

**THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
LEBANON CRISIS OF 1982**

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PARWAIZ AHMAD

**CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI—110067, INDIA**


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


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PARWAIZ AHMAD

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PREFACE

This dissertation seeks to examine various developments leading to and issues arising from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, with special reference to diplomatic interactions at the United Nations in the wake of the invasion.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 may be considered as one of the major events in the history of international conflicts that occurred in the present turbulent decade. The invasion has a bearing on the history of Lebanon, the Palestinian problem not excluding the larger Arab-Israeli conflict and on the role of the UN in the field of maintenance of peace and security.

Firstly, as a result of the invasion and the policies pursued by Israel thereafter, fragmentation of Lebanon as a country of multireligious and ethnic groups had reached more frightening proportions, while state and social institutions were paralysed if not destroyed. The most serious impact of the invasion was evident in the collapse of the 1943 National Pact that brought about an agreement on sharing of power among the various political forces-

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the Christians represented by the Phalangist Party, the Moslem majority as represented by the coalition known as the Lebanese National Movement, the Druze. Long time animosities manifested sufficiently themselves in the resumption of civil war in Lebanon from which it has not yet been able to recover.

Secondly, the Arab-Israeli conflict insofar as the Palestinian question was concerned had taken a new turn for the worse following the invasion. Israel effectively destroyed the military bases of the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon. Later all of them were deported to Arab countries. The deportation was soon followed by serious fighting between factions of Palestinian Liberation Organization often supported by various Arab countries. Moreover, the ghastly massacre of Palestinian refugees by Phalangist militias supported by Israel had shocked the conscience of the international community. Despite these developments Arab countries remained as disunited as in the past.

Thirdly, the 1982 Israeli invasion tended to seriously question the vitality of the concept of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The fact that the invading forces had run over the UN

presence in southern Lebanon namely, UN interim force in Lebanon, clearly showed how seriously was the credibility of UN Peacekeeping eroded. The UNIFIL found itself behind the Israeli frontline- a circumstance which was qualitatively different from the situation when it was deployed in 1978. The credibility of both the United Nations and peacekeeping was severely shaken. Adding insult to injury, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion an attempt had been made to resort to peacekeeping outside of the UN forum. Two multinational forces were set up to supervise the withdrawal of Palestinian guerrillas and help the Lebanese government restore sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area respectively. In all, these developments questioned some of the basic assumptions of the UN peacekeeping and the relevance of the UN to containment of international conflicts.

Against the background of what has been observed above, some questions would seem pertinent. Is it that the second Israeli invasion was only a manifestation of the long-drawn conflict in the region? What are its implications for the Palestinian question in particular and Arab-Israeli in general? what was the nature and pattern of response of the

international community as represented at the UN to the events associated with the 1982 invasion? To what extent the Israeli invasion challenged the conceptual and operational foundations of the UN peacekeeping operations? How could one view UNIFIL's role and response to the challenges? These are some of the questions the dissertation seeks to look into.

The first chapter of the dissertation presents a historical perspective and traces the origin of the Palestinian problem, as also various Arab-Israeli wars to the extent Lebanon was involved in the conflict. The next chapter brings out the developments that immediately preceded the invasion of 1982. It focuses on the first Israeli invasion of March 1978, the UN response including inception of UNIFIL and the developments which led to second invasion. The third chapter examines the nature and pattern of diplomatic interactions at the UN Security Council on the report of invasion. Examined in this chapter are the points of views presented by not only members of the Council but also the points made by the countries directly concerned, Lebanon and Israel, and Arab and non-Arab countries too, and the outcome of the council's deliberations.

The fourth chapter examines the dimensions of challenges faced by UNIFIL, especially in terms of the conceptual and operational aspects of UN peacekeeping and the consequential situation. The final and fifth chapter attempts an overall assessment and some concluding observations.

The study is essentially descriptive-analytical in nature. UN documents constitute primary source material for the study. In addition, books, research articles and other secondary sources have been consulted.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 did not take place all of a sudden. Historically, its roots could be traced to interactive relationship between the Palestinian question, the Arab-Israel conflicts and the worsening Lebanese domestic political situation over a period of time. To focus how and to what extent these factors contributed to the developments which eventually led to the invasion is the purpose of this chapter.

Palestine Problem

Since the creation of Israel on 14 May 1948, no Arab country has been free from the repercussion of Palestinian problem, both militarily and diplomatically. This is true in case of Lebanon also, a country which has common border with Israel and has a considerable proportion of Muslim population. Thus when the hostilities broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbours in the wake of Jewish unilateral proclamation of the establishment of Israel, Lebanon found itself involved in the fighting along with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan.

The hostilities were, however, halted through a truce arranged by the Security Council and observation of truce was supervised by United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). Armistice Agreements were signed in 1949 by Israel and four Arab countries: Egypt Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

Egypt was the first Arab country to sign on Armistice Agreement with Israel quickly followed by Lebanon. Lebanon government was quite ready to replace the undependable ceasefire with an armistice once it was clear militarily how weak Lebanon was among the Arab states. Moreover, some Lebanese, particularly certain Christians, had not been in favour of war with Israel from the very beginning. Israel's unwillingness to evacuate strategic position on Lebanese territory near the Syrian border unless Syria was also willing to accept an armistice, delayed progress of a Lebanon-Israel armistice agreement. Once Syria signed the agreement with Israel, Israel-Lebanese armistice agreement was quickly concluded.¹

¹Fred J. Khouri, The Arab Israeli Dilemma (New York, 1983), p.96.

Meanwhile, Israel was granted the membership of the United Nations on 11 May 1949.²

The impact of First Arab-Israel war on Lebanon was felt in the sudden influx of large number of Palestinian refugees. By the end of the war about 1,40,000 refugees arrived in Lebanon.³ In Lebanon seventeen refugee camps were established with the help of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRUA).⁴

1967 War and Its Repurcussion on Lebanon

The Arab-Israel dispute simmered throughout the 1950's. In 1956 following the nationalization by Egypt of the Suez Canal, Israel and subsequently France and the United Kingdom launched military offensive against Egypt mainly on the question of Suez Canal. Eleven years later, in 1967, Israel inflicted humiliating defeat on Egypt, Syria and Jordan by occupying huge chunks of territory. Lebanon did not take part in 1956 war nor did it in June

²GA Res. 273 (III), 11 May 1949.

³David C. Gilmour, Lebanon : The Fractured Country (Oxford, 1983), p.86.

⁴For details of the refugee problems see, Henry Caftan, Palestine, The Arab and Israel : The Search for Justice (London, 1970), pp 39-54.

1967 war. But the 1967 war was important for Lebanon as it had bearings on the developments that took place in the country.

Among the most decisive and far reaching consequences of the third Arab-Israel war (1967) notable were the spread and consolidation of Palestinian nationalism, the rise of new and activist leadership within the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and emergence of the Palestine resistant movement as a major force in Arab politics and in the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵

Until the third Arab-Israeli war most Palestinian nationalists looked to political and military power of the Arabs as the primary instrument for achieving the liberation of Palestine on their behalf. But after the 1967 war they lost faith in Arab military strength because of the latter's defeat. Further, Arab government's attempted to seek a settlement individually with Israel without regard to Palestinian aspiration. Moreover Israel was rapidly establishing Jewish settlement colonies in many parts of the occupied territories. All these developments led the Palestinian leaders to realise that Arab armies were incapable of defeating Israel. They seemed

⁵Khouri, n.l, p.356.

to have decided to take military initiative against Israel themselves.⁶

In the aftermath of 1967 war P.L.O. leadership fell on younger and more active popular Palestinians such as Yassir Arafat. Thousands of Palestinian joined al Fatah and the P.F.L.P. which had set up their headquarters in Jordan. Numerous commando operations were conducted by these two organizations in the Israeli occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza. They clashed with Israeli troops at Karama, a Jordanian village where Israeli forces suffered heavy casualties giving a moral boost to guerrillas.

Besides Jordan, Lebanon was another important base from where guerrilla could launch attacks against Israel. When Gaza and Sinai Peninsula fell to Israel in 1967 war, the Palestinian lost their bases in Egyptian controlled territory. In Syria they were organised into a special force, Siqua, and placed under Syrian army control. But the Lebanese government was too weak to control them.⁷

⁶Gilmour, n.3, p.56

⁷Ibid.

When the Palestinian Liberation Army was established in 1964, the Lebanese government had made it clear that they would not be allowed to have bases in Lebanon. But the situation had changed after the 1967 war as all the Palestinian territory fell under Israeli occupation and the Palestine guerrillas had nowhere else to operate from except the territory of neighbouring Arab states. Following the battle of Karama the guerrillas enjoyed such an overwhelming sympathy in the Arab world that it became impossible for the Lebanese government to restrict their activities without incurring strong criticism from both other Arab states as also from radical Arab nationalists inside Lebanon.⁸ Under these circumstances, Lebanon became the main place for guerilla attacks against Israel. By October 1968 guerrilla attacks from southern Lebanon had rapidly increased and skirmishes between them and Israel forces were taking place continually. The situation came to a crisis point when on 26th December 1968 two Arabs attacked El Ai passenger plane at the Athens airport. Israel without turning to the U.N. Security Council attacked two days later the Beirut International Airport, resulting in the

⁸Ibid., p.93.

destruction of thirteen planes that belonged to Arab Airlines, as also some damage to airport.⁹

Both Israel and Lebanon requested for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Lebanon requested the Council to consider its charge that Israel had committed a wanton and premeditated attack.¹⁰ Israel charged that Lebanon was assisting and abetting acts of warfare, violence and terror by irregular forces and organization against Israel.¹¹

During the course of deliberations in the council the Israeli representative stated that the complaint before the Council must be seen in the broader context of the continuation by Arab nations including Lebanon of active belligerency and warfare against Israel through the use of irregular forces and organization armed, trained, encouraged and financed by the Arab governments. He justified Israel attack on the ground of right to self-defence.¹² The representative of Lebanon, on the other hand, denied Israeli charges

¹⁰ Doc. S/8945, 29 December 1968.

¹¹ Doc.S/8946, 29 December 1968.

¹² UN Monthly Chronicle, (New York) Vol. 6, No. 5, January 1969, p.5

that two fadayen in question had received training in Lebanon and pleaded for strict action, including sanction against Israel.¹³

For the first time the US representative issued a serious condemnation of an aggressive act of Israel and extended full support for prompt action by the Security Council to condemn the latest Israeli action.¹⁴ The US view was supported by the United Kingdom, France, India and Pakistan. The USSR not only condemned the attack but also viewed it as an attempt to undermine the United Nations' efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Middle East problem. The Soviet Union supported the Lebanon demand for action against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁵

After the debate, the Security Council unanimously adopted on 31 December 1968 a resolution which condemned Israeli attack and warned Israel that sanctions would be imposed against it if attack was repeated. Never in the twenty years of Arab

¹³Ibid., p.4

¹⁴Ibid., p.6.

¹⁵Ibid.

Israeli clashes had an incident evoked so much world consensus as had the Israeli raids on the Beirut airport. For the first time in many years the Soviet Union and the United States were in full agreement.

The Israeli aggression on Lebanon raised the question of the Lebanese status. Until the attack Lebanon, unlike the rest of the Arab countries surrounding Israel, was regarded as enjoying a special status. Israeli attack showed that no Arab country could be safe from Israeli strikes. The Israeli aggression on Lebanon was a reminder to Lebanon of the threat to its southern border. It was also a reminder to the Arab countries of the extent of the Israeli threat as also to world at large of the explosive Middle East situation.¹⁶

Lebanese Domestic Situation and External Factors:

The 1968 Israeli attack on Lebanon caused considerable anxiety in the country for various reasons. First Lebanon had witnessed the consequences of Israeli retaliatory policy against Jordan. Secondly, Lebanese were aware of the fact that Israel was looking for an excuse to invade the country to

¹⁶The Arab World Weekly (Beirut) 4 January 1969, p.2

usurp the Litani river. Thirdly, Israeli retaliatory targets were not limited to the Palestinian guerrilla bases. Moreover, the Lebanese authorities were also worried that the activities of the guerrilla and the retaliation by Israel were likely to have damaging effect on delicate relations between the Maronites and Muslims.¹⁷ Lebanese Muslims frustrated by the Maronite leadership were ready to support Palestinian in exchange of latter's support to the former for gaining greater share in the Lebanese political system.¹⁸ Muslims, mostly leftists, demanded removal of restrictions on the movement of the commandos. This was also supported by the then Prime Minister, Abdullah Yafi. The demand for removal of restrictions evoked strong protest from the Maronite sides. They on the contrary demanded strict control over the Palestinians.

In the meantime radical tides began to sweep the Arab world. Ba'ath Party came to power in Syria and Iraq and in Libya a radical regime of Col. Gadhafi was established.

¹⁷ For Lebanese internal politics see, Salem A. Elie, "Lebanon's Political Maze, the Search for Peace in a Turbulent Land," Middle East Journal, (Washington DC) Vol. 33, no. 4, 1979, pp. 444-452.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.453.

These alarming development and growing pressure on Maronite let government to think that a time had come to contain the Palestinian as well as to isolate the left which flourished only because of Palestinian presence. As a result fighting took place between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian guerrillas with Syria sending a unit of Syrian controlled Palestinian forces. The Lebanese Prime Minister, who was against the army action and restrictions on the Palestinians resigned in protest leading to a political crisis. It soon became obvious that the Army could only crush the Palestinians at the risk of splitting of the nation as well as the Army.¹⁹ The Lebanon government felt compelled to come to terms with the Palestinians. A compromise was worked out, known as the Cairo Agreement, which legitimized the armed Palestinian Presence in Lebanon by giving them authority to participate in the Palestine revolution through armed struggle and tried to reconcile and regulate their presence under the Lebanese sovereignty.²⁰

¹⁹Gordon C. David, Lebanon, the Fragmented Nation, (New York : Inst Press, 1980,)p.67.

²⁰John K. Coolay, "The Palestine", in P.S. Hailey and LW. Sniden (ed .), Lebanon in Crisis (New York , 1979,)p.30.

Following the Cairo Agreement the situation in Lebanese Southern border deteriorated as Israel stepped up its attacks in retaliation to guerrilla attack. In 1970 the Security Council met three times on the issue of Israel attack on Lebanon and passed three resolutions and deplored deteriorating situation along the border.²¹

The continuing Israel attacks once again caused tension between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinians and some clashes took place between the Lebanon's army and Palestinians but they were contained. But the calm proved to be deceptive, incidents and confrontation were frequent. Lebanon's dilemma was that either it tolerated the Palestinian and continued to suffer from Israeli raids or she checked the Palestinian and risked the civil war. If it opted for the second course, the other Arab countries would criticise in their eagerness to show that they support for the Palestinian cause. Then Lebanon's problem was how to reconcile the Palestinian reality with national unity.²²

Neighbouring Jordan was facing the same problem as was Lebanon due to the Palestinian guerrilla

²¹Sec Sc Reso 279, 12 May 1970, 280, 19 May 1970 and 285, 5 Sept. 1970.

²²David, n.3, p.70.

presence. But unlike Lebanon, in Jordan King Hussain had full control over Jordan's Army. When the Palestinians interference in the domestic affairs threatened King Hussain's power, the latter launched a vigorous campaign in the Summer 1970 to eliminate the armed Palestine presence in Jordan. By 1971 Jordan was free from the armed commandos. For Lebanon the significance of this was that it became the only nation in which commandos could operate freely with relative immunity. Lebanon became the Centre of commandos activities and their heavy arsenals.

In the wake of Black September, Israel stepped up the retaliatory attacks on Lebanon with the objective of pressurizing Lebanon to take the same action as King Hussain did. Even when the commandos began to conduct operation from outside the Arab countries, the Israeli launched raids against Lebanon killing hundreds of people. Israel, in fact, wanted to create an upheaval in Lebanon by stirring up antagonism between Maronite, Christian and the Arab nationalists. Three Palestinian leaders were murdered in 1973 in Beirut by Israeli terror squads with the same objective in view and it seemed that Israel succeeded to some extent. Following the incident the then Lebanese Prime Minister, Salam, resigned

in protest against non-action by the army, resulting in a major political crisis. Following this, fighting broke out between the commandos and the Lebanese army for the first time since the signing of the Cairo Agreement. However, it came to an end with the signing of a new Lebanon-Palestinian agreement known as the Malkat Protocol on 17 May 1973, which reinforced the Cairo Agreement.²³

Developments After 1973 War

The 1973 war, at least initial stage, restored Arab pride and self confidence and accrued political advantages to the Arabs within and outside the UN. On the other hand, the war also demonstrated that Israel remained considerably more powerful than the Arabs and the United States would do everything possible including risk of a conflict with the Soviet Union to protect Israel. Moreover, economic pressure was mounting on Arabs. Due to these reasons the Arab States except Iraq and Libya, to realize that they should accept the reality of Israeli existence and negotiate a final peace settlement. Due almost to the same reasons the Palestinian leaders also began to conclude that their goal of secular democratic state of Palestine by means of force was unrealistic.

²³Cooley, n.19, p.32

Moreover, after 1973, there was a growing realisation on the part of the majority of nations including Western Powers that Resolution 242 is not adequate because it did not include the Palestine issue which was the core to overall Arab-Israeli conflict and without settling it there could be no lasting peace in the region. They encouraged Palestinians to suitably modify their demands and accept a negotiated settlement.

As a result of these developments the moderate Palestinian leaders reached the conclusion that it was imperative to accept a compromise which would provide for the existence of Israel along with Palestine. In February 1974 the two largest and modest commando groups, al Fatah and Sa'iqe along with the PDFIP approved a document calling for the establishment of a Palestine in any part of the occupied areas evacuated by Israel. Later, at Rabat conference Arab states declared PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and UN General Assembly passed several resolutions backing the right of national self-determination of Palestine. In autumn of 1974 the General Assembly invited Arafat to make a statement before it and gave the PLO observer status at the United Nations.

These major political and public relation gains created more strain between the Palestinians and Israel on the one hand and moderate and rejectionist Palestinian groups on the other. The rejectionist front, composed of militant groups like RFLP and Arab Liberation Front and other militant groups, were vehemently opposed to attempts at compromise. They maintained the hardline posture and continued terrorist activities in order to frustrate any peace effort.

Though majority of the UN members including Arabs were in agreement as to basic framework for a final settlement, the continuing reluctance of Israel frustrated any move towards a settlement of Arab-Israel dispute. The then US Foreign Secretary took the initiative and tried to move step by step. He tried to achieve a second withdrawal accord between Egypt and Israel. This created difference and dissension between Syria and Palestinians on the one hand and Egypt on the other hand, for to the former it was a move to promote Egyptian interest by disregarding that of Palestinians and Syria.²⁴ This further created disunity among Arabs.

²⁴ Fred J. Khouri, "The Arab- Israeli Conflict," Hailey and Snider (eds.), Lebanon Crisis (New York, 1979), p.165.

Civil War in Lebanon

Meanwhile civil war broke out in Lebanon when on 13 April 1975 the militant of Kataib massacred a busful of 26 Palestinians outside a church in Ayu at Rumman. Fighting took place between extremist Palestinian, supported by leftist elements in Lebanon, and rightist forces. At first PLO did not take part in the fighting. But the right wing Christian were worried about the Palestinian in Lebanon as the imminent Sinai Accord tried to bypass the Palestine issue and the Arab-Israel dispute was in stalemate. This led them to conclude that the time had come to destroy Palestinian military and political influence in Lebanon and expel as many of them as possible.

On the other hand, Palestinians realised that the United States & Egypt were engaged in negotiations about an agreement which would disregard their rights. In these adverse circumstances, Lebanon became extremely crucial for the Palestinian guerrillas. They decided to protect their bases and positions in Lebanon and they came into direct conflict with rightist forces. As a result the civil war was intensified.

Thus the stalemate in an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement and Kissinger's step by step diplomacy heightened the hostilities between Lebanon rightist and the Palestinian and their supporters and they helped together with various internal, social, economic, psychological, ideological and other forces and factors in creating the conditions of civil war.²⁵

The unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, especially Palestine issue, not only precipitated the civil war, it also exacerbated it, for Israel wanted to emasculate the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Lebanon and to remove it from future peace negotiation. Israel helped directly right wing forces during the civil war. She also tried to divide and distract the Arabs in order to lessen the Arab threat and to weaken Arabs bargaining power, to delay the American efforts to convene a Geneva Conference and to gain more time to enable her to strengthen the bargaining position against Arabs.²⁶ On the other hand, Syria which was in the beginning helping the Palestinian and leftist radicals soon changed her policy when it saw that the leftists

²⁵Ibid., p.166

²⁶Ibid.

along with Palestinians, were gaining ground and growing strong. Syria feared that the leftist elements would establish some sort of regime which in alliance with the PLO could take initiative for war or peace and could bring Israel and Syria on the brink of war for which Syria was not prepared.²⁷ Thus Syria swung her support for leftist and Palestinian to the rightists and soon Palestinian and the leftist radicals were forced into near defeat.

The civil war in Lebanon came to a temporary halt with the decision taken at Arab Summit in Riyadh in October 1976. Election of the President took place, a new central government was constituted and Syrian army was legitimised as an Arab deterrent force under political authority of the Lebanese President which was to help Lebanon government in resorting its authority.

Situation in South Lebanon

Though war ended in Lebanon in October 1976, fighting did not completely stop in southern Lebanon. When the Syrian troops of the Arab Deterrent Force moved towards the South, the Israeli government

²⁷Cooley, n.19, p.37

threatened to take stern counter-measure if they tried to advance beyond an imaginary east-west red line, extending south of Zahran River. The Syrian forces stopped short of the south. Sporadic fighting continued in that area between the Christian militants assisted by Israel and armed elements of the Lebanon National Movement, supported by PLO. PLO was the dominant force in South Lebanon at that time and had established many bases there.

Meanwhile, President Sadat took an initiative with the United States to solve the Arab Israel dispute but the latter demanded the Palestinian to publicly and finally accept Security Council resolution 242 which the PLO was unprepared to do. Following this the American President Jimmy Carter claimed that the PLO had been so intractable that it had at least for the immediate future forfeited its right to participate in any peace negotiation. President Sadat warned that if PLO did not alter its stand, he would bypass it and associate Palestinian leaders in the occupied area for negotiation on behalf of Palestinians.²⁸

²⁸Khouri, n.23, p.267.

These developments made Palestinians apprehensive and they concluded that there was need for some spectacular guerrilla action against Israel which might signal to the United States and Israel that the PLO and Palestinian rights could not be ignored with impunity in any peace making process.²⁹ On 11 March 1978, Palestinian commando landed in Israel and seized a bus. In the shooting which followed, thirty seven Israelis were killed. Israel used the bloody event as justification for launching a major attack on southern Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March 1978.

The developments starting with the 1978 invasion and the events that preceded the second, June 1982 invasion by Israel of Lebanon are discussed in the Chapter that follows.

²⁹ Ibid., p.168.



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CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO 1982 ISRAELI INVASION

The roots of the 1982 Israeli invasion, in more than one way, can be traced to the offensive it launched, for the first time against Lebanon in 1978.

Three days after the Palestinian guerrilla's raid, the Israeli forces crossed the Lebanese frontier, on 19 March 1978 and pushed back the Palestine Guerrillas six miles deep inside the border. The Israeli forces continued to move north-wards and within a few days they captured all of Lebanon South of the Litani river, an area of some 425 square miles.¹

The Israeli invasion was immediately followed by the Security Council meeting on 17th March 1978. Both Lebanon and Israel requested for the Security Council meeting.² At their request, the representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mongolia, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, were invited without right to vote to participate in discussion of the Council. The P.L.O.

¹David G.Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country (Oxford, 1983) p.86.

²Doc. S/12606, 17 March 1978, S/12607, 17 March 1978.

representative was also invited to participate in the debate without right to vote.

During the discussion in the Council Lebanon accused Israel of having committed aggression and urged the council to demand immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the Israeli forces. It also stressed the need for restoring peace, Lebanese sovereignty over its territory and reestablishing an acceptable international order in the Middle East³. Israel, on the other hand, justified its attack against guerrillas by invading southern Lebanon on the ground of right to self defence⁴. Other Arab countries supporting Lebanon demanded adoption of resolution condemning Israel and affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and ensuring the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Lebanese territories⁵.

The Arabs demand was supported by most of the participants, including the Soviet Union and China⁶.

³ Security Council Official Records (hereafter cited as SCOR), Yrs. 33rd, mtg. 2071st, p.2

⁴ Ibid., p.6

⁵ Ibid., pp. 9, 11, 14, Yrs. 33rd, mtg. 2072nd pp. 3, 5.

⁶ SCOR, Yrs. 33rd, mtg. 2073rd, p.9
Yrs. 33rd, mtg. 2074th, p.2

Even the western countries like France, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany and United Kingdom condemned the Israeli action⁷. But the United States did not. However, the United States soon realised that its silence might be misunderstood by the Arab countries as the former's approval of Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory. This was likely to affect not only the United States role as mediator in the Middle East Peace settlement but also its oil and other interests⁸.

Thus instead of protesting against Israeli aggression, the United States tried to ensure the Israeli withdrawal. But Israel was ready to withdraw only under such conditions which would prevent the return of the Palestinian guerrillas to Southern Lebanon. For performing this task neither the weak Lebanese army was in a position to assume control in the South and nor was the prospect of deploying Syrian forces there acceptable to Israel. Under these circumstances the United States decided that introduction of a United Nations peacekeeping force

⁷SCOR, Yrs. 33rd, mtg. 2072nd, p.5., Yrs. 33rd, mtg. 2073, pp 1-5, Yrs. 33rd, mtg. 2074th, p. 2

⁸Robert W. Stokey, "The United States", in P.E. Hailey and L.W. Snider (eds.), Lebanon in Crisis (New York, 1979), p.248.

was only feasible means of ensuring Israeli withdrawal. Accordingly the American delegation introduced a draft resolution⁹, which was adopted by the Security Council on 19 March 1978, by 12 votes to none, with two abstentions (Czechoslovakia and USSR) as Resolution 425.¹⁰

The Security Council by resolution 425, inter alia, called upon Israel to immediately cease its military action against Lebanon and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory and decided to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim peace keeping force for Southern Lebanon to confirm the Israeli withdrawal, restore peace and security and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it within 24 hours on the implementation of the resolution.

On the same day, the Secretary-General submitted a report proposing terms of reference of UNIFIL¹¹,

⁹Doc. S/12610, 19 March 1978.

¹⁰See SC 425, 19 March 1978.

¹¹Doc. S/12611, 19 March 1978.

which were approved by the Council in resolution 426, by 12 votes to none with 2 abstentions.¹²

Soon after the setting up force the Secretary-General negotiated with Israel. It resulted in later's withdrawal of its troops in four stages¹³. During the first three stages of withdrawal the Israeli forces handed over the areas occupied by it to the UNIFIL. But at her final withdrawal she turned the area over to defacto forces led by Major Haddad, head of the defacto forces.¹⁴ UNIFIL managed through negotiations, to establish only 16 positions within the enclave and the UNTSO military observer attached to UNIFIL maintained these position in the five observation posts within the enclave.¹⁵ But UNIFIL was in no sense in control of the enclave. UNIFIL could not deploy its troops in the city of Tyre and surrounding areas due to insistence of the PLO.

Thus UNIFIL could not bring the Southern Lebanon under its complete control.¹⁶ But it consolidated

¹²SC. Res. 426, 19 March 1978.

¹³Doc. S/12620/Add.5, 13 June 1978.

¹⁴Doc. 5/12736, 13 June 1978.

¹⁵Doc. S. 12845, 13 September 1978.

¹⁶Doc. S. 12736, 13 September 1978.

itself in the area under its control by seeking to keep the area free from hostilities, so that no unauthorised armed elements entered the area. The UNIFIL took several measures to check infiltration and thwarted most of, though not all, infiltration attempts.¹⁷

The measures taken by UNIFIL to prevent infiltration by the Palestinian and Lebanese leftist armed elements were also applied to Major Haddad's defacto forces. Nonetheless the latter successfully made a few infiltration attempts, and established several encroachment positions within UNIFIL areas.¹⁸ The encroachment attempts were made by Israeli forces also.¹⁹

Despite these difficulties UNIFIL brought an element of stability to southern Lebanon. It managed to keep its own area relatively peaceful, by acting as a buffer between the opposing forces. At the same time UNIFIL tried to help the Lebanese government restore its authority in the area under its control

¹⁷The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping (New York, United Nations, 1985), p. 124.

¹⁸Ibid., p.125.

¹⁹Doc. S/14295, 12 December 1980.

by helping the latter to establish civil administration and deploy army and internal security forces there. (A full scale appraisal of the UNIFIL is attempted in a separate, ensuing chapter).

Situation Outside the UNIFIL Areas

Though UNIFIL area of operation was relatively calm, the situation outside it was different. The reason was that the PLO had acquired long range artillery capable of targeting Israeli galillie settlement. Thus from March 1979 onwards, there were frequent reports of exchange of fire between the PLO and the de facto forces across the gap and over the UNIFIL area. Whenever PLO shelling resulted in Israeli casualties, Israeli forces would send its war planes, to launch massive attacks against PLO targets north of the UNIFIL area, sometimes as far as Beirut.²⁰ Since the armed forces engaged in the hostilities were located outside its area, UNIFIL could not take direct action to prevent or stop them. UNIFIL, however, endeavoured to arrange a ceasefire whenever possible and brought the most serious cases to the attention of the Security Council²¹.

²⁰The Blue Helmets, n.18, p.127.

²¹Ibid.

July 1981 Fighting, Ceasefire and Later Developments

Within a year two serious clashes took place, one in August 1980 and the other in July 1981.²² On 18 August 1980, a long exchange of fire broke out between de facto forces with the assistance of Israel and PLO positions north of the Litani river and continued with varying intensity for five days.²³

But the fighting of July 1981 was more serious and extensive. On 10 July, during the exchange of fire with the de facto/IDF positions, PLO forces shelled the town of Kiyat Shemona, northern Israel with rockets. On the same day Israel war planes retaliated by attacking PLO targets in Lebanon north of the UNIFIL area.²⁴ The attack was followed by renewed exchanges of fire between the PLO armed elements and the Israel forces and Major Haddad's de facto forces. Artillery, mortar and rockets were fired by the two sides. The exchanges of fire intensified with Israeli naval vessels joining it while Israeli aircraft destroyed bridges on the Zohra and Litani rivers and launched an intense

²²Ibid.

²³Doc. S/14295, 19 August, 1980.

²⁴Doc. S/14789, 10 July 1981.

attack on Beirut itself. Exchange of fire in all sectors, as well as Israeli air strikes and naval bombardments continued until 24 July.²⁵

The Security Council responded to the situation by unanimously adopting a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of all armed attacks.²⁶ Following the adoption of the resolution parallel efforts were made by the United Nations and the United States government. As a result a defacto ceasefire was established on 24 July 1981.²⁷ The ceasefire arrangement were accepted by all the parties.²⁸

Israel's acceptance of the cease fire was due to heavy United States pressure²⁹, as Israel former was no longer satisfied with just deterring guerrilla activities of the PLO. By that time the PLO had developed a comprehensive civilian infrastructure in Lebanon and had been enjoying freedom of manoeuvre. It had implications for both domestic Lebanese

²⁵The Blue Helmets, n.18, p.129.

²⁶SC Res. 490, 21 July 1981.

²⁷The Blue Helmets, n.18, p.129.

²⁸Kessing's Comntemporary Archives, (Bristol), Vol.29, January 1983, p.31908.

²⁹Ibid.

politics and stalled negotiations over autonomy for the West Bank.³⁰ A devastating attack on the PLO in Lebanon would have also facilitated the rise of power of a Lebanese government opposed to the PLO's presence and inclined to normalize relations with Israel.³¹ Moreover war against PLO would also been helpful in destroying missiles batteries which Syria and installed in April 1981 in Lebanon. This would in turn give Syria a military setback vis-a-vis Israel and create political upheaval within the country.³²

With these objectives in mind, Israel was looking for an excuse for launching an offensive. Israel undertook an explicitly provocative campaign in an attempt to elicit a response from the PLO which would then give Israel an excuse for launching a war.³³ The campaign began when four Israeli fighters flew over Syrian missile sites in the Bekka valley. Soon thereafter the Israeli forces in Haddadland

³⁰ Nawmi J. Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Operation in Lebanon", The Middle East Journal (Washington DC), Vol. 37, no. 3, Summer 1983, p.355.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Charles A. Rubeberg, "The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, Objectives and Consequences", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (London), Vol. 8, no. 2, Winter 1984, p.9.

³³ Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1982.

fired from machineguns on the PLO areas during training exercises in Yasin and Masouchine. The United Nations observers described these actions as intensive, excessive and provocative. Further incidents of this nature occurred throughout the spring. The PLO did not, however, respond to the provocative campaign.

While the provocative campaign was under way the Israel government sought to ensure Washington's full support for its military action. The United States was believed to have told that Israel would need a clear breach of the ceasefire for launching war. It was necessary for make action acceptable to international community.³⁴ Moreover, at that time the Syrian government was passing through a period of domestic trouble and regional isolation. Therefore Israel calculated that time was appropriate.

On 3 June, 1982 the Israeli Ambassador in London was seriously wounded in a terrorist attack. It provided Israel with the opportunity it was looking for. Although PLO disclaimed responsibility, Israel began raids against PLO targets in and around Beirut.

³⁴See Zev. Schiff, "The Green Light", Foreign Policy (Washington DC) No. 50, Spring 83, pp. 53-85.

PLO retaliated. Consequently exchange of fire broke out in Southern Lebanon and Israel towns came under PLO artillery and rocket fire.

The Security Council on 5 June called on all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately all military activities within Lebanon and across the Israel Lebanese border at not less than 0600 hours local time on 6 June.³⁵ In addition, the resolution requested all member states which were in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities could be respected. Finally, the resolution requested the UN Secretary General to undertake all possible efforts to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report to the Security Council as early as possible and not later than forty eight hours after the adoption of this resolution.

Following the adoption of the above resolution, the Secretary-General made an effort to achieve a cease-fire. But shortly after 0600 local time, Israel resumed its airstrike against PLO targets in the Lebanon. The UNIFIL commander, who met the

³⁵ SC Res. 508, 5 June 1982.

Israeli authorities regarding the implementation of the resolution, was told that Israel planned a military operation into Lebanon soon, so that Israel would be no longer within PLO artillery range.³⁶

Soon thereafter Israel launched what it described "Peace for Galilee," a full scale invasion of Lebanon by-passing over UNIFIL positions.

How did UN respond? What was the nature of deliberations at the UN Security Council? These are some of the questions which form focus of the next chapter.

³⁶Doc. S/15194/Add.1, 11 June 1982.

CHAPTER III

THE 1982 ISRAELI INVASION AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

While operation "peace for Galilee" was under way, the Security Council reconvened in the evening of 6 June 1982.¹ During the period, beginning of the war on 6 June to its culmination three months later in gruesome massacre at Sabra and Chatila refugee camps, the Security Council met as many as sixteen times to discuss issues raised by the parties to the conflict and other members of the Council. What follows in this chapter is a discussion of various issues of the problem on which the participants in the Council debates interacted day after day and with what effect.

June 6 Invasion by Israel

As the Council meeting took place, in the evening of 6 June the Secretary-General, reporting to the Council as requested by resolution 508, informed that it had been impossible to effect a cease-fire.

¹The Security Council was convened on 5th June 1982 and it had passed resolution 508 which had asked all parties to conflict to cease immediately all military activities within Lebanon and across the Israel-Lebanon border. The resolution also asked the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution.

Instead the hostilities had escalated dangerously.² Israel had increased the scale of its intervention after the expiry of cease-fire deadline imposed by the resolution 508.³ UNIFIL had tried to impede the Israeli advance, however, it possessed neither the mandate nor the military capacity to encounter the invasion taking place.⁴

Following the speech of the Secretary General, Ireland describing the situation in Lebanon as dangerous which called for an urgent action by the Council,⁵ demanded voting on the draft resolution which it had submitted earlier.⁶ The Council however decided to listen to Israel, Lebanon and PLO, parties to the conflict, before putting the draft to vote.

Addressing the delegates, the representative of Israel, cited numerous PLO guerrilla attacks on Israeli civilians in Israeli territory and abroad which Council did not heed, and justified Israeli

² Security Council Official Records (hereafter cited as SCOR) SCOR/PV, 2375th Meeting, 6 June 1982, p.3.

³ Ibid., pp.4-5.

⁴ Ibid., pp.4-6.

⁵ Ibid., p.7.

⁶ Dec. S/15171, 6 June 1982.

action against them in Southern Lebanon on the ground of right to self-defence.⁷ He said, "The Government of Israel has now decided to act justifiably and within clearly delineated parameters to free the inhabitants of the Galilee from PLO harassment."⁸ He further argued that Israel had no quarrel with Lebanon rather "Israel is eager to see Lebanese Sovereignty restored, its internal strife resolved, the Syrian occupier removed, the PLO subdued and freedom and tranquility restored to that war-torn land."⁹

The Israeli concern for sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon was ridiculed by the Lebanese representative who said that "Israel had a strange way of helping a country by conducting aggression against it."¹⁰ This was the first instance in history where peace was to be established by aggressor when the aggressor pretended to be aggressed. He described the Irish draft resolution as inadequate as it did not condemn Israel for aggression and failed to provide effective measures against Israeli

⁷ SCOR/PV 2375th meeting, 6 June 1982, p.33.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.36

aggression.¹¹ However, he supported it because it was an important step towards implementation of peace and the guarantee of everybody's rights. Lebanon's demand of explicit condemnation was supported by PLO who described Israeli action as aimed at destroying Palestinians. "What was taking place on the ground in Lebanon was to destroy the national will of the Palestinian people,"¹² the PLO representative emphasized.

After the statements of the parties involved, the Ireland draft was put to vote and was adopted unanimously as resolution 509.¹³ Resolution 509 demanded that Israel withdraw all the military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognised boundaries of Lebanon, all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph 1 of resolution 508 (1972) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese Israeli border. The resolution enjoined the parties to communicate to the Secretary-General their acceptance of the present resolution within 24 hours.

¹¹Ibid., p.37.

¹²Ibid., p.42

¹³Sc.Res. 509, 6 June 1982.

Following the adoption of the resolution, statements were made by China, USSR, Poland, the League of Arab States and the United States.

China supported the statements made by Lebanon and PLO,¹⁴ and expressed the view that resolution was inadequate.¹⁵ It demanded the condemnation of Israel's crime against Lebanon and effective measures against the aggression. The Chinese demand for explicit condemnation was echoed by the USSR and Poland. The USSR said that the Israeli aggression aimed at annihilating the fighters of Palestine resistance and then to break the will of Palestine people's to struggle for freedom of independence.¹⁶ Further, it described the Israel's action against Lebanon as a direct threat to peace and security. The USSR like China described the resolution as inadequate as it did not fully respond to the extremely serious and steadily worsening situation in Lebanon and did not condemn Israel. Nevertheless, since the resolution demanded full and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops to internationally recognised boundaries of Lebanon, the Soviet Union

¹⁴Ibid., p.48.

¹⁵Ibid., pp.49-50.

¹⁶Ibid., p.52.

supported it. Poland supported the resolution for similar reason, though not fully satisfied with it.¹⁷

The United Kingdom saw a link between happenings in Israel occupied territories and Lebanon.¹⁸ Both were parts of the same issue - attempt by Israel to liquidate the Palestine people physically in Lebanon was the other component of liquidating them politically in occupied Palestine. The U.K. described the Israeli aggression against Lebanon as an insult to the Security Council. The United States did not condemn the Israeli aggression but it supported the resolution because it focussed on two elements as a means of ending conflagration in Lebanon: a cessation of hostilities by all the parties and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.¹⁹ In United States view the two objectives were inextricably linked and must take place simultaneously.

The representative of the League of Arab states, who was invited along with Egypt, under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rule of procedure, saw

¹⁷ Ibid., p.56.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.62.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.46.

Israel's intention behind the invasion not only to destroy the destiny of Palestinians but also the chance of peace in the Middle East.²⁰ He demanded two actions by the Council - redressal of aggression and respect and implementation of resolution and in case of non-compliance with, a contingency Plan to enforce the resolution. Egypt likewise described the aggression as another setback to the Middle East and demanded strong condemnation of the Israeli aggression.²¹

**Israeli Refusal of the Observance of Resolution and
Consequent Security Council's Response**

Despite adoption of resolution 509 Israel declined either to withdraw its forces from Lebanon or to observe a ceasefire. Israel in a communication to the UN Secretary-General made it clear that her forces would not be withdrawn from Lebanon prior to the conclusion of concrete arrangement which would permanently and reliably preclude hostile action against Israeli citizens.²² On the other hand,

²⁰ Ibid., p.58.

²¹ Ibid., p.62.

²² S/15178, 7 June 1982.

Lebanon and the PLO agreed to the implementation of the Council's resolution.

The fighting continued as the Israeli forces continued to attack Beirut, Tyre and Sidan and maintained advance towards north.²³ Lebanon requested for an urgent meeting of the Security Council in the afternoon of 8 June.²⁴ In his brief speech to the Council the Security-General said that the information received from the area indicated that extensive hostilities were in progress.²⁵ The Lebanese representative appealed to the members of the Security Council collectively and individually to "take all the measures that are in their power and with Charter and with the Council's field of action to stop the war immediately".²⁶ Israel once again reiterated its demand for a concrete arrangement before withdrawal.²⁷ The meeting was adjourned without taking any decision.

The meeting was reconvened on the same afternoon. Spain introduced a draft resolution in view of the

²³The Times (London) 9 June 1982.

²⁴S/15186, 8 June 1982.

²⁵SCOR/PV. 2376th meeting, 8 June 1982,
pp.3-5

²⁶Ibid., p.7.

²⁷Ibid., p.12.

urgency of the situation.²⁸ The draft resolution condemned Israeli non-compliance with resolution 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and reaffirmed the Council's demand that Israel withdrew all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognised boundaries of Lebanon and all parties observe strictly the terms of Paragraph 5 of the resolution 508(1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border. The draft resolution proposed that if all hostilities had not ceased within six hours, the Council would meet again to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter.

When the draft resolution was put to vote, it received the affirmative votes of fourteen member states. However, the United States exercised its veto.

Explaining the negative vote, the United States representative said that "unlike resolution 508 and 509, the text of present resolution was not sufficiently balanced to accomplish the objective of ending the cycle of violence and establishing

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Doc.S/15185, 8 June 1982.

the conditions of a just and lasting peace in Lebanon."²⁹

The US veto was deeply regretted by the Council members and non-member participants and led the USSR to charge that the Israeli aggression was undertaken with the support of the United States whose disgraceful veto had frustrated the Council's action.³⁰ The permanent observer of the League of Arab states also expressed his regret over the veto. He observed, "The opportunity has been missed, which is a matter of regret."³¹ Lebanon and France regretted that Council had not adopted the resolution. They expressed the hope that efforts at peace under earlier resolution would continue.³² Other countries like Ireland and Japan expressed their sincere concern at the upward spiral of violence and the force that the conflict could spread.³³

²⁹ SCOR/PV.2377th meeting, 8 June 1982, pp.8-10.

³⁰ Ibid., p.21

³¹ Ibid., p.27

³² Ibid., pp.30, 32.

³³ Ibid., pp.35, 39.

Israel-Syria Clash

The fighting continued and its scale increased when Israeli forces engaged Syrian forces. A full scale aerial battle between the Israelis and Syrian air forces took place on June 8-9, during which the Israeli aircraft destroyed Syrian surface to air missiles batteries in the Bekka valley on 9 June.³⁴ But no security council meeting took place owing to differences among the council members.

The escalation of Israeli Syrian clashes on the other hand gave added impetus to efforts outside the U.N. to bring about cessation of hostilities as Soviet Union threatened to intervene on behalf of Syria. The U.S. envoy, Philip Habib played an important role in this regard. Eventually both Israel and Syria agreed to observe a truce from noon on June 11.³⁵ Clashes nevertheless continued between Israeli forces and PLO fighters entrenched in West and South Western Beirut and the extension of the ceasefire to PLO Israeli hostilities at 9 p.m. on 12 June broke down after a few hours. Later the

³⁴ Kessings Contemporary Archives (Briston),
Vo. 29, p.31915.

³⁵ Ibid., p.3191.

Israeli forces linking up with Christian Phalangist concentration in East Beirut completed the encirclement of Palestinian position in West Beirut.³⁶

Extension of UNIFIL's Mandate

The Security Council was reconvened on the evening of 18 June, not to discuss the situation arising out of seige of Beirut, but to extend the UNIFIL's mandate which was to expire on the following day. The UNIFIL which was set up in 1978 as an interim measure, got extension since then as the situation in the area continued to be unpredictable and sporadically violent. But this time the circumstances of the extensions were without precedent. The force was bypassed by the invading Israeli army and the recent developments had radically altered the circumstance in which UNIFIL was established and under which it functioned.³⁷

Preceding the Council meeting, an informal meeting of the Council members took place which discussed the report of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General in his report suggested that UNIFIL

³⁶The Times (London), 17 June 1982.

³⁷S/14194/Add.2, 14 June 1982.

could usefully contribute to the objectives prescribed by the Security Council in resolution 509.³⁸ The Government of Lebanon itself had expressed the view that UNIFIL should continue to be stationed in the area pending further consideration of the situation, the report said. The informed consultation led to the preparation of a draft resolution which was adopted by the Council on 18 June, by 13 votes in favour with two abstentions³⁹ - the Soviet Union and Poland abstained.

The Security Council, by Resolution 511 extended UNIFIL's mandate as an interim measure for a period of two months. Under the provisions of the text, Council authorised the force to extend its protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area. Finally the Council called on all concerned to extend full cooperation to the force in the discharge of its task and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the implementation of its resolution on the Lebanon.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Security Council Res. 511, 18 June 1982.

Explaining the reason for the support of the resolution, the United States said that the US believed that extension would contribute to the restoration of peace in the area and to the restoration of the authority and sovereignty of the government of Lebanon.⁴⁰ However, US was not in favour of extension of the mandate of UNIFIL to provide protection and humanitarian assistance. As the US representative said, "The United States has voted today to extend the mandate without any extension of responsibilities, function or territorial scope."⁴¹ But most of the members like UK, China, Netherlands, Sweden, Zaire, supported the new interim function of UNIFIL and said that UNIFIL must be given full cooperation and freedom of movement to carry out its peace-keeping and humanitarian task.⁴² However, some members reminded that the extension should only be seen as an interim arrangement and that much longer decision must be faced.⁴³ Some members like the USSR, United Kingdom, China, Poland, Zaire, expressed the view that the Palestinian question still remained at the heart of the matter

⁴⁰ SCOR/PV. 2379th meeting, 18 June 1982, p.6.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., pp.17, 22, 23, 33, 66.

⁴³ Ibid., pp.17, 66.

and that there could be no lasting peace until the issue of Palestinian self-determination was resolved.⁴⁴

Plight of Civilians

Apart from discussion on UNIFIL and concern for lasting peace in the Middle East, a number of delegates expressed concern about the plight of civilian in the Lebanon, at the Council's meeting on 18 June. The Lebanese delegate complained that several convoys of UNIFIL troops, carrying Red Cross supplies and relief workers had been prevented from entering Tyre by Israeli forces.⁴⁵ Earlier on 8 June 1982, in the Council meeting, the Lebanese delegates had said that Israel was not only violating Lebanon's integrity, but also human rights and the 1949 Geneva convention relating to the protection of civilians in time of war. The Red Cross ambulances, automobiles and volunteers had been attacked by the Israeli forces and prevented from fulfilling their duty.⁴⁶ The Zaire delegate noted the difficulties affecting the delivery of food and

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.14-15, 18, 22, 32, 38.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 18 June 1982, p.76.

⁴⁶ SCOR/PV. 2377th meeting, 8 June 1982, p.4

medicine to the civilian population.⁴⁷ The Netherlands delegate appealed to Israel to allow humanitarian assistance.⁴⁸ Though Israel claimed that civilian population had been provided with adequate aid, both the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) complained difficulties caused by Israel.

When the Council meeting took place on 19 June to address to the plight of the civilian population of the Lebanon, the Council president in his capacity as the representative of France said that so far the Security Council has not specifically dealt with the tragic situation of civilian population. "It is the time that we must express our concern on an active way and we must see to it that the civilian population receive large-scale and effective aid. For these existing obstacles must be removed and it be ensured that no new one arise."⁴⁹ He introduced a draft resolution.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ SCOR/PV. 2379th meeting, 18 June 1982, p.27.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.34-35.

⁴⁹ SCOR/PV. 2380th meeting, 19 June 1982.

⁵⁰ Doc.S/15240, 19 June 1982.

The draft resolution was put to vote and was adopted unanimously by the Council as resolution 512.⁵¹ This resolution called upon all the parties to the conflict to respect the right of the civilian population, to refrain from all of violence against those population and to take all appropriate measures to alleviate the suffering caused by the conflict, in particular, by facilitating the dispatch and distribution of aid provided by the United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross. Other provisions of the resolution stressed the particular humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations and its agencies towards civilian population. Thirdly, the resolution called on all the parties to the conflict "not to hamper the exercise of those responsibilities and to assist in humanitarian efforts."

Following the adoption of the resolution statements were made by the representatives of Japan, the United States, USSR, Israel and Lebanon.

Japan regretted the great number of civilian casualties, the destruction and displacement suffered

⁵¹ SC Res. 512, 19 June 1982.

by the inhabitants of Lebanon and agreed to contribute one million dollar in response to the call of the Security Council for the effective rehabilitation of Lebanese.⁵² Japan demanded Israeli withdrawal of its forces immediately and unconditionally and urged "all the parties concerned, in particular the Israel occupying force in Lebanon, to fully cooperate with the international organization engaged in the humanitarian relief activities in Lebanon."⁵³ The United States also showed its willingness to support the effective humanitarian services to the people of Lebanon. However, it made it clear that the its main concern was the restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty and authority throughout Lebanese territory. The United State's assurance of support was described by USSR as born out of fear of finding itself completely isolated.⁵⁴ In reply the United States representative argued that the improvement it had suggested informal consultation had been intended to make the text a well designed and finally targeted resolution.⁵⁵

⁵² SCOR/PV. 2380th meeting, 19 June 1982, p.7.

⁵³ Ibid., p.8

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.71.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp.18-20.

Lebanon appreciated the prompt Council reaction and said that its future depended on a great deal on the UN response.⁵⁶ On the other hand, while Israel welcomed co-operation with the Secretary-General in providing genuine humanitarian efforts, it rejected the paragraph calling on all the parties not to hamper the exercise of United Nations responsibilities and assistance in humanitarian efforts.⁵⁷ Israel demanded that Council refrain from attempts to abuse humanitarian concern for the purpose of political objectives,⁵⁸ and said that "we shall resist, reject and foil any effort which under the cover of humanitarian cover attempts to advance dubious objectives."⁵⁹

Fighting in Beirut and Security Council's Call for Withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian Forces from Beirut.

Meanwhile, Israeli forces encircling Palestinian position in Beirut were substantially reinforced.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Ibid., j p.74.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp.9-10.

⁵⁸ Ibid., j p.12.

⁵⁹ Ibid., o,16.

⁶⁰ The Times (London), 21 June 1982.

Fierce artillery exchanges between Israeli and Palestinian guerrilla continued and Israeli jets bombarded Palestinian targets in West Beirut.⁶¹ The Security Council met early in the morning of 26 June at the request of France. The French representative urged the delegates to act before the destruction of entire neighbourhood of the city of Beirut,⁶² and submitted a draft resolution.⁶³ The draft was revised twice before voting. The final draft resolution called, inter alia, for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from around Beirut and the simultaneous evacuation of Palestinian armed forces from West Beirut.⁶⁴ It requested the Lebanese government to deploy its forces in the areas vacated by Israel and Palestinian elements and called on the UN Secretary-General to make a proposal to the Security Council for the installation of a United Nations force to take up position behind the Lebanese forces. Further, the Secretary-General was asked to report to the Council "on an urgent and sustained basis", on the status of implementation of the resolution as well as on

⁶¹The Times (London), 24 June 1982.

⁶²SCOR/PV. 2381st meeting, 26 June 1982, p.7.

⁶³S/15255/Rev.2, 25 June 1982.

⁶⁴S/15255/Rev.2, 25 June 1982

the Council resolution previously adopted on the subject.

When the draft was put to vote, it was vetoed by the United States.⁶⁵ Explaining its negative role the US representative said that it had vetoed the resolution because it failed to call for the essential recognition of the authority of the government of Lebanon and the elimination of Palestinian element from Beirut and elsewhere, who neither submit to nor respect the sovereign authority of the Lebanese government.⁶⁶ Lebanon regretted that the text had not been adopted.

Seige of Beirut

Emboldened by the American veto to the draft resolution, Israel called for the surrender of all Palestinian forces in West Beirut and their withdrawal from Lebanon.⁶⁷ In a bid to increase the pressure on the Palestinians, Israeli forces refused to allow vehicles carrying food or fuel to

⁶⁵ SCOR/PV. 2381st meeting, 26 June 1982, pp.8-10.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.11.

⁶⁷ The Times (London), 5 July 1982.

enter West Beirut.⁶⁸ Israel cut off power to Beirut and interrupted water supplies.

These developments led to the reconvening of the Security Council on the evening of 4 July on the request of permanent representative of Jordan who asked for immediate meeting to examine the extremely grave situation which was deteriorating hour by hour.⁶⁹ A draft resolution,⁷⁰ which was introduced by the President, N.G. Sinclair of Guayana after consultation with other members, was adopted unanimously.⁷¹

Through resolution 513 the Security Council once again expressed alarm at the continued sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian population in South Lebanon and in West Beirut and called for respect for the rights of those population without any discrimination and repudiated all acts of violence against them. The Council called, further for the restoration of the supply of vital facilities such as water, electricity, food and medical provision, particularly in Beirut.

⁶⁸The Times (London), 6 July 1982.

⁶⁹S/15272, 4 July 1982.

⁷⁰S/15273, 4 July 1982.

⁷¹Sc.Res. 513, 4 July 1982.

It is important to note here that the resolution did not refer explicitly to Israel, nor did to threaten the imposition of sanctions in the event of non-compliance. These had been omitted to avoid an American veto, and not because of any inherent reluctance on the part of Security Council members.

Despite the adoption of the resolution 513, Israel did not permit the restoration of water and electricity supplies to West Beirut until 7 July. Israeli troops continued to interdict supplies of food and fuel to the beleaguered inhabitants of West Beirut.⁷² The delay was justified by the Israeli authorities on the ground that it was necessary to ensure that relief operations were not used as cover for the military resupply of the Palestinian, while in the case of West Beirut the Israeli priority lay in securing a speedy Palestinian surrender.⁷³ Moreover, Israel repeatedly threatened that it would storm West Beirut if a satisfactory agreement regarding withdrawal of Palestinian of Syrian forces from Beirut was not reached quickly.

⁷²The Times (London), 8 July 1982.

⁷³Kessing's Contemporary Archives (Bristol), vol. 29, 1982, p.3191.

Diplomatic Efforts for the Withdrawal of PLO

The seige of Beirut continued through July and into August punctured by heavy bombardment by Israeli forces. On the other hand, diplomatic efforts outside UN continued to find an agreed basis for a supervised withdrawal of the Palestinian forces from Lebanon. A multinational force comprising contingents from U.S.A., Italy and France was envisaged to supervise the withdrawal of PLO from Lebanon. Though Arafat agreed in principle to withdraw, major difficulties remained to be resolved regarding the procedure, logistic and time table for a PLO evacuation and their destination.⁷⁴

Diplomatic efforts and negotiations to secure the evacuation of the Palestinian guerrilla were hampered by the outbreak of fighting in Beirut, the most serious being one which started on 21 July. The fighting reached unprecedented level during the night of 28 July when heavy artillery exchange took place between Israeli forces and Palestinian guerrillas.⁷⁵

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵The Times (London), 28 July 1982.

The Security Council was convened on 29 July at the request of France and Egypt.⁷⁶ They submitted a draft resolution which demanded an immediate and lasting cease fire throughout Lebanon and simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian forces from West Beirut and stationing of US observers in and around Beirut.⁷⁷ The draft reaffirmed the right of all states in the region to existence and security, as well as the legitimate national rights of Palestinian people including the right to self-determination with all its implication.⁷⁸

Introducing the draft France said, "The Council members must be aware of the essential relationship between the search for a solution to the immediate problem of Beirut and the search for direction on the fundamental problem that had led to the current crisis: it was Council's task to define the principles of a settlement."⁷⁹ There can be no peace without a political settlement.⁸⁰ Egypt, another co-sponsorer of draft resolution, observed that the problem of the Middle East will continue to defy settlement

⁷⁶A/15316, 28 July 1982.

⁷⁷S/15317, 29 July 1982.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹SCOR/PV. 2384th meeting, 29 July 1982,

p.12.

⁸⁰Ibid., p.11.

unless until a just solution to the Palestinian question has been achieved.⁸¹ The draft resolution had received wide support from Jordan, Pakistan, Ireland and UK.⁸² It was also welcomed by PLO and Lebanon.⁸³

Beirut Blockade

While discussion on the draft resolution was just getting under way, however, events in Lebanon in particular, the brutal seige of Beirut led Spain to introduce another draft resolution.⁸⁴

The draft resolution introduced by Spain was short with just two operative paragraphs. The first demanded that Israel lift immediately the blockade of the city of Beirut in order to permit the dispatch of supplies to attend the urgent necessities of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organization in particular the international committee of the Red Cross. The second

⁸¹Ibid., p.12.

⁸²SCOR/PV, 2385th meeting, 29 July 1982, pp.37, 12, 18, 16.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴S/15318, 29 July 1982.

paragraph requested the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the resolution to the government of Israel and keep the Security Council informed on its implementation.

Spain asked the delegation to vote on the Spanish text.⁸⁵ Both Egypt and France agreed for a quick vote on the draft resolution submitted by Spain.⁸⁶ A procedural wrangle was created. The United States proposed for a two-hour adjournment to allow consultation with government. It was however settled down by a vote and Spanish draft was put immediately to the vote. It was adopted with 14 in favour and the United States not participated in the vote.⁸⁷

Explaining absentention the United States remarked that the resolution called only on Israel and did not ask the PLO to abandon its occupation of Beirut or desist from military activities.⁸⁸ Such a one-sided appeal suggested purpose that was political as well as humanitarian.⁸⁹ The U.S. stand

⁸⁵ SCOR/PV, 2385th meeting, 29 July 1982, p.25.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p.31, 29.

⁸⁷ SC. Res. 515, 4 July 1982.

⁸⁸ SCOR/PV, 2385th meeting, 29 July 1982, pp.28-30.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.31.

was criticised by both Poland and USSR. The former stated that when people were suffering and dying it could not be argued that some political balancing should take place at the expense of a humanitarian proposal.⁹⁰ The USSR said that Israeli action in cutting off food and electricity supplies to Beirut was not humanitarian and the yardstick used by the United States must be monstrous and strange if it failed to support an elementary humanitarian resolution.⁹¹

Israel refuted the charge of interruption on its part to humanitarian efforts and argued that it fully supported any genuine humanitarian concern designed to alleviate suffering.⁹² On the contrary, citing United Nations press release of 24 July, it blamed the PLO for stopping UNRAWA supplies.⁹³ Replying the Israeli charges, the PLO representative said that in a case where there was no guarantee that the Palestine refugee, who were supposed to receive the UNRWA rations, would certainly get them, no city under seige would permit the condition of its warehouses to leave the city.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp.58-60.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.57.

⁹² Ibid., p.66.

⁹³ Ibid., p.68.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.91.

UN Observers to Monitor Situation in Beirut

Despite the Security Council's call to Israel to lift its blockade of Beirut, conditions did not improve in the Lebanese capital on the evening of 30 July. Israeli jets renewed their attacks on Palestinian camps in West Beirut.⁹⁵ The scale and intensity of the attacks increased on 1 August. The Security Council reconvened on 1 August at the urgent request of the Lebanon.⁹⁶ Prior to the Council meeting formal consultation among the Council Members took place in which members agreed upon a draft resolution which demanded "an immediate cease-fire and a cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanon-Israel border."⁹⁷ It authorised the Secretary-General to deploy immediately, on the request of the government of Lebanon, United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut. The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council on compliance with the resolution as soon as possible and no later

⁹⁵ The Times (London), 31 July 1982.

⁹⁶ SCOR/PV 2386th meeting, 1 August 1982, p.6.

⁹⁷ S/15330, 1 August 1982.

than four hour from now.⁹⁸ When the draft resolution was put to vote in the formal meeting it was adopted unanimously.⁹⁹

In the discussion following the adoption of resolution members like Zaire and Soviet Union hoped that sending of the United Nations military observers to Lebanon would prevent fresh escalation of violence in and around Beirut.¹⁰⁰ However the Soviet Union described it as the immediate measure and demanded by the Council to ensure implementation of the resolution and its earlier decision by making use of the means available to under chapter VII of the United Nations.¹⁰¹ The PLO representative stressed the complete withdrawal and unconditional Israeli withdrawal not only from Beirut but from Lebanon itself.¹⁰² Israel argued that it was ready to maintain and observe a ceasefire throughout Lebanon provided it was bilateral. Israel blamed the PLO terrorists for the violation of various ceasefires particularly in Beirut sector.¹⁰³ Israeli forces

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Security Council Res. 516, 1 August 1982.

¹⁰⁰ SCOR/PV. 2386th meeting, 1 August 1982, p.13.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., 0.26.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp.14-15.

did not advance into Beirut. They merely replied to the terrorists violation and provocation. A new ceasefire had come into effect, the Israeli representative said, but if the PLO terrorists violated it Israeli forces would respond.¹⁰⁴

In pursuit to the resolution 516, the Secretary-General submitted his report to the Security Council.¹⁰⁵ The Secretary-General in his report noted that the Lebanese government had formally requested the stationing of UN observers in Beirut and the PLO had signified its acceptance of the resolution.¹⁰⁶ The Israeli Cabinet is yet to take decision on the matter relating to the implementation of the resolution.¹⁰⁷

The Report of the Secretary-General was discussed by the Security Council members in an informal meeting on 3 August. During the discussion a text of a statement, to be made by the President of the Council at the formal session of Security Council, was prepared. In the evening of the same day, the Council

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p.16.

¹⁰⁵S/15334, 1 August 1982.

¹⁰⁶S/15334/Add., 3 August 1982.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

President expressed the concern of members at the prevailing high tension and at reports of military movements and cautioned outbreaks of firing and shelling in and around Beirut. The President expressed full support for the steps taken by the Secretary-General to secure the immediate deployment of United Nations observer to monitor the situation in and around Beirut. He also asked all parties to cooperate fully in the effort to secure effective deployment of the observers and to observe strictly the terms of the resolution.¹⁰⁸

Some Council Members, however, expressed their dissatisfaction over the statement issued by the President. The USSR said that the statement was not as strong as it should have been due to United States.¹⁰⁹ The United States had termed as unacceptable the inclusion of the words "absolutely imperative" to ensure observance of the ceasefire, the USSR representative said.¹¹⁰ The PLO observer also regretted that the Council had not taken stronger action, at least by calling for a prompt return to

¹⁰⁸ SCOR/PV 2387th meeting, 3 August 1982, pp.3-4

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.4

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.5.

the ceasefire position of August 1.¹¹¹ The United States, however, regretted the Soviet allegation and said that it was inconsistent with the spirit of confidentiality of informal Council Consultation.¹¹² The meeting ended in the early hours of 4 August.

Demand for Sanctions Against Israel

The meeting of the Security Council was reconvened at 10 a.m. on the same day, 4 August as a result of the resumption of hostilities in Beirut. Israeli forces advanced into Beirut and had penetrated to Shatila refugee camps.¹¹³

The Soviet representative, who had called the urgent meeting of the Council, addressing the Security Council urged the delegates to condemn Israel for its flagrant violation of resolution 516 and to demand an immediate and full ceasefire and the return of Israeli troops to the position they occupied at the moment of the adoption of resolution 516.¹¹⁴ He

¹¹¹Ibid., p.12.

¹¹²Ibid., j p.15.

¹¹³The Times (London), 5 August 1982.

¹¹⁴SCOR/PV 2388th meeting, 4 August 1982, p.6.

proposed that the number of UN observers in and around Beirut should be increased and the Secretary-General should continue to report to the Security Council on a daily basis, regarding the situation in an around Beirut. The USSR further said, "we could no longer postpone effective measures to put an end to aggression", and called the Council to take all possible measures provided in the Chapter VII of the UN charter.¹¹⁵ Poland, Jordan and China joined USSR in calling for the invocation of Chapter VII. Jordan said that if the Council did not do so now, the flood gates of international licences would be opened.¹¹⁶

Jordan and Spain submitted a draft resolution.¹¹⁷ The draft resolution condemned Israel for its failure to comply with previous Council resolutions. It confirmed the Security Council's demand for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and called for the prompt return of Israeli troops which have moved forward subsequent to 13.25 hours EDT on 1 August 1982. The text also authorised the Secretary-General to increase the number United Nations observers in and around Beirut

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.17.

¹¹⁷ S/15343, 4 August 1982.

and requested him to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. In case of failure to comply by any of the parties to the conflict, the draft resolution stated, the Council would consider adopting ways and means in accordance with the provision of Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations.

Before the draft resolution was put to vote its paras 3 and 7 were amended. The word condemned of Para 3 was replaced by the word censure and Para seven read after amendment as "the Council would consider adopting effective ways and means in accordance with the provisions of the charter of the United Nations."¹¹⁸

When the draft resolution was put to vote it received a vote of 14 in favour with one abstention.¹¹⁹ The United States abstained.

Explaining the abstention, the United States representative said one fatal flaw in the resolution was that it did not explicitly and unequivocally

¹¹⁸S/15343'Rev, 4 August 1982.

¹¹⁹Sc. Res. 517, 4 August 1982.

call for the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon.¹²⁰

However, the other members who voted for the resolution condemned Israeli action and demanded Israeli withdrawal from Beirut. Thus Japan said Israeli latest action was violation of the various United Nations resolutions, and it constituted a serious challenge to the international community and should be condemned.¹²¹ France described the Israeli action in Beirut as violation of international law and the rights of civilian in wartime and censured Israel for this.¹²² The United Kingdom said that bloodshed must be brought to a stop, and demanded implementation of resolution 516.¹²³ Lebanon, demanded, withdrawal of the Israeli forces and of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon and the deployment of the Lebanese army and security forces throughout the country.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ SCOR/PV 2389th meeting, 4 August 1982, j p.6.

¹²¹ Ibid., p.7.

¹²² Ibid., p.8.

¹²³ Ibid., pp.9-10.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.16.

Soviet Demand for Arms Embargo Against Israel for
Non-compliance with Resolution

Though Israel, supported the Lebanon's demand that all foreign forces should be removed from Lebanese territory,¹²⁵ it declined to signify its acceptance to the Council's call for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and for the prompt return of Israeli troops which have moved forward subsequent to 13.25 hours EDT on 1 August 1982. On the contrary, Israel said the "following the departure of the terrorist organization operating in Beirut beyond the Lebanese borders, the arrangements for the deployment of the Israeli forces will be determined on the basis of the principle that all foreign forces will leave the sovereign territory of Lebanon."¹²⁶ On the question of deployment of UN observers in Beirut, Israel refused to cooperate on the ground that presence of such observers in Beirut would signal to the terrorists organization that they are under no obligation to leave Beirut. On the other hand government of Lebanon agreed to cooperate fully in the implementation of the resolution and the PLO

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.17.

¹²⁶ S/15345/Add.5, 5 August 1982.

reaffirmed its commitment to cease-fire.¹²⁷

Israel's refusal to comply with the resolution (517) led USSR to call an urgent security council meeting on 6 August 1982. Addressing the delegates the Soviet representative said that Israel had refused to implement resolution 516 and 517¹²⁸ and submitted a draft resolution which strongly condemned Israel for not implementing resolution 516 (1982) and 517 (1982) and demanded that Israel immediately implement these resolutions fully."¹²⁹ The draft resolution proposed that in order to carry out the above mentioned decision of the Security Council, all the members of the United Nations should, as a first step, refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and from providing it with any military aid.

The Soviet sponsored draft-resolution could not be put to vote in that meeting as the meeting was suspended at the request of Jordanian delegate.¹³⁰ when the meeting resumed at 11 a.m. both the French

¹²⁷Inid.

¹²⁸SCOR/PV 2390th meeting, 6 August 1982, pp.3-5.

¹²⁹S/15347, 6 August 1982.

¹³⁰SCOR/PV 2390th meeting, 6 August 1982, p.17.

and Chinese delegates expressed their support for the Soviet draft resolution.¹³¹ France said, the measures regarding military supplies in the draft resolution were justified until the full withdrawal of Israel from all Lebanese territory.¹³² China said the Council should consider imposing sanction against Israel.¹³³ However, the United Kingdom declined to support the draft as it would not make any positive contribution to the peace process in the Middle East.¹³⁴

When the Soviet draft resolution was brought to vote, the United States used its veto.¹³⁵ The United States voted against draft resolution because, as the US representative explained, it was unbalanced and would not contribute to US goal of achieving, through negotiations, a peaceful settlement.¹³⁶ However, the other members who voted for the draft resolution felt that the enforcement action by the Council is necessary for implementing its decision.

¹³¹SCOR/PV 2391st meeting, 6 August 1982, pp.7, 12.

¹³²Ibid., p.7.

¹³³Ibid., p.12.

¹³⁴
Ibid., pp.8-10.

¹³⁵Ibid., p.13.

¹³⁶Ibid., p.17.

Ireland said it felt that the Council could not accept the fact that its decision were not being implemented.¹³⁷ Jordan regarded the proposed arms embargo as a final step which must be followed by much sterner measures as spelt out in the charters chapter on enforcement measures.¹³⁸ China and France already supported the Soviet draft resolution before voting.¹³⁹

Israel-Syria Clash in Tripoli and Bekka Valley

Though US vetoed the Soviet sponsored draft, it brought pressure on Israel to withdraw from West Beirut. It threatened Israel to discontinue arms supply if Israel refused to comply.¹⁴⁰ However, the US pressure on Israel could not work. On the contrary, Israel resumed their bombardment of West Beirut. Israeli tanks and armoured vehicles advanced into the central mountain plateau of northern Lebanon to confront Syrian forces in Tripoli and the Bekka valley.¹⁴¹ This led to

¹³⁷ Ibid., p.37.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p.16.

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp.7, 12.

¹⁴⁰ The Times (London), 7 August 1982.

¹⁴¹ The Times (London), 13 August 1982.

Convening of the Security Council meeting on 12 August at the request of Soviet Union. Owing the debate, the Soviet representative accused Israel of repeatedly violating the ceasefire in Beirut and of advancement of its forces north of the capital.¹⁴² He urged the security council to undertake immediate action to put on end to Israeli aggression.¹⁴³ Jordan's representative said that Israel was systematically and ruthlessly devastating Beirut and it advance indicated that it planned either to take over or encircle the Bekka valley.¹⁴⁴ According to Jordanian representative, the present development escalated the conflict to new dimensions that undermines, if unchallenged, the ongoing negotiations and authority of a peaceful settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution. He submitted a draft resolution on behalf of the non-aligned members of the Council comprising Guyana, Jordan, Panama, Togo, Uganda and Zaire.¹⁴⁵ Other participants, though not members of the Council, showed their satisfaction over the draft and asked for immediate

¹⁴² SCOR/PV 2392nd meeting, 12 August 1982, pp.3-6.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.6.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.10.

¹⁴⁵ S/15355, 12 August 1982.

action of the Council. Thus, the PLO representative described the situation as very serious and dangerous and called for immediate action.¹⁴⁶ Egypt and Uganda demanded that international community and the Council should put an end to the genocide.¹⁴⁷ The Arab League said that it was time that the Council told Israel that enough was enough.¹⁴⁸

The Jordanian draft resolution was amended before it was put to vote.¹⁴⁹ Later it was adopted unanimously.¹⁵⁰ Resolution 518 demanded that Israel and all parties to the conflict observe strictly the terms of Security Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and particularly in and around Beirut. It further demanded the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in Beirut. The resolution requested the United Nations observers in and in the vicinity of Beirut to report on the situation

¹⁴⁶ SCOR/PV 2392nd meeting, 12 August 1982, p.76.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid pp. 17, 31.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.28-30.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., j p.36.

¹⁵⁰ S.C. Res. 518, 12 August 1982.

and demanded that Israel cooperate fully in the effort to secure the effective deployment of the United Nations observers as requested by the government of the Lebanon. Lastly the Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution.

Following the adoption of resolution the United States urged that action in the Security Council should support and not complicate negotiating process.¹⁵¹ "...we urged the Council to avoid any initiative that could upset the negotiations during present critical phase".¹⁵² Other delegates also emphasised the importance of the negotiation that were being conducted by US envoy Philip Habib to get PLO forces removed from West Beirut.¹⁵³

Multinational Force and Evacuation of PLO from Lebanon.

Habib's efforts ultimately resulted in a plan which involved the withdrawal of PLO guerrillas

¹⁵¹ SCOR/PV 2392nd meeting, 12 August 1982, pp.38-40.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid., pp.41, 42.

from Beirut and the introduction of a Multinational force comprising American, French and Italian contingents, to assist in supervising the withdrawal of the PLO and aid the Lebanese government in the restoration of its authority over the Beirut area.¹⁵⁴

The Lebanese formally requested the contributing state to dispatch the force on 18 August and three days later Multinational forces arrived in Lebanon.¹⁵⁵ Under the supervision of the Multinational force PLO units completed withdrawal from Beirut by 30 August. On the other hand Israel also withdrew their heavy armours from Beirut.¹⁵⁶

Assassination of Bashir Gamayel and Israeli Entry Into West Beirut

Soon after the evacuation of PLO fighters and withdrawal of MNF-1 from Lebanon, Bashir Gamayel, President elect of Lebanon was killed in a bomb explosion on West Beirut.¹⁵⁷ Following this Israeli forces advanced into Moslem West Beirut.

¹⁵⁴ The Times (London), 16-21 August 1982.

¹⁵⁵ The Times (London), 26 August 1982.

¹⁵⁶ The Times (London), 31 August 1982.

¹⁵⁷ The Times (London), 16 September 1982

Israeli incursion into West Beirut was condemned by the United States, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from West Beirut.¹⁵⁸ The incursion was also protested by Lebanon. Lebanon called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council.¹⁵⁹

The Council was convened on the afternoon of 16th September 1982. During the debate the Lebanese representative condemned Israel advance into West Beirut and demanded that "Israel be called upon unequivocally and immediately to withdraw its forces from Beirut."¹⁶⁰ Lebanon's call for immediate withdrawal of Israel forces was supported by USSR, Jordan and Kuwait. The Jordan representative said, "the Security Council is duty bound to demand that Israel withdraw immediately from Beirut as a prelude to total and complete withdrawal to the internationally recognised boundaries of Lebanon."¹⁶¹ On the other hand, the Israeli representative stated that Israeli forces would be withdrawn from West Beirut when the Lebanese armed forces are ready to

¹⁵⁸ The Times (London) 17 September, 1982

¹⁵⁹ S/15392, 16 September 1982.

¹⁶⁰ S/PV 2394th meeting, 16 September 1982., p.11.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p.22.

assume control of these positions in coordination with "Israel Defence Force in order to ensure public order and safety."¹⁶² The meeting ended without any decision.

In the next meeting on the following day, Jordan representative submitted a draft resolution.¹⁶³ Jordan draft had broad support. France, China and United Kingdom had agreed to support. The British representative said, "Israel has no right to arrogate to itself the power of intervention in the capital and territory of a neighbouring state. We support to call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal to the position it occupied before 15 September."¹⁶⁴ France also supported the draft resolution as did China.¹⁶⁵ The Chinese representative said, "The Chinese government and people strongly condemn the new crime of aggression of the Israeli authorities. We finally support the appeal made by the Lebanese Prime Minister for Israeli troop withdrawal."¹⁶⁶

¹⁶²Ibid., pp. 58-60.

¹⁶³S/15394, 17 September 1982.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p.13.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., pp.8-10, 12.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., p.12.

The Jordanian draft-resolution was put to vote and was unanimously adopted as resolution 520.¹⁶⁷ Resolution 520 condemned the recent Israeli incursion into Beirut in violation of the ceasefire agreements and Security Council resolution and demanded an immediate return to the positions occupied by Israel before 15 September 1982 as first step towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution.¹⁶⁸

Massacre at Sabra and Shatila

While the Security Council was meeting, the Phalangist militias, at the permission of Israeli Defence Minister, entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on the 16 September to apprehend the PLO guerrillas alleged to be hiding there and massacred several hundreds Palestinians inside the camps.¹⁶⁹

Following the gruesome massacre at Sabra and Shatila the Security Council was hastily convened.

¹⁶⁷ Sc.Res. 520, 17 September 1982.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ For details see, Final Report of the Commissioner of Enquiry into the events at refugee camps in Beirut, 1983, pp. 14-20.

The Secretary-General informed the delegates that two teams of UN observers had reached the Sabra camp at 8.30 am on 18 September and found many clusters of bodies of men, women and children in civilian clothes who appeared to have been massacred in groups of 10 to 20.¹⁷⁰ The Secretary-General further said that according to information received from the Lebanese army, the units responsible for massacre were elements of Phalange together with units from Major Haddad's militia.

The discussion that followed in the Council concentrated on the circumstances of the massacre at Sabra and Chatila as well as steps that should be taken to protect the civilian population. A number of delegates charged Israel with responsibility for the massacre on the ground that Israeli forces were in effective control of West Beirut.¹⁷¹ After further discussion, the meeting was suspended for informal consultations during which a draft was agreed upon.¹⁷² The draft resolution was adopted at the formal session of the Council of 19th September unanimously.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ SCOR/PV, 2396th meeting, 19 September 1982, p.6.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., pp.8-66, 82.

¹⁷² S/15402, 19 September 1982.

¹⁷³ Sec. Res. 521, 19 September 1982.

Resolution 521 condemned the criminal massacre of the civilians in Beirut and reaffirmed resolution 512 and 513 and authorised the Secretary-General to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from 10 to 50 and insisted that there "shall be no interference with the deployment of the observers and they shall have full freedom and movement." The Secretary-General was, as a matter of urgency requested to initiate appropriate consultations and in particular consultation with the government of Lebanon on additional steps which the Council might take including the possible deployment of United Nations forces to assist that government in ensuring full protection for the civilian population in and around Beirut.

Move to Deploy UN Forces in Beirut

Israel consented to the deployment of additional UN observers in and around Beirut, as called by the Security Council resolution 521 but it indicated that it would not allow UN forces to be deployed in Beirut.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, Lebanese representative said that his government was enthusiastic about the use

¹⁷⁴The Times (London), 20 September 1982.

of MNF in Beirut, and urgently requested the reconstitution of the MNF to bolster army itself.¹⁷⁵

Thus, Multinational Force consisting of United States, French and Italian troops once again came to Lebanon on the invitation of the Lebanese Prime Minister. Amin Gamayel, the brother of assassinated President Bashir Gamayel was elected President of Lebanon by the Parliament.¹⁷⁶

The Security Council, which had met on 19 September to condemn the Beirut massacre was convened on 18 October 1982 and 18 January 1983 to renew the UNIFIL mandate.¹⁷⁷ But the negotiations for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the establishment of peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon, were tried to be reached outside the Security Council. Thereafter the role of the Security Council was not, significant.

¹⁷⁵ See Richard W. Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping in Middle East and the United Nations Model", International Affairs (London), Vpo. 61, 84-85, p.74.

¹⁷⁶ The Times (London), 23 September 1982.

¹⁷⁷ SCOR/PV, 2400th meeting, 18 October 1982, SCOR/PV, 2411th meeting, 18 January 1983. See also Security Council Res. 523, 18 October 1982, Res. 529, 19 January 1983.

Summary observations

From the above discussion, it is clear that the Security Council, during the period under review could not fulfil its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security in so far as developments in Lebanon during 1982 were concerned. It remains a harsh fact of history that Israel resolutely refused to head the call of the international community. Israel violated council's resolutions - be it a call for cease fire or call to lift Beirut Blockade. Obviously Israel could get away with these violations owing to the fact that United States was there in the security council to come for its rescue.

As the war broke out, the Council started its action by demanding immediate cease-fire by all the parties and calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces immediately and unconditionally from Lebanon. It is important to note that there was unanimity in the Council at this stage. However, the consensus soon disappeared when Israel refused to withdraw and condemnation of Israel was sought by all the Council members except U.S.A. Encouraged by the United States veto, Israel began to defy every later Council resolutions.

Moreover, in certain circumstances Council could not meet owing to lack of consensus among the Council members. Thus when Israel attacked Syrian missiles in the Bekka Valley, diplomatic efforts outside the UN took place and cease-fire was arranged. Further, when Israeli forces seized Beirut trapping Palestinian forces there, no Council meeting took place.

It is true that Council condemned Israel in certain cases like Israeli incursion into West Beirut after evacuation of PLO, massacre at Sabre and Shatila refugee camps. But, these condemnations by the Council were possible due to the fact that the United States found morally incumbent to support the resolution. There were a number of occasions when all the non-members permanent as well as permanent except U.S. were willing to condemn Israel for violating the security council resolution. Thus owing to veto or threat of veto by the U.S. the council was handicapped in restoring peace in Lebanon. At the same time, it should be noted Israel and united states stood diplomatically isolated even by the western allies.

Israel's unwillingness to cooperate with the security council in restoring peace in Lebanon in a

way reflected on the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon - UNIFIL. Indeed the dilemma/challenges faced by the UNIFIL were never the experience of any peacekeeping operation launched by the UN. How and why did the challenges emerge? What were the consequences? These aspects are looked into in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

UNIFIL AND ITS RELEVANCE

As mentioned in the concluding Paragraphs of the preceding chapter, no study on developments in Lebanon in 1982 with reference to the role of the UN would be complete, without an understanding of the important implications of those developments for the UN peacekeeping presence in Lebanon-UNIFIL. Indeed the implications for UNIFIL seemed so grave that the very assumptions of the concept of UN peacekeeping were questioned.

Peacekeeping as an institution evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement. It developed due to failure of enforcement mechanism to take off for maintaining international peace and security as envisaged by the charter. Peacekeeping forces, which have emerged as an important instrument for maintaining peace, have almost become a permanent part of the united nations machinery, though charter specifically nowhere speaks of either peacekeeping operation or of Peacekeeping forces. Peacekeeping forces gained currency with the establishment of UNEF in 1956. From then on a number of conflict situations had been contained or frozen with the help of Peacekeeping

operations as exemplified by UNOGIL (Lebanon), ONUC (Congo), UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNDOF (Syria-Israel sector) etc. But all these initiatives represented an evolving process of UN responses to particular situations - the process that can be said to have begun in late 1940s. In other words inspirations the earlier UN observer missions of late 1940's such as UNTSO, UNMOGIP provided to major peacekeeping operations cannot be undermined with all these more or less successful operations UN has become not only the most experienced but also most suitable agency for instituting and effectively operating a peacekeeping operation by keeping up its credential of a nonpartisan and creative involvement for maintenance of peace.

In the Middle Eastern region the history of UN peacekeeping is long—from UNTSO (1948) through UNEF (1956-67), UNOGIL (1958) to UNEF (1973-79) and UNDOF (1974). with all these, UN could acquit itself well in terms of being widely acceptable to parties to the conflict in the region and of being useful for maintenance of peace in the turbulent region. This background has to be kept in view when one examines the circumstances in which UNIFIL was established.

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon was set up by the Security Council on the basis of two resolutions passed on 19 March 1978, in the wake of Israel invasion of Lebanon on 15 March 1978¹. The Security council decided to set up U.S. designed force in the first resolution (425) and approved the following broad terms of reference for UNIFIL in the second resolution (426).

The force was to: (a) confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces; (b) restore international peace and security; (c) assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the areas; (d) establish and maintain an area of operation to be defined in the light of above tasks; (e) use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation was not be utilised for hostile activities of any kind.²

Thus in the first stage UNIFIL was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territories to the international border. After this, it was to establish and maintain an area of

¹See SC Res. 425, for setting up the force.

²UN Doc. S/12611, 19 March 1978.

operation to be defined in consultation with the parties concerned. The force was to supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese authority.³

The guidelines of UNIFIL were essentially the same as those given to UNEF II and UNDOF. Important decision on the organization of UNIFIL, such as the appointment of the force commander or the selection of contingents were to be taken by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. All matters which might effect the nature or the continued functioning of the force were to be reported to the Council. Emphasis was laid as usual, on the principle of non-use of force except in self-defence and non-interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon.⁴

The total initial strength of UNIFIL was a little more than four thousand.⁵ Its strength went up from time to time: it was about 7000 in early

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

1982.⁶ Following the second Israeli invasion, in June 1982, the strength and composition of UNIFIL underwent important changes.⁷ However, at any time, UNIFIL has usually been made up of contingents from nine to ten countries. It is also important to note that unlike the previous peacekeeping operations (except UNECYP) a permanent member of the security council, France was accepted as a contributor of UNIFIL.

Aspects of operationalisation of UNIFIL's mandate

For the fulfilment of UNIFIL's mandate, the cooperation of all the parties - Israel, Lebanon, PLO, local militias etc - was necessary, Particularly since UNIFIL as was the case with its operations, did not have coercive power. But the chief hitch noticed was inadequacy of the mandate. In the light of the realities on the ground the enabling resolution

⁶The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace Keeping (New York : UNO, 1985), R.113, The Composition of the force at that time was as: infantry, battalions - Fiji (628), France (595), Ghana (557), Ireland (471), Nepal (432), Netherland (810), Nigeria (696), Norway (660), Senegal (561), Headquarters Camp Command - Ghana (140), Ireland (51); Logistic Units - France (775), Italy (34), Norway (191), Sweden (144).

⁷Ibid.

(426) had mentioned only Israel and Lebanon as parties to the conflict excluding PLO and various armed elements, though they were very much part of the problem.⁸ Israel and Lebanon agreed to extend their co-operation to UNIFIL, as did PLO when UNIFIL officials held negotiations with Arafat, the PLO chief.⁹

The UNIFIL officials, however, could not officially negotiate with various armed elements, some of whom sided with the PLO while others with Israel. The PLO was allied with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which was a loose association of Lebanese Moslem and leftist parties and their armed elements.¹⁰ On the other hand, Israel assisted and controlled so called defacto militia led by Major Haddad, a renegade officer of the Lebanese army. Whenever problems arose due to activities of those elements, UNIFIL tried to sort them out with the help of PLO leadership and the Israeli authorities as the case might be.

⁸See SC Res. 426, 19 March 1978.

⁹Blue Helmets, n.5, p.114.

¹⁰Ibid.

- a. Withdrawal of Israeli Forces: UNIFIL confirmed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, the accordance with its mandate.¹¹ It is true that Israel withdrew on her own accord and was not compelled by UNIFIL to withdraw. Coercion by UNIFIL was not any sense intended either. Like other peacekeeping operations it was intended that UNIFIL should not expel the invaders by force, for peace keeping depends on cooperation and not on enforcement. And this is why the Secretary-General in his report, while laying down the terms of reference of the UNIFIL had put special emphasis on the principle of non use of force except in self-defence.¹² It is also true that UNIFIL did not play any important role with regard to procedure of withdrawal of Israeli Forces. Israel planned its withdrawal on its own and simply passed it to the UN Forces.¹³

It may be recalled that Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon took place in four stages. During the first three stages Israel handed

¹¹ Ibid., p.120.

¹² UN Doc. S/12611, 19 March 1978.

¹³ Blue Helmets, n.5, p.117.

over the evacuated areas to UNIFIL. But in the final stage Israel turned over the area not to UNIFIL but to the defacto forces of Major Haddad on the ground that Israel considered him as legitimate representative of the Lebanese government.¹⁴

- b. Deployment of Forces: After the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, the second important task of UNIFIL was to deploy in southern Lebanon. As it transpired UNIFIL found itself in considerably less than complete control of Southern Lebanon.¹⁵ But the fault lies with the vagueness of the mandate rather than with UNIFIL. The mandate indicated only that UNIFIL would operate in southern Lebanon.

The vagueness of the mandate may be explained by the fact that the enabling resolution of the security council was a result of compromise. During preparation of his report on the implementation of the resolution (425) the Secretary General was unable to clearly define

¹⁴Ibid., p.120.

¹⁵

Alam James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon, 1978-82, "International Journal" (Ottawa), no. 38, Autumn, 1983, p.18.

the area of operation as the members of the Security Council were not unanimous in this regard.¹⁶ He only suggested UNIFIL would be set up in an area of operation in consultation with the parties.¹⁷ But the parties had different perception of the tasks of UNIFIL and no agreement could be reached on a definition of its area of operation.¹⁸ Furthermore, the resolution prohibited any UNIFIL action that could prejudice the right, claim or position of the parties concerned.¹⁹

Moreover the conflicting interpretation by parties of their rights and needs frustrated the UNIFIL's mission. UNIFIL had to acquiesce in both the PLO claims that Tyre Pocket was operationally out of bound to UNIFIL and Israeli insistence on setting up the Hadded enclave.

As a result, UNIFIL held only 24 positions in the enclave, in addition to its headquarters at Naqura and five posts previously established

¹⁶ Blue Helmets, n.5, p.115.

¹⁷ Doc. S/12611, 19 March 1978.

¹⁸ (Blue Helmets, n.5, p.115.

¹⁹ SC Res. 426, 19 March 1978.

by UNTSO along the Armistice Demarcation Line.²⁰
No further development could be achieved.²¹
The efforts of the Secretary General and his
representatives to secure the full deployment
of UNIFIL in its area of operation could not
succeed.²² The Security Council repeatedly
reaffirmed its determination to implement its
resolution on UNIFIL in so far as ensuing
UNIFIL's area of operation as assigned on
original resolution and called upon all the
parties to extend the necessary cooperation to
UNIFIL. The pleas of the Security Council
went unheeded.

Thus, UNIFIL was faced with not only Haddad's
force, but also with the Israeli forces who
would have continued to support the former in
any conflict and possibly have intervened on
their behalf.²³ For such a conflict UNIFIL
was not equipped either politically or
militarily. Politically, contributing countries
had not sent contingents with a view to their

²⁰ Blue Helmets, n.5, j p.121.

²¹ Doc.S/12845, 12 September 1978

²²
Ibid.

²³ James, n.18, p.30.

fighting against Israeli puppet, let alone Israel itself.²⁴ Militarily, in such an encounter casualties would have been high and no purpose would have been served.

- c. Restoration of Peace and Security: Though UNIFIL could not be deployed in the whole southern Lebanon, as required by the mandate, it took active step to ensure that, so far as possible its area of operation continued to main under its control. It tried to prevent infiltration in its area of operation by both PLO and left militias as also the defacto forces it conducted patrol, supervised and monitored cease-fire.²⁵

To check the infiltration of PLO and leftist armed elements UNIFIL took several measures like establishing check points, inspection, patrolling, redeployment of troops in greater density.²⁶ These efforts paid and most of the infiltration attempts were thwarted.²⁷

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Blue Helmets, n.5, p.118.

²⁶ Ibid., p.122.

²⁷ Ibid.

The UNIFIL, however, could not prevent all infiltration attempts, particularly after third phase of Israeli withdrawal when intensity of attempts increased.²⁸ Difficulty of terrain, the limited size of the force, existence of many armed caches in the UNIFIL area and the infiltration armed elements in civilian dress were some impediments in the way of UNIFIL's effort. In these circumstances, the most effective way of stopping or at least controlling infiltration was to secure the cooperation of the PLO leadership and the latter, it may be noted, cooperated with the UNIFIL to a significant degree.²⁹ Thereafter, there were no reports of largescale infiltrations and when incidents occurred the PLO leadership assisted UNIFIL in resolving them. But in some exceptional cases, the PLO was either unwilling or unable to help and a number of armed elements succeeded in infiltrating into UNIFIL area and setting up some additional positions there.³⁰ The number of such elements, however, were relatively limited and most of them remained

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., p.124.

confined to the northern part of the area, well away from the frontier.³¹ Records of UNIFIL indicated that after its establishment in March 1978, there was only one major raid into northern Israel by PLO armed elements coming from its area. To do this a group would have to cross not only UNIFIL areas but also the enclave and the border.

The measures taken by UNIFIL to prevent infiltration by the Palestinian and Lebanese leftist militias were also applied to the defacto forces. The defacto forces made several attempts to set up positions within the UNIFIL area. Thus, five encroachment positions were established by the defacto forces between July 1979 to July 1980.³² All of them were located in strategic areas. To remove these positions, UNIFIL, instead of using force, tried to seek a negotiated solution through the Israeli authorities but the latter refused to get them removed as Israel considered those position vital for its security.³³ what was ironic that instead of getting encroached defacto positions

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., p.125

³³ Ibid.

removed, Israel itself made encroachment attempts.³⁴

The defacto forces not only made encroachment position within UNIFIL area but also harassed the latter. When UNIFIL failed to deploy in the enclave held by defacto forces, it tried to preserve the installations it held there and to secure the freedom of movement it required to this effect.³⁵ With the assistance of the Israeli army, the UNIFIL reached an agreement with defacto forces whereby UNIFIL troops would enjoy freedom of movement on the main roads in the enclave five days a week and UNIFIL helicopters could fly over the enclave subject to approval by major Haddad's command. But when difficulties of one kind or other arose between UNIFIL and the defacto forces, Major Haddad retaliated by closing the roads in the enclave to United Nations personnel and to the UNIFIL

³⁴Doc S/14295, 1980. In late 1980 UNIFIL reported an increasing number of encroachment by Israeli defence forces. At the same time the presence of the Israeli forces inside the enclave was greatly expanded. The Israeli forces conducted military exercise in the area and on a number of occasions carried, incursion into the UNIFIL area in search of PLO armed elements leading to confrontation with UNIFIL.

³⁵Blue Helmets, n.5, p.124.

vehicles.³⁶ Moreover UNIFIL personnel were frequently fired upon. In his report, the Secretary-General observed that incidents occurred almost daily and harassment of the UN Force continued almost unabated, including attacks on its headquarters and encroachment on its area of operation.³⁷ Moreover, a number of Shiite villages were subjected to occasional shelling from positions in the enclave and the villagers were threatened with punitive measures if they continued to cooperate with UNIFIL.³⁸ UNIFIL sought to contain the action of the defacto forces by negotiation, its troops were sometimes obliged to resist harassment and to use force in self defence. Despite the restraint displaced by the UNIFIL soldiers, violent incidents occurred in some areas.³⁹

Despite these problems, UNIFIL tried its best to ensure that its area of operation was under control. It was successful to an extent, in checking infiltration into its area of operation

³⁶ Ibid., p.125.

³⁷ Doc. S/13026, 12 January 1977.

³⁸ Blue Helmets, n.5, p.125.

³⁹ Ibid., p.126.

from both south and north. It constituted an imperfect buffer between the opposing forces and avoided clashes between them. Though periodic exchange of fire between the defacto forces in the enclave and armed elements stationed in the Tyre Pocket and north of Litani River took place, these hostilities were outside the UNIFIL area of and it could not take direct action against them.⁴⁰ It, however, tried to arrange a cease-fire whenever possible and brought the most serious cases to the attention of the Security Council.⁴¹

- d. Restoration of the Authority of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon : Another part of UNIFIL's mandate was to help the Lebanese government restore its authority over southern Lebanon. UNIFIL encountered two obstacles in this regard. First, opposition of defacto forces and Israeli authorities, second, the fragmented condition of the Lebanese state meant that the Government had virtually no authority to exercise

⁴⁰ Blue Helmets, n.5, p.127.

⁴¹ Ibid.

anywhere in the country, let alone the troubled south. But certain gesture were made in this direction.

Though UNIFIL succeeded in helping the Lebanese Government establish its civil administration in the UNIFIL area of operation, its move to send the Lebanese army there was opposed by both, the defacto forces and the Israeli authorities.⁴² Major Haddad feared that he could be discredited or ousted by legitimate army personnel.⁴³ Israel on her part, apprehended that if the Lebanese army went down to the south and the situation returned to normal, Haddad would not have any enemy and would cease to exist.⁴⁴ This was more important for Israel, in its long term interest to support Haddad.

Despite the opposition of the defacto forces and Israeli authorities, Lebanese government decided to dispatch a task force of Lebanese army to

⁴²Blue Helmets, n.5, p.130.

⁴³Naomi J. Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon", The Middle-East Journal (Washington, D.C.), Vol.37, No.3, June 1983, p. 352.

⁴⁴Ibid.

southern Lebanon on 31 July 1978.⁴⁵ When the advancing battalion reached the town of Kawkaba in north-western sector of the UNIFIL area, it was bombarded by Haddad's militias and prevented from advancing further.⁴⁶ The Kawkaba incident crushed early hopes of significant Lebanese army presence in southern Lebanon.

After protected mediatory efforts, two Lebanese Army battalion reached southern Lebanon by 1980 and were deployed in the UNIFIL's area of operation.⁴⁷ By 1981 the strength of army in south was 1350, the ceiling imposed by 1949 Armistice Agreement with Israel.⁴⁸ But this was little more than a token gesture. There was no real sense in which it could be said that Lebanon was exercising control over other parts of country since mid 1970s let alone the southern Lebanon.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Blue Helmets, n.5, p.131.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.132.

⁴⁸ Blue Helmets, n.5, p.132.

⁴⁹ James, n.18, p.29

A Review of UNIFIL's Role Preceding June 1982 Invasion

A review of the UNIFIL's role makes it clear that UNIFIL could not successfully implement its mandate completely. Of course, it confirmed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, but it did not deploy over the whole of southern Lebanon, nor could it hand the area back to the Lebanese government.

UNIFIL could not implement all of its mandate because of the fact that necessary co-operation was not forthcoming within its immediate surroundings. The Lebanese government was not in a position to cooperate effectively due to its own weakness. Israel was unwilling to do so. According to an author,⁵⁰ from the beginning, Israel perceived that UNIFIL had been imposed on it without Israel's case being heard. While the Israeli forces was still carrying out the Litani operation the U.S. and the U.N. initiated the formation of peace-keeping force without getting Israeli concurrence. UNIFIL, thus was formed on the basis of a unilateral Security Council decision, and not as a result of an agreement

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Pelecsti A. Nathan, Peacekeeping on Arab Israeli Front; Lesson from the Sinai and Lebanon (USA, 1984), p. 18.

between hostile parties. From the outset, Israel judged UNIFIL as a potential impediment to the existing Security arrangement on its northern border. Under such circumstances, Israeli cooperation was certainly not likely to be a willing one. The Palestinians were, at the leadership level, prepared to extent cooperation, but on the ground level things were different. UNIFIL could not use force neither against the Israeli and its supported defacto forces, nor against PLO. Moreover, UNIFIL could not get the necessary political support of members whose support could have maltered.⁵¹

So far as restoration of peace and security to the southern Lebanon is concerned it is true that relative calm prevailed in the UNIFIL area but this was largely due to policy of the parties concerned to avoid a major conflagration rather than activities of UNIFIL.⁵² The contribution of UNIFIL was secondary in this direction. For as long as, parties concerned

⁵¹In this connection the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council noted that when UNIFIL was established, it was assumed that parties concerned would finally abide by the Council's decision and that in the event of non-compliance, the Council itself and those members in a position to bring their influence to bear would be able to act decisively to ensure respect for the decision of the Council. UNIFIL was faced with inadequate co-operation throughout its existence. See Doc. S/15194/Add.2, 14 June 1982.

⁵²James, n.18, p.22.

wanted to avoid a major conflict, UNIFIL certainly helped to prevent the escalation of conflict by providing a more or less continuous buffer between the opponents. But if either side decided that its intent demands a major clash, UNIFIL could do little to prevent. Thus when Israel decided to launch the second invasion against Lebanon UNIFIL was in no position to stand in the way. Nor did it had mandate to stop the invading army. Of course, UNIFIL soldiers placed obstacles in the way of advancing Israeli army but those were removed by the Israeli army, Israel wanted to pass through UNIFIL's line and there was no way in which UNIFIL could have stopped it.

Aftermath of 1982 invasion

In the aftermath of the invasion there was support in some quarters, particularly of the United States, in favour of expanding UNIFIL's size and mandate to give it a role in Beirut. But this idea could not take practical shape due to unwillingness of Israel to cooperate with UN troops.⁵³ Moreover on 26 June 1982 the United States vetoed a French draft resolution which would have called for UN observers to supervise a disengagement of Israeli and PLO forces, objecting because the plan would have allowed the Palestinians to retain their arms while regrouping.⁵⁴

On the other hand, the Lebanese government itself requested the United states to stations source

⁵³Richard W. Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model", International Arrairs (London), Vol.61, Winter 1984-85, p.71.

⁵⁴SCOR/PV, 2381st meeting, 1982, p.11.

of its troops temporarily which would facilitate the evacuation of Palestine forces safely from Beirut.⁵⁵ In the first week of July, 82 it was reported that President Reagan of the United States agreed in principle to send to Beirut 800-1000 US marines joined by a French contingent to act as a temporary evacuation and Peacekeeping force. Subsequently, British and Italian contingents were also drawn on. Thus the force was put together despite the fact that the soviet union was totally opposed to such a move.⁵⁶

MNF - II

The second MNF was set up in the wake of massacre at Sabre and Chatila. Immediately after the massacre took place, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on 19 September authorising the Secretary-General to increase the number of observers to fifty and requesting him to consult the government of Lebanon on the possible deployment of UN Forces in

⁵⁵Nelson, n.60.

⁵⁶Ibid., p.72. Israel was reported to have initially opposed to leave Lebanon. It opposed the use of French troops in the first stage of evacuation as they might act as a shield for the PLO against the Israeli forces, if the evacuation collapsed. Eventually, Israel gave in when French assured Israel that it would withdraw its forces if the PLO went back on its promises to leave Lebanon.

Beirut.⁵⁷ Use of UNIFIL was reportedly the preference of the United States government as well as the Soviet Union and many other countries, including Arab states.⁵⁸ But again Israel indicated that it would hamper the movement of troops from Southern Lebanon to Beirut, though it cooperated with the deployment of UN observers.⁵⁹ Lebanon also stated that it was not enthusiastic about the UN Forces in Beirut and had urgently requested the reconciliation of MNF.⁶⁰ Lebanon urgently requested the reconstitution of the MNF to bolster Lebanon army and Lebanon itself. on 20 September, the MNF countries agreed to send their forces.

The mandate of the new MNF was in general, to provide the multi-national presence as requested by the Lebanese government. More specifically it was to provide an interposition force which would create such conditions as would enable the Lebanese armed forces to carry out their responsibilities: assist the efforts of the Lebanese government to ensure the safety of persons in the area and bring an end to

⁵⁷ Security Council Res. 521, 19 September 1982.

⁵⁸ Nelson, n.60, p. 73.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.74.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

the violence; and facilitate the restoration of the Lebanese sovereignty and authority over Beirut area.⁶¹

Whereas MNF-I succeeded in achieving its objectives, i.e. supervise the withdrawal of PLO from Beirut and went back, MNF-II, at the beginning, encountered no major setbacks. Among the function they begin to perform were clearing the pieces of unexploded explosives, protecting civilian, guarding certain installations, including the airport and operating routine patrol and security posts. They conducted military rescue operation beyond Syria line. But as soon MNF tried to train Lebanese army it began to be opposed by the militias opposed to the government. These militians employed every means available including terrorism, to drive the MNF out of the country. MNF tried to respond these challenges by force which changed its role from third party peacekeeper to factional participant. As the challenge from the armed militia opposed to government and thus MNF grew, the US, the most important partner of MNF tried to strengthen the MNF mandate which in turn produced a corresponding subordination of a conception of international peace

⁶¹ Ibid.

keeping to calculation of national interest.⁶² But the growing terrorist activities against the MNF made it to withdrew hastily from Beirut, without fulfilling its mission by March 1984.

Now the most pertinent question is what should be the necessary conditions for a peacekeeping operation to be effective. It should be stressed that the question is not so much who should undertake the peacekeeping, as which agency would be better able to undertake it. Surely UN cannot claim monopoly over the peacekeeping operations. It is not the first time that peacekeeping is undertaken outside the united nations. In the past these were cases, for example, MFO, in Sinai. But in the case of MNF unfortunately one of the very basic assumptions- impartiality was eroded. The united states, the most important contributor of MNF, got intimately involved in the conflict. In accordance with demands of its interest the United States became firmly committed to the Gamayel government. Thus the opposing faction began to identify MNF, increasingly as a part of enemy force. once this happened, the presence of MNF was no longer that of an impartial

⁶²Ramesh Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon; United Nations Authority and Multinational force (London, 1987), p.7.

third party and it became a party to the conflict which ultimately resulted in its hasty retreat.

On the other hand UNIFIL tried to function in an impartial manner. In the beginning Israel questioned the impartiality of UNIFIL by alleging that it was not dealing firmly with PLO and allowed them to infiltrate into UNIFIL area of operation. But Israeli attitude towards UNIFIL underwent to a gradual transformation.⁶³

Israel began to acknowledge the positive contribution of UNIFIL. Had UNIFIL not been there, Israel would have been obliged to intervene on behalf of Haddad's militia under repeated heavy attacks from the PLO. Thus UNIFIL role was that of a true peacekeeper, so far as question of neutrality was concerned.

Whether UNIFIL would have been successful in Beirut where MNF failed is difficult to say but it can be said that composition of the former would have been acceptable to all the parties as UNIFIL was based on the principle of equitable geographical representation, though other principle i.e., general

⁶³Ibid, p.69.

prohibition of the troops from the Security permanent members was not followed in the case of UNIFIL. France, a permanent member of the security council, contributed its troops to UNIFIL, but it happened so when there was no opposition. On the other hand MNF was made up entirely of NATO countries. And this was probably the fact more than anything else that caused it to be unacceptable to anti-government factions and of course to Syria and the Soviet Union. Moreover, UNIFIL may not have lost so quickly or at all the mantle of neutrality essential in the art of peacekeeping.⁶⁴ It would probably not have slipped into the reprisal game and could not have involved itself into open warfare as MNF did because UNIFIL was not heavily equipped as MNF was. The same mandate as was the case of MNF might have made a difference.

The MNF failure however need not be an occasion for celebration. It should provide an opportunity to strengthen UNIFIL in particular and, UN as an important peacekeeping agency, in general.

⁶⁴Nelson, n.60, p.89.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT

The discussion contained in the preceding chapters would lead to a set of concluding observations with reference to the United Nations and Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

I

The circumstances that characterized the situation in Lebanon immediately preceding and long standing macro-historical factors that lay at the root of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 are, if any thing, extremely complex. To mention a few of them for the purpose of facilitating an analysis : the larger Parameters of the continuing stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the inextricable linkage between the Palestinian refugee/guerilla problem with the contemporary history of Lebanon, the Lebanese unsettling political situation with all characteristics of a civil war, and the inadequate response from the international community in general and United nations in particular to the maze of events in Lebanon immediately preceding the 1982 invasion.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has for long eluded a solution, despite numerous efforts aimed at peaceful settlement made both in and outside of the United Nations. Ever since the creation of Israel in 1948, the world witnessed at least four major military confrontations between the parties, but these wars failed to contribute to the elimination of roots of the conflict. Indeed they have led to only further intensification of the rivalry. Furthermore, one cannot escape a stark irony in the scenario : on the one hand Israel has grown militarily stronger, on the other the disgruntled Arab nations remained disunited. As a consequence, the Arab natives of the Palestine continue to be denied their inalienable right to self-determination.

Lebanon with sizeable Moslem population had remained unaffected by the destructive impact of the Arab-Israeli wars excepting the one that had occurred in 1967. It is a matter of history that 1967 Arab-Israeli war had resulted in colossal uprooting of the civilian population from occupied areas (by Israel) including those of West Bank and Gaza. These population had taken refuge in surrounding

countries like Lebanon and Jordan. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon shot up following the 1970 Jordanian expulsion of Palestinians and by 1975 it reached to four lakh. In the meantime the Palestinians after the 1967 war took to arms and stepped up. Guerilla activities against Israel from Souther part of the Lebanese territories. The Palestinian guerrillas secured legitimacy of their free operation from Lebanon against Israel under 1969 Cairo-Agreement owing to the solidarity shown by Lebanese Moslems with Palestinian guerrillas.

The years that followed the 1969 agreement marked the beginning of the end of an otherwise economically flourishing Lebanon. The political situation of the country was marked by antagonism between the political forces representing two major communities- namely Moslems and Christians. The 1943 National Pact on the sharing of power between various communities was put to stress and strains. The situation was complicated with the deep involvement of external forces in the Lebanese domestic politics. P.L.O. in return to the solidarity - Moslems shown to it, was on the side of Moslem brothers. Likewise the christians were seeking

support from the West and Israel. The two opposing groups were engaged in bloody violence, thanks to arms supplied by respective allies.

The Lebanese turmoil had caused so much concern to the Arab countries that latter, at the request of Lebanese government deployed what was then known as the Arab Deterrent Force, essentially an euphemism for Syrian Forces while the Syrian forces was busy in restoring normalcy between Moslem and christians Palestinian guerrillas were left force to launch fresh and rigorous attacks against Israel from southern border of Lebanon. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 with the purpose of driving out the Palestinian guerrillas from the southern part of Lebanon.

Israeli objective was, however, obstructed by an outraged international community which disapproved of Israeli action. An activated forum of the U.N. Security Council brought about heavy diplomatic and political pressure against Israel to end the aggression. The Security Council made its own Contribution by sending a peacekeeping force, namely United Nations Interim Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL) with a view to, inter alia, supervise withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and restoring sovereignty of the Lebanese government over southern Lebanon. But as UNIFIL realised during its operation that neither the mandate given to it was commensurate with the complexity of the Lebanese situation nor was it easy for the UNIFIL to secure for it consistent and unstinted cooperation not only from the withdrawing Israeli forces, the Lebanese government but also the feuding domestic political factions as well as the Palestinian guerrillas. But UNIFIL could not afford to give up.


Faced with the absence of conducive environment the UNIFIL rather than giving up the situation persevered in its activities in whatever limited geographical area it was able to take over from Israeli forces. But what was required in the circumstances was more than Perseverance. To provide teeth to UNIFIL, political will was not, unfortunately, coming from major powers. Alongside, no opportunity was given, whole heartedly by any of the parties (formal or otherwise) to the Lebanese situation, to help UNIFIL in bringing Lebanon back to normalcy. The cataclysm in the helpless scenario

was reached when the Israeli forces in June 1982, contemptuously bypassed UNIFIL and invaded Lebanon, for the second time in four years.

II

It can be contended that the June 1982 Israeli invasion was not an unanticipated development. The events immediately preceding the invasion on 6th June, 1982 provided enough indications. And the Security Council vainly attempted to prevent such occurrence. In the light of Israeli raids against P.L.O. targets in and around Beirut and just one day before the invasion on 5 June, the Security Council in a resolution had called for immediate Cessation of military activities. The Council had also urged all member states which were in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon the parties to end the hostilities. Ironically enough, within a few hours of the call made by the Security Council Israel invaded Lebanon. By implication it appears that Israel, by design, went ahead with its invasion plans, thereby demonstrating its disregard for the restraining voice of the Security Council in a most telling manner. There is more to it either

necessary these political pressure was not exerted on Israel by the countries who were able to do so, the United States, or Israel refused to heed the advice of the United States.



The situation constituted serious enough challenge to the charter framework with reference to maintenance of peace and security, as also to the obligations of members, written into the charter. As far as the UN functional role in preserving peace in Lebanon was concerned, the Israeli invasion had presented particularly a potent poser. For the first time perhaps after the experience in the Congo, during early sixties, the UN peacekeeping presence in Lebanon-UNIFIL was humiliatingly outmanoeuvred by advancing Israeli forces.

The backdrop against which the Security Council met to consider the situation was too grim to give room for an immediate effective response. For one thing, the diplomatic interactions at the Security Council were bound to be of such a nature as to ensure a certain stalemate. The Israeli invasion had made it clear that there was lack of concert among key permanent members of the Security Council.

The invasion had not improved, indeed the views of some permanent members as well as parties, of course hardened. This was evident amply in the divergent nature of the deliberations at the Security Council, which spanned as many as sixteen meetings spreadover a long period of three months. The Soviet Union, supported Lebanon's accusation against Israel of a premeditated aggression and condemnation of that act. Britain, China, France and most non-permanent members strongly disapproved of Israeli invasion. Israel with the backing of the United States refuted the charges.

In the midst of these apparently irreconcilable position, would it be possible for the Security Council to play any meaningful role? As it transpired, the Security Council adopted in total nine resolutions on the subject. Setting aside the practical value of these resolutions for a while, the question remains how did the Council manage to adopt nine resolutions despite differences among members. And why nine? When closely examined, the records would reveal that the members of the Security Council painstakingly pursued a set of objectives with a varying priority dictated by pragmatism.

The foremost objective the council kept in view was cease-fire immediately followed by the question of withdrawal of the Israeli forces and later modified as that of simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and P.L.O. forces. On the question of ceasefire, the Security Council gave a call in a resolution of 6 June. To facilitate the adoption of the resolution the text avoided, formal condemnation of Israeli invasion; and the United States found it so balancing that it also voted for it. However, it soon became clear that cease-fire could not be achieved, because of Israeli insistence on some permanent arrangements to ensure that the Palestinian guerrillas would not return to southern Lebanon. It was only the Soviet threat to intervene militarily and intense American pressure that led to Israeli's acceptance in principle of the cease-fire call, after a delay of five precious days, on 11 June 1982.

But Israel was adamant about its preconditions when the attention turned to the question of withdrawal of Israeli forces to Lebanon-Israel border. Israel declined to withdraw from Lebanon unless and until a concrete arrangement was made which would permanently and reliably precluded hostile action

against Israel. Israel insisted on the surrender of all Palestinian forces in West Beirut and their deportation. Here, Israel had the United States support. The United States vetoed three resolutions (sponsored by France, the Soviet Union, and Spain) which condemned Israel for not complying with the resolutions calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of the Israel forces. Apart from differences on the substantive aspect of the withdrawals, there existed difference on the modalities of withdrawals. Unlike in 1978, it remained a moot point as to under whose supervision withdrawals would take place. Any role by UNIFIL? Neither Israel nor Lebanon (surprisingly) favoured. While the objective of ceasefire with all reported violations was achieved, there was no progress on withdrawals. Besides, in regard to long term measure to address the roots of the situation in Lebanon that caused the Israeli invasion, the Palestinian problem, no concrete initiative was forthcoming in the council. Though throughout the discussions, most of the members highlighted the urgency of a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict, the Security Council did not pass a single resolution on these aspects. Perhaps the council thought the moment was not opportune for

the purpose and presumably members still desired all doors of policy options be kept open for the time being. However the Security Council came out very clearly so far as moral issues were concerned for instance it passed two condemnation resolutions- first, when Israeli forces intruded West Beirut in the wake of Gamayal's assassination, and second in the wake of Massacre at Sabra and Chetila.

III

The question still remained how to achieve Israeli withdrawal. On the one side Israel was totally opposed to any more UN involvement in Lebanon (although U S was not averse to the U N), on the other the Security Council members were unwilling to accommodate Israeli preconditions, viz., keeping southern Lebanon secure from activities of Palestinian guerrillas, surrender Palestinian guerrillas etc. Thus the matter was taken up outside the U.N. Framework. The U.S. took lead with the assistance/cooperation from Israel and Lebanon. Eventually a multinational force (MNF) composed by American, British, French and Italian forces, was mobilised to supervise the evacuation of Palestinian

guerrillas from Beirut. But the question of Israeli withdrawal remained unaccomplished as Israel put new condition, withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. In the meanwhile MNF, a second version, had to withdraw in a most humiliating set of circumstances.

The MNF faced criticism on several counts. It was unable to ensure, Israeli withdrawal. Moreover, it had to share the blame, for contributing although indirectly to the inhuman massacre of Palestine refugees because after the Palestine guerrillas deportation they were left without any protection. All these could be due to the fact that the MNF was conceptualised, established, operationalised, hurriedly without much careful thought without examining all dimensions and difficulties of the tasks.

In perspective the experience of MNF would indicate that peacekeeping outside the framework of the united nation by a group of interested (that is to so in terms of their national interest) countries had done no better job than what the U.N. had done on their part, and was really capable and doing in

such situations. All said and done, the credentials of the U.N. specially in terms its nonpartisanship and its ever preparedness for inception and operationalization of a peacekeeping force in a troubled region are impeccable. (Intriguingly it may be noted here even Lebanon, which had opposed fresh U.N. peacekeeping presence in Beirut had strongly favoured the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL on 18 June, 1982.)

IV

In sum, whereas the Israeli invasion highlighted the limitations of a United Nations peacekeeping force, the failure of MNF made it clear how important could a UN force have been in containing a conflict situation. But the failure of MNF need not be an occasion for celebration. It should provide an opportunity to strengthen UNIFIL in particular and U.N. in general as an important Peacekeeping agency.

The Israeli invasion also clearly demonstrated that Palestine problem was central to the Middle East problem at large and the only way to find a solution to Arab-Israel conflict is to find a just

and equitable solution to the Palestine problem. Without it there cannot be peace in the region. Time is not lost, the U.N. machinery is capable, given necessary political will, of playing a useful role to that end.

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