There was coordination between various agencies including the DoD; from 1964 to 1971 most of the actions were carried out via verbal request, approval and funding documents were issued later. The DoD units are directed by the defence coordinator to conduct relief operations basely solely through telephone request from AID disaster relief coordinator. The guiding principle for AID/OFDA has been providing goods and services to the disaster victims. However, assessing the damage by the nature of the disaster has become a major issue for the identification of specific needs. The U.S. government has often been pressurized to act immediately and provide goods and services specific to their needs; often the goods and services provided are unrelated to their needs.

The U.S. mission and the disaster-stricken country very often do not have proper resources to make an assessment of requirement and damages. The military due to its resources comes to the picture; the AID/OFDA was at first reluctant to take military's help for the fear that the disaster-stricken country might not accept the help. The first Military Disaster Assessment and Survey Team (DAST) were used in 1965 in the aftermath of the El Salvador earthquake. This emphasized on the training of the DAST and further cooperation between the military and AID/OFDA. The involvement of the army does not call for direct assistance by providing relief goods but to assess damages if not exclusively.

This relation between the AID/OFDA and the military went a further step with the stockpile agreement of 1967; this agreement provides the storage of necessary goods like blankets, cots, tents in Panama, for used in Latin America. As from 1973 to 1975, three additional stockpiles were established at Guam; Leghorn, Italy; and Singapore (National Research Council U.S. Committee on International Disaster Assistance

1978). In the event of the destructive hurricane in Honduras in the year 1974, the U.S. army's disaster survey team estimated the death toll and provided helicopters and twin-engine aircrafts to deliver supplies and rescue isolated and affected families (The New York Times Archives 1974).

The U.S. military also participated in the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala; the military helped to assess the damage, provided air medical evacuation and supply transportation to other inaccessible areas, and also operated an emergency hospital in the sectors that was hardest hit. The assessment was made principally by U.S. Army Disaster Area Survey Team from Panama. In 1976 earthquake in Italy, the USG provided six helicopters for medical evacuations, for aerial reconnaissance and for carrying supplies, which was deployed from the "U.S. Air Force Base at Aviano, about 25 miles southwest of the earthquake area" (OFDA Report 1976).

Policy and Budgetary Provisions

A Study on the Effectiveness of Foreign Disaster Response conducted by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2008), has listed out a number of factors that might provide a rationale for a state to intervene and offer military assistance. Primarily, it depends on the nature and impact of a disaster. Second, if a country has a policy to operate outside its borders for international disaster relief. Third, on the basis of a request made, a state may chose to deploy its military abroad. Fourth, the military assets may be deployed if they are not engaged in other tasks, which however depend on the time required to respond to such emergencies. Fifth, if a country has a national interest towards the affected country, the country will give its full effort to help recover from the disaster. Six, the diplomatic and historical relations with the disaster driven country, can also be a major factor to send its military for assistance. Lastly, the coverage of the disaster by the media and the public pressure receive by the government; will make a country's decision to lean towards employing its military assets. Additionally, while evaluating requests for assistance DoD factors are considered pertaining to the legality, the risk and the cost factor, appropriateness and also readiness to perform its primary mission (DSCA manual).

Policies in Support of Foreign Disaster Response: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 gives the U.S. Department of State leading authority for providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief abroad. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) takes the lead in providing Disaster Assistance (CRS Report for Congress: 2008). However, a request for help is made to the DoD when civilian agencies require military help to provide for specific needs in times of disaster.

The other essential guidance that provides for DoD to conduct FDR includes the Executive Order 12966 passed on July 14, 1995. Secretary of State (SoS) determines when the Secretary of Defense (SoD) helped is required whether it is a case of man-made or natural disaster. This request is made to prevent loss of lives and further damages. Further, the Executive Order requires the SoD to act at the direction of the President in agreement with the SoS. In an emergency situation where the SOD does not have sufficient time for SoS approval, the SoD is required to seek the concurrence of SOS within a given period of time.

The DoD Directive (DODD) 5100.46 provides the policy guidance for the military to carry FHA operations (Joint Publication3-07.6:2001). Under Title 10 of U.S. Code (U.S.C) 2561 and 402 the DoD provides transportation and funding for humanitarian assistance. The U.S.C 2561 also allows the DoD to use allocated funds for providing transportation for humanitarian relief and other activities carried worldwide. Further, the President through the Executive Order 12966 governs the implementation of Title 10 of section 404. The doctrine for “planning, executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian operations” was provided in the document published in 2014 titled “Joint Publication 3-29 on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.”

Disaster Response Activities of the U.S. Military: Disaster response requires a broad range of human and material resources, the human is the personal skill and knowledge needed for coordinated action, and material resources refer to specific disaster-related items like debris clearance equipment or some facilities like a hospital (NRC 1978). The United States Government (USG) response to foreign disasters involves the activities carried by several key officials and agencies within the DoS, USAID, and DoD (Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual). QDR (2006)

suggest that the whole process of mitigating a crisis to preventive action is an important aspect of DoD effort in disaster relief. It requires the military to be both reactive and proactive to disasters. The activity of the U.S. military following the catastrophe is a reactive one.

According to DSCA-Security Assistance Management Manual, the FDR support provided by the USG with its military assets should be defined as “primarily to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the affected country's civil authorities or humanitarian” aid community. It also states that its contribution should be about DoD- unique capabilities like providing its logistics support, security for civilian agencies, communications and distribution of relief commodities. As DoD policy dictates that disaster relief is a mission policy that is imperative in nature which the U.S. military should be prepared to conduct under all circumstance. The U.S. military under the banner of Joint Task Force Commander supports the affected state authority with their resources.

Based on the scale, the nature and the impact of disasters, the US military through its Aviation and Engineer supports the relief effort. Search and Rescue, transportation, and structural damage assessment are conducted by the Aviation and the Engineer supports in clearing the roads or emergency bypasses, clears the rubble, ports and waterways for navigation and makes infrastructure assessment. DoD logistics supports the distribution of relief materials and supplies such as food, water, temporary shelters, medicines and other equipments. DoD also provides medical evacuation assets both air and on ground through its air force, navy and army. DoD personnel with medical training are deployed in areas that require medical treatment. This logistical support of the military is capable of filling in critical gaps in humanitarian assistance provided by other agencies as per required by the ‘Oslo Guidelines’.

When disaster strikes, the response must be rapid and coordinated to ensure the mitigation of crises by efficient delivery of relief and aid (Fischer 2011). Since the cost of disaster has increased rapidly in the recent years, disaster preparedness is seen as an effective measure to help reduce the cost and damage of future incidents, for example, the procedures to offer and receive military assets, exercises, and development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These activities carried out

by the U.S. military enhance the disaster response and recovery capability of the host government and also help to conduct training of the emergency responder. The activity also includes the construction and repair of Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) and disaster relief warehouses.

According to the DoD report (2012), the Construction of disaster relief warehouses in U.S. and abroad help the delivery of goods to reach the disaster sites within a short period of time for immediate relief. This warehouses stores items that are required for immediate disaster relief in the event of a disaster. The DoD also provides government services, builds community centres for public meetings, which serves as emergency shelters at the time of disaster, and also construct roads in areas that does not have access to government services both medical and schools (e.g. in the Philippines). The multi-purpose Cyclone shelters that were build in Bangladesh also served as schools at normal times. A humanitarian assistance project carried by the military which benefits the population and reduces the vulnerability of that population to disaster is seen as a form of emergency preparedness.

The DoD also provides emergency response training. The goal of this training is to improve host nation's capabilities to respond to disaster efficiently and thereby reducing US military response. In General, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) training does not provide to the foreign militaries; however, this training based on humanitarian assistance has included armed forces personnel of a selected host nation to demonstrate military's role in supporting civilian agencies.

The Joint report to Congress based on Foreign Military Training suggests "Disaster response training provides the necessary skills for the civilian leaders of foreign governments and institutions to organize emergency workers, hospital medical and administrative personnel, and military members to respond to natural disasters." For example, the 72nd Expeditionary Signal Battalion partners with German Signaleers in training exercise, to bridge communication and a better understanding of each other's signal and equipment. "Named Exercise Express 11, the scenario is that a river begins to flood a village. The Germans request help from U.S. forces to provide heavy machinery to rebuild broken levees and banks and provide emergency and disaster relief" (Gray 2011).

Resources/Funds for U.S. Military in FDR efforts: The DSCA/ Office of Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Funding “provide supervision and oversight of DoD humanitarian mine action and humanitarian assistance programs.” DSCA's role in FDR to analyse the cost of an operation, seeks reimbursement for the assistance provided by the DoD, and also allot funds to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to conduct its mission. The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) receive a two-year appropriation as stated in the U.S.C, to support the U.S. National Security Strategy and DoD’s Security Cooperation (SC) programs. DSCA manages the OHDACA funds by which means DSCA conduct its activities and provide services to the AID/OFDA.

However, this FDR activities funded by OHDACA was required to benefit only the civilians or non-combatants by assisting in transportation and other services that strictly fulfils humanitarian needs. DSCA ensures that the activities of the FDR do not negatively affect the stability of the DoD’s budget. On 27th February when earthquake took place in southern Chile, the DoD was approached by the Department of State to provide humanitarian aid for disaster relief and recovery which was mostly through the utilization of C-130s to transport relief commodities. Simultaneously, a request was made that the assistance provided by the DoD will be non-reimbursable basis under such authorities that are available to DoD (e.g., title 10 U.S. Code 404 sections and 2561) through the use of funds OHDACA account. The Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), stated in U.S. Code Title 10, section 166a subsection (b) (6), is for the purpose of training, joint exercises, instant unanticipated humanitarian relief and long-term humanitarian assistance.

Disaster Relief in the Asia-Pacific

Based on USAID/OFDA report (1992-2009), it was seen that DoD has participated in more than 40 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations in or near the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) (Moroney *et al.*2013). The region is significant because it is the home to numerous U.S. allies and major alliances- Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. Climate Change is seen as one of the reasons behind the increasing number of natural disaster; the Asia-Pacific is most often the victim of these natural disasters.

The U.S. military had participated in various disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2005 Earthquake in Pakistan, Cyclone Nargis in Burma, 2011 Tsunami in Japan, 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, etc. As Rear Admiral Colin G. Chinn once stated: “In the Indo-pacific, the question is not whether a disaster will occur, but when and where the next disaster will happen” (Chinn 2015).

Though Asia-Pacific has always been under U.S. Strategic Vision, certain factors occupy U.S. interest in the region at various times. The first QDR of 1997³ describes the regional dangers in East Asia from the Korean peninsula which remains divided even after the cold war, which poses a challenge to its security. North Korea poses a threat to its ally the Republic of Korea, due to its forward positioning of offensive military capabilities. Second, China was acknowledged to become a “potential military power in Asia”. The U.S. seeks to engage and foster cooperation in areas where their interest overlap and also its improved forces and power capabilities "will not go unnoticed.”

Prior to the 9/11, the policy guidelines of 2001 QDR of the Bush Administration focuses on a “U.S.-Japan alliance renewed; the vision of China as a strategic competitor; change in the U.S. Policy on North Korea to a tougher posture; maintenance of an ongoing approach to India; diminished attention to Southeast Asia.” But after the 9/11 the priorities have changed there was:

“A reinforcement of U.S.-Japan Alliance; a halt in China Policy; an even tougher stand on the North Korea issue; a halt in the approach to India of the approach to Pakistan due to Afghanistan’s operations and the War on Terror; a greater attention to Southeast Asia and Central Asia: priority area in the War on Terrorism” (Garcia 2004).

Southeast Asia became the "Second Front" in the war against terrorism under the Bush administration; U.S. interest and priorities in the region above all lies in combating terrorism. The U.S. with USPACOM remained in close contact with its allies the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The Indonesia though not a

³ The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) analyses the U.S. defense strategy, programs, and resources; it is conducted every four years, the first QDR was published in 1997. Since then it was released in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014.

willing participant in the U.S. war on terror effort due to its opposition to U.S. war in Iraq, supported U.S. effort to capture the mastermind behind the 9/11 attack. Following the 2004 Tsunami and the presidential election in Indonesia, the relationship found a mutual ground in expanding military to military relations.

The QDR of 2006, keeping China in mind, states that the U.S. will attempt “to ensure that all major and emerging powers are integrated as constructive actors and stakeholders into the international system”. Meanwhile it asserts that that it will not allow a foreign power to “dictate the terms of regional or global security”. Furthermore, the QDR suggest:

“Shaping the choices of major and emerging powers requires a balanced approach, one that seeks cooperation but also creates prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail to preclude future conflict.”

So, a “hedging strategy” requires the U.S. to improve the partner states capabilities and reduce vulnerabilities. The American-Japanese alliance is seen as an important factor to the stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.

The 2010 QDR states that the foundation of U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific was its documented treaty alliance. The QDR under the Obama administration emphasizes its relationship with Asia. The QDR seeks to work closely with its principal alliance- Japan and South Korea, by taking on various issues such as global, regional and bilateral issues into focus. The defence strategy focuses on the forces realignment, and ways to strengthens deterrent and defence capabilities. The U.S. seeks to deepen its partnership with Australia, by focusing on issue that goes beyond Asia, seeking to deepen its engagement into a much broader range of international security challenges.

The U.S. is working to enhance the long-standing relations with Thailand and Philippines, and also increase collaboration with Singapore, and simultaneously develop new strategic relationships with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam to address menaces such as terrorism, narco-trafficking and to offer humanitarian assistance in this sensitive zone. As for China, its burgeoning presence and power in the international arena is seen as “one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving

strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.” The counter-challenge posed by a rising China has necessitated steps from the U.S. administration.

On the other hand, India’s contribution to Asia is seen as a “net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.” Pakistan on the other hand, occupies a location of a high-degree strategic value and therefore, its safety and stability is seen crucial to U.S. national security strategy in the region and the world. The 2014 QDR suggests increased American involvement in the Asia-Pacific region in order to maintain the balance of power and prevent any mishaps in region. The DoD commitment to the “rebalance” in the Asia-Pacific lies in the efforts “to modernize and enhance our (DoD) security alliances with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand.”

This rebalance seeks to maintain its presence in Asia, and by upgrading and maintaining its overseas bases in regions such as Oceania, Southeast Asia as well as in the Indian Ocean. Some of the forces from Iraq and Afghanistan will be relocated to the Asia-Pacific region and will resume bilateral and multilateral training exercises “to improve capabilities and capacity of partner nations, as well as support humanitarian, disaster relief, counterterrorism, and other operations that contribute to the stability of the region”.

In 1997, the QDR describes the use of military forces in cases where interests are important but not so vital:

“Military forces should be used only if they advance U.S. interests, are likely to accomplish their objectives, and other means are inadequate to accomplish our goals. Such uses of force should be both selective and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the U.S. interests involved.”

And in cases where the interest at stakes is primarily humanitarian:

“The U.S. military is generally not the best means of addressing a crisis. In some situations, however, use of our military's unique capabilities may be both necessary and appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; or when the need for immediate relief is urgent, and only the U.S. military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster. In such cases, if the United States decides to commit its forces to assist in the situation, the military mission should be clearly defined, the risk to American troops should be minimal, and substantial U.S. military involvement should be confined to the initial period of providing relief until broader international assistance efforts get underway.”

Finally, in all these cases where the U.S. Forces in considered:

“Determining whether the associated costs and risks are commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake should be the central calculus of U.S. decisions. Such decisions should also depend on our ability to identify a clear mission, the desired end state of the situation, and the exit strategy for forces committed.”

Therefore, In the case of American military in disaster relief in Asia-Pacific cannot be solely on humanitarian grounds but rather interest based on cost and risk analysis. The experiences of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami shows the strategic benefits earned by the disaster relief of the U.S. military. A report by the CSIS Global Health Policy Centre on U.S. Navy in humanitarian assistance (2013), where the analysts agree that “U.S. Navy proactive humanitarian engagement is mostly strategic: it contributes to foreign policy goal while enhancing the readiness of U.S. Navy ships and personnel”. According to the report, the U.S. diplomats, who are stationed abroad, agree that:

“Humanitarian missions expand U.S. access and influence, improve overseas opinion of the United States, and strengthen relationships with other countries and partner organizations. As a means to enlarge its access and eminence, humanitarian engagement is attractive to political and military leaders and citizens in partner countries.”

Smart Power has become a part of essential U.S. strategy, Hillary Clinton in her Senate Confirmation Hearing for the Secretary of State in 2009 also mentions Smart Power as a strategy to promote U.S. interest. Investing in global good, according to Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, on the contrary of being an act of charity is instead considered to be a smart foreign policy (CSIS Commission on Smart Power). Disaster relief abroad by the U.S. is also a form of smart foreign policy that will garner goodwill and also ‘brings acceptance for unpopular ventures’. The following three case studies on the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2011 Tsunami in Japan and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines will try to analyze how Smart Power strategy, of the American government leads to massive strategic benefits for the United States.

Chapter: Three

Indian Ocean Tsunami and the U.S. Military Response

The tsunami that took place in the Indian Ocean states has seen for the first time such a 'global response' in a massive scale. The U.S. did not lack behind in its effort to be part of one of the biggest disaster relief in the history of tsunami. During the relief mission, military hard power assets provided enormous help, particularly in logistics. Elleman (2007), in his study on the Indian Ocean Tsunami, reflects how a "hard power" asset like aircraft carrier can be an instrument of "soft power". The disaster relief in the aftermath of the tsunami is an example of a combination of hard power assets and soft power policies. The disaster relief provided by the U.S. was a case of natural disaster caused by a gigantic tsunami; however, the worst affected areas like Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka were under civil strife, making it a complex environment for the U.S. military to provide its relief efforts. A study has been made to analyse the application of smart power in this particular case and how it works in a complex environment. The chapter consist of three sections: the first section focuses on the response of the American agencies-the White House, the U.S. Congress, the Department of State and AID/OFDA, and the Department of Defense; the second sections analyses the responses of the three core states i.e. Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka and also briefly the countries that were affected by the tsunami; and the third sections focuses on the strategic considerations and benefits of the United States in the aftermath of disaster relief aid and operations in such states.

U.S. Response to the Tsunami

On 26th of December, 2004, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake damaged the west coast of Sumatra, an island in Indonesia. The earthquake is one of the largest in 40 years. The earthquake subsequently triggered a Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, which affected twelve countries and deaths of 230,000 people approx. It stretched throughout South and Southeast Asia and as far as north-eastern coast of Africa; and estimated to have travelled 3000 miles within six hours, at a speed of more than 600 kilometres per hour. Due to the magnitude of the earthquake and tsunami, the international media started pouring out news of the event both in the television sets and the Internet. Immediately the national and the international community started preparing for the disaster relief operation, which began with search and rescue operations. The

humanitarian response to the Tsunami in disaster relief and recovery operations was seen as the largest in history. The United States, Australia, India, and Japan formed a coalition in the wake of the disaster to provide for immediate assistance.




Figure. 1 Map showing the geographical impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami

Source: http://www.esri.com/news/arcnews/spring05articles/spring05_gifs/p2p2-1g.jpg

According to scholars, it became difficult to identify a group that might not be involved in the tsunami relief efforts; along with the national government and its militaries, various civil society organisations, private enterprises, foreign militaries and international NGOs also played a vital role. The civil society organisations gave generous donations, and including NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Society, Church groups and other communities also contributed to men power. Foreign militaries help was extensive in nature, providing logistical support, and search and rescue operation with the help of helicopters, and also in the distribution of food. Foreign military assets comprises of soldiers, personnel and technicians, in addition to equipment and services that are provided by the government of a certain state at the

request and in collusion with the consent of the affected state during a disaster relief operation (Wiharta *et al.* 2008).

It was the largest HA/DR operations ever carried, with over 90 NGOs and militaries from over 18 countries (Shaw 2014). Approximately, 40,000 troops from more than a dozen nations were present in the disaster relief process; the U.S. and India together contributed around 32,000 soldiers, sailors and aircrew and Japan deployed 1,000 military personnel the largest deployment of forces for disaster assistance since the WWII (South Asian Monitor 2005). According to an interview conducted by Liaison (CFE-DHMA) of Retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, U.S provided the foundation for 1/3 of the militaries, which includes 11 countries that has worked together to de-conflict the efforts and coordinate the efforts (LIAISON 2015).

The response of the U.S. comes from various agencies of the government- the white house, the department of state AID/OFDA, the U.S. Congress and the department of defense. The response varies based on the information disseminated and the interest and resources of the agencies of the government. Though the Department of State is the main agency in providing foreign disaster relief abroad, however, in the case of the Indian Ocean Tsunami the Department of Defense commenced with the relief effort followed by other agencies of the USG. Following are the responses from the white house, the USAID/OFDA, the U.S. Congress and the department of defense through its military operations.

Role of the White House: The White House response to the tsunami was rather slow; the Bush administration gave a statement three days later after the actual event. The real extent of the damage was said to have been clearer only on Monday, i.e. on 27th of December, by then the U.S. Navy has already headed their way to the affected area before the President's authorization (Shaw 2014). It was on 28th of December that President Bush made the public commitment in assisting the affected state through military assistance and pledges the initial aid contribution of \$15 million, which increased to \$35 million on the same day. In the first few days, the criticism of the Bush administration was made for displaying the lack of urgency in its initial response. On 29th December, President Bush announced the formation of a group of donors which comprised of the U.S., Japan, Australia and India in order to coordinate

activities related to relief operations and to also provide military support in the affected region during the first few weeks (Margesson 2005).

On 31st of December, the administration has increased the pledge from \$35 million to \$350 million. The UN emergency relief coordinator, Jan England criticized this level of commitments when \$15 billion was the estimated requirement. However, the U.S. was not alone, the European Union, Australian, and Japan also initially pledge a combined of \$100 million (Shaw 2014). President Bush appointed the Florida Governor Jeb Bush to oversee the relief operation due to his experience in his home state along with Secretary of State Colin Powell. He also raised a campaign for private donation with the help of his father, George H.W. Bush, the 41st, and also the 42nd President Bill Clinton. The estimates of private-sector donation came to about \$700 million towards the relief efforts. According to observers, the high-profile visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell on the 5th of January has been able to rebalance the earlier response of the administration.

Former Presidents of the U.S. Bill Clinton and George Bush visited the areas affected by the tsunami in areas such as Sri Lanka, Maldives and Thailand from 18 to 21 February. Due to the growing concern of corruption from the relief money, Clinton during his visit advised that the focus must be concentrated on three important themes: first, focus must be to raise more money for relief and rehabilitation of the affected states. Second, the money raised should be spending wisely and efficiently and; third, the process of reconstruction needs to be well-coordinated. President Clinton was appointed as the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami-affected Countries by the UN Secretary-General. President Bush also requested a supplemental package of \$950 million “to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas devastated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and cover the costs of the U.S. government’s relief efforts to date (The White House Archives 2005).”

Congressional Dimension: On 11th March, 2005, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives placed a report that accompanied H.R. 1268 “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005.” This report suggests that the “Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund” would provide \$656 million as a relief fund, and to aid in reconstruction and recovery programmes in these countries that were affected by the

tsunami. The committee recommends \$10 million for training and equipments to women-led local non-governmental organizations in the form of small grants in tsunami-affected areas. The Committee also requests the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the U.S.G assistance to the affected countries. This bill became a Public Law No. 109-13 on May 11, 2005.

Simultaneously, On April 12, 2005, a bill was introduced in the House Committee on International Relations “To authorize assistance for the relief victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and the recovery and reconstruction of tsunami-affected countries” (Civic Impulse 2017). The bill authorises the President of the United States of America to provide assistance for humanitarian aid for long-term recovery. In addition to that it also engages in assistance for children who are orphaned and are in dire need. It also states that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) must step up its efforts to support American sponsored private investments. Such programmes will include offering assistance through the United Nations' (UN) International Early Warning Program, to set up an all-hazard event public warning systems in foreign countries, and to also refurbish funds for specified assistance in regions which were affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. The bill, however, was not enacted. In May 2005, the Congress raised the tsunami relief and rehabilitation fund to \$631 million.

USAID/OFDA: The U.S. since its commitment to assisting the Tsunami has considerably increased its pledges analyzing the scale of the disaster. The USAID/OFDA sent its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) in the region to assess and provide needs to the disaster victim and provide services in the areas of sanitation, health and other kinds of relief supplies.⁴ The USAID/OFDA delivered relief aid before the delivery of US military assets because the military operation was not formally set up (Shaw 2014). Though the USAID and U.S. military's Disaster Relief Assessment Teams (DRATs) was deployed simultaneously in the region,

⁴ In the case of large- scale disaster, OFDA can deploy a Disaster Assistance Response Team to coordinate and manage an optimal U.S. government response, while working closely with local officials, the international community, and relief agencies.

DRATs could not disperse widely in the area due to sensitivities over military presence in the region.

Despite the early start, PACOM was in a less advantageous position, the HA/DR contingency plan was designed to address a single nation. The ‘extreme geographic scope’ required that any assets deployed will be widely spread resulting in ‘complex and fat-ranging logistical requirements’; the multi-national aspects of the operation has made the approach tactics different than the usual exercises on HA/DR. As of May 6, 2005, the total USG humanitarian assistance was \$140.3 million.

The USAID humanitarian assistance to Indonesia includes emergency relief supplies like water, sanitation, emergency household kits, water purification, and cash-for-work, relief and rehabilitation interventions, and psychological and social support for children with the aid of international and local NGOs in the Aceh Province and North Sumatra. The AID/OFDA carries these with the help of various implementing partners like the UNICEF, WHO, Mercy Corps, Indonesian Red Cross, Church World Service, Catholic Relief Services, CARE etc. The total USG assistance to Indonesia was \$52.2 million (Relief web 2005).

The USAID humanitarian assistance in Sri Lanka also provides disaster essential supplies such as water, food, sanitary items as well as proceeds for rehabilitation of the affected communities, psychological and social support including anti-trafficking, transitional shelter and latrine construction, debris clean up and repair of buildings. USAID carried out these activities through various implementing partners like the Sri Lankan Red Cross, CARE, Mercy Corps, Sarvodaya, and Shelter for Life, UNICEF, etc. The total USG assistance to Sri Lanka was \$65.2 million.

The USG assistance in India was in the affected states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh. The activities carried out are to provide essential items and equipments as well as rehabilitation including psychological assistance and social support, anti-trafficking, disaster preparedness and training through various implementing partners like UNDP disaster risk program, CARE, Prime Minister’s relief fund, Indian Red Cross, ACTED, EXNORA etc. The total USG assistance to India was \$7.2 million.

In Maldives, the USAID provided Emergency relief supplies, Health, nutrition and water sanitation and transport of relief goods through the UNICEF with the total USG assistance of \$1.3 million. In Thailand, through the Thai Red Cross and University of Rhode Island/SUCCESS LWA, the USAID carried out the activities like the distribution of relief items, and restoration of fishing industry. The total USG assistance to Thailand was \$1million.

Military Operations: The U.S. military response was immediate; though the Department of State (DoS) is the lead agency for FDR, the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) have a 72 hours window to act in support of disaster relief without the approval of President or Secretary of Defense (SoD). However, the GCC should coordinate with the mission chief in the area. On this basis, the U.S. military responded before the formal approval from the USG to provide relief in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.

The Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters at Pearl Harbour (Hawaii), on hearing the news, set up an operational planning team by its commander Admiral Thomas Fargo. After three days, the military assistance worked under the banner of Operation Unified Assistance (OUA), with the support of the USG. OUA mainly concentrated in alleviating the suffering of three leading countries- Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, although India, Somalia, Maldives and the Seychelles received some amount of assistance. A few months prior to the tsunami, a Contingencies Operational Intelligence Cell was created by the Joint Intelligence Centre Pacific (JICPAC), which has operational intelligence capability, which is especially created in order to respond to emergency situations within a short notice of time which gave an edge for the military to respond quickly (Elleman 2007).

On 28th December 2004, Admiral Fargo set up a JTF-536 to plan and operate OUA, the command of which is given to the commander of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman (USMC). Blackman was chosen to give his experience in Cobra Gold exercises.⁵ He chose the Royal Thai

⁵ Cobra Gold exercises is Asia-Pacific military exercises held every year in which the United States participates. It is headquartered in Thailand. These activities are carried out both for combat and humanitarian efforts. According to Analysts, these exercises have proven effective in coordinating

Navy Base in Utapao, Thailand as the JTF headquarters. Simultaneously, Blackman established three combined support groups, in Galle (Sri Lanka), Medan (Indonesia), and Phuket (Thailand). The U.S. military coordinated with the multinational agencies and the non-governmental organizations for the relief effort.

The III MEF which was designated as JTF-536 formed the three Disaster Relief Assessment Teams (DRATs) in Thailand on 29th and in Sri Lanka and Indonesia on the 30th December. DRATs conducted their search and rescue operations through intelligence gathering, surveillance and inspection. It was on 30th of December 2004 that the first C-130 flights carrying relief arrived in the theatre; the first report that came in from Thailand held a death count of about 1,500 and with another 1,400 missing, which quickly rose to 5,000 deaths and 3,000 missing (Shaw 2014). The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) started flying off the waters of Indonesia and Thailand from January 1st for the first time since its departure from Hong Kong on 29th December 2004 (Dille 2005).

The USS was positioned off the coast of Banda Aceh; within helicopter range, they helped in moving personnel from the ships to the airfields and in delivering aid in the region. From carrying food to medical supplies, Lt. Cmdr. John Daniels, LINCOLN CSG public affairs stated that these helicopters should also assist in carrying the injured and affected people to receive medical treatment. JTF-536 established the Combined Coordination Centre (CCC) on 2nd Jan 2005; on 3rd JTF was re-designated as Combined Support Force (CSF) 536. The USS Bonhomme Richard (ESG-5) began its operation from the 3rd of January upon its arrival from Guam. The CSF- 536 operations in Thailand and Sri Lanka ended on the 22nd and 29th of January. As Blackman reported that these countries are beyond the bleeding phase, therefore, subsequent conditions for transition to the host military control should be made.

On 1st of January 2005, USNS Mercy received a presidential order to be activated, which is under Military Sealift Command (MSC); on Jan 5th, Mercy sailed with 275 Navy medical and support personnel and 64 MSC civil service mariners who operated

military response to natural disaster during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2011 Tsunami in Japan and the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan.

the ship (Brigham 2005).⁶ One of the experiments carried during the period was cooperation between Mercy and Project Hope, an International nongovernmental organisation. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed which enabled Project Hope to recruit 210 civilian volunteers-physicians, nurses and medical practitioners and logistical support to serve aboard USNS Mercy off the coast of Banda Aceh.

On 3rd Feb 2005 USNS Mercy arrived in the area, and LINCOLN CSG departs for the area on the next day. CSF-536 operations in Indonesia concluded on the 10th of Feb. According to USAID fact sheet, more than 24.5 million pounds of relief items and equipment are supplied with the help of 1,070 military personnel to the affected region. On 12th February CSF-536 were disestablished, and JTF-536 was re-established. Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) concluded, and JTF-536 was disestablished on the 23rd February. Finally, on 16th of March, USNS Mercy departs the area (Shaw 2014). OUA in total has employed 58 U.S. military helicopters (Shaw 2014).

The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) simultaneously started building docks, bridges, roads about line of the communication on the ground. USACE also helped to restore infrastructure, including sewer and electrical systems; USACE continued to support the reconstruction process under USAID after the OUA mission concluded. U.S. Navy sea base was incredible in providing tsunami relief in Aceh, while the American civilian worked on land and the U.S. military remained at sea. Elleman (2007) argues that the military ability to keep off the coast of Aceh led to the decrease of American intervention as well as supported the American involvement leading to less friction and supported the main mission's objectives. Sea basing was seen crucial to helped eliminate any unwanted accidents and incidents in delivering aid to the conflicted area.

The OUA lasted for less than 60 days; however, during the process the most valuable lesson was learned. According to analyst, the world saw "the importance of early

⁶ USNS Mercy was deployed nearly after thirteen years; Mercy's last deployment was in support of Operation Desert Shield. Since its deployment in 2004 Tsunami, Mercy became part of 'Pacific Partnership' deployment.

warning systems and accurate damage reporting, rapid and flexible sea basing, robust logistical trains, helicopters access, efficient communications, and world class medical care long after disaster” (Elleman 2007). CSF 536 also worked closely with the Embassy to ensure that request for assistance was promptly address and also to assist in the coordination of relief from civilian agencies, NGOs, and Corporate donors.

Responses of the Affected Countries

There were mixed responses to the USG assistance to the tsunami relief efforts. Since countries like Indonesia and Sri Lanka has a long history of civil strife in the country, the immediate reaction was to decline any assistance through the military. But due to the nature of the disaster, it was beyond the countries’ ability to offer relief to the victims who were affected by the tsunami. Following are the responses for three deeply affected countries-Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, and also of the others:

Indonesia: The tsunami in the Aceh province of Indonesia was a case of natural emergency in a complex environment. The province of Aceh was fighting for independence from Indonesia since 1976. The struggle for Acehnese independence started in 1873 with the beginning of Dutch. Post-Independence, the Acehnese pro-Islamic groups were against the secular Indonesian regime in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Billion and Waizenegger 2007). The Free Aceh Movement (FAM) was suppressed by the military which resulted in human rights abuse and an estimated death of 15000 protesters. The Aceh province was closed with the help of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-TNI), and national police, which severely affected the living condition, and the tsunami added to their grief.

Though tsunami brought devastation in the region, however, the Indonesian military did not lift the banned for the international humanitarian assistance to provide aid for several days after the initial tsunami. As a result, it limited the ability of the humanitarian assistance agencies to access on scene and make estimates. Nervousness and distrust from the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and suspicion from the TNI were a common phenomenon during the initial phase (Shaw 2014).

Sukma (2006) claims that in Indonesian public there was a true show of solidarity on one hand, and also fear of foreign intervention on the other hand. The primary concern was that it would undermine the country's sovereignty with the gradual intervention. The U.S. military offering support in the region was functioning off the shore of Sumatra. The helicopters from the USNS carrier provided relief in the area. The U.S. government consistently communicated with the GoI, with the help of its embassy the CSG- Indonesian headquarter in Medan.

Due to cultural sensitiveness and religious friction sea-basing provided security to the military forces from keeping American troops from civilian areas at night, making an appropriate future model for humanitarian assistance in other highly sensitive areas (Elleman 2007). Shaw (2014) mentions that due to the sensitiveness of the situation, the mission OUA led by the military was a combined operation. It was important for Indonesia that the Indonesian representatives are seen in charge. Simultaneously, when any helicopter flew into a new area, it had a TNI member with it and after landing left the Indonesian military member to organize survivors and unload supplies.

President Yudhoyono of Indonesia gave a positive response to the issue facing Indonesia and the plight of the Acehese people in discussion with the two former Presidents Bush and Clinton. Expressing that with this terrible disaster, a better understanding and reconciliation between the Acehese people and the Indonesian government will be made. Some saw the humanitarian assistance in Aceh and the presence of foreign troops, especially those from the U.S. and Australia, as a hidden agenda to strengthen its control over the Malacca Straits (Sukma 2006). In response to the suspicion among the Indonesians, President Yudhoyono asserts that the presence of foreign personnel has nothing to do with military intervention and did not pose any threat to the sovereignty and was involved in humanitarian assistance in the region, and after which the Indonesian government will take over.

Theo Sambuaga, Chairman of the Defense and Foreign Relations Commission of the House of Representatives, also commented that the Indonesians should be grateful for the military presence, as it will be hard for the TNI to provide assistance with no foreign help (Sukma 2006). A three- month deadline was issued by the government, however, the U.S. responded positively to the deadline and thought 'reasonable.'

Sri Lanka: After Indonesia, Sri Lanka suffered the most; its southern and eastern coastline was severely affected by the Tsunami. The U.S and Sri Lanka enjoys cordial relations since its Independence in 1948. However, U.S. military presence did not go without questioning the ulterior motives behind U.S. military relief assistance. The reasons included overcoming decades of deep hostility among the Sri Lankan masses towards U.S. imperialism and above all Washington was seeking to forge closer ties, including Sri Lanka, to pursue its strategic and economic relations with the broader region (Ratnayake 2008).

Like Indonesia, Sri Lanka also has a history of conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The majority of the population in Sri Lanka are made up of the Sinhalese community; however, various ethnic communities are also part of the Sri Lankan population. One of the ethnic communities in Sri Lanka is the Tamil, who for decades are fighting the government with secessionist aspirations of the LTTE. Gathering information was the biggest challenge faced by the U.S. military in the northeast region of Sri Lanka under the control of the LTTE (Shaw 2014).

In Sri Lanka, all sections of the community were affected by the Tsunami, the Sinhalese, Tamils, and the Muslims. The government though pledged that it's funding to be evenly distributed amongst all the communities; however, the relief efforts could not reach the Tamil population, who predominantly lives in the areas occupied by the LTTE feeling marginalized once again (Lakhani, Kalsoom and Pramit Mitra 2005).

Thailand: The tsunami affected six southern provinces of Thailand, especially the Phang Nga and the resort Islands of Phuket and Phi Phi. Phang Nga contributed to the highest number of deaths, and the deaths of the foreigners surpassed the locals. With over 5000 deaths from over 44 countries, the government did not ask for any aid assistance, however, requested technical help in identifying the deaths. Though according to Thai law, the Thai Royal Police Force is in charge of victim identification, however, to find and identify thousands of Tsunami victims was beyond the capability of the Thai Royal Police Force alone.

On 27th December, the Thai government sent out a request for assisting in the identification of the victims. Specific request for American assistance included a POW-MIA team from the Joint Prisoners of War/Missing in Action Accounting

Command. The USG also deployed several eight members' forensic analysis teams, which consisted of anthropologists, mortuary affairs experts, forensic photographers as well as civilians (Elleman 2007).

Thailand has good security ties with the U.S.; these ties were institutionalised in 1962 with U.S.-Thai military pact. This pact allowed the American forces to create military bases in Thailand in order to carry out its operations in Vietnam. The relations continued both during and after the cold war which includes joint military exercises and extensive intelligence coordination (Manyin 2004). The U.S. military has used the Thai Naval base in Utapao as the regional hub to coordinate the largest international disaster relief effort in history. The U.S. military was granted blanket over flight clearance by the Royal Thai Armed Forces for relief operations in the region, including for aircraft flying from USS Abraham Lincoln which operated off the coast of Sumatra. CSG 536 worked closely with the embassy and Joint US Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) to ensure that the requests are promptly addressed and also coordinate with other relief organisation. The Thai government was particularly concern of the nation's critics of U.S.'s intentions in rendering help, and also U.S. continued presence might underscore its commitment to remain engaged in Southeast Asia and support treaty obligation.

India and Other Countries: In India, the tsunami caused massive damaged to the Union Territory (UT) of Andaman and Nicobar Islands situated in the Bay of Bengal, along with the mainland coast of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala and in the UT of Pondicherry. The Armed Forces launched “Operation Sea Waves” for relief, rehabilitation and evacuation of tsunami victims, coordinated by Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). India also extended its help to the Tsunami affected countries like Sri Lanka under “Operation Rainbow,” Maldives under “Operation Castor” and also Indonesia under “Operation Gambhir.” It was the largest rescue operation for the Indian military with approximately 16,000 troops, 32 Navy ships, 41 aircraft and several medical and mobile hospitals (Lakhani, Kalsoom and Pramit Mitra 2005). The Ministry of Home Affairs is in-charge of relief, response, and rehabilitation in the affected states.

India was also a member of the core group on tsunami relief; according to Ministry of External Affairs, teleconferences among the representatives of the core group took

place on the 31st of December 2004 and 1st January 2005. According to reports, India made no request for any international assistance and turned down offers from the U.S., Japan, Russia, and Israel to provide emergency aid. However, the government later made request for long-term rehabilitation support from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (Margesson 2005). The USAID offered on a massive scale around \$4.1 million for sanitation, shelter, water, food, cleanup operations, education, cash for work and rehabilitation for the people that were affected by the tsunami in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.

In Maldives, the USAID staff and military personnel started their relief effort on January 10th, 2005 by making disaster assessments, and coordinated and consulted the government officials. The USAID/OFDA relief effort in Maldives came to an end on the 28th of January 2005. USAID/OFDA during the period offered more than \$1.3 million for water, health, nutrition, sanitation as well as rehabilitation and relief supply. The USAID humanitarian assistance to Malaysia amounts to \$50,000, as of February 11, 2005 in the Procurement/distribution of relief items and materials for shelter with its implementing partner Malaysia Red Crescent National Disaster Management and Relief Committee. In Seychelles, the amount provided was \$50,000 for emergency relief activities through the Seychelles Red Cross. USAID provided Somalia \$1 million for health, shelter and emergency assistance.

Strategic Considerations

According to analysts, a political decision is made whenever a country chooses to employ military assets to a disaster relief operation, since it deals with the essential features of state power (Wiharta *et al.* 2008). Various Political considerations take into place to make a political decision, for example, it may be domestic, the public might pressurise the government to respond to such measure of human suffering, and also in cases when the citizens of a country is caught up in the disaster abroad; or they may be International, when a country might try to improve its image on the world stage. In a similar manner, they provide their military assets taking historical, political and strategic issues into account, and also to appreciate their friendship in an earlier account of event (Wiharta *et al.* 2008:19).

There are various strategic considerations taken by the USG in providing assistance to the tsunami: firstly, to improve the image of the U.S. and its military. Second, the Bush administration's intention was to improve military-to-military relations with Indonesia. Thirdly, the USG assistance in the affected region came as a result of long history of alliance with Thailand and new strategic partners with Sri Lanka. And lastly, the growing influence of China in the region.

To Counter Discourse on U.S. Decline and Improve Military's Image: Before the 2004 Tsunami, the United States has been fighting terrorism since the 9/11 in two fronts- the Middle East and South East Asia, which is known as the second front. There seems to be a decline in the U.S. image abroad, particularly during the War in Iraq. The large-scale assistance of the USG provided a positive example of the U.S. leadership and military capabilities. After the Iraq war, Anti-Americanism became a global phenomenon, which led to the decline in U.S. image in the Muslim world. In Indonesia, the U.S. popularity has been constantly decreasing over the years; according to polling data, in 1999, 79% of Indonesians had a favourable opinion of the United States, while 61% did in 2002, and only 15% did in 2003. Most of Indonesian analyst view that the U.S. did not pay much attention in improving their image as compared to the U.S. policy towards the Israel-Palestinian issue (Manyin 2004:15).

While, U.S. efforts to counter terrorism brought anti-American sentiments, however, the Tsunami aid has mainly improved the overall opinions of the U.S. most notably in Indonesia, India, and Russia. According to Pew Global Attitudes Project surveyed in Indonesia in 2005 in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, roughly eight-to-ten (79%) said that the American involvement in the relief operations improved the perception of the people towards the U.S. leading to a positive image, which doubled from 15% in 2003 to 38% in 2005 poll. The polls also showed that the Indonesians appreciate the U.S. interest in their country's issue mainly in regards to the assistance provided, with 34% increased in positive response within a two year period. Further, the survey conducted by Pew Global Attitude Project, claims that although the tsunami relief operations carried out by the U.S. led to a better image, it did not last long due to the American involvement in the war in Iraq. In Indonesia, from 38% in 2005, the U.S. image slips down to 30% in 2006 following the four-year stretch in the war in Iraq.

Military-to-Military Relations with Indonesia: The U.S. has maintained cordial relations with Indonesia, however, over the years due to human rights violation of the TNI in the East Timor region, has halted U.S. military assistance to the country. Since 1991, the Congress has restricted on providing military assistance to Indonesia through Leahy Amendment (Manyin 2004).⁷ Indonesia's strategic location, its importance in the war on terror, and as the world's populous Muslim democracy, it is critical for U.S. interests in the region. After 9/11, the U.S. has tried to engage extensively with Indonesia through informal negotiation to increase support for anti-terrorist cooperation, while expressing U.S. concern on various issues to the Indonesian government.

The Congress provided funds in FY2002-2003, which allows the DoD to carry out their counterintelligence training with the Indonesian military and also approved the provision of funds for Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET), which was instituted to provide training in critical issues democratisation and respect for human rights (Manyin 2003). However, the fund was suspended following an attack on U.S. civilians in Papua, for which the TNI was suspected.

The Bush administration has always been receptive in bringing military-to-military relations; however, the Congress blocked plans to revive it based on human rights concerns. On October 22nd, 2003, President Bush in his three hours visit to Bali, Indonesia gave a joint statement with President Megawati pledged “to enhance their bilateral cooperation in the fight against Terrorism, including through capacity building and sharing of information” especially through military-to-military relations (Manyin 2003). It was a visit to strengthen bilateral and counterterrorism ties. However, the worries for the Indonesians were the presence of the U.S. forces for permanent posture in Indonesia which would breach their ideas on sovereignty. (Smith 2005).

With the 2004 Indonesian election in Favour of candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the world saw Indonesia undergo free and fair election. President

⁷ The Leahy law or amendment was sponsored Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) in the late 1990s. The law sets "limitation on assistance to security forces," under Section 620 M of the FAA of 1961, as amended and DoD Appropriations Act for FY 2012. If the department of state finds credible information that foreign security forces have committed a gross violation of human rights.

Yudhoyono, who studied in the U.S with an M.A. from Webster University, took part in a military training program in the United States at Fort Benning and Fort Leavenworth (Smith 2005). He also emphasized on the IMET programs with the U.S. During the tsunami relief period, he opened up the previously closed Aceh province for international assistance, which is seen by many as a new era in Indonesian leadership. The cooperation between both the American and Indonesian military during the relief operation, led to the need for creating proper military-to-military relations between the two countries.

In February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice lifted restrictions on Indonesia's participation in IMET programs. In May 2005, on a visit to U.S. by President Yudhoyono, a Joint Statement was made by the President of the United States and the Republic of Indonesia, welcoming Indonesia's participation in International Military Education and Training. The resumption of IMET programs in Indonesia is seen as an important step towards military-to-military relation. In the words of Anthony L. Smith (2005):

“The Bush administration has explored ways to increase cooperation with Indonesia to counter terrorism. This includes looking at partially restoring military-to-military relations. The tsunami that devastated parts of Sumatra (including Aceh province) has facilitated U.S. forces arriving in Indonesia and the sale of military equipment to Indonesia for the first time since the East Timor crisis of 1999—with the proviso that it not to be used against rebels in Aceh.”

This policy change in the U.S. has been criticised by human rights and political organisation in Indonesia and overseas. Furthermore, the congressional critics of Indonesia resort to place restrictions on the 2006 legislation on military relations, however, the administration waive the restriction on account of national interest (Haseman 2006). The two Presidents also resumed talks on energy, trade, and investment during Yudhoyono's visit to the U.S.

Thailand- Traditional Ally and Sri Lanka- New Strategic Partner: Thailand is the oldest friend of the U.S. in the region. In 1954, the U.S. and Thailand became part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The 1954 Article IV (1) of Manila Pact signed by both the countries which created (now defunct) SEATO remains in force, calls for signatory states to “act to meet the common danger” in the event of an attack (Avery, Dolven and Mackey 2015). And the subsequent 1962 agreement on

Thanat-Rusk communiqué further enhanced U.S.-Thai security relations. Ties between the countries were strengthened and can be seen in its joint efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War and in both the Iraq wars.

Thailand served as an anti-communist ally to the U.S. in the region during the cold war. During the Vietnam War, Thailand was the base for up to 50,000 U.S. troops and also sent them to South Vietnam and Laos to aid U.S. efforts. In the same frame, in both the Iraq Wars, “Thai ports and airfields played a crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipments and supplies” (Avery, Dolven and Mackey 2015). Thailand was stated as a "major non-NATO ally" of President George W. Bush in 2003, which allows Thailand to receive "U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit guarantees for major weapon purchases" (Avery, Dolven and Mackey 2015). This relation helped the military to set the base camp in Thailand during the tsunami military operation.

The U.S. on the other hand, established diplomatic relations with Sri Lanka since its Independence in 1948, which was then known as Ceylon. During the cold war period, the relations between the countries were based on the government that ruled Sri Lanka. The rightist leaning United National Party (UNP) government considered U.S. as a friendly power than the leftist oriented Sri Lanka Freedom Party, who sees U.S. as an imperial power. During the first Sirimavo Bandaranaike government, two foreign-owned oil companies were nationalised, which led to the backtracking of U.S. assistance under PL480 with significant negative consequences in the state's budget. Under Prime Minister Jayewardene in 1977, the Sri Lankan economy was liberalised and further develop closer ties to the west, and the USAID also grew during the period.

In the late 20th century the U.S. attention to Sri Lanka was mainly focused on solving the country's ethno-national conflict, which revolved around the armed struggle between the Buddhist Sinhalese which constituted the majority as well as the Hindu Tamil minority in the northern and the eastern part of the Sri Lankan state (Kronstadt 2008). After the end of the cold war, the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka (2003-2006) Jeffrey Lunstead, pointed out that the U.S. did not have any strategic interest in Sri Lanka, neither in political-military interest nor in making military bases. The only interest is ensuring that a terrorist organisation does not obtain its goal through terror

practices in Sri Lanka, referring to the LTTE. The U.S. has designated the LTTE as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 1997.⁸ Before the Indian Ocean Tsunami, U.S. assisted Sri Lanka in relief aid following the devastating flood of 1957.

The China Factor: According to wiki leaks revelation, the Thai government expresses China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia, which was evident in the sphere of business, arts, media and the military. The military-to-military exchanges between China and Thailand has expanded in the recent years and so has the number of bilateral military visits. Thailand was also negotiating a barter trade deal with China, a Chinese Armoured Vehicles for Thai Fruits. Alongside, the Chinese immigrants to Thailand have also increased, making huge impact through economic engagement with Southeast Asia. Further, China's assertiveness is perceived more from the 1990s, for example, when china fortified the disputed territory in the South China Sea which is commonly known as Mischief Reef (Vaughn 2011). However, China's relations with the region improved in the event of the Asian financial crises that took place in 1997. The U.S. on the other hand, was viewed by the ASEAN as a partaker in the "intrusive and inappropriate policies" advocated by IMF (Vaughn 2005).

The fondness of Thai towards China has also increased, which was seen in the polls conducted in 2003, with 79% against 9% in favour of China than the U.S., the promptness of China than the U.S. to offer financial assistance in the 1997 financial crises was one of the reasons. The absence of maritime territorial disputes with China was also seen as one of the reasons that help to move their relations ahead than any other Southeast Asian state (Vaughn 2005).

Edward Masters, co-chairman of U.S.-Indonesia Society, in his statement before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific (2004), states that China has been engaged in "Smiling Diplomacy" by increasing trade and investment significantly in the area, and also plans to limit the U.S. sphere of influence in Southeast Asia by bringing the region under Chinese Influence. China has negotiated agreements with each of the ASEAN nations on bilateral economic cooperation, and also signed a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership with the

⁸ Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended.

regional organization in October 2003, which called for cooperation in the fields of politics, security, regional and social affairs. China is also pushing for a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and has laid the foundation for “a strategic partnership with ASEAN.”

Further, China has also improved relations with Indonesia, this step was taken when President Wahid of Indonesia in the 1990s extended hand of friendship to China, as a move to balance the U.S. pre-eminence, and further, with the visit of President Megawati in 2002 (Vaughn 2005). The bilateral trade relations have also increased over the years with \$2 billion in 2002 to \$8 billion in 2002, and also the increased of Chinese investment from \$282 million in 1999 to \$6.8 billion in 2003. Cultural exchanges between the two countries have also increased through student visas with 51% in 2004 (Vaughn 2005).

China’s assertiveness was seen as going against the U.S. interest in the region that is primarily maintaining the stability and balance of power. This was seen by most observers, as the U.S. handing the region over to China, partly due to the U.S. diversion of interest from the region to the Middle East. With the growing influence of China in the region, the U.S. felt the need to reassert its position in the region. The OUA with massive U.S. military presence in the region led to the reassurance of these regional allies. Further, the U.S. presence reassures that a rapidly rising China would not be able to make a move and fill up the space created (Elleman 2007). With the visit of a high-profile American statesman, it was clear that the region was important to U.S. strategic interest.

In Indonesia, the 2004 election in Indonesia was seen as an opportunity by the U.S. to strengthen its relations with Indonesia, and also reassure the region of the U.S. presence. Bruce Vaughn (2011), in Congressional Research Service, states that there are numerous reasons for improved U.S.-Indonesia relations. The goodwill generated towards Indonesia through disaster assistance, in the face of the tsunami is one of the main reasons. Second, the increase understanding of Indonesia by the U.S. also helped in bringing the two countries closer. Third, the U.S. views Indonesia as a, an important strategic partner in the region which is imperative considering the war against Islamic extremism. Lastly, it is the U.S. recognition of Indonesia as a state with strategic and geopolitical importance.

The formation of the core group of the disaster relief efforts- the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India led to "advanced military cooperation, trust and dialogue among those four powers...set the ball rolling for a quadrilateral dialogue a few years later, when officials from the four countries convened closed-door talks on lesson learned from coordinating the tsunami relief effort", as accused by many as "Asian NATO". The core group, however, did not last but have improved a bilateral or three-way security ties ever since (Metcalf 2013).

The OUA carried by the U.S. military was a success in the history of Navy in the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. During the period, it brought U.S. military and the militaries of the affected nation in close contact, working alongside in providing support. The Thai and the U.S. military were already part of Cobra Gold exercises; the Cobra Gold exercise of 2005 focuses on the lesson learned from the 2004 Tsunami. In Indonesia, the United States has provided grant aid training under IMET program from 1950-1992, however, cut the funding in 1992 on account of human rights violation. Human Rights were always an issue for the U.S. in having military-to-military relations with Indonesia. The members of the Congress are concern with the lack of progress by the Indonesian government towards identifying and bringing justice to the perpetrator responsible for the murder of two Americans in West Papua. However, the state department in February 2005 has agreed to restore military relations with Indonesia on account that justice is brought to those who carried out the human rights violations.

The Bush Administration's decision to lift its restrictions on International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS), in 2005 helped to strengthen the bilateral relations, which also serves as a foundation to further improved relations (Vaughn 2011). Sri Lanka maintains a cordial relationship with the United States; in 2002, Sri Lanka had signed an agreement which allowed in receiving assistance in matters of military training, military technology, and Intelligence. The Sri Lanka government has declared that the U.S. Navy Command has helped in taking down LTTE in 2009. In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the two countries most affected by the ravaging tsunami took a different course of history. In Indonesia, the government took the opportunity to make a peaceful resolution with the GAM. On the other hand, Sri Lanka could not

put through a peaceful settlement to the problem, until 2009 with the defeat of LTTE under Sri Lankan army.

Chapter: Four

2011 Tsunami in Japan and Operation Tomodachi of the U.S. Military

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami shows how “hard power” assets could provide soft power benefits; it was also a case of a natural disaster in a complex environment. The case of Japan, on the other hand, is unique on its own; the earthquake and tsunami in Japan caused power failure which resulted in a nuclear meltdown, it was a case of ‘triple disaster.’ The U.S. government and its military stood by the side of the Japanese government along with its military in the search, rescue and relief operation. The U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) provided massive help to the Japanese government in containing the nuclear disaster. Before the disaster, there was an ongoing controversy regarding the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and Futenma base (Avery and Rinehart 2016). This study analyses whether the application of smart power had any effect in pushing the agenda of the U.S in the Japanese Diet. This chapter is classified into three sections: the first section focuses on the response of the U.S. government to the triple disaster through the White House, USAID/OFDA, the department of defense, and the department of energy; the second section focuses on how U.S. government tried to help Japan in the triple disaster; and the third section will focus on the strategic considerations and benefit of the U.S. following the disaster response.

U.S. Governmental Response

The triple disaster in Japan consisting of tsunami, nuclear accidents, earthquakes required a response that was non conventional in nature and went beyond the thought process of the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) disaster relief program. The SDF got the support of the foreign partners like U.S. and Australia, which helped in the operations. During the whole process, militaries played a significant role from transportation, communication, water supply, medical care and infrastructural reconstruction. According to reports, within days of the quake and tsunami, ninety-one countries and nine international organisations extended their hands to assist in the relief efforts. Countries like Pakistan and Bolivia who are still recovering from their

natural disaster have pledged their support. The International Organisations like the World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF and the Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs also offered their support. Some countries like China, Republic of Korea, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia have also deployed search and rescue teams to assist Japan in its search and rescue operations.




Figure 2. Showing the magnitude of the earthquake and Tsunami

Source: https://community.apan.org/hadr/japan_earthquake/b/updates/posts/coe-japan-earthquake-and-tsunami-update-march-15-2011

Due to long standing relations between both the countries and the presence of the U.S. bases in Japan, gave an advantage to the USG for swift and massive response. The usual method of response from the USG comes from the agencies like the department of defense, department of state AID/OFDA, the U.S. Congress and the White House. However, in the case of Japan due to the nature of the disaster, the department of energy (DoE) also played a crucial role in response to the nuclear disaster in Japan. Following are the responses shown by the U.S. government agencies:

The Executive Response: Due to the time difference between the two zones, it would have been early morning 1:46 in Washington. The President of the United States was briefed around 9:30 am that morning. The White House Office of the Press Secretary released a statement by the President on the earthquake in Japan and tsunami warning throughout the Pacific, he expressed his condolences to Japan and particularly the families of disaster victim. Further, he expressed the friendship and alliance that the two nation shares, which strengthen the most in such times, and that U.S. stands alongside the people of Japan in their plans to resolve the crises. The USAID have coordinated with the U.S. government to help the Japanese government in providing immediate relief. As per the policy for FDR, when the U.S Ambassador John V. Ross declared an emergency, an immediate funding of \$100,000 was released from USAID/OFDA.

According to the White House Press Release on 15 March, the Japanese government have accepted the offer for an aerial measuring system from the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), along with detectors and analytical equipment which was used to provide assessments of contamination on the ground. In total, the DoE team includes 34 people. On March 11, the USS Reagan has stationed itself off the coast of Japan. The USS Essex functioned from the air facility in Masawa, which acted as the forward operating base. The U.S. worked in support of the government of Japan (GoI), particularly the nuclear portion (Moroney *et al.* 2013). The DoD, Department of State (DoS), and the DoE played an important role in the disaster response. The DoD played a vital role in the whole operation, however, ensuring that the Japanese forces were in the lead. But they played a major role in clearing the airfields and ports for the relief supplies to reach the affected areas.

The Legislative Response: The 112th Congress expressed condolences to the victims' families and sympathised to the survivors still suffering from the disaster. The Congress ensured its supports to the efforts of other USG, relief agencies and private citizens to the assist the government and people of Japan. In the Congressional hearing of the Senate, one Senator recalled the generosity shown by the Japanese people during Hurricane Katrina and expressed the hope that the country will do the same when Japan is in need.

The year 2011 also marked the 51st anniversary of the signing of United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which is crucial in ensuring the prosperity of both the U.S. and Japan while promoting regional peace and security. During the period, the U.S. Congress was also concern about the economic implications the tsunami might have. Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, speaking in Senate states that Japan is one of the strongest economies in the world and Louisiana is their second largest trading partner as a country and the people of Louisiana has vested interest in Japan standing on its feet.

Response of Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance: On March 11, 2011 a Washington D.C based Response Management Team was activated by the USAID in response to the humanitarian crises in Japan. At the request of the GoJ, USAID also sent two urban search-and-rescue (USAR) teams from Fairfax and Los Angeles counties. These teams included rescue dogs and had emergency medical and water rescue capacities. In collaboration with the GoJ, USAID also deployed USAID/DART to respond to humanitarian crises. After the shutting down of a nuclear reactor by the GoJ following the earthquake, the USAID continued to monitor the situation in collaboration with USG technical expert. In addition to the \$100,000 of the initial contribution made by the USIA/OFDA, the USAID/OFDA provided \$640,000 to support USAID/DART response activities on March 13, 2011.

On 13th March, 2011 the USAR arrived and was stationed in Masawa Air Force Base (AFB), the team was composed of 144 personnel and 12 canines trained to detect, people who are still missing or buried under debris. The USAR travelled to the northern part of Japan's Honshu Island to Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture and established a combined operation with the United Kingdom USAR. The USAR teams concluded their assignment on the 17th of March and transferred equipment worth \$145,000 to the Ofunato fire department to assist with local rescue efforts. Simultaneously, the JSDF officials in lead of the operation were transitioning from search and rescue operations to life sustaining efforts in the Miyagi and Iwate prefecture.

At the official request of the GoJ, the USAID/OFDA also send 10,000 personal protective equipment (PPE) kits to Japan for use in recovery clean up which arrived on the 23rd of March, 2011. DART in recognition to the transition from disaster

response to reconstruction, concluded its mission on the 30th of April 2011 after seven weeks of operation but continued its stay in Tokyo till the end of May to facilitate USG nuclear assistance activities. According to USAID report published on June 15, 2011, the total USAID/OFDA assistance for the 2011 tsunami in Japan was about \$6.3 million, which included search and rescue, and nuclear assistance activities.

Pentagon's Role: The DoD's relief effort was designated as "Operation Tomodachi" which is the Japanese word for "Friend." The DoD provided the services of the U.S. Navy, including the Marine Corps, the Air Force and the Army in providing assistance. U.S. military troops and assets were deployed within 24 hours of the earthquake and tsunami. According to reports, at the peak of the humanitarian and relief efforts, approximately, 24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft, and 24 Navy vessels were involved (Feickert and Avery 2011). Major military assets like the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, USS Chancellorsville, the USS Preble, and the USNS Bridge were diverted to the affected region. The USS Essex which arrived in Malaysia was also diverted to Japan for relief effort. The USS Blue Ridge, the US Seventh Fleet command ship, departed Singapore for Japan carrying relief materials.

The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Amphibious Squadron 11 already stationed in Japan had moved for the east coast. The C-130 aircraft of the III MEU was sent to the affected region of Japan to help to clear debris in Sendai airport, which was seen as essential service provided by the military, and provided clearance for transportation. During the relief process, the U.S. military and JSDF worked together with JSDF in the lead. According to USAID report of March 16, 2011 USS Tortuga provided transportation for 279 Japan defense forces personnel, equipment and supplies in support of Japan's rescue effort. As of March 16, 2011 the DoD had sent 113 helicopters and 125 aircraft mission to support the recovery efforts of the survivors, transportation of personnel and the distribution of more than 129,000 pounds of water and 4,200 pounds of food and other relief materials. The III MEF has also facilitated the opening of an airfield in Sendai for relief efforts, which was reopened for domestic flights on the 13th of April 2011.

The DoD constantly provided logistical assistance to the JSDF in delivering relief goods; however, the problem noted by the local officials was the challenges faced in the transportation of goods from the central or prefectural government to the sites due

to a limited amount of fuel. The U.S. military also conducted an intensive search for human remains along the coastlines of Fukushima, Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures. This mission was carried out along with JSDF, National Police Agency (NPA), Japanese Coast Guard, and GoJ Fire and Disaster Management Agency, which resulted in a decreased number on missing person list. The total assistance of USAID/OFDA and DoD amounted to \$94.9 million, of which DoD provided approximately \$88.6 million in response to the tsunami.

Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission: On March 12, 2011 an explosion occurred at Fukushima Daiichi (Fukushima 1) nuclear power plant, located approximately 150 miles of Tokyo. According to reports from the GoJ, the primary containment vessel at reactor was still intact after the explosion. Residents near the Fukushima 2 were evacuated, with an estimated number of 200,000, according to International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the DoE and other technical experts from the U.S. government together reviewed the situation. They provided the scientific and technical information necessary to respond to the worsening situation at the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

Further, on March 16, 2011 it was recommended that U.S. citizens living within the vicinity of 80 kilometres from the nuclear plant evacuate or take shelter indoors. The U.S. military in the form of emergency supplies provided two high-pressure water cannon trucks. Since, the U.S. military by regulation was forbidden to enter the zone within an 80kms radius of the nuclear accident, so they cooperated through its equipments (Sato 2012). The Nuclear specialist team of 11 NRC officers were part of the DART- monitoring the technical aspects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The team consisted of 1 DoE officer and 1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officer, who were also engaged with the GoJ officials on the status of the health impact of the radiation, and provided guidance to U.S. Embassy Tokyo on its efforts to help cool the reactors.




Figure 3. Map showing the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant

Source: <http://powderdetours.com/hokkaido-news/earthquaketsunami-update-from-niseko/>

A 35 member team of the DoE conducted an aerial surveillance mission to assess air contamination by the radiation between Fukushima and Tokyo. In addition to the surveillance, the DoE installed high volume air pump sensors on the roof of the U.S. Embassy. This sensor was capable for advanced radiation detection. Simultaneously DoD established a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and nuclear control centre at the Yokota Air Base; however, the assets for decontamination were limited. According to reports from the IAEA on 23rd March 2011 the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi facility remains serious. Staffs from the DoE, NRC, DART and the U.S. Embassy Tokyo continued to actively monitor and analyse the radiation level in Tokyo.

A major development came from the reports of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which reported that within 16 hours of the earthquake and tsunami the reactor 1 of the nuclear power plant had experienced a full meltdown. TEPCO also confirmed on May 24 that reactor 2 and 3 experienced a full meltdown on the 15 and

14 of March respectively. Based on the understanding of the conditions of the reactor, TEPCO issued a revised map, for stabilizing and shutting down the reactors, to improve the plant working environment, and also compensating the families affected by the disaster. Studies conducted on the accident of Fukushima nuclear power plant, offers that the Japan-U.S. coordination during the period helped keep the damage to the minimum (Akiyama and Sato 2012).

Japan's Response to the U.S. Support

Japan is prone to earthquakes; however, she was not prepared for the tsunami that hit after a 9.1 magnitude earthquake off the east coast of Japan. It occurred 130 kilometres off the shore of Sendai, on the eastern coast of Honshu Island. It is the biggest earthquake in Japan. The earthquake generated huge Tsunami waves measuring up to 40 metres which caused widespread destruction. Following the tsunami, there was a state of emergency due to the threat posed by the meltdown in three reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The meltdown of the reactors caused the third disaster, which leads to the evacuation of people living within 20 miles of the reactor.

The accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant is one of the three worst nuclear reactor accidents in history, the others are- the Three Mile Island in the U.S. and Chernobyl disaster in Russia. However, the difference lies in causes; the Fukushima accident was caused by a power failure in the reactors resulting from natural disaster, on the other hand, Three Mile Islands and Chernobyl was caused by human errors (Akiyama and Sato 2012). The response of Japan to the USG is divided between the Okinawa prefecture and the rest of Japan. While the rest of the country applauded USG assistance in relief, rehabilitation and containment, the Okinawans due to the long standing history of animosity with the U.S. military stationed in region saw as a strategic move. Though the tsunami aid by the U.S. and particularly the USFJ left a good impression to the public of Japan, however, it did not have much impact on the Okinawans. The local newspapers of Japan did not publish anything regarding the relief provided by the military, as to the rest of Japan, the tsunami deepened "U.S.-Japan Alliance." The following are the response of the GoJ and the Japanese public:

Governmental Response: Japan's response to the triple disaster was remarkable; its military from the SDF was immediately deployed to the scene. The SDF responded

from a rescue mission to providing relief and finally reconstruction of temporary shelter to the displaced communities. When reports on the Fukushima nuclear plant reached Tokyo, the GoJ shut down all nuclear reactors after the earthquake and also evacuated residents as a precautionary measure.

However, due to enormous capacity of Japan, DART staff reported that the local and international NGOs were most likely to play only a small role. The GoJ recommended that no relief effort should be sent by an individual, organisations, or government without the coordination of the GoJ. During the initial stages, the GoJ refused the U.S. assistance in the nuclear crises, for example, on March 11, the U.S. embassy faxed an offer list of 20 items that it could provide via Military of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) North American Affairs Bureau but was refused by the GoJ. Later it was clarified that its intention was to provide Japan's independent response to the accident (Sato 2012). The JSDF forces took the lead to resolve crises in the nuclear reactor and provide relief to the tsunami-affected victims.

One of the toughest lessons learned, according to the observers, was that the U.S. military "learned to fight its natural inclination to take charge" and instead worked in synch with the host nations' military (Olson 2016). The USFJ and JSDF worked together to form a Joint Task Force in Yamagata Prefecture and also to establish a Civil-Military Operation Centre. The USFJ provided air support to JSDF personnel and vehicles to reach the disaster sites. To analysts, the joint action between the two forces can be said as "war simulation"; as one Senior Foreign Minister Officials pointed out that "the nature of the operation is different, but operation with the use of civilian facilities by militaries, landing and so forth, also became a practice in the event of an emergency in the Korean peninsula in practice" (Asaho 2012). The Defense Minister Yoshimi Kitazawa in a Press Conference saw the joint effort as a symbol of the "deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance" (Asaho 2012).

The joint SDF-U.S. military coordination was praised even in the highest level of administration, recalling which the ministers encouraged to promote bilateral and multilateral coordination in HA/DR and others through joint exercises and mutual logistical support. The Japanese SDF has been involved globally since 1991, with the dispatch of minesweeper vessels to the Persian Gulf after the end of the war. The SDF since then had participated in various humanitarian and disaster relief activities

abroad, from providing humanitarian assistance to refugees of the Rwanda Civil War to disaster relief activities in Honduras after the devastating hurricane.

The SDF also participated in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Thailand and Indonesia. JSDF since its inception has contributed to sustaining and expanding the US-Japan alliance; like the US military, the JSDF shifted to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Before the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, SDF participated in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, which garnered praised from the public and greatly enhanced its reputation (Watanabe, Yoshida and Hironaka 2016). Simultaneously, the SDF response to the triple disaster was acknowledged by the public; SDF during the relief effort was supported by the U.S. military and provided adequate help for the SDF to operate in the affected region smoothly.

Public Opinion: Mataka Kamiya, a Professor in International Relations in a Seminar in Hawaii, praised the Operation stating that the U.S. military stood by Japan even when international relief teams decided to move out of Japan due to fears over the radiation generated from the nuclear power explosion. He added that Operation Tomadachi proved that the alliance between the two countries could function even in such emergency situation and in a well-coordinated manner. Further, it proved to the fullest degree that the U.S. military worked for the benefit of the Japanese people (Johnston 2012). JSDF official who were sceptical of U.S.-Japan alliance felt that U.S. military fully supported the SDF and that the U.S. assisted Japan while witnessing the real-world collaboration between the U.S. military and SDF for the first time realize the importance of USFJ (Michishita and Pressello 2016).

According to research conducted by Pew Global Centre's Global Attitudes Project, the effort made a strong impression on the Japanese people. The ratings of U.S. have increased to the highest after Operation Tomadachi. In 2010, the research which was conducted shows a positive image of U.S. with 66% of the respondent showing favourable views and just a year later, weeks after the tsunami, 88% of the respondents gave positive ratings (Wike 2012). The survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office in October, 2011 also found 82% expressing "friendly feelings" towards the U.S. As for the aid provided, 57% of Japanese said that the U.S. have provided a "great deal" in its relief efforts following the disaster, while 32% said that U.S. gave a "fair amount" of assistance (Wike 2012).

U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Ross was praised for delivering public information; simultaneously, the feeling of trust and gratitude for the U.S. from the Japanese public seems to have surpassed that of their government (Sato 2012). On November 13, 2013 two years and eight months after the triple disaster, a joint U.S.-Japan survey was conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup. 55% of respondents in Japan said that the relationship between the two countries was 'good' the highest since 2000, while 21% responded that the relations was 'bad' (Michishita and Pressello 2016). However, this positive response has an exception to the Okinawans; the Okinawa residents are not impressed by Operation Tomadachi because "they felt that the Japanese government was using it politically to justify the presence of U.S. Forces in Okinawa" (Michishita and Pressello 2016). The Okinawa media was critical of U.S. military HA/DR which was seen as a Public Relations activity to improve USFJ's image; the political impact of Operation Tomadachi to the Okinawans was rather small. Some observers believe that due to the politicization of Operation Tomadachi by the Okinawa media, it was seen that "the effective collaboration between the local municipalities and U.S. forces was hindered" (Michishita and Pressello 2016).

Strategic Considerations

Over the years, the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan has garnered some animosity in the public. The hostility and agitation was especially visible in the Okinawa prefecture, while hosting the largest U.S. Forces in Japan and also subjected to various controversies relating to the U.S. forces. The humanitarian and disaster relief was one of the largest efforts carried by the U.S. military after the 2004 tsunami. Some of the strategic consideration taken into account by the USG was: Firstly, the issue of Futenma base realignment. Secondly, the nuclear disaster in Japan might hamper the growth of nuclear energy industry. Thirdly, the economic considerations, since Japan plays an important part in the chain of production and distribution. And lastly, the security alliance signed between the two countries.

Futenma Base Realignment: The issue of Futenma base in the Okinawa prefecture was raised in the 90s. This resentment was surfaced in 1995, when U.S servicemen gang rape a twelve-year-old girl, which led to a mass protest of eighty-five thousand locals. The Okinawa's prefecture hosts 65% of the U.S. forces in Japan, and the poorest amongst the forty-seven prefectures. The various issue of crime, violence, and

assault that surfaced, including the heavy burden of hosting U.S. troops made the Okinawans agitated of the U.S. base in the prefecture. In the light of these incidents, the Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto directly asked his contemporary, President Clinton to return Futenma base to Japan's control.

To reconcile tension, both the parties came up with the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” on 1st May, 2006, represented by Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld from the U.S. and Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso and Minister of State for Defense Nukaga from Japan. This realignment seeks to relocate the Futenma Air Station from the city of Ginowan to Camp Schwab area and also relocation of 8,000 III MEF personnel and approximately their 9,000 dependants from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.

However, this proposal was opposed by the Democratic Party of Japan candidate Yukio Hatoyama during his political campaign, who eventually became the Prime Minister in 2009. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his visit to Japan in October 2009, expresses the displeasure of the Obama administration in a Joint Press Conference with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, which states: “Without the Futenma realignment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa” (Avery *et al.* 2011).

From 2006 to 2012, Japan saw instability in the government, with five Prime Ministers in a period of six years. When the largest opposition party of Japan, the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) came to power in 2009, there was concern in the U.S. regarding the future of U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of the DJP promised the public to close the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture during his campaign election. However, he broke his promised and resigned due to public uproar. He was replaced by another DPJ leader, Prime Minister Naoto Kan. Kan's Prime Ministership lasted from June 2010 to September 2011, he resigned due to the poor ratings received in his administration handling of 2011 Tohoku earthquake and Tsunami and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster. The government was criticised for concealing information like the nuclear meltdown and the forecast of radioactive plumes. After him, Yoshihiko Noda administration took over but he conceded on his party defect in 2012 general election.

For most part of U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Liberal Democratic Party was in Power; the Present Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is the longest serving prime minister in Japan's history. During his tenure in May 2006, U.S. and Japan took the initiative to transform and strengthen their alliance which was described as “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” This realignment was to ensure the smooth operation of U.S. forces in Japan due to dissatisfaction of public opinion towards the military. The U.S. government emphasised the importance of a benevolent policy between the U.S. military and the residents of Japan.

The realignment was an effort made by Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush in June 2002. During which both the parties agreed to initiate security dialogue to strengthen and set the direction for future security cooperation. From the period 2002-2006, various “2+2” meeting on U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) were held, which was attended by heads of Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency with their U.S. counterparts. The meeting was based on realignment issues, how to reduce the U.S. facilities in the areas, and adjust the U.S. military operational procedures in Okinawa, and maintained its obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements.

At the “2+2” meeting on February 19th 2005, the two countries emphasized the importance of the implementation of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the implementation of Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), based on a report submitted on December 2nd, 1996. Finally in February 2009, as a part of the implementation of the Roadmap, the two governments signed the agreement “Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam.” The most important points in the agreement are the funding for the relocation of U.S. Marines which will be jointly funded. Second, that the U.S. should appropriately manage the resources provided by Japan and the equal treatment of all those involved in the relocation. Hatoyama government, to the dismay of the voters agreed to honour the agreement, followed by his predecessor Kan and Noda.

In June, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for the first time since 2009 held “2+2” meeting with their Japanese counterparts. According to defense officials, despite the uncertainty of the event surrounding Kan's

resignation following the poor response towards the “triple disaster” and the imminent departure of Gates, the meeting was important for reaffirming and strengthening ties, particularly after the joint success of tsunami relief effort by the U.S. and Japanese militaries (Avery 2011). However, Okinawan officials’ opposition to the relocation had made the 2006 realignment a gridlocked. In 2012, both the parties decided to delink the two parts of the realignment- one the relocation of Marine Corps Air Force to a Camp Schwab area, Futenma and the other the redeployment of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam. In 2013, then governor of Okinawa took the initiative for the offshore construction of the replacement facility, which was followed by his predecessor. However, this realignment remains a challenge for both the parties, based on political, environment and sociological concerns by the Okinawan.

Growth of Nuclear Power Industry: The U.S. has a history of nuclear accident caused by nuclear meltdown in the ‘Three Mile Island’ power plant in Pennsylvania in the 1970s, which led to cancellation of planned project to on nuclear reactor construction in the 70s and 80s. Though the future of nuclear power industry at that point of time was uncertain, however, in 2012 the NRC approved the construction of a new reactor after three decades.

Due to the U.S. interest for a safer and increased growth of nuclear power energy, the USG took a rapid approach towards crises management related to radioactivity. When low-level radiation materials were detected in Japan, the USAFJ recommended voluntary evacuation of military families and personnel from the Yokosuka and Atsugi bases. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo suggest that those resides within 80kms from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant should be evacuated. Analyst suggests that the nuclear crises management of the Japanese government was slow and at the most judging by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, without taking further measures. Despite the frustration of Japanese response to the crises, it was believed that the cooperation continued because of the existing alliance relationship between both the countries (Sato 2012). According to a study by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation on the Fukushima nuclear accident and crises management, USG proactive assistance to Japan was because of its:

“Fear of the negative impact on the global growth of the nuclear power industry if the nuclear accident worsened. The sudden expansion of the global nuclear energy

market—dubbed the “nuclear renaissance”— has presented significant business opportunities for the US and French nuclear power industries in particular, and thus in order to maintain that business environment, it was essential to limit the damage and quickly resolve the Fukushima accident” (Sato 2012).

U.S. and France both were actively involved in addressing the situation. On March 31st 2011, visit of French President Sarkozy signifies the importance of the nuclear accident concerning the growth of nuclear power industry, and pledged full cooperation from France’s AVERA in dealing with Fukushima nuclear accident. Simultaneously, the U.S. was able to strengthen its relations through official channels, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Defense. France, on the other hand, deepened its ties to Japan based on industry-to-industry relations (Sato 2012).

Economic Dimension: From an economic standpoint, Japan economic instability posed a potential damage to its trading partner. The U.S. economic interest was centred on the radioactive fallout, which might hamper the supply of Agricultural products from Japan, the U.S. based company in Japan, the Disruption in supply chain after the tsunami could have adverse effect in the overall production and shipments of the product made in Japan, the supply of parts to the U.S. from Japan, and also increased instability in Japanese and U.S. financial market, and also the yen-dollar exchange rate (Nanto *et al.* 2011).

Due to the radioactivity fall from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an “Import Alert”, there was fear of contaminated food items to have reached the soil of the U.S. and so screening of shipments from Japan was required for entering the U.S. ports. Though the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relations have reduced over the years due to the ‘development of international production network’ and the ‘segmentation of production processes’ across countries, however, some U.S. based Japanese companies that obtain parts from Japan could not obtain due to the disruptions (Nanto *et al.* 2011). Japanese auto manufactures like the Toyota Motor Corp., operating in the immediate vicinity of the earthquake was adversely affected and simultaneously, the supplier of parts chain was disrupted. About 20.6% of U.S. imports from Japan are in machinery, which includes printers, computers and 15.2 % in electrical machinery including semiconductors, the

shipments of which was disrupted by the damages caused by the tsunami (Nanto *et al.* 2011). The tsunami had a direct impact of the financial market with the dropped in the stock exchange and the decrease in the value of paper money. In the exchange rate between the yen and dollar, the value of yen is 76.25 yen per dollar in 17th March 2011, which was 83.8 yen per dollar a year ago. This rapid rise and volatility on the value of yen was a concern to the Group of Seven (G-7) nations and decided to work upon the decrease in the value of Yen as deemed appropriate, which led to its decrease by 80 yen per dollar.

Before the tsunami hit Japan, there was a talk on Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) by the Obama administration with the Japanese government. The discussion was planned to hold in June, 2011, there seems to be a inclination of Japan in negotiation terms on TPP, however, due to the earthquake and tsunami, the decision was delayed to be discussed after the tsunami (Nanto *et al.* 2011).

Alliance relations Lip: The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was signed in 1951 alongside the Treaty of San Francisco that ended the WWII; the treaty was for ten years with a renewable military agreement. In 1960, a revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed that grants the U.S the right for military bases on the archipelago, in exchange for the U.S. pledged to defend Japan in the event of an attack. The security alliance that was signed in the 1960s refers to security concerning foreign attacks. However, with the changing global scenario, this security alliance encompasses various issues related to human security.

This Alliance has survived throughout the cold war and the post-cold war period despite turbulence along the way. The U.S. government and military response to tsunami aid presented an unwavering alliance, in spite of the speculation of U.S. commitment to the security. The growing alliance between the two countries despite the effort to resolve the issue regarding Futenma airbase, is also seen mainly because of the ‘provocation from North Korea and Confrontation with China’ on various occasion (Avery *et al.* 2011). This “alliance seemed to re-focus itself on the changing security contours of the region, with an explicit attention to China’s activity” (Avery *et al.* 2011).

The Obama Administration makes its “Pivot” to Asia-Pacific region, keeping China's rapid rise in the formation of an alliance. China has been playing an assertive role in

the Asia-Pacific, which led many to believe that the U.S. interest in the region is to counter its declining influence and the simultaneous rise of China. China and Japan are faced with a territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a cluster of uninhabited Islands in the East China Sea. Though Washington did take a stance on the matter, however, considers it to be under the Japanese administration and so falls under the security agreement.

This deal came into play in November, 2013, when China's Ministry of Defence announced the creation of East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. The protocol requires submitting flight plans for all non-commercial air traffic before entering the area, which encompasses most of the East China Sea and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Xu 2014). The Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Vice-President Joe Biden, and President Obama on various occasion backed the Tokyo's administration concerning the disputed territory and reaffirming that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty covered the disputed Islands.

Chapter: Five

The U.S. and 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in Philippines

The U.S. has continually projected its “hard power” assets like the USS George Washington, a USN nuclear- powered aircraft carrier that permits the ship to steam for 18 years before refuelling, and can load 97,000 tons, with about 75 aircraft and is manned by 6,250 battle-ready crews. Smart Power is the capability to turn the “hard power” assets as an expression of “soft power.” Peter Shadbolt for CNN (2013) states that: “as an expression of hard power, they don’t come bigger more fearsome than the USS George Washington...but as an expression of soft power, the Nimitz-class carrier is finding its influence in its Asian theatre of operations goes far beyond the range of its fearsome arsenal as it assists the Typhoon Haiyan relief operation known as Operation Damayan in the Philippines.” The Philippines saw the use of military assets in typhoon Haiyan, which took place when talks on enhancing defence agreement was going on. According to USAID/Philippines, the USG over a period of ten years has provided \$177 million, of which \$14 was for disaster risk reduction. This chapter is divided into four sections: the first section provides the response of the American government to the disaster. The second section focuses on the response of the government of Philippines and the Filipino public to the USG assistance. The third section analyses the strategic considerations and benefits derived from the USG response to Typhoon Haiyan.

The U.S. Government Agencies Response

The Philippines has been a constant victim to various natural disasters, and particularly vulnerable to tropical cyclones and floods, earthquakes, landslides and volcanic eruptions. Typhoon Haiyan also locally known as Yolanda was the strongest typhoon to strike land on record. Haiyan made its landfall on the 6th of November, with a wind speed of 200 mph (320km/h) with gust up to 225 mph (360km/h) entered Philippine on 8th November, “maintaining its strength throughout the day as it moved across the central Philippines, only weakening the next day late in the afternoon” (Parker *et al* 2016). According to the United Nations (U.N.) agencies report 2013, nearly after two and half month, 14.1 million people were affected, with more than 4.1 million people displaced and missing. Haiyan affected nine out of the seventeen

regions in Philippine, bringing strong winds, rainfall which resulted in floods, landslides and widespread damage particularly in East Samar and Leyte Provinces.




Figure 4. Map showing the direction of the storm

Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24917722>

Some of the most affected areas with the maximum relief assistance were in Tacloban, located on the islands of Leyte, Cebu City on Cebu Island, and Roxas City on Panay Island. Cebu city became the primary logistics hub for the Philippines and international relief efforts. Haiyan destroyed critical infrastructure including airports, roads, seaports, power distribution networks and other vital resources that were essential to support relief operations. The U.N. agencies and various bilateral and multilateral donors including various Private Voluntary Agencies (PVOs), and also non-governmental organisations made pledges. The response from the USG was seen as crucial due the long standing relationship between the two countries and also because of the nature of disaster. The following are the responses of the USG:

The Administration’s Response: USG began coordinating possible support before the storm hits the Philippines. According to reports from the White House, various

USG departments and agencies in Washington remained in close contact with the Embassy in Manila, and also issued a warning message for the American citizen and USAID. The White House under Obama administration responded immediately following the Typhoon. President Obama, on November 10, stated expressing sympathy and support to the people of Philippines. On 11th November, President Aquino of Philippines issued Presidential Proclamation No. 682, which declared a state of natural calamity, the USAID/OFDA who is the lead USG agency arrived on the same day (Parker *et al.* 2016).

On 12th November, President Obama spoke with the Filipino President over a phone call expressing heartfelt condolences on behalf of the American people. And further discussed the “need for a speedy assessment of what further American resources would be most helpful to assist in the Philippine recovery effort.” Secretary of State John Kerry also paid a visit to Tacloban, the Philippines and met with President Benigno Aquino. During which he announced \$40 million in military assistance and additional \$25 million in humanitarian aid to \$60 million already provided (Lum and Margesson 2014).

The USG provided \$20 million as an initial response for the benefit of those affected by the Typhoon, \$10 million from the USAID/OFDA response fund and another \$10 million from USAID/FFP to the U.N. World Food Program (WFP). The USG also provided basic necessities like food, basic hygiene, and water. According to USAID (FY) report in April 2014, the total USG assistance to Philippines for Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda was through USAID/OFDA i.e. \$35 million, USAID/FFP is \$20.1 million, and DOD spending is \$34.5 million and USAID/Philippines is \$1.2 million.

Policy of the Congress: During the 113th congress a hearing was held before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee titled “Assessing the Response to Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan” on November 19, 2013. Congressman Chris Smith led a bipartisan congressional delegation to the Philippines, on November 22, joined by Al Green [D-TX] and Trent Franks [R-AZ]. The members of the Congress were the first of the U.S. government officials to offer support (Lum and Margesson 2014). The finding of the delegation and the response of the U.S. government and international aid organizations were

discussed in the congressional hearing before the House global health panel chaired by Smith.

The Hearing took place before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted on December 3, titled “The U.S. Post-Typhoon Response in the Philippines: Health and Human Rights Issues.” The report by Smith suggested that special attention was required in two key areas- preventing and addressing potential epidemics and minimizing the scourge of human trafficking. On November 21, the Senate expedited hearing on the confirmation of the new U.S. ambassador to the Philippines to help coordinate U.S. humanitarian assistance and relief support in the Philippines (Lum and Margesson 2014).

The Typhoon Haiyan revived a long drawn debate in the Congress regarding U.S. food aid methods. U.S. held a record of the largest donor in International Food Assistance, with \$2 billion per year to provide for food-insecure countries in emergency food assistance to avert humanitarian crises and development aid to support agriculture and related sectors. According to the law, most of the food aid is shipped from the U.S., however, currently due to prepositioning of food in domestic and overseas warehouse, it reduces the average delivery time. The current law governing the U.S. food aid is seen by aid workers and anti-poverty groups that it could hurt or delay recovery efforts in the Philippines.

The administration ensures that the agency of assistance has the flexibility to buy less expensive food closer to the areas of disaster. However, the proposed program was resisted by the agricultural and shipping industries, as this could hurt U.S. farmers and cost jobs (Nixon 2013). Under the current law, only about 20% of U.S. food aid provided could be bought locally i.e. about \$300 million, U.S. has contributed \$10 million of food aid to the Philippines out of which \$8 million is purchased locally. The advocates of anti-poverty states that this was unlikely to continue, since much of the food aid is already committed to the Democratic Republic of Congo, and some are reserves for other anticipated humanitarian crises around the world. The administration proposal of 45% of food aid to be bought locally has been rejected by the Congress (Nixon 2013).

Preparedness of USAID/OFDA: The U.S. assistance in the affected communities was focused on three important areas: emergency shelter, water and sanitation, and food aid, along with support to logistics and distribution networks. According to USAID on April 21st, 2014, 16 million people were affected, and resulted in 6300 deaths, 4.1 million people were displaced, and 1.1 million homes were damaged or destroyed in the event of the disaster. As stated by the director of OFDA, the hydro-meteorological experts identified severity of the storm before it hit the ground, and the OFDA pre-deployed a Disaster Assistance Advanced Team in Manila and was in Leyte Province after the storm passed through.

On the 9th of November, when a disaster was declared in the Philippines, USAID/OFDA activated a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and also a Washington D.C. based Response Management Team (RMT). USAID/OFDA staffs in Bangkok (Thailand), Honolulu (Hawaii) and Washington D.C. remain in frequent contact with the DART and humanitarian response partners to monitor the damages and relief efforts. The USAID initially gave \$10m to OFDA for immediate relief effort for the purpose of procuring the emergency goods, the subsequent transportation and distribution of relief commodities, and also improving access to sanitation in the affected areas.

The USAID/Food for Peace (FFP) gave \$10m to the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) for emergency food assistance. WFP has estimated that nearly 2.5m people required immediate food aid. The FFP funding supported the emergency airlift of 55 metric tons (MT) of emergency food product from Miami (Florida) to feed 20,000 children under five and 15,000 adults for five days. The shipments from the disaster relief warehouses in Colombo (Sri Lanka) consist of 1020 MT of food supplies, which lasted for three weeks and fed 60,000 people for a month.

USAID/OFDA worked in close contact with the DoD's Pacific Command (PACOM). PACOM forces soon after arrival in Manila supported the USAID/OFDA effort by providing transportation for commodities to reach the affected areas. The U.S. military aircraft helped DART to assess the affected areas, and to determine the additional emergency relief goods. PACOM also assisted the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) in its search-and-rescue operations. When the first shipment of

commodities arrived on the 12th of November, it was distributed with the assistance of the DoD.

The USAID/OFDA has various other options to respond outside of DoD to provide immediate support like resources, including money, deployment-ready humanitarian expert, and advisors across the USG. However, the impact of Typhoon Haiyan required greater response capabilities and capacity that these response options could provide, like DoD-unique airlift capabilities (Parker *et al.* 2016). USAID with support from DoD and in partnership with UNICEF and the GoP resumed the supply of clean water to roughly 200,000 people in the city of Tacloban. USAID also enabled the U.N., the GoP and other international responders to utilize DoD airlift capacity. The USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance announced an additional \$10 million for the relief effort. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with Procter & Gamble and Coca-Cola by the USAID, in order to create a public-private partnership. This Partnership seeks to help more than 2000 small convenience stores to repair, restock, and rehabilitate their shops.

Department of Defense Response: In the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan, U.S. military responded by conducting Operation Damayan. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the 9th of November directed the USPACOM to assist and support the USG in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. According to the officials, the support provided was at the request of the GoP. PACOM initial focus was search-and-rescue, with the help of helicopters and other military vehicles. Marine Corps Forces Pacific was directed by USPACOM to lead in military relief operation, with Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) serving as the tactical mission commander (Parker *et al.* 2016).

The U.S. Marines that was placed in the Philippines, at the time of disaster were among the first to respond using C-130s and MV-22 Ospreys to airlift relief supplies in the city of Tacloban and other hit areas. According to reports on November 11th about 90 U.S. Marines and sailors were on the ground in the Philippines. The III MEB was deployed from Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma, Japan. Upon arrival the III MEB set up their Command Operation Centre (COC) at Villamor Air Base coordinated with the AFP, home of the Philippine Air Force (Parker *et al.* 2016). The USS George Washington carrier strike group which arrived on 14th November 2013,

helped to expand the search-and-rescue operations, provided medical care and also delivered supplies using its 21 helicopters.

PACOM established its Joint Task Force (JTF) for relief assistance at Camp Aguinaldo. The JTF replaced the III MEF, and its commander Lt Gen John E. Wissler assumed the command of the JTF. By the 19th of November, the total DoD assistance was about 7 million, and about 9,500 U.S. military personnel were placed to the crises. The assistance was seen in the form of logistical support, and ensured the clearance of airports for transportation of relief goods, and establishing aid distribution centres. JTF in its report on the 26th stated that the mission no longer required a unique DoD capability, and recommended a mission for transition; second, disestablishing the JTF and also releasing all major assets and U.S. forces for redeployment by 1st of December (Parker *et al.* 2016).

Due to prepositioned U.S. military assets in the region, the military was able to respond quickly alongside AFP counterparts. Further, the military assets based near the Philippines could provide life-saving assistance to the responders, when the Philippines' disaster relief goods were exhausted (Parker *et al.* 2016). The U.S. and the Philippines military combined effort helped to provide tactical forces, while the government and humanitarian aid community organised the relief goods to deploy (Parker *et al.* 2016).

During Operation Damayan, the International Coordination Team (ICT) played a crucial role in assisting and ensuring the effective and speedy delivery of military capabilities and resources to support international efforts in the USPACOM area of operation. The USPACOM core structure included the "USPACOM DJ3 (Chair); a Canadian LNO (Liaison Officer); a Japanese LNO; the Philippines LNO and Deputy LNO; an Australian LNO; a British LNO; representatives from USPACOM directorates, including training, plans, logistics, information technology, finance, and operations; the OFDA representatives; the foreign policy advisor; and an All Partner Access Network (APAN) representatives" (Parker *et al.* 2016).

The emergency response to the disaster ended within two weeks, while the U.S. military major operations completed by November 26th. However, some contributing nation's military were on the ground assisting the Philippine government in the affected areas (Parker *et al.* 2016). The use of DoD assets was followed according to

the Oslo Guidelines, where the DoD assets provided for a unique capability and in a timely manner, when it was clear that no other alternative existed (Parker *et al.* 2016; Romauldez 2013).

The Philippines Response to U.S. Support

The international humanitarian response to the disaster was enormous. The international donors had provided with U.S. \$796 million, as stated both inside and outside the appeal of the Government of Philippines (GoP). According to OCHA's financial tracking service based on International Commitment during 2013 and 2014, the United Kingdom leads the chart with \$110 million followed by U.S. with \$90 million and by Canada, Japan, European Commission, Australia, Norway, Central Emergency Response Fund, Sweden, and Germany. Unlike the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the outflow of information from mainstream media, social media and citizen journalism on the effects of the typhoon, significantly helped the responders to take an appropriate course of action.

The increasingly globalised nature of disaster response was seen in the commitment to foreign humanitarian assistance players, who came to the aid of the Philippines (Parker *et al.* 2016). According to a report, the relief efforts saw 450 international staff workers that were deployed within the first three weeks of the disaster (Carden and Clements 2015). However, the USG assistance to the disaster did not go unnoticed. The U.S. participated in disaster relief with 59 other nations and 29 militaries. According to various humanitarian aid experts, Typhoon Haiyan in Philippines presented one of the best civil-military coordination (Parker *et al.* 2016). The USG participated in the disaster relief at the request of the President of Philippines, although arrangements by the USG had been made prior to the occurrence of a disaster. The following are the responses of the Filipino government and the public:

The Government Response: The Philippines has a specialised institution for risk reduction and management, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council/Office of Civil Defense (NDRRMC/OCD), which was well designed and a robust disaster risk management system. Though the country is well known to suffer from fearsome storms, floods, and hazards, however, it was not fully prepared for a disaster of such magnitude (Ocon and Neussner 2015). The evacuation order was

given before the storm reached the Philippines, however, studies have suggested that those evacuation centres were single storey buildings typically schools, and were not strong enough to withstand the force of violent waves. It did not protect the evacuees from the sudden surge in storms by the typhoon and was a death-trap to the people seeking shelter (Ocon and Neussner 2015).

The Philippines weather agency PAGASA and other national and international institutions noted an emergence of a typhoon in Philippines days before it made a landfall. The NDRRMC/OCD is responsible for disseminating information to the general public from the reports given by PAGASA. On November 7, President Aquino of Philippines made a television broadcast of the dangers of the typhoon. Interviews conducted in the aftermath of the Typhoon by Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in December 2013 concluded that there was enough time to prepare before the typhoon hit Philippines (Ocon and Neussner 2015). The study suggests that many residents were unaware of the term “storm surge,” stating media coverage of 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2011 Tsunami in Japan made them aware of the dangers of Tsunami but not “storm surge.” The first responders on scene after the typhoon included the Air Force personnel of the Philippines; the priorities of the first responders were to clear the airports, roads and establish communications.

The GoP requested U.S. help for humanitarian assistance on the 9th of November (Washington time). GoP quickly facilitated the humanitarian aid provided by the USG and the international community, Further, GoP provided clearance for U.S. aircrafts, ships, and personnel enabling an efficient response to the affected areas. On the 10th of November President Aquino visited the affected areas in Tacloban City and Roxas City and called for an NDRRMC meeting at the command post in Tacloban City Police HQ. The following day President Aquino brief the nation on the extent of the devastation, and assured that relief and recovery had already being made by the government. Further, he stated that the international humanitarian community had also made their pledges, and also declared the state of natural calamity.

There were three major distribution hubs of relief goods and other emergency materials- the Tacloban, Ormoc and Guiuan, each with its area of responsibility. Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario stated that the U.S. military deep

involvement in the humanitarian operations illustrated the country's need to grant the U.S. greater access to the country (Quismundo 2013). On the 28th of April, President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines acknowledges the immediate assistance provided by the USG and the American people in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan and also reiterates that the Filipino people will never forget such kindness and compassion.

Public Opinion: Philippine Star Columnist Babe Romauldez, in his “Babe eye view: Thank God for the United States!” described the events that unfolded in the aftermath of the typhoon; the arrival of USS George Washington in Leyte Gulf from Victoria Harbour in Hong Kong, according to him:

“reminiscent of the time in our history when Filipinos rejoiced at the arrival of General MacArthur on the shores of Palo, Leyte in October 1944 heralding our country's liberation from Japanese occupation — the same sentiment that survivors and the public now feel at witnessing the rapid deployment of the *Nimitz* class supercarrier and its strike wing, with cargo jets, choppers, and American troops dispatched on the ground to help bring some semblance of order in the chaos and confusion that was hampering relief efforts several days after the typhoon.” (Romauldez 2013)

The U.S. leadership was seen in the way they handled the crises. The DoD rapid response in deploying its air and naval assets, according to Romauldez, showed a bit of muscle flexing to all, particularly China, that U.S. can “flex its muscle in the Asia-Pacific Region at short notice” (Romauldez 2013). The U.S. Response to Typhoon Haiyan generated goodwill not only among the Filipino population but throughout the region. Writing in the USA today, Jonah Blank states:

“The goodwill the tsunami relief brought the U.S. is incalculable. Nearly a decade later, the effort may rank as one of the most concrete reasons Southeast Asian nations trust the long-term commitment to a strategy of ‘Asian rebalancing’.” (Kurlantzick 2013)

Strategic Considerations

There are various strategic considerations to the USG response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines: Obama's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy is one of the reasons, the

U.S. response was “designed to express support for an important ally and reinforce an already strong bilateral relationship” (Dolan and Lyon 2016). Second, it is the desire to increase U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Lastly, the treaty alliance signed between the two countries.

Rebalancing Strategy: Speaking in the Australian parliament in 2011, President Obama ensures that “as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and close partnership with our allies and friends.” Obama in 2011 participated in the 3rd East Asia Summit held at Indonesia, and was also the first U.S. President to attend the conference. This Asia trip made headlines due to the renewed focus of Asia-Pacific, and his speech in the Australian Parliament, stating U.S. as a Pacific nation. This renewed engaging came to be known as “Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy”, this strategy gave priority to U.S. military planning, foreign policy and also economic policy.

One of the key issues in Asia-Rebalancing in relation to the Philippines is the maritime issue; the U.S. military played a crucial role in the Philippines’ security, when there was tension over territorial rights in the South China Sea (Albert 2016). In April 2012, a tension between Beijing and Manila took place, following an incident relating to a Chinese fishermen and the Philippines authority. Philippines then filed an arbitration case under the UN Convention and Law of the Sea in January 2013.

The U.S.-Philippines relations were regarded as the pillar for U.S. security strategy in Asia (Albert 2016). China, on the other hand, is seen as a crucial link in the U.S. relations with the Philippines and vice-versa. Though the U.S. presence ended in 1992, the Filipino President invited back the U.S. forces in the form of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The change in the policy of the government is seen as a partial response to China’s construction of buildings on the Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands chain of the South China Sea in 1995. The VFA was signed by both the countries in 1998 and ratified by the Philippine Senate in 1999, amidst protest from the Catholic Church of the Philippines, leftist politicians and academics and others. The VFA allow for Joint Philippine-U.S. military operations, among other provision the VFA requires, that the American military will only engage in non-

military roles and will not engage in any combat roles, neither will they establish any permanent base in the Philippines (Lum and Dolven 2014).

The Philippines and the U.S., since 2011, have established bilateral strategic dialogues, to maintain a regular policy consultation and exchange of views on various issues, bilateral, regional and global issues. Various high-profile visits of the American statesmen also took place during the early years of Asia-rebalancing; Secretary Clinton visited the Philippines in November of 2009 and 2011 and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in March 2013. In the 2009 visit, Secretary Clinton assured its support to fight against the country's extremist and also help rebuild the affected areas after three storms. Clinton expressed that the military pact which allows the deployment of U.S. military in the Philippines, was a sign of partnership based on mutual respect and interest.

The 2011 visit of Secretary Clinton reaffirms the military ties between the two countries. The visit was to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty and at the time of the growing tension over the South China Sea between its ally Philippines and China. In 2013, during Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter visit to the Philippines, a wide range of security issues that were deemed important to the U.S. and the Philippines alliance. The issues were concerning maritime domain, the modernisation and capacity building of AFP, and U.S. continued assistance against counterterrorism. According to analyst, this diplomatic and military presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region is largely due to the rebalancing measures taken by the Obama administration.

U.S. Military Presence in the Philippines: The typhoon Haiyan took place at a time when the U.S. and the Philippines are considering increased rotational presence of the U.S. military in the country. At the time of the disaster, the U.S. military had a very “small footprint” of people and equipment with about 500 U.S. military personnel from Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines (JSOTF-P) “conducting counterterrorism training for selected units of the Philippine military,” some of the members were involved in carrying Operation Damayan in Ormoc City, Leyte Province (Lum and Margesson 2014).

During the December 17, 2013, visit of Secretary of State John Kerry, in his remarks with Foreign Affairs Secretary Del Rosario, mentions the ongoing negotiations for a

‘strong and enduring framework agreement’ that would enhance defense cooperation and also increased rotational presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines. Further, he announced \$40 million “for a new initiative to improve the Philippines’ maritime security and maritime domain awareness.” Six months after Typhoon Haiyan, President Obama visited the Philippines on and from 28-29 April to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to the alliance and to discuss U.S. strategic vision for the bilateral friendship (White House Archives 2014). During which both the Presidents announced that both the countries have agreed to an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

The EDCA seeks to update and enhanced the U.S.-Philippines defence cooperation in the 21st Century. The EDCA signed by Washington and Manila allows the rotational presence of U.S. forces, with a 10 year renewable agreement, and also facilitate the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines and the region. The 10-year renewable arrangement is seen by the observers as a milestone in U.S. military engagement in the Philippines and the Administration's rebalance policy, and the agreement is consistent with the VFA (Lum and Dolven 2014). Further, President Aquino also welcomes the U.S. to actively participate in a regional mechanism such as ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. The EDCA allows the increased presence of U.S. forces, aircraft, ships, and equipment; also the use of Philippines base including the U.S. built facilities and improvement to be used rent free but owned by the Philippines. According to the analyst, the involvement of U.S. military in the disaster relief efforts bolstered the support for enhanced U.S.-Philippines military cooperation, the EDCA was an issue both the sides have been discussing for past several months (Lum and Margesson 2014).

The U.S.-Philippines Alliance: The Philippines is one of the oldest allies of U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and also with long lasting defense relations. On August 30, 1951, the Philippines and the U.S. signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, pledging to come to each other's aid in case of an attack. The origin of a defense relation between both the countries can be seen with the signing of a Military Base Agreement by U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Paul McNutt and Philippine President Manuel Roxas in March 1947 which granted the right to the U.S. to establish bases at more than a dozen locations (Albert 2016). Following which the U.S. maintained and operated

major facilities like the Subic Bay Naval Complex, Clark Air Base and other subsidiary installations in the Philippines.

The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 was a public and formal declaration of unity and support to each other's security, a common purpose to defend each other at times of external aggression. Though the U.S. military bases were closed in 1992, both the countries maintained security relations and took part in various Joint Counterterrorism Measures, which helped to reduce terrorist activities in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines (Lum and Dolven 2014).

The Philippines and China have an unresolved territorial dispute over an 'Island Territories' in the South-China Sea since the 70s. Though both the countries continue to pursue their territorial claims over the islands in the UN, however, bilateral approach has been made areas relating to economic and people-to-people program. According to disaster diplomacy, "Fast and generous U.S. aid effort is restoring its prestige in Asia, while China's sluggish, modest response is being seen as a missed opportunity" (Kwok 2013). Observers' states that aid diplomacy helped Washington regain from an earlier blow to its prestige when President Obama missed two important summits and Beijing on the other hand, missed the chance to strengthen ties from the maritime disputes (Kwok 2013).

Writing about the strategic consequences of the typhoon in Philippines, Rory Medcalf, the director of the International Security Programme at the Lowy Institute in Australia, states that "the U.S. may not be giving much money...but the rapid response...by the U.S. military forces is sending a signal that will be noticed across the region." The power projection of U.S. on the world stage through humanitarian disaster relief effort is viewed as a "public relations goldmine for the U.S. military, at a time when the U.S. is perceived as losing influence in the region to China" (Shadbolt 2013). According to Pew Global Attitudes survey (2015), the image of U.S. remained favourable in most Asian nations; the Philippines with 85% favourability in 2013 to 92% in 2014 and 2015.

On April 2, 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel hosted ten defense ministers of the Association of Southeast Asians (ASEAN), for a 'first- of- its kind' meeting in Hawaii on the U.S. soil. One of the goals of the meeting was how the militaries could work best worked together in challenges posed by the non-traditional security

challenges including climate change and natural disaster (Podesta 2014). A natural disaster is seen as posing a direct threat to regional stability, security, and prosperity which is seen as an impact caused by climate change. Therefore, climate change is not just an environmental problem, on the contrary it is an economic and security problem as well. The meeting gave a tour of some of the latest capabilities deployed in the Pacific, such as U.S.S Anchorage, which is Navy's newest amphibious transport ship and also held a round table discussion on how to work together in order to enhance the capabilities and efficient ways to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts which is led by the USAID Administrator.

The Typhoon Haiyan as Peter Shadbolt for CNN (2013) states "The projection of U.S. power on the world stage, especially in the context of a humanitarian disaster such as Haiyan, represents a public relations goldmine for the U.S. military, at a time when U.S. is perceived as losing influence in the region to China." The relief effort can be seen in the growing relations between the two countries after the Iraq war of 2003, and the assertion of China in the disputed territories of South China Sea. The baggage of history of being a colony and the colonizer produce challenges to their relations. However, according to commentators, the administrations' policy of rebalancing of U.S. forces and diplomacy to Asia was the driver behind the warming of relations, and simultaneously the Philippines was driven to re-embracing U.S. due to China's behaviour in South China Sea (Kurlantzick 2013). Typhoon Haiyan expedited the process of ongoing negotiations on EDCA, meanwhile projecting the image of the American military image in the Philippines and the region.

Chapter: Six

Conclusion

The U.S. military has assisted several countries affected by natural disasters and also has played an enormous role in delivering Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) to enhance its image. When disasters occur in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. military is generally at the centre of focus for all the operations. Catering to the needs of the 21st century, the U.S. government has expanded its efforts to give the military resources to perform its HA/DR role, but has also based its decisions as per its interests and other strategic considerations. Smart power strategy was used in recent years by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific by rendering help in disasters faced by these countries. The U.S. government conducted massive disaster relief response with the help of its military assets in the Asia-Pacific in two gigantic tsunamis that hit the Indian Ocean states and Japan and also Typhoon Haiyan brought enormous damage to life and property in the Philippines. The deployment of hard power assets like USS George Washington was a strategic move that did not fail to uplift the spirit of disaster victims and create positive public opinion. Further, the arrival of USNS Mercy to provide medical support to the tsunami disaster victims in Aceh province, though late, caught the world's attention. In the Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOT), hard power assets like USS Abraham Lincoln and USNS Mercy was deployed; in the tsunami in Japan, USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group was in action, and also the use of a nuclear power aircraft like USS George Washington in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines was remarkable. Since the region is prone to natural calamities, smart power strategy of the U.S. comes into play to generate strategic benefits as well

Significantly, the US military's responses in all these cases were immediate; and in the case of IOT, it responded even before the approval of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the President. The military has 72-hour window, and this put the military on edge before any agencies of the government. However, the military needs to uphold the Oslo guidelines. The responses of the military in all the cases were followed according to the Oslo guidelines. The military delivered assets that the civilian agencies did not possess, and provided immediate relief, primarily to fill in humanitarian gaps. These natural disasters were gigantic and required the support of

the military assets. In the case of Japan, despite the country's enormous wealth and capabilities, the tsunami necessitated the government to take outside help. The US military promptly came to the rescue of the victims and filled the humanitarian gaps.

Though numerous reports and commentaries and scholarly writings suggest that the presence of external military force during humanitarian relief operations creates confusion and sometimes compromise the security of the victim country, the U.S. military has mostly provided timely help and ensured the success of its military operations for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. In the Aceh province of Indonesia, the US navy carried out its disaster relief effort through sea basing. The USS Abraham was stationed off the coast of Sumatra, and with the help of its helicopters provided the transportation of necessary goods and services.

While the US has been traditionally the security provider in the Asia Pacific region, rise of the Chinese power in recent years created credibility issues and the US influence in the region began to reduce in relative terms. The US Government made use of the HA/DR operations to boost its soft power in the region. The defence and alliance related agreements with several countries in the Asia Pacific during the Cold War era were modified to include fight against natural disasters environmental problems. Bilateral and multilateral military exercises were regularly conducted for tackling the issue of climate change and natural disasters.

The image of the US that had got a beating in the midst of the war against terrorism, changed due to US help in disaster relief. The public opinion in Indonesia turned positive towards the U.S., the Bush administration restored cordial relations with the Indonesian President Yudhoyono, by expanding military-to-military relations. In Sri Lanka too the U.S. got favourable ratings in the opinion polls due to its military's role in HA/DR operations. Similar was the case in Thailand and the U.S. continues to conduct joint military exercises and maintain its alliance relations with that country.

While US-Japan security relations had suffered due to Futenma base issue and Sino-Japanese disputes in East China Sea, particularly over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the tsunami effect and the nuclear accident in Fukushima nuclear power plant brought new opportunities for re-emphasizing the alliance treaty. Following the reactor explosion in Fukushima nuclear power plant, the U.S. and France together assisted the Japanese government to contain the radiation generated from the reactor explosion in

Fukushima power plant, and also to deal with any negative impact that may be faced with the growth of nuclear power industry.

The US-Philippines alliance that had considerably weakened in the post-Cold War era also got a Philip with prompt US assistance to disaster victims in that country. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed between the U.S. and the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan relief effort by the U.S. military. The defence cooperation allowed the rotational presence of U.S. military in the Philippines, and also the use of U.S. built facilities in the Philippines. The current EDCA allows increased presence of U.S. forces, aircraft, ships, and equipment. The agreement also made provision for a ten-year renewable contract.

Following the IOT, the U.S. has further increased its preparedness in assisting in disaster relief. It has also adopted various policies in recent years to enhance the military's capabilities for playing helpful role in HA/DR. In the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. has increased HA/DR exercises and enhanced cooperation with regional countries to meet future crises.

Hypotheses:

The research is based on two hypotheses:

The U.S. military response to disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region was not guided by humanitarian considerations alone:

The first case study on the Indian Ocean Tsunami during the Bush administration proves that the US delivered the largest aid program conducted by its military. The US military worked simultaneously in three countries. Strategic consideration prevailed in US decision making- first, Washington sought to change the negative image of the U.S. military after the U.S. led Iraq war, in particular, in the Muslim majority country of Indonesia. The U.S. also needed the support of the government in the fight against terrorism as Indonesia became a haven to the global terrorist. The Bush administration sought to improve military-to-military relations with Indonesia and assist Indonesian military in capacity building. The U.S. also capitalized on its HA/DR operations to strengthen its alliance relations with Thailand and strategic partnership with Sri Lanka.

The second case study on the tsunami in Japan portrays various strategic considerations that were taken into account in assisting the Japanese government. Strategic considerations surpassed humanitarian concerns- first, the issue of Futenma base realignment, this realignment seeks to relocate the Futenma Air Station from the city of Ginowan to Camp Schwab area and also the relocation of 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximate 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam. Second, the economic considerations, Japan plays an essential role in the chain of production and distribution, and do not want Japan to tremble down from the echelon of economic power. Lastly, the defence security treaty signed by both the countries during the Cold War era; the alliance has refocused to the changing security contours of the region, and in particular with China.

The third case study on Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines also maintains the strategic consideration over humanitarian. First, in the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy under the Obama administration, the Philippines is placed as the most strategic country. Second, the U.S. seeks to increase U.S. military rotational presence in the region, and bring the ongoing talks on enhanced defence cooperation to life.

The involvement of U.S. military personnel in disaster relief was a pretext to increase troop deployment in Asia-Pacific region.

The military-to-military relations between Indonesia and the U.S. in the aftermath of the tsunami showcased the interest of the USG to increase troop deployment through various military exercises carried out with the country. The war against terrorism was the interest behind the increase in troop's presence in the Asia-Pacific under the Bush administration.

The U.S. and Japan, on the other hand, were faced with the issue of realignment of the Futenma base. The realignment contains two parts to it- one is the redeployment of the U.S. troops to Guam and the other, is to relocate Marine Corps Air Station to a less congested area in Futenma. In 2012, however, due to opposition from the Okinawa officials on the issue of relocation of Marine Corps Air Station, the two governments decided to delink the two issues. Following which 9000 marines and their dependants were agreed to be relocated from Okinawa, with around 5000 in Guam, subsequently about 2,500 marines to be redeployed in Australia on an occasional basis, and around 1,500 to Hawaii.

In the case of Philippines, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. and the Philippines came to light after the typhoon Haiyan relief effort made by the USG and its military, even though there was an ongoing talk on increasing U.S. presence. The EDCA gives the U.S. rotational presence in the Philippines including its military assets, and also allows the use of the U.S. facilities in the Philippines.

The research confirmed the hypotheses that the U.S. decision in HA/DR operations were influenced by strategic considerations in rendering disaster relief to the countries in Asia-Pacific. It gave an opportunity to enhance the deployment of U.S. troops in the region for the sake of disaster relief. The limitation of the research comes from the attitude and interest of the affected states towards the U.S., which is left out in the research. The affected countries also had vested interest in maintaining security ties with the U.S., for example, though Typhoon Haiyan expedited the process for Enhanced Security Cooperation Agreement, this process would not have had a smooth operation if the Philippines had not been in maritime disputes with China. In a similar way, Indonesia elected a new President in 2004, who was willing to improve relations with Indonesia, especially in the arena of military-to-military relations. The Indonesian government got the public backing to increase its military relations with the U.S. after the assistance provided by the U.S.

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